Sublime vs. Sublime, or Moral Comfort vs. Tragic Downfall - On One Neglected Aspect of Schelling's Early Critique of Kant

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Sublime vs. Sublime, or Moral Comfort vs. Tragic Downfall:

On One Neglected Aspect of Schelling's Early Critique of
Kant
r
Fo
Journal:
Manuscript ID:
Wiley - Manuscript type:
JAAC-OA-14-099
Original Article
This paper thoroughly examines Schellings early critique of Kant from a
slightly different angle: Schellings alternative to Kants concept of the
sublime. As I argue, this critique is not marginal, or pertains solely to an
alleged minor and insignificant terrain, but rather bears a symbolic role and
deeply reflects Schellings positing an alternative to Kantian philosophy as
a whole.
ew
vi
Re
Abstract:
ly
On
Page 1 of 21
Sublime vs. Sublime, or Moral Comfort vs. Tragic

Downfall: On One Neglected Aspect of Schelling's
Early Critique of Kant
Abstract
r
Fo
This paper thoroughly examines Schellings early critique of Kant from a slightly
different angle: Schellings alternative to Kants concept of the sublime. As I argue,
this critique is not marginal, or pertains solely to an alleged minor and insignificant
terrain, but rather bears a symbolic role and deeply reflects Schellings positing an
alternative to Kantian philosophy as a whole.
I. Introduction
Considerable scholarly research has grappled, over the years, with the question of the
precise character of German idealism,1 and, moreover, with the significant attempt to
Re
assess the extent to which Fichte, Schelling and Hegel (overlooking, for that matter,
the subtle inner development each philosopher underwent), predominantly share a
vi
philosophical ground and orientation. All in all, as Peter Thielke rightly indicates, it
seems easier to say what German idealism is not,2 than to state positively what it truly
ew
is.3
By the same token, presupposing its allegedly unified goals and character, the
consensual postulation of an inner development within this important philosophical
On
movement has became, in recent decades, disputed as well, for the "classic" view of
Fichte and Schelling as Hegel's ostensible predecessors an interpretation powerfully
ly
buttressed by Richard Kroner in his monumental Von Kant bis Hegel4 has been
problematized time and again. Serious inroads were traced over the conception that
Hegel's philosophical project, in its entirety, represents the crux of German Idealism,
1
Needless to say, it is virtually impossible to address the entire corpus that has been written on this
subject over the last decades.
2
Significant hypotheses have been mistakenly aligned with idealism, such as the claim that matter, or
the external world, does not have an independent reality. See Karl Ameriks (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to German Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8. See also, in the
same book, Gnter Zller's "German Realism: the self-limitation of idealist thinking in Fichte,
Schelling and Schopenhauer," 200-19.
3
Peter Thielke, "Recent Work on Early German Idealism (1781-1801)", in Journal of the History of
Philosophy 51:1 (2013), 150.
4
Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, Tbingen: J.C.B.Mohr, 2 vols. The interpretation of Schelling's
early romantic exuberance as a merely transitional stage, culminating in Hegel's philosophy, may also
be found, for instance, in Josiah Rojce's The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1892), 164-89.
ostensibly representing its ultimate, decisive and most elaborated synthesis; it was
argued by some commentators that it was, in point of fact, Schelling's later philosophy
rather than Hegel's which embodies the apex of this movement,5 thus paving the way,
in addition, for some important later philosophical developments that have led directly
to Kierkegaard's anti-Hegelian endeavor and to what can be termed as the
"existentialistic turn" against Hegel.6 In the same spirit, it has been claimed, notably
by Heidegger,7 that Hegel (and some of his adherents and commentators) have not
fully comprehendedand have even misinterpreted Schelling's later philosophy.
And yet, regardless of whether we consider Schelling and Fichte as Hegel's
r
Fo
predecessors or not, whether we think that Schelling has eventually "overcome"

Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik or not, or whether Fichte's decisive critique of
Schelling's Naturphilosophie in the name of his Wissenschaftslehre was justifiable or
not,8 one common and central aim was shared by all these major champions of
Re
German Idealism: their positing an allegedly solid basis to Kantian philosophy. This
is not to imply, of course, that the undertaking of German Idealism can be boiled
vi
down solely to this demanding mission; it merely indicates the undeniable centrality
that this undertaking has come to assume for these three prominent German idealists.
ew
That this was conceived as one of the most pressing and compelling
philosophical missions these three philosophers were facing became evident from the
5
ly
On
Ernst Cassirer's Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit, vol.3,
[(Berlin: Verlag Bruno Cassirer), pp.217-84] suggests an empathic appreciation of Schelling's critique
of Hegel; Lewis S. Ford mentions Paul Tillich's two doctoral dissertations as holding a similar view;
see "The controversy between Schelling and Jacobi", Journal of the History of Philosophy 3, (1965),
76. Other works of research worth mentioning in this respect are Walter Schulz's Die Vollendung des
Deutschen Idealismus in der spt Philosophie Schellings (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1955); Manfred
Frank's introduction to his Eine Einfhrung in Schellings Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1985) as well as his Das unendliche Mangel am Sein (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975); Horst
Fuhrmans, Schelling's Philosophie der Weltalter. Schellings Philosophie in den Jahren 1806-1821.
Zum Problem des Schellingschen Theismus (Dsseldorf: L. Schwann, 1954).
6
Kierkegaard attended Schelling's Vorlesungen in Berlin, and the germane parts of his diary regarding
Schelling can be found in Manfred Frank (ed.), Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841-1842,
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 530 ff.
7
See Martin Heidegger's Schellings Abhandlung ber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit,
(Tbingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1995). And yet, Heidegger claims, towards the end of his detailed
essay on Schelling, that their "dissention" attests to their fundamental unity (ibid., p. 223).
8
See, for instance, Fichte's sharp critique of Schelling's 1804 Philosophie und Religion, which came
after Schelling's first explicit diatribe against Fichte's philosophy in his 1801 Darstellung meines
Systems der Philosophie. Fichte's criticism of Schelling's Philosophie und Religion is discussed in
detail in Reinhard Lauth, "Kann Schelling's Philosophie von 1804 als System bestehen? Fichtes
Kritik", Kant Studien 85 (1994): 48-77; see also his "Die zweite philosophische Auseinandersetzung
zwischen Fichte und Schelling" in Kant Studien 65 (1974): 397-435; see also Christoph Asmuth, "Das
Verhltnis von Philosophie und Religion zur Religionsphilosophie Fichtes,"in F.W.J.Schelling.
Philosophie und Religion, Alfred Denkner and Holger Zaborowski (eds.), (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2008),
143-45.
Page 2 of 21
Page 3 of 21
first embryonic beginnings of Fichte's, Schelling's and Hegel's writings. Fichte, for
instance, maintains that my system is actually the Kantian.9 And in a letter to Hegel,
dated January 6th 1795, Schelling states that "the philosophy has not reached its end
yet. Kant gave the results, but the premises still lack."10 Hegel concurs with
Schellings abovementioned declaration, and adds, in a letter dated April 16th 1795,
that he expects a revolution in Germany as to the Kantian system and its most high
consummation.11 For Schelling and Hegel, then, just as for Fichte, forging an
ostensible "solid" basis to Kantian philosophy is the main philosophical mission at
stake.
r
Fo
Yet, it is not always clear how to account for this new "grounding" of Kant's
philosophy. Moreover: it is reasonable to expect that each philosopher would engage
in a slightly different critique of Kant in this attempt, an undertaking entailing the
tracing of a somewhat different grounding for his philosophy. As suggested by the
Re
title of this paper, I am interested here solely in unearthing a specific and often
neglected aspect of Schelling's early critique of Kanthis early critique of Kants
vi
concept of the sublime. As I argue, this critique bears a symbolic significance for
Schelling, and it symbolizes, in addition, Schellings unique post-Kantian trajectory
ew
vis--vis Hegels and Fichtes.
At any rate, the title of this paper is also somewhat misleading. What I mean
by that is the following: I will focus in this paper only in a roundabout way on
On
Schelling's critique of Kant's premises; rather, what interests me is mainly a specific

