Affective Responses Mediating Acceptance of Advertising

Journal of Consumer Research, Inc.
Affective Responses Mediating Acceptance of Advertising

Author(s): Rajeev Batra and Michael L. Ray
Source: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Sep., 1986), pp. 234-249
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Affective
Responses
Acceptance
of
Mediating
Advertising
RAJEEV BATRA
MICHAELL. RAY*
This article argues that affective responses (ARs) should supplement the cognitive
responses more often studied in communication research. ARs are not evaluative
responses to an advertisement, but represent the moods and feelings evoked by
the ad. The literature on ARs is reviewed, and a typology for such responses is
presented. Three ARs are studied empirically;they appear to be antecedents of the
attitude towards the ad (Aad) and to have a weak but significant impact on brand
attitudes.
In
sponse categories developed by advertising agencies

(Schlinger 1979; Wells, Leavitt, and McConville 1971).
Though it may appear to be a minor refinement, such
an expansion of the types of cognitive responses coded
and analyzed could, in fact, be very important. Studies
now indicate that attitude toward the advertisement
(Aad) itself leads to changes in brand attitudes (Gorn
1982; Lutz, MacKenzie, and Belch 1983; Mitchell and
Olson 1981). Social and cognitive psychologists have
produced two models of attitude-change processesthe heuristic and the peripheral (Chaiken 1980; Petty
and Cacioppo 1979). These models show that "less involving" processing typically involves a limited elaboration of message arguments. In such situations, persuasive impact stems largely from execution cues and
source likability. For this reason, many researchers have
recently begun to pay greater attention to respondent
evaluations of ad-execution style and to other responses
pertaining to ad execution (e.g., Lutz and MacKenzie
1982; Lutz et al. 1983). Similarly, researchers in social
psychology interested in studying the effects of source
factors in persuasion (e.g., Chaiken 1980) have distinguished between "message-oriented" and "communicator-oriented" response categories.
This trend must be welcomed. However, while it is
likely that such research will indeed show source derogation and bolstering to be important influences on
Aad, the very complexity of advertising stimuli makes
it unlikely that evaluations of ad execution (such as
statements of praise for or criticism of the manner in
which the ad was made) represent the only influences
of interest. By combining attribute statements with
music, humor, affectionate vignettes, story elements,
role portrayals, and the like, ad-execution cues evoke
moods and feelings that go beyond the evaluative re-
1973, Wrightsuggestedthat consumeracceptance
of advertising was mediated by the cognitive responses generated by message recipients rather than by
the content of the ad itself. This cognitive response paradigm (pioneered by Greenwald in 1968) has since been
used frequently in persuasion research (see Petty, Ostrom, and Brock 1981 and Wright 1980 for reviews).
However, although the number of persuasion-research
studies has increased substantially, most researchers
continue to analyze only three of the four kinds of
thoughts that Wright (1973) coded-support
arguments, counter arguments, and source derogationswhile often relying on his coding guide.1
Recently, the list of cognitive responses that have
been studied has begun to expand. Some of the newer
categories of responses consist of subclassifications of
various kinds of support and counter arguments (Wright
1980, p. 153). Other new categories include simple affirmations and disaffirmations (Beaber 1975); neutral,
irrelevant thoughts (Cacioppo and Petty 1979); ad-execution responses (Lutz and MacKenzie 1982); and
source bolstering and study-specific "repetition-related
evaluations" (Belch and Lutz 1982). Radically different
coding schemes for ad response include Krugman's
(1967) "connections" and the close-ended viewer-re*Rajeev Batra is Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Business,
Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. Michael L. Ray is Professor of Marketing and Communication, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. This research was
funded by a grant from the Marketing Science Institute, and additional
support was provided by the Marketing Management Program of the
Stanford Business School and by the Columbia Business School's
Faculty Research Fund. The authors would like to thank the many
companies and advertising agencies that provided commercials for
use, but that prefer anonymity. We also wish to thank three anonymous reviewers and Morris Holbrook for helpful comments on earlier
versions of this paper.
'Wright (1974) used curiosity thoughts in addition to these three.
234
? JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH* Vol. 13 . September 1986

AFFECTIVERESPONSES TO ADVERTISING
actions toward the commercial typically coded as source

bolstering or source derogation statements. For example, in addition to making us like and admire the execution, "affective" ads can also make us happy, sad,
warm, fearful, angry, and so on. A consumer may dislike
an ad not only because s/he distrusts it (a reaction typically coded as source derogation), but also because it
makes him/her feel afraid of the future or sad about
some ad-evoked memory from the past.
As Lutz (1985, p. 47) points out, the determinants
OfAad are not all cognitively based reactions to the advertising stimulus. Some Aad determinants, like the
moods evoked by the advertisements, are simply the
consumer's affective state at the time of exposure (Lutz
1985, p. 54). Emotion theorists such as Arnold also argue that such moods and feelings are perceived not as
qualities of the object but as states of the subject. These
moods and feelings do not provide information about
the external world; rather, they indicate how the external world affects us. "Because of this insistent self-reference implicit in feeling, it is perceived as a state of
the subject." (Arnold 1960, p. 31). Other theorists of
affect have made similar distinctions between object
and subject. Berlyne (1974, Ch. 1) distinguished between "evaluative" scales that measure the hedonic
value of a stimulus (e.g., "pleasing-displeasing") and
those scales that simply describe the subjects' reactions
and moods (e.g., "no pleasure-extreme pleasure"). This
distinction is also made by Mehrabian and Russell
(1974, p. 18), while Dahl (1977) has distinguished between "it" emotions, which are directed towards others,
and "me" emotions, which are feelings of pleasuredispleasure in subjects themselves. Clore and Ortony
(1983) distinguish hedonic emotions having a state focus (pleased) from hedonic emotions having an object
focus (pleased with). Stout and Leckenby (1984) distinguish inner directed emotional responses-I felt relaxed-from outer directed responses, where the eliciting stimulus is identified.
Thus, these feeling states go beyond cognitive appraisals of how good or bad a stimulus object is. Moreover, they cover a much wider emotional range. And
while some of these feeling states may well be captured
in the current categories of source derogation and source
bolstering (depending upon the particular coding
schemes used), their multidimensionality suggests that
more refined categorization is probably necessary.
Where, for example, would one currently classify the
fear evoked by much insurance advertising (cf., Ray
and Wilkie 1970)?
Reports of the many different kinds of moods and
feelings evoked by an ad have not yet been widely researched; accordingly, these responses, which we call
"affective responses," form the subject of this article.
Reports of moods and feelings evoked by an ad are independent of respondent statements of praise for or
criticism of the manner in which the ad was made, and
deserve study in their own right. In recent reviews both
235
Lutz (1985) and Gardner (1985) have called for an investigation of the effects of different kinds of moods on
advertising processing. These effects seein particularly
relevant to models of low-effort "peripheral processing,"
since (as we will discuss) the evocation of moods and
feelings by stimuli may be largely involuntary and automatic. This article describes the results of a study that
examined the effects of three positive affective responses
on (1) a consumer's attitude to the ad, (2) a consumer's
attitude to the brand, and (3) the relative importance
of each type of response. First, however, we will review
the literature on a much wider range of moods and
emotions and present our synthesis of that literature.
Following our identification of types of affective response, we will present the collection procedure and
coding categories used in our empirical study, and then
the results of the study itself.
AFFECTIVE RESPONSES:
CONCEPTUALIZATION
The Typology Literature
We will begin by synthesizing previous attempts to
develop typologies of emotional, mood, and feeling responses. While theorists disagree on the specific definitions of these terms, the term "affect" is normally
used to encompass all emotions, moods, feelings, and
drives and so serves as our domain. (For some commonly accepted definitions of affect, see Gardner 1985;
Izard 1977; and Kleinginna and Kleinginna 1981.) The
development of these typologies of affect goes back at
least to 1650, when Descartes declared that there were
six "primary passions": love, hate, desire, joy, sadness,
and admiration. Much of the more recent work has used
the approach of classifying facial responses that accompany emotions (e.g., Izard 1977; Osgood 1966; Tomkins
1962, 1963; see also the review in Ekman, Friesen, and
Ellsworth 1982). Some typology-development efforts
have used data-reduction techniques such as factor or
cluster analysis (e.g., Frijda 1970; Osgood 1966), while
others have used logical, deductive approaches (Arnold
1960; Clore and Ortony 1983; de Rivera 1977; Solomon 1976). While most of these studies analyzed emotions, others (e.g., Nowlis 1965) analyzed moods, which
are defined as milder, more pervasive, and more transient than emotions (for a review of definitional differences between emotions and moods, see Gardner 1985).
Some typologies have been based on linguistic analyses
(e.g., Clore and Ortony 1983), while others are based
on neurohormonal differences (e.g., Pribram 1980) or
are inspired by evolutionary considerations (e.g., Plutchik 1980). Factor analytic studies using advertising
stimuli have also identified underlying factors of affective response (e.g., Aaker and Bruzzone 198 1; Schlinger
1979; Wells et al. 1971).
As pointed out by Ekman et al. (1982, p. 46), these
typologies of affect often yield different categories be-

