Chapter Five

Unfinished Business: Civil Society

Ivana Howard

A strong civil society has long been viewed, both by theorists and practitioners, as a necessary precondition for democracy.1 Indeed, a vigorous
civil society is believed to contribute to democratization by performing a
number of important functions, such as promoting basic democratic ideas
and values among the general public, fostering and protecting human
rights, enhancing the inclusiveness of the political system, representing
the interests of minority and marginalized groups, improving the transparency of public institutions, and holding governments accountable. In
places like the Western Balkans, civil society has particularly been seen as
an arena for the dialogue and compromise needed in politically polarized
and ethnically divided post-conflict societies.
As a result, civil society development became central to the international communitys democratization efforts in the Western Balkans beginning in the 1990s. Practically every international organization providing
democracy assistance to the former Yugoslav countries and Albania thus
explicitly made civil society an element of its assistance strategy, usually
one of high priority and importance.
As was the case with democratization processes in Central Europe,
however, civil society assistance in the Western Balkans essentially developed in the direction of supporting just one of its more common forms
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The reasons were very practical:
being easier to measure and evaluate than a broader vision of civil society,
NGOs also tend to have a better capacity to meet donors administrative
requirements than do other forms of civil society. Consequently, the

This paper contains portions of materials previously published in Ivana Howard, Mistakes Donors Make: Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in the Balkans (Belgrade:
Agency for EU Integration and Civil Society Cooperation, 2011).

35

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NGOs were not only seen as the equivalent of civil society, but became a
centerpiece of democratic consolidation efforts.
As a result, massive amounts of financial, human, and technical
resources were directed to NGOs in the Western Balkans in the name of
supporting democratization processes. As official data indicates, NGOs in
Kosovo received 411 million in 2000 and over 200 million in 2001 and
20022 respectively, although more recent funding has been significantly
lower. From 1995 to 2000, when international aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina was at its peak, it is estimated that roughly $5-6 billion was spent
on various forms of assistance to local communities, including support for
the development of civil society.3 The European Commission alone had
spent more than 44 million on civil society organizations in BiH by
2008.4 In Serbia, U.S. public and private organizations spent some $40
million on democracy programs from mid-1999 to late 2000, largely to
support civil society.5 A recent survey by the OSCE Mission to Serbia
indicates that 22 international donor organizations operating in Serbia currently provide approximately 10 million annually for civil society.6
Initially preferring to focus on assistance to state institutions, European
donors are often seen as relative latecomers to civil society development
efforts in the Western Balkans. Today, the European Union is considered
to be the single largest and most influential donor to civil society: its Civil
Society Facility, with an annual regional budget of up to 18 million, is
only one of its civil society assistance mechanisms. Although increasingly
relying on the EU to provide the bulk of democracy assistance to most
2

Valon Murati, The Role of Civil Society in Good Governance in Kosova, in Wolfgang
Benedek, ed., Civil Society and Good Governance in Societies in Transition (Belgrade:
Belgrade Center for Human Rights, 2006).

arko Papi ed., International Support Policies to South-East European Countries: Lessons (Not) Learned in BiH, Sarajevo: Open Society Fund/Mueller, 2001.

European Citizen Action Service, Towards a Sustainable Europe-wide Civil Society,

Zagreb: Government Office for Cooperation with NGOs, 2008.

Thomas Carothers, Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace policy brief, May 2001.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Serbia,

Strengthening Civil Society: Assessing and Improving the Organizational Sustainability
of Serbian Civil Society Organizations, final report of the research project Sustainability of Civil Society Organizations in Serbia by the OSCE Mission to Serbia, Belgrade,
June 2010.

Unfinished Business: Civil Society

37

Western Balkan countries, the U.S. Government also continues to deliver

significant aid to civil society. Its strategy for democratic reforms in a
number of Western Balkan countries continues to include, among other
priorities, building NGOs capacity to participate in the public policy
debate and advocate for reform.7

Notable Achievements
Massive amounts of international assistance to NGOs have significantly altered the civil society landscape across the Western Balkans.
Undoubtedly, each of the former Yugoslav countries today has a stronger
and more diverse civil society than it did at the time of the breakup in the
1990s, as does Albania. But the overall results are mixed at best.
The impact of civil society development aid has probably been the
most profound on the individual and organizational level, where the benefits of capacity building and skills development are evident. Initial civil
society assessments in the Western Balkans frequently noted the lack of
technical and organizational abilities as key obstacles to the reform
process. In response, NGOs across the region were inundated by capacity
building programs that sought to transfer technical skills to local leaders
and activists. Today, an average NGO leader in the Western Balkans has
participated in an extraordinary number of training sessions on topics
ranging from organizational and financial management to conflict resolution and media relations. Almost 85 percent of NGOs recently surveyed in
Kosovo reported that their staff have had the opportunity to participate in
some form of training.8 In Serbia, where a separate survey yielded the
same number, NGOs additionally indicated that they were satisfied with
their staffs current level of training and education.9
It is beyond doubt that such training programs have contributed to
improving the education, skills, and experience of individual NGO staff in
strategic planning, proposal writing and budgeting, organizational manage7

U.S. department of State, Serbia, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe
and Eurasia fact sheet, december 2009.

Kosovo Civil Society Foundation, Mapping and Analysis of Kosovo Civil Society, September 2005.

Civic Initiatives, NVO u Srbiji 2009, Analysis produced for USAId/Serbia, Belgrade,
2009.

38 U NFINISHEd B USINESS : T HE W ESTERN B AlKANS ANd THE I NTERNATIONAl C OMMUNITY

ment and governance, financial management, media relations, fundraising,

and monitoring and evaluation. As donors began to withdraw, however,
additional training was being requested in fundraising, project writing, and
financial management skills, particularly for NGOs in smaller cities and
rural areas. Nevertheless, the training received thus far has strengthened
the basic infrastructure of most NGOs and raised both the professionalism
and expertise of its staff, which is generally perceived to exceed that of
their peers in other sectors. Consequently, NGOs are often seen as training
grounds for future government and diplomatic officials.
Staff training has contributed to the increased organizational capacity
of NGOs across the Western Balkans. As documented by the USAID NGO
Sustainability Index, the overall organizational-capacity scores have
improved across the region over the past decade. Most organizations
today have a clearly defined mission, fairly clear organizational profiles,
defined internal structures, access to modern equipment, and suitable and
functional office space. Some concerns about organizational capacity
remain with regard to rural NGOs, which tend to receive less training and
support from international donors.

Remaining Challenges
The sustainability and financial viability of NGOs remain a concern
throughout the region. despite massive international support, or perhaps
thanks to it, NGO sustainability has only slightly improved over the last
decade. NGOs remain heavily dependent on foreign funding, which is
rapidly dwindling, especially during a time of global economic crisis.
Recent data demonstrate that, in countries like Kosovo, well over 50 percent of donations still originate from foreign donors,10 while 35 percent of
NGOs surveyed in Bosnia and Herzegovina are completely dependent on
foreign donor support.11 Two-thirds of the organizations surveyed in
Macedonia indicated international donors as their main source of funding,
while the smallest amount of funding contribution comes from citizens.12
10

KCSF, Kosovo Civil Society.

11

Kronauer Consulting, Civilno drutvo: prilozi za izradu strategije za uspostavu stimulativnog okruenja za razvoj civilnog drutva u Bosni i Herzegovini, report produced for
the European Union. Sarajevo, 2009.

12

Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, Civic EngagementLong Road to

Go, CIVICUS civil society index report for Macedonia, Skopje, March 2011.

Unfinished Business: Civil Society

39

The financial viability of Serbian NGOs rates among the lowest in the
region. Close to 75 percent of NGOs surveyed in 2009 indicated that
international donors continue to be their main source of funding, and
almost a half of them reported that their budgets have decreased over the
previous three years.13 A surprising number of NGOs in Serbia have
recently closed down their operations, mostly due to the limited availability of resources.
Initially, donors had taken the number of NGOs to be the principal
measure of assessing the success of democracy assistance efforts. However, the numbers can be misleadingmany organizations disappear as
quickly as they appeared, or exist only on paper, without having any meaningful effects on democratization. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the immediate post-war period saw a proliferation of NGOs, which, above all, offered
employment opportunities in a devastated economy. The most recent data,
from 2008, indicates that over 12,000 NGOs are officially registered in
BiH, although the exact number of active or even functioning NGOs
remains unknown. The number of officially registered NGOs in Kosovo
doubled from only 65 in 1999 to 130 in 2001, and grew to over 3,000 by
2005.14 Today, more than 5,000 NGOs are registered but the majority of
these are dormant; unofficial estimates put the number of active NGOs at
500 at most. In Serbia, the number of organizations grew from 196 in 1994
to 2,000 in 2000.15 Just in the six months following the October 2000
uprising, 900 new NGOs were registered. Thanks to the mandatory re-registration of NGOs under a new law on Associations, it is now known that
well over 13,000 are registered in Serbia.16 A similar requirement in Albania in 2001 led to more than 3,000 associations, foundations, and centers
being registered,17 although the current number is uncertain since the government does not maintain a central registry of NGOs. The central registry
in Macedonia indicates that close to 11,500 associations and foundations
existed in 2010a threefold increase in less than a decade.

