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tablishing the link between Plato and Aristotle and so clearly Platonic in character. On reading him one almost feels that the text is
extremely unpleasant to him. He dodges the question as to what
the different OUO'L(xL and, therefore, the parts of philosophy, are.
In the end he suggests that one of these OUO'L(xL could be imperishable but movable; that is, he draws from the unique passage in
Physics, quoted above and implying that astronomy rather than
mathematics would be the intermediate branch of theoretical
philosophy. Indeed, we can not blame, but should praise,
Alexander for his sensitiveness. Where he can eliminate mathematics as a full-fledged branch of theoretical philosophy from
Aristotle's system, he does it *.
On the other hand, it is sufficient to read St. Thomas' discussion concerning the unmoved character of mathematicals
in his commentary on Boethius De Trin. 2 (q. 5, art. 3, ad octavum)
to see how puzzled he was by the very passage in Physics, used
by Alexander to interpret the passage in Metaphysics. To extricate himself from the difficulty he follows the lead of Avicenna.
He separates astronomy from arithmetic and geometry and
makes it one of the intermediate sciences between mathematics
and physics (q. 5, art. 3, ad quintum); furthermore he asserts,
after Averroes, that the tripartition in Physics refers exclusively
to things and not at all to knowledge (ibid., ad octavum; d.
In II Phys., tecto II). This device makes it possible to designate
the objects of mathematics as either unmoved or moved and to
make the two tripartitions appear to be consistent. More will
soon be said on this topic. For the time being it is sufficient to
observe that Alexander Aphrodisias tried to preserve the Aristotelian (i.e. moderately realistic) character of Aristotle's tripartition of theoretical philosophy by giving preference to the
Physics passage, obviously because he felt that the tripartition
in Metaphysics was Platonic (excessively realistic with regard to
mathematicals). St. Thomas, as shall presently be seen, reinterpreted the tripartition in Metaphysics so as to deprive it completely of its Platonic character; he therefore did not have to
interpret it in the light of the Physics passage **.
See also the tripartition in Rabbi Gershon Ben Shlomoh d'Arles, The Gate of
Heaven (tr. and ed. by F. S. Bodenheimer), Jerusalem, 1953, p. 86 f.; but d. H. A.
Wolfson, "The Classification of Science in Medieval Jewish Philosophy", Hebrew
Union College Jubilee Volume (1925) 263-315, esp. 283 .
.. Cf. H. A. Wolfson, ibid. partie. on Avicenna, p. 299 f.; idem, "Additional Notes",
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Aristotle himself in the end denied the subsistence of mathematicals, but obviously through some kind of inertia kept the
three branches of knowledge (d. W. Jaeger, Aristoteles 2[1955J
225), whether or not he attempted to replace this tripartition by
another more consistent with his own philosophic system.
The wisdom of this conservatism may be doubted. With the
correspondence of the three spheres of philosophy to the three
spheres of being gone, there was no reason to keep mathematics
as a branch of knowledge between theology and physics. As
a result, even in Aristotle himself the tripartition is inconsistent
within itself. We are going to discuss the two passages exhibiting
this inconsistency.
The first is Met. E 1,1026all-16. Physics, says Aristotle,
deals with objects which are &:x.~p~a't"ot (on this term see below)
and in motion; mathematics with objects which are unmoved
but not subsistent (:x.(i)p~a't"!X) though mathematics considers them
as subsistent; theology (first philosophy) with objects that
subsist (:x.(i)p~a't"!X) and are unmoved. It is quite obvious that
this tripartition is false, because it is based on two principles:
ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi. Physicals and theologicals
differ from each other by their modus of existence, the former
being moved, the latter being unmoved (on the meaning of the
difference between &:x.~p~a't"ot and :x.(i)p~a't"cX see below). But mathematicals differ from physicals not by any particular modus of
existence; in fact, they have no existence of their own. They
differ from them only formaliter, to use the scholastic term,
i.e. by the way they are being considered. This way is often
described by Aristotle as the way e; &~IX~peae:(i)t;, which usually
is being translated by "abstraction". In other words, what we
have before us is not a true tripartition. It is rather a dichotomy,
with one of the members subdivided. The dichotomy is "movedunmoved" ; the member "moved" is subdivided. Physicals
are moved and are being considered as moved; mathematicals
are moved but are being considered as unmoved.
All commentators or followers of Aristotle who on one hand
Hebrew Union CoUege Annual 3 (1926) 371-375, esp. 374. On intermediate sciences
in Aristotle see e.g. W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Poste,ior Analytics (1949)
63; A. Mansion,lntroduction Ii la Physique Aristotilicienne2 (1945) 186-195.
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chronological order.
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i. e.
non subtracted
non separabilia =
separabilia,
necessarily imbedded i.e. not imin matter
bedded in
matter
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St. Thomas seemingly accepts Boethius' tripartition of speculative philosophy. But he changes its meaning considerably.
A brief indication will be sufficient as this matter has been
discussed above in detail. St. Thomas makes the tripartition
consistent by basing it entirely on cognitive differences (grades
of abstraction, i.e. physics abstracts from individual matter,
mathematics from all sensible matter, formal metaphysics
from all matter; q.5, art. 2, Resp., ad primum; art. 3, Resp.,
ad quartum; art. 4, Resp.). The price of this consistency is a
double one. First, the status of the physicals is different from
their status in Aristotle. Second, there is no place for special
metaphysics within this new tripartition. From now on the
choice was: either to keep the tripartition and interpret the
meaning of special metaphysics in such a way that it would
ultimately be reducible to general metaphysics, or to keep special
metaphysics as a branch distinct from general metaphysics
and abandon the tripartition. As all neat divisions are extremely
convenient for school and didactic purpose, the first alternative
became widely accepted *.
We still have to ask: is the dichotomy general and special
metaphysics justified from Aristotle's point of view? This
question will be answered in chapter VII.
It is interesting to see how the insight into the incorrectness
of the Aristotelian tripartition expresses itself ultimately in
Maritain. Maritain tried to interpret the tripartition of knowledge
in terms of degrees of abstraction; but if we simply take a look
at his synopsis of degrees of knowledge we see immediately that
mathematics is no longer coordinated with theology and physics
(J. Maritain, Distinguer pour unir5 [1946] 69-93, esp. 79 =
Distinguish to Unite [1959] 35-46, esp.39, left side). A follower
of Maritain like Whittaker reduces St. Thomas' trichotomy
to the dichotomy: material-immaterial (1. F. Whittaker,
"The Position of Mathematics in the Hierarchy of Speculative
* In his Boethius text St. Thomas found the theologicals described as abstracta
and inseparabilia (q. 4, art. 4, lectio 2). It is obvious that this mistake is the result
of another confusion due to the ambiguity of the term X(J)p~(ft"6v. It is very difficult
for St. Thomas to explain the term inseparabilia. He says: we cannot designate the
theologicals as separabilia, because they have never been connected - sell. with
matter. Therefore we call them inseparabilia. This is almost a lucus-a-non-lucendo
explanation (inseparabile because separatum) - but there was clearly no way out
of this jungle of mistakes and slips of the pen.
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Appendix
1. I should like to add two more examples illustrative of the
continuity of ancient and medieval (Arabic) interpretations of
Aristotle.
In his Physics commentary (p. 1,21-2,6 Diels) Simplicius says
of the third part of speCUlative philosophy that it deals with d~1J
which partly are partly are not, X(!lPLO"TcX., which part fL(Xe1JfL(x't"LX~V
X(xL m:pL ~UX~~ X(XAOUO"L. The equation (or at least the close vicinity)
of mathematicals and the soul here leads to a characterization of
the soul in terms usually reserved for mathematicals. It should be
obvious that X(!lpLO"'t"6v cannot mean the same when applied to the
soul and to mathematicals - unless the soul is thought of as a
mathematical.
The other example is taken from al-Kindi (see M. Guidi and R.
Walzer, "Studi su al-Kindi. 1. Uno studio introduttivo allo
studio di Aristotele", M emorie della R. Accademia nazionale dei
Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, Ser. VI, vol.
VI [1937-40J, fasc. V, Rome 1940). After having relegated
mathematics to a purely propedeutical status (317 f.) he
divides speculative philosophy into logic, physics, psychology,
metaphysics (378). Logic is, of course, added merely in its
quality of an organon. Thus, to the Aristotelian tripartition
corresponds the series physics - psychology - metaphysics. In
other words, mathematics as an intermediate science has been
replaced by psychology, which only reminds us in a strangely
oblique way that the two must sometimes have been identified.
However, al-Kindi shuns the term 'intermediate', because by
the inclusion of logic his theoretical philosophy has four instead
of three parts. On the other hand al-Kindi says that Aristotle in
De anima deals with objects which can exist without a body - a
clear adaptation of the idea expressed by Simplicius (405-6).
2. As Aristotle in one passage of the Metaphysics replaced
mathematics by astronomy (see above p. 60) and as on the other
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Scholz distinguishes clearly between the individual and the universal on one hand, the concrete and the abstract on the other).
This can best be seen from the passage in De caelo III 1, 299a15
(see above p. 67). Otherwise it would completely be inexplicable
why Aristotle would as example of the results of a.cpOtLpeO"Lt; always
quote mathematicals and never such obvious universals as 'man',
'animal', etc. I know says Scholz, not one passage in Aristotle,
where such an example could be found, unless we strain the text.
Thus, Aristotle should not be considered the precursor of the
classic theory of abstraction. His a.cpOtLpeO"Lt; is meant to yield
objects; it is not meant to yield concepts.
Now, it seems to me that the way Scholz presents the problem
lends itself better to an evaluation than to an interpretation of
what Aristotle actually said. It presupposes a degree of reflection
which is simply absent from Aristotle's writings. If we take a
passage like that in De anima III 8, 432a2 we read that also -ra: E~
a.cpOtLpeO"ew;; Aey6(J.evOt have no subsistence outside of the OttO"f.l1j-roc,
just as the other V01j-roc have none. And we read in this context:
7tpiiy(J.Ot ou{)ev EO"'rL 7tOtpa: -ra: (J.eyef.l1j -ra: Ott0"81j-ra: Xe)(WpLO"(J.evov. It
is not easy to interpret the v01j-roc (and -ra: E~ a.cpOtLpeO"eWt;) as designating individuals rather than universal concepts.
In spite of these reservations it seems however that in the main
Scholz is right *. It seems that it would be in vain to look in
Aristotle for the 'classical' theory of abstraction (i.e. the abstracting from differences, while concentrating on similarities, of a
number of things, the result being a universal concept **). This is
particularly true of the passages which deal either with the
concept of occpOt(pemt; or that of )(wpLO"-r6v. On the contrary, in most
places Aristotle uses the concept of a.q>OtLpeo"Lt; in such a way that it
indeed implies what Scholz correctly characterizes as ascent, not
from an individual to a universal concept but rather from an
individual (object, not a concept) of a certain type of being to
another individual (not a universal concept) representing a
superior type of being.
But let it be repeated: we must disagree with Scholz to the
Pace 1. J. M. Van den Berg, "L'abstraction et ses degres chez Aristote", Proceedings 0/ the XIth International Congress of PhiloSOPhy (1953), v. XI 109-113. Berg
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