Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
Chung/Mulholand
SS Mexico TBHA Negative

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Strategy Sheet
T
CEA CP
Politics
Shale DA
K

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Congressional-Executive
Agreement

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CEA 1NC
The United States federal government should enact a
Congressional-Executive Agreement in order to codify the
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement.
The counterplan is distinct from ratification but solves the case
Geohegan, 6/18/2007 (Thomas J.D. from Harvard Law, Forget Those Treaties! Its Time to
Do Away with Treaties and Start Passing Laws to Bring American Back in Step with the Rest
of the World, Prospect, p. http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=forget_those_treaties)
[MN]
The next Democratic president will be looking straight down into Woodrow Wilson's grave -- unless we just stop
trying
and failing
to ratify
trade bill.
A " law ," or "Executive-Congressional agreement," or whatever you want to call it is just as good. "But
these things as treaties.
Instead, we should just do what we do when we pass a
doesn't it still have to go through the House and Senate?" Yes, but if the House is Democratic, everything gets
through the House. It's an electoral dictatorship, and Nancy Pelosi is like a Gordon Brown dealing with a British
Parliament. The House, thank God, will pass damn near anything. The problem is the Senate -- but there's a way
around the problem. In a law-journal article in 2004, George Washington University law professor Steve Charnovitz
proposed a fast-tracktype scheme for these laws to replace treaties. Congress indeed has rules exempting some
bills (fast track, budget resolutions) from filibusters. Now to some, a mere law passed by two houses of Congress is
not as good as a treaty: "If it's not a treaty, it's not binding." But
a treaty is not binding , either, if we decide not
to abide by it, as Bush stopped abiding by the A nti- B allistic M issile Treaty. In some ways, a law is really much
better than a treaty, because it is more likely we can go to court to hold the U nited S tates to it. That can happen
with a treaty, too. But as a lawyer, I'd much rather sue to enforce a statute. Treaties make judges nervous.
***Net Benefits***

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CEA Net Benefit Executive-Legislative Relations 1NC

CEAs solidify interbranch cooperation and relations --- its the most
reliable signal of commitment.
Hathaway, May 2008 (Oona Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Treaties End:
The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, Yale Law
Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
The interbranch cooperation required to pass the legislation necessary to create congressional-executive agreements
has deep significance for the level of cooperation required at the point of termination. Termination of
congressional-executive agreements by the President is more complicated than is withdrawal from Article II treaties.
Congress cannot prevent the President from communicating with foreign governments about the termination of a
congressional-executive agreement (as long as the termination is consistent with the terms of the statute that
created the agreement). Hence the President could unilaterally withdraw the United States from a congressionalexecutive agreement by communicating the withdrawal to the foreign parties. Yet the act of withdrawing from the
international agreement does not undo the statute on which the agreement restswhich cannot be undone
without the cooperation of Congress . Even though the President may be able to unmake the
international commitment created by a congressional-executive agreement as a matter of international law, the
President cannot unmake the legislation on which the agreement rests. 32 As the Supreme Court stated in INS v.
Chadha, Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I, including the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.33 The President is not able to terminate a statute unilaterally, and
hence cannot terminate the statutory enactment that gives rise to a congressional-executive agreement. And
insofar as the statute specifies a course of action by the United States, the President is required to execute it unless
and until the underlying statute is repealed
or superseded. This understanding of withdrawalthat the
President may unilaterally withdraw from a congressional-executive agreement but not the statute on which it rests
marks out the distinct areas of authority of each branch. Congress approves the legislation necessary to authorize
(in the case of ex ante agreements) or to approve (in the case of ex post agreements) the agreement. The President,
on the other hand, manages the negotiations of the agreement with the foreign government and registers the formal
assent of the United States to the agreement (based on the authority or assent offered by Congress), thereby
binding the country as a matter of international law. Neither can craft an agreement without the
other . Congress cannot encroach on the Presidents foreign affairs power, for it cannot communicate assent to
the agreement on behalf of the United Statesonly the President can do so. What it can do without the President is
enact legislation. Congress could not commit the United States to a free trade agreement without the President, for
Congress cannot speak with a legally binding voice on behalf of the United States on the international stage. But it
might achieve a similar result by passing a statute that unilaterally reduces tariffs on goods imported from a
particular country.34 Moreover, as already noted, Congress can condition its consent to a congressional-executive
agreement through detailed legislation.35 The bottom line is that while there are some similarities between treaties
and ex post congressional-executive agreements at the time of withdrawal, the President is on the whole likely to
find it more difficult to withdraw unilaterally from a congressional-executive agreement than an Article
II treaty. This is because Congress can, as part of the legislation authorizing the agreement, commit the country to a
certain course of action even in the absence of a formalized international commitment . A
congressional-executive agreement therefore can create a more reliable commitment than an Article II
treaty.
Effective executive-legislative relations prevents global conflict and

is key to ally credibility.
Winik, Autumn 1991 (Jay Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University
Foundation, The Quest for Bipartisanship: A New Beginning for a New World Order,
Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
Thus, it is demonstrably clear that, in the absence of bipartisanship, dealing with the new international system will
be difficult at best and at times next to impossible. Friends and foes alike, watching U.S. indecision at home, will
not see the U nited S tates as a credible negotiating partner, ally , or deterrent against wanton
aggression . This is a recipe for increased chaos, anarchy, and strife on the world

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scene . The appeal, then, to recreate anew as the hallmark of U.S. efforts abroad the predictability and resolve
that can only come from bipartisanship at home is as critical as during the perilous days following World War II.
Bipartisanship in Context The ease of constructing bipartisanship, however, should not be overstated. Its halcyon
years are often idealized. People forget that the golden years from Pearl Harbor to the Tet offensive were the
exception rather than the rule. Consensus was not a prevailing characteristic in the first 170 years of the Republic.
Critics have noted with justification that it was the clear lack of purpose regarding vigorous U.S. involvement in
world affairs that led to the U.S. rejection of membership in the League of Nations. In no small measure, this
rejection led to the 20-year crisis that resulted in the rise of Hitler. Proponents of bipartisanship point out its
crowning achievements. Unprecedented unity between the two political parties made it possible for President Harry
S. Truman and a Republican senator, Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-Mich.), to join forces and create such monumental
achievements as the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the United Nations
Charter. Despite strains between the two parties over the Korean War and China, to name but two issues, that unity
held firm and enabled United States to act with continuity and consistency. Allies saw that the United States was
strong and reliable, and the unmistakable message to adversaries was that the United States would abide by its
commitments. Some argue that it was the foreign policy consensus prevalent during the Cold War that made
possible the tragic U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. But this argument in no way invalidates the benefits of
bipartisanship and, in the case of Vietnam, represents an oversimplification of the facts. The failure of U.S.
involvement in Southeast Asia had as much to do with the unique circumstances of the war itself, which were
exacerbated by the then current theories of limited war fighting. These factors, in conjunction with the profound
domestic turmoil on both domestic and foreign policy that was tearing at the U.S. political fabric, made a
complicated and protracted war abroad virtually impossible to prosecute. More generally, the fact remains that the
perception of strength resting on bipartisan unity has been crucial to the United States in times of crisis. This
principle was most vividly displayed by the bipartisan support for President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban
missile crisis. Had the Soviets felt the United States was divided, the situation might have ended in tragic defeat or
quite possibly in a devastating war. Although history will be the final judge, it could be argued that in the recent
Gulf crisis it was precisely the vast chasm that separated the Republicans from the Democrats over whether to use
force or to employ sanctions in order to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression that led him to calculate that the
United States would never actually employ significant military power. This encouraged him to ignore the resolutions
passed by the United Nations (UN) and wait for the United States to seek a watered-down diplomatic compromise.
Certainly Hussein's statements that the American people would have to "face rows of coffins' if there were a war,
echoing statements emanating from lengthy Senate hearings and floor debate, were designed to play into the
antiwar sentiment that wanted to "give sanctions a chance." Tragically, the perception of division and weakness at
home made the necessity for a military solution almost inevitable. Executive-Legislative Relations: The Search for
Balance
The foundation of sustainable bipartisanship is effective executive-legislative relations .
After the Vietnam War, however, the cold war foreign policy consensus, supported by harmonious executivelegislative relations and by both parties in Congress in a manner that minimized conflict over foreign affairs, was
rudely shattered. Although it was not completely undone, as is often claimed by the pundits, and central elements
of the postwar consensus enjoyed a fair deree of support, it was severely frayed. As a result, a slide began down a
slippery slope leading to the balkanization of the U.S. approach to national security, and today this threatens
to inject chaos into the foreign policy process . Congress lies at the heart of the issue.
Allies prevent nuclear war.

Ross, Winter 1998/1999 (Douglas professor of political science at Simon Fraser University,
Canadas functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction,
International Journal, p. Lexis) [MN]
Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than
recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small
arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national selfimage. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of
resources to the management and prevention of international conflict and thus the
containment of the WMD threat . Future American governments will not police the world alone. For
almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United
Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the U nited S tates and other leading powers in a
co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any
plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD .
States. That world is gone.

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Executive-Legislation Relations Turns Hegemony

Interbranch relations is critical to leadership --- turns hegemony
Ikenberry, Spring 2001 (John G. Professor at Georgetown University, The National
Interest, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
When other major states consider whether to work with the U nited S tates or resist it, the fact that it is an open,
stable democracy matters. The outside world can see American policymaking at work and can even find
opportunities to enter the process and help shape how the overall order operates. Paris, London, Berlin, Moscow,
Tokyo and even Beijing-in each of these capitals officials can readily find reasons to conclude that an engagement
policy toward the U nited S tates will be more effective than balancing against U.S. power. America
in large part stumbled into this open, institutionalized order in the 1940s, as it sought to rebuild the postwar world
and to counter Soviet communism. In the late 1940s, in a pre-echo of today's situation, the United States was the
world's dominant state--constituting 45 percent of world GNP, leading in military power, technology, finance and
industry, and brimming with natural resources. But America nonetheless found itself building world order around
stable and binding partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security protection. But the intensity of
political and economic cooperation between the United States and its partners went well beyond what was
necessary to counter the Soviet threat. As the historian Geir Lundestad has observed, the expanding American
political order in the half century after World War II was in important respects an "empire by invitation."(n5) The
remarkable global reach of American postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of European
and Asian governments to harness U.S. power, render that power more predictable, and use it to overcome their
own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security
partnerships.
Even though the U nited S tates looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it
nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure . Three elements matter most in making
U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America's mature political institutions organized around the
rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon . The pluralistic and
regularized way in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build
long-term , mutually beneficial relations . The governmental separation of powers creates a shared decisionmaking system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or
aggressive moves toward other states . An active press and competitive party system also provide
a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of purpose.
The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over
democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies --policies that do
not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat.
the long term,

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Ext CEAs Key to SOP

CEAs are critical to empower the House and adds credibility to the
policy
This would not only put an unpalatable past behind us, but would lead to more democratic, effective, efficient, and
reliable international lawmaking. Unlike the treaty-making process, a congressional-executive agreement involves
the House. This not only lends the lawmaking process greater legitimacy , as it includes the legislative body
intended to be most representative of the American people . It also precludes the need for
separate implementing legislation for treaties that are either not self-executing or that encroach on the Houses
traditional scope of authorityrequiring, for example, a new appropriation of funds. This in turn leads to more
efficient lawmaking (requiring one step rather than two) and at the same time avoids the awkward
possibility that the Senate would be willing to give its advice and consent to a treaty, but the House would be
unwilling to support legislation to implement it. Moreover, because the lawmaking process would require simple
majority votes in both houses rather than a supermajority vote in one house, it would be less likely to be subject to
the whims of the unrepresentative political extremes that might command thirty-four votes in
commitments once made are more likely to be kept because Congress is likely to have a
greater say in undoing agreements that it has had a hand in making through legislation.
the Senate. And

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Ext CEAs Key to Effective Foreign Policy

CEAs check an isolationist Congress.
Yoo, February 2001 (John C. Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley
School of Law, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive
Agreements, Michigan Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
Once we dispel the notion that the congressional-executive agreement has received the approval of historical
practice or judicial decision, the genuine reason for its modern use comes into focus.
C ongressional- e xecutive
a greement s represented an effort to replace what was seen as an outmoded method for dealing with international
affairs, one established in a world of sailing ships, horse-borne couriers, and muskets, with a more efficient,
democratic process. New Deal legal scholars and their progeny believed that providing the Senate with a checking
role in making international agreements had been a dismal failure. Functionally, the Senate had never assumed the
co-equal role in international negotiations that the Framers had hoped for. n66 The Senate's formal role in
treatymaking had become one of after-the-fact consent, while the President assumed primary responsibility for
setting foreign policy and conducting diplomatic negotiations. Vesting the treaty power partially in the Senate to
achieve secrecy and speed no longer seemed compelling, due to the large size of the Senate, the role of the House
in foreign affairs, and the nature of modern treaties, which no longer demanded such secrecy. Defects in the
Senate's role did not rest just in process. Giving the states a checking role in foreign affairs had led to results that
harmed the national interest. With only a small minority needed to block an international agreement, the treaty
process allowed isolationism to reign over American foreign policy . n67 Some even suspected
that states [*776] would use their voice in the treaty process to win regional or sectional advantages. Sectional
controversy, they asserted, originally had forced the Framers to create the two-thirds requirement for senatorial
approval in the first place. n68 While some might argue that the constitutional difficulty in making treaties
expressed the Framers' bias against international entanglements, the New Deal authors believed that isolationism
was simply a disease that threatened to cripple America in a new, interdependent world. Isolationist Senators , after
all, had blocked American participation in the League of Nations, to which they attributed the failure of the peace,
the rise of Hitler, and the return of world war. New Deal scholars believed that a small minority of Senators should
not be able to use the Constitution to foist their isolationist preferences upon the majority's desire for more
engagement in the world. Adopting a congressional procedure, without a supermajority, would rid
isolationism of its chokehold over American foreign policy .

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CEA Politics 1NC

Treaty ratification drains capital.
Voeten, 12/19/2012 (Erik Peter F. Krogh Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Justice in
World Affairs at Georgetown Universitys Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and
Government Department, Why Has the Obama Administration Secured So Few Treaty
Ratifications?, The Monkey Cage, p. http://themonkeycage.org/2012/12/19/why-has-theobama-administration-secured-so-few-treaty-ratifications/) [MN]
it is indeed hard work to pass treaties is supported by a recent working paper by Judith
Kelley and Jon Pevehouse. Passing a treaty isnt a simple matter of tallying the votes. The Senates agree and
consent process takes away legislative time and political capital that could be used for other ,
The idea that
perhaps more valuable, legislation . This opportunity cost theory yields some interesting and
counterintuitive hypotheses. Presidents should become less likely to advance treaties when their approval ratings
are high and when their party controls the Senate because that is the time when they can pass more valuable
Kelley and Pevehouse find strong support for these patterns in their
analysis with data from 1967-2008.
legislation on domestic issues.

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Politics 2NC
The CP solves the link turns --- the link is only a question of
mechanism. Ratification requires a supermajority while a CEA only
requires a majority which requires less capital. Thats Voeten 12
Prefer our ev because its supported by over forty years of empirical
evidence.
Ratification spends capital on the most polarizing part of the Senate
The supermajority requirement imposed by the Treaty Clause means that treaties that enjoy the support of a strong
majority of the population and its political representatives may still not receive approval. This is all the more true
because the Senate is extremely malapportioned
- far more so today than was the true at the Founding,

or even a century ago. 217 Senators representing only about eight percent of the country's population can halt a
Achieving support of a two-thirds majority also requires playing to the polarized extremes of
the difference in ideological positions of the fiftyfirst vote in the Senate versus the sixty-seventh. If we array the senators in the 109th Congress from most liberal to
most conservative according to a widely used measure of ideological position, we see that in the 109th Congress the
sixty-seventh senator was just over twice as conservative as the fifty-first senator. 220 In the [*1311]
treaty. 218
modern American politics. 219 Consider, by way of illustration,
reverse dimension,
other words,
the sixty-seventh senator was also just over twice as liberal as the fifty-first . In
the supermajority requirement means treaties must gain the support of senators that are twice as
conservative or liberal
as the so-called median voter in the Senate. 221
There is a comparative difference between the plan and the CP

McGinnis, June 2009 (John Stanford Clinton Sr. Professor of Law at Northwestern
University Law School, Medellin and the Future of International Delegation, The Yale Law
A threshold empirical question for the policy wisdom of requiring domestically binding international delegations to
be authorized by treaty is whether in fact the process for consenting to a treaty imposes a higher hurdle [*1752]
and, if so, to what degree. Only by considering that question can we gauge the policy effect of requiring binding
international delegations to be implemented by treaty rather than congressional-executive agreement. Most
it is harder to obtain the two-thirds support in the Senate for an international

agreement than to pass a congressional-executive agreement with the support of both houses of Congress and the
commentators have believed that
President. n156 Indeed, it was an assumption that underlay the long historical effort to permit the congressionalexecutive agreement to be used instead of treaty ratification: proponents believed that the Senate was the
There is also political science support for this

view. The ideological medians of the House and Senate have been quite similar for the last seventy years and their
ideological distributions have not been dissimilar. n158 Thus, assuming that it will be harder to get the vote of a
representative who is more ideologically predisposed to oppose the international agreement at issue, it is likely to be
har der to get the vote of one who is at the sixty-seventh percentile of opposition than
graveyard of important international agreements. n157
one who is at the fifty-first percentile . n159 It should be recognized that the Senate permits
filibusters, making the sixtieth senator rather than the fifty-first senator sometimes pivotal even for ordinary
legislation. n160 Nevertheless, the filibuster is weaker than an express sixty-vote supermajority rule for at least two
reasons. First, senators who engage in a filibuster and thereby prevent legislation from coming to a vote can be
portrayed as obstructionist. n161 Second, as the threat of the so-called nuclear option shows, senators are likely to
deploy the filibuster more cautiously, [*1753] because a majority can get rid of the filibuster rule. n162 Thus, my

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best estimate is that the two-thirds ratification requirement in the Senate would generally represent an
appreciably , but not hugely, higher hurdle for international delegations of domestic power. n163
Treaty ratification costs political capital

Haftel and Thompson, June 2012 (Yoram Department of Political Science at the
University of Illinois-Chicago, and Alexander Department of Political Science at Ohio State
University, Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
International Organizations, p. 8-9) [MN]
Of course, leaders face many political obstacles that are not captured in the formal process of treaty ratification,
and it is important to consider such constraints in addition to the specific hurdles governing treaty ratification. As
one U.S. BIT negotiator explained, it is not just the ratification institutions that Washington takes into account in a
partner, its how freely the government functions.31 Like legislation and other policy initiatives, treaty ratification
entails issue-linkage at the domestic level and often requires the expenditure of finite political
capital , thus the executive must take into account these broader political dynamics when advocating for a treaty.
For example, President Obamas efforts in 2010 to secure Senate ratification of the New START arms control treaty
with Russia were held up by Senate Republicans as part of a broad political strategy, not for reasons related to
national security. Partly for these reasons, and because executives may depend on legislatures and local
governments to implement a treatys provisions, the preferences of other domestic actors matter even when they
do not play a formal role in ratification. Thus the Canadian prime minister often seeks to build a broad base of
support for international treaties32even though no such legal requirement exists.

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Ext Treaties Cost Capital

Ratification trades-off with Obamas agenda.
Yoo, November 2011 (John Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School, Rational Treaties:
Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, Cornell Law
Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
A watching adversary will see that the Presidents political efforts to win legislative approval make it less likely that
the United States is bluffing. The more expensive the audience costs, the less likely that the President has
misrepresented the probability of American victory. The different paths to the approval of an international
agreement allow the United States to send varying signals about private information. While the international
relations literature does not further distinguish audience costs, we can identify two types of information
communicated through the advice-and-consent process. The first is simply the costs of the political effort to secure
Senate or congressional approval. A President will expend political capital to build a majority or
supermajority to approve the agreement, just as the executive will incur costs to convince Congress to pass its
domestic legislative program. Presidents may take time and resources away from other priorities ,
offer legislators favors for their votes, and risk public support to push an international agreement forward.
These costs mirror the costs that Presidents incur to convince Congress to enact their legislative agenda. Political
audience costs send a costly signal, but the nature of the signal itself is not important, only the cost.

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Politics Comparative Evidence

Ratification costs more political capital than a CEA.
Up to this point, there is no difference between the Article II treaty process and the Article I statutory method. The
choice of instruments will not affect the type of information communicated about the probability of winning, but
rather the strength of its credibility beyond the political costs that a President would suffer for misrepresenting
information to Congress. Taking the Article II route requires the President to convince two-thirds of the Senate to
agree to the treaty. A blocking coalition of thirty-four Senators need represent the population of only the smallest
one-third of states by population. This could be as small as 7.4% of the population (the amount of the nations
population contained by the seventeen smallest states), or 22.7 million out of the U.S. population of 307 million in
2009.105 By contrast, the minority needed to block legislation in the Senate can be as small as 16% of the
population (the population of the twenty-five smallest states). The Article I route, by contrast, requires simple
majorities of both the House and Senate. To get through the House, the President need only convince the
representatives of 51% of the majority of the population. To get through the Senate, the President must
only persuade fifty-one Senators, instead of sixty-seven as with an Article II treaty. This assumes that a simple
majority of the Senate does not actually represent 51% of the population. It might. But if the twenty-five smallest
states vote together, enactment of a statute requires the other twenty-five to cooperate84% of the population. In
fact, to take account of Senate rules, a minority opposed to a congressional-executive agreement would need the
votes of only the smallest twenty states, which represent about 10% of the populationenough votes to sustain a
filibuster that would prevent the bill from coming to a vote. Nevertheless,
the President will consume more
political capital to convince the representatives of 93% of the population, via a treaty, rather than the
representatives of 84% of the population, via a statute. In the terminology of our earlier equation, choosing the treaty
process over the congressional-executive route will increase audience costs . That increase will be
equivalent to the
additional political capital needed to win the votes
of 9% of the population
(the difference between 84% of the population for a statute and 93% of the population for a treaty). It may be the
case that this is not a great amount, but the marginal difference allows the United States to increase the cost, and
hence the credibility, of its signal. Treaties thus provide a more credible means for the United States to reveal
private information to its negotiating partner than the enactment of a statute.

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Politics AT: CEAs Link

Comparative evidence --- the CP costs less capital.
Paul 1998 (Joel Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law, The
Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, California Law
The Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate in order to check the President's negotiating power. The
super-majority was a normative requirement that changed the dynamics of the ordinary legislative process. When
the President knows that the agreement can be rejected by any thirty-four senators, he must insist on negotiating
terms that command broad support ; whereas he is not under the same negotiating pressure if
he submits the agreement as a congressional-executive or sole executive agreement. In some respects, the
President's negotiating position may be strengthened if the foreign government knows that the President needs the
votes of two-thirds of the Senate. Often,
it is not
[*726]
easy to persuade a super-majority of
senators to support a treaty. The Constitution creates obstructions to forming treaties for good reasons: both to
protect state law from being readily overturned by foreign agreements and to discourage entangling alliances.
Though the United States plays a larger role in the world today than it did in 1789, there is still wisdom in not
undertaking foreign commitments lightly. When two-thirds of the Senate votes to ratify a treaty, our commitments
have greater credibility. We are more likely to keep commitments that are endorsed by super-majorities and to stay
the course through good times and bad. Finally, because treaties are the supreme law of the land, and are difficult
to change without the participation of the other contracting parties, the Constitution requires two-thirds of the
Senate to ensure that changes in domestic law reflect the will of a broad majority.