13

Civic Initiatives, NVO u Srbiji 2009.

14

Armend Bekaj, The History of Civil Society in Kosovo, in Human Development Report
Kosovo 2008: Civil Society & Development, United Nations development Program.

15

NGO Policy Group, Trei sektor u Srbiji: Stanje i perspektive, Belgrade: Centar za
razvoj neprofitnog sektora, 2001.

16

www.gradjanske.org.

17

http://tacso.org/cso-db-res/Albania/?id=32.

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As impressive as these statistics may seem, the number of NGOs does

not reflect the actual strength of civil society, but rather its potential: by
and large, the size of the sector failed to translate into its ability to influence government policies or result in a significantly improved level of
civic-mindedness among the general public.
The capacity for direct advocacy by NGOs was an area initially neglected by donors in countries like BiH and Kosovo. Favoring more measurable indicators and apolitical issues, donors generally preferred to support NGOs providing humanitarian aid or services such as helping the
internally displaced and offering psychosocial support to war trauma victims. A number of scholars believe that the delayed support for advocacy
efforts is to blame for the general weakness of civil society today. Whatever the reason may be, communications channels between the government and civil society throughout the region in general remain weak and
their cooperation insufficient.
Some improvement has been noted recently, with government institutions recognizing the potential for civil society organizations to contribute
to policy development. In most countries, however, such cooperation has
been largely anecdotal and NGO staff are more frequently engaged as subject matter experts on an individual basis. Nevertheless, notable achievements in advocacy have been made, such as the remarkably successful lobbying efforts by an NGO in Bosnia and Herzegovina to introduce the
direct election of mayors, or the active participation of NGOs in developing the law on Associations in Serbia. Generally speaking, however,
NGOs tend to be sidelined in discussions on politically sensitive policies.
The most troubling challenge facing efforts to build a strong civil society is the distance that remains between the NGO sector and ordinary citizens. largely funded and sometimes even created by foreign donors,
NGOs tend to lack a solid membership base and strong roots in broader
civil society. Across the Western Balkans, citizens tend to be distrustful
and suspicious of the actual motives behind NGO work. They often
equate nongovernmental to anti-governmental and see NGOs as welloff sellouts to foreign interests. The public image of NGOs remains generally poor: a 2009 survey in Serbia shows that one in three citizens has a
negative view of NGOs and only one in 10 citizens trusts them.18 Another
18

Civic Initiatives, Percepcija i stavovi javnosti o nevladinom sektoru u Srbiji u 2009.

godini, analysis produced for USAId/Serbia, Belgrade, 2009.

Unfinished Business: Civil Society

41

survey conducted the same year indicates that close to half of the citizens
in Belgrade think that NGOs do not work in the interest of society, and
roughly the same number believe that NGOs receive funds to promote the
interests of foreign governments.19 The situation is not much better elsewhere in the region: trust in civil society remains almost equally low in
Macedonia and Kosovo, although for slightly different reasons. With such
a pronounced lack of trust in organized groups among citizens, it comes
as no surprise that local NGOs continue to have low organizational memberships, which in turn weakens their sustainability and impairs long-term
financial viability.
Even here, some improvements can be noted. Citizens and even some
politicians are beginning to recognize the value of civil society and are
becoming more open to the idea of civic activism. during the 2008 Sarajevo street protests, several civic movements and NGOs managed to
mobilize tens of thousands of citizens to publicly object to the governments failure to curb juvenile violence in the capital, resulting in several
political resignations. Unfortunately, citizens still appear to be more readily mobilized by those opposing politically and socially sensitive campaigns rather than by those in favor of them: close to 6,000 youth took to
the streets of Belgrade to violently protest against the 2010 Pride Parade,
which itself attracted only some 500 supporters.

Real Impact?
It is nearly impossible to determine the exact contribution that the assistance to NGOs or broader civil society has made to democratizing the
Western Balkans, since democratization is a complex process involving
many different actors and variables. Freedom Houses Nations in Transit
rankings indicate small but consistent improvements in most countries
electoral processes, civil society, governance, and judicial frameworks
over the last decade, although some backsliding can be noted, particularly
in independent media and corruption rankings. It would be a gross overstatement only to credit civil society for these improvements, especially
considering the dominant role in decision-making played by the interna19

Agency for European Integration and Cooperation with Associations, City of Belgrade,
Nacrt Strategije podrke razvoju civilnog drutva na teritoriji grada Beograda 20122017,
Belgrade, April 2011.

