DUDES YOURE SCREWED

Or
HOW TO BEAT BIG OIL
AT THEIR OWN DIRTY GAME
by David Lincoln

PREFACE
This paper is written to all the unfortunate victims of oil and chemical spills past, present, and
future. It is an attempt to condense all that is currently known about Health Impacts and
Compensation for Oil and Chemical Spills on a global basis.

The popular TV show, Dude Youre Screwed is about a group of trained survivalists who select
one of their friends to be placed in an impossible situation with few tools or resources and then
they film his techniques and strategies. According to the Discovery Channel, Every episode,
one of the world's foremost survival experts is kidnapped, blindfolded, and dropped without
warning into one of the harshest environments on earth. The goal: find civilization within 100
hours.

Going up against Big Oil feels very much the same except that it might take 10 years or more
and you will be lucky to survive the experience. We hope that by seeing how others have
responded you will develop some of the tools which have worked in the past and abandon those
which have failed miserably. In this way, you can learn about some of the industrys stalling
tactics and inexcusable defensive strategies.

In this survival guide we will teach you how to avoid the pitfalls, how to acquire survival skills,
and how to develop the counter offensives needed to fight the battles against the biggest
petrochemical polluters the world has ever seen. We have beaten these companies before and
we will show you how to beat them again.
First, in order to foster realistic expectations, you must understand the small value placed on
human life by some of the richest corporations on earth. This is best viewed by studying the
Bhopal India Gas Tragedy, the worst industrial disaster ever reported.

PART A

Table of Contents
UNION CARBIDE - BHOPAL, INDIA 1984 ....................................................................................................... 3
PG&E HINKLEY, CA

1993 ......................................................................................................................... 4

W.R. GRACE - WOBURN, MA

1982 ............................................................................................................ 5

4 DOG DEFENSE ............................................................................................................................................ 6

UNOCAL TORREY CANYON, ENGLAND

1967........................................................................................... 7

UNOCAL - SANTA BARBARA, CALIF.

1969 .................................................................................................. 7

AMOCO CADIZ, BRITTANY FRANCE

1978 .................................................................................................. 8

LOVE CANAL, NY

1978 .............................................................................................................................. 9

IXTOC 1, MEXICO

1979 ............................................................................................................................ 10

OCCIDENTAL PIPER ALPHA, NORTH SEA

EXXON VALDEZ, ALASKA
AMOCO HAVEN, ITALY

1989 ................................................................................................................. 11
1991.................................................................................................................... 12

CHEVRON / TEXACO ECUADOR

1993 ................................................................................................... 12

BP/ARCO - HASTINGS ON HUDSON, NY

PRESTIGE, SPAIN

1988...................................................................................... 11

1998 ......................................................................................... 14

2002 ............................................................................................................................ 15

HURRICANE IVAN US GULF COAST 2004..................................................................................................... 16

BP -Texas City Refinery Explosion 2005 ...................................................................................................... 17
2010 Texas City Chemical leak .......................................................................................................... 18
BP PRUDHOE BAY, ALASKA 2006 ................................................................................................................ 18
Subsequent spill in 2009 ....................................................................................................................... 20
2011 Civil suit ........................................................................................................................................ 20
Alaskan lawsuit settlement ................................................................................................................... 20
BP Health and Safety Violations.......................................................................................................... 21
Hazardous substance dumping 19931995 ........................................................................................ 21

Air pollution violations ....................................................................................................................... 22

Health and safety violations ................................................................................................................. 22
1965 Sea Gem offshore oil rig disaster ............................................................................................... 23
BP - DEEPWATER HORIZON, GULF COAST 2010 ......................................................................................... 24
Health consequences ....................................................................................................................... 25
ENBRIDGE KALAMAZOO RIVER

2010....................................................................................................... 29

Health Impacts .................................................................................................................................... 30

EXXON MAYFLOWER 2013 ..................................................................................................................... 31
LAC MEGANTIC 2013 ................................................................................................................................ 33
Cleanup and environmental costs ............................................................................................. 39
Provincial reaction ......................................................................................................................... 39
Maine and United States .............................................................................................................. 40
Litigation ................................................................................................................................................ 40
Yellowstone River Spill 2015 .................................................................................................................. 43
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................... 45

UNION CARBIDE - BHOPAL, INDIA 1984

Case Study 1

Excerpted from Wiki

Bhopal disaster - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

An explosion in the Union Carbide (UCC) chemical plant in Bhopal, India, in December1984
released 42 tons of a deadly gas called methyl isocyanate, which is used to make pesticides. An
estimated 3,000 to 7,000 died immediately, 15,000 to 20,000 died from the effects in the years
after the disaster, and 50,000 to 100,000 suffered from serious injuries as a result of the world's
worst chemical disaster.
The Indian government sued on behalf of 570,000 victims and in 1989 settled for $470 million in
damages and exempted company employees from criminal prosecution. The company's Indian
assets were seized (1992) after its officials failed to appear to face charges.
Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001, seventeen years after the disaster. Still, by
2008, UCC had not released information about the possible composition of the cloud. The
chairman of Union Carbide's Indian branch and seven other of its Indian employees (one
deceased) were convicted of death by negligence in 2010, and later that year the Indian
government sued to increase the damages paid to $1.1 billion. The UCC CEO at the time of the

disaster, Warren Anderson, passed away at a nursing home in Vero Beach, Florida on
September 29, 2014.
The Indian Government's finance department allocated US$14 million for victim relief in July
1985.[34][35] Widow pension of US$3.10 per month later US$12 were provided. The government
also decided to pay US$24. From 1990 interim relief of US$3.10 was paid to everyone in the
family who was born before the disaster.[7]
The final compensation, including interim relief for personal injury was for the majority US$390.
For death claim, the average sum paid out was US$970.
So, the value of a human life in India as determined by an American multi-national
petrochemical corporations was less than about a $1000 for deaths and it took more than 25
years for the last victims and their families to be compensated.
On 24 June 2010, Government of India approved a US$200 million aid package which would be
funded by Indian taxpayers through the government.[37]
In the early 90s I was working as Asia Exploration Manager for ENRON, traveling frequently to
evaluate leases in Malaysia, Pakistan and India. The Union Carbide Case Study was in all the
English papers and the hostility for American business practices was palpable. Meanwhile, the
people still showed a fondness for Americans and our culture.
If India had realized in time that Union Carbide was going to be purchased by Dow Chemical
while the company was negotiating compensation, they could have made a fair settlement a
condition of the sale approval. This would have prevented the taxpayers from getting stuck with
the final bill. Of course, the nationwide protests against ENRONs Dabhol Nuclear Power Plant
near Bombay may have kept the government pre-occupied. The infamous ENRON CEO Ken
Lay (Kenny Boy) once confided in me they can either negotiate the price with us or they can
negotiate our terms with the U.S. State Dept.

During the same period that negotiations were taking place in India, another giant liability Case
Study was proceeding in California.

PG&E HINKLEY, CA

1993

Case Study 2
Excerpted from Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinkley_groundwater_contamination
In 1993, Erin Brockovich, a legal clerk to lawyer Edward L. Masry, investigated the apparent
elevated cluster of illnesses in the community linked to hexavalent chromium. The Case was
settled in 1996 for $333 million to more than 600 Hinkley residents, the largest settlement ever
paid in a direct-action lawsuit in U.S. history.
In 2006, Pacific Gas and Electric agreed to pay $295 million to settle cases involving another
1,100 people statewide for hexavalent chromium-related claims.
So, at first glance, it seems that average settlements in Hinkley ranged from about a quarter
million up to a half million dollars. However, Roberta Walker, the housewife sick from toxic
chromium depicted in the movie Erin Brockovich still lives in Hinkley. Despite non-disclosure
agreements, she revealed that attorneys received about 50 percent of the settlements. Walker

said she knew Hinkley residents who received as little as $10,000 from the settlement and one
that received $2.5 million.
Following receipt of her portion of the historic $333-million settlement, Walker bought a new
home, four miles from the toxic contamination and learned in 2012, that the pollution was
seeping into their groundwater. As of September 2013, the Cal/EPA reports show that some
progress is being made on cleanup, but also show that the plume has expanded to 6 miles long
and 4 miles wide.[6] The PG&E cleanup could last up to 40 years and cost over $800 million.
If the injured residents had known how much the company was spending on clean-up without
containing the problem, I doubt that many would have agreed to settlements as small as
$10,000. If they knew what it would cost for a lifetime of medical bills, they might not have
agreed to at most a million dollar settlement. They might even have lost money when you
consider that the homes located over the expanding toxic plume are now worthless after paying
hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy into this, formerly idyllic, California community. Now that
the school has closed the community is destined to be a ghost town.
I used to pass through Hinkley, throughout the summer of 1973 near where I studied Field
Geology at USC. I remember thinking that a town like this in the middle of nowhere reminded
me (prophetically) of a ghost town. Not even the best geologists of the time could have
envisaged the level of hexavalent chromium contamination or the callous disregard for safety
when PG&E dumped this carcinogenic metal into unlined evaporation pits.

W.R. GRACE - WOBURN, MA

1982

Case Study 3 A Civil Action

Another famous liability case also spawned a movie Civil Action with the lawyer Jan
Schlichtmann played by John Travolta. The 1982 case involved eight Woburn families and a
public water supply contaminated by toxic chemicals like Trichloroethelyne (TCE) a known
carcinogen. Schlichtmann, eventually settled the 1982 Case for $8 million minus legal fees that
amounted to about 375,000 per family. The EPA later sued both W.R. Grace and Beatrice for
$68 million for the estimated clean-up cost.
I lived in Newton MA and Gloucester MA for about 15 years (until 2010) and although I was only
about 20 minutes away from this historic pollution case, few people I encountered remembered
it. Edmond Burkes famous quote, Those who dont know history are doomed to repeat it
should be taken as a warning. Today the drinking water wells which were linked to cancer in
Woburn are still contaminated despite a $21 million cleanup effort.
Schlichtmann told me if he had known while he was negotiating that W.R. Grace had seven
other contaminated sites in MA he might have gotten more leverage in coming up with a timely
settlement. More importantly, if he knew that W.R. Grace was in the midst of a billion dollar deal
with Indonesia for filters that would be used at EXXONs CO2 field in the South China Sea he
could have threatened to expose their unethical practices in the US. Since Indonesia at the time
was concerned with producing the worlds largest subsurface carbon dioxide deposit without
destroying the environment, he might have had considerable leverage for his clients. I knew
because I was working then for Tenneco Oil Company in Indonesia.
If he had known that W.R. Grace poisoned entire towns in Montana with asbestos for decades
he would have had even more leverage. You must know your enemy before you can defeat
them.

After asbestos injury claims unexpectedly nearly doubled in 2000, W.R. Grace & Company filed
for bankruptcy protection in 2001. The United States Department of Justice alleged that Grace
had transferred 4 to 5 billion dollars to daughter companies that it had recently purchased,
shortly before declaring bankruptcy. Justice Department attorneys alleged that this amounted to
a fraudulent transfer of money in order to protect Grace from civil suits related to asbestos. The
bankruptcy court ordered the companies to return nearly $1 billion to Grace, which will remain
as part of the assets to consider in the bankruptcy hearings.
By this time, the petrochemical industry had perfected its 4 dog defense. It worked so well in
these toxic legacy cases that they are still using it with predictable regularity in spill events. It
works like this:

4 DOG DEFENSE
1. My Dog Does Not Bite.
2. My Dog Bites, But It Didn't Bite You.
3. My Dog Bit You. But It Didn't Hurt You.
4. My Dog Bit You And Hurt You, But It Wasn't My Fault
Here is the counter strategy to the 4 dog defense. If all victims and their lawyers used this
approach then the companies would have to change their behavior and policies while dealing
with the real issues.
1. Know the breed of dog - learn all of the unique toxic characteristics and potential risks.
Determine ways to fingerprint the toxic substance such as the wavelengths of fluorescence of
the crude oil. Know the statistics about how often it has caused harm.
2. Prove you were bitten - Prepare your health history and be prepared to show your "before
and after" condition with pictures, if possible. Determine the exact nature of exposure and use
techniques to date the time of exposure even if you have to dig up the waste pits and measure
the radiation levels from nuclear tests to nail down the time frame.
3. Proof of harm. Go to the doctor immediately. Prepare your acute and chronic symptoms.
Determine your level of maximum exposure. Compare your symptoms with those in this country
and globally.
4. Risk / reward - Show the chances of being injured. Compare damage with costs to avoid
similar injury. Prepare lists of all previous fines and violations for problems of a similar nature.
While Big Oil is watching you waste all your time and money in the usual ways, they always
attack the messenger. This means that before addressing the arguments, they attack the
credibility of witnesses (regardless of qualifications) to introduce doubt. They know time is on
their side and you will soon run out of money.
The most important lessons are do not be afraid, prepare a defense for every offensive tactic,
and always claim the moral high ground. Do not break the law to make your point because then
you will be viewed as just another criminal in a never-ending parade of criminals.

Now that we have seen how the petrochemical industry valued human life and how they
responded to the risk of cancer following years of toxic exposure, lets look at how Big Oil
developed their ideas on short term exposure to massive pollution events and what could have
been done to counter their defense.

UNOCAL TORREY CANYON, ENGLAND

1967

Case Study 4
Excerpted from Wiki Torrey Canyon

The attack on the environment really begins in 1967 and the multiple ironies are so bitter you
will want to spit them out. In March 1967 a supertanker named the Torrey Canyon ran aground
in SW England. This tanker was Liberian flagged with an Italian crew, but owned by Union Oil of
California (UNOCAL now BP) which at the time was also leased to BP. This was the largest
supertanker wreck and it created the worst environmental disaster of its time. The tanker was
bombed by the RAF, but the fire went out and the oil slick stretched 30 miles long and 20 miles
wide. As the slick washed ashore volunteers and the British navy were tasked with the cleanup.
There was no known financial settlement and for all intents and purposes UNOCAL was never
held accountable. UNOCAL eventually blamed the Captain who was asleep and a faulty
autopilot. No charges were ever filed and no health studies were conducted on the clean-up
workers. This utter disregard for the health of exposed workers has essentially continued to this
day.
In fact, of the more than 40 major oil spills prior to 2010, only 8 led to studies of health
effects and only two of them included any long-term follow-up. According to the
researchers at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, early data from the two
long-term studies "suggested that respiratory and genotoxicity effects were important to capture,
as well as mental health outcomes commonly associated with disasters of this scale."[11]
Yet even today, health studies are rarely done on any victims who come in contact with toxic oil.
There is almost never any long-term follow-up on health impacts of clean-up workers and
usually it is nearly impossible to get the names of those involved.
As a partial response to this public relations disaster, UNOCAL began developing Explorer
Scout Posts in California under the Boy Scouts of America. I know this for a fact, because it was
at this time that I was recruited from my High School by UNOCAL to help improve their image
and restore their tarnished reputation. I was coached on what to say to reporters and given
scripts to read on the air.
Tragically, less than two years after UNOCALs Torrey Canyon disaster, the same company
was faced with another catastrophe which hit much closer to home in Calif.

UNOCAL - SANTA BARBARA, CALIF.

Case Study 5
Excerpted from Wiki Santa Barbara

1969

According to Wiki, The Santa Barbara oil spill occurred in January and February 1969 in
the Santa Barbara Channel, near the city of Santa Barbara in Southern California. It was the
largest oil spill in United States waters at the time, and now ranks third after the 2010
Deepwater Horizon and 1989 EXXON Valdez spills. It remains the largest oil spill to have
occurred in the waters off California.
The source of the spill was a blow-out on January 28, 1969, 6 miles (10 km) from the coast
on Union Oil's Platform A in the Dos Cuadras Offshore Oil Field. Within a ten-day period, an
estimated 80,000 to 100,000 barrels [3.4 million to 4.2 million gallons][1] of crude oil spilled into
the Channel and onto the beaches of Santa Barbara County in Southern California, fouling the
coastline from Goleta to Ventura as well as the northern shores of the four northern Channel
Islands.
Both governmental entities and private individuals filed class-action lawsuits against Union Oil
to recover damages. These were settled within about five years. The City of Santa Barbara
received $4 million in 1974 for damages inflicted.[66] Owners of hotels, beachfront homes, and
other facilities damaged by the spill received $6.5 million; the commercial fishing interests
received $1.3 million for their losses; and cities, the state, and the County of Santa Barbara
settled for $9.5 million in total.[18]
Note that after paying a total of about $20 million for economic damages, UNOCAL tracked no
clean-up workers and provided no compensation for health impacts. It was considered the cost
of doing business with callous disregard for long-term environmental impacts. That explains why
they changed the casing program on the so-called development wells to save money offshore
Santa Barbara.
At this stage, you may well wonder how I could know this for certain. I was not only used in their
PR campaigns on Los Angeles radio stations, but when I graduated from Santa Fe Springs High
School in 1970, I was employed by UNOCAL to archive all their reports at the LA headquarters
library. Later, I worked as a pumper on a UNOCAL offshore platform off Huntington Beach,
Calif. where I sometimes worked with other field operators.

AMOCO CADIZ, BRITTANY FRANCE

1978

Case Study 6
It was nearly 10 years before the industries luck ran out again and the chickens came home to
roost.
Excerpted from Wiki Amoco Cadiz

AMOCO (now also BP) was operating four Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) which were built
in Spain. Gradually AMOCO became aware of a design flaw in the steering mechanisms in the
4 vessels. By 1978, two of their supertankers, the AMOCO Cadiz and the Haven were leased to
Shell. AMOCO replaced the steering on two of the vessels carrying their own oil, but the two
vessels leased to Shell at a high day rate had their maintenance cycle extended from once a
year to once every two and a half years.
On March 16, 1978, the AMOCO Cadiz ran aground on Portsall Rocks, three miles off the coast
of Brittany, France due to failure of the steering mechanism in high seas. This created the worst
oil spill recorded at that time spilling 60 million gallons onto the French coast, over twice that of

the UNOCAL Torrey Canyon. AMOCO refused to accept any responsibility for any of the
cleanup or impacts. The French government and local communities conducted and paid for
most of the clean-up. The French government paid $12 million to fishermen and others to offset
their losses.
AMOCO was found liable largely because of its dismal maintenance record, and because it
knew from the first voyage of the Cadiz that the steering mechanism was flawed and failed to
repair it. The Captain who argued for 12 hours over the tugboat fee on orders from AMOCO
London was never charged and the builders refused to appear in court and were exonerated.
In 1990, the judge awarded the French Government and the spill victims damages totaling
$117.5 million, in most cases awarding specific victims only a fraction of what they claimed. No
damages were awarded to anyone for general damage to the environment. There was, of
course no compensation or follow-up on the 10,000 French soldiers involved in the clean-up.
If AMOCO had been forced to compensate workers and been required to fix the other sister
ships steering, lives may have been saved. This event had little coverage in the U.S., but I was
working for Occidental (OXY) in Libya at the time and it was a very big deal throughout Europe
and North Africa. Everyone I talked to was asking how the Americans could allow this to happen
twice.

LOVE CANAL, NY

1978

Case Study 7
Excerpted from wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Love_Canal
It was during this period that the horrendous practices of Hooker Chemical (OXY) at Love Canal
in Niagara Falls were exposed and the EPA was forced to take action. As it turned out this
legacy site of monumentally reckless waste disposal was sold to the Niagara Falls School
Board in 1953 for $1.
If only the School Board had known that this was common practice among the oil industry as a
feeble attempt to transfer liability while appearing to help the community. Perhaps, they might
have been more willing to look this gift in the mouth and say no.
[Many years later, I personally witnessed this same trick with ENRON giving polluted waste pits
to schools in third world countries. It was one of the many reasons I eventually left the oil
industry for good.]
Excerpted from Wiki
In early 1978, following complaints from residents the EPA found birth defects and many
anomalies such as enlarged feet, heads, hands, and legs. The investigation revealed that the
neighborhood sat atop 21,000 tons of buried chemical waste.[17] Many of the residents were
evacuated and the responsible parties were sued. The school was closed and demolished, but
both the school board and the chemical company (OXY) refused to accept liability. The parties
argued that the area's endemic health problems were unrelated to the toxic chemicals buried in
the Canal.
Since the residents could not prove the chemicals on their property had come from Hooker's
disposal site, they could not prove liability. Throughout the legal battle, residents were unable to
sell their properties and move away.

In 1979, the EPA announced the result of blood tests that showed high white blood cell counts,
a precursor to leukemia,[19] and chromosome damage in Love Canal residents. In fact, 33% of
the residents had undergone chromosomal damage. Over time, reports suggested that dioxin
levels at Love Canal were 100 times greater than the community had been told. A federal
study indicated that Love Canal residents had a 1 in 10 chance of developing cancer.
Eventually, the government relocated more than 800 families and reimbursed them for their
homes, and the United States Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), or the Superfund Act.
In 2002, however, the agency faced perhaps its biggest challenge of all when Congress slashed
the Superfunds primary income source a tax targeting industrial polluters that once generated
about $1 billion annually. By the end of Fiscal 2003, the funds balance was zero, down from a
peak of $3.8 billion in 1996. Since that time, the Superfund budget has generally decreased
down to $1.1 billion proposed in fiscal year 2015.
OXY was sued by the EPA and in 1995 agreed to pay $129 million in restitution.[33] This
settlement amounts to an average of about $145,000 per family minus lawyers fees. It is
estimated that today more than 6,000 people have been impacted. Residents' lawsuits were
also settled in the years following the Love Canal disaster and are still being settled nearly 40
years afterward.[34
A few years ago when I visited Niagara Falls, I saw the fence encircling the main danger zone of
the Love Canal debacle and thought that if only OXY had put that fence around their waste
decades earlier they could have saved so many lives and an entire community from destruction.]

IXTOC 1, MEXICO

1979

Case Study 8
Excerpted from Wiki Ixtoc I oil spill
Also in 1979, a year after the AMOCO Cadiz ran aground in England, the Mexican Government
experienced a blowout in the Gulf of Mexico of historic proportions. The Pemex Ixtoc 1 well blew
out for 10 months spilling 130 million gallons of oil. This was nearly as much as the BP
Deepwater Horizon in 2010 which was eerily similar. Like BP, Pemex tried the very same failed
containment procedures and they dumped 1 to 2 million gallons of toxic Corexit dispersant with
little positive effect even though the water depth was only 150 feet deep at the source. The US
requested that Mexico stop using dispersants in US waters. The oil eventually coated 170 miles
of Texas Coastline in some places up to a foot thick. I remember because I was in Houston at
the time working for Tenneco Oil and traveling to numerous offshore platforms throughout the
Gulf of Mexico.
Pemex spent $100 million to clean up the spill and avoided most compensation claims by
asserting sovereign immunity as a state-run company.[11] . No health studies are known and
there was no tracking of clean-up workers.
If the US had demanded more information on this spill in the early days and required tracking
and health impact studies on US workers for the oil and the dispersant, it is likely that the same
mistakes could have been avoided at the BP Deepwater Horizon. They could have immediately
banned the use of Corexit and saved lives in Alaska and the Gulf Coast. Instead, since there

was little accountability, the lessons learned were quickly forgotten and the mistakes were
inevitably repeated.

OCCIDENTAL PIPER ALPHA, NORTH SEA

1988

Case Study 9
Excerpted from Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piper_Alpha

Piper Alpha was a North Sea oil production platform operated by OXY beginning in 1976 when I
began working for OXY in Libya. It was an oil platform and then later converted to gas
production. An explosion and the resulting oil and gas fires destroyed it on 6 July 1988, killing
167 men, [3] with only 61 survivors. The death toll includes two crewmen of a rescue vessel.[4]
Total insured loss was about US$3.4 billion. It was the worst offshore oil disaster in terms of
lives lost and industry impact[5] and it should have been a wake-up call for the entire oil industry.
OXY was eventually found guilty of having inadequate maintenance and safety procedures, but
no criminal charges were ever brought against the company.[4] The disaster led to insurance
claims of around $1.4 billion USD, making it at that time the largest insured man-made
catastrophe. After all the condolences, hand wringing and finger pointing the oil company went
back to what it does best, cutting corners and making lots of profit. If Oxy had been held fully
accountable for the incident and criminal charges brought against company executives who put
cost-cutting bonuses above human lives, then the BP-Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in the
Gulf Coast would have been much less likely to occur.

EXXON VALDEZ, ALASKA

1989

Case Study 10
Excerpted from Wiki Exxon Valdez
The EXXON Valdez oil spill occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on March 24, 1989, when
the oil supertanker bound for Long Beach, California, struck Prince William Sound's Bligh Reef
spilling nearly 40 million gallons of crude oil covering 11,000 sq. miles of ocean and coating
1300 miles of coastline. The Captain of the vessel was not on the bridge as he had passed out
from drinking the night before. It was eventually determined that the ships radar had not been
working for more than a year before the disaster. Dispersants were used extensively and the
main component of the Corexit formulation used during cleanup, 2-butoxyethanol, was identified
as "one of the agents that caused liver, kidney, lung, nervous system, and blood disorders
among cleanup crews in Alaska. Of the 10,000 people involved in the clean-up, all are now
believed to be dead at an average age of 52, nearly 20 years earlier than the national average.
EXXON was sued and a jury awarded $287 million for actual damages and $5 billion for punitive
damages. After numerous appeals which cut the damage assessments in half, EXXON
appealed to the Supreme Court and punitive damages were reduced to about 500 million
dollars.

Exxon's official position was that punitive damages greater than $25 million were not justified
because the spill resulted from an accident, and because Exxon spent an estimated $2 billion
cleaning up the spill and a further $1 billion to settle related civil and criminal charges. Attorneys
for the plaintiffs contended that Exxon bore responsibility for the accident because the company
"put a drunk in charge of a tanker in Prince William Sound."[45]
Exxon recovered a significant portion of clean-up and legal expenses through insurance claims
associated with the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.[46][47]The only negative outcome for EXXON
was that the Valdez was no longer allowed into Prince Williams Sound and double hulled
tankers would be required in US waters after 2015.
If EXXON had been forced to track clean-up workers and pay all medical and environmental
claims promptly, more people might be alive today. The largest company on earth would have
been held partially accountable and this might have been a lesson to other oil companies
resulting in reduced tanker incidents.

AMOCO HAVEN, ITALY

1991

Case Study 11
Excerpted from Wiki MT Haven
In 1991, the sister ship to the AMOCO Cadiz blew up and sank off the coast of Italy. On 11 April
1991, the AMOCO Milford Haven was unloading a cargo of crude oil to the Multedo floating
platform, seven miles off of the coast of Genoa, Italy.
The ship exploded, caught fire and sank off the coast of Genoa, Italy, killing six Cypriot crew
and flooding the Mediterranean with up to 45 million gallons of crude oil.[1] It broke in two and
sank after burning for three days, and for the next 12 years the Mediterranean coast of Italy and
France was polluted, especially around Genoa and southern France. This was the same ship
that was scrapped 4 years earlier after being hit by an Exorcet missile during the Iran-Iraq war.
It was put back into service with many of the design flaws and maintenance problems that led to
the grounding of the AMOCO Cadiz. Apparently, it doesnt take much for a supertanker to be
certified.
The ship was leased to Troodos Shipping and the owners, Lucas and Stelios, faced charges of
the manslaughter of the six killed, extortion and intimidating and attempting to bribe witnesses.
Lucas and Stelios were later acquitted after three retrials (of which 2002 was the last) and much
controversy, with subsequent appeals and demands for compensation also thrown out,[1]
So once again, no one was held accountable although, given this ships history, more deaths
were predictable. If AMOCO had been forced to pay for their earlier crimes, this disaster might
never have happened.

CHEVRON / TEXACO ECUADOR

1993

Case Study 12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lago_Agrio_oil_field

This brings us to one of the worst crimes ever committed by the oil companies which involves
the deliberate dumping of reportedly 18 billion gallons of oil-contaminated produced water for
decades into the jungle of Ecuador. Because it occurred in the Texaco held part of the Amazon,
the truth has never fully been told. You can choose to believe the oil company propaganda or
get lost in the artificial political posturing. You can even believe that the whole process is
corrupt, but do not believe data you have not seen because CHEV/TEX refuses to release it.
I have seen it, I started working for Texaco in 1974 in New Orleans about when production in
Ecuador began. I was present for the annual meetings when the VPs were touting the huge
profits coming from Ecuador and the plans for rapid, unencumbered development by CEPE,
then the government oil company. More importantly, I have seen what few others will admit to;
namely the company data with Texacos logo on it. In the decades of lawsuits by CHEV/TEX,
little if any of the original company generated, operational data showing pressures, volumes,
maintenance logs or analyses have been released. What are they hiding?
Instead, there are mountains of partially-sanitized, consultant data in finalized reports which are
easy to write in rosy terms near the end of any project. These were written for Texaco by
consultant agencies who would follow Texacos guidance and instructions and not dig deeper.
That is what they were paid to do. They agreed to study and analyze only what they were given
by Texaco and not ask questions about the data they were not shown.
Lawyers for the indigenous residents of the Lago Agrio field sued Texaco in New York in 1993.
The 30,000 member class-action lawsuit accused TexPet (now CHEVRON) of discharging
produced water into open pits, contaminating the water that was used by the locals for fishing,
bathing, and drinking. Plaintiffs in the Ecuadorian court case had initially demanded
compensation payments of $27 billion. When the court ordered CHEVRON to pay $18 billion in
February 2011 (later reduced to $9.5 billion), the company vowed to appeal.
CHEVRON sued lawyers and consultants personally and argued that compensation by
consultants, journalists and activists was fraud while spending tens of millions on the companys
defense. CHEVRON even hired lobbyists to convince Obama to pressure Ecuador to block the
judgment against them. All the while funding a relentless media campaign portraying itself as
victim.
In September 2013, The Hague arbitration panel ruled in favor of CHEVRON, finding that an
agreement signed in 1995 by the government of Ecuador released Texaco Corporation from
financial responsibility from any claims of collective damage. However, the panel left open the
possibility that CHEVRON could still be liable for damages incurred by individuals.[35] While
the lawyers argue legal points, more of the victims suffer and go without adequate medical care
or merely die off.
CHEVRON practices an age-old strategy of attacking the messenger. It doesnt matter the
argument, they have an army of lawyers to attack syntax in legalese without addressing the
core issues. They have rarely encountered someone they cannot bully or frighten with money or
legal action. Their favorite tactic is to demand access to all information on any media that
contains some remotely relevant information. They have done that with hard drives, unedited
film and even personal diaries. It would be interesting to see what would happen if a lawyer
reciprocated and demanded all of the data on their computers which contains or contained any
original data from Texaco.

In 2009, I was interviewed for El Comercio, the Ecuadorian Trade News, where I gave the
following advice:
If the Ecuador case comes back to the U.S. Courts, it is possible that the case could be
dismissed. I believe that an out of court settlement for $300-400 million may be the best
that the families can hope for at this point. That is about $1 for every barrel that
Chevron/Texaco dumped. It might be something that the company would accept as the
cost of doing business and the price for improving their image.
While I still believe that the amount [approx. $13,000 per person] would have been reasonable
for both sides, CHEVRON has since badgered and paid so many people that they dont believe
they need to settle with the indigenous victims at all. While this issue is likely to be bogged down
in the courts for decades to come, it is unlikely that CHEVRON will ever be held accountable. At
the very least, they should apologize to the people for attracting them out of the forest by the
thousands to work for Texaco, then establishing towns and villages in an oil production zone.
They should issue an advisory to all companies to discourage workers from living in the vicinity
of oilfields in the rainforest because villages in these climate conditions are easily contaminated.
Many of these victims have lived their entire lives on top of primitive oilfields and now they will
spend the rest of their lives dealing with the consequences without any help or medical
intervention.

BP/ARCO - HASTINGS ON HUDSON, NY

Case Study 13

1998

BP website http://oneriverstreet.com/site/history.php

On August 5, 1998, the New York Times reported "high levels" of PCBs had been discovered in
Hastings-on-Hudson, NY. These were found at the former Anaconda Wire & Cable Company
which ceased operations in 1974, a 26-acre toxic waste site owned by ARCO (now also BP).
Wire manufacturing operations during a portion of the operating period caused the release of
carcinogenic, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and metals to site soil, groundwater and
sediments. The highest levels of PCBs in New York State would make this BP/ARCO site one of
the hottest toxic dumpsites in America.
15 years ago, I wrote the following recommendation for the Earth Society and it was presented
to the Hastings on Hudson community:
When ARCO took over Anaconda [in 1977], it didn't acquire just the land; it acquired the
pollution legacy of Anaconda and the responsibility that this knowledge demands.
Although by the late 1970's PCBs were no longer being manufactured, companies were
still being sued for PCB cleanup. ARCO must surely have investigated its own [PCB]
liabilities at the time of the takeover. The courts might find those reports and records
very interesting reading. ARCO should be instructed to immediately turn over any files
and records remaining from the Anaconda purchase which reference toxic materials
utilized at this site. These would include, but not be limited to, photographs, materials
transfers, purchase agreements, sales contracts, reports and legal briefs. Far from being
an innocent inheritor of Anaconda's problem, ARCO has chosen to conceal and
downplay the previous irresponsible behavior and flagrant pollution violations that
occurred at the site. ARCO has elected to ignore the true causes of the contamination
and to minimize their relevance. It deserves to pay for the consequences of those
decisions.

At about the same time my recommendation was circulated, Arco repurchased the site. The
Atlantic Richfield Website states that they purchased this site in order to gain control over
environmental investigation and remediation efforts.
Once BP/ARCO regained control of the polluted site on the Hudson River, they delayed and
resisted action in every way possible. They argued every insignificant detail and always claimed
that the site was of no risk to the population since they did not obtain their drinking water from
local wells. Somehow, they managed not to do a single long-term health study which might
have revealed impacts from airborne PCBs. To this day, there has been no health follow-up for
any of the employees who worked in this toxic environment and there has been zero
compensation for any potential victims.
On April 18, 2000, ARCO was purchased by BP America and completely merged into BP
operations in a $29 billion takeover. The merged firm had an estimated market capitalization of
nearly $190 billion, making it the world's second largest oil company behind EXXON Mobil. At
the time of the merger, Atlantic Richfield Co and its parent BP America settled a 700 persons
lawsuit of the Anaconda mine in Nevada built in 1941 for up to $19.5 million. EPA tested wells in
2009 and found that 79% of the wells north of mine had dangerous levels of uranium and/or
arsenic.[21]
The settlement in Nevada from the second largest oil company averaged $27,857 per person
potentially poisoned by uranium and arsenic. There has apparently been no settlement offer for
Hastings on Hudson victims.
In 2014, the cost of the on-site and off-site remedies at Hastings was estimated to be over $250
million. BP/ARCO will pay for the clean-up and the design and remediation will take
approximately four to five years.
The final insult is that BP has given donations to the towns Fire Department and City Council
while commandeering the villages website for BP Public Relations.
http://oneriverstreet.com/site/history.php

PRESTIGE, SPAIN

2002

Case Study 14
Excerpted from Wiki Prestige
The Prestige oil spill was an oil spill off the coast of Galicia caused by the sinking of an oil
tanker in 2002. The spill polluted thousands of kilometers of coastline and more than one
thousand beaches on the Spanish, French and Portuguese coast, as well as causing great
harm to the local fishing industry. The spill is the largest environmental disaster in the history of
both Spain and Portugal.
According to Wiki, one of its twelve tanks burst during a storm off Galicia, in northwestern Spain.
Fearing that the ship would sink, the captain called for help from Spanish rescue workers, with

the expectation that the vessel would be brought into harbor. However, pressure from local
authorities forced the captain to steer the embattled ship away from the coast and head
northwest. Reportedly after pressure from the French government, the vessel was once again
forced to change its course and head south into Portuguese waters in order to avoid
endangering France's southern coast. Fearing for its own shore, the Portuguese authorities
promptly ordered its navy to intercept the ailing vessel and prevent it from approaching further.
With the French, Spanish and Portuguese governments refusing to allow the ship to dock in
their ports, the integrity of the single-hulled oil tanker was quickly deteriorating and soon the
storm took its toll when it was reported that a 40-foot (12 m) section of the starboard hull had
broken off, releasing a substantial amount of oil.
On November 19, the ship split in half. It sank the same afternoon, releasing over 20 million US
gallons of oil into the sea. The oil tanker was reported to be about 150 miles from the Spanish
coast at that time. An earlier oil slick had already reached the coast. The Greek captain of the
Prestige was taken into custody, accused of not cooperating with salvage crews and of harming
the environment.
In the subsequent months, thousands of volunteers were organized. It estimated the cost of the
clean-up to the Galician coast alone at more $3 billion about the same as the EXXON Valdez.
Spanish investigators have concluded that the failure in the hull of the "Prestige" was entirely
predictable and indeed had been predicted already: her two sister ships, "Alexandros" and
"Centaur", had been submitted to extensive inspections under the "Safe Hull" program in 1996.
The organization in charge of the inspections, the American Bureau of Shipping, found that both
"Alexandros" and "Centaur" were in terminal decline. Due to metal fatigue in their hulls,
modeling predicted that both ships would fail between frames 61 and 71 within five years.
"Alexandros", "Centaur" and a third sister-ship, "Apanemo", were all scrapped between 1999
and 2002. For some reason, however, "Prestige" was not scrapped, and, little more than five
years after the inspection, as predicted, her hull failed between frames 61 and 71.[4]
This was one of the few tanker spills which investigated health problems among cleaning staff.
Five years later after the cleaning activities, a study found that people participating in the
cleaning activities, many of them volunteers, suffered several health problems, such as
pulmonary, cardiovascular, and chromosomal diseases. This was found among a study of 800
involved Spanish Navy personnel.[5]
In November 2013, three judges of the high court concluded it was impossible to establish
criminal responsibility. The Captain was found guilty of disobedience and given a nine month
suspended sentence.
If countries spent a fraction of the energy they use to keep tankers out of their ports making sure
that dilapidated tankers are not certified to sail the seas there would be far fewer tanker spills.
Maybe now is the time to finally stop supertankers from sailing under flags of convenience with
little regulation or oversight.

HURRICANE IVAN US GULF COAST 2004

Case Study 15
Excerpted from Wiki Hurricane Ivan

Along with the 14 deaths in Florida, Ivan is blamed for eight deaths in North Carolina, two in
Georgia, and one in Mississippi. An additional 32 deaths were reported as indirectly caused by
the storm.[1]

As it passed over the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana, Ivan caused the destruction of
Taylor Energy's Mississippi Canyon 20-A production platform, 550 feet above 28 producing oil
and gas wells drilled in water 479 feet deep. Waves estimated to be 71 feet caused tremendous
pressures below the surface, causing a landslide that obliterated the platform. Hundreds of
gallons of oil per day were still leaking onto the surface of the Gulf ten years later in 2014, and
continue to appear to the present date.
The well is about all that is left of the company, which at one time was the largest independent
oil and gas production company operating in the Gulf of Mexico. Taylor died in November 2004,
two months after Hurricane Ivan. Five years later, the company sold off the rest of its oil and gas
production assets in the Gulf to Ankor Energy.
The companies should long ago have been forced to create an offshore contingency fund to
jointly pay for any spills. In this way the companies and their insurers could police themselves
and avoid equipment and practices which would cost them all money.

BP -Texas City Refinery Explosion 2005

Case Study 16
Excerpted from Wiki - BP

In March 2005, the Texas City Refinery, one of the largest refineries owned then by BP,
exploded causing 15 deaths, injuring 180 people and forcing thousands of nearby residents to
remain sheltered in their homes.[343] A 20-foot (6.1 m) column filled with hydrocarbon
overflowed to form a vapour cloud, which ignited. The explosion caused all the casualties and
substantial damage to the rest of the plant.[344] The incident came as the culmination of a series
of less serious accidents at the refinery, and the engineering problems were not addressed by the
management. Maintenance and safety at the plant had been cut as a cost-saving measure,
the responsibility ultimately resting with executives in London.[345]
The fallout from the accident clouded BP's corporate image because of the mismanagement at
the plant. There had been several investigations of the disaster, the most recent being that from
the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board[346] which "offered a scathing
assessment of the company." OSHA found "organizational and safety deficiencies at all
levels of the BP Corporation" and said management failures could be traced from Texas to
London.[343] The company pleaded guilty to a felony violation of the Clean Air Act, was fined
$50 million, the largest ever assessed under the Clean Air Act, and sentenced to three years
probation.[347]
On 30 October 2009, the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) fined BP
an additional $87 million, the largest fine in OSHA history, for failing to correct safety hazards

documented in the 2005 explosion. Inspectors found 270 safety violations that had been
previously cited but not fixed and 439 new violations. BP appealed the fine.[343][348] In July
2012, the company agreed to pay $13 million to settle the new violations. At that time OSHA
found "no imminent dangers" at the Texas plant. Thirty violations remained under
discussion.[349] In March 2012, US Department of Justice officials said the company had met
all of its obligations and subsequently ended the probationary period.[350] In November 2011,
BP agreed to pay the state of Texas $50 million for violating state emissions standards at its
Texas City refinery during and after the 2005 explosion at the refinery. The state Attorney
General said BP was responsible for 72 separate pollutant emissions that have been
occurring every few months since March 2005. It was the largest fine ever imposed under the
Texas Clean Air Act.[351][352]

2010 Texas City Chemical leak

BP has admitted that malfunctioning equipment lead to the release of over 530,000 pounds
(240,000 kg) of chemicals into the air of Texas City and surrounding areas from 6 April to 16
May 2010. The leak included 17,000 pounds (7,700 kg) of benzene, 37,000 pounds
(17,000 kg) of nitrogen oxides, and 186,000 pounds (84,000 kg) of carbon
monoxide.[379][380] In June 2012, over 50,000 Texas City residents joined a class-action suit
against BP, alleging they became sick in 2010 as a result of the 41-day emissions release
from the refinery. Texas has also sued BP over the release of emissions. BP says the release
harmed no one.[381]
In October 2013, a jury found that BP was negligent in the case, but due to the lack of substantial
evidence linking illness to the emissions, decided the company would be absolved of any
wrongdoing.[382][383]

BP PRUDHOE BAY, ALASKA 2006

Case Study 17 BP-Alaska Pipeline Oil Spill
Excerpted from Wiki - Prudhoe Bay Oil Spill

The Prudhoe Bay oil spill was an oil spill that was discovered on March 2, 2006 at
a pipeline owned by BP Exploration, Alaska (BPXA) in western Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Initial
estimates of the five-day leak said that up to 267,000 US gallons (6,400 bbl) were spilled over
1.9 acres (7,700 m2), making it the largest oil spill on Alaska's north slope to date.[1] The spill
originated from a 0.25-inch (0.64 cm) hole in a 34-inch (86 cm) diameter pipeline. In November
2007, BPXA pled guilty to negligent discharge of oil, which prosecutors said was the result of
BP's knowing neglect of corroding pipelines, a misdemeanor under the federal Clean Water Act,
and was fined US$20 million.[3] In July 2011, BPXA paid a $25 million civil penalty, the largest
per-barrel penalty at that time for an oil spill, and agreed to take measures to significantly
improve inspection and maintenance of its pipeline infrastructure on the North Slope to reduce
the threat of additional oil spills. In November 2012, it was announced that the U.S. state of
Alaska would collect $255 million related to BP Plc's pipeline leaks and a resulting shutdown in
2006. BP's share was $66 million since it would pay the award and then be reimbursed by

partners, including Exxon Mobil Corp and ConocoPhillips, based on their proportionate share of
ownership.
Red flags and warning signs had been raised about corrosion on several occasions both from
within and outside the organization but had been ignored.[3] The 1992 tests on the eastern line
had indicated the presence of calcium in the line, but nothing was done about it.[9] A company
report in year 2005 said BP based its corrosion-fighting on a limited budget instead of needs.[9]
Employees had raised their concerns before the actual incident, which were ignored by BP
management. In an e-mail to a company lawyer in June 2004, Marc Kovac, an official of the
United union representing workers at the BP facility, forwarded a collection of his earlier
complaints to management. One of these, dated February 28, 2003, concerned "corrosion
monitoring staffing levels". It began, "The corrosion monitoring crew will soon be reduced to six
staff down from eight."[10]
One of the reasons for the pipeline failure was an insufficient level of corrosion inhibitor, a
liquid which resists corrosion of pipeline by the corroding liquid, which is water.[12]John Dingell
read from an internal BP email that said budgetary constraints would force the end of a
programme to inject corrosion inhibitor directly into the pipeline system.[11] The process of
injecting corrosion inhibitor directly into a pipeline, though costly, is much more effective than
injecting in a process plant.
In the subsequent investigation, Carolyn Merritt, chief executive officer of the U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, told the committee that "virtually all" of the root
causes of the problems at Prudhoe Bay had "strong echoes" of those that led to the 2005
explosion in Houston. These had included cost cutting and a failure to invest in the plant. The
committee was also told that the spillage happened at a time when BP was making huge
profits.[11]
The leak detection system measures the volumes of fluid entering each pipeline segment and the
volumes of fluid leaving each segment. The system triggers an alarm if the volume
measurements don't match up. The leak detection alarm sounded four times during the week
before the spill was discovered, but BP interpreted the leak detection alarms as false alarms.
The spill went undetected for as long as five days, according to a New York Times report of a
BP press conference on the spill in mid-March 2006.[14]
Subsequent investigation found a six inch layer of sediment in the bottom of the pipe section.
Investigators said that the sludge helped breed acidic bacteria and corrosion that ultimately ate
though the pipe. BP executives said they were surprised that corrosion developed in the large
trunk lines because they didn't carry much water mixed with the oil. But they were aware that
sediment was collecting and that leak technology wouldn't work if the lines were not periodically
cleaned. Federal and state authorities concluded that BP did not spend the money necessary to
maintain the Prudhoe pipes.
On March 15, the U.S. Transportation Department ordered BP to test its three low-pressure lines
in Prudhoe Bay for corrosion using a smart pig. The western line had not been smart-pigged
since 1998 and an eastern section of pipe had not been tested since 1992.[16]Instead, BP relied
on imprecise spot checks of the line using methods such as ultrasound testing. On August 7, BP

announced data from a smart pig run completed in late July revealed severe corrosion and 16
anomalies in 12 locations in an oil transit line on the eastern side of the oil field.
In October 2007, BP was fined US$20 million for the Prudhoe Bay oil spills. BP paid a
US$12 million federal criminal fine, US$4 million in criminal restitution to the state, and
US$4 million for Arctic research. BP's local subsidiary, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., was
placed on probation for three years.[3]
In 2008 BP announced that it had completed replacing 16 miles/26 km of the Prudhoe Bay transit
lines and the other work as planned. [26]
Subsequent spill in 2009
On November 9, 2009, a spill occurred from an 18-inch three-phase common line carrying a
mixture of crude oil, produced water, and natural gas at BP's Lisburne field,[27][28] part of the
greater Prudhoe Bay area.[29] BP's preliminary estimate for the total volume of oily material
released was 45,828 gallons (1,091 barrels);[28] there were 13,500 gallons (321 barrels) of
crude.[30][31] The spill occurred because the pipe froze.[30] Although sensors provided alarms of
cold temperatures, BP employees testified that operators didn't use the cold alarms as a measure
of flow, but rather as a measurement of the mixture of oil, gas, and water.[30] In November 2010
BP's federal probation officer filed suit to revoke BP's probation stemming from the guilty plea
for the 2006 spill, which could have led to further penalties for the 2006 spill, on the grounds that
the 2009 Lisburne spill showed that BP was still negligent.[32] BP challenged the revocation and
the probation was lifted as planned in December 2011.[31]
2011 Civil suit
In the settlement of a civil suit, in July 2011 investigators from the U.S. Department of
Transportations Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) determined
that the 2006 spills were a result of BPXAs failure to properly inspect and maintain the
pipeline to prevent corrosion. PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) to BP XA that
addressed the pipelines risks and ordered pipeline repair or replacement. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency had investigated the extent of the oil spills and oversaw
BPXAs cleanup. When BP XA did not fully comply with the terms of the CAO, a complaint
was filed in March 2009 alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the
Pipeline Safety Act. In July 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska entered a
consent decree between the United States and BPXA resolving the governments claims. Under
the consent decree, BPXA paid a $25 million civil penalty, the largest per-barrel penalty at that
time for an oil spill, and agreed to take measures to significantly improve inspection and
maintenance of its pipeline infrastructure on the North Slope to reduce the threat of additional oil
spills.[33][34][35][36]
Alaskan lawsuit settlement
In November 2012, it was announced that the U.S. state of Alaska would collect $255 million
related to BP Plc's pipeline leaks and a resulting shutdown in 2006. BP's share was $66 million
since it would pay the award and then be reimbursed by partners, including Exxon Mobil Corp
and ConocoPhillips, based on their proportionate share of ownership. The payment, which was
final and not subject to appeal, included a $245 million award for lost state royalties and interest
and $10 million which included per-gallon environmental penalties for the spills, fines for
natural resource damages and other civil charges to settle civil assessments for the spills. BP
argued that no money was owed to the state for lost production, but the arbitration panel

concluded that the pipeline problems and associated reservoir complications resulted in lost or
deferred production of more than 30 million barrels of oil and natural-gas liquids until the end of
the oil field's life.[37][38]
BP is a British multinational company, headquartered in London, England, whose performance in
2012 made it the world's sixth-largest oil and gas company, the sixth-largest energy company
by market capitalization[8] and the company with the world's fifth-largest revenue
(turnover).[9][10] In 2013, the company's revenue was US$396.217 billion, operating income
was $31.769 billion and net income was $23.758 billion.[2] As of 2013, 83,900 people employed
by the company worldwide.[4] By 2013, BP had fallen from the second largest oil company to the
fourth after selling off assets to cover Deepwater Horizon oil spill-related payouts.[133]

The US operations comprise nearly one-third of BP's worldwide business interests,[158] and the
US is the country with the greatest concentration of its employees and investments.[159][160] As of
April 2014, per the company website BP employs approximately 20,000 people in the
US.[161][162][163] BP is the second largest producer of oil and gas and the largest leaseholder in
the deepwater Gulf of Mexico.[162]

BP Health and Safety Violations

Excerpted from Wiki - BP
BP has been directly involved in several major environmental and safety incidents. Among them
were the 2005 Texas City Refinery explosion, which caused the death of 15 workers and
resulted in a record-setting OSHA fine; Britain's largest oil spill, the wreck of Torrey Canyon;
and the 2006 Prudhoe Bay oil spill, the largest oil spill on Alaska's North Slope, which resulted
in a US$25 million civil penalty, the largest per-barrel penalty at that time for an oil spill.[17]
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the largest accidental release of oil into marine waters in
history, resulted in severe environmental, health and economic consequences,[18] and serious
legal and public relations repercussions for BP. [19] In February 2012 BP North America
launched a $500 million branding campaign to rebuild its brand.[303] The company's advertising
budget was about $5 million per week during the four-month spill in the Gulf of Mexico, totaling
nearly $100 million.[304][305]
The company plead guilty to 11 counts of felony manslaughter, two misdemeanors, and one
felony count of lying to Congress, and agreed to pay more than $4.5 billion in fines and
penalties, the largest criminal resolution in US history.[20][21][22] Legal proceedings are
continuing, with proceedings set to commence in January 2015[23] to determine payouts and
fines under the Clean Water Act and the Natural Resources Damage Assessment.[24][25][26][27] In
September 2014, the judge ruled in the first phase of the case that BP was "reckless" and
committed "gross negligence," in a "worst case" ruling that could cost BP $18 billion in
additional penalties above the $28 billion already expended on the spill by that time. BP is
appealing the ruling, which raised concerns about BP's future.[28][29]
Hazardous substance dumping 19931995

In September 1999, one of BP's US subsidiaries, BP Exploration Alaska (BPXA), pleaded guilty
to criminal charges stemming from its illegally dumping of hazardous wastes on the Alaska
North Slope, paying fines and penalties totaling $22 million. BP paid the maximum $500,000 in
criminal fines, $6.5 million in civil penalties, and established a $15 million environmental
management system at all of BP facilities in the US and Gulf of Mexico that are engaged in oil
exploration, drilling or production. The charges stemmed from the 1993 to 1995 dumping of
hazardous wastes on Endicott Island, Alaska by BP's contractor Doyon Drilling. The firm
illegally discharged waste oil, paint thinner and other toxic and hazardous substances by
injecting them down the outer rim, or annuli, of the oil wells. BPXA failed to report the
illegal injections when it learned of the conduct, in violation of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.[313] [CERCLA or the Superfund Act.]
Air pollution violations
In 2000 BP Amoco acquired ARCO, a Los Angeles-based oil group.[85] In 2003
Californias South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) filed a complaint against
BP/ARCO, seeking $319 million in penalties for thousands of air pollution violations over an 8year period.[314] In January 2005, the agency filed a second suit against BP based on violations
between August 2002 and October 2004. The suit alleged that BP illegally released air
pollutants by failing to adequately inspect, maintain, repair and properly operate
thousands of pieces of equipment across the refinery as required by AQMD regulations. It
was alleged that in some cases the violations were due to negligence, while in others the
violations were knowingly and willfully committed by refinery officials.[315] In 2005 a
settlement was reached under which BP agreed to pay $25 million in cash penalties and $6
million in past emissions fees, while spending $20 million on environmental improvements at the
refinery and $30 million on community programs focused on asthma diagnosis and
treatment.[316]
In 2013, a total of 474 Galveston County residents living near the BP Texas City Refinery filed a
$1 billion lawsuit against BP, accusing the company of "intentionally misleading the public
about the seriousness" of a two-week release of toxic fumes which began on 10 November
2011. "BP reportedly released Sulfur Dioxide, Methyl Carpaptan, Dimethyl Disulfide and other
toxic chemicals into the atmosphere reads the report. The lawsuit further claims Galveston
county has the worst air quality in the United States due to BP's violations of air pollution
laws. BP had no comment and said it would address the suit in the court
system.[317][318][319][320][321]
Health and safety violations
Citing conditions similar to those that resulted in the 2005 Texas City Refinery explosion, on 25
April 2006, the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) fined BP more than $2.4 million for unsafe operations at the
company's Oregon, Ohio refinery. An OSHA inspection resulted in 32 per-instance willful
citations including locating people in vulnerable buildings among the processing units, failing to
correct de-pressurization deficiencies and deficiencies with gas monitors, and failing to prevent
the use of non-approved electrical equipment in locations in which hazardous concentrations of
flammable gases or vapors may exist. BP was further fined for neglecting to develop shutdown

procedures and designate responsibilities and to establish a system to promptly address and
resolve recommendations made after an incident when a large feed pump failed three years prior
to 2006. Penalties were also issued for five serious violations, including failure to develop
operating procedures for a unit that removes sulfur compound; failure to ensure that operating
procedures reflect current operating practice in the Isocracker Unit; failure to resolve process
hazard analysis recommendations; failure to resolve process safety management compliance
audit items in a timely manner; and failure to periodically inspect pressure piping
systems.[333][334]
In 2008 BP and several other major oil refiners agreed to pay $422 million to settle a class-action
lawsuit stemming from water contamination tied to the gasoline additive MTBE, a chemical that
was once a key gasoline ingredient. Leaked from storage tanks, MTBE has been found in several
water systems across the United States. The plaintiffs maintain that the industry knew about
the environmental dangers but that they used it instead of other possible alternatives
because it was less expensive. The companies will also be required to pay 70 percent of cleanup
costs for any wells newly affected at any time over the next 30 years.[335][336]
BP has one of the worst safety records of any major oil company that operates in the
United States. Between 2007 and 2010, BP refineries in Ohio and Texas accounted for 97
percent of "egregious, willful" violations handed out by the U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). BP had 760 "egregious, willful" violations during that
period, while Sunoco and Conoco-Phillips each had eight, Citgo two and Exxon had
one.[337] The deputy assistant secretary of labour at OSHA, said "The only thing you can
conclude is that BP has a serious, systemic safety problem in their company."[338]
A report in ProPublica, published in the Washington Post in 2010, found that over a decade of
internal investigations of BP's Alaska operations during the 2000s warned senior BP managers
that the company repeatedly disregarded safety and environmental rules and risked a
serious accident if it did not change its ways. ProPublica found that "Taken together, these
documents portray a company that systemically ignored its own safety policies across its
North American operations -- from Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico to California and Texas.
Executives were not held accountable for the failures, and some were promoted despite
them."[339]
The Project On Government Oversight, an independent non-profit organization in the United
States which investigates and seeks to expose corruption and other misconduct, lists BP as
number one on their listing of the 100 worst corporations based on instances of
misconduct.[340]
1965 Sea Gem offshore oil rig disaster
In December 1965, Britain's first oil rig, Sea Gem, capsized when two of the legs collapsed
during an operation to move it to a new location. The oil rig had been hastily converted in an
effort to quickly start drilling operations after the North Sea was opened for exploration.
Thirteen crew members were killed. No hydrocarbons were released in the accident.[341][342]

Whatever happened to 3 strikes and youre out? BP is so obviously bad it doesnt belong in the
American business picture. How many more innocent people are we going to let them kill in
order to improve their bottom line. They should be immediately disqualified from all government
leases and they should be forced to sell their American assets to companies with better safety
records. No one could do worse. The ubiquitous maximum civil penalty of $25 million represents
a paltry .0063 % of BPs $396 billion revenue in 2013. For perspective, this amounts to about $3
for an average person making an income of $50,000 per year.
BP is the second largest producer of oil and gas and the largest leaseholder in the deepwater Gulf
of Mexico.[162]Since the Macondo, Deepwater Horizon oil spill, BP acquired 75 leases in the
Gulf. Also, of the seven largest drilling platforms in the Gulf, four are operated by BP.[172At the
very least there should be a minimum of one OSHA regulator and one BP Vice President on
every platform at all times. Maybe if it is their lives on the line, they will find a way to shut these
dangerous operations down permanently. Regulating agencies have tremendous power to
change the actions and attitudes of companies. All it would require is for just one company to be
held fully accountable for its crimes and the industry would be a whole lot safer for everyone.

PART B

BP - DEEPWATER HORIZON, GULF COAST 2010

Case Study 18
Excerpted from Wiki Deepwater Horizon
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill began on 20 April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico on the BPoperated Macondo Prospect. It claimed eleven lives[6][7][8][9] and is considered the largest accidental
marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry, an estimated 8% to 31% larger in volume
than the previously largest, the Ixtoc I oil spill. Following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig, a sea-floor oil gusher flowed for 87 days, until it was capped on 15 July 2010.[8][10] The
US Government estimated the total discharge at 4.9 million barrels (210 million US gal).[3] After
several failed efforts to contain the flow, the well was declared sealed on 19 September
2010.[11] Some reports indicate the well site continues to leak.[12][13]
A massive response ensued to protect beaches, wetlands and estuaries from the spreading oil
utilizing skimmer ships, floating booms, controlled burns and 1.84 million US gallons of Corexit oil
dispersant.[14]
in 2011, a White House commission likewise blamed BP and its partners for a series of cost-cutting
decisions and an insufficient safety system, but also concluded that the spill resulted from "systemic"
root causes and "absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might
well recur".[24]

In November 2012, BP and the United States Department of Justice settled federal criminal charges
with BP pleading guilty to 11 counts of manslaughter, two misdemeanors, and a felony count of lying
to Congress. BP also agreed to four years of government monitoring of its safety practices and
ethics, and the Environmental Protection Agency announced that BP would be temporarily banned

from new contracts with the US government. BP and the Department of Justice agreed to a
record-setting $4.525 billion in fines and other payments[25][26][27] but further legal proceedings
not expected to conclude until 2014 are ongoing to determine payouts and fines under
the Clean Water Act and the Natural Resources Damage Assessment.[28][29] As of February
2013, criminal and civil settlements and payments to a trust fund had cost the company $42.2
billion.[30]In September 2014, a U.S. District Court judge ruled that BP was primarily responsible
for the oil spill because of its gross negligence and reckless conduct. The ruling could result in
additional penalties as high as $18 billion, with grave implications for BP's future.[31]
As of July 2011, about 491 miles (790 km) of coastline in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and
Florida were contaminated by oil and a total of 1,074 miles (1,728 km) had been oiled since the
spill began.[60] As of December 2012, 339 miles (546 km) of coastline remained subject to
evaluation and/or cleanup operations.[61]
The fundamental strategies for addressing the spill were containment, dispersal and removal. In
summer 2010, approximately 47,000 people and 7,000 vessels were involved in the project. By
3 October 2012, federal response costs amounted to $850 million, mostly reimbursed by BP. As
of January 2013, 935 personnel were still involved. By that time cleanup had cost BP over
$14 billion.[61]
According to a NALCO manual obtained by GAP, Corexit 9527 is an eye and skin irritant.
Repeated or excessive exposure ... may cause injury to red blood cells (hemolysis), kidney or
the liver. The manual adds: Excessive exposure may cause central nervous system effects,
nausea, vomiting, anesthetic or narcotic effects. It advises, Do not get in eyes, on skin, on
clothing, and Wear suitable protective clothing. For Corexit 9500 the manual advised, Do not
get in eyes, on skin, on clothing, Avoid breathing vapor, and Wear suitable protective
clothing. Neither the protective gear, nor the manual were distributed to Gulf oil spill cleanup
workers, according to FOIA requests obtained by GAP.[136]
Underwater injection of Corexit into the leak may have created the oil plumes which were
discovered below the surface.[139] Because the dispersants were applied at depth, much of the
oil never rose to the surface.[148] One plume was 22 miles (35 km) long, more than a mile wide
and 650 feet (200 m) deep.[149] In a major study on the plume, experts were most concerned
about the slow pace at which the oil was breaking down in the cold, 40 F (4 C) water at depths
of 3,000 feet (910 m).[150]
In late 2012, a study from Georgia Tech and Universidad Autonoma de Aguascalientes in
Environmental Pollution journal reported that Corexit used during the BP oil spill had increased
the toxicity of the oil by 52 times.[151] The scientists concluded that "Mixing oil with dispersant
increased toxicity to ecosystems" and made the gulf oil spill worse."[152][153]

Health consequences
Main article: Health consequences of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill

By June 2010, 143 spill-exposure cases had been reported to the Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals; 108 of those involved workers in the clean-up efforts, while 35 were
reported by residents.[224] Chemicals from the oil and dispersant are believed to be the cause; it
is believed that the addition of dispersants made the oil more toxic.[225]
The United States Department of Health and Human Services set up the GuLF Study in June
2010 in response to these reports. The study is run by the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences, and will last at least five years.[226][227]
Mike Robicheux, a Louisiana physician, described the situation as "the biggest public health
crisis from a chemical poisoning in the history of this country."[228] In July, after testing the blood
of BP cleanup workers and residents in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida for volatile
organic compounds, environmental scientist Wilma Subra said she was "finding amounts 5 to 10
times in excess of the 95th percentile"; she said that "the presence of these chemicals in the
blood indicates exposure."[227][229][230] Riki Ott, a marine toxicologist with experience of
the EXXON Valdez oil spill, advised families to evacuate the Gulf.[231] She said that workers
from the Valdez spill had suffered long-term health consequences.[232]
A 2012 survey of the health effects of the spill on cleanup workers reported "eye, nose and
throat irritation; respiratory problems; blood in urine, vomit and rectal bleeding; seizures; nausea
and violent vomiting episodes that last for hours; skin irritation, burning and lesions; short-term
memory loss and confusion; liver and kidney damage; central nervous system effects and
nervous system damage; hypertension; and miscarriages". Dr. James Diaz, writing for
the American Journal of Disaster Medicine, said these ailments appearing in the Gulf reflected
those reported after previous oil spills, like the EXXON Valdez. Diaz warned that "chronic
adverse health effects, including cancers, liver and kidney disease, mental health disorders,
birth defects and developmental disorders should be anticipated among sensitive populations
and those most heavily exposed". Diaz also believes neurological disorders should be
expected.[240]
Two years after the spill, a study initiated by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health found biomarkers matching the oil from the spill in the bodies of cleanup workers.[citation
needed]
Other studies have reported a variety of mental health issues, skin problems, breathing
issues, coughing, and headaches.[241] In 2013, during the three-day "Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill &
Ecosystem Science Conference",[242] findings discussed included a '"significant percentage" of
Gulf residents reporting mental health problems like anxiety, depression and PTSD. These
studies also showed that the bodies of former spill cleanup workers carry biomarkers of "many
chemicals contained in the oil".[243]
A study that investigated the health effects among children in Louisiana and Florida living less
than 10 miles from the coast found that more than a third of the parents reported physical or
mental health symptoms among their children. The parents reported "unexplained symptoms
among their children, including bleeding ears, nose bleeds, and the early start of menstruation
among girls," according to David Abramson, director of Columbia University's National Center
for Disaster Preparedness.[243]

Legal aspects and settlement

Investigations

The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released
a final report on 5 January 2011.[298][299] The panel found that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean
had attempted to work more cheaply and thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing
leakage.[300]
It concluded that "notwithstanding these inherent risks, the accident of April 20 was avoidable"
and that "it resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP, Halliburton and
Transocean, and by government officials who, relying too much on industry's assertions of the
safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program of regulatory oversight that would
have properly minimized the risk of deepwater drilling."[301][303] The panel also noted that the
government regulators did not have sufficient knowledge or authority to notice these cost-cutting
decisions.[300]
The loss of life and the subsequent pollution of the Gulf of Mexico were the result of poor risk
management, lastminute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to critical indicators,
inadequate well control response, and insufficient emergency bridge response training by
companies and individuals responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of
the drilling platform.[22]
In a New York Times opinion piece, Stephen Teague, staff attorney at the Mississippi Center
for Justice, argued that BP had become "increasingly brazen" in "stonewalling payments." "But
tens of thousands of gulf residents still haven't been fully compensated for their losses, and
many are struggling to make ends meet. Many low-wage workers in the fishing and service
industries, for example, have been seeking compensation for lost wages and jobs for three
years."[313]
In January 2015, court documents revealed a court-appointed administrator has paid out just
$331,589 in medical claims in his first 11 months processing requests under BP's settlement,
resolving less than 6 percent of the more than 12,000 health-related damage claims submitted
so far.
By comparison, a separate settlement fund to pay for economic damages from the disastrous
2010 oil spill has doled out $4.3 billion to more than 53,000 claimants.
Meanwhile, BP paid the medical claims administrator, Matt Garretson of Cincinnati, $2.2 million
in November 2014 alone.13 health claims

Litigation and settlements

In July 2013 BP made a motion in court to freeze payments on tens of thousands of claims,
arguing inter alia that a staff attorney from the Deepwater Horizon Court-Supervised Settlement
Program, the program responsible for evaluating compensation claims, had improperly profited
from claims filed by a New Orleans law firm. The attorney is said to have received portions of
settlement claims for clients he referred to In a New York Times opinion piece, Stephen Teague,
staff attorney at the Mississippi Center for Justice, argued that BP had become "increasingly
brazen" in "stonewalling payments." "But tens of thousands of gulf residents still haven't been
fully compensated for their losses, and many are struggling to make ends meet. Many low-wage
workers in the fishing and service industries, for example, have been the firm.[313] The federal
judge assigned to the Case Study, Judge Barbier, refused to halt the settlement program,
saying he had not seen evidence of widespread fraud, adding that he was "offended by what he
saw as attempts to smear the lawyer administering the claims."[314]

On 13 January 2013, Judge Barbier approved a medical-benefits portion of BP's proposed $7.8
billion partial settlement. People living for at least 60 days along oil-impacted shores or involved
in the clean-up who can document one or more specific health conditions caused by the oil or
dispersants are eligible for benefits, as are those injured during clean-up.[320] BP also agreed to
spend $105 million over five years to set up a Gulf Coast health outreach program and pay for
medical examinations.[47]
On 25 July 2013 Halliburton plead guilty to destruction of critical evidence after the oil spill and
said it would pay the maximum allowable fine of $200,000 and will be subject to three years of
probation.[330]
In January 2014, a panel of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an effort by BP to
curb payment of what it described as "fictitious" and "absurd" claims to a settlement fund for
businesses and persons affected by the oil spill. BP said administration of the 2012 settlement
was marred by the fact that people without actual damages could file a claim. The court ruled
that BP hadn't explained "how this court or the district court should identify or even discern the
existence of 'claimants that have suffered no cognizable injury.'" [322]
On 4 September 2014, U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier ruled BP was guilty of gross negligence
and willful misconduct. He described BP's actions as "reckless." He said Transocean's and
Halliburton's actions were "negligent." He apportioned 67% of the blame for the spill to BP, 30%
to Transocean, and 3% to Halliburton. Fines would be apportioned commensurate with the
degree of negligence of the parties, measured against the number of barrels of oil spilled. Under
the Clean Water Act fines can be based on a cost per barrel of up to $4,300, at the discretion of
the judge. The number of barrels was in dispute at the conclusion of the trial with BP arguing 2.5
million barrels were spilled over the 87 days the spill lasted, while the court contends 4.2 million
barrels were spilled. BP issued a statement strongly disagreeing with the finding, and saying the
court's decision would be appealed.[336]
Barbier ruled that BP had acted with conscious disregard of known risks" and rejected BPs
assertion that other parties were equally responsible for the oil spill. His ruling stated that BP
"employees took risks that led to the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history, that the
company was reckless, and determined that several crucial BP decisions were primarily
driven by a desire to save time and money, rather than ensuring that the well was secure. The
ruling means that BP, which had already spent more than $28 billion on cleanup costs and
damage claims, may be liable for another $18 billion in damages, four times the Clean Water
Act maximum penalties and many times more than the $3.5 billion BP had already allotted. BP
strongly disagreed with the ruling and filed an immediate appeal. The size of the ruling "casts a
cloud over BPs future," The New York Times reported.[31][337]
My View
When the blowout occurred, I was working with fishermens organizations in the Northeast and I
advised everyone to avoid the Gulf Coast and never to join an oil clean-up crew. I told them if no
one was willing to work in these dangerous conditions the industry might have to confront the
human health risks.
In August 2010, I released an E-book Deep Horizons Exposed, The Untold Story of How BP
and the Oil Industry Have Poisoned Water Resources in North America. which was one of
the first books to detail the operational similarities with the Ixtoc 1 Mexican Blow-out and criticize
BPs non-standard drilling and completion practices. The book reviewed BPs other operational
decisions which inevitably led to spills and explosions and revealed a general lack of regard for
the safety of personnel and the environment.

Nearly five years ago, I predicted that the use of this dispersant could have devastating and
long lasting consequences on people and on the ecosystem of the Gulf and recommended the
immediate halt to the use of dispersants and the establishment of long-term health studies.
Still given these warnings it is imperative that the EPA immediately halt the use of COREXIT
9527 with 2 BE and demand the complete formula for COREXIT 9500 with petroleum distillates.
At the very least, the government should set up a protocol to carefully monitor the long-term
health of all workers involved with cleaning up the BP spill. It is likely that the manufacturer
never anticipated that these products would be utilized in such enormous quantities or ever
intended to expose 40,000 workers to their effects. They certainly never imagined that they
would be applied near public beaches where millions of people enjoy their recreation every
summer
I also warned of the threat of oxygen depletion in the Gulf and the growth of Dead Zones:
First the oil spreads a suffocating blanket across the surface forcing organisms that can
migrate to move deeper while bacteria use up oxygen consuming the oil. The migrating
organisms encounter more dispersants which themselves have a high oxygen demand creating
more hypoxic zones. The dead organisms sink to the seafloor where they are confronted with
more concentrations of dispersants using up the remaining oxygen and preventing any
significant oxygen replenishment from the deep inflowing currents. It is a perfect storm of
oxygen deprivation brought on by BP and being played out beneath the surface of the ocean.
This storm can only result in massive ecosystem disruption. The victims will not only be the
marine life, but those who are dependent on it for their livelihoods and survival.
I summarized the incident as follows:
In short, BP acted like a teenager who accelerates the car when the lights turn yellow, runs
stop signs when he thinks no one is watching and occasionally runs red lights because he
assumes the car has good brakes. But he hasnt actually tested them. Then he acts surprised
when he has an accident. He tries to hide the damage with 2 million gallons of toxic paint and
then blames everyone else who was in the intersection. Also like our wayward teenager, BP
should be punished with the loss or suspension of its operators license and should not be in
charge of repairs.

ENBRIDGE KALAMAZOO RIVER

2010

Case Study 19
Excerpted from Wiki Kalamazoo River oil spill
The Kalamazoo River oil spill occurred [on July 25, 2010] when a pipeline operated
by Enbridge (Line 6B) burst and flowed into Talmadge Creek, a tributary of the Kalamazoo
River. A six-foot break in the pipeline resulted in the largest inland oil spill, and one of the
costliest spills, in U.S. history. The pipeline carries diluted bitumen (dilbit), a heavy crude
oil from Canada's Athabasca oil sands to the United States. Following the spill, the
volatile hydrocarbon diluents evaporated, leaving the heavier bitumen to sink in the water

column. Thirty-five miles of the Kalamazoo River were closed for clean-up until June 2012,
when portions of the river were re-opened. On March 14, 2013 the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) ordered Enbridge to return to dredge portions of the river to remove submerged
oil and oil-contaminated sediment.
On 29 July 2010, the Calhoun County Health Department asked 30 to 50 households to
evacuate, and twice as many were advised not to drink their water.[3]
The oil was contained to a 25-mile (40 km) stretch of the Kalamazoo River as several hundred
workers took part in the cleanup.[5]
As of November 2014, the largest inland oil spill in U.S. history cost Canadian energy giant
Enbridge $1.21 billion to clean up. One of the reasons for the vast escalation in time and
expense of cleanup was that the EPA had never handled a dilbit spill. In addition, it is reported
that Enbridge never informed the EPA of the product distinction. Unlike conventional crude,
dilbit floats briefly in water but then sinks, causing a much more difficult cleanup particularly if
dredging is considered too ecologically damaging.[4] This disaster was the largest on-land spill in
American history to date.[9] In 2013, EPA recommended to the State Department that pipelines
that carry tar sands oil should no longer be treated just like pipelines that carry any other oil.
Now, in 2005, Enbridge actually had learned that this section of pipe was cracked and
corroding. ... That same 2005 internal report pointed to 15,000 defects in the 40-year-old
pipeline. And Enbridge decided not to dig up this [Talmadge Creek] area to inspect it."[12]

Health Impacts
According to the Detroit Free Press (June 24, 2013), Three years after oil spill, a slow
recovery haunts Kalamazoo River. In a Michigan Department of Community Health
study of health impacts in the months just after the burst pipeline, health care providers
identified 145 patients who reported illnesses or symptoms associated with the oil spill,
including one patient whose eight health impacts were classified as disabling or lifethreatening. A state health department survey of 550 people in affected Kalamazoo
River communities found 58% of respondents reported adverse health effects that they
attributed to the spill. Chief complaints included headaches, breathing problems and
nausea.
In 2011, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services declined to study the longterm health risks to those exposed to the spill.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/arkansas-oil-spill-health-_n_3045610.html

Dr. Michael Harbut, chief of the Center for Occupational and Environmental Medicine at the
Wayne State University School of Medicine in Detroit, has been treating patients in the
aftermath of the Kalamazoo disaster. "Some people developed problems within a couple weeks.
Others got sick several months later," he said, with issues that have included respiratory and
immune system problems and memory losses. "It's too soon to see the cancers. Those tend to
occur 20 or 30 years after exposure."
No one is currently tracking long-term health problems among people exposed in Kalamazoo,
even though Rutherford said he has petitioned state and national partners for such a study.

Therefore, it remains difficult to prove any connections or say for certain what may be in
Mayflower's future.
Following the Enbridge spill, I was one of the first to release a model of the air dispersion of
toxic gases near the Kalamazoo River and the evaporation curve of the Cold Lake Tar Sands
which were spilled. I utilized satellite imagery to define the area impacted and then overlaid that
area to Capitol Hill in Wash. D,C and eventually a simulated KXL spill in Nebraska. I later used
videos describing local health impacts in a YouTube video to discourage approval of the KXL
pipeline which could spill much more than the Enbridge pipeline.

EXXON MAYFLOWER 2013

Case Study 20
Excerpted from Wiki Mayflower
The 2013 Mayflower oil spill occurred on March 29, 2013, when an EXXONMobil pipeline
carrying Canadian Wabasca heavy crude from the Athabasca oil sands ruptured in Mayflower,
Arkansas, about 25 miles northwest of Little Rock. Approximately 12,000 barrels of oil mixed
with water had been recovered by March 31. Twenty-two homes were evacuated.[1] The
Material Safety Data Sheet for the product confirms that the Wabasca Heavy is bitumen mixed
with hydrocarbon diluents [also known as Tar Sands, specifically Diluted Bitumen or
Dilbit].[7][8]The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classified the leak as
a major spill.[2] A reported 5,0007,000 barrels of crude were spilled.[3][4] On April
10, UPI reported that around 5,000 barrels (approximately 210,000 gallons of oil were spilled
but quoted EXXON as saying that the final volume would not be known until after the pipeline
was repaired and refilled.[3]
EXXON's Pegasus pipeline carries 95,000 barrels per day [nearly 4 million gallons per day] of
crude a distance of 850 miles (1368 km) from Patoka, Illinois to Nederland, Texas. The pipeline
is twenty inches in diameter and is buried an average of twenty-four inches below ground.[5] On
April 2, 2013, PHMSA, the federal pipeline regulator, issued a corrective action order until
repairs have been completed and all safety concerns addressed.[6]
Excerpted from Alternet THURSDAY, APR 4, 2013 07:43 AM CDT TARA LOHAN,
6 things you need to know about the Arkansas oil spill.
The damage it's wrought, human and environmental, could determine the future of the Keystone
XL pipeline. The pipeline was built in the 1940s [1947 and 1948] but in 2006 the flow was
reversed in order to carry Canadian tar sands to Texas. The pipeline was built to carry 65,000
barrels a day, but EXXON was allowed to expand that to 95,000 barrels a day just a few years
ago.

John H. Cushman Jr. wrote for InsideClimate News:

seven years ago, when EXXON, the pipelines operator, turned it into a higher-volume line for
diluted bitumen from Canada flowing under greater pressure to refineries on the Gulf Coast,

federal rules did not require a new permit application or safety reviews, according to federal
officials.
Our regulations dont specify how much product a pipeline carries. There is no regulation if they
want to change the type of crude they carry, said Damon Hill, a spokesman for the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, a part of the Transportation Department. As far as
reversing the flow of a pipeline, it is not a safety issue.
To reverse the line that runs from Patoka, Ill. to Nederland, Tex. required 240,000 man-hours of
work on pump stations, valves, bypasses and integrity tests, EXXON said when it opened the
line.
Excerpted from Wiki
For several days after the spill, local residents complained about the "horrible smell" of
the diluted bitumen.[16] Air quality monitoring has been conducted by the EPA and EXXONMobil
and posted online by the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality. According to Fox 16
News, the air quality readings have been reviewed by the Arkansas Department of Health and
are below levels that will cause health effects for the general population except in cleanup areas
where emergency responders are working.[17]
According to a representative of the Sierra Club: "Total toxic hydrocarbons were detected at
more than 88,000 parts per billion in the ambient air."[20] EXXON reported detecting benzene
and other harmful chemicals in early sampling at Mayflower but said air and water quality was
within safe limits. However, the report, released by the Faulkner Citizens Advisory Group, said
residents were still showing symptoms of exposure to harmful chemicals,
including benzene and toluene, more than four weeks after the spill.[20]
On July 22, 2013, InsideClimate News and the Arkansas Times announced that
a crowdfunding initiative had amassed over $25,000 to fund two reporters to investigate the
causes and consequences of the spill. Inside Climate News noted that EXXONMobil had not yet
explained the cause of the 22-foot-long gash in the pipeline, nor stated how much oil had been
spilled. The oil company has maintained that the results of an inspection it conducted of the
pipeline are not available to the public. The Inside Climate News article stated: "That leaves two
critical questions unanswered: Did EXXON manage and test its broken Pegasus pipeline
according to established guidelines? And, if it did, is the Arkansas accident a warning that other
pipelines might be at risk?"[23]
According to Fox 16 News, local residents banded together on April 5, 2013 and April 8, 2013 at
a "Mayflower Oil Spill Town Meeting hosted by Johnson & Vines Attorneys" to discuss their
legal rights.[25] Since that time, in addition to the State action file by the Attorney General, a
mass action has been filed by two law firms in Arkansas state court in Faulkner County,
Arkansas: Johnson & Vines [26] (member of the American Injury Attorney Group [27] and
partnering firm, Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton.[28]
When the EXXON pipeline burst I was in Arkansas about a hundred miles away and working on
the Executive Committee of the Arkansas Sierra Club. We were the lead national environmental
organization for the media and we immediately focused our press releases on the long term
health risks for those who were next to the pipeline and people throughout the community. We
were the first to acquire and analyze satellite imagery after the oil spill and map the area of
damage.

I presented the detailed oil analysis and the symptoms the victims could anticipate from the
exposure. I was the first to release new air dispersion models which showed the specific
exposure of benzene, toluene and hydrogen sulfide in different hazard zones in the first hour
following the spill in Mayflower. I traced the chemicals in the spill to their Canadian sources and
revealed their unique properties of viscosity and flammability. I lectured on the dangers of
returning to houses in Mayflower too soon and how citizens could prepare for the inescapable
lawsuits. Finally, I emphasized the importance of historical precedents for liability suits and
forming effective strategies to beat EXXON.

LAC MEGANTIC 2013

Case Study 21 Lac-Mgantic derailment

Excerpted from Wiki

The Lac-Mgantic rail disaster occurred in the town of Lac-Mgantic, in the province
of Quebec, on July 6, 2013, when an unattended 74-car[3][4][5][6][7] freight train carrying Bakken
formation crude oil ran away and derailed, resulting in the fire and explosion of multiple tank
cars. Forty-two people were confirmed dead, with five more missing and presumed
dead.[8] More than 30 buildings in the town's centre, roughly half of the downtown area, were
destroyed[2] and all but three of the thirty-nine remaining downtown buildings are to be
demolished due to petroleum contamination of the townsite.[9] Initial newspaper reports
described a 1-kilometre (0.62 mi) blast radius.[10]
The death toll of 47 due to the crash and resultant explosion makes it the fourth-deadliest rail
accident in Canadian history,[11]and the deadliest involving a non-passenger train. It is also the
deadliest rail accident since Canada's confederation in 1867.
The railway line passing through Lac-Mgantic is owned by the United States-based Montreal,
Maine and Atlantic Railway (MMA). The MMA has owned and operated a former Canadian
Pacific Railway main line since January 2003, The rail line through Lac-Mgantic and across
Maine was built in the late 1880s as part of the final link in CPR's transcontinental system
between Montreal, Quebec and Saint John, New Brunswick. A 1970s proposal to reroute the
line to bypass downtown Lac-Mgantic was never implemented due to cost.[14]
The western half of the line between Brownville Junction toward Montreal was sold to a U.S.based company called Iron Road Railways, which established a subsidiary called Canadian
American Railroad.
Iron Road Railways declared bankruptcy for its subsidiary company in fall 2002. The former
CPR main line from Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu to Brownville Junction was sold to Rail World
Inc. in January 2003. Rail World formed the MMA as a subsidiary and engaged in aggressive
cost cutting[15][16] for freight train operations and continued to defer maintenance on the tracks to
the point where much of the track is now in marginal condition.[17]
Transport Canada permits a railway line to remain in service with as few as five
solid ties (British English = sleepers) and fourteen damaged ties in a 39 feet (12 m) section of
track,[18] provided trains are limited to 10 mph (16 km/h) on straight flat track.[19] MMA failed to
take advantage of millions of dollars of available federal/provincial 2:1 matching
infrastructure grants under a 2007 program as track conditions on the MMA line in

Quebec continued to deteriorate. By 2013, speed reductions were required on 23 portions of

the line, including a 5 mph (8.0 km/h) limit at Sherbrooke yard and 10 miles per hour (16 km/h)
on an 11 miles (18 km) stretch east of Magog.[20]
MMAs single engineer train operation [involved] one loaded box car used as a buffer
car followed by 72 non-pressure dangerous goods DOT-111 tank cars[21] loaded with petroleum
crude oil (Class 3, UN 1267). Each tank car was filled with 30,000 US gal. of crude
oil.[22][23][24]. 3,830 rail cars of Bakken crude were shipped by 67 trains in the 9-month period
preceding the derailment.[30] [equiv. to 115 million gallons of explosive crude through Lac
Megantic in less than a year. Do you think the people in the town knew?] Since 2011,
the Canadian government has required tank cars with a thicker shell, though older models are
still allowed to operate.[34]
Freight trains operated by MMA were allowed (not "permitted", see below) by regulators in
Canada (Transport Canada) and the United States (Federal Railroad Administration) to have
Single Person Train Operation (SPTO, alternately OPTO) status (1 operator). The "permit"
process, which requires public input, was not followed. The Canadian regulator and the MMA
entered into a negotiation process at the culmination of which, sometime before the second
week of July 2012, the government allowed MMA to reduce their manpower to SPTO. An
average of 80 tank cars per train was carried on this route[30] under the supervision of one
person only. The Maine regulator had already allowed SPTO status before the first week of April
2012.[35][36][37] The use of SPTO for MMA freight trains was a cost-cutting move for which the
railway company has received much criticism. In May 2010, former MMA engineer Jarod Briggs
of Millinocket, Maine explained to the Bangor Daily News that so much could happen in a 12hour shift on one of these trains, such as a washed-out track, downed trees or mechanical
failure. What if the engineer onboard were to encounter a medical problem? Who is going to
know about it? If there is a fire engine or an ambulance needing to get by a train or a crossing
when that happens, it could take hours.[38] Briggs left MMA to work for another railway in 2007;
while he described the lone crew member involved in the Lac-Mgantic derailment as "a very
good engineer, one of the better on the property",[39] he has long expressed safety concerns
about the company's overall train operations because if you have two people watching
you can catch a mistake. It was all about cutting, cutting, cutting.[40]
Eight months prior to the derailment
In October 2012, eight months before this accident, the lead locomotive (5017) was sent to
MMA's repair shop following an engine failure. Because of the time and cost for a standard
repair, and the pressure to return the locomotive to service, the engine was repaired with an
epoxy-like material that lacked the required strength and durability. This material failed in
service, leading to engine surges and excessive black and white smoke. Eventually, oil began to
accumulate in the body of the turbocharger, where it overheated and caught fire on the night
of the derailment.[41]
According to Transport Canada, it is unusual to leave an unattended train parked on a main
line,[51] but there were no regulations in place to prevent that behaviour.[52] The engineer
then contacted the rail traffic controller in Farnham, Quebec, to advise that the train was secure.
Next, the engineer contacted the rail traffic controller in Bangor, Maine to report that the lead
locomotive had experienced mechanical difficulties throughout the trip and that
excessive black and white smoke was coming from its smoke stack. Expecting the smoke
to settle, they agreed to deal with the situation the following morning.[41]
While Transport Canada had repeatedly reprimanded MMA from 2004 to 2009 and in 2011 and
2012 for violations of CROR Section 112 handbrake requirements on parked trains in Nantes,

no fines had been issued for the infractions.[59] The TSB found that the MMA's operating
plan was to leave the train parked on the main line, unattended, with an unlocked locomotive
cab, alongside a public highway where it was accessible to the general public, with no additional
protection.[60] However, there were no rules against leaving a train unlocked, running and
unattended, even if it contains dangerous materials and is stopped on a main rail line, on
a hill just next to a residential area.[61]
[Seriously, why have any rules at all if you are allowed to do every stupid thing
imaginable to the locomotive and there is no security at all!]
Witnesses recall having seen the train seemingly unattended and in distress around
22:45 that night.[66] People driving on the road that parallels the rail line near Nantes, recall
seeing the train and having to slow down as they passed by the locomotives where there was a
thick dark blue cloud of diesel smoke being emitted as well as sparks coming out of a
locomotive's exhaust,[66] due to a broken piston in the locomotive's diesel
engine.[67] According to the TSB, the MMA's rail traffic controller was warned of the train having
technical difficulties while the train was still in Nantes on the evening of Friday, July 5.[68] After
the engineer had departed, the Nantes Fire Department as well as a police officer from
the Sret du Qubec's Lac-Mgantic detachment responded to a 911 call from a citizen at
23:50 who reported a fire on the first locomotive;[3] according to Nantes Fire Chief Patrick
Lambert, "We shut down the engine before fighting the fire. Two MMA track maintenance
employees had arrived from Lac-Mgantic; the Nantes firefighters left the scene as the MMA
employees confirmed to the police officer and to the Farnham rail traffic controller that
the train was safe.[70]

Derailment and explosion

It began to roll downhill toward Lac-Mgantic, just over seven miles away.[41][72] A witness
recalled watching the train moving slowly toward Lac-Mgantic without the locomotive
lights on.[73] The track was not equipped with signals to alert the rail traffic controller to
the presence of a runaway train.[48] The train entered the town of Lac-Mgantic at high
speed.[74] The train derailed in downtown Lac-Mgantic at 01:14.[1][75] The locomotives and the
VB car were found intact, separated from the rest of the train approximately 800 metres
(0.50 mi) east of the derailment site.[76] The equipment that derailed included 63 of the 72
tank cars as well as the buffer car. Nine tank cars at the rear of the train remained on the
track and were pulled away from the derailment site and did not explode. Almost all of
the derailed tank cars were damaged, many having large breaches. About six million
litres [1.5 million gallons] of petroleum crude oil was quickly released; the fire began
almost immediately.[41]
The train may have been moving at up to 101 kilometres per hour (63 mph).[46][77] The rail
line in this area is on a curve and has a speed limit for trains of 16 kilometres per hour
(10 mph)[77] as it is located at the west end of the Mgantic rail yard.
Just before the derailment, witnesses recalled observing the train passing through the crossing
at an excessive speed with no locomotive lights, "infernal" noise and sparks being emitted from
the wheels.[78] People on the terrace at the Musi-Cafa bar located next to the centre of the
explosionssaw the tank cars leave the track and fled as a blanket of oil generated a ball of fire
three times the height of the downtown buildings.[79] Between four and six explosions were
reported initially[80] as tank cars ruptured and crude oil escaped along the train's trajectory. Heat
from the fires was felt as far as 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) away.[81] People were jumping from the

third floor of buildings in the central business district to escape the fire. As the blazing oil
flowed over the ground, it entered the town's storm sewer and emerged as huge fires
towering from other storm sewer drains, manholes, and even chimneys and basements
of buildings in the area.[79]
After 20 hours, the centre of the fire was still inaccessible to firefighters[86] and five pools
of fuel were still burning. Claims to local insurers were estimated at [$50 million].

Aftermath

Rail World's president and CEO Edward Burkhardt visited the town on July 10, 2013, and
was heckled by residents. After the accident, the railway's safety record was called into
question: over the previous decade the firm recorded a higher accident rate than the rest of the
U.S. rail fleet, according to data from the Federal Railroad Administration. In the previous year,
the railroad had 36.1 accidents per million miles travelled, in comparison to a national
average of 14.6 accidents.[128][129] Burkhardt's historical involvement with a 1996
derailment on the Wisconsin Central in which hazardous materials burned for over two
weeks also drew renewed scrutiny.[130] While the actual cause of the disaster was still under
provincial (Sret du Qubec) and federal (Transportation Safety Board) investigation,
Burkhardt announced the railway had suspended the engineer for allegedly improperly setting
the handbrakes on the rail cars.[131] The engineer was made unavailable at the suggestion of
his lawyer[132] and MMA instructed its employees not to answer questions from police
without first consulting the company's lawyers.[133] A former colleague established
an Albany-based legal defence fund for the engineer.[134][135] The Sret du Qubec raided
MMA offices in Farnham on July 25 as part of a criminal investigation into the LacMgantic fatalities;[136] the Transportation Safety Board conducted its own search backed
by RCMP on August 1.[137]
On August 6, 2013, Burkhardt stated that MMA has no further plans to carry oil by
rail.[146] On August 7, 2013, the company filed for bankruptcy protection in both
the Quebec Superior Court in Montreal (under the Companies Creditors Arrangement
Act)[147] and the United States Bankruptcy Court in Bangor, Maine[148] (under Chapter
11).[149]
On August 13, 2013, the Canadian Transportation Agency suspended the railway's Certificate
of Fitness[150] effective August 20 because of its failure to obtain adequate insurance
coverage,[151] shutting down the line.[152][153] It later extended this deadline to conditionally
allow operation until October 18.[154][155] While the amount of liability insurance is not listed on
the federal Certificate of Fitness for reasons unknown, MMA's bankruptcy petition disclosed
an insurance policy valued at $25 million[156] and an estimated cleanup cost, which
excludes damages in tort, of $200 million.[156] MMA's Certificate of Fitness was last modified
in 2005, to reflect the use of the line by Orford Express (an independently owned passenger
service between Magog and Sherbrooke).[157] It is unclear whether notice was given of the
oil-by-rail shipments which began in 2012 despite a requirement to "notify the Agency in
writing without delay if ... the ... operation has changed so that the liability insurance
coverage may no longer be adequate."[157]
In Maine, state transportation authorities have contacted all rival freight operators in-state to
establish a contingency plan; if MMA ceases operation, US federal law requires a trustee keep
the line operating until a buyer is found because of the MMA's status as a monopoly in many

communities.[158] The US has no requirement that privately owned railways carry liability
insurance.[159]
On August 22, 2013, the Canadian Transportation Agency ordered CPR to reinstate delivery to
MMA,[160] a move CPR (as one of multiple firms ordered by Quebec's government to pay for the
costly cleanup of oil spilled by MMA at Lac-Mgantic)[161] considers an unacceptable safety
risk.[citation needed] Canadian Pacific chief executive officer Hunter Harrison stated that, "While we
disagree with this order, we have taken immediate steps to comply". The CTA, as federal
regulator, has satisfied itself that MMA is fit to operate and has adequate insurance to do so.
We will review our legal options.[162] The CTA also found that "the balance of inconvenience
clearly favours MMA as the refusal to grant the interim order would result in the virtual
cessation of MMA's operations."[163] The CTA also held that issues regarding public safety
were none of its concern.[163]
In separate developments also occurring on August 22, 2013, the New Brunswick and Maine
Railway company, a division of the J. D. Irving conglomerate, indicated its interest to acquire the
troubled MMA railway,[160] and the Canadian Transportation Agency indicated it would review
insurance coverage of federally chartered railways at some point "in the fall".[164] The same day,
the Quebec government hired Paul Hastings, a Quebec bankruptcy specialist firm with
standing in New York State, to represent it in American proceedings.[163]
Federal Railroad Administration administrator Joseph C. Szabo wrote to the MMA the following
day, stating that "I was shocked to see that you changed your operating procedures to use
two-person crews on trains in Canada, but not in the United States. Because the risk
associated with this accident also exists in the United States, it is my expectation that the
same safety procedures will apply to your operations."[165]

Because crude oil generally does not readily ignite, TSB investigators are looking into
the composition of the train's cargo. Theories being investigated are:[188]

The oil may have contained additives to speed up the transfer of the syrupy oil.
This is common when shipping via pipelines but rare for shipping by rail.[188]

There may have been chemical contaminants in the tank cars from a previous
shipment. However, the MMA had a detailed bill of lading from a U.S. oil services
company stating there were no chemicals in the crude.[188]

The oil may have been contaminated with chemicals used in

the fracking process.[189]

Bakken oil can contain high levels of hydrogen sulphide gas; hydrogen sulphide
is flammable, corrosive, poisonous, and
explosive.[188][190] Pipeline operators Tesoro and Enbridge no longer accept crude
with more than five parts per million H2S, citing safety concerns.[189]

A local propane tank near the derailment might have exploded when struck by a
rail car.[188]

High temperatures in Quebec at the time of the derailment may have made the oil
cargo more flammable.[188]

Hydrogen sulfide (H2S, sour gas), a gas which is toxic to humans and flammable, has
been detected in Bakken crude by Enbridge and likely was part of the reason for the
explosive nature of this event.[191][192]
On August 1, 2013 the TSB said it has taken samples of the oil for analysis.[194] Both
Canadian[195] and US investigators[196] have found the Bakken crude was not identified correctly
in shipping documents,[197] and the incorrect classification led to its volatility being
underestimated.[198]

In its August 2014 report, the TSB identified 18 distinct causes and contributing factors, many of
them influencing one another:[41][42][43]. One of these involved the tank cars and their contents:

Factor related to the tank cars:

Breached tank cars and highly volatile crude oil: The tank cars were prone to
puncture and the Bakken oil was highly volatile.

The report also pointed to the risk of not systematically testing petroleum crude
oil and recommended railway companies should conduct strategic route-planning
and enhance train operations for all trains carrying dangerous goods.
(Recommendation made in January, 2014.) The TSB wants railways to choose
their routes carefully when shipping dangerous goods to avoid populated areas.
Railways are resisting this recommendation because of cost of relocating routes
away from population centres.[205]

Omissions in the TSB report

The TSB did not address the problem of volatile oil in its report into the disaster. The oil
that exploded was extremely light having properties similar to gasoline. The oil was
prone to gasification before and during transit, and its vapours are believed to have been
the reason for the large explosions at Lac-Mgantic.[205]
Criminal investigation
On May 12, 2014, the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway was charged with 47 counts of
criminal negligence
The defective locomotive MMA 5017, a key piece of evidence in the criminal enquiry,
inexplicably turned up at the former MMA Derby Yard in Milo, Maine, as part of a
collection of equipment destined to an August 2014 auction on behalf of the Bangor
Savings Bank, a creditor.[214] The engine was removed from the auction in response to
Surt du Qubec objections
It may take up to five years to decontaminate some sites where homes formerly stood,
forcing householders to rebuild elsewhere.[218]

The disaster site was so heavily contaminated with benzene that firefighters and
investigators in the first month worked in fifteen-minute shifts due to heat and toxic
conditions.[219]

A hundred residents were not expected to return home until mid-2014[dated info] as the
ground beneath their still-standing houses is contaminated with oil;[222] some homes in
the most-contaminated areas might never be habitable.[223]
Environmentalists have reported heavy contamination from polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons and believe arsenic levels to be well above legal limits.[232]
Cleanup and environmental costs
MMA contractors responsible for removing oil and damaged rail cars from downtown
Lac-Mgantic stopped work on July 17 as the railway had not paid them.[233] Work soon
resumed under municipal (and later provincial) funding.[234] As of July 30 the municipality was
demanding MMA reimburse $7.6 million in cleanup costs.[235] Rail World CEO Ed Burkhardt
indicated "were unable to fund that out of our own cash, so were waiting for the insurance
company to come forward".[236]
Provincial environment minister Yves-Franois Blanchet issued a July 29 order under the
Quality of the Environment Act [237] requiring MMA, Western Petroleum Company and its
parent World Fuel Services pay the full cost of clean-up and damage assessment.[238] Canadian
Pacific Railway was added on August 14[239] after World Fuel Services, as shipper of the
crude oil, claimed its only contractual relationship is to the CPR with MMA (as CP's
subcontractor)[240] exercising sole control of the site.[241] The claim that MMA was
contracted by CP (and not WFS) has since been drawn into question.[242] Blanchet stated I will
leave it up to lawyers, but lets be clear: under the law on environmental quality, the minister
does not ask for, or suggest, compensation ... he orders it."[243] CP intends to appeal the
order.[243][244][245][246][247]

Municipal reaction
Local governments in various communities across Canada have expressed concern not only
that railways are exempted from all local regulations (as they are under federal jurisdiction) but
that information on the content of dangerous goods shipments is being deliberately,
systematically withheld from municipal leaders whose duties include disaster planning
and 9-1-1 emergency response.[251][252][253]

Quebec City mayor Rgis Labeaume has offered that city's continued support for the
reconstruction effort (the city already has emergency workers on-site)[261] and called for the
immediate construction of 12 km of new track to reconnect Lac-Mgantic's industrial park to
the rails, bypassing the damaged downtown. He praised local mayor Colette Roy-Laroche
unequivocally while denouncing Rail World CEO Burkhardt as a "corporate bum" whose
modus operandi of taking large dividends in profit while leaving company coffers nearly
empty would allow the railway to declare bankruptcy, leaving taxpayers to foot the huge
cost of rebuilding Lac-Mgantic.[262][263]
Provincial reaction

During a July 11 visit Premier Marois criticized the rail company's response, while
announcing a $60-million fund for survivor assistance and rebuilding.[275] Ten days later,
the federal government had yet to commit to any specific aid for the stricken community, despite
requests from the municipality for help to rebuild damaged infrastructure and reroute the rails
outside the stricken downtown.[276]
During an annual premiers' conference, the Council of the Federation, provincial leaders called
for stricter requirements for liability insurance for rail carriers, real-time information on
content and location of dangerous goods trains for officials at all levels of government
and a federally supported national emergency response program.[277][278]
The premiers of Quebec and all four Atlantic Provinces, as well as all six New
England governors, have called for stricter federal regulation of dangerous goods by rail in both
nations.[279]
A 2001 Quebec law (Article 8 of the Loi sur la scurit civile) for which the corresponding
regulations were never enacted was cited on 19 August 2013 by Vision Montral, a municipal
political party. Under that law, a company conducting activities or holding materials which could
cause a major disaster would be required to disclose these risks to municipalities, indicating the
potential damage and any contingency plans.[280]
Maine and United States
In Maine, where oil-by-rail has attracted environmental protests,[281] the state legislature voted
91-52 for a study on transportation of crude oil through the state. The proposed study was
vetoed by the state's governor[282] and the Maine Department of Transportation (Maine DOT)
has no plans to review movements of crude oil through Maine.[283] Maine governor Paul
Lepage has advocated federal review of all procedures affecting rail safety on both sides of the
border.[284]

Litigation
In Canada, a class action lawsuit has been filed by a Lac-Mgantic attorney whose office was
destroyed by the derailment and fir) and a group of Canadian and US law firms on behalf of
Musi-Caf proprietor Yannick Gagn and one of the widowers from the disaster, Guy
Ouellet.[314]
It alleges Canadian Pacific Railway "entrusted the transport of highly explosive shale liquids to a
carrier with one of the poorest safety records in the industry which was operating on poorly
maintained 'excepted track' that did not permit the transport of flammable or dangerous
goods" and claims CP knew that MMA was insolvent and underinsured. It also
targets Union Tank Car Company, Trinity Industries and GE Capital Rail Services, claiming
"non-reinforced older model DOT-111 tankers were wholly unsuitable for the transport of these
highly explosive shale liquids".[318] The lawsuit states that the transportation of flammable and
dangerous goods is limited to 10 km/hour.[317] Canadian courts can award plaintiffs a maximum
of $326,000 as compensation for non-economic damages like emotional distress.[319]
In the U.S, another lawsuit filed in Chicago, Illinois on behalf of ten victims is asking for over
$50 million in damages.[319] Tafisa Canada, Canadian Pacific Railway and Western Petroleum
Company have also announced intent to seek damages.[321]

In mid-July, Burkhardt indicated Whether we can survive is a complex question. Were trying to
analyze that right now.[322] On August 7, hours after Quebec health minister Rjean
Hbert stated that the province may sue to recover costs of its aid to victims,[323] MMA filed
for bankruptcy protection under US Chapter 11 and Canada's Companies Creditors
Arrangement Act.[324] As many of the suits name multiple defendants, typically oil companies
including World Fuel Services, the Case continued to progress despite MMA's bankruptcy
filings.[319]
A $200 million legal settlement was proposed in January 2015, but remains subject to
government approval in both nations.[325]
The Federal Railroad Administration is investigating multiple safety issues with crude oil
shipments, which are the fastest-growing hazardous material shipments by rail. On July 29, the
FRA requested American Petroleum Institute members provide data on content of their crude
shipments and crude oil loading practices and proposed to do its own testing if the data were
not made available.[330] The U.S. Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration launched a 'Bakken blitz' of inspections of North Dakota oil
trains in August 2013, citing ongoing concerns about improper identification of the chemical
composition and flash point of flammable cargo.[331]
According to the FRA, chemical composition of the oil is not being properly identified on
shipping manifests, despite the use of corrosive or volatile chemicals in the fracking process.
Content of blended crude from multiple wells is not tested before loading, even though FRA
indicates that it is critical that shippers determine the proper classification of the crude oil as a
tanker with a higher safety classification (and not the standard DOT-111A car) is required for
corrosive or explosive materials. The information is needed for provision to first responders and
emergency services during a disaster.
In an increasing number of incidents, chemicals such as hydrochloric acid (used to release
crude from oil well rock formations) have corroded tanks, covers, valves and fittings. As unit
trains of tanker cars do not pass over weigh-in-motion scales in classification yards, many are
overloaded, increasing risks of leakage as oil expands with temperature. The result has been
twice the number of leaks from crude oil shipments as from alcohol shipments, the next highest
hazardous material, even though comparable volumes of each travel by rail.[330]
My View
So what can be done about this deplorable situation in the Railway and Tank Car industry? First
this must be a joint and coordinated effort between the U.S. and Canada. Both countries must
realize that they were seriously caught off-guard by the rapid increase in hazardous cargo tank
car traffic. They also seem to have been surprised by the volatility of the Bakken Oil and the
sinking of Tar Sands in water. The government agencies must accept that these are no ordinary
oils that they are dealing with and they must immediately gather information they apparently
dont have. I am not talking about indoor scientific experiments done in sterile labs but, real
world simulations done under controlled conditions. The first question they should attempt to
answer is which toxic gasses and at which concentrations are released in an actual spill
situation.
Now that Bakken Oil is being transported by rail at volumes exceeding 30 million gallons day, it
is past time for Environment Canada and EPA to acquire a truckload of it. A few thousand
gallons of Bakken Oil poured into a burn pit surrounded by hazmat air monitors recording in real

time could answer many questions about maximum exposure concentrations of multiple gases
and could help to calibrate air dispersion models. Moreover, if this material is then ignited in a
controlled burn and the flammable properties investigated, both firemen and first responders
could be better prepared. If these agencies have already done these experiments in real time
then they must release the measurements and the videos. This is the only way that
municipalities and communities can anticipate how to respond in emergency situations. With
more than a million barrels a day (42 million gallons per day) of Tar Sands being imported into
the U.S from Canada, it is inconceivable that there is no hard data on simulated spills.
It is rumored that Canadian Pacific is desiring a merger with CSX Corp. If the U.S. and Canada
made reasonable compensation to Lac Megantic surviving victims and their families a condition
of merger approval, possibly the governments and taxpayers would not get stuck with the final
bill.
Finally, if both countries utilized the fact that billionaire and philanthropist, Bill Ackman, is the
principal stock holder of Canadian Pacific Railways perhaps they could appeal to his social
conscience.
Ackman is a signatory of The Giving Pledge committing himself to give away at least 50% of his
wealth to charitable causes.[34]
Bill and Karen Ackman founded The Pershing Square Foundation in 2006 to support innovation
in the areas of economic development, education, healthcare, human rights, arts and urban
development. Since it was founded, the Foundation has committed over $160 million in grants
and social investments. In 2011, the Ackmans were among The Chronicle of Philanthropys
"Philanthropy 50" list of the most generous donors.[35]
His wife is a trustee of Human Rights Watch and serves on the board of Friends of the High
Line, a charity that transformed a stretch of an old elevated railroad line in New York City into a
public park.[31]
Perhaps they would consider helping some of the surviving victims of Lac Megantic recover
from the catastrophe for which his company is indirectly responsible. If they are not interested,
maybe Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, the two richest men in the world, and major shareholders
in Canadian National and BNSF railways, respectively, would be willing to repair some of
damage their Bomb Train industry has destroyed.

Yellowstone River Spill 2015

Case Study 22
Excerpted from Wiki Yellowstone River Spill 2015
According to the Bridger Pipeline LLC, another oil spill occurred near Glendive, Montana
on January 17, 2015, at 10 a.m. In response, the pipeline company shut down the
pipeline at 11 a.m. in effort to prevent further environmental hazards. The company
stated that 3001,200 oil barrels were spilled into the river. State officials estimated, on
the other hand, up to 50,000 US gallons) of spilled oil.[15] Benzene, a carcinogen[16]
that may cause cancer, was found in ten to fifteen parts per billion.[17][18] An EPA
official said that "anything above five parts per billion is considered a long-term risk."[18]
[Two days after the spill] Nearly 6,000 people were told not to use municipal water in
Glendive due to the elevated levels of cancer-causing benzene found in the Yellowstone
River, and in the tap water supplied,[19][20] bottled water was provided to their residents.[21]
On January 23, 2015, the city water treatment plant was declared decontaminated.[22]
City officials declared tap water safe to consume.[23] The Wyoming company from True
Companies Poplar pipeline system[21] involved in this incident has a history of nine oil
spills in the period 2006-2014 leaking an amount of 11,000 gallons of crude. Also their
sister company Belle Fourche Pipeline owned by Tad True and their family, recorded 21
incidents in the same period leaking 272,832 gallons of oil, both companies had federal
fines levied against them and appear in governments records.[24][25] The oil cleanup on
Yellowstone River was put on hold for one month or more on 3 February 2015 until the
ice melts. Montana Department of Environmental Quality was monitoring an area
spanning a 90-mile stretch of the Yellowstone, from the spill site downstream to a bridge
just across the North Dakota border.[26]
http://www.mohavedailynews.com/news/glendive-s-water-declared-safe-after-oilspill/article_ddb8df04-a2d9-11e4-bd19-fb3b87818ced.html
According to the Mohave Daily News (January 23, 2015), Paul Peronard with the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency said residents should open their taps and run the
water to flush out any residual contamination.If it doesnt smell anymore you have
cleaned it out, youre good, Peronard said. Citizens can start drinking it...
[On what basis does he make this ridiculous assertion?]
Resident Roseann Koepke, 65, said shed been using bottled water to bathe, brush her
teeth, drink and cook. Koepke ran the taps in her trailer home Thursday after her
landlord told her the contamination had been cleared. But she turned off the water after
the strong smell of oil gave her a headache.
I ran it for about ten minutes and had to open up the door for five minutes to get the
smell out, she said. My God, did I end up getting a headache.
Koepke said she would try again.
Also Thursday, government regulators and representatives of the Poplar Pipeline owner
Casper, Wyoming-based Bridger Pipeline were trying to set up sites downstream
where some oil might be recovered by cutting holes into the ice.

Weve got 22,000 feet of boom available for deployment, said Bridger spokesman Bill
Salvin. Unfortunately, theres just not a lot of place to deploy boom to capture the oil.
Oil sheens have been reported as far away as Williston, North Dakota, below the Yellowstones
confluence with the Missouri River, officials said.
The farthest downstream that free-floating oil has been seen was at an intake dam about 28
miles from the spill site, officials said.
The accident was the second large oil spill into Montanas Yellowstone River, Yellowstone River
2011, in less than four years, raising questions about oversight of the nations aging pipeline
network.
The Poplar Pipeline was constructed in the 1950s. The breached section beneath the
Yellowstone was replaced at least four decades ago, in the late 1960s or early 1970s, according
to the company.
Montana Democratic Sen. Jon Tester wants more frequent inspections by regulators and says
that older pipelines should face stricter safety standards.
What could have been done? An informed EPA would have known that Bakken Crude oil had
and unusually high concentration of Benzene and would have assumed that people who could
smell oil in their drinking water were exposed to Benzene.
According to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR):
Is there a medical test to show whether I've been exposed to benzene?
Several tests can show if you have been exposed to benzene. There is a test for
measuring benzene in the breath; this test must be done shortly after exposure.
Benzene can also be measured in the blood; however, since benzene disappears rapidly
from the blood, this test is only useful for recent exposures.
The 2007 Toxic Profile for Benzene states as follows:

1.1 WHAT IS BENZENE?

Benzene, also known as benzol, is a colorless liquid with a sweet odor. Benzene
evaporates into air very quickly and dissolves slightly in water. Benzene is highly
flammable. Most people can begin to smell benzene in air at approximately 60
parts of benzene per million parts of air (ppm)[equiv. to 60,000 parts per billion] and
recognize it as benzene at 100 ppm. Most people can begin to taste benzene in
water at 0.5 4.5 ppm [500-4,500 parts per billion]. One part per million is
approximately equal to one drop in 40 gallons. Benzene is found in air, water, and soil.
Benzene comes from both industrial and natural sources.
It took only 10 seconds for me to retrieve the odor threshold for Benzene, So, for an EPA
Official in 2015 to tell 6000 residents that if they cant smell it, that it they are good to

drink it might be considered more than uninformed. Some courts might consider that
advice to be criminally negligent, but the victims will never know until they sue.
The EPA official should have been informed about benzene since another spill occurred in the
Yellowstone River near the same area just four years earlier. The ExxonMobil pipeline which
runs from Silver Tip, to Billings, Montana, ruptured about 10 miles (16 km) west of Billings on
July 1, 2011, at about 10:40 p.m.[12] The resulting spill leaked an estimated 1,500 barrels of oil,
equivalent to 63,000 US gallons into the Yellowstone River for 56 minutes before it was shut
down.[12] As a precaution against a possible explosion, officials in Laurel, Montana evacuated
about 140 people on Saturday[when?] just after midnight, then allowed them to return at 4 a.m.[13]
Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer stated that "The parties responsible will restore the
Yellowstone River".[14]

CONCLUSION
As we have seen, petrochemical companies are only as good as they have to be and they are
as bad as they can get away with. Each time we relax safety and health regulations for their
profits we shave years off the lives of some people who do not realize the risks that they are
taking. Furthermore, we significantly decrease the quality of life of those afflicted with chemical
poisoning. At this point what is required is a national registry and possibly a union of oil and
chemical spill workers as well as spill victims so that we can track their whereabouts and
conduct long-term health studies to compare their chronic diseases and life expectancy with
those who were not exposed to toxic chemicals. The government should make this a high
priority before the next major spill and let the companies know that in future it should be
considered part of the cost of doing business. It must be punishment for their abominable
practices and policies in which they have demonstrated that the leaders of the largest, most
profitable companies the world has ever seen have behaved like petty demigods who do not
use common sense to avoid disasters and cannot be reasoned with following their predictable
catastrophes.