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studies in
social & political thought

Volume 19
Summer 2011
Volume 17 . June 2010
Special Feature: Theorising the Postcolonial, Decolonising Theory

Edited by Emma Battell Lowman and Lucy Mayblin
Marie-Julie Frainais-Maitre, Haifa S. Alfaisal, Samer Frangie, Brantley Nicholson
Articles
Bataille against Heidegger: Language and the Escape from the World
Andrew Ryder
Democracys Era of Relative Decline
Andrew Gibson
Two Tunnelers: Digging Through the Differences in the Chomsky-Foucault Debate
Xavier Scott
Wikipedia: Example for a Future Electronic Democracy?
Decision, Discipline and Discourse in the Collaborative Encyclopaedia
Sylvain Firer-Blaess
Books Reviewed
Politics and the Imagination by Raymond Geuss
Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political by James Gordon Finlayson and
Fabian Freyenhagen
For a New Critique of Political Economy by Bernard Stiegler
The Pathologies of Individual Freedom by Axel Honneth
Of Jews and Animals by Andrew Benjamin
Adorno for Revolutionaries by Ben Watson
studies in social and political thought

Studies in Social and Political Thought is a peer-reviewed biannual journal produced
by postgraduate students, many of whom are based at the University of Sussex.
The journal seeks to foster and promote interdisciplinarity in social and political
thought, in addition to providing a publishing platform to junior academics.
International Advisory Board
Robert Pippin Axel Honneth Seyla Benhabib
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak Fredric Jameson Homi Bhabha
Alessandro Ferrara William Outhwaite Simon Jarvis
Shadia Drury Martin Jay Adriana Cavarero
Gordon Finlayson Robert Goodin Andrew Chitty
Editorial Group
Chris OKane Simon Mussell Verena Erlenbusch
Zoe Sutherland Tim Carter R. Phillip Homburg
Arthur Willemse Huw Rees Elliot Rose
Thomas Jeffery Chris Allsobrook
Angela Koffman Alastair Kemp
Reviewers
Chris OKane, R. Phillip Homburg, Huw Rees,
Chris Allsobrook, Tim Carter, Alastair Kemp,
Christos Hadjioannou, Arthur Willemse,
Emma Battell Lowman, Lucy Mayblin
Copyediting and Proofreading
Tim Carter, Simon Mussell, Huw Rees,
Arthur Willemse, Emma Battell Lowman, Lucy Mayblin
Design and Typesetting
Simon Mussell
Studies in Social and Political Thought
Centre for Social and Political Thought
School of History, Art History and Philosophy
University of Sussex
Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN
Contact: sspt@sussex.ac.uk
www.sussex.ac.uk/cspt/sspt
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This issue of SSPT was made possible by a contribution from the
Centre for Social and Political Thought at the University of Sussex.
copyright is retained by the authors
contents
Volume 19
Summer 2011
Special Feature:
Theorising the Postcolonial, Decolonising Theory
Introduction from the Editors
Emma Battell Lowman and Lucy Mayblin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Coloniality of Western Philosophy: Chinese Philosophy as Viewed in
France
Marie-Julie Frainais-Maitre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Indigenous Epistemology and the Decolonisation of Postcolonialism
Haifa S. Alfaisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
On the Broken Conversation between Postcolonialism and Intellectuals in
the Periphery
Samer Frangie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Decolonizing Cosmopolitanism: Guaman Poma de Ayalas Early Response
to a Singular Aesthetic Economy
Brantley Nicholson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Articles
Bataille against Heidegger: Language and the Escape from the World
Andrew Ryder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Andrew Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Two Tunnelers: Digging Through the Differences in the Chomsky-Foucault
Debate
Xavier Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Wikipedia: Example for a Future Electronic Democracy?
Decision, Discipline and Discourse in the Collaborative Encyclopaedia
Sylvain Firer-Blaess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Contents
Reviews
Politics and the Imagination by Raymond Geuss
Chris Allsobrook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Habermas and Rawls:Disputing the Political Edited by James Gordon
Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen
Huw Rees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
For a New Critique of Political Economy by Bernard Stiegler
Danny Hayward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
The Pathologies of Individual Freedom:Hegels Social Theory by Axel
Honneth
Philip Hogh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Of Jews and Animals by Andrew Benjamin
Verena Erlenbusch and Colin McQuillan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Adorno for Revolutionaries by Ben Watson
Luke Manzarpour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Introduction from the Editors:

Theorising the Postcolonial, Decolonising Theory
by Emma Battell Lowman
and Lucy Mayblin
Postcolonialism and decolonisation both speak to moving beyond colonial
orders; but how this is accomplished remains contested. Are states controlled
by settler colonial peoples, like Canada or Australia, decolonised? Where do
they stand in relation to African or Asian states controlled by local
populations but subjugated in world politics through internalized
colonialism and international intellectual and economic imperialism? This
all points to the problem of how we think about colonialism. Historically
entangled with colonialism, the Enlightenment tradition emerged in a
specific time and place. Indeed, the academic disciplines to be found in much
of the West today were born of the age of Empire on a continent home to
most of the colonial powers of the day. While other philosophies are
parochialised in the academy, always to be set within the context from which
they emerged, the European is apparently left untainted by culture or
history. This privileging of European-derived epistemologies also has its
roots in colonial domination, with the latter having asserted a particular and
totalizing logic over the past 500 years, insisting that European knowledge
is superior to other knowledges. European knowledge represents rationality,
science, and reason, while other ways of knowing are constructed as
traditional, irrational, spiritual, and contextual. Yet the Western academy,
historically home to apologetics for empire and influenced heavily by
Enlightenment ideals of progress, has seen over the past thirty years both
the assertion of postcolonial voices and the emergence of a postcolonial
politics of decolonisation. The knowledges and voices of colonised people,
now relevant in the academy and accessible globally, have revealed
trenchant insights and productive critiques that have called into question
many popular assumptions about culture, power, society and modernity.
The opening up of social and political thought to questions of
parochialism and, consequently, entanglement with colonialism has several
implications. First, it presents us with a world of theory which is not
necessarily rooted in Western European traditions and which therefore offers
helpful and previously ignored insights for better understanding a world
beyond European conceptual boundaries. This is a significant challenge, as
Battell Lowman & Mayblin: Introduction
Shilliam acknowledges in the case of international relations theory, but it is

worth undertaking since globalization has made it increasingly difficult for
Western civilization to masquerade as the geo-cultural retainer of a universal
experience of modernity (2011: 3). Second, it poses a fundamental challenge
to some of the core concepts of contemporary social and political thought in
the academy: modern, traditional, society, democracy, and so forth.
What happens to the idea of modernity when it is reconceived as coconstituted by colonialism? As Bhambra points out, the Western experience
has been taken both as the basis for the construction of the concept of
modernity, and at the same time, that concept is argued to have validity that
transcends the Western experience (2007: 4). Third, it blurs the boundaries
of who we are talking about when we speak of society, modernity,
Europe, or the West. If our boundaries have become meaningless, then
we must fundamentally shift our imaginations as researchers to
acknowledge interconnections that have been, and continue to be, obscured.
Once acknowledged and recognised, we must accept the responsibility to
act on these shifts.
There have been two main strands of thought that in recent years have
driven forward the agenda of theorising the postcolonial and decolonising
theory. These have collectively provided the inspiration for this special
section. The first is postcolonial theory, whose founding scholars are often
cited as Said (1978), Bhabha (1994), and Spivak (1999). Postcolonial literature
calls for a dramatic change in academic thinking, away from the perception
of colonialism as being primarily about states and borders, and towards an
analysis of the cultural and epistemic legacies of colonialism. It is perhaps
pertinent to note, then, that postcolonialism has taken much longer to break
in to the disciplines of political science and international relations than
sociology and literature. More recently, Walter Mignolo (2000; 2007; 2009),
Anibal Quijano (2000) and others have begun to speak of Decolonial theory
as a theoretical school whose origins are not so much a critique of Europe
from within as a theory of coloniality/modernity from without. When
coloniality and modernity are viewed as two sides of the same coin, any
analysis of the present must be seen through the lens of the coloniality of
power. This gives the historical events of colonialism very real
contemporary implications.
Within these two broad fields there are, of course, a plethora of
different perspectives and theories, as well as many crossovers. Both
postcolonial and decolonial thought problematise the universalising claims
which have characterised European Western philosophy from the
Enlightenment period onwards. In this sense, then, both are political projects
that seek to highlight implicit assumed epistemological hierarchies. Yet,
while postcolonialism has emerged from within this framework, decolonial

theorists such as Mignolo have sought to theorise from the borders of
coloniality, from outside European thought. Furthermore, these are just two
strands of thought, and numerous interventions have been made which
cannot easily be slotted into either box.
As postcolonialism and decolonisation remain contested, flexible and
ambiguous terms, they continue to serve as touchstones for some of the most
contentious, difficult and powerful discourses occurring both in the academy
and in social politics around the world. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
been theorised as a settler colonial conflict; American interventions in Iraq
and Afghanistan are discussed as enactments of neo-colonial imperialism;
indigenous Indians assert their identity against the Indian state, as do
indigenous Bantu people in southern Africa; these conflicts are revealed as
layered, complex and hybrid in part through postcolonial and decolonising
discourses. This underscores the necessity of pushing these discourses ever
further: imperialism and colonialism remain active forces in societies and
political orders around the world, and as such postcolonial insights and
decolonising action must remain similarly dynamic. This is the impetus
behind this special section: postcolonial and decolonising analyses are rich
and necessary areas of exploration in social and political thought, and
warrant our continued attention and engagement.
This conviction has been confirmed by the overwhelming response to
the call for papers for this special section of Studies in Social and Political
Thought. The submissions, received from four continents, were remarkable
in the diversity of perspectives, issues, concepts and approaches they
represented and the intriguing and novel insights they offered. Indeed, it
was a difficult task to choose among such strong and engaging articles, and
we would like to express our thanks to all of the authors who put forward
their work for consideration. Each of the sections articles represent
contributions to the debates and discourses surrounding one of the key
challenges facing social and political thought today: namely, how to
reconcile core concepts and ideas from canonical authors which, though
universal in their claims, are undeniably European in their origins.
In the first of the four articles, Marie-Julie Frainais-Maitre investigates
the reception of Chinese philosophy in France. She finds Chinese philosophy
is both little known in France and not generally recognised as a valid
philosophy. This drives Frainais-Maitre to ask: does China not think?
European philosophy derived from the Enlightenment predominates, and
Chinese contributions are more commonly viewed, and dismissed, as
wisdom or spirituality. The author, however, finds Chinese philosophy to
be worthy of inclusion in the category philosophy and as such attributes
its exclusion to colonialist, orientalist and eurocentrist perspectives which

appear to dominate academia.
Haifa S. Alfaisal engages directly with the marginalisation of
indigenous epistemologies by postcolonialism and postcolonial theorists in
Indigenous Epistemology and the Decolonisation of Postcolonialism.
Through investigation of postcolonial theorists who have addressed, even
in a limited way, indigenous epistemology, Alfaisal clearly illustrates the
dichotomised frameworks that underpin the segregation of indigenous
epistemology from postcolonial epistemology. She pushes this enquiry
further by considering decolonisation in relation to the challenges posed by
indigenous epistemologies. Alfaisal argues persuasively that in order to
decolonise postcolonialism the complicity of postcolonialism in the
modernity/coloniality complex must be acknowledged and addressed and,
further, that a critical, self-reflexive stance must be developed towards the
epistemological foundations of postcolonialism.
Following this, in On the Broken Conversation between
Postcolonialism and Intellectuals in the Periphery, Samer Frangie deals with
the reception of postcolonial critique in the periphery. Specifically, Frangie
investigates how Arab intellectuals have responded to Edward Saids
Orientalism. He uses the context-driven notion of the problem-space to
warn against the universalising tendencies of postcolonialism and presents
the work of Mahdi Amil and Sadek Jalal al-Azm as demonstrating his case.
Ultimately, Frangie is arguing for an excavation of the political from
underneath the epistemological critique in postcolonial thought, as a way to
renew the broken conversation between the metropole and the periphery.
In the final article, Decolonizing Cosmopolitanism: Guaman Poma
de Ayalas Early Response to a Singular Aesthetic Economy, Brantley
Nicholson offers a thoughtful and critical consideration of the textual and
graphic interventions of Guaman Poma. Nicholson skilfully puts this
seventeenth century Andean into conversation with other early philosophers
of globalisation and argues that Guaman Poma successfully decolonises
postcolonialism through his navigation of aesthetic borders and archival
code switching. In so doing, Nicholson makes a strong case for the
importance of investigating aesthetic diversity as a critical part of the power
dynamics of Empire. His engagement with the historical and contemporary
implications of Guaman Pomas interventions perform the dual purpose of
grounding his theoretically nuanced argument and assuring the important
place of these works in postcolonial thought and theory.
These four articles from early career researchers offer valuable insights
into the new generation of decolonising and postcolonial scholarship. The
authors have been robust in their criticism of the field while maintaining
their faith in the underlying motives of the project. We would like to thank
Frainais-Maitre, Alfaisal, Frangie and Nicholson for their dedication and
engagement throughout the process, and particularly for their hard work in
meeting tight publication deadlines. We would also like to thank all the
reviewers who so generously shared their time and expertise. Their critical
engagement helped enormously to strengthen both the quality and impact
of the articles in this special section. Finally, the editors would like to thank
Chris OKane and Simon Mussell at Studies in Social and Political Thought for
their support and for taking on a theme outside of the usual journal content.
We are honoured to be a part of what we believe is an important
intervention, bringing new voices together in a vigorous and necessary
discourse that contributes to the analysis and action that will, we hope, help
to transcend colonial barriers and to imagine truly post-colonial futures.
Emma Battell Lowman (e.j.b.lowman@warwick.ac.uk) is a PhD student in
the Sociology Department at the University of Warwick, and received her
MA in History from the University of Victoria (Canada). Her thesis
investigates the application of Indigenous methodologies to missionary
histories in British Columbia and is concerned with the ethical and logistical
challenges of Indigenous-Settler historical research.
Lucy Mayblin (l.mayblin@warwick.ac.uk) is a PhD student in the Sociology
Department at the University of Warwick. Her research focuses on the ways
in which Britains colonial history is implicated in its contemporary asylum
regime. She is also research assistant for the ESRC network Connected
Histories, Connected Sociologies, Rethinking the Global, and co-organiser
of a forthcoming conference Rethinking the Modern: Colonialism, Empire
and Slavery (July 2011).
Bibliography
Bhabha, H. K. (1994) The Location of Culture London: Routledge
Bhambra, G. K. (2007) Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological
Imagination Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Mignolo, W. (2000) Local Histories/Global Designs Chichester: Princeton
University Press
Mignolo, W. (2007) DELINKING: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of
Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality Cultural Studies 21(2), 449-
514
Mignolo, W. (2009) Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and DeColonial Freedom Theory, Culture, and Society 26(7-8), 1-23
Quijano, A. (2000) Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America
Nepantla: Views from South 1(3), 533-580
Said, E. W. (1978) Orientalism London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Shilliam, R. E. (2011) International Relations and Non-Western Thought:
Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity London:
Routledge
Spivak, G. C. (1999) A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the
Vanishing Present Boston: Harvard University Press
The Coloniality of Western Philosophy:

Chinese Philosophy as Viewed in France
by Marie-Julie Frainais-Maitre
Abstract
Chinese philosophy is little known in France and is not
generally recognised by twenty-first century French
philosophers as a philosophy. They often regard its
contributions as wisdom, thought or spirituality. But when we
study it in detail, we are clearly faced with a philosophy. Why
then is Chinese philosophy isolated from philosophy in France?
Is it perhaps only the Western world that has the right and
ability to think? Does not China also think? This paper attempts
to understand this state of affairs by seeking clues that might
explain why the notion that Chinese philosophy is not
philosophy remains prevalent in France today. This issue may
be understood if we place it in the context of the relationship
between the West and the others, and therefore in a colonialist,
orientalist and eurocentrist perspective. It is possibly because
the world remains caught in a persistent intellectual coloniality
and an entrenched eurocentrism of thought, such that the West
does not recognise the philosophies of others. The West still
occupies the epistemological centre of the world and constitutes
a unique reference point of knowledge. Finally, some solutions
could be sought in order to decentralise philosophy, by opening
up possibilities for the diversification and localisation of
knowledge and provincializing the West in philosophy.
Introduction
Chinese philosophy is little known in France and is not officially recognised
by twenty-first century French philosophers as a philosophy. A philosophy
is here understood to be a critical and rational activity, made possible with
the emergence of the logos (or reason, thought, discourse and study) in
ancient Greece, which aims to discover the truth through questioning, the
use of rationality, and the creation of concepts, and which became a
discipline developed and institutionalised in the West (Lalande, 1999: 774;
10
Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy
Godin, 2004: 742, 979). French philosophers regard Chinese philosophy less
as alternative reasoning and more as wisdom, thought or spirituality. Within
France, Chinese philosophy is often called Chinese thought (see, for
example, Jullien, 1998; Cheng, 1997; Granet, 2002), and only Chinese
philosophy by a small number of authors (Billeter, 2002; Kaltenmark, 1994).
The French philosopher Franois Jullien employs China as the other in
order to provoke thought within Western philosophy. He strongly
differentiates the Chinese wise man and the Greek philosopher (Jullien,
1998). He argues that when somebody tells me that Chinese thought is not
a philosophy I answer that it is true, Chinese thought could develop itself
in that sense, but it has not made this choice (Jullien, 2004: 91). Alain Badiou
praises Franois Jullien for providing structures to Chinese thought, because
when he read Chinese thought without preparation and conceptual work,
he dismissed it as small talk, as did Hegel many years earlier (Badiou, 2007:
140).
However, when studied in detail, Chinese philosophy does deserve
to be included in the category philosophy understood to mean an activity
of thinking which tries to understand and to explain the world and human
existence, and which is common to humankind; a philosophy which is open
enough to not exclude anything that might help in this endeavour. This does
mean that Chinese philosophy lacks the European imperative of rationality,
and that Chinese philosophers deploy forms such as poetry and metaphor
which are not intrinsic to European philosophy. However, such differences
do not need to be seen as disqualifications. Chinese philosophy contains texts
which demonstrate an act of thinking, an attempt to explain the world and
humankind as well as reflections on the organisation of society. For instance,
Zhuangzi, written by the Taoist philosopher of the same name in the 4th
century BC, contains reflections on death, the political organisation of
society, and happiness. The Zhuangzi also shows reflections that could be
considered as naturalist.1
Why, then, is Chinese philosophy isolated from philosophy in France?
Is it perhaps only the Western world that has the right and the ability to
think? Does China not think? This idea that Chinese philosophy is not a
philosophy was first linked to the introduction of Chinese culture and
philosophy in France in the 16th century by the Jesuit missionaries.
Philosophers of the Enlightenment read and relayed the content of the
Edifying and Curious Letters of some Missioners, of the Society of Jesus, from
Foreign Missions to the next generations of philosophers, and so on from there
to later philosophers. But these descriptions are skewed. Jesuits were in
contact with just one social class of the Chinese population, namely, the
Mandarins. They also had to justify their missions to Rome and present
China in a positive light. However, at that time, Chinese philosophy was
11
considered as a philosophy by philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as

Voltaire. But in the 19th century, through the rise of Orientalism and
scientific racism, the old admiration for China transformed into contempt,
as described by Hegel. Hegel argued that China, representing the beginning
of the abstraction and the childhood age of the Spirit, has no philosophy
(Hegel, 1964: 16; 1965: 287).
In his book Orientalism (1978), the theorist Edward W. Said (1935-2003)
describes Orientalism as a constellation of false assumptions underlying
Western attitudes toward the East. Orientalism is depicted as the Western
style of dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient as
well as the constitutive discourse of the West on the Orient. The Orient is the
object of the discourses message and its authors are the Orientalists. From
the 16th century onwards, generations of philosophers had built an
imaginary of Chinese philosophy which is still observable in academic
discourse today.2 The status of Chinese philosophy in France has been
studied in the journal Extrme Orient Extrme Occident, with the special issue
Y a-t-il une philosophie Chinoise? [Is there a Chinese philosophy?]. In this
issue, the authors noted that Chinese philosophy is not considered as a
philosophy. Most articles try to resolve this problem of the existence of
Chinese philosophy, but in general the problem is studied within the
Western categories of philosophy, and Chinese philosophy is analysed
through a Western lens. This makes the problem appear insoluble (see
Cheng, 2005). Jean-Francois Billeter has also tried to explicate Chinese
philosophy through translations of original texts which contrast with
traditional representations of Chinese philosophy as mysticism. This
mysticism maintains the myth of the radical otherness of China (see Billeter,
2002; 2006).
John J. Clarke, scholar of the history of ideas, has also contributed to
the study of how the West received Oriental philosophies. He aims to
highlight the narrowness of Eurocentric intellectual historiography by
evoking key moments of the encounter between the two sides of the world,
and by examining the intellectual relations between West and East (see
Clarke, 1997). Anne Cheng wondered in her inaugural lecture at the Collge
de France, Does China think? Cheng stressed that the main issue has always
been to think China, but she also asked if China is even allowed to think
and think for itself (see Cheng, 2009). Finally, Carine Defoort and Rein Raud
discussed this subject in a journal entitled Philosophy East and West. Defoort
studied the problem of the existence of Chinese philosophy and extracted
four possible positions, while Rein Raud reproached Defoort for failing to
get to the bottom of the problem, namely, Eurocentrism (see Defoort, 2001;
2006; and Raud, 2006).
This paper aims to understand the contention Chinese philosophy
12
is not a philosophy through a colonialist, orientalist and Eurocentrist

reading. Eurocentrism is understood here as a kind of ethnocentrism and as
an ideology (conscious or unconscious) to focus on, and take as its lead,
European concerns, culture and values, at the expense of those of other
cultures.3 As such, a key question is the following: Is it because the world
remains in a persistent intellectual coloniality and an entrenched
Eurocentrism of thought that the West does not recognise philosophies of
the others?
The Centrality of Western Philosophy
The centrality of the West in its perception of knowledge can be studied in
order to understand why the West represents other philosophies as nonphilosophies. Concepts of West and East, or Occident and Orient, are
cultural, geographic and politically instituted concepts. As Said argued, the
ideas of Orient and Occident have a history and a tradition of thought,
imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence (2003: 5).
Orientalism produces imaginative geographies and the West has constructed
itself in comparison to the Orient (Gregory, 2004: 4). Uta Janssens has also
argued that the West defined and still defines itself in contrast to the East,
with the result that the two concepts are dependent upon a series of
opposing values (2007: 223). The border between West and East has, thus,
been invented and reproduced over time.
The discourse of Orientalism created a series of binary oppositions
and pairs, and Occident and Orient are an important example of this. In this
construction and representation of the world, the West seems to represent
the strong and superior centre of the world with the rest serving as its
peripheries. This idea of the West as a centre can be found in the field of
history as argued by Naoki Sakai, specialist of Japanese intellectual history.
For him, history seemed to be an eternal process of unification and
centralization with Europe at the centre. Hence, we designed the history
simply as a process of Europeanization (Sakai, 2001: 91). This phenomenon
of the appropriation of the world by the West has its origin in the expansion
of European religion developed by the Jesuits and exported through
colonisation. This expansion can be observed today in the phenomenon of
globalisation. Globalisation is the global extension of cultural, political and
economic exchanges. This phenomenon has primarily been a process of
unequal exchange and absolute domination with the Occident/West and the
Global North at its centre transferring their culture to the Third World, the
South and the Orient/East (Bessis, 2001: 27-28).
According to Sophie Bessis (2001: 7), Western supremacy is not only
present in personal feelings, but also appears to structure society through
13
discourse and intellectual spheres. These assertions can be understood

through the idea that Orientalism is a discourse constructed through
stereotypes, images and representations. The West interprets, depicts and
speaks for the Orient. In this sense, the West produces a categorised discourse
(Said, 2003: 129; 56). Said, through the works of Michel Foucault (1966; 1975),
has identified Orientalism as a discourse that helps to understand the
Western systematic discipline that allowed Western culture to manage and
to produce the Orient (Said, 2003: 3). This context can help us understand
why, generally speaking, Western philosophy is considered as the only
philosophy, the philosophy among French academics. The other
philosophies do not matter because they are folk wisdom, confined to
orbiting around the centre as peripheries, neglected and inferior, never able
to reach the privileged higher status of Western philosophy. Thus,
philosophy is the property of the West. This situation is fixed by an imagined
origin which took root in Ancient Greece, and then in Europe more widely.
This ability to think and philosophise is denied to others. Western
philosophy is seen as the matrix of thought, and every thought which
diverges from it is not acceptable because it jeopardises the Wests central
and dominant position.
It seems that behind this question of the ability of the others to think,
there are remnants of a colonialist thought and a persistent Orientalism. This
is the case for the questioning of the existence of Chinese philosophy by
Western philosophers, questioning which is linked to entrenched forms of
intellectual colonialism. It might appear that with decolonisation in the
second half of the 20th century these notions of colonial influence and
domination by the West on the world have disappeared. But this is not the
case. For sociologist Anibal Quijano, the most powerful myth of the 21st
century consists in the idea that the elimination of the colonial
administrations is equal to the decolonization of the world (Grosfoguel,
2006: 60-61). Indeed, the post of postcolonialism indicates that coloniality
continues under new forms; and post-Occidentalism indicates that
Occidentalism continues to be reproduced under new forms (Mignolo,
2000: 30).
According to Quijano, the concept of coloniality of power is a
system constituted by multiple and heterogeneous forms of sexual, political,
epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial hierarchies and systems
of global domination and exploitation (Quijano, 1993; 2000; in Grosfoguel,
2006: 57). From this perspective, coloniality and modernity are two sides of
the same coin. Coloniality is the continuity of the domination and of the
forms of exploitation which follow the disappearance of colonial
administrations produced by hegemonic structures and cultures of the
capitalist/patriarchal modern/colonial world-system (Grosfoguel, 2006: 61).
14
It seems that coloniality is beyond colonialism and constitutes a set of values

which structures an ideology born with the modern/colonial world in the
16th century (with the encounter of America by Christopher Columbus and
other explorers). This is a principle and a control strategy which goes beyond
simple economic exploitation. Coloniality institutes Eurocentrism which
becomes a source of religious, ethnic and (especially) epistemic
discriminations. It implies the colonisers behaviour as well as the
comportment of the colonised.
Coloniality is therefore not only economic but also intellectual.
According to the geographer Philippe Pelletier, Western expansion has not
only been economic and political but also cultural and intellectual (2006:
85-86). The foundations of knowledge were found (and are still found) in
Western civilisation and in its multiple and complex possibilities, as long as
the conceptualisation (of the right and of the left) remains within the
framework of language and modernity (Fals-Borda, 1971; in Mignolo, 2001:
59-60) As Mignolo explains:
From the 16th to the 21th centuries, the colonial difference has
been the mechanism which has undervalued the non-western
knowledge. The double epistemic conscience of the how to be
an African philosopher (Eze) or an Indian historian
(Chakrabarty) is still relevant today. The monotypic episteme
of modernity is facing the pluritopic episteme of coloniality
[. . .] This is an episteme of borders, of the edge of the thought,
announced from the perspective of the coloniality (2001: 57)
Intellectual coloniality is illustrated by, for instance, the export of Western
concepts and disciplines to Asia at the end of the 19th century. This
knowledge is exported via the expansion of the epistemic and philosophical
Western concepts as much as by the classification of the social sciences and
humanities. This global expansion of the social sciences implies that
intellectual coloniality remains in place, even if this colonization is caused
by good intentions, made by people of the left and supports decolonization
(Mignolo, 2001: 60).
China and the Academic Disciplines in France
The humanities, which are built using Western categories, organise the
relationship between the world and knowledge through an interplay of
subjective techniques and practices. Naoki Sakai and Osamu Nishitani have
described a classification which organises the world of knowledge and
humanities. This is the distinction between humanitas, as subject of
knowledge, and anthropos, as object of knowledge (Solomon and Habib, 2005:
15
94).4 In light of this, China has been represented by the West as a concept or
an object of study. Chinese philosophy in France suffers from its construction
as an object of study, rendering it always inferior to French philosophical
offerings. Chinese philosophy is used as an argument, a case that the Western
philosopher uses in order to improve his or her system.5
Chinese philosophy is also used by some French philosophers in
helping to understand silences in Western thought.6 In the preface to the
French edition of Saids Orientalism, Tzvetan Todorov wrote that domination
could be expressed by this concept. If you say to somebody I have the truth
about you it is informing the nature of my knowledge but it is also a
relationship in which I dominate and the other is dominated (Said, 2003:
8). In his relation with China, the Western philosopher is in a position of
domination because he has the truth about the other because he judges and
gives (or denies) the philosophy label. This use of categories in order to
distinguish between philosophy and Chinese philosophy illustrates an
argument employed by the sociologist Christine Delphy. According to her,
to classify is to hierarchise. The power of language and of the discourse is to
name something or someone, and then create a reality, a group, and in
particular to distinguish us and the others (see Sharp, 2009: 18).
Classification of the philosophies hierarchises them because these two
operations are linked and function simultaneously (Delphy, 2008: 40). This
notion of domination can be characterised by discourse because the master
is the one who is speaking, he speaks for the other and of the other. Language
participates in the Wests intellectual hegemonic construction of others.
Orientalism has been described as knowledge on the Orient but also as
power. As Michel Foucault argued in Discipline and Punish, power implies
knowledge and both are constituted together: there is no power relation
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations (Foucault, 1975: 27). Foucault thought that language is a function
of power. Thus, power circulates in the context of representation. There is a
connection between differences, power and representations. It is an exercise
of the symbolic power through representational practices. The stereotypes
created by language are a key point in symbolic violence. Power is not only
to constrain but it is also to produce (Hall, 1997: 261). In the case of Chinese
philosophy, this power allows for the production of new objects of
knowledge (such as the Orient), and new forms of knowledge (such as
Orientalism).
The other key point which could help to explain why Chinese
philosophy is not seen as a philosophy in France is the universalisation of
Western knowledge. One of the central claims of Western philosophy is its
universalist vocation, a pretention to the universal which is the characteristic
of Europe, according to Jrgen Habermas (2008). As Kenta Ohji and
16
Mickhael Xifaras underline, the German philosopher has argued, without

any contradiction and without using the metaphysical conception of the
universal, that pretention to the universal is a characteristic of the West and
the criterion of valid norms for everywhere and any time (Ohji and Xifaras,
1999: 42).
Universalism is also the mask of ethnocentrism. In this vein, Todorov
has argued that the universal hid the will of European ethnocentrism or
Eurocentrism (1989: 510). In that sense, it is not possible to recognise an
origin for philosophy other than Greece, nor a philosophy (Chinese
philosophy, for example) other than Western philosophy. Enrique Dussel
proposes that the origin of this universalist belief can be found in Descartes
who initiated the ego-politic of knowledge. Descartes placed European man
at the level of God inasmuch as he thought the foundation of knowledge was
the first and indubitable principle. Dussel argues that ego cogito was
preceded by ego conquistus, I conquer therefore I am (1977; in Grosfoguel,
2006: 53). Europe has created the universal but has limited its areas of
application. This is a process of exclusion. Nowadays, the creators of this
notion of the universal have not renounced their right to apply it. They
continue to classify what is inside and outside the universal.
The consequence of the universalisation of knowledge is that thoughts
are not situated. Thus, the West assumes the paternity of thoughts. Walter
Mignolo quotes Enrique Dussel who speaks about the lack of situated
thought, which for him shows the vagueness of the European modern
capitalist universal (Mignolo, 2001: 60). The concealment of the localisation
of the subjects enunciation implies a hierarchy of knowledge. After
appropriating the origin of bright ideas for knowledge, Europe was able to
claim intellectual authority and establish the others as inferior. This
situation has logically permitted its domination over the others, and the
possibility to colonise them in order to educate and give them superior
knowledge; the latter of which may arise from the others themselves. As a
consequence, this lack of localisation of the subject feeds the universalist
myth. Indeed, by not declaring who is at the origin of an idea or discovery,
the West appropriates this idea and at the same time erases the origin of the
idea or discovery. This is what happened historically in printing technology.
Gutenberg in Germany is said to be the inventor of printing because in 1440
he had the idea to use movable lead characters to print. But according to
Joseph Needham and Etiemble, this technique was already used for centuries
in China.7
By the erasure of the localisation of the subject in the power and
epistemic relationship, Western philosophy and science
managed to produce a universalist myth which covers, or rather
17
hides the epistemic localisation in power relationships from

which the subject speaks (Grosfoguel, 2006: 53)
Thus, the West takes on the good role by colonising the others in
order to provide them with science and civilisation, and this constitutes a
reason to extend its intellectual and spatial territory. The West believes in its
civilising mission as well as in its economic interests. In the 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century, all the European political movements
argued that humanity was led by an order, a scale, and that the top of this
hierarchy was occupied by the West. Sophie Bessis conceives of this idea as
the serious mission of civilizing that the white man undertakes, and which
then can be used as an excuse for all its enterprises (2001: 43).
Clues for a Decentralisation and a Decolonisation of Western Philosophy
Solutions proposed by post-colonial theories can help to de-centralise and
de-colonise French philosophy. First, it is possible to counteract the idea that
the West is the only one to hold knowledge and so has the power to dominate
the others. A solution could be to practise a relativism regarding cultures
and knowledge in the world. The categories of the Western disciplines are
founded upon Western criteria which have been instituted by specific
definitions. Many French philosophers refuse China and others the ability
to philosophise, because recognising these other philosophies might
decentre Western philosophy. According to Mignolo,
It is crucial [. . .] to rethink the articulations in the production
and distribution of knowledge, and the role of the Humanities,
the Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences in the corporate
university under which we are living and working. [. . .] [I]t
implies going beyond national literatures and looking at the
larger picture in the structure of colonial power, language and
the interstate system (2000: 14)
The second solution could be to invert the process of comparison
between the centre and the periphery which feeds intellectual coloniality
and Orientalism. This comparison could be illustrated by the grammatical
construction they are like us, where the word they means the others, and
the word us means the West. It could therefore be a solution to practice a
post-colonial language as Naoki Sakai has argued. According to Sakai, this
declaration they are like us refers to the conviction of the annihilation
of the other, which in its otherness, is probably the mission of the monist
history (2001: 93). The alternative could be the expression, we are like
18
them, but in this expression the centrality of the West is no longer ensured.
A third solution for restoring the wholes shattered by the universalist
discourse of Western philosophy could be to take into account the geopolitics
of knowledge. A way to practice this idea would be to highlight the spatiality
of epistemology and to thoroughly historicise it. That is to say, one has to
seek where and when an idea has been thought. This exercise will
consequently de-centralise Western thought. It will highlight several
epistemological foci worldwide, with none appearing superior to any other.
According to Mignolo, epistemology is not a-historic. It is not anymore a
linear history which goes from Greece to the production of Western
contemporary knowledge. Epistemology must be spatialised, historicised by
playing the colonial difference (2001: 61). Thus, a solution could be to put
the West in perspective and not to place it in the centre but as a region among
others.
Such ideas echo Dispesh Chakrabartys proposal to provincialise
Europe, particularly in the field of history (see Chakrabarty, 2000). This
solution would be to think of every culture, every civilisation, as a result of
exchanges between, and contacts and bonds with, others. Whether such a
universalist humanism can be counterbalanced by respect for
epistemological diversity remains to be seen.
Conclusion
These clues have helped us to better understand these issues by considering
to what extent China thinks, or if it is only the Western world that has the
right and the ability to think. The issue of the existence of other philosophies,
such as Chinese philosophy, may be explained with a colonialist, orientalist
and Eurocentrist perspective. The main reason being that philosophy,
understood as Western philosophy, is centralised because the West is seen
as the centre of world knowledge. Western philosophy is marked by
Eurocentrism and by coloniality of thought. Western philosophy considers
itself as dominant, and this idea gives it the asserted right to colonise and
civilise others. The others think of themselves in comparison to the West,
and the hierarchy of knowledge implies that Chinese philosophy is seen as
a peripheral and unable to reach the centre represented by Western
philosophy. The universalism of Western philosophy is reinforced by
centralism and intellectual coloniality, as well as the lack of temporal and
spatial situation of the thoughts in the world. The relativism of cultures and
knowledge, as well as the spacialisation and historicisation of knowledge,
could help to decentre Western philosophy. A modification of the way to
construct comparisons between forms of knowledge could also help to break
the schema of centre and peripheries that is so often identified. These clues
19
could help French scholars to correct their cultural myopia (Clarke, 1997:
114) and allow for the practice of a new way of thinking about the world and
the many philosophies within it.
Marie-Julie Frainais-Maitre (mjmaitre@cityu.edu.hk) is Research Fellow in
the Department of Asian and International Studies and in the Hong Kong
Advanced Institute for Cross-Disciplinary Studies of City University of Hong
Kong. Her research interests are Western and Chinese philosophy, Taoism
and decolonial thinking.
Endnotes
1
See Zhuangzi (1980: 254).
The concept of imaginaire or imaginary is borrowed from Cornlius

Castoriadis and means invention (see Castoriadis, 1975).
3
On these notions of ethnocentrism and eurocentrism, see Todorov (1989).
See Sakai and Nishitani (1999).
For instance, Montesquieu in the 18th century used China to improve his
political system (see Montesquieu, 1951).
6
Franois Jullien, a French philosopher, uses Chinese philosophy in order

to understand the unthought-of in Western thought (see Jullien and
Marchaisse, 2000: 189).
7
See Needham (1954) and Etiemble (1988).
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Indigenous Epistemology and the Decolonisation of

Postcolonialism
by Haifa S. Alfaisal
Abstract
This paper traces the involvement of postcolonialism in the
marginalisation of indigenous epistemologies. It begins by
illustrating how postcolonialism maintains a dichotomised
conceptual framework that clearly separates indigenous
epistemology from postcolonial epistemology. This is followed
by an examination of indigenous interventions that have noted
the epistemological imperialism of Western ways of knowing
and the need to de-link from these. Then the paper examines
decolonisation in relation to indigenous epistemologies, which
leads to a discussion of Mignolos modernity/coloniality power
complex. This exploration reveals that the dichotomising
framework that postcolonialism applies to indigenous
epistemologies is symptomatic of a profound shortcoming. This
concerns postcolonialisms lack of a critical stance towards its
own epistemological foundations, namely, its entanglement
with Mignolos coloniality/modernity power complex. The
paper concludes with a brief consideration of the viability of a
decolonised postcolonialism.
In Coloniality of Power and De-colonial Thinking, Walter D. Mignolo
insightfully pointed out that, counter-intuitively, postcolonialism is a field
of knowledge in need of decolonisation. He stated: The radical difference
between on the one hand post-colonial theory and post-coloniality in
general and de-colonial projects on the other hand lies in the genealogy
of thought in which each projects found its energy and its vision (Mignolo,
2007: 163). Mignolos point appears to be valid. Postcolonialism cannot
engage with indigenous epistemologies unless it also turns a critical gaze
towards its own theoretical entanglement with the modernity/coloniality
power structure. In short, postcolonialism cannot sustain its ethical purchase
unless it decolonises itself. In this article, postcolonialisms encounter with
indigenous epistemologies is used as a theoretical yardstick for measuring
postcolonialisms ethical purchase. It is prudent, at this juncture, to point out
Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology
25
that the terms epistemology and epistemologies are used interchangeably to

indicate a category that is fundamentally at odds with postcolonialisms
epistemology. The plural usage indicates an awareness of the plurality of
indigenous epistemologies, and the singular usage is intended to convey the
idea that these epistemologies are unified in their appeal to pre-colonial
ways of knowing, and indigenous ways of knowing that encompass
spiritual, economical, environmental and social dimensions.1 The efficacy of
applying indigenous epistemologies to a critique of postcolonialism is
further justified by the fact that these are positioned outside the
modernity/coloniality complex identified by Mignolo as an integral part of
colonial power.2 Therefore, this study is by necessity diagnostic but not
exhaustive in its approach. The erudite postcolonialist will note the omission
of many theorists from the discussion. These omissions are necessary given
the focus of this exploration is the consideration of postcolonial theorists
who have addressed indigenous epistemology. Likewise, this article will not
engage in an extensive review of the considerable work done by indigenous
thinkers and critics, except to involve those who have been drawn upon by
postcolonial theorists who have explored or commented on the relationship
between indigenous epistemologies and postcolonialism.
From Nativism to Indigenous Epistemology
Tracing the genealogy of indigenous epistemology in postcolonialism reveals
that the indigenous voice was first addressed as nativism, which can be
perceived as a form of cultural essentialism, and then as a more nuanced
conceptualisation of indigenous worldviews in indigenous epistemology.3
This movement towards a better understanding of the issues associated with
indigenous peoples expressions of resistance came about as a result of
postcolonialisms growing awareness of the crisis regarding its own ethical
purchase and the epistemological challenge that indigenous epistemologies
pose.
The postcolonial engagement with indigenous epistemology always
occurs within a dichotomising framework. Fanon accurately described the
dichotomised condition of native anti-colonial intellectuals as individuals
who are caught between the bourgeois representatives of the mother
country and an anxious impulse to turn to ancient cultures as a source of
national culture in an effort to shrink away from that Western culture in
which they all risk being swamped (1963: 178, 209).4 His centralisation of
national liberation as the ultimate aim of any recourse to indigenous
ancient culture confined him to a limited view of nativism that did not
take indigenous epistemology into consideration. For Fanon, nativism
26
remained a possible and competing source of postcolonial identity, a

healthier choice for the general psycho-affective equilibrium, and an
indicator of the failure of colonial assimilation (1963: 210). Fanon never
considered nativism as offering a radically different epistemology, which
may present an entirely different perspective on liberation that may or may
not have anything to do with national constructs. In fact, indigenists5 have
questioned the nation as an ideal form of a popular, modern, political
organisation.6 Based on Fanons reasoning, postcolonial critics must then ask
themselves the following question: How can colonialist assimilation be
declared a failure if the conceptual and, indeed, cognitive complex (i.e.,
Western ratio-centric epistemology) that was highly instrumental in
colonisation in the first place still governs all expressions of resistance to
assimilation? In other words, if there is no epistemological rupture, can there
be liberation? The dichotomy that Fanon noted becomes the modus operandi
for much of postcolonialisms consideration of indigenous peoples
expressions of anti-colonialism. When indigenous peoples resistance is
subjected to a postcolonialist epistemological gaze, it is dichotomised into
two modes: (1) modes of indigenous resistance that are acceptable to this
epistemology; and (2) modes that are considered retrograde and archaic
because they belong to an indigenous epistemology.
The perceived lack of a role for indigenous epistemology within the
theoretical bastion of postcolonialism gains orthodoxy from
postcolonialisms foundational critic, Edward Said. Although Said
unequivocally rejected all forms of nativism, he did recognise the absence
of an epistemological critique at the most fundamental level of the
connection between the development of a historicism ... and the actual
practise of imperialism (1985: 101). Nonetheless, he rejected the idea of
responding to the tyrannical conjuncture of colonial power with scholarly
Orientalism simply by proposing an alliance between nativist sentiment
buttressed by some variety of native ideology (ibid.: 103). This antipathy
towards nativism extends to one of Saids, and indeed postcolonialisms,
most ardent foes, Aijaz Ahmad. Ahmad perceptively accused the emerging
field of being postmodernisms wedge to colonize literatures outside
Europe and its North American offshoots (1992: 276). However, his firm
dedication to orthodox Marxism prevented him from seeing beyond
postcoloniality as a matter of class and beyond the necessity of launching
an unending critique of capitalist modernity to counter colonialism (Ahmad,
1996: 289). With his Marxism firmly entrenched in the Western episteme,
Ahmad rejected nativism as a form of cultural differentialism, which treats
indigenous culture as self-referential, autonomous in its own authority,
and therefore unavailable for cognition or criticism from a space outside
27
itself (1996: 289). He also failed to notice the radical subversive potential
posed to postcolonialism by indigenous epistemology.
Benita Parry managed to rescue nativism from outright dismissal by
postcolonialism and return it to a more tolerant Fanonian Marxism.
However, Parry could not support the hopeless attempt to locate and revive
pristine pre-colonial cultures (1994: 179). Does this mean that native
epistemologies are to be wholly rejected? Parry predicated the acceptance of
these epistemologies based on responses to the following: Who is revisiting
the repositories of memory and cultural survivals in the cause of postcolonial
refashioning and why they are doing so (1994: 174)? She therefore accepted
recourse to nativism only as a source of locating traditions of protest. In other
words, Parry accepted modes of indigenous peoples resistance considered
suitable for postcolonialist epistemology, which up to this point were
governed by a Marxist episteme that envisioned a materialist, anti-capitalist,
anti-colonialist, national liberation movement as an ideal. In fact, Parrys
dedication to this materialist epistemology is strikingly apparent in what can
only be read as a deliberate overlooking of the challenge of indigenous
epistemology. Her lack of consideration of this issue is evident from her
decision to limit her exploration of Mudimbes account of African Gnosis to
his comments on Fanon, despite the fact that Mudimbes signal achievement
was that his was the first significant intervention in postcolonialisms neglect
of indigenous epistemology (1988).
In fact, Mudimbes intervention notwithstanding, the mainstream of
postcolonial theory continued and in fact still continues to have
difficulties with regard to its relationship to indigenous epistemology. The
difficulty is expressed in postcolonialisms unregistered subjection of all
engagements with indigenous epistemology to a dichotomised framework.
As postcolonialism began to develop a greater critical awareness of its own
ethical purchase vis--vis the need to account for indigenous knowledge, a
change in terminology occurred that is, the term indigenous epistemology
replaced the term nativism to signal this newly developed sensitivity.
Nonetheless, philosophical, poststructuralist and historicist postcolonialist
engagements with indigenous epistemology continued to apply a
dichotomising framework without recognising that the Western ratio-centric
episteme supporting postcolonialism is, as Mudimbe noted, part and parcel
of the the colonizing structure (1988: 4).7
In his work, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-cultural Encounter
(1996), Dallmayr attempted to locate points of philosophical convergence
between different epistemologies and ontologies that would allow a crosscultural dialogue and promote critical engagement between differing
cultures. He used Raimundo Panikkars diatopical hermeneutics, which
28
differs from monocultural and historicist forms of interpretation

(Dallmayr, 1996: 61). Diatopical hermeneutics relies on dialogue and
processes of reciprocal learning (ibid.). Dallmayr posited an ontology of
openness, which implies at least a certain willingness to transcend
established categories in favor of a freer recognition of alien life-forms, thus
permitting otherness to be in a nonpossessive way (ibid.: 130). In this way,
the Eurocentricity of certain values that are considered universal such as
liberty and equality is easily recognised. These values are seen as
qualities of individual agents [. . .] of autonomous egos seen as
constitutive building blocks of social life; as a corollary, social
distinctions or differentiations have to be justified or
legitimated against the benchmark of uniformity or equal
liberty (ibid.: 131)
The end objective is to counter monolithic universalism with diatopical
hermeneutics so as to move towards a lateral universalism, which is a
mature stance where universal principles are no longer found beyond
concrete differences but in the heart of the local or particular itself, that is, in
the distinct topography of the world (ibid.: 222).
Although Dallmayr did not directly address the topic of indigenous
epistemologies, it is safe to assume that they are included in the categories
of the local and particular from which lateral universalism can be
constructed. His privileging of philosophy as the medium of exploration
would appear to marginalise indigenous epistemologies that cannot be
adapted to the standards of philosophical speculation and that function
according to their own internal logic their own gnosis, which may
denigrate Western ratio-centric reason altogether. The dichotomy is implicit
in Dallmayrs discourse where there is no critical self-reflection on the
epistemological foundations of his own discourse and its likely
incompatibility with indigenous epistemology. Local and particular
epistemologies may and this is most often the case be opposed to the
ratio-centrism that is the foundation of Dallmayrs philosophical system.
Dallmayr is not at all sensitive to this fact in his proposal for a lateral
universalism. This would mean that his lateral universalism, a philosophical
construct developed from said ratio-centric foundations, would be used to
allow indigenous epistemologies to have their say.
The poststructuralist school of postcolonialism similarly applies a
dichotomised framework to indigenous discourse through the concept of
the hybrid. This occurs in spite of Robert Youngs intervention, through
which postcolonialism began to reflect critically on its own theoretical
29
underpinnings and the counter-modernity of anti-colonial discourse (2001).

For this intervention remained firmly placed within the Western episteme
when deconstruction was chosen as the ideal form of postcolonialism. Young
considered postcolonialism a form of cultural and intellectual
decolonization operating within the heart of metropolitan culture (2001:
421). He did not, however, consider whether or not working within
metropolitan culture determined the framework of interest, nor did he
consider its being determined by what Anbal Quijano referred to as the
modernity/rationality cultural complex (2007: 171). Young clearly operated
within a Western episteme and that is why, in the Fanonian mould, he (like
most postcolonial critics before him) dichotomised indigenous epistemology
into that which can be assimilated into postcolonialist epistemology and that
which cannot. Hybridity was the key notion that allowed him to do so.
Youngs use of hybridity served two purposes: first, to cleanse
indigenous discourse from that which is unpalatable for the postcolonial
critic; and, second, to give the illusion that indigenous epistemology is being
fully considered when in fact the consideration is nominal at best. In terms
of cleansing indigenous discourse, Young accepted indigenous anticolonialist expressions as long as they do not institute their own
procedures of oppression (2001: 164), as do some movements of religious
revivalism. To overcome such procedures of oppression, he prescribed
hybridising these indigenist conceptualisations of anti-colonialism with
some of the objectives of socialism and feminism . . . as in certain forms of
Arab nationalism so that they can link positively to the politics of
postcolonial critique (Young, 2001: 164). In other words, he advocated an
indigenism that is hybridised with modernity. In addition to its sweeping
generalisation, Youngs point here betrays several problems. First is the
complete failure to exhibit any form of engagement with indigenous
epistemology. Second, Young is strikingly uncritical towards modernity and
the contribution it has made to the oppressive and intolerant strain in
movements of religious revivalism.8 To clarify, modernity is not the root
cause of all religious oppression, neither are indigenous religious
epistemologies inherently oppressive. Taiaiake Alfred, an indigenous
scholar, addressed exactly this point, explaining that the oppressive potential
may be found in the betrayal of the traditional values, such as the principles
of respect and harmonious coexistence, by indigenous leaders (2009: 11).
Youngs use of hybridity to give the illusion that indigenous
epistemology is being fully considered is distinctly apparent in his handling
of Gandhis anti-colonial discourse.9 Here, Young clearly perpetuates the use
of the dichotomising framework to explore indigenous discourse. Young
reads postcolonialisms exclusion of Gandhi as indicative of this fields
30
unmediated secularism and its exclusion of the religions that have taken
on the political identity of providing alternative value-systems to those of
the west, to finally declare that postcolonialism despite its espousal of
subaltern resistance, scarcely values subaltern resistance that does not
operate according to its own secular terms (2001: 338). Nevertheless, Young
himself is not different because he failed to explore the epistemological
import of Gandhis spiritualised anti-colonial discourse when he neglected
to examine what was arguably the most formative element in Ghandis
discourse. In actuality, this discourse was based on an epistemology that was
rooted in a rediscovered Hinduism, which not only opposed Western
modernity but also represented a spiritual path for Gandhi himself. Young
seemed content simply to allude to the influence of the Theosophical Society
on Gandhis discourse. By contrast, Young exaggerated Gandhis use of the
tools of modernity to promote this spiritualised anti-colonialism, thereby
suggesting some sort of philosophical complicity with the underpinnings of
modernity on Gandhis part. Because of his theoretical commitments, Young
was obliged to hybridise Gandhis discourse, and the only way he could do
so was by suggesting the hybridisation of Gandhis discourse with
modernity. Ultimately, the epistemological import of Gandhis intervention
remains unregistered.
Aside from Mudimbes (1988) intervention, Arif Dirliks (1997)
Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism was
perhaps one of the first works of postcolonialism to address indigenous
epistemology. However, Dirliks intervention, which incidentally treats
indigenous epistemology as a category, appears to be nothing more than a
nuanced echo of Parrys position. Instead of fully exploring the significance
of such epistemologies and recognising the challenge they pose to
postcolonial studies, Dirlik impelled by his ideological commitment to
materialism subsumed these epistemologies under multi-historicalism. He
defined multi-historicalism as the multiple and alternative indigenous
historical trajectories that present different epistemologies (1997: 3). He
described indigenous peoples as products of a modern historical experience
who are internally differentiated, partake of the social, ideological, and
cultural diversities of the present and, consequently, hold diverse views of
the present, the past, and the future (Dirlik, 1997: 140). Initially it may not
be clear how Dirlik sustained the dichotomising framework. But on closer
examination it becomes apparent that while he allowed indigenous peoples
to have their own historical trajectory and even defined them in terms of that
trajectory, he did not accept their epistemological contribution. The
transition from the recognition of indigenous epistemology to multihistoricalism is achieved through his treatment of history as epistemology,
31
which is based on the idea of the contemporaneity of indigenous peoples

(Dirlik, 1997: 3).
Treating history as epistemology and exploring indigenous
epistemology on its own terms are very different research approaches. The
application of Dirliks multi-historicalism means exploring contemporary
articulations of indigenism in connection with past histories rather than past
epistemologies. Instead of trying to trace the epistemological continuity
between past and present articulations of indigenous epistemology, Dirlik
examined these articulations from the vantage point of sharing a common
history, which is governed by a similar historical determinism. Dirlik
recognised, however, that history hardly possesses a universal
epistemological foundation, and, surprisingly, addressed this issue in an
endnote:
I realize that this historicization of indigenism does violence to
indigenous conceptions of time and space, which repudiate
EuroAmerican notions of history. [. . . ] Indigenism itself,
however, has been reworked by the historical developments
discussed here, so that there are also postmodern and
postcolonial Indians (1997: 22)
Here, Dirliks solution was to incorporate indigenous beliefs that repudiated
history as epistemology into multi-historicalism (1997: 22). This statement
essentially establishes the plausibility of subsuming indigenous
epistemology that repudiates history under the rubric of historiography,
irrespective of contradictions involved in such an action. Overall, Dirliks
comments about the importance of indigenization of epistemology as a
necessary first step before achieving a genuine inter-discursivity are
merely a form of verbal acquiescence (1997: 141).
Although postcolonial critics seem to recognise the importance of
including indigenous epistemologies, they predicate this acceptance on
epistemologies conforming to each critics own theoretical concerns and
affiliations. This act of predication has necessitated the adoption of a
dichotomising framework for the treatment of indigenous epistemology.
Moreover, the use of this framework indicates the failure of postcolonialism
to reflect critically on its epistemological genealogy. This failure highlights a
major flaw since anti-colonial indigenous epistemologies do indeed exist
and, more importantly, have been for several decades discussed in serious
scholarly works.10
32
From Indigenous Epistemology to Decolonisation

There is a subtle but substantial difference between full and conditional
acceptance of indigenous epistemology. In his literary masterpiece, Hombres
de maz, Miguel ngel Asturias provided a remarkably complex articulation
of indigenous epistemology (1993 [1949]). The ethos and fundamental logic
of Hombres de maz are expressed in the following passage from the novel:
The maize impoverishes the earth and makes no one rich.
Neither the boss nor the men. Sown to be eaten it is the sacred
sustenance of the men who were made of maize. Sown to make
money it means famine for the men who were made of maize
(Asturias, 1993 [1949]: 11)
Now, from the vantage point of a standard postcolonial interpretation, the
expressed sanctity of the land can be understood as being in line with anticapitalist exploitation and is a metaphorical expression denoting the
importance of land for Mayan identity. However, the third sentence of this
passage would never be understood literally as a vital epistemology from
which a whole worldview is constructed. From the vantage point of
Enlightenment-based reason it is hardly rational to accept Asturias
positing that men are made of maize. However, from the vantage of point
of Mayan epistemology, men who are made of maize is a lived way of
knowing. Similar indigenous voices abound in postcolonial societies,
revealing other ways of knowing and being. Moreover, these other ways are
not by definition benign. For example, indigenous religious traditions in
Guatemala have helped usher in a wave of reverse racism in an effort to
exclude ladinos from indigenous communities (Warren, 1989: 21). Regardless,
indigenous ways of knowing need to be acknowledged as valid
contributing and indeed powerful epistemologies if postcolonialism is to
uphold its ethical purchase.
Indigenist scholars have put forward resonant interventions that note
the epistemological imperialism of the West. For example, Taiaiake Alfred
(2009) explored the forging of indigenous forms of governance based on
indigenous knowledge and a self-conscious traditionalism. Perhaps the most
remarkable example and, indeed, the most striking oversight by
postcolonialists is the work of Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999), who sought
nothing less than the decolonisation of research methods, based on a
scathing critique of postcolonial epistemology. In her study, Smith dissected
postcolonialism and echoed the objection put forth by Ahmad regarding
postcolonialisms appropriation of the third world. Indigenous academics,
33
she said, suspect that post-colonialism has become a strategy for

reinscribing or reauthorizing the privileges of non-indigenous academics,
because postcolonialism has been defined in ways which leave out
indigenous peoples, their ways of knowing and their current concerns
(Smith, 1999: 24). In contrast to Ahmad, however, Smith is firmly placed
within a critical perspective that recognises the complicity between Western
epistemology and the continuing colonisation of all fields of research. Even
though she seemed to conflate modernity and modernism with this
episteme, she identified the Enlightenment as the progenitor of Western
epistemology (ibid.: 58). To illustrate how radically different indigenous
ways of knowing can be from Western- or Enlightenment-generated
epistemology, Smith provided several examples, including the following:
The Maori word for time or space is the same (ibid.: 50). Furthermore,
Smith echoes Asturias aforementioned literary intervention in her
description of indigenous space: Indigenous space has been colonized.
Land, for example, was viewed as something to be tamed and brought under
control. The landscape, the arrangement of nature, could be altered by Man
[. . .] not simply for physical survival but for exploitation and aesthetic
concerns (ibid.: 51). But Smith is most compelling when she examines the
epistemological import of indigenous spirituality:
The arguments of different indigenous peoples based on
spiritual relationships to the universe [. . .] have been difficult
arguments for Western systems of knowledge to deal with or
accept. These arguments give a partial indication of the
different world views and alternative ways of coming to know,
and of being, which still endure within the indigenous world.
Concepts of spirituality which Christianity attempted to
destroy, then to appropriate, and then to claim, are critical sites
of resistance for indigenous peoples. The values, attitudes,
concepts and language embedded in beliefs about spirituality
represent, in many cases, the clearest contrast and mark of
difference between indigenous peoples and the West. It is one
of the few parts of ourselves which the West cannot decipher,
cannot understand and cannot control [. . .] yet (ibid.: 74)
Smiths own position is clear from her description of how her
grandmother instilled in her spiritual relationships to the land and, more
importantly for Smith, helped her develop a sense of quite physical
groundedness that made her sceptical or cautious about the mystical,
misty-eyed discourse that is sometimes employed by indigenous people to
34
describe our relationships with the land and the universe (ibid.: 12). This
sense of groundedness of which she speaks refers to the very material way
in which indigenous ways of knowing were crucial for survival: We had to
predict, to learn and reflect, we had to preserve and protect, we had to
defend and attack, we had to be mobile, we had to have social systems which
enabled us to do these things (ibid.: 13). Hence, Smith does not consciously
dichotomise indigenous epistemology, as do postcolonial critics, but rather
consciously selects what aspects of indigenous epistemology she wants to
emphasise. At this point, it may be said that Smith modifies the Fanonian
dichotomised intellectual. In her discourse indigenous epistemology is the
privileged locus. The intellectual is aware of the dichotomy, and, moreover,
is self-consciously selective. This is why Smiths decolonisation does not
mean and has not meant a total rejection of all theory or research or Western
knowledge. Rather, it means prioritising the indigenous world view and
its concerns and then coming to know and understand theory and research
from that perspective (ibid.: 39).
For some postcolonial critics like Mudimbe and Quayson (2000)
knowing these concerns and world view of which Smith speaks requires
an intersection with anthropology. It is at this intersection with anthropology
that the fissures of postcolonialism begin to emerge. This is where
Mudimbes celebrated epistemological interrogation of colonial knowledge
began. He investigated the epistemological shifts in, and the philosophical
contribution to, what he referred to as African gnosis that is, the
scientific and ideological discourse on Africa (Mudimbe, 1988: 187).
However, Mudimbe pointed out the sheer impossibility of escaping the
profoundly entrenched roots of the Western episteme in this gnosis (ibid.:
185). Instead of harking back to a pristine past, he constructed from within
that episteme a theoretical framework that enabled a highly self-critical
anthropology.11 By contrast, Smith emphasised the soiled reputation that
anthropology as an instrument of colonisation has acquired amongst
indigenists. This view of a contaminated anthropological gaze can be
considered the launching pad for what is perhaps the most thorough
theoretical intervention in the decolonisation of knowledge in general.
Mignolos decolonisation extends far beyond that of Mudimbes selfcritical anthropology and echoes indigenist objections to anthropology noted
by Smith. Mignolo maintained that decolonisation implies a de-linking
from anthropological agendas [. . .] to agendas that emerge from the
decolonial needs of indigenous communities (2008: 20).
This de-linking involves a thoroughgoing critique of the
epistemological foundations of Western discourse, which highlights the
interdependence of coloniality and modernity. Although critics, like Smith
35
and Battiste,12 have revealed an awareness of this connection, none have

exposed its depths, as did Mignolo whose work surprisingly failed to
mention Smiths call for decolonisation. Mignolo followed Quijanos (2007)
lead and called for the decolonisation of being and knowledge that extends
beyond the mere takeover of the state by the local elite (2008: 18).
Mignolos signal achievement was his realisation that decolonisation starts
with the recognition of the following:
There is no modernity without coloniality; coloniality is
constitutive of modernity and not derivative. There is a single
modernity/coloniality that is the consequence of the geopolitical
differential distribution of epistemic, political, economic, and
aesthetic (e.g., sensing, subjectivity) power (ibid.: 22)
Moreover, this complex is fundamentally dichotomising: colonial
differences, epistemic and ontological, are constructed in the rhetoric of
modernity inferior beings (colonial ontological difference), racially or
sexually, are beings not well suited for knowledge and understanding
(colonial epistemic difference) (ibid.). In addition, the site of contestation is
epistemology. Mignolos thesis provides a profound understanding of the
aforementioned dichotomising drive observed in postcolonialisms
engagement with indigenous epistemology. This is because his critique
reveals that the source of postcolonialisms dichotomising drive is its
dependence upon a Western ratio-centric epistemology that does not
recognise the interdependence of coloniality and modernity. This
dependence is what, as indigenists such as Smith have already intuited,
keeps postcolonialism as an appropriative discourse with regard to
indigenous epistemology.
Towards a Decolonised Postcolonialism?
If a decolonised postcolonialism is the goal, then a closer look at the root
cause of postcolonialisms recourse to the dichotomising framework is
required. Without an awareness of the coloniality/modernity complex
postcolonial critics have no choice but to dichotomise. This is why Deepika
Bahri is compelled to announce, in advance, the ultimate failure of any effort
to understand ways of knowing that have allowed sustainability and
survival among postcolonial communities because they would require
dedicated engagement with a context unavailable to most metropolitan
audiences (2003: 20). Her comment suggests an implicit and perhaps
subconscious recognition of the impossibility of transgressing the
36
dichotomising framework. The fact that Bahri was content with merely
pointing out this phenomenon instead of examining its full implications
for postcolonialism is symptomatic of a profound anxiety that governs
postcolonialisms encounter with indigenous epistemologies. The anxiety
has a great deal to do with Lpezs objection to the naive search for a
mythical singular authentic voice for the indigene, as if Columbuss
crunch upon the sand had never happened (2001: 16, 83).13 Because they
are unable to adopt a radically critical standpoint towards their own
epistemological roots, postcolonial critics have no choice but to imagine the
unassimilable other from within a dichotomised worldview. They cannot,
for example, understand that a recourse to indigenous epistemology need
not pursue an either/or scenario that is, either a native authentic
untarnished voice or an already hybrid colonially contaminated subject.
Smith best described the actual stance of many indigenists by pointing out
how solutions are posed from a combination of the time before, colonized
time, and the time before that, pre-colonized time. Decolonization
encapsulates both sets of ideas (1999: 24). Therefore, to extend the
Columbus metaphor of the colonial encounter, postcolonial critics see only
the imprint of Columbuss foot; they fail to recognise that the beach is vast,
with regions as yet unknown and unexplored.
Can there be a decolonised postcolonialism? Until there is a thorough
recognition of the involvement of postcolonialism in the
modernity/coloniality complex, which is specifically manifested in its
dichotomised handling of indigenous epistemology, postcolonialism will
not escape the charge that it extends colonial paradigms so as to appropriate
other knowledge for its own Eurocentric ends. The decolonisation of
postcolonialism must involve a high degree of self-critical reflection.
Haifa S. Alfaisal earned her PhD from the University of Essex. She is
currently teaching at King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Her
research interests include exploring religious discourse within postcolonial
studies, and more recently investigating Eurocentric travel accounts of
Arabia. In 2006, she published a book entitled Religious Discourse in
Postcolonial Studies: Magical Realism in Hombres De Maiz and Bandarshah.
Endnotes
1
This usage of epistemology/epistemologies is attuned to the idea that

many tribes did not have laws or religion, but a single belief system that
was described as our way of doing things (Alfred, 2009: 67).
2
There is no modernity without coloniality; coloniality is constitutive of
37
modernity and not derivative (Mignolo, 2008: 22).

3
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivaks (1999) epistemic violence is useful;

however, aside from noting the epistemic violence of imperialism, Spivak
did not incorporate indigenous epistemology anywhere in her critique of
colonialism. Spivaks strategic essentialism was founded upon antiessentialism, which is anathema to most, if not all, indigenous
epistemologies.
4
Throughout this article the terms West and Western will remain
capitalised, while the term indigenous will remain lowercased. This is to
indicate and keep the reader aware of the marginalization of indigenous
epistemologies as opposed to the centralisation of the Western episteme
within postcolonialism.
5
I take indigenist to refer to scholars who support or advocate indigenism.

The latter has strong roots in Latin America; however, I use it as a descriptive
term to indicate whatever entity, mythology, religion, and so on, is invoked
as a source of indigenous pre-colonial identity, that is politically legitimate
and used as an anti-colonial discourse.
6
See Alfred (2009: 77-81).
Dirlik also discussed the epistemology of postcolonialism its insistence

on difference in identity construction, the conviction that literary works
suffice as evidence of what goes on in the world, and the overriding
significance of the politics of identity in place of radical politics (1997: 5-6).
8
Critics who reject indigenous epistemologies out-of-hand are excluded

from consideration. Moreover, postcolonial critics will note the absence of
the feminist school of postcolonialism. This is because this article
distinguishes between two modes of feminism: postcolonial feminism is
considered as epistemological rupture of the magnitude and type that it is
hoped will be possible for indigenous epistemology; indigenous feminism
is considered as being part and parcel of indigenous epistemology.
9
A case in point would be the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan. For a detailed

analysis, see Alfaisal (2006: 182-206).
10
M. Gandhis indigenous epistemology is specified here because Young uses

him as a case in point, and therefore his failure to fully examine the religious
38
epistemology of Gandhis discourse can be taken as indicative of postcolonial

theorys neglect of indigenous epistemologies.
11
For example, Alfred (2009); Kunnie and Goduka (2006); Battiste (2000);
Kincheloe and Semali (1999); and Deloria (1973). The omission of these
interventions from postcolonialists consideration is striking; however, this
study has chosen one particular token intervention to exhibit this
shortcoming.
12
This consists of a critical synthesis of Foucaults thesis on the last

archaeological rupture in Western epistemology, a brief interpretation of
Lvi-Strausss notion of savage mind, and finally a plea for the importance of
the subject in social sciences (Mudimbe, 1988: 23).
13
The colonial experience traps us in the project of modernity. There can

be no postmodern for us until we have settled some business of the
modern (Smith, 1999: 34).
14
Lpez adopted this phrase from Brathwaite (1990).
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Ahmad, A. (1996) The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality in P. Mongia (Ed.)
Contemporary Postcolonial Theory London: Arnold (276-293)
Alfaisal, H. S. (2006) Religious Discourse in Postcolonial Studies: Magical Realism
in Hombres De Maz and Bandarshah Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press
Alfred, G. R. (2009) Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (2nd
edition) Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press
Asturias, M. A. (1993 [1949]) Men of Maize Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press
Battiste, M. (2000) Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press
Bahri, D. (2003) Native Intelligence: Aesthetics, Politics, and Postcolonial
Literature Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
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Brathwaite, E. K. (1990) History of the Caribbean Writer and X/self in G.

Davis and H. M. Jelinek (Eds) Crisis and Creativity in the New Literatures in
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Dallmayr, F. R. (1996) Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-cultural Encounter
Albany: SUNY Press
Deloria, V. (1973) God is Red New York: Grosset & Dunlap
Dirlik, A. (1997) Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global
Capitalism Boulder: Westview Press
Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth New York: Grove Press
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays Basic Books
Kincheloe, J. L. and Semali, L. M. (1999) What is Indigenous Knowledge?: Voices
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Kunnie, J. and Goduka, N. I. (2006) Indigenous Peoples Wisdom and Power:
Affirming our Knowledge through Narratives Aldershot: Ashgate
Lpez, A. J. (2001) Posts and Pasts: A Theory of Postcolonialism Albany: SUNY
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Thinking Cultural Studies 21(2-3), 155-167
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Blackwell
On the Broken Conversation between

Postcolonialism and Intellectuals in the Periphery
by Samer Frangie
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the reception of the postcolonial
critique in the periphery, as a way to probe the more general
problem of knowledge in and on the periphery. The paper will
look at the broken conversation between postcolonialism and
some trends of intellectuals in the Arab world. The two
moments of the story are the evaluation of anti-colonial
intellectuals by Postcolonialism, and the reception of Edward
Saids Orientalism by intellectuals in the Arab world. Regarding
the first moment, the notion of problem-space will be
deployed to warn against the universalizing tendencies of
postcolonialism. As to the second moment, the work of Mahdi
Amil and Sadek Jalal al-Azm is presented as illustrating the
primacy of the political in their reading and reception of Saids
thesis. The conclusion argues for an excavation of the political
from underneath the epistemological critique as a way to renew
the broken conversation between the metropole and the
periphery.
Postcolonialism, Colonial Knowledge and Anti-Colonial Struggles
The problem of knowledge in and on the periphery and its political
implication has become a central concern for many trends of thought, a sign
of the adoption of post-structural and post-modern theories (or at least
sensibilities) to the study of the periphery.1 Postcolonialism has been a major
influence in this respect, with its problematization of Western epistemologies
and its questioning of the relation between colonial power and knowledge
(Chakrabarty, 2000; Mignolo, 2000; Mehta, 1999). Despite the heterogeneity
of this trend and its variable political implications, a running concern among
authors writing under this broad umbrella has been the decolonization of
the representation of the periphery, and the problematization of the various
political and social identities inherited from the Enlightenment. Viewed from
42
Frangie: Postcolonialism and Intellectuals in the Periphery
this perspective, Edward Saids Orientalism is a central moment in the

genealogy of the postcolonial critique (1979). Saids critique of the
representation, and creation, of the Orient by the Western gaze opened up
a whole new field of investigation through the politicization of Western
epistemology and aesthetics. Thanks to this intellectual move, Said widened
our understanding of colonialism, uncovering the subterranean alliance
between positions that might have appeared as opposed, and the unknowing
dependence of anti-colonial discourses on assumptions that belong to the
colonial conceptual structure.
Saids intellectual move, and the subsequent postcolonial trend,
gained their critical purchase, partly due to their contrasting effect vis--vis
previous anti-colonial narratives. Saids critique of the Orientalist Marx and
his warning in the concluding pages of Orientalism against radical
intellectuals participation in their own Orientalizing, illustrate the tense
relation between these two modes of critique. Marxism or nationalism,
despite their radical emancipatory dimension, appear to draw on the same
Eurocentric master-narratives, according to this new critical perspective. A
similar line of friction appeared between Saids Orientalism and part of the
modernist and radical intelligentsia in the periphery. According to the broad
outlines of this critique, intellectuals in the periphery inherited their
understanding of modernity from colonial and Orientalist accounts,
condemning them to remain perpetually in the waiting-room of history, to
use Chakrabartys imagery (2000). Describing Arab intellectuals, Makdisi
notes that
even many of those who have refused to acknowledge such
putative European superiority have nevertheless established
their challenges to it in the very narrative and discursive terms
that it has itself proposed and invented; hence, such challenges
have more often than not been defused or negated by their
participation in the very same conceptual and discursive system
(of modernity) against which they seek to define themselves as
oppositional (1995: 88)
A significant tradition of intellectuals in the periphery, including Marxists
and nationalists, emerged after the postcolonial critique. As unknowing
participants in their own domination, these scholars framed their opposition
in a self-defeating narrative, one that cannot form the basis for a program of
emancipation.2
This paper will start from the reception of Saids Orientalism by Arab
intellectuals, as a way to probe the line of friction between some of the tenets
43
of postcolonialism and the intelligentsia in the periphery. Through this

historical detour, the essay will shed some light on the early differentiation
of critical discourses, and will provide a historical context for the question
of the relevance of the epistemological critique of intellectuals in the
periphery. If the problematization of previous anti-colonial or emancipatory
discourses was a welcome and necessary move, the question that needs to
be asked in our post-postcolonialism era pertains to the continuing critical
purchase of this intellectual move, and more specifically for this paper to its
critical purchase in the periphery. In other words, if the post-colonial move
was very fruitful politically and theoretically in the Western academic field
at a specific historical and political conjuncture, does this imply that it has
the same critical purchase in the context of the periphery?
Travelling Said: On the Production of Knowledge in the Periphery
A fruitful way to start thinking about these questions is to examine the
reception of postcolonialism in the periphery. Dirlik hinted at the ambiguity
of postcolonialism in the Third World where themes of modernization and
nationalism still exert a certain attractiveness, noting the difference between
the radical intelligentsia in the periphery and their postcolonial interlocutors
(1994: 337). Similarly, Mignolo sensed a certain distrust of postcolonialism
among some Latin American intellectuals who saw it as an exportation of
North American intelligentsia (2000: 173). These ambivalent reactions in no
way exhaust the reception of the postcolonial critique in the periphery, where
it has a strong contingent of supporters. But they highlight the difference
between the problem-space of Western academia and that of intellectuals
in the periphery, raising questions as to the critical purchase of
postcolonialism in different contexts.3 This ambiguity is clearly at work in
the travelling of Saids Orientalism to the Arab world, where the reception of
his work was ambivalent, ranging from enthusiastic adoption of his thesis
to more suspicious evaluations.4
The political and intellectual context of the reception of Orientalism in
the Arab world was different from its context of production. On a political
level, the Arab world was witnessing the weakening of the nationalist,
socialist and Marxist political options of the 1950s and 1960s with their
secularism and modernist slogans, and their replacement with more nativist
ideologies, Islamist politics and questions of identities. For instance, the
Lebanese civil war (1975-1989), which started for many as two warring
ideological camps, had descended in the early 1980s into a struggle between
various sectarian groups. More importantly, Saids book coincided with the
Iranian revolution of 1979 and the rise of a radical form of Islam that would
44
charm, at least in its early stages, substantial groups of radical intellectuals.5

Orientalism came at a moment of great turmoil in the intellectual history of
the Arab world. The defeat of 1967 which heralded a literature of defeat and
disappointment among Arab intellectuals witnessed the rise of new
questions pertaining to the notion of authenticity, signalling a shift from the
modernist project of the middle of the century, or at least the growing
concerns with questions of identity. Saids book made its entry into the Arab
world amid this troubled context, one that would heavily mark the books
reception.
One of the first discussions of Saids work to come from the Arab
world was Sadek Jalal al-Azms review of Orientalism (1981). The Syrian
philosopher starts by noting the possible essentialist deviation of Saids text
and its bias toward representation, a critique shared by many of Saids
commentators.6 Moving from this general critique of the text, al-Azm then
adopts a more situated perspective, reading the texts from his location in the
Arab world. In the last part of the text entitled Orientalism in Reverse, alAzm drags Saids text to the Arab world, finding in some brands of Arab
nationalism and Islamic revivalism the same Orientalist logic albeit reversed:
This Orientalism in Reverse strives to show the ontological superiority of
the Oriental mind [. . .] over the Occidental one, writes al-Azm (1981: 232).
What is interesting in this application of Said is the resulting decoupling
between its epistemological and political critique. Whereas Said deployed
the epistemological critique in order to question the underlying colonial
project and Western gaze, for al-Azm, this mode of critique is used against
another target, one that does not appear in Saids book, having no presence
in his Western academic problem-space. This is not the case for al-Azm,
located in a radically different context: Ontological Orientalism in Reverse
is, in the end, no less reactionary, mystifying, ahistorical and anti-human
than Ontological Orientalism proper (1981: 237). Whereas postcolonialism
could uphold a collapsing of essentialism and colonialism, seeing the
epistemological as the other face of the political, intellectuals in the periphery
were moving in a problem-space that was not amenable to such a theoretical
move. The epistemological essentialism was as much part of the native
ideology as it was part of the colonial one, offering a weak hold on the
existing political oppositions.
al-Azm was not alone in responding to Said. Mahdi Amil (1936-1987),
a Lebanese Marxist philosopher, devoted a whole book to harshly criticizing
Said and his thesis of Orientalism (2006). Engaged in the production of a
form of Marxism that was rooted in the periphery, Amil had tackled in his
earlier work the problem of knowledge and its political implications. In 1974,
he produced a book-length refutation of claims about Arab backwardness
45
(2002). In this critique, he toyed with themes that would become the bread
and butter of the postcolonial critique, such as the duality of progress and
backwardness, the interplay between essentialism and historicism, the
notion of Arab civilization and the position of the West in the theoretical
imagination of intellectuals. But such a critique of the representation of the
Arab world was still grounded in a materialist framework. As Amil writes:
the causes of the backwardness are not historical [. . .] i.e. they
are not inherited or genetic, but are structural, in the sense that
they are located in the nature of the social formation that is
determined by the development of the dominant colonial mode
of production that requires the persistence of the past social
relations, due to its structural dependence on imperialism
(2002: 58)7
Amils critique of the essentialist representation of the Arab world was part
of his general critique of the various culturalist conceptions of the Arab
world, whether in the thesis of primordial sectarian identities or the
essentializations of Islamist and nationalist discourses.8
But as a Marxist, Amil was also keen to assert the possibility of a
universal political theory. Marxism was criticized from different quarters of
the Arab intellectual field as an imported ideology, one that is not organic
to this part of the world. Amil found different instantiations of this argument
among nationalist authors, whether Arab or Lebanese, and Islamist authors
influenced by the Iranian revolution (1990; 2003). Whether due to its
conception of a society divided among classes, its position regarding religion
or its lack of authenticity in the Arab world, Marxism was deemed not to be
suitable to the realities of the Arab world. Faced by these questions, Amil
was forced to criticize the false universals of bourgeois ideology while
asserting the possibility of a universal knowledge, encapsulated in Marxism.
It is in the coordinates of this debate that Amil received Saids Orientalism,
read as a form of dangerous relativism. Despite the fact that certain affinities
might have existed among the two authors regarding the relation between
power and knowledge, Said, according to Amil, went too far, falling into the
logic of the various primordialist authors that Amil was struggling against,
thus condemning the possibility of an emancipatory politics in the Arab
world.
The official point of contention is Saids treatment of Marx as an
Orientalist, a qualification that Amil, a Marxist, vehemently rejected. Starting
from a similar perspective as al-Azm, Amil accused Said of reproducing the
dichotomy he was trying to question, and more importantly of reducing all
46
Western thought to the dominant bourgeois ideology. Furthermore, by

constructing such a rigid polarity between the West and the Orient, Said is,
according to Amil, forced to reject reason in toto, opposing it to emotion in
a quasi-Romantic gesture. Such a duality is apparent in Saids treatment of
Marx as an unwilling Orientalist: Marx exits the structure of Orientalist
thought when he uses his heart, according to Amils reading of Saids text,
yet he comes back to it, falling into its structure, when he uses his mind
(2006: 19). The Orient appears to be only accessible through spiritual means
or bouts of individual genius, since any scientific or rational approach to
the Orient seems to be necessarily forced to reproduce the logic of
Orientalism (2006: 20). By favouring the heart over the mind, Said slides
to an anti-rational position, reducing any theoretical act to an act of violence
and denying the possibility of a scientific and hence universal knowledge.
Such a position made Said politically suspicious for Amil, who concludes
by writing:
It is not strange then that cultural structuralism, that
characterizes the thought of Michel Foucault, would meet
Nietzschean Nihilism, on a common ground [. . .] Rationalistic
imperialism would reconcile itself with the anti-rational
nihilism in asserting the oneness of reason, and hence, the
refusal of revolutionary reason, the only opposition to the
dominant reason (2006: 72)
Without necessarily agreeing with all of the critiques raised above and
without positing Amil or al-Azm as the sole representative of Arab
intellectuals, their responses to Said articulate the differences between the
problem-space of Said and theirs, providing a way to think about the fate of
the epistemological critique when transposed to the periphery.9 al-Azms
response illustrates the decoupling of the epistemological and political
dimension of the postcolonial critique. Amil goes further, with his texts
explicating two anxieties at the Saidian move. The first is a radicalization of
al-Azms point. In an intellectual field seen as dominated by primordialist
understandings of identity, a nativist return to Islam and culturalist
understanding of nations, Saids sole focus on representation was read by
Amil as a regression from the materialist standpoint, one that can easily act
as an endorsement of these positions. But more importantly, the second
anxiety was caused by the absence of a clear political angle within Saids
critique. Through the questioning of the existing ideological oppositions and
reframing the political conflict in terms of representations, the Saidian
framework was not very helpful politically for Amil, enmeshed in a civil
47
war, having to struggle against local reactionary ideologies and colonial

knowledge simultaneously. These two responses illustrate the growing
divide between the grounds of critique of the Western academe and the
periphery, each articulating different modes of critique.
The Political as a Connection
al-Azm and Amils critiques of Said were triggered by the ambiguous
political implications of his thesis in the context of the periphery. For al-Azm,
the target of Orientalism when transposed to the Arab world changes
drastically from what Said had in mind, while for Amil, the political
implications are at best weak and at worse pernicious. Such critique
paralleled the Marxist critiques of early postcolonial authors, as holding a
vague political program, one that lacks the edge of Marxism in its heyday.
McClintock has noted, for instance, that [h]istorically voided categories
such as the other, the signifier, the signified, the subject, the phallus,
the postcolonial, while having academic clout and professional
marketability, run the risk of telescoping crucial geo-political distinctions
into invisibility (1992: 86). The suspicion is that the sophisticated theoretical
rhetoric deployed by postcolonialism does not translate into a radically
different form of political intervention or even a radical form of politics. In
other words, the translation of the epistemological critique to the political
field does not yield the same critical effect it has in the academic field,
becoming either a vague political statement or a rewording of existing
positions.
Irrespective of the validity of this specific critique, it is important to
note that it is not the fact that postcolonialism entertains vague political
conclusions that is crucial for the current argument. Rather, the relation
between theory and politics itself has been transformed with this
poststructuralist turn. What appear as vague political implications reflect
certain expectations made regarding theory, expectations that have been
entertained by post-Enlightenment theories in general, and Marxism in
particular with its notion of praxis. Scott captures this expectation and the
underlying conversation between postcolonialism and Marxism, when he
writes:
Marxism had defined in a very fundamental way the ethicalpolitical horizon of our visions of and commitment to the
making of just and independent societies. And although our
intellectual preoccupations had in the meantime been traversed
and repositioned by the postmetaphysical critiques of Marxism,
48
we were still haunted by the specter of a theory that would

enable us to deduce a set of rational political practices and
procedures for the radical transformation of our societies (1999:
131-132)
If we rephrase the problem of the political implication of postcolonialism
into the more general problem of the relation between theory and politics,
one can have a better grasp of the ambiguity of postcolonial politics.
Postcolonialism has operated through a certain suspension or deferral of
the question of the political, as Scott writes, through implicitly occupying
the horizon of nationalist politics already defined by the anticolonial project
(1999: 14). In other words, postcolonialism had delegated the political to the
same anticolonial discourses they were bemoaning. Such a position has
relieved the need to come up with a postcolonial theory of politics, either
relying on a rewording of a position that has been discredited at an
epistemological level, or privileging a responsibility to otherness over the
responsibility to act, or the privileging of the opening up of cognitive
space for the play of difference over the affirmation of institutional
frameworks that embody normative political values and normative political
objectives (Scott, 1999: 135). As such, postcolonialism has fluctuated
between, on the one hand, an ambiguous reappropriation of Marxism and,
on the other, an ambivalent ethics of otherness, two poles that are united by
a similar problematization of the relation between theory and politics.
Such ambivalence can be seen at work in Orientalism. The absence of
an alternative epistemology, of a clarification of the grounds for the critique
of Orientalism or of discrimination among Western knowledge, all entertain
a certain political ambiguity (Young, 1990). Such an ambiguity might have
been productive in a specific context and at a certain point in time, but was
deemed to be untenable in the context of the Arab world by al-Azm and
Amil. Indeed, such ambiguity could be entertained in the Saidian text
because of the absence of key aspects of the Orient from its narrative. As
Binder rightly notes:
Said says nothing [about Islam] and says nothing about why he
says nothing, and it is in this double silence which suggests an
anomaly, a kind of paradox, an aporia or the very conditions
which makes Saids critical discourse possible. Of course it may
be true that if Said were to have written anything about Islam,
he might have been able to write nothing about Orientalism
(1988: 121)
49
Such a silence was not an option available to either al-Azm or Amil, with
Islam in its various instantiations being omnipresent in their problem-space.
In other words, postcolonialisms ambiguous politics, despite having been
extremely productive in some contexts, did not travel well to the periphery,
a problem-space that was not amenable to such ambiguity. The friction
between postcolonialism and the periphery is related to the absence of a
politics that could respond to the expectations and demands of a problemspace whose stakes have not yet been de-politicized. Describing Arab
political thought, Abdallah Laroui, a Moroccan historian and philosopher,
linked the popularity of Marxism among the Arab intelligentsia to its
capacity to unite politics and theory, via the notion of praxis, while providing
a perspective to reconcile the Arab world with Europe without endorsing
this latter self-perception (1976). As argued above, both al-Azm and Amil
reacted to Saids Orientalism from the perspective of its political use-value,
finding dangerous tendencies in its application. It is one thing to unmask
essentialism, but quite another to make this epistemological claim the basis
for political intervention. A programmatic politics, aiming at intervening in
the real, providing a principle of distinction between enemies and allies, and
acting as an anchor point to theory, might have lost some of its lustre in
Western academe, but it remains a desirable goal for intellectuals in the
periphery.
The Postcolonial and the Post-Colonial
The differing relationships to politics, the growing disjuncture between
Saids intellectual fields and his counterparts in the periphery (or at least part
of them), and the different stakes that were imparted on the theoretical game,
explain the reception of Said by Arab intellectuals, and the ambiguous travel
of the epistemological critique to the periphery. Recognizing this fracture
might be the first step in appreciating the critical purchase, albeit a localized
one, of the various traditions described in this paper. The postcolonial move,
according to this reading, has been extremely beneficial in the problem-space
of Western academe, whereas its political purchase in the periphery has been
more ambiguous. Many of the misunderstandings between the various
critical strands are rooted in this desire to jump over this fracture, in an
attempt to revive the older desire for reconciliation. In other words, the
different political stakes in the two problem-spaces problematizes any
straightforward importing of the postcolonial intervention in the periphery.
If there is any present value to the history of the reception of Said among
Arab intellectuals, it lays in the awareness that different problem-spaces do
not only coincide in terms of the political stakes that characterize them.
50
Part of the misunderstanding lays in the desire of some authors to

bridge this gap by universalizing the concerns of one problem-space,
subsuming the differences between different fields. As many commentators
have noted, there has been a tendency among postcolonial authors to replace
one universal by another, despite their questionings of essentialism, rigid
binaries and theoretical closures. For McClintock, for instance, the term
post-colonial, despite its critical deconstruction of post-Enlightenment
binaries, re-orients the globe once more around a single, binary opposition:
colonial/post-colonial (1992: 85).10 The point is not about the validity of this
new binary, but rather pertains to whether this new conceptualization of the
conditions of the periphery is not being forced upon problem-spaces which
might not share it. The intellectual configurations in which postcolonialism
made its intervention, and the stakes that were attached to such an
intervention, might not be the same as the ones with which intellectuals in
the periphery were dealing, which partially explains the ambivalent
reception of this trend.
This line of argument was developed by David Scott who warned
against the universalizing temptations of this antifoundationalist trend (1999;
2004). Scott starts from the premise that in the wake of the
antifoundationalist move, criticism cannot operate in the manner of a
General Hermeneutic, a Master Narrative, a View from Nowhere (or from
Everywhere), the Panoptic of a Critical Theory (1999: 3). Such an implication
allows postcolonial authors to criticize the fixed conceptions of nation, race
or class that formed the vocabularies of earlier discourses of resistance.
Agreeing with this impulse, Scott nevertheless warns against such a claim
turning into a
simple anti-essentialism according to which hitherto existing
strategies of criticism are found out, admonished, and
dismissed for their epistemological navet [. . .] In effect, then,
what starts out being a welcome humbling of certain hegemonic
regimes of Truth turns out to be little more than the adoption
of an updated counter-design procedure, a counter-rationalism,
a counter-claim to the right way for criticism to carry on (1999:
4)
In other words, what started as a corrosive critique of certain self-delusion,
misconceptions or simple imposition, became itself a quest for certainty and
an imposition of a vocabulary that ignores the local variability in historical,
theoretical and political contexts. Returning to the question of this paper, the
postcolonial critical evaluation of the modernist intellectuals in the periphery
51
is grounded in the assumption that these two groups were trying to answer
the same questions, with one of them being more advanced theoretically.
And it is such an assumption that would ground the belief that the
epistemological critique developed by postcolonialism in the context of
Western academe would have the same critical purchase when transposed
to the periphery, a context that has different stakes, questions and power
configurations.
Political critique, in our post-postcolonial world, is one that cannot
endorse a single logic, target or horizon; instead it is condemned to a
multifarious and multifaceted approach. Recognizing this reality is a first
step, but one that should serve as a ground for rethinking possible
reconciliations, for reconnecting broken conversations between different
critical strands and for living up to the initial expectations of postcolonialism
pertaining to opening up spaces for marginal voices. This second step
requires the excavation of the political from underneath the epistemological
critique. Commenting on the debate between Dirlik and Prakash, Scott asks
whether the conceptual dispute of which both are a part, a dispute whose
stakes are epistemological, continues to be one worth investing in at all.
Remaining in the epistemological game, according to Scott, imposes upon
us the question of how to write histories of the third world, but not the
question of to what ends are we rewriting this history, to what political
projects, to what futures? (1999: 137-140). There is no escape from a reengagement with the political as a way to think the fracture in our modes of
critique.
Samer Frangie is an Assistant Professor at the Political Studies and Public
Administration Department at the American University of Beirut. His
research interests are in the fields of social and political theory, with an
emphasis on Arab thought.
Endnotes
1
I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful
comments.
2
For examples regarding the Arab world, see Aksikas (2009) and Massad
(2007).
3
A problem-space refers to a discursive context, a context of language [. . .]

a context of argument, and therefore, one of intervention. A problem-space,
in other words, is an ensemble of questions and answers around which a
52
horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as well as ideological-political

stakes) hangs (Scott, 2004: 4).
4
For details on Saids reception in the Arab world, see Massad (2004), Sabry
(2004) and Sivan (1985).
5
The temporal coincidence between Saids Orientalism and the Iranian

revolution would be given a more substantial turn by one Arab intellectual,
Hazem Saghyeh, who draws a parallel between Saids critique of the West
and the nativist ideology of the revolution (1995).
6
For a similar critique, see Ahmad (1991) and Porter (1994).
All translations of Amil are mine.
For examples of these critiques, see Amil (1989a; 1989b; 1990; 2003).
This misunderstanding is not simply due to the geographical location of

these intellectuals, but also to the disciplinary frameworks in which each
trend was mainly located. Both al-Azm and Amil, despite being academics,
were mainly public intellectuals and politically engaged. The same cannot
be said of postcolonialism, which has remained an academic practice, subject
to the rules and stakes of the academic field.
10
A similar point is made by Shohat (1991).
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Colonialism Social Text 10, 88-113

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Decolonizing Cosmopolitanism: Guaman Poma de

Ayalas Early Response to a Singular Aesthetic
Economy
by Brantley Nicholson
Abstract
In this article, I analyze Guaman Poma de Ayala and his
seventeenth century text, Nueva cornica y buen gobierno,
considering it an early example of border dwelling and
cosmopolitan writing. I posit that Guaman Poma decolonizes
cosmopolitanism through his tactful navigation of aesthetic
borders and archival code switching. In doing so, I put Gauman
Poma in conversation with early philosophers of globalization,
such as Bartalom de las Casas, Gins de Seplveda, and
Francisco de Vitoria, and global aesthetic theorists, such as
Immanuel Kant and Alexander Baumgarten.
Since the second half of the twentieth century, Latin American literature has
been rife with treatments of the clash between local subjectivities and global
cultural and economic flows. Colloquial oral registers are set in relief against
a rigid, lettered city cultural model in Fernando Vallejos La virgen de los
sicarios [Our Lady of the Assassins] (1994).1 The most prominent works to come
out of Latin America in the post-Operacin Condor twentieth century Luisa
Valenzuelas Aqu pasan cosas raras [Strange Things Happen Here] (1975), Ariel
Dorfmans La muerte y la doncella [Death and the Maiden] (1990) and Ricardo
Piglias Plata quemada [Burnt Money] (1997) weigh universal high culture
and economic liberalization against the violent experience of local life. And,
in the Eloisa Cartonera movement, an alternative publishing industry has
been established in Buenos Aires to provide local residents with affordable
works that represent local experience, existing in contrast to a global
publishing industry based primarily in Madrid and Barcelona.
In the seventeenth century, archival clashes did not enjoy the same
audience. Challenges to the cosmopolitan center, be it a symbolic center, as
is increasingly the case, or geographical, as has long been the case in the
Spanish-speaking publishing industry, have a much stronger voice today
56
Nicholson: Decolonizing Cosmopolitanism
than in the past. My concern in this article is the precedent set by Guaman
Poma de Ayala (1535-1616), who, as a cultural border dweller, offers an early
guide to navigating the aesthetic border-the place where multiple forms of
perception converge. Aesthetic diversity, I posit, should be treated and
valued as highly as bio diversity. It faces challenges from the flows of Empire
in similar ways, and aesthetic borders just as much as economic and
ontological borders act as gateways to alternative epistemological archives.
Yet, with Spanish conquest and the high European Enlightenment that
followed, the aesthetic field became increasingly leveled. And, the cultural
hermeneutics of the time became emphatically singular and extracting rather
than dialoguing.
Guaman Pomas life in what is now present-day Per spanned a
period of Spanish conquest in which he experienced early aesthetic,
economic and cosmological clashes associated with the inchoate
globalization. Here, we read an archetypal American border dweller that
used cultural code-switching as a subversive rhetorical tactic. As a member
of Incan nobility with a familiarity with Christian faith and the Spanish
language his paternal lineage technically made him an Incan prince he
stood between local Incan and global Spanish hegemonies, playing them off
of one another in a way that facilitated the liberation of the local, individual
body. This was a utility and freedom in discursive maneuvering that, for
Rolena Adorno, was complex but coherent and always unequivocal: in
favor of native rule and opposed to colonialism [] anti-Inca but proAndean, anticlerical but pro-Catholic (Adorno, 1986: 5). Similar to many
contemporary Latin American writers that today are both opposed to the
local, lettered city, State-model and the global liberal model, Guaman Poma
shifted between two epistemological frameworks and occupied the rhetorical
externality where the cosmopolitan center ran up against its limits. When he
forced the Spanish Court to enter into a communicative dialogue and,
through his alternative visual economy, created a diatopical hermeneutic,
he interjected the Andean cosmology into the early global aesthetic system,
and, in turn, set up an early avenue of resistance to a singular
cosmopolitanism.
Early Global Symbolic Systems
It is in the context of the burgeoning of a new commercial order centered
round the Atlantic Ocean and the urbanization of the masses in Europe
during the sixteenth century that we observe the ingredients that led to a
novel global design emanating from this formerly backwards and forgotten
geographical area of Europe. With Spanish conquest, a political economy
57
hinged on the relationship between a European center and a colonial

periphery began to arise. Land appropriations in the New World,
exemplified by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, along with the enslavement of
indigenous peoples caused European economies with a stake in the New
World to flourish. This economic boom, in turn, created the bedrock of what
would later become a democratic European middle class that permanently
modified the political framework of the state by slowly shifting away from
governance based on juridical power to one based on biopower.
Yet, European, as did indigenous subjects, began to question the
realms of humanity and reason in the exploitation of man and labor,
precisely at a time in which the global rhetorical theater began to indicate a
novel semantics of human rights and international law. The birth of Western
modern philosophy and the foundation of the civilized and rational human
seemed less like a natural global aesthetic and economic system and more
like a rigid and exclusive epistemological model imposed from the outside.
In contemporary terms, Anbal Quijano has defined this model as the colonial
matrix of power, pointing out that beyond economic expansion, Empire
spread largely in aesthetic terms (Quijano, 2000). Immanuel Kant, who is
flanked on either side by Alexander Baumgartens shifting of sensual
aesthesis to a mathematically quantifiable aesthetics and Friedrich Schillers
theorization of the relationship between the individual and the collective
through the aesthetic citizen, is readily credited with applying the rules of
the Newtonian Revolution to perception and, in doing so, theorizing
aesthetic modernity. Just as the economy that led to a European middle class
was based on a favorable position in the novel global economy, the
indigenous subject, as a conceptual construct, provided a negative example
for Kants rational forms of aesthetics.
58
Kants theory of the rational capabilities of the Western modern

subject through his/her power of judgment was based on his concept of
innate reason and showed a heavy racial bias that, for Emmanuel Chukwudi
Eze, was a product of Kants collapsing of morality and geography onto a
singular plane (Eze, 1995). Without a dialogue with New World subjectivies,
his hierarchical anthropology was based on hearsay and rumors in
circulation in the travel writing that Kant read and the conversations that he
had with traveling seamen, more than the empirical model for which Kant
and Baumgarten acted as champions. While Kant intended to codify the
world mathematically with reason and the capacity for judgment as
symbolic anchor, he monologically dictated the aesthetic rules of the world
based on his own remote archive.
This founding European narrative of reason was part of the larger
polemics of World Culture. Culture, as was understood as a necessary tenet
of modernity, globally centered Europe while simultaneously trivializing
and deterritorialzing other cultures; it created the social death of nonEuropean subjects by biologizing, racializing and dehumanizing them
through instrumental totalized epistemology. Non-European cosmologies
were displaced by the grafting of the novel construct of reason onto the rest
of the world, and modernity took on a temporal designing of the world.
According to Paget Henry, this was accomplished by using rhetoric such as
behind, barbarous, primitive, traditional, and underdeveloped resulting
in not only the conquest of land and body, but also of mind and soul (Henry,
2004).
The Infrastructure of Reflexivity
Guaman Poma stood out among the philosophers that theorized the novel
global socioeconomic system in that he was the first individual to engage
with Empire in an aesthetic medium and cosmology that was not an
extension of the European archive, itself. In the sixteenth century,
intellectuals did speak on behalf of indigenous subjects: Bartalom de las
Casas questioning of the Catholic treatment of New World subjectivities
and Franisco de Vitorias similar philosophical interrogation of Spanish
rights to property and dominion both represent indigenous subjects on
Spanish terms. Yet, while neither political stance should simply be dismissed
as a malicious act, both Las Casas and Vitoria failed to depart from the
modern paradigm, with both falling into the trap of self-reflexive modern
subjectivity.
Infamously known as the propagator of the Black Legend, Bartalom
de Las Casas, whose early trips to Espaola as a young man would lead him
59
to become the self-proclaimed protector de los indios, feeling a calling to

defend the rights of the Indians on the basis of Catholic Doctrine.2 Although
his ethics and motivation have been drawn into question, Las Casas
continues to be heralded by many as an anachronistic progressive
intellectual that crusaded for international human rights well before the
inception of international law.3 In Brevsima Relacin de la Destruccin de las
Indias (A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies), Las Casas undertook a
lengthy chronicle of the abuse of the indigenous populations at the hands of
the Spanish in Espaola (present day Hispaniola, comprising the Dominican
Republic and Haiti). Las Casas principle concern arose from the economic
exploitation of indigenous peoples by the corrupting encomienda system.4
The early socioeconomic infrastructure, according to Las Casas, led to the
corrupt practice of the Kings agents abroad. This rhetorical maneuver
allowed Las Casas to critique the King Charles Vs dominion without, in fact,
blaming the royal figure himself.
According to Las Casas, the encomienda system was exploitative and
not compatible with the message purported by Catholic Doctrine, which in
effect was used as the apologetic rhetorical device to philosophically
perpetuate the economic exploitation of local lands and peoples. Indigenous
populations were constructed as barbarous and unable to govern themselves
and, as a result, needed an external superior order to create civilized
Christians of them. Las Casas framing of exploitation within the terms and
logic of Catholicism, however, had obvious shortcomings. His treatment of
indigenous populations was paternalistic, and in one instance he went so far
as to metaphorize himself as the shepherd needed to guide the lost sheep of
the New World (Las Casas, 2006). Further, he failed to break with the
epistemic violence carried out through indoctrination. In effect, he argued
against short-term physical exploitation by arguing for long-term
indoctrination. In his writings, he did not argue for corporeal and epistemic
liberation so much as for a rational approach to creating Christians of
indigenous peoples, keeping the debate on European terms and denying
indigenous peoples the right to agency and memory.
Las Casas debates with Juan Gins de Seplveda at Valladolid in 1551
reiterated this point. This time, however, the debate was framed not only on
European terms but, going a step further, was also carried out on European
soil. In contrast to Seplveda, here we begin to see why some have argued
in favor of Las Casas actions as constituting a defense of the rights of
indigenous peoples. While Las Casas paternalistic and protectionist
treatment of indigenous peoples does not sit easy, Seplveda treated them
as natural slaves and, in the neatness of one theoretical platitude borrowed
from the Aristotelian school, assuaged the Spanish of any guilt, be it human
60
or Catholic, for the continuous exploitation of their nascent economic and

symbolic order. For Immanuel Wallerstein, the debate at the Consejo de las
Indias marked the foundation of international human rights and its globally
totalized and hegemonic counterpart, interventionism (Wallerstein, 2006).
Reducing indigenous subjectivity to a dyadic debate between two
philosophers that based their arguments on European logic highlighted the
foundation of the geopolitics of reason and the zero-point of human rights.
Neither the philosophers nor governors among Las Casas, Seplveda, and
Charles V, who presided over the session, thought to include indigenous
memory, subjectivity, or history in the debate over the rights of indigenous
peoples themselves.
If we understand Las Casas writings and debates with Seplveda as
an early dialogue at the cosmopolitan center of the Spanish Court, then it
should follow that the writings of their contemporary, Francisco de Vitoria,
marked what would later flourish into international law. A pious Jesuit
thinker, Vitoria followed the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Vitoria
believed that there was a natural law that man could encompass, theorize,
and disseminate. In his lecture at the University of Salamanca in 1539, Vitoria
asked if Spanish conquest and the usurpation of indigenous land were
justified within the context of natural law. To develop his argument, he
called into question the concept of dominion. If the indigenous populations,
in fact, had dominion over the territories of the New World, and the
Spaniards unilaterally appropriated these lands, then Spanish conquest
would be proven to be an infringement of natural law. After all, Vitoria
shows that indigenous peoples had a social order prior to the arrival of the
Spaniards: they have some order (ordo) in their affairs: they have properly
organized cities, proper marriages, magistrates and overlords (domini), laws,
industries, and commerce, all of which require the use of reason (Vitoria,
1991, 250). However, Vitoria was quick to turn this point on its head by
arguing that the fact that indigenous peoples were capable of reasoning, a
faculty that Kant would later deny them (Kant, 2000). This showed that
indigenous peoples should easily be able to assimilate into the correct
reasoning, that which was brought to them by the Spanish.
In this way, Vitoria simultaneously humanizes and Humanizes
indigenous populations. He proves that they are worthy of protection by the
law, but that the law is necessary to create rational creatures out of them.
Vitoria uses a Christian vocabulary to explain his concept of law: Nor could
it be their fault if they were for so many thousands of years outside the state
of salvation, since they were born in sin but did not have the use of reason
to prompt them to seek baptism or the things necessary for salvation. He
continues: Thus if they seem to us insensate and slow-witted, I put it down
61
mainly to their evil and barbarous education. Even amongst ourselves we

see many peasants (rustici) who are little different from brute animals
(Vitoria, 1991: 250). Evangelism and baptism are translated into the
protection of law, both marking the Christian substratum of Western law
and an obvious blind spot in the theoretical bedrock of reason. Those who
have not become Christians demonstrate the irrational rationality that falls
outside of the reach of law, consequently causing indigenous populations to
be labeled as backwards and barbarous. Vitorias clearly biased unseating of
local cosmology not only justifies, in his mind, epistemic, territorial, and
corporeal colonization but even encourages it by depicting it as noble.
This paternalistic tone should have resonated strongly with anyone
privy to Las Casas writings in sixteenth century Spain. As is the case with
Las Casas, Vitoria metonymically stood in for indigenous populations in the
debate over indigenous rights and religious freedoms. By only granting
indigenous peoples agency on Spanish soil and within the European
paradigm through Christian-Spanish thinkers, non-European consciousness
is displaced altogether, and an early example of cosmopolitanism resembles,
under critical examination, simple reductionism. This natural law that, four
hundred years later would be interpreted by Carl Schmitt as the nomos of the
earth, writes the rules to human rights and international law based on its
own convenient interpretation of a reason steeped in Catholic Doctrine. And,
when these new concepts of rights and law are confronted by hang-ups or
outliers, they simply pay lip service to aberrations with an indoctrinated
stand-in; a clumsy metaphorization of New World archives.
This reflexive infrastructure is a clear example of the displacement
of autochthonous cultural and ontological registers through colonial
semiosis. Taking post-structuralist semiotics as a template, we understand
that the articulation of meaning through language always leaves an
unfulfilled remainder. The position of the speaker and the interlocutor is as
important as the relationship between sign and signified. This impossibility
of pure communication is magnified when two peoples without a common
symbolic order to act as a reference point engage and interact. Spanish
conquest and the self appointment of reason, as is highlighted above, offers
an example of this difficulty in communication and further demonstrates
what Walter Mignolo refers to as the locus of enunciation. In his book, The
Darker Side of the Renaissance, Mignolo points out that the semiotic disconnect
and privileging of the European locus of enunciation based in a Catholic
symbolic order was carried out by means of favoring a history and cultural
memory based on written texts rather than an oral tradition (as was largely
the practice in the pre-Columbian New World). The privileging of the
European symbolic register is made possible by the nascent Capitalist system
62
and authoritarian control established by the Spanish explorers. Mignolo

writes, In the first place, colonial semiosis implies the coexistence of high
and low cultures. It also implies power relations between, on the one hand,
the group of people controlling the politics and economy, and, on the other,
the subaltern communities (2003: 10). Kants aesthetic classification and the
instituting of the infrastructure of Western modernity through debates
carried out within the locus of enunciation all use the singular hermeneutic
and the privileged space of an implied high culture set in motion by the
colonial matrix of power. In creating the Western modern man, a totalized
episteme displaces alternative hermeneutics, also understood as alternative
nomoi or loci of enunciation. But as we see in the writings and drawings of
Guaman Poma, opposition to the privileged symbolic order was already in
circulation as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Responses of Subjectivity
Guaman Poma, the Andean border dweller whose treatise Nueva Cornica y
Buen Gobierno (The First New Chronicle of Good Government) took to task
Spanish Catholic Doctrine and sociopolitical infrastructure in the New
World, is exemplary of decolonial thought. Decolonial thinking highlights
the fissures in totalized epistemes by theorizing from the borders and
arguing for an agency of the silenced. Put in a theoretical vocabulary, it is a
metanarrative of the censored that, contrary to traditional metanarratives,
does not normalize or instrumentalize its practitioners. Decolonial
theorization attempts to interject the displaced original consciousness into
the dominant paradigm, allowing for the displaced to speak for themselves.
In his letter to Phillip III, Nueva Cornica y Buen Gobierno, Guaman Poma
interjects the displaced Andean cosmology into the Catholic-based political
infrastructure of sixteenth century Spain. He uses the moral code purported
by Catholic Doctrine in order to gain agency within the dominant system
and recover local memory displaced by the colonialist Spaniards at the
cosmopolitan level.
Some critics argue that this does not travel a great distance from
Bartalome de las Casas undertakings. Yet, the debates in Valladolid take
place on Spanish soil and in the context of the Spanish royal court. More
importantly, they remain firmly rooted within the European Catholic
cosmology, using referents exclusively from the Western cultural model. The
debate does not give agency to indigenous populations of the New World
but instead grants them a symbolic representative within the dominant
cosmology. Guaman Poma, on the other hand, shifts the geography of reason
by locating the debate in the New World, going so far as to frame Spain
63
within the Incan archive through his drawing of the cosmos, Pontifical Mundo
(The Pontiffs World), and its division into a center and four Incan suyos
(roughly translated from Quechua as government). The Pontifical Mundo
places the Incan world above Castilla in the drawing, which is anchored by
a sun rising over the New World at the top of the folio in an emphasis of the
importance of nature as foundational to the local symbolic order. This act
turns the dominant consciousness on its head by reducing it to the Andean
cognitive map and draws attention to the contradictions between Catholic
Doctrine and the actions of the Spanish enlightened exploiters.
Pontifical Mundo is the most effective of Guamn Pomas drawings. It

reinterprets Spanish cosmology with the intent of calling attention to the
epistemic displacement carried out by the evangelism of the self-interpreted
natural order. It is also exemplary of his employment of irony, wit, and code
switching. By actually saying out loud what is implied in Catholic expansion,
i.e. this is the Popes empire, and placing the words in the context of the
Andean suyo, he enters into a legal dialogue while highlighting the laws
absurdity and incapacity to govern the local space. He makes visible
constituted global doctrine while showing its constitutive limits. In essence,
64
he brings the implied cosmopolitan border-a great distance in geographical

terms-together in one folio, producing a border poetics and undermining
Catholic cosmology. It is an example of this give and take subversion that
Rolena Adorno refers to when she writes:
His employment of Andean spatial symbolism challenges the
readers assessment of his apparently assimilated artistic style;
his metaphorical identifications, apparently innocent and well
intended, posses a dark underside that overwhelms his
interpretation of both the European and Andean sides of
colonial experience. As a tool of irony, metaphor denies the
illusion of unity and wholeness; it disguises differences but
acknowledges that they cannot be ignored (Adorno, 1986: 140)
When he forces the cosmopolitan center and the barbarized elsewhere to
converge, Guaman Poma both trivializes the metropole and finds an
aesthetics that expresses his own existence as an epistemological border
dweller.
Throughout the Nuevo Cornica y Buen Gobierno, we observe the
detailed quotidian issues that weighed on the local psyche during the period
of conquest. Many of these drawings highlight the physical violence carried
out in the New World through the inception of the encomienda system, a
representation already circulating in the Iberian intellectual imaginary
thanks to Las Casas. However, instead of reducing his arguments to Catholic
Doctrine, which he does of course use as a means to gain agency, both as an
individual and an Andean, Guaman Poma points to one of the sources of
the problem in his poignant drawing, Es ste oro que comes? (Is this Gold that
you Eat?).
Es ste or que comes comes from Guaman Pomas chapter on Spanish
conquest and sharply draws Spanish economic interests into focus when in
the foreground an Andean and a Spaniard sit in conversation. The Andean
asks, Is this gold that you eat? The Spaniard simply responds, extending
a plate of gold, Yes, we eat this gold. The dialogue and symbolic exchange
between the Andean and the Spaniard is fortified by the depiction of grain
houses in the background that are used by the local subject to store food,
further emphasizing the purpose of Andean labor: survival. The
cosmopolitan border that is set as a geographical difference in Pontifical
Mundo finds an epistemological and social counterpoint in Es ste or que
comes, where we see that Guaman Poma interprets the Spaniards occupation
of the New World as driven by economic exploitation rather than a cultural
dialogue. The metaphor of food is rich; it contrasts the natural sustenance of
65
the New World subject with the economic, commodity-drive sustenance of

the Spaniards, highlighting the birth of the new economic order that, as we
have seen, acts as the impetus for modern epistemic categorization. The fact
that the Spaniard is portrayed as teaching the Andean to eat the gold is
crucial. Not only does the Spaniard encroach upon the Andeans land, but
he further displaces the local cosmology by introducing an exogenous value
system. In this, and in contrast to the local paradigm, the driving force
behind social organization is not natural sustenance, but valuable
commodities.
Guaman Poma expresses himself through a border poetics that plays

out through subversive rhetorical and aesthetic maneuvering. He reduces
the geographical distance used by human rights and aesthetic theorists that
displace New World subjects to a single folio in Pontifical Mundo further, he
reduces the epistemological distance used by the same theorists in Es ste oro
que comes. Aesthetically, he transcends the visual-literary binary used to
bolster cosmopolitan claims to symbolic dominance by combining visual and
literary elements in his chronicle. What is the reduction of a geographic
66
border in the first instance plays out as the reduction of an epistemological

border in the second, both of which force the cosmopolitan center to confront
its negative referents head on. By speaking aloud what is implied by the
early global design of Spanish expansion into the New World, Guaman
Poma depicts the aesthetic border at which he dwells and calls into question
the universal claims of the cosmopolitan center.
Conclusion
The need to totalize the world arising from Spanish conquest and continuing
to the present day by way of modern theorization is a necessary
accompaniment to the emergence and development of a modern political
economy based on the reproduction of capital through surplus value.
Philosophical meta-discourse in addition to a racial hierarchy that is used as
an apologetics for conquest through the exoticizing and othering of nonEuropean subjectivities create what is determined from within the privileged
discourse to be a natural order or nomos of the earth. As a means of
maintaining power, dissenting voices are kept within the locus of enunciation,
thus metaphorically representing alternatives within the confines of the
modern paradigm. Aesthetic borders are monological rather than dialogical,
and what is claimed to be cosmopolitan remains myopic and reductionist.
Epistemic totality necessarily implies a cosmological displacement by
means of codifying the world through a reduction of the global subjectivities
to a chain of differences, leaving displaced populations to think of
themselves in relation to the universal idyll. However, when Guman Poma
addresses the head of the Spanish Court, Phillip III, he gives voice to the
complexities and strengths of Andean epistemology, political organization,
history and spirituality. In doing so, he breaks with the self-referential
debates carried out within the confines of the European paradigm. This
alternative interpretation exemplifies what Mignolo refers to as the
pluritopic hermeneutic and emphasizes the escape from totality as such
(Mignolo, 2003). Guaman Poma ruptured the circular logic of coloniality by
vocalizing a cosmology that does not fit neatly into its assigned position in
the colonial matrix of power. He did so on aesthetic terms by giving visual
representation to his life as a cosmopolitan border dweller. This act of border
thinking adds a dimension to the colonized consciousness and subjectivity
of the New World by resituating the exogenous narrative in its locus, and in
doing so, points to the need for cosmopolitanism to breathe from a multitude
of aesthetic archives. Otherwise, as Guaman Poma is early to point out,
cosmopolitanism is simply conquest.
67
Brantley Nicholson is currently a PhD candidate at Duke University where

he will defend his thesis, A Poetics of Globalism: Fernando Vallejo, the
Generation of 72, and the Contemporary Colombian Urban Novel, this
autumn. His work focuses on the representation of globalization and
cosmopolitanism in modern and contemporary Latin American literature.
He is currently co-editing a volume on the Generation of 72, Latin Americas
forced cosmopolitans, and from August 2011 will be Visiting Lecturer of
Latin American and Iberian Studies at the University of Richmond.
Endnotes
1
For versions of the mentioned contemporary Latin American texts in

English, see Paul Hammonds translation of Our Lady of the Assassins, Helen
Lanes translation of Strange Things Happen Here, Ariel Dorfmans own
English version of Death and the Maiden, and Amanda Hopkinsons
translation of Burnt Money.
2
The term Black Legend, or leyenda negra as it is known in Spanish, is a concept

developed Julin Juderas in La leyenda negra y la verdad histrica (1914),
although the term has been in circulation in the Spanish press since 1912.
The concept, according to Juderas, depicted Spanish hegemony as
excessively exploitative and marred by backward practices such as religious
fanaticism and was used by Northern European courts as rhetorical leverage
against the Spanish Empire. For a more recent assessment of the concept, see
the edited volume, Rereading the Black Legend (Greer and Mignolo, 2007).
3
For a good critique of Las Casas Human Rights campaign, see Daniel
Castros text Another Face of Empire (2007).
4
The encomienda system was the economic model used by the Spanish in the
New World to extract raw goods during colonization. Not dissimilar to the
slave plantations of North America, the encomienda system was based on the
exploitation of the cheap and roundly inhumane labor. In this case,
indigenous subjects were de facto slaves.
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68
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Rights, and Ecclesiastical Imperialism Durham, NC: Duke University Press
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Dorfman, Ariel (2001) La muerte y la doncella Westminster, Md.: Seven Stories
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(200-241)
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the Renaisssance Empires Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Guaman Poma de Ayala, Felipe (1987) Nueva crnica y buen gobierno Madrid:
Historia
Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2000) Empire Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press
Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2004) Multitude: War and Democracy in
the Age of Empire New York: Penguin
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1994) Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit:
Selections University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press
Henry, Paget (2004) Between Hume and Cugoano: Race, Ethnicity and
Philosophical Entrapment The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18(2), 129-148
Kant, Immanuel (2000) Critique of the Power of Judgment Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Las Casas, Bartalome de (2006) Brevsima relacin de la destruccin de las Indias
69
Andre Saint-Lu (ed.) Madrid: Ctedra

Maldonado-Torres, Nelson (2008) Rousseau and Fanon on the Inequalities
of the Human Sciences Reflections on the De-colonial Option and the
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Duke University
Mignolo, Walter (2003) The Darker Side of the Renaissance Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press
Piglia, Ricardo (2006) Plata quemada Mexico City: Anagrama
Quijano, Anbal (2000) Colonialidad del Poder y Clasificacin Social
Journal of World-Systems Research 6(2), 342-386
Schiller, Friedrich (2004) On the Aesthetic Education of Man New Haven: Yale
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Schmit, Carl (2003) The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus
Publicum Europaeum New York: Telos Press
Valenzuela, Luisa (2005) Aqu pasan cosas raras Buenos Aires: De la Flor
Vallejo, Fernando (2001) La virgen de los sicarios Mexico City: Punto de Lectura
Vitoria, Francisco de (1991) Political Writings Cambridge: Cambridge
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Images
The Colonial Matrix of Power
Taken from: Quijano, Anbal (2000) Colonialidad del Poder y Clasificacin
Social Journal of World-Systems Research 6(2), 342-386
El Pontifical Mundo
Retrieved from:
http://img.kb.dk/ha/manus/POMA/poma550/POMA0371.jpg
70
Es Este Oro Que Comes?

Retrieved from:
http://img.kb.dk/ha/manus/POMA/poma550/POMA0371.jpg
Bataille against Heidegger:

Language and the Escape from the World
by Andrew Ryder
Habermas Identification of Bataille with Heidegger

In 1984, Jrgen Habermas spoke of a common project between Bataille and
Heidegger (1998: 168). Each desires to overcome modernity, to discard
rationalism, and to outstrip subjectivism (Habermas, 1998: 169). Habermas
admits two distinctions: One is stylistic, and the other is that Batailles
objection to rationalization is ethical, whereas Heideggers is ontological
(ibid.). He considers both of these gaps to be epiphenomenal. The difference
of style is of greater import than Habermas realizes. More than this, Batailles
ethical objection is substantive as well as stylistic; in Heidegger, he sees
acquiescence to the hierarchical distinctions of a reified world. The distance
of style and an ethic of affect between Bataille and Heidegger separate the
former from the political errors of the latter. I will strive to pry apart the
equivalence established by Habermas, partly through a measured
comparison of both these thinkers to Emmanuel Levinas.
The stakes of Habermas identification are political. From his
perspective, both Bataille and Heidegger to have missed the politicophilosophical point of modernity: the founding of a rational community of
mutual understanding. As a result, their writings fail to support democracy;
instead, Bataille embraces anarchism and Heidegger, fascism (Habermas,
1998: 170). The identification of Heidegger with fascism is very
controversial.1 Indeed, Heideggers work has often been read with great
interest on the left, and a tendency towards left-Heideggerianism has been
noted.2 I will leave aside the pressing question of the degree to which
Habermas is correct in reading Heidegger as a consistent advocate for
fascism. Instead, because Bataille agreed with this characterization, subtitling
his notes on Heidegger Critique of a Philosophy of Fascism, this article
will instead demonstrate Batailles extrication of his own ideas from
association with Heidegger and his grave political mistakes.3
Habermas notes that both Bataille and Heidegger are attempting to
think through atheism. While Bataille repudiates any higher authority,
Heideggers death of God is voiced in noble tones; as a result, it loses all
radicality (Habermas, 1998: 170). He notes that, for Heidegger, there is a
72
Ryder: Bataille against Heidegger
place ready to be filled in by the hero, who will turn out to be fascistic.4
Habermas sets forth a distinction between Bataille the anarchist and
Heidegger the fascist, but sees them as united in their incoherence. From
Habermas perspective, Heideggers open place of authority is ready for
some fascistic sovereign; Bataille lies in wait at the same opening, ready to
mock and reject the divine emergence. It is my contention that what
Habermas takes to be a gap for the divine in Bataille is instead a recurrent
fascination with alterity. This opening to alterity is bound up in Batailles
literary style.
Habermas mentions with confidence that its obviousness must make
it superficial: the obvious differences between erotic writing and scholarly
essays on one side, philosophical investigation and Being mysticism on the
other (1998: 168). This difference, the difference of style, is to Habermas
negligible. Where Bataille appears frenzied and Heidegger stodgy,
Habermas sees this as a distraction from their complicity. Bataille thinks
more of his own stylistic difference from Heidegger than Habermas does.
Indeed, it is necessary to elucidate how this difference in style is crucial to
Batailles distance from Heidegger. Bataille states this directly in his
Critique of Heidegger: In the moment when I write, I breathe with all my
strength, and I breathe free (2006: 28). He ties love to strength, to freedom,
and to writing, a configuration of terms alien to Heidegger. We find in
Bataille that his strength becomes apparent, not in a concrete endeavor, but
in writing. This is the moment of freedom, and the possibility of love; both
these terms rest on a certain understanding of language, and specifically of
literary language.
Kojve: Language and Death
Batailles understanding of literature inherits ideas from Alexandre Kojve,
the thinker most responsible for Hegels significance in French thought of
the 1930s and 1940s. Kojves subject imposes meaning through the negative,
related to the consciousness of finitude. For this subject, revelation through
language requires a term with no direct relation to the world itself (Kojve,
2004: 39). Kojve asserts that this linguistic mediation relies on death (2004:
36). To make this point, Kojve takes the example of a dog. This dog has an
existence in the world, but its distinction from other animals that we give
different names is not immediately given by nature. This is languages
separating force, the ability to distinguish the concept dog from an actually
existing dog (Kojve, 2004: 42). Words have no natural relation with the
object they represent. To give a name is to establish a genus and to detach
from the hic et nunc. Rather than a singular example, we have in addition the
concept of a dog, removed from this living and breathing dog.
73
Kojve believes that this mediation and discovery through language

requires mortal man, because only a being capable of imagining the removal
from existence of this dog, could be capable of forging the concept in excess
of this possibility (its name). In part, this emphasis on death is derived from
Heidegger as much as from Hegel, in particular Heideggers insistence on
orientation towards death as necessary to authenticity (Heidegger, 1962:
266). Indeed, Kojve affirms identity between Heidegger and Hegel on
finitude (Kojve, 2004: 74). Heidegger will make a similar point about death,
language, and humanity, decades later, in his 1959 On the Way to Language:
Mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do
this. But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death
and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought (Heidegger,
1971: 107-108). Heidegger notes a relationship that is essential, but declares
it ahead of us, not deriving it or following its consequences.
Hegels discourse is boundless and absolute (Kojve, 2004: 39).
Language is capable of asserting anything, discussing impossible objects,
constructing agrammatical formulations, and taking on absurd meanings in
new contexts. Hegels goal is to construct the Notion, which is the real
building block of existence. This requires correspondence between the
negating force of discourse and objects in the world. Without discourse and
human negation, we just have raw dumb immediacy, and without reference,
we have imaginative excess. The Understanding requires subsequent
Reason, which supplies the abstraction of language with its bearings in the
world (ibid.). Literary language, however, does not submit itself to this
reckoning.
This is why Bataille speaks of the freedom of writing in his critique of
Heidegger. This complicity between literary style and death occurs again in
his Inner Experience. Bataille writes:
Laughter, dream and, in sleep, in the rooftops fall in a rain of
gravel [. . .] to know nothing, to this point (not of ecstasy, but
of sleep): to strangle myself thus, unsolvable puzzle, to accept
sleep, the starry universe my tomb, glorified, glory constellated
with deaf stars, unintelligible and further than death, terrifying
(nonsense: the taste of garlic which the roasted lamb had) (1998:
61)
This parenthetical taste of garlic appears to be exactly what Bataille is after:
a nonsense that we will find absent from any of Heideggers
phenomenological analyses. Here we find dreams in the sleep of death; the
prospect of a further unknown, which Bataille finds at the limits of
languages expressive capacity. The ability to produce this effect is one
74
inherent to Batailles fragmentary style. We will never find Heidegger

writing like this, whatever the encomium to poetry that is his later work.
Batailles linking of this specifically nonsensical poetry to a shore on the
opposite side of death evokes Levinas notion of the il y a. This is appropriate,
because he gives poetic and artistic examples in order to approach painful
Being.5 My reading of Levinas literary qualities, and Batailles reception of
these ideas, is greatly indebted to Jill Robbinss authoritative treatment in
Altered Reading.
Levinas and the il y a
The thesis of Levinas Existence and Existents is that existence in general
precedes any particular being (2001: 1). While a being already exercises over
Being the domination a subject exercises over its attributes, we are always
capable of looking back over our shoulder to a preexistent period, prior to
our individualization (ibid.). Levinas describes an impersonal Being that
precedes us and will survive us, and that he identifies with matter and with
evil (2001: 4). According to Levinas, Heidegger considers evil to be a defect
and anxiety regarding death to be a crucial problem. In contrast, Levinas
declares that Being, not its absence, is itself suffering; the impersonal Being
that precedes and survives death is already malevolent and disturbing
(ibid.).6 He identifies the experience of the il y a with horror, and contrasts
this to Heideggers anxiety (2001: 57). For Levinas, horror is not directed
at death itself, it is an awareness of the Being that continues after death (2001:
58). After mortality remains an evil, unthinkable substance.
Bataille read and reviewed Existence and Existents. In this review,
Bataille considers thought beyond philosophy, suggested by Sren
Kierkegaards cry against Hegelian science (1999: 162). Bataille argues that
modern existentialists, including Heidegger, are not faithful to Kierkegaards
cry (1999: 159). For Bataille, the language of Heideggers philosophy is
laborious, it is gluey. There is, it seems to me, a hesitation at its basis.
Existentialist thinking is always fleeting but never achieves in itself the
annihilation of thinking (1999: 160). Despite this criticism, Bataille
commends Heidegger for synthesizing atheism and religious experience
(ibid.). This is high praise from Bataille, whose Summa atheologica writings
had this goal. Bataille writes that Heideggers teaching proceeds from the
most meaningful investigation that has been made of the spheres of the
profane and the sacred, the discursive and the mystical, the prosaic and the
poetic (ibid.). This opposition and intertwining between sacred and
profane, and prose and poetry, is at the center of Batailles concerns. In this
moment, he seems to support Habermas argument, recognizing Heidegger
as his semblable. At one point, Bataille even seems to exonerate Heideggers
75
political missteps, in a footnote removed from the corrected version (ibid.).

Heidegger and Passion
Bataille proceeds from this praise to a series of vehement criticisms, directly
in line with those made a decade earlier in his Critique of Heidegger.
Bataille argues that Heideggers sacred is identical to the realm of the
authentic (ibid.). For this reason, whatever Heideggers commonalities with
Kierkegaard in their commitment to the singular as against science, the two
are distinct. This is because of the formers characteristic misery, opposed
to Kierkegaards passion (Bataille, 1999: 161). Unlike Heideggers, the
authenticity of Kierkegaard is inapplicable to a world, it was a
consummation of life so intense that it left the development of knowledge
in the background (ibid.). In contrast, while Heidegger starts from the
position of the individual Dasein, he characterizes the modes of being
according to an authentic relationship with objects and their adequate
discernment. For this reason, Bataille has trouble seeing in Heidegger that
which responds to the passion which is truly mad and cried out by
Kierkegaard (ibid.). Whatever Heideggers criticisms of rationalisms
forgetfulness of Being, his tone and his values confine him to the realm of
the already-given and the sanity of recognition. In this Bataille articulates a
kind of ethic of affect.
Bataille declares that Heidegger is consumed with nostalgia for rare
authentic moments scattered in a professorial life (ibid.). While this is an
ad hominem criticism on Batailles part, the biographical differences between
Heidegger and Bataille are here revealed as consequential. Bataille declares
that, for Heidegger, the authentic appears as a consciousness of the
authentic [. . .] [and] given over to the knowledge of the authentic (ibid.).
Heideggers refusal to commit himself to consideration of the experiences
that Bataille sees as crucial to the breaking point of subjectivity render
Heideggers critique of the history of that subject moot. Bataille leaps from
this criticism of the tedium of Heideggers biography to deduce the cause of
his political folly:
This life does not seem dominated by a terrible passion: one
cannot be surprised by a slippage, which is not necessary but
possible, from the authentic to Hitlerism. What dominated
Heidegger was doubtless the intellectual desire to reveal being
(being and not existence) in discourse (in philosophical
language) (ibid.)
This evocative, too-brief passage, later redacted, links several claims.7
76
Heidegger is accused of timidity and careerism in his personal life,

contributing both to his support for Hitler and his need to display Being in
the language of philosophy. Bataille claims that Heidegger prefers
authenticity to passion. Heideggers goal is recognition of being, through
language, and not the radical repudiation in which Bataille locates his version
of the sacred.8
Heidegger himself would not agree that he is deficient in passion.
Rather, he writes that it is essential for the assumption of authenticity to
wrench oneself from the illusions of the They and embrace an impassioned
freedom towards death (Heidegger 1962: 266). However, Heideggers
passion is not at all consonant with Batailles. In the chapter Will as Affect,
Passion, and Feeling of his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger aims to distinguish
between different varieties of mood. He believes that Nietzsche conflates
affect, a bodily agitation, with passion, which allows him to achieve lucid
mastery (1991: 45, 48). Heidegger stipulates, Passion has nothing to do
with sheer desire. It is not a matter of the nerves, of ebullition and dissipation
(1991: 49). Rather than ebullition, Heideggers passion is a lucidly gathering
grip on beings (ibid.). Heidegger associates ebullition with affect and with
infatuation, which are dubitable, and not truly passionate. He associates
passion with values symbolized in Nietzsche by the eagle and the serpent.
According to Heidegger, the eagle represents pride, which is the fully
developed resolution of one who maintains himself at the level of his own
essential rank (1991: 46). This concern for hierarchy echoes a statement
made on behalf of National Socialism: To domination belongs power, which
creates a hierarchy of grades through the imposition of the will of the one
who rules, insofar as he is actually powerful, i.e., insofar as he disposes those
under his rule (Faye, 2009: 239).9 The Nietzschean serpent, according to
Heidegger, represents discernment. In this context, Heidegger is talking
about passion in terms of love. He thinks that both mature love and the
anticipation of death require passion, which depends on pride and
discernment. Like Nietzsche, Bataille does not distinguish between seizure
by affect on one hand and resoluteness of passion on the other. Rather,
Batailles passion would include the loss of mastery that Heidegger needs
to confine to the realm of affect. Through a reading of Bataille, Heideggers
pride and discernment can be seen as ways of covering up the possibility of
alterity.
Bataille criticized the figure of the eagle in advance. In an early article,
he associates himself with materialism as against the sovereign virility of the
eagle (1985: 34-35). Bataille argues that the eagle is aligned with imperialism
and metaphysical ideals, and opposes Marxs old mole and Zarathustras
sense of the Earth to the prideful eagle (1985: 39). Zarathustras love for
the earth carries with it the realization that the bourgeoisie have killed God,
and all that remains is in catastrophic disarray. This landscape is where
77
Bataille chooses to think.

Bataille, Materialism, and the il y a
The sense of the earth, which Bataille locates in both Marx and Nietzsche,
appeals to his particular sense of materialism. This materialism also
corresponds, in some ways, to the il y a. Levinas associates the il y a with the
absence of God, as well as with the primitive, pre-Judaic sacred (2001: 56).
He also explicitly identifies this godless, evil, excessive being with matter
(2001: 51). Levinas declares that Heidegger is unaware of the horror of the il
y a. Heidegger begins with Beings already thrown into the world and their
anxiety at the prospect of their dissolution into nothingness, and who
purchase authenticity by anticipating this eventuality. Levinas, in contrast,
argues that an essential problem is indicated by a more profound horror.
This horror is not in the face of nothingness, but at the intuition of
impersonal being that precedes us, and which lies in wait for us just
following our deaths.
Bataille embraces this horror and valorizes it. He argues on behalf of
something like Levinas il y a a desolate, post-divine landscape of
meaninglessness for the failure of Heideggers conception of Dasein, which
remains all-too-subjective in its insertion into Being (1999: 173). Bataille and
Levinas interpret this immediate entry into Being as an authority over it.
Batailles fascination with matter reveals the necessity of the il y a for Levinas
post-Heideggerian outlook. Whatever horror is attendant to Levinas
consideration of impersonal Being, this impersonal-existence-in-general is
crucial to his distinction from Heidegger.
The theme of perception is central to these relations of endorsement
and critique. Levinas argues that Heidegger fails properly to conceive of evil.
Heidegger imagines it to be privative, an impending nothingness, where it
is for Levinas a superfluous abundance. Levinas believes that Heidegger
strayed into evil because of this failure adequately to perceive its nature.
However, it is the nature of the il y a to be imperceptible. The il y a can only be
glanced at through poetry or through art, and written of in an evocative,
literary style. In other words, a commitment to lucid perception, vital to
Heideggers authenticity, by its goals and methods will necessarily fail to
grasp the il y a, which is the dissolution of any such certain apprehension. A
commitment to perception walls off the imperceptible.
Bataille chooses to criticize Levinas characterization of the il y a as
remaining too close to the descriptive realm of philosophical language. From
Batailles perspective, Levinas remains all-too-phenomenological, and hence,
too close to the discursive revelation Bataille identifies with Heideggers
authenticity. Batailles gesture will be towards a different language that does
78
not appeal to discernment, but rather to a tearing from the world. Bataille
indicates that Levinas, whatever his desire to criticize Heidegger, continues
to practice philosophical language, and as a result fails to express the force
of impersonal Being.
For Bataille, Levinas draws back from evil on a stylistic level. To take
the il y a seriously is to discard concrete language and to speak in the
ambiguity of the literary and to risk meaning nothing. Being beyond death
is also beyond the grasp of perception. For this reason, its expression must
escape discernment and adequation. The il y a interrupts the transmission
of meaning, and words that speak of it must do the same. It may not be even
be correct to say that one speaks of the il y a. Bataille indicates that literary
language moves towards animal sounds and away from human speech: he
speaks of equivalence to the impenetrable howling of a dog (1999: 167). In
other words, poetry aspires to the quality of barking or howling. The goal
would be to dispense with thinking entirely, to instead express an opaque,
meaningless shriek.
Bataille appropriates Levinas term entirely, at one point even
asserting that Levinas thought does not differ, it seems to me, [. . .] from
mine (1999: 168).10 Bataille indicates that the il y a is not an object of
knowledge, but an experience: Individual, painful, with the value of a cry
(1999: 169). The experience is so intimate and nonsensical that is apparently
non-communicable. Bataille goes on to indicate that experience is always this
way (ibid.). Experience, by nature, cannot be communicated under the
heading of clear knowledge, but solely in the form of poetry (Bataille, 1999:
171). Contrary to Levinas, who sees this type of experience and the poetry
that expresses it as a hazard, Bataille acclaims these themes: I can regard
the night of non-knowledge as my deliverance (1999: 172).
However, it is imperative not to confuse Batailles endorsement of the
il y a as a positive dimension of experience, and his valorization of poetry,
with romanticism. For this reason, Batailles indication of Heidegger as a
romantic is not laudatory (1999: 159). This is clear from Batailles reading of
Jean Wahl, in the same review in which he treats Levinas. In Batailles gloss,
Wahl dreamt of philosopher-poets, philosophers by origin but only in
order to liquidate a heritage, who endlessly resolve the tension of
philosophical research in poetic effusion (1999: 159). Wahl saw Kierkegaard
as the first of these, and argued that a greater fidelity to him could be
achieved by a poetized version of philosophy. This is not far from the journey
towards poetry on which Heidegger embarked, subsequent to Being and
Time. Bataille does not approve of this aesthetic solution.
79
Heidegger, Language, and Humanism

Bataille criticizes Wahl for an aestheticism that maintains the coherence of
the philosopher-poet and his capacity to interact with his situation through
art. According to Bataille, Kierkegaard and Rimbaud, who express existence
in intensity, are not destroyed by a necessity of which they are conscious
(1999: 163). Expression is not consciousness, and destruction is not a
recognized necessity. Batailles experience cannot be described as a romantic
or aesthetic one, in that, as Robbins puts it, it calls into question any notion
of poetic authority and its concomitant celebration of the creative powers of
a subject (1999: 108). Famously, Heidegger later emphasizes such a
departure from the subject in his 1947 Letter on Humanism, intended to
correct Kojves reading of his work into Hegelianism.11 In contrast to Kojve,
who posited the human subject as central and language as destructive,
Heidegger establishes language and Being as having a kind of priority over
human beings. This text posits Man as the shepherd of Being, who lets
beings Be through language, rather than killing them, as Kojve would have
it (Heidegger, 1993: 234).
Heidegger appears close to Bataille when he argues that grammar is
a manifestation of the public. The public realm degrades language, with the
purpose of expediting communication along routes where objectification
the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone branches out and
disregards all limits (Heidegger, 1993: 221). The goal of hastening
communication eliminates the specificity in favor of the abstract.
Instrumental language stems from the dominance of subjectivity (ibid.).
Even so, Heideggers clarification or revision remains vulnerable to Batailles
charge of aestheticism. This is because Heideggers account of mans duty to
Being rests on a consideration of discernment of existing beings, rather than
on the experience of being torn away from them. While Bataille does not
entirely endorse Kojves more active consideration of Man, he remains
much closer to the Kojvian model in his emphasis on language as the carrier
of separation and of negativity.
Heidegger tells us that in thinking Being comes to language (1993:
218). Language does not separate and recombine the existence of things as
the sovereign right of man. It allows Being to appear. Thinking brings Being
to language and maintains it there, protecting it from danger. To think is to
say the truth of Being, but also to be seized by it. Heideggers thinking serves
Being, it does not master it as Kojves does. Kojves Hegelian subject is
capable of recombining and representing objects with impunity. It is man as
agent of the realization of things, and it is both existentially unique and
historically universal (2004: 39). In contrast, Heidegger will advocate a
80
different mode of revealing Being through language, which will not

subordinate Being to the absolute power of thinking man. This seems to
abandon the mastery he once argued as essential to passion (Heidegger,
1991: 48).
Heidegger refuses to define thinking as the role of the collective
subject, a goal and actor Heidegger considers merely the public and the
they. Heidegger sees the instrumental understanding of language on
behalf of history that Kojve endorses as inadequate for the revelation of
Being and a threat to the essence of humanity (1993: 221). The essence of
humanity is to bring Being to thought. This threat, language as instrument,
undermines aesthetic and moral responsibility (ibid.). Technology
conquers language and subjugates it to mere willing and trafficking as an
instrument of domination over beings (ibid.: 223). Technical language
speaks to hubris on the part of man, a metaphysical exaltation of the subject,
and abandonment of the duty to Being. This use of language, linked to the
emphasis on craft, contributes to the homelessness of modern man (ibid.:
243).
Heidegger endorses a partial allegiance to the young Marx's notion of
alienation in this consideration of homelessness. For Marx, man, the
producer, bows down before his products. Heidegger is not interested in
restoring the central place of man, and would not endorse an understanding
of things in terms of use-value. He is, however, in agreement with regard to
this understanding of man as losing his humanity in service to commodities.
To Heidegger, exploitation is one egregious manifestation of the
homelessness produced by submission to technological understanding. This
homelessness, man's forgetting of himself in favor of a preoccupation with
rationality, science, and production, leads metaphysics to be entrenched
and covered up as such (ibid.). Technical thinking, which necessarily
follows from humanist presuppositions, finds the truth of Being in causes
and explanations (ibid.: 223).
The problem with humanism is that it situates man as a being among
beings, and pretends it already knows what those beings might be.
Humanism has decided that Being is expressed in causes and in
explanations. Those forgotten presuppositions carry with them a technical
and teleological interest in defining objects by their reference to an essence
other than their existence. Heidegger calls this technicity, teleology, and
essentialism metaphysics. Rather than being the master of things, naming
them and determining their causes, purposes, and explanations, Heidegger
opens the question of ontological difference between objects and the raw
appearance of their existence. Instead of providing subjective meaning to the
world, man is thrown from Being itself (ibid.: 234). He is himself a being
81
separate from Being, but uniquely capable of thinking the question of Being.
This awareness of the ontological difference, the famous difference between
Being and beings, allows man to guard the truth of Being, in order that
beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are (ibid.).
While Batailles moi is also separate from Being, he would repudiate
the essential role of revealing beings through language and Being. Even this
duty, from his perspective, remains subordination. His language does not
illuminate beings. The taste of garlic that Bataille evokes in the
apprehension of death is not revealed in his language. It is instead presented
as enigmatic, untruthful, and dirty. Batailles language is a being that is
obscured by death. It is material.12
Heidegger criticizes Marxism for a metaphysical commitment to
materialism, which posits all beings as the material of labor (1993: 243).
The tendency to see all objects as congealed labor-time leads Marxism to
complicity with technical thinking. Marxism remains as much a threat to
man and Being as capitalism. Bataille might share distaste at measuring
things according to labor. However, Heideggers revulsion is also directed
at a material definition of things. Materialism, for Heidegger, must carry
with it the desire to seek out an essence distinct from existence, and for this
reason be metaphysical. Bataille, in contrast, finds matter to be something
else entirely than an adjunct to labor or to metaphysics.
Outside of Being
Bataille speaks of le moi, the ego or the self, rather than of Dasein. Batailles
moi is distinct from Dasein because it is undetermined and absent from the
world (2006: 33). While Heidegger would set himself against the
determinations of rationalism, his Dasein is a being among beings. Heidegger
sees Dasein as discerning beings through action and language, tending to
their appearance. Bataille sees this as belonging to a system of intentions
against which he is in revolt (ibid.).13 He insists on the necessity of value (as
against Heideggers pride of the eagle):
If a man has a sense of his value, which he relates to another,
established value, if he relates to the place he occupies on one
of the miserable ladders of power, then by so doing he rejects
himself outside of being and rejects his existence in the mass of
squandered existence, existence that has been produced in fact
but has not attained the form where it ceases producing itself
in relation to other things (2006: 34)
82
In other words, for Bataille, man is not a being among beings, but a being
capable of rejecting his place among beings. The essential capacity is not to
let beings Be through language, but to tear yourself from them. As
Geroulanos puts it, without a proclamation of insufficiency as a central
factor in all existence, Being is nothing but immanence reducing the
individual to shared uniform sociality (2006: 14). Bataille returns to the
Kojvian theme of desire as a destructive capacity, carrying with it a force
separate from the world as given. Desire proceeds from and aims itself at an
insatiable lack.
From Batailles perspective, Heideggers Dasein, thrown into the
world and with the duty of tending to the Being of the objects surrounding
him, falls short of the freedom of a human individual. Le moi, capable of
slipping out of this world, carries with it the potential for radical freedom.
For Bataille, Heideggers reduction of existence to the maintenance of beings
mirrors the political accomplishment of fascism, which upholds the profane
world under the pretense of transcending it. Heideggers authenticity covers
up the pain, lack, and horror attendant to existence. This attempt culminates
in the project of authentic Mit-sein: Our fates have already been guided in
advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our
resoluteness for definite possibilities (Heidegger, 1962: 384). It is this world
and these possibilities that Batailles moi escapes.
Andrew Ryder (aryder@emory.edu) is an Assistant Professor of English
Language and Literature at Al-Quds University in East Jerusalem. He
received his doctorate from Emory University, where he was a fellow at the
Fox Center for Humanistic Inquiry. He has published articles on Freud,
Lacan, Sartre, and Derrida.
Endnotes
1
For condemnations and evidence of Heideggers involvement in National

Socialism, see Victor Faras (1991) Heidegger and Nazism, and Emmanuel Faye
(2009) Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the
Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935. See also David Farrell Krells discussion
in the Introduction to the Paperback Edition of Heidegger (1991).
2
For the history of Heideggers reception in France and its controversies, see
Ethan Kleinberg (2005) Generation Existential. For subsequent innovations,
see Oliver Marchart (2007: 11-34) The Contours of Left Heideggerianism:
Post-Foundationalism and Necessary Contingency.
3
For an exploration of commonalities between Bataille and Heidegger, see
83
Rebecca Comay (1990: 66-89).

4
Heidegger writes of an authentic repetition of a possibility of existence

that has been the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero, grounded
existentially in anticipatory resoluteness (1962: 385).
5
Robbins points out an utter intrication of art and the il y a (1999: 93).
Bataille points out that the distinction from Heidegger is not clear.
Heideggers ontological difference indicates that Being in general is nearly
nothing, and the nothing, as such, is the form of Being qua Being (1999:
166).
7
Bataille removed the reference to Hitlerism from the corrected text that
appears in the uvres compltes (1988a: 285).
8
For a brief engagement with contemporary Heideggerian thought on this

point, see my review of Engaging Heidegger by Richard Capobianco (Ryder,
2010).
9
This is quoted from the unpublished Winter 1934-35 seminar, Hegel, On the
State, citations from which are published in Faye (2009: 203-242).
10
Robbins sees this as an erasure of the evident alterity between Batailles

and Levinas conceptions of the il y a. Bataille appropriates and re-evaluates,
rather than citing and reading. For this reason, each is unable to quote the
other (1999: 99).
11
For this work as a corrective to Kojve, see Kleinberg (2005: 157-208).
12
As Andrew J. Mitchell and Jason Kemp Winfree write, for Bataille, In

poetic language, the impenetrable ungraspable is no longer neglected, but
neither is it objectified or possessed (see the Editors Introduction, 2009:
15).
13
Batailles association of Heidegger with intentionality may come from the

early French readings of Heidegger, which associate him closely with
Husserl. Heidegger also uses the language of intentionality in On the
Essence of Ground (Geroulanos, 2006: 17).
84
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Studies in Social and Political Thought 18, 143-144

by Andrew Gibson
Abstract
This article focuses on the question of democratic participation
in Canada and in Western democracies more generally. Two
approaches to the problem of declining participation are briefly
canvassed. The first links the problem to social exclusion and
the persistence of democratic divides, while the second
attributes weak participation levels to institutional deficiencies.
The paper problematizes these approaches by contrasting them
with a set of insights brought forth by philosopher Charles
Taylor in his assessment of the current era as one of relative
democratic decline. Central to his argument is the idea of a shift
in forms of democratic politics from a broad-gauge model to
a punctual one. And behind this lies another shift, between
the postwar mobilization of working-class identities and the
simultaneous emergence of consumer identities based on
status-driven practices of mutual display.
Keywords
political participation citizenship identity
civil society consumerism
In many Western countries today, there is a general discouragement about
the worth and potential of democratic life. Belief in the notion that in obeying
our rulers we are actually obeying ourselves is felt to be half-hearted at best.
In exchanging political points of view at the local pub or caf, conversations
all too quickly fall prey to cynicism and indifference. It used to be that
commentators focused their critique on the democratic failings of corrupt
and repressive regimes abroad. But an increasing number of men and
women are now beginning to worry about the soundness of Western
democracies themselves, Canada included.
Scholarly debates seem to have shifted away from the old question of
whether we should be advocates of republican democracy or protectors of a
more liberal form of self-government focusing on rights and the election of
capable leaders. These debates now seem rather moot, as it has become
Gibson: Democracys Era of Relative Decline
87
apparent that the citizens of many Western nations are increasingly

unwilling to partake in even the most basic democratic duties. The clearest
example of this is the steady decline in participation at the ballot box in
recent decades. Thus, quite apart from anything going on in other parts of
the world, this has led many commentators to ask about the integrity and
sustainability of democracy in its erstwhile heartlands.
Of course, things are not as bleak as some people make them out to
be. Rule-by-the-people continues to be regarded as a cherished ideal with
regard to which many men and women remain committed. As testimony of
this commitment, we find that a lot of ink has been spilt addressing the
weaknesses and shortcomings of Canadian democracy, with the aim of
reinvigorating it. And this literature has generated many important insights.
Various proposals for institutional reform have been made, just as a strong
case has been put forth concerning the material preconditions of democratic
engagement. If there is an inadequacy in this literature, it is that it fails to
offer a holistic picture of what it is seeking to shed light on.
The present paper seeks to make a contribution to this debate by
drawing on the work of philosopher Charles Taylor. In doing so, it provides
a critique of current approaches to the analysis of democratic decline, while
at once putting forth a more comprehensive interpretation. The strength of
Taylors ideas on the subject is their breadth. His work shows that our focus
cannot be limited to the mathematics of parliamentary representation, nor
to fluctuating numbers at the ballot box or the amount of members signed
up to political parties and to other associations of civil society. For there also
needs to be an understanding of how one form of participation differs from
another in terms of sustaining overall democratic vitality, just as there needs
to be a sense of how personal identities are shaped around non-political
vehicles of public expression such as fashion and consumption.
The paper begins by questioning the assumptions behind two
prominent approaches to the question of democratic vitality. The first of
these focuses its assessment around the democratic divides created
through various forms of social exclusion. On this view, the fact that large
swaths of the Canadian population do not have the resources to permit
serious engagement gets at the heart of the problem of democratic decline.
A second approach holds that weak public participation can be linked to
deficiencies in democratic institutions such as parties and legislatures. In
calling into question these different approaches, the paper does not argue
that they are simply wrong or that the issues they address are unimportant.
Rather, the claim is that social exclusion and institutional deficiencies do not
tell us the whole story behind why Canadian citizens are turning away from
the ballot box and, indeed, why they seem less interested in changing the
world than they might once have been.
88
The second part of the paper turns to Taylors interpretation of a shift

in modes of democratic politics. He describes this as a shift away from
broad-gauge politics to more punctual forms of engagement. The former
requires broad social engagement around all the relevant issues affecting the
nation, while the latter involves the targeted interventions of single issue
interest groups and associations. Part of what is at stake behind this shift,
Taylor suggests, is the dissolution of working class identities. For, with the
newfound affluence of the working classes in the postwar period, broadgauge mobilization has lost much of its appeal. Yet, as argued in the final
section of the paper, what is also at issue is the rise of a different sort of public
life altogether, one centered on consumer based practices of mutual
display.
The Social Exclusion and Institutional Deficiency Theses
One approach to the problem of weak democratic participation is to link it
to social exclusion. This is essentially a critique of democracy on the grounds
that it has failed to include the marginalized and underprivileged precisely
those men and women who could benefit most from having their voices
heard. It is hard to disagree that Western democracies suffer from their
inability to bring about more equal opportunity. In Canada, as elsewhere,
there exist many enduring types of exclusion. Typically, marginalized
groups suffer from low levels of education and professional training, but
they may also be geographically isolated. They are likely to be discriminated
against for reasons of gender, colour, faith or creed. Prejudices tend to work
against them when applying for jobs, receiving services and in the mere
expression of their views.
The overall effect of these factors tends to be one of material
dispossession, poverty and humiliation. Yet it also involves a failure of
meaningful participation, such as in political parties or other civic
associations. It is not as though there have not been any attempts to reform
these conditions. Historically, such initiatives have met with some success.
Indeed, it is hard to discount the moral progress of egalitarian reforms over
the last two centuries. Still, the critique of social exclusion is right to suggest
that the egalitarian project remains incomplete. To take a telling statistic,
there is roughly the same proportion of poor and marginalized Canadians
today as there was a quarter of a century ago. Further, there is no reason to
believe that the unlucky members of this second tier of citizens will be able
to offer their children a more promising fate. There is no obvious
groundswell of egalitarian sentiment on the horizon, nor are there any longterm structural changes to be optimistic about.
89
Many first tier citizens are baffled by the seeming intractability of

the problem. Given the many state initiatives and service groups, they are
puzzled by the millions of poor that remain. Some end up blaming the
victims or attributing their bad lack to irremediable facts of nature. On the
other hand, there are also those committed groups of activists and
professionals who dont find the problem to be all that puzzling whatsoever.
In their view, community and state-based initiatives have simply never been
creative or compassionate enough. Consequently, there remain vast numbers
of Canadian citizens that struggle daily to avoid humiliating deprivation.
These are men and women belonging to large families with low incomes,
recent immigrants, single mothers, the long-term unemployed and those
feeling the hard pinch of rapidly devaluing job skills.
Operating on a different plane than official politics, their struggles are
of a more personal and immediate sort. The worst off are thrown into a
protracted crisis-situation involving, as one commentator succinctly puts it,
a series of exhausting, embittered activities within which they rely on
forms of opposition extending from confrontations with authorities, to
desperate efforts to maintain the integrity of both family and psyche, to the
mobilization of aid by friends and relatives (Fraser & Honneth, 2003: 117).
These struggles and conflicts typically have little connection to political
parties and social movements. They are often poorly understood by the
media and public opinion. The afflicted themselves, finally, often have little
time or interest for politics.
We can plausibly assume that it is on the basis of an initial picture of
this sort that the social exclusion approach emerges. The main argument of
this body of research, as defended for example by Elisabeth Gidengil and
her colleagues, is that there are simply too many men and women that are
directly or indirectly excluded from political activities for meaningful,
widespread participation to occur. It is difficult to deny there being an
important element of truth to this argument. Indeed, the reasoning is fairly
straightforward: the fewer active, capable and committed participants there
are, the less likely it is that well find an overall buzz of democratic activity,
whether in everyday associative instances, or in the formal sphere of parties,
elections and legislatures.
The argument could be extended to specify that it is not just a question
of objective exclusion through lack of time, education and political
knowledge, but also an issue respect. The marginalized classes may have
highly relevant contributions to make to democratic debate. We might even
assume that their opinions are of the greatest urgency in purportedly
egalitarian societies. In the regular humdrum of everyday politics, however,
their experiences of felt injustice are seldom sought after. Instead, the
90
opinions of marginalized men and women are for the most part implicitly
devalued and ignored.
Thus the social critique of participation remains crucial. Gidengil and
her colleagues are certainly right to suggest that political absenteeism finds
deep causes linked to inequalities in material resources, education, gender,
region and age, creating what they call democratic divides. These divides
form obvious obstacles to a more fully engaged citizenry. Still, it is
reasonable to question to what extent such obstacles can be used as an
explanation of democratic decline. One cannot help wonder, for instance,
why such factors would be any more pertinent today than in previous times.
Put differently, we might ask whether there have not always been
marginalized men and women, and this in greater proportions than today,
i.e. prior to the rise of the postwar middle class.
The social critique of participation tends to come up short in
addressing such questions. Furthermore, if it helps to specify who is
excluded and why, it does little to address the question of why those who
are not excluded are themselves failing to participate. While the latter are
more engaged than the former, their numbers are still low. As mentioned
above, there is a second type of approach which at first seems better able to
shed light on these questions. From this alternative perspective, the problem
lies in the deficiencies of official democratic institutions. The focus is thus
not on social exclusion per se, but rather on the failing standards of
democratic institutions.
On this view, it would seem that the daily functioning of these
institutions is so ill-perceived by the public that they are no longer able to
motivate citizens to partake in public affairs. Since the 1990s there has been
much negative press of this sort at the federal level. Given that voter apathy
has struck at all levels of government, calls for reform have also been heard
at provincial and municipal levels. But whatever the instance, the main
assumption of the institutional deficiency thesis seems to be that if our
institutions were better designed, according to more democratic principles,
citizens might once again fly to the assemblies.
Some of the institutions in question include political parties,
legislatures and parliaments, as well as the electoral system itself. So, for
example, we commonly hear that there is too much party discipline and not
enough autonomy in the representation of constituencies; that there is too
much power and secrecy surrounding Cabinet and an excessive
centralization of power in the PMO; that the Senate is a dysfunctional vestige
of the old aristocracy and that the first-past-the-post system consistently
under-represents voter preferences.
The list could go on, as demonstrated by Jeffrey Simpsons analysis
91
in The Friendly Dictatorship, which sums up many of the more detailed

academic accounts. Much of Simpsons analysis links public ill-feelings to a
perception of arrogance among public officials, which Simpson in turn
considers to be the consequence of poor institutional organization. With
friendly dictators at the helm, it is perhaps not surprising to find what he
describes as a sullen and disengaged citizenry (Simpson, 2001: xiii). From
this perspective, what is needed for men and women to regain confidence
in political leadership is a sense that our political institutions are running as
democratically as possible in a responsive, participatory and inclusive
manner.
The argument of this paper is not to say that the concerns raised by
institutional critics are invalid. Few will deny the importance of sustained
reflection about the functioning of democratic institutions. Indeed, a clear
analysis of institutional shortcomings can show the way toward much
needed reforms. But perhaps the problems are less alarming than some
critics may suppose, and they may be difficult to resolve without creating
new ones. Furthermore, there is something odd about the fervour behind
institutional criticism. This is especially noteworthy when contrasted with
the social critique. For while institutional critics seek to build structures that
perfectly reflect the will of the people, they tend to ignore the circumstances
of civil society within which the most basic expression of democratic activity
might be expected to take root.
If the concern is with mobilizing the voice of the people, redesigning
the technical modalities of official institutions will in all likelihood only go
so far. Why not first inquire at the local level to find out why, for example,
such a small number of men and women participate in local associations,
parties and unions? Surely the fact that few people are used to associating
with others in committees and workgroups, of generating agreement and
organizing for change, should be of primary concern to those worried about
democratic voice. It is difficult in this regard not to see a contradiction in
drumming up so much concern for institutional reform. Can there really be
such a strong link between public disengagement and the exact structure of
official democratic institutions? Should we not be more concerned with the
vitality of locally rooted democratic vehicles, such as tenants associations
and immigrant advocacy groups, riding associations, workers cooperatives,
trade unions and consumer groups?
Of course, if we consider these democratic settings to be within the
purview of institutional change, the argument for reform takes on new
salience. But this would involve turning the standard institutional critique
on its head, such that reforms would look quite different from those
mentioned above. We might think, for example, of a program of associative
92
democracy, where underrepresented groups are assured the means and

resources of self-organization. Ultimately, it remains unclear whether
parliamentary reform, for example, is likely to draw greater numbers of
citizens into the democratic fray. Institutional restructuring might well have
an important impact in countries where democratization marks a radical
break from the past. The situation is different, however, in older, more
affluent democracies, where the balance of interest between public and
private life appears at odds with mass participation.
Declining and Shifting Participation
At one time in Canadian history elections were hotly contested events that
would frequently result in riots. The stakes were understood to be so high
that someone could lose a life in their attempt to support one candidate or
another (Greer, 1993: 116). In our day, elections have become the minimal
expression of willingness to partake in the governance of ones city, province
or country. But now even this minimal commitment and expression of
belonging seems vulnerable. As mentioned above, over the last twenty years
there has been constant decline in voter participation at pretty much all levels
of government in Canada. The absence of the youth vote is perhaps what
worries commentators most, as they are the inheritors of a tradition that
today appears somewhat fragile.
The buzz and excitement of an election, or lack thereof, speaks to the
vitality of democratic life more generally. As such, in cases of high voter
participation, we might expect a correlate flourishing of civil society, with
hundreds of thousands of men and women actively attempting to persuade
others of the virtues of this or that party, movement or cause. Political
scientists understand this correlation to form the basis of the canary in the
coal mine argument. The idea is that if voter turnout can be considered a
barometer of democratic activity, then dwindling voting turnout is likely to
signal a more general decline in a countrys democratic vitality (just as the
declining breathing capacity of the canary in the coal mine signals a decline
in air quality of which miners should be wary).
Some commentators are willing to take the argument one step further.
Robert Putnam, for example, claims that voter decline in the U.S. means not
only a withering of political activity but also of engagement in social life
more generally. His research suggests that Americans have become the shutins of a mass media society. Men and women would appear to be unwilling,
perhaps even scared, to engage one another in civic contexts. The implication
is that the public square has become a meaner, less compassionate place than
it once was.
93
Yet there is also research that contradicts such an interpretation.

Perhaps it is true that todays mobile society makes it harder to partake in
durable civic associations or even durable friendships. Nevertheless, there
would appear to be a willingness to adapt to the opportunities of forming
looser social connections. Furthermore, research shows that there is still
reason to consider Canada and the U.S. to be activist civil societies.
Compared to our European counterparts, there are more people here that
partake in the spectrum of social and political activities. Consequently, it
may well be possible that just as fewer Canadians turned out to vote in recent
decades, more of them have gotten involved in one form of association or
another.
How, then, is this complex state of affairs to be understood, and how
does it pare off with the notion of democratic decline? Taylor interprets the
situation to mean something other than straightforward decline.
Circumstances may better be described as leading to relative decline. This is
not to suggest that the canary in the coal mine argument is not valid or
worrisome. It is hard to see how declining voter turnout would not also
signal a weakening of democratic life. And evidence suggests as much, for
along with declining voter participation there has also been a decline of
membership in political parties. Similarly, there would also seem to be a
waning of political campaign activities. Thus, there is still good reason to
consider low voter turnout as mirroring broader trends.
But for Taylor, this understanding only gets at part of what is
happening with the shifting forms of engagement underfoot. For alongside
the decline in traditional modes of democratic politics, there has also been a
rise in new forms of engagement. This is not to say that the latter are an
adequate substitute to the former. Indeed, the trend Taylor is most concerned
about is towards a politics anchored in single issue organizations,
chequebook groups and litigation campaigns. Research shows that
alongside the rising prominence of strategic groups of this sort, there is a
perception that such alternative means of change are more effective than
traditional ones (Gidengil et al., 2004: 131). When political parties, media
outlets and other vehicles of democracy begin to feel inaccessible, citizens
will turn to other means of engagement.
Taylor describes the shift in question as involving different modes of
citizen efficacy. The first of the two general modes of efficacy Taylor is
referring to involves what he calls broad-gauge politics, while the second
is based on more targeted punctual interventions. The difference between
the two is perhaps most important in terms of the place social conflict finds
in each. Broad-gauge politics involves something resembling a single fault
line between contending majority coalitions, such that we can understand
94
there to be a central point of cleavage throughout society.

Typically, we know of this cleavage as the touchstone of partisan
politics that is, the battle between Left and Right although Taylor also
describes it as a cleavage between elite and nonelite segments of the
population. Broad-gauge democratic reforms that break with the status quo
are likely to be mobilized by the nonelite majority, what he refers to as the
demos or people. As a paradigm example of democratic citizen efficacy,
he alludes to the opposition between commoners and elites in Ancient
Greece. It is this rivalry that provided the most powerful motivation for
democratic engagement in the polis. When the parallel is drawn to modern
democracies, nonelite citizen efficacy is perhaps best understood as passing
through workers organizations in coalition with marginalized groups of
various sorts.
Political parties are not necessarily the sole vehicles of broad-gauge
politics. Other groups and associations of civil society may be similarly
committed to a program of broad based reforms. Taylor mentions the
manner in which the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) functions in the US. In the Canadian context, we might
think of a group like the Council of Canadians, with its local chapters set
up throughout the country. The important point here is that broad-gauge
politics involves a commitment to arriving at a common package of reform
proposals. What is distinctive about this kind of politics is the broad scope
of interests at play and the potential for organic linkages between individuals
and groups. Taylor describes the inside view of the broad-gauge model of
citizen efficacy as seeking to change the whole governance of society.
According to the broad-gauge conflict model, the aim of nonelite
political parties and affiliate organizations is to win power and concessions
from elite wielders of power and holders of wealth. This objective can in turn
be seen as part of the modern struggle to reverse entrenched hierarchies of
superiority and subordination. Of course, conflict of this sort is not without
dangers of excess. We need only consider the egalitarian fervour of Jacobin
revolutionaries or later communist horrors. But taken within the framework
of established liberal democracies, such a model of democratic conflict is
highly defendable. Taylor in fact goes as far as to defend the counterintuitive
claim that broad-gauge democratic conflict can actually serve to bring
citizens together in a heightened form of common allegiance.
In this latter sense, democratic conflict is seen as the seedbed of
arguments and reforms in the interest of the common good. At its best, the
rallying of support for one package of reforms or another is a patriotic
enterprise through which the ties of solidarity are strengthened and
enhanced. Even elite parties must today justify their platforms with
95
arguments defending some understanding of the common good. Inasmuch

as parties both from the Left and Right believe in the respective visions they
are putting forth, we can expect the overall process to have the effect of a
unifying struggle over the conditions of a shared community of fate.
The same cannot be said of the punctual mode of politics which Taylor
identifies as partially supplanting the broad-gauge model. The punctual
mode may be understood as a politics of small-scale associations. But Taylor
links it more specifically to single issue organizations. Typically, the aims
of such groups are singularly focused. They have little interest in building
support for a common package of reforms. Indeed, the success of these
organizations often depends on their ability to bring strategic pressure to
bear on highly focused events and campaigns. The concentration of
resources on a single cause is understood to be instrumental in swaying
public opinion, politicians and government officials. In recent decades, such
groups have increasingly attempted to effect change through litigation
battles.
In a fully-fledged punctual politics, the mobilizing issues of the day
all stand orthogonal to one another. Gun control and reasonable
accommodation, say, are considered as standalone issues that have little to
do with an overall view of society. The men and women joined to take a
position on single issues have little concern for politics beyond the specific
cases they are advancing. Insofar as the different groups in question do not
need to rub shoulders and compromise with one another, the threat of social
fragmentation is serious. Taylor mentions the American cultural wars as a
case in which identification with the polity is weakened by the channeling
of political passion into punctual instances. In the U.S., he notes,
The powerful packages have become the lifestyle issues, those
that are the object of the present culture wars: abortion, gay
marriage, school prayer, sex education in schools. These
divisions cut across class, and moreover, they unite very
heterogeneous constituencies on each side, and so they do not
seem to be able to become the fault line along which a fight that
intensifies identification with the polity can take place like the
former successful cases of class war (Taylor, 2007: 133)
Taylor also points out the negative effects of the media in exacerbating the
conflict level of punctual politics. Thus, we might assume that ordinary
supporters of campaigns for and against abortion may not be as divided as
the media portrays them to be. In fact, the majority of campaign supporters
may only be so involved as to donate a cheque now and then. But this
96
financial support in turn provides the resources needed for professional

lobbyists to continue the war of perception in the eyes of the public. Given
the manner in which media representations can spiral out of control, the
negative impact of punctual politics cannot be underestimated. As
demonstrated by the U.S. case, this sort of politics can wear on even the
strongest political identities, let alone one that is wrought by the strains of
regionalism, language, multiculturalism and sub-state nationalism.
Given these two contrasting modes of political activity, how then does
Taylor understand the motivation behind the shift toward the punctual
mode? Bureaucratization and the centralization of political power may be
an important part of the puzzle. Distant and unresponsive bureaucracies
tend to create alienating gulfs between citizens and public decision-makers.
Certain corporations also function as the oligarchic equivalent to this by
muzzling the voice of workers in the economy. But for Taylor, these
problems, while significant, only go so far in making sense of the shift away
from broad-gauge politics. To glean further insight requires an appreciation
of the place of affluence in postwar consumer society.
Affluence and Worker Acquiescence
Taylor suggests that postwar affluence has had an effect on the way people
understand their place in society. It has also changed their relation to
democratic politics. An aspiration towards comfort, independence and
control was clearly a central element of the workers movement. But equally
important, and linked to this, were certain understandings of mutuality,
interdependence and solidarity. With the postwar transition, changing
material conditions also meant a shift in these forms of common
understanding. For, now, working class men and women could aspire
towards material sufficiency more or less on their own, as individuals. They
no longer depended on the power of numbers as much as they once did.
The catalyst to these changes was the wave of upward mobility that
came with postwar economic growth, workers rights and the emergence of
expansive social programs. Increased access to postsecondary education, the
expansion of service sector employment, higher personal revenues and a
new diversity of life experiences meant that older forms of mutual help
began to recede. Individual men and women became more private, just as
they became more autonomous.
A central aspect of these changes was the physical dissolution of
traditional working class neighbourhoods. Along with new wealth there
came an exodus from crowded city blocks into the world of suburban home
ownership. Thus the tightly knit culture of the street that was so central
97
to the older neighbourhoods also began to dissolve. The move away from
conditions of tenancy allowed for a new autonomy and control over
extensive private space. Along with increased financial security, the
connected set of ways through which the working classes understood their
social oppression lost its perceived salience.
It was not only the commitment to public housing which began to be
seen differently. Rather, it was the whole spectrum of means through which
greater personal dignity could be achieved through collective mobilization.
Most emblematic, perhaps, was the slowed and weakened intensity of efforts
to democratize the workplace. With greater command over private space in
the home, the goal of fighting for reforms on the shop floor lost its sense
of urgency. Of course, the aims of class mobilization were never easily
secured. Ironically, however, these aims became even more difficult to push
forward once individuals and families accrued greater autonomy.
Taylor links these changes to a transformed perception of political ties
and affiliations. Objectively, he says, a rise of affluence helps bring about
a shift in our understanding of our predicament so that one of the basic
retaining walls under the older idea of a class war subsides (Taylor, 2007:
133). Thus, due in part to a changing socioeconomic environment,
involvement in politics recedes in the scale of social priorities. The shared
interest that once linked millions of men and women together by way of their
common class predicament ceases to carry the same relevance. As he puts
it,
Each citizen is cut loose on his or her own, perhaps connected
from time to time to people with like interests on this or that
issue [. . .] but without a strong identification to something like
a movement. This change of consciousness meant that the older
kind of broad-gauge efficacy is going to be much harder to
recreate (ibid.)
If this interpretation is correct, it makes little sense to explain declining
political participation in terms of social exclusion, as suggested above.
Disengagement can hardly be understood as a matter of social disadvantage
and lack of political means. In fact, quite the opposite would seem to be the
case. It is the process of inclusion into a once privileged lifestyle that seems
to have distanced men and women from political pursuits. Yet it is not as
though a degree of middle class affluence signaled the end of elite
concentration of wealth of power. Democratic decline may, in this sense, be
understood as a failure of the Left to make the transition from an egalitarian
politics of the old blue-collar working class to one that serves similar ends
98
for a broader nonelite constituency.

The institutional critique may also be of some relevance here. When
political institutions turn into inaccessible bureaucracies, the joys and
gratifications of private life become more alluring than public involvement.
Disengagement should, therefore, not only be understood in relation to
affluence, for there is also the institutional constraint of citizen efficacy to
consider. But Taylor wants to dig deeper still by attempting to conceptualize
forms of social motivation built around emergent consumer based
individualism. Far from insignificant, he considers the manifestation of
consumerist forms of identify-formation as constituting nothing short of a
cultural revolution.
The Politics of Mutual Display
The cultural roots of consumer based identity-formation find their legitimacy
in what Taylor refers to as the ethics of authenticity (Taylor, 1991). The
popularization of this ethics can be dated roughly to the 1960s, but its
original sources go back to the Romantic period. Perhaps the core insight of
the Romantic understanding of authenticity is that moral virtue is not to be
objectively determined, but is rather to be found within oneself. In the late
18th Century, this was understood to be quite a radical discovery. The
ultimate implication of this discovery is, as Taylor puts it, that each
individual must discover his or her own way of being human. Self-discovery
and personal development become central to our understanding of freedom.
This, in turn, is not without political relevance.
Whether framed as civil rights or lifestyle liberation, the gains of the
1960s can be understood as facilitating greater freedom to become who you
are. No longer would women accept to be fit into the role-stereotype of the
domestic wife, nor would gay people accept to be humiliated for reason of
their sexual desires. Moral progress on these fronts was linked to new ethical
assumptions. One such assumption was that each person has a unique inner
core, unlike anything else under the sun. Individualism itself is of course not
new. Even working class collectivism could be said to enable a certain kind
of individualism if only in the sense that the gains of social mobilization
permitted these men and women to live more autonomously.
What came about with postwar consumerism, however, is something
quite different. The emphasis was no longer just on the affirmation of
equality, but also on expressive self-distinction, as against the stodgy
conformity of the multitudes. The pursuit of authenticity engages
individuals in a transformative process of personal growth throughout
which one gains insight into ones own nature and potential. The ethics of
99
authenticity thus require bringing ones unique set of endowments to

fruition. It is an ethics that is perhaps best described through the metaphor
of the journey. Philosopher Stanley Cavell speaks in this regard of a
journey of ascent which is determined not by natural talent but by
seeking to know what you are made of and cultivating the thing you are
meant to do, or to be (Cavell, 2004: 446).
The ascent to authentic selfhood sometimes requires personal retreat
and detachment from the rush of everyday social life. But on the whole, the
search for authenticity is unimaginable without the guiding support and
encouragement of others. Typically, such mutuality grows out of close
relations with friends and intimates. There is, however, no reason to think it
incompatible with public engagement. Social participation is not itself the
sign of conformity. In fact, quite to the contrary, it should be understood as
an important means to particularistic self-knowledge. Engagement with
others can help to map ones inner life while at once shedding light onto ones
unique place within society. Ultimately, a vigorous social and political life
serves to heighten awareness of the personal dispositions of each and all.
Self-discovery, in turn, helps one to understand ones life in the form of a
purposeful endeavour, not just mere stumbling in the dark.
In contrast to the ideal form of the ethics of authenticity, there has over
the last several decades arisen a distorted manifestation of the ethics which
is linked to contemporary consumer society. While postwar counterculture
is wedded to certain ideals of authenticity, it has also succumbed to a kind
of antisocial extremism, where mainstream culture is portrayed as
irretrievably corrupt and devoid of any redeeming features whatsoever.
Instead of allowing social changes and the search for authentic selfhood to
play off one another in the building of a better society, the two processes are
set at irreconcilable odds. A narcissistic concern with rebellious distinction
is matched by a parallel detachment from social and political life.
The virtues of authenticity were once cast against the disciplined
productivity that 1960s youth saw as imperiling their world a world of
unprecedented industrial production that fostered competition in the
acquisition of new goods, such as cars, domestic appliances, fashion items,
and so on. Yet while originally critical of ever-increasing production and
consumption, the countercultural sensibility has done little to attenuate such
excesses in the long run. Indeed, in some ways it has served to exacerbate
them. For when the search for distinctiveness and originality become the
norm, the demands of authenticity can easily be trivialized. One way in
which this can happen, as demonstrated by Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter
in their book on rebel consumerism (2005), is when the pursuit of original
selfhood gets reduced to the acquisition of new goods.
100
In cases where consumer-based forms of authenticity become the

norm, the capitalist production process becomes increasingly geared towards
meeting countercultural demand. There is something quite perverse about
this insofar as the countercultural movements original intent was to
transform a system which was considered to be excessively materialistic. It
would seem that by the time the utopian hopes of the 1960s had run their
course, the countercultural critique had retreated into something less than
it once was. According to Heath and Potter, the earlier protest culture was
left with little by which to define itself other than seeking out novel forms of
consumer lifestyles. Rebel or cachet consumption became the new marker
of dissent and self-distinction. Ironically, it also served to spur on new cycles
of capitalist obsolescence.
It is fairly easy to see how consumer based individualism can have
the effect of sapping precious energies from the democratic life of the
political community. This is especially true among youth, whose striking
absence from the political scene is paralleled by the development of
specialized youth markets. The life stage that has come to be understood as
youth, somewhere between childhood freedoms and adult responsibilities,
is a crucial phase in the unfurling of personal identities. But it is a phase
where socialization into broad-gauge political identities is on the wane.
Accordingly, Taylor suggests that youth identities are increasingly shaped
through small stylistically defined groups related to consumer goods and
logos. Although dynamic and fluid, these social or public identities are not
without a powerful draw.
As such, while democratic forms of public identity are receding,
another quasi public dimension is on the rise. For it is not as though public
life ceases to exist with the rising prominence of consumer oriented identityformation. Rather, it is that it comes to be structured around different forms
of social interaction. Taylor refers to the general concept of fashion to
describe the social dynamic behind consumer oriented public life. Thus he
considers that democratic spaces of common action, where confrontation,
debate and policy proposals might arise, are competing with fashion spaces
of mutual display. In contrast to oppositional political exchange, mutual
display involves its own special kind of social responsiveness, where the
meaning of any one fashion gesture depends on the background language
of style that frames public life. It is a kind of responsiveness where, as Taylor
puts it, it matters to each of us that as we act the others are there as witness
to what we are doing and thus as co-determiners of the meaning of our
action (Taylor, 2007: 140).
While in a sense highly individualized, a fashion oriented public
culture is one within which a general mood or common feeling may be
101
struck. Consider, for example, open urban spaces such as parks and malls,
where strangers rub shoulders, display their individuality and observe
others doing the same. More importantly perhaps, consider the diffuse
media spaces structured by corporate logos and other mass-marketed
symbols. These metatopical common spaces, as Taylor calls them, are not
limited to the corporeality of any specific time and place. Indeed, today they
may be understood as structured across national and transnational contexts.
Practices of mutual display are in this sense able to plug hundreds of
millions of men and women into a common language of style, although one
mostly dominated by corporate backed fantasies, heroes and stars. These
commercialized spaces of identity-formation act to undermine the possibility
of frank self-interrogation about how one might go about living in a manner
that is true to oneself. A fashion oriented public culture, while not without
its particular joys, can hardly contribute to the creation of a vigorous culture
of authenticity defined by what John Stuart Mill once described as human
development in its richest diversity. By contrast, a culture emphasizing
practices of mutual display is, as Taylor suggests, ambiguously situated
between solipsism and communication, loneliness and togetherness. When
such practices overpower more democratic forms of mutuality, such as those
of broad-gauge or even punctual politics, they become the emblems of
democratic decline.
Andrew Gibson is a postdoctoral student at the UNAM in Mexico City. He
has been researching the democratic transition in Mexico within the
framework of a study on the role of intellectuals in international politics. His
doctoral dissertation examined the Canadian social criticism of philosopher
Charles Taylor. He has recently been involved in setting up a field study for
young Canadians focusing on sustainable development in rural Mexico.
Endnotes
1
Voter participation has been in decline since the 1988 federal election. Public
disengagement from formal politics was an important subject of inquiry in
the 1991 Royal Commission on Election Reform and Party Financing (see
Canada. Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report, 1991). For a more recent
study of voter participation, see Centre for Research and Information on
Canada, Voter Participation in Canada: Is Canadian Democracy in Crisis?, 2001).
For example, see Pharr & Putnam (2000).
The Canadian Democratic Audit series is a worthy example of this. As
102
editor William Cross puts it, Our purposes are to conduct a systematic
review of the operations of Canadian democracy, to listen to what others
have to say about Canadian democracy, to assess its strengths and
weaknesses, to consider where there are opportunities for advancement, and
to evaluate popular reform proposals (Foreword to Barney, 2005).
4
Based on the Low Income Cut Off (LICO) measurement of poverty, which
focuses on families that spend a greater percentage of their income on food,
shelter and clothing than the average, the number of Canadian families living
in straitened circumstances was 11.6 per cent in 1980 and 10.8 per cent in
2005 after rising to a peak of 15.7 per cent in 1996 (Victor, 2008: 160).
5
Historian James Struthers, for example, is of this opinion (see Struthers,

1994).
6
See Gidengil et al. (2004).
For an analysis of the systematic moral denigration of marginalized groups

see Honneth (2007: esp. chapter 4). For an analysis specific to the industrial
adjustment process in northern Ontario, see Dunk (2002).
8
As they put it, Canadian society is marked by disparities in income and

education and by differences in power and status of groups like women and
racial minorities. We cannot overlook the potential of these structural
inequalities on the level and nature of citizens political engagement. We
have to ask whether structural inequalities create democratic divides. In
other words, are some citizens less engaged than others because they have
fewer resources at their disposal? (Gidengil et al., 2004: 4).
9
Aside from the question of low voter turnout, consider the issue of party
membership. Gidengil et al. note that only 24 per cent of affluent Canadians
have belonged to a political party at some point in their lives (ibid.: 129).
10
For a good example at the provincial level, see Cross (2007).
11
This is Rousseaus phrase, referring to the motivation felt by citizens of the

good polity that is, citizens motivated to fly to the assemblies (Rousseau,
2003).
12
Consider in this regard Joseph Heaths observations about proportional

representation, free votes in parliament and other such reforms: Most of
103
the proposals for reform and the demands for more democracy are deeply
flawed, and are based on a demonstrably inadequate conception of
democratic politics. As a result, it is doubtful that any of these proposals
would improve anything in the Canadian system. Furthermore, they exhibit
a peculiar blindness to many important features of how the current system
works. Thus in many cases these proposals run the risk of destroying
elements of the current system that are functioning well, in return for
benefits that are, at best, unclear. As a result, I am inclined to view the
institutional stasis of the past ten years with significantly less alarm than
many other commentators. While there are clearly defects in the current
system, all of the proposals for large-scale reform seem to be equally
defective. Furthermore, almost every proposal on the table would have the
effect, in one way or another, of weakening federal powerIn this context,
electoral and democratic reform would be far more likely to succeed if one
or more provinces were to attempt it first (with, of course, the exception of
Senate reform) (Heath, n.d.: 29-30).
13
Consider, for example, parliamentary reforms in the area of party

discipline. Will attempts to relax party discipline and give more freedom to
MPs to consult with their constituencies have an effect on public
engagement? Perhaps, and thus such reforms remain crucial. But I am
inclined to believe that more radical reforms are needed at the level of the
secondary associations of civil society: providing more resources and
leverage for associations representing the disadvantaged, less for those
representing the well-off. For interesting insights on the actual impact of
parliamentary reform, see Aucoin & Turnbull (2003). For a discussion on the
problem of everyday engagement in civil society, see Walzer & Miller (2007:
esp. chapter 8) and Smith (2005).
14
Putnam describes this in terms of a loss of civic trust and social capital
(Putnam, 2000).
15
16
See Wuthnow (1998).
As Young and Everitt put it, European countries tend to have either high
levels of group membership or high rates of membership participation, but
seldom both. Canada and the United States are unique in that they are
activist civil societies that possess widespread group membership and high
levels of voluntary activity among these members (Young & Everitt, 2004:
34).
104
17
For more on this question, see Young and Everitt (ibid.: 41).
18
These are not uniquely Canadian phenomena. See Scarrow (2000); Dalton
& Wattenberg (2000).
19
By this he means the capacity of citizens to have an impact on their

environment. As he puts it, One of the most important faculties of the
modern subject is the ability to effect ones purposes. This is what I have
called efficacy. Subjects without efficacy, unable to alter the world around
them to their own ends, would either be incapable of sustaining a modern
identity or would be deeply humiliated in their identity. To a considerable
degree, each of US can have a sense of efficacy in our own individual action
getting the means to live, providing for the family, acquiring goods, going
about our business, and so on [. . .] But important as private efficacy is, it is
not possible to make it the whole, to give no thought at all to ones efficacy
as a member of society, affecting its direction or having a part in the global
efficacy that society possesses relative to nature (Taylor, 1993: 79).
20
In Ancient Greece, the demos were not simply understood as all members
of the polity, for the term also held an alternative understanding, which
referred to the populace or commoners. It is this portion of the citizenry that
had the most to gain from the promise of democracy. As Taylor puts it, the
word demos is used synonymously with common people, ordinary people,
or in older French, le menu peuple. It contrasts to elites, aristocracy, the rich,
the powerful, or some such designation of the hegemonic class or classes
(Taylor, 2007: 133).
21
As he puts it, I seek input of influence over the whole governance of my

society that is, not only over the decision on this or that issue but over the
whole way these issues are defined, prioritized and related to each other. It
makes sense in this picture to pick as my vehicle a party that could aspire to
govern or take part with others in a governing coalition or, failing this, a
broad-gauge association like the NAACP (Taylor, 2007: 131).
22
Young and Everitt observe that over the past two decades, litigation has
become a much more significant aspect of advocacy group activity in Canada
[. . .] When we think about advocacy groups engaging in litigation, the first
examples that come to mind involve equality-seeking groups like gays and
lesbians, Aboriginals and women. While these groups have made
considerable use of the courts to achieve some significant policy changes,
they are by no means the only groups using the courts. In fact [. . .] between
105
1988 and 1998 [. . .] corporate interests accounted for almost half the legal
interventions by groups (Young & Everitt, 2004: 112).
23
For a Canadian example linking media and punctual politics to

reasonable accommodation, see Potvin and Tremblay (2008).
24
For a documentation of the culture of the street in working class Britain,

see Hoggart (1957).
25
Geographer Richard Harris makes this point with regard to the Canadian
context (see Harris, 2003).
26
The extent to which the counterculture abandoned its original ideals is a

matter of some debate. Taylor, for example, argues that the baby boomers
or what David Brooks refers to as bobos (i.e. bourgeois bohemians) still
carry some of the 1960s idealism. The bobos, he notes have made their peace
with capitalism and productivity but they retain their overriding sense of
the importance of personal development and self-expression [. . .] Among
the things that get lost in the original package are, on one hand, social
equality; bobos have made their peace with the Reagan-Thatcher revolution,
with the slimming down of the welfare state, and with increasing income
inequality where they sit at the upper end. On the other hand, their highly
mobile lifestyle has helped to erode community. But there is more than a
residual unease about this among many of these highfliers. They want to
believe that they are contributing to the welfare of everyone, and they yearn
for more meaningful community relations. In fact, this kind of capitalist
subculture, which one found mainly in the information technology world,
is not unanimously accepted among the rich and powerful. There still exists
a culture of the big vertical corporations, and there is a tension between the
two (Taylor, 2007: 139).
27
Taylor contrasts metatopical media spaces with topical spaces centered

on physical proximity. Nineteenth-century urban spaces, he notes, were
topical that is, all the participants were in the same place, in sight of each
other. But twentieth century communication has produced metatopical
variants when, for instance, we watch the Olympics or Princess Dianas
funeral on television, aware that millions of others are with us in this. The
meaning of our participation in the event is shaped by the whole vast
dispersed audience we share it with [. . .] The language of self-definition is
defined in the spaces of mutual display, which have now gone metatopical
they relate us to prestigious centers of style-creation, usually in rich and
106
powerful nations and milieus. And this language is the object of constant
attempted manipulation by large corporations. My buying Nike running
shoes may say something about how I want to be or appear, the kind of
empowered agent who can take Just do it! as my motto (Taylor, 2007: 144145). For related insights applied to media and digital culture see Karaganis
& Council Social Science Research (2007).
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Parliamentary Reform Canadian Public Administration 46(4), 427-449
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Two Tunnelers: Digging Through the Differences in

the Chomsky-Foucault Debate1
by Xavier Scott
In 1971 an epic debate took place between Noam Chomsky and Michel
Foucault entitled Human Nature: Justice vs. Power. Fons Elders opening
comment that they are both tunnelers through a mountain, working at
opposite sides of the same mountain with different tools without even
knowing if they are working in each others direction (2006: 1) is
incredibly appropriate given the way the debate unfolds. They are working
from opposite ends, with different tools, and fail to realize that they will
meet in the middle, depending on the concrete obstacles that they meet along
the way. The primary area of disagreement between the two thinkers is over
the idea of justice and its relationship to power. For Chomsky, justice is the
means by which oppression can be unmasked and is used to constitute the
basis of his critiques of power. For Foucault, however, justice can be a
dangerous ideological tool that obscures the struggle for social hegemony,
utilized by both oppressive forces and those who wish to supplant them.
Despite their differences, these projects are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, although their respective achievements could not have occurred
had they included the others methodology in their own.
The following article will examine the points of departure between
the two theorists, with an attempt to contextualize the positions each takes
vis--vis justice in relation to the tactics used to combat the power structures
that dominate their respective societies. While the philosophical basis and
rhetoric each of them employs are markedly different, so too are the contours
and obstacles of the mountain of power that stands between them. Brian
Lightbody comments that the
debate represents a forum of exchange of two diametrically
opposed positions [. . .] and perhaps more importantly, both
Chomsky and Foucault are political activists attempting to tear
down the same mountain and yet neither participant embraces,
fully understands, nor even attempts to try to understand the
position of the other (2003: 68)2
110
Scott: The Chomsky-Foucault Debate
Lightbodys view correctly frames the need, particularly among social

activists, to understand one anothers arguments in order to find
commonalities (particularly in objectives), despite the obvious need to
maintain a critique of false paths towards greater human freedom. By
examining the diverse problems that power presents to Chomsky and
Foucault we can find parallels that can help to overcome the initial view of
the debate as consisting of diametrically opposed positions to locate
common ground between the respective projects.
Theory and Tactics
The most interesting part of the debate to both interlocutors was the political
portion. The section on human nature, though important to understanding
the basis of their respective critiques, is sidelined in favor of politics. As
Foucault remarks near the end of the debate,
this problem of human nature, when put simply in theoretical
terms, hasnt led to an argument between us; ultimately we
understand each other very well on these theoretical problems
[. . .] [W]hen we discussed the problem of human nature and
political problems, then differences arose between us (Chomsky
& Foucault, 2006: 57)
While they do not agree on the questions raised in the section on human
nature, they at least understand one anothers projects and the approach each
of them takes towards the questions that arise as a result.
The differences that arise between Chomsky and Foucault in the
human nature section of the debate have important connections to the
political section that will become the locus of their disagreement. Foucault
explains the different approaches that each of them takes towards
understanding the generation of knowledge:
Mr. Chomsky has been fighting against linguistic behaviorism,
which attributed almost nothing to the creativity of the
speaking subject. [. . .] In the field of the history of science or,
more generally, the history of thought, the problem was
completely different (ibid.: 15)
Chomskys starting point from which to address political problems is his
belief that were safer trusting to what I hope are the fundamental human
emotions of sympathy and the search for justice, which he believes are
111
maximized in systems of free association rather than coercive institutions

(ibid.: 63). For Foucault, as Rabinow notes, a historical examination of
thought (or the production of truth) will adopt the tactic of historicizing
such supposedly universal categories as human nature (Rabinow, 1984: 4).
Their disagreement is largely over the tactics each uses in their
respective social critiques. For Chomsky, the critique is based upon an idea
of justice that stems from the innate generative moral grammar each person
possesses. In his innumerable political writings, he attempts to unmask the
immorality of the American political system by applying the same standards
of moral judgment that are traditionally reserved for private citizens. Such
an approach to politics came out of the intellectual and political context in
which Chomsky lived (post-war America). For Foucault, the issue should be
framed in terms of the social struggle rather than in terms of justice
(Chomsky & Foucault, 2006: 50). Foucault is distrustful of the revolutionary
predilection for universal terms, such as justice, truth and morality. Such
terms had been employed before, and in fact were employed by the Marxist
intellectuals of France at the time, to little effect (or arguably to disastrous
effect as will be explained below).
Justice as a Tactical and Ideological Term
For Chomsky, the enlightenment notion of imagining a world based upon
universal conceptions of justice is of central importance. He believes that it
is his own commitment to such an ideal that forms the basis of his critique
of power structures that seek to employ Thucydidean political theory in
which the strong do as they can and the weak do as they must (Chomsky,
2009). Chomsky can be very critical of the misappropriation of the term
justice when co-opted by the power structures in the west, but the concept
of justice as equal application of universal principles of morality remains the
basis from which he criticizes those misappropriations. This, however, is
often the same vocabulary that is used to criticize Chomsky. His critics argue
that the selectivity of his own examples of western atrocities overlooks the
oppression that takes place without western intervention. The criticism most
often leveled at his political writings is that he condemns intervention rather
than constructive engagement when intervention takes place, but condemns
collusion with dictatorships and other abuses of human rights when the
United States engages with them. For example, he condemns the
intervention in Serbia while condemning collusion with the Suharto regime
in Indonesia. Chomsky believes that the application of universal principles
of justice help to distinguish which instances are justified and which are not,
whereas Foucault would see the application of those very enlightenment
112
principles as the cause of many of the interventions and collusions of which

Chomsky is most critical.
To put the Chomsky-Foucault debate in context it is important to
understand why Foucault is skeptical of the term justice. Justice, for Foucault,
is understood in juridical terms. In the debate, he argues: if justice is at stake
in a struggle, then it is as an instrument of power (Chomsky & Foucault,
2006: 40). This is a function of Foucaults critique of the institutions that
govern society. His critique relies heavily on a Nietzschean genealogy. As
Rabinow puts it,
Foucault is highly suspicious of claims to universal truths [. . .]
[H]e doesnt take a stand on whether or not there is a human
nature. Rather, he changes the subject and examines the
functions that such concepts have played in the context of
practices (Rabinow, 1984: 4)3
By historicizing grand abstractions Foucault hopes to strip away the
foundation of truth upon which modern bourgeois society is based (ibid.).
It is important to realize that Foucault does this not for philosophical reasons
(i.e. to arrive at a notion of the truth) but rather for tactical reasons,
inasmuch as he wants to undermine particular power structures without
erecting new monolithic structures of thought that can then be co-opted.
Foucaults is a political task that is propelled forward by his writings:
It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as
ours is to criticize the workings of institutions, which appear to
be both neutral and independent; to criticize and attack them
in such a manner that the political violence which has always
exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so
that one can fight against them (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006: 41)
Foucaults critique is important precisely because it is able to discover that
we have escaped domination under an old form of power only to find
ourselves disciplined by a new form (Taylor, 1984: 161-162). Furthermore, it
seeks to avoid the problem of co-optation endemic in the revolutionary
struggle.4 However, though it functions perfectly well as a critique of the
current institutions, Foucaults approach is admittedly unable to define,
nor for even stronger reasons to propose, an ideal social model for the
functioning of society (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006: 40). It is for this reason
that Charles Taylor criticizes Foucault. For Taylor,
113
Foucaults analyses seem to bring evils to light; and yet he wants

to distance himself from the suggestion that would seem
inescapably to follow, that the negation or overcoming of these
evils promotes a good (1984: 152)
Here it is important to understand that Foucaults reticence in proposing an
ideal social model for the functioning of society is not a philosophical
mistake but rather a tactical decision. The unmasking that Foucault
proposes in the debate does not become a truth itself, as Foucaults entire
project is meant to recognize the complexity of the dynamics of power, which
would invariably co-opt any new formulation of the idea of truth. The reason
he leaves a gap in his thought, which Taylor and Chomsky criticize as
implicitly pointing towards an idea of Truth, can be explained by examining
Foucaults critique of the French Marxist intellectuals.
Foucaults Critique of the Marxist intellectuals
The critiques that Foucault levels at Chomsky on the subject of justice during
the debate can be better understood by examining his treatment of the
French Marxist intellectuals. Foucault begins the interview entitled Truth
and Power by addressing power/knowledge and the social sciences. He
began his investigation of criminality and delinquency because he felt that
such an investigation was oddly omitted among the Marxist intellectuals of
the day. He explains his reasons for undertaking such an investigation by
outlining why the Marxist intellectuals failed to carry out such a critique.
Foucault offers three explicit comments on the intellectual Marxists
and two implicit ones. (1) They sought recognition by other intellectuals in
the universities and consequently addressed only the questions asked by the
mainstream. In other words, the intellectual Marxists were co-opted by a
desire for acceptance in mainstream intellectual currents. Foucault argues
they were no different from the mainstream: they simply felt their
interpretation of mainstream questions was superior; (2) Post-Stalinist
Stalinism excluded everything that was not a frightened repetition of the
party line;5 (3) Most condemning of all, Foucault felt there was a suspicion
surrounding the (as yet not public) existence of the Gulag. Even if such
suspicions did not exist, the head of the party (who knew everything) would
have been able to direct research away from such a topic as criminality, as
a discourse of controlling power.
Implicit in the arguments Foucault makes about the French Marxist
intellectuals are two points of importance. First, the membership of most
French intellectuals in the PCF (Parti Communiste Francaise) necessarily meant
114
that they were co-opted. The communists in France were subservient to the
party (and the USSR by proxy), and thus precluded themselves from any
genuinely subversive protest or new ideas. He describes them as playing
the role prescribed for them by the PCF (Foucault, 1980: 110). His own
membership in the PCF, between 1950 and 1953, might explain why Foucault
is critical of the PCF and revolutionary parties more generally. From his
criticisms and writings one gets the distinct impression that Foucault quit
the PCF because of his dismay at their willful blindness towards the early
hints of the operations of the Gulag under Stalin the publicizing of which
dealt a major blow to the PCF. Foucault seems skeptical of the ability of any
(even oppositional) political parties to affect change outside of the influences
of power. The practice of party politics becomes co-opted by the political
power it attempts to wield.
A second implication in Foucaults critique of the French Marxists
stems from the question of why Foucault chooses to address the Marxist
intellectuals specifically. Why not the psychiatrists? Why not the dominant
intellectual streams? It seems as if Foucault agrees with (or has the most
respect for) the stated revolutionary project of the Marxist intellectuals. It is
only that they do not accomplish their stated goals because of the
organizational structure endemic in political parties, i.e. because of a
mistaken choice of tactics. Foucault seems to criticize them for the many
faults listed above, but at the same time there is a respect in the very question
why have you not addressed this as it could easily have been your project
had you been able or willing to live up to your stated aim? That he himself
was (briefly) led by Louis Althusser to join the PCF, shows the attractive
front that their stated project initially presented to him; only to leave him
disillusioned and critical of any self-proclaimed revolutionary party, which
also helps explain his criticism of Chomsky in 1971.
It is only after the revolutions around the world in 1968, which were
notably non-Marxist and devoid of the organizational structure of a
revolutionary party, that Foucaults books assumed the political relevance
they have today.6 The co-opting of the Marxists is the background of the
academic context in which Foucault is living at the time of the debate.
Foucault seeks to avoid the pitfalls of co-opted Marxism by adopting a
Nietzschean interpretation of how power has continued to manifest itself
since the Marxist revolution in the Soviet Union.7
Chomsky, by contrast, is writing in the United States, where there is
no Marxist party and any group that considers itself Marxist is extremely
removed from the influence of the Soviet Union. As Chomsky notes, prior
to the late sixties,
115
you would have had great difficulty in finding a Marxist

professor, or a socialist, in an economics department at a major
university for example. State capitalist ideology dominated the
social sciences and every ideological discipline almost entirely.
This conformism was called the end of ideology (Chomsky &
Foucault, 2006: 79)8
While in France the 1968 demonstrations were necessary for nonMarxist interpretations to gain credence (such as Foucaults), in the United
States the anti-war movement of the late sixties was necessary for Marxist
interpretations to be examined in opposition to the dominant liberal
intellectual orthodoxy. In Chomskys words, Orthodox economics was very
briefly challenged by students who wanted to undertake a fundamental
critique of the functioning of the capitalist economy; students questioned
the institutions, they wanted to study Marx and political economy (ibid.:
96).9
By examining the respective contexts in which Foucault and Chomsky
wrote we can see why Foucault would want to avoid referring to a
revolutionary critique of the existing social institutions. In turn, it seems
apparent that Chomskys reliance on what Foucault attributes to leftistorthodoxy (conceptions of human nature and the emergence of Marxist
political-economy) is in fact incredibly subversive. When one considers that
in the United States the left is often confined to the liberal attitudes of the
Democratic Party, the critical stance that Chomsky adopts lacks the
institutional pitfalls for which Foucault critiques the Marxist intellectuals in
France. Though the discourse surrounding the idea of justice between
Chomsky and the French Marxist might appear very similar, the function
that each of them serve is markedly different. It could be argued that
Foucault may have found a Marxist end goal that did not fall into the same
trap as the PCF and other French intellectuals, namely, of being right only
with and by the party. To understand why Foucault had to adopt a
Nietzschean genealogical approach to the production of truth10 one may
examine Foucaults critique of Marxist theory, which also explains some of
Foucaults critiques of Chomsky.
Foucaults Critique of Marxist Theory and End Goals
Foucault disagrees with the typical biological image of a progressive
maturation of science that underpins history. This is in contradiction to the
Hegelian-Marxist-Kojevean interpretation of history that is typical among
the left. He says of Hegels dialectic:
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Dialectic is a way of evading the always open and hazardous

reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and
semiology is a way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal
character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language
and dialogue (Foucault, 1980: 115)
Foucaults project in Discipline and Punish is to refute this progressivist
End of History view of the French Revolution:11 How is it that at certain
moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden takeoffs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to
correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited? (ibid.:
112). He begins to answer his own question:
At this level its not so much a matter of knowing what external
power imposes itself on scientific statements, what constitutes,
as it were, their natural regime of power, and how and why at
certain moments that regime undergoes global modification
(ibid.: 112-113)
It appears as though, in attempting to distance himself from co-opted
Marxists, Foucault avoids explicitly stating the argument in Marxist terms,
though it retains many Marxist elements, particularly a focus on history and
materialism. His contention that shifts in discourse and in the minute
operations of power occur in a bourgeois society because of a shift in tactics
is reminiscent of the Marxist dialectic. The bourgeoisie cannot exist without
constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the
relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society (Marx,
1978: 476). Replace the word production with power and you could be
reading Foucault rather than Marx. The capitalist class is essentially reactive
and must respond to the many revolts undertaken by the working class.
The production of delinquency and its investment by the penal
apparatus must be taken for what they are: not results acquired
once and for all, but the tactics that shift according to how
closely they reach their target (Foucault, 1977: 285)
Power is assaulted from one position and moves into another. The king melts
into society and becomes more difficult to recognize and attack.12
The important difference between Marx and Foucault is that while the
former has in mind a final goal (Communist society) Foucault has no such
guiding telos or even a progression forward.13 It is this seemingly static14
117
view that also separates Chomsky from Foucault. For Chomsky, one of the
central tasks of the intellectual is to try to create the vision of a future just
society [. . .] based, if possible, on some firm and humane concept of human
nature (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006: 31). Charles Taylor also criticizes
Foucaults position stating that power, in [Foucaults] sense, does not make
sense without at least the idea of liberation (Taylor, 1980: 173).15 Since, in
Taylors words, power requires liberty, it also requires truth if Foucaults
project is in fact to unmask power as he says it should (ibid.: 174). Lack of
the possibility for liberation brings us back to Foucaults specific criticisms
of Chomsky and the gap previously mentioned in this paper. However,
such a gap is not necessarily due to negligence but is, in fact, specifically
intended on Foucaults part, as part and parcel of his overall political project.
Foucaults Criticism of Chomsky
While explaining the difference between the position of the structuralists
and his own, Foucault outlines what he believes to be the central difference
between his own approach to scholarship from Chomskys. From this follows
a refusal of analyses couched in terms of the symbolic field or domain of
signifying structures and
a recourse to analyses in terms of the genealogy of relations of force,
strategic developments, and tactics. Here I believe ones point of
reference should not be to the great model of language (langue) and
signs, but to that of war and battle. The history which bears and
determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a
language: relations of power, not relations of meaning.
(Foucault, 1980: 114, emphasis added)
This statement suggests that the methodology Foucault uses (i.e.
Nietzschean genealogy) is what leads him to a strategy so radically different
from Chomskys. He specifically condemns (or at least separates himself
from) the study of language as a departing point for the study of the
structural impact of power. Language is so caught up in the practice of power
that it could never hope to deconstruct it. This stems from Foucaults belief
that the social sciences are linked with a whole range of institutions,
economic requirements and political issues of social regulations (ibid.: 109).
Chomsky agrees that the study of language cannot serve as a departing point
for the study of power, a position which he feels is misattributed to him by
Parisian intellectuals in general.16
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The only way in which a generative grammar enters is Humes

quite correct observation that since we are constantly making
moral judgments in new situations, we must have internalized
some principles that underlie these judgments, and clearly
these must have substantially derived from what he called the
original hand of nature (Chomsky, August 28, 2010)
Chomskys political position is founded upon the universal ability of human
beings to make and understand moral propositions, which relates to his
(later) work in linguistics in only an abstract way.
In order for Foucault to pose the political problems as he did, he was
forced to dissolve the (Marxist) phenomenological subject. He says that the
problems of constitution could not be resolved by historicizing the subject.
He does not say that such an undertaking was or is useless, but merely that
it did not seem to solve the specific political problems with which he was
grappling. By shifting the focus Foucault also changed what was visible,
obscuring certain things (such as end goals) in the process. He therefore
adopted a framework he calls genealogy, that is, a form of history which
can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of
objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject that is
transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness
throughout the course of history (Foucault, 1980: 117).
Foucault undertakes a genealogical examination of power. He
uncovers problems with the ways in which questions of power are posed on
both the left and the right. The right understands power in juridical terms
of constitution (along the same lines as Hobbes), while the left conceives of
power in terms of state apparatus (Marx) (ibid.: 115). The microphysics of
power is left alone until the revolutions of 1968 when a genuine grassroots
political activism opens the field to non-Marxist challenges to power.
Foucault then turns to the question of ideology, which is obviously
related to Marx. He offers three reasons as to why the notion of ideology is
difficult to employ:
The first is that [. . .] it always stands in virtual opposition to
something else, which is supposed to count as truth. [. . .] The
second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think
necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly,
ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something
which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic
determinant, etc. (ibid.: 118)
119
Each of these criticisms can be examined in relation to Chomskys most

famous political work (published 15 years after this interview),
Manufacturing Consent. The third criticism would be largely in line with
Chomskys thesis in Manufacturing Consent, the subtitle of which is The
Political Economy of the Mass Media. Chomsky views the mass media from the
perspective of the free market. Similar to Foucaults discussion of an
economy of power, Chomsky argues that there are economic constraints on
the media that shape it towards a given political ideology. Ideological
conformity in the media is not accomplished by crude intervention,
according to Chomsky, but by the internalization of priorities and
definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the institutions policy
(Chomsky & Herman, 2002: xi). In Foucaults studies, it is the apparatus of
punishment that conforms most completely to the new economy of power
and the instrument for the formation of knowledge that this very economy
needs (Foucault, 1977: 304). The shifting set of interdictions that the
population places on themselves, in conformity with the new form of
hierarchical structures that characterize modernity, are a general theme in
Foucaults later studies of power and the formation of the subject found in
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality.17 Chomsky, as an American,
confines himself to the critique of modern capitalist institutions within the
United States, something Foucault would shy away from because of his
problems with the Communist Parties of Europe and the less than noble ends
to which they put their own control of the party apparatus.
Chomskys most scathing criticism is reserved for American
intellectuals who serve as the ideological manufacturers necessary to justify
the military and economic interventions of the United States. In The Culture
of Terrorism, he outlines the ideological climate that is produced by the
dominant stream of American media that he believes was necessary to justify
atrocities in Nicaragua a case where the American public had to be won
over in order to explain the amount of aid given to the Contras who
concentrated increasingly on soft targets (Chomsky, 1988: 76). This critique
of ideology serving as the basis for violence fits in well with Foucaults own
understanding of overt control being replaced by the self-discipline that
characterizes modern bourgeois society. The difference is that Foucault,
because of the context in which he is writing, does not adopt a universalist
moral criteria from which to make his criticism on account of his distrust of
the forms in which such moral conceptions have hitherto been used.
Foucaults second criticism of the Marxist intellectuals might also be
leveled at Chomsky, since the latter appears to understand ideology in terms
of a moral subject. However, the structures of generative moral grammar,
though perhaps originally developed as something couched in the subject,
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is not necessarily bound to be so. Chomskys understanding that language

develops out of a community made him very sympathetic to the idea of
resonant structures that formed grammar through the interaction of multiple
individuals. Furthermore, Chomskys research in the area of linguistics
offers a strong amount of evidence for the existence of such structures.
Chomsky cites many different contributions of various philosophers, dating
as far back as Descartes and Galileo, which were instrumental in his
development of generative moral grammar. He goes so far as to say its
misleading to call it my theory, except in the specific manner in which
theories have developed (Chomsky, April 10, 2008).18
The first criticism gets to the heart of the Chomsky-Foucault debate,
inasmuch it attacks directly the possibility of generative grammar
constituting the biological infrastructure for concepts such as justice and
morality, which is where Chomsky grounds his belief in universal
understandings of justice and morality. This brings the discussion full circle
and back to the debate itself.
The Chomsky-Foucault Debate
When asked about the debate later, Chomsky said that, though he liked
Foucault, he had never met anyone so amoral in his life (Lightbody, 2003:
69). To expand upon this, Chomsky later stated:
In the debate, the question came up about the justification for
proletarian revolution (he was in a kind of Maoist phase at the
time, quite fashionable among Paris intellectuals). His position
was that there was no issue of justice, just of power, and he was on
the side of the proletariat (then). I cant think of a more accurate
illustration of amorality. Not immorality: just saying that moral
issues dont arise, only issues of power. [...] Out of the limelight, I
liked him a lot. The public persona I could do without, but that
holds for Paris intellectual life rather generally. A strange
phenomenon. (April 10, 2008, emphasis added)19
Foucault would hardly contest the idea that he is amoral, given that he
would understand morality to mean behaving according to a code of good
and evil. By contrast, Foucaults system of ethics, based around an aesthetic
view of life, does away with the coding of ideas according to right or wrong.
Interestingly, Foucault equates Chomskys position with that of Mao
(Chomsky & Foucault, 2006: 44). This comment illustrates Foucaults
misunderstanding of Chomskys desire to base political society upon a
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conception of human nature and human morality. There is a reason why

Foucault argues against the position of moral absolutism taking Mao as an
example. He does so because of an implicit understanding that Maos crimes
were immoral and he wishes to show the danger of basing politics on moral
absolutism. However, the fact that he can make such a statement accords
with what Chomsky means when he talks about the universal capacity to
make moral decisions. From Foucaults (stated) position we can see no reason
for condemning Mao he merely did well in the power game that everyone
is playing. However, the common sense morality that Chomsky would
advocate would certainly condemn Mao (who has been attributed with
sanctioning the death of millions). This is best illustrated in an exchange
between them later in the debate. Chomsky distances himself from any
conceivable connection to the Maoist position:
If I could convince myself that attainment of power by the
proletariat would lead to a terrorist police state, in which
freedom and dignity and decent human relations would be
destroyed, then I wouldnt want the proletariat to take power
(ibid.: 52)
To which Foucault responds (oddly, given his previous equation of
Chomskys moral position with that of Mao):
When the proletariat takes power, it may be quite possible that
the proletariat will exert towards the classes over which it has
triumphed, a violent, dictatorial, and even bloody power. I cant
see what objection one would make to this (ibid.)
In the course of the debate, Foucault seems to fall into the trap for which
Taylor criticizes him in Foucault on Freedom and Truth, arguing against
a given arrangement of power without the (usual) implication that a
preferable one is possible.
Foucaults criticism comes from his misunderstanding of Chomskys
position as being related to biological determinism, which he sees as possibly
leading to Maos idea of bourgeois and proletarian human natures. To
explain the misunderstanding through an analogy, equating Chomskys view
of justice to a linguistic project, Maos idea of bourgeois and proletarian
human natures is equivalent to believing in a universal language. This is
clearly not Chomskys position, as no one contends that we are all born with
the ability to speak English, for example. He does, however, contend that we
are born with the ability to speak (in general). His position could not be used
122
to argue that there are just and unjust people and that they are biologically
determined, as everyone (in his view) has an equal ability to make moral
propositions, just as everyone has an equal ability to use grammar.20
Chomsky bases his idea of justice not on a universal definition of justice but
on a universal ability to understand justice. Chomsky, for example, has a very
good understanding of how generative moral grammar is expressed crossculturally, as too are conceptions of justice.21
Returning to the first of Foucaults three critiques of ideology, what
Chomsky fails to appreciate about Foucaults argument is that it is informed
by the experiences of the results of a Marxist political project that managed
to attain power through its critique of state-capitalist power. Foucault is
correct (and Chomsky would not deny) that implied in the critique of
ideology is a desire to replace it with something else, which is supposed to
count as truth (Foucault, 1980: 117). Foucault is extremely critical of the
constitution of this new regime of truth. Those criticisms can themselves take
on a power of their own and are often willing to undertake some surprisingly
immoral actions in order to safeguard that power. This is a common critique
of Chomsky in that by damning American foreign policy, he ignores (some
say even implicitly supports) the regimes of the Khmer Rouge and the Soviet
Union. He consistently denies any such support and maintains that, since it
is the common moral sense that everyone inherently possesses that keeps
people from setting up gulags or carpet bombing peasants, all such regimes
bear moral responsibility for their actions the United States is merely the
worst transgressor. While Chomsky criticizes the current state of American
politics on the basis of a possible world that he deems better, he reserves the
right to withdraw support from a movement that appears as if it will exert
towards the classes over which it has triumphed, a violent, dictatorial, and
even bloody power, which Foucault believed would be justified.
Justice vs. Power
To characterize the difference between Chomsky and Foucaults respective
starting points, we must turn to each of their conceptions of power.
Foucaults seems to be best summarized as an examination of power at the
level of how it invests itself in absolutely every activity, so that each activity
is co-opted and becomes an instrument for the propagation of power.
Meanwhile, Chomskys could be said to examine creativity and see how this
expresses itself in every action undertaken, independently of power, so that
we can envision what it might look like if it was not co-opted by power.
When Foucault talks about power one gets the distinct impression that
he conflates two distinct types, namely, the political and the capable. The
123
political power about which Foucault talks is the sort of power that allows
anything to transpire. He is talking specifically about a type of power that
co-opts and controls. Chomsky, on the other hand, clearly differentiates
between the coercive power of oppressive political regimes and the creative
power of the individual that is used in constructing sentences, for example.
If it were the all-encompassing (Nietzschean) form of power, it would not
be possible to escape, whereas Foucault seems to suggest that it is.22
Foucault might as well be criticizing Chomskys use of the word
power when he says that power traverses and produces things, it induces
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered
as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much
more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (1980: 119).
He levels a valid criticism, however, as it seems to address the second type
of power capable power. Foucault seems skeptical of the ability of society
to transform itself in a way that frees it from political power while
maintaining capable power, though he does not discount such a possibility.
As he writes, One has to recognize the indefiniteness of the struggle
though this is not to say it wont someday have an end (ibid.: 57).
By contrast, Chomskys political project is to enable human beings to
function and use their capable power (which he defines in the form of
creativity) to maximize decent human instincts, which he believes would
be best promoted through a decentralized system of association free from
the coercion of centralized institutions which he feels maximizes the worst
of human instincts (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006: 67). Free from the
influences and failures of an American Communist Party, Chomsky is much
more optimistic than Foucault. He does attempt to formulate what such a
society might look like. This understanding of power helps us see why
Chomsky is a committed anarchist. Foucault may also appear to be an
anarchist but of a different sort:
The anarchists posed the political problem of delinquency;
when they thought to recognize in it the most militant rejection
of the law; when they tried not so much to heroize the revolt of
the delinquents as to disentangle delinquency from the
bourgeois legality and illegality that had colonized it; when
they wished to re-establish or constitute the political unity of
popular illegalities (Foucault, 1977: 392)
Foucaults politics is warier and more removed from organization than
Chomskys. His critique is aimed at the ability of power to co-opt any theory
of liberation, and thus he avoids articulating a theory of liberation. While
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Chomskys anarchism is achievable as a form of political organization,23

Foucaults clearly is not nor is it meant to be. Such a political organization
would only represent a further shift in the apparatus of power, which
Foucault contends would be just as coercive. The purpose of resistance, for
Foucault, is to achieve a state of freedom. If his ethics is an ethics of aesthetics
then resistance to coercion (rather than overcoming it) is the greatest
expression of freedom and ethics. In his castigation of the term justice,
Foucault expresses a fear that such a term can only be translated into a
juridical concept which power will use to coerce. Yet it seems that a more
generative concept of justice exists implicitly throughout Foucaults work
on resistance. He touches on this idea briefly in chapter five of
Power/Knowledge, when he talks about local knowledges (which he connects
to Deleuzes idea of minor knowledges), though he does not elaborate on
this idea for reasons already explained.
Conclusion
The subject of the critiques Chomsky and Foucault launch at their respective
societies is the oppressive institutionalization of power that exists within
each. They have different approaches and methodologies in their theoretical
work, but are ultimately able to understand and accept the theoretical
projects of one another quite easily. The locus of their disagreement is
politics; specifically the tactics to be employed in practicing a politics of
resistance. Chomsky, speaking from an enlightenment philosophical
tradition, bases his politics on ideas of justice that he believes to be as
universal as the generative grammar which expresses them. Foucault, whose
Nietzschean genealogy leads him to a fundamental critique of all
formulations of justice, brings to light the problems of how power is
expressed through the criminal justice system and the application of modern
conceptions of justice. The two projects are fundamentally different in terms
of their theoretical underpinnings and the tactics they choose to employ.
However, their criticisms of the institutions of power demonstrate that the
mountain of political coercion before which each of them stands is ultimately
the same. The context in which each of the interlocutors writes becomes
important because it serves as the basis of their arguments in terms both of
the theoretical tradition being employed and of the dominant institutions
they are criticizing. The model of American capitalism and the forces brought
into the world through the military industrial complex with the complicity
of educated elites and media organizations require criticisms that appeal to
the conventional moral codes of the American working class that America
is not living up to its stated values. In France, where communism poses an
125
actual threat to the liberal model, Foucault attempts to show the similarity
between the two systems and the injustices perpetrated under both so as not
to side with either. What is important for Foucault is that the workings of
power be recognized so that moral issues do not reinforce institutional
structures of power.
The importance of the debate exists in how two such radically
different formulations of the role of justice can be seen as mutually
supportive. Both critiques are meant to survey and surmount the same
mountain. To gloss over their differences does both projects a disservice, as
it is the particularities of the criticisms that make them effective. But by the
same token, to privilege the tactics of one over the other does a disservice to
the debate itself and the importance of using a multitude of approaches in
political activism. The political views of Foucault and Chomsky, respectively,
were developed in concrete contexts and, just as an engineer might use a
variety of tools and methods to create a tunnel through a mountain
depending on the obstacles with which they are confronted, both Chomsky
and Foucault have adopted radically different techniques to bore through
the mountain that separates them.
Xavier Scott is currently a Lecturer in the departments of Economics and
English at the University of Hargeisa, Somaliland. A Canadian, he has a
Masters degree in Social and Political Thought from York University. He is
currently researching the relationship between Islam and democracy and
their role in Somaliland which is a sovereign but unrecognized state.
Endnotes
1
I would like to thank Noam Chomsky for his incredibly swift responses to
my requests for certain clarifications on his part, as well as Brian Lightbody
whose guidance and comments made this paper possible.
2
Lightbody states in the footnote to this sentence: I think Foucault is more

open minded than Chomsky but, nevertheless, fails to fully appreciate the
novelty of Chomskys position.
3
Note that Charles Taylor criticizes Foucault for doing precisely this, and
connects Foucaults refusal of a notion of Truth to Nietzsche (see Taylor, 1984:
160).
4
Well, if one fails to recognize these points of support of class power, one
risks allowing them to continue to exist; and to see this class power
126
reconstitute itself even after an apparent revolutionary process (Chomsky

& Foucault, 2006: 41).
5
The best example of what Foucault is afraid of comes from Trotskys stress
for Party unity (in absentia) for the Thirteenth Congress of the Communist
Party: We can only be right with and by the Party, for history has provided
no other way of being in the right. The English have a saying, my country,
right or wrong. [. . .] We have much better justification in saying whether it
is right or wrong in certain individual concrete cases, it is my party
(Trotsky, cited in Arendt, 1967: 307).
6
Later in the interview, Foucault says: Where Soviet socialist power was in
question, its opponents called it totalitarianism; power in Western capitalism
was denounced by the Marxists as class domination; but the mechanics of
power in themselves were never analyzed. This task could only begin after
1968 (see Foucault, 1980: 116). I get the impression that Foucault agrees with
both the Marxists and the mainstream academics, namely, that power exists
in both the USSR and Western society. His criticism is not that they are
wrong, merely that the way in which each criticizes the other comes out of
a method of analysis that is necessarily blind to its own abuse of power. By
analyzing the carceral archipelago Foucault focuses on an apparatus of
power that exists in both communist and bourgeois societies. One wonders,
were Foucault alive after the fall of the USSR when communism was
disproven would he would adopt a more Marxist approach, now that the
corrupting influence of being an institutionalized ideology has been taken
out.
7
Foucaults criticism of Marxs writings in Power/Knowledge is worth recalling

here. Rather than saying that Marx and Lenin have been misunderstood in
the implementation of the Gulag system, or asking what kind of
misunderstanding could have caused the Gulag system to have arisen out
of a revolutionary party that adopted Marxist texts, Foucault argues it is a
matter of asking what in those texts could have made the Gulag possible,
what might even now continue to justify it, and what makes its intolerable
truth still acceptable today (ibid., 135). That Foucault does not apply the
same criticism to Nietzsches writings, which have been cited as inspiration
for much of the National Socialist ideology, it is fair to argue that his criticism
of Marx is merely a reminder of the dangers of any philosophy being coopted if those who seek to apply it do not do so carefully. Marx is referenced
specifically because of the context in which Foucault is writing at the time.
Perhaps, then, Foucault is not so much anti-Marx as anti-vanguard.
127
Note the similarity in language between the intellectual orthodoxy of the

State-capitalist academics Chomsky is arguing against in the United States,
and the language of the orthodox Marxist-intellectuals (such as Alexander
Kojve) whom Foucault is arguing against (see below).
9
He also notes that he cannot imagine a similar intellectual climate existing

in Western Europe or Japan (ibid.: 86-87).
10
Foucaults conception of power is inextricably bound to the production of

truth: We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we
cannot exercise power except through the production of truth (Foucault,
1980: 93).
11
A position recently popularized by neo-conservative Francis Fukuyama in

The End of History and the Last Man, developed largely from Alexander
Kojves Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of
Spirit.
12
[The carceral] generalized in the sphere of meaning the function that the
carceral generalized in the sphere of tactics. Replacing the adversary of the
sovereign, the social enemy was transformed into a deviant; who brought with
him the multiple dangers of disorder, crime and madness (Foucault, 1977:
299-300, emphasis added).
13
It is important to note that Marx (like Foucault) is not a humanist or a

moralist. He does not feel that the proletarian revolution should occur, so
much as he feels that it must occur, and that it is in the proletariats best
interests that it occur.
14
Foucault does see the lines of power and counter-power as constantly

shifting. Here I mean static only insofar as he does not envision an escape
from coercive institutions of power the way Marx or Chomsky does.
15
Taylor argues this by saying that different forms of power indeed are
constituted by different complexes of practice, to form the illegitimate
conclusion that there can be no question of liberation from the power implicit
in a given set of practices. Not only is there the possibility of frequently
moving from one set of practices to another; but even within a given set the
level and imposition can vary. Foucault implicitly discounts both these
possibilities (ibid.: 174, emphasis added). The first because of the Nietzschean
framework he uses, the second because of an overly simplified notion of
128
modern systems of control.

16
Chomsky explains he was a committed anarchist long before he had even

heard of linguistics (Chomsky, August 28, 2010).
17
This shift in the employment of power has been the basis of modern studies
of bio-politics, which characterize post-modern leftist thought epitomized
by the recent work of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt in works such as
Empire and Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire.
18
One could perhaps draw a comparison between what Chomsky says about
the development of his theory and Foucaults broader understanding of
what constitutes a subject in What is an Author? See Foucaults What is
an Author? (in Foucault, 1984).
19
Chomsky is quite critical of Foucault, but reaffirms the fact that he did not
feel Foucault was immoral, and that they got along well before the debate
took place.
20
Chomsky says this specifically in an interview: Only Cartesian common

sense, which is distributed quite evenly, is needed (Chomsky & Foucault,
2006: 70).
21
Chomsky brought this up in response to my question, to wit: According

to your theory of generative grammar and the couching of morality in that
grammar, are there innate moral truths (e.g. Thou shalt not kill) hardwired
into us, or do you mean [. . .] that we have a generative moral grammar
where we innately have the capacity to understand things in moral terms
and apply a set of ingrained moral schemas to a given situation, in a
particular context, from an individual's standpoint [. . .]? To quote part of
his response: Your description seems to me reasonable, but the conclusions
arent really derived from generative grammar. Rather, they are reached by
the same kind of traditional reasoning that leads directly to generative
grammar for language. As perhaps you know, there is recent work exploring
empirically, cross-culturally, the innate principles that underlie the moral
grammars that yield the kind of normal behavior that led to Humes
reflections (Chomsky, April 10, 2008).
22
Evidence for this position is largely implicit in his concept of counterpower used throughout his work, however, the best evidence I have found
to suggest he uses power in this sense exists in Discipline and Punish: In the
129
classical period, there opened up in the confines or interstices of society the

confused, tolerant and dangerous domain of the outlaw or at least of that
which eluded the direct hold of power: an uncertain space that was for criminality
a training ground and a region of refuge (Foucault, 1977: 300). If something
can elude the direct hold of power, then power is not everything, though
today (Foucault contends) it permeates everything.
23
Chomskys anarchism is not a utopia, it only seeks to promote certain forms

of creative human behavior, while limiting the capacity of people to perform
destructive acts without the need of coercive institutions (which he feels
are inherently destructive).
Bibliography
Arendt, H. (1967) The Origins of Totalitarianism New York: Harcourt Inc.
Chomsky, N. (1997) Perspectives on Power: Reflections on Human Nature and the
Social Order Montreal: Black Rose Books
Chomsky, N. (1998) The Culture of Terrorism New York: South End Press
Chomsky, N. (April 10, 2008) personal correspondence with author
Chomsky, N. (2009) The Responsibility to Protect UN General Assembly July
23, 2009, Retrieved from: www.chomsky.info
Chomsky, N. (August 28, 2010) personal correspondence with author
Chomsky, N. & Foucault, M. (2006) The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human
Nature New York: The New Press
Chomsky, N. & Herman, E. S. (2002) Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy and the Mass Media New York: Pantheon Books
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish New York: Random House
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge New York: Pantheon Books
Foucault, M. (1984) The Foucault Reader P. Rabinow (Ed.) New York: Pantheon
Books
130
Foucault, M. (1988) The History of Sexuality: Volume 3, The Care of the Self
[trans. R. Hurley] New York: Vintage
Foucault, M. (1990) The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction [trans.
R. Hurley] New York: Vintage
Foucault, M. (1990) The History of Sexuality: Volume 2, The Use of Pleasure
[trans. R. Hurley] New York: Vintage
Elders, F. (2006) Human Nature: Justice vs. Power (1971), A Debate between
Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault in The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On
Human Nature New York: The New Press
Lightbody, B. (2003) Theseus vs. the Minotaur: Finding the Common
Thread in the Chomsky-Foucault Debate Studies in Social and Political
Thought 8, 67-83
Marx, K. (1978) Manifesto of the Communist Party in The Marx-Engels
Reader R. C. Tucker (Ed.) New York: W. W. Norton Company (469-500)
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1936) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
Retrieved from:
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/index.htm
Rabinow, P. (1984) Introduction in The Foucault Reader New York:
Pantheon Books
Robinson, P. (February 25, 1979) The Chomsky Problem The New York
Times
Taylor, C. (1984) Foucault on Freedom and Truth Political Theory 12(2), 152183
Wikipedia: Example for a Future Electronic

Democracy? Decision, Discipline and Discourse in
the Collaborative Encyclopaedia
by Sylvain Firer-Blaess
A number of online projects aiming to bring citizens closer to political
decisions have appeared over recent years.1 These projects originate from
public authorities seeking to come closer to their citizens, as well as small
groups trying to make existing institutions more democratic. The idea of a
possible electronic democracy is as old as the Network itself, but its
realisation remains today at an embryonic stage, limited as much by
technical problems2 as by a lack of political will. The idea of an electronic
agora, where citizens can debate and vote, is very often included in notions
of a modern representative democracy moving toward a more direct
democracy or what might be called participatory democracy or strong
democracy after the model described by Barber (1984).
This article describes the mechanisms of a successful product of the
internet involving mass collaboration, namely, the online encyclopaedia
Wikipedia.3 Wikipedia relates to the world of electronic democracy in the
sense that it gives us the successful organisational mechanisms of decisionmaking processes, and involves millions of people. As such, it could be taken
as an example for future projects. As we shall see, the practice of computer
technology in Wikipedia has resulted in a pragmatic and unplanned
construction, a decision-making process that deviates from the standard
direct democracy model (one person-one vote, numerical calculation of
votes), and takes rather the form of debates and consensus that, if one looks
for historical examples, could be likened to the old method of the palaver or
the modern techniques of some left libertarian circles. It should be
emphasised that the Wikipedian practice has been built gradually through
progressive user-experience. A pre-arranged organisation would have been
unable to foresee and cope with the many difficulties facing such a complex
project as the construction of a collaborative encyclopaedia, as we shall later
argue.
In the first part of the paper we shall analyse the decision making
process (DMP), including debates and consensus, which Wikipedia employs,
and make a connection with the Habermasian model of rational discourse.
132
Firer-Blaess: Example for a Future Electronic Democracy?
In the second part, we analyse the disciplines (in the Foucauldian sense)
which underlie and permit this DMP. We find that, on the theoretical plane,
despite the harsh criticisms Habermas claimed against the writings of
Foucault, we can see a rather complementary relation between the
establishing of rational discourse in Wikipedia and the effects of its discipline.
Then, in third part we show the resistances that face the decision-making
process and the disciplines, and consider the reactions that have emerged
against such resistances. These findings lead on to a discussion of the
normativity of Foucauldian disciplines and the possibility of their
heterogeneity. Finally, we examine the possible implementations of the
Wikipedia system to electronic democracy projects.
1. Practices of Decision: A Debate/Consensus Decision-Making Process,
and a Culture of Rational Discourse
Wikipedia has developed an original decision-making process (DMP),
mainly thanks to a new technology of electronic editing called Wiki. A wiki
is a piece of web-based software which generates web pages that may be
modified or edited by anyone.4 This technology enables the communal
writing of texts, and from this communal work a DMP has arisen based on
debate and consensus. The DMP has been proven to be efficient not only
with communal editing but also, and more surprisingly, with other
functions, such as the creation of internal rules and with the nomination of
users for added responsibility for the site.
1.1 In the Writing of Articles
The best way to explain the decision-making process in article editing is
surely to show how a wiki web page works. There are in fact several pages
in one wiki page, each of them represented by a tab at the upper end of an
article page:
For the DMP, three tabs are of interest: article, discussion, and edit this
page. The tab article simply shows the article. The tab edit this page
redirects to a web-based editor enabling users to modify the article page.
Last, the tab discussion refers to a wiki-page dedicated to discussions,
debates and consensus-making in relation to the article.
Most of the time, the decision-making process is not even
communicative. A new edit will be accepted or rejected through what we
133
can call a passive consensus: the new edit stays in place, is deleted (reverted:
each version of an article is recorded so you can come back to an older
version), or modified. This non-communicative process can go on
indefinitely while Wikipedians disagree with one another over whether an
edit should stay as it is. At times some users engaged in a disagreement stay
in a non-communicative practice and decide to reverse each others edits in
an infinite circle. This practice, called an edit war, is recognised, restricted
and forbidden by the rules of Wikipedia.5 In order to solve their differences
of opinion, Wikipedians must then enter into a process of active consensus.
This is a communicative process and works upon our so-called
debate/consensus decision-making process.
Figure 1: the decision-making process in the

editing of articles on Wikipedia6
This DMP takes place on the discussion page attached to each article. Here
the disagreeing parties will present their arguments and debate on what
edits should remain. It is a custom, as well as a policy of Wikipedia, that
parties in conflict should find an agreement by themselves. But the debate
is also structured by internal rules. Indeed, an article must follow certain
rules of style and content, and the decision-making process must end in
134
agreement with these rules. Therefore, arguments in debates are often based
on and legitimated by the aforementioned rules. The most structuring rule
of article content is the policy of Neutral Point of View (NPOV), which asserts
that Wikipedia articles should present all significant facets or competing
positions on a given subject in an unbiased way.7
We need to say at this point that this method is a success: thousands
of edits are created every day by thousands of users, and the conflicts which
overflow the debate/consensus DMP, which we shall discuss later, are
relatively limited in number compared to the number of edits per se. We
shall see now the mechanisms of rule creation.
1.2 In the Making of the Rules
Rules for Wikipedia have not been established ex nihilo, but are a product of
early practice (Firer-Blaess 2007b; Sanger 2005). The making of the rules has
developed from a tension between the form of Wikipedia a wiki and
its aim to build an encyclopaedia. The medium is not the message, but it
goes into resonance with the latter to create original practices. While the wiki
form was stressing a more anarchic and let it be way of doing things, of
allowing people to do what they want and of not applying any written rules,
the aim of making an encyclopaedia stressed the need of policies and
guidelines.
In 2003, Wikipedians agreed on the process of communal editing,
forming a consensus between pro-rules Wikipedians and anti-rules
Wikipedians, resulting in an original set of policy and guidelines. Thus, the
rules of Wikipedia are decided in common. They follow the same
debate/consensus DMP as in the editing process. They are called policies and
concern matters of style and content, of behaviour in the editing process, of
copyright and other legal matters between Wikipedia and the real world
legal system, as well as of the enforcement of these very policies. Most of the
time, a policy comes to be when some Wikipedians realise that something is
not working well or could be improved. A policy proposal usually emerges
from a discussion in the village pump, the general forum of the Anglophone
Wikipedia.8 If the community has shown enough concern, a user will create
a policy proposition page, and advertise the policy proposal by putting an
advert section in sensitive pages.9
The policy proposition page serves as a forum where a
debate/consensus DMP takes place. Bit by bit, Wikipedians add their view
onto the proposal page, and debate with one another. The process of making
a rule is usually quite extensive (lasting several months) and contains
numerous discussions. Once the community thinks a consensus has emerged
135
from the discussion, a policy page is finally created (again in a communal way,
and following the editing DMP). These policy pages have the status of official
policy, and therefore can be claimed in any DMP and enforced. Like most
other Wikipedia phenomena, things are unfixed, and the policy pages stay
open to amendments and modifications following the latest DMP edit.
Figure 2: the process of rule-creation in Wikipedia

Rules today appear rather stable. We can count the 5 pillars of Wikipedia,
which are the structuring rules. All in all, there are fifty rules concerning
specific subjects, and more than 200 guidelines that indicate the best way to
deal with precise matters.10 Generally, one need only read the five pillars in
order to acquire a good understanding of the behaviour to follow with
Wikipedia.
1.3 In the Nomination of the Wikipedians with Special Powers
The Wikipedian community has decided to create a small hierarchy for
organisational issues. It implies the nomination of Wikipedians who may be
granted additional powers, for instance, that of blocking the editing of a page
when conflicts go awry, or the possibility of blocking a particular user. The
process of nomination is close to an election in modern democratic systems,
yet with a notable difference, namely, the replacement of voting with
consensus.
Wikipedians with additional powers are trusted users who usually
have a long experience of editing in the encyclopaedia project. For a user to
be nominated, one needs first to present ones candidacy to a dedicated wikipage. Usually the candidate will ask other trustworthy Wikipedians to
sponsor their nomination with a cover letter written on the page. Then, the
community debates on whether (s)he should be granted nomination.
Questions are then asked and former acts of the candidate are checked and
discussed. At the end of the page, fellow Wikipedians finally give their view
on the nomination favourable, neutral, against.
This nomination process lasts seven days. At this time, a special user
with supplementary powers called a bureaucrat reviews the discussion to
see whether or not there is a consensus for promotion. Consensus here is
136
quite difficult to assert, and seems to be a compromise between the quality

and the quantity of the different views, but as a general descriptive rule of
thumb most of those above 80% approval pass, most of those below 70% fail,
and the area between is subject to bureaucratic discretion.11 When the
consensus is favourable, the user is directly promoted by the bureaucrat, and
given his or her legal and technical powers.
Figure 3: nomination process of Wikipedians with special powers

It is quite striking to see that from different situations the same DMP prevails
in Wikipedia: editing, rule-making, nominating. In contrast to the modern
democratic system, the means of decision are not the vote but rather
consensus: votes are even explicitly excluded from Wikipedia.12 The
Wikipedia DMP is based on the weighing of a point of view by the perceived
quality of the argument (see figure 4). This, among other things, maximises
the involvement of users. It is not enough to have points of view; one must
also make them explicit and rational. Finally, the Wikipedia DMP not only
enables the making of decisions, but positively constructs them. Often in the
talk pages, long and heated debates take place, and from the debates
solutions previously not thought of begin to appear. This is a different
situation from representative democracy, whereby citizens have to vote on
solutions created by experts. On Wikipedia, by contrast, the agents are the
makers and the deciders.
1.4 A Rational Discourse?
We have seen so far the threefold decision-making processes of Wikipedia.
Let us now approach the debates occurring within this DMP. If decisions
come from a democratic process, nothing tells us about the quality of the
debates and, thus, the extent to which they are indicative of progress. A
recent study suggests that these debates, nevertheless, have positive
elements which create practices approaching a rational discourse.
137
Hansen, Berent and Lyytinen (2007) have recently shown that we

could assimilate the Wikipedia DMP system within the model of the rational
discourse of Jrgen Habermas. In his Theory of Communicative Action (1984),
Habermas describes a type of action by which the discursive possibilities of
personal and social emancipation are maximised. This discursive action is
also called rational discourse. The rational discourse is an ideal-type that can
never be attained, but it can be approached in practice. For Hansen et al.,
discourses that take place in Wikipedia approach Habermas rational
discourse, albeit with some limitations.
Habermas distinguishes between three forms of personal action in
society: (i) instrumental action; (ii) strategic action; and (iii) communicative
action. While the first two types of action are used to reach a rather selfish
subjective aim, the third type, communicative action, aims to achieve a level
of mutual understanding between actors it is an inter-subjective goal. It
is this communicative action which is made possible by rational discourse.
A rational discourse can be formed under five conditions: (i) the actors
consciously pursue a cooperative search for the truth; (ii) through a formal
structure (with rules) (iii) excluding the use of force; (iv) in accordance with
the rules of an ideal speech situation (another Habermasian principle); and
(v) engaging in open dialogue and with sufficient duration.
For Hansen et al., Wikipedia meets these five conditions. Conditions
2, 3 and 5 are easily satisfied: the debates are structured by the rules of
Wikipedia; violence or pressure does not exist; and the debates are open to
everyone with an internet connection and have no time limit (often the
debate takes months). The cooperative search for the truth (condition 1) can
be considered as part of the rules of Wikipedia, especially with the rule of
the Neutral Point of View (NPOV) seen above. The ideal speech situation
(condition 4) requires that anyone can access the dialogue without
discrimination, under the condition that one uses a rational argument.
These five principles are the necessary but not sufficient conditions
for the establishment of a rational discourse. To identify such a discourse,
Habermas has constructed a typology of speeches that can be found in a
discussion approaching rational discourse. There is the theoretical discourse,
a statement of truth based on evidence and logic; the practical discourse, based
on social norms, statements about what is appropriate and socially
acceptable; the aesthetic critique, founded on good taste, on standard values;
the therapeutic critique, questioning the sincerity and honesty of a claim; and
finally explanatory discourse, which consists of clear and intelligible claims
made to explain a fact, theory or previous speech. The validity of a statement
can be challenged by one of these speeches and a dialogue with these types
of discourse can be established. Thus, for Habermas, if a dialogue includes
138
mostly these types of speech, then it can be regarded as approaching rational

discourse. If Wikipedia approaches rational discourse, then, for Hansen et
al., Wikipedia is a tool for emancipatory potential in terms of Habermas
critical theory.
Hansen et al. go on to study the content of the debates within
Wikipedia to check their hypothesis. To what extent are discourses of a
rational type present in the debates of Wikipedia? Hansen et al. here focus
on the debates about the Armenian genocide article, which can be regarded as
one particularly sensitive to the presence of non-rational discourse, devoting
considerable space to the passions and with a large number of instrumental
and strategic actions. But, in short, the authors counter-intuitively (but
certainly in keeping with their hypothesis) find that [w]hile much of the
interaction observed in the articles talk page is patently strategic, each of
the [communicative] forms of discourse outlined by Habermas can be
observed there as well (2007: 6). They also find that theoretical discourse in
particular is used. Participants on the talk page also often use practical
discourse by reminding others of the rules of Wikipedia, using therefore a
clear disciplinarian act (using the Education practice described below).
Interestingly, users also use therapeutic discourse in order to counteract
strategic actions, by questioning the sincerity of the other editors as to
whether they are looking for the truth or trying to impose their view. Here
again, the legal apparatus of Wikipedia is used in order to legitimate such
therapeutic discourse, through the invocation of a Wikipedia policy, namely,
the assumption of good faith policy (ibid.: 7). In conclusion, the researchers
write:
[O]ur analysis does show that early in the life of the article,
major theoretical discourse occurred. As these truth claims were
addressed over the life of the article, practical discourse was
also mixed in (as evidenced by the ready elimination of vandal
activity), as was therapeutic discourse in the discussion pages
(as editors question each others intentions). The current
discursive activity mostly focuses on explicative discourse,
such as grammar and phrasing correction (ibid.: 8)
Why then can such an article, as controversial as it is, be the subject of
rational discourse? The authors briefly explain that the rules and structure
of Wikipedia promote such discourse. For instance:
One of the reasons for such clarity (i.e. good style and grammar
in the debates) may lie in the process for resolving disputes that
139
has been established at Wikipedia. While intervention by an

Administrator or the Wikipedia Arbitration Committee is an
extreme option for unresolved issues, these avenues take
into consideration the previous efforts at resolution pursued by
the parties to a conflict. Thus, if events escalate to necessitate
third party engagement, the clarity and commitment to
dialogue reflected in previous discussions can have a bearing
on the outcome of the dispute (ibid.: 7)
These are the mechanisms of regulation and discipline which allow the
emergence of such a discourse. We should then highlight the beneficial and
emancipatory effects of certain types of Foucaldian subjectivation, some of
which we will examine shortly.
2. A Discipline Underlying Rational Discourse and the Debate/Consensus
Decision-Making Process
These mechanisms of subjectivation, or normalisation, that lead actors to
behave in a certain way, abound in Wikipedia. Wikipedia has original
mechanisms of normalisation, which we will call disciplines. We can divide
these disciplines into two parts: hierarchical discipline, and non-hierarchical
discipline, which we will call rhizomic with reference to Deleuze (1989).
Wikipedias rhizomic disciplines are relations between agents that are not
structured by a specific plan. Lacking any hierarchical pyramid they
randomly connect discipliners and disciplined, the agents being able to move
from the first to the second role and vice versa depending on the time and
situation. Wikipedia also contains a standard hierarchical normalisation
structure, but without proper pyramid levels and favouring specialisation
by horizontal tasks rather than by vertical levels of responsibility.
2.1 Rhizomic Mechanisms
2.1.1 The gaze of Wikipedia: Hyperpanopticon
Here are the words of Julius,13 cited by Foucault:
In times past, the great challenge of the architects was to solve
the question of how to give the largest possible number of
people access to the spectacle of one event, one gesture, one
single man [. . .] This question, which began in the ancient greek
society insofar as the latter was a community which
participated in strong events that was forming its unity
140
religious sacrifices, theatre or political speeches still continued

to dominate western civilisation until the modern days. The
question was the same for churches. [. . .] Currently, the
fundamental problem for modern architecture is just the
opposite. One wants the largest number of people to become a
spectacle to one single individual in charge of their surveillance
(Foucault, 2006 [1975]: 607-608, my translation)
We could say that with Wikipedia the main problem has been to create an
architecture where the many do not see the one nor the one the many, but
where the many can see the many. Wikipedias system of surveillance
enables anyone to watch the acts (the edits) of anyone else. The group does
not nominate wardens; everyone is or can become a warden. Modern
discipline has been trying to diminish the scope of private life. Wikipedia
makes it disappear: there is no edit in the online encyclopaedia that cannot
be found and identified.
I have named this architecture a hyperpanopticon in previous papers
(Firer-Blaess, 2007b). Like the Bentham/Foucault panopticon, it permits one
to see every action in a given area. The prefix hyper refers to the addition
of new dimensions: first, a quantitative dimension, in that compared to the
panopticon the number of eyes of the hyperpanopticon is dramatically
increased, which leads to an intensification of surveillance as such; second,
a qualitative dimension, in the fact that it is not a happy
few that sees everything, but the entire group that can see the actions of
everyone, a change with important ethical implications.
The Wikipedian hyperpanopticon is intrinsic to the MediaWiki
software the programme that runs the Wikipedia website. It is a software
body made up of large databases and user-friendly interfaces. These
databases list all edits made to Wikipedia, and are accessible to all through
certain web pages of Wikipedia. They all show a listing of edits, giving the
name of the amended section, time and date of publishing, authors
identities (the user name if the author is listed, or else an IP address), a short
description of the edit, and finally its weight in the data. The data access
pages provide various tools, allowing them to focus on certain time periods,
an article or author, and also to compare different versions of the same article
at different times.14
The hyperpanopticon solves two problems attributed to the ancient
techniques of panoptical surveillance. The first is the cost: indeed, in a
panoptical system surveillance is a specialised division of labour that brings
a certain cost as one has to pay the guards or watchers. In
the Wikipedian system the task of monitoring is not specialised and is
141
distributed among numerous benevolent agents. The second problem is an

obvious ethical one, given that with the division of labour the specialisation
of surveillance creates a very unbalanced power relationship that is
potentially repressive. On the contrary, Wikipedians have no fixed
relationship concerning surveillance (we will see this in greater detail
shortly).
The multiplication of the eyes involved in the hyperpanopticon makes
surveillance very effective in Wikipedia. It has been calculated that flagrant
sabotage, such as insults within an article, is detected and removed, on
average, in 1.7 minutes on average (Foglia, 2008: 57). Finally, in and of itself,
the hyperpanopticon is not only a surveillance tool, but is also very useful
for the decision-making process. It enables Wikipedians to recognise and
trust one another during the debates. The hyperpanopticon creates a
relationship of the gaze among Wikipedians, which fuels the DMP.
2.1.2 Soft Disciplines, Soft Normalisation
We call soft discipline the techniques of teaching and making the individual
comply with the rules, without him perceiving enforcement. Soft discipline is
a legitimate form of normalisation, an internalisation of the rule in the
thinking and practices the individual freely chooses. Most compliance with
the rules of Wikipedia is achieved through these processes of normalisation.
Normalisation is often a process of teaching as well as of self-learning:
Wikipedians usually invite one another to read a policy or guideline page.
They also ask questions in order to acquire more information and to
understand how to apply a rule.
This process of normalisation is diffuse in Wikipedia and
consequently difficult to categorise. We give here a few examples: the
processes of welcoming, of adoption, of education, and of reward.
Welcoming: the Wikipedian community shows itself right at the
beginning to the newcomers. When a user registers with Wikipedia (which
gives him a fixed username, instead of an IP address, as well as several new
tools and options), he receives a welcoming message from the community.
More than a first communicative bonding, the message gives him the first
hints about how to behave, as well as redirections to the main rules of the
encyclopaedia. The user is kindly invited to read them, and to put questions
to the author of the message. Indeed, some regular Wikipedians group
themselves to form a Welcoming Committee. This committee is in charge of
sending all new registered users these messages, and to help the newcomers
when prompted.
Adoption: the adoption programme is a new policy of Wikipedia
created in September 2006, as a programme designed to help new and
142
inexperienced users.15 The programme gives willing adopters and adoptees

a platform to meet. Adoption is a kind of mentorship: it implies an older
Wikipedian supporting and helping a newcomer, monitoring his or her
edits, giving advice and answering any questions. This new programme does
have quite a low number of participants compared to the total sum of
newcomers, but it has seen great success among its members and is
expanding as a result.
Education: this practice is the most pervasive and omnipresent of all.
It is not an official Wikipedia programme like welcoming and adoption, but
remains a very common practice. It implies the sending of a message to a
user when she has broken a rule, which happens very often concerning
newcomers. The message is usually less than a warning and more a reminder
of the rules: Wikipedians are used to seeing newbies behaving in the wrong
manner, and know that they will learn by trial and error. This is all part of
the normalisation process. For instance, if a user downloads a picture on a
Wikipedia article that contains a copyright (which is not permitted by the
rules of the site), one Wikipedian will surely send him what one calls a
template, that is, a ready-made message concerning pre-defined matters
in our case this template would contain the rules about picture uploading
and legal rights. Templates follow a gradation between a reminder and a
warning. If a Wikipedian persists in transgressing a rule, (s)he is sent
gradually more and more authoritative messages, before (s)he is punished.
In this way, the most authoritative message is the boundary between the
practice of normalisation and the practice of punishment.
Finally, reward: Wikipedians showing particularly good behaviour can
receive medals called Barnstars. Gratification still follows in a nonhierarchical way, as anyone can give out barnstars to anyone. There is a great
amount of different barnstars, around eighty, each having a different
meaning. They are awarded for excellent or very useful edits, the fighting
against vandalism, good adoption, good support, and good civility.
Barnstars are a way of motivating Wikipedians in an environment that can
easily be stressful. The good behaviour is also highlighted, which therefore
encourages fellow Wikipedians to follow such behaviour.
In all these processes, there is no real separation
between the normalisers and normalised. Wikipedians tend to co-normalise
themselves, each one being able to take both roles at any one time. Soft
normalisation is the main way of making Wikipedians comply with the rules.
Nevertheless, it is not enough, and mechanisms of enforcement based on a
hierarchical structure complete the system. They are nonetheless
mechanisms of crisis, used quite rarely.
143
2.2 Hierarchical Discipline: Judge and Punish

When Wikipedians happen to fail to solve their differences in the decisionmaking process so that the editing process ends up with practices that are
not accepted on Wikipedia (for example, poor arguments, edit wars, insults,
and so forth) the Wikipedians have a complex and progressive dispute
resolution process (DRP) that focuses first on a communicative/consensual
mode, but which can ultimately go all the way to a court case to enforce its
decisions. The DRP contains a set of gradual processes that tries to avoid
going to the last step of a judgement procedure. The Dispute Resolution16 is
an official policy and gives a series of advice for using when one faces a
seemingly irresolvable dispute. These steps can be roughly classified in three
groups, from the least to the most authoritarian and energy consuming: (1)
individual practices; (2) community practices; and (3) official judgment.
2.2.1 Preventing judgement: the dispute resolution process
The first group, that of individual practices, classifies things one can do
alone. These are simple pieces of advice and things to do which try to clear
a dispute within the debate/consensus DMP practice. They are more
reminders of the classical DMP than extra policies: focusing on the content
of the dispute and not on the personality of the other editor, staying cool
and taking some time to reflect, rationally talking with the other party, and
in the last resort proposing a truce with the other editor in order to be clear
of mind.
The second group of practices goes to a level higher in authority and
classifies things that can be done when the classical DMP has failed, with
the help of the community. Outsider Wikipedians can be asked for help,
according to the nature and intensity of the dispute. For instance, first, one
can ask for an editor assistant if one is unsure of the rules concerning the
conflict; second, one can ask for the third opinion of a Wikipedian about a
dispute concerning only two people; and third, when the dispute concerns
precise encyclopaedic content, one can ask for a subject matter discussion.
If the dispute relates to a frequent issue there are specific noticeboard pages
on which one can ask for help for instance, there is a biographies of living
people noticeboard, a fringe theory noticeboard, and a special page dealing
with incivilities.
The third and highest practice involving the community the most
structured one that should be used in the last instance is the process of
mediation. As in real-world juridical conflicts, parties in a dispute (when they
both agree) can ask for a third party to try and find an arrangement. There
is an informal and a formal mediation process. The informal one is organised
144
by an unofficial club that calls itself the mediation cabal,17 constituted of

volunteer Wikipedians. By contrast, the formal mediation process is
organised by the official Mediation Committee.18 The Mediation Committee
is composed of Wikipedians who are not only volunteers but also have been
chosen by the community (following the same DMP nomination seen in the
first section). There is no rule dictating whether one should ask for the
mediation cabal or the mediation committee. However, the more serious a
dispute, the more often it goes toward official mediation. When one of the
parties is unwilling to go to mediation, or when the mediation has failed,
the dispute can go toward the last and highest body of the DRP, the
Arbitration Committee.19
The Arbitration Committee only deals with the most serious disputes
and cases of rule-breaking. We have seen that the Wikipedia organisation
tries to avoid recourse to the Arbitration Committee (also called ArbCom)
as much as possible. Wikipedians are reluctant to clear conflicts by legal
enforcement (note that the process is called Arbitration and not judgement).
Cases are intended to be kept at a low number (unfortunately, statistics are
not yet available). Nevertheless, the ArbCom process looks in many ways
like the process of a real-world judicial body. The function of Arbiter is
particularly serious; contrary to the usual debate/consensus nomination
process, Arbiters are chosen by polls, and then appointed by Jimmy Wales,
the founder of Wikipedia, in accordance with the votes.20
As always in Wikipedia, cases are public, and a wiki-page is dedicated
to each case. The process begins with a Request for Arbitration. From here
arbiters look at the admissibility of the case (i.e. has the dispute resolution
process been rightly followed? Have other ways of resolution been tried
before the request? Is the case serious enough that it cannot be settled
without arbitration?) If the case is received, Arbitration begins. Arbiters create
a wiki-page and ask parties to the conflict, alongside possible witnesses for
the depositions of complaints and defences, and any other commentaries
and testimony/evidence. Arbiters can also lead an investigation and look into
the archives of Wikipedia (the history pages of articles and talk pages). This
having been done, arbiters give themselves a week to rule the case and
publish their decisions. Decisions are presented in a somewhat juridical way:
the statement first refers to the rules and jurisprudence which pertains to the
case, after which time decisions are made. Decisions have res judicata and
shall be enforced. For a case to be taken by the ArbCom, the breaking of the
rules must be deemed serious, so are the decisions of the ArbCom.
2.2.2 Punish
If prison was and still is the universal and modular punishment of the
145
modern world, the universal punishment on Wikipedia is the Ban. A ban is

an interdiction (as well as a technical impossibility) of editing on Wikipedia.
As with sentences to prison, bans can be of different lengths depending on
the seriousness of the offence. It also adds a spatial modality: one can be
restricted to writing a single article, or on one topic.
The Wikipedian Rule assumes apriori good faith toward all users; this
apriori is that everyone wants to create an encyclopaedia of good quality.21
When there is evidence that a user has been editing for other reasons
(personal motivation, lobbying, etc.), the sentence is usually the harshest: the
user suffers an indefinite and general ban. Apart from the breaking of trust
in good faith, lots of decisions are taken not to prevent users to write on
Wikipedia but to make them accept the rules. A good number of cases deal
with incivilities and failure to conform to the debate-consensus DMP; in such
cases the ban will usually be a few months.22
This section intends to show which mechanisms of discipline exist in
order for Wikipedians to comply with the rules. The structure of these
mechanisms is very different from the modern discipline described by
Foucault. Modern discipline was constructed around the concentric circles
of the panopticon with the pyramid of hierarchy (Foucault, 2006 [1975]: 205).
Roles were fixed, whereas with the network structure of Wikipedia, most
roles change from one user to the next. The discipline of Wikipedia contains
a majority of rhizomic mechanisms, which means that anyone can take the
role of discipliner or disciplined following the circumstances; this is the case
for the roles of watcher/watched, normaliser/normalised, conflictresolver/party to a conflict, rewarder/rewarded. This rhizomic discipline is
completed with a hierarchical form of discipline that contains fixed roles.
This is the case for serious mediations of a conflict, for legal procedures, for
punitive procedures. We assume that rhizomic mechanisms of discipline
have a more important role. The gaze and the procedures of normalisations
(especially education) are omnipresent, pervasive in the practice of Wikipedia,
while structured mediations and legal procedures are quite rare compared
to the thousands of debates taking place every day. Furthermore, the
Wikipedians try to use them as little as possible. The hierarchical power of
administrators is more present, but mechanisms of nomination and recall
(loss of the status of administrator) seem to ensure that an oligarchy is not
forming (Konieczny, 2009), and that the acts of Admins reflect the will of the
community.
We shall now see the resistance encountered in the previously studied
decision-making processes and disciplines.
146
3. Practices of Resistance: Strategies and Counter-Measures

A power relationship is the act (or play, or struggle) of an agent toward
another human being aiming to enforce upon him a practice he could have
avoided. The discipline we have described above is then a power
relationship, as it implies the agents will respect the rules. According to
Foucault, a relationship of power goes in both directions, as a person
embodies a part of freedom in doing the things asked of him or her, and can
either answer the call or resist it. Discipline and normalisation can never be
complete, and counter powers tend to take root. Just as, according to
Foucault, the panopticon doesnt succeed in eliminating resistant practices,
the hyperpanopticon cannot avoid resistant practices despite the
multiplication of the eyes of the gaze and the consequent normalisation. In
Wikipedia one has the power of discipline, but also the different practices of
resistance of some users against this discipline. Games of power and counterpower are constant in the disciplinary practices of Wikipedia.
Practices of resistance are any practices that consciously disrupt the
DMP and go against Wikipedias policies. Vandalism per se (editing an article
in order to lower its quality) is in a way a naive and benign resistance,
because it can be easily and rapidly reverted. We shall focus here on less
visible but more serious practices of resistance, which are the ones that
attempt to distort the DMP. First, we see a technique of individual resistance,
called sockpuppeting. Second, we discuss a collective resistance that we call
lobbying.
3.1 Sock Puppets
The Wikipedia Debate/Consensus DMP is quite sensitive to the number of
people who are part of the debate: the more people share a view, the more
it is likely to be adopted. From this fact, a practice of resistance has emerged
called sockpuppeting. It aims to disrupt and cheat with the DMP by
multiplying individual accounts, and playing different users in the debate.
Next to classical sockpuppetting, similar practices have been identified:
Meatpuppetting consists of recruiting family and friends to create an account
for the purpose of influencing a decision; and the inventive Strawpuppetting
includes the use of a sockpuppet to create a fake opponent, making poor
claims in order to weaken the argument one is against.
Wikipedias DMP has shown itself to be quite resistant to these
strategies: the debate/consensus style weighs individual points of view not
only in relation to the quality of the argument but also to the recognition and
popularity of the user. Consequently, the voice of new users will usually be
given less weight: Wikipedians are aware of the practice of sockpupetting,
147
and will become suspicious if new users enter covertly in a debate to support
a minority position.
Quality of the given
arguments
Each argument is
weighed according to:
Number of users agreeing

with the argument
Popularity of these users

within the community
Figure 4: weight of an argument depending on various factors

A second defence mechanism is a counter-strategy that uses discipline.
Sockpuppeting is strictly forbidden by the rules of Wikipedia and severely
punished (usually with an indefinite ban). Thanks to the hyperpanoptical
surveillance, when one suspects a sock puppet, one can request special
police operatives, called checkusers. Checkusers are very few and extremely
trusted Wikipedians; they are given a tool that bites the deepest into the
privacy of users, as it can localise the computer that has been used. With this
tool, checkusers can compare localisation of editions and unmask sock
puppets.
3.2 Lobbies
Individuals can, of course, seek to degrade the NPOV policy for any
personal, political, religious, and other reasons. More serious is the resistance
coming from big organisations, public or private, for their personal purpose.
We shall call them lobbies: they seek their own interest and do not care for
the global quality of the encyclopaedia. The lobby problem emerged while
Wikipedia was becoming popular; now the online encyclopaedia is the third
most visited web-site, after Facebook and Google, which means it is the
foremost information website on earth. From 2005, dozens of companies and
sects have been shown to try to delete or lower criticisms on their related
article page: Wal-Mart, Exxon-Mobil, Shell, Microsoft, as well as the Church
of Scientology, and the Vatican. Several State Intelligences have also tried to
modify sensitive matters, like the CIA and the Australian intelligence.23
Wikipedia could be distorted by powerful lobbies. One can imagine
the creation of entire departments within big organisations, devoted to
148
overwhelming the debate/consensus DMP and to shaping articles at their

will. The answer to such a threat comes from a Wikipedian: in August 2007,
Virgil Griffith, a programmer at the California Institute of Technology,
released a tool called Wikiscanner on his website. It is a publicly searchable
database that links millions of anonymous Wikipedia edits to the
organisations from where the edits originated. Therefore, Wikiscanner
makes it possible to look for organisations and see their edits. One can
consider it an extension of the hyperpanopticon that focuses on lobbies
which try to modify sensitive matters. As Virgil Griffith says, Overall
especially for non-controversial topics Wikipedia already works. For
controversial topics, Wikipedia can be made more reliable through
techniques like [Wikiscanner].24 The aim of Griffith was to create minor
public relations disasters for companies and organizations [he] dislike[s]25,
and in practice it can certainly slow down disinformation attempts from the
lobbies. Media coverage has been abundant on this issue since the tool has
been released, and editions from both private and public organisations are
now scrutinised.
The fight against lobbies will not be solved only by extending the
possibilities of surveillance. It will also need the strict application of the
NPOV, the debate/consensus DMP, the citation policy. Even if organisations
take much effort to modify the free encyclopaedia, their tasks will be quite
difficult if Wikipedians find good arguments supported by NPOV and
citation policies, if lobby-users are punished when they try to pass in force,
and so on. As long as the project finds users willing to build a truth-related,
quality encyclopaedia, the governance of Wikipedia will support them and
their task.
3.3 Theoretical Implications: On the Normativity of Discipline
We brought up this topic of resistance because, in the Foucauldian logic of
discipline, resistance is normally seen as the good side of the coin against
the bad dominative discipline. We cannot really deem Wikipedia to be like
this. Why? The hypothesis is that a discipline is not intrinsically charged
with a specific normativity, but that its normativity depends both on
its function and its nature.
Foucault stays normatively (ethically) neutral in his writings on the
subject, but the form and style of his writing, as well as the historical period
during which he wrote, cannot but suggest a normative stance for the reader.
Reading Discipline and Punish, we cannot but feel outraged against the
alienating technologies of power, dominating the people. Nevertheless,
Foucault never gives normative reasons for criticising them, while he uses
149
what Nancy Fraser calls a normative-sounding terminology (Fraser, 1989:

27), which means that it sounds critical while there are no normative grounds
to legitimate the critique. Moreover, concerning Foucault, power is not only
repressive in that it does not just say no to what are defined as illicit desires,
needs, acts, and speech (ibid.: 26), but also creates all these things. Power is
indispensable to any practice, so it would be useless to criticise or to judge
something that cannot be otherwise. However, if power is indispensable to
human relations, we could affirm that its modalities can change and give
different normative effects to one another. For instance, we can consider that
the modern discipline described by Foucault serves norms that come from
without, estranged from the will of the people; decided by and serving
dominative forces such as states, economic forces, traditions. But in
Wikipedia, norms come from within, decided on by the Wikipedians, and
they are there to serve a DMP that makes it possible for everyone to express
themselves on an equal footing and in a near-rational discourse. The
functions of modern discipline is domination and productivity, while the
function of Wikipedian discipline is the creation of a free encyclopaedia and
more precisely the application of decisions whose formation strongly
approaches the democratic model.
The Nature of the discipline also concerns normativity. Mechanisms
of modern discipline base themselves on the domination of a minority of
watchers, teachers, above the majority. On the contrary, Wikipedia by and
large uses rhizomic types of disciplines; power is far more equally
distributed. The nature of modern discipline is domination of a hierarchical
form; the nature of Wikipedian discipline is equalitarian and rhizomic.
Finally, it is probable that the rhizomic nature of Wikipedian discipline
fosters and supports the Wikipedian rational discourse. The
hyperpanopticon creates an atmosphere of common trust between the agents
since they can know everything about past edits and the comments of their
fellows. Here the destruction of privacy dissolves the possibilities of
suspicion. Free from it, Wikipedians can focus on the types of speech that
create rational discourse. We also think that the rhizomic mechanisms of
normalisation bring a feeling of equality which helps the creation of rational
discourse, maximising the condition of non-discrimination toward speeches
included in the Ideal Speech Situation and thereby toward rational discourse.
Last, the self-managing steps of the Dispute Resolution Process appears to
force the agents to use rational speeches in order to settle their disputes, since
continuing a fight would make the DRP move to a higher level of
involvement, eventually dispossessing the parties to the dispute of the
answer to its resolution.
This hypothesis namely, that rhizomic discipline supports rational
150
discourse will need to be refined, both empirically and theoretically.

Foucauldian and Habermasian thoughts are not easily combined and future
work will need to clarify this theoretical position.
Conclusion: Is Wikipedia a Relevant Model for Electronic Democracies?
Wikipedia and electronic democracy projects have in common the
establishment of a mass-scale decision-making process. Could the
Wikipedian method be applied to the various e-democracy projects
mentioned at the beginning of our article? A thorough review of these
projects shall be our next task. We must also raise the substantive differences
between these two types of project, which could involve differences between
the organisational forms and discourses. To build a free encyclopaedia is not
the same as to govern, which is politics in the purest sense of the term. As
the first fundamental difference, we note the importance of the choices
involved and the potential for conflicts that this entails. The search for the
truth within an article is important, but certainly much less than a political
choice that would have material and human consequences. The search for
consensus is not accepted, consciously or not, by all agents or even by the
majority, and the state of mind can vary greatly between different democratic
and national cultures. We can therefore assume that debates can surely take
place, but that consensus building would be much harder to achieve if not
impossible. Perhaps, then, the use of a majority voting system would be
required in cases where consensus is not formed.
One could also argue that the timing for both projects is different, for
while there is no urgency to write an article, it is sometimes urgent to take
material decisions. However, we think that an electronic democracy could
only take care of the legislative system, and that the executive one, including
law enforcement and the countless micro-decisions that it entails (in the form
of decrees and regulations in particular), could be left to the standard
executive power. Now, what is particularly criticised in the current
democratic system (and especially in France) is the voting of laws that have
been proposed because of a precise event and a fleeting emotion. Good laws
take time to form and reach maturity, so we see no objection in the fact that
a decision would take months to be agreed upon, as is the case with
Wikipedia.
There is the question of the frequency of the decisions. Modifications
of an article by passive consensus can be numerous on any given day, and
of course we cannot conceive the same about laws. But there would be no
problem were a bill to be rapidly and frequently modified. Concerning the
voting of the laws itself, the example of the DMP concerning the Wikipedia
151
rule-making would fit i.e. the debates are long and the text changes many
times, but ultimately only one act comes to fruition which cannot be changed
without a new law-making procedure.
Finally, we think Wikipedia gives us the tools for the different cases
of democratic choice: the article edition DMP is applicable for the
construction of a bill, the DMP concerning the creation of rules within
Wikipedia for passing laws, and finally the DMP concerning the election
of Wikipedians with special powers, may apply to elect the executive
powers. The Wikipedian experience of resistance to the discipline provides
a great example of the possibilities of counter-measure (especially with
regard to the lobbies). We do not deny their usefulness in the democratic
process of real politics, but their actions, if they comply with the rules, could
become more transparent, even if we can never prevent bribery from
occurring.
The construction of electronic democracies will certainly occur in a
pragmatic way, by trial and error, as has been the way of Wikipedia. Perhaps
the designers and the Multitude alike will find it useful to see Wikipedias
mechanisms as examples to build upon, and to construct a reliable system
that would become the best advance in democratic systems since the
construction of liberal democracy.
Sylvain Firer-Blaess is a PhD student in the Department of Informatics and
Media at Uppsala University. He holds a degree in political science from the
Lyon Institute of Political Studies and a Masters degree in political
philosophy from the University of Sussex. His interest lies in critical theory
and Internet studies, and he is currently working on matters of surveillance
and privacy on social networking sites.
Endnotes
1
A list of such projects is available at:

www.metagovernment.org/wiki/Main_page
2
For example, the problem of how to provide a totally secure identity to

every citizen while conforming to the demands of data protection.
In this article, I will discuss the Anglophone Wikipedia, which contains the
highest number of articles and sees the highest number of visitors and
contributors.
4
For more details, see www.en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki
152
The policy of the Three Revert Rule has been instated in order to avoid edit
wars: it is forbidden to revert and to edit the same thing more than three
times a day. People trespassing this limit, or who participate to an edit war
by other means, face sanctions from the community.
6
Constructed from www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Consensus
See www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:NPOV
Other policies structuring debates are the verifiability policy, instating that
each claim should be quoted with a verifiable and reliable source, and the
prohibition against original research (sources must have undertaken a peer
review process). Of course these policies need interpretation, and much of
the DMP in edition turns around such interpretations.
8
See www.en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Village_pump
For instance, the centralised discussion page, which groups topics of

which Wikipedians should be aware. See www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tem
plate:Cent
10
See www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Five_pillars
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_policies
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_guidelines
11
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_adminship#
About_RfA
12
www.en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Polling_is_not_a_substitute_for
_discussion
13
Professor at the University of Berlin in 1830, and former colleague of Hegel.
14
A full description of these interfaces is available in Firer-Blaess (2008: 18).
15
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Adoption
16
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Dispute_Resolution
17
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Mediation_Cabal
18
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Mediation_committee

19
153
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration_Committee
20
Here Wales plays the role of, as he likes to say, the Queen of England. He
keeps this power of nomination in case the things were going wrong, but
he has never from now refused to go against a decision of the community.
21
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Assume_good_faith
22
An interesting example is the recent homeopathy case:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_arbitration/Homeo
pathy
Here, a Wikipedian, DanaUllman, has been banned for one year because
he has engaged in advocacy of homeopathy on Wikipedia, therefore
breaking the assumption of good faith. Other parties to the conflict have been
banned for a few hours or weeks because of incivility and personal attacks.
23
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6947532.stm
24
http://virgil.gr/31.htm
25
http://creativemac.digitalmedianet.com/articles/viewarticle.jsp?id=172757
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Fraser, N. (1989) Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary
Social Theory Cambridge: Polity Press
Fraser, N. (2003) From Discipline to Flexibilization? Rereading Foucault in
the Shadow of Globalization Constellations 10(2), 160-171
Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action London: Heinemann
Hansen, S., Berente, N. & K. Lyytinen (2007) Wikipedia as Rational
Discourse: An Illustration of the Emancipatory Potential of Information
Systems Proceedings of the 40th Hawaii International Conference on System
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Koniesczny, P. (2009) Governance, Organisation, and Democracy on the
Internet: The Iron Law and the Evolution of Wikipedia Sociological Forum
24(10), 162-192
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Retrievable from: www.features.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/04/18/164213
www.features.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/04/19/1746205&tid=95
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Politics and the Imagination
by Raymond Geuss
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009, pbk 16.95 (ISBN: 978-1-40083213-2), 216pp.
by Chris Allsobrook
For Nietzsche, every culture is a construct of the imagination, the
foundations of which will not bear inspection. As an agent of
enlightenment, the genealogists critical task is to cut through layers of
significance beneath self-evident customs and civilized consensus, to reveal
the underlying tensions of past struggles. Genealogy traces a history of
certain human reactions that have worked free of embedded contexts and
attempt to deny their origin, in order to become normatively absolute. The
genealogist is also self-critically aware that Enlightenment is not at odds with
Entstellung; that such acts of recovery cast their shadow on the present. Thus,
a question is raised which sets the theme for Raymond Geuss latest volume
of collected essays, Politics and the Imagination, namely, if we cannot free
ourselves of our necessary illusions, how can we make imaginative use of
the distance from reality this entails, to radically criticize the way things are,
without losing a realistic grip on the context in which we are engaged?
In this sequel, of sorts, to Philosophy and Real Politics, Geuss distances
himself from the crude Realpolitik that has been associated with his previous
polemical treatment of the normative grounds of liberal political philosophy.
Realism in politics, he writes in the preface, does not mean trying to
engage in the utterly incoherent task of thinking about practical politics
while abstaining completely from making value judgments (Geuss, 2009:
30) of which Geuss, like Nietzsche, makes many. Realism means that one
starts, as Max Weber taught us, from action and its consequences (ibid.).
An experienced diplomat, for example, does not take the content of what
is said in isolation. Rather, he sees specific actions in a particular context
(ibid.: 9).
Like Nietzsche, Geuss rejects the idea of a universally accessible,
transcendental perspective, as a framework with which to evaluate all
empirical institutions and arrangements. The paradigm of political
philosophy as rational deliberation grounding a political order, or a
deductive inference from certain premises leading to a political judgment
gives a distorted view of politics. In real politics, standards of evaluation
are changing and up for renegotiation. Every perspective has a concrete
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historical genesis and location (ibid.: 84). While he is at pains to

acknowledge the important imaginative political role played by conceptual
constructs, culture and values, the point made here is not just that ethical
norms are historically contingent but that Ethics is usually dead politics
(ibid.: 42). There are no pre-political ethical values.
Geuss dismisses a dominant ethics-first conception of political
philosophy, predicated upon ideal, systematic, rules-based, normative
deliberation, driven by a non-coercive competition among anonymously
held discursive propositions, to be decided upon prior to the persuasions of
power and material interests, and then applied to the political domain, to
safeguard independent, objective standards of evaluation. The notion of a
closed human life guided by fixed, ideal, moral rules is a fantasy. Of course,
no one would want to prevent human agents from trying to bring their own
moral beliefs into some kind of order, and making of them a system (ibid.:
59). But it is important not to confuse this rather narcissistic activity with
anything that might be called trying to engage cognitively (in the widest
possible meaning of that term) with the real world (ibid.).
Questioning the extent to which rule-governed conceptions of politics
are valuable prior to any study of a context of action, an essay on modernity
in the collection draws an amusing satirical analogy between Don Quixote
and the figure of the bourgeois enlightenment philosopher: the autonomous
modern subject (or, self made Don) freed from traditional bonds,
responsible for self-legislation and the rational organization of his own life
according to clear, generalizable rules that he himself has established. Don
Quixote puts together and fetishizes a codex of general rules governing
chivalrous conduct, to slavishly follow in the secure belief that as long as he
follows these rules, he need have no concern about the consequences (ibid.:
64). He is never afflicted with inner doubts or moral uncertainty, even
though he can never be cognitively certain whether he has followed the law
or his drives, and he has no idea of what impact his conscious decision will
have on the world. Quixote shows that the association of imagination and
liberty threatens madness in the absence of consideration of external factors.
Such criticism will no doubt prompt philosophers to pose the
question: how can we justify, evaluate or criticize power, if the criteria by
which we do so are effects of power? Geuss does not dismiss the role of
philosophical conceptual analysis, at which he excels, and though he rejects
the idea of an absolute morality he does not reject all particular forms of
morality. Real politics does not mean power and material interest are all
that matter. Crude realism is incoherent to the extent that it is impossible
to specify material interests independently of what groups actually pursue.
Real politics is not the sort of hardheaded realism that altogether eschews
imaginative constructs (ibid. x). Even the deepest kind of political
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conformism and any defense of the status quo requires an act of imagining
of some kind (ibid.).
So what do we get in place of politics-as-applied-ethics? Much
elaboration on the dictum, actions speak louder than words. Politics
involves an interaction between individuals and groups, with different
power to control, counter or preempt the actions of others and assess a
variety of courses of action, appealing to shared principles and assumptions,
asserting themselves and cajoling each other to further particular policies
and orientations towards the world (ibid.: 6). Ethical judgments and moral
oughts should not always trump other practical considerations. Contexts of
action are more important than opinions and beliefs. Realism can be more
than an abstract negation of reputable, rule-centered Kantian political
philosophy. For example, Thucydides takes an agent-centered approach to
political philosophy, focusing on the power of individuals or groups rather
than rules. Instead of asking, following Lenin, what ought to be done, we
may ask, who [does] what to whom for whose benefit? (ibid.: 53).
To readers of Geuss previous work this may sound familiar, although
the topics themselves are often fascinating in their own right, ranging from
reflections on radical criticism, bourgeois philosophy and philology, to
discussion of such diverse figures as Paul Celan, Richard Rorty and Tony
Blair, and analysis of events such as the Twin Towers bombing and the
invasion of Iraq. However, the key original motif in these essays, which helps
to distinguish real politics from crude realism, involves an emphasis on
various ways in which imaginary constructs can create realities that go far
beyond merely subjective spheres of action (ibid.:68). There are
overpowering imaginary constructs of such seductive power and attraction
that they can prevail for centuries against all resistance (ibid.: 67). The state
and the ideal of the social contract, for instance, have become so real that it
is hard to imagine the artifice of these conceptual constructs.
The activated imagination is not a mere historical epiphenomenon, but
rather shapes political reality. It constrains the scope of current possibilities
and changes the situation in a way that does not simply instantiate preexisting rules. Imaginative acts, such as poetry, can introduce a radical change
of attitude, orientation, possibilities and identity with gestures that change
the air one breathes. Culture is an artificial, imagined horizon, but the
restrictions it imposes are conditions which make it possible for participants
to lead a meaningful life. Heidegger, who makes a cameo appearance in two
essays in the collection (on his stuttering brother, Fritz, an ironically eloquent
Carnival Fool, and on Paul Celan), brings to real politics the idea of the
project: that Who I really am, is given to some extent by my possibilities
(ibid.: 123). We need such a horizon to orientate ourselves, otherwise our
energies become too diffuse. The paradox surrounding the imaginative
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mediation of fantasy and reality, which recurs in Nietzsche and unifies these
essays, is that human beings are subject to certain illusions, which they can
to some extent see through as illusions, but which are nonetheless utterly
necessary for them to continue to live (ibid.: 95).
How, then, is it possible to gain imaginative critical distance without
getting caught up in the web of powerful fantasies which our society spins
around us? (ibid.: x). Marxs insight that customs appropriate to a particular
historical context may drag back development as situations change, helps to
explain a distinction between two examples raised in the preface: (1)
politicians, such as Margaret Thatcher, bring into existence new brute
realities with the exercise of the imagination (ibid.: ix); but (2) the Bush
regime suffered from the hubristic belief that the United States was so
limitlessly powerful it could successfully conjure a completely new reality
into existence in Iraq, without regard to antecedent conditions (ibid.). The
dialectical point here against hypostatization is raised again in relation to
Celans poetry and Nietzsches philology, the task of which is to bring
together past and present with the intention of using each to criticize the
other (ibid.: 84). The imagination may generate destructive illusions, but
with careful attention to contexts of action, it can also help us, constructively,
to define and fundamentally alter reality.
At times the theme of politics and the imagination proves a thin
thread in its attempt to draw together work previously presented in diverse
contexts and addressing a broad range of interests. However, an overriding
concern with the question of the distance required for realistic criticism may
provide methodological justification for the loose connections between these
essays, and perhaps even for the essay style itself, which Geuss associates
with an alternative conception of modernity in Montaigne, Rabelais,
Marlowe and Grotius a world of skeptical tolerance, affirmation of life, and
a concept of liberty not linked to the self-regulated internalized policeman.
A literary move away from philosophical treatises, he suggests, could help
to free us from the illusion of an absolute autonomous subject and the
fantasy of an overarching consensus that distorts the political philosophy
of the Enlightenment (ibid.: 78).
It is unlikely, writes Geuss, that we can make sense of everything, or
even make sense of why we cannot do so. His reluctance to develop a
systematic treatise is no doubt motivated by a concern, typical in critical
theory, to avoid didactic, moralistic exposition, which lends itself to the
reinforcement of hierarchically categorized prejudices effected by social
relations of domination. Following Celan, these essays may be said to take
the form of a meridian (like Benjamins constellation) by bringing together
apparently different places and events without subsuming them under a
single concept or metaphor (which deprives singularities of their
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uniqueness), to create new possibilities and give new orientation, in a light

which shines from the utopia of human memories and past dissatisfactions
(ibid.: 132).
Yet something is still missing in this elegiac re-imagination of real
politics. We are encouraged to check imaginative constructs against real
contexts of action, but reality is partly imagined. One also wonders where
the action is, amid the abstract meta-analysis of the limitations of political
philosophy divorced from real contexts of action. Geuss is a doctor of
philosophy, not a mechanic. What we have is a desperate situation of
increased world population, irreversible environmental damage, economic
and political divisions, military conflicts over increasingly scarce resources
(ibid.: 184), dominated by real conflicts which no amount of sophisticated
intellectual maneuvering will resolve (ibid.: 181). These issues will impose
radical responses which will require much discipline. It is impossible to
continue with the notion of the unbridled productivity of the free market
and we will be dragged to confront this (ibid.: xiii) if we do not come up
with some imaginative responses.
Any organized attempt at improvement of our situation will
include some at least minimal exercise of the imagination, in
that it will require agents to think of ways in which their
environment or modes of acting could be different from what
they now are (ibid.: ix)
The end of the book is a bit of let-down which follows a typical babyboomer formulation of ends (an attempt to take with them to the grave their
entire inherited traditions: the end of history, modernism, post-modernism,
philosophy, ideology, history, job security, affordable housing, the welfare
state, and so on). After 192 pages of criticism, the book kills itself in Hegelian
fashion, spilling out into the world and over the future. We learn that
criticism, and especially radical criticism, emerged from a bourgeois age
and is unlikely to outlive it (ibid.: 185). The comfortable Western European
world, which introduced criticism to society, is about to collapse, taking with
it a luxury good that has showed itself to be in practice almost completely
ineffective (ibid.). In response, it is worth pointing to a cruel illusion for the
moth who holds the sound principle (before electricity), to wit, the darker
it is, the less visible I am. The closer to the light it flies, the darker the world
appears. Perhaps a gloomier enlightenment could help us keep better track
of the world as it is, or perhaps this illusion is simply too comforting to lose
or surrender.
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Chris Allsobrook (callsobrook@uj.ac.za) is a Post Doctoral Research Fellow

in the Department of Politics at the University of Johannesburg. His primary
research focus is on normative problems of justification (both
epistemological and ethical) in social and political theory. Other areas of
interest include 19th and 20th century German philosophy, as well as
criticism of liberal political discourse on agency, sovereignty, rights and
development.
Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political

Edited by James Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen
Oxford: Routledge, 2010, hbk 80.00 (ISBN 978-0-4158-7686-5), 315pp.
by Huw Rees
Is there anything left to say about the Rawls-Habermas encounter? James
Gordon Finlayson and Fabian Freyenhagen evidently think so, as do the
eminent philosophers who have contributed to this book. Its purpose is not,
as the editors make clear, to re-run the encounter or assess what Rawls and
Habermas said about each other, but rather to examine how their respective
theories deal with the important questions of political philosophy, including
wider questions which did not feature directly in the dispute (Finlayson &
Freyenhagen, 2010: 2). It is divided into three sections. The first reproduces
the encounter itself Habermas Reconciliation through the Public Use of
Reason, Rawls Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas, and finally
Habermas Reasonable versus True, or the Morality of Worldviews. The
second section, which takes up the majority of the volume, is made up of
essays about the encounter. The third and shortest section consists of
Habermas reply to these essays.
Finlayson and Freyenhagen provide a lucid introduction, including a
particularly useful summary of the prehistory of the Rawls-Habermas
encounter. The editors efficiently sketch out Rawls and Habermas positions.
They assume that Rawls will be better known to readers, and that Habermas
theories are the ones in need of greater explication. This is clearly a widelyheld assumption several of the contributors to section two share it but
readers who are not so familiar with Rawls (and such people do exist) may
need to look elsewhere for an introduction to his ideas. The editors blowby-blow account of the dispute itself is detailed and effective.
Turning to section one, a question immediately confronts the reader:
does this book need to exist? It is useful to have the texts by Rawls and
Habermas to hand. But these articles have been freely available for years.
The first two appeared in The Journal of Philosophy (1995: 109-131, 132-180)
and Habermas reply took up a chapter of The Inclusion of the Other (1999: 75103). Anyone with access to a university library is already able to read them,
and given that the book costs 80, it is likely that university libraries will be
its main purchasers. The value of the book must lie, then, in the eight essays
which make up section two, and Habermas comments on them.
The essays vary in quality. Three of them are extremely good, and
Joseph Heaths Justice: Transcendental not Metaphysical is the best. Heath
defends Habermas against one of Rawls fundamental criticisms, namely,
his decision to regard the Discourse Theory of law and democracy as a
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comprehensive doctrine, and thus not on the same level as Rawls

freestanding Political Liberalism. This was one of the impediments to the
original encounter, as several contributors note. With his usual rigour and
skill, Heath unpicks and inverts this criticism, arguing that Rawls theory is
far more comprehensive than he liked to admit. Heath has a gift for clarifying
the murkiest controversies, and readers will welcome his contribution.
Christopher McMahon offers a brisk, laconic examination of
Habermas, Rawls and Moral Impartiality. Both theorists are found
wanting, although his focus is on the former. McMahon uses his distinction
between piecemeal and integral consensus (2010: 203) to force open
some of the flaws in Habermas approach, and takes aim at the possible
circularity of purely procedural justification a problem which afflicts Rawls
as well. His criticisms may not be devastating Habermas responds to them
robustly in section three but they are well-made and enlightening.
Catherine Audard stages the debate that never was (2010: 225)
concerning Rawls and Habermas on the Place of Religion in the Political
Domain. While the contents of the first half of her essay will be no surprise
to anyone who is familiar with this issue, it is an excellent primer for those
who are not. Audard demonstrates the initial convergence between Rawls
and Habermas on this issue, as well as showing that the latter has, in recent
years, gone much further than the former in his attempts to accommodate
religion in modernity. The second half of Audards essay contains the most
stringent criticisms of Habermas to be found in this book. She dismantles
his grounding of postsecularism on the cognitive burden which secularism
(supposedly) places on religious citizens. Ultimately, Audard concludes that
Rawls weak secularism, which asks only for a convergence of minds
between citizens, may be more liberal and tolerant than Habermas
postsecularism, which aims for both hearts and minds.
The essays by Anthony Simon Laden, James Gledhill, and Jeffrey
Flynn are well-executed and successful exercises in philosophical
commentary. Gledhill shares Heaths intuition that Rawls theory is more
substantive than metaphysically neutral. Flynn argues that Habermas
dialogical approach to global human rights, informed by a Honnethian
sensitivity to struggles for recognition, is more appropriate for the
contemporary world than Rawls austere formulation. Laden looks deeply
into exactly where Rawls and Habermas differ on the matter of justification.
The two remaining essays are not so successful. James Bohmans
prose is impenetrable, and his arguments are unclear. Rainer Forst takes
twice as long as most of the other contributors to say half as much. Moreover,
his essay is a truncated version of a chapter of his forthcoming The Right to
Justification. Interested readers should wait until December 2011, or seek out
the German version.
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Habermas replies to his critics in the third section. For all his
prolificacy, any new text of his should be welcomed, and this section is one
of the books strengths. The regrettable thing, as Habermas himself
acknowledges, is the irremediable asymmetry of the fact that he is here to
reply and continue the debate, while John Rawls is not (2010: 283). Habermas
devotes a short subsection to each of the contributors. Lack of space
inevitably means that his comments are general rather than detailed. He
sometimes responds to specific criticisms with rather vague restatements of
the criticised arguments. Despite this, many of Habermas comments are
illuminating, and the most profitable way of using this book may be to read
an essay from section two, followed by Habermas comments on it.
This is very much a book for specialists. It gives the impression at
times of being written by fans of Rawls and Habermas, for fans of Rawls and
Habermas, but the best of the essays in section two offer genuine criticisms
of the titular theorists. The book will make a fine contribution to any
philosophical library, chronicling as it does the only sustained encounter
between the greatest political philosophers of the late twentieth century.
Huw Rees (dr81@sussex.ac.uk) is a DPhil student at the Centre for Social
and Political Thought at the University of Sussex. His research focuses on
postsecularism in Habermas recent work.
Bibliography
Finlayson, J. G. & Freyenhagen, F. (2010) Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the
Political Oxford: Routledge
Forst, R. (2011) The Right to Justification New York: Columbia University Press
Habermas, J. (1995) Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason:
Remarks on John Rawlss Political Liberalism The Journal of Philosophy 92(3),
109-131
Habermas, J. (1999) The Inclusion of the Other Cambridge: Polity
Rawls, J. (1995) Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas The Journal of
Philosophy 92(3), 132-180
For a New Critique of Political Economy

by Bernard Stiegler
Cambridge: Polity, 2010, pbk 12.99 (ISBN: 978-0-7456-4804-0), 154pp.
by Danny Hayward
What to make of the figure of the proletariat today, when the persistence of
complex class divisions is so manifestly incontrovertible, and when, in the
Western states at least, capitalism seems to have pacified even those whom
it immiserates? This is an old and drably familiar question, posed by thinkers
as unalike as Theodor Adorno and Anthony Giddens, in various tones of
pain and beatific contentment. For the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler
(who cites Adorno but who is closer in spirit to Giddens), the continued
power of the category proletarian is ensured in (what I will contend is) the
grand sophistical tradition: by a change in definition. The proletarian is no
longer simply (what it was for Marx) the individual expropriated of the
means of production, but becomes, in what Stiegler understands to be an
intensification of Marxs thesis, the individual expropriated of savoir-vivre
of the knowledge of life.
Stieglers For a New Critique of Political Economy is the elaboration of a
lecture given in 2009, and the condensation of lessons learnt in a series of
books on technics and society, most of which were published in the 1990s.
According to the central thesis of this latest text and this is its explanation
in divine theoria of the economic crisis that began in 2008 the knowledge
of life is abolished in the process of technological advance: the memory gives
way to the hard drive, the instinctive sense of melody to digital audio
storage, craftsmanship to the automatically controlled, reprogrammable,
multipurpose manipulator. Stiegler sometimes (and following Derrida) calls
this process grammatization; sometimes he calls it the production of negative
externalities. Whatever the designation, at the far reach of the process (that
is, we are told, sometime in the early 1970s) grammatization had so
completely denuded people of their variable savoir-vivre that even the elites
were proletarianised (2010: 47). A page later we are told that the nervous
system has been proletarianised. Sixteen pages further in and the petit
bourgeoisie too have been subjected to an aesthetic and noetic
proletarianization (2010: 64). Proletarianisation has exalted itself to a
universal condition. It is the very spice of life that embitters all its flavour.
How did we poor humans get here? Stiegler has an answer, or, rather,
he has a narrative of unusual stretch and impressive grandiloquence, arcing
preposterously from the advent of Neolithic sedentarization (2010: 9) to
the arrest in December 2008 of the Information Age ponzi-sorcerer Bernie
Madoff. I do not have time to recapitulate the full arc of this narrative (and
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in 130 pages, neither does Stiegler): instead I will recapitulate his account
from 1900 onwards.
It begins badly. Around the turn of the century capitalism underwent
a crisis of profitability. In a kind of reprieve for the ruling class, the crisis was
put off by the invention of a new industrial model (2010: 23), available in
any colour so long as its black. Readers will recognise this as the Fordism
thesis. Stieglers original contribution is not the periodisation but its
hermeneutics. How did Fordism restore profitability? According to A New
Critique, it did so by inventing consumerism. For Stiegler, profitability
resumed not in consequence of the invention of a new and fertile productive
line (automobiles), but in consequence of the proletarianization of the
consumer. Whatever capital was perpetrating in the nineteenth century in
factories and fields, in the twentieth century the system renewed itself by
the exploitation and functionalization of a new energy . . . the consumers
libidinal energy. This energy, harnessed by marketing to the grim warhorse
of Sears catalogues and, latterly, of Amazon browser windows, meant that
the tendential fall of the rate of profit met, if not quite its match, then at least
its countertendency.
But all good things come to an end, and not least in what Stiegler calls
the pharmakon emerging from the process of grammatization in which, in
the epoch of reticulated capitalism, cognitive technologies and digitalized
cultural technologies are formed; and so in the second chapter Stiegler
attempts to set his account to work in explanation of the capitalist crisis of
2008 onwards (2010: 48). As the reader may by now have guessed, this
account is not akin to those Marxist analyses whose terminology it endorses.
In Stieglers opinion, the crisis was not in the financial system alone (an
assumption he shares with most Marxists), but was also in the libidinal
economy (an assumption which he doesnt), which through its subjection to
marketing has been bludgeoned and tantalised into a delirious short
termism, a kind of systemic stupidity or carelessness that is sufficiently
universal to explain both the wide-eyed, speechless enthusiasm of a viewer
of X Factor and the shut eyes of Alan Greenspan mouthing off in 2007 from
his highchair on the Board of the Federal Reserve (2010: 47).
The crisis of capital in 2010 is the Nachtrglichkeit, the last Freudian
aftereffect, of the botched resolution of 1908. In Stieglers view, it is also the
pharmakon, the poison that contains its own remedy. Stiegler descries here
the cure for capital in crisis: a new therapeutics of investment (2010: 19),
where the technologies of grammatization might allow a circumvention of
the consumer economy. On the last page of the book we are told in the lofty
tones of the office memorandum that this circumvention will allow a
potentially beneficial inter-systemic macro-tendency formed at the interface
of the technical system and social systems, and operating a fundamental
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integration between them; but also that [d]eveloping such forms of

knowledge and valuing them economically will cause a new economic
system to emerge from the heart of the social systems (2010: 129). This
might strike the reader as circular: we must circumvent the economy so that
we may better integrate the technical and social systems; then we can restore
them to the economy and resume our wielding of the price-tag gun. This is
not untypical: in Stieglers quasi-marxisant programmatic digest, the
Benjaminian Einbahnstrae is supplanted by the one way mirror. Peering at
its warped surface, the reader sees reflected back the categories of Das
Kapital; behind them, however, she can make out the faint and faded outlines
of another political programme, a tattered manual of social change for jaded
cyberneticians. A trip through any page of the endnotes confirms this; and
Marxists will baulk at the procrustean bed onto which Stiegler forces
economic analysis. The tendential fall in the rate of profit is understood as a
consequence of marketing, chronic short-termism and the destruction of all
motives (2010: 61). How do we understand capitalist decline in the 1970s?
Was it due to class struggle? Industrial overcapacity determined by market
imperatives to competition? No: the answer is the languid contemplation of
billboards.
It was often remarked in the turbid wake of the financial sector crash
and the sovereign assumption of private debt that the category capitalism
had thrust its way back into popular consciousness. Stieglers New Critique
licenses a few antiquated cybernetic remedies to capitalist decline (Stiegler
is a Heideggerian prophet come to speak of hackers and social media); but
its real and revanchist function is to tear away from the two categories of
Marxism and capitalism everything that might make those categories
persistently unpalatable to a bourgeois and post-Marxist readership. Stieglers
book doesnt just retail a newly evacuated definition of the proletariat in a
market of competing class analyses: it philosophises the proletariat. Once the
philosophical definition of the proletariat has been purged of its relation to
the means of production, the commodification of those means, and the
authorities that police their use, Stiegler has consummately evacuated from
his Critique any detailed account of property relations; and this in turn
licenses the decisive deletion from his Marxism of communism, both as the
description of a non-capitalist form of property holding and as the
inextinguishable horizon for revolutionary action. The old, shuffling horde
of proletarian producers, with its familiar iconography of grimaces and flatcaps, its gimmick hammers and its unaffordable pension plans, are swept
once again from the stage of history, in emblematic fidelity to a social
analysis which has been passed down like a membership card or
mantelpiece ornament from the Frankfurt School to Foucault to Andr Gorz
to the hordes of ex-Marxists who from the eighties onwards thronged onto
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the sofas of French chat shows to chant their valedictions (and with whom
Stiegler understands himself to be in combat).
As I said, this analysis is not a rebuttal of the categories of Marxs Das
Kapital, but it is nevertheless a negation of its arguments, because its
resumption of the critique of political economy is delicately negotiated to
appeal to the sensibilities of exactly those social groups which Marxs
analysis of capital was intended to frustrate i.e. those who stand to lose on
its prognosis and is calculated to found its appeal in the universal ascription
of membership of the category Marx used to describe capitals victims. Today, we
are all victims, and the final outcome of this is a perfectly abstract description
of a better relationship to work beyond mere employment, which consists
in action in the world in order to transform it on the basis of the knowledge
one has of it (2010: 131n). But this is a statement just as true of the man who
in The Wealth of Nations engages forever in the peculiar business of putting
the head on a pin or of migrant Philippine textile workers now being
exploited in Romania as it is of humans freed from the grim exigencies of
capitalist markets (1986: 110). I would propose that this is a more specific
problem in Stiegler than the one that might be diagnosed, of excess
abstraction carried out in a social vacuum. In the quashing of social
antagonism, it is the function of reactionary thought to trivialise basic
differences in material conditions by refusing entry of those differences into
the hallowed realm of moral thought. Such thinking denies not the reality but
the significance of those basic differences, and it does so in the name of a
putatively more basic similitude. After all, screams the refrain, everyone has
to work. This is the inverse of good class analysis, which attempts to
characterise the production of basic similitude (of classes) in solicitude for
the experienced significance of differences. Under the fluorescent sign of
marketing and the grammatized technics it sells us, Stiegler diminishes the
proletarian ascription to a universal freebie, chucked in to sweeten the deal
for the non-committal reader. But this is just one way of picking sides.
Danny Hayward is a PhD candidate in English at Birkbeck College. He
works on conceptions of commitment in English Romanticism. An article on
the poetry of Keston Sutherland is forthcoming in the Journal of British and
Irish Innovative Poetry.
Bibliography
Smith, A. (1986 [1776]) The Wealth of Nations: Books I-III London: Penguin
Stiegler, B. (2010) For a New Critique of Political Economy Cambridge: Polity
The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegels Social Theory

by Axel Honneth
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, hbk 20.95 (ISBN: 978-0-69111806-2), 96pp.
by Philip Hogh
It is probably no exaggeration to call Axel Honneths Struggle for Recognition
one of the most influential works in social philosophy and critical theory of
the last two decades. In his work Honneth returned Hegels concept of
recognition to the center of philosophical attention. Honneths special
interest was to use Hegels early social philosophy to develop a theory of
intersubjective recognition that would end up neither in what Honneth
called Hegels monological idealism represented by the Phenomenology of
Spirit nor in a formal and transcendental moral theory of recognition
represented by the works of Jrgen Habermas.
Surprisingly, Hegels Philosophy of Right did not play a major role in
Honneths crucial work. In his newly published book, Honneth tries to
regain Hegels Philosophy of Right as a theory of the conditions and
realizations of individual freedom. In the first of three main chapters,
Honneth explains the difficulties one has to face in carrying through this
attempt as well as the reasons why it is promising to actualize Hegels theory
in the aforementioned way. Honneth takes into account two problems which
every engagement with Hegels work has to confront: the current disinterest
in the Philosophy of Right, despite its attractiveness for the politicophilosophical self-understanding of our time (Honneth, 2010: 3), has both
political and methodological reasons. Politically, Hegels work seems to have
antidemocratic consequences because it subordinates the freedom of the
individual to the ethical authority of the state (ibid.), while
methodologically the main objection holds that the steps in Hegels
reasoning can be correctly followed and judged only in relation to the
appropriate parts of his Logic, but the Logic has become totally
incomprehensible to us owing to its ontological conception of spirit (ibid.:
4).
This is why Honneth proposes an indirect and modest strategy in
reactualizing Hegels social theory instead of showing that the two
aforementioned objections are mere misunderstandings: we must criticize
them indirectly by demonstrating their irrelevance to any really productive
reappropriation of the treatise (ibid.). In doing so Honneth aims to prove
that the Philosophy of Right can be understood as a draft of a normative
theory of those spheres of reciprocal recognition that must be preserved
intact because they constitute the moral identity of modern societies (ibid.:
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5). Honneth is fully aware that his way of interpreting Hegels work bears
the risk of losing access to its substance. In order to avoid this danger
Honneth uses two of Hegels concepts that are crucial for his system and
must not be neglected even though the structure and the idea of Hegels
system as a whole are no longer convincing: these two concepts consist in
objective spirit and ethical life. According to Honneth, the former is used
to understand social reality as a rational structure, while the latter is used to
describe the social spheres of action in which inclinations and moral norms,
interests, and values are already fused in the form of institutionalized
interactions (ibid.: 6). In Honneths view, these two concepts, and the
theoretical consequences resulting from their use, represent the necessary
framework if one wants to read Hegels Philosophy of Right as a theory of the
realization of individual freedom.
Having explained his theoretical and methodological approach to
Hegels work, Honneth proceeds to read the Introduction of the Philosophy
of Right, where Hegel explains his theory of the freedom of the will, and uses
the concept of friendship to grasp the normative core of Hegels work: as
the quintessence of a just social order [Hegel] regards those social or
institutional conditions that allow each individual subject to enter into
communicative relationships that can be experienced as expressions of their
own freedom (ibid.: 15). Friendship then means nothing else but being
with oneself in the other (ibid.: 14), so that the normative criteria Hegel uses
to decide whether the social spheres allow its members to realize themselves
in reciprocal recognition are the criteria of successful intersubjective
communicative relations.
In his second chapter Honneth examines the two deficient forms of
the realization of individual freedom with which Hegel is concerned, namely,
abstract right and morality, in addition to the suffering these deficient
forms create a suffering from indeterminacy. These two forms are necessary
but not sufficient forms of the self-realization of the individual. The
deficiency of abstract or formal right is that those who articulate all their
needs and intentions in the categories of formal right become incapable of
participating in social life and must therefore suffer from indeterminacy
(ibid.: 35). Every bearer of rights therefore has to participate in social
relations if she wants the potential of freedom that lies within her rights to
be realized. Honneth then discusses the manifold objections Hegel raises to
morality, which is the Kantian form of the realization of freedom, but regards
only one as being worth considering, or indeed true: it is the objection to
context-blindness (ibid.: 39). Honneth continues:
As is well known, Hegels objection to the idea of moral
autonomy is that it does not help us in reconstructing how a
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subject will ever come to act rationally; for in trying to apply

the categorical imperative, the subject will remain disoriented
and empty so long as he does not resort to certain normative
guidelines drawn from the institutionalized practices of his
environment, which provide him with the most basic
information about what may be regarded as a good reason in
any given situation (ibid.)
The deficiencies from which subjects suffer are isolation from social
practices in abstract right, and emptiness and the inability to act with good
reason in a distinct situation in morality. This suffering from
indeterminacy has to be overcome, and Honneth describes this process in
his third chapter as a liberation that leads to or creates ethical life:
If we are to list the conditions in brief key phrases, the sphere
of ethical life must consist of interactional practices that are able
to guarantee individual self-realization, reciprocal recognition,
and the corresponding process of education; and the three aims
must be closely interwoven, since Hegel seems convinced that
their relationship is one of mutual conditioning (ibid.: 56)
For Honneth, it is important to point out that Hegel is not a moral
constructivist who outlines moral principles and in a second step then asks
what the social conditions for the realization of these principles must be like.
On the contrary, on Honneths reading Hegel thinks that the social
conditions of life
generally contain enough justifiable moral norms to serve as a
foundation for most of our judgments and decisions; and this
thesis itself was the expression of his broader conviction that
social reality should be spoken of only as objective spirit
because it must be regarded as the result of the rational
instantiation of generalizable reasons (ibid.)
The sphere of ethical life is tripartite and consists of the family, civil
society, and the state. In a typical Hegelian manner, the family and civil
society alone are deficient parts of ethical life that can only be called ethical
(sittlich) if they are integrated into a whole. This integration now can only
be guaranteed by the state. As Honneth reads Hegels work as a theory of
individual freedom that can only be realized in social practices of reciprocal
recognition it strikes him that Hegel does not conceptualize the state as a
sphere of recognition:
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If Hegel had thought along such lines, if he had really

envisioned an emphatic concept of public freedom, he could
easily have conceived the state as a third sphere of reciprocal
recognition: what the subjects recognize about each other, if
they cooperate in the manner described, is their readiness and
ability to cooperate, through their own activities, in the creation
of a common good (ibid.: 78)
This means Honneth criticizes Hegel for conceptualizing the state as a sphere
of domination and not as a sphere of recognition.
Now I think this is the point where Honneths reading of Hegel
reaches its limits. Of course, Honneth is right in criticizing Hegels theory of
the state as affirmative given that it subsumes individual freedom under the
state. But this conservative aspect of Hegels thought could show its critical
truth content if one thinks of it as a realistic expression of the relations
between individuals and the state. If one takes into account that even the
institutions of the modern democratic state are means of domination then
one could read Hegels social theory as a theory of recognition that knows
its limits, as mutual recognition in social practices is restricted by the state.
Although Honneths strategy of an indirect reactualization of Hegels
Philosophy of Right is a strong and stimulating reading of Hegel, the
preference for Hegels early socio-philosophical works which are
foregrounded in Struggle for Recognition and the present text risks lapsing
into a romantic distortion of social and political reality. As The Pathologies
of Individual Freedom is a very short book, one is left curious as to how
Honneth will continue his engagement with the Philosophy of Right in his
forthcoming book on the right of freedom.1
Philip Hogh (p.hogh@gmx.de) is currently working on his dissertation on
Adornos philosophy of language in the Philosophy Department at the
Goethe University Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany. His current research
interests are social philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of
nature, and psychoanalysis.
Endnotes
1
Honneths book Das Recht der Freiheit. Grundri einer demokratischen

Sittlichkeit (The Right of Freedom. Groundwork of a Democratic Ethical
Life) is announced to be published in June 2011 by Suhrkamp Press, Berlin.
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Bibliography
Hegel, G. W. F. (1979) Phenomenology of Spirit [trans. A. V. Miller] Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Hegel, G. W. F. (2004) Elements of the Philosophy of Right A. W. Wood (ed.)
[trans. H. B. Nisbet] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Honneth, A. (1996) The Struggle for Recognition Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Honneth, A. (2010) The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegels Social Theory
[trans. L. Lb] Princeton: Princeton University Press
Of Jews and Animals

by Andrew Benjamin
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010, hbk 65.00 (ISBN: 978-0-74864053-9), 208pp.
by Verena Erlenbusch and Colin McQuillan
Andrew Benjamin has undertaken a compelling study of the ways in which
Jews and animals are figured in the history of art, literature and philosophy
in his recent book Of Jews and Animals. Benjamin acknowledges that
associating Jews and animals is problematic for historical and political
reasons, yet, he attempts to show how both Jews and animals become figures
of the without relation. The without relation is, according to Benjamin, a
radical separation that takes the form of an absence of a relation. It is an
inadequate conception of difference in which particularity is effaced in the
name of universality. The purpose of Benjamins study is to develop a
metaphysics of particularity, which would allow a more affirmative concept
of relationality than can be conceived through the without relation.
Benjamin begins his study by examining how Descartes and
Heidegger define the difference between animals and humans, in order to
show that the exclusion of animality, and the negation of any relation
between the human and the animal, is constitutive of their respective
conceptions of humanity. In both cases, however, Benjamin argues that
animality remains essentially related to humanity. When one considers the
role animal spirits play in Descartes account of human physiology, and
Heideggers account of the existence of the dog, it becomes apparent that
the without relation is founded on the denial of a more fundamental relation.
Benjamin goes on to elaborate the ways in which human community
is defined by the exclusion of the animal. He contends that, for Blanchot,
community is defined by the death of the animal. The animal is sacrificed in
order to establish the separation from nature and the linguistic relations that
obtain between members of a community. The relations that define the
community are, therefore, essentially human relations. Benjamin is less
concerned about the possibility of including the animal in the community,
however, than he is with the possibility of thinking the animal outside the
logic of sacrifice and the without relation.
The logic of sacrifice and the without relation are maintained by the
anthropocentric bias of the language of metaphysics. Navigating between
Derridas deconstruction of humanism and the space of play that
deconstruction opens up between the human and the animal, Benjamin
attempts to demonstrate the primordiality of relationality. Relationality is
always already constituted by the way in which difference is thought. For
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that reason, Benjamin emphasizes the way in which difference is figured,

rather than the difference between the human and the animal.
Drawing on Hegels discussion of disease in the Philosophy of Nature,
Benjamin introduces the figure of the Jew. Benjamin situates his discussion
of the Jew within a discussion of disease since the latter marks the
movement in which particularity dominates a conception of possible
universality (2010: 99). For Hegel, Benjamin claims, the Jew takes the form
of a disease that can be overcome (ibid.: 104). The Jew can be incorporated
into the universality of man if his particularity as Jew is effaced.
Universality is thus dependent upon the exclusion of particularity and the
establishment of a without relation. Instead of arguing for recognition of the
Jew as Jew, however, Benjamin insists on a rethinking of relationality which
affirms particularity.
Benjamin argues that Agamben neglects that particularity in his
account of bare life. He accuses Agamben of effacing the particularity of
those who were reduced to bare life in the camps and emptying the political
of the founding mark of difference (ibid.: 122-124). Doing so, Benjamin
maintains, leads Agamben to a utopianism in which bare life is an
absolutely indeterminate form of life beyond identity. For Benjamin, this
utopianism is problematic, firstly, because it is unable to distinguish between
potential and actual victims of violence. Violence is not inflicted on bare life
indiscriminately, but rather on those like Jews in Nazi Germany whose
otherness leads them to be regarded as enemies. Secondly, Agamben also
fails to see that particularity must persist in the coming community, even
if the differences which distinguish particularity are no longer considered
marks of enmity.
Examining the logic of enmity, Benjamin considers Pascals reflections
on the relation between justice and force. Benjamin argues that justice
requires force, for Pascal, because there are always those who are wicked.
The presence of the other, the representation of the other as the enemy, and
the denunciation of the enemy as wicked, allows force to be exercised against
the other in the name of justice. Rather than being the mystical foundation
of authority, as Derrida contends, this gesture is for Benjamin the original
and grounding form of violence (ibid.: 127). The manifest violence in
Pascals identification of the Jew as wicked is the result of a process of
universalization, which substitutes the immediacy of identity for the porous
and ongoing incompleteness of particularity (ibid.).
Against this original and grounding form of violence, Benjamin
poses the work of art. Although the work of art is often beholden to the same
process of universalization that led Pascal to declare the Jew wicked, the
portrait also represents the particularity of its subject. The distinguishing
characteristics of the particular are presented in the portrait in ways that are
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neither simple nor immediate. Particularity breaks through the universal in

surprising and unexpected ways, when, for example, faces do not look at
one another in Van Eycks The Fountain of Grace (1430), or while hands seem
to touch without touching in Drers Jesus Among the Doctors (1506). In both
cases, the work of art presents the complex plurality that undoes the
universalization of identity, exclusion and enmity. For this reason, Benjamin
concludes that a just and affirmative encounter with particularity is possible.
Andrew Benjamin offers an important intervention in the
philosophical concern with the figures of Jews and animals. His
problematization of ethical reflections for being tainted by the founding
mark of the without relation between human and non-human beings, draws
attention to the necessity of a new way of thinking about relationality. It is
not entirely clear, however, if, for Benjamin and in the history of philosophy,
the animal is actually presented as something without relation to the human.
Benjamin does not consider the ways in which separation, negation,
exclusion, and difference, constitute, despite their negativity, forms of
relation.
Benjamins reading of Pascal is likewise questionable since Pascal does
not actually call Jews wicked. There is an important slippage in Benjamins
reading, which passes from Pascals statement that it is necessary that Jews
or Christians are wicked (ibid.: 130) to the conclusion that Jews are
automatically (ibid.: 143) and immediately (ibid.: 146) wicked. What
Benjamin brings out in his discussion of Pascal, however, is a question of
philosophical and political acuity. What does it mean, Benjamin asks, to
be just to particularity? (ibid.: 145). The answer is as provocative as it is
powerful. Instead of understanding justice as force, doing justice to
particularity requires a temporal and spatial element that allows immediacy
to be displaced and the time of judgment to be held open. Doing justice to
particularity means
to hold both philosophically and as a matter of social policy to
the maintenance of particularities as sites of conflict and thus
within terms they set and create to hold to the necessity that
particularities have their own sense of self-transformation
(ibid.: 146).
Benjamins reflections on particularity and the justice it demands
deserve the kind of wide readership that the publishers price tag seems to
preclude. Given the lack of an exhaustive bibliography, as well as the
shockingly poor copyediting, one is left wondering about the level of care
and attention Edinburgh University Press have chosen to pay to this
important intervention by a scholar of Benjamins stature.
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Colin McQuillan (cmcquillan@utk.edu) is Lecturer in Philosophy at the

University of Tennessee, Knoxville. He received his PhD from Emory
University in 2010.
Verena Erlenbusch (v.erlenbusch@sussex.ac.uk) is a recipient of a DOCfellowship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences at the Centre for Social and
Political Thought, University of Sussex. She is also a Visiting Research
Scholar in Philosophy at Emory University.
Adorno for Revolutionaries

by Ben Watson
London: Unkant Publishing, 2011, pbk 11.99, (ISBN: 978-0-9568-1760-0),
256pp.
by Luke Manzarpour
Few calls have been made on the writings of Theodor Adorno to engage in
direct political action since his students vainly demanded he march them to
the barricades in 68. One recent attempt to chase away his black dog of
despair was the decidedly limp autonomist publication Negativity and
Revolution by John Holloway (2008). Others seeking an affinity between
Adorno and contemporary radicalism have sought to apply Adornos
aesthetic theory to the jazz of Coltrane or the punk of Fugazi. The most
sustained effort to reconcile Adorno with contemporary praxis has come
from music journalist Ben Watson, whose sprawling tomes on Frank Zappa,
Derek Bailey and the avant-garde are driven by a confidence in Trotskyist
politics and its consistency with the doyen of the Frankfurt School.
Adorno for Revolutionaries a collection of Watsons essays and reviews
from early 90s to mid-00s offers an opportunity to evaluate the unique
contribution to leftist thought of its author. Published under the banner of
his newly-founded Association of Music Marxists (AMM), the political and
philosophical bases of Watsons oeuvre are presented throughout in
discussions on a wide range of targets from The Doors to Plato showing
just why he has devoted so many exuberant pages to music of which the
majority of people have no experience. An excellent introduction, then, to
Watsons ideas; however, the same cannot be said for those of Adorno.
Watson concludes the books final piece a transcript of a talk given
to the SWPs annual Marxism festival in 1995 with the distinctly unAdornian statement that contemplation is not the task of revolutionary
socialists (2011: 212). Readers familiar with Adornos magnum opus
Negative Dialectics will immediately think of the well-known opening line
a rebuttal of Marxs condemnation of the role of philosophers as merely
interpreting the world: Philosophy, which once seemed outmoded, remains
alive because the moment of its realisation was missed (1973: 3, translation
modified). Thus, he calls for a return to the problematic of German Idealism
which socialism had thought concluded decisively with Marx and the class
struggle. The critique of socialist theory developed in Negative Dialectics is
not merely an attack on Soviet Diamat (as Watson contends) but strikes at
the core of Marxist thought, exposing the primitive in its purported progress.
For Adorno, in an age when certainties about how action can resolve the
issues of contradiction inherent in capitalism and its philosophy are all but
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lost, philosophical thinking is itself an important form of praxis that will help
lead us out of the quagmire of actually existing socialist opposition (or lack
thereof).
Not so for Watson, who repeats the neo-Kantian dichotomy between
thought and action despite his sensitivity elsewhere to such cant in
sociology, favouring action over thought. Watsons reading glosses over the
significant fact that, for Adorno, contemplation is action, a move which
informs Watsons division between what is alive (of practical use) and what
is dead (abstract philosophy) in Adornos writings. This is the frustration
of the music journalist; ever discussing but never making music. For Adorno,
immanent critique of German Idealism fosters truths about society as a
whole since he reads the philosophy as the most substantial vessel of
capitalist ideology and its antithesis. Watson, however, takes Adorno as
reading philosophy as simply an unmediated reflection of the categories of
society. Thus, Adornos critique of the domination of the concept since
Plato is taken simply as his shorthand for domination of the boss over the
employee (Watson, 2011: 45). Shorn of the nuances of Adornos
conceptualisation we are denied his vision for a reconfiguration of human
relations that Watson too readily assumes will be resolved in class struggle
as understood by Lenin.
In this Watson resembles the students to which Adorno referred in a
1955 newspaper article:
Many students wait expectantly to see whose side the lecturer
takes; they become excited if they detect an affirmative or
polemical judgement and prefer a definite position to mere
reflection (Adorno, 2002: 284)
The Adorno that emerges is one of unfamiliar vitality, with Watson egging
him on beyond the misgivings over a revolutionary subject to embrace a
politics with which Adorno the man would have been uncomfortable.
Unlike Adorno, Watson sees escape routes from the otherwise allencompassing logic of capital cropping up all over the place, primarily in
music. Lacking technical musical training, Watson takes his lead from
Adornos repeated inclusion of his subjective response to music and how
sounds resemble objectively existing social phenomena, as opposed to
reliance on musicological insight (2011: 190). This informs a fundamental
aim of Watsons project; all judgement must acknowledge and include the
subjective response of the individual judging if it is to achieve objective
validity cultural analysis is meaningless that does not admit the point of
view of the observer (ibid.: 7).
Thus, we are taken through a cornucopia of Watsons musical likes,
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from Snoop Dogg to Pinski Zoo. Any positive vibe Watson gets from music
is put down to a progressive impulse lurking within, broadly following the
criteria for radical music Adorno found satisfied through twelve-tone
composition. At one point, Watson is candid about the vindication for his
likes and dislikes he derives from reading Adorno:
[W]hat I especially like about Adorno is that he explains to me
in rational, historical-materialist terms proclivities and
animosities Id previously thought to be subjective and arbitrary
(ibid.: 31)
Watson argues powerfully for an Aufhebung of Adornos score-based
aesthetic (ibid.: 22), applying Adornos appreciation of modernist
composition to music completely alien in the common-sense logic of market
genres. In turn, he does not so much appreciate music as use it (and his
response to it) for political ends. There is a certain degree of vivacity in his
concern with the establishment of social theory by virtue of explication of
aesthetic right or wrong (ibid.: 102), a celebration of true musical (and, by
extension, sensual) experience that relates how one feels to the social
revolutionary impulse.
Yet the author lacks the dialectical reading of all personal proclivities
that would validate individual response to even the most commercial of
music and thereby universalise his project. It is not made clear why Watsons
personal preferences happen to correspond to a radical progressive social
impulse. Even if we accept his theorisation of the music he likes, he says little
about the truth content of personal responses to music he hates. Surely a
dialectical approach would extend to find a truth in false form in
appreciation of the music of Justin Timberlake and Lady Gaga, even if
revolutionary content cannot be readily imputed. As it stands, the subjective
responses of the vast majority of society are simply deemed wrong. Again,
Watson smuggles in fixed antinomies between progressive and reactionary.
Not that there is no true and false in music, but his method cries out for
recognising the truth in the false (sensitivity to the commercialism in all
music demonstrates recognition of the false in the true). With such an evident
lack, a central tenet of the book namely, that our desires and struggles are
significant to the impulse for radical social change is unsatisfyingly
formulated.
Elsewhere, his assaults on undialectical celebrants of pop pap are
devastating. Simon Frith, Georgina Born and Sarah Thornton are all exposed
for the market promoters they are, with Watson deftly slapping down their
sociological/anthropological studies with Gillian Rose-inspired polemics
Descriptive sociology is an insult to the people it describes: it performs the
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condescension of generalising specific experience, of treating human beings

as an object of study rather than a subject of address (ibid.: 139). The
Guardian-friendly moralism such thinking engenders in lieu of class analysis
tick-box lists of identity politics causes is similarly swatted for being
ineffectual liberal cant, as is the jargon of postmodern reverence for the
Other could anyone go on the radio and argue against immigration
controls using the concept of otherness? (ibid.: 117-118). Deleuzes
nomadic thought is held up against a passage from Lenin promoting the
right of travel for all, while the metaphysics of poststructuralist belief in the
arbitrary relation between signifier and signified are dealt with conclusively
in a footnote. Watson follows Adorno in holding that the thing conceived
will always exceed its conception, and attempts to do justice to the negative
in Negative Dialectics by insisting on the validity of that singularity contra
those who would subsume it in categorical thought.1
In one article, parallels are drawn between the dialectic of freedom
and necessity in both music and political action. Roughly, music and politics
take on emancipatory roles only when fantasy, play and accident are allowed
to infringe upon predetermined goals. Free improvisation is here linked to
Leninist activism in what Watson believes to be a mutual concern with the
specific situation and human idiosyncrasy, while presupposing a common
objective ground and the possibility of communication. Rules (musical and
social) are not simply rejected in this conception in the manner of
anarchism/deconstruction, but instead taken as material for analysis and
exploration.
At times Watsons fantasy and play produce nonsense. His assertion
that the term academy derives from the musical academy was picked up
by Gordon Finlayson in an otherwise ineffectual rebuttal of Watsons review
of Jarvis (1998) published in Historical Materialism. The full text of Finlaysons
letter is reprinted here and is followed by Watsons unsatisfying response of
rare cringe-worthy self-aggrandisement (e.g. I am no stranger to
controversy). The exchange is a low point of the book and one suspects its
existence and reproduction here discloses more between the two than mere
intellectual animosity. Still, in provoking a comparison with the wider
analytical Habermasian work of his opponent, the exchange highlights
Watsons pressing impulse to get out of the academy, where the inheritors
of the Frankfurt School tradition remain, and this at least offers a further
vindication of those who read Adorno contra Habermas.
Watsons musical judgement can suffer from his over-excitability. His
assertion that atonal music and the blues are both protests against the
repression of the tempered harmonic system (2011: 207) misses the fact that
the standard blues song utilises the rigid and tonally consistent pentatonic
scale (the microtones of string bends being more occasional derivations than
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consistent protest). The link between these two musical forms, then, must
lie elsewhere. Watson also holds that the Rolling Stones answer Adornos
call for derivation from an abstractly standard beat, despite Charlie Watts
seldom venturing beyond the most basic of rock beats in their entire output.
At another point, we are told the inclusion of a double bass in Roni Sizes
lounge drum and bass evokes the legacy of jazz and its resistance to
commercial hegemony (ibid.: 163)! This kitsch gesture toward jazz is lapped
up by Watson simply because he likes the music any jazz bassist would
find the connection ridiculous.
Here, Watsons assumption of a consistent coincidence between what
he likes and objective radical content becomes untenable. At times, he seems
to be aware of the problem. The AMMs Manifesto statement For US,
music is a test of you and everything about you, and if you fail that test YOU
ARE THE ENEMY!!! may sound like the joyfully implacable confidence
in personal impulses of a Situationist, but it smacks of mere fun and games
when, throughout the text, SWP comrades are let off for not liking
groovacious music (a compromise not overcome by his anticipation of its
criticism). The conviction is there without the courage, something that may
be remedied if the invalidity of an absolute harmony between Watsons
proclivities and his politics is resolved.
Despite its shortcomings Adorno for Revolutionaries is an immensely
enjoyable manifesto for the revolutionary impulse of sensual pleasure, and
so far more valuable to mobilisation than the analytical consistency of those
leftists with corpses in their mouths. As an attempt to steal back Adorno
from academia it is much more alive than the range of available
introductions to Adorno and one which, most significantly, should provoke
activist readers to put aside quietist academic commentaries and reconsider
Adorno for themselves.
Luke Manzarpour studied law at Kent and Amsterdam, and has a Masters
in Social and Political Thought from Sussex. He grew up in Brighton (an
experience he is commemorating in a book of Lewisian satire called The
Chronicles of E-Z P) and currently works in immigration law in London. He
became interested in Adorno after reading Ben Watsons Negative Dialectics
of Poodle Play.
Endnotes
1
For example, see Campbell (2007).
Indeed, the imprint set up by him and Wilson for AMM is named
specifically in opposition to such thinking.
182
Reviews
Against such academic sociology, Watson lauds three books on different

genres (jazz, rock, and funk) by people involved in those scenes, and traces
the unifying thread in their respective materialist content, generating a
boundary-crossing universalism entirely absent in postmodern liberal
relativism. The instances of isolated identity politics dissent are repeatedly
redirected towards class politics in the tradition of Lenin and Trotsky. Hence
the regular refrain that lacking a Marxist understanding an author does not
quite grasp the significance of their dissent. Thus, universality in music is
taken to be the common cause of the universal working-class. Music, for
Watson, is entirely social, not the other plane of meaning promoted by music
hacks. In turn there is, as such, no contentless form for him; the supposedly
apolitical is in fact deeply political. In fact, for Watson, form has more content
than lyrics. For this reason, Watson can reject music that lacks innovation
but has progressive lyrical content (one thinks of Rage Against the Machine,
Billy Bragg and Dead Prez here, or, indeed, Harold Pinter): Bad form, or
reactionary, derivative treatments are not something that may be excused
by a progressive message (ibid.: 7). Of course, this ignores the fact that a
lot of these artists turn people on to left politics, that a Rage Against the
Machine are of more practical use in psyching up protestors facing violent
police and/or right-wing thugs than a John Zorn, and overlooks the
occasional happy marriage of left politics and innovative music (Eugene
Chadbourne, Minutemen, Propagandhi), but it opens the way to recognition
of radicalism in unexplored and innovative areas beyond gestures to left
issues by celebrity artists.
Bibliography
Adorno, T. W. (1973) Negative Dialectics [trans. E. B. Ashton] New York:
Continuum
Adorno, T. W. (2002) Kants Critique of Pure Reason [trans. R. Livingstone]
Stanford: Stanford University Press
Campbell, C. J. (2007) Three Minute Access: Fugazis Negative Aesthetic
in D. Burke, C. J. Campbell, K. Kiloh, M. K. Palamarek & J. Short (Eds) Adorno
and the Need in Thinking Toronto: University of Toronto Press (278-295)
Holloway, J. (Ed.) (2008) Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political
Activism London: Pluto Press
Jarvis, S. (1998) Adorno: A Critical Introduction New York: Routledge
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Centre for Social and Political Thought
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studies in

social & political thought

Special Feature: Theorising the Postcolonial, Decolonising Theory

studies in social and political thought

Introduction from the Editors:

Battell Lowman & Mayblin: Introduction

Shilliam acknowledges in the case of international relations theory, but it is

Battell Lowman & Mayblin: Introduction

while postcolonialism has emerged from within this framework, decolonial

Battell Lowman & Mayblin: Introduction

its exclusion to colonialist, orientalist and eurocentrist perspectives which

Battell Lowman & Mayblin: Introduction

Battell Lowman & Mayblin: Introduction

The Coloniality of Western Philosophy:

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

considered as a philosophy by philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

is not a philosophy through a colonialist, orientalist and Eurocentrist

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

discourse and intellectual spheres. These assertions can be understood

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

It seems that coloniality is beyond colonialism and constitutes a set of values

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

Mickhael Xifaras underline, the German philosopher has argued, without

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

hides the epistemic localisation in power relationships from

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

See Zhuangzi (1980: 254).

The concept of imaginaire or imaginary is borrowed from Cornlius

On these notions of ethnocentrism and eurocentrism, see Todorov (1989).

See Sakai and Nishitani (1999).

Franois Jullien, a French philosopher, uses Chinese philosophy in order

See Needham (1954) and Etiemble (1988).

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

Castoriadis, C. (1975) LInstitution imaginaire de la socit Paris: Seuil

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

Gregory, D. (2004) The Colonial Present Malden: Blackwell

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

Mignolo, W. (2001) Gopolitique de la connaissance, colonialit du pouvoir

Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy

Thoraval, J. (1992) De la philosophie en Chine la Chine dans la

Indigenous Epistemology and the Decolonisation of

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

that the terms epistemology and epistemologies are used interchangeably to

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

remained a possible and competing source of postcolonial identity, a

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

differs from monocultural and historicist forms of interpretation

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

underpinnings and the counter-modernity of anti-colonial discourse (2001).

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

which is based on the idea of the contemporaneity of indigenous peoples

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

From Indigenous Epistemology to Decolonisation

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology

she said, suspect that post-colonialism has become a strategy for

Alfaisal: Indigenous Epistemology