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Siguenza v.

CA
FACTS: Spouses Quimbo (private respondents) filed a complaint before the CFI of
Cebu against Carmen and Helena Siguenza (petitioners) together with Bert Osmea
and Associates for breach of contract and payment of damages.
The complaint alleged that the petitioners entered into a contract with the spouses
Quimbo for the sale of two lots purportedly owned by Carmen and Helena Siguenza,
and which were Identified as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, Block 1, Phase II of the Clarita Village
The said lots were to be paid in the total amount of P15,200.00 of which the amount
of P3,040.00 was to be paid upon the execution of the contract of sale and the
balance of P12,160.00 to be paid in monthly installments and that subsequently,
however, the spouses Quimbo discovered that as early as 1969, the petitioners had
already sold and conveyed the same lots to Irenea D. Maningo and that both are
now covered by different Transfer Certificates of Titles in the name of the latter.
The complaint further alleged that because of this double sale, the spouses Quimbo
demanded from the petitioners the return of their downpayment but the latter
refused and that as a consequence of the deceit and misrepresentation employed
upon them by said petitioners, the spouses were also prevented from constructing
their house worth P100,000.00 on the lots which if constructed at the present would
cost them three hundred (300%) percent more than the original amount.
In their answer, petitioners admitted the sale of the lots to the spouses but argued
that they had nothing to do with the sale as the one responsible was Bert Osmea
and Associates. Petitioners also alleged that the impleading of Carmen Siguenza as
a party defendant had no basis because the lots in dispute were originally
registered only in the name of Helena Siguenza.
The other defendant, Bert Osmea and Associates admitted the sale of the lots to
Irenea Maningo but countered that such sale was only for the purpose of enabling
the latter to obtain a loan from the Government Service and Insurance System.
Since the loan did not materialize. the whole transaction collapsed and during the
process of reverting the lots back to the subdivision, the spouses Quimbo showed
interest and deposited money for the lots although they were fully aware of the
status of the said lots and after the down payment no further installments were paid
by the spouses.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Quimbo.
On April 14, 1975, the petitioners received a copy of the decision. On April 29, 1975,
they filed their motion for reconsideration and on May 14, 1975, but was denied.
The petitioners received the copy of the above order on May 27, 1975. On the same
day, they filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and motion for extension of time
to file the record on appeal.
On May 29, 1975, the spouses Quimbo filed a motion for execution of judgment
against the petitioners on the ground that the judgment had become final and
executory for failure of the petitioners to perfect their appeal on time.
On June 30, 1975, the trial court issued the writ of execution prayed for by the
spouses Quimbo on the grounds that the motions filed by the petitioners were pro
forma as they were based on forgotten evidence, i.e., the deed of partition, and that

said motions were not supported by affidavits of merit thus making them fatally
defective.
The trial court likewise disapproved the petitioners' notice of appeal, appeal bond,
and motion for extension to file a record on appeal for having become academic.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. for the reason
that we have here considered as granted the extension of 20 days to petitioner but
despite this period, their record on appeal was filed out of time. Besides, petitioners
have no right to presume that their motion would be granted. Neither can
respondent Court be compelled by mandamus to approve the appeal when the
same was not perfected within the reglementary period. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners' appeal was perfected on time.
Whether or not the award of damages is excessive.
HELD: First Issue: YES.
In Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA 782), the Court stressed the importance
and real purpose of the remedy of appeal and ruled:
An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system, We have advised the
courts to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed
from the constraints technicalities.
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override
substantial justice. Therefore, we ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (83
SCRA 453) that a six-day delay in the perfection of the appeal does not
warrant its dismissal. And again in Ramos v.Bagasao (96 SCRA 395), this
Court held that the delay of four (4) days in filing a notice of appeal and a
motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the
basis of equity.
We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the filing of an appeal
in some cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it,
only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the petitioners' delay in filing their record on appeal should not
be strictly construed as to deprive them of the right to appeal especially since on its
face the appeal appears to be impressed with merit.
In the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, the Court have also
deemed it proper to decide this case on the merits as a remand to the lower court
for approval of the appeal, its subsequent elevation to the appellate court and
probably, another resort to this Court would only entail undue burden on the parties
and needless delays only to obtain the same judgment that could very well be laid
down through this petition.

Second Issue: YES. The orders of the trial court ordering the petitioners to pay the
private respondents P100,000.00 for compensatory damages is patently erroneous
because no proof whatsoever was presented or could be presented by the private
respondents to show that they had actually suffered pecuniary loss in that amount.
In fact, the whole amount of P100,000.00 had no basis at all except the
respondents' mere allegation that they, absent the malice, bad faith, and unlawful
and deceitful acts of the petitioners.
While the amount of moral damages is a matter left largely to the sound discretion
of a Court, (Art. 2216, Civil Code) the sums of P30,000.00 and P5,000.00 awarded
herein as moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively, by the Court of Appeals,
are excessive and should be reduced to more reasonable amounts, considering the
attendant facts and circumstances.
The records will show that the injury suffered by the respondents was not serious or
gross and, therefore, out of proportion to the amount of damages generously
awarded by the trial court, and subsequently affirmed by the appellate court.
The decision appealed from is MODIFIED as to the amount of damages.

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