consequence of this critique. Or let me put the matter in this way: Kant's philosophy
hits, according to Schelling, a dead end, which Schelling identifies with its essential
ly
inability to suggest a cogent concept of the sublime. Now, surely, to express the view
that a given philosophy cannot account for the experience of the sublime does not
amount to a theoretical invalidation of this philosophy, especially in light of the fact
that Schelling defines the concept of the sublime in a different way than Kant to begin
with. However, as I will suggest, Schelling's claim concerning this allegedly impasse
discloses an inherent characteristic of Kant's philosophy at large, and echoes,
adequately, Schelling's explicit critique of it.
9
Johan Gottlieb Fichte, Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre,in Fichtes Werke, vol.I (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 420 (my translation).
10
This quotation is taken from Materialien zu Schellings philosophischen Anfngen, eds. Manfred
Frank and Gerhard Kurz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), 119 (my translation).
11
Ibid., p.128.
Before delving into this issue, it is necessary to raise two principal problems.
Firstly, and unlike Kants third Critique, the young Schelling does not construe a
detailed formal definition of the concept of the sublime. He engages systematically
with arts specific epistemological function in a system of philosophy only in the
celebrated last chapter of his 1800 System des transzendentalen Idealismus, and
notably afterwards in his Philosophy der Kunst lectures, where he first offers an
elaborated system of art. However, this is not to conclude that the problem of art in
general, and particularly the concept of the sublime, did not capture his philosophical
attention long before. Actually, from his very first philosophical beginnings, and most
r
Fo
notably in Briefe ber Dogmatismus und Kritizismus (henceforth: BDK) from 1795,12
he identifies, in a way that will be discussed in due course, the very essence of
philosophy with the structure of Greek tragedy, in other wordswith the structure of
a work of art. Despite the fact, then, that the young Schelling still did not elaborate a
Re
full-fledged theory of art in 1795, a coherent and consequent concept of the sublime
can indeed be elicited from his early writings.
vi
Secondly, I wish to account for the fact that I will focus here predominantly on
Schelling's BDK, thus overlooking some no less important texts from those years,
BDK's epistolary style.
ew
most notably Vom Ich, written during the same year (1795). The ground for this lies in
Schelling's oscillation between different kinds of literary forms through which
On
to introduce his philosophical argumentation is manifest. During the long course of

his philosophical career he wrote short essays, detailed systems, philosophical
dialogues, aphorisms, philosophical letters, texts which were purported to be read in
ly
front of an audience as lectures, and so forth. Different genres call for different
argumentations. A predominant trait of the philosophical epistles in Schelling's BDK
is their rhetorical function, aimed at convincing a conjectural addressee rather than
merely suggest an argumentation which refutes the rivals claims. In a way, the
admixture of philosophy and literature, which later during the nineteenth century
became the trade mark of Kierkegaard's writings, is adopted already in Schelling's
12
See Schelling's Smmtliche Werke (henceforth: SW), Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von K.F.A
Schelling, 1. Abteilung: 10 Bde. (=I-X), 2. Abteilung: 4 Bde. (XI-XIV), Stuttgart/Augsburg 1856-1861,
vol.1; all the translations from Schelling's writings in this paper are mine.
Page 4 of 21
Page 5 of 21
BDK.13 This technique of persuasion, which dominated some of Schelling's early

writings, is salient predominantly in BDK, and far less in Vom Ich, despite their
belonging essentially to the same philosophical momentum. As such, it can account
for my claim above, according to which Schelling was preoccupied not merely with a
theoretical refutation of Kant, but also with the unwarranted practical consequences
of Kant's philosophy. In other words, even if one is not convinced of Schelling's
endeavors to undermine the premises held by Kant, one must, nevertheless, be
troubled by the conjectural consequences of an acceptance of Kant's philosophy. This
may induce the reader to dispense with Kants philosophy altogether. Such an
r
Fo
uncalled-for upshot, regarded from the perspective of the young Schelling, entails an
alleged Kantian renunciation, deeply originated in the most fundamental locus of
Kantian thought, of the "genuine," full-fledged experience of the sublime.
Re
II. Kant and the Moral Background of Sublimity

Schelling's aim is not to launch an attack on Kant's concept of the sublime per se. The
vi
object of his unfavorable judgment is, rather, the link, allegedly implied in Kant's
philosophy, between Kant's concept of the sublime and morality (first and foremost,
ew
the connection between Kant's morality and his concept of a moral God) which
constitutes, according to Schelling, the genuine Kantian position vis--vis the
sublime. This Kantian triangle morality, a concept of a moral God (as a
knot that Schelling ardently seeks to sever.
On
systematical upshot of Kant's morality) and a concept of the sublime is the Gordian
Thus, before inquiring into Kant's concept of the sublime, it is important to
ly
call to mind, however generally, three germane points which underpin Kants ethics.
First, Kant maintained time and again that ethics is not to be confused with
anthropology. This bears important consequences for Kant's concept of God. In
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (one of many examples which can be drawn
out of his writings on ethics) Kant argues:
[U]nless we want to deny to the concept of morality all truth and all references
to a possible object, we cannot but admit that the moral law is of such
widespread significance that it must hold not merely for men but for all
rational beings generally [viz., for God as well], and that it must be valid not
13
A similar anticipation of Kierkegaard can be found in Jacobi's Allwill. See George Di Giovanni,
"From Jacobi's Philosophical Novel to Fichte's Idealism: Some Comments on the 1798-1799 Atheism
Dispute," Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (1989): 78-86.
merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions but must be

absolutely necessary.14
Unlike the concept of "beauty, [which holds] only for human beings,"15 Kantian
morality "holds for every rational being as such."16 "A [divine] understanding in
which through self-consciousness all the manifold would eo ipso be given," and thus
"would be intuitive,"17 is perfectly attainable in Kant's philosophy, even if "our [own
finite] understanding can only think, and for intuition must look to the senses."18
However, this is not the case with morality, since an alternative moral law is
objectively impossible for God as well.
r
Fo
The second point is directly related to the first; Kant posits a logical priority of
ethics over theology:
Re
A perfectly good will [namely, Gods] would thus be as quite as much

subject to objective laws (of the good), but could not be conceived as
thereby necessitated to act in conformity with moral law, inasmuch as it can
of itself, according to its subjective constitution, be determined only by the
representation of the good.19
vi
The difference in the manifestation of morality between a finite and an infinite being
lies, according to Kant, solely in the mode of givenness of morality: the very same
ew
morality appears, to a finite being, in the form of an imperative, for the structure of
the will in that case is heterogeneous, whereas, given the hypothesis that God's will
acts of itself in accordance with the moral law, the concept of an imperative is
On
redundant for Him.
The third point, which is of utmost importance for Schelling's critique of Kant,
ly
pertains to the systematic role that the concept of God plays in Kant's philosophy; this
role is unequivocally and exclusively practical. The Kantian concept of God has
nothing to do with the validation of morality (which is grounded solely on formal
grounds, such as the concept of contradiction).20 Nor does it have anything to do with
14
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals [henceforth: Groundings], trans. James W. Ellington,
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1981), 20 (my emphasis).
15
Critique of Judgment [henceforth: CJ], trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1987), 52, (my emphasis).
16
Ibid., ibid.
17
Critique of Pure Reason [henceforth: CpR], trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933),
155
18
Ibid., ibid.
19
Groundings, 24
20
This is not to say that that the categorical imperative, for instance, can be explained solely on formal
grounds, for the very concept of an imperative is put forward by Kant to begin with only in reference
Page 6 of 21
Page 7 of 21
the concept of a conjectural legislator of moral law (reason legislates for itself, or else
the concept of autonomy, and morality likewise, would be rendered empty). Rather, it
concerns mainly to the problem of the final end of morality,21 namely, the realization
of the highest good.22
Kant indicates: "[I]f [] the highest good is impossible according to practical
rules, then the moral law which commands that it be furthered must be fantastic,
directed to empty imaginary ends, and consequently inherently false."23 However,
what renders the highest good possible and attainable is, according to Kant, a concept
of God, on which Kant remarks similarly: "Such [a concept of a] Ruler [viz. of God]
r
Fo
[] reason finds itself constrained to assume; otherwise it would have to regard the
moral law as empty figments of the brain [leere Hirngespinste]."24 Put very briefly,
and without inquiring into Kant's attempt at a justification of this claim, the possibility
of the highest good is required in order not to render the moral law "inherently false,"
Re
whereas a necessary condition of the attainment of the highest good entails, in turn,
the positing of a theistic concept of God.
vi
This is the practical ground on which Kant models the concept of God: the
acting finite moral agent, who strives to bring about, by means of his or her moral
ew
deed, a perfectly moral world, must rationally believe in a moral God as a

precondition for the fulfillment of that mission.25 An essential moment of this rational
belief is the belief that nature is divine, for bringing about a moral world means,
On
among other things, rendering nature moral. Rendering nature moral requires,
ly
to the concept of a (finite) human will, a will which, by definition, always bears some relation to
sensibility; strictly speaking, even the concept of freedom cannot be ascribed to a pure intellectual
essence such as God, and its formal dimension cannot be fully detached from a reference to a finite
will. See, for instance, Kants Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Present
Itself as Science, trans. Peter G. Lucas and Gnter Zlle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.
147.
21
See Giovanni B. Sala, "Wohlverhalten und Wohlergehen. Das moralische Gottesbeweis in den
Schriften Kants," Zeitschrift fr Theologie und Philosophie 68 (1993), 185.
22
Kant uses a conception of God not just in his discussion of the highest good, but also in the first
Critiques account regarding purposiveness and the maxims of reason (B: 713-4; reason treats the
world as if it were divinely ordered, but only in a regulative way). However, I will not elaborate on
this direction here.
23
Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, New York: The Liberal Art
Press, Inc., 1956), 118. An elaboration of this point lies beyond the scope of this paper; for an
explication of it, see, for instance, Marina, Jacqueline, "Making sense of Kant's Highest Good", in Kant
Studien 91 (2000) :329-55.
24
CpR, 639.
25
It is a rational belief, rather than knowledge; the free subject can truly know solely the moral
imperative, and the existence of God is not accessible to knowledge. Kant distinguishes between
opining, knowing and believing, and between three kinds of believing: pragmatic, doctrinal and moral;
ibid., 645-52.
according to Kant, positing a (rationally justified) belief that nature is inherently

moral; namely, that it was primordially designed by God to correspond to the moral
act, and not merely to postulate a belief that nature is an external barrier that ought to
be (morally) enlivened from the outside.26 This accounts for the fact that Kant uses a
predominant argument from design terminology in his moral demonstration of the
existence of God.27 As Kant puts it, for instance, in the first and second Critiques, "the
alleged necessary connection of hope and happiness [] can be counted upon only if
a Supreme Reason, that governs according to moral rules, be likewise posited as
underlying nature as its cause,"28 and "therefore, the highest good is possible in the
r
Fo
world only on the supposition of a supreme cause of nature which has a causation
corresponding to moral intention."29
To conclude, then: a finite moral acting subject ought to rationally believe, in
order for the highest good to be considered possible, that nature is primordially moral,
Re
namely, that nature is an upshot of God's design, and not an utter otherness.
Bearing in mind this background against which Kant unfolds his moral
vi
concept of nature, I now turn to his concept of the sublime, and to its link to Kants
ethical project, a link on which Schelling has placed great (albeit critical) emphasis.
ew
III. Sublimity Reveals Morality: Kants Concept of the Sublime

Whereas there is an obvious sense in which "beauty" is predicated on works of art as
On
well, and not just on objects in nature, in the third Critique Kant attributes "sublimity"
predominantly to nature,30 or more accurately, to crude nature: " [W]e must point to
ly
26
I cannot elaborate here on the precise reasons which induced Kant to claim that nature must be
thought of as primordially moral, namely, that nature is moral from within; for it seems that Kant could
have been satisfied just as well with the mere assumption that, for the Highest good to be possible,
nature can be rendered moral from outside, i.e. by means of the moral act of a finite subject. This was,
on the whole, Fichte's systematic position: nature for him was merely a "dead" barrier, which should be
enlivened from outside by the moral acting subject. See, for instance, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ber das
Wesen der Gelehrten, und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit, in Fichtes Werke, vol. VI,
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 362. As I have said, all that matters for the purpose of the present
paper is to point out that Kant conceived of nature as primordially moral, and not to dwell on the way
whereby he attempted to justify his stance. Attempts at a justification of Kant's position can be found,
for instance, in Marie Zermatt Scutt, "Kant's Moral Theology," British Journal for the History of
Philosophy 18 (2010): 611-33; see also Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 335 ff.
27
Lewis Beck, A Commentary on the Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960), 275 ff.
28
CpR, 638-39, the second emphasis is mine.
29
CprR, 129-30, my emphasis.
30
As Birgit Recki remarks, Kant has held a different position in his pre-critical writings (mainly in his
Beobachtungen zum Gefhl des Schnen und Erhabenen from 1764), according to which monuments
Page 8 of 21
Page 9 of 21
the sublime not in products of art (e.g. buildings, columns, etc.) [] nor in natural
things whose very concept carries with it a determinate purpose [] but rather in
crude nature."31
At any rate, Kant alluded to some important differences between "the
beautiful" and "the sublime," which concern both the subject of sublimity on the one
hand (though, as I will indicate presently, strictly speaking there is no such thing as a
sublime object), and to the kind of liking this object arouses on the other hand. As for
the object of liking,
r
Fo
the beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in [the
objects] being bounded. But the sublime can also be found in a formless
object,32 insofar as we present unboundedness, either [as] in the object or
because the object prompts us to present it, while yet we add to this
unboundedness the thought of its totality.33
And regarding the kind of liking, Kant writes:
Re
ew
vi
the one liking (for the beautiful) carries within it directly a feeling of life's
being furthered, but the other liking (the feeling of the sublime) is a pleasure
that arises only indirectly: it is produced by the feeling of a momentary
inhibition of the vital forces followed immediately by an outpouring of them
that is all the stronger."34
He adds that "the feeling of the sublime is a feeling of displeasure [] but is at the
same time also a pleasure,"35 whereas the aesthetic experience is related solely to the
On
feeling of pleasure.
In order to gain, however, a better understanding of this inherent tension

between pleasure and displeasure that constitutes the experience of the sublime
ly
according to Kant, it is significant to bear in mind that Kant distinguishes between the
mathematically and the dynamically sublime. Although Schelling focused primarily
on Kant's dynamically sublime, for he designates nature (and God) mostly as an
absolute power, I will elaborate here on both kinds of Kantian sublime, since they
share some essential similarities and each sheds light on the other.
such as the pyramids, or Petersdom were regarded as sublime as well; see Aesthetik der Sitten. Die
Affinitt von sthetischem Gefhl und praktischer Vernunft bei Kant (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann GmbH, 2001), 187-89.
31
CJ, 109.
32
Note the "can also be found"; it means that the Kantian sublime is not occasioned solely by formless
objects, and that "unboundedness" is not identical with "formless"; see Allan Lazaroff, "The Kantian
Sublime: Aesthetic Judgment and Religious Feeling," Kant-Studien 71 (1980), p. 206.
33
Ibid., 98.
34
Ibid., ibid.
35
Ibid., ibid.
The mathematical sublime entails an experience of something which is

"absolutely large,"36 of something which lies beyond our capacity of understanding.
Now, to state that something is absolutely large means that it is large "beyond
comparison,"37 and not merely that it is large in comparison to a specific finite
magnitude. Indeed: being beyond measure does not necessarily mean that "more"
sublime or "less" sublime is unconceivable on Kantian grounds;38 and yet, even if
"more" and "less" sublime is conceivable, the clear-cut difference between being
absolutely large and being large by comparison is still retained.
This reveals that Kant was not referring to an empirical magnitude while
r
Fo
entertaining the concept of the mathematical sublime,39 but rather to some kind of an
utter beyond; it shows that, properly speaking, there is no sublime object, since an
utter beyond cannot be represented by a corresponding intuition. According to Kant,
"establishing that our concepts have reality always requires intuitions," andunlike
Re
"empirical concepts (whose intuitions are called examples)," or "pure concepts of

understanding (whose intuitions are called schemata)" "no intuition can be given
vi
[to ideas of reason] that would be adequate."40 In Kant's terminology thus, this utter
beyond refers to ideas of reason (such as the idea of God), or to what he alternatively
ew
terms "rational concepts."41
This "absolutely large," which lies beyond the ken of intuition, illustrates the
fundamental finitude which characterizes a finite agent's knowing capacity: "[What
On
happens is that] our imagination strives to progress towards infinity, while our reason
demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the imagination], our power of
estimating the magnitude of things in the world of senses, is inadequate to that
ly
idea."42 "Being beyond measure," as experienced in a specific occasion by a finite

agent, overwhelms and thus frustrates the power of imagination.
36
CJ, 103.
Ibid., ibid.
38
See James Rasmussen, "Language and the Most Sublime in Kant's third Critique," The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (2010): 155-66.
39
Herder's critique of the Kantian concept of the sublime focuses on this discrepancy: according to
Herder, the sublime is rooted in objects that are (say) higher than us, and not absolutely high, a concept
he finds completely unattainable. For Herder, then, the difference is not qualitative, and the very same
object can be considered sublime and, given a different context, it can be considered beautiful. See
Rachel Zuckert, "Awe or Envy: Herder contra Kant on the Sublime" in The Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism 61 (2003): 217-32.
40
Ibid., 225-26.
41
CJ, 225.
42
Ibid., 106; the remarks in brackets were added by the translator (Werner S. Pluhar).
37
10
Page 10 of 21
Page 11 of 21
Yet, sublimity does not partake of this epistemological frustration alone, for
"this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of feeling that we have within us a
supersensible power [] Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the
mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense";43 and elsewhere, in the same
spirit:
[B]ut our imagination, even in its greatest effort to do what is demanded of it
and comprehend a given object in a whole of intuition (and hence to exhibit
the idea of reason), proves its own limits and inadequacy, and yet at the same
time proves its vocation to [obey] a law, namely, to make itself adequate to
that idea. Hence the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own
44
vocation."
r
Fo
"Vocation," "respect," "obey a law," terms drawn directly from Kant's moral
dictionary, tell, in a nutshell, the story of the mathematically sublime: it is not the
frustration of our epistemological powers alone, triggered by the awareness of its
Re
inherent limitation, which constitutes the experience of the sublime (in that case, only
the displeasure would be accounted for); rather, it is the feeling of a moral (namely,
vi
supersensible) overcoming of that finitude of the understanding by means of reason

that makes for the genuine character of the sublime. The sublime is thus founded on
ew
the "predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., to moral feeling."45
Obviously enough, this accounts for the mixture of pleasure and displeasure
that we experience in the sublime:
On
ly
[O]ur inner perception that every standard of sensibility is inadequate for an

estimation of magnitude is itself a harmony with laws of reason, as well as a
displeasure that arouses in us the feeling of our supersensible vocation,
according to which finding that every standard of sensibility is inadequate to
the ideas of reason is purposive and hence pleasurable.46
The second kind of sublime, the dynamical, which brings us closer to the kernel of
our discussion, refers to nature as a "might" ("bold, overhanging and, as it were,
thunderclouds pilling up in the sky and moving about accompanied by lightening and
thunderclaps")47 and as ungeheuer (monstrous, enormous).48 As such, nature is
43
Ibid., ibid.
Ibid., 114.
45
Ibid., 125.
46
Ibid, 115; my emphasis.
47
CJ, 120.
48
Note that "enormous" does not carry within it an ethical implication, contrary to "monstrous"; I will
dwell on this point in due course, since it pertains directly to the present discussion. As Jacob
44
11
represented as "arousing fear," for "nature can count as a might [] only insofar as
we consider it as an object of fear."49 Nature experienced as arousing fear illustrates
our physical limitations (just as the mathematically sublime represented our cognitive
limitation): when experienced in this way, nature simply appears as a power which
bears the potential to imperil our lives, and hence to obliterate our very existence.
Whereas the occurrence of the event that arouses the feeling of the
dynamically sublime is essentially contingent (we can certainly imagine an agent who
has never, during the course of his life, experienced nature as ungeheuer), Kant's
account of it, just as in the case of the mathematically sublime, is transcendental. That
r
Fo
is to say, experiencing (empirically) nature as "might" merely occasions the

dynamically sublime, just as experiencing absolute magnitude merely occasions the
mathematically sublime. Kants alludes to it when he argues that it is impossible to
"pass judgment at all on the sublime in nature if we are afraid,"50 and thus "we must
Re
find ourselves safe in order to feel the exciting liking [of the sublime]."51 This points
that merely being afraid of nature's power does not, in and of itself, capture the
vi
essence of the experience of the sublime.
In order to account transcendentally for the experience of the sublime, it is to
ew
be recalled that nature is called sublime not only because it is being represented to us
as "might"; "nature", as Kant makes explicit, "is here called sublime merely because it
elevates".52 And precisely in this feeling of elevation is Kant's account of the
On
dynamically sublime encapsulated. For "elevation," according to Kant, is not exactly

an empirical feeling (a feeling being engendered by, say, gladdening news I received);
its intelligibility requires a transcendental account.
ly
The feeling of elevation, sensed in the experience of the dynamically sublime,

and its true kernel, is linked, according to Kant, once again to our highest vocation,
which is moral in essence: physically, we experience nature, indeed, as overpowering;
Rogozinsky indicates, the Ungeheuer does not appear in Kant's writings, and a remarkable exception
can be found in Kant's discussion of the sublime; see "A la limite de l'Ungeheuer sublime et
"monstrueux dans la Troisieme Critique," in L'esthetique de Kant, ed. Herman Parret (Berlin &New
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 642. The Ungeheuer features in &26, in which Kant discusses the
mathematically sublime, but given that "monstrous" and not just "enormous" is one of its senses, it
could have featured, in essence, in Kant's discussion of the dynamically sublime as well.
49
CJ, p. 119.
50
Ibid., p. 120.
51
Ibid., p. 121.
52
Ibid., ibid.; my emphasis.
12
Page 12 of 21
Page 13 of 21
but precisely this overpowering (the impotent frustration) gives us the opportunity to
exert our moral practical predominance over nature:
though the irresistibility of nature's might makes us, considered as natural
beings, recognize our physical impotence, it reveals in us at the same time an
ability to judge ourselves independent of nature, and reveals in us a superiority
over nature that is the basis of self-preservation in kind from the one that can be
assailed and endangered by nature outside us [....] Hence if in judging nature
aesthetically we call it sublime, we do so not because nature arouses fear, but
because it call forth our strength.53
The dynamically sublime, then, just as the mathematically sublime, is not to be found
r
Fo
in objects (nature as "might" and threatening, or rather, as presenting "absolute

magnitude"). Rather, the object is presented as suitable for exhibiting a sublimity "that
can be found in the mind."54 Whereas in the mathematical sublime the sublime objects
(or strictly speaking, objects that occasion the sublime in us) are incommensurate with
Re
our ability to comprehend them fully, the dynamical sublime represents a similar
moral overcoming, now as to nature's might rather than as to its magnitude.
This illuminates the mixture of pleasure and displeasure characteristic of the
vi
dynamically sublime as well: the dynamically sublime is constituted not just by fear,
ew
but by the fact that nature, crude, threatening and ungeheuer as it may be, cannot truly
reach and annihilate our supersensible ability, our moral vocation, which includes, a
rendering of this very nature moral. According to Kant, "it is difficult55 to think of a
On
feeling for the sublime in nature without connecting it with mental attunement similar
to that for moral feeling";56 in the sublime we are primarily "compelled to
subjectively think nature itself in its totality as the exhibition of something
ly
supersensible, without our being able to bring this exhibition about objectively."57
This account evokes Kant's moral concept of nature, as engendered by a conjectural,
rationally believed in moral God, according to which nature is, from a practical point
of view, nothing but a hidden morality. The conception of nature as hidden morality
neutralizes its alleged (physical) threatening otherness. Physically speaking, nature
defeats humanity (hence, the sense of impotent frustration), yet humanity (reason)
53
Ibid, 120-121.
Ibid, 98-99; my emphasis.
55
In point of fact, Kant uses a more decisive term in German: "es lt sich nicht denken"; it seems just
as well appropriate, then, to translate it as "impossible" rather than "difficult."
56
Ibid., 128.
57
Ibid., ibid.
54
13
exerts a practical dominance over sensibility, rendering nature essentially identical

with morality.
For Kant, then, the experience of the dynamically sublime is contingent, and yet it
entwines within it a transcendental moment that reinforces his ethical project; to
practically overpower nature's threatening otherness constitutes its very essence.
Schelling, however, insists upon nature's (and God's) utter otherness, which cannot be
resolved by means of our moral concepts, as he grasped it; put differently, Schelling
vehemently rejects Kant's moral concept of God, and consequently Kant's moral
concept of nature, which derives from it. This is precisely why Schelling searches an
r
Fo
explication of the experience of the sublime elsewherein the structure of tragedy.
IV. Tragic Downfall vs. Moral Comfort: Schelling's Alternative

As I have mentioned in the first section, in BDK Schelling is interested not only in
Re
undermining Kant's premises, but rather in admonishing his addressee against some
unwarranted consequences of Kant's system. Now, "premises" and "consequences"
vi
are context-dependent terms; nature as hidden morality, as we have seen, is a

consequence of Kant's moral discussion as to the possibility of the realization of the
ew
highest good; yet it serves as a preestablished premise regarding Kant's discussion of

the sublime. Thus, we must be more accurate concerning our contention: Schelling
warns his addressee against the Kantian distortion of the "genuine" experience of the
On
sublime. For him, a falsification of this experience is the consequence of Kant's

premises; the premises, which enabled such a falsification, and thus must be
eradicated, are those which constitute Kant's morality. It would be natural to expect,
ly
then, that Kantian morality, taken in its broader sense (namely, including its upshots,
such as his view of nature as a hidden morality), would be assailed by Schelling.
In point of fact, this is precisely what unfolds at the outset of BDK. Schelling's
avowed aspiration in BDK is an assault on Kant's moral demonstration of the
existence of God. Retrospectively, in 1809, in his Vorrede zu F.W.J. Schelling's
philosophischen Schriften,58 Schelling indicates that BDK "contained a vital polemic
against the [] moral demonstration of the existence of God" (As BDK figures in,
Schelling addresses his diatribe predominantly to the Kantian version of this
demonstration). It is true that Vom Ich, as well as other early texts composed by
58
This introduction can be found, for instance, in Schellings ber das Wesen der menschlichen
Freiheit, Hamburg: Meiner, 1997, pp. 3-6.
14
Page 14 of 21
Page 15 of 21
Schelling till 1801, may bear the same consequences as to Schelling's rejection of
Kant's moral concept of God, and of Kant's morality as a whole; still, an explicit,
independent and well-established attack on Kant's moral concept of God is to be
found mainly in BDK, as Schelling himself points out in retrospection.
Schellings forthright assault on Kant's concept of moral God consists of two
moments (I follow here Schelling's terminology): an aesthetical and a philosophical
one. Schellings contention that a moral concept of God disables a genuine experience
of the sublime, a claim which would interest me here, pertains mainly to the
aesthetical aspect of his claim. In effect, Schelling opens BDK by stressing the
r
Fo
aesthetical side, and only afterwards turns on to suggest its "philosophical" grounding.
However, since according to my interpretation the aesthetic side represents, in many
respects, the apex of Schelling's discussion, I would reverse the order, and present
first Schellings philosophical discussion.
Re
Schelling writes: "[T]his idea of a moral God lacks any aesthetical side. But I
claim, further: it does not even have a philosophical side; it contains nothing sublime
vi
[], and it is empty as every anthropomorphic representation [Vorstellung]."59 This

concise claim of Schelling encapsulates his distinct systematical point of departure in
ew
comparison to Kant. Schelling holds that ascribing moral attributes to God is an

"anthropomorphic" move. It is crucial to note that what is at stake here is primarily
Kant's writings on morality, and only consequently Kant's concept of a moral God. To
On
assert that Kant's moral concept of God is nothing but an "anthropomorphic"

subterfuge amounts to saying that Kant's morality in and of itself is an
"anthropomorphic" enterprise, namely, that its claim for utter generality "for all
ly
rational beings" (God included) and not just for us is questionable.60 The controversy
between the young Schelling and Kant, then, is ethical in its basis, and not merely
theological, or rather; it revolves around Schelling's refusal to consent to the Kantian
contention regarding the logical precedence of ethics over theology: "[N]ot
theological ethics: for this contains moral laws, which presuppose the existence of a
supreme ruler of the world, exhorts Kant; Moral theology, on the other hand, is a
conviction of the existence of a supreme being a conviction that bases itself on
59
BDK, 285.
The philosophical unease as to this Kantian move was shared by many philosophers after Kant. See,
for instance, Arthur Schopenhauer's ber die Grundlage der Moral (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1988), pp. 18-24; 53-9.
60
15
moral laws."61 In this respect, Schelling upholds theological ethics, whilst Kant
endorses a moral theology.
Schelling launches his attack on Kant's moral concept of God through several
strategies. Primarily, however, he questions Kant's celebrated distinction between the
theoretical and the practical, as embodied in Kant's moral concept of God. Schelling,
indeed, has a good grasp on the systematical place ascribed to God in Kant's system
when he comes to describe Kants position:
r
Fo
[H]ow do I reach the idea of a moral God? [] the answer [namely, Kant's
rejoinder] is this: for the theoretical reason is all too weak for grasping a God
and the idea of God can be realized only by means of moral demand
[Forderung]; in that way, I must think of God [only] under moral laws [] I
need, that is, the idea of a moral God in order to salvage my morality, and
since I assume God only in order to save my morality, this God must precisely
on account of that be moral.62
Re
Now, it is clear that Schelling is unwilling to accept this merely "practical need" of a
concept of God, according to which you [Kant] won't allow God's superior power [to
be] before you are certain that his will corresponds to this law,"63 thus securing "your
vi
[Kant's] existence against God's superior power [bermacht]."64 Let us see precisely
ew
how Schelling warrants his disapproval. Shelling incisively challenges Kant:
ly
On
With the assistance of which law do you want to reach that will [God's]? With the
moral law itself? This is the question we are raising presently, how can you convince
yourselves that the will of this essence [God's] corresponds to this law? The simplest
thing would be to say that this essence is the originator [Urheber] of the moral law;
however, this stands against the spirit and letters of your philosophy. Or, maybe,
should the moral law be independent of all will? [But] then we find ourselves in the
field of fatalism; for a law that cannot be accounted for as a result of an independent
precedent being [Dasein] [] has not sanction but that of necessity. Or should the
moral law, maybe, be accounted for as deriving from my will? Should I dictate the
Highest a law? A law? Barrier of the Absolute? I, a final essence?65
Schellings critique of Kant at this point can also be formulated as follows: to

condition God's will by a moral a priori constraint entails a contradictio in adjecto,
namely, a conditioning of that which must be grasped as the unconditioned essence
61
CpR, 526; Note that the moral basis of theology does not necessarily lead to an exhaustive reduction
of theology to morality; see Stephen Palmquist, "Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?" in Kant
Studien 83 (1982): 129-48.
62
BDK, 286.
63
Ibid., 288.
64
Ibid., ibid.
65
Ibid., ibid.
16
Page 16 of 21
Page 17 of 21
per se. Schelling grants Kant's "practical need" of a concept of God as an

indispensable complementary component of ethics (namely, bringing about the
Highest Good); yet, as Schelling holds, "once something is valid, it is valid backwards
just as it is valid ahead."66 This means that once Kant introduces a concept of God in
his system, he must accept its full-fledged consequences; once there is a God,
regardless of the ground (or "need") that advanced it to begin with, a tacit ascription
of its immanent attributes , such as omnipotence (namely, all-determining) becomes
inevitable. Acknowledging solely God's moral attribute while discarding God's other
necessary properties, which constitute the very concept of God, would amount to
r
Fo
denying, while upholding a concept of a triangle, one of its defining qualities (say,
rejecting that 180 is the sum of its angles). Kants granted need of a concept of God
cannot alter arbitrarily the sense of the concept.
Now, if according to Schelling, the concept of God must be valid "backwards"
Re
as well, once it is raised, the logical need to ascribe to God all His necessary
attributes, especially His being all-determining, practically destroys the premises that
vi
constitute Kant's morality. For how can morality, as a self-determining project, be

compatible with God as all-determining essence? Caught up in a vicious circle, Kant's
ew
"practical need" for a concept of God is an inevitable upshot of his morality, yet this
upshot undermines the very premises which constitute his morality. "Divinity,"
Schelling maintains, "cannot carry the fault of the weaknesses of your [Kant's]
On
reason"; indeed, "you [Kant] can reach it only through moral law"; yet from this it
does not follow that "it must be appreciated only according to these measures."67
What arises from Schellings passionate criticism is manifest: "for an absolute
the Kantian sense, is utterly rejected by Schelling.
ly
causality," Schelling concludes, "there is no moral law."68 A moral concept of God, in
By now I believe that it is already evident that Kant's account of the sublime,
which is bound up with his moral concept of God, and with nature's hidden morality
a consequence of his conception of God is incompatible with Schelling's
framework. God's (and consequently, nature's) utter otherness, namely the fact that
God's will is not constrained by (merely our, as Schelling has it) moral laws disables a
Kantian account of the sublime. Once God retains his utter otherness in respect to
66
Ibid., 289.
BDK, 289.
68
Ibid., ibid.
67
17
morality as well, an intimation of horror regarding God, and, consequently,

concerning natures might as well, cannot be eradicated.
So, given the aforesaid claim, how can Schelling uphold the experience of the
sublime? And not less crucial: what does the experience of the sublime stand for in
Schellings view? This brings me to the "aesthetical" side of Schelling's critique of
Kant. In the very first lines of BDK Schelling indicates:
r
Fo
"I understand you, dear friend! To struggle against an absolute power, and
while struggling to sink and to be defeated, seems to you much bigger than to
secure yourself in advance against every danger with the help of a moral God.
Indeed, not only that the struggle against the big beyond measure is the most
sublime a man can think of, but it [entwines], I think, the very principle of
sublimity [] if we look at the idea of a moral God from its aesthetical side
we must conclude: by determining such a moral God we have lost the
principle of pure aesthetics."69
Note that Schelling backs up a wondering raised by his conjectural addressee. This
Re
addressee is presented as questioning the outcome of assuming a moral God, and not
the way whereby a concept of a moral God is grounded. Schellings rejoinder is that
such a moral God, be its grounding warranted or not (recall that we find ourselves
vi
here sill on an "aesthetical" and not on a "philosophical" terrain), cannot be
ew
compatible with the genuine concept of the sublime. In addition, notice that Schelling
alludes to concepts such as "defeat," "sinking" (untergehen) and so forth as the
authentic kernel of the experience of the sublime, contrary to Kants moral vocabulary
On
which consists in an overpowering of nature. Sublimity, thus, cannot reside in

morality's awaited triumph, namely in some kind of a moral belief. Rather, it has
something to do with Moralitys being routed.
ly
Still, note that despite Schelling's terminology cited above, sublimity is not to
be reduced to humanity's defeat either; rather, it is about the very struggle with an
utter absolute otherness, whose strength overpowers you, a struggle which is carried
out despite the awareness of an inevitable defeat. More accurately, it is about tragedy.
Schelling returns to this issue in the tenth (and last) letter as well: "to know that there
is an objective power who threatens us with annihilation, and with this conviction to
struggle against it [] and so to sink [] this possibility must be kept for art - for the
most high in art [namely, tragedy]."70
69
70
Ibid., 284.
Ibid., 336.
18
Page 18 of 21
Page 19 of 21
To gain a thorough understanding of Schelling's intention here requires some