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tional community in countries like Kosovo; still, NGOs have been and
continue to be a significant factor in the democratization equation.
Active participation by NGOs in designing and advocating for key legislation has directly contributed to several countries progress in meeting
some of the political criteria for EU candidacy status. Moreover, in the
absence of an effective system of checks and balances in most of the
Western Balkan countries, NGOs act as an important watchdog on the
governments domestic and foreign policies. But most importantly, a
number of politically sensitive domestic and regional issues would not
have been addressed without the work and devotion of certain NGOs.
This is particularly true for human rights advocacy groups, which have
played a crucial role in supporting transitional justice and monitoring
domestic war crimes trials, as well as facilitating regional cooperation
amid the contentious relationships among the countries in the region.

Wither Support?
While it has become increasingly difficult to argue for renewed attention to the Western Balkans, assistance to civil society remains a necessary and worthy investment. Yet, in light of the evolving environment,
shifting priorities and diminishing resources, different approaches should
be considered to ensure that a strong, diverse, and sustainable civil society
is indeed developed before withdrawal of foreign funding becomes
inevitable. Specifically:
Remain committed for foreseeable future: NGOs throughout
the region have felt the consequences of the geopolitical shift in
attention towards the Middle East since 2001 and, more recently,
towards North Africa. But even earlier, donors had tended to allocate funds to specific countries for only short periods of time.
Without a concrete and definitive means to measure democratic
progress, decisions to cease programming and move on to other
areas have largely been arbitrary and in a number of cases premature, as evidenced by the recent democratic backsliding in some
Central European countries. While arguably more diverse and
influential as a result of the democracy assistance received, civil
society structures in the Western Balkans remain weak and continue to lack the resources and capacity needed to tackle the

Unfinished Business: Civil Society

43

large-scale democratization and stabilization challenges facing

the region. As recent closures of independent media outlets in
Macedonia and the enactment of a severely restrictive media law
in Hungary indicate, the early withdrawal of foreign support and
heavy reliance on funding channeled through national governments creates a situation in which political influence and
resources can vastly outweigh the capacity of civil society to
counter such anti-democratic tendencies. Until Western Balkan
governments are firmly anchored in the EU and demonstrate that
they have fully subscribed to its values and norms, civil society
will need some level of outside financial and political support.
Reconsider the meaning of sustainability: As international priorities have shifted and donor commitment to the Western
Balkans has dwindled, sustainability has become the most
fashionable word in civil society aid programs. For most donors,
sustainability means financial viability, usually achieved by
diversifying a funding base. donors are increasingly requiring
that matching funds, preferably from domestic sources, be
secured prior to approving their own support. However, tax and
legal codes in many Western Balkan countries do not yet foster a
culture of corporate philanthropy, and economic conditions
restrict individual giving. Foreign donors find it particularly
desirable that counterpart funding is secured from the host governments budget, which supposedly demonstrates a constructive
partnership between the recipient and its national government.
Unfortunately, such policies are not without consequences: certain types of NGO worksuch as watchdog initiativesare simply not attractive to domestic governments; on the other hand,
some groups that receive funding from governments which do
not fully subscribe to democratic norms and values may become
vulnerable to influence and pressure, or even be coopted as government NGOs or GONGOs. Recognizing such limitations, foreign donors should continue being a key funding source for certain types of organizations, advocacy and human rights groups in
particular, while helping them to better reach out to citizens,
develop and expand their membership base, and offer unique
services to business or government sectors. To do so, donors
must better balance their own priorities with the real needs of the

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societies they are seeking to help: only when the programs supported truly reflect and address the needs of local communities,
rather than those of assistance providers, will citizens recognize
the value of NGO work and perceive them as authentic representatives of citizen interests. This is the first and most fundamental
step towards sustainability without which post-donor financial
viability will not be possible, even under favorable legal and economic conditions.
Leave the comfort zone: Usually for very practical (and occasionally self-serving) reasons, donors prefer supporting certain
types of organizations over others, for example urban over rural,
or large over small organizations. As they face pressure to
demonstrate policy change or document other significant impact,
donors are inevitably drawn to larger, higher-profile, nationallevel NGOs with proven track records. In general, donors have
displayed a tendency to restrict their interactions and relationships to a limited range of civil society actors; some do not even
consider supporting new groups or project ideas. In some cases,
rigid donor practices and cumbersome application procedures are
alone responsible for restricting the access of small, provincial
NGOs. Complex application processes and requirements that
NGOs obtain matching funding invariably rule out the participation of such groups and benefit those that already have established contacts with other donors or are simply physically closer
to them in large urban centers. But such practices ultimately
result in a less diverse and pluralistic civil societyan outcome
that runs contrary to the very definition of democracy. Massive
amounts of civil society aid undoubtedly have resulted in the
excessive proliferation of NGOs, and a pruning of the sector may
be desirable and even necessary; however, rural and small organizations should not be left to die by default. Rather, donors should
develop strategies for the remainder of their work in the Western
Balkans to better identify and support worthy rather than convenient organizations. If possible, donors should also try to engage
with a greater variety of actors, including different parts of civil
society, such as trade unions, interest associations, and even religious groups, all which can play a role in democratization. In
addition, donors should relax their requirements and allow more

