Professional Documents
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The status quo is paranoiac even in its attempt at counter culture. Status quo
methodology confines experimentation to only processes with set goals in mind,
destroying these movements from the beginning. We must instead abandon these final
goals and embrace free thought.
Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 370-1
The codes and their signifiers , the axiomatics and their structures, the imaginary
figures that come to occupy them as well as the purely symbolic relationships that
gauge them, constitute properly aesthetic molar formations that are characterized by
goals, schools, and periods. They relate these aesthetic formations to greater social
aggregates, finding in them a field of application, and everywhere enslave art to a
great castrating machine of sovereignty. There is a pole of reactionary investment for
art as well, a somber paranoiac-Oedipal-narcissistic organization. A foul use of
painting, centering around the dirty little secret, even in abstract painting where the
axiomatic does without figures: a style of painting whose secret essence is scatological,
an oedipalizing painting, even when it has broken with the Holy Trinity as the Oedipal
image, a neurotic or neuroticizing painting that makes the process into a goal or an
arrest, an interruption, or a continuation in the void. This style of painting flourishes
today, under the usurped name of modern painting-a poisonous flower-and brought one
of Lawrence's heroes to speak much like Henry Miller of the need to have done with
pouring out one's merciful and pitiful guts, these "flows of corrugated iron.":" The
productive breaks projected onto the enormous unproductive cleavage of castration, the
flows that have become flows of "corrugated iron," the openings blocked on all sides.
And perhaps this, as we have seen, is Where we find the commodity value of art and
literature: a paranoiac form of expression that no longer even needs to "signify" its
reactionary libidinal investments, since these investments function on the contrary as its
signifier; an Oedipal form of content that no longer even needs to represent Oedipus,
since the "structure" suffices. But on the other, the schizorevolutionary, pole, the value
of art is no longer measured except in terms of the decoded and deterritorialized
flows that it causes to circulate beneath a signifier reduced to silence, beneath the
conditions of identity of the parameters, across a structure reduced to impotence; a
writing with pneumatic, electronic, or gaseous indifferent supports, and that appears
all the more difficult and intellectual to intellectuals as it is accessible to the infirm, the
illiterate, and the schizos, embracing all that flows and counterflows, the gushings of
mercy and pity knowing nothing of meanings and aims (the Artaud experiment, the
Burroughs experiment). It is here that art accedes to its authentic modernity, which
simply consists in liberating what was present in art from its beginnings, but was hidden
underneath aims and objects, even if aesthetic, and underneath recodings or
axiomatics: the pure process that fulfills itself, and that never ceases to reach fulfillment
as it proceeds-art as "experimentation.'
The paranoia spreads to every aspect of our lives and locks us into a capitalist
mindset it controls the military by creating the desire for war to deposit surplus
capital and it engineers genocide to check the human surplus. Support for
capitalism is mired in an insanity that believes capitalisms benevolent actions are
apolitical when in reality the greatest benefits of capitalism exist only as a facade to
allow the systems most cruel actions. Meanwhile, lines of flight such as the desire
to revolt against capitalism are taught to be repressed by desire itself a byproduct
of the status quos paranoiac take-control-and-fix-all mentality.
Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 372-4
In the capitalist formation of sovereignty-the full body of capital money as the
socius-the great social axiomatic has replaced the territorial codes and the
despotic overcodings that characterized the preceding formations; and a
molar, gregarious aggregate has formed, whose mode of subjugation has no equal.
We have seen on what foundations this aggregate operated: a whole field
of immanence that is reproduced on an always larger scale, that is continually
multiplying its axioms to suit its needs, that is filled with images and with images of
images, through which desire is determined to desire its own repression
(imperialism); an unprecedented decoding and deterritorialization, which
institutes a combination as a system of differential relations between the
decoded and deterritorialized flows, in such a way that social inscription and repression no
longer even need to bear directly upon bodies and persons, but on the contrary precede them (axiomatic:
regulation and application); a surplus value determined as a surplus value of flux, whose extortion is not
brought about by a simple arithmetical difference between two quantities that are homogeneous and
belong to the same code, but precisely by differential relations between heterogeneous magnitudes that
are not raised to the same power: a flow of capital and a flow of labor as human
investment of desire whose nature unconscious- libidinal-is altogether different, and is not simply
explained by the conditioned profits, but on the contrary itself explains that a small-time capitalist, with no
great profits or hopes, fully maintains the entirety of his libidinal investments: the libido investing the great
flow that is not convertible as such, not appropriated as such-"nonpossession and nonwealth," in the words
of Bernard Schmitt, who among modern economists has for us the incomparable advantage of offering a
delirious interpretation of an unequivocally delirious economic system (at least he goes all the way). In
short, a truly unconscious libido, a disinterested love: this machine is fantastic.
also
with respect to the despotic machine, which adds the relations of the
new alliance and direct filiation to the old alliance and filiations (whence
reproduction, according to one's status from the standpoint of the alliances and the filiations, but
the role of the sovereign's family in despotic overcoding, and that of the "dynasty"-whatever its mutations,
The process by no
means remains the same in the capitalist system." Representation no
longer relates to a distinct object, but to productive activity itself. The
socius as full body has become directly economic as capital-money ; it
does not tolerate any other preconditions. What is inscribed or marked is no longer
its indecisions-which are inscribed under the same category of new alliance).
the producers or nonproducers, but the forces and means of production as abstract quantities that become
effectively concrete in their becoming related or their conjunction: labor capacity or capital, constant
This familial commodification of social relations makes the family a copy of a copy
of capitalism an image of an image of an image of an image! The mother, the
father, the child all become simulacrum shells of people as value to life is
replaced with the never-ending commodity fetish.
Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 264
This placing of the family outside the social field is also its greatest
social fortune. For it is the condition under which the entire social field
can be applied to the family. Individual persons are social persons first of all, i.e.,
functions derived from the abstract quantities; they become concrete in the becomingrelated or the axiomatic of these quantities, in their conjunction. They
are nothing more nor less than configurations or images produced by
the points-signs, the breaks-flows, the pure "figures" of capitalism; the
capitalist as personified capital-i.e., as a function derived from the flow
of capital; and the worker as personified labor capacity-i.e., a function
derived from the flow of labor. In this way capitalism fills its field
of immanence with images: even destitution, despair, revoltand on the other side, the violence and the oppression of
occurs through the experimental testing of beliefs that leads to surprise and
doubt, a doubt that is then relieved by way of a hypothesis (or abductive inference) that leads to
new beliefs when successfully tested. And it is precisely this charting of the road of inquiry by way of
experimentally challenging beliefs so that they might become transformed or give way to new beliefs that bears an
important similarity to Deleuzes call to tap into the virtual . 31 As Deleuze states it, In going
from A [actual] to B [virtual] and then B to A, we do not arrive back at the point of
departure as in a bare repetition; rather, the repetition between A and B and B and A is
the progressive tour or description of the whole problematic field. 3 2 This progressive tour of
the whole problematic field is precisely the intuition of problems inseparable from the actualities (A) that are their
solutions; or, in Peirces terms, it is the instilling of doubt or surprise into the actual, a doubt
that
"What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an
experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in
upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the
removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without
organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and
connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant
modification." (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 12) This latter decalcomanic process operates as though
the map were perpetually shifting as the traveller moved from one quadrant to the next.
Some of that territory is charted--it is well mapped out in terms that the traveller
understands, and connected to familiar territory or nodes, and some is uncharted-either because it consists of unlinked nodes that exist within the rhizome much as an
undiscovered island might exist in the sea, disconnected from the lines of transfer and
communication linking other land areas; or as an unidentified planet in space, with the potential for
discovery and even exploration, but as yet just a glimmer in the sky--or because it is linked in ways that are
meaningless to the traveller in his present context or given his current state of mind. The traveller must
Our methodology is that of the rhizome our advocacy opens up countless offshooting lines of flight and deconstructs the hierarchy of tracings in favor of the
acentered, nonsignifying map
Deleuze and Guattari 80, A Thousand Plateaus, pg. 21
The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots . Unlike the
graphic arts, drawing, or photography, unlike tracings the rhizome pertains to a map that must
be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible,
modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight. It is tracings
that must be put on the map, not the opposite. In contrast to centered (even polycentric)
systems with hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished paths, the
rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and
without an organizing memory of central automaton , defined solely by a circulation of
states.
Even when capitalism and its inherent paranoia are at their strongest, our lines of flight trigger their
decline. These lines are created by art like the aff without finite goal
Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 368-70
Why this appeal to art and science, in a world where scientists and technicians
and even artists, and science and art themselves, work so closely with the
established sovereignties-if only because of the structures of financing?
Because art, as soon as it attains its own grandeur, its own genius, creates chains
of decoding and deterritorialization that serve as the foundation for desiringmachines, and make them function. Take the example of the Venetian
School in painting: at the same time that Venice develops the most
powerful commodity capitalism, bordering an Urstaat, that grants it a large
degree of autonomy, its painting apparently molds itself to a Byzantine code
where even the colors and the lines are subordinated to a signifier that
determines their hierarchy as a vertical order. But toward the middle of the
fifteenth century, when Venetian capitalism confronts the first signs of its
decline, something breaks out in this painting: what would appear to be another
world opens up, an other art, where the lines are deterritorialized, the colors are
decoded, and now only refer to the relations they entertain among
themselves, and with one another. A horizontal or transverse organization
of the canvas is born, with lines of escape or breakthrough . Christ's body is
engineered on all sides and in all fashions, pulled in all directions, playing the role of a full body without
organs, a locus of connection for all the machines of desire, a locus of sadomasochistic exercises where the
artist's joy breaks free. Even homosexual Christs. Organs become direct powers of the body without
organs, and emit flows on it that the myriad wounds, such as Saint Sebastian's arrows, come to cut and cut
again in such a way as to produce other flows. Persons and organs cease to be coded
in a transversal direction. Suddenly a painting by Lotto surges forth that could just as
easily be from the nineteenth century. And of course this decoding of the flows of
painting, these schizoid lines of escape that form desiring-machines on the
horizon, are taken up again in scraps from the old code, or else introduced
into new codes, and first of all into a properly pictorial axiomatic that chokes off the
escapes, closes the whole constellation to the transversal relations between lines and
colors, and reduces it to archaic or new territorialities (perspective, for example). So
true is it that the movement of deterritorialization can only be grasped as the reverse
side of territorialities, even the residual, artificial, or factitious ones. But at least
something arose whose force fractured the codes, undid the signifiers,
passed under the structures, set the flows in motion, and effected breaks at the limits
of desire: a breakthrough. It does not suffice to say that the nineteenth century is
already there in the middle of the fifteenth, since the same would have to be said of
the Byzantine code underneath which strange liberated flows were already
circulating. We have seen this in the case of the painter Turner, and his most
accomplished paintings that are sometimes termed "incomplete": from the
moment there is genius, there is something that belongs to no school, no
period, something that achieves a breakthrough-art as a process without
goal, but that attains completion as such .
Finally, higher academia is key to our affirmation the role of the ballot is to reject
frameworks that legislate for others and to instead endorse the intellectual
advocacy that best transforms capitalism. The specificity of our radical criticism
spills over and becomes an autonomous revolution against capitalisms norms.
Owen 1997 David Owen, professor of social sciences at Southampton University, 1997,
Maturity and Modernity: Nietszche, Weber, Foucault and the ambivalence of reason, Routledge
publishers, published July 22, 1997
In our reflections on Foucaults methodology, it was noted that, like Nietszche and Weber, he commits
himself to a
stance of value-freedom as an engaged refusal to legislate for others. Foucaults critical activity is
oriented to human autonomy yet his formal account of the idea of autonomy as the activity of selftransformation entails that the content of this activity is specific to the struggles of particular
groups and individuals. Thus, while the struggle against humanist forms of power/knowledge relations denotes the
formal archiectonic interest of genealogy as critique, the determination of the main danger which denotes the filling in
of this interest is contingent upon the dominant systems of constraint confronted by specific groups and individuals. For
example, the constitution of women as hysterical, of blacks as criminal, of homosexuals as perverted all operate
through humanist forms of power/knowledge relations, yet the specificity of the social practices and
discourses engaged in producing these identities entails that while these struggles share a
general formal interest in resisting the biopolitics of humanism, their substantive interests are
distinct. It is against this context that Foucaults stance of value-freedom can be read as embodying a
respect for alterity. The implications of this stance for intellectual practice became apparent in
Foucaults distinction between the figures of the universal and specific intellectual. Consider the
following comments: In a general way, I think that intellectuals-if this category exists, which is not certain or perhaps even
desirable- are abandoning their old prophetic function. And by that I dont mean only their claim to predict what will
happen, but also the legislative function that they so long aspired for: See what must be done, see what is good, follow me.
In the turmoil that engulfs you all, here is the pivotal point, here is where I am. The greek wise man, the jewish prophet,
the roman legislators are still models that haunt those who, today, practice the profession of speaking and writing. The
universal intellectual, on Foucaults account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as
a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for
generating norms) grounds politics in the truth; of our being (e.g. our real interests). The problematic
form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of Foucaults critique of humanist
politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is
the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can
Foucault present to us? Foucaults elaboration of the figure of the specific intellectual provides
the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and
generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak
points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesnt know exactly
where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. The
historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, leads Foucault to locate
intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and
arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does
not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism . We should be clear
on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucaults position does not entail the impossibility of acceding
to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical
limits and, consequently, we are always in the position of beginning again (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of
the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in far as it involves a
recognition that everything is dangerous, a hyper-and pessimistic activism (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very
historicity and partiality of criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and
urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by
coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ideal critique and real transformation.
Foucault suggests that the activity of critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they
are but rather of pointing out what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged,
uncontested modes of thought and practices we accept rest (PPC p. 154). This distinction is perhaps
slightly disingenuous, yet Foucaults point is unintelligible if we recognize his concern to disclose the epistemological
grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that