G.R. No.

L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges 2 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,"
or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned
in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches
and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash
money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of
in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already

adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants
are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects
seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail
the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission
of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one
were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a
seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly,
such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes
had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the
Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows,
therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an
alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants
but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A

Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis
supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need
be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be
used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a
matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned
applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity
of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It
is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the
party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched
for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized
be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their
criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other
legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true
no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the
same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held,
in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the
right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years
on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against
the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule
the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a
form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court
as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment
had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the
right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right
newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused
had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year
the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it
is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.
(emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there
is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for
the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance
of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are,
in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral
effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning
power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated
June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments,
House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304
of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J.
Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal
belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and
control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the
federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and
control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In
other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions,
to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended.

Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion
for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the
views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners,
as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar
as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences
are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment
should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the
twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily

demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the
documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three
residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made
therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately
preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity
of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility
of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the
exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political
and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future
generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general,
blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the
Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the
suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their
residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic
nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made
thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are
void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No
inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack
of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the
import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct
conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this
case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of,
paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search
warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1,
should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said
residences is made permanent; and

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted
to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression
and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than
their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial
construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have
invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return
of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure,
may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives
"standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of
premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely
and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three,
all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were
named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of
the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants.
But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also
the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control
of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or
"the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of
Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were
actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of
the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return
and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and
corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from
the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F.
2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive
possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was
held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a
person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature
and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when heplaces himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or
in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could
not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of
the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court
over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the
protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No
doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either
foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized,
the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their
proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and
leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and
need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304,
Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained
personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or
furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored
(Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses,
owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary
interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them
standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized
therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and
extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to
suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the
then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in
evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other
branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.
Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See
Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between
"lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not
be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must
own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress.
In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations
from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their
return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y.
1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to
him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the course of
an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or
the corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and
seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were
unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the
suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis
supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or
the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary
rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson

joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the
shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the
official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers,
432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267,
the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment
unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule
protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search
occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a
corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and
suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.
1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent
grounds: First he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had
an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal
inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the
corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not
have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure
of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not
show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial
possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir.
1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place
of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several
employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had
a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villanoconsidered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed
at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United
States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to
Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to
quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers
were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was
directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal
rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable
search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of
compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver
them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said
person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp.
191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and
papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the
records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the
country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control
and management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers
together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell
did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar).
Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even
though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing"
to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones
vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d
631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed
solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as
having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records
as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second
search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p.
198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to
move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records
stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises
searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498
(1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States
did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the
case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were
seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were
"PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both
types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at
bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants
regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the
word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent
that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were
seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings
submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the

corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging
to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it
their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed
(actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn
applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers
belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of
which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things arepersonal/private of the
petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued
the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said
documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have
clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President
and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void
search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition
were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal
searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not
criminal in origin or nature.

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE
OF
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the

contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI
and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted
from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21
(b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and
his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the
contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of
the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect
the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to
his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes
no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages
were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size
(1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the
packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making
the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the

Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at
about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987.
He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes
informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.
Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer,
went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were
placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,
removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by
Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cakelike dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana
leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October
6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of
the
contents
thereof,
after
signing
a
"Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7,
1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated
address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested
assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming
his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It
turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE
FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT
DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE
NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS
CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained
in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy
of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal
Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill
v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue
of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier
adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of
evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art.
IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the
advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck
down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA
823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
[1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et
al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained
were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or
other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in
a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under
the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a
private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien,
from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the
access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus
is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis
supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there
in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches

and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to
governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental
agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation
of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of
seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking
attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared
admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the
search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966);
State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a
private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed
overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence*** complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's
own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local
police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to
the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require
exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without
the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the
Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search
and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his
conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both
instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI
agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of
the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency,
who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a
standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before

delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 &
7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business.
Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed
that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search
(Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374
US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property
was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the
search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within
the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject
to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in
the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against
whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden
zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
(Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as
a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable

searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as

to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been
modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of
the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships
between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in
the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant
or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof
(SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and
Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to
whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed
against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be
invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of
Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through
private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as
it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in
convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under
custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case
and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of
his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The
law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is
presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the
contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give
any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI,
Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the
accused here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:

Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the
accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any written
statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the
defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by
the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is
more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any
reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was
utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore
misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe
that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a
certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila:
that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the
packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national
was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous,
self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An
acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man
to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for
appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its
contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and
of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of
P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would
not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same
from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he
readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989];
People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the
Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the
Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated
shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is
just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October
8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342
[1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA
651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567
[1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name,
his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national
was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of
shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract
as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which

a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j],
Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the
assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

KATZ v. UNITED STATES, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

389 U.S. 347

KATZ
v.
UNITED
STATES.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT.
No.
35.
Argued
October
17,
1967.
Decided December 18, 1967.
Petitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering
information by telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1084. Evidence of
petitioner's end of the conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from which
the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation since there was "no
physical entrance into the area occupied by" petitioner.
Held:
1. The Government's eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which petitioner
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 350-353.
(a) The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items but extends as
well to the recording of oral statements. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 . P.
353.
(b) Because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, its reach cannot
turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. The
"trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 , and Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 , is no longer controlling. Pp. 351, 353.
2. Although the surveillance in this case may have been so narrowly circumscribed that it
could constitutionally have been authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted
pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such electronic
surveillance. Pp. 354-359.
369 F.2d 130, reversed.
Burton Marks and Harvey A. Schneider argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner. [389 U.S. 347, 348]
John S. Martin, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were
Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice
Rosenberg.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California
under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by
telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute. 1 At trial
the Government was permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to introduce evidence of the
petitioner's end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from
which he had placed his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, [389 U.S. 347, 349] because "[t]here was no physical entrance into the area
occupied by [the petitioner]." 2 We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional
questions thus presented. 3

The petitioner has phrased those questions as follows:

"A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence
obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is
obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth. [389 U.S. 347, 350]
"B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a
search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place, the correct solution of
Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase
"constitutionally protected area." Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated
into a general constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often
have nothing to do with privacy at all. 4 Other provisions of the Constitution protect
personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. 5But the protection of a
person's general right to privacy - his right to be let alone by other people 6 - is, like
the [389 U.S. 347, 351] protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law
of the individual States. 7
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have
attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the
petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a
"constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it
was not. 8 But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is
"constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this
case. 9 For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 ; United States v.
Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. [389 U.S. 347, 352] See Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 ; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 .
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made
his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he
would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he
entered the booth was not the intruding eye - it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his
right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No
less than an individual in a business office, 10 in a friend's apartment,11 or in a
taxicab, 12 a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.
The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this case should not
be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique they
employed involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the
petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time
thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 457 , 464, 466; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-136, for that
Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible [389 U.S. 347,
353] property. 13 But "[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the

Government to search and seize has been discredited." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
304 . Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance
without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of
the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision
rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under . . . local property law." Silverman v. United
States,365 U.S. 505, 511 . Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that
the Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply "areas" - against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by
our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to
penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance. [389 U.S. 347,
354]
The question remaining for decision, then, is whether the search and seizure conducted in
this case complied with constitutional standards. In that regard, the Government's position
is that its agents acted in an entirely defensible manner: They did not begin their electronic
surveillance until investigation of the petitioner's activities had established a strong
probability that he was using the telephone in question to transmit gambling information to
persons in other States, in violation of federal law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited,
both in scope and in duration, to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the
petitioner's unlawful telephonic communications. The agents confined their surveillance to
the brief periods during which he used the telephone booth, 14and they took great care to
overhear only the conversations of the petitioner himself. 15
Accepting this account of the Government's actions as accurate, it is clear that this
surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly
notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was
to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could
constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and
seizure that the Government asserts in fact took place. Only last Term we sustained the
validity of [389 U.S. 347, 355] such an authorization, holding that, under sufficiently
"precise and discriminate circumstances," a federal court may empower government
agents to employ a concealed electronic device "for the narrow and particularized purpose
of ascertaining the truth of the . . . allegations" of a "detailed factual affidavit alleging the
commission of a specific criminal offense." Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 330. Discussing that holding, the Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 , said that "the
order authorizing the use of the electronic device" in Osborn "afforded similar protections
to those . . . of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence."
Through those protections, "no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was
necessary under the circumstances." Id., at 57. 16 Here, too, a similar [389 U.S. 347,
356] judicial order could have accommodated "the legitimate needs of law
enforcement" 17 by authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance.
The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions in Olmstead and
Goldman, and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with
prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It

is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were
not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause
for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct
of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court
order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the
authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such
safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers
reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their
activities to the least intrusive [389 U.S. 347, 357] means consistent with that end.
Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause," Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 , for
the Constitution requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be
interposed between the citizen and the police . . . ." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 481 -482. "Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 , and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment 18 - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. 19
It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever apply to the sort of search
and seizure involved in this case. Even electronic surveillance substantially
contemporaneous with an individual's arrest could hardly be deemed an "incident" of that
arrest. 20 [389 U.S. 347, 358] Nor could the use of electronic surveillance without prior
authorization be justified on grounds of "hot pursuit." 21 And, of course, the very nature of
electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect's consent. 22
The Government does not question these basic principles. Rather, it urges the creation of
a new exception to cover this case. 23 It argues that surveillance of a telephone booth
should be exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate
upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such authorization
"bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause,
and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for
the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight
judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96.
And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals
secure from Fourth Amendment [389 U.S. 347, 359] violations "only in the discretion of
the police." Id., at 97.
These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the
setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The government agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent justification . .
. that is central to the Fourth Amendment," 24 a procedure that we hold to be a
constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case.
Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and because it led to the
petitioner's conviction, the judgment must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
/G.R. No. L-26177 December 27, 1972

OSCAR
VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JOSE R. QUERUBIN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Yulo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez and Assistant
City Fiscal (Bacolod) Andres M. Bayona for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
In accordance with the policy to which this Court is committed, namely, that a colorable
claim of a denial of a constitutional right should not be ignored, petitioner, in
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding, succeeded in having his alleged grievance
against respondent Judge, the Honorable Jose R. Querubin, now retired, heard. He would
have us nullify the lower court order of June 1, 1966 requiring him "to return and deliver to
the Provincial Commander, Bacolod City, the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden
container stated in the receipt issued by the accused dated April 1, 1966, within forty-eight
(48) hours upon receipt of this order." 1 The money in question formed part of the things
seized in accordance with a search warrant previously issued by respondent Judge
himself. Petitioner therefore, to lend plausibility to his plea, was under the necessity of
alleging that less than full respect was accorded his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure. 2 He would impress on us that full fealty was not shown
to what is ordained by such a guarantee. Assertion of such a disregard of a constitutional
command is one thing; proof is another. What is more, there is included in the petition
itself 3 a written promise of petitioner to return such amount when required. Accordingly, as
will be explained, petitioner did fail to show that he is entitled to the writs of certiorariand
prohibition prayed for.
It was alleged in the petition that on April 23, 1966, in a motion filed with respondent Judge
by an assistant city fiscal of Bacolod City and a special prosecutor of the Department of
Justice, it was set forth that on March 16, 1966, the residence of petitioner was raided by a
constabulary and police team on the strength of a search warrant issued by such
respondent Judge, in the course of which, there was a seizure of the amount of
P10,350.00, which was not however deposited in court, as thereafter its possession was
restored to petitioner. It was further stated that an information for the violation of Article 195
of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the City Court of Bacolod against
petitioner. 4 There was an opposition on the part of petitioner to such motion wherein after
asserting that the lower court was without jurisdiction and that the matter had become
moot and academic, because the money was spent in good faith by him for the payment of
the wages of his laborers, it was contended that there was a violation of his constitutional
rights not to be deprived of property without due process of law and to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 Subsequently, after a reply to such opposition and
a rejoinder were submitted, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order dated June
1, 1966, the dispositive portion of which reads: "[In view thereof], the accused Oscar
Villanueva is hereby ordered to return and deliver to the Provincial Commander, Bacolod
City, the amount of P10,350.00 and the wooden container stated in the receipt issued by
the accused dated April 1, 1966, within forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of this order." 6

There was a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 11, 1966. 7 Hence this
petition. In view of the stress laid therein as to the failure of respondent Judge considering
the circumstances of the case to yield deference to the command of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the assertion that unless there is a writ of
preliminary injunction issued, respondent Judge will cause the enforcement of the
challenged order, thus exposing him to contempt proceedings and other disciplinary
actions if he could not comply with it, this Court adopted a resolution on June 21, 1966
which reads as follows: "The respondents in L-26177 (Oscar Villanueva vs. Hon. Judge R.
Querubin, etc., et al.) are required to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not
a motion to dismiss) to the petition for prohibition and certiorari; upon petitioner's posting a
bond of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), let preliminary injunction issue." 8
In the answer filed by the then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this
Court, the question of the alleged violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure was squarely met, thus: "Neither will the assailed orders
result in unreasonable search and seizure for as already said earlier the money and
wooden box in question were confiscated during a gambling raid pursuant to a search
warrant issued by the respondent court after due and appropriate proceedings during
which the petitioner and his witnesses were examined under oath by the respondent
court." 9 The point thus raised was sought to be refuted in petitioner's written
memorandum, but in a manner far from persuasive. For he did raise the specious
argument that after the service of the search warrant on March 16, 1966, the motion of
April 23, 1966 for the return of the money came too late, ignoring that the Rules of Court
does require that the things seized be deposited in court. 10 Moreover, to counter the
damaging effect of a written promise, which commendably he did not omit from his petition,
that the amount of P10,350.00 "will be returned ... if the higher authorities will require the
return of the same by legal orders,...," 11 he would rely on his alleged rights as owner. Thus:
"While he agreed to return the money by 'legal orders', this cannot be considered as a
limitation on his right of ownership, because when an agreement conflicts with the
provision of law, the latter must prevail. (Article 1306, Civil Code)." 12 There was no
adequate appreciation of the controlling norms as to the effects of a seizure under a valid
search warrant or one not so challenged. It is on the basis of such contentions that
petitioner would have us issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition.
A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of
demonstrating that there was a denial of a constitutional right sufficient to oust the court of
jurisdiction. On the contrary, what appears undeniable is that the actuation of respondent
Judge was in accordance with law. There can be no question then of a violation of the
safeguard against unreasonable search and seizure.
1. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien,
from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. Since, moreover, it is invariably through a search and seizure that such an
invasion of one's physical freedom manifests itself, it is made clear that he is not to be thus
molested, unless its reasonableness could be shown. To be impressed with such a quality,
it must be accomplished through a warrant, which should not be issued unless probable
cause is shown, to be determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, with a particular description of the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also
looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but
not necessarily thereto confined. 13What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to

choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have
access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. 14 In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative
work 15 could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of "a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value
human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards." 16
2. Necessarily, then, if petitioner's alleged grievance, consisting of a disregard of the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, were substantiated, he could validly
raise a constitutional question of sufficient gravity to entitle him to the remedies sought. For
a failure to respect a constitutional command resulting in a deprivation of a constitutional
right is visited by loss of jurisdiction. 17 Such is not the case, however. He did not even put
in issue the validity of the search warrant, as a result of which there was a seizure of the
money in question. For what were the facts on which the challenged order was based,
facts binding on this Court? As set forth therein: "As a result of the raid conducted by a
party of the Philippine Constabulary led by Lt. Alexander Aguirre at 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of March 16, 1966, in virtue of a search warrant issued by the undersigned on
March 14, 1966, the raiding party was able to arrest eight (8) participants in the game of
"Monte" held in one of the rooms of the house of Oscar Villanueva at 6th Street, Bacolod
City. Among the gambling paraphernalias seized during the raid is cash in the amount of
P10,570.00, which the raiding party submitted to this Court in endorsing the search
warrant, thus subjecting the gambling paraphernalia seized by the raiding party under the
control of this Court. On March 24, 1966 the City Fiscal of Bacolod City filed an information
for Violation of Art. 195 of the Revised Penal Code against the eight (8) apprehended
persons named in the endorsement of the Philippine Constabulary. All the accused
pleaded guilty and [were] convicted by the City Court. Upon recommendation of the Fiscal,
however, only the amount of P220.00 was ordered forfeited in favor of the government and
the amount of P10,350.00 was ordered to be returned to Oscar Villanueva, the owner of
the house, who issued the receipt for the amount with the condition that he will return the
money if the higher authorities will require the return of the said amount." 18 Then
respondent Judge, after referring to Philips vs. Municipal Mayor, 19 stated further in the
order now under scrutiny: "In the light of the aforequoted ruling of the appellate court, it is
clear that the Court of First Instance that issued the search warrant has jurisdiction over
the amount of P10,350.00 and its wooden container. With regard to the contention of the
counsel for the accused that the return of the amount of P10,350.00 is a moot question
because the said amount is already spent by the accused, whatever defenses the accused
may invoke to resist the return of the amount of money in question is futile and untenable
by estoppel. The accused in issuing the corresponding receipt of the amount of
P10,350.00 and the wooden box container, agreed to return the said amount and the box if
the higher authorities may so require. The return of the amount of P10,350.00 and its
wooden container. With regard to the contention money in the box is a part and parcel of
the gambling paraphernalia seized by the raiding party of the Philippine Constabulary in
the house of the accused Oscar Villanueva who is at present facing the charge for violation
of the gambling law." 20
Even if the recital of the antecedents of the challenged order were less compelling in thus
lending support to what was done by respondent Judge, still petitioner had failed to make
out a case. For, had he entertained doubts as to the validity of the issuance of the search

warrant or the manner in which it was executed, he was called upon to establish such a
claim in court. He could rely on authoritative doctrines of this Court precisely to seek a
judicial declaration of any illegal taint that he could, with plausibility, assert. 21 That he failed
to do. The Rules of Court made clear what is to be done after the seizure of the property.
Thus: "The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the municipal judge or judge of the
city court or of the Court of First Instance which issued the warrant, together with a true
inventory thereof duly verified by oath." 22 The legal custody was therefore appropriately
with respondent Judge, who did authorize the issuance of such search warrant. Even if the
money could validly be returned to petitioner, had it happened that in the meanwhile some
other officer of the law had it in his possession, still, under the ruling of this Court in Molo v.
Yatco,23 there should be a motion for its restoration to petitioner that must be affirmatively
acted upon by respondent Judge. Thus: "It appears from the present case that the
documents and other papers belonging to the petitioner Mariano Molo, which were seized
by a special agent of the Anti-Usury Board by virtue of a warrant issued by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, came into the possession of said board, and while it does not
appear how said board came to have them in its possession, it is presumed that it was by
virtue of an authority given by said court (see. 334, No. 31, Act No. 190). By virtue of said
authority the board became an agent of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the custody
of the documents in question, with the obligation to return them to said court upon the
termination of the investigation for which the board needed them. As the Anti-Usury Board
had found no sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal action against the petitioner for
violation of the Usury Law, and as said board had dismissed the case under investigation,
it was duty bound to return said documents and papers to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal so that the latter might order the return thereof to their owner." 24
Much less could the seizure, the validity of the search warrant being admitted, be open to
question. As was set forth by Justice Malcolm in People v. Veloso: "The police officers
were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building
occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to
arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the
evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which
was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish
the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be
used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise." 25
3. There is an equally insurmountable obstacle to the grant of petitioner's prayer for the
writs of certiorari and prohibition. There is included, as one of the annexes to his petition,
the following: "Received from Assistant City Fiscal Jesus V. Ramos the sum of [Ten
Thousand Three Hundred Fifty] (P10,350.00) Philippine Currency. This money will be
returned to him if the higher authorities will require the return of the same by legal orders,
otherwise the same will not be returned." 26 It was executed on April 1, 1966 and duly
signed by him. As previously noted, he would dispute the legality of the order requiring the
return to enable him to avoid the effects of such a promise. Not only would he thus ignore
his plighted word, but what is worse, he would impress on this Court a rather unorthodox
notion of what legality connotes. His contention as to the failure of the challenged order to
meet such a test is that he is the owner of such an amount. What he would conveniently
ignore was the seizure thereof under a valid search warrant. The very constitutional
guarantee relied upon does not preclude a search in one's home and the seizure of one's
papers and effects as long as the element of reasonableness is not lacking. It cannot be
correctly maintained then that just because the money seized did belong to petitioner, its
return to the court that issued the search warrant could be avoided when precisely what
the law requires is that it be deposited therein. As a matter of fact, what lacks the element

of legality is the continued possession by petitioner. Resort to a higher tribunal then to

nullify what was done by respondent Judge is futile and unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition and certiorari is dismissed and the writ of
preliminary injunction under the resolution of this Court of June 21, 1966, lifted and set
aside. With costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA,

QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA
JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA
HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA
COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS
GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA
LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA
PESIMO, LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL
VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA,
ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE,
ROSA
MARTIN
and
JAIME
BONGAT,petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS
GARCIA, respondents.

5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and Pacheco Street,
Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas, Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International Airport, Pasay
City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police
officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or
"Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.

According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical
areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding.
The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay,
Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on November 3 during
the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives
follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the
following were committed:

The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of
Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain
that they have a common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law,
protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their communities.
They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition
contending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not
the proper parties to institute the action.
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in Metro
Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and Magdalena Streets, Tondo,
Manila.
2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension and San
Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along Aroma Beach
up to Happy Land, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.

1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or

early morning hours, police and military units without any search
warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence
and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila.
Most of them are in civilian clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on
the walls and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors
open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering the residents
within to come out of their respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like
cows, the men are ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined
for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted
by the raiders, some of the members of the raiding team force their way
into each and every house within the cordoned off area and then
proceed to conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses
from the neighborhood.

5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders

ransack their homes, tossing about the residents' belongings without
total regard for their value. In several instances, walls are destroyed,
ceilings are damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for
incriminating evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with
increasing frequency that their money and valuables have disappeared
after the said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and
unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting
vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and 'verified.' These arrests are all conducted without any
warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the conditions that
will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men are used to
fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration
of the period wherein they can be legally detained without any charge
at all. In other instances, some arrested persons are released without
charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at
the residents during these illegal operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spotbeatings, maulings
and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are
subjected to mental and physical torture to extract confessions and
tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as
their Memorandum after the petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they
allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights
are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article
VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Emphasis supplied )
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of

the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. ...
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the
nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must conduct concerted
campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with
the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief
Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constitution grants
to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which would bring
down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are
suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police
actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt
the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left,
the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our
democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened
through violations of the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court stated:
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the
right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has
ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty
English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject
had his own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was
his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all
the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian
regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the
onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able
again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must
cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son
returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the
1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

xxx xxx xxx

Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
v. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and
unreasonable invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person,
papers and effects. We have explained in the case of People vs.
Burgos(144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why
the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally
protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto
confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is
sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed
entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise
in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted
intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf.
Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan J. and Boyd v.
United States, 11 6 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]),
could fitly characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach
of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need,
and then only under stringent procedural safeguards. (ibid, p. 74.)

"offend even hardened sensibilities." InBreithaupt v. Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448
[1957]), the same court validated the use of evidence, in this case blood samples
involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where there was nothing brutal or offensive in the
taking. The Court stated:
Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or
'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case,
under the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the driver here was
unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of conscious
consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a
violation of a constitutional light; and certainly the rest was administered
here would not be considered offensive by even the most delicate.
Furthermore, due process is not measured by the yardstick of personal
reaction or the sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that
whole community sense of 'decency and fairness that has been woven
by common experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct....
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far
outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the
police action.
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the
determination of the exact facts surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly
procedure ascertains their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions
would immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent pattern of wholesale and gross
abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by the petitioners
are a complete lie.
The Solicitor General argues:

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US 165; 96
L. Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be characterized by
methods that offend a sense of justice. The court ruled:
Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the
present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by
which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his
mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his
stomach's contents this course of proceeding by agents of government
to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They
are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of
constitutional differentiation.
It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is impermissible and which should
be prohibited. Rather, it is the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which

This a complete lie.

Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to human
rights. Not only that, they were intelligently and carefully planned
months ahead of the actual operation. They were executed in
coordination with barangay officials who pleaded with their constituents
to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification.
Local and foreign correspondents, who had joined these operations,
witnessed and recorded the events that transpired relative thereto.
(After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20,
1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the
drives so far conducted, the alleged victims who numbered thousands
had not themselves complained.
In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp
Aguinaldo, President Aquino branded all accusations of deliberate

disregard for human rights as 'total lies'. Here are excerpts from her
strongest speech yet in support of the military:
All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights have been
shown- up to be total lies.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every
assurance that I will stand by you through thick and thin to share the
blame, defend your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you the
final victory that I am certain will be ours.
You and I will see this through together.
I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
We have wasted enough time answering their barkings for it is still a
long way to lasting peace. . . . The dangers and hardships to our men in
the field are great enough as it is without having them distracted by tills
worthless carping at their backs.
Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same: economic
development to pull out the roots-and military operations to slash the
growth of the insurgency.
The answer to terror is force now.
Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our economic
and social initiatives bear fruit. . . Now that the extreme Right has been
defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution of the war against
the communist insurgency, even as we continue to watch our backs
against attacks from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1,
Annex 15; emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of President Aquino's observation on the matter, it
can be said that petitioners misrepresent as human rights violations the
military and police's zealous vigilance over the people's right to live in
peace and safety. (Rollo, pp. 36-38)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything before us
consists of allegations. According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were
arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition. No estimates are given for the
drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley
Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons
treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a
petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in
courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents
who were inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of
those arrested has apparently been charged and none of those affected has apparently
complained.

A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the statement that
local and foreign co-respondents actually joined the saturation drives and witnessed and
recorded the events. In other words, the activities sought to be completely proscribed were
in full view of media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being used to fingerpoint
suspected subversives would have been good television copy. If true, this was probably
effected away from the ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor General
contends, the allegation is a "complete lie."
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines sought to overthrow the present Government introduces another
aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly why those directly affected by human
rights violations should be the ones to institute court actions and why evidence of what
actually transpired should first be developed before petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force
to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels
and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and
without violating the Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in the White Plains
Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the first week of December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal
elements particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police
officials by elements supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were
conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was
no rebellion or criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears
to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong
showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could not be
achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it
is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power
of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of the court to
take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where the petitioners do
not complain that they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the
thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all
police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually
happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is
so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to
submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." We cannot imagine
police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by the respondents,
being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain
abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and
legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in
troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not
move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights
of people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the
petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations where search

warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy
may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices because all
concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit.
Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is
not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive departments and for
trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events cannot
keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police to
the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of
constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of
rights. They should be followed. If our policy makers sustain the contention of the military
and the police that occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of
government and to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of
soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be enforced. A method
of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference
should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National
Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to devise
procedures for the prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman
whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an
orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of
the petitioners' charges and a hard look by administration officials at the policy implications
of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably
committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily
restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked
men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if
these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to
the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila,
Malabon, and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their
allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding General
PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of clear guidelines to govern police actions
intended to abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and subdue
terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed
during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such
actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES,
INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL
SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P.
Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7,
1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively,
were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be
issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief
Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City
Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates,
substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition.
The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June
28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the
prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had
come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants
before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants
before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued

them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view
of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public
interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in
Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the
words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or
to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require
it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable
stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982,
the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse
of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of
the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983,
more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they
had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they
tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill
years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of
public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become
a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons
close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of
the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been
sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer
of the Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to
hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to
come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We
find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the
extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they
had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the
charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and
marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is
now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the
logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used
them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the
search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the abovequoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This
objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had
indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct
places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of
Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search
warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly
keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means
of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as
amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places
sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col.
Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity
that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The
fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units
C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the
opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent
judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched
with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as
to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true
where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and
when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in
the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in
the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his copetitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were
seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds
or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him.
In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may
be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than
the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable
property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this
Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted
as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of
Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla
which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the
search warrants on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not

have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant
may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,

typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment,
tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied
for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits
must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he
has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the
broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing
the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is
a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft
of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave
error for respondent judge to have done so.

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE

FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement
contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the
evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises abovementioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of,
illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines,
and April 6 Movement." 13

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No.

NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge
by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit
filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court
in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA

892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No.
NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and,

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the
U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any
evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under
the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference
herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of nonconformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and

seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom
of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground
that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as
amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or
artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted
authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by
the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by
the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less
than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester
the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for
sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum
offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment
and all materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further
confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated
February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos,
expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983,
Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities
and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the
seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered
released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our
law enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the
extent of failing to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal
searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the
law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8)
kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak" placed in a traveling bag, which are prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. 1
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-inCharge of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo.
Based on their testimonies, the court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie,
that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December
14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a
team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt.
Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon
of December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two
groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted
themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline
station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO
printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30
in the evening of the same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this
stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a
traveling bag.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa"
about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic
bag marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner
bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought
to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared
for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory,
Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a
Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical
report, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant's
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility
in evidence.
The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the
alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items
seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version
of the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to
her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie
"Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a
shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked
her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the
woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested.
Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Comment
and/or Objection to Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of
the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced
her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 2
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a
warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one
of the requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched
must be specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was
applied for by the NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant
for the reason that the same would be considered a general search warrant
which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the
arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter's constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak
yet the evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.

and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against
unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. 6
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule
or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search
warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases
specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal
liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication
yet often violated. 7
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

In People v. Ramos, 3 this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers
only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest

in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police

who had the right to be where they are;

This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures
as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plain import of the
language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches
and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and
seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of
arrest. 4
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno. 5 This
exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search; 9
6. Stop and Frisk; 10 and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 11

Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into
the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The
constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law
enforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more
fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential
requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to
be searched. 12

ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense
which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required
in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it
must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue
of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched. 13

In People v. Bagista, 16 the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They
likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fitted the
description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search
by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is admissible
against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a
moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are
exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to
be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and
used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only
be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or
is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient
probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben, 14 acting on information supplied by informers, police
officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando,
Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may
be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen
noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously. They
confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on
when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped
in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night
of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant
regarding Aruta's alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an onthe-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used
by drug traffickers as their "business address". More significantly, Tangliben was acting
suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to
reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single
indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt, 15 the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to
obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily
ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the
operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the

Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case,
the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second,
Aruta's identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth,
Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the
warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, 17 the policemen conducted a surveillance in an

area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming
therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who
appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking
in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When
approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he
showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient
reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to
his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a
haven for drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for
conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances
were present which, when taken together with the information, constituted probable causes
which justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause
necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the
morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an
informant named "Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for Baguio City on
December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her
a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accusedappellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a traveling bag even as the informant
pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt.
Abello about the contents of her traveling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they
opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then
brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days
before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was

certain. From the information they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of
securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was
brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from
Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential
information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada
would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the
morning of the following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity,
the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a
basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in
accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the
lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to
secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinada's constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of
arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag,
accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which
provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about
to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing
the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for
the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was
only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as
the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents
would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the
informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason
whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for
the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it
is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of
probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless
search of accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accusedappellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently
illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not
incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized
could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are "fruits of a
poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the
Constitution.

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a
lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it
is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence
produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary
to law. 18
As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin 19 where, this Court
observed that:
. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any
of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search
and seizure of accused-appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence
in "plain view" under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately
apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accusedappellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search
of a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as
accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner
bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao, 20 applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted
in Posadas v. Court of Appeals. 21 In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his
companions were accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no
observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents
as to cause them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant
was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases,
accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter
identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable
cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a
crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and
emergency
circumstances,
as
applied
in People
v. De
Gracia. 22 In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being used as
headquarters by the RAM during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a
group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused
to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and
ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and
disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being

committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the
building. The same could not be said in the instant case.

waived his right against the warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's
testimony.

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure
would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount
to a waiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant
voluntarily submitted herself to search and inspection citingPeople v. Malasugui 23 where
this Court ruled:

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what

happened next?

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his

person or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to
examine the two chairs that he carried, what did you do next?

In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to
Aling Rosa, what happened after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM
agents and confronted her with our informant and asked her
what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was
carrying.
Q What was her reaction?

A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in

between the two chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise
illegal search, we believe that appellant based on the transcript quoted above did not
voluntarily consent to Bolonia's search of his belongings. Appellant's silence should not be
lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there
was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted
irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the
presumption of regularity of the performance of duty." (Emphasis supplied)

A She gave her bag to me.

Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of

her constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court
held in People v. Barros: 27

A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside. 24

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's contention for the Malasugui case is
inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless
arrest thereby making the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally
lawful. 25 On the contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as expounded
above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and
illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise
unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be
used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in
handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary
submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is
similar to People v. Encinada, 26 where this Court held:
[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs
containing the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively

. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search

conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to
object"
. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The
fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any

affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority
by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration
of regard for the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." 28 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right.
As clearly illustrated inPeople v. Omaweng, 29 where prosecution witness Joseph Layong
testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag,
what did you do?
A When we saw that traveling bag, we asked the driver if
we could see the contents.
Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there
was any?
A He said "you can see the contents but those are only
clothings" (sic).
Q When he said that, what did you do?
A We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q When you said that, what did he tell you?
A He said "you can see it".
Q And when he said "you can see and open it," what did
you do?
A When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was
not clothings (sic) that was contained in the bag.
Q And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what
did you do?

A When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took

some of the contents and showed it to my companion
Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was
marijuana. (Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be
stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the
protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the Court." He willingly gave prior consent to the search
and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not
the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues
that the police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it
could be secured only if accused-appellant's name was known, the vehicle identified and
the date of its arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had
forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
. . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to
those and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made. 30
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one
without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person
intended to be searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The
time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling
Rosa" turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The
vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely
positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their
passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this
would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars
would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively
participating in the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to

the illegality of the warrantless search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained
thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case for the following reasons:

Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed." 35

1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her
plea of "not guilty" and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission
to the court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the
illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The
waiver simply does not extend this far.

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 36

2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible

upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accusedappellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecution's
Formal Offer of Evidence.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As
Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 37

It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros, 33 which stated:

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an
invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by
an accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified
warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be
waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an
accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the
failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that
waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former
an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver
of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a
warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality
for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had
expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box
and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence
by the prosecution. We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of
such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the
circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be
reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial. (Emphasis
supplied).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y
MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she
is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search
warrant considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is
again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and
inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 34
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held
criminally and civilly liable, theStonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized
that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by Judge

G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

ALAIN
MANALILI
y
DIZON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Appellant remained on provisional liberty. 7 Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense,
filed a Notice of Appeal 8dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent
Court 9 promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial
court: 10
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets
where unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen
should employ limited, flexible responses like "stop-and-frisk" which are graduated in
relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to
respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against
unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.

Respondent Court 11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20,
1994, disposing:
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby
DENIED.
The Facts

The Case
Version of the Prosecution
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."
1

In an Information dated April 11, 1988, Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by
Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows: 2
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a
prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 3 With
the agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00
bail bond. 4 After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124,
acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision 5 convicting
appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads: 6
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN
MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,
Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana
residue), and hereby sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the
costs.
xxx xxx xxx

The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: 12

At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance
along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The
policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver
named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car
of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because
of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan
City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their
vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who
appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes
and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police
officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his
hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male
person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter
showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat.
Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for
investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated
wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the
accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu,
Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he
wrote "Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The white sheet of paper was

marked as Exhibit "E-3". The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of
folded paper. (Exhibit "E-4").
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana
residue (Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
apprehending policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the
referral slip (Exhibit "D") to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including
the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat.
Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit "D".
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip
and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988
as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit "D".
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical
examinations
of
the
specimen
which
she
identified.
(Exhibit
"E") 13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana
leaves" in her Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit "F"). 14 These crushed
marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In
this examination, she also found that the "crushed marijuana leaves" gave
positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her
examinations (Exhibit "G").
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white
letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit "E"). She then wrote identification notes on
this letter-envelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl.
Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City.
(Exhibit "C")
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in
front of the cemetery when he was apprehended. 15
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows: 16
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN
MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City
Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the driver
of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were
under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the
tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The
policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point,
the accused asked the policemen why he was being searched and the policemen
replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found

on the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle
driver to go while they brought the accused to the police headquarters at
Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and
signalled the latter to follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the
Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked
to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion.
The policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper
trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt
and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the
policemen to release the accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen
later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought
outside the cell and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the
policemen to call his parents in order to "settle" the case. The policemen who led
the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl.
Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his
parents. The accused did not call his parents and he told the policemen that his
parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought
in the office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no
marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say
anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he
and the accused were stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April
11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on his person
or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused
at the Kalookan City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the
police searched the accused who was made to take off his pants at the police
headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several
pictures showing that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery. 17
The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the
strength of the arresting officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were "neutral
and disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the performance of
their duties. Substantially they asserted that the appellant was found to be in possession of
a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely "trumped up,"
because the appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen
nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.

On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based
on speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies
were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the narration. It further found
petitioner's contention that he could not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana
residue to be without merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she
examined were marijuana leaves.

appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to sustain his conviction.

Issues

First
Issue:
Admissibility
During a Stop-and-Frisk

Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:

I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of
the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the)
accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of the accused had been
proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence
that the accused was framed for the purpose of extorting
money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused
when the evidence presented is consistent with both
innocence and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the
prosecution which are inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against
him, (2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.
of

the

Evidence

Seized

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession,
contending that they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his
Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for respondent,
counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner
never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in
evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search
was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-andfrisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, 18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search
is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken. 19
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of
effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This
was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case,
when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered
alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for
anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a
third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to
have failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court
held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police

officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated
by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge. 20Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
gives this guarantee:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless,
futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for
a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan
City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug
addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City
Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The
policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually
high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession: 25
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the
Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug
dependents were roaming around at A. Mabini Street in front
of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in

evidence as a "fruit of the poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be

inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute. 21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated
five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure." 22 In People vs. Encinada, 23 the Court further explained
that "[i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as
the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a
search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched."
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against
a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court held that there
were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of
the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag
and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two
rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade.
In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to

Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with

Pat. Angel Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez, what
happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the
Caloocan Cemetery then when we called his attention, he
tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and
introduce ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person
when you chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that
you chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a
swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon
him?

A He was roaming around, sir.

for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not
raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. 27

Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he

avoided you?

Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police

officers in a polite manner, sir.

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained "polluted,
irreconcilable and unexplained" contradictions which did not support petitioner's conviction.

Q How did you introduce yourselves?

We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case,
is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a
departure from this rule. 28

A In a polite manner, sir.

Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.

We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:

Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked
him what he was holding in his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in
his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.