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Presidential Power 2NC

CPs strengthens presidential power
Posner, 1/5/2009 (Eric Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago,
Bolton and Yoo on the Treaty Power, p. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_01_042009_01_10.shtml) [MN]
Bolton and Yoo appear to concede that the 2/3 rule is too strong for financial and economic
agreements . They just want to preserve it for agreements that touch on national security or that involve
delegation to international institutions (however, that is what happens with the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism). Certainly, the framers did not make such a distinction, and Bolton and Yoo do not explain why there
should be different rules for different types of treaties.
If the Obama administration can further erode the
Senates role in treatymaking , this will strengthen the presidents hand . John Yoo
thinks that the president has the power, and ought to have the power, to make war, control American troops, and
dominate American foreign policy ; if he can do all that, why shouldnt he also have the power to
make the agreements that Americas foreign policy requires?
That prevents global instability and miscalculation

S outh C hina M orning P ost, 12/11/2000
A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world . For better or worse,
the person who rules the U nited S tates influences events far beyond the shores of his own
country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The
first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the
A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world . The Middle
East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between
China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job.
world.
There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they
would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there
are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that
a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak,
insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be
wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be
constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks
of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict . There are very few
conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the U nited
S tates to use its power deftly and decisively .
US/China war causes extinction

The Straits Times, 6/25/2000 (Regional Fallout: No one gains in a war over Taiwan, p.
Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates
a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between
the US and China.
If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests,
then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries
far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told
the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces
attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the
Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on
fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to
overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine

Chung/Mulholand

17
Europes political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq.
In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal,
could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General
Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War , the US had at
the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The
Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that
US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to
nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later,
Beijing
also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was
short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities .
considering a review of its non first use principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute
for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by
that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the
should that come to pass, we would

see the destruction of civilisation . There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect
country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that
of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above
everything else.
***Perms & Theory***

Chung/Mulholand

18
Perm 2NC Do Both

1. The CP is mutually exclusive --- the U.S. cannot both pass a treaty
and CEA on the same agreement.
Harvard Law Review, June 2001 (Restructuring the Modern Treaty Power, p. Lexis-Nexis)
[MN]
In light of the conceptual developments since the Founding, it is necessary to restructure the treaty power for
modern purposes. The Article II treaty power should no longer be considered the exclusive [*2495] means of
approving international agreements; rather, treaties should be considered fully interchangeable with congressionalexecutive agreements, which are approved by both houses of Congress and the President. n113 Interchangeability
creates two tracks for adopting international agreements: the formal treaty ratification process and the
congressional-executive procedure . This two-track approach provides a rational way to account for
the new threat that modern international agreements pose to domestic federalism. The most justifiable way to
accommodate federalism concerns would be to impose the state sovereignty limits recently recognized by the Court
on agreements approved under the congressional-executive procedure, but not on treaties passed by a Senate
supermajority pursuant to the treaty power.
2. Links to politics --- it magnifies the expenditure of political capital

by passing two separate agreements.

Chung/Mulholand

19
Perm 2NC Do the CP

1. The perm severs ratify
A) Ratification is a process that refers to Article II powers which
require a two-thirds approval in the Senate.
Novak, Spring 2010 (Steven Staff Attorney at the John Marshall Law School Veterans
Support Center & Clinic, Everyone Knows Medellin; Has Anyone Heard of OBrien?, John
Marshall Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
Admittedly, the procedural default rule, which is the focus of the proposed amendment, is mostly unique to
American law. n148 However, the other nations which are parties to the VCCR may be willing to agree to this
proposed amendment because of the incredible amount of foreign nationals that visit and live in the United States
who may be affected. n149 If negotiations are successful, the President may choose to submit such an international
agreement of amendment to the Senate for consent to its ratification . n150 This is known as an Article II
treaty. n151 Another option is to modify the treaty with a Congressional-Executive agreement. n152 These
agreements are international treaties that are concluded by a general or specific act of Congress instead of the
Article II process of ratification . n153 These always have been treated as constitutionally equivalent
to Article II treaties. n154
B) Ratification and CEAs are distinct mechanisms.

Gathii, Spring 2004 (James Assistant Professor at Albany Law School, Insulating Domestic
Policy Through International Legal Minimalism, University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Economic Law, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
Finally, the U.S. makes international legal commitments part of domestic law through Congressional-Executive
Agreements.
and
C ongressional- E xecutive A greement s become effective after being "negotiated by the President
submitted to both houses of Congress for simple-majority approval, rather than to the Senate for
two-thirds approval ." n39 Although they are called Congressional-Executive "Agreements," they are
treated "as the equivalent of the treaty form with respect to supremacy over state or prior federal law." n40 Since
1934, the U.S. has favored Congressional-Executive Agreements over Article II treaties as a way of making trade
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the WTO. n41 In fact,
C ongressional- E xecutive A greement s , as opposed to ratification as required by Article II, Section 2,

have been the preferred form of entering into international trade commitments. n42 The constitutional propriety of
Congressional-Executive Agreements relies on Article I, Section 8, "the broad reach of Congress' power [*20] over
foreign commerce, combined with its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause." n43 An alternative
viewpoint questions the constitutional propriety of Congressional-Executive Agreements and argues that "structural
considerations outside of Article I, 8 limit congressional authority." n44 For example, while the constitution does not
expressly mention any role for the House of Representatives in approving international agreements to which the
U.S. is a party, Professor Tribe argues: the Constitution's enumeration of other instances in which Congress may
give bicameral consent to conduct implicating the nation's foreign relations - is powerful evidence that the Treaty
Clause is not simply an optional alternative to treaty approval by Legislation. Indeed, even where 10 of Article I
grants Congress the power to approve a specifically identified category of agreements and compacts - between or
among the different states, or between states and foreign governments - Congress' approval power extends only to
state agreements that do not qualify as "treaties." n45
2. Severance is a voting issue --- it kills all neg ground and skews
the 1NC strategy. Allowing them to sever moots all negative
strategy
3. CEAs do not require ratification.
Miron 2000 (George, Did the ABM Treaty of 1972 Remain in Force After the USSR Ceased to
Exist in December 1991 and Did It Become a Treaty Between the United States and the
Russian Federation?, American University International Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]

Chung/Mulholand

20
n51. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 30 n.6 (1982) (citations omitted) (holding that agreements to protect
U.S. nationals on military bases abroad did not require Senate approval, but limiting its holding to construing a
statute); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-82 nn.8-10 (1981) (discussing the President's ability
to settle claims by executive agreement without congressional approval); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). An "Executive Agreement" or a "Sole-Executive Agreement"
is made between the United States and another state without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, and
without the consent of a majority of both Houses of the Congress. If the Agreement has received the consent of a
majority of both Houses of Congress, it is called a " Congressional-Executive Agreement ." The Court
has explained that an agreement of that nature, though sometimes called a "treaty," is not a treaty "possessing the
dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate of the U nited S tates..." See B. Altman & Co. v.
U nited S tates, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (examining the constitutionality of import duties as resulting from a
reciprocal trade agreement concluded between the President and France); see also Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 29 ("the
word "treaty' has more than one meaning."); Regan, 453 U.S. at 679-84 (1981); Pink, 315 U.S. at 225; Belmont, 301
U.S. 324. No case has been presented to a court, however, to decide whether an arms-control treaty can
constitutionally be made by the President acting alone or with the consent only of a majority of both Houses.
4. The core question about the TBHA is ratification or CEA.

Seelke, 1/29/2013 (Clare Ribano Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional
Research Service, Mexico and the 112th Congress, Congressional Research Service, p.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf)
the governments of the U nited S tates and Mexico announced the Transboundary
Hydrocarbons Agreement.122 The agreement is a step toward clarifying relations between the two countries with
On February 20, 2012,
respect to managing resources in portions of the Gulf of Mexico that straddle their international marine border.123
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the Trans-boundary agreement as an example of recent U.S.Mexican efforts to develop a sustainable energy trading relationship. Before the agreement can take effect, both
countries must review and accept it. The Mexican Senate approved the agreement on April 12, 2012, and the
Mexican Presidency completed all other domestic requirements to implement the agreement on May 22, 2012.124
Steps toward U.S. review and acceptance are currently underway with the Department of State taking lead
responsibility for addressing questions about the agreement during this process.
A procedural question
has emerged with respect to what actions are needed for the agreement to be accepted in the U nited S tates.
At issue is whether the agreement should be entered in the form of a treaty (in which case it would need
to be submitted to the Senate and approved by a two-thirds majority) or a Congressional-Executive
Agreement
(in which case congressional authorization would take the form of a statute passed by a majority
of both Houses).
5. Aff plan wording checks --- they could have said CongressionalExecutive Agreement in the plan but they chose to say ratify.
Allowing this perm kills pre-round prep and makes the aff a moving
target. Thats a voting issue for fairness and education.
6. The CP is an alternative policy mechanism to ratification.
Kreczko, 11/25/1996 (Alan Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the
National Security Council, Validity of Congressional-Executive Agreements that Substantially
Modify the United States Obligations Under an Existing Treaty, p.
http://www.justice.gov/olc/treaty.top.htm) [MN]
24
In light of such judicial and historical precedents , the General Counsel to the Clerk of the House
of Representatives concluded that "the U nited S tates may appropriately choose to negotiate an arms accord in the
form of a Congressional-Executive agreement, and approve it by legislation, as an alternative to treaty
ratification ." Memorandum to the Honorable Dante B. Fascell, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
from Steven R. Ross, General Counsel to the Clerk, and Charles Tiefer, Deputy General Counsel to the Clerk, Re:
Congressional Approval of an Arms Control Agreement by Legislation Rather than Treaty Ratification (May 23, 1985),

Chung/Mulholand

21
reprinted in 134 Cong. Rec. 7323 (1988). See also Memorandum to Ambassador Kampelman, Counselor, from
Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, Re: Form of submission of arms control agreements (Apr. 14, 1988),
reprinted in 134 Cong. Rec. 7324 ("Neither the [Arms Control and Disarmament Act] nor the Constitution dictates
which of these two options the President should exercise with respect to a particular [arms control] agreement," but
noting that "[w]ith one exception, the significant arms control agreements of the past few decades have all been
submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate as treaties.").

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22
Ext Ratify = Competition

Ratification is distinct from a CEA
Howe 2005 (Angela, United States v. Martignon & KISS Catalog v. Passport International
Products: The Anti-bootlegging Statute and the Collision of International Intellectual Property
Law and the United States Constitution, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis)
[MN]
Congress or the President can invoke the treaty power even when the agreement is not an official treaty.
Even
though TRIPs was approved as a C ongressional- E xecutive A greement (requiring simple majorities of both
as opposed to formal treaty ratification (requiring two-thirds of Senate approval),
the Supreme Court has recognized that Congressional-Executive Agreements may "pass constitutional muster ." n117
Houses of Congress)
In fact, only approximately five percent of all the international agreements entered into by the United States are
submitted to the Senate for advice [*849] and consent. n118 The President usually passes international
agreements that explicitly or implicitly follow on to a prior treaty without obtaining further approval from the
Senate. n119 The TRIPs obligations are part of a continuing body of integrated international intellectual property
law that began over 100 years ago with the Berne Convention. The Constitution itself implies the validity of
alternative types of international agreements, n120 and further, the practice of entering into international
agreements while foregoing the formal treaty process is a long-standing tradition in U.S. history and reflects the
practical accommodation of the mandates of foreign affairs. Finally, the URAA did receive two-thirds of the Senate's
vote. n121 Thus, the URAA should be regarded as a legitimate implementation of treaty obligations.
UNCLOS advocates prove its distinct.

Smith 2010 (Angelle Associate at Covington & Burling L.L.P., Frozen Assets: Ownership of
Arctic Minteral Rights Must Be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War, George Washington
International Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
UNCLOS supporters are beginning to look at alternative methods to adopt the
treaty in lieu of traditional Senate ratification . n163 One such non-traditional method would
In the face of this Senate inaction,
involve the use of a Congressional-Executive Agreement. n164
A C ongressional- E xecutive A greement is an
alternative to treaty ratification where both the House and the Senate approve a treaty by a majority,
rather than a two-thirds Senate approval. n165 While the constitutionality and feasibility of the CongressionalExecutive Agreement to ratify a treaty are outside the scope of this Note, the argument demonstrates the
seriousness of the lack of ratification.

Chung/Mulholand

23
Perm 2NC AT: Ratify = Approval

Ratification does not simply mean approval.
Cerone 2008 (John Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International
Law and Policy at New England School of Law, Making Sense of the U.S. Presidents
Intervention in Medellin, Suffolk Transnational Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
In light of the recent judgment in the Medellin case on March 25, 2008, n67 the Symposium authors have all been
invited to revise their contributions. While I am disappointed by the majority's disregard for Avena and, in particular,
its narrowing of the doctrine of self-execution, n68 I am heartened by the Supreme Court's rejection of the U.S.
President's position, as well as an improvement in its use of treaty terminology . n69

[Footnote]
n69. The majority, however, still slips up in places, referring to Congressional approval as " ratification "
and using the term "signatory" when it means "party."
Prefer our evidence --- it puts ratification in the context of

international agreement instead of dictionary defintions.

Chung/Mulholand

24
Ext Difference Between CEA and Treaty

CEAs are legislative statutes and treaties are executive acts.
Recall the constitutional difference between treaties and congressional-executive agreements. Treaties are executive
acts - hence the location of the advice-and-consent clause in Article II alongside the similar provision for the
appointment of executive branch officers. The location of the treaty power in Article II was an important piece of
evidence for the courts in Goldwater in agreeing that the President could terminate treaties and that the courts had
no authority to review the decision. n128 The constitutional argument for presidential termination of treaties mimics
the argument for presidential removal of subordinate officers. While the Senate must consent to the appointment of
major officers of the government, the Constitution remains silent about their removal. The Constitution has been
understood to grant removal to the President, except in certain circumstances, because the Senate's consent is a
specific exception to what would have been a general executive power to both appoint and remove unilaterally.
Similarly, the Constitution is silent about treaty termination, but the lower courts have read it as remaining with the
President because the Senate's advice-and-consent role is a specific exception to a general executive authority to
Congressional-executive agreements, by contrast, are statutes . They are

passed using the same process as other laws enacted within Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers . They combine
make or terminate treaties. n129
the approval of [*37] the international agreement with the necessary domestic implementing legislation. As with
removal or treaties, the Constitution only sets out the process for the affirmative enactment of a statute. Article I
does not explicitly address the negative act of terminating the law. Unlike removal or treaties, however, the
Constitution has not been understood to allow for alternate methods for reversing an earlier statute. If Congress or
the President wants to terminate a federal law, they must enact a second law overriding the first. One exception
might be judicial review, but a court's striking down of a federal law conceptually amounts to no more than judicial
refusal to enforce a law, rather than the actual removal of the law from the U.S. Code. Generally, statutes must be
reversed by later-in-time statutes.

Chung/Mulholand

25
Process CPs Good 2NC

1. Education forces the aff to research and defend particular
mechanisms instead of glossing over the details.
2. Decision-making Congress cannot both ratify a treaty and pass a
CEA on the same issue --- only the CEA CP helps make that choice.
3. Core question especially true for the TBHA
Seelke, 1/29/2013 (Clare Ribano Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional
Research Service, Mexico and the 112th Congress, Congressional Research Service, p.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf)
the governments of the U nited S tates and Mexico announced the Transboundary
Hydrocarbons Agreement.122 The agreement is a step toward clarifying relations between the two countries with
On February 20, 2012,
respect to managing resources in portions of the Gulf of Mexico that straddle their international marine border.123
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the Trans-boundary agreement as an example of recent U.S.Mexican efforts to develop a sustainable energy trading relationship. Before the agreement can take effect, both
countries must review and accept it. The Mexican Senate approved the agreement on April 12, 2012, and the
Mexican Presidency completed all other domestic requirements to implement the agreement on May 22, 2012.124
Steps toward U.S. review and acceptance are currently underway with the Department of State taking lead
responsibility for addressing questions about the agreement during this process.
A procedural question
has emerged with respect to what actions are needed for the agreement to be accepted in the U nited S tates.
At issue is whether the agreement should be entered in the form of a treaty (in which case it would need
to be submitted to the Senate and approved by a two-thirds majority) or a Congressional-Executive
Agreement
(in which case congressional authorization would take the form of a statute passed by a majority
of both Houses).
4. Neg ground process CPs check 2AC add-ons and unpredictable

aff strategy
5. Promotes aff responsibility otherwise the aff wont scrutinize
their plan text because they dont have to answer the best CPs.
6. Depth over breadth its better to learn about the intricacies of
particular policy than to gain superficial knowledge about hundreds
of DAs.
7. Aff choice checks they chose to word their plan to say ratify
and implement which makes this CP predictable
8. Err neg the aff speaks first and last and choose the plan
9. Reject the argument not the team.
***Solvency***

Chung/Mulholand

26
Solvency 2NC
The counterplan passes the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement
as a statute instead of ratifying it. Thats Geohagen 2007.
CEAs are indistinguishable from the aff --- scholars agree
Despite the fact that the constitutional text includes a specific Treaty Clause but no other means to enter into
international agreements,
a broad intellectual consensus exists that congressional-executive
agreements may serve as full substitutes for treaties . As Professor Louis Henkin, the dean of American
foreign relations law scholars, writes, "it is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is
available for wide use , even general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty ." n6 Declares
the Restatement (Third) of United States Foreign Relations Law: "The prevailing view is that the CongressionalExecutive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance ." n7
Under this theory of "interchangeability," congressional-executive agreements and treaties are
indistinguishable from one another , with the result that the former may enjoy all of the benefits that
accrue to the latter, despite the easier method for enacting statutes. Rather than a supermajoritarian barrier to
international agreement-making, the Treaty Clause becomes merely an alternative method for making contracts
with other nations. According to this logic, President Bush could now resubmit the Test-Ban Treaty to Congress for
approval by majority vote, and President Wilson could have brought the United States into the League of Nations
through a statute, even after the defeat of both agreements in the Senate. Few constitutional provisions seem so
easily evaded.
CEAs send a stronger signal --- the plan can be rolled back.
a President who wishes to withdraw from a congressional-executive agreement must convince a majority of
Congress to consent. And the supermajority nature of enactment works against breaking the
Hence,
international commitment . The President needs not only 51% of the House, but also fifty-one Senators.
If the twenty-five smallest states oppose terminating the congressional-executive agreement, the President may
need to persuade Senators who represent as much as 84% of the population to consent. And, taking into account
the Senate filibuster rule, the President may even need to win over Senators who represent as much as 90% of the
nations population. That is not quite the 93% needed for two-thirds of the Senate, but a high political cost
nonetheless. The difference between treaty and statutory termination allows the United States to send signals of
varying credibility about its commitment to keep an international promise. Tr eaties will send a lesser signal of
commitment than c ongressional- e xecutive a greement s because of the Presidents power to unilaterally
terminate the former . The Presidents main domestic cost will arise from opposition political parties and
interest groups that support the policies in the treaty. A President would suffer those same costs in terminating a
congressional-executive agreement, but he must go to the greater effort of assembling majorities in both the House
and Senate. These audience costs could be significant, especially if opposition aligns along differences in state
geography or population. The additional political resources required to terminate a statute provides a credible
signal , at the time of the signing of the international agreement , of commitment.
Only the CP assures investors --- turns the aff (Pemex)


Chung/Mulholand

27
Congressional-executive agreements, by contrast, would prove better suited for situations where the U nited
S tates has less need to reveal private information and more need to show a credible commitment .
Economic agreements could fall into this category . As argued earlier, there may be little
private information that needs to be revealed to reach an agreement. Commitment, however, may prove the more
difficult challenge . Trade agreements will encourage investments, such as in manufacturing plants or
distribution and retail facilities, to take advantage of reduced tariffs and other trade barriers. Private actors,
however, will have some reluctance to invest if they are unsure about the long-term commitment of
the U nited S tates to the agreement. Making it more difficult for the President to terminate a trade
agreement will increase confidence that the U nited S tates will comply with its obligations.

Chung/Mulholand

28
Ext Rollback Turn

CEAs signal stronger commitment --- the plan will just be rolled back
C ongressional- e xecutive a greement s create more reliable international commitments than
do
Article II treaties. This is an important and perhaps surprising advantage. It is important because the central
purpose of an international agreement is to commit states to act in ways consistent with the agreement . It may
be surprising, because, as just argued, the bar in Congress is generally higher for Article II treaties - which might be
thought to create a stronger assurance of political durability. Indeed, the very limited scholarship on the issue to
date has argued that, because of this higher bar, treaties do in fact create a stronger commitment . 236 That
scholarship is misguided . Fixated on vote thresholds in the Senate, it has missed the two core
reasons why congressional-executive agreements create stronger commitments than do Article II treaties: their
stronger domestic legal status and their more stringent rules regarding withdrawal
from an enacted agreement .
There is a beneficial side effect of a move away from Article II treaties
avoiding commitments that are unenforceable or that

the President might withdraw from without congressional involvement also promises to bring better balance to the
exercise of authority by Congress and the President over international lawmaking, while at the same time more
toward congressional-executive agreements. As we shall see,
effectively protecting the House's traditional scope of authority.

Chung/Mulholand

29
Ext Same Signal

A CEA will be perceived the exact same as the aff
Hastings, 6/6/2013 (Doc U.S. House of Representatives Chairman of the Committee on
Natural Resources, Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements
Authorization Act, p. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113hrpt101/pdf/CRPT-113hrpt101pt1.pdf) [MN]
The situation has been further complicated by the control of the Mexican oil market by Mexicos national oil
company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), and Mexicos pre-2008 prohibition on foreign oil and gas companies
operating within Mexican territory. However, while investment is now permitted, there remains a possibility that
Mexico will pass laws which are inconsistent with U.S. interests, and U.S. companies must be protected from this.
According to Duncan Wood, Director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Mexico ratified the Agreement as a treaty in April 2012, despite some opposition, who, prior to reviewing the final
details of the Agreement, portrayed it as selling out to the U.S. That said, the Calderon Administration largely
supported the finalization of the Agreement given PEMEXs longstanding troubles in its deep water endeavors.
Additionally, current Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, whose six-year term began in December 2012, has
indicated his intention to promote legislative changes to allow private companies to partner with PEMEX. Some have
viewed this push for collaboration as a clear signal that Mexico wishes to enhance its deep water production given
the U nited S tates vast success in the Gulf of Mexico OCS. The Obama Administration has decided to enact this
Agreement as a C ongressional- E xecutive A greement, rather than a treaty , which requires a simple
majority in both houses of Congress rather than a 2/3 majority in the Senate. Despite the difference in
approval methods , the Agreement has the same status under international law as Mexicos
ratification.

Chung/Mulholand

30
Ext CEA = Same as Treaties

CEAs are indistinguishable from treaties
In both cases, the international agreement received support from a majority of the Senators, but failed to reach the
two-thirds supermajority required by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution. n2 The failure of the Versailles Treaty
resulted in a shattering defeat for President Wilson's vision of a new world order, based on collective security and
led by the United States. Rejection of the Test-Ban Treaty amounted to a major setback for the Clinton
administration's arms control policies and its efforts to promote American participation in international efforts at
regulatory cooperation. In both cases, presidents raised the concern that a minority of the Senate could frustrate an
internationalist American foreign policy and thereby turn the nation toward isolationism . According
to most international law scholars and authorities, however, both presidents easily could have evaded the Treaty
Clause by submitting their international agreements as statutes . Instead of navigating Article II's advice-and-consent
process, presidents have sent many international agreements to both houses of Congress for simple majority
approval. Known as c ongressional- e xecutive a greement s , these instruments are indistinguishable
under international law from treaties in their ability to bind the U nited S tates to international obligations. Several
recent agreements of significance , such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") n3 and the
World Trade [*759] Organization (" WTO") agreement, n4 have undergone this statutory process. Not surprisingly,
presidents have favored this easier route to making international agreements. While in the first fifty years of
American history, the nation concluded twice as many treaties as nontreaty agreements, since World War II the
nation has concluded more than ninety percent of its international agreements through a nontreaty mechanism. n5

Chung/Mulholand

31
Solvency 2NC Relations/Commitment

CEAs solve commitment and relations better than the plan
The bottom line is that while there are some similarities between treaties and ex post c ongressional- e xecutive
a greement s
at the time of withdrawal,
the President is on the whole likely to find it more difficult to
withdraw unilaterally from a congressional-executive agreement than an Article II treaty. This is because
Congress can, as part of the legislation authorizing the agreement, commit the country to a certain course of action
even in the absence of a formalized international commitment . A congressional-executive
agreement therefore can create a more reliable commitment than an Article II treaty.
[*1337] The
claim that congressional-executive agreements establish a stronger international commitment than do treaties runs
against the grain of the very limited scholarship on the issue to date. 294 That scholarship is, in my view,
misguided. Though the treaty might appear to require a "higher degree of consensus than is needed to pass an
ordinary law" because it requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate, 295 it is far from clear that a majority vote in the
Senate and House requires any less of a consensus. Moreover, it may be true that foreign governments have in the
distant past been wary of accepting a commitment that is not labeled a "treaty," 296 but it seems unlikely that
wariness would remain once they understand the nature of the legal framework. Indeed, that foreign states have
been entirely willing to enter trade agreements with the U nited S tates where a congressional-executive agreement
was used rather than an Article II treaty suggests that other countries are perfectly willing to accept
agreements concluded outside the Article II process . Moreover, the vast majority of foreign
nations make their own international legal commitments in precisely this way
(that is, through a process

that is identical to that used for domestic lawmaking). 297 It would be passing strange for them to find a similar
process in the United States insufficiently reliable. Replacing treaties with congressional-executive agreements
would make for better international lawmaking in the United States. The process would be more democratically
legitimate, less cumbersome, and less subject to political manipulation , and the U nited S tates
would be able to make more reliable international legal commitments . The next Part turns to
the issue of how [*1338] congressional-executive agreements could come to play this near-exclusive role in U.S.
international lawmaking. Far from insurmountable, the legal and practical issues that this change presents are
eminently manageable. A better process is within reach.
CEAs promote stable relations by preventing termination.
A sharp difference between treaties and congressional-executive agreements lies in enforcement . The two
types of international agreements provide different ways of addressing the absence of an international institution
capable of compelling the parties to obey the agreement or awarding damages for violations. Treaties, for example,
provide more ex ante signals of commitment because more political capital is required to obtain two-thirds of the
Senate to agree than majorities of each House. Congressional-executive agreements, on the other hand, provide
stronger ex post guarantees because of the difficulty in terminating a statute . The latter may lead to
more stable , longer-term cooperation
voting requirements.
than the former, contrary to the initial intuition based on the

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Solvency AT: Must Be a Treaty

The best studies proves that there is no substantive impact to
choosing treaties over CEAs.
Purvis, April 2008 (Nigel vice president of the Nature Conservancy and deputy assistant
secretary of state for Oceans, Environment and Science, and President of Climate Advisers,
Paving the Way for U.S. Climate Leadership The Case for Executive Agreements and Climate
Protection Authority, p. http://www.cleanair-coolplanet.org/documents/Purvis_RFF.pdf)
Some scholars argue that the Constitution should be
interpreted as requiring executive agreements and treaties to occupy separate spheresthat is, we should reserve
What should one make of these historical tendencies?
some international subject matters for treaties and perhaps use congressionalexecutive agreements exclusively in
other areas. On its face, this theory is not unreasonable. On questions relating to foreign affairs, where the text of
the Constitution does not provide clear guidance, the Supreme Court looks to the actual practice of the President
and Congress to help it interpret the Constitution.70
The most complete, current, and persuasive
empirical review of U.S. treaty practice to date finds no persuasive explanation for when
treaties should be used instead of congressionalexecutive agreements based on the subject matter, form, topic, or
any other substantive difference.71 Rather, the study finds that any consistency in classifying certain types of
agreements lies in historical accident and anachronistic tradition , rather than law and
principle.72 Therefore, any existing tendencies to classify certain types of agreements as treaties rather than
executive agreements should not and do not bind the President and Congress going forward .
Empirical data proves CEAs apply to all areas.

Hathaway and Rosalind Dixon, separately, have extended the transformative approach.
Hathaway argues that no subject-matter distinctions remain between treaties and congressionalMore recently, Oona
executive agreements.53 Hathaways empirical data show that congressional-executive agreements have
been used for every subject on which international agreements have been made.54 Eliminating treaties and
relying only on congressional-executive agreements would provide for a more democratic form of lawmaking, reject
the obsolete concerns that originally gave the Senate such an outsized role in treaty making, and produce more
reliable American commitments.55 Although Dixon disagrees with Ackermans theory of constitutional change, she
argues that the Treaty Clause creates high constitutional error costs because changes in population have made it
even harder to ratify a treaty than the Framers intended.56 In interchangeability, Dixon writes, Congress has in
fact succeeded in using ordinary legislative means to update constitutional meaning (i.e., the supermajority voting
rule found in Article II).57 For Ackerman and Golove, Hathaway, and Dixon, President Woodrow Wilson could have
resubmitted the Treaty of Versailles, after its rejection by the Senate in 1919 by one vote, for approval by a simple
majority of both houses of Congress.

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Solvency AT: Doesnt Apply to TBHA

CEAs can be applied to any area of law
This summary of the empirical evidence calls into question the claims of both sides of the interchangeability debate .
Scholars who argue that congressionally authorized executive agreements and treaties are (and ought to be) fully
interchangeable fail to accurately describe both the past and present practices of the United States. Though there
are some areas of law in which treaties and congressionally authorized executive agreements are today used
interchangeably, there are also significant areas that are dominated almost entirely by one process or the other. By
ignoring the distinct uses to which the two different processes for making international law are put, those who favor
interchangeability undermine confidence in their accounts. And in seeing the world as they wish it to be, they fail to
recognize that the continuing use of the Treaty Clause has had a disproportionately large effect on U.S. participation
in some areas of international law - including human rights - while leaving other areas entirely unaffected. Yet
those who argue that the two processes are not interchangeable (and ought not to be) also miss important
parts of the story . These scholars correctly note that the Treaty Clause and congressional-executive
agreements are not treated as fully interchangeable. They err, however, in providing an incomplete picture of
current practices in the United States. They fail to acknowledge, for instance, that the instruments are both used
in
several areas of law . They also attempt to shoehorn the patterns of practice that they detect into reasoned
they fail analytically to provide a coherent
normative account that justifies the different uses to which the two processes are put. For example, Yoo's claim that
theories of constitutional law that simply do not fit the facts. And finally,
congressionally authorized executive agreements are used exclusively for agreements that fall within Congress's
Article I powers whereas treaties are used for agreements that extend beyond Article I is contradicted by the
evidence.
There is little evidence that the two instruments are used exclusively in certain areas of law , much
less in the constitutionally guided manner that Yoo suggests.
Quite the contrary: in many areas of
international law - including investment, maritime matters, education, nuclear safety and technology,
judicial and criminal assistance, and trade - Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements are used
side-by-side . Moreover, areas of law in which Article II treaties are used extensively, including human rights,
dispute resolution, arms control, aviation, the environment, labor, consular relations, taxation, and
telecommunications, [*1271] almost never extend beyond Congress's Article I powers. If agreements on human
rights, labor, and taxation were beyond Congress's Article I powers, then the Civil Rights Acts, the Labor
Department, and the Internal Revenue Service would seem to be unconstitutional exercises of federal power as
well.

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Solvency AT: Not Binding

CEAs are legally binding --- they empirically work.
Guymon 2012 (Carrie Lyn Office of the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of
State, Digest of United States Practice in International Law,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/211955.pdf) [MN]
Let me start with treaties. Even in this age of legislative near-deadlock, treatiesin the constitutional, Senate
advice and consent senseremain an integral part of our international lawmaking practice. Article II of the
Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties, subject to the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate, and the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, makes those treaties the supreme law of the land. But in modern
times, Article II treaties have never been the only option. The longdominant view in the Academy
articulated by my late Yale colleague Myres McDougal and Asher Lans in the Yale Law Journal as far back as 1945
has
been that treaties and congressional-executive agreements are in fact interchangeable , legally available
options for binding the U nited S tates in its international relations. At the same time, a governmental practice has
arisen of doing certain types of agreements by treaty: for example, extradition, human rights, membership in
international organizations, and arms control matters. Other forms of international lawmaking have traditionally
been done by congressional-executive agreement. For example, free-trade agreements have traditionally been
entered into with the ex post approval of Congress expressed through subsequent legislation.

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Solvency AT: Rollback

1. Fiat should be durable --- otherwise inherency proves the plan
would be repealed.
2. CEAs lock-in commitments
Stone 2002 (Christopher Associate at Sullivan & Cromwell, George Washington
International Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
the difficulty of repealing a congressional-executive agreement reinforces the idea that the political
branches have forged a durable consensus on the wisdom of a given signal. The President can withdraw
Similarly,
from a treaty unilaterally, without congressional consent . 191 But while no court has tested the
proposition,
the President probably cannot unilaterally terminate congressional-executive
agreements . Congressional-executive agreements are international accords that the President has submitted
for congressional approval as statutes. That is, congressional-executive agreements represent a form of lawmaking.
192 Since Congress can repeal existing laws only by passing new legislation , 193 presumably Congress must pass a
new law to repeal a congressional-executive agreement. Thus, the United States can withdraw from treaties
relatively easily, but
withdrawal from congressional-executive agreements requires cooperation by
both political branches . For example, when the 100th Congress passes a congressional-executive
agreement, it becomes difficult for the 101st Congress to undo its handiwork . The use of
congressional-executive agreements also reduces the possibility of a capricious President
withdrawing
haphazardly
from international commitments. Presumably Congress will enmesh the country in a
congressional-executive agreement only in two cases: first, when the Constitution so requires because the [*354]
treaty touches upon Congress' Article I powers; or second, when Congress wishes to underscore the unwavering
nature of American commitment. In other words, entrenched congressional-executive agreements must signal
learning, rather than tactical adaptation or routine policy changes.

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36
Solvency AT: Rollback (Courts)

No rollback --- it will be upheld
Paul 1998 (Joel Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law, The
Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, California Law
since the advent of the Cold War federal and state courts have treated both sole
executive agreements and congressional-executive agreements as functional equivalents to Article II
With these few exceptions,
treaties for purposes of state and federal law. n456 In some cases, courts have held that sole executive
agreements are "treaties" for purposes of interpreting a treaty exception clause in a federal statute. n457 Other courts
[*760] have held that executive agreements, like treaties, may effectively supersede federal law . For
example, courts have held that sole executive agreements can be used to transfer property held by the U.S.
Government to a foreign government, n458 deny U.S. nationals the benefits of claims against foreign governments,
n459 and exempt foreign income of U.S. nationals from U.S. income tax. n460 Similarly, congressional-executive
agreements have been interpreted by courts, inter alia, to afford substantive rights and remedies to inhabitants of
the Pacific Trust Territories, n461 to preclude the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act abroad, n462 and to
permit the Palestine Liberation Organization to maintain its U.N. office contrary to federal statute. n463 These
judicial opinions evidenced a profound change in the understanding of executive agreements. Despite the claim by
some scholars that GATT was sui generis, GATT had become a persuasive precedent for the general proposition that
executive agreements could function like Article II treaties for purposes of domestic law. The expansion of the
executive agreement power reflected a broader shift of authority from Congress to the President over foreign
relations, as we have [*761] already seen. The courts used the same justificatory discourse to defend this power
shift, but GATT cases illustrate the transparency of that justification. The courts deferred to the executive's
characterization of geopolitical relations, even where the executive defied common sense. This suspension of
disbelief represented a collective fantasy about our relationship to the world.

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37
Solvency AT: Weak Signal

1. The CP is compared to the status quo not the plan --- the CEA will
send a sufficient signal
2. CEAs signal stronger commitment --- the plan will just be rolled
back
C ongressional- e xecutive a greement s create more reliable international commitments than
do
Article II treaties. This is an important and perhaps surprising advantage. It is important because the central
purpose of an international agreement is to commit states to act in ways consistent with the agreement . It may
be surprising, because, as just argued, the bar in Congress is generally higher for Article II treaties - which might be
thought to create a stronger assurance of political durability. Indeed, the very limited scholarship on the issue to
date has argued that, because of this higher bar, treaties do in fact create a stronger commitment . 236 That
scholarship is misguided . Fixated on vote thresholds in the Senate, it has missed the two core
reasons why congressional-executive agreements create stronger commitments than do Article II treaties: their
stronger domestic legal status and their more stringent rules regarding withdrawal
from an enacted agreement .
There is a beneficial side effect of a move away from Article II treaties
avoiding commitments that are unenforceable or that

the President might withdraw from without congressional involvement also promises to bring better balance to the
exercise of authority by Congress and the President over international lawmaking, while at the same time more
toward congressional-executive agreements. As we shall see,
effectively protecting the House's traditional scope of authority.

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38
Solvency AT: CEAs Bad

CEAs happen a lot --- the DA is non-unique.
Congressionalexecutive agreements have become a vital tool of American foreign policy and have surpassed
These opinions attempt to catch up to, rather than radically change, constitutional practice.
treaties in terms of frequency . After World War II, the United States entered a period of rapid agreement
making, entering into as many as 450 agreements per year as compared with the less than fifty per year before
World War II.6 According to the Congressional Research Service, nontreaties are responsible. Congressional-
executive agreements, for example, accounted for 88.3% of all international agreements between
1946 and 1972.7 From 1939 to 1989, the nation entered into 11,698 nontreaty international agreements and only 702
Article II treaties.8 Oona Hathaway reports that from 1980 to 2000 the U nited S tates made 2744
congressional-executive agreements and only 375 treaties.9 Congressional-executive agreements
not only are numerous, but also bear on subjects of great importance to the American national interest. The North
American Free Trade Agreement10 (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements,11 the two most
recent prominent examples, regulate roughly one-quarter of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) related to
imports or exports.12

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Shale Disadvantage

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40
Shale DA 1NC
Russia perceives the shale revolution as confined and limited
McKeigue, 7/8/2013 (James reporter for Oil and Gas Investor, How to profit from the shale
revolution in Latin America, Money Week, p. http://moneyweek.com/new-world-how-to-profitfrom-the-shale-revolution-in-latin-america/)
What do
the Russian government and Greenpeace have in common? They both fear the spread of
Americas shale gas revolution . The former worries that if shale takes off elsewhere it will weaken
its position in the market , while the latter dreads the supposed environmental consequences of global
shale production. Im sure you have all heard about shale gas by now, but just to recap, shale gas is natural gas
trapped within shale rock formations. Over the past decade, new drilling methods and a process called hydraulic
fracturing (fracking), which involves pumping a mix of pressurised water, sand and chemicals underground to
crack underground rocks and free the gas. Producers now have access to gas that was once uneconomic to extract.
So far the shale revolution has been largely confined to the US , where there is so much of the stuff,
there has been a glut. This has helped to drive prices of natural gas to new lows in recent years. But attempts to
launch it elsewhere have failed . For example, after wasting millions of dollars drilling failed wells in Poland
supposedly Europes best shale prospect ExxonMobil pulled out of the country last year. Fracking is not without
its risks In the US, the shale revolution has been nothing short of a miracle. And it promises to grant energy
independence to the worlds biggest oil importer. Indeed, thanks to shale, the US is set to overtake Russia as the
worlds biggest gas producer in 2015 and Saudi Arabia as the worlds biggest oil producer by 2020. The energy
transformation is boosting Americas economy and giving the government new geopolitical strength. Its even
helped to cut the countrys C02 emissions as the countrys power plants switch from coal to gas. So, why arent
other countries following suit? Well, like most miracles, shale energy comes with several strings attached. The
extraction technique, fracking, involves pumping millions of litres of water and chemicals at high pressure to
fracture underground rock formations to release trapped gas. And not everyone is prepared to do it. For example,
the French have banned it over fears that it may contaminate underground aquifers. In the relatively densely
populated UK, Nimbyism threatens to slow fracking development, as local communities recoil against the idea of
heavy industry despoiling quiet rural spots. Even in places like China, where the government is often prepared to
ignore environmental worries or Nimbyism, shale gas is far from certain. In this instance, the problem is water
scarcity. China has the worlds biggest shale gas reserves and it could sustain a widespread fracking campaign. But
experts are uncertain if fracking will take off there. But
Russian oil ministers and Greenpeace activists cant
breathe easy just yet . Because Latin America has the perfect conditions for shale gas
and
Ive found one company that looks like its about to spark the revolution over there.
The plan exports the shale revolution to Mexico.

Karl, 5/7/2013 (David president of the Asia Strategy Initiative, board of counselors of
Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, former director of studies at the Pacific Council on
International Policy, Time for a North American Energy Initiative, Monsters Abroad, p.
http://monstersabroad.wordpress.com/2013/05/07/time-for-a-north-american-energyinitiative/)
Mexico possesses energy reserves so large that they rival Kuwaits and it is the third-largest oil supplier
(following Canada and Saudi Arabia) to the United States.
Sitting on top of what may be the worlds fourth-
largest reserves of shale gas , it is also well positioned to benefit from the shale revolution.
Yet due to
nationalistic restrictions that shut out foreign capital and technology, PEMEX has experienced sharp production
declines in recent years and is unable to exploit deep-water reserves in the Gulf of Mexico or onshore resources
that require hydraulic fracturing (fracking) to extract. Indeed, a Baker Institute report two years ago warned that
without major new investments in exploration and production the company could lose its entire capacity to export
crude oil within a decade. PEMEXs new head sees shale development as a key to the countrys economic future
but
acknowledges that foreign partnerships are a critical factor . The regional payoff would be profound if
Mexico is able to replicate the energy renaissance now unfolding in the other NAFTA countries and act in concert
with them to maximize its benefits. A recent Citigroup report argues that surging oil and natural gas output in the
three countries will eventually turn the global geopolitics of energy on its head and that the growing continental
surplus of hydrocarbons points to North America effectively becoming the new Middle East by the next decade. A
study by the Manhattan Institute concurs, noting that the total North American hydrocarbon resource base is more
than four times greater than all the resources extant in the Middle East. It also estimates that a NAFTA-style

Chung/Mulholand

41
collaboration in the hydrocarbon sector could yield as much as $7 trillion in value to the North American economy
over 20 years. Prospective gains like these should start policymakers in Washington, Ottawa and Mexico City
thinking in imaginative and cooperative directions. A first step is the implementation of the U.S.-Mexico
T rans b oundary H ydrocarbons A greement (TBHA), signed a year ago and quickly ratified by Mexico but now
awaiting passage by the U.S. Congress.*** The accord will foster joint cooperation in the exploration
and development of oil and gas fields sitting astride the maritime border . But an even more important consequence
might be symbolic sending a concrete message about the advantages of bilateral partnership just as Mexico
begins to debate the Pena Nieto energy reforms.
That creates a perception of Russian decline.

Mead, 5/1/2013 (Walter Russell, US Shale Gas Boom Undermining Putins Gazprom, The
American Interest, p. http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/05/01/us-shale-gasboom-undermining-putins-gazprom/)
In public statements, however,
the Russian company remains defiant
(and perhaps in a state of denial) about
the implications of the shale gas boom: Speaking on state television on March 30, Gazprom Chief Executive Alexei
Miller minimized the impact of gas from U.S. shale fields , extracted using hydraulic-fracturing techniques. He
predicted that it was a bubble that will burst very soon . We are skeptical about shale gas. We dont
see any risks [to us] at all. Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov acknowledged that shale-gas development
does have an impact on contract negotiations. But we dont see any tragedy here.Our main competitive
advantage is that we can guarantee volumes for a long time. Maybe, maybe not. But the immediate impact on
Russia should not be underestimated. Vladimir
Putins plans for reclaiming Great Power status for
Russia are predicated on the countrys continuing strong economic performance, and the energy sector is
key . Gazprom accounts for more than 10 percent of the countrys exports, and hits to its bottom line
this year, the WSJ speculates, will cause Russia to miss Putins target of 5 percent annual growth. Putins hardball
tactics in his near-abroad when Russia was energy top dog were instrumental in confirming him as an authoritarian
bully in the minds of many Westerners. These tactics also inadvertently made Russia more vulnerable to
shifts in the global energy market, with many of its main customers desperately seeking out alternative
suppliers so that they would never find themselves backed into a corner again. So its easy to join the Bulgarians in
gloating over this reversal. But everything in moderation. As weve said before,
a cagey , resentful and
frustrated Russia facing economic decline and increasing powerlessness on the world
stage is good for no one at all.
Nuclear war
Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2002 (Olga Associate Director of the International Security &
Defense Policy Center and Senior International Policy Analyst at Rand Corporation, and
Tanya, Assessing Russia Decline: Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.S.
Air Force, p. 97-98)
Given Russia's conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of
nuclear weapons use , and Russia's demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic
with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia's civilian and military
nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of
weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of
Russia's nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising
serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict
internal or otherwiseand the general de- terioration that Russia has in common with failing" states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed
Russia can easily affect the interests of the U nited S tates and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the
U nited S tates, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in
and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement.

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43
U 2NC
Russia doesnt perceive the shale gas revolution as a threat --- other
countries have failed to adopt the technology and it has been
confined to the U.S. Thats McKeigue 13
Prefer it because it assumes current perceptions of the shale
revolution.
Russia thinks the shale revolution is declining.
RT, 8/2/2013 (Gazprom CEO: Shale gas not Russias concern this century, p.
http://rt.com/business/medvedev-gazprom-shale-russia-947/)
ALEXANDR
MEDVEDEV (AM): We always are monitoring all the modern tendencies in the gas
and oil market, and other energy markets connected with gas and oil. Its very strange to hear that we have missed
the shale gas revolution. Weve always been involved in accommodating our activities to the market realities, but I
believe that it may be a nice word revolution which these tendencies influence the situation on the American
gas market, and also, indirectly, have a certain influence European markets, but we are not sleeping, we have done
what we believed necessary to be done to stay competitive. RT: So you feel like Russia is not missing out on
anything, as far as shale gas is concerned? AM: First of all, I would not exaggerate the influence of the shale gas on
our activity. Obviously, we should change the approach to the American market, because the target market for our
Shtokman project was the North American market. Now, the US looks to be targeting to be self-sufficient , or
even considering to export energy, but we are well prepared to stay competitive and the events of the current year
are just confirming how we are restoring our competitiveness, which actually was not even damaged. RT: But like
you said, US shale gas production is booming, while European countries prohibit it one by one. Why such extreme
it was booming and now we are seeing a slowdown ,

not only in production but also in the speed of drilling, and many companies are forced to sell their assets in shale
gas production. Actually, with the current level of price in the US, its not possible to have a profitable production in
the majority of shale gas fields. I would like to quote the president of France, who said that as long as hes
president, he will not allow the production of shale gas in France, and there are quite a number of reasons behind
points of view? Why such a difference? AM: In my opinion
this opinion. Im rather sure that the French president was supplied with all the available information about shale
gas potential and problems, and number one is that the cost of production of shale gas in Europe is incomparably
higher than in the US and also the situation with the environment is different, because in the US its main production
is in unpopulated areas, which are quite available in the US, but in Europe we cant find such big unpopulated areas
with reach to the water. We shouldnt also close eyes on the environmental risks involved, and there are quite a
number of disturbing facts associated with production of shale gas. Its not surprising that in Poland all the majors
actually stepped out of the shale gas exploration.
Russia is watching the shale revolution carefully

Global Post, 4/25/2013 (Putin urges Russia to keep eye on shale gas revolution, p.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130425/putin-urges-russia-keep-eye-shalegas-revolution)
Putin urged his government Thursday to be " attentive " about the potential of shale
gas production after the head of energy giant Gazprom denied that an alternative fuel revolution was under way
around the world. Putin told a marathon question and answer session televised live across the nation that there was
Russian President Vladimir
a chance that Russia had "overslept" the new energy craze now sweeping North America and denting Gazprom's
demand. His comments came after the state gas firm's chief Alexei Miller told state media last month that the
"shale revolution" was "a bubble" that would burst soon and that Gazprom did not intend to shift its production
strategy in the years to come. "As to whether Gazprom overslept the shale revolution or not, this is a difficult
question that has no answer yet," Putin said in response to a critical question about Miller's remarks. Putin argued
that Russia had enough natural gas "for now " to keep up the pipeline production that Gazprom has been
selling to European clients and hopes to start exporting to China in greater quantities. He also noted the "enormous"
environmental costs from such projects. But Putin directly contradicted Miller by arguing that it was time for Russia
to look at the shale option -- especially considering the amount of the necessary rock formations found by scientists
across the vast country. "This does not mean that we have completely rejected shale gas. Even international

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44
experts who study this issue say that Russia has enormous prospects in producing shale gas,"
think that we have overslept anything, but we do have to be as attentive as possible
said Putin. "I do not

-- here you are
absolutely right."
Shale is not perceived as a threat --- but an expansion would trigger

decline
W all S treet J ournal, 4/10/2013 (Shale Threatens Russias Economy, p.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323741004578414582783570350.html)
If the "shale breakthrough" expands , it could reduce Russia's forecast exports by as much as 50
That, in turn, could
cause the energy industry's share of Russia's g ross d omestic p roduct to fall from over one-quarter in 2010 to just
million tons a year by 2040, the report said. Russia last year exported 240 million tons of oil.
over
15% by 2040, it said. About half of Russia's federal budget comes from oil and gas .
A spokeswoman for the Energy Ministry had no immediate comment on the report. Russia's largest oil company,
OAO Rosneft, also had no immediate comment. Russian officials have berated gas monopoly OAO Gazprom OGZPY
+0.77% in recent months for reacting slowly to changes in the global market brought about by soaring shale-gas
production in the U.S. Gazprom saw exports to its most lucrative market, Europe, drop nearly 10% last year, as
power generators switched to cheap coal that was pushed out of the U.S. by even-cheaper shale gas. U.S. crude
production surged to its highest daily level for two decades in November, as new drilling techniques unlocked vast
amounts of oil from underground shale-rock formations. The International Energy Agency in November forecast the
U.S. would surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia as the world's largest oil producer in 2020. "Given the United States'
geopolitical significance, it will effectively turn into the most influential player on the global hydrocarbon market,"
the report from the Russian Academy of Sciences said. There are, however, threats to the continued expansion of the
shale-oil boom, the report noted. Recoverable resources could prove to be smaller than expected , while
recovery technology might advance more slowly , it said. In that case, Russia's exports could increase, it
said. In a television interview this month, Gazprom Chief Executive Alexei Miller said the U.S. wasn't a competitor
and called shale gas "a bubble that will soon burst ."

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45
U AT: U.S. Shale N/U

1. The U.S. shale revolution is limited and confined because it has
not been exported. Thats the McKeigue 7/8
2. Prefer issue specific uniqueness --- it assumes U.S. shale and
concludes that Russia is not worried yet.
3. U.S. shale is unsustainable
Ahmed, 6/21/2013 (Nafeez Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research &
Development, Shale gas wont stop peak oil, but could create and economic crisis, The
Guardian, p. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/jun/21/shale-gaspeak-oil-economic-crisis)
Two years ago, following the publication of the EIA April 2011 report a New York Times investigation obtained
internal EIA communications showing how senior officials, including industry consultants and federal energy
experts privately voiced scepticism about shale gas prospects. One internal EIA document said oil companies had
exaggerated "the appearance of shale gas well profitability" by highlighting performance only from the best
wells, and
using overly optimistic models for productivity projections
over decades. The NYT
reported that the EIA often "relies on research from outside consultants with ties to the industry."
The latest EIA
shale gas estimates, contracted to ARI, is no exception . ARI, according to the NYT's 2011 article, has "major
clients in the oil and gas industry" and the company's president, Vello Kuuskraa, is "a stockholder and board
member of Southwestern Energy, an energy company heavily involved in drilling for gas in the Fayetteville shale
formation in Arkansas."
Independent studies published over the last few months cast even more serious
doubt over the viability of the shale gas boom .

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Link 2NC
The plan expands U.S./Mexico collaboration on shale gas technology
--- U.S. firms have the technology and expertise to help Mexico
make the transition. Thats Karl 13.
The plan results in greater cooperation on shale gas.
Rosenberg, 2/27/2013 (Mica, Analysis: Mexico in no rush to exploit shale oil bonanza,
Reuters, p. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/us-mexico-shaleidUSTRE81Q20Q20120227)
Early Pemex studies are more conservative than the EIA estimate and see between 150 and 459 tcf of
shale gas
in five different geological provinces. " Even
in the most conservative scenarios ,
exploiting these shale gas resources could and should spark the development of a national industry
without precedent ," Herrera - who directed Pemex Gas before his current post - said at an event shortly
after taking office. He said the industry could attract investment of between $7 billion and $10 billion a year.
Herrera is confident that Mexico could transform itself from a natural gas importer to a global gas
powerhouse if it taps its shale resources. Without shale, national production of natural gas is only expected to
grow 0.5 percent over the next 15 years, while demand is seen rising 2.5 percent. That would mean expanding
imports at a constant rate of 6.5 percent to keep up, Herrera has said. It is not clear, however, if Pemex is as equally
enthusiastic. The company plans to spend 30.5 billion Mexican pesos ($2.36 billion) on shale exploration over the
next three years, just 2 percent of its requested budget for that same period. The Eagle Ford formation in Mexico's
Burgos basin is by far the most promising with between 27 and 87 tcf of "dry gas" and "liquids-rich" resources,
according to a Pemex presentation seen by Reuters. Mexico reported its first production - 2.9 million cubic feet per
day - from its first shale well Emergente-1 in March last year. By the end of this year three more wells - Montanes-1,
Nomada-1 and Navajo-1 - should be finished. Both Nomada-1 and Navajo-1 are within the region where oil has been
discovered in Southern Texas, the presentation showed. In the Tampico-Misantla region further south, Pemex says
there is possibly light crude in the formations, but no drilling has been done there yet. Mexico would need a
much more aggressive drilling program
to fully understand the scale of its shale resources,
said
Kenneth Medlock, an energy expert at the Baker Institute at Texas' Rice University. "Pemex's exploration and
production projects are focused on traditional offshore fields in the Gulf of Mexico, like Chicontepec, and now deep
waters. Given the limited resources Pemex has, I doubt they will be able to expand to include more things. Right
now, Pemex has other priorities," said Lourdes Melgar, an energy expert at the EGADE Business School in Mexico.
Pemex is eager to move into deeper waters of its Gulf Coast but has little experience
managing the complicated projects. On Monday,
Mexico signed an agreement with the U nited S tates to exploit
resources in the Gulf of Mexico that straddle maritime boundaries opening up the possibility for more
collaboration between U.S. companies and Pemex .
US expertise overcome technical barriers to shale extraction

Wood 2010 (Duncan director of the Mexico Institute, Growing Potential for U.S.-Mexico
Energy Cooperation, Wilson Center, p.
http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wood_energy.pdf)
Mexicos energy establishment, and increasingly it seems, the government, hope that private investment will occur
in unconventional hydrocarbons sector. For Mexico the most interesting plays in the future will be found in the
deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico , in the as yet untapped shale reserves
that are found
throughout the east of the country, and in the geologically-complex fields of Chicontepec, where Pemex has been
consistently failing to meet production targets over the past four years. The application of cutting-edge
technologies and techniques from U.S. firms would likely be important
in all three of these areas,
and the
experience of American firms in shale plays would provide them with an advantage in the event of an
opening in that area. Of particular interest in this regard is the experience of U.S. firms in the hydraulic fracturing
(fracking) business. The ability to extract shale oil and gas in areas that suffer from water shortages (such as Texas)

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47
will be crucial to developing shale resources in Mexico, particularly in the north of the country. In fact existing
knowledge of the geological characteristics of the Eagle Ford formation will also be crucial in exploiting its oil and
gas reserves in Coahuila, where the formation extends. One Mexican company, Alfa, has already worked extensively
with U.S. partners in the shale industry north of the border, and we can expect higher levels of private sector
collaboration to develop. Beyond exploration and production, the pressing need for infrastructure stands out as an
area with high potential for bilateral collaboration. First, it is vital that large scale construction of gas pipelines
occurs, both within Mexico and across the border. Within Mexico, the Calderon administration identified the need for
multi-billion dollar investments in the creation of a truly national gas pipeline network: at the present time the
majority of western portion of the country lacks access to natural gas. Secondly, as was made painfully clear to a
number of private sector industrial consumers during 2012, during times of short supply, the country lacks the
capacity to import extra supplies of gas from the United States due to the limitations of the cross-border pipeline
network. In 2012 this led to complaints from companies that they were unable to secure stable and sufficient
supplies of gas for their manufacturing processes. The second deficit in energy infrastructure can be found in the
refining sector. The much-publicized efforts of the Calderon administration, announced in January 2009, to build a
new refinery at Tula in the state of Hidalgo that was designed to process up to 300,000 barrels a day of Mexican
heavy crude have thus far come to nothing. The project has been repeatedly delayed, first due to problems in
securing the land, then due to bureaucratic problems and political wrangling. At the same time, Mexicos
dependence on imported gasoline has increased in line with rising demand. Mexico therefore needs to find a
solution to this issue in the near future, and one option that presents itself is the example of the Deer Park refinery
complex in Texas where since 1993 Pemex and Shell have worked together in a joint venture to refine 340,000
barrels a day of crude oil. Part of the production of the refinery heads back to Mexico and has become an important
source of income for Pemex as well as helping to satisfy the countrys need for refined products. Lastly, Mexicos
petrochemical sector is in urgent need of investment. For many years now the industry has languished due to a lack
of funds and a lack of direction from the government. Despite encouraging signs of new investment interest in
recent months, the major Mexican petrochemicals project of the last few years, Ethylene XXI, has suffered repeated
delays. When completed in 2015, the project will be a private petrochemical complex for the production of
polyethylene, producing up to one million tons of polyethylene, and replace up to $2 billion worth of imports
resulting in the creation of thousands of jobs. But
and the U.S. shale gas industry
the prospect of huge supplies of cheap gas from Mexico
offers the tantalizing prospect of turning Mexico into a production
and export base for these products , and there will be a major opportunity for joint ventures with
foreign firms.
Cooperation is key to provide Mexico the experience and investment

for shale.
Mead, 4/8/2013, (Walter Russell, Foreign Investors Back US Shale Boom, Ignore Mexico, The
American Interest, p. http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/04/08/mexico-takenote-foreign-investors-invested-in-us-shale/)
The US isnt the only country with shale reserves; many other countries are keen on replicating Americas shale
boom. Mexico might be the country best poised to replicate that success . North American geology
is particularly well-suited to horizontal well drilling . Unfortunately, Mexicos oil monopoly is making
this more difficult than it should be. Energy production at the state-owned Pemex, described as one of the most
inefficient oil companies in the world, has remained stagnant despite the countrys abundant natural resources.
If
Mexico wants to emulate Americas shale industry, its going to need to open itself up to joint ventures
with foreign companies. These companies can support the nascent shale energy industry in Mexico financially and
give Pemex valuable experience in both fracking and horizontal well drilling. Mexico has ambitions to be
the new Middle East, but it cant get there on its own .
Tech transfers solidify Mexicos shale revolution.

Martin, 10/23/2012 (Jeremy director of the Energy Program at the Institute of the
Americas at the University of California, San Diego, Mexico: Shale Gas Becomes Priority,
Latinvex, p. http://latinvex.com/app/article.aspx?id=312)
Mexico's increasing appetite for natural gas particularly for power generation bears mentioning. Indeed, natural gas
is increasingly replacing oil as a feedstock for electric generation in Mexico. Estimates indicate that almost 50
percent of electric capacity additions in Mexico over the next decade will be gas-fired, combined cycle generation.
But all is not lost.
According to the E nergy I nformation A dministration (EIA), Mexico has the second largest shale

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48
gas potential in Latin America and the fourth largest in the world . Mexico counts around 16 trillion
cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas reserves but a 2011 Energy Information Administration (EIA) report indicated that
Mexico has the second largest shale gas potential in Latin America, second only to Argentina and the fourth largest
in the world. The EIA report places Mexico's shale gas potential at 680 TCF. The potential associated with the EIA
figures for shale gas in Mexico has not gone unnoticed by Mexican energy officials. Indeed, some have increasingly
advocated for a "Shale Revolution" of their own and the possibility for shale gas to jumpstart a lagging
petrochemical industry. To wit, some senior government officials have argued that Pemex should create a new
subsidiary focused exclusively on natural gas to spur nascent shale exploration and production, particularly given
that shale gas technology and expertise differ from that of conventional fields. Figures from Mexico's Energy
Ministry indicate that ramping up a shale gas industry could mean investment between $7 billion and $10 billion a
year. And many cite the possibility to jumpstart the petrochemical industry. Moreover, without shale, natural gas
production in Mexico will not keep up with demand. But with shale gas development, Mexico could position itself to
transition from its current status as a natural gas importer to a huge international player
when it comes to natural gas . There are issues that policy makers in Mexico, especially in the incoming
government,
must take into account as they endeavor to seize its shale gas potential . Technology stands
out as a key element for the successful development of shale gas in Mexico. Gaining access to the technology
and know-how necessary to extract the gas in a cost-effective and environmentally secure manner is critical .

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Ext Expertise Key

Expertise provides access to the shale market
Southern Pulse, 7/5/2013 (The Game-Changing Mexico Opportunity, Exchange Traded
Funds Digest, p. https://www.etfdigest.com/myblog/The-Game-Changing-MexicoOpportunity.html)
Mexico has the worlds fourth-largest shale gas reserves. The EIA estimates it has up to 680 trillion cubic feet (tcf).
And the Eagle Ford play extends south of the US border. Not only does Pemex not have the technology to tap into
this shale or to pump deep-water reserves, it also doesnt have the money to focus on onshore explorationits all
tied up offshore. And US natural gas imports are pretty cheap, so theres not enough incentive for Pemex to foot
this bill or try to go it alone.
Strategic partnerships with experienced foreign companies would allow
Pemex to quickly enter those markets , and would be some of the most profitable areas for investors.

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50
Link Nieto Reform

Nietos PEMEX reform results in an influx of shale gas expertise
Pearson and Ramirez, 11/30/2012 (Will director in Eurasia Groups Global Energy and
Natural Resources, and Carlos Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason
University, Mexico the North American shale revolution heads south, Financial Times, p.
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/11/30/guest-post-mexico-the-north-american-shalerevolution-heads-south/#axzz2aglkK8RY)
The North American shale gas revolution, currently confined to the US and Canada, could soon spread south
to Mexico . Political decisions awaiting incoming President Enrique Pea Nieto will shape the timeline for the
development of domestic shale resources. This timeline will in turn have ramifications on energy markets in the US,
as well as the rest of the world. If Pea Nieto successfully opens the sector to private investment, US and Canadian
firms with expertise in exploiting shale oil and gas will rush into Mexico . Nevertheless, regardless of the
trajectory of its shale gas sector, Mexican imports of US shale gas will rise in the immediate future. Pea Nieto
appears set to initiate a needed discussion about Mexicos energy future by pressing for a second energy reform in
less than five years. But to develop indigenous shale resources at a speed that matches Mexicos needs, the
government recognizes that it must open up the domestic upstream sector to private sector participants with
to lure companies with this kind of knowledge, Pea Nieto

must propose a constitutional reform to allow state-owned energy company Pemex to form partnerships with private
firms, which his administration intends to do as early as February.
technological and operational expertise. And

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51
AT: No Link Plan Doesnt Include Natural Gas

1. TBHA spills over to natural gas cooperation --- thats Karl 13.
2. The agreement includes gas
Platts, 2/20/2012 (US, Mexico reach accord on Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, p.
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/Houston/US-Mexico-reach-accord-on-TransboundaryHydrocarbons-8960756)
The Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement was signed in Los Cabos, Mexico, by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa, with US Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, Mexican President Felipe
Calderon and Mexican Energy Secretary Jordy Herrera in attendance. The agreement covers revenue aspects of the
two countries drilling into common reservoirs that straddle the maritime border. It also establishes safe drilling
standards for oil and gas reservoirs that straddle the international boundary. The agreement should make nearly 1.5
million acres (6,070 square km) of US Outer Continental Shelf more accessible for exploration and development, the
Department of Interior said Monday in a statement about the agreement. According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, the area contains as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of
natural gas . The agreement establishes a framework for US offshore oil and gas companies and Mexico's
Pemex to jointly develop transboundary reservoirs.

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52
Internal Shale Key 2NC

Russia perceives shale expansion as an existential threat.
Francis, 4/5/2013 (David, How the U.S. Blew Up the Global Energy Market, The Fiscal Times,
p. http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/04/05/How-the-US-Blew-Up-the-GlobalEnergy-Market.aspx#page1)
Late last month, Alexey Miller, CEO of the Russian energy giant Gazprom, dismissed the energy boom occurring in
the U.S. right now as a soap bubble [that] will burst soon and said the United States was not a competitor to
Gazprom. Currently, there arent any projects that we know of where shale gas production would be profitable,
Miller said. He added that absolutely all the boreholes in the U.S. are empty. In the same article, published by
Russias state-sponsored outlet Russia Today, Vagit Alekperov, president of Lukoil, another huge Russian energy
firm, also dismissed the advancements the United States has made in shale drilling. Of course, it is a great
achievement on the part of U.S. engineers that America is now producing oil and gas from shale. In order to do it,
they had to drill very tricky wells and do hydraulic fracturing, he said then added, Undoubtedly, this is an
achievement, but I wouldnt call it a revolution. Coming from a typical business executive, these kinds of
comments toward competitors could be dismissed as corporate bluster. Its the same kind of talk that was heard
during the Bush administration, when Russia seemed to celebrate each one of the U.S.s multiple missteps in
European and Iraq relations. Coming from Miller and Alekperov, the comments have weight and deserve attention.
But
they also show that the tables have turned : Russia had the United States on its heels during the Bush
administration. Now,
Russia is concerned about how much the U.S. shale gas explosion will hit Russias
energy industry, the single source of the countrys economic strength .
Perception is key
The Economist, 6/29/2013 (Spooked by shale, p.
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21580131-shale-gas-revolution-unnerves-russianstate-capitalism-spooked-shale)
A SPECTRE is haunting Russia: the spectre of shale gas. It is seeping into the salons of power, discomfiting Russias
leaders and their bizniz cronies. Energy companies account for half of the value of the Russian stockmarket , and a
single, state-backed firm, Gazprom, produces 10% of the countrys exports. Russian politics are also built on
conventional oil and gas: Vladimir Putin is in essence the CEO of Russian Energy Inc. The revolution in
unconventional gas production from shale beds, which began in the United States and is now spreading around the
world,
is shaking Russian state capitalism to its foundations . All the powers of Mr Putins
Russia have joined in a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: president and prime minister, oligarchs and
bureaucrats, trendy environmentalists and Kremlin police-spies. Mr Putin has denounced shale for costing too much
and ruining the environment. Alexey Miller, the boss of Gazprom, has described the revolution as a myth and a
bubble that will burst soon . We are sceptical about shale gas, he says. We dont see any risks [to
us] at all. But more recently the ruling clans position has become more nuanced. Mr Putin now admits that there
might be a real shale revolution after all. He has declared that he is monitoring the revolution
carefully , and urged Russias energy companies to rise to the challenge of shale.

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Impact 2NC
DA outweighs
Magnitude US/Russian war is the only existential risk
Bostrum, March 2002 (Nick professor of philosophy at Oxford University, Existential Risks:
Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and
Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html) [MN]
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR.
An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability
and with
that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal . There was a real
worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would
occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and
consequences
the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately.
There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that
a smaller
nuclear exchange , between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk , since it
would not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk
for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid
strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.
Nuclear war turns oceans

Sagan 1984 (Carl Ph.D. from U Chicago and former professor of biology and genetics at
Stanford, Nuclear War and Climate Catastrophe, Foreign Affairs, p. Lexis) [MN]
The darkness alone may cause a collapse in the aquatic food chain in which sunlight is harvested by
phytoplankton, phytoplankton by zooplankton, zooplankton by small fish, small fish by large fish, and, occasionally,
large fish by humans. In many nuclear war scenarios, this food chain is likely to collapse at its base for at least a
year and is significantly more imperiled in tropical waters. The increase in ultraviolet light available at the surface
of the earth approximately a year after the war provides an additional major environmental stress that
by itself
has been described as having " profound consequences " for aquatic , terrestrial and other
ecosystems .
n17

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AT: Impact D Only Conventional

1. Conventional weakness makes nuclear escalation likely thats
Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2002
2. Weakness in the energy sector causes Russia to miscalculate and
become aggressive --- thats Mead 13
3. Military officials agree
Business Week, 11/17/2011 (Russian military chief warns of nuclear war risks, p.
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9R2I9480.htm)
Russia is facing a heightened risk of being drawn into conflicts at its borders that have the potential of turning
nuclear , the nation's top military officer said Thursday. Gen. Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of the
Russian armed forces, cautioned over NATO's expansion eastward and warned that the risks for Russia to be pulled
into local conflicts have "risen sharply." Makarov added, according to Russian news agencies, that "under certain
conditions local and regional conflicts may develop into a full-scale war involving nuclear weapons."
A steady
decline in Russia's conventional forces has prompted the Kremlin to rely increasingly on its nuclear
deterrent . The nation's military doctrine says it may use nuclear weapons to counter a nuclear attack on Russia
a large-scale conventional attack that threatens Russia's existence.
or an ally, or

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55
AT: Impact D No Russian Conflict

1. The perception of a declining energy sector will cause Russia to
be paranoid and miscalculate --- thats Mead 13
2. History proves aggression follows
Weitz, November 2011 (Richard senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Can We Manage a
Declining Russia, Hudson Institute, p. 80)
Conversely, a Russia relatively weaker to the United States would have less capability to challenge the United
States but can provide less assistance for realizing common U.S.- Russia goals. A weaker Russia may also find it
harder to control its WMD assets and become vulnerable to external predators not friendly to the United States
(e.g., China and Iran). But in all probability Russia will still have sufficiently strong nuclear forces to ward off
external threats. Most worrisome,
a Russian leadership that perceived Russia on a slope toward
protracted decline might feel compelled to take drastic measures , internally and externally, to
reverse its descent . The German Empire, Imperial Japan, and other great powers in the 20th century
attempted to reverse their feared decline in ways that helped precipitate disastrous global wars .

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Impact Russian Aggression

Russian aggression causes nuclear war
Cohen 96 (Ariel, PhD and Senior Policy Analyst Heritage, Heritage Foundation Reports, 125, Lexis)
Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's
transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $ 6
billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price
from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove
much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former
Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of
w eapons of m ass d estruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially
threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major
destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's
neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist
Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. n15 n15 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, mouthpiece for the most
irredentist elements in the Russian security and military services, constantly articulates this threat. Domination of
the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian
imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm
port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine,
Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has
been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security
services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off
Islamic militancy more difficult. Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development in the early 21 st
century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or
Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the
southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modem
market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of
thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created.

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Impact Russian Economy

Russian economic decline causes political instability and nuclear
conflict
Filger 2009 (Sheldon Columnist and Founder of Global Economic Crisis, Russian Economy
Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contradiction, Huffington Post, p.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html)
[MN]
In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely
encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union
that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's
history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political
stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and
protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent
polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond
the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and
executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where
economic collapse is not out of the question,
the impact will go far beyond
the obvious accelerant such an
outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then
the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia
remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to
destroy the world as we know it . For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister
Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a
virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval . It just may be possible that U.S.
President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major
economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates
put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the
greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During
the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went
without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to
terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would
the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least
dangerous consequence.

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Case Answers
***Mexico Advantage***

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Mexico 1NC
1. Mexico economy is strong and growing
Solomon, 7/30/2013 (Adina, Mexicos economy sprouts wings, Air Cargo World, p.
http://www.aircargoworld.com/Air-Cargo-News/2013/07/mexico%E2%80%99s-economysprouts-wings/3014703) [MN]
Mexicos economy is evolving . Its GDP has risen over the past few years, and its people are becoming
wealthier. Within five years, Mexican factories could produce up to US$60 billion in output annually, according to
the Boston Consulting Group. The business strategy adviser also reported that in 2012, average manufacturing
costs in Mexico, adjusted for productivity, dropped below those of China and are set to keep dropping. Mexico has
44 free-trade agreements, more than any other country. Butch Hensley, president of Amado Trucking in Arizona,
knows what Mexicos growth looks like. Today Im seeing freeways built where there were cattle trails 10 years
ago, Hensley says. Amado, which trucks to airports in the Southwestern U.S. and Mexico, is the exclusive Mexican
handler for ShipHaus, a freight forwarder based at Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport in Mesa, Ariz. Its incredible,
Hensley says. Theres excess of 100 million consumers in Mexico, and thats about 30 percent of what we have in
the U.S., so its a tremendous market. Tell that to Aeromexico or Lufthansa, American Airlines or United Airlines.
These carriers move thousands of tonnes a year between Mexico and the rest of the world. If you look at what
were shipping from Mexico, it really runs the gambit, Tony Randgaard, manager of cargo marketing at United
Airlines, says. This includes pet and human remains services into and out of Mexico. The airlines and forwarders
interviewed move much of the same cargo to and from Mexico: textiles, consumer electronics, automotive parts,
luxury goods and perishables. Many electronics come from Guadalajara, whose nickname is the Silicon Valley of
Mexico. In the last few years, major U.S. manufacturers have been providing the raw materials for electronics to
China-based companies, who do part of the manufacturing, Hensley explains. Then the parts come back to the U.S.
and go to Mexican companies, who complete the value-added features. The electronics then return to the U.S.
under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Perishables frequently shipped include mangos, lemons,
avocados, limes, papaya, herbs and seafood. Agribusiness
has just grown at an insane rate over the last 10
years, Hensley says. The array of products goes to places such as Germany, Japan, the U.S. and Canada. Curt
Fischer, regional manager for Mexico and Central America for Lufthansa Cargo, says three times as much Lufthansa
cargo 90,000 tonnes a year goes from Europe to Mexico than vice-versa. This is because Mexico has a strong
import market whereas much of the export industry targets nearby markets in North and South America, says
Fischer, who is based in Mexico. Lufthansa has worked on ramping up its service in the country, serving Mexico City
and Guadalajara to Frankfurt. Mexico
is always full of surprises , Fischer says when asked of hurdles in
transporting airfreight. Benito Jurez International Airport in Mexico City is already crowded and cannot grow any
further. Meanwhile, the city has grown all around it, Fischer says. Mexico City is one of the largest cities in the
world, and the airport, which used to be out of the city at one time, is now in the middle, more or less. So theres no
way to go any further. Theres no way to put in any additional runways, but also within the warehouse area, there is
no space for growth. Fischer says Mexicos drug cartel problem presents security challenges for airlines and
shippers. Additional security measures always will hinder the free flow of air cargo. So this is something we have to
cope with, he says. Especially also our customers that have to cope with longer handling times. Antonio Gomez
Elorduy, Aeromexico Cargo vice president for the U.S., Asia and Canada, says competition from other carriers and
rising fuel costs hurt the airline. He also highlights Aeromexicos move toward E-freight. One of the issues that we
have is the customs side, Gomez Elorduy says. Theres a lot of things that in Mexico are done with a lot of paper
and involving a lot of people in imports and exports, so I think that now that we are one step ahead with the
government to try to develop that process with their help. I think its going to be an improvement in Mexico
because were a little bit late in that lets say it that way against the other carriers. Randgaard of United says
the Mexican air cargo market hasnt jumped into E-freight. He also points out the importance of having specific
and precise documentation. Theres not a lot of tolerance in shipping to and from Mexico. You really have to ensure
that your import documents, your pet or your human remains permits or certificates, are exact, and you really need
a lot of precision, or youre going to experience delays, and our customers are not going to be happy with that, he
says. I think that theres a number of countries around the world that you need to make sure that youve got all
your ducks in a row, and certainly Mexico is one of those. Carmen Taylor, American Airlines managing director for
cargo sales for Latin America, and Hensley of Amado Trucking say if you have experience and the proper
documentation, its a fluid process. Do I hear about the Mexican Customs holding an important shipment for days
and days like I hear in other countries? I havent heard that in many years, Taylor says. Its because we have
learned to do business. Mike Barclay, owner and director of business development at ShipHaus, says with the
increased flow of goods into and out of Mexico, aircraft will have capacity issues. Some freight will need to sit and
wait for additional flights. Barclay and Hensleys plan is to truck freight from northern Mexico to fly out of U.S.
airports.
Mexico is a country on the rise
and the airfreight industry knows it. American is looking at Mexico-
Seoul service. A few years ago, Lufthansa was flying two freighters into Mexico; now that number has tripled.

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Investments in Mexico are very strong, and they are bound

We want to be there also to offer air cargo capacity and services as it comes.
to grow , Fischer says.
2. PEMEX oil production is high
Reuters, 7/26/2013 (Mexico's Pemex posts increased crude production, exports in June, p.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/26/mexico-oil-idUSL1N0FW1YU20130726) [MN]
Pemex said on Friday it produced 2.52 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude in June,
the highest output since February , and an increase of 0.4 percent compared with May. Pemex also
Mexico's state oil monopoly
said crude exports in June reached an average of 1.09 million bpd, up nearly 6 percent compared with average
crude shipments the previous month. While crude shipments rose in June, the monthly average is the second lowest
this year for the company. Mexico is a top oil exporter to the United States, but has to import nearly half of its
gasoline due to a lack of domestic refining capacity. Earlier on Friday, Pemex posted its steepest quarterly loss since
2011, hurt by lower crude export prices and a stronger peso, the company said in a filing with the Mexican stock
exchange. In a conference call with analysts, Carlos Morales, head of Pemex's exploration and production arm, said
the company would still be able to reach a goal of lifting production slightly to 2.54 million bpd by the end of the
year.
3. PEMEX reform coming

W all S treet J ournal, 8/2/2013 (Mexicos Leader Tackles Historic Oil Law, p.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324635904578644363664634772.html)
[MN]
President Enrique Pea
Nieto is set to unveil a long-awaited proposal to change the constitution to try to lure
back major private oil companies to Mexican oil fields
for the first time since the country's
1938 nationalization, a move that could attract billions of dollars in investment and boost Mexico's image as an
emerging economy. The stakes are high for the new president, who took power last December for a six-year term.
The proposal, expected to be delivered to the Senate on Wednesday, is seen as a make-or-break initiative. If
passed, it could strengthen the leader's hand as he seeks to transform the country in other ways, such as
overhauling a dysfunctional tax code and judicial system. More broadly, it would showcase Mexico as a dynamic
economic opportunity at a time when global growth is slow and other big emerging markets like Brazil have faded in
appeal. Economists say it would boost the competitiveness of Mexico's economy and likely reverse declining oil
output, returning the country to the big leagues of global oil-exporting nations. "A transformational change in the
energy market has the potential to finally place Mexico at the center of the stage among emerging markets," said
Nomura Securities strategist Benito Berber in New York. "I would expect a double-digit growth in investment next
year if the reform passes." Mr. Pea Nieto's government wants to allow private firms to share the risks involved in
developing increasingly complex energy reserves such as deep-water oil deposits by letting them produce oil and
gas through profit-sharing deals and joint ventures with state monopoly Petrleos Mexicanos, or Pemex. Current
service contracts have only attracted oil suppliers, such as Schlumberger or Halliburton, which work on behalf of
Chances for the legislation look good ; besides the support from
his ruling PRI party, the right-wing PAN opposition party within Mexico's divided Congress is also behind the
Pemex and can't drill on their own.
reform.
4. Mexican economy is resilient

Thomas White International, 1/27/2012 (Mexico: The glow of economic resilience
lightens the shadows of violence, p. http://www.thomaswhite.com/world-markets/mexicothe-glow-of-economic-resilience-lightens-the-shadows-of-violence/) [MN]
the Mexican economy has so far remained somewhat impervious to all that violence .
GDP growth last year was relatively healthy and the expected slowdown during the current year is likely to be a
minor dip rather than a steep fall . Domestic consumer demand has held up, supported by nearly $23
But, surprisingly,
billion in remittances during 2011 from Mexicans working abroad. Industrial investments are flowing in from abroad,
and last year were estimated by the UN at close to $18 billion. Despite higher consumer prices in recent months,
inflation remains under control and has allowed the central bank to maintain interest rates relatively low. It is
interesting that much of the economys resilience is rooted in the sustained buoyancy in export shipments,
especially of manufactured goods, when consumer demand in the U.S., the destination for most of Mexicos exports,

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61
This suggests Mexicos improved export competitiveness and , in fact, Mexico has
been steadily increasing its share in the total import basket of its northern neighbor. The most significant
has not been particularly robust.
driver of this trend are rising labor and other costs in China and in neighboring Asian countries that are the
principal suppliers into the U.S. market. Even though the average wages in Mexico are still higher than most
developing countries in Asia, the competitive edge in that Far East region has gradually declined when aggregate
costs are considered. The close proximity to the U.S., which allows greater logistical flexibility in response to
short-term demand fluctuations , adds to Mexicos luster in the eyes of large manufacturers.
6. No relationship between US capabilities and peace

Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College, 10,
[Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages
59 82//informaworld]
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US
actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is
little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no
relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability . During
the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998,
the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in
1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in
hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global
security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives
William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut
much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the
verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States
cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable
US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries
were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms
races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was
diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a
pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United
States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the
United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the
George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is
unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are
unrelated.
7. Corn ethanol production inevitable set to rise

K.B. Hicks, et al 2008 [[W.G. Hettingaa, H.M. Junginger, S.C. Dekker, M. Hoogwijkc, A.J.
McAloond [Hettingaa and Junginger: Department of Science, Technology and Society,
Copernicus Institute, Utrecht University, Dekker: Department of Innovation and
Environmental Sciences, Dekker: Copernicus Institute, Utrecht University, Hoogwijkc: Ecofys
Environmental Research Netherlands McAloond and Hicks: Eastern Regional Research
Center, ARS, United States Department of Agriculture] [ELSEVIER, Understanding the
reductions in US corn ethanol production costs:
An experience curve approach, http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0301421508003996/1-s2.0S0301421508003996-main.pdf?_tid=1896f42c-f58d-11e2-9e3100000aab0f6b&acdnat=1374799892_516f1a37adcb97cf96e63ffad71962a7] [MN]
In 2005, the US consumed 530 million m3 of gasoline (EIA, 2007). In that year the production of ethanol reached
15 million m3 (RFA, 2007). Ethanol made up 2.8% of US fuel supply by volume (1.9% based on HHV
energy content). With US production growing to 18 million m3 in 2006, the US has become the worlds largest
ethanol producer. Ethanol is now blended in 46% of US gasoline. Historic and mandated ethanol
production is displayed in Fig. 1. Future production is likely to exceed prescribed levels in the Renewable
Fuels Standard (RFS) considerably (Urbanchuk, 2006). Corn-based ethanol accounts for 97% of total US

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62
ethanol production (Urbanchuk, 2007). The US is the largest corn producer in the world, with production in
2005 reaching 282 million tonnes (see Fig. 1), representing 40% of the worlds corn production. Highest corn
yields up to 10 tonnes/ha are obtained in the US (USDA/FAS, 2007). US corn supply almost
doubled between 1975 and 2006. In 2006, 17% of total US corn supply went to ethanol production
(equal to at least 7% of world corn production). The increased share for ethanol is mostly
compensated for by lower stock levels, which are presently at a historical low level. Relative
corn exports decreased as well, while the share for animal feed remained constant
(USDA/ERS, 2007). Ethanol is currently produced in 136 plants with a further 77 under construction, mostly
located in the corn rich Midwest area, or Corn Belt2 (RFA, 2007). A signicant share of the plants is owned by
farmers cooperatives, but investments from Wall Street are rising. Ethanol plants generally require
feedstock sourcing within a 80 km radius to keep transportation costs low (BBI, 2000).
Farmers cooperatives are closely located to corn supply and involved farmers are obliged to
bring a share of their corn to the ethanol plant. However, the production of corn ethanol is a nonvertically integrated market, since ethanol producers still pay market prices for corn. This is in
contrast with Brazil, were ethanol producers own (shares of the) sugarcane plantations. The majority of the
growth in US ethanol production has been the result of farmer ownership and investment in
dry grind ethanol facilities, but signicant investments now come from non-farmer investors (Hansen,
2006).

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63
Mexico Economy High 2NC

Extend 1NC 1 Mexican econ high --- increases in imports and a
strong agriculture industry is driving strong growth. Thats Solomon
7/30
Prefer our evidence because it is predictive and makes a holistic
assessment of the state of the economy.
Growth will continue for years --- the plan is not key
Rindebro, 7/31/2013 (Ulric, Mexican economy poised for significant recovery next year
BofA Merrill Lynch, BN Americas, p. http://www.bnamericas.com/news/banking/mexicaneconomy-poised-for-signficant-recovery-next-year-bofa-merrill-lynch) [MN]
The Mexican economy is set to make a significant comeback next year after reporting weak growth this
year, said Bank of America Merrill Lynch in a report. The US investment bank expects Latin America's second
largest economy to only grow 2.5% this year, but recover strongly in 2014 when it forecasts
growth of 4% . The Mexican economy expanded 3.9% last year and was widely expected at the beginning of
the year to grow close to 4% this year again. However there have been several GDP growth downgrades during the
first half of the year, with the latest coming from the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (Eclac), which this month cut its 2013 growth prediction for Mexico to 2.8% from its earlier April forecast
of 3.5%. Bank of America Merrill Lynch sees the main reasons for the Mexican economy's disappointing
performance this year as being weak external demand and a domestic fiscal shock. The bank expects Mexico's
economic recovery to begin during the second half and continue in 2014 with the main growth drivers
being higher growth in the US, increased expenditure by the Mexican government and the first positive effects from
several major reforms that are expected to be approved and implemented this year and during 2014.
More growth coming --- this assumes prior growth dips
Latin American Herald Tribune, 7/24/2013 (Moodys Forecasts GDP Growth of 3.1% in
Mexico, p. http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=887467&CategoryId=1409) [MN]
Mexicos economy will gain strength in the second half of this year and finish 2013 with g ross d omestic
p roduct growth of 3.1 percent , Moodys Investors Service said. The forecast from the U.S. credit-rating
agency is in line with the latest projections from Mexican officials, who said domestic and external factors caused
the economy to slow in the first half of this year. The Mexican economy has decelerated recently, but the current
softness is more a product of cyclical deceleration and growth should resume toward the second half of
this year and will, in fact, be stronger next year, Moodys Investors Service said.

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64
PEMEX Strong 2NC

Increase in PEMEX production takes out their case
A) The 1AC Samples and Vittor 12 evidence cites the risk of
becoming a net importer of petroleum as the only warrant for
decline. Increased production disputes this internal.
PEMEX production will continue to grow
W all S treet J ournal, 3/26/2013 (Pemex Produces More Oil, Imports Less Gasoline at Start
of Year, p. http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130326-710869.html)
Mexico's state-owned oil monopoly Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, produced more crude oil in the first two months
of this year and imported less gasoline, diesel and other refined products, improving its trade surplus compared to
the same period of 2012, according to the figures published by the company. In recent years, Pemex has missed its
targets for crude-oil production and refinery output, which has meant less oil exports and more fuel imports,
including importing about half of the country's gasoline. Pemex says new oil wells are coming on line this year,
which should allow the firm to break an eight-year trend of declining production , while
increased refinery capacity is putting a dent in fuel imports.
More rigs and production coming

Hickey, 7/10/2013 (Terry, Mexicos rig renaissance gets under way, Offshore Magazine, p.
http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-73/issue-7/latin-america-report/mexicosrig-renaissance-gets-under-way.html) [MN]
With domestic drilling picking up, additional assets are needed. Mexico anticipates a significant increase
in drilling and production activity over the next 10 years, and recent rig orders reflect the growing
need for more domestic units. In 2013, nine new rigs will enter Mexico for Perforadora Central SA de CV, Oro
Negro, Aban Offshore, Perforadora Mexico, and China Oilfield Services Ltd. Mexico, with another 12 scheduled to
arrive in 2014. Oro Negro has a business plan that includes adding 10 rigs, most of which are jackups, although
there are plans for three or four semisubmersibles as well. The Grupo R conglomerate, which currently operates
three semisubmersibles, has ordered four jackups from Keppel FELS in Singapore. Perforadora Mexico has taken two
jackups originally ordered by Prospector Offshore Drilling in the US. The rigs are being built in Dalian, China.
Perforadora Central has another jackup scheduled for delivery in February 2014, which is under construction at
AmFELS in Brownsville, Texas. EVYA has plans to add five jackups to its fleet. The company recently located two rigs
in Dalian, China, and is in the process of securing another three to meet its acquisition goal. PEMEX plans to build a
fleet of 12 jackup rigs in the near term and has indicated that by 2030, the anticipated rig count needs to range
from a high of 40 jackup rigs to a low of 25 rigs.

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65
PEMEX Reform Now 2NC

Extend 1NC 3 --- PEMEX reform now --- Nieto has support from his
party and the right wing to pass major PEMEX reform now. Thats
WSJ 8/2
This proves the status quo solves their advantage. Their Melgar 12
and Samples 12 evidence cite constitutional barriers and a lack of
private investment --- Nietos reform resolves both of these.
Pressure from oil decline means support outweighs opposition
Platts, 7/11/2013 (Oil and gas reform in Mexico, once mere talk, appears at hand: legal
expert, p. http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/houston/oil-and-gas-reform-in-mexico-oncemere-talk-appears-21268243) [MN]
Reform in Mexico has been talked about for many years, but substantial change that would likely involve some
degree of constitutional amendment seems finally at hand, a Mexican energy legal expert said
Thursday. With production dwindling and the prospect of becoming a net oil importer inching closer, Mexico must
act soon, David Enriquez, a partner in oil and gas/maritime division at Mexico City law firm Goodrich Riquelme
Asociados, said during a Credit Suisse conference call on the potential for energy reform in Mexico. A middle-of-theroad approach is more likely than minimal or radical change, he said. "This is the mother of all reforms [in Mexico],"
Enriquez said. "The political capital of [President Enrique Pena] will be invested in this one." Because declining
production contains what Enriquez called a "public finance element" -- state company Pemex's current revenues
fund about one-third of the federal budget -- reform agreements between Pena's ruling PRI party and the
conservative PAN party, which was in power during the previous two presidential administrations,
are " more
likely than not ," he said. The most feasible reform, Enriquez said, is not one of extremes but an
"intermediate scenario that takes into account political tensions, the technicalities of the industry and the role of
[international] supermajors and independents." That scenario "considers a full range of contractual possibilities"
and would involve creation of either a new national oil company or a similar entity alongside Pemex with the power
to enter into production-sharing agreements and concessions, he said. Enriquez projected that some kind of
constitutional amendment would be forged and signed by year end; next year, various government agencies would
develop and implement them. "We expect later this year a constitutional amendment and then in 2014, a
constitutional design and legislation," he said. "Realistically ... in a year, a year-and-a-half from now, we'd expect to
have full implementation of the reform ." Oil and gas is currently property of the Mexican state, and
while foreign upstream companies do operate in the country, they do so under fee-for-service agreements and are
not allowed to book reserves. Most of the handful of operators in Mexico are small, privately held independents.
Mexico's oil production is now 2.6 million b/d, down from a peak of 3.4 million b/d less than 10 years ago, Enriquez
said. He said the level of capital spending by Pemex needed to raise production to even 3.1 million b/d is $30
billion/year. However, about three-quarters of the country's estimated 115 billion barrels of estimated petroleum
reserves are figured to be unconventional -- in deepwater, tight oil and natural gas, and shale oil and gas -- said
Enriquez, and are more costly to extract than conventional reserves. Consequently, the amount of funding needed
to raise production from unconventional sources to 4 million b/d would likely be triple that amount -- perhaps as
high as $100 billion/year, he said. Because of the urgency of production declines, Enriquez said he does not expect
fierce political obstacles
as in the past.
The PRI and PAN have historically been at odds, but given the
need for reform he expects them to form a supermajority in Congress to get the measure
passed . The left-leaning PRD party would oppose it, but could not muster enough support to
block it .
Pressure is mounting --- causes reform

Peixe, 7/10/2013 (Joao, Will an End to Pemexs Monopoly Boost Economic Growth in
Mexico?, Oil Price, p. http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Will-an-End-toPemexs-Monopoly-Boost-Economic-Growth-in-Mexico.html) [MN]

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Mexicos oil output volumes have been declining for eight straight years and it has been suggested that large
reforms are needed to lure foreign investment to the nations oil and natural gas fields. The necessary changes are
expected to be introduced by President Enrique Pena Nieto by the end of the summer, and it is estimated that they
will encourage as much as $50 billion in investments each year. Hector Moreira, who used to work in Mexicos
Energy Ministry, said; we need far more investment, we need capacity in production and we need technology. We
need to transform the energy sector in a very deep way. I think now is the time. Mexicos economic growth has
been slowing in recent years, and this is putting pressure on
Pena Nieto to make changes that will

stimulate more growth. According to Bloomberg, Barclays predicts the economy to grow by 2.5% in 2013, the
slowest rate since 2009, and JPMorgan predict GDP to increase by 2.8%. the countrys annual growth of 1.7% over
the last five years is half the rate of Brazil. Gabriel Casillas, the chief economist for Mexicos Banorte, stated that
this administration doesnt only have the willingness , but the political power and political
capital to make the needed changes that could ultimately result in faster economic growth, and a
stronger currency.
Constitutional reform will pass

Graham, 7/25/2013 (Dave, Analysis: Mexico to rewrite sacred text in long-awaited energy
reform, Reuters, p. http://news.yahoo.com/analysis-mexico-rewrite-sacred-text-long-awaitedenergy-050213831.html) [MN]
Pena Nieto has said he favors a constitutional reform to revamp Pemex . But he has been very quiet about his plan.
To change the constitution, the president needs a two thirds majority in Congress, and the approval of more than
half of Mexico's 31 state legislatures. The PRI governs about two thirds of the states - but it lacks a majority in
Congress. To get around this, Pena Nieto has brokered his biggest reforms in the "Pact for Mexico", an accord that
he announced with the leaders of the two main opposition parties just days after taking office in December. Aimed
at revitalizing the economy, the pact has yielded major bills to overhaul the telecommunications industry, the
education system and a banking reform still in Congress. But it is likely to run out of steam on energy reform,
forcing Pena Nieto to push through his bill with the aid of the conservative National Action Party, or PAN. Both the
PAN and the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) have their own visions for oil reform. The PRD's plan
aims to give Pemex autonomy and cut its tax burden - ideas which have support across the political spectrum. But
the PRD has rejected any changes to the constitution. It argues that the way to make the company thrive is by
rooting out corruption, cutting back on waste and giving Pemex operational independence. "The cost of (production)
in shallow waters is $5-10 per barrel, the international price is $100. In deep waters it costs $30. Who wants to
carve up a business like that? Who in their right mind would say 'come on in' so we get less?", said Luis Chazaro, a
PRD energy expert in the lower house of Congress. At the other end of the spectrum, the PAN wants to open up the
industry and grant full-blown concessions to oil companies. The PRI is positioning itself between the two parties, but
leaning firmly towards the PAN's side of the argument. Rather than ceding ownership of the oil to private firms, the
PRI has been exploring a change in article 27 that will enable Mexico to remain sole proprietor of the crude while
providing oil majors with the incentives they need. Contracts could be designed that allow oil companies to show
crude reserves on their balance sheets without making them the legal owners of the oil, said Jorge Jimenez, an
expert on Mexican energy law at law firm Lopez Velarde, Heftye & Soria. "The rules are flexible enough to
acknowledge that a company has a right to receive a contractual revenue on the basis of a barrel of oil produced,"
Jimenez said. "And that that revenue, as opposed to the fixed fee in the current contracts, is linked to the price of a
barrel of oil in the market." Without changing article 27, Mexico would only be able to continue offering the socalled service contracts it now operates that pay firms a fee per barrel, Jimenez said. MOMENTUM For the PRD, such
changes would be tantamount to privatization. "Nobody takes the risk without sharing in the property," said PRD
congressman Chazaro. "They don't do it in Brazil, they don't do it in Norway and they're not going to do it here."
Leftists have promised to mobilize millions of Mexicans to oppose Pena Nieto's reform, with Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador, twice runner-up for the presidency, aiming to lead the charge. So far, however, the mood has been
subdued. Pena
Nieto and his cabinet have kept the energy reform out of the headlines
by saying next to
nothing about it inside Mexico, and the media have followed suit. Some in the PRI worry that the government is not
doing enough to lay the groundwork for selling the reform. But people close to Pena Nieto say it is a deliberate ploy
to avoid stoking a debate . They are confident he can push through his proposal without kicking
off a storm of protest .

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Mexico Economy Resilient 2NC

Extend 1NC 4 --- Mexican econ is resilient --- strong manufacturing
exports and proximity to the U.S. allows the Mexican econ to adjust
and adapt to changing conditions. Thats Thomas White
International 12.
***Gulf of Mexico Advantage***

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68
Gulf of Mexico 1NC

1. Gulf of Mexico is resilient to oil spills
R&D Magazine, 4/8/2013 (Research shows Gulf of Mexico resilient after spill, p.
http://www.rdmag.com/news/2013/04/research-shows-gulf-mexico-resilient-after-spill) [MN]
The Gulf of Mexico may have a much greater natural ability to self-clean oil spills than
previously believed, according to Terry Hazen, University of Tennessee-Oak Ridge National Laboratory Governor's
Chair for Environmental Biotechnology. Hazen conducted research following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster,
which is estimated to have spilled 210 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. His research team used
a powerful new approach for identifying microbes in the environment to discover previously unknown
and naturally occurring bacteria that consume and break down crude oil. "The Deepwater Horizon oil provided a
new source of nutrients in the deepest waters," said Hazen. "With more food present in the water, there was a
population explosion among those bacteria already adapted to using oil as a food source . It was
surprising how fast they consumed the oil. In some locations, it took only one day for them to reduce a gallon
of oil to a half gallon. In others, the half-life for a given quantity of spilled oil was six days." This data suggests that a
great potential for intrinsic bioremediation of oil plumes exists in the deep sea and other environs
in the Gulf of Mexico.
Oil-eating bacteria are natural inhabitants of the Gulf because of the constant supply
of oil as food.
2. Drilling now
Vancouver Sun, 7/18/2013 (Gulf of Mexico rebounds as drilling rigs return in record
numbers, p.
http://www.vancouversun.com/business/Gulf+Mexico+rebounds+drilling+rigs+return+recor
d+numbers/8675518/story.html) [MN]
The deepwater Gulf of Mexico, shut down after BP's record oil spill in 2010, has rebounded to become the
fastest growing offshore market in the world. The number of rigs operating in waters deeper than
in the U.S. gulf will grow to 60 by the end of 2015, said Brian Uhlmer, an analyst at Global Hunter
Securities in Houston. As of last week, there were 36 rigs working in those waters, according to industry researcher
300 metres
IHS Petrodata. Producers will need $16 billion worth of additional rigs to handle the expanded drilling, analysts
including Uhlmer estimate. Demand is driven in part by exploration successes in the lower tertiary, a geological
layer about 20,000 feet below the sea floor containing giant crude deposits that producers are only now figuring out
how to tap. Companies such as Chevron Corp. and Anadarko Petroleum Corp. must do more drilling to turn large
discoveries into producing wells - as many as 20 wells for each find. " The Gulf had more than its fair share of
discoveries," said Chris Beckett, chief executive officer at Pacific Drilling SA. "Right now, the Gulf is the fastest
growing deepwater region in the world ."
3. PEMEX drilling is safe

U nited P ress I nternational, 10/24/2012 (Mexicos Pemex to build oil response cap, p.
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/10/24/Mexicos-Pemex-to-buildoil-response-cap/UPI-33931351078084/) [MN]
British energy company
BP said it signed an agreement with Mexico's Pemex to share oil-spill response
technology for work in the Gulf of Mexico. BP, in response to the oil spill in 2010, maintains a deep-water
well capping system that can operate in 10,000 feet of water. The company said it keeps the system on hand in
Houston for global deployment. BP said it signed a deal to share technical information with Pemex so it could build
its own capping system for use in the Mexican waters of the Gulf of Mexico. " Today's announcement builds on our
commitment and the work we have done -- and continue to do -- to help advance global deep-water response
capabilities around the world," Richard Morrison, BP's global deep-water response director, said in a statement.

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4. Squo solves
Joe Hasler, 5/4/10, writer/reporter/researcher at Hearst Magazines, Special Projects Assistant
at Popular Mechanics, The State of Oil Spill Cleaning Technology
Extreme Spill Technology's "High Speed" Skimming Vessel Mechanical clean-up technology tends
to work only in placid waters. Booms and skimmers can be rendered ineffective and unsafe
in currents of more than 1 knot and waves exceeding 1.5 meters. According to David Prior,
CEO and lead designer at Extreme Spill Technologies, his boatthe method for which has been
successfully demonstrated for the Canadian Coast Guardcan not only handle rough seas, it can also
travel at much higher speeds. Case Western Reserve's Aerogel In February researchers at
Case Western Reserve University unveiled a sponge-like material of their creation composed of 2
percent clay, 2 percent plastic and 96 percent air. Their lab tests demonstrate how the sponge
(called Aerogel) when applied to polluted water is capable of absorbing the oil and leaving behind the water . It
can then be squeezed clean so that the oil can be recycled.
5. Size of the oceans means no significant impact from current

activities.
Bjrn Lomborg 01, Director, Environmental Assessment Institute, THE SKEPTICAL
ENVIRONMENTALIST, 2001 p. 189
But the oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been
astoundingly insignificant - the oceans contain more than 1,000 billion liters of
water. The UNs overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: The open sea is still
relatively clean. Low levels of lead, synthetic compounds and artificial

radionuclides, though widely detectable, are biologically insignificant. Oil
slicks and litter are common among sea leans, but are, at present, a
minor consequences to communities of organisms living in ocean waters.

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Resiliency 2NC
Extend 1NC 1 the Gulf of Mexico is resilient --- the most recent
study on the 2010 Deep Horizon spill proves that the Gulf can adapt
and survive. Oil-eating bacteria eliminate the risk of damage. Thats
R&D Magazine 2013.
Prefer our evidence
A) Its backed by scientific evidence --- the affs ev comes from
pundits.
B) Its comparative --- our evidence is a conclusive study of the
Deepwater Horizon spill that the 1AC Craig 11 evidence cites.
Our study uses the newest data and concludes that no
countermeasures are needed.
Science Daily, 4/8/2013 (Gulf of Mexico Has Greater-Than-Believed Ability to Self-Cleanse
Oil Spills, p. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/04/130408152733.htm) [MN]
Hazen's team used a powerful new approach for identifying previously recognized kinds of oil-eating
bacteria that contributed to the natural clean-up of the Deepwater Horizon spill. In the past, scientists identified
microbes by putting samples of water into laboratory culture dishes, waiting for microbes to grow and then using a
microscope to identify the microbes. The new approach, called " ecogenomics ," uses genetic and other
analyses of the DNA, proteins and other footprints of bacteria
microbial life in the water. "The
to provide a more detailed picture
of
bottom line from this research may be that the Gulf of Mexico is more
resilient and better able to recover from oil spills than anyone thought ," Hazen said.
"It shows that we may not need the kinds of heroic measures
proposed after the Deepwater Horizon spill,

like adding nutrients to speed up the growth of bacteria that breakdown oil, or using genetically engineered
bacteria. The Gulf has a broad base of natural bacteria, and they respond to the presence of oil by multiplying
quite rapidly ."

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Ext No Oil Spills Impact

Worst case predictions of oil spills are wrong
Handwerk, 4/19/2011 (Brian, Gulf Oil Spill Anniversary: Resilience Amid Unknowns,
National Geographic, p. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/04/110420-gulf-oilspill-anniversary-year-later-science-nation-environment/) [MN]
A spill that started with the tragic loss of life soon wrought major environmental devastation over huge region of the
Gulf. Disturbing images appeared daily of oiled wildlife, iridescent surface slicks, overwhelmed cleanup workers,
fouled beaches, burning oil fires, and blackened wetlands. The damage from nearly five million barrels of oil was
very real, yet many expert predictions missed their marks . Hurricanes didn't drive enormous
quantities of
oil ashore, giant dead zones didn't materialize , and oil didn't round the tip of Florida to
rocket up the East Coast via the Gulf Stream.
Fisheries now appear poised to rebound instead of suffering the
barren years or decades some feared. And Mother Nature had her own surprises in store, showcasing an
ability to fight back against the spill
short-term.
and, later, to bounce back from the damageat least in the

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Drilling Now 2NC

Extend 1NC 2 drilling now --- deepwater drilling is accelerating in
the Gulf thats the Vancouver Sun 13 evidence. Thirty-six projects
exist now and that will almost double in the near future.
This makes their impact inevitable --- the plan doesnt prevent U.S.
drilling in the Gulf and the small text of their Shields 12 evidence
concedes U.S. drilling is the problem.
U.S. drilling makes Gulf destruction inevitable
Mufson, 4/19/2012 (Steven, Two years after BP oil spill, offshore drilling still poses risks,
Washington Post, p.
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-19/business/35453515_1_oil-spill-peterroopnarine-transocean) [MN]
Two years after a blowout on BPs Macondo well killed 11 men and triggered the largest oil spill in U.S. history, oil
companies are again plying the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Forty-one deep-water rigs are in the gulf. The vast
majority of them are drilling new holes or working over old ones, while the other behemoths are idle as
they await work or repairs. A brand new rig the South Korean-built Pacific Santa Ana, capable of drilling to a
depth of 7.5 miles is on its way to a Chevron well. But three recent incidents in other parts of the world show
just
how risky and sensitive offshore drilling remains. In the North Sea, French oil giant Total is still battling to regain
control of a natural gas well that has been leaking for nearly four weeks. Meanwhile, Brazil has confiscated the
passports of 11 Chevron employees and five employees of drilling contractor Transocean as they await trial on
criminal charges related to an offshore oil spill there. And in December, about 40,000 barrels of crude oil leaked out
of a five-year-old loading line between a floating storage vessel and an oil tanker in a Royal Dutch Shell field off the
coast of Nigeria. Many experts say that even with tougher regulations here in the United
States , such incidents are inevitable . Im not saying we shouldnt do it [offshore drilling], but we ought to
go at it with our eyes open, said Roger Rufe, a retired Coast Guard vice admiral. We cant do it with a humandesigned system and not expect that there will be occasional problems with it. Shell is one company particularly
anxious to avoid the slightest whiff of trouble. It is on the verge of getting the final two permits needed to drill this
summer in the Chukchi Sea, off Alaskas Arctic Coast, a plan that has aroused opposition from a broad array of
environmental groups. So on April 10 when federal regulators told Shell that they had spotted a 1-by-10-mile oil
sheen in the eight miles of water between two Shell production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, executives acted
quickly. They promptly mobilized an oil cleanup vessel and sent two remotely operated underwater vehicles to
scour the sea floor. It turned out that the oil only six barrels came from a natural seep common in the gulf.
Post-Macondo, theres no such thing as a small spill , said an executive from another big oil
company, who asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to comment. With the anniversary of the BP
spill, many experts are reassessing U.S. progress since the accident. And environmentalists are assessing damages.
A National Wildlife Federation report said, for example, that the shrimp catch increased last year but that since the
spill 523 dolphins have been stranded onshore, four times the historic average; 95 percent of them were dead. A
team of scientists led by Peter Roopnarine of the California Academy of Sciences said oysters collected post-spill
contain higher concentrations of heavy metals in their shells, gills and muscle tissue than those collected before the
spill. The members of the presidential Oil Spill Commission that investigated the BP spill said in a report that they
were encouraged by reforms at the Interior Department, which oversees drilling in U.S. waters. But they said they
are dismayed by the failure of Congress to enact
some
reforms
into law, worried about the prospect of Arctic
drilling, and concerned that the United States had not altered the embargo of Cuba to allow U.S. vessels to respond
if there was a spill from a rig drilling in Cuban waters. Environmental groups are more adamant. Oceana, a group
opposed to offshore drilling,
said offshore drilling safety has not improved .
Safe technology doesnt check spills

DOW 12 (DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, "OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING",
https://docs.google.com/viewer?
a=vandq=cache:0hRYuUTRu6wJ:www.defenders.org/publications/impacts_of_outer_continent

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al_shelf_drilling.pdf+andhl=enandgl=usandpid=blandsrcid=ADGEESimvF33YzLvIENzYCceMo
6rbZBgGL_qq52L3lPQbQp9oCHvySHbDLITJDlQ61o__xCzITqYc56OWssn5OEjL5C7HATlZWYsBP4Ec9SoxALLnh9Rk0NY_ANjAdU
gfb3vh0C-e31andsig=AHIEtbSgOUGu_Q4pEWJM2fsBDGMuNjtfvA)
Even with safety protocols in place , leaks and spills are
inevitable each year U.S. drilling operations send an average of 880,000 gallons of oil into the ocean. Then
there are the unanticipated catastrophes. In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed 113 of
the oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico and damaged 457 pipelines. Hurricane damage caused at least 124
different spills, totaling over 17,700 barrels (743,000 gallons) of petroleum products. Oil is toxic to the plants
and microscopic animals that form the basis of the marine food chain. It also poisons birds,
mammals and fish. Those not killed outright can suffer a slow death from debilitating illness
and injury.
Spills, Leaks and Catastrophes.

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Ext Yes Drilling

More drilling is on the way --- predictive evidence
Morgan, 7/4/2013 (John, Return of Deepwater Rigs Bodes Well for Growth in Gulf of Mexico,
Money News, p. http://www.moneynews.com/Economy/Deepwater-Rigs-GulfMexico/2013/07/04/id/513405) [MN]
Deepwater drilling has made a strong comeback in the Gulf of Mexico
only three years after the BP
disaster, and it may be the start of a new energy growth cycle there, according to MSN Money. Instead
of becoming a drilling wasteland following the BP disaster that created the worst oil spill in U.S. history, Gulf
exploration and production apparently is now one of the reasons the nation is moving toward energy independence.
The Houston Business Journal reported recently 40 rigs are under contract in the Gulf only five less than were
predicted for 2013 before the BPs Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster and the count could double by 2017 .
Editor's Note: After essentially being left for dead following the devastating (BP) blowout, we believe the deepwater
Gulf of Mexico is in the early stages of an extended growth cycle, a report from the International Strategy &
Investment Group LLC said.
Those analysts predicted the Gulf of Mexico may be the strongest offshore
market in the world through 2015.

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Drilling Now AT: Safe Technology

Drilling is not safe even after Deepwater Horizon
Savitz 12 (Jacqueline, Vice President North American Oceans at Oceana, Industry Won't
Make Drilling Safe, National Journal, 4-30, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/04/whatmore-can-be-done-to-ensur.php?comments=expandall#comments) [MN]
The idea that offshore drilling safety and spill response have substantially improved is little
more than a figment of some peoples imagination . In the question above, Michael Bromwich
acknowledges that during the Deepwater Horizon disaster (DWH) safeguards were not effective,
preparation was not adequate, and response tools were little better than they were 20 years
ago. But what has really changed in the past two years? Sadly, not enough . Even the question
itself, what the industry (private sector) can do to reduce risks, misses the point because it
sidelines the needed government action to scale back drilling given the lack of sufficient
safety and response options. Not to mention the lack of private sector solutions. Lets look at the
categories on the list: safeguards, preparations and response tools. Safeguards have barely changed. The
last line of defense at the wellhead, the heavily relied upon blowout preventer (BOP), turns
out to be flawed by design according to Det Norsk Veritas not just the one on the Deepwater Horizon, but
possibly the rest. Did the private sector fix that problem? Have BOPs been redesigned to be
effective and replaced? No and no. So, theres something the private sector could do, or rather
should have done before resuming drilling. But it hasnt been required and dangerous deep
water drilling is already back in full swing . There are new testing and maintenance
regulations for BOPs, but they dont fix the underlying design flaw. So that means we need real
improvements in the second category: preparations. Is industry more prepared now? Of course they are, just ask
them. Their exploration plans brag about response times in days now, rather than the months that we are
accustomed to. According to BP, if DWH happened again, it could plug a well in 2-3 weeks, much faster than the 3
months it took them last time. But what changed? Well, this time we are to assume the capping device will work -except we really dont know that. Just because it eventually worked on DWH doesnt mean it will
work next time on a different blowout with a differently oriented pipe or even a damaged
wellhead. Maybe if the companies offered to pre-drill relief wells, then they could credibly promise a faster
response. But the private sector isnt offering that, and again, government hasnt required it. So be ready for
another 3-month ordeal. That takes us to response. Its impossible to fully respond to a major spill. The DWH
caused tremendous impacts on marine life and coastal economies. And the response tools are not much
better now than they were 2 or even 20 years ago. We still rely on booms that dont really
work, and surface burns that may remove about 5% of the oil. And then there are always toxic
dispersants that can be used to hide the problem, though they create new problems. As a result, the next spill
will look like 2010 all over again. Response is little more than damage control.

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Alt Causality Overfishing 2NC

Their Brenner evidence concedes overfishing is the largest factor
Brenner, 3/14/2008 (Jorge, Guarding the Gulf of Mexicos valuable resources, SciDevNet, p.
http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html)
[MN]
[Their card beings]
The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known
nesting beach of Kemp's Ridley, the world's most endangered sea turtle. The Gulf's
circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importance: water from the
Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico
and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the
United States and Cuba to form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate
the climate of western Europe.
[Their card ends]
About one-third of the Gulf is a broad continental shelf, which provides a wealth of fisheries.
Intensive fishing is the biggest factor interfering with the Gulf's environment, and is an area where the
three governments should cooperate in managing this international resource.
***Solvency***

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Solvency No Cooperation
Mexico cant cooperate --- its unconstitutional
Grunstein et. al, November/December 2012 (Miriam Professor of Law at CIDE University
in Mexico, Richard McLaughlin Endowed Chair for Marine Policy and Law at the Harte
Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies at Texas A&M University, Corpus Christi, and
Luis Anastacio Gutierrez legal intern at the Mexican Foreign Ministry, Gulf of Mexico
Offshore Transboundary Hydrocarbon Development: Legal Issues Between Mexico & the U.S.,
The Houston Lawyer, p. Lexis-Nexis) [MN]
a cooperative solution has not been easy to negotiate or reach. One of the greatest challenges in
establishing a regime for joint exploration and exploitation of possible shared petroleum resources in the Gulf is the
stark difference between the two countries' petroleum legal regimes. In Mexico, not only is there a state
Unfortunately,
monopoly of the oil industry; but its constitution prevents the Mexican government from
authorizing direct exploitation
and production of hydrocarbons by private companies from foreign
countries, other than through service contracts. n5 In 2008, Mexico passed reforms to federal law in an attempt to
remove some of the restrictions that limit private contracting. Calls for further reforms surfaced in the context of
the recent presidential elections, but incoming President-elect Enrique Pena
Nieto faces difficult political
obstacles to passing the necessary constitutional reforms to allow international oil companies to drill within
Mexican boundaries. Despite the dramatic differences in their regulatory regimes, on February 20, 2012, the United
States and Mexico successfully negotiated an international agreement designed to establish a collaborative
relationship for joint development of transboundary reservoirs. Officially known as the "Agreement between the
United States of America and the United Mexican States Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the
Gulf of Mexico" (the "Agreement"), it addresses transboundary reservoirs and attempts to set up a unitization
framework for their efficient and equitable exploitation, although it leaves many details for future negotiation. n6
The Agreement will enter into force pending its ratification by the U.S. Senate and the establishment of internal
regulations regarding permits and licenses for U.S. operators to carry it out. n7
Significantly more
thorough legal and regulatory reform is needed in Mexico before the Agreement can be
effectively implemented. Once implemented, however, the Agreement will terminate the moratorium on drilling in
the Western Gap, which was implemented by the Western Gap Treaty on June 9, 2000. n8
US companies wont participate --- disclosure conflicts

I nstitute for E nergy R esearch, 4/24/2013 (IERs Simmons to Testify on Hydrocarbons
Agreement, p. http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2013/04/24/testimony-of-danielsimmons-subcommittee-on-energy-and-mineral-resources/) [MN]
Concerns about a Potential Conflict Between the T ransboundary H ydrocarbon A greement and Section 1504 of
Dodd-Frank While the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement is a good agreement that will aid both the United
States and Mexico, one potential problem is a conflict between Article 20 of the agreement and the Security and
Exchange Commissions Rule 13q-1 regarding Resource Extraction Payments. Article 20 states: To the extent
consistent with their national laws, the Parties shall maintain confidential, and obligate their Licensees to maintain
confidential, all Confidential Data and other information obtained from the other Party or its Licensees in
accordance with this Agreement. Together with Rule 13q-1, requiring resource extraction issuers to disclose
Article 20 can create an impossible situation for American

companies operating on transboundary hydrocarbon resources. For example, Mexican confidentiality requirements
may forbid the disclosure of the very information that Rule 13q-1 requires American companies[23] to disclose. This
would lead to a situation where companies regulated by the SEC have, at very least, uncertainty about
payments made to foreign governments,
compliance
with both Mexican and American disclosure laws. This uncertainty and potential disclosure conflict
would place foreign state-owned oil companies, who are not regulated by the SEC, at a competitive advantage to
the companies which operate in the United States are regulated by the SEC. Because much of the transboundary
area is deepwater, it would require multi-billion dollar investments

resources.
to produce the hydrocarbon
Any legal uncertainty brought about by disclosure law could easily dissuade American

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companies from undertaking what is already an expensive decision , in turn reducing opportunities for
new jobs for Americans.

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SS Hydrocarbon Negative Wave Three

1NC Strategy:
1. Budget DA (highlighted down)
2. Shale DA (highlighted down)
3. TESECA CP
4. Dodd-Frank DA
--K
--ASpec
Cross-X:
Do both the House and the Senate vote for the plan?
***TESECA Counterplan***

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MPA 1NC
The United States federal government should establish a Transboundary Energy Security
and Environmental Cooperation Area over the Western Gap.
The counterplan solves the case --- it promotes hydrocarbon cooperation and
environmental protection
McLaughlin 2008 (Richard Texas A&M University, Establishing Transboundary Marine Energy Security and
Environmental Cooperation Areas as a Method of Resolving Longstanding Political Disagreements and Improving
Transboundary Resource Management in the Gulf of Mexico, Frontier Issues in Ocean Law: Marine Resources,
Maritime Boundaries, and the Law of the Sea, p. Degruyter) [Kreus]
This article examines the longstanding political and legal obstacles to bilateral cooperation between the United States and Mexico, and it suggests
that bilateral cooperation could be improved without antagonizing long-standing political tensions by creating one or
more Transboundary Energy Security and Environmental Cooperation Areas (TESECA) in the GOMs maritime
boundary region. Two areas, in particular, that straddle the maritime boundary are especially well suited. The first is known as the
Perdido Foldbelt Region, where large quantities of hydrocarbons are known to exist in transboundary reservoirs.9 The second is the area
the Western Gap , which is already governed by an international treaty between the two nations.10
Creating a TESECA in these areas will provide a valuable institutional forum for bilateral discussion and development
of cooperative management opportunities for transboundary hydrocarbons as well as the protection of the
beyond national jurisdiction known as
marine environment . In addition to being an important area for oil and gas production, recent scientific studies have shown that the GOM
maritime boundary region contains highly productive deep-water chemosynthetic communities as well as a globally important nursery area for
blue fin tuna, among other ecologically important attributes.11 A formal bilateral arrangement will improve the ability of both
nations to manage, conserve , and monitor the status of the regions marine biodiversity and habitats. In contrast to
some other areas of the world where joint development agreements are commonly negotiated to exploit transboundary hydrocarbon deposits, a
new approach is needed in the GOM to overcome the historical barriers to cooperation that exist between the
U.S. and Mexico and to protect fragile environmental assets . To some extent, a TESECA would resemble existing
MPAs or Transboundary Peace Parks by serving to conserve natural resources and promote political good will .12 There
are currently 188 transboundary protected areas worldwide.13 However, the purpose of the proposed TESECA would differ from these
existing models by placing priority on the cooperative development of transboundary hydrocarbon resources
while preserving multiple uses and protecting the environmental integrity of the region . It is not a question of if, but of
when and how the U.S. and Mexico will exploit the hydrocarbon resources in the ultra-deepwater GOM. Creating TESECAs will provide
a method to share effective conservation approaches , new technologies and management strategies and lay
the foundation for the wise use of transboundary resources. Nations, beyond the GOM, that share transboundary hydrocarbon
resources but have longstanding political disagreements with neighbors may learn from the GOM experience and create similar areas and
arrangements.

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TESECA Overview
The counterplan establishes a transboundary marine protected area over the Western Gap.
The CP emphasizes environmental conservation while allowing for cooperative
development of hydrocarbon reserves.

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Perm 2NC
1. Perm links to the DA --- ratifying the TBHA kills the Dodd-Frank Act
2. The CP is mutually exclusive with the plan --- it makes the Western Gap a marine
protected area while the plan opens it up to joint development
3. Any perm that doesnt ratify the TBHA severs --- thats a voter for fairness because it
kills neg ground and makes the aff a moving target.
4. The plan and the CP are two distinct options
Given the extraordinary political sensitivity associated with any attempt to open up Mexicos energy sector to foreign
participation, it is unlikely that a formal joint development agreement between Mexico and the U.S. to exploit
transboundary hydrocarbons in the Perdido Foldbelt or Western Gap Regions is possible in anything resembling the near term.
Longstanding historical and political disagreements will significantly hinder any negotiations. Moreover, submitting the issue to third party
mediation or adjudication will be either politically infeasible or non-judiciable. Mutual accommodation is especially difficult when the
disagreement, as is the case in the GOM, is based primarily on domestic political and legal concerns rather than being limited to the foreign
policy arena. A more
realistic approach may be for the two nations to establish TESECAs to provide a framework
for cooperation and to address common challenges inherent in managing adjoining deepwater areas in the GOM. In many parts of the
world, transboundary protected areas serve to improve regional ecological management, increase economic opportunities, foster peace, and
provide a foundation for further collaboration in other, more politically charged areas.52 TESECAs in the GOM could similarly provide an
institutional forum to resolve specific bilateral problems.

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Perm 2NC AT: Do the CP

1. The perm severs --- our CP does not ratify the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement.
A) They sever the words Hydrocarbon Agreement
B) Capitalization means that its a proper noun which refers to a specific agreement
Fogarty, 9/9/2010 (Mignon grammar expert, Proper Nouns, p.
http://www.quickanddirtytips.com/education/grammar/capitalizing-proper-nouns?page=all) [Kreus]
When you're trying to decide whether to capitalize a noun, you have to figure out whether it's a proper noun or a common noun because
proper
nouns are capitalized and common nouns aren't. If you remember the Saturday morning cartoon Schoolhouse Rock!, you'll
remember that a noun is a person, place, or thing. But proper
nouns name specific
things . Names like Juan, Sarah,

like boy and girl aren't
capitalized because they're common nouns that don't refer to any one individual person or item .
people, places, or
and Ji Soo are capitalized because they're proper nouns that name specific people. On the other hand, words
2. The CP is functionally different than the plan --- it includes a marine-protected area and
the plan does not.
3. Severance is a voting issue --- it guts neg ground and makes the aff a moving target.

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Solvency 2NC PEMEX

The aff has no threshold for how much development has to occur to solve their Mexico
advantage. If we win any development occurs, you should evaluate the CP as sufficient to
solve.
The CP allows for hydrocarbon development but subjects it to environmental monitoring
standards and regulations. Thats McLaughlin 8.
TESECA includes access to hydrocarbons.
It will not be easy to reduce the deep-seated historical mistrust that the Mexican people have of foreign enterprises exploiting the nations natural
resources. However, establishing
TESECAs in the Gulf of Mexico may represent the best way to develop a
foundation of trust between the two nations . It is in both nations strong self-interest to find a framework to efficiently and
effectively develop and manage the transboundary hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Mexico. Collaboration using a TESECA approach
represents a template upon which a complex set of relationships can evolve. It will allow the nations to jointly develop goals and
priorities; produce baseline geo-seismic and environmental studies; and begin the process of setting up the institutional and legal
mechanisms necessary to jointly develop their shared transboundary resources as mandated by norms of international
law. Future research will be necessary to determine the most effective way to institutionally structure, administratively implement, and
sustainably fund any proposed TESECA.
TESECA cooperation spills over to legal reform of Mexicos constitution.

The TESECA framework may also provide a valuable forum for binational scholarly exchange on legal and
policy issues . For instance, it is currently unsettled how these co-owned transboundary hydrocarbon deposits should
be treated under Mexican domestic law generally and within the meaning of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution more
specifically.55 It could be persuasively argued that fungible resources such as transboundary hydrocarbons do not fall
within the ambit of Article 27. Shared transboundary resources have always been given unique legal status under international law and
perhaps the same approach would apply under Mexicos domestic law. Answers to these unsettled legal questions could
profoundly change the political dynamics that currently exist in the region.

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Solvency 2NC Environment

The CP creates a marine protected area over the Western Gap and the subsequent
transboundary areas. This allows for environmental protection through safety regulations
and monitoring. Thats McLaughlin 2008.
Solves the environment --- any drilling will be environmentally safe and collaboration spills
over
A more realistic approach may be for the two nations to establish TESECAs to provide a framework for cooperation
and to address common challenges inherent in managing adjoining deepwater areas in the GOM. In many parts of the world,
transboundary protected areas serve to improve regional ecological management , increase economic
opportunities, foster peace, and provide a foundation for further collaboration
in other,
more politically charged
areas .52 TESECAs in the GOM could similarly provide an institutional forum to resolve specific bilateral
problems . For example, Mexican officials have publicly expressed concern that commercial production on the U.S. side
of the maritime boundary in the Perdido Foldbelt area scheduled to begin by 2010 may deplete transboundary reservoirs within
Mexicos territory.53 The validity of this assertion is currently unknown because no detailed surveys have been conducted to determine the
unity of deposit along the maritime boundary.54 One of the principle functions of the TESECA could be to facilitate a
detailed bi-national survey of the precise location and potential size of transboundary reservoirs. A well-planned binational survey of this kind would reduce the mistrust between the parties and legitimize any future decisions
regarding commercialization of transboundary reservoirs . Similarly, joint scientific expeditions to understand,
manage, conserve, and monitor critical marine habitats within designated TESECAs would be highly beneficial. Once again, the
TESECA structure could be used as an institutional framework to stimulate and organize bilateral scientific
collaboration between the nations . This scientific effort could provide very useful baseline data and guide future
decisions to commercialize transboundary resources with as little damage to the marine environment as
possible .

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Solvency 2NC AT: Mexico Says No

1. They have zero evidence to substantiate this claim
2. The environmentally focused nature of the transboundary park overcomes barriers to
cooperation. Mexico would go along with the CP. Thats McLaughlin 8.

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Solvency 2NC AT: Cooperation Add-Ons

Solves cooperation
There is a growing body of scientific literature suggesting that transboundary peace parks and environmental
conservation zones can serve as a catalyst to broader political reconciliation beyond the environmental sphere.57
Using game theoretic models, Lejano found that transboundary peace parks provide symbolically important regimes
for relationship-building and create a context in which parties can more actively cooperate.58 Moreover, by
requiring the cooperative, joint action of the parties, transboundary parks allow them to see themselves as a
functioning group and to better envision methods of agreement.59 In the context of transboundary water issues, it
has been found that joint water management projects funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) dramatically
speed up the process of gaining agreement on priorities and firm commitments to action compared to water projects
where there is no institutionalized collaborative process.60 Achieving a shared vision and commitment by focusing
on a few strategic projects allows broader political and legal disagreements to be broken down into manageable
priorities. TESECAs could serve this function by providing a vehicle for the two nations to engage in joint fact
finding and sharing of information to address sensitive legal, political, and scientific issues in a non-confrontational
setting. A number of these transboundary parks are located in the marine environment. Several, most notably the
Israel/Jordan Red Sea Marine Peace Park (RSMPP), have been very successful in not only improving
communications and partnerships among scientists and managers, but also in furthering broader foreign policy
goals.61 As a result of this collaborative program, communication and coordination have been improved between
the Jordanian and Israeli management and scientific communities at a transboundary scale. According to senior park
managers:
The lessons learned through the RSMPP Program and its new paradigm approach for interactions between and
amongst scientists, resource managers, policy makers and the public are transferable and have applicability for
promoting similar transboundary partnerships around the world.62 A similar effort between the nations of Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, to establish a common marine eco-region has been described as creating an era of
relationship-building that transcends the park itself. In fact, at the signing ceremony, the Malaysian delegate
interpreted the event as the beginning of adikberadik, a Malay word for kinship.63 While all transboundary parks are
established to meet their own unique goals and stakeholder interests, they all share the common aspirations of
finding integrated solutions across borders and creating a framework for conflict resolution and peace building.
Regardless of what final form that a TESECA in the Gulf of Mexico may take, Mexico and the U.S. will benefit
from these positive institutional features.
***Dodd-Frank Disadvantage***

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Dodd-Frank DA 1NC
Ratifying the TBHA unravels the Dodd-Frank disclosure provision.
Geman, 4/25/2013 (Ben, House GOP moves to shield oil companies from disclosure rule, The Hill, p.
http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296235-house-gop-moves-to-shield-oil-companies-from-disclosure-rules)
[Kreus]
A House GOP bill to implement a U.S.-Mexico offshore energy accord exempts oil companies operating under
the pact from controversial federal rules that force energy producers to disclose their payments to foreign governments. The provision
could become a sticking point in enacting the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement , a 2012 accord to enable
cooperation in development of oil-and-gas along a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico.
I dont see how that provision can be
taken out , said Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.), the chairman of a House subcommittee that reviewed the bill Thursday. The U.S.Mexico energy accord has strong support from Republicans and the Obama administration. Backers note it will open a substantial offshore region
to oil production and enable new cooperation between U.S. companies and PEMEX, Mexicos state-owned oil giant. But Interior and State
Department officials declined, at Thursday's hearing, to weigh in on the GOP implementing bills limited exemption from Securities and
Exchange Commission disclosure rules. The
legislation appears to be the first bill introduced to alter the resource payments
disclosure provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial law, a provision that faces heavy opposition from oil industry and
business groups. Dodd-Frank requires SEC-listed oil, natural gas and mining companies to disclose payments to foreign governments related to
projects in their countries, such as money for production licenses, royalties and so forth. On Thursday, Republicans and officials with oil industry
groups said the exemption in the GOP bill is needed to prevent a collision with confidentiality provisions in the U.S.-Mexico accord. The treaty
that we are hammering out with Mexico does address confidentiality and allows for it for competitive reasons for both their company and
American companies, so that right there puts that agreement at odds with Dodd-Frank, Lamborn, chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and
Mineral Resources, told reporters. Daniel Simmons of the Institute for Energy Research (IER) told the subcommittee that the U.S.-Mexico accord
and the Dodd-Frank mandate could together create an impossible situation for American companies weighing expensive deepwater projects in
the transboundary region. Any legal uncertainty brought about by disclosure law could easily dissuade American companies from undertaking
what is already an expensive decision, in turn reducing opportunities for new jobs for Americans, said Simmons, director of regulatory and state
affairs for IER, which receives fossil fuel industry backing. Obama administration officials declined to weigh in on the exemption. Tommy
Beaudreau, the Interior Departments acting assistant secretary for land and minerals management, said during the hearing that he doesnt have a
view of the provision at this point and wants more information. It is something that we are going to have to talk with the committee about, try
and understand what the committee is getting at there, and work with them on it, he told reporters after his appearance before lawmakers. But
Oxfam America, which is a major backer of the SEC rules, criticized the exemption and is concerned the bill is part of a
wider effort to repeal the Dodd-Frank provision . We agree with the SEC that no exemptions to the payment
reporting requirements of [Dodd-Frank] Section 1504 are warranted and believe that oil industry arguments in favor of exemptions
are groundless. The exemptions language in this proposed legislation implementing a US-Mexico transboundary hydrocarbons agreement is
irrelevant and unnecessary, said Ian Gary, senior policy manager of Oxfam Americas oil, gas and mining program, in a statement. The American
Petroleum Institute, which also backed the exemption Thursday, is currently challenging the SEC rule in court, and has said it may seek
legislation to thwart the regulation. Lamborn, for his part, suggested the provision in the U.S.-Mexico energy bill could be a
model going forward , and expressed concern that similar conflicts could arise between the Dodd-Frank
provision and confidentiality laws in other nations . The Dodd-Frank disclosure provision is aimed at undoing
the resource curse , in which some impoverished countries in Africa and elsewhere are plagued by corruption
and conflict alongside their energy and mineral wealth. Human rights and anti-poverty groups say greater transparency will
help ensure the public in these nations benefits from their natural resource wealth. Backers also argue the disclosure will
provide greater information to investors. Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-Ariz.) criticized the exemption is the transboundary bill during
Thursday's hearing, stating that the Dodd-Frank mandate goes to the core of the SECs investor protection mission.
Dodd-Frank solves corruption in Afghanistan --- the impact is stability.

Clough, 8/3/2010 (Christine coordinator of the Task Force on Financial Integrity & Economic Development,
Using Transparency to Avoid the Resource Curse in Afghanistan, Financial Transparency Coalition, p.
http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/)
[Kreus]
Additionally,
the disclosure of corporate profits
on a country-by-country-basis would
in the fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan .
aid civil society groups and donors
Extractive industry experts will be able to estimate whether the
revenue figures disclosed by a corporation are accurate based on their knowledge of the deposits and the industry.
Relatively accurate

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89
revenue figures will in turn support better estimates of government revenue, which outside parties can then compare to
figures released by the government on its receipts and expendituresas discrepancies between the two sources could suggest
corruption. The net result of a country-by-country reporting standard is the potential for more of the wealth generated by Afghanistans mineral
resources to actually reach and benefit the general population. Transparent management and reporting of Afghanistans natural
resources would be a win-win situation for all the parties involved. The central government will have more revenue,
which can then be spent on development; infrastructure; and proper, timely payment of government employees (including the
military and police). The happier, wealthier populous will generate greater legitimacy for political leaders ,
which contributes to improved government and social stability . Mining companies will, in turn, benefit from a stable and
lawful environment in which to operate eventually improving their bottom line. Allied governmentsand their peoplewould then
transition from the role of donor to a desperate country into investors in a dynamic and rapidly developing country.
Significant progress was made towards country-by-country reporting this past month when the United States Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Zct. The legislation included the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT)
provision, which requires all companies working in the extractive industries and registered with the SEC (i.e. 90% of
all major international companies working in the extractive industries) to disclose all payments made to host governments on an on-going
basis. Thats major progress , and it will significantly help curtail corruption in resource-rich countries like
Afghanistan. However, its not until we report corporate profits on a country-by-country basis, that well achieve full transparency in this
crucial sector.
Afghanistan collapse escalates to global nuclear war

Morgan 2007 (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee,
Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?, 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive
.com/article/_Better_another_Taliban_Afghanistan__than_a_Taliban_NUCLEAR_Pakistan___/99961/0/) [Kreus]
However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no
guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say.
Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban
Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan . Then, the likely
break up of Afghanistan
along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to
the break up of Pakistan , as well. Strong
centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could
be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup dtat.
Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born
that year was Osama (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition
parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup dtat by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take
power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely.
Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist
movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq
would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread
to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast.
Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes,
terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would
break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war , between Pakistan and India
could not be ruled out . Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda
deep chaos would, of course, open a Pandora's box for the region and the world. With the
influence is a real possibility. Such
possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not
only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly
weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America . Therefore a nuclear war would now
again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could
War with China and Russia pitted against the US .
usher in a new Cold

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FYI Section 1504

This is a card proving our DA is about Section 1504
Hunt, Spring 2011 (Sinead J.D. Yale University, Refining Black Gold: The Dodd-Frank Act and Corruption in the
Oil Industry, UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs, p. Lexis-Nexis) [Kreus]
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, n13 [*45] ostensibly aimed at regulating US financial institutions,
tackles the resource curse head on. Section 1504 , n14 located in the "Miscellaneous Provisions" at the end of the 2,319-page
document, requires oil companies and other extractive issuers registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to disclose payments made to governments for oil and other natural resource extraction rights . Section 1504,
which has yet to be implemented, aims to increase transparency in the extractive industries by providing enhanced oversight of revenue streams
filtered through the governments of resource-rich states.

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Dodd-Frank Link 2NC

1. Extend Geman 13 --- the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement will include
exemptions for Dodd-Frank provisions. This spills over to the collapse of transparency
measures.
2. TBHA weakens Dodd-Frank
Gary, 5/9/2013 (Ian Senior Policy Manager for Extractive Industries at Oxfam America, A back door attack on oil
payment transparency, Oxfam America, p. http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/05/09/a-back-doorattack-on-oil-payment-transparency/) [Kreus]
A few weeks ago, a few House Republicans introduced H.R. 1613, the innocuous sounding Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary
Hydrocarbons Agreement Act. A little over four pages long, H.R. 1613 is primarily designed to provide Congressional approval to
a US-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement (TBA) signed by both governments over a year ago. Oxfam has no problem
with the approval of the US-Mexico TBA which simply lays out the rules for how hydrocarbons reserves in the Gulf of Mexico that straddle our
maritime borders would be developed. We do have a big problem with an irrelevant provision inserted into the bill designed to
weaken the payment disclosure requirements in Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the Cardin-Lugar
provision. That law provides for the annual disclosure of payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to host
governments around the world final rules were issued by the SEC in August last year. H .R. 1613 would exempt any covered
company from reporting payments from in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbons agreement anywhere
in the world .

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AT: No Link Plan Doesnt Exempt

1. Implementation of the TBHA results in creating an exemption for Mexican companies
under the Dodd-Frank act. It is not possible for the provision to be taken out. Thats
Geman 13
2. Cross-x proves a link --- they say the plan only has to pass the Senate. This means they
pass the House version of the bill.
3. Defer to normal means --- allowing the aff the clarify after weve already given our 1NC
creates a moving target --- thats a voter for fairness.

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Dodd-Frank Impact Afghanistan Stability 2NC

Dodd-Frank encourages global transparency measures that weaken corruption in
Afghanistan --- corruption kills legitimacy and causes instability. Thats Clough 2010.
The Dodd-Frank provision limits corruption in Afghanistan --- prevents conflict
Firger, 9/28/2010 (Daniel, Lifting the Resource Curse: Will Dodd-Frank Do the Trick?, The Huffington Post, p.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-firger/post_945_b_741761.html) [Kreus]
Don't think Wall Street reform has much to do with Afghan corruption? Think again , says Congress, President Obama,
and a broad coalition of human rights and sustainable development NGOs. As we all know by now, the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
Act passed in July 2010 contains a slew of new rules to rein in abuses in the financial sector. One of its most interesting features,
however, is
aimed not at wrongdoing by American commodities traders, but at corruption and conflict in the countries where
commodities themselves are extracted from the ground. Packed into the bill's 2,300-odd pages is a somewhat overlooked but
nonetheless far-reaching provision that requires publicly traded oil, gas and mining companies to disclose the payments
they make to foreign governments in exchange for the rights to drill and dig. From Congolese gold mines and Nigerian oilfields to
the rainforests of Borneo and soon -- if the Pentagon is to be believed -- the mountains of southern Afghanistan, natural
resource abundance is too often linked to corruption , conflict , and human rights abuses . One promising
strategy to help lift this so-called "resource curse" involves natural resource revenue transparency . The idea is simple:
force international companies to disclose what they pay -- and to whom -- and then let local stakeholders and international
NGOs make use of this information to hold corrupt leaders accountable .

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Impact 2NC
DA outweighs
A) Timeframe the risk of heg collapse is decades away --- the 1AC Kohl evidence says it
will be ten years before a collapse. Prefer our quicker time frame because you can only die
once.
B) Probability Pakistani collapse it the most probable scenario for extinction
OHanlon 2006 (Michael senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, Dealing with the
Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State, The Princeton Project Papers, p. 1) [Kreus]
Few dangers in the 21st century could compete with the altogether too plausible scenario in which a nuclear-armed state
collapses, with the custody of its weapons immediately becoming a national security threat of the highest order
United States and some of its allies. In fact, there is a strong case that in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world, this
greatest existential threat
to Western survival: the
to the
danger is the single
chances of nuclear war between the U nited S tates and Russia are
now very low ; those between the U nited S tates and China are nontrivial but limited ; and the chances that al
Qaeda or a related terrorist organization could develop its own nuclear arms are also very small . However, if a terrorist group
somehow got its hands on one or more nuclear arms, it could pose an extraordinary risk to the U nited S tates and
other internationally prominent Western countries with controversial foreign policies, such as the United Kingdom. The
most likely path to
such a situation may well be the collapse of a nuclear-armed country, in all likelihood Pakistan or North Korea given their fragile
politics, and the subsequent purchase or confiscation of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group in the anarchical environment
that ensued.
Nuclear war turns oceans

Sagan 1984 (Carl Ph.D. from U Chicago and former professor of biology and genetics at Stanford, Nuclear War
and Climate Catastrophe, Foreign Affairs, p. Lexis) [MN]
The darkness alone may cause a collapse in the aquatic food chain in which sunlight is harvested by
phytoplankton, phytoplankton by zooplankton, zooplankton by small fish, small fish by large fish, and, occasionally, large fish by humans.
many nuclear war scenarios, this food chain is likely to collapse at its base for at least a year and is significantly more imperiled in
tropical waters. The increase in ultraviolet light available at the surface of the earth approximately a year after the war
provides an additional major environmental stress that by itself has been described as having " profound
consequences " for aquatic , terrestrial and other ecosystems .
n17
In

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Impact Afghanistan Laundry List

Afghanistan collapse causes Russian/Ukraine conflict and NATO collapse
Miller, March/April 2012 (Paul D. former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff under
Presidents Bush and Obama, assistant professor of the International Security affairs at the National Defense
University, director for the Afghanistan-Pakistan program at the college of International Security Affairs, Its Not
just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region, World Affairs Journal, p.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it%E2%80%99s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region)
[Kreus]
Russia remains heavily involved in the Central Asian republics. It has worked to oust the United States from the air base at
Manas, Kyrgyzstan. It remains interested in the huge energy reserves in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russia may be wary of significant
involvement in Afghanistan proper, unwilling to repeat the Soviet Unions epic blunder there. But a US withdrawal from Afghanistan followed by
Kabuls collapse would likely embolden Russia to assert its influence more aggressively elsewhere in Central Asia
or Eastern Europe, especially in the Ukraine. A US departure from Afghanistan will also continue to resonate for years to come in the
strength and purpose of NATO. Every American president since Harry Truman has affirmed the centrality of the Atlantic Alliance to US national
security. The war in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Alliances first out-of-area operation in
its sixty-year history, was going poorly until the US troop surge. Even with the limited success that followed, allies have complained that the
burden in Afghanistan has been distributed unevenly. Some, like the British, Canadians, and Poles, are fighting a shooting war in Kandahar and
Helmand, while others, like the Lithuanians and Germans, are doing peacekeeping in Ghor and Kunduz. The poor command and controlsplit
between four regional centersleft decisionmaking slow and poorly coordinated for much of the war. ISAFs strategy was only clarified in 2008
and 2009, when Generals David McKiernan and Stanley McChrystal finally developed a more coherent campaign plan with counterinsurgencyappropriate rules of engagement. A bad
end in Afghanistan could have dire consequences for the Atlantic Alliance,
leaving the organizations future, and especially its credibility as a deterrent to Russia, in question. It would not be
irrational for a Russian observer of the war in Afghanistan to conclude that if NATO cannot make tough decisions, field
effective fighting forces, or distribute burdens evenly, it cannot defend Europe . The U nited S tates and Europe must
prevent that outcome by salvaging a credible result to its operations in Afghanistanone that both persuades Russia
that NATO is still a fighting alliance and preserves the organization as a pillar of US national security.
Ukraine intervention sparks global nuclear war.

Kingston, February 2009 (Brian, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs CIFP, Ukraine: A Risk
Assessment Report, p. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1214.pdf) [Kreus]
Russia: Russia
seeks to influence the weakened Ukraine, inflaming ethnic-Russian separatism ; Crimea declares
resists, perhaps seeing an external war as a distraction from internal strife; Russia comes to the aid of Crimea/ethnicRussians resulting in open warfare between Russia and Ukraine. The West: The West also suffers from the global recession, but
independence; Ukraine
(perhaps following a period of inward looking protectionism) realizes
that it cannot allow Russian success in Ukraine; open
hostilities erupt between Russian and NATO forces triggering World War III and the strong possibility of
nuclear war , or at least the drawing in of many other countries.
NATO collapse causes nuclear wars

Duffield 1994 (John, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs University of Virginia, Political
Science Quarterly, 109, p. 766-767) [Kreus]
Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring
relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the
alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating
from outside their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the relatively
new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for
institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is
increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern
Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the
former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and
that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter

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96
rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security
policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually
inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant
stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic
interests in Europe as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign
investment by American companies remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the U nited S tates could easily be
drawn into a future major war in Europe , the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating
than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons .

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Impact Central Asia 2NC

Afghan collapse destabilizes Central Asia
Akbulut, 2007 (Isil, International Strategic Research Organization, If Afghanistan Collapses?, Afghan Profile, 719, http://afghanprofile.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=163&Itemid=27) [Kreus]
If the situation in the country continues as it is and the power of the US army ebbs, the loss of Afghanistan would be devastating for
both the region and the whole world. Above all, Pakistan is very much vulnerable to the changes in Afghanistan. Pakistan, whose
demographical structure is composed of many tribes, is one of the largest Muslim countries in the world. The geographical features of
Afghanistan and Pakistans borders preclude offensive security arrangements. In regard to ethnic, social, linguistic and religious structure, there
are lots of similarities between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is a country which could not tackle even its own problems, because of its
fledgling democracy, economy and other disadvantages. In the case of Pakistan, it could be said that the country would face the process of
Afghanistanization if the problems of Afghanistan are added on to its own. Apart from Pakistan, Afghanistan is a key
country for the Central Asia as well. Uzbeks, Tajiks and other societies are widespread in Afghanistan, and the changes in this country
would inevitably affect the neighboring Muslim Central Asian republics. Besides most of Central Asian republics, especially
Uzbekistan would not be able to resist the extremist and radical movements in Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, there is the risk that
Afghanistans problems would spread not only on the direction of Southern Asia but also to Central Asia. In addition to Pakistan and
Central Asia, the failure of the reforms and moderate groups in Afghanistan will add another Palestine, Iraq or Chechnya issue for
the Muslim world. All these problems increased the victimization feeling of the Muslims and deepened the mistrust
between Muslims and the West by luring many Muslims to the extremist ideas. In another word, if the world cannot solve the
Afghanistan problem, Afghanistan will spread all over the world.
Central Asian conflict escalates to global nuclear war

Tsepkalo 1998 (Valery V., Belarussian Ambassador to the U.S., Foreign Affairs, March/April, Lexis) [Kreus]
But abetting the continuing destabilization of Eurasia is not in the West's interests. NATO enlargement has not consolidated anti-Western forces in
the region, as some Western experts had feared, but it has encouraged the division of Eurasia and the shattering of the Russian Federation. There
will likely be further attempts at secession, although not necessarily according to the bloody model of Chechnya. Central Asia and the
Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite several nations and draw in outside powers. And with regional
destabilization and the slackening of central control, the nuclear threat is perhaps greater now than during the Cold War.
[Continues] The scramble for the spoils of the Soviet heritage could cause serious conflict between major
geopolitical players and threaten the very foundations of established security systems. When a tenant in a building falls ill or dies, if the
tenants in the other apartments begin knocking down walls to expand their own space, they could end up destroying the entire building. Any
"world order" is stable only when everyone knows his place in it and there is sufficient collective and individual power, and the willingness to use
it, to maintain the whole. The challenge for Europe and the world in the post-Soviet space is averting further disintegration and
keeping disorder and conflict from spilling out of the region and setting the globe ablaze. It is clearly to the West's advantage
to promote certain kinds of regional integration in Eurasia. The rapid rise of any player, especially China or Iran, or a radical Islamic revolution
could harm Western interests. Western unity would be shaken if one or more of its own, whether Germany, Turkey, or Japan, tried to secure its
own zone of influence. The intervention of NATO forces in future conflicts in the region, probably at the request of the parties involved,
could cause further disintegration, perhaps resulting in loss of control over weapons of mass destruction.

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Impact Indo/Pak 2NC

Afghanistan instability causes insurgency ignites Indo-Pak nuclear war
Foust 9 (Joshua, Fellow American Security Project, Military Intelligence Analyst, and Author Afghanistan
Journal, The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations, Registan, 8-27,
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/08/27/the-case-for-afghanistan-strategic-considerations/) [Kreus]
It is possible that scaling back American influence in the country merely to that of an advisory and arms dealing rolemuch as the Soviet Union
did post-1989might be effective. Indeed, it very well might for a little bit. But this is where it becomes impossible to ignore
Pakistan (and not just for the shallow reason that al Qaeda is hiding in an ungoverned space in the Northwest). Pakistan has not lost its
fundamental strategic rationale for supporting the original Taliban: a hedge against Iran, strategic depth against India, and a training ground for
Kashmiri insurgents. In fact, it could be easily argued that a big reason Kashmir has calmed down is that all the crazies were too busy fighting in
Miram Shah and Kandahar and Khost and Ghazni to go plant bombs in Srinagar. And lest anyone think it is appropriate to write off the
India-Pakistan conflict as somebody elses problem, it is never somebody elses problem when nuclear weapons are involved. As
Jari Lindholm reminded, India
like it or not, it
and Pakistan have come a hairs breadth from nuclear c onflict twice over Kashmir. And
is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asiawhich makes
fixing Afghanistan
in some way also a vital American interest. Regional security is one of those topics that gets mentioned casually by
many pundits but never really articulated. It is by far Ahmed Rashids most convincing argument, that supporting stability in Central and
South Asia is a compelling interest not just for the U.S., but for the West in general. When it comes to Pakistan, the big danger
is not in a Taliban takeover, or even in the Taliban seizure of nuclear weaponsI have never believed that the ISI could be that
monumentally stupid (though they are incredibly stupid for letting things get this far out of hand). The big danger, as it has been since 1999,
is that insurgents, bored or underutilized in Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and
Pakistan, and that that confrontation will spillover into nuclear conflict . That is worth blood and treasure to prevent. When
Afghanistan was a sanctuary for destabilizing elementswhether Chechens training to go fight Russia, Juma Namangani training to go fight
Tashkent, or even Osama bin Laden training his men to go fight Americathe region as a whole was a serious security concern. The reason why
so many books and articles condemning the Clinton administrations stand-offish attitude have been so popular is because that message resonates
how could you not have seen this coming? While things have undoubtedly become more violent, they are also, in a way, more ordered. The
insurgency in Afghanistan is a difficult and frustrating enemy to fight, more so the insurgency in Pakistan. But both are
identifiable, and are capable therefore of being defeated or delegitimized . The fact that the U.S. has chosen not to do this is the topic
for another post (and the source of the tremendous frustration and borderline burnout Ive been struggling with the last few months). But right
now, the major security concerns are compelling, they are fairly clear to me at least, and I am completely baffled as to why even the war
supporters cannot articulate them. So, let us summarize the strategic goals of the Afghanistan War: A basic minimal stability
in Afghanistan, such that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda is likely to develop a staging ground for international
attacks, whether against neighboring countries or the United States and Europe; The permanent delegitimization of Pakistans
insurgents, such that they can no longer push Pakistan and India toward nuclear conflict ; I find both of those convincing
reasons to stay and do things right.

Chung/Mulholand

99
Ext Pakistani Collapse

Afghanistan collapse leads to the break up of Pakistan
Miller, March/April 2012 (Paul D. former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff under
Presidents Bush and Obama, assistant professor of the International Security affairs at the National Defense
University, director for the Afghanistan-Pakistan program at the college of International Security Affairs, Its Not
just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region, World Affairs Journal, p.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it%E2%80%99s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region)
[Kreus]
The Afghanistan Study Group, a collection of scholars and former policymakers critical of the current intervention, argued in 2010
that al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan and is unlikely to return , even if Afghanistan reverts to chaos or Taliban rule. It
argued that three things would have to happen for al-Qaeda to reestablish a safe haven and threaten the United States: 1) the Taliban
must seize control of a substantial portion of the country, 2) Al Qaeda must relocate there in strength, and 3) it must build facilities in this new
safe haven that will allow it to plan and train more effectively than it can today. Because all three are unlikely to happen, the Study Group
argued, al-Qaeda almost certainly will not reestablish a presence in Afghanistan in a way that threatens US security. In fact, none of those
three steps
are necessary for al-Qaeda to regain its safe haven and threaten America . The group could return to
safe haven there if
Afghanistan relapsed into chaos or civil war. Militant groups, including al-Qaeda offshoots, have gravitated toward other
failed states, like Somalia and Yemen, but Afghanistan remains especially tempting, given the networks
familiarity with the terrain and local connections. Nor does al-Qaeda, which was never numerically overwhelming, need
to return to Afghanistan in strength to be a threat. Terrorist operations, including the attacks of 2001, are typically planned and
carried out by very few people . Al-Qaedas resilience, therefore, means that stabilizing Afghanistan is, in fact,
Afghanistan even if the Taliban do not take back control of the country. It couldand probably wouldfind
necessary even for the most basic US war aims. The international community should not withdraw until there is an Afghan government and
Afghan security forces with the will and capacity to deny safe haven without international help. Setting aside the possibility of al-Qaedas
reemergence, the
U nited S tates has other important interests in the region as wellnotably preventing the Taliban from
gaining enough power to destabilize
neighboring Pakistan , which, for all its recent defiance, is officially a longstanding American
ally. (It signed two mutual defense treaties with the United States in the 1950s, and President Bush designated it a major non-NATO ally in 2004.)
State failure in Pakistan brokered by the Taliban could mean regional chaos and a possible loss of control of its
nuclear weapons . Preventing such a catastrophe is clearly a vital national interest of the United States and cannot be accomplished with a
few drones. Alarmingly, Pakistan
is edging toward civil war . A collection of militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda,
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), among others, are fighting an insurgency that has
escalated dramatically since 2007 across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan. According
to the Brookings Institutions Pakistan Index, insurgents, militants, and terrorists now regularly launch more than one
hundred and fifty attacks per month on Pakistani government, military, and infrastructure targets. In a so far feckless and ineffectual
response, Pakistan has deployed nearly one hundred thousand regular army soldiers to its western provinces. At least three thousand soldiers have
been killed in combat since 2007, as militants have been able to seize control of whole towns and districts. Tens of thousands of Pakistani
civilians and militantsthe distinction between them in these areas is not always clearhave been killed in daily terror and counterterror
operations. The two insurgencies
in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked . Defeating the Afghan Taliban would give the
U nited S tates and Pakistan momentum in the fight against the Pakistani Taliban. A Taliban takeover in Afghanistan,
on the other hand, will give new strength to the Pakistani insurgency, which would gain an ally in Kabul, safe haven to
train and arm and from which to launch attacks into Pakistan, and a huge morale boost in seeing their compatriots win
power in a neighboring country. Pakistans collapse or fall to the Taliban is (at present) unlikely, but the implications of that scenario are so dire
that they cannot be ignored. Even short of a collapse, increasing chaos and instability in Pakistan could give cover for terrorists
to increase the intensity and scope of their operations, perhaps even to achieve the cherished goal of stealing a nuclear weapon. Although
our war there has at times seemed remote, Afghanistan itself occupies
crucial geography . Situated between Iran and

Pakistan, bordering China, and within reach of Russia and India, it sits on a crossroads of Asias great powers. This
is why it has, since the nineteenth century, been home to the so-called Great Gamein which the US should continue to be a player.
Two other players, Russia and Iran, are aggressive powers seeking to establish hegemony over their neighbors. Iran is
seeking to build nuclear weapons, has an elite military organization (the Quds Force) seeking to export its Islamic Revolution,
and uses the terror group Hezbollah as a proxy to bully neighboring countries and threaten Israel. Russia under Vladimir Putin is

Chung/Mulholand
seeking to reestablish its sphere of influence

100
over its near abroad, in pursuit of which it (probably) cyber-attacked Estonia in 2007,
invaded Georgia in 2008, and has continued efforts to subvert Ukraine. Iran owned much of Afghan territory centuries ago, and continues
to
share a similar language, culture, and religion with much of the country. It maintains extensive ties with the
Taliban, Afghan warlords, and opposition politicians who might replace the corrupt but Western-oriented Karzai government. Building
a stable government in Kabul will be a small step in the larger campaign to limit Tehrans influence .

Chung/Mulholand

101
Pakistan Collapse Impact AT: Containment

Attempts to contain Pakistani weapons will fail and escalate to Indo/Pak nuclear war.
OHanlon 2006 (Michael senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, Dealing with the
Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State, The Princeton Project Papers, p. 11-12) [Kreus]
Were Pakistan to collapse, it is unclear what the United States and like-minded states would or should do. As with North Korea, it is
highly unlikely that surgical strikes to destroy the nuclear weapons could be conducted before extremists could
make a grab at them. The U nited S tates probably would not know their location at a minimum, scores of sites
controlled by Special Forces or elite Army units would be presumed candidates and no Pakistani government would likely
help external forces with targeting information. The chances of learning the locations would probably be greater than in the North Korean
case, given the greater openness of Pakistani society and its ties with the outside world; but U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation, cut off
for a decade in the 1990s, is still quite modest, and the likelihood that Washington would be provided such information or
otherwise obtain it should be considered small . If a surgical strike, series of surgical strikes, or commando-style raids were not possible,
the only option would be to try to restore order before the weapons could be taken by extremists and transferred to terrorists. The
United States and other outside powers might, for example, respond to a request by the Pakistani government to help restore order. Given the
embarrassment associated with requesting such outside help, the Pakistani government might delay asking until quite
late , thus complicating an already challenging operation. If the international community could act fast enough, it might help defeat an
insurrection. Another option would be to protect Pakistans borders, therefore making it harder to sneak nuclear weapons out of the country, while
only providing technical support to the Pakistani armed forces as they tried to quell the insurrection. Given the enormous stakes, the United States
would literally have to do anything it could to prevent nuclear weapons from getting into the wrong hands. India would, of course, have a
strong incentive to ensure the security of Pakistans nuclear weapons. It also would have the advantage of
proximity; it could undoubtedly mount a large response within a week, but its role would be complicated to say the least. In the case of a
dissolved Pakistani state, India likely would not hesitate to intervene; however, in the more probable scenario in
which Pakistan were fraying but not yet collapsed, Indias intervention could unify Pakistans factions against the
invader, even leading to the deliberate use of Pakistani weapons against India . In such a scenario, with Pakistans
territorial integrity and sovereignty on the line and its weapons put into a use or lose state by the approach of the Indian
Army, nuclear dangers have long been considered to run very high .

Chung/Mulholand

102
Dodd-Frank Impact AT: No Modeling

Dodd-Frank creates a model of transparency globally.
The history of the FCPA suggests that when the U nited S tates takes the lead in the effort to tackle foreign corruption,
it sets a high bar that other countries will replicate . For example, the U nited S tates played a key role in the
enactment of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which now has 38 member [*70] countries. n133 While no other country had a law
analogous to the FCPA when it was enacted in the United States, the main trading partners of the United States now do. Indeed, other
countries explicitly take the FCPA as a baseline from which to establish stringent anti-corruption laws . For example, the
United Kingdom recently enacted the UK Bribery Act, n134 which one commentator nicknamed "the FCPA on steroids." n135 The UK Bribery
Act is tougher than the FCPA in several ways. n136 In addition to corrupt payments involving a foreign official, the Act encompasses bribery
between private individuals and companies. The Act also punishes the acceptance of bribes as well as the offer and payment of corrupt outlays,
and the Act does not exempt facilitation payments unlike the FCPA. n137 Additionally, in May 2011 China amended its Criminal Law
to prohibit bribery of foreign officials for the first time. n138 This should help to address concerns about the rise of China and other
emerging economies, which are more likely to lack anti-corruption laws similar to those of the United States. Section 1504 will also
generate beneficial consequences in the extractive industries more widely . The provision fits squarely within a growing trend
of increasing transparency requirements for resource issuers. In early 2010, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) amended its listing rules to
establish clear criteria that mineral companies must meet if they wish to list on HKEx, including disclosing payments made to governments on a
country-by-country basis. n139 [*71] Although Section 1504 goes beyond the HKEx standard by requiring companies to disclose financial
information at a project level in regular annual reports rather than country level disclosure limited to initial listing applications, n140 it
already appears to be influencing key international actors . For example, the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB), an independent accounting standard-setter, is currently considering whether to develop a new standard on
accounting for extractive activities. n141 In addition, in 2010 the European Commission (EC) opened up a public
consultation to receive feedback on a proposed law requiring a greater level of detail in the financial reporting of
multinational companies (MNCs), n142 which would affect all twenty-seven EU member states. n143 In October 2011, the European
Commission announced its proposed regulations, n144 which are "tougher than expected," n145 and reach beyond Section 1504 "by extending
the scope of the rules to forestry groups and big unlisted companies, which are currently exempt from US provisions." n146 The FCPA suggests
two important lessons for Section 1504. First, tackling
foreign corruption is of vital importance to US national interests, [*72]

leadership in anti-corruption efforts has the potential to
influence global transparency standards . The recent developments in Asia and Europe are indicative of a
growing trend of increasing transparency in the extractive industries by targeting resource issuers, and Section 1504
is a bold step forward in the global movement towards advancing transparency in the extractive industries .
which are more broadly defined than US business interests. Second, US
By establishing a high bar for such transparency, the SEC may enhance the reputational value of being a publicly traded company in the United
States, which could be a net asset for SEC-registrants. If the European Union adopts the proposed transparency requirements for listed
companies, then transparent reporting for resource issuers will become an inherent condition for participating in globally dominant American and
European financial markets. n147

Chung/Mulholand

103
Dodd-Frank Impact AT: Oil Competitiveness Impact Turn

No impact on oil competitiveness
This Comment argues that Section
1504 is unlikely to render US oil companies significantly less competitive overseas.

The Angola case study illustrates the wide applicability of Section 1504 to major international oil companies that currently
dominate upstream exploration and production activities in many countries , as well as to several internationalizing national oil
companies. Furthermore, the experience of Statoil, which is expanding its operations in Angola, suggests that national laws
prohibiting disclosure of payments will not conflict with Section 1504 . Overall, the Angola case study suggests that fears of
competitive disadvantage are probably overstated. The
technological expertise that US oil companies possess remains vitally
important in Angola and elsewhere because oil exploration is expanding into more challenging environments that
require sophisticated technology for successful E&P activities. This comparative advantage will mitigate some of
the advantages that may accrue to companies not registered with the SEC. The analysis of the Angolan oil sector also points to
a broader industry trend of internationalizing NOCs that are not registered with the SEC, and this Comment argues that this trend makes it all the
more important to establish a high level of transparency as the international industry standard now.

Hydrocarbons Negative - DDI 2013 CM

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Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

these things as treaties.

Instead, we should just do what we do when we pass a

a treaty is not binding , either, if we decide not

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

CEA Net Benefit Executive-Legislative Relations 1NC

and until the underlying statute is repealed

or superseded. This understanding of withdrawalthat the

Effective executive-legislative relations prevents global conflict and

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

The foundation of sustainable bipartisanship is effective executive-legislative relations .

Allies prevent nuclear war.

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Executive-Legislation Relations Turns Hegemony

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Ext CEAs Key to SOP

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Ext CEAs Key to Effective Foreign Policy

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

CEA Politics 1NC

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

because the Senate is extremely malapportioned

- far more so today than was the true at the Founding,

modern American politics. 219 Consider, by way of illustration,

as the so-called median voter in the Senate. 221

There is a comparative difference between the plan and the CP

it is harder to obtain the two-thirds support in the Senate for an international

There is also political science support for this

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Treaty ratification costs political capital

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Ext Treaties Cost Capital

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Politics Comparative Evidence

the President will consume more

additional political capital needed to win the votes

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Politics AT: CEAs Link

easy to persuade a super-majority of

Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013

SS Mexico TBHA Negative

Presidential Power 2NC

If the Obama administration can further erode the

That prevents global instability and miscalculation

US/China war causes extinction

Perms & Theory