Saguid To Reyes

G.R. No.
159467 December 9, 2005

SPOUSES
NORA
SAGUID
and
vs.
SECURITY FINANCE, INC., Respondent.
ROLANDO
P.
SAGUID, Petitioners,
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
delivered to it; or (2) in the event that manual delivery thereof cannot be effected, order the
petitioners to pay the amount of P756,634.64 exclusive of accruing interest and penalty charges
thereon at the rate of five percent (5%) per month until fully paid. In either case, to order
petitioners to pay respondent the amount of P189,158.66 as and for attorneys fees, replevin
bond premium and other expenses incurred in the seizure of the motor vehicle, and costs of suit.
On 03 August 1998, the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge, Branch 135, RTC, Makati City,
issued an Order directing the branch sheriff to seize the aforementioned vehicle upon filing of a
bond in the amount ofP1,513,270.00 which is double the value of the property to be seized, and
to take it into his custody upon further orders from the court.8
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure are the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129 dated 31 January
2003 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil
Case No. 98-1803, dated 07 July 2000, ordering respondent Security Finance, Inc. to pay
petitioner Spouses Nora and Rolando Saguid the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle as
well as damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit, and its Resolution 2 dated 10 June 2003
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Upon being informed by respondent in a Motion for Clarification 9 that the reasonable estimated
value of the vehicle involved is P150,000.00, the RTC lowered the Replevin Bond to be filed
to P300,000.0010 which respondent filed on 12 August 1998.
On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with
Alternative Prayer for Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners and one John Doe in
whose possession and custody the mortgaged property may be found. 3 It alleged that
petitioners, for value, jointly and severally executed in its favor a Promissory Note 4 in the amount
of P508,248.00, payable in monthly installments per schedule indicated therein. To secure
payment of the Promissory Note, petitioners executed a Chattel Mortgage 5 over a motor vehicle
particularly described as follows:
On 13 October 1998, after service upon petitioners of the copy of the summons with the
complaint and annexes, affidavit, writ of seizure and bond, the vehicle subject of this case was
repossessed by the sheriff upon issuance of the corresponding receipt. On 20 October 1998, the
vehicle was delivered to respondent.12
MAKE : TOYOTA COROLLA XL

MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying with the terms and conditions of the
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage by failing to pay several monthly installments on the
Promissory Note. As provided for in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage, the failure of the
petitioners to pay any installment when due shall make the entire balance of the obligation
immediately due and payable. The total obligation of petitioners amounted toP756,634.64 as of
15 May 1998.6
Despite demand7 for payment or the surrender, if in good order and condition, of the mortgaged
motor vehicle, petitioners failed and refused to comply with the demand. Thus, respondent was
constrained to file the instant case praying that (1) a Writ of Replevin be issued ordering the
seizure of the afore-described vehicle, complete with all its accessories, and that same be
On 12 October 1998, the RTC issued a Writ of Seizure ordering the Branch Sheriff to seize the
vehicle, to keep it in his possession for five (5) days, and then to deliver it to respondent. 11
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, 13 petitioners specifically denied the allegations in
the Complaint. They maintained they, whether individually or as spouses, did not and never
executed a Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage in favor of respondent. They claimed they
bought the car subject of the case in cash as evidenced by the Vehicle Sales Invoice 14 of Toyota
Balintawak, Inc. dated 15 March 1996. Petitioner Nora Saguid alleged that she could not have
physically executed the Promissory Note on 23 April 1996 as she was in Australia when the
same was supposedly executed. On the part of petitioner Rolando Saguid, he admitted that he
signed the promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the request of one
Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor vehicle to
be converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent. As compulsory counterclaim, they ask that
respondent be ordered to pay moral, exemplary and actual damages, as well as attorneys fees
and costs of suit.
After pre-trial, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing the following stipulation of facts:
1. The personal and corporate personalities of the parties;
2. That the promissory note dated April 23, 1996 in the amount of P508,248.00 in favor of
plaintiff was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; and
3. That the chattel mortgage was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; . . . 15
EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES
Trial ensued. The respective evidence of the parties are substantially summarized in the
decision of the RTC.
Evidence of the Petitioners:
The plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: 1] Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., 43 years of age,
married, Assistant Vice-President for Marketing of the plaintiff, and a resident of No. 140 J.
Molina Street, Marikina City; and 2] Antonio B. Placido, 37 years of age, married, an employee
of the plaintiff, and a resident of 263 Santo Cristo Street, Angat, Bulacan.
It can be culled from plaintiffs evidence that an application [Exhibit A] for a loan to finance the
purchases [of] a new car was filed with the plaintiff. The application was not signed by any of the
defendants. The signature appearing on the application [Exhibit A] belongs to one David Garcia,
a Marketing Assistant of the plaintiff. The application was evaluated and investigated and was
approved. The Promissory Note No. 96-01447 dated April 23, 1996 [Exhibit B] and the Chattel
Mortgage Contract dated September 3, 1996 [Exhibit D] were signed. Submitted to the plaintiff
were postdated checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. When deposited these checks were dishonored
for the reason that the account was already closed. The dishonored checks were replaced with
P27,137.67 cash for which O.R. No. 12467 dated June 27, 1996 [Exhibit F]. After the payment
made on June 27, 1996, the checks that subsequently bounced were not replaced. The case
was referred to counsel for collection. A demand letter was delivered by witness Placido to the
residence of the defendants. There being no response from the defendants this case was filed
against them. Placido conducted a surveillance of the place where the vehicle could possibly be
found. He accompanied the sheriff in implementing the writ of seizure. After seizure of the
vehicle it was stowed at the warehouse of plaintiff in Las Pinas.
On cross-examination of Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Assistant Vice-President for Marketing of
the plaintiff, it was established that the mortgage of subject motor vehicle was not registered with
the LTO because the dealer did not submit to plaintiff the certificate of registration. In
transactions of this nature, loan applicants are required to submit the original certificate of
registration and the official receipt. The dealer, Toyota Balintawak, did not send to the plaintiff
these documents.16
Evidence of the Respondent:
Defendants testified for and in their behalf. Zenaida Marquinez Maralit, 33 years of age, single, a
resident of Orlon Street, Litex Village, San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal, and the Credit and Collection
Head of Toyota Balintawak testified for the defendants. Defendant Rolando bought in cash the
subject motor vehicle from Toyota Balintawak. He was issued Vehicle Delivery Invoice No. 7104
[Exhibit1] and Vehicle Delivery Note No. 7104 [Exhibit 2]. The same vehicle was registered
[Exhibit 3]. He identified his signatures in the promissory note [Exhibit B] and in the chattel
mortgage [Exhibit D]. He was asked by one Sonny Quijano to sign these documents in blank on
the representation of the latter that he will help him secure additional capital to enable him to
purchase another taxi.
there was only one available unit at Toyota Quezon Avenue. Quijano approached Rolando
informing him that there are units colored white available at Toyota Balintawak and that he will
help him secure one. Rolando was able to secure one. In the month of May, Quijano went to the
house of defendants and asked Rolando if he is still interested in getting additional capital to
purchase a taxi. Rolando was asked to sign documents in blank. The name of the plaintiff does
not appear in these documents. When Rolando asked Quijano why the documents are in blank,
Quijano told him just to sign and that he will take care of everything. Nora did not sign the
documents because at that time she was in Australia. Rolando do (sic) not know what happened
to the documents he signed. He read from the papers that Quijano was shot. He denied the
issuance of the checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. Defendants received a letter [Exhibit 8] dated
February 21, 1997 from De Castro Law Office. Rolando went to this Law Office and presented
his documents evidencing payment of the subject motor vehicle. He was told by Atty. De Castro
that everything is okay and that he will take care of everything.
On October 28, 1998 at about 7:00 in the morning two [2] units of taxi including subject motor
vehicle were seized by the sheriff assisted by three [3] SWAT members. The boundary of the
subject motor vehicle, which is a taxi, is P750.00 for every 24 hours. From October 28, 1998 to
October 1999 defendants lost P180,000 in income. Defendants retained the services of counsel
for P100,000 plus P1,500 per appearance. With this incident on October 28, 1998, Rolando was
embarrassed in front of his neighbors. For his sufferings Rolando is praying for P1 Million in
damages plus P3 Million in exemplary damages.
Witness Maralit corroborated that testimony of Rolando that the subject motor vehicle was
purchased in cash and not through financing. Had subject vehicle been purchased through
financing the original Certificate of Registration and Certificate of Registration would have been
transmitted to the financing company marked by the LTO "encumbered". This did not happen in
this case. Security Finance, the plaintiff in this case was not accredited by Toyota Balintawak not
even in one transaction. The appearance in both Exhibits 1 and 2 of "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid"
as purchaser of the subject motor vehicle was satisfactorily explained by witness Maralit. The
subject motor vehicle was initially reserved by SPQ Center but later on it waived its right in favor
of Nora. It is for this reason that "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" appears as the purchaser of the
vehicle.17
In its decision18 dated 07 July 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff SECURITY FINANCE,
INCORPORATED to pay defendant-spouses ROLANDO and NORA SAGUID:
1. The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle computed from the date of
its seizure on October 28, 1998 up to its return to the defendants, at the rate of P750.00 daily;
2. The amount of P500,000 for moral damages;
3. The amount of P1,000,000 for exemplary damages;
Rolando met for the first time Sonny Quijano sometime in January 1996 at Toyota Quezon
Avenue. Rolando was then planning to purchase two units of taxi colored white. But at that time
4. The amount P200,000 for and as attorneys fees; and
5. The Costs.
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory note and the deed of mortgage were
not valid contracts and were not binding on petitioners. It explained that respondent failed to
show with convincing evidence that it loaned to petitioners the money used in the purchase of
the subject motor vehicle. On the contrary, it found that there was preponderance of evidence
showing that the motor vehicle was purchased in cash by petitioners from Toyota Balintawak,
Inc.
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.19
3) To pay the costs of suit.23
On 31 January 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of respondent. It disposed of the case as
follows:
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.20
The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that there was no valid contract entered
into between the parties on the ground there was no cause or consideration when they executed
the same, and that respondent failed to show with convincing evidence that it loaned the money
to petitioners which was used to purchase the subject motor vehicle, to be bereft of factual and
legal basis. It relied heavily on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid during pre-trial and
during his direct-examination that he signed the promissory note dated 23 April 1996 and the
chattel mortgage dated 03 September 1996. It did not give weight to petitioners bare denial that
they never transacted with respondent for the subject loan and that they never executed the
promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage because it belied the admission made by
petitioner Rolando Saguid.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 dated 24 February 2003 while respondent filed a
Motion for Clarificatory Judgment22 dated 17 February 2003.
In a resolution dated 10 June 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration
and granted the Motion for Clarificatory Judgment. It amended the dispostive portion of its 31
January 2003 decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant
ordering the defendants-appellees:
1) To deliver to the plaintiff-appellant the motor vehicle described as follows:
2) In the event the manual delivery of the above-described motor vehicle is not feasible, to pay
the plaintiff appellant the amount of P508,248.00 plus interest and penalty charges at the legal
rate per annum until fully paid, in line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Medel vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 481; and
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ENTERED INTO A TRANSACTION WITH RESPONDENT
CONCERNING THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE BASED ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND
CHATTEL MORTGAGE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER ROLANDO SAGUIDS
ADMISSION OF HAVING SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS WAS MERELY IN PREPARATION FOR
A LOAN APPLICATION PRESENTED TO HIM BY THE LATE SONNY QUIJANO, A CAR SALES
AGENT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE DEED OF MORTGAGE ARE NOT
VALID AND NOT BINDING ON THE PETITIONERS CONSIDERING PETITIONER ROLANDO
SAGUIDS EXPLANATION REGARDING HIS ADMISSION AND THE SOLID AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WIFE WAS NOT IN THE PHILIPPINES AT THE
TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS BUT WAS IN AUSTRALIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT AND ORDERED PETITIONER TO DELIVER THE SUBJECT
MOTOR VEHICLE TO RESPONDENT AND TO PAY RESPONDENT THE AMOUNT OF
P508,248.00 PLUS INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES IN CASE MANUAL DELIVERY OF
THE VEHICLE WAS NOT FEASIBLE, OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT
MOTOR VEHICLE WAS ALREADY FORCIBLY CONFISCATED AND SEIZED BY THE
SHERIFF BY VIRTUE OF THE WRIT OF SEIZURE ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND DULY
ACKNOWLEDGED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE SHERIFF FROM THE PETITIONERS.
MAKE : Toyota Corolla XL

MODEL : 1996
Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is a valid Contract of Loan between it
and petitioners, and that the proceeds of the loan were used to buy the vehicle involved in this
case. In support thereof, it offered, among other things, a Promissory Note 24 dated 23 April 1996
and Chattel Mortgage25 dated 03 September 1996 over the subject vehicle which served as
security for the payment of the amount indicated in the former. On the other hand, petitioners
contend that they neither entered into any contract with respondent nor did they receive any
money from it that was used to buy the subject car. Though petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted
that the signatures in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage are his, he clarified that when
he signed said documents upon the prodding of Sonny Quijano, he signed them in blank.
Petitioner Nora Saguid, on her part, denied signing said documents. She claimed that the
signatures purporting to be hers are forgeries since she was in Australia when said documents
were executed.
Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they entered into a
transaction with respondent based on the promissory note and chattel mortgage despite
petitioner Rolando Saguids explanation of the circumstances surrounding his signing thereof,
and in not holding that these documents are not valid and binding on them.
To ascertain whether or not petitioners are bound by the promissory note and chattel mortgage,
it must be established that all the elements of a contract of loan are present. Like any other
contract, a contract of loan is governed by the rules as to the requisites and validity of contracts
in general. It is basic and elementary in this jurisdiction that what determines the validity of a
contract, in general, is the presence of the elements constituting the same, namely: (1) consent
of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3)
cause of the obligation which is established. 26 In this case, petitioners insist the third element is
lacking since they never transacted with respondent for the proceeds of the loan which were
used in purchasing the subject motor vehicle.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with respondent and are bound by the
promissory note and chattel mortgage they signed. It anchored its ruling on the admission of
petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed said documents. Citing Section 4, Rule 129 27 of the
Rules of Court, it reasoned out that petitioner Rolando Saguids bare denial cannot qualify the
admission he made during pre-trial and during trial that they transacted with respondent and
executed the aforesaid documents. It brushed aside the explanation made by petitioner Rolando
Saguid that he signed the same in blank and only as preparation for a loan application
presented to him by Sonny Quijano.
From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted was only his signatures
in the aforementioned documents and not the contents thereof. In petitioners Answer, Rolando
Saguid admitted signing the promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the
request of Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor
vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent. During trial, Rolando Saguid
explained the circumstances under which he signed the documents with emphasis that he
signed them in blank.
We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it closed its eyes to the clarification
made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on the ground that same belied his admission. The rule that
an admission cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made will not apply under the circumstances obtaining in
this case. It does not follow that the admission of the signatures carries with it the admission of
the contents of the documents especially when the person who affixed his signatures thereon
questions its execution and the veracity of the details embodied therein. Petitioners could have
been bound by the terms and conditions of the promissory note and chattel mortgage if
petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted not only his signatures but also as to what are contained
therein. This is not to be in the case before us. Petitioners can therefore adduce evidence that
would nullify or invalidate both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage. In other words,
they can show that the elements of the contract of loan are wanting.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position to entangle itself in resolving the
matter as regards the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on his admission
because whatever the documents he signed in favor of Mr. Quijano is not the concern of the
court as the same is not one of the issues presented before it, and that Mr. Quijano is not a party
in the case. Petitioners claim that if only the Court of Appeals ruled on the matter, it could have
ruled in their favor and sustained the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being the primal defense of petitioners. It
should not have wholly disregarded the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid
considering that said defense can easily be supported by other competent evidence. Instead of
relying heavily on the admitted signatures, it should have evaluated other evidence that could
have either bolstered or disproved the defense of petitioners.
This did not happen in this case. The Court of Appeals conveniently did not mention in its
decision the testimony of Zenaida M. Maralit, an employee of Toyota Balintawak, Inc., who
testified as to the circumstances on how the subject car was bought, and the documentary
evidence that originated from Toyota Balintawak, Inc. We consider her to be an impartial witness
whose testimony is vital in the proper resolution of this case.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ruling of the trial court that
the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are not valid contracts and are not binding
on them on the ground that the contracts did not contain the essential element of cause. The
Court of Appeals said the trial court did not clearly declare in categorical terms the absence of
cause in the aforesaid contracts and that petitioners failed to disprove that they are debtors of
respondent since it is presumed that the cause exists in the contract.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration 28 exists and is lawful
unless the debtor proves the contrary.29 Moreover, under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, it is presumed that there is a sufficient consideration for a contract. The presumption that
a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no
consideration.30 To overcome the presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration
must be shown by preponderance of evidence.31
In proving that there is no consideration for the aforementioned documents, petitioners proffered
in evidence the following documents that showed that they bought the subject vehicle in cash
and not in installment basis: (a) Vehicle Sales Invoice No. 7104; 32 (b) Vehicle Delivery Note;33 (c)
Official Receipts No. 20864634 and No. 208648;35 (d) Certificate of Registration No.
32862328;36 and (e) Official Receipt No. 40459605.37 In addition, Ms. Zenaida Maralit of Toyota
Balintawak, Inc. confirmed that the subject car was indeed paid in cash and not through
financing for the reasons that the originals of the Certificate of Registration and the Official
Receipt of the subject vehicle have not been marked as encumbered by the Land Transportation
Office and are in the possession of the buyer. She added that respondent is not accredited in
Toyota Balintawak, Inc. She testified:
A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked encumbered.
Q: Madam Witness, do you know if this vehicle was purchased in cash or through financing?
A: On the face.
A: It was purchased in cash.
Q: Do you have any policy as far as your company is concerned with regards to the purchase of
vehicle through financing?
Q: On the face?
Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in cash?