deepening into Schelling's critique of Kant. One of the main problems with Kant's
philosophy, according to Schelling, is that it does not belong to a specific system of
philosophy at all; that it is Kanon to every system of philosophy. Schelling rejects
Kant's pretension in this respect, and one line of his reasoning, which pertains to the
bond between morality and the concept of God, was delineated above. Schelling,
nevertheless, incorporates into his own one essential element of Kant's philosophy in
BDK, and he acknowledges it most vividly in his fifth letter: "the Critique of Pure
Reason has first shown, out of the mere Idea of system in general, that no system
r
Fo
whatsoever can be an object of knowledge, but only an object of a practical necessary,

of endless action."71 This Kantian conclusion reverberates positively in Schelling's
BDK. And in Kants spirit, Schelling adds: "[A] system of knowledge is of necessity
merely a game of thought [Gedankenspiel] [] or it must receive reality, not by some
Re
theoretical knowing capacity, but rather by practical, productive capacity, which can
be realized, not by knowledge, but by action."72 Now, if the ultimate goal of all
vi
knowing is the unconditioned, as Kant grants as well, and if this unconditioned cannot
be resolved by theoretical means, then the only way out of this philosophical labyrinth
ew
is practical; philosophy, in its essence, is not an enterprise of thought, but rather a

matter of experiment, carried out by the free finite agent. "Philosophy," so goes
Schelling's reasoning, "cannot pass from the infinite to the finite [namely, it cannot
On
have its point of departure in the unconditioned, as Spinoza, for instance, strived to
do]; but it can nevertheless pass from the finite to the infinite."73 For Schelling too,
then similarly to Kant a finite self-determining essence is philosophys point of
ly
departure, for it is the free agent who strives to realize the absoluteness; the moment
some kind of system takes control (Schelling alludes constantly to Spinoza as the
most consistent champion of this alternative), the finite agent "ceases to be a creator,
and turns to be an instrument of his system."74
Now, the precise character of this practical mission which the finite agent has
to carry out, namely the passing from finite to infinite, is determined not merely by
the character of the finite (which must be thought of as self-determining), but by the
character of the infinite as well. Kant grants the infinite, as we have seen, a moral
71
Ibid., 305.
Ibid., ibid.
73
Ibid., 315.
74
Ibid., 306.
72
19
Page 20 of 21
sense: passing from the finite to the infinite, to wit, to model oneself on God, means
to be ultimately moral, for God is the highest embodiment of morality (recall that the
Kantian God acts von selbst in accordance with the moral law). Given Schellings
disavowal of Kants concept of a moral God, the idea of modeling oneself on God
necessarily entails a different sense for him, free from the constraints of morality: to
possess an absolute power, or, better still, to be absolutely unconditioned.
As Schelling already taught us, Kants mission is doomed to failure: Kants
morality results in a theological impasse that cannot be overcome. Its outcome a
(moral) concept of God, which must be thought of as an all-determining essence,
r
Fo
contradicts its premise the agents self-determining essence. But it seems that,
paradoxically, Schellings philosophy hits the very same Kantian dead end, for, as we
have seen above, he too acknowledges a finite self-determining essence as
philosophys point of departure. But then, how can this be compatible with a full-
Re
fledged concept of an all-determining God advocated by Schelling? Schelling must

find a paradigm that would guide him out of this philosophical maze, without
vi
claiming that the finite agents freedom is a metaphysical illusion (Spinozas

alternative) and without falsifying the true character of God (namely, not to succumb
ew
to Kants postulation of a moral God).
The structure of tragedy, which also captures the genuine character of the
sublime, serves as that paradigm. For this is precisely the great riddle presented in
On
Greek tragedy: an agent, who is doomed by fate to commit a crime, struggles against
this predestination, and is still being punished for a crime that was essentially the
work of fate.75 The ground of this contradiction, according to Schelling,
ly
lies deeper than the place people usually seek it [] it lies in the conflict of
human freedom with the objective world, in which the mortal and given
that this power is a super power (Fatum)must be defeated. And still,
because it cannot surrender without a struggle, he must be punished for his
defeat.76
The so-called objective world contradicts the finite agents freedom; tragedy,
nevertheless, introduces us to the finite agents struggle with it, a struggle he or she
must loose; paradoxically, then, in tragedy "[human] freedom is proven thorough its
loss."77
75
Ibid., 336.
Ibid., ibid.
77
Ibid., 337.
76
20
Aesthetic or
organic?
Page 21 of 21
Note that tragedy does not provide here a theoretical solution to this
philosophical riddle, namely, the incompatibility between a self-determining agent
and an objective world: this riddle is theoretically irresolvable. However, it
demonstrates, by means of art, a practical solution: by presenting the struggle against
the Absolute, an Absolute which is not subordinate to (our) morality, it opens a
sublime way for the finite subject "to know that there is an objective power who
threatens us with annihilation, and with this conviction to struggle against it [] and
so to sink ."78 This struggle ends up with sinking, on grounds of the rivals absolute
power. And still, as Schelling holds, the struggle against the big beyond measure is
r
Fo
the most sublime a man can think of [] it [entwines], I think, the very principle of
sublimity.79
Sublimity for Schelling, then, does not indicate a merely contingent

experience, which reveals a transcendental moment. Rather, it represents the
Re
culmination of human existence, as it demonstrates its highest essence, which is

tragic. And precisely this tragic element, the apogee of humanityits dignity
vi
(Wrde)is abdicated in Kants philosophy according to Schelling, as it does not

allow this very sublime struggle to take place. For Kant, the ultimate purpose that
ew
nature has as a teleological system and the final purpose of the existence of a
world80 is moral, and signifies a transcendental elevation; for Schelling, the ultimate
structure of reality lies beyond morality, namely in tragedy, where sublimity reveals
background.
ly
On
itself, and the elevation at stake is rendered intelligible only against a tragic
78
Ibid.,336.
Ibid., 284.
80
CJ, 317, 322.
79
21

Sublime vs. Sublime, or Moral Comfort vs. Tragic Downfall - On One Neglected Aspect of Schelling's Early Critique of Kant

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sublime vs. Sublime, or Moral Comfort vs. Tragic Downfall - On One Neglected Aspect of Schelling's Early Critique of Kant

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism