Independent Civil Action

JESUS B. RUIZ,
G.R. No. L-45404

petitioner,

vs. ENCARNACION UCOL, respondent.

August 7, 1987
153 SCRA 14

Facts: The laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Ruiz filed an administrative charge against
defendant-appellee Ucol. Ucol, in her answer, alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by
Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol because of a case filed by respondents husband against
Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated
the charges. When the administrative case was dismissed, the petitioner filed his own criminal
complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer. The lower
court acquitted Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court, as to the civil liability of the accused, made no pronouncement. Instead of
appealing, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the
libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and
that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata (a matter already judged). On appeal,
the appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel.
Held: The contentions of the petitioner have no merit. Art. 33 of the Civil Code, independently of a
criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be
brought by the injured party. The civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be
determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or
does not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. The Supreme
Court did not find any defamatory imputation, which causes dishonor, or discredit to the
complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libellous attack against her
honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in her
answer, to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for
their livelihood

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY

BEDENIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-39999

May 31, 1984

129 SCRA 558

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the
trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on
the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages. On February 8, 1964
Roy Padilla and company, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his
family to close their stall located at the Public Market of Camarines Norte, and by subsequently
forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall
and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods,
wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in
the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further
the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

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That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions
as Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a
decision, convicting Padilla et al. The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals on ground of reasonable doubt. But they are ordered to pay jointly and
severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages. However, The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge.
Held: The SC held that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages
despite a judgment of acquittal. Under Article 29 of the Civil Code, it provides that "when
the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted." It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by
an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state
that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may
be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive
permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of
acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand
side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not,
however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which
civil liability might arise did not exist.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully
terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient
than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a
separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered
by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants
in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

MARCELO JERVOSO and NORMA CLOSA,

and COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 89306

petitioner,

Sept. 13, 1990

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

189 SCRA 523

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Facts: The RTC of Manila and the CA convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of homicide for the fatal
stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso; and convicted Marcelos wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries
committed against the deceased. The RTC imposed the penalty of imprisonment and ordered the
petitioners to indemnify the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso in the amount of P30,000.
Issue: Whether or not the indemnity may be recovered by the heirs of R. Jervoso despite the
reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused.
Held: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the plea of self-defense was not
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Regrettably missing in the appellants' evidence are the
elements of self-defense which are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent and repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. The defense failed to demonstrate the concurrence of the three essential
elements with satisfactory evidence so as to entitle the appellant of the defense of self-defense.
The Supreme court entirely in accord with the trial court that the affirmative defense of selfdefense was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence is doubtful, and lacks that
requisite of certainty and sufficient credulity to sustain the plea of self-defense.
The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated,
frustrated, or attempted homicide(Madeja vs. Cruz, 126 SCRA 293) . Having reserved and filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused
arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from
recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover
damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the
heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their
reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in
affirming the award.

MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR

MARCIA, and RENATO YAP, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE,
and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. L-34529

January 27, 1983

120 SCRA 200

Facts: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by the
petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for damages
for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence. On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus
operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent
Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in
physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for
homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in
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Independent Civil Action

the CFI of Pampanga. Consequently, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by Edgar
Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents, against the Victory Liner, Inc. and
Felardo Paje, alleging that the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the
latter in driving the passenger bus. While said Civil Case was in progress in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The
accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, he was acquitted with the CA holding that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this
case, and that appellant was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE.
On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje. Petitioners
appealed the case to the CA, which basically affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the accused in reckless
imprudence on the ground that the incident was accidental, extinguished by implication the civil
action for damages.
Held: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist. Since, the CA found that this case was of pure accident, it is as good as saying
as if he did not commit the crime charged. There being no crime committed, no civil liability arises.
It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3
(c)thereof, should apply in the case at bar.
The cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." -We do not agree.
Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting
for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to
prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases.
However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist bars
the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, we have held
in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the
accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court
declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where
the court states 'that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an
unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible, 'this declaration fits well
into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil liability." Also, the charge
against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered
by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33
of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution.
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Independent Civil Action

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children
KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed
DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON.
TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION
AND
SECURITY
CO.,
INC.,
and
SUPERGUARD
SECURITY
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 108017

April 3, 1995

243 SCRA 220

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard
on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay,
widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed
an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or
Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not
state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act of shooting Dulay was beyond
the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under
Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition,
the respondent argued that petitioners filing of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employers subsidiary
liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the
ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions,
stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for
damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
Issues: Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code; and Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil
Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed;
Held: Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to the theory of private
respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts
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or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries
causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in
the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where
the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused
in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant
in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on
Article 33 lies.
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.

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