A: We have only the accredited financing companies.
A: There was an invoice cash return.
Q: Is the plaintiff herein, Security Finance, accredited in your company?
Q: By the way, being the head of the Credit and Collection, what are your duties and functions?
A: No, not even in one transaction.
A: We are in-charge of collection, we are in-charge of the documentation with LTO, insurance
and financing documents.
Q: What would be the significance if the original copy of the Certificate of Registration and the
corresponding Official Receipt is in the possession of the buyer?
Q: As far as the purchase of vehicle through financing, what is your specific duty?
A: That means it was on cash transaction.38
A: We are the one who asked the client to sign the documents.
Q: Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the procedure in case the vehicle is purchased from
your office through financing?
A: After the client signed the documents, we get all the requirements based on the credit advice
issued by the financing company. So together with the documents and all the requirements, valid
ID, post dated checks, we are the one transmitting them to the financing company and after
processing, the financing company gave us the proceed two to four days after the release of the
vehicle.
Q: As far as the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt are concerned, what did you do
with them if the vehicle was purchased through financing?
A: If it was through financing, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration goes to
the financing company. We are the one transmitting them. Only the xerox copies of the Official
Receipt and Certificate of Registration go to the client through financing transaction.
Q: As far as the security of the financing company, when it comes to purchase of vehicle through
financing, what do you do with the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration?
A: The LTO marked there encumbered. It means it was mortgaged to that particular financing
company.
Q: Where it was marked?
On the other hand, respondent, through Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Vice-President for
Marketing, said that it paid the dealer in checks and that they have proof of payment. He
testified:
Q: Mr. witness, you said you paid the dealer. In what form did you pay the dealer?
A: In checks, sir.
Q: Do you have any proof of your payment?
A: Yes, sir. 39
It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and not through financing via respondent.
We find the evidence presented by respondent to be unreliable and erratic. The testimony of
Rosauro Maghirang, Jr. that respondent paid Toyota Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated
by competent evidence. If respondent truly paid the dealer how come it never presented the
checks it used to pay Toyota Balintawak, Inc.? Even assumingarguendo that respondent
released the loan proceeds to petitioners, the same would be inconsistent with its allegation that
it was the one that paid the dealer. Furthermore, another telltale sign that strengthens the claim
of petitioners that they did not transact with respondent for a loan was the fact that the alleged
loan/credit application40 was not signed by any or both of them.
Respondents contention that petitioners did not deny drawing postdated checks in its favor is
untenable. Petitioner Rolando Saguid categorically denied issuing the check and claimed that
the signatures appearing thereon were not his.41
As to the alleged signature of petitioner Nora Saguid in the promissory note, evidence points
that she could not have signed the document she being in Australia when she allegedly
executed said document on 23 April 1996 as established by a certification 42 from the Bureau of
Immigration that she left for Sydney, Australia, on 30 September 1995 and returned to the
country on 15 June 1996.
From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that petitioners allegation of absence of
consideration has been substantiated and the presumption of consideration disproved and
overcome. We are of the mind that petitioners bought the car with their own money. There being
no cause or consideration in the contract of loan allegedly entered into by the parties, the
promissory note is not binding on the petitioners.
As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage is a mere accessory contract and
its validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it. 43 The chattel mortgage
constituted over the subject vehicle is an accessory contract to the loan obligation as embodied
in the promissory note. It cannot exist as an independent contract since its consideration is the
same as that of the principal contract. A principal obligation is an indispensable condition for the
existence of an accessory contract.44 Since it has been sufficiently established that there was no
cause or consideration for the promissory note, it follows that the chattel mortgage has no leg to
stand on. Hence, it must be extinguished and cannot have any legal effect on petitioners.
Petitioners are entitled to moral damages having suffered undue embarrassment when the
subject vehicle was seized from their home. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination
of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar facts. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive. 50 We
find the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive. In our view, the
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.51 When moral
damages are awarded, exemplary damages may also be granted. 52 We, however, find
the P1,000,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive and should accordingly be
reduced to P50,000.00.
Moreover, attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur
expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party. 53 Petitioners
are entitled thereto because they were compelled to litigate in order to protect their interest.
Moreover, there being an award for exemplary damages, 54it follows that there should be an
award thereof. An award of P20,000.00 will be sufficient as the award ofP200,000.00 by the RTC
is too much.
Having ruled that both promissory note and chattel mortgage are not binding on petitioners, the
return of the subject vehicle to petitioners is in order. In case the vehicle can no longer be
delivered in the condition when it was seized, respondent shall pay petitioners the amount
of P150,000.0045 plus interest of 6% per annum to be computed from 13 October 1998, 46 the
date when said vehicle was seized, until finality of judgment after which interest rate shall
become 12% per annum until actual payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68129 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Security Finance, Inc. is ordered to deliver
the possession of the subject vehicle to petitioners, or, in the alternative if such delivery can no
longer be made, to pay petitioners the amount of P150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per annum to
be computed from 13 October 1998 until finality of judgment after which interest rate shall
become 12% per annum until actual payment. Respondent is also ordered to pay
petitioners P50,000.00 as moral
We now go to the award of damages.
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P20,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.
It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must be proved and proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A party is entitled only up to such compensation for the
pecuniary loss that he has duly proven. 47 It cannot be presumed.48 Absent proof of the amount of
actual damages sustained, the Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as
to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been
suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.49
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
In the instant case, the trial court awarded as actual damages the amount of P750.00 per day as
daily earnings of the seized vehicle from 28 October 1998 until its return. Same should be
deleted for lack of competent proof. The bare assertion of petitioner Rolando Saguid that the
subject vehicle was earning P750.00 a day before it was seized is inadequate, if not speculative,
and should not be accepted because it is not supported by independent evidence. Petitioners
should have at least presented a record or journal that would clearly show how much the vehicle
earned in a specific period. This, petitioners failed to do. Instead, they relied on mere allegations
that do not prove anything.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62789 which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Tarlac City dated July 31, 1998 in Civil Case
No. 7384.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1991, Edgar H. Canlas (Edgar) filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage against Milagros Simon (Milagros) and her husband, Liborio Balatico
(petitioners). In the complaint, Edgar alleges that: on September 10, 1987, Milagros
obtained a loan from him in the amount of P220,000.00 secured by a real estate
mortgage2 over her paraphernal property, a 748-square meter parcel of land located at San
Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139884; the loan
was payable within a period of three years or until September 18, 1990; Milagros defaulted
in the payment of the loan and repeated demands for payment went unheeded, prompting
the filing of a case in court.3
On March 25, 1991, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that Milagros
never transacted any business with Edgar and she did not receive the consideration of the
alleged mortgage.4
On March 26, 1991, Edgar filed his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, reiterating validity
and due execution of the real estate mortgage.5
On November 12, 1991, with leave of court, 6 petitioners filed a Third-Party Complaint
against Virginia Canlas (Virginia) and Aurelia Delos Reyes (Aurelia), claiming that they
duped Milagros to part with her title and sign the mortgage documents without giving her
the consideration and refusing to return her title when demanded.7
On November 18, 1991, Virginia and Aurelia filed their Answer with Counterclaim to ThirdParty Complaint, alleging that the complaint states no cause of action against them since
they are not privies to the real estate mortgage and Aurelia is only a witness to the
mortgage document.8
G.R. NO. 148273
On November 28, 1991, petitioners filed their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,
reiterating their claims in the third-party complaint. 9
April 19, 2006
MILAGROS
SIMON
vs.
GUIA W. CANLAS, Respondent.
and
LIBORIO
BALATICO, Petitioners,
Edgar died during the pendency of the case. On December 4, 1991, upon proper
motion,10 the RTC ordered that Edgar be substituted by his wife, Guia W. Canlas
(respondent), as plaintiff.11
On August 12, 1996, the RTC issued a pre-trial order stating that the parties failed to arrive
at a settlement. However, they agreed to stipulate on the following: "[t]hat the defendant
executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the plaintiff involving a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 139884 located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac."12
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with respondent presenting her witnesses, namely:
Nelson Nulud, the records custodian of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac; Aurelia, the thirdparty defendant and one of the instrumental witnesses to the real estate mortgage; and
respondent herself. When petitioners turn came, they presented Crisostomo Astrero, the
other instrumental witness to the real estate mortgage. 1avvphil.net
On April 15, 1998, petitioners counsel, Atty. Norberto De Jesus, filed an Ex-Parte Urgent
Motion for Postponement since he is busy campaigning as a candidate in the coming
elections.13 There being no objection from respondent, the RTC reset the hearing to May
28, 1998.14
On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to appear in court. The RTC reset
the hearing on June 17, 1998 with a warning that if the petitioners will still fail to appear on
said date, they will be considered to have waived their right to present further evidence. 15
On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court but petitioners were present.
Milagros informed the RTC that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel.
In view thereof, the RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of another counsel and
the hearing was reset to June 24, 1998 with a warning that should petitioners still fail to
present evidence at said hearing, they will be considered to have waived their right to
present further evidence.16 On June 23, 1998, Atty. De Jesus filed his Withdrawal of
Appearance as Counsel for the Defendants with the conformity of Milagros. 17
On June 24, 1998, Milagros informed the RTC that they have retained Atty. Alejo Y.
Sedico18 as new counsel. The hearing was again reset to July 2, 1998 with the final
warning that should petitioners witnesses fail to appear at the said hearing, they would be
considered to have waived their right to present further evidence. 19
On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to Reset, praying that the hearing scheduled on July 2, 1998 be reset to August 12,
1998 due to conflict of schedule and his trial calendar for July is fully occupied, as well as
to give him more time to study the case since he had just been retained. 20
On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice, the resetting of the hearing for
presentation of petitioners evidence for the last time on July 15, 1998. The RTC directed
petitioners to secure the services of a counsel of their choice to represent them in the said
hearing considering that it postponed motu propio the hearing in the interest of justice over
the vigorous objection of the respondent due to failure of petitioners counsel to appear for
three successive times. It warned petitioners that in case they would be unable to present
evidence in the next scheduled hearing, they would be deemed to have waived their right
to present further evidence.21
On July 9, 1998, Atty. Sedico filed an Urgent Motion to Reset the scheduled hearing on
July 15, 1998 due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date of Criminal Case
Nos. 6463 to 6510 for Estafa entitled "People of the Philippines v. Eddie Sentero" before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela. He reiterated that his trial calendar for
the whole month of July is fully occupied and requested the hearing be reset to August 10
or 19, 1998.22
At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was apprised of the Urgent Motion to
Reset filed by petitioners counsel. In view of the vigorous objection of respondents
counsel on the ground that the case has been postponed several times at petitioners
instance, the RTC denied the motion to reset and petitioners were deemed to have waived
their right to present evidence. The case was then considered submitted for decision. 23
Sixteen days later, on July 31, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having substantiated her claim by a preponderance of
evidence, this Court hereby renders judgment in her favor, ordering the defendants to pay
the plaintiff within a period of ninety (90) days from the entry of judgment hereof, the
following sums of:
(1) P220,000.00, representing the principal obligation plus interest thereof of 12%
per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
(2) P30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(3) The costs of suit.
It is further adjudged that in the event defendants default in the payment of the above
determined amounts, Lot No. 2763, with an area of 748 square meters situated in San
Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13984 Tarlac
Registry, particularly identified and described in the Real Estate Mortgage contract (Exhibit
"A"), shall be sold at public auction to satisfy this judgment.
SO ORDERED.24
The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of Edgar and
she received the consideration for the mortgage in the amount of P220,000.00; that
petitioners inaction for three years before the filing of the complaint against them to protest
the alleged non-receipt of the consideration for the mortgage casts serious doubts on their
claim; and that the deed of real estate mortgage was duly notarized and assumed the
character of a public instrument.
EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE WAS ADMITTED WHILE

WHAT WAS ADMITTED ONLY IS ITS EXECUTION;
On September 2, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that they
were denied due process when the RTC decided the case without petitioners
evidence.25 On October 16, 1998, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, holding
that petitioners were given ample opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for trial and
adduce evidence, which they took for granted and they should bear the fault. 26
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SUBJECT
REAL PROPERTY IS PARAPHERNAL EVEN AS EXISTING LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE HAD CONSIDERED IT CONJUGAL OR ABSOLUTE
COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY;
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May 23, 2001, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.27The CA ruled that petitioners were not denied due process since
they were duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and present evidence to
substantiate their defense but they forfeited their right for not appearing in court together
with their counsel at the scheduled hearings; that since Milagros admitted the existence,
due execution, authenticity and validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage during the
Pre-Trial Conference on June 7, 1995, absence of consideration is no longer an issue;
that, in any case, the amount of P220,000.00 was actually received by Milagros per the
testimony of Aurelia; that petitioners slept on their rights, if they had any, since they never
lifted a finger to protect and preserve their alleged rights and interests; and that the
mortgaged property is not conjugal property but the exclusive property of Milagros which
she could validly dispose of or encumber without her husbands consent.
The CA merely noted that the RTC failed to dispose of petitioners third-party complaint
and without any further discussion, dismissed the third-party complaint in the dispositive
portion of its decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto as to the main
case. The third-party complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.28
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following Assignment
of Errors:
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE
QUESTIONED REAL ESTATE MORTAGE EVEN AS THERE WAS LACK OF
CONSIDERATION AND THAT THE SAME WAS EXECUTED THROUGH
FRAUDULENTLY [sic] SCHEME;
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DUE

OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT DESPITE OF [sic]
HAVING DENIED PETITIONER TO BE REPRESENT [sic] BY A COUNSEL OF
CHOICE DUE PROCESS IS SATISFIED.29
Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was fraudulently executed and there was
lack of consideration but material facts relating thereto were not fully ventilated because
the RTC denied petitioners motion to reset the hearing. They maintain that they never
admitted the due execution of the real estate mortgage, but only its execution or existence.
They further insist that the mortgaged property is conjugal, not paraphernal, and therefore,
Milagros could not dispose of or encumber without her husbands consent; and the CA
disregarded Article 9930 of the Family Code which provides that all the property owned by
the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter forms part
of the community property. Lastly, they submit that while they were given the opportunity to
secure the services of a new counsel to defend them, the RTCs apathy to the plight of
petitioners counsel on the latters conflict of schedule amounted to stripping such right to
counsel and denial of due process.
For her part, respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for
impleading the CA as respondent, despite the clear directive of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure against it. She further points out that the petition lacks verification, a certification
against forum shopping, a copy of the assailed CA decision, and it fails to raise any
specific question of law but only presents and discusses an "assignment of errors."
In any event, even if these procedural defects are disregarded, respondent argues that
petitioners were not denied due process when the RTC denied their motion for
postponement since they were duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present their evidence to substantiate their defense but they forfeited this right for not
appearing in court together with their counsel at the scheduled hearings. They also aver
that the real estate mortgage is valid and duly executed and the mortgaged property is the
paraphernal property of Milagros such that she can validly dispose of or encumber it
without her husbands consent.
Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court agrees that the correct
procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is not
to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed decision. 31 However, impleading
the lower court as respondent in the petition for review on certiorari does not automatically
mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of the
petition.32Besides, formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has
encountered previous petitions for review on certiorari that erroneously impleaded the CA.
In those cases, the Court merely called the petitioners attention to the defects and
proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.33
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in this case.
While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being
defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather
than on technicality as the latter approach may result in injustice. 34 This is in accordance
with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 35 which encourages a reading
of the procedural requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice. 36
As to respondents claim that the petition lacks verification, a certification against forum
shopping and a copy of the assailed CA decision, the Court has carefully examined the
rollo of the case and found them to be attached to the petition. 37
Anent respondents submission that the petition failed to raise a question of law, the Court
disagrees. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 38 Petitioners
contention that they were denied substantive due process is a pure question of law.39
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on the consideration that more
than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice
and fairness should be served thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part
and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice." 40 When no substantial rights
are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest with the corresponding motion to
transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the
same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. 41 Thus, in considering
motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the
postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. 42 Unless grave abuse of
discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or
appeal.43
In the present case, there are circumstances that justify postponement of the July 15, 1998
hearing. Atty. Sedico had only been formally retained as petitioners new counsel as of July
1, 1998, or merely two weeks before July 15, 1998. Atty. Sedico also had a previously
intransferable hearing in a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
Valenzuela scheduled on the same date of July 15, 1998. The distance factor, from
Valenzuela to Tarlac, is enough consideration to call for postponement. Moreover, Atty.
Sedico twice informed the RTC that his entire calendar for July is already full such that he
requested specific dates in August for the hearing. 44 The motion to reset the hearing has
not been shown to be manifestly dilatory. Besides, except for the May 28, 1998 scheduled
hearing,45 petitioners have always been present in court. They cannot be said to have lost
interest in fighting the civil case to the end; only that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his
appearance as their counsel and petitioners had to look for new counsel to take their case
on short notice. Absolutely wanting from the records is any evidence that the change of
counsel was intended to delay the proceedings. In fact, only 48 days have lapsed from the
time Atty. De Jesus failed to appear on May 28, 1998 46 to the time when Atty. Sedicos
motion to reset was denied on July 15, 1998.47 Such intervening time cannot be said to
have greatly impaired the substantial rights of respondent. Thus, absent unreasonable
delay and manifest intent to employ dilatory tactic prejudicial to the respondent and trifling
court processes, Atty. Sedicos request for resetting should have been granted.
It cannot be disputed that the case has been pending since February 11 1991, 48 or more
than seven years until petitioners were able to start their presentation of their evidence on
March 11, 1998.49
The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases.
However, it must be emphasized that speed alone is not the chief objective of a trial. It is
the careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice, a genuine respect
for the rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process, and an
adherence to this Courts standing admonition that the disposition of cases should always
be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts and
of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. These
are more important than a race to end the trial. 50Indeed, court litigations are primarily for
the search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given
the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. 51
Ironically, the precipitate action of the RTC prolonged the litigation and unnecessarily
delayed the case, in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid.
Instead of unclogging dockets, it has actually increased the workload of the justice system
as a whole. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.
Moreover, it is noted that petitioners filed a third-party complaint which the RTC simply
disregarded. On the other hand, the CA, while stating in its Decision that "[a]ll thus told, we
find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court, except that it failed to dispose of
the third-party complaint,"52 it simply proceeded to dismiss the third-party complaint in the
dispositive portion of herein assailed decision, without giving any reason or justification
therefor.
As to the effect of petitioners admission of the due execution of the real estate mortgage
during the pre-trial conference, it must be noted that in Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 53 this Court ruled that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of
a document simply means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the
time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
10
relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law,
such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
However, it does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration.
Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting evidence regarding their claim of want
of consideration.
It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration and alleged fraudulent
scheme perpetuated by third-party defendants, being evidentiary, should be threshed out
in a proper trial. To deny petitioners their right to present evidence constitutes a denial of
due process, since there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on
the merits.
Ordinarily, when there is sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it to resolve the
fundamental issues, the Court will dispense with the regular procedure of remanding the
case to the lower court, in order to avoid further delays in the resolution of the
case.54 However, a remand in this case, while time-consuming, is necessary, because the
proceedings had in the RTC are grossly inadequate to settle factual issues. Petitioners
were unduly deprived of the full opportunity to present evidence on the merits of their
defense and third-party complaint.
Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the other issues raised by
petitioners. Suffice it to say that such matters are best decided by the RTC only after full
reception of petitioners evidence.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 23,
2001 of the Court of Appeals and the Decision dated July 31, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7384, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the said Regional Trial Court for reception of petitioners
evidence and further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165987
March 31, 2006
11
JOSHUA
S.
ALFELOR
and
MARIA
KATRINA
S.
ALFELOR, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the Resolution 2 dated June 28, 2004 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor
filed a Complaint for Partition3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the
plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed
to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention, 4 alleging
as follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for
partition between plaintiffs and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one
of the children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is
subject to herein special proceedings for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of her
late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case and to submit
attached Answer in Intervention.5
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention, 6 claiming that she was the surviving
spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua
and Maria Katrina were not her husbands children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the
appointment of a special administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her
pleading a copy of the marriage contract7 which indicated that she and Jose were married on
February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented
the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in- Intervention 8 filed by the heirs of the deceased,
where Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with
that of the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9However, Josefina did not appear in court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002.10 She narrated that she and the
deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and
that they were subsequently married in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30,
1966. Among those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefinas own relativesAtty. Margarito
Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her father.11 While she did not know Josefina
personally, she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two
did not live together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Joses
relatives consented to her (Teresitas) marriage with Jose because there had been no news of
Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months after the marriage, Josefina disappeared,
and Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to
locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina
annulled because he believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her
for more than seven years. This opinion was shared by Joses sister who was a judge. Teresita
also declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been
married three times, was now happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United
States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order 12 denying the motion and
dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court
pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim.
Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an
original copy of the document or any public officer who had custody thereof. According to the
court, the determinative factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the
second marriage with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been
previously married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof
required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 13 the RTC ruled that
while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification
and the accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities
required by law could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were
the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to
them as his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the
oppositor did not present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan through counsel, not
sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence and compliance with the basic rules of evidence
to proved (sic) the competent and relevant issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir
of the deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss (sic) with
cost[s] de oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor through counsel
sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly
supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children,
Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late
12
Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the latter in
accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or
intestate proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance, they are
legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as the case maybe (sic). 13
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita
admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Joses
previous marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous
marriage.16 Since the existence of the first marriage was proven in accordance with the basic
rules of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second
marriage was void from the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article
83 of the Civil Code provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present"
(thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity of the second
marriage were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage,
an absurd situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by two legitimate
spouses.
The trial court denied the motion in its Order17 dated October 30, 2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous
marriage valid and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also
stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that any
subsequent marriage is null and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that
she had been absent for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.
admission no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the
fact that Josefa was married to the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos, 18 the appellate
court ruled that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission, and is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs
submitted by the party who made the admission should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by the other party or not. The CA concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused
its discretion in ordering the dismissal of Josefinas Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit petitioners complaint in intervention and
to forthwith conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the
appellate court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the
admission of private respondents intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that
in setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002,
the CA completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an admission does not require proof, such
admission may be contradicted by showing that it was made through palpable mistake.
Moreover, Teresitas statement in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting
knowledge of the alleged first marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the legal
wife must show proof thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the
following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,
the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedding; the
birth and the baptismal certificates of children during such union, and other subsequent
documents mentioning such union. Regarding Teresitas alleged admission of the first marriage
in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay,
without probative value, as she heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to
Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own personal knowledge. They also pointed
out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose after their alleged
marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first time in 1988 during the filing of the case for
partition of the latters share in his parents estate. They further pointed out that Josefina does
not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of Josefina,
paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family Code, is applicable.
Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to question her claim that she had not been heard of
for more than seven years.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission
which does not require proof. Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when it
ruled in her favor.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that
Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to
the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial
The petition is dismissed.
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Joses previous marriage to
private respondent in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified during the hearing,
for the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be
considered hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and
substantiate her Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy
of a purported marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the other
party who claims to be the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition
involving the share of the deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.
13
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the
existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late Jose K.
Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956;20
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late
husband had been previously married to another. To the Courts mind, this admission constitutes
a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of judicial
proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. 21 A party who judicially admits a
fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; 22 production of
evidence is dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary
or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or
not.25 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as
against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded.26
On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the pertinent provision of
the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which provides:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected
in a separate proceeding.
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not
parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The
words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one
that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without
the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.30
In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the surviving legal
spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings even
after the parties had already submitted a compromise agreement involving the properties of the
decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside the
compromise agreement, the Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and that "in
the interest of adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners inclusion in the action for partition,
given the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper disposition of
the case."32
Contrary to petitioners argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals 33 is not in point, as
the Court therein did not discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but resolved
the validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the Court
ultimately determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to a
share in the subject properties.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit
respondent Josefina Halasans Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper
proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the
parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition
of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.27Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit
or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining
plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the
claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by
which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave
of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person
becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected
by such proceedings."28
Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners mother, the Court rules that respondent
Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has
shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd.
v. Court of Appeals:29
G.R. No. 178551
October 11, 2010
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC

HEALTH-KUWAITPetitioners,
vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
DECISION
14
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in
behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the
Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1)
year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from
employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary
period.
As the Ministry denied respondents request for reconsideration, she returned to the
Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local
recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry,
as the foreign principal.
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither
showed that there was just cause to warrant respondents dismissal nor that she
failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed
and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary
for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters
decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
having been denied by Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of
Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government
agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within
the one-year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further
contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas
worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors
and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable
with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to overseas
workers.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by
Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents
employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was
patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code
provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA)
Rules relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules
and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and
labor laws and legislation of the host country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are
applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune
from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and
solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the
Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired
over it.
The petition fails.
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the
money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the
mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed
with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liability must first be
established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry
and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their
foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse
15
and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers
United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by
and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with
the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the
agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees
under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.Otherwise, this will render nugatory
the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for
foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to
protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. 9 Verily, to allow petitioners to
simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial
determination of the foreign principals liability before petitioner can be held liable
renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment
are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents employment
contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be
governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA
Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the
same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who
can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations,
as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign
law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption
which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDIStaffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that
Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific
causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the
parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern
all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter;
thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded,
is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not
only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it
must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between
respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the
employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host
countrys Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy11 (Arabic to
English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass the
probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the
certificate of termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha
16
Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic

Certification and Translation Unit; and respondents letter 13 of reconsideration to the
Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was
given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work
schedule.
case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that
respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil
service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws
duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required
under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting
only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter
which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine
laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog
and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and
the same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no
responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever
legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in
order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001
GRACE
J.
GARCIA,
a.k.a.
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
GRACE
J.
GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
17
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia
and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City
as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable
laws to any and/or both parties."3
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage andits subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."13
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground
that it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for resolution.17
The Facts
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a

"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner
a Filipina and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued
in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage
ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
18
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in
Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha
Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present
a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code
in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21,
35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this
case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in
pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing
a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate
on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson
was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to
take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the
divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably
failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of
the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must
first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting
parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the
proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
19
xxx
xxx
xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;
xxx
xxx
xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of
baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage,
the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the
delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. 31 The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only
to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible
as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known
by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
20
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are
of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the

national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent,
had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.50
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or

provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal

capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only
the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended
Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 58 (d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may
be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the
ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January
12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding
that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to
remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
21
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties'
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994

CLEMENTE
CALDE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMO AGAWIN and DOMYAAN APED, respondents.
Nestor P. Mondok for petitioner.
Lazaro Padong for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision, dated March 27, 1990, of the Court of
appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071, disallowing probate of the Last Will and Codicil executed by
Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang, who died on March 20, 1976.
The records show that decedent left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property.
She also left a Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated
July 24, 1973. Both documents contained the thumbmarks of decedent. They were also signed
by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the
Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.
Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of
Bontoc, Mt. Province, Br. 36. 2 He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly
substituted by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed
by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that
decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents
because of her advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedents thumbmarks were procured
22
through fraud and undue influence; and that the codicil was not executed in accordance with
law.
Q And after Jose Becyagen signed his name with the

ballpen, who was the next to sign?
On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing
decedents will and its codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent
Court of Appeals. It held:
A Me, sir.
. . . (T)he will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the
New Civil Code but for one crucial factor of discrepancy in the color of ink
when the instrumental witnesses affixed their respective signatures. When
subjected to cross-examination, Codcodio Nacnas as witness testified as
follows:
Q And Jose Becyagen passed you the paper and the

ballpen, Exhibit "B" and "B-1" plus the ballpen which
used to sign so that you could sign your name, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And all of you signed on the same table?
Q And then after you signed, who was the next to sign
the document, Exhibit "B" and "B-1"?
A Yes, sir.
A Hilario Coto-ong.
Q And when you were all signing this Exhibit "B" and
"B-1", Exhibit "B" and "B-1" which is the testament was
passed around all of you so that each of you will sign
consecutively?
Q So you passed also to Hilario Coto-ong the same

Exhibit "B" and "B-1" and the ballpen so that he could
sign his name as witness to the document, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was the first to sign?
Q And that is the truth and you swear that to be the

truth before the Honorable Court?
A Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang.
ATTY. DALOG:
Q After Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang was made to sign

I withdraw the question. How did Calibia Lingdan
Bulanglang sign the last will and testament?
He already testified under oath, Your Honor.
A She asked Judge Tolete the place where she will affix
her thumbmark so Judge Tolete directed her hand or
her thumb to her name.
COURT:
Witness may answer
A Yes, sir.
Q After she signed, who was the second to sign

allegedly all of you there present?
For his part, Obanan Ticangan likewise admitted during cross-examination

in regard to the codicil that:
A Jose Becyagen.
Q With what did Jose Becyagen sign the testament,
Exhibit "B" and "B-1"?
Q When you signed Exhibit "D" and "D-1", did you all
sign with the same ballpen?
A One.
A Ballpen.
23
Such admissions from instrumental witnesses are indeed significant since

they point to no other conclusion than that the documents were not signed
by them in their presence but on different occasions since the same ballpen
used by them supposedly in succession could not have produced a different
color from blue to black and from black to blue. In fact, the attestation
clause followed the same pattern. The absurd sequence was repeated
when they signed the codicil, for which reason, We have no other alternative
but to disallow the Last Will and Codicil. Verily, if the witnesses and testatrix
used the same ballpen, then their signatures would have been in only one
color, not in various ones as shown in the documents. Moreover, the
signatures, in different colors as they are, appear to be of different
broadness, some being finer than the others, indicating that, contrary to
what the testamentary witnesses declared on the witness stand, not only
one ballpen was used, and, therefore, showing that the documents were not
signed by the testatrix and instrumental witnesses in the presence of one
another. . . " (Rollo, pp. 44-46. Citations omitted.)
Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the impugned Decision. His motion was
denied by the respondent court in its Order, dated May 24, 1990.
Thus, this appeal by petitioner who now puts in issue the correctness of the respondent courts
conclusion that both decedents will and codicil were not subscribed by the witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another, contrary to the requirements of Article 805 of the
Civil Code. He contends that:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT BY CONCLUDING
BASED ON PURE SPECULATION OR SURMISES AND WITHOUT
REGARD TO THE TESTIMONY OF JUDGE TOLETE WHICH IS AN
EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANCE THAT THE WILL AND THE CODICIL OF THE
LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG WERE SIGNED BY HER AND BY
HER INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY
DISREGARDING THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE ATTESTATION
CLAUSES OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT AND THE CODICIL OF
THE LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG.
The petition must fail.
The question in the case at bench is one of fact: whether or not, based on the evidence
submitted, respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both decedents Last Will and
Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate
occasions. As a general rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and
conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this court. In the present instance, however,
there is reason to make an exception to that rule, since the finding of the respondent court is
contrary to that of the trial court, viz.:
. . . (Private respondents) pointed out however, that the assertions of
petitioners witnesses are rife with contradictions, particularly the fact that
the latters signatures on the documents in issue appear to have been
written in ballpens of different colors contrary to the statements of said
witnesses that all of them signed with only one ballpen. The implication is
that the subscribing witnesses to the Will and Codicil, and the testatrix did
not simultaneously sign each of the documents in one sitting but did it
piecemeal a violation of Art. 805 of the Code. This conclusion of the
(private respondents) is purely circumstantial. From this particular set of
facts, numerous inferences without limits can be drawn depending on which
side of the fence one is on. For instance, considering the time interval that
elapsed between the making of the Will and Codicil, and up to the filing of
the petition for probate, the possibility is not remote that one or two of the
attesting witnesses may have forgotten certain details that transpired when
they attested the documents in question . . . (Rollo, pp. 36-37.)
A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its
impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in question
were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion.
As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in
decedents will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This
discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two
pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioners
witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary
documents.
It is accepted that there are three sources from which a tribunal may properly acquire knowledge
for making its decisions, namely: circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence, and real
evidence or autoptic proference. Wigmore explains these sources as follows:
If, for example, it is desired to ascertain whether the accused has lost his
right hand and wears an iron hook in place of it, one source of belief on the
subject would be the testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in
believing this testimonial evidence, there is an inference from the human
assertion to the fact asserted. A second source of belief would be the mark
left on some substance grasped or carried by the accused; in believing this
circumstantial evidence, there is an inference from the circumstance to the
thing producing it. A third source of belief remains, namely, the inspection by
the tribunal of the accuseds arm. This source differs from the other two in
omitting any step of conscious inference or reasoning, and in proceeding by
direct self-perception, or autopsy.
It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to ask whether this is not, after all, a
third source of inference, i.e., an inference from the impressions or
24
perceptions of the tribunal to the objective existence of the thing perceived.