(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some

inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, We do not find them
substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People
vs. Avila, it was held that "As long as the witnesses concur on the material
points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the
essential veracity of their statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty,
the bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible evidence
on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas' contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by
the Joint Affidavit 29 signed by both arresting policemen. The question of whether the
marijuana was found inside petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial,
considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present
the wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in petitioner's possession.
This shows that such contradiction is minor and does not destroy Espiritu's credibility.30

xxx xxx xxx

Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there
was a marijuana (sic) crushed residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively
waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this
issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following
requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge,
actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. 26Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this
elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such
right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 31
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist
Aida Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess
these leaves was established. His awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that
petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when
asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that
petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient
grounds to believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative
or criminal case against the arresting officers or present any evidence other than his bare
claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and unbelievable, considering that

he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988. 32Since
then, he could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody
of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor,
because it is easy to concoct and fabricate. 33

SO ORDERED.

The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No.
4103, as amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day
of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the
imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those
convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of
this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following
penalty for illegal possession of marijuana:
Sec. 8. . . . .
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years
and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian
hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years. 34
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as
minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994

ELIZALDE
MALALOAN
and
MARLON
LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C.
VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.

Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the

Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial
region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under

challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5,
1990, petitioners have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising
the sole issue:

REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case
through the present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for
resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an
application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its
territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place
outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction. 1

WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE

COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A
SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN
OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE
ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE
A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A
PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.

The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the
findings of respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be any
dispute, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can
be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the
CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The
search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of
P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions)
perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview,
Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan
City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around
2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search
warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor
seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research
(EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of
Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive
documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search.
And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched
were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were
later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER
Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal
Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation,
Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally
Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental
Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and
Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the
challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer
for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which
warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the trial court,
by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining
order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of
respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present
recourse before us.
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of
their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter
and intent of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not
dangerous doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish,
hence they do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court
which has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the
permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the
court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete
since the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to
avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussedseriatim.
I
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate
the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is
directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in
Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case
against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in
the latter court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed
in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without
jurisdiction to do so.

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the
obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a
trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to
issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over
which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the
requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. 4 A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. 6
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on
search warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally
issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for
purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing
issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses, andorders of courts of justice or judicial
officers. 9 It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial
proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or
enforce the judgment, 10 or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court
of justice. 11
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the
Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or
in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some
judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may
eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it
may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles
sought to be seized are then located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal
action may be filed in different venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those
instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same
criminal offense.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may
create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein
the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients
thereof took place.

(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or

any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the
criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle
passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of
its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper
court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through
which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally
accepted principles of international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable
therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable
by the proper court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the
prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search
warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case
under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement would
be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they file their application therefor in and
obtain the same from what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the
aforequoted Section 15.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter,
the Judiciary Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, 13 have never
required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially
drawn from the silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view
that said statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the
formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or
correct, on considerations of national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a
legal manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now
impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may
instead be reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be
tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but
which someone believes ought to have been embraced therein. 14
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case
has already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure
evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may
properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and due compliance with the requisites
therefor, since such application would only be an incident in that case and which it can
resolve in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its
territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further complications. The jurisdictional
problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction,
which aspect will be addressed hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on
the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which correspond
to the thirteen judicial regions, 15invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to
its
authority
granted
by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court 17 over

which
the
particular
branch
concerned
shall
exercise
its
authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a
warrant to search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from
issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by
Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of
general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be
the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were
issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on
applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other
courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act,
crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms
and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the
aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply
tosingle-sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be
adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be
vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative
Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts," was the source of thesubject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished
from the exercise of jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative
order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the
Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of
the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of
all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, . . . .
(Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by
a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction
conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope.
Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to
a region which shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme
Court to any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public interest may
require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ."
which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did
not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that
non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely
defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise
its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The
circulars only allocated to the three executive judges the administrative areas for which
they may respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated
therein, but likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg,
129.

Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant
of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the
place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other
courts from exercising the same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was
basically intended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its
predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a
raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had been filed with the executive
judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by
amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead that such applications should
immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose
jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer
exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were
themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same
among the other judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to
require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of
an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human
capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth,
Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the nonexclusionary nature of that provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized
thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall
be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23,
1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to
whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who
issued the search warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal
case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position
that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a
warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a
criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof,
has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has
yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the
offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace
the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of
that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency,
subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court
which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or
his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied
enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial
jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of
enforcement of search warrants.

II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional
trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial
jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a limitation on
search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of
arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were
limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no
period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days
from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to
the issuing judge, 19 said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable
indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a
search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision
as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on
and within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law
or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent
specific mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary implication from
the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the
intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be
countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore
was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the
province only with the approval of the former court of first instance. 21 Under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the
approval of the regional trial court. 22 On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and
processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the
Philippines, 23 under
the
Interim
or
Transitional
Rules
and
Guidelines,
certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its
judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision be
set out in full:
3. Writs and processes.
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced
in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial
court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three
cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
(Emphasis ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in
unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued

by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it
unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued
the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a
search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory
or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area
of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim
Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among
the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made
regarding
the
processes
contemplated
in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a
search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it
undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally
possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not
make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit
items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of
procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we
are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections
based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,et
al., 24 the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of
therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the Quezon City
and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts of
Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were never challenged on jurisdictional grounds
although they were subsequently nullified for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously
invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not
believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial
jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional
question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement
authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an
application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search
warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is
translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, 26 and all these have to be
observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually
issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the
warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of
the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are
really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such
constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are
enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy,
but persons and liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend
now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and
influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any
attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor
should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's
witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and
expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and
verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court:

This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information
which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is
secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does
not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region,
where the place to be searched is located. 28
The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the
foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the
peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another
district of the county and made returnable before the justice of still another district or
another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. 29 In the present state of
our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the court
which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere in the
Philippines.
III

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same
and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property
seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the
criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged
in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent
original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case
shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary
jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in

the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used
as evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent
in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in
Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy
guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue
search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search
warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances
that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not
give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for
not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be
filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed
waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing
court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the
suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is
offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are
involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress
evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping,
a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper
remedy in the appropriate higher court.

G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.
CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED,
MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's
petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80
of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996. 2 as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996
denying the People's motion for reconsideration. 3 Those orders were handed down in
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives, after the accused
had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the
Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano
I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on
December 15, 1995, 4
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the
warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court
within five (5) days "to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful
owner considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search
Warrant."

4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment,

pleaded not guilty to the offense charged; **" and on the same date,
submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant
and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15,
1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading
(consolidated comment on petition forcertiorari **): On January 29,
1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by
respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as
contained in the order dated January 30.1996 ** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at
Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's
Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in
the building as it is correspondingly called only as
"Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the
Abigail's Variety Store;

The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for
search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr.
Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and
explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay
Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068
(95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at
Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in
the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their
personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches,
pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags
including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from
US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant.
The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon
order of the court on respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly
are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4
type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items
described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram machine
pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted
chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg
and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a
return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers
and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There
was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the
search.

4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass

from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1
have its own respective doors used for ingress and
egress.
There being no objection on the said observation of
the Court, let the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order duly
granting the motion to quash search warrant**; 5
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant
motion to dismiss** ;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan
filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order
quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the
motion for reconsideration** ;

10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order denying the
motion for reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private
respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to,
the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth
Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996,
dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial
Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected
to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996.
The place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were
then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and
separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent
to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted to Judge
Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually
depicted the particular place to be searched was effectively confuted
by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated,
not signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the
Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who)
instead **directed them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment
1207** in the Order **dated December 15, 1995" this, too, being the
address given "in the Application for Search Warrant dated December
14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team
Leader." The untenability of the claim is made more patent by the
People's admission, during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not attached to the
application for search warrant ** (but) merely attached to the motion for
reconsideration." 7
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following
observations of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28,
1996, viz.: 8
d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is
different from the place mentioned in the Search
Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP
Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and
SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED
CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being
RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN
BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR
MOUTH to say TAGALOG with Honorable Judge
who issued the Search Warrant the words "KATABI",
or "KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY

STORE ang papasukin namin" or if they happen to

be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were
not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the
ENGLISH WORDS "RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or
"BEHIND" or "NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE,
the place they are going to raid."**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful
occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of
the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the
living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the
law. 9
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as
required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days
or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. 10
5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash
search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco
vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the
Supreme Court in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the
prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one
court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court
or branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search
warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search
warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has
the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence
unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent
Judge, in light of "Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not
the special civil action ofcertiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of
Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the
proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latter's
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be
searched;"
2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence** to
the contrary;"
3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"

4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be

diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a
substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at
bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule;" and
6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove
the validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly
resolved without informing petitioner thereof."
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was
validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually
residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically
described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the
search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things
to be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously
enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate
apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers
who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the
place to be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly
what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind
the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store"
was not what the Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was
ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the
premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended,
they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge
reproduced in the search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207.
Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the
scope of the search was made more particular and more restrictive by the Judge's
admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises herein
described."
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct
places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4)
separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single
structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through
which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5)
places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its individual front
door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only
one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to
the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the
store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla
understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having
received the warrant which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises

herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment
units at the rear of the store they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They
seem to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched
clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge
Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient particularization of the general
identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of
Staff, AFP, 11 allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for
seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]).
Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" because both search warrants apparently
indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where
the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this
Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that
the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact
that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in
fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City"
appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that
evidently, this was the address the Judge intended to be searched when he issued the
second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the "obviously
typographical error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the
official court file. 12
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical
error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the
search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible
on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the
warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting
of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the
Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge
had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind.
This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched
although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they
applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material
in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the
court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of
this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been
fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support
of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which

requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as
well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of
choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would
open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a
search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them.
The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done
only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge
Bacalla's finding of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the
record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out
inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant
itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. 13 In Judge
Casanova's view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the
sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause
before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded,
the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant which, of course,
is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not that which
the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they
actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in
the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as
regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 the first of the four
(4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the private
respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:

14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things to be
seized.
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on
probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under
oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is
essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, 15 the
manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so
described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement
necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained
in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. 16

In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought
to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the
building housing the store and the residential apartment units the place to be searched
being plainly marked was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or
(2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein
petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the
tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly
refused to receive "evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to
present before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would
not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are
void because the place set forth in the search warrant is different from that which the
officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway the premises
searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all
times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a
search warrant has been "issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal
case," the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before
the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the
warrant is afterwards filed. 17 In support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines"
laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 18 concerning "possible conflicts of
jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is
pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of
personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second
guideline reads: 19
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the
main criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the
same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without
prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant,
otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court
and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in
another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things
thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for
the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending.
However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of
the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject
to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in
the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or
resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same
is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with
different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a
search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and

not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion

to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in
the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the
motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in
the appropriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other
hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed
in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the
search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband)
could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was
only after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to
quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within
guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to
have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of
September 11, 1996 which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996
and May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the
foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122092 May 19, 1999

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ
JR., RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA,
NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B.
CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T.
LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL
OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where
the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's

witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge,
the search warrant must be struck down.
The Case
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying for (1) the nullification of
Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995,
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; 2 and (2) the
issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor
Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the
respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP
Traffic Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with
90 pages of annexes. 5 On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment 6 agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. After
petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to the Petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its
February 5, 1997 Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the
memorandum for the public respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on
June 23, 1997, 8 the Court in its September 24, 1997 Resolution gave him a nonextendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file the required
memorandum. In view of Dacera's manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that
he had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8,
1999 Resolution, ordered the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic
Management Command to file its memorandum within thirty days from notice; "otherwise,
the petition will be deemed submitted for decision." 9 Even after the expiration of the said
period, the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.
Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its memorandum
as a waiver of its privilege to do so.
The Facts
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 10
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.]
Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered
firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense,
or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . .
are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the
law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following
described properties:

Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10)

M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI
submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade
Launcher[s] cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten
(10) cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading
machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers
of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.
Attached to the application 11 were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and
SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, 12 as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary
statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the
contested search warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining
under oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to
believe that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G.
Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal 5.56
Ten (10) M14 US rifles
Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.
Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]
Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]
Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]
Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
Ten (l0) handgrenades
in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives), and the same should be seized
and brought before this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate
search daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the

aforementioned premises and to seize and bring the articles abovedescribed and make an immediate return there[of] 14

18 M16Rifle 5.56 RP1714637 (Tampered) Elisco

19 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco

On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and
seized the following: 15
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco
02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco
03 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco
04 M16Rilfe 5.56 Defaced Elisco
05 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco
06 M16Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco
07 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco
08 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco

20 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco

01 M14 7.62 1499694 Elisco
02 M14 7.62 889163 Elisco
01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal
01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin
02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin
01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield
02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega
02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade

09 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco

10 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco
11 M16Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco
12 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco
13 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco
(With pending
case-Casaway Case)
14 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171754 Elisco
15 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco
16 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco
17 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco

(Paltik)
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.
02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.
03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.
04 BAR 19 pcs.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 2,023 rounds
03 Carbine M1 276 rounds
04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds
05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds

06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds

Pistol

07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.

05 Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)

AMMO DAM POST NO. 24

Shotguns

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M16 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.

01 M16 (long) 3 pcs.

02 Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann

02 M16 (short) 4 pcs.

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

03 Intratec 1 pc.

01 M1 (short) 3 pcs.

04 US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.

02 M16 (long) 1 pc.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

03 M14 8 pcs.

01 M16 147 rds.

04 Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.

02 Cal .30 5 rounds

05 Mag Assy Cal .22 1 pc.

03 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

04 Carbine 5 rounds

01 M16 73 rounds

05 Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds

02 M14 160 rounds

06 9 MM 30 rounds

03 M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds

NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16

04 Rifle Grenade 1 round

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT

01 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor

01 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco

03 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor

02 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco

04 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor

03 M16 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco

05 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor

04 Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor

07 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor

08 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor
09 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor
10 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor
11 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor
12 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor
13 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor
14 Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB
15 Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB
16 Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not
Indicated
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a
"Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental
Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." 17
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners'
motions. 18 On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested
Order 19 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 20
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:

21

I
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed
grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to
quash Search Warrant No. 799(95). Probable cause [has] not . . . been
sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a
general warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed
grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to
quash Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully
served or implemented.

02 M16 2,349 rds.

III
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.
02 Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs
03 M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.
04 M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.
05 Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.

Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting

with grave abuse of discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with the
proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter,
we shall also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition should be dismissed for
raising factual questions.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.

Preliminary Issue:

07 BAR (defective) 2 pcs.

Alleged Factual Questions

In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising
questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They
maintain that the Petition merely assails the "factual basis for the issuance of the warrant
and regularity of its implementation. 22
This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present case, petitioner do not
question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in
which those findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was violative of the
which those Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only
question of law, which may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant
The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the basic
conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, 24 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:
Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and
the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and
under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally

known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. 25
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court failed to
examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod,
who appeared during the hearing for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal
knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the
place to be searched was not described with particularity.
No Personal Examination
of the Witnesses
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was
valid, stating that "before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching
questions to the applicant and the witnesses in order to determined whether there was
probable cause . . .." 26 (Emphasis supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the
Motion to Quash, which argued that "it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable
Court did not propound searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon
Pascua and the witnesses he produced." 27 The records, however, proclaim otherwise.
As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported
by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a
summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe
Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod however, none of the aforementioned witnesses
and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the
hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness
Bacolod: 28
COURT:
Where is the witness for this application for search
warrant?
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear the witness.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)
Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth before this Court?
WITNESS:

Yes Ma'am.

Q How do you know that said the properties were

subject of the offense?

STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status,
occupation,
address
and
other
personal
circumstances.
WITNESS:
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married,
policeman, c/o Camp Crame, Quezon City, SOU,
TMC.
xxx xxx xxx
Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he
failed even to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to
propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses
other than Bacolod (whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously,
His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in this
language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may procedure and attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will
be found later that his declarations are false.
xxx xxx xxx
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. 29
Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to
Facts Personally Known to Him
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his
testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation
of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his
Deposition, he stated:

A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and

case build up for several days, we gathered
informations from reliable sources that subject
properties [which] are in their possession and
control [are] the herein described properties subject
of the offense. (Summary of Information dtd Oct. '94.
SS's of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both dtd 30
Nov '94 are hereto attached). 30
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP
security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not
meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He
declared:
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against
Paper Industries Corporation located at PICOP
Compound Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
How come that you have knowledge that there are
illegal firearms in that place?
A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched
by our Commander to investigate the alleged
assassination plot of Congressman Amante.
Q In the course of your investigation, what
happened?
A We found out that some of the suspects in the
alleged assassination plot are employees of PICOP.
Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of
PICOP, what did you do?
A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside
the compound of PICOP in Tabon.
Q What did you find . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms.
Q How were you able to investigate the compound
of PICOP?
A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.
Q By what means?

A By pretending to have some official business with

the company.

A I conducted the inquiry.

Q What did you find out?

Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate

the compound of PICOP?

A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.

A Yes, sir.

Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?

Q What did you f[i]nd . . .?

A Yes, sir.

A I found . . . several high-powered firearms being

kept in the compound of PICOP.

Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security

Agency has no firearms of their own?

Q Where are those located?

A No high-powered firearms.

A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.

Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms

have you seen inside the compound of PICOP?

Q Inside the compound?

A There are M-16 armalite rifles.
A Located inside the compound.
Q What else?
Q Then what?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14
US rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols,
several
handgrenades
and
ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)

A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters

or office.
Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries
Corporation has its own security guards?
A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.
Q You mean to say that their own security guards
guarded the PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the
security guards are illegally obtained?
A I believe they have no license to possess highpowered firearms. As far as the verification at FEU,
Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have no license.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security
Agency?

Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP
compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guard
were not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he
made no statement before the trail court PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no
license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably
failed to attach to the application a copy aforementioned "no license" certification from the
Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP or to present it during the hearing. Such
certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in
Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based. In People v. Judge Estrada, 32 the
Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be
the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The
introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is
the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for
instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present
case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the
applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must
show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the

Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the Constitution to be
searched only to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this Court has held that "this
constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach
of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural
safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific
description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the
magistrate that the described items are to be found in particular place. 35
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with
particularly. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not
specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon,
Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200
offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6
POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are
spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." 36 Obviously, the warrant gives the
police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside
the PICOP compound. 37

not that specified in the warrant [was] exactly what they had in view
when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in the
supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a
search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants
had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to
the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in
the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the
rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified
or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or
the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the
warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place
to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open
wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers
executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of
the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and
only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police
officers conducting the search. (Emphasis supplied.)
Seized Firearms and Explosives

In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement,
because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the
warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched,
because they were not among those identified during the hearing. 38
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were
not made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asucion. Moreover, the fact
that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP
Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the
place to be searched. 39 Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the
warrant the place indicated in the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such
conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforces.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that the police had no authority to
search the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even
if they intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched
cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a
meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the
applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what
was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written
down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in
their mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor
licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in
the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although

Inadmissible in Evidence
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95)
issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint
docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms.
State Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary
investigation, issued a subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the
preliminary investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search
warrant. They argued, as they do now, that the illegal obtained firearms could not be the
basis of the criminal Complaint. Their motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration met the same fate. In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
petitioners assert that "State Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for
continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167." 41
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence was "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." 43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the
poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right "would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means evidence means of coercing evidence . . .." 44

In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the
firearms and other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these
illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complainant and the
proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace
and order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they
must do so only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our
people.
Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason."