236
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
cause different stimulus domains have been studied with

different methods. Taken individually, each of these typologies is incomplete, and some sort of integration is
necessary to develop an exhaustive superset of categories.2 Unfortunately, the integration offered by Ekman
et al. (1982, p. 43) ignores the categories found in the
advertising literature and the literature on moods. Before attempting our own integration, we will consider
a different approach to studying affect.
Types versus Dimensions

Rather than classify affective responses into different
types, some researchers have tried to identify the dimensions in which these different types may be located.
Wundt (1896) proposed that the sphere of consciousness
described by emotion or feeling could be accounted for
by three dimensions: (1) pleasantness-unpleasantness,
(2) relaxation-tension, and (3) calm-excitement. Subsequent empirical work has provided support for similar
dimensions. Schlosberg (1954), for example, showed
that facial expressions could be adequately described
as combinations of specific levels of pleasantness-unpleasantness, attention-rejection, and sleep-tension
(activation).3 As Strongman (1973, p. 157) points out,
such a dimensional approach interprets the similarity
between different types of emotions as proximities in a
multidimensional space; named emotions are thus reduced to combinations of fewer dimensions. While the
parsimony implicit in the idea of dimensions is useful,
economy is lost when too many dimensions are proposed. Many researchers have identified two or three
dimensions (Block 1957; Mehrabian 1980; Osgood
1966; Plutchik 1980; Russell 1980), but others have
found four (Davitz 1970) or even five (Frijda 1970).
Also, the specific dimensions proposed do not always
agree because of differences in the domain of scales analyzed (Ekman et al. 1982, p. 54).
As pointed out by Osgood, the distinction between
the typology and dimension approaches to studying
emotions (1966, p. 26):
is not a matter of either-orbut of both. Given a space
defined by several dimensions, the labels by which we
referto [differentemotions]maybe representedby points
withinthe space,eachpoint havingsome projectiononto
each dimension . . . if the distributionof the points representinglabels were homogeneous,there would be no
clustersand hence no defendable'types'of expressions;
if, on the other hand, the labels did fall into clusters-
2Foran exampleof a study usingjust one typology(Plutchik's)to

study advertisingstimuli, see Holbrookand Westwood 1984. For a
classificationof typologiesthemselves,see Holbrook 1985.
3Whilesome authorsuse "arousal"to denote physiologicalenergizationand "activation"to denoteneuralexcitation,most researchers in the affectliteratureuse the terms interchangeably,as do we.
Thus, both arousal and activation are used here to mean a unidimensional feeling state that rangesfrom sleep to franticexcitation
(cf., Mehrabianand Russell 1974, p. 19;Plutchik 1980, p. 137).
and the spacewerethus unevenlypopulated-the 'types'

could be identifiedand confirmed.
Osgood himself found that his three dimensions could
be further divided into nine interpretable clusters, a
number almost large enough to bring us back to a typological list of primary emotions. Ekman et al. (1982,
p. 55) conclude that the typology approach allows more
distinctions but that it is not clear which approach is
preferable overall. In our review, we shall stress the typology approach (so that more distinctions are possible),
but will also mention the dimensional combination that
each category of primary emotions is supposed to represent. For simplicity, we will use the two dimensions
proposed in Russell's (1980) circumplex model, in
which each named emotion is identified as a point on
a circle and combines particular levels of two orthogonal
axes: pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleepiness.
Typologies of Primary Emotions

Given the diversity of objectives, methods, and stimulus domains, it is not surprising that the typologies
developed in previous research do not completely agree,
although there is, of course, some overlap in the categories identified. Categories identified in one study do
not always appear in others or, when they do, these
categories often appear combined with other factors.
The categories identified are not always mutually exclusive, especially in studies using oblique rather than
orthogonal methods of factor rotation (see the many
mood studies reviewed by Nowlis 1965). As a consequence, empirical studies often combine categories that
in other studies or typologies are considered distinct
(for examples and precedents of such composites, see
Nowlis 1965, p. 367).
AFFECTIVE RESPONSES: SYNTHESIS

Categories of Emotion
In this section we will discuss the major categories
of affective response identified in the literature and attempt our own synthesis. The categories appear in Exhibit 1, which uses as a starting point the Table offered
by Ekman et al. (1982, p. 43).
Interest/Expectancy. Izard (1977, p.216) defines this
category as a feeling of being engaged, caught up, fascinated, curious, of wanting to investigate and become
involved. A perception of novelty and change is usually
a key determinant of interest. Interest appears not only
in Izard's typology (which incorporates the work of
Tomkins 1962, 1963), but also as Osgood's expectancy,
interest, Plutchik's anticipation ("attentiveness," "curiosity"), and Frijda's interest/attention ("surprised,"
"amazed," "curious"), among others. In the mood literature, Nowlis reports a category called concentration
("attentive," "contemplative," "engaged in thought").

AFFECTIVE RESPONSES
237
TO ADVERTISING
EXHIBIT1
AFFECT TYPOLOGIES:A SYNTHESIS OF CATEGORIES
Plutchik
(1980)
Batra and Ray

(1986)
Izard
(1977)
Frijda
(1970)
Osgood
(1966)
Wells et al.
(1971)
Nowlis
(1965)
Schlinger
(1979)
Aaker and
Bruzzone
(1981)
Interest/
expectancy
Anticipation
Expectancy/
interest
Interest/
attention
Interest/
excitement
Concentration
Uniqueness
(Un)familiarity
(Personal
relevance)a
Surprise
Surprise
Surprise/
amazement
Surprise
Surprise/
startle
na
na
Confusion
na
Disgust/scorn
Disgust
Disgust/scorn
Disgus
Bitter
na
(Irritation)a
(Familiarity)a
Disgus
Scorn
(Dislike)a
Skepticism
na
Distrust
Skepticism
na
Skepticism
(Irritation)a
Alienation
(Dislike)a
Anger
Anger/
annoyance
Sullen anger/
rage
Anger/
aggrieved
Anger/rage
Aggression
Irritation
(Alienation)a
Dislike
Fear/anxiety
Fear
Fear
Fear/terror
Anxiety
na
na
na
Fear
]b
Lnsecurej
Anxiety
Shame
na
na
na
Shame
na
na
na
na
Guilt
na
na
Guilty
Guilt
na
na
na
na
Pi'ty
na
Pity
na
na
na
na
na
na
Pride
na
na
Pride
na
na
na
na
na
Sad
Distress/
anguish
Sadness
na
na
na
Humo b
Vigorj
Entertaining
Entertaining
Sensuousness
na
(Gentle)a
Sadness
Sadness
Despair
Acute sorrow
SEVA
Joy
Enjoyment
Happy/gay
Active joy
Deactivation
na
Quiet pleasure
Quiet
Relaxed
peacefulness
Social affection
Acceptance
na
Soft
pleasantness
Joy
Social affection
na
Empathy
Warmth
Drives
na
na
Pain
na
Fatigue
na
na
na
Categories not
used here
na
na
Irony
na
Egotism
na
na
na
Surgency
Elation
Vigor/
L activationj
Deactivation b
Nonchalance
Categories within parentheses contain, in our judgment, elements relevant to this discussion.
Bracketed terms denote multiple categories for Batra and Ray's one.
NOTE: Terms separated by a / denote one category.
Among the advertising studies, Wells et al. (197 1) found

a similar factor, called uniqueness ("novel," "imaginative"), Schlinger found that the item "unusual"
loaded negatively on her familiarity factor, and Aaker/
Bruzzone found an "interesting" item loading on their
personal relevance factor. Such adjectives were not used
by, and thus do not appear in, Russell's (1980, p. 1 166)
dimensional analysis.
Surprise. Izard (1977, p. 277) calls this category surprise/startle and defines it as a transitory, pleasant feeling of uncertainty, set off by any sudden and unexpected
event. In many studies, surprise has not appeared as a
separate category; probably it is combined with interest/
excitement (e.g., Wells et al.'s uniqueness). However,

surprise does appear as a separate category in Osgood's
typology-surprise/amazement
and in Plutchik's and
Frijda's surprise ("astonishment," "confusion," "distraction"). In Russell's dimensional analysis, astonishment is located as being pleasant, with very high arousal.
With somewhat negative valence, surprise appears in
Schlinger's confusion ("difficult to follow," "distracting").
Disgust/Scorn. Izard (1977) treats disgust/scorn as
two categories, defining disgust as a desire to move away
from an object that is "spoiled" and "tastes bad," that
leaves a-"bad taste in the mouth" (p. 336), while scorn

238
is defined as a feeling of being superior, of hostility,

disapproval, revulsion, and contempt (p. 337). However, disgust/scorn forms one category in Osgood's typology ("disgust," "contempt," "scorn"). Frijda's typology uses two categories-disgust and bitter, while
Plutchik's typology has one category called disgust
("revulsion," "dislike," "loathing"). In the advertising
literature, disgust and scorn appear as components of
Wells et al.'s irritation ("stupid," "ridiculous") andfamiliarity ("saw before," "copycat"); they are also components of Aaker/Bruzzone's dislike ("silly," "pointless"), though dislike also reflects an element of distrust
and skepticism, a category discussed later. Neither
Nowlis nor Russell discusses either disgust or scorn.
Skepticism. Not discussed by Izard (1977) as a separate category, skepticism appears in the categories
Osgood-disidentified by Frijda-skepticism-and
trust ("disbelief," "incredulous doubt," "suspicious").
Nowlis also has a skepticism category ("skeptical,"
"suspicious," "dubious"). In the advertising literature,
the skepticism category combines with a contempt/
scorn category and appears in Wells et al.'s irritation ("phony"), Schlinger's alienation ("exaggeration," "unrealistic"), and Aaker/Bruzzone's dislike
("phony"). Clearly, this category can be defined as a
feeling of distrust and doubt evoked by stimuli that appear to be unrealistic, exaggerated, and phony. Again,
Russell's dimensional analysis does not include these
adjectives among those sampled.
Anger. Izard includes anger as part of the "hostility
triad" along with disgust and contempt, defining anger/
rage (1977, p. 329) as a feeling of being restrained from
what one intensely desires to do, with an impulse to
strike out at the source of the anger. In this state, energy
is mobilized, the blood "boils," the face becomes hot,
and muscles tense (p. 331). Anger forms one category
in Osgood's typology-sullen anger/rage, in Frijda'sanger/aggrieved, and in Plutchik's-anger/annoyance
("fury," "hostility"). In Plutchik's scheme, annoyance
appears as a "low intensity" form of anger. Nowlis finds
a category called aggression ("angry," "annoyed," "defiant"). In terms of underlying dimensions, Russell locates annoying in the unpleasant dimension, with low
arousal, and anger is also located in the unpleasant dimension but with high levels of arousal, suggesting that
the two affects could be treated separately if necessary.
In the advertising literature, anger appears as part of
Wells et al.'s irritation ("irritating"), Schlinger's alienation ("irritating"), and Aaker/Bruzzone's dislike ("irritating") in the low intensity level of irritation.
Fear/Anxiety. Izard (1977, p. 365) uses fear/terror
to describe this category, a state of apprehension,
uneasiness, uncertainty, insecurity, and perceived danger, which can be caused by either external or internal
(i.e., imaginary or objectless) events. Fear, according to
Izard, interacts with other emotions (e.g., guilt) to form
anxiety, which he defines as "chronic fear" (p. 378).
Fear/anxiety appears as two categories in both Osgood's

typology-fear and horror and anxiety-and Frijda'sfear and insecure. Plutchik's typology uses one category
for this emotion-fear ("fright," "apprehension"), and
Nowlis reports an anxiety category ("fearful," "tense,"
"worrying"). On Russell's two dimensions, fear appears
as high in unpleasantness and high in arousal. None of
the advertising studies reviewed here found a fear or
anxiety factor, probably because of the sample of ads
used in those studies.
Shame. Izard defines this category (p. 389) as a
heightened degree of self-awareness, inadequacy, ineffectiveness, and incompetence, where the self is felt as
the object of contempt, scorn, and ridicule. None of
the other typologies reviewed here identified this category.4
Guilt. Izard (p. 425) defines this as an intense,
gnawing feeling of not "being right" with a person
wronged, of being in the wrong, of causing a person to
hold his/her head lower and avert his/her gaze. (Izard
distinguishes guilt from shame by calling shame "nonmoral" guilt.) Of the other typologies reviewed, only
Frijda's includes a similar category-guilty.
Sadness. This category, defined by Izard (p. 289) as
a feeling of being downhearted, discouraged, miserable,
lonely, and helpless is called distress/anguish. Sadness
appears in Osgood's typology as two categories-despair
and acute sorrow. Like Izard, Frijda and Plutchik use
one category: sad (Frijda) and sadness ("sorrow," "dejection;" Plutchik), while Nowlis reports a sadness
("regretful," "sad," and "sorry") mood factor. This
category was not used by any of the advertising studies
reviewed. In Russell's two-dimension scheme, sadness
appears as an affect that is unpleasant and has low
arousal.
Surgency, Elation, Vigor/Activation (SE VA). This
corresponds to a composite category that Izard (p. 272)
calls active joy-feelings of intense joy intermixed with
feelings of confidence and vigor. The descriptors used
in the name for the SEVA category come from three
factors in the mood literature-surgency, elation, and
vigor/activation. Of the mood factors reported by
Nowlis, these three seem closely related, judging by the
results of the oblique factor analyses reported as well
as his descriptions of these factors. Thus surgency
(carefree, playful, witty, lively), elation (overjoyed,
pleased, refreshed, lighthearted), and vigor/activation
(lively, energetic, peppy, active) together refer to an af-
4Two further categories appeared in only one other typology besides

ours: pity (Osgood) and pride (Frijda). Pain and irony and fatigue
and egotism are categories found only in Frijda and Nowlis, respectively. Pain and fatigue would appear to be equivalent to our drives
category and will be discussed as such later. Irony and egotism may
Inot be considered affective by others (see the review of definitions by
Kleinginna and Kleinginna 1981); as such, these categories are not
discussed further here, but are depicted in Exhibit 1.