The law does not need and does not attempt to consider theories of
psychology as to the subjectivity of knowledge or the mediateness of
perception. It assumes the objectivity of external nature; and, for the
purposes of judicial investigation, a thing perceived by the tribunal as
existing does exist.
There are indeed genuine cases of inference by the tribunal from things
perceived to other things unperceived as, for example, from a persons
size, complexion, and features, to his age; these cases of a real use of
inference can be later more fully distinguished . . . But we are here
concerned with nothing more than matters directly perceived for
example, that a person is of small height or is of dark complexion; as to
such matters, the perception by the tribunal that the person is small or large,
or that he has a dark or light complexion, is a mode of acquiring belief which
is independent of inference from either testimonial or circumstantial
evidence. It is the tribunals self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing itself.
From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing this source of belief, it
may be termed Autoptic Proference. 3 (Citations omitted.)
In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by
petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black and
white or more accurately, in black and blue that more than one pen was used by the
signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve
petitioners claim that both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge
Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary
documents were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedents thumbmarking thereof, to
the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless,
nowhere in Judge Toletes testimony is there any kind of explanation for the different-colored
signatures on the testaments.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of respondent
Court of Appeals, dated March 27, 1988, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071 disallowing the Last Will and
Testament, and the Codicil thereto, of the decedent Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
25
14-15). The accused were later taken to the PC Headquarters in

Lagawe where they were investigated and subsequently detained
(TSN, March 12, 1992, p. 12).
G.R. No. 108722 December 9, 1997

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ERLINDA CARREON y PRECIA, accused-appellant.
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
FRANCISCO, J.:
Appellant Erlinda P. Carreon was charged with and convicted of violating Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, by the
Regional Trial Court 1 and meted "the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos, and to [pay] the cost." 2 Dissatisfied, appellant interposed the present
appeal anchored on an interrelated assignment of errors, jointly discussed in her brief,
which dwell on the alleged (1) insufficiency of evidence to prove her guilt; (2) erroneous
admission in evidence of the bundles of marijuana, and (3) failure of the trial court to give
any brobative value on the supposed affidavit of desistance of the apprehending officers
and on her defense of denial. 3
The facts of the case, aptly narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General and which we
have verified to be duly supported by the record, are as follows:
At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 1990, a passenger
jeepney in which herein appellant was riding was flagged down at a
checkpoint manned by elements of the Philippine Constabulary in
Lamut, Ifugao province. In accordance with orders from their
headquarters, a search was made on the jeepney as well as its
passenger. The search was conducted by C2C Melchor Rivera and
C2C Samuel Bulahao, who was himself a passenger of the same
jeepney (TSN, supra, pp. 3-4).
At the time the search was being conducted, herein appellant and her
companion Armina de Monteverde were seated side by side
immediately behind the driver. The bags and personal belongings of the
passengers were individually searched by the constables. As a result of
said search, a small wrap of marijuana was found in the handbag of
herein appellant, while a larger bundle consisting of four wraps was
found in a jute sack located beside her, approximately one foot away
from her feet (Tsn, supra, pp. 4-7.)
As a result thereof, appellant and her companion were arrested and
their bags containing the marijuana were confiscated. The seized items
were all later turned over to the Provincial Command (TSN, supra, pp.
Upon investigation by the forensic chemist assigned at the Crime

Laboratory at Camp Dangwa, the items seized from appellant were
confirmed to be marijuana (TSN, May 22, 1991, p. 4).
The appellant, together with her companion Armina de Monteverde,
were subsequently charged with violation of R.A. 6425, as amended.
On arraignment, both entered pleas of not guilty. After trial on the
merits, the trial court found herein appellant guilty as charged while
Armina de Monteverde was acquitted [on the ground that the
prosecution failed to convincingly prove the existence of conspiracy
between the two accused]. 4
The appeal is not impressed with merit; hence we affirm the conviction.
Appellant harps on the failure of the prosecution to present as evidence her handbag from
where the marijuana leaves were taken and assails C2C Rivera's inconsistent testimony
where on one part he declared that the bag was turned over to the Provincial Headquarters
while on another portion he said that appellant took it. The argument is unpersuasive.
Appellant seems to have lost sight of the fact that her conviction was not premised on the
presence or absence of the bag, but on her apprehension in flagrante delicto, i.e., while in
the possession of and transporting the prohibited drugs. The non-presentation of the bag
does not debilitate the case for the prosecution. The alleged inconsistency in the testimony
of C2C Rivera, on the other hand, is inconsequential. The testimony, we note, is
unmistakably clear that the bag was forwarded to the Provincial Headquarters from where
appellant took the same. In addition, minor inconsistencies do not discredit but rather
strengthen the testimony of a witness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony. 5 The alleged insufficiency of evidence, therefore, is more imagined than real.
Anent appellant's averment that the bundles of marijuana were erroneously admitted in
evidence as C2C Rivera failed to immediately submit the marijuana leaves for laboratory
examination and, in fact, it was not he who actually brought the specimen to the Crime
Laboratory, suffice it to say that there is no rule requiring the apprehending officer to
personally deliver the prohibited drug to the Crime Laboratory for testing. What is important
is that the transmittal of the specimen , as in this case, was not vitiated by irregularity or
fraud to cast doubt on the authenticity and source of the subject specimen. Moreover, the
subject marijuana leaves taken from the appellant were duly identified by C2C Rivera, the
apprehending officer and Lt. Ong, the chemist assigned at Dangwa Crime Laboratory
where the specimen was brought for testing. In the absence of evidence to indicate that
these witnesses were moved by improper motive, their testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit. 6 Besides, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of their duties accorded by
law 7 was not at all overthrown by contrary evidence.
26
In an apparent attempt to discredit the prosecution's witnesses, appellant invites the court's
attention to an affidavit of desistance purportedly executed by C2C Rivera and C2C
Bulahao. We are not persuaded as the said affidavit appears to be an afterthought. Apart
from the fact that retractions are exceedingly unreliable 8 and looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts 9, the trial court rightly observed that the signatures
appearing thereon were forgeries. Thus:
First, comparison on the real evidence or autoptic proference on record
consisting of signatures of the affiant witness Melchor E. Rivera,
appearing in the joint affidavit in support of the criminal complaint found
on page 2 of the records, and the signature of said witness marked as
Exhibit "3-C" appearing in Exhibit 3, Joint Affidavit of Desistance found
on page 5 of the records visibly show to the naked eye that the said two
signatures are entirely different, revealing the fact that the alleged
signature of the alleged affiant Melchor Rivera appearing in the
contested document Exhibit 3 and 3-A was written by a person other
than the true and real Melchor E. Rivera, the witness for the
prosecution in the instant case. In other words, the signature marked as
Exhibit "3-C" appearing in Exhibit "3" is a forgery.
Second, it is quite surprising and lamentable to say the least, that an
L.L.B. graduate, like the defense witness Revelino Antonio, professing
himself to be a Notary public since 1979 up to the present to have been
allegedly satisfied as to his identity of the alleged affiants by the mere
presentation of military ID's of the alleged affiants, for normally a Notary
public should satisfy himself as to the true identity of any person or
party to a document that he notarized. His allegation that he did not
require them to present their Residence Certificate because the alleged
affiant told him that they do not have, has to be taken with a grain of
salt considering that a person like the witness who is capable of
prevaricating on a vital and delicate matter by testifying that the witness
Melchor Rivera appeared before him as Notary Public, claiming to be
personally present when the alleged affiant affixed his signature n
Exhibit "3", when in truth and in fact, the said signature is found out to
be a forgery is not trustworthy, thereby rendering his entire testimony
unworthy of credence. A witness who is capable of testifying falsely on
a forged signature of a person is likewise capable of committing
falsehood on less important details. Consequently, the principle of law
"Falsus in, unos-falsus in omnibus squarely jibes with the testimony of
the defenses witness, Revelino Antonio.
xxx xxx xxx
Thirdly, it would be unnatural for the alleged affiants in Exhibit "3" to
have voluntarily gone to the residence of Notary Public Evelino Antonio
and requested for the preparation and final execution of the document,
and later categorically denied to have executed any when confronted

by the Court during the preliminary investigation, which only goes to
show that it was fraudulently prepared, a fact reinforced by the act of
policeman Daniel Dominong who accordingly to witness Revelino
Antonio was the one who paid later the Notarial fee for no apparent
reason at all, a circumstance showing that there was something fishy in
the preparation of the document Exhibit "3", which confirmed the
version of the alleged affiants that they did not in truth and in fact
appear before any notary public.
More importantly, the veracity of the affidavit in question is now academic since
C2C Rivera himself appeared as a witness for the prosecution; hence, reliance
on his alleged affidavit of desistance which he disowned is wanting in merit.
Further, appellant's argument that her defense of denial and her witnesses' testimony
should be given credence deserve scant consideration. Findings of fact of the trial court,
especially its assessment on the credibility of witnesses, are not disturbed on appeal
except when the trial court has overlooked, ignored, or disregard some fact or
circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the
result, 10 an instance absent in this case. Besides, appellant's denial does not inspire belief.
With approval, we quote the following disquisition of the trial court:
In summation, the Court is of the considered view, that the defense of
denial interposed by the accused is flimsy and preposterous which
finding and conclusion of the Court finds its source and strength from
the very purpose advanced by accused Erlinda Carreon in going to
Hapao, Hungduan and later to O-ong, Banaue, two places in the
province of Ifugao noted and taken judicial notice of by this Court to be
great source of marijuana leaves. The accused Erlina Carreon assisted
earlier, a total stranger allegedly went to Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao a far
flunged placed to see one Fidel, her alleged companion who applied in
going abroad. Such an allegation is highly unbelievable for the accused
does not even know and cannot tell the Court the family name of that
Fidel. All the more, that belies her alleged purpose in going to those
places is the fact that it runs counter to the ordinary course of things or
event for normally, it would be this Fidel who would have taken interest
in going to Metro Manila and verify for himself the status of his alleged
application for abroad, if there was indeed any, not the accused going
to Hapao, Hungduan, Ifugao to look for Fidel whose relationship to the
accused was not even shown by evidence, as a matter of fact, he does
not even know the family name of this Fidel, neither is there a showing
that the accused is a legal recruiter of any recruitment agency to create
an apparent semblance of truth of her alleged purpose in going to see
the person Fidel.
27
Anent the purpose of the accused Erlinda Carreon in going to

O-ong, Banaue, Ifugao as elsewhere stated herein earlier, is highly
incredible. A scrutiny of the testimony of the testimony of accused
Erlinda Carreon would seem to suggest that these Liza Antonio and
Rosa Kindipan are intimately related to her. Assuming the relationship
to be such, it is strange that said persons would address and course
their letter to the accused at O-ong, Banaue, Ifugao, a far away place
from her alleged residence at Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. At most, the
logical and reasonable course of action to have been taken by the said
accused is for her to have given her city address to them, which for
purposes of convenience and expediency, could be at the ideal place
where to address and course their alleged intended and expected letter
from the two informing the accused Carreon of a possible job
placement or employment abroad. All the moren (sic) nugatory to
accused Carreon's alleged purpose in going to Hapao and O-ong is the
fact that to a reasonable mind, the prudent course of action for her to
have done is to write these Rita Antonio and Rosa Kindipan and/or go
to the placement agency concerned, or to the Office of the POEA, to
verify the status of her alleged application for abroad, if any, instead of
going to two places.
The foregoing facts and circumstances indubitably show that the
version of the accused Erlinda Carreoin (sic) is self-serving being the
product or a concoction so flimsy to deserve the slightest consideration
of this Court, and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight that the
positive testimony of the witness C2C Melchor Rivera. 11
Denial constitutes self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declarations of the prosecution witnesses
testifying on affirmative matters. 12
G.R. No. 170300
February 9, 2007
BARTOLOME
BALINGIT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO YAMAT, Respondents.
DECISION
Appellant in this case was convicted and meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of twenty thousand pesos under Rep. Act No. 6425 for transporting more or less six (6)
kilos of marijuana on July 1990. Rep. Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31,
1993, amended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6425, increasing the imposable penalty for
the sale or transport of 750 grams or more of marijuana to reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Such penalty is not
favorable to the appellant as it carries the accessory penalties provided under the Revised
Penal Code and had a higher amount of fine which in accordance with Article 22 of the
same Code should not be given retroactive effect. The Court, therefore, finds and so holds
that the penalty of life imprisonment and fine in the amount of twenty thousand
pesos correctly imposed by the trial court should be retained.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Pablo Yamat (Yamat) was declared the elected Punong Barangay of Nigui, Masantol,
Pampanga, in the last July 28, 2002 barangay elections, with Yamat obtaining 257 votes,
and his opponent, Bartolome Balingit (Balingit), 250 votes.
Balingit filed an election protest with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Macabebe-Masantol, Macabebe, Pampanga, alleging fraud in the counting and
preparation of the election returns. After revision of the ballots, the tally turned out with
Balingit still having 250 votes, while Yamat had 255 votes.
Thereafter, in a Decision dated September 24, 2003, the MCTC declared Balingit as the
duly elected punongbarangay, with the following tabulation:1
28
Precinct Nos.
Balingit
Yamat
53-A
64
16
54-A
52
55-A
87
13
56-A
11
57 (97+1-41)
57-A
16 (17-1)
48 (63+1-16)
58-A
19
34 (62+1-29)
Total Votes
249
172
The MCTC invalidated a total of 86 ballots cast in Precinct Nos. 56-A, 57-A, and 58-A, and
credited three separate votes cast in these three precincts, resulting in 172 votes cast in
Yamat's favor. On the other hand, the MCTC discredited in Balingit's favor one vote cast in
Precinct No. 57-A for having been a marked ballot, reducing the latter's number of votes to
249.
56-A
B44
B45
B5
B7
58-A
135
136
Thus, a total of 252 votes were considered in favor of Yamat, with Balingit still having the
same number of votes 249.
COMELEC Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, however, registered his dissent on the
Commission's findings with regard to six other ballots, namely: Exhibits B-3, B-6, B-41, B72, B-137, and B-138. These six ballots were among the 86 ballots previously invalidated
by the MCTC but were held to be valid by the Commission. It was Commissioner Sadain's
view that these ballots appear to have been written by one person and should have been
invalidated and not credited in favor of Yamat. Thus, only a total of 246 votes should be
credited in favor of Yamat, making Balingit, with 249 votes, the winner by a margin of three
votes.4
Yamat appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

On the other hand, Balingit filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of the MCTC
Decision which was granted by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order dated January
26, 2005.2
On April 11, 2005, the COMELEC Second Division rendered its Resolution on Yamat's
appeal, reversing the MCTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Macabebe-Masantol,
Macabebe, Pampanga, inElection Case No. 02(01) declaring appellee Bartlome [sic]
Balingit the duly elected Punong Barangay ofBarangay Nigui, Masantol, Pampanga, during
the 2002 Barangay Elections is hereby REVERSED.
Let the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implement this Resolution.
Balingit filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution with the
COMELEC En Banc but it was denied per Resolution dated November 12, 2005. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc DENIES the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merits. The Resolution of the Second Division promulgated [on]
April 11, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. The proclamation of PABLO YAMAT as Punong
Barangay of Barangay Nigui, Masantol, Pampanga is UPHELD.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission EN BANC hereby ORDERS:
1. Appellee BARTOLOME BALINGIT to VACATE the contested post which he
assumed by virtue of the Order of the Second Division dated January 26, 2005
granting execution pending appeal, in favor of PABLO YAMAT and to CEASE and
DESIST from performing the functions attached to said office.
SO ORDERED.3
The COMELEC Second Division validated 80 out of the 86 ballots previously invalidated by
the MCTC and counted them in favor of Yamat, while the other six ballots remained invalid.
The six ballots were as follows:
Precinct No.
Exhibit Nos.
2. The Deputy Executive Director for operations of the Commission to furnish a

copy thereof to the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, and the Office of the Secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan, Masantol, Pampanga.
Considering the proximity of the end of the term of the contested office in this case, this
resolution is hereby declared immediately executory.
29
Such abuse must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.7
SO ORDERED.5
Balingit filed before the Court a Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
A. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT LIMITED AND
FOCUSED ONLY ITSELF FROM CONDUCTING AN ALLEGED "EXAMINATION
OF BALLOTS" WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF COMMISSIONER MEHOL K.
SADAIN'S DISSENTING OPINION, BUT DID NOT EXAMINE THE ENTIRE
BALLOTS AND EVIDENCE SUBJECT OF BALINGIT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
B. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT MISLED THE PARTIES
TO JUSTIFY THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS
IN HOLDING THAT "PROXIMITY OF THE END OF TERM OF THE
CONTESTED OFFICE IN THIS CASE" WHEN IN TRUTH, THE TERM OF
OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS ELECTED ON JULY 15, 2002 HAS
BEEN EXTENDED TO LAST MONDAY OF OCTOBER 2007 BY REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9340, APPROVED ON 22 SEPTEMBER 2005
C. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PROMULGATED ITS
ASSAILED 11 APRIL 2005 RESOLUTION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
STRONG AND VALID OBJECTIONS OF BALINGIT ON THE CONTESTED
BALLOTS, AS CORRECTLY RULED BY THE TRIAL COURT, THAT THOSE
CONTESTED BALLOTS OF PABLO YAMAT WILL CLEARLY REVEAL THAT
MOST, IF NOT ALL ARE GROUPS OF BALLOTS WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE
SAME PERSON (WBO) AND SINGLE BALLOTS WRITTEN BY TWO PERSONS
(WBT).
D. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF AND EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT PROMULGATED ITS
ASSAILED 11 APRIL 2005 RESOLUTION IN SWEEPINGLY VALIDATING THE
EIGHTY (80) CONTESTED BALLOTS OF YAMAT, WHICH THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY RULED AS GROUPS OF BALLOTS WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE
SAME PERSON (WBO), WHOSE FINDINGS/RULINGS THEREON DO NOT
CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY EXPRESSED [sic] THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH THEY WERE BASED.6
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave,
as when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility.
In this case, Balingit laments the manner in which the COMELEC, both the Second
Division and En Banc, resolved the issue on the contested ballots, arguing that it
committed grave abuse discretion when it merely limited itself to the six ballots that
Commissioner Sadain found to be invalid, that it did not consider his arguments on the
invalidity of all the contested ballots and "sweepingly" validated these ballots without
setting forth the basis, and that it erroneously justified the immediate execution of the
decision.
A review by the Court of the assailed Resolution dated April 11, 2005 rendered by the
COMELEC's Second Division and Resolution dated November 12, 2005 of the
COMELEC En Banc failed to establish any grave abuse of discretion such that these
Resolutions should be set aside.
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of
fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the
supervision of elections all over the country, as it is the constitutional commission vested
with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial
and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings, and
decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence shall
not be interfered with by this Court.8
The MCTC originally found a total of 86 ballots cast in favor of Yamat in Precinct Nos. 56A, 57-A, and 58-A as invalid for having been written by only one person. Both the
COMELEC Second Division and En Banc, however, nullified the MCTC's findings on 80 of
these ballots and found them to be valid.
It is fallacious for Balingit to argue that the COMELEC "sweepingly" validated the
contested ballots and did not take into consideration his objections thereto, and that the
COMELEC did not clearly set out the basis for its findings, as the assailed Resolution
dated April 11, 2005 shows otherwise. The COMELEC's Second Division, in fact, physically
examined each set or pair of contested ballots and accordingly made its corresponding
factual findings, viz.:9
Precinct
No.
Exhibit No.
56A
B2,
B39,
B44,
B51,
B8,
B40,
B45,
B54,
Commissions Finding/Ruling
B16
B41,
B50,
B55
Contrary to the finding of the trial court,

these ballots are valid. The differences
30
B56,
B61,
B67,
B70,
B75,
B83
B57,
B65,
B68,
B72,
B80
B58,
B66,
B69,
B74,
and
57A
in strokes, writing styles, dents,
alignment of letters, color of ink used
and the point of the pen are glaring.
We found however Exhibit Nos. B44
and B45 as pair of ballots written by
one person. The Minutes of Voting and
Counting does not show that there was
a physically disabled or illiterate voter
assisted during the voting. We cannot
therefore uphold the validity of these
ballots.
B53,
B73,
B79 and B81
B3, B4,
and B7
B5,
B78,
Valid
Strokes are different.
58A
B86,
B87,
B88
B91, B113, B114
B115, B116, B117,
B118, B119, B121,
B122, B128 and
B129
B135,
B143,
B161,
B164,
B167,
B186,
B196
B136,
B144,
B162,
B165,
B168,
B192
B142,
B153,
B163,
B166,
B182,
and
ballots
B6
Exhibit Nos. B3, B4 and B6 are valid
ballots.
However, Exhibit Nos. B5 and B7 are
two (2) ballots that could hardly be
considered valid. The similarities in
strokes, handwriting, dents, color of
the ink and pen point, and the spacing
of letter are so obvious to the naked
eye.
B137 and B138
Valid
ballots
Writing styles, strokes and dents of the
letters are strikingly different.
Exhibit Nos. 135 and 136 are invalid

ballots for their obvious similarities in
handwriting, strokes or dents and
scratches of letters. They are
undoubtedly written by one person. No
illiterate or physically disables voter
had been assisted during the voting as
manifested by the Minutes of Voting
and Counting duly issued by the
members of the Board of Election
Tellers.
The rest of the contested ballots are
valid.
Valid
ballots.
These ballots were all written in script
but the dissimilarities in the strokes,
loops, connecting and spurs are
evident.
The handwriting of different people
may appear to bear a marked
resemblance to each other, although,
on analysis of the structure of the
master patterns can be shown to be
quite distinctive and unlikely to be
confused.
B21 and B22

Valid
ballots
The dents and scratches, the
alignment and the spacing of the
letters are different.
B29 and B30

Valid
ballots
The strokes, terminals and loops of the
letters
are
strikingly
different,
specifically the way the letters Y, L, D
and Z is written.
B139,
B150
B140
and
Valid
ballots
See ruling in Exhibit Nos. 137 and 138
above.
31
B157 and B158
The Commission En Banc AFFIRMS the rulings of the Second Division declaring
as INVALID only the ballots marked as Exhs. B44 and B45, B5 and B7. The similarities in
the handwritings in these ballots were glaringly similar that there is sufficient reason to
believe that these two ballots were prepared by only one person.
Valid
ballots
The strokes, dents and spacing of
letters are not similar.
The other ballots alleged as prepared in sets or groups by only one person must be
considered VALID. The Division correctly cited in the Resolution Silverio v. Castro as the
basis of its rulings. It is therein taught:
B159 and B160
Valid
ballots
We do not see any fluency and rhythm
in the handwriting evidently showing
that they were accomplished by only
one person.
The total votes obtained by appellant and appellee based on the rulings discussed above
are now as follows:
Appellant
Number
of
Decision of the Trial Court
Votes
Per 172
Appellee
249
Plus: Number of Votes Validated by the 80

Commission
Minus: Number of Votes Invalidated by the 69

Commission
Equals: Total Number of Votes Obtained from 252

All Precincts
249
And, contrary to Balingits allegations in the petition, the COMELEC En Banc conducted its
own examination of the ballots and did not limit itself only to the six ballots that were
validated, subject matter of the dissent of Commissioner Sadain, thus:
The Commission En Banc could have conveniently upheld the dispositions of the Division
and declared the same as appropriate finding of facts. However, considering that Presiding
Commisioner Mehol K. Sadain dissented therefrom and manifested his different
appreciation of the ballots, the Commission En Banc conducted its own examination of the
ballots to arrive at a judicious determination.
In order to reach the conclusion that two writings are by the same hand there must be not
only be present class characteristics but also individual characteristics or "dents and
scratches" in sufficient quantity to exclude the theory of accidental coincidence; to reach
the conclusion that writings are by different hands, we may find numerous likenesses in
class characteristics but divergences in individual characteristics, or we may find
divergences in both, but the divergence must be something more than mere superficial
differences.
"x x x the rule is simple whatever features two specimen handwriting may have in
common, they cannot be considered to be of common authorship if they display but a
single dissimilarity in any feature which is fundamental to the structure of the handwriting
and whose presence is not capable of reasonable explanation." (Silverio v. Castro, 19
SCRA 520)
Putting it simply, where the writings in said ballots were strikingly alike, these ballots must
be ruled to be of single authorship and must be rejected.
The Second Division is right in its observation that the handwritings on the questioned
ballots were glaringly different and no identical characteristics are impressive. Indeed, it
could justifiably be concluded that the cited ballots were each prepared by the individual
voters and not in sets or pairs by only one person.
Whatever perceived similarities in the handwritings were but pictorial effects and general
resemblances which were insufficient to warrant a finding of single authorship.
Precinct No. 57A
We AFFIRM the Divisions rulings that the ballots questioned as having been written in
sets or pairs by one person are VALID because the strokes, dents, and slants were
distinctly different and it could not be justifiably concluded that only one hand prepared the
ballots.
Hereunder are our findings:

Precinct No. 58A
Precinct No. 56A
32
We agree with the Division that only the ballots marked as Exh. Nos. B135 and
B136 are INVALID because of the obvious similarities in the strokes, slants and dents of
the handwriting on the ballots.
All the other ballots contested on the allegation that they were written in sets or pairs by
only one person did not show remarkable similarities which could sufficiently warrant a
finding that they were written by only one hand.
By the En Bancs own computation, the total number of votes to be credited to Appellant
are as follows:
PABLO YAMAT
Votes per physical count - - - - - - - - - - - - Less:
Votes
By the Division and En Banc - - - - - - - - - -
Balingit wants the Court to consider in his favor the six ballots that Commissioner Sadain
opined to be invalid and should not be credited to Yamat, thus giving him an edge of three
votes, i.e. 249 as against Yamat's 246, and making him the victor. Suffice it to say that the
COMELEC adequately explained the reason for holding these six ballots as valid, 16 and
absent any evidence to the contrary, the appreciation of these ballots by the COMELEC,
acting as a collegial body, should be upheld.17
255
Invalidated
6
149
Add: Validated Claims
COMELEC's treatment of these ballots such that the MCTC's findings should outweigh the
COMELEC's. Both tribunals physically examined the contested ballots and made their
respective findings thereon. The divergence lies in the physical and actual appreciation
and interpretation of the perceived defects in the ballots, and it need not be stressed that
given that the COMELEC is the specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections
all over the country,14 which the framers of the Constitution intended to place on a level
higher than statutory administrative organs, its factual finding is binding on the Court. 15
+3
252
There being no issue as regards the disposition on the ballots of Balingit, The Commission
En Banc left the findings of the Trial Court and the Second Division that Bartolome Balingit
obtained a total of 249 votes, undisturbed.10
Based on its own physical assessment of the contested ballots, the COMELEC En
Banc agreed with the Division's conclusions that the invalidity of Exhibits Nos. B-44, B-45,
B-5, B-7, B-135, and B-136 should be sustained, while the other ballots shall remain
valid.11
Balingit also appears to be in awe of the MCTC's disquisition on the invalidity of these
ballots, quoting the MCTC's use of the term "autoptic proference" in maintaining that its
rulings on the objections and claims of the parties is the valid ruling. 12 Autoptic proference,
in legal parlance, simply means a tribunal's self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing
itself.13 The COMELEC may not have used such a high-sounding term, nevertheless, it
does not follow that it did not examine the ballots or that its findings were flawed.
The Court cannot imagine how Balingit can argue as he did when the foregoing findings
clearly show that all the 86 contested ballots were physically examined by the COMELEC,
and the basis for upholding the validity of 80 of these ballots was sufficiently established.
The Court also cannot find any salient distinction between the MCTC's and the
Finally, with regard to Balingit's view that it was misplaced and misleading for the
COMELEC En Banc to justify the immediate execution of its assailed Resolution dated
November 12, 2005, with the proximity of the elections when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9340
amended
R.A.
No.
9164
by
extending
the
term
of barangay and sangguniangkabataan until October of 2007; indeed, the Court finds it
odd that the COMELEC should justify the immediate execution of its decision with the
"proximity of the elections."
The COMELEC, being the specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections, is
presumed to be aware of the passage of R.A. No. 9340. As Balingit correctly pointed out,
R.A. No. 9340 extended the term of barangayand sangguniang kabataan to October 2007,
thereby amending R.A. No. 9164, which initially set the synchronized elections on the last
Monday of October three years after the July 15, 2002 elections, i.e., October 2005.
Obviously, the COMELEC cannot refer to the proximity of the October 2005 elections since
at the time it issued its November 12, 2005 Resolution, the elections would have already
passed. Neither can the COMELEC refer to the October 2007 elections because it would
not then be proximate (or immediate) because such elections will take place a little less
than two years after the issuance of the November 12, 2005 Resolution.
Nevertheless, such mistake will not render the issuance of the assailed Resolutions tainted
with any grave abuse of discretion.1awphi1.net
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The proclamation of Pablo Yamat as Punong
Barangay of Nigui, Masantol, Pampanga is UPHELD; and the order for petitioner
Bartolome Balingit to vacate, cease and desist from performing the functions attached to
said office per COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2005 isREITERATED.
Costs against petitioner.
33
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
34
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO
TAMAYO,petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986
EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon
C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by
"Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and
animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it
resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons
identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 8647322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No.
86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal
Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538
against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y
Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano
and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of
Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution
presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of
their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the
Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their
application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered
at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver
Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in
between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District,
arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres
thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but
this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng
mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the
crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but
some of them fought back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards
Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized. 1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the
Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President
Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal
and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she
continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si
Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A
few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang
gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the
loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow
shirt. 2 He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting
"Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers
appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him.
Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled
him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo
Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo
unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which
Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to
tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as
another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo
twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. 3 Salcedo tried to stand but
accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. 4 Accused Nilo Pacadar
punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" 5Sumilang tried to pacify
Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on
the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip
Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed
him. 6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. 7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face.
He sat on some cement steps 8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary
of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang
in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo
ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until
Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a
traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So
they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
35
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions,

abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the following post-mortem
findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right
side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x
3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0
x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right
temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right
anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid. 10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and
foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the
following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to
order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident.
A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then
Police Chief, for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. 11 Several
persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on
the basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and
investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim
and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of
the photographs presented by the prosecution 12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house
in Quezon City. 13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the
Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with
hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los
Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He
said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the
photographs.18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a
member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day.
According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed
the incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting
Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo.
The maulers however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in
their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar,
Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder
qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise
convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez,
Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases
as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No. 8647322, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
two (2) Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby
acquits them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the
Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on each of them an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS
and TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY
(20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
ofReclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No. 86-47790,
the Court finds the Accused Richard de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal for the crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no other extenuating circumstances,
the Court hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion
Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-48538 the
Court finds the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, for the
36
crime of "Murder" defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No. 86-4893l, the
Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused for
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said
charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-49007, the
Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of
said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court
finds the said Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplice to
the crime of Murder under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE
(9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to
TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan,
Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, to the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as
actual damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan,
Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under detention
during the pendency of these cases shall be credited to them provided that
they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial court
by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for
Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified
by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the
information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel Tan y
Mostero and Richard de los Santos are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a
consequence, an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an
accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed
in the instant consolidated cases, the said cases are now hereby certified to
the Honorable Supreme Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as
Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to
us for automatic review of the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accusedappellants sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the
Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from the City
Jail unless they are being detained for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot
and academic. The Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison
and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD
TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES
WHO HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega
are hereby cancelled. 22
II
37
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING

CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND
INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT
INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE
RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PRINCIPAL
ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER AND NOT DEATH
(HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY.25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION
OF FACT UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND
EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF
THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P",
"V", TO "V-48", "W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED WAS MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE
INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies
of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo,
because they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to
them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only
after a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three
sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved version of the
incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another
case as accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and
unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by
General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the
government. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the
police and submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before
announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the police that he would cooperate with them and
identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony
incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended
during the investigation of Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness
stand for being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's
testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the
whole, his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at
some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate
the credence of witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on
the witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions
of a witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an
entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest
mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from
persons with imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness
can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate
each other on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive
identification of all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported
by the medical and documentary evidence on record.
38
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that
the victim had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from
more than one hard object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by
punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a
result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and
blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified
that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G,"
and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to
"W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligenceoperatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly
identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the
contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution
witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to
impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the
Luneta starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along
Roxas Boulevard, 41 as he was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with
his assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling
published in local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms.
Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these
photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or
persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified
by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they
were produced. 48 The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can
identify the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the
person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject
to impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and
accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence,
appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of
proper identification. 54 However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove
Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48"
to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated
in the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and
accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas
represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including
Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs
to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was made by
counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and
interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility.57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that
the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these
photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an
admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos,
Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence
thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the
appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in
various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo
Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after
the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the
two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture
the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did
not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang
and
Banculo 61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among the
principal accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not
death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several
persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each
other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray
someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries
can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prison
mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the
deceased, the penalty ofprision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon
the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2)
that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
39
and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and
assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed
in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or
who used violence can be identified. 62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. 63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and
one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but
this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a
while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and
blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a
reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident. 64
a showing as to who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a
conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others regardless of the intent
and character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July
27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for
employment in Saudi Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the
anguish wrought on his widow and three small children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages
from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the
death of the victim.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de
los Santos are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without
any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in
number 65 and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of
their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and
free himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several
meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There was
a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the
blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not
defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his
assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for
mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and
prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayoras minimum
to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is no

proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the
assailants' safety from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo
was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a
yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the rallyists, taunting
them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense
the temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation
on the part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against
Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack
against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the socalled "Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were
committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a
concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved,
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and

(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 71464 August 4, 1988

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ROMEO ESTREBELLA, accused-appellant.
40
I
PARAS, J.:
Accused Romeo Estrebella pleaded not guilty to the crime of rape allegedly
committed as follows:
The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the

crime of rape despite the insufficiency of evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
II
That on or about the 25th day of October, 1981, in the Municipality

of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimation upon the person of the undersigned,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned against her will and consent.
The trial court gravely erred in trying the case on ground of lack of
jurisdiction. (p. 34, Rollo)
From the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution Dr. Erlinda Marfil, Dr.
Maximo Reyes, Fernando Alcala and Wilfredo Davan, the following facts are
gathered:
Contrary to law.
As per result of the psychiatric and psychological examination conducted by Dr.
Erlinda Marfil of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the person of
complainant Joy Alcala y Advincula, it was established that said complainant is a
mental retardate (Exhs. "A", "A-1" and "A-2") whose chronological age is thirteen but
her mental age is below that (only six or seven).
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

March 24, 1982.
(Sgd.) JOY
ALCALA
Y
ADVINCULA
Complainant
(p. 4, Rollo)
After due trial, the court, rendered a decision 1 the dispositive portion reading as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Court finds accused
Romeo Estrebella guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the complaining witness, Joy Alcala y
Advincula, in the sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (P. 24, Rollo)
Accused assails said decision, submitting before Us the following:
ARGUMENTS
When Dr. Maximo Reyes, senior NBI medico-legal officer did a physical and genital
examination on the person of the complainant on October 26, 1981, a day after the
alleged commission of the offense charged, he found that the outer genitalia (i.e. labia
majora and labia minora) showed healing abrasions on the posterior aspect and the
presence of bleeding. An internal examination showed congestion of the posterior of
the vestibular mucosa, meaning there was reddening and inflammation of that
particular portion. In ordinary parlance, such irritation in the genitalia of the
complainant could be caused only by the sex organ of a male in erection. Dr. Reyes
concluded that the complainant could have had sexual intercourse with a man on or
about the alleged date of commission, however, there was no complete penetration
as the hymen was intact, and elastic. (Exh. "B-3")
Fernando Alcala, brother of the complainant, testified that Romeo Estrebella, is their
neighbor. On October 25, 1981 at about 3:00 p.m., as he was about to take a bath, he
saw the accused under the house of Crisanto Cuevas sitting on a long bench with the
zipper of his pants opened. He also saw the legs of a woman around the waist of the
accused with the latter making some movements. He did not readily recognize who
the woman was until he went to the faucet and saw accused stand up. Recognizing
the female partner of the accused as his mentally retarded sister, witness Fernando
immediately went to where accused was and boxed him. His sister who was
frightened ran away while the neighbors tried to pacify Fernando and Romeo
Estrebella. The latter was able to disengage himself from the former, but another
41
brother of complainant, named Armando, ran after Romeo Estrebella and was able to
catch up with him. The two brothers then brought the accused to the police precinct of
Mandaluyong. Fernando's testimony was corroborated by Wilfredo Davan, another
witness for the prosecution.
Accused denied that he had sexual intercourse with complainant. Through his
testimony as the sole witness for the defense, accused alleged that while he was
resting under the house of his godfather on October 25, 1981 at around 3:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, Joy Alcala suddenly arrived. He called her and the latter sat on the
bench where he was sitting. He told Joy Alcala to go to the house of his sister to get
his clothes as he was going home to Bulacan. However, she did not go at once
because she was asking money from him. While he and Joy were talking, her brother
Fernando Alcala arrived and suddenly hit him. He did not do anything because
Fernando was drunk. When he was on his way home, Fernando Alcala and his
brother Armando, stopped him and then boxed him until he fell down. He asked them
why they hit him but they did not answer. He further averred that he used to see Joy
Alcala play with her private part by inserting her two fingers. In fact whenever he saw
her playing with herself he usually gave her a spanking.
Appellant's defense is denial of the offense charged. That he did not rape
complainant is allegedly supported by the findings of Dr. Maximo Reyes that there
was no tear or laceration in her hymen. He further argues that
"(g)ranting arguendo but without admitting that rape is committed, there is however,
no evidence adduced that complainant was forced or intimidated by the accused", or
that the sexual intercourse was against her will and consent but that, it was mutually
voluntary, as gleaned from the testimonies of Fernando Alcala and Wilfredo Davan
who testified to the effect that they did not hear any word or conversation between the
two (accused and complainant) while performing the sexual act.
Appellant's arguments deserve no consideration.
Based on the medical and physical examination of the genital organ of complainant
conducted by Dr. Maximo Reyes (Exh. "B"), Joy Alcala had sexual intercourse with a
man on October 25, 1981 due to the presence of abrasion and congestion and
bleeding in the genitalia, a physical condition consistent with sexual intercourse.
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all
witnesses put together. (People vs. ardoje 99 SCRA 388). Furthermore, such medical
findings confirm the testimonies of Femando Alcala and Wilfredo Davan that they saw
accused Romeo Estrebella having carnal knowledge with Joy Alcala on said date
under the house of Crisanto Cuevas. The fact that the hymen was not lacerated does
not negate rape. We have held that penetration by entry of the lips of the female
organ even without rapture of hymen suffices to warrant conviction for rape (People
vs. Conchada, 88 SCRA 683, People v. Ytac 95 SCRA 644).
It is established by the medical and phychological examination that complainant is a

