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DOI 10.1007/s11846-013-0110-8
ORIGINAL PAPER
Abstract In this study, we investigate the relationship between information content of new product preannouncements (NPPAs) and trading behaviors of institutional investors. Using hand-collected data from 1995 to 2004, in empirical results,
we find that there is a significantly positive relationship between information content and institutional investors. NPPAs can help institutional investors to evaluate
the potential success of forthcoming new products through signaling enough
information content. As a result, more information cues and earlier NPPAs can
make institutional investors choose these preannouncing firms into their investment
portfolios to increase their holdings and attract more different institutional investors
to hold these shares of preannouncing firms. In addition, we also find the positive
advertising and R&D investment effects. Our findings suggest that managers should
use the information content of NPPA signals to reduce information asymmetry and
help managers to implement their NPPA strategies so as to receive greater financial
support from institutional investors.
Keywords New product preannouncements Information content
Institutional investors Information asymmetry Signal
JEL Classification
D82 G23
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1 Introduction
Managers often use new product preannouncements (hereafter NPPAs) as signaling
tools to communicate with market participants. The costs of NPPAs may include
information spillover, damage to the existing products of the preannouncing firms,
and retaliatory responses from competitors (Robertson et al. 1995; Su and Rao
2010). In contrast, the possible benefits include creating demand for new products,
offering information about innovations, helping firms to test new product designs,
and discouraging competitors from participating in the market (Sorescu et al. 2007;
Su and Rao 2010). In addition, the success of new products is likely to attract the
attention of institutional investors, leading to an increase in the market value of the
firm. Due to the importance of institutional investors (Andreas et al. 2012),
managers may use NPPAs to communicate information about the development of
new products with institutional investors, and it is the focus of this study.
More specifically, the goal of this article is to offer a way to assess the
relationship between institutional investors and NPPAs. Building on signaling
theory and agency cost, we develop these hypotheses based on the information
content involved in NPPAs. Because of information asymmetry between preannouncing firms and institutional investors, institutional shareholders have trouble
making their investment decisions. This can be reduced by the information cues
contained within NPPAs and the timing of NPPAs. Thus, the preannouncing firm
has a better understanding of the potential success of the new products through the
information content in NPPAs.
This study investigates institutional ownership in response to the information
content within NPPAs. Institutional ownership can be measured by institutional
holdings and the number of institutional investors (Bushee 1998; Chen et al. 2007;
Hussain 2000). Although information asymmetry may have a substantial, negative
impact on the trading decisions of institutional shareholders, given their lack of
sufficient knowledge about forthcoming new products, it can be reduced by
appropriate NPPAs. The empirical results show that the use of NPPAs has an effect
on the trading decisions of institutional investors. Specifically, our findings indicate
that the more information cues that are included in an NPPA, the less information
asymmetry that institutional investors feel with regard to the new products that are
being preannounced. Thus, the information cues have a positive effect on
institutional ownership. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between the
timing of NPPAs and institutional ownership, showing that early NPPAs allow
institutional investors to verify and digest the information of new products more
completely, and subsequently they are more likely to make favorable investment
decisions. Finally, advertising and R&D expenditures are also found to affect
positively the trading decisions of institutional shareholders. In sum, we suggest that
managers should send earlier and more informative messages to institutional
investors once firms decide to adopt the NPPA strategy, as this can receive positive
responses from institutional investors.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
literature on the relationship between NPPAs and institutional investors. Section 3
then describes the sample selection procedure, defines the variables, and provides
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the related statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while Sect. 5 discusses
the implications. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes with a summary of this study.
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MV is equal to the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the share price. The ADI
is the advertising expenditure per dollar of sales for the fiscal year prior to the NPPA.
The RDI is the R&D expenditure per dollar of sales for the fiscal year prior to the NPPA.
The return on assets (ROA) is defined as the operating income before depreciation
scaled by TA. The Herfindahl index (HI), defined as the sum of the squared fraction of
industry sales for the fiscal year prior to the NPPA, is used to measure the competitive
intensity of the industry that a firm operates within. The higher the value of the index,
the lower the competitive intensity, and when it equals one, this means that there is a
monopoly market. The industries are identified based on the four-digit SIC codes in the
Compustat database. Firm age (FA) is the number of years the firm has been listed in the
CRSP database.
3.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the sample. First, the mean and median of
institutional holdings are 76.36 and 54 %, respectively, while the mean and median of the
number of institutional shareholders are 78.63 and 36, respectively. Institutional investors
have relatively large holdings in NPPA firms, indicating that they tend to allocate their
funds to those companies that are more active with regard to publicizing their new
products. The mean and median of NPPA cue are 5.04 and 5, while the mean and median
of NPPA timing are 128.52 and 121 days, respectively. This means that NPPA firms are
willing to release information regarding new products that includes data on around half of
the 10 categories of cues. Additionally, the NPPA firms, on average, make their
preannouncements half a year before the new product is actually for sale. The NPPA firms
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variables
Mean
SD
Median
76.36
123.52
54.00
78.63
155.32
36.00
NPPA cue
5.04
128.52
1.66
5.00
119.82
121.00
3.27
3.16
2.12
2.11
2.84
1.03
12.18
6.38
7.00
Advertising intensity
0.18
0.27
0.12
R&D intensity
0.27
0.38
0.16
Return on assets
0.06
0.26
0.12
Herfindahl index
0.23
0.21
0.22
Observations
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The table reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample data is collected from 1995 to 2004.
The institutional holdings and number of institutional investors data are collected from Thomson Reuters
CDA/Spectrum. NPPA information variables include the number of NPPA cue and NPPA timing from
LexisNexis Academic. In addition, firm characteristics including the market value of equity, total assets,
firm age, advertising intensity, R&D intensity, return on assets, and Herfindahl index are collected from
Compustat and CRSP
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Mean (%)
Pre-NPPA
52.24
Post-NPPA
76.36
Difference
24.12**
Panel B
Smallest
Largest
Smallest
5.12
6.36
8.25
10.83
35.63
6.23
7.79
9.42
14.34
48.88
8.25
8.86
11.38
18.46
55.63
10.14
11.23
15.64
25.38
65.68
Largest
28.25
32.46
48.26
54.45
88.56
Difference (largest-smallest)
23.13**
26.10**
30.01**
43.62***
52.93***
Panel C
Smallest
Largest
Smallest (late)
6.03
7.25
8.15
10.14
36.24
6.89
8.17
9.52
16.22
44.18
8.23
10.23
11.36
21.16
56.43
10.13
14.36
16.28
28.56
63.36
Largest (early)
28.27
38.46
42.23
53.66
87.38
Difference (largest-smallest)
22.24**
31.21**
33.08**
43.52***
51.14***
This table presents the portfolio means of institutional holdings by the quintiles of market value of equity,
NPPA cue, and NPPA timing. In panel A, we examine the difference in institutional holdings after
NPPAs. We double sort firms into quintiles by first using the NPPA cue and sorting firms according to
their market values given the NPPA cue quintile. Panel B presents the institutional holdings results
according to the NPPA cue and market value sorts. Similarly, the NPPA timing subgroups are repeated in
panel C. The reported numbers are based on means. The institutional holdings data is collected from
Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum and the market value of equity data is collected from Compustat. The
significance levels of the differences are based on a two-tailed t test
***, **, and * Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
have an average age of 12.18 years, and their average size is US$2.11 billion. The NPPA
firms spend an average of 18 cents on advertising activities and an average of 27 cents on
R&D investments for every dollar of sales. In addition, the competition is intense for the
NPPA firms examined in this study, as the average HI is 0.23, far below 0.5.
4 Empirical results
4.1 The univariate analysis
Table 2 presents the results of the univariate analysis of institutional holdings. Panel A
indicates that institutional holdings increase significantly after firms announce NPPAs.
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Mean
Pre-NPPA
45.35
Post-NPPA
78.63
Difference
33.28**
Panel B
Smallest
Largest
Smallest
5.23
10.14
21.23
31.12
41.87
8.36
12.58
22.26
33.45
54.42
10.58
14.64
25.37
36.68
71.38
13.15
18.12
28.24
41.22
106.27
124.68
Largest
15.34
22.37
35.68
62.39
Difference (largest-smallest)
10.11*
12.23*
14.45*
31.27**
Panel C
Smallest
82.81***
Largest
Smallest (late)
5.87
10.32
22.01
33.86
40.81
8.81
13.32
23.52
35.28
52.36
11.23
15.37
26.47
38.62
75.38
14.65
19.15
29.33
42.32
110.51
Largest (early)
16.43
23.84
36.72
65.83
128.47
Difference (largest-smallest)
10.56*
13.52*
14.71*
31.97***
87.66***
This table presents the portfolio means of the number of institutional investors by the quintiles of market
value of equity, NPPA cue, and NPPA timing. In panel A, we examine the difference in the number of
institutional investors after NPPAs. We double sort firms into quintiles by first sorting firms using the
NPPA cue and then according to their market values given the NPPA cue quintiles. Panel B shows the
number of institutional investors according to the NPPA cue and market value sorts. Similarly, the NPPA
timing subgroups are repeated in panel C. The reported numbers are based on means. The number of
institutional investors data is collected from Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum and the market value of
equity data is collected from Compustat. The significance levels of the differences are based on a twotailed t test
***, **, and * Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
The NPPA strategy can help preannouncing firms to attract the attention of institutional
shareholders, whose subsequent investment decisions would favor these companies. In
order to understand the influences of the information included in NPPAs, we double sort
the firms into quintiles by first sorting them using the information cues or NPPA timing,
and then sorting them according to their market values given the information cue
quintiles. Panel B reports the institutional holdings results according to the information
cue and market value sorts. The empirical results show that the level of institutional
holdings increases when there is a greater number of information cues for a given market
size. This positive relationship between information cues and institutional holdings is
monotonic, and it can be assumed that institutional investors have more confidence in
their investment decisions when they receive more information cues. Panel C presents the
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results when the data is sorted by NPPA timing and market value. It can be seen that early
NPPAs encourage institutional investors to significantly increase their holdings. This
confirms that early NPPAs are able to give institutional investors more time to digest the
related information of new products, thus resolving the agency problem and subsequently
leading them to allocate more investments to such companies.
Table 3 presents the empirical results for the number of institutional investors for the
NPPA firms. As in Table 2, the number of institutional investors increases significantly
once a firm preannounces a new product. We further double sort firms, first by
information cues or NPPA timing and then by their market value. The results for the
information cues sort are listed in Panel B. Similar to the institutional holdings results in
Table 2, Panel B shows that there is a significant increase in the number of institutional
investors when more information cues are released in NPPAs. Moreover, the results for
the NPPA timing sort in Panel C confirm those in Table 2, which the number of
institutional investors increases significantly for earlier NPPAs.
Overall, the results shown in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that more information cues
and earlier NPPA timing are significantly and positively related to institutional
ownership. These results support our hypotheses.
4.2 Regression analysis
The results of the univariate analysis in the previous subsection demonstrate that there is
a positive relationship between information content and institutional ownership. In this
subsection, we take a further step to analyze the relationship between these with a
consideration of other variables that are believed to affect institutional ownership, based
on the following cross-sectional regressions:
HOL a0 a1 CUE a2 lnTIME a3 lnMV a4 lnTA
a5 lnFA a6 ADI a7 RDI a8 ROA a9 HI e
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Constant
CUE
Ln(TIME)
Ln(MV)
Ln(TA)
Ln(FA)
ADI
RDI
ROA
HI
Dependent variables
HOL
NUM
2.162
1.285
(2.341)
(2.082)
0.512**
0.551**
(0.258)
(0.273)
0.611**
0.637**
(0.309)
(0.318)
0.541**
0.553**
(0.267)
(0.271)
0.428**
0.415**
(0.212)
(0.208)
0.136
0.109
(0.141)
(0.123)
0.337**
0.322**
(0.165)
(0.162)
0.435**
0.411**
(0.217)
(0.208)
0.087
0.073
(0.073)
(0.054)
0.156
0.144
(0.147)
(0.127)
Number
198
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Adjusted R2 (%)
7.9
7.5
F statistic
6.481***
6.428***
The dependent variables are the percentage of institutional holdings relative to total shares outstanding
(HOL) and the number of different institutional investors (NUM). The independent variables include
NPPA cue (CUE) and NPPA timing (TIME). These control variables are the market value (MV), total
assets (TA), firm age (FA), advertising intensity (ADI), R&D intensity (RDI), return on assets (ROA), and
Herfindahl index (HI). The model is estimated using the ordinary least squares single equation. The table
reports each coefficient with standard errors in parentheses and the values of adjusted R2 and F statistic in
the final two rows. Each equation is highly significant, with the p value for all F statistics being \0.01
***, **, and * Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
information cues, the greater the number of institutional investors. The same
positive relationship applies to the effect of NPPA timing. Moreover, the higher the
expenditures on advertising and R&D, the greater the number of institutional
investors.
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individual investors, analysts, and the rival firms may all be hypothesized to affect
the market value of preannouncing firms, and so would be investigated in future
research.
6 Conclusions
This study provides an analysis of institutional shareholders in reaction to the
information content of NPPAs. Although institutional investors are more sophisticated than individual investors, the issue of information asymmetry still exists,
since firms usually withhold some important information regarding their new
products for strategic reasons. We carry out an empirical analysis of the relationship
between institutional investors investment decisions and how firms implement their
NPPA strategies. Specifically, the information cues involved within NPPAs, as well
as the timing of such preannouncements, are examined to see how these affect the
trading decisions of institutional shareholders.
The empirical results indicate that institutional ownership increases in NPPA
firms which release more information or make earlier preannouncements. More
information cues reduce information asymmetry from new products, while earlier
preannouncements give institutional investors more time to formulate their trading
strategies. The findings can be explained based on signaling theory and agency cost,
which state that when institutional investors face information asymmetry of
forthcoming new products, they have difficulty in making investment decisions in
reaction to the new products. Therefore, in order to reduce agency costs, firms
should use NPPA signals to communicate more complete information to institutional investors. However, this may have some disadvantages, such as retaliatory
reactions from rival firms or copycat products. Institutional shareholders should
consider the costs and benefits NPPAs by closely examining the information
contained in such preannouncements, and thus assessing which preannouncing firms
are worth investing in. It is anticipated that these findings presented in this study
could help managers to implement better NPPA strategies, so as to receive greater
financial support from institutional investors.
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