45

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and
Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Illinois v. Gates
Argued October 13, 1982
Reargued March 1, 1983
Decided June 8, 1983
462 U.S. 213
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
Syllabus
On May 3, 1978, the Police Department of Bloomingdale, Ill., received an anonymous letter
which included statements that respondents, husband and wife, were engaged in selling
drugs; that the wife would drive their car to Florida on May 3 to be loaded with drugs, and
the husband would fly down in a few days to drive the car back; that the car's trunk would
be loaded with drugs; and that respondents presently had over $100,000 worth of drugs in
their basement.
Acting on the tip, a police officer determined respondents' address and learned that the
husband made a reservation on a May 5 flight to Florida. Arrangements for surveillance of
the flight were made with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the
surveillance disclosed that the husband took the flight, stayed overnight in a motel room
registered in the wife's name, and left the following morning with a woman in a car bearing
an Illinois license plate issued to the husband, heading north on an interstate highway
used by travelers to the Bloomingdale area. A search warrant for respondents' residence
and automobile was then obtained from an Illinois state court judge, based on the
Bloomingdale police officer's affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts and a copy of the
anonymous letter. When respondents arrived at their home, the police were waiting, and
discovered marihuana and other contraband in respondents' car trunk and home. Prior to

respondents' trial on charges of violating state drug laws, the trial court ordered
suppression of all the items seized, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. The Illinois
Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the letter and affidavit were inadequate to
sustain a determination of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant under Aguilar
v. Texas,378 U. S. 108, and Spinelli v. United States,393 U. S. 410, since they failed to
satisfy the "two-pronged test" of (1) revealing the informant's "basis of knowledge" and
(2) providing sufficient facts to establish either the informant's "veracity" or the "reliability"
of the informant's report.
Held:
1. The question -- which this Court requested the parties to address -- whether the rule
requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment should be modified so as, for example, not to require exclusion of evidence
obtained in the reasonable
Page 462 U. S. 214
belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, will
not be decided in this case, since it was not presented to or decided by the Illinois courts.
Although prior decisions interpreting the "not pressed or passed on below" rule have not
involved a State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or remedy asserted below, the
purposes underlying the rule are, for the most part, as applicable in such a case as in one
where a party fails to assert a federal right. The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively
applied the federal exclusionary rule does not affect the application of the "not pressed or
passed on below" rule. Nor does the State's repeated opposition to respondents'
substantive Fourth Amendment claims suffice to have raised the separate question
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified. The extent of the continued vitality of the
rule is an issue of unusual significance, and adhering scrupulously to the customary
limitations on this Court's discretion promotes respect for its adjudicatory process and the
stability of its decisions, and lessens the threat of untoward practical ramifications not
foreseen at the time of decision. Pp. 462 U. S. 217-224.
2. The rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilar and Spinelli for determining whether an
informant's tip establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant is abandoned, and the
"totality of the circumstances" approach that traditionally has informed probable cause
determinations is substituted in its place. The elements under the "two-pronged test"
concerning the informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge" should be
understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common
sense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or
evidence is located in a particular place. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. This
flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and
private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has
developed from Aguilar and Spinelli. Pp. 462 U. S. 230-241.
3. The judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
to search respondents' home and car existed. Under the "totality of the circumstances"
analysis, corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work is of
significant value. Cf. Draper v. United States,358 U. S. 307. Here, even standing alone, the
facts obtained through the independent investigation of the Bloomingdale police officer and
the DEA at least suggested that
Page 462 U. S. 215

respondents were involved in drug trafficking. In addition, the judge could rely on the
anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in major part by the police officer's efforts.
Pp. 462 U. S. 241-246.
85 Ill.2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and
BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 462 U. S. 246. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 274. STEVENS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 291.
Page 462 U. S. 216
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for violation of state drug laws after
police officers, executing a search warrant, discovered marihuana and other contraband in
their automobile and home. Prior to trial, the Gateses moved to suppress evidence seized
during this search. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state courts
granting the motion. 85 Ill.2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981). It held that the affidavit
submitted in support of the State's application for a warrant to search the Gateses' property
Page 462 U. S. 217
was inadequate under this Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas,378 U. S. 108 (1964),
and Spinelli v. United States,393 U. S. 410(1969).
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the Fourth Amendment to a
magistrate's issuance of a search warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated
anonymous informant's tip. 454 U.S. 1140 (1982). After receiving briefs and hearing oral
argument on this question, however, we requested the parties to address an additional
question:
"[W]hether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United
States,232 U. S. 383 (1914), should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to
require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and
seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment."
459 U.S. 1028 (1982).
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we framed for the parties was not
presented to the Illinois courts and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider the
question originally presented in the petition for certiorari, and conclude that the Illinois
Supreme Court read the requirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restrictively.
Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not addressing the question regarding
modification of the exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 1982. Ibid.
I
Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from state courts derives from 28 U.S.C. 1257,
which provides that
"[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: . . . (3) By writ of
certiorari, . . . where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution, treaties or statutes
Page 462 U. S. 218
of . . . the United States."
The provision derives, albeit with important alterations, see, e.g., Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch.
2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, 1257, 62 Stat. 929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789,
25, 1 Stat. 85.

Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning of 1257 and its predecessors, our
decisions are in some respects not entirely clear. We held early on that 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with no jurisdiction unless a federal question had been
both raised and decided in the state court below. As Justice Story wrote in Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 35 U. S. 392 (1836): "If both of these requirements do not appear on
the record, the appellate jurisdiction fails." See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5
Cranch 344 (1809). [Footnote 1]
More recently, in McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,309 U. S. 430, 309
U. S. 434-435 (1940), the Court observed:
"But it is also the settled practice of this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
that it is only in exceptional cases, and then only in cases coming from the federal courts,
that it considers questions urged by a petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in
the courts below. . . . In cases coming here from state courts in which a state statute is
assailed as unconstitutional, there are reasons of peculiar force which should lead us to
refrain from deciding questions not presented or decided in the highest court of the state
whose judicial action we are called upon to review. Apart from the
Page 462 U. S. 219
reluctance with which every court should proceed to set aside legislation as
unconstitutional on grounds not properly presented, due regard for the appropriate
relationship of this Court to state courts requires us to decline to consider and decide
questions affecting the validity of state statutes not urged or considered there. It is for
these reasons that this Court, where the constitutionality of a statute has been upheld in
the state court, consistently refuses to consider any grounds of attack not raised or
decided in that court."
Finally, the Court seemed to reaffirm the jurisdictional character of the rule against our
deciding claims "not pressed nor passed upon" in state court in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel,324 U. S. 154, 324 U. S. 160 (1945), where we explained that,
"[s]ince the [State] Supreme Court did not pass on the question, we may not do so." See
also Hill v. California,401 U. S. 797, 401 U. S. 805-806 (1971).
Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of our more recent cases have treated
the so-called "not pressed or passed upon below" rule as merely a prudential restriction.
In Terminiello v. Chicago,337 U. S. 1 (1949), the Court reversed a state criminal conviction
on a ground not urged in state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, in Vachon v. New
Hampshire,414 U. S. 478 (1974), the Court summarily reversed a state criminal conviction
on the ground, not raised in state court, or here, that it had been obtained in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court indicated in a
footnote, id. at 414 U. S. 479, n. 3, that it possessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise
in state court the question on which it decided the case.
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of the "not pressed or passed upon
below" rule, we have recognized that it often may be unclear whether the particular federal
question presented in this Court was raised or passed upon below. In Dewey v. Des
Moines,173 U. S. 193, 173 U. S. 197-198 (1899), the fullest treatment of the subject, the
Court said
Page 462 U. S. 220
that,
"[i]f the question were only an enlargement of the one mentioned in the assignment of
errors, or if it were so connected with it in substance as to form but another ground or
reason for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's] judgment, we should have no
hesitation in holding the assignment sufficient to permit the question to be now raised and

argued. Parties are not confined here to the same arguments which were advanced in the
courts below upon a Federal question there discussed. [Footnote 2]"
We have not attempted, and likely would not have been able, to draw a clear-cut line
between cases involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented below and those
involving entirely new questions.
The application of these principles in the instant case is not entirely straightforward. It is
clear in this case that respondents expressly raised, at every level of the Illinois judicial
system, the claim that the Fourth Amendment had been violated by the actions of the
Illinois police and that the evidence seized by the officers should be excluded from their
trial. It also is clear that the State challenged, at every level of the Illinois court system,
respondents' claim that the substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had been
violated. The State never, however, raised or addressed the question whether the federal
exclusionary rule should be modified in any respect, and none of the opinions of the
Page 462 U. S. 221
Illinois courts give any indication that the question was considered.
The case, of course, is before us on the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. Since the Act
of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790, jurisdiction has been vested in this Court to review
state court decisions even when a claimed federal right has been upheld. Our prior
decisions interpreting the "not pressed or passed on below" rule have not, however,
involved a State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or remedy asserted below. As
explained below, however, we can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have
challenged an asserted federal claim differently from the failure of the proponent of a
federal claim to have raised that claim.
We have identified several purposes underlying the "not pressed or passed upon" rule: for
the most part, these are as applicable to the State's failure to have opposed the assertion
of a particular federal right as to a party's failure to have asserted the claim. First,
"[q]uestions not raised below are those on which the record is very likely to be inadequate,
since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in mind." Cardinale v.
Louisiana,394 U. S. 437, 394 U. S. 439 (1969). Exactly the same difficulty exists when the
State urges modification of an existing constitutional right or accompanying remedy. Here,
for example, the record contains little, if anything, regarding the subjective good faith of the
police officers that searched the Gateses' property -- which might well be an important
consideration in determining whether to fashion a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. Our consideration of whether to modify the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit
from a record containing such facts.
Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate relationship of this Court to state
courts," McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. at 309 U. S. 434435, demands that those courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of
the actions of state officials, and, equally important, proposed changes in existing
remedies for unconstitutional
Page 462 U. S. 222
actions. Finally, by requiring that the State first argue to the state courts that the federal
exclusionary rule should be modified, we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the
State as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an adequate and independent state
ground.See Cardinale, supra, at 394 U. S. 439. Illinois, for example, adopted an
exclusionary rule as early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp,307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728
(1923), and might adhere to its view even if it thought we would conclude that the federal
rule should be modified. In short, the reasons supporting our refusal to hear federal claims
not raised in state court apply with equal force to the State's failure to challenge the
availability of a well-settled federal remedy. Whether the "not pressed or passed upon

below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier decisions indicate, see supra at 462 U. S. 217219, or prudential, as several of our later decisions assume, or whether its character might
be different in cases like this from its character elsewhere, we need not decide. Whatever
the character of the rule may be, consideration of the question presented in our order of
November 29, 1982, would be contrary to the sound justifications for the "not pressed or
passed upon below" rule, and we thus decide not to pass on the issue.
The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the federal exclusionary rule -suppressing evidence against respondents -- does not affect our conclusion. In Morrison v.
Watson,154 U. S. 111 (1894), the Court was asked to consider whether a state statute
impaired the plaintiff in error's contract with the defendant in error. It declined to hear the
case because the question presented here had not been pressed or passed on below. The
Court acknowledged that the lower court's opinion had restated the conclusion, set forth in
an earlier decision of that court, that the state statute did not impermissibly impair
contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held that there was no showing that "there was any
real contest at any stage of this case upon the point," id. at 154 U. S. 115, and that without
such a contest, the routine restatement
Page 462 U. S. 223
and application of settled law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not pressed or
passed upon below" rule. Similarly, in the present case, although the Illinois courts applied
the federal exclusionary rule, there was never "any real contest" upon the point. The
application of the exclusionary rule was merely a routine act, once a violation of the Fourth
Amendment had been found, and not the considered judgment of the Illinois courts on the
question whether application of a modified rule would be warranted on the facts of this
case. In such circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary to apprise the state
court of the arguments for not applying the exclusionary rule, we will not consider the
question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.
Likewise, we do not believe that the State's repeated opposition to respondents'
substantive Fourth Amendment claims suffices to have raised the question whether the
exclusionary rule should be modified. The exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally," and not "a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra,414 U. S. 338, 414 U.
S. 348 (1974). The question whether the exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a
particular context has long been regarded as an issue separate from the question whether
the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Havens,446 U. S. 620 (1980); United States v.
Ceccolini,435 U. S. 268 (1978); United States v. Calandra, supra; Stone v. Powell,428 U.
S. 465 (1976). Because of this distinction, we cannot say that modification or abolition of
the exclusionary rule is "so connected with [the substantive Fourth Amendment right at
issue] as to form but another ground or reason for alleging the invalidity" of the
judgment. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. at 173 U. S. 197-198. Rather, the rule's
modification was, for purposes of the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, a separate
claim that had to be specifically presented to the state courts.
Page 462 U. S. 224

v. Williams,430 U. S. 387, 430 U. S. 413-414 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring); Robbins v.

California,453 U. S. 420, 453 U. S. 437, 453 U. S. 443-444 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J.,
dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public importance are involved, there are strong
reasons to adhere scrupulously to the customary limitations on our discretion. By doing so,
we "promote respect . . . for the Court's adjudicatory process [and] the stability of [our]
decisions." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover,
fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual record will be available to us, thereby
discouraging the framing of broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts, which may
prove ill-considered in other circumstances. In Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the
rule lessens the threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id. at 367 U. S. 676 (dissenting
opinion), not foreseen at the time of decision. The public importance of our decisions
in Weeks and Mapp and the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding these
decisions counsel that we meticulously observe our customary procedural rules. By
following this course, we promote respect for the procedures by which our decisions are
rendered, as well as confidence in the stability of prior decisions. A wise exercise of the
powers confided in this Court dictates that we reserve for another day the question
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.
Page 462 U. S. 225
II
We now turn to the question presented in the State's original petition for certiorari, which
requires us to decide whether respondents' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments were violated by the search of their car and house. A chronological statement
of events usefully introduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb of Chicago
located in Du Page County. On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Department
received by mail an anonymous handwritten letter which read as follows:
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make their
living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off
Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his
wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance
flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she
is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At
the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs.
Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement."
"They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on
pushers."
"I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends with
some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often."
"Lance & Susan Gates"
"Greenway"

Finally, weighty prudential considerations militate against our considering the question
presented in our order of November 29, 1982. The extent of the continued vitality of the
rules that have developed from our decisions in Weeks v. United States,232 U. S.
383 (1914), andMapp v. Ohio,367 U. S. 643 (1961), is an issue of unusual significance.
Sufficient evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue that Members of this
Court recently have made, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,403 U. S.
388, 403 U. S. 415(1971) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.
S. 443, 403 U. S. 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 403 U. S. 502 (Black, J.,
dissenting); Stone v. Powell, supra, at 428 U. S. 537-539 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Brewer

"in Condominiums"
The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the Bloomingdale Police Department to
Detective Mader, who decided to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of the
Illinois Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license had
Page 462 U. S. 226
been issued to one Lance Gates, residing at a stated address in Bloomingdale. He
contacted a confidential informant, whose examination of certain financial records revealed

a more recent address for the Gateses, and he also learned from a police officer assigned
to O'Hare Airport that "L. Gates" had made a reservation on Eastern Airlines Flight 245 to
West Palm Beach, Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 5 at 4:15 p. m.
Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration for
surveillance of the May 5 Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader that
Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in Florida had observed him arrive in
West Palm Beach and take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported that Gates
went to a room registered to one Susan Gates and that, at 7 o'clock the next morning,
Gates and an unidentified woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates
and drove north-bound on an interstate highway frequently used by travelers to the
Chicago area. In addition, the DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate number on
the Mercury was registered to a Hornet station wagon owned by Gates. The agent also
advised Mader that the driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale was
approximately 22 to 24 hours.
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts, and submitted it to a judge of the
Circuit Court of Du Page County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The judge
of that court thereupon issued a search warrant for the Gateses' residence and for their
automobile.
The judge, in deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the modus
operandi of the Gateses had been substantially corroborated. As the anonymous letter
predicted, Lance Gates had flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon
of May 5th, had checked into a hotel room registered in the name of his wife, and, at 7
o'clock the following morning, had headed north, accompanied by an unidentified woman,
Page 462 U. S. 227
out of West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers from South Florida to
Chicago in an automobile bearing a license plate issued to him.
At 5:15 a.m. on March 7, only 36 hours after he had flown out of Chicago, Lance Gates,
and his wife, returned to their home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left
West Palm Beach some 22 hours earlier. The Bloomingdale police were awaiting them,
searched the trunk of the Mercury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of
marihuana. A search of the Gateses' home revealed marihuana, weapons, and other
contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered suppression of all these items, on the ground
that the affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the necessary
determination of probable cause to believe that the Gateses' automobile and home
contained the contraband in question. This decision was affirmed in turn by the Illinois
Appellate Court, 82 Ill.App.3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980), and by a divided vote of the
Supreme Court of Illinois. 85 Ill.2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).

the anonymous letter with information sufficient to permit a determination of probable

cause. See Whiteley v. Warden,401 U. S. 560,401 U. S. 567 (1971). In holding that the
affidavit in fact did not contain sufficient additional information to sustain a determination of
probable cause, the Illinois court applied a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision
in Spinelli v. United States,393 U. S. 410(1969). [Footnote 3] The Illinois Supreme Court,
like some others, apparently understood Spinelli as requiring that the anonymous letter
satisfy each of two independent requirements before it could be relied on. 85 Ill.2d at 383,
423 N.E.2d at 890. According to this view, the letter, as supplemented by Mader's affidavit,
first had to adequately reveal the "basis of knowledge" of the letterwriter -- the particular
means by which he came by the information given in his report. Second, it had to provide
Page 462 U. S. 229
facts sufficiently establishing either the "veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively,
the "reliability" of the informant's report in this particular case.
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules that have developed among
various lower courts to enforce the "two-pronged test," [Footnote 4] found that the test had
not been satisfied. First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied because
"[t]here was simply no basis [for] conclud[ing] that the anonymous person [who wrote the
letter to the Bloomingdale Police Department] was credible."
Id. at 385, 423 N.E.2d at 891. The court indicated that corroboration by police of details
contained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity" prong, and in any event, could not
do so if, as in the present case, only "innocent" details are corroborated. Id. at 390, 423
N.E.2d at 893. In addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its writer's
knowledge of the
Page 462 U. S. 230
Gateses' activities. The Illinois court understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained
in a tip to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for his statements, but it
thought that the anonymous letter failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an
inference. Thus, it concluded that no showing of probable cause had been made.
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's "veracity," "reliability," and
"basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do
not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and
independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case, [Footnote 5] which the
opinion of the Supreme
Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as detailed below, they should be understood simply
as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical
question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is
located in a particular place.
III

The Illinois Supreme Court concluded -- and we are inclined to agree -- that, standing
alone, the anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide
the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe
contraband would be found in the Gateses' car and home. The letter provides virtually
nothing from which one might conclude that its author is either honest or his information
reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer's
predictions regarding the Gateses' criminal activities. Something more was required, then,
before a magistrate could conclude that there
was probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gateses' home and
car. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 109, n. 1; Nathanson v. United States,290
U. S. 41 (1933).
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that Detective Mader's affidavit might
be capable of supplementing
Page 462 U. S. 228

This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment
of probable cause [Footnote 6] than
Page 462 U. S. 231
is any rigid demand that specific "tests" be satisfied by every informant's tip. Perhaps the
central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a
"practical, nontechnical conception." Brinegar v. United States,338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S.
176(1949).
"In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
Id. at 338 U. S. 175. Our observation in United States v. Cortez,449 U. S. 411, 449 U. S.
418 (1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is also applicable to the probable cause
standard:

"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the
law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common
sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the
same -- and
Page 462 U. S. 232
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and
weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement."
As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid concept -- turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts -- not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and
sizes from many different types of persons. As we said in Adams v. Williams,407 U. S.
143, 407 U. S. 147 (1972):
"Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene,
may vary greatly in their value and reliability."
Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. "One simple rule will not cover
every situation." Ibid. [Footnote 7]
Page 462 U. S. 233
Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two largely independent channels -the informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge." See nn. 4 and <=""
a="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">| 4 and <="" a="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">S.
213fn5|>5, supra. There are persuasive arguments against according these two elements
such independent status. Instead, they are better understood as relevant considerations in
the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause
determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of
reliability. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, supra, at 407 U. S. 146-147; United States v.
Harris,403 U. S. 573 (1971).
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions
of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to
thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar
to a finding of probable cause based on his tip. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37
(CA5 1973). [Footnote 8] Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with
a report of criminal activity -- which, if fabricated, would subject him to criminal liability -- we
have found
Page 462 U. S. 234
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Adams v. Williams,
supra. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his
explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the
event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the
case. Unlike a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, which permits a balanced
assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability)
attending an informant's tip, the "two-pronged test" has encouraged an excessively
technical dissection of informants' tips, [Footnote 9] with undue attention's
Page 462 U. S. 235
being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts
presented to the magistrate.
As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 11 U. S. 348 (1813), Chief Justice
Marshall observed, in a closely related context:

"[T]he term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation. . . . It imports a seizure made under circumstances
which warrant suspicion."
More recently, we said that "the quanta . . . of proof" appropriate in ordinary judicial
proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 338
U. S. 173. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate's
decision. While an effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty
corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is clear that "only the probability,
and not a prima facieshowing, of criminal activity, is the standard of probable
cause." Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 419. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure 210.1(7) (Prop.Off.Draft 1972); 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 3.2(e)
(1978).
We also have recognized that affidavits
"are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.
Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings
have no proper place in this area."
United States v. Ventresca,380 U. S. 102, 380 U. S. 108 (1965). Likewise, search and
arrest warrants long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and
who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of "probable
cause." See Shadwick v. City of Tampa,407 U. S. 345, 407 U. S. 348-350 (1972). The
rigorous inquiry into the Spinelliprongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and
analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled
with the fact that many warrants are -- quite properly, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 348-350 -issued on the basis of nontechnical,
Page 462 U. S. 236
common sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used
in more formal legal proceedings. Likewise, given the informal, often hurried context in
which it must be applied, the "built-in subtleties," Stanley v. State, 19 Md.App. 507, 528,
313 A.2d 847, 860 (1974), of the "two-pronged test" are particularly unlikely to assist
magistrates in determining probable cause.
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of
an affidavit should not take the form of de novoreview. A magistrate's "determination of
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts." Spinelli,
supra, at 393 U. S. 419. "A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants," Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 380 U. S. 108, is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts
should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a
common sense, manner." Id. at 380 U. S. 109.
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some
courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the
hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the Warrant Clause that might
develop at the time of the search. In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers
conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive
police conduct, by assuring
"the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search."
United States v. Chadwick,433 U. S. 1, 433 U. S. 9 (1977). Reflecting this preference for
the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable

cause determination has been that, so long as the magistrate had a "substantial basis
for . . . conclud[ing]" that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth
Amendment requires no more. Jones v. United States,362 U. S. 257, 362 U. S.
271 (1960). See United States v.
Page 462 U. S. 237
Harris, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 577-583. [Footnote 10] We think reaffirmation of this standard
better serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure and is more
consistent with our traditional deference to the probable cause determinations of
magistrates than is the "two-pronged test."
Finally, the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli poorly serves "[t]he most basic
function of any government:" "to provide for the security of the individual and of his
property." Miranda v. Arizona,384 U. S. 436, 384 U. S. 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The strictures that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged test" cannot avoid seriously
impeding the task of law enforcement, see, e.g.,n 9,supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme Court
apparently thought, that test must be rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips
would be of greatly diminished value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary
witnesses, see Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed.Rule Evid. 701, 28 U.S.C.App. p. 570,
generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations.
Likewise, as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the veracity of persons
supplying anonymous tips is, by hypothesis, largely unknown, and unknowable. As a
result, anonymous tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of
the Spinelli prongs. Yet such tips, particularly when supplemented by
Page 462 U. S. 238
independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise "perfect
crimes." While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required
by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen
informants is not. For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "twopronged test" established by our decisions inAguilar and Spinelli. [Footnote 11] In its place,
we reaffirm the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed
probable cause determinations. See Jones v. United States, supra; United States v.
Ventresca,380 U. S. 102 (1965); Brinegar v. United States,338 U. S. 160 (1949). The task
of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and
"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing]" that probable cause
Page 462 U. S. 239
existed. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 271. We are convinced that this
flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and
private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has
developed fromAguilar and Spinelli.
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing
a warrant. A sworn statement of an affiant that "he has cause to suspect and does believe"
that liquor illegally brought into the United States is located on certain premises will not
do.Nathanson v. United States,290 U. S. 41 (1933). An affidavit must provide the
magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, and
the wholly conclusory statement at issue in Nathanson failed to meet this requirement. An
officer's statement that "[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a credible person
and do believe" that heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar v.
Texas,378 U. S. 108 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a mere conclusory statement that
gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable
cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to

determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions
of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not
occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which
warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the "bare bones" affidavits present in
cases such asNathanson and Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed
set of rules, like that which had developed from Spinelli.Instead, the flexible, common
sense standard articulated in Jones, Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes
of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent suggests in several places that the approach we take today
somehow downgrades the
Page 462 U. S. 240
role of the neutral magistrate, because Aguilar and Spinelli "preserve the role of
magistrates as independent arbiters of probable cause. . . ." Post at 462 U. S. 287. Quite
the contrary, we believe, is the case. The essential protection of the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment, as stated in Johnson v. United States,333 U. S. 10 (1948), is in
"requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence] be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Id. at 333 U. S. 13-14. Nothing in our opinion in any way lessens the authority of the
magistrate to draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to him
by applicants for a warrant; indeed, he is freer than under the regime
of Aguilar and Spinelli to draw such inferences, or to refuse to draw them if he is so
minded.
The real gist of JUSTICE BRENNAN's criticism seems to be a second argument,
somewhat at odds with the first, that magistrates should be restricted in their authority to
make
probable
cause
determinations
by
the
standards
laid
down
in Aguilar and Spinelli, and that such findings
"should not be authorized unless there is some assurance that the information on which
they are based has been obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible person."
Post at 462 U. S. 283. However, under our opinion, magistrates remain perfectly free to
exact such assurances as they deem necessary, as well as those required by this opinion,
in making probable cause determinations. JUSTICE BRENNAN would apparently prefer
that magistrates be restricted in their findings of probable cause by the development of an
elaborate body of case law dealing with the "veracity" prong of the Spinelli test, which in
turn is broken down into two "spurs" -- the informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" of his
information,
together
with
the
"basis
of
knowledge"
prong
of
the Spinelli test. Seen 4, supra. That such a labyrinthine body of judicial refinement bears
any relationship to familiar definitions of
Page 462 U. S. 241
probable cause is hard to imagine. As previously noted, probable cause deals
"with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act,"
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 175.
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent also suggests that
"[w]ords such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'common sense,' as used in the Court's
opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude towards police practices in
derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment."
Post at 462 U. S. 290. An easy, but not a complete, answer to this rather florid statement
would be that nothing we know about Justice Rutledge suggests that he would have used
the words he chose in Brinegar in such a manner. More fundamentally, no one doubts that,

"under our Constitution, only measures consistent with the Fourth Amendment may be
employed by government to cure [the horrors of drug trafficking],"
post at 462 U. S. 290; but this agreement does not advance the inquiry as to which
measures are, and which measures are not, consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
"Fidelity" to the commands of the Constitution suggests balanced judgment, rather than
exhortation. The highest "fidelity" is not achieved by the judge who instinctively goes
furthest in upholding even the most bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any
more than it is achieved by a judge who instinctively goes furthest in accepting the most
restrictive claims of governmental authorities. The task of this Court, as of other courts, is
to "hold the balance true," and we think we have done that in this case.
IV
Our decisions applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined above have
consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by
independent police work. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 269, we held
that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to
Page 462 U. S. 242
be deemed insufficient on that score so long as a substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay is presented." We went on to say that, even in making a warrantless arrest, an
officer
"may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct
observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other
matters within the officer's knowledge."
Ibid. Likewise, we recognized the probative value of corroborative efforts of police officials
in Aguilar -- the source of the "two-pronged test" -- by observing that, if the police had
made some effort to corroborate the informant's report at issue, "an entirely different case"
would have been presented. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 109, n. 1.
Our decision in Draper v. United States,358 U. S. 307 (1959), however, is the classic case
on the value of corroborative efforts of police officials. There, an informant named Hereford
reported that Draper would arrive in Denver on a train from Chicago on one of two days,
and that he would be carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a fairly
detailed physical description of Draper, and predicted that he would be wearing a light
colored raincoat, brown slacks, and black shoes, and would be walking "real
fast." Id. at 358 U. S. 309. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for his information.
[Footnote 12]
On one of the stated dates, police officers observed a man matching this description exit a
train arriving from Chicago; his attire and luggage matched Hereford's report, and he was
Page 462 U. S. 243
walking rapidly. We explained in Draper that, by this point in his investigation, the arresting
officer
"had personally verified every facet of the information given him by Hereford except
whether petitioner had accomplished his mission, and had the three ounces of heroin on
his person or in his bag. And surely, with every other bit of Hereford's information being
thus personally verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable grounds' to believe that the remaining
unverified bit of Hereford's information -- that Draper would have the heroin with him -- was
likewise true,"
id. at 358 U. S. 313.
The showing of probable cause in the present case was fully as compelling as that
in Draper. Even standing alone, the facts obtained through the independent investigation of
Mader and the DEA at least suggested that the Gateses were involved in drug trafficking.
In addition to being a popular vacation site, Florida is well known as a source of narcotics
and other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall,446 U. S. 544, 446 U. S.

562 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); DEA, Narcotics
Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs to the U.S. Illicit Market From Foreign and
Domestic Sources in 1980, pp. 8-9. Lance Gates' flight to West Palm Beach, his brief,
overnight stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return north to Chicago in the family car,
conveniently awaiting him in West Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a prearranged drug
run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip.
In addition, the judge could rely on the anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in
major part by Mader's efforts -- just as had occurred in Draper. [Footnote 13] The Supreme
Court
Page 462 U. S. 244
of Illinois reasoned that Draper involved an informant who had given reliable information
on previous occasions, while the honesty and reliability of the anonymous informant in this
case were unknown to the Bloomingdale police. While this distinction might be an apt one
at the time the Police Department received the anonymous letter, it became far less
significant after Mader's independent investigative work occurred. The corroboration of the
letter's predictions that the Gateses' car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to
Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive the car north toward Bloomingdale all
indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the informant's other assertions also were true.
"[B]ecause an informant is right about some things, he is more probably right about other
facts," Spinelli,393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 427 (WHITE, J., concurring) -- including the claim
regarding the Gateses' illegal activity. This may well not be the type of "reliability" or
"veracity" necessary to satisfy some views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we think it
suffices for the practical, common sense judgment called for in making a probable cause
determination. It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that "[c]orroboration
through other sources of information reduced the
Page 462 U. S. 245
chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale," thus providing "a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 269, 362 U. S. 271.
Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily
obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third
parties ordinarily not easily predicted. The letterwriter's accurate information as to the
travel plans of each of the Gateses was of a character likely obtained only from the
Gateses themselves, or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary travel plans.
If the informant had access to accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly
conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable information of the
Gateses' alleged illegal activities. [Footnote 14] Of
Page 462 U. S. 246
course, the Gateses' travel plans might have been learned from a talkative neighbor or
travel agent; under the "two-pronged test" developed from Spinelli, the character of the
details in the anonymous letter might well not permit a sufficiently clear inference regarding
the letterwriter's "basis of knowledge." But, as discussed previously, supra, at 462 U. S.
235, probable cause does not demand the certainty we associate with formal trials. It is
enough that there was a fair probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had
obtained his entire story either from the Gateses or someone they trusted. And
corroboration of major portions of the letter's predictions provides just this probability. It is
apparent, therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant had a "substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing]" that probable cause to search the Gateses' home and car existed. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois therefore must be
Reversed.

G.R. No. 124461 September 25, 1998

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
BRANCH 83, QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The People of the Philippines, through this petition for review, seeks the reversal of the
order of respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated December 7, 1995, which granted
private respondent Aiden Lanuza's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958 (95), as well
as the order dated April 1, 1996 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
earlier order.
On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a search
warrant against "Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City,"
for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines).
In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged, among others, as follows:

1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of

LICD, I received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional
Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain

4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of drug products
from the residence of Ms. Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City to another person.

1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana

Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer
Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos
(P7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;

5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various products sold to/and

purchased by the affiant contained in two (2) plastic bags marked
"Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2."

1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San

Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has
no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug
products from the BFAD;
1.c. Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of
drug products without license to operate from BFAD
is in violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA 7394 (or "the
Consumer Act").
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his
report and the various drug products sold and purchased contained in a
(sic) plastic bags marked "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2"
were enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted herewith.
xxx xxx xxx. 1 (Emphasis supplied)
The application, however, ended with the statement that the warrant is to search the
premises of another person at a different address:

This is executed in support of the affiant's report to BFAD and for

whatever legitimate purpose this may serve. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the sketch 4 of the location of Aiden
Lanuza's residence at her stated address.
On the same day the application was filed, the respondent Judge issued Search Warrant
No. 958 (95), which reads in full:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 83 QUEZON CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,

3. This is executed to support affiant's application for a search warrant

on the premises of Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay
Cebu. 2 (Emphasis supplied)

-versus- SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)

AIDEN LANUZA,

In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member of the
Regional Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna, was attached thereto, wherein he declared that:
1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he conducted surveillance
for persons distributing, selling or transferring drug products without
license to operate from BFAD.
2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City sold to him various drug products
amounting to P7,232.00 and
3 Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or
premises, the said person and place have in fact no license to operate.

Defendant.
X-------------------------------X
SEARCH WARRANT
It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after examining under oath
Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD)
and her witness. Manuel P. Cabiles, member of the Intelligence Group
IV, Intelligence Command, PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang,
Laguna, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of
Article 40(k) in relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394
(Consumer Act) has been committed or about to be committed and
there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Ms. Aiden Lanuza

of 516 San Jose dela Montana Street, Cebu City has in her possession
and control at said address the following described properties:
medicines and drugs of undetermined quantity
among which are Bricanyl Tablet, Bisolvon Tablet,
Buscopan Tablet, Buscopan Ampoule, Mucosolvan
Ampoule, Persantin Tablet, Tegretol Tablet, PZACiba Tablet, Voltaren Tablet, Zantac Ampoule,
Ventolin Tablet, Ventolin Inhaler, Dermovate Cream,
Fortum Vial, Zinacef Vial, Feldene 1M Ampoule,
Norvasc Tablet, Bactrim Forte Tablet, Rochephin
Vial, Tilcotil Tablet, Librax Tablet, Methergin Tablet
and Tagamet Tablet
which she is selling, distributing and transferring without the necessary
license from the Department of Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time
of the DAY or NIGHT of the premises above-described and forthwith
seize and take possession of the undetermined amount of drugs and
medicines subject of the offense and to bring the same to this Court to
be dealt with as the law directs.

LANUZA;" and that the "said items were brought to the 7CICRO office for detailed
inventory headed by Atty. Lorna F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and
Compliance Division of the BFAD, Manila." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what actually happened
during the implementation of the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition states: "At the
commencement of the search, the members of the team discovered that the premises
described as 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a five
thousand (5,000) square meter compound containing at least fifteen (15) structures which
are either leased residences, offices, factories, workshops or warehouse. The policemen
proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said
address. Finding no drug products thereat, they proceeded to search a nearby warehouse
at Lot No. 38 within the same compound and address above stated. This search yielded
fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted drug products which were then inventoried in due
course. . . . ." 8(Emphasis supplied)
In an order 9 dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the seized
drugs and authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples of the
drugs analyzed and be brought to the registered drug manufacturers for parallel testing.

On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion 10 praying that
Search Warrant No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized articles be declared
inadmissible in any proceeding and ordered returned to the warehouse owned by Folk Arts
Export & Import Company located at Lot No. 38 inside the compound at 516 San Jose de
You are further directed to submit a return of this Search Warrant within
la Montana Street, Cebu City. The motion is based on the grounds that the search warrant
ten (10) days from today.
is illegal and null and void because: (1) it was applied to search the premises of one Belen
Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of
This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10) days from the
private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it
date of issue.
was issued for a non-existing offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly
authorized by applicant BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it failed to particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized; (5) the applicant's witnesses had no
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this Court this 27th day of
personal knowledge of the facts upon which it was issued; and (6) its implementation was
June 1995 at Quezon City.
unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or wrong place which was lawfully occupied
by a different or wrong person. 11
(Sgd.) ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD, opposed 12 the motion to
Second Vice
Executive
Judge
quash
the search
warrant, to which the private respondent countered with a reply.
(EmphasisAfter
supplied)
the contending parties had submitted their respective positions without further oral
arguments, the respondent Judge issued the assailed order 13 dated December 7, 1995,
quashing Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the order dated July 3, 1995 was
On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuza's
revoked and all the articles seized were declared inadmissible in any and all proceedings
residence at the indicated address by a composite team of policemen from the PNP 7th
against private respondent Aiden Lanuza. Also, the BFAD was ordered to return at its
Criminal Investigation Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.
expense all the seized items to the warehouse of Folk Arts Import & Export Company at
Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City within a period of fifteen
6
How the search warrant was implemented was briefly narrated in the Joint Affidavit, dated
(15) days from notice of the said order. 14
June 29, 1995, of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan, both
members of the search and seizure team. They stated in their affidavit that their team,
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 1995 order was denied in an
armed with the search warrant, "conducted a raid at the premises of one AIDEN LANUZA
order 15 dated April 1, 1996, impelling petitioner to file the present petition asserting that the
of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City . . .;" that "the raid was witnessed by Luis
respondent Judge erred:
Rivera, Demetrio Panimdim and Francisco Ojales, both (sic) Brgy. Tanod of Kasambagan,
Cebu City;" that "the service of the (search) warrant resulted in the confiscation of fifty-two
(52) cartoons (sic) of assorted medicines from the possession and control of AIDEN

a) In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's

application for a search warrant is so "grave" in
nature as to warrant quashal of the search warrant
issued thereunder, considering that such variance is
actually a harmless clerical error.
b) In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not, authorized
by the BFAD to apply for a search warrant
concerning the unlicensed distribution of drugs,
considering that the grant of BFAD authorization
upon her to investigate fake, misbranded
adulterated or unregistered drugs necessarily
contemplates the authority to investigate the
unlicensed activities above noted.
c) In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to
discharge the burden of proving probable cause for
issuance of a search warrant, by failing to present
documentary
proof
indicating
that
private
respondent had no license to sell or distribute drug
products, considering that under the authority
of Carillo v. People (229 SCRA 386) the BFAD only
had the burden of proving the negative ingredient of
the offense charged on the basis of the best
evidence procurable under the circumstances.
d) In holding that the place sought to be searched
had not been described with sufficient particularity in
SW No. 958 (95), considering that Aiden Lanuza's
residence at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was not so
conspicuously or notoriously represented to the
public as such by her as to contradict the
investigating and serving officers' perception of the
outward appearance of her dwelling, which led them
to believe that the more general address of 516 San
Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City referred
to her dwelling.
e) In ordering the return of the things seized, the
possession of which is prohibited. 16

Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised by petitioner.

The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR
PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES, SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE
AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO
SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE
EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED
PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH
OF AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES
HE MAY PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE
TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE
SEIZED. (Emphasis supplied)
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the
application for its issuance suffered from a "grave" defect, "which escaped (her) attention,"
considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New
Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of herein private
respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Cebu City. 20
We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.
The title of the questioned application, which reads:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plai
ntiff,
-versus- SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA, For: Violation of Article
516 San Jose de la 40 (k) in relation to
Montana Street, Mabolo, Article 41 of Republic

We granted, the petitioner's application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in
a resolution 17 dated June 26, 1996 and restrained the implementation of the assailed
orders, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her comment 18 on the petition, but petitioner's
reply thereto was not admitted by this Court in a resolution 19 dated January 13, 1997, for
failure by the Solicitor General to file the same within his first extension of thirty (30) days,
that was granted, but with a warning that no further extension would be given. Instead of
filing his reply, the Solicitor General asked for two (2) more extensions of time, which were
denied.