239
fective response that is at once both pleasant and arousing. In Russell's circumplex model, this response is located in the quadrant that has high arousal and high
pleasantness as its axes, close to his "excitement."5 In
discussing the previous use of such a composite, Nowlis
called it euphoria/good mood (1965, p. 367). In Osgood's typology, this state is described by the category
enjoyment ("joy," "glee"), in Plutchik's typology it is
called joy ("cheerfulness," "elation"), and in Frijda's
typology the category is happy/gay. In the advertising
literature, Wells et al. found that a humor factor represented "jolly," "merry," and "playful" feelings and
a vigor factor represented "enthusiastic," "vigorous,"9
and "exhilarated" feelings. Schlinger found a factor
called entertainment that was evoked by commercials
seen as "pleasurable," ''enjoyable," and "enthusiastic,"
while Aaker/Bruzzone found a factor called entertaining
("lively," "amusing," "clever").
Deactivation. Osgood (1 966, p. 16) reports an emotional category called quiet pleasure ("silent laughter")
similar to a factor found in Wells et al. called sensuousness, which indicates a self-indulgent relaxed state
(evoked, for example, by cosmetics commercials) measured by using the items "tender," "gentle," "serene,"
and "soothing." Sensuousness would seem to correspond to an affective state in Russell's circumplex model
that is at once both pleasant and low on arousal, which
is close to where he shows relaxation and contentment.
Plutchik has no category for sensuousness but he classifies serenity as a low-arousal level of his joy category.
The term deactivation comes from a mood factor that
Nowlis called deactivation and described as "at rest,"
"'quiet,"and "placid," and which he related empirically
to a mood factor called nonchalance ("leisurely"). Izard
refers to this category at various points, calling it relaxed
peacefulness (1977, p. 264). He also classifies this state
as "low-intensity joy," "receptive joy," and "calmnesstranquility," (p. 271) pointing out its emergence as an
independent empirical factor. Deactivation appears in
Frijda's typology as quiet ("calm"), and elements of it
are incorporated into Aaker/Bruzzone's gentle mood
factor.
Social Affection. Izard (p. 240) defines this category
as a feeling of being loved, of engendering trust, and of
being accepted in the surrounding world, along with a
sense of confidence and meaningfulness. In Izard's own
typology, this category is labeled joy, but it should not
be confused with Plutchik's joy category mentioned
earlier, since joy is explicitly differentiated by Izard from
feelings of having fun or being amused or entertained
5As Izard points out (1977, p. 270-271), joy is often (but not always)
accompanied by feelings of strength and vigor. He writes, "There is
an unresolved problem with respect to the role of activeness in the
phenomenology of joy. Many people . . . make a distinction between
active and passive (or receptive) joy." Therefore, our composite SEVA
category describes the state in which both pleasantness and vigor
appear.
(these feelings fall in Izard's active joy category). In

Frijda's typology, social affection is cailed soft pleasantness ("endearment," "happy," "loving"), and in
Plutchik's typology it appears as acceptance ("love,"
"trust"). In the mood literature reviewed by Nowlis,
this category is called social affection and represents
feelings that are "affectionate, forgiving, kindly, warmhearted." In the advertising literature, this category appears to be similar to the elements of Schlinger's empathv factor ("personal," "intimate," "affectionate,"
and "warm"-feelings evoked by commercials showing
affectionate couples, mothers with children, or a cuddly
Pillsbury dough boy) and to Aaker and Bruzzone's
warmth factor (see also, Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty
1986). This category does not appear in Russell's circumplex model because Russell did not use such adjectives in his analysis.
Drives. Not included in any of the earlier categories
are affective responses that theorists would call drives
or motivations. Izard (1977, p. 65) defines these responses as states brought about by tissue changes or
tissue deficits, exemplified by hunger, thirst, etc. Izard
includes among them pain and fatigue (categories that
both Frijda and Nowlis also use). Note that many theorists include both emotions and drives/motivations in
an all-encompassing category called affects or feelings
(Izard 1977; Pribram 1980). While in most cases it may
be true that advertising does not directly evoke drivelike, motivational feelings, some protocols taken from
a developmental prestudy (not reported here) did show
instances (especially for food ads) where the "sizzle"
(nonverbal appetitive) appeal of an advertised object
made the respondent "wish I could go out and buy some
just now." This desire is one of the affective categories
discussed by Descartes (1650) and by de Rivera (1977)
in his logically derived categorization scheme. It is also
possible that advertisements using high levels of sex appeal might, in certain circumstances, evoke some kind
of sexual desire. Thus, such motivational drive-like
feelings could form another kind of response category.
Integration with Current Categories

The 13 categories of affective response just discussed
are not new to studies of advertising response. It is possible to relate at least some of these 13 to categories
that have already been used. For example, the rarely
used cognitive response category curiosity mentioned
by Wright (1973, p. 62) seems at first glance to reflect
our description of interest. However, Wright's definition
of curiosity only describes a situation in which the
viewer "expresses interest in additional information
about the product." The description of interest just
given could (in the advertising context) indicate interest
in (1) the manner of presentation, (2) the product or
message itself, or (3) both manner and message. In our
synthesis, such interest is incorporated as source bolstering if the interest stems from ad presentation or as

240
support argumentation if it stems from the product or

message itself.
Another affective response category that may be incorporated into the extant source-bolstering category is
surprise, assuming such surprise led to positive feelings
towards a stimulus. Also indicative of source bolstering
would be the personal relevance factor of Wells et al.
("important to me," "valuable") and Aaker/Bruzzone
("worth remembering," "effective"), plus Schlinger's
relevant news ("taught something," "useful") advertising factor.
Conversely, the currently used category of source
derogation (inclusive of source discounting) would seem
to capture some of the moods and emotions described
earlier in the disgust/scorn, skepticism, and anger categories. It should be noted, however, that the emotions
in these categories are conceptualized here as feeling
states and not simply evaluative responses to an ad.
The extent to which these emotions are captured would
depend on the coding definitions or measuring scales
used by particular researchers.
Clearly, however, many affective response categories
emerge for which no current coding category seems to
exist. Some of these categories may appear rarely in the
advertising domain, e.g., shame, guilt, or sorrow, although the use of fear and anxiety as an advertising
appeal is well documented (e.g., Ray and Wilkie 1970).
Our distinction between three combinations or types
of pleasure and arousal, here called SEVA, deactivation,
and social affection, is also of interest. It is crucial to
note that these three categories are different, conceptually and operationally, from the like-dislike evaluations measured as attitudes to an ad. As Mehrabian and
Russell write (1974, p. 18), "Pleasure-displeasure is a
feeling state (and) . . . is distinguished from preference,
liking, positive reinforcement, or approach-avoidance."
(See also the earlier references on the state/object distinction.) The study we are about to describe examines
whether these three categories of positive affective responses-SEVA, deactivation, and social affectionmake equally important contributions to Aad and,
through Aad, to brand attitudes and intentions.
CODING
In order to study these three positive affective response categories, we needed to develop a coding
scheme that could be used to classify the rnany verbal
protocol responses collected here. Using an iterative
procedure on prestudy data, coding categories were developed; nine categories achieved 76 percent interjudge
agreement. The nine categories were: support arguments
(SA), counter arguments (CA), execution discounting
(ED), execution bolstering (EB), SEVA feelings, deactivation feelings, social affection feelings, neutral distractors, and other. Readers desiring details of the developmental work should see Batra 1984. (An overview of the coding scheme appears in Exhibit 2.) Note
that of the 13 affective response categories discussed
earlier, only the three positive response categories were

used as coding categories (the other six were standard
cognition categories), since only these three were evoked
by the sample of ads used in the present study.
The support arguments category includes affirmations
(both reasoned and simple) for the specific brand. While
this definition of support arguments conforms closely
to convention, several differences deserve mention.
Wright (1980), for instance, argues that simple affirmations do not represent cognitive mediators; rather,
they are the attitudinal outcomes of cognitive mediators and thus should not be included as support arguments. Others could argue, however, that most advertising reaches consumers already buying the product,
and the task of much advertising is to reaffirm brand
support (see, for instance, Schlinger 1979, p. 41). Present users are more likely to agree with an ad about an
advocated brand in globally affective (i.e., simple and
nonreasoned) terms; therefore, we felt it was reasonable
to include affirmations in our support argument category. Thoughts evincing a heightened ad-evoked appetitive desire to try or buy a brand were also counted
as support arguments. During the developmental phase
of the study, it was found that food ads evoked supportive feelings for the brand that often manifested
themselves as a heightened desire to buy or consume
the advertised brand, especially when the ad sold the
product through its nonverbal sizzle. Researchers may
disagree about whether such reports of heightened motivational appetitive impact belong in a support argument category. There appears to be no discussion of
this issue in the literature; further analysis of this question is left for future research.6
The counter arguments category includes thoughts
having the opposite valence of support arguments (see
Table 2).
The execution discounting (alternatively called source
discounting) coding category includes challenges to both
ad execution and brand credibility as well as derogatory
statements about execution technique (which appear as
negative reactions "irritating," "stupid," and so on).
(While "irritating" could conceivably be coded as a
separate affective response category, it was included here
to stay consistent with most current practice.) The execution (source) bolstering category consists of positive
references to individual ad-execution elements: realism,
credibility, overall technique and style, and so on. Note
that for ad source, we made no distinctions among the
ad, the presenter, or the company. As pointed out by
Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, p. 19), sources generally subsume persons, groups, media, and so on, with
processes and effects for one particular kind of source
usually generalizable to others.
The three positive affective response categories
6The coding scheme being discussed also used various subcategories

to allow for subsequent analysis with different aggregate categories.
A copy of the coding scheme is available from the authors.

241
EXHIBIT
2
OVERVIEWOF FINALCODING SCHEME USED IN STUDY
Coding category
Excludes
Includes
Support arguments (SA)
Reasoned affirmations
Simple affirmations
Brand trial
Generic trial
Message miscomprehension-positive
Positive feelings (SEVA, deactivation,

and social affection)
Execution bolstering
Counter arguments (CA)
Reasoned disaffirmations
Simple disaffirmations
Message miscomprehension-negative
Execution derogation and challenges

to execution credibility
Execution discounting (ED)
Negative reactions to execution

credibilityand/or execution elements
and style
Challenges to intrinsic brand credibility

Neutral execution distractors
Execution bolstering (EB)
Positive reactions to execution credibility

and/or execution elements and style
SEVA, deactivation, and social

affection feelings
Execution bolstering due to effect on
moods
Surgency, Elation, Vigor/Activation

(SEVA) feelings
Positive reports of upbeat, happy mood

Execution bolstering due to SEVA
Deactivation and social affection

feelings
Execution bolstering not due to SEVA
Deactivation feelings
Positive reports of ad elements being

soothing, relaxing, quiet, pleasant
SEVA and social affection feelings
Social affection feelings
Positive reports of warmth, tenderness,

caring, ad being heartwarming
Deactivation/SEVA feelings
Neutral distractors
Curiosity and surprise from execution

elements
Execution-evoked thoughts that are
neutral to brand or execution
References to other commercials/
viewing occasions
Non-neutral execution comments

(discounting, bolstering)
Support/counter arguments
Other
Playback of ad content
Subsequently generated thoughts
Execution bolstering/discounting
Concurrent thoughts about other ads/
times
(SEVA, deactivation, and social affection) were operationalized in the coding scheme as follows. SEVA was
coded when an ad had a pleasant and upbeat effect on
respondent feelings and moods because the ad's music
was "catchy," the ad was "fun to watch or breezy," or
made a likable use of humor. Deactivation was coded
when respondents reported that ad elements were
soothing, pleasant, or relaxing, and so on. Social affection was coded when ad effects were called "touching,"
"warming the hearts of," and/or "creating a loving
feeling in" respondents, or when ads were seen as depicting "happiness," "beauty" and/or "caring," and
therefore were sometimes "liked," making the viewer
"happy" and/or "feel good." It should be noted that
despite the use of the word "happy" in the coding definitions for both SEVA and social affection, coding ambiguities were not very frequent, since the other phrases
in the protocol usually indicated whether the viewer
was happy because of the ad's upbeat music, humor,
and so on, or because the ad depicted tenderness, caring,
or warmth.
The neutral distractors coding category included (1)

statements about elements of ad execution that could
detract from the processing time spent on the brand
message, (2) other ad execution-evoked thoughts neutral
to either a brand or execution evaluation, and (3) references to other ads or viewing occasions that in the
opinion of the judge appeared to have occurred to the
respondent while the ad was being shown. (Unlike the
Other category about to be discussed, the thoughts
placed into the neutral distractors category were
thoughts that were apparently generated concurrently
rather than subsequently.) Finally, since we desired a
coding scheme that would be not just mutually exclusive
but also collectively exhaustive within the domain of
positive affective responses, we defined a coding category called Other. This category included (1) reported
thoughts that the judge felt were mere playback of ad
content, (2) thoughts that were unlikely to have been
generated during exposure but were instead subsequently generated, or (3) thoughts related to the viewing
task, such as "don't think we should have seen ads

242
twice" (which, in a repetition experiment, might be

classified as a repetition-related thought). In the study
reported below, less than 3 percent of the protocol responses fell into this category. We now turn to the main
study, which attempted to assess the usefulness and
other characteristics of the affective responses studied
in this sample of commercials.
METHOD
Stimuli and Design

In this study, 120 subjects were exposed to four TV
commercials each, taken from a pool of 40 ads. The
ads covered 10 product categories, two brands each,
with two executions-one
"affective," the other "rational" per brand. An experimental design (for brevity
not described here; see Batra and Ray 1985) was used
to systematically vary the subject's (1) motivational involvement in the product category, (2) extent of prior
usage (hence "processing ability") of the brand, and (3)
opportunity to generate cognitive responses (through
the number of arguments in the message). Thus, we
attempted to tactically create the maximum variance
possible in the antecedent conditions (motivation, ability, opportunity) believed to influence the number of
support and counter arguments generated (see Wright
1975). In addition, the number of affective responses
generated should also vary, since only half of the ads
used were "affective" in executional style. It was hoped
that attribute-based cognitive responses as well as the
affective responses discussed earlier would be generated,
and that the role and influence of affective responses
could be studied.
Using this experimental design, subjects were randomly assigned to one of ten variance-maximizing
"balanced incomplete blocks." In each block, four ads
were shown to 12 subjects in four sessions of three subjects per session. The four ads were randomized with
respect to exposure sequence. After initial randomization, the position of the four ads was rotated across the
four sessions, to equalize primacy and recency effects.
The four sessions were also balanced across the four
different times of day during which the sessions were
conducted. Over 40 sessions were held in all over a twoweek period.
Procedure
Subjects were women, aged 20 through 60, from the
Palo Alto and nearby areas. Subjects were contacted by
telephone approximately one week before their experimental sessions for some pre-exposure measures. At
the experimental session, subjects were told that the
study was not of advertising effectiveness, but of trying
to understand "what thoughts and feelings people naturally have when they see ads." Subjects were first
shown each of the four commercials once to check and
equalize prior familiarity. Since it seemed likely that
some subjects had not seen some of the ads before, this
first viewing ensured that the mediating response data
(collected after a subsequent exposure) would reflect
responses to an ad seen at least once before, thus reducing the possible effects of a qualitative difference
between a first and subsequent exposure (cf., Krugman
1972). In addition, this first exposure also served to
more nearly equalize the test commercials on prior familiarity, since the time of last exposure was now not
only the same but also very recent.
The verbal protocol data-collection method used in
the experimental sessions was based on the results of a
prestudy (not described here; see Batra 1984) conducted
to develop a data-collection methodology that encourages the reporting of "feeling" and "irrelevant" responses, provided such responses are natural and valid.
Eight methodological variations were examined in that
prestudy. These methodologies differed depending on
(1) how directive the instructions were, (2) whether or
not an example protocol was provided, (3) whether there
was a "practice" screening and protocol, and (4) how
the data were collected ("standard," "cued," "structured"). The methodology about to be described is the
one we judged best based on both the quantity and
quality of responses obtained. Discussion of its advantages and disadvantages can be found towards the end
of this article.
The verbal protocol instructions we used stressed the
need to (1) be natural, (2) not deliberately attempt to
memorize content, and (3) report exhaustively on both
thoughts and feelings. First, subjects were shown an example commercial and then read samples of reported
verbal responses to this commercial. (The samples read
covered a counter argument, a support argument, an
execution bolstering thought, and a distractor thought.
To reduce demand artifacts, affective responses were
not given.)
Next, subjects saw a practice commercial and were
asked to write down their thoughts and feelings in response to the ad. Subjects were then asked to read back
their protocols silently. Using standardized written and
oral instructions, we told the subjects that ad playback
was not desired; neither were opinions on whether the
ad was "successful" in making them pay attention or
want to buy the product. We indicated instead our interest in the kinds of thoughts and feelings that showed
whether the subjects agreed or disagreed with something
the ad said, whether the ad reminded them of something, or whether it made them feel a certain way (even
if what the ad made them think about had nothing to
do with the product the ad was talking about)-whatever went through their minds naturally. Then, for the
second time, the subjects were shown the four test ads
for their replicated block, in the randomized and rotated
sequence appropriate for their session. After seeing each
ad, the subjects were asked to write a response to the
question, "What thoughts and feelings went through
your mind while you were looking at the commercial?"
They were given one blank page and no time limit, al-

though almost every protocol was completed in under

four minutes.
After the four protocols had been written, the subjects
answered questions on dependent and covariate measures. The protocols themselves were coded independently by two judges (Batra was one of these judges)
using the scheme presented earlier (see Exhibit 2); both
judges were blind to the experimental treatments. Interjudge agreement was 83 percent, which is close to
the 76 percent prestudy level and well above chance.
The percentage of interjudge agreement by category
was: support arguments-91 percent, counter arguments-87 percent, execution discounting-90 percent,
execution bolstering-78 percent, SEVA feelings-80
percent, deactivation feelings-84 percent, social affection feelings-73 percent, distractor thoughts-79 percent, and other thoughts-54 percent. Disagreement
was resolved by the judges discussing the discrepant
coding assignments until a consensus was reached.
After completing the dependent measures, the subjects were shown the commercials for a third time. Each
ad exposure was followed by scales that rated the ad on
various aspects, including liking for the ad. As argued
by Calder and Sternthal (1980), showing the stimulus
commercials again allows a direct comparison of reactions to the commercials across treatment conditions
without distortion by subjects' memory of the commercials. Such differential forgetting could have been
a significant factor here, since the dependent measures
took over 40 minutes to collect.
On average, the sessions lasted between 50-60 minutes. Approximately one week later, subjects were contacted by telephone and asked to rate their attitudes to
the test brands. These delayed measures were collected
from 100 of the 120 subjects.
Measures
Only those measures used in the analysis are described here. Postexposure brand attitudes, the major
dependent variable, were assessed through various semantic differential items: "useful-useless," "important-unimportant," "pleasant-unpleasant," "niceawful," and "good-bad." The mean of these five items
(Cronbach alpha = 0.80) was used. Brand purchase intentions (self-predictions of such intentions) were measured on a 7-point scale anchored at "definitely would
buy" to "definitely would not buy." Subjects indicated
their attitude to the ad on an 8-point scale ("no liking"
to "liked the ad a lot"). As with the purchase-intentions
measure, this single Aad measure could have low reliability. In the delayed (one week later) telephone callbacks, subjects were told that we needed to measure
how they felt about certain brands that day. To reduce
subject irritation by limiting the time taken for this interview, only four of the five attitude items (all except
"good-bad") were administered. The mean of these four
items was used, which had a correlation with the five-
243
item immediate attitude measure of 0.84, p < 0.001, n

= 398 and a Cronbach alpha of 0.93.
RESULTS
Analysis is reported here only for the major issues
mentioned earlier: (1) whether affective responses influence Aadabove and beyond the influence of the currently studied execution-derogation and bolstering categories, and (2) whether the influence of these affective
responses on brand preferences (attitudes and purchase
intentions) occur directly or indirectly through previously studied antecedents (support and counter arguments and Aad). However, before getting to those results,
we would like to note the proportion of mediating responses that were classified into each of the different
coding categories: support arguments- 15 percent,
counter arguments- 12 percent, execution discounting-28 percent, execution bolstering- 14 percent, the
three affective response categories- 12 percent, neutral
distractors- 17 percent, and other-2 percent. Of the
three affective response categories, the largest was social
affection responses (6.1 percent), followed by SEVA (3.7
percent), and deactivation responses (2.5 percent). The
480 protocols yielded an average of 2.57 reported
thoughts and feelings per protocol, of which the mean
levels per response category were 1.09 for execution
discounting and bolstering together, 0.68 for support
and counter arguments, 0.43 for distractor thoughts,
0.3 1 for the three affective responses, and 0.06 for other
thoughts.
Estimates of the individual and combined effect of
these affective responses on attitude towards the brand
and towards the ad can be obtained through multiple
regression. However, regressions using ordinary least
squares (OLS) suffer from potentially autocorrelated
errors, since four observations are used from each of
120 subjects, and these four observations are thus not
entirely independent. Though tests showed that the effects of autocorrelation were not severe,7 these regression runs were performed by using more efficient "joint
GLS (generalized least squares)" estimation procedures.
If the four observations per individual are related, their
error terms should covary such that the four observations form a system of four interrelated equations rather
than one equation. The appropriate estimation method
in these circumstances is that of "seemingly unrelated
regressions" (Zellner 1962), which uses estimates of the
covariance of the residuals across equations to increase
the efficiency of the estimates. The JGLS estimation
procedure that we employed constrained the parameter
estimates across the four equations to be equal, so that
comparisons could be made between each OLS param7An examination of OLS residual matrices showed that in almost
every case the error terms were correlated at very low (e.g., r = 0.05)
and insignificant levels. Further, the OLS coefficients were very close
to their JGLS counterparts, though coefficients significant in the OLS
estimates were often significant at slightly lower (i.e., stronger) levels
in the JGLS estimates.

244
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER
RESEARCH
TABLE
JOINT GENERALIZEDLEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS OF MEDIATINGRESPONSES ON DEPENDENTVARIABLES
Predictor variables
Weighted
Criterion
variable
A.d
Ab-i
SA
ED
EB
-.434
(.001)
.245
(.001)
-.351
(.001)
.242
(.001)
CA
A.d
Aad
Ab-i
.372
(.001)
Ab-i
Ab-i
.404
(.001)
Ab-i
.090
(.013)
Equation
.2742
480
.201
(.001)
.064
(.082)
.263
(.001)
.3909
480
.115
(.012)
.055
(.223)
.144
(.002)
.0404
480
.001
(.984)
.011
(.787)
.023
(.605)
.1766
480
-.051
(.226)
.166
(.001)
-.103
(.023)
.0410
480
.030
(.617)
-.015
(.672)
.1732
480
.211
(.001)
-.107
(.003)
.060
(.088)
.244
(.001)
.4459
480
.075
(.099)
.038
(.391)
.153
(.001)
.0334
480
.734
(.001)
-.001
(.963)
.002
(.942)
.041
(.174)
.5537
480
.702
(.001)
-.025
(.450)
-.008
(.797)
.017
(.596)
.5564
480
10
.086
(.064)
.089
(.067)
.165
(.001)
.0503
398
11
.059
(.182)
.053
(.261)
.117
(.017)
.1315
398
12
-.314
(.001)
.229
(.001)
Ab-d
Ab-d
R2
(system)
.051
(.249)
Pi
Pi
Deactivation
.210
(.001)
Aad
Pi
SEVA
Social
Affection
.126
(.014)
-.104
(.025)
-.174
(.001)
.079
(.104)
NOTE: Ad
= Attitude to ad
= Immediate brand attitudes
Ab,
= Delayed brand attitudes
Ab
ED/EB = Execution Discounting/Bolstering
Pi
= Purchase Intentions
SA/CA = Support/Counter Arguments
SEVA = Surgency, Elation, Vigor/Activation
Figures are beta coefficients; significance levels in parentheses.
eter estimate and a single JGLS equivalent, rather than

with four different JGLS estimates (one each for the
four equations in the system). The JGLS estimates are
reported in the Table.
As already mentioned, the affective responses studied
here are of interest as possible antecedents of Aad, as
additions to the conventionally studied execution-derogation and bolstering categories. While the role of execution derogation and bolstering responses in influencing Aad has been demonstrated in much prior research (e.g., Lutz et al. 1983; MacKenzie and Lutz
1982), the role of the affective responses studied here
has not. It is therefore necessary to test whether these
affective responses as a group add to the variance already
explained in Aadby the execution-derogation and execution-bolstering response categories. A "models comparisons" test of incremental variance explained
(Johnston 1972, p. 143) was performed (see the Table).8

It showed that while the execution-derogation and bolstering-response categories together explained 27.4
percent of the variance in Aad (Equation 1), this percentage rises to 39.1 percent when the three affective
response categories are added (Equation 2).9 This increase in R2 is both large (a gain of about 12/27, or 45
percent) and significant (p < 0.01) in tests of incre-
8Inadditionto testing for the magnitudeof the gain in explained

variance,such comparisonsalso providea bettertest for the significance of the variable(s)addedto the equation, since individualsignificancelevels could be affectedby multicollinearity.
9Notethatall regressionsreportedhereexcludedistractorand other
thoughts,since there is no theoreticalrationalefor includingthem.
Eachregressionwasalsorunwiththesethoughtsincluded,withalmost
no differencein parameterestimatesor significancelevels.

mental variance explained. Of the three affective responses studied, only deactivation fails to reach conventional significance (p < 0.082), while social affection
has a higher beta than SEVA.
Next, it is of interest to see whether the effect of these
affective responses on brand attitudes (Ab) occurs directly, or through the variables that in past research
have been shown to be direct antecedents of Ab. Much
previous research has shown that these antecedents include SAs and CAs (e.g., Petty et al. 1981; Wright 1973),
as well as Aad (e.g., Lutz et al. 1983; Mitchell and Olson
1981). Information about this mediating role is available through the analysis of covariance technique (see
Cacioppo and Petty 1979; Insko, Turnbull, and Yandell
1974). This ANCOVA technique compares specific
causal models by introducing the hypothesized mediator into a regression equation as a covariate. If the
regression coefficient for the initial variable on the criterion variable drops to nonsignificance upon such introduction, the data are consistent with the mediating
role of the covariate as theoretically modeled (the data
could, of course, be consistent with other theoretical
models as well).
It can be seen from the Table that SEVA and social
affection responses are significant predictors of immediate brand attitudes (Equation 3), but the effects of
these two responses drop to nonsignificance when Aad
and support and counter arguments are introduced into
the Equation (Equation 4). This suggests that both
SEVA and social affection responses operate only indirectly in their effect on immediate brand attitudes.10
Note, interestingly, that SAs and CAs themselves do
not reach significance in explaining Ab when Aad is already in the Equation (Equation 4). This result parallels
the weak relationships between brand cognitions and
Ab found earlier by MacKenzie and Lutz (1982, p. 32)
and Lutz et al. (1983, p. 535) and is discussed further
below. The Table also shows clearly that these affective
responses by themselves explain a very small portion
of the variance in brand attitudes (Equation 3) or purchase intentions (Equation 8), suggesting that Aad is the
relevant dependent variable for them.11
Next, it is of interest to see whether the effect of the
affective responses on purchase intentions (PI) occurs
'?Note,however,thatthe dataarestillconsistentwiththe hypothesis
that Aad influencesboth immediatebrandattitudesand supportand
counterarguments,a causalsequencenot tested here.
"Note that the R squaresin the Tableare lowerthan the variance
explainedby studies such as Wright 1973. This is probablydue to
the fact that the stimuli used here deal with pre-existingbrands,although the data reflectthe impact of two advertisingexposuresin
modifyingexistingbrandattitudesand intentions. Toy (1982), who
also used pre-existingbrandsin explainingattitudechangethrough
cognitiveresponses,also found relationshipsof this magnitude(see
p. 75 for a discussion).Further,Stewartand Furse(1984), when examiningcopytest scores for 1,059 commercialsfor existing brands,
also found that all executionalfactors,including message,only explained about 12 percent of the total variancein persuasion,with
mostvariancebeingaccountedfor by the respondent'spriorexposure
and usagehistory.
245
completely through brand attitudes, in view of the

weight of past research on that relationship (e.g., Ryan
and Bonfield 1975). It can be seen (Equation 8) that
social affection responses are significant predictors of
purchase intentions (p < 0.01), while SEVA is only significant at p < 0.10 (and deactivation fails to reach even
that level of significance). However, when Ab is introduced into the Equation (Equation 9), social affection
and SEVA also become insignificant at p < 0.10, confirming that their effect on purchase intentions is completely mediated by Ab. The variance explained in PI
by Ab alone is 0.5502, not significantly less than that of
Equation 9 (Fadd = 1.24), confirming the nonsignificance of the ARs in Equation 9. Since we have just
shown that the effect of the affective responses on Ab
itself is completely mediated by Aad, it is appropriate
also to compare Equation 10 (which brings in Ab and
Aad together) with Equation 8. While Aadappears to be
significant in Equation 10, this result is due to multicollinearity, because the gain in variance explained by
Aad (Equation 10 over 9) fails to reach significance (Fadd
= 2.89, ns at p < 0.05), suggesting that Aadworks on PI
only through Ab, which is consistent with earlier results
(Lutz et al. 1983; MacKenzie and Lutz 1982). As far as
these affective responses are concerned, then, the ANCOVA results are consistent with prior theory and evidence suggesting effects through the chain ARs
-
Aad
' Ab
' PI.
DISCUSSION
Clearly, the affective responses studied here form part
of the mood subsystem that other researchers (e.g., Lutz
1985; Lutz et al. 1983) hypothesize to be an antecedent
of Aad. We have here an empirical demonstration of
their significance in determining Aadand we have correlational (ANCOVA) evidence suggesting that the rel' PI
evant chain of effects is ARs -' Aad - ' A
It is also interesting to examine (as far as these data
will allow) the role of support and counter arguments
in this chain. Following prior theory and research (e.g.,
Lutz et al. 1983), SAs and CAs were not introduced as
predictors of Aad in Equations 1 and 2; they are, after
all, mediators of Ab and not of Aad. However, as suggested by previous researchers (Lutz 1985, p. 59; Lutz
et al. 1983, p. 533; MacKenzie and Lutz 1982), various
relationships are possible between SAs and CAs, Aad,
Ab, and ad-execution thoughts and feelings. For example, it is possible to hypothesize that Aad may also
mediate at least some of the effect of SAs and CAs on
one tends to agree or disagree with an ad about
Ab-if
a brand, one may tend to like or dislike the ad as well.
Such effects may be greater for existing rather than new
brands. Alternatively, ad likability may cause greater
or lesser message argumentation and acceptance, or
both Ab and Aad may have common antecedents. Previously estimated models have often had to model SAs
and CAs, ad credibility statements, and/or other adexecution statements as covarying (Lutz and Mac-

246
Kenzie 1982; Lutz et al. 1983). The theoretical and empirical argument for a nonrecursive system of equations
is thus strong. Unfortunately, for identification reasons,
such simultaneous estimation was not possible in this
data set.12 However, ANCOVA runs here show that
while SA and CA are significant predictors of Ab (Equation 5), which is consistent with prior research, SA and
CA drop to nonsignificant levels (and the R2 gain is
significant) when Aad is introduced as another predictor
of Ab (Equation 6), suggesting that Aad mediates the
effect of SAs and CAs on Ab. (SA and CA also appear
as significant predictors of Aad in Equation 7, in which
ED and EB and the three affective responses are included.) Further, as pointed out earlier, both SA and
CA are not significant in predicting Ab if Aad and the
three ARs are already in the Equation (Equation 4).
While surprising, this replicates a result found earlier
by Lutz et al. (1983) and MacKenzie and Lutz (1982):
when Aad and brand cognitions are both modeled as
causing Ab, the relationship between brand cognitions
and Ab is sometimes surprisingly weak. Those authors
discuss various possibilities for this anomalous result,
including demand artifacts, measurement problems,
restrictions in range of brand cognitions, and so on.
While these remain possibilities, and while further
causal modeling of these relationships is clearly required, the apparent robustness of this result suggests
that A,d may in fact be the dominant influence on Ab
at least in some exposure settings.
It may be asked if the observed result in which support
and counter arguments were found to be significant
predictors of Aad (Equation 7) is due to the inclusion
in support arguments of the motivational/appetitive
feelings likely to be evoked by affective ads that have
such an execution. To test this possibility, this regression
was repeated with a definition of support and counter
arguments that (1) excluded motivational/appetitive
feelings, and (2) excluded simple affirmations and disaffirmations; these were instead analyzed as separate
response categories. The results showed no difference:
the redefined support and counter argument categories
were still significant (p < 0.01) Aad predictors.
Development of Theory
In addition to the empirical, causal modeling just
suggested, more theoretical work is clearly required that
examines the role of ARs as a component of the vector
of all mediating responses. Many researchers have suggested that the effects of such responses on Aad and Ab
should be greater in peripheral processing conditions,
since their generation should be more "natural" and
";automatic," and less "effortful" (Batra and Ray 1985;
Lutz 1985; Lutz et al. 1983). Such hypotheses find support in the literature on moods and emotions. Earlier
'2Simultaneousequation estimationwas attemptedhere but was
not possiblebecausethe system was empiricallyunidentified.
research has shown (Izard 1977, pp. 106-7) that emotions and moods are "contagious," and their transfer
"involuntary." As Zajonc points out, affective reactions
"occur without effort" (1980, p. 156). Further, the research on source attractiveness shows that attractiveness
(likability) effects appear to be "involuntary" and "less
cognitive," in that they occur whether the source is
identified at the beginning of the message or not (e.g.,
Mills and Harvey 1972). The analysis presented in this
article did not address the question of whether the effect
of ARs on Aad, and/or of Aad on Ab, is moderated by
such variables as the motivational involvement of the
consumer in the processing of the message. Further research on this question, using experimental manipulations, seems needed (see Batra 1984 for some correlational evidence).
If, however, such moods and emotions affect Aad and
Ab through involuntary and effortless ways, other research questions also suggest themselves. The fact that
we have here evidence of a process that involves measurable affective responses of which subjects are aware
suggests a more complex process for the effects of affective advertising on brand attitudes and intentions
than the unaware "classical conditioning" mechanisms
that have recently been suggested (e.g., Gorn 1982; see
also Allen and Madden 1985). The exact nature of this
process awaits further development. Next, if such affective responses are effortless, are they also so transient
that their effects on Aad and Ab are dissipated very
quickly? Analyses from this data set suggest they do
not: when delayed (one week later) brand-attitude measures were regressed on all mediating responses, social
affection affective responses were still significant (at p
< 0.05) influences (Equations 11 and 12).
Development of Methods
More work is also necessary in the area of validating
affective response dimensions and in developing a coding scheme for their study. First, the convergent and
discriminant validity of the response categories developed needs to be established formally, as does the discriminant validity of the affective responses from Aad. 3
Second, additional AR categories need to be studied
'3Note here that while such discriminant validity could not be tested
formally in this study (because only one measure was used per construct), evidence does exist that Aad and the affective responses are
not simply different measures of the same construct. Correlational
data indicate that while Aad is significantly (p < 0.05) correlated with
SAs (r = 0.31), CAs (r = -0.16), SEVA (r = 0.26), deactivation (r
= 0.12), and social affection (r = 0.34), SEVA does not correlate
strongly with SAs (r = -0.01) or CAs (r = -0.06), and social affection
does not correlate significantly with SAs (r = 0.03), although it does
seem to reduce CA production somewhat (r = -0.12). Thus, these
data indicate that Aad shares unique variance with SAs and CAs, which
SAs and CAs do not share (or share at much lower levels) with the
affective responses. The argument that Aad and the responses are one
and the same (in the sense that they relate identically to other constructs of nomological interest) does not therefore find strong support
from the data, although more stringent tests are obviously required.

247
empirically. Only three types of affective responses, all

positive, were studied here. A wider sample of commercials needs to be studied that includes negatively
valenced affective responses such as fear and anxiety,
among others.
Finally, questions arise about the data collection
methodology to be used. One may ask whether the collection of such nonverbal response data through verbal
protocols invalidates the data collected. We feel this is
not the case for two reasons. First, while the data collected may incompletely reflect affective responses, this
does not make such (incomplete) responses invalid per
se (see Wright 1980). (Such incompleteness could, of
course, lead to biased coefficient estimation if it implies
a systematically omitted variable.) Second, the response-reporting (verbalization) process does not seem
to be one that interferes with the response itself. The
reporting is retrospective, not concurrent, and does not
request or require forced intellectualization or abstraction (see Ericcson and Simon 1980).
Even if verbal protocol methods are defensible, however, the specific data-collection procedure used here is
open to question. One may argue, for instance, that the
instructions and training procedure used may have
biased subjects towards reporting more feelings than
they would have had naturally. While such speculation
is plausible, and warrants future research, we do not
believe these criticisms seriously threaten the validity
of the research reported here. A review of the procedure
used should make it clear that the instructions (1) repeatedly mentioned both thoughts and feelings, (2)
stressed that the respondent should report only those
thoughts and feelings that come naturally-those that
would emerge if the subject were watching the ad at
home, (3) legitimized the reporting of support and
counter arguments ("agreed or disagreed with something the ad said"), feeling states, and distractor
thoughts, and (4) did not use affective responses among
the examples given. Thus, while it is true that our instructions could have led subjects to provide an edited
version of their thoughts and feelings, it is our belief
that no lab testing situation can ever completely simulate a natural viewing situation (e.g., see Ray 1977),
and instructions to combat expected biases, if used with
care, can be superior to no instructions at all. Obviously,
future research will need to empirically validate this
assertion; as Wright (1980, p. 156) points out, the effects
of such priming instructions are currently unknown.
While alternative data collection methods could certainly be tried, therefore, it does appear that ads seem
to create measurable affective responses of various kinds
in viewers, and these seem to significantly influence Aad.
Further research into these affective responses seems
appropriate, in view of their potential contribution to
our study of peripheral advertising processing.
[Received February 1984. Revised April 1986.]
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Affective Responses Mediating Acceptance of Advertising

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Affective Responses Mediating Acceptance of Advertising

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sponse categories developed by advertising agencies

1973, Wrightsuggestedthat consumeracceptance

'Wright (1974) used curiosity thoughts in addition to these three.

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actions toward the commercial typically coded as source

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THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

cause different stimulus domains have been studied with

Types versus Dimensions

2Foran exampleof a study usingjust one typology(Plutchik's)to

and the spacewerethus unevenlypopulated-the 'types'

Typologies of Primary Emotions

AFFECTIVE RESPONSES: SYNTHESIS

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Batra and Ray

Among the advertising studies, Wells et al. (197 1) found

excitement (e.g., Wells et al.'s uniqueness). However,

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is defined as a feeling of being superior, of hostility,

Fear/anxiety appears as two categories in both Osgood's

4Two further categories appeared in only one other typology besides

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(these feelings fall in Izard's active joy category). In

Integration with Current Categories

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support argumentation if it stems from the product or

earlier, only the three positive response categories were

6The coding scheme being discussed also used various subcategories

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Support arguments (SA)

Positive feelings (SEVA, deactivation,

Counter arguments (CA)

Execution derogation and challenges

Execution discounting (ED)

Negative reactions to execution

Challenges to intrinsic brand credibility

Execution bolstering (EB)

Positive reactions to execution credibility

SEVA, deactivation, and social

Surgency, Elation, Vigor/Activation

Positive reports of upbeat, happy mood

Deactivation and social affection

Positive reports of ad elements being

SEVA and social affection feelings

Social affection feelings

Positive reports of warmth, tenderness,

Curiosity and surprise from execution

Non-neutral execution comments

The neutral distractors coding category included (1)

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twice" (which, in a repetition experiment, might be

Stimuli and Design

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though almost every protocol was completed in under

item immediate attitude measure of 0.84, p < 0.001, n

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THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER