G.R. No.

L-409

January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy
giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these
Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the
obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429;
Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web.
Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier,
as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the
supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished
from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to
another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without
putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of
suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of
the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over
them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p.
482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that,
as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy
occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and
therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set
forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and
quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director
of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a

government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must
have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the
military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the
first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the
occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof;
and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the
sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and
therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other
publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar
to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein
he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the
absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted
for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory
occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government
or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the
allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws
in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign
country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public
order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on
the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of
his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is
entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the
legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the
legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the
political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra),
for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are
inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against
national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country,
flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty,
illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are
penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or
become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by
the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated,
unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not
responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said
Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the
latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless
absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social
and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at
his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service
demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country
and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague
Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of
public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76,

77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are
obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the
legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force,
are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force
and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only
passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the
occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation
of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their
legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident
that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control
of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically
transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that,
therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant,
through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if
necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling
inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the
risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military
operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation,
and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the
action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task
of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of
their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;

determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds
the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines
shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino
people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said
sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty
although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason
may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as
well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of
government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the
crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The
government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of
Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's
petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said
opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros
dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

[G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002]

JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized
in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then
organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of
the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established
by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1,
Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof,
which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with
this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials
under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute
but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance
appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the
United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines,
which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States;
that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a
government of other independent nations in fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States
(137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the

THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be
unconstitutional. This is the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent
Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the
Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution [1] finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President
and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic
Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the
case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused
was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioners provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on the
ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one
offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On
its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.

On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion [2] alleging that: (1) no probable cause
exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved
in illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No.
7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he
be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. [3]
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail
On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts
Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him. [4]
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out So-Called Entry of Appearance, To Direct
Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending
Incidents.[5]
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to Quash
and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion. [6] Petitioners alternative prayer to post bail was set for
hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1)
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada; (2)
MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO
QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S.
Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, his
VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for
want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds
mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in
said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for
bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon after the
arraignment of all the accused. [7]

AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. ASIONG
SALONGA AND a.k.a JOSE VELARDE, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER,
BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a)

The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent
court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea
prompting respondent court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. [8]
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and
denying him the equal protection of the laws;

by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN

THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),

MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with coaccused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b)

by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;

HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of

the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the

3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which
and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is
personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;

Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c)

4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality. [9]
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies
him the equal protection of the laws.[10]
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law,
has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[11] We take off from the Amended Information
which charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie
Atong Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:

by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK

MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR
LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK

IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS

Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million

[P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF

was delivered to petitioner as jueteng haul on at least two occasions.The P2 million is, therefore, not

THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d)

by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001

[12]

Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on
the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot
constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it
is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the
crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused
conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe
in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No.
7080, and state the names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the
aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback
or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former
President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting
to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from
illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner
committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner
with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a
twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination or series as they
appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[13] we held that where these two terms are to
be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word series is synonymous with the clause on
several instances. Series refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1
(d) of the law. The word combination contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate
acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner
with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding
probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have
received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required
under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the
Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in
pertinent part reads:
x x x
xxx
xxx
Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also
surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the
statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned
over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million,
i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged listahan of jueteng
recipients listed him as one Jingle Bell, as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000
SBRC/SCI].[14]

the entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion
of the Ombudsman that:
x x x
xxx
xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio
and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from
jueteng collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, in exchange for
protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x. [15]
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any
probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause
against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then
underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the
Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to
guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense. [16] Thus, he posits the
following questions:
For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we
impose on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it
be a lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten
specifications, what would be the penalty imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five
or seven of the specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and the
courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is rather than to apply
what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended. [17]
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is
charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in subparagraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different
from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an
accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the
Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in
sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner
cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for sustaining the charge against petitioner for
alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely
connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results in the denial
of substantive due process.[18]
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act
in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is

indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the
first and second paragraphs of the Amended Information. [19]
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis--vis the
provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with
the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in
general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Subparagraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in
particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate
acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from
illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names
petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This
predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A.
No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion
of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described
in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner
but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate
acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System
(SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such
purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at
the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A.
No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched
himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited
the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the
offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in subparagraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the
latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass
the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the
conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph
of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be
held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design
was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.

abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be
penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and
graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to
come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous
regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of
power.
There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different
accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge,
therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each
misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to
purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly
involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or
group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the
chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations
between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. [23]
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The
hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the
spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that
the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it
could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and
jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in
common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general

We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the

rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes

predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in

a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In

four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to
avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the

contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the

aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President
Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the
multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal
wealth.[20] They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time
and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate
case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The
preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and
independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. [21] R.A. No.
7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law[22] was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is
pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the
public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and

offense.[24] The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to
accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal
or unlawful means.[25] Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or
more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense.[26]
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive.

It principally punishes two (2) crimes of

conspiracy[27] conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to
impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized
under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,[28] as follows:
Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only,
the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such
misdemeanor.

When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint
or information.
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense

Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession,
or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any
office, trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to
induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are
required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of
the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to
molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United
States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to commit
any offense against the United States refers to an act made a crime by federal laws. [29] It refers to an act
punished by statute.[30] Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether
criminal or regulatory.[31] These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic,
racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations,
counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws
governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal regulation.

[32]

Section 371 penalizes the

conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally
separate and distinct from the substantive offense,[33] hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the
substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy. [34]
The conspiracy to defraud the government refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property
or money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit,
craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. [35] It comprehends defrauding the United
States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not. [36]
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law
on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of
effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of
particulars.[37] An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the
offense-object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance
of the agreement.[38] To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the
matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an
agreement.[39] The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is
charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in
cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense.[40]
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American
courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated,
conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged
as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of
the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain the
following averments:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party,
the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be
made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given
by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. [41] The information must
also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.[42] The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment.[43] No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. [44] Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information.[45] What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. [46] The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [47]
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of
said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of conspiracy
to commit treason is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy
war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to
commit it.[48] The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the
Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other
person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the
enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons decide to
carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a
crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of
the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the
accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their
participation in the crime.[49] The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be
equally responsible for the acts of others,[50] for the act of one is the act of all.[51] In People v. Quitlong,
we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the
Information, viz:
x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts
and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused
can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against
two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact
which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent
[52]

proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an
accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of
the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts
done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the
others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he
faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving
the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement

of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said,
generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably
informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following
the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective
statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state
that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of
design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an

On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate
Resolution of Jose Jinggoy Estradas Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations.
Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan. [56]
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution
and requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution
dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioners motion for bail for lack of factual basis. [57] Basing its
finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner failed to submit
sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be
confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail. [58]
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.[59]

allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words conspired or confederated or the
phrase acting in conspiracy, must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts
constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the
community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term
conspire or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an
accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly
alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may beinferred from
shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in
the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or
its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; [53] or (2) by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is
intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.[54]
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of
acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of
sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. [55] A statement of this evidence is not necessary in
the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue
of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court
conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to
present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of
guilt.[60]
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its
Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was
given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioners guilt was
presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if
the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in connivance/conspiracy with his coaccused. Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the
accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioners plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition
before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an Urgent Second Motion for Bail for
Medical Reasons. Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition
which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by
respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on
the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the MakatiMedical Center, testified as sole
witness for petitioner.

G.R. No. 129306

March 14, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JAMES PATANO Y MARCAIDA, RAMIL MADRIAGA Y LAGONOY AND ROSENDO MADRIAGA Y
BANAAG,appellants.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

For automatic review is the decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 262 in Criminal Case No. 110089-H convicting appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga
and Rosendo Madriaga of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and imposing upon them the supreme
penalty of death.
The Amended Information, dated May 15, 1996, charged appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and
Rosendo Madriaga as well as Oswaldo Banaag, Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte and Jose Doe, with the crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom, committed as follows:
That on or about March 25, 1996, in Mandaluyong City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused grouping themselves together, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously detain/kidnap and/otherwise deprived VICENTE UY Y CHUA (NGO LIT POON) of
his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom, as in fact demand therefore in the amount of
TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS had been made by the above-named accused, while
detaining said victim in Antipolo, Rizal, until his rescue on March 27, 1996.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
All three appellants together with Oswaldo Banaag pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged. Their other
co-accused Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte and Jose Doe remain at large. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented six witnesses.
Kidnap victim Vicente Uy testified as follows -- On March 25, 1996, at around 10:30 in the evening, he
was along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, on his way home driving his Nissan Sentra when a black
Pajero bumped his car on the left door, driver's side. Both he and the driver of the Pajero got off their
respective vehicles. When he told the driver that they have to call a police officer, he was told that the
passengers inside the Pajero were police officers. He was asked to look inside the Pajero. When he did so,
the driver suddenly pushed him inside the vehicle while the four other passengers grabbed him. He was
blindfolded and his feet and hands were tied. After traveling for about 30 minutes, the vehicle stopped and
he was transferred to the baggage compartment of another vehicle. An object was placed on top of him and
he was told that it was an armalite. They traveled again for 30 minutes, after which, he was moved, placed
on a "hard object" and covered with "something". He was asked if he has ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) to which he replied in the negative. They bargained for a while until the ransom money
was pegged at five million pesos (P5,000,000.00). They asked for his telephone number which he gave.
After some hours, Uy felt somebody lifting him up, telling him that he was already safe, removing his
blindfold and untying him. His daughter Lucy Ngo then entered the room. He was asked if he wanted to go
to the hospital but he declined.2
On cross-examination, Uy stated that when his blindfold was removed, he saw two handcuffed men. He
pointed to appellant Rosendo Madriaga who was in the courtroom, but Uy declared that he is not certain
that Rosendo was the one he had seen handcuffed because the one he saw was wearing a moustache and
Rosendo does not have one.3
Chief Inspector Gilbert Cruz, in-charge of operations of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission's (PACC)
Task Force Habagat, testified as follows -- On March 27, 1996, his superior, Supt. Calinisan instructed
him to proceed to the residence of Uy as the former received a call from Lucy telling him that there was
someone in the house of Virginia Avelita, Uy's common-law wife, who claims to know the location of the
victim. He went to the house of Lucy and they agreed that he will pose as the family's lawyer. They then
went to the house of Virginia. There, he was introduced to appellant Ramil Madriaga who told them that
Uy was under the custody of the Antipolo police because he was arrested for swimming without authority
at the Villa Cristina Resort (resort for brevity), Antipolo, Rizal, now Antipolo City. Upon his instructions,

verification was made by a certain Chief Insp. Quidato 4 who had gone to the resort and learned that the
information was false. Together with Lucy and appellant Ramil, Maj. Cruz proceeded to the resort. Upon
reaching the resort, Ramil "dashed" towards cottage no. 2 but Maj. Cruz stopped Ramil. In front of the
cottage was a certain Richard Dimal to whom Cruz identified himself as a police officer. He found
appellant Rosendo and victim Uy inside the cottage. Dimal and appellant Rosendo were then arrested,
handcuffed and brought to the headquarters where they identified a certain Oswaldo Banaag as the
"tipster" of the group.5
Lucy Ngo's testimony is as follows -- In the morning of March 26, 1996, she received a call from Virginia
Avelita telling her that a certain Ramil Madriaga was at her place with information regarding the
whereabouts of her father Vicente Uy, also known as Ngo Lip Poon. She called Maj. Gilbert Cruz and
together, they went to Virginia's house. There, they met appellant Ramil who informed them that he
received a beeper message from his cousin, appellant Rosendo, telling him that the Antipolo police picked
up their group and Uy was recovered. Maj. Cruz then instructed Maj. Winnie Quidato to check with the
Antipolo police if there was really an arrest made on that day and it was learned that there was none. Maj.
Cruz instructed Quidato to proceed to the resort which they also did together with Lucy's uncles and
aunts. At the resort, appellant Ramil got off the car and talked to Maj. Cruz who instructed Ramil: "(O)kay
but slowly, do not run or make any move." Halfway towards his cousin, appellant Ramil ran and met
appellant Rosendo. Maj. Cruz then ran, followed by his staff. Lucy and her companions were left waiting in
the car until Quidato returned and told her that her father is safe, and they proceeded to the cottage.
Appellant Ramil approached Lucy and asked her not to include his cousin Rosendo in the case because of
Ramil's help in the rescue of her father.6
Richard Dimal who was arrested by Maj. Cruz on March 27, 1996, testified as follows -- In the evening of
March 25, 1996, he was renting some VHS tapes at the Star Gazer video shop located at Pasig City where
he saw his friend Nadel Francisco. They chatted until 12 o'clock midnight. Appellant Ramil passed by in
his white Toyota Corolla car between 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock in the morning of March 26, 1996 and
invited Dimal "to go around" to which the latter acceded. They went to the house of Dimal at Cainta, Rizal.
Dimal saw a black Nissan Patrol parked in front of his house. Appellant Ramil then called up a passenger
of the Nissan Patrol on his mobile phone and told the latter, "we can't do it here, we must find a darker
place." Then they proceeded to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind its new market. Appellant Ramil alighted
from the car and went to the Nissan Patrol. Thereafter, Dimal saw them put something inside the trunk of
the car of Ramil. They left Taytay, Rizal and roamed around, with the Nissan Patrol tailing them. When
they reached Bulacan, they stopped and Ramil talked to the passengers of the Nissan Patrol. Ramil
returned to his car and told Dimal that they will go to Antipolo, Rizal. Upon reaching Antipolo, the
passengers of the Nissan Patrol transferred to the car of Ramil. They left the Nissan Patrol behind. Dimal
identified Manolo Babac as the driver of the Nissan Patrol and both appellants Rosendo Madriaga and
James Patano as well as the two co-accused who are still at-large, Alan Duarte and Jose Doe, as its
passengers. When they reached the resort located in Antipolo, Rizal, between 5 o'clock and 6 o'clock in the
morning (March 26, 1996), appellant Ramil opened the trunk of his car. Jose and appellant Patano lifted a
person out of the trunk and brought him inside cottage no. 2. Dimal asked appellant Ramil if he could go
home but Ramil said that they will all leave together. Ramil and Duarte then left the place. Dimal,
appellants Rosendo and Patano, and Jose were left inside the cottage. They all went to sleep. When Dimal
woke up, it was between 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock in the afternoon (March 26, 1996). He went to the
resort's restaurant and stayed there for about 30 minutes. When he went back to the cottage, the others
were not there anymore. While waiting for Ramil and the others to come back, he took his dinner between
7 o'clock and 8 o'clock in the evening of "March 26, 1996" and he laid down up to "1 o'clock early morning"
of "March 27, 1996". When he went out of the cottage to call up somebody because he was confused
having been left alone, appellant Rosendo arrived together with Jose. Jose left again at 6 o'clock in the
morning (March 27, 1996) leaving Dimal and appellant Rosendo inside the cottage. They took their lunch
in front of the cottage and waited until "around 3 o'clock to 4 o'clock in the afternoon" when appellant
Ramil arrived with several companions who he later learned to be the kin of Uy and some police officers.
Dimal and appellant Rosendo were left inside the cottage together with some police officers to wait for
their (Dimal's and Rosendo's) other companions. At 7 o'clock in the evening, appellant Patano arrived.
They stayed in the resort until the afternoon of the next day and they were brought by the policemen to
Camp Crame.7

On cross-examination, Dimal admitted that he was arrested that afternoon of March 27; that he was
wearing a moustache at the time of the arrest and that he was the one who fed victim Uy. 8
Virginia "Virgie" Avelita, Uy's common-law wife, corroborated the testimony of Lucy and Maj. Cruz
regarding appellant Ramil's contact with her. Virginia further testified that appellant Ramil related to her
the whole kidnapping scenario; that Ramil informed her that the kidnappers were demanding one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) ransom; that Oswaldo Banaag is the gang's tipster; and that
Ramil requested her not to involve his cousin Rosendo. 9
The last witness for the prosecution, Chief Inspector Winnie Quidato, Chief of the Intelligence and
Operation Division of the Task Force Habagat, corroborated some portions of the testimony of Maj. Cruz
on the episode at the resort. He also testified that appellant Patano arrived at the resort at around 9
o'clock to 10 o'clock in the evening of March 27, 1996 bringing with him one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
as payment for the cottage rental.10
The defense presented five witnesses.
First to be presented was accused Oswaldo Banaag, family driver of a certain Beverly Tan. He denied any
complicity in the crime. Banaag testified that: he was arrested in White Plains, Quezon City, on March 29,
1996 by Maj. Cruz and was brought to Camp Crame; it was only when he was transferred to a detention
cell that he met his co-accused; although he knew victim Uy, he thought that he was being charged with
the killing of his employer, Reynaldo Tan; he was surprised when he learned that he was being implicated
in the kidnapping of Uy.11
Nadel Francisco, a college student taking up Management course, testified that at "around 4 o'clock to 5
o'clock in the afternoon" of March 25, 1996, Richard Dimal visited him at his house at de Castro, Pasig
City. They chatted for about one hour. Dimal invited him to go swimming in Villa Cristina Resort but he
declined because he has an examination the following day. Francisco belied Dimal's statement that they
were together until 12 o'clock midnight as he was already asleep in his house at that time. He further
stated that he did not see appellant Ramil Madriaga on said day. 12 On cross-examination, Francisco
admitted that appellant Ramil's girlfriend asked him to testify but he clarified that he was testifying not
because of such request, but because of the subpoena issued to him. 13
Appellant Rosendo Madriaga testified thus -- At around 8 o'clock in the evening of March 25, 1996,
Richard Dimal, together with a certain Nestor, went to his house and invited him for a swim in Antipolo,
Rizal, as it was Nestor's birthday. They arrived at Villa Cristina Resort at around 10 o'clock in the evening
and rented a "cottage table" near the pool. While he and Nestor were swimming, he saw Dimal talk to some
men and then go upstairs. Later, he noticed that Nestor was no longer around. Afterwards, Dimal came
back and invited him to drink. They went to a veranda and there, he saw Nestor drinking Fundador with
the same men he previously saw talking to Dimal. Appellant Rosendo recalls the names of two of the men
as Allan and Bong. At around 4 o'clock in the morning (March 26, 1996), Dimal confided to him that they
were going to actually stand guard over a person. Dimal pulled him towards a room where Rosendo saw a
person with bound feet and hands lying on his belly on the floor. When Rosendo told Dimal that he
wanted to leave, he was told that Bong's group had men posted at the gate and he might be killed if he left.
Scared, he stayed inside the room. Per instructions of Dimal, Rosendo burned all the things belonging to
the captive but Rosendo kept a PLDT bill. When Dimal had gone asleep, Rosendo went to the resort's
canteen and called the number of Virginia Avelita reflected on the PLDT bill but the person answering the
phone hung up on him several times. He then called up his cousin, appellant Ramil Madriaga, and asked
for his help. Ramil initially didn't want to intervene but eventually agreed to help him. He gave the number
on the phone bill and appellant Ramil assured him that he will contact such person. He then went back to
the veranda where he slept. The next day (March 27, 1996), between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, he heard somebody calling his name, and saw appellant Ramil who was with several armed
men, running towards him. Dimal then ran and threw a gun near the trees. 14

Appellant Rosendo further testified that he saw appellant James Patano for the first time in the afternoon
of March 28 on board a van at the resort,15 while he saw Oswaldo Banaag for the first time at the PACC
office.16 Rosendo avers that Dimal implicated him because the latter thinks he was the one who caused his
arrest.17 Further, Rosendo testified that in the room where he, Patano and Dimal were brought by Maj.
Cruz, victim Uy only pointed to Dimal as the one who kidnapped him. 18
Appellant James Patano recounted that: on March 28, 1996, after having gone for a swim, Maj. Quidato
arrested him while he was urinating in one of the corners in the resort; he was brought inside a comfort
room in one of the cottages where he was asked if he knew Dimal or appellant Rosendo; when he was
brought out of the room, he was already unconscious as he was mauled and a plastic bag was placed on
his head; he regained consciousness inside a vehicle; from the resort, he was brought to the PACC office;
at the PACC office, Dimal's kin, particularly Dimal's sister Arlene and her husband Willie Pangan, asked
him to testify against the Madriagas, but he turned them down; and he was also asked to sign an affidavit
but he likewise refused. Patano further denied knowing his co-accused in the case. 19
Appellant Ramil Madriaga asserts his innocence of the crime charged. He testified as follows -- In the early
morning of March 26, 1996, his cousin Rosendo called him up asking for his help. Rosendo told Ramil
that he was in the resort and was unexpectedly mixed up in a kidnapping; that he could not get out of the
resort because there were "look-outs" posted in the area. Rosendo gave Ramil a name and a number
written in a PLDT bill. Appellant Ramil was hesitant because the results of the Bar examinations were
coming out that day; but nevertheless, he went to see a certain Lt. Capitulo in Camp Aguinaldo and told
him about his cousin's predicament.20 The next day, March 27, 1996, Ramil went to see Virginia Avelita,
the name given by appellant Rosendo written on the PLDT bill. He showed her his school I.D. and asked
her if she knows anybody who is missing, and the latter replied, "si Vicente ko." He was then made to talk
over the phone to Vicente Uy's daughter, who asked him to wait. Virginia, meanwhile, told him that she
was going out. After an hour, Virginia, Lucy, three old women, their driver, PACC operatives and Maj. Cruz
arrived. After a short conversation, they left for the resort, leaving Virginia behind. He asked the latter to
look after his white Toyota Corolla car which he left in her residence. Upon reaching the resort, they were
approached by Maj. Quidato who asked him questions. He got off the car when he saw his cousin Rosendo
near the pool with Dimal. He pointed the two to Maj. Cruz who instructed his men to scatter. He then
started walking towards his cousin, and when appellant Rosendo saw him, he told the latter, "mga kasama
natin ito, huwag kang matakot." When he got to Rosendo, he pulled him and they leaned on the wall for
fear that they might get shot. Dimal ran upstairs while Rosendo pointed to the place where Uy was being
kept. They went inside the cottage and Ramil removed the plaster bindings on Uy. 21
The trial court convicted appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom, but acquitted their co-accused Oswaldo Banaag.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. With respect to the Criminal Case No. 110090, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, all
the accused are ACQUITTED.
2. With respect to Criminal Case No. 110089-H, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence,
accused OSWALDO P. BANAAG is hereby ACQUITTED. The jail warden of Mandaluyong City is
hereby directed to immediately release his person unless there are other legal grounds to
justify his continued detention. However, with respect to accused ROSENDO B. MADRIAGA,
JAMES M. PATANO, and RAMIL L. MADRIAGA, judgment is hereby rendered finding them
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, said accused
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, as provided for under said Article 267 of

the Revised Penal Code, to suffer the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto, and
to proportionally pay the costs.

hatinggabi. Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay napadaan sa harapan namin si kuya

Amel na lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya akong sumama sa kanya at sinabing
mayroon daw kaming happenings.28 (Emphasis Ours)

SO ORDERED.22
Appellants insist that they are innocent of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, arguing that:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GROSSLY IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WITHOUT
BEING IDENTIFIED AS THE ABDUCTORS/KIDNAPPERS OR CULPRITS OF THE ALLEGED
KIDNAPPING.

But defense witness Francisco categorically denied Dimal's assertions. While he admitted that he saw
Dimal that day, he testified that they merely chatted for only about one and a half (1 ) hours and parted
ways at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Francisco testified thus:
Q
You said you talked with Richard Dimal for one hour, more or less, will you tell this
Honorable Court what time did Richard and you started to talk?
A

Approximately 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.

It lasted around 5:30 o'clock?

Yes, sir.

What subject matter did you talk with Richard Dimal?

I cannot remember anymore, we just chat about the lives of our friends, sir.

Who among your friends were talked about?

I cannot remember anymore, sir.

Before you and Ricard Dimal parted ways, what did Dimal tell you, if any?

He invited me to go with him for swimming, sir.

Will you tell this Honorable Court what place he is going to have swimming?

Although the trial court described the testimony of Dimal as "direct, straightforward and spontaneous", it
should not automatically endow outright probative weight to his testimony or its veracity, to the exclusion
of the testimonies of other witnesses. Many witnesses can give testimonies that are blatant lies, even if
they appeared poker-faced and did not bat their eyelashes.

Villa Cristina, sir.

After a careful scrutiny of the testimony of prosecution witness Dimal, the Court finds that the trial court
failed to consider some significant facts and circumstances which affect his credibility. His version of the
incident is so incredible that a complete reversal of the findings of the trial court is warranted.

I did not go with him, sir.

Why?

I have an examination on the following day, sir.

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SOLELY ON THE

BASIS OF THE LONE AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR. 23
Bearing in mind that it devolves upon the State to establish by proof all the essential elements of the
crime with which appellants are charged and to establish beyond reasonable doubt that they are guilty of
said crime,24 the Court, after a meticulous examination of the evidence of the prosecution, finds that
appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga should have been acquitted by the trial
court. The prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
appellants. It failed to adduce the quantum of proof necessary to convict them.
In convicting appellants, the trial court gave great weight and evidentiary value to the uncorroborated
testimony of prosecution witness Richard Dimal on appellants' alleged participation in the crime. It stated
that Dimal's testimony is "direct, straightforward and spontaneous" thus justifying the conclusion that
appellants acted in concert in carrying into effect the kidnapping of Vicente Uy. The trial court totally
disregarded appellants' testimonies on the ground that they failed to support their versions of the
incident.
It is well settled that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is
clear, straightforward and worthy of evidence by the trial court. 25 It is likewise a settled doctrine that when
it comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of a trial court on such matter will not be disturbed unless
the lower court overlooked, ignored, misapprehended, or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances
which are so material such as to affect the outcome of the case. 26

To begin with, Dimal testified that he was with Nadel Francisco on the night of the kidnapping when
appellant Ramil passed by and invited him "to go around". 27 Dimal likewise declared in his Sworn
Statement dated April 1, 1996 that he was with Francisco when appellant Ramil Madriaga invited him at
around 12 o'clock midnight, viz.:
SAGOT
13. Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay nagpunta sa
Star Gazer Video Shop sa Azucena Street, De Castro, Pasig upang mag-arkila ng VHS
tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si NADEL FRANCISCO at
nagkuwentuhan kami doon sa tapat ng nasabing video shop hanggang bandang alas-dose ng

Q
Tell this Honorable Court what was your reaction to the invitation of Ricahrd Dimal to
go with him at Villa Cristina?

Q
I am showing to you a statement of Mr. Ricard Dimal attached to the records of this
case found on page 64 consisting of 6 pages, on page 65 or the second page of the statement of
Richard Dimal, question #13 and the answer thereto, I'm reading it to you and please listen.
"Maaari bang ikuwento mo dito kung paano ka nadamay sa nasabing kaso? And the answer,
"Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay nagpunta sa Star GazarVideo
Shop sa Azucena St., De Castro, Pasig upang mag-arkila ng VHS tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita

kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si Nedel Francisco at nagkuwentuhan kami sa tapat ng nasabing

video shop hanggang bandang alas-dose ng hatinggabi. Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay
napadaan sa harapan namin si Kuya Amel na lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya akong
sumama sa kanya at sinabing mayroon day kaming happenings". Did you hear what I read?
A

Yes, sir.

Did you understand what I read?

Yes, sir.

What can you say about what I have read which is the statement of Richard Dimal?

I do not know about that alleged happening, sir.

On that date, around 12:00 o'clock midnight, where were you?

I was already sleeping during that time, sir.

Q
During your conversation with Richard Dimal from 4:00 to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon
of March 25, 1996, tell this Honorable Court whether you saw Kuya Amel?
A

I did not see him that day, sir.29

The trial court chose to ignore Francisco's testimony. It did not explain in its decision why it opted not to
consider his testimony, why it relied on the testimony of Dimal despite Francisco's explicit testimony that
he and Dimal talked only up to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon and that it is not true that he saw Ramil with
his car around midnight or at any time of that day. The Court is confounded why the trial court entirely
overlooked or disregarded the testimony of Francisco who is a disinterested witness and had nothing to
gain from belying Dimal's claim. Dimal regards Francisco as his friend; 30 and Francisco considers Dimal
as a closer friend of his than Ramil's. 31 Thus, when Francisco repudiated Dimal's testimony, there was no
reason for him to discredit Dimal except to tell the truth. The credibility of Dimal is thereby eroded. There
is no reason for the trial court to discredit the testimony of Francisco. One may assert that while it may be
true that after Francisco and Dimal parted ways at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, it could have happened
that Dimal and appellant Ramil had met at midnight. But this posture could not be upheld because of the
testimony of Dimal himself that Francisco was present when Ramil invited him to roam around at about
midnight, which could not be believed because Francisco was, in fact, not present. In effect, from the
start, Dimal is shown to be concocting his version of the kidnapping incident.
Furthermore, the trial court erred in accepting Dimal's testimony as gospel truth considering that his
account of the events that transpired is replete with incredible happenings that should not have been
accepted by the trial court as part of ordinary human experience and common sense. For example, Dimal
testified that he went with Ramil upon the invitation of the latter and they went to his (Dimal's) house
located at No. 046 Blk. I, PFCI Brgy. San Andres, Cainta, Rizal; 32 that through a cellular phone, Ramil told
the passengers of the Nissan Patrol parked in front of Dimal's house that they could not do what they have
to do in that place and that they have to find a darker place. 33 Why then did Ramil have to meet the
passengers of the Nissan Patrol in front of Dimal's house when the place is not suitable to his (Ramil's)
plans in the first place? Why did Ramil have to go to Dimal's house when he could have used the cellular
to tell them the place where he thought would be a better place to meet them? There is nothing in Dimal's
testimony to explain said incongruities.

In addition, Dimal testified that they went to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind the new market place where
Dimal saw something transferred from the Nissan Patrol to the trunk of the Toyota Corolla of Ramil; 34 that
thereafter, from Taytay, Rizal, they roamed around and then went to Bulacan with the Nissan Patrol still
tailing Ramil's car; that upon reaching Bulacan, Ramil alighted from his car and talked with the
passengers of the Nissan Patrol; that Ramil went back to his car and told Dimal that they will go to
Antipolo, Rizal; that upon reaching Antipolo, the passengers of the Nissan Patrol transferred to Ramil's
car35 and then they proceeded to Villa Cristina Resort in Antipolo, Rizal. From Taytay, Rizal, why do they
have to roam around, go to Bulacan and then back to Rizal? From past midnight to 6 o'clock in the
morning, why did Dimal, Ramil and the passengers of the Nissan Patrol have to go around killing time
when the final destination of all of them together is the resort in Antipolo, Rizal? Why did the Nissan
Patrol have to tail them all the while from Taytay, Rizal to Bulacan after the victim was transferred to the
car of Ramil only to go to Antipolo, Rizal, a nearby town of Taytay, Rizal? Said acts are so preposterous
that no amount of stretching of imagination could bring the same within the realm of human
understanding.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with
knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever is repugnant to these standards
becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance. 36 Further, absent any other evidence to explain
or corroborate such implausible actuations, the trial court committed a reversible error in considering the
testimony of Dimal credible enough to sustain a conviction of all appellants. Evidence to be believed must
not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself. 37
It may be posited that in the commission of the crime of kidnapping with ransom, the culprits usually
adopt and pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies not only to avoid easy detection or monitoring of their
movements, but to confuse the police authorities, the victim and the family of the victims; that the
incredible happenings narrated by Dimal only highlight his knowledge of the details of the facts
surrounding the kidnapping for ransom. This may be so if the credibility of Dimal on the fact that he and
Ramil had met that night of the kidnapping is beyond question.
In any event, if a set of facts admits of two interpretations, then the one consistent with the presumption
of innocence and in favor of the accused should prevail. 38
The trial court declared that "there was never any positive identification made on any of the accused, and
that the prosecution presented evidence which are circumstantial in nature to support the charge."39
It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence. The
prosecution miserably fell short of this requirement.
The trial court explicitly declared that the prosecution witness is not a co-conspirator and therefore his
testimony may be taken in evidence against all the appellants without running counter to Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.40
The court a quo seriously erred in this aspect. Based on Dimal's sworn statement, marked as Exhibit
"A",41 and his testimony, Dimal admitted and confessed as to his participation. 42
In addition, the following manifestation of Atty. Marcelino Arias, to wit:
Atty. Arias
Before the prosecution starts the direct examination, as per record, I learned that
his Richard Dimal is one of the suspects and he was arrested in all these cases but he was not
included as one of the suspects, I want to put that on record, as far as the record is concern,
he is one of those who allegedly took the victim, he confessed by means of an affidavit, now he
is a witness and not one of the accused, your Honor.

Court
Everything you have said will be put on record, and for your own information defense
counsel, that is the prerogative of the prosecution and no longer of the defense.
Atty. Arias
Considering that I noticed that the prosecution is in possession of an Affidavit of
this witness which was not included in the records of this case, may I ask to be furnished of
this affidavit.
Fiscal Abesamis
The purpose of the testimony of Richard Dimal is to show the
circumstances before, during and after the kidnapping of Mr. Vicente Uy, to show the
conspiracy acts of the accused in this case of said kidnapping and to identify some evidence
and thereafter to identify the accused in this case. With the permission of this Honorable
Court.43
was not refuted by the prosecution.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
Thus, conspiracy must be proven by evidence other than the testimony of Dimal.
Proof of conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant itself may be inferred from
the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the commission of the crime disclosing a common
understanding between them relative to its commission. 44
In its assessment, the trial court declared that the evidence for the prosecution is purely
circumstantial,45 on which basis it ruled that appellants conspired in perpetrating the crime of kidnapping
with ransom.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 46 The
following elements must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts on which the
inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.47
In the present case, the totality of the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
not sufficient to establish the guilt of appellants. Not one of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual
abduction. Witness Dimal admitted during cross-examination that he did not see appellants actually
kidnap or abduct Uy, viz.:
Q

You know that you never saw Ramil kidnapped Vicente Uy?

No, sir.

You never saw your Kuya Sendong kidnapped kidnapped (sic) Mr. Uy?

Yes, sir.

You never saw Oswaldo Banaag kidnapped Mr. Uy?

No. sir.

You never saw James Patano kidnapped Mr. Uy?

No, sir.

Never did you see Mr. Ramil Madriaga kidnapped Mr. Uy?

Yes, sir.48

There could not be any misinterpretation in the meaning of the above testimonies. If the testimony of
Dimal is taken in its entirety, it mainly revolved around events that allegedly occurred after the abduction
was already consummated. As such, one would readily conclude that Dimal did not really see the act of
kidnapping and therefore, he did not see any of the appellants perform the actual act of kidnapping.
Besides, the trial court itself declared that "there was never any positive identification made on any of the
accused."49
Further, the prosecution evidence failed to sufficiently prove overt acts on the part of appellants that will
convincingly show their direct participation or complicity in the kidnapping.
In the case of appellant James Patano, he was condemned to death for his presence in the resort. The trial
court held that since appellant Patano failed to corroborate his excuse that he was just there for a swim
with friends, then, the same must be ignored. 50 The Court disagrees. If at all, what the prosecution was
able to establish is that appellant Patano knocked on the door of cottage no. 2, and Maj. Quidato heard
him say: "(P)are kaibigan ninyo ito, dala ko ang pera".51 Such alleged statement by Patano, even if true, is
equivocal and ambiguous. He did not state for what purpose the money is to be used. No probative weight
may be given to the testimony of Maj. Quidato that the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) is for
the payment of the cottage because it is a mere conclusion on his part based on his bare claim that the
security guard and the official of the resort were preventing the victim from leaving because the cottage
has not been paid yet. Quidato did not testify that he heard appellant Patano say that the alleged money
he had with him was for the rental of the cottage. In other words, even if appellant Patano really brought
money to the cottage, the prosecution failed to connect the participation of Patano in the commission of
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. Absent any other proof of overt act necessary or essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping, Patano's alleged presence and utterance cannot be a valid basis for his
conviction. The Court cannot accept the trial court's sweeping conclusion against Patano. The mere
presence of appellant Patano at the resort after the commission of the crime does not imply conspiracy.
Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to
a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. 52 Conspiracy transcends companionship.53 Neither can
the Court rely on the uncorroborated testimony of Dimal whose testimony at the outset had been found
not to be credible. The failure of appellant Patano to present the friends he was with is not sufficient to
support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An accused should be found guilty on the basis of the
strength of prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 54
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the defense. The identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Even though appellant Patano invokes the inherently weak defense of denial, such
defense nonetheless acquired commensurate strength in the instant case where no positive and proper
identification has been made by the prosecution witnesses of the offender, as the prosecution still has
the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused. The weakness of the defense does not relieve
the prosecution of this responsibility. Besides, the Court has held that the testimony of witness Dimal is

not credible and not worthy of belief. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt or participation in the
commission of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. The doubt should therefore be resolved in favor of
appellant James Patano.55
As regards appellant Ramil Madriaga, the trial court refused to accept his testimony and found his claim
that he was responsible for the rescue of Uy to be "beyond ordinary human comprehension deserving of no
evidentiary value".56 Instead, it banked on the suspicions entertained by the police operatives that
appellant Ramil's actuations during the rescue were suspect, and that the latter failed to present Lts.
Capitulo and Lim, often referred to by him in his testimony. 57 The Court does not agree. Mere suspicion,
speculation, relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. 58
The Court scrutinized the testimony of appellant Ramil Madriaga and there is nothing therein which is
beyond ordinary understanding or which indicates any suspicious behavior on his part that would create
doubt on his account of what really transpired. In fact, appellant Ramil exhibited candor and sincerity
when he admitted that he was initially ambivalent in helping out his cousin Rosendo because of fear and
of the fact that the results of the Bar examinations were coming out that day. 59 Also, the victim's daughter,
Lucy Ngo, did not sense any suspicious behavior on the part of appellant Ramil, and she testified that she
even believed that the latter was trying to help them, thus:
Q

Will you tell us what do you mean by that?

'Nagmamagandang loob is parang tumutulong siya,' sir.

xxx

Q
The man who was 'nagmamagandang loob'. Are you referring to Ramil Madriaga as the
one who was 'nagmamagandang loob'?
A

The Court went over the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cruz, Avelita and Quidato and it found that
certain portions thereof were tailored to suit the charges against appellants.
Both Cruz and Quidato testified that appellant Ramil rushed to the cottage as soon as they arrived at the
resort and that they found appellant Rosendo inside the cottage with victim Uy, giving the impression that
appellant Ramil knew exactly where the victim was and, therefore, appellants Ramil and Rosendo were
two of the kidnappers.63 However, Lucy Ngo contradicted their testimonies. Lucy, instead, confirmed the
testimonies of appellants Ramil and Rosendo that the latter was outside the cottage and that Ramil
rushed to Rosendo only after getting instructions from Maj. Cruz. 64
The Court is likewise wary of the testimony of Virginia Avelita insinuating appellant Ramil's complicity for
knowing the details of the crime. If it were true that she suspected Ramil, then there was utterly no
reason for her to tell Lucy Ngo when she called up the latter that there was a certain person who was
offering his assistance ("nagmamagandang-loob") in locating Uy.65 Instead, she would have forewarned Ngo
about appellant Ramil.
Consequently, the Court cannot give much weight to the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses as
they suffer from infirmities.
Besides, it is a settled rule that the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told
him, whether orally or in writing is hearsay and has no probative value 66 under Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Neither could the same be validly regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule
considering that the details testified to by said witnesses were directly refuted by appellant Ramil when he
testified in court and asserted the fact that appellant Ramil merely went to Avelita's house to tell her of the
location of her common-law husband, Vicente Uy, and to help his cousin, co-appellant Rosendo; which
fact is confirmed by prosecution witness Lucy Ngo.

He is the one who was 'nagmamagandang loob'. Yes, sir.

Q
Even before, you knew Ramil Madriaga was incarcerated and one of the accused in this
case, were you surprised to know that Ramil Madriaga who according to you
'nagmamagandang loob' is now one of the accused in this case?
A

victim, affirming that appellant Ramil was the one who was "nagmamagandang-loob" and who told them
about the kidnapping of her father and where he could be found.

Yes, sir.60

It cannot be denied that appellant Ramil played a major part in the rescue of Vicente Uy. The testimonies
of Lucy Ngo, Virginia Avelita and Maj. Cruz all show that it was through the information given by appellant
Ramil that they were able to locate Vicente Uy. If it were really true that appellant Ramil was one of the
conspirators of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, it is absolutely incredible that Ramil would openly go
to the house of the victim's common-law wife and place himself at the risk of being identified as one of the
conspirators when he could have accomplished the same purpose by other means at the same time protect
himself from being identified by witnesses. Neither did Virginia Avelita nor Lucy Ngo testify that Ramil
asked for ransom. What then could be the motive of Ramil in going to the house of Avelita if not to help his
cousin out of his predicament? Whatever suspicions the police operatives entertained were pure
speculations, insufficient to warrant the conclusion that appellant Ramil participated in the kidnapping.
The required quantum of evidence is proof beyond reasonable doubt. 61 "The sea of suspicion has no shore,
and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." 62
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maj. Cruz, Virginia Avelita and Chief Inspector Quidato were all
based on what appellant Ramil had purportedly told them. The veracity of what they claimed was told
them by Ramil is highly dubious in view of the testimony of prosecution witness Lucy Ngo, daughter of the

The failure of appellant Ramil to present Lts. Capitulo and Lim does not denigrate the credibility of his
own testimony. As stated above, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of that of the defense.
Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution evidence lacks that degree of conclusiveness required to
convict appellant Ramil Madriaga.
With regard to appellant Rosendo Madriaga, the Court also finds that there is no sufficient evidence
proving beyond reasonable doubt that he was involved in the kidnapping of Vicente Uy. As with appellant
Patano, there is lack of adequate evidence of conspiracy insofar as appellant Rosendo is concerned. No
proof was adduced by the prosecution to show that Rosendo knew about the kidnapping and that he had
actively participated in its execution. When victim Uy identified Rosendo in the courtroom as the person
he saw handcuffed after his blindfold was removed, Uy admitted that he was not sure of Rosendo's identity
as the latter is without a moustache. The testimony of prosecution witness Dimal in this regard is quite
revealing. Dimal admitted that he was the one who fed the victim and that he was wearing a moustache at
the time of his arrest on March 27, 1996. 67
Appellant Rosendo testified that he called up his cousin Ramil and asked for his help as he got
unintentionally mixed up in a kidnapping.68 Appellant Rosendo convincingly explained that he could not
do anything because he was afraid.69 Such is not far-fetched or improbable. The Court is cognizant of the
fact that fear is an effective anesthetic that can paralyze one into inaction. Rosendo's failure to report his
predicament with the police is not anindicium or positive proof that he actively took part in the crime and,
therefore, it could not be a valid basis for a finding of guilt for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. What is

clear is that appellant Rosendo called up his cousin, appellant Ramil, for help because he was in a
predicament over which he had no control.
All told, while the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom has been proven, appellants' participation therein had
not been adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, all three appellants must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 262 in Criminal Case No.
110089-H convicting appellants JAMES PATANO y MARCAIDA, RAMIL MADRIAGA y LAGONOY and
ROSENDO MADRIAGA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING them
of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellants, unless
they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of their release or the
ground for their continued confinement, within five (5) days from notice of this decision.
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director- General of the Philippine National
Police are directed to cause the arrest of accused Manolo Babac and Allan Duarte who have remained-atlarge as well as other persons who appear criminally responsible for herein subject crime. The prosecution
must exert more diligent efforts next time.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
April 25, 1950
G.R. No. L-2232
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGATON MARTIN (alias BORONG-BORONG), defendant-appellant.
Jorge V. Jazmines for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. for
appellee.

saw him only when we was already downstairs with Cirilo Tuason and his companions; that he and Teofilo
Torres were taken to the garrison of the Military Police in Pasig, that while there he heard Teofilo Torres
being maltreated in the adjoining room and he afterwards saw him with his face battered. Gregorio Reyes,
who lived in the adjoining house and was himself arrested on the same occasion, declared that Teofilo
Torres was arrested by several persons, among them the appellant herein, and that he saw Teofilo Torres
being tired by the Makapilis and the military police as he was being led to the street.
It is contended that with the above evidence, appellant was not shown to have done anything in
connection with the arrest of Teofilo Torres; that no two witnesses testified on the same overt act. While it
appears that appellant was not the one who pointed to Teofilo Torres as a guerrilla suspect and tied his
hands, there is no denying the fact that made the arrest and can not therefore escape responsibility in the
absence of any exculpatory evidence.
Count 7 refers to the arrest of Guillermo Salandanan and is supported by the testimony of Antonio Santos
(mother of the victim), Olivia Natividad, and Arcadia Cruz. According to this testimony the arrest took
place in the afternoon of August 11, 1944, in barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Rizal, in front of the house of
Olivia Natividad and was effected by a group of armed men led by the appellant. Asked by Antonio Santos
why they were arresting her son Guillermo Salandanan, appellant informed her that it was because her
son was a guerrilla. After his arrest, Guillermo Salandanan was never heard from.
The defense contends that the proof on this count does not established collaboration with the enemy, for it
does not show that appellant was accompanied by any Japanese or that the person arrested by him was
surrendered to the Japanese. But the fact that Salandanan was arrested because of his guerrilla activities
clearly shows that appellant was acting for or collaborating with the enemy, and the insinuation that the
said arrest may have been due to rivalry between guerrilla units has no basis in fact as there is no
evidence that appellant was identified with any guerrilla unit.
Counts 11 and 12 refers to the arrest of Miguel Castillo, Candido Cruz, and one Takio. The arrest of these
individuals on November 21, 1944, in barrio Ugong, Pasig, Rizal, by appellant and several companions was
testified to by Leona Natividad and Rita Pascual. But there is no evidence as to the reason for the arrest
other than what may be inferred from Rita's testimony that those apprehended were made to lug the
bananas, oranges, and sugar cane which appellant and his and his companions had gathered in the place.
Their hands were not even tied as in other cases. We therefore have to agree with counsel de oficio that
proof on these counts does not establish collaboration with the enemy.
Count No. 18 refers to the zoning of Tipas, Pasig, Rizal, for the purpose of apprehending guerrilla suspects.
Several witnesses testified that the said zoning was staged on December 1, 1944, and some of them
claimed having seen appellant there. They did not, however, mention any act of direct participation on the
part of appellant, and much less have two witnesses testified on the same overt act. The evidence is
obviously insufficient to hold appellant guilty on this count.

REYES, J.:
Appellant was charged with treason on thirty-eight counts but, after trial, was found guilty by the People's
Court on only seven counts (nos. 1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 18, and 30), and sentenced to life imprisonment, P10,000
fine, and costs. From this sentence he appealed.
As contended by the attorney de oficio and admitted by the Solicitor General, count 1 has not been proved.
Court 6 refers to the arrest, torture, and killing of Teofilo Torres, a guerrilla suspect. To prove this count,
the Government presented three witnesses, namely: Felipa Bernal, Gregorio Reyes, and Anastacio Cruz.
The first testified that at about 2 o'clock in the morning of July 9, 1944, a Japanese captain and several
Filipinos, among them Cirilo Tuason and the appellant herein, went up her house in barrio Maybuga,
Pasig, Rizal, and lined up all the men (the three brothers Leodegario, Gregorio, and Teofilo, all surnamed
Torres). Cirilo Tuason then pointed to Teofilo Torres as a guerrilla, whereupon the Japanese captain tied
his hands. Teofilo Torres was taken away by the appellant and his companions and has not been heard
from since then. Anastacio Cruz who was himself arrested on the same day, but in a different house and
by a different person, testified that he knew Teofilo Torres was arrested as a guerrilla suspect but that he

Count No. 30 refers to the arrest of Ernesto Buenviaje and is supported by the testimony of Mercedes
Mendiola, Alfonso Benito, and Patricio Benito. Mercedes Mendiola was the wife of Ernesto Buenviaje and
she testified that on December 30, 1944, her husband, who was a guerrilla, came down from the
mountains to visit her in Sagad, Pasig, Rizal; that informed that he was being sought by appellant for his
guerrilla activities, he took her to the house of their cousin, Zacarias, in sitio Caniuguan, Maybuga,
Pasig, Rizal; that hardly had they arrived at said house when appellant and his companions, including
members of the military police, came upon them, arrested her husband and then tied and took him away.
Thereafter, her husband was never heard from.
This testimony was corroborated by Alfonso Benito and Patricio Benito, who did not witness the actual
arrest but later saw Ernesto Buenviaje with hands tied pass in front of their house in the custody of
appellant and several companions who were armed.
The defense finds contradiction between the testimony of Mercedes Mendiola, who said that the arrest
took place at about 5:30 in the afternoon and the declaration of the two corroborating witnesses who said
that they saw Ernesto Buenviaje being led by his captors already on the following morning. It should be
noted, however, that both of these witnesses declared that they did not see the actual arrest, although one

of them said that he heard about it. What they did see was something that happened after the arrest and
which therefore did not have to coincide in point of time with the actual arrest. It would appear that
counsel merely surmised that from the house of Zacarias, where Buenviaje was arrested at about 5:30 in
the afternoon, he was immediately let in front of the house of these two witnesses when there is no proof
at all that he was not taken to some other place before that. As the Solicitor General observes, it is quite
within the realm of possibility for Buenviaje's captors to have been detained for some reason or other in
that neighborhood and that they did not leave until early the following morning when Alfonso Benito and
Patricio Benito saw then pass by. Our conclusion is that this count has been sufficiently proven.
It should be stated in conclusion that, in connection with the counts of which we find appellant guilty, his
defense of alibi has nothing to support it except the doubtful testimony of his prisonmates, which certainly
can not prevail over that of the witnesses for the prosecution who saw him commit the different
treasonous acts attributed to him and by whom he was clearly identified.

that the appellant arrested Aniceto Iglesia on suspicion of being a guerilla in barrio Dalangan, Lopez,
Tayabas, he having been brought to the Japanese garrison.
Counsel for appellant argues that appellants citizenship was not duly proven and that none of the overt
acts charged against him and of which he was convicted by the trial court is supported by the evidence.
Appellants Filipino citizenship is, however, satisfactorily shown by the official record in the Bureau of
Prisons, Exhibit "A", which was admitted in evidence without who have known the appellant to have been
born in the Philippines of Filipino parents. Appellant's pretense that he did not know whether his parents
were Filipinos, is absurd, if not unbelievable, he being a high school graduate and having been a high
school teacher and a candidate for municipal vice-president and senator. The case of Jose Tan Chiong vs.
Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 47616, invoked by the appellant in support of his contention that mere birth
in the Philippines is not sufficient to confer Filipino citizenship, is not applicable, for the reason that said
case involved and alien born of an alien father and Filipino mother.

And lastly, as to the contention that the prosecution has failed to establish appellant's Filipino citizenship
as an essential element in the crime of treason imputed to him, it appears that the prosecution did
present appellant's prison record, which sets out his personal circumstances, with the testimony of the
chief of the identification section of the Bureau of Prisons that all the personal data contained in said
record were supplied by appellant himself, and that although he was not the one who prepared said
record, he, however, verified its contents after it was prepared. Said record shows appellant to be a Filipino
citizen, and we think it is sufficient proof of that fact in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
Wherefore, we find appellant guilty of treason on counts 6, 7, and 30 but not on counts 1, 11, 12, and 18.
This, however, necessitates no change in the sentenced imposed below, which is in accordance with law, so
that the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

We agree with counsel for the appellant that count No. 1 was not duly proven. But we are convince that
appellant conviction on the other counts is well founded. The evidence for the prosecution, with reference
to count 2, is to the effect that in an encounter between a number of guerrillas and the enemy forces in
the town of Lopez, three guerrillas members, namely Monosea, Talavera and Ramos, were killed.
Florentino Salumbides, Epifanio Ardiente, Felipe Cargan, Francisco Caldecara and Lorenzo Ambas,
testified about the encounter, in which the appellant fought on the side of the enemy. It is true that there
is no direct proof that the appellant actually killed the three guerrillas, but said facts does not exculpate
him from criminal liability resulting from his participation on the enemy's side.
With reference to the arrest of Florentino Salumbides as charged in account No. 7, two prosecution
witnesses, Florentino Salumbides himself and his brother Dominador Salumbides, testified. The appellant
claims that it was Lamberto San Juan who actually arrested Florentino Salumbides, as shown in the
transcript. As the two Salumbides brothers have known the appellant since boyhood, it is unlikely that
they could have mistaken the appellant for another; and the appearance of the name of San Juan in the
transcript must have been an obvious clerical error, especially in view of the alleged denial of San Juan
that he ordered the arrest and subsequent release of Florentino Salumbides.
The arrest of Gerundio Villanisa by the appellant is confirmed by Gerundio Villanisa himself and Santiago
Surbano. Appellant defense against this count No. 8 is that while he was present at the time of the arrest,
it was Lamberto San Juan who actually made the arrest. Appellants allegation is not again sufficient to
exculpate him from criminal liability, as he acted knowingly in conjunction with Lamberto San Juan.
Neither is there merit in appellants pretense that Villanisa was arrested because of crime, and not
because of his guerilla activities, since the crime imputed to Villanisa consisted in the hold-up of the
Japanese trucks.
The arrest and subsequent torture of Aniceto Iglesia by order of the appellant, as charged in count 10, is
testified to by Aniceto Iglesia himself and David Villapane. There is no point in appellants contention that,
according to David Villapane himself, the latter was arrested by the "companions of Profirio Jimenez" and
not by the appellant, because the appellant was a companion of Profirio Jimenez and the overt act charged
in count 10 is the arrest and torture of Aniceto Iglesia, not of David Villapane. Aniceto Iglesia and David
Villapane both testified that the appellant was present when Aniceto was arrested and it was the appellant
who ordered their captives to be hog-tied and tortured in the garrison.
The appealed judgment being in accordance with the facts and the law, the same is hereby affirmed with
costs. So ordered.
May 23, 1951
G.R. No. L-2956

May 23, 1951

G.R. No. L-2998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOAQUIN FLAVIER, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for plaintiff and appellee.
Ignacio Lugtu for defendant and appellant.
PARAS, C. J.:
This an appeal taken by the defendant, Joaquin Flavier, for a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, finding him guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment, with legal accessories, and
to pay a fine of P15,000. The information contained ten counts, but the appellant was found guilty of only
counts 1, 2, 7, 8, and 10.
Count No. 1 accuses the appellant of having given aid to the Japanese Imperial Forces by serving as an
officer to the United Nippon Organization, established to counter act the guerrilla movement and the
American liberation forces Lopez Tayabas. Under, Count No. 2, the appellant is charged with having killed
three guerrillas known as Monosea, Talavera and Ramos, in Lopez, Tayabas. Count alleges that the
appellant arrested Florentino Salumbides in his house in Lopez, Tayabas, on suspicion of being a guerilla
spy, the said Florentino Salumbides having been taken to the Japanese garrison and detained therein for
a period of twenty-two days. Count 8 refers to the apprehension by the appellant of Gerudio Villanesa in
his house in Lopez, Tayabas. On suspicion of being a guerilla, and his house in Lopez, Tayabas, on
suspicion of being a guerilla, and his torture by the appellant in the Japanese garrison. Count 10 alleges

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELEUTERIO ICARO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Ramon Avancea for plaintiff and appellee.
Jose P. Parentela for defendant and appellant.
PARAS, C. J.:

This is an appeal by the defendant, Eleuterio Icaro, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, finding him guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay the fine of P10,000 plus the costs.
In a nutshell, the facts upon which the appellant was convicted by the trial court are stated in the
appealed decision as follows: "The evidence clearly shows that, during the latter part of 1944, and early in
1945, while the United States of America, the Philippines, and the Allied nations were at war with the
Japanese Empire, defendant herein, Eleuterio Icaro, a Filipino citizen, owing faith and allegiance to both
America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, openly adhered to the enemy, and gave it aid and
comfort. Armed with a rifle, and in company with other Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, also armed, he
took part in raids against guerrilla suspects, and in their arrest. Among these arrested, because of their
underground activities, by the defendant and his companions, were Norberto Ungkiatco, on December 23,
1944, Emilio Biscocho, Santiago Nipal, Victor Vergara, Valentin Vergara and Vicente Ele, on January 15,
1945. With the exception of Emilio Biscocho, none of the other persons mentioned above has been seen
again."
The brief for the appellant stresses the criticism that the evidence for the prosecution utterly fails to prove
appellant's guilt in conformity with the two-witness rule required in treason cases. We find, however, from
an examination of the record that the arrest on December 23, 1944, of Norberto Ungkiatco in the
municipality of Calauan, province of Laguna, by the appellant in company with Japanese soldiers and
other Filipinos, on suspicion of being a guerilla, was testified to by prosecution witnesses Norberto
Ungkiatco and Matias Mendoza. With respect to the arrest on January 3, 1945, by the appellant in
company with Japanese soldiers and other Filipinos, of Emilio Biscocho, Santiago Nipal, Victor Vergara,
Valentin Vergara and Vicente Ele, on suspicion of being guerrillas, prosecution witnesses Emilio Biscocho,
Anselmo Maranan and Tranquilino Martinez testified substantially in unison. The arrest on January 15,
1945, by the appellant accompanied by Japanese soldiers and other Filipino, all armed, of Andres Ramos,
a guerilla suspect, is confirmed by prosecution witnesses Aurora Azucena and Crispin Aniceta.
We have no reason to doubt the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses who are appellant's townmates.
The only explanation given by appellant why all the prosecution witnesses incriminated him is that they
concentrated in him their hatred against his "compadre" Roman Amatorious. It is improbable that said
witnesses would have done so, especially because of the lapse of time between the date of the commission
of the crime and the date of the trial. In the ordinary course of things, the fact that said witnesses testified
in the way they died during the trial is fairly safe indication that they telling the truth being impelled
undoubtedly by a desire to let justice take its course, and undeterred by any impulse to forget and to
forgive as a result of the passage of time. The defense that the appellant and his family moved from
Calauan to Santa Maria, Laguna, where they presided continuously until June 15, 1945, cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Much less can his denial of the imputations by
eyewitnesses be given credit.
The trial courts found that there is no direct and conclusive proof that the appellant was a Makapili, and
this finding is assailed by the Solicitor General on the ground that while there is no documentary evidence
to show that appellant had joined the Makapili organization, the witnesses for the prosecution are
unanimous in alleging that appellant was in fact a Makapili. The point becomes unnecessary, since
adherence to the enemy may be inferred from the over acts of the treason committed by the appellant,
consisting in the arrest of persons suspected of being guerrillas who, with the exception of Emilio
Biscocho, were never seen again, especially because the appellant was armed and in company with armed
Japanese soldiers and other Filipinos.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
November 10, 1950
G.R. No. L-1678
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff -appellee,
vs.
ELEUTERIO CAA, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Montilla for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Office of the Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

The appellant Eleuterio Caa was charged in the People's Court with treason under seven counts. After
trial, he was sentence to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, to pay a
fine of P5,000, plus costs.
This is relatively an old case. The reason for the delay in the determination of appeal is that it was first
received in the court and later, because of the penalty imposed which apparently had jurisdiction over it.
However, said court because according to its resolution the case to the opinion that the penalty applicable
is reclusion perpetua.
For purpose of reference, we are reproducing the first five counts under which the People Court found the
appellant guilty:
1. That said accused, Eleuterio Caa , with intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, wilfully ,
feloniously and treasonably acted and served as puppet Mayor of the Japanese in the municipality of
Abuyog, Leyte, Philippines, and from June to October, 1942, and from November, 1943, to August, 1944,
and as such puppet Mayor he willfully, feloniously and treasonably performed the following acts:
(a) That he forced the people of Abuyog including government employees to dig trenches and foxholes and
build stables for the Japanese Armed Forces;
(b) That he told the people of Abuyog that the Americans would not return to the Philippine and that he
was not afraid of the Filipino soldiers and guerrillas because the Japanese Armed Forces were behind him;
(c) That the people of Abulog must obey his orders and tell the guerrillas and their relatives to surrender;
and
(d) That he provided the Japanese soldiers with houses to live and ejected the Filipino civilians of Abuyog
out of their houses to give room to the Japanese.
2. That the herein accused, Eleuterio Caa, with intent to give aid and or comfort to give aid and or
comfort to the enemy during his incumbency as puppet Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, Philippines, especially in
November, 1943, February and May, 1944, wilfully, feloniously, treasonably led, guided and accompanied
Japanese patrols to the barrios of Abuyog to apprehend guerrilla suspects and their supports and also to
locate hideouts.
3. That during the months of April and May, 1944, the herein accused, Eleuterio Caa, with intent to give
aid and/or comfort to the enemy, and taking advantage of his position as puppet Municipal Mayor of
Abuyog, Leyte did then there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably force the people to harvest palay in the
outlying farms and did confiscate the palay taken therefrom giving part of it to Japanese soldier.
4. That the herein accused, Eleuterio Caa, with intent to give aid and or comfort to the enemy, during the
time of the his incumbency as puppet Municipal Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, did then and there lead, guide
and accompany patrols composed patrols composed of Japanese and Constabulary soldiers patrols to the
barrios of Himara, Mahapalag, Union, Ogis, Mahayahay, Polahongon all in the Layog District, and in the
barrios of Bayabas, Dingle, Combos, Laray, Taleque, Habadyang, sitio Malasiga, sitio Maitum, parts of the
Barrio Anglad, of the all of Hogasaan District, which patrols machine gunned and burned the houses in
the abovementioned places.
5. That sometime during the month of July, 1944, the herein accused , Eleuterio Caa, with intent to give
aid and /or comfort to enemy, during his incumbency as puppet Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably informed the Japanese garrison of Abuyog as a guerrilla suspect, was the
father-law of the guerrilla lieutenant named Nicolas Camintoy, and due to this information, said Basilio
Pacatan was investigated, imprisoned and tortured by the Japanese soldiers for a period of over thirty
days.
In the open court the accused admitted that he was and had always been a Filipino citizen.
The following facts are not disputed. In the last elections helds before the last World (Pacific ) War, Pedro
Gallego and defendant Eleuterio Caa were elected Mayor and Vice Mayor respectively, for the town of
Abuyog, Leyte. When the Japanese forces went to Abuyog in June, 1942, they found the town without a
Mayor because Gallego served as town chief executive only to May, 1942, after which he went to the

mountains and joined the guerrilla forces as a Mayor. The appellant being the vice mayor elect, was
designated acting mayor by the provincial governor and he acted as such form June to October, 1942,
when the Japanese garrison was removed form the town. Again, he acted as Mayor form November, 1943
when another Japanese garrison was stationed there, until August, 1944, when the garrison was
withdrawn. The acts of treason of which he was accused were supposedly committed during his
incumbency as Acting Mayor of Abuyog.
Under the first count, we find from the evidence that the defendant really recruited laborers to dig
trenches, foxholes and air raids shelters around the Japanese garrison and in some streets, and to build
stables for the Japanese cavalry horses. It has also been established that the accused had intervened in
the Japanese soldiers and officers stationed in the town, although there is evidence to the effect that rent
was paid by said Japanese forces for the use of the houses. It was also proven that in the poblacion of
Abuyog as well as in some barrios, such as Malagikay, Anlag and San Roque he called people to meetings
where he made speeches in the Visayan dialect, telling the people that the real government was the one
established and sponsored by the Japanese; that the Americans, will never come back to the Philippine
because they were afraid of the Japanese forces who where stronger; that they must pay their taxes for the
support of the Japanese sponsored government; and that he (defendant) was note afraid of the guerrillas
because the Japanese Army was behind him.
Considering the fact that the accused was then acting as mayor of his under orders of the Japanese
garrison commander, there is every reason to believe that defendants act in recruiting laborers for the
construction of the trenches, foxholes. air raid shelters and stables for the use of the Japanese forces was
in obedience to the wishes and orders of the Japanese commander. The same thing may be said of the
commandeering of private houses. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which we may take judicial notice,
that during the occupation, not infrequently, the enemy forces restored labor to fill in their military needs
and also commandered indiscriminately private houses not only for their accommodation but even for
their civilian agencies, and that in such cases then services or intervention of the executive of the town
were availed of, voluntarily or otherwise. Furthermore, we agree with the Solicitor General that these acts
of collaboration, including his making speeches during the meeting is called by him, endorsing the
Japanese regime may be considered as political in nature are covered by Amnesty Proclamation No. 51 of
the January 1, 1948, which he now invokes (People vs. Alvero, 86 Phil., 58). We may therefore discard
count No. 1.
Under counts 2 and 4, is the following evidence:
Bonifacio Laher, barrio lieutenant of Anlag, Abuyog stated that on February 2, 1944, a Japanese patrol of
about 80 soldiers arrived at his barrio, headed by the defendant Caa who was armed with a revolver.
Caa called a meeting which about 60 residents attend. The accused made a speech in the Visayan dialect
and asked the people about the whereabouts of Mayor Gallego and Captain Landia of the guerrillas, saying
that if they ever came with their forces, the resident should report the matter to him or to the Japanese
government was the real government. The patrol spent the night in the barrio and the witness as
lieutenant of the barrio was ordered by the accused to return the following morning to accompany the
patrol. The next day, February 3rd. Laher a accompanied the accused and the Japanese troops to the
mountains. On reaching sitio Malasiga, The patrol passed by the houses of Gonzalo Ablanque and
Rosendo Fortaleza, and the latter was called from his house and made to join the patrol to the house of
Daniel Bolero where the soldiers ate pineapples and papaya. The defendant asked Bolero who were the
owners of the two houses they had passed and on being informed that they belonged to Ablanque and
Fortaleza, appellant exclaimed: "These are the houses where the guerrillas used to live." Thereafter, the
defendant conversed with Capt. Mikawa who commanded the patrol, after which Mikawa called two
Japanese soldiers and ordered them to burn the houses of Ablanque and Fortaleza. At the time said two
houses contained agricultural products of different kinds, including furniture and household goods.
According to Fortaleza, he pleaded with the defendant not to burn his house, but the accused paid no
attention to him and the two houses were burned to the ground.
Laureano Pacia, a captain of the guerrillas told the court that on February 3rd, a Japanese patrol of about
80 soldiers headed by the accused who was then armed with a revolver, arrived at the barrio of Anlag. The
next day the patrol went to the barrio of Malagikay. Pacia followed the patrol at a safe distance in order to
observe as per instructions of his superiors. He saw that in Malagikay the Japanese soldiers shot pigs and
chickens for food. The defendant called the people to attend a meeting in front of the barrio school
building at which meeting he spoke and asked about the guerrillas , particularly Major Gallego and

Captain Landia. He urged his hearers to fight them (the guerrillas) if they ever came and to report their
presence to the poblacion. After the defendant, a lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary also spoke.
About these doings of defendant and the Japanese patrol in Malagikay, Pacia was corroborated by Major
Gallego who was with Pacia observing what was happening and listening to the speeches, particularly that
of the defendant.
Major Gallego in his testimony also told the People's Court that on May 27, 1944, he saw the defendant
Caa armed with a revolver at the head of a Japanese patrol composed of about 80 soldiers in the barrio
of San Roque, Abuyog. They shots pigs and chickens for food and in the afternoon. The school bell and
assembled the people , and at the meeting the defendant made a speech in the Visayan dialect, asking the
people if there were any guerrillas in the vicinity, telling them that if they (guerrillas) came. The people
should not give them food so that they would starve, and to report their presence to them town so that the
Japanese forces could come and catch them. He urged the people to help the government, the real
government sponsored by the Japanese, and not wait for the Americans go will never come back. With
sarcasm he told the people that if they were still interested in the Americans, they had better swim across
the Pacific Ocean to get to them in America. At the time that the accused spoke, there were no Japanese
around him. In his testimony about the arrival of the Japanese patrol in San Roque and the speech of the
appellant, Gallego was corroborated by Felix Balga who added that the defendant in his speech said that
to show that the government sponsored by the Japanese was the true government he (defendant) was
accompanying the Japanese patrol.
Pelagio Elmeda stated to court that on February 2, 1944. He was at his post at barrio Bayabas on duty as
captain of the Volunteer Guards attached to the guerrillas under orders of Captain Landia. On that date,
he saw a Japanese patrol of about 80 soldiers headed by the accused pass by the said barrio of Bayabas,
apparently the same patrol that later went to the barrio of Anlag and still later to the barrio of Malagikay
on February 4th. The accused was then carrying a revolver. When the patrol saw no people in the said
barrio the soldiers burned all the five houses in the vicinity. The owners of said houses were then in the
mountains, having evacuated thereto because of the fear of the Japanese.
Under the court 3, Filomeno Tupa and Marcial Costen testified to the effect that the defendant as Mayor
asked the people in the poblacion of Abuyog belonging to the neighborhood associations to go to the farms
and under the protection of Japanese soldiers, harvest palay therefrom: that one-half of the harvest was
given to the harvester; one fourth to the municipality and the remaining one-forth to the Japanese
garrison to feed its cavalry forces. The evidence on this point, however, further shows that almost
invariably, the owners of these lands had evacuated to the mountains and that said owners were afraid to
harvest their own palay for fear of the Japanese soldiers who might suspect them of harvesting said palay
to give to the guerrillas who frequented the farms. Their is reason to believe who frequented the farms.
There is reason to believe and conclude from the evidence that these harvests of palays directed by the
defendant were not made with the intention of aiding the enemy but rather to avoid loss or prevent the
ripe palay form rotting in the fields and to utilized the harvest to aid the people. As already stated , onehalf of the harvest was given to the people who effected the harvest and one-fourth was given to the
municipality, said portion according to the uncontradicted evidence for the defense having been utilized to
feed the indigent people, and that a portion of it was sent to the capital (Tacloban) presumably. For the
same purpose of aiding the poor in the province.
It will be remembered that during the occupation there was no importation of rice in order to make up for
the deficiency, our production being insufficient for the needs of the population, and that if the palay crop
belonging to those who had evacuated to the mountains were not harvested the critical food situation
would have worsened. It is not difficult to see that members of the neighborhood associations living in the
poblacion of Abuyog and needing rice for their consumption, may have even suggested to the defendant to
harvest the palay in the outlying districts under the protection of the Japanese soldiers against the
guerrillas. Among the farms where palay was then growing and ready for harvest there must have been
some which belonged to these very members of neighborhood association living in the poblacion who,
fearing that the guerrillas would interfere with the harvest of their own palay, asked for protection from
the Japanese Forces.
As to the one fourth portion of the harvest given to the Japanese garrison, undoubtedly, said portion was
given pursuant to the wishes and orders of said garrison for its needs and also in return for the protection
services rendered by its solders during the harvest. We find that under the circumstances the defendant
cannot be held liable under this count No. 3.
Under count 5, Basilio Pacatan, 69 years of age, stated in court that on June 1, 1944, a Japanese patrol
composed of about 44 soldiers headed by the defendant who was then armed with a revolver came to the

barrio of Quarry, Abuyog and found him pasturing his carabao. Some of the soldiers in the patrol caught
him, tied his hands behind his back and then took him to the main body of the patrol where the
defendant was. He was asked about Capt. Landia and Capt. Nicolas Camintoy, his (Pacatan's) son in law,
both of the guerrillas. He told them that when Col. Kangleon passed by that place he took some of the
resident with him, presumably including Camintoy. The defendant Caa told Pacatan that until his son-in
law Nicolas, surrendered he (Pacatan) will be kept as a hostage. After being slapped and kicked by the
Japanese soldiers he was taken to the garrison in the poblacion and imprisoned there for a month and a
half. As regards his arrest and his arrest and his being tied and taken to the poblacion, Pacatan was
corroborated by his stepson Pio Balida who stated that in the Japanese patrol there were four Filipinos,
among them the defendant Caa. He said that he saw all this because at the time he was with his step
father Pacatan altho at some distance from him.
In connection with the imprisonment of Basilio Pacatan in the Japanese garrison in the poblacion of
Abuyog, Filomeno Tupa and Maricel Costen in their testimonies said that the accused had once stated
within their hearing that he would oppose the release of Basilio Pacatan unless his son in law , Nicolas
Camintoy, a captain in the guerrilla first surrendered and that when a delegation composed of leaders of
neighborhood association went to petition the Japanese captain for release of Pactan, saying that he was a
good man, the defendant who was present voiced objection to the release his (Pacatan's) guerrilla son-inlaw , Nicolas Camintoy. first surrendered as a result of which Pacatan's release was refused by the
Japanese officer. It was further stated that the defendant enjoyed the confidence of the Japanese officers,
in proof of which , he had previously obtained the release of three prisoners, C. Tan, Barcelo and Briones
who had sons in the guerrilla forces and who promised to have said surrender to the Japanese.
In his defense, the appellant with his witnesses tried prove that although he accompanied the Japanese
patrols in their reconnaissance trips to the barrios, he did so not of his own free will but under
compulsion by the Japanese officer of the garrison . He also said that he acted merely as interpreter of
Japanese officer who spoke at the meetings held in the barrios. The People's Court did not believed this
claim of the defendant and we find nothing in the record to warrant correcting and disturbing this mental
attitude and action of the People's Court. There is ample evidence to show that when appellant spoke in
the barrios as head of Japanese patrols, he did not act as a mere interpreter but that he made his own
speeches. Many times there were no Japanese around when he spoke because the members of the patrol
were either going around the barrio or the house evidently checking up and looking for guerrillas, or doing
things looking toward their accommodation and shelter for the night or preparing their meals from the
pigs and chickens they had previously shot. And the vehemence or apparent sincerity of the accused in
his speeches wherein he urged the people to support the municipal government which he head, to support
the presence of guerrillas in the barrios and to abandon all hope of the return of the Americans because
they were afraid of the Japanese soldiers, sufficiently shows that he went with the patrols voluntarily and
of his own free will. He was really determined to suppressed the guerrilla movement in his locality as may
be inferred from his speeches but also from his strong opposition to the release from the garrison of
Basilio Pacatan unless the latter's son-in-law first surrendered. His action telling the Japanese officer of
the patrol in the sitio of Malasiga that the houses of Ablanque and Fortaleza had been occupied by the
guerrillas. Followed by his private conference with said Japanese officer after which said two house were
set on fire and burned to the ground despite the pleas of Fortaleza with him, fortifies this belief and
finding.
Considering all the evidence submitted, we agree with the People's Court and Solicitor General that
appellant is guilty under counts 2,4 and 5. Ordinarily, in the penalty should be imposed in its medium
degree, namely, reclusion perpetua as opined by the Court of Appeals. However, taking a broad view of the
case, we are inclined to impose a lighter penalty as did the People Court. We must bear in mind that
treason is not considered and punished according to the presence or absence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances provided for in Revised Penal Code. It is a very serious crime committed during
war by one who, forgetting his loyalty and oath of allegiance to his own country, aids the enemy and gives
it aid and comfort. The amount or degrees of said aid or comfort given the enemy as well as the separate
and distinct acts of treason committed by the accused, rather than the circumstances aggravating or
mitigating attending its commission. determine of the penalty to be imposed. This court as rule, has
imposed the death penalty upon treason indicates proven not only to have aided the enemy but also while
giving such aid, to have either tortured or killed their own countrymen, and even then, only when the
necessary number of votes was secured. Where the necessary number of votes could not be obtained even
when the defendant was guilty of killing or torturing his own countrymen, the penalty imposed has
beenreclusion perpetua. Where the acts of treason by a defendant in a treason case, consist in acting as a

spy for the Japanese, as a result of which guerrillas or suspects tortured or killed by the Japanese forces
themselves without any direct participation by the defendant, the punishment imposed has invariably
been reclusion perpetua. That is to say, the penalty for treason in its medium period. And when the acts
proven against an accused has been acting as informer and spy for the enemy resulting merely in the
temporary confinement of guerrillas suspects, we have imposed the penalty in its minimum,
namely, reclusion temporal. In other words, we have punished the commission of treason on the basis of
the seriousness of the treasonable acts, and of the presence or absence of atrocities on the victim, rather
the presence of atrocities on the victims, rather than on the presence or absence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Here there has been no killing, not even torture of prisoners, at least not on the
part of appellant. The People's Court may have been imbued with this same attitude and viewpoint when it
imposed an imprisonment of 15 years without making any reference to the existence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. We might add that the fact that the appellant has been in jail since the
beginning of a liberal and benign view of his case.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant .

March 2, 1949
G.R. No. L-433
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.

TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the
First Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of the penalty is the sole
question put in issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of Cebu, Philippines with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said
accused being a member of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany 10 other member of the pro-Japanese constabulary
all armed like the accused and did apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas
and of being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the herein accused after maltreating said Paulino Osorio
did detain him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same date the accused and his companions
did apprehend Melchor Campomanes and 7 other person who were also tortured for being guerrillas
supporters and sympathizers and the accused herein with his firearm did shoot Melchor Campomanes
killing him instantly;
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of Dalaguete Province of Cebu,
Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her
military forces said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest
and apprehend Fortunato Linares for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did
tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut a portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe especially
with respect to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of said tortures administered by the
accused.
3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused being a soldier of the Philippines
Constabulary did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and treasonable accompany a group of
Constabulary soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and other parts of Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio
Padilla, a former USAFFE soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his companions did
tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain him at the Constabulary Headquarters for several days after
which he was taken out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders with
the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum
degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the court believed that the same
result obtained. It opined that the killing were murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the
circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength cruelty and an armed band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed part
of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention supplied a vital
ingredient in the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe unaccompanied
by the giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not
committed the atrocities in question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which impelled the court against its
sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty we only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil.,
623) in which this question was discussed and decided. There we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength treachery
and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not taken to
aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in many cases as in
this a long continued process requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed,
reflective and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior
strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose
in collaboration with the enemy the use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The enemy to whom
the accused adhered was itself the personification of brute superior force and it was this superior force
which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The

law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their foes only on even terms according to he
romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the
commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of
prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the
perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately
augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14
of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty
fall within the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed inn treason
characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into
consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in
which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason the highest crime known to law would confer
on its perpetrator advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity and injustice the
penalty in treason will be adapted within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code to the danger and
harm and to which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that
resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the
perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of
graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of homicides connection
with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be
summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in the furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the appellants spontaneous plea of
guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the maximum. The appealed decision is therefore
modified and the sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with the legal accessories and costs.
January 23, 1948

G.R. No. L-985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO AGONCILLO, defendant-appellant.
Macario Nicolas for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellee.
PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant, Dionisio Agoncillo, guilty
of treason and sentencing him to suffer fifteen years ofreclusion temporal and to pay a fine of two thousand
pesos and the costs.

G.R. No. L-2318

According to the information, from February, 1944, to March, 1945, in Cebu City and its environs, the
appellant (1) "did consistently and continuously traffic in war materials and sold them to the enemy," and
(2) "did join and serve the enemy as informer, agent, and spy." The People's Court held that the second
count was not proven, and the appealed judgment of conviction is predicated solely on the first count.

TEOFILO PAAR (alias TEOFILO PAJAR, alias BEN PAJAR), defendant-appellant.

Under the theory of the prosecution, appellant's adherence to the enemy is inferable from the following
alleged facts: (a) In the afternoon of September 20, 1944, while the appellant was taking a bath in the
house of his neighbor Rufina Cepeda, the latter's cousin (Olimpio Do), who knew how to read Chinese,
examined appellant's clothes and found therein appellant's identification card written in Japanese and
Chinese characters tending to show that the appellant was a Japanese undercover. (b) In January 1945,
after a trip to Bohol, Rufina Cepeda told the appellant that there were guerrillas in Bohol and that
Japanese notes were no longer accepted in said place. In the evening of the next day, Rufina Cepeda was
arrested by the Japanese and their undercovers and asked about things she saw in Bohol. Rufina was
detained for three days. After her release, the appellant came to her house and got some chickens for the
consumption of the Japanese who arrested her. A Japanese also used to sleep once in a while in
appellant's house.
Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and comfort to the enemy are summarized
in the brief for Government as follows: In the middle of April, 1944, the appellant sold about 300 kilos of
alum crystals, at three pesos a kilo, to the Keribo, a construction company operated by the Japanese
Army. Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same entity some 100 pieces of water pipes, the price
of which was not known. About the third week of December, 1944, the appellant was seen on Jones
Avenue helping push a handcart full of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the
intermediate and high school premises then used by the Japanese Army as a motor pool.
Regardless of the writer's view on suspension of political laws and change of sovereignty as heretofore
expressed, the Court is of the opinion that the overt acts imputed to the appellant have not been duly
proven. With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the testimony of the prosecution witness
Lorenzo Barria to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not corroborated by any other witness. With
respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the appellee admits that the price
thereof was not known. An essential part of the overt act charged in the information was therefore lacking.
No pretense was made that the appellant donated the articles in question. The alleged delivery of truck
and auto tires, batteries and spare parts can be disregarded. The only detail that may at most be
considered established by the prosecution refers to the fact that the appellant helped in pushing a
handcart loaded with such articles, and the evidence is even uncertain in one respect, namely that the
cart was brought either to the intermediate school premises or the high school building. Indeed it was
acknowledged by the lower court that the witnesses for the Government did not know how the appellant
disposed of the articles loaded in the cart.
Even supposing, however, that the appellant had really sold for a definite price alum crystals and water
pipes, the same did not per se constitute treason. As said articles or materials were not exclusively for war
purposes, their sale did not necessarily carry an intention on the part of the vendor to adhere to the
enemy. The theory of the prosecution is that the sale was treasonable in view of the other proven acts
showing appellant's adherence to the enemy. It appears, however, that the alleged acts of adherence
performed by the appellant took place after the overt act in question. It is not unlikely that at the time the
appellant made the sale, his motive was purely personal gain, uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the
enemy. Where two probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of
innocence will be adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G.R. No. L-778, October 10, 1947.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costsde oficio. So ordered.

March 31, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

Padilla, Carlos and Fernando for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo and Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the now defunct People's Court which found Teofilo Paar guilty of
treason and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the
costs. The defendant of the fifteen counts, and the prosecution presented evidence to support only the
allegations made in the first, fourth, seventh and eight counts.
From our study of the evidence, we find that as regards the first count, it has been established by the
prosecution, and the defense did not deny, that between October, 1944, and February, 1945, Teofilo Paar
worked for the Japanese Kempei Tai as an undercover man. In fact, the appellant himself, by his
testimony, and that of his witness Juan S. Alano, admitted that he affiliated himself with the Military
Police of Baguio. The government witness have, during that period of time, seen him parading in the
streets of Baguio with members of the Kempei Tai, dressed in their uniform and carrying a .45 caliber
pistol.
It is claimed by appellant that he entered the service of the Kempei Tai without the intent of betraying his
country and his people, and that even if he were responsible for or participated in the arrest of civilians on
suspicion of underground activities, he can not be held liable for treason in view of the absence of the
essential elements of adherence. The record, however, shows that his overt acts evidenced his adherence
to the enemy, and even in the absence of either proof, the very act of giving information to the enemy,
constitutes not only giving aid and comfort, but also show adherence to the enemy. It clearly appears that
Teofilo Paar joined the Kempei Tai or Japanese Military Police, whose main purpose was to obtain
information and other necessary data to suppress the resistance movement. This is treasonous adherence
which constitutes a violation of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
Much emphasis is given by appellant on the allegation that Teofilo Paar joined the Kempei Tai upon the
advise of one Major Laconico of the underground movement. Apart from the fact that he never mentioned
Major Laconico to the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps of the USAFFE) when he was being investigated by
said organization, if he was really made to join the Kempei Tai in obedience to instructions of Major
Laconico and in furtherance of the resistance movement his direct participation in the activities of the
Kempei Tai, for whom he was acting as agent or undercover man, having been observed by the witnesses
for the prosecution, completely negatives his exculpatory explanations.
It stands to reason that, if appellant was really "plated" by Major Laconico in the City of Baguio, as an
observer, to further the resistance movement, he had many other means to accomplish his alleged mission
of helping the guerrillas. But his close association with the Kempei Tai, that most hated organization of
the Japanese invader, his participation in the arrest of several persons who were subsequently deprived of
their freedom and tortured on suspicion that they were sympathetic with the underground forces, far from
convincing us the that he joined the Japanese Military Police for a worthy patriotic purpose, strengthens
our belief that he deliberately, for sordid motives, entered the service of the Kempei Tai, because he
thought that Japan would win the last war. .

To substantiate count No. 41, the prosecution, through the testimony of Patricia Guerrero, a waitress in
the City Lunch Restaurant in Baguio, proved that in the morning of October 3, 1944, while she was
dressing up, she heard a knock on the door of her room on the upper floor of the Mayo Building. Before
opening the door, she peeped through the window and saw the accused standing beside a car. When
Patricia opened the door of her room she met two members of the Japanese Military Police who ordered
her to dress up because she was to be taken to their headquarters. She went with the two Japanese, but
when she reached the car, the accused was no longer around. She was investigated and maltreated by the
Japanese who wanted to get information about the resistance movement.
As they could not get anything from her, she was made to work as washer-woman in the garrison, until
she was released sometime on December 20, 1944. The testimony of Patricia Guerrero was, to a certain
extent, corroborated by Carlitos Costales.
It is noted, however, that Carlitos Costales did not corroborate the statement of Patricia Guerrero that she
saw the appellant standing beside a car parked in front of the house and which brought the two Japanese
members of the Military Police who arrested Patricia. it appears, therefore, that while the evidence of the
prosecution regarding this count establishes the adherence of the appellant to the enemy, it fails to prove
the same overt act as required by law.
Three witnesses were put on the stand by the prosecution in support of count No. 7. In December, 1944,
Melquiades Valdez, assistant sanitary inspector in Baguio, was making an inspection around the market
accompanied by Dr. Emilio Reyes. While they were conversing, Teofilo Paar approached the group and
inquired for Melquiades Valdez. The latter identified himself and par told Dr. Reyes that he was taking
Valdez to the military police for questioning. The accused conducted Valdez to the Kempei Tai, and upon
arrival the names of Valdez and one Antonio Romero and handed it ton the Japanese guard, saying: here
are Valdez and Romero." Valdez was investigated and tortured on the charge of listening to radio
broadcasts from San Francisco and spreading the new heard by him.
Regarding the eight count, it appears at about noon of December 30, 1944, while Dr. Irineo Solano was in
the house of Felisa Caliao, his niece, named Maria Taverna, informed him that a Filipino and a Japanese
were waiting for him. Solano met the visitors, the accused and a Japanese. In answer to defendant's query,
if he was Irineo Solano, the latter identified himself and the accused told him that he was to go with the
Japanese officer. Doctor Solano was conducted to the Japanese officer. Doctor Solano was conducted to
the Japanese Military Police headquarters and once in the garrison, the accused left the group.
Investigated on account of his guerrillaactivities and his pro-American propaganda work, the doctor was
maltreated and was not released until January 14, 1945.
The testimony of Doctor Solano was corroborated by that of Felisa Caliao regarding the fact that on
December 30, 1944, while the doctor was in her house, Solano was taken by a Filipino who happened to
be this appellant; she further said that Paar called for doctor Solano and took him to the car where a
Japanese officer was waiting.
The evidence is a very clear from the testimonies of Melquiades Valdez and Dr. Emilio Reyes, that the
former was arrested and brought to the headquarters of the military police by Teofilo Paar who delivered
him to the Japanese garrison. Soon after the accused delivered Melquiades Valdez to Kempei Tai, he was
investigated for disseminating news broadcasted by the San Francisco station known as KGEI. The
testimonies of Valdez and Dr. Reyes are corroborated by a third witness Antonio Romero, who
substantially told the court his observations in connection with the arrest of Melquiades Valdez.
The testimony of Doctor Solano, corroborated by that of Felisa Caliao, established that the appellant was
responsible for the arrest of the doctor. The appellant alleged that he could not have participated in the
arrest of Melquiades Valdez and Dr. Irineo Solano, because he didn't know either of them. But it seems to
us that his mere denial cannot only by the victim of this treasonable acts but also by Dr. Emilio Reyes and
Felisa Caliao.

Discarding count No. 4 because, as already stated, the evidence presented by the prosecution does not
apply with the two-witness rule required by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, we are satisfied that
this appellant who, by his own admission is a Filipino's Court for the crime of treason, not only because of
his adherence to the enemy but also on the account of his having committed treasonable overt acts
resulting from his having directly participated in the arrest, detention and torture of the persons
mentioned elsewhere in this decision.
The People's Court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, but from our careful considerations of the facts,
it seems to us that, inasmuch as the treasonable acts committed by this appellant have not resulted in the
killing of the persons arrested by the Kempei Tai, through his intervention, the ends of justice will be
served if this culprit is sentenced to a lesser term of imprisonment.
Appellant is, therefore, sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of the law. Thus, modified, the judgment appealed from is otherwise
affirmed, costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
July 30, 1947
G.R. No. L-430
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. ABAD (alias PAQUITO), defendant-appellant.
Alejo Labrador for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
In a decision penned by Judge Angel S. Gamboa, concurred in by Judges Jose Bernabe and Emilio
Rilloraza, all of them of the People's Court, accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex crime
of treason with homicide and sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs of Osias
Salvador in the amount of P2,000, and to pay costs.
The information charges appellant of the crime of treason as defined and penalized under article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code by giving aid and comfort to the Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial
Forces during the period comprised between December 24, 1943, and September 26, 1944, as follows:
1. That on or about the 24th day of December, 1943, in the municipality and province aforesaid, Francisco
Abad (alias Paquito) the accused herein, serving as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then
and there, join participate in a raid conducted by about fifteen Japanese soldiers of the Military Police at
the house of Magno Ibarra, and did then and there apprehended the said Magno Ibarra, charging him of
possession of a revolver which had been previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the Japanese that
Magno Ibarra still had the revolver, the latter was confined in the Japanese garrison.
2. That on or about March 11, 1944, in the same municipality and province aforesaid, the said Francisco
Abad (alias Paquito), as such informer of the Japanese Army, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably, for more than two months, of one Mr. Francisco, whose first name is still unknown, for having
remarked that the Americans would soon return many places in the Philippines had already been retaken.

3. That on or about September 28, 1944, in the municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein
accused, as such informer of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably force, coerce, and compel Osias Salvador and his two brothers Epifanio Salvador and Liberto
Salvador to go, as they did to go to the Japanese garrison where the said Osias Salvador and his two
brothers, at the instance of the herein accused in his presence, were tortured as guerrilla suspects, and
although Epifanio and Liberto Salvador managed later to escape from imprisonment, the said Osias
Salvador was unable to do so and died from the tortures and injuries inflicted upon him.
4. That on or about November 12, 1844 and on the occasion of a stage show held in the said municipality
of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused, taking advantage of his connection and influence as
informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously hand over
one Francisco Donato to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and kicked the said Francisco Donato, for an
incident in which the accused was entirely to blame in that the said accused annoyed Flora Esteban, wife
of Francisco Donato, by throwing sugar cane butts at her.
The lower court found the accused guilty on the first three counts.
Nine errors are assigned in appellant's brief.
The first question raised by appellant is that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty on the first
count, notwithstanding the fact only one witness testified to the overt act alleged therein.
Two witnesses were called by the prosecution to prove the first count, Magno Ibarra and his wife, Isabel.
The latter testified that when appellant, accompanied by his brother and Japanese soldiers, went to their
home, demanding the surrender of a revolver of her husband, the husband was out supervising the
harvest of their palay, and the latter happened to learn of the incident by information from the wife.
Magno could not, therefore, corroborate his wife as to the latter's testimony concerning appellant's coming
to their house.
The testimony of Magno Ibarra as to what happened to him in the garrison, where he was told by
appellant to produce his revolver, is not corroborated by his wife nor by anybody else.
The Solicitor General advances the theory that where the overt act is simple, continuous and composite,
made up of, or proved by several circumstances, and passing through stages, it is not necessary that there
should be two witnesses to each circumstance at each stage. The theory is not well taken. The two-witness
rule must be adhered to as to each and everyone of all the external manifestations of the overt act in
issue. Appellant's going to the Ibarra house, in search of the revolver, is a single overt act, distinct and
independent from appellant's overt act in requiring Magno Ibarra, when the latter went to the garrison, to
produce his revolver. Although both overt acts are inter-related. it would be too much to strain the
imagination if they should be identified as a single act or even as different manifestations, phases, or stage
of the same overt act. The searching of the revolver in the Ibarra house is one thing and the requiring to
produce the revolver in the garrison, another. Although both acts may logically be presumed to have
answered the same purpose, that of confiscating Ibarra's revolver, the singleness of purpose is not enough
to make one of two acts.
The lower court erred consequently in not pronouncing that the first count of the information was not
proven.
Whether accused caused the arrest and incarceration of Fausto Francisco, as alleged in the second count
of the information, is the next question raised in appellant's brief.

In the afternoon of March 10, 1944, while conversing with a group of about ten persons, Francisco, who
had just arrived from Manila, stated that the Americans were coming nearer to the Philippines and, on
noticing a Japanese plane flying over them, added that in the very near future they will see American
planes flying over the Philippines. The accused was among those present in the group. Jose Tamurrada
and Adriano Reyes were also among them. At night of the same day Francisco attended the dance held in
the auditorium of Palimbo, Camiling, on the occasion of the barrio fiesta. A group of Japanese soldiers,
accompanied by appellant and his brother Mariano, arrived. Appellant pointed at Francisco saying, "That
is the man;" whereupon, Francisco was arrested and was imprisoned for almost two and a half months,
during which time he was subjected to torture and made to undergo hard labor for being an American
propagandist. These facts were testified by several witnesses for the prosecution.
Appellant, who has resorted to an alibi as defense, made an almost exhaustive analysis of the declarations
of the witnesses for the prosecution in a forceful effort to discredit them. A careful reading of said
declarations leads us to the conclusion that they deserved credibility and by them it was proved beyond all
reasonable doubt that appellant was present in the group which in the afternoon heard Fausto Francisco
make statements in favor of the Americans and that he caused the arrest of Francisco in the auditorium
by appointing him to the Japanese soldiers who arrived with him at the place.
Among the arguments in appellant's brief relating to the second count in question, the one in which
appellant alleges that no one has ever heard that, after the afternoon statements of Fausto Francisco,
appellant went to the Japanese garrison and informed the Japanese soldiers thereof, appears to be
stronger. In fact, there is no evidence as to what the appellant did during the time intervening between
when appellant heard Francisco's afternoon statements and when appellant went at night to the
auditorium to have Francisco arrested by the Japanese soldiers accompanying him and his brother
Mariano. But the natural relationship between the two incidents makes unnecessary any evidence as to
appellant's conduct and actions during the intervening period. Besides, it is not alleged in the information
that it was appellant who denounced Francisco to the Japanese for the afternoon statements in question,
and even if we should disregard any connection between the afternoon incident in which appellant heard
Francisco's statements and the incident in which Francisco was arrested, and, furthermore, even if we go
to the extent of disregarding completely the first incident, the fact that appellant caused the arrest of
Francisco at the auditorium night dance, by pointing him as the man sought for to the Japanese soldiers
who accompanied him and his brother Mariano, in itself alone is sufficient to find him guilty of adherence
to the Japanese enemies and of giving them aid in the attainment of their was purposes, among them the
suppression of American or anti-Japanese propaganda.
Upon this our conclusion, appellant's insistence that there were well-known Japanese spies, instead of
him, who must have given the tip to the Japanese as to Francisco's statements, is of no consequence.
The next question raised by appellant is the third count of the information upon which the appellant's
brief dealt in three assignment of errors, 3, 4, and 5.
Liberato Salvador testified that in 1944 he was a member of Major Ramsey's Guerrilla, which he joined on
March 5, 1942, he having been formerly in the Recruiting Division of the Philippine Army. On September
28, 1944, he went to Camiling with his brother Osias to find out the strength of the Japanese garrison
stationed there, and to said effect "we brought along with us five gallons of coconut oil just pretending to
sell it in the public market in order that we cannot be detected by the spies of our enemy, the Japanese."
Then they saw the accused "who was about five meters away from us." Felix Abad asked for a ride back to
Mangatarem. While Osias was talking with Felix, the accused "winked his eye and then, immediately,
Magdalera drew his revolver and pointed at me. He winked with a motion indicating that I was to be
captures. My brother Osias approached me. We were asked to raise our hands." Because Liberato
protested that he was not making any trouble and at first did not raise his hands, Magdalera said: "No you
are a member of the guerrillas, you are fighting against the Japanese." Then Epifanio Salvador approached
his brother Liberato and told him: "Raise your hands because he is a spy of the Japanese," referring to
Cristoper Magdalera. Then Felix Abad suggested to Magdalera that the Salvador brothers be brought to
the Japanese garrison, 25 meters away from the market. The incident took place at about 3 o'clock in the

afternoon. At the garrison "we were tied up against the wall of the building. At about 6 o'clock in the
afternoon were given water to drink (about five or six gallons) and maltreated. They hung me and tied in
the wrist with the rope around my neck. They hung me with my toes barely touching the floor. Then they
boxed me and beat me with a baseball bat until I was unconscious. I did not regain consciousness until
they stuck a lighted cigarette in my face at about 8 o'clock already in the evening."
When he regained consciousness, he heard his brothers shouting for help and groaning. Witness was
about six meters away from them, but he has not seen them being tortured because "we were brought
again to the porch and tied our neck in the same way they tied us before, with our hands tied at the back.
At about 4 o'clock in the morning of the 29th, my brother Epifanio Salvador, who was sitting side by side
with Osias Salvador, who was sitting side by side with Osias Salvador, was able to untie his rope and then,
all of a sudden Epifanio left us. The sentry who was just sitting in front of us with a rifle at fixed bayonet
was sleeping. When the sentry was awakened he asked: "`Where is your brother Epifanio Salvador?' I
answered the sentry: `I do not know.' Then, at first he was planning to release us to look for our brother
Epifanio. We consented to be released, but the sentry changed his mind and got another big rope with
which he whipped us again right and left. Then they went to our house, the house of Epifanio, and looked
for him. And when they were not able to locate him they got my sister-in-law Inocencia Manson de
Salvador and she was also questioned as to where was my brother Epifanio, and tied up her hands as they
have done to us. After that, Osias Salvador and myself were brought to the room just behind the one we
were tied up and they got an electric wire and tied us again, but putting on a bench and the bench was too
short that the legs of my brother Osias was on top. We were tied and then rolled with the wire from my
head up to the head of my brother, aside from tying us from neck to leg. We talked, my brother and I, to
escape if we can. After ten minutes, a Japanese entered the garrison and he had a bamboo with which
whenever we asked for water and food they beat us. They question us: `Where is the machine gun you are
hiding? You are hiding six machine guns and automatic rifles; where are the rifles and revolvers? Where
are the Americans now?' That was done to us many times. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon one of the
Japanese came to us and cut our hair and said: `Kayo dalawa patay mamayang gabi.' We answered:
`Ngayon na.' The Japanese said: `No, tonight.' Then in my struggle to remove the rope around my leg I was
able to untie it without my knowledge. One of the Japanese entered to find out what we were doing, but he
did not inspect me and left again. Although my hands were bleeding, with my courage to live still I grabbed
the electric wire and cut it trough continuously doing this (witness showing the act of twisting something
with his fingers), and unbound myself. When the sentry entered, I allowed the electric wire to be placed as
it was. Then it was 6 o'clock (on September 29) from the bells of the church. My brother Osias said: `I can
not escape, I am weak. My face is bleeding. I cannot walk. If you are untied, the thing for you is to live, if
you can run for your life. Never mind for me. If I am dead, never mind. Now we are fighting our common
enemy, the Japanese. I want you to find out what will be the result of this war.' Then he kicked me,
because I was untied already up to the knee. I tried to remove the rope at his back, but he said: 'No, I can
not run.' And he shouted: 'You better run for your life.' Then I saw one Japanese that heard that, and I
jumped outside and when I fell to the ground I saw another Japanese watching and shouting words that I
can not understand. I just ran. Between the municipal building and the street there was a barbed wire
fence and jumped it over and then passed to the rear of the municipal building, passing between the
house of Mr. Javier and the Treasurer's and then to the bank of the river. I passed under the bamboo
groves and I went to the house of my friend (Gregorio Javier) and I was able to go up and then fell down
weak." Osias was the commanding officer of the guerrilla unit in which Liberato was a second lieutenant
and Epifanio, a volunteer without grade. Since then Liberato did not see Osias any more, but he was able
to locate Epifanio in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
The testimony of Liberato Salvador was substantially corroborated by Epifanio Salvador on all what
happened from the afternoon of September 28,1944, when they were arrested in the market place up to
about 4 o'clock in the morning of September 29, when Epifanio was able to untie himself and escape from
the Japanese garrison, passing in front of a sleeping sentry two meters away from where the Salvador
brothers were tied.
Augusto Antonio testified that the accused told him that Osias Salvador was killed, bayoneted by a
Japanese soldier, behind the elementary school building, near the closet, where the corpse was later
buried. The information was given by the accuse in 1945 when the Japanese were still ruling.

Appellant endeavors to discredit Liberato and Epifanio Salvador's testimonies by trying to show the
improbability for Liberato to have seen the accused making signs to Cristoper Magdalera for their arrest on
the basis of the relative positions of witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away and
came near the place where Liberato was being arrested only after Magdalera for their arrest on the basis of
the relative positions of witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away and came near the
place where Liberato was being arrested only after Magdalera had pointed his pistol at his back.
The fact that, while he was going southwest, he had seen the accused in the northeast making the sign to
Magdalera, is satisfactorily explained by Liberato by saying that "because a man wanted to by the
Japanese begins to observe everything," and he had to observe "because I knew they were making signs,"
and at that time the accused was "in the left side," and with respect to Epifanio, appellant's surmise that
he was "apparently away" appears to without basis if it is recalled that it was Epifanio who advised
Liberato to hold up his hands, when Liberato was refusing to do it, by saying, in allusion to Magdalera, "he
is a Japanese spy."
Appellant maintains also that it must have been Felix Abad whom the witnesses for the prosecution saw
winking his eyes at Magdalera for the latter to arrest the Salvador brothers and not Francisco Abad. But
the theory cannot be maintained upon the positive and unequivocal testimonies of Liberto and Epifanio
pointing the accused as the one who made the sign. Appellant's insistence to put the blame on Felix Abad,
by trying to show that it was he and not the accused who made the sign, even if accepted, will not relieve
appellant of all responsibility, because, according to the witnesses for the prosecution, he went along with
his brothers Mariano and Felix and Cristoper Magdalera in bringing the Salvador brothers to the Japanese
garrison where they were delivered by the accused himself, and it was Francisco Abad who told the
Japanese "that we were guerrillas."
In the sixth assignment of error appellant complains that the lower court admitted evidence of supposed
treasonable acts of appellant but which are not specifically alleged in any of the counts of the information.
Appellant points specifically to the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz, to the effect that in the moth of
October, 1944, at around 11 o'clock, while witness and others were around a gambling table, appellant
came unnoticed with six Japanese soldiers and demanded of those in the gathering the information of the
whereabouts of Lt. Riparip and Sgt. Juan Asuncion, both of the guerrilla army, and that sometime in
November, 1944, on the occasion of the shooting of Eustaquio Domingo, the accused was in the Japanese
garrison while the Japanese soldiers proceeded to the site of the shooting, gathered all the males found
thereabouts, bringing one of them, Benjamin Aremajo, to the garrison to be later dragged to the plaza
where he was beaten up, facts which were declared proven by the lower court.
The assignment is well taken as the above facts are not alleged in any of the four counts of the
information. The fact that accused is described therein as an informer is not enough, because the
description is a conclusion made by the author of the information based on the facts specifically alleged in
the four counts. The information alleged that the accused "adhered to and served as an informer of the
enemy, . . . giving them aid and comfort in the following manner, to wit:", and then follow the four
counts.
Furthermore, even if the word "informer" in the information should justify the admission of the evidence in
question, the lower court erred in finding the facts proved when the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz about
them has not been corroborated by any other witness, thus violating the two-witness rule in treason
cases.
Appellant assigned as the seventh error of the trial court in finding him as an informer "on mere
assertions of witnesses to that effect without supporting treasonable acts and in making findings of fact
not supported by any evidence at all" and makes the complaint, specifically, in relation with the following
pronouncement in the appealed decision:

. . . The accused acted and served as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese army in
Camiling, directing his espionage activities or detecting and gathering informations about the activities of
members of the guerilla organizations, of persons maintaining or providing for the support thereof and of
persons possessing firearms or in any other manner connected with the underground resistance
movements against the Japanese and spying on the movements of those persons who cherish the return
to the Philippines of the Americans, . . .. Proofs adduced by the prosecution of the fact that the accused
had been acting as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese are highly convincing. One after
another the various witnesses for the prosecution has pointed his accusing finger at the accused to have
been an informer and spy of the Japanese army. . .

Finding the accused guilty of the crime of treason as punished by article 114 of theRevised Penal
Code with the attendance of one mitigating circumstance, as provided in number 2 of article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, with the modification of the lower court's decision, we sentence him to 14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporaland to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs.

The pronouncement appears to be based on the testimonies of Publio Dumaual, Rafael Guillermo, and
Agustin de la Cruz, each one of whom testified about facts not alleged in any of the counts of the
information, and their testimonies on said facts appear not to be corroborated by another witness, as
required by the two-witness rule. The assignment of error is well taken.

I reserve my vote. The decision in the Laurel case is not as yet final.

Appellant complains in his eight assignment of error that the court failed to take into account two
mitigating circumstances: the fact that the Abad family was persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution
ending in the killing of Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad, father and brother, respectively, of the accused,
and, appellant's age.

BRIONES, M., disidente:

On September 26, 1942, a group of around thirty guerrillas took the Abad family to the barrio of Ketegan.
On October 17, Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad were brought to the schoolhouse, and from that time on
they were never seen alive again. On January, 1943, the family was released minus the above mentioned
two members, and they proceeded to Camiling where Mariano Abad, the eldest son, was living, as
explained by his widowed mother, "to whom I could look after the support inasmuch as he is my living
eldest son. He was with the Japs because that was the last resort for him to do inasmuch as if he did not
do that he would have been killed by the guerrillas."

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
PARAS, J.:

Separate Opinions

Creo que el apelante debe ser absuelt, por duda razonable. Parecia pesar una maldicion sobre la familia
del acusado: perseguidos por los guerilleros, algunos de sus miembros perecieron en manos de estos. El
cargo mas grave contra el acusado es el relacionado con la muerte de Osias Salvador. Pues bien; me
parece que las pruebas acerca de este cargo no justifican la condena.
G.R. No. L-477

June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.

These facts cannot be considered to mitigate appellant's guilt as they are not of a similar nature or
analogous to those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant's age can be considered. He was born on October 20, 1924, and when he committed the acts
alleged in counts two and three, the latter on September 28, 1944, he was not yet 20 years old. The fact
that his eldest brother, Mariano, was the liaison officer of the Japanese and another elder brother, Felix,
was also in the service of the Japanese, coupled by the fact that, as stated by his widowed mother, the
accused had to depend on Mariano for his support, the same as the other members of the family, are
circumstances from which, in view of appellant's immature age, did not allow him the freedom of initiative
and action which should be expected of a person who is aware of the full consequences and responsibility
for his acts. The circumstances of this case justify crediting appellant with a mitigating circumstance of
similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although we hold appellant as one of those responsible for the arrest of the Salvador brothers, we do not
agree with the lower court in finding him responsible also for the death of Osias Salvador, as according to
the evidence, it was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato, which must have enraged the
Japanese to the extent of killing Osias Salvador, who, were not so weak, had the same chance as his
brothers to escape. If his brothers did not escape, there is no ground to presume that Osias would have
been killed by the Japanese if we take into consideration that, after almost two and a half months of
confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto Francisco to be released. There is absolutely no evidence that
appellant was present or had anything to do with the killing of Osias Salvador.
Upon the conclusion we arrived at, it is not necessary to deal with the ninth assignment of error in
appellant's brief.

Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the accused
to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who
is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably
adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United
States were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist and aid
militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations
against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and assisted the
Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements against the United
States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San

Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime
between January and April, 1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of
defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that the accused
participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property. The court
below, however, said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so
regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did find established under the
two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy
garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed
with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same
period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the
Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the
enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two witnesses.
No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason imputed by them
to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal
property, and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on different
dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the
witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform
carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if
corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular thing, it a
routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the
enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the
Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the organization was
created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed
by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives
of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and
unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common
enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent
and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or
from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for the
purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious
acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the
enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though an opportunity
never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy
derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with
which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented,
and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and his
kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from that of
enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two witnesses.
Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by the
testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another
witness another day, and so forth?

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from
American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-witness
principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull from American
materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the same overt act,
was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and another witness to another overt act
of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that the same construction might
apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity
of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is wholly
destroyed by permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the
constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the
same overt act. This also is now the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea:
"It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits
together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote
in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918),
decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very
minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient
action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to
the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be
supported by the testimony of two witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the
possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we
have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy
purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so exacting
and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths
to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and
held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested
by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences,
however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other
sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of
another eyewitness to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal
interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American government fully
realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the objections.
(Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional
Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against legislative change."
(Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention,
Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer
case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision.
Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in
psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical
calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to

warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is
severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by
James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely
difficult as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not merely in
spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by
accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for
treason were generally virulent.'"

of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably arrest and/or cause to be arrested one Antonio Conducto as a guerrilla and did turn him over
and deliver to the Japanese military authorities in their garrison, since which time, that is, since the said
18th day of March, 1944, nothing has been heard from said Antonio Conducto and is considered by his
family to have been killed by the Japanese military authorities.

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By extension, the
lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to have
intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers
meant.

The court found "no concrete evidence as to defendant's membership in the U. N. or Makapili organization
nor on what the patrols he accompanied actually did once they were out of town", and so was,
"constrained to rule that the evidence of the prosecution fails to establish, in connection with counts 1
and 2, any true overt act of treason." We may add that no two witnesses coincided in any specific act of
the defendant. The People's Court, believed, however, "that the same evidence is sufficient to prove beyond
question defendant's adherence to the enemy."

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

As to the 3rd count, the opinion of the People's Court was that it had been fully substantiated.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

The record shows that on or about, March 11, 1944, Japanese patrol composed of seventeen men and one
officer was ambushed and totally liquidated by guerrillas in barrio Bibito, Lopez, Province of Tayabas, now
Quezon. As a result, some of inhabitants of Bibito and neighboring barrios, numbering several hundred,
were arrested and others were ordered to report at the poblacion. Among the latter were Antonio
Conducto, a guerrilla and former USAFFE, Conducto's wife, parents and other relatives.

G.R. No. L-1006

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
FILEMON ESCLETO, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former People's Court with treason on three counts,
namely:
1. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the municipality of Lopez,
Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines,
then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably collaborate, associate and fraternize with the Imperial Japanese Forces, going
out with them in patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or in
sympathy with the resistance movements in the Philippines; bearing arms against the American and
guerrilla forces in the furtherance of the war efforts of the Imperial Japanese Forces against the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and mounting guard and performing guard duty for the
Imperial Japanese Forces in their garrison in the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines.
2. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the municipality of Lopez,
Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named
accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably accompany, join, and go out on patrols with Japanese soldiers in
and around the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts,
and of persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movement in the Philippines.
3. That on or about the 18th day of March, 1944, in the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Filemon
Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies

Sinforosa Mortero, 40 years old, testified that on March 18, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon,
obedience to the Japanese order, she and the rest of her family went to the town from barrio Danlagan.
Still in Danlagan, in front of Filemon Escleto's house, Escleto told them to stop and took down their
names. With her were her daughter-in-law, Patricia Araya, her son Antonio Conductor, and three
grandchildren. After writing their names, Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison in
the poblacion where they were questioned by some whose name she did not know. This man asked her if
she heard gunshots and she said yes but did not know where they were. The next day they were allowed to
go home with many others, but Antonio Conducto was not released. Since then she had not seen her son.
On cross-examination she said that when Escleto took down their names Antonio Conducto asked the
accused if anything would happen to him and his family, and Escleto answered, "Nothing will happen to
you because I am to accompany you in going to town."
Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town, Filemon Escleto stopped her, her mother-in-law, her
husband, her three children, her brother-in-law and the latter's wife and took down their names; that after
taking their names Escleto and the Philippine Constabulary soldier took them to the PC garrison; that her
husband asked Escleto what would happen to him and his family, and Escleto said "nothing" and assured
Conducto that he and his family would soon be allowed to go home; that Escleto presented them to a PC
and she heard him tell the latter, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm;" that afterward they were
sent upstairs and she did not know what happened to her husband.
The foregoing evidence fails to support the lower court's findings. It will readily be seen from a cursory
examination thereof that the only point on which the two witnesses, Patricia Araya and Sinforosa Mortero,
agree is that the accused took down the names of Conducto and of the witnesses, among others, and
came along with them to the town. Granting the veracity of this statement, it does not warrant the
inference that the defendant betrayed Conducto or had the intention of doing so. What he allegedly did
was compatible with the hypothesis that, being lieutenant of his barrio, he thought it convenient as part
of his duty to make a list of the people under his jurisdiction who heeded the Japanese order.
It was not necessary for the defendant to write Conducto's name in order to report on him. The two men
appeared to be from the same barrio, Escleto knew Conducto intimately, and the latter was on his way to
town to present himself. If the accused had a treasonable intent against Conducto, he could have
furnished his name and identity to the enemy by word of mouth. This step would have the added

advantage of concealing the defendant's traitorous action from his town mates and of not appraising
Conducto of what was in store for him, knowledge of which might impel Conducto to escape.
That the list was not used for the purpose assumed by the prosecution is best demonstrated by the fact
that it included, according to witnesses, Conducto's wife and parents and many others who were
discharged the next day. The fact that, according to the evidence of the prosecution, spies wearing masks
were utilized in the screening of guerrillas adds to the doubt that the defendant had a hand in Conducto's
misfortune.
In short, Escleto's making note of persons who went to the poblacion as evidence of overt act is weak,
vague and uncertain.
The only evidence against the appellant that might be considered direct and damaging is Patricia Araya's
testimony that Escleto told a Philippine Constabulary soldier, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm."
But the prosecution did not elaborate on this testimony, nor was any other witness made to corroborate it
although Patricia Araya was with her husband, parents and relatives who would have heard the statement
if the defendant had uttered it.

The decision of the People's Court will be and the same is reversed with the costs de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., Mr. Justice Pablo voted to reverse.
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. SIMEON MAGTIBAY, Defendant-Appellant.
Enrique Barrera for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; CONFESSION. The confession in open court, upon which a defendant
may be convicted of treason under section 9 of the act of Congress of March 8, 1902, is a confession of
guilt. The section can not be extended so as to include admissions of fact, from which his guilt may be
inferred, made by-the defendant in giving his testimony after a plea of not guilty.

Leaving aside the question of Patricia's veracity, the failure to corroborate her testimony just mentioned
makes it ineffective and unavailing as proof of an overt act of treason. In a juridical sense, this testimony
is inoperative as a corroboration of the defendant's taking down of the name of Conducto and others, or
vice-versa. It has been seen that the testimony was not shown to have been made for a treasonable
purpose nor did it necessarily have that implication. This process of evaluating evidence might sound like
a play of words but, as we have said in People vs. Adriano (44 Off. Gaz., 4300)[[1]] the authors of the twowitness provision in the American Constitution, from which the Philippine treason law was taken,
purposely made it "severely restrictive" and conviction for treason difficult. In that case we adverted to the
following authorities, among others:

2. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE. The testimony of one witness to a confession made by the defendant, to the
effect that he had joined the insurrectionary forces, and to the finding upon his person of a commission
making him a lieutenant in such forces, is insufficient to support a conviction for the crime of treason, as
such conviction can only be had upon the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act of
treason.

Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must be two witnesses
to each part of the overt act. (VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 2038, p. 271.)

WILLARD, J. :

DECISION

It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits
together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths;. . . . (Opinion of
Judge Learned Hand quoted as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.)
The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it show
sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and
comfort to the enemy. Every action, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute
treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses. (Cramer vs. U.S. of A., 65 S. Ct., 918; 89
Law. ed., 1441.)
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the
framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researches in psychology warrant.
Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of
evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely
restrictive. It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James
Wilson that "Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficultas in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy." The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the
difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident,
but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecution for treason
were generally virulent." (Cramer vs. U.S. of A., supra.)

The defendant has been convicted of the crime of treason as defined in Act No. 292, section 1, and
sentenced to death.
It was proved that he was a soldier in the Constabulary stationed at Imus, in the Province of Cavite; that
on October 13, 1902, he deserted and was captured on October 27, 1902. When he was captured he
stated to the inspector, according to the latters testimony, that he had given the arms which he took with
him to his general, Montalon. Upon his person was found a commission, making him a second lieutenant,
signed by Montalon and dated October 14. The only witness to the finding of this commission was the
inspector. There was evidence that, in October, Montalon was in armed rebellion against the Government
and that there had been engagements in that month between his troops and the forces of the
Constabulary.
Section 9 of the act of Congress of March 8, 1902, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 9. That no person in the Philippine Islands shall, under the authority of the United States, be
convicted of treason by any tribunal, civil or military, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act, or on confession in open court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Passing for the present the testimony of the defendant at the trial, there was no other evidence in the case
to show that he had ever joined the forces of Montalon, except the testimony of the inspector as to the

confession made when he was captured and the commission as second lieutenant found upon his person.
Under the act of Congress there can be no conviction, unless two witnesses testify to the same overt act of
treason. There is no such testimony in this case. The evidence of the Government related exclusively to the
desertion of the defendant and his capture.
The act of Congress provides that there may be a conviction upon a confession in open court. The
defendant testified as a witness in his own behalf at the trial. He denied that he had deserted, but claimed
that he had been carried off by force by soldiers of Montalon and taken to the latters camp. He promised
to serve them, and they made him a lieutenant and gave him a revolver. He remained with them two
weeks, but he says that it was against his will and that he had no opportunity to escape, except the time
when he was captured. This was not a confession within the meaning of the said section 9. The confession
there mentioned means a confession of guilt. The section can not be extended so as to include admissions
of facts made by him in giving his testimony after a plea of not guilty, from which admissions his guilt can
be inferred. The evidence required by the act of Congress does not appear in this case.
It is unnecessary to consider the point made by the defendants counsel that, in view of the official
proclamations, there existed no state of insurrection or war in Cavite in October, 1902.
The judgment is reversed and the defendant acquitted only of the crime charged in this complaint, with
the costs de oficio, and without prejudice to the presentation of complaints for the other crimes of which
the evidence in this case indicates that the defendant may be guilty.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-369

March 13, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant.
Luis Atienza Bijis for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Bautista for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and costs,
Carmelito Victoria comes to us to seek for the reversal of the decision of the People's Court.
He is accused of treason in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito Victoria, Carling Victoria,
Carlos Victoria of the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That during the period compromised between March, 1942 to December, 1944, more specifically on or
about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereunder stated, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accussed not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing
allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of his said duty of
allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the
Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States and
the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort, in the
following manner, to wit:

1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the
Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and
comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies and a Japanese soldier, which went
to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking Labak Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused
Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas; that said patrol was arresting said Federico Unson when some
guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies and the patrol left; that said accused directed several men
in the patrol in picking up the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in the afternoon of the same
day, the same party of spies, including the accused and eight members of the Japanese Military Police,
went again to the house of Federico Unson and did feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and treasonably arrest
him, together with Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at the house; that with their hands
bound, the three were tortured and then taken along by said patrol after setting fire on the house of
Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were found lying nearby with numerous bayonet wounds; and that
Ruben Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, and there killed.
2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies, Pedro
Raviera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and others who were all
armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house
of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese
garrison on the charge that he had a short wave radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the
guerrillas and at the same time supporting them; that said Unson was released on the same day, but on
the next day he was again arrested and brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said
Jose Unson never returned.
3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in company with Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo Coronel,
Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro Raviera, all members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei
Tai, were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went
to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect,
and turned him over to the Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing themselves
near the house of Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him.
4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused, accompanied by
two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with the intent
to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and
apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that said two Japanese Military Police and the accused
conducted a search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he was
subjected to inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the Hunters ROTC
Guerrillas.
5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused then acting as an
informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, with intent to aid said enemy, did wilfully, feloniously and
treasonably cause the Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended Antonio San Agustin, a
guerrilla officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and unlawfully detained
up to September 20, 1944.
6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives,
for the purpose of giving and with intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Melecio
Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, where he was
tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably joined the Makapili organization designed to support the Imperial
Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies; that he took military training from the Japanese
and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier, taking orders from the Japanese; that he
participated in the raid and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the

Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from Bautista to the
mountains of Susong Dalaga and Mt. Malipuo, Laguna; that he performed sentry duty for the Japanese
Army in Mount Malipuo, where he was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes
by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and Dolores Kalakasan, the lower court found that the
mutilated corpses of Federico Unson, Jr. and of Isaias Perez were found rotting in the vicinity of the
houses of the victims which were burned and looted by the same hands, on the day following the arrest,
effected by the accused in the company of a Japanese soldier and several spies of the enemy. The body of
Unson which was still tied to a tree showed that it had been disemboweled by several bayonet thrusts and
the corpse of Perez appeared ankleless and mutilated. Ruben Godoy, who was arrested at the same times
as Unson and Perez, since he was imprisoned in the garrison of the Japanese kempei, was never heard of.
Appellant's testimony to the fact that, although admitting his presence in the previous morning raid, he
did not come along with party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the actual arrest of Unson,
Perez and Godoy took place, was not given by the lower court enough weight to prevail over that of the
prosecuting witnesses, thus finding the accused guilty on the first count.
With respect to the second count, the lower court states that the accused admitted having taken part in
the raid of the house of Jose Unson and in the latter's arrest, but claims that he tried to save Unson, only
the latter was accepted by the lower court, in view of appellant's behaviour as recalled by witnesses
Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon Unson. The last that was seen of Jose Unson, was
his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest, the exhumation having
been effected with the aid of those who claimed to have seen how his life was ended. These facts relate to
the second count.
With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of Elena Romulo and Enriqueta Alviar, the lower
court found that on February 10, 1945, in the company of Japanese kempei and Filipino spies, the
accused raided the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo and arrested him as alleged guerrilla. The
accused simply alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date he was in Gagalagin, Manila.
In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to
accompany them in the raid on Hermogenes Caluag's house and admitted that he was present throughout
the investigation and torture of Caluag who, according to the accused himself, was tied suspended in the
air for fully twenty minutes, but the lower court did not accept this defense, considering it rather as
corroborative of the facts alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the prosecution.
Appellant's participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan, alleged in the sixth count, according to the lower
court, has been abundantly established, disbelieving appellant's feigned ignorance of the arrest because
appellant himself testified that he promised to see what he could do about Labalan and accepted three
chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to the interpreter at the kempei office.
Counts five and seven were not proven.
Upon the record, it appears that the lower court's conclusions on the overt acts alleged in counts one, two,
three, four, and six of the information are fully supported by the evidence. A perusal of appellant's brief
alone, in taken. It is highly significant that, although appellant's brief compromises one hundred thirty
printed pages, it failed completely to point out any specific error in the conclusions of fact of the lower
court, counsel limiting himself into raising legal questions, maintaining that the penalty imposed is
unjustified, and that the acts committed by the accused do not constitute treason but ordinary crimes
against the victimized persons.

Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese occupation has not been impeccable, counsel
wants us to consider what the accused did in behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of his criminal
responsibility, and that the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public vengeance, but to attain the
correction of the guilty person, such purpose will not be attained with appellant's death as decreed by the
lower court.
Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he joined the Japanese in their raids
only because he was forced to do so; that in the instances he had to go to the Japanese garrison he did it
either in obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to intercede in behalf of some prisoners;
that he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor Constancia, who appealed to him not to go to the
mountains so he may continue helping those who were detained by the Japanese; and that in October
1943, he was arrested by the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and that he was released only after he
had been made to promise to indicate who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the involuntary
promise exacted from him, he did not cause the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we accept this testimony of
appellant it cannot overthrow the clear, positive, and straightforward declarations of the witnesses, for the
prosecution. Appellant's claim that he, too, was a guerrilla, had helped the resistance movement, and in
fact, succeeded in interceding for some Filipino prisoners, does not relieve him from criminal responsibility
for the acts he had committed as alleged in the counts in the information which were declared proven by
the People's Court.
The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated by
the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs,
and although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused the killing of
a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It was already
said that: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James
2:10).
We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that the acts committed by him are not punishable as
treason and that the People's Court who tried him had no jurisdiction, they being merely upshots of the
wrong theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty.
Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower court, there
is disagreement as to the penalty that should be imposed, because, while nine of the ten members taking
part in the decision of this case voted for the affirmance of the death penalty imposed by the lower court,
the writer of this opinion takes the position that the penalty the accused deserves is that of reclusion
perpetua, the medium penalty provided by law.
The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in view of the presence
of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information as follows:
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes
by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as aggravating, while the
undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of
the treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act,
by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a
continuous crimes as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are
some accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number not
changing the nature of the offense committed.

For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this Court in the imposition of the
death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-895

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE LUIS GODINEZ, defendant-appellant.
Cardenas and Casal for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Acting Solicitor Pedro Ocampo for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
Prosecuted and tried for treason, the accused-appellant Jose Luis Godinez was found guilty by the Fifth
Division of the People's Court, Judge F.V. Borromeo dissenting.
He was a shipmaster in the Philippines coastwise trade before the Pacific War. After the Japanese
invasion, from May, 1942 to June, 1943, he rendered services to the Japanese Navy, as pilot in the Port of
Cebu, bringing their ships into harbor and otherwise performing work connected with navigation. He was
paid monthly salaries. After a period of rest due to ill health, he was again engaged by the Japanese Army
to do the same chores from May, 1943 to October, 1944, at varying rates of compensation.
The prosecution's case rests on such acts of cooperation interpreted in the light of incidents, hereafter
mentioned which, it is argued, demonstrate treasonable adherence to the enemy, making defendant guilty
as charged.
In his defense the accused swore that he had to serve the Japanese because he was required by them to
do so, that he could not give any valid excuses, that if he made any false statements he would be caught,
and killed; and that even if he could escape, the many members of his immediate family would be left to
their ruthless ill-will.
The majority of the trial judges discounted this explanation saying, in effect, that the danger to the
accused was not imminent, because other merchant marine officers, like Captain Obosa and Joaquin Alex
succeeded in evading service to the Japanese and were not molested. It was not demonstrated, however,
that these seamen were surrounded by the same circumstances of herein indictee, as to family members,
means of evasion, personal relations or conditions, etc., all of which necessarily affected any decision to
serve or not to serve. To clinch its case the prosecution should have attested that appellant had a valid
excuse or that he could eluded the wrath of the masters. Furthermore, the mere fact that some Filipinos
were brave enough to refuse and were lucky enough to be let alone is no conclusive reason to hold that in
truth there was no danger in denying the conqueror's demands. There were persons put to death or
maltreated for so refusing, and that was known at the time, as admitted on the stand by the people's
witness Francisco Garcia. Again, it may be that such marine officers were not pressed by the Japanese
precisely because the herein accused and others (Eduardo Gonzales, Marcelo Ayesa) had consented to
render pilotage service. Those who refused to cooperate, in the fact of danger, were patriotic citizens; but it
does not follow that the faintheart, who gave in, were traitors. On this subject the statement of President
Osmea in November 1944, may be quoted:

. . . Not all public officials could take to the hills to carry on the heroic struggle. Some had to remain in
their posts to maintain a semblance of government, to protect the population from the oppressor to the
extent possible by human ingenuity and to comfort the people in their misery. Had their services not been
available, the Japanese would either have themselves governed directly and completely or utilized
unscrupulous Filipino followers capable of any treason to their people. The result would have been
calamitous and the injuries inflicted to our body politic beyond cure.
The problem under consideration must be solved with justice and dignity. Every case should examined
impartially and decided on it own merits. Persons holding public office during enemy occupation, for the
most part, fall within three categories; those prompted by a desire to protect the people, those actuated by
fear of enemy reprisals, and those motivated by disloyalty to our government and cause. The motives
which caused the retention of the office and conduct while in office, rather than the sole fact of its
occupation, will be the criteria upon which such persons will be judged. (Official Gazette, Vol. 41, No. 1, p.
102.)
It is now undisputed that the mere governmental work under the Japanese
regime and pilotage service may be considered in the same light [[1]] does not constitute per
se indictable disloyalty.
It is contended, however, that appellant's help to the Japanese together with criminal intention to betray
render him guilty of treason. Proof of this traitorous intent is made to consist of five circumstances
described in the brief of the Solicitor General as follows:
(1) During the year 1943, accused often went to the coffee shop of S. P. Banis and during the discussion
between Banis and appellant, the latter always showed his pro-Japanese sentiments. On one occasion,
during November, 1943, Banis told him about the expected arrival of the Americans, and the appellant
exclaimed that Banis was crazy in believing that the Americans were coming back to the Philippines,
because according to the appellant, the American forces would never back to these Islands (testimony of S.
P. Banis, p. 10, t.s.n., Lopez).
(2) Sometime in July, 1942, Capt. Canuto Obosa was in Cebu City for a few days. He saw the appellant
inside his own automobile which carried a Japanese flag and on his left arm, appellant was wearing a
band with Japanese characters (testimony of Capt. Canuto Obosa, pp. 1-2, t.s.n., Lopez).
(3) When the Japanese landed in Cebu City on April 11, 1942, the accused with two other persons went
up a Japanese ship anchored alongside the Pier, presented his respects to the Japanese officer in charge
of the boat, handed to him a revolver which was examined by said Japanese officer. The appellant showed
how the firearm worked by firing the pistol (testimony of Antonio Yee, pp. 14-15, t.s.n., Lopez).
(4) From April 1942 to October, 1944, the appellant had a Japanese flag placed on the door of his house
situated at D. Jakosalem Street, Cebu City about a foot wide and about two feet long and on the left side of
the door was a piece of board with Japanese Characters written on it (testimony of Antonio Yee, p. 15,
t.s.n., Lopez.)
(5) During the middle of September, 1944, when American planes were dropping bombs in Cebu City, the
appellant who was in the lawn of his house said, more or less, the following:
"Those sons of the bitches of Americans (referring to the American aviators) are the gangsters of the
United States; they are drunk, they will go down". (Testimony of William del Villar, p. 7, t.s.n., Dizon.)
I. On the first point, the accused denied having stated the Americans could never come back, admitting,
however, having expressed the belief that it was not easy for them to return, in view of the successive

victories of the Imperial hordes at that time. Even if appellant had uttered the words attributed to him, it
is doubtful whether they exhibited adherence to the foe, unless it is shown that he wanted, or rejoiced in
the inability to return of the American forces. But it is hard to believe appellant wished the defeat of our
allies, because he had two sons in the guerrilla forces. And if he ever made the remark, it was probably as
one of those arm-chair strategists dishing out war opinions on the basis of doctored news fed by the
propaganda machine to the local newspapers and broadcasting stations. The man was sadly in error; he
underestimated the publicity corps of the Japanese Army; but should he be jailed for it?
II. The second point has no merit. Although there was proof about a Nippon flag fluttering on the
automobile the appellant rode, no evidence was adduced that the car belonged to him.
III. On the third point the appellant swore that when the Japanese arrived in Cebu, they arrested him,
and when they found, after investigation, that he was a marine officer they ordered him to report the next
day to the Port Surveyor, bringing any firearms he had in his possession; that he did as directed and
surrendered his pistol. His version is entirely credible. Those who were in Manila during the first days of
January, 1942, remember identical directives of the Military Commander. And if surrender of the firearm
meant treasonable collaboration, thousands of Manila residents would be traitors too.
IV. About the display of the Rising Sun. The witness of the prosecution had to admit that after the fall of
Cebu City the Japanese issued orders requiring every resident to hoist a Japanese flag in their houses and
that refusal to obey meant death. Naturally, compliance with this decree should not be chalked against
appellant, a resident therein.
V. The accused denied having made the insulting statements imputed to him by William de Villar against
American aviators that raided Cebu, and proved that said witness bore a grudge against him that probably
colored the testimony. Anyway, his counsel, pleading in extenuation, submitted some endorsable
comments upholding the proposition of one undergoing the nerve-racking experience of aerial
bombardments, for caustic remarks spoken in private motivated by his apprehension for the safety of his
family and his own.
After considering all matters, the Court reaches the conclusion that defendant's disloyal heart or
treacherous mind has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. He is absolved, with costs de oficio.

1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May 3, 1945 in the city of
Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and
become a member of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-sponsored military organization
knowing fully well that the aims and purposes of said organization are among other to extend every aid
and cooperation with said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of
America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a member of said
enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary the said accused further adhering to the enemy with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to them did go out on numerous patrol in
company with Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and other elements and other elements resisting said
enemy in the Philippines.
2. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and May 3, 1945, and
the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Forces with treasonable to give as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy in violation of his allegiance and fidelity to the United States of America and
the Commonwealth of the Philippines did then and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably
join the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the command of a T. Yushida,
performing the function and duties of an informer spy and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of
said military police and did during the period aforesaid in various places in the Province of Cebu
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy with
treasonable intent to give as he did give and comfort aid and comfort to them did in company with other
member of the Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to apprehend guerrilla as they did apprehend
capture and torture guerrillas loot civilians and otherwise commit acts of atrocities in furtherance of the
hostile design of the enemy and to weaken the cause of the United States of America in the Philippines.
3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province of Bohol Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and
the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy
in his capacity as a member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary attached to the Japanese Military
Police and a guide of the Japanese Army Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the Japanese Imperial
Army did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called
mopping up operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas and other element engaged in resistance
against said enemy and as a result thereof ten guerrillas were killed.

March 29, 1949

G.R. No. L-456
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.
C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez for appellee.
REYES, J.:
We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the
People's Court upon the appellants who was charged with treason but convicted of what the said court
terms "complex crime of crime of treason with murder robbery and rape."
The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended contains the
following counts:

4. That on or about during the period comprised between September 1944 and November 1944 in the City
of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did
give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably help
in the a construction of air raid shelters for the protection of Japanese soldier against allied air raids and
did help in the acquisition of as he did acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation against the
expected landing of America forces.
5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines the
accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces
with treasonable intent to give as he did aid and comfort to the said enemy in company with Japanese
Military soldier of the Japanese Military Police and other Filipino enemy spies did then and there wilfully
unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo Cansancio in an
effort to force the latter to disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo a guerrilla officer to cause said
Primitivo Cansancio to confess his guerrilla activities.
6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable
intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in company with a patrol of Japanese soldier s

of the Japanese Military Police and other enemy spices and informers did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Francisco Larrobia and did kick said
Francisco Larrobia strike him on the face and head with a pistol and subsequently bayoneting and killing
said Francisco Larrobia on the suspicion that he was a guerrilla.
7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay province of Cebu, Philippines and
within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to
the said enemy in his capacity as chief undercover man for the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in
company with Japanese soldier and Santiago Bernaba another Japanese spy did then and there willfully
unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa on suspicion of being a guerrilla
thereafter taking said Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and thereat herein accused did
investigate said Numeriano Bellesa about the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in gathering up
arms in gathering up arms in furtherance of their hostile design and did strike said Numeriano Bellesa on
the face and body and otherwise maltreat him in the course of said investigation.
8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy
the Empire of Japan and its imperial Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police Cebu District and in company with Japanese soldier of the Japanese Military
Police did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona and
did investigate the latter as to the whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan food procurement
officer of the guerrilla and upon his denial of knowledge of said whereabouts herein accused did torture
said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter by the arms so that his body dangled down striking his
stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting wounds on his head and finally striking his mouth with a
flashlight splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.
9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay Province of Cebu Philippines and within
the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Imperial Japanese
Government and her armed forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese
Military Police Cebu District in company with other informers said Military Police, did then and there
apprehend and arrest Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and treasonably investigate said Albina
Alpez as to the whereabouts of her husband Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division
Cebu Area Command and when said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid husband's
whereabouts herein accused did slap kick and throw her to the ground hang her by the arms strike her on
the breast with his revolver threaten her with a dagger pointed at her throat and otherwise maltreat and
torture said Albina Alpez.
10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire
of Japan and its Imperial of Japan its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did
give aid and comfort said enemy in company with five Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese
Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai and his capacity Military Police for the Cebu District
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Victoriano
Primacio and one Juan Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and
strike said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times and did turn over said
Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the ground that said person were
guerrilla and as a result of which said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia have not been heard of ever
since then.
11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his

capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt. Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE
officer, in furtherance of the hostile designs of said enemy.
12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within furtherance of his adherence to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in
his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and
inn company with Japanese soldier, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
arrest one Jose Murillo on suspicion that the latter was a guerrilla.
13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did and comfort to said enemy, did then and there,
wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Basilia Arong and did take the latter to
headquarters of the Japanese Military Police and thereat herein accused did question and investigate said
Basilia Arong as to the whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and when said Basilia Arong
denied knowledge of their whereabouts, herein accused did said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her of
her clothing, severely beat her and otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter
addressed to her aforesaid husband, Pedro Arong asking the latter to report top the Japanese Kempei-Tai
headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said headquarters in compliance of said letter,
he not been seen ever since.
14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps Island, in the Province of Cebu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable to give as he did give aid comfort to,
said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military
Police of Cebu District and in company with Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and spies, did then and there
wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and did question the latter as
the whereabouts of Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in the course of said
investigation, the accused did hang said Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs and an iron
pipe thereby inflicting several wounds on his head for the latter's refusal to divulge said guerrilla
whereabouts.
15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the City of Cebu Philippines and within
the Jurisdiction of this court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid comfort to said enemy,
acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military
Police of the Cebu District, in company with two Japanese soldiers and three other Japanese informers
and spies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Marciano Alejandro, Carlos Numera and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos Numera,
and wounding said Jose Rada on the charge that said person had contact with guerrillas.
16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy, acting in his capacity as an informer and spy of said enemy, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla soldier for the latter's
guerrilla activities and resistance to said enemy.
17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different place in the Province of Cebu, Philippines,
particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, thee Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, as member

of the enemy-sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable join and take part in the general mopping up operation
conducted by the Japanese Army under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of
Tubonok to Minglanilla for the Purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting
said enemy.
18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of Cebu, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer and spy under the employ of the Japanese Military
Police, Cebu District, in company with the member of said Japanese Military Police under the command of
Sergeant T. Yushida of the Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably arrest, maltreat and torture Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and some
Filipino girls naked, raping them, and, did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said
Martin Francisco:
2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch
P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring

Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as did give and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief informer, spy and undercover man of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District,
did and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado and "John
Doe" her husband, on suspicion that said persons were cooperating and helping the guerrillas and did
thereafter bring said Paulita Delgado and her husband to the Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat
herein accused did torture them by hanging them by their arms did otherwise maltreat them.
23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and Imperial
Japanese Army, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as member of the enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military
Police, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably kill Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla,
for his activities and resistance to the said enemy.
By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the information. But
he now pleads for modification of the sentence, contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:(1) voluntary
surrender; (2) the facts that the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC in cases
against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military commission; on and (3) the facts that the accused
helped and saved the lives of many civilian and from death in the hands of the Japanese;
2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-appellant on the strength of
the assurance that no death penalty would be imposed upon him;

on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.

3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and unnecessary cruelty;
19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy, acting as an informer to the enemy and in company with soldiers of the Japanese Army, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and as a result of which, Governor Hilario Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from
said enemy, was captured.
20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of
this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike Vicente Padilla with a
baseball bat, hang said Vicente Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him in an effort to extract
confession of the latter's connection with guerrillas.
21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the
accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of
the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in company with Japanese soldier and other agent of the
Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie
up the hands of said persons, severely inflicting wounds on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as
consequence of said maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days thereafter.
22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of
this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial

4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with murder, rape
and robbery;
5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.
Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant should not have
been convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape." The killings,
robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere
elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified
with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with treason to increase the penalty under
article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,[[1]]L-399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should,
therefore, be held guilty of treason only.
Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his
admission that he was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the CIC, is proof that he was in
fact arrested. Where there has been actual arrest the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be invoked (Peoplevs. Conwi, 40 Off. Gaz. [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 166[[2]]; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil.,
307.)
The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and his countrymen have
not been established by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be considered as mitigating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty on the assurance that he would not be
sentenced to death. The claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is denied by both the

prosecution and the trial court, the latter stating in its order denying appellant' motions for
reconsideration that "No responsible judge can or would advance his opinion in connection with the
decision to be rendered in any case before he has properly deliberated on the merit of the same."
There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength should not have been considered. These circumstances are "by their nature, inherent in
the offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty." (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623)
But the facts alleged in the information show that appellant in committing the crime of treason,
deliberately augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting
them to barbarous forms of torture and finally putting them to death, and as appears in count No. 18, he
also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by
stripping his wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as
they are by the allegations of the complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these two
aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against him. As this
said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the
commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of
prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their
perpetration will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy will be regarded as aggravating
circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal
objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above
mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty, fall within the term of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are adsorbed in treason
characterized by killings, the killings themselves and other and other accompanying crimes should be
taken in to consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the
manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason, the highest crime known to law,
would confer on its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. To avoid such incongruity
and injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code,
to the danger and harm to which the culprit has exposed his exposed his country and his people and to
the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal
Code just penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution.
Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable, as in the case of
homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the
offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in furtherance of the law's aims.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion temporal to death and a fine of not to exceed
P20,00 Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary confession of guilty,
but appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances of ignominy and unnecessary cruel, the said
penalty should be imposed in its maximum. But since five member of this court are opposed to the
imposition of the death penalty in this case, the appellant can only be sentenced toreclusion perpetua and
a fine of P20,000.
Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared guilty of treason and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in this instance de oficio.
January 21, 1949
G.R. No. L-365
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO RACAZA, defendant-appellant.

Pedro C. Mendiola for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Francisco Carreon for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Antonio Racaza was charged with treason on 14 counts and tried din the City of Cebu before the First
Division of the People's Court. The information is as follows:
That during the period comprised between January , 1944 and February, 1945, more specifically on or
about the dates and periods herein below mentioned, in the municipalities hereinafter stated all within the
Provincial of Cebu and Bohol, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused not being a
foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, in violation of said duty of allegiance did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably adhere to the Empire of Japan with which the United States and the Philippines were
then at war, giving said enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese forces in the Philippines,
aid and/or comfort in the following manner, to wit:
"1. That on or about May 8, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comport fort to the enemy said accused did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably acting as a Japanese spy lead, guided and accompany a patrol composed of
Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers, which apprehended Custodio Abella; that the Filipino
undercovers, which apprehended Custodio Abella; that the aforementioned accused did question Abella as
to the hiding place of Captain Ibaez, G-2 of guerrilla forces; that during the investigation, the herein
accused hit Custodio Abella several times with a revolver and did threaten to kill him if he did not give the
desired information; and while Abella's hands were tied behind his back, the herein accused did knock
him down and choke him, while another companion did jump up and down several times on Abella's
stomach; that said Antonio Abella was finally taken and detained at the Japanese Kempei TaiHeadquarters
for fifteen days:
"2. That sometime during the month of August, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu,
the accused therein acting as a Japanese spy and undercover with the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comport to the enemy did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol composed of two Japanese soldiers and twelve Filipino
undercovers which apprehended one Florencio Perez as a guerrilla suspect; that over his pistol to the
accused as and upon denying of having any pistol, said accused and his companions did hang him with a
rope and while he was thus suspended in mid air, the herein accused and his companions hit Florencio
Perez on the head hand in other parts of the body with the butts of the revolvers and with their fists; that
the accused then took Florencio Perez outside the house and threatened to shoot him on the back of his
head unless he told where his pistol was;
"3. That on or about December 2, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe. Province of Cebu, the aforesaid
accused acting as a Japanese spy for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany
three Japanese soldiers to the house of Pablo Seno; that upon arrival at the said house, the herein
accused and his companions did apprehend the said house, the herein accused and his companions did
apprehend Pablo Seno and his daughter Anunsacion Seno for alleged guerrilla activities and connections
and did ransack and take away many objects therein; that said Pablo Seno and Anunsacion Seno after
having been tied and tortured by the accused and his companions were imprisoned at the Japanese
Kempei Tai Headquarters and since then nothing more was heard of them nor are their whereabouts
known;
"4. That on or about December 2, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu, for the purpose
of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, the aforesaid accused acting as a
Japanese spy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable lead and guide a patrol

of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the house of one Rufino Seno for being a guerrilla
suspect; that said Rufino Seno was tied, beaten and tortured and brought to and detained at the Japanese
Kempei Tai Headquarters at Cebu City and since then nothing more was heard of him nor are his
whereabouts known;
"5. That on or about the first day of July, 1944, in the municipality of Clarin, Province of Bohol,
Philippines, said accused, acting as Japanese spy and with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy did, them and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
lead and guided a patrol composed of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers for the enemy which
apprehended Leonilo Mercado and Jovito C. Soria for alleged guerrilla activities; that Leonilo Mercado was
brought to the municipal jail of Clarin, and detained up to July 12, 1944 when his wife visited him; and
since then Leonilo Mercado was not seen again nor heard from, nor are his whereabouts known;
"6. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the City of Cebu, the herein accused who was a Japanese spy,
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead and guide a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the house of Silvina Caballon; that upon arrival at said house, the herein a accused and
his companions did ask Silvina about the whereabouts of her brother who was a guerrilla and to
surrender the latter's revolver; that upon receiving an unsatisfactory reply, said accused forcibly undress
her, choke and beat her; that the aforesaid accused then took her to another house where through force,
violence and intimidation he attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, but which criminal purpose
the accused did not realize on account of reasons independent of his own will;
"7. On or about the 24th day of August, 1944, in the Mandawe, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said
accused acting as Japanese spy, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany
a patrol of fifteen Filipino pro-Japanese undercovers and two Japanese soldiers in search of guerrillas,
guerrilla suspect and their supporters, and did apprehended Patricio Suico, Leonardo Ouano and
Eduardo Ouano from their homes and did bring them to the Japanese Navy Kempei Tai Headquarters in
Cebu City where they were questioned on the whereabouts of Sulpicio Ouano, brother of Leonardo Ouano
and a guerrilla suspect, and Patricio Suico was questioned and blamed for not taking proper steps against
the guerrillas as barrio lieutenant; that the accused therein and his companions did bring the aforesaid
three persons back to Leonardo's house at Banilad where they again tied, hung tortured on account of
which Patricio became unconscious; that while said Patricio Suico was thus unconscious, the accused
and his companions did build a fire under the sled where Patricio Suico was, on account of which said
Patricio was burned and died; that while being detained in Cebu City, Leonardo and Eduardo Ouano
managed to escape and fled to the mountains;
"8. Sometimes during the month of December, 1944, in the municipality of Lahug, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, the accused herein acting as Japanese spy with four other Filipino undercovers for the
Japanese Army, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comport to the enemy did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably capture Pedro Lavares and Luis Hallares
and did detain, tie and torture them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters for alleged guerrilla activities; that
said accused and his aforesaid companions did detain likewise in said Kempei Tai Headquarters Bonifacio
Suico and Aniceto Taranza and did torture them by giving them fist blows tying them with ropes, hitting
them with bamboo poles and wooden pestles to force them to tell the real connections of Major Alejandro
Fortuna with the guerrillas that due to said punishment and torture, Bonifacio Suico died; that after
torturing Aniceto Taranza, said accused and his companions did bring him to the river bank near by and
did kill him with a saber;
"9. On or about July 28, 1944, in the Mabaling, City of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as
Japanese spy with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid comfort to the enemy did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese
soldiers and Filipino undercovers for the Japanese Army and did capture Vicente Abadiano, Nazario
Abadiano, Tereso Sanchez, Fidencio Delgado and some twenty Filipinos whose names cannot now be

stated all suspected of being guerrillas and of having allegedly taken part in the ambush of Japanese
soldiers on board a truck while passing at the boundary of Mambaling on July 25, 1944; that all the
persons above-named and twenty mountains near Ponta Princesa and after having been questioned and
tortured, twelve of them including Nazario Abadiano and Tereso Sanchez were shot by the herein accused
and his companions, all of whom died except Tereso Sanchez who is now an invalid due to wounds he
received;
"10. On or about July 21, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as
Japanese spy with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably in company with three Filipino undercovers like
the accused and two Japanese soldiers, capture Jose Roda for being the brother of Apolonio Roda alleged
G-2 operative for the guerrilla who could not be found, Claros Numeran for being related with Santiago
Numeran a guerrilla suspect whom accused and his companions were looking for, and Marciano
Alejandrino a guerrilla suspect, and did maltreat and torture said Jose Roda, Claros Numeran and
Marciano Alejandrino and later did bring them to a secluded spot at Mambaling and shoot them to death;
that due to the fact that the wounds of Jose Roda were not serious, he survived;
"11. On or about November 17, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said
accused acting as Japanese spy, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably guide, lead and accompany
a patrol composed of ten Filipino undercovers for the Japanese Army and two Japanese soldiers for the
purpose of apprehending guerrillas, guerrilla suspects and their relatives and the herein accused and his
companions did catch Hipolito Cabahug, Dioniso del Castillo, Victorino del Castillo and Demetrio Congson
and did whip and torture the last three persons for being allegedly messengers for the guerrillas; that said
accused and his companions finally did kill Dionisio del Castillo and Victorino del Castillo by inflicting
fatal wounds on theirs necks with swords;
"12. Sometimes in January, 1945, in Inawayan, Pardo, Cebu Province, said accused who was a Japanese
spy, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol composed of
Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers for the Japanese to Inawayan, Pardo, Cebu for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas; that the herein accused and his companions did catch one Hospicio Singson
from his house, tie him with a rope, hang and torture him urging him to till about reports and papers
from the mountains (guerrilla reports) and questioning him about money contributions to guerrillas; that
thereafter said Hospicio Singson was carried by accused and his companions to the local Japanese
garrison and since then he was not seen again nor heard from, nor are his whereabouts known;
"13. On or about the 5th day of January, 1945, in the municipality of Cebu Province of Cebu, with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy the aforesaid accused acting as
Japanese spy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead a group a Filipinos
who were enemy undercovers to the house of Susana Singson; that upon arrival at the said house, said
accused and his companions did catch Hospicio Singson, brother of Susana Singson and who was a
guerrilla suspect; that the herein accused and his companions tied and tortured Hospicio Singson and
brought him to the Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters in the City of Cebu and that from that date
Hospicio Singson was not seen again nor heard from, nor are his whereabouts known;
"14. That on or about January 25, 1945, in Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused who
was a Japanese spy, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead and accompany five other Filipino
undercovers and did arrest Anacleta Eben, that the herein accused and his companions did take Anacleta
to the Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters where she was questioned on the whereabouts and activities of
her daughter who was a member of the Women's Auxiliary Service (Guerrilla); that during the questioning
Anacleta Eben was tied, hung, boxed, beaten and beaten and tortures, and while said accused was
questioning her, he did choke and threaten to kill her with a gun.

The trial court found the defendant guilty of all the counts and sentenced him to death ands to pay a fine
of P20,000 and costs, It said that "the prosecution substantiated the overt acts specified in counts Nos.
2,3,4,5,6,7,9,11,12, and 13 by two competent witnesses, and the through the confession of the defendant
in open Court."
The trial was not conducted in strict accordance with law and the rules of practice and procedure, giving
rise to confusions, misunderstanding, and non-presentation of evidence on some charges. The court below
itself was led into serious errors.
After several witnesses for the prosecution had given testimony, defendants counsel informed the court
that his client, upon the latter's insistence, was willing "to enter a plea of guilty and ask whatever
consideration or mercy the court will give him." Upon being asked whether or not he ratified the statement
of his counsel, the defendant answered yes. He also answered yes to the question whether he was aware of
the consequences of a plea of guilty (t. s. n., pp. 50-51). However, when the information was read over
again, the accused said that he admitted some of the charges but not all (t. s. n., pp. 51-52). Specifically,
he said he pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, an 14 and not guilty to counts 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11 (t.
s. n., pp. 54-55).
The prosecution then resumed the presentation of evidence and called witnesses to substantiate the
charges to which a plea of not guilty was entered. But after three new witnesses, had taken the stand, and
while the third of them was testifying, counsel for the accused reiterated "his petition at he instance of the
accused himself", that the latter be allowed to changed his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to all the 14
counts. Informed of his attorney's statement, the defendant said "I am pleading guilty. I accept my guilt" (t.
s. n., pp. 71-73).

Regarding count 2, he said it was Japanese accompanied by some Filipinos, one of whom was Antonio
Tancingco, who arrested Florencio Perez. Reminded that he had pleaded guilty to this count, the accused
after the session, he had been struck in the head and that when he came back to court he was still
confused. Nevertheless, he said having guilt he wanted to abide by his plea fully realizing its
consequences, now that his mind was already clear. (T. s. n., pp. 102-104).
In answer to a direct question of Judge Borromeo, the accused answered in the affirmative the question
whether he admitted the facts and pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, 4,7, 12, 13 and 14 (t. s. n., p. 104). But
when these last counts were read over again and he was told to plea after each count was read, he pleaded
guilty to counts 2 and 3, and not guilty to counts 4, 7, 12, 13 and 14 (t.s.n., p. 105).
With specific reference to count 7, he said: "When we apprehended Suico and Ouano, they were brought to
the pier before Yusidati, a sergeant of the Japanese Military Police here. At night time, Ouano, his nephew
and Patricio were taken by four Japanese by the names of Muraki, Isisaki, Pujisaki and Koydi and other
members of the Japanese Military Police. We started from the pier about 9:00 o'clock of that evening and
they took a truck and proceeded to Mandawe. Upon reaching Mandawe, right in the house of Leonardo
Ouano, there they were investigated by Muraki. In the affidavit, it says that Patricio Suico was burned and
that is not true. The truth is that, during that night, those three were brought back here to the pier, and
from that time on Ouano and Suico were never heard by me any more." He admitted that he took part in
the apprehension of these persons but said that he was ordered to do so by Watanabi (t. s. n., pp. 106107).
With respect to count No. 12, he said that those who took part in the apprehension of Hospicio Singson
was Maximo Bati alias Pacho (t. s. n., p. 108).

As counsel insisted on putting his client on the stand, the prosecution went ahead with its witnesses who
testified on counts 6, 9, 12 and 13. Then it rested and the accused testified on his own behalf.

With regard to count 13, he said he had nothing to say and renewed his plea of guilty to this charge (t. s.
n., pp. 108-109).

According to defense counsel the purpose of the defendant's testimony was not to deny his guilt for the
crime of treason; it was, he added, to "clarify certain points which he (accused) denied when he was
informed again of the contents of the information filed against him."

As to the counts which the defendant denied or qualified, his plea does not posses the requirement of a
plea and should have been rejected and the parties directed to introduce their evidence. A plea of guilty
must be unconditional save to explain mitigating circumstances. The defendant's responsibility on these
counts therefore have to be gauged by the prosecution's evidence and defendant's admissions.

After having been sworn the defendant again said that some of the charges filed against him were not true;
that in some of those cases there were other persons responsible for the commission of the crime, 9, he
said who were tortured because of their refusal to give information, be taken to Isisaki and Muraki, after
which they were marched off to Lensa by Japanese soldiers. There were about 20 prisoners, he said. Upon
arriving at Lensa they were shot by Muraki and Isisaka in the presence of Captain Suriyama. He admitted
having gone with these people and seen Isisaka and Muraka shoot the prisoners with luggers. He said
about 700 civilians were herded on that particular date and that it was among these 700 that 20 were
executed.
In answer to a question of Judge Saguin if he wanted to make any statement regarding counts 3 and 4, to
which he had pleaded guilty, the defendants answered in the affirmative. He said that when they
apprehended Pablo Seno and Anunciacion Seno, he and Pedro Labares stood guard under the house while
the Japanese went up. When the Japanese came down they brought the Senos. From there they returned
to the Normal School where prisoners were confined. That was, he said, all he could say.
As to Del Castillo (count 11), he said he was not the one who killed him but two Japanese by the names of
Isituca and Pujisaki; that it was Pedro Labares and not he who reported Del Castillo to the Japanese; that
he accompanied Labares because the Japanese ordered him to do so. He said that his sole connection
with the Japanese was as a driver of Watanabi. He said that after he was captured as a guerrilla he was
told that he should drive their car or else he would be killed (t.s.n., pp. 98-102).

From the defendant's changing attitude, changing pleas and statements, only counts 2, 3, and 13 survive
the test of having been confessed in open court. The prosecution's evidence and defendant's testimony
substitute counts 4, 6, 9 and 11. On count 7, only one witness testified; on the rest none whatever.
Count 4. Maximina Basubas, 46 years old, testified that on December 2, 1944, the accused apprehended
her son Rufino Seno for being a guerrilla; that Rufino Seno was tied, beaten, tortured, and taken to and
detained at the Japanese Kempei Tai headquarters in Cebu City; that since then he heard nothing more of
him; that with the accused were other Filipinos and Japanese.
Jose Cui, 24 years old, testified that on December 2, 1944, Antonio Racaza "raided our place". Racaza was
accompanied by other persons, Japanese and Filipinos; that he (witness) was arrested with four others,
among them Apolonio Ceniza and Rufino Seno. They were taken to the U.P. Building in the city of Cebu,
near which he was punished personally by Antonio Racaza, hung by the hands tied at his back and
whipped with a golf club (witness showed the scar). He said that he was accused of being a guerrilla; that
Rufino Seno was brought with him and others in the afternoon of December 3 to the Kempei Tai; that a
Japanese took Rufino Seno out and he had not seen Rufino since.
Count 6. Silvana Cabello, 22 years old, single, testified that in August 1944, Antonio Racaza and others
came to their house looking for somebody her brother who was a soldier. Among the men who came she
recognized only the accused. In her house the accused and others undressed her. She prayed to God and

pleaded that she be not undressed. They succeeded in their purpose however and her naked body was
exposed. They pushed her mother when the latter was not able to produce any arm. From that place they
took her to Buakaw where they went up a house apparently in search of something. when they did not
find anything they moved to another house. In the latter house they caught a man, took him behind a tree
and there killed him. Then a soldier, Teofilo Navarro, who had killed that person, approached her and said,
"Well, how do you like to come along with me behind the cassava trees?" She refused and then they
proceeded to the provincial road with her; she was crying. At Basac, near a big house owned by Filemon
Rago, Antonio Racaza told her, "Come along with me." Once in that place he hugged her and kissed her
and told her to take off her panties. Then she said her devotion to the Virgin Mary praying that she might
be delivered from her aggressors. Luckily, the accused did not succeed. Afterward one companion of the
accused, Jose Abascas, slammed her against a coconut tree and embraced her. Later, a truck passed by
and she was told to get on. Then Racaza approached the Japanese and later she was released.
Raymunda Sabillano, 42 years old, testified that on August 19, 1944, Antonio Racaza came to her house
at night (it was Saturday) looking for her son who was a guerrilla soldiers. He had many companions
among whom were two Japanese. They were armed but Racaza was not. As she was not so, they
undressed her daughter, Silvina Cabellon, and Antonio Racaza told witness to step out. when she heard
her daughter cry out she tried to get inside but they blocked her way. Afterward they left her daughter
dress up again and took her away. About 3 o'clock in the morning the girl returned. Her house is in Pardo,
Cebu City.
Count 9. Hilario Cabaezas, 56 years old, testified that on the 29th of July, 1944, her house was
surrounded and she and the inhabitants of the house were apprehended and taken to a place near the
Normal School in Basac. Those who arrested them were, among others, Antonio Racaza, Carding and
Loloy. These three tied them and she pleaded for mercy. From her house she could see may people
tortured in the Basac school building. There must have been around 1,000 people there.
Pastor Abadiano, 45 years old, testified that on the 29th of July, 1944 the accused and his several
companions with Japanese came up to hi house and maltreated him, trampling on his body. When he
could not endure the punishment any longer they asked him where his nephew Inocencio was. Inocencio
was a guerrilla soldier. Among those who were tortured and killed were Sario Abadiano, Tomas Bacalla,
Quirico Abellanosa and Lope Bacon. The witness was allowed to go when they found the brother of
Inocencio. Vicente Abadiano was one of those who survived the torture.
Tereso Sanchez, 25 years old, testified that he knew Antonio Racaza. On July 29, 1944, he was arrested by
Filipino spies. About 1,000 were apprehended and taken to the school building in Basac. They were taken
there to be screened building in Basac. They were taken there to be screened for guerrillas. Among those
who tortured civilians was Antonio Racaza. He saw Jose de la Cerna. Antonio Racaza was armed with a
revolver. After he was tortured he was taken to the mountain of Lensa. With him were about 24; all of
them were tied. When they arrived at the mountain, the Japanese and their Filipino cohorts told them to
sit down . The prisoners were taken by the Japanese to another place where they were shot. The witness
was shot by Filemon Delgado and was hit in the neck, the bullet coming out his left eye. He was left for
dead and that was how he lived to tell the story. Before he was shot, Nazario Abadiano was shot by
Antonio Racaza and killed immediately.
Vicente Abadiano, 19 years old, testified that he was apprehended on July 29 and brought to a place
where his bother Nazario was killed. His brother was apprehended on July 29 and brought up where he
was killed by Antonio Racaza. He actually saw Racaza shoot his brother; it was in Lensa, in the mountain.
His brother had his back on Racaza when Racaza shot him in the buttock. He saw Tereso Sanchez as one
of the victims in that massacre. He also witnessed the mass torture in the school building before the
victims were marched up to the mountains.
Jose de la Cerna, 34 years old, testified that on July 29, he was one of the people arrested in Basac and
concentrated in the school building. Those who made the arrests were Japanese and Filipino undercovers.

Among these were Antonio Racaza, Antonio Tancinco, Roberto Bautista alias Eriberto Ocampo, Filemon
Delgado, Margarito Campos and Jesus Campos. Antonio Racaza was one of those who beat him (witness)
with an iron bar, kicked him, boxed him and inserted a galvanized iron tube into his throat through which
sand was poured. He was choked and was unconscious for several minutes. When he came to, they
questioned him as to the whereabouts of his brother who was with Governor Abellanosa. Then he was
hung from two to five o'clock in the afternoon. The cause of the massacre and mass torture in Basac was
that about three or four days before July 29, the guerrillas attacked a train loaded with naval officers on
Mambaling bridge in Dulho, Cebu.
Count 11, Hipolito Cabahug, 18 years old, widow, testified that her husband was captured by Racaza and
his companions on November 16, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu. On that date
Antonio Racaza came up to her house leaving his companions below. He threatened the people in the
house with his sword, told them not to move, and asked the witness whether her husband was a soldier.
Because her answers were not satisfactory, he arrested her and her husband and Antonio Racaza hung
her husband. While her husband was hanging in mid-air they beat him with a big bat. Then they lowered
her husband and Racaza hung her instead. While she was dangling in the air they stepped on her
husband's prostrate body trying to force him to admit that he was a guerrilla. They put o his neck a piece
of lumber and stepped a man sat astride her husband's abdomen. Afterward they hung her husband
again. After he was released this time he was taken across a creek; that was the last she saw of him. The
cadaver was found by her father-in-law Gregorio Del Castillo. Her brother-in-law, Victorino del Castillo,
was taken the next morning and brought to the same place. They also hung Victorino and beat him while
hanging. He died before his body was brought down.
Gregorio del Castillo 50 years old, testified that this sons are dead because they were arrested by Antonio
Racaza at their place It was November 16, about 9 o'clock in the evening. Hipolita Cabahug is his
daughter-in-law living with him. He was present when his sons were arrested. Hipolita was told to come
along. He found the next day the bodies of his son in a creek. One of them was naked with several wounds
and the neck was almost severed from the body. Rope was still tied around his hands.
To sum up, we find the defendants guilty of counts 2, 3 and 13 by the defendant's plea of guilty, and of
counts 4, 6, 9, and 11 by the testimony of two or more eye-witnesses to the overt acts. These admitted and
proven charges, in the opinion of the majority of the court, lead to the same result reached by the trial
court.
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength, treachery
and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are, by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken
to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is, in many cases, as
in this, a long, continued process requiring, for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose,
fixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior
strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements, which was Racaza's
purpose in collaborating with the enemy, the use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The
enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the personification of brute, superior force, and it was this
superior force which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his
brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their foes only on even terms
according to the romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the
commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of
prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal gain, and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the
perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately

augmenting unnecessary wrongs to the main Criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of article 14
of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned, of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty,
fall within the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed in treason
characterized by killing, the killings themselves and other accompanying crimes should be taken into
consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in
which they were committed. Were not this the rule, treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer
on its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. to avoid such incongruity and injustice,
the penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger
and harm to which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that
resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the
perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of
graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected
with treason, the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense my be
summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in furtherance of the law's aims.
The judgment appealed from is correct in this result and the same should be affirmed with costs.
However, as four justices dissent from the imposition of the death penalty, the appealed sentence is
modified and reduced to reclusion perpetua and legal accessories, a fine of P20,000 and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 2189
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the United States in the
Philippine Islands and the Government of the Philippine Islands, as defined and penalized in section 4
of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and $3,000
fine, and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each of them, to three years' imprisonment, with
hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and all and each of the said appellants to pay their proportionate share of
the costs of the trial and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay
their respective fines.
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the latter part of the year 1903 a junta was
organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos, resident in the city of Hongkong, for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms
and establishing in its stead a government to be known as the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina;
that one Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as chief
of the military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the furtherance of the plans of the
conspirators; that toward the end of December, 1903 the said Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong in
hidding on board the steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the Philippines he held a number of

meetings in the city of Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was perfected the above-mentioned
conspiracy hatched in Hongkong that at these meetings new members were taken into the conspiracy and
plans made for the enlistment of an army of revolution and the raising of money by national and private
loans to carry on the campaign; that to this end bonds were issued and commissions as officers in the
revolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators, empowering the officers thus appointed to
raise troops and take command thereof; and that the conspirators did in fact take the field and offered
armed resistance to the constituted authorities in the Philippines, only failing in their design of
overthrowing the Government because of their failure to combat successfully with the officers of the law
who were sent against them and of the failure of the people to rise en masse in response to their
propaganda.
It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco Bautista, a resident of the city of Manila,
was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila
and that, to aid him in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of
Ricarte, Bautista was present, taking part in several of the above-mentioned meetings whereat the plans of
the conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at one of these meetings Bautista, in answer to a
question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations had been made and that he "held the
people in readiness."
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with the conspirators through the agency of
one Jose R. Muoz, who was proven to have been a prime leader of the movement, in the intimate
confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute bonds and nominate and appoint certain
officials, including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces; that at the
time when the conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several
conferences with the said Muoz whereat plans were made for the coming insurrection; that at one of
these conferences Muoz offered Puzon a commission as brigadier-general of the signal corps and
undertook to do his part in organizing the troops; and that at a later conference he assured the said
Muoz that he had things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly organized in accordance with
the terms of his commission.
Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with the conspirators; that he had accepted
the appointment as brigadier-general of the signal corps of the revolutionary forces with no intention of
ever taking any further action in the matter, and merely because he did not wish to vex his friend Muoz
by refusing to do so, and that when Muoz offered him the appointment as brigadier-general he did so in
"a joking tone," and that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila organizing the conspiracy at
that time.
These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate the testimony of Muoz as to the fact that
he had several interviews with Puzon at which plans were entered into for the advancement of the cause of
the conspirators), can not be accepted as true in the light of a written statement signed by Puzon himself
at the time when he was first arrested, part of which is as follows:
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence, and occupation? A. My name is Tomas Puzon;
born in Binondo in the Province of Manila; 37 years of age; married; by profession a teacher of primary
and secondary schools, and residing in Calle Concepcion, No. 195, district of Quiapo.
Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? A. Personally I do not know him, but by name, yes.
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in these Islands and with what object he came here?
And if you know it to be true, through whom did you get such information? A. In the first place I had
notice of his coming to the Islands as well as his object by reading the newspapers of Manila, and secondly
because J. R. Muoz told me the same on one occasion when I was in his house to visit him.

Q. Did you acquire this information through any other person? A. No, sir; I have no more information
than that which I have mentioned.

unless the physical possession of these appointments proved such relation," and that it appeared that
each one of the defendants "were separately approached at different times by armed men while working in
the field and were virtually compelled to accept the commissions."

Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by Ricarte? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is the employment (empleo) which you have in this organization, and who is it who invited you to
join it? A. J. R. Muoz, who is general of division of this new organization, spoke to me with much
instance, asking me to accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps, to which I, on
account of his request and in view of the fact that the said Muoz is a friend of mine from my youth,
acceded; nevertheless I have organized absolutely nothing in respect to this matter.
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you any commission for it? A. Yes, sir; I accepted
said employment and although they gave me an order to organize in my brigade I did not do it, because I
had neither the confidence nor the will.
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the will to carry out what was intrusted to you,
why did you accept employment as general of the brigade? A. I accepted it on account of friendship and
not to vex a friend, but I never have the intention of fulfilling the obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made this statement, but he attempted
to explain it away by saying that when he made it he was so exited that he did not know just what he was
saying. He does not allege that improper means were taken to procure the confession, and it was proven at
the trial that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the results of violence, intimidation, threat,
menace, or promise of reward or leniency. The accused appears to be an intelligent man and was for
eighteen years a school-teacher and later a telegraph operator under the Spanish Government, and during
the insurrection he held a commission as an officer in the signal corps of the revolutionary army. His
confession is clear and intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he was so excited as not to
know what he was saying when he made it, and its truth and accuracy in so far it inculpates him is
sustained by other evidence of record in this case.
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of the military forces of
the conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against him in the light of the decisions of this court
in the cases of the United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes[[1]] (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio
Nuez et al.[[2]] (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al.[[3]] (3 Off. Gaz., 528), and
United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al.[[4]] (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be distinguished
from these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly disclose that the accused actually and
voluntarily accepted the apppointment in question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by
such acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused
accepted the appointment is taken into consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with the
conspirators. In the first of these cases the United States vs. De los Reyes the accused was charged
with treason, and the court found that the mere acceptance of a commission by the defendant, nothing
else being done either by himself or by his companions, was not an "overt act" of treason within the
meaning of the law, but the court further expressly held that
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the playing of the game of government like children,
the secretaries, colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags and seals and commission, all on proper, for
the purpose of duping and misleading the ignorant and the visionary . . . should not be dignified by the
name of treason.
In the second case the United States vs. Nuez et al. -- wherein the accused were charged with
brigandage, the court held that, aside from the possession of commissions in an insurgent band, there
was no evidence to show that it they had committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared that they
had never united with any party of brigands and never had been in any way connected with such parties

In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was contended that de la Serna had confessed that
"he was one of the members of the pulajanes, with a commission as colonel," but the court was of opinion
that the evidence did not sustain a finding that such confession had in fact been made, hence the doctrine
laid down in that decision, "that the mere possession of such an appointment, when it is not shown that
the possessor executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not constitute sufficient proof of
the guilt of the defendant," applies only the case of Enrique Camonas, against whom the only evidence of
record was "the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant was found at his house."
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. there was testimony that four appointments of
officials in a revolutionary army were found in a trunk in the house of one Valentin Colorado, and the
court in said case reaffirmed the doctrine that "the mere possession of the documents of this kind is not
sufficient to convict," and held, furthermore, that there was "evidence in the case that at the time these
papers were received by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of the assistant councilmen of
the barrio in which lived, a witness for the Government, showed him the envelope, and stated to him he
had received these papers; that he didn't know what they were and requested this councilman to open
them. The coucilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope and sent it to the councilman Jose
Millora. We are satisfied that this envelope contained the appointments in question and that the appellant
did not act under the appointment but immediately reported the receipt of them to the authorities."
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in no wise connected with them
to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such person would afterwards accept the
commission and thus unite himself with them, and it is even possible that such an appointment might be
forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the possession of the person thus nominated, and
that such appointment might be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the person in
whose possession the appointment was found might be entirely innocent of all intention to join the
conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators to use his name in this manner nor to send such a
commission to him. Indeed, cases are not unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein it has
been proven that such appointments have been concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the
accused persons, so that when later discovered by the officers of the law they might be used as evidence
against the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is
proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think
that this fact may properly be taken into consideration as evidence of his relations with the conspirators.
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the testimony of at least two
witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a conviction for the crime of
treason should be applied in this case, but this court has always held, in conformance with the decisions
of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate
and distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not applicable in
such cases. (In re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest
substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds from one of the conspirators, such bonds having
been prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising funds for carrying out the plans of the
conspiracy, but it does not affirmatively appear that he knew anything of the existence of the conspiracy
or that, when he received the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the bundle was,
nor that ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these bonds. He, himself, states
that when he opened the bundle and discovered the nature of the contents he destroyed them with fire,
and that he never had any dealings with the conspirators in relation to the conspiracy or the object for
which it was organized.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence before us, in so far as it affects the said
Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his proportionate share of the costs of both instances de
oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman should be acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and
set a liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence of the trial court, in so far as it applies to
Francisco Bautista and Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so far as it imposes
subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective fines, and, there
being no authority in law of such provision, so much of the sentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary
imprisonment is hereby reversed.
After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, when the record will be returned to the
trial court for execution. So ordered.
October 10, 1947
G.R. No. L-778
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NEMESIO L. AGPANGAN, defendant-appellant.
Alfredo Gonzales for appellant.
Acting First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
Appellant stands accused of treason, committed between December, 1944, and January, 1945, in the
Province of Laguna, on only one count alleged in the information as follows:
That on or about December 20, 1944, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a subversive pro-Japanese
organization, joined the Pampars, a military organization supporting the Imperial Japanese Army and
designed to bear arms against the army of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines
and the guerrillas in the Philippines; that he was equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle, caliber .30, and
was made to undergo 10 days training, consisting of military drill, manual of arms, and target practice;
and that from or about January 12, 1945 to March 15, the said accused was assigned to guard duty once
a week; that he was armed with a rifle with orders to shoot any of the Filipino prisoners whom he was
guarding who might attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or American soldier who might approach the
Japanese garrison.
The lower court found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs.
Three witnesses testified for the prosecution.
Tomas C. Serrano, 46, farmer, resident of Siniloan, Second Lieutenant in the Marking's guerrilla
organization, testified that on December, 1944, he saw the accused in the Japanese garrison in Siniloan,
"he was a member of the Makapili organization;" "he was doing guard duty, with a rifle, with a bayonet at
his side;" "he was at the entrance of the garrison and he made all civilians passing through the entrance
bow to him." If they did not bow, "he dragged them by the arms and brought them to the captain of the
garrison;" he served as guard "since November, 1944, when the Japanese garrison was established in
Siniloan, up to the time I was arrested on March 25, 1945;" he saw the accused on guard duty in the
garrison "many times;" "I often saw him confiscating foodstuffs such as rice, fruits, calabasa, and other
vegetables, for the support of the Japanese soldiers;" "he was with arms accompanied by Japanese
soldiers and other members of the Makapili;" "I often saw him accompanied by Japanese soldiers and

other Makalipi members, arresting suspected guerrillas and sometimes they were patrolling or camping in
the hideouts of the guerrilla forces, I cannot tell how many times, but I often saw him;" the witness was
arrested on March 25, 1945, by the Japanese soldiers and Makapilis, with whom the accused was; "the
next morning we, the thirteen prisoners, were brought to the place where we were to be executed; but
luckily while we were on our way to the barrio, the American planes came roaring, so the guards took
cover;" "they were pulling the rope that tied us, and luckily I was able to slip away because I was the
second to the last man in the line, and the rope was cut;" "I could not run fast because I was lame;" the
rest were executed, naming the following: "Alejandro Serrano, Custodio Adaro, Emilio Javier, Peter Sardal,
Elias Rodolfo, Ignacio Cavano, Biato Optis, Napoleon Pagtakhan, Bienvenido Agpangan, and myself;"
Miguel Palma "was in my back to the last, so we two remained, and Pacifico (Adopina) remained untied"
because he was carrying food, and when the Japanese ran, "he escaped." Asked to explain that he knew
about the lot of those who were executed, the witness said that he went home when the town was
liberated, and he visited the place "because I know the place," and we reached the spot "I smelled very bad
odor, and I recognized the soil which swelled, so I said to myself that this is the place where our son was
buried;" "I went home and I told the other parents of the victims" about the spot; " the next month, about
thirty days," the witness and the other parents requested the municipal authorities to be allowed to
exhume the bodies; when his son is being taken to the place of execution. "I had not seen him that time;"
the witness based his knowledge as to appellant's being a Makapili on Exhibit A and he saw him armed,
guarding the Japanese garrison, confiscating foodstuffs for the Japanese, and arresting guerrilla suspects
in the town; Bienvenido Agpangan, one of those who were executed by the Japanese, "was the son" of
appellant; "I can not tell you whether he (appellant) was reporting to his officers any guerrilla;" Angel
Javier and Custodio Adaro were arrested by a party of which the accused was a member, and "I know
because he was with them when they were arrested;" the witness does not know whether the accused was
present during the execution "because there was nobody present; only God had witnessed the killing of
those persons."
Mauricio Adaro, 47, farmer, resident of Siniloan, testified that in December, 1944, he saw the accused in
the Japanese garrison in Siniloan; " he was mounting guard;" asked from what date to what date he saw
him in the garrison, the witness answered that "I cannot remember the month in 1944 because we used to
go out of Siniloan every time;" appellant "was getting food supplies from the civilians and giving them to
the Japanese;" "the accused and the Japanese companions of his arrested my son (Custodio) in our
house;" the witness was not arrested, "because I was able to hide;" he saw defendant mounting guard in
the Japanese garrison "many times;" "more than ten times;" the garrison was located "in the school
building."
Delfin Redor, 55, mayor of Siniloan, since 1937, testified hat appellant "has been my barrio lieutenant;" he
belongs to Pampar Makapili, and Pampar and Makapili, "I believe are the same;" from December, 1944, to
March, 1945, the witness saw the accused "in the Makapili garrison, in the Siniloan plaza;" "I believe that
he was a member of theMakapili;" "Sometimes he was detailed as guard in front of the garrison with arms
and ammunitions bayonet;" he saw as such "many times;" the witness was not a mayor during the
Japanese occupation because "in 1944, March, I escaped because, you know, I was wanted by the
Japanese because I was also a guerrilla; before that "I was mayor of the town;" during December, 1944, up
to March, because you know, I left the office, I was still in the town of Siniloan collecting some supplies for
the guerrillas;" after abandoning the office of mayor, the witness "remained living in the poblacion of
Siniloan;" he "never stopped living in the poblacion;" "I had three times seen the accused accompanied by
the Japanese in raiding outside poblacion;" the accused commandeered foodstuffs "and took them to the
garrison for food;" "the Japanese garrison was in the Intermediate Building and the Makapili garrison is in
Baybay Academy, about one kilometer distant;" the witness saw the accused "in Makapiligarrison;" the
witness was a captain of the guerrillas and was arrested by the Japanese four times, and in those
occasions he did not see the accused in the garrison; the witness does no know of anybody who had been
pointed out by the accused to the Japanese and was arrested by the same.
The Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent
until the contrary is proved." (Article II, section 1 [17].) To overcome this constitutional presumption, the
guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The evidence presented by the
prosecution in this case does not offer that degree of proof. None of the several overt acts alleged in the

information has been proved in accordance with the two-witness rule provided in the article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code.

accepted the order and worked there," he testified, adding: "The Japanese, not being contended with my
work, they got my carabao and on March, 1945, they got my son, who was tortured and killed."

It is imputed to the appellant, in the first place, that he is a member of the Ganap, "a subversive proJapanese organization," and "joined the Pampar, a military organization supporting the Imperial Japanese
Army and designed to bear arms against the Army of the United States in Commonwealth of the
Philippines and the guerrillas in the Philippines." No witness has testified that appellant is the member of
the Ganap. Only one witness, Redor, testified that appellant belonged to Pampar, but he did not testify as
to its nature.

This son is the same Bienvenido Agpangan who, according to the first witness for the prosecution, was
executed by the Japanese with several other victims. We do not believe that appellant could have adhered
to the Japanese, the same who tortured and killed his own son. We do not believe that, in the absence of
proof, he can be such a monster.

The next allegation of the information is that appellant "was equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle, caliber
30, and was made to undergo ten days training, consisting of military drill, manual of arms, and target
practice. "No evidence has been presented in support of this allegation.
The third allegation against appellant is that "from or about January 12, 1945, to March 15, 1945, the
said accused was assigned to guard duty once a week." The fourth and the last allegation is that "he was
armed with a rifle with orders to shoot any of the Filipino prisoners whom he was guarding who might
attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or American soldier who might approach the Japanese garrison."
In connection with these two allegation, the only thing that the prosecution attempted to prove is that
appellant did guard duty and was armed with rifle. But the attempt does not meet the test under the twowitness rule.
The first two witnesses for the prosecution testified that they had seen the accused doing guard duty in
the Japanese garrison in Siniloan "many times," more than "ten times," but neither of them has
mentioned any specific time, day and hour. They were able to mention only years and months. There is no
way of concluding the two witnesses testified about the same overt act. The "many times" or more than
"ten times" mentioned by them may refer either to two different sets of moments, not one instant of one set
coinciding with any one of the other, or to only one and identical set of instances or, although referring to
two sets, some of the instances are the same in both. As there is no basis on record upon which we may
determine which, among the two alternatives, is the correct one, the doubt must be decided by taking the
first alternative, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence stated in the fundamental law. The
case for the prosecution is further weakened by the fact that it is first two witnesses are contradicted by
the third, who testified that appellant did guard duty "many times," more than "ten times," in
the Makapili garrison, located in the Baybay Academy, one kilometer from the Intermediate School
building, where the Japanese garrison was located.
To meet the test under two-witness rule, it is necessary that, at least, two witnesses should testify as to
the perpetration of the same treasonous overt act, and the sameness must include not only identity of
kind and nature of the act, but as to the precise one which has actually been perpetrated. The treasonous
overt act of doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison on one specific date cannot be identified with the
doing of guard duty in the same garrison in a different date. Both overt acts, although of the same nature
and character, are two distinct and inconfusable acts, independent of each other, and either one, to serve
as a ground for conviction of an accused for treason, must be proved by two witnesses. That one witness
should testify as to one, and another as to the other, is not enough. Any number of witnesses may testify
against an accused for treason as to a long line of successive treasonous overt acts; but notwithstanding
the seriousness of the acts nor their number, not until two witnesses, at least, shall have testified as to the
perpetration of a single but the same and precise overt act, can conviction be entertained.

The decision of the People's Court is reversed and appellant is acquitted. He shall be released from the
custody of the agent of the law upon the promulgation of this decision.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuazon, JJ., concur.
PARAS, J.:
I concur in the result.

LAUREL V. MISA

FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered
to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for
the crime of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there
was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT

BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION

HELD:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains
vested in the legitimate government.

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
In justice to appellant, we feel it necessary to state that our decision to acquit him is not only based on the
reasonable doubt we entertain as to his guilt, because the prosecution has not satisfied the requirements
of the two-witness rule, but because we are rather inclined to believe his testimony to the effect that a
guerrilla member, Vicente Auxilio, was caught by the Japanese in appellant's house, tortured and, finally,
killed. For said reason, appellant was called by the Japanese, investigated, and then told to do some work
in the garrison, otherwise he would have the same fate that befell Vicente Auxilio. "To save my life, I

territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during
military occupation.
a

People v Pedro Marcaida

79 Phil 283
Sept 18 1947
FACTS:

Pedro Marcaida: charged with treason by the Peoples Court

Marcaida alleges that the court erred in saying that his citizenship was sufficiently proven.

Defense claims that Marcaida testified in Tagalog that he is taga-Lopez (in Tayabas, Quezon) and
that he was born in Lopez, but there are no such details in the records.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Marcaida can be convicted of treason.

HELD/RATIO:

No. His citizenship is not sufficiently proven. The name Pedro Marcaida can be Filipino, Spanish of
South American. No evidence of citizenship of parents means there is no way to ascertain whether or not
he is a Filipino citizen, as he could be a descendant of Spanish subjects who chose to retain Spanish
citizenship even after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, or even by South Americans who refused to go
through the naturalization process.
U.S. vs. Abad
G.R. No. L-976, October 22, 1902
Ponente: Ladd, J.
Facts:

Maximo Abad was charged with violation of oath of allegiance when he denied to an officer of the
United States Army the existence of certain rifles at the time of his surrender in April 1901 when in
fact, he was aware of the existence and whereabouts of such rifles. Section 14 of Article 292 of the
United States Philippine Commission states that: "Any person who shall have taken any oath before
any military officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such official so
administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in which oath the affiant is
substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in
these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the passage of this act,
violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of such terms or provisions, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."

Abad is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of amnesty if the
offense is one of those to which the proclamation applies. The denying of the whereabouts of the
rifles can be considered an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the United
States, giving them aid and comfort, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be
covered by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under another name.

Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the United States or
the Government of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort
within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere. Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same act as the
rising publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods certain
enumerated objects of a political character.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance fall under the category of treason and
sedition.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:

The offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offenses defined in Act No.
292, is included in the general words "treason and sedition," as used in the amnesty proclamation of
July 4, 1902.

The offenses listed in Act No. 292 include: treason, misprision of treason, insurrection, conspiracy to
commit treason or insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, seditious words and libels,
the formation of secret political societies, and violation of oaths of allegiance. When the framer of the
proclamation used the words "treason and sedition" to describe the purely political offenses covered
by the amnesty, we think it was his intention, without specially enumerating the political offenses
defined in Act No. 292, to include them all under the terms treason and sedition.
Ruling: The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation of amnesty, and upon filing in the
court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below with directions that he be
discharged.

People v. Adriano
GR#477 Jun 30, 1947
En Banc
Ponente: Tuason, J.
FACTS: Appeal from decision of the Peoples Court sentencing Apolinario Adriano to life imprisonment and
a fine of PhP 10,000 plus costs. Adriano was charged with treason for being a Makapili and for bearing
arms and assisting the Japanese Army in its operations in the Gapan-San Leonardo Area from Jan.-Apr.
1945. The Peoples Court established that: Adriano was a Makapili; he performed sentry duties in the
Japanese garrison in Gapan, Nueva Ecija; he carried a rifle in drills led by Japanese commanders; he
surrendered to the Americans with rifle in hand.
ISSUE: W/N Adriano is guilty of treason
HELD/RATIO: No. The Philippine law on treason follows the two-witness test derived from the AngloAmerican law on treason. This test requires the concurrence of two witnesses to an overt act of treason. In
this case, each of the overt acts imputed to Adriano failed the test. Although mere membership in the
Makapili organization is a treasonous act in itself (indicative of adherence and giving aid and comfort to
the enemy), such membership is an overt act which should be proven by at least two witnesses. In this
case, no two witnesses saw Adriano doing the same single act as a Makapili.
Hilado, J. dissenting:
Membership being a continuous and indivisible act, it is not necessary that two witnesses have
ascertained that Adriano was a Makapili on the same day. The witnesses agree on the fact that Adriano is
a Makapili, hence he should be convicted.
PEOPLE vs.CARMELITO VICTORIA
78 Phil 129,
G.R. No. L-369
March 13, 1947
Ponente: Perfecto, J.
FACTS:
Appellant was sentenced by the lower court to supreme penalty of death and fine of P20,000. His crime:
Treason (in violation of duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did knowingly
adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with
which the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy
aid and/or comfort) in the following events:
1.
October 6, 1944: joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about 8 spies and a Japanese soldier,
which went to the house of Federico Unson in Lucena, accused Unson of hiding guerrillas. But then, when
the enemy was about to arrest Unson, guerrillas showed up and killed one of the spies. The Jap patrol left,
but came back afternoon of the same day, arrested Unson and two others (Perez and Godoy), tortured
them, and set fire to the house of Unson. Perez and Unson sustained numerous bayonet wounds mutilated and were found rotting in the vicinity of the house. Unson was tied to a tree, and disembowelled
by several bayonet wounds, while Perez was mutilated and appeared ankle-less. Godoy was never heard of.
It appears he was taken to Lucena and was killed there.
o Version of Defense: Although admitting his presence in the raid, he did not come along with
party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the actual arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy took place.
o Lower courts decision: Guilty. Defense doesnt have enough weight to prevail over that of
the prosecuting witnesses.
2.
December 21, 1944: accompanied other Japanese spies to the house of Jose Unson, arrested said
Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short wave radio; that
he was furnishing radio information to the guerrillas and at the same time supporting them; that said
Unson was released on the same day, but on the next day he was again arrested and brought to the
Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned. The last that was seen of
Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest.
o Defense: He admitted to have taken part in the raid but claims that he tried to save Unson.
o Lower court: Only the latter (act of saving?) was accepted by the lower court, in view of
appellant's behaviour as recalled by witnesses Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon
Unson. Guilty as well.
3.
February 10, 1945: accompanied armed members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai to the
house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and
turned him over to the Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing themselves near the
house of Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him.
o Defense: Alibi - he was in Gagalagin, Manila.
o Lower court: Guilty.

4.
December 21, 1944 (5AM): accompanied two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives
to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and apprehended said Calauag, conducted a
search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he was subjected to
inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
o Defense: He alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to accompany them
in the raid, admitted that he was present throughout the investigation and torture of Caluag who,
according to the accused himself, was tied suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes.
o Lower court: Guilty. Considered the account of the defense as corroborative of the facts
alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the prosecution.
5.
March 9, 1944 (5AM): acting as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, caused the Japanese
Military police to arrest and apprehend Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was thereupon
brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and unlawfully detained.
o Not proven.
6.
June, 1944: accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives to the house of Melecio
Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, where he was
tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
o Defendant: Feigned ignorance of the arrest.
o Lower court: Guilty. Accused himself testified that he promised to see what he could do
about Labalan and accepted three chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to the interpreter at the
kempei office.
7.
February, 1945: that as a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, he joined the Makapili
organization designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies; that
he took military training from the Japanese and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili
soldier, taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning of the barrio of
Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and foodstuffs
for the Japanese Army; that he performed sentry duty
o Not proven.

In all of these instances, appellant maintains that he is not a spy, and was only forced to be one. He also
claims to be a guerrilla and that he tried to help Filipino prisoners.
Aggravating circumstances (lower court): treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity,
and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of counts 1,2,3,4 and 6

o If guilty, whether or not his act of saving some Filipinos justify or mitigate his criminal
responsibility

Whether or not the penalty should be death, considering the aggravating circumstances
HELD:

Guilty.
RATIO: Appellants 130-page brief failed completely to point out any specific error in the conclusions of
fact of the lower court,
o The fact that he helped some Filipinos does not relieve him from criminal
responsibility for the acts he had committed. The performance of righteous action, no matter
how meritorious they may be is not a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of wrongs.

Sentence is reclusion perpetua.

RATIO: The voters are divided as to what the sentence should be. Majority is of the opinion
that the sentence should be death while the ponente is of the opinion that the circumstances in question
are essential elements of the treason appellant has committed. There being no unanimity of all the
members of the Court in the imposition of the death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and
appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.