Cebu City, Act No. 7394 (or the

Defendant.
Consumer
Act)
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x

21

(Emphasis supplied)
and the allegations contained therein, pertinent portions of which we quote:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of
LICD, I received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional
Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer
Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos
(P7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has
no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug
products from the BFAD.
xxx xxx xxx
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his
report and the various drug products sold and purchased contained in a
(sic) plastic bags marked "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2"
were enclosed, and the same are likewise submitted herewith.
xxx xxx xxx. 22 (Emphasis supplied)
unmistakably reveal that the said application was specifically intended against
private respondent Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City. She has been the only one identified in the application, as well as in
the aforequoted affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon which the application
was based, as having allegedly sold to said SPO4 Cabiles various drugs
amounting to P7,232.00 on May 29, 1995, without any license to do so, in
alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394. It is noteworthy that, as stated in
the above-quoted paragraph 2 of the application, the plastic bags which
contained the seized drugs and which were submitted together with the
application, were marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2." These
markings with the name "Lanuza" obviously refer to no other than the herein
private respondent. And when the respondent Judge issued the search warrant, it
was directed solely against private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her address: 516
San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application by saying that on the same day
applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June 27, 1995,
another application for search warrant was also filed against one Belen Cabanero at her
residence at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City. This can be deduced from the
following examination conducted by respondent Judge on Atty. Cabanlas:
(COURT)

Q. And who is your respondent?

A. Mrs. Aiden Lanuza and the
other one is Belen Cabanero.
Q. Where are they situated?
A. Mrs. Lanuza is situated in No.
516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
Q. About the other?
A. New Frontier Village, Talisay,
Cebu.
Q. Do you have any specific
address at New Frontier Village?
A. It was reported by Mr. Manuel
Cabiles.
Q. Will he be testifying?
A. Yes Ma'am. Your Honor, this is
the vicinity of the New Frontier
Village, Cebu (witness presenting
a sketch) (sic)
Q How about this San Jose de la
Montana. This is just in Cebu
City?
A At 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street,
Mabolo,
Cebu
City. 23
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name and address of one Belen
Cabanero were erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in question. Such
defect, as intimated earlier, is not of such a gravity as to call for the invalidation of the
search warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was
not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the
applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza
had no license to sell drugs.

It must be noted that in the application for search warrant, private respondent is charged
with the specific offense of selling drugs without the required license from the Department
of Health, which is in violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394, and penalized under Article 41
thereof. The said application was supported by the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles
where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he declared that he made a "verification in the BFAD
registry of licensed persons or premises" and discovered that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should
have submitted documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no such
license. Although no explanation was offered by respondent Judge to support her posture,
we hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance
of a search warrant, the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." 24
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence
that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is
necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient
of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the
present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant
who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the
time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the
examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards
before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a
person to the privacy of his home and personalties. As well stated by this Court through
former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Villanueva vs. Querubin: 25
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right; but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally
protected area, primarily one's home but not necessarily thereto
confined (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 [1966]). What is
sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed
entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise
in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted
intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life
(Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 Brennam, J. and Boyd v.
United States, 116 US 616, 630). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966),
could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach
of government is no less, than to value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need,
and then only under stringent procedural safeguards (Ibid, p. 47).
(Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that
private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that
effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured
such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons
or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured.
Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient
to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The presumption of regularity cannot be
invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 26 We apply by
analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.: 27
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from
which the pirated firms were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession
the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrant is not meritorious. The court cannot
presume the duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape
outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to
P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted
work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted
films to compare the with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted
films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient
particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot
No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different person.
Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this point.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the
present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by
a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The
sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X"
enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other people,
workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have
been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient
particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same

compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is
516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be
searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent.
Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to
be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which
is violative of the constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general warrant, it was
correctly implemented. For, the searching team went directly to the house of private
respondent Aiden Lanuza located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. However, the team did not find any of the
drug products which were the object of the search. Frustrated, and apparently
disappointed, the team then proceeded to search a nearby warehouse of Folk Arts Export
& Import Company owned by one David Po located at Lot No. 38 within the same
compound. It was in the warehouse that drug products were found and seized which were
duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Markbilly
Capalungan, members of the searching team, is a statement that the confiscated 52
cartons of assorted medicines were found in the possession and control of private
respondent Aiden Lanuza. This is a blatant falsehood and is aggravated by the fact that
this was committed by officers sworn to uphold the law. In searching the warehouse of Folk
Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po, the searching team went beyond
the scope of the search warrant. As the trial court aptly observed:
. . . . The verified motion to quash and reply also show that the search
at the house of defendant-movant yielded negative result and the
confiscated articles were taken from another place which is the
warehouse of Folk Arts Import and Export Company owned by another
person. In the return of the search warrant, it is stated that Search
Warrant No. 958 (95) was served at the premises of 516 San Jose dela
Montana St., Cebu City and that during the search, drug products were
found and seized therefrom which were duly receipted. Accompanying,
said return is the Joint Affidavit of two (2) members of the searching
team, namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete and SPO2 Markbilly Capalingan,
both of the 7th Criminal Investigation Command, PNP, with station at
Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City which also
mentioned only the address as 516 San Jose dela Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City and the confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted
medicines purportedly from the possession and control of defendantmovant. However, as indicated in the sketch attached to the application
for search warrant, said Folk Arts Import and Export Company is owned
by one David Po, which is a concrete proof that the searching team
exceeded their authority by conducting a search not only in the
residence of defendant-movant Lanuza but also in another place which
the applicant itself has identified as belonging to another person, David
Po. The foregoing are strong reasons to support the conclusion that
there has been an unreasonable search and seizure which would
warrant the quashal of the search warrant. 30
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued in
a resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

legal right upon the Government to seize, much less to retain or open the filing
cabinet in question, Exhibit 3.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, which is void ab
initio may not be legalized by evidence secured subsequent to the issuance, or in
consequence, of said illegal search warrant.
G.R. No. L-41957

August 28, 1937

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
SANTIAGO
SY
TEOPISTO B. REMO, petitioner-appellant.
Laurel,
Del
Rosario
and
Office of the Solicitor-General for appellee.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
JUCO, defendant.

Sabido

for

appellant.

DIAZ, J.:
Upon petition of the agent and representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, named
Narciso Mendiola, who alleged that, according to information given him by a person whom
he considered reliable, certain fraudulent bookletters and papers or records were being
kept in the building marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila, occupied by
Santiago Sy Juco, a warrant to search the building in question was issued against said
person on March 7, 1933, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, through Judge Mariano
A. Albert. In said warrant, the peace officers to whom it was directed for execution were
required to seize the above-stated articles for the purpose of delivering them to the court,
for the proper action to be taken in due time. After making the required search the officers
concerned seized, among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Attorney Teopisto
B. Remo to be his and to contain some letters, documents and papers belonging to his
clients. Inasmuch as said officers later refused to return the filing cabinet in question to
him, he filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that the Collector of
Internal Revenue and his agents be prohibited from opening said art metal filing cabinet
and that the sheriff of the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take charge of said property
in the meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the search was made is
null and void, being illegal and against the Constitution. A similar petition was later filed in
the same case by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., the same agents of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue having also seized some books belonging to it by virtue of the above-mentioned
search warrant.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance through Judge Delfin Jaranilla, decided to
overrule both petitions, declaring that the art metal filing cabinet and the books and papers
claimed by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., would be returned to Attorney Teopisto B. Remo
and to the company, respectively, as soon as it be proven, by means of an examination
thereof to be made in the presence of the interested parties, that they contain nothing
showing that they have been used to commit fraud against the Government. Only Attorney
Teopisto B. Remo appealed from the decision of the court and he now contends that it
committed the nine errors assigned by him as follows:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, issued
in the case at bar is unconstitutional and void ab initio and hence can confer no

3. The lower court erred in not holding that the doctrine of the case of People vs.
Rubio (G. R. No. 35500, 57 Phil., 384), is not applicable to the case at bar.
4. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, was
procured in order to obtain evidence against the defendant Santiago Sy Juco.
5. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, was
issued solely against the premised occupied by the defendant Santiago Sy Juco,
and hence cannot be used against the premises occupied by a stranger, or the
petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo.
6. The lower court erred in not holding that the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, is the
personal property of the petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, and not of the defendant
Santiago Sy Juco.
7. The lower court erred in not upholding the inviolability of the contents of the
filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, the same being confidential documents entrusted to the
herein petitioner, Attorney Teopisto B. Remo, by his clients, in his professional
capacity and in connection with cases pending before the courts of justice and
administrative tribunals.
8. The lower court erred in not holding that the Internal Revenue agents gave
infringed the penal laws not only by procuring the search warrant, Exhibit B,
against the premises of the defendant, Santiago Sy Juco, without just cause, but
also by exceeding their authority in enforcing said search warrant against the
premises of the petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, who is stranger to said search
warrant, which acts also constitute a violation of the domicile of said petitioner;
and in not endorsing the matter to the city fiscal for proper action.
9. The lower court erred in not ordering the return of the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3,
intact and unopened, to its lawful owner, the petitioner Teopisto B. Remo.
The pertinent part of the search warrant in question was couched in the following
language:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me, Mariano Albert,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, by the complainant on oath of Narciso Mendiola, special
investigator, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila, that the defendant,
Santiago Sy Juco, of No. 482 Juan Luna, Manila, keeps illegally and
feloniously fraudulent books, correspondence, and records and that he
verily believes upon probable cause that the said books,
correspondence and records at No. 482 Juan Luna, Manila, and the

said (personal) property is now being used in the commission of fraud

of the revenue of the Government.

It appears clear to this court that the question that the appellant wishes to raise by means
of the allege errors attributed by him to the lower court, may be reduced to the following:

You are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and
proper assistance and to enter, in the daytime, into the said premises
and there diligently search for fraudulent books, correspondence and
records and that you seize and bring them before the court to be
disposed of according to law.

1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the
provisions of the law and of the Constitution relative thereto?

Given under my hands this 7th day of March, 1933, in the City of
Manila.
[SEAL]
(Sgd.)
MARIANO
Judge of Court of First instance of Manila

A.

ALBERT

The affidavit or deposition referred to in the warrant above-quoted contained the following
questions and answers:
TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE HON. JUDGE MARIANO A. ALBERT, Narciso
Mendiola, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? A. Narciso Mendiola,
special investigator, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila.
Q. Are you the applicant for this search warrant? A. Yes, sir.
Q. do you know the premises situated at No. 482 Juan Luna, Manila? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Do you know who occupy said premises? A. According to the best of my
information, the house is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco.
Q. What are your reasons for applying for a search warrant? A. It has been
reported to us by person whom I considered reliable that in said premises are
fraudulent books, correspondence and records.
I. Narciso Mendiola, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read
the foregoing questions and answers and that I found the same to be
correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) NARCISCO MENDIOLA.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of March, 1933, in the
City of Manila, P. I.
[SEAL]
(Sgd.)
Judge, Court of First Instance, Manila

MARIANO

A.

ALBERT

2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue belong to Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
3. Could the search warrant in question affect Attorney Teopisto B. Remo, not
being the person against whom it was directed?
4. Had the court authority to order the opening of the cabinet in question for the
purpose of determining, by an examination of the books, documents and records
contained therein, whether or not same were used to commit fraud against the
Government?
1. A question which is very similar to the first one herein raised by the appellant, has been
decided by this court in the negative in its judgment rendered in the case of Alvarez vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti Usury Board, p. 33, ante. According to our laws
in force on the date in question, which do not differ substantially from the provisions of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth in matters regarding search, in order that a search
warrant may be valid, the following requisites, among others, must be present: That the
application upon which it is issued be supported by oath; That the search warrant
particularly describes not only place to be searched but also the person or thing to be
seized and that there be probable cause (sec. 97, General Orders, No. 58: sec. 3, Jones
Law; Article III, sec. 1, paragraph 3, Constitution of the Commonwealth).
In the above-cited case of Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury
Board, supra, and in that of United States vs. Addison (28 Phil., 566), this court held that
the oath required must be such that it constitutes a guaranty that the person taking it has
personal knowledge of the facts of the case and that it convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual seeking the issuance of the warrant or the person making the averment
by hearsay, of the existence of the requisite of probable cause. It has likewise been held by
this court that by probable cause are meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to
the issuance thereof. It has furthermore been held that the true test of the sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon in case the allegations contained therein
prove false (Sate vs. Roosevelt, 244 Pac., 280), and that the provisions of the Constitution
and the statutes relative to searches and seizures must be construed liberally in favor of
the individual who may be affected thereby, and strictly against the State and against the
person invoking them for the issuance of the warrant ordering their execution (Elardo vs.
State of Misissippi, 145 So., 615; Fowler vs. U. S., 62 Fed. [2d], 656; Saforik vs. U. S.
Feed. [2d], 892; Boyd vs. U. S., 116 U. S., 616; 29 Law. ed., 746), for the simple reason
that the proceedings of search and seizure are, by their very nature, summary and drastic
ones (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, supra, and the
authorities cited therein).
By reading the affidavit which gave rise to the issuance of the search warrant in question, it
will be seen that the latter does not fulfill the necessary conditions in support of its validity.
In the first place, it is not stated in said affidavit that the books, documents or records
referred to therein are being used or are intended to be used in the commission of fraud

against the Government and, notwithstanding the lack of such allegation, the warrant avers
that they are actually being used for such purpose. In the second place, it assumes that
the entire building marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco
against whom the warrant was exclusively issued, when the only ground upon which such
assumption is based is Narciso Mendiola's statement which is mere hearsay and when in
fact part thereof was occupied by the appellant. In the third place, it was not asked that the
things belonging to the appellant and to others also be searched. In otherwords, the
warrant in question has gone beyond what had been applied for by Narciso Mendiola and
the agent who executed it performed acts not authorized by the warrant, and it is for this
and the above-stated reason why it is unreasonable, it being evidence that the purpose
thereof was solely to fish for evidence or search for it by exploration, in case some could
be found. It is of common knowledge that search warrants have not been designed for
such purpose (Gouled vs. U. S., 255 U. S., 298, S. C. R., 65 Law. ed., 647; Uy Kheytin vs.
Villareal, 42 Phil., 886) much less in a case as the one under consideration where it has
not even been alleged in the affidavit of Narciso Mendiola what crime had been committed
by Santiago Sy Juco or what crime he was about commit. On this point said affidavit
merely contained the following allegation: "It has been reported to us by a person whom I
considered reliable that in said premises are fraudulent books, correspondence and
records." Therefore, the first question raised should be decided in the negative.
2. The resolution of the second question depends entirely on the nature of the evidence
presented and the relative preponderance thereof. The only witness who testified that the
art metal filing cabinet belongs to the accused Santiago Sy Juco, is Macario Garcia.
Against Garcia's testimony, we certainly have that of the appellant himself and his
witnesses Rufino C. Wenceslao, Vicente del Rosario, Jose Jeuquenco and Feliciano
Belmonte, besides Exhibits E, F, G, H and L, which conclusively proves that the furniture in
question was purchased by said appellant at the beginning of January, 1933, and that he
had it precisely in a room on one of the upper floors of building No. 482 on Juan Luna
Street, which he was then subleasing from Santiago Sy Juco, to keep his records and
those of his clients. On the otherhand, it is unimportant now to determine whether the
furniture in question belongs to Santiago Sy Juco or to the appellant Attorney Topisto B.
Remo. It should have been alleged at the time he applied for the issuance of the search
warrant, to show with the other allegations, reason and evidence that the issuance thereof
was justified because of the existence of probable cause, the latter being a requisite
without which the issuance of the judicial warrant authorizing such search would be
unwarranted. For these reasons, this court concludes that the second question raised calls
for an answer in the negative.
3. After the considerations just made, the third question cannot be resolved except in the
negative. The search warrant in question could not and should not in any way affect the
appellant attorney on the ground that he is not the person against whom it had been
sought. It is Santiago Sy Juco alone against whom the search warrant could be used,
because it had been obtained precisely against him; so much so that Narciso Mendiola,
who applied for it, mentioned him expressly in his affidavit and again did so in his report to
his superior, that is, the Collector of Internal Revenue (Exhibit C); and at the trial of this
case, it was insisted that there was necessity of making the search in the premises
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco because an investigation was then pending against him, for
having defrauded the Government in its public revenue. The doctrine laid down in the case
of People vs. Rubio(57 Phil., 384), invoked against the appellant, is not applicable to the
case at bar because, unlike in the above-cited case, neither books nor record indicating
fraud were found in his possession, and it is not he against whom the warrant was issued.
4. It is clear that the court could not and can not order the opening of the art metal filing
cabinet in question because, it having been proven that it belongs to the appellant attorney

and that in it he keeps the records and documents of his clients, to do so would be in
violation of his right as such attorney, since it would be tantamount to compelling him to
disclose or divulge facts or things belonging to his clients, which should be kept secret,
unless she is authorized by them to make such disclosure, it being a duty imposed by law
upon an attorney to strictly preserve the secrets or communications made to him. Such an
act would constitute a qualified violation of section 383, No. 4, and of section 31 of Act No.
190, which read as follows:
An attorney can not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment; nor can an attorney's secretary
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of client and his
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity. (Sec. 383, No. 4, Act No. 190.)
A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets
of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court without the consent of his
client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in
professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal
matters. (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.)
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the appellant are very
well founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art metal filing
cabinet, together with the key thereof seized by the internal revenue agent by virtue of the
judicial warrant in question, which is hereby declared null and void, be immediately
returned unopened to the appellant; and that a copy of this decision be sent to the
Solicitor-General for him to take action, if he deems it justified, upon careful investigation of
the facts, against the internal revenue agent or agents who obtained and executed the
warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions of article 129 of the Revised Penal
Code, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

In the three applications for search warrant, NBI Agent Reyes stated under oath that the
respondents had in their possession and control
1. (p)irated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the
titles of which are mentioned in the attached list;

G.R. No. 96597-99 October 6, 1994

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORP., PARAMOUNT PICTURES
CORP., TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP., UNITED ARTISTS CORP.,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., WALT DISNEY COMPANY and WARNER BROS.,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TUBE VIDEO ENTERPRISES and EDWARD CHAM,
BLOOMING ROSE TAPE CENTER and MA. JAJORIE T. UY, and VIDEO CHANNEL and
LYDIA NABONG, respondents.
G.R. No. 97156 October 6, 1994
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION,
PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP., MGM/UA
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY
COMPANY,
and
WARNER
BROS.,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
FOX'S
VIDEO,
INC.
and
ALFREDO
ONGYANGCO., respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners.
Herminio T. Banico, Jr. & Associates for private respondent Lydia Nabong.
Molo, Padua, Salazar, Roldan & Associates for Blooming Rose Tape Center/Ma. J.T. Uy.
RESOLUTION

2. (p)osters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, journals,

ledgers, job order slips, delivery slips, stickers and books of account
bearing and/or mentioned the pirated films with titles . . ., or otherwise
used in the videogram business or activities of the defendants; sold,
leased, distributed or possessed for the purpose of sale, lease,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition, journals, ledgers, job order
slips, delivery slips, stickers and books of accounts used in the unlawful
videogram business or activities of the defendants; (and)
3. (t)elevision sets, video cassette and/or laser disc recorders, dubbing
machines, rewinders, film projectors, U-matic machines, image
enhancers, dubbing machines, tape head cleaners, converters,
accessories, equipment and other machines and paraphernalia,
materials or empty/erasable video tapes and master copies used or
intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction,
sale lease or disposition of videograms they are keeping and
concealing in the premises abovedescribed. 1
Acting
on
the
applications,
then
Regional
Trial
Court
Judge
Maria
Alicia M. Austria conducted a joint hearing during which she made a personal examination
of the applicant and his witnesses. Finding just and probable cause for granting the
application at the time, Judge Austria issued the corresponding Search Warrants ("SW")
numbered 95, 96, and 97.
Private respondents filed their respective motions to quash the three search warrants,
citing as grounds therefor the following:
In SW No. 95
1. There is no probable cause nor the existence of a satisfactory fact
upon which the search warrant is based;
2. The National Bureau of Investigation has no authority nor the
jurisdiction to initiate the filing of suit against the defendants;

VITUG, J.:
On 07 April 1988, the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), through its Agent Lauro C.
Reyes,
filed
with
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Pasig
(Branch 159) three applications for search warrant against private respondents Tube Video
Enterprises and Edward C. Cham (ASW No. 95), the Blooming Rose Tape Center and Ma.
Jajorie
T.
Uy
(ASW
No.
96),
and
the
Video
Channel and Lydia Nabong (ASW No. 97), charging said respondents with violation of
Section 56 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 49, otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property, as amended by P.D. No. 1988.