mental retardate. Sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason or one
who is weak in intellect to the extent that she is incapable of giving rational consent to
the carnal intercourse constitutes rape. In this type of rape the employment of force or
intimidation on the part of the man and resistance on the part of the woman are not
essential. In the instant case the fact that complainant did not offer any resistance did
not mean that she consented, for clearly she could not comprehend the fun
implications of the libidinous act. Surely, she deserves the protection of the law.
In his second assignment of error, appellant insists that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction to try the case because the complaint was filed by complainant who was a
minor and a mental retardate contrary to the provisions of Rule 110, Secs. 4 and 5 of
the Revised Rules of Court and Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent
portions reading as follows:
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to
institute the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of
her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent
or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority.
(Rule 110, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; Rule 110, Sec. 5, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.)
xxx xxx xxx
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as the case may be. ...
(Also, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code)
Again, appellant's argument holds no water.
It is of course well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an actionin this
case the crime of rapeis and may be conferred only by law, and that jurisdiction
over a given crime not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred
thereon by the parties involved in the offense. (Manila Railroad v. Atty. General, 20
Phil. 523; Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514, cited in Valdepenas vs. People, 16 SCRA
871). But the aforementioned provision of Art. 344 does not determine the jurisdiction
of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction,
because the same with respect to the instant crime is governed by the Judiciary Act of
1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of
42
crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint
required in said Art. 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been
imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer
to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public
trial. (Samilin v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304, cited in
Valdepenas v. People, supra)
In the case at bar, while the complaint may have been technically in the sense that
complainant was incompetent, this defect has been cured when complainant's brother
Fernando Alcala took the witness stand for the prosecution. The brother's testimony
shows the consent and willingness of the family of complainant, who can not give her
consent obviously, to have the private offense committed against the latter publicly
tried. Substantially, this is what is required by the rules. Evidently, by undergoing trial,
the family of complainant chose to denounce the injustice committed against the latter
in public and thus agreed to bear the personal effects of said exposure. Undoubtedly,
therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to try the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of the accused has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
43
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P42,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages,
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Eladio C. Tangan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking the rule that factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. Thus, he argues
that this Court erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstances which were appreciated by the
lower courts and in raising the indeterminate penalty imposed on him from a maximum of two
years and four months of prision correccional to a maximum of fourteen years, eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal. This, he claims, exposed him to the "horrifying reality" of being
re-incarcerated after having been preventively confined for more than four years.1
It bears stressing that at no time during the trial of the case did petitioner raise self-defense.
Nevertheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the attendance of the mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense, sufficient provocation, and passion and
obfuscation.1wphi1.nt
When petitioner appealed the decision, he threw open the whole case for review. It became the
duty of this Court to correct any error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it was
made the subject of assignment of errors or not.2
G.R. No. 105830
January 15, 2002
ELADIO
C.
TANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 23, 2001, this Court rendered a Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed decision
subject of G.R. No. 105830 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,maximum, with all the
accessory penalties.
Thus, this Court reviewed the records of the case and found that the evidence fails to support or
substantiate the lower court's findings and conclusions. Clearly, therefore, this case falls within
the recognized exceptions to the rule that an appellate court will generally not disturb the
assessment of the trial court on factual matters considering that the latter, as a trier of fact, is in
a better position to appreciate the same.3
First of all, the physical evidence belies petitioner's version of the incident. As we clearly
explained in our assailed Decision:
The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and
the target was about 2 inches but definitely not more than 3 inches. Based on the
point of exit and trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the alleged assailant
were facing each other when the shot was made and the position of the gun was
almost perpendicular when fired. These findings disprove Tangan's claim of accidental
shooting. A revolver is not prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its
mechanism, unless it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied
on the trigger to fire the revolver.4
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the
hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence. 5 For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest
order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.6
44
The physical evidence is amply corroborated by the eyewitness accounts of Rosalia dela Cruz
and Mary Ann Borromeo to the effect that petitioner took a gun from his car and suddenly fired it
at the deceased.7
Likewise, this Court found that the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the trial court are not
present. Petitioner refutes this and insists on his version of the facts. However, the testimony of
his witness, on which he heavily relies, suffers from material inconsistencies which render it
unworthy of belief.
It was shown that defense witness Nelson Pante was 10 meters away when he saw the incident,
and his line of vision was blocked by petitioner's car.8 From that distance and vantage point, he
could not have heard anything or have had an unobstructed view of the events. Sure enough,
the details of his statement betray the falsity thereof. He testified that petitioner was hit on the
eyebrow, while petitioner said he was hit on the jaw.9 Pante was also unable to identify Manuel
Miranda, the person whom he supposedly saw punch petitioner.10
All of these, and the incredibility of petitioner's account when compared with the physical
evidence, belie self-defense. From the established facts, it can be plainly gleaned that there was
no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. What merely transpired before petitioner's
gun went off was a heated exchange of words between the protagonists. This does not qualify
as unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack, or imminent danger thereof. The person defending himself must have been attacked with
actual physical force or with actual use of weapon.11
the assailed Decision is biased in favor of respondents and, therefore, must recuse herself from
this case. Petitioner's accusation, however, is based on nothing more than this Court's own
evaluation of the evidence and departure from the rule that findings of facts of lower court are
not to be disturbed.
Petitioner should bear in mind that the Decision, although penned by a member of the Court, is a
decision of the whole Court. Hence, any attack on the integrity of the ponente, or any member of
the Court for that matter, is an attack on the entire Court. More importantly, petitioner fails to
establish with concrete proof his imputations of bias. Such irresponsible and unfounded
statements will not be taken lightly by this Court. Hence, petitioner and his counsel should be
admonished for making such baseless and unsubstantiated accusations of bias against the
Court. Moreover, the Omnibus Motion should be denied for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt
Petitioner faults the Court for increasing the penalty five times such that, despite having served
the penalty imposed by the trial court, he now faces the "intolerable specter of
reincarceration."13 It should be recalled that petitioner, by consciously and deliberately firing his
gun, snuffed the life out of a 29-year old optometrist. Suffice it to state that petitioner should bear
the consequences of his felonious act.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Omnibus Motion to Re-Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse is likewise DENIED. This
denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.12
By the same token, the evidence does not show the attendance of the mitigating circumstance
of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party. As stated, the provocation must be
sufficient to excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its
gravity. In this case, all that the deceased did immediately before he was shot was shout
expletives and slap petitioner's hand when the latter pointed it to his face. These acts, while
offensive, were grossly disproportionate to petitioner's act of drawing and firing of a gun.
Furthermore, there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence that could have naturally
produced a powerful excitement in petitioner's mind causing him to lose his reason and selfcontrol. As shown by the facts, no passion and obfuscation could have clouded his mind.
On the whole, therefore, this Court correctly imposed on petitioner the proper penalty for
Homicide, without the attendance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and sentenced
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, maximum.
While his Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioner filed with the Court an "Omnibus
Motion to Re-Raffle/Transfer and/or to Recuse." He alleged, among others, that the ponente of
G.R. No. 104383*

July 12, 2001
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VIAS, FEDERICO AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO
BAGAS
y
DALUHATAN
and
DIASCORO
VIAS
y
ODAL, accused.
ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN, accused-appellant
KAPUNAN, J.:
One of the cardinal rules of criminal law is that the guilt of the accused must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 1 In the present case,
there being a doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant, the constitutional presumption of
innocence stands and he must be acquitted.
This is an appeal from the decision dated November 28, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 131, Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. 36930 finding accused-appellant Albino
Bagas guilty of the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape and sentencing him
accordingly.
At about nine-thirty in the evening of February 22, 1991, a group of eight armed men
wearing masks entered the house of complainant Perlita delos Santos Lacsamana at
45
Sacred Heart Village, Kalookan City and robbed the said premises of valuables in the total
amount of P728,000.00. In the course of the robbery, two members of the gang raped
Maria Fe Catanyag and Estrella Rolago, niece and employee, respectively of complainant
Lacsamana.
On February 27, 1991, accused-appellant Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico
Ampatin, Dioscoro Vias and four other accused, whose identities are unknown and who
are still at large up to the present, were charged with the complex crime of robbery in band
with double rape under the following information:
That on or about the 22nd day of February 1991, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, all armed with guns, with
intent of gain, and by means of violence, threats and intimidation upon the
person of Perlita delos Santos de Lacsamana, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:
Cash money in the amount of -----------
P128,000.00
Jewelries worth ----------------------------
600,000.00
Total -
P728,000.00
all belonging to said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the
aforesaid amount of P728,000.00; and on the occasion thereof, said accused
conspiring together and mutually helping one another likewise by means of force
and violence and with the use of their weapons, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with Fe Catanyag y Cabaero and Estrella
Rolago y Madrid both residents of said house, against their will and without their
consent.
Contrary to law.2
On arraignment, all the accused including accused-appellant Albino Bagas pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court and as presented in the Solicitor General's Brief are as
follows:
The incident happened at the compound of Block 5, Road 32, Phase II of the
Sacred Heart Village in Kalookan City (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 2, 1991). In the
compound are the main house where Mrs. Perlita Lacsamana resides and
another house which serves as the office and quarters for Lacsamana's
employees. In between of these two houses is about three (3) meter-wide area
where the dirty kitchen and the garage are found. In the first floor of the main
house is the master's bedroom, and on the second floor is the guestroom" (pp. 68, TSN, July 2, 1991).
While at the master's bedroom on that particular evening at about 9:30 p.m.,
Lacsamana overheard her maid, cried 'aray, aray, aray'. She immediately went
out but as soon as she opened the door of her room, two (2) men (one of them is
accused Amestuzo while the other one remains unarrested) poked their guns on
her. At gun point, Lacsamana, Lea, Edwin, and Belen were forcibly brought to the
second floor of the main house. Thereat, Lacsamana saw four (4) other male
persons ransacking her premises. The said male persons, armed with guns and
knives, tied her including all her employees and members of her household with
the use of torn electric fan wire and television wire. After that they were told to lie
down with face against the floor but a minute later she was asked where the
master's bedroom is and when she answered that it is on the ground floor, she
was again forcefully brought down. On her way down, she saw, aside from the six
(6) male persons who were inside her house, two (2) other male persons (later
identified as accused Ampatin and Vias) outside the main house but within the
compound (pp. 8-10, TSN, July 2, 1991).1wphi1.nt
Once they were already inside the master's bedroom, the six (6 ) armed male
persons (two (2) of them were Amestuzo and Bagas) ransacked the same and
took all her monies, jewelries, shoes, jackets, colored television and imported
wine. Likewise, aforesaid accused ate the foods found by them in their kitchen.
(pp.10-11, 13, TSN, July 2, 1991).
After ransacking the room, two (2) of the accused, one (1) of them is Amestuzo,
brought Estrella Rolago inside her room and afterwhich she was in turn brought
to the guest room. Thereat she heard Rolago pleading "Maawa kayo, maawa
kayo" then after ten (10) minutes, Rolago, with bloodstain on her shorts, was
brought in back to the guest room (pp. 13-14, TSN, July 2, 1991). Rolago was
raped by Amestuzo (pp. 17-20, TSN, July 3, 1991).
Almost simultaneously, Bagas likewise sexually assaulted and ravished Fe
Catanyag (pp. 38-40, TSN, July 3, 1991; pp. 2-5, TSN, July 4, 1991). Thereafter,
Bagas shouted at her to stand up and although she was experiencing pain on her
private part which was bleeding at that time, she stood up, dressed up and
proceeded to the servants' quarter (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 4, 1991).
Thereafter, Mrs, Lacsamana shouted for help. Sensing that the accused had
already left, they locked the door. With the help of her employer and coemployees, more particularly Nanding, she and Rolago were brought the nearby
Neopolitan Clinic and from there they proceeded to the St. Luke's Hospital where
Dr. Brion treated Catanyag and Rolago (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 4, 1991; pp. 19-20,
TSN, July 3, 1991).3
On November 28, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment convicting all the accused. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment CONVICTING accused VALERIANO
AMESTUZO y VIAS, FEDERICO AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y
DALUHATAN, DIOSCORO VINAS y ODAL of the complex crime of ROBBERY IN
BAND WITH DOUBLE RAPE and sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment
of DOUBLE RECLUSION PERPETUA and orders them to jointly and severally
indemnify to complainant Perlita delos Santos de Lacsamana the amount of
P800,000.00 representing the value of monies and properties taken forcibly away
by the accused and to indemnify, jointly and severally, Ma. Fe Catanyag and
Estrella Rolago the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each.
SO ORDERED.4
From the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accused-appellant Bagas
appealed to this Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1) the alleged deprivation of his
constitutional right to be represented by counsel during his identification, (2) the trial court's
error in giving due weight to the open court identification of him which was based on a
suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification, and (3) the trial court's improper
rejection of his defense of alibi.
Accused-appellant maintains that from the time he was arrested until he was presented to
the complainants for identification, he was deprived of the benefit of counsel. He narrates
the circumstances surrounding his arrest and investigation as follows:
On February 26, 1991, four days after the alleged incident, a group of policemen together
with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in
NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They
were looking for a certain "Mario" and searched the first and second floors of the building.
Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and
uttered, "Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino." It was at
this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person
Ampatin chanced to look upon.
46
Thereafter, he was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused
Ampatin. While on board the jeep, accused Ampatin told him that he (Ampatin) committed
an error in pointing him out to the police,"namumukaan lang niya ako, napagkamalian lang
niya ako." They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed
under detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the
complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and
then to the right and he was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew
accused Amestuzo and Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The
policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This
incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped
when one of the policemen intervened.5
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious error when it deprived
him of his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His
singular presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel,
accused-appellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be
assisted by counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by the
police and placed on detention. He maintains that the identification was a critical stage of
prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial
proper.
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-calledMiranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is
under custodial investigation.6 Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. 7 Police line-up is not part of the
custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. 8 This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing9 and in
the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra.10 The right to be assisted by counsel
attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process.
This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory11 and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up. 12
Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was
presented for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the
investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the
complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from
accused-appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accusedappellant when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of the
constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of his conviction. 13In the present case, there is no such
confession or extra-judicial admission.
Accused-appellant also makes much ado about the manner in which he was presented to
the complainants for identification. It is alleged that the identification was irregular as he
was not placed in a police line-up and instead, made to stand before the complainants
alone.
Again, the contention has no merit. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is
no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. 14 The fact that he
was brought out of the detention cell alone and was made to stand before the accused by
himself and unaccompanied by any other suspects or persons does not detract from the
validity of the identification process.
However, we agree that complainants' out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was
seriously flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the admissibility and reliability
of out-of-court identifications, we have applied the totality of circumstances test enunciated

in the case of People vs. Teehankee15 which lists the following factors:
xxx (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.
The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the police
station appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before complainants had the
opportunity to view accused-appellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the
detention cell to be presented to them for identification, the police made an announcement
that he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by
accused Ampatin as one of culprits. According to accused-appellant Q:
When the complaining witnesses arrived at the Urduja precinct at that time
you mentioned, were you immediately kicked by them?
A:
No, sir.
Q:
How long a time from the time they arrived at the Urduja precinct to the
time that you were kicked by them?
A:
Around 10 minutes, sir.
Q:
And how were you identified or recognized by the complaining witnesses?
A:
Because upon arrival at the Urduja police station, the policemen
announced that I am one of the suspects in this case and thereafter, the
complainants started kicking me, sir.
Q:
So that the announcement of the policemen that you were one of the
suspects came first then they started kicking you?
A:
Yes, sir.16
It is, thus, clear that the identification was practically suggested by the police themselves
when they announced to the complainants that accused-appellant was the person pointed
to by Ampatin. The fact that this information came to the knowledge of the complainants
prior to their identification based on their own recall of the incident detracts from the
spontaneity of their subsequent identification and therefore, its objectivity.
In a similar case, People vs. Cruz,17 accused Cruz, a suspected co-conspirator in a case of
robbery with homicide, was presented to the witnesses alone and made to walk and turn
around in their presence. Then the police pointed out to the accused and several others as
the persons suspected by the police as the perpetrators of the robbery committed in Gosoon. The Court, in rejecting the subsequent identification made by the witnesses, reasoned
that:
The manner by which (witnesses) were made to identify the accused at the
police station was pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was
none, activated visual imagination, and all told, subverted their reliability as
eyewitnesses.
In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,18 an NBI agent first pointed the accused to the witnesses
after which the latter identified the accused. The Court held that such identification was
doubtful as the same was not spontaneous and independent as there was improper
suggestion coming from the NBI agent. We ruled that a "show-up" or the presentation of a
single suspect to a witness for purposes of identification is seriously flawed as it
"constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the
police."
Likewise in People vs. Meneses,19 where the accused was presented to the lone witness
as the suspect in the crime inside the police investigator's office, the Court pronounced
that although the police officer did not literally point to the accused as in the Tuason case,
the confrontation and the identification proceeding therefrom was objectionable.
The Court also finds that the trial court erroneously rejected accused-appellant's alibi.
47
Accused-appellant clearly and positively testified that at the time of the crime, February 22,
1991, he was working as a shell cutter in a factory in Pasay City where he was a stay-in
employee. He rendered overtime work until ten o'clock in the evening that night because
they had to rush work. After ten p.m., he, together with his stay-in co-workers, went to
sleep. Four days later, he was arrested when accused Ampatin randomly pointed him out
to the police.20
This testimony of accused-appellant was materially corroborated by two of his coemployees who were with him on the night of the incident. Rodolfo Rosales, his co-worker,
testified that he worked overtime until 10 p.m. in the Pasay City factory together with
accused-appellant. Upon finishing work, they went to sleep in their quarters on the second
floor of the building because they were stay-in employees of the factory. 21 Another coworker of accused-appellant, Clemente Gahelan, was similarly offered as a witness to
corroborate Rosales' testimony and his testimony was duly admitted by the prosecution. 22
The employer of accused-appellant Rolando Ocasla, likewise testified that on the night of
the incident, accused-appellant worked overtime in his factory until 10 p.m. After 10 p.m.,
he personally locked the door of the premises which was the only means of ingress and
engress, as he always does because it was his means of preventing any pilferage of
materials. He was the only one who had keys to said door. Around five a.m. of the following
day, he woke up accused-appellant and told him to drink his coffee. He also declared that
there was nothing unusual about accused-appellant's behavior either, before, during or
after the date of the alleged crime.23
The defense of alibi or denial assumes significance or strength when it is amply
corroborated by a credible witness. 24 And to be given weight, accused must prove not only
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he was so far away
that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.25
In this case, we find accused-appellant's alibi sufficiently corroborated by the testimonies
of his co-workers and his employer who categorically stated that they were with accusedappellant on the night of the crime. There was no evidence that these witnesses were
related to accused-appellant; neither was it shown that they had any personal interest nor
motive in the case. As impartial credible witnesses, their testimonies cannot be doubted
absent a clear showing of undue bias or prejudice, or convincing proof of the impropriety of
their motives to testify for the accused.26
Accused-appellant vehemently argues that it was physically impossible for him to have
been present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. First, the crime was committed around 9:30 in the evening of February 22,
1991. Accused-appellant, as well as two other witnesses, testified that he worked in the
factory until 10 p.m. that night and went to sleep after. Second, there was only one door in
the factory which was the only means of entrance and exit and this door was kept locked
by witness Ocasla after ten p.m. that night. Ocasla was the only person who had a key to
this door. Third, the windows on the first floor of the building consisted of hollow blocks with
small holes which do not allow passage. The second and third floor windows were 14 and
21 feet high, respectively. There was no possible means of exit through these windows
without accused-appellant getting hurt or injured. Lastly, the crime took place in Kalookan
City around 9:30 p.m. while accused-appellant's place of work was in Pasay City.
Assuming for the sake of argument that he was able to leave the premises after 10 p.m.
that night, by the time he reaches Kalookan, the crime would have already been
completed.
The Court has held that where an accused sets up alibi as a defense, the courts should not
be too readily disposed to dismiss the same, for, taken in the light of all the evidence on
record, it may be sufficient to reverse the outcome of the case as found by the trial court
and thereby rightly set the accused free.27 Though inherently weak as a defense, alibi in
the present case has been sufficiently established by corroborative testimonies of credible
witnesses and by evidence of physical impossibility of accused-appellant's presence at the
scene of the crime. Alibi, therefore, should have been properly appreciated in accusedappellant's favor.
Another significant evidence which the trial court failed to consider is the voluntary
confession of accused Federico Ampatin absolving accused-appellant Bagas of the crime.
Ampatin's testimony was clear and categorical:
Q:
When you reached that house where Bagas was working what happened?
A:
All the persons were ordered to lie down, sir.
xxx
Q:
And what did they do to you?
A:
Immediately I was instructed to follow the policemen who went upstairs,
sir.
Q:
Why did that policemen go upstairs?
A:
He was looking for Mario, sir.
xxx
Q:
Upon reaching the second floor, what happened there?
A:
They did not see any person there, sir.
Q:
What followed next?
A:
P/O Melmida pistol-whipped me, sir.
Q:
Where were you hit?
A:
On the left portion of my neck, sir.
Q:
Did Melmida utter any remark while hitting you?
xxx
A:
He told me to point to somebody else, sir, saying these words, "Magturo ka
ng tao kahit sino."
xxx
Q:
So what did you do when you were ordered to point to anyone?
A:
Because at that time I cannot yet stand up he forced me to go downstairs,
sir.
xxx
Q:
Were you able to reached (sic) the ground floor?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And what happened there?
A:
I pointed to Albino Bagas, sir, because he was the only first person I saw
there at the ground floor while his companions were on the other side because I
don't want to get hurt anymore, Your Honor.
Court: When you see (sic) Bagas was lying face down at the time you pointed to
him?
A:
Yes, your Honor.
Court: You did not bother to look at his face?
A:
No more Your Honor because I was in a hurry to point to somebody
because I was afraid that I will be hurt again, Your Honor.
xxx
Court: You mean to say at the time you pointed to Albino Bagas you did not know
him?
A:
No I don't know him, Your Honor.28
Ampatin and accused-appellant were charged as co-conspirators in the crime of robbery
with rape. As a co-accused, it would have been more consistent with human nature for
Ampatin to implicate accused-appellant if indeed he was one of the gang. In fact, the Court
has recognized that "as is usual with human nature, a culprit, confessing a crime is likely to
put the blame as far as possible on others rather than himself. 29 The fact that he testified to
the innocence of a co-accused, an act which resulted in no advantage or benefit to him
and which might in fact implicate him more, should have been received by the trial court as
an indicum of the truth of Ampatin's testimony and the innocence of herein accusedappellant. Ampatin's testimony, therefore, should have been given weight by the trial court.
48
More so, the same was substantially corroborated by another witness, Rodolfo Rosales,
accused-appellant's co-worker and who was present when accused-appellant was
arrested. Rosales testified as follows:
Q:
Now, do you know when was Albino Bagas arrested in connection with this
case?
A:
Last February 25, that was Monday, sir.
Q:
And where were you when he was arrested?
A:
I was there at that time.
xxx
Q:
xxx what was the reaction of Albino Bagas when he was being pointed to
and arrested by the arresting officers?
A:
The situation goes like this, sir, the policemen arrived there and they were
holding the persons of Ampatin and they were looking for a person named Mario
that was what I heard, sir, and then the policemen forced us to be identified or to
be seen by the guide. Ampatin at first at the ground floor but since there was
nobody there by the name of Mario they proceeded to the second floor and upon
looking one of the policemen shouted, "Wala rito, niloloko lang tayo ng taong ito."
Court: Then what happened next?
Witness: And I noticed that the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was afraid,
so, because of fear he was able to point on the person of Albino Bagas but when
asked he does not know the name of Albino Bagas, Your Honor.
Atty. Pacis: Before going to the second floor, because according to you the
arresting officers and the guide went to the second floor, was Albino Bagas at the
ground floor seen by the guide and the policemen?
A:
We were the first group of persons seen by the policemen and Albino and I
were beside each other, sir.
Q:
And you want to impressed (sic) upon this Honorable Court that at first at
the ground floor, Albino Bagas was not identified by this Ampatin before going to
the second floor?
A:
The guide was not able to identify the person of Albino Bagas and that was
the reason why they still made searches at the second floor, sir.
Q:
How was Federico Ampatin able to identify Albino Bagas when he was
accompanied by the policemen went downstairs?
A:
I noticed from the reaction of Federico Ampatin that he was afraid after
hearing the shout of the policemen, sir.
xxx30
The testimony of witness Rosales corroborates Ampatin's declaration in court that he does
not know herein accused-appellant and merely pointed to him out of fear of the police.
These testimonies remain unrebutted by the prosecution as the arresting officers were not
presented to refute or deny the same. The foregoing testimonies exculpating accusedappellant have sufficiently cast at least a shadow of doubt as to his guilt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Albino Bagas of
the crime of robbery with multiple rape is hereby REVERSED and he is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. His immediate release is hereby ordered unless he is held for some
other valid charges.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
49
of small transparent plastic sachets containing 0.08 gram, total weight of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu) for [t]wo (2) pcs of One Hundred Peso Bill with SN DF950395 and
KY384741 knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment. During the pre-trial conference, the
parties stipulated that P/Insp. Ericson L. Calabocal conducted a qualitative examination on two
(2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets evidenced by Physical Science Report No. D-845-03
dated 17 July 2003. It was further stipulated that said witness had no personal knowledge as to
the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest of appellant, as well as the source of the
subject specimens.4
Trial ensued. Witnesses for the prosecution narrated that in the evening of 16 July 2003, a male
informant came to the office of the Northern Police District on Tanigue Street, Kaunlaran Village,
Caloocan City. In the presence of PO3 Gilbert Velasco (PO3 Velasco) and PO2 Eugene Amoyo
(PO2 Amoyo), the informant complained about the rampant selling of shabu by a certain MacMac. Said information was relayed to P/Chief Inspector Rafael Santiago who immediately
instructed PO3 Velasco to form a buy-bust team. The team was composed of PO3 Velasco, PO2
Amoyo, PO3 Joel Borda (PO3 Borda), PO2 Loreto Lagmay, PO1 Renato Ameng, PO1 Allan
Reyes and PO1 Joel Cosme. PO2 Amoyo was the designated poseur-buyer. Two (2) pieces
of P100.00 bills were prepared as boodle money. The initials "ECA" were placed on the bills.
G.R. No. 181545
October 8, 2008
THE
PEOPLE
vs.
MARK DELA CRUZ, appellant.
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
DECISION
The buy-bust team underwent a briefing and then proceeded to the target area on board two (2)
separate vehicles. They arrived at a parking lot along Hipon Liit in Dagat-dagatan at 7:30 p.m.
PO2 Amoyo, PO3 Velasco and PO3 Borda, along with the informant, waited beside a coconut
tree for Mac-Mac.
After two hours, appellant arrived with two male companions. The informant approached
appellant and introduced PO2 Amoyo to him as a buyer of P200.00 worth of shabu. Appellant
left for a while to get the shabu from his companions, who were standing 7 meters away from
the group. He returned ten (10) minutes later and handed two (2) plastic sachets to PO2 Amoyo,
who, in exchange, handed over the boodle money.
TINGA, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the 12 September 2007 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02534, affirming the 24 August 2006 judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 120 of Caloocan City, finding appellant Mark Dela Cruz y Batac guilty of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Appellant was charged with illegal sale of shabu in an Information dated 18 July 2003,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16 th day of July 2003 in Caloocan City, M.M. and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, without having been authorized by law, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to one PO2 EUGENE C. AMOYO, who posed as buyer, two (2) pcs.
After the exchange, PO2 Amoyo raised his left hand to signal the other members of the buy-bust
team that the transaction had already been concluded. PO3 Velasco and PO3 Borda
immediately arrested appellant while PO2 Amoyo ran after appellants companions. There was
an exchange of gunfire between PO2 Amoyo and an unidentified companion but the latter was
able to escape unscathed. PO2 Amoyo kept the two (2) plastic sachets in his pocket.
A spot investigation was conducted on appellant. It was revealed that the two (2) male
companions were identified as Amay and Tabo. Appellant was then brought to the police
headquarters. PO2 Amoyo placed his markings "ECA-BB-1" and "ECA-BB-2" on the plastic
sachets before turning them over, together with the buy-bust money, to SPO4 Jorge Tabayag.
PO2 Amoyo also prepared a request for laboratory examination addressed to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
50
The two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were found positive
for shabu. Said finding was indicated in Physical Science Report No. D-845-035 prepared by
Forensic Chemist and Police Inspector Erickson L. Calabocal of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Group.
Appellant presented a different version of the facts. He testified that at 8:30 p.m. on 16 July
2003, he was sitting in the plaza located on Hipon Liit St., Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City. He
was waiting for his brother to deliver his boots when the policemen arrived and were looking for
an alias Amay. Appellant then heard a gunshot and saw Amay firing the shot. Appellant ran
towards his house. Later, the policemen went to his house and handcuffed him. When appellant
asked why he was being arrested, the policemen claimed that appellant knew Amay. Appellant
denied selling shabu and asserted that the case was filed against him when he refused to give
information about Amay.
Appellants testimony was corroborated by his brother, Balweg Dela la Cruz, who stated in court
that appellant instructed him to get his boots and bring them to the plaza at around 8:30 p.m. 6 As
he was about to leave the house, Balweg saw his brother being arrested by two policemen. He
heard from other people that the policemen were asking appellant if he knew of a man named
Amay.7
In finding appellant guilty, the trial court ruled that there was a meeting of minds between the
poseur-buyer and appellant as to the delivery of shabu in exchange for P200.00. The dispositive
portion of said judgment reads:
Premises considered, this Court finds accused MARK DELA CRUZ Y BATAC "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Sec. 5, Article II of [R.A. No.] 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon him the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
The two (2) plastic sachets containing 0.04 gram each of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride is
hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PEDEA) [sic] for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.8
On 15 September 2006, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal.9
On 12 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the RTC's decision in
Criminal Case No. 68601.10 The appellate court gave weight to the testimony of the poseurbuyer as well as to the Physical Science Report in concluding that the illegal sale of shabu was
perpetrated by appellant. The appellate court rejected appellants defense of frame-up for failure
to substantiate such allegation and in light of the presumption of regularity accorded to police
officers in the performance of their official duties. Anent the alleged failure of the police officers
to observe the procedure laid down under Section 21 of R. A. No. 9165, the appellate court held
that such failure is not fatal as the circumstances in the instant case show that the integrity
pertaining to the custody of the seized shabu was not compromised notwithstanding that the
same were marked only during the investigation held at the police station.11
After obtaining an unfavorable decision, appellant filed a notice of appeal before this Court.12
On 9 April 2008, this Court required the parties to simultaneously file their supplemental briefs. 13
In two separate manifestations, both parties expressed their intention not to file any
supplemental brief since all the issues and arguments have already been raised in their
respective Briefs.14
Appellant maintains that the prosecution was not able to establish the moral certainty required
by law to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that his defenses of alibi and
denial were supported not only by his testimony but by that of other witnesses. He questions the
identity of the shabu allegedly confiscated from him as the marking was made only in the police
station in front of the investigating officer, contrary to the requirement laid down in Section 21 (1)
of RA No. 9165. He also assails the forensic laboratory examination result in that it was not
covered by a certification in violation of Section 21 (3) of the same law. He stresses that the
prosecution must not simply rely on the presumption of regularity for it cannot by itself support a
judgment of conviction.15
In its appellees brief,16 the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) supports the conviction of
appellant. It argues that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu in a legitimate
buy-bust operation. It claims that the elements necessary in the prosecution of the illegal sale of
drugs were duly established by the prosecution, namely: the appellant, as seller of
the shabu, and the poseur-buyer were identified; and the shabu confiscated from appellant and
the money used to buy it were also presented in court. The OSG emphasizes that the sachets
of shabu presented in court were the same sachets confiscated from appellant and subjected to
laboratory examination. It justifies the non-observance of Section 21 (1) of R. A. No. 9165 since
the corpus delicti of the illegal sale of drugs was duly established during trial. It adds that after
the confiscation of the sachets of shabufrom appellant, they were immediately submitted for
laboratory examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory.17
The appeal is meritorious.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.18
The common issue that crops out of a buy-bust operation, like in this case, is whether the drug
submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. The Court is cognizant of the fact that an entrapment operation is open to possibilities
of abuse. It is by this same thrust that the chain of custody rule was adopted by the Court.
In Lopez v. People,19 we had the occasion to expound on the chain of custody rule, thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
51
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at
the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The
same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when
the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in
form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham v. State positively
acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas
handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the
condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded
from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have
been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state
can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between
the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact
they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court
cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the
links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar
evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects
which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original
item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
Thus, the corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude.20
This Court believes that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the
seized plastic sachets containing shabu from the time they were first allegedly received until
they were brought to the police investigator.
PO2 Amoyo testified that he failed to place any marking on the sachets of shabu immediately
after the apprehension of appellant. In fact, PO3 Amoyo admitted that he only placed his
markings upon being ordered by SPO4 Tabayag.21
The defense however failed to corroborate PO2 Amoyos claim. While SPO4 Tabayag was
presented in court, he neglected to mention nor was he asked about the markings on
the shabu. On the contrary, the sworn statement of PO2 Amoyo, which was formally offered in
evidence, seemed to suggest that markings were made prior to the submission of the shabu to
SPO4 Tabayag, to wit:
16 T: Maipapakita mo ba yong sinasabi mong pinaghihinalaang Shabu na nabili mo dito kay
Mark Dela Cruz, alyas Mac Mac?
S: Opo. Ito po. [Affiant presented two (2) pieces of small transparent plastic sachets (heatsealed) containing a crystalline substance believed to be Shabu] at ang plastic po nito ay aking
minarkahan ng aking inisyal na "ECA-BB1" at "ECA-BB2]."22
Verily, PO2 Amoyos testimony suggests that he already placed his markings prior to being
questioned by SPO4 Tabayag.
Moreover, no other witness was presented to testify or to fill the gap from the time SPO4
Tabayag received the sachets of shabu from PO2 Amoyo up to the time they were delivered to
the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Furthermore, nothing on record shows that the procedural requirements of Section 21,
Paragraph 1 of Article II of R. A. No. 916523 with respect to custody and disposition of
confiscated drugs were complied with. There was no physical inventory and photograph of the
items allegedly confiscated from appellant. Neither did the police officers offer any explanation
for their failure to observe the rule. The prosecution merely sought refuge in its belief that a
stringent application of the rule may be dispensed with if the corpus delicti has been duly
established.
In People v. Orteza,24 the Court citing People v. Laxa,25 People v. Kimura26 and Zarraga v.
People,27 reiterated the ruling that the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the
custody of the seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.28
In People v. Nazareno,29 the poseur-buyer failed to immediately place his markings on the
seized drugs before turning them over to the police investigators. The police officer who placed
his markings was not presented to testify on what actually transpired after the drugs were turned
over to him. The Court equated these circumstances as failure on the part of the prosecution to
prove the existence of the corpus delicti.30
As stated by the Court in People v. Santos, Jr.,31 failure to observe the proper procedure also
negates the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. 32 As a general
rule, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full
faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties
52
regularly.33 However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities, such
presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties,
this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 34 The
presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof
and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. 35
In fine, the failure to establish the corpus delicti is detrimental to the cause of the prosecution.
The Court is thus constrained to acquit appellant on reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 September 2007
affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 120
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant MARK DELA CRUZ y BATAC is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he is
being lawfully held for another offense.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision forthwith and
to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually
released from confinement.
Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the PNP Director and the Director General of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper guidance and implementation. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that the evidence of guilt satisfies the standard of
moral certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The standard demands that all the
essential elements of the offense are established as to leave no room for any doubt about the
guilt of the accused. The courts should unfailingly impose the standard in order to prevent
injustice from being perpetrated against the accused.
Under review is the decision promulgated on September 28, 2007 by the Court of Appeals
(CA),1 whereby the CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 2, in Manila2 for violations of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Antecedents
On February 23, 2005, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed two informations charging
petitioner with illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of shabu defined and punished,
respectively, by Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165,3 to wit:
Criminal Case No. 05234564
That on or about January 20, 2005, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not
being been (sic) authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell One (1) heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing zero point zero two two (0.022) gram, of white crystalline substance
known as "SHABU" containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 05234565
That on or about January 20, 2005, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not
being then authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control One (1) heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero two four (0.024) gram of white
crystalline substance known as "SHABU" containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
G.R. No. 180177
April 18, 2012
ROGELIO
S.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
DECISION
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
REYES, Petitioner,
After petitioner pled not guilty, trial ensued. The summary of the evidence of the parties adduced
at trial follows.
In the morning of January 20, 2005, a lady confidential informant went to the Police Station 8 of
the Western Police District to report on the drug-dealing activities of a certain alias Boy (later
identified as petitioner) on M. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. 6 A buy-bust team of ten
53
members,7 including PO2 Erwin Payumo as designated poseur-buyer,8 was formed. PO2
Payumo then prepared the necessary documents prior to the operation.9
Ruling of the RTC

As stated, on May 23, 2006, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
From the police station, the lady confidential informant called petitioner by phone. The latter
instructed her to wait on M. Mapa Street. 10 Thus, the buy-bust team proceeded to that area and
arrived at around 4:20 p.m. of January 20, 2005. 11 PO2 Payumo and the lady confidential
informant arrived together to wait for petitioner. The rest of the buy-bust team, who had gone to
the area on board an L300 van, 12 took positions nearby. Petitioner came by five minutes
later,13 and, after asking the lady confidential informant whether PO2 Payumo was the buyer,
instructed Payumo to follow him to his house where he told PO2 Payumo to wait. Two other
individuals, later identified as Conchita Carlos and Jeonilo Flores, were also waiting for
petitioner.14
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with
respect to the operation deserve full faith and credit.
However like alibi, we view the defense of frame up with disfavor as it can easily be concocted
and is commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecution arising from violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Acts.
Upon getting back, petitioner asked PO2 Payumo for the payment, 15 and the latter complied and
handed the marked money consisting of three P50.00 bills all bearing the initials
"TF".16 Petitioner then went into a room and returned with a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance that he gave to PO2 Payumo. Receiving the plastic sachet, PO2 Payumo
placed a missed call to PO1 Miguelito Gil, a member of the buy-bust team, thereby giving the
pre-arranged signal showing that the transaction was completed. PO2 Payumo then arrested
petitioner after identifying himself as an officer. PO2 Payumo recovered another sachet
containing white crystalline substance from petitioners right hand, and the marked money from
petitioners right front pocket.17 The rest of the buy-bust team meanwhile came around and
recovered two sachets also containing white crystalline substance from the sofa where Conchita
and Jeonilo were sitting. The buy-bust team thus also arrested Conchita and Jeonilo.18
Having established that a legitimate buy-bust operation occurred in the case at bar, there can
now be no question as to the guilt of the accused-appellant. Such operation has been
considered as an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard to
the constitutional and legal safeguards, it deserves judicial sanction." (People of the Philippines
vs. Lowell Saludes, et al., G.R. No. 144157, June 10, 2003)
Back at the police station, PO2 Payumo placed on the plastic sachet that petitioner had handed
him the marking "RRS-1" and on the other sachet recovered from petitioners right hand the
marking "RRS-2."19 The seized items were thereafter turned over to the Western Police District
Crime Laboratory for examination by P/Insp. Judycel Macapagal, who found the items positive
for methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu.20
The entrapment operation paved the way for the valid warrantless arrest of accused, Sec. 5(a)
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides thus:
On the other hand, petitioner denied that there had been a buy-bust operation, and claimed that
he had been framed up.
Petitioner testified that he was at his house entertaining his visitors Conchita and Jeonilo in the
afternoon of January 20, 2005;21 that Conchita was selling to him a sofa bed for P800.00, while
Jeonilo was only contracted by Conchita to drive the jeepney carrying the sofa bed; 22 that the
three of them were surprised when a group of armed men in civilian clothes barged into his
house and conducted a search, and arrested them; that he was also surprised to see a plastic
sachet when the armed men emptied his pocket; that the plastic sachet did not belong to
him;23 that PO2 Payumo was not among those who entered and searched his house; 24 that the
three of them were made to board a van where PO1 Rudolf Mijares demanded P30,000.00 for
his release;25 and that because he told them he had no money to give to them, one of the men
remarked: Sige, tuluyan na yan; and that they were then brought to the police station. 26
Jeonilo corroborated petitioners story.27
The accused failed to show any ill motive on the part of the policeman to testify falsely against
him. Indeed, the prosecution showed that the police were at the place of the incident to do
exactly what they are supposed to doto conduct an operation. The portrayal put forward by
accused and his lone witness remained uncorroborated. Evidence to be believed must not only
come from a credible witness but must in itself be credible.
"A police officer or private person, without warrant, may arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; xxx
"It has been held that the testimonies of police officers involved in a buy-bust operation deserve
full faith and credit, given the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. This
presumption can be overturned if clear and convincing evidence is presented to prove either two
things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any
improper motive." (People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Remarata et al., G.R. No. 147230,
April 29, 2003)
The positive identification of appellants by the prosecution witness should prevail over the
formers denials of the commission of the crime for which they are charged, since greater weight
is generally accorded to the positive testimony of the prosecution witness than the accuseds
denial. Denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. (People of
the Philippines vs. Edwin Belibet, Manny Banoy and Ronnie Rosero, G.R. No. 91260, July 25,
1991)28
54
The dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 05-234564, finding accused, Rogelio Reyes y Samson,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay the fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

FINDING WORTHY OF CREDENCE PETITIONERS WITNESS TESTIMONY CREATING
DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
Petitioner wants the Court to give credence to his defense of frame-up, and to believe the
testimony of Jeonilo Flores who had no reason to testify falsely against the arresting officers.
Ruling
2. In Criminal Case No. 05-234565, finding accused, Rogelio Reyes y Samson,

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4
months as maximum; to pay a fine of P300,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The specimens are forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court,
accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is directed to turn over with dispatch and upon receipt the
said specimen to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in
accordance with the law and rules.
SO ORDERED.29
With his motion for reconsideration being denied by the RTC, petitioner filed his notice of
appeal.30
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC thuswise:
A fortiori, viewed in the light of the foregoing, We are strongly convinced that the prosecution has
proven the guilt of the Appellant for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The challenged Decision of
the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.31
The CA gave more weight to the testimony of poseur buyer PO2 Payumo, and believed the
findings of the laboratory examination conducted by P/Insp. Macapagal. It recognized the validity
of the buy-bust operation.
Issue
The appeal is meritorious.

In this jurisdiction, we convict the accused only when his guilt is established beyond reasonable
doubt. Conformably with this standard, we are mandated as an appellate court to sift the records
and search for every error, though unassigned in the appeal, in order to ensure that the
conviction is warranted, and to correct every error that the lower court has committed in finding
guilt against the accused.32
Guided by the standard, we acquit petitioner.
The buy-bust operation mounted against petitioner resulted from the tip of an unnamed lady
confidential informant. Such an operation, according to People v. Garcia, 33 was "susceptible to
police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion," and the possibility of
that abuse was great.34 The susceptibility to abuse of the operation led to the institution of
several procedural safeguards by R.A. No. 9165, mainly to guide the law enforcers. Thus, the
State must show a faithful compliance with such safeguards during the prosecution of every
drug-related offense.35
The procedural safeguards start with the requirements prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 relating to the custody and disposition of the confiscated, seized, and surrendered
dangerous drugs, plant sources of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments and paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. The provision relevantly
states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. xxx:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner is now before the Court seeking to reverse the decision of the CA upon the sole error
that:
55
This appeal involves two distinct drug-related offenses, namely: illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The successful prosecution of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs requires: (a) proof that the transaction or sale took place, and (b) the
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti, or the dangerous drugs themselves. On
the other hand, the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs necessitates the
following facts to be proved, namely: (a) the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs, (b)
such possession was not authorized by law, and (c) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.36 For both offenses, it is crucial that the
Prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity
thereof has been well preserved from the time of seizure or confiscation from the accused until
the time of presentation as evidence in court. Nothing less than a faithful compliance with this
duty is demanded of all law enforcers arresting drug pushers and drug possessors and
confiscating and seizing the dangerous drugs and substances from them.
This duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is discharged only
when the arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is unbroken. This has been
the reason for defining chain of custody under Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, viz:
(b) "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer or
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the
final disposition; (Emphasis supplied)
In Mallilin v. People,37 the need to maintain an unbroken chain of custody is emphasized:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at
the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The
same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule.
Cogently, Mallilin v. People is reiterated in Catuiran v. People, 38 People v. Garcia,39 and People v.
Villanueva,40among others.
Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the arresting lawmen of the
rule on chain of custody. To start with, the fact that the dangerous drugs were inventoried and
photographed at the site of arrest upon seizure in the presence of petitioner, a representative of
the media, a representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official,
was not shown. As such, the arresting lawmen did not at all comply with the further requirement
to have the attending representative of the media, representative of the DOJ, and elected public
official sign the inventory and be furnished a copy each of the inventory. Instead, the records
show that PO2 Payumo placed the markings of "RRS-1" on the sachet allegedly received from
petitioner and "RRS-2" on the two sachets allegedly seized from petitioners hand already at the
police station with only petitioner present. Yet, the Prosecution did not also present any witness
to establish that an inventory of the seized articles at least signed by petitioner at that point was
prepared.
We clarified in People v. Sanchez41 that in compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, supra,
the physical inventory and photographing of the seized articles should be conducted, if
practicable, at the place of seizure or confiscation in cases of warrantless seizure. But that was
true only if there were indications that petitioner tried to escape or resisted arrest, which might
provide the reason why the arresting team was not able to do the inventory or photographing at
petitioners house; otherwise, the physical inventory and photographing must always be
immediately executed at the place of seizure or confiscation.
In People v. Pringas,42 the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21, supra, was
held not to be fatal for as long as there was justifiable ground for it, and for as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated or seized articles were properly preserved
by the apprehending officer or team. The Court further pronounced therein that such noncompliance would not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from
him inadmissible, for what was of utmost importance was the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized or confiscated articles, considering that they were to be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
However, the omissions noted herein indicated that the State did not establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner with the same exacting certitude required for a
finding of guilt.
56
To be sure, the buy-bust operation was infected by lapses. Although PO2 Payumo declared that
he was the one who had received the sachet of shabu ("RRS-1") from petitioner and who had
confiscated the two sachets of shabu ("RRS-2") from petitioner, all of which he had then sealed,
nothing more to support the fact that the evidence thus seized had remained intact was
adduced. In fact, the State did not anymore establish to whom the seized articles had been
endorsed after PO2 Payumo had placed the markings at the station, and with whose custody or
safekeeping the seized articles had remained until their endorsement to P/Insp. Macapagal for
the laboratory examination. Presently, we cannot justifiably presume that the seized articles had
remained in the possession of PO2 Payumo in view of the testimony of P/Insp. Macapagal to the
effect that the party requesting the laboratory examination had been a certain Police Officer
Alano,43 whom the Prosecution did not at all particularly identify or present as its witness. In this
regard, Laboratory Report No. D-085-05,44 the report prepared by P/Insp. Macapagal, also
stated that the party requesting the conduct of the laboratory examination was the "OIC-SAIDSOTU, PS-8, Western Police District." Also, the Prosecution did not show to whom the seized
articles had been turned over following the conduct of the laboratory examination, and how the
seized articles had been kept in a manner that preserved their integrity until their final
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Such lapses of the Prosecution were fatal
to its proof of guilt because they demonstrated that the chain of custody did not stay unbroken,
thereby raising doubt on the integrity and identity of the dangerous drugs as evidence of the
corpus delicti of the crimes charged.
We are then not surprised to detect other grounds for skepticism about the evidence of guilt.
Firstly, PO2 Payumo testified that the lady confidential informant had gone to Police Station 8 to
report the alleged drug-selling activities of petitioner for the first time in the morning of January
20, 2005. That report led to the forming of the buy-bust team, 45 for purposes of which he
prepared the pre-operation documents. His veracity was suspect, however, considering that his
so-called Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet appeared to have been prepared on the day before,
as its date "January 19, 2005" disclosed.46 The date of January 19, 2005 also appeared in the
Certification of Coordination issued by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency in reference to
the buy-bust operation against petitioner.47 Considering that the Prosecution did not explain the
discrepancy, the impression is unavoidable that the buy-bust operation was already set in motion
even before the lady informant actually made her report against petitioner. Thereby, his defense
of frame-up was bolstered.
Secondly, the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet indicated that there were ten members "and
three (3) others" that comprised the buy-bust team.48 Yet, the Joint Affidavit submitted by the
members of the buy-bust team was executed and signed by only six officers (excluding even
poseur buyer PO2 Payumo himself), namely: PO1 Mijares, PO1 Mark Dave Vicente, PO1
Maurison Ablaza, PO1 Elmer Clemente and PO1 Gil.49 The Prosecutions failure to explain why
only six members of the buy-bust team actually executed and signed the Joint Affidavit might
indicate that the incrimination of petitioner through the buy-bust operation was probably not
reliable.1wphi1
And, thirdly, both the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet and the Certification of Coordination
revealed that the confidential information received involved two suspects of illegal drug trade in
Bacood, Sta. Mesa known as alias Boy and alias Totoy Tinga. PO2 Payumo recalled, however,
that the lady confidential informant had tipped the police off only about alias Boy. It seems from
such selectiveness that PO2 Payumo deliberately omitted the other target and zeroed in only on
alias Boy (petitioner), which might suggest that PO2 Payumo was not as reliable as a poseur
buyer-witness as he presented himself to be.1wphi1
Conviction must stand on the strength of the Prosecutions evidence, not on the weakness of the
defense the accused put up.50 Evidence proving the guilt of the accused must always be beyond
reasonable doubt. If the evidence of guilt falls short of this requirement, the Court will not allow
the accused to be deprived of his liberty. His acquittal should come as a matter of course.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
September 28, 2007 by the Court of Appeals; and ACQUITS accused ROGELIO S. REYES of
the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 05-234564 and Criminal Case No. 05-234565.
The Court DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to release
ROGELIO S. REYES from custody unless he is detained thereat for another lawful cause; and
to report on his compliance herewith within five days from receipt.
No pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
57

Saguid To Reyes

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Saguid To Reyes

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G.R. No.

159467 December 9, 2005

MAKE : TOYOTA COROLLA XL

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

4. The amount P200,000 for and as attorneys fees; and

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512

SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787

3) To pay the costs of suit.23

Hence, the instant petition, contending that:

MAKE : Toyota Corolla XL

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked encumbered.

A: It was purchased in cash.

Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in cash?

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

We now go to the award of damages.

damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P20,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

G.R. NO. 148273

April 19, 2006

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE WAS ADMITTED WHILE

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH

4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

G.R. No. 165987

March 31, 2006

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

The petition is dismissed.

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

G.R. No. 178551

October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 138322

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Ruling of the Trial Court

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994

EVIDENCE: SAGUID TO REYES

Q And after Jose Becyagen signed his name with the