Unfinished Business: Civil Society

45

latitude for their partner grantees. Seeking greater accountability

through excessively bureaucratic procedures not only limits the
diversity of organizations supported but, through practices such
as imposing a strict set of program goals and objectives, can stifle
the very changes the program is expected to create in the targeted
society.
Learn more about fellow donors: donor coordination offers
many advantages, including harmonization of activities,
exchanges of information, leveraging of resources, and promotion of grantees, to name just a few. More importantly, the
process helps donors to avoid unnecessary overlap in funding and
duplication of activities. Unfortunately, donor coordination has
long been and continues to be a key problem in democracy assistance. To be fair, donor coordination does require frequent follow
up and can consume significant time and resources. Yet considering the amount of resources wasted, as well as the frustration
experienced by NGOs when projects and funding overlap, effective donor coordination is well worth the time and effort invested
in it. There are also other reasons why donors should share information about their plans, strategies and competencies. U.S. private and public donors and even private European foundations
are increasingly counting on the EU to pick up the tab in the
Western Balkans. The pre-accession funds, which are increasingly available, are expected to ease the burden on donors whose
priorities may now lie elsewhere. However, this type of EU funding is not particularly suited for all forms of civil society, or even
for all types of NGOs. Service-oriented organizations are better
positioned to benefit from most EU funds, while advocacy,
watchdog, and policy NGOs, third sector resource centers, and
human rights groups that deal with politically sensitive issues are
often be ineligible for most types of EU assistance. Moreover, as
witnessed in the wake of the recent Arab uprisings, the EUs
heavily bureaucratic and recalcitrant funding mechanisms are
poorly suited to respond to sudden developments and provide
needed support with a quick turnaround. When confronted with
these shortcomings in private conversations, EU officials are surprisingly frank about their institutional limitations. Other private
and public donors should be equally honest in trying to better

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understand and weigh what kinds of civil society support the EU

can and cannot offer, and devise a realistic division of labor
that will result in the proper distribution of support needed to
continue to build a diverse and resilient civil society in the Western Balkans, and beyond.
Try to be consistent: According to their original activities and
purpose, a number of bilateral and multilateral donors maintain
interest relationships with domestic governments or member
states while also working with civil society. Such relationships
can be productive when donors access to public officials or relevant government bodies is used to facilitate an NGO advocacy
initiative. But problems arise when the goals and views of potential NGO grantees do not align with those of particular governments, in which case the donor may simply decide not to fund a
potentially controversial project. But this is the least damaging of
scenarios. In not-so-rare cases when democracy promotion
efforts might have to be balanced against or are outweighed by a
desire for political stability in a country or a region, donors have
been known to summon NGO grantees and dispense instructions
on desirable or undesirable behavior in a particular situation. If
they comply, NGOs lose their position as a critical voice; if they
do not, they may lose their funding and support. One of the most
frustrating practices of international actors in countries like
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been to shift policy positions suddenly, usually in pursuit of short-term stability objectives rather
than long-term democratization goals, often directly contradicting public positions taken by NGOs engaged on the issue. Such
practices not only undermine NGOs advocacy efforts but also
cause irreparable damage to their credibility in the eyes of political leaders and the public. One of the simplest remedies for this
problem is less donor visibility. Most donors insist on strict
branding strategies and donor logo visibility, indicating support
for a project. While such practices are understandable and serve a
particular public diplomacy purpose, they may result in not only
weakening local ownership but also making donors more connected to the project, thereby forcing them to intervene with the
NGOs should a conflict in policy interests arise. Certain types of
democracy and governance programs are, by their nature, more

Unfinished Business: Civil Society

47

likely to be controversial and perhaps donors who cannot afford

such controversies should simply avoid them rather than inflicting damage to a quality that is among the most difficult for civil
society organizations to build: credibility.