3. The confiscation of defendants' seized articles based on the

questioned search warrant violated the latter's constitutional right
against deprivation of properties without due process.
4. The films in question are not protected by Pres. Decree
No. 1988 in that they were never registered in the National Library as a
condition precedent to the availment of the protection secured by that
decree. The complaint has acquired no right under the same.

5. The mere publication by complainant of its alleged ownership over

the films in question does notipso facto vest in the right to proceed
under P.D. No. 49 as that law requires official registration. Moreover,
the said publication took place only after the application for the
questioned search warrant.2

5. Whether or not private complainants who are members of the Motion

Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA for brevity) through their
counsel, Atty. Rico Domingo, have sufficiently proven their ownership
over the alleged pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion
pictures/films.

In SW No. 96

6. Whether or not the items seized by the NBI agents by virtue of SW

Nos. 95, 96 and 97 may be ordered released to defendants. 4

1. The complainants, one Rico V. Domingo and one Rene C. Baltazar,

in representation of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.,
have not proven nor established their ownership over the films listed in
Annex "A" of the search warrant issued by this Honorable Court against
the defendants herein.
2. The information provided by the National Bureau of Investigation
agents and the representatives of the MPAA, Inc. are replete with
generalities insofar as the description of the items to be concerned in
violation of the provisions of Sec. 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Their allegations as to the offense are presumptuous and speculative in
violation of the same section of the Rules of Court. 3
Private respondents in SW No. 97 adopted the motions filed for the quashal of both SW
No. 95 and SW No. 96.
Herein petitioners (the private complainants in the three cases), namely, Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc., Orion Pictures Corporation, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation,
MGM/UA Communications Company, Universal City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Company
and Warner Bros., Inc., submitted their oppositions to the motions to quash. The movants,
herein private respondents, filed their replies to the oppositions and sought,
simultaneously, the release of the items seized. After a rejoinder was filed, the court a
quo considered all the incidents submitted for resolution.
In a Joint Order, issued on 09 December 1988, Judge Austria defined the issues raised in
the motions to quash thusly:
1. Whether or not the NBI had authority to file the application for search
warrant; whether or not it is the Videogram Regulatory Board under
P.D. No. 1987 which has exclusive jurisdiction to file suits against
violators of said law.
2. Whether or not this Court observed due process of law before
issuing the search warrants in question.
3. Whether or not search warrants Nos. 95, 96 and 97 are general
warrants and therefore void.
4. Whether or not there was probable cause in the issuance of the
search warrants pursuant to Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines.

Anent the first three issues, Judge Austria ruled that the NBI had the authority to apply for
the search warrants; that in the issuance of the search warrants, due process of law was
duly observed; and that the questioned search warrants were not general in character
since the provision of law violated, i.e., Sec. 56 of P.D. No. 49, as amended by P.D. No.
1988, was clearly specified. Judge Austria, nonetheless, reversed her former stand initially
finding probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants and ordered the quashal of
the search warrants giving the following reasons:
1. Private complainants were uncertain of their ownership of the titles
subject of the seized video tapes;
2. Complainants did not comply with the requirement that the master
tapes should be presented during the application for search warrants;
and
3. Private complainants cannot seek the protection of Philippine laws as
they failed to comply with the deposit and registration requirements of
P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D. No. 1988. 5
Judge Austria thus ordered the return of all the items seized by virtue of the warrants.
Petitioners appealed the order of Judge Austria to the Court of Appeals, docketed CA-G.R.
CV No. 22133-22135, assigning the following alleged errors:
1. The Court a quo erred in ruling that private complainants were
uncertain of their ownership of the titles subject of the pirated video
tapes.
2. The Court a quo erred in ordering the quashal of the search warrants
on the ground that the requirement of producing the "master tapes"
during the application for a search warrant, as enunciated in the 20th
Century Fox case, promulgated on 19 August 1988, was applicable to
the facts of the instant case which transpired on 07 April 1988, and that
the same was not complied with.
3. The Court a quo erred in ruling that appellants do not have a
protectable copyright under Philippine laws for their failure to comply
with the deposit and registration requirements of Presidential Decree
No. 49, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1988. 6

On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals, through Justice Salome A. Montoya, rendered
its decision sustaining petitioners' first and third assignment of errors but rejecting
petitioners' second assignment of error. It, therefore, still affirmed the quashal of the search
warrants.

In applying for the search warrants the NBI charged violation of the
entire provisions of Section 56 of P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D.
No. 1988. This included not only the sale, lease or distribution of pirated
tapes but also the transfer or causing to be transferred of any sound
recording or motion picture or other audio visual work.

Hence, this petition (G.R. No. 96597-99). Another decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 20617), involving the same petitioners on
substantially identical facts and issues, was also brought before this Court (G.R. No.
97156). In a Resolution, dated 06 March 1991, this Court consolidated the two petitions.

But even assuming, as appellants argue, that only the sale, lease, or
distribution of pirated video tapes is involved, the fact remains that
there is need to establish probable cause that the tapes being sold,
leased or distributed are pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts back to
the question of whether there was unauthorized transfer, directly or
indirectly, of a sound recording or motion picture or other audio visual
work that has been recorded. 7

We affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals.

This Court, in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655) has
already laid down the rule that a basic requirement for the validity of search warrants, in
cases of this nature, is the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from
which pirated films are supposed to have been copied. We quote:
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from
which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession
the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot
presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape
outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to
P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted
work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted
films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted
films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
We also fully concur with the Court of Appeals when, in resolving petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 22133-35, it ratiocinated thusly:
It is not correct to say that "the basic fact" to be proven to establish
probable cause in the instant cases is not the "unauthorized transfer" of
a motion picture that has been recorded but the "sale, lease, or
distribution of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films."

With due respect to petitioners, the Court does not see a compelling reason to reexamine
its previous position on the issue.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingo's deposition was also taken. On the

basis of the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C.
Reyes, Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search Warrant
No. 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49, as amended, was
issued by the court a quo.
The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14,
1987 to Sunshine and/or their representatives. In the course of the
search of the premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents
found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion
pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by private complainants,
and machines, equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials,
accessories all of which were included in the receipt for properties
accomplished by the raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished
and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor
of Sunshine Home Video.

G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT
PICTURES CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION,
UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT
DISNEY
COMPANY,
and
WARNER
BROTHERS,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A.
PELINDARIO, respondents.

On December 16, 1987, a "Return of Search Warrant" was filed with the
Court.
REGALADO, J.:p

A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed but was later
denied for lack of merit (p. 280, Records).

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals 1 promulgated on July 22, 1992 and its resolution 2 of May 10, 1993
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, both of which sustained the
order 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated
November 22, 1988 for the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053 earlier issued
per its own order 4 on September 5, 1988 for violation of Section 56 of
Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, otherwise known as the "Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property."

A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The

court a quo granted the said motion for reconsideration and justified it in
this manner:
It is undisputed that the master tapes of the
copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copies (sic), were never presented in the
proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants
in question. The orders of the Court granting the
search warrants and denying the urgent motion to lift
order of search warrants were, therefore, issued in
error. Consequently, they must be set aside. (p. 13,
Appellant's Brief) 5

The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as follows:

Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National
Bureau of Investigation for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and
sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI
and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video
establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine Home Video Inc.
(Sunshine for brevity), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with
address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a
search warrant with the courta quo against Sunshine seeking the
seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of
which were enumerated in a list attached to the application; and,
television sets, video cassettes and/or laser disc recordings equipment
and other machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be used in
the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition
of videograms tapes in the premises above described. In the hearing of
the application, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, upon questions by
the court a quo, reiterated in substance his averments in his affidavit.
His testimony was corroborated by another witness, Mr. Rene C.

Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private
respondents' motion for reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it
had theretofore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset, said
appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.
Hence, this petition was brought to this Court particularly challenging the validity
of respondent court's retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 6 in dismissing petitioners' appeal
and upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court.
I
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter of and the
challenge to petitioners' legal standing in our courts, they being foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have
such license to be able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so
challenging petitioners' personality to sue, private respondents point to the fact
that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of
distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also to
the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being
constitutive of "doing business in the Philippines" under Section 1 (f)(1) and (2),
Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign corporations doing
business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the
Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in
Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do business. Consequently, they
have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant. 7

is laid down regarding acts or transactions failing within its purview, the question
rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus held that all the combined acts of a
foreign corporation in the State must be considered, and every circumstance is
material which indicates a purpose on the part of the corporation to engage in
some part of its regular business in the State. 12

In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the
Philippines, 8 and contend that private respondents have not adduced evidence to
prove that petitioners are doing such business here, as would require them to be
licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, other than averments in
the quoted portions of petitioners' "Opposition to Urgent Motion to Lift Order of
Search Warrant" dated April 28, 1988 and Atty. Rico V. Domingo's affidavit of
December 14, 1987. Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the
ownership of such exclusive right does not conclusively prove the act of doing
business nor establish the presumption of doing business.9

As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject

to such modifications as may be necessary in view of the particular issue or of
the terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a foreign corporation is
"doing," "transacting," "engaging in," or "carrying on" business in the State when,
and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agents and is there
engaged in carrying on and transacting through them some substantial part of its
ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be
distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and
isolated acts. 15

The Corporation Code provides:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation
transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its
successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in
any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of
the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded
against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid
cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code
is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine
courts by a foreign corporation. However, under the aforequoted provision, no
foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines, as
this phrase is understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have the
license required by law, and until it complies with the law intransacting business
here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts. 10 As thus
interpreted, any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may
maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the
subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not
the absence of the prescribed license but "doing business" in the Philippines
without such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our
courts. In other words, although a foreign corporation is without license to
transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to
bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in
the Philippines. 11
Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of what constitutes
"doing business" or "transacting business" within that forum, in which case said
provisions are controlling there. In others where no such definition or qualification

No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes

"doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business. Each case must be judged in
the light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances. 13 The true tests,
however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or
substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it
has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. 14

The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute
doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however,
held that the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements,
and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive
prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization. 16
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having
been adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation in our
jurisdiction.
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455 17 provides:
Sec. 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. (1) . . . ; and the phrase
"doing business" shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service
contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches;
appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the
Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a
period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic
business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act
or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements,
and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and
object of the business organization.
Presidential Decree No. 1789, 18 in Article 65 thereof, defines "doing business" to
include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether

called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who

are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the
Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business
firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a
continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that
extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the
purpose and object of the business organization.
The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree conclude the
enumeration of acts constituting "doing business" with a catch-all definition, thus:
Sec. 1(g). "Doing Business" shall be any act or combination of acts
enumerated in Article 65 of the Code. In particular "doing business"
includes:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of commercial
dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial
gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization.
Finally, Republic Act No. 7042 19 embodies such concept in this wise:
Sec. 3. Definitions. As used in this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) the phrase "doing business shall include soliciting orders, service
contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches;
appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or
who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods
totalling one hundred eight(y) (180) days or more; participating in the
management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm,
entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that
imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and
contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and
object of the business organization: Provided, however, That the
phrase "doing business" shall not be deemed to include mere
investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic
corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of
rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to
represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing a
representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts
business in its own name and for its own account.

Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory
standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present action. There
is no showing that, under our statutory or case law, petitioners are doing,
transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would
require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our courts. No
evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the
enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or
transact business in the Philippines.
Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission 20 stating that its records do not show the registration of petitioner
film companies either as corporations or partnerships or that they have been
licensed to transact business in the Philippines, while undeniably true, is of no
consequence to petitioners' right to bring action in the Philippines. Verily, no
record of such registration by petitioners can be expected to be found for, as
aforestated, said foreign film corporations do not transact or do business in the
Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take recourse to
our courts.
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Omnibus Investments Code lists, among others
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete
and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, or by an agent of such
foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm amounting to
negotiations or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service
contracts, regardless of where the contracts are actually reduced to
writing, shall constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no
office or fixed place of business in the Philippines. The arrangements
agreed upon as to manner, time and terms of delivery of the goods or
the transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign firm which does
business through the middlemen acting in their own names, such as
indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants, shall not be
deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such indentors,
commercial brokers or commission merchants shall be the ones
deemed to be doing business in the Philippines.
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the
Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an
independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its
own account, and not in the name or for the account of a principal.
Thus, where a foreign firm is represented in the Philippines by a person
or local company which does not act in its name but in the name of the
foreign firm, the latter is doing business in the Philippines.
as acts constitutive of "doing business," the fact that petitioners are admittedly
copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of
motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of
doing business which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue
upon a cause of action in local courts.

Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of

petitioners, with express authority pursuant to a special power of attorney, inter
alia
To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate authorities and to
provide evidence in support of both civil and criminal proceedings
against any person or persons involved in the criminal infringement of
copyright or concerning the unauthorized importation, duplication,
exhibition or distribution of any cinematographic work(s) films or
video cassettes of which . . . is the owner of copyright or the owner
of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any
agreement(s) between . . . and the respective owners of copyright in
such cinematographic work(s), to initiate and prosecute on behalf of . . .
criminal or civil actions in the Philippines against any person or persons
unlawfully distributing, exhibiting, selling or offering for sale any films or
video cassettes of which . . . is the owner of copyright or the owner of
exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any
agreement(s) between . . . and the respective owners of copyright in
such works. 21
tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising
one's legal and property rights and taking steps for the vigilant protection of said
rights, particularly the appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and
of themselves to be doing business here.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in
the State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the State,
where such contracts are consummated outside the State. 22 In fact, a view is
taken that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the State merely
because sales of its product are made there or other business furthering its
interests is transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a
natural person, where such activities are not under the direction and control of
the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged agent as an
independent business. 23
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent
dealer who has purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products
sold are not a doing of business by the corporation. 24 Likewise, a foreign
corporation which sells its products to persons styled "distributing agents" in the
State, for distribution by them, is not doing business in the State so as to render it
subject to service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers is
that they shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it
manufactures and shall sell them at trade prices established by it. 25
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an
attorney to represent it in a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing
business within the scope of the minimum contact test. 26 With much more reason
should this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal
protection against contingent acts of intellectual piracy.
In accordance with the rule that "doing business" imports only acts in furtherance
of the purposes for which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the

mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction

which is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the
doing of business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal thereof is
neither the making of a contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional
provision placing foreign corporations licensed to do business in the State under
the same regulations, limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as
domestic corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not
a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation. 27
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents'
basis for arguing that petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the
Philippines. For allegedly being foreign corporations doing business in the
Philippines without a license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their
pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action
before Philippine Courts. 28
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court
are lack of legal capacity to sue 29 and that the complaint states no cause of
action. 30 Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear
in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. 31 On the
other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state a
cause of action. 32 The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with
the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's
general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence,
lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the
latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest.
Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; 33 whereas the second can be used as a
ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face
thereof, evidently states no cause of action. 34
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for
barring recourse to our courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or
transacting business in the Philippines should properly be "lack of capacity to
sue," not "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights
have been violated is undeniably such, if not the only, real party in interest to
bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it
is not capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Court's rejection of the common procedural
tactics of erring local companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign
corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines, invoke the latter's
supposed lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based
on failure to first acquire a local license is based on considerations of public
policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous
establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violation of
legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because they are not
licensed to do business in the country. 35
II

We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present
controversy of the ruling in20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19, 1988, 36 that for the determination of
probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright
infringement cases involving videograms, the production of the master tape for
comparison with the allegedly pirate copies is necessary.
Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to the
discretion of the court subject to the determination of probable cause in
accordance with the procedure prescribed therefore under Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 126. As of the time of the application for the search warrant in question, the
controlling criterion for the finding of probable cause was that enunciated
in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff 37 stating that:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then required, the
lower court determined that there was probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant, and which determination in fact led to the issuance and service
on December 14, 1987 of Search Warrant No. 87-053. It is further argued that
any search warrant so issued in accordance with all applicable legal
requirements is valid, for the lower court could not possibly have been expected
to apply, as the basis for a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, a pronouncement
which was not existent at the time of such determination, on December 14, 1987,
that is, the doctrine in the 20th Century Fox case that was promulgated only on
August 19, 1988, or over eight months later.
Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the quashal of the search warrant by the lower court on the
strength of that 20th Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very
essence of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the search warrant
involved here, although the 20th Century Fox case had not yet been decided,
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing law on the matter.
The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely an application of the law on probable
cause. Hence, they posit that there was no law that was retrospectively applied,
since the law had been there all along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century
Fox ruling, which had supervened as a doctrine promulgated at the time of the
resolution of private respondents' motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal
of the search warrant for failure of the trial court to require presentation of the
master tapes prior to the issuance of the search warrant, would have constituted
grave abuse of discretion. 38
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century
Fox ruling by the trial court in resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration in
favor of the quashal of the search warrant, on this renovated thesis:

And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must be noted

that in the 20th Century Fox case, the lower court quashed the earlier
search warrant it issued. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the
quashal on the ground among others that the master tapes or
copyrighted films were not presented for comparison with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes to determine whether the latter
is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.
If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash the warrant, it
is Our view that the Supreme Court would have invalidated the warrant
just the same considering the very strict requirement set by the
Supreme Court for the determination of "probable cause" in copyright
infringement cases as enunciated in this 20th Century Fox case. This is
so because, as was stated by the Supreme Court in the said case, the
master tapes and the pirated tapes must be presented for comparison
to satisfy the requirement of "probable cause." So it goes back to the
very
existence
of
probable
cause. . . . 39
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the
rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling
cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners' consistent position that the order of the
lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein defendants' motion to lift the
order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory
compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for determination of
probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have
expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant
other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted,
required with respect to the finding of probable cause.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares
that "(j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines."
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an
independent source of law; it cannot create law. 40 While it is true that judicial
decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the
legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though
not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this
reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines. 41Judicial
decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself. 42
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of
the above disquisition, this Court emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. 43 that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to original or
amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and
properly so, to judicial decisions. Our holding in the earlier case of People
vs. Jabinal 44 echoes the rationale for this judicial declaration, viz.:

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are

nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The
settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the
legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. . . . , but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 45 where the Court expounded:
. . . . But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are
also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law
looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy
to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights
that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565
[1961]). The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only
prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. . . . .
The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima 46 that judicial interpretation of
a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since
the Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial
doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, and that is precisely the
situation obtaining in this case.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as
of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and
more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and
acted in good faith. 47 To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality
of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior
to such adjudication. 48
There is merit in petitioners' impassioned and well-founded argumentation:
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 164 SCRA 655 (August 19, 1988) (hereinafter 20th Century Fox)
was inexistent in December of 1987 when Search Warrant 87-053 was

issued by the lower court. Hence, it boggles the imagination how the
lower court could be expected to apply the formulation of 20th Century
Fox in finding probable cause when the formulation was yet nonexistent.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after conducting
searching examination questions of the applicant and his witnesses that
"an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense (were) in the place sought to be searched"
(Burgos v. Chief of Staff, et al., 133 SCRA 800). It is indisputable,
therefore, that at the time of the application, or on December 14, 1987,
the lower court did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with
any legal requirement for the valid issuance of search warrant.
. . . (W)e believe that the lower court should be considered as having
followed the requirements of the law in issuing Search Warrant No. 87053. The search warrant is therefore valid and binding. It must be noted
that nowhere is it found in the allegations of the Respondents that the
lower court failed to apply the law as then interpreted in 1987. Hence,
we find it absurd that it is (sic) should be seen otherwise, because it is
simply impossible to have required the lower court to apply a
formulation which will only be defined six months later.
Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require compliance with legal
and/or doctrinal requirements which are inexistent at the time they were
supposed to have been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . If the lower court's reversal will be sustained, what encouragement
can be given to courts and litigants to respect the law and rules if they
can expect with reasonable certainty that upon the passage of a new
rule, their conduct can still be open to question? This certainly breeds
instability in our system of dispensing justice. For Petitioners who took
special effort to redress their grievances and to protect their property
rights by resorting to the remedies provided by the law, it is most unfair
that fealty to the rules and procedures then obtaining would bear but
fruits
of
injustice. 49
Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial decisions imports
application thereof not only to future cases but also to cases still ongoing or not
yet final when the decision was promulgated, should not be countenanced in the
jural sphere on account of its inevitably unsettling repercussions. More to the
point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century
Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for
determination of probable cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting
and clarification.

It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search warrant
proceedings in anticipation of the filing of a case for the unauthorized sale or
renting out of copyrighted films in videotape format in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 49. It revolved around the meaning of probable cause within the
context of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures, as
applied to copyright infringement cases involving videotapes.

Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video

cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have
personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The
witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes
were pirated without stating the manner it was
pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has
knowledge of that fact.

Therein it was ruled that

On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the retaping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from
master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth
Century Fox, because, according to him it is of his
personal knowledge.

The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from which

the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of
search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated
films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the
master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these
would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether
or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search
warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or
copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it
owns.

At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration,

Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that
when the complaint for infringement was brought to
the NBI, the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
tapes were shown to him and he made comparisons
of the tapes with those purchased by their man
Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film
reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown
to the Court during the application gives some
misgivings as to the truth of that bare statement of
the NBI agent on the witness stand.

The application for search warrants was directed against video tape
outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to
P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted
work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted
films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted
films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual antecedents
of 20th Century Fox, the pertinent portions of the decision therein are quoted
hereunder, to wit:
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search
warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on
the application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted
it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that
infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been
committed. Thus the lower court stated in its questioned order dated
January 2, 1986:
According to the movant, all three witnesses during
the proceedings in the application for the three
search warrants testified of their own personal
knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated
that the counsel or representative of the Twentieth

Again as the application and search proceedings is

a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49,
the copyright infringement law, and although what is
required for the issuance thereof is merely the
presence of probable cause, that probable cause
must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a timehonored precept that proceedings to put a man to
task as an offender under our laws should be
interpreted
in strictissimi
juris against
the
government and liberally in favor of the alleged
offender.
xxx xxx xxx
This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a
matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of
Rights in our 1973 Constitution.
So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation
that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were
compared to the purchased and seized video tapes
from the respondents' establishments, it should be
dismissed as not supported by competent evidence
and for that matter the probable cause hovers in that
grey debatable twilight zone between black and
white resolvable in favor of respondents herein.

But the glaring fact is that "Cocoon," the first video

tape mentioned in the search warrant, was not even
duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines.
(Annex C of Opposition p. 152 record.) So, that
lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court of
an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison
with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
allegedly pirated and those seized from
respondents, there was no way to determine
whether there really was piracy, or copying of the
film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox.

writer with the vice of overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue
generalization.

The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search
warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private respondents
violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted
as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of
their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the
private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a
witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants
stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes
owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from
master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did
not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the
master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court
during the application (Emphasis ours).

Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene
C. Baltazar, a private researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of
America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise presented as a witness during the
search warrant proceedings. 55 The records clearly reflect that the testimonies of
the abovenamed witnesses were straightforward and stemmed from matters
within their personal knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence and
uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This
categorical forthrightness in their statements, among others, was what initially
and correctly convinced the trial court to make a finding of the existence of
probable cause.

xxx xxx xxx

The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial court therein
required the presentation of the master tapes of the allegedly pirated films in
order to convince itself of the existence of probable cause under the factual
milieu peculiar to that case. In the case at bar, respondent appellate court itself
observed:
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the
pirated copies as well as the master tapes, unlike the other types of
personal properties which may be seized, were available for
presentation to the court at the time of the application for a search
warrant to determine the existence of the linkage of the copyrighted
films with the pirated ones. Thus, there is no reason not the present
them (Emphasis supplied ). 50
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for
the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of
search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in
determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement
caseswhere there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the
pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could
lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a
sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases.
Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their
parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the

In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for
search warrant with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by
petitioners, judging from his affidavit 51 and his deposition,52 did testify on matters
within his personal knowledge based on said complaint of petitioners as well as
his own investigation and surveillance of the private respondents' video rental
shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, stated
in his affidavit 53 and further expounded in his deposition 54 that he personally
knew of the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his
clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purpose of selling any of the
copyrighted films.

There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the validity

of the search warrant, obviously borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that
petitioners' witnesses NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and
Rene C. Baltazar did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of
their respective testimonies and that said witnesses' claim that the video tapes
were pirated, without stating the manner by which these were pirated, is a
conclusion of fact without basis. 56 The difference, it must be pointed out, is that
the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no allegation of
misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of
petitioners' witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part of private respondents
that the tapes seized were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones not have
they shown that they were given any authority by petitioners to copy, sell, lease,
distribute or circulate, or at least, to offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation
the said video tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive surveillance of the
suspected area was undertaken by petitioners' witnesses sufficient to enable
them to execute trustworthy affidavits and depositions regarding matters
discovered in the course thereof and of which they have personal knowledge.
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear
to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of
the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable
cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object
evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the
controverted fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the
senses of the presiding magistrate. 57 Such auxiliary procedure, however, does
not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions,
admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum

probandum, 58 especially where the production in court of object evidence would

result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary
value. 59
Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions relating to
search warrants prohibit their issuance except on a showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of
warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the purpose
to protect against all general searches. 60 Indeed, Article III of our Constitution
mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized; and
Sec. 3 thereof provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
These constitutional strictures are implemented by the following provisions of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is
thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application
is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form
prescribed by these Rules.
The constitutional and statutory provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a
showing of probable cause before a search warrant can be issued are mandatory
and must be complied with, and such a showing has been held to be an
unqualified condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant
not based on probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in
legal contemplation, arbitrary. 61 It behooves us, then, to review the concept of
probable cause, firstly, from representative holdings in the American jurisdiction
from which we patterned our doctrines on the matter.
Although the term "probable cause" has been said to have a well-defined
meaning in the law, the term is exceedingly difficult to define, in this case, with
any degree of precision; indeed, no definition of it which would justify the
issuance of a search warrant can be formulated which would cover every state of

facts which might arise, and no formula or standard, or hard and fast rule, may
be laid down which may be applied to the facts of every situation. 62 As to what
acts constitute probable cause seem incapable of definition. 63 There is, of
necessity, no exact test. 64
At best, the term "probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged; 65 or the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind acting
on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the
charge made by the applicant for the warrant is true. 66
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import
absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is not
concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has been or is being
committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether
the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief. 67 The requirement is less than
certainty or proof , butmore than suspicion or possibility. 68
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 69 It being
the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as
practicable after the application therefor is filed, 70 the facts warranting the
conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the time of such judicial
determination by necessarily using legal standards then set forth in law and
jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.
As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated
in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, et al., supra,vis-a-vis the provisions of Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 126, were the prevailing and controlling legal standards, as they
continue to be, by which a finding of probable cause is tested. Since the propriety
of the issuance of a search warrant is to be determined at the time of the
application therefor, which in turn must not be too remote in time from the
occurrence of the offense alleged to have been committed, the issuing judge, in
determining the existence of probable cause, can and should logically look to the
touchstones in the laws theretofore enacted and the decisions already
promulgated at the time, and not to those which had not yet even been
conceived or formulated.
It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to
define probable cause, obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the
court's discretion within the particular facts of each case. Although the
Constitution prohibits the issuance of a search warrant in the absence of
probable cause, such constitutional inhibition does not command the legislature
to establish a definition or formula for determining what shall constitute probable
cause. 71 Thus, Congress, despite its broad authority to fashion standards of
reasonableness for searches and seizures, 72 does not venture to make such a
definition or standard formulation of probable cause, nor categorize what facts
and circumstances make up the same, much less limit the determination thereof

to and within the circumscription of a particular class of evidence, all in deference

to judicial discretion and probity. 73
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular
requirement (the presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox)
not provided nor implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the
realm of judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves no purpose but to
stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a court's prerogatives and to
denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a
mere ministerial or mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which
requires that the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely
by a specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by
the framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended the
statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for all
seasons and reasons in infringement cases.
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that the lower
court followed the prescribed procedure for the issuance of a search warrant: (1)
the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses,
with them particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized; (2) an examination personally conducted by the judge in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant
and witnesses on facts personally known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to
the records.
Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings leading to the
issuance of the search warrant now subject of this controversy:
In the instant case, the following facts have been established: (1)
copyrighted video tapes bearing titles enumerated in Search Warrant
No. 87-053 were being sold, leased, distributed or circulated, or offered
for sale, lease, distribution, or transferred or caused to be transferred
by defendants at their video outlets, without the written consent of the
private complainants or their assignee; (2) recovered or confiscated
from defendants' possession were video tapes containing copyrighted
motion picture films without the authority of the complainant; (3) the
video tapes originated from spurious or unauthorized persons; and (4)
said video tapes were exact reproductions of the films listed in the
search warrant whose copyrights or distribution rights were owned by
complainants.
The basis of these facts are the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior
Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, and Rene C. Baltazar.
Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) thru their counsel,
Atty. Rico V. Domingo, filed a complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation against certain video establishments one of which is
defendant, for violation of PD No. 49 as amended by PD No. 1988. Atty.
Lauro C. Reyes led a team to conduct discreet surveillance operations
on said video establishments. Per information earlier gathered by Atty.
Domingo, defendants were engaged in the illegal sale, rental,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of copyrighted films of MPAA
without its written authority or its members. Knowing that defendant

Sunshine Home Video and its proprietor, Mr. Danilo Pelindario, were
not authorized by MPAA to reproduce, lease, and possess for the
purpose of selling any of its copyrighted motion pictures, instructed his
researcher, Mr. Rene Baltazar to rent two video cassettes from said
defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar proceeded to
Sunshine Home Video and rented tapes containing Little Shop of
Horror. He was issued rental slip No. 26362 dated October 21, 1987 for
P10.00 with a deposit of P100.00. Again, on December 11, 1987, the
returned to Sunshine Home Video and rented Robocop with rental slip
No. 25271 also for P10.00: On the basis of the complaint of MPAA thru
counsel, Atty. Lauro C. Reyes personally went to Sunshine Home Video
at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes Commercial Center, Makati. His
last visit was on December 7, 1987. There, he found the video outlet
renting, leasing, distributing video cassette tapes whose titles were
copyrighted and without the authority of MPAA.
Given these facts, a probable cause exists. . . . 74
The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, despite its prior detailed and
substantiated findings, by stating in its order of November 22, 1988 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and quashing the search warrant that
. . . The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu; both involve
alleged pirated copyrighted films of private complainants which were
found in the possession or control of the defendants. Hence, the
necessity of the presentation of the master tapes from which the pirated
films were allegedly copied is necessary in the instant case, to establish
the existence of probable cause. 75
Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper retroactive application of the
master tape requirement generated by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation
completely different from that in the case at bar, and without anything more, this
later order clearly defies elemental fair play and is a gross reversible error. In
fact, this observation of the Court in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, et
al., supra, may just as easily apply to the present case:
A review of the grounds invoked . . . in his motion to quash the search
warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for quashing a
warrant. They are matters of defense which should be ventilated during
the trial on the merits of the case. . . .
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite of
presentation of the master tapes in copyright infringement cases, as the prime
determinant of probable cause, is too exacting and impracticable a requirement
to be complied with in a search warrant application which, it must not be
overlooked, is only an ancillary proceeding. Further, on realistic considerations, a
strict application of said requirement militates against the elements of secrecy
and speed which underlie covert investigative and surveillance operations in
police enforcement campaigns against all forms of criminality, considering that
the master tapes of a motion picture required to be presented before the court
consists of several reels contained in circular steel casings which, because of
their bulk, will definitely draw attention, unlike diminutive objects like video tapes

which can be easily concealed. 76 With hundreds of titles being pirated, this
onerous and tedious imposition would be multiplied a hundredfold by judicial fiat,
discouraging and preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions.
Given the present international awareness and furor over violations in large scale
of intellectual property rights, calling for transnational sanctions, it bears calling to
mind the Court's admonition also in La Chemise Lacoste, supra, that
. . . . Judges all over the country are well advised to remember that
court processes should not be used as instruments to, unwittingly or
otherwise, aid counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of
the law as it seeks to protect the Filipino consuming public and frustrate
executive and administrative implementation of solemn commitments
pursuant to international conventions and treaties.
III
The amendment to Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by Presidential
Decree No. 1987, 77 which should here be publicized judicially, brought about the
revision of its penalty structure and enumerated additional acts considered
violative of said decree on intellectual property, namely, (1) directly or indirectly
transferring or causing to be transferred any sound recording or motion picture or
other audio-visual works so recorded with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or
cause to be sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use or cause to be used for
profit such articles on which sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual works
are so transferred without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; (2)
selling, leasing, distributing, circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale,
lease, distribution, or possessing for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition any of the abovementioned articles, without the
written consent of the owner or his assignee; and, (3) directly or indirectly offering
or making available for a fee, rental, or any other form of compensation any
equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge that
such equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or material will be used by another to
reproduce, without the consent of the owner, any phonograph record, disc, wire,
tape, film or other article on which sounds, motion pictures or other audio-visual
recordings may be transferred, and which provide distinct bases for criminal
prosecution, being crimes independently punishable under Presidential Decree
No. 49, as amended, aside from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting such
infringement under Section 29.
The trial court's finding that private respondents committed acts in blatant
transgression of Presidential Decree No. 49 all the more bolsters its findings of
probable cause, which determination can be reached even in the absence of
master tapes by the judge in the exercise of sound discretion. The executive
concern and resolve expressed in the foregoing amendments to the decree for
the protection of intellectual property rights should be matched by corresponding
judicial vigilance and activism, instead of the apathy of submitting to technicalities
in the face of ample evidence of guilt.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in
order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof.
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and

occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and
infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this
connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner
of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on
the owner of the copyright. 78
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the
pirate, in such cases, did not know what works he was indirectly copying, or did
not know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that
what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In determining the
question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work
is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that
the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much
is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the
original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by
another, that
is
sufficient
in
point
of
law
to
constitute
a
piracy. 79 The question of whether there has been an actionable infringement of a
literary, musical, or artistic work in motion pictures, radio or television being one
of fact, 80 it should properly be determined during the trial. That is the stage
calling for conclusive or preponderating evidence, and not the summary
proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant wherein both lower courts
erroneously require the master tapes.
In disregarding private respondent's argument that Search Warrant No. 87-053 is
a general warrant, the lower court observed that "it was worded in a manner that
the enumerated seizable items bear direct relation to the offense of violation of
Sec. 56 of PD 49 as amended. It authorized only the seizur(e) of articles used or
intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other unconcerted acts in
violation of PD 49 as amended. . . . 81
On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., et al. vs. Ruiz, et al., 82 instructs and
enlightens:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be
seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem.,
dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued (Sec 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). . . . If the
articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other
than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of
search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence. . . .
On private respondents' averment that the search warrant was made applicable
to more than one specific offense on the ground that there are as many offenses
of infringement as there are rights protected and, therefore, to issue one search
warrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the rule that a search
warrant must be issued only in connection with one specific offense, the lower
court said:

. . . . As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was issued for
violation of Section 56, PD 49 as amended only. The specifications
therein (in Annex A) merely refer to the titles of the copyrighted motion
pictures/films belonging to private complainants which defendants were
in control/possession for sale, lease, distribution or public exhibition in
contravention of Sec. 56, PD 49 as amended. 83
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the
search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video
tapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search
warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the registration
and deposit requirements under Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for
invoking the court's protective mantle in copyright infringement cases. As
explained by the court below:
Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended covers only
producers who have complied with the requirements of deposit and
notice (in other words registration) under Sections 49 and 50 thereof.
Absent such registration, as in this case, there was no right created,
hence, no infringement under PD 49 as amended. This is not welltaken.
As correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors, the
Department of Justice has resolved this legal question as far back as
December 12, 1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50 do
not apply to cinematographic works and PD No. 49 "had done away
with the registration and deposit of cinematographic works" and that
"even without prior registration and deposit of a work which may be
entitled to protection under the Decree, the creator can file action for
infringement of its rights". He cannot demand, however, payment of
damages arising from infringement. The same opinion stressed that
"the requirements of registration and deposit are thus retained under
the Decree, not as conditions for the acquisition of copyright and other
rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for damages". The statutory
interpretation of the Executive Branch being correct, is entitled (to)
weight and respect.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his witnesses led
the Court to believe that a crime existed when in fact there was none.
This is wrong. As earlier discussed, PD 49 as amended, does not
require registration and deposit for a creator to be able to file an action
for infringement of his rights. These conditions are merely prerequisites to an action for damages. So, as long as the proscribed acts
are shown to exist, an action for infringement may be initiated. 84
Accordingly, the certifications 85 from the Copyright Section of the National
Library, presented as evidence by private respondents to show non-registration

of some of the films of petitioners, assume no evidentiary weight or significance

whatsoever.
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49 reveals that even
with respect to works which are required under Section 26 thereof to be
registered and with copies to deposited with the National Library, such as books,
including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories and
gazetteers; and periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers; lectures,
sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the
failure to comply with said requirements does not deprive the copyright owner of
the right to sue for infringement. Such non-compliance merely limits the remedies
available to him and subjects him to the corresponding sanction.
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which prefaces its
enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit statement that "the rights
granted under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with
respect to any of the following classes of works." This means that under the
present state of the law, the copyright for a work is acquired by an intellectual
creator from the moment of creation even in the absence of registration and
deposit. As has been authoritatively clarified:
The registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of
the work with the National Library within three weeks after the first
public dissemination or performance of the work, as provided for in
Section 26 (P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of
securing a copyright of the work, but rather to avoid the penalty for noncompliance of the deposit of said two copies and in order to recover
damages in an infringement suit. 86
One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the basis of, and its
resolution long delayed by resort to, technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by
private respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce any credible
evidence showing that they conduct their business legitimately and fairly. The fact
that private respondents could not show proof of their authority or that there was
consent from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate
petitioners' copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters the lower court's initial
finding of probable cause. That private respondents are licensed by the
Videogram Regulatory Board does not insulate them from criminal and civil
liability for their unlawful business practices. What is more deplorable is that the
reprehensible acts of some unscrupulous characters have stigmatized the
Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a hub for intellectual piracy in this part
of the globe, formerly in the records of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and, now, of the World Trade Organization. Such acts must not be glossed
over but should be denounced and repressed lest the Philippines become an
international pariah in the global intellectual community.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court dated
November 22, 1988, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the
court a quo of September 5, 1988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No.
87-053 is hereby REINSTATED, and said court is DIRECTED to take and
expeditiously proceed with such appropriate proceedings as may be called for in
this case. Treble costs are further assessed against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.