Janoski Etc. Ed - Handbook of Political Sociology - 2005

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The handbook of political sociology
Written by a distinguished group of leading scholars, The Handbook of Political

Sociology provides the first complete survey of the vibrant field of political sociology.
Part I begins by exploring the theories of political sociology. Part II focuses on the
formation, transitions, and regime structure of the state. Part III takes up various
aspects of the state that respond to pressures from civil society, including welfare,
gender, and military policies. Part IV examines globalization. The handbook is
dedicated to the memory of coeditor Robert Alford.
Thomas Janoski is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Kentucky.

He has taught at the University of California, Berkeley, and at Duke University. He
is the author of Citizenship and Civil Society and The Political Economy of Unemploy-
ment, which in 1992 won the political sociology section of ASA’s Distinguished
Contribution to Scholarship Award. Professor Janoski has published articles in
journals such as Social Forces and Comparative Social Research as well as in edited
books. He is currently completing a book called The Ironies of Citizenship.
Robert R. Alford, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, City University of New

York - Graduate Center, was a respected scholar of political sociology and a dedi-
cated teacher. At the time of his death he was working with a former student on
the development of a new theory of misinformation. This book is dedicated to
his memory; the preface details his remarkable life.
Alexander M. Hicks is Professor of Sociology at Emory University. His articles have

appeared in leading sociology and political science journals, including American
Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, and American Political Science Review.
Since 2001 he has served on the editorial board for the American Sociological Review
and as inaugural coeditor of the Socioeconomic Review. Professor Hicks’s publications
include The Political Economy of the Welfare State (coauthored with Thomas Janoski)
and Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism, for which he won the Luebbert Award
in the Comparative Politics section of the American Political Science Association
for best book on comparative politics in 1998–1999.
Mildred A. Schwartz is Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois at Chicago

and Visiting Scholar in the Department of Sociology at New York University.
In 2004 she received a citation for Distinguished Scholarship in Canadian Studies
from the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States. Professor Schwartz
is the author or coauthor of eight previous books, including The Party Network and
Politics and Territory, which, twenty-five years after publication, became the theme
of a conference and a later Festschrift, Regionalism and Political Parties, edited by
Lisa Young and Keith Archer. She has published articles on the subject of political
science and public policy, many as chapters in edited volumes.
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The Handbook of Political Sociology

states, civil societies, and
globalization
Edited by
THOMAS JANOSKI
University of Kentucky
ROBERT R. ALFORD
ALEXANDER M. HICKS
Emory University
MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ
University of Illinois, Chicago
iii
cambridge university press
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© Cambridge University Press 2005
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without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2005
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guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
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in memory of
Robert Alford
—
A political sociologist
of world renown
and friend
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Contents
Preface page xi
Contributors xv
Political Sociology in the New Millenium 1

Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz
PART I: THEORIES OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

1 Rulemaking, Rulebreaking, and Power 33
Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward
2 Neopluralism and Neofunctionalism in Political Sociology 54

Alexander M. Hicks and Frank J. Lechner
3 Conflict Theories in Political Sociology 72

Axel van den Berg and Thomas Janoski
4 Institutionalist and State-Centric Theories of Political Sociology 96

Edwin Amenta
5 Culture, Knowledge, and Politics 115

James Jasper
6 Feminist Theorizing and Feminisms in Political Sociology 135

Barbara Hobson
7 The Linguistic Turn: Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek 153

Jacob Torfing
8 Rational-Choice Theories in Political Sociology 172

Edgar Kiser and Shawn Bauldry
9 Theories of Race and the State 187

David R. James and Kent Redding
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viii Contents
PART II: CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ROOTS AND PROCESSES OF

POLITICAL ACTION
10 Money, Participation, and Votes: Social Cleavages and Electoral Politics 201
Jeffrey Manza, Clem Brooks, and Michael Sauder
11 Public Opinion, Political Attitudes, and Ideology 227
David L. Weakliem
12 Nationalism in Comparative Perspective 247
Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan R. Eastwood
13 Political Parties: Social Bases, Organization, and Environment 266
Mildred A. Schwartz and Kay Lawson
14 Organized Interest Groups and Policy Networks 287
Francisco J. Granados and David Knoke
15 Corporate Control, Interfirm Relations, and Corporate Power 310
Mark S. Mizruchi and Deborah M. Bey
16 Social Movements and Social Change 331
J. Craig Jenkins and William Form
17 Toward a Political Sociology of the News Media 350
Michael Schudson and Silvio Waisbord
PART III: THE STATE AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS

18 State Formation and State Building in Europe 367
Thomas Ertman
19 Transitions to Democracy 384
John Markoff
20 Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements 404
Jeffrey Goodwin
21 Regimes and Contention 423
Charles Tilly
22 Theories and Practices of Neocorporatism 441
Wolfgang Streeck and Lane Kenworthy
23 Undemocratic Politics in the Twentieth Century and Beyond 461
Viviane Brachet-Márquez
24 State Bureaucracy: Politics and Policies 482
Oscar Oszlak
PART IV: STATE POLICY AND INNOVATIONS

25 Comparative and Historical Studies of Public Policy and the Welfare State 509
Alexander M. Hicks and Gøsta Esping-Andersen
26 Women, Gender, and State Policies 526
Joya Misra and Leslie King
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Contents ix
27 The Politics of Racial Policy 546

Kent Redding, David R. James, and Joshua Klugman
28 War, Miltarism, and States: The Insights and Blind Spots of Political
Sociology 566
Gregory Hooks and James Rice
PART V: GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

29 Globalization 587
Philip McMichael
30 State Economic and Social Policy in Global Capitalism 607
Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens
31 The Politics of Immigration and National Integration 630
Thomas Janoski and Fengjuan Wang
32 Counterhegemonic Globalization: Transnational Social Movements in
the Contemporary Global Political Economy 655
Peter Evans
References 671
Name Index 785
Subject Index 797
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Preface
Quite unexpectedly and tragically, our coeditor, Robert Alford, died of pancreatic
cancer on February 14, 2003, at the age of 74. We would like to tell you a little
bit about him. Bob grew up near the Sierras in California where his parents had
a ranch in Avery near Angels Camp, of jumping-frog-contest fame. Bob was well
over six feet tall and he loved to walk in the forest, orchards, and mountains.
He graduated from Bret Harte High School in the gold country of Northern
California and attended the University of California at Berkeley in 1946. He was
president of Stiles’ Hall and active in the campus YMCA and the Labor Youth
League. He regularly played classical piano in the Berkeley Chamber Music Group
and loved folk music. Bob began work on an MA in sociology at California during
the days of the controversial Loyalty Oath and left the university in 1951 rather
than sign.
In 1952, Bob started working at the International Harvester truck plant in
Emeryville, California. Bob Blauner, who was a coworker, describes their first
meeting. “He was wearing goggles to protect his eyes and a gray apron or smock
over his work clothes to collect the metallic dust coming from the machine he
was operating” that made fenders for diesel trucks. Bob served as a shop stew-
ard and, with Blauner and others, pushed the UAW further to the left than it
might otherwise have gone. Roger Friedland and Bob Blauner report that after
Khrushchev’s “secret” speech that detailed Stalin’s crimes, including executions of
supposed enemies who were actually loyal communists, Bob refocused politically
and entered the sociology department at the University of California at Berkeley.
Friedland comments that, for Bob, the “state’s promulgation of information that
was, in fact, disinformation, or outright lies, would later become a theme in his
work.”
A graduate student of Seymour Martin Lipset, Blauner reports that Bob Alford
was Lipset’s research assistant for – and even did some of the writing on – the classic
Political Man. Alford finished his doctoral dissertation in 1961 on class voting in
Anglo-American democracies, and it was published as Party and Politics. He left
Berkeley to take his first academic job at the University of Wisconsin, where he
helped lead the Social Organization Program for just over ten years. Bob took his
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students through a critical engagement with the classic debates with Marxism. In
seminars, Bob demonstrated both personal care and political critique as he molded
a generation of sociologists. Freidland says that “Teaching for him was a kind of
wrestling, a loving combat.” And a lifetime of teaching accomplishments was
recognized in 1997 with the American Sociological Association’s Distinguished
Contribution to Teaching Award. Some of the knowledge built over the years
of teaching was laid out in his 1998 book, The Craft of Inquiry: Theories, Methods,
Evidence, and covers historical, quantitative, and interpretative methods and how
to develop sociological problems in proposals and prospectuses. In large part, the
book teaches the reader how to think about formulating sociological issues.
In 1974, Bob left Wisconsin for the University of California at Santa Cruz,
which was closer to his beloved Sierra Mountains. In 1975, he published Health
Care Politics: Ideological and Interest Group Barriers to Reform. This work showed
how rationality developed as a form of symbolic politics, shaping how interest
groups, organizations, and politicians could block reform in medical care. It won
the C. Wright Mills Award given by the Society for the Study of Social Problems.
In 1986 he and Roger Friedland published The Powers of Theory. This magisterial
study of political sociology is a classic in the field and, in many ways, is the starting
point for much of the work in this volume.
Bob never lost his love for music. A gifted pianist in his earlier life, he continued
to play the piano. Tragically, in his later years he progressively lost his hearing,
leaving him bereft of the joy of even listening to music. It was a supreme loss to
him as a musician, yet he, as the consummate sociologist he was, found a way to
live with that loss. He turned to writing about music with Andras Szanto in Theory
and Society in an article titled “Orpheus Wounded: The Experience of Pain in the
Professional Worlds of the Piano,” published in 1996.
In 1988, Bob took a position as Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the City
University of New York, Graduate Center. Friedland reports that “Bob had fallen
in love with New York City as a result of doing research there for his health care
politics book.” In 1999, we four editors began working together on The Handbook
of Political Sociology. Bob insisted on editing every chapter of the handbook, initially
planned to be thirty-five chapters. He would type out his comments and send them
by mail from New York, Avery, or wherever he might be. Bob pursued this work
with so much gusto up to the end that we had no inkling of our impending loss.
He was a man of tremendous principle, goodness, loyalty, and modesty as Friedland
and Blauner describe and as we ourselves know. Bob neither complained nor ever
said a word to us about being ill. He was to write the final chapter of this volume,
to summarize and comment on the preceding thirty-two contributions. We leave
this final and carefully probed and deliberated task undone, as a symbol of his
unfinished concerto.
The genesis of the handbook project began with a number of articles by Thomas
Janoski in the political sociology newsletter Political Sociology: States, Power, and
Society (see the 1997–1998 issues) and was followed by a session he organized
at the 1998 ASA Convention called “Visions of Political Sociology: Directions,
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Preface xiii
Emphases and Roads Not Taken.” Anthony Orum of the University of Illinois –
Chicago, Richard Weil of Louisiana State University, Margaret Somers of the
University of Michigan, and Robert Alford of the City University of New York –
Graduate Center made presentations and answered questions on the “visions of
political sociology” in a lively and well-attended session. Afterward, Robert Alford,
Alexander Hicks, and Mildred Schwartz agreed to be coeditors along with Thomas
Janoski. The project began with the circulation of a position paper that was, in
many ways, a reaction to Baruch Kimmerling’s Political Sociology at the Crossroads.
That book assessed the state of political sociology in the United States, United
Kingdom, Scandinavia, Russia, India, Poland, Germany, and a number of other
countries. Anthony Orum’s article (1996) in Crossroads about political sociology
in the United States was also influential.
Funding was provided by the American Sociological Association and National
Science Foundation Fund for the Advancement of the Profession for a conference
on “Challenges to Theories of Political Sociology,” held on May 25th and 26th,
2001, in New York City. The departments of sociology at the Graduate Center
and New York University generously augmented those funds. Beginning versions
of most of the theory chapters in the handbook were presented at this conference.
The following presentations were made: Thomas Janoski and Axel van den Berg
on “Political Economy, Neo-Marxist, Power-Resources Theory,” Frances Fox
Piven discussant; Edwin Amenta on “State-Centric and Institutional Theories,”
Robert Alford discussant; James Jasper on “Cultural and Post-Modern Theories,”
Francesca Polletta discussant; Thomas Janoski on “Neo-Pluralist Theories and
Political Sociology,” Jeff Goodwin discussant; and Edgar Kiser on “Rational
Choice Theories,” Edward Lehman discussant.
Planning continued in meetings by the four coeditors in New York and Chicago.
After Bob’s death, the three of us met in New York in 2003 to reassign responsi-
bilities, select new authors, and iron out other details.
More than fifty authors and coauthors were recruited over a two-year period
for the various theoretical and substantive chapters. Each author was asked to
provide a review of the literature that had an angle or edge that might reflect his
or her new position on each topic. Given the highly charged nature of the field,
personal views and ideological orientations at times intruded on analysis in ways
that may add a controversial tenor to the result. But we did not ask authors to
avoid controversy, and many of them made their statements as strong as our field’s
standards of discourse might allow.
As each chapter went through a three-stage review process, some authors com-
plained of an American Sociological Review–like process. We lost a few who did not
want to change their focus but the vast majority revised their chapters, and some
even wrote totally new chapters. At a late date, we had to seek new authors for
four chapters. They did truly outstanding work, and we thank them for writing
and editing with grace under short deadlines and imposing time pressures.
The handbook project took longer than expected, and we worked with a num-
ber of editors at Cambridge University Press. We especially thank Mary Child
for helping us to initially conceptualize the handbook, attending our meetings in
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New York, and allowing us the leeway to produce an exceptionally long work. And
we thank Ed Parsons and Cathy Felgar of Cambridge University Press, and espe-
cially Michie Shaw of TechBooks for shepherding the work through its production
and final stages.
We are also indebted to friends and colleagues in New York and Lexington.
At the City University of New York – Graduate Center, we thank the Depart-
ment of Sociology and Julia Wrigley for generous support. A number of Bob’s
graduate students helped during the conference and we particularly want to thank
Lorna Mason. We also thank Noll Anne Richardson for her hospitality during the
conference and keeping us informed on critical issues. At New York University
we are indebted to Edwin Amenta and Kathleen Gerson for support from the
sociology department and to Tom Lynch for arranging accommodations for the
conference. We also thank former chairs Jim Hougland and William Skinner at the
Sociology Department of the University of Kentucky for their support and Donna
Wheeler, Agnes Palmgreen, Brian Foudray, Leigh Ann Nally, and Fengjuan Wang
for production assistance. And last but not least we would like to thank Natatia
Ruiz Junco and Kathleen Powers for assisting Thomas Janoski in constructing the
index in the XML system.
Lexington, Atlanta, and New York, 2004

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Contributors
edwin amenta(Sociology Department, University of California, Irvine) is the author of Bold Relief:
Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy (1998). His articles on political
sociology, social movements, and social policy have appeared in the American Sociological Review,
the American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, and the Annual Review of Sociology. He is presently
competing a book, forthcoming from Princeton University Press, titled When Movements Matter:
The Townsend Plan, the Old Age Pension Movement, and Social Security.
shawn bauldry (University of Washington in Seattle) is currently a Research Associate at Public/
Private Ventures. His research has centered on program evaluation, particularly programs operated
by faith-based organizations working with high-risk youth or ex-offenders. He has recently co-
authored The Promise and Challenge of Mentoring High-Risk Youth: Findings from the National Faith-based
Initiative and a report on the implementation of a national faith-based re-entry program.
deborah m. bey (Sociology Department, University of Michigan) is pursuing a doctorate degree
in the Sociology Department of the University of Michigan. She has been granted The National
Institute on Aging Fellowship and is also an instructor with the university.
viviane brachet-m árquez (Centrode Estudios Sociology, El Colegio de México) has published
The Dynamics of Domination (1994) and Entre Polis y mercado (2001). She has worked on democracy
and the politics of health and social security reform in Latin America. Her current project is a
comparative study of state formation and democracy in Latin America since independence from
Spain.
clem brooks (Sociology Department, Indiana University) has interests in electoral politics, public
opinion, and welfare states in developed democracies. He is working with Jeff Manza on a book
entitled Why Welfare States Persist developing a new theoretical approach to understanding sources
of cross-national variation in social policy. Other projects include a study that evaluates economic
versus sociological approaches to understanding mechanisms behind mass policy preferences.
The Late richard cloward (School of Social Work, Columbia University, New York) published
Delinquency and Opportunity (1960) with Lloyd Ohlin and authored The Politics of Turmoil (1974)
and Illegitimate Means, Anomie and Deviant Behavior (1993). With Frances Fox Piven, he co-authored
Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How they Fail (1977), Why Americans Don’t Vote and Why
Politicians Want it That Way (1988), The Breaking of the American Social Compact (1997), Regulating
the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (1971, and 1993, updated edition). The last named book
was listed among the “Forty Most Notable Books” by the American Library Association, and the
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2nd Edition won the 1993 Political Sociology Section Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship
Career Award. His many other books and articles are too numerous to mention. As an activist, he
was a force for change in many protest movements having co-founded the National Welfare Rights
Organization, which aimed to federalize Aid to Families with Dependent Children. He co-founded
Service Employees Registration and Voter Education and advocated for the Motor Voter Act of
1992. At Columbia University from 1954 to 2001, he was an academic and an activist who saw a
number of his proposals become the law of the land.
jonathan eastwood (Committee on Degrees in Social Studies, Harvard University, Lecturer) is
currently completing a study of nationalism in Spain and Latin America, as well as working on a
number of related questions in sociological theory and the sociology of culture. His most recent
publication, an article titled “Positivism and Nationalism in 19th Century France and Mexico”
appeared in the December 2004 issue of the Journal of Historical Sociology.
thomas ertman (Department of Sociology at New York University) teaches and researches in
comparative/historical sociology, political sociology, social theory, and sociology of the arts. His
book, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, was
awarded the Barrington Moore Prize of the ASA in 1998. Currently he is writing Taming the
Leviathan: Building Democratic Nation-States in 19th and 20th Century Western Europe.
gøsta esping-andersen (Sociology at the Departamende Ciencies Politques i Sociales, Univer-
sity Pompeau Fabra in Barcelona, Spain) has recently published Social Foundations of Postindustrial
Economies (1999), Why De-regulate Labour Markets? (2001) and Why We Need a New Welfare State
(2003).
peter evans (Sociology Department at the University of California, Berkeley) holds the Marjorie
Meyer Eliaser Chair of International Studies. His past research has been on the role of the state in
industrial development, an interest reflected in his book Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial
Transformation (1995). He has also worked on urban environmental issues, producing an edited
volume, Livable Cities: Urban Struggles for Livelihood and Sustainability (2002) and is currently working
on labor as a global social movement.
william form (Sociology Department, Professor emeritus, The Ohio State University) has pub-
lished widely in economic sociology, social stratification, and industrial organization in Italy, Ar-
gentina, India, Korea and the United States. Currently, he is studying the response of downtown
churches to the daytime downtown population as well as the economic stratification of churches in
the metropolis.
jeffrey goodwin (Sociology Department, New York University) is author of No Other Way Out:
States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (2001) and co-editor of Passionate Politics: Emotions and
Social Movements (2001), Rethinking Social Movements (2003) and The Social Movements Reader (2003).
francisco j. granados (Sociology Department, Southern Methodist University) wrote “Interor-

ganizational Alliance Diversity, Firm Status Change, and Performance in the Global Information
Sector, 1989–2000” (with David Knoke). He was awarded the 2004 NSF Dissertation Improve-
ment Grant (with David Knoke), as well as the 2003 American Sociological Association Economic
Sociology Section Graduate Student Paper Award when he attended the University of Minnesota.
liah greenfeld (Political Science Department, Boston University) has published widely on ques-
tions of art, economics, history, language and literature, philosophy, politics, religion and science.
She is a preeminent authority on nationalism, a stature reinforced by the publication of The Spirit
of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth (2001). In 2002, she received the Kagan Prize of the
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Historical Society for the best book in European History for The Spirit of Capitalism and in 2004
delivered the Gellner lecture at the London School of Economics.
alexander hicks (Departments of Sociology, Emory University) authoredSocial Democracy and
Welfare Capitalism (winner of the 1999 Luebbert Award). He has first-authored papers in the American
Journal of Sociology, the American Political Science Review, the American Sociological Review, and other
leading journals of sociology and political science on the political economy of social and economic
policy, on which he continues to write. In 2001 he began service as founding co-editor (with David
Marsden) of the Socioeconomic Review.
barbara hobson (Sociology Department, Stockholm University) has published numerous articles
on gender and citizenship concerning welfare regimes and social movements, and most recently
transnational institutions and diversity. Her most recent books are Recognition Struggles and Social
Movements (2003); Making Men Into Fathers: Men, Masculinities and the Social Politics of Fatherhood
(2002), Contested Concepts in Gender and Social Policy (with Lewis and Siim, 2002 Edward Elgar).
She is founder and an editor of the journal, Social Politics.
gregory hooks (Departments of Sociology and Rural Sociology, Washington State University) has
contributed to several sub-areas within sociology, including political sociology, urban and regional
sociology, and organizations. He is currently involved in research into the rhetoric and the impact
of prisons on local economic. Among his publications is “Guns and Butter, North and South: The
Federal Contribution to Manufacturing Growth, 1940–1990,” in Scranton (ed.), The Second Wave:
Southern Industrialization, 1940–1970 (2000).
evelyn huber (Political Science Department, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) is the
Morehead Alumni Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of Latin
American Studies. She was awarded 2001 Best Book on Political Economy from the Political Econ-
omy Section of the American Political Science Association. Among her publications are Development
and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (with John D. Stephens, 2001) and
Models of Capitalism: Lessons for Latin America (2002).
david james (Sociology Department, Indiana University) focuses his research on the politics of race
and class stratification in the United States. His published works include articles on racial differences
in education in the South, determinants of voter registration rates during the 1960s, and residential
segregation in urban areas of the United States. At present, he is engaged in collaborative research
(with Kent Redding) on the determinants of racial differences in voter turnout in the American
South during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
thomas janoski (Sociology Department, University of Kentucky) has published The Political Econ-
omy of Unemployment (1990), which won the Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship Award in
political sociology, and Citizenship and Civil Society (1998). His work has appeared in Social Forces,
Comparative Sociological Research, a co-edited volume with Alexander Hicks called The Comparative
Political Economy of the Welfare State (1994), and other books and journals. He is currently writing a
book called The Double Irony of Citizenship.
james jasper (Independent scholar in New York City) is editor of Contexts published by the
American Sociological Association. He wrote Restless Nation: Starting Over in America (2002), The
Art of Moral Protest (1999), Nuclear Politics (1990) and co-authored Rethinking Social Movements (2003)
and Animal Rights Crusade (1991). He co-edited Passionate Politics (2003), and Social Movements Reader
(2003).
craig jenkins (Sociology Department and Faculty Associate, Mershon Center for International
Security, Ohio State University) has published The Politics of Insurgency (1985) and co-edited The
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xviii Contributors
Politics of Social Protest (1995) with Bert Klandermans. His articles have appeared in the American
Sociological Review, the American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces and numerous other journals and
collections. He is currently working with Charles Taylor on The World Handbook of Political Indicators
IV, a study on high technology policy, and the development of the environmental movement in
the United States.
lane kenworthy (Department of Sociology at the University of Arizona) studies the impact of
institutions and government policies on economic performance in affluent countries. His publica-
tions include Egalitarian Capitalism (2004), In Search of National Economic Success: Balancing Competition
and Cooperation (1995), and articles in the American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review,
Comparative Political Studies, European Journal of Political Research, Social Forces and World Politics.
leslie king (Department of Sociology and Environmental Science & Policy, Smith College) focuses
her research on population policies, mainly in countries with relatively low fertility. She is especially
interested in how ideologies of nationalism, gender, race/ethnicity and class are implicated in the
construction and implementation of population policies. Leslie’s articles on population-related issues
have appeared in Ethnic and Racial Studies, European Journal of Population, The Sociological Quarterly,
and Gender & Society. She is currently beginning a project that will examine debates within the
Sierra Club over immigration to the United States.
edgar kiser (Sociology Department, University of Washington in Seattle) has published articles in
sociology, political science, and economics journals on topics including the determinants of war and
revolt, the development and decline of voting institutions, the centralization and bureaucratization
of state administration, and the methodology of historical sociology.
joshua klugman (Sociology Department, Indiana University) is a doctoral student. His dissertation
is about resource inequalities among U.S. public schools and the consequences for their students.
He also teaches undergraduate courses for the university.
david knoke (Sociology Department, University of Minnesota) is author of Changing Organi-

zations: Business Networks in the New Political Economy (2001) and co-author of Comparing Policy
Networks (1996). His current project analyzes the changing strategic alliance network of the Global
Information Sector.
kay lawson (Political Science Department, Professor emerita, San Francisco State University) is co
editor of International Political Science Review, and her most recent publications are the fifth edition
of The Human Polity: A Comparative Introduction to Political Science (2003), and How Political Parties
Respond: Interest Aggregation Revisited (Co-edited with Thomas Poguntke, Routledge, 2004).
frank lechner (Sociology Department, Emory University) has edited The Globalization Reader
(2000, 2004) and written World Culture: Origins and Consequences (2005), both with John Boli,
in addition to publishing numerous papers on religion, globalization, and sociological theory. His
current work focuses on globalization and national identity, using the Netherlands as an illustrative
case.
jeffrey manza (Sociology Department and Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern Univer-
sity) has co-authored Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions
(1999) and Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy (forthcoming). He is also the
co editor of Navigating Public Opinion: Polls, Policy and the Future of Democracy. He is currently writing
a book with Clem Brooks on the impact of public opinion on welfare state effort in comparative
perspective.
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Contributors xix
john markoff (Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh) Professor of Sociology, History

and Political Science, has published Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change (1996),
The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords and Legislators in the French Revolution (1996), and (with
Gilbert Shapiro) Revolutionary Demands: A Content Analysis of the Cahiers of Doléances of 1789 (1998).
He is working on the history of democracy.
philip mcmichael (Development Sociology, Cornell University) has authored Settlers and the
Agrarian Question (1984), Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective (2004, 3rd edition),
edited The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems (1994), Food and Agrarian Orders in the World
Economy (1995), and co-edited Looking Backward and Looking Forward: Perspectives on Social Science
History (2005). He has published in The American Sociological Review, Theory and Society, International
Social Science Journal, and Review of International Political Economy. His research concerns food regimes
and counter-movements.
joya misra (Sociology Department and Center for Public Policy and Administration, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst) has published articles in a variety of journals, including Social Problems,
Social Politics, Gender & Society, the American Journal of Sociology, and the American Sociological Review.
She is currently finishing a project focused on neoliberal economic restructuring, immigration, and
carework, and beginning another cross-national project that examines the effect of family policies
on employment, wages, poverty by gender, marital status and parenthood status.
mark mizruchi (Department of Sociology and Business Administration at the University of Michi-
gan) is the author of The Structure of Corporate Political Action, The American Corporate Network, 1904–
1974 and more than 80 articles and reviews. His recent publications have appeared in the American
Sociological Review, Theory and Society, and The Journal of Corporate Finance. His current work includes
a study of the changing nature of the American Corporate Elite over the past three decades.
oscar oszlak (Director of the Masters Program in Public Administration, University of Buenos
Aires in Argentina) has published La Formacion del Estado Argentino (1982, 2nd Edition 1997), Merecer
la Ciudad (1983), Estado y Sociedad: nuevas reglas de juego, and Civil Service Systems in Latin America
and the Caribbean (2002). His work has appeared in the Latin American Research Review, International
Social Science Journal, and Asian Review of Public Administration. He is currently writing the second
part of The Formation of the Argentine State, 1880–1945.
frances fox piven (Department of Sociology at the City University of New York, Graduate
Center) is Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Sociology. She was the first recipient
of the Lifetime Achievement Award of the Political Sociology Section of the American Socio-
logical Association. More recently, in 2000, she received the American Sociological Association’s
Distinguished Career Award for the Practice of Sociology. Among her publications is Regulating the
Poor (with Richard Cloward, 1972/1993), a landmark analysis of the role of welfare policy in the
economic and political control of the poor and working class.
kent redding (Sociology Department, the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee) has published
Making Race, Making Power: North Carolina’s Road to Disfranchisement (2003). His work has also
appeared in the American Sociological Review, Historical Methods, Social Forces, Sociological Forum, and
other journals. Current projects include an examination of the comparative success of extreme
right political parties in the past two decades and comparative analysis of the incorporations of
labor, women, and racial and ethnic minorities into western democracies over the past 150 years.
james rice (Departments of Sociology and Rural Sociology, Washington State University) is pur-
suing a doctorate degree in Sociology from Washington State University. He is also a teaching
assistant for the university.
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xx Contributors
michael edward sauder (Department of Sociology, Northwestern University) is pursuing a

doctorate in Sociology at Northwestern University. He was awarded the 2004 American Sociological
Association’s Graduate Student Paper prize (with Ryon Lancaster) for “Law School Rankings and
Admissions: The Effects of the Redefinition of a Status Hierarchy.”
michael schudson (Communication Department, University of California, San Diego) is the

author of Discovering the News (1978), Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion (1984), Watergate in American
Memory (1992), The Power of News (1995), The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life
(1998) and The Sociology of News (2003). He is presently working on changing norms and practices
of public expression in the United States since 1960.
mildred schwartz (University of Illinois-Chicago, professor emerita, and New York University)
includes among her books Persisting Political Challengers (2005), The Party Network (1990), and
A Sociological Perspective on Politics (1990). She has also published widely in sociology and political
science journals and in edited volumes. She is now beginning work on the deterrents to corruption.
In 1999, she held the Thomas O. Enders Chair in Canada – U.S. Relations at the University of
Calgary.
john d. stephens (Political Science Department, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) is
the Gerhard E. Lenski, Jr. Professor whose main interests are comparative social policy and political
economy, with area foci on Europe, the Antipodes, Latin America, and the Caribbean. He is
author or co-author of four books including Transitions to Socialism (1978) and Capitalist Development
and Democracy (1992) and Development and Crisis of the Welfare State, (2001). He also has authored
numerous journal articles.
wolfgang streeck (Department of Sociology and Director of the Max Planck Institute for the
Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany). From 1988 to 1995, he was Professor of Sociology and
Industrial Relations at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has written on industrial relations
and comparative political economy. His recent books include Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change
in Advanced Political Economies (with Kathleen Thelen, 2005) and Germany: Beyond the Stable State
(with Herbert Kitschelt, 2003).
charles tilly (Social Science, Columbia University in New York) is The Joseph L. Buttenweiser
Professor of Social Science and has recent books that include Stories, Identities, and Political Change
(2002), The Politics of Collective Violence (2003), Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000 (2004),
Social Movements, 1768-2004 (2004), Trust and Rule (2005), and Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties
(2005).
jacob torfing (Politics and Institutions, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University,
Denmark) has published Politics, Regulation and the Welfare State (1995) New Theories of Discourse
(1999) and Discourse Theory in European Politics (2005). He is co-founder of the Danish Center for
Discourse Theory and Director of the Centre for Democratic Network Governance. He is currently
writing about the role of discourse in new forms of democratic network governance.
axel van den berg (Sociology, McGill University) has published books and articles on Marxist
state theory and other kinds of “critical” and sociological theory, rational choice theory, compar-
ative labor market regimes, and cross-cultural differences in aesthetic preferences. He is currently
European Commission Incoming International Marie Curie Fellow charged with the formulation
of a multi-country collaborative research plan on “transitional labor markets” and the evolution of
current social protection regimes.
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Contributors xxi
silvio waisbord (Department of Journalism and Mass Media, The State University of Rutgers)
is the author of Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, Accountability and Democracy (2000),
El Gran Desfile: Campañas Electorales y Medios de Comunicación en la Argentina (1995) and co-edited
Media and Globalization: Why the State Matters (2001) and Local Politics, Global Media: Latin American
Broadcasting and Policy (2002). He was a fellow at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies
at the University of Notre Dame, the Annenberg School for Communication, the Media Studies
Center at the Freedom Forum, and the Center for Critical Analysis of Contemporary Cultures. His
research interests are media and politics, audiovisual industries, nation and cultures, globalization,
and Latin America.
fengjuan wang (Department of Sociology, University of Kentucky) wrote her thesis, A Comparative
Analysis of Ethnic Niche Effects on Immigrants’ Earning Returns, comparing the income gains of four
Asian and two Hispanic immigrant groups in the United States. She is currently finishing a master’s
degree in statistics.
david weakliem (Department of Sociology, University of Connecticut) is interim director of the
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. His current projects include a historical study of class
politics (with Julia Adams) and an examination of ideological change in the United States since the
1970s. His articles have appeared in the American Journal of Sociology, British Journal of Political Science,
American Sociological Review, and other journals.
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0521819903pts.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 April 26, 2005 18:10
introduction
Political Sociology in the New Millennium
Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz
Although modern political sociology has ex- 1990, 1991), Pierre Bourdieu (1994, 1998a,
isted for more than a century, it came into 1998b), and other poststructuralist or culturally
its own during the decades bridging the vic- oriented theorists; of feminism (Butler, 1990;
tory at the end of World War II and the anti- Hobson, 1990; Hobson and Lindholm, 1997;
Vietnam War movement. Especially important Young, 1990); of racialization theory (Goldberg,
in setting the direction for political research 2002; Omi and Winant, 1994; Winant, 2001);
with a distinctive focus on “the social bases and of rational choice theories (Coleman, 1966;
of politics” was Seymour Martin Lipset’s Po- Hechter, 1987; Lange and Garrett, 1985, 1987;
litical Man (1960), published in twenty coun- North, 1990; Tsebellis, 1990, 1999; Wallerstein,
tries and deemed a “citation classic” by the So- 1999). Along with other perspectives, these have
cial Science Citation Index. The transformative all shaken the theoretical dominance of pluralist,
potentials of the social bases of politics were political/economic, and state-centric theories.
redirected away from the pluralist theoretical Today, political sociology stands out as one of
tradition by William G. Domhoff ’s Who Rules the major areas in sociology. Its share of articles
America? (1967), which stimulated interest in and books published is impressive. For exam-
capitalist power; William Gamson’s The Strategy ple, in 1999, 17 to 20 percent of the articles in
of Social Protest (1975), which expanded atten- the American Journal of Sociology and the American
tion to the popular bases of power beyond inter- Sociological Review and about 20 percent of the
est groups to social movements; and James Petras books reviewed by Contemporary Sociology, the
and Maurice Zeitlin’s Latin America: Reform or major reviewing journal in American sociology,
Revolution (1967), which excited new interest dealt with political sociology. A number of po-
in the politics of labor movements. The 1980s’ litical sociologists, including Seymour Martin
ascent of state-centric institutionalism regis- Lipset, William Gamson, and Jill Quadagno,
tered a major impact on political sociology with have served as president of the American So-
its Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter ciological Association (ASA). The political so-
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda ciology section of the ASA continues to attract
Skocpol (1985). The works of these times had an above-average membership.1 Yet, along with
a common focus on the societal determination all this vitality, the field remains fluid, stimu-
of political processes and outcomes and on how lated by the following processes and theoretical
state structures cause varied outcomes in differ- transformations.
ent countries. 1
In 2003, membership stood at 560 compared to the
Since the early 1980s, political sociology has average of 463 for all sections. Dobratz et al. (2002b) also
moved to include the unique and powerful per- report that a high percentage of articles in the Annual
spectives of Michel Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984, Review of Sociology are on the topic of political sociology.
1
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2 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz
First, although state-centered, and later Sprague, 1995). Theories of political delibera-
policy-centered, theory associated with Theda tion certainly should play a stronger role, espe-
Skocpol and others (e.g., Evans, Rueschmeyer, cially in considering the impact of small group
and Skocpol, 1985; Skocpol, 1979, 1992) has democracy, deliberative polling, and electronic
garnered a great deal of attention in politi- town meetings (Bohman, 1996; Fishkin, 1991;
cal sociology; new developments in pluralist, Fishkin and Laslett, 2003; Habermas, 1984,
political/economic, and elitist theoretical tra- 1987, 1996). Process theories of democracy are
ditions have largely flown beneath the radar important as well in regard to the transformation
these past two decades. With similar stealth, new of political parties and trade unions, multiple
approaches to policy domains (Burstein, 1991; and changing political identities, and participa-
Knoke et al., 1994) and civil society (Hall, 1995; tion in voluntary groups that cause cross-cutting
Jacobs, 2002; Janoski, 1998; Keane, 1988) have cleavages (Manza, Brooks, and Sauder, Chap-
emerged without widespread recognition from ter 10, and Schwartz and Lawson, Chapter 13,
political sociologists. These developments indi- this volume). Structural and process explana-
cate that the time is ripe to move from differ- tions involving political mechanisms need to be
entiation of theoretical work to more synthetic brought more into play, and the growing area of
theory building by bringing civil society, policy cultural explanation needs to be integrated into
domains, voluntary associations, social move- this mix (Diamond, 1999; Fung and Wright,
ments, interest groups, and the state into more 2003; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Mutz
meaningful theoretical relations. and Martin, 2001; Tilly, 2003).
Second, although the print and electronic Fourth, the conceptual gulf between the two
media have been studied in detail, these institu- vastly different locations in space – “all politics
tions have not been adequately integrated into are local” and “all politics are global” – needs to
political sociology. Even though political sociol- be bridged, as is being done in the literature
ogy may often refer to the media, within its own on antiglobalization movements and perhaps
theory it has failed to integrate the media as an with the political slogan to “Think Globally,
oblique force that has strong but not always clear Act Locally” (e.g., Khagram et al., 2002; see
impacts on political candidates, elections, ide- the McMichael and Evans chapters [Chapters 30
ologies, and legislation, and on the implemen- and 32] in this volume). More attention needs
tation and evaluation of policy. Except where to be paid to the urban and local studies of the
political parties or candidates control the me- political and neighborhood politics of William
dia, such as in Italy with Prime Minister Silvio Gamson in Talking Politics (1992) (see also Berry
Berlusconi, the impact of mass media is often in- et al., 1993). Means need to be found that in-
direct and not obviously, or at least continuously, tegrate theories as diverse as the world systems
in favor of any party. But the media are political theory of Immanuel Wallerstein in The Mod-
actors, not just fuzzy filters of news and views. ern World System (1989) and Michael Hardt and
The integration of the media into empirical re- Antonio Negri’s Empire (2000). Finally, efforts
search, especially comparative work, is partic- that directly link the local and the global (e.g.,
ularly important for the comprehension of the Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002; Hay,
role of mass media in the public sphere (Keane, 2001; Ranney, 2003) need to be encouraged.
1991; Kellner, 1990; Schudson and Waisbord, Fifth, although it is sometimes denied, the
Chapter 17, this volume; Wheeler, 1997; Zaller, study of politics is affected by cycles of politi-
forthcoming). cal power. On the one hand, politics and poli-
Third, some process-oriented subtheories in cies themselves change, depending on whether
political sociology have been underemphasized. the right or left is in power. On the other
Public opinion needs to be pushed in the direc- hand, social and political hegemony can shift
tion of social network and media contexts rather from democratic processes in the community
than seen as something that is just out there and the welfare state to privatization and mar-
(Burstein, 2003; Gamson, 1992; Huckfeldt and ket processes. This creates oscillations in political
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Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 3
research, such as the leftward and rightward tilts, realism conflates sociology and literary fiction,
respectively, in the political scholarship of the whereas the diminution of theoretical domains
1960s and then the 1980s and early 1990s (e.g., (at times to a vanishing point) blurs the distinc-
see Hunter, 1991, on “culture wars” and Linz tiveness of sociology from biography, journal-
and Stepan, 1978a, 1978b, and Diamond et al., ism, and descriptive historiography.
1988, on “cycles of democratization”). Yet the Seventh, although institutions have always
eagerness to explain the expanding welfare state been the mainstay of sociological explanations,
is hardly matched by the comparative lack of new challenges have emerged from alternative
enthusiasm to theorize and explain its decline perspectives. In recent years, economists and
(Korpi and Palme, 2003; Pierson, 2001). More- political scientists have been applying ratio-
over, social movement research seems much nal choice theory to the formation of institu-
more enthusiastic about the civil rights move- tions and to action in an institutional context
ment than the New Right/fundamentalist and (Booth, James, and Meadwell, 1993; Hardin,
neoliberalism movements. Still, the mobiliza- 1995; Kiser and Bauldry, Chapter 8, this vol-
tion of the religious right has attracted signifi- ume; Knight and Sened, 1995; Lewin, 1988,
cant attention from sociologists (e.g., Diamond, 1991; North, 1990; and Tsebelis, 1990). The
1995; Liebman and Wuthnow, 1983; Luker, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1984; Marshall, 1994). Indeed, the sociolog- has been at the forefront of these efforts, re-
ical study of the neoliberal movement looks inforced by the Nobel Prize awarded to its
like a burgeoning academic cottage industry preeminent spokesman, Douglas North (1990).
(e.g., Campbell and Pederson, 2001; Fourcade- Political sociologists have been stimulated to
Gourinchas and Babb, 2002; Simmons, Garrett, move beyond verifying and describing the exis-
and Dobbin, 2003; Swank, 2003). tence of institutions to explaining their creation
Sixth, the influence of poststructuralist and and transformation (Brinton and Nee, 1998;
postmodern theories, and the feminist expan- Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992), as well
sion of the “political,” have broadened the con- as examining how emotions affect political out-
cept of power from formal political institutions comes (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2001;
to the informal political processes often in- Hochschild, 1983). Yet we still see the need for
volved with the market or private spheres much more theoretical and cumulative work on
(Dyrberg, 1997; Foucault, 1979, 1980, 1984, institutions (Boudon, 2003).
1991; Torfing, 1999). Poststructuralist and post- Amidst this swirl of change, there is a need
modern authors have also questioned the ob- for intellectual tools that can survey and inte-
jectivity and narrowed the empirical scope grate the family of disparate subfields called po-
of sociology (at least insofar as any theoret- litical sociology (Turner and Power, 1981). Such
ical/empirical correspondence is concerned), a survey needs to do the following four things:
sometimes to the extent of denying the pos- (1) bring the diverse contributions to the field
sibility of theoretical realism and trading away of political sociology together and place them
the theoretical domain to be explained for the within a clear and encompassing conceptual
specific case to be interpreted. These authors framework; (2) synthesize, or at least counter-
have equated political sociology with nearly “all pose, new developments in theories of political
of sociology,” revealing previously neglected as- sociology in ways that still recognize some resid-
pects of politics. However, when everything is ual fragmentation; (3) consolidate sociological
political, political sociology itself becomes dif- explanations of politics through the “social bases
fuse and unfocused. Although researchers, es- of politics” and state institutionalism while ad-
pecially those who look for the wide-ranging vancing the recognition of “civil society” as a
“social bases of politics,” naturally abhor the key aspect of the state’s social foundations and
imposition of boundaries on the political, some achievements; and (4) incorporate the expand-
redelineation of what constitutes political so- ing theories of globalization and empire. We
ciology is necessary. The denial of theoretical present the Handbook of Political Sociology, partly
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based on a “Visions of Political Sociology” ses- Robert Dowse and John Hughes (1972), Arnold
sion at the 1998 American Sociological Asso- K. Sherman and Aliza Kolker (1987), George
ciation convention and a 2001 conference on Kourvetaris (1997), Kate Nash (2000b), and
“Theories of Political Sociology,” as a means to Baruch Kimmerling’s edited volume (1996).2
reorient sociological explanation of politics. We One may also read Richard Braungart (1981),
believe that it can advance political explanation Jonathan Turner and C. Power (1981), and An-
not only by providing new directions but also by thony Orum (1988) for summary essays on the
energizing students of politics with creative in- field. Robert Alford and Roger Friedland did
sights from previously unassimilated literatures. an impressive review of pluralist, managerial,
and class theories of political sociology (1985),
which we examine in more detail shortly, and
the place of a handbook Martin Marger followed with a somewhat sim-
in political sociology ilar classification (1987).
More recently, edited volumes have empha-
The purpose of this handbook is to sharpen our sized particular theories or approaches. An em-
focus on what has been somewhat blurred by phasis on “state-centered” theories is presented
the seven entropic developments just discussed. in the Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol
Although political sociology has had consider- book (1985). George Steinmetz (1999) and
able success with its focus on “the social bases Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola
of politics” and its new institutional approaches, Orloff (2004) emphasize the fusing of the “cul-
it needs to be more inclusive of recent develop- tural turn” and rational choice in political soci-
ments while retaining a critical sensibility. Rein- ology. This handbook differs in not arguing for
tegration of the field and a possible synthesis of a single perspective. We shall err toward present-
new developments into existing theories, where ing as many points of view as possible, and we
practicable, are important ways to extend and indicate where theoretical explorations, synthe-
refocus the goals of political sociology. ses, or other responses are needed.
The second, most obvious, reason that a Other edited volumes address methodolog-
Handbook of Political Sociology is needed to clar- ical approaches. Theda Skocpol (1984) exam-
ify political sociology is that one has never been ines historical methodologies. Thomas Janoski
assembled before. This handbook is the first and Alexander Hicks (1994) cover a range
of its kind to bring together original articles of quantitative methods and formal qualita-
covering a coherent range of topics. The gap tive approaches like those presented in Charles
it fills was dealt with in the past by a num- Ragin (1987, 2002). In addition, a recent survey
ber of edited volumes that included both classi- of historical/comparative sociology by James
cal and current readings, including Lewis Coser Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2003)
(1966), Frank Lindenfeld (1968), S. N. Eisen- focuses largely on political sociology. As with
stadt (1971), and Kate Nash (2000a). One two- theory, we believe allowing a thousand flowers
volume collection by William Outhwaite and
Luke Martell (1998) contains classical statements 2
Two widely used textbooks using elite theory, one
by Marx, Weber, and Gramsci along with a large in sociology and the other in political science, make little
number of reprints of more current articles. attempt to cover a broad range of theories but, nonethe-
less, connect to parties, interest groups, legislatures, and
These compendia relied on previously published government: G. William Domhoff (1967, 1983, 1998,
sources to construct an overview of the field. 2002) and Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler (2000).
Instructive surveys of the field were also writ- Kate Nash (2000a, 2000b) captures the cultural turn in
ten, such as those by Barrington Moore (1962), political sociology but rarely mentions political parties,
Morris Janowitz (1970), Edward H. Lehman interest groups, legislatures, or government. She focuses
on cultural theory with most of her attention on so-
(1977), Tom Bottomore (1979), Mildred A. cial movements, citizenship and rights, identity politics,
Schwartz (1990), Keith Faulks (2000), An- international organizations and movements, and the dis-
thony Orum (1977), Philo C. Washburn (1982), placement of the nation-state.
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to bloom is preferable to confining investigative challenge of synthesizing a disparate field. For

methods to a few strains. many researchers in specialized areas, this inte-
Betty Dobratz, Lisa Waldner, and Timothy grative view should bring cutting edge research
Buzzell have recently edited three special issues in adjacent fields and also offer as definitive a
of Research in Political Sociology with the intent panorama of political sociology as space permits.
of “assessing the state of the field of political In addition to the intellectual need for integrat-
sociology at the start of the twenty-first cen- ing theory, delineating the scope of the field,
tury” (2003:1). The first, more specialized, vol- and developing multiple perspectives on society
ume looks at social movements and the state and politics, a Handbook of Political Sociology of
along with a symposium on the 2000 presi- this scope has never been done. We, and the au-
dential election in the United States (2002a). thors of subsequent chapters, offer this work as
The editors describe the second volume on the- an attempt to provide what has until now been
ory (2002b) as “not a comprehensive overview” missing.
but a volume that gives “examples of several
new promising trends” and “a critique of cur-
rent approaches” in the areas of pluralist, class, two new challenges
elite, world systems, and postmodern debates
(Waldner et al., 2002:xiii–xiv). The third vol- In the mid-1980s, the field of political sociolog-
ume (2003) is a more general survey of public ical theory was effectively summarized and par-
opinion, civil society, electoral politics, social tially synthesized in Robert Alford and Roger
movements, and a historical/comparative anal- Friedland’s The Powers of Theory. In their mas-
ysis of the state. It also contains a few more terful book, action and structure are analyzed at
specialized chapters such as Paul Luebke’s re- three levels (individual, organizational, and soci-
flections on being a progressive legislator in a etal) each with its characteristic mode of power
very conservative state and Eduardo Bonilla- (situational, bureaucratic, or systemic). Three
Silva et al.’s article on the new racism in present- major theoretical perspectives, each closely tied
day American society. The result is an important to a level and to a mode of power, anchor their
contribution, but one, as the editors make clear, conceptions of theory. One is the pluralist per-
without the intention of providing the kind of spective: individualistic, situational, and tied to
comprehensive overview that is our objective.3 a characteristic problematic of governance, in
This handbook intends to provide readers particular democratic governance. A second is
with an integrated overview of major theories the managerial perspective: organizational, bu-
and findings, lead them conveniently to top- reaucratic, and focused on problems of state ca-
ics of interest, and assist them in the common pacity that is comparative. A third is the class
perspective: societal, systemic, and focused on
3
the conundrums of resistance to economic in-
There are also a number of handbooks in political
science, such as those by Fred Greenstein and Nelson equality and societal “crisis.” To these theo-
Polsby (1975), Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klinge- retical perspectives and elements are added an
mann (1997), and, in its overall effect, Ira Katznelson and additional emphasis on either politics (politi-
Helen Milner (2002). However, political science does cal structure and process) or function (the con-
not emphasize the “social bases of politics” to the extent sequences of politics). As with many holistic
that sociology does, and much of its approach to politi-
cal behavior in international, comparative, and national articulations of social science phenomena, this
politics involves more psychological and rational choice scheme evokes the metalanguage of systems the-
approaches. Although much closer to us in subject mat- ory. Individual and group actions link the soci-
ter, a recent handbook in political psychology refracts the etal environment and the organization(s) of the
political through the lens of psychology (Sears, Huddy, state. Insofar as modes of power are concerned,
and Jervis, 2003). The present handbook responds to our
perceptions of what is missing in sociology itself, where situationally embedded actions have their im-
we also learn from political science and allied fields and pact as inputs and throughputs on and through
borrow freely from their accomplishments. the bureaucratic structure of the state, feeding
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Figure 1.1. The Directions and Redirections of Political Sociology.
back, in systemslike fashion, on actors and their increasingly assesses politics in complex, even
social situations (organization and society). In nested, situations.
short, although beginning from some distinc- To some degree, these postmodern and ra-
tive roots and moving toward a number of orig- tional choice positions lead in orthogonal or
inal objectives, Alford and Friedland echo long- even opposite directions as follows: (1) with a
held views in sociology and political science diffusion and deconstruction of power (and do-
about how to conceptualize the social and po- mains for its explanation) associated with post-
litical world (e.g., Easton, 1965; Parsons, 1969; modernism and the cultural turn and, at times,
Wallerstein, 1989). emphasized in feminist orientations toward the
But much has changed in the nearly twenty private sphere, and (2) with the integration of all
years since they presented their work. From one social science around modes of rational action
direction, the epistemology of science has been (that arguably are more psychological and eco-
challenged by more contextualized and cultural nomic than sociological) associated with the ra-
conceptions of politics and by less positivist (e.g., tional choice approach. These diverse and con-
more realist and interpretivist) views of causal tradictory pressures are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
origins. Although frequently stopping short of The cultural and feminist paths lie within so-
an antiscientific “postmodernity,” a postmodern ciology but may lead to postmodern theory in
influence can be seen in the emphasis on sub- anthropology and the humanities, both of which
jectivity and “capillarity” (a Foucaultian term strongly emphasize culture. The rational choice
for diffused and extensively networked power), approach has seeds in much of power resources
a turn to structural and discursive conceptions of and political economy theory but leads outward
objective culture, and a major rejection of mate- toward political science and economics. In many
rialist and other determinisms. From the direc- ways, both theories lay claim to institutional
tion of economics and political science, rational theory. A coherent approach to political soci-
choice and game theorists have influenced po- ology would strive toward the sort of rapproche-
litical sociologists with an innovative stress on ment between, or even integration of, two of the
rational motivation that brackets most forms theoretical orientations that Campbell and Ped-
of “subjectivity” – everything beyond prefer- ersen (2001) sketch out for conflicting schools
ences, information and rational calculation – and of institutional theory: “rational choice” and
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“discursive” institutionalism. These orienta- it was founded on the assumption that social
tions differ greatly in their views of how univer- cleavages and interest groups shape the elec-
sal or historically specific (or “local”) theories tion, legislation, and social and foreign pol-
should be, with rational choice theory at one, icy outcomes of states. The theory’s concep-
universalistic, pole and historical and discursive tualizations, much like those stressed by Alford
theories at the other, highly particular, pole. and Friedland (1985), are tersely characterized
These are at opposite ends as well in their by Adams, Clemens, and Orloff (2004) as in-
views of how positivistic or interpretivist the- volving a “double reduction” of phenomena to
ories should be. Yet although new theories social (and state) structure and to utilitarian
from across the aisle from one’s own preferred action (the last constrained, if not prefigured,
side of the universalistic/local and the posi- by structure). In case the quoted use of “reduc-
tivist/interpretivist divides often are dreaded, tion” appears pejorative, we note that “reduc-
Campbell and Pedersen show how institution- tion” was a respectable theoretical goal for the
alists of every stripe are “finding ways to con- modernists in question and remains so to the
nect their turf to others” (2001:273). We return many modernists (or perhaps “neomodernists”)
to these distinctions when we discuss the chal- who continue in political sociology today, two
lenges presented to political sociology by the decades after Alford and Friedland’s (to use a
“cultural turn” and the rise of rational choice literary trope) “high modernist” work.
theory. Adams, Clemens, and Orloff ’s critique is not
entirely new, having been anticipated by mi-
crointeractionist theories ranging from symbolic
The First Challenge: Culture interactionism and ethnomethodology in the
(and Postmodernity) United States (e.g., Herbert Blumer, Howard
Garfinkel, Anselm Strauss, and Erving Goffman)
From the perspective of the new cultural soci- to hermeneutics, phenomenology, and histori-
ology, the theory that had dominated sociology cism in Europe (e.g., Edmund Husserl, Al-
following World War II was modern in epis- fred Schutz, Paul Ricouer, and Hans-Georg
temology (objectivist and scientific) and mod- Gadamer). As described by Stephen Pepper
ern in politics (a creature of industrial society).4 (1972), the epistemological basis for this new
Epistemologically, it was marked by an antitra- contextualism lies in the meaning created in
ditionalist and antireductionist skepticism that small contexts, with its strands dissipating as
preceded the postmodern skepticism toward sci- it moves beyond the originating context to
entific objectivity certainty yet remained ob- other situations. Such contextualism is com-
jectivist (or “realist”) and scientific. Politically, monplace within the more encompassing ori-
4
entation toward social reality sometimes termed
The “modernist political sociology” presented by
Alford and Friedland articulates not merely a scientifi- interpretivist (Steinmetz, 1999). By and large,
cally ambitious concatenation of accounts of theories of the postmodernists, feminists, and race/ethnic
the state – that is, of state, state and society, state and social constructionists may be termed interpre-
economy, state in capitalist society, and the like – it con- tivists. However, as we shall see, we believe that
veys an ontology appropriate to the scientific sociological interpretivism leaves social scientists in need of
study of states. The Powers of Theory world is one of ac-
tion and structure, structure and function, and function an epistemological midpoint between such an-
and process, where structures are presumed to be like timonies as explanatory theory and orienting
the social relational structure articulated by Peter Blau framework; and between covering law explana-
(1964) or Erik Olin Wright (2002, 1997) but not like tion and contextually specific interpretation.
the symbolic structures described by Mary Douglas and The path to the assimilation of culture into
Baron Isherwoood (1979) or William Sewell, Jr. (1980,
1985, 1992, 1994). And it is from this latter direction political sociology has been a lengthy one. In the
that the first major challenge to political sociology has 1950s and 1960s, political sociology focused on
come. power structure research and pluralism and on
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value consensus and functionalist equilibrium. the previously mentioned neo-Marxist practi-
Political culture was often viewed in what has tioners of cultural political analysis.
come to be known as “essentialist” national- Despite Weber’s dynamic account of capi-
ist terms, which left most cultural variability as talism and Thompson’s nuanced view of the
a distinction between nations. Gabriel Almond working class, prevailing approaches to polit-
and Sydney Verba set the tone of early cultural ical culture were severely criticized for their
studies with The Civic Culture (1963), in which static nature and for their stereotyping of en-
they examined the cultural constants affecting tire peoples (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963).
political participation in five nations. Laboring Culture itself became infused with a fixity that
long in the gardens of political culture, Ronald clearly overgeneralized. Although Weber and
Inglehart presaged some aspects of postmoder- Thompson had shown one way out of this bind,
nity through his studies of postmaterialist values cultural studies did not really emerge as a force
(1990, 1997). Murray J. Edelman (1964) took until it embraced a vibrant intellectual commu-
an early look at symbolic culture from an inter- nity relatively isolated from the kind of social
pretivist perspective unusual for American so- science practiced in the Anglo-American world,
cial scientists during the first post–World War II namely the French poststructuralist community
decades. of Michel Foucault, Frederik Barth, Roland
Under the aegis of neo-Marxist concerns Barthes, and (in some ways) Raymond Boudon
with capitalism and the rise of the working class, and Pierre Bourdieu, plus such postmodernists
various scholars did cultural research in politi- as Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida, Jacques
cal sociology. Edward P. Thompson probed the Lacan, and Jean-Francois Lyotard.
meaning of religion and craft in The Making of Foucault removed the critical aspect of de-
the English Working Class (1966) and helped cre- terminism from his theories by talking about
ate a “social history” movement that explored “what was possible” in various social contexts
the meaning of everyday life under the shadow between groups and people with varying levels
of capitalism. Basil Bernstein (1975), Raymond of power/knowledge. This changed the analyst’s
Williams (1973, 1977), and Garth Stedman- viewpoint toward culture as something of an
Jones (1983) examined how language and sym- epiphenomenon of industrialization to one that
bols in a social context affected socialization, perceived cultural processes to cause material
learning, and action. Later in the 1970s and outcomes or even to supplant the “social as
1980s, much of the upsurge in critical theory material” with the “social as text.” This ap-
was oriented toward advertising, gender, the proach allowed the static theories of culture to
media, and culture in general. become dynamic and the secondary nature of
An important precursor to all of this was culture under capitalism to become primary.
Weber’s (1922, 1930) cultural work on reli- It also declared as essentialist both the predic-
gion. Weber argued that capitalism was created tions about revolution and the leadership role
through the religious insecurities of a band of of the working class in Marxist theory and the
religious heretics “irrationally” believing in pre- social scientific laws and generalizations about
destination.5 Weber, working largely within the the inevitability of progress or economic devel-
German tradition of the “cultural” or “human opment.
sciences” (e.g., Dilthey, 1989) and influenced by For many advocates of the cultural turn,
Friedrich Nietzche (Turner, 1992: chapter 10), claims for culture’s broad relevance to the con-
can be interpreted as equally as antipositivist as stitution and explanation of social reality come
laden with epistemological and methodolog-
5
ical implications. For them, social reality is
The Weberian framework of social action utilizes evanescent – frequently changing and subject
four types of rationality – instrumental, practical, sub-
jective, and theoretical – but it also recognizes traditional to unpredictable change – as well as geograph-
and emotional action as equal components ( Janoski, ically heterogeneous. If culture as a pervasive
1998; Kalberg, 1980). source and constituent of social institutions
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is thus impermanent and heterogeneous, then restricted space, confined mainly to the Soviet
such cultural volatility undermines the degree era. Not only does much of the pre-Soviet era
of social stability needed for the sort of sta- lack “worker” as its revolutionary actor or “so-
ble and homogenous domains required for valid cialist revolution” as its dominant revolutionary
“universal” theorizing (Adams, Clemens, and project, the Soviet era of class revolutions ends
Orloff, 2004; Steinmetz, 1998, 1999). with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which vi-
Culturally induced social-theoretical instabil- tiates the socialist revolutionary vision. In other
ity raises some disturbing questions. What if words, theoretical domains can be hemmed in
cogent causal regularities, and thus robust the- by history and its cultural infrastructure (Good-
oretical domains, are not only institutionally win and Jasper, 1999), leaving them at risk of
conditioned, as is typically assumed for middle- sudden and unpredictable terminations beyond
range theories? What if institutions themselves which new theory is needed.7
have an irreducibly cultural aspect, as in William If in natural science the history of concepts
Sewell’s (1992) Janus-faced view of institution and theories tends to play catch-up with real-
and social structure?6 Then class groupings and ity, in social science the histories of scientific
actions would be contingent on workers’ own sign and social referent rush forward on separate
historically contingent conceptions of them- tracks running in rough tandem. In this latter
selves and their labor. case they do so as new social phenomena enter
What if the political movements of even class- the world, requiring new concepts and opening
conscious workers are dependent on work- the door to new theoretical domains (Somers,
ers’ conceptions of the movements in which 1995). True, the challenge of such volatility
they participate? Here one outcome is de- may be manageable. Historical and institutional
scribed by Nader Sohrabi (1995, 2002), for specificity may, at times, only call for carefully
whom revolutionaries in the early twentieth constructed middle-range theoretical domains
century (e.g., the Russian of 1905, the Iranian (Paige, 1999), a move anticipated by Merton
“Constitutionalist” insurrectionaries of 1906, (1968:39–72). It may merely require the kind of
and the Young Turks of 1908) enacted a con- attention to statistical interactions that now per-
stitutionalist/parliamentary paradigm of politi- meates institutionally sensitive macro studies of
cal revolution while themselves members of the politics (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1993; Garrett,
paradigm’s ecumenical, and by no means sim- 1998; Goodwin, 2001; Pampel and Williamson,
ply class, variety of revolutionary coalition. If 1989; Steinmetz, 1993; Swank, 2002). Yet, as
workers did not enact socialist revolutions as Janoski and Hicks (1994:10–12) indicate, there
members of class, or even cross-class, projects, are times when an explanatory domain may be
then the universalizing aspirations of class theo- quite specific, even to a particular nation in a
ries to theorize politics for the entire industrial particular era. The degree to which a theoreti-
age contracts into a relatively small, culturally cal domain is temporally and spatially localized
must be evaluated through the lens of history
6
Moreover, the resulting variance in social regular- (Goodwin, 2001:293–306).
ities across time and place appears more perturbed by The cultural turn and the uses of culture
cultural volatility if one is a realist who sees social phe- in political sociology come in close associa-
nomena as “over determined” (e.g., Steinmetz, 1998). tion with other new directions in sociology, for
The same hypervariability reigns for an interpretivist,
who will tend to see any given account of social (or
7
regularity) as an artifact of the interpretive scheme in This is not simply a state of affairs unique to a
use and who will tend to see the scheme as bracketting few theoretical entities. For example, what appears to
the favored foci of other schema (e.g., Steinmetz, 2003). be a quite general “interest group” in one theory may
As advocates of the cultural turn have long been and turn out to be a local creation of Progressive Era poli-
increasingly are realist, interpretivist, or both (Adams, tics (Clemens, 1997), and the truths about Finanzkapital
Orloff, and Clemens, 2004), skepticism toward theoret- (Hilferding, 1981[1910]; Lenin, 1933[1916]) may turn
ical universalism in the sense of causal regularities invari- out to be local and transient German truths (Hicks, 1988;
ant across wide swaths of time and space is especially rife. Zysman, 1984).
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example the feminist one (e.g., Adams, 1999; articulations establish the mechanisms by which
Orloff, 1993). Feminist thought may not only entirely new cultural formations are created: the
add new variables, unsettling old theories and selection of new ideas by actors (Protestant min-
investigations (e.g., Orloff, 1993), it may also in- isters, philosophes, or labor organizers) who use
troduce new cultural dimensions to the analysis specific behavioral scripts to create figural ac-
of power with all their potential complications tors (i.e., narrative heroes or heroines of the pil-
(Adams, 2003; Misra, 2003). grim, freethinker, or worker) of new ideolo-
In short, many participants in the cultural gies and the different institutional carriers of
turn – for example, postmodernists, feminists, these ideas (1989:5–18). Wuthnow goes on to
and race/ethic social constructionists – may be explain these three ideologies appearing on the
regarded as interpretivists, who view theoretical Western stage: the Reformation ( joining the
domains as local and evanescent because of the pious in church, as guided from the pulpit,
operation of culture (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999). in direct communion with God), the Enlight-
This elaborates our earlier claim that participants enment (rational, secular intellectuals based in
in the cultural turn need, if their advance is to royal courts and later in bourgeois salons), and
strike a healthy balance, to find an epistemo- Socialism (as a party and labor union project
logical midpoint between positivist universal- mobilizing employees for revolution and the fu-
ism and interpretivist historical and institutional ture leadership of society). Wuthnow’s focus is
specificity. The cultural turn directs political soon ideologies as ideas that promote momentous
ciologists down a slippery slope from positivis- change, much as we see in Weber’s (1930) con-
tic universalism, through increasing degrees of sideration of the Protestant ethic in promotion
institutional and historical specification of theo- of capitalism, Philip Gorski’s (1999, 2003) ex-
retical domains, into a realm where theory serves amination of religious pietism in the formation
not so much to capture social regularities as of the bureaucratic disciplinary state in Prussia,
to regulate the interpretation of unique events. and Steinmetz’s (2003) account of “pre-colonial
In our view, middle-range theory provides the ethnographic discourse” in the construction of
missing midpoint. Of course, the objects of Wilhemine colonial governance.
some quests for theoretical understanding may For a second approach, fusing postmodern
prove elusive, receding from the general to and Marxist theory, Ernesto Laclau and Chan-
the particular. However, we think sociologists tal Mouffe (1985) present a skeptical two-stage
should strive to resist the pull of cultural theo- theory that avoids essentialism by proposing a
rizing into particularism. Our methodological pluralist governing scenario and a leftist strat-
injunction should be, with due institutional and egy within it. Their politics embody a radical
historical alertness, to find the interaction that plural democracy that accepts liberal democ-
clarifies the order that lies beneath what at first racy to the extent that the left extends and
appears to be confusingly heterogeneous pro- deepens the principles inherent in it (Mouffe,
cesses, never to lightly abdicate the search for 1992). Liberal democracy is seen as a contradic-
explanatory empirical patterns (Paige, 1999). tion between libertarian norms of unrestricted
As one of three different approaches to the rights and communitarian norms of cooperation
new cultural sociology, Robert Wuthnow’s (Mouffe, 1993; Torfing, 1999:249–52). From
Communities of Discourse (1989) provides an ex- this tension emerges an “agonistic democracy”
planation for major political changes. He ex- that gives political space for varied and even
amines environmental conditions, institutional contradictory political strategies that allow for
contexts, and action sequences to demonstrate a wide diversity of viewpoints without striving
how ideologies of change are produced and how for an ultimate utopia (Mouffe, 1993:4, 1996;
subsets of these are then selected for institu- Torfing, 1999:255).
tionalization into roles of world-historic im- A third approach is supplied by feminist ana-
portance. The “performativity” of such cultural lysts of politics who have challenged much that
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had been conventional wisdom in political so- theoretically mathematical, and individualistic
ciology. For example, feminist scholars of the ways than have been the tendency in political so-
welfare state, like Orloff (1993) and O’Connor, ciology. True, a number of political sociologists
Orloff, and Shaver (1999), expose the distor- have been influenced by the theory and practice
tions in current views of social needs and care, of rational choice (e.g., Adams, 1996; Brustein,
both public and private, that do not take account 1996; Coleman, 1990; Ermakoff, 1997; Gould,
of the care provided by unpaid female work- 2004; Hardin, 1995; Hechter, 1987, 1999;
ers. Joya Misra (2003) shows how women were Hopcroft, 1999; Kiser, 1999; Kiser and Kane,
key actors in developing family allowances in 2001a, 2001b; Oberschall, 1993). It would re-
the welfare state. In areas other than the welfare quire a longer story than we can accommo-
state, Adams (1994) reveals how Dutch, English, date here to indicate how neoclassical economic
and French representatives of family lineages thought came to play such a strong role in the
mobilized signifiers of paternal identity in con- discipline of political science, but suffice it to say
stituting patrimonial political structures; and, in that the prestige of Nobel prizes, the increas-
so doing, she uncovers the gendered contents ing market orientation of society, and the rise
of long-standing sociological concepts and in- of neoconservative and antigovernment senti-
stitutions. And Kathleen Blee shows how the ments have helped advance this ascent. Even
interaction of race and gender operated within sociologists have adopted economic terms such
the culture of the Klu Klux Klan (1991). as human, social, and cultural capital. The in-
For political sociologists interested in gener- fluence of human capital, associated with Gary
alizations about political phenomena – whether Becker, a Nobel prize-winning economist, was
historically, institutionally, or culturally nested, given additional legitimacy in sociology with his
whether culturally wide-ranging or contextu- joint appointment to the department of sociol-
ally hemmed in, whether meant to capture the ogy at the University of Chicago. The rational
one best map for a theoretically comprehensible choice orientation, which is almost diametri-
reality or to merely provide theoretical flash- cally opposed to the cultural turn, constitutes a
lights able to help orient us to a stubbornly ob- second challenge, this one from economics via
scure reality – this cultural turn calls attention political science.
to new investigative possibilities. The turn may In parallel to rational choice theory in po-
then direct political investigators to historically litical science, sociology has its own micro-
specific and historically unfolding cultural as- based exchange theory. Its precursor, Georg
pects of social reality. This leads toward a greater Simmel (1950, 1955), focused on the dyad and
historicization of political sociological theory triad, and in so doing laid the basis for so-
and method. At the same time, such awareness cial exchange theory. George Homans (1964)
does not eclipse earlier concentrations on so- and Peter Blau (1964) developed a theory of
cial structure and utilitarian action. Nor does it exchange and power based on expected re-
eliminate the need for generalizing theory and wards from exchange (e.g., money, approval,
explanation. esteem, and compliance), norms of reciprocity
and fair exchange, and the belief that balanced
exchanges in one sphere tend to produce imbal-
The Second Challenge – Rational anced exchanges in others. From this, Richard
Choice Theory Emerson (1972, 1976) and others developed
a microtheory of power based on how much
The commitment to rational choice theory, cur- one actor depends on the other. Group ex-
rently evident in as much as, say, 40 percent change theorists, such as Samuel Bacharach and
of political science writing, presents a strong Edward Lawler (1980, 1981), extend this power-
challenge to political sociology. Rational choice dependence analysis to unions/management,
approaches politics in much more rationalistic, political parties, and other groups. However,
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social exchange theory has not, by and large, explicit premises. This conception of theory is,
penetrated nearly as far into political sociology as in turn, linked to a “positive” method of em-
rational choice theory has into political science. pirical investigation (Friedman, 1953; Keat and
Paradoxically, it may be that rational choice Urry, 1983:chapter 2).
theory, though less ostensibly sociological than Major developments in rational choice
exchange theory, might have better prospects decision-making theory include articulating a
within political sociology than exchange the- theory of constrained optimization and the in-
ory ever did. However, the reasons for rational corporation of game theory. The first includes
choice theory’s potential appeal to sociologists social (and cognitive) structural contexts in the
are, as we shall see, closely tied to its arguable elaboration of optimizing behaviors (Alt and
limitations. Crystal, 1983; Becker and Murphy, 2003; Tin-
Rational choice theory is a generalization of bergen, 1952). The second makes an even more
the basic theoretical method of economics de- direct appeal to the sociological imagination by
vised to move onto terrain beyond the mar- addressing the problem of strategic choice in
ket (Becker, 1991, 1995; Suzumura, 1989). the context of interaction between two or more
First of these new substantive domains was the actors, each of whom takes account of the an-
polity, focus of the new economic subfield of ticipated actions of the other (Schotter, 1981).
“public choice.” Public choice theory extends We almost hear the voice of Weber (1978:4) on
economic models into such topics as optimal action as “social” insofar as it “takes account of
location theory, rent-seeking theory, and po- the behavior of others” as it is “oriented in its
litical supply theory. Optimal location theory course.”
addresses the question, “How does the institu- An axiomatic theoretical structure that can
tional structure of the state determine the num- embolden its practitioners to theorize in diverse
ber of political parties and party platforms?” domains not only encourages cumulative the-
(Downs, 1957; Riker, 1962). Rent-seeking theory building but also establishes an abstract do-
ory addresses the question, “What are the con- main hospitable to universal theoretical claims,
sequences of actors lobbying the state to inter- namely the logical structure of the theory it-
vene in the market?” (Wicksell, 1954.) Principal self, a kind of laboratory of the mind aloof
agent and policy supply theories are theories that from the noisy empirical fray. Just as cases can
ask, “Are elected politicians and state officials be made for the “realism of the abstract struc-
able to adequately control appointed bureau- tures of logic and mathematics” (e.g., Putnam,
crats and the political economic consequences 1983), ones can be made for the realism of the
of their actions?” (Niskanen, 1971). As these abstract generalizations of economic theory as
theories developed outside the market arena and the structure – or a modal structure – of ratio-
the specific theoretical formulations that had nal action (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). More
sought to capture market logic, a more gen- substantively, rational choice theory’s treatment
eral theoretical logic was formalized (Becker, of strategic rationality in the theory’s “game-
1991, 1995). This logic clarifies, or rearticulates, theoretic” mode also seems likely to appeal to
economic theory as rational choice theory: as those focused on social exchange. Similarly, ra-
a theory of the optimizing decision-making tional choice theory’s efforts to situate action in
decisions (and behaviors) of rational egoists social context can only improve the theory’s fa-
(Suzumura, 1989). vor in the eyes of sociologists even though, as
Undiluted rational choice theory comes in- we shall see, such favor comes sparingly.
extricably linked with a family of formal, In resonating with sociologists of exchange,
mathematical methods of theoretical articula- the work of Lief Lewin (1991) shows how, in the
tion, development, and analysis that conform context of the welfare state, weaker groups gain
closely to the logicodeductive conception of power to manipulate stronger groups or coali-
theory as a logical structure of statements de- tions. Addressing eight crisis periods in Swedish
rived through formal logic or mathematics from politics – the tariff, suffrage and mass franchise,
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parliamentarism, the Saltsjöbaden agreement, behaviors that would once have been treated by
economic planning, supplementary pensions, sociologists as based solely on emotional orien-
nuclear power, and the employee investment tation (e.g., attitude) or political tradition. So
funds crisis – Lewin shows how distinct barga- Brustein (1991) finds the roots of Mussolini’s
ining strategies enacted in each policy arena ex- support in his fascist appeals to the material in-
plain resolutions of the crises (see other political terests of various constituencies, in particular
examples in Edling and Stern, 2003; Przeworski, agricultural small holders. He does much the
1985; and Wallerstein, 1999).8 same in examining support for the Nazi move-
Heckscher (1996) and Fischer and Ury ment (Brustein, 1996). Finally, in Roots of Hate
(1981), along similar lines, extend rational (2003), he extends the rational choice explana-
choice analysis to a multilateral bargaining tion for the roots of anti-Semitic politics to all of
model that includes multiple participants with interwar Europe. Critical to much of his anal-
diverse social bases (i.e., class, race, ethnicity, ysis is the Nazis’ ability to mobilize rural small
gender, region, religion, and so on). This model holders in reaction to left parties that opted for
avoids positional bargaining (i.e., stating con- agricultural collectivization policies.10
crete bargaining demands in two-party bargain- One criticism of rational choice theory com-
ing) and embraces cooperative bargaining that monly made by sociologists is that it relies on an
focuses on problem solving from many different implausibly rational, even hyperrational, theory
perspectives.9 In a similar way, Bacharach and of human behavior. However, rational choice
Lawler (1980, 1981) build a sociological theory theory has made advances that dull this criti-
of bargaining based on group power. cism – for example, by providing insights about
Rational choice theory has the ability to interests as they stray from strict individualis-
offer new explanations for socially embedded tic rationality (Gould, 2004). George Tsebellis
(1990, 1999) puts decisions and coalitions into a
8
For example, in the suffrage crisis of the 1900s, the more realistic societal situation based on games
Social Democrats wanted universal suffrage to be de- nested within other games, which are them-
clared the law of the land. They were growing in num-
bers through incremental changes in the franchise rule,
selves nested within institutions. This becomes
and they were bound to be the majority party when a basis for a new and more complex institu-
an eventual franchise bill was passed. The conservatives, tional theory. Decisions are made in a rational
seeing the writing on the wall and acting early, pur- fashion but with considerable room for con-
sued a strategy of making additions to the agenda. They text as nesting alters payoffs and hence deci-
backed universal suffrage, despite internal conservative
protests, but attached the principle of proportional rule.
sions (see Cook, 2002, on alliances and nesting).
This meant that the conservative party would survive
10
the postuniversal suffrage change and not die with a Social Democratic agricultural platforms offering
“winner-take-all” election. The Social Democrats were subsidies and supports for cooperative arrangements of-
divided partly because they were not prepared for the ten appealed to agricultural small holders. Communist
agenda amendment. As a result, the weaker party had platforms aimed at public agricultural collectivization
the basis to survive into the future and, indeed, survives often made sense to agricultural laborers. However, in
to this day. In general, the weaker party (e.g., the conser- countries where they were strong, Communist plans for
vatives facing possible oblivion with the mass franchise) collectivization were so anathema to small holders that
often wins because it can more clearly pursue its goals they tended to drive small holders and, with them, much
with specific strategies, whereas larger or more power- of the rural population straight into the arms of Na-
ful groups have more difficulty maneuvering because of tional Socialist and Fascist parties brandishing appeals to
internal factions. the property rights and economic security of farm pro-
9
In international relations, similar forms of multi- prietors. In short, communist agricultural planks were
lateral bargaining are starting to emerge, especially bar- so inconsistent with the cost–benefit ratios of agricul-
gaining in NAFTA, the European Union, and various tural proprietors that they tipped the balance of farmer
international gatherings (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000; preferences for a mixed economy, and, where Commu-
Keohane, 1989; Putnam, 1993). However, as its descrip- nist parties were electorally strong, they split the left
tive scope is expanded, the predictive value of rational and tended to push the economically rational political
choice theory in studying political conflict is reduced choices of economically insecure but ultimately propro-
because the constrained situation is lost. prietorial farmers to the far Right (Brustein, 2003).
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Dennis Chong integrates sociological and eco- we examine the implications of rational choice,
nomic mechanisms into bargaining and aims to along with cultural theory, for the future of po-
account for the conflict between groups over litical sociology.
norms and values. He proposes a status politics
that is “based on subjective calculations of self-
interests” that are “motivated by both material The Challengers and the Challenged
and social goals” (Chong, 2000:1, 220). Interests
are consequently based on “the history of one’s One major advantage held by the challengers is
choices, including the values, identifications, that they have momentum, support, and emo-
and knowledge that one has acquired through tion on their side. Their theories enthrall highly
socialization” (Chong, 2000:6–7). Frank Knight motivated and malleable graduate students and
(1992) puts inequality directly into a bargaining dismay aging faculty with sunk-costs in other
theory of institutions by incorporating distribu- theories. Although one might be tempted to
tional inequalities into a mixed game of choice. describe every challenge in Kuhnian terms, as
This systemic inequality inevitably leads to dif- revolutionary science overthrowing normal sci-
ferential bargaining power, which, in the con- ence, we should remember that many challenges
struction of political institutions, provides for to this or that theory or metatheoretical thrust
unequal benefits. He couches this formulation come and go. There have been many more fads
in an evolutionary framework (e.g., variation, with little lasting impact on the field than there
selection, and inheritance) whereby citizens will have been tectonic shifts in political sociology’s
make decisions depending on whether the costs underlying conceptual strata.
are sufficient to change or accept these insti- Although theorists of the new approaches of-
tutions. Edgar Kiser and collaborators explore ten show disdain for previous theories, espe-
many other aspects of state formation and devel- cially when they demand mastery of new jar-
opment employing the principal agent theory gons, challenges ebb. New directions sometimes
(e.g., Kiser and Bauldry, Chapter 8, this volume; double back onto old terrain as when Fou-
Kiser and Kane, 2001; Kiser and Linton, 2002). caultian scholars rediscover the long sociological
However, for all its appeals to, and inroads tradition on social control and total institutions
into, sociology, rational choice has been greeted (Goffman, 1961). Just how different is capillar-
with much more resistance by sociologists than ity (Foucault) from power in social exchange
by political scientists. Its degree of logicodeduc- networks, Korpian power resources from ear-
tive theoretical method and universalism, its ra- lier pluralist ones (Rogers, 1974), bricoulage from
tional empiricism (or positivism), the stylized pluralism? The key point is not that these con-
character of its models of strategic action, and cepts are exactly the same but rather to ques-
its ad hoc (when not negligible) treatment of so- tion whether there has been any attempt at
cial context have all been copiously criticized cumulation in sociological work (see Boudon,
(Gould, 2004; Green and Shapiro, 1995). More- 2003). As stated, cultural and postmodern the-
over, the simplicity of its assumptions about hu- ories needed the isolation of French intellec-
man rationality and egoism and of its claims tual circles to escape the determinism of Anglo-
for the “exogeneity” of preferences have been American, German, Marxist, and other more
viewed with widespread skepticism by social neutral or scientistic theories. But in the end,
scientists, especially sociologists (Elster, 1989; theorists must make sense of the cacophony of
Gould, 2004; Hastie, 2001; Rabin, 1998). Al- terminology and ask, “What is really new here?”
though such criticisms have been extensive Sociology, inherently a composite of structure
among political scientists as well as sociologists, and culture, with individual and group social ac-
sociology has clearly offered much resistance tion that is rational and emotional, will operate
to the spread of rational choice theory. Some to create, oppose, or ignore constraints from
reasons for this differential will appear when challengers with varying degrees of success. We
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may ask what these challengers’ ideas might look tion of Weber and Bendix undercuts claims for
like if they are absorbed or ignored, perhaps to the novelty of the new cultural turn, consid-
live a life of their own in a parallel but separate eration of Tilly (2003) and Swedberg (2003)
realm of ideas. catches us up in the new turn and reveals the ten-
In answer to the cultural challenge, we find sion between much of culturally oriented polit-
the amount of determinism or essentialism at- ical sociology and the prevailing empiricist bent
tributed to political sociological theory to be of contemporary political sociology.
overstated by practitioners of the turn. It would One challenge issuing from participants in the
be false to characterize those political socio- cultural turn involves a generalization of the po-
logical theorists not committed to the cultural litical. For example, Agger and Luke (2003:189)
turn as pursuing “covering law” explanations, in citing Baudrillard, claim that:
insensitive to cultural, historical, and institu-
tional specificity. For example, the once-strong The political in this context is found not in parlia-
deterministic vein within Marxist political so- ments, but rather in professional-technical conflicts or
ciology continues to recede as cultural critiques the competition of capital: the non-political becomes
political as power rushes into sub-political realms of
of determinism by Thompson (1966) and Garth action. The allegedly political dimension, in turn, of
Stedman-Jones (1983) are reinforced by a new elections, parliaments or parties decays into a non-
post-Soviet wave of cultural critiques (Gibson- politics of spectacle, quietism or plain ignorance . . . .
Graham, 2002; Harvey, 2000; and the journal
Rethinking Marxism). A new substructure has been found for the
Although a case for a deterministic Weber overtly but derivatively political in cultural dis-
was recently constructed in an attempt to lo- course over identity, family, professions, and
cate the progressive triumph of rationalism as the other aspects of the private and market spheres.
central theme in Weber’s ouevre (Hennis, 1987; The state, as it was in early Marxism, is again
Schluchter, 1981), others have accentuated an an epiphenomenon; and political science should
antideterministic Weber that appears truer to either demote itself as a discipline or plunge into
his era and his main thrust. In particular, Bryan the all-consuming investigation of culture.
Turner, using Stephen Kalberg (1985) to address The claim that political sociology will or
“religion and state-formation,” has described should devolve into a power perspective on
Weber as follows: “society in general” simply does not hold. The
politics of elections, legislation, and state policy
Weber approached society as a diversified, fragmented actions are not epiphenomena totally ruled by
and competitive collection of semi-independent in- cultural forces. This does not mean that there
stitutions, sectors and social groups which fought
with each other for the monopolization of social re-
are no new social forces in identity, the private
sources. (Turner, 1992:111) sphere, and so on. Few political sociologists,
however, are disposed to accept such a diffu-
The nondeterministic Weber has long been re- sion of the political out into the whole meta-
flected in the sensitive use of “themes” rather theoretical domain of sociology. Indeed, by no
than “theory” in the work of Reinhard Bendix means can most political sociological partici-
(1964, 1970, 1984), echoed in Skocpol and pants in the cultural turn be said to take this ex-
Somers (1980) on Bendix. It recurs again in treme postmodern position. What we can affirm
the turn from covering laws to “social mech- is that state- or polity-centered theory is not
anisms” in the work of Charles Tilly (2003 ready for the dustbin of history.
and in this volume). Further, Richard Swedberg Our preference for theories that claim to ar-
(2003) points to a new interpretation of Weber ticulate an “objective” reality over theories that
based on interests and emotions in institutions principally claim to orient interpretations of a
that combines both rational choice and interests subjective (or explosively intersubjective) real-
embedded in culture. Still, although considera- ity goes along with our guarded respect for the
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many methodological and epistemological chal- 1992). Indeed political economists have long
lenges posed by the cultural turn and its counsel packed some culture into actors’ goals (Moore,
of alertness to the particularity of history, in- 1967).
stitutions, and culture (and an underlying cul- The second major challenge, rational choice
tural volatility). We suggest that the tensions theory, presents a view of politics that is nearly
generated by the encounter between heavily the opposite of the culturally centered one. De-
cultural and social-relational (and psychologi- spite some allowance for culture in the articula-
cal) views of social phenomena may find sat- tion of options and interest, which is a view
isfactory resolution for many realists and posi- virtually dominated by the decision making
tivists in the use of three regulative ideals: middle of instrumentally (and sometimes strategically)
range theory, statistical interactions (Paige, 1999; oriented egoists. The more economic variety of
Swank, 2002), and “multiple conjunctural cau- rational choice emphasizes preferences and, in
sation” (Ragin, 1987). Furthermore, realists game-playing situations, strategies that mainly
who doubt the accessibility of open concrete concern material outcomes, whereas the polit-
systems to robust regularities in phenomena ical science versions tend to direct more atten-
may still find assurance in experimental and tion to institutions and consider more diverse
quasi-experimental modes of theory testing goals (such as status or secure incumbency in of-
(Cook and Campbell, 1979). Certainly, the rel- fice). For political sociology, even more weight
evance of theory stressing “orienting” concepts needs to be given to acknowledging that a per-
(cf. Skocpol and Somers, 1980) remains robust son’s goals are diverse and complex if the rational
far down such risky “slippery slopes” as we choice approach is to seem credible. Although
have cautioned against here. Indeed space may people may want to negotiate the best deal, it
be found for quite universalistic theorizing in may not be entirely clear what their best deal
that realm of rational choice theory that de- is. Because, until recently, emotion (as well as
votes itself to elaborating the rational calculi of most subjectivity) has been left off the ratio-
the stylized homo economicus, to whom we soon nal choice table, a hole has marred the domain
turn. of such analysis, which is a problem from the
The cultural turn may have emerged at a pro- cultural perspective (Adams, 1998; Hochschild,
pitious moment, a time when ideological per- 1983; Somers, 1998). As troublesome Weberians
formance moves from the authors and readers of point out to rational choice theorists commit-
pamphlets and books to the creators and view- ted to a highly stylized version of instrumental
ers of television, computer monitors, and the rationality, reason itself has more than a single
Web. Increasing scrutiny of the media’s impact form ( Janoski, 1998:85–7; Kalberg, 1980).
on voter preferences and participation, candi- The logicodeductive theoretical apparatus of
date and official behavior, and political com- rational choice theorists is viewed skeptically,
petition in general are most welcomed at this if not with hostility, by sociologists who think
point and may be among the major strengths of that it builds on a foundation of simplistic as-
the cultural approach (Hayles, 1990; Johnston, sumptions about human actors (i.e., too self-
1998; Schudson, 2003). Still, many would argue ish or hyperrational, too unemotional, too given
that a cultural emphasis needs to be counter- to fixed “exogenous” preferences) while ignor-
balanced by a continued interest in the political ing the windfalls of inductive discovery (Hirsch,
economy, lest the focus on ideas distract from the Michaels, and Friedman, 1987). Indeed, the im-
importance of resources and interests. Attention pression that rational choice theory builds on
to both the culture and political economy need an utterly unrealistic model of the person is
not be strained. For example, in focusing on ide- strongly held by many social scientists (Elster,
ology one might see the role of “public interest” 1989; Gould, 2004; Green and Shapiro, 1995;
organizations as conduits running from politi- Hastie, 2001; Rabin, 1998). Moreover, few soci-
cal interests to media representations of politics ologists are comfortable with Milton Friedman’s
by spokespersons and talking heads (Gamson, (1953) argument that rational choice theory is
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so predictively powerful that it has license to still will be effective brakes on the theory’s
proceed from its assumptions on an “as if ” basis progress within sociology. The long legacy of
(Green and Shapiro, 1995). sociological opposition to highly individual-
Rational choice theory’s tendency toward ist modes of theorizing, from Marx’s (1904,
universalistic presumption for its propositions 1909) critiques of classical political economy
antagonizes those who place high value on and Durkheim’s (1984) critique of Spencer, will
the “realists” specification of causal mecha- keep rational choice theory from ever exerting
nisms grounded in a concrete knowledge of the extent of influence already attained by the
the “thing” or “object of study” at issue (e.g., cultural turn. Just as sociology has pitted the
the unit of analysis in historical and institutional social against the individual and the socialistic
context) (Quadagno and Knapp, 1992). Com- against the rationally egotistical, it has favored
plementarily, some sociologists view attempts the cultural, from Durkheim (1915) and Weber
by rational choice authors to work within the (1922, 1930) on religion, to Fine (1987, 1998)
constraints of social contexts viewed under on little leaguers and mushroom hunters, and
considerable historical and institutional speci- Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) on social orders
ficity (e.g., Kiser and Hechter, 1991) as insuf- large and small.
ficiently attentive to historical and institution The recent advance of cultural approaches to
detail and inductive reasoning (Quadagno and political sociology also has its limits. Not only
Knapp, 1992). does continued regard for political economic is-
Rational choice theories may be at their best sues caution against too strong a cultural stress,
in tightly constrained situations where the range the modernist strain of sociological objectivism
of outcomes are clear and manageable, when (realism and science) ascendant in U.S. polit-
social structural (and cognitive and cultural) ical sociology throughout most of the postwar
constraints are well-defined, and where there period seems likely to contain the culturalist ad-
are either (a) an indefinitely large set of ac- vance. On the one hand, political economy had
tors, each of which must adjust behavior to all best accommodate cultural analysis if it is to mas-
the others as an aggregate, as price takers do in ter such matters as political economic reproduc-
competitive pricing situations, or (b) a limited tion and diffusion (e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron,
number of parties, as in such game-theoretic 1990; Campbell and Pedersen, 2001). On the
situations as collective bargaining between one other hand, cultural sociology will surely have
representative of management and one of labor to accommodate the material and the social re-
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, 1981; DeMenil, lational as well.
1971; Raiffa, 2003). In other words, the partici- We hazard a guess that perhaps one-fifth of
pants know whether strategic action is an option political sociologists are substantially within the
and whether the option is manageable.11 “culture” camp, whereas another 5 to 10 per-
We suspect that, overall, despite rational cent practice a variant of rational choice theory.
choice theory’s deductivism and positivism, its Unless these guesstimates are short, or short-
increased alertness to social interaction and con- sighted, a political sociology that is centered on
text, and its accommodations to sociological social structure and social action (albeit substan-
insight (e.g., Tsebellis, 1992, on nesting and tially utilitarian action) can be expected to con-
Chong, 2002, on irrationality in action), there tinue into the foreseeable future. At the same
time, we believe that advocates of both post-
11
Most rational choice theorists recognize this, but modernity and rational choice will pull away
other rational-action enthusiasts attempt to extend the from their cognate disciplines in the human-
range to all behavior. Exchange theory in sociology does ities, literature, and neoclassical economics to
this most clearly by arguing that, because power emerges return and re-create political sociology in con-
from dependency, wherever dependency exists, there are
power differences. Oddly enough, this view resembles junction with, rather than as a replacement for,
Foucault’s position, at least insofar as power is every- the neopluralist, conflict, and state-centric stan-
where. dard bearers. To refer back to Figure 1.1, these
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two movements, represented by outward flow- migration/naturalization,genocide/asylum, and

ing arrows, will return or curve back to a focus national devolutions). In short, our model of
on institutions and other core areas of sociol- national politics stresses the more distal social
ogy and enrich the latter with their insights as bases of political action as relatively exogenous
they engage in a diversified and more complex variables; the intervening, but also partially au-
process of theory building. tonomous, role of the institutions of the state
and its policies and the repercussions of regime
change; and the ultimate exogenous force of
the purposes and approach of the transnational systems.
handbook of political sociology
From the future of theory to the task at hand, Theoretical Approaches

this handbook pursues an integrated survey of to Political Sociology
the field of political sociology. We address four
sets of questions: How have major theoreti- The core debates among theories of political
cal traditions in political sociological theories sociology appear in the first section, which
adapted to changing times over the last several opens with Frances Fox Piven and the late
decades? How are the social bases of politics Richard Cloward’s argument that, if rule mak-
manifested in political sociology? What forms ing is a strategy of domination, rule break-
have been taken by the state and why? How are ing is the essence of opposing, disabling, and
political outcomes reflected in policies, regimes, even replacing such domination. The question
and international systems? These questions form about power in political sociology then becomes
the basis for dividing the handbook’s chapters “How does the ‘human capacity for innova-
into five parts. The first, a section on “theo- tion’ bring about these challenges to rule and
ries of political sociology,” focuses on plural- domination?” Power is based on dependence,
ist, conflict, state-centric, institutional, rational but the recognition of dependence requires in-
choice, cultural, and postmodern theories. The terpretation on both sides and is often clouded
second, a section on the social bases of politics, by complexity and/or ideology. How do we and
focuses on political processes (social cleavages, others “see” rules? In other words, the power
voting, campaign contributions, public opin- of rule breakers depends on their recogniz-
ion, political attitudes, ideology, and political ing power potential in votes, organization, and
deliberation) and political organizations (politi- mobilization. And much of this requires “stay-
cal parties, interest groups, policy organizations, ing power,” “controlling alternatives,” “limiting
corporations, social movements, and the media). constraints,” and “facing or deflecting crushing
The third, a section on the state and its processes, force.” Thus rule making consists of strategies to
concentrates on the structural and cultural for- control people through the state, whereas chal-
mation of nation-states, civil and military bu- lenges to these rules involve defying them and
reaucracies, and authoritarian political systems. working hard to change them.
A fourth section focuses on the outcomes of pol- The theory section then flows into three
itics in terms of social change, justice, redistribu- chapters that update debates among the new
tion, and repression. It does so by examining the pluralist and neofunctionalist, conflict and po-
following two levels: (1) policy changes (wel- litical economy, and state-centered or polity-
fare state, policies toward minorities, interven- centered perspectives. Alexander Hicks and
tion in the economy) and (2) regime transfor- Frank Lechner’s chapter on neopluralism and
mations (wars, revolutions, and transitions from neofunctionalism in political sociology reviews
communism to market-based politics). In the the rise of new forms of pluralist theories that
fifth and final section, we examine international have penetrated political sociology, whether
systems (imperialism, neocolonialism, trade, with theoretical banners flying high or more
transnational corporations, global capitalism, covertly. The authors show how neopluralism
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has extended the range of agency to class- and Max Weber and Otto Hintze against the 1950s
state-based actors within structural contexts. and 1960s backdrop of pluralist and conflict
One wave of pluralism comes from recognizing theories. The struggles that the Marxists were
the impact of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and having with the autonomy of the state stimu-
other social forces; another comes from the in- lated Theda Skocpol and others to reexamine
creasing variety and quantity of interest groups Weberian theory and consider how the structure
in the policy process; and a third comes from and processes of the state were a causal factor,
increasing levels of democratization, the me- with considerable force in and of themselves.
dia, and openness in the political process. Ne- Processes involving state formation, state inter-
ofunctionalism’s impact has not been as great ests, state strength, and state autonomy could
as pluralism’s, but its influence is felt especially influence, and even create, interest groups and
through its cognate affinities to cultural sociol- establish rules of the game favoring some of
ogy and because of the broader theoretical foun- them. Concern with these issues has led to a
dation that it provides to the pluralist point of political-institutional theory (in Skocpol’s lat-
view. Pluralist ideas permeate political sociol- est terms, a polity-centered argument). Amenta
ogy, emerging from different directions through shows how this new historical institutionalism
a loosely coupled group of scholars. emphasizes political contexts rather than the
From an opposing direction, Axel van den state alone. The key to more elaborate argu-
Berg and Thomas Janoski’s chapter on conflict ments within this tradition is to rely on creative
theories in political sociology argues that func- or genealogical aspects of the state in forming
tionalism has nearly vanished and that all current politics and shaping interest group desires.
theories – pluralism, state-centric, cultural, fem- The next five chapters present the main theo-
inist, and racialization – have adopted the dom- retical challenges introduced earlier in this chap-
inant, meta-perspective of conflict. They trace ter. The cultural challenge comes mainly from
two conflict traditions through Marxist and within sociology and is discussed in four chap-
Weberian lenses. Although traditional Marxist ters. The rational choice challenge, although
theory has imploded with the pluralization of coming partly from within sociology, is largely
conflict (e.g., from social bases in gender, race, a phenomenon arising from economics and
ethnicity, and religion) and new and more con- influencing the discipline of political science.
tingent theories have developed with, for exam- Although important to sociology as well, its
ple, the “power constellations” theory of Huber outlines are captured in a single chapter.
and Stephens (2001) – and the “accommoda- In James Jasper’s survey of the cultural ap-
tionist” theory of Prechel (2000) – there is a proach, he proclaims that culture has become an
tendency to place too exclusive an emphasis on increasingly central analytical tool since the early
corporate and elite power. Yet, some of the best 1970s. He asks why, if capillary power is every-
work today by Marxists and some others work- where in the Foucaultian universe, are political
ing in this area is less theoretical, more empiri- sociologists not happier. Although he does not
cal, and indeed exactly in this area of corporate answer this question, he gives a wide-ranging
power. For example, it describes exactly how survey of the cultural approach and extends even
campaign finance and insider influence involv- wider permission for the cultural study of in-
ing large corporations actually work (Clawson, trinsically political issues, ranging from those
Neustadtl, and Weller, 1998; Prechel, 2000). associated with government to personal rela-
The authors side more with the Weberian ap- tions in the bedroom, on the playground, or on
proach that gives equal weight to class, status, the street corner. In his grand tour of the wide
and power in both the political economy and world of culture, Jasper examines culture from
cultural explanations. its presence as civic culture, crowd psychology,
In discussing state-centered and political in- structuralism, critical theory, hegemony, post-
stitutional theory, Edwin Amenta shows how modernity, and globalization to its forms as ide-
state-centered theory grew out of the work of ology, collective identity, text, narrative, ritual,
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practice, discourse, and rhetoric. He considers racial policies, the authors direct us to examine
how citizens are mobilized outside and inside the processes by which states create and maintain
the state and concludes with suggestions for at- racial identities and conclude with an analyti-
tending to many of these undeveloped themes. cally sensitive definition of the racial state. Their
Jacob Torfing views some of the same ma- approach challenges prior theories of racializa-
terial from the perspective of discourse analysis tion in a number of effective ways.
in political sociology, moving beyond Michel In the final chapter of this section, Edgar Kiser
Foucault to the subjectivism of Jacques Derrida and Shawn Baudry present rational choice the-
and Slavjo Žižek. From the subjectivist angle ory as having considerable relevance to political
he derives a set of terms and concepts, radically sociology. It applies broadly to the new institu-
new for most social scientists, such as articu- tionalism, exemplified by studies of aristocrats,
lation, constitutiveness, dislocation, sedimenta- tax farmers that control the state, and the pool-
tion, sutures, and bricoulage. Torfing guides the ing of resources through institutions as a way
reader through them with sensitivity and a dis- to resolve the tragedy of the commons. Ratio-
section of the differences in four different the- nal choice theory also has applications to cul-
ories (and methodologies) of discourse. This ture, for example, as in “focal points,” where
is the cultural turn with the sharpest angles, rituals, holidays and statues that serve legitima-
ending with LaClau and Mouffe’s “agonistic tion functions can also serve as “focal points” to
democracy” and Žižek’s contradiction that “we coordinate collective protests. Yet in explaining
can only save democracy only by taking into collective action, rational choice seems to be at
account its own radical impossibility” (1989:6). a disadvantage because people can be free rid-
Barbara Hobson’s chapter on feminism takes ers. Kiser and Baudry respond by tying collec-
us away from “monolithic conceptions of state tive action to repeated games, especially involv-
as patriarchy” to a recognition of the complex ing “unconditional cooperators.” In seemingly
processes and structures of today’s multiple fem- spontaneous situations, they use “preference fal-
inisms. For example, she confronts the dilemmas sification” to explain sudden reversals in politi-
of citizenship posed by maternalist and humanist cal action. They argue as well for a relationship
feminism (i.e., the pull between difference and between rational choice and history and make
equality, private and public, needs and rights, a contribution to institutional theory with their
and care and justice), and presents contextuality critique of path dependence.
as one way to solve them (i.e., when difference Chapters ranging from conflict to culture to
makes a difference). Conceptions of rights in rational choice suggest that the era of grand the-
neoliberal, civic republicanism, and Marshallian orizing is over. As our theoretical scope narrows,
thinking are all demonstrated to have implica- it focuses more on mechanisms, constraints, and
tions for the different ethic of care that emerges contexts. Although we began this chapter in an-
from different political regimes. Hobson shows ticipation of a move to synthesis, it is apparent,
how the impact of postmodernity and multicul- at the present time, that that possibility is still
turalism can have surprising counterintuitive ef- limited. We experienced this personally as our
fects on universalism in the treatment of women plans for the theory section expanded from four
of different racial origins. She concludes by as- to nine chapters. It appears that the answer is still
sessing the primary dilemmas for feminist the- “yes” to the conflict chapter’s question: must
orizing in political sociology. we have a separate theory for class, race, gen-
David R. James and Kent Redding put race der, and the state? Adams, Clemens, and Orloff
theory in the forefront of an expanded concep- (2004) also predict a tripartite dialectic of cul-
tion of how political sociology needs to address ture, rational choice, and structure in the next
theories of the state. They do this by examin- few decades of the twenty-first century. If so,
ing theories about how race and ethnicity are this may lead to a more complex synthesis of
politically constructed. Although there is broad theory, but it is difficult at this time to predict
recognition about the ways in which states affect what it might be, if it indeed happens at all.
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Figure 1.2. The Structure of Civil Society and the State ( Janoski, 1998).
The Social Bases or Roots of Politics 10 Downing Street,” “the hallowed halls of
in Civil Society Congress,” “the White House,” or “the new
Bundestag building in Berlin.” Rather they re-
The very nature of the field that makes political side with citizens situated in groups like labor
sociology sociological comes from civil society unions, women’s groups, corporations, volun-
in the broadest sense – everything about soci- tary associations, and churches or other religious
ety that is either not the state or where the state organizations. They are rudiments of sociology,
has overlapped into other arenas. In Figure 1.2, discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 27 on theory (this
this would be the three overlapping circles be- volume). Less directly, social bases are comprised
low the circle representing the state, that is, the of every citizen and sometimes even noncitizen
public, market, and private spheres. The social residents. Collectively, we call all these nonstate
bases of politics are located not at “Number entities civil society. They constitute the diverse
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interests, rationalities, emotions, and traditions at both sides of the equation: what social forces
that shape the state and its actions and are, in affect the formation of public opinion and what
turn, shaped by it. impact public opinion has on political processes.
The complexity of societal existence is re- As Manza, Brooks, and Sauder do in Chapter 10,
flected in deep-seated divisions, of which the treating the implications growing out of the way
most notable are social class, race, ethnicity, gen- cleavages have been studied, Weakliem begins
der, and religion. Jeffrey Manza, Clem Brooks, by noting the hiatus between mid-twentieth-
and Michael Sauder (Chapter 10) examine social century studies of public opinion and the rel-
cleavages through a comprehensive survey that ative loss of interest in the topic until recently.
focuses on elections and the electoral effects of Although Weakliem is appreciative of the early
inequalities in power. In particular, they con- work, particularly in its emphasis on social cleav-
sider how cleavages have an impact on political ages, he also sees its deficiencies. One was a lack
participation (a theme also addressed in Misra of attention to processes of thinking, as though
and King’s chapter on gender [Chapter 26]), opinions were transmitted mainly through con-
voting behavior, and, in the United States, on tacts. Another was a conception of change that
campaign finance. Unlike many authors within had no place for sudden or discontinuous shifts
the social cleavage tradition, they focus on the in opinions. Weakliem evaluates recent work
flip side of class by showing how elites maintain that looks precisely at these formerly neglected
political advantage through campaign finance. areas and sees the potential enrichment of po-
To those who say class is dead, studies of cam- litical sociology in renewed scrutinies of public
paign finance provide a resounding “no.” By opinion, especially in relation to public policies.
placing their topic in the context of how social In exemplifying this potential, James, Redding,
cleavages were treated by sociologists and po- and Klugman’s chapter (Chapter 27) traces the
litical scientists in the past, the authors are able hidden ways in which public opinion about race
to emphasize remaining controversies over the affects efforts to undo past policies that created
political role of social cleavages and to suggest racial inequalities.
avenues for future research. The remaining five chapters in this section go
In her chapter on nationalism, Liah Green- beyond unorganized social cleavages to exam-
feld and Jonathan Eastwood (Chapter 12) pick ine them in their various organized forms. The
up on a solidarity rooted in primordial attach- first of these, by Mildred A. Schwartz and Kay
ments to place and kin that is transformed in the Lawson (Chapter 13) tackles the quintessential
modern world into conceptions of the nation- form of political action in the social bases, orga-
state with repercussions for both the function- nization, and environments of political parties.
ing of the state and its relations with other Discussion of the social bases of parties neces-
states. After examining various theories of na- sarily overlaps with previous chapters on social
tionalism, from Hans Kohn’s to Roger Fried- cleavages but also takes into account the ties be-
land’s, they outline the relation of national- tween parties and organized interests and the
ism vis-à-vis other forms of consciousness and links between government and citizens. The
the impacts of nationalisms on various types of extent to which cleavages are mobilized by
political action. Their own cultural approach parties remains a troubling question in many
to nationalism, focused especially on ressenti- societies and touches on the difficulty of sepa-
ment (à la Max Scheler), shows how deprivation rating normative concerns from empirical ones.
and envy lead to particularly irrational forms In considering the structure and culture of par-
of political action, especially those involving ties, similar problems arise in evaluating predic-
violence. tions of party decline. Because parties carry out
Still working with social cleavages as unorga- governing functions, there is controversy over
nized divisions in society, David Weakliem, in whether political parties should be treated as
“Public Opinion, Political Attitudes, and Ideol- inside or outside civil society, one of the issues
ogy” (Chapter 11), moves to examine how they raised by considering the environmental context
are expressed in opinions and ideas. He looks of parties.
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Social cleavages can be most directly orga- In their chapter on the media, Michael
nized into interest groups – organizations with Schudson and Silvio Waisbord (Chapter 17)
the goal of influencing public policy – which point to the diverse ways that the mass media
is the subject of Francisco Granados and David relate to social cleavages. The roles played by
Knoke’s chapter (Chapter 14). As political ac- the media are often ambiguous if not contradic-
tors, interest groups overlap to some degree with tory. In societies where they are separate from
political parties but also with social movements. organs of the state, they make up part of civil
Interest groups vary according to how they are society. Their interaction with the state involves
organized, the extent of resource mobilization, efforts at their regulation, on one side, and their
their governance, and the range of interests they attempts to influence the state, on the other.
represent. Their internal character then has a They represent part of the corporate power sys-
bearing on how they influence policy. Granados tem while publicizing its abuses. They present
and Knoke capture the range of interests that can themselves as purveyors of news to the gen-
be mobilized by examining the extent to which eral public, regardless of divisions in that pub-
they form policy networks. They also draw at- lic, and at the same time their drive for profit
tention to the significance of policy institutes makes for their emphasis on entertainment as
as sources of interest group influence (e.g., the a factor in how news are disseminated. In the
American Enterprise Institute and the Brook- United States, although close ties between ho-
ings Institution). The authors conclude by em- mogeneous news media and a single political
phasizing the complexity of issues involved in party have waned, some highly salient connec-
understanding the role of interest groups and tions obtain, and the media are often unpre-
the potential they have in settings outside North dictable in the ways in which they treat parties
America and Europe. and candidates. At the same time, journalism is
A key tenet of most conflict theories is that an institution that can be examined as a politi-
some groups are more powerful than others. In cal system in itself, a theme that Schudson and
current societies, these sites of power are cor- Waisbord find especially compelling.
porations, which Mark Mizruchi and Deborah The roots of politics in civil society are both
Bey examine in their chapter (Chapter 15) on far-reaching and changing. There is potential for
corporate power and control, including inter- any major social division in a society to become
firm relations and networks. Although acknowl- mobilized into political salience. Societal divi-
edging the power of corporations in capitalist sions can be expressed in a variety of organized
societies, the authors also point to the uncer- outlets while those organizations can represent
tainty in evaluating the role of business just as it anything from portions of a single cleavage to
is becoming more global. They caution against cross-cutting cleavages and interests. Structural
making too-easy generalizations about the past divisions coexist with cultural ones, sometimes
while mapping a blueprint for future research. reinforcing each other, leading to disintegration,
Craig Jenkins and William Form (Chapter 16) or retreating from salience. What these chapters
move away from those organized groups recog- all make clear is how the relation between the
nized to have some power to the more infor- social/cultural and the political varies over time
mally organized category of social movements. and from society to society. Their message is
Because social movements are, by definition, that what we have learned in the past, although
committed to bringing about change, the cen- remaining relevant, cannot replace a continuing
tral question for Jenkins and Form is when and search for how the political is transformed.
how such change takes place. In looking for the
causal connections that underlie the possibility Explaining the State and Its Policies
that movements will produce change, they draw in Political Sociology
a portrait of movements embedded in their in-
stitutional milieus, dependent for results on their Influencing the state itself is the ultimate aim
interaction with the mass media, allies and op- of most social movements, interest groups, and
ponents, and political authorities. parties. This section is concerned with how the
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state is created, various forms of states, transi- include the historically and culturally shifting
tions between states, and how the state creates, definitions or domains of democracy, the theo-
implements, and evaluates its policies. In Chap- retical combining of levels of organization and
ter 18, Thomas Ertman discusses the formation results, and the methodological issues involved
and building of nation-states in Europe. He con- in the measurement of democratic rights.
trasts the founding work of Weber and Hintze In his chapter on revolutions and revolution-
and the renaissance of state and war theory of ary movements (Chapter 20), Jeff Goodwin re-
the 1960s to that of the 1980s by Anderson and views several general theoretical approaches to
Tilly. these phenomena, including modernization and
Currently, the strongest factors influencing Marxist theory. He suggests that state-centered
the formation of the state are warfare, rational approaches may shed the brightest light on the
choice, and culture. For Ertman and Down- key questions of where and when revolutionary
ing’s (1992) bellicist (warfare) approach, com- movements become powerful forces and some-
bined with the variable strength of medieval times seize state power. (Not all revolutionary
constitutionalism (legislatures), provides a useful movements, even powerful ones, actually seize
cross-national explanation of state formation. In power.) Revolutionary movements are likely to
single-country studies, the rational choice ap- become especially strong where infrastructurally
proach of North highlights how relative power weak authoritarian states radicalize their polit-
affects the extent to which rulers may enter into ical opponents by, among other things, politi-
durable bargains with representative institutions cally excluding and indiscriminately repressing
to constrain predatory behavior and create an them. Weak authoritarian states that are also
efficient property rights system. Using cultural corrupt and clientelistic, thereby alienating or
case studies, Adams (1994) develops patrimo- dividing potentially counterrevolutionary elites
nial theory of how families gain state power and (economic, political, and military), are especially
resist bureaucracy in the Dutch Republic, and prone to being overthrown by the revolution-
Gorski (2003) explains how the Calvinist rather ary movements that they unintentionally help to
than Lutheran religion shaped the disciplinary foster. Goodwin suggests that democratic polit-
aspects of the Prussian state. Ertman finds the ical regimes, by contrast, rarely radicalize social
key to these three (bellicist, rational choice and movements because they generally provide the
cultural) approaches in a fundamental question: “political space” in which movements may de-
how do participatory local governments gain mand reforms from the state, sometimes suc-
enough strength to avoid both the rent seek- cessfully.
ing associated with patrimonial corruption and Denying that a general, lawlike theory of
the authoritarian solutions to state formation regime change is possible, Charles Tilly (Chap-
processes? ter 21) examines the increasing focus on robust
In Chapter 19, John Markoff follows with a mechanisms for change rooted in contentious
survey of the transitions to democracy whose politics. Tilly formulates a taxonomy of state
variable beginnings have helped to mold their regimes based on five dimensions: state capac-
diverse end points. Given such constraints, ity to shape resources and action within its so-
“transitologists” have increasingly studied the cial realm, the breadth of representation in the
deals and strategies pursued, especially those polity, the equality of representation throughout
among radicals, moderates, and hardliners. This the polity, the strength of consultation among
necessarily includes elites but not to the exclu- polity members, and the protection of members
sion of social movements of workers, farmers, of the political system. He discusses the most
and the like. Interim regimes and consolidation likely of the thirty-two combinations of bi-
are the next step in process theories of transi- nary categorizations of these five variables, and
tion. Moving from case studies to macrotran- within each one there are “contentious reper-
sitions and waves of democratization in many toires” that provide collective claim-making
countries, he finds that challenges to scholarship routines that characterize the conflicting actors
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within each regime type. Tilly leaves us with laws to protect the vulnerable and with vast in-
three important questions: How does the basic equalities of income. It exists at the international
character of a regime affect the form and dy- level with arms deals, money laundering, aid
namics of contentious politics? How do changes packages, and covert action to undermine so-
in a regime’s character affect changes in the cial movements and to promote (often undemo-
forms and dynamics of contention? And how cratic) regime stability. This spread of undemoc-
do changes in repertoires of contention, paths racy takes the political sociologist well beyond
of claim making, and claim-making parties af- the limits of the communist and fascist regimes
fect the trajectories of regimes? of the past.
In their chapter on neocorporatism (Chap- State policies are most often implemented by
ter 22), Wolfgang Streeck and Lane Kenworthy civil bureaucracies. Oskar Oszlak (Chapter 24)
describe the evolution of corporatism’s concep- examines these processes of public administra-
tualization in political thought and of its role tion, many of which are often ignored by polit-
as a key institution in the political economies ical and even organizational sociologists. Oszlak
of affluent nations. They examine the dis- sees the formation of the state, nationhood, and
tinctions between corporatism and pluralism capitalism as simultaneously involved in the de-
and among corporatist organizational structure, velopment of bureaucracy, which then reacts to
concertation, and private-interest government. political and policy developments as they occur
They survey theory and research on the im- over time. These bureaucracies operate in di-
pact of corporatism on economic performance. verse environments with varying degrees of pro-
And they consider the extent to which current ductivity, different behaviors and norms, many
processes – such as heightened capital mobil- structures, and, especially, miniscule to sufficient
ity, union fragmentation, labor market deregu- resources in terms of budgets, employees, and
lation, and European integration – threaten to mandates. The policy realm is where each new
undermine democratic corporatism. regime attempts to alter the power relationships
Despite waves of seemingly political free- within civil society and between it and the bu-
dom, all is not well with either democratic or reaucracy itself. Consequently, resources come
undemocratic states. Viviane Brachet-Marquez and go within the constraints of technology, cul-
(Chapter 23) focuses on the nature of undemo- ture, clientele, and, of course, the regime itself.
cratic states that employ repression and deal in His chapter provides a justification for bureau-
death. She develops a three-part typology of cracy in public policy and a model of its internal
regimes: totalitarianism with a strong guiding and external dynamics. He concludes that tech-
ideology, authoritarianism without such an ide- nology and culture may have strong impacts on
ology, and sultanistic states that have extreme bureaucratic productivity and performance, but
patrimonialism. Given that totalitarianism seems the strongest factor is the state regime, which
to be a thing of the communist and fascist past, must be adequately characterized to measure its
she looks at leftist movements against authori- impact on the bureaucracy.
tarian and sultanistic regimes in Latin America In their chapter on the comparative study of
that, ironically, become quite undemocratic and welfare states (Chapter 25) Alexander M. Hicks
violent themselves. Shifting focus, she examines and Gøsta Esping-Andersen review the litera-
a broad range of right-wing parties and move- ture on the origins of welfare policies in the
ments in more democratic circumstances and narrow sense of social insurance and other in-
casts them into a typology of liberal or populist come maintenance policies. In addition, true to
versus ultraconservative or extreme Right. She the spirit of current welfare state theories and
concludes that democratic and undemocratic investigations, they examine a range of family
are linked together both within democracies and and labor market policies, examine the egali-
outside them in the international arena. Thus, tarian/redistributive and, more generally, strat-
undemocracy surfaces in nominally democratic ification dimension of state policies as a fur-
states where there is a lack of enforcement of ther aspect of welfare states, and stress gendered
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aspects of all of these policy outputs and out- experiences of the United States from the days of
comes. They view the welfare state as a polit- slavery to the present, their comparative sweep
ical nexus between the causally powerful and allows them to point out when race produces
the politically dependent aspects of social strati- policy outcomes unique to national settings.
fication. In reviewing explanations, class-linked The strength of historical constraints, institu-
power resources (e.g., business and union orga- tionalized in a range of social patterns and unar-
nization and partisan politics) loom large, and ticulated public attitudes, leads them to caution
globalization emerges as a less compelling and against the wholesale adoption of race-neutral
transformative force than domestic economic policies even after some of the worst race-based
and demographic trajectories from factors such abuses have disappeared.
as increasingly high and long-term unemploy- In Chapter 28 Gregory Hooks and James
ment to societal aging. Although the stratifica- Rice examine the processes and effects of con-
tion/welfare nexus is used to highlight the study ducting, winning, and losing wars. Despite
of the welfare state as central to the contempo- Morris Janowitz’s early work, sociology largely
rary response to the old question “Who gets emphasizes the domestic or “homefront” to
what from government?,” attention to material the neglect of war. But more recently this has
struggle and allocation is complemented by at- changed with works by Skocpol, Moore, Tilly,
tention to social rights and citizenship. Hicks Giddens, Mann, and many others. War clearly
and Esping-Andersen open and conclude their impacts demography, budgets and governmen-
“introduction” with historical as well as theo- tal planning, industrial production, citizenship
retical background and analysis. rights and the welfare state, contentious politics
Joya Misra and Leslie King, in looking at state and state breakdown, battles between military
policies toward women (Chapter 26), identify and civilian power, and the state itself as it moves
gender as an inherently political concept be- toward empire or defeat. Disgust with war may
cause it is involved in the distribution of power, even produce major advances in human rights
generally resulting in a system of inequality. But and some global governance. Hooks and Rice
that does not make gender a passive component, make a strong plea for taking the political soci-
always at the mercy of unilateral state actions. ology of war off the sideline and putting it into
They emphasize that the relation between gen- a more central place, which they say may come
der and the state is bidirectional, dependent on about through the confluence of world systems
such factors as political resources and structures, and neoinstitutionalist work on how war molds
the strength of interest groups and social move- society.
ments, women’s inclusion in these, prevailing
ideologies, and the degree of state autonomy. In
selecting three policy areas of special relevance The Globalization of the World
to gender, those concerning the labor market, and Politics
social welfare, and population, Misra and King
point to the need for considering how state poli- Although some may proclaim the end of poli-
cies affect gender, even when they do so implic- tics, the nation-state or multinational state is a
itly, as in employment-related pensions geared strong entity. The loss of sovereignty often pro-
only to full-time workers. claimed is based on an exaggerated sovereignty
Kent Redding, David R. James, and Joshua that may have existed for only the most pow-
Klugman trace the interconnections between erful state, and even then, all states encounter
race and state actions in their chapter on the resistance and constraint. This section looks at
politics of racial policy (Chapter 27). They em- the processes of globalization and how it is af-
phasize how existing racial identities and so- fecting politics, mobilization, and the move-
cial inequalities affect how states construct racial ment of people and capital.
categories and race-based policies in a contin- In Chapter 30, Philip McMichael casts a
uing process. Although concentrating on the critical eye on the process of globalization,
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suggesting that it takes different forms across pressures – in comparison with neoliberal ide-
time and space. He specifies contemporary ological pressures, societal aging, and increasing
globalization as a discursive project, geared long-term unemployment – for the actions of
to institutionalizing corporate markets through state.
multilateral and regional economic agreements Thomas Janoski and Fengjuan Wang (Chap-
driven by powerful states. From this perspec- ter 31) examine the politics of both the most
tive of depicting globalization as an exercise often poor and nondemocratic “sending coun-
in power, he examines political countermove- tries” and the predominately rich and demo-
ments to globalization. Global justice move- cratic “receiving countries.” One focuses more
ments, he argues, are globalization’s “historical on “emigration” and what population move-
and relational barometer,” and they operate at ments do to those left behind and what gov-
various, but often interrelated, scales. Work- ernments do to control immigration; the other
ing from Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” of looks at “immigration” and what the continu-
implementation of and resistance to economic ous influx of new people do to society and then
liberalism, McMichael questions the adequacy how they may be integrated through natural-
of Polanyi’s formulation for the elaboration of ization and citizenship. Their first point is that
market rule in the twenty-first century. This theories of immigration need to combine the
question concerns the conventional interpre- perspectives of sending and receiving countries
tation of “sovereignty” as the centerpiece of in their political sociological analyses. A sec-
nation-state formation, including the devel- ond point is that the increase in welfare and
opment of citizenship. Here, globalization is other payments for refugees seeking and obtain-
viewed through the lens of a sovereignty cri- ing asylum have politicized immigration debates
sis, where corporate market rule compromises such that the Left and Right have become much
the social contract upon which the state/citizen more polarized on this issue. At the same time,
relation is founded. The crisis is expressed dif- transnational immigration processes aided by air
ferently across the world, as the impact of market travel and the transmission of remittances to sup-
rule generates alternative social movement con- port whole towns make this global process much
ceptions of sovereignty, especially in the global more fluid, whereas the reacceptance of “dual
south where corporate globalization is realized nationality” and the view of immigration as an
through a drastic intensification of social exclu- investment process makes the issue more com-
sion. plex than in the past. All of this will become
In Chapter 29, on the politics and economics much more important as the retirement of the
of global capitalism, Evelyn Huber and John baby boomers causes vastly increased immigra-
D. Stephens map current political sociological tion to most receiving countries.
and political economic views of the impact of Peter Evans, in his chapter on counterhege-
global capitalism on state policy in the more af- monic globalization (Chapter 32), brings the
fluent democracies of the Organization for Eco- emerging global drama of transnational social
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) movements of labor, gender, and the environ-
nations and Latin America. They find that the ment into a sharp, new, and wide-screen focus.
results seem thin, equivocal, or highly condi- Evans argues that analysis of the dynamics of
tional upon institutional context in the afflu- transnational social movements should be cen-
ent OECD democracies but indicative of real tral to the core agenda of political sociology,
global pressures for neoliberal policy reform in both because we cannot understand the politics
Latin America. Indeed they see little evidence of global governance institutions without taking
of policy-relevant global pressures other than into account the role of oppositional movements
those of liberalized capital flows upon the free- and because the idea of a purely “domestic”
dom to pursue traditional Golden Age fiscal and or “national” social movement is becoming an
monetary stabilization policies. In general, they anachronism. Evans makes a sharp distinction
question the importance of global economic between antiglobalization movements, which
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aspire to somehow retrieve a world in which particularity? How do we blend the local and
power and values might be defined primarily the global in a meaningful way? How do we all
on a local basis, and what he calls counterhege- balance the field’s focus despite the cycling of
monic globalization. The transnational labor, political power among Left, Center, and Right?
women’s and environmental movements are not How do we develop a view of power that is
trying to negate globalization so much as they useful in explaining urgent, concrete political
are trying to provide global support for the val- phenomena? How do we revise the study of the
ues and interests of their constituents. In going politics of stratification, its parties and institu-
about their global project these movements not tions in the globalizing, aging, environmentally
only build their own networks, organizations, constricting new world? How do we revise the
and “collective action frames” but also simulta- theory of institutions in civil society enlightened
neously leverage ideologies and organizational by perspectives on rationality and emotion, ac-
structures that have been constructed by the ne- tion and tradition, culture and social structure?
oliberal globalization that they oppose. “Basic The political theories that are used to an-
human rights” and “democratic governance,” swer these questions are likely to develop in
for example, are central to the hegemonic ide- four ways: (1) by incorporating both rational
ology of neoliberal globalization, but they are agency and culture into our conceptualizations
also valuable ideological tools for counterhege- and analyses of institutions; (2) by not privileg-
monic globalization. Evans illustrates his per- ing any simple status or class category, which
spective with a number of examples of success- creates exclusions, but focusing on many sta-
ful transnational campaigns but also admits that tus and class groups in creating a more com-
his approach only demonstrates the possibility plex theory of the social bases of politics; (3) by
of a counterhegemonic globalization. creating studies of political sociology focusing
on the development of agency and micro-
social mechanisms, process theories of democ-
conclusion racy, deliberation, and the media, and how pol-
itics filters through protopolitical groups into
Political sociology points in a number of theo- more directly political actors; and (4) by ex-
retical directions for the new millennium. We panding conceptions of diffused and networked
anticipate that the most influential theories will power in societies and incorporating the cul-
prominently include those that most success- tural, martial, economic, and political forces in
fully allow researchers to answer the questions the globalized world beyond boundaries.
posed earlier in this introduction. How do we We began our work conscious of how press-
solve the apparent contradiction between con- ing were the foregoing questions, along with
flict theory of elites and the new pluralism their related theoretical challenges but with no
within policy domains? In what ways do we illusions that we could, in the space of the hand-
make the media a central part of theories of book, provide definitive answers. We hope that
political sociology and not just a theory of how our four objectives – providing an encompassing
the media works? How do we optimally blend framework, surveying the possibility of synthe-
culture into political sociology, previously dom- sis, consolidating the social bases, and incorpo-
inated by social-relational or structural concep- rating the global – have been more modest and
tions of social action? How do we incorpo- realistic. We conclude by reviewing those objec-
rate the analytical tools and substantive insights tives and how we have fulfilled them, mindful
of rational choice without underplaying cul- that, ultimately, it will be our readers who assess
tural and nonrational motivations and frames for the usefulness of our work.
action? How do we develop middle-range theo- Our first objective was to gather under the
ries and mechanisms for understanding political roof of the handbook all the theories and
processes, sensitive to historical and institutional substantive areas that could legitimately be
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called political sociology. We began with well- exercise of power. States can be influenced by
established and contending theories – neoplu- all the social forces that make up civil society,
ralism, neofunctionalism, conflict and political but also retain a level of autonomy that makes
economy, and institutionalist and state-centric them social actors in their own right.
theories. We included as well new challenges Our third objective was to consolidate the
from culture, discourse, feminist, racialist, and widening range of the “social bases of politics.”
rational choice theories, which we anticipate to This is because power is also located outside
become even more influential. Our substantive the state, making it equally important to adopt
reach led us to look at adjacent sociological sub- some of the prompts from cultural theory in
fields of social movements, peace and conflict, taking account of diffused power as well as the
race and ethnic studies, and sex and gender. We interest-based organizational forces long studied
are also alert to developments in adjacent dis- in political sociology. Just as social characteris-
ciplines, particularly political science. As a re- tics change over time in their relevance to social
sult, we devote eight chapters to aspects of civil cleavages, so too do they alter in their ability to
society, ranging from social cleavages to pub- become politicized. Here we have valuable con-
lic opinion to organized efforts in mobilizing tributions from feminist and racialist perspec-
the public and influencing the state. Another tives in showing how problems become political
eleven chapters are devoted to the state in all its issues in proto-political groups – families, neigh-
forms and variations and in policies as they affect borhoods, corporations, and voluntary associa-
social welfare, gender, and military operations. tions including churches and charitable groups –
The briefest section, consisting of four chapters, which are then passed on and modified in more
deals with globalization, an area where scholarly directly political groups – social movements, in-
attention can be expected to grow as relations terest groups, corporate action committees, the
among states change and movements of people police and judicial system, political parties, and
and capital break out from the confines of state the media.
boundaries. Although some topics may not have Finally, our fourth objective was to incorpo-
been treated with as much thoroughness as pos- rate globalization and empire within political
sible, and some arguably notable topics may not sociology. Clearly, power is also located outside
have been included, we think that the coverage the state (and state system) in an increasingly
largely realizes our first objective. globalized economy and this necessitates a fo-
Our second objective was to draw together cus on political economy. Global power is en-
relevant theories with an eye to possible consol- countered when states attempt to use economic
idation. It required recognizing that underlying policy to deal with foreign competition or even
every theoretical venture in political sociology simply to regulate their domestic economies
there is some conception of power. Although and exchange rates. Global influences are com-
moving away from seeing political power only plicated by processes of international migra-
in terms of actions of the state or its organs, tion that since the early 1950s have allowed
as Piven and Cloward do by directing us to a migrants to travel with increasing speed. Cul-
range of institutions in which power is a primary tural factors also shape how these migrants are
process – religion, family, work, the media, and treated and integrated with powerful influences
other cultural forces – we remain committed to exerted both by domestic politics and inter-
a focus on the state. One whole section of the national civil society, including the UN and
handbook is given over to the state in all its va- transnational movements. Meanwhile, counter-
rieties and activities. That is, although power is measures against globalization and related in-
diffused throughout society and emerges in net- ternational forces are being mounted by social
works of relations, we still believe it important movements and other forms of protests. Clearly,
to keep a central focus on the state as an insti- the international arena forms an engrossing stage
tution whose rationale is the consolidation and for political economy and cultural explanation.
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We still see a divided theoretical arena. Long- political sociological theory, indeed enrich the-
standing and established theories in the field co- ories beyond themselves. Some authors have al-
exist in uneasy tension while contentious new ready pointed to areas where bridging may oc-
theories have entered political sociology, some- cur and where fruitful borrowing can develop.
times with as little regard to competing ap- For example, Kiser and Baudry discuss where
proaches as they feel that they have received rational choice theory can benefit from culture
from established ones. To us, the field’s great and Hobson notes how feminist theory draws
diversity of theoretical arguments is a sign of on structuralist approaches to the state. In some
its health, stimulating vigorous debate and self- fashion, all the handbook chapters, theoretical
examination. Our own assessment is that ratio- and substantive, grapple with theoretical ten-
nal choice theory, on the one hand, and the sions and suggest pathways for a vibrant political
cultural turn, on the other, can together enrich sociology in the new millenium.
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part i
THEORIES OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
31
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32
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chapter one
Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power1
Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward
Social life is inevitably organized by rules, nally, we briefly consider the bearing of theories
whether these rules are rooted in custom or in of agency, of the human capacity for innovation,
the laws of an organized state. Rules are usually on the emergence of challenges to the rules.
treated as ubiquitous, the most elementary fea- Our interest in the bearing of rules on power
ture of society. But obedience to rules cannot arises from our career-long study of the dynam-
be taken for granted. People everywhere both ics of social movements, and particularly the un-
conform to the rules that organize social life ruly collective protests that periodically disrupt
and violate them. In this chapter we explore the the normal workings of the American political
question of why women and men break the rules system. We think these events play a key role in
of their society and why they break particular the process of reform in American politics. But
rules. And we focus on this question because we the disorder associated with protest is neverthe-
think it illuminates the dialectic of power – of less widely criticized; even those who sympa-
domination and resistance – in human relations. thize with the grievances of the protestors often
The crux of our argument is that just as rule complain that they ought to have chosen more
making is a strategy of domination, so is rule conventional and rule-abiding ways of advanc-
breaking a strategy in challenges to domination. ing their cause. Our historical studies of Amer-
We make our case in several steps. First, we dis- ican protest movements lead us to the quite dif-
cuss concepts of power and focus on the par- ferent conclusion that defiance of the rules of
ticular understanding of power as embedded in normal politics is an essential aspect of the de-
interdependent social relations that undergirds velopment of such power as the protestors are
our argument. We contend that rule making and able to wield. Our earlier work traced the im-
rule breaking can be understood as strategies to pact of collective defiance on American political
inhibit or activate the leverage inherent in con- institutions. Here we put institutional outcomes
tributions to social interdependencies. And fi- aside to consider more specifically and theoret-
ically the bearing of rules and rule breaking on
1
power relations.
We thank the editors of this volume for their edito-
rial suggestions. Our good friend the late Robert Alford In contemporary social science, the study of
took special pains in offering his help. We also thank rule breaking has been dominated by the field of
other colleagues who gave us their careful reading and “deviance” and then further divided into spe-
criticisms, including Peter Bratsis, Jonathan Fox, Chad cialties according to forms of rule violation or
Goldberg, Margaret Groarke, and Sid Tarrow. We are the demographic characteristics of the rule vi-
particularly grateful to Lori Minnite, Leo Panitch, and
Susan Woodward, who not only read the manuscript but olators. The result is to tear the study of rule
also argued at length for the critical amendments they breaking away from larger questions about the
suggested. nature of social order. In the past, however,
33
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34 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward
thinkers who tried to understand why people political allegiance, saw in the rising disorder
sometimes broke the rules of their society were that surrounded them a contest for or against
preoccupied with the connection between rule domination. They saw, in short, that rule break-
breaking and threats to the established order or ing and rule making are at the core of the strug-
to constituted authority. Aristotle’s (1962:193) gle for power in human society.
catalog of the “origins and causes of the disor-
ders” leading to the dissolution of governments
was an effort to identify the conditions that definitions of power
would prevent internal strife. Thomas Hobbes
excoriated such iniquitous doctrines as that of We think that when people either make rules
individual conscience, not to mention the no- or break rules they are expressing a fundamental
tion that the sovereign himself ought to be sub- human propensity to try to exert power. To be
ject to civil law as “Those things That Weaken or sure, talk about fundamental human propensities
Tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth.” is hazardous, but we believe our focus on rules
Modern sociological ideas have also been ex- and power is undergirded by assumptions that
plained by Nisbet (1966:21) as “responses to the are straightforward and uncontroversial.
problem of order created at the beginning of First, we take for granted the sociological
the nineteenth century by the collapse of the premise that people are inherently social and that
old regime under the blows of industrialism and the experience of collective life profoundly in-
revolutionary democracy.” fluences the identities people develop, the pur-
Thinkers who turned these political assess- poses to which they are oriented, and the inter-
ments on their head, who abjured constituted pretations of their reality that informs the actions
authority as a source of oppression, also focused they take to pursue those purposes.
on the corpus of law because it was the hand- Second, we assume a human capacity to re-
maiden of authority. “The universal spirit of construct learned identities, discover different
Laws, in all countries” pronounced Rousseau and conflictual purposes from that imposed by
(1962:200), “is to favor the strong in opposition the group, and invent new interpretations of
to the weak, and to assist those who have posses- social reality in the course of pursuing those
sions against those who have none.” This con- purposes. We thus take for granted that human
clusion was shared by Adam Smith as follows: beings are to some extent purposeful and re-
flective agents.2 For this reason, and despite the
Laws and governments may be considered in this and force of group influence, every actor confronts
indeed in every case as a combination of the rich the social constructions imposed by other ac-
to oppress the poor, and preserve to themselves the tors, including collective and institutionalized
inequality of the goods which would otherwise be
soon destroyed by the attacks of the poor, who if
constructions, as an exterior and constraining
not hindered by the government would soon reduce force. Social relationships are both a means of
the others to an equality with themselves by open cooperation in the pursuit of shared goals and
violence. (cited in Monthly Review 32(5):13) also a means of conflict, of acting on disparate
individual and group goals.3
Aristotle wrote at a time when the Greek city-
states were seething with rebellion, Machiavelli 2
We use the term “purposeful” with some hesitation.
in the midst of the intrigue and turmoil of late We agree with Giddens (1984:6) that much day-to-day
medieval Florence, Hobbes in the aftermath of action is routine and as such is subject only to “reflexive
two civil wars in England, and Rousseau and monitoring and rationalization.” By contrast, “motives
Smith on the eve of what was to be “the age tend to have a direct purchase on action only in relatively
of revolution.” The grand theorists of sociol- unusual circumstances.”
3
The oft-cited argument about sociology’s “overso-
ogy wrote in the midst of the social and politi- cialized conception of man” is by Dennis Wrong. Both
cal turmoil of the second half of the nineteenth the original essay and Wrong’s contemporary comments
century. All of these thinkers, whatever their on the problem can be found in Wrong (1999).
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Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power 35
Third, we think the complex patterns of co- desires, and to prevent his own conduct being
operation that constitute group life shape and modified in the manner in which he does not.”
constrain peoples’ capacities for agency. But This understanding of power as inherently
group life is also the context in which agency conflictual is sometimes referred to as the zero-
is realized, in which people discover divergent sum conception. What an actor on one side of a
identities, invent new interpretations, and find power relationship achieves is at the expense of
the power to act on their divergent purposes.4 another actor. It contrasts with an understand-
These minimal assumptions allow us to claim ing of power as simply the capacity to realize
that action to make or break rules can be un- ends, as when Bertrand Russell (1938:2) defined
derstood as an expression of the perennial ef- power as “the production of intended effects.”
forts of women and men to use their rela- It also contrasts with the Parsonian (1967:297;
tions with others in the pursuit of outcomes 1969:352–429) view of power as the commu-
they desire, to exercise power. We recognize, nal capacity to secure or enforce compliance for
of course, that everything depends on the con- collective purposes, or power conceived as a
crete character of ongoing social relations, on
the specific goals of different parties to those re- generalized capacity to secure the performance of
lations, and on the vast accumulated repertoire binding obligations, when the obligations are legit-
of institutionalized practices and beliefs within imized with reference to their bearing on collective
goals and where, in the case of recalcitrance, there is
which these concrete relations exist and goals are
a presumption of enforcement by negative sanctions.
pursued. (1967:297)6
Having asserted that rule making and rule
breaking reflect efforts to exercise power, we Anthony Giddens (1976:11–112) also notes the
need to discuss that much belabored term.5 Our difference between the use of power in the sense
usage so far is familiar enough, similar to the un- of the capacity of an actor to alter the course of
derstanding of power running through the ar- events and what he calls the narrower, relational
guments of theorists from Thomas Hobbes to sense, as a “property of interaction” which may
Steven Lukes. The most widely cited formu- be defined as “the capability to secure outcomes
lation is Max Weber’s (1968:926–40): power is where the realization of these outcomes depends
understood as “the chance of a man or a num- on the agency of others . . . is power as domi-
ber of men to realize their own will in a social nation” (emphasis in the original). To Giddens,
action even against the resistance of others who the relationship between power and conflict
are participating in the action.” R. H. Tawney is contingent, because power presupposes con-
(1931:229) proposes a similar though more ex- flict only when resistance has to be overcome.
plicitly reciprocal definition: “Power may be de- But resistance often does have to be overcome.
fined as the capacity of an individual, or group Hobbes (1958:160) was not the only one to note
of individuals, to modify the conduct of other the following:
individuals or groups in the manner which he
And therefore if any two men desire the same thing,
4 which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they
The dualism of social action and social structure is
an argument that runs through Giddens work, beginning
6
with Giddens (1976). See also Norbert Elias (1978:94–6) We note in passing that although there are differ-
for a parallel argument about “figuration” and the psy- ences between the Parsonian view of power and the con-
chological capabilities of actors, and see Zygmunt Bau- ception developed by Michel Foucault (2000), there are
man (1989) for a critical commentary. also strong and striking similarities. For Parsons, power
5
In the discussion that follows we do not attempt to is total, a generalized feature of a social system, rooted
consider the entire voluminous literature on power but in a normative consensus, which includes a consensus
rather focus on the work that applies to our argument. on the use of sanctions against those who deviate. For
Recent publications not covered include Dowding Foucault, power is embedded in a system of knowledge
(1996), Haugaard (1997, 2002), Flyvbjerg (1998), Klein and classification which penetrates institutional life and
(1998), Morriss (1987), Poggi (2001), Scott (1996), embraces and controls everything and everyone. See also
Stewart, (2001), and Wartenberg (1992). Dyrberg (1997).
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become enemies; and in the way to their end, which to a good many refined redefinitions that are also
is principally their own conservation, and sometimes not important for our discussion. One familiar
their delectation only, endeavor to destroy or subdue and nagging issue does bear on our argument,
one another. however, and it is perhaps the most impor-
Power is thus inextricably linked with con- tant dispute in the discussion of power. What
flict in actual social life, simply because social are to be regarded as power resources? Weber’s
life implies zero-sum contests, whether, as in the (1968:53) definition may be widely accepted
Hobbesian example, because men and women precisely because of what it does not specify,
compete over the same things or because they “the basis on which this probability [of exert-
contest the terms and ends of cooperative ef- ing power] rests.” Weber himself thought the
forts. Moreover, the fact of group life means bases for power could not be explicated: “The
that people try to use each other to reach their concept of power is sociologically amorphous.
goals, a point that Parsons (1949:93) makes in All conceivable qualities of a person and all con-
his discussion – but ultimate dismissal – of the ceivable combinations of circumstances may put
Hobbesian perspective. Thus pervasive conflict him in a position to impose his will in a given
is “inherent in the very existence of social re- situation” (cited in Wrong, 1979:23). That po-
lations themselves. For it is inherent in the lat- sition forecloses the possibility of analyzing the
ter that the actions of men should be potential patterned distribution of power in any society,
means to each other’s ends.”7 which a good many analysts have not been sat-
Although the disputes generated by these dif- isfied to accept. Instead, there are major and
ferent conceptions have received enormous at- recurrent disputes about the bases (i.e. the re-
tention,8 we do not need to do more than note sources) for domination in social interaction.
them here.9 It is sufficient to say that we are Our own position on power resources is cen-
using the term power in the Weberian zero-sum tral to our argument about the relations among
sense that postulates conflict as endemic to social rule making, rule breaking, and power.
life. The usual understanding about resources for
power in social science is that power rests on at-
tributes or things, such as personal skills, tech-
Power Resources: The nical expertise, money the control of oppor-
Distributional Perspective tunities to make money, prestige or access to
prestige, numbers of people, or the capacity to
A zero-sum view of power leaves much un- mobilize numbers of people. Randall Collins
settled, including such perennial disputes as (1975:60–1) summarizes the prevailing wisdom
whether power is a latent capacity or whether as follows:
it must be actualized to be called power. Also,
Look for the material things that affect interaction:
are the unintended consequences of action evi- the physical places, the modes of communication, the
dence of power? These disputes have given rise supply of weapons, devices for staging one’s public
impression, tools, and goods. Assess the relative re-
7 sources available to each individual: their potential for
We should note here the work of Adam Przeworski
and Michael Wallerstein (1982, 1985), who develop the physical coercion, their access to other persons with
argument that under specified conditions class conflict whom to negotiate, their sexual attractiveness, their
in capitalist and democratic societies can produce a mu- store of cultural devices for invoking emotional soli-
tually beneficial class compromise institutionalized and darity, as well as the physical arrangements just men-
coordinated by the state. tioned . . . . The resources for conflict are complex.
8
See, for example, Parsons’s (1960:220) well-known
attack on C. Wright Mills (1956). Alvin Gouldner (1970) Collins’s catalog is familiar and not notably dif-
is virtually a book-length polemic against Parsons, but ferent from Dahl’s (1961:226) “common sense”
see especially Chapter 8.
9
See also Dennis Wrong (1979:237–47), for a good list of “anything that can be used to sway the
discussion of this dispute. And see Anthony Giddens specific choices or the strategies of another indi-
(1977). vidual” or Oberschall’s (1973:28) discussion of
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“anything from material resources – jobs, in- power.14 By extension, if all sorts of things
come, savings, and the right to material goods matter as resources, almost everyone has some-
and services – to nonmaterial resources – thing that can be used to influence somebody,
authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, a perspective embodied in pluralist studies of
skills, habits of industry, and so on.” Others have community power structure.15 Even those who
tried to classify resources according to some would seem to have virtually nothing that any-
discriminating principle, as when Giddens one might desire or fear have at least their num-
(1985:7) distinguishes between “allocative re- bers, an argument often regarded as self-evident.
sources,” meaning control over material goods We consider these claims to be both empirically
and the natural forces that can be harnessed in contestable and theoretically opaque.
their production, and “authoritative resources,” Typically, however, the kinds of goods and
meaning control over the activities of human traits singled out by analysts as key resources are
beings. Etzioni (1968:357–59) distinguishes be- not widely distributed but are concentrated at
tween utilitarian resources or material induce- the top of the social hierarchy. This is what
ments, coercive resources that can be used to Giddens intends to convey by identifying “al-
do violence to bodies or psyches and normative locative” and “authoritative” resources as the
or symbolic rewards or threats.10 Tilly (1978:69) bases for power and what Etzioni implies with
takes a more strictly economistic tack, empha- his classification of resources as utilitarian, co-
sizing “the economist’s factors of production: ercive, and normative. It is also the implication
land, labor, capital, perhaps technical expertise of schemes such as Tilly’s land, labor, capital,
as well.” Mills (1956:9,23) makes the impor- and technical expertise and is the obvious mean-
tant additional point that the “truly powerful” ing of Mill’s definition. It follows that power is
are those “who occupy the command posts” of also concentrated at the top. The reasoning is
major institutions,” because such institutions are straightforward. Some attributes and things mat-
the bases for great concentrations of resources.11 ter more to people than others. Wealth, pres-
And everyone appears to agree that one kind tige, and the instruments of physical coercion
of resource can be used to gain another, as re- are all reliable bases for dominating others. Be-
sources are “transferred, assembled, reallocated, cause these traits and goods are, everyone agrees,
exchanged” and invested.12 In sum, from this distributed by social rank, it appears to follow
perspective, power resources are the attributes as night after day that people with higher social
or things that one actor can use to coerce or rank have more power and people with lower
induce another actor.13 social rank have less.
The sheer proliferation of lists of resources This distributional view of power is certainly
that can result from this perspective, from money not altogether wrong. Indeed, it matches much
to popularity to numbers to spare time, has ordinary human experience. Most of the time,
sometimes been the basis for arguing for a con- those who have riches, or prestige, technical
siderable indeterminacy in the patterning of skill, or guns do dominate those who have none
of these things. Moreover, riches and prestige
10
William Gamson’s (1968:100–4) classification of re- and skill tend to flow together, creating a class
sources according to whether they are used for induce- hierarchy. But if this pattern of power were en-
ment, constraint, or persuasion is similar to Etzioni’s. tirely and inevitably so, all efforts by people at
11
This point about the organizational bases of power
was later developed by Robert Presthus (1964).
lower positions in the social hierarchy to exert
12
The language here is taken from Oberschall (1973: power, including by actions that break the rules,
28); for the identical point in different language, see
14
Dahl (1961:227). The obvious point that wealth, sta- Dahl (1961:226), for example, begins his own list
tus, and power are each all potential means to the other with “control over an individual’s time.” By this sort of
was originally made by Weber and is discussed in Wrong reasoning, the unemployed should be expected to exert
(1979:229). substantial influence.
13 15
Other and more elaborate lists of resources can be The classic study is Dahl (1961). See also Polsby
found in Lasswell and Kaplan (1950:83–92). (1963).
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would be in vain. Perhaps such efforts could be electoral relations, labor-capital relations, mar-
understood as an expression of an enduring hu- riages, or churches can be explained in isola-
man proclivity to try to influence others, but the tion from each other (which leads us to another
proclivity is inevitably without consequence if version of the pluralist concept of power). The
resources for power are fixed in advance by pat- formally democratic state may be only formally
terned inequalities in the distribution of things democratic and the key relations may not be be-
and traits. tween citizen-voters and state leaders but per-
Thus, if the distribution of power simply re- haps between the owners of property and state
flected other structured inequalities, then po- leaders. But even when they are wrong, such
litical challenges from below would always be perspectives have the virtue of a certain coher-
without effect. The realm of power and pol- ence, in the sense that ideas about the power
itics would inevitably reiterate other inequali- resources that enable one group or individual
ties. And social thinkers observing very unequal to dominate another are firmly rooted in ideas
societies would not worry about defiance and about the patterned relationships that bind them
disorder as potential challenges to established together. We know why a thing or trait can be
authority. employed by one actor to sway another because
we know something about how they depend
on each other. This patterned interdependence
interdependent relations and is what Michael Schwartz (1976:172–3) has in
resources for power mind when he writes about “structural power”
as follows:
We believe that a different way of thinking about
resources for power is more useful in interpret- Since a structure cannot function without the rou-
ing rule breaking and rule making. Examples tinized exercise of structural power, any threat to
that focus on specific institutional settings point structural power becomes a threat to that system itself.
Thus if employees suddenly began refusing to obey
us in the right direction. The effective exer-
orders, the company in question could not function.
cise of power in electoral representative insti- Or if tenants simply disobeyed the merchant’s order to
tutions, for example, or in industry or in mat- grow cotton, the tenancy system would collapse . . . .
ing relationships, does not result simply from Thus, we see a subtle, but very important, relationship
a general currency of things or traits and the between structural power and those who are subject
pattern of their distribution but rather depends to it. On the one hand, these power relations de-
on the specific relationships that make particu- fine the functioning of any ongoing system; on the
other hand, the ability to disrupt these relationships
lar things or traits useful and important. Thus,
is exactly the sort of leverage which can be used to
political analyses that focus on formal electoral alter the functioning of the system. . . . Any system
arrangements identify votes as a key resource. contains within itself the possibility of power strong
Although disembodied votes mean nothing, in enough to alter it.
formal democratic theory votes matter greatly
because state leaders are dependent on voting These observations suggest a general perspec-
majorities to retain office. Analyses that assume tive on resources for power that is less static than
relations of production to be preeminent iden- the distributional perspective and that is capa-
tify control of capital or labor as key resources ble of explaining not only why those who have
for the exercise of power by contending classes. riches or status usually prevail but also why those
A focus on religious institutions might highlight without riches or status nevertheless try to pre-
the priesthood’s control over religious revelation vail and sometimes even succeed. It also helps
and salvation, on the one side, and the laity’s to explain, as a distributional perspective can-
control of acknowledged faith, on the other. not, why the making and breaking of rules is
These perspectives may not be right, but if they central to the pervasive contests of social life.
are not right it is because they have misspeci- Resources for power are not only or pri-
fied the key relationships within which power marily the disembodied attributes or things that
is to be exercised or assumed that power in can be used to induce or coerce others but
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in addition are derived from the patterns of only because of the social relations in which
interdependence that characterize all social the actors are enmeshed.18 Control over capital
life.16 Of course, systems of economic or po- is an effective resource for exercising power
litical or religious or military or ideological or over others because those others are already
kinship interdependence vary from one society entangled in a system of economic relations that
to another and from one location in a given so- makes them dependent on entrepreneurs for the
ciety to another. Such variations matter greatly means of production and subsistence, or they are
in deciphering the actual distribution of power enmeshed in a political system that makes gov-
and the potential for the exercise of power. Our ernment dependent on tax revenues generated
point for now, however, is that whatever the spe- by private wealth. Numbers are considered a
cific pattern of social relations, the social fact political resource because the parties to a conflict
of relationship and interdependence generates contend within a set of political relationships
the resources, as well as the occasions, for the that gives voting majorities, and hence num-
exercise of power. bers, significance in determining who will hold
In other words, power resources are embed- constituted state authority. Or a thing called
ded in the patterns of expectation and cooper- money carries great weight because it is a script
ation that bind people together, even when all that governs the distribution of material goods
that is expected or required of particular peo- in a specific system of economic relationships.
ple is their quiescence. Cooperation implies pat- The large and important exception to this un-
terns of mutual dependence, and mutual depen- derstanding of power resources as rooted in so-
dence implies the possibility of using others for cial interdependence are the things and traits that
desired ends – to exert power. People have po- allow one actor to dominate another by using or
tential power, the ability to make others do what they threatening to use physical force. Force cannot
want, when those others depend on them for the contri- reasonably be said to depend on any social re-
butions they make to the interdependent relations that lationship. Indeed, modern military technology
are social life. Just as the effort to exert power is a has made even the minimal relationship implied
feature of all social interaction, so is the capacity by physical proximity unnecessary for the ex-
to exert power at least potentially inherent in all ercise of power through force. This is a large
social interaction. And because cooperative and exception, not only because force is employed
interdependent social relations are by definition or threatened more widely than is usually ac-
reciprocal, so is the potential for the exercise of knowledged but also because the threat of force
power.17 lurks in the background even in the manifold
Moreover, many of the things and attributes interdependent relationships in which it plays
emphasized by other writers as resources for no direct role, as is obvious in the pervasive in-
power are effective inducements or sanctions fluence of state coercion in regulating social life.
Even putting aside this important exception,
16
we quickly admit that at first glance our perspec-
The foundational statement is Hegel’s discussion
of independence and dependence in the relationship of
tive on power resources as embedded in social
master and servant. See Carl J. Friedrich (ed.) The Phi- interdependencies makes rather less sense of
losophy of Hegel, Modern Library Edition, New York: our common experiences than does the distri-
Random House, 1953:399–411. Michael Mann’s ar- butional perspective. The focus on interdepen-
gument that we “conceive of societies as federated, dence suggests a strain toward equality, whereas
overlapping, intersecting networks rather than as sim-
ple totalities” complements this discussion of power. See
social life as we know it is everywhere unequal.
Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A History of A great deal remains therefore to be explained.
Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, Cambridge, UK: Still, it is worth recalling that Thomas Hobbes,
Cambridge University Press, 1986:17.
17
A quite different argument roots power relations in
18
social cooperation by arguing that cooperation toward Giddens (1984:33) says something like this when he
a common purpose makes necessary some hierarchy claims that what he calls “allocative resources” become
of command in order to coordinate activities. See resources “only when incorporated within processes of
Collingwood (1942:153–4). structuration.”
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an astute theorist of power, took the essential If people without wealth or status or techni-
equality among people as his starting point. The cal skill sometimes prevail, then they must have
Hobbesian understanding stressed endemic and some kind of power. Their power, the power
rapacious conflict precisely because all people of people we ordinarily consider powerless, de-
have the resources for conflict. It is not inequal- rives from the patterns of interdependence that
ity of resources for power, and the resulting constitute social life and from the leverage em-
entrenched patterns of domination, that are bedded in interdependent relations. In a feudal
natural as in the distributional perspective, but system of production, not only do peasants need
a rough equality of resources, and the ensuing overlords, but overlords need peasants. There is
endemic and pervasive conflict, that is natural. no production and no surplus for the overlord
At least some part of our experience confirms without peasant labor. Similarly, not only does
this seemingly paradoxical view as well. To be labor need capital in an industrial system of
sure, rural overlords have wealth, social stand- production. Just as land is not a means of pro-
ing, and force of arms, and peasants have none duction without those who work it, so is capital
of these things. Most of the time, the overlords not capital without labor. And it is not only the
are the powerful, the peasants are the powerless, poor who need contributions from the rich; in
and the distributional conception of power a society of densely interdependent relations,
seems confirmed. But sometimes peasants rise the rich also need contributions from the poor.
up against their overlords. They refuse to labor If nothing else, they need them to be quiescent.
in the lord’s fields or withhold their rents or The systems of interdependence that con-
taxes or take to arms or to the hills. When they stitute societies determine the main lines of
do, the outcome often goes against them. But it strategic action available to contending actors
does not inevitably go against them. Sometimes, or, in another language, shape the repertoires
in some places, peasants prevail. Or at least, they of political action.20 Thus contention in eco-
win something, perhaps some moderation of nomic relations takes broadly predictable forms
the terms of their subjugation. And sometimes, as different groups try to exert leverage by
whether in the end for better or worse, their withholding or threatening to withhold their
actions become part of the chain of events that contributions to production: owners or man-
transforms their society. Workers may refuse to agers engage in lockouts or blacklists or capital
labor or take to the streets or to the barricades. flight on the one side; workers engage in labor
When they do, the outcome is not necessarily strikes or slowdowns or sabotage on the other.
foretold. Insurgent workers sometimes win In religious institutions, the priesthood can
something. Sometimes, they win shorter hours threaten to withhold the promise of salvation
or higher wages. More rarely still, they help set whereas adherents and acolytes can threaten
in motion the forces that topple governments. a withdrawal of faith. In political institutions,
Even the marginal poor, those on the fringes the complex interdependencies between state
of social life, the people who seem to have no actors and private property owners are activated
role in ongoing patterns of economic, social, or by curbs on property rights on the one side, by
political activity, can become the urban mobs capital flight or tax rebellions on the other.
of the American or French Revolutions or the These examples are certainly too broad; they
urban rioters of contemporary Latin America. are virtual caricatures of the actually diverse and
And even rioters sometimes win something.19 specific interdependent relations that charac-
terize real societies, especially complex modern
19 societies. For one thing, few relationships are
The literature on the reverberations of challenges
from below is, of course, enormous. “Social movements simple dyadic relations as in our examples so far.
based on power resources,” Janoski (1998) asserts boldly,
“provide the pressure for change in citizenship rights.” For
20
a series of studies on contemporary protest movements The term repertoire is used by Charles Tilly (1982:
and their outcomes in Latin America, see Eckstein and 21–51, 1984:308, 1986:253–80) to describe the charac-
Wickham-Crowley (2002). teristic forms of collective action employed by a group.
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A web of complex networks of political, eco- intrapersonal strategies by which actors reduced
nomic, and cultural interdependencies has to their power disadvantages by reducing their
be analyzed if the actual potential for power by own motivational investment in the power-
different participants in these networks is to be dependence relationship or by increasing the
deciphered. Moreover, the myriad relations of investment of their antagonist. These ideas
everyday life in which people try to exert power were tested in a series of experiments in small
may not be the classical hierarchical relations group settings. This narrow and ahistorical
between overlords and peasants, or even capital tack, however, probably goes far to account for
and labor. Contemporary power relations are the limited influence of Emerson’s perspective.
also between foremen and workers, guards and Peter Blau’s (1964) subsequent development
prisoners, merchants and customers, landlords of Emerson’s work has received more attention,
and tenants, husbands and wives, bureaucrats prompting Coser (1976:157) to call it “one
and clients, doctors and patients, teachers and of the most significant advances” in the study
students. Lateral relations are also grids of inter- of power. But although Blau rightly faulted
dependency, as in the relations among workers Emerson for a focus on “balancing operations”
or prisoners or students. For some purposes that diverted attention from the actuality of
these multiple concrete relations may not be power imbalances, Blau himself made changes
very important. When doctors and patients, in Emerson’s initial premise that had the effect
or wives and husbands, try to use the leverage of naturalizing – and legitimating – existing
inherent in these interdependent relationships power relations. Where Emerson (1962:32) had
to exercise power, each on the other, the re- begun from the premise that social relations
verberations of their actions are usually limited. “commonly entail ties of mutual dependence
They are not likely to transform institutions or between the parties,” Blau (1964:118) empha-
societies. Nevertheless, the concrete relations of sized a one-sided and unilateral dependence
everyday life may loom very large in patterning and proposed that such dependence could be
the real efforts of people to exercise power and explained by the unequal contributions that
to exercise power by breaking rules. Most of the different parties made to a relationship:
time, people only try to make their everyday
lives. They do not try to make history.21 By supplying services in demand to others, a person
Our perspective shares a premise with the establishes power over them. If he regularly renders
needed services they cannot readily obtain elsewhere,
conception of power developed by “exchange
others become dependent on and obligated to him
theorists” in sociology. The initiating insight of for these services, . . . unless they can furnish other
exchange theory was contained in an article by benefits to him that produce interdependence . . . .
Richard M. Emerson (1962),22 who proposed
that power was an attribute not of social actors Blau thus treats power imbalances as a reflection
but of relationships. Power resides in the depen- of imbalances in the contributions different
dence that one actor has on another in social people make to collective life. Concentrations
relationships. In this and later work, Emerson of power merely register dependence on ser-
puzzled over the processes through which vices and benefits. The power that employers
power inequalities were reduced by what he have over their employees, or husbands over
called “balancing operations” – intrapsychic or wives, is the result of the benefits they provide
that employees and wives need and cannot get
21
A point forcefully made by Flacks (1988). elsewhere. By resting the case there, Blau in
22
Emerson’s perspective in turn had antecedents in effect eliminates the moral problematic and em-
the work of Waller (1951) and (1949) who both ar- pirical tension in power relations. Those who
gued that in sexual relations the partner who is less in- are dominant are those who contribute more;
volved and therefore less dependent on the other has
greater power. And see Bacharach and Lawler (1980) for those who are subordinate contribute less.
a discussion of mutual dependence in organizational and Even casual attention to real historical patterns
labor-management bargaining situations. of domination and subordination – of tenant
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farmers by plantation owners, for example, or ongoing relationship. Why, then, is nothing else
of wives by husbands, or servants by masters – equally distributed? Or more specifically, why
and the key assumption of the exchange theory don’t people use the potential power embedded
of power, that domination reflects greater in social interdependence to secure a more
contributions to social relationships, collapses. equal distribution of the things that they value?
Landowners and railroad magnates did not, after
all, become dominant because their contribu-
tions in the form of what Blau (1964:118) calls The Problem of Actionability
“needed services” were inherently greater than
the contributions of those who tilled the prairies A large part of the answer is that some contribu-
or laid the tracks or succored the children. tions to interdependencies can more readily be
Although we share Emerson’s premise that used to exert leverage than others. The lines of
the sources of power are to be found in inter- power, of domination and exploitation, tend to
dependent social relations, we do not think that reflect not the actual value of the contribution
power inequalities reflect unequal contributions of services or benefits to others, as Blau argues,
to these relations. On the contrary, notions but rather differences in the “actionability” of
about unequal contributions to systems of contributions. Interdependencies generate po-
social cooperation are usually intensely ideo- tential resources for power. Whether they can
logical. The view that landlords or capitalists be acted on or not is, however, a highly contin-
or breadwinners make greater contributions to gent matter.
interdependent relations than those who are The basic power tactic that arises out of inter-
subordinate to them is just that sort of notion. dependency is to withhold or threaten to with-
The belief that a landowner “owns” land, and hold what others need. But that is usually easier
can therefore supply it to those who don’t, or for some participants than for others, and easier
that investors “own” capital, is itself variable and under some conditions than under others, and
contingent, a reflection of the system of rules for several reasons.
and interpretations within which social interde- First, contributions to interdependent rela-
pendencies develop. Contributions to interde- tions must be recognized before they can be-
pendent relations can be real, in the sense that come actionable. Interdependencies are real in
they involve action on and in the material world. the sense that they have real ramifications in the
And they are real in the sense that they generate material bases of social life. But they are also
real responses from actual others. They are also, cultural constructions. At first glance it might
however, socially and ideologically constructed, seem that the very fact of participation in coop-
and they are socially constructed differently erative activities would lead people to recognize
by different people.23 Moreover, socially con- their own contributions. Perhaps so, or at least
structed ideas about contributions can and do to some extent and under some conditions, as
change, a point we discuss in the next section.24 explained in the next section. But this recog-
Virtually by definition, reciprocal interde- nition must overcome inherited interpretations
pendencies argue a rough equality of contri- that privilege the contributions of dominant
butions, in the sense that the contributions of groups, as well as the continuing ability of dom-
different parties are equally necessary to the inant groups to project new and obscuring in-
terpretations. Simply put, people must recogn-
23
That this is so, and may nevertheless not be readily
ize their potential power before they can act on it.
observable, is perhaps James C. Scott’s (1985, 1990) main Second, to effectively threaten to disrupt on-
point about peasant resistance. going interdependencies requires, where con-
24
The shift in public opinion effected by the cam- tributions are collective, that the power seekers
paign in the United States to “reform” welfare is an themselves coordinate their actions, something
example. Where prior to the campaign, the mothering
activities of poor women had been accorded some le- that is easier for an organized church, state, or
gitimacy, the campaign persuaded the public that only firm, for example, than for numerous dispersed
wage work was a legitimate social contribution. believers or citizens or workers. Note that our
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meaning here is not simply the usual organizing relations depends on whether the challengers
idea that individuals and their resources must be confront the threat of physical coercion. Again,
aggregated but rather that it is the contributions the history of the use of force to crush American
necessary for the functioning of an ongoing so- labor insurgencies provides a vivid illustration.26
cial relationship that must be aggregated. We call This is the problem of force.
this the problem of coordination. Or, to put the problem of actionability an-
Third, power seekers must be able themselves other way, some contributions to interdepen-
to tolerate the costs imposed by a halt in coop- dent relations are more liquid, more readily
erative activities, which is usually (but not in- converted into power resources, than others.27
evitably) easier for capitalists than for workers, Further, some contributors who try to activate
for example, or for landlords than tenants. This interdependencies risk more than others, which
is the problem of endurance or staying power. matters greatly for the possiblity of transforming
The fourth condition for effective action on interdependencies into power. Even so, how-
contributions is that the power seekers be able to ever, this is not the whole of it. The action-
prevent those with whom they are contending ability of different contributions is variable and
from finding substitute contributions. For ex- contingent: people who are dispersed and di-
ample, striking workers try to prevent their em- vided do sometimes manage to forge unified
ployers from hiring other workers or wives try action; those who are hard-pressed sometimes
to limit their husbands’ access to other women. accomplish stunning feats of endurance; under
This is the problem of controlling the supply of some conditions, contributions from below can-
alternatives. not easily be replaced; exit may mean forfeit-
A fifth condition for the exercise of power ing whatever was desirable in the relationship;
in interdependent relations is that contenders and the threat of force has both limits and costs.
do not respond to challenges by simply exiting Much of the social movement literature about
from the relationship, or threatening to exit, as the conditions that give rise to new collec-
when peasants evade the exactions of an over- tive claims from below can be recast as being
bearing prince simply by moving elsewhere or about the conditions that make it possible for
employers facing strike actions threaten to close lower status people to act on interdependent
down. This is the well-known problem of exit. power.
Sixth, the effective use of the leverage inher- But there is another large part of the answer
ent in interdependencies requires that the power to why reciprocity in contributions to social life
seekers be free from constraints that might be does not lead to greater equality in power rela-
imposed by their interdependent relationships tions, and this part of the answer is ordinarily
with other parties, as when would-be peasant ignored. Social rules inhibit the activation of
insurgents are constrained by the threat of re- interdependencies and hence restrict the wide
ligious excommunication or when labor insur- exercise of power.
gents are constrained by the threat of interven-
tion by the courts. Indeed, it is widely agreed
that recurrent defeats of American labor strug- rules as instruments of power
gles were the result of just such “third party”
state interventions.25 This is the problem of mul- Rules are often treated as simply the basic pos-
tiple and constraining bonds. tulates of collective life, so elementary a fea-
Seventh and last, the realization of the power ture that they do not themselves have to be
potential inherent in interdependent social
26
For a recent discussion, see Goldstein (2001).
25 27
The role of government in crushing labor insur- William Gamson (1968:94–5), who relies on a dis-
gency is one of our main points in Poor People’s Move- tributional concept of power, uses the term liquidity to
ments (1977, Chapter 3), and it explains the continuing differentiate between power resources and potential re-
emphasis of American unions on building its electoral sources that must be deployed or mobilized before they
leverage. See for illustrations of these contemporary ef- can be used to influence others. Immediately available
forts Lazarovici (2002:14–17). power resources are more “liquid.”
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explained.28 But rules are also the achievement Thus the age-old rules the peasant follows
of social life: created by people, enforced by when he tills the fields, even when these rules are
people, and violated by people. Rule making endowed with sacred meanings that reinforce
is, whatever else it may be, a power strategy a pattern of worldly hierarchy, nevertheless do
with which some people try to make others do not usually mainly reflect domination but rather
what they want. Rules do this by specifying the distill a centuries-old reservoir of communal
behaviors that are permissible by different par- knowledge. James C. Scott (1976) describes the
ties in interdependent relations. And because the rules to ensure against subsistence crises among
rules are fashioned to reflect prevailing patterns Southeast Asian peasants, including rules com-
of domination, they prohibit some people but manding redistribution when dearth is threat-
not other people from using the leverage yielded ened. Carol Stack’s (1974) account of rules gov-
by social interdependence. erning the exchange of gifts and services in an
Although the view that rules are an instru- urban ghetto are similarly strategies honed by
ment of power will surely not be unfamiliar, experience to ensure community survival in the
and has in fact been advanced from time to time face of scarcity and uncertainty. The laws of con-
and perhaps most boldly by sociologists in the tract that made possible the growth of merchant
field of criminology,29 it nevertheless seems too capitalism in Europe were not – although they
brash and too simple. And it surely is too simple, would later be put to that purpose in relations
which is part of the reason this argument has not with labor – primarily instruments of domina-
seemed credible when it has been advanced in tion but rather facilitated exchange by making
the past. It is too simple insofar that the quest the terms of contract more secure. Perhaps most
for power certainly does not exhaust the social of the myriad rules that govern the daily actions
meaning of rules and rule making. Rules or- of people – driving to work, crossing the street,
der human activities in ways that have little di- responding to a fire alarm – are merely the regu-
rect bearing on power. Thus the rules that guide lating framework that makes group life possible.
people in their everyday behavior, that tell them However, this functional perspective on rules
how to till the fields or work their machines or does not help to make sense of those impor-
mate or die, do much more than establish and tant rules that are the lynchpins of the patterns
maintain patterns of hierarchy. They make avail- of domination of a given society. Rules are ba-
able to people the wisdom of accumulated ex- sic to group life, but so is the play of power,
perience, and they secure people against the to- the effort to use others to achieve ends even
tally unexpected in social encounters. They also against opposition. Perhaps the most important
make possible the tacit cooperation that underway that people try to use social relationships to
pins social life. In the classical line of sociolog- achieve their ends over time is by rule making.
ical thinking from Durkheim to Parsons, rules The ability of social actors to use the leverage
originate and persist in the effort to solve these generated by interdependent social relations is
problems of collective life. contingent and subject to change, for all of the
reasons we have already given. But power can be
made more secure by fashioning rules that de-
28
“Humans are rule makers,” says Guillermina Jasso fine or redefine the contributions made by dif-
(2001:48). “Every day, and in every area of life, they ferent contenders in interdependent relations,
make rules – rules for themselves, rules for other individ-
uals, and rules for groups and societies.” We should add
thus making the contributions of some recog-
that recently rational choice analysts have in fact given a nizable and obscuring the contributions of oth-
good deal of attention to the effort to explain the evo- ers. In so doing, rules also legitimate the actions
lution of rules. See, for example, Jonathan Bendor and available to some contenders while delegitimat-
Piotr Swistak (2001:1493–545). See also Hechter and ing the actions available to others.
Opp (2001).
29
See, for example, Vold (1958), Turk (1966), The first aspect of these power rules might be
Sutherland (1943:99–111), Quinney (1973), Chambliss called the social construction of contributions.
(1975:149–70). Recall Blau’s mistake in assuming that power
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inequalities flowed from inequalities of contri- fact of social interdependency, and it curbs the
butions. A vivid example is the legal construc- use of power by some people and not by others.
tion of private property. Once a legal right is The play of power is never free play.
established that confers total possession of land Rule making is thus the exercise of the power
or goods on certain actors, that possession in of some to neutralize the power of others in in-
turn is understood as their contribution to interdependent relations. This exercise of power
terdependent relations. When commercializing stabilizes power by institutionalizing it. The
landowners across Europe and Asia apppropri- force of tradition, the authority of the group and
ated common lands and wastelands, they turned the state, and the force of group and state sanc-
to the state to make and enforce laws that up- tions against the rule violator are added to the
held their right to do so in the face of local exercise of power. Simmel (1950:263) grasped
resistance and to sanction those who resisted. some of this when he wrote the following:
Once “ownership” of the disputed lands was
As soon as the ruler gives the law as law, he docu-
established, it became the basis for new rela- ments himself, to this extent, as the organ of an ideal
tions between owners and the working peas- necessity. He merely reveals a norm which is plainly
antry. Similarly, the French colonial regime in valid on the ground of its inner sense and that of the
Algeria replaced a complex system of commu- situation, whether or not the ruler actually enunciates
nal rights to use the land with a new law of it.
private property. At one stroke the law “threw
Simmel made this comment in the context of
all land held by Muslims upon the open market,
arguing that the ruler himself becomes subject
and made it available for purchase or seizure by
to the law he promulgates, a point of some im-
French colonists” on whom the Algerian peas-
portance, especially in understanding why in-
antry then depended for access to land (Wolf,
surgents often invoke some aspect of the law
1969:213).
itself to justify their defiance. But he also said
The property laws that now regulate social
that the law, as an “objective power,” enforces
and economic relations also construct contri-
subordination by objectifying it. Thus when the
butions in ways that legitimate power. As eco-
worker is under contract, the character of his
nomic activity in evolving capitalist societies
subordination changes, for then “The worker is
came to depend less on the control of land and
no longer subject as a person but only as the
more on the control of capital and goods, so
servant of an objective, economic procedure,” a
were laws developed and elaborated that secured
procedure dictated by “objective requirements”
the access of some groups to these new or newly
(262–3). In a similar way, contracts imposed by
important forms of property and ensured their
employers on workers, or by welfare staff on
exclusive rights to dispose of property, while
recipients, seem to be neutral agreements be-
limiting the access and rights of other groups.
tween freely negotiating and equal parties.31
Ongoing patterns of interdependence thus
We can now comment on a feature of rule
continually stimulate efforts by some parties
making in modern societies that has been the
to make rules that simultaneously legitimate
source of some dispute. “It is inherent in the spe-
their domination in interdependent relations
cial character of the law, as a body of rules and
and limit what others can do in these relations.
procedures,” says E. P. Thompson (1975:262–
In the course of these contests, what some con-
3), “that it shall apply logical criteria with refer-
tenders expropriate comes to be defined as pri-
ence to standards of universality and equity . . . .
vate property, what others expropriate is defined
The essential precondition for the effectiveness
as stolen goods.30 In other words, rule making
curbs the use of power resources inherent in the
31
Sanford Schram (2000:chapter 1) makes the argu-
ment that the use of “contracts” between welfare de-
30
For historical illustrations, see the accounts in Hall partments and welfare recipients is deceptively neutral.
(1952:62–79), Douglas Hay (1975a, 1975b), Thompson For a more general discussion of the criminal law and its
(1975). implementation as political domination, see Turk (1982).
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of law . . . is that it shall display an independence prohibition or restriction the strategies available
from gross manipulation and shall seem to be to some actors and not the strategies available
just.” Even when due account is taken for what to others. That laws restricting strikes apply to
may be the distinctly Western and modern fo- workers and employers alike is not significant.
cus of Thompson’s generalization, we think the What is significant is that laws governing labor
universal character of law has to be seen in a dif- strikes have always been far harsher than laws
ferent light. Rules cast in the language of univer- that restrain capital strikes by investors.
sality nevertheless discriminate among different The rules themselves are therefore a major
kinds of contributions to interdependent rela- focus of contention. People will do battle about
tions and thus restrict the power strategies of what actions are permissable by whom in inter-
different actors differently. dependent relations, about which parties to a re-
We think this observation clarifies the some- lationship have the legitimate right to withhold
times belabored and confusing argument by or threaten to withhold their contributions or,
“critical” criminologists, who weave unsteadily less directly, which parties have the right to un-
between the view that the substance of the dertake the organizing activities that will make
law is inherently biased against the lower orders their contributions actionable. The bitter labor
and the alternative argument that the enforce- struggles in Europe and the United States pre-
ment of the law is uneven, exempting dominant cisely over the right to strike were struggles over
groups.32 Gouldner (1950:296) contributed to the right to use contributions to interdepen-
this confusion with his breezy charge that the dent relations as a power resource. Other statutes
law is not an objective power at all. On the were devised that forbid the organization of
contrary, “the possession of power itself enables workers employed by the emerging manufactur-
some to default on their moral obligations . . . ing class (Orren, 1991; Hattam, 1993; Forbath,
and . . . this default of morality is itself estab- 1989:1111–256). Nineteenth-century struggles
lished as customary.”33 That the powerful evade for freedom of speech, or worship, or assem-
moral sanctions is surely true, at least much of bly were similarly struggles over the right to
the time.34 organize contributions to interdependent rela-
However, we believe our point is more tions (Pope 1997:941–1031).35 The outcome of
telling. Rules shore up power not just because these struggles may be to reaffirm existing power
they are biased or enforced unequally. Rather, rules, but it may also lead to their modification.
the rules are only superficially universal, as in Popular struggles did win freedom of speech and
Anatole France’s jibe about the law that pro- worship; workers did win the right to unionize
hibits the rich and the poor alike from sleeping and the right to strike, albeit on closely defined
under bridges. Laws shore up power not mainly terms. Also, rules can be modified by the pow-
by unequal enforcement but by singling out for erful, as when long-standing rights to the use
of the commons or the forests are withdrawn,
32 the right to unionize is whittled back, or speech
See, for example, the discussion of crime and law
enforcement in Nigeria in Chambliss (1975).
33
Gouldner goes on to say “The more powerful
35
are . . . both ready and able to institutionalize compliance See Pope (1997) for a discussion of labor’s effort to
with the moral code at levels congenial to themselves and use the 13th amendment to establish “Labor’s Constitu-
more costly to those with less power . . . . The powerful tion of Freedom.” Much of the literature treats New
can thus conventionalize their moral defaults (emphasis Deal labor legislation as if it allowed labor to break
in the original, 1950:297). Relatedly, Hechter and Bor- free of this tradition of legal constraint. More accu-
land (2001:186–233) argue that ambiguity in the norm rately, whereas New Deal legislation, and the court de-
of national self-determination enables more powerful ac- cisions which followed, created a new legal framework,
tors to employ the norm strategically. that framework also limited and channeled labor’s efforts
34
E. P. Thompson (1975:262) rightly criticizes this to use interdependent power. See Piven and Cloward
overgeneralized view of the law “as a pliant medium (1977:155–75). Nelson Lichtenstein (2002) also makes
to be twisted this way and that by whichever interests the case that the sorry state of contemporary unions is
already possess effective power.” very much owed to the New Deal legal framework.
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rights are curtailed. Such changes in the struc- Because the power relations underlying the
ture of rules alter the legitimate repertoire of introduction of systems of rules tend to emerge
political action by different participants in in- more vividly as the events recede in time and
terdependent relationships. And the inevitable space, we turn to some historical examples. The
recurrence of such power conflicts means that feudal laws that governed the relations between
the structure of rules is never stable for long. lord and vassal were cemented by an oath of
fealty at a time when the breaking of an oath
held the palpable terror of everlasting damna-
the state as promulgator and tion. The vassal was obliged by law to work
enforcer of rules the lord’s domain, to serve in and supply the
lord’s armed retinue, and to submit to the lord’s
In modern societies, the rules that sustain im- will in matters of marriage or trade (Tigar and
portant forms of domination are typically for- Levy, 1977; Markoff, 1996). Such laws were cer-
mulated and imposed by the state. “The mod- tainly functional for feudal communities, aside
ern state,” Weber (1946:82) says bluntly, “is a from their role in maintaining a power struc-
compulsory association which organizes domi- ture. They made possible a system of armed
nation.” The laws that prohibit certain behav- protectorates that provided a measure of security
iors in interdependent relations, and prescribe for lords and vassals alike in an era of violence
the penalties to be imposed on violators, should and pillage. Feudal law, like any system of rules,
be understood as the use of power to stabilize also established a framework to regulate mul-
power, by means of the state’s bureaucratic ap- tiple forms of cooperation and secure people
paratus for promulgating and elaborating rules against the unexpected contingencies of social
and monitoring compliance, and by means of life. Moreover, these rules obligated the lord to
its coercive resources for enforcing compliance. provide for his vassals in bad years. Christopher
Lawmaking and law enforcement in the modern Hill (1952:36) argues that undergirding feudal
world is, whatever else it may also be, the use notions of the responsibility of lord to vassal
of the formidable arsenal of the state to inhibit was the economic imperative of keeping the
challenges to ongoing patterns of domination people who worked the land alive during pe-
in interdependent relations. This argues that the riods of dearth. This limited reciprocity may
most telling kind of power, at least in modern have also indicated that the power of the dom-
societies, is political power. Effective leverage inant class was not total. In any case, whatever
in political relations results in the promulgation else it did, an important consequence of feu-
and enforcement of state laws that enhance or dal law was to stabilize the raw power of a rul-
constrain the exercise of power in any of the ing class that had initially been based largely on
myriad social networks of a society. force.
The system of law thus constitutes a new con- The main recourse of subordinate groups was
straining social reality, a structure of power built evasion or flight.37 It was not easy to counter
by the accumulation and objectification of the these stratagems with armies. Then, as later,
outcome of past power struggles.36 Once suc- surveillance was difficult, and the geographical
cessfully institutionalized, the law shapes ongo- reach of military forces was limited. But the rit-
ing conflicts by constraining or enhancing the ual meanings and legitimate sanctions embodied
ability of contemporary actors to use whatever in the feudal code inhibited recourse to the vas-
leverage they have in interdependent social re- sal’s stratagems of evasion and flight and thus also
lations. reduced the leverage they might otherwise have
36
Our definition of structure here is broadly similar
37
to Giddens’s (1984:xxxi) definition of structure as “rules Michael Mann (1986:49 passim) argues flight was
and resources recursively implicated in social reproduc- historically the main recourse of subordinate groups con-
tion.” Giddens goes on to offer an extremely abstract fronted by the exactions military rulers who, in turn,
elaboration of what he means by rules and resources. strove to reinforce the “caging of social life.”
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exerted, albeit at the cost of fleeing the lord’s tance. Draconian punishments were meted out
protectorate. to those who tried to sabotage the new parks or
In the midfourteenth century, the plague that even those who simply took advantage of prox-
killed off an estimated half of Europe’s popula- imity and uneven surveillance to persist in the
tion shifted the balance of interdependent power exercise of hunting and other customary ancient
in favor of workers. The poor took to the road use rights (Thompson, 1975; Hay, 1975a).
in vast numbers to better the terms of their em- As commerce, manufacturing, and wealth ex-
ployment, prompting a rush of lawmaking across panded in the eighteenth century, and the forms
Europe to prohibit vagrancy and beggary and of property became more complex, opportu-
to enforce work on the terms offered by lo- nities for theft and fraud also expanded. Ac-
cal landlords. These laws were no doubt in part cordingly, the laws sanctioning theft were also
an effort to secure a modicum of social order elaborated. The process was not indirect or
in the face of the breakdown of medieval so- obscure; it was simple and bald, interest-group
cial arrangements. But they were also intended politics. Three examples are illustrative. In 1753,
to ensure the domination of landlords over la- Parliament enacted a new statute prescribing
borers. The English Statute of Laborers of 1349 hanging as the penalty for stealing shipwrecked
attempted to eliminate the leverage the poor goods. The “Merchants, Traders and Insur-
had gained from labor scarcity (enhanced by the ers of the City of London” thought existing
newly available option of service in the King’s laws insufficiently tough to discourage the scav-
army), by requiring that all able-bodied men and engers who were reducing their profits. In 1764,
women under sixty and without income accept Parliament decreed the death penalty for those
employment at wage rates that prevailed before who broke into buildings to steal or damage
the plague (Lis and Soly, 1979:48) and forbid- linen or the tools to make it, as part of an act
ding those already employed to depart without incorporating the English Linen Company. In
good cause (Chambliss, 1964:66–7; Piven and 1769, an act making the destruction of mills by
Cloward, 1993, Chapter 1). The option of exit food rioters punishable by death had quickly
was thereby prohibited. The new law limited appended to it measures providing for the pun-
exit in other ways as well. Many of the poor ishment by transportation of those who rioted
tried to survive by taking to the road and plead- against enclosure and also those who meddled
ing for alms. Not only did this make the supply with bridges and steam engines used in the
of workers and servants insecure, but the sheer mines, as one group of gentlemen after another
numbers of vagrants terrified the landed gentry. named the economic interests they wished to
They responded by securing laws that prohib- protect (Hay, 1975b:20–1).
ited the giving of alms on the one side, and Evolving English and American labor law also
vagrancy and beggary on the other, and enforc- reveals the uses of lawmaking to shore up power.
ing the latter prohibitions by the brand and the Ceilings on wages were established. Refusal of
lash and, later, the workhouse. work became a crime. Laws against unioniza-
The evolution in tandem of new laws creat- tion were succeeded by contemporary laws that
ing and elaborating the terms of ownership of closely prescribe the terms on which workers
private property, on the one hand, and of crim- can strike. All such rules limit the ability of
inal theft or property destruction, on the other, workers to use their contributions to economic
also reveals the effort to shore up power. Con- relationships to change the terms of those rela-
sider the struggle over access to English forest tionships. Lawmaking in other institutional ar-
lands that culminated in the Black Acts in the eas, such as laws against heresy or laws establish-
eighteenth century. An aristocracy intent on the ing patriarchal prerogatives in family relations,
exclusive use of the forests as pleasure parks, in also buttress power. The electoral-representative
contravention of custom, turned to the state to system itself, precisely because it raises the threat
legalize their dispossession of commoners and and possibility of equalizing power relations, is
to enforce that dispossession in the face of resis- shaped and twisted by laws and regulations that
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give the votes of some people more weight than paupers or workers or peasants some leverage in
other people.38 Once we move beyond the view interdependent relations.
that social norms mainly reflect a value consen- People do challenge domination. Each in-
sus or support key social functions, it is clear that stance of lawmaking as an exercise of power is
rule making in the modern world is, whatever paralleled by instances of efforts of women and
else it may also be, an effort by some people men to refuse, evade, or resist the constraints of
to use the state to ensure their domination in the law. The poor who were prohibited by law
relations with other people. from vagrancy and beggary took to the road
nevertheless. Starving rural people flocked to
the towns, where they laid siege to the rich
rule breaking with their pleas for alms and theft and where
their very presence was perceived as threaten-
A focus on rules and rule making can be mis- ing, as indeed it often was, and particularly so
leading, for it fits too neatly with traditional because disease epidemics often followed in the
sociological perspectives that deny agency and wake of hunger. “The permanent confronta-
conceive of social life as systems of total dom- tion with the migrating possessionless became
ination. But domination is never total. People an obsession for the ‘right-minded’ European,”
obey rules, but they also defy rules. The clas- say Lis and Soly (1979:115), and especially so in
sical sociological tradition explains rule break- the wake of bad harvests or the expropriation
ing as a byproduct of a breakdown or rupture of small holders.39 Moreover, the dispossessed
in the larger society. There is surely something seemed to think they had some rights, a re-
to this. But although breakdown or disorganiza- flection perhaps of feudal ideas of reciprocity
tion, conceived of as the weakening of socializa- (Markoff, 1996:40).40 Consequently, prohibi-
tion processes, may open the way for defiance, tions and punishments came to be comple-
we think rule breaking also has to be under- mented by provisions for relief of the poor.
stood as the effort of purposeful and reflexive The artisans and tradesmen in the small towns
human agents to exercise power. This is virtu- of medieval Europe also defied feudal law and
ally a corollary of our perspective on rule mak- took up arms to secure their freedom from
ing. If rules are strategies of domination evolved feudal obligation. Villagers forbidden access to
by purposeful and reflexive human agents, chal- the forests or the streams nevertheless poached
lenges to these rules by other agents will take and sometimes pillaged. In the eighteenth cen-
the form of defying the rules, along with other tury, as enlarging urban markets and grow-
more and less legal attempts to change the rules. ing armies depleted rural grain supplies, out-
At the very least, defiance will be a recurrent raged crowds simply commandeered the local
element in such challenges when they occur. grain, often selling it at a “just” price (Rudé,
Observers of such events may shudder at the 1964; Thompson, 1971; Tilly, 1969).41 Work-
threat to social order inherent in defiance of the ers who could not openly combine, did so se-
rules and hurry to recommend alternative and cretly, and when they could not strike legally
law-abiding remedies, whether through appeals
39
to God or appeals to the Congress. Such reme- See also Jutte (1994) and Hill (1952).
40
On this point, see John Markoff (1996:40) and Jutte
dies are not remedies. The crucial point is that
(1994:27).
precisely the actions which the law forbids give 41
See George Rudé (1964), Thompson (1971), Tilly
(1969). The tendency in this material is to understate
the element of defiance in the food riot by emphasizing
38
Most such electoral rules come over time to be that when the rioters commandeered grain and called for
regarded as functionally necessary for the conduct of a “just price” they were merely acting out the role that
elections. See Piven and Cloward (2000:1–36). For an the magistrates should have played according to medieval
interesting examination of the power implications of the custom and law. But, of course, nothing in medieval
customary rules requiring the secrecy of the ballot, see tradition allowed the crowd to assume the authority of
Barbalet (2002:129–40). magistrates.
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they sometimes struck illegally. And everywhere (or at least a particular reading of Durkheim),
at all times, heresy is not stamped out by the laws who had sought to overturn nineteenth-century
against it, for the law intended to ensure ideo- theories of the biological and environmental
logical hegemony is matched by challenges to determinism of human behavior by enjoining
hegemony. his readers to believe in the facticity of soci-
These examples should not mislead by their ety, in the actuality of what he called “social
drama, for defiance does not have to be bold. facts” as causal forces.45 This brilliant stroke
Sometimes people do riot and burn and pil- became an intellectual rallying cry. He com-
lage. But the penalties for open defiance can be manded us to shift our focus from the natural
terrible. More often subordinate and vulnerable to the social world to explain human behav-
people turn to the age-old ruses and evasions of ior. The simplicity and clarity that made the
the peasantry, the foot dragging and desertions injunction so compelling also helped to pro-
of the infantry, the soldiering and sabotage of duce a sociology in which the ideas and ac-
the factory worker, and the pilfering and deceits tions of people were interpreted as solely or
of the servant. All such actions express the hu- primarily the products of social structure. The
man inclination to use social relationships to remain theoretical task of social science came to
alize ends and thus to exercise power. For those be understood as the identification of structural
on the underside of relationships of domination, determinants of human action. The structural
that inclination takes the form of resisting, evad- determinants favored at different times ranged
ing, and defying the rules that have secured their from Parsonian structural-functionalism46 to a
domination. similarly deterministic Marxism and then to the
structural determinism of the purely ideal realm
of “knowledge” exemplified by Foucault. With
rule breaking and agency the decline of both the functionalist and Marx-
ist paradigms, the ascendance of postmodernist
With these comments on rule breaking, we have interpretive schools, and the simultaneous rise
taken one side in the debate over whether hu- of rational choice perspectives with their em-
man agents matter, whether reflective and pur- phasis on the rational egoist as the prime mover
poseful people make a difference in the patterns in history, the issue of human agency has moved
of collective life.42 to the fore.
The question of whether reflective human The idea of human agency, with its connota-
agents play a role in social causation has only tions of a retreat from scientific explanation of
recently come to the fore in social explanation.
45
True, some conception of agency was always The well-known Durkheimian imperative was to
at least implicit in the various “interpretive” “consider social phenomena in themselves as distinct
from the consciously formed representations of them in
sociologies descended from Husserl,43 as well
the mind . . . .” See Durkheim (1938:28).
as in the American interactionist tradition.44 46
A number of authors have made the point that Par-
But for a long time, these approaches remained sons in fact began his formidable theoretical journey
marginal, and social science was dominated by preoccupied with the voluntaristic element in human
a social determinism inherited from Durkheim conduct, a preoccupation that some writers say was later
submerged by the elaboration of a deterministic func-
tionalism. See, for example, Dawe (1978) and Therborn
42
Or, to use Gidden’s (1977:8) words, because this is (1976). Thus the ostensible goal of The Structure of So-
one of his preoccupations, it is the question of whether cial Action (1949) was to provide a theoretical basis for
social life is shaped in part by “rationalized conduct or- the voluntaristic and creative element in human action,
dered reflexively by human agents.” although John Finley Scott (1963:716–35) argues that
43 as early as the writing of The Structure of Social Action,
For discussion of this point, see Dawe (1978:362–
417) and Miller (1979). Parson’s interest in the voluntaristic element in action
44
See, for example, Cooley (1902); Mead (1936), had receded and that the better expression of these ear-
Blumer (1978), Goffman (1959), Strauss (1958), Dunier lier ideas appeared only in an earlier article by Parsons
(1999), Anderson (1999). (1935:282–316).
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social phenomena into an unsatisfactory volun- People internalize structural constraints through
tarism, raises difficult and troubling issues. But socialization and then confront structural con-
we need the concept of agency when we try straints again as externally imposed sanctions on
to understand not why people obey the rules, behavior. So long as structure is conceived of as
not why they do what they know will be ap- entirely constraining, the idea of human agency
proved and rewarded, but why they break the rests on the premise of structural lacunae, on
rules, defy the expectations of their community, the notion that socialization can somehow be
and risk sometimes terrible penalties. incomplete or that there are gaps or inconsis-
Most discussions of agency rest their case tencies in the structural constraints that confront
on a distinctive human capacity for reflection the actor.
on action (or “reflexivity”) and for innovative On the contrary, structure can facilitate not
interpretation, despite the constraints of social only by its gaps or incompleteness or weakness
structure. This capacity is said to defeat efforts but also by its sheer denseness and complex-
at formulating deterministic laws about social ity.48 Some features of social structure enable
action in two different ways. One is simply that people to be something more than manipula-
reflection and interpretation complicate causal- ble objects shaped by a social environment. The
ity by intruding psychological and semantic pro- key question is “How?” Structural constraints,
cesses into models of explanation, thus creating says Giddens (1984:174), “serve to open up cer-
a fundamental divide between the natural sci- tain possibilities of action at the same time as
ences and social explanation. “The human ca- they restrict or deny others” but his discussion
pacity for the construction of meaning,” says remains elusive and abstract. Lukes’ (1977:6–7)
Dawe (1978:373) “ . . . constitute[s] the crucial assertion that “although agents operate within
difference between the conceptualizing subject structurally determined limits, they nonetheless
matter of sociology and the nonconceptualizing have a certain relative autonomy and could have
subject matter of natural science.”47 acted differently”(1977:6–7) is also unconvinc-
The other is that thinking human agents can ing. Lukes never tells us what it is about the
anticipate and upturn even complex causal gen- changing and variable features of structure that
eralizations. Giddens (1984:xxxii–xxxiii) calls permits or nurtures “relative autonomy.”
this the “double hermeneutic” through which Our argument about interdependent power
social actors anticipate and innovate in the face may provide a conceptual bridge between social
of efforts by social scientists, or indeed any so- structure and the self-conscious and purposeful
cial observers, to predict behavior. “[R]eflection actor. We think the ability of human agents to
on social processes (theories and observations invent new interpretations and action strategies
about them) continually enter into, become dis- in the face of dominant interpretations, includ-
entangled with [sic] and re-enter the universe of ing strategies that defy authoritative rules, may
events that they describe.” be rooted in their experience of social life, and
The possibility for human agency, however, specifically in the experience of their own con-
does not rest only on inherent capacities for re- tributions to the web of interdependencies that
flection and innovation. Social structure itself constitute social structure.
encourages or inhibits self-consciousness and in- Peasants till the fields and provide the surplus
novation, with consequences that can in turn on which the overlords depend. Irish laborers
lead to the power challenges that change struc-
ture, including both the rules governing social 48
Analysts point to a number of processes through
relations and the body of inherited meanings we which structure may facilitate agency. See the argu-
call culture. ment that market economies tend to create autonomous
Most social science has focused on the way so- and complex personalities (see Lane, 1978:2–24); Sewell
(1992) sees institutionally complex societies as provid-
cial structure constrains thought and behavior. ing alternative rules and resources that can encourage
agency. Habermas (1984) sees the potential for critical
47
See Alan Dawe, 1978, op. cit., 373. reason inherent in Western modernization.
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on the railroads laid the tracks that made the possibilities for exercising power. Underlying
railroad magnates rich; Blacks in the gold mines this testing of possibility are the realities of social
of South Africa work the lodes on which the interdependence and the potential for realizing
mining companies depend; and so on. Human disparate purposes it generates.
agents necessarily reflect on these social rela- Rule making and rule breaking, conformity
tions, and on their own contributions to them. and deviance, are an expression of the dialecti-
Barrington Moore (1966:471) had something cal and conflict-ridden character of social re-
like this in mind when he asserted that “Folk lations. The interdependent and cooperative
conceptions of justice . . . . do have a rational and social relations in which people are lodged are
realistic basis.” Moore was looking at the top also relations of domination and potential con-
side of interdependent relations, and he pro- flict. People try to exercise power by making
posed that peasants evaluate the contributions and breaking the rules governing these relations.
of overlords to the community in relation to Or, to shift to another idiom, people make rules
the surplus they extract in deciding whether an and break rules because because rules and rule
injustice is being done. We are arguing more breaking are rational means to desired ends in
generally that the actual experience of making social life. Both those on top and those below
contributions to social relationships is the ob- try to use the very links that bind them to others
jective and material basis for the self-conscious to make or remake some aspect of their lives. As
reevaluation of social relationships by human Thompson (1978:240) put it,
agents.
Of course, social structure is constraining.
. . . [T]he fact is that all histories hinge on power. The
Human agents do not construct interpretations power of some men [sic] has repressed the potential
out of whole cloth. Rather, they reevaluate their nature of other men. These other men have discov-
circumstances within an ideological framework ered their own nature only in resisting this power.
that is largely inherited, to which they are largely Not only their economic being, but their intellec-
socialized. To assert a capacity for reflection and tual being – their ideas, knowledge, values – have
innovation is not to deny this but rather to say been coloured by the possession of or the resistance
that people continue to probe and question the to power; at this point all “histories” have found a
common nexus.
dominant interpretations that they inherit and
to modify those interpretations in the light of
their experience. That experience includes the But there is a good deal that remains to be
reflexive observation of their contributions to explained. For one thing, to understand the
social life. The fact of interdependence may be quest for power from the underside of social
the foundation for alternative evaluations of ex- relations, we have to begin to examine the
isting social arrangements, and for alternative power implications of systems of law and reg-
visions of how social life could be organized, ulation. Only when the power implications of
including how socially valued goods and sym- the rules governing specific systems of social re-
bols could be distributed. lations are analyzed as structures of power, in all
In this way, social structure provides the ob- their complexity, can we appreciate what it is
jective grounding for agency, for the develop- that rule makers and rule breakers as trying to
ment of alternative ideas of what is right and accomplish.
what is possible. Of course, even real contribu- Moreover, the quest for power is hardly the
tions are often not actionable, for all of the rea- whole of an explanation. If it were, then the
sons we have explored. But the complex contin- answer to the question of why people break
gencies that determine whether contributions the rules would be simple and clear-cut, and
are actionable change. As they do reflective and we would have already answered it: they do so
innovative human agents, drawing on the reser- to assert power, to bend the actions of others
voir of alternative interpretations created by hu- in the pursuit of their own disparate interests
man agents in the past, probe anew the shifting and aspirations. But in most places most of the
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time, people don’t challenge the rules that en- are often not easily seen as power strategies.
force their domination.49 In everyday life, peo- Sometimes people poach and burn and pillage
ple mainly endure and obey. If rule violation and riot. Sometimes, they pilfer and smuggle
is a politics embedded in the power dimension and sabotage and evade. But women and men
of all social relations, then the question experi- break a good many rules that cannot reasonably
ence forces on us is not only why some people be regarded as instruments of domination.
sometimes break the rules that enforce domi- They take their own lives and not the lives
nation, but why do most people most of time of their rulers; they turn on their own bodies
obey those rules. Why, in other words, if hu- in hysteria and hypochondria instead of the
man beings are political beings, if they try to act bodies of their antagonists; they join together in
on their divergent purposes in group life, don’t millenial movements of self-destruction instead
they try to break the rules they must break to of joining in revolutionary movements of
exert power? A perspective on rule making and self-assertion. Why? Why do women and men
rule breaking as the play of power requires us defy, evade, and resist rules against narcotics or
to wonder not only why there is disobedience, homicide or child abuse which seem to have
but why there is obedience. If there is disorder no bearing on domination?
some of the time, why is there social order most Why, in short, if all men and women are en-
of the time? dowed with a capacity for politics, do they obey
Further, Thompson’s paean to resistance not- the rules of domination as much as they do? And
withstanding, actual patterns of rule breaking why do they defy rules that have little to do with
power? Why do they rebel so infrequently and
49
The problem has not been entirely neglected. It is go mad so frequently? These are the difficult
in fact the distinctive Gramscian problem. See Gramsci questions in an inquiry into rule breaking and
(1971), Burawoy (1979), and Scott (1990). power.
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0521819903c02.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 April 26, 2005 20:23
chapter two
Neopluralism and Neofunctionalism in Political Sociology
Alexander Hicks and Frank J. Lechner
A broadly pluralist tradition of political sociol- Neofunctionalism is hardly the pervasive force
ogy flourishes today in its neopluralist recon- that functionalism was during the first two
structions in political science and, to a lesser decades following World War II. Nevertheless it
extent, sociology. Since the 1970s the pluralist remains a significant presence in sociology, es-
tradition of political analysis, which stressed the pecially political sociology, neopluralist political
causal primacy of a plurality of collective social sociology most particularly.
actors, has passed into a neopluralist phase. This We begin with neopluralism. First, we place
transition entailed an extension of the plural- neopluralism within its pluralist legacy, espe-
ist repertoire of actors into the once-forbidden cially that of the “classical” pluralism of post–
territory of Marxian class and antiestablishment World War II political science. Second, we trace
social movements, as well as an enhanced recog- the emergence and articulation of neoplural-
nition of the grounding and embeddedness of ism as a series of complicating revisions of the
politically influential actors in social structures pluralist orientation in response to the critics
and systemic dynamics beyond those of cul- of pluralism who took issue with the scope of
ture. Neopluralism expands the pluralist stress its repertoire of social agents and with its rela-
on multiple bases of social action to encompass tive disembodiment of its key social actors from
a yet fuller range of actors (class ones in partic- structural context. We next examine neoplural-
ular), an increased sensitivity to structural and ism in terms of a series of marriages with other
systemic modes of power not reducible to so- theoretical orientations as well as a number of
cial action, and a more complex articulation of innovations not evidently made in response to
agency and structure. Insofar as frameworks and pluralism’s external critics. We finally turn to a
theories of political analysis today reflect both brief summary of what neopluralism is and is
this ecumenical approach to the varieties of po- not in relation to its pluralist heritage and its
tentially important actors (for example, union many theoretical competitors.
movements as well as business lobbies and in- These things done, we continue with neo-
terest associations) and the approach’s openness functionalism, showing its historical affinity
to the causal powers of both agency and struc- with pluralism, its independent development of
ture (for example, macroeconomic and political a more systemic conception of polities, and its
institutional constraints upon as well as ground partial convergence with neopluralism in work
for action) today we are all neo-pluralists. that links a plurality of actors and conflicts to
Neofunctionalism is a notable complement structural contexts. We end with a summary of
to neopluralism, much as functionalism was an what we have written and an eye to the future
important complement to classical pluralism. of neopluralism and neofunctionalism.
54
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Neopluralism and Neofunctionalism 55
neopluralism, its pluralist tradition, it ignored the role of structural and systemic
and its competitors contexts for – and explanatory complements
to – social action. The reconstructed pluralism
Who rules, asked Aristotle, “the one, the few or of the past quarter-century that has responded
the many?” Theoretical perspectives on politics to challenges of these sorts is our “neoplural-
vary in their answer to his question. Though ism.”
no currently influential theory posits the the- Again, to examine neopluralism, we review
oretical generalization that individual positions the pluralist tradition in its classical incarnation,
or single individuals rule entire polities, some consider neopluralist reincarnations in response
nevertheless may suggest that, in a sense, “the to charges that pluralists truncated the cast of
one” does rule.1 For example, class theories have political actors or robbed it of set and stage,
sometimes tended to view each polity as dom- describe pluralist elements present in the guise
inated by one “ruling class” (Domhoff, 1967), of sundry ostensibly non-pluralist theoretical
whereas elite theories have sometimes granted orientations and attempt a final articulation of
rule to single, homogeneous elites (Hunter, what neopluralism is and is not, as well as of the
1953). Nevertheless, such class and elite the- pluralist/neopluralist distinction. Neopluralism
ories do typically propose, whether as work- considered, we turn to neofunctionalism. Con-
ing hypothesis or fine-grained conclusion, that clusions follow.
“the few” rule. Thus, the apparent “one” of a
“ruling class” or a single, homogeneous “ruling
elite” may in fact be internally differentiated like Classical Pluralism
Domhoff’s (2001) class analytical “power elite”
or Mills’ (1956) more classically elitist “power Central to pluralist theories of politics are con-
elite.” ceptions of a polity marked by Aristotle’s “unity
The classic pluralist answer to Aristotle’s ques- in diversity” and the early liberals’ competitive
tion was “the many” (Polsby, 1960). Pluralists and representative democracy. Not coinciden-
claimed that power is exercised by, or on be- tally does De Tocqueville emerge as the first
half of, either the whole of a population or renowned modern pluralist political analyst, for
at least a wide range of the population’s sub- in his Democracy in America he wrote in closely
groups. Yet pluralism has been transformed. In observed empirical detail about the liberal
response to criticism of its basic claim about democracy of a socially diverse people at a time
the nature of rule, pluralism has had to con- when such political empiricism was rare. Works
cede that advantage might sometimes go to the that came to be called, or dubbed themselves,
few, for example to the organized, plural elites pluralist were works about the political process
from atop the stratification system described by in such socially diverse liberal democracies: for
Schattschneider (1960) and Bachrach and Baratz example, Arthur F. Bentley’s The Process of Gov-
(1962).2 Moreover, pluralism had to respond to ernment (1908), David Truman’s The Governmen-
the criticism that it ignored certain actors or that tal Process (1951), and Robert A. Dahl’s Who
Governs? (1961). In the terms of Dahl’s (1971)
1
Some authors also apply their theories to the study Polyarchy, pluralist theory developed as a the-
of powerful individuals. We do not claim that contem-
porary scholars never study monarchs (as Trevelyan stud-
ory of power in liberal democracies. This the-
ied George III) or powerful individuals (as Dahl studied ory is one of power in polyarchies, which are
New Haven’s Mayor Lee) but they have not done so of- defined by the conjuncture of (a) effective rule
ten. Nor have they prominently, except in some theories by “representative” officials who are (b) cho-
of Sultanates, characterized rule as “monarchical” as op- sen by vaguely inclusive electorates and through
posed to more pluralistic elite (e.g., “league,” “clique,”
“coalitional”) metaphors.
free and competitive election, who are (c) safe-
2
As Schattschneider (1960) famously wrote, “The guarded by individual and associational civil lib-
pluralist choirs sing with a decidedly upper class accent.” erties and who also are (d) socially grounded in
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56 Alexander Hicks and Frank J. Lechner
heterogeneous – pluralistic – social structures.3 interest groups from lobbies and partisan
Pluralism, in fact, is an explanatory theory of tribes to professionalized voluntary associations
state action, preponderantly in political demo- (Clemens, 1997), and it is revived again by
cratic societies, that stresses the effective agency Key (1942) and Truman (1951), who extend
(i.e., state power) of a plurality of types of ac- the pluralist axioms to include the proposition
tors.4 that party and public opinion, along with interest
One core pluralist axiom goes back even be- groups, are potential vehicles for power and are all
fore De Tocqueville: a plurality of interest groups largely capacitated by the electoral and representa-
and interest group conflict are keys to understanding tive medium – or roadway – of political democracy.
power and governance (e.g., Hume, 1987[1739]). (For a recent review of public opinion in the-
This proposition is picked up by Bentley (1908) ory and research see Burstein, 1998.) This plu-
during the Progressive-era transformation of ralist premise states not that interest groups and
conflict among them must always prevail a priori or
3
Here social is used in an encompassing societal sense have, in fact, dominated the empirical record,
rather than in contrast with political or economic, and het- but that they are key theoretical categories
erogeneity is used especially as concerns the economy, that should be prominently considered when
particularly when this is not excessively centralized or one frames her exact investigation and speci-
fused with or dominated by the state (Dahl and Lind-
blom, 1953; Friedman, 1962; Dahl, 1971, 1982; Lind-
fies her theory (e.g., details it propositions or
blom, 1977). model).
4 Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1960) elaborate the
One might unpack this “plurality of actors” into a
plurality of social-structural and cultural bases of actor “pluralist” perspective in response to the per-
identification and a plurality of social resources for, as ceived intellectual closure of the “power struc-
well as bases of (and enactors of ) power. In addition,
the pluralist focus on political democracies is so con- ture” approaches of preceding decades, in par-
venient as to suggest that pluralist seek a tautological ticular in response to the work of Hunter (1953)
advantage for their theory. However, it should be noted and his sociological disciples (see Aiken and
that pluralism’s, and neopluralism’s, theoretical competi- Mott, 1970).5 In his exceptionally clear and
tors commonly challenge, if not disdain, the “pluralist” precise articulation of the pluralist stress on a
explanatory stress on a plurality of theoretically antic-
ipated possible sources of rule. For example, Domhoff volatile plurality of potentially consequential re-
(2002), as opposed to Amenta (1998), sees economic sources, Polsby (1960:13) offers a partial list of
elites engineering the Social Security Act of 1935 with the “many different kinds of resources” that may
few democratic (or related nonelite) complications. ground power, “many more, in fact, than strat-
One might also think that pluralism’s scope is too ification theorists”(Polsby’s elite theorists) “cus-
limited. However, theoretical universalism of the sort
that does not specify clear, institutionally homogeneous, tomarily take into account,” and a flexible view
theoretical domains, is not without its critics – from of “the conditions for their relevance.” The
the advocates of local knowledge such as Boas (1940) list includes economic resources (e.g., “money
and Geertz (1995) to proponents of historical realism and credit,” “control over jobs,” and “con-
like Skocpol (1975) on revolution in agrarian empires trol over the information of others”), status re-
or Paige (1997, 2000) on revolution in coffee-growing
modes of production. Here we assume that a political sources (e.g., “social standing” and “popular-
democratic domain is a valid domain for a political the- ity, esteem, charisma”) and authority resources
ory insofar as the gain in realism and specificity that (e.g., “legality, constitutionality, officiallity and
the theory gets from focus on the democratic domain legitimacy”), along with some less cleanly clas-
is large relative to the lose in theoretical scope. Judg- sifiable resources (i.e., “knowledge and exper-
ments will differ on what constitutes “large” where a
particular theory is concerned. The viability of debate tise,” “ethnic solidarity,” “the right to vote,”
over scope versus realism in chose of theoretical domain
5
noted, specific debates over such choice can hardly be Theory should cast a large net designed to catch as
settled here. Suffice it to say that a theory of explanatory wide a variety (a plurality!) of fish as may characterize
powers that were comparable within the democratic do- the waters trawled, as well as one knit to search out the
main and superior beyond it would have a serious case real stuff of policy decisions as opposed to the fish stories
to make against pluralism for its democratic focus. of political reputation.
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“time,” and “personal (human) energy”).6 The politically “leveling” considerations should not
“flexibility” involved concerns the skill and, in obscure the pluralist’s awareness of typically large
turn, the aptness of “timing and targeting” with skewing of the distribution of political resources
which the resources are employed, for central in favor of a relatively few. In addition, Bachrach
to the pluralist perspective is the view that the and Baratz’s argument was not with the breadth
range of potentially empowering resources and of the pluralist inventory of the potentially pow-
of opportunities for their use is so broad that stu- erful so much as it was with the shallowness
dents of politics must cast a wide net. Not only of concentrating attention on a single, final
must they be conceptually open to a wide range phase of decision making and on conflict over
of potentially powerful categories of actors; they outcomes at that one point. Pluralist (or neo-
must be epistemologically open to the point of pluralist) scholars today often take inquiries up
supplementing theoretical logic with method- the river of the policy processes from final leg-
ological induction: “pluralists want to find out” islation to bill drafting and from that all the way
(Polsby, 1960:12). Polsby also offsets the arguably to the headwaters of agenda setting (e.g., An-
indeterminate breadth of the pluralist view of derson, 1994; Stone, 1989).7
who may be powerful with a precise concep- To increasing criticism during the politically
tion of where and how power is to be found: and ideologically tumultuous 1960s and 1970s –
at the point of decision and in the identity of the era of emergent liberation movements, an-
whomever made or influenced the decision. tiwar and anti-imperialism movements, and the
Each of Polsby’s stresses came under nearly New Left – pluralism responded with self-
immediate criticism, criticism that initiated the transformation. Indeed, in responding it meta-
movement toward a revised (neo-)pluralism. morphosed into what we term neopluralism.
Schattschneider (1960) was among the first to Much of the transformation involved arose
note how greatly the disparate resources de- around criticisms of some limitations in the
tailed by Polsby were associated with class ad-
7
vantage, whereas Bachrach and Baratz (1962) Underlying the axiomatic premises that plurality in-
terest groups and interest group conflict are keys to understanding
were quick to note that agenda setting (however
power and governance and that party and public opinion are,
“decisional” it might be) lay beyond Polsby’s fi- along with interest groups, potential vehicles for power and are
nal policy decisions. Still, Schattschneider’s ar- all largely capacitated by political democracy are two factors.
gument was less with pluralism as theory than One is the core power resource view underlying a wide
it was with the perhaps Pollyannaish views of range of theories of social action that conceptualizes ef-
fective action as centrally, if not exclusively, a function
some pluralists concerning the extent to which
of predispositions to action (whether centered in “prefer-
the democratic playing field is “level,” for exam- ences, values, interests, goals, or the like”) and of capac-
ple, undistorted by “social standing” and marked itating resources for action, including in some theories of
by “noncumulative” inequalities in “resources social action situational or contextual infra resources (see
of influence” (Dahl, 1961:7, 229–30). Plural- Rogers, 1974). The second is the behavioral revolution
of the 1950s, which privileged the individual (but see
ists stressed that political resources are, in fact,
the prebehavioral Bentley, 1908, and the postbehavioral
diverse; and that they may substitute for one Clemens, 1997). This individualism takes forms from the
another, thereby empowering actors whom a virtual individualist reductionism of behavioral-era clas-
more narrow conception of resources would bar sicists like Dahl (1962) and Polsby (1960) and the individ-
from political opportunity. Nevertheless, such ualist microfoundationalism of macrocomparativists like
Iversen (1999). However, pluralists and neopluralists, de-
fined in terms of the axioms of plural actors and democratic
6
These resources, although all are ones that might be conduits are not necessarily individualist (e.g., Hume,
attributed to individuals and groups and capacitate their 1987[1739]; Bentley, 1908, Lijphart, 1984). Thus, we
action, also are ones that vary in level of analysis for regard methodological individualism, although promi-
potential attribution (e.g., of “esteem”) from individual nent for some pluralists, as inessential to pluralism and
(e.g., “charisma”) through group (“solidarity”) to the neopluralism, as well as a source of issues related to
macro institutional (“economic” and, most especially, pluralism and neopluralism that we no longer address
“authority” resources). here.
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pluralist emphasis on agency. This tended to exercise of influence.8 One principle is that “In-
be exclusive, despite its stress on a plurality of fluence is situation specific.” Another is that
agents, and it tended to be volitional beyond “Low visibility may be more advantageous than
many views of social action and its structural high visibility.” A third states that “The merits
embeddedness. In turning to pluralism’s re- may count more than clout.” A fourth enjoins
sponse to critics, we turn ipso facto to the rise that “Newcomers would do well to take the
of neopluralism, for pluralism’s response to its advice of regulars.” A fifth states that “Inter-
critics was self-transforming. In articulating the est groups, even those who share common ob-
responses, many of which include concessions jectives, may be clumsy and get in each other’s
and revisions of original pluralist positions, we way.” The sixth counsels that “. . . it is dangerous
simultaneously delineate the new neopluralism. to assume that conventional notions of influ-
ence will accurately predict policy outcomes.”
A key general idea is that elites are not organized
Neopluralist Responses to Critics into disciplined or predatory swarms of interests
that capture or otherwise control government
(Neo-)pluralist Responses to Critics I: Extending agencies and dictate policy (1993:377–8). In-
the Range of Agency. More theoretically pointed stead they are rather loosely coupled, despite a
criticism would come. Perhaps the most basic great increase in numbers (numbers of lobbyists
criticism charged neglect of class- and state- in particular).
based actors, as in Domhoff (1978) on Dahl’s Elisabeth Clemens’s (1997) The People’s Lobby
(1961) underestimation of business in the lat- focuses on interest-group politics in the United
ter’s New Haven study or Shefter (1978) and States from 1890 to 1925. It shows that high lev-
Skowronek’s (1982) statist framings of bottom- els of political participation by interest groups –
up pressure groups and parties in U.S. policy at least groups with a degree of formal, politi-
formation. Responses to such criticism began a cally oriented, organizational structure such as
transformation of pluralism into a neopluralism. the modern voluntary association – were not al-
On the statist revisions of pluralism, attention ways the case. Rather, during the pivotal 1890–
to state initiatives and state-framed mediations 1925 period group politics was vitally changed
of a world of pluralistic associational forces is in the five following ways: (1) state capacity was
now commonplace both in the work of Amer- increased and rationalized; (2) traditional elites
icanist and comparativist investigators. For ex- were alienated from party politics and attracted
ample, the pluralism of agency is extended to to progressivism; (3) political parties became in-
state-based “interest groups” agents by Garand creasingly regionalized and regulated; (4) new
(1988). It is extended to associational state net- forms of political participation – such as the ini-
works in Laumann and Knoke (1987), which is tiative, the referendum, the recall, and the direct
reviewed in Chapter 14 of this volume. In par- election of senators – were invented; and (5) in-
ticular, it has been extended, using graph the- terest groups were organized outside of polit-
ory conceptualizations and techniques, to a new ical parties to represent a large number of is-
interest in and affirmation of the importance sues (1997:27–8). Focusing on the creation of
of lobbyists in Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and labor, women, and farmers’s interest groups in
Salisbury (1993) and to a “new institutionalist” Washington, California, and Wisconsin, she is
framing of group and party action by Clemens able to show how these groups, by means of
(1997). As shown, agency is also extended to novel repertoires of action and new organiza-
class actors; and the importance of class actors is tional forms, could represent their interests in
large relative to what it was in classical pluralism. the public sphere in ways that circumvented
In their ambitious survey of lobbyist growth,
in The Hollow Core (1993) John Heinz, Edward 8
The survey questions members of groups that em-
Laumann, Robert Nelson, and Robert Salis- ploy lobbyists, government officials who deal with lob-
bury cite six important principles about the byists, and the lobbyists themselves.
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the well-vested elites of business lobbyists and organization, Dahl admits into the pluralist
party leaders. Clemens clearly delineates a universe precisely those types of “neocorpo-
“new politics of pluralism,” albeit with a state- ratist” political economic configurations that
centric twist and new institutionalist theoretical have recently captured the imagination of so-
tools.9 ciologists in recent decades (see Streeck and
Where incorporation of class and other ac- Kenworthy [Chapter 22] in this volume). These
tors, often judged as reification of group forces, configurations are marked by high “inclusive-
has been concerned, Americanist pluralists have ness and centralization” of “interest organiza-
been less inclined to widen their purview of rel- tions” and of governmental participation in “ne-
evant actors than have comparativist pluralists. gotiation” that culminates, to lift a term from
However, a clear extension of the role of class Rokkan (1970), in the Scandinavian system of
actors emerges among established U.S. plural- “corporate pluralism” (Dahl, 1982:67–8; Hicks,
ists around 1980 (e.g., Lindblom, 1977; Dahl, 1991).
1982), as also is documented by the chapter of With Dahl’s (1982) Dilemmas, pluralist theory
Granados and Knoke in this volume. Suddenly, emerges, whether by transformation or revela-
key pluralist figures were quite open to the rel- tion, as more than a theory that is conceptually
evance of class and variously class-based actors alert to a fine-grained range of actors, interests,
from unions and business associations to confed- resources, institutions, and other bases of power.
erations of these. Indeed, class-linked organiza- It emerges as one that conceptualizes variations
tion of interests become prominent within the in the organization of interests from the frag-
broadly pluralist tradition. In particular, Dahl mented, hyperpluralist United States of modal
(1982:53–4, 67–8, 79–80) identifies salient plu- Americanist “pluralists” to the “corporate plu-
ralist emphases on highly fragmented systems ralism” of such European pluralists as Rokkan.
of interests and weak class profiles, with plu- With the theory of organizational pluralism,
ralist readings of an extreme United States case. Dahl (1982) explicitly seeks to balance the plu-
More fundamentally, in his Dilemmas of Plural- ralist stress on a diversity of possible power bases
ist Democracy, Dahl (1982:chapter 4, especially with an offsetting emphasis on a diversity of ac-
pp. 48–54, 68–80) elaborates the concept of tual configurations of active power bases. He
“organizational pluralism.” With this he maps also incorporates a highly inclusive, centralized,
and, in turn, helps explain variation in the struc- and coordinated organization of interests into
ture of interest organizations, the aggregate so- the vocabulary of pluralism by treating such in-
cietal – level organization of interests. Elements terest organization as one molecular realization
of this structure range from the relatively de- of pluralism’s eclectic table of theoretical ele-
centralized, exclusive, and fragmented forms of ments. Moreover, he breaks with the theoretical
U.S. democracy to the relatively centralized, in- presumption of a greater democratic represen-
clusive, and cohesive pluralism of Scandinavia. tativeness in polities characterized by a more
At this latter pole of the continuum of interest “plural” organization of interests. The “dilem-
mas” of Dahl’s title involves polities across his
9
As Clemens (1997) is more directly focused on in- spectrum of degrees of interest organization.10
stitution than actor, it might be regarded as more an new Consistent with Dahl’s clarification of plu-
institutionalist work than a neopluralist work. However, ralism as a variously realized range of possi-
it is easily read as a new institutionalist framing and re-
vision of interest group pluralism, whether as one of a bilities from the hyperpluralism of the United
new institutional neopluralism or a neopluralist new in-
10
stitutionalism. Note that, moving from substantially so- For example, Dahl contrasts corporate pluralism as an
ciological projects like Clemens (1997) and Heinz et al. admirably effective representation of a few fixed, salient,
(1993) onto unquestionably political scientist terrain, we and shared interests of a relative inclusive constituency
find further notable state-structural framings of plurali- with the greater range and flexibility of interests being
ties of associational and partisan actors (e.g., Boix, 2001b; voiced in more hyperpluralist systems. This is a restate-
Brzinski, Lancaster, and Tuschhoff, 1999; Lijphart, 1984: ment of pluralism as a neopluralism in the sense of a
chapter 8). reconstituted pluralism.
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States to the more centralized interest organi- Pluralists in sociology and political science
zation of Scandinavia, comparativist students of adapted to the criticism that they neglected class.
European politics have often worked in a virtu- In doing so they contributed to the construction
ally class-centered neopluralist mode. This liter- of neopluralism.
ature, which might be called corporatist neoplu-
ralism, is consistent with the traditional pluralist Neopluralist Responses to Critics II: Agency in Con-
stress on industrialization, heterogeneous so- text. Perhaps the most telling criticisms of plu-
cial cleavages, organized interests, and electoral ralism were those that came from Poulantzas
politics. However, it is articulated with novel (1968, 1973, 1978), Lukes (1974), Block (1977,
emphases on the European empirical terrain 1981), Alford (1975), and Alford and Fried-
with its unabashedly class-linked organizations land (1985), arguing that two or three addi-
(Pierson, 2001). It identifies a continuum of stru- tional structural or systemic levels of power
ctures of “interest intermediation” (Schmitter, (with their own crucial explicantia) operated
1981), which vary, like Dahl’s (1982) “organiza- from beyond immediate policy-making arenas
tional pluralism,” from fragmented arrays of in- and their fields of political actors. As articu-
terest groups to formally organized corporatists lated by Alford (1975) and Alford and Friedland
meta-organizations of interest associations (e.g., (1985), these involve structural and systemic
confederations of business associations and la- levels of power beyond the situational level in
bor unions). This helps explain comparativists’ which pluralist agents engage in relatively visible
responsiveness to class-analytical, neocorporate conflicts over relatively final, policy-producing
and other institutionalist critiques of an unre-
constituted pluralism. Central innovations here virtually every societal structure and process but class –
are the combination of a pluralistic openness economic, political, or intermediating – in nonclass an-
to power sources with stresses on class- and alytical terms (indeed in their centering of class mobi-
state-grounded actors (e.g., union confedera- lization in trade/union bourgeois democratic partisan
institutions). Still, Douglas Hibbs, Jr. (1986a, 1986b),
tions and class parties, politicians, and pub- Lange and Garrett (1985, 1986), Garrett (1998a, 1998b),
lic organization like central banks). Common Przeworski and Wallerstein (1982, 1988), Przeworski
too is a balance between social actor and in- (1985), and Wallerstein (1987, 2000) might all appear
stitutional constraint (agent and structure) in to be too focused on opposing pairs of class-linked ac-
policy determination and an eye for broadly po- tors to qualify as neopluralist. However, these authors
treat classes as large interest groups, reconceptualize class
litical economic structures, outputs, and out- interests in group terms and class capacities in organi-
comes as objects of analysis. Some key authors zational/associational (e.g., party and union) terms; ar-
have combined pluralist and class-analytical ticulate economic issues in orthodox, if inventive and
elements. Moving from works with relatively leftist, economic terms; and embrace a view of inter-
decided pluralist tilts to works with relatively de- est organization that overlaps with Rokkan (1970) or
Dahl’s (1982) “corporate pluralism.” They might be clas-
cided class emphases, we note David Cameron sified – or coclassified – as “conflict theorists” of political
(1978, 1984), John Ruggie (1982, 1996), Peter democracies; however, self-conscious “conflict theory”
Katzenstein (1984, 1985), Douglas Hibbs, Jr. has been absent from the minds of political scientists since
(1986a, 1986b), Hicks and Misra (1993), Iversen the 1980s rejections of functionalism, except in some
(1999, 2001), Lange and Garrett (1985, 1986), theories of revolution (e.g., Gurr, 1971). They might
also be (co-)classified, Hibbs, Jr. (1986a, 1987) aside, as
Garrett (1998a, 1998b), Przeworski and Waller- rational choice theorists. However, they tend to embrace
stein (1982, 1988), Przeworski (1985), Waller- certain practices proscribed by rational choice theorists:
stein (1987, 2000), and Swank (1992).11 that is, they pose questions and conduct research at a
macroinstitutional level, theorize about collective actors
11
All of these literatures are clearly nonelitist in their without explicit individual-level micromechanisms, and
consideration of varied bases of consequential popular or incorporate a large number of institutional factors that
“mass” power (class, religious, ethnic, peripheral as well have not been theoretically reconstituted as emergent
as core) that effectively utilize electoral/representative properties of “the time-tested verities” of optimizing
institutions. All are nonclass in their conceptualization of behavior.
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or -defeating decisions. It would seem that for Friedland, 1986:chapter 18) and her respondent
any outcome, as for the proximate battles and (Hibbs, Jr., 1986a, 1986b; Lindblom, 1977).
decisions that bring it about, a structural level On neglect of the structural level, (neo-)
(e.g., one of state structural organizational and pluralists have addressed the power implications
policy resources, rules and procedures, mis- of social structures and social system dynam-
sions and legacies, options for action, and so ics for particular agents (e.g., Hibbs, 1986a,
on) is present that at once constrains and em- 1986b; Lijphart, 1984); Lijphart (1984, 1998)
powers, modifies, and transcends agency. Si- and Birchfield and Crepaz (1999) on the redis-
multaneously, an even more encompassing sys- tributive implications of unitary state consensus
temic level exists at which political structures systems; Pampel and Williamson (1989) on the
are embedded in economic, cultural, and other relevance of democracy for the political voice
structures. Yet these contexts for the pluralist of the elderly; and Katzenstein (1984) and Boix
arena had been marginalized, when not sup- (1999) on the contested class functions of pro-
pressed. portional representation provide just a few ex-
In particular, this jointly structural/systemic amples of the sort of work in question. Indeed,
criticism targets pluralist tendencies to neglect these authors all focus on political agency in the
or marginalize both (1) social and cultural12 po- contest of structural factors that condition its oc-
litical structures directly impacting on state out- currence or shape its course or consequences.
comes (processes, decisions, actions, policies, On the implications of systemic forces for
impacts, and so on) and (2) new, deeper levels of agent power, we have two types of (neo-)plu-
state action and reaction situated beyond these ralist responses. On the one hand, we have
structures (as in the decisions behind forma- pluralist denials that policy maker accommo-
tion of structures). Further, structural/systemic dation to intractable systemic forces counts as
critics and their neopluralist accommodators see evidence of the power of the force favored.
larger systemic forces of economy and culture – Here, for example, we have Rose’s (1967:3)
plus interdependencies among these and state stress on “social forces” versus “powerful men”
structures and actors – exerting themselves. For and on “impersonal forces – such as geography
example, a chain of dependencies running from and economic – ” not as determinants of the
investment to productivity, from productivity to “predominance” of certain actors but as “semi-
material and symbolic support for state actors, independent forces of social change” that “set
and from support to actions itself is often in- marked limits to the power of any elite group
voked by the critic (Alford, 1975; Alford and to control the actions of society” (p. 7). On the
other hand, we have neopluralist acknowledg-
12
Cultural structures are not prominent in Alford and ments of the consequences of systemic forces for
Friedland (1985). However, social structure may be said political action. These acknowledgments show
to connote symbolic as well as social-relational structure
since at least Sewell, Jr. (1992) Indeed, looking back in that openness to a truly encompassing plurality
light of that landmark article, deep cultural constraint is of power bases that we earlier termed neoplu-
prominent in Lukes (1974; see also Gaventa, 1980), if not ralist. Here we have Lindblom on the procap-
in the other critics noted. Indeed, Friedland and Alford italist power biases of capitalist systems, Swank
(1991) indicates that Alford and Friedland (1985) would (1992) on the policy consequences of invest-
been more prominently cultural had it been compelted
a half-dozen years later. Almond and Verba’s (1963) The ment rates for a range of partisan forces and
Civic Culture is, of course, the classic pluralist work on political economic policy outcomes, Hicks and
culture and politics, and Robert Putman’s (2000) Bowl- Misra (1993) on the reshaping of groups power
ing Alone is perhaps its most innovative critical update. by the new post-OPEC economic troubles, and
Ronald Inglehart (1997) has prompted much work on Pierson (2001) on the impacts of globalization –
the “subjective” political culture of “values.” For a thor-
oughly cultural, hyperpluralist theory in a postmodernist by policy regime or political structure – for
vein opposed to distinctions between agency and dis- welfare state “retrenchment.” Each shows the
course, see Laclau and Mouffe (1992, 1996). neopluralist openness to structural and systemic
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explanation, in addition to class (and traditional business.” Since the late 1970s some of the best
interest group).13 articulations of systemic dynamics are patently
For pluralists like Rose, the options for pop- pluralistic (e.g., Boix, 2001, and Katzenstein,
ular “voice” silenced by particular political in- 1984, on electoral agency in the context of de-
stitutions or rendered prohibitively costly by velopment and globalization). Furthermore, al-
particular political economic systems typically though institutionalism within the pluralist tra-
were not regarded as evidence for the power dition of political science is hardly synonymous
of any grouping that the institutions might ap- with a clearly pluralistic view of prominent po-
pear to disproportionately advantage. Rather, litical actors, it certainly has contributed to the
they tended to be regarded as those inevitably neopluralist articulation of political institutions
recalcitrant aspects of social reality – the ne- and of agency in its (structural) context (Brzin-
cessity of certain incentives for investment, of ski et al., 1999; Iversen, 1998; Lijphart, 1998).
adequate investment for prosperity, of prosper- Indeed, neopluralists have been able to turn to
ity for revenue sufficiency, of revenue adequacy their tradition for many of their insights into
for state efficacy and legitimacy, and state con- institutionally situated action. Neopluralists did
siderations of efficacy and legitimacy for what not tend to preclude structural and systemic fac-
they do – that agents must, at least typically, tors as conditions for state policy so much as
take as a given (Rose, 1976). For neoplural- they tended to downplay them as criteria for the
ists, structural and systemic forces came to be assessment of group power. Neopluralists have
regarded as grounds for, and even aspects of, been keenly alert to the power implications of
group (or class) power. Eleventh-hour pluralists, structures and systems.
as part of their reconstitution into neopluralists, If there is any neopluralist deemphasis of
reached out to augment their explanatory pow- structural and systemic factors as determinants,
ers by incorporating theoretical elements that it has been the result of a neopluralist ten-
they had previously shunned. In part, such plu- dency to stress the degree of free play that ac-
ralists’ coming to terms with the limitations of tors retain in the face of such (merely par-
early agency theories of politics gave rise to neo- tial) structural determinants. Indeed, in line
pluralism. with such sociologists as Berger and Luck-
That pluralist treatments of structural and man (1966), Giddens (1973), and Powell and
systemic power were thin on theoretical ac- DiMaggio (1991), neopluralists place some stress
counts of systemic process á la Baran and Sweezy on the constitution and construction of social
(1966) and O’Connor (1973) seemed to count structure and system by social actors (e.g., see
against them. However, Block’s (1977, 1981) Boix, 1999, and Katzenstein, 1984, on the so-
especially influential accounts of systemic or cial construction of proportional representations
structural power shared the pluralist interest in systems).
consequences of systemic and structural con- Structural/systemic constraints should be un-
text for the poltical actions of a range of actors. derstood as variously dependent on agency: for
In addition, they closely resembled Lindblom’s example, agency may operate as a source of
(1977) treatment of “the privileged position of structural constraint as in Katzenstein (1984)
or Boix (1999) on the partisan political con-
13
struction of proportional representations. In ad-
To the images of the mediation of social action by
structures of social relations already presented previously, dition, agency may also may operate as a mi-
we might add images from two works already discussed crofoundation of structural constraints affecting
in a little detail. One is Heinz et al.’s (1993) network- policy as in Iversen (1999) on corporatism and
centered account of the mutual determination and co- macroeconomic policy. Neopluralists have ad-
operation of actor agency and social structure qua net- vanced understanding of the sources of social
work. The other is Clemens’s (1997) new-institutionalist
relocation of social action in concatenating institutional structure in political action as well as opened the
structures that so overdetermine agency that they virtu- pluralist tradition to concern for the embedded-
ally reduce agency to their own designs. ness of political action in social structure.
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Higher-Order Integrations and Distal Influences. embedded can ground the differentiation of ac-
Imperialistic syntheses of elements of traditional tors. Further, Amenta (1998) shows how em-
political/sociological approaches such as plu- bedding actors in institutions helps knit the va-
ralism, elitism, class analysis – often syntheses riety of relevant political agents into an overall
centered on one of the initial perspectives – pattern.14
marked the last decades of the twentieth cen- We have argued that although neopluralism
tury. These provided us with neo-Marxist, statist retains the traditional pluralist openness to a va-
(neoelitist) and polity-centered (neostatist), re- riety of politically consequential actors, it is also
source mobilization, “new institutionalist” and marked by a new openness to class structure and
multicultural innovations like those of Wright agency and by a new attentiveness to the struc-
(1985), Skocpol (1985), Skocpol (1992), Hicks tural and systemic forces embedding agency.
and Misra (1993), Clemens (1997), and Mouffe Development of a wide range of works along
and LaClau (1993, 1996). Most of these works these lines constitutes a major trend. Still, par-
place sufficient stress on a plurality of potentially ticular political sociologists and political scien-
powerful social actors to qualify as neopluralism tists tend to address questions passed on to them
(if not necessarily only neopluralism). For exam- by their disciplinary communities. They tend
ple, Skocpol’s (1992) “polity-centered” frame- to most fully address those questions that fre-
work presents a polity in which the wide range quent their hallways, conferences, and publish-
of actors – not merely state as well as societal but ing venues. In doing this, practitioners with par-
gendered as well as classist and partisan as well ticular disciplinary affiliations tend to be most
as interest group – is prominent enough to war- vocal about issues long relatively salient within
rant a neopluralist reading, and Skocpol (1996) their particular professional disciplines – say, is-
provides an almost classically pluralist interest- sues of group and party preference rather than
group account of the failure of Clinton’s na- ones of class interests for the case of schol-
tional health care initiative. In revising “political ars ensconced in political science. They like-
resource” theory, Hicks and Misra 1993:703) ar- wise tend to articulate common issues with
gue for “an authentically open political resource distinct emphases – as when political scientist
theory that is as alert to ‘class’ and ‘state’ as it Dahl (1982:66–8) colors Scandinavian “neocor-
is to ‘interest group’ and ‘electorate.’” Indeed, poratism” with an “inclusiveness and centraliza-
they free the use of political resource from the tion” of “interest organization” and sociologist
“class” usage assigned it by Korpi (1982) despite Hicks (1999:230–6) paints the same institutions
such more catholic precedents as Rogers (1974). in terms of the institutionalized incorporation of
Skocpol and Campbell’s (1994) delineation of an labor unions into the structures of political eco-
“institutional” “theory of the state and politics” nomic policy making. So agency may operate
is replete with references to generic “actors” in guises of “employee association” or “political
(as opposed to their pluralist “groups,” elite- incorporation” but are offered similar pictures
theory “elites” or class-analytical “classes”), and in either case. Structural/systemic constraints
this move from a traditional pluralist concentra- should be understood as variously dependent on
tion on “groups” to the yet more open category agency. For example, agency, as in Iversen (1999)
of actors (albeit actors in state-institutional con- on corporatism and macroeconomic policy, may
texts) qualifies as just such an opening up of the operate as a microfoundation of structural con-
range of potentially powerful political agents as straints affecting policy. In addition, agency, as
we see at the core of neopluralism. Moreover,
in a recent “institutional” work, Amenta (1998) 14
In its multidimensional conception of the expan-
not only shows an openness to a plurality of con- sion of rights underlying democratic citizenship and of
sequential actors (unions, populist movements, the factors that have engendered these rights, theories of
citizenship and citizenship rights might, insofar as they
parties and party factions, machine politicians constitute explanatory as well as normative theory and
and Dixiecrat autocrats) but also indicates how legal taxonomy, be regarded as substantially neopluralist
variation in the institutions in which actors are ( Janoski, 1998).
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in Katzenstein (1984) or Boix (1999) on the par- the substantially institutionalist Clemens (1997)
tisan political construction of proportional rep- and Amenta (1998). Indeed, from the perspec-
resentations, may operate as a source of struc- tive of theoretical approaches other than neo-
tural constraint. In addition, agency also may pluralism itself, neopluralism appears to be the
operate as a microfoundation of structural con- orientation subsumed rather than that doing
straints affecting policy as in Iversen (1999) on the subsuming. The multitude of group actors
corporatism and macroeconomic policy. contained within the pages of Clemens (1997)
might appear less a neopluralist ensemble of
agents couched in a particularly institutional-
Neopluralism in Brief ist conception of social context than as a series
of political agents constructed and animated by
Pluralism is a theoretical orientation stressing the Clemens varied institutional structures. What
causal potency of a plurality of interest groups looks like a new institutional variant of neo-
and interest-group conflict, as well as of party, pluralism to one person might appear more like
public opinion, and election, as determinants a neopluralism of the new institutionalism to
of the institutions and actions of governance, another (e.g., Clemens). Still so long as theo-
democratic governance in particular. Neoplu- retical orientations need not fall into mutually
ralism is a reconstitution of pluralism extending exclusive categories, some orientations that also
its conception of interest group to encompass fit other categorizations might be regarded as
class groupings and social movement organiza- neopluralist. The opening assertion that “we are
tions and revising its conception of group po- all neopluralists today” may have been an over-
litical agency to an enhanced appreciation not statement. However, today many political soci-
only of the structural foundations and arenas of ologists sometimes wear neopluralist hats.
agency but also of the shaping and the comple-
mentation of social action (and political influ-
ence) by structural and systemic determinants. neofunctionalism and its
Thus, in the wake of Hibbs (1976), Lindblom functionalist roots
(1977), and Cameron (1978), Lipset’s (1950,
1960) early focus on class ceases to appear an As many of their counterparts in other traditions
eccentric digression from the pluralist tradi- within political sociology, neopluralists often in-
tion. In the wake of Lindblom (1977), Lijphart voke a general kind of functional analysis. Their
(1984), and Swank (1992), discussion of struc- arguments are “functional” in a very basic, and
tural power does not appear alien to that tradi- epistemologically disputed, sense insofar as they
tion. By the 1990s sociological works full of het- posit certain “needs” on the part of groups, in-
erogeneous causal agents operating alongside (or stitutions, or even whole societies that are “satis-
entwined with) institutional and other structural fied” by means of a particular political process or
explicantia, stand out only for their excellence institutional adaptation. A case in point is Gid-
(e.g., Amenta, 1998; Clemens, 1997; Skocpol, dens’s (1973:217–19) “industrial society” variant
1992, 1996; Steinmetz, 1993). of structural/functionalist theory, which served
As our language has repeatedly stressed, neo- as the base of several influential early theories
pluralism is, like pluralism, a theoretical ori- of societal historical development, in particular
entation, a loose family of more focused at- those pertaining to welfare state development.
tempts at tightly argued prepositional theory. As In this theory, new needs generate new institu-
our section on higher-order integrations indi- tions and common needs tend to generate com-
cated, it may overlap with other theoretical ap- mon institutions (e.g., Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison,
proaches as well as encompass them. For exam- and Meyers, 1964), a theme that persists today in
ple, if it encompasses Lijphart (1984) and Swank the literature on the welfare state (e.g., Wilensky,
(1992), it overlaps with the substantially neo- 2002). For example, new needs for security
Marxist Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988) or emerge due to transitions from agriculture to
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industrialism, rural life to urban life, personal voluntarist conception of rule by analyzing poli-
relations to impersonal exchange. Thankfully, tics in systemic terms. It also strives for metathe-
they emerge complemented by imperatives and oretical integration by taking into account the
capabilities for the operation and maintenance multiple (i.e., plural) influences on the political
of the new industrial system. Important among domain that stem from its complex structural
the institutions generated to satisfy these imper- setting. Although this tradition provides a the-
atives is an expanded state nurtured by the in- oretical scaffolding that supports neopluralism,
dustrial system’s plentiful resources (Kerr et al., it also diverges in some ways. It centrally and
1964). Part of the inexorable emergence of uncompromisingly conceives of the polity as a
this new state is the appearance of the welfare system within a larger social system and, in post-
state (Myles 1989:91–3). Explicitly functional- Aristotelian fashion, it dispenses with the idea
ist are Wilensky and Lebeaux (1964), Wilen- of the polity as the center of a society striving
sky (1976), and Stinchcombe (1985), who stress to realize the good life. With some exceptions,
policy responses that are functional for the needs then, neofunctionalism decenters politics con-
of burgeoning elderly populations. Residues of ceived in the prevalently state-centered terms of
functionalist industrialism are evident in Pampel our era: the specific concerns of neopluralism,
and Williamson (1989), Williamson and Pampel including its very focus on the political as such,
(1992), Collier and Messick (1975), and Usui become secondary to a systemic analysis of soci-
(1993), in which needs arguments sometimes ety, the political dimension of which is only one
emerge in ways evocative not just of functional subsystemic facet of its overall organization. We
inspiration for causal argumentation but also as illustrate this cognate tradition with a brief dis-
functional imperatives. Indeed, Hicks’s (1999) cussion of several relevant contributions, starting
finding that economic development is a nec- with that of Parsons himself.
essary condition for early consolidations of ba- Long an influential figure in twentieth-
sic repertoires of welfare state programs circa century sociology and a leading exponent of
1920 does not fully break loose with functional- functional analysis, Parsons held an essentially
ist rhetoric, even though it stresses the causal pri- pluralistic view of modern societies: not only
macy of class social action within developed so- were they differentiated along functional lines,
cieties. Moreover, Wilensky’s (2002) treatment they were also comprised of many collectivi-
of convergent tendencies (e.g., substantial so- ties. The polity of a society, effectively equiva-
cial insurance systems) in modern welfare states lent to government as a specialized organ of a
rooted in common developmental tendencies of nation-state, depended for support on a “soci-
advanced welfare states updates the functional- etal community” consisting of “a complex net-
ist account of convergence-inducing functional work of interpenetrating collectivities and col-
imperatives for the modern era. In the latter, lective loyalties, a system of units characterized
sophisticated versions, which do not attribute by both functional differentiation and segmen-
“needs” to societies and do not assume that tation” (Parsons, 1969:42–5). The “democratic
“need satisfaction” counts as explanation, such association,” Parsons argued, was grounded in
functional accounts partly follows the precedent “the solidarities of various kinds and levels of
set by Robert K. Merton (1968). associational communities,” which function to
Going beyond functional analysis, the specific some extent independently of politics proper
theoretical tradition associated above all with the (Parsons, 1969:3). Criticizing C. Wright Mills
work of Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) shares an for sketching a far too monolithic picture of the
affinity with neopluralism in some of its assump- American “power elite” in the 1950s, Parsons
tions about the political process and in its im- presented his own work as defending the viabil-
agery of politics in democratic polities. Broadly ity of “pluralistic-democratic society” (Parsons,
speaking, this cognate tradition affirms the in- 1969:159). His antielitist, antinostalgic, and
trinsic pluralism of power sources in demo- antiutopian assessment of liberal/democratic
cratic societies. It moves away from a narrowly institutions (Holton and Turner, 1986:chapter
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5) fits the spirit of the (neo-)pluralism we have notably in his functionalist view of the plurality
described. of power bases and agents, his work diverged in
Parsons’s key step in analyzing the politi- several ways. In keeping with his general view
cal domain was to conceptualize it as a func- of institutions, Parsons assumed that shared nor-
tionally specialized subsystem of a larger social mative commitments under gird pluralist con-
system, namely as that institutional structure fo- tention (cf. Sciulli, 1990:369–75). Because he
cused on attaining collective goals by mobiliz- focused more emphatically on the polity as a
ing collective resources. Its key function was to system and treated political action within the
make binding decisions (Parsons, 1969:33, 45). context of a larger theoretical agenda, his work
Along with this functional redescription of pol- lacked a distinctly political agenda resembling
itics, Parsons also proposed to treat power not the exclusive focus on things political charac-
as the ability to affect the behavior of others teristic of neopluralist work. Yet several of Par-
but rather as the “generalized capacity to secure sons’s students systematically applied his theory
the performance of binding obligations by units to political conflict and change.
in a system of collective organization” (Parsons, In his book on Social Change in the Indus-
1969:361). Instead of a zero-sum game, there- trial Revolution, Smelser (1959) applies Parsonian
fore, the pursuit of power concerned the non- functional analysis to the transformation of the
zero-sum process of mobilizing the means to British cotton industry and working-class fam-
make decisions advancing a collective interest. ily structure between 1770 and the 1840s. He
Parsons argued that, by analogy with money, describes these changes as forms of structural
power could be treated as a medium of exchange differentiation brought about by a specific se-
in interaction. Although this type of analysis quence of dissatisfaction with older structures
retained a voluntarist element, insofar as it as- leading to symptoms of disturbance, followed
sumed that actors acted in pursuit of goals in- by attempts at institutional control and the
scribed in systemic norms, it construed political specification and implementation of new ideas
action as embedded within a particular systemic (Smelser, 1959:15–16, 404). Functionalist the-
context. ory serves at least two purposes in this analysis:
Applying functional analysis to the opera- it helps to identify components of the relevant
tion of the polity, Parsons focused on the con- institutions that were undergoing change, and it
ditions for sustaining an effective democratic suggests the direction in which potential differ-
polity. These included not only support from entiation might proceed. In applying the theory,
the societal community but also legitimation of Smelser relies on an assumption familiar from
the powers of government and control of ba- Parsons’ work, namely that in episodes of dif-
sic facilities. More generally, Parsons represented ferentiation values are relative stable, providing
these conditions as part of a set of exchanges be- criteria by which both initial dissatisfaction and
tween the polity or “goal-attainment” subsys- newly defined roles might be legitimated. Most
tem and the integrative, pattern-maintenance, relevant in this context is Smelser’s interpreta-
and adaptive subsystems, respectively. By show- tion of new factory legislation from the 1820s
ing how the operation of the polity, as one sub- to the 1840s. He shows how this legislation
system among others, depended on these multi- constituted a political response to disturbances
ple exchanges, Parsons also illustrated a broader brought about by specific systemic problems,
theoretical strategy, the purpose of which was how attempts at political control of working-
to devise a conceptual scheme that would inte- class agitation and “regressive” disturbances gave
grate different dimensions of action and thereby way to “new ideas,” and how apparent working-
avoid reductionist explanations of any single class victories, such as bills limiting working
domain. hours, also contributed to the incipient dif-
Although in some respects Parsons displayed ferentiation of working-class families (Smelser,
a substantive and metatheoretical affinity for the 1959:chapter XI). In analyzing this contentious
neopluralist vision we outlined previously, most period, Smelser thus pays close attention to
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political conflict and political change, but from theories of society. By assigning factors and
a distinctively functionalist standpoint, by treat- actors in the English Revolution a definite
ing conflict as reflecting underlying structural place in a general theoretical scheme, he argues
strains and by treating change as part of a pro- that systematic explanation of political change
cess of reequilibrating a disturbed system. must also be systemic (i.e., structural and func-
In one of the most politically relevant and tional).
theoretically sophisticated studies in the struc- One strand of recent work in the Parsonian
tural/functional vein, Gould builds on Smelser vein, which Jeffrey Alexander has labeled neo-
as well as Parsons to argue that “[t]he English functionalism (Alexander, 1985), has loosened
revolutions of the seventeenth century were an Gould’s theoretical strictures and moved closer
outgrowth of internal, inherent movement of to the neopluralist mainstream by focusing on an
the manufacturing mode of production when empirical agenda concerned with the impact of
controlled, as it was in England, by a set of group conflict and competition. Such politically
rationalizing values, in contradiction to a po- oriented neofunctionalist work is guided by two
litical system legitimized within the context criticisms of Parsons. As Alexander has argued
of traditional values” (Gould, 1987:114). The (1983), Parsons’ substantive work suffers from
revolutions replaced a patrimonial polity with idealist conflation, because he turned a presup-
a stronger rational/legal state legitimated by a positional commitment to the significance of
new egalitarian individualism, a political sys- values in action into an overly integrated and
tem more capable of mobilizing people and re- consensual view of actual societies. Skirting the
sources, projecting power, and supporting the rough-and-tumble of actual conflict and com-
rise of machine capitalism (Gould, 1987:362–3). petition also hampers causal explanation of ac-
To account for the coming of the Revolution, tual social processes. Inspired by the work of
Gould relies on a structural description of En- S. N. Eisenstadt, several neofunctionalists have
glish social structure and on a functional anal- turned their attention to particular political pro-
ysis of the tensions generated within it. He cesses (see Alexander and Colomy, 1990). For
dissects the overall episode into revolutions at example, Colomy (1990) shows how compe-
the levels of facilities, goals, and norms/values, tition among strategic groups in early Amer-
and analyzes each as the outcome of a “value- ica produced uneven differentiation of political
added” sequence in which functionally rele- institutions. Similarly trying to bring “agency”
vant strain, combined with suitable opportunity back in, Rhoades (1990:188–9) argues that dif-
structures, precipitating factors and legitimating ferentiation in higher education “is largely the
beliefs, leads to an attempted political change. product of political competition and state spon-
Only the specifically political revolution at the sorship.” Smelser’s later work on education
level of goals, he argues, represented the “cul- perhaps marks this direction most clearly. To
mination of the tendential development of pre- account for the distinct forms of differentiation
revolutionary English social structure”; neither of primary education in Britain and America,
normative nor value revolution proved sustain- he refers more explicitly than in his earlier work
able (1987:291). As this brief summary already to the role of “political struggles among social
indicates, Gould’s functionalism has a Marxist groups” with certain vested interests and to “the
twist, because he describes relevant changes as political resolutions of those struggles” (Smelser,
“bourgeois” revolutions that resolved a “contra- 1990:165). He adds that the condition of the
diction” in the English social system in a man- British working class hampered differentiation
ner that advanced (a new stage in) the capi- in the nineteenth century (Smelser, 1990:166).
talist mode of production. In combining Par- As these examples show, this neofunctional-
sonian and Marxist systems theory to account ist work particularly aims to explain how, and
for political change, Gould implicitly challenges to what extent, new, differentiated institutions
any clear pairing of (neo-)functionalist theo- can emerge. Although such work addresses
ries of society with more eclectic (neo-)pluralist political processes as independent rather than
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dependent variables, the imagery of multi- democratic society along neofunctionalist lines.
faceted contention within a complex institu- He has argued for the relative autonomy of civil
tional setting partly converges with that preva- society, described variations in patterns of inclu-
lent in neopluralism. sion, and studied the problematic reintegration
Alexander has contributed to this neofunc- of U.S. civil society after Watergate (Alexander,
tionalist line of thought with his analysis of 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1998a). He thus conveys
Watergate (1988a, 1988b). The specific question by example “the pluralism, complexity, and in-
he addresses is why the initially muted public evitably conflict-ridden nature of democratic
response in the United States to the Watergate social life” (Alexander, 1998a:12). Alexander’s
break-in turned into a major societal crisis after work also illustrates how some neofunctional-
the elections of 1972. In a manner familiar to ists have modified the traditional Parsonian em-
neopluralists, Alexander first describes the po- phasis on the symbolic nature of all action. For
litical polarization that developed through the example, he argues that civil society is “not
1960s. Different factions in the American polity merely an institutional realm” but also “a realm
legitimated their political behavior in very dif- of structured, socially established consciousness,
ferent terms, and these political subcultures had a network of understandings that operates be-
become more polarized over time. When the neath and above explicit institutions and the
main Watergate events became known in 1972, self-conscious interests of elites” (Alexander,
a substantial portion of the American public 1998b:97). This implies that every study of social
was inclined to treat them as “normal” poli- or subsystem conflict “must be complemented
tics and to resist the more radical interpreta- by reference to this civil symbolic sphere”
tion of the break-in as a profoundly deviant (Alexander, 1998b:97). Rather than analyze this
act (1988a:167ff ). Alexander then shows that sphere as the normative specification of consen-
as new information suggested that basic po- sual values, Alexander shows how certain con-
litical norms had been violated, and as insti- flicts are discursively organized around polarized
tutional controls and elite cooperation broke (e.g., “democratic” vs. “counter-democratic”)
down, the definition of the problem became codes (Alexander, 1998b). He thus moves be-
generalized (1988b:198ff ). In dealing with this yond the consensual strain in Parsons’ treatment
crisis, however, the relevant actors could draw of symbolic action, suggesting that neofunction-
on a broadly shared consensus about the na- alism is able to account for political conflict in
ture of the polity and its purposes. As ritual substantially cultural terms.
affirmations of a sacred common culture, the The work of Alexander and like-minded col-
Senate Watergate hearings and the subsequent leagues has remained “Parsonian” in its aware-
impeachment hearings in the House of Rep- ness of the cultural nature of political action,
resentatives constituted key steps toward reinte- its interest in grand themes like differentiation,
gration (1988a:170, 1988b:203). Although this and its “multidimensional” form of theorizing.
conveys the capacity of the American politi- Although creatively extending Parsonian func-
cal system to overcome the divisive impact of tionalism and linking up fruitfully with neoplu-
modernizing change and polarizing conflict in ralists in several respects, some neofunctional-
a manner that fits the Parsonian view of Ameri- ist work risks retreating to a voluntarism more
can politics, Alexander argues that understand- characteristic of the older pluralism and over-
ing this regenerative pattern requires jettisoning come in Parsons’ later work. By pursuing a
the Parsonian assumption that social systems more empirical agenda, it also veers away from
simply “specify” consistent cultural schemas and the coherent systemic and theoretical thrust his-
attend instead to the contingent dynamics of torically associated with functionalism and il-
conflict within social systems (1988a). lustrated by Gould’s work discussed above. In
Though not focused on political matters working through such trade-offs, neofunction-
narrowly conceived, Alexander’s related work alism faces dilemmas similar to those confronted
on civil society aims to rethink the nature of by neopluralism.
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Whereas the concerns of Parsons’ American or parties loses its central place in the political
successors partly converge with those of neo- sphere. Contention matters insofar as it presents
pluralism, Niklas Luhmann’s systems-theoretical options to the system, which can thus avoid par-
response to Parsons breaks decisively with neo- alyzing overcommitment to particular decisions
pluralist assumptions and problems. Regarding or structures and maintain an openness to “other
functional differentiation as the defining fea- possibilities” that is especially important in a sys-
ture of modern society, Luhmann follows Par- tem focused on reducing complexity by making
sons in treating politics as a differentiated subsys- decisions (Luhmann, 1982:162, 164). Not sur-
tem specialized in “issuing binding decisions and prisingly, then, Luhmann notes that although
creating social power” (Luhmann, 1982:139). pluralism has touched on issues of systemic sig-
But Luhmann’s analysis differs from that of Par- nificance, “its limitation to groups and interests
sons (Luhmann, 1982:chapter 3). For example, has not been transcended” (1982:383). From a
he defines systems not as patterned relationships neopluralist standpoint, in turn, the Luhman-
but in terms of the difference they maintain in nian agenda may seem overly systemic and ab-
relation to a complex environment (Luhmann, stract. Thus, although contemporary American
1982:139), through the self-reproduction of (neo-)functionalism remains connected to neo-
their operations (Luhmann, 1995). For social pluralism in certain of its assumptions and in its
systems, treated as forms of communication vision of democratic polities, the Luhmannian
rather than institutionalized normative patterns, approach to politics decisively parts company
this means that self-referential communication with both kinds of scholarship.
about communication is essential (Luhmann,
1995). Although Parsons focused on the way a
society could balance functional differentiation conclusion
with integration, and Alexander still maintains
that there is “a society that can be defined in The influence of sociological functionalism
moral terms” (1998b:97; emphasis in original), has waned since the post–World War II, pre–
Luhmann argues that differentiation is suffi- Vietnam War heyday of both functionalism
ciently pervasive to require a new way of think- and pluralism. However, as we have shown,
ing about society that does not view it as a com- some nesting of political analysis in functional-
munity writ large. Applied to politics, this line ist social theories persists (e.g., Wilensky, 2002;
of thought has several consequences. First, poli- Williamson and Pampel, 1992) and neofunc-
tics becomes a form of communication set apart tionalist political analyses, both pluralist and
from communication in other spheres; the key nonpluralistically tilted (e.g., Alexander, 1988a,
question here is how, once the political system 1998a; Gould, 1987, 1999; Stinchcombe, 1985),
is differentiated, it can be shielded against com- have not left the scene.
plexity, entropy, and risk through self-reference By creatively embedding actors and conflicts
and further internal differentiation (Luhmann, in systemic accounts of political processes, some
1982:139). Second, power is redefined as the varieties of neofunctionalism, as we have shown,
medium in this form of communication, specif- continue to be relevant to the evolution of neo-
ically “the possibility of having one’s own de- pluralism. Though its role in political sociol-
cision select alternatives or reduce complex- ogy has diminished, neofunctionalism remains
ity for others,” thus transmitting a “selection a resource to neopluralists concerned about ex-
based on selection” (Luhmann, 1982:150–1). planatory entropy within a markedly ecumeni-
Third, in Luhmann’s radically differentiated im- cal tradition.
age of modern society, the very place of politics The role of the pluralist tradition of politi-
changes: it becomes simply one part of a so- cal analysis with its stress on attention to a plu-
ciety “without a top or a center” (Luhmann, rality of potentially powerful social forces, on
1990:100). As a consequence of this recasting social action over structural determination, and
of politics, finally, contention among groups on political democracy as a principal theoretical
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domain is alive today. Within sociology, the it may gain focus when combined with other
broadly pluralist tradition has rebounded, in theoretical stains. Indeed, neopluralist and non-
part because of neopluralists openness to class neopluralist theoretical elements often appears
forces often previously regarded as alternatives in combination. For example, we may speak
to the pluralist repertoire of notable social ac- of Laumann and Knoke (1987) as organiza-
tors, in part because of neopluralist assimilations tional neopluralists – or as neopluralist theo-
of structural arguments, and in part because of a rists of organizational fields. We may dub Hicks
conscious neopluralist recognition of the insti- and Misra (1993) class-centered neopluralists but
tutional specificity of the social contexts (such Hicks (1999) a neopluralist class analyst. We may
as polyarchy) in which political pluralism is a term Clemens (1997) and Amenta (1998) new
plausible theoretical prior. Within political sci- institutional neopluralists – or neopluralist new
ence, the pluralist tradition not only has with- institutionalists.
stood the sociological critique of pluralism; it A theoretical orientation that can perhaps best
also has contributed to the neopluralist revision pride itself on its Catholicity invites fundamen-
of the pluralist tradition. It has survived the rise talist reformation. To entertain a great range of
of rational choice theories of politics whose rad- explanatory tools risks loss of explanatory, pre-
ical methodological individualism and formal- scriptive, and predictive specificity. Indeed, neo-
ism place them at some distance from – or in pluralist work tends toward such cognate forms
some arcane corner of – neopluralism (see Kiser as those offered previously – organizational neo-
and Baldry, in this volume [Chapter 8]). pluralism, neoinstitutional neopluralism, class-
What we here call neopluralist work is a po- centered neopluralism. This is so because neo-
litical analysis of state action and its determi- pluralism often gains closure and elegance from
nants that is centrally open to a variety of po- combination with particular other theoretical
litically consequential power bases and actors, orientations. For example, Clemens (1997) and
class structure and actors among them, as well Amenta (1998) use the woof of neoinstitutional
as racial, ethnic, sectoral, and disparately cultural analysis to weave together a wide range of po-
identifications and groupings, and that is system- litical materials.15 At times, the explanatory ac-
atically attentive to the structural and systemic curacy and realism will pressure us away from a
contexts embedding action. plurality of societal actors, as in class accounts of
Still, students of politics who are not, or the origins of neocorporatism (see Katzenstein,
at least not foremostly, neopluralists do remain 1984; Western, 1991). At other times, they will
prominent. For example, among sociologists, counsel a plurality of actors, as in delineation of
those who would sharply focus their explana- U.S policy domains (e.g., Heinz et al., 1993;
tory efforts with the selective tools of class Laumann and Knoke, 1987). As neopluralists
analysis or neoinstitutionalism remain very no-
15
table (e.g., Frank,2000; Wright, 1997). Among If one were inclined to view individualism as a
primary characteristic of (neo-)pluralism and the (neo-)
political scientists, not only do some eschew pluralist stress on interests as highly similar to the rational
class actors or circumvent economic constraint choice on preferences and goals, one might be inclined to
(e.g., Boix, 2001; Skowronek, 1999) yet remain view the current U.S. ascendance of rational choice the-
prominent; much is dominated by the concepts ory as fundamentalist revision of (neo-)pluralism. We do
and tools of rational/public choice theory. Still, not regard individualism as essential to (neo-)pluralism;
and we think that the relation of interests to preferences
neopluralism as we have delineated it is now and goals is complicated. Thus, we do not see ratio-
commonplace within both sociology and polit- nal choice as simple evolution out of (neo-)pluralism.
ical science. Nonetheless, we do think that the long highly individ-
Like all wide-ranging and eclectically in- ualistic thrust of much American political science that is
clined theoretical orientations, neopluralism has importantly manifested in neopluralism and the plural-
ist tradition does energize the large presence of rational
entropic tendencies that pressure for correc- choice in contemporary U.S. political science, as well as
tive measures. As neopluralist work is some- the smaller presence of rational choice in contemporary
what eclectic by virtue of its very openness, sociology.
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pragmatically work through such options, in so new modes of political analysis may arise from
continuing engagement with alternative theo- critiques of neopluralism and neopluralist mu-
retical approaches, they will bolster the vitality tations.16
of a central tradition in political sociology.
Just as neopluralism emerged from the cru- 16
The authors of this chapter are indebted to Janoski
cible of an earlier pluralism under critical attack, (2001) for inspiration.
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0521819903c03a.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 August 27, 1956 9:46
chapter three
Conflict Theories in Political Sociology1
Axel van den Berg and Thomas Janoski
Once upon a time, Parsons’s structural function- are the conflict theories more or less directly
alism, depicting society as a community founded hailing from the Marxist tradition. These theo-
on a value consensus, was thought, at least in ries focus on the fundamental material interests
the United States, to be the dominant theoreti- of different groups as they become intertwined
cal paradigm in the discipline. To be sure, there with political forces. These conflicting interests
was always a fair amount of resistance to this are ultimately based in the mode of production,
view (e.g., C. Wright Mills, Ralf Dahrendorf, which creates two main classes, in the case of
Dennis Wrong, and others). But it was not capitalism, labor and capital. It is the conflict
until some time during the 1960s, in part no or struggle between these two primary classes,
doubt encouraged by the turmoil resulting from and the organizations representing their inter-
the civil rights, antiwar, and gender protests of ests, that is thought to provide the fundamen-
the era, that a strong reaction set in against the tal key to explaining political outcomes. But
value consensus approach under the label of con- although the importance of fundamental eco-
flict theory. Although different approaches have nomic interests had been recognized by non-
come under this label, they have one main fea- Marxists from Adam Smith to Max Weber, an-
ture in common: conflict theories emphasize other feature is more exclusively Marxist: that
the importance of social cleavages generating the working class is ultimately struggling to
social conflict that in turn account for polit- overthrow the existing mode of production for
ical outcomes, including momentary political a more advanced one, culminating in the es-
events, more enduring policies, and long-lasting tablishment of “socialism,” a mode of produc-
political institutions. tion in which fundamental conflicts of mate-
It is useful to distinguish two major strands of rial interest will disappear. In this sense, the
conflict theory according to the kinds of social struggle of the subordinate class is “progressive”
cleavages they emphasize as well as the histori- and aims at the ultimate elimination of class
cal role that conflict plays in them. First, there conflict.
Arguably the most profound difference be-
1
An earlier version of this article was presented at tween Marxists and other conflict theories is that
the Theories of Political Sociology Conference at the the latter do not entertain a progressive view of
CUNY-Graduate Center and NYU on May 25–27, history in this sense.2 Instead, they treat social
2000. We thank Frances Fox Piven, Jeffrey Goodwin,
Mildred Schwartz, Alexander Hicks, and Robert Al-
2
ford for helpful comments and the ASA/NSF “Fund Which does not mean that they do not recognize
for the Advancement of the Discipline” for financial any long-term trends, Weber’s secular process of ratio-
support. nalization being an obvious example.
72
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Conflict Theories 73
and political conflict as an inevitable and perma- class conflict theories: from marx
nent feature of social life. Nor do they recog- to hardt and negri
nize the primacy of class conflict. Instead they
have either posited political power itself as the Marxism, Leninism, and “Revisionism”
fundamental source of social cleavage and con-
flict or insisted on the multiplicity of sources of According to the Marxist canon, the state and
social conflict such as race, gender, ethnicity, re- politics belong to the social “superstructure”
ligion, language, age, and so on, in addition to that “reflects” or is “determined by” the eco-
economic interests, arguing that each of these nomic base, in particular the relations of pro-
can produce groups that compete and pursue duction, that is, the class structure. Such a
different political ends, and in so doing, dom- “reflection” might imply that the degree to
inate or subordinate their competitors. Some which the working class and the bourgeoisie, as
cultural, feminist, and racial theories would fit well as the intermediate strata, are able to exert
under this rubric as well but their practition- effective influence on government varies, de-
ers often reject the label of conflict theory be- pending on the class struggle. Marx does some-
cause of its materialist connotations (see Chap- times appear to suggest this in his more “con-
ters 4, 5, 6, and 9 of this handbook for these junctural” analyses (e.g. Marx, 1963, 1972) as
theories). well as in his unfailing support for prolabor
Today, some three decades after it was first legislation. On the whole, however, Marx and
introduced as such, there is no longer much Engels clearly took a more categorical view
talk about conflict theory as a distinctive apas famously expressed in the The Communist
proach. This does not mean that it has disap- Manifesto: “Political power, properly so called,
peared. To the contrary, it may well be a sign is merely the organizing power of one class
of its success. In fact, the relatively precipitous for suppressing another” (Marx, 1954:56) and
decline of structural functionalism as a major “[t]he executive of the modern State is but a
approach has rendered the label conflict theory committee for managing the common affairs of
as a way to designate a new, alternative way the whole bourgeoisie” (1954:18).
of looking at the social world largely redun- Until the rise of liberal democracy and uni-
dant. At the same time, the Marxist branch of versal suffrage, this general position would seem
conflict theory does seem to have lost much of to have been tenable enough. And in their com-
its original appeal since its brief revival in the ments on some of the cases where the suffrage
1970s. In view of the apparent decline of much was gradually extended during the second half
of the traditional, class-based left/right politics of the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels
of the first half of the twentieth century, even made it clear that they did not think democ-
in the old European heartland, and the related racy and capitalism could coexist for long (van
rise of various alternative forms of “identity” den Berg, 2003:77–95). But as working class
politics involving race, gender, religion, and eth- parties grew more influential without provoking
nicity, Marxists have been under much pres- the expected cataclysm or swift transition to so-
sure to rethink and reformulate their most basic cialism, Marxists were forced to make a difficult
assumptions. choice: either accept that the reformist “parlia-
In this chapter we first review the theoret- mentary road” to socialism was to be consider-
ical traditions based on class from Marx to the ably slower than anticipated or insist that parlia-
present day and then examine more general con- mentary democracy was really just a cover for
flict theories that include status and other factors continued bourgeois rule.
from Weber to Bourdieu. Finally, we attempt to The reformist position was first proposed by
draw some conclusions from this survey about German labor leader Eduard Bernstein (1909)
the likely future trends and fate of conflict the- and only much later accepted by German Social
ory in political sociology. Democratic leader Karl Kautsky (1971) and the
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74 Axel van den Berg and Thomas Janoski
other social democratic parties of Europe. But by a state exclusively serving the interests of
Lenin drew the opposite conclusion, namely the capitalists (cf. Alford and Friedland, 1985)?
that the An immediate answer was simple: welfare state
reforms have not only done little to advance
democratic republic is the best possible political shell
the cause of socialism, they have actually been
for capitalism, and . . . once capital has gained control
. . . it establishes its power so securely, so firmly that no “an essential prophylactic against it” (Miliband,
change, either of persons, or institutions, or parties in 1977:155), the “relatively low . . . price which
the bourgeois republic can shake it. (Lenin, 1932:14)3 the dominant classes knew they would have to
pay . . . for the maintenance of the existing social
In the end, Lenin’s position became the undis- order” (Miliband, 1969:100). But this immedi-
puted Marxist orthodoxy, energetically en- ately raises a much thornier question: given the
forced by his Third International. Effectively apparently democratic institutions and the active
excommunicated from the community of “real” participation of the largest working-class parties
Marxists, reformism came to be seen as a decid- through which such reform has often been imple-
edly non-Marxist view of politics and the state mented, what is it that keeps reform from cross-
in modern capitalism. ing the line between merely helping to maintain
The decisive factor in Lenin’s thinking, at the system and actually transforming it? That is,
least since the 1903 split between the Men- how is reform kept within the limits of ulti-
sheviks and Bolsheviks, was that “the work- mate capitalist class interests? Most of the de-
ing class, exclusively by its own effort” would bate among Marxists about the true nature of
never attain a level of class consciousness be- the “capitalist state,” which raged from the late
yond reformism (Lenin, 1968:40). A succes- 1960s to the early 1980s, revolved around alter-
sion of Western Marxist theorists have tried native answers to this question.
to account for this puzzling fact by reassess- One answer, most clearly formulated by
ing the role of the bourgeois cultural realm Ralph Miliband (1969), was that the capital-
as having a far more powerful effect in im- ist class in effect controlled government pol-
posing “false consciousness” (Lukács, Korsch), icy. Citing a mass of British empirical data on
“hegemony” (Gramsci, 1971) or “instrumental the social class origins and sociopolitical values
rationality” (Horkheimer, Adorno, the Frank- of the top officials in all branches of govern-
furt School) on the working class than the ment, the judiciary, as well as the educational
original base-superstructure model would have system and the mass media and even religion,
allowed (e.g., Anderson, 1976; Kolakowski, Miliband concludes that the British capitalist
1978). These more “culturalist” arguments class has a firm grip on all levels of public power,
would become particularly influential among as well as on the institutions of opinion for-
neo-Marxist theorists from the 1960s and after, mation and legitimation. As a result, Miliband
whose work we discuss in the next sections. argues, the capitalist class “exercises a decisive de-
gree of power” (1969:45), enabling it to block
any reform that seriously undermines its long-
Marxist and Marxisant Theories term interests. The state, in other words, is an
of the State instrument of capitalist power, whence the term
instrumentalism for this particular Marxist theory
With reformism discredited as un-Marxist, the of the state.
rise of the welfare state, especially under social In a much subtler and detailed manner,
democratic auspices, posed a special problem G. William Domhoff has tried to demon-
for orthodox Marxists: how could such appar- strate something similar for the United States,
ent concessions to the working class be made paying particularly close attention to some of
the landmark legislation of the New Deal.
3
For all quotations in this chapter, the emphasis is in Like Miliband, but in much more painstak-
the original. ing detail, Domhoff shows how members or
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representatives of America’s corporate elite are political mobilization of American business in-
heavily overrepresented in all major political terests and corporate funding of political cam-
institutions, lobbying organizations, boards of paigns, all with the more or less instrumentalist
major universities, mass media, and major foun- intention of documenting the degree to which
dations. But in addition to this, Domhoff traces well-organized business interests potentially ex-
in detail the process that led to New Deal legis- ercise a disproportionate amount of influence
lation, especially the 1933 Wagner Act, to show on public policy making in the United States.5
that at every step of the way the formulation In a similar vein, the somewhat more complex
of the problems as well as the solutions were de- “accommodationist” theory of Glasberg and
cisively influenced by a network of policy and Skidmore (1997:11–16) and Prechel’s “contin-
research organizations that was created and con- gency theory” (1990, 2003) examine class-based
trolled by the most far-sighted as well as the political mobilization and organization in re-
most powerful among America’s businessmen. sponse to perceived political threats and in in-
Consequently, Domhoff claims, even the most teraction with politicians and bureaucrats in a
apparently prolabor legislation in the United dynamic process that modifies both.6 Thus, in
States was formulated and often advanced by many ways Domhoff ’s approach, and several ap-
powerful elements of the corporate class, a class proaches like it, have remained a thriving re-
that “is able to impose its policies and ide- search enterprise. Yet in the eyes of the more
ologies in opposition to the leaders of vari- theoretically inclined Marxists of the 1970s
ous strata of the non-propertied, wage-earning and early 1980s, the instrumentalism Domhoff ’s
class” (Domhoff, 1979:16). theory shared with Miliband’s rendered both de-
Domhoff ’s argument is often referred to as cidedly beyond the Marxist pale.7
the “corporate liberalism” thesis, because it Using structuralist Marxism, Nicos Poul-
holds that the more moderate, far-sighted seg- antzas (1967, 1972, 1973b, 1976) mounted a de-
ment of the corporate business community usu- vastating critique of Miliband’s (1972, 1973) in-
ally prevails over its more conservative segments. strumentalism. As a result of its “empirical and
Domhoff has continued to develop an impres-
sive oeuvre to support that basic argument and it 5
On corporate interlocks see Mintz and Schwartz
has generated an extensive secondary literature (1985), Mizruchi (1989), Mizruchi and Koenig (1986),
criticizing various aspects of his account of the and Sklair (2001), on business mobilization Burris (1987,
genesis of New Deal policies.4 Empirically, 1992, 2001). The campaign finance literature developed
somewhat later (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden, 1986;
these critics have generally argued that Domhoff
Clawson and Neustadtl, 1989; Clawson, Neustadtl, and
tended systematically to underestimate the role Scott, 1992; Neustadtl, 1990; Neustadtl and Clawson,
of social forces other than the most advanced 1988).
6
wing of corporate business, in particular the in- For further work in the accomodatonist tradi-
fluence of unions, politicians, and the state. tion, see Akard (1992), Allen (1991), Allen and Broyles
(1989), Brents (1992), Gilbert and Howe (1991), Glas-
But whatever the merits of Domhoff ’s and berg (1989), Glasberg and Skidmore (1997), Hooks
his critics’ detailed arguments about the de- (1993), Jenkins and Brents (1989), McCammon (1994),
terminants of the New Deal, he has helped Mizruchi (1989), and Prechel (1990, 1991, 2000, 2003).
7
spawn several research traditions empirically ex- Domhoff does not consider himself to be a Marxist
amining the extensive interlocks between major and he has vehemently rejected the now derisory label
of instrumentalist (Domhoff, 1976). But for all practical
corporations and banks, the sources of effective purposes his theory does have quite a lot in common with
mainstream Marxism and it does posit a (most powerful
4
For Domhoff ’s own work see 1967, 1970, 1974, segment of the) capitalist class capable of decisively in-
1978, 1979, 1983, 1990, 1998, and 2001 for a summary. fluencing government policy and consciously and, even
His most important critics include Quadagno (1984, more important, accurately doing so in the best long-term
1985, 1996), Skocpol (1980), Skocpol and Amenta interests of the class as a whole. This is the essence of
(1985), and Skocpol and Orloff (1986). For an extensive the instrumentalist position which subsequent, allegedly
critique of Domhoff on both empirical and theoretical more sophisticated Marxist theorists were to treat with
grounds, see van den Berg (2003:196–221). such contempt (see also Lo, 2002:200–2).
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neo-positivist approach,” involving a wholly by itself (1973a:284–5). Instead of treating the

naı̈ve “voluntarism” and “subjectivism,” Mili- state as the willing instrument of the capitalist
band’s argument was, according to Poulantzas, class, this means that:
“unconsciously and surreptitiously contami-
nated by the very epistemological princi- the capitalist State best serves the interests of the cap-
ples of the adversary” (1972:241–2, 1976:67). italist class only when the members of this class do
As a result, Miliband was unable to demonstrate not participate directly in the State apparatus, that is
the structural necessity of the coincidence be- to say when the ruling class is not the politically govern-
ing class . . . this State can only truly serve the ruling
tween capitalist state policy and the long-term class in so far as it is relatively autonomous from the
interests of the capitalist class, whoever happens diverse fractions of this class, precisely in order to be
to favor or oppose that policy. Theoretically, able to organize the hegemony of the whole of this
Miliband’s approach treats the state as a neu- class. (1972:246–7)
tral instrument that, hence, could in principle
be captured and wielded by real anticapitalist Thus, the objective function of the state ap-
forces to undermine capitalism, which comes paratus to serve the interests of the dominant
perilously close to the “revisionism” of Bern- classes has nothing to do with the class origins
stein, Kautsky, and their social democratic heirs. of its personnel or external pressures from the
Empirically, he is unable to account for the members of those classes. It is entirely deter-
many kinds of social reform that, though of- mined by the state’s “relation to the structures”
ten promoted as radical by labor governments (1973a:115). Paradoxically, the political actions
and sometimes vehemently opposed by all or of the dominated classes actually help the state
most major fractions of the bourgeoisie, invari- in achieving its objective function, allowing it to
ably end up strengthening the capitalist mode of enforce decisions that are opposed by the domi-
production rather than undermining it, includ- nant classes, too short-sighted to recognize their
ing welfare state policies, social security, legal own long-term interests (1973a:285–9).
protection for unions, and so on. In fact, his ap- Claus Offe arrived at a very similar Marxist
proach assumes a degree of omnipotence, om- theory of the state by way of a system theoretic
niscience, and unity of the capitalist class that is analysis of “late capitalism.” Treating capital-
far beyond its ability. ist society as a configuration of interconnected
Basing himself on Althusser’s (1969) “struc- subsystems with their own internal “organiza-
turalism,” Poulantzas formulated a rigorously tional principles,” Offe argues that the state
“scientific” Marxist theory of the capitalist is a necessary “flanking subsystem” (1976:33–
state that conceptualizes it as a “relatively au- 5) whose function consists of counteracting
tonomous instance” and in modern capitalism the self-destructive tendencies of the dominant
as the “dominant” instance as well. According economic subsystem, while violating as little as
to this possible the latter’s organizational principle of
commodity exchange. Thus, the long-term in-
. . . scientific Marxist conception of the state super- crease in state interventionism in the economy
structure . . . the state has the particular function of and the expansion of welfare state provisions and
constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels
programs are efforts by the state to avoid or re-
of a social formation . . . and . . . the regulating fac-
tor of its global equilibrium as a system. (Poulantzas, solve crises and conflicts provoked by the pro-
1973a:44–5) cess of private capitalist accumulation that might
otherwise have threatened the very foundations
Although this function serves the long-term in- of the capitalist system (Habermas, 1973:50–
terests of the capitalist class, the state can effec- 60; Offe, 1972a:21–5, 1972b; Offe and Ronge,
tively perform only it if it enjoys a considerable 1975:141–3; van den Berg, 2003:29–31). They
degree of “relative autonomy” from that class fulfill the legitimation function of retaining mass
that is ordinarily far too divided and fragmented acquiescence, allowing the state to perform its
to realize or agree on its own long-term interests functions favoring the long-term interests of
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the capitalist class (Offe, 1972b, 1972c:81). Con- (1973:9), as the monopoly sector corporations
sequently, and labor unions become increasingly reluctant
to finance further increases in state expenditures
[t]here is no need to equate the capitalist state, either out of their “rightful” share of the economic
empirically or theoretically with a political alliance
of the personnel of the state apparatus on the one
surplus (1973:7–10).
side and the class of owners of capital (or certain seg- In any case, the “structuralist” and systems-
ments of this class) on the other side. For the abstract theoretic criticisms made by Poulantzas, Offe,
principle of making a subject of permanent market and others (Therborn, 1977, 1978:129–61;
exchange relationships out of every citizen does more Laclau, 1975) swiftly relegated instrumentalism
to keep state policies in tune with the class interests of to “the prehistory of theoretical formalisation”
the agents of accumulation than any supposed “con- (Laclau, 1975:96). After putting up minor re-
spiracy” between “overlapping directorates” of state
and industry could possibly achieve. (Offe, 1975:251)
sistance, even Miliband himself seems to have
capitulated to the theoretical sophistication of
Thus, like Poulantzas, Offe claims that the capi- his critics, now arguing, in a much-quoted pas-
talist state has paradoxically been able to gain the sage, that Marx and Engels’s formula about the
required autonomy from the bourgeoisie in the state being “but a committee for managing the
latter’s own long-term interest only by utilizing common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” should
the “formal structures of bourgeois democracy” be interpreted to mean that “the state acts on be-
(Offe, 1974:54). half of the dominant ‘ruling’ class” but not nec-
But somewhat unlike Poulantzas, Offe em- essarily “at the behest of that class” (Miliband,
phasizes how state interventionism and social 1973:85 n.4).
welfare policies can only displace the contra- Thus “relative autonomy” was quickly estab-
dictions of capitalism, not resolve them. Al- lished as the “new orthodoxy” (Krieger and
though the working class may be pacified Held, 1978:191) among right-thinking Marx-
indefinitely in this way, other sections of so- ists. Yet its effective reign was to be remark-
ciety become increasingly “decommodified” ably short. Questions soon arose as to what
and hence unwilling to continue to endorse causal mechanisms, exactly, kept the capitalist
the state’s continuing support of private accu- state’s autonomy relative, that is, in line with
mulation, eventually producing a new “legiti- the long-term interests of the capitalist class,
mation crisis”(1972c:169–88; Habermas, 1973). given that class’s own inability to understand
Efforts to cut back on “excessive” legitimacy its own interests and the state’s apparent de-
commitments (e.g., through social spending pendence on working class support. Neither
cuts and more reliance on repression) will not Offe nor Poulantzas ever offered anything but
work because legitimation programs are not a few murky hints about “functional necessity”
readily reversible: they cannot easily be cut as an answer to this question. More serious,
back without the danger of “exploding conflict from a Marxist perspective, however, was the
and anarchy” (Offe, 1984a:153, 288, 1984b:240, “implacable determinism” (Anderson, 1976:65)
1972a:96–102, 1974:4952, 1976:59). that characterized their functionalist approach,
James O’Connor (1973) proposed a very sim- leaving no room whatsoever for conscious hu-
ilar argument with respect to the contradictory man agency and hence no “motive force for
accumulation and legitimation functions of the political action” at all (Appelbaum, 1979:26;
U.S. state. As the state’s accumulation function Bridges, 1974; Burris, 1979; Esping-Andersen
forces it to get ever more deeply involved in sup- et al., 1976:188; Smith, 1984).
porting private monopoly capital, O’Connor In his last major work, Poulantzas seems to
argues, it is increasingly forced to conceal its have taken some of these criticisms to heart,
complicity with capital by ever more gener- now proclaiming, ad nauseam in fact, “the pri-
ous “legitimation” programs. But ultimately this macy of the class struggle over the apparatuses”
will lead to a “fiscal crisis” eventually culminat- (1978:38, 45, 53, 126, 149, 151) and conced-
ing in “economic, social, and political crises” ing that “popular struggles traverse the State”
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(1978:141) and even advocating a “democratic that although instrumentalists like Domhoff and
road to socialism” that preserves the institutions Miliband may have ingloriously lost the battle of
of “bourgeois” democracy, which were truly “a “high theory,” in retrospect they appear to have
conquest of the masses” (1978:256). Offe, too, won the war. Although the arguments of their
seems to have shifted toward a less functionalist structuralist critics are at most of antiquarian
position in his more recent work, now view- interest by now, there is a rich and continu-
ing “the state of democratic politics . . . as both ing research tradition following Domhoff ’s lead.
determined by, and a potential determinant of Moreover, whatever the specifics of his account
social power” (Offe, 1984a:161). of the New Deal, his general point, that U.S.
These vague allusions sound somewhat like business interests have far more clout at virtu-
the “class struggle” or “class dialectic” approach ally all levels of policy making than any other
that some Marxist writers have proposed in real or potential interests, and certainly a great
an effort to rehabilitate “historically dynamic deal more than they were assumed to have in the
class conflict as a motor of structural change” more complacent versions of 1950s neoplural-
(Block, 1977; Bridges, 1974:178–80; Esping- ism, has become a commonplace in this much
Andersen et al., 1976:188; Whitt, 1979a). This more cynical age, among the wider public as
approach views state power and government much as among the erstwhile advocates of neo-
policy “as a complex, contradictory effect of pluralism themselves (e.g., Dahl, 1989, 1990).
class (and popular-democratic) struggles, me-
diated through and conditioned by the insti-
tutional system of the state” (Gold, Lo, and Power Resources Theory
Wright, 1975a, 1975b; Jessop, 1977:370). That
is to say, depending on the effectiveness of those The return toward the once-taboo reformism is
“popular-democratic struggles,” state policies quite explicit in so-called power resources the-
may very well serve the interests of the work- ory, a.k.a. social democratic or working class
ing class rather than just those of the capitalist strength theory (Korpi, 1983, 1989:312; Korpi
class. A number of attempts to assess the em- and Shalev, 1980; Shalev, 1983, 1992). Korpi
pirical validity of this “class struggle” approach starts from the classical Marxist position that
have generally tended to confirm it (Devine, capitalist markets create enormous inequalities
1985; Gough, 1975, 1979; Isaac and Kelly, 1981; in access to resources and power, producing a
Quadagno, 1984; Skocpol, 1980; Whitt, 1979a, fundamental conflict of interest between the
1979b, 1982): the capitalist class is not always most and the least favored, and capitalists and
united and even when it is, it does not always workers (e.g. Korpi, 1983:227). But although
get its way. the members of the capitalist class enjoy a
But this comes uncomfortably close to the great advantage in terms of economic resources,
old “revisionist” and “reformist” heresies, of workers have access to some resources of their
course.8 Although the proponents of the “class own, which can be employed in the demo-
struggle” approach have been loathe to draw cratic political arena. Although “ . . . wage earn-
this conclusion, the fact remains that post– ers are generally at a disadvantage with respect
War Marxist state theory seems to have come to power resources . . . through their capacity
around full circle, from instrumentalism to fierce for collective action, the extent of their disad-
structuralist rejections of any reformism, back vantage can vary over time as well as between
to a version of the formerly excommunicated countries” (Korpi, 1985a:41). The wage earn-
revisionism. A second irony worth noting is ers’ “capacity for collective action” depends on
a host of factors, including the degree of homo-
8
This has not been lost on the authors who seek some geneity of their working and living conditions,
support for a reformist position in the recent Marxist lit- the degree of mobilization and coordination of
erature. Both Korpi (1983:19, 245 fn. 20) and Stephens
(1979:215, fn. 5) invoke Esping-Andersen et al. (1976) labor unions and political parties, the lessons
as evidence for the Marxist pedigree of their own ap- learnt from previous conflicts, the institutional
proaches. setting, and so on. Such factors will determine
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the strength of working-class organizations rela- nothing but a “transmission belt” for the class
tive to those representing the interests of capital, interests of various interest groups (Weir and
which will, in turn, help determine government Skocpol, 1985:117), others fault it for focusing
policies, particularly those that affect the distri- too narrowly on the primary social classes and
bution of economic resources between the social on material interests (Lister, 2002). Against such
classes. criticisms, Korpi in particular has recognized the
Thus, the basic power resources approach importance of built-in arrangements in all so-
starts from a classic two-class model to explain cietal institutions, including the state, that fa-
political outcomes. The workers and the bour- vor some interests at the expense of others and
geoisie mobilize through trade unions and em- that reflect not only past conflicts and the cur-
ployer associations that may become the bases rent balance of societal power (Korpi, 1985a,
for left, right, and even centrist political parties. 1985b) but also strategic interactions among
These parties then channel conflicting class in- politicians, bureaucrats, and interest-group lead-
terests through the state, bureaucracy, and courts ers that make outcomes highly contingent. As
as a result of elections, legislation, and execu- a result, state officials may have “considerable
tive decisions. Hence, patterns of change in so- freedom of choice” although their autonomy
cial welfare legislation can be explained from remains “circumscribed” by the broad mandate
the relative strength of the two class groups. As of their constituents (Korpi, 1989:314). Second,
labor gains in class strength by the mobilization Korpi claims to take norms and ideology quite
of resources through trade unions and support- seriously. Ideology can be a method by which
ing social democratic parties, it wins greater say power resources based on coercion or remuner-
in funding and managing the welfare state. In ative power can be converted into normative
this way the lower classes can use the welfare incentives, and it is an important normative re-
state for redistributive purposes to compensate source in mobilizing groups and overcoming the
to some extent for the unequal distribution by “free rider” problem (1985a:39). Nor does ide-
markets. ology necessarily always serve the interests of
With this general theory, Korpi, Esping- the most privileged. In the opposite direction,
Andersen, Shalev, and many others seek to ex- “contagion from the left” may lead to working-
plain how different “models of capitalism” – class demands being adopted by other political
arrangements for the distribution of economic parties (Korpi, 1989:313, 1985a, 2003; Rogers,
resources through the labor market and in- 1974). As for the narrow class focus, Korpi ar-
dustrial relations (Coates, 2000; Crouch, 1997; gues that “[t]he power resources approach does
Crouch et al., 1999) – have produced differ- not . . . imply that social policy development is
ent political power alignments between labor based on the organizational and political power
and capital, which, in turn, generate different of the working class and left parties alone,” be-
“welfare state regimes” that restructure income cause in the Swedish case as elsewhere it empha-
distributions and incentives through pensions, sizes the importance of coalitions with “farmers’
health care, education, and other state and parties, conservative parties, and Catholic par-
sometimes private services. This is how power ties,” among others (1989:313). In fact, Korpi
resource theorists explain the rise of the highly insists, it offers a “game theoretical perspec-
developed and redistributive Scandinavian wel- tive on the analysis of interdependent actors”
fare states and how Esping-Andersen explains (1989:313). Similarly, Esping-Andersen empha-
the emergence the three regimes of welfare cap- sizes the importance of coalitions in Scandi-
italism – liberal, traditional, and social demo- navian social policy development (1985:36–7;
cratic regimes (1990; Esping-Andersen and Baldwin, 1990; Hicks, 2000; Van Kersbergen,
Korpi, 1987; Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979). 1996).
But the basic two-class model of power re- In practice, however, even where they explic-
sources theory has been criticized for being itly mention bureaucrats and politicians, power
too simplistic in several respects. Some critics resources theorists tend to subordinate their
claim that it has a simplified view of the state as interests to those of the primary social classes,
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either capital or labor (e.g., Esping-Andersen, mode of production argument with their recent
1985:30, 1990; Korpi, 1985a:106; Stephens, emphasis on production regimes. But they add
1979:65–8, 79, 131). But more recently, there gender and racial groups combining them into
have been several serious attempts to incor- so-called constellations of power (Huber and
porate many aspects of state-centric theory – Stephens, 2001:17–20, 23). Huber and Stephens
constitutional structures, state centralization, agree with the state-centric critics in seeing state
corporatism, and bureaucratic paternalism – structures as potential veto points defined by
into the power resources and related approaches constitutions, and in the importance of policy
(Hicks and Misra, 1993; Huber, Ragin, and legacies, which can easily be interpreted as the
Stephens, 1993). Most often they concentrate results of previous battles over power resources.
on constitutions, welfare state structures, and But they remain “quite skeptical” (2001:21) of
modes of deregulation (Korpi and Palme, 2003). state bureaucrats significantly affecting policy
A number of scholars referring to themselves because they appear to have no obvious inter-
as “analytical Marxists” have attempted quite ests of their own with respect to policy, and
explicitly to provide Marxism with microfoun- more importantly, the power resources of parties
dations based on rational choice theory (Carver and interest groups “profoundly limit the range
and Thomas, 1995; Elster, 1982, 1985; Prze- of policies that bureaucrats are able to suggest”
worski, 1985a; Roemer, 1986). Interestingly, (2001:21). Thus, in this broadened power re-
with respect to political sociology this brings sources approach, the pressure for change may
them very close to power resources theory still come from societal groups and particularly
when explaining the rise of working-class re- labor and capital, but state structures in the leg-
formism and the welfare state (Lo, 2002:207–8). islature via the constitution, and policy lega-
The starting point for analytical Marxism is the cies in the bureaucracy can channel that pres-
assumption that individual workers as well as sure to varying degrees ( Janoski, 1998:143–4).
their representatives in unions and labor parties Although this may not satisfy state-centric theo-
will act according to what they perceive to be rists, it constitutes a significant extension of the
their best immediate interests, given the exist- original power resources model.
ing balance of power and the most likely ac- Paul Pierson, in the “new politics” approach,
tions and options of their political opponents. maintains that power resources theory is very
From this they argue that, in the absence of useful in explaining the rise of the welfare state
any clear revolutionary alternative, the labor but not in accounting for the retrenchment
movement has rationally opted for a reformist process (1994, 2001). However, Korpi points
strategy that has subsequently produced welfare out that groups other than labor and capital –
states offering a range of social security benefits pensioners, health care consumers, and the dis-
and income redistributions, depending on the abled – are the “new client groups of benefit
power of their respective labor movements (e.g., recipients generated by welfare states them-
Przeworski, 1985b, 1991; Przeworski and Spra- selves” who play a more prominent role in re-
gue, 1988; Wallerstein, 1999). sisting government cutbacks (2003:591). This is,
Beginning with Skocpol and Orloff (1986) of course, perfectly compatible with the wider
and followed by Janoski (1990:9–36; 1998:148– power resources theory just outlined. Korpi and
65) and Hicks and Misra (1993), a basis was Palme use this to further demonstrate that class
laid for combining a multigroup approach factors, state structures, and citizenship vari-
to power resources and state-centric theory. ables explain retrenchment in eighteen coun-
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Huber and tries (2003:426–42).
Stephens (2001) propose a power constellation Thus, some power resources theorists have
theory that also addresses more diverse groups. begun at least to acknowledge the importance
This approach stays centered on the impor- of other causal factors such as the state, culture,
tance of class groupings in trade unions and and nonclass group interests. There certainly is
political parties, and even reinforces a sort of nothing in principle to preclude a general power
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resources theory from being extended in these These grounds ultimately rest on the “central
directions.9 At the same time, when this is se- intuition” (Dews, 1986:99; Honneth et al.,
riously attempted, that is, when current state 1981:9) that the “ideal speech situation,” a situa-
structures are seen not only as the results of tion that “excludes all force. . . except the force
struggles for power in the past but are also treated of the better argument” (Habermas, 1984:25)
as effective causal forces in the present, and when is in some way “the inherent telos of human
status groups such as blacks, women, gays, and speech” (Habermas, 1984:287).
ethnic minorities are treated as groups capable of It is only in The Theory of Communicative Ac-
accumulating and wielding power resources on tion (1984, 1987) that Habermas finally clearly
a par with labor and capital, then the theory does attempts to identify the potential social carri-
tend to take on an uncanny resemblance to the ers of critical emancipatory, communicative rea-
neo-Weberian conflict theories discussed under son who will form the progressive forces in
“Class, Status, and Symbolic Conflict: From the central social conflicts of the near future.
Weber to Bourdieu.” In it, Habermas proposes a “two-level” theory
of modern society pitting the Schutzean “life-
world” of culture, social norms, and personal
Critical and Emancipatory Theory identities against the anonymous commercial
and bureaucratic “systems” of modern capital-
In the 1920s and 1930s a group of neo-Hegelian ist society. The principle of organization of the
Marxists known as the “Frankfurt School” be- lifeworld, Habermas maintains, is interpersonal
gan to formulate a “Critical Theory” to analyze communication that ultimately rests on the ideal
how the working class’s “false consciousness” of an “ideal speech situation” among free and
was the result of the triumph of “instru- equal participants. Although this ideal speech
mental reason” over “substantive reason.” situation must always remain an unattained ideal,
Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Habermas claims, there is nevertheless a his-
Marcuse, and others loosely associated with torical tendency for the lifeworld in modern
their original institute in Frankfurt saw as their societies to become more and more “rational-
principal task the search for new social and ized,” that is, more closely approaching an
philosophical sources of true reason with which “ideal speech situation,” relying more and more
to counter the manifest unreason of modern on “discursive will-formation” rather than the
capitalism ( Jay, 1973). automatisms of received tradition (Habermas,
Jürgen Habermas is the leading exponent of 1987:147).
the second generation of critical theorists. Like At the same time, large domains of mod-
his erstwhile mentors Habermas has spent an ern society, and in particular the economy and
intellectual lifetime searching for an effective the legal-political system, have become so com-
philosophical and social antidote to the relent- plex that they can only be effectively steered by
less march of “instrumental rationality” char- mechanisms that do not appeal directly to ac-
acterizing modern capitalism and its bureau- tors’ intentions and orientations. These systems
cratized states. Most of Habermas’ work has of purposive-rational action are instead increas-
been concerned with establishing the philosoph- ingly coordinated by the generalized “delin-
ical grounds for a critical, emancipatory practice guistified steering media” of money and power
resisting the spread of instrumental rationality. (Habermas, 1984:341–2). But although this
“uncoupling” of system from lifeworld is a nec-
9 essary part of the overall process of rational-
In some ways, the European ties of power resources
theorists in countries with strong labor movements ization, according to Habermas, the process
seemed to blind them to making these developments. is “contradictory from the start” (Habermas,
Just as new social movements seem new to countries
long dominated by class, other countries with a history 1984:342), with the two antithetical princi-
of ethnic and/or racial conflicts do not see them as all ples of coordination clashing as the subsystems
that new. of purposive-rational action tend inexorably to
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expand their reach beyond their original do- sophical realm and its sociological implications
mains. As a result, there is the growing danger remain underdeveloped. John Keane has exten-
of a “colonization of the lifeworld” by the sub- sively written about the potential for resistance
systems of purposive-rational action, as mani- against the dominant ideology in civil society
fested in persistent tendencies toward state reg- (Keane, 1987a, 1988a, 1988b, 1991, 1998; Arato
ulation on the basis of administrative rationality and Cohen, 1984). Axel Honneth attempts a
as well as the commercialization of the lifeworld pluralization of the left beyond economic dom-
(Habermas, 1987:153– 97, 301–31). ination and sees the civil sphere as a loca-
Clearly the working class and its organization for “practical-critical activity” (Honneth,
tions are in no position to resist this coloniza- 1991:19–31) and the development of a “moral
tion as they are themselves hopelessly implicated logic of social conflicts” using Hegel and
in the ongoing processes of bureaucratization Mead (Honneth, 1996:160–79). Seyla Benhabib
and monetarization. But there are, according (2001, 2002) attempts to formulate a commu-
to Habermas, a number of significant sociopo- nicative ethics with much more of a gender and
litical movements that have recently emerged, racial emphasis. But very much in keeping with
including feminism, the Greens, peace move- the earlier Frankfurt School tradition, all of these
ments, human rights activists, ethnic and ge- writers are much concerned with finding the
ographically based movements, and youth and philosophical and moral principles on which to
“alternative” movements, which are both prod- build a critical stance, although some attempts
ucts and proponents of the communicatively have been made, inspired by Habermas and his
rational discourse increasingly shaping the life- followers, to promote deliberation in the public
world. These so-called new social movements, sphere at a much more practical level (Fung,
Habermas expects, will take up the banner 2003; Fung and Wright, 2003; Sargeant and
of the embattled “lifeworld” and the struggle Janoski, 2001).
against the encroachments of monetary and bu- In a somewhat similar vein, Ernesto Laclau
reaucratic principles of organization (Habermas, and Chantal Mouffe (1985) have attempted
1981, 1986, 1987:391–6). to combine Marxism and postmodernism into
Thus, Habermas predicts the outbreak of a something they call “postmarxism.” Taking
new set of central social conflicts in the advanced Gramsci’s emphasis on political activity as the
capitalist countries based on the fundamen- basis of hegemony to its logical extreme, they
tal tensions, the contradiction in fact, between categorically deny that any social agent takes
the expansion of ever more encompassing sys- a privileged position within the emancipatory
tems of impersonal organization in politics struggle: “in certain instances it may very well
and economy and the increasingly democra- be that ecological, feminist or gay/lesbian lib-
tized lifeworld of cultural identity and social eration movements constitute the most radical
action. This accounts for the rise and recent forms of hegemonic struggle against an existing
prominence of those much-discussed new so- set of power structures” (Daly, 1999:71). The
cial movements that seem to be based more task of the political left, according to Laclau
on matters of identity and principle than on and Mouffe, is to radicalize plural democracy
their members’ immediate interests. It may be by exploiting the tensions created by the con-
a far cry from the erstwhile certainties of classi- tradiction, inherent in liberal democracy, be-
cal mode-of-production Marxism, but it does, tween the individualist and libertarian aspects
quite unlike the neo-Weberian conflict theo- of unrestricted rights and the cooperative and
ries, predict the predominance of one particular norm-building nature of a democratic commu-
kind of social conflict over others and provide nity (Mouffe, 1992a, 1993a; Rosenau, 1992:14–
the not inconsiderable comfort of identifying 17; Torfing, 1999:245, 249–52). Such “agonistic
the progressive forces in the battles to come. pluralism” (Mouffe, 1999) will have a radical de-
A third generation of critical theorists has mocratizing effect, transforming citizens from
emerged but most of its work is in the philo- passive bearers of rights into active constructors
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of associations creating and exercising further down trends of Kondratieff cycles to help ex-
rights. It will lead to entirely new relations be- plain changes in the world economic and po-
tween citizens and the state, between the private litical order. Many others, including Christo-
and the public sphere, and so on. But because pher Chase-Dunn (1983) and Terry Boswell and
no kind of struggle is a priori privileged over, Albert Bergesen (1987), have contributed to this
or more fundamental than any other, there also literature. Daniel Chirot (1986) and others have
cannot be any future socialism in which the provided a non-Marxist alternative to world sys-
most fundamental conflicts are resolved once tems theory.
and for all. Therefore, the struggle for liberty Many of the debates in and about world sys-
and equality will continue forever, being taken tems theory have focused on whether and to
up by a succession of different social agents forg- what extent exploitation of the periphery is nec-
ing their hegemonic projects ad infinitum. In essary for core country prosperity and domi-
short, Laclau and Mouffe end up redefining the nance, and on the nature, length, and relations
socialist project as a never-ending “radicaliza- between the various economic and political cy-
tion of democracy; that is, as the articulation of cles of the capitalist world system (Hall, 2002).
struggles against different forms of subordina- But political power, and its intimate connec-
tion – class, gender, race, as well as those others tion with powerful economic interests, plays a
opposed by ecological, anti-nuclear, and anti- central role in the dynamics of world systems.
institutional movements” (Laclau and Mouffe, In turn, political outcomes within as well as
1985:ix).10 between countries are explained by world sys-
tem theorists as the outcome of the struggle for
domination and resistance within the world sys-
World Systems and
tem. Thus, the emergence of strong, formally
Globalization Theories
democratic, somewhat redistributive states de-
pending heavily on popular legitimacy in the
The main point of world systems theory is to
core countries, as well as the rise and persistence
shift our focus from social cleavages within to
of weak, corrupt, and often brutally coercive
those between states and nations. The major
comprador states in the periphery are explained
cleavage is that between the core country or
by, but also help explain, the respective coun-
countries dominating the capitalist world system
tries’ position within the overall world system.
and the peripheral and semiperipheral coun-
As with other approaches with Marxist roots,
tries dominated and exploited by them through
world systems theory has been criticized for
an international division of labor characterized
paying insufficient attention to nonclass groups
by “unequal exchange.” Immanuel Wallerstein’s
and issues such as gender, race, and ethnicity
work (1974, 1980, 1989) has focused on distinct
(Dunaway, 2001; Misra, 2000; Ward, 1993).
periods in world history applying the up and
But here as elsewhere proponents claim to have
10
Although recognizing that all programs are a par- made amends in this regard in recent years (e.g.,
tial hegemony, Mouffe specifies that the new leftist Hall, 2003).11
project opposes complexity, bureaucracy, and massified
11
life and pursues a form of associational democracy (Hirst, There are some interesting parallels between world
1988, 1994; Cohen, 1995). This associational socialism systems theory and some critical versions of globalization
would include (1) cooperatively owned and democrati- theory that stress the combination of powerful multi-
cally managed economic units, (2) challenges to hierar- national corporations, U.S. political and military might,
chies and inequalities, and (3) decentralized, democratic and Western or U.S. culture imposing a new world order
governance. The state would be transformed in a re- benefitting primarily the advanced West while domi-
flexive manner to ensure equity and balance between nating and exploiting the rest of the world (Robertson,
associations and protect the rights of individuals and as- 1992, 1995; Roudometof, 1995; Sanderson, 1995). But
sociations. Representative democracy would continue world systems theorists generally see globalization as
but be transformed by deliberative democracy and the merely the latest wave of an age-old dynamic and tend
socialism pursued by the left would be forever “becom- to dismiss overly excited globalization theories as lacking
ing” in a truly pluralist society (Hirst, 1994). historical perspective (Hall, 2002:103–7).
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Perhaps the most discussed attempt to refur- Hardt and Negri’s reasons, though not al-
bish Marxism by transferring the class struggle ways clear, for expecting the multitude to turn
to the international arena is Empire (2000) by against capitalism are instructive, as they are a
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.12 They seek throwback of sorts to classical Marxism. The
to go beyond postmodern localism and post- multitude, they argue, constitutes the “real pro-
structuralist pessimism to recapture Marxism’s ductive force” (Hardt and Negri, 2000:62) in
original promise of the eventual overthrow of a labor process of unprecedented sociality. But
capitalism. Their principal claim is that capi- this unprecedented socialization of the now-
talism has, partly in response to the crises pro- international labor process also gives the multi-
voked by the various oppositional movements tude unprecedented powers of resistance against
that emerged since the 1960s, transformed itself the globalizing capital of empire. For however
from an imperialism based on sovereign nation- local the struggles may appear, they are imme-
states and Foucauldian disciplinary power to diately globalized in their effect and impact.
what they call empire, an entirely new stage Examples include, according to Hardt and Ne-
characterized by deterritorialized global control gri, such seemingly local struggles as the Pales-
through the internationalization of the capital- tinian Intifada, the rebellion in Chiapas, the
ist market, the “informatization” of labor and a race riots in Watts, and the student protests in
seamless web of interconnected economic, po- Tiananmien Square. All these are united, they
litical, and cultural control mechanisms com- insist, by the fact that they “directly attack the
pletely permeating the minds and bodies of the global order of Empire and seek a real alterna-
multitudes it brings under its sway across the tive” (Hardt and Negri, 2000:56–7). They rep-
globe, amounting to an entirely new form of resent the multitude’s struggle for freedom from
power: “biopower.” the control of Empire. Although this identifies
This new system of control does not de- a new, albeit rather fragmented and disparate
pend on the old binary categories and exclu- worldwide social conflict with presumably far-
sions attacked by the postmodernists anymore, reaching consequences, Hardt and Negri do not
nor does it have any trouble accommodating and venture any clear predictions as to what the po-
incorporating those local identities and differ- litical outcomes are likely to be.
ences that postmodernists and poststructuralists
hold so dear, rendering them entirely harm-
less and even celebrating them. In this sense, class, status, and symbolic conflict:
Hardt and Negri argue, empire is actually a pro- from weber to bourdieu
gressive force in that it effectively sweeps aside
or neutralizes those narrowly parochial nation- Weber’s Multiple Conflict Theory
alisms and localisms in which postmodernists
and postcolonialists see the sources of resistance Of all the classical theorists, Weber was perhaps
(2000:138). It globalizes capitalism in a way not the one who took politics in all its forms most
even imperialism could, creating a new, broader seriously. For Weber, politics was, first and fore-
basis for anticapitalist struggle in the multitude, most, an incessant struggle for power, the power
a much-expanded version of the former Marx- to control or influence the collective actions
ist proletariat defined as “a broad category that of the community. In relatively organized com-
includes all those whose labor is directly or in- munities such action takes place through, or is
directly exploited by and subjected to capitalist sanctioned by, a state, defined by Weber as “a
norms of production and reproduction” (Hardt human community that (successfully) claims the
and Negri, 2000:52). monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within
a given territory” (Weber, 1948:78, 1978:56).
12
The journal Rethinking Marxism recently devoted Weber distinguished three pure types of legit-
an entire double issue, Fall/Winter 2001, to discussions imate rule or domination, each with its own
of the book. characteristic internal dynamic: rational-legal
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rule based on the belief in the legality of the valuable goods and services as determined by
process by which policies are enacted and au- one’s ability to trade one’s assets on labor and
thority is conferred; traditional rule resting on commodity markets. This is a broader defini-
the belief in the “sanctity of immemorial tration of class than the Marxist definition of (lack
ditions and the legitimacy of those exercising of ) control over the means of production, which
authority under them” (Weber, 1978:215); and is only one kind of class in Weber’s scheme. As
charismatic rule, resting on the belief in the Marxists have often pointed out, Weber’s defini-
exceptional qualities of an individual political tion of class focuses on inequality of consump-
leader. Although Weber’s emphasis on legiti- tion opportunities, as opposed to the produc-
macy points to the fact that political rule de- tion side and its relations of “exploitation” (e.g.,
pends for its stability to some extent on its cul- Wright, 2002).13
tural justification, he was far from a consensus The second, and more important way in
theorist. To the contrary, his detailed discussions which Weber departs from Marx is that he ar-
of the various historical subtypes of legitimate gues that class, however defined, is neither the
rule all revolve around the perpetual struggles only nor even the historically most important
between rulers and ruled, and especially be- basis for “communal action.” Classes are not,
tween rulers and their lieutentants and officials, according to Weber, natural communities. It
yielding never-ending cycles of concentration takes a great deal of effort and favorable con-
and fragmentation, usurpation and legitimation ditions for large numbers of people in compa-
(1978:Part I, chapter III; Bendix, 1960:285– rable class situations to actually get mobilized as
468). In fact, Weber treated the underlying val- a class (Weber, 1978:928–32). Conversely, sta-
ues, and the religious beliefs on which they were tus groups, that is, groups of individuals who
based, themselves as outcomes of struggles be- share positive or negative social estimation of
tween a variety of groups with clashing ideal honor based on some shared characteristic, “are
and material interests (1978:Part II, chapter VI; normally groups” (1978:932). The character-
Bendix, 1960:83–281). istic in question may be “any quality shared
That Weber was, first and foremost, a con- by a plurality,” including race, ethnicity, gen-
flict theorist, even when considering culture der, religion, language, occupation, and so on
and politics, is quite clear from his well- (1978:932). Any one of these may be a source
known passage on “Class, Status, Party” (Weber, of status in a given community and, as such, a
1978:926–40). This passage was intended as source of conflict and struggle for power. Status
a conceptual introductory statement on “The groups often involve a distinctive lifestyle as well
Distribution of Power Within the Political as restrictions on interactions with “outsiders.”
Community.” In other words, Weber was try- Given that they are, almost by definition, al-
ing to systematize the multiplicity of interests ready self-conscious groups, status groups are
around which citizens can get mobilized to relatively easily mobilized and hence at least as
try and affect the distribution and use of po- likely to play an important role in the peren-
litical power in their own favor. Of course, nial struggle for power as classes are, according
the passage was also quite deliberately meant to Weber (1978:932–8). Moreover, status dis-
to counter the unidimensional Marxist idea tinctions can cut across and even run counter
that all major struggles were at bottom class to class distinctions in a variety of ways. At the
struggles.
Weber certainly does not deny the impor- 13
This does not mean, however, that class inequali-
tance of economic interest as a basis for mobi- ties are not a result of “domination” for Weber (Scott,
lization and conflict throughout history. But he 1996:188–92). But a critique of Weber for not having a
revises Marxist doctrine on two crucial points. theory of exploitation (e.g., Wright, 2002) largely misses
the point. For Weber exploitation was a term of moral
First, he defines class position as determined by disapproval, not a social-scientific concept adding to our
similarity of “market situation,” that is, simi- explanatory understanding of economic inequality and
larity in the extent to which one has access to its correlates.
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same time, Weber insisted that class and status culties in maintaining organizational democ-
(and, presumably, political power) do tend to re- racy (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, 1956), tracing
inforce one another in the long run. Although the interactions between class and status group
“[p]roperty as such is not always recognized as a membership in determining political behavior
status qualification . . . in the long run it is, and and outcomes (Lipset, 1981) or working out
with extraordinary regularity” (1978:932). the complex historical patterns of interaction
The section on party is rather short, but it is among class, status group, and forms of political
clear that Weber had intended to treat it as a third domination to account for the long-term rise of
major source of political organization, struggle, democracy and dictatorship (Moore, 1966).
and domination. A party is any association aim-
ing to influence “social action no matter what its
content” (Weber, 1978:938). Thus, a party may Political Power Elite Theory
represent primarily economic class interests or
status groups or, more likely, a combination of Other early critics of Marxism sought to re-
both. But it may also fight for the realization of place the class struggle with the struggle for
ideal interests or it may, for that matter, primar- political power itself as the “motor force of
ily serve to provide political office and benefits history.” These were the classical power elite
for its members (as in pure patronage parties) theorists, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and
although “[u]sually the party aims at all these Robert Michels, sometimes referred to as the
simultaneously” (1978:938). neo-Machiavellians for their hard-nosed, even
Thus, Weber’s approach is, if anything, even cynical, view of the world. The primary conflict
more unflinchingly a conflict theory than in society was not one between classes struggling
Marx’s. For Weber, conflict is endemic in social for control of the means of production but be-
and especially political life, and it has as many tween elites and would-be elites struggling for
sources as there are types of life chances and so- control over the means of coercion. For every
cial advantages that people can pursue. None social endeavor, according to Pareto, there are
of these sources or types of conflict has pri- those naturally endowed to excel and those who
macy over any of the other, either in the sense will not, and the former are the elite. The most
of being causally more fundamental or in the important of these elites, the governing elite, is
sense of having some special place in determin- the one that controls government and politics.
ing the grand sweep of history. Unlike either By virtue of its control of the means of coer-
Marx or the neo-Machiavellians, Weber takes cion, it effectively dominates the rest of society
culture very seriously, both as a binding force as well. So the main line of social cleavage in
and as a source of division and conflict. Unlike all societies runs between the governing elite
Marx, Weber takes politics very seriously as well trying to hold on to power and aspiring coun-
and sees it, too, as the source of an inevitable and terelites trying to conquer it. To stay in power,
unending struggle for power in its own right as the governing elite must use a judicious mix of
well as a means to satisfy other ideal and material physical force, religion, intelligence, and cun-
interests. ning. But this requires the presence of sufficient
Weber had a profound influence on a variety numbers of elite members with the appropriate
of social thinkers from Talcott Parsons to the talents (lions as well as foxes). Yet elites have a
Frankfurt School. Schumpeter’s argument for tendency to close themselves off to the talented
democratic elitism and his dark predictions of offspring of nonelite members, which produces,
the impending rise of a bureaucratized social- over time, an imbalance between an increasingly
ism, in particular, owed much to Weber’s in- decadent elite and a rising number of talented
sights (Schumpeter, 1950). After WWII, with but frustrated subjects. In the absence of a proper
the rise of political sociology proper, much of circulation of elites ensuring the incorporation
the mainstream more or less naturally adopted of new talent, then, those ruthless and talented
a Weberian perspective, examining the diffi- enough will eventually stage a revolution to
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overthrow and replace the existing elite, starting Early Postwar Conflict
the eternal cycle all over again (Pareto, 1963). Theory – Dahrendorf
Thus, Pareto proposed a theory of revolution
as well as a cyclical theory of political regimes By combining elements from Marx and Weber,
and an argument about the essentially illusory Ralf Dahrendorf (1959, 1968) formulated a
character of all democracies, based on a simple conflict theory, explicitly in opposition to the
set of assumptions about the random (bio- structural-functionalist consensus theory, based
logically determined) distributions of various on the inevitable inequality of authority. Com-
talents within any human population. Mosca’s plex societies, according to Dahrendorf, are
argument (1939) is similar, albeit less directly populated by imperatively coordinated asso-
derived from biology. All societies are, accord- ciations centered around major societal tasks,
ing to Mosca, divided between a minority class which can be political, economic, cultural, and
that rules by virtue of its political power and a so on. By definition, these associations are char-
majority that is ruled by it. A successful ruling acterized by a division between those with
class will combine the use of force with a authority and those without. This creates an
“political formula,” that is, an ideology capable inevitable conflict of interest within each such
of uniting society under its leadership. Thus, association between the dominant class, which
parliamentary systems are merely a modern way has an interest in maintaining the status quo,
of ensuring the stable command of the current and the subordinate class challenging that sta-
ruling class. tus quo. Thus, Dahrendorf claims to general-
Michels set out to examine the presumably ize Marx’s two-class model beyond the sphere
most democratic of modern institutions, po- of production on the basis of the division of
litical parties, and especially those representing power characteristic of all forms of complex
the working classes, to find the mechanisms by organization. But given the variety and multi-
which such organizations manage to overcome plicity of imperatively coordinated associations
this tendency toward the concentration of there will also be any number of two-class sys-
power. What he discovered, instead, was his tems and most invidividuals will occupy differ-
“Iron Law of Oligarchy.” Large-scale organi- ent class positions in different associations. The
zation, no matter how democratic its official result is a proliferation of classes and class po-
ideology, requires a division of labor between sitions, many of them cross-cutting, having the
expert officials and rank-and-file members. effect of preventing any single, societywide class
This inexorably leads to oligarchic control by a conflict from dominating all others, except un-
small insider elite. “Who says organization says der unusual conditions of coinciding multiple
oligarchy” (Michels, 1962:365). cleavages.
Thus, neo-Machiavellian theorists view the Hence, although organizational power-based
conflict between the rulers and the ruled, be- conflict is ubiquitous and inevitable, according
tween those in control of the political system to Dahrendorf, it predicts no single or sim-
and those whom it controls, as the primary ple political outcomes. The latter depend on
conflict in all societies (see also Lukes, 2001; the distribution of resources between domi-
McCormick, 2001). It tends to view the demo- nant and subordinate classes at any one time,
cratic pretensions of modern democracies with which in turn depends on technology, the shape
suspicion and treats the cultural realm as an ap- of organizations and institutions, overlapping
pendage (Pareto’s derivatives, Mosca’s political class divisions, degree of mobilization and much
formula) in the real struggle between rulers and else. But although Dahrendorf accepted the in-
ruled. It also appears to have been of limited use evitability of conflict over political power as the
as an explanatory conflict approach in political neo-Machiavellians had done (see also Lenski,
sociology because it fundamentally takes polit- 1966), he did not share their jaundiced view of
ical inequality for granted instead of seeking to modern democracy and spent much time and
explain it. energy arguing for various improvements and
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strengthening of the democratic process (1967, standing of their members. Such groups are
1974, 1987, 1988, 1994). neither necessarily class-based in the Marxian
sense, nor exclusively based on organizational
power as assumed by the neo-Machiavellians
General Neo-Weberian Conflict and their latter-day followers. In true neo-
Theories – Collins and Turner Weberian, multidimensional fashion, Collins
seeks to explain the formation of specific con-
From at least the early 1970s, a number of flicting groups as the result of shared experi-
‘left-Weberians’ have attempted to resurrect a ence, available resources and technology, net-
Weberian approach centered on group conflict, works of communication and cooperation, and
in explicit opposition to the Parsonian appropri- so on. The result is a plethora of sometimes
ation of Weber as a theorist emphasizing culture primarily culture-based, sometimes occupation
and consensus. They have argued that Marxian or wealth-based, and sometimes organizational
classes are only one among several sources of power-based groups jockeying for relative ad-
power and conflict and by no means necessar- vantage.
ily the most important or the determinant ones, Several things about Collins’s general ap-
not even “in the last instance.” Social exclusion proach foreshadow more recent developments
and the monopolization of privilege occurs at in conflict theory. First, as the emphasis on sub-
least as frequently and effectively on the basis of jective experience already suggests, Collins is
status characteristics and political power. keenly sensitive to two aspects of the social strat-
Perhaps the most prominent, and certainly ification process that have generally escaped the
the most explicit, attempt to advance the con- close attention of the more macro-oriented the-
flict tradition is Randall Collins’s Conflict Sociol- orists of stratification. The first is the importance
ogy (1975). Collins sets out to formulate a gen- of repeated face-to-face interaction as the ulti-
eral neo-Weberian conflict theory that “may be mate microsociological foundation of the social
applied to any empirical areas,” based on the stratification process (1975:chapter 3, 1988:188–
simple assumptions that: 228). The other is the recognition of culture as
both the product of shared experiences of re-
men [and women] live in self-constructed subjective
worlds; that others pull many of the strings that con-
peated unequal encounters and as a major source
trol one’s subjective experience; and that there are fre- on the mobilization and realization of group
quent conflicts over control. Life is basically a struggle interests (1990, 1998). Finally, Collins strongly
for status in which no one can afford to be oblivious emphasizes the importance of the nature and
to the power of others around him [or her] [and] scope of communication and cooperation net-
everyone uses what resources are available to have works for social outcomes, ranging from the
others aid him [or her] in putting on the best possible distribution of wealth to that of ideas (1975:
face under the circumstances. (1975:60)
chapter 8, 1998).
Armed with this fairly rudimentary set of as- Although Collins himself has primarily ap-
sumptions, Collins tackles a wide range of tra- plied his conflict approach to other matters, its
ditional sociological issues, from occupational, implications for political outcomes and struc-
sex, and gender stratification to complex orga- tures are nonetheless clear. Much of his anal-
nizations, the distribution of wealth and social ysis of credentialism, for example, is devoted
mobility, educational sociology, and even the to showing how public policy with respect to
sociology of knowledge and philosophy (1971, school curricula is the outcome of sometimes-
1975, 1979, 1998). In each case, Collins tries fierce battles between groups representing dif-
to show how outcomes can be explained as ferent social strata trying to gain relative ad-
the result of ongoing struggles between groups vantage for their members’ children within the
formed around shared experiences of privi- educational system (Collins, 1979). In keeping
lege and exclusion, order giving and order tak- with the Weberian tradition, Collins treats pol-
ing, and attempting to improve the relative itics as a form of overt or covert violence and
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defines the state as “the way in which violence member of the society and nation in question.
is organized” (1975:351). Thus, the politics of These groups may get mobilized along class
premodern societies are, in Collins’s view, pri- lines, through trade unions and employers, left
marily determined by the technology of vio- and right parties, and other organizations repre-
lence and administrative coercion, which in turn senting workers and the intelligensia or as status
depend in large part on economic resources. groups, such as ethnic/racial groups, women,
At the same time, coercion alone always meets religious groups, and so on (Turner, 1988:42–
resistance and requires a legitimating ideology, 64). Interest groups and organizations represent-
usually in the form of a state religion, at least to ing these emerging citizens may be strengthened
keep those doing the coercing solidary and those or weakened by economic, demographic, ideo-
being coerced passive. The larger the empire, the logical, or international developments. Gener-
more universalistic such religions have to be to ally, in the battles for citizenship, status groups
maintain a semblance of legitimacy and cohe- tend to cut across classes rather than coincide
sion over and among increasingly diverse popu- with them (Parkin, 1982:98–9), rendering the
lations and administrators. Collins treats the pol- politics more fragmented than it would other-
itics of modern bureaucratized states in entirely wise be. As a result, the criss-crossing of differ-
Weberian terms as well, with an ever-changing ent types of groups and interest representation
array of mobilized representatives of classes, sta- produces many types of social policy outcomes.
tus groups, and parties seeking to enlist the state’s This is then embedded within the larger conflict
coercive powers to serve their constituents’ in- of capitalism and its markets versus citizenship
terests. Democracy is, according to Collins, not and its rights ( Janoski, 1998:147–64).
the rule of the people resulting from inevitable
historical progress but a relatively more inclusive
form of coercive rule by mobilized interests ne- Mann’s Integration of Ideological,
cessitated by conditions of relatively even distri- Economic, Military, and Political Power
butions of coercive and administrative resources
among separate but interdependent mobilized By far the most ambitious, as well as politically
groups. Thus politics are and remain a mat- sociological exponent of the neo-Weberian cur-
ter of continuous conflict and struggle between rent is Michael Mann’s attempt to recast the en-
groups more or less mobilized around varied tire “history of social power” (Mann, 1986, 1994)
material, coercive and cultural interests that are in terms of a neo-Weberian conceptual scheme.
neither reducible to any one “master cleav- As his fellow neo-Weberians, Mann is con-
age” nor ultimately resolvable (Collins, 1975: cerned to show that control over economic re-
chapter 7).14 sources is only one source of social power among
By contrast, Bryan Turner’s analyses of the several, none of which are always or entirely re-
politics of citizenship can be seen as an appli- ducible to or based on the others. But Mann
cation of this kind of neo-Weberian conflict introduces several major conceptual innovations
theory (1981, 1986a, 1986b, 1990, 1992, 1993a, that make his approach distinctive. First, he re-
1993b; also Janoski, 1990, 1998). Turner de- places the traditional Weberian triad of stratifi-
scribes the battles among a variety of exclud- cation dimensions – class, status, and power –
ing groups pursuing “personhood” – the initial with four mutually irreducible kinds of social
right to be considered a citizen and thus be a power: economic power based on control over
material resources, ideological power based on
14
Collins’s approach has much in common with the need for meaning, military power based on
Parkin’s (1980) theory of social closure, implying a per- physical coercion, and political power based on
petual and many-sided group struggle for access to, and more or less centralized territorial administra-
exclusion from, any number of valued resources and op-
portunities. Raymond Murphy (1988) has attempted to tion (1986:chapter 1). This yields the so-called
combine and refine Collins’s and Parkin’s arguments (see IEMP model of social power. In other words,
also Janoski, 1998:235–6). by splitting the traditional Weberian dimension
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of political power into two, one based on phys- unitary entities (1986:9). Instead, they are bun-
ical coercion and the other on administrative dles of several intertwined, partially overlapping,
control, Mann explicitly rejects the tight We- power networks that have highly variable con-
berian connection between statehood and the nections beyond the society’s supposed bound-
monopoly of the means of physical coercion. aries, which are themselves continuously shift-
To the contrary, Mann argues, administrative ing and being contested.
and military control historically rarely overlap With this expanded, but still rather spare, We-
completely and their conceptual separation al- berian toolkit, Mann recasts the history of social
lows for the analysis and recognition of a much power from the dawn of time to the present. In
greater variety of political forms beyond the Eu- this way, he eventually hopes to discover his-
ropean state (1986:25–8). torical patterns and regularities that may yield
Mann’s treatment of ideology as a source of some empirically grounded higher-level gener-
social power similarly elaborates and refines the alizations. His account emphasizes how different
traditional Weberian approach. Although that power networks are entangled in a continuous
approach treats status as an important source of and remarkably “promiscuous” process of inter-
stratification and conflict, and pays some atten- action and intertwining, as they are constantly
tion to the importance of ideas, especially re- being mixed and matched in various combina-
ligion, as a basis for and resource in such con- tions, never wholly independent of one another,
flicts, it does not explicitly conceptualize the yet never entirely reducible to one another ei-
important difference between transcendent ide- ther. Periodically, the process crystallizes into
ologies that are able to appeal across, and some- recognizable, durable social structures in which
what independently of, other sources of power one of the distinct sources of power tends to
and immanent ideologies that mainly serve to dominate. But Mann insists again and again that
sustain the morale of existing groups or or- such dominance is historically contingent and
ganizations. For Mann, this distinction enables that no source of power ever has ultimate deter-
us much better to understand why certain re- mining primacy.
ligious currents, in particular the great world Mann’s massive reconsideration of the major
religions, were and are able to appeal widely turning points in history has produced an array
across class and political boundaries and thus of novel, and thus inevitably controversial, in-
able to provide the basis for quite independent terpretations and generalizations. He argues, for
and powerful networks of ideological power, instance, that sociogeographic “caging” of sub-
whereas others are primarily effective as sym- ject populations by a well-organized minority
bolic sources of narrower group cohesion and is perhaps the most important factor account-
mobilization. ing for the rise of early stratification systems
Third, Mann conceives of social power, much generating the first major civilizations. Simi-
like Collins, as a matter of the active organiza- larly, the caging of populations into increasingly
tion of social networks of varying reach and so- tightly administered nation-states in the early
phistication that are built to acquire and harness, modern era, ultimately produced demands for
to cultivate and monopolize, the various sources democracy as they were the only option of im-
of power to the benefit of their members. Such provement left open. Another intriguing no-
networks can be extensive, that is, far-flung but tion Mann has gleaned from his inductive study
relatively superficial in their effects, or intensive, of major historical turning points is the “in-
capable of commanding high concentrations of terstitial emergence” of new power networks
commitment and mobilization. Also, these net- (1986:15–19, 537–8). Such networks tend to
works are not neatly bounded entities but more arise in the interstices or pores – the empty
like disorderly bundles of interactions of vari- spaces left by the incomplete institutionaliza-
ous reach and strength that are rather frayed at tion and disorderly interaction – of existing
the edges. As a result, Mann argues, it is mis- power networks. This was the case with the
leading to think of societies as neatly bounded rise of Christianity, as it was, in a quite different
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setting, with the emergence of modern capital- Bourdieu’s Field Theory

ism.
The second volume of Sources of Social Power The late Pierre Bourdieu may well be the most
(1994) uses his framework to address the mod- influential of the contemporary neo-Weberian
ern period from 1760 to 1914. Against much conflict theorists. Although often mistaken for
conventional wisdom, Mann tends to down- a neo-Marxist (e.g., Alexander, 1995; Jenkins,
play the role of capitalism and industrialism and 1992), particularly for his liberal use of con-
to emphasize instead the early modern “revolu- cepts such as capital, class struggle, domination,
tion” in military organization and technology as and so on, and his obvious delight in expos-
the key to the rise of the modern, strong admin- ing the meritocratic pretensions of elites, Bour-
istrative state. He then proceeds to depict both dieu’s approach is clearly much closer to that
class politics and nationalism as in large part the of Collins, Parkin, and Turner than it is to any
product of the creation of a national political version of (neo-)Marxism. Bourdieu himself did
arena by the revenue-extracting infrastructure- not accept either label, maintaining that his ap-
building modern nation-state. The same his- proach transcended all simple classifications and
torical dynamic helps to explain the later mo- dichotomies.
bilization of a plethora of social movements, For Bourdieu, the social world can be viewed
representing gender, ethnic, sexual, environ- as a series of partially overlapping but relatively
mental, religious, and many other interests. In autonomous domains that are in effect battle-
a similar vein, Mann insists that the degree to fields in which individuals and groups compete
which globalization is a new phenomenon and for social advantage. Each of these social fields
is likely to weaken the powers and sovereignty has its own type of reward or distinction, its
of the modern state is much exaggerated (Mann, own rules of engagement, and its own dom-
1997, 2001). inant class or elite. The nature of the reward
Although these middle-level generalizations as well as the rules governing the process of its
are certainly fascinating, Mann has not, thus far, acquisition are themselves subject to struggle as
arrived at the kind of cross-temporal and cross- well. The struggle is fought through the deploy-
cultural generalizations that might constitute a ment and conversion of various forms of capi-
coherent, general theory of inequality or social tal, a term Bourdieu uses in a peculiarly broad
evolution. Instead, he has concentrated on is- sense: there is social capital, otherwise known as
sues specific to the twentieth century that he reputation and social connections, cultural capital
could not deal with in earlier volumes (Mann, or cultural/educational advantage, symbolic capi-
1999, 2000). This is, perhaps, not entirely sur- tal or legitimation, as well as economic and political
prising. Much of Mann’s work is intended, capital. In short, Bourdieu uses the term capital
in true Weberian form, to show how much to designate whatever advantage people struggle
more multicausal and complex the forces that for in any particular field to emphasize its uses as
drive history really are than any a priori grand both a resource in a struggle and the final prize of
theoretical synthesis, including Marxism (cf. the struggle. Much of Bourdieu’s work is a series
Anderson, 1974), could ever do justice to. of applications of this field theory to a variety
But this basic intent, which is virtually built of social fields, particularly cultural ones such as
into Mann’s conceptual scheme, tends, for this the educational system (Bourdieu and Passeron,
very reason, to militate against sweeping, cross- 1971), aesthetics and the arts (Bourdieu,
epochal generalizations. It remains to be seen, 1984, 1996), and academia and language
then, whether Mann’s approach is capable of (Bourdieu, 1988, 1991) but also the upper strata
delivering the empirically grounded theoreti- of the French civil service (Bourdieu, 1996).
cal payoff he aspires to or whether it will re- At the center of Bourdieu’s empirical work is
main a monumental and Weberian testimonial the claim that elites are able to reproduce them-
to the sheer complexity of the social and polit- selves, that is, pass on their privileges to their off-
ical world. spring, even in the apparently most meritocratic
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social fields, by converting one kind of capital underprivileged is also a major theme in Bour-
(e.g., social capital) into another (cultural capital, dieu’s analyses of political polling, which pro-
credentials). They reproduce their own because vides, according to his accusations, “scientific”
they can manipulate the very criteria for what legitimation for political powerlessness (Bour-
counts as worthy in a particular field, such as dieu, 1984:Chapter 8, 1990b: chapter 12). As
education or high-brow art, in such a way as to elsewhere, Bourdieu seems primarily interested
favor their own and their children’s tastes and in deflating the pretensions of the various ex-
predispositions. Except for the terminology of perts, bureaucrats and professional politicians
field and capital, this theory of seemingly mer- who dominate the political field. He does at
itocratic class reproduction is virtually identical one point describe “[t]he state [as] the culmina-
to Collins’ theory of credentialism. tion of a process of concentration of different species of
Given his preoccupation with social domina- capital: capital of physical force or instruments of
tion, it is perhaps surprising that Bourdeu paid coercion (army, police), economic capital, cul-
relatively little attention to the fields of politics tural or (better) informational capital, and sym-
and to political power, as compared to his studies bolic capital,” all of which leads “to the emergence
of various cultural domains. But, very much like of a specific, properly statist capital” (Bourdieu,
his predecessors since at least Althusser (1971), 1994:4). But he never carries out the analysis
Bourdieu has a typically French preoccupation of the effects of the struggles over these various
with how power and domination are “repro- other kinds of capital on “statist capital.” The
duced” symbolically. Arguably most of Bour- only clear instance where he examines the ef-
dieu’s work is devoted to showing how dom- fect of the social and economic realms on the
inant classes are able to manipulate symbols, political is where he briefly explains political
values, knowledge, and tastes so as to uphold propensities by the cross-pressures of economic
their own continued domination by making capital (read: class) and cultural capital (read: sta-
them appear objectively valid, natural, univer- tus/lifestyle), which is, of course, standard We-
salistic, and meritocratic. Thus, his major work berian fare (Bourdieu, 1998, 1984:451–3).
on France’s civil service elite deals primarily Conversely, as a major public figure in France,
with the way this elite reproduces itself through Bourdieu did devote an increasing amount of his
highly selective elite schools and claims of supe- energy in his later years to political interventions
riority of character and expertise that appear to on behalf of those he saw as most disadvantaged.
be entirely universalistic and meritocratic. Sim- The Weight of the World (Bourdieu et al., 1999) is
ilarly, in one of his rare forays into the field of primarily a lengthy documentation of the many
politics and the state, Bourdieu actually focuses economic and social miseries suffered by the un-
mostly on how the state successfully claims the derprivileged in French society that Bourdieu
monopoly of “symbolic violence” by imposing partly attributes to the state’s abdication of its so-
the distinctions, categories, and divisions that cial responsibilities under the sway of neoliberal
come to be accepted as natural by the citizenry ideology. Bourdieu’s later political tracts mostly
and that thereby help produce the “doxic sub- denounce neoliberalism and the free market
mission to the established order” (1994:15) that ideology, as well as commercialism and patri-
legitimates and upholds the state. archy, as ideologies meant to further strengthen
The one essay in which Bourdieu proposes the domination of the already privileged
some “elements for a theory of the political and to exacerbate the repression and power-
field” (Bourdieu, 1991:chapter 8) deals primar- lessness of the disadvantaged (Bourdieu, 1998a,
ily with the professionalization of politics and 1998b, 2001). There is, it must be said, a bit of
the resulting problems of accountable political an unresolved tension between these idealistic
representation, particularly by politicians and efforts and Bourdieu’s rather more cynical view
parties of the left claiming to represent those of the political field in his more academic work.
most deprived of economic and cultural cap- For many of his admirers, the appeal of
ital. The political disenfranchisement of the Bourdieu’s approach lies no doubt in its promise
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to unmask the self-serving pretentions of all institutions, this is now the standard explanatory
elites. Although Bourdieu himself did not ex- model.
tensively analyze politics from this vantage So what is the current state of the two theo-
point, a full-fledged Bourdieuian study of the ries highlighted in this chapter? First, the long-
political field, thoroughly deflating the rhetor- term trend toward fundamental revision of the
ical and ideological ploys used by the political basic doctrines of Marxism, a trend that arguably
classes to maintain their dominance in this field, started a century ago with the split between
is both plausible and likely to be undertaken Leninism and revisionism, continues unabated.
sooner or later by one of his disciples. Like all The major reassessments appearing in today’s
the work inspired by Bourdieu, it will firmly put marxisant journals, especially Rethinking Marx-
culture and symbolic power at the center of the ism, invariably and most energetically question
analysis. But it is worth noting that this use of precisely the most central assumptions of histor-
culture does remain rather narrower than that ical materialism: the base-superstructure model
of Mann, in that it almost exclusively focuses of society, the primacy of class and production-
on culture as ideology, that is, as a set of symbols based interests and struggles, and the belief
and ideas that objectively serve to uphold the in historical progress. Traditional mode-of-
domination of the privileged few. Conversely, production Marxism is castigated by its crit-
treating culture as a force potentially capable of ics for ignoring nonclass and non-production-
genuinely cutting across class lines, that is, as be- based interests and conflicts of all kinds: gender,
ing something more than merely the mystifica- nationality, the environment, culture, politics,
tions serving the interest of the dominant class, globalization, and so on (Gamble, Marsh, and
might deprive Bourdieu’s approach of much that Tant, 1999; Gibson-Graham, 1996; Sherman,
his followers find most attractive about it. 1995). But whatever the merit of such criti-
cisms, there is no question that any attempts to
“reinvent” Marxism by abandoning its materi-
conclusion alist core and replacing it with social cleavages
of a more superstructural provenance are bound
At first sight, conflict theory, and particularly to make it lose much of its distinctiveness as a
the neo-Weberian variants, would seem to have social theory (cf. Burawoy and Wright, 2002).
conquered all. At the time the term conflict the- As we have seen in the first part of this chap-
ory was first used to describe this approach, it ter, Marxist and marxisant approaches to politics
was meant to set it off against the then suppos- seem to have gone into two quite different di-
edly dominant consensualist structural function- rections. On one side there are those who still
alism of Talcott Parsons and his followers. To- take class and class conflict to be a fundamen-
day, that kind of structural functionalism simply tal determinant of political outcomes. Among
is not around anymore. Latter-day admirers of them we may count Domhoff and those doing
Parsons have attempted to resurrect some of his research on business influence in politics gen-
ideas, but their neofunctionalism explicitly rec- erally, the self-styled “class struggle” theorists,
ognizes social conflict as a primary determinant power resources theory and its offshoots, and an-
of social outcomes of all kinds (e.g., Alexander, alytical Marxism. After having been temporar-
1985, 1998; Colomy, 1990). In fact, whatever ily eclipsed by their “structuralist” foes during
the topic, the standard explanatory strategy in the 1970s and early 1980s, this collection of ap-
political sociology today is to look for two proaches continues to produce much research
or more groups with clearly opposed inter- documenting and explaining how class interests
ests, and the resources to make their influ- have shaped political institutions and policies.
ence felt, to explain the phenomenon in ques- As they have been strongly criticized for their
tion as the outcome of the conflict between relative neglect of determinants other than class,
them. Whether we try to explain the occurrence many have felt compelled, however reluctantly,
of revolutions, elections, policies, or political to pay some attention to nonclass factors such as
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gender, the state, “new” social movements, and sense. But, as we have seen, there is today nary
so on. But in doing so their approaches do be- a Marxist left who would openly proclaim the
come less and less distinct from Weberian con- primacy of class struggle over other kinds.
flict theory. Perhaps, then, we are all (neo-)Weberian
The second direction taken by Marxist the- conflict theorists now. But the victory of neo-
orists follows more in the tradition of Western Weberianism does seem to be, if not exactly
Marxism (Anderson, 1975). They have given up Phyrric, then at least rather a prosaic one.
on the working class as the agent of progressive For it may well be true that essentially single-
change but not on the possibility of identify- cause theories such as Marxism and neo-
ing new progressive forces that will challenge Machiavellian power elite theory cannot possi-
the capitalist system in the near future. Among bly accommodate the full complexity of the real
these we can count the several generations social world out there, but what neo-Weberians
of critical theorists, neo-Gramscians such as propose to put in their place, that is, the un-
Laclau and Mouffe and Hardt and Negri’s the- flinching acceptance of this inescapable com-
ory of empire. World systems theory is a little plexity, is not exactly going to satisfy our deeper
more difficult to classify because it remains in theoretic yearnings either (cf. Rule, 1997). The
some respects firmly materialist in its emphasis merit of Marxism and neo-Machiavellian the-
on trade and the international division of labor, ory is that they offer a grand theoretical vision:
but it does replace the Western working class a more or less singular key that will unlock all
with a rather vaguely conceived periphery as of history’s and society’s mysteries. As opposed
the source of future progressive conflict. What to such grand theoretic visions, Weber and the
is, in any case, most distinctive about this second neo-Weberians offer only a caution that no sin-
strand of Marxist theorizing is its strong drift gle key is likely to do the job alone. Is that really
away from materialism and toward more philo- the best we can do?
sophical, normative, or even moral sources of Perhaps this is not entirely fair to the hard
resistance to power.15 explanatory work that has been done and is be-
The general trend in Marxist theorizing ing done by the whole range of scholars we
about politics, then, and for that matter, Marx- have discussed. Having accepted the multiplic-
ism as a whole, is a drift away from the erstwhile ity of group interests and resources, and hence
materialist assumptions and toward a progressive causal factors, that are likely to be involved in
acceptance of independent effects of superstruc- any satisfactory explanation of whatever we are
tural forces such as politics, the state, and culture. trying to explain, the next step is surely to try
What of the second major set of theo- and uncover whatever regularities there may be
ries examined? Neo-Weberian conflict theorists in the relationships between them. What re-
have always argued that their approach was su- sources are likely to be decisive in what social
perior to the Marxist variety of conflict theory settings? Are there any historical trends in the
in that it recognizes conflicts between groups relative importance of various types of resources
based on cultural and political interests as no and the groups who have the greatest access
less important than class conflict in the Marxist to them? What exactly are the mechanisms by
which some groups manage to mobilize such
15
resources, whereas others do not? And so on
This is, as van den Berg (2003:420–3; also Ander-
son, 1975) argues, probably a direct result of the self- and so forth. And in their various ways these
imposed puzzle they have set out to solve: why do the are exactly the sorts of questions that those we
Western workers refuse to act in their own clear interest have labeled neo-Weberians, and many others
when those interests are so obvious and there is no mas- like them, have pursued with much energy, in-
sive repressive state apparatus keeping them from acting telligence, and ingenuity. As we have mentioned
on them? There is an interesting parallel here with Par-
sons’ recourse to socialization, culture, and value con- all along, these efforts certainly have borne fruit
sensus to solve the “Hobbesian problem of order” he had in terms of producing a range of fascinating and
set for himself. important middle-level generalizations that are
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ready for further testing and modification. Per- state-centric theories, economic conflict theo-
haps, as Charles Tilly argues (echoing Robert ries, cultural conflict theories, feminist theories
Merton), the best we can do is search for “causal and so on – or else in a multidimensional con-
mechanisms that link contingent sets of circum- flict theory that can easily turn into little more
stances” rather than grand theories that predict than an excuse for ad hoc eclecticism in explain-
“recurrent trends on a large scale” (Hedström ing whatever needs to be explained. But surely
and Swedberg, 1998; Tilly, 1993:18, 2003). conflict theory can be developed beyond these
Furthermore, from the survey we have just rather unsatisfactory opposites. The way for-
concluded one can draw at least some tentative ward, it seems to us, is to try and think about
conclusions about promising paths for future the social and historical contexts in which one
work. The ongoing research on the effects of rather than another of the many possible types
money and well-organized business interests on of social conflicts tends to dominate the political
politics is important and fruitful both for prac- arena and what, if any, the most typical political
tical reasons and in advancing our theoretical outcomes are. Thus, many potentially fruitful
understanding of modern democracies. And it questions present themselves. Are status groups
will undoubtedly have to pay more attention indeed generally more readily mobilized, as
to the role of the media in the future. Also, this Weber suggested, than economic classes? What
work would be usefully complemented by more are the social conditions necessary for economic
research on the influence of other organized and inequality to become the primary focus of orga-
not-so-organized interests and their underlying nized political conflict? Is it the case that social
causal mechanisms. conflicts based on economic inequality tend to
Then there is the role of culture. Conflict the- be more amenable to compromise and gradual
orists still appear to be uncomfortable in their reform than conflicts based on ethnic identities
attempts to incorporate the role of culture, as or nationalism? Is the success of such compro-
can be seen from Bourdieu’s and others’ persis- mise dependent on a growing economy ren-
tence in treating it almost exclusively as ideol- dering the conflict a positive-sum game? Is the
ogy, as mystification helping to justify and main- rise of strong ethnic and religious movements
tain the privileges of the dominant class. Collins in part the result of political rather than social
and Mann have begun to add more depth to this exclusion?
picture by recognizing how culture can unite as These are just some of the many interesting
well as divide, and how it can be a weapon in and important questions that the conflict the-
the hands of all kinds of conflict groups, includ- oretical approach to politics opens up. Answers
ing the subordinate ones. This line of thinking to such questions, and a better understanding of
and inquiry looks exceedingly promising and is the underlying mechanisms explaining them, as
worthy of further extension and elaboration. well as the range of historical contexts and soci-
Facing the seemingly unmanageable com- eties for which they hold, offer, it seems to us,
plexity of the many kinds and sources of social the greatest promise for conflict theory to pro-
conflict, there is an understandable temptation duce well-founded generalizations about the so-
to take refuge either in specializing in one par- cial determinants of political outcomes, which
ticular kind of conflict – ethnic conflict theories, is, after all, what political sociology is all about.
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chapter four
State-Centered and Political Institutional Theory:

Retrospect and Prospect1
Edwin Amenta
A generation ago few political sociologists phenomena. Unlike the others, state-centered
placed states and other large-scale political in- analysts tended to view states, in the manner of
stitutions at the center of politics and under- Weber, as a set of organizations, but with unique
stood states as sets of organizations. But now functions and missions. Thinking about states in
we do, transforming the way that political so- this Weberian way shifted what was important
ciologists think about states and political pro- to explain in political life, and this approach to
cesses. This alternative conceptualization of the politics opened up new research questions and
field of study has opened up numerous ques- agendas. This has especially been the case for
tions and empirical terrains. If states and power analyses of revolutions and social movements,
are the central subjects of political sociology welfare states and social policy, and the de-
(Orum, 1988), in our understanding of these velopment of states generally. Some of these
key concepts we political sociologists are now new questions and research agendas promoted
all “institutionalists.” by state-centered scholars employing Weberian
The rise of self-consciously state-centered understandings of states have been taken up by
scholarship was motivated in part by perceived proponents of varying theoretical persuasions,
inadequacies in Marxist, elitist, and pluralist including Marxists and pluralists, who have pro-
theories and behaviorist approaches to politics, vided explanatory answers different from those
including their conceptions of states and their of state-centered scholars and political institu-
research programs. State-centered and politi- tionalists.
cal institutional scholars confronted these the- What is more, few social scientists had placed
oretical programs by contesting both what was states and political institutions explicitly on what
worth explaining in political sociology and the might be called the independent-variable side
dominant explanations for political sociological of causal arguments until the 1980s. Since then
there has been much work that gives states and
1
political institutions the primacy of place in ex-
My thanks to the participants of the Theoretical
Challenges in Political Sociology Conference, CUNY
plaining political phenomena. These theoretical
Graduate Center and NYU Departments of Sociol- moves toward statist and political institutional
ogy, May 26–27, 2001, the NYU PPP Workshop, explanations were in part due to pluralist and
the NYU 2003 Political Sociology class, as well as to Marxist explanations of politics. State-centered
Vanessa Barker, Neal Caren, Brian Gifford, Thomas scholars tended to see state structures and ac-
Janoski, Edward W. Lehman, Miriam Ryvicker, Mil-
dred Schwartz, and anonymous readers, for their helpful
tors as having central influence over politics and
comments. The chapter is dedicated to Bob Alford, mas- states. On the one hand, structural aspects of
ter political sociologist. states shaped the political identities, interests,
96
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State-Centered and Political Institutional Theory 97
and strategies of groups that other perspectives the risk and significance of explicitly
took as given. On the other hand, state actors state-centered theory
were deemed important players in politics, who
depending on their autonomy and capacities There has always been political institutional and
might matter more than class or interest group statist-centered work in political science and so-
actors in determining political outcomes. The ciology. In European social science and history
political institutionalists that followed tended to at the turn of the century, the centrality of states
focus more on the systemic and structural as- to politics and political life was posited especially
pects of states and the manner of their organi- among German scholars, notably Max Weber
zation in constructing causal arguments. These and Otto Hintze. In American social science,
institutionalists also sometimes expanded their many political scientists, working from the so-
focus to political party systems in shaping the called old institutionalist school, placed states
political identities, interests, and strategies of and political institutions at the center of their
politically mobilized groups. Nowadays many analyses as a matter of course, though not always
more political sociologists employ political insti- referring explicitly to them (see Almond, 1990).
tutional arguments, even those whose theoreti- In the postwar period, however, this older insti-
cal allegiances are mainly elsewhere. If political tutional view was mainly abandoned for other
sociologists are not all proponents of political perspectives, with pluralists and elitists dominat-
institutional theories, we certainly pay far more ing in U.S. domestic political analysis and with
attention to the potential causal impact of po- a political cultural approach that placed “polit-
litical institutions than 25 years ago. ical development” and “modernization” at the
In what follows I discuss the rise and the dis- center of analyses in comparative politics (see
tinctiveness of state-centered and political in- review in Hall, 2003).
stitutional theories, including early proponents In the first 30 years after the end of the
and what later scholars were reacting against. Second World War, scholars sometimes placed
From there I address the evolution from state- states near the center of their analyses. Pluralists
centered theory to political institutional theory. scholars were interested in legislative decisions
Along the way I discuss its promise and address made by political actors, especially elected of-
some of its achievements through exemplars of ficials. Usually they referred to “governments,”
this sort of analysis, for it has made profound saw U.S. government processes as largely simi-
contributions to political sociology, as well as lar, and focused frequently on the political in-
some of its shortcomings. This critical appre- fluence of groups other than political parties,
ciation, however, is not intended to be com- as in the work of David Truman (1951) and
prehensive. In my illustrations I draw especially Robert Dahl (1961). By contrast, Marxist schol-
on work in the area of social policy, which ars, who in the 1960s began to contest pluralist
mainly concerns interactions within states but images of political processes as inclusive, began
also the literatures on revolutions, social move- to refer explicitly to “the state.” But this was
ments, and state building. I argue that the the- typically done in an undifferentiated way and
oretical project has advanced far, but not as with states remaining conceptually and espe-
far as it might have, because scholars working cially theoretically peripheral to their analyses.
with these ideas have had countervailing an- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Marxist schol-
alytical and research aims, based in compar- ars in political science and sociology explicitly
ative and historical analyses. I conclude with discussed “the state,” though they usually un-
some ideas about how to advance the theoreti- derstood it in a singular way, as “the capitalist
cal project, within the framework of the com- state,” and tended to see states at best as “rel-
parative and historical analyses that scholars us- atively autonomous” and their actions mainly
ing political institutional ideas most frequently influenced by class-based determinants, such as
employ. economic elites and the needs of capitalism, as in
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98 Edwin Amenta
the famous debate between Ralph Miliband and A Self-Conscious Conceptual Shift
Nicos Poulantzas. Among scholars of American to “States”
politics, some scholars in international relations
field of political science (e.g., Krasner, 1978) also In American political sociology, however, self-
addressed states as such, but worked largely at the consciously statist and state-centered analyses
geopolitical level and were not concerned with were developed mainly in the late 1970s and
state and society relationships. 1980s, largely in reaction to other conceptual
Perhaps more important, other scholars more constructions and theoretical arguments. A fo-
centrally addressed state actors, structures, and cal point of this shift in attention was the volume
state building in a more macrosociological man- by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and
ner. Comparative sociologists and political sci- Skocpol (1985), Bringing the State Back In, which
entists, notably Reinhard Bendix, Barrington brought together a number of scholars working
Moore, Samuel Huntington, Seymour Martin in political sociology as well as related fields.
Lipset, Stein Rokkan, Juan Linz, Shmuel Eisen- At around the same time many other schol-
stadt, and Charles Tilly, paid close attention to ars gave serious theoretical attention to states
state processes and provided analyses that might (see review in Orum, 1988). Skocpol (1985)
be deemed nowadays as state-centered but often wrote an introduction that is worth discussing
viewed and referred to states through the con- because it was a kind of self-conscious statist
ceptual tools of dominant perspectives. Work- manifesto that drew a great deal of critical atten-
ing from a highly abstract set of social systems tion. Many of these ideas were already current,
concepts pioneered by Talcott Parsons, Lipset, but she harnessed them to a theoretical and re-
and Rokkan (1968), for instance, argued that to search program and call to academic action that
understand long-standing differences in politi- placed states at the center of political analysis.
cal party systems one had to focus on “nation To show the distinctiveness of this perspective,
builders,” the situations and crises they faced, Skocpol criticized pluralists and Marxists. Al-
and the choices they made (see also Lipset, though there were many scholars from each tra-
1963). The nation builders in their account dition with relatively subtle understandings of
could also be viewed as “state builders,” because states, she argued that these perspectives treated
their projects were perhaps more institutional states chiefly as arenas in which political conflicts
than cultural. Huntington (1968) addressed vari- took place. Pluralists tended to see this arena as
ations in forms of “political modernization” in largely neutral, one in which all manner of in-
a manner that focused on characteristics and terest groups and citizens could participate and
development of state institutions. Tilly (1975) contend but with some advantages being held by
made the greatest break with previous under- elected officials. Marxists tended to see the arena
standings, explicitly addressing state building as one in which classes battled, with a tremen-
rather than political modernization or nation dous home-field advantage for capitalists, or, al-
building. In a volume that stood out from in ternatively, Marxists saw the state as serving the
a series largely devoted to nation building, Tilly function of reproducing and legitimating capi-
asked why “national states” came to predomi- talism. Marxists tended to refer to “the state,”
nate in Europe rather than other statelike and especially the “capitalist state,” rather than to
protostate political organizations. He also made “states,” suggesting little variation among them
breakthroughs on the explanatory side, arguing and little importance of states before extensive
that state-led processes of war making in part led capitalism. In short, neither set of scholars saw
to the expansion of states and victory the form. states as complex organizations that were differ-
Theda Skocpol (1979) found accounts relying ent from other organizations in their political
on societal causes of the major revolutions to be centrality and missions, nor did these scholars
unconvincing and argued that states, understood see that the way that states were structured or
in the Weberian way, were crucial in explaining state actors as highly consequential in political
revolutions. life.
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Conceptually speaking Skocpol’s call was illustrations (e.g., O’Connor, 1973) rather than
even for scholars of American politics, where causal analyses. The organizational turn in con-
executive bureaucracies were relatively weak ceptualizing states implied wider examinations
and lacking in political power, to embrace a to explore larger differences in patterns of pol-
Weberian understanding of states – as sets of itics and political outcomes across places and
political organizations that exerted control over times. Issues such as state building, democratiza-
territory and people and engaged in legislation, and revolutions became more central sub-
tive, executive, military, and policing activities. jects of political sociology. Issues such as social
Within these territories states held a monopoly policy that were already examined by political
on legitimate violence and sought to maintain sociologists could be reconceptualized beyond
order, extracting resources from their popula- examination of relative spending on programs.
tions and often seeking territorial expansion in All in all, the change in outlook about what was
competition with other states. All states engaged important to understand and worth explaining
in lines of action that could be understood as suggested that political sociologists turn to their
state policy. States were sets of organizations attention to addressing major differences in pat-
in some ways like other organizations but with terns of politics across places and times. Scholars
unique political functions, missions, responsibil- studying one country or even focusing on post-
ities, and roles. In their bids to maintain order war American politics were encouraged to sit-
and exert legitimate authority they structure re- uate the subject comparatively and historically.
lationships between political authority and citi- State-centered scholars, however, went be-
zens or subjects and social relations among dif- yond the conceptual shift about the subject mat-
ferent groups of citizens or subjects; they also ter to political analysis to claim that states were
interact and compete with other states. Histor- crucial causal forces in politics as well. The
ically states have been structured in ways other widest break with other theoretical perspectives
than the today’s prominent nation-state, have concerned the causal influence of state institu-
operated in economic contexts other than in- tions on political life – what Skocpol (1985)
dustrial capitalist ones, and have been only vari- calls a “Tocquevillian” conception of states or
ably subject to democratic forces. what Goodwin (2001) recently calls a “state-
This conceptual shift in thinking about states constructionist” conception. State institutions
highlighted aspects of politics ignored by much might be configured in different ways for any
of pluralist and Marxist scholarship and opened number of reasons, including historical acci-
up a series of research questions. Not surpris- dents of geography, results of wars, constitu-
ingly given its Weberian origins, the statist tional conventions, or uneven processes of polit-
research program was often comparative and his- ical, economic, bureaucratic, and intellectual
torical but could also be employed in quanti- development. But whatever the reason for their
tative research. The organizational conceptual- adoption or genesis, if these political arrange-
ization of states criticized the empirical focus ments were for long stretches of time imper-
of pluralism, which centered on who partici- vious to change they would have fundamen-
pated and prevailed in various episodes of deci- tal influence on political patterns and processes
sion making in American politics, as well as to over new issues that might emerge, particularly
elite theorists, such as William Domhoff, who those concerning industrial capitalism. Invoking
also studied these decisions but with a focus on the impact of political institutions had been ex-
the influence of elite groups. The statist research plicitly addressed in a comparative fashion by
program also criticized the empirical approach Huntington (1968) and in American politics
of Marxists with functionalist conceptualiza- by E. E. Schattschneider (1960) and Theodore
tions of the capitalist state; the latter suggested Lowi (1972) among others, but the new dis-
somewhat ahistorically that all states in capitalist cussions of causal role of state institutions on
societies acted in similar ways and whose re- politics gave the idea a boost among scholars
search often sought merely to provide empirical who were dissatisfied with previously dominant
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100 Edwin Amenta
approaches. This line of argumentation was in ing, and other governmental functions within
line with criticisms of standard views of power, given political authorities might be located
which concerned decision making or decisions within set of organizations or spread among dif-
to keep issues off political agendas (Bacharach ferent ones, each with their own autonomy and
and Baratz, 1970). Instead it suggested the pos- operating procedures. Polities might differ
sibility that political power was structurally de- greatly in type, depending on the degree to
termined, in that the basic construction of states which state rulers had “despotic power,” to use
would influence which political battles were Michael Mann’s (1986) distinction. State polit-
likely to take place as well as which groups might ical institutions were subject to different levels
win political battles. and paces of democratization and political rights
Arguments about the causal role of state polit- among citizens. Once democratized they were
ical institutions also implied more fundamental subject to all manner of electoral rules governing
difference with other theories of politics, in that the selection of political officials. States execu-
state political institutions were posited to have tive organizations were also subject to different
key impacts on the political identities, interests, levels and paces of bureaucratization and pro-
preferences, and strategies of groups. Political fessionalization. Each of these processes might
identities, organization, and action were not fundamentally influence political life.
things that could be read off market or other The other main line of argumentation, first
relationships but were influenced by political sit- in the order treated but second in ultimate im-
uations. Even if political identities were largely portance, was that states mattered as actors, an
similar for a category of people across differ- idea already current in the “bureaucratic poli-
ent places, political institutional arrangements tics” literature in political science (e.g., Allison,
might encourage some lines of political action 1971). State actors were understood organiza-
and organization by this group across polities tionally, largely in a resource-dependence way.
or time and discourage others and thus shape As organizations, different parts of states might
political group formation. In short, the politi- have greater or lesser degrees of autonomy and
cal institutional theory rejected arguments that capacity. The autonomy of states or parts thereof
landowners or workers or experts or ethnic mi- was defined as their ability to define indepen-
norities would take similar forms and make sim- dently lines of action. State capacities were de-
ilar demands in all capitalist societies; instead fined as the ability to carry out lines of action,
their political identities and organization would however they were devised. These differences
depend on political institutional situations. A in state autonomy and capacity, mainly under-
signal contribution along these lines was Ira stood as those in executive bureaucracies, were
Katznelson’s (1981) City Trenches, in which he argued as being important in explaining in polit-
addressed why American workers were orga- ical outcomes across times and places. The roles
nized around their jobs economically, but po- of these actors were deemed both central and
litically around their neighborhoods and in po- variable – and thus likely important in politi-
litical parties along ethnic and religious lines, cal outcomes and in need of greater investiga-
in comparison with workers in other capitalist tion, theoretical and empirical, than provided
democracies who were organized consistently by other perspectives on politics. The idea of
in one manner or another. states’ capacities was sometimes understood in
Leaving aside the geopolitical level, many a wider way, with Mann (1986) referring to
macro-level political institutional conditions states’ “infrastructural power.” The ideas of state
might shape broad patterns of politics. Overall autonomy and capacity brought into the discus-
authority in state political institutions might be sion the “power to” do something, as in Par-
centralized or decentralized. Political authority sons’s treatment of the subject, without neglect-
might be centralized or spread among localized ing “power over,” on which political scientists
political authorities in the manner of the United and sociologists previously had focused (Lukes,
States. The legislative, executive, judicial, polic- 1974).
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Sometimes claims by statist theorists about groups. It would not constitute much of a the-
state autonomy and capacity and the impor- ory, though, until state-centered scholars speci-
tance of state actors have been understood to fied causal claims employing this framework.
mean that state actors were more likely to prevail
in any particular political decision (Alford and
Friedland, 1985), a kind of specific elitist argu- State-Centered Theory: An Example
ment. Instead statist theorists posed state actors and Model
as potentially key players in political outcomes,
given their functions and mandate to carry out In a 1984 article, Ann Orloff and Skocpol intro-
state policy. Their role and effectiveness would duced explicitly state-centered theory and ap-
depend partly on characteristics that made other plied it to a central problem in political sociology
political actors effective – strategies of action, re- and politics, the development of social policy.
sources, knowledge, and so on. They might be The new approach was signaled by the sort of
captured or staffed by politically organized or question they asked. They wanted to know why
social groups as well, but the groups might not social insurance programs were adopted much
necessarily be representing capitalists or work- sooner in Britain than in the United States, de-
ers. In addition, the ability of state actors to spite the many similarities between these coun-
devise autonomous lines of action might be in- tries. This comparative question also homed in
fluenced in turn by the structure of state insti- important historical episodes in policy mak-
tutions and other political institutional arrange- ing for each country. The answers they pro-
ments. posed were different, too. They asserted the two
The state-centered arguments proposed by means of state causation suggested by Skocpol
Skocpol at first were more theoretical frame- and used the framework to construct specific
work and conceptional development than the- causal claims. Most fundamentally they argued
ory, however. They suggested that macrostruc- that processes of state formation influence how
tural aspects of states and large-scale processes state and political organizations operate; these
of state building influenced politics directly and organizations in turn would have an impact on
indirectly. In channeling political activities in policy proposals directly and indirectly, by in-
some ways rather than others, state structures fluencing what politically active groups would
would influence the identities and actors at this propose. Behind the processes of state formation
meso level of organized political actors. The way were sequences of democratization and bureau-
states were structured would also influence who cratization. Notably, if a polity had been de-
among these organized actors might win politi- mocratized before it had been bureaucratized,
cal battles and which ones they might win. Thus it would produce a state with low bureaucratic
state structures would also influence the rela- capacities and orient political parties toward pa-
tionships between the actions of politically mo- tronage rather than programs, as they used state
bilized groups and political outcomes. Because positions as sources of employment for their op-
macrostructural aspects of states were likely to eratives. Patronage-oriented parties would es-
vary substantially across polities and over time, chew social programs and the underdeveloped
these conditions might be likely to explain long- states they led would have fewer capacities to run
standing patterns of politics. A second line of them (see Shefter, 1978). The way that polities
argumentation concerned the impact of state were structured in turn had effects on politi-
actors on political outcomes. State actors were cally organized groups. Despite similarities in
deemed to be potentially autonomous and thus backgrounds and goals and contacts across bor-
potentially major players in influencing political ders, social reformers in different polities, for
outcomes. Even if not autonomous, they might instance, would have a different orientation to-
be captured by different groups other than those ward social politics. They also argued that state
prominently figuring in Marxist theory, such bureaucracies and the officials in them might
as political parties or non-class-related interest also be sites of autonomous action, employing
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102 Edwin Amenta
their capacities and location in struggles with The theoretical explanation combined as-
other groups. State domestic bureaucratic ca- pects of macro-level structural and systemic ar-
pacities were argued to influence political offi- gumentation with meso- or organizational-level
cials, whose proposals would be shaped by the argumentation in a novel way that fundamen-
availability of specific capacities to engage in tally contested both Marxist and pluralist claims
policy (Finegold and Skocpol, 1995), an argu- about the likely actors in the political process
ment that was later dismissed by some schol- and their importance. Orloff and Skocpol (1984)
ars synthesizing class-struggle arguments from argued that broad processes of social change,
a neo-Marxist perspective and political institu- democratization, and bureaucratization config-
tionalism (cf. Huber and Stephens, 2001). These ured the U.S. polity and party system against the
capacities, however, were also likely to be con- adoption of modern social spending policy and
strained at the political institutional level. Britain’s in favor of it. The macro-level con-
The article suggested both the promise of figuration of polities was deemed to influence
the outlook provided by a wider understand- processes of politics, including how key political
ing of states and the potential for political in- actors identified themselves at lower levels and
stitutional theorizing, as well as the issues raised what these actors wanted. Although worker and
by them. They were asking questions that few capitalist political actors, predominant in Marx-
others were asking, given their limited concep- ist theory, would likely matter in all polities, they
tualization of states and their focus on behav- might see their interests and identities diverge
ioral concepts, such as who made decisions, who according to the incentives provided for them by
voted for which parties, or how much was being political institutions, including the nature of the
spent for a state function. In addressing impor- political party system. Like the pluralists, they
tant differences in these policies across coun- argued that a wide group of actors might matter,
tries, the question went beyond what would though the possibilities of organizing interests
have been addressed by functionalist Marxists, would be influenced by the political structure
who would have seen the issue as a similar mat- and the broad processes that lay behind it.
ters of accumulation and legitimation. Their re- Left undertheorized, though, were a number
search project moved the discussion away from of issues. Among them were the fundamental
comparative spending on social policy to its relationships between the large-scale processes
adoption, an issue overlooked given previous and the structure of other polities subject to
conceptualizations of states and techniques of these processes. Although state capacities were
analyzing data. The comparative approach also claimed to be important in influencing political
helped to address the issue of why an issue did officials and these capacities were argued to be
not reach the political agenda, without anyone constrained by political institutional patterns, it
needing to make a decision about keeping it off was not clear under what conditions state ca-
(Lukes, 1974). At the same time, this issue was pacities might vary and matter. The interaction
going to prove useful to theorize about only of politically organized groups was largely left
so long as other scholars felt it was important, undertheorized, with the presumption, though,
perhaps depending on the degree to which state that those favored by the structure of a given
power was involved. In this case, scholars tended polity would prevail disproportionately in po-
to agree about the importance of the adop- litical decision making. Political actors at the
tion of social policy and attempted to explain meso level were viewed as rational for the most
it (see review in Amenta, 2003). Also, it was part, as rational choice theorists would expect,
somewhat difficult to appraise the importance shifting the best they could under the circum-
of these particular episodes of policy making – stances. But as organizations, these actors also
which is similar to the problem of address- might be constrained by the conditions of their
ing what constituted “important decisions” for founding, as some “old institutional” organi-
those studying power in communities (Polsby, zational theorists would have it (see review in
1980). Stinchcombe, 1997), or by understandings of
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their missions that might result from bounded scientists. It is now conventional to say that there
rationality and constraining scripts, templates, are three groups of institutionalists: “new in-
and schemas, as “new institutional” organiza- stitutionalists” in the sociology of organizations
tional theorists would suggest (see review in (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), “institutionalists”
Clemens and Cook, 1999). employing rational choice theory in political
science (Moe, 1987), and “historical institution-
alists,” political scientists who are distinctive for
toward political-institutional theory their comparative and historical methodology
(Thelen, 1999; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; see
The initial state-centered theoretical program – review in Hall and Taylor, 1996). The new in-
treating states as important causal forces in pol- stititionalism is a species of organizational the-
itics – has evolved into a political-institutional ory, which sees organizations in a particular way
one over the last decade or so, altering the pro- and treats states largely like other organizations.
gram in important ways. Scholars have gener- For this group, political sociology involves or-
ally employed the Tocquevillian argument about ganizations, and thus new institutional theory
states in an explanatory way and have added fur- is expected to be relevant; mainly, however,
ther argumentation concerning the construc- this theory provides a broad cultural perspec-
tion of other large-scale political institutions, tive on politics (e.g., Meyer, 2001). By con-
including political party systems. In the hands trast, the rational choice institutionalists in po-
of some theorists, the arguments became more litical science employ a style of theorizing based
structural and systemic, with long-standing po- on micro-level foundations; they emphasize de-
litical institutions influencing all groups and ductive theorizing itself as being central to so-
having major influence over outcomes of inter- cial scientific progress and are concerned less
est. In the hands of others, political institution- with sustained empirical appraisals of theoreti-
alism has become more historical and focused cal arguments. They are roughly aligned with
on historical processes. Here scholars continue economic institutionalists (e.g., North, 1990).
to argue that political institutions fundamen- Finally, historical institutionalism is a way of
tally influence political life but focus theoret- engaging in the social scientific enterprise that
ical attention on the interaction of actors at a places less emphasis on general theorizing in
medium-systemic, interorganizational, or meso which scholars pose macropolitical or – soci-
level. These actors are seen as working within ological empirical puzzles and employ compar-
institutional constraints, as well as with con- ative and historical analytical research strategies
straints on resources and other means of ac- to address them (cf. Immergut, 1998). Institu-
tion, and attempting to influence state policy. tional structures of all sorts usually matter in
Changes in state policies in turn set processes in these explanations. There is an elective affinity
motion that influence the interests and strate- between the approach of the historical institu-
gies of actors that will determine whether pro- tionalists, who now form a self-conscious aca-
grams will feed back in a way that strengthens demic grouping, and political institutional the-
the program or undermines it or leaves it open orizing, but the overlap is far from complete.
to changes at a later time. The main theoretical Historical institutionalists tend to see political
framework is that macro-level political institu- institutions as being distinctive and influential
tions shape politics and political actors, who act and more than new institutionalists are con-
under constraints that may influence their im- cerned with issues of power. Those who call
pact on states and policies, refashioning political themselves historical institutionalists, including
institutions in the process, and so on. Skocpol, often rely on political institutional the-
Before I discuss this political institutionalist orizing. Indeed, that so much of political in-
theoretical project, I want to say a few words stitutional theoretical argumentation has been
distinguishing it from other uses of the term developed and appraised by comparative and
institutionalism among sociologists and political historical research has strongly influenced the
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104 Edwin Amenta
evolution of the political institutional theoret- Third World revolution posed by Jeff Goodwin
ical project. But there is no necessary connec- (2001). He asked why revolutions were pecu-
tion between the historical institutionalist ap- liarly modern phenomena, why some Third
proach, where causation is often presumed to World countries rather than others were beset
be multiple, conjunctural, and path-dependent, by revolutionary mobilizations, and why some
and any given theory or even style of theorizing. regimes rather than others were vulnerable to
Historical institutionalists may not ascribe cen- revolutionary overthrow. The answer was nei-
tral causal roles to political institutions in any ther poverty nor mere authoritarianism, as there
given analysis and could instead rely on eco- were many examples of each throughout history
nomic or social institutions in their theoreti- without significant revolutionary movements.
cal argumentation. By contrast political institu- Instead there were no revolutions until there
tional argumentation relies on the structure of were states. From there he found that closed
state and other major political institutions, in- authoritarian regimes provided motivation and
cluding electoral systems and political party sys- a focus for revolutionary groups, whereas even
tems, and processes of state and party building, limited inclusionary regimes tended to siphon
in the construction of causal political arguments off opposition. From there he asked which
and explanations for macropolitical pheno- regimes were vulnerable to overthrow by revo-
mena. lutionary movements, that is, contexts in which
Developments in political institutional theo- revolutionary action and actors were likely to
rizing since the early 1990s have continued to succeed. The answer was that there were two
focus more on the impact of political contexts different sorts of regimes that tended to be im-
on politics more so than on the role of bureau- pervious to reform and unable to respond ef-
cratic state actors. Scholars working in this mode fectively to revolutionary movements: neopatri-
have often followed some of the same structural monial dictatorships and colonial regimes based
guidelines of Orloff and Skocpol, but focusing on direct rule.
on other political institutions and hypothesiz- Structural and systemic, this line of argumen-
ing different empirical implications. One line tation was more elegant and encompassing than
of argument is that political institutions influ- the previous state-centered arguments, which
ence the types of actors in a polity, including involved a variety of processes and a profu-
the form, identities, and interests of political ac- sion of actors, and provides an example of a
tors, and from there to important processes and strictly political institutionalist argument. The
outcomes. The second is that political institu- type of regime influenced strongly the interests
tions provide distinctive contexts that influence and identities of potential political actors. In a
causal relationships at a meso level of political patrimonial regime, involving personal control
organization and action. Third, there have been by dictators allowing no stable group prerog-
attempts to theoretically model the process over atives in the policy, businesspeople, landlords,
time, in which state institutions influence po- and professionals were likely to go into op-
litical actors, who maneuver within constraints position, reading their interests off political in-
to influence states, which are altered in turn and stitutional situations, not economic class po-
then influence real and potential political actors. sitions. The type of regime also shaped state
The theorizing here focuses not structural po- repressive capacities, promoting unprofessional
litical institutions and large-scale processes, but and incompetent military forces and making it
smaller scale processes. difficult for them to resist armed revolutionar-
ies, if they were to appear. The argument is not
strictly determined, in that these were power-
Structural Political Institutionalism ful tendencies, not necessarily leading to armed
struggle by revolutionaries, and not ensuring its
An example of the highly structural political success once they had formed. There was room
institutionalism is the state-centered theory of for maneuver by these regimes, and room for
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agency of revolutionaries as well, but the main enced the views and activities of the main actors
line of argument was political institutional and involved and in turn account for key taxation
helped to separate which states would be sub- outcomes. Committee government in Amer-
ject to revolutionary movements and likely to ica, with its decentralization of power, brought
succumb from those of poor countries suffering with it low revenues and high tax expenditures,
under authoritarian regimes that did not. This low efficiency, and high complexity. Providing
left somewhat undertheorized, at least by insti- great power but only limited time to exercise
tutional argumentation, the activities of revolu- it, party government in Britain produced ex-
tionary movements and other groups that might treme instability in taxation policy. Corporatism
tip these situations one way or another and rein Sweden, based on the continuing power of
quired supplementation especially on the side of the Social Democratic party, created a deep and
the political actors. abiding trust between that party and the per-
Another example of structural political in- manent bureaucracy and produced a stable taxa-
stitutionalism at the macrosocial level, but ad- tion system in which corporate actors traded off
dressing differences in policy in democratized higher taxes for other benefits. In this model the
polities, is Sven Steinmo’s (1993) Taxation and broad patterns of taxation policy over a century
Democracy. Steinmo demonstrates that the tax- are explained by large political institutional dif-
ation systems of America, Britain, and Sweden ferences in electoral systems that translate into
had varied over the past century greatly and of- differences in the processes by which politics
ten in unexpected ways. American and British takes place. Corporatism as a mode of state-led
taxation has been more redistributive and pro- interest intermediation has its own influence on
gressive, imposing stiffer taxes on the rich than social politics (see also Hicks, 1999) but is ex-
Swedish taxation, which generates more rev- plained in turn by prior political institutional ar-
enue. He also demonstrates that American tax- rangements. The argumentation is elegant, with
ation for most of the postwar period was com- large patterns of politics and major differences
paratively complex and inefficient, whereas the in important political outcomes explained with
Swedish taxation system was stable, efficient, few moving structural and systemic political in-
and yields high revenues. The British tax sys- stitutional parts.
tem stood out chiefly for its unstable and erratic As with Goodwin’s state-centered theory of
character. He asks why these comparative differ- revolution, Steinmo’s institutional argument by
ences in taxation policy – given that they matter design leaves a fair amount unexplained. The
for redistribution in themselves as well as for all structural line of argumentation does not at-
redistributive programs that might be funded by tempt to explain political change or specific
states. outcomes within a given case, especially those
Steinmo’s explanation focuses on the struc- resulting from the mobilization and action of
ture of a polity’s decision-making institutions. groups at the organizational level. Perhaps more
American political authority was born frag- important, though, the question is framed with
mented and was never unified. In Sweden, a respect to the three countries and not more gen-
constitutional convention at the turn of the cen- erally and the implications of the argumentation
tury created a Lower Chamber elected by pro- are not drawn out for other polities. Also, the
portional representation and an Upper Chamber broad institutional differences among the poli-
less responsive to the will of the people. Britain ties identified by Steinmo are different from the
had no constitutional convention and restrained ones that Orloff and Skocpol suggested as be-
its upper chamber, the House of Lords. Accord- ing crucial for social politics. Although both pay
ing to Steinmo, each set of democratic institu- causal attention to the role of political institu-
tions engendered a specific form of governing: tions, Orloff and Skocpol focus on the long-
in America, by congressional committee; in term processes of democratization and bureau-
Sweden, corporatism; in Britain, strong party cratization in state formation, whereas Steinmo
government. These forms of government influ- discusses the impact of electoral and political
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106 Edwin Amenta
decision-making institutions based on differing As before, too, Skocpol’s theoretical model

constitutional arrangements. This difference in gives primacy of causal place to the struc-
outlook suggests that there are many possibilities ture and formation of political institutions. The
for structural political institutional arguments, state-formation process leads to political or-
even in democratized polities and regarding sim- ganizations with given capacities and operat-
ilar objects of explanation. ing needs. Early democratization and late bu-
reaucratic development within the U.S. state
meant among other things that political parties
Toward More Elaborated Institutional tended to pursue patronage policies and avoid
Argumentation programmatic social policy (see also Mayhew,
1986:292–4; Amenta, 1998:chapter 1). Skocpol
Within state-centered and political institutional also argues that political institutions strongly in-
scholarship there has been something of a shift fluence social identities in politics. State and
from comparative theoretical argumentation to party structures and the scope of the electorate
explain differences in large outcomes to histor- contribute to the formation of political identi-
ical argumentation explaining processes. This ties and group political orientations, along with
theoretical shift addresses the issue of explain- socioeconomic relations and cultural patterns.
ing political changes and tries to fill in some In this vein she argues, for instance, that U.S.
of the explanatory gaps in the initial theoreti- workers did not have to mobilize along class
cal program. These theoretical moves take the lines to gain the vote and thus did not act as
from of claiming that changes in state policies class-conscious actors. By contrast women in
have the potential to reconfigure political con- the United States reacted as a group against their
texts and with them political identities, interests, exclusion from the polity – a process intensified
and activity. by the fact that elite women in America were
A key example of this movement, to stay more highly educated than their counterparts in
with the social policy example, was in Theda other countries.
Skocpol’s Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (1992). Yet the argumentation goes beyond these
In it she seeks to specify more fully the impact structural and systemic claims to indicate other
of macro-level political institutions on political institutional reasons behind the making of social
actors and action, but she also allows increas- policy. For according to the logic of the struc-
ing autonomy among meso-level political ac- tural, instititutional argumentation, there would
tors in battling over issues and adds reciprocal be no impulse toward modern social policy in
argumentation about the impact of state policies America. To address this, Skocpol makes link-
on politics. Skocpol drops the state-centered la- ages between the macrostructural level and the
bel and instead employs what she calls a “struc- organizational level in making claims about the
tured polity model,” which she uses to explain causes of change in social policy. She suggests
specific historically and comparatively situated that to be effective in any polity political actors,
questions regarding U.S. social policy. These in- however organized and with whatever identi-
clude why the United States created in the late ties, have to construct a good “fit” between
nineteenth century a system of veterans’ bene- their capabilities and the given political insti-
fits when other countries did not and why the tutions. In a U.S. polity in which elected mem-
United States did not replace this system of ben- bers to Congress and state legislatures are not
efits in the early twentieth century with social constrained by the party discipline imposed by
insurance for male wage-earners, when many parliamentary political systems and are chosen
other countries did, and instead creating pro- by way of geographic representation, she argues
grams for women. As before, she seeks to ex- that the groups likely to gain the greatest lever-
plain why U.S. social policy diverged from that age are “widespread federated interests.” From
of countries elsewhere subject to broadly similar here she claims that U.S. reformist professionals
economic processes. were likely to succeed in political struggles only
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when they were allied with groups with popular formed explicitly around beneficiary categories
constituencies organized across many legislative created by programs. In short, policy changes
districts. She points to groups such as the Grand can cause positive feedback loops that lead to
Army of the Republic, the Women’s Christian their reinforcement.
Temperance Union, and the Federal Order of Others have extended the project is by sup-
Eagles as being exemplars of such organization plementing it with other perspectives (Amenta,
and effectiveness in policy. Although the argu- 1998; Orloff and Skocpol, 1986; see also Janoski,
mentation deals with general aspects of polities, 1998). Although the political institutional ar-
these combinations of characteristics is specific gument points to influence on the formation
to the U.S. polity, whose early policy develop- of political interests and identities, it still leaves
ments and lack of development in modern social a great deal of autonomy at this level. New
insurance programs she is attempting to explain. policies often are claimed inadvertently to cre-
In her final theoretical claim, Skocpol opens ate new groups and identities, making the ar-
the way to see state building and policy mak- guments compatible with some pluralist and
ing as a reciprocal and path-dependent process. Marxist arguments at the meso level of politics.
Following Lowi (1972), she argues similarly that Many have combined institutional argumenta-
once adopted new policies can transform state tion with Marxist arguments, especially those
capacities and produce changes in social groups regarding class struggle (Hicks, 1999; Huber
and their political goals and capabilities. The and Stephens, 2001) or class coalitions (Esping-
new state actors can employ these capacities in Andersen, 1990), which are more compatible
further political struggles. Political groups may with political institutional theorizing than oth-
be strengthened by having states sanction them ers. However, these arguments largely see class
and reward them through policies. New groups factors as the driving force behind state devel-
may be encouraged by policies. Both of these in- opment and political change and thus remain
fluence policy at a later point in time. In short, located in that camp. Others have similar em-
the initial configuration of social policy influ- ployed political institutional theorizing with dif-
ences its future; the structure of social policy ferent forms of cultural analysis (Clemens, 1998;
has important impacts on the politics of social Hattam, 1993), including the new institutional-
policy and thus the future of it and other poli- ism in the sociology of organizations.
cies. In this way the political institutional theory
is made “historical” (Abrams, 1984).
Other scholars have argued similarly that Some Issues in Political Institutional
the process of social spending policy is path- Theoretical Projects
dependent in this matter. The main line of ar-
gumentation is that the form a program assumes Despite advances and syntheses, many issues re-
may influence its political future by determining main to be addressed at the each of the three
whether groups will mobilize around it in sup- main levels of theorizing in political institutional
port. It has been argued notably that programs arguments. Political institutional argumentation
whose recipients are confined to the poor tend has been most coherent in its structural and sys-
to gain little support (Weir et al., 1988), be- temic form. Even here, though, the implications
cause the coalitions that can potentially form that scholars have drawn for political processes
behind them are likely to be small and polit- and outcomes are delimited, both in the de-
ically weak; programs with larger beneficiary gree to which they explain outcomes or pro-
groups, including middle classes, will have a bet- cesses under study and in terms of the situa-
ter chance to grow. Pierson (1994) argues fur- tions to which they might apply. Also, there have
ther that mature programs have “lock-in” effects been divergent claims about the impact of polit-
that counter bids to cut them, because people ical institutions on politics and these differences
have organized their lives around these programs need to be addressed by theorists. The opening
and in many cases interest groups have already of this program by scholars specifying linkages
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108 Edwin Amenta
between the macro and meso levels of analy- general theorizing for other cases. Also, Steinmo
sis, indicating macrocontextual factors that in- and Skocpol are making political institutional
fluence relationships at the organizational level arguments at the same level but are claiming
has addressed some issues, but these theoretical that different sorts of political institutions mat-
linkages need to be traced further. The theoret- ter. These differences in systemic argumentation
ical argumentation concerning state building as need to be acknowledged and their implications
a path-dependent process has opened the theo- addressed.
retical program further and facilitates theorizing As for the links between the macrostructural
processes and change. Yet with the greater the level and the meso-organizational level, the po-
openness of the project, political institutional litical institutionalist line is that the former influ-
theorizing runs the danger of returning to a ences the latter and from there the fundamental
framework for analysis rather than a set of theo- course of politics. In the social policy literature,
retical claims that can provide explicit empirical for instance, scholars have made arguments that
expectations in different situations. sequences of democratization and bureaucrati-
On the structural and systemic side, schol- zation have influenced whether political parties
ars in this camp have specified characteristics at will appeal by way of patronage or programs.
the political systemic level of argumentation and Similarly, scholars have made arguments about
given reasons for their likely influences on po- the impact of the pace and character of de-
litical processes. Many scholars studying social mocratization on group formation (Amenta and
policy, for instance, now agree that the central- Young, 1999). But for scholars making institu-
ization of the polity promotes the development tional arguments about social policy, it is im-
of redistributive social policy and fragmenta- portant to make further theoretical connections
tion hinders it, because fragmentation facilitates from macro-level conditions to the political or-
the ability of opponents of social policy to de- ganizational level. Skocpol (1992), for instance,
flect initiatives (Immergut, 1992; Maioni, 1998). argues that the particular way that democratiza-
Skocpol (1992) argues similarly that the frag- tion took place in the United States had an im-
mented U.S. polity limits what is possible in pact on the political group formation and iden-
social policy. But the argument is multidimen- tities. The argument is set out in a general way
sional. Political authority in the United States but is not conceptualized or extended beyond
has never been horizontally or vertically inte- the case at hand to see how applicable it might
grated. At the national level of government, the be to others.
United States has a presidential and nonparlia- Policy feedback claims similarly have ad-
mentary system that allows intramural conflict. vanced, but need further specification to be
Members of Congress from the same party can transformed into systematic theoretical argu-
defect from the president’s legislative program ments. To return to the social policy case again,
without risking loss of office and can initi- despite the incentives to organize around new
ate competing programs. There are two legisla- categories and benefits created by state pro-
tive bodies, and legislators represent geograph- grams, groups sometimes form in support of
ical districts, not parties. Any laws that make programs and identify themselves with them
it through this maze can be declared uncon- and sometimes not. Those groups that sup-
stitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. Schol- ported the adoption of mothers’ pensions pro-
ars have not, however, theoretically sorted out grams in 1910, for instance, had lost inter-
which of these forms of fragmentation matter est in them by 1930. Although need-based
most and how with regard to social policy mak- programs tend not be supported, they some-
ing (Amenta, Caren, and Bonastia, 2001). By times have been politically popular, as work
contrast, Steinmo makes claims about the role of programs were during the Depression and is
electoral institutions on political processes and Medicaid nowadays (Amenta, 1998; Howard,
makes plausible claims for his three cases but 1999). The nature of policy feedback argu-
does not follow through with the implications of ments been conceptualized in ways that would
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it possible to construct theoretically coherent readily ask why some countries had revolu-
path-dependent arguments (see Abbott, 1992; tions, democracies, and welfare states, whereas
Griffin, 1992; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000a). others did not. These bold comparative ques-
Scholars making these claims, however, need to tions and research projects have an affinity to
provide more specific expectations linking as- structural and systemic explanation. For polit-
pects of policy to the processes that influence ical institutionalists explaining the differences
their fate. That is to say, they need to identify as- in large patterns usually involves showing that
pects of social policies that induce the formation some structural and systemic political conditions
of groups around them or that are expected to or circumstances hindered a major development
influence their politics and fates in other ways. It in one place and either aided or allowed the de-
would fit with the political institutional project velopment in another. In addition, these schol-
that the policies that would matter the most in ars use comparisons or trace processes to cast
reconfiguring political life would be those that empirical doubt on other possible explanations
influence systemic aspects of politics. and to provide further support for their own.
This sort of questioning calls attention to large-
scale contexts and processes, which are some-
research practice and the next steps times not noticed in approaches to data anal-
ysis that focus on events surrounding specific
Political institutional projects have gone great changes under study and do not look at the big
distances since the early 1980s, but the type of picture.
progress made and the lack of progress in some Usually the impulse is even bolder, however,
areas has been due chiefly to how political infor comparative and historical scholars are not
stitutionalists typically engage in social scientific often content to explain a large part of the vari-
inquiry. Although not all historical institution- ance in their cases, as quantitative investigators
alists are political institutionalists, most political are content to do, but often want to explain all
institutionalists mainly employ comparative and of it (see Ragin, 1987). And so after explain-
historical methods, which in turn influence the ing broad patterns, these scholars attempt to
strengths and weaknesses in the political insti- trace the processes which helped cases to show
tutional mode of theorizing. The style is bold change, whether the adoption of a policy or its
in some ways (in asking questions) and reticent retrenchment or the development of a revolu-
in others (in extending theoretical claims be- tionary movement or an issue of state build-
yond cases of interest). Together these charac- ing. This task usually involves some theorizing
teristics have led to many new and promising at the meso level of political organization, of-
political institutional hypotheses and theoretical ten involving with the interaction of politically
argumentation, buttressed by compelling histor- active groups with state bureaucrats and other
ical and comparative research, but the theoreti- actors, or some combination of theorizing at
cal claims have not been carried through as far the macro and meso levels. The causal argu-
as they might be. mentation sometimes gets quite detailed at the
organizational level. In the bid to explain all the
variance sometimes elements from other the-
Boldness and Reticence in Comparative oretical perspectives are added, and sometimes
and Historical Analyses strictly contingent elements are brought into the
account.
Comparative and historical scholars are not Bold as they are in their questions and
afraid of big questions – empirically at least explanatory goals, comparative and historical
(for discussions, see Amenta, 2003; Goldstone, scholars are often reticent theoretically. They
2003; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). do not frequently bid to theorize beyond the
These analysts often seek to explain differences cases and time periods of interest. Often these
in major patterns of political development and cases are states, subnational units, and policies or
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110 Edwin Amenta
groups within a country or across a few coun- political context and possibly that context in
tries, and the studies are limited to a specific the decades surrounding 1900. Yet it would be
period, often lengthy, of time. It is only in rare consistent with her argumentation that to make
instances that comparative and historical schol- an impact organized groups have to fit politi-
ars address populations of theoretically relevant cal contexts whatever they happen to be – and
cases in their research. Mainly this gap is due the to specify what that might mean across cases.
steep research requirements of doing compara- The form of the argument is that certain com-
tive and historical work, as one needs to gain binations of variables or conditions are deemed
a deep understanding of the cases involved. Yet to have specific effects within a given overarch-
there is no reason not to draw out the theoret- ing context, and it seems worth attempting to
ical implications for other cases that we know speculate theoretically about these relationships
less about. beyond the her case and time period. This theo-
As we have seen, Steinmo (1993) compares rizing would mean thinking through the impact
across his three countries and is willing to ex- of the contexts and whether the combination of
plain major differences in policy-making pro- variables or conditions would be likely to have
cesses and taxation outcomes over long periods implications in many situations or few and what
of time but does not follow through with the they might be. It would also make it possible
implications for other democratic states with for other scholars with deep understandings of
relatively advanced capitalist economies – the other cases to appraise the arguments.
population from which his three cases form a Political institutional scholars do occasionally
subset. But because his theorizing involves spe- theorize and examine the relevant cases in a
cific countries and their electoral institutions, population of interest. In Ertman’s (1996) analy-
he leaves it open as to how the process from sis of state formation in early modern Europe, he
electoral rules to taxation policy patterns might stands out in placing all cases into four groupings
play out in countries with different electoral of types of state formation. These are group-
laws. Without his specifying the argument fur- ings are based on whether the character of the
ther, one might presume that there would be state’s infrastructure was patrimonial or bureau-
as many different patterns in taxation policies as cratic and whether the political regime was ab-
there were electoral laws and countries to ex- solutist or constitutional – more or less along
amine. It would also be possible and more theo- the lines of Mann’s (1986) ideas of infrastruc-
retically valuable to construct a somewhat more tural and despotic power. This rephrasing of
general argument to explain the policy-making the question is a major contribution in itself, as
processes of other countries, but he stops short he reworks previous concepts of absolutism to
of drawing out the implications. show variation in state types where others had
Skocpol (1992) wants to explain develop- seen uniformity and blurred important distinc-
ments over a somewhat shorter period than tions. From there he presents a theoretical model
Steinmo and provides more detailed theorizing, that involves initial conditions and processes that
as she is hopeful to answer numerous questions combine to order the cases into different pat-
about U.S. social policy and explain all the vari- terns. Territorial-based assemblies were more
ance she addresses. She makes meso-level argu- likely than estates-based ones to hold out against
ments about the forms of organization that are the blandishments of would-be absolutist rulers.
likely to work in a polity structured like that But early geopolitical conflict, rather than build-
of the American one and traces the activities of ing the state infrastructurally, meant that states
these organizations over time. She goes on to could not take advantage of new techniques of
explain variation in broad patterns of policy – administration and finance and the explosion
such as why some maternalist programs passed of administrative expertise after 1450. His argu-
and why ones for male workers did not – as ment includes path-dependent claims that alter
well as the specifics of individual programs. Her the workings of long-term processes, with states
theorizing is explicitly situated in the American becoming subject to military pressures altering
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the paths they were set down by initial condi- not calling for general laws designed to apply
tions. As a result he is able to explain all the everywhere, but middle-range theoretical argu-
cases. This sort of theorizing is an exception, mentation in the Mertonian tradition that has
however, and is not necessarily due to a dif- implications beyond the cases or times at hand
ference in attitude about the proper role of the- with well-thought-out scope conditions. At the
ory in comparative and historical research but to most general level, the theoretical claims could
one scholar’s ability to master many cases. This be of the sort that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) did
seems less likely to be possible for most scholars, for political parties or Rueschemeyer, Stephens,
especially those studying processes over the last and Stephens (1996) have done for democratic
centuries, as secondary literatures on individual breakthroughs. Even if scholars develop their
countries and political issues have exploded, as theoretical argumentation by way of paired or
well as the availability of primary documents. implicit comparisons as standard in comparative
Findings of comparative and historical ana- and historical and historical institutional analy-
lysts are sometimes held suspect because they ses, it is always possible and worthwhile to think
possibly select on the dependent variable, lead- through the similarities with other cases and
ing to biased results (King, Keohane, and Verba, work through the theoretical implications for
1994; cf. Ragin, 1987, 2000). The theoreti- those cases even if one cannot carry through
cal problem resulting from small-N comparative with the research needed to appraise these ar-
studies is, however, that scholars frequently do guments.
not theorize beyond their cases. And so I am Let me suggest a few ways to propel this pro-
calling for scholars to apply some of the same cess. One way to develop political institutional
boldness to take on the big questions and explain theory further would be to modify some of the
all relevant variance in research projects to po- largely methodological precepts of Przeworski
litical institutional theorizing. Scholars need to and Teune (1970). They implored comparative
think further about the range of variation across scholars to replace proper names of countries as
the likely population for which claims can be far as possible with variables in their causal analy-
made and need, too, to take into account the ses. Do not theorize about Sweden or America
likely result of a lack of diversity in the popu- and Britain or Latin American countries, was
lation (Ragin, 2000). Theoretical programs can their injunction, but instead capitalist democra-
advance through a scholarly process in which cies, liberal welfare states, or Third World coun-
one person studies three countries and another tries. Also, their view of comparative analysis
studies two others and each makes theoretical was multilevel, with an emphasis on macro and
claims particular to those cases and time peri- contextual theoretical argumentation. A com-
ods, but the progress would likely come faster parative argument was one in which differences
if the comparative and historical analysts would in theoretical variables at the political systemic
think through the implications of their theo- level resulted in differences in individual-level
retical arguments and provide some empirical causal relationships. Thus the nature of the party
expectations for some relevant cases they do not system might be argued to influence the rela-
study. tionship between an individual’s class position
and their political affiliation or voting behavior.
In short, they suggested that whenever possi-
Extending the Political Institutional ble analysts should think more generally and to
Theoretical Project think about the impact of contexts at one level
to influence causal relationships at another.
To advance the theoretical project, the next steps It would be worth extending these insights,
for political institutional scholars are to go be- but altering some of the precepts to fit the cir-
yond preliminary or highly bounded theoret- cumstances faced by political institutional the-
ical statements and general orienting concepts orists, who usually engage in comparative and
to make more extensive theoretical claims. I am historical studies. My call is for them to provide
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112 Edwin Amenta
theoretical argumentation with applicability to many political regimes. Later Pierson (2000b)
all capitalist democracies or to all liberal wel- situates some of his arguments in institutional
fare states or to some larger population, perhaps settings. He argues that retrenchment processes
bounded by a time period or process, rather than are likely to be dependent on the nature of
limiting theoretical discussion to the few cases the previous welfare state, whether it is liberal,
or time periods being closely studied. Other conservative corporatist, or social democratic,
scholars might try to extend the argumenta- according to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) institu-
tion to these other cases to see whether they tional models.
are supported or, if not, whether the initial ar- A way to go beyond theorizing about spe-
gumentation would needed to be modified and cific historical periods would be for political in-
how. This might help as well to separate what stitutional theorists to make theoretical claims
is general from what is specific in the explana- about phases of processes. In the literature on
tion of any given phenomena. The injunction social policy, for instance, scholars have taken
to remove proper names when possible might seriously the possibility that different phases of
also be applied to historical contexts, as differ- development of social policy had different de-
ent periods of time may in themselves stand in terminants (Flora and Alber, 1981). From this
for combinations of variables or particular pro- point of view, because they differ as processes,
cesses that could be conceptualized more gen- the adoption of social policy may be determined
erally. The goal would be to theorize about the by different causes than its expansion or its re-
conditions behind the period in question rather trenchment (see review in Amenta, 2003). This
than the specific time itself. conceptualization can be employed to reflect
This sort of theoretical development and ac- back on theory and improve it. By breaking so-
cumulation can be seen in the literature on cial policy into different processes, scholars can
revolutions and the retrenchment of the wel- theorize that conditions and variables will have a
fare state. Wickham-Crowley (1992) provides a different impact across them. It has been argued
theory of revolution in Latin America, a con- with regard to the Marxist- and class-based so-
junctural argument with five main conditions cial democratic explanation of social policy that
that include both political institutional circum- a period of social democratic rule after the estab-
stances as well as issues applicable to Latin Amer- lishment of social policy may have less impact or
ican countries only. Together the five conditions a different sort of impact than when social poli-
explain each of the countries that had revolu- cies were being adopted or changed in form (see,
tions in that region. He argues that his expla- e.g., Hicks, 1999). Similarly, it may be useful to
nation applies only to Latin America and does consider retrenchment as a recurrent possibility
not try to extend it outward. Going further, throughout the history of social policy with dif-
Goodwin (2001) pitches his argumentation to ferent determinants when once social policy has
all Third World countries and sees the different been established as compared to when it is at an
continents as providing different sorts of contex- early stage of institutionalization.
tual conditions that can be employed in theoret- Spelling out as far as possible with concepts
ical argumentation with implications for empir- the scope conditions of theoretical argumen-
ical differences. In his examination of social tation in general terms would aid progress in
policy in the United States and Britain in both theory and research. Even if one’s theoret-
the 1980s Pierson (1994) argues that forces ical argument provides implications that even-
for retrenchment were general across capitalist tually are not borne out in research – perhaps
democracies in the last quarter of the twentieth the largest drawback to theorizing beyond one’s
century (see also Huber and Stephens, 2001; cases – the claims will give others something
Swank, 2001). By this time most systems of with which to begin their own empirical work
social spending had been completed and ex- and lead to the creation of better theories. This
panded – had become “institutionalized” – and would be true whether one employs the con-
bids to cut them back were taken up in force by junctural sort of theory in which combinations
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of conditions lead to outcomes (Katznelson, elements as contextual factors for the meso-level
1997; Ragin, 1987) or the time-order sequence ones. One would start from theoretical argu-
sort in which events or processes must hap- ments made on a few cases in a specific time
pen in a certain order to produce outcomes period and extend the thinking outward as far
(Griffin, 1992). Abbott (1992) notably suggests as one would think it plausible.
that scholars making time-order or narrative ar- The theorizing process would thus begin by
guments need to address populations rather than addressing the impact of higher-level institu-
have these arguments always tied to case studies. tional conditions or processes on meso-level or-
In short, one should think through that applica- ganizational conditions or processes. In the first
bility and implications of even path-dependent step one would theorize about the interaction
claims for processes in other settings than the of macroinstitutional conditions that would be
ones at hand. likely to lead to the prevalence of actors at a
Another analogy from Przeworski and Te- meso level, including perhaps the existence of
une’s methodological precepts would be to certain state bureaus and agencies. The elements
extend contextual theorizing concerning the of the argument at the either level might include
macro level of political institutions on meso- processes and issues of timing, such as whether
level relationships regarding interactions of po- a polity was democratized before it was bureau-
litical organizations and outcomes of interest. cratized. From these one would make claims
A main line of argumentation of institutional about the relationship between different meso-
theory is that political institutions not only in- level actors and their forms of activity or lines
fluence the identities and modes organization of action within different macrosocial contexts
of politically active groups; political institutions and the outcomes or processes to be explained.
also constitute contexts that alter relationships at In thinking through the different combinations
the political organizational level between politi- expected to lead to the outcomes in question,
cally mobilized groups and outcomes of interest. one could theorize that multiple combinations
These contexts may alter as well individual- might lead to the same outcome. In this way it
level relationships, such as whether an indi- would be possible to make claims, for instance,
vidual’s class position will influence political about the adoption of major social spending
preferences. The task here would be to address programs across all interwar capitalist democ-
systematically how these contexts influence the racies or a successful revolutions in post–World
relationships at these lower levels between orga- War II Third World countries. One would be
nizations and outcomes or processes. able to think through which combinations of
One way to sort this out is for institution- explanatory circumstances and variables would
alists to theorize if they were going to em- be impossible or unlikely to appear empirically
ploy Boolean qualitative comparative analysis and tighten theoretical thinking (Stinchcombe,
(Ragin, 1987; see also 2000) to appraise their 1968).
claims. In a Boolean analysis, an investigator In my own work on the development of so-
typically examines a set of five or fewer cate- cial policy (Amenta, 1998), I argue along these
gorical – all or nothing – independent variables lines. One claim is that the democratization of
and employs them to explain a categorical de- the polity, a systemic condition, influences re-
pendent variable. A set of algorithms indicate lationships at the meso level between political
the combinations of conditions that are associ- actors and social policy. For instance, it is gener-
ated with the outcome in question. But the task ally held among statist scholars that autonomous
for institutional scholars would be to theorize in and resourceful domestic bureaucracies will spur
this manner by a stepwise process that first ana- social spending policy. I argue instead that this
lyzed the connections between macro-level and relationship depends crucially on whether and
meso-level developments and then combined the degree to which the larger polity is democ-
the macro- and meso-level elements in an anal- ratized, with autonomous domestic bureaucra-
ysis to explain outcomes, using the macro-level cies largely uninfluential in underdemocratized
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114 Edwin Amenta
polities. I argue as well that the relationship action, which influences states at a later point in
depends in part on the partisan nature of the time.
political regime in power. The larger argument These advances and evolutions in the theo-
also extends to the influence of other polit- retical project have also brought with them im-
ically mobilized groups on social policy. An portant theoretical challenges for its proponents.
underdemocratized polity not only discourages Institutional theories do well in explaining the
the mobilization of social movements but also broad lines on which political contention takes
attenuates the relationship between their col- place and the limits on political activity, but less
lective action and advances in social policy. Al- well in explaining changes. Also, the way that
though the theoretical claims are appraised on political institutional thinking has progressed has
the development of U.S. social policy, in com- depended on groups of researchers mainly mak-
parison with that of Britain, the claims are gen- ing arguments about a few cases in historical
eral enough in nature that they could be applied periods about which they have detailed knowl-
to other cases. edge. They have not often extended their the-
oretical thinking to the relevant populations of
cases and processes. This has slowed the devel-
conclusion opment of political institutional theory and the
accumulation of research findings in particular
The turn toward political institutionalism in po- areas of study.
litical sociology, thinking about states in a We- To make greater contributions theoretically
berian and organizational manner, has opened and to avoid degenerating into a framework
up a number of questions for research, breaking or an outlook, political institutionalism needs
through the barriers imposed by other perspec- to be able to make greater portable theoretical
tives. These questions, such as the development claims about the likely consequences of different
of states, the appearance of revolutions and other configurations of political institutions and actors
social movements, and the development of soon outcomes and processes of importance. The
cial policies are of key interest to those who task here is to develop configurational theoreti-
study issues of political power and have helped cal claims in which connect political institutions
to transform the subject matter of political so- at the systemic level to actors and relationships
ciology. between them at the meso level to processes and
What is more, scholars have proposed polit- outcomes, such as revolutions or social policy
ical institutional theories of politics and states and the like. This theorizing should be done in
to explain these and other social processes and ways that go beyond the specific cases at hand.
outcomes. These arguments have been mainly Institutional scholars also need to better theo-
structural and systemic but also address relation- rize path-dependent argumentation, in which
ships at lower levels of organization. Macro-level timing and sequence matter in the explanation
structures constitute political contexts that in- of outcomes. This important thing is for this
fluence the politics at the organizational level reciprocal process to be modeled and applied
and the relationship between the forms and more systematically to key comparative and his-
lines of action of these organizations and po- torical questions. These issues, which amount to
litical outcomes of interest. In addition, insti- in essence a call for more middle-range theory
tutional theories have been opened up to be- with greater historical sophistication built in, are
come historical in nature, with the political both challenges and opportunities for the next
process modeled as states influencing political generation of scholars.
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chapter five
Culture, Knowledge, Politics
James M. Jasper
In the last thirty years, culture has been taken their constituencies. When power is discussed,
more seriously as an analytic tool and used more it is the ability to set urban growth agendas or
extensively than ever before in the social sci- gain citizenship rights, not to make blockbuster
ences. A generation of scholars has now demon- movies or suppress masturbation. What’s more,
strated the cultural dimensions of all political there has been considerable reluctance to recog-
institutions and processes. At the same time, nize the cultural dynamics within the organiza-
they have shown the political side of all culture, tions of the state itself. By defining their domain
from childrearing to insane asylums, television as certain institutions rather than certain pro-
shows to presidential inaugurations, architecture cesses, most political sociologists – especially in
to the gardens of Versailles, fairy tales to high the United States – have chosen a narrow and
fashion. Across many disciplines, the study of safe terrain over a broad but treacherous one.
culture today is about the power of gatekeepers, Political sociology has yet to fully incorporate
the rhetorical legitimation of formal organiza- meaning in its explanations, and it will be more
tions, the social determinants of art and ideas, dynamic and creative when it does.1
the reproduction of hierarchies, the acquisition
of cultural capital, the normalization of the in-
dividual self. To show that an idea or institution brief history
is socially constructed – one of today’s great in-
tellectual pastimes – is normally to reveal the For two hundred years, political analysis has re-
political purposes hidden behind it (Hacking, flected a broader cultural conflict between En-
1999). lightenment and Romantic impulses, between
Political sociology should be riding high “civilization” and “culture” (Elias, 1978/1939).
thanks to the “cultural revolution,” as culture On the one hand is an optimistic, liberal faith
and politics have become central, intertwined
1
lenses for viewing all social life. But I suspect Here is some evidence that cultural sociology has
the opposite has happened. Rather than defin- embraced politics more than political sociology has cul-
ture. In Smelser’s 1988 Handbook of Sociology, Anthony
ing its domain as the exercise of power, the Orum’s article on political sociology paid virtually no
clash of wills, the construction of favorable ideas attention to cultural dimensions, despite his enthusiasm
and institutions, wherever it happens – in other for E. P. Thompson, important to Orum for his histor-
words, making politics, like culture, a way of ical approach not his cultural. Several years later when
seeing the world – political sociology has de- Diana Crane edited a volume called The Sociology of Cul-
ture (1994), almost all the chapters in fact concerned
fined its terrain more narrowly as the institu- power and politics, although the titles were about his-
tions of the nation-state: parties and elections, torical sociology, formal organizations, the integration
citizenship and boundaries, state agencies and of national societies, material culture, and art.
115
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116 James M. Jasper
in science and rationality, which views peo- image of government as a natural outgrowth
ple as essentially the same everywhere, differ- of society, easily disrupted by efforts at sudden
ing primarily by how far they have traveled transformation. Culture and community were
along the same road of progress and develop- central to this vision.
ment. On the other hand we see a recognition, Political sociology (and perhaps sociology as a
and sometimes celebration, of abiding cultural whole: Nisbet, 1966; Seidman, 1983) was born
differences, thought to be the fount of spiri- out of the tension between Enlightenment and
tual values more important than material ad- Romanticism. We see this in Marx’s search for
vancement, a higher source of knowledge than universal laws of history, placed precariously
science. The utilitarian tradition that derives alongside his faith in the revolutionary action
from Enlightenment ideals has given us ratio- of the proletariat. It is even more striking in
nal choice models of humans as largely mate- Weber’s distinction between the value neutral-
rial creatures, with mostly universal urges, and ity of social science and the normative commit-
a corresponding model of social science as the ments of researchers that influence their choice
search for constant laws like those of physics of problems. From this contrast came another:
or chemistry. Those suspicious of modernity Weber’s analysis of the increasing rationalization
(whether on esthetic, ecological, or reactionary and rigidity of modern, bureaucratic societies
grounds) have been more likely to analyze cul- and his desperate hope for charismatic lead-
ture as a source of resistance and alternative ers to bring innovation to these systems. Pes-
values. For every Bentham there has been a simism over Europe’s political arrangements in
Coleridge, for every Tom Schelling a Clifford the 1920s fostered a cult of actions and decisions
Geertz. that could set things right.
Romanticism began to stir at the very height This brand of Romantic political thought
of the Enlightenment. As early as the 1760s, came to a fiery and disreputable end with fas-
the Sturm und Drang movement emphasized the cism, its great triumph and debacle. Figures
inner self and its emotions over the colder ratio- like Carl Schmitt (1976/1932), arguing for a
nality of science. Rousseau published his Con- strong state and community, savaged liberal-
fessions in 1783, claiming that the truth about ism for its optimism about human nature, in-
individuals lies in their inner workings and sen- deed for its denial of the need for politics and
timents. In 1813, Madame de Staël returned the state. Inspired by Weber, Schmitt developed
to France from a German sojourn with a new an existentialist reverence for powerful leaders
term, “romanticism.” Burke (1973/1790) fa- who could make decisions and create politics
mously described the ancient origins and slow, by defining a society’s enemies (Wolin, 1992:
organic development of British liberties solidly chapter 4). Mussolini articulated the Roman-
rooted in community – in contrast to the rad- tic spirit of mythical community in proclaim-
ical social engineering of the French Revolu- ing, “We have created a myth, this myth is a
tion. Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli trans- belief, a noble enthusiasm; it does not need
formed many of Burke’s ideas into practice, to be reality, it is a striving and a hope, be-
adding an overlay of medieval nostalgia, while lief and courage. Our myth is the nation, the
Matthew Arnold and others additionally in- great nation which we want to make into a con-
sisted on the benefits of high culture (also Eliot, crete reality for ourselves” (quoted approvingly
1949). The great turn-of-the-century theorist in Schmitt, 1985/1923:75–6). In their dread
of hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey (1976), ex- of communism, most conservatives abandoned
plicitly contrasted his holistic vision of cultural Burkean principles of organic community to
meaning – and the human sciences – with the line up behind fascist parties of radical change,
Enlightenment reductionism and materialism of thereby discrediting traditional tropes of cul-
natural science. Into the twentieth century, the- ture, community, and nation. Romantic politi-
orists like Michael Oakeshott continued Burke’s cal language was made unavailable to the initial
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Culture, Knowledge, Politics 117
postwar generation of political analysts (cf. join social movements led by demagogues (Bell,
Alexander, 1995).2 1960; Smelser, 1962).
Romantic tropes of culture and community Marxists challenged this vision, but simply re-
could thus be rediscovered in the 1960s, migrat- versed the attribution of truth and ideology. The
ing from the Right end of the political spec- state, in thrall to capital, promulgated false ide-
trum to the Left. The traditional association ology through the schools, the media, and other
of the Left with universalist rationality and the “apparatuses” (Althusser, 1971; cf. Thompson,
Right with cultural singularities was in large 1978), whereas the social position of the work-
part reversed (Gitlin, 1995). Increasingly, polit- ing class (and intellectuals aligned with it)
ical activists and scholars of the Left used cul- allowed it to grasp the truth about capitalist
tural analyses to build their followings and criti- society. If the mainstream blamed fascism on
cize their societies, drawing on many antimarket Romantic impulses, the Left frequently attri-
images first developed by conservatives. Collec- buted it to the Enlightenment (Horkheimer and
tive identities, beginning with Black Power and Adorno, 1979/1944). In postwar political anal-
Third World revolutionaries, became a source of ysis of all stripes, however, people were either
resistance to political and economic structures; right or wrong in their thoughts and actions.
community became a rallying cry of the Left As many activists of the 1960s – such as Todd
more than the Right. Ecology and feminism ar- Gitlin, Richard Flacks, and Stanley Aronowitz –
ticulated a critique of the “instrumental reason” became academics in the 1970s, they frequently
of Enlightenment science and self-confidence; turned to culture as a way of criticizing their so-
new criticism of professions and other experts cieties and explaining what went wrong. Social
appeared. Small became beautiful. In a mo- scientists rediscovered the local meanings and
mentous shift, the professional middle classes, practices of culture. They came to appreciate
once the great supporters of the rationalistic that people do not see and encounter the world
tradition, grew more ambivalent if not critical around them directly, but through the many
of the Enlightenment project (Espeland, 1998; lenses of cultural meanings, language, tradition,
Moore, in press). (These concerns find echoes memory devices, structures of feeling, and cog-
in today’s antiglobalization protest.) At the same nitive schemas. “False consciousness” was a con-
time, much of the Right embraced promarket venient first effort to explain the failure of revo-
utilitarianism with a revolutionary zeal, espe- lutions, but it was soon dropped for its arrogant
cially in Britain and the United States. assumption that scholars had the truth while the
Political analysis changed as well. Under En- working class were dupes. Even scientific facts,
lightenment ideals in the immediate postwar Thomas Kuhn and others showed, are not en-
generation, most students of politics believed tirely free from expectations, theories, and cul-
in two forms of knowledge, that which ac- tural frameworks. All that we know and do as
curately reflected reality and that which did humans occurs through thick webs of mean-
not. Those with accurate understandings were ing. The social sciences took a profound cul-
thought to include scientific scholars, of course, tural turn, complete with the celebration of di-
but also citizens who pursued their goals by vot- versity that traditionally accompanied a cultural
ing and forming interest groups in good pluralist emphasis, but (mostly) without its reactionary
fashion. Suffering from illusions, on the other associations.
hand, were those with ideologies or those who There were broader social sources for the
stepped outside normal institutional channels to resurgent Romanticism of the 1960s. Most
strongly in the United States (where World
2
After Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger was the greatest War II could be viewed as a victory rather than
anti-Enlightenment thinker, and it is no accident that
he was both a Nazi sympathizer and the trailblazer for a debacle for the Enlightenment), the 1950s had
environmental ideas, the cultural turn, and the critique been an apogee for Enlightenment values. Sci-
of instrumentalism. ence was glorified as never before. Modernism
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118 James M. Jasper
in architecture and urban design triumphed side and your favored group is doing well, you
through an alliance with developers and plan- tend to see the world as rational. When your
ners attracted by its no-frills economy. Archi- group acts as you think they should but is
tects and developers shared a disregard for local blocked anyway, you may tend to turn to struc-
contexts and communities, which stood in the tural explanations, as also happened after the
way of broad freeways and International Style 1960s. When your side does not even act as
blocks (the modernist premise of this architec- you think they should, in the way the work-
ture was that buildings had their own logics ing class has regularly disappointed the intel-
independent of existing contexts). Nuclear re- lectuals sympathetic to them, cultural and psy-
actors and skyscrapers were built regardless of chological explanations come naturally to the
the qualms of local populations. Such hubris fore. In the 1970s academic radicals turned to ei-
was ripe for reaction. In the early 1960s, Jane ther structure or culture to understand what had
Jacobs’s defense of traditional city life (1961), gone wrong. Those who entered the humanities
Rachel Carson’s warning of environmental dis- could assure themselves they were still “doing
asters (1962), and SDS’s 1963 critique of in- politics” while studying Courbet or Shakespeare
strumentalism, the Port Huron Statement, were (e.g., Clark, 1973; Eagleton, 1976; Jameson,
parallel reactions to an Enlightenment appar- 1981).
ently running amok. The movements of the This momentous flip-flop, in which Right
1960s, populated by those who had not lived and Left traded tropes of culture and particu-
under fascism or fought in the war against it, larism for those of science and universalism, is
surreptitiously carried Romantic baggage. only part of intellectual history. Alongside the
Since the 1970s the Left has been torn be- new free-market Right, there persisted a reli-
tween Romanticism and Enlightenment, be- gious Right that continued to appeal to values of
tween deconstructing all claims to truth, thereby community and family. Nor were all scholars of
undermining its own bases for political rhetoric culture and politics leftists inspired by images
and action, and attacking especially or only the of popular communities. But more than ever
truth claims of the powerful. (Even postmod- before, progress and social justice came to be as-
ernists have an ironic, nihilist wing and a po- sociated with criticism of large bureaucracies in
litical, engaged wing: Rosenau [1992].) In fig- the name of the local and the particular. What-
ures like Foucault and Derrida, this tension ever the motivation, however, the proliferation
is never fully resolved; many combine thor- of cultural concepts since the 1970s has enor-
oughgoing intellectual critique with political mously enriched the study of politics.
action based on strongly held values – with no
necessary connection between the two. Col-
lective movements are similarly torn. Femi- postwar approaches to politics
nists build social movements on the basis of and culture
the idea of “woman,” for example, but also
criticize each other for reifying this concept. For twenty years after World War II, efforts to
Their critique of all metaphysics seems to un- understand politics and culture were dominated
dermine their own programs. (Anyone who by attempts to explain fascism and communism,
thinks this “postmodern” plight is altogether while at the same time reflecting national dif-
new should read not only Weber but also ferences. Enlightenment approaches triumphed
Robert Musil’s unsurpassed portrait, The Man most fully in the United States, perhaps because
Without Qualities, set in 1914 and written in Americans’ experience of World War II was less
the 1920s.) psychologically devastating than Europeans’.
The collapse of the Left at the end of the One research program examined the civic cul-
1960s also helps explain the shift in scholarly ture thought to be necessary for democracy.
perspectives. When history seems to be on your Another addressed the occasional regression of
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politics into participation outside normal chan- environmental protection, the quality of life, and
nels, viewing protestors and insurgents as irra- the avoidance of hierarchy, rather than material
tional or immature. concerns with a paycheck and what it can buy.
Such values are of interest especially for their ef-
fects on political trust and participation (Barnes
Civic Culture and Kaase, 1979).
Political culture research has come in for its
The main American approach was to exam- share of criticism (e.g., Elkins and Simeon, 1979;
ine what was called “political culture,” how Somers, 1995). It has been accused of inade-
people thought and behaved in the civic arena quately distinguishing between individuals’ at-
(Almond and Verba, 1963). On Enlightenment titudes and institutional opportunities open to
assumptions, researchers expected Western- them. It does not fully address differences within
style democracy to spread gradually throughout populations, especially those who do not fit the
the world. They also sought to promote these “dominant” pattern of values and behaviors; co-
systems to counter communism. Civic culture operation does not require consensus (Mann,
was linked to pluralist ideals of stable institu- 1970). It does not specify clearly the relation-
tions within which organized pressure groups ship between political and other domains or the
could maneuver freely, an amalgam of demo- ways in which cultures change over time. Many
cratic spirit and deference toward “proper” au- of these inadequacies have been discussed by
thorities. Pockets of resistance, such as fascist Verba himself (1980). Another problem is the
Germany and many developing nations, could conceptualization of culture as individual atti-
be explained by their backward political cultures tudes measurable through surveys – a view that
(Banfield, 1958). Poor childrearing, as in au- distinguishes the political culture tradition from
thoritarian families, was blamed for inadequate the cultural revolution that has appeared along-
veneration of representative elections and insti- side it. Today’s practitioners, such as Robert
tutions (Adorno et al., 1950). The civic culture Putnam, are at least more sophisticated in the
approach combined a belief in unitary cultures, kinds of evidence they deploy.
usually associated with nation-states, faith in
attitudinal surveys as the means for getting at
cultural meanings, and a Burkean notion that The Crowd Mentality
certain national cultures were conducive to
democratic institutions. Protest movements and other extrainstitutional
Research in this vein continues today. One forms of political action were seen as the op-
branch has claimed to find increased civic- posite of sound civic participation (Almond
mindedness in Germany (Baker et al., 1981) and and Coleman, 1960:5–8). Most postwar aca-
Italy (Inglehart, 1989; Putnam, 1993) and a de- demics dismissed them in pejorative fashion, as-
cline in the United States (Lipset and Schneider, sociating them with the mass rallies of fascism
1983; Putnam, 2000) and Britain (Kavanagh, and communism. In one view, personality de-
1980). Such research shows that civic virtue ficiencies led people to join larger entities, to
varies over time, affected by factors like his- lose themselves in some cause, no matter what
torical events and demographic transformations, it was (Hoffer, 1951); deluded participants were
rather than being a mysterious emanation from a working out internal psychodynamics from
national population. Another branch has exam- their childhoods, with little connection to the
ined diversity within a nation as well as changes world around them (Swanson, 1956, 1957).
over time. Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1989), most In another, crowds led members to act irra-
prominently, has disclosed the rise of “postma- tionally, to do things they would avoid as indi-
terial” values among significant minorities in viduals. Hence social movements were studied
the advanced industrial countries: issues such as in the same “collective behavior” field as fads
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120 James M. Jasper
and panics (Smelser, 1962). More charitably, their efforts to understand the political effects
protestors were immature young people, per- of culture.3
haps working out unresolved Oedipal issues
or identity crises, but not hopelessly and per-
manently pathological (Smelser, 1968; Klapp, Structuralism
1969). This was a popular academic response
to the youth-filled social movements that ap- From France came a semiotic model (the best
peared in the 1960s, and which would eventu- history of which is Dosse, 1997). Drawing on
ally evoke a more sympathetic and sophisticated Saussure’s structural linguistics, anthropologist
view of protest. Critics of American society at Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969/1949; 1967/1958)
least put the blame on institutional tendencies had shown that other cultural phenomena could
toward mass society (Kornhauser, 1959), espe- be treated as though they were tight systems
cially after Stanley Milgram (1974) discovered of signs, whose meanings derived from each
that Americans, and not just Germans, could be sign’s difference from other signs rather than
bullied into administering electric shocks to re- from the intentions of the user or correspon-
search subjects. Psychologizing approaches like dence to objective reality. Thus we know what
these were often crude attempts to grapple with “beige” means because we know how it dif-
cultural meanings ( Jasper, 2004). fers from tan, brown, and other colors; it does
Like civic culture, the study of collective be- not reflect any inherent “beigeness.” As struc-
havior continues. Relative deprivation theories turalism’s influence grew in France in the 1950s
have been used as a way of thinking about and 1960s, any number of human conventions
grievances and discontent in protest (Tyler and were analyzed as though they were a tightly or-
Smith, 1998), the importance of which was de- ganized language. Lacan (1977/1966) reinter-
nied in structural models (e.g., McCarthy and preted Freud’s concept of the unconscious as a
Zald, 1977; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977). David language. Barthes applied the same ideas to me-
Snow and coauthors (1998) found a breakdown dia images (1972/1957), fashion (1983/1967),
in the routines of daily life to lie behind much and Japanese culture (1982/1970). Althusser
collective action. To explain feelings of threat, (1969/1965, 1971) recast Marxism in the same
so important to political mobilization, requires light. A flood of English translations of semiotic
psychology and culture ( Jasper, in press, a), works like these appeared in the 1970s.
one reason that more structural approaches have French structuralism gave central place to cul-
missed it entirely (cf. Goldstone and Tilly, ture, but allowed little room for intention or
2001). creativity, change in or resistance to the sys-
In true Enlightenment style, most American tem’s meanings. Language strongly constricts
research in the 1950s and early 1960s was deaf to its users, whose tiny innovations appear rarely
the particularities of culture and community. All and spread slowly. Indeed, Saussure’s linguistics
nations would follow the same path of progress largely dismissed people’s spoken speech in favor
toward autonomous individuals freed from the of the underlying rules of language. Compared
cognitive and emotional bonds of local commu- to orthodox Marxism, Althusser’s concern with
nities. When they did not, psychoanalysis could ideological state apparatuses was an advance,
be used to explain deviations as pathologies. (As
always, there were exceptions, such as Lane’s 3
Anthropologists such as Victor Turner (1967, 1974),
[1962] lengthy interviews probing the political Mary Douglas (1966, 1973), and especially Clifford
beliefs of fifteen men.) After the political con- Geertz (1973, 1983) also provided insights into cul-
flicts of the 1960s destroyed this Enlightenment ture. But these scholars tended to see culture as a search
complacency, community and cultural embed- for existential meaning, in contrast to more politically
and strategically alert anthropologists like Fredrik Barth
dedness resurfaced as central categories. Schol- (1959, 1969) and F. G. Bailey (1991, 2001). As a result,
ars had several traditions, incubated in different political sociologists were less influenced by anthropol-
national settings, to which they could turn in ogy than other sociologists were.
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allowing a “relative autonomy” to noneco- itself, according to Horkheimer and his collab-
nomic factors in politics, but economic deter- orator Theodor Adorno (1979/1944:xi–xii), led
minism remained. And structuralists’ insistence to fascist barbarism, the end result of a process
that they were doing rigorous science through in which “thought inevitably becomes a com-
their analysis of signs (for example, Lévi-Strauss modity, and language the means of promoting
hoped to locate binary sources of mythic struc- that commodity.” In psychological terms, cap-
tures in the human brain) was not the impulse italist crises undermined the power of the fa-
that would draw so many to culture in the 1970s. ther, in struggle against whom boys had tradi-
The great cultural turn was deeply suspicious of tionally developed their own autonomous egos
science, searching instead for the same “rich- and superegos. Without these, they were sus-
ness” of cultural meaning that had attracted ear- ceptible to mass propaganda from the state. The
lier Romantics. The semiotic model was al- team – especially Adorno and Marcuse – in-
luring because it highlighted meanings, but it creasingly turned their attention to art, finding
conceptualized them as rigid and relatively un- in it a critique of the present and a longing for
changing. some future society that would allow freedom
and creativity. Yet art was too often an instru-
ment for capitalist docility and alienation, when
Critical Theory
it suggested that modern societies had already at-
tained social harmony. The culture industry lev-
The Frankfurt School provided a more polit-
eled its products to commodities, isolated from
ical version of culture, steeped in the horrors
any sense of society as a whole or of the possi-
of Nazi Germany. Led by philosopher Max
bilities for historical change. Through numbing
Horkheimer, this group began its social anal-
familiarity, for instance, radio eroded our capac-
ysis in the 1920s, in the same atmosphere of
ities to listen to music in a sophisticated, critical
despair as Weber and Schmitt. Drawing on
way (Adorno, 1978/1938).
Marxism, they grappled with several historical
For former activists hoping to draw lessons
observations: Modern society seemed increas-
from their political failures, critical theory was
ingly shackled by the iron cages of bureaucracy
almost as grim as French structuralism. The cul-
and industrial production; the working class was
ture industry could turn everything, even radi-
not a reliable force for progressive change, ac-
cal critique, into another fetishized commodity.
commodating easily to mainstream politics and
Jürgen Habermas, primary heir to this tradition,
even to the nationalism of World War I; the
has explicitly looked back to the Enlightenment
world’s only socialist nation seemed more and
as a way to rescue the entire Frankfurt project
more subject to Stalin’s cult of personality and
(1987a). Rather than an inherent tendency, bar-
rigid domination by the state; and average citi-
barism is one possible path down which ratio-
zens were increasingly drawn to the peculiar fas-
nality can take us. Unlike the French, Habermas
cist amalgam of nationalism and populism, an-
turns to speech rather than language as the ba-
ticommunism and communalism. The group’s
sis for his analysis, finding in it a foundation for
exile to New York in 1934, or more precisely
action and critique rather than a tight system
the conditions that forced it, only added to their
(1979, 1984, 1987b). Through communicative
reasons for pessimism.
interaction we can challenge those in power to
Mass culture became the primary culprit used
live up to rules and ideals we all share, asking
to explain the unfortunate direction the zeit-
them to justify their actions. Through his ideal
geist took in the 1930s.4 The Enlightenment
of “undistorted communication,” Habermas
suggests both an analysis of current distortions
4
The members of the Frankfurt School who stud- and a direction for progressive change. Pitched
ied politics more directly, such as Franz Neumann, Otto
Kirchheimer, and Frederick Pollock, receded in promi- at such a high level of universalist abstraction,
nence over time and were barely read at all when the however, his work does not altogether sat-
perspective enjoyed a resurgence in the 1970s. isfy the curiosity about and fondness for the
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122 James M. Jasper
particularities of culture that motivated many traditions and community solidarities rather
scholars of the 1970s and 1980s. Although he than from economic class.
puts meaning at the core of social life, Habermas British traditions of seeing class conflict
remains a social theorist, not a cultural analyst. in culture continued. At the University of
Birmingham, Stuart Hall, Paul Willis, Dick
Hebdige, and others looked to working class
Hegemony subcultures for forms of resistance that fused
culture and politics (Hall and Jefferson, 1976).
A third national tradition, hailing from Britain, Willis (1977) famously described how youth-
thoroughly attends to those details of culture ful rebellion in the schools condemned working
and community, the stuff of meaning. Old class boys to a life of dead-end jobs. Hebdige
leftists such as Raymond Williams and E. P. (1979) found resistance in the safety pins and
Thompson, heavily involved in working class torn clothes of punk subculture. In a related
movements, perceived considerable resistance to vein, Stanley Cohen (1972) saw “moral panics”
the dominant culture. When Williams tried, in in mainstream institutions’ reactions to working
Marxism and Literature, to give a general de- class youth, whom they cast as dangerous “folk
scription of culture (liberally defined as mean- devils.”
ings, values, practices, and relationships), he The British and eventually others recovered
even smuggled in a model of class conflict. His the concept of cultural hegemony from Antonio
residual, dominant, and emergent elements of Gramsci (2000), whose involvement in Italian
culture all too obviously correspond to the aris- politics in the 1920s made him sensitive to the
tocracy, bourgeoisie, and proletariat. Williams real choices to be made in wars of position
escaped Marxism’s economic determinism but and wars of maneuver. The term “hegemony”
not its image of history as class struggle. (He attractively suggested that resistance was pos-
gives the game away [1977:123] by the – admit- sible, even while most power lay with those
tedly “difficult – distinction between emergent on top. But elites’ hegemony is not automatic;
elements “which are really elements of some they must constantly work to maintain their
new phase of the dominant culture . . . and those position. According to Gramsci, much of that
which are substantially alternative or opposi- work is cultural, promulgating ideas favorable
tional to it” – a familiar metaphysical distinc- to their continued power. Like many cultural
tion between what remains capitalist and what concepts, hegemony could be read in ways that
is instead socialist). stress structure and the stability of domination or
No other work on culture and politics ways that emphasize struggle and the potential
matches the influence of E. P. Thompson’s The for change.
Making of the English Working Class, published These basic, if contrasting, models of culture
in 1963. The book’s title suggests the central and politics were easily exported to new realms.
theme of agency, so entirely missing from the A good example is R. W. Connell’s research.
semiotic and Frankfurt traditions: The working Having written about class relations in the 1970s
class was present at and active in its own making. (Connell, 1977), he turned his attention to gen-
Thompson especially describes the cultural and der in the 1980s (1987, 1995). He simply applied
religious traditions and ideas, with roots deep his British model, describing hegemonic im-
in the eighteenth century, that were major in- ages of masculinity, subordinate, complicit, and
gredients. Like Williams, he takes the working marginalized ones, as well as “protest masculin-
class and the class basis of historical change for ities.” Connell runs into the difficulties charac-
granted. He assumes it was the same collective teristic of this tradition, however: Knowing the
actor resisting industrialism on the basis of class structure of class or gender in advance, as well as
interests and consciousness in the 1790s and the in many cases the direction of historical change,
1830s. But much of that resistance, Calhoun these scholars misrecognize other kinds of polit-
(1982) has shown, arose from preindustrial ical players (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). They also
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have trouble linking ideas and concrete actors, and less by the extraction of raw materials or
or rather they assume a link rather than demon- their processing into industrial products, and
strating it. Ideas and sensibilities can float more more and more by the production and distri-
freely than the metaphor of class structure and bution of symbols, knowledge, and informa-
conflict allows. tion (Touraine, 1971; Bell, 1973). At the same
time, postmodernism in those arts affected by
it has resulted from a thoroughgoing cultural
Synthesis
constructionism in which the play of human
creativity is emphasized over the search for sup-
Agency, the ingredient missing from French and
posedly “deeper” ontological realities (Huyssen,
German cultural studies, had to be imported
1986). The increasing efficiency and penetra-
from Britain. Anthony Giddens (1973, 1979)
tion of communication technologies are said
coined the now-famous term “structuration”
to have created a world of simultaneous, su-
to insist that structures must be reproduced by
perficial images without any extension in time
agents even while constraining and channeling
or space (Meyrowitz, 1985). The result is an
their agency. Drawing on interpretive traditions
increasing “incredulity toward metanarratives,”
like those of Schutz and Winch, Giddens (1976)
the metaphysical groundings by which we situ-
insisted that mutual knowledge allows social in-
ate ourselves, including both the Science of the
teraction to be meaningful to agents. In turn-
Enlightenment and the Soul of the Romantics
ing away (partially) from structuralism, Pierre
(Lyotard, 1984). To trace power today one must
Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans-
“read” the polity and economy: The world is a
lated into English in 1977, also viewed culture as
text to be interpreted (Shapiro, 1992). (For more
strategic, seeing it not just in oppressed groups
on this tradition, see chapter 6 of this volume.
but throughout social life, in marriage cere-
Culture has also left its mark on debates over
monies as well as motorbikes. Whereas Giddens
globalization (Featherstone, 1990; King, 1997;
remained at the abstract level of theory, carving
Tomlinson, 1999). Much of the research con-
out a logical place for meaning in social explana-
ducted under this banner reflects a fusion of the
tion, Bourdieu reveled in the details of cultural
interpretive concern of postmodernism with an
capital (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979), artis-
older world systems interest in international re-
tic tastes (1984), academic competition (1988),
lationships. The Marxist world systems tradition
and artistic production (1996). For both, in-
was resolutely structuralist and antiinterpretive
voking agency was a way of throwing up their
(Wallerstein, 1997), so a generation of scholars
hands at the limits of structural explanations, a
interested in the cultural aspects of global trends
kind of residual. (On the incomplete ways in
had to march under a different banner, redis-
which Giddens and Bourdieu inserted agency
covering many of the older generation’s insights
into their work, see King [1998, 2000], and for
in the process. The speed with which the con-
a more cultural approach to structures, Sewell
cept of globalization replaced the more struc-
[1992].) By the end of the 1980s, cultural re-
tural idea of the political economy of world sys-
search had transcended the national models that
tems reflects, I think, the cultural turn. Debates
had constrained it in the 1970s.
over globalization frequently center around the
relative homogenization and resistance of cul-
Postmodernism and Globalization ture – even when disguised as debates over the
future of the nation-state.
The influence of the cultural turn was obvi-
ous in discussions of postmodernism and glob-
alization in the 1980s and 1990s. Although it forms of culture
has been given many nuances, postmodernism
is closely related to the “postindustrial” con- In this proliferation of work, several trends stand
cept that modern societies are dominated less out. Foremost, culture is seen to permeate all
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124 James M. Jasper
knowledge, choices, practices, and institutions, structured, public meanings available to us, but
rather than being a restricted part of social life. In also from interviews with individuals and even
this “constructionist” view, all that humans can introspection (a lost art in sociology). Culture
know and perceive, even the most objective sci- arises from a constant interaction between in-
entific knowledge, is shaped by our frameworks. dividual intentions and others’ responses. You
As a result, there is skepticism about truth claims can use language and culture in new ways, but
and efforts to establish foundations in social sci- you will then struggle to be understood. Like
ence, which found its strongest expression in the old question of coherence, that of subjec-
postmodernism. We simply cannot get outside tivity turns out to be something of a red her-
our language and our theories to test the latter ring.
with total assurance. The crisp Enlightenment To avoid seeing culture as either a unitary
distinction between true and false claims is hard whole or subjective beliefs, we need to recog-
to maintain, as all ideas reflect their social con- nize that each individual has a unique set of
text. meanings, generated through a lifetime’s inter-
At an implicit level, culture helps constitute action with the natural and social worlds. The
our reality; at a more explicit level it is deployed idea that individuals “share” a culture, which
strategically to shape that reality (Laitin, 1988). they “internalize” so that it means exactly the
Culture is therefore viewed as an element of same to each of them, seems misguided. Turner
strategy and power, a potential site of contesta- (2002) grounds this differentiation in the learn-
tion rather than automatically a source of social ing structures of the brain, Chodorow (1999) in
unity (if it does encourage unity, this is because lifelong psychodynamic interaction.
elites have used cultural tools for that purpose). If culture is everywhere, then we need to dis-
Ann Swidler (1986, 2001) has suggested that tinguish the forms it takes if we are to avoid
we view culture as an open-ended “toolkit” of tautology. Various metaphors and concepts have
strategies from which individuals select in pur- been used to understand it, which also roughly
suing their goals and living their lives, a form of correspond to different embodiments and uses
problem solving. Charles Tilly’s repertories of of culture. Unfortunately, partisans of one or
action (1978) is a more structural version of the the other of these concepts have regularly in-
same idea. As a result, the tendency has been to flated them into general theories of culture to
abandon talk of “a culture” (as a coherent en- the exclusion of other forms and formulations –
tity shared by members of a “society”) in favor a strategy good for academic careers but not in-
of discussions of cultural tools, meanings, and tellectual progress. Here are some of the most
rituals. Culture comes in discrete pieces, not as prominent.
a whole. It is everywhere, but it is not every- Ideology. A relatively coherent and explicit
thing. system of ideas, this was the most common
At the same time, culture has not been col- way to study culture in politics when observers
lapsed into the subjective beliefs of individuals, had more confidence in their ability to dis-
which would be a kind of anything-goes rela- tinguish true and false beliefs (the latter be-
tivism. The “social context” of knowledge ining ideology). It lost favor in the cultural turn,
cludes institutional and rhetorical mechanisms – but there are signs that the term may be re-
always imperfect – by which we continue to vived to mean simply “a system of meaning that
sort better and worse claims. There has been a couples assertions and theories about the na-
strong insistence that culture is an objective real- ture of social life with values and norms rel-
ity of symbols and rituals that can be interpreted evant to promoting or resisting social change”
without having to delve inside the minds of in- (Oliver and Johnston, 2000:43). In other words,
dividuals (e.g., Wuthnow, 1987:32). Perhaps too a rationalized set of images, claims, and val-
strong. Meaning, like language, seems both sub- ues that are a useful tool in political mo-
jective and objective: We can get at it from the bilization and argumentation. One limitation
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is that few parties, movements, or individuals Somers, 1995; Polletta, 1998). Although often
attain such a high degree of coherence in their treated in static fashion as structural, predictable
beliefs. combinations of characters and events, narra-
Frames are cognitive schemas or root meta- tives can be used in a more dynamic fashion –
phors that highlight or encourage certain mean- “storytelling” – to get at the interaction between
ings and feelings rather than others. Even “speakers” (figurative as well as literal) and their
though Snow et al. (1986; also Carruthers and audiences (Ricoeur, 1984; Davis, 2002).
Babb, 1996) insisted on the processes by which Ritual. When meanings are expressed in ac-
leaders and followers came to agree on frames tion, they can get a grip on people without their
to analyze a problem, in most research frames being aware of it. The most obvious case is rit-
are analyzed, one at a time, through the static ual, a symbolic expression of shared beliefs at a
lens of traditional content analysis. Rhetors try time and place intended to increase their emo-
on one frame after another until they find one tional resonance (Kertzer, 1988). People enjoy
that works with their audiences, but little at- rituals for their embodiment of group solidarity,
tention is paid to the development of each the collective effervescence Durkheim pointed
frame. out (Berezin, 1997). Rituals can have exter-
Collective identity is the drawing of group nal audiences as well as internal, telling out-
boundaries, us versus them. It is the solidar- siders what is important to a group or organiza-
ity often needed for mobilization and is probation, what kind of entity it is, who its enemies
bly more an emotional than a cognitive process are.
( Jasper, 1998). Drawn from the world of struc- Practice. Bourdieu and Giddens both argued
tural binary oppositions, collective identity has that much of our cultural knowledge is tacit,
rarely been seen as an interactive process un- embodied in practices rather than consciously
folding over time – although this may be the and explicitly held in the form of something
future direction of research (Polletta and Jasper, like propositions. The emphasis is on the work
2001). Although analysts emphasize the “social that goes into making meanings and knowledge
construction” of identities, they are only now rather than the ideas produced, even though in-
turning to the actual work that goes into that tention is often overlooked. Turner (1994) has
construction rather than the structural circum- raised questions about what exactly is shared in
stances that allow it. practices – a difficulty avoided by newer for-
Text is the favorite postmodernist metaphor mulations which view practices as an engage-
(Shapiro, 1992). Sometimes literal texts are im- ment with the physical world (Archer, 2000),
portant, as postmodernists, indebted to literary as in science (Knorr Cetina, 1999). We can
criticism, prefer to read novels, constitutions, learn to accomplish expected tasks without nec-
and other documents. But they also read every- essarily sharing the same underlying knowl-
thing else as though it were a text: cities, wars, edge. This is a radical rethinking of what cul-
geography, political cartoons, the evening news, ture is.
even fondness for animals. The text metaphor Discourse. Dialogical approaches, inspired by
reminds us that our object of study is a human early Soviet scholars such as Bakhtin and Vygot-
creation, often carefully and consciously fabri- sky, are highly social in their models of the ori-
cated, not a fact of nature, but it can also be used gins of meaning, highlight the open-ended free-
to shift attention from the intentions of the cre- dom of social life, and include attention to the
ator to the thing created (Foucault, 1977/1969). emotional dimensions of meaning and action
Texts lend themselves especially to semiotic and (Steinberg, 1999; Barker, 2001). Like texts,
structuralist analysis. however, discourse can be viewed as having
Narrative. Many cultural meanings come a life of its own, independent of the institu-
packaged in stories with beginnings and ends, tional contexts in which it unfolds. (See Chap-
told in a variety of social contexts (Hall, 1995; ter 6.)
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126 James M. Jasper
Rhetoric. Many of these cultural concepts can time necessary for the coordination of modern
be rethought as a form of strategic and symbolic factories [Thompson, 1993] or the ability to dis-
interaction by placing them in the context of play certain emotions on demand [Hochschild,
rhetoric: of speakers and audiences, of emo- 1983]).
tional and cognitive responses, of the open- As the great student of techniques used to
ended development of cultural meanings (Billig, keep people in line, Michel Foucault did
1987). Emotional responses become prominent, more than anyone else to make the cultural
and there is room for creativity and innovation turn glamorous. Through the 1960s, Foucault
as cultural meanings are fabricated in a complex (1965/1961, 1973/1963, 1973/1966) was a fel-
interactive process that can never be predicted low traveler of structuralism, showing the extent
in advance. Rhetoric (about which the ancient to which humans are trapped within their lan-
Greeks and Romans knew so much: Quintilian, guages and languagelike conceptual systems –
2001) seems a useful way to understand culture in what amounted to an assault on the human
in politics, for it focuses on the appeals made – sciences. In the 1970s, he turned his atten-
in both words and actions – to a variety of audi- tion to more institutional settings (1978/1975,
ences, often simultaneously. And at 2,500 years, 1978/1976), especially the “disciplinary” prac-
it is our oldest tradition of explicit social con- tices and knowledges that controlled minds and
structionism. bodies: surveillance in prisons and schools, mil-
The first five of these cultural concepts em- itary drills, psychological tests for “normalcy,”
phasize structured meanings. Ritual and prac- statistics on fertility and other demographics that
tice put meanings in action, although they usu- could be helpful to the state. He criticized exist-
ally leave little room for intentionality. The last ing theories of power for focusing so heavily on
two focus on social action and interaction as the state: Power was treated as though it were a
the source of meaning, and they can also be thing rather than a relationship, it was seen as too
used to show strategic intentions behind cultural centralized, and it was viewed as primarily neg-
work. Each gets at a different form that culture ative and constraining. In Foucault’s “capillary”
takes. model, power also produced actions and knowl-
edge, created new kinds of people and new prac-
tices. In the final years of his life, Foucault (1982,
1991) was groping toward a more strategic view
mobilizing citizens of power, based on metaphors of war and con-
flict rather than the structuralist metaphor of
Cultural tools and historical research have en- language or economic metaphors of money and
riched each other, especially concerning the rise exchange.
of the modern state and related practices. The For politics in a narrower sense than
nation-state is notorious in its need to mobilize Foucault’s, the French Revolution was a great
and discipline large numbers of people, most leap forward in techniques of mass mobiliza-
obviously to fight in and support wars but also tion – and its historiography has been a proving
to reproduce the population, train it, keep it ground for new theories. The history of its his-
healthy and productive, acting normally or pre- tories shows the increased appreciation for cul-
dictably. The disciplinary techniques of recent ture in the 1970s, as studies of the class basis of
centuries are cultural efforts to shape the minds, the revolution (Lefebvre, 1947; Soboul, 1974)
hearts, and habits of citizens and their fami- were displaced by discussions of the revolu-
lies. States are not the only perpetrators: Some- tion’s symbolism, rituals, and language. François
times rising economic classes craft themselves Furet (1981/1978) took the lead in attacking
(and especially the next generation), and eco- traditional accounts that saw the revolution as
nomic leaders need to train people for specific the triumph of the bourgeoisie, preferring in-
kinds of workplaces (as in the abstract notion of stead to emphasize the struggle over symbols and
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language (and the right to speak for the nation). both of them flourished and then collapsed with
Mona Ozouf (1988/1976) analyzed revolution- fascism. The power of nationalism, long ig-
ary festivals as special events in which mean- nored by materialist and universalist interpre-
ings were constructed, even new images of time tations of European history, which expected
and place worked out. Although recognizing it (like religion) to whither, began to receive
that rival festivals were used as part of a con- considerable attention in the 1980s (Gellner,
flict between the emerging political parties, she 1983; Smith, 1983, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1990) –
nonetheless found in them a Durkheimian effort especially as a form of discourse (Calhoun,
to forge a national collective identity. Extend- 1997).
ing their work, Lynn Hunt (1984:54) showed Benedict Anderson’s (1983) suggestion that
that politics itself is a cultural creation, an im- nations are “imagined communities” opened
provisation based on existing values and beliefs the way to understanding the elaborate work
but also a crucible for creating new ones: “Po- that goes into constructing national identities,
litical symbols and rituals were not metaphors through literature, folk traditions, monuments,
of power, they were the means and the ends of buildings, ritual commemorations, museums,
power itself.” This cultural and linguistic rein- and other carriers of collective memory. Almost
terpretation of the revolution stressed its cre- all commentators have debunked nationalists’
ativity and particularity as an “event” (Sewell, own claims to deep-rooted “natural” or essen-
1996) – in contrast to earlier Marxist images of tial identities – although Anthony Smith (1986)
it as an important step forward for universal his- sees most nationalism as grounded in premod-
torical progress. Studying cultural creativity was ern ethnic identities. Fascist regimes were espe-
also a way to break with Lévi-Strauss’s semiotic cially adept at manipulating symbols of national
model.5 identity. Mabel Berezin (1997) and Simonetta
Nationalism was one of the most power- Falasca-Zamponi (1997) have amply shown the
ful mobilizing rhetorics used after, and in re- aesthetic dimensions of politics, especially the
sponse to, the universalistic pretensions and im- careful staging of rituals designed to bolster
perialist policy of the French Revolution and Mussolini’s regime. (Fascism’s foes had to arouse
Napoleonic consolidation. Nationalism consists equally strong emotions to defeat it: Dower,
of the meanings necessary for rousing peo- 1986.)
ple to support modern states, usually appeal- Collective identity has been recognized as a
ing to some sense of a shared history, even crucial building block of political action, even
if it had to be fabricated, as well as a com- in relatively simple tasks like voting. Most re-
mon language – itself thought by Romantics search has focused on legally defined identi-
to define the essence of a “people.” At its ties involved in citizenship and discrimination,
heyday from the French Revolution to World even though all identities (including citizenship:
War II, nationalism was deployed most often Brubaker, 1992) are a cultural accomplishment
by aristocratic elites who wanted to mobilize that reflect considerable conflict over interpreta-
the lower orders for war and work but not to tions and boundaries. Some are more obviously
help govern. The intellectual history of nation- cultural, such as religious or regional identities,
alism is closely tied to that of Romantic po- which often arise in response to state efforts
litical thought (e.g., Fichte, 1968/1807–8), and to suppress them in favor of national identities.
In the Islamic world, religious identities today
sometimes serve the role that nationalist ones
5
For Kevin Michael Baker (1990), the revolution re- did in Europe a hundred years ago ( Jasper, in
sulted from conceptual shifts in the field of discourse press, a). We can no longer assume that class
that included the word “revolution.” Rosenfeld (2001)
extended this symbolic approach to other, nonverbal will be a primary identity, especially as the most
arts in the making of the revolution. Also see Chartier active theorizing over identity in recent years
(1991). has focused on gender (Scott, 1988; Young,
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128 James M. Jasper
1990; Nicholson, 1990) and sexual preference outside the state

(Gamson, 1995; Bernstein, 1997; Stein, 1997;
Lichterman, 1999). The raw materials of politics – motivations, fan-
An untheorized tendency persists, in which tasies, fears, and sensibilities – arise in any sort
identities are assumed to form as a kind of of practice or institution, but they are especially
cultural icing over a structural cake. For in- thought to be formed in the private sphere,
stance, class may be thought the important fac- whence they shape what happens in the pub-
tor, subject to different ways of living and feel- lic. The private sphere has proven remarkably
ing one’s class position. Or sexual preference amenable to cultural analysis. Studies of national
may be the bedrock, so that theorists can then character, for example, stretch back at least to
describe the cultural work it takes to make peo- Montesquieu and Tocqueville, if not Herodotus
ple aware of the identity that it supports (Taylor and Thucydides. More recently, to take one
and Whittier, 1995). If there are structural posi- example, Lamont (1992) showed how French
tions that are more likely to encourage collective professionals use intelligence as a central crite-
identity, almost no one has successfully theo- rion in judging people, whereas Americans rely
rized about why (cf. Tilly, 1998). And each time more on moral probity and material success.
a framework privileges one position, another Other works are only implicitly comparative.
comes along that seems equally important: Gen- Weiner (1981) found widespread English resis-
der challenged class in the 1970s, but crashed tance to industrialism even at its apparent peak in
on the shoals of racial differences, then sexual the late nineteenth century, while Perkin (1969)
preferences came along to cut across the oth- demonstrated the reach of the emerging middle
ers. What is more, we recognize the structural class in the same period, including its increasing
basis only after we encounter the culturally elab- dominance of state offices. A number of schol-
orated identity, never before. Some identities ars have addressed the roots of American indi-
form with no conceivable structural supports vidualism (Bellah et al., 1984; Merelman, 1984;
except what the collectivity creates for itself. Gans, 1988), and Macfarlane (1978) traced En-
We must no longer assume that collective iden- glish individualism deep into medieval history.
tities exist prior to mobilization efforts – many Such studies (and these are only a tiny sample)
people identify with a movement, an organiza- trace the social roots of political preferences.
tion, or in some cases even a political tactic such Inspired in part by Habermas’s (1989) dis-
as nonviolence (Melucci, 1996; Jasper, 1997: cussion of the public sphere as the incubator
85ff ). of political goals, understanding, and participa-
It took powerful ideas and feelings – and a tion, considerable research has investigated the
lot of blood – to enlist normal people in the resources normal citizens use to approach poli-
projects of state builders and rulers. Rulers reg- tics. Bellah and his collaborators (1984) found
ularly maintain their positions by manipulating Americans extremely individualistic in their
symbols and rituals. They build edifices that awe talk, making it hard to see how collective poli-
their subjects, control flows of information in tics could emerge. Gamson (1992), on the other
the media, determine school curricula, and even hand, used focus groups to uncover critical ideas
build gardens to demonstrate the scope of their and feelings out of which protest might arise.
power (Mukerji, 1997). Words are crucial, but Eliasoph (1998) showed how a pejorative cul-
they are not the only carrier of meaning. The tural definition of “politics” prevents Americans
power of meanings is every bit as great as that from taking their “private” opinions into public
of force, and history has been a fruitful source arenas – in other words, how they work hard
of evidence in rediscovering the former. The to create the apathy so often observed. Citizens’
cultural creation of “nations” and “peoples” moods, such as cynicism, resignation, or opti-
was necessary for the institutional invention of mism, shape their political participation. Others
modern states, the primary focus of political (Reinarman, 1987; Hochschild, 1995; Block,
sociology. 1996; Jasper, 2000) have explained Americans’
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embrace of markets and suspicion of govern- panics) almost always are ( Jenkins, 1992, 1998).
ment. “Panic” is a pejorative word, but it attracts cul-
Following the assumptions of the hege- tural constructionists by viewing public reac-
mony model, many scholars look to marginal- tions and rhetoric as a part of cultural struggle
ized and oppressed groups for resistance to rather than linked to any objective measure of
mainstream institutions, values, and sensibili- threat. Many observers have found the concept
ties. They are seen, for instance, as sources of useful because it opens a window onto a society’s
new tastes and means of expression, as with disagreements over basic values, often intuitively
graffiti and rap (Rose, 1994). Poor African felt ones, as well as onto fears and anxieties that
Americans (Duneier, 1999) and working class are normally submerged.
youth (Charlesworth, 2000) fascinate sociolo- Social movements and other nongovernmen-
gists not only because of political sympathies but tal organizations are today’s preferred vehicles
also, one suspects, as Romantic symbols of the for articulating new sentiments and interests. In
“other” (on the blurred line between sociology turn, recent theories of movements have de-
and moral cheerleading, see Wacquant, 2002). scribed them as sources of moral, emotional,
Multiculturalism seems to encompass both sides: and cognitive creativity, satisfying to participants
a universalist embrace of equal opportunities for less because they pursue group and individual
cultural expression and a Romantic celebration self-interest than because they express emerging
of particularities. So-called communitarianism knowledge and moral intuitions (Luker, 1984;
insists on membership in a cultural community Melucci, 1989; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991;
as a defining property of human beings, even Jasper, 1997), including new collective identi-
though many of its standard-bearers are rootless ties (Melucci, 1996). Whereas an earlier gen-
academics who move from university to uni- eration of scholars (summed up in McAdam
versity – and whose “communities” are rather et al., 1996) concentrated on explicitly politi-
fanciful, nostalgic constructs. cal and economic movements, such as labor and
Moral panics are one form of political mo- civil rights, younger scholars turned their atten-
bilization that sociologists have investigated, but tion to more cultural movements in the 1980s
under the rubric of deviance more often than and 1990s (Rose, 1994; Stuempfle, 1995) –
political sociology. The concept (which as I sometimes using the misleading label “new so-
noted developed in loose connection to the cial movements” (Calhoun, 1993). A number of
Birmingham School but also echoes crowd the- cultural dimensions of social movements have
ories of the 1950s) describes sudden concern been described, including the need to frame ar-
over a group or activity, accompanied by calls guments in ways that resonate with potential au-
for control and suppression. Out of an infinite diences (Snow et al., 1986; Gamson, 1992); the
range of potential perceived threats, one – which use of discourse (Steinberg, 1999) and narrative
may be neither new nor on the rise – suddenly (Polletta, 1998; Davis, 2002); the emotions of
receives considerable attention. The news me- social movements ( Jasper, 1998; Goodwin et al.,
dia, public officials, religious leaders, and pri- 2001); and, finally, the use of collective identi-
vate “moral entrepreneurs” focus public atten- ties for mobilization (Gamson, 1995), strategic
tion on the issue, typically by identifying some outreach (Bernstein, 1997), and the clarification
recognizable group as “folk devils” – usually of goals (Polletta and Jasper, 2001).
young people, racial and ethnic minorities, or Revolutions are the most political form that
other relatively powerless groups – responsible social movements can take, aiming at transfor-
for the menace (Cohen, 1972; Rieder, 1985; mation of the state. Their obvious structural in-
Beisel, 1997; Springhall, 1998; Glassner, 1999 – tent (to change state structures themselves, and
not all of whom explicitly use the concept of sometimes economic structures too) seems to
moral panic). New political or legal policies are have discouraged more cultural views, perhaps
sometimes the result, and new symbols and sen- combined with the long shadow of Skocpol’s
sibilities (available as the raw materials for future (1979) structural reorientation of the field.
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130 James M. Jasper
Nonetheless, Goldstone (1991) has inserted The media, as the lens through which most
some role for ideology into his structural model; citizens view politics, were important to the
Foran (1993) and Goodwin (2001) integrated emerging cultural perspective in the 1970s and
cultural factors more fully with structural ones. 1980s. A number of scholars examined the char-
(See the chapter in this volume by Goodwin.) acteristic biases of print and television news
Even structural conflicts and transformations are (Schudson, 1978; Gans, 1979; Bagdikian, 1983;
imbued with meaning for participants on both Kellner, 1990). Todd Gitlin (1980) showed not
sides. only how media coverage of the New Left dis-
If cultural meanings channel political aspira- torted its means and ends in the eyes of outsiders,
tions and action, they are also the stuff of pol- but also how it transformed the movement’s
itics as a spectator sport. Given the complex- sense of its own identity. Fictional programming
ity of modern societies, most of us participate could also be deconstructed for its political (or
in politics indirectly through the media. Dra- apolitical) thrust (e.g., Gitlin, 1983; Jhally and
maturgical metaphors of politics become quite Lewis, 1992). Edward Said (1978) made a large
literal. One implication is that we need to dis- impact by decoding the cultural biases of the
tinguish the many audiences for any politi- West in dealing with the East, showing how the
cal choice or action, bringing rhetoric to the former made the latter appear mysterious, un-
fore (Nimmo and Combs, 1980; Jamison, 1988; changing, and inferior. Critics decried cultural
Popkin, 1991). Politicians carefully “manage imperialism, implying that the flow of mean-
their visibility” to achieve the desired impacts on ing was unidirectional from the center to the
audiences (Thompson, 1995). Robin Wagner- periphery (Hamelink, 1983; Schiller, 1992).
Pacifici (1986), for instance, successfully ana- This hegemonic view of the media began
lyzed the Red Brigades’ 1978 kidnaping of Aldo to give way to a more complex picture in the
Moro (Italy’s prime minister) as a social drama. late 1980s. Under the influence of reader re-
For several decades Murray Edelman has sponse research in literature, sociologists began
shown how politics and policies are aimed at to discover the varied interpretations viewers
more than one audience at the same time. Ap- made of the programs they watched (Ang, 1985;
parently drawing on “mass society” models, he Liebes and Katz, 1990) and citizens’ ability to
distinguished material and symbolic effects of mix their own common-sense understandings
policies, with “organized” interests having suf- with media information (Gamson, 1992). By
ficient power to grab the “real,” namely, ma- the 1990s, viewers were no longer the pas-
terial, effects. Although Edelman insisted that sive recipients portrayed by critical theory, but
elites do not simply use symbols instrumentally agents actively interpreting the world, using me-
as a smokescreen – the opiate of the masses – dia such as television for a variety of purposes
he did describe symbolic processes pejoratively (Tomlinson, 1991; Lembo, 2000). No one can
(1964:40) as “the only means by which groups be left in the status of pure victim: not even
not in a position to analyze a complex system Islamic women (Saliba et al., 2002; Beaulieu
rationally may adjust themselves to it, through and Roberts, 2002). A vast literature on the
stereotypization, oversimplification, and reas- political meanings and impacts of other media
surance.” He later expanded the residual con- and arts has followed a similar trajectory toward
trast between rationality and symbolism into a the recognition of audience agency. (On simi-
tougher critique (drawing on French postmod- lar trends in anthropology, see Miller [1995] and
ernism) of political language (1977) and images Baumann [1996]; in history, Geyer and Bright
(1988) for the ways in which they hide power in [1995].) Postcolonial discourse gives a voice to
modern societies. When attention is thus refo- those once framed as others and then as victims
cused on elites rather than on “masses,” the crit- (Bhabha, 1994).
ical kernel of the earlier theories – formulated Political sociology, alas, has had too little con-
as a critique of complacent pluralism – becomes nection to these closely related fields, in which
clear. culture and power have been central.
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inside the state impact on political sociology has been limited

by the backward way the state has been used,
The state remains the central focus of politi- primarily to criticize images of firms as au-
cal sociology, and here cultural approaches have tonomous rational actors. The thorough and
made the least progress. The biased vision of defining intervention of states in markets has
the 1950s, in which extrainstitutional action was been one of the approach’s core ideas (Dobbin,
based on ideology and emotion while bureau- 1994; Fligstein, 2001), but the emphasis has
crats were driven by interest and instrumental- been on the state’s effect on corporate policies
ism, seems to persist. Whether tinged with ad- rather than on state policies themselves. A small
miration or indignation, analyses of state actors current, however, emphasizes normative models
tend to examine their practical, strategic choices of how states should be organized (e.g., demo-
and policies as though they were transparently cratically, with certain kinds of departments and
rational. Admitting that they too operate within agencies), and the worldwide spread of a sin-
culture and emotion, however, would hardly gle model of the national state (McNeely, 1995;
render them irrational – just human. Meyer et al., 1997; Meyer, 1999).
Scholars have found it easier to examine the As part of their broader program to show that
cultural dimensions of past states than contem- organizational development and change are not
porary ones, and especially practices of state for- driven by efficiency, Meyer and Rowan (1977)
mation. Thus Philip Gorski (1993, 2003) ana- argued that organizations devote considerable
lyzed the “disciplinary revolution,” propelled by resources to following prevailing conceptions
ascetic Protestantism, which helped create mod- about how organizations should function, in
ern state bureaucracies. Eiko Ikegami (1995) de- other words increasing their legitimacy more
scribed a parallel process in Japan, the “taming than their efficiency. Strategic efficacy is not
of the samurai” as part of modern state build- the same as technical efficiency. In some ways,
ing. The works on nationalism and disciplinary the new institutionalists have substituted cog-
power cited above also address state formation nitive components for the norms of structural
in the early modern period (and Steinmetz’s functionalism as the glue that binds organiza-
State/Culture, a central collection addressing the tions and systems of organizations. At any rate,
cultural dimensions of the state, has as its content there is a large opening for cultural analysis of
and subtitle, “State-Formation after the Cultural organizations, including state agencies. Fligstein
Turn,” as though there were no culture in nor- and Mara-Drita (1996), for example, showed
mally functioning states). how political elites strategically frame arguments
State culture has also been probed from the to legitimate their policies to one another.
perspective of those oppressed by it. Thus James Other scholars have looked inside the state
Scott, with a career devoted primarily to peas- from cultural perspectives. Most common have
ant resistance (1985, 1990), could write about been accounts of local organizational cultures.
what it is like to “see like a state” (1998). Like For instance, a fatalistic attitude toward accidents
large-scale capitalism, the modern state controls and pollution may arise among those who pro-
territory and people by reducing them to sim- cess nuclear materials and wastes daily (Loeb,
ple, homogenized categories and numbers capa- 1986; Zonabend, 1993). In many cases, orga-
ble of counting and manipulation. Scott decodes nizational cultures reflect the professional train-
the faith in progress and technology that peaked ing of those who dominate the organizations
in the twentieth century within subcultures of ( Jasper, 1990) – even when these conflict with
the state and the experts closely aligned with legal mandates (Bell, 1985). Yet the same pro-
them. fession may contain factions with contrasting as-
The “new institutionalism” in sociology em- sumptions about the world, reflecting in some
phasizes culture in explanations of organizations cases generational differences (Espeland, 1998).
and their decisions, including components of Unfortunately, many of these works present the
the state (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). But its cultural aspects of decision making as though
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132 James M. Jasper
they interfered with rationality, accepting an un- undeveloped themes

realistic notion of pristine rationality.
Culture becomes a clear explanatory variable Now that they have established that culture mat-
when different sets of meanings are compared ters, researchers seem likely to continue cur-
or traced across different institutional levels. For rent trends toward distinguishing and refining
example, I was able to trace different “policy its many effects. Identities, frames, narratives,
styles” – based largely but not entirely on profes- and so on operate differently. Once they are
sional training – across different organizations distinguished, we can begin to study the rela-
involved in nuclear policy making ( Jasper, tionships among them. In what rhetorical sit-
1990). Disagreements were especially strong uations are narratives most effective? When do
between engineers, who relied on develop- narratives help to construct identities? Do dif-
ing technologies and transforming the physi- ferent schemata give rise to different frames or
cal world as the solution, and economists, who identities? We still need to describe the iden-
preferred to let prices reconcile supply and de- tities, rhetorics, and so on at work in differ-
mand, aided by careful cost-benefit analyses. ent countries and groups, now that so much
Then, by comparing the organizational distri- work has been done defining these concepts
butions of these styles across countries, I could at an abstract level. We need to know more
explain policy outcomes. The same policy styles about the concrete meanings in use; we cur-
were found inside and outside the state, help- rently lack even basic typologies for many of
ing to explain why some preferences affected them.
policies more easily than others. What Haas Other aspects of culture and politics have
(1992) calls “epistemic communities” of simi- been ignored almost entirely.
larly trained professionals transcend the bound- Emotions, for example, permeate all social
aries of the state and of the nation. The borders life. Long-standing affects such as love and hate
of the state are porous, and cultural meanings (but also trust and respect) are both crucial
are one of the things that flow across them. means and fundamental ends of political life.
Finally, a growing body of research has exam- Other emotions, such as compassion or indigna-
ined the role of ideas in politics and policy mak- tion, are complex cultural constructs that guide
ing (reviewed in Campbell, 2002). All too much much political action. Moods such as depres-
of this literature compares the impacts of ideas sion, hope, or cynicism affect people’s ability and
and interests, as though the two were compet- willingness to participate in politics. Although
ing and mutually exclusive – a starting point en- some emotions seem hardwired into us, espe-
couraged by the boldest rational choice formu- cially reflex emotions like anger and surprise
lations ( Jacobsen, 1995; McDonough, 1997). (Griffiths, 1997), most are eminently cultural
Some research on ideas often pushes into more creations. Political psychologists have examined
implicit forms of meaning (such as worldviews: the effects of emotions on political perceptions
Dobbin, 1994); looks at experts and others who and voting (Ottati and Wyer, 1993), and students
attempt to “own” social problems and poli- of social movements have rediscovered the emo-
cies (Gusfield, 1981); and examines the social tional dimensions of protest (Goodwin et al.,
networks through which the ideas flow (Keck 2001; Aminzade and McAdam, 2001). Other-
and Sikkink, 1997). Discussion of ideas rather wise, even the most culturally oriented analysts
than less explicit meanings still tends to con- of politics have ignored emotions – even though
cede considerable rationality to state officials, in many cases it may be the associated emotions
however. that give recognized causal mechanisms their
Despite this start, the emotions, cognitions, real explanatory thrust ( Jasper, 1998). It is obvi-
and moral principles and intuitions of elected ous that emotional workmanship goes into the
officials and bureaucrats cry out for closer in- construction of someone as a victim, for ex-
vestigation. ample, but less so how much emotional work
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must go into constructing someone as rational ciologists have looked for “structures.” Leaders
(Whittier, 2001). were a staple of research in the 1950s, aimed
Character. Victims are one example of the at explaining demagogues’ ability to manipulate
character types we commonly construct in po- mass followers – a topic that at least focused on
litical life; the other main ones are heroes and rhetorical dynamics (Burke, 1941). The func-
villains. Heroes and villains are both powerful, tions of coordinating a team or agency are to-
victims weak. Heroes and victims share moral day collapsed into organizational research. Yet
righteousness, something villains notably lack. the emotional identifications, rhetorical fram-
Through cartoons, jokes, and direct description, ings, and other persuasive powers of leaders re-
political parties, nations, and other players try main a rich and understudied topic. Cognitive
to portray themselves as heroes or victims, their and emotional issues of leader succession, for
opponents as villains. The subject of the epide- instance, are crucial for formal organizations,
ictic tradition in rhetoric, this kind of praise and regimes, parties, revolutions, and protest groups
blame is a core political activity rarely studied by (Gouldner, 1954:70–101).
political sociologists. It is cognitive, moral, and Cognition. The cognitive revolution in psy-
emotional at the same time. chology has paralleled the cultural one in soci-
Biography. The self and individuals are an- ology, but there has been little cross-fertilization.
other topic inadequately studied – even by post- One has universalist pretensions whereas the
modernists who dismiss the idea as an illusion. other does not, but they cover similar topics like
There is little borrowing from the vibrant field memory, basic assumptions, decision making,
of political psychology or mainstream research and so on (Cerulo, 2002). A variety of psycholo-
on personality. We need to understand selves if gies may have something to contribute to politi-
we are to incorporate individuals into our ex- cal sociology. Even psychoanalysis, once popular
planations. Ironically, the more “macro” one’s but now in disfavor, can still tell us something
research, the more difference an idiosyncratic about unconscious motivations, hidden mean-
individual can make – as historians and readings, and personality types ( Jasper, 2004). If in-
ers of biographies understand. Political sociolo- dividual leaders occasionally play pivotal roles in
gists are less likely today to try to explain “the politics, then psychobiographies should have a
state” than they are to explain specific outcomes larger part in our explanations.
such as Swedish trade policies in the 1960s, Zeitgeist. Analyzed by Mannheim (1952/
and as soon as we are on concrete historical 1928) but forgotten in recent years, every mi-
terrain, key figures loom large in any expla- crogeneration comes of age in a slightly different
nation. A dictator’s decision to fight or flee a cultural mood, retains different memories. The
mob, a prime minister’s passion for nuclear en- “structures of feeling” in a society (Williams,
ergy or ecology, a protest leader’s commitment 1977) shift rapidly, reframing conflicts and how
to nonviolence: All these have significant ef- they are experienced, even shifting the identities
fects, reduced to noise in more structural models of the players involved. Senses of momentum,
(for critique: Jasper, 1990, 1997). Individuals are for instance, shift quickly but influence goals
also widespread symbols (Fine, 2001). Through and strategies. Each year’s recruits to parties and
the intersection of culture and psychology, we movements differ somewhat from other years’
should be able to deal with them more effec- (Whittier, 1995).
tively. Many of these issues have been covered Strategy. Strategic action is a topic that has
under the rubric of leadership, a matter central received both too much and too little attention.
to Weber but so contrary to current trends that Just as rational choice theorists have managed
it lacks a chapter in this handbook. to define rationality in their own narrow way,
Leadership. The subject of leadership has inso the subset of them called game theorists
creasingly been left to students of strategy (e.g., have staked a claim to strategic thinking that
Allison and Zelikow, 1999), while political so- has scared away other social scientists. Diverse
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134 James M. Jasper
institutional and cultural contexts disappear in are connected, namely culture (Skocpol, 1979;
the sparse elegance of game theory. Strategic Block, 1977; Evans et al., 1985). Political soci-
choice depends heavily on personality traits, ology has still not entirely recovered from this
know-how, routines, emotions – and a whole one-sided paradigm. But as we have seen, the
range of cultural meanings of every sort. Again, most “structural” institutional settings are per-
the structural bias of the 1980s has prevented meated by cultural meanings, which account for
political sociologists from recognizing strategy much of their causal impact.
when they encounter it. They are likely to In addition, many of the criticisms and gaps
overestimate the constraints and underestimate in rational choice theory can be addressed by
the choice involved in any given outcome. A supplementing it with culture (Ferejohn, 1991;
strategic approach might be the key to inte- cf. Adams, 1999). These include the origins of
grating culture and structure, order and agency preferences, still often treated as exogenous to
(McAdam et al., 2001; Fligstein, 2001; Jasper, rational choice models. Culture may also help
in press, b). us grapple with noncomparable preferences, es-
Agency. Agency is a concept whose popular- pecially what Taylor (1989) calls moral “hyper-
ity has risen in recent decades alongside that of goods” that people are reluctant to give up at
culture, and the two ideas are often linked. Be- any cost. A number of the decision-making bi-
ginning with Giddens (1979), however, agency ases described by cognitive psychologists and
is a term most often used by structurally oriented behavioral economists are the result of local cul-
researchers when they reach the limits of their tures as well as limitations of the human brain
models: a residual category for what is left over, (Kahneman et al., 1982; Thaler, 1992; Camerer,
dismissed as unexplainable. Attention to strat- 2003). More broadly still, when actors satisfice
egy and culture would, I think, help us give a rather than maximize, they must follow cultural
fuller account of agency. People make choices, traditions to tell them what satisfactory levels
face dilemmas with no right answers, interact are, and often bring in culturally determined
with each other in open-ended ways. In the reference groups in doing so. Culture is the
political realm, this is the source of most free- main context within which strategic decisions
dom, creativity, and contingency ( Jasper, 1997; are made ( Jasper, in press, b).
Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). A number of these paths would lead cultural
In addition to these underdeveloped areas, at- approaches out of their recurrent Romantic cel-
tention to culture could enrich other approaches ebration of particularism, especially by link-
and dimensions of political life. In recent years ing them to abiding strategic concerns. Some
scholars have come to appreciate the role of scholars have already criticized the emphasis on
social networks in mobilizing people and in- community and culture for undermining uni-
fluencing policy. Although there remains a fre- versal standards of justice and equality (Gitlin,
quent tendency to reify the network metaphor 1995; Barry, 2001), others – more dubiously –
in structuralist fashion, the impact of networks for abandoning materialism (Palmer, 1990).
is mainly that they allow information to flow, Habermas views humans as cultural creations
affective loyalties to evolve, and common un- yet still seeks universalist agreement through di-
derstandings to grow (Gould, 1995; Emirbayer alogue. In the study of politics it is hard to avoid
and Goodwin, 1994) . moral polemics, but cultural approaches have
Structural approaches more generally might given us a number of taut analytic tools for un-
benefit from attention to culture. In their con- derstanding the politics of social life regardless
cern to demonstrate the autonomy of state bu- of our own value judgments. Political sociology
reaucrats (in a polemic against earlier marxist will be a more interesting field as it continues
simplifications), structuralists overlooked one of to open up dialogues between culturalists and
the main ways that state and nonstate institutions others.
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chapter six
Feminist Theorizing and Feminisms in Political Sociology
Barbara Hobson
Feminist theorizing in the social sciences covers to feminist theorists in dialogue with main-
a vast territory. It emerged from feminist move- stream theorizing on citizenship. In gendering
ments and feminisms in politics, and though still the theoretical terrain of citizenship, feminists
in dialogue with them, feminist theory now has have challenged the lack of gender perspectives
its own track in the academy, in academic jour- in mainstream approaches as well as introduced
nals, graduate programs, and has its canon of new dimensions that have deepened and ex-
core feminist texts. Feminist theory has been panded existing theories, models, and typolo-
engaged in debates with mainstream theory, in- gies.
cluding critiques of theories, concepts, and epis- In calling this chapter feminist theorizing and
temologies as well as offered alternative explana- feminisms in political sociology, I underscore
tory theories of gender differences in power the plurality in theories and approaches. The
resulting from economic, political, and social plural form, feminisms, mirrors an important
structures and processes (Chaftez, 1997). It has shift in the theoretical terrain, from monolithic
a normative side developing models and for- conceptions of the state and patriarchy toward
mulating strategies to achieve gender equality more complex frameworks that consider pro-
and equity. However, as a result of postmod- cesses and social structures of states and state
ernism, in feminist theorizing there has been a institutions, and embedded notions of citizen-
strong critique of approaches that assume gen- ship and exclusion within specific histories and
dered coherent identities and interests. What has political contexts. Finally, feminisms signify the
remained constant in feminist theorizing is its multidimensionality in the category of gender
interdisciplinarity. In the course of this chapter, and how this insight informs the framing of
we will be traveling across disciplinary borders, gender across class, race/ethnicity, sexual pref-
featuring feminists speaking from traditions of erence, and disability in different political arenas
sociology, political science and political philos- (the local, national, and supranational).
ophy, history and law. My presentation of this The chapter is divided into four sections.
kaleidoscopic and fractured theoretical terrain is Part one considers the first phase of feminist
admittedly selective, based on my own render- theorizing of the state, which can be orga-
ing of the core research areas, the key actors, and nized into three categories: liberal, socialist, and
their exchanges. radical feminisms. The next section addresses
The chapter focuses on gender, state, and mechanisms of exclusion, including the femi-
citizenship using two lenses. The first concen- nist critique of classical theories of citizenship
trates on debates among feminist theorists and that bifurcated public and private spheres. Part
citizenship around public and private spheres, three considers the postmodern turn and its im-
difference, and universalism; the second turns pact on theorizing inclusion and exclusion. This
135
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136 Barbara Hobson
includes both the postmodernist and poststruc- wage. Mary McIntosh (1978), in “The State
turalist critique and the challenges made by black and the Oppression of Women,” linked the la-
feminism, Third World feminism, and feminist bor process to the institution of the family. The
scholars from former Soviet regime countries. I state’s support for the male breadwinner repro-
also concentrate on the feminist dialogue with duced the division of labor in the household and
two citizenship theoretical traditions, social cit- women’s dependency, which also made them
izenship and civic republicanism. Here I seek to a source of cheap labor or a latent army of
highlight the ways in which gendering of citi- reserve labor (McIntosh, 1978:264). McIntosh
zenship reaches the heart of debates on inclusion emphasized the contradictions in these state in-
and exclusion around rights and needs, individ- terventions in sustaining these relationships. By
ual and group rights, and multiculturalism. The making women dependent on men’s wages, they
concluding section considers current challenges kept women in a semiproletarianized state – eas-
for feminist theorizing and political sociology. ily exploited.
Another response to the domestic labor de-
bate was the assertion that there was a paral-
the state, power, and agency lel system of exploitation, patriarchy (gender
could not be fit into a Marxist frame), because
Until the early 1980s, feminist theoretical posi- women’s unpaid domestic work not only served
tions on the state fell into three broad categories: the interests of the capitalist economy but also
socialist/Marxist, liberal, and radical. Each of- the interests of individual men, as expressed in
fered a different account of the state reproducing Heidi Hartmann’s classic article, “The Unhappy
and perpetuating gender inequalities. Marriage of Capitalism and Patriarchy” (Hart-
mann, 1986). Joan Acker (1988) has provided
the most theoretically promising reconciliation
Neo-Marxist and Feminist Dialogues of this unhappy marriage of class and gender
through her introduction of the concept of dis-
The state entered feminist theory through so- tribution, which addresses the role of the state
cialist feminism and neo-Marxist debates on in mediating these relationships. Not two sys-
production and reproduction (Haney, 1996). tems but one structure operates, according to
Within Marxian theory, the state is an agent Acker. Gender is implicated in the organization
of elite capitalist power; gender exploitation is of the labor process (deskilling and technology,
viewed as a subset of class exploitation reproduc- and the wage structure relation) as well as present
ing class relations. Feminist theories sought to in the evolution of the family wage constructed
modify and extend Marxist theories of produc- around gender difference. State policies bolster
tion and reproduction (Eisenstein, 1979; Sacks, the family wage and women’s economic depen-
1974) to go beyond the analysis of women’s un- dency as well as seek to ameliorate the condi-
waged labor in the household as reproducing tions it helped to create (Acker, 1988; Walby,
and maintaining an exploited labor force (Sec- 1990).
combe, 1974; Zaretsky, 1976). Socialist femi- Liberal feminist theory views the state as a
nists argued in what has been referred to as the potentially neutral arbiter lacking any ideology
domestic labor debate that one had to focus of its own. Recognizing that men dominate
on the underlying social conditions that shaped the state, liberal feminism maintains that the
women’s unpaid labor, that gender inequalities state and its institutions exist apart from men’s
in the family were ideologically and practically domination. Men, like women, are an interest
linked to their responsibility for unwaged work or pressure group. The state is a site in which
in the family (Barrett, 1980; Hartsock, 1985; groups contest and compete with one another,
Molyneaux, 1979; Vogel, 1983). The state be- hence a neutral arbiter between them. State pro-
came a focal point in these feminist dialogues cesses are legitimate, but men have captured
through its support of the male breadwinner them (Connell, 1987). Given this perspective,
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Feminist Theorizing and Feminisms in Political Sociology 137
liberal feminist approaches embrace strategies “power over” ignore the sites of resistance and
for more access and influence (Gelb, 1989; strategies to overcome domination (empower-
Klein, 1987; Sawer, 1993). Women’s agency is ment) (Brush, 2003; Heckman, 1996). Foucault
a crucial dimension in liberal feminist theoriz- does not address the gendered dimensions of
ing on the state and is an explanatory variable power as knowledge – that the power to know is
for variations across states in terms of women’s gendered. Moreover, in Foucault’s analysis, the
voice/representation and their influence over regulation of sexuality is gender-neutral, ignor-
gender inequalities. ing the much greater control of women’s bodies
(Hartsock, 1985). Still, Foucault reverberates in
much of radical feminists’ theorizing both be-
The Patriarchal State cause of his emphasis on bodies as sites of power
and because of his view of power as permeat-
Radical feminist theory takes as its starting point ing everyday life relationships of people, both
that the state is a system of structures and insti- individually and in institutions.
tutions created by men in order to sustain and Radical feminist theorizing assumes the state
recreate male power and female subordination. is a purposive actor reproducing patriarchy, that
Departing from economic analysis of women’s states are masculinist, designed by men to serve
exploitation, radical feminist theorist Cather- their interest. Although the framework of gov-
ine MacKinnon (1983), in her agenda-setting ernance seeks to broaden the analysis to include
article, “Feminism, Marxism Method and the structures of power, a suspicion and pessimism
State,” sought to carve a feminist theory of the remain about the potential of state institutions
state in opposition to Marxist theory. She ex- to address feminist politics. There is also skep-
pressed this in her now classic analogy: Sexual- ticism about the usefulness of institutional state
ity is to feminism what work is to Marxism. theories to accommodate issues of sexual sub-
Although both Marxism and feminism were ordination and violence.
concerned with analyzing power, MacKinnon In his examination of feminist research on the
asserted that they were incompatible. Her the- patriarchal state, Robert Connell (1990), the au-
orizing on the state revolves around the sex- thor of Gender and Power, highlighted two im-
ual subordination of women and how this sub- portant theoretical weaknesses. The state is not
ordination is embedded in the state apparatus, monolithic but consists of complex structures
procedures, and structures (MacKinnon, 1989). and actors, with sites for resistance. In short,
Radical feminist theorizing has rejected the es- the state is not a thing but a process. Connell
sentialism implicit in MacKinnon’s stance in in his appraisal of feminist theorizing on the
which men and women appear as fixed cate- patriarchal state argues for more complexity as
gories of dominant and subordinate. However, well as a process-oriented view of the state. The
her emphasis on sexuality as the core of state state is constituted within gender relations as the
patriarchy continues to influence radical femi- central institutionalization of gendered power.
nists’ analyses of the state and the governance Conversely, gender dynamics are a major force
of gender (Brush, 2003; Elman, 1996). Gov- constructing the state, both in the historical cre-
ernance, a central concept in radical feminist ation of state structures and in contemporary
framework, derives its inspiration from Foucault politics” (1990:519).
and the regulatory function of the state. What Anna Yeatman (1997) begins from this posi-
they take from Foucault is his formulation of the tion – that feminism has been a force in the de-
diffusion of power, that power is fluid, relational, velopment of more democratic social relations
existing in institutions that reflect the gendered in public and private domains. She distinguishes
power structure. As Lisa Brush (2003) argues state-centric “power over women,” or domina-
in her study of Gender and Governance, how- tion – which often includes state interventions
ever, both Foucault’s and Weber’s definitions of to protect women from abusive men, a form of
power are gender-blind. Weberian notions of liberal paternalism – from power as capacity. The
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138 Barbara Hobson
latter assumes “democratic deployment of legit- Mechanisms of Exclusion:

imate state domination,” obtained through fem- Public/Private Divide
inist demands for a politics of women as rights-
bearing subjects and agents (Yeatman, 1997). The initial dialogues in feminist theorizing and
Over the past decade, a rich literature on the state debated whether the state was positive
gender and welfare state formation has devel- or negative for women. They asked whether
oped, underscoring the importance of women’s private patriarchy was being replaced by pub-
agency that implicitly challenges the monolithic lic patriarchy, whether women’s dependency
view of the patriarchal state (Koven and Michel, on husbands was being shifted to dependency
1993; Misra and Atkins, 1998). Skocpol’s (1992) on welfare state bureaucracies (Pascall, 1986;
distinction between paternalist and maternal- Hernes, 1987). But another strand of feminist
ist welfare states highlights the importance of theorizing emerged in the late 1980s, which
women’s agency in the development of Ameri- turned the focus toward analyzing the mech-
can welfare states compared to European pater- anisms of exclusion, particularly the gendered
nalist ones. Hobson and Lindholm (1997) an- construction of public and private spheres of life.
alyze the power resources of feminist actors in Rather than presenting a feminist theory of
the first years of Swedish social democracy, sug- the state, Carole Pateman analyzed the exclu-
gesting a need to pay attention to variations in sionary mechanism in citizenship theory: the
European welfare state formation. relegation of women’s activity to the private
Feminist actors have been important agents sphere. In what has become a classic feminist
in the making of welfare states and in shap- text, The Sexual Contract (1988), she revisited the
ing the different gender logics around paid and triad of classical social theorists on citizenship,
unpaid work (Skocpol, 1992; Lewis, 1992b, the state, and the social contract: Rousseau,
1994; Hobson and Lindholm, 1997; O’Connor Hobbes, and Locke. Pateman referred to the so-
et al., 1999). Making the argument that po- cial contract as a fiction, a narrative that has pro-
litical institutions and politics make a differ- vided the theoretical underpinnings for the ex-
ence, feminist research on the Nordic countries clusion of women from an active participation in
has underscored the importance of the govern- the polity. Underlying the social contract were
ment as an actor promoting women’s interests constructions of sexual difference. For exam-
(Selle and Karovonen, 1995). In her overview of ple, Rousseau conceptualized civic republican-
feminist debates, Bryson (1992) made a similar ism and political life as male domain; the public
point about the “women friendly” Scandinavian sphere of rights of protections did not apply to
states: “‘the vicious circle’ of women’s political women, whom he believed lacked the faculties
economic and social disadvantage is being re- of reason and were unable control their passions,
placed by a ‘virtuous circle’ through which gains two prerequisites for civic republicanism (Pate-
in one area interact with gains in another, to pro- man, 1988; Phillips, 1991). The relegation of
duce a general picture of cumulative progress” women to the family, a sphere lacking in rights,
(Bryson, 1992:110). Women have been key ac- meant that women were civilly dead. In the pri-
tors in promoting women’s greater participation vate sphere there was an implicit sexual contract,
in political and economic spheres. Although one one in which men had access to women’s bodies
may disagree with the optimistic prognosis of in marriage through law and women’s economic
this assessment, one cannot ignore the variation dependency. Hence women were more a kin to
in women’s economic, political, and social posi- slaves than to exploited workers.
tion that has been revealed in empirical research
on gender and the welfare state.1
Wollestenscraft’s Dilemma
1
The ambitious RINGS project on state feminism
and movements has sought to demonstrate this: see In her analysis of “The Patriarchal Wel-
Mazur (2001); Stetson (2001); and Outsthorn, (2004). fare State,” Pateman (1989) reformulated the
P1: NFT
classical dilemma in citizenship theory and are hinged – debates around the private/public
practice for women, which she called Wolles- divide, needs and rights, and an ethic of care
tencraft’s dilemma. Referring back to that versus an ethic of justice.
eighteenth-century feminist philosopher who At the extreme end of the equality/difference
first recognized the dilemma of difference, Pate- debates are theories rooted in essentialist iden-
man applied it as a theory of modern citizenship: tities that assume an epistemological position
In a patriarchal understanding of citizenship, in that women speak in a different voice (Gilligan,
which the ideal of citizenship is based on a uni- 1982; Offen, 1988). Taking a perspective of dif-
versalistic gender-neutral social world – in our ferentiated citizenship, maternalist feminists cel-
century connected to paid work – women are ebrate the private sphere as the realm of women’s
lesser men, as norms are built on a male model. influence. Rather than seeing women’s encap-
In a framework in which women’s special tal- sulation in the private sphere as the means by
ents, needs, and capacities are acknowledged as which they were excluded from the polity and
different from men, whose citizenship is based from participatory citizenship (Pateman, 1989;
on rights and duties attached to paid work, then Vogel, 1994; Philips, 1992), maternalist femi-
women are lesser citizens as there is an inherent nists (or social feminists as they are sometimes
lack of respect for their contribution as moth- called) view the private sphere as the uncor-
ers and caregivers. These two routes to citizen- rupted domain of women’s power and influence
ship lead to a dead-end for women (Pateman, (Elshstain, 1992). For Jean Bethke Elshtain, its
1989:196). What is obvious in this analysis is most uncompromising proponent, mothering
that the public/private split has played a dual and the sphere of the family are the high moral
role, both as an explanation of women’s subor- ground where human ties are the most impor-
dinate position and as an ideology constructing tant for articulating values, in contrast to the
that position (Davidoff, 1998). This dichotomy corrupt world of politics and self-interest. The
has had the effect of solidifying women’s differ- logic in maternalist thinking is that women’s ex-
ence and subordination. periences of care and motherhood will create
Wollenstencraft’s dilemma placed the equal- a “politics of compassion,” “an ethical policy,”
ity and difference debate at the center of the that will result in a more just and peaceful world
sphere of citizenship. One can trace this theo- (Elshtain, 1981: Ruddick, 1984).
retical divide back to cleavages in the first wave In proposing an ethic of care, Joan Tronto
of feminist politics, both the pre- and post- (1993) has sought to distinguish her position
suffrage movements. Various feminist actors from essentialist/maternalist theories of female
promoted competing agendas: whether strate- identity as well as avoid deepening the rift be-
gies for women’s emancipation should embrace tween public and private. She maintains that her
laws and policies to put women on the same conceptual ground in the ethic of care is gender-
footing as men or whether they should struggle neutral. Her purpose is to incorporate gender-
for special protections that recognized women’s sensitive dimensions that stand in opposition to
maternal responsibilities (Koven and Michel, the ethic of justice rooted in Kantian universal-
1993; Harrison, 1988). The debates resurfaced istic formulas. Arguing that hers is a “contex-
in the second-wave feminism of the 1970s, but tual moral position,” she is asking us to view
the real playing field of the equality/difference care as public concern and consider what so-
divide has been in academia. It covers many cial and political institutions should support an
different theoretical fields including epistemol- ethic of care. Along the same lines as Tronto,
ogy, psychology, moral philosophy, and, most Diemut Bubeck (1995) makes the case for care
relevant to this discussion, citizenship (Bock as a resource for political citizenship. She main-
and James, 1992; Lister, 1998; Phillips, 1992). tains that “private” concerns, values, skills, and
Within the domain of citizenship and political understandings can enhance the public practices
theory, the equality/difference debate is a ful- of citizenship. Nevertheless, although it seeks
crum on which other feminist theoretical issues to go beyond maternalist feminism, the ethic
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140 Barbara Hobson
of care tends to fall into similar rhetoric, of structuralism and the recognition of differences
“essentialized carers,” if not mothers (Leira and among women and the diversities in feminisms.
Saraceno, 2002). Though rejecting the idea of Pateman’s two-horned dilemma has become
biologism in maternalist thinking and essential- many-sided when confronted with postmod-
ized identities, many feminist scholars never- ernist/poststructuralist theories. The postmod-
theless are arguing for an alternative vision of ern turn has imploded the equality and differ-
collective, interdependent citizens, in opposi- ence debate by destabilizing the very category of
tion to liberal democratic theory rooted in a woman and the political underpinnings of fem-
tradition of the independent rational individ- inism, which assumed gendered identities and
ual (Hochschild, 1995; Knijn and Kermer, 1997; interests based on shared experiences of sub-
Sevenhuisjen, 1998). ordination and exclusion. Postmodernists reject
Feminist scholars have offered different strate- not only the binary oppositions of man/woman,
gies to resolve Wollstencraft’s dilemma. One re- but also those of unity/diversity and univer-
sponse that seeks to go beyond equality and dif- sality/distinctiveness. The very idea of making
ference is contextuality: when does difference claims based on gendered identities (even those
make a difference. Carole Bacchi has elaborated that emerge from political struggles) is viewed
this position most fully in her book on Same as reifying individuals into abstract categories,
Difference (1990). In that study, she locates ex- ignoring their diversity and experience. The
amples of how feminists have employed differ- idea of gendered collective struggles for justice
ent strategies, emphasizing gender distinctive- is rejected on two fronts: the first as a denial
ness and gender neutrality at different moments of unified experience upon which women can
in time and across societies. The context thesis is frame claims for rights, and the second as a rejec-
also supported by a great deal of historical soci- tion of universalism as a legitimate base for such
ological work, which reveals the importance of claims. The former has been most problematic
institutional variations in shaping the universe of for feminist critics, who claim that it under-
political discourse and political choices (Hobson mines the potentialities for collective feminist
and Lindholm, 1997; Jenson, 1990; Koven and action. There is diversity in postmodernist and
Michel, 1993). poststructuralist theorizing. Indeed, some argue
Legal theorist Martha Minow (1990) has of- that rather than a theory or theories, postmod-
fered the most theoretically powerful analysis of ernism is more a body of thought bound by
the contextual argument. She claims that by em- conceptual ground in which concepts of lan-
phasizing difference, we highlight deviance or guage, power, identity, and resistance are central
stigma, but by ignoring it we leave in place all (Bryson, 1992:36). One can find many exam-
the problems that arise from a false neutrality. ples of poststructuralist analyses of discourses of
Instead of viewing the equality/difference di- power that view social practices as important in
vide as opposites, she suggests that we regard constructing gender identity. From this stand-
them as practices and sets of relations between point, they propose transformative politics (But-
people and institutions (Minow, 1990:90). ler, 1990; Fraser, 1997; Weedon, 1987, 1998).
To the extent that most feminist theory is cau-
tious about generalizing about all women on
the postmodern turn: gendered the basis of what middle class Western women
identities and feminisms experience – that the experience of gender
is context-bound: culturally, structurally, and
The contests over women’s inclusion as full cit- individually – one can say that a postmod-
izens based on their difference or equality have ernist/poststructuralist critique has transformed
been battles over the category of gender, sur- theorizing gender. Moreover, the postmodern
rounding collective identities and shared inter- emphasis on the importance of discourse and
ests. These struggles have intensified as a result the importance of language as a signifier of
of the interventions of postmodernism and post- power has been integrated into much of feminist
P1: NFT
theory: in terms of how political subjects are against the intrusion of the state and the policing
constituted and more generally of how discourse of unmarried mothers (Mink, 1994). Women
operates in different institutional fields in the scholars from the postsocialist transition coun-
construction of social meanings. The inclusion tries have raised many of the same points in their
of discourse as a dimension of power is visible challenges to Western feminist scholarship. This
in analyses of political opportunity and of the critique has been captured in a series of dia-
discursive resources of feminist actors (Adams logues on gender and citizenship (Gal and Klig-
and Padamasee, 2001; Hobson and Lindholm, man, 2000; Special Forum, “East meets West
1997; Hobson, 2003; Jenson, 1990). It has also and West meets East,” 1995). In the same vein as
been incorporated in social movement theory black feminists, scholars from the former Soviet
and recognition politics, of which gender is one Regime countries argue that for women under
key dimension (Gal, 2003; Gamson and Ferree, socialism, the private sphere was not viewed as a
2003; Gamson, 1995; Hobson, 2003). location of oppression (Szalai, 1991; Havelklova,
Whereas the critique of gender as an analyti- 2000; Maleck-Lewy, 1995). Rather, it embod-
cal category in postmodernism for the most part ied a sphere of protection and refuge against the
has been a deconstructivist enterprise, critical control of totalitarian regimes – a place to re-
race and gender theory has been a reconstruc- treat from the surveillance of the state where one
tivist endeavor from which to develop analytical could count on the loyalty of family members.
frameworks that take into account the multi- It was a place for bartering goods and services, a
dimensionality of gender and feminisms. Black place to strike out on one’s own in the unofficial
feminist scholarship has had a profound impact economy (Gal and Kligman, 2001; Szalai, 1991).
on feminist theorizing (Crenshaw, 1995). This The clash between feminisms is highlighted
scholarship has challenged empirically and the- in Myra Marx Ferree’s (2000) analysis of two
oretically feminist analyses of the sources of op- distinct feminisms in East and West Germany.
pression, the notion of a gendered collectivity She has used the terms “private patriarchy”
formed around common identities and interests. and “public patriarchy” to represent different
Speaking from different experiences, histories, discourses, identities, and structures of experi-
and political and economic positions, black fem- ences of the East and West German women’s
inist scholars not only highlighted the exploita- movements. Analyzing the sources of oppres-
tion of black and Third World women by white sion from different lenses, East German fem-
middle class women, but also challenged the ba- inists addressed the structural features of state
sic frameworks of feminist theorizing (Collins, power (public patriarchy); while Western fem-
1991; hooks, 1995). inists viewed women’s exploitation in terms
How gender was incorporated into welfare of the power of individual men over women
state formation and citizenship, in addition, has in families and their acts of violence toward
been bound up with constructions of race and women (private patriarchy). West German fem-
ethnicity in different societal contexts. In their inists characterized their Eastern counterparts as
genealogy of dependency, Fraser and Gordon naı̈ve and backward because of their failure to
(1994) have traced different registers (gender, address private patriarchy – women’s exploita-
class, and race) in U.S. history. They reveal the tion in the family. East German feminists in
ways in which the construction of welfare be- turn charged their West German counterparts
came associated with the black single mother, with arrogance (Ferree, 2000:165). Paralleling
dependent on the state, lacking a male bread- the East–West critique, Third World feminist
winner, and whose mothering was deemed less scholars have also questioned the validity of
worthy than white motherhood. middle class American and European feminists
Moreover, for black feminists, the family, who have constructed them as powerless victims
rather than a site of oppression – a central ar- of patriarchy (Mohanty, 1991) – a South–North
gument in feminist theories of women’s sub- critique. Nor do Third World women iden-
ordination – is viewed as a site of resistance tify with the public/private dichotomy, claiming
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142 Barbara Hobson
that Western feminists’ emphasis on the gender from advanced capitalist societies. Postcolonial
division of labor does not resonate in their per- feminist analyses have succeeded in revealing
ception of a struggle for economic survival – a the ways in which feminists have been complict
struggle that does not pit men against women in colonialist and racist policies (Lake, 2000;
(Gordon, 1996). Mohanty, 1991, 2003). Research on gender and
Critical race and gender theories seek syn- global restructuring has underscored the ex-
thetic analyses across race, class, and gender. ploitation between women, making visible the
Evolving from the wellspring of research on class/gender positionings across regions (Marc-
gender and the welfare states, Fiona Williams hand and Runyan, 2000). Referring to the
(1995) posits a model of welfare states that global care chain, feminist research (Hochschild,
views structured social relations across race, class, 2000; Anderson, 2000; Gavanas and Williams,
and gender, all of which are mutually consti- in 2004) traces the migration of women from
tutive and shape women’s claims for inclusion. the South who travel across continents to do
Elaborating on Castell and Miller’s concept of the “dirty work,” of middle class white women
migration regimes, she extends the theoretical in the North, leaving behind their own chil-
boundaries of citizenship to embrace the inter- dren to be cared for by others. Nevertheless,
sectionality of race and gender in the processes global restructuring has created a theoretical
of nation building, the legacies of racism, and bridge across North and South, revealing sim-
the construction of family and motherhood in ilar processes in the feminization of casualized
welfare states (Williams, 1995:149). Eileen Boris and irregular labor, that women are employed in
(1994) has coined the terms “racialized gen- temporary irregular employment. The effects of
der” and “gendered race” to capture the ways global restructuring are mirrored in the retreat
in which gender and race/ethnicity have been of the state and the effects on the care deficit
interconnected in the constructions of citizen- and the loss of social infrastructure in societies
ship, policy-making structures, and economic in the North and South (Pearson, 2000; Marc-
structures. These relationships are also expressed hand and Runyan, 2000; Moghadam, 2003).
in movements and countermovements around The North–South dialogue in feminist theo-
gender and race. She applies these insights to the rizing can be seen in the diverse literature on
U.S. case, the paradigm of the gender/racialized women and development enriched by transna-
state. In Unequal Freedom, Evelyn Nakano Glenn tional networks such as DAWN (Development
(2002) confronts race and gender theory with Alternatives of Women for a New Era) and UN
three case studies: blacks and whites in the forums in Nairobi, Copenhagen, and Beijing
Southern United States; Mexicans and Anglos (Stienstra, 1994).
in the Southwest, and Japanese and Haoles in Destabilizing gender as a category of anal-
Hawaii. Race and gender are fluid categories in ysis has led to a multidimensional awareness
Unequal Freedom shaped by one another in lo- of gender. But it has also produced theoret-
cales, constructed by dominant “whites” (which ical dissonance in the response to the chal-
includes whites in the South and Haoles in lenge of how to develop theories that recog-
Hawaii), and contested by subordinate groups. nize that people are more than just the sum of
For Glenn, employing Dorothy Smith’s notion their race, class, and gender, but that neverthe-
of the everyday as problematic to the compara- less do not surrender to relativism or disregard
tive analysis of citizenship, race and gender hi- the patterns of power and inequality. For many
erarchies are experienced in the micropolitics feminist scholars, the frame of citizenship has
of everyday life. Her analysis reflects the focus opened up conceptual space for developing the-
of feminist theorizing on citizenship as practice ories of women’s agency, a theoretical perspec-
rather than status. tive that has been confounded by the postmod-
There is also a flowering of research seek- ernist challenge to the existence of women as
ing to theorize citizenship across gender, race, collective. The framework of citizenship also has
and class divisions within the context of nation enabled feminist scholars to confront histories of
building and colonialism, shifting the focus away discrimination and exclusion through the lens of
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social citizenship, which has enhanced the anal- theories of agency because it valorizes citizen-
ysis of the role of institutions and welfare state ship from below, that is, politics with a small “p.”
structures in reproducing gender inequalities. Because there are no women’s political parties
and women lack a critical mass of representatives
in governments in most countries, citizenship
feminist dialogue across as practice opens up a theoretical framework for
citizenship theories the incorporation of women’s politics.
Citizenship as practice has engaged feminist
Citizenship became a keyword in feminist the- scholars ( Jones, 1990; Lister, 1997), particularly
orizing on the state and social politics, part of those who have broken with liberal conceptu-
a much broader development in late-twentieth- alizations of citizenship that revolve around the
century citizenship scholarship, though much of individual’s civil and political rights. This ap-
that scholarship continues to be gender-blind. In proach promotes a more civic-minded service
trying to develop a full vision for gendered cit- to a community ( Jones, 1994:267). Jones de-
izenship, feminist theorizing has drawn on two fines this dimension of citizenship “as an ac-
traditions: (1) civic republicanism and participation practiced by a people of certain identity
tory citizenship, reflected in a range of theories, in a specifiable locale” (1994:261). Citizenship
most recently communitarianism; and (2) citi- as practice draws on Brian Turner’s theory of
zenship, inclusion, and membership embodied active citizenship.2 Concentrating on the moral
in Marshall’s theories of social citizenship. active subject, Turner (1993) uses the French
case as an example of active citizenship, and the
challenges from below to the spheres of family,
Civic Republicanism: Participation, and religion. Although he seeks to overcome the
Rights, and Obligations public/private split, Turner does not address at
all the gender implications of his analysis (Lister,
Civic republicanism dates back to ancient 1997:125).
Greece and the ideal of civic duty and the po- Civic republicanism and the notion of citi-
litical obligations in the polity. As discussed pre- zenship from below has led feminist theorists
viously, the Enlightenment republican writers to revisit Hanna Arendt’s theory of participa-
such as Rousseau bestowed both the virtues tory democracy. For many second-wave femi-
and duties of participatory citizenship to male nists, Arendt appeared as masculinist and at odds
citizens. However, eighteenth-century feminists with basic principles of feminism, captured in
used the discourse of civic republicanism to ar- the idiom of the personal is the political. Not
gue for women’s inclusion into the ranks of citi- only Arendt’s strict demarcation of public space
zens (Bussemaker and Voet, 1998), and the ideals as the world of politics, but also her hostility to
of liberalism to press for equal citizenship with feminism and unwillingness to recognize par-
men (Olympe De Gouges Declaration for the ticularized identities, such as gender, as a base
Rights of Women, Déclaration des Droits de for politicization, make her an unlikely bedfel-
la Femme et de la Citoyenne, 1791, 1986, is a low for feminist theorists (Honig, 1995). But
classic example). feminist theorizing in the 1990s has prompted
One reason for the renewed interest in civic a reconsideration of her work (Honig, 19953 ;
republicanism in our own day can be traced Landes, 1998a) through the lens of participatory
to the structural reorganizations of global capi- citizenship and civic republicanism. Her work
tal, the retrenchment of welfare societies, and speaks to feminist theorists who are embracing
what Turner calls the breakup of a reformist
2
consensus (Turner, 1993:33). Hence we have a Turner (1990) viewed his concept of active citizen-
need for a more active mobilized citizenry. Civic ship in relation to Marshall’s evolutionary theory of cit-
izenship (see discussion below).
republicanism also offered a theoretical frame- 3
See the collection of essays published by Bonnie
work for building women’s agency into theo- Honig (1995), which seeks to politicize and historicize
ries of citizenship. It has appealed to feminist Arendt’s work.
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144 Barbara Hobson
active democratic citizenship that acknowledges munitarianism (Phillips, 1991; Bussemaker and
pluralism (Mouffe, 1992a). Voet, 1998), which shares with civic republi-
In contrast to Arendt’s strict demarcation of canism a belief that individual needs should be
public space as the world of politics, Habermas balanced against the common good. A paral-
in his generalized notion of the public sphere lel critique can be made against Arendt’s con-
(1990) constructs a framework for participatory cept of public space and Habermas’s framework
democracy, which is an intermediary space be- of deliberative democracy in which members
tween the political system and private sectors of civil society act collectively to democrati-
of lifeworld. According to Nancy Fraser (1989), cally resolve the issues that concern them as
what is missing in Habermas’s analysis is a gen- a political community. Once again, the dom-
dered subtext on the public and private – that inant voices and politically advantaged groups
there is no meaningful way to reveal the insti- will be the fittest in this competitive set-
tutional links between the spheres of paid and ting.
unpaid work and family and official economy Finally, feminist scholars also have been wary
in his distinction of system and lifeworld. But of civic republicanism and communitarian-
others view his later works (1990, 1998) on the ism because of its emphasis on obligations over
public sphere and his theory of discourse ethics rights (Sevenhuijsen, 1998). Communitarianism,
as a corrective to his earlier gender blindness. which has been championed by left and right
They note that his theory has much to offer fem- political spokespersons, has laid the basis for
inist analysis of feminist politics (Cohen, 1995; a reestablishment of responsibilities of citizens
Benhabib, 1998). Still, feminist theorists query (Etzioni, 1993). This has opened the gates for
whether his concept of deliberative democracy attacks on welfare mothers as passive dependent
can truly feminize and democratize the public citizens, which reflects a failure to understand
sphere (Landes, 1998b), in light of his rigid dis- their caring work is work (Levitas, 1998; Mink,
tinctions between needs and interests, and val- 1999). Within the broader contexts of participa-
ues and norms. To do so would entail a radical tory citizenship, the duty to participate embod-
restructuring of discursively organized public ied in civicness should be understood in terms
space to include all social norms, including fam- of women’s lack of resources, including time,
ily norms and the gendered division of labor money, and social networks (Lister, 1997; Stolle
(Benhabib, 1992). and Lewis, 2002).
From another perspective, feminists have The dialogue between feminists and partic-
challenged Habermas’s notion of deliberative ipatory democratic theory has been essentially
democracy in the context of social and eco- a feminist interpolation, as much of the theo-
nomic inequalities in societies. More privileged rizing remains gender-blind. Feminist theoret-
groups dominate this sphere, men more of- ical challenges, feminist movements, and fem-
ten than women. Iris Young claims that sub- inist activism in civil society have led to some
ordinated groups, minorities, poor people, and rethinking of the discursively organized public
women, historically created “subaltern counter space and civil society (Cohen, 1995). But the
publics,” often lack the associational life that feminist challenge to participatory democratic
provides forums for its members to raise issues theory to develop a truly integrative framework
among themselves (Young, 2000:171–2). for the public and private still remains on the
This critique of participatory democracy has table.
been leveled at civic republicanism more gen-
erally as it is understood in conventional terms,
which assumes that individuals come together T. H. Marshall: Social Citizenship
and create the common good without par- and Membership
tiality or insensitivity to the rights and needs
of weaker members of societies. This critique For many feminist theorists, T. H. Marshall pro-
is implicit in the feminist challenge to com- vided a framework for confronting histories of
P1: NFT
exclusion, though class inequality, not gender, it as an antidote to the negative state and negative
underlay Marshall’s framework of social citizen- rights in classical liberal theory and neoliberal-
ship. Marshall defined social citizenship “as a ism. His notion of community flowed from a
status bestowed on those who are full members tradition of social liberalism (Faulks, 1998) and
of a community. All who possess the status are was premised on a vision of the state that would
equal with respect to the rights and duties with provide a modicum of security for its citizens.
which the status is endowed” (1950:28–9). This When gender was incorporated into this frame-
gender-neutral formula did not explicitly ex- work, feminist research introduced dimensions
clude women, but in an era when full member- of social citizenship that Marshall never could
ship in community assumed a male breadwinner have imagined.
wage to support a wife and children, social cit- For example, Sheila Shaver (1994) argues that
izenship rights were applied to male citizens.4 social rights are a precondition for the civil right
In addition to the critique of the implicit gen- to abortion; without social rights to abortion,
der blindness in Marshall’s concept of citizen- access becomes stratified. Taking this perspec-
ship, feminist scholars also made the point that tive further, one can argue that to deny women
his sequencing of rights, his historical analysis the right to choose pregnancy or not is to un-
of the evolution of rights – from civil, polit- dermine their right to participate in civil society
ical, and social – was an androcentric model. and the polity (Bryson, 1999; Held, 1989).
Women in many Western societies had access Marshall’s formulation of inclusion as mem-
to social rights before they had the right to vote bership in a community rather than in a nation-
(Fraser and Gordon, 1994; Walby, 1994). Finally, state has also provided the basis for a more holis-
Marshall analysis of the emergence of social cit- tic definition of citizenship that goes beyond
izenship assumed a male subject as it was his- formal rights such as voting or the right to carry
torically linked to class inequalities and work- a passport. The notion of community rather
ing class mobilization. The working class man than state leaves room for theorizing around
armed with the right to vote and mobilized in a divided communities and differences (Yuval-
trade union emerged as a new category of citi- Davis, 1997) and claims that are linked to EU
zen who required new types of rights (Marshall, citizenship (Hobson, 2000). Finally, Marshall’s
1950:106). This account of the worker-citizen construction of citizenship as full membership
did not embrace the rise of a new woman citi- has resonated among feminist scholars who ad-
zen and the gendered social rights being claimed vocate it as blueprint, an ideal, or gold standard
around widows’ pensions, maternal health, and of citizenship (Lister, 1997; Vogel, 1994), an ar-
aid to dependent children, as well as protections gument for retaining the universalistic dimen-
against dismissal from employment upon mar- sion in citizenship rights.
riage and pregnancy (Skocpol, 1992: Hobson The main thrust of feminist research and so-
and Lindholm, 1997). cial citizenship emerged in a dialogue with wel-
There are many reasons why Marshall became fare state theorists who took Marshall’s mantle,
a focal point in feminist research. Recognizing particularly the power resource school. Paral-
that Marshall did not integrate gender in his leling Marshall analysis of the conflict between
account of the evolution of citizenship rights, class and citizenship, the power resource model
some feminist scholars nevertheless have wel- in welfare state theorizing recast the conflict
comed Marshall’s view of the active state, seeing in terms of politics and markets, labor parties
and employers (Korpi, 1989; Esping-Andersen,
4 1985). In Gösta Esping-Anderson’s well-known
Empirical research on gender and the origins of
the welfare state has shown the extent to which the book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
Marshallian model, when applied to the Beveridge wel- (1990), variations in social citizenship across
fare state, had negative consequences for dependent
wives, excluded from full participation in the commu- welfare states revolve around two dimensions:
nity of paid work and the social rights attached to work stratification and decommodification. The lat-
(see Lewis, 1992; Pedersen, 1993). ter, like Marshall’s own construction of social
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146 Barbara Hobson
citizenship, assumed a male worker model. De- that consider women’s unpaid work in the fam-
commodification embodies those rights that ily and the social rights for carework. The en-
weakened a worker’s dependence on the mar- terprise of gendering welfare regime typologies
ket. However, this measure of social rights as- implies gendering the gender-neutral subject in
sumed that individuals were already commod- welfare state models, who is the average in-
ified (Hobson, 1994; Knijn and Ostner, 2002; dustrial worker. Further, it involves introduc-
Orloff, 1993). Even in 1990, when Three Worlds ing carework as work, incorporating types of
of Welfare Capitalism was published, the ma- services as well as types of benefits in the con-
jority of women in the Western welfare states struction of models of welfare state regimes. Us-
analyzed were not in the labor force or had ing this framework, feminist typologies of wel-
intermittent employment. More to the point, fare states analyze variations according to the
feminists argued that for many women, com- strength or weakness of the male breadwinner
modification could have a beneficial liberating logics (Lewis, 1992a). Drawing on theories of
effect by weakening women’s dependence on welfare regimes, feminist researchers on gender
a male breadwinner wage, enhancing women’s and welfare states have incorporated the con-
civil rights by enabling them to exit untenable cept of social care into the definition of citi-
marriages (Hobson, 1990). Feminist theorizing zenship, which assumes that citizens are both
introduced a gender-sensitive dimension of so- wage workers and unpaid carers and that pol-
cial citizenship) – the right to form indepen- icy regimes can be clustered along the public
dent households without the risk of poverty and private mix of care, and the role of the
(Hobson, 1994; Orloff, 1993). This dimension state structuring gender choices around paid and
of gendered social rights challenged mainstream unpaid work (Knijn and Kremer, 1997; Daly
theories that focused on the state/market nexus and Lewis, 2000). Care regimes cluster differ-
on two levels. First, feminist challenges affirmed ently than the policy regime models in Esping-
that states not only play a role in the stratification Anderson (1990), and this has become more
within societies by regulating markets and redis- pronounced as welfare states seek solutions to
tributing resources across families, but also that the care deficit that has resulted from the in-
states stratify and redistribute resources within creasing numbers of women in employment
families. Second, they argued that decommod- and welfare state retrenchment. Another lens
ifying policies are gendered, often those aimed from which to view gendering of welfare state
at women workers such as maternity leave and regimes revolves around the degree of individ-
the parent’s right to work part-time, and often ualization in social citizenship rights (Sainsbury,
had the perverse effect of intensifying gender- 1996), a perspective that undermines the notion
segregated labor markets, leading to greater gen- of the family as a unit of shared interests.
der stratification in the labor market (O’Connor In many respects, the feminist dialogues with
et al., 1999; Mandel and Shalev, 2003). welfare policy regime theorizing have been a
The paradigm shift in welfare state theo- two-way street. Feminists have employed the
rizing toward typologies or clusters of policy regime model as a springboard and taken up
regimes also opened up theoretical space for the challenge of gendering it (Sainsbury, 1994;
feminists to engage with mainstream theorizing. O’Connor et al., 1999). From the other side,
The mainstream policy regime typology is power resource theorists, for example, Gösta
structured around an institutional triangle of Esping-Anderson (1999, 2002) and Walter
states, markets, and families. This analytical de- Korpi (2000), have acknowledged their debt
vice reflects the ways in which states gov- to feminist theorizing. Korpi draws on fem-
ern markets (the state/market axis), but also inist theorizing most directly in his institu-
how states redistribute resources and support tional models of gender inequalities. Andersen,
family forms (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Korpi in his subsequent studies and most recently his
and Palme, 1998: Korpi, 2000). Feminist re- book on Why We Need a Welfare State, con-
search proposed alternative regime typologies fronts the gendered postwar settlement rooted
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in Marshall’s social contract that sought to en- of participation rights involves incorporating
sure and uphold the male breadwinner. Esping- dimensions of women’s inclusion into policy-
Andersen (2002) argues for a changed gender making bodies. In this context, there is a sig-
contract that does not assume a male life cycle. nificant body of research on women’s partici-
However, as feminist research on welfare states pation in non-governmental agencies as experts
has underscored, women’s agency is crucial for influencing policy decision making. The role of
altering the institutional agenda to allow for a femocrats in government can also be analyzed
reconciliation of family responsibilities and em- through the lens of participation rights. Though
ployment, and for including men as fathers and first used in the Australian context (Eisenstein,
caretakers in the feminist project (Hobson and 1996), the term “femocrats” refers to women
Morgan, 2002). with feminist orientations who become part
Embedded in the term “women-friendly of the welfare state bureaucracy, boring from
state,” a phrase coined by Scandinavian political within and being pushed from without, from
scientist Helga Hernes (1987), embraces Mar- feminist movements and non-governmental or-
shall’s notion of an active state that provides ganizations (NGOs). The concept has been sys-
universalistic benefits and services but also en- temically applied to studies of women’s policy-
ables women to be participants in economic making influence across Western industrialized
and political spheres. Following a Marshallian countries (Hernes, 1987; Stetson and Mazur,
framework that links civil, political, and social 2001).
rights, Hernes and other Scandinavian scholars The positioning of women as collec-
(Siim, 2000; Dahlerup, 2003) have understood tive agents cannot ignore the importance of
that being a full member of the community is women’s social movements in shaping gendered
dependent on the possibilities of women’s mo- dimensions of citizenship. Even in the wel-
bilization and representation in discursive arenas fare state typologies that seek to address gender
and politics. Along similar lines, Walter Korpi directly, this dimension is not integrated into
(2000), applying Marshall’s frame of social citi- welfare state models.5 Women’s agency is op-
zenship alongside Amartya Sen’s concept of ca- erationalized in terms of numbers of women
pacities, employs the concept of gender agency in parliament or ministries, or the strength of
inequality to reflect women’s economic depen- confessional parties versus working class parties.
dency in the family. An active state, with ben- To develop a theory of agency that addresses
efits and services, according to Korpi (2000), social movements in welfare state development
enhances women’s capacities to become inde- and retrenchment would involve a merging of
pendent and active citizens by allowing them the two traditions of citizenship. Ruth Lister
to combine employment and family responsi- (1997:36) argues for a dynamic approach that
bilities. More explicit in her analysis of feminist would encompass social citizenship rights and
agency and participatory citizenship, Birte Siim inclusion, embracing women’s social, economic
(2000) couples social rights to political rights and reproductive rights, alongside political
and vice versa, maintaining that without so- participatory rights that recognize collective ac-
cial rights, women are not in a position to be tors and in which the content of rights is the
politically active and engaged in participatory product of political struggles.
citizenship. According to Siim, it is feminist pol-
itics from above and below that leads to exten-
Gendering Citizenship Conflicts
sions in social citizenship.
Thomas Janoski’s (1998) concept of partic-
Citizenship defined as membership and inclu-
ipation rights is also relevant to this discus-
sion involves struggles over the content of rights
sion. Extending Marshall’s model of citizenship,
he introduces participation rights that embrace 5
See Huber et al. (1993) and Korpi (2000). For a
workers’ councils and organizations that set comment on these analyses of gendered agency: Hobson
the course for policy. Gendering this concept (2000); Shaver (2002).
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148 Barbara Hobson
( Janoski, 1998; Turner, 1993). Janoski (1998) in a state of nature and only give up those parts
suggests that conflict enters into citizenship the- of this “natural liberty,” freedom, that are abso-
ory on three levels: (1) conflicts between capi- lutely necessary. What follows from this narra-
talism and citizenship that can be traced back tive of the origins of rights is a highly individ-
to Marshall’s analysis of the inherent tension ualistic view of citizenship rights that assumes
between class and citizenship; (2) contests be- rational man should be able to pursue his own
tween different claim structures, for example, interests without undue interference. This fram-
affirmative action can violate equal treatment ing of negative rights tends to set up a series of
law; and (3) conflicts entail struggles over the dichotomies between public and private, active
extensions of citizenship of which he includes and passive citizenship, and individual and col-
class and status groups. However, as feminist re- lective agency (Turner, 1993; Glendon, 1991;
search reveals, gendered struggles around citi- Dietz, 1992). Another American political the-
zenship concern not only the content of rights, orist, Mary Dietz, acknowledges these liberal
but also the framing of citizenship: as individual tenets of equal treatment in law have overturned
and collective rights and needs. many of the restrictions on women as individ-
uals, but maintains that they do not provide the
language or concepts to articulate a feminist vi-
The Discourse on Rights sion of citizenship (1992:7). She underscores
the limitations in an individualistic notion of
Throughout the history of feminism, the citi- rights that override the welfare of society as a
zenship discourse on rights has been central to whole. Reacting to the lack of collective social
women claims, including such basic rights as ed- responsibility in liberal rights talk, some feminist
ucation, owning property, custody of children, theorists have found other idioms in needs talk
and suffrage. In current-day feminism, liberal- (Kittay, 1999).
ism and its associated rights discourse have been Will Kymlicka (1989) maintains that feminist
the subject of intense debate and feminist theo- critiques (as well as socialist and communitarian
retical challenges. One could divide the feminist critiques) of liberalism as promoting excessive
debate on rights into two strands: those engaged individualism and atomism do not consider the
with classical liberal or neoliberal constructions varied theoretical terrain in liberalism (2–12).
of negative and abstract rights (which are a re- Referring to theories of justice, such as Rawls
statement of classical liberalism); and those in and Dworkin, among others, he claims that in-
dialogue with the social liberal tradition inter- terests are socially embedded and emerge from
preted by Marshall. The latter has synthesized a social interactions that are always under revi-
collective notion of rights with liberal ideas of sion. Feminist theorists, who have embraced a
individual freedom (often referred to as social rights-based framework, have understood that
liberalism).6 they need to revise theories of justice that have
Some of the strongest critiques of the demo- focused on class rather than gender inequali-
cratic liberal tradition of rights have come ties and ignored rights embedded in the private
from American feminist political theorists. Mary sphere.
Glendon (1991) offers a stern critique of “rights Susan Moller Okin (1989) takes the Rawlsian
talk” in the United States where the vocabulary formula for social justice and applies it to the
of rights is translated into negative rights and the family. Here she constructs a system of rights
passive state. According to Glendon, this is built employing Rawls’s concept of the veil of ig-
on a Lockean fable, which takes as its premise norance or original position, that is, individ-
that men possess property in their own person uals would not have knowledge of their sex.
In effect, she asks us to perform a thought
6
This strand of liberalism has been referred to as new experiment: to suppose we did not know our
liberalism, or social democratic liberalism (O’Connor social position before birth, and hence be-
et al., 1999). ing rational actors we would create more just
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institutions. In her analysis, she provides us with 1995; Taylor, 1994) emerged. Purposefully dis-
a visual demonstration of her theory in a series tancing themselves from identity politics, critical
of cartoons in which judges are asked to rule political theorists have employed the concept of
on rights for pregnancy leave. In the middle of recognition (Fraser, 1997; Honneth, 1995; Tay-
their deliberations, they grow enormous preg- lor, 1994). Setting the agenda, Charles Taylor
nant bellies. (1994) affirmed that to misrecognize someone
Others, such as Nancy Fraser (1997), argue is more than an individual harm, but a form of
for a synthesis of needs and rights, which allows oppression; to ignore or make invisible histories
us to “translate justified needs claims into social of devaluation and exclusionary processes or to
rights.” This approach encourages us to con- denigrate them as persons based on their group
textualize our discursive strategies, to recognize difference. Gender disadvantage in this concep-
that the question of whose needs should be met tual domain appears as but one of many types
exists in a highly contested arena, continually of misrecognition; however, it has been salient
shifting from the domestic or personal to the in both the theoretical and empirical analyses.
political. Thus “needs talk” can act to politicize One reason is that several of the main pro-
needs and bring them into the sphere of the tagonists in setting the agenda have been en-
public, or needs talk can result in reprivatizing gaged with feminist theorizing on citizenship
them, defining needs as private concerns. and justice. But perhaps more importantly, fem-
Struggles around citizenship rights are most inist challenges to univeralism and theorizing
visible in the contests around individual ver- on gender-differentiated citizenship dovetailed
sus group rights. These hinge on many other with multiculturalist debates. Taylor, for exam-
fractures in feminist theorizing around gender ple, acknowledges that struggle for recognition
identities, agency, and power. How to develop is a “struggle for a changed image,” which has
theories that allow for the multidimensionality been crucial for strands of feminism (Taylor,
of gender but avoid the reification of identities? 1994:65).
How to address multiple identities and loyalties Recognition politics brings to the fore the
in citizenship claims while retaining the theo- issue of individual rights versus group rights.
retical framework of women’s collective agency? Individuals can be oppressed by the very same
In some respects these questions are simply vari- groups that claim to represent them based
ations on earlier dilemmas in feminist theorizing on their group disadvantage (Kymlicka, 1995;
surrounding gender as an analytical category, but Yuval-Davis, 1997), a concern that has been
they have matured in their complexities within raised by feminist scholars. In a provocative and
the contested theoretical space of multicultural- controversial article, Susan Moeller Okin (Okin
ism and citizenship (Phillips, 1995). and Cohen, 1999) asks, “Is multiculturalism bad
for women?” Her answer is affirmative, argu-
ing that cultural differences and group rights in
challenges to feminist theorizing societies can deny women freedom and basic
and citizenship human rights. Her main examples are genital
mutilation, polygamy, and child marriage. Will
Multiculturalism and Group Difference Kymlicka (1995) incorporates liberal tenets into
multiculturalism by asserting that one can make
In the 1990s, social movements constructed the distinction between group rights that in-
around distinctive identities challenged the uni- volve the claim of a group against its members
versalist framing of rights in theories of cit- and the group’s claims against the larger society.
izenship that ignored or denigrated gender, He affirms that a liberal theory of multicultural
race/ethnicity, sexual preference, disability, or rights does not accept rights that result in gen-
age. An academic discourse on cultural citi- der inequalities (Kymlicka, 1999). Nevertheless,
zenship and cultural claims (Benhabib, 2002; his distinction does not address the power posi-
Fraser, 1997, 2003; Hobson, 2003; Kymlicka, tionings in the group, and empirical studies of
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150 Barbara Hobson
group claims suggest women’s voices are often Overcoming Reification

silenced or disregarded (Williams, 2003; Yuval- of Collective Identities
Davis, 1997).
Nira Yuval-Davis (1997; and Yuval-Davis Iris Marion Young’s original schema of group-
and Werbner, 1999) views multiculturalism less differentiated citizenship began with the as-
critically than Okin, but also points to its inher- sumption that groups “cannot be socially equal
ent dangers for women. For her, multicultural- unless their specific experience, culture and so-
ism is an “interruptive rhetoric” and antidote cial contributions are publicly affirmed and rec-
against false notions of national homogene- ognized” (Young, 1990:174). This is to be done
ity and unity (1997); however, she nevertheless through institutional mechanisms that give op-
claims that multiculturalism can reify groups as pressed groups a voice in the political arena. A
internally homogenous. In her analysis in Gender key criticism aimed at Young’s position is that
and Nation, Yuval-Davis argued that fundamen- it freezes group identities and suppresses differ-
talist religious constructions of family and gen- ences within groups.
der have been overall detrimental to women, an Addressing the dilemma of reification of
example of how individuals and groups can re- identities, in her recent study of Democracy and
strict the autonomy of individuals in the group. Inclusion, Young (2000) suggests one can under-
They can be oppressed by the very same col- stand group membership as seriality. This is a
lectivities that are claiming citizenship rights concept that she derives from Jean Paul Sartre,
based on their group’s disadvantage. Moreover, who used it to describe unorganized class ex-
she maintains that fundamentalist politics have istence (Young, 1995). Not based on identity
essentialized identities of ethnic communities. or shared attributes, serial collectivities result
Here she addresses the basic dilemma in the from “people’s historically congealed institu-
recognition paradigm, that it tends to tends to tionalized actions and experiences that position
reify social groups. Feminist theorizing has con- and limit individuals in determinate ways that
fronted the issue from different perspectives: in they must deal with” (Young, 2000:119). Ap-
the critique of essentialism or fixed identities plying seriality to gender, Young sidesteps the
and in the formulation of feminisms versus fem- problem of women as a social unity by claiming
inism. that individuals can choose to ignore their serial
Yuval-Davis argues for a multilayering in cit- memberships or join with others and develop
izenship that reflects a growing acceptance that group solidarity.
citizens are political subjects often involved in Nancy Fraser (2003) in her recent published
more than one political community – the local, work has chosen another route to avoid reifi-
ethnic, national, and transnational – often with cation of groups by reconceptualizing recogni-
multidimensional loyalties and interests: gender, tion in Weberian terms as status inequality. She
nationality, religion and ethnicity, disability, and defines misrecognition as social subordination
sexual preference (Yuval-Davis and Werbner, in the sense of being prevented from participat-
1999). Her concept of transversal politics seeks ing as a peer in social life, which is grounded in
to go beyond multiculturalism through coali- institutionalized patterns of disrespect and de-
tion building across communities. One such valuation. However, to abandon the conceptual
example (Yuval-Davis, 1997) that illustrates a terrain of collective identities is to give up a crit-
successful transversal politics is Women Against ical dimension in theorizing women’s agency in
Fundamentalism, comprised of women who have states and civil society.
crossed borders as migrants, refugees, and dis- For some feminist scholars, process theories
sidents. Because transversal politics understand of social movements have offered insights and
that individuals are members of various collec- analytical strategies that avoid the reification
tivities, they also respond to the dilemma, al- of women’s identities while still embracing the
luded to above, of multiple loyalties and multiple concept of women’s collectivities and collec-
identities. tive action. This theoretical lens has focused
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on collective identity formation and the sys- of traditional conceptions of citizenship. The
tems of meaning that produce collective action. gender-pluralist citizen, a poststructuralist solu-
It provides a way of building-in contingen- tion to the classic dilemma, is organized around
cies, multiple identities, and loyalties into anal- a democratic conception of citizenship in which
ysis of collectivities in specific locales (Gamson, the subject is constructed through different dis-
1995; Melucci, 1996; Meuller, 1994; Della Porta courses and subject positions as opposed to an
and Diani, 1999). Frame analysis, representing identity – be it race, class, or gender (Mouffe,
a cultural turn in social movement theorizing 1992b:377). However, this theoretical casing
(Snow and Benford, 1992; Hunt et al., 1994), of citizenship tends to undermine collective
highlighted the importance of cognitive pro- agency and lead toward a fragmented politics.
cesses that shape collective identity formation. The dilemma of universalistic and differenti-
This dynamic model of identity formation al- ated citizenship may be unresolvable. Benhabib
lows for analyses of the making of feminist (1992) in her concept of feminist universalism
collectivities: How actors (movement activists suggests that we combine universalistic princi-
or feminist spokespersons) construct meanings ples with particularistic perspectives, in which
and frame claims also enables us to understand we assume a context-specific ambiguity. Also
the boundary-making mechanisms in feminist taking a context-bound position, Lister (1998)
movements. To reveal these processes is to con- concludes that universalistic and particularistic
front the power dimensions in the making of rights are always in creative tension, a dilemma
collectivities and the privileging of certain ac- reflected in the theory and practice of citizen-
tors and their claims over others – that is, who ship.
and what gets recognized in the public sphere How to translate the practice of citizenship
and political arenas (Hobson, 2003). into theories of agency that are context-specific
has been on the agenda of gender research for
over a decade. However, the challenge in our
conclusion century is how to develop theory that addresses
the multidimensionality in gender in an era of
With the recognition of the multitiered layer- global actors and supranational institutions and
ing of citizenship and identities, it is increasingly arenas. Citizenship rights and protections are
difficult to fit feminist theorizing into neat cate- still lodged in national law, but supranational
gories of socialist, liberal, and radical. From the institutions have more and more impact on re-
vantage point of feminist theorizing on citizen- defining nationality and membership through
ship, Wollestencraft’s dilemma has grown at least laws and their interpretation of international hu-
three horns that can be expressed in the gender- man rights codes (Sassen, 1998). Individuals and
differentiated citizen, the gender-neutral citizen, and groups can leapfrog their own legal systems and
the gender-pluralist citizen (Hobson and Lister, seek justice in international and supranational
2002). However, none of these stances brings courts. The European Union is a unique ex-
us closer to articulating a feminist theory of cit- ample, as EU law supersedes the national law
izenship that does not either jettison the uni- of member states. Though European citizen-
versalist frame of citizenship as a gold standard ship has had a limited meaning confined within
of rights or alternatively shade out the particu- the framework of the free flow of labor across
larized experiences of groups with histories of borders, the Social Charter of Rights, the new
disadvantage and social exclusion. The gender- directives on parental leave, and informal rec-
differentiated citizen falls into the trap of cre- ommendations on domestic violence and sex-
ating sexually segregated norms ( Jones, 1990) ual trafficking all suggest the expanding loci of
and freezing identities. The gender-neutral cit- the EU framework of rights (McGlynn, 2001;
izen places women in the unequal world of Carson, 2004).
male norms (Phillips, 1991:7), into what Ur- The idea of the global citizen is metaphor that
sala Vogel refers to as illusory, ready-made spaces suggests new legal and political opportunities,
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152 Barbara Hobson
which may have significance for marginalized because transnational actors even when they are
groups. For women’s collective agency, the mobilizing in global forums – the centralizing
“transnational” has generated new forms of col- role played by the UN conferences comes to
lective action and made available alternative mind – the transnational networks that they
gender frames and discursive resources. Re- spawned seek to influence and recast rights and
cent feminist research has begun exploring some claims for full citizenship in respective national
of the implications of transnational feminism settings (Keck and Sikkonk, 1998). In her study
and supranational feminist networks on feminist of how EU policies are translated into national
theorizing (Basu, 2000; Bulbeck, 1998; Alvarez discourses and legal frameworks, Ulrike Liebert
2000; Tickner, 2001). However, little attention (2003) underscores this point.
has yet been paid to how global activism and The challenge for feminist theorizing is to
actors reshape institutions and alter the con- imagine the practice of citizenship in a multi-
structions of citizenship. Karen Booth (1998) dimensional and dynamic context of gendered
has made the argument that global actors re- actors across local, national, and supranational
ject the sovereignty and even the relevance of arenas. This is to take into account how global
the nation and the significance of citizen iden- restructuring and new supranational institutions
tity (119). Yet this is too simple a formulation, contour the field of claimants and claims.
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chapter seven
Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Foucault,

Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek
Jacob Torfing
Poststructuralist discourse theory is a tool for Following Ludwig Wittgenstein (1959), lan-
analyzing the more or less sedimented rules and guage is conceived neither as a medium for the
meanings that condition the political construc- representation of an extralinguistic reality nor
tion of social, political, and cultural identity.1 as a medium for the expression of our inner
It begins with the assertion that what exists thoughts and emotions. Rather, it constitutes a
only becomes intelligible when it is joined with rulebound system of meaning and action that
a specific form which constitutes its identity. conditions the ultimately political construction
The formation of identity is not grounded in of identity.
some metaphysical instance like God, Nature, The emphasis on the constitutive role of lan-
Man, Reason, or the Iron Laws of Capital- guage clearly indicates that discourse theory is a
ism. Instead, discourse theory subscribes to an part of the linguistic turn in the social sciences.
antiessentialist ontology, which is opposed to the However, the point of discourse theory is nei-
idea of a self-determining center that structures ther to study how we actually speak and write
society and defines identity while itself escap- nor to investigate the rules that we draw upon
ing the process of structuration. Hence it as- when speaking or writing. Discourse theory
serts that identity is constructed in and through aims at a much broader analysis of the construc-
a multiplicity of overlapping language games. tion of discursive forms. The theoretical devel-
opment from Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural
1 linguistics and Louis Hjelmslev’s glossematics to
In the present context “identity” refers not only to
peoples’ conception of who they are or want to be, but Roland Barthes’s semiology has purged linguis-
also to the meaning, sense or signification they attach tics of all reference to phonic and semantic sub-
to different objects, experiences, and events. Generally,
poststructuralist discourse theory aims to say new things stance, thereby transforming it into an analysis of
with new words that for outsiders might appear as in- pure forms. Military parades, popular cul-
comprehensible jargon. The appropriation of the post- ture, public administration, political demonstra-
structuralist vocabulary is complicated by the fact that tions – everything can be analyzed in terms
many terms are developed and used in particular textual of the construction of discursive forms. Thus,
contexts, rather than defined as a part of a systematic
conceptual apparatus. Another difficulty lies in the fact when Jacques Derrida (1988:148) claims that
that many of the concepts aim to capture the experi- “there is nothing outside the text,” he is not
ence of the limits of the modernist quest for a metalan- arguing that the state and economy only exist
guage that provides a transparent representation of the as words or meanings contained in spoken or
objectively given social reality. However, as a possible written messages, but rather that these institu-
inroad to the conceptual wonderland of poststructuralist
discourse theory, I have elsewhere produced a glossary tional orders should be analyzed as complex sign
covering most of the key concepts that are found in this systems, which can be analyzed by applying the
chapter (see Torfing, 1999:298–307). principles of linguistic form analysis.
153
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154 Jacob Torfing
Discourse theory aims to analyze the con- prevent it from constituting a closed and unified
struction of identity within linguistic systems totality.
and it holds a relationalist and contextualist view Discourse is coexistent with the social, and
of identity formation. Identity is thus shaped the discursive order is politically constructed
by its relation to other identities within a par- through acts of inclusion and exclusion, or, in
ticular historical context. This means that we other words, by the exercise of power. These
can only understand “mother” through the con- stipulations permit us to reject both the liberal
textualized relationship to “father,” “son,” and and Marxist view of the political as something
“daughter,” we can only see something as “na- that is ultimately determined by the social (the
ture” in its historically conditioned opposition pregiven preferences of individuals or the laws of
to “culture,” and we can only account for the the capitalist economy). Instead discourse the-
historical form of “the state” in relation to his- ory asserts the primacy of the political over the
torical forms of “economy” and “civil society.” social. Certainly, this assertion does not imply
These historically specific, relational ensembles that everything is political, because politically
of mutually constitutive identities are called dis- constructed identities and relations over time
courses. become sedimented into a recursively validated
Identity is always constructed within a par- social realm that is oblivious to its political ori-
ticular discourse. However, the formative or- gin. The political origin of sedimented social
der of discourse is not a stable self-reproducing identities is not eliminated, but only repressed.
structure, but a precarious system that is con- Therefore, the possibility of reactivating the po-
stantly subjected to political attempts to under- litical origin of the social through a deconstruc-
mine and restructure the discursive order. There tion of the discursive hierarchies distinguishing
is no deep essence that can guarantee the for- the normal from the deviant, order from dis-
mation or reproduction of a particular discourse. order, and the sensible from the nonsensical is
Rather, the discursive order and the mechanisms always present (see Laclau, 1990).
ensuring its contingent reproduction are shaped When analyzing the political construction of
and reshaped through a series of political deci- relational identities within particular discourses,
sions that are taken in an ultimately undecidable we should, of course, bear in mind the post-
terrain of unresolvable dilemmas and nontotal- positivist insight that no empirical observation
izable openness. Even though the constitutive can possibly verify the truth of our proposi-
decisions might be supported by good reasons tional statements (Popper, 1959). It should also
and noble motives, the key point is that in an be recognized that even falsification fails to rebut
undecidable terrain we never arrive at a situation knowledge claims because these are underde-
in which the decision is taken by the structure termined by empirical evidence (Quine, 1971)
and then subsequently presented to us as a fait and protected by the armor of the predom-
accompli. We are always left with a nonalgorith- inant scientific paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). This
mic political choice between a series of actual means that science can no longer be identi-
options, which in different ways satisfy the rules fied with truth as opposed to nontruth. How-
prescribed by the discursive context of the de- ever, it is still possible to insist on the possibility
cision. This means that the constitutive choice of scientific knowledge by relying on princi-
of A necessarily involves the repression of the ples of an undogmatic willingness to give up a
alternative options B, C, and D. Consequently, scientific paradigm or research program when
the political should be seen as both a constitutive it is confronted with others carrying a larger
and subversive dimension of the social order. It heuristic value (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1974).
can neither be reduced to state institutions nor The problem with this attempt to rescue sci-
to party politics. Rather, it refers to constitutive ence is that it presupposes the existence of a
and subversive practices that, at least potentially, metalanguage which can be applied in evaluat-
are found everywhere in society and ultimately ing the heuristic value of competing paradigms
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Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek 155
(Feyerabend, 1975). The antifoundationalist stance mainstream theory. In others, it has almost be-
of poststructuralist discourse theory renounces come the new mainstream. However, the post-
this presupposition by asserting that there is no structuralist wave seems to have taken slightly
extradiscursive instance in terms of empirical different forms in Europe and the United States.
facts, methodological rules, or privileged cri- Many European academics were immediately
teria for scientificity that can safeguard either captured by French poststructuralism and devel-
Truth or Science. Truth is always local and mo- oped a strong interest in ontological questions.
bile as it is conditioned by a discursive “truth This was also the case with North American aca-
regime” that specifies the criteria for judging an demics like Judith Butler (1990), Craig Calhoun
analytical narrative to be convincing (Foucault, (1994), and Mark Poster (1990). However, in the
1986a). Science may constitute a particular United States a large group of political sociolo-
truth regime that is built around conventional gists fashioned a discourse theoretical approach
norms about cumulative and intersubjective that combines new ideas from poststructuralism
knowledge, replicability, intellectual honesty, with basic (methodological) insights from the
and so forth. However, these criteria are subject highly influential currents of symbolic interac-
to constant renegotiation and there is no way of tionism and ethnomethodology (see Eliasoph,
protecting them from the influence of compet- 1998; Gubrium and Holstein, 1997; Reiner-
ing truth regimes. The boundary between sci- man, 1987).
ence and nonscience is thus blurred and subject The growing interest in poststructuralist dis-
to politico-discursive interventions. course theory stands in sharp contrast to its
The antiessentialist ontology, the linguistic incomplete character. As yet, there does not
form analysis, the relationalist and contextu- exist a coherent theoretical paradigm, only a
alist view of identity formation, the assertion heterogeneous set of theoretical and analytical
of the primacy of politics, and the antifoun- contributions that in different ways combine ge-
dationalist epistemology constitute the back- nealogical hermeneutics, deconstructivism, and
bone of the poststructuralist discourse theory psychoanalysis with post-Marxism, postanalyti-
advanced by prominent thinkers such as Michel cal philosophy, and American pragmatism. The
Foucault, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and number of empirical studies is growing rapidly,
Slavoj Žižek. The works of these distinguished but there is a general lack of methodological self-
theorists have significantly contributed to the reflection and few discussions about research
development and renewal of political sociology. strategy. On the other hand, the open and tenta-
Their persistent focus on political issues such tive character of poststructuralist discourse the-
as power, social movements, populism, democ- ory is also its strength, as it makes it possible
racy, and emancipation, as well as their dedi- for people to contribute actively to the elabora-
cated attempt to advance new ways of thinking tion of a strong theoretical and methodological
and analyzing these issues, warrant a close study alternative to the dominant approaches of ra-
of their thoughts and ideas. tional choice theory, historical institutionalism,
Poststructuralism has had a huge impact on systems theory, and political economy.
cultural studies, where it has become almost A number of historical events have nurtured
hegemonic. However, in the past decades post- the emergence and development of poststruc-
structuralist discourse theory has gained increas- turalist discourse theory. The events of May
ing prominence among political theorists and 1968 generated a need for a renewal of social and
critical political sociologists, attracting special political theory. The struggle against the domi-
attention from post-Marxists of various kinds. nant forms and contents of higher education and
In the mid-1980s discourse theorists were still the efforts on the part of progressive intellectuals
few and far between, but today there are many to ally with oppressed groups of prisoners, im-
places and fields of study where poststructuralist migrants, and so forth prompted a closer study
discourse theory constitutes a real challenge to of the relation between power and knowledge.
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156 Jacob Torfing
The transformation of the student revolt into a “anything-goes theory,” and students of dis-
broad struggle against multiple forms of ideo- course theory had a tough time trying to justify
logical repression and the proliferation of new their position. Many were rescued by the repres-
social movements fostered a growing interest in sive tolerance on the part of mainstream theory,
the question of how identity was constructed according to which it was acceptable to use dis-
and changed. Finally, the politicization of cul- course theories to analyze “soft” issues such as
tural expressions and private lifestyles generated gender, sexuality, and ethnicity. In this way, the
a need for a broadening of the understanding of core areas of research were monopolized by the
politics. more traditional theories. However, in recent
The theoretical crisis and political impotence years the hostility toward discourse theory has
of Marxism has also played a key role in the de- largely disappeared. Mainstream theorists have
velopment of discourse theory. Many Marxists gradually become used to the new vocabulary,
have lost their faith in economic determinism, and poststructuralist discourse theorists have be-
the primacy of class struggle vis-à-vis other so- come more open-minded, engaging in a fruitful
cial and political struggles, and the blessings of dialogue with other researchers about the value
centralized state regulation of society. They find added from taking a discourse theoretical ap-
in discourse theory a critical theory that ex- proach to the study of central problems within
plicitly claims to be both post-Marxist and post- political sociology.
Marxist (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:4). In countries like Britain, Denmark, Ger-
The postmodern recognition of the limits many, and Holland and in research areas such
of modernity has also exerted a huge influ- as gender and ethnicity studies, Third World
ence. The modern conception of a rational, studies, and policy analysis, poststructuralist dis-
unencumbered individual who liberates him- course theory has become a highly influential
self through the uncovering of an undistorted approach. The sudden rise to fame does, how-
knowledge is problematized by the postmodern ever, carry the dangers of trivialization and reab-
insistence on viewing rationality, identity, and sorption into mainstream theory. It has become
knowledge as contingent products of discur- increasingly fashionable to talk about discourse,
sive power strategies. This has stimulated inter- but without buying into the theoretical pack-
est in analyzing the historical processes of inclu- age of poststructuralist discourse theory. Often
sion and exclusion, which have established and people use the term “discourse” merely in or-
formed the rationalist, individualist, and eman- der to emphasize the role of ideology, common
cipatory discourse of modernity. perceptions, and shared values, and they tend to
Finally, the emergence of a “new reflexivity,” see discourse as something that is manipulated
which is characterized by the gradual loss of by rational and willful actors who aim to bend
authoritatively given rules, norms, and values, discourse to their own ends. In order to coun-
forces us to engage in the active construction teract these dangers, we have to insist on the
of a provisional foundation for the validation of need for a more profound understanding of the
our actions as reasonable and appropriate. This key concepts and arguments of poststructuralist
engagement drives us into a self-reflexive nego- discourse theory. The main part of this chapter
tiation of rules, norms, and values at the level of will be devoted to an exploration of the concep-
discourse. Hence, the death of the grand nar- tual and argumentative framework of poststruc-
ratives seems to stimulate our interest in the turalist discourse analysis. This will be followed
contingent construction of the many small nar- by a response to some of the standard criticisms
ratives that can help to structure our identity, of discourse theory. I will then elaborate the
actions, and views of the world. consequences of discourse theory for under-
Initially, the growing interest in discourse the- standing the social basis of politics and conclude
ory was met with a great deal of skepticism. with a brief assessment of its future tasks. How-
Very often it was written off as “postmod- ever, before dealing with the intricacies of dis-
ern nihilism,” “antiscientific nonsense,” and course theory, I shall provide a brief overview
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of different kinds of discourse theory in order to address the crucial issue about the relation be-
show the distinctiveness of the poststructuralist tween power and the use of language.
version. Dialogue and conversation analysis (see Sinclair
and Coulthard, 1975; Atkinson and Heritage,
1984) also defines discourse as spoken lan-
discourse theory as a study guage either in terms of an institutionalized and
of meaning and politics hierarchical dialogue (e.g., between doctor and
patient) or in a more informal dialogue be-
Discourse theory developed as a cross- tween equals (e.g., a telephone conversation).
disciplinary attempt to integrate central insights The focus is not so much on the use of language
from linguistics and hermeneutics with cen- as on the organization of linguistic interaction.
tral insights from social and political science. How are conversations initiated and concluded?
Such integration is prompted by the widespread How are topics chosen and changed during
recognition of the fact that political and so- the conversation? What determines turn-taking,
cial change is accompanied by linguistic change. and how does one sentence affect the next?
However, the latter is not merely a reflection However, the ethnomethodological point of
of the former. Linguistic forms and rhetorical departure of this type of analysis precludes a
operations are constitutive of the social world. theoretical interest in questions about the ex-
Hence, when “workfare” is linked to “oppor- ercise of power that, eventually, would lead to
tunity” and “duty” rather than “welfare” and more heterogeneous forms of interaction than
“right,” and opposed to “welfare,” “greed” and the ones analyzed by dialogue and conversation
“patronage,” the consequence is that social ben- analysis.
efits are cut, repressive quid-pro-quo schemes Discourse psychology (see Labov and Fanshel,
are introduced, and the incentives to take inse- 1977; Potter and Wetherell, 1987) is a con-
cure low paid jobs are augmented. This shows structivist branch of social psychology that is
that rhetoric cannot be reduced to a quasi- also interested in what people actually say to
logical art of persuasion that helps politicians each other. However, the focus has shifted from
to sell their policy by means of providing an the organization of linguistic interaction to the
eloquent linguistic wrapping. Rhetoric plays a strategies of speakers. The speakers want to
central role in the shaping of our world, and this achieve something in and through the conversa-
is exactly what discourse theory explores. tion, and they consciously try to produce a shift
There are many kinds of discourse theory. In in the framing of the conversation and in the
linguistics “discourse” refers to a textual unit style in which it is deployed. The social environ-
that is larger than a sentence. A sentence con- ment of the speakers provides models for what
sists of a number of signs, each of which articu- can be said and done in the conversation, but
lates a signifier (an expression or sound–image) the identity of the speakers is partly determined
and a signified (a content or concept). Sociolin- through their heterogeneous interaction during
guistics (see Downes, 1984) and content analysis the conversation. Discourse psychology clearly
(see Holsti, 1969) are examples of a linguistic moves in the direction of a constructivist analy-
discourse analysis. At the operational level, dis- sis of discourse, but it fails to relate this analysis
course is defined as spoken language and the aim to questions of politics, ideology, and power.
is to identify patterns in our use of language. The group of so-called critical linguists at the
Sociolinguistics analyzes the relation between University of East Anglia (see Fowler et al.,
our socioeconomic status and our vocabulary 1979) broadens the notion of discourse to
and linguistic code, whereas content analysis include both spoken and written language.
analyzes our usage of particular words, word Most importantly, it departs from linguistic dis-
classes, and word combinations. This type of course analysis by claiming that language can-
analysis is sometimes extended to include writ- not be analyzed independent of its social and
ten language. However, there is no attempt to political function. The critical linguists share
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158 Jacob Torfing
with Michel Pêcheux (1982) the interest in how from the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s
discourse, through its choice and combination quasi-transcendental conception of discourse. Fou-
of different linguistic expressions, produces a cault (1985) does not focus on the particular
particular representation of reality, and it aims to form and contents of linguistic statements and
show that processes of representation often result semiotic practices, but on the rules of forma-
in an ideological misrepresentation. The interest tion governing the production of such state-
in the ideological effects of language clearly links ments and practices. He is concerned neither
the linguistic analysis of discourse to an analysis with the truth nor the meaning of actual state-
of power. Hence, it is asserted that ideological ments, but with their conditions of possibility in
discourses contribute to the reproduction of the terms of the discursive rules that regulate what
existing power relations. However, this type of can be said, how it can be said, who can say
discourse theory is still biased toward linguistic and from which position, and which discur-
analysis and the notions of ideology and power sive strategies can be advanced. Influenced by
are undertheorized. Marxist theory, which was very strong at the
Critical discourse analysis (CDA), as developed time, Foucault’s archaeological approach to dis-
most consistently by Norman Fairclough (1992, course analysis insists that the discursive rules of
1995), aims to balance linguistic analysis with formation are conditioned by nondiscursive re-
the analysis of power and politics. CDA fur- lations. However, the criteria for distinguishing
ther expands the notion of discourse to in- the discursive realm from the nondiscursive and
clude all linguistically mediated practices. Social the nature of the “conditioning relation” remain
practices are discursive practices insofar as they unclear.
contribute to a semiotic production and inter- In his later works, Foucault (1986b, 1986c)
pretation of text in the broad sense of speech, seems to be less concerned with the distinction
writing, images, and gestures. Discursive prac- between the discursive and the nondiscursive,
tice is ideological insofar as it contains natural- and with the development of his genealogi-
ized semiotic elements (i.e., linguistic expres- cal approach he shifts the analytical focus from
sions that are taken for granted). Social classes the rules governing the production of state-
and ethnic groups use ideological discourse to ments to the complex web of power strate-
maintain their hegemonic power or to estab- gies that establish hierarchical relations between
lish a counterhegemony. Hence, ideological dis- global/totalitarian forms of knowledge and lo-
course not only contributes to the reproduc- cal/subjugated forms of knowledge. Foucault’s
tion of the predominant discursive order, but power analytics replaces the classical notion of
also to its transformation. CDA clearly demon- sovereign power, which basically views power as
strates the power effects of discourse. However, dominance and repression, with a new notion
CDA remains unclear about how exactly to un- of discursive power that emphasizes the produc-
derstand the relation between discourse and its tive aspects of power (Foucault, 1990). Power is
nondiscursive context, and its explicit reliance neither a relation of dominance nor a capacity
on critical realism (see Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, to act, but the way actions affect other actions
1984) tends to reduce discourse to a linguistic by means of shaping the identity, capacities, and
mediation of causal mechanisms embedded in horizon of meaning of the acting subjectivities
the multilayered socioeconomic structure. This (1986d). Hence, power and discourse are mutu-
significantly reduces the explanatory power of ally constitutive and we cannot have one with-
discourse analysis. out the other. This makes Foucault the antidote
Although CDA conceives discourse as some- of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas
thing that actors draw upon in their produc- (1987, 1990, 1992), who also tends to label his
tion and interpretation of meaning, there is a work discourse theory. Whereas Habermas tries
tendency to view discourse as an empirical ref- to rescue the project of modernity by seeking to
erent, that is, a collection of practices with a eliminate power in order to realize the ideal of
semiotic content. As Fairclough (1992:38–9) a communicative rationality based on free, sin-
himself notes, this marks a sharp difference cere and truth-seeking dialogue, Foucault tends
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to view modernity as constituting a particu- they clearly recognize the many pathbreaking
lar truth regime that is shaped in and through insights of Marxism, they insist on the need
power struggles. The British-based political to transgress the Marxist tradition in order to
theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe solve some of the inherent theoretical problems.
(1985) agree with Foucault’s insistence on the Both Laclau and Mouffe were part of the Al-
internal relation between power and discourse, thusserian revolution, which sought to reinter-
and they also define discourse in transcenden- pret Marxism as a structuralist science about the
tal terms as the historically variable conditions underlying matrix of society in terms of modes
of possibility of what we say, think, imagine, of production, social formations, and so forth.
and do. However, they take issue with, and They both experienced the shortcomings of the
ultimately abandon, the unsustainable distinc- structural Marxism of Louis Althusser, Etienne
tion between the discursive and the nondiscur- Balibar, and Nicos Poulantzas in the face of Latin
sive. Hence, they claim that discourse is coex- American politics. And although the notions
tensive with the entire social fabric. Although of “hegemony” and “overdetermination” were
they still want to pay attention to the discursive helpful in understanding populist movements,
rules governing the use of language, they are the class reductionism and economic determin-
more concerned with elaborating a set of theo- ism inherent to structural Marxism constituted
retical concepts and arguments that can help us a deadweight loss that had to be removed.
to account for the construction of such rules in Interestingly, Laclau and Mouffe found in
and through power struggles. In this sense, their the open and undogmatic Marxism of Anto-
work can be seen as a continuation of Foucault’s nio Gramsci (1971) the theoretical inspiration to
later studies, although their theoretical sources deconstruct the Marxist legacy and counteract
of inspiration are different. the paradoxical tendency toward the disappear-
ance of politics within Marxist political theory.
In Marxist theory the form and functions of the
poststructuralist discourse theory state, and political class struggles that are fought
in a nutshell out at the superstructural level, are seen as de-
termined by the inner movements of the eco-
Whereas Foucault draws on French epistemo- nomic infrastructure. When, finally, the produc-
logical studies of the history of ideas, Laclau tive forces are fully developed, the proletarian
and Mouffe develop their concept of discourse revolution will render the Marxist doubling of
through a deconstructive reading of struc- the political into state and class struggles obso-
tural linguistics. After the publication of their lete. Gramsci attacks the Marxist conception of
now classic book Hegemony and Socialist Strat- society and claims that state, economy, and civil
egy (1985), Laclau and Mouffe became heavily society, rather than forming a structured hier-
influenced by the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj archy of determination, are articulated within
Žižek’s poststructuralist psychoanalytic theory. a historical bloc, which is shaped and reshaped
This is particularly evident in Laclau’s New Re- through political struggles that cannot be re-
flections on the Revolution of Our Time (1990), duced to their class content. It was Gramsci’s
which aims to develop a theory of the sub- critique of essentialist thinking within Marx-
ject before its subjectivation. Recent debates ism and the radicalization of his key concept of
between Laclau and Žižek published in Con- hegemony which inspired Laclau and Mouffe’s
tingency, Hegemony, Universality (Butler, Laclau, elaboration of a poststructuralist discourse the-
and Žižek, 2000) show that despite the theo- ory that has recently developed into a new type
retical points of convergence, there is serious of postmodern political sociology (see Torfing,
disagreement about the political implications of 1999).
the theoretical arguments (see below). As such, the intellectual development of
As noted above, Laclau and Mouffe (1985:4) Laclau and Mouffe can be divided into three
insist that their discourse theory is both post- phases. These can be described in terms of
Marxist and post-Marxist. That is to say, whereas the historical situation, the main target of their
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160 Jacob Torfing
Table 7.1. The Three Phases of Laclau and Mouffe’s Intellectual Development
A Gramscian Critique The Elaboration of a Toward a New Type of

of Structural Marxism Poststructuralist Discourse Postmodern Theorizing
(the 1970s) Theory (the 1980s) (the 1990s)
Historical Post-1968 era and The rise of the New Right The surge of
situation emerging crisis of the and the recognition of postcommunist identity
“social democratic” the political impotency politics and particular
welfare state of the Left multiculturalist
interpretations
Main target of Criticize structural Criticize the last remnant of Criticize the structuralist
critique and Marxism for its class essentialism in Gramsci account of subjectivity
sources of reductionism and its and use poststructuralist and use Lacanian
inspiration economic determinism theory to make further psychoanalysis to
and use Gramsci to insist theoretical advance advance new theory of
on the independent role the subject and the
of hegemonic politics political construction of
subjectivity
Theoretical Notion of popular The development of a Distinction between social
contribution antagonism (nonclass consistent theory about antagonisms and the
interpellation) that is still discourse, hegemony, dislocations that reveals
seen as overdetermined and criss-crossing social the undecidability of the
by class antagonism antagonisms that social and opens the
emphasizes the primacy space for its rearticulation
of politics around empty signifiers
Political project A democratic socialism A radical plural democracy An agonistic democracy
advanced that can articulate the that displaces the struggle that reconciles
demands of the new for liberty and equality to democracy and
social movements all spheres of society antagonism
critique, and its sources of inspiration; the most that did not follow the economic and political
significant theoretical contribution; and the po- dividing lines between the social classes (Laclau,
litical project advocated. An overview of the 1977; Mouffe, 1979, 1981). The implicit asser-
three phases of development is provided in tion was that such a theory would help to make
Table 7.1. the struggle for democratic socialism more sen-
As already noted, the events of May 1968 sitive to the demands of popular movements.
stimulated the interest in the struggle against the In the second phase – the 1980s – the rise of
dominant ideology. In addition, the emerging the New Right clearly demonstrated the fail-
crisis of the welfare state shattered the belief in ure of the Left to win the battle of the hearts
crisis-free, rational state planning and intensified and minds of the general population. The dev-
popular struggles against the bureaucratization, astating result was that a large fraction of the
commodification, and homogenization of social British working class voted for the Conservative
relations. This led to a strengthening of the Left, Thatcher government. Laclau and Mouffe saw
which in turn stimulated the interest in Marxist the dogmatic assertion of the primacy of class
theory. Structural Marxism was extremely fash- and economy as a major obstacle to the rein-
ionable among left-wing intellectuals. However, vigoration of the Left, and they criticized the
Laclau and Mouffe criticized its essentialist as- last remnant of essentialism in Gramsci, who
sertions of the necessary class belonging of all still asserted that only the fundamental classes
ideological elements and the economic deter- were capable of exercising hegemony (Laclau
mination in the last instance, and sought to de- and Mouffe, 1985). The social classes owed their
velop a theory about ideological interpellations privileged role in the struggle for hegemony to
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their structural position in the sphere of proof identity formation. Inspired by Žižek’s in-
duction, which provided a nonpolitical anchor- terpretation of Lacanian psychoanalysis (Žižek,
age point for the political struggles. However, 1989, 1990), Laclau and Mouffe aimed to de-
by questioning the idea of a determining cen- velop a theory of the political construction of
ter of society and by insisting on the political identity through processes of identification that
structuration of the economic field, Laclau and are prompted by the dislocation of the sub-
Mouffe not only effectively eliminated the last ject prior to its subjectivation (Laclau, 1990).
element of essentialism, but also paved the way The articulation of different points of identi-
for the development of a poststructuralist the- fication is conditioned by the construction of
ory of discourse, hegemony, and social antag- an antagonistic frontier, which in the language
onism that asserts the primacy of the political of Carl Schmitt divides friends from enemies
over the social. In addition, the resultant post- (Mouffe, 1992). The problem now becomes
Marxist and poststructuralist theory of discourse how to reconcile the ineradicable presence of
opposed the privileging of the socialist strug- social antagonism with a plural democracy. This
gle for the common ownership of the means can be achieved through the development of
of production. Indeed, socialism is now seen an agonistic democracy, which aims to turn
as but one element in a broader struggle for a “enemies” into “adversaries” who agree on
radical and plural democracy. Throughout the the basic rules of plural democracy, while dis-
history of modern society, the egalitarian logic agreeing on their interpretation and their im-
of democracy has proven its ability to mobi- plications for now to organize society (Mouffe,
lize popular antagonistic fronts directed against 1993).
different kinds of oppression. However, it is im- The cumulative effect of the continuities and
portant to combine the struggle for democratic discontinuities in Laclau and Mouffe’s intel-
equality with the struggle for pluralism in order lectual development is the advancement of an
to avoid totalitarian assertions of the democratic increasingly refined theory that is organized
identity between the ruler and the ruled. Hence, around the key concepts of discourse, hege-
democracy should be plural, and the inherent mony, social antagonism, dislocation, and the
conflict between equality and liberty is exactly split subject. Before proceeding to clarify the
what prevents the elimination of the political. precise meaning of these concepts, it should be
Finally, it is argued that a further radicalization of noted that the kind of theory which they put
political, rather than economic, liberalism must forward is neither a substantive theory covering
extend the demand for equality and liberty to a particular field or subfield nor an elaborate sys-
all spheres of society and aim to unify the strug- tem of analytical categories and typologies that
gles of the new social movements in a progres- aims to map the world in an isomorphic way.
sive hegemonic project (Mouffe, 1988, 1989, Instead, it provides a consistent set of concepts
1992). and arguments that enables us to answer old and
The 1990s, the third phase of the develop- new research questions in a way that takes se-
ment of their writings, is marked by the end riously the assertion of the contingency of all
of the Cold War and the subsequent surge of social identities.
a multiplicity of nationalist, ethnical, religious,
cultural, sexual, and postmaterialist struggles for
the construction and assertion of a new set of Discourse
identities. Some multiculturalist interpretations
of the new identity politics abandoned the idea Discourse is defined as a relational ensemble of
of universal values and celebrated the radical signifying sequences that provides the condi-
particularism of authentic identities. The new tions of emergence of any meaningful object.
identity politics made it pretty obvious that the This does not deny the existence of real ob-
structuralist account of subjectivity in terms of jects outside discourse, but simply asserts that
its structural locations within a discursive for- the construction of such objects as meaningful
mation was unable to account for the dynamics always take place within discourse.
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162 Jacob Torfing
The notion of discourse has its distant roots within a wider social realm. Whereas this might
in classical transcendentalism (Laclau, 1993). provide an accurate description of the concept
Like Kantian transcendentalism, it focuses on of discourse found in the early works of Fou-
the conditions of possibility for our percep- cault, it certainly misses the nature of the con-
tions, utterances, and actions rather than on the cept in the works of Laclau and Mouffe (1985).
factual immediacy or hidden meaning of the As already mentioned, Laclau and Mouffe re-
world. However, there are two important dif- ject the distinction between the discursive and
ferences between classical transcendentalism and the nondiscursive and insist on the interweav-
poststructuralist discourse theory. First, whereas ing of the semantic aspects of language and the
classical transcendentalism conceives the condi- pragmatic aspects of action. Hence, discourse is
tions of possibility as ahistorical and invariable, coextensive with the social and takes the form
discourse theory insists on their historical vari- of a series of overlapping language games.
ability. That is to say, the transcendental condi- In the concrete analysis of discourse, we
tions are not purely transcendental, but a provi- must pay attention to the way that identity is
sional horizon of meaning that is continuously constructed through relations of difference and/or
changed by empirical events (Laclau, 2000:76). relations of equivalence. Sometimes it is the differ-
Second, although classical transcendentalism is ential aspect of the social identities that is em-
still in some sense anchored in an idealist con- phasized (this is the case in the modern welfare
ception of the subject as the willful creator of state, which expands a differential logic by con-
the world, discourse theory conceives the quasi- structing everybody as legitimate differences).
transcendental conditions as a structural feature of At other times, it is the equivalential “same-
discourse. The subject itself is conceived as a part ness” of the different identities that is empha-
of discourse and analyzed in terms of its different sized (this is the case in a revolutionary situation
positions within the discursive structure. where everyone is constructed either as a part of
The deconstruction of totalizing and deter- the people or as a part of the repressive regime).
ministic structures leads directly to the notion The balance between the differential and equiv-
of discourse. The classical notion of structure alential character of social identity is a result of
is another name for the totalizing closure of a political struggles.
topography, construction, or architecture whose The construction of relations of equivalence
internal order is determined by a privileged cen- is a result of what Sigmund Freud in his Interpre-
ter. However, according to Derrida (1978:279), tation of Dreams (Freud, 1986) called overdetermi-
the idea of an ultimate center is contradictorily nation. Overdetermination occurs at the sym-
coherent as it assumes that the center structures bolic level and may take the form of either
the entire structure while itself escaping the very condensation or displacement. Condensation
process of structuration. Discourse theory takes involves the fusion of a variety of significa-
the consequence of this and abandons the idea tions and meanings into a single unity. Dis-
of an ultimate center, which is given in its full placement involves the transferral of the signi-
presence beyond the reach of the play of mean- fication or meaning of one particular identity
ing. By giving up the idea of a determining to another identity. In Lacanian psychoanalytic
center, the process of signification extends al- theory, condensation becomes equivalent to
most infinitely. In this situation, everything be- metaphor, whereas displacement becomes equiv-
comes discourse in the sense of being consti- alent to metonymy. An example here would be
tuted within relational ensembles of signifying the metonymical relation of contiguity between
sequences that in the absence of an ultimate cen- different ethnic groups working together to sup-
ter are organized around a multiplicity of mu- port each other’s social and political demands,
tually substituting centers that fail to invoke a but without thereby developing a common
totalizing closure. cause or identity. The bonds between the differ-
A common misunderstanding is that dis- ent groups might be strengthened in the wake
course merely designates a linguistic region of a right-wing populist attack on refugees and
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immigrants, which could lead to a metaphorical example, an ethnic identity is articulated with
unification of these groups around a common a class identity, both identities are transformed.
perception of who they are and for what they The class identity can no longer be expressed in
are fighting. purely economic terms, and the ethnic identity
A discursive field might be unified by par- has to show its relevance for economic struggles.
ticular nodal points, such as “communism,” Articulations that involve the production of
“welfare,” “globalization,” and so forth. These political frontiers are defined as hegemonic ar-
are signifiers without any precise content that ticulations. Hegemony is an articulatory practice
function to construct a knot of meaning which aiming to establish a political as well as moral–
fixes the differential identity of a variety of social intellectual leadership. According to Gramsci
identities. For example, “globalization” confers (1971), a political force becomes hegemonic
a certain meaning to terms like “regulation,” insofar as it succeeds to transgress its own in-
“competitiveness,” “the state,” and so forth. terests and present itself as the expression of a
Hence, we see how in neoliberal discourse the collective will with a national and popular char-
reference to “globalization” tends to redefine acter. Lenin saw hegemony merely as the work-
“regulation” in terms of “the need for deregula- ing class’s political leadership of a broad class al-
tion,” “competitiveness” in terms of “structural liance that was made possible by the exceptional
competitiveness,” and “state” in terms of “the situation in Russia, where the bourgeoisie was
enabling state.” to weak to carry out its own revolution and
It should be noted that the fixation of identity capitalism was too scarcely developed to foster
within discourse only results in a partial fixation a large working class. Trotsky insisted that the
of meaning. There will always be something that “uneven and combined development” in Russia
escapes the seemingly infinite process of signi- was a general condition in the Western coun-
fication within discourse. The partial fixation tries and thereby expanded the scope of valid-
of identity produces an irreducible surplus of ity of the contingent logic of hegemony. But it
meaning that is not captured by the logic of dis- was Gramsci who changed the content of the
course. The field of irreducible surplus meaning notion of hegemony by showing that the forg-
is termed the discursive, or the field of discursiv- ing of a political and moral–intellectual lead-
ity, in order to indicate that what is not fixed ership involved the articulation of a variety of
within discourse is not extra- or non-discursive, ideological elements into a common political
but is discursively constructed within a terrain project that modifies the identity of the politi-
of unfixity. The field of discursivity provides, at cal forces behind it. Laclau and Mouffe further
the same time, the condition of possibility and radicalized Gramsci’s concept of hegemony by
impossibility of discourse. On the one hand, it removing the ontological assumptions behind
provides the differential trace structure that ev- the assertion that only the proletariat and the
ery fixation of meaning must necessarily pre- bourgeoisie are capable of exercising hegemony
suppose. On the other hand, it provides an am- (Gramsci, 1971:161, 182).
biguous realm that overflows and subverts the Conceiving hegemony as an articulatory
attempt to fix identity within a stable discourse practice that unifies a discursive field around
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:111). a nodal point always involves an element of
ideological totalization (Laclau, 1996a). How-
ever, ideology can no longer be seen as a
Hegemony distorted representation of social reality, as
the latter is always-already constructed in and
Discourse is a result of articulation, which is through discourse. Ideology still involves dis-
defined as a practice that establishes a rela- tortion, not of how things really are, but of
tion among elements such that their identities the undecidability of all social identity. As
are mutually modified as a result of that prac- such, ideology constructs social identity as a
tice (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:105). When, for part of a totalizing horizon that denies the
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164 Jacob Torfing
contingency and precariousness of the constituted identity, whereas in social antagonism
structed identities. Ideology may take the form the identity of A is problematized by an antag-
of a myth or a social imaginary (Laclau, 1990). onizing force. In the case of a social antago-
A myth provides a reading principle that per- nism, A cannot be fully A because it is negated
mits the political actors to interpret the cause of by anti-A. However, social antagonism does not
societal crisis in a certain way by emphasizing simply counterpose a positive, differential pole
particular empirical events and by suggesting a with a negative, equivalential pole. For when
particular solution to the crisis. Hence, a myth confronted with an antagonizing otherness, the
constructs a surface for the inscription of partic- differential moments of the negated discourse
ular social demands. A myth is transformed into tend to become articulated in a chain of equiva-
a social imaginary when the symbolic and imagi- lence that expresses their sameness vis-à-vis the
nary content of its story line begins to dominate enemy. We shall return to this problematique
the empirical events that it inscribes. Hence, in later. section 5.
a social imaginary the mythical construction of
a crisis-ridden situation is transformed into an
unlimited horizon for the inscription of any so- Dislocation
cial demand.
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), social
antagonism is held responsible for the “impossi-
Social Antagonism bility of society.” The argument is that social an-
tagonism introduces a radical negativity, which
The limits and unity of a hegemonic discourse prevents society from forming a fully constituted
cannot be constituted by reference to an inner symbolic order. However, according to Žižek,
essence. Neither can it be constituted in relation the social identities negated in a social antago-
to an external element that is different from the nism are always-already negated. In other words,
moments within the discourse, because in that the negation of a social identity in a social an-
case the outside is reduced to simply one more tagonism is always the negation of a negation.
difference within the discursive system. Hence, Žižek (1990) points to the effects of the Laca-
the construction of the limits and unity of a nian real, which is an unrepresentable kernel of
hegemonic discourse involves the positing of a negativity that reveals the ultimate failure of any
constitutive outside that has no common mea- symbolic order to constitute a completely su-
sure with the discourse in question. Instead, it tured space.
constitutes a threat to the differential order of the Žižek’s intervention led Laclau (1990) to re-
discourse (Laclau, 1996b). The construction of formulate his position. A theoretical division of
a radical and threatening otherness is a result of labor is established between dislocation, which is
the exclusion of a series of discursive elements responsible for the disruption of the discursive
that are articulated in a chain of equivalence order, and social antagonism, which reconstructs
which collapses the differential character of the the limits and unity of the discursive order
excluded elements. The chain of equivalence while simultaneously preventing its closure. A
expresses a certain sameness of the excluded el- hegemonic discourse is dislocated when new
ements, but as the number of elements increases, events cannot be domesticated, integrated, or
it becomes clear that the only thing they have explained by the discursive system. A discursive
in common is that they pose a threat to the disorder is normally quite flexible and thus capable
course in question (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). of inscribing a wide range of new events and
This clearly shows why social antagonism has developments. However, discourse only leads
nothing in common with either a “real opposi- to a partial fixation of identity. It is therefore
tion” in which A clashes with B or with a “log- bound to come up against events that it can-
ical contradiction” in which A is contradicted not inscribe in its symbolic matrix. The fail-
by non-A. In both cases A remains a fully con- ure to domesticate new events will lead to a
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complete or partial breakdown of the symbolic self-denial or seek to establish an illusionary full
order. Dislocation shows itself in a structural or identity in and through processes of identifi-
organic crisis in which there is a proliferation of cation. Identity is not the cause of the actors’
floating signifiers. A good example of disloca- political identifications. On the contrary, iden-
tion is the stagflation crisis that hit many West- tity is a result of the split subject’s identification
ern economies in the beginning of the 1970s. with political discourses that promise to con-
Keynesianism was stalemated by the joint oc- struct a fully achieved subjectivity by eliminat-
currence of rising unemployment and rising ing the source of all evil (Laclau, 1990; Butler,
inflation. Laclau, and Žižek, 2000). Hegemonic struggles
Dislocation reveals the undecidability of the aim to articulate the different points of identi-
social and opens a terrain for totalizing hege- fication into a credible political project, which
monic attempts to heal the rift in the dislocated attempts to solve the problems at hand in accor-
structure of society. As such, dislocation is the dance with the cherished values of the commu-
condition of possibility of political action. With- nity and the institutionalized understanding of
out the disruption of the social order, there can what is appropriate action.
be no hegemonic politics. However, this is not Taken together, the five key concepts and the
merely replacing an essentialist grounding of so- related arguments provide the basis for a new
ciety in a fully present positivity with an equally type of postmodern theorizing. The concepts
essentialist grounding of society in the abyss of may prove to be of great value in empirical
pure negativity. With the assertion of a radical analysis of social and political phenomena, but
negativity, the concept of “grounding” loses its the task of further elaborating and operational-
meaning. That is to say, whereas one can de- izing the conceptual framework remains. For,
rive a whole series of determinate effects from a as David Howarth (2000) remarks, there is still
positively defined essence, nothing follows from a gap between some of the abstract ontological
negativity except the contingent political strug- concepts and the need for concepts dealing with
gle about how to suture the dislocated social the ontic level. The task of filling this gap is a
space (Laclau, 2000:184). challenge that is currently taken up by numerous
students of discourse.
The Split Subject

discourse theory: accused
The recurrent dislocations of the discursive sys- and defended
tems means that the subject cannot be conceived
in terms of its structural position within dis- Two accusations against poststructuralist dis-
course, such as structuralist thinkers have done course theory are repeatedly voiced. The first
it. Discourse theory sides with the structuralists claims that discourse theory leads to a relativist
in their critique of the notion of a free, atom- gloom and the second that discourse theory
istic subject. The subject is internal to the struc- lapses into idealism. The charge of relativism
ture, but because of the constant dislocations contends that because there are no ultimate
that disrupt the discursive order, the subject al- foundations and everything is discursive, we
ways emerges as a split subject. The subject has end up in a situation where everything is equ-
neither a fully achieved structural identity nor ally true, right, or good (Geras, 1987, 1990;
a complete lack of identity, but rather a failed Howard, 1989). This makes it impossible to
structural identity (Laclau, 1990). The subject defend any particular set of claims or values.
cannot be what it is because of the dislocating The premise of the argument is correct because
events that function to disrupt the symbolic or- discourse theory insists that there is no extradis-
der of society. cursive truth, moral, or ethics (Rorty, 1989;
In this situation, the split and trauma- Mouffe, 1996). However, the conclusion is
tized subject will either lapse into paralyzing wrong, as we never arrive at a situation where
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166 Jacob Torfing
everything is equally valid. We always find our- or false, but the world cannot determine the vo-
selves placed within a particular discourse that cabulary by which we render the material enti-
provides us with a set of historically contingent ties, events, and feelings intelligible.
criteria for determining what is true, right, and Discourse theory is not only realist, but also
good. Only God is capable of transcending all materialist in the sense that it claims that the dis-
discursivity; we mortals are stuck within partic- cursive forms which render the world intelligi-
ular discursive frameworks that define our cri- ble cannot be reduced to a reflection of the im-
teria for judging something to be true, right, manent essence of either the experienced object
or good. However, if we were trapped within or the experiencing subject. Discursive forms
unified, closed and self-reproducing discourses, are determined in and through their relation to
the possibility of an agonistic dialogue between other discursive forms within signifying systems
different discursive truth claims would be im- that are constantly disrupted by dislocation and
possible. The different cultures, traditions, and hegemonic interventions. The dream of a total
contexts that condition our truth claims are con- fixation of a discursive system of forms that fi-
stantly rearticulated through processes of dis- nally describes the world as it really is will never
integration, mutual influence, and antagonistic come true as the Lacanian real constitutes a un-
conflict. They cannot be protected from contes- domesticable kernel which prevents the sym-
tation and contamination as their boundaries are bolic order of discourse from fully constituting
continuously permeated and redrawn. It is this itself. It is this destabilization of the discursively
ongoing destabilization of the multiple contexts constructed forms that maintains the irreducible
of cognitive, normative, and ethical judgment distance between form and matter, which is the
that facilitates a common political dialogue and defining trait of a materialist position.
can prevent a violent clash between pure and Finally, discourse theory can be said to be rad-
self-enclosed particularities. ical in the sense that the material entities, whose
The charge of idealism holds that the idea that forms are constructed in and through discourse,
everything is discursively constructed leads to an are not simply awaiting their discursive significa-
idealist denial of the independent existence of tion which can then be said to provide a more or
reality (Geras, 1987; Woodiwiss, 1990). How- less correct representation of social reality. Ac-
ever, against this accusation it can be argued cording to Žižek (1989), the material entities are
that poststructuralist discourse theory is a realist retroactively constituted by the discursive forms
and materialist constructivism of a radical kind through which they are signified. Hence, the
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1987; Torfing, 1999). Dis- tendentially empty signifier “welfare state” pro-
course theory is realist in that it asserts that matter vides a reference point for the construction of a
exists independently of our language, thoughts, relative unity of institutions, policies, and social
and consciousness. However, matter only be- practices that together are signified as “welfare
comes intelligible for us when it is joined with state.”
a discursively constructed form. A spheric ob-
ject at the bottom of the sea becomes a “min-
eral” in the hands of a geologist, a “projec- the retroactive construction
tile” in the hands of a desperate soldier, and a of the social basis of politics
“ball” when a child kicks it down the street.
A less trivial example would be that the bomb- If political science studies how politics shapes
ing campaign against Serbia becomes a “military policy within a certain polity, political sociology
aggression” in the discourse of Serbian nation- inquires into the social basis of politics and the
alists and a “humanitarian intervention” within state. This raises the important question about
the discourse of UN officials. When social and the role and impact of class, ethnicity, gender,
political identities are initially constructed and and so on for the form and function of the
classified within discourse, we can judge propo- state and the political struggles that take place
sitional statements about the world as being true within and outside it.
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Recently, the notion of class has lost its ca- particular demands through democratic strug-
pacity to function as the articulating core around gles that give rise to conflicts within limited so-
which all political identity is constituted (Laclau, cietal sectors. Hence, students demand better
2000:296–301). The working class is in decline financial support, the workers demand higher
both numerically and in terms of its organiza- wages, women demand equal opportunities in
tional strength. At the same time, class identity the labor market, environmentalist groups de-
is decentered by internal divisions and by the mand tough regulation of industrial emissions,
participation of the working classes in a general- and so on. If these particular demands are met
ized mass culture. Finally, the location of social by the system, the basis for political conflict will
agents in the productive process seems to lose disappear. On the contrary, if they are not met –
its centrality in determining their identity. The either because they are rejected by the govern-
decentering of class has thus far led to its in- ment for political reasons or because a socioe-
sertion into an enumerative chain together with conomic crisis makes it impossible for them to
other identities that are considered capable of be met – the particular groups will share with
producing a political frontier within a limited each other a feeling of frustration because of
social space. In the absence of a political iden- the negation of their demands and will stand up
tity capable of unifying the other identities due against the negating force, with hopes of over-
to its ontologically and epistemologically privi- coming their loss of identity through political
leged position, politics becomes a babel of mul- action. Despite the different content of the par-
tiple voices that is often referred to as identity ticular demands, they will all be united in their
politics. opposition to the system.
The danger implicit to some multicultural- What unites the particular groups is the con-
ist interpretations of identity politics lies in the struction of a chain of equivalence that empha-
conception of the multifarious identities as sepa- sizes a universalizing sameness of the negated
rate, self-defined, and authentic identities whose demands. As the particular identities might not
particular demands should be reinforced rather share any positively defined interest, the same-
than compromised through political struggle. At ness constructed by the chain of equivalence can
the theoretical level, the problem is that the con- only be expressed by tendentially empty signi-
tingent and politically constructed character is fiers appealing to universal ideas about Freedom,
denied. At the political level, the problem is that Progress, Modernization, Revolution, the Peo-
the production of broad popular frontiers is pre- ple, and so on. The more the chain of equiva-
vented, leaving the state with a golden opportu- lence is extended, the more empty the signifiers
nity to deal with the particular demands of each of universality must be, in order to be able to
identity in a completely transformist manner. express, metaphorically, all the different negated
This will make it difficult to advance a progres- demands. However, there can be no completely
sive politics building on universalizing demands empty signifier, and thus no pure universality,
for freedom and equality. as a signifier always signifies something. There
Now, the solution to this problem does not, will be an ongoing struggle between different
as Žižek (2000) seems to suggest, lie in the dog- conceptions of universality, and the hegemonic
matic reassertion of the privileged role of a uni- attempt to widen a certain conception of uni-
versal class, but rather, as Laclau suggests, in ana- versality to include all other conceptions will
lyzing the contingent political recomposition of always fail to eliminate the reference to particu-
common political projects. We should not deny laristic interests. For example, it is often argued
the particularity of political identities, but insist that the universal expansion of human rights
on the possibility of articulating broad popular is an expression of the particular interests of
frontiers based on a hegemonic universality. Western capitalism.
In his argument, Laclau (1996b, 2000) pre- It should be noted that the universal dimen-
supposes the existence of different political sion of the chain of equivalence does not preex-
groups each aiming to advance their own ist the particular demands in terms of a common
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168 Jacob Torfing
recognition of the normative basis of society or project. This dilemma indicates the problems
a regulative idea of the future achievement of involved in making the transition from leading
the good life. Rather, the universal dimension a popular resistance movement to taking over
grows out of the negation of particularity and government office.
only exists as an attempt to symbolize the chain The argument of Laclau clearly shows that the
of equivalence that expresses the common feel- hegemonization of the empty universals con-
ing of a lack of identity. The empty universals structs the social basis of politics in a political
emerge as an attempt to positivise a radical neg- act of inclusion and exclusion. The universal-
ativity. The empty universals might provide im- ization of the demands of the hegemonic agent
portant reference points for the particular iden- may lead to a recomposition of its social basis as
tities, but they do not absorb the particularity of some people might leave the group while oth-
the negated identities into a universal dialectical ers join. Likewise, the particularization of the
unity. The particular identities remain split be- empty universals may include some particular
tween their own particularity and their universal groups in the hegemonic bloc while excluding
dimension. others. The conclusion is that although poli-
Because the universal dimension of the chain tics clearly has a social basis, this is constructed
of equivalence does not carry the means of its in and through hegemonic struggles. In other
own representation, a particular political agency words, politics cannot be read off its social basis,
must assume the task of expressing the univer- as the latter is retroactively constructed by the
salizing sameness of the negated identities. This politics it engenders.
process by which a particular group assumes the
function of universal representation is a hege-
monic operation as it involves seizing the po- the tasks ahead
litical and moral–intellectual leadership of an
alliance of popular resistance. The hegemonic In order to meet the rising expectations of the
operation will imply both a universalization of rapidly expanding, but still rather new and in-
particularity and a particularization of the uni- complete, research program of poststructural-
versal. Hence, on the one hand, the hegemonic ist discourse theory, some crucial theoretical,
agent will have to give up or modify its partic- methodological, and empirical tasks must be ful-
ular demands in order to be able to speak in the filled in the future.
name of the people. The universalization of the Theoretically, there is a need for a further
particular identity of the hegemonic agent will clarification of the status of poststructuralist dis-
often lead to its splitting into a group of hard- course theory (Žižek, 2000). The twin pitfalls
liners, who remain true to the original partic- consist either in insisting on the radical histori-
ularity, and a group of pragmatics who wish to cism of the historicist approach of discourse the-
fulfill the role of universal representation. ory and delimiting the validity of the different
On the other hand, the hegemonic agent’s ar- concepts and arguments to the historical, and
ticulation of a political project that incarnates a even textual, context in which they have been
certain conception of the universal will eventu- developed, or in viewing discourse theory as a
ally provide the empty universality with a par- transcendental truth about radical contingency,
ticular content that to some degree reflects the which could only be revealed in the present
hegemonic agent’s demands. In order to advance postmodern condition. Whereas the first option
the political struggle, the hegemonic agent will risks turning discourse analysis into a strictly lo-
have to operationalize the abstract appeal to cal storytelling exercise with no general validity,
empty universal signifiers. The transformation the second option betrays the discourse theo-
of the empty universals into concrete propos- retical insight into the contingency of all truth
als and legislation will further contribute to claims. Therefore, an important future task of
their particularization, and this means that more discourse theory is to find ways of recognizing
identities will be excluded from the political the historicity of its analytical categories without
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letting that recognition stand in the way of a changes its form. Hence, a discourse theoretical
pragmatic usage of these categories in different critique will take the form of a deconstructive
social and historical contexts. Hence, it might be attempt to denaturalize social objectivity by re-
that the hegemonic logic of politics only comes vealing the political process of inclusion and ex-
to the fore with the development of modern clusion that any totalizing hegemonic operation
mass society, but, as Laclau notes, we can still must necessarily involve (Laclau, 1996a). How-
use this logic to “interrogate the past, and find ever, it is not enough to show the contingency
there inchoate forms of the same processes that of essentialist claims and totalizing ideologies. A
are fully visible today; and, when they did not constructive political critique should be linked
occur, understand why things were different” to moral and ethical considerations. There is an
(Laclau, 2000:200). urgent need for analyzing the ethical substance
Another theoretical task is to develop further of the community (i.e., what Derrida refers to
the theoretical resources for understanding the as justice), which is impossible because it is in-
processes of sedimentation of politically constructed commensurable with any normative order (i.e.,
social identities and relations, the contribution what Derrida [1994] refers to as law) and neces-
of institutional frameworks to the stable repro- sary because it is constantly invested in particular
duction of historical forms of capitalism, and the normative orders. We should pay special atten-
path-dependent effects of institutionalized regimes tion to the processes through which this eth-
on the path-shaping hegemonic strategies (see ical substance is constructed through political
Mouzelis, 1988; Torfing, 1998). The theoretical decisions that are not predetermined by some
emphasis on contingency, dislocation and un- aprioristic normativity, but, nevertheless, taken
decidability, which was an important weapon within sedimented practices that constitute
in the struggle against rationalistic, determin- the normative framework of a certain society
istic and functionalistic theories, has discour- (Laclau, 2000:82–5). The distinction between
aged studies of the formation and formative an undecidable justice and an eminently decon-
effects of institutionalized discourse. Poststruc- structable law, and the attempt to show how the
turalist discourse theory can contribute signif- two are articulated through hegemonic oper-
icantly to the development of the expanding ations, provides a promising starting point for
field of (neo)institutional theory. This can be the future elaboration of constructivist account
achieved not only by questioning the objectivist of the relation between politics and ethics.
assumptions underlying much of the research in Many people are struck by the imbalance be-
this field, but also by directing more attention tween the sophisticated and highly elaborated
to the crucial role of sedimented imaginaries, philosophical and theoretical framework of dis-
which is not fully captured by the present fo- course theory and the crude and scarcely de-
cus on the regulative, normative, and cognitive veloped account of questions about research
dimensions of institutions. However, the real- strategy and methodology. This can be largely
ization of this potential requires a serious theo- explained by the postpositivist and even anti-
retical engagement with institutional analysis. epistemological stance of discourse theory,
The last theoretical task to mentioned in this which rejects the need for a scientific method
context is the need to further theorize the im- enabling us to confront theoretical statements
plications of discourse theory for critique, normativity, with empirical facts. Unfortunately, the cri-
and ethical questions (see Critchley, 1998; Žižek, tique of epistemology has thrown the baby
1999). Critique of political claims and ideolo- out with the bathwater, as poststructuralist dis-
gies can no longer take the form of an appeal course theorists have paid little attention to method-
to universal values or the presence of an undis- ological questions (see Howarth, 1998; Howarth
torted reality. Both values and reality are revealed and Torfing, 2004). Of course, we should not
as malleable discursive constructs and, thus, fail seek to elaborate an authoritative methodolog-
to provide a solid foundation of critique. This ical rulebook telling us how to apply discourse
does not make critique impossible, but radically theory in empirical studies. Research is not
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170 Jacob Torfing
about following rules, but rather about bend- lem of how discourse analysts should handle this
ing and inventing rules as an instance of their implication cannot be reduced to a conflict be-
usage. However, discourse analysts need to de- tween the normativity of the discourse analyst
velop some more explicit, systematic, and self- and the factual character of the empirical field.
critical reflections about the formative usage of Normative and descriptive aspects cannot be en-
methodological rules. During the research pro- tirely separated, but are articulated both in the
cess, discourse analysts are confronted with a discourse of the analyst and the discourse to be
series of choices about how to conduct their analyzed (Laclau, 2000:80). Hence, the problem
analyses. There are crucial questions about how poses itself as a question of the effects of intertex-
to narrow down the theoretical and empirical tuality, that is, the effects of an interface between
scope of analysis; how to select the case or cases different texts. There is no way of preventing the
to be studied; how to select and blend differ- construction of such an interface, but we need to
ent kinds of qualitative, and even quantitative, find ways of assessing the effects of this intertex-
data; how to analyze data in a valid and reliable tuality. Again, the question is not simply one of
way; how to be sensitive to unexpected and re- the impact of the researcher’s pre-interpretations
calcitrant interpretations of events; and how to on the interpretative understanding of the dis-
integrate theoretical and empirical arguments course, but of the active construction of certain
in a fruitful way. All these important questions interpretations in the meeting between the re-
should be dealt with in a much more explicit searcher and the discourse to be analyzed. It is
way and ought to be subjected to careful argu- the form and impact of this meeting that needs
ments about the consequences of the choices further investigation at a general theoretical, as
made. well as practical, level.
Another important methodological task re- Although poststructuralist discourse theory
lates to the more fundamental question of informs an increasing number of empirical stud-
research strategy (see Howarth, 2000). Different ies in a wide range of areas (see Dyrberg,
problematiques call for different research strate- Hansen, and Torfing, 2000; Howarth, Norval,
gies. If we want to show the contingency of and Stavrakakis, 2000; Norval, 1996; Smith,
“Frenchness,” as it is constructed within the na- 1994; Torfing, 1998), there are important em-
tionalist discourse of right-wing populism, we pirical tasks to carry out. First of all, we need sys-
need to adopt a deconstructive research strategy, tematic in-depth studies of empirical phenomena
which is quite different from the kind of hege- that clearly take us beyond the level of illustra-
monic power analytics to be used in the analysis tive examples of theoretical arguments and the-
of the outcome of political struggles over envi- oretically informed redescription of a series of
ronmental regulation. In short, discourse ana- events. However, it is not enough that empirical
lysts need to be more explicit about what they analysis is rich and detailed. It must also be sys-
choose to look for in empirical analysis, why tematic so as to avoid impressionistic accounts,
they want to look for it, how they are going to thus permitting other researchers to follow the
do it, and what kind of research results they are various steps in the analysis. Systematicity could
likely to obtain. be enhanced through a more rigorous applica-
At an even more basic level, there is a great tion of various techniques of textual analysis. Of
need for reflections about the role of the researcher. course, such methods should not be applied in
Already Foucault (1986a) gave up the idea of an instrumental way, and they will never short-
the discourse analyst as a neutral spectator who circuit the toils of empirical discourse analysis.
deciphers discourse from a point outside of it. However, a pragmatic usage of textual analysis
The discourse analyst is implicated in the power methods will help to scrutinize empirical mate-
struggles that take place within or around the rial in a more systematic manner.
discourse in question, and brings his or her own An important, and yet unfulfilled, ambition
discursivity into play in the analysis. The prob- in empirical discourse analysis is carefully to
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show the merits of adopting a discourse theo- Last but not least, the current trend toward
retical perspective. The comparative advantage addressing core issues of political sociology and po-
of discourse theory in analyzing empirical phe- litical science should be continued. Not only will
nomena and events should be brought out more it help to prevent the theoretical marginaliza-
clearly by highlighting the strengths and weak- tion of discourse theory while advancing its ar-
nesses of discourse theory vis-à-vis other the- gumentative and conceptual resources, but it
ories. The aim of this exercise should be to will also further stimulate the dialogue between
show that poststructuralist discourse theory is poststructuralist discourse theorists and more
not merely covering other aspects than the more traditional mainstream theories. This will hope-
traditional theories, but opens up new and better fully benefit everybody and help to renew polit-
ways of dealing with key problems of political ical sociology as a key element in contemporary
sociology. social science.
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chapter eight
Rational Choice Theories in Political Sociology1
Edgar Kiser and Shawn Bauldry
Rational choice theory has been dramatically political sociology, we include seminal works
transformed in the past few decades. Many from political science and economics in our dis-
economists are abandoning the sparse mathe- cussions. Third, we discuss the scope of rational
matical models that dominated neoclassical eco- choice theory, arguing that it will be useful for
nomics in favor of the more complete and nu- many but not all problems of interest to political
anced pictures of institutions, organizations, and sociologists.
action advocated by the “new institutionalism”
(North, 1981, 1990; Williamson, 1975) and
“behavioral economics” (Thaler, 1991). Ratio- sociological rational choice theory:
nal choice theory in political science and soci- a brief outline
ology has taken further steps in that direction by
developing much broader arguments at both the This section outlines a sociological version of
micro and macro levels. The intellectual diffu- rational choice theory (Hechter, 1987; Hechter
sion of rational choice is best described as a com- and Kanazawa, 1997; Brinton, 1988; Levi, 1988,
plex form of assimilation, in which ideas from 1997; Coleman, 1990; Kiser, 1994, 1999; Adams,
economics have both shaped and been shaped 1996; Brustein, 1996; Boudon, 1982, 1996; Lin-
by their new disciplinary contexts. We believe denberg, 1989; Brinton and Nee, 1998).2 Ra-
the new theoretical model that is emerging from tional choice theory consists of separate argu-
this process – which we call a sociological rational ments pertaining to the motives and goals of
choice theory (in contrast to the traditional neo- individual actors and to models of the condi-
classical approach) – has much to contribute to tions within which their action takes place. The
political sociology.
This chapter has three main goals. First, we 2
We believe that this version of rational choice (in
outline the core features of sociological rational contrast to neoclassical economics) has classical roots in
choice theory. Second, we summarize the con- the work of Max Weber (Kiser, 1999; Kiser and Baer,
tributions of rational choice theory to political in press; Swedberg, 1998; Norkus, 2001). Both perspec-
tives rely on methodological individualism, assumptions
sociology in three areas: the analysis of insti- about intentional action, and the use of abstract models
tutions, culture, and history. As rational choice of organizational and institutional structures. Like ear-
has only recently made significant inroads in lier readings of Weber (Parsons, 1937; Bendix, 1977;
Collins, 1986), our interpretation is shaped by our own
theoretical perspective. This rational choice interpreta-
1
We would like to thank all participants in the con- tion of Weber is roughly analogous in its intent to the
ference on “Theoretical Challenges to Political Sociol- analytical Marxism proposed by Jon Elster (1985) and
ogy” (May 2001, New York University) and two re- John Roemer (1986), and thus can be called Analytical
viewers for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Weberianism.
172
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Rational Choice Theories in Political Sociology 173
focus on motives derives from methodological general goals such as wealth, power, and prestige,
individualism. This does not imply reduction- as these have the advantages of being fungible
ism (Homans, 1964) – it means simply that all and having clear behavioral implications. More
complete explanations must include an analy- detailed specifications of preferences are some-
sis of individual motives and actions (Weber, times used. For example, Barry Weingast and
1968:13; Hechter, 1981; Coleman, 1986). Nor Michael Moran (1983) and Terry Moe (1985)
does it imply that corporate actors (classes, firms, were able to construct “ideological indexes” of
states) cannot be used in rational choice models, the Congress as a whole, even for relevant con-
only that their unity as “actors” must be justi- gressional committees and subcommittees. This
fied, not just assumed. type of detailed preference specification is very
Motives consist of orientations to action (ei- rare in rational choice models – the data avail-
ther consequentialist or nonconsequentialist) ability in this context make it possible.
and the goals of action. Instrumental action Rational choice is not just a microlevel
is consequentialist; nonconsequentialist actions theory – it is a multilevel theory that focuses on
are generally based on either values or emotions. explaining macrolevel outcomes, and it does so
Instrumental action provides the best starting with arguments that always combine macro and
assumption about microfoundations because: micro levels (Coleman, 1986, 1990; Friedman
(1) it is least ambiguous and therefore most un- and Hechter, 1988; Hechter and Kanazawa,
derstandable to the analyst; and (2) it yields clear 1997). In addition to microfoundations, ratio-
empirical implications.3 Instrumental micro- nal choice theory thus also requires abstract
foundations are used as ideal types, and as such macrolevel models of structures and relations.
they are also useful in that they clearly reveal These models sometimes come from within ra-
anomalies. To resolve these anomalies, modifi- tional choice theory (agency theory, optimal lo-
cations of the explanation should be made first cation theory, various types of game theory).
in the least central aspects of the theory, with However, sociological rational choice has also
successive movements to more central elements borrowed models from other parts of sociology
if that tack fails (Lakatos, 1978). More specifi- that are consistent with the microfoundations of
cally, look first at the way the social structural rational choice, such as network theory, Marxist
constraints specified by the model have been economics, and Weberian ideal types (Coleman,
operationalized in the particular case. Second, 1990; Przeworski, 1985; Elster, 1985; Roemer,
perhaps the wrong model has been used for the 1986; Adams, 1996; Gould, 2000; Kiser, 1994).
case (maybe the case is really a repeated game This chapter will show that standard crit-
as opposed to a one-shot game, or maybe it is a icisms of rational choice – that it is fatally flawed
chicken game instead of a prisoner’s dilemma). as a result of its inability to incorporate institu-
The next step is to reassess the microfoundations, culture, and history – are no longer valid.4
tional assumptions. Look first at the specifica- These were reasonable criticisms of rational
tion of the goals of actors – this is no doubt
the source of many of the incorrect predictions 4
Anthony Obserschall and Eric Leifer (1986) argued
in rational choice explanations. Finally, perhaps that rational choice theories too often assume that out-
the assumption of instrumental rationality is incomes are efficient and ignore the fact that power dif-
correct and some other form of action should ferentials often create and sustain inefficient institutions
and policies. Mark Granovetter (1985) claimed that many
be employed in the explanation. rational choice models ignore the fact that action is al-
One of the most difficult things to do in ways embedded in social contexts and that institutions,
rational choice models is to specify the goals networks, and culture often shape choice and action.
of action. Analysts generally begin by assuming Margaret Somers (1998) and Philip Gorski (2000) ar-
gued that rational choice theory cannot incorporate the
3
Weber (1968:5) argued that “[t]he interpretation of important effects of history and culture. Donald Green
such rationally purposeful action possesses, for the un- and Ian Shapiro (1994) listed several problems with ra-
derstanding of the choice of means, the highest degree tional choice theory, but their primary complaint is that
of verifiable certainty.” it has very little empirical support.
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174 Edgar Kiser and Shawn Bauldry
choice work in neoclassical economics, but so- Contemporary economists have begun to real-
ciological rational choice theory is responding ize something Adam Smith ([1776]1976) knew
to all of them by incorporating institutions, cul- all along6 – that all economies are embedded
ture, and history into their models (see also in institutional contexts and that the nature of
Brinton and Nee, 1998). As a result, rational these institutions has important effects on eco-
choice theorists are currently producing much nomic development and growth (for summaries,
more interesting analyses of politics.5 see Eggertson [1990] and Weingast [1996]). This
elaboration of the theory allows rational choice
to respond to Mark Granovetter’s (1985) crit-
rational choice models of icism that they ignore the embeddedness of
political institutions action.
Institutions are defined broadly in rational
Rational choice models in economics are choice theory as equilibria of extensive form
known for their parsimony. One of the ways games (Shotter, 1981; Calvert, 1995:57–93;
that neoclassical versions of rational choice have Bates et al., 1998:5).7 They are viewed as so-
simplified the world (in part to make the math- lutions to cooperation problems that are self-
ematics tractable) is to virtually ignore institu- enforcing (meaning that no actor in a position
tions. Gary Becker’s (1976) application of the to change the institution has an incentive to do
neoclassical model to several sociological top- so) and as mechanisms to resolve coordination
ics is a classic example: Everything at the macro problems through providing focal points (Kreps,
level is modeled as a market – there are mar- 1990; Alt and Alesina, 1996; Weingast, 1996).8
kets for crime, marriage, and children – as if This approach facilitates the use of game theory
the market was the only type of institution. to explain the origin of institutions and institu-
This is beginning to change, even within eco- tional change.
nomics, with the rise of the “new institution- Game theoretic models, however, often pro-
alism” (North, 1981, 1990; Williamson, 1975) duce multiple equilibria. In these cases, they fail
and the “new growth theory” (Barro, 2002). to generate clear predictions and thus are often
not helpful in testing models. Rational choice
theorists have developed the concept of “struc-
5
We do not attempt to discuss all aspects of rational ture induced equilibrium” to deal with multi-
choice theory that have addressed politics. Three things ple equilibria problems (Shepsle and Weingast,
might be especially conspicuous by their absence: spatial
models of politics derived from Anthony Downs (1957), 1987). The key to this argument is that par-
theories of war and international relations, and theo- ticular features of institutional structure push
ries of voting behavior. Downsian models of the “opti- toward one stable equilibrium point by limit-
mal location” of political parties have had little impact ing either the choices available to actors or the
on sociology, and we believe they are unlikely to due range of enforceable outcomes. If these institu-
to their highly mathematical nature (but see Burstein
[1999] for an interesting application of these ideas stress- tional features can be identified, the choice of
ing the role of public opinion in determining politi- one equilibrium among the many possible can
cal outcomes). With the exception of the literature on be explained. For example, Moe’s (1989) study
war and state making in historical sociology (Tilly, 1985, of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
1990; Ertman, 1997; Kiser and Linton, 2000), sociolo-
gists have shown little interest in the causes and conse-
quences of warfare. Therefore, although there is a great 6
It is no coincidence that the increased focus on in-
deal of interesting rational choice work in political sci- stitutions has been coupled with the revival of political
ence on this topic (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Bueno de economy, the core of classical economics.
Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Fearon, 1995), we do not 7
In extensive form games, actors move sequentially.
address it here. We ignore work on voting, in spite of The game is thus depicted as a series of branching actions
the fact that there has been a great deal of it in political and reactions, in a decision tree.
8
science, because we believe the small costs and bene- Focal points are basically shared understandings of
fits associated with voting make it beyond the scope of what is obvious and are generally produced by shared
rational choice theory (see below). culture, history, or personal experience.
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explains both its stability and its extremely cum- Edgar Kiser and Joshua Kane (2001) showed that
bersome administrative procedures. He noted the power of aristocrats and tax farmers often
that politicians creating bureaucratic agencies blocked administrative reforms in early modern
face an intertemporal control problem – the states – revolutions often broke the power of
next administration may have different policy entrenched aristocrats and thus facilitated some
goals and thus attempt to change the way the bureaucratizing reforms. Jack Knight (1992; see
agency works. In order to prevent this and make also Knight and Sened, 1995) developed a gen-
their policies more durable, creators of the EPA eral model of the formation of institutions fo-
enacted a series of complicated and rigid proce- cusing mainly on how power is used to control
dures that decreased the efficiency of the agency distributional outcomes.
somewhat, but made it much more difficult to George Tsebelis (1990:246) developed these
alter its functioning in the long term. arguments further by specifying the conditions
Another set of models of institutional change in which institutions will be based more on
focus on the role of incomplete information. For efficiency or more on distributive factors. He
example, Arthur Stinchcombe (1999) showed argued that when little information about the
that organizations grow toward areas of uncer- future is available, actors will attempt to con-
tainty, in an attempt to reduce it. Keith Krehbiel struct institutions that maximize efficiency,
(1991) and Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast whereas good information about the future
(1994) demonstrated that committees are im- leads to the creation of redistributive institu-
portant to Congress in part because they pro- tions. These theoretical developments provide
vide incentives to some actors to gather costly a strong response to critics who claim that ra-
but useful information, and Susanne Lohmann tional choice theory ignores the role of power
(1995, 1998) developed interesting models of in politics (Oberschall and Leifer, 1986). They
the informational functions of lobbying. may also be useful in providing more detailed
As rational choice models of institutions causal mechanisms for traditional sociological
moved from economics to political science and arguments focusing on power and conflict, such
sociology, analyses of their aggregate efficiency as Marxism (for a start, see Elster, 1985; Roemer,
effects (often based on functionalist logic in neo- 1986).
classical models)9 have been supplemented by Another area in which rational choice mod-
models focusing on power and distributional els of institutions have made substantial progress
effects. Through a consideration of the distri- is in understanding the management of jointly
butional effects of institutions, rational choice owned (“common pool”) resources. Garrett
theorists have developed a class of models that Hardin’s (1968) analysis of the “tragedy of the
explicitly incorporate power. William Riker’s commons” suggested that there is a strong
(1962) analysis of distributive politics, focus- tendency for collectively shared resources to
ing on the formation of “minimum winning be overexploited by self-interested individuals.
coalitions,” is an important early move in this This will lower the productivity of the resource,
direction. More recently, Robert Bates et al. in some cases exhausting or ruining it. Although
(1998) began their discussion of “analytic nar- this argument was theoretically compelling, it
ratives” by assuming that “coercion is as much a was soon confronted by a host of anomalies –
part of . . . life as are production, consumption, many common pool resource situations were
and exchange.” Geoffrey Garrett and Barry both long-lasting and efficient. These anoma-
Weingast (1993:185–6) also incorporated power lies were resolved by focusing on the role of
into their argument, in order to determine institutions. Most importantly, Elinor Ostrom
which of multiple possible equilibria are chosen. (1990) analyzed the wide variety of institutions
that have been used to solve problems of com-
9
The validity of this type of functionalism depends mon pool resources. She used game theory and
on the extent to which the existence of strong selection extensive empirical research to show that pri-
mechanisms can be demonstrated. vatization and state regulation are not the only
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two solutions to “commons” problems. Volun- the goals of politicians. The form of many of
tary self-organization often works – as the case the arguments is partly functionalist: Existing
of early modern peasant communities illustrates. institutional structures (procedures, monitoring
This work lays the foundation for analyses of systems, etc.) are explained by the agency prob-
the increasingly important international con- lems they presumably mitigate (Moe, 1990:224;
flicts over the control and protection of natural Fiorina, 1990:256).
resources that cross state boundaries. William Niskanen’s (1971) Bureaucracy and
Rational choice theorists in sociology have Representative Government is the classic rational
extended analyses of institutions to many di- choice analysis of agency problems in state pol-
verse spheres of society, including, but not lim- icy implementation. He argued that one of the
ited to, political institutions.10 Instead of treating main threats to contemporary democracy is that
the state as a unitary actor, as state-centered the- elected politicians are losing power relative to
ory has often done, the multilevel character of appointed bureaucrats. He assumed that bureau-
rational choice models allows for the state to be crats want to maximize the budget of the agency
disaggregated and analyses to consider interac- they control. They can use the fact that they
tions between different political actors. There- have better information than politicians to get
fore, they are in a position to further develop the inflated budgets for their agencies, so the state
insights of state-centered theory (Evans et al., becomes larger than either politicians or voters
1985). want it to be.
Because the central problem in all agency re-
lationships is information asymmetry, the bu-
an illustration of the new reaucrats have better information about both
institutionalism: agency theory the environment and their actions than politi-
cians do – agency analyses naturally tend to fo-
The implementation of state policy, a classic is- cus on politicians monitoring bureaucrats. It is
sue in Weberian political sociology (and one of thus surprising that there seems to be very little
Weber’s main concerns), has recently been ad- direct monitoring of bureaucratic agencies by
dressed by rational choice theorists using agency their political principals (Weingast and Moran,
theory. This allows us to assess the extent to 1983; Hammond and Knott, 1996).12 This dis-
which contemporary rational choice models covery led some to conclude that Weber (1968)
improve on Weber’s work. There is now a fairly and Niskanen (1971) must be right, that bureau-
large literature, mostly in political science, ap- cracies are indeed beyond the control of politi-
plying agency theory to a Weberian question: cians. However, this still leaves a critical question
How can rulers (usually democratically elected unanswered: Why are politicians hardly even
officials) control the bureaucratic agencies to trying to monitor them? The main answer of-
which they have delegated the power to im- fered by “congressional dominance” arguments
plement state policies?11 The focus has been on (Weingast and Moran, 1983; Weingast, 1984)
institutional responses to the problem of “bu- is that Congress is in fact able to adequately
reaucratic drift” – the tendency for the actions control bureaucratic agencies, but that they use
of a bureaucratic agency to “drift away” from means other than direct monitoring. Matthew
McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984:166)
10
For another example, Rosemary Hopcroft (1999)
noted that direct monitoring is very expensive,
drew on Douglass North’s (1981) model of institutions so principals have strong incentives to find less
to analyze the importance of different types of agrarian
social relations for economic development.
11 12
Roberto Michels’s (1915/1959) argument about There is of course some direct monitoring of bu-
the “iron law of oligarchy” is another classical analy- reaucratic agencies, by organizations including the Con-
sis of an agency problem – in this case, party members gressional Budget Office and the General Accounting
(principals) are unable to adequately control their leaders Office (using hearings, investigations, evaluation re-
(agents) as the party grows larger and more organized. search, and budget reviews).
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costly strategies. One way to compensate for that various types of administrative proce-
poor monitoring is to use stronger sanctions dures can mitigate informational disadvantages
(Becker and Stigler, 1974). Because any decision with reporting requirements (“red tape” thus
to deviate from the interests of the principal will serves a monitoring function) and can facili-
combine the probability of getting caught and tate third-party monitoring by giving particular
the punishment if caught (as well as the likely constituencies access to the agency. However,
rewards), increasing the severity of sanctions can Kathleen Bawn (1995) noted that there is of-
be used to compensate for a low probability of ten a trade-off between technical efficiency and
being caught (as in deterrence theory in crim- political control. Administrative procedures can
inology). Therefore, several scholars (Weingast, enhance control, but they often decrease effi-
1984; Weingast and Moran, 1983; McCubbins ciency (thus the common complaints about the
and Schwartz, 1984) have argued that the use of proliferation of red tape). Overall, using admin-
strong ex post sanctions (adjusting budgets us- istrative procedures to control agents will be ef-
ing appropriations and reauthorizations bills) are fective when the gains in controlling corruption
key components of congressional control over outweigh the losses due to red tape.14
bureaucracy.13 Although early versions of agency theory
Even with strong sanctions, some monitor- tended to ignore the role of power and depen-
ing is still necessary – how does Congress know dence (Emerson 1962), this is not true of more
whose budgets to cut? Because most types of recent models. For example, Julia Adams (1996)
bureaucratic “drift” harm some interest groups used agency theory to model the relationship
or other citizens, these third parties have strong between metropolitan principals and colonial
incentives to monitor bureaucracies and re- “company men” in colonial trading compa-
port problems to politicians. This type of reac- nies in the Netherlands and England. Given
tive “fire alarm” oversight is much cheaper for the problems principals in the Netherlands and
politicians than direct monitoring because the England faced gathering information about the
costs are paid by the third parties. It is also of- activities of their agents in Asia due to the dis-
ten more effective, as these third parties usually tance involved, how were they able to con-
have better information about the actions of bu- trol them? In the Dutch hierarchy, the Bata-
reaucratic agents than Congress does (Weingast, vian outpost (contemporary Jakarta) maintained
1983; Keiweit and McCubbins, 1991:27–34). a middleman or brokerage position between the
However, Weingast and Moran (1983:767) also metropolitan principals and company agents, al-
noted that third parties can hinder monitoring. lowing them to illegally extract some of the sur-
For example, interest groups may collude with plus by collusive corruption with other agents.
agencies to serve their mutual interests, which In spite of this, the level of corruption initially
may include hiding some agency actions from was limited. To account for this, Adams made
politicians. This argument provides an impor- an argument that was stressed often by Weber
tant addition to pluralist theory, indicating that (1968:1007, 1015–18): The level of corruption
interest groups can be important not just in polis inversely related to the level of agent depen-
icy making, but in implementation as well. dence on principals. Agents of the Dutch ini-
Administrative procedures can also be used tially had no alternative opportunities, and this
to mitigate monitoring problems. Several polit- dependence limited their corruption. The situa-
ical scientists (McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins, tion changed when the English company moved
Noll, and Weingast, 1987:254–5) have argued
14
Another way of mitigating monitoring problems
13
This relationship holds in a wide variety of histor- is by attempting to hire loyal agents. Andrew Walder’s
ical contexts. For example, Kiser (1994) showed that tax (Walder, Li, and Treiman, 2000; Li and Walder, 2001)
farming was used in early modern states when strong work on the ways that party membership (a loyalty sig-
sanctions were necessary to compensate for poor moni- nal) affect recruitment and mobility in communist states
toring capacity. provides a good example.
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in, because they provided not only direct com- coordination. One of the first attempts to incor-
petition but also more opportunities for collu- porate culture in a rational choice framework is
sive corruption for agents of the Dutch (Adams, Thomas Schelling’s (1978) work on how focal
1996:23). The ultimate result is the one pre- points are used to solve coordination problems.
dicted by Weber: By the end of the eighteenth Focal points come from shared expectations
century, patrimonial principals had almost to- derived from cultural common knowledge,15
tally lost control of their colonial agents. which allow the coordination of behavior in
Kiser also used agency theory to address clas- the absence of explicit communication between
sic Weberian questions. For example, Kiser and actors. In situations of multiple equilibria, fo-
Schneider (1994) addressed Weber’s claim that cal points can determine which particular so-
the efficiency of Prussian tax administration was lution is chosen. Garrett and Weingast (1993)
due to its early bureaucratization. In contrast to suggested that shared beliefs can act as “con-
Weber’s claim, they demonstrated that particular structed focal points” around which actors can
variations from the bureaucratic ideal type that converge.16 They used this to explain the in-
increased the dependence of agents or strength- stitutional structure of the internal market cre-
ened their incentives were the primary causes ated by the European Community. Steve Pfaff
of efficiency in this case. For example, Prussian and Guobin Yang (2001) provided a great exam-
rulers used a unique system of caring for injured ple, showing how important political anniver-
military veterans. Instead of giving them welfare saries and landmarks, usually used to legitimate
payments, they gave them positions as collec- regimes, can also serve as focal points that co-
tors of indirect taxes (what we would now call ordinate collective action by groups opposed to
a “workfare” program). Because these officials the regime.
had poor alternative employment opportunities, One of the most important moves in the tran-
they were very dependent on rulers and thus less sition from neoclassical economics to broader
corrupt. By creating a high level of dependence, forms of rational choice theory was dropping
this way of selecting officials was more effective the assumption of perfect information. Models
than bureaucratic selection on the basis of merit. of agency relations, property rights, and trans-
actions costs (the costs of creating, monitoring,
and enforcing contractual agreements) were all
rational choice models of cultural developed to deal with situations in which infor-
aspects of politics mation is incomplete and unequally distributed
across actors. Because information is one of
Rational choice and cultural theories are gener- the key components of culture, analyses of the
ally seen as polar opposites, and many traditional effects of the amount and distribution of infor-
criticisms of rational choice fault it for ignor- mation available to actors provide one impor-
ing culture. Like many other standard criticisms tant part of a rational choice theory of culture
of rational choice, this one is rapidly becoming
outdated. Some of the most interesting recent 15
People have common knowledge when they all
developments in rational choice have been in the know something and they all know that they all know
area of culture broadly defined, including work it. Pluralistic ignorance is thus the absence of common
on information, signaling, norms, focal points, knowledge, as the second criterion is not met (Chwe,
2001:17).
legitimacy, and reputations. 16
This notion of constructed focal points may pro-
As functionalist theories stress (Parsons, vide a way to develop a rational choice model to address
1963), politics are not just about conflict, but one of the classic critcisms of social contract and mar-
also involve coordination around shared inter- ket formation arguments in Thomas Hobbes and Adam
ests (“power to” as well as “power over”). Ra- Smith–Emile Durkheim’s (1893/1964) argument about
the importance of the “precontractual bases of contract.”
tional choice work on focal points and com- These precontractal understandings that are the neces-
mon knowledge develops this insight further by sary foundation of trade and institution building could
outlining the causal mechanisms that produce be understood as constructed focal points.
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(with implications for political issues such as le- the other actor.20 This suggests that they might
gitimacy and public opinion). do the same thing when states act unfairly to-
Beginning with Herbert Simon’s (1958) work ward them. If so, collective action (especially
on bounded rationality and satisficing,17 a fo- high-risk collective action like revolts and revo-
cus on the complexity of many choice situa- lutions) would be more frequent than neoclas-
tions and the lack of complete information (or sical rational choice theory predicts.
the cognitive capacity to process it) has led to Rational choice theorists have also begun
a reconceptualization of the microfoundations to study legitimacy. Following Weber (1968),
of rational choice models. Although there have Margaret Levi (1988, 1997) argued that things
been many moves in this direction, the most like paying taxes and serving in the military can-
significant is what has come to be called be- not be explained by coercion alone. Instead,
havioral economics (Thaler 1991). Building on compliance is “quasi-voluntary” and based on
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s (1979) “contingent consent.” The legitimacy of the
famous experiments, behavioral economics is an state (and thus the granting of contingent con-
attempt to construct more realistic microfoun- sent) is based essentially on two factors: (1) does
dations for rational choice theory. It began as an the state provide public goods as promised; and
attempt to explain a large body of anomalies in (2) can the state ensure that other citizens com-
standard neoclassical theory,18 and has evolved ply with their obligations (so those who do
into a nascent (as yet not fully unified) set of comply do not feel like “suckers”). These two
alternative microfoundational assumptions. conditions are the basic terms of the implicit
Because it is not possible to even list all of contract between the state and its citizens, and
the anomalies and explanations here, we focus when they are met the state will be legitimate
on one with important implications for poli- and compliance by citizens will be high. She
tics – fairness norms.19 Behavioral economists used this to explain variations in the structure
have shown that people are willing to pay costs and effectiveness of systems of taxation (rang-
to punish others who act unfairly. They often ing from Republican Rome to contemporary
reject “unfair” offers in ultimatum games, thus Australia) and military organization over the
imposing costs on themselves in order to punish past three centuries.
One of the most interesting elaborations of
Schelling’s work on coordination problems and
17
When actors maximize, they examine all of the focal points, Michael Chwe’s (2001) argument
alternative actions in the choice set and select the best
one (the action with the highest net benefit). Simon
about the rationality of (political and other) ritu-
(1958) argued maximizing is rare – due to the limited als, also has important implications for the study
cognitive capacities of actors and the complexity of the of legitimacy. Submitting to a political author-
world, actors usually use a much simpler and quicker ity is in part a coordination problem, because
procedure. Satisficing refers to a choice process in which everyone will be more willing to do so if oth-
alternative choices are only explored until one that is
“good enough” (satisfactory) is found, at which point
ers do (this is true for both existing states and
that actor stops the search and selects that alternative. challengers). Because coordination problems are
18
To take just a few examples: (1) why don’t people
20
ignore sunk costs?; (2) why do they often choose to An ultimatum game is a situation in which two
eliminate options from their choice sets?; (3) why are players divide a fixed amount. Player 1 gets to specify
things like Super Bowl tickets and great wine always a particular division of the pie, and player 2 can either
underpriced?; and (4) why don’t people treat losses and accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the
gains symmetrically? players split the sum as offered; if it is rejected, both
19
For a different substantive political example of the players get nothing. For example, if the total sum to be
use of ideas from behavioral economics, Randall Calvert divided is a dollar, neoclassical theory predicts that player
(1986) moved beyond the assumption of fixed prefer- 1 will make an offer of 99 cents for herself and 1 cent for
ences by using learning models of how voters form be- player 2, and that player 2 will accept that offer. However,
liefs about candidates and parties, and “voter heuristics” the experiments almost never work out that way. Offers
models to look at how voters use ideology to predict of 1 cent (and other very low offers) are almost always
more complex policy preferences of candidates. rejected, leaving both players with nothing.
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solved by common knowledge, Chwe explored norms, as that will depend on the willingness of
the social processes that create common knowl- people to sanction noncompliance. When can
edge. He argued that one of the main ways that this second-order free rider problem (free riding
common knowledge is generated is by public on the collective responsibility to sanction the
rituals. The purpose of public political rituals noncompliance [first-order free riding] of oth-
is neither to indoctrinate individuals ideologi- ers) be overcome? Coleman argued that tight
cally (as Marxist theories suggest) nor to create networks (multiple, overlapping ties) are nec-
prostate emotions (Durkheim’s “collective effer- essary because they facilitate sanctioning. Thus
vescence”), but to show individuals that others norms are a joint product of the externalities of
participating in the ritual support the state. Be- behavior and tight network relations.
cause these rituals make it more likely that indi- Robert Ellikson (1991) also developed a com-
viduals will think others support the state, they pelling theory of informal norms of cooperation
make support of the state a stable focal point. among cattle ranchers. Traditional neoclassical
Therefore, states (and groups opposing them) models expect disputes (such as those between
are expected to use rituals to try to create the ranchers about stray cattle) to be resolved “in the
common knowledge that will facilitate coordi- shadow of the law” – meaning that both par-
nation. ties know what the outcome would be if they
Another recent example of a rational choice went to court, so they use that as a guideline
analysis of culture is Michael Hechter’s (2000) for resolving the dispute. He found instead that
work on nationalism. He argued that the rise disputes are resolved “in the shadow of norms”
and decline of nationalism is primarily a con- governing interaction between ranchers (a fairly
sequence of changes in the nature of the state. stable group in a repeated game situation) and
When states were decentralized and ruled indi- that laws have very little effect.
rectly (through local notables), the interests of More recently, two of the most prominent
different national groups within states were not rational choice theorists in sociology collabo-
threatened because they controlled important rated on a book on norms (Hechter and Opp,
policies locally. This changed when states be- 2001). Michael Hechter and Elizabeth Borland
gan to centralize and rule directly. When states (2001) looked at the development of norms of
were able to make and enforce uniform poli- national self-determination, showing that ratio-
cies, they often infringed on particular group nal choice theory does a better job than cultural
interests and led to the development of nation- institutionalism of explaining their emergence
alist movements. This explains why nationalism and diffusion. Karl-Deiter Opp (2001) explored
is mainly a modern phenomenon, as central- the emergence of “protest norms” out of per-
ized direct rule was rare prior to the French sonal networks and documented their impor-
Revolution. Moreover, it implies that contain- tance in explaining collective action.
ing nationalism usually requires decentralization Another way in which rational choice theo-
or some form of federalism to return local con- rists have begun to incorporate culture is by ex-
trol to nationalist minorities. ploring the effects of reputation. Work on rep-
Norms are another aspect of culture tradi- utation emerged out of repeated game theory,
tionally ignored by rational choice theorists. as there are clear reputational costs for defection
That changed with the seminal work of James not present in one-shot games. Recent appli-
Coleman (1990) on the development and ef- cations have been to areas as diverse as political
fects of different types of norms. Coleman ar- party discipline and the dynamics of revenge.
gued that the demand for norms is a function James Alt and Alberto Alesina (1996:653) argued
of the externalities of behavior. Behaviors with that the main reason parties control appoint-
negative externalities for others will increase the ments to committees is because the actions of
demand for norms proscribing them, and committee members (especially chairs) can have
behaviors with positive externalities will in- important effects on the reelection chances of
crease the demand for norms encouraging them. all party members through their effect on party
However, demand will not ensure the supply of reputation. The central prediction that follows
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from this, that parties will put members with absence of his necessary conditions: selective in-
views close to the mean of the party in impor- centives and small group size.
tant committee posts, has received strong em- Some of the first and most important modi-
pirical support. Denis Chong (1991) argued that fications of Olson’s model from within rational
the negative reputational effects of defecting in choice theory came from game theory. Instead
repeated game situations is one of the reasons of looking at collective action as a one-shot
that free riding in collective action is less fre- prisoner’s dilemma (Hardin [1971] showed that
quent than Mancur Olson (1966) predicted. In Olson’s argument can be modeled this way),
a very different analysis of reputational effects, many instances of it might be more usefully
Roger Gould (2000) showed that a group tends modeled as repeated games (Axelrod, 1984) or
to take revenge when its reputation for solidar- different types of games (chicken, assurance,
ity has been threatened. A reputation for taking etc.) (Taylor, 1976).22 The sociological findings
revenge demonstrates group solidarity (because that strong network ties facilitate participation in
one member must take a risk to avenge another) collective action (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993)
and thus deters future attacks on group mem- could be modeled using assurance games. More
bers. recently, several scholars have broadened ratio-
As this short summary indicates, critics can nal choice models of collective action by includ-
no longer claim that rational choice theorists ing more cultural components, such as norms,
ignore culture.21 The question now is how well values, and shared information about the prefer-
rational choice models can explain the cultural ences of others (Chong, 1991; Opp et al., 1995;
aspects of politics relative to alternative theories. Kuran, 1995).
We explore this issue in the following section Chong’s (1991) analysis of the civil rights
by analyzing the ways in which rational choice movement combined standard game theo-
theory has incorporated cultural factors into the retic models with more cultural factors.23 He
study of collective action. (1991:235) argued that few movements will get
off the ground without the actions of morally
committed “unconditional cooperators.” In ad-
the evolution of rational choice work dition to the value-based action in the early
on collective action
22
A chicken game is one in which either of two ac-
Rational choice analyses of collective action be- tors could provide a public good unilaterally, but both
would prefer that the other actor do it. This game has
gan with Olson’s (1965) seminal Logic of Col-
two equilibria, one in which the first actor provides the
lective Action. He showed that when goods are good and another in which the other actor does (because
nonexcludable (it is difficult or costly to pre- the costs of neither actor providing the good are greater
vent anyone from consuming the good once it to each than the cost to either one of them of provid-
is produced) and characterized by jointness of ing the good themselves). An assurance game is one in
which the joint efforts of two actors are necessary to
supply (the consumption of the good by one
provide a public good, and neither can provide the good
actor does not significantly decrease the amount alone. This game also has two equilibria, one in which
available to others), people will free ride on their both players contribute to the provision of the public
provision and they will be undersupplied. This good and one in which neither player contributes. As-
pathbreaking analysis of free riding in public/ surance games tend to produce conditional cooperation
agreements – “I will if you will.”
collective goods contexts showed why most so- 23
Elster (1989:37) made a very similar proposal when
ciological models predicted too much collec- he suggested that “when trying to explain individual
tive action. However, Olson’s model predicted participation in collective action, one should begin with
too little – collective action often occurs in the the logically most simple type of motivation: rational,
selfish, outcome-oriented behavior. If this proves insuf-
ficient to explain the phenomena we observe, we must
21
This is not to say that sociological rational choice introduce more complex types, either singly or in com-
theory has fully incorporated culture. As Adams (1999) bination.” Seigwart Lindenberg (1989) and Mark Lich-
noted in a compelling critique, emotions are generally bach (1996:236–9) have made similar arguments from a
ignored (but see Frank, 1988). rational choice perspective.
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stages of collective action, he suggested that probability of winning elections, Downs (1957)
successful campaigns generate social and psy- developed elegant models predicting the op-
chological incentives that can turn a prisoner’s timal location of political parties (the policy
dilemma game into an assurance game, making platform that maximizes votes) in issue spaces
cooperation much more likely.24 This compos- (coninua of voters’ opinions on an issue). Social
ite model suggests that different games with dif- movements may behave in the same way as po-
ferent microfoundations occur at different stages litical parties, choosing ideological positions to
of social movement development – but, most maximize members/participants, so it might be
importantly, Chong showed the relationships possible to use the Downsian model to explain
between these stages (see also Lindenberg [1989] the actions of social movement organizations.
on revolutionary collective action). In another David Snow et al. (1986) developed a model
example of the use of composite models, Opp of frame alignment (based on symbolic inter-
et al. (1995) developed a compelling account actionist theory) to understand the techniques
of the East German protests in 1989, show- used by social movement organizations (SMOs)
ing that in addition to material incentives, both to recruit members. Basically, the argument is
values and network ties were important causal that when the frames (general worldviews) of
factors. potential members match those of SMOs, they
Another example comes from Timar Kuran’s will be more likely to join. SMOs thus use tech-
(1995) work on the unpredictability of revo- niques to facilitate that matching. If we can
lutions. One of the most interesting (and hum- think of these SMOs as analogous to political
bling) features of the revolutions of 1989 is parties, it might be useful to model their posi-
that they came as a surprise to leaders, rebels, tions relative to each other using Down’s opti-
and academics alike. Kuran (1995) developed mal location scheme. It then should be possible
an argument about “preference falsification” to to make clear predictions about where SMOs
explain why this was the case, and more gener- should locate themselves relative to each other
ally to specify a set of conditions in which we in the issue space and how many adherents they
should not expect our theories to have much would be expected to attract as they move in that
predictive power. Because people will system- space – thus systematizing some of the insights
atically misrepresent their preferences in pub- in Snow’s argument.
lic in an autocratic setting (or even one in
which their preferences are not socially desir-
able), it becomes very difficult for either par- modeling the historical dimension
ticipants or scholars studying them to know the of politics
actual level of discontent with the status quo
and thus the potential for revolutionary collec- The relationship between rational choice the-
tive action. The actual level of discontent only ory and history has been hotly debated recently
becomes apparent when some exogenous event (Gould, in press; Bates et al., 1998; Elster, 2000;
decreases the cost of expressing true (antiregime) Skocpol, 2000; Carpenter, 2000; Goldthorpe,
preferences. When this happens, revolutions of- 2000). Some critics of rational choice have ar-
ten escalate very quickly, as people realize their gued that it is ahistorical and cannot incorporate
grievances are widely shared. particular details, temporal sequences, and nar-
It may also be possible to use Downsian op- rative methods (Somers, 1998).25 This section
timal location models to study the strategies
of social movements. Beginning with the as-
25
sumption that politicians want to maximize the One major proponent of rational choice theory
(Goldthorpe 2000) has argued against historical soci-
ology generally (based on the low quality of histori-
24
Another way to make this argument is to claim cal data), and thus against the use of rational choice in
that there are benefits from the act of participation itself historical work (advocating instead a union of rational
(Hirschman, 1982:86–7). choice and quantitative data based on survey research).
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shows that these are not valid criticisms of con- terms in several medieval Italian city-states) kept
temporary rational choice models, as contem- the peace and facilitated economic develop-
porary rational choice theory is now doing all ment in Genoa by protecting warring clans from
of these things. each other. Weingast argued that the balance
Historical sociologists are no doubt correct rule protected federalism (by providing both the
that the temporal sequence in which causal fac- North and South with the power to veto legis-
tors occur often affects outcomes (Aminzade, lation contrary to their interests) and facilitated
1992; Griffin, 1993). The fact that many ra- territorial expansion in antebellum America.26
tional choice models tend to be abstract and Both Levi and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal showed
formal gives the impression that they are not how differences in domestic political institutions
well-suited to analyzing the messy details of his- shape the likelihood and nature of warfare. Levi
tory, such as complex narrative sequences. It is looked at changes in conscription policy and
becoming increasingly clear that this superficial Rosenthal showed how the frequency of war
impression is incorrect. After all, it was rational was determined by relations between monarchs
choice theorists who first developed models of and representative institutions in early modern
path dependence, in an attempt to explain the France. Bates used a variety of models to ana-
persistence of apparently inefficient outcomes lyze the rise and decline of a political institution
(David, 1985; Arthur, 1994; for a good recent that regulated international markets, the Inter-
summaries, see Peirson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000). national Coffee Organization. In each case, their
Rational choice work using game theory and accounts combined detailed historical narratives
models of agenda setting are intrinsically tem- with rational choice models.27
poral – the sequence in which things happen Game theory is not the only way in which
always affects the outcome. Temporal sequences rational choice models have incorporated tem-
are explicitly modeled in extensive form games, porality in political sociology. Yoram Barzel and
a class of game theory models that explain out- Edgar Kiser (1997) demonstrated that the timing
comes as the consequence of temporally ordered of factors affecting the insecurity of rule de-
strategic interaction (i.e., sequences of action termines their effects on voting institutions –
and reaction). Game theory may prove to be the Hundred Years’ War disrupted the develop-
an especially useful devise for the construction ment of voting institutions in France more than
of theory-driven narratives that do not ignore in England because their prior development
the important roles of agency and particular (and thus the ability to withstand shocks) was
events. greater in the latter. Lindenberg (1989) outlined
Peter Abell (1987, 1993), Kiser (1996), and an ordered sequences of game structures that
Bates et al. (1998) offered general arguments are likely to unfold as a revolutionary situation
about the utility rational choice theory in his- moves toward revolution – and then uses them
torical analysis. Analytic Narratives (Bates et al., to construct brief narratives of the French and
1998) is especially useful because it provides five Russian revolutions. As noted above, Chong
case studies illustrating their approach – just the (1991) argued that the timing of successful
sort of systematic empirical work Green and social movement activity is critical – early
Shapiro (1994) claimed rational choice lacks.
Both Avner Grief and Weingast focused on 26
Weingast is not the only Americanist (the branch of
the determinants of institutional stability, using political science most known for formal rational choice
extensive form games to show how strategic in- models) to turn to history. John Ferejohn (1993) analyzed
teraction produced particular institutional equi- the dynamics of the English Parliament in the Stuart era
libria. Grief showed that the podesta (foreigners as in large part a consequence of changes in what he calls
hired to serve as political executives for short “non-verifiable beliefs.”
27
Elster (2000) criticized the “analytic narratives”
project on several grounds: for assuming hyperrational-
This rejection of history is a minority position in con- ity, for ignoring uncertainty, and for fitting their models
temporary rational choice theory. to the historical evidence.
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success is necessary to gain support and facil- on the more precise definition of path de-
itate the development of emotional attachment pendence in economics (David, 1985; Arthur,
to the group effort. 1994), Peirson (2000) clarified the concept and
Rational choice work on agenda setting also applied it to the study of politics. From a ratio-
incorporates temporality, generally by demon- nal choice perspective, path dependence refers
strating how moving first allows certain to processes that are characterized by increas-
actors to shape outcomes. Following Kenneth ing returns – the probability of further steps
Arrow (1963), McKelvey’s (1976) theory dem- down a particular path increases (the costs of ex-
onstrated that majority voting can be wholly iting from the path increase) because the relative
cyclic, so whoever controls the agenda can benefits of the current path increase over time.
lead the majority to any alternative (Lichbach, The causal mechanisms generating increasing
1996:vii). One of the best recent examples of returns are high set-up/fixed costs (creating
work on agenda setting is the “setter model” higher payoffs for future investments), learning
(Rosenthal, 1990). In this model, an execu- effects (knowledge gained by operating a system
tive individual or organization has exclusive increases the benefits of continued use), coor-
power to set the agenda. Shepsle and Weingast dination effects (the benefits an individual gets
(1987) applied this model to policy forma- from an activity increase if others do the same
tion in Congress and viewed the congres- thing), and adaptive expectations (projections
sional committee with jurisdiction over the is- about future aggregate use affect current choices
sue as the “setter” with the power to shape if coordination effects are important). The re-
the agenda. They showed that the agenda maining debate mainly concerns whether path
setting advantage of committees results in poli- dependence is produced only by the mecha-
cies that reflect the interests of the committee nisms posited by rational choice theories (David,
more than those of Congress as a whole.28 1985; Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2000) or by power
Many historical sociologists, political scien- and legitimation mechanisms as well (Mahoney,
tists, and economists have begun to stress the 2000).29
path-dependent nature of social and politi- Paul Pierson’s (1994) work on the welfare
cal processes (David, 1985; Aminzade, 1992; state provides a nice illustration of path de-
Arthur, 1994; Peirson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000). pendence in politics. Although it is normal to
One of the main problems with the concept look at how institutional structures and interest
of path dependence has been its vagueness – it groups shape state policies, it is less common to
has often been used to refer to any process in explore the effects of policies on institutions and
which temporality and sequence are important. interest groups. Pierson did exactly this, tracing
Recently, that has begun to change. Drawing the “policy legacies” of the development of the
welfare states in Britain and the United States.
28
Because the welfare state created both institu-
Temporality is also important at a more micro level.
Rational choice work on discount rates (the rate at tional rigidities and supporting constituencies,
which actors discount future costs and benefits relative attempts to dismantle it by both Reagan and
to current ones) has contributed to our understanding Thatcher were largely ineffective. This is a clas-
of this. Most economists assume that discount rates are sic case of path dependence – dismantling the
normally distributed in the populations they study, a rea- welfare state is not simply the causal mirror im-
sonable assumption if one does not know what causes
discount rates to vary. More sociological rational choice age of creating it, because once it has been cre-
models have been attempting to discover the structural ated it produces “increasing returns” processes
determinants of variations in discount rates. For exam-
ple, Levi (1988) showed that discount rates increase with
29
the insecurity of rule. Experimental work in behav- Furthermore, Russell Hardin (1995:30) noted that
ioral economics suggests that discount rates will be lower all conventions have a path-dependent quality – their
when benefits are higher, when both choices are more initial creation is often due to particular historical factors,
distant in time, and when the choice is between negative but after that point, actors have little incentive to change
outcomes (Thaler, 1991). them.
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(working through both institutions and interest and benefits of actions is very high. In the first
groups) that support its persistence. situation, actors will not care much about act-
ing instrumentally (because they will not “pay”
much for acting on values, identities, etc.). This
conclusion may explain the relative lack of success of ratio-
nal choice theory in explaining low-cost activi-
Rational choice theory has recently made sub- ties like voting.30 In the second situation, when
stantial contributions to our understanding of uncertainty is very high, they will not be able
institutions, culture, and history. These devel- to make rational choices. Uncertainty will be
opments have laid the foundation for a new, especially high when conditions change rapidly,
more sociological version of rational choice that creating many novel situations and choices. To
should be very useful to political sociologists. put the point more positively, rational choice
Rational choice models of the emergence and theory should work well in situations with high
the effects of political institutions have been used costs and benefits and that are often repeated.
in a wide variety of substantive areas, facilitating Sociological versions of rational choice the-
the explanation of congressional policy mak- ory are developing a broad agenda for future
ing, the rise and decline of nationalism, “red research. However, because this theoretical per-
tape” in bureaucratic administrations, and the spective is currently still under construction, it is
management of common pool resources. Ra- difficult to predict how it will evolve. As it has
tional choice models of culture cover a diverse moved away from neoclassical economics, so-
range of topics, including the politics of infor- ciological rational choice theory has grown in
mation, reputation, norms, and legitimacy. As two main directions: (1) developing better mod-
yet, there has been no attempt to bring all of els of social structures and institutions and (2)
these strands of work together into a general ra- developing more complex microfoundations. It
tional choice model of culture, but that is clearly is likely that both of these trends will continue,
the next important step. Recent work has also but which will be stressed and how far will the
begun to model the historical dimension of pol- process go?
itics. Extensive form game theory now allows Sociological rational choice theorists cur-
the construction of theoretically unified narra- rently disagree about which of these two strate-
tive histories. Work on path dependence is being gies will be most fruitful. Some prefer to
applied to many political issues (Pierson, 2000; stick with the traditional microlevel assump-
Mahoney, 2000). These models of institutions, tions while working on more sophisticated
culture, and history have allowed rational choice macrolevel models, whereas others pay little
theorists to resolve the core problem of game attention to the macro level and focus in-
theory, by allowing them to explain why one of stead on elaborating more detailed microfoun-
many possible equilibria emerges. dations. In fact, one likely scenario is that
We have stressed the virtues of rational choice rational choice theory will split into several re-
theory throughout this chapter, but we do not lated but competing theories – some stressing
intend to imply that it will ever be the only the- complex microfoundations that include values
ory necessary to understand politics. Rational and emotions, and others retaining fairly simple
choice theory will not work well for all prob-
lems of interest to political sociologists, because 30
Rational choice models have had some success in
noninstrumental bases of action are important showing that marginal changes in the costs of voting
in some situations. The scope of rational choice lead to changes in turnout. However, they have been
theory is determined mainly by two factors. unable to explain why anyone ever votes (there is vir-
Standard rational choice theory will probably tually no benefit because the odds of one vote affecting
the outcome of an election are so low) or why people
not be effective when either: (1) the costs and vote for particular candidates (especially these proposing
benefits of actions are very low (Barry, 1978:40– platforms contrary to their material interests) (Green and
6; North, 1990) or (2) uncertainty about costs Shapiro, 1994).
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microfoundations but developing more elabo- make sense to give the new theory or theories
rate models of structure and institutions. The new names – the current conceptual stretching
latter group could revitalize versions of materi- of the label “rational choice” is already leading
alist structuralism, either by linking with some to some confusion, thus the use of “sociological
version of Marxism or by constructing a new rational choice” in this chapter.
synthesis. The former could draw on ideas from Extrapolating from trends in the development
symbolic interactionism, experimental psychol- of sociological rational choice theory leads to
ogy, evolutionary psychology, or the four types another question: How far can this transfor-
of social action developed by Weber. Behavioral mation go without losing the positive features
and experimental economists are just beginning of standard rational choice theory? The danger
to explore these issues. The further elaboration here is that broadening the theory, especially if it
of the role of noninstrumental microfoundations is done simultaneously at both micro and macro
(values, emotions) and their interaction with levels, could make it less precise and more diffi-
instrumental motives will no doubt be one of cult to test. We should not forget that one of the
the most important growth areas in sociological main reasons neoclassical models produced so
rational choice. many anomalies is that they were parsimonious
If these trends toward broadening rational and precise enough to test. These virtues should
choice models at both the micro and macro lev- not be given up lightly. The most difficult task
els continue, the eventual product may retain lit- facing sociological rational choice theory today
tle more than a rough family resemblance to the is making it more sociological without making
old neoclassical version. At some point, it might it less scientific.
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chapter nine
Theories of Race and State
David R. James and Kent Redding
Popular notions of race have putative biologi- policies. We then examine the definition of the
cal origins, but the mechanisms through which racial state proposed by Omi and Winant (1994)
certain human characteristics come to repre- and argue that it has limited analytical power
sent categorical identities and differences have to explain the different ways that states create
always been created by social, historical, and po- and/or maintain racial inequalities and identi-
litical processes. In the latter instance, we simply ties. Racial states, according to Omi and Winant
mean that racial signification is necessarily about (1994) and the closely related work of Goldberg
power and, we might add, not simply the power (2002), define racial states by their effects. Be-
of one group over another, but the power of any cause all states have effects on racial inequalities,
such group to collectively form a racial identity all states are racial states. We argue that a fo-
and organize in defense of it. In spite of this cus on the internal structure, rather than the
intimate connection between race and politics, effects, of states provides a stronger theoretical
the literature on race and the social construc- explanation of how states produce and maintain
tion of race on the one hand, and the litera- race inequalities and identities. In the last sec-
ture on political sociology on the other, have tion, we develop a conceptual contrast between
largely developed independently and with little racial states, which enforce race-conscious poli-
dialogue between them. This chapter explores cies, and liberal democratic states, which en-
the implicit and increasingly explicit connec- force equal citizenship rights for all regardless of
tions between the two literatures with an eye to membership in racial or other status groups. We
how race theory and state theory can inform one review recent typological work on the variation
another. in the extent to which race-conscious distinc-
First, we examine current constructivist theo- tions are institutionalized within state structures
ries of race and ethnicity, with special attention to illustrate how variation in state structures af-
to issues concerning the political construction fects racial inequalities and identities.
of race. Next, we argue that current research in
the political sociology of race tends to ignore
or deemphasize how states create and main- theories of race and ethnicity
tain racial identities. Race identities are typi-
cally viewed as the source of state-enforced racial Most sociologists agree that political processes
policies, but are rarely seen as their effect. An and institutions shape race inequalities and iden-
examination of the social and political deter- tities and vice versa. Groups mobilize on the
minants of racial categories used by the U.S. basis of race for the purpose of transforming po-
Census provides a convenient illustration of how litical institutions, electing candidates who rep-
race identities are both causes and effects of state resent their interests, and shaping policies that
187
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188 David R. James and Kent Redding
affect the social distribution of symbolic and of individuals to categories and the assertion of
material goods. At the same time, policies are group identities by members of racial groups.
enforced by state agents within the context es- The identities of subordinate racial group mem-
tablished by existing political institutions that bers are shaped by their own actions as well as the
assign race identities to citizens, influence the actions of those who discriminate against them.
mobilization opportunities available to existing Omi’s and Winant’s (1994) influential theory
and potential groups, and distribute resources calls this process “racial formation” and argues
to citizens and groups in ways that have racial that it constitutes a process of “racial projects.”
effects. Hence, political processes and institu- A racial project, which may be produced by an
tions are dynamically linked to racial inequalities individual or a group, is an “interpretation” of
and identities in a process of mutual causation. racial dynamics and an attempt to “reorganize
The definition of race that we adopt here allows and redistribute resources along particular racial
for the possibility that racial identities and in- lines” (Omi and Winant, 1994:56). In other
equalities can be politically constructed and can words, a racial project contains both a theory of
provide the motivation and resources to shape how race inequalities are created and maintained
political outcomes. and a set of actions or policies that are designed
All sociological definitions of race include to affect those inequalities in a manner consis-
some reference to the phenotypical character- tent with the theory. A white supremacist racial
istics of individuals that are thought to be de- project, for example, might be motivated by the
cisive in assigning individuals to racial groups. theory that blacks are members of an inferior
For example, Cornell and Hartmann (1998:24) race and designed to disfranchise black voters for
defined race as “a human group defined by it- that reason. Resistance to the white supremacist
self or others as distinct by virtue of perceived racial project by blacks would constitute a rival
common physical characteristics that are held to racial project. The hierarchical structure of race
be inherent.” The physical characteristics that inequalities and identities flows directly from the
serve as markers to distinguish races are selected clash of racial projects. Omi and Winant located
by social processes and are in no way essen- the motor of racial transformation in the purpo-
tially determined by genetics or other biolog- sive social actions of individuals who are divided
ical processes. According to Omi and Winant into racial groups and act on the basis of group
(1994:55), racial categories are “created, inhab- identities.
ited, transformed and destroyed” through so- Omi and Winant viewed race and ethnicity
cial and historical processes. Some of the most as distinct concepts and argued that existing eth-
important of those processes are political. For nicity theory – namely, U.S.-based explanations
example, the United States has assigned indi- of the upward social mobility of Southern and
viduals to racial categories since its inception Eastern European immigrants (and their descen-
and enforced the assignments through political dents) as a consequence of cultural assimilation –
institutions at the state and federal level. The cannot explain patterns of black–white dispari-
strength of the assignment process and the na- ties in the United States. Cornell and Hartmann
ture of the categories defining races varied dra- agreed with Omi and Winant that theories of
matically over the past 200 years, of which more ethnicity and race are distinct, but argued that
will be said below (Anderson, 2002; Lee, 1993; they are not mutually exclusive. They (1994:19)
Rodriguez, 2000). adopted Schermerhorn’s definition of ethnic-
The transformation of race categories over ity, which is typical of most current definitions:
time is shaped not only by the politically domi- “An ethnic group is a collectivity within a larger
nant race that assigns others to subordinate racial society having real or putative common ances-
categories, but also by the resistance and agency try, memories of a shared historical past, and a
of those who are so assigned. Constructivist the- cultural focus on one or more symbolic el-
ory claims that racial identities and inequalities ements defined as the epitome of their peo-
emerge from the dynamic between assignment plehood” (Schermerhorn, 1978:12). Hence, an
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Theories of Race and State 189
ethnic group is self-consciously ethnic; in-group Finally, Cornell and Hartmann (1998) argued
members identify others as coethnics if they that racial groups become ethnic groups when
share the three general social claims specified members of racial groups become self-con-
in the definition regardless of whether the indi- sciously ethnic by thinking of themselves as
viduals are known personally or not. members of racial groups. But when does this
Race identities are distinguished from eth- moment of self-conscious racialized identifica-
nic identities by four factors (Cornell and Hart- tion occur? Evidence on this point is scant, but it
mann, 1998:25–35): makes little sense sociologically to view a racial
group as a distinct race if most individuals as-
1. Race identities are based on perceived
signed to the race do not view themselves that
physical differences; ethnic identities are
way. Treating individuals differently on the ba-
based on the three claims specified by the
sis of perceived physical characteristics was the
definition.
first step historically in the creation of new racial
2. Race identities typically originate in the
groups. But the process of racial group forma-
assignment of group members to the
tion cannot be considered complete until those
group by powerful outsiders; ethnic iden-
who are the objects of an assignment process
tities may originate in assertion by in-
recognize that fact and begin to push back.
group members as well as assignment by
Once racial groups begin to resist the assign-
others.
ment process, they make the same three claims
3. Race identities typically reflect power
that define ethnic groups. Members of racial
relations; ethnic identities may not.
groups see themselves as sharing kinship ties,
4. Race identities are accorded different lev-
albeit often fictional ones, and may use famil-
els of social worth; ethnic identities may
ial terms (e.g., brother, sister) when speaking to
not be.
others of their group. They claim a common
These four distinctions disappear under careful history of discrimination and prejudice at the
consideration. First, Schermerhorn (1978:12) hands of the most powerful racial group, and
included phenotypical characteristics explicitly they view certain physical characteristics (e.g.,
among the possible symbolic elements that de- skin color) as the key symbolic elements that
fine ethnic groups. Somatic differences have of- define membership in their racial group. Their
ten been used to distinguish groups typically view of themselves almost surely differs from
identified as ethnic rather than racial or who that of out-group members, but that is char-
were once considered racial and later regarded acteristic of all ethnic groups. No substantive
as ethnic (Collins, 2001; Isaacs, 1989). Consis- difference exists between the definitive claims
tent application of the definition of an ethnic of ethnic groups and those of racial groups.
group requires that racial groups be included if The problems with Cornell’s and Hartmann’s
they are self-consciously ethnic. Second, Cor- treatment that led them to posit exceptions to
nell and Hartmann noted that factor 2 does not the second factor for the dominant racial group
apply to the dominant racial group that initially are solved by Omi’s and Winant’s (1994) concept
assigns others to subordinate race categories. of the racial project. The idea of contending
For example, the white race in the United racial projects, which focuses the same theo-
States is implicitly defined by the assignment of retical lens on both dominant and subordinate
nonwhites to subordinate racial groups. Hence, groups, introduces a more powerful dynamic
some race definitions emerge through the asser- into the process of assignment and assertion
tion of dominant groups of their perception of of identities posited by current constructivist
inherent differences from other groups. race and ethnicity theory. Claiming that race
Third, factors 3 and 4 are conditional dif- identities and inequalities emerge from a field
ferences that may or may not apply in certain of conflict and struggle over the meaning of
historical contexts and cannot be considered es- race and/or the causes of racial inequalities re-
sential differences in defining the two concepts. moves the need to view identity formation of
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the dominant race as an exception to the theory methodological strategy if it is reasonable to as-
of race making. Instead, white racial identities in sume that the identities are stable during the
the United States flow directly from the racial period under investigation. The assumption of
projects animated by the actions of whites as stable racial identities is usually valid if the data
they clash with the racial projects of other races. analyzed span a short period, but caution is re-
There is no fundamental obstacle to using quired if race identities are transformed during
the theory of racial formation to explain ethnic the target period. Sometimes identities change
group formation. The major difference between rapidly. For example, the name preferred by
ethnic projects and racial projects is the content blacks changed during the late 1960s as a re-
of the symbolic elements selected to capture the sult of the influence of the black power wing
core of group identity and the rhetorical differ- of the civil rights movement. The rapidity of
ences among the sociologists who analyze those change caught the U.S. Census Bureau by sur-
processes. We disagree with Cornell and Hart- prise, forcing it to scramble to allow “black” as
mann (1998) and Omi and Winant (1994) that one option for indicating race identity for the
racial categories and identities differ from eth- 1970 census tabulation.1 Whether one preferred
nic ones in some fundamental way and share to think of one’s race identity as “black” or “Ne-
Collins’s (2001) view that there is no “analyt- gro” often indicated the person’s position on
ically important” difference between race and the civil rights policies and practices advocated.
ethnicity. Those who thought of themselves as “black”
typically advocated more radical strategies. On
the other hand, race identities are sometimes
political institutions and race stable over long periods (Davis, 2001; Lee,
1993).
Most sociological research on the links between If constructivist theory is correct, race in-
political institutions and process on the one hand equalities often reinforce the race identities that
and racial identities and inequalities on the other power the dynamic of racial politics ( James,
do not explicitly employ the constructivist the- 1994). As Lieberman (1998:232) argued, “Race
ory of race discussed above. Instead, research identity, constructed in and by politics, reshapes
typically takes one of three approaches. One politics through institutions, which in turn re-
is to take race inequalities as a given and view construct race.” Increasingly researchers study
race identities and motivations as causal agents how political institutions, processes, and conflict
and determinants of political processes, political shape and influence racial identities. Scholars
policy formation and implementation, and the also utilize constructivist race theories to make
like (e.g., Bensel, 1984; Blalock, 1967; James, sense of the dynamics of social movements, par-
1988; McAdam, 1982; Valelly, 1995; van den ticularly with respect to the interactions be-
Berghe, 1967, 1987; Wilson, 1978). A second tween movements and political processes (Blee,
approach examines the effects of state policies, 2002; Cornell, 1988; Redding, 2003; Williams,
social movements, and political institutional ar- 1990). Nagel (1997), for example, identified
rangements on race inequalities and ignores any
1
impacts on race identities (e.g., Burstein, 1985; The Census question for race in 1970, 1980, and
Kousser, 1999; Smith, 1997). A more common 1990 treated “Negro” and “black” as two alternative
but interchangeable choices for the same race category.
approach is to combine the second and the first In 2000, the option of choosing “African American”
with the causal path flowing from racial iden- was allowed as an additional option as that label became
tities and motivations through state policies to increasingly popular (Farley, 2002; Snipp, 2003). Cur-
impact race inequalities (Cell, 1982; Kousser, rently, “African American” and “black” are the two most
1974; Massey and Denton, 1993; Quadagno, popular names chosen for purposes of self-identification.
“African American” tends to emphasize American eth-
1994). nic status more than “black” does, but the political dif-
Taking race identities and motivations linked ferences between those who prefer different race names
to those identities as givens is an appropriate has declined.
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state policies as direct causes of changing identi- an illustration of the political

ties of Native American groups. She found that construction of race:
the United States engaged in a variety of poli- census categories
cies between 1880 and 1933 intended to force
Native Americans to assimilate and to remove The creation of official race categories recog-
their access to Indian lands. As a result, Na- nized by the state and used by the state for census
tive Americans who migrated to urban areas tabulations and policy formulation and enforce-
began to form pan-Indian organizations. The ment are the archetypal examples of the polit-
U.S. policies shifted from the individual back ical institutionalization of race. As Starr (1992)
to the tribes between 1933 and 1946, which pointed out, the state must create a multitude of
spurred the growth of tribal identities, but as the categories among all kinds of people for all sorts
tribe became more important as a link between of purposes ranging from tax collection to mili-
individual Indians and the federal government, tary service. Once created, official classifications
pan-tribal organization followed with a result- become, over time, “impersonal cognitive com-
ing weakening of tribal boundaries. Between mitments” for those who use them; the pop-
1946 and 1960, the United States again pro- ulation counts based on them inform “count-
moted the termination of tribal status and again less decisions, private as well as governmental”
pan-Indian identification and organization grew (Starr, 1992). The creation of official race cate-
in urban areas. After 1960, different federal poli- gories is a powerful force in the assignment of in-
cies spurred all three forms of Indian identity dividuals to racial groups that increases the prob-
formation and organization: tribal, pan-Indian, ability that some citizens will come to see them-
and pan-tribal (Nagel, 1982, 1995, 1997). selves as members of that group (Cornell and
The formation of political parties within Hartmann, 1998; Nagel, 1986; Nobles, 2000).
the context of electoral competition can have Race categories tend to persist over time,
a marked effect on the institutionalization or but the permanence of the classification sys-
deinstitutionalization of race categories within tem depends on the outcomes of the contin-
state institutions. Aminzade (2000) showed that uing clash of racial projects. The history of
competition between political parties was de- the creation of official race categories in the
cisive in institutionalizing citizenship in Tan- United States clearly illustrates the mutability
ganyika on the basis of its national terri- of race categories and their link to competing
tory rather than the tripartite racial hierarchy racial projects. The United States recognized
(Europeans, Asians, and Africans) that it inher- seven nonwhite races in 1890, and four of those
ited from the colonial policy makers who gov- (black, mulatto, quadroon, and octoroon) be-
erned the country before independence. A racial longed to groups that were soon merged (Lee,
nationalism similar to that which triumphed 1993). Southern political influence at the fed-
in South Africa and the United States (Marx, eral level coupled with the concern of South-
1998) was defeated by the party that champi- ern whites to suppress black political power
oned a distinction between citizens and for- defeated the attempts of mulattoes to maintain
eigners. In the more recent period, the ruling an intermediate social status between whites and
party in Tanzania2 was able to win an ideolog- Negroes (Anderson, 1988; Davis, 2001; Starr,
ical struggle with opposition parties to trans- 1992). By 1930, the one-drop rule was adopted
form the meaning of “indigenous” to refer to by both whites and blacks as the definition of
the boundary between citizens and foreigners “who is black” (Davis, 2001) and persisted for
rather than the racially charged boundary be- sixty years. Then, in the space of less than a
tween black Africans and Asians (Aminzade, decade, the rules for race classification in the
2003). United States changed.
Although the definition of and number of
2
Tanganyika joined with Zanzibar to form Tanzania racial categories shifted over time, the view that
in 1964. individuals could be assigned to one unique race
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category (e.g., white, black, quadroon, etc.) per- The number of racial groups recognized by
sisted. This constant of race classification the- the United States has expanded with each cen-
ory ended with the 2000 census. For the first sus between 1970 and 1990 (Lee, 1993). The
time, the U.S. Census allowed individuals to se- new 2000 census multiple race options expand
lect more than one race category to describe the number of officially recognized single and
their race identity, a change that Farley labeled multiple race combinations to sixty three, which
the “greatest change in the measurement of race points to further proliferation of race categories;
in the history of the United States” (2002:33). “there is no natural limit” to the number of races
Nearly 5 percent of those previously identified given this logic (Hochschild, 2002:356; Prewitt,
as black claimed more than one race, a figure 2002; Snipp, 2003). A consequence of the race
twice as large as predicted, and the numbers se- classification system changes may be to delegit-
lecting multiple races are likely to grow in the imize race classification altogether, a result that
future (Hochschild, 2002:341). is consistent with the preference for color-blind
The change in race classification was a bu- policies by most whites, but that result is not im-
reaucratic response to an emerging movement minent given the ardent support for major racial
for a multiracial category. The increasing rate groups that continues to exist (see Perlmann and
of intermarriage between members of different Waters, 2002 for other implications).
racial groups since the civil rights victories of the This brief account of the trends in the U.S.
1960s produced a critical mass of citizens who race classification system is consistent with a po-
felt that the existing system did not provide a litical constructivist theory of race. The mu-
place for them. State officials opposed chang- latto category disappeared when the mixed-race
ing the race classification system, but for rea- racial project was defeated and disappeared at
sons unrelated to the racist policies of the early the beginning of the twentieth century (Starr,
twentieth century that used race classification 1992). New multiple race options appeared in
as a basis for discrimination against nonwhites. 2000 as a result of the clash of competing racial
State officials in the 1990s preferred adminis- projects and especially with the emergence of
trative simplicity and cited the need to collect mixed-race individuals and their advocates, who
high-quality data for civil rights enforcement mounted a powerful challenge to the existing
and the provision of social services (Robbin, race classification system.4
2000). The pressure for change was too great
to resist, but the advocates for a multiracial race
Hawaiians did not have that relationship to the United
category did not get what they wanted. Power- States although they had suffered many of the same in-
ful civil rights lobbyists representing the inter- justices. In an attempt to please as many interest groups
ests of African Americans supported the Office as possible, OMB removed Native Hawaiians from the
of Management and Budget’s (OMB) sugges- “Asian or Pacific Islander” category, but placed them in
tion that respondents be allowed to choose more a new category – Hawaiian or Pacific Islanders – rather
than including them with Native Americans (Robbin,
than one race category in lieu of creating a new 2000). Other changes proposed by identity advocates in-
multiracial category. The clash of racial projects cluded the addition of a special category for Middle East-
between those of the OMB, black civil rights erners and Arab Americans and including “Hispanic” as
organizations, and the new multiracial move- a race rather than an ethnic category. Both were rejected
ment was resolved for the time being in favor of by OMB (Rodriguez, 2000:153–76). Hispanics, a supra-
national category that includes many Spanish language
multiple race options rather than a multiracial cultural groups, remain the only ethnic group officially
category (Farley, 2002; Robbin, 2000).3 recognized by the United States (Rodriguez, 2000).
4
Sometimes states shape race identities for reasons
3 having little to do with the pressure from social move-
The political basis for the change in classifying peo-
ple of mixed race was reflected in other changes as ments, political parties, or other factors typically asso-
well. Native Hawaiians pressed OMB to be reclassified ciated with race, class, or interest group politics. In a
as “Native Americans” and were opposed by American study of state-level race policies, Williams (2003) found
Indians, who mounted a national campaign claiming that a number of states adopted or seriously considered
that they were sovereign nations and that indigenous adopting multiracial category classification schemes for
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theories of the racial state conflict” (1994:82). As a consequence, Omi and

Winant argued that
Most research in the political sociology of race
does not attempt to develop a theory of the The state is composed of institutions, the policies they
carry out, the conditions and rules which support and
state, even though understanding how varia-
justify them, and the social relations in which they are
tion in the political institutionalization of racial imbedded. Every state institution is a racial institu-
practices affects race inequalities and identities tion. . . . (1994:83, emphasis in original)
is a pressing practical and theoretical problem.
Just as the heated debate on theories of the Omi and Winant clarified the meaning of each
state subsided in favor of mid-level theories ad- of the italicized terms. Importantly for our pur-
dressing issues of policy formation and imple- poses, they explained that state institutions or-
mentation, few attempts to develop a theory ganize and enforce the racial politics of every-
of the incorporation of race into state institu- day life through policies “which are explicitly or
tions have been attempted. In fact, all of the implicitly racial” (1994:83). What is meant by
classic works in the state theory debates es- “explicitly or implicitly racial” requires a little
sentially ignored the causes and effects of state digging. Omi and Winant argued that the civil
enforced race discrimination (e.g., Barrow, rights movement of the 1960s accomplished a
1993; Carnoy, 1984; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and “great transformation”; voting rights drives, for
Skocpol, 1985; Jessop, 1990; King, 1986; example, led to black enfranchisement and cre-
Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Miliband, 1969; ated a new racial state in the process (1994:104–
Poulantzas, 1973; Skocpol, 1985). 6). Even if the state extends the right to vote
Omi and Winant (1994) attempted to rem- to all without regard for race, the state is still a
edy the blindness of state theory to problems racial state because it still affects racial inequali-
of race by devoting a chapter to the concept ties. The overtly racist policies of the past have
of the “racial state.”5 How should states be been replaced with “color-blind” policies that
distinguished? Omi and Winant (1994) recog- pay lip service to racial equality while preserving
nized that the clash of competing racial projects white privilege.
often transforms state institutions in ways that The “great transformation” of the 1960s was
favor certain racial groups at the expense of viewed in later decades by whites as enforcing
others. The state is not a neutral, mediat- racial injustice by extending group rights (e.g.,
ing body, but an institutional arrangement that affirmative action policies) to racial minorities.
shapes racial inequalities. Because of its power Whites came to view themselves as victims of
to distribute social resources unequally, the state the new racial state even though race inequalities
is “increasingly the pre-eminent site of racial and white advantages persisted (1994:117). En-
forcing color-blind policies masks a defense of
official purposes between 1992 and 1997. Surprisingly, white advantage with the rhetoric of eliminat-
multiracial category adoption did not occur as a result
of pressure from a powerful movement; the multiracial
ing racist practices (Omi and Winant, 1994:104–
movement was very weak or absent in some states. Nor 18). Hence, Omi and Winant argued that a
did partisan party politics cause the new policy to be state is a racial state if it uses race as an explicit
adopted. The policies were adopted because of the ways criterion to enforce race discrimination (e.g.,
that some legislators perceived that the policies would be segregated public schools) or if it allows race in-
considered by their broader constituencies. Because the
United States policy allowing individuals to have mul-
equalities to continue without intervention by
tiple race identities became official for all federal record extending citizenship rights to all without re-
keeping in 2003, the states are under great pressure to gard to race. The failure to define different types
adjust their record keeping accordingly. of racial states makes it impossible to explain
5
The notion of a racial state is not new, but was used how the state’s causal impact on racial inequali-
as a descriptive term for the explicitly racial policies of
Nazi Germany (e.g., Burleigh and Wippermann, 1991; ties changes as a result of the “great transforma-
Jacoby, 1944) rather than a theoretical concept that could tion” produced by the civil rights movement.
distinguish types of states. See also James (1988). If all states are racial states, knowing that a state
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is racial provides no analytical leverage to un- 500 years in creating new forms of empire and
derstand how it creates racial inequalities and nation, reorganizing new systems of capital and
identities. Omi and Winant (1994:65–9) rec- labor, and articulating new concepts of cul-
ognized this weakness implicitly by contrast- ture and identity (Winant, 2001:20–1). Winant
ing the “racial dictatorship” that existed before claimed that he is not a racial determinist, but his
the “great transformation” to the “racial hege- work elevates race to a position of prominence,
mony” that emerged afterward. How racial dic- the most important cause among contenders.6
tatorship and racial hegemony are linked to the Omi and Winant (1994; Winant, 1994, 2001)
racial state remains untheorized. and Goldberg (2002) provided a great service by
Goldberg (2002:195) implicitly adopted presenting convincing accounts of how states
Omi’s and Winant’s definition: Racial states are in racially divided societies produce racially un-
“states that historically become engaged in the equal effects whether the state policy being en-
constitution, maintenance, and management of forced is explicitly racial or not. That color-
whiteness, whether in the form of European blind policies often create, maintain, or exacer-
domination, colonialism, segregation, white bate racial inequalities is frequently overlooked
supremacy, herrenvolk democracy, Aryanism, by scholars as well as dominant racial groups that
or ultimately colorblind-(ness) or racelessness” benefit from race-neutral policies ( James, 2000;
[sic]. Varieties of “raceless” states came into Kousser, 1999, 2000). Nevertheless, labeling all
being around the world in the late twentieth states “racial” does not provide the conceptual
century, and all mask white privilege and dom- clarity needed to distinguish the racial impacts
ination. Goldberg’s cross-national comparison of states that enforce overtly racist policies from
of race policies in Europe, the United States, those that are ostensibly race-neutral.7 Omi and
Brazil, and South Africa concluded that in Winant (1994; Winant, 1994, 2001) and Gold-
contrast to the racist policies of earlier periods, berg (2002) failed to conceptualize the state as
“racelessness” now represents “state rationality an organization that has a multilevel relationship
toward race” in modern states (2002:203). In the to status and class structures (Lehman, 1988).
United States, racelessness is promoted under
the banner of “color-blindness”; similar policies
the organizational structure of
are called “racial democracy” in Brazil, “nonra-
liberal democratic and racial states
cialism” in South Africa, and “state multicult-
uralism” or “ethnic pluralism” in Europe (2002:
Defining the state on the basis of its orga-
200–38). In all four cases, racelessness has racial
nizational structure provides four advantages
effects. All four “raceless” states are “racial”
states that protect white advantage, according to
6
Goldberg, a claim that reproduces the weakness Race is “a key causative factor in the creation of
of Winant’s definition of the racial state. Nev- the modern world. Imperialism’s creation of modern
nation-states, capitalism’s construction of an interna-
ertheless, Goldberg’s analysis recognizes that all tional economy, and the Enlightenment’s articulation of
racial states are not the same. Racial states differ a unified world culture. . . were all deeply racialized pro-
in important ways that cause them to affect race cesses” (Winant, 2001:19).
7
inequalities in different ways. How racial states Goldberg apparently recognized this problem be-
differ is developed further in the next section. cause he distinguished “raceless” racial states from those
that explicitly enforce race discrimination by labeling
Winant’s (2001) sweeping analysis of the role the latter “racist” (2002:112–5). He pointed to the at-
of race in making modernity overlaps consid- tack on affirmative action to illustrate the difficulty in
erably with that of Goldberg (2002), but con- using a racial state for antiracist purposes. Hence, Gold-
tains broader claims (see Steinberg, 2003 for a berg implicitly defined three types of racial states: racist
review). Race is not just an epiphenomenon states that use race explicitly to the disadvantage of sub-
ordinate races, antiracist states that use race explicitly to
of state-making, capitalist development, moder- the disadvantage of dominant racial groups, and raceless
nity, or some other process. On the contrary, states that do not use race explicitly to enforce racial state
racial formation was crucial during the past policies.
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compared to the definition of the state preferred individuals whereas racial states protect the
by Winant and Goldberg (Alford, 1975; Alford rights of citizens qua members of racial groups.
and Friedland, 1985; Lehman, 1988). First, the Hence, the liberal democratic state, with its fo-
organizational features of the state are the usual cus on individual rights, grants citizenship rights
targets of racially based social movements. Ef- to each individual without regard to race, eth-
forts to institutionalize racial advantages or to nicity, religion, social class, culture, language,
elide those advantages are a common goal (e.g., national origin, sex, education, wealth, or any
Jenkins and Brents, 1989). Second, focusing on other group status.8 To the extent that a democ-
the “supraorganizational” features of the state racy extends political, civil, or social rights to
makes it possible to evaluate the effects of dif- one, it must extend them to all if it is a liberal
ferent organizational arrangements on race in- democracy. Racial states, by contrast, extend
equalities and identities. States are divided into different citizenship rights to individuals accord-
different branches that are fragmented hierar- ing to their race status and therefore fall short of
chically, making for important variation in the liberal democracy as classically defined (Bendix,
racial impact on policy formation and imple- 1964; Marshall, 1992, 1950; Starr, 1992).
mentation ( James, 1988; Lehman, 1988; Omi Racial states are not defined by the outcome
and Winant, 1994). of state policies. The race nature of the state
Third, institutional arrangements constitute is defined by the incorporation of race criteria
the practical context within which politicians within the fabric of state institutions as the ba-
and other officials of the state perform the ac- sis for enforcing state policies. For example, the
tions that ratify and implement state policies. racial state in the southern United States segre-
Understanding their impacts on racial inequal- gated public schools, public transportation, and
ities and identities is a prerequisite to creating public accommodations by race, disenfranchised
state institutions that make certain outcomes black voters, and meted out more severe pun-
more likely. Transformative pressures on states ishments to blacks than whites for equivalent
are resisted by state officials, whose interests and crimes ( James, 1988; Kousser, 1974; Lieberman,
conceptualizations of “the possible” are shaped 1998; Perman, 1984, 2001; Quadagno, 1994).
by existing organizational features (Clemens, For the purpose of distinguishing racial states
2003; Skowronek, 1982). from liberal democracies, it matters not whether
Finally, the purposes of race-conscious poli- the policies increase or decrease race inequalities
cies enforced by racial states are apparent to those (Starr, 1992). Using race as a policy criterion to
who benefit and those who suffer from them. reduce race inequalities, for example, is also a
Race-conscious policies have direct effects on racial state policy. Enforcing race advantage and
race identities and race inequalities regardless of disadvantage is the business of racial states.
which races they are intended to favor. Liberal The increasing drumbeat of state-enforced
democratic state policies, by contrast, must be race and ethnic violence and discrimination
color-blind. Color-blind policies tend to protect
the advantages of favored racial groups and pre- 8
Race is not the only status advantage that may be
vent the state from taking direct action to redress enshrined as official state policy and incorporated within
race inequalities. Hence, how liberal democra- the fabric of state institutions although it is the only status
cies protect the race advantages of favored races distinction considered here. We view race and ethnic-
ity as equivalent concepts, but distinct from other social
is less transparent than are the results of racial statuses that may form the basis of group identities. Any
state policies. We discuss how the ideological state that guarantees group rights in opposition to indi-
power of liberal democratic state policies legit- vidual rights is a departure from the model of the liberal
imates race inequalities elsewhere (see Redding, democratic state. For example, patriarchal states protect
James, and Klugman,Chapter 27 in this volume). the group rights of men; theocracies defend particular
religious groups; etc. Officially sanctioned state discrim-
James’s (1988) definition of the racial state dis- ination against women and religious minorities is more
tinguishes racial from liberal democratic states. common today around the world than is officially sanc-
Liberal states extend rights to citizens qua tioned race discrimination (James and Heiliger, 2000).
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since the disintegration of the Soviet Union has criticism of multiculturalism by Goldberg and
stimulated examinations of the various ways that Winant discussed above).
racial and ethnic group rights are embedded in Smooha’s last type is labeled “ethnic democ-
state institutions and how these arrangements af- racy,” which he locates between consociational
fect race and ethnic mobilization and violence. democracy and nondemocracy. Ethnic democ-
Because we regard ethnic and race identity for- racies are “second-rate” democracies that ex-
mation as manifestations of the same process, tend some citizenship rights to all but deny other
we view states that privilege ethnic groups as rights to nonprivileged ethnic groups. The level
examples of racial states. of democracy extended to subordinate groups is
Smooha (2002a) distinguished five types of strongly conditioned by relationships with other
democracies according to the extent that they states and the conditions of the state’s found-
restrict individual rights in order to protect ing. Estonia, for example, which was founded
group rights. He distinguished the classical in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union,
model of the liberal democratic state defined discriminates against Russians, the previously
above from existing republican democracies dominant group (Smooha, 2002a). Turkey’s dis-
(e.g., France) because they created a “nation” crimination against Kurds is still strongly con-
by enforcing brutal policies of homogenization ditioned by its relationship to other states as it
and assimilation over a long period of time. Re- was during and after its emergence as a new
publican democracies (nation-states) impose a state with the breakup of the Ottoman Em-
single language and culture and foster a com- pire (Saatci, 2002). Smooha (2002b) classified
munity (nation) that shares a common identity. Israel as an ethnic democracy, a Jewish state
Republican democracies provide no state sup- that denies certain citizenship rights to non-
port for different racial groups. Distinguishing Jews, and predicted that its long-term stability
liberal democratic states from existing “repub- depends on its ability to move toward a more
lican democracies” provides no apparent con- liberal democratic form. Israel’s discrimination
ceptual advantage other than to draw attention against its Israeli-Arab citizens is directly linked
to the historical processes that created modern to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Rouhana
nations. and Bar-Tal (1998) showed that violence and
Consociational democracies, a long-recog- conflict reinforce and valorize Palestinian and
nized third type (Lijphart, 1977), depart from Israeli identities, thereby making peaceful rec-
liberal and republican democracies by recog- onciliation extremely difficult. Recognition of
nizing ethnic differences; they provide state- a Palestinian state, which would be a racial state
enforced mechanisms for ensuring proportional and perhaps an ethnic democracy, would tend
allocation in resource allocation, power sharing, to legitimize Israel’s ethnic democracy status and
and veto power to the ethnic groups recognized make transformation to more liberal democratic
by the state. Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada forms difficult.
are typical examples. Van den Berghe (2002) argued that ethnic
Smooha (2002a) argued that two new types of democracies fall between consociational de-
democracies are emerging as a result of region- mocracies and his concept of the “Herren-
alization (e.g., the formation of the European volk democracy,” which constitutes a sixth type
Union) and globalization processes that weaken (van den Berghe, 1967). Herrenvolk democra-
the autonomy of the nation-state. Multicultural cies provide democratic institutions to the dom-
democracies fall between liberal and consocia- inant race or ethnicity but deny all citizenship
tional democracies because they recognize that rights to subordinate groups; South Africa un-
ethnic and racial differences exist in society, but der apartheid and the antebellum South in the
afford them no official recognition or special cit- United States are examples. Israel today and
izenship rights. He claimed that postapartheid the postbellum South are examples of ethnic
South Africa and the Netherlands are exam- democracies. Of course, nondemocratic forms
ples of multicultural democracies (but note the of racial or ethnic states have also existed. A
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common form of despotic regime that recog- (see, for example, Marx, 1978, 1843). By con-
nized ethnic (racial) differences is the “multina- trast, the impact of liberal democratic state poli-
tional” empire (Walzer, 1997). For example, the cies on race identity formation and mobilization
Ottoman Empire privileged Islam, but tolerated has rarely been examined, but is beginning to
certain other religions under its millet system. receive more scrutiny than in the past.
Millets were allowed a certain amount of orga-
nization autonomy and all non-Muslims were
required to belong to one. Group differences conclusion
(but not individual differences) were tolerated
so long as taxes were paid and the authority of The emerging literature that links the construc-
the Ottomans was not challenged. tion of race identities and inequalities to political
Different types of racial states have different processes is encouraging. No longer do politi-
impacts on the creation and maintenance of cal sociologists take race categories and iden-
racial identities, the mobilization of contend- tities as givens, outside the domain of inquiry.
ing racial groups, racial and ethnic violence, This chapter reviewed critically a selection of
and the possibility of preserving state stabil- important works from a huge and expanding
ity (e.g., Maiz, 2003; Marx, 1998; McGarry, literature and makes no claims of comprehen-
2002; Smooha, 2002b). For example, van den siveness. Nevertheless, we issue both a caution
Berghe (2002) argued that multicultural democ- and a call based on our understanding of current
racies promote identity formation and group trends in the political sociology of race.
conflict by “unleashing a game of recognition- First the caution. Serious scholarly attention
seeking between communities.” Whereas van to the role that race played and continues to
den Berghe (2002:437) provided evidence that play in political processes, state formation, and
consociational democracies are fragile, “clumsy the institutionalization of citizenship rights is
and inflexible states that mainly benefit rul- long overdue. Politics is central to race catego-
ing elites” (see also Horowitz, 1985), McGarry rization and race identity formation and trans-
(2002) claimed that Ireland tried Herrenvolk, formation. Nevertheless, there is a tendency in
liberal, consociational, ethnic, and multicultural some strands of current research to view race as
democratic forms at different times in its his- the chief determinant of social inequalities be-
tory and that consociational democracy offers tween and within states. State making and race
the greatest promise of peace and stability. making have been inextricably linked for 500
The attempt to develop taxonomies that de- years and promise to continue their intimate as-
scribe how the organizational structure of the sociation for the foreseeable future. Race is an
state affects race inequalities and identities, and important cause and effect of struggles for state
therefore state stability, is an important step even power, but despite its ubiquity, it is not the sole
if current efforts produce mixed results. Conso- cause or effect and may not be the most impor-
ciational, ethnic, and Herrenvolk democracies tant cause in most cases. Race may be the face
are all racial states by the definition that we pro- that class takes in shaping state making in many
pose because all depart from liberal democracy historical contexts. Or, more likely, race and
by using race categories to differentially allocate class and gender may mutually constitute one
citizenship rights. No taxonomy can capture all another in complex ways in the context of cap-
of the past or present variation in racial states, but ital accumulation and/or state building (Reed,
they illustrate the importance of analyzing how 2002).
internal state structures shape racial inequalities On the other hand, it is just as problematic to
and identities. But liberal democratic states have underplay the importance of race. The litera-
racial effects, too. That liberal democratic states ture on the civil rights movement, for example,
protect existing race inequalities by putting has typically not taken the issue of race making
them beyond the reach of policies that might seriously as an object of analysis. Rather, race is
ameliorate them has long been recognized seen largely as one mobilization identity among
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others, not as a social phenomenon with dis- to have been more likely.9 We are beginning to
tinct characteristics. Political sociology needs to accumulate enough studies of the political con-
reconsider this omission. Just as race making and struction of race to allow fruitful comparisons,
state making are causally linked, social move- but more are needed. We need to investigate
ments are the engines of race and state making. when and how racial identities become the
A political sociology of race that takes the vehicle of mobilization for the transformation
construction of race and ethnic identities seri- of state institutions and why they are sometimes
ously may act as a corrective to a tendency to ei- the mobilization vehicle of choice as political
ther exaggerate the importance of race or to fail regimes crumble and decline (e.g., the rise of a
to theorize its significance and distinctiveness. racially motivated conservatism after the decline
Sophisticated new studies of the interaction of the Great Society in the late 1960s/early
between state making and race making indi- 1970s, the Nazi takeover of the Weimar
cate that institutional arrangements matter. State Republic, the replacement of communism with
structure must be theorized and linked to the aggressive ethnonationalism in Yugoslavia and
collision of racial projects within and between parts of the former Soviet Union).
states. Both racial states and liberal democratic A number of scholars have documented a
states affect race inequalities within their territo- trend away from color-conscious policies and
ries, but in different ways. It is widely recognized toward a greater acceptance of color-blind poli-
that color-conscious policies vary dramatically cies in the United States, Brazil, South Africa,
in their impact on race inequalities. That the and the European Union. We characterize this
power of color-blind state policies to shape so- trend as a movement from racial to liberal demo-
cietal race inequalities varies with the organiza- cratic states, but the trend is far from monolithic.
tional forms employed to implement them (e.g., Ethnic democracies, consociational democra-
Lieberman, 1998) is not widely recognized by cies, and despotic states that privilege certain
either scholars or nonscholars. Studies that em- races or ethnic groups continue to emerge and
phasize race need to better analyze the specific persist as a result of state-building efforts in re-
institutional and mobilization contexts in which gions divided by race and ethnic conflict. In
race is made and remade; variations in state and many contexts, appeals to race and nation are
organizational contexts of the sort discussed ear- more powerful mobilization strategies than the
lier in this chapter certainly shape both the de- ideology of liberal democracy. Granting equal
gree as well as the kind of racializations that may citizenship rights to all without regard to race
occur. Careful, theoretically informed studies of and ethnicity may be possible only in states in
the dynamic linkages between state making and which no group is powerful enough to dom-
race making promise to identify the institutional inate all others or in those wealthy countries
arrangements that emphasize the importance of with long, albeit imperfect, liberal traditions. In
race and those that do not. the second case, color-blind policies consolidate
We do not know much about the contexts the advantages of the privileged racial group by
that favor certain racial projects and make the deflecting or delegitimizing the race-conscious
success of others less likely. Aminzade’s (2003) appeals of those who suffer from the durable in-
work is interesting in this regard because it equalities created by the color-conscious poli-
shows that mobilization around racial divisions cies of the past.
sometimes fails. Are there other such failures, 9
Gerteis (2002) shows that the Knights of Labor
and how do they compare to “successes”? viewed Chinese workers, but not blacks, as lacking in
Recent work by Gerteis (2002) is intriguing civic virtue and therefore unsuitable for membership.
because it addresses the puzzle of why a move- Hence, Chinese workers were excluded, whereas blacks
ment pursued one racial mobilization strategy were recruited as members. We find Gerteis’s analysis
convincing, but wonder how the Knights of Labor de-
(including one racial group and excluding veloped this view given the monolithic racially exclu-
another) over others (including or excluding sionary ideologies common among nineteenth-century
both groups) that seemed (at least in retrospect) white Americans.
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0521819903pt10.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 August 27, 1956 11:48
part ii
CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ROOTS AND

PROCESSES OF POLITICAL ACTION
199
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200
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chapter ten
Money, Participation, and Votes

Social Cleavages and Electoral Politics
Jeff Manza, Clem Brooks, and Michael Sauder
Democratic governance in the modern world (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954;
presumes regular elections in which the rights Lipset, 1960; Alford, 1963; Lipset and Rokkan,
of citizenship include, in principle, equal partic- 1967a).
ipation and collective influence over the com- After the late 1960s, as part of a larger
position of government. For individuals, “cast- turn in political sociology toward research on
ing a ballot is, by far, the most common act of the state and macrolevel political processes on
citizenship in any democracy” (Verba, Scholz- the one hand and social movements and con-
man, and Brady, 1995:23). The right to vote tentious politics on the other, scholarly debates
also provides the foundation for other political shifted away from the study of voting behav-
and social rights of individuals and groups. At ior. With a few notable exceptions (Hamilton,
the aggregate level, election outcomes are an 1972; Knoke, 1976; Form, 1985), relatively little
important causal factor behind national policy work on the social influences on voting behav-
making (Castles, 1982; Blais, Blake, and Dion, ior and election outcomes appeared. The field
1996; Powell, 2000; Erikson, MacKuen, and of voting studies increasingly came to be domi-
Stimson, 2002:Chap. 7). For example, the insti- nated by the investigations inspired by the pio-
tutional characteristics of welfare state regimes neering work on the social psychology of voting
have been shown to be influenced by the share launched by the Michigan School (Campbell et
of the vote won by left-wing or other party fam- al., 1960; Converse, 1964) and rational choice
ilies (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hicks, 1999; theories (beginning with Downs, 1957).
Huber and Stephens, 2001). Since the early 1990s, however, there has been
Not surprisingly, given their importance in a renewed interest in questions regarding how,
democratic capitalist societies, elections are also and under what conditions, social factors shape
influenced by inequalities in the amount of electoral outcomes. Beginning with the influ-
power and status possessed by different groups. ential contributions of Anthony Heath and his
The impact of such inequalities on democratic colleagues in Britain (especially Heath, Jowell,
governance has accordingly been a central topic and Curtice, 1985, 1991), research on voting be-
of investigation in political sociology. Political havior by political sociologists has accelerated,
divisions along class, religious, racial and eth- paying attention to both individual- and group-
nic, linguistic, national, or gender lines have of- level factors (see Manza, Hout, and Brooks,
ten led to enduring patterns of conflict in party 1995 for a comprehensive survey of research on
systems or political institutions. Indeed, the in- class voting through the mid-1990s). This sec-
vestigation of these divisions helped to define ond generation of sociological work has revived
some of the central contributions of the post- the classical focus by introducing new methods
World War II generation of political sociology and concepts. The results have underscored the
201
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202 Jeff Manza, Clem Brooks, and Michael Sauder
enduring importance of social divisions while classes, status groups, and organizations in cap-
also pointing to the theoretical relevance of italist societies both suggest that political divi-
other factors relating to ideologies, economics, sions are rooted in social structures. The pos-
and institutions (see Manza and Brooks 1999, sibility that a growing industrial working class
Brooks, Manza, and Bolzendahl, 2003). could provide the foundation for an “electoral
In this chapter, we provide an overview of road to socialism” (Engels, 1895; Przeworski and
research on social cleavages in the study of elec- Sprague, 1986) provided the earliest impetus for
toral politics. To keep the discussion manage- investigating the role of social cleavages in shap-
able, we focus on three hotly contested areas of ing voting behavior. Predictions about workers’
research – the impact of cleavages on political preferences for socialism were based on the as-
participation, voting behavior, and campaign fi- sumption that class interests inevitably lead vot-
nance in U.S. elections – leaving aside consider- ers to favor the political party most likely to
ations of important but related issues such as the advance those interests. The “class politics” the-
role of social cleavages in shaping public opin- sis became the object of social science inquiry
ion, party organizations, social movements, and when political change did not unfold in the ways
political recruitment. Although our main em- predicted by the theories put forward by Marx-
pirical focus is on the United States, exclusively ists and social democratic intellectuals, perhaps
so in the case of campaign finance, we also draw most famously in the question of “Why is there
on cross-national research and evidence. no socialism in the United States?” (Sombart,
Our approach is as follows. First, we intro- 1906; see also Lipset and Marks, 2000).
duce the cleavage concept in voting research Many of the early claims about how social lo-
as it developed, paying particular attention to cations influenced voting behavior were based
some key postwar developments in survey re- on largely impressionistic evidence. The earli-
search and analysis. Part two outlines a system- est attempts to systematically investigate the im-
atic model of social cleavages, distinguishing pact of social cleavages drew upon ecological
the mechanisms and processes through which data (e.g., Ogburn and Peterson, 1916; Rice,
cleavages influence elections. Part three applies 1928; Tingsten, 1937; Ogburn and Coombs,
insights from the model to explore in more de- 1940). In this period, the best available sources
tail the impact of cleavages in structuring po- of voting data were aggregate, district-level
litical participation, whereas part four develops election returns, which could be combined
a similar analysis of voting behavior. We then with Census data to crudely estimate social
turn (in part five) to the special case of cam- group alignments. The nature of the avail-
paign finance, examining debates over both who able data, in fact, encouraged analysts to limit
gives and with what substantive impact. A short their attention to identifiable sociodemographic
conclusion summarizes the discussion while also characteristics, usually class divisions, which
suggesting some of the ways in which we expect could be measured at the district level with Cen-
future research on cleavages to intersect with sus data (Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993:196).
other emerging research programs in political
sociology.
Early Postwar Voting Research
social cleavages and electoral The advent of the modern election survey from
politics: origins of a research program the mid-1930s onward encouraged social scien-
tists to develop individual-level analyses of the
The concept of social cleavage can be traced sources of voting behavior. The rapidly devel-
to the intersection of Marxist and Weberian oping tools of survey research made it increas-
social theory as applied to the study of poli- ingly possible to systematically test the impact of
tics. Marx’s class-centered model of history and different kinds of social cleavages using multi-
social change and Weber’s distinction between variate models incorporating other political and
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Money, Participation, and Votes 203
ideological factors influencing voter alignments munism, and the social bases of modern polit-
(although widespread use of multivariate anal- ical parties. Lipset focused his investigations on
yses in voting studies would only develop af- the distinctive social bases of ideologies, social
ter interest in the impact of social cleavages on movements, and political parties that shape the
elections had already begun to wane in the late larger political phenomena he sought to explain
1960s). The first wave of studies – important (fascism, communism, democracy). Democratic
and pathbreaking as they were – were based on societies were said to be those with a large and
cross-tabulations and relatively simplistic mea- stable bloc of middle class citizens. Fascism and
surement strategies. communism, by contrast, were traced to the au-
In the early postwar period, the most influ- thoritarian politics of key groups or classes, in-
ential and pioneering work on political com- cluding workers (Lipset’s famous formulation of
munication, social cleavages, and voting be- the thesis of “working class authoritarianism”),
havior was done by Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard small business owners, and other economically
Berelson, and their students at Columbia Uni- threatened middle class segments.
versity (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948;
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). In
developing a theory of the “two-step flow of The Development of Social Psychological
political communication” and in highlighting Models of Voting
the role of “opinion leaders,” Lazarsfeld and
Berelson made enduring contributions to the The most influential thrust of the postwar gen-
field of communication studies. They also de- eration of research on voting behavior was the
veloped pioneering understandings of the so- social psychological approach of the so-called
cial factors influencing voting behavior. In their Michigan School (see especially Campbell,
1954 study of a panel of voters interviewed sev- Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960). Design-
eral times during the 1948 election campaign in ers and first analysts of the early National Elec-
Elmira, New York, for example, Berelson et al. tion Studies, Angus Campbell and his colleagues
identified nineteen distinct social characteristics asserted that voters’ alignments were best con-
that could be used to predict an individual’s vote. ceptualized as the product of long-standing
Among the key findings of the Columbia inves- emotional attachments and identification with
tigations was the importance of social networks a specific political party. Complementing this
of friends, family members, and co-workers in assumption, Campbell and his colleagues (1960:
reinforcing the political preferences of voters Chap. 10) reported further evidence that par-
(helping to produce very high levels of stabil- tisan voters were able to articulate general im-
ity even in the face of extensive campaigning). ages of their preferred party as endorsing po-
They also reported that “cross-pressured” vot- sitions expected to benefit their social group.
ers, who had overlapping group memberships, In this way, they extended the social cleavage
were less enthusiastic and engaged participants model. In their famous “funnel of causality”
in the political process. metaphor of individual voting decisions, social
The wide-ranging work of Seymour Martin structural attributes – including class origins and
Lipset probably did the most to focus attention occupation – were viewed as operating at the
on the role of social cleavages in structuring vot- large (back) end of the funnel, leading to the
ing behavior (see especially Lipset, 1981, 1960, social–psychological attributes (primarily parti-
1963; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967a, 1967b; see san identification and political attitudes) at the
also Alford, 1963). In the essays gathered in his narrow front end of the funnel that ultimately
widely read 1960 book, Political Man, Lipset de- predicted vote choice.
veloped what he would later characterize – in The American Voter’s social psychological the-
the 1981 postscript to the reissue of the book – as ory defined much subsequent research and de-
an “apolitical Marxist” approach to explaining bate over U.S. voting behavior (Brooks, Manza,
the social origins of democracy, fascism, com- and Bolzendahl, 2003). However, its emphasis
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on the stable sources of partisanship and the an economic model of vote choice that distin-
seemingly low capacity of voters to acquire ei- guished between the retrospective versus prospec-
ther sophistication or factual information was tive orientations of economic expectations and
(and is) not without controversy at the individ- behavior. Kinder and Kiewiet (1981; see also
ual and aggregate level. (At the individual level, Kiwiet, 1983) demonstrated the importance of
see Verba, Nie, and Petrocik, 1979 and Delli- conceptualizing and measuring the variable tar-
Carpini and Keeter, 1996, At the aggregate get of economic evaluations: Voters’ evalua-
level, see Page and Shapiro, 1992; Erikson et al., tions are egocentric when they involve percep-
2002:Chap. 3, and Green, Palmquist, and Schik- tions of economic conditions experienced by
ler, 2002. See Niemi and Weisberg, 2001:Chap. an individual; voters’ evaluations are sociotropic
10, for an overview.) when they involve perceptions of level of na-
Although hardly unproblematic, the Michi- tional economic prosperity.
gan model did provide a way of moving beyond
the conceptual limitations of early cleavage-
based approaches to studying voting behavior.
Campbell and his colleagues noted that in no concepts, mechanisms, processes
case did all of the members of a social group
give their votes to one party: There were al- By 1960, with the publication of Lipset’s Politi-
ways plenty of defectors. One way of account- cal Man and Campbell et al.’s The American Voter,
ing for these defections was to consider the following closely on the heels of Down’s An Eco-
social–psychological factors mediating the rela- nomic Theory of Democracy (1957) and Berelson
tionship between social group membership and et al.’s Voting (1954), much of the terrain of
vote choice, pushing some voters away from debate over social cleavages and voting behav-
voting their class or other group interest. ior had been firmly established. These works
identified social cleavages as important factors
in studying voting, and taken as a group they
Economic Models also proposed a set of mechanisms – economic
interests, social psychological factors, and social
The third of the major postwar approaches de- networks – to account for the effects of social
veloped an economic model of participation, cleavages on political behavior.
voting behavior, and policy outcomes. Trac- But the first generation of social science
ing its origins to Anthony Downs’s influential work on social cleavages in electoral politics
(1957) work, these models emphasize the ways did not, for the most part, develop systematic
in which voters evaluate the expected utility of theories about the linkages between individual-
choices they are offered by candidates and par- or group-level factors, on the one hand, and
ties. Downs’s original thesis started with the as- organizational and institutional forces on the
sumption that “citizens act rationally in poli- other (the early Columbia School work pro-
tics. This axiom implies that each citizen casts vides a partial exception). In general, the study
their vote for the party he believes will proof voting behavior developed as an individual-
vide him with more benefits than any other” level enterprise, in which individual voters were
(1957:36). In this view, “groups” are aggregates viewed as having a set of attributes that allowed
of self-interested actors (albeit with possibly sim- analysts to assign them to politically relevant
ilar calculations of utility), and group-based vot- groups. The subsequent attack on behavioral
ing is explained in terms of similar individual models in the social sciences by institutional-
calculations. ists was, at its core, a challenge to the isolation
Various extensions of the economic model of research on voting from the broader polit-
have been introduced in a vast literature that ical contexts in which elections occur and the
has appeared since Downs. For example, the feedback processes they generate (see Immergut,
pioneering work of Fiorina (1981) developed 1998).
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In this section, we explicitly draw on later tive identification, or “group consciousness.”

research to outline a multilevel model of social Such affect models extend the original Michi-
cleavages and elections. We begin by unpacking gan School approach by refining the notion of
the mechanisms that give rise to, or reinforce, the social group beyond simple objective group
cleavage-based political divisions, and then memberships (such as one’s religion, class, gen-
present a model of the processes through which der, race, or region of residence) to take into
cleavages come to be manifest (to a greater or account the strength of feeling about member-
lesser degree) in the political system. This dis- ship in the group defining voters’ overall iden-
cussion points the way to a more systematic un- tities. According to advocates of this approach,
derstanding of social cleavage impacts across the the underlying causal process is not to be found
full spectrum of research on electoral politics. in the objective attributes of voters, but rather in
the degree to which people identify with, or de-
velop positive affect toward, a particular group.
Mechanisms If objective group membership does not also in-
volve a subjective component, it can be expected
In the literature on social cleavages, three dis- to have much less influence over attitudes and
tinct though not exclusive mechanisms of the behavior.
source of cleavage impacts have been proposed: At the heart of the social–psychological me-
economic, social–psychological, and social networks. chanisms accounting for group-based political
We elaborate on each briefly in this section, be- differences are conceptions of the “linked fate”
ginning with economic factors. (Dawson, 1994:Chap. 4) of group members.
The class models of voter preferences that un- Building from earlier arguments about the role
derlay the socialist tradition assumed a straight- of perceived interdependence in social groups
forward economic logic in which working class (Conover, 1984, 1988; Gurin, Hatchett, and
voters would vote for socialist parties as a way of Jackson, 1989), Dawson argued that a strong
realizing their material interests (whereas middle sense of linked fate helps to explain why remark-
and upper class voters were presumed to favor able levels of political solidarity persist among
conservative parties). Such a rendering assumes African Americans even as class divisions have
that (class) voters evaluate the expected eco- grown. On this account, middle class blacks see
nomic utility of the political choices offered by their own prospects as tied to the well-being of
candidates and parties. In this view, “groups” are all blacks because “the historical experiences of
really aggregates of self-interested actors (albeit African Americans have resulted in a situation
with similar calculations of utility), and group- in which group interests have served as a useful
based voting is explained in terms of calculations proxy for self-interest” (Dawson, 1994:77).
regarding which party will more likely bring The third major mechanism that has been
about desired economic outcomes (see, e.g., postulated concerns the role of social networks
Lipset et al., 1954:1136). For example, Hibbs’s in shaping political participation and voting be-
(1982, 1987) work on macroeconomic condi- havior. The basic idea is that social networks
tions and vote choice suggests group-specific of family, friends, co-workers, and fellow par-
applications: Working class voters prefer eco- ticipants in social or civic organizations influ-
nomic outcomes in which unemployment is ence voters’ orientation toward politics. Huck-
low, whereas middle class voters prefer a low- feldt and Sprague’s (1995) work hypothesizes
inflation environment. Parties may adjust their the importance of network-based information
policy priorities accordingly in order to best to voters’ decision-making and voting behav-
serve their electoral constituencies (see Haynes ior, arguing further that such information is
and Jacobs, 1994). routinely transmitted through both strong ties
A second, quite different approach to ana- (e.g., involving friends) and weak ties (e.g., in-
lyzing the role of groups in shaping political volving individuals acquainted solely through a
behavior highlights the importance of subjec- common contact). For example, Weakliem and
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Heath’s (1994) analysis of the 1987 British Elec- of ‘social cleavage’ or ‘up’ to that of ‘politi-
tion Study found that a sizable portion of class cal cleavage’” (1990:214). Their proposed so-
differences in voting remain after controlling for lution to this dilemma was to suggest that any
income and economic policy preferences, sug- social cleavage capable of shaping political be-
gesting that the operation of social networks havior will simultaneously exist on three differ-
accounts for the rest. Studies of the impact of so- ent levels. First, it has an “empirical” compo-
cial mobility on political preferences also point nent rooted in social structure. Second, it has
to the power of social ties to the class of origin in a “normative” component, in that the social
structuring the political identities of mobile citi- groups making up a cleavage adopt conflicting
zens, whose political preferences tend to fall be- forms of consciousness. Third, it has a macroin-
tween those of their class of origin and those of stitutional component, expressed through “in-
their class destination (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, dividual interactions, institutions, and organiza-
and Heath, 1995). tions, such as political parties, which develop as
These three mechanisms – individual and part of the cleavage” (1990:214). We extend this
group economic interests, group-based con- model to note that social cleavages are also typ-
sciousness and a sense of linked fate, and so- ically linked to the outputs of public policy (see
cial networks – are not mutually exclusive. For Manza and Brooks, 1999:Chap. 10; Manza and
example, individual voters can simultaneously Wright, 2003). Policies reflect both the capaci-
view the interests of their group in purely eco- ties of particular groups to influence politicians
nomic terms and be embedded in social net- and political parties and ultimately public pol-
works that reinforce such perceptions. However, icy, and the policy outputs of governments re-
the analytical problem of separating out the reinforce or reshape (depending on their content)
spective influences of each is demanding, and the structural conditions giving rise to cleavage
few existing election study datasets contain fully divisions in the first place.
adequate measures to carry out the appropriate In previous work, we have argued that po-
tests. The American National Election Studies, litically significant social cleavages have impacts
for example, contain comprehensive batteries of at all these levels; variation in their magnitude
items about economic views and social group over time (or cross-nationally) can be explained
identities but few measures of respondents’ by differences in how they manifest themselves
social networks. at each level (Manza and Brooks 1999, Chap. 2).
For example, the religious cleavage is often
strongest in countries in which there is a plural-
Processes ist religious market, competition between reli-
gious groups for access to desired goods, and/or
In their macroanalysis of cleavage systems in a party system that includes religious parties.
Western Europe, Bartolini and Mair (1990) The force of class divisions will vary depending
introduced a rich, multilevel approach that pro- in part on the organizational capacities of labor
vides a useful starting point for any considera- unions and employer groups to mobilize and
tion of the processes through which cleavages shape the political orientations of their mem-
come to be manifest in the political system. bers, as well as the extent to which the party
The analytical problem, as they put it, is that system includes social democratic or labor par-
“the concept of cleavage lies in its intermedi- ties making class-based political appeals.
ate location between the two main approaches We consider each of these processes across the
of political sociology: that of social stratification four levels introduced in greater detail below.
and its impact on institutions and political be-
havior, on the one hand, and that of political Social Structure. “Social” cleavages are, by def-
institutions and their impact on social structure inition, grounded in the social structure of
and change, on the other. . . . The concept of any society. Social structural divisions give rise
cleavage is often either reduced ‘down’ to that to groups of people with shared interests or
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statuses. Major social structural divisions include Group Identification and Conflict. The second
those stemming from race/ethnicity, class, gen- level can be characterized as the cleavage “field,”
der, religion, region, language, or national iden- defined by the existence of two or more dis-
tity. Societies vary in the types of divisions tinct groups whose members recognize them-
embedded in social structure. Although class selves as both (1) distinct from and (2) in conflict
and gender may be universal, there is consid- with one another. In general, group identifi-
erable variation on other social structural divi- cation is a crucial condition for social struc-
sions. For example, in the case of religion there tural divisions to become politicized; without
is wide variation in the types of divisions found some clear recognition of group boundaries, so-
in different countries. In some countries, a sin- cial or economic inequalities are unlikely to
gle denomination (the Catholic Church in Italy, become embedded in the organizational and in-
Ireland, or Belgium; the Anglican Church in stitutional contexts in which political conflicts
Britain; the Lutheran Church in Sweden) has occur (Koch, 1993). One of the most powerful
the allegiance of most citizens who claim a reli- ways in which group-based consciousness may
gious identity. Here the social basis for a cleav- shape voting behavior is through group heuris-
age lies in the division between adherents versus tics, in which voters make attributions about
secular or nominally affiliated church mem- candidates or parties based on which group they
bers. In other countries, however, there is much think the candidate or party most closely repre-
greater competition between distinct denomi- sents (Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Sniderman,
nations or religious traditions with large mem- Brody, and Tetlock, 1991).
berships (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, or the
United States). Religion can, in such societies, Macropolitical Factors. The third source of social
provide a basis for social stratification and in- cleavage impacts in a political system – and per-
equality, in which members of a “dominant” de- haps most important for its mobilizing impact –
nomination have privileged access to valued po- relates to the processes through which interest
sitions (e.g., in the long dominance of mainline groups, social movements, political parties, or
Protestant denominations in the United States). governing institutions explicitly draw upon or
Two points about social structural divisions encourage group-based differences as a way of
are worth highlighting. First, because social furthering their goals.
structures change slowly, political change based Let us consider these more specifically. The
on changes in social structure per se are typically existence of organizations such as unions and
cumulative, emerging over a period of time. business associations influences the political
Second, there are multiple ways in which social alignment of classes. Unions organize workers
structural changes may alter political outcomes not only at the point of production but also in
(Manza and Brooks, 1999:Chap. 7). Changes in the polls (Asher, 2001). Similarly, groups or as-
the relative size of particular groups within a sociations based on minority group member-
cleavage represents one such way. Changes in ships, as well as civil rights organizations, polit-
the internal composition of the group, irrespec- ically organize racial or ethnic group-based po-
tive of its relative size, provides another. If, for litical action. In the United States, churches also
example, the proportion of working class voters have been particularly important in organizing
declines, the overall impact of the class cleavage African Americans politically (Rosenstone and
on party coalitions may decline even if the vot- Hansen, 1993:Chap. 6; Harris, 1999), as have
ing behavior of those who remain in the work- the major organizations of the Christian Right
ing class is unchanged. Conversely, the working (Layman, 2001; Brooks 2002).
class may change internally in ways that alter Political parties vary widely in the degree to
its political alignment. Either of these changes which they seek to organize on the basis of so-
would reduce the importance of working class cial cleavages, but some common patterns can
voters as a class, but they suggest very different be found (see Schwartz and Larson, Chapter
analytical interpretations. 13 of this volume). Electoral systems shape the
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number and types of political parties and their puts are influenced by social cleavages – the sys-
general character (e.g., catchall parties ver- tem of campaign finance – in the fifth section
sus parties organized around specific cleavages) of this chapter.
(e.g., Mair, 1997). Parties may also shift the type
of appeals they make, or the success of those ap-
peals, in response to social and economic change political participation
or changes in the social structure of the elec-
torate. An instructive example is the transforma- In this section, we examine some of the re-
tion of social democratic parties from class-based cent contributions, interpretations, and con-
parties to parties that compete more broadly for troversies over the role of social cleavages in
middle class votes (see Przeworski and Sprague, shaping political participation, focusing espe-
1986; Heath et al., 2001). This can also be a cially on the United States. One recent inter-
two-way process: Success in recruiting middle national survey shows that turnout in U.S. na-
class voters changes the profile of a left party’s tional elections ranks an extraordinary 138th
electoral coalition and the balance of interests among the 170 countries that hold elections, far
it represents (see Manza and Brooks, 1999b: lower than all similar capitalist democracies ex-
Chap. 7). cept Switzerland (which ranked 137th) (Inter-
national Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Feedback Processes. A final, if underexamined Assistance, 1997). The United States is also un-
set of processes, involves feedback dynamics in usual for having a substantial cleavage-based
which social cleavages are reinforced by policy skew in political participation: There is typi-
outcomes and politicians’ strategic behavior. cally a turnout gap of some 25 percent or more
Policy outcomes skewed toward the benefit of between the highest turnout group within a
some groups both reflect the existence of sig- cleavage and the lowest (such as professionals
nificant cleavages in the political system and and unskilled workers in the case of class, Jews
reproduce those differences. Once in office, par- versus those with no religion in the case of
ties reward their supporters and attempt to the religious cleavage, and whites and Hispanics
make good on at least some of their campaign in the case of race/ethnicity) (Hout, Brooks,
promises, thereby signaling in a manner that re- and Manza, 1995; Lijphart, 1997; Manza and
inforces group-based loyalties. Brooks, 1999: Chap. 7; Freeman, 2004). Such
There are three kinds of issues about feed- sharp socioeconomic-based cleavages are not
back processes that relate to cleavages in elec- generally found to the same degree in other
toral politics: (1) the impact of socioeconomic countries, although cross-national research fre-
skews in the electorate on policy (the impact quently finds that in those countries without
of who votes), (2) the impact of social cleav- compulsory voting, there are small to moderate
ages on electoral coalitions (the combined im- effects of education on turnout (Powell, 1986,
pact of who votes and how they vote), and (3) pp. 26–27; Font and Viros, 1995; Dalton, 1996;
the beneficiaries of the policy outputs of gov- Lipjhart, 1997, pp. 2–3).
ernments (who benefits). We discuss some of the In the social science literatures on politi-
key research findings relating to (1) and (2) be- cal participation, there are two broad streams
low. With respect to (3), scholarship document- of explanation that bear on cleavage-based
ing bias in policy outputs is widespread, but it differences: individual-level explanations and
would go beyond the scope of this chapter to political and institutional explanations. Sociode-
try to summarize it (on the United States, see, mographic attributes of individuals such as ed-
e.g., Weir, 1998; Page and Simmons, 2001; for ucation, race/education, income, gender, and
comparative evidence, see, e.g., Lipjhart, 1997; religion are the ingredients of individual level
Hicks, 1999; Esping-Andersen, 2001; Huber explanations. Political and institutional expla-
and Stephens, 2001). We do, however, consider nations point to the role of mobilizing activi-
one notable way in which American policy out- ties by parties and political organizations on the
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one hand, and institutional constraints such as ditional pattern of increasing turnout with age
voter registration requirements, the timing of will be true for more recent cohorts is less clear
elections, and the range of meaningful choices (Miller and Shanks, 1996:Chaps. 3–5).
presented to voters through the party system, on
the other. We consider both types of factors.
Group-Level Factors
Social Structural Factors One of the most well-understood aspects of

political participation is that social networks
It has long been understood that in elections provide a key source of both information and
where turnout is far from universal, resource- motivation. The basic idea is straightforward:
rich groups vote at higher rates than more dis- Interactions with others enhance one’s likeli-
advantaged groups (Lijphart 1997, pp. 1–2). For hood of political participation, and the greater
example, in his ecological study of voter turnout the degree of interaction, the greater the effect
in Chicago during the 1924 presidential elec- (Huckfeldt, 1986; Leighley, 1990; Kenny, 1992;
tion, Gosnell (1927, p. 98) concluded that “the Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Networks also
more schooling the individual has the more provide incentives to participate; as Verba et al.
likely he is to register and vote in presidential (1995:16) pithily put it, one reason people do
elections.” Other early research found similar not participate is “because nobody asked.” This
results (Tingsten 1937), and it has remained a finding appears to hold across both aggregate
staple finding of participation research since that contextual measures of social environment and
time (Wolfinger and Rosestone 1980, pp. 13– measures of individual networks, although Mutz
36; Teixiera 1992; Verba et al. 1995). Educa- (2002) produced new survey-based evidence
tional effects on turnout are often found to be suggesting that individuals with substantively
mediated by other, associated factors: knowl- cross-cutting and conflictual networks are less
edge of the candidates and issues, newspaper likely to participate, a point emphasized by the
reading to keep up on current events, a sense early Columbia School.
of political efficacy, and concern with the out- The identities of the candidates have also been
come of the election (Teixiera 1992; Conway shown to have significant group-level effects, es-
2000, pp. 25–28). pecially with regard to race and gender and, to
Other sociodemographic attributes of indi- a lesser extent, religion. Racial differences are
vidual voters that influence turnout have also especially pronounced for African Americans
been widely documented (for overviews, see (e.g., Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Tate, 1993); a
Abramson et al. 2000, chap. 4; Conway 2000, particularly dramatic example is the 1983 cam-
chap. 3). Whites vote at higher rates than blacks, paign for mayor in Chicago, in which an African
although the gap has varied depending on elec- American congressman, Harold Washington,
toral context and other factors (e.g. Tate 1993); surprisingly gained the Democratic nomina-
and turnout among Latinos is lower still (Leigh- tion, prompting extraordinary levels of turnout
ley 2001). For much of the 20th Century, men among black voters in Chicago during the gen-
voted at higher rates than women, but that eral election (Kleppner, 1985). White voters
gap has disappeared in recent elections (Fire- have similarly been shown to participate at lower
baugh and Chen 1995). Regional differences rates in elections with black candidates (Reeves,
in turnout are more pronounced than is often 1997). The presence of a woman candidate in-
recognized; for example, in the 2000 presiden- fluences the participation and voting behavior of
tial election turnout ranged from a low of 40.5% women (Plutzer and Zipp, 1996). In the case of
in Hawaii to 68.8% in Minnesota. Younger peo- the religious cleavage, the group-specific mobi-
ple vote at lower rates than older voters (Wol- lization of evangelicals Protestants caused by the
finger and Rosestone 1980:46–50; Highton presence of born-again Christian Jimmy Carter
and Wolfinger, 2001:202–9); whether the tra- on the presidential ballot in 1976 and (to a lesser
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extent) 1980 increased turnout among evangel- ethnic minorities, and the poor, may thus ac-
icals (see Manza and Brooks, 1997). The con- count for some of the sociodemographic skew
verse proposition – that when the candidate of in the electorate, as low-turnout groups are po-
one’s party has a disliked social identity, partici- tentially subject to more influence by mobi-
pation frequently falls – has also found support. lization efforts than higher-turnout groups (see
For example, Herron and Sekhon’s (2002) study Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978; Powell, 1986; Rad-
of voter roll-off (i.e., ballots containing invalid cliff and Davis, 2000). Leighley’s (2001) exam-
votes for some races) found significant declines ination of variation in the rate of mobilization
in African American participation in election and turnout of Latino voters in the United States
contests pairing only white candidates, and vice found that higher levels of mobilization are as-
versa, in the 1998 election in Cook County sociated with increased turnout (see also De La
(Harris and Zipp, 1999). Garza, Menchaca, and DeSipio, 1994).
Mobilization may not always be successful,
however. Over the past twenty years, for exam-
Organizational Factors ple, organizations of the Christian Right (CR),
most notably the Christian Coalition and its pre-
In attempting to explain why turnout is so much decessors, have consistently attempted to mo-
lower in the United States than in other com- bilize evangelicals to participate in the politi-
parable democracies, or why it is lower today cal process. Christian Right organizations have
than in earlier periods in American history, a as their explicit goal the restoration of tra-
great deal of attention has been paid to organiza- ditional values through public policy (Green,
tional and institutional factors. The underlying 1997; Layman, 2001). Employing a grassroots
presumption in such research is that individual- strategy of mobilizing supporters from below,
level factors may not account for the full extent the CR in the 1980s and 1990s built an exten-
of low U.S. turnout. For example, Americans sive network of local organizations with per-
have as much or more education on average as haps as many as 200,000 members or more at
the citizens of any polity (and far more on av- their peak in the early 1990s (Persinos, 1994;
erage than in earlier periods of American his- Wilcox, 1994; Green, 2000). In each election,
tory with higher turnout). Furthermore, their these groups claimed to have distributed mil-
lack of interest in politics, low levels of politi- lions of pamphlets, and survey data produced by
cal efficacy, or apparent apathy toward election Regnerus et al. (1999) found that over 20 per-
outcomes may reflect substantive views of the cent of all voters reported receiving one of the
party system or the character of elite political pamphlets. In spite of these extraordinary mo-
conflicts (e.g., Burnham, 1982; Vallely, 1995; bilizing efforts, however, there is little evidence
Piven and Cloward, 2000). Differences in lev- for any general increase in turnout among evan-
els of political mobilization in the United States gelical voters since these efforts began in the late
promoted by social movements or party orga- 1970s (Manza and Brooks, 1997).
nizations, as well as institutional constraints on Although one case hardly undermines the
participation such as preelection registration re- entire mobilization thesis, other evidence sug-
quirements, also contribute to accounting for gests that electoral mobilization in the modern
cross-national differences. era rarely increases either aggregate or group-
The level of mobilization efforts undertaken specific turnout significantly. For example, the
by social movements is especially important sharp increase in mobilizing efforts of unions in
(e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wiel- the 1990s has produced only modest increases
houwer and Lockerbie, 1994). The compara- at best in turnout rates among union members
tive weaknesses of mobilizing organizations in or households (e.g., Abramson et al., 2002:82).
the United States, especially those targeted at Gerber and Green’s (2000) field experiment
lower-turnout groups such as workers, racial and comparing the effectiveness of nonpartisan
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appeals to participate using personal contacts, stantial sociodemographic skew in terms of who
direct mail, and telephone contacts found a is registered in the first place (with, for exam-
significant effect of person-to-person contacts, ple, better-educated, more affluent voters being
precisely the type of mobilization efforts that more likely to be registered than less-educated,
appear to have declined in recent years in favor less affluent voters) (Wolfinger and Rosenstone,
of professional campaign techniques. 1980). This suggests that socioeconomic cleav-
In specifying institutional factors, analysts ages in participation are themselves rooted in
have focused on the following sets of issues: (1) voter registration requirements.
the difficulty of registering in the United States For the registration thesis to be supported,
compared with other countries that use an auto- however, we would need systematic evidence
matic system of voter registration (Powell, 1986; that looser registration laws both increase
Piven and Cloward, 2000); (2) the increased turnout and reduce sociodemographic differ-
costs of voting, with national elections held on ences. There is some evidence that making reg-
a working day in the United States versus on ei- istration easier encourages turnout, although
ther a weekend or national holiday in most other the impact appears not to be as substantial as
countries (Crewe, 1981; see Freeman, 2001 for was often thought to be the case a decade ago
the extraordinary differences in turnout be- (Teixeira, 1992:122). Cross-section comparisons
tween Puerto Ricans voting in Puerto Rico, show that states with easier registration require-
where elections are either held on Sunday or ments have higher turnout (e.g., Wolfinger and
a national holiday, versus Puerto Ricans living Rosestone, 1980; Teixera, 1992). The lowering
on the U.S. mainland); (3) the role of negative of registration barriers in virtually all states after
campaign advertisements in the media in reduc- 1960 probably precluded an even greater de-
ing voter participation (Ansolabehere and Iyen- cline in turnout (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen,
gar, 1995), as well as the changing character of 1993:214), although most of the impact came
news media coverage of politics (e.g., Patterson, from a single change: the removal of barriers to
1992); (4) societalwide trends of declining so- registration faced by African Americans in the
cial capital reducing participation across a wide South.
range of social institutions (Putnam, 2000), and Against this evidence, however, is a wealth
specifically those related to social networks that of counterevidence that raises substantial doubts
promote political participation (e.g., Teixiera, about the impact of registration laws. For exam-
1992); and (5) the limited range of ideologi- ple, states with looser registration regimes might
cal choices available to voters in the U.S. two- have had higher turnout even without reform-
party system (e.g., Burnham, 1982, 1987; but see ing their registration laws; at least one fixed
also Jackman, 1987; Manza and Brooks, 1999: effects model found no evidence that changes
Chap. 1). in individual state registration laws increased
These mechanisms are not, of course, mu- turnout (Knack, 1995). At the aggregate level,
tually exclusive; some or all may contribute to increased registration levels after the passage of
explaining the puzzle of low turnout. We do the motor voter law in 1993 has not increased
not have the space here to discuss all of the is- overall turnout levels; turnout was lower in the
sues they raise, but it is important to comment presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 than
briefly on the debate over voter registration laws in 1992, and these were among the lowest of
because of their particular relevance to explana- the twentieth century, as were turnout levels
tions about social cleavages in participation (see, in the 1994, 1998, and 2002 midterm elec-
e.g., Burnham, 1982; Powell, 1986; Piven and tions. This does not mean, as Piven and Cloward
Cloward, 2000). It is well-known that registered (2000:Chap. 12) pointed out, that easier regis-
voters participate at fairly high levels in Ameri- tration would not have an important impact in
can politics (with turnout rates over 80 percent future movement-driven mass-mobilizing elec-
in presidential elections) and that there is a sub- tion contexts; but by themselves, changes in
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registration laws have had little impact on ag- els and declining barriers to participation (prin-
gregate turnout levels. cipally in terms of registration laws) should have
combined to increase turnout during this same
period (Brody, 1978).
Feedback Processes? Even determining the precise magnitude of
turnout decline has proven a difficult challenge.
Writing in 1949, V. O. Key asserted that, “The Some analysts have questioned whether the ac-
blunt truth is that politicians are under no tual extent of declining turnout has been ex-
compulsion to pay much heed to classes and aggerated. The denominator used to calculate
groups of citizens that do not vote” (Key, the “voting age population” includes legal im-
1964/1949:527), and this argument has been migrants and ineligible felons. Some of the fall
frequently reasserted (Burnham, 1987; Rosen- in turnout is an artifact of the growing propor-
stone and Hansen, 1993; Piven and Cloward, tion of the adult population that cannot legally
2000). Questions about how and when group- vote due to citizenship status, a felony convic-
specific turnout may matter are, however, com- tion (Uggen and Manza, 2002), or other rea-
plicated and difficult to conclusively resolve. In sons. The most aggressive contribution on this
this context, a reasonable initial hypothesis is issue is that of McDonald and Popkin (2001),
that lower turnout among disadvantaged groups who argued that, contrary to the conventional
reduces the incentives for political parties to wisdom, all of the decline in turnout since 1972
appeal to these groups (see Hill and Leighley, is due to the rising proportion of ineligible indi-
1992), although those incentives likely vary viduals improperly included in the denominator
depending on the institutional context (with of official turnout statistics or survey data (see
multiparty proportional representation schemes also Burnham, 1987; Burden, 2000).
producing higher levels of responsiveness to the From the standpoint of the impact of social
shape of the electorate than single-member dis- cleavages on turnout, the key question with re-
trict systems). gard to recent trends in turnout is how much,
if any, group-based inequalities in participation
have grown. In other words, is the turnout de-
Recent Trends in Political Participation cline (whatever its precise magnitude) concen-
trated disproportionately among certain groups,
Between 1960 and 1988, official turnout figures most notably the working class or poor? The
in presidential elections fell from 62.8 percent question is important if, as Rosenstone and
to 50.3 percent, subsequently hovering within Hansen (1993:248) warned, “the more recent
a narrow band between 49 percent and 53 per- decline of citizen involvement in government
cent since then (with a one-shot increase to has yielded a politically engaged class that is not
55 percent in 1992). Turnout in midterm con- only growing smaller and smaller, but also less
gressional elections is far lower, sliding from 45.4 and less representative of American democracy.”
percent in 1966 to just 33.1 percent in 1990, ris- The case for an increased skew in participa-
ing to 37.4 percent in 1994, but back down to tion has been made using income and education
32.9 percent in 1998, though up to 39.4 percent to measure socioeconomic status (Reiter, 1979;
in 2002. Bennett, 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993)
The implications of declining voter turnout and occupation (Burnham, 1987). Most stud-
in the United States, both in relation to re- ies that have measured changes in turnout by
cent downward trends and in comparison with educational level have also found a greater de-
other countries, have been subject to a great deal cline among better-educated groups (Teixeira,
of discussion and scholarly concern (Putnam, 1992; Leighley and Nagler, 1992; Abramson et
2000:Chap. 2). Turnout decline has also been al., 2002), even among analysts skeptical of any
viewed as something of a paradox, because overall increase in social cleavage-related bias
steady increases in societalwide educational lev- (especially Leighley and Nagler, 1992).
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Explanations offered for an increased skew that although substantial participation inequal-
tend to focus on macrolevel attributes, although ities remain, “the bowlers remain the same.”
individual-level explanations have been pro- Using an occupational measure of class, Hout,
posed as well. Among the key organizational Brooks, and Manza (1995) found only very lim-
factors that have been identified, the most im- ited evidence that turnout fell among working
portant has been declining levels of partisan class voters, principally among skilled workers
mobilization by parties and social movements (Brooks and Manza, 1999:Chap. 7).
since the 1960s (see especially Rosenstone and Overall, the trend debate has proven difficult
Hansen, 1993; also Burnham, 1982, 1987; Piven to resolve, in part because estimates based on
and Cloward, 2000). These scholars have argued self-reported turnout are subject to nonrandom
that the Democratic Party, and the social move- reporting biases, and different model specifica-
ments and organizations affiliated with the party, tions produce sufficiently divergent results to
have generally lost the capacity to reach out to permit alternative interpretations. These sources
disadvantaged voters as part of a broader trend of uncertainty hold across the major datasets
toward a more elite-oriented, money-driven (the National Election Study and the Current
party. Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) widely Population Survey’s Voter Supplement Module)
cited analysis produced statistical evidence from and across different specifications of key social
individual-level survey data suggesting that de- cleavages of interest, notably class. We conclude
clining mobilization accounts for half of the that there is at best only modest evidence for an
turnout decline between 1960 and 1988. How- increase in social cleavage impacts on turnout, but
ever, since the late 1980s, both the Democratic this should in no way obscure the fact that by
and Republican Parties and their allies have sig- any measure the persisting cleavage-based skews
nificantly increased their efforts to mobilize vot- in participation rates in U.S. elections are sub-
ers; National Election Study (NES) data show stantial.
that whereas 22 percent of voters were contacted
by one of the parties in 1960 (the year with the
highest postwar turnout), in 1996 29 percent of voting behaviour
voters were contacted, and in 2000 fully 36 per-
cent of voters were contacted (the highest total The impact of social cleavages on political par-
ever recorded) (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, ticipation provides one source of cleavage im-
2002:90; but see Gerber and Green [2000:653], pacts, but it is through their impact on elections
who noted the shift from personal contacts to that their ultimate influence operates. In this
less effective telephone or mail contacts). section, we investigate issues relating to over-
However, a number of other analysts have time trends in cleavage impacts on voting be-
found less or no evidence of an increasing skew, havior, the question that has framed much of
emphasizing instead that turnout decline is the the recent controversy. Because the issues and
result of electoratewide trends. Leighley and key theories and evidence parallel the previous
Nagler (1992) argued that income is the best discussion about political participation, our dis-
single measure of the class skewness of the elec- cussion here is abbreviated. For a fuller account,
torate and that there is no change in the relative see Manza and Brooks (1999) and Brooks et al.
participation rates of different income groups (2003).
(see also Shields and Goedel, 1997 on midterm
elections). Utilizing a new dataset – the Roper
Social and Political Trends Data – with over- Recent Controversies
time measures of participation across a range of
political and charitable activities, Brady, Scholz- At the center of recent debates is the question of
man, Verba, and Elms (2002) found largely whether or not cleavage impacts on voter align-
trendless patterns in the turnout ratio of up- ments have declined. A wide range of schol-
per to lower socioeconomic groups, concluding ars have argued that traditional group-based
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political alignments have eroded, often directly The lively debate concerning the fate of the
paralleling the decline of traditional left–right class cleavage in British politics provides a good
politics (Franklin, 1992; Franklin, Mackie, and example of the increasingly complex overall pic-
Valen, 1992a, b; Van der Eijk et al., 1992; Dalton ture. Early research by Heath et al. (1991) ad-
and Wattenberg, 1993; Dalton, 1996; Carmines judicated competing models of British Election
and Huckfeldt, 1996). Ronald Inglehart and his Studies data from 1964 through 1987, report-
collaborators’ influential arguments about the ing a pattern of aggregate change with no net
emergence of a “new politics” rooted in a clash decline in the class cleavage. The most recent
between materialist and postmaterialist values assessment of Heath et al. (2001), covering the
started from the assumption that there has been period through the election of Tony Blair in
a decline in the impact of social cleavages such 1997, however, reported evidence of the erosion
as class and religion (see, for example, Inglehart, in the overall level of class voting (Heath et al.,
1990, 1997). 2001:Chap. 7; see also Goldthorpe, 1999:81–2).
Comprehensive claims about the universal Nieuwbeerta, Brooks, and Manza (2004) found
decline of social cleavages on voting behav- evidence of a significant decline in British class
ior have, however, been challenged on several voting that developed in the 1970s. Although
grounds. Persistent reassertions of class voting they analyzed different data and class schemes
decline generally rely on simplistic measures of than other studies, Weakliem and Heath’s (1999)
class and political outcomes whose flaws have analysis of election data from the 1930s onward
been well-understood for a long time (Korpi, suggests that British class voting was at its high-
1972; Heath et al., 1985, 1987). Recent work est point in the early 1960s (preceded by lower
reconsidering the relevance of social factors levels in the 1930s and 1940s). This finding po-
for understanding vote choice has drawn upon tentially reconciles contradictory findings in the
more differentiated class schemas and better literature.
specifications of the party system (moving be-
yond simple polarizations to consider the full
range of groups and party families). These stud-
ies also deployed statistical models that permit Explaining Trends in Voting Behavior:
distinctions between over-time changes that af- Mechanisms and Processes
fect the voting alignments of all groups from
those changes that have group-specific impacts (a Debates over trends in the impact of social cleav-
point first made by Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, ages on voting behavior lead directly to a recon-
1985). This research has produced a mixed sideration of the underlying mechanisms and
picture but no systematic evidence of univer- processes through which cleavage factors are ex-
sal decline (e.g., Heath, Jowell, and Curtice, pressed in elections.
1985, 1991, 2001; Weakliem and Heath, 1994, Some of the most widely asserted claims
1999; Hout, Brooks, and Manza, 1995; Brooks about changes in the influence of social cleav-
and Manza, 1997; Evans, 1999, 2000; Manza ages on electoral politics are linked to hypothe-
and Brooks, 1999; Nieuwbeerta, Brooks, and ses about changes in social structure. Three key
Manza, 2004). Although it is sometimes as- trends have often been invoked as factors pro-
sumed that these latter studies have reasserted ducing declining levels of cleavage voting: ris-
old orthodoxies about the persistence of class ing levels of citizen affluence (e.g., Brooks and
or other social cleavages, there has been con- Brady, 1999) and increased upward intergen-
siderable recognition that changes in the pat- erational social mobility (Heath et al., 1995);
terning of groups and political alignment have increasing levels of education and cognitive ca-
occurred, including class and religious voting in pacities of voters (e.g., Nie et al., 1979; Ingle-
some contexts (see Nieuwbeerta, 1996; Brooks hart, 1990:Chap. 10); and the changing size of
and Manza, 1997a; Ringdal and Hines, 1999; key groups in the electorate (Manza and Brooks,
Nieuwbeerta et al., 2004). 1999:Chap. 7; Heath et al., 2001:Chap. 7).
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Taken together, these social structural may be more complex patterns emerging. Con-
changes tend not to lead to simple or unidi- sider the case of race in shaping U.S. voting be-
rectional consequences. Social structural factors havior. The larger debate extends beyond what
that push voters in one direction may be offset by we can cover in this chapter (for our previous
other changes that pull in other directions. For analysis, see Manza and Brooks, 1999:Chap. 6;
example, rising affluence has frequently been Manza, 2000; see also James and Reading, this
accompanied by rising levels of class inequal- volume). On the one hand, explicit racism has
ity (e.g., Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995; Fis- eroded (Schuman, et al. 1997), but a number of
cher et al., 1996), which can result in class di- analysts have explored the rise and persistence
visions (e.g., Greenberg and Skocpol, 1997). It of new forms of “subtle” or “symbolic” racism
is also likely that some social structural changes (Sears et al. 2000). At least with respect to U.S.
are producing new social cleavages. Consider voting behavior, there is relatively little reason to
the case of gender. Women, including those think that the main black–white divide has nar-
with small children, have become much more rowed (e.g., Dawson, 1994; Manza and Brooks,
likely to hold full-time jobs in the 1990s than 1999:Chap. 6), although the precise role of racial
they were in the 1950s (Spain and Bianchi, group interests and symbolic attitudes remains a
1996). The gender “wage gap” between men fruitful topic for further research.
and women has, however, declined only mod- Finally, political and organizational factors.
estly, mostly among younger cohorts in which In the previous section, we discussed the role
women gained greater access to occupations (in- of organizations in reinforcing cleavage-based
cluding opportunities in lower- and middle- divisions in relation to turnout. Many of the
level management and the professions) previ- same organizational factors that influence par-
ously monopolized by men (e.g., Bernhardt, ticipation shape the vote. Unions, churches, in-
Morris, and Handcock, 1995). Greater exposure terest groups, political organizations, and so-
to workplace inequality contributes to a grow- cial movements push supporters and members
ing political cleavage between men and women of particular groups not only to turn out to
(Manza and Brooks, 1998; Stryker and Eliason, vote, but also to support particular candidates or
2002). parties.
Next, group-level factors. A number of With respect to political parties, however,
scholars have asserted that declines in group there are important differences between mo-
consciousness are important factors. There have bilization and vote-getting strategies. It is now
been a number of arguments about the de- clear that most of the parties that once sought
cline of class-consciousness (e.g., Pakulski and to organize on the basis of a specific cleavage –
Waters, 1996; Kingston, 2000), old-fashioned especially class or religion – have tended to
racism (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997), and broaden their appeals over time; those parties
religious group (denominational) consciousness that have not have tended to see their vote shares
(e.g., Wuthnow, 1988, 1993). In the case of shrink drastically. Using a model of socialist par-
class and religion, most of the broad histori- ties as rational vote-seeking organizations, Prze-
cal interpretations that have been advanced have worski and Sprague (1986) provide good reasons
emphasized the decline of homogeneous com- for understanding the logic of broadening party
munities that helped to reinforce group con- appeals. As the size of the working class elec-
sciousness (see especially Pakulski and Waters, torate declines, incentives to launch class-based
1996). The decline of such communities and appeals decline in favor of cross-class appeals that
the accompanying growth of social and religious will also win votes from middle class voters, in
mobility weaken the strength of group ties and turn discouraging class-based voting. A similar
the capacity of a cleavage to influence voting model can be applied to religious parties (see
behavior. Manza and Wright, 2003).
Group consciousness in other cleavage fields In analyzing the overall impact of social cleav-
may be increasing over time, or at least there ages on major parties’ electoral coalitions, bias in
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turnout must be combined with differences in politics over the past twenty-five years,” as one
group size and group-based political alignments. veteran political journalist recently character-
When these three components are combined, ized it (Drew, 1999:vii; see also Broder, 2000).
we can estimate the respective influence of any In this section, we consider the role of money
group of voters within the major party coalitions and campaign finance in shaping elections and
(Axelrod, 1972; Erikson, Romero, and Lan- public policy. Consistent with the broader goals
caster, 1989; Stanley and Niemi, 1993; Bartels, of the chapter, an examination of campaign
1998). The approach of Manza and Brooks finance shows how a cleavage-based analysis
(1999:Chap. 7) and Heath et al. (2001:Chap. 7) is usefully expanded beyond individual- and
developed such estimates for the electoral coali- group-level dynamics to grasp the full range
tions of U.S. and British political parties. The of the political impacts of money. In partic-
trend analyses undertaken by these authors ular, as we will discuss below, vast disparities
showed extraordinary changes in the shape of in the resources provided to politicians by dif-
the major left party coalition in each country: ferent classes and interest groups constitute a
Both the Labour Party and the Democratic potentially important component of the class
Party have undergone a major shift from a party cleavage in the organizational and institutional
with far more working class voters than pro- sphere of American electoral process. But at the
fessional and managerial voters, to parties with same time, it is important to consider the causal
far larger representations of the latter (with the force of money in relation to other social forces
Democratic Party going from a 3:1 ratio of that shape the dynamics of elections and policy
working class to professional/managerial voters making; doing so suggests that some of the alarm
in 1960 to a 1:1 ratio by 1996, and the Labour over the impact of big money may be misplaced.
Party going from 5.2:1 ratio in 1974 to a 1.7:1
ratio in 1997). With such a vast shift in where
the votes come from, it can hardly be surpris- The Regulatory Context
ing that these parties have altered their political
appeals over the years. Fears that wealthy corporate and individual
campaign donors were buying government in-
fluence early in the twentieth century led to
social cleavages and campaign finance an initial attempt at campaign finance reform,
the Tillman Act of 1907, which sought to ban
Dramatic increases in the availability of money corporate contributions to federal campaigns.
in the American political system in recent The effectiveness of this legislation, however,
decades have prompted widespread concern, was limited by lack of enforcement and its sus-
suggesting to many observers an important ex- ceptibility to loopholes. Similar limitations have
tension of the class cleavage in electoral politics. characterized the numerous attempts at cam-
To be sure, the availability of large amounts of paign finance reform right up to the present
money to finance political campaigns is hardly (Corrado, 1997; Goidel et al., 1999; and Mutch,
a recent phenomena (e.g., Corrado, 1997). For 2001).
example, in the first of her pioneering studies The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
of campaign contributions, Overlacker (1932) of 1971, along with key modifying amendments
found that nearly 70 percent of all money con- in 1974, 1976, and 1979, defines the landscape
tributed to the 1928 federal election campaigns of money and politics today. The act put into
came from donations of over $1,000. But it is place new requirements for the disclosure of
in the recent period that concerns about the in- money received by candidates while placing
creasing role of money in politics have erupted new limitations on contributions to candidates
into widespread declarations regarding “the ex- and political parties. Under the 1974 amend-
panding corruption of money in all its pervasive ments to the act, each election individuals may
ways” leading to “the debasement of American contribute up to $1,000 to a candidate, $5,000
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to a Political Action Committee (PAC), and are formed around single issues or explicit party
$20,000 to national parties, but no more than support rather than sponsoring organizations. In
$25,000 total; PACs are allowed to contribute up addition to money given to PACs, individuals
to $5,000 each election to a candidate, $5,000 account for a large proportion of total dona-
to other PACs, and $15,000 to national parties. tions, and a vast majority of the largest of these
“Soft money” contributions were made legal contributions are made by affluent individuals
in the 1979 amendment to the FECA; these or families.
contributions have no ceiling but are limited Table 10.1 presents a summary of the distri-
to party-building activities, such as get-out-the- bution of PAC contributions to congressional
vote drives and issue advertisements (see Potter, campaigns from the 1978 to the 2000 election
1997; Magleby, 2002). cycle. Money contributed by PACs increased
In a recent attempt to eliminate the influence nearly eightfold during this period (from ap-
of very large soft money contributions coming proximately $34 million to $260 million dol-
overwhelmingly (as we note below) from busi- lars), with business PACs increasing their giving
ness sources, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform from $20.7 million to $152.5 million. Although
Act of 2002 prohibits (after the 2002 election) organized labor also increased its donations dur-
national party committees from accepting and ing this period, the relative share of business
spending soft money contributions, though it PAC contributions increased significantly, ris-
also allows for increased individual contribu- ing from just over twice that of organized la-
tion limits. The legislation is unlikely to funda- bor in 1978 to more than three times as much
mentally alter the system of campaign finance, in 2000. Total contributions doubled from the
however, insofar as soft money is allowed for 1992 (the first year for which detailed report-
voter registration, get-out-the-vote efforts, and ing of soft money donations are available) to the
other allegedly nonpartisan activities. Further, 2000 election cycle, rising from approximately
the new legislation also does not set any limits $591 million in 1992 to $853 million in 1996
on independent soft money for ideological or is- to almost $1.4 billion in 2000 (Center for Re-
sue campaigns. In general, the use of proxies to sponsive Politics, 2002).
funnel money to preferred candidates as a sub- In addition to these “hard money” contribu-
stitute for soft money donations can, if anything, tions, an increasingly important source of cam-
be expected to increase. paign donations is reflected in “soft money”
contributions. These are donations that are not
regulated or limited by federal law and that may
Social Cleavages and Campaign Finance: be used for party-building activities – such as
Overview voter registration drives and general campaign-
ing for the party (e.g., bumper stickers and
Where does political money come from, and lawn signs) – as opposed to the direct, “hard
how can we characterize the overall division money” election expenses that are regulated by
of funds? Contributions come from either in- the FECA. Before 1990, soft money contribu-
dividual donors or from PACs. PAC contributions were not required by law to be reported,
tions can be divided into three broad categories: so systematic data on soft money contributions
business-related, labor, and ideological PACs. are only available beginning with the 1992 elec-
Business PAC contributions are defined here as tion cycle. During this ten-year span, however,
donations made by corporate PACs and non- there was a dramatic increase in total soft money
labor membership organizations such as trade, contributions: from $75 million to $410 mil-
business, and health associations; labor PACs lion dollars. Business soft money contributions
are those PACs generally associated with sin- completely dwarf those of labor and ideological
gle unions, although the most prominent labor groups. Consider, for example, the 2000 elec-
PAC is the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Politi- tion cycle. Business organizations contributed a
cal Education (COPE); finally, ideological PACs total of $368.9 million in soft money, whereas
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0521819903pt10.xml
Table 10.1. Trends in Campaign Finance, 1978–2000

CB779/Janoski
Business soft Labor soft Ideological Ideological Total

Business PAC money Labor PAC money PAC soft money individual
contributions contributions contributions contributions contributions contributions contributions
Election (in millions of (in millions of (in millions of (in millions of (in millions of (in millions of (in millions of
0 521 81990 3
Cycle dollars) dollars) dollars) dollars) dollars)1 dollars)2 dollars)

1978 20.7 9.9 2.5
1980 34.9 13.2 4.9
1982 49.9 20.3 10.7
1984 62.7 24.8 14.5
218
1986 62.7 29.9 18.8
August 27, 1956
1988 79.0 33.9 19.2

1990 88.9 33.6 14.3 142.3
1992 115.3 69.0 39.4 4.3 17.4 1.3 322.0
11:48
1994 114.7 69.4 40.7 4.4 17.5 5.1 262.7

1996 125.6 193.0 46.6 9.5 22.0 4.2 419.2
1998 130.2 162.2 43.3 10.3 27.1 3.8 333.3
2000 152.5 368.9 50.1 30.4 35.7 10.4 698.3
1 PAC data are from the Federal Election Commission. Data for the 1978 to 1984 election cycles are from Corrado et al. (1997); data for the 1986
to 2000 election cycles are from the Federal Election Commission Web site (www.fec.gov).
2 Soft money donation estimates are from the Center for Responsive Politics (2002).
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organized labor provided just $30.4 million (up In addition to money coming from organi-
from $4.3 million in 1992, although some of zations, millions of Americans make campaign
that increase reflects changed reporting require- donations in their own names (or those of fam-
ments in which in-kind contributions are now ily members). Most of these donations are in
required to be reported) and ideological groups small amounts, but when we consider larger in-
$10.4 million. The ratio of business to labor dividual contributions (over $200), the class dis-
contributions is thus vastly more skewed with parity in donations is substantial. For example,
respect to soft money donations: Business soft the Center for Responsive Politics (2002) was
money contributions were twelve times greater able to categorize about 70 percent of such do-
than labor in 2000, fifteen times greater in 1998, nations for the 2000 election cycle. They re-
and twenty times greater in 1996. The total share ported that individuals associated with business
of campaign resources coming from business interests contributed a total of $533.7 million
sources (PAC donations and soft money con- to election campaigns, compared with less than
tributions) has steadily increased during the last $1 million contributed by individuals associated
twenty years. In 1978 the ratio of business to with organized labor.
labor donations was 2.1:1; it had reached 6.5:1 Burris (2001) cautioned against assuming that
by the 2000 election cycle. individual donations by corporate officers are
Aside from business and labor PACs, the other likely to be identical to the giving of the corpo-
two major categories of donors are “ideologi- ration’s PAC, because individual contributions,
cal” PACs (Clawson et al., 1998) and individ- even those provided by individuals connected to
ual donors. As part of the larger trend toward corporate interests, tend to be motivated more
increasing political donations, ideological PACs by (usually conservative) ideology. He found ev-
have also increased their giving in recent years, idence to this effect in a study of the 1980 cam-
contributing almost as much as labor PACs in paign, finding a more strongly pro-Republican
the 2000 election cycle in hard money (though tilt of individual donors (see also Biersack, 1999).
much smaller amounts in the form of soft money The fact that such donations may be connected to
donations). The largest share of ideological PAC partisanship does nothing to reduce the disparity
money – approximately 40 percent of the total in overall resources, and may in fact tend to mag-
amount of hard money provided by these PACs nify the political consequences as Democrats re-
in the 2000 cycle – is that given by so-called ceive a smaller share of such donations than they
leadership PACs, organized by current or for- would from less partisan donor motivations.
mer political officeholders for the purpose of Survey data on individual-level giving to po-
making donations to other candidates or PACs litical campaigns is consistent with this finding;
(Center for Responsive Politics, 2002). Among patterns of significant giving are heavily skewed
the other largest ideological PACs were single- toward individuals from affluent households.
issue groups such as the National Rifle Associa- For example, Verba et al. (1995:191–6) found
tion, EMILY’s List, and the National Commit- that 56 percent of households with incomes
tee to Preserve Social Security. Some ideologi- over $125,000 (in 1989) donated to a political
cal PACs associated with the major parties were campaign, with the average amount of all dona-
also significant donors in this category; Ameri- tions being $1,183, compared with only 6 per-
cans for a Republican Majority (the third-largest cent of households with incomes below $15,000
ideological donor in this category during the (who gave an average of $86). Surveying large
2000 election cycle) made all of its contribu- ($200 or more) contributors to the 1996 con-
tions to Republican candidates, while the Na- gressional campaign, Biersack et al. (1999) re-
tional Committee for an Effective Congress ported that 79.5 percent of large donors had in-
(the sixth-largest donor in the category) gave comes over $100,000, and 42.4 percent had in-
100 percent of its contributions to Democratic comes over $250,000. These authors found that
candidates (Center for Responsive Politics, large donors are far more conservative politically
2002). than NES respondents (with only 29 percent
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identifying as Democrats, compared with 52.4 members of wealthy Jewish families contributed
percent of the NES sample for that year), but far more money to the Democratic Party than
they are more liberal on social issues than the members of wealthy families in general; Cohen
entire NES sample. (1989) estimated that Jewish contributors have
We can now answer the question posed at provided half of all individual Democratic Party
the beginning of this section. Organized la- donations outside of the South since 1960. Bur-
bor constitutes the main counterweight to busi- ris (2001:374) estimated that 60 percent of Jew-
ness contributions, with contributions from ide- ish capitalists gave to the Democrats in 1980,
ological PACs and individuals scattered across compared to 24 percent for non-Jewish capital-
the ideological spectrum. Labor’s contributions ists in his sample.
are made almost completely through PACs and There is also evidence of a gender gap in
soft money donations, with very few donations campaign finance. The most systematic effort
coming from individuals connected to the la- to compare rates of giving by men and women
bor movement. Estimating the contributions of reported that in the 1990s, donations from
business only through PAC and soft money do- women accounted for only a quarter of individ-
nations, however, significantly underestimates ual hard money contributions and one-seventh
the overall contributions of the capitalist class to one-eighth of individual soft money contri-
as a whole because of the large share of the total butions (Biersack et al., 1999; Weber, 2002).
donations by individuals connected to business Further, because some wealthy contributors,
interests. A rough estimate of the total gap be- usually male, also donate money to candidates
tween business and labor sources suggests that or PACs in their spouses’ name to avoid dona-
in recent election cycles, the ratio of business to tion limits, the gender gap in campaign finance,
labor donations is more than ten to one. particularly with respect to hard money, may
actually be even larger than these figures would
suggest. A modest counterweight to the percep-
Other Cleavages in Campaign Finance tion of male dominance in campaign finance is
the increasing prominence over the past twenty
Although class divisions in campaign finance years of women’s organizations like EMILY’s
are the most pronounced, other social cleav- List, the Women’s Campaign Fund, and Wish
age impacts have been noted as well. For ex- List, ideological PACs that contribute sufficient
ample, although data about the religious back- amounts to be visible. No comparable men’s
grounds of contributors are poorly documented PACs exist.
(as contributors are not required by the FEC
to list their religious affiliations) and much of
the most visible activity of religious groups A Note on In-Kind Donations
is more activist than financial, there is one
particularly notable religious cleavage in cam- Although most of the literature on campaign
paign finance: clear evidence that Jewish con- finance focuses on direct giving, a second
tributors account for a significant proportion broad category of contributions has particular
of Democratic contributions (see Domhoff, relevance for social cleavage impacts: in-kind
1972, 1990:Chap. 9 ). Webber and Domhoff’s contributions of voluntary activism provided
(Webber, 2000; Webber and Domhoff, 1996) directly or indirectly to political campaigns.
historical research on the New Deal showed Determining the precise value of such in-
that among religiously identifiable large contri- kind contributions is impossible (Alexander and
butions, Jews were overwhelmingly the largest Haggerty, 1985), but it is nonetheless frequently
bloc of Democratic donors. This pattern an important source of support for political cam-
has continued in more recent elections (see paigns. Survey data suggest that voluntary ac-
Domhoff, 1990:245–7 for an overview). Allen tivity on behalf of political candidates is drawn
and Broyles (1989) found, for example, that much more evenly than financial contributions;
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although poorer households are still underrep- behalf of Republican candidates have been es-
resented among all activists, far more hours pecially significant in the past two decades.
are contributed by poor and middle income
household than affluent ones (see Verba et al.,
1995:191ff.). With respect to organized groups, Using Campaign Finance Data to
business organizations have relatively little ap- Investigate Capitalist Class Influence
paratus for providing in-kind contributions, but
religious groups, unions, and organizations such A recurring focus of the political sociologi-
as the National Rifle Association or pro-choice cal literature on money and politics has been
groups frequently work on behalf of particular to test various power-elite and business class
candidates or political initiatives. segment theories using campaign finance data
Of further note are the activities of reli- (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden, 1986;
gious and labor organizations. Perhaps recog- Clawson and Neustadtl, 1989; Ferguson and
nizing the vast disparities in resources discussed Rogers, 1986; Burris, 1987; 2001; Boies, 1989;
above, AFL-CIO president John Sweeney has Mizruchi, 1989; Domhoff, 1990; Ferguson,
maintained that political activism, not money, 1995). In general, scholarship in the power-
is the key to labor’s political influence (see, elite tradition has held that pluralist models
e.g., R. Gerber, 1999; Asher et al., 2001:107). (e.g., Ippolito and Walker, 1980; Malbin, 1980;
Unions are especially well-equipped to gener- Sabato, 1984) significantly understate the unity
ate manpower for political campaigns because of business interests with respect to particular
of an organizational structure with paid staff at types of legislation or the pursuit of a broad
the national, state, and local levels to generate, pro-business agenda (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl,
maintain, and coordinate activity. The activities and Bearden, 1986; Domhoff, 1990:Chap. 9,
that union members have typically provided in- 2002; but see Smith, 2000). Beyond that, how-
clude distribution of voting literature, solicit- ever, there is little agreement over the sources
ing campaign contributions, working at phone of business unity in spite of a wealth of attempts
banks, participating in voter registration drives, to formulate theories about capitalist class divi-
organizing and attending candidate meetings, sions along regional, industrial, or market sector
putting up yard signs, and working at party factors.
headquarters (Asher et al., 2001:123). It has been A central issue concerning business politi-
estimated that during one particularly intense cal donations is whether they are motivated by
mobilization – on behalf of Walter Mondale’s pragmatic or ideological goals. Pragmatic do-
bid for the Democratic presidential nomina- nations are given in order to gain access to
tion in 1984 – unions provided some $10 mil- politicians, regardless of their party affiliation or
lion to $20 million worth of in-kind contri- ideological positions, and are most often mea-
butions (Dark, 1999:132). (Note, however, that sured by the percentage of donations given to
under current laws some of those in-kind do- incumbents (as they are obviously most likely to
nations, such as the use of office space, would be reelected). The aim of ideological contribu-
now be officially recorded; see Alexander, tions, on the other hand, is to alter the com-
1992.) position of the government by giving money to
Religious organizations have also provided politicians who share the contributor’s political
important in-kind contributions in recent years. view; ideological behavior is usually measured
Although many mainline Protestant churches by the similarity of donation patterns between
have long sponsored political action of var- a corporation’s PAC and PACs explicitly ori-
ious kinds among their laity (see Wuthnow ented toward ideological issues. The distinc-
and Evans, 2002), the most prominent type of tion between these types of contributions has
in-kind contributions have been those of the a long history in the literature (Gopoian, 1984;
Christian Right. As discussed previously, in- Clawson and Neustadtl, 1989; Clawson et al.,
kind contributions by the Christian Right on 1998). Evidence from both quantitative and
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qualitative studies suggests that pragmatic giv- finance in terms of a timeline, marking the re-
ing is by far the more common form and that spective points in which money might influ-
corporate PACs with ideological orientations ence political outcomes. The main points along
are outliers. Clawson et al. (1998), for example, this timeline are the following: (1) the role of
reported that during the 1996 election cycle, money in influencing who runs; (2) the role
“almost 4 out of 5 large corporate PACs gave at of money in affecting who is elected; (3) the
least 70 percent of their money to incumbents, role of money in shaping the voting patterns of
and a majority gave at least 80 percent to in- those who are elected; and (4) related to the
cumbents” (39). When business donations are impact on legislative voting patterns, the im-
ideological, they likely go to conservatives and pact of money in influencing other actions of
to tight races (1998:39). legislators. At every stage of this process, there
Analyzing pragmatic donations is important are arguments about the power of money to
because it helps to explain why the results of skew outcomes; but equally importantly, in no
past studies of corporate divisions in campaign area is money universally viewed as a decisive
finance have proven disappointing (see Burris, factor.
2001:363). Two sets of findings stand out. Many of the recent debates turn on com-
Mizruchi’s (1989, 1990) work on the politi- plex methodological issues, what two leading
cal dynamics of corporate interlocks provided analysts have described as “the statistical morass
evidence in support of one version of power- that surrounds the study of campaign finance”
elite theory (see also Useem, 1984; Mintz and (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994:1115). We do
Schwartz, 1985; Domhoff, 1990). In this work, not have the space here to discuss the debates
interlocking directorates are hypothesized as over competing statistical approaches, but sev-
providing network relations that foster similar eral common issues appear repeatedly. Most
patterns of political contribution. Mizruchi’s re- notably, there are linked questions about simul-
sults suggest that indirect ties among corpora- taneity bias and assumptions about the exogene-
tions – namely, shared relations with financial ity of money in the political process. For exam-
institutions – are positively associated with do- ple, models that treat campaign contributions
nation patterns (see Mizruchi, 1996 for a more as an exogenous variable tend to ignore the
recent overview). Second, studies exploring a possibility that PACs give legislators money be-
range of explanatory factors to account for po- cause these legislators vote in a particular way.
litical divisions among the capitalist class, partic- Such models are unable to distinguish between
ularly in the context of a possible rightward shift these two scenarios. The most sophisticated at-
in the late 1970s, found two factors that were tempts to model the role of money at any of
important: the degree of governmental regula- the four stages include parameters for capturing
tion in an industry and the extent of a firm’s de- processes that may shape both the amounts of
fense contracting (Clawson et al., 1985, 1986; money received and their impact.
Clawson and Neustadtl, 1989; Burris, 1987;
Burris and Salt, 1990). Who Runs. The debate over patterns of politi-
cal recruitment primarily concerns the question
of whether incumbent war chests (or war chests
Skewed Outcomes? Assessing the Political of one candidate in an open seat) deter poten-
Impact of Money in American Politics tial challengers or, alternatively, encourage some
types of challenges while discouraging others.
The vast bulk of the scholarly literature on cam- On the question of deterrence, campaign funds
paign finance focuses not on theories about the may indirectly affect the quality of a challenger
underlying cleavages among business donors, by signaling to potential rivals the commitment
but rather on the overall impact of money of the incumbent (or the front-runner) to win-
on elections and public policy. We can or- ning the race, as well as the (large) amount of
ganize the extensive debates over campaign resources that will be needed to be competitive
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(see, e.g., Sorauf, 1992; Epstein and Zemsky, the size of war chests is in some cases partially
1995; Box-Steffensmeier, 1996). determined by the existence and quality of chal-
In the signaling process, early fund-raising lengers, the effects of war chests on potential
plays a much greater strategic role than late opponents are difficult to measure.
fund-raising (Epstein and Zemsky, 1995). Be-
cause early fund-raising is much easier for can- Who Wins. Aside from the impact of money on
didates who already have access to elite money candidate selection, there are large controver-
networks, some have argued that the early fund- sies over the question of whether, once the ma-
raising process constitutes a “money primary” jor party candidates are selected, the amount of
(Magleby and Nelson, 1990:58–61; Clawson money involved in an election significantly in-
et al., 1998:Chap. 1; Domhoff, 2002, Chap. 6). fluences the outcome. A striking feature of po-
In the money primary, just as in the actual elec- litical money in the contemporary era is that
tion, momentum and visible evidence of a high there is usually relatively little overall difference
probability of ultimate success are key factors in between how much the major parties raise or
being able to raise money; many affluent candi- even how much of that money comes from busi-
dates also give or loan their campaigns substan- ness sources. As a consequence, questions about
tial money from their own pocket to provide who wins do not have clear partisan implica-
campaign start-up funds. The money primary tions. Indeed, from the standpoint of resources,
is important because it serves to eliminate po- it is hard to resist the suggestion by Clawson et al.
tential challengers who do not have access to the (1998) that the United States has only one major
same types of resources as incumbents or front- party: the “money party” (91). Those who are
runners (Magleby and Nelson, 1990:Chap. 4). unable to raise substantial resources simply do
In a more speculative vein, it may force chal- not make it to this stage of the political process.
lengers to tailor messages in ways that will appeal One important way in which this question
to potential donors. has been framed is by reference to a policy-
There have been challenges to claims about related controversy: Would setting limits on ex-
the importance of money in influencing who penditures help or hurt challengers? Some an-
runs for office. Large war chests rarely deter alysts have argued that money plays a much
challengers who expect to have access to signifi- bigger role in determining the success of chal-
cant resources themselves. Critics of the money lengers, whereas the marginal benefit for in-
primary hypothesis have also asserted that be- cumbents is fairly small (e.g., Jacobson, 1980,
cause only “quality” challengers have a chance 1990; Abramowitz, 1991). Other analysts have
of defeating incumbents, and because “qual- argued that campaign spending is an important
ity” challengers are rarely deterred by incum- determinant of both incumbent and challenger
bent money, the true effect of war chests is success (e.g., Green and Krasno, 1988; Erikson
very small (e.g., Krasno and Green, 1988; Bauer and Palfrey, 1998; A. Gerber, 1998). The key to
and Hibbing, 1989; Jacobson, 1990; Goodliffe, the latter set of findings centers around the en-
2001). Goodliffe (2001), for example, argued dogenous role of money. Rational incumbents
that war chests provide little information that will raise and spend more money in close elec-
challengers do not already have about the in- tions, that is, in elections they are more likely
cumbent. If past election performance and be- to lose, than those that are one-sided in their
havior in office are included in the model, the favor (e.g., A. Gerber, 1998). Because many in-
deterring effect of war chests falls significantly. cumbents spend little and win easily and those
Finally, the measurement of the relationship be- spending more have a greater likelihood of los-
tween war chests and deterrence is complicated ing, it looks as if spending has little effect on
by evidence that the fund-raising of incumbents outcomes for incumbents if spending is treated
is often tied to the real or anticipated qual- as an exogenous variable in a regression model.
ity of the challenger (Krasno and Green, 1988; The policy implications of the latter set of find-
Krasno, Green, and Cowden, 1994). Because ings are that spending limits would help to
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create more competitive elections by aiding than those who are expected to vote in the
challengers (see especially Green and Krasno, PAC’s interest. This suggests that a relationship
1988; A. Gerber, 1998). between PAC contributions and voting patterns
cannot be solely attributed to shared political
Legislative Voting Patterns. Does money influence interests (i.e., PACs give money to certain can-
legislative votes on policy, either for individual didates because they vote in accordance to the
legislators or in the aggregate? Periodic scan- PAC’s interest), but instead indicate attempts by
dals excite journalistic outrage. But what is the PACs to sway undecided legislators.
larger picture? With little, if any, direct evidence Critics of the vote-buying thesis abound. A
of systematic vote selling (see, e.g., Milyo, 1997; second generation of research on the influence
Milyo et al., 2000), much hinges on the assump- of money on votes has introduced techniques
tions of measures and statistical models. Early for distinguishing how voting behavior influ-
examinations treating political donations as an ences PAC contributions as well as how PAC
exogenous variable were split inconclusively be- contributions influence voting behavior (e.g.,
tween those finding that contributions influ- Grenzke, 1989; Levitt, 1998; Wawro, 2001).
ence voting patterns (Silberman and Durden, This line of work suggests that contributions do
1976; Frendreis and Waterman, 1985; Ginsberg not dictate voting patterns in a unidimensional
and Green, 1986) and those finding no effect fashion, that is, from money to votes. Other
(Welch, 1982; Wright, 1985, 1989). The differ- more recent critics of the view that money
ent findings were often attributed to the vari- changes votes have further pointed out, plausi-
ance of issues on which votes were cast and bly, that the scholarly attention given to the in-
competing approaches to measurement issues. fluence of PAC contributions on voting patterns
A related but more sophisticated version of is exaggerated for the simple reason that PACs
the influence argument suggests the existence of do not contribute enough money to be very in-
a “spot market” in which votes are exchanged fluential. Legislators are, in this view, not capable
for contributions. Proponents of this approach of being bought off with contributions from a
(Austen-Smith, 1987; Baron, 1989; Stern, 1992; single PAC (even if the PAC gives the maxi-
Stratmann, 1992, 1998) claim that contributions mum $5,000). House incumbents are likely to
are short-term investments through which the spend upwards of $1 million on reelection (and
donor will secure political favors (such as votes Senate incumbents far more), amounts that rise
on relevant issues or the framing of legislation in competitive races. Those holding “safe” seats
in ways that are beneficial to the donor) and/or should be even less subject to influence (see, e.g.,
ensure that legislators honor past agreements. Milyo et al., 2000).
Short of legislators admitting that their vot- The theoretical case for impact thus requires
ing behavior was influenced by PAC donations, a more nuanced interpretation than a simple
however, direct evidence of money buying votes vote-buying thesis would suggest. Indeed, one
is almost impossible to find except for explicit model argues that the relationship between con-
scandals. Members of Congress can always claim tributors and legislators is best understood as a
that voting behavior leads to contributions from long-term commitment. Neustadtl (1990), for
like-minded PACs, rather than vice versa. In lieu example, reported that “PAC directors indicate
of direct evidence, scholars have attempted to that there is a long-term give-and-take estab-
support the spot market hypothesis by show- lished between interest groups and members and
ing that PAC behavior closely corresponds to that, as a political player, one cannot be con-
behavior one would expect if votes were being cerned only with legislative outcomes” (559).
exchanged for contributions. Stratmann’s (1992) In explicitly theorizing this relationship, Claw-
analysis of the behavior of PACs associated with son, Neustadtl, and their colleagues drew upon
the farming industry is illustrative, finding that Mauss’s famous analysis of the gift to argue that
these PACs tend to contribute more money to donations create a “gift” relationship in which
legislators whose voting decisions are uncertain periodic small favors are exchanged, but not any
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specific or immediate responses on the part of is not directly visible to the public or subject to
the recipient legislator (i.e., voting a particular media scrutiny, access may provide privileged
way on a particular issue) (Clawson et al., 1998; opportunities for influence not easily available
see also Schram, 1995). Like a gift, the donation to noncontributing groups or individuals. In-
implies unnamed obligations and acts of reci- deed, some research suggests that the influ-
procity (i.e., legislators will attend, whenever ence of contributions on legislators’ behavior
possible, to the interests of contributors with is most apparent in cases of low public visibility
whom they have a relationship) (e.g., Clawson (e.g., Frendreis and Waterman, 1985; Schroedel,
et al., 1998:84–7). 1986; Jones and Keiser, 1987; Neustadtl, 1990).
One intriguing empirical test of this view is
the contention that long-term gift relationships
should skew the distribution of money given conclusion
by PACs to the same members over and over,
and that seniority should thus be a factor. In- In this chapter, we have considered politi-
deed, Snyder (1992) found that PACs tend to cal sociological models of social cleavages, fo-
contribute to similar sets of legislators over time cusing on empirical implications for studying
and that policy makers who have long careers political participation, voting behavior, and
in front of them (those with high electoral se- campaign finance. We outlined a theoretical ap-
curity, those who are relatively younger, and/or proach to cleavages that distinguishes the mech-
those whose career trajectories are ascendent) anisms through which cleavages are produced
receive higher shares of PAC contributions than (specifically economic, psychological, and net-
those who do not. Similarly, Grier and Munger work factors) and the processes through which
(1991) and Romer and Snyder (1994) found they become manifest (in social structures,
that a disproportionate amount of money goes group consciousness, political and organiza-
to committee chairs and legislators who are tional forms, and feedback processes). We be-
on committees relevant to the contributing lieve this approach provides a coherent way
PACs. of organizing a large set of scholarly debates
concerning the connections between a diverse
Access and Extravoting Influence. Although ques- range of related topics in political sociology. It
tions about the direct influence of PACs on also suggests new questions and directions for
votes remain, there is little disagreement among research in this area. For example, future stud-
analysts that PAC money buys access (see, for ies of social cleavages in voting should pay at-
example, Hall and Wayman, 1990; Austen- tention to how cleavages are organized by par-
Smith, 1995; McCarty and Rothenberg, 1996; ties and/or other powerful institutional actors
Clawson et al., 1998). The question is, what ex- as well as simply documenting their existence
actly does access provide? Critics of the proposi- in the political system as a whole. Studies of
tion that access matters have questioned the lack campaign finance would similarly benefit from
of direct evidence of its influence on legislation linking institutional and organizational processes
(e.g., Milyo et al., 2000; Wawro, 2000). through which inequalities in funding are main-
The most straightforward claims about tained to the core questions of who gives and
the role of access maintain simply that it with what impacts.
provides a regular opportunity for interest A multilevel approach incorporating individ-
groups/contributors to prime legislators with ual, group, and political/institutional processes
information or interpretations about specific provides a useful check on premature dismissals
policy issues; and that all else being equal, legis- of social cleavage impacts on political outcomes.
lators are more than willing to listen to contrib- It forces us to see, for example, that cleavages can
utors when they are uncertain (Sabato, 1984; persist in some domains even while they may
Langbein, 1986; Wright, 1990; Rothenberg, be declining in others. For example, levels of
1992). Because so much of what Congress does class voting in recent American elections have
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eroded, but the class skew in turnout persists cleavages to the exclusion of other, more proxi-
and has grown rapidly in the case of campaign mate forces shaping political behavior will gen-
finance. To say that class is a minor factor in erate little new knowledge about the linkages
American politics, as, for example, Kingston between inequality and political institutions. To
(2000:Chap. 6) does, thus requires an unduly remake significant contributions to the study of
strictive focus. Viewed more broadly and taking electoral politics in the future, political sociol-
into account the full range of processes through ogy will have to engage a wider range of the-
which class divisions become manifest (includ- oretical and empirical concerns in their work
ing feedback processes), we arrive at a much and build connections to related work in politi-
different conclusion. cal science (see McAdam and Su, 2002; Brooks
Such considerations suggest that the inves- et al., 2003). But at the same time, we see no
tigation of social cleavages will remain an im- reason to conclude that social influences on
portant part of any comprehensive assessment electoral outcomes have become irrelevant to
of political divisions in democratic polities. To understanding election outcomes or the policy-
be sure, sociological models that focus on social making process.
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chapter eleven
Public Opinion, Political Attitudes, and Ideology
David L. Weakliem
This chapter devotes roughly equal attention to public opinion. Finally, the concluding section
recent research and work from the 1950s and suggests directions for future research.
1960s. This dual focus is necessary because of
the history of public opinion research. Polit-
ical sociologists originally played a prominent sociological and political research
part but tended to abandon the field after the
late 1960s, for reasons that are discussed in the Research on public opinion developed rapidly
section on recent research. Hence, most con- after the appearance of sample surveys in the
temporary public opinion research is oriented mid-1930s. Of course, the idea of public opin-
toward social psychology. The older research ation was considerably older, and there had been
tempted to address macrosociological questions some notable studies of the topic, such as those
such as the sources of stable democracy or vari- of De Tocqueville (1969[1850]), Dicey (1914),
ations in the strength of socialist parties and and Bryce (1897). However, the development
hence remains relevant to the interests of po- of surveys greatly expanded the opportunities
litical sociologists. for systematic research. In fact, Osborne and
The chapter begins with a discussion of Rose (1999) argue that survey research helped
the distinction between sociological and polit- to create the modern sense of public opinion –
ical approaches to public opinion. Next, three as the aggregate of the views held by the
strands of research from the 1950s and 1960s entire adult population. Before the twentieth
are reviewed: the Columbia voting studies, century, “public opinion” was often used in
which focused on networks of communica- other senses, such as the opinions of knowledge-
tion and their role in creating and maintaining able or public-spirited persons or opinions that
group differences; the Michigan studies, which were expressed publicly. Some critics of public
focused on explaining short-term political opinion research, including Blumer (1948) and
change; and the “social cleavages” approach rep- Schlesinger (1962), have charged that surveys do
resented by Lipset (1960[1981]), which focused not measure public opinion in the traditional
on long-term change and national compar- sense. This issue is relevant to some contempo-
isons. After discussing the reasons for the decline rary research, and is considered in the section on
of public opinion research in political sociol- ideology and framing but in general I use “pub-
ogy, I then review four areas of contemporary lic opinion” in the conventional modern sense.
research: the relationship between economic Opinions are sometimes distinguished from at-
development and public opinion; framing and titudes, with attitudes defined as predispositions
ideology; the effect of public opinion on policy, that underlie specific opinions (Erikson and
and “policy feedback” or the effect of policy on Tedin, 2001:6). Some observers distinguish a
227
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228 David L. Weakliem
still deeper level, values, which can be defined demographic factors on individual opinions and
as qualities that a person regards as desirable and voting choices: the sociological approach holds
important (Rokeach, 1968). For example, the that demographic factors are a major influence,
value of equality will influence a wide variety whereas the political approach denies this.
of attitudes and opinions. However, even when Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944:27)
these distinctions are made, the field of public stated “a person thinks, politically, as he is, so-
opinion research is usually understood to in- cially. Social characteristics determine political
clude attitudes and values as well as opinions. preference.” This passage has been quoted by a
In this chapter, no distinction is made between number of later authors as an exemplar of the
opinions and attitudes, but “values” is used in sociological or “social determinist” approach
the sense given above. (Cox and McCubbins, 1986:370–1; Pomper,
The first major survey-based studies of pub- 1978:620). Taken literally, the claim that social
lic opinion were carried out by the Bureau of characteristics “determine” vote is clearly false.
Applied Social Research at Columbia Univer- For example, 17 percent of the people in Lazars-
sity (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; feld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s “strongly Demo-
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944). Some- cratic” group voted Republican. In fact, just be-
what later, a group of social psychologists and fore the previously quoted passage, they made
political scientists at the University of Michigan the much weaker claim that “a simple combi-
began a series of national election studies, which nation of three primary personal characteristics
culminated in a major work by Campbell, Con- goes a long way in ‘explaining’ political pref-
verse, Miller, and Stokes (1960). The Michigan erences.” Since that time, numerous empirical
group had a great deal of influence on the subse- studies have shown that demographic charac-
quent development of public opinion research. teristics virtually always have some predictive
The Columbia group did not continue beyond power. Different observers might disagree over
the mid-1950s, but a number of political soci- whether a given association should be charac-
ologists, notably Seymour Martin Lipset, built terized as strong or weak, but there is clearly no
on their work in the 1960s (Lipset, 1981[1960]; objective standard for such judgments. Hence,
Lipset, 1970). at this level, the distinction between sociological
There is not much evidence of a rivalry and political views has no theoretical substance.
between the Columbia and Michigan groups, A related contrast between sociological and
although there were definite differences of political approaches sometimes appears in de-
emphasis. Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and bates about change in the association between
McPhee, 1954) received enthusiastic reviews in opinions and demographic variables, especially
the American Political Science Review and the Jour- social class. Beginning in the 1970s, a number
nal of Politics, and Campbell, Converse, Miller, of observers argued that there had been a de-
and Stokes (1960:12–16) spoke of their own cline in the predictive power of class and pos-
work and that of the Columbia school as shar- sibly of other traditionally important variables
ing a common “behavioral” approach. Never- such as religious denomination. The change was
theless, a conventional distinction between soci- sometimes characterized as a decline in the em-
ological and political approaches developed and pirical relevance of a sociological model. Ac-
persists to this day. As it is usually presented, cording to Whiteley (1986:98), for example,
the sociological approach holds that politics “the sociological account of electoral behavior is
“reflects” social conditions and processes, clearly obsolescent.” Other observers disputed
whereas the political approach holds that pol- the claim that the influence of class was declin-
itics and political thought are autonomous ing, and the ensuing debate is reviewed in Evans
(Sartori, 1969). There are various ways in which (1999), Manza and Brooks (1999), and Clark
this contrast can be applied. On the simplest (2001). Sociologists tended to be more skepti-
level, the issue can be seen as the influence of cal about the claims of decline, so in a purely
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Public Opinion, Political Attitudes, and Ideology 229
empirical sense the contrast versus sociological alignments represent the accumulated effects of
and political views has some validity. However, different strategies followed by various political
the debate does not easily fit into the frame- actors.
work of sociological versus political theories. In To summarize, at the individual level the
fact, Goldthorpe (in Mair, Lipset, Hout, and contrast between sociological and political ap-
Goldthorpe, 1999:322) observes that many ar- proaches reduces to a question of the weight
guments about the decline of social cleavages of various explanatory variables. At the soci-
are “sociological” in the sense of explaining this etal level, the contrast has theoretical substance,
development as a reflection of general social although it does not correspond closely to dis-
changes. For example, Inglehart (1997) argues ciplinary boundaries.
that economic growth leads to a decline of class
conflict.
The political versus sociological contrast can the columbia studies
also be applied at the societal level. For exam-
ple, consider the classic question of the weakness The earliest major project of the Columbia
of socialism in the United States. A sociologi- group was a panel study of the 1940 presiden-
cal approach would hold that socialist parties tial campaign. This study was primarily con-
and movements were weak because there was cerned with the flow of information and influ-
little popular demand for them. The lack of ence through social networks. The most notable
popular demand would be explained by some finding was that the campaign had little effect on
general conditions of American society such as voting choices. The predominant influence
mass affluence, ethnic divisions, or a high rate of appeared to be routine personal contact with
social mobility. A political explanation, such as family, neighbors, co-workers, and other acqua-
that proposed by Katznelson (1981), holds that intances. Although everyday discussions rarely
the weakness of the socialist movement explains focused on politics, over the course of time
the subsequent lack of popular demand. The people picked up a good deal of information
Democratic and Republican parties organized about what other people were thinking. Because
the public before socialist parties arrived on the personal contacts tend to occur among people
scene. This initial advantage, combined with in- who resemble each other, personal influence re-
stitutional factors that made it difficult for third inforced voting tendencies within groups. An
parties to grow, meant that the socialist move- urban Catholic worker, for example, would
ment never gained a solid foothold in the United talk mostly with other urban Catholic work-
States. Hence, socialists were unable to commu- ers. Because the members of this group with
nicate with a wide audience and cultivate class strong political preferences would tend to be
consciousness in the public. Democrats, the undecided members would
At this level, the general issue is whether so- hear opinions and information favorable to the
cial conditions such as economic development, Democrats and would gradually be won over.
ethnic heterogeneity, or rates of social mobility In between elections, voters might waver, but
have a uniform effect on politics. Sartori (1969) in times of enhanced political interest, most of
and Przeworski (1985) identify the assumption the undecided people would return to the party
of uniform effects as the key flaw in the socio- of their friends and family. Despite the efforts of
logical approach. Przeworski (1985:101) asserts the parties, few voters were persuaded to change
that “parties – along with unions, churches, fac- sides during the election campaign. As Lazars-
tories, and schools – forge collective identities, feld (1944:317) put it, “in an important sense,
instill commitments, define the interests on be- modern Presidential campaigns are over before
half of which collective actions become possible, they begin.”
offer choices, to individuals and deny them.” According to the Columbia studies, a small
Consequently, national differences in political number of “opinion leaders” paid attention to
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politics and the media and then transmitted their the factors that motivated a search for alternative
views by personal contact (Katz and Lazarsfeld, models.
1955). Although these opinion leaders tended
to have somewhat higher social standing than
other people, they were not exclusively from the michigan studies
the middle classes. Rather, different groups had
their own opinion leaders. For example, manual A second research group formed around the
workers would be influenced by the views of American National Election Studies, which be-
better informed or more articulate co-workers. gan with a pilot study in 1948 and a full-scale
The second major work by the Columbia study in 1952. The American Voter (Campbell,
school was based on a study of the 1948 cam- Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960) was the ma-
paign (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). jor work of this group. For the purposes of this
This work elaborated the theory of social cleav- review, the Michigan group differed from the
ages implied in the earlier study. Berelson, Columbia group in two important ways: they
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee proposed that politi- paid more attention to short-term change and
cal cleavages depended on three conditions: dif- they attempted to define and measure political
ference of interests, transmission to succeed- ideology.2
ing generations, and differential contact.1 For As mentioned earlier, the explanation of
example, class is a strong cleavage, not simply change was a weak point in the Columbia
because it is related to material interests, but model. If there are significant differences among
also because there is considerable stability across demographic groups, then changes in the size
generations and a tendency to associate within of the groups will lead to change in the over-
classes. The conclusion was that class, race or all distribution of votes or opinions. However,
ethnicity, and place met these conditions most demographic changes occur slowly, whereas
fully and hence would generally be the most im- the popularity of different parties often varies
portant political cleavages (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, substantially from one election to the next.
and McPhee, 1954:75). The Columbia researchers recognized this fact,
Subsequent research has confirmed the im- but made little effort to explain it. Lazarsfeld
portance of social interaction in shaping po- (1944:330), for example, merely suggested that
litical alignments, while adding some elabora- “elections are decided by events occurring in the
tions and qualifications (Huckfeldt and Sprague, entire period between the two elections,” with-
1993). For example, Finifter (1974) noted that out saying what those events were or why they
tendencies to political uniformity could be mit- might have an effect. Authors from the Michi-
igated if people with “deviant” views tended to gan school noted that there was also significant
form friendship groups, whereas Wald, Owen, fluctuation in the strength of social cleavages
and Hill (1990) found that conservative Protes- (Key and Munger, 1959; Converse et al., 1960).
tant churches promoted cohesion on moral is- For example, although social class continued to
sues but that liberal churches did not. Like the be associated with vote in the 1952 election, the
original work of the Columbia school, the more connection was noticeably weaker than in 1948.
recent studies emphasize the forces promoting Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes
stability. Although networks of social influence (1960) suggested that variation in the overall
may help to explain the diffusion of new ideas, support for parties or opinions reflected the
they do not explain why the ideas emerge in the influence of factors that affected all people in
first place. This weakness was quickly noted by roughly the same way. Thus, economic decline
critics of the Columbia school and was one of would tend to lead to demands for government
1 2
Their reasoning suggests that continuity over the The Michigan group made many other contribu-
life course would also be relevant to the formation of tions that cannot be discussed here. See Prewitt and Nie
cleavages. (1971) for a more extensive overview.
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action, which would mean a move to the left in among different political opinions. If people de-
conventional terms. Variations in the strength of rived their opinions from some basic principles,
cleavages reflected changes in interest or focus. opinions on different questions would be cor-
For example, during periods of international related because they shared a common cause.
crisis, people might pay less attention to eco- The advantage of this approach was that it did
nomic interests, so that class differences would not require people to be able to characterize
decline. Furthermore, these changes in focus their principles in standard ideological terms,
were not due solely to outside forces but could or even to realize that they were applying any
be influenced by the parties. For example, a principles. However, Converse found the corre-
party might choose to emphasize class issues lations among opinions were generally low, sug-
more or less strongly in its appeals to voters. gesting that most people approached different
Although the social processes identified by the issues in a piecemeal fashion rather than apply-
Columbia group governed the potential size ing some general philosophy. Moreover, panel
of cleavages, historical or political factors in- studies suggested that there was a good deal of
fluenced the degree to which this potential change in opinions on specific issues. Converse
was realized (Campbell et al., 1960:369). The (1964) argued that most of this instability did not
possibility of differences in the importance or reflect actual change in opinions but rather the
“salience” of different concerns is an impor- absence of opinions: people answered at random
tant component of many later accounts, as is rather than saying that they had no opinion.
discussed in the section on Economic Develop- Thus, the overall conclusion of the Michigan
ment and Public Opinion. studies was that most people had very low levels
The Michigan researchers also attempted to of political knowledge, interest, and sophistica-
measure political ideology. The Columbia stud- tion. In general, people did not have ideologies
ies had simply relied on the conventional spec- but only collections of largely unrelated opin-
trum of left and right, which were defined by ions, and even those opinions were often weakly
class interests. The Michigan researchers, how- held.
ever, sought to discover the extent to which
people actually thought in ideological terms.
They found that few people offered any kind social cleavages
of ideological justification for their party pref-
erences. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes Beginning in the late 1950s, a number of soci-
(1960) classified only about 15 percent of their ologists developed a synthesis that built on the
respondents as expressing an ideology, and even Columbia school’s analysis of cleavages while
many of these seemed vague or confused. They adding a psychological component. Lipset (1981
concluded that “the concepts important to ide- [1960]) was the most important figure in this ap-
ological analysis are useful only for that small proach, with other notable contributors includ-
segment of the population that is equipped to ing Alford (1963) and Kornhauser (1959). In
approach political decisions at a rarefied level” this analysis, democratic politics were primarily
(Campbell et al., 1960:250). a mechanism for responding to social inequality.
Several subsequent researchers used other In a well-known phrase Lipset (1981[1960]:230)
methods to measure ideology but came to sim- called elections “the expression of the demo-
ilar conclusions. Butler and Stokes (1969) asked cratic class struggle.” Democracy would not last
British voters to place the major parties on the if cleavages were too strong and persistent, be-
right or left and found that many gave incorrect cause then there would be a permanent minor-
answers or said that they didn’t know. More- ity with no interest in abiding by the rules of
over, many of the people who placed the par- the game. Conversely, if attachment to social
ties correctly could offer no definition of the groups were too weak, the result would be “mass
terms. Converse (1964) considered ideology in politics,” dominated by charismatic personali-
terms of “attitude constraint” or the correlations ties (Korhnhauser, 1959). Moreover, given stable
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cleavages based on differences of interest, polit- The two-dimensional model offered some
ical leaders would learn to compromise. Hence, potential for explaining political change. Varia-
over time conflict would be routinized, result- tions in the relative importance of the two di-
ing in what Lipset called the “politics of collec- mensions could affect political alignments and
tive bargaining” (Lipset, 1970:277). In contrast, the success of the left or right. This general
compromise would be difficult when move- idea continues to be important in some con-
ments were based on charismatic leaders or temporary accounts, particularly that of Ingle-
some grand vision of society. hart (1990, 1997). However, several different
The Columbia school had focused on differ- interpretations of the second dimension were
ences of material interest as the major source proposed. Hofstadter (1964[1955]:84) proposed
of political opinions. Although they recog- a distinction between class politics and “sta-
nized the existence of noneconomic issues, tus politics,” which he defined as “the clash of
they regarded them as secondary. Other re- various projective rationalizations arising from
searchers sought to analyze opinion in terms status aspirations and other personal motives.”
of psychology rather than material interests. Hofstadter’s definition suggests that status pol-
The concept of authoritarianism proposed by itics are irrational, in the sense that they are
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and San- not directed against the true sources of discon-
ford (1950) was particularly influential. These tent. This was close to the original view of
researchers sought to understand the origins of Adorno et al. (1950), who regarded the au-
prejudice and antidemocratic ideologies. They thoritarian personality as a form of psycho-
argued that ideology could not be reduced to logical ill health. Gusfield (1986[1963]:16–19)
material interests. Rather, there was a distinct proposed an alternative definition of status pol-
“authoritarian personality” that had an inclina- itics as conflict over the distribution of prestige
tion toward racism, anti-Semitism, and rigid at- among groups. In this definition, status pol-
tachment to conventional morality. They argued itics are no less rational than class politics –
that the existence of the authoritarian personal- they simply involve the rational pursuit of dif-
ity helped to explain why significant numbers ferent goals. Gusfield’s definition was closely
of people in the lower classes had supported connected to Weber’s (1978[1920]:935–9) view
fascism. of class and status as overlapping forms of
Some observers criticized the assumption that stratification.
the authoritarian personality was associated ex- Hixson (1992:198–209) argues that Gusfield’s
clusively with support for the political right. In definition of status politics has been more in-
their view, authoritarianism should be treated fluential with later researchers. The suggestion
as entirely distinct from the conventional divi- that noneconomic conflicts are essentially pro-
sion between left and right (Shils, 1954). Hence, jections of other concerns, however, still ap-
political ideology had two distinct dimensions, pears frequently: for example, Heath and Stacey
which loosely could be described as involving (2002:667) state “the brutal volatility of glob-
economic and social affairs. Although both are alized markets generates nostalgia for security
conventionally described in terms of left and that many associate with ‘traditional family val-
right, the two dimensions are essentially inde- ues.’” Hofstadter (1962:99) later suggested that
pendent on the individual level – for example, his original definition had been too narrow and
views on economic redistribution do not predict that status politics were part of a broader “cul-
views on crime. On the level of classes, there is tural politics. . . . questions of faith and morals,
actually a conflict between the two dimensions – tone and style, freedom and coercion, which
the lower classes tend to have more conserva- become fighting issues.”
tive views on noneconomic questions. Lipset Although there is still disagreement over the
(1960:87–126) developed this observation into interpretation of the dimensions, later research
a model of “working class authoritarianism.” has confirmed the general claim that there are
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at least two largely independent dimensions of ceived particular attention. The analysis in Lipset,
political ideology. That is, describing people’s Lazarsfeld, Barton, and Linz (1954) suggested
views in simple left/right terms is inadequate that working-class support for the left would
even as a rough summary. Lipset’s character- increase during industrialization. In the early
ization of the lower classes as “authoritarian” stages of industrialization, many workers had
may be exaggerated, but later research has con- grown up in rural areas and worked in small
firmed that they are more conservative on social plants where they had personal contact with
issues (Zipp, 1986). However, education rather their employers. With the development of
than occupation seems to be the most important industrialization, workers experienced more
influence on social liberalism. Some observers homogenous environments – they grew up in
have suggested that the apparent liberalism of working-class families, lived in working-class
more educated people may reflect social desir- neighborhoods, and worked in large firms where
ability bias and not real commitment to toler- they had little contact with the owners. More-
ance ( Jackman, 1978). However, analysis of vot- over, Lipset (1970:207–8; see also Lipset, Lazar-
ing patterns indicates that parties that emphasize sfeld, Barton, and Linz, 1954:1136) suggested
causes such as environmentalism and multicul- that political knowledge and sophistication
turalism get most of their support from the mid- would make people more aware of the conn-
dle classes (Heath et al., 1991; Weakliem, 1991). ection between government policies and their
Thus, the class differences on social issues have economic interests. This point implied that
real political consequences. working-class consciousness would grow dur-
Another important aspect of the social ing industrialization because of increases in edu-
cleavages approach was the extension of the cational levels and exposure to the media.
Columbia school’s model of cleavage forma- This model was similar to the account of the
tion. The core idea of this model was that development of class consciousness offered by
communication within a group would reduce classical Marxism but differed in that it did not
deviation from group norms, whereas commu- predict the development of a commitment to
nication across group lines would increase de- socialism. The state to which economic devel-
viation. Because people simultaneously belong opment would lead was support for the “mixed
to a number of different groups, the extent economy” – capitalism with substantial regu-
of deviation would also depend on whether lation of business and income redistribution.
group boundaries overlaid or cut across each In fact, Lipset (1981[1960]:45–53) argued that
other. For example, if all working-class people “extremist” views would decline with industri-
were Catholic and all middle-class people were alization as well, so that the moderate left would
Protestant, class and religious divisions would gain at the expense of both the revolutionary
reinforce each other. The lower the correla- Left and the Right. The model could be taken to
tion between religious denomination and class, imply that national differences in politics would
the more people would be subject to “cross- decline with economic development. For ex-
pressures.” Such people might follow their class ample, Alford (1963:333–5) found substantial
or their religion, arrive at some compromise, or differences in the influence of class on voting
avoid politics entirely. Cross-pressures were gen- choices in different nations but suggested that
erally seen as enhancing the prospects of democ- the nations would converge toward a “normal”
racy by causing people to develop a degree of level of class voting as historical influences
sympathy and understanding across group lines faded.
(Lipset, 1981[1960]:77–9). In later work, Lipset (1970:267–304) argued
The analysis implied that public opinion that class differences declined during the more
would be influenced by the composition of the advanced stages of industrialization. He sug-
population and the pattern of contact among gr- gested that even when workers continued to
oups. The effects of economic development re- vote for socialist or social democratic parties,
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they had less commitment to their ideology. left, the national average will be farther to the
Conversely, the middle classes had moved to- left.3 Because average opinions in the working
ward the center, so that the political spectrum classes will virtually always be to the left of opin-
no longer ran between socialism and laissez- ions in the middle classes, this means that larger
faire capitalism but only between a more or less class differences will be associated with greater
extensive welfare state. Although Lipset never support for the Left.
offered a comprehensive account of the rela- Second, working-class unity will be associ-
tionship between industrialization and class dif- ated with more support for the Left. This is
ferences, taken as a whole his writings suggest a a familiar assertion, but it is not a logical ne-
nonlinear relationship – class divisions will in- cessity – in principle, the working class could
crease with industrialization up to a point but be united around a moderate or conservative
then will decline. position. The social cleavages analysis, how-
The social cleavages model also implied that ever, provides a rationale for this claim. In every
cross-pressures generally had more effect on society, some workers will be in homogenous
the working classes than on the middle classes. working-class environments and will conse-
Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and Linz (1954: quently be on the left. Other workers, how-
1136), for example, in reviewing factors affect- ever, will be in heterogeneous environments,
ing support for the left, state that “we shall dis- and their position will vary depending on the
cuss mainly variations on the lower income side, extent to which they are influenced by their
because the higher income groups show much contacts with the middle class. Where middle-
less variation.” One reason for this difference is class influence is weak, these workers will tend
that intraclass contact, particularly the exchange to be on the left as well, and there will be lit-
of political information and opinions, is greater tle variation within the working class. Where
among the upper classes (Lipset, 1970:205–7). middle-class influence is strong, only the “core”
Moreover, interclass contact has more influence of the working class will be on the left, whereas
on the lower classes, because the upper classes “peripheral” workers will take more moderate
have greater prestige and resources. For exam- positions.
ple, the owner of a business may have a sub- Surprisingly, very little empirical research has
stantial influence on the way the workers vote, been conducted on these issues. In fact, there are
but the workers will have less influence over no studies that directly address them, although
the owner. Hence, opinions among the lower there are a few that provide relevant informa-
classes are sensitive to the degree to which they tion. In a study of seven nations, Verba, Nie,
are protected against influences from the upper and Kim (1978) find that working-class political
classes. Working-class consciousness will there- participation is more variable than middle-class
fore be strongly affected by factors such as the participation. They argue that working-class
strength of labor unions and vigorous party or- participation varies depending on the degree
ganization. Middle-class consciousness, in con- to which there is “explicit contestation on the
trast, will not need this kind of institutional basis of social class” (Verba, Nie, and Kim,
support. 1978:307). Although they focus on participa-
Two important implications follow from this tion rather than opinions, their findings sup-
point. First, national differences in average opin- port the general claim of greater variation in
ions will depend primarily on differences in the the working classes. Stephens (1979:411) con-
opinions of the working classes. To illustrate, ducted an empirical study of working class unity.
suppose that average opinions in the middle In a comparative study of the working class in
classes are the same in all nations, whereas opin- Britain and Sweden, he found that national dif-
ions in the working classes differ from one na- ferences are greater among peripheral workers.
tion to the next. In that case, differences in
national averages will depend entirely on the 3
For the sake of illustration, it is assumed that the
working classes – where they are farther to the relative size of the classes does not differ among nations.
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Core workers gave solid support to the left in Hence, political sociologists made little con-
both nations, but in Britain support was contribution to the development of public opin-
siderably lower outside of the core. Because his ion research during the 1970s and 1980s. There
study included only two nations, however, it can were a number of significant sociological stud-
hardly be regarded as conclusive. ies of public opinion, but they were relatively
specialized – there was no major work that set
the agenda for later researchers the way that
recent research Voting or Political Man had. However, many po-
litical scientists and social psychologists contin-
There is a significant gap between the research ued to work on public opinion, and some of
of the 1950s and 1960s and current work. Polit- their work dealt with issues of relevance to so-
ical sociologists turned away from public opin- ciology. Also, in recent years sociologists seem
ion research after the late 1960s for a variety to have shown more interest in opinions, al-
of reasons. One was the growing interest in though often without drawing on the main-
Marxism, particularly in its structuralist form. stream of public opinion research. The remain-
Structuralists regarded individual consciousness der of this chapter reviews four topics in recent
as relatively unimportant and were particularly work: the relationship between economic de-
critical of attempts to measure consciousness in velopment and public opinion, political ideolo-
the artificial setting of a survey or even a less gies, the impact of public opinion on policy, and
structured interview. A second reason was the the effect of policy on public opinion.
rise of resource mobilization and rational choice
theories. After Olson (1965) demonstrated that
shared interests did not provide a sufficient con- economic development and
dition for collective action, social movement public opinion
researchers shifted their attention to resources
and incentives rather than grievances. Even so- As discussed above, Lipset (1981[1960]) held that
ciologists who rejected a strict rational choice economic development had consistent effects
approach tended to accept the principle that on public opinion. Specifically, he argued that
actions should be explained by interests and re- it was associated with the development of atti-
sources rather than by values and beliefs. How- tudes conducive to stable democracy, such as tol-
ever, perhaps the most important reason for the erance and support for civil liberties, although
loss of interest in public opinion was the resur- his explanation for this relationship was sketchy.
gence of political and industrial conflict and the As historical studies emphasized complexity and
appearance of a variety of “new social move- variety, sociologists have become skeptical of
ments.” The Columbia, Michigan, and social general claims about the effects of economic
cleavages approaches seemed to offer no promis- development. A series of studies by Inglehart
ing explanation for these developments. The (1990, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000), how-
Columbia approach implied stability or gradual ever, indicate that there is a correlation between
long-term change, whereas the Michigan ap- economic development and public opinion in
proach implied short-term fluctuation within a the contemporary world. In general, affluence
constant framework. Hence, neither could ac- is associated with more tolerance of differences
count for the sudden appearance or growth of in religion and lifestyle, increased acceptance of
movements challenging the status quo. The idea gender equality, and less respect for traditional
of status politics did allow for relatively sudden authority (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). More
change. However, it had usually been applied broadly, one could say that affluence is usually
to declining groups that were trying to preserve associated with liberal views on social or cultural
their status; consequently, it did not provide a issues.
promising explanation of the new conflicts that Of course, correlation is not proof of a causal
emerged in the 1960s. connection – it may reflect the influence of
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some other factor that is associated with eco- as material needs are satisfied, people pay more
nomic development. The most plausible alter- attention to “postmaterial” concerns. Drawing
native explanation is based on diffusion, where on Maslow’s (1954) psychological theory, he
the opinions characteristic of the most devel- argues that the postmaterial concerns involve
oped nations spread to other nations. The in- freedom, aesthetics, and a sense of belonging
fluence might take place directly, as when peo- and self-esteem. The distinction between ma-
ple in other nations are exposed to American terialism and postmaterialism is related to the
movies and television, or indirectly, as when the idea of “status” or “cultural” politics discussed
American or British educational system serves as in the section on social cleavages. Hofstadter
a model for other nations. If one makes the ad- (1964[1955]) argued that cultural politics were
ditional assumption that the strength of Western essentially a luxury that people would pursue
influence is correlated with economic develop- under conditions of prosperity and abandon un-
ment, then one has an alternative explanation of der conditions of economic hardship. However,
the cross-sectional correlation. However, time- he understood prosperity in relative terms and
series data suggest that the same kind of changes hence saw the shift between cultural and eco-
have taken place within nations over time. For nomic politics as cyclical. Inglehart understands
the United States, more than fifty years of data prosperity in an absolute sense and consequently
show a relatively steady growth in tolerance and argues that priorities will continue to shift as
support for gender equality (Page and Shapiro, long there is economic growth.
1992; Smith, 1990). Evidence for other nations A distinctive feature of Inglehart’s account
covers shorter time periods, but also generally is that it links change in priorities to change
shows that the changes over time parallel the in the content of opinions. Postmaterial values
cross-sectional differences (Inglehart and Baker, have an affinity with liberalism, as convention-
2000). If affluence affects opinions, economic ally defined, so that a rise in the importance
growth will produce a gradual shift in opinions of cultural conflicts is accompanied by a shift
in all nations. In contrast, the diffusion argu- to the left in most opinions. Previous discus-
ment does not predict a trend in affluent nations. sions of cultural politics had treated salience and
Hence, whatever disagreements one might have the content of values as distinct. That is, a rise
with the specifics of Inglehart’s argument, there in the importance of cultural politics did not
is strong evidence for the general proposition generally go with a shift to the left on cultural
that some factor related to economic develop- issues. Another central feature of Inglehart’s ac-
ment influences public opinion. count is that it posits an inverse relationship be-
It should be noted that a claim that economic tween the importance of cultural and economic
development influences opinions does not nec- conflicts. Many accounts of cultural politics im-
essarily imply convergence among nations. In plicitly make a similar assumption, but as Parkin
fact, Inglehart and Baker (2000) argue that there (1979:34) points out, it is not a logical neces-
are persisting “cultural” differences among na- sity. That is, the importance of both economic
tions. Moreover, these cultural differences can- and cultural politics could rise or fall together.
not be understood in terms of distance along Inglehart (1990) justifies the assumption by ap-
a single path. For example, the United States pealing to the economic principle of declining
has a number of distinctive features, including marginal utility. However, this principle is most
high religiosity and a strong sense of individu- relevant to the allocation of a fixed stock of
alism. Hence, economic development does not resources such as income. One might say that
mean that all nations will move in the direction value priorities involve the allocation of at-
of the United States or of any other specific tention, but this is not a definite quantity in
nation. the same sense as money or time. This ques-
There is considerable doubt about how the tion deserves more attention from empirical re-
relationship between economic development searchers.
and opinions should be interpreted. Inglehart Inglehart’s claim that affluence leads to a
(1990) holds that it reflects a shift in priorities: shift from economic to cultural conflict seems
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consistent with trends over the past few decades, countries (Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf, 1999).
but it is difficult to reconcile with a longer However, there has been very little research on
view. Although direct information on public patterns of class differences in opinions. That
opinion is very scarce before the middle of is, we do not know whether class differences in
the twentieth century, examination of the his- opinions are smaller in more affluent nations,
torical record does not support the idea of a as Inglehart’s account implies. We also do not
shift from economic to cultural politics over know much about historical trends, but available
the whole period of the industrial revolution. information generally suggests that class differ-
During the nineteenth century, many countries ences on economic issues have remained steady
saw controversies over religion, women’s suf- (Shapiro and Young, 1989:74).
frage and the “woman question” more gener- A related question is whether economic de-
ally, and moral issues such as temperance. In fact, velopment leads to a general decline of the left.
looking over the nineteenth and early twenti- Inglehart (1997:263) argues that it does, noting
eth centuries, one could make a plausible case that there is a substantial negative correlation be-
that there was a shift from cultural to economic tween economic development and support for
politics. public ownership of industry. Moreover, nearly
An alternative interpretation of the relation- all socialist parties have retreated from programs
ship between economic development and opin- of extensive public ownership and economic
ions is that it is a change in the content of planning. Although this development has accel-
values rather than priorities. For example, Inke- erated in recent decades, it was already visible in
les (1983) argues that economic growth leads to the 1950s. Thus, if the left is defined in terms
increasing support for “modern” values, which of public ownership, there is strong evidence
include individualism, rationalism, and certain that support for the left declines with economic
forms of egalitarianism. There is a correspond- development. However, it is not clear that In-
ing decline in respect for traditional authorities. glehart’s theoretical model actually helps to ex-
This model has the advantage of accounting for plain this pattern. That is, there is no obvious
the trend toward liberalism without implying a affinity between postmaterial values and opposi-
steady growth in the importance of cultural pol- tion to socialism. One could argue that increased
itics. That is, the conflict between modern and emphasis on the postmaterial value of freedom
traditional values is potentially important at all would lead to a decline in support for socialism.
stages of economic development, but the center On the other hand, a major criticism of capital-
of gravity will be farther to the left at higher ism, dating back to the utopian socialists, is that
levels of development. it elevates economic accumulation over values
Although it is fairly apparent that economic such as community, leisure, and beauty. From
development is associated with views on social this point of view, one would expect postma-
issues, the relationship between economic de- terial values to be associated with support for
velopment and economic opinions is much less socialism.
clear. Using the assumption of an inverse rela- Moreover, most evidence about the decline
tionship between economic and cultural con- of the left involves public ownership. There
flict, Inglehart (1990:248–88) argues that the has been little research on the relationship be-
shift toward postmaterial values will lead to a tween economic development and opinions
decline of class differences in voting choices and about economic inequality, which has also been
opinions. This is a straightforward implication of a central issue for the left. There is no sub-
his model – if people pay less attention to ma- stantial comparative study of the relationship
terial interests, both the middle classes and the between economic development and support
working classes will be more likely to deviate for equality, but the scattered evidence that is
from their “natural” position. There has been a available does not suggest any strong associa-
good deal of research on class differences in party tion. There is some evidence about changes over
choice, and there is some evidence that they time in attitudes toward equality, particularly
have declined over the past few decades in most in the United States. The figures in Page and
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Shapiro (1992:128–9) suggest that support for data, there are promising opportunities for re-
egalitarianism has fluctuated since the 1950s with search.
no clear trend. Shapiro and Young (1989) re- Another question that deserves further inves-
view evidence about public opinion toward the tigation is the possibility that the relationship be-
welfare state and find a similar pattern. More- tween economic development and public opin-
over, Henderson (1998) notes that government ion reflects the effects of education. Research
regulation of business remains popular. More has found that education tends to be associated
precisely, although most people support calls with liberal views on social issues (Hyman and
for less regulation in the abstract, they tend Wright, 1979). Because there is a strong corre-
to be sympathetic to calls for particular kinds lation between average levels of education and
of regulation. For example, over 80 percent economic development, it seems possible that
of the American public supported the provi- the changes in opinions that Inglehart ascribes
sion of the Americans With Disabilities Act that to affluence are actually due to education (Davis,
required employers with more than fifteen em- 1996). A natural counter to this claim is that the
ployees to make “reasonable accommodations” effects of education may vary substantially be-
for employees with disabilities. Similarly, there tween societies. If the values taught in schools
is overwhelming support for minimum wage involve pluralism and tolerance, educated peo-
laws and usually majority support for any pro- ple will be more tolerant, but if they involve
posal to increase the minimum wage.4 Hender- hierarchy and authority, they will be less tol-
son (1998:81) concludes that “in most if not erant. Weakliem (2002) examines the effect of
all countries, majority opinion remains hostile education on a variety of opinions in about forty
to . . . what is termed ‘leaving it to the mar- nations. Although the strength of the relation-
ket.’ . . . there is no sign that this situation, which ship varies among nations, it is almost always in
historically has been the norm, is now about to a liberal direction for noneconomic issues. Be-
change.” Consequently, it is possible that what cause it appears that the liberal effects of educa-
is often presented as a decline of the left is tion are relatively widespread, Davis’s hypothesis
merely a decline in support for public owner- remains plausible.
ship.
Although many aspects of Inglehart’s model
can be questioned, there is strong support for ideology and framing
his basic claim that economic development af-
fects opinions. This does not mean, however, As discussed above, the Columbia, Michigan,
that there is a universal, invariant effect. Rather, and social cleavages schools gave little attention
the effects of development might differ depend- to political ideas. Ideology was seen as simply
ing on circumstances. The general correlation, a classification along a scale of left to right, and
however, would still be meaningful in the sense the work of Converse (1964) suggested that even
of giving an average effect. In principle, it is this assumed too much structure. Within main-
possible to examine variation around the aver- stream public opinion research, there were very
age – that is, to look for systematic differences few efforts to think of ideology in terms of a sys-
in the effects of development. For example, one tem of thought. Even when considering the for-
could compare the effects of economic develop- mation of specific opinions, the older research
ment among Muslims and Christians or among traditions gave very little attention to processes
traditionally Muslim and Christian nations. No of thought. Opinions were taken as straight-
studies of this type have yet appeared, but with forward expressions of interest or as the di-
the increasing availability of comparative survey rect result of social contact. When Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, and Gaudet (1944:150–8) discussed
4
These statements are based on searches using the the nature of personal influence, they empha-
iPOLL database of the Roper Center for Public Opinion sized the importance of trust rather than the
Research. content of arguments.
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Some observers objected to this picture on A number of theoretical approaches to po-

either theoretical or empirical grounds. Stud- litical reasoning have been proposed since the
ies based on extended conversations generally 1970s, but none has come to dominate. The
suggested that people had meaningful princi- idea of schemas, which draws from cognitive
ples and views of the world. Lane’s (1962) in- psychology, is popular among political scientists
terviews with working- and lower middle-class (Axelrod, 1973; Conover and Feldman, 1984).
men, for example, gave a very different pic- A schema is not just a set of beliefs but also
ture of political ideology than that suggested includes rules for processing new information
by the Michigan studies. Although Lane’s sub- and arguments. Hence, people with different
jects were not necessarily sophisticated thinkers, schemas could draw different lessons from the
their political views seemed to be more than same events, as often seems to happen in real-
just a collection of unrelated opinions. Hence, ity. Given the scarcity of longitudinal data on
some observers suspected that the apparent lack opinions, however, it is difficult to examine this
of structure reflected problems of measurement point. In empirical work, “schemas” often are
or analysis. Reinarman’s (1987) more recent no more than descriptive classifications of beliefs
study addresses Converse’s (1964) model of ide- (Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland, 1991).
ology as attitude constraint. He argues that peo- An alternative approach that has been more
ple can often give reasonable justifications of popular among sociologists is based on “fram-
apparent inconsistencies among their opinions ing.” At its simplest level, the idea of framing
(1987:215). Thus, low levels of attitude con- is that changes in the way a question is pre-
straint do not necessarily demonstrate a lack of sented may influence responses, even if the sub-
ideological sophistication. In his view, the ap- stance remains the same. For example, support
parent weakness of ideological thinking in the for government spending to combat some prob-
public is an artifact of the use of conventional lem may be higher if the question is preceded
structured surveys, which do not give people by questions about the severity of the problem
the opportunity to explain their reasoning. and lower is preceded by questions about taxes.
The most ambitious attempt to observe polit- In this sense, framing has long been familiar to
ical reasoning directly is the “deliberative poll” psychologists and survey researchers (Schuman
(Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell, 2002). In a de- and Presser, 1981). However, it may also have
liberative poll, participants first take a standard broader relevance to public opinion. There is
survey and then attend a weekend conference usually room for disagreement concerning what
in which they hear briefings from experts rep- a given political issue is “really about,” and the
resenting diverse points of view and engage in way in which it is defined will change the at-
small group discussions, after which they are sur- tractiveness of the different answers. Hence, one
veyed again. The overall distribution of opin- would expect political actors to struggle over the
ions remains about the same on some issues, definitions of issues. Snow, Rochford, Worden,
but changes substantially on others. Although and Benford (1986) argued that the concept of
Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell (2002) do not pro- framing could be applied to the activity of so-
pose a theory of why change takes place, their cial movements, and many later researchers have
results show that ordinary people are able to crit- followed their lead.
ically evaluate new information and arguments – Gamson (1992) argues that the concept of
they do not simply adhere to their prior be- framing also helps to illuminate the formation
liefs or adopt the views of a trusted authority. of public opinion. He arranged for groups of
Gamson (1992:175) assembled focus groups on people to have conversations on a variety of
various topics and came to similar conclusions: political topics. Although people did not nec-
“one is struck by the deliberative quality of their essarily begin with much information on the
construction of meaning about these complex topics, they were able to have pertinent discus-
issues . . . they achieve considerable coherence in sions by drawing on their own experience and
spite of a great many handicaps . . . .” frames that were current in the media or the
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general culture. The idea of framing is most nat- as a whole, opinions on welfare would be corre-
urally suited to actual conversations such as those lated with opinions on race, gender, taxes, and
analyzed by Gamson, but some authors have spending, but all of the correlations would be
tried to extend it to include enduring struc- relatively weak.
tures of beliefs. Snow, Rochford, Worden, and The idea of framing may also help to illumi-
Benford (1986:475) speak of a “master frame nate change in opinions. As Snow, Rochford,
that interprets events and experiences in a new Worden, and Benford (1986) put it, some frames
key.” As Oliver and Johnston (2000) point out, have high “resonance” with existing views. In
in this sense a frame comes close to the tradi- this case, when confronted with arguments for
tional meaning of ideology. They argue, how- change, many people will quickly accept them.
ever, that the two concepts should be kept sep- For example, Zaller (1992:317) argues that after
arate. In their view, “a frame lacks the elaborate the American Psychiatric Association voted to
social theory and normative and value systems remove homosexuality from its official classifi-
that characterize a full-blown ideology, but in- cation of mental disorders, “the press began to
stead is . . . an angle or perspective on a problem” employ a ‘civil rights’ frame of reference along-
(Oliver and Johnston, 2000:50). They argue that side the old ‘vice’ frame, thus offering the public
people with different ideologies can appeal to an alternative way of conceptualizing the issue.”
the same frame – for example, both opponents Although information is scarce, he suggests that
and supporters of abortion could frame the issue this change in coverage resulted in a substantial
in terms of individual rights. shift in public views.
The idea of framing has most often been Thus, one attraction of the idea of framing is
applied in studies of social movements rather that it potentially helps to explain cases of rapid
than the analysis of opinions at the individ- opinion change. Many shifts in public opinion
ual level. However, it is potentially relevant to are slow and steady, with almost imperceptible
the individual-level associations among opin- changes from year to year adding up to substan-
ions. Different ways of framing a question make tial changes over longer periods of time (Page
some issues more relevant to a particular topic and Shapiro, 1992). However, there are some
and others less relevant. Thus, changes in the cases in which opinions change quickly with-
prevalence of different frames might result in out any obvious external cause. For example,
changes in the associations among individual support for President Clinton’s proposed health
opinions. That is, an opinion might become care program declined from 57 percent to 47
aligned with one set of issues and less closely percent between January and February 1994 and
aligned with others. For example, some ob- never rebounded after that time. Skocpol (1996)
servers of recent American politics argue that argues that this change occurred because op-
some issues that were once seen in terms of class ponents of the proposal successfully drew on
are now generally seen in terms of race (Edsall popular distrust of government. A second at-
and Edsall, 1991). This argument implies shifts traction of the idea is that it may explain why
in the associations among opinions. For exam- certain changes precede or follow others. His-
ple, views of welfare spending could shift from torical accounts of change in opinions generally
being associated with opinions about topics such suggest that there is some logical sequence of
as the minimum wage to being more closely change – that is, new ideas grow out of previ-
associated with opinions about topics such as ous ideas. The civil rights frame referred to by
affirmative action. Also, the low levels of over- Zaller (1992) is a familiar example, in which a
all attitude constraint noted by Converse (1964) concept that originally developed in the move-
might be the result of competing frames. That ment for racial equality was adopted for many
is, different people might apply different frames, other causes. Although not all efforts to frame
some seeing welfare primarily in terms of race, questions as issues of civil rights were successful,
others in terms of gender, and others in terms of the idea seems to have provided a useful resource
taxes and spending. When looking at the public for later movements.
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There has been little effort to test these impli- A variety of studies have looked at the match
cations, and most applications of framing rely on between public opinion and government policy
case studies rather than analyses of opinion data. on particular issues. Brooks (1985, 1987, 1990)
One reason for this situation is that framing has examines policy and opinion in Canada, France,
often been defined loosely, as Benford (1997) the United States, and Germany and finds that
notes. A second reason is that relevant data in all nations the policy favored by the majority
are not always available. For example, Skocpol’s was adopted in less than half of the cases. Other
(1996) account of the Clinton health care pro- studies, however, have obtained more optimistic
posal implies that the shift of opinion against the estimates (Monroe, 1998; Petry, 1999). An alter-
proposal should have been larger among people native approach relies on comparison of differ-
with lower confidence in government. The sur- ent units. Using data from the American states
veys that contained the questions on health care, in the 1930s, Erikson (1976) found a signifi-
however, did not necessarily include questions cant correlation between average opinion and
on trust in government. In general, testing hy- policies on several issues. Erikson, Wright, and
potheses about framing requires a good deal of McIver (1993) constructed general measures of
continuity in repeated surveys and often requires public opinion and state policy, rating both in
longitudinal data on individuals. Moreover, the terms of liberal and conservative, and found a
span of time that must be considered will vary positive correlation. The cross-sectional corre-
depending on the question. For an analysis of a lation, however, might result from the influence
specific political controversy, it would be neces- of policy on opinion – people might come to
sary to have frequent surveys over a short period accept whatever policies were in place. To es-
of time. An analysis of efforts to apply a civil tablish the direction of causality, a number of
rights frame to various questions, in contrast, studies have looked at changes in opinions and
might require data extending over decades. policy.
Finally, it should also be noted that the very Stimson (1999) undertakes a comprehensive
characteristics that make the concepts of fram- analysis of questions on government policy in-
ing and ideology appealing to social scientists cluded in national surveys since the 1950s and
might make them less applicable to the general finds that most of the change can be reduced to
public. People who study politics are usually in- a single factor, which he calls “policy mood.”
terested in political ideas and think about the That is, when opinions on one issue become
connections between them. Ordinary people, more liberal, opinions on most other opinions
however, may combine ideas in an eclectic way do as well.5 As noted previously, the individual-
with little regard for consistency, as the work of level correlations among opinions tend to be
the Michigan school suggested. Thus, it is pos- weak, and a one-factor solution does not fit well.
sible that the efforts to take ideas more seriously However, because the units of analysis are dif-
will be relevant to the study of elite groups, but ferent, there is no contradiction between these
of little use in studies of general public opinion. findings. In effect, most of the idiosyncratic fac-
tors that are relevant to individual opinions may
cancel out when comparing aggregate opinion
public opinion and policy distributions over time. Stimson’s (1999) estima-
tes suggest that the public mood was at its most
If public opinion had no impact on events, it liberal in the late 1950s and at its most conserva-
might still be of interest to social psychologists tive around 1980. There were also several other
but not to political sociologists. Whether public
opinion actually makes a difference is a classic 5
question in the social sciences. Until recently There are some exceptions to this generalization.
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) find evidence of
there was very little systematic evidence, but in a second dimension involving some issues of crime and
the last fifteen years or so the situation has started poverty. They also report that opinions on a few issues,
to change. particularly abortion, move in a distinctive fashion.
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striking movements, such as a gradual move to public opinion to be a weak force when
the right during the early 1960s and a shift back matched against the financial resources and ac-
to the left in the second half of the decade. cess of business. He limited his attention to poli-
Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995) and cies on which business was united in support or
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) ana- opposition and found that public opinion con-
lyze the relationship between policy mood and tinued to have an influence. His explanation of
several indexes of public policy, including con- this finding is that policies that unite business
gressional votes, the content of laws passed, and tend to be visible and relatively easy to interpret
Supreme Court decisions. They find a substan- in terms of interests, so that the public is easily
tial correlation – for example, the liberal mood mobilized.
of the early 1960s was followed by the pas- There are very few studies of nations other
sage of major civil rights laws and an extension than the United States. Soroka and Wlezien
of antipoverty programs, and the conservative (2002) analyze the effect of public opinion on
mood of the late 1970s and early 1980s was fol- public expenditure in Great Britain. They find
lowed by deregulation and tax cuts. The con- that spending generally responds to public opin-
nection is only partly accounted for by party ion, as it does in the United States. In Britain,
control of the presidency and Congress. For however, spending in specific areas is less closely
example, policy was relatively conservative in tied to opinion about those areas – “it is as
the late 1970s, despite a Democratic president though policymakers receive cures for increased
and Democratic majorities in both houses of (decreased) spending . . . but exercise discretion
Congress. Thus, their results suggest that polit- in deciding where spending increases (decreases)
ical leaders respond directly to public opinion. occur” (Soroka and Wlezien, 2002:23–4).
Their work, however, does not address the pos- Systematic studies of change over time are also
sibility that changes in both policy and public scarce. Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue that gov-
opinion reflect some other factor, such as the ernment responsiveness to public opinion has
activities of organized groups. Burstein (1998) declined in the United States, whereas Quirk
addresses this issue by reviewing a number of and Hinchliffe (1998) argue that it has increased.
studies that take account of both social move- However, both rely on impressionistic evidence.
ment activity and public opinion. He concludes The most systematic study finds that the corre-
that public opinion has a direct effect on policy, spondence between public opinion and policy
but social movement activity does not. That is, was somewhat lower in 1980–1993 compared to
any effect that social movements have on policy 1960–1979 (Monroe 1979).
is an indirect one operating through their effect Another issue that deserves more attention
on public opinion. Given the difficulties of mea- is the relative influence of different groups.
suring social movement activity, his conclusion Blumer (1948:545) objected to the modern def-
that it has no direct effect should not be taken inition of public opinion as the opinions of
as definitive. However, his work provides fur- the entire population and proposed that pub-
ther evidence that public opinion does have an lic opinion should be understood as only the
effect. “views and positions on the issue that come to
Given the general finding that public opinion the individuals who have to act.” Even if politi-
influences policy, it is natural to ask whether the cal leaders pay attention to polling data, they
effect varies among nations, times, or types of will presumably give some attention to opin-
issues (Manza and Cook, 2002). A few empir- ions expressed in letters, personal contact, and
ical studies have considered these questions. It the media. This argument suggests that predic-
appears that public opinion affects most types tions could be improved by refining the measure
of policy, although there may be some differ- of public opinion. One approach would be to
ences in the strength of the influence. Smith’s construct measurements of other senses of opin-
(2000) study of policies related to business is par- ion, such as the views expressed in newspaper
ticularly important, because one might expect editorials. Another approach would be to use
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survey data, but give different weights to the policies that facilitate union organization. Be-
opinions of different people. In particular, because union membership affects a variety of
cause political participation and resources gen- opinions, such policies will affect public opin-
erally increase with socioeconomic status, one ion, generally shifting it to the left. However,
might expect influence on policy to do so as there may also be more complex effects. For
well. Another possibility is that political lead- example, the design of social policy may influ-
ers focus on groups that are regarded as poten- ence the way that people think of themselves –
tial “swing voters.” In this case, the opinions as members of a class, an ethnic group, an age
of these groups would have more weight than group, or the general community. Also, it may
those of others. influence the way that they draw group bound-
In principle, it would be straightforward to aries. If this is the case, policy decisions could
conduct such an investigation: one would in- have long-term effects that are not anticipated
clude average opinion in each group as an inde- at their inception. A policy could lead the pub-
pendent variable. For example, rather than re- lic to redefine their interests and identities in
gressing a measure of policy on average opinion, ways that undermine, enhance, or alter the bases
one could regress it on two variables – the av- of support for that policy. Moreover, the effect
erage among people with high incomes and the on public opinion could spill over beyond the
average among people with low incomes. There policy in question. For example, if a policy en-
are, however, several practical obstacles to this courages people to think of themselves in terms
kind of research. First, surveys may not con- of social classes, it would ultimately influence a
tain the necessary information on group mem- whole range of opinions.
bership. For example, some surveys do not ask Thus, the idea of policy feedback is a case of
about income, and those that do use a vari- what I previously called a “political” approach
ety of response categories. Second, the opinions on the societal level. Existing opinions depend
of all groups seem to move roughly in parallel not only on current structural conditions but
over time (Page and Shapiro, 1992), so that the also on past opinions. Also, rather than hold-
group measures of opinion will be highly cor- ing that national differences simply endure, as
related, making it difficult to distinguish their Inglehart and Baker (2000) do, policy feedback
effects. That is, when opinions of high-income theorists hold that they can change based on
people are more liberal than usual, opinions of the history of policy and opinions. For exam-
low-income people will be relatively liberal, too. ple, if class consciousness was initially stronger
Nevertheless, the question is important enough in one nation than another, governments might
to deserve attention despite these difficulties. implement policies that were organized in class
terms, strengthening class consciousness still fur-
ther and increasing the gap between the nations.
policy feedback The idea of policy feedback is connected
to the popular but vague concept of political
In recent years, there has been considerable “coalitions.” In a descriptive sense, a coalition is
interest in “policy feedback” (Pierson, 1993). simply a collection of groups that gives relatively
There are several different senses of policy feed- high support to a party or policy. However, the
back, but the one that is of interest here is term is often used in a stronger sense – for exam-
the possibility that government policies shape ple, it is sometimes said that a party was success-
public opinion. If public opinion affects policy, ful because it “forged” a particular coalition. In
as the research discussed in the previous sec- this explanatory sense, a coalition involves some
tion suggests, that would mean that the pol- sort of alliance – people do not simply happen
icy choice at one time would influence the to be on the same side but agree to work to-
subsequent development of policy. There are gether. Of course, ordinary people do not make
some straightforward examples of this process. formal alliances in the way that organizations
For example, leftist governments often enact sometimes do. However, people may think of
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themselves as part of a common project which historical accounts contain suggestions about
they will support even if they derive not im- the long-term consequences of policy decisions.
mediate benefits. For example, a skilled man- Empirical analysis of claims about the effects
ual worker in a secure job would not benefit of policy choices on public opinion is diffi-
from welfare spending, an increase in the mini- cult, because it would require data from sev-
mum wage, or aid to farmers. However, he may eral nations covering substantial periods of time.
support all of these programs if he thinks of Esping-Andersen (1985) analyzes voting pat-
them as benefiting “ordinary people” against the terns in Scandinavian countries, arguing that
“big interests.” Thus, in the explanatory sense there was a stronger trend toward “decom-
a coalition would be a group of people who position” of the Social Democratic vote in Den-
regarded themselves as sharing basic interests. mark and Norway than in Sweden. By this, he
A decade ago, Pierson (1993:597) noted that means that support became less stable and less
studies of policy feedback usually focused on uniform across the working class. He argues that
politicians, bureaucrats, and party organizations the differences result from a combination of so-
rather than the general public, and his obser- cial and economic policies. However, Esping-
vation remains true today. The most systematic Andersen’s (1985) account is closely tied to the
attempts to study public reactions to policy have histories of these nations and offers no clear
used a simple “thermostatic” model (Wlezien, predictions that could be applied to other na-
1995). In this model, the government responds tions.
to public opinion, but often overshoots it, caus- Some authors have made more rigorous at-
ing the public to move in the opposite direction. tempts to model the effect of policy on opin-
For example, the conservative public mood of ions, although they have not tested them em-
the late 1970s resulted in the election of Ronald pirically. Lindbeck (1995) proposes a model in
Reagan in 1980. Once the direction of public which norms against relying on state benefits
policy shifted sharply to the right under Rea- decline as the size of the population receiving
gan, the public mood began to shift in a lib- benefits increases. He finds that this model has
eral direction (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, two equilibrium values – a high or a low share
2002). Consequently, public opinion fluctuates relying on state benefits. He also suggests that
around an equilibrium. In this model, the role of there may be broader consequences: for exam-
political leaders is very limited, because they ple, if political debate focuses on the distribu-
cannot affect the equilibrium level. The impli- tional implications of policies “the tolerance for
cation of the policy feedback literature, how- income differences will gradually fall, and . . .
ever, is that there is no single equilibrium. social and political conflicts . . . will rise in par-
The “final” state of public opinion will depend allel with an equalization of disposable income”
on previous choices of policy. For example, it (Lindbeck, 1995:488).6
has been claimed that reliance on means-tested Although empirical study of these issues is
welfare policies undermines support for wel- likely to be difficult, the development of mod-
fare spending, whereas the reliance on univer- els would be helpful. Existing discussions are not
sal policies enhances it (e.g., Korpi and Palme, very clear about exactly how policies are sup-
1998). This does not mean that means-tested posed to affect opinions: they generally appeal
programs are less popular at the start, but that to some mix of self-interest, group interest, and
they encourage people to think in terms of a psychological factors without specifying the role
division between a small group of beneficiaries of each. It would also be particularly useful to
and a large group of taxpayers and that this way
of thinking ultimately leads to a loss of sup-
6
port. Hence, the decisions of political leaders This suggestion is reminiscent of De Tocqueville’s
(1850[1969]:673) analysis of equality: “it is therefore nat-
can send initially similar societies down different ural that love of equality should grow constantly with
paths. This kind of analysis has a strong appeal to equality itself; everything done to satisfy it makes it
people who are interested in politics, and many grow.”
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consider implications that could be tested with virtually the sole exception. Consequently, the
comparative cross-sectional data. For example, major task for researchers is not choosing among
if universalistic welfare policies create a sense theories but developing theories.
of social solidarity, one might expect class or There is still much of value in the older work
income differences in support for welfare poli- of the Columbia, Michigan, and social cleavage
cies to be smaller in nations with such policies. schools. As I argued previously, political soci-
Alternatively, universalistic policies might win ologists turned away from public opinion after
over parts of the middle classes without gaining the late 1960s not primarily because of the fail-
support from the upper classes. In this case, one ure of these approaches, but because their at-
could not unambiguously describe the class dif- tention was attracted by other issues and theo-
ferences as larger or smaller. Rather, one could ries. Many of their claims have been confirmed
say that there was a qualitative difference in by later studies. For example, the evidence col-
the nature of the coalition supporting welfare lected in the World Values Surveys (Inglehart,
policy. 1990, 1997) supports Lipset’s (1960) claim that
Wright (1997) provides some evidence for economic development generally leads to more
the existence of national differences in class tolerance and support for liberal democracy. It
coalitions. He argues that in Sweden, the opin- is still not clear why the relationship exists, but
ions of manual and white-collar workers are rel- it is clear that there is something that needs to
atively close together, whereas in the United be explained. Moreover, there are a number of
States they are more distant. As he puts it, “the research questions suggested by older work, par-
bourgeois class formation penetrates the middle ticularly in the social cleavages approach, that
class to a much greater extent in the United still have not received adequate study.
States than in Sweden” (Wright, 1997:429). The work of the 1950s and 1960s did have
The pattern of class differences in Japan, mean- two related weak points. One was that it did
while, is different from both the American and not take account of the processes of thinking
Swedish patterns. Wright explains the national and argument. A model in which opinions are
differences as the result of differences in state simply transmitted by contact captures part of
employment and unionization. He also argues the truth but leaves something out as well. Simi-
that the “shape” of class coalitions affects the larly, the Michigan school’s contention that peo-
prospects for future class conflict. ple did not have worldviews but merely collec-
tions of largely unrelated opinions is difficult to
square with the evidence of studies based on de-
conclusions tailed observation such as those of Lane (1962)
and Gamson (1992). A second weak point was
Compared to their counterparts from the 1950s the lack of a model of discontinuous change.
and 1960s, contemporary researchers have far The Columbia school saw change as the re-
more information to work with. Public opinion sult of gradual changes in population and social
data now extend over fifty years in some coun- structure, while the Michigan school saw it as
tries, and there are a number of international a matter of fluctuation around an equilibrium
surveys that include nations from all parts of level. These sorts of changes certainly do occur,
the world. Although having more information but there are also occasions in which new ideas
is obviously an advantage, it means that there appear and spread quickly. The two weak points
is a great deal more to organize and assimilate. are related, because the rapid spread of an idea
With more information and better models, it is likely to depend on some kind of intellectual
has been possible to make substantial progress appeal, such as the “resonance” spoken of by
on some questions, like the analysis of trends framing theorists.
in class voting. However, there have been few There are several different attempts to take
general attempts to synthesize the new research, the process of thinking more seriously. The re-
with Inglehart’s (1997) work standing out as view in this chapter focused on framing but
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also mentioned work on schemas that is pop- To conclude, political sociology and public
ular in political science. There are still other opinion research, after drifting apart during the
alternatives that were not discussed here. For ex- 1970s and 1980s, may be moving closer together
ample, from the perspective of rational choice again. Public opinion is not likely to regain the
theory, Riker (1984) proposes a model of preeminent position that it had in political so-
“heresthetics” or political argument. It is not ciology during the 1950s. However, as a re-
clear which, if any of them, will eventually be sult of the combination of better data and new
the most successful. However, this general area research questions, it may be ready to move
is likely to be the focus of considerable attention from the margins and enter a period of rapid
in the future. progress.
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chapter twelve
Nationalism in Comparative Perspective
Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood
the state of the field three-quarters of a century earlier.2 However,

Kohn (as well as Renan) can be criticized for
The inclusion of a chapter on nationalism in a being insufficiently rigorous in defining the idea
Handbook of Political Sociology, which introduces of the nation. For him, the nation was funda-
subjects fundamental to the profession in these mentally a sovereign community, but he failed to
early years of the twenty-first century, reflects recognize the essentially secular quality of nation-
the recognition, which has grown steadily in alism or the structural implications of national
the past twenty-five years, of the political im- consciousness.
portance of nationalism. There has been consid- Between the late 1970s and 1980s, work on
erable academic interest in nationalism before, nationalism was largely dominated by several
but this interest wavered and at times seemed to thinkers, whose works are often taken to be
disappear altogether. This faltering interest may canonical, despite the many points of sharp dis-
be held responsible for the fact that our under- agreement between them. The most significant
standing of the phenomenon did not advance as of these thinkers, most of whom began pub-
much as one could have wished from the begin- lishing on nationalism in that period, are Eric
ning of World War II, when its violent eruption Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Anthony Smith,
took American social scientists by surprise, and and Benedict Anderson. Of these, the first two
even from the beginning of the twentieth cen- are ordinarily considered structuralists. By this it
tury.1 is meant that they judge nationalism (and the
The work of Hans Kohn is among the most nation) to be fundamentally a “structural” or
useful early efforts in attempting to come to “material” phenomenon. That is, they approach
terms with the development of nationalism in nationalism from a theoretical point of view that
historical perspective. Kohn was particularly owes a great deal to Karl Marx.
notable for constantly stressing that national- Perhaps the most influential of those theo-
ism is fundamentally an idea, rather than a static, rists commonly identified as structuralists has
structural phenomenon, echoing the argument been Ernest Gellner. Gellner takes the state to
that the French sociologist Ernest Renan made be the fundamental structural phenomenon, and
he defines it as
1
Those scholars who repeat the old prediction that
so-called globalization is likely to lead to a reduction that institution or set of institutions specifically con-
or elimination of nationalism evidence a similar lapse in cerned with the enforcement of order . . . the state
judgment. There is little to indicate that nationalism is in
2
decline, and global flows of capital, migrating labor, and See Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York:
the internet have not pushed it any closer to the brink MacMillan, 1946). See also Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce
of extinction. Qu’une Nation (Leiden: Academic Press Leiden, 1994).
247
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248 Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood
exists where specialized order-enforcing agencies, many laudable efforts, does not pinpoint what
such as police forces and courts, have separated out is distinctive about nationalism.
from the rest of social life. Eric Hobsbawm is a more unequivocal struc-
These order-enforcing agencies “are the state.”3 turalist than Gellner and is very clear about the
The state, in turn, is a function of the “industrial fact that he takes the nation to be an “objective”
age,” within which “the presence, not the ab- phenomenon (that is, he never even seems to
sence of the state is inescapable.”4 Thus nation- suggest that nationalism is fundamentally a form
alism is dependent, for Gellner, on industrializa- of consciousness). For Hobsbawm, “defining
tion. Gellner attempts to define the nation itself a nation by its members’ consciousness of
as a form of consciousness. That is, for Gellner, belonging to it is tautological and provides only
a nation has a shared culture (he understands an a posteriori definition of what a nation is.”7
“culture” to refer to “a system of ideas and Moreover, Hobsbawm continues, the nation
signs and associations and ways of behaving is “a social entity only insofar as it relates to
and communicating”) and depends on the a certain kind of modern territorial state, the
recognition of its members: “A mere category ‘nation-state’, and it is pointless to discuss nation
of persons . . . becomes a nation if and when and nationality except insofar as both relate to
the members of the category firmly recognize it.”8 That is, the “modern” state (one wonders
certain mutual rights and duties to each other what, exactly, this “certain kind” of state is) is
in virtue of their shared membership in it.”5 taken to cause nationalism. Ultimately, though,
There is a certain tension in Gellner’s approach. Hobsbawm rejects all possible definitions of
On the one hand, the nation, for him, is a mat- the phenomenon under consideration and
ter of consciousness which, as in the definition recommends “agnosticism” as “the best initial
above, seems to be autonomous. On the other posture of a student in this field.” As a result,
hand, it is inseparably tied to the state, which is his work “assumes no a priori definition of what
understood as itself a function of industrial de- constitutes a nation.”9 Critics would charge
velopment. In other words, it is treated as Marx that one needs to define one’s object of study to
treated all consciousness: as epiphenomenal to be reasonably assured of a consistent approach
the changing forces and relations of production. to the problem in question.
Later, Gellner offers an alternative definition of Anthony Smith, in contrast, provides us with
nationalism. It is “a very distinctive species of a “working definition” of the modern nation
patriotism, and one which becomes pervasive wherein it is taken to be “a named human
and dominant only under certain social con- population which shares myths and memories,
ditions, which in fact prevail in the modern a mass public culture, a designated homeland,
world, and nowhere else” (as we’ve seen, the economic unity and equal rights and duties for
rise of industrial society and the state). The main all members.” As such, nations have their roots
characteristics of this “species of patriotism” in “ethnies,” those “named units of population
are “homogeneity, literacy, [and] anonymity.” with common ancestry myths and historical
He seems at times to identify it with “cultural memories, elements of shared culture, some
chauvinism” as well.6 These are, of course, not link with a historic territory and some measure
definitions, if we understand a definition to be of solidarity, at least among their elites” that
something that brackets the thing defined off have “appeared in the historical record since at
from everything else and that does not describe least the late third millennium.”10 Ultimately
a set of things that includes items not meant
7
to appear under that name. Gellner, despite his Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780:
Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge Uni-
3
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell versity Press, 1992), pp. 7–8.
8
University Press, 1983), p. 4. The italics are Gellner’s. Ibid., pp. 9–10.
4 9
Ibid., p. 5. Ibid., p. 8.
5 10
Ibid., p. 7. Anthony Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global
6
Ibid., p. 138. Era (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1995) pp. 56–57.
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Nationalism 249
it is unclear exactly what separates ethnies from another. They are not mere “populations,” in
nations for Smith, leading to further definitional the biological sense of the word, but instead
problems. depend on bonds that are essentially symbolic in
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities nature.
may indeed constitute the most influential acc- What is important, as Anderson himself
ount of nationalism produced to date. Ander- notes, is the “style” within which different po-
son is typically identified as a “constructivist,” litical communities are imagined. It has been
meaning that he allegedly takes nations to pointed out, however, that, as with Kohn, the
be historically contingent products of human definition of this style offered by Anderson is
cultural construction. Indeed, such a con- not sufficiently rigorous. That is, Anderson un-
ception is suggested by the very title of his derstands nations to be imagined communities
book. Anderson stresses that the fundamental that are “inherently limited and sovereign.”14
quality of the nation is that it is an “imagined That is, they are limited because “even the larg-
community”; because the majority of inhab- est of them, encompassing perhaps a billion
itants or members of any given nation do not living human beings, has finite, if elastic, bound-
know each other and do not meet face to face, aries, beyond which lie other nations.”15 It
they cannot be, presumably, a “real” commu- hardly needs pointing out that this is not a dis-
nity but can only constitute an imagined one. tinguishing characteristic of any particular type
As he puts it, the nation is “imagined because the of human group. Anderson’s understanding of
members of even the smallest nation will never sovereignty is relatively straightforward (he is
know most of their fellow-members, meet referring, of course, to the notion of popu-
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of lar sovereignty), and he takes this aspect of na-
each lives the image of their communion.”11 tional consciousness to be a function of the fact
This is most certainly the case, though, it that “the concept [of the nation] was born in
should be pointed out, all human communities an age in with Enlightenment and Revolution
are imagined communities in precisely this were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-
sense. That is, as Emile Durkheim so clearly ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.”16 In
saw, social forces are ultimately moral (i.e., other words, it seems that, in Anderson’s esti-
mental and not physical) forces.12 Even the mation, the idea of popular sovereignty became
most organizationally simple societies cannot attached to the nation because they (supposedly)
exist but through “collective representations,” happened to emerge at the same moment. It is
which are, though externalized through sym- also important to note Anderson’s definition of
bols, ultimately products of (and continue to the term community. For him, all communities,
reside in) the imaginations of individuals.13 by definition, are based on “a deep, horizontal
That is, even hunter-gatherer societies do not comradeship” that “makes it possible . . . for so
fundamentally constitute “real communities,” many people . . . willingly to die for such lim-
if by that term we mean physical constellations ited imaginings.”17 Thus, nationalism, for An-
of human beings, living in proximity to one derson, is an imagined form of human society
that is taken to be sovereign and limited and that
is based on a sense of egalitarian “comradeship.”
11
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflec- However, as with the other theorists considered
tions on the Origin and Spread of Nationlism (New York:
above, this is insufficiently rigorous. This defini-
Verso, 1983/1991), p. 6.
12
See Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological tion would include a number of things – for ex-
Method, trans. Sarah Solovay and John Mueller (New ample, the city-states of ancient Greece (which,
York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 1–13. See also Emile
Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,
trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: The Free Press, 14
Anderson, Imagined Communities, op. cit., p. 6.
1965), pp. 237, 238, 260. 15
Ibid., p. 7.
13 16
See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Ibid., p. 7.
17
Religious Life, op. cit., pp. 21–2. Ibid., p. 7.
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incidentally, would contradict Anderson’s claim of ethnicity, nevertheless insisted that it was
that the nation is a modern phenomenon) – that a strictly modern phenomenon that reflected
are clearly not nations.18 specifically modern economic and political
The conclusion one draws from a review processes, such as the development of capital-
of the central texts in the field is that political ism and/or industrialization and of modern
sociology (and political science, more broadly) bureaucratic state, and was inconceivable, or
has not come to grips with nationalism as “unimaginable,” out of their framework. As
yet. Despite the broad ontological similarities was noted above, the representative modernist
between major theories (their convergence on theorists all subscribed to, and approached
fundamental structural materialism, for ins- nationalism from, the Marxist perspective,
tance), there is no feeling in the profession that dominant in the social sciences in regard to
they have captured and sufficiently illuminated everything cultural; that is, they assumed the
the phenomenon. In this sense, the inclusion fundamental nature of “material” – specifically
of a chapter on nationalism in a section of this economic – processes, which, being funda-
volume devoted to “the roots and processes of mental occurred of themselves, and the epiphe-
political action” in civil society may be taken as nomenal, reflective nature of “ideal” – that is,
an indication of deepening understanding. Only symbolic or cultural – processes.22 As a result,
recently, the preferred meaning of the term the latter could always be explained by the
nationalism even in scholarly literature was pejo- former, while having very little independent
rative, and civil society was emphatically absent influence to affect them in turn, so that the
among its immediate associations. In much of consequences of the cultural processes, however
popular discussion, such pejorative meaning is curious on the face of it, could be safely disre-
still dominant19 , as is the belief that nationalism garded. Placing nationalism among the possible
is a deep-rooted psychological, and therefore roots of political action in civil society, instead,
ancient and ubiquitous rather than culturally forces us to focus on these consequences and
constructed, modern, and historically limited, represents a significant departure from the
phenomenon, essentially identical to ethnic, paradigm of the 1980s.
racial, and ultimately biological allegiances and
groupings, which represent its earlier forms.20 Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: Uni-
True, academic experts on nationalism since versity of North Carolina Press, 1982). For alternative
the early 1980s have leaned toward the “mod- views see Steven Grosby, “The Chosen People of An-
cient Israel and the Occident: Why Does Nationality
ernist” side of the “modernist/primordialist” Exist and Survive?” Nations and Nationalism 5(3), 1999,
or “modernist/perennialist” divide, postulated 357–80. See also Adrian Hastings, The Construction of
by Anthony Smith.21 “Modernists,” although Nationhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
admitting that nationalism was an outgrowth 1997); Donald L. Horowitz, “The Primordialists,” in
Daniele Conversi, ed. Ethnonationalism in the Contempo-
18
For a more detailed discussion of these issues see rary World (New York: Routledge, 2002) pp. 72–82; and
Liah Greenfeld, “Etymology, Definitions, Types,” in En- Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Under-
cyclopedia of Nationalism, Vol. 1, ed. Alexander J. Motyl standing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
22
(New York: Academic Press, 2001), pp. 251–66. All of the following “modernists” represent one
19
See, for example, William Pfaff, The Wrath of or another version of this view. See, for example, Karl
Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism (New Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An In-
York: Simon and Schuster, 1993). quiry into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, MA:
20 The MIT Press, 1966) as well as Eric Hobsbawm,
See, for example, Michael Ignatieff, Blood and
Belonging: A Journey into the New Nationalism (New York: op. cit.; Ernest Gellner, op. cit., and Encounters with Na-
Farrar, Straus, and Girout, 1994). tionalism (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1998) – not
21
Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Cambridge, to mention the collection of essays on Gellner’s work in
MA: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 7–12. Today, most versions John Hall, ed., The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and
of the “primordialist” or “perennialist” thesis recognize the Theory of Nationalism (New York: Cambridge Uni-
that, if they existed at all, prenational “nations” were versity Press, 1998); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the
not “objective” biological categories but were them- State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982); and Benedict
selves socially constructed. See, for example, John A. Anderson, op. cit.
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Nationalism 251
The authors of the present article take On the most general level – apart from being
nationalism to be a “perspective or a style of an umbrella term for a series of related symbolic,
thought,” an image of the world, “at the core of psychological, legal, and geopolitical phenom-
which lies . . . the idea of the ‘nation,’” which, ena that are characterized as “national,” such
in turn, we understand to be the definition as national identity, national consciousness, na-
of a community as fundamentally equal and tional sentiment, national pride, national patri-
sovereign. In the national world, the mass of the otism (i.e., sense of loyalty and devotion toward
population – the people – is seen as the nation. a national entity specifically), national mem-
Popular sovereignty signifies an essentially bership, whether or not defined as citizenship
secular worldview: the living people, not a (i.e., nationality and national communities, i.e.,
transcendental power, become the source of all nations) – nationalism is a form of conscious-
law and authority. Because of the principles of ness. It represents a comprehensive framework
popular sovereignty and equality, membership for seeing the world, both social and, in a some-
in the nation bestows dignity on the individual, what vaguer way, natural, and thus constitutes
in principle presuming everyone as a potential the cultural blueprint for experiencing and con-
leader or a member in a leadership elite.23 Such structing “reality.” The image of reality nation-
dignity, in turn, explains why people are willing alism projects lies at the roots of modernity,
to die for their nations. This definition meets which, in turn, may be defined as the insti-
the objections raised against the earlier attempts tutionalization or “embodiment” of national-
detailed previously. In other words, this defini- ism in social, political, and economic structures,
tion does not fall to objections of either of the that is, in patterned relations and processes –
two following forms: (1) it cannot be said of it patterned, indeed, by the dictates of this un-
that phenomena that one “wants” to call nations derlying form of consciousness.24 Therefore,
are not captured by the definition and (2) the nationalism is most definitely to be included
definition does not capture any phenomena that among the roots of political action in civil
clearly are not nations. Like those definitions in society: whatever else may inspire any partic-
the tradition of Ernest Renan, the approach is ular movement or event, it is nationalism that
“voluntarist” or “constructivist,” meaning that both makes conceivable and generates modern
it is recognized that the existence of such na- political action – and civil society – as such.
tions is dependent on the imaginations of their
members. However, unlike earlier proponents
of such views, the type of “imagined com- the political effects of nationalism
munity” or the “style of imagination” under as compared to those of other forms
consideration is here sufficiently specified. of consciousness
France, the United States, Russia, Japan, and so
forth all clearly constitute nations, whereas an- As a comprehensive form of consciousness
cient Greece and Rome do not. This definition forming the cultural foundation of a distinctive
does not involve the simple assertion that the type of society, nationalism is analogous to such
nation is a modern phenomenon; it points to broad forms of religion as monotheism, panthe-
what separates this modern phenomenon from ism, or animism, from all of which it is simul-
superficially similar phenomena that preceded taneously distinguished by its essentially secular
it. Moreover, this is the only view that recog- character. Whatever prominence religion may
nizes that nationalism is an essentially cultural be given in any particular nationalist discourse,
phenomenon, not reducible to or derivative it nevertheless exists on the latter’s sufferance,
from some so-called structural factors. reduced to a strictly subservient or at best
23 24
Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Moder- Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism, op. cit. and The
nity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth
pp. 3, 6–7, 12–14. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).
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marginal role, and in fact survives in every mod- describes.27 Indeed, it would be absurd to talk of
ern society as an atavism.25 Nationalism is fo- “civil society” or “political action” in the frame-
cused on this world, which it presents as ul- work of the European feudal society or Indian
timately meaningful and self-sufficient, rather caste society, to mention the two perhaps best
than in any way dependent on grander transcen- known nonmodern types. The forms of con-
dental forces, and this secular focus is reflected sciousness prevailing in them did not allow for
not only in the twin principles of the image of the existence of such political phenomena, and
sociopolitical reality it projects – the principle they still appear unimaginable to us, being log-
of fundamental equality of national member- ically incongruent with the two cultural frame-
ship and the principle of popular sovereignty – works. In distinction, the cultural framework, or
but also in the awesome powers attributed in all foundation, of modern society – nationalism –
modern societies to natural science. This does not only allows for the proliferation of political
not mean, however, that nationalism should be action throughout the social system, but effectu-
regarded as a “civil religion.” To identify this ally calls “civil society” into existence. The focus
fundamentally secular form of consciousness in of nationalism on this world as ultimately mean-
such a way does not do justice to the term reli- ingful and the principle of popular sovereignty
gion, which, from a sociological point of view, is combine to render social reality changeable and
best understood as a cultural system oriented to- place the responsibility for its shape in the hands
ward the transcendent. In other words, religion of the earthly living community – the nation.
is, by definition, not secular.26 The focus on the life in this world dramatically
The essential secularism and the two princi- increases the value of this life to the individual
ples of nationalism’s image of the social world and inevitably leads to the insistence on a good
(popular sovereignty and the equality of mem- life, however defined. One is no longer expected
bership in the nation) define this form of to submit to suffering or deprivation, unless one
consciousness as such, and though its specific has special reasons to do so, for the general rea-
expressions, or particular nationalisms, are dis- sons for such submission – the expectation of
tinguished by numerous other qualities, it is rewards in the beyond, transmutation and mi-
these three general characteristics that explain gration of the souls, the duty to serve witness to
the central political features of every modern the glory of God wherever one is called, or the
society. The first of these central features to be sheer impossibility to change one’s condition –
listed is the democratization or universality of no longer apply. Religion, as Clifford Geertz
political action: the striking fact that in mod- noted so memorably, made suffering “suffer-
ern societies it may be found on any rung of able,” because it made it meaningful, and it
the social ladder and in any corner of the na- made it meaningful because life on Earth was
tional territory. It is this, dramatic by compari- just a link, rarely a central link, in a great chain of
son to other types of societies, level of political being and drew meaning from its transcenden-
participation that the term civil society as a rule tal context.28 In the framework of nationalism
25
For a detailed discussion of the relationship be-
27
tween nationalism and religion see Liah Greenfeld, “The This is what Edward Shils meant when he spoke
Modern Religion?” Critical Review 10:2 (Spring 1996), of the spread of the center into the periphery in mod-
pp. 169–91. For alternative views, see Josep R. Llobera, ern, mass society. As he put it, “in the modern societies
The God of Modernity: The Development of National- of the West, the central value system has gone much
ism in Western Europe (Oxford: Berg, 1994) and Roger more deeply into the heart of their members than it
Friedland, “Religious Nationalism and the Problem of has ever succeeded in doing in any earlier society.” See
Collective Representations” Annual Review of Sociology, Edward Shils, “Center and Periphery” in Shils, Center
Vol. 27, August 2001, pp. 125–52. and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago: Univer-
26
On the idea of “civil religion” see Robert Bellah, sity of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 11–12.
28
“Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus, the Journal of the Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,”
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Winter 1967, Vol. The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books,
96 (1), pp. 1–21. 2000), pp. 87–125.
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Nationalism 253
one’s earthly life became all one could ever have, ingly brave, it is also a function of age: it is
fully meaningful in its own right, and this made noteworthy that all revolutionary movements of
suffering meaningless and therefore insufferable. the past three hundred years, from the French
Moreover, in a self-sufficient world, changeable Revolution (with the deservedly capital R) to
and shaped by people, suffering is generally be- the student one (with the small r) of the 1960s,
lieved to be human-made. Even natural disas- were movements of adolescents and people in
ters are likely to be so interpreted: a famine, an their twenties and, to a lesser extent, thirties. It
earthquake, or an epidemic are as often as not at- is even more significant that in the past three
tributed to some human agent’s withholding of hundred years – but never before – there were
the needed but available resources or negligence; revolutionary movements, that is, explicit at-
personal misfortunes, such as debilitating, life- tempts at social change, movements oriented
threatening, and incurable illnesses, are blamed toward reshaping the world by human design.
on artificially created environmental conditions All forms of consciousness allow for revolts and
(e.g., second-hand smoke and lead paint) or on rebellions, spontaneous eruptions of frustration
doctors’ incompetence. None of these natural and rage, essentially expressive collective actions,
disasters, it is said, “have to happen”: they are no aimless – perhaps vaguely oriented to the right-
longer believed to be in the nature of things. Of ing of some tremendous, but ill-defined, wrongs
course, the right to a life free of suffering is most – with goals and demands thought through, if
clearly asserted when suffering is caused – as it at all, only after the fact. But revolutions are a
is mostly, in modern societies – by social evils: modern form of political action: at their root
war, economic or political conditions, competi- always lies nationalism.
tion for precedence, and so forth. Humiliation, The present section of the volume being de-
rejection, thwarted ambition are felt as unjust voted to civil society, its focus is political action
– as contrary to expectations and thus resulting outside the state, but as the state is also a function
from illegitimate intervention of malicious oth- of nationalism, a brief discussion of the connec-
ers. As one’s precious time on Earth is limited, tion between this, modern, form of government
the change in the conditions preventing the re- and this, constitutive of modernity, form of con-
alization of one’s right to a life of contentment, sciousness may be in order here. Formed under
free of suffering, is experienced as urgent, and the profound influence of German Romantic
because those responsible for their creation are thought, many of its fundamental concepts im-
only human, any naturally active and tempera- ported uncritically from the murky reservoirs of
mental individual who is not particularly timid the latter, American political science often iden-
easily gets engaged in whatever form the polit- tifies the state with government as such. Thus
ical process around him or her takes. numerous authors feel compelled to qualify
As a result, involvement in political action their use of the term with such adjectives as capi-
(or participation in civil society) under nation- talist, modern, or bureaucratic.30 But to speak of the
alism is a function not of the social position – as “modern state” or of the “bureaucratic state” is
it was, let’s say, in feudal and absolutist Europe redundant, for the state is only a form of govern-
or in Tokugawa Japan – but of character ment, and this form is characteristically modern
and personality.29 Because temperament chan- and necessarily bureaucratic. The concept of
ges with age, and young people, for instance,
are more likely to be impetuous and unthink- 30
Works that treat the state in such terms include
Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its
29
On political action in feudal and absolutist Europe Place (University Park: The Pennsylvania State Univer-
see Marc Bloch’s Feudal Society: The Growth of Ties of sity Press, 1990). See also Gianfranco Poggi, The Devel-
Dependence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, opment of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Palo
1988), esp. Part IV, “The Ties Between Man and Man: Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), and Howard
Vassalage and the Fief.” Regarding political action in G. Brown, War, Revolution, and the Bureaucratic State: Poli-
Tokugawa Japan, see Liah Greenfeld, The Spirit of Capi- tics and Army Administration in France, 1791–1799 (Oxford:
talism, op. cit., pp. 227–98 and especially pp. 266–7. Clarendon Press, 1995).
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“state” as a form of government appeared in the but a bureaucrat, as was Joseph Stalin, the ap-
English of the sixteenth century – about fifty positely referred to General Secretary, who did
years after the entrenchment of the idea of the not believe in any such thing but made sure that
“nation” and well into the development of the everyone else did.
nationalist discourse.31 It obviously reflected a Finally, the principle of the equality of na-
new reality, as it did later in other countries tional membership lies at the root of the open
when the term migrated there in translation. recruitment for state offices, which obviously
This new reality was the new form of govern- also exerts a most profound influence on the na-
ment, called forth by the new form of con- ture of politics in modern society.34 It is through
sciousness, which presented a new image of the principle of equality of membership – its
what a government should be. As nationalism core social principle – that nationalism affects
first developed in Western Europe, this image the social structure most directly, because in
contrasted most sharply with the then existing modern society the system of social stratifica-
Western European ideal of government – the tion – the nodal structural system, in which all
medieval ideal of kingship.32 The distinguish- social systems meet and connect – is based on
ing characteristic of kingship was its personality: this principle. In this case, too, the modern, or
the government was inseparable from a partic- national, system of social stratification represents
ular person, a person born at a certain time to the very opposite of the stratification system
a certain family, who needed no other qual- characteristic of the European feudal society,
ifications in addition to this accident of birth which it replaced. In place of a rigid structure,
(of course, never regarded as an accident and at sharply distinguishing between strata of which it
a later stage explicitly reaffirmed as divine ap- was composed and, except by special dispensa-
pointment) to assume power. In contrast, the tion, allowing no movement between them, we
distinguishing characteristic of the state became now have an open system with loosely and only
its impersonality.33 Because supreme authority, theoretically defined compartments, in practice
in the framework of nationalism, resides in the virtually indistinguishable and seamlessly flow-
body of the nation in accordance with princi- ing one into another via the numerous channels
ple of popular sovereignty, the authority of the
state is necessarily delegated, representative (in 34
The emphasis on the equality of national mem-
the sense that it only represents the authority of bership here should not be confused with an em-
the people), and, insofar as it is subject to recall, phasis on citizenship. Different nationalisms conceive
of membership in different terms (indeed, this is the
limited. Sovereignty is delegated to the office, essence of the civic/ethnic distinction noted elsewhere
not to any particular person, and any person in this article) and only for some nations is member-
exercises authority only as a holder of the of- ship coterminous with citizenship. Citizenship itself is
fice. The state is a government by officers, that not a function of nationalism. That is, other types of
is, a bureaucracy. In this sense, Adolph Hitler, societies – consider Ancient Rome – have had citi-
zens. National citizenship, however (like national patri-
the Führer who ardently believed that he rep- otism), constitutes a subtype of citizenship more gen-
resented the will of the German people, was erally considered and signifies a particular set of rela-
tions with the state – the central political institution
31
Liah Greenfeld, “Nationalism and Modernity,” through which popular sovereignty is “made manifest.”
Social Research 62:4 (Winter 1996). For a variety of views on the nature of citizenship, see
32 T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development:
Regarding the medieval conception of kingship,
see Reinhard Bendix, Kins or People: Power and the Man- Essays (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964); Bryan
date to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, S. Turner Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over
1978). See also Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Reformism (Boston: & Unwin, 1986); and Thomas
Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of
Princeton University Press, 1957). Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social
33
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Democratic Regimes (New York: Cambridge University
Interpretive Sociology, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Press, 1998), as well as the essays in Bart van Steenber-
Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), gen, ed., The Condition of Citizenship (Thousand Oaks,
pp. 600, 998. CA: Sage, 1994).
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Nationalism 255
of social mobility.35 One no longer has a social nation. The process of recruitment in the demo-
position and function, clearly defined by birth, cratic, national, or modern societies differs dras-
which is supposed to serve one (or, rather, which tically from those based on forms of conscious-
one is supposed to serve) all of one’s lifetime; ness different from nationalism, for, whatever
instead, one is supposed to choose a function the differences between nationalisms (which, as
and to achieve a social position (which pre- is argued in the section on “Types of National-
supposes specifically upward mobility), moving ism and their Implications for Political Action”
from one social position to higher and higher may be very significant), it is in all nations essen-
ones as one grows older, “bettering oneself ” or tially, rather than accidentally, a process of self-
“getting ahead.” In modern societies one does recruitment, always dependent (though not in-
not talk of “usurpers,” “parvenus,” or, how- evitably determined) by individual initiative, the
ever great the temptation, “nouveaux riches”: nature of one’s ambition and talent, whereas in
one is expected, even encouraged, to strive, to other societies it follows strictly charted paths
have ambitions, to be a proficient social climber. from certain initial social positions to speci-
And so there is nothing strange in a poor semi- fied political functions, which only extraordi-
narian from Georgia becoming the all-powerful nary circumstances allow to circumvent.
ruler of the great Soviet Union, a son of elderly
underpaid Leningrad parents rising through the
types of nationalism and their
ranks of foreign espionage to the presidency of
implications for political action
only slightly less great Russia, a daughter of a
modest greengrocer gaining recognition as the
Because of the fundamental dependence of all
strongest premier of United Kingdom, and a
cultural processes on the individual mind, no
child of a single mother, unhappily remarried
form of consciousness is uniform by definition,
to a garage mechanic from Arkansas, twice be-
and this applies in particular to comprehen-
ing elected to head the United States of Amer-
sive forms of consciousness that underlie broad
ica. Our form of consciousness, nationalism,
types of social formations, such as nationalism.
makes this kind of mountaineering normal, re-
That is why nationalism is analogous to forms
spectable, and, in fact, necessary.
of religious consciousness, such as monotheism,
The combination of the principles of popular
rather than to specific religions, such as Chris-
sovereignty and fundamental equality of mem-
tianity, for instance, and even less to specific
bership implies democracy: government of the
secular ideologies, such as liberalism or con-
people by the people; therefore, political re-
servatism (which cannot be considered com-
cruitment must be open to any member of the
prehensive forms of consciousness), to which
35
The authors do not mean to minimize enduring it is regularly compared.36 As within monothe-
inequality in the modern world. Instead, we assert that ism one can distinguish Judaism, Christianity,
modern, national societies are by definition devoted to and Islam, each one of which is a variety of
the ideal of equality (however conceived, as there is in- monotheism interpreted and implemented in a
deed considerable variation in this regard) and that this
tends to be reflected in the expanded possibilities of the
distinctive way, so within nationalism one finds
majority of modern social actors. Indeed, it may very several types of this secular form of conscious-
well be the case that discriminatory behavior is funda- ness, distinguished by the manner in which they
mentally a modern phenomenon, meaningful only in interpret and implement the twin principles of
the national world. In premodern Europe, for exam- nationalism. The implications of these types for
ple, the failure of a member of the lower social strata
to rise would not have been regarded as unjust, given
36
the absolute lack of expectation of social mobility. It is For a recent example of this very old sort of con-
only because we live in a world where the expectation fusion, see Ronald Beiner, “Liberalism, Nationalism,
is widespread that if one works hard and applies oneself Citizenship: Three Models of Political Community”
and is treated fairly one will rise that inequality, though in Beiner, Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship: Essays on
less pronounced than in the past, is in some ways a more the Problem of Political Community (Toronto: UBC Press,
apparent feature of social life. 2003), pp. 21–38.
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political action differ dramatically, as they do represents a sharp contrast to the individualistic-
in all the spheres of social action generally de- civic type, the representative nations of the two
fined,37 and this explains singular features and types being traditionally found on the oppo-
characteristic tendencies in the political cul- site sides of international political conflicts. The
ture, process, and historical record of individual great ideological divide of the twentieth cen-
nations. tury was the divide between individualistic-
The character of a particular nationalism is civic and collectivistic-ethnic nationalisms, and
a function of (a) the definition of the nation, collectivistic-ethnic nations were invariably par-
which may be seen as a composite or as a unitary ties and, as a rule, the aggressive parties, in all
entity, and (b) the nature of membership crite- the many wars fought in it – from World War I
ria, which may be civic or ethnic. Three types of to the almost permanent Arab–Israeli war – in
nationalism are created by the combinations of which they either fought among themselves or
these possibilities.38 Historically, the first type opposed civic nations of the two other types.40
of nationalism to emerge was the individualistic The type of nationalism affects every aspect
and civic type, in which the nation is defined in of political conduct in a nation, beginning with
composite terms, as an association of individu- the very manner in which political reality is con-
als (with plural pronouns corresponding to the structed and embodied in various institutions,
concepts of “nation” and “people,” as in “We, as these directly reflect the interpretation of the
the people”), and the criteria of membership two core principles of nationalism. To start, it
are civic, nationality being equated with citi- affects the type of democracy that prevails, for
zenship. Nations such as United Kingdom, the although every nation is a democracy by defi-
United States of America, and Australia are na- nition – government of the people by the peo-
tions of the individualistic and civic type. The ple being implied in nationalism as such – it is
type to follow was collectivistic and civic, repre- well known that one nation’s democracy is an-
sented, for example, by France and Israel. In this other one’s nightmare.41 Certainly, this is what,
case a unitary definition of the nation, as an irre- for instance, democracy in the Soviet Union or
ducible whole organized according to principles China of Chairman Mao’s time (“popular” or
peculiar to itself, is combined with civic mem- “socialist” democracy) was for democracies of
bership criteria. Both of these early types are the American or British variety (that is “liberal”
quite rare. The few nations belonging to them democracy) and vice versa. With the exception
have, by and large, recognized a deep affinity of a few pockets of resistance (particularly so-
tying them together and treat each other as nat- phisticated societies such as the Dutch Republic
ural allies. For purposes of rough comparative of the Golden Age or Renaissance Italy), na-
analysis they may be discussed as one. The last tionalism, similarly to monotheism at an ear-
to appear and the most widespread type of na- lier period, has spread quite easily throughout
tionalism is the collectivistic and ethnic type, which the world. But in its spread it has transformed
combines a unitary definition of the nation with into particular nationalisms, giving rise to par-
“ethnic,” hereditary, or, in fact, genetic criteria ticular forms of national organization, national
of membership.39 In its political implications, it
characteristic is taken to constitute the boundary marker

37
Regarding social action, see Weber, op. cit., of that form of identity. In other words, the essential
pp. 22–6. quality of ethnic identity is that it is not taken to be
38
A number of commentators, following Brubaker, a matter of choice. For an ethnic nationalist, one can
have only distinguished between two types of neither acquire nor alienate one’s national identity.
40
nationalisms: ethnic and civic. See Rogers Brubaker, Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot, “Nationalism
Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany and Aggression,” Theory and Society 23(1): 79–130.
41
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). Liah Greenfeld, “Nationalism and Democracy:
39
Ethnic criteria of membership are not necessarily The Nature of the Relationship and the Cases of
tied to racialist thinking. The essential quality of an eth- England, France, and Russia,” Research in Democracy and
nic form of identity is that some involuntary ascriptive Society, vol. 1, 1993, pp. 327–52.
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Nationalism 257
consciousness, and national identity. In distinc- participate actively in the political process and
tion to nationalism in general, these particular have one’s input counted through voting; the
forms can be no more imposed one on another will of the nation, believed to be changeable
than can Islam on Christianity, Christianity on within the broad value framework (of individ-
Judaism, and so on. (This, obviously, applies to ual liberty and equality), is periodically opera-
societies, not to individuals; and societies under tionalized as the will of the majority of individ-
long-term occupation may represent an excep- ual members and always arrived at by induction,
tion.) The type of democracy a nation devel- rather than being deduced from some first prin-
ops (liberal or popular/socialist – a new phrase ciples. Within institutions of government, or
“managed democracy” has been coined to re- the state, members of the nation are represented
fer to this latter type in Mr. Putin’s Russia), in by proxy by officials they have elected. This is
distinction to democracy in general, which is the way one understands representative institu-
implied in the nationalist principles of popular tions in liberal democracies. But, of course, it
sovereignty and equality of membership, is a re- is equally possible to understand them in a very
flection of such particular forms of nationalism different, if not wholly contradictory, way.
and therefore can no more be imported into Political representation can be understood (or
and imposed on a nation than can a foreign na- represented) as “representation to,” rather than
tional identity. In other words, it is as unlikely “representation of,” the nation. In fact, this is
that an Arab, collectivistic-ethnic nation, such precisely the function of specific – and distinc-
as Iraq, which until quite recently, anyway, was tively modern – political role: that of the ideo-
a socialist democracy (similar to the national so- logue. Ideologues represent the nation, its nature,
cialist democracy in Germany in the 1930s, for its interests, its will, to its members. Ideolog-
instance) will transform into a liberal democ- ical politics reflect a unitary definition of the
racy as that the Iraqis en masse will redefine and nation. The conceptualization of the national
consider themselves Americans or French. And, collectivity as an entity in its own right, irre-
of course, it is a transformation of this kind that ducible to its elements, almost inevitably tends
we care about, not the reaffirmation by nations to abut in its reification, in imagining the na-
hostile to us of their generally democratic char- tion anthropomorphically as a collective indi-
acter, truthful as it is. vidual, which is particularly likely when the na-
To understand the political propensities of tionalism combines the unitary definition of the
different types of nationalism, we have to con- nation with ethnic criteria of national mem-
sider the logical implications of the definitions of bership. This collective individual is then en-
the nation and of national membership, on the dowed with its own will, rights, and interests,
basis of which these types are constructed. The independent of the wills, interests, and rights of
composite definition of the nation as an associa- human individuals who compose it and unalter-
tion of individuals locates popular sovereignty – able, because its essential nature does not change
the will of the community – in the individuals with natural changes in this composition. Hu-
who compose it, thus projecting an image of man individuals are subsumed in the larger and
sovereignty as divisible and aggregate of sep- so clearly more imposing collective individual
arate sovereignties of each member. Members similarly to the way in which cells are subsumed
are thus viewed as interdependent but fully in the living organism and are to be considered
autonomous and self-governing. It is because only to the extent that they contribute to a life
they are essentially, that is, by their very nature, of the higher order; national membership loses
free and equal that the nation is free and egali- its meaning of active participation and becomes
tarian. The institutionalization, or implementa- something like a biological condition: one is a
tion, of popular sovereignty, so interpreted, remember in the sense in which a particular minor
sults in institutions (norms and routine practices) organ, say, a finger, is a member of a body.
that safeguard individual freedom, equality, Although in an individualistic national-
and autonomy. Everyone has the possibility to ism, popular sovereignty is interpreted as the
P1: NFR
aggregate liberty of free individuals, in a col- to disregard the differences between these two
lectivistic nationalism it is interpreted as the types. Modern tyrannies have been invariably
freedom of the nation from foreign domina- associated with collectivistic nationalisms, usu-
tion. Liberty itself is redefined as a reflection of ally ethnic, from Jacobin France to the Russian
such national autonomy and is no longer seen Empire of the “official nationalism” period to
as an innate human capacity. Equality is also Fascist Italy, National Socialist Germany, the
reinterpreted. Members – nationals or citizens – Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics under
of individualistic nations are equal specifically “the Great Russian nationalism,” and such late-
in their liberty: their capacity and right for twentieth-century/new millennium diehards as
self-government and political participation and, Ba’ath Iraq or Syria.42 In the twentieth cen-
therefore, legal rights and obligations. In collec- tury these authoritarian regimes were often eas-
tivistic nations they are equal only in that they ily recognizable under the names of “social-
equally share the essential nature of their nation, ist” or “communist” regimes. Since the early
that which makes it a particular nation and them 1990s, such self-identification went out of fash-
nationals of this particular nation. This equality ion, which makes it more difficult for politi-
is fundamental, but in everything else, including cians who set great store by names to recognize
the nature of their political participation, they these regimes for what they are. But, of course,
may be legitimately considered unequal. a change of the name rarely, if ever, implies a
When the nation is reified and believed pos- change of nature.
sessed of its own, independent will, this will, Although at the root of distinctions between
which cannot be equated with the will of the liberal and authoritarian regimes described pre-
majority, must be perceived by some other, viously lies the difference between the compos-
nonempirical means. It is this need that creates ite and unitary definitions of the nation, col-
the position of the ideologue. Ideologues – lectivistic nationalisms that are civic (namely
Rousseau’s “great legislators” – are the nat- when the unitary definition of the nation is
ural rulers of collectivistic (especially ethnic- combined with civic criteria of membership)
collectivistic) nations. They are the “aristocracy may, but are unlikely to, develop authoritarian
of intelligence (or) virtue” who know the will tendencies, because their civic character con-
of the nation. They represent this will to the tradicts and neutralizes such development. Civic
mass of the members (it is telling that mem-
bers of the nation are in fact commonly referred 42
See Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and
to in collectivistic-ethnic nations as a “mass”), Prevalence of Evil in Our Age (New York: The Free Press,
informing the people what it wants and needs 1994), pp. 267–308. The case of Iran after the revolu-
and imposing these alleged wants and needs on tion, so often taken by social scientists as an example
them. of so-called religious fundamentalism, likewise seems to
This profound distinction between those few be closely related to, if not an instance of, collectivistic
and ressentiment-laden nationalism. Khomeini, for ex-
who have (because they claim) direct access to ample, so often taken as the religious ideologue par ex-
the will of the nation and those multitudes who cellence, was clearly an Iranian nationalist. In response to
don’t (because it is denied to them), itself a log- the granting of capitulatory rights to the United States
ical implication of the unitary definition of the in 1964, Khomeini proclaimed that “Our dignity has
nation, as a rule results in authoritarian politics. been trampled underfoot; the dignity of Iran has been
destroyed.” Moreover, those responsible for the measure
What is referred to as “popular,” “socialist,” or, had “sold our independence, reduced us to the level of
in the case of Putin’s new Russia, “managed” a colony, and made the Muslim nation of Iran appear
democracies are in fact authoritarian democra- more backward than savages in the eyes of the world!”
cies of collectivistic nations, which represent the He promised that “If the religious leaders have influ-
very antithesis of liberal democracies, character- ence, they will not permit this nation to be the slaves
of Britain one day, and America the next.” See Imam
istic of individualistic nations, such as the United Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations
States, and frequently equated in them with of Imam Khomeini, trans. and annotated by Hamid Algar
democracy as such. It is extremely dangerous (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), pp. 181–3.
P1: NFR
Nationalism 259
nationalism makes membership in principle vol- than its other common expressions: language,
untary, dependent on the will of the individual. religion, traits of character, and territorial and
As is made abundantly clear by the experience political affiliation – thus the emphasis of ethnic
of the United States, Israel, and other immigrant nationalisms on blood. Physical type is transmit-
nations, but may be observed in cases of non- ted genetically; nationality is presumably also
immigrant civic national communities, such as, so transmitted. This makes it indistinguishable
most notably, France, one can both acquire a from biological race and by extension turns na-
civic nationality, if one is not born with it, and tional language, religion, traits of character, and
opt out of it if one is. Either of the two changes territorial and political affiliations into racial
of identity and membership may be more or characteristics. Biology becomes destiny. One
less difficult, depending on the laws of the par- can no more acquire a nationality, if one is not
ticular nation, but both are possible. All that is born with it, or give it up, if one is, than one can
needed to become a new member, in fact, is to change one’s blood type. Therefore, those who
convince the gatekeeping authorities (which in do are considered either impostors or traitors,
some cases may need more convincing than in that is, criminals of one degree or another. In-
others but are in all cases open to argument) that dividual will has nothing to do with the choice
one is willing to adopt the fundamental values of nationality and language, religion, values, al-
and practices – which may be linguistic, polit- legiance to a particular state, liking for a par-
ical, religious, or pertain to public behavior in ticular territory – whatever is counted among
general, such as not wearing a face-veil out- the national characteristics in the case – because
doors – of the nation in question and to assume there is no choice. The individual is determined
the duties of membership in it. And very little by the nation into which he or she is born
indeed is needed to abandon membership one and is emphatically denied freedom. There is
no longer wishes to have. This principled vol- no need for freedom on the individual level –
untarism makes the very existence of the civic the individual is not defined as a free agent; the
nation dependent on the wills of its individual only freedom one may (and, as a matter of fact,
members, thus constantly affirming their auton- should) wish for is the freedom of the nation
omy and liberty, which the unitary definition of from foreign domination. Nationality defined in
the nation constantly tends to deny. Collectivis- ethnic terms, therefore, deprives the individual
tic and civic nationalisms are ambivalent, con- of what constitutes individuality, dissolving in-
flicted, and conflictive nationalisms – which is dividual agency and making it logical indeed to
daily reflected in their politics – because their talk of people as “a mass.” At the same time, by
two constitutive principles, equally capable of attributing agency to the nation, its definition as
provoking political passion and devotion, are a collective individual achieves the same result,
logically contradictory. No evidence of this is or rather vastly reinforces the impression left by
likely to be more familiar than the turbulent this result on the mind, and breaks whatever
political history of France, the nation that in- residual resistance to the submission of the hu-
vented political totalitarianism, while subscrib- man mass, dispossessed of its wills, to the crash-
ing to the arch-individualist maxim “penser c’est ing authority of the will of the nation and its
dire non” and none better is needed. self-appointed representatives.
Ethnic criteria of membership, in distinction, Although ethnic nationalism (which is always
reinforce the authoritarian tendencies of collec- collectivistic) is as open to individual ambition
tivistic nationalisms. In the framework of eth- as are nationalisms of the two other types, it
nic nationalisms, nationality is regarded as an virtually excludes the population outside of the
inborn trait, like those genetic characteristics state institutions from participation in the gov-
that are also considered ethnic, such as physi- ernment and policy formation: it is meaning-
cal type. In fact, physical type is usually believed less to speak of political process in this sense, or
to be the most reliable expression of nationality, of public opinion, in its context. But, like na-
less likely to be faked or claimed by outsiders, tionalism in general, it still encourages political
P1: NFR
activism, and therefore political action, outside focused on foreign policies and conditions
the state’s sphere of action even when authori- would not be accurate, because it is not at all
tarian democracies for which ethnic nationalism a focused type of activism, because it leaves for-
provides the cultural soil spawn, as they so often eign policies to the authorities as much as it does
do, tyranny. Political activism, obviously, takes domestic policies, and because foreign condi-
very different forms in ethnic nationalism and tions are of no interest to the activists. But it is
in individualistic and civic nationalisms that pro- fired (as this activism expresses itself in sporadic
duce liberal nations. In liberal nations, it can be outbursts of activity, rather than in systematic
characterized as generally introvert (focused on and organized action, fired is the proper descrip-
the internal policies and domestic conditions); as tive term) by diffuse concerns with presumed
directed by and large to the correction of, or im- foreign threats and by ever fomenting sense of
provement on, government actions and to their collective injury and personal hostility toward
supplementation in instances where it is felt the the eternally unjust world somehow preventing
government fails to take action; and as rational the self-realization of one’s nation. This sense
and instrumental in the sense of being oriented of permanent siege is a function of ressentiment,
to specific and realistic goals. It is most emphati- which plays a central role in the formation of
cally goal-oriented. As a result, it expresses itself ethnic nationalisms45 and shapes both the im-
in constructive, methodical (which means un- age of the particular ethnic nation itself and the
emotional, even when enthusiastic), organized attitudes toward the external world. Among its
action, which naturally ends when the goal is related functions is the dual vision in which the
reached. By and large, individuals engaged in essential, the “really real,” exists apart from the
political action work with (i.e., seek to involve,
inform, and secure the support of ) governmen- 45
The concept of ressentiment, which was developed
tal agencies and use channels provided for such by Friedrich Nietzsche and later Max Scheler, cannot
action within political institutions: they lobby, simply be translated as resentment (it is, instead, a form
they distribute petitions to be signed, and so of existential envy) and implicitly recognizes the signifi-
cance of status in social life (a recognition to which, one
forth.43 Only exceptionally does political ac- might argue, recent work in political sociology has not
tivism in liberal nations takes destructive, ex- been sufficiently attentive). Ressentiment can occur when
pressive, and emotional forms. Historically, this a given actor (or set of actors) finds him- or herself in
happens in times of major disorientation and a position of fundamental comparability with another
exacerbation of anomie (a low-grade state of social actor (or set of actors) and discovers that, within
the prevailing value scheme, he or she is of inferior sta-
which is a systemic problem in modern – i.e., tus. There are three logically possible responses to such
national – societies) and has to be taken as a a state of affairs. One is to accept the prevailing value
symptom of these conditions.44 scheme and one’s place in it – to resign oneself to a posi-
The political activism of ethnic nations, in tion of inferiority. In the modern, national world, with
contrast, is largely extrovert. To describe it as its tremendous emphasis on the importance of equality,
this is a route seldom taken, because it is considered so
important to be “as good” as everyone else. The second
43 logically possible response is to accept the value system
Examples of social movements relying largely on
this sort of political action include the women’s suffrage within which one seems to be inferior and to work to
movement and the Civil Rights movement in the United improve one’s position in its terms. An example of such
States, as well as myriad local initiatives such as the estab- a response can be see in the Herculean works of propa-
lishments of Casinos on Native American Reservations ganda of Friedrich List in nineteenth-century Germany.
and the building of new schools. The third possible response, what is called the “transvalu-
44
Examples of such types of political action include ation of values,” involves attacking or inverting the value
the famous demonstrations by unemployed veterans of scheme in terms of which one appears inferior. This last
the First World War in Washington, DC, not to men- option is consistent with ressentiment. On ressentiment
tion much of the political organization of the students’ and nationalism see Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to
movements of the 1960s. This is not to say that such Modernity, op. cit., pp. 15–17. Regarding Friedrich List’s
movements are necessarily “destructive,” nor do the au- role in German economic development, including an
thors intend to praise or criticize, either implicitly or analysis of his motivations, see Greenfeld, The Spirit of
explicitly, their aims. Capitalism, op. cit., pp. 199–214.
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Nationalism 261
empirical or the way things appear. This vision different meanings and is likely to be sought
allows one to see one’s nation as essentially and for different reasons and by different means.
wholly good, whatever one’s experience of re- These differences are obscured by the equation
ality and the nation’s historical record, and to of the motivation behind all liberation move-
blame everything that is not good in these ex- ments with the desires for independence from
perience and record (usually there are plenty of foreign domination and the establishment of na-
things to blame) on malicious aliens. Because tional state and the confusion between these two
ethnic purity is an unattainable ideal, it is more desires. The desire for a state of one’s own is
than likely that aliens coexist with nationals as not necessarily related to the revulsion at, or
citizens of the national state or, if there is no even consciousness of, being governed by for-
state, inhabitants of the national territory. Polit- eign powers. This is abundantly clear from that
ical activists are likely to be suspicious and re- model case of liberation from colonial rule – the
sentful of these aliens, seen as natural agents of American War of Independence. It is not a mere
the outside world (they carry treason in their coincidence that the American War of Indepen-
blood in the same way in which members of dence is equally well known under the name of
the nation carry their nationality). As a result the American Revolution and that the confi-
of all these representations, which are implicit dently national political entity that came out of
in ethnic-collectivistic nationalism, political ac- it remains until this very day a nation without a
tivism within its framework is largely expressed name. This curious asymmetry in nomenclature
in more or less constant vociferation against oth- reflects the fact that the insurgents were a part
ers’ wrongs and occasional outbursts of ethnic of the British nation, in which they believed
violence, both usually in accordance with the themselves to be mistreated by reason of the re-
state-promoted line or ideology, even when the moteness of their province, not at all because
state, for reasons of diplomacy, abstains from ex- the European British were foreigners. There-
plicitly supporting such vociferation and vio- fore, they decided to partially transform the
lence. This political action is not goal-oriented political structure within their own – at the
and, therefore, not rational and not organized. moment British – nation, turning its American
It is emotional and expressive (specifically of na- part with which they were immediately con-
tional identity, commitment, and solidarity). Its cerned into a republic. This revolution was very
end is psychological gratification that is achieved much in the nature of limited, rational, specific-
in the process of expression, meaning that it has goal-oriented political actions characteristic of
no end. Unlike political action inspired by indi- individualistic nations, of which the British
vidualistic and civic nationalisms, which comes nation was the prime example. Only the
in limited quanta, emitted, so to speak, in larger achievement of the goal inevitably resulted in
or smaller frequencies depending on the prag- abandoning the national name to the European
matic requirements of the situation, political ac- kingdom that held it first. The actual reason the
tion within ethnic nations may be regarded as a American British (whose descendents and fel-
wave, constantly simmering, and rising or falling low nationals are known today as Americans)
in accordance with collective psychological craved independence was that the colonial struc-
dynamics.46 ture of their nation prevented them from partic-
This has most serious implications for the un- ipating fully in the political process or, in other
derstanding of the so-called national liberation words, limited their individual liberty.
movements. The very different understanding Only this liberty offers members of individu-
of liberty in individualistic and civic versus eth- alistic nations a sufficient reason to rise of their
nic nationalisms implies that liberation, too, has own will and risk their lives in a struggle against
a government, if this government is not partic-
46
Liah Greenfeld, “Russian nationalism as a medium ularly brutal, does not starve people or subject
of revolution: an exercise in historical sociology,” Qual- them to physical and psychological condi-
itative Sociology 18:2, pp. 189–209. tions that cannot, by an impartial observer, be
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considered tolerable (which does not, of course, It is significant that despite the desperate ur-
apply to the “intolerable acts”). This would be gency of the matter, the Israeli national liber-
so, whether the government in question is na- ation movement took the methodic, organized
tional or foreign, and this is likely to be so in form political action takes in individualistic and
nations which are strongly civic (i.e., when the civic nations under regular peace-time circum-
individualistic element is strongly emphasized), stances. The participants used the channels pro-
even when they are collectivistic. The goal of vided by, in this case, international legal and
national liberation or independence movements political institutions; they lobbied, petitioned,
in all these cases is the protection of the hu- and argued. There was never violence against
man rights of the nation’s individual members, families of British officials; there was very little
and they result in the establishment of liberal violence against British military violently im-
democracies. plementing antiemigration policies of the man-
Israel presents an example of the movement date. The War of Independence broke, as is well
of civic national liberation from foreign domi- known, only after the newborn, half-a-million-
nation. In the case of the Jewish settlement in strong state of Israel, voted into being by the
Palestine, the government of the British man- United Nations and barely declared, was at-
date, clearly, was not as mild as in the case of tacked on all sides by five populous independent
its own American colonies, but, though it was states of its Arab neighbors-to-be, who did not
decidedly uncooperative with the Jewish com- want to be its neighbors.49
munity leadership and though its sympathies In the case of ethnic nations, national libera-
were generally pro-Arab, neither could it be tion is motivated by different considerations and
considered particularly oppressive. Throughout uses different methods.50 The liberty of ethnic
the 1920s and 1930s, the concerns of the Jewish nationalism being the liberty of the nation from
community, as earlier, focused on building on foreign domination, (ethnic) national indepen-
the spot of desert allotted to it by international dence movements are always oriented to the es-
largesse a liberal and socially just secular soci- tablishment of the state, the lack of which spells
ety, in accordance with the progressive ideals national – and therefore personal – indignity
its founders brought with them from Europe, for the activists. Rather than being concerned
and on turning the dry barren earth of their with human rights (i.e., rights of individuals
“national home” into fertile ground, capable to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness),
of sustaining flourishing agriculture and pros- they are inspired by the sense of humiliation,
perous, growing, technologically sophisticated which, in accordance with the reified, animistic
economy without any natural resources.47 Inde-
pendent statehood, however, became a central MacMillan Company, 1968), p. 7. See also Martin
issue with the outbreak of World War II, when Gilbert, Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Home-
the world turned a blind eye on the tragedy land (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1978),
pp. 243–4.
of Jews in Europe and the British authorities 49
See Lacquer, op. cit., pp. 11–13.
closed to the straggling refugees the Jewish set- 50
This is not to suggest either that (a) nations that
tlement in Palestine – the only community will- conceive of themselves in fundamentally ethnic terms
ing to take them in. The internationally sanc- are inevitably bound to pursue violent political action
tioned and officially designated Jewish “national or (b) civic nations (whether individualistic or collec-
tivistic) never engage in violent acts related to their na-
home” was not allowed by its British landlords tionalism. In the first case, it is argued that, for reasons
to open its doors to members of the nation who specified in the text, there is a sort of built-in tendency
were thus condemned to death48 ; it was time to toward collective violence in ethnic nationalism: but it
get rid of the landlord. is just that, a tendency. Regarding the second point, the
participation of the United States in the Second World
47 War, to take just one of many possible examples, cannot
Martin Gilbert, The Dent Atlas of the Arab–Israeli
Conflict (London: J. M. Dent, 1993), p. 12. be understood but in relation to American nationalism.
48
See Walter Lacquer, The Road to Jerusalem: The In general, the character, causes, and duration of political
Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict (New York: The violence in different types of nations vary considerably.
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Nationalism 263
imagery of ethnic nationalism, they believe Arab neighbors, were ruled by the British and
to be intentionally inflicted on them by the exercised no authority at all over the Arabs,
evil other. This other is, usually, the nation Arabs nevertheless repeatedly attacked the Jew-
from which ethnic nationalists in question seek ish community and not the British officialdom,
independence, but not only and not necessarily; burning Jewish farms that offered them work
the decisive quality that creates the enemy is the and murdering people who nursed them when
latter’s evident superiority over one’s ethnic na- they fell sick and assisted their women in labor.
tion, which makes independence fighters resent The fault of the Jews was glaring: it was that
the other’s very existence. In other words, the in the short period of several decades since
motivation behind national liberation move- they were allowed to establish their “national
ments in the framework of ethnic nationalism is home” in Palestine, they turned their sliver of
ressentiment responsible for the formation of the desert into an orchard, which produced not
particular ethnic nationalism in the first place. only oranges (which were burnt with particular
Because foreign domination as such is experi- determination)52 but also a bustling industry
enced as an insult, it is never the specific actions and world-class universities, whereas the vast
or policies of the foreign authorities that are the stretches of land that Arabs possessed for cen-
cause of the liberation movements, but the fact turies remained barren and kept their people
of their foreignness. The foreign regime may hungry and dependent. Their presence was far
actually be responsible for the improvement of more humiliating – thus far more of a foreign
conditions among the subject nation popula- domination – than the British mandate.53
tion, bringing them economic opportunities, The methods employed in the fight for the
medical care, and educational resources that national liberation of ethnic nations reflect the
they in its absence would not have; this would motivations and also represent logical impli-
not change the attitude of activists in its regard. cations of the ethnic nationalist consciousness
The activists are not concerned with the fates of and its essentialist and absolutist imagery. The
individuals but with the dignity of the nation. struggles of ethnic nationalism are struggles to
Still, if the foreign power owes its domination the ultimate end, to the death: ethnic national-
to accidental circumstances and is not seen as the ism brooks no compromise. Because the nation
superior eternally hostile other who is respon- (every nation) is imagined as a collective, quasi-
sible for the sense of national inferiority and biological individual, and because nationality
humiliation, the animus against it will be spent with all its characteristics is believed to be
when statehood is achieved. Unfortunately, this transmitted by blood, an entire nation, from
is rarely the case, and therefore independence is newborn infants to elderly in nursing homes,
only a stage (however necessary) in the process
of liberation. The essential fault of the evil mandate from July 24, 1922 or the “Resolution on
“superior” other is its very being – as long as the Future Government of Palestine” of November 29,
1947. Both appear in Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin,
it exists or as long as it remains “superior,” it
eds., The Arab–Israeli Reader: A Documentary History of the
is seen as oppressive, and only its destruction Middle East Conflict (New York: Penguin Books, 2001),
or irreparable humiliation can bring the pp. 30–6, 69–77.
52
sense of freedom. This explains, among other Regarding major attacks against Jewish-owned
things, why in the 1920s and 1930s, before farms and orchards see Gilbert, The Dent Atlas of the
Arab–Israeli Conflict, op. cit., pp. 18–20.
the foundation of the state of Israel, when 53
See Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab
Palestinian Jews (incidentally identified in their Political Thought and Practice since 1967 (New York:
documents as “Palestinians”51 ), as well as their Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Dream Palace of
the Arabs: A Generation’s Odyssey (Vintage Books, 1999)
as well as Efraim Karsh, Arafat’s War: The Man and his
51
Indeed, international documents similarly identi- Battle for Israeli Conquest (Grove Press, 2003), The Iran–
fied both the Jewish and Arab populations as Palestinians Iraq War 1980–1988 (Osprey Publishing Co, 2002), and
or residents of Palestine. See, for example, the declara- Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Polit-
tion of the League of Nations concerning the British ical Biography (Grove Press, 2003).
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is considered the enemy and a legitimate target conclusion

for hostile action. Owing to its quasi-biological
programming, the enemy is eternal, no con- This chapter has focused largely on the nature
cession on its part can turn it into a friend, of nationalism and its main implications for po-
and every unfriendly act on its part, no mat- litical action. To conclude, we take a slightly
ter what the context, serves to prove its im- broader view of directions for future research.
mutable fiendishness. For this reason the action The scientific study of nationalism, like that of
against the oppressor regularly takes the form of all social phenomena, must treat its object as an
violence against civilians. The preferred method empirical problem. Like all cultural phenomena,
of national liberation movements of ethnic na- nationalism is fundamentally a symbolic reality
tions is terrorism: surprise peacetime attacks on taking place in time. In other words, national-
members of the enemy population. The siege ism, though possessing a number of relatively
mentality of ethnic nationalism creates a siege static features, is a process. This is most readily
reality for the unlucky nations chosen as the grasped when one views the main contours of
evil other. The goal of the “freedom fighters” its initial (and ongoing) spread, from the site of
in this case is to hurt the collective individual its first imagining in late fifteenth or early six-
of the enemy nation wherever and whenever teenth century England to its place today as the
there is an opportunity. For this reason, they dominant mode of political discourse. The bulk
are likely to choose easy targets near at hand of this process has, as of yet, not been explored in
(such, for instance, as planting bombs in school any detail. We know a good deal about national-
buses or sending an individual suicide driver to ism’s origins in England and its spread to France,
a crowded street in a neighboring enemy cen- Russia, Germany, Japan, and the United States
ter) more often than long distance ones and such (and, to a lesser extent, in Eastern and Southern
that require careful and time-consuming orga- Europe). The outlines of its spread elsewhere
nization (i.e., crashing American jets into the remain largely anecdotal at this point (despite a
Twin Towers of the World Trade Center). This handful of truly illuminating studies of particu-
may create the impression that they are actually lar cases) and their clarification constitutes the
fighting for the liberation from foreign political foremost problem for future research.
domination and that the establishment of a na- At present, despite the considerable attention
tional state would fully satisfy their demands and devoted to the study of nationalism since the
put an end to violence. But, of course, this is early 1980s, the study of most of these cases con-
not so, and the fact of the attack on American stitutes more or less open terrain. Of the major
soil (perpetrated as it was by individuals none theorists of nationalism cited in the section on
of whom were stateless and the very same or- “The State of the Field” most pay only pass-
ganizations, tacitly supported by several states, ing attention (at most) to nationalism in Africa,
that fund and train the national liberation mil- the Middle East, Asia, or Latin America. A sub-
itants in what is now called Palestine) should set of the series of cases requiring further ex-
have convinced us of that. International terror- ploration includes what is often referred to as
ism, carried by members of one nation against pan-nationalism. In general, examples of so-
members of another, cannot be fought effec- called pan-nationalism are nothing more than
tively without the understanding of its deep varieties of nationalism itself. Arab nationalism
roots in ethnic-collectivistic nationalism and its (or pan-Arab nationalism), for example, is a
connection and affinity to all the other types of form of nationalism. What remains unknown
political action to which this nationalism gives at present, except, perhaps, to the most special-
rise. Today, with our own country being made a ized researchers in the various cases, is the extent
target of terrorist attacks and placed in a state of to which and how membership in multiple po-
siege, it would be dangerous to disregard these tential national groups is juggled by members
roots. or resolved within populations with competing
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Nationalism 265
and/or overlapping national affiliations. That is, discourse relatively quickly and yet did not
to return to a timely example, to what extent spread to the mass of the population for some
is the population of Iraq devoted to an Iraqi time.54 Logically, it is apparent that, given that
nation as an object of loyalty and to what ex- nationalism is fundamentally an idea, it enters
tent is that loyalty and identification reserved for a society one mind at a time. Is there a criti-
a larger, Arab nation? It should be obvious, of cal threshold beyond which we ought to take
course, that there is nothing inherently prob- a certain degree of national sentiment or self-
lematic about the overlapping existence of mul- identification to constitute a nation? If not, what
tiple identity groups in a given population. sort of a “thing” do we take a nation to be?
In addition to the many empirical problems
of nationalism remaining to be studied in depth, 54
See Eric Van Young, The Other Rebellion: Popu-
a number of theoretical problems remain. One lar Violence, Ideology, and the Struggle for Mexican Inde-
involves the question of when, precisely, a given pendence, 1810–1821 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2001). Indeed, as Eugene Weber famously showed,
collectivity becomes a nation. In many cases,
the idea of the French nation did not spread to the bulk
such as much of Latin America in the early of the French population until the late nineteenth cen-
nineteenth century, nationalism, after being tury. See Weber, Peasants Into Frenchmen (Palo Alto, CA:
imported, came to dominate elite political Stanford University Press, 1979).
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chapter thirteen
Political Parties:
Social Bases, Organization, and Environment
Mildred A. Schwartz and Kay Lawson
Political parties have long been the subject of No one has shown how representative govern-
opposing assessments. From a negative perspec- ment could be worked without them.” Out-
tive, parties are criticized because they pro- side of government, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman
mote conflict and dissension. Lord Bolingbroke (1956) found that the presence of organized op-
(1965), writing in the 1730s, saw parties as de- posing interests, equivalent to parties, were the
serving suppression, to be replaced by a leader means to sustain internal democracy in the In-
who could supply the moral authority to pro- ternational Typographical Union.
mote national unity. On the eve of World War I, Yet the relation between parties and democ-
perhaps viewing himself as such a leader, Kaiser racy has not been settled to everyone’s satisfac-
Wilhem II announced that he no longer recog- tion. Part of the difficulty in finding a resolu-
nized parties, only Germans. In much less ex- tion stems from the many meanings assigned to
treme fashion, James Madison’s distaste for par- democracy (e.g., Markoff, 1996:101–25). On
ties went along with a recognition that they were one side are those who argue that one-party
inevitable and hence needed to be controlled. states can be “people’s republics.” Other critics,
All the U.S. Founding Fathers, who, per- such as Ostrogorski (1970) and Michels (1962),
haps understandably, were uncomfortable with stressed the ways parties foster corruption and
the kinds of rudimentary parties with which resist needed changes. In the United States, we
they were familiar, shared Madison’s concerns in find those who feel confined by the overwhelm-
some form. It took another eighteenth-century ing ascendancy of the Republican and Demo-
Englishman, Edmond Burke, to recognize the cratic parties. We offer no answers to such critics
value of parties when, removed from a mi- in this chapter – we, in fact, admit to believing
lieu of paralyzing conflict, they could operate that competitive parties are essential for demo-
as civil competitors (Mansfield, 1965). At the cratic government. Yet these often negative per-
birth of the United States, despite the ill-feeling ceptions continue to provide a context for more
toward political parties, the Founding Fathers recent controversies present in the scholarly lit-
soon found parties necessary to govern and, erature. As a result, it is important to recog-
later, to peacefully transfer power (Hofstadter, nize the difficulty in totally separating discussion
1972:viii). about the nature of parties and how they oper-
It was not until the early twentieth century ate from the normative judgments made about
that political theorists began to give parties a them. We therefore give attention to both nor-
central role in guaranteeing democratic gov- mative and empirical concerns.
ernment. In one such assessment, James Bryce We divide our study of parties into four parts:
(1921:119) wrote that, “parties are inevitable. the social bases of political parties, the structure
No free large country has been without them. and culture of political parties, parties’ relations
266
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Political Parties 267
with the institutional environment, and remain- inept that capability seems out of their realm.
ing questions. The objective in each of the first At the same time, some parties, both in one-
three sections is two-fold. First, we seek to lo- party states and where they are in competition
cate the study of political parties within the for power, may engage in acts of violence and
broader history of political sociology. Second, fraud that stretch the fabric of inclusion in a
we offer a critical review of the literature, with a peaceful electoral process.
bias toward the past twenty years. That literature In searching for the broadest existing def-
is evaluated in terms of continuities with earlier, inition of political party, one unconstrained
influential traditions in the field as well as with by national setting, degree of institutionaliza-
regard to how effectively it breaks new ground. tion, or electoral fortunes, there is a possibil-
Accomplishing these two objectives permits us ity of overlapping with social movements and
to address our final goal, making an informed interest groups (Clemens, 1997; Tarrow, 1995;
assessment of where we are in understanding Thomas and Hrebenar, 1995:1–2).1 Moreover,
political parties, both with respect to what has not all definitions of parties confine them to
been done and where significant gaps remain. actual or potential government roles. Weber
A political party is an organization that nomi- (1978:939), for example, defined parties as con-
nates candidates to stand for election in its name tending groups that struggle for political con-
and seeks to place representatives in the govern- trol within corporate bodies. Lipset et al. (1956),
ment. Etymologically, party can be traced back as we have already noted, examined the inter-
to its roots in “part” and in “divide,” imply- nal workings of the International Typographi-
ing that a party represents one side of a contro- cal Union through the activities of two oppos-
versy. Yet in practice the word “party” is also ing organized groups or parties. Although these
used to refer to entities like the German Nazi broader conceptions have contributed many in-
Party or the Soviet Communist Party, where sights to our understanding of how parties work,
party and state were synonymous and no op- they do not form an essential part of our subse-
posing parties were permitted. Furthermore, al- quent discussion. In this volume, interest groups
most all parties claim that, if successful, they will and social movements are the primary subject of
exercise power on behalf of the general pub- Chapters 14 and 16 respectively.
lic, and some states with single-party systems
may seek to build democracy rather than repudi-
1
ate it (Wekkin, Whistler, Kelley, and Maggiotto, In Tilly’s model, a social movement offers “a sus-
tained challenge to power holders” (1999:257), which,
1993). But some still insist that states with only when coupled with electoral activity, can characterize
a single party do not really have parties at all: a protest party, what Schwartz (2000, 2002) considers
“[A party is] an organization of society’s active a “party movement.” Keuchler and Dalton (1990:189–
political agents who compete for popular sup- 90) speak of a “movement party” as the partisan arm of
port with another group or persons holding a social movement and Yishai (1994:198–200) refers to
“interest parties” as those that represent single-interest
diverse views,” says Neumann (1956:395), and groups. Organizations like trade unions, farm organiza-
Schlesinger (1968:428) claims a party is a “polit- tions, and business interest groups, although they have
ical organization which actively and effectively nonelectoral goals that provide their primary rationale
engages in the competition for elective office.” for existence, may, without having formal party status,
Our own more generous definition includes also play an active role in elections and work exclusively
on behalf of a single political party or its candidates. But
both all-powerful single parties and hopelessly when a movement or an interest group nominates can-
unpopular minor parties and is, we believe, more didates to stand for election in its own name and these
consistent with general usage. It is similar to that candidates are accepted for placement on the ballot, then
of Sartori (1976:64), who defines party as “any that organization is no longer “just” an interest group –
political group that presents at elections, and is it has become, however temporarily, a political party.
Conversely, when a group does not place candidates in
capable of placing through elections, candidates contention for office in its own name, it is not a party,
for public office,” although the word capable is a no matter how active it may be in determining and sup-
stumbling block for us – some parties are so very porting the candidates of existent parties.
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268 Mildred A. Schwartz and Kay Lawson
the social bases of political parties political party. Charlot (1967:37–8) shows how
the French Rally for the Republic, known orig-
The social bases of political parties have three inally as the Union for a New Republic, was
interrelated aspects – origins, ties with orga- formed out of a collection of groups and indi-
nized interests, and links with citizens. Under viduals who supported Charles de Gaulle during
origins we treat the social structural roots from the 1958 crisis produced by France’s battle with
which parties emerge, an emphasis that gives Algerian rebels. Determined to place their hero
weight to national histories while considering (and themselves) in office, they found it neces-
the extent to which history can be overtaken by sary to form a party. More often, it is a single
contemporary changes. Ties with organized in- group that transforms itself into a political party,
terests continue the theme of origins by linking as did the African National Congress after the
groups with parties in a way that concentrates on fall of apartheid in South Africa (prior to which
active efforts at mobilization that take place af- it was an illegal movement) and the trade union-
ter the founding experiences. Finally, links with based movement of Solidarity in Poland after the
citizens, although clearly an outgrowth of both fall of communism.
origins and organized interests, need to be con- Sociologists have taken a different approach to
sidered on their own terms, as ways even un- the study of party origins, one based more on
organized population categories are mobilized. social than institutional factors. Unquestionably
It is this last kind of link that is generally asso- the most influential and far-reaching is found in
ciated with conceptions of “party in the elec- Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who built on the-
torate” (e.g., Beck and Sorauf, 1992; Dalton and ories developed by Talcott Parsons to account
Wattenberg, 2000). But the electoral or citizen for the kinds of parties that appear at particu-
component of parties are more than just ties lar stages of national development, depending
with voters. Origins, whether remote or recent, on the cleavage structure. They array cleavages
and ties with organized groups, whether stable along two dimensions, the territorial-cultural
or changing, are also necessary in giving social and the functional. The first had its roots in
meaning to political parties. the national revolution that led to the rise of
nation-states; the second, in the industrial rev-
olution. Each revolution, in turn, gave rise to
Party Origins two kinds of cleavages. The national revolu-
tion created tension between church and state
The originating circumstances of political par- and between a central nation-building culture
ties remain important markers for their fu- and that of “peripheral” subjects distinctive in
ture development, comparable to the impact of language, religion, or ethnicity. The industrial
childhood on an adult (Duverger, 1963:xxiii). revolution created tension between the landed
For Duverger, a political scientist, the important aristocracy and the new industrial entrepreneurs
question to ask is whether parties have formed and between owners and landlords, on the one
inside or outside legislative bodies – those form- hand, and tenants and workers, on the other.
ing inside are, he says, more likely to be elite- They conclude that, “Much of the history of
based parties, whereas those forming outside Europe since the beginning of the nineteenth
tend to be open mass parties. Panebianco agrees century can be described in terms of the in-
that origins are important, but calls for a more teraction between these two processes of revo-
complex “genetic model,” one taking into con- lutionary change: the one triggered in France
sideration a party’s specific construction and de- and the other originating in Britain” (Lipset
velopment, the presence or absence of an ex- and Rokkan, 1967:14–15). Cleavages make up
ternal “sponsor institution,” and/or charismatic interrelated systems whose appearance under
leadership (Panebianco, 1988:50–2). formative historical circumstances leads to the
What Panebianco calls a “sponsor institution” emergence of particular kinds of parties. Once
may simply be groups that turn themselves into a established, these parties continue even under
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changing conditions – the party systems of the By using Saskatchewan as his source of com-
1960s still reflected, they found, the underlying parison, Lipset allowed “agrarian socialism” to
cleavages of the 1920s or even earlier. Politics stand in for the more usual association between
may heat up and change, but party systems freeze socialism and the urban working class (Schwartz,
at birth and do not alter much thereafter – what 1991). In contrast, other explanations for the
has come to be called the “freezing hypothesis.” absence of a viable socialist party in the United
Although often considered applicable to the States focus on the weakness of the early la-
United States and Canada, Lipset and Rokkan bor movement. Despite its success in mobi-
developed their model mainly to account for lizing large numbers of urban workers in the
party origins in Western Europe. But even in 1880s, the Knights of Labor soon lost its appeal
Europe they found deviations. Where there is with that population and hence its potential to
a “fully mobilized nation state” – that is, once form a working-class party. Voss (1993) blamed
all citizens have been incorporated – there can this failure on opposition from employers’ or-
still be new forms of protest against elites stem- ganizations. Kaufman (2001) links the falloff in
ming from conflicting conceptions of the na- Knights of Labor support to its positioning as
tion and leading to the rise of “anti-system a fraternal association, putting it in competi-
parties,” exemplified by fascism and other au- tion with similar groups in a crowded organiza-
thoritarian, right-wing movements (Lipset and tional niche. Moving to the twentieth century,
Rokkan, 1967:23). Katznelson (1982) finds the pull from ethnicity
Limits to the Lipset–Rokkan model were and community overpowering the potential for
apparent in the United States, where concern a unified working-class consciousness. Lipset’s
with party origins has focused on why it re- latest analysis gives greatest weight to the ef-
mained virtually the only industrialized coun- fects of the political system, antistatist and in-
try without a strong working-class party. Engels dividualistic values, and working-class diversity.
(1942:467) attributed U.S. backwardness to the For example, the contention that immigrants
absence of feudalism, which would other- made it difficult to sell socialism to workers
wise have stimulated more differentiated classes. is shown to apply only when the community
Sombart (1976) argued that U.S. workers en- was ethnically heterogenous (Lipset and Marks,
joyed relatively better economic conditions, 2000).
greater social equality, and opportunities for New questions about the origins of par-
mobility, particularly to the West, which dis- ties have arisen in Europe, where the dura-
couraged the kind of militancy experienced by bility of some parties in Western Europe has
German workers and required for a vibrant so- continued alongside rising electoral volatility
cialism. Lipset (1968) was motivated to write his and the creation of new parties. One of the
dissertation on this topic in the 1940s, finding first to document this trend was Pedersen
what was missing in the United States in the (1979), stimulated by Denmark’s “earthquake
Canadian province of Saskatchewan, where so- election of 1973” to analyze the phenomenon
cialism emerged among prairie wheat farmers.2 in Western Europe. Pedersen’s observation that
European party systems were steadily shift-
ing was subsequently confirmed by others
2
Lipset’s explanation of how Saskatchewan differed (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, 1984; Harmel and
from comparable regions in the United States has altered
with time. Originally, he attributed it to social and eco- Robertson, 1985; Lawson and Merkl, 1988;
logical conditions in Saskatchewan that produced a rural Shamir, 1984; von Beyme, 1982; Wolinetz,
class consciousness (Lipset, 1968:xiii). Later he would 1979, 1988). As Rommele (1999:9) pointed out,
give more importance to political institutions, in partic- “the new studies suggested the glacier was in re-
ular, the nature of federalism and a parliamentary system treat, and a great thaw had begun.”
of government (Lipset, 1968:xiii–xiv). In a third shift,
he gave new significance to cultural factors, created by Consistent with Inglehart’s (1977, 1990,
the impact of Canada’s counterrevolutionary tradition 1997) work on value orientation and value
(Lipset, 1990). change, Kitschelt (1989, 1990) found that the
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new parties were emerging from social move- (Maxwell, 1986). The fall of the Soviet Union
ments concerned with lifestyle issues of the produced newly autonomous states and new op-
environment, racism, peace, and gender and portunities for political parties. Parties in Russia
labeled them “left-libertarian” parties. “They appear to be based largely on shifting combi-
are ‘Left’ because they share with traditional so- nations of interests in the pursuit of capitalis-
cialism a mistrust of the marketplace, of private tic success (Barany and Moser, 2001; Pammett
investment, and of the achievement ethic, and a and De Bardeleben, 2000). In many Eastern and
commitment to egalitarian redistribution. They Central European states, old cleavages were bru-
are ‘libertarian’ because they reject the author- tally wiped out by successive Nazi and commu-
ity of private or public bureaucracies to regulate nist totalitarian regimes and the only consistent
individual and collective conduct” (Kitschelt, posttotalitarian cleavage has been that between
1990:180). Characteristically, these parties are current winners and losers. But more immediate
associated with economic affluence and appeal history remains relevant. Kitschelt (1995a) clas-
to the young and well-educated. sified communist regimes in Eastern Europe and
Were the old cleavages disappearing in this the former Soviet Union to construct a typol-
wave of political postmaterialism? Not accord- ogy of patrimonial, bureaucratic-authoritarian,
ing to Katz, for whom the new cleavages are and national consensus types that he then used
strongly akin to the older ones, focused on dis- to account for the character of communist suc-
putes over the distribution of power between cessor parties.
citizens and the central state and between em-
ployees, including employed professionals, and
corporate enterprise. He argues that Lipset and Ties with Organized Interests
Rokkan’s evolutionary argument, in which class
was the newest basis of party formation, over- Many political parties exist in more or less close
looked the contemporary power of more pri- relationship with organized interests. Some ties
mal cleavages of religion, language, origin, or arise at the formative stage, when a party is cre-
location (Katz, 2001). Others have shown that ated as the political arm of an organized interest
these ascriptive characteristics show up as well group. Past examples include the development
in new parties of the right. In Canada, a signifi- of parties to defend the interests of particular
cant basis for the formation of the Reform Party religious denominations, which then continue
resides in the power of regionalism to mobilize to express positions reflecting the views of those
discontent (Harrison, 1995:38–47). The anti- churches. In the Netherlands, Calvinists formed
immigrant and politically disenchanted mem- two parties, the older Anti-Revolutionary party,
bers of the French National Front, the Dan- which split through internal dissension, and the
ish People’s Party, the Italian Northern League, later Christian Historical Union (Daalder, 1955;
the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swiss Peo- Lijphart, 1968). Trade unions also have been
ple’s Party, the Belgian Flemish Bloc, and the both sources of parties and continuing influ-
Norwegian Progress Party share the belief that ences on their policies and governance.
democracy works best when there is a culturally When the line dividing parties from related
homogenous population (Betz, 2001). interest groups is unclear, it may lead to what
In other contexts, however, it is difficult if not Yishai (1994) calls interest parties, illustrated by
impossible to find new parties based on the old the Poujadists in France, the Peace Party in
cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan and Japan, and the Pensioners’ Association in Israel.
this is particularly true in newly democratizing Or it may foster an uneasy relation, as illustrated
countries (Lawson, Rommele, and Karasime- by the Christian Right and its penetration of
onov, 1999). Yet successor parties in Portu- the Republican Party in the United States. Yet,
gal, after the passage from an authoritarian to although the Christian Right supplies impor-
a democratic regime, appear to have contin- tant resources of money and support, its influ-
ued class cleavages, most readily from the left ence on the party’s nomination process may lead
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to conflict with other interests within the party interests as well as labor to distribute their
and to an inability to elect candidates it favors contributions more evenly between both ma-
(Green, Rozell, and Wilcox, 2001). jor parties. Because U.S. legislatures operate in
Other ties have been instigated by parties a log-rolling fashion, not only will probusi-
themselves in efforts to ensure resources for ness Democratic office-seekers be supported
their own continuity as well as to tap into the but so will others, perhaps not so sympathetic,
concerns of potentially important constituents. yet in critically influential committee positions
These efforts are often matched by those of (Eisemeier and Pollock, 1988; Mizruchi, 1992;
organized groups seeking access to policy mak- Schwartz, 1990:54–6).3
ers. One process through which such ties are In other nations, where candidate depen-
formed is through co-optation, where new el- dency on private funds is less pronounced, the
ements are given a voice in an organization to links between particular groups and parties have
prevent them from causing disruption (Selznick, also weakened. In Canada, the Canadian Man-
1949:13). The expectation of those doing the ufacturers’ Association (CMA) has long been
co-opting is that the elements co-opted will a strong supporter of the Conservative Party,
become less fervid exponents of their origi- but never to the exclusion of the Liberal Party.4
nal group’s interests. The organizational liter- On the Left, the New Democratic Party (NDP)
ature suggests that co-optation is likely to take began in 1961 with strong commitments from
place as a means of managing interdependence organized labor and formal provision for affil-
(Scott, 1998:200), when the organization do- iation (Horowitz, 1968), but when the party
ing the co-opting would otherwise be hindered gained office in the industrialized province of
in its activities by opposition from competitors. Ontario during an economic slow-down, labor
And as Scott (1998:201) reminds us, co-optation did not hesitate to publicly criticize the govern-
“provides a two-way street, with both influ- ment (Schwartz, 1994b:16–17).
ence and support flowing sometimes in one di- Despite the fact that Socialist parties often
rection, sometimes in the other.” Rosenstone, owe their origin to organized labor, European
Behr, and Lazarus (1996) describe how third trade unions have recently loosened their for-
parties in the United States may disappear merly strong ties with the left and have reached
through co-optation by one of the major parties out to establish better relations with often-ruling
yet still experience a kind of victory through conservative parties or, at least, as in the case of
their impact on the policies of the co-opting the relations between the French Parti Social-
party. iste and the Confédération Francais de Travail
In the United States, the amount and sig- (CFDT), to make it clear their support can
nificance of interest group campaign contri- no longer simply be taken for granted. Rivalry
butions to, or on behalf of, candidates has among trade unions, leading to competitive de-
grown exponentially in recent years (Goidel, mands, is suggested as the cause for a loos-
Gross, and Shields, 1999). Efforts to keep the ening of ties with the Spanish Socialist Party
sums involved down to reasonable proportions (Ruiz, 2001). The British Labour Party (BLP),
have either failed altogether or resulted in which grew out of the trade union movement,
such watered down legislation as to make lit- long encouraged “automatic” membership in
tle difference (Rozell and Wilcox, 1999:100–1). the party through prior membership in affiliated
Although there is strong evidence for big busi- trade unions, giving labor leaders, along with
ness preference for the Republican Party and
for legislation supporting a conservative agenda 3
The relation between campaign contributions and
(Clawson and Su, 1990; Clawson, Neustadtl, social cleavages is dealt with in more detail in the chapter
and Scott, 1992; Clawson Neustadtl, and Weller, by Manza, Brooks, and Souder in this volume.
4
However, when the two major parties lined up
1998; Neustadtl, Scott, and Clawson, 1991; on diametrically opposed sides over free trade with the
Su, Neustadtl, and Clawson, 1995), it has be- United States in the 1980s, the CMA’s contacts with the
come more common for organized business Liberals became sidelined (Bashevkin, 1991).
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elected party elites, influential roles in party de- competitive systems. In these studies “mobiliza-
cision making (McKenzie, 1956; Webb, 1992). tion” means voting. Indeed, the connection be-
However, under the leadership of Tony Blair, tween social cleavages and voter alignments is
the BLP has moved to avoid being seen as merely at the core of what is often thought of as the
a workers’ party. In parallel, the trade union “sociological model” of politics (e.g., Dalton
movement has worked to place its own eggs in and Wattenberg, 1993:199–200).
more than one basket (Webb, 1994:115). In the United States, the most influential early
In the United States, in an analogous way, studies of voting behavior, associated with what
trade unions maintained relatively close relations we can call the Columbia school (Lazarsfeld
with the Democratic Party. Unions are a signifi- et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954) and the Michi-
cant source of campaign contributions, advisors, gan school (Campbell et al., 1954; Campbell
and party workers for the Democrats, especially et al., 1960), all agreed on the centrality of social
in those geographic locations where unionized characteristics in connecting voters to either the
industry remains strong ( Jewell and Morehouse, Democratic or Republican parties. Even with-
2001:154). Yet the sharp drop in union mem- out clearly class-based parties, it was possible to
bership has clearly reduced the overall presence discern a strong connection between the work-
of trade union leadership in the Democratic ing class and Democratic voting and the middle
Party and the Clinton administration disap- class and Republican voting. In addition, reli-
pointed its union supporters time and again, gion, race, urban or rural residence, and region
perhaps most significantly by going forward of the country all played a prominent role in
with the North American Free Trade Agree- partisan mobilization.
ment [although unions kept up enough pressure By the 1980s, scholars were arguing that the
to ensure the passage of a labor side-agreement, social structural basis of partisan alignments was
the North American Agreement on Labor Co- declining in the Americas and Western Europe
operation (Mayer, 1998)]. Unions now maintain (Dalton, 1988; Franklin, 1992; Wattenberg,
better contacts than earlier with the Republican 1996). Whatever had emerged in its place was
Party and can, at times, find individual candi- now so fluid that patterns were no longer dis-
dates of that party they deem worth supporting cernible. Reasons given for these changes, and
(e.g., Schwartz, 1990:234, 237). conveniently summarized by Manza and Brooks
(1999:20–33), rest on four theses:
(1) changes in social structure, especially increased
Citizen Linkage levels of affluence, upward social mobility, and de-
clining marital homogamy; (2) increased levels of
The question of parties and linkage can be ap- education and ‘cognitive mobilization’ in the elec-
proached from two perspectives: we can assume torate, which potentially provide voters with the
that citizens who vote for a particular party are tools to make judgments independent of social group
thereby linked to that party and, via it, to the loyalties; (3) the rise of new values and issue conflicts;
and (4) changes in the party systems and the pattern-
political process and then seek to discover and
ing of macro-level electoral alignments.
track changes in voter alignment, asking which
groups identify with which party and noting Given our focus on political parties, it is
changes over time. Or we can, instead, ask how worth elaborating on this fourth theory, which
exactly political parties link citizens to the po- argues that, because no party can muster a single
litical process and whether there are different cleavage-based constituency sufficient to give it
kinds of linkage, performed by different parties office, parties must broaden their appeal to in-
in different nations. clude other kinds of voters, thereby weakening
The first approach has been by far the most ties with the original social base. First presented
common, and here we begin by exploring so- by Kirchheimer (1966), the “catch-all” theory
ciological visions of linkage as the mobiliza- of political parties found further support in an
tion of population groups by political parties in analysis of Western European social democratic
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parties (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986) and is declining significance of class in U.S. politics, if
buttressed by more recent changes in those by this is meant a decline in support from the
parties in Britain, France, and Germany. It also working class for the Democratic Party. Grow-
finds support in the experiences of the Cana- ing unpopularity of the welfare state and coun-
dian New Democratic Party (Schwartz, 1994b) tervailing pulls from race and ethnicity may ac-
and in the shift to the center by the Democratic count for some of this shift. At the same time,
Party under President Bill Clinton. The result of the increasing significance of race and ethnic-
these changes is to limit the options available to ity ensures that U.S. parties will remain distinct
working-class voters. They can stick with their in composition, especially as more Latino voters
original party, though their influence is diluted enter the electoral arena.
by the inclusion of other kinds of voters, find What of other Western democracies? There
an alternative party (generally a minor one), or too controversy remains over the declining sig-
withdraw from politics altogether. The likeli- nificance of class as the underlying rationale
hood of the latter possibility is supported by refor partisan behavior. Basing their argument on
search that shows nonvoting to be higher among data analyzed by using an index first developed
the poor and working class in the United States by Alford (1963) to dichotomize occupations
(Piven and Cloward, 1988; Verba, Schlozman, into classes, Clark, Lipset and Rempel (2001)
and Brady, 1997). are among those who argue for decline most
Yet not everyone is prepared to give up on forcefully. Goldthorpe (2001), who works with
the importance of social cleavages in providing a more complex index of class, represents those
links with particular parties. Manza and Brooks who, although abandoning any commitment to
(1999) cover the field most thoroughly by first a straightforward Marxian analysis of class con-
defining social cleavage according to whether flict, still see the salience of class to politics.
it is rooted in social structure, associated with In this second camp, researchers report decline
group consciousness, and mobilized for politi- in class voting as well but emphasize how it is
cal action. Based on this definition, they iden- tied to national differences, with Canada and
tify four major cleavages in the United States: the United States the lowest and Britain and
race, religion, class, and gender. Classifying re- the Scandinavian countries the highest (Nieuw-
ligion and class more finely than by the usual beerta, 2001). The division of postcommunist
dichotomous variables, they are able to find sig- populations into winners and losers is another
nificant cleavages associated with partisanship as way of saying that class persists.
strong in the 1990s as in the 1950s. Among their Nonetheless, as we noted earlier in our dis-
relevant findings are the preeminence of race, cussion of party origins and ties with organized
followed by religion, then class, and finally gen- groups, ascriptive characteristics also remain
der. Class has fluctuated over the decades, show- powerful in determining European partisan be-
ing sharpest decline in 1996. Professionals, once havior, as they do in the United States. Do-
the most Republican, moved to be the most gan (2001), for example, who refers not only
Democratic in 1996. The self-employed be- to the Western European drop in class but also
came more Republican and the nonskilled less in religious voting (which had remained very
Democratic. Liberal Protestants changed from robust until the 1970s), sees new importance
being the most Republican to a centrist posi- in ethnic factors as a result of immigration.
tion, while Conservative Protestants remained Migrants, often visibly distinctive, unenfran-
unchanged as staunch Republicans. The gender chised, geographically concentrated, and work-
gap has been growing since the 1960s, moving ing in low-skilled jobs, contribute to the erosion
more women into the ranks of Democrats and of working class solidarity and the attractions
reflecting the impact of increased labor force of right-wing parties to native-born workers
participation. (Kitschelt, 1995b).
At one level, at least, Manza and Brook’s anal- Other writers are less concerned to discover
ysis supports that of others who argue for the linkages between particular groups and parties
P1: JZP
than to focus on the forms of linkage parties picks up from origins to examine the possibil-
provide. Lawson (1980:13–19) takes the broadest ities of continuing interaction between parties
view by identifying four possibilties. Parties can and groups as well as the attenuation of those
connect the public with government by serving ties. Relations with the electorate are differ-
as agencies for citizen participation, providing ent in that they do not presume either a for-
avenues for the representation of citizens’ views, mal connection with parties or the organization
returning favors for votes, or manipulating and of demographic groups. Each approach to these
controlling constituents. From this perspective social bases remains important in its own right
it is possible to view the linkage roles of parties by demonstrating continuities, disjuncture, and
even in noncompetitive and coercive political new connections.
systems. All three perspectives on social bases also
For some scholars the most fundamental link- point to interrelations and their consequences.
age role is encouraging participation, regardless At least as far as the literature is concerned, the
of how that participation is directed.5 Here re- most notable conjunction is between socialist
cent evidence of decline is considerable. Wat- parties and the working class. Socialist parties
tenberg (2000) looks at figures for nineteen in- have emerged where there is a self-conscious
dustrialized countries, comparing the first two working class, organized into trade unions. But
elections in the 1950s with the two most re- they also appear in rural areas, where small land-
cent ones in the 1990s. Every country except holders find, at least in some variant form, polit-
Sweden and Denmark shows a drop in voting ical solutions in socialism (Lipset, 1968:15–38;
turnout, from as high as 39 percent for Switzer- Schwartz, 1991). In either case, the existence
land to as low as 1 percent in Australia. Although of a class-conscious laboring group is a pre-
acknowledging that these figures may represent requisite for the emergence of a socialist party.
only a temporary phenomenon rather than a Socialist parties that exist without this social ba-
long-term trend, because many countries did sis, united solely by ideology, are not electorally
not demonstrate decline until the 1980s, Wat- viable. Genuine socialist parties must negotiate
tenberg is inclined to a pessimistic assessment. their relations with the organized constituencies
“The fact that voter turnout has declined indi- that gave them birth. Yet even here the amount
cates that there is less of a market for the par- of influence that the latter will have on the day
ties’ product and that party systems around the to day affairs of the party and on its policy mak-
advanced industrialized world have fallen upon ing is now in question.
hard times” (Wattenberg, 2000:76). Our own assessment acknowledges both the
reality of the declining relevance of class in ad-
vanced industrial societies, along with national
Assessing Social Bases
variations, and the persistence of class as just one
of the significant factors in the mobilization of
Dividing our discussion of social bases into three
the electorate. Overall, we see the continuing
has the virtue of revealing the distinct ways they
importance of social cleavages, not the homog-
operate. Origins give direction to party forma-
enization of the electorate. At the same time,
tion, indicating which social cleavages are suffi-
the size, salience, and mobilization of cleavages
ciently mobilized to take advantage of opportu-
alter, supporting the need for ongoing research,
nities to emerge as parties. They also recognize
as Katz (2001:89) convincingly argues. And to
the importance of national histories, including
that research must now be added a new puzzle:
their capacity to create new tensions, sources of
to what extent do parties, especially those seek-
grievance, and cleavages that can take partisan
ing power based on large majorities rather than
shape. Attention to ties with organized groups
the mere opportunity to speak out on behalf
5
See the discussion by Manza, Brooks, and Sauder in of cherished values, actually seek to mobilize
this volume. cleavages?
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the structure and culture roots but it is the latter, giving rise to bureau-
of political parties cratic structures, that best describe the modern
world (1978:956–1002). Although Weber saw
Classical Approaches and Influences elections modifying the principle of rationality
by introducing other, more personal factors
In the days before there were sharply drawn lines (1978:266–9), he viewed competitive mass po-
among social science disciplines, the organiza- litical parties, including those of England and
tional structure of political parties attracted the the United States as well as the German Social
attention of a number of scholars who continue Democrats, as essentially bureaucratic (1978:984).
to influence both sociology and political sci- When reference is made to organization it
ence. The most preeminent were Ostrogorski, now often conjures the kind of bureaucratic
Weber, and Michels. structure described by Weber but with a nega-
Ostrogorski (1970) viewed organization, which tive image. Moreover, in the United States, the
he equated with extralegislative party machines supposed absence of organization as a character-
and caucuses, with suspicion. Using examples istic of political parties was perceived to be a pos-
from U.S. urban politics, he worried that such itive virtue, captured in the sardonic tribute paid
organizations could manipulate the public and by Will Rogers, who said, “I belong to no orga-
the political agenda through the use of patronage nized party. I’m a Democrat.” The result is that
and outright corruption. Ostrogorski’s warn- political parties have tended to escape the kind
ings were supported by later exposés of party of study that has been addressed to a variety of
machines (Riordon, 1963) and fed the populist other organized activities. Panebianco (1988) at-
disdain for politics, leading to ever increasing tributed the shift away from organizational anal-
legal restrictions on parties (Lawson, 1987; ysis to new methods and theories that examined
Winger, 1995), including their disbarment from electoral behavior, social class, and public pol-
competition in local elections (Hawley, 1973). icy and led to an emphasis on party systems. But
Amenta (1998:252–3) argues that the continued there has been a loss from this change, “namely
existence of patronage-oriented parties in the the awareness that whatever else parties are and
United States was one of the barriers to the to whatever other solicitations they respond,
adoption of far-reaching social welfare policies. they are above all organizations and that orga-
Others, however, take a more measured look at nizational analysis must therefore come before
machines, finding virtues in them through their any other perspective” (Panebianco, 1988:xi).
ability to integrate immigrants and provide Michels (1962) influential work, based mainly
local arenas for political participation (Gosnell, on his analysis of the pre–World War I Ger-
1968; Merton, 1968:125–31). In addition, there man Social Democratic Party, argued that, even
is evidence that only rarely have machines actually as social democratic parties formed to fight for
been fully developed and dominant in Amer- greater democracy, they were destined to turn
ican cities (Eldersveld, 1964; Key, 1964; Mayhew, into oligarchies, with power concentrated in the
1986). Meanwhile, nonpartisan elections have hands of a small number of entrenched leaders.
been shown to depress voting turnout, ad- According to him, a viable political party, partic-
vantage incumbents (Schaffner et al., 2001), ularly one that sets out to challenge the existing
and discourage working-class and minority distributions of power, must become organized.
participation (Winger, 1995). The result is a bureaucracy, where holding office
Weber, who viewed parties broadly as groups becomes a full-time activity. Whether acting
that struggle for political control (1978:939), as functionaries or popularly elected leaders,
is most influential for his theory of legitimate officeholders acquire the kind of information
authority and the administrative structures that gives them power and reduces the role of
based on it (1978:212–45). Authority can stem rank-and-file members. In this model, internal
from traditional, charismatic, or rational-legal democracy is not possible.
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Michels’s prediction about the inevitability party structure. “Cadre parties correspond to
of oligarchy has been a challenge to those caucus parties, decentralized and weakly knit;
who see political parties in more positive or mass parties to parties based on branches, more
nuanced terms (see Lipset, 1962:25–8). Du- centralized and more firmly knit” (Duverger,
verger (1963:424) acknowledges that all sys- 1963:67).
tems of governance are necessarily oligarchic Duverger predicted that mass parties would
in the sense that it is virtually impossible for become the dominant form of organization as
everyone to equally participate in decision mak- cadre parties saw the advantages of greater mem-
ing. Panebianco (1988:171–3), based on a more ber participation. He was soon opposed by,
complex conception of organization, sees oli- for example, Kirchheimer (1966), who instead
garchy as one possible outcome that results from saw the spread of “catch-all parties”; Epstein
the form of the dominant coalition (those who (1980:126–9), who disputed any “contagion
control and coordinate the party’s activities) and from the left”; and, more recently, Katz and Mair
the extent of institutionalization (closeness in (1995), who present an alternative model in the
the relation between the party and its environ- cartel party. Cartel parties loosen the boundaries
ment). An oligarchy results when a small coali- between party and state and cooperate with each
tion exercises power under conditions of com- other to tap resources. Scarrow’s (2000:92–5)
plete institutionalization. For Panebianco, such empirical analysis of the eighteen OECD mem-
institutionalization is part of an evolutionary de- bers concludes that the mass party was never
velopment that moves a party from expansive widespread and was, in any case, more prevalent
social movement-kinds of interests and orga- during the third quarter of the twentieth cen-
nization to ones that are more limited, profes- tury, rather than in the first half, as Duverger ar-
sional, and bureaucratic. Given that Panebianco gued. Even so, the mass party model has found
(1988:165) offers the SPD as his prime example some success in the postcommunist transition
of an oligarchy, it is clear that he has not aban- within the Hungarian Socialist Party and So-
doned Michels but only added to his theory. cial Democracy of the Polish Republic (Lewis
1996:16–17).
Structure can be evaluated differently when,
Variations in Organizational Structure in opposition to the Weberian model of bureau-
cracy, organizations are treated as coalitions of
Perhaps the most radical statement about the sig- interests, sometimes cooperating and sometimes
nificance of organization came from Duverger competing (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:36). In
(1963:xv): “present-day parties are distinguished these situations, parts are more loosely coupled.
far less by their programme or the class of their With coordination no longer so important, it
members than by the nature of their organiza- is possible for the organization to find areas of
tion. A party is a community with a particu- slack, where there are unused resources that can
lar structure. Modern parties are characterized be mobilized at times of changing needs (Scott,
primarily by their anatomy.” From this posi- 1998:234–5). In the United States, for exam-
tion he went on to build a schema based on ple, field staff from the Local Elections Com-
structural elements, kinds of membership and mittee of the Republican National Committee
support, and leadership. Most relevant is his dis- often took the initiative in deciding which state
tinction between cadre and mass parties. Mass legislative seats deserved their help, even when
parties are based on members that contribute their choices did not coincide with those made
their resources to ensuring an ongoing oper- by state-level party officials (Schwartz, 1990:32,
ation, originally descriptive of Socialist parties. 218–219). Loose coupling reduces interdepen-
In cadre parties, a relatively small core is respon- dence among parts, an advantage where an or-
sible for activities tied to elections and may be ganization operates in a diverse and segmented
inactive at other times. There is a coincidence environment (Scott, 1998:268). In federal sys-
between these membership characteristics and tems, like those in Canada and the United States,
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the weakness of a party at one level of gov- An analysis of the Republican Party of Illi-
ernment or in particular areas of the country nois found the basis of a matrix organization
does not then necessarily translate into over- in two dimensions subsuming how activities are
all weakness. Loose coupling within parties can organized – “central arenas of action in con-
also be associated with efforts to be broadly trast to local ones, and efforts at centralization
representative of a diverse electoral environ- in contrast to those aimed at retaining auton-
ment (Schwartz, 1990:257–9). Or, in the case omy” (Schwartz, 1990:84). The result is con-
of left-libertarian parties, loose coupling can sistent with Epstein’s (1982) characterization of
also be present with more ideological coherence U.S. parties as federations of individual and col-
(Kitschelt, 1990:185). lective actors. Federations are “organized hierar-
One structural variation allowing loose cou- chically, not in terms of dominance, but in the
pling is a matrix form, where there are compet- clustering of interdependent parts” (Schwartz,
ing centers of authority based on vertical and 1990:267).
horizontal lines. Vertical lines are usually tied to Network structures that emphasize egalitar-
functions; horizontal lines, to projects, or geo- ian and reciprocal ties among units are another
graphic location (Hill and White, 1979). When organizational variant (Powell, 1990). Although
political events occur at different geographic egalitarianism may not be prominent in politi-
levels – local, provincial, and national – and cal parties, network imagery itself is broadly ap-
when responsibilities are distinct (e.g., indepen- plicable to party structure. The network is not
dent elections and unique activities) the kind of limited to a formal organizational chart but en-
party organization that evolves will likely be of compasses “individual and collective units shar-
this matrix form. It should be noted that matrix ing a party name whose activities have some rec-
is a label applied by an organizational analyst; it ognized partisan purpose” (Schwartz, 1990:11).
is not necessarily a form deliberately selected by Components can range from public officehold-
party actors. The way in which a matrix emerges ers, at all levels of government; party func-
is illustrated by the Canadian New Demo- tionaries, whether elected or appointed; official
cratic Party (NDP). In 1961, it was recreated committees; unofficial influentials like advisors
from the Cooperative Commonwealth Federa- and financial contributors; representatives of al-
tion (CCF) to better represent social democracy lied interest groups; and members at specified
within urban, industrial Canada (Whitehorn, levels of activism. This way of looking at party
1992). The NDP’s structure and constitution has been recognized by party functionaries such
made national politics crucial, yet the struc- as Tom Cole (1993:61) when he was executive
ture and culture of Canada ensured that re- director of the National Republican Campaign
gional/provincial interests would remain promi- Committee. “One of the blinders on political
nent. The results were illustrated by tensions scientists is to think in terms of parties, not par-
between the national and Saskatchewan wings, tisanship, which is much more important.” Re-
where, provincially, the CCF had a history as lations among network elements can be exam-
the governing party. Formation of the NDP was ined – for example, whether they are strong or
unwelcome in Saskatchewan, still dominated by weak – as well as with respect to sources of sta-
rural, farm interests rather than by the working- bility and change – for example, in so far as they
class concerns in more industrialized areas. To are affected by the governing status of the party
emphasize these differences, the party contin- or the personal styles of individual actors.
ued to call itself the CCF Saskatchewan Section A network approach supports new ways of
of the NDP (Morton, 1986:22). It was not until looking at party membership. Mair (1994:16),
1968 that it officially changed its name to the for example, suggests that parties now are
New Democratic Party of Saskatchewan even consciously distinguishing among categories of
while continuing to distinguish itself program- members by giving increased power to the
matically from its federal counterpart (Schwartz, supposedly more docile rank-and-file than to
2002:160–1). party activists. Even with overall membership
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decline, members remain important in intra- similar to Epstein’s (1986:134–44) but differs
party struggles (Scarrow, 2000:100) and in se- from Ware’s (1988:xii), who sees them as caucus-
lecting legislators and legitimizing elections cadre types, with power concentrated in the
(Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell, 2000). In Austria, hands of local elites. The decline of machines
membership is now fostered less to maintain a is matched by studies of individual cities where
loyal electoral base than to enhance financial new kinds of organizations, with more bureau-
resources and sources for recruiting candidates cratic structures, have emerged (see those in-
(Müller, 1994:66–7). In Canada, the direct elec- cluded in Crotty, 1986).
tion of party leaders by all parties, not just by Evidence suggests considerable variation and
those that had a mass-type organization, has re- distinct differences between Republicans and
moved the old distinctions between members Democrats at different levels, with county,
and nonmembers because now those choos- and particularly state and national, levels of or-
ing leaders need only pay a membership fee to ganization most elaborated among Republicans
be given this privilege without incurring any (e.g., Cotter et al., 1984; Herrnson, 1993; Ware,
other responsibilities (Carty, Cross, and Young, 1988). It is such differences that make it possible
2000:227). to plausibly argue either that parties as organi-
Abandoning rigid organizational models that zations are or are not declining. We feel most
focus solely on formal positions and conceiving comfortable with a conclusion that party orga-
of parties as network structures gives a place to nizations are changing.
professional advisors whose main loyalty is to
party chiefs. Panebianco (1988:264) assesses the
importance of professional staff in leading to the Organizational Culture
development of electoral-professional parties,
where there is, concomitantly, a direct appeal For Panebianco (1988:163–4), party organiza-
to the electorate, emphasis on public represen- tion has an importance that is independent of
tatives, and dependence on interest groups. The social base or ideological thrust. Our own agree-
use of professional campaign staff contributes to ment with this position is modified by the un-
party centralization and enhances the position derstanding that organizations are as much cul-
of the party leader (Farrell and Webb, 2000). tural systems as they are structures of relations.
Professional staff is also given a critical role in It is culture that provides the cognitive and
Monroe’s (2001) analysis of California parties. symbolic bases for both constraining and en-
Schwartz’s (1990, 1994a) network analysis of abling social action (Emirbayer and Goodwin,
the Illinois Republican Party included elements 1994:1436–42). Trice and Beyer (1993:2) distin-
whose influence in the party came from their guish the substance of culture as the emotionally
status in the larger community, like business, charged ideologies developed for dealing with
trade union, or professional leadership. uncertainty. The expression of beliefs, values,
There are, in effect, multiple ways for par- and norms takes place through cultural forms
ties to organize. Bureaucracy remains a criti- manifested in symbols, language, narratives, and
cal organizational form – it is just not the only practices (Trice and Beyer, 1993:77–128).
one. Variations become apparent when parties Party culture operates in at least four ways.
are examined in different institutional contexts. At one level, culture is expressed as ideology –
For example, in the United States, there has the beliefs that identify a party as distinct from
been an inclination to think of party organi- others and provide a rationale and identity for
zation in terms of state or local bodies (for a adherents, an explanation of political events,
summary, see Epstein, 1993). When the empha- and a blueprint for action. Such cultures exist
sis is on local machines, the model is a kind of in the grand isms of modern political theory.
fiefdom, based on personal loyalties and secured Nationalism, fascism, socialism, and commu-
through patronage and other favors. Although nism are all associated with major social move-
using different terminology, this assessment is ments that are (or were) also political parties,
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although not always in competitive party sys- personal lives, dissuading the study of literature
tems. Socialism retains its vitality in various as a bourgeois pastime and demanding devotion
workers, socialist, and social democratic par- to the movement to the point of driving one
ties at the same time as it is shaped and altered unfortunate person to suicide (Palmer, 1988:
by national settings, electoral strength, and gov- 219–21).
erning experience. Socialism also demonstrates Third, culture is prominent in styles of action.
how a single ideology can become fragmented, Judgments that the two parties in the United
even within one country, through factional dis- States are indistinguishable are negated when
putes over how it should be translated into ac- culture is used to assess them (Freeman, 1985–6).
tions and who are recognized as its genuine Klinker (1994) describes competing cultural
exponents (e.g., Bartolini, 2000). Nationalism styles in which the Republicans display a busi-
also remains potent in the contemporary world, ness culture tied to the background of promi-
sometimes translated into specific regional or nent activists and their treatment of the party
ethnic parties ( Johnston, 1994). Examples in- as a business. He found the Democrats, at the
clude the Canadian Reform Party and the Ital- time studied, to have a culture of democracy,
ian Northern League. Meanwhile, new value premised on inclusiveness, internal democracy,
orientations emerge, such as feminism and envi- and attention to constituencies. There is, of
ronmentalism, reshaping old parties or creating course, a difference between a culture that sup-
new ones, like the Green Party. Middle-of-the- ports internal democracy and the practice of
road catch-all parties tend to suppress ideologi- such democracy. The tension between ideals
cal currents. Yet, even so, in the United States, and performance was at the heart of Michel’s
the Democrats and Republicans manifest clear critique of the German Social Democratic Party.
differences along a right/left dimension, espe- It has been echoed as well in analyses of the
cially when viewed from the perspective of party Canadian CCF/NDP, whenever a preference
leaders (Grofman et al., 2002). for centralized organization and strong leader-
Second, culture provides the organizing ra- ship comes in conflict with its commitment
tionale by which members are incorporated. It to member participation (Morley, 1984:173–
is captured in Neumann’s (1956) distinction be- 200; Schwartz, 1994b:24–8; Whitehorn, 1992:
tween parties of representation and parties of 252–3).
social integration. The former are made up of Although culture, by definition, has consid-
cadre or catch-all parties that involve support- erable stability, styles can change. Clark and
ers mainly in their capacity as voters. The latter, Hoffmann-Martinot (1998) relate how politi-
descriptive mainly of democratic socialist par- cal policies of left-wing parties in Britain and
ties that encompassed the social and cultural life Germany, as well as the Clinton Democrats, rep-
of members through various auxiliary organiza- resent a “third way” (Giddens, 2000) in the sense
tions, are now less common. The loosening of of a new political orientation different from that
integrative ties has led to further inference about of their predecessors. Yet it is exactly such cul-
party decline. tural change that is interpreted as another sign
Comprehensive social integration is often a of party decline.
feature of social movements that rely on sol- Finally, party activities can be an expression of
idarity incentives. To the extent that social culture. Fine (1994) describes platforms as a way
movements and parties overlap, those kinds of for parties to symbolically express their identity.
incentives will create an integrative and com- Ideology is one of the factors that accounts for
mitted culture. At the extreme, such a culture the direction of party policies (Amenta, 1998;
can preempt attachments to family, friends, or Boix, 1998). Even in the United States, where
even the state. For example, a long-time Cana- ideology is thought to be a low-level influence,
dian Communist, Jack Scott, recounted how an it enters into the policy preferences of legisla-
organizer in the Communist Party of Canada – tors (Wright and Schaffner, 2002). Poole and
Marxist-Leninist exerted pressure on members’ Rosenthal’s (1997) analysis of roll calls presents
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the most thorough historical study of how clea- taken for granted, and are slow to change ex-
vages, ideology, and policy positions have changed cept under drastic circumstances (DiMaggio and
over time. Powell, 1991:8–11).
The connection between party platforms and Curiously enough, although the institutional
their effect on mobilization remains clouded. perspective encompasses systems of power, au-
Although hard evidence in the form of gov- thority, and governance, it has led to little overt
erning party policies is not always clear, it has attention to the institutional basis of political
been argued that party platforms are treated parties. For example, even such political sci-
as party mandates and do differentiate parties ence luminaries as James G. March and Johan
(Hofferbert and Budge, 1992; King, Budge, P. Olsen, who devote a volume to reinvigorat-
Hofferbert, Laver, and McDonald, 1993). But ing the application of institutional analysis to
the sharpness with which party elites in the politics, have only a single reference to political
United States can now be distinguished along parties. That one reference is itself to Lipset and
a number of policy dimensions appears not to Rokkan’s (1967) paper on party origins, which
be translated into parallel mobilization of the March and Olsen (1989:169) use to demonstrate
general public. That is, except for a hard core the stability of ineffective political forms.
of party identifiers, public views have not fol- Two decades ago, Skocpol (1985) and others
lowed leaders into similarly polarized ideologies began arguing that sociology had become ne-
(Layman and Carsey, 2002), suggesting that so- glectful of how state institutions played a role
cial cleavages may not be presented with com- in both creating and restraining opportunities
patible partisan choices. for action. Although Skocpol’s plea led to a
By adding culture as an aspect of organiza- resurgence of work that is characterized as state-
tion, we flesh out structural elements with sym- centered, among sociologists that work has stim-
bolic and ideational ones. Culture is then not ulated only fairly narrow interest with political
something separate but an integral part of or- parties. Among political scientists, a greater va-
ganization and yet another way to assess the riety of topics are considered. We try to take
theme of party decline. The programs and poli- account of both disciplines in the following
cies associated with parties that rest on cultural review.
factors become one of the outcomes of orga- Regardless of how much overt attention has
nization. Although party structures appear to been given to the institutional basis of political
becoming more similar, culture remains differ- parties, there is little question that parties them-
entiating. However, the significance of cultural selves have institutional qualities, operate in an
differences can also decline and become largely institutional world, and influence the function-
symbolic when detached from programs. ing of other institutions. Institutional analysis is
present even if it is not labeled as such. Here we
examine studies in which this institutional ap-
relations with the institutional proach is explicit as well as those in which it is
environment not, considering the exchange of power and in-
fluence between parties and the state, the media,
Renewed Concern with Institutions and the global system.
Contemporary concern with institutions and

their analysis emphasizes the regulatory, nor- Parties and the State
mative, and cognitive forces that provide the
context from which organizations emerge, State institutions constrain parties through laws
flourish, and change (Scott, 1995:xiii–xix). To ranging from clauses embedded in national con-
sociologists represented in the new institutional- stitutions forbidding certain kinds of parties
ism, institutions are distinct from individual ac- to municipal ordinances forbidding parties to
tions, have rulelike qualities by virtue of being run candidates in local elections. In the United
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States some of the most significant restrictions minorities to public office in the United States
on parties are a result of the direct democracy (1992).
reforms at the beginning of the twentieth cen- Among political scientists, there is renewed
tury. The establishment of primary elections attention to reforming the electoral system (Far-
took away a party’s right to name its own can- rell, 1997; Lijphart, 1994). As states as diverse
didates and placed that power in the hands of as Mexico, Russia, Germany, and Italy adopt
those whose only connection to the party was mixed systems, scholars have begun to reassess
the label they gave themselves upon registering the relative merits of single member districts,
to vote, or not even that, in the case of open proportional representation, or some mixture
and blanket primaries (Cronin, 1989; Haskell, (e.g, Amy, 1993). Lijphart (1999) and Powell
1996; Lawson, 1999a; Reiter, 1993). Restric- (2000) expand these concerns to include how
tive ballot laws have made it difficult for third the number of parties, bicameralism, federal-
parties to mount campaigns in the United States, ism, and other related institutional features con-
though they have never been totally successful in tribute to greater democracy. At stake is the way
suppressing them (Donovan, 2000; Lewis-Beck such characteristics enable voters to influence
and Squire, 1995) and recent campaigns by Ross policy-making and the part played by the rela-
Perot and Ralph Nader have suggested to some tive strength of parties.
that the pressure for changing such restrictions Another important theme focuses on the reg-
is mounting (Sifry, 2002). Changing constraints ulation of party campaign financing, both com-
have been examined in Canada in the choice paratively (Alexander and Shiatori, 1994; Ware,
of national party leaders (Courtney, 1995) and 1987a, 1987b) and in the United States (Goidel,
in local constituencies (Carty, 1991) as well as Gross, and Shields, 1999; Reiter, 1993; Sabato,
in Europe in the rules governing candidate se- 1984; Sorauf, 1988; Thurber and Nelson, 1995;
lection (Norris, 1997; Ware, 1987b). Subtle dif- Wayne, 2000). Initially, questions about the
ferences in constitutional structures also affect need for such regulation produced conflicting
the ability of parties to govern: in some nations, answers, as did questions about the corrupting
narrow majorities are able to legislate despite re- influences of money. But as technological
sistance, whereas, in others, minority parties can changes made the need for money in cam-
sharply influence legislation (Huber, Stephens, paigns so much greater (Magleby, 2002; Sabato,
and Ragin, 1993). 1989; Selnow, 1994; Trent and Friedenberg,
Other kinds of institutional constraint are of- 2000), the effects of unregulated contributions
ten more indirect in their effects on parties. For raised troubling issues about the ability of large
example, a strong presidency has been shown contributors to determine every stage of the
to lead to an emphasis on winning, downplay- electoral process: who is nominated, who wins,
ing ideology, and fostering cadre-type parties and what policy choices will be made (Medvic,
(Linz, 1990). Similarly, the size of electoral dis- 2001; Nelson, Dulio, and Medvic, 2002; West,
tricts affects how parties operate (Schlesinger, 2000). Yet the kind of regulations that would be
1984), fostering mass-type communist succes- ideal is still far from clear (Mann, 2002; Ware,
sor parties where the average district size is 1987a).
larger (Ishiyama, 1999). More controversial are Parties and the state have a two-way rela-
inferences about the effects of proportional tionship. As we have already seen, in working
representation and whether it leads to mul- through the electoral process, parties link cit-
tiple parties and party innovation (Courtney, izens to the state. They also provide political
2004; Duverger, 1963; Kim and Ohn, 1992; leadership in appointive as well as elective of-
Kitschelt, 1988). Redding and Viterna (1999) fices of governments and suggest programs of
find proportional representation one of the ma- action to be followed. In the most positive assess-
jor factors contributing to the success of left- ment, parties lend legitimacy to government,
libertarian parties. Rule and Zimmerman ex- ensuring that the people themselves choose the
amine its effect on the election of women and path government must follow. Because almost
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all legislative and executive officers in modern and Stephens (1979). Marks, Wilson, and Ray
democracies wear partisan labels, government (2002) find that parties, and especially party
policies are policies made by parties (Castles, families (those linked by ideology), provide
1982). Indeed, according to Schattschneider frames for new issues. When experts in thir-
(1942:1), “political parties created democracy, teen countries were surveyed about the posi-
and . . . democracy is unthinkable save in terms tion of party leaders on European integration,
of parties.” More recently, Aldrich (1995), using they were able to reliably predict leaders’ place-
a rational choice perspective, sees parties as the ment. There is, however, recent questioning of
creation of ambitious politicians who can then the link between policies and governing parties,
accomplish their goals within parties. But they primarily the result of economic retrenchments
do so in ways that solve three problems intrin- that have affected the welfare programs of so-
sic to democratic government: ensuring that the cial democratic parties (Hicks, 1999; Huber and
polity rests on popular elections, that legislatures Stephens, 2001; Swank, 2002).6
enact public policies, and that issues are kept to In the United States, it is also possible to
a manageable number. By providing a basis for see parties structuring issues (e.g., Cox and
collective action, even if only imperfectly, par- Poole, 2002). Wright and Schaffner (2002:377)
ties encourage citizens to vote and politicians to argue that the apparently low level of ideo-
cooperate while restricting the legislative agen- logical consistency in policy positions is the
das they must deal with. result of party actions to incorporate new is-
Other, more limited assessments of the pos- sues and new voters. This assessment, we note,
itive contributions of competitive parties find goes along with previous citations to evidence
legitimacy flowing from the capacity of parties that there are sharp and growing ideological
to channel dissent and maintain system stabil- differences between the two parties. Examin-
ity (Epstein, 1980; Rose, 1980; Sartori, 1976; ing policy making at the state level, Barrilleaux
Ware, 1987, 1996). Wilensky’s (2002) analysis of (2000:70) found that the ideological dispositions
the nineteen richest democracies, for example, of the two parties interact with electoral com-
measures legitimacy by the vitality of political petition so that “Democrats and Republicans
parties. differ when they are forced to.” Even as con-
Not everyone is convinced of the connec- tentious an issue as abortion policy, normally
tion between parties and legitimacy. In the avoided by parties, became a source of oppos-
United States, Mayhew (1974, 1991) has argued ing stands for the Democrats and Republicans
most forcefully that congressional candidates (Halfmann, 2000). Cox and McCubbins (1993)
seek election independent of party positions, trace how the majority party in the U.S. House
which he interprets as meaning that such candi- of Representatives uses its rule-making power
dates cannot be treated as exponents of unified to ensure partisan outcomes to the legislative
party platforms. He concludes that government process.
works just as effectively when parties are weak Not all observers agree that partisan differ-
and levels of government divided. ences become apparent in policy. Rose (1980)
Governmental institutions enable parties to showed years ago that British parties were largely
enact policies, but do parties play their legisla- in agreement with one another and so failed to
tive role in ways that differentiate among them? offer seriously different choices to the voters.
Evidence of such partisan effects is provided Although both major parties tended, by and
by Boix (1998), whose examination of twenty large, to keep campaign promises, the policies
countries shows that socialist governments in- adopted seldom had the effect promised in af-
vest relatively more heavily in education, labor fecting unemployment, low wages, low growth,
market policies, and capital investment. Others high public expenditure, and high interest rates.
who find an association between social demo-
cratic governments and generous social policies 6
For a fuller discussion, see the chapter by Hicks and
include Esping-Andersen (1990), Korpi (1978), Esping-Anderson in this volume.
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Such problems were created and changed by fac- 1994; Nimmo and Combs, 1983; Perloff, 1998).
tors largely outside the control of government, According to some, the growing concentration
such as the world economy. Furthermore, even of media ownership in the hands of giant corpo-
when there was control, government effective- rations is another force compelling parties and
ness was limited by internal quarrels and ad- candidates to distort their messages to reach their
ministrative inertia. The rightward move of hoped-for publics (Alger, 1998). Picard (1998)
Tony Blair’s Labour government has exacer- has shown how far this process was taken by
bated these effects in more recent times. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, chair-
Others debate whether parties actually do man of the multimedia Fininvest firm. Patterson
keep campaign promises; in such studies much (1998) demonstrates, in a broadly comparative
seems to depend on what is meant by “promise” study, that journalists do finds ways, nonethe-
( Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; McLaughlin, 2000). less, to interject their own political values, but
Lawson (1999b) points out that, in dissociat- how reassuring that is to the parties obviously
ing themselves from cleavages, majority par- depends on the match between those biases and
ties tend to substitute less important (and less their own programs. And as in the question of
divisive) issues for those of deeper concern, a campaign finance, it is not always clear what
tactic which makes it easier to keep campaign should – and can – be done to solve the problems
promises. For Katz and Mair (1995) the strategic of excessive mediaization of democratic politics:
choices of cartel parties make them ever more issues of free speech and questions of political
remote from their supporters, both before and feasibility are difficult to resolve (Lichtenberg,
after elections. 1990).
Parties, however, should not be seen as help-
less victims of the media. When in office, they
The Media may pass laws regulating the media that are de-
signed to ensure fair representation of all points
Institutions other than the state also interact of view by preventing or seriously limiting the
powerfully with parties, of which one of the use of paid political advertising (or forbidding
most important are the media. Murray Edelman it altogether, as in France), by requiring the
(1985, 1988) was perhaps the first to under- broadcast media to give equal or at least propor-
stand the profound implications of the growing tionate free coverage to all the parties, and/or
relationship between media and party politics. by providing sufficient public funding so that
Recent general studies include those by Dye, even the smaller parties can buy the access they
Ziegler, and Lichter (1992), Jamieson (1996), need (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 1995). Or they
and Graber, McQuail, and Norris (1998). Here, may, conversely, effectively block efforts to pass
as well, the relationship is two-way: the media such laws, ensuring that the advantage continues
influence what parties do; parties influence the to go to themselves, the well-financed majority
media. parties.
The first effect is often more apparent to vot- Furthermore, party campaign strategists have
ers. Several studies have stressed how the main- learned to beat the media at their own game,
stream media – businesses that make a profit securing favorable coverage by such “entertain-
by attracting readers and viewers – seek to ing” tactics as sound bites, photo opportunities,
present political campaigns as entertainment, and ever more aggressive and negative attacks
concentrating excessively on personalities and on the opposition (Diamond and Bates, 1992;
the “horserace” aspect of political competition, Maltese, 1994; Mickelson, 1989; Newman,
reducing serious discussion of issues, developing 1994; Sabato 1996; Selnow 1994). They also use
mere group fantasies about the nature of po- the Internet, direct mail, and the telephone to
litical reality and thus endangering the demo- reach voters via media that are more difficult
cratic process (Bennett, 1996; Jamieson and for others to control ( Johnson, 2001). Finally,
Waldman, 2003; McChesney, 1999; Newman, and most importantly, parties secure the media
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coverage they want by paying for it. The amount international resources available to new actors
and cost of political advertising has steadily in- in domestic struggles, “blurring the boundaries
creased in every nation, although most dramat- between a state’s relations with its own nation-
ically in the United States (Diamond and Bates, als and the recourse both citizens and states have
1992; Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Magleby, to the international system” (Keck and Sikkink,
2002). 1998:1–2).
The evidence on this score remains mixed.
In North America, where NGOs have been
Globalization important in recent debates on free-trade
treaties, political parties in their governing ca-
Globalization is not only the international- pacity remain important. Opportunities remain
ization of capital and capitalism but also the for parties to form transnational relations al-
penetration of global institutions and processes though these have barely begun (Macdonald and
into all parts of the world. With it come new Schwartz, 2002). Europe has had most experi-
constraints on the established ways in which ence with transnational party links, going back
national parties operate. For example, chang- to the first Socialist International. More recently,
ing conditions in the global economy and the the move to the European Union stimulated
related decline in rates of unionization con- parties to form ties across states (Gaffney, 1996;
tribute to weakening ties between organized Hix and Lord, 1997). Meanwhile, the need for
labor and parties. A study of sixteen industri- stronger involvement by both parties and NGOs
alized countries finds that it is the decreasing to establish democratic procedures at the in-
importance of unions themselves that has re- ternational level is argued by Etzioni-Halevy
duced their influence on policy making in so- (2002).
cial democratic parties (Piazza, 2001). At the In response to the formation of the Euro-
other end of the political spectrum Swank and pean Union, the three most prominent families
Betz (2003) find that economic uncertainties af- of parties, the Socialists, Liberals, and Chris-
fected by globalization have contributed to the tian Democrats, each formed its own federa-
success of right-wing populist parties in Western tion in the 1970s – the Confederation of the
Europe.7 Socialist Parties of the European Community
The role of parties at the international level (CSPEC), the European Federation of Liberal,
is still a puzzle that studies are only now begin- Democratic and Reform Parties of the Euro-
ning to address. Changing conditions of global- pean Communities (ELDR), and the European
ization have led to assessments that nongovern- People’s Party (EPP, the Federation of Christian
mental organizations (NGOs)8 will displace po- Democratic Parties in the European Commu-
litical parties in building links among a wide nities). The degree to which these federations
range of actors. This is because they can create actually play party roles is, however, not clear,
advocacy networks that “multiply the channels because their national components can have in-
of access to the international system” and make terests at odds with each other. The working
of the European Parliament (EP), meanwhile,
7
Stimuli to right-wing parties are mitigated by na- encourages national party representatives to
tional policies with generous welfare provisions. seek coalitions outside the federations (Bardi,
8
NGOs may be voluntary associations, interest
groups, or social movement organizations. Their sep- 1994).
arateness from government may be ambiguous where The European Greens have differed from
they are regulated by government or receive state fund- other party families by being less positive about
ing. As we noted in the section on “ties with organized the European Union and forming a federation
interests” the boundary between interest groups or so- with countries outside the EU. Still, they have
cial movement organizations and political parties may
be blurred. NGOs make up what is termed civil society, been effective in presenting their positions to
a concept generally, though arguably, used to exclude the EP. At the same time, their federation has
political parties. been less effective than that of other parties in
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becoming unified. Dietz (2000:208) attributes relevance of institutions such as the media and
this to the forces of globalization, we note that find-
ings about relations with parties are often still
Differing points of view concerning European inte- tentative.
gration in general, the reluctance to give up parts of Missing from this discussion is the place of
the national sovereignty because of their decentral- political parties in civil society, although some
ized, grassroots and anti-bureaucratic ideology, con-
aspects of this were dealt with earlier, when deal-
flicts between more left and more center-oriented
parties about the method and extent of cooperation ing with the social bases of parties, and party
with small left-wing parties and the permanently in- scholars have always paid attention to the rela-
creasing number of member organizations. tionship between parties and groups.9 Still un-
examined is the extent to which political par-
Yet, to the extent that national ties remain strong ties should be treated as components of civil
among the Greens, they are not unusual among society, completing the circle of institutional
parties in the EP. From an examination of 1,000 analysis.
roll call votes in the EP, Hix (2002) finds that
national party policies are the strongest predic-
tors of how members will vote. remaining questions
The long-term effects of European integra-
tion on national cleavages remain unclear. Na- As subject matter for political sociology, the
tional settings and their electoral environment trouble with parties is that they arouse strong
remain important forces at the same time as in- feelings pro and con. In earlier times, it was the
tegration arouses new foci for possible conflict conflicts that stemmed from opposing parties
and, with it, new alignments (e.g., Bartolini, that produced negative reactions. Positive assess-
2001. ments, in contrast, assigned parties centrality in
Globalization also goes along with renewed ensuring democratic government. Today’s neg-
local and regional efforts to retain separate op- ativity is more often related to the failings of
erations and identities (e.g., Di Muccio and parties in bringing about a more perfect demo-
Rosenau, 1992). Tossutti (2002) examined cratic governance, either of themselves or of the
twenty-one countries with particularistic par- states where they operate. A mixture of norma-
ties based on ethnic, religious, or regional inter- tive concerns with a selective empirical agenda
ests. Yet rather than an expected direct reaction appears to affect the amount of emphasis that
to globalization, she found the success of such has been given to political parties by political
parties greater in countries relatively more in- sociologists. But if political sociologists take an-
sulated from global forces. At present, the ques- other look at political parties, unconstrained by
tion is open on the extent to which global forces concerns about what parties should be or by past
make partisan policies vulnerable to conditions findings that may have prematurely appeared to
that individual states will be unable to control answer all our questions, they will find rich ter-
(Scharpf, 2000). ritory for study.
In sum, relations with the institutional en-
9
vironment both allow political parties to oper- Epstein (1986), for example, noted the ease with
ate and constrain what they can accomplish. In which interest groups and social movements could enter
U.S. major parties, making the party system not only
turn, parties actively influence the role other unique among competitive party systems but also com-
institutions are able to play. Here we have mendably able to resist serious competition from third
given most attention to the interaction between parties. Now authors are more likely to see nonparty
parties and governmental institutions, ranging groups as either a welcome alternative to disappointing
over forms of governance, electoral systems, parties (Putnam, 1995), as themselves one of the causes of
the decline of parties as agents of democracy (Berman,
and campaigning. Parties link citizens to the 1997; Doherty, 2001), or just one of the crucial ele-
state but debate continues over how effectively ments in modern democratic life (Foley and Edwards,
they do this. Although recognizing the growing 1996; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson, 2000).
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Among the most prominent questions that yet, less well-studied are questions about the ef-
remain are ones about the continuing rele- fects of the media, globalization, and the relation
vance of social cleavages, whether in countries between parties and civil society.
with uninterrupted histories of democracy or Most of all, we need to be prepared to address
in ones newly experiencing the struggles to the recurring predictions of party decline with
achieve democratic government. Everywhere, more specific questions about the kind of de-
the mobilization of specific cleavages continues cline involved. How do voters attach themselves
to change. How do we anticipate which will be- to parties? What organizational adaptations do
come more prominent and how do we account different parties follow? What is the current re-
for national differences? And to what extent are lation between the legitimacy of the state and
contemporary parties failing to mobilize cleav- the performance (and existence) of parties? In
ages altogether, focussing instead on issues that what ways do parties retain the ability to mobi-
are less divisive? lize voters and produce policies?
Because the ways in which parties organize We can, as well, find inspiration for further
and the relation between culture and structure study in considering how well parties adapt
change over time, they need closer scrutiny. The and perform. For example, Lawson’s (1999b:33)
transformations that come about as parties, both concern with the quality of linkage running
old and new, grapple with changing environ- from citizen to state via party leads her to ask:
ments require an alertness on our part that is not If winning parties, or coalitions of parties, are
constrained by preconceptions of what makes in fact campaigning on catch-all programs only
for organization. What is needed are alternate marginally distinct from those of their near-
models of organization that take into account est competitors, and then governing more and
different ways of responding to structural prob- more in response to the demands of large donors
lems and different opportunities for cultural ex- (as is in the United States), and if increasingly
pression. large percentages of Western citizenries fail to
Of the three general topics dealt with, the exercise their right to vote altogether, then what
institutional environment received least cover- difference does it make if those who do vote
age, a reflection of how political parties are per- make their choices in terms of the cleavages
ceived, especially within sociology. Most atten- or issues that separate them most from their
tion went to work on relations with the state, fellows? Finding voters who characterize them-
ranging from the particulars of policy making to selves in terms of old or new cleavages and pin
the fundamentals of legitimacy. Under chang- their hopes accordingly to this or that party is
ing environments, we can expect the need to not the same as finding parties that compete and
examine these issues in even more detail. As of perform accordingly.
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chapter fourteen
Organized Interest Groups and Policy Networks1
Francisco J. Granados and David Knoke
What’s thy interest in this sad wrack? How came it? Who We continue with an exposition of the main
is it? What art thou? foundational approaches to investigating interest
– William Shakespeare (1609, “Cymbeline,” groups. Next, we briefly review some issues in
Act IV, Scene II) the internal development of interest groups: or-
ganizational formation, resource mobilization,
governance, and collective interest definition.
introduction We also briefly scrutinize policy research in-
stitutes, a particular and underanalyzed variety
The organizational promotion of specific in- of interest organization. The following section
terests in public policy-making processes con- investigates policy network approaches to ex-
stitutes an important phenomenon of state- amining the macrolevel dynamics of organized
oriented politics. Theoretical and empirical interest group efforts to influence public poli-
analyses of interest groups are divided among cies, especially by networking with other inter-
two major themes. The first considers the forest organizations. We then discuss the interest
mation and maintenance of organized interests group systems of the European Union (EU) and
groups, and the second theme considers their the United States. We conclude with some sug-
role and impact on public policy making. The gestions for advancing the research agenda of
latter investigates the patterns of relationships interest organization studies.
among governmental agencies and interest or-
ganizations, how interest groups and coalitions
gain access to public policy makers, and the ex- defining organized interest groups
tent to which they exert advantageous influence
over policy decisions. We restrict the term organized interest group to
We review fundamental elements of prior designate any political actor, usually consist-
studies of organized interest groups and con- ing of a formally structured organization with
sider some relevant topics for advancing re- a bounded membership and distinct leadership
search in this area. We begin with basic concep- and participatory roles, whose goals include
tual issues in defining organized interest groups. seeking to influence public policy-making ac-
tivities of elected or appointed public officials.
1
The authors contributed equally to this chapter. However, some organized interest groups may
We thank Jürgen Grote, Patrick Kenis, Jörg Raab, the be informal cliques or coalitions consisting of
handbook editors, and anonymous reviewers for their
commentaries on previous drafts. Address all queries politically active formal organizations and/or
by email to: Knoke@atlas.socsci.umn.edu or Granados prominent families or persons. For variety, we
@socsci.umn.edu also use the more common “interest group”
287
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288 Francisco J. Granados and David Knoke
label that appears throughout the literature, as (Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, and Stephens,
well as the term interest organization. We prefer 2003; Hicks, 1999).
the organized interest group concept because it We also exclude governmental agencies and
excludes status categories when they lack collec- public-sector policy-making bodies, such as city
tive organization and political objectives, such as councils or state legislatures, whenever they are
farmers, welfare recipients, consumers, or spe- solely the targets of other interest organiza-
cific ethnic groups. Instead, we treat as theo- tions’ influence efforts. But, governmental enti-
retically problematic the relationships between ties sometimes behave as interest organizations,
a formal organization devoted to influencing whenever they engage in coalitional or direct
public policy making and the latent identity lobbying of other governmental institutions.
constituencies from which it seeks to mobi- Examples of institutional lobbying include as-
lize legitimacy, participation, funds, public sup- sociations of subnational and local governments
port, and other politically valuable resources. pressing national political institutions, as well as
For example, people with disabilities constitute national governments promoting their interests
subpopulations with diverse concerns about to such transnational political institutions as the
employment opportunities, health insurance, European Union or United Nations.
pensions, public services, medical research, and Most theorists treat social movement organi-
discrimination. A set of disability interest orga- zations (SMOs) as conceptually divergent from
nizations seeks to represent these status groups organized interest groups. SMOs consist of self-
in various policy-making processes. conscious groups of activists – more or less for-
Interest organizations are predominantly mally organized – who typically advance the
private-sector voluntary associations, whose claims of powerless and unrepresented con-
members are natural persons or other organi- stituencies to challenge powerholders and pro-
zations, that pool their members’ financial and mote or resist social change (see Chapter 16).
other resources for use in conventional polit- SMOs frequently resort to contentious extrain-
ical actions to affect policy making (Knoke, stitutional forms of political activity, such as
2001:324). This definition excludes apolitical street demonstrations. However, many SMOs
voluntary associations whose activities are re- become fully legitimated participants in public
stricted solely to religious, fraternal, philan- policy debates, such as civil rights, environmen-
thropic, self-help, or recreational purposes. But, tal, and women’s organizations. And many con-
many mass-membership voluntary associations ventional interest organizations participate in
pursue explicit political agendas, thus qualify- protests, for example, labor unions that marched
ing for inclusion in the organized interest group against the recent World Trade Organization
population. meetings in Seattle and Genoa. Some schol-
Most private corporations do not indepen- ars indicate that SMOs engage in more-or-
dently engage in political influence activities, less institutionalized activities (public proclama-
and thus we do not regard them as interest or- tion of grievances in the mass media, lobbying,
ganizations. The prominent exceptions are large hiring consultants to write impact reports, or
firms that try directly to influence public policy litigation) depending of their resources and
decisions affecting their economic goals (Hacker the structures of opportunities and constraints
and Pierson, 2002; Swank and Martin, 2001; posed by specific political contexts (Marks and
see Chapter 15). Peak business associations and McAdam, 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly,
sectoral trade associations are clearly organized 1996). Burstein (1998) persuasively argued that
interest groups that advocate for the economic treating SMOs as conceptually dissimilar to in-
policy objectives of their corporate members. terest organizations is neither meaningful nor
Similarly, labor unions and federations behave empirically useful and, because that dichotomy
as interest groups when lobbying for the labor cannot stand up to close scrutiny, it should be
market regulatory and social welfare redistri- abandoned. He noted that, although both types
bution policies favored by their constituencies of organizations vary in their particular tactics,
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Organized Interest Groups 289
formal organization, numbers of members, re- In this dynamic, elected and appointed govern-
sources, and goals, each still tries to influence ment officials are depicted as accessible yet dis-
political outcomes. We remain unpersuaded by engaged from interest-group rivalries and con-
theorists who conceptually exclude SMOs from flicts. The government’s minor role in policy
the organized interest group category. Because making consists of arbitrating the group compe-
analyses of political parties, corporations, and tition without controlling it or trying to impose
SMOs appear elsewhere in this volume, we its own solutions. Especially in the United
deemphasize these types of organized interest States, pluralism was elevated from a hypothesis
groups. However, the policy research institute about political behavior to an ideology about
constitutes a distinct understudied subtype, with how the democratic system should operate
growing involvement in policy-making activi- (Lowi, 1967).
ties aimed at direct or indirect influence. An Pluralism maintains that certain institutional
academic literature recently emerged that spe- checks-and-balances prevent any group from
cializes in policy research institutes, as we note becoming too powerful and dominating the
below. policy-making process. In most instances, the
constrictions imposed by these checks assure
that political power is dispersed across diverse
foundational approaches to interest interest groups, and no single interest organiza-
groups study tion or set of organized interests always prevails.
A primary check consists of matching political
Since the 1950s, interest group studies within pressures from one group by a rival countervail-
individual countries or cross-nationally have ing group. A latent interest group, which by def-
emphasized the relevance of several pluralist, inition was not previously mobilized, will for-
Marxist, elitist, and corporatist theories for ex- mally organize if its constituent interests become
plaining issues of policy making, polity gover- threatened. Furthermore, given the potential
nance, and state-society relations (e.g., Berger, mobilization of latent interests, governments an-
1981; Cawson, 1985; Thomas, 1993). We assess ticipate and preemptively take unorganized in-
these four foundational approaches from an his- terests into account despite complete absence of
torical perspective as prologue to discussing political pressures (Finer, 1966; Truman, 1951).
contemporary research on interest group net- A second check consists of politicians’ propensi-
works. ties to listen to numerous interest groups in ex-
Pluralism considers that interest groups play pectation of obtaining sufficient electoral sup-
a central role in the political process, with sig- port for reelection. Both mobilized and latent
nificant power to influence policy outcomes groups whose interests are ignored may threaten
(Bentley, 1949; Dahl, 1961; Finer, 1966; Truman, an electoral defeat. Therefore, inequality in eco-
1951; see Smith, 1990, for a critical review). nomic resources is counterbalanced by interest-
This approach views political power as frag- group voting strength (Finer, 1966). A third
mented and widely dispersed among competing check is that governmental departments may de-
interest groups, with policy decisions resulting velop close consultative relationships with dif-
from complex interactions and bargaining within ferent interest groups, providing every group
the different sets of groups, defined by specific with some political access (Wilson, 1977). Fi-
matters or kind of personal traits. Pluralism nally, internal disarray within very resource-
describes the policy process in liberal democra- ful interest groups can weaken their political
cies as analogous to a marketplace where many clout, further reducing power inequities among
(plural) preferences on each policy issue are groups (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951). Although
represented by organized interest groups that most pluralists acknowledge that pressure group
freely compete to gain governmental attention, power depends on political resources, and that
hoping ultimately to win enactment and imple- resource variation may confer unequal power,
mentation of their preferred policy decisions. access, and influence, they consider that all
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groups have some power resources and no sin- socioeconomic inequality (Dahl and Lindblom,
gular asset, such as money, bestows special ad- 1976).
vantages (Smith, 1990). Pluralists reacted to such criticisms and the
The classical pluralist model is criticized theory’s deviation from empirical evidence by
for concentrating excessively on interest group modifying the original model (Smith, 1990;
resources and behaviors, paying insufficient at- Manley, 1983). Thus, Richardson and Jordan
tention to governmental interests and activities, (1979) acknowledged that perfect competition
and neglecting external constraints on govern- rarely exists because access to certain policy ar-
ments such as international economic develop- eas may be not completely open to all interest
ments. It inadequately recognizes governmental groups. Institutionalized relations between gov-
capacity to make decisions independently of ernment and specific interest groups may ex-
group influence (Nordlinger, 1981), and over- clude others. Policy events typically occur in
looks institutionalized organizational effects oligopolistic or monopolistic power structures
structuring the policymaking process (Hall, whose participants try to capture control of gov-
1986). Classical pluralism also assumes a pro- ernmental units, resulting in situations of de-
cedural consensus among all interest groups in pendence, cooptation, and clientelism that blur
the polity, without considering that actors who distinctions between the public sector and pri-
refuse to play by the policy game rules may vate interest groups. Nevertheless, Richardson
be denied access to government officials and and Jordan insisted that sufficient countervailing
hence become politically disadvantaged (Smith, power arises through interest group access and
1990, 1993). Moreover, relationships between issue networks consulted by government. How-
government and some interest organizations ever, they disregarded the possibility that access
can become very close and exclusive, confer- and consultation differ from actual policy influ-
ring advantages on these favored groups (Finer, ence and that ideological constraints may block
1966). Checks-and-balances may be unrealis- some group access.
tic in many cases and group access to officials Neopluralist scholars depart from classical
might be less open than the model assumes. pluralism by fully accepting that insufficient
Pluralism fails to consider the impact of ide- countervailing powers allow business domina-
ologies, which can shape policy content, group tion of policy agendas and creation of struc-
accessibility to policy makers, and variation in tures of political patronage and privilege (see
influence among groups possessing equivalent Chapter 2). These structures exclude the gen-
resources (Hall, 1986). If access is not com- eral public’s interests, stabilize social inequalities,
pletely open to all groups and some interests and harm democratic processes, institutions, and
are excluded, pluralists erroneously assume that values (Lowi, 1967, 1969; McConnell, 1966).
an absence of group activity implies political Business groups also attain a privileged policy
consensus, signifying widespread social agree- position resulting from their structural power
ment, acceptance of the policy processes and in the capitalist economy, given the govern-
outcomes, and the peaceful conflict resolution ment’s need for a successful economy to sur-
benefiting most, if not all, contending interest vive politically. Policy makers adopt measures
groups. Instead, the apparent political consen- favorable to business interests, boosting “busi-
sus might be biased toward certain privileged ness confidence” to encourage economic in-
interests, whereas silence and passivity might vestments, independently of any political actions
just reflect the effective exclusion of groups that business groups might undertake, a point
questioning the prevailing consensus and un- raised by Marxists such as O’Conner (1973)
willing to conform to pluralist rules of partic- and Offe (1984). Consequently, government
ipation. These groups are deemed irresponsi- decisions mirror and reinforce existing social
ble and unsuitable for policy consultations by and political inequality. Neopluralists question
the powers-that-be (Smith, 1990, 1993). Finally, the state’s conventional image as fundamen-
some critics also argue that pluralism sustains tally concerned with the welfare of the whole
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society, acknowledged that power inequalities 1973). Although the capital class can be a pres-
rooted in the very structural organization of so- sure group, its policy influence is neither mainly
ciety privilege some organized interests more a product of its organizational capacities nor its
than others, and allowed for the role of ideol- political activities, but results from capital’s dom-
ogy in policy making (Dahl, 1982; Lindblom, inant structural position in the economy and its
1977). Lindblom and Dahl (1976) proposed control of the state. Some Marxist conceptions
incremental structural reforms to promote portray the capitalist state in a semiautonomous
equality in the U.S. political economy, such as relationship vis-à-vis the capitalist class whenever
wealth and income redistribution, that imply the state increasingly intervenes in the econ-
just minor adjustments to the social structural omy to deal with threatening market failures and
foundations of capitalism. Despite significantly negative economic externalities, accommodates
modifying the original model, neopluralists still the interests of different component parts of
fail to integrate the disproportionate power of the electorate and political environment, acts to
business into the pluralist democratic framework resolve conflicts among factions within the cap-
(Manley, 1983), to specify the precise mecha- italist class, and responds to pressures from inter-
nisms connecting business to governments, and national economic and political context. Never-
to consider sufficiently the state’s political au- theless, such relative autonomy does not reduce
tonomy, which may explain why governments the class bias of the state but actually allows it
occasionally enforce policies harmful to some to fulfill its class-subordinated role (Miliband,
business interests (Smith, 1990). 1977; Prechel, 2000).2
Marxism explicitly emphasizes the effects of Critics disagree with Marxism’s overly simpli-
power inequality within the class structure and fied view of interest group systems in contem-
the state’s policy-making biases. The capitalist porary liberal democracies, noting that numer-
state is extensively involved in resolving conflicts ous noneconomic divisions permeate capitalist
among contending interests by always champi- societies. Two differing neomarxist perspectives
oning capitalist class domination over the work- consider the existence of the capitalist class’s
ing class (Lukes, 1974; Miliband, 1969; Offe, internal unity. The first emphasizes intraclass
1975; Poulantzas, 1973, 1978). Marxists depict consensus over conflict consisting of a class-
political power and class interests as fundamen- wide rationality on general politicoeconomic
tally originating from the economic foundation interests (Miliband, 1969). Some scholars ar-
of society; that is, from the ownership and con- gued that consensus arises from bank hege-
trol of the means of production and the conse- mony over business corporations that supports
quent relations of production. They argue that politicoeconomic strategies to achieve general
control over the means of production confers long-run economic profit (Bearden, 1987; Kotz,
massive political power advantages, regardless of 1978; Mintz and Schwarz, 1985). Other studies
the political party composition of the state, be-
cause capitalist society depends on economic 2
These arguments about state autonomy parallel
production. The state is an instrument con- those of the state-centric perspective that conceives the
trolled by the dominant capitalist class to protect state as an entity with its own economic and noneco-
the rights of private property, thereby reinforc- nomic agenda that results not merely from interest-
ing that ruling class’s power. group demands, but rather, a state’s structures shape these
groups’ formation, operation, and influence on pol-
In Marxist theory, the state always does the icy making (Skocpol, 1980, 1985; Block, 1977, 1980;
bidding of capitalists and undermines democ- Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Weir and Skocpol,
racy. The state acts to prevent or suppress class 1985; Prechel, 1990; Finegold and Skocpol, 1995). Un-
conflicts harmful to the interests of capital, coer- der the state-centric perspective, the state’s goals are also
cively restricts working-class interests, and lim- affected by its own organizational structure, and its own
interests are carried out by state officials, with advice
its trade union influence in the polity. Marxists from policy experts, who tend to behave according to
stress the powerlessness of many interest groups their roles as officials as well as pursuing their particular
under capitalism (Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas, agency interests.
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suggested that an inner circle, consisting of It also advocates a “sustainable development”

prominent members of interlocking corporate response to the global ecological crisis (Hoff-
networks, have connections and organizational man, 1997). Sustaining hegemonic capital
capacity to promote general business interests interests by appropriate cultural-ideological
on behalf of the whole capitalist class (Useem, activity is crucial for the “transnational capitalist
1979, 1982, 1984; Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott, class” undertaking global economic activities
1985). Conversely, a second neo-Marxist per- through multinational corporations (Sklair,
spective maintains that the lack of a unitary 2001). This class participates in economic glob-
economic trend produces divisions of inter- alization struggles occurring within national
ests among business sectors having differential and international political forums. It exercises
and competing rates of capital accumulation direct control of strategic global localities and
(Aglietta, 1979; Offe, 1975; Poulantzas, 1978), indirect control in other locations through
depending on each sector’s structural position alliances with local or national rulers and
in the economy (Baran and Sweezy, 1966; capitalists who favor basic aspects of globaliza-
Mizruchi and Koening, 1986). Such production tion (Fennema, 1982; Sklar, 1987; Overbeek,
segmentation implies persistent conflicts over 1993).
preferred state policies among the consequent Elitist theories conceive elite interest groups
capitalist class segments (Prechel, 1990; Zeitlin, whose top position holders are politically ac-
Neuman, and Ratcliff, 1976). tive while the nonelite citizenry remains politi-
Some Marxist analysts emphasize the cultural- cally passive. Hence, elitist policy analysts focus
ideological elements that sustain capitalist class in activities undertaken by those elites. Authors
hegemony, particularly intellectuals, profes- disagree on reasons for the political apathy of
sionals, and opinion leaders who help to de- average citizens in democracy, ranging from in-
velop and advance ideological positions sup- dividuals’ characteristics to political institutions
porting capitalist interests (Cockett, 1995; and societal structures (Walker, 1966). Rele-
Connell, 1977; Gramsci,1971[1934]; Sklair, vant studies of elite structures consider the re-
2001). Ideologies are important for shaping the lation between elite integration, political stabil-
premises of polity and the state’s role in the ity, and democracy (Dahrendorf, 1967; Higley
economy and its crises (e.g., state fiscal crisis and Moore, 1981). Elitist analysts tend to as-
and crisis of the welfare state) (Gottdiener and sume that social power is conferred by for-
Komninos, 1989). An important current cul- mal organizations (Domhoff, 1996; Mills, 1956).
tural element of capitalist ideology is “con- Several variants within the elitist perspective
sumerism,” which encourages conspicuous and are identifiable according to the characteristics
unrestrained consumption. The resulting eco- defining inclusiveness in elite groups (positional
nomic demand, which is satisfied by enlarged prominence in organizations, policy-making in-
corporate production, keeps the capitalist volvement, class membership, and social group
economy running at high levels. In addition attributes) and whether one elite group (e.g.,
to lobbying policy officials to obtain favorable business, trade union, political-governmental,
legislation, corporations actively publicize and mass media, military, and academic) dominates
propagate cultural and ideological elements by possessing some resource conferring extraor-
supporting their economic and political inter- dinary power to rule the polity (Higley and
ests. Moreover, they disarticulate alternative Moore, 1981; Scott, 1990). Accordingly, from
ideologies threatening to their interests by an elitist perspective, pluralism could be consid-
co-opting adversary actors and counterculture ered a variant of the elitist model in which no
ideas. Specifically, the capitalist class attempts to single group, defined by positional prominence
persuade public opinion of the close alignment and involvement in specific policy issues, dom-
between corporate and national economic in- inates the polity; hence, denying the existence
terests (Ryan, Swanson, and Buchholz, 1987). of a ruling elite. A second variant proposes a
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clear hierarchy of power and influence among associations; creating policy-planning networks
elite groups, with business and political elites at to advocate preferred general policies; influ-
its apex and other elites having lesser political encing the selection of candidates for public
power (Dye, 1976, 2002; Hunter, 1959; Mills, office; and attempting to shape public opinion
1956; Porter, 1965). (Domhoff, 1996).
A third variant is the class-dominance model, Corporatist theories reacted to inabilities of
differing from the second variant in the in- other approaches to explain interest group ac-
terpretation of its analyses, which is based on tivities in many democratic regimes, especially
economic relations between social classes, as in European countries. Corporatism reached its
well as in relying on social class as the key el- peak in Europe during the mid-1970s and en-
ement to define elite inclusiveness (Connell, tered a decline starting in the 1980s, ironically
1977; Domhoff, 1996, 1998; Therborn, 1978). at the moment scholars began to analyze corpo-
Class-dominance and Marxism are highly ratist systems (Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982;
compatible: both emphasize the extraordinary Schmitter, 1989; Schmitter and Lehmbruch,
political power provided by ownership and con- 1979; Williamson, 1989; see Chapter 22). In that
trol of the means of production, class con- period, most democratic European states relied
flict and dominance, and the issue of inequality on centralized national bargaining between in-
pervasiveness in liberal democracies. The class- stitutionalized class, sectoral, or professional in-
dominance model indicates that the state has lit- terest groups represented by peak associations
tle autonomy to promote its own interests and that coordinated their constituencies. These ne-
goals, although its institutional structure shapes gotiations were facilitated by social democratic
the class-elite’s exercise of policy influence. The governments willing to integrate their political
class-elite is a well-defined, self-conscious, and systems after the social turmoil of the late 1960s,
tightly knit corporate community able to gen- the deinstitutionalization of the capitalist world
erate internal classwide consensus on the issues economy, and the international economic crisis
of greatest concern. Its great political influ- after 1973. This crisis consequently inaugurated
ence usually ensures the dominance of its po- lower national growth rates and the fiscal crisis
litical preferences despite opposition from pow- of the state, triggering impediments to reaching
erless groups. Domhoff (1996:18) asserted that corporatist agreements to redistribute diminish-
the United States has “(1) a small social upper ing economic wealth.
class (2) rooted in the ownership and control Corporatism’s distinctive feature is the state’s
of a corporate community that (3) is integrated leading role in orchestrating interest group par-
with a policy-planning network and (4) has ticipation in policy processes. Such political
great political power in both political parties and practice, referred to as “concertation,” is char-
dominates the federal government in Washing- acterized by explicit, officially recognized, and
ton.” He identified three interlocking networks regular cooperation and reciprocity between
of the U.S. ruling elite: upper wealth-holding these groups and the state, aimed at achiev-
class members (identified through social net- ing harmony among special interests and par-
works of schools, clubs, and intermarriage); the ticipant obligations to promote the collective
corporate community (intercorporate network good and social solidarity. Not only are inter-
of upper-class members and executives sharing est groups formally incorporated into the state
corporate boards); and policy-planning special- policy system by representing their members’
ists (corporate experts and leaders of charita- interests during consultations prior to legislative
ble foundations and policy research institutes). deliberation, but they also participate in decision
This power elite impacts government through making and assist the state to implement pub-
four processes: seeking special-interest legisla- lic policies to which they actively consent
tion by employing lobbyists, former govern- through delegated self-enforcement (Cawson,
ment lawyers and politicians, and heads of trade 1985, 1986). We focus on corporatist regimes
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allowing relatively free and plural interest It also involves governmental intervention in
groups, permitting widespread public partic- the economy and society to achieve policy
ipation, and sustaining a democratic state.3 goals regarding income distribution, welfare,
This corporatist variant (variously called “so- and other socioeconomic issues. The exception-
cietal corporatism,” “democratic corporatism,” ally minimal state economic intervention and
or “neocorporatism”) is often based on an ex- weak peak associations of the United States rel-
plicit constitution or series of contracts nego- ative to European countries are largely responsi-
tiated between the state and corporate interest ble for scholarly disregard of corporatist theory
groups spelling out mutual rights and respon- in that country (Salisbury, 1979; Wilson, 1982).
sibilities, thus giving corporatism a legal foun- Macroeconomic corporatist policies by Eu-
dation. Such attributes differ from “state cor- ropean states decayed from the late 1970s into
poratism,” where an authoritarian state imposes the 1980s as national governments lost eco-
and strongly controls all interest group activities, nomic sovereignty to implement effective
thus verging on dictatorship or fascism (Schmit- Keynesian-expansionist economic policies. This
ter, 1974). However, even neocorporatism can trend came to a close with the creation of the
undermine democratic participation and repre- European Central Bank in 1998. Moreover,
sentation. By granting monopolistic representa- fundamental aspects of nationally centralized
tion to certain interests and associations, the state collective bargaining faded by desegregation
excludes other, usually less powerful, groups. In (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991). Market insta-
this sense, not all interest groups are corpora- bilities pressured firms to increase production
tized. A substantial number remain whose re- and develop social organizational flexibility, re-
lations to the state more closely resemble the sulting in increasing exclusion of centralized
pluralist model or lack any effective political in- unions and employer associations from many
fluence. workplace-specific negotiations and collective
Interest groups under corporatism become bargaining issues. One factor was the decreas-
explicitly incorporated into the state, that is, as ing relevance, and at times counterproductiv-
agents that are no longer solely private enter- ity, of negotiations aimed at establishing broad
prises but as public actors with responsibility to standard national solutions to regulate the em-
provide stability and predictability in deciding ployment relationship. Policies had to be tai-
and implementing certain binding policies. Be- lored to improve the productivity and inter-
cause corporatism has mainly concerned eco- national competitiveness of specific sectors and
nomic policies (income policies, employment, individual enterprises. Another factor was the
inflation, fiscal policy, working conditions, accelerating differentiation of social structures
worker training, and productivity measures), and collective interests within advanced cap-
most interest groups participating in corporatist italist societies that transcend the simple class
arrangements are economic – business, labor, polarization of capital and labor. Consequently,
agriculture, and professions (Lehmbruch, 1979). policy attention changed from a class-based
The government grants a monopoly of repre- cleavage toward many discrete dimensions such
sentation to certain peak associations to speak as consumer protection, gender and ethnic
for and negotiate on behalf of their constituents identity, environmental preservation, and other
in exchange for their cooperation in develop- issues championed by social movement organi-
ing and enforcing policy decisions. Therefore, zations (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991).
corporatism requires large peak associations ca- Although corporatism declined during the
pable of representing large constituencies and 1980s, it remained the practice at all govern-
compelling their members to abide by deci- ment levels of most European states for ne-
sions negotiated through the policy process. gotiating diverse welfare-state issues (Schmitter,
1989). Some analysts detected a renaissance of
3
See Williamson (1985) and Wiarda (1997:15–24) for national macrocorporatist policy making during
different conceptions of the term corporatism. the 1990s, perhaps motivated to ensure social
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peace by counteracting the negative social con- interest groups. However, attempts to construct
sequences of the economic adjustments required a unitary theory capable of integrating all pre-
by the European Union (EU) processes of the vious perspectives also seems difficult to recon-
Single European Market and monetary union cile with the idiosyncratic social, political, and
(Grote and Schmitter, 1999). Finally, down- cultural components among diverse national in-
graded corporatist systems survived in some terest group systems. This agenda seems par-
countries by shifting from national to sectoral ticularly ill-suited for investigating nonwestern
industrial levels. This “meso-corporatism” in- democracies and other political systems found
volves policies agreements reached by the par- in African, Asian, Islamic, Latin American, and
ticipation of sectoral capital, labor, and profes- ex-socialist European countries (Wiarda, 1997;
sional associations within one industrial sector Zeigler, 1988).
(Cawson, 1985, 1986; Schmitter, 1989). Meso-
corporatist studies usually compared policy-
making process at different sectors within a organizational development
country. Researchers investigated how interests of interest groups
enter into political arenas through the interme-
diation of organizations, considered the biases At the organizational level of analysis, an inter-
of that transformation, and analyzed the distinct est group pools financial and political resources
potential to organize different interests. Still a contributed by its individual members and sup-
third level of corporatism can be discerned, porters, overcomes the weaknesses of isolated
“micro-corporatism,” referring to policy mak- persons or organizations, and coordinates joint
ing between a government agency and an in- actions that seek to influence policy makers. We
dividual monopolistic firm, but implying nei- briefly discuss five problems that many interest
ther “clientelism” nor a “franchise state” arising groups confront during their development: or-
from weak state authorities lacking autonomy ganizational formation, resource mobilization,
and dependent on serving a specific firm’s in- structural transformation, internal governance,
terests (Wolfe, 1977). and collective interest identification. Interest or-
The complexity national interest group sys- ganizations also encounter other serious dilem-
tems allows researchers to find instances sup- mas that may impede collective action, such as
porting some aspects of pluralist, Marxist, elitist, opportunism (Williamson, 1981), loss-of-power
and corporatist perspectives. Thus, any inter- (Coleman, 1973), loyalty and exit (Hirschman,
est group system explanation concentrating on 1970), and democratic accountability (Knoke,
one exclusive theory most likely will paint 1990a), which we cannot examine in depth.
an incomplete picture. In this regard, analysts Many of these organizational-level issues also
express divergent opinions about the relative arise at the interorganizational network level,
presence of alternative features emphasized by which we examine in later sections.
the different perspectives in different countries The historical trends over the past two cen-
and at different periods within a country (e.g., turies in many Western liberal democracies saw
Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982; Streeck and various interest organizations emerging at suc-
Schmitter, 1991; Thomas, 1993; Wiarda, 1997). cessive periods, encompassing ever-widening
To obtain better descriptions and explanations segments of society over time. In general se-
of interest group systems, analyses should draw quence, the initial societal interests that po-
selectively from all four approaches. This se- litically mobilized were preindustrial religious
lectivity is appropriate for advancing research and charitable organizations, followed by agri-
programs on interest groups, as scholars too of- cultural and industrial producer groups such
ten fixate on identifying where each nation fits as trade unions and employers’ organizations,
along some pluralist-corporatist continuum and then professional associations, and more recently
thus marginalize more crucial issues about vari- by identity groups such as those concerned
ations in political power and inequality among with civil liberties, minority rights, and the
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environment. Interest organization formation policies from which they could benefit regard-
seems to accelerate during periods of economic less of their individual contributions. That is,
and political disturbances that create threats and they would take a “free ride” on the group’s po-
opportunities, particularly when major ideolog- litical advocacy efforts. Olson deduced that most
ical shifts in legislative, regulatory, and judicial interest organizations would fail to mobilize
decisions affect the interests of previously passive their optimum potential supporters if they de-
or unorganized social groups (Gray and Lowery, pended solely on public goods to attract member
1996; Scholzman and Tierney, 1986:74–82). resources. Instead, membership organizations
To illustrate these dynamics with examples must offer nonpolitical “selective incentives,”
drawn from the United States, the National such as magazine subscriptions and social cama-
Grange in the late nineteenth century trans- raderie, that could be received only by members
formed itself from a service group for farm- in exchange for making contributions toward
ers into an advocacy organization demanding the organization’s public-good advocacy efforts.
governmental regulation of unrestrained rail- The free-rider conundrum changed an organi-
road prices (Browne, 1998:15; Clemens, 1997: zation’s recruitment and resource mobilization
145–83). Rates of U.S. trade association cre- strategies from emphasizing collective goals to
ation increased dramatically as national markets satisfying its members’ preferences for personal
expanded in the early twentieth century and material and social benefits. Thus, the resources
business firms sought political influence in state available organizational leaders to fight public
and national capitals (Aldrich and Staber, 1988; policy battles were a “by-product” of selling
Aldrich, Staber, Zimmer, and Beggs, 1994). selective incentives to politically disinterested
During the 1970s and 1980s, numerous busi- members, creating a conspicuous “disjuncture
ness advocacy groups took up permanent res- between member goals and group goals” (Moe,
idence in Washington, seeking political redress 1980:74).
from the newly created regulatory agencies that Despite the simple elegance of Olson’s col-
issued thousands of pages of federal regulations lective action theory, subsequent empirical re-
affecting business interests, from air pollution search revealed that many members nevertheless
to pension funds to consumer product safety desire policy solutions with little personal ben-
(Vogel, 1996). Similar expansions in interest or- efit and willingly contribute their money and
ganization populations occurred in the labor time toward achieving interest organizations’
unionization struggles of the New Deal and the public policy goals (Knoke, 1990a; Marwell and
civil rights, antiwar, feminist, environmental, Oliver, 1993; Moe, 1980). The environmental
and sexual identity movements from the 1960s conditions, internal organizational economies,
through the 1990s. and individual motivations that foster collec-
The creation of mass-membership interest tive political action appear much more complex
organizations involves an exchange process be- than Olson conceived. Several analysts proposed
tween entrepreneurial leaders, who invest their broader arrays of private- and public-good in-
social and economic capital in a set of bene- centives to overcome the temptations for indi-
fits offered to potential supporters, and mem- viduals to free ride on other members’ efforts
bers who obtain those benefits by paying dues (Etzioni, 1975; Knoke, 1990a; Knoke and
and participating in organizational activities. Wright-Isak, 1982; Oliver, 1980, 1984). James
Mancur Olson’s rational choice theory of group Q. Wilson (1973) attempted to shore up ratio-
exchange depicted as illogical or irrational any- nal choice explanations of interest organization
one who joined and provided resources to an information by positing a triad of material, sol-
terest organization that seeks only public goods idary, and purposive inducements that mobilize
from which no eligible recipient could be ex- members’ resource contributions and engage
cluded (Olson, 1965; Salisbury, 1969). Utility- them in collective political actions. Purposive
maximizing actors would refuse to pay for an incentives appeal to people’s desires to feel con-
interest organization’s efforts to influence public nected to some highly valued larger purposes
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and to achieve altruistic goals. By explicitly interests. Internal factors can also transform or-
stressing the importance of an interest organi- ganizational missions, particularly through the
zation’s professed public policy goals, purposive routinization of charismatic authority after the
incentives contradict the private-good dichoto- passing of a social movement’s founding leaders
my in Olson’s selective incentive perspective. (Glassman and Swatos, 1986). Organizational
Membership organization leaders play a cru- goal displacement occurs when oligarchic lead-
cial role in resource mobilization by identify- ers lose sight of original public policy goals
ing prospective participants, recruiting members to concentrate on achieving greater organiza-
with diverse incentives, and persuading them to tional efficiencies or simply to feather their own
contribute toward public policy influence ef- nests. Although analysts have given organiza-
forts despite the evident irrationality in maxi- tional transformation scant theoretical and em-
mizing their personal gains. pirical attention, this theme should be pursued
An important but relatively neglected corol- vigorously in future research agendas.
lary to the interest group formation problem Analysts often pose the fundamental problem
is explaining the dynamic transformation of in interest organization governance as a choice
diverse organizational forms – including so- between oligarchic or democratic alternatives.
cial movements, religious sects, professional so- Entrenched leadership and staff cliques in
cieties, academic institutions, nonprofit foun- labor unions, trade associations, fraternal
dations, for-profit businesses, and government organizations, professional societies, political
agencies – into organized political interest parties, and social movement organizations
groups. Social movements that successfully de- allegedly demonstrate an inevitable “iron law of
ploy disruptive mass protests, winning pub- oligarchy” (Michels, 1958). Oligarchs not only
lic legitimation and political acceptance from capture control of organizational governance
the established polity for their social change mechanisms but also typically pursue policy
goals, may subsequently convert into conven- goals divergent from rank-and-file preferences.
tional lobbying organizations, political parties, However, most voluntary membership organi-
or nonprofit foundations. For example, the U.S. zations depend too heavily on their members
civil rights movement, after its major victory for critical resources to enable officials to flout
ending Southern legal segregation in the 1960s, membership interests over the long run. Conse-
spawned numerous specialized advocacy orga- quently, most interest organization constitutions
nizations that persevere today in legislative and provide an array of democratic institutions,
regulatory politics in Washington and the state including competitive elections, membership
capitals (Garrow, 1989). Similarly, during the meetings, referenda, and committee systems
earlier Progressive Era, the sudden decay of mass (Berry, 1984:92–113; Knoke, 1990a:143–61).
political parties spun off activist factions into But actual practices of consulting members to
agrarian, women’s, and labor associations that formulate collective actions vary widely and re-
developed and disseminated innovative strate- searchers have little understanding of how dem-
gies and tactical repertoires for pressuring state ocratic mechanisms shape organizational capac-
and national governments on their narrowly fo- ities to mobilize members for collective actions.
cused policy interests (Clemens, 1997). The analytic task is complicated by the intri-
Less commonly, interest groups may change cate interactions of formal governance processes
into nonpolitical organizations, for example, with executive and leadership decisions, bureau-
an environmental association that decides to cratic administrative practices, environmental
make profits by publishing educational mate- conditions, and the internal economy of mem-
rials. Fluctuations in organizational forms may ber incentives.
originate from external conditions, including Organizational interests express collective
seismic shifts in popular ideological climates and preferences for specific processes or end-states.
governmental policies that unintentionally en- To assert that an organization holds a policy in-
gender new constituencies with vested policy terest means that certain public policy decisions
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are consequential for its members and the con- socially construct the collective interests of their
stituencies it claims to represent. We do not at- organizations under uncertain environmental
tempt to classify the myriad objectives that inter- constraints. Empirical researchers should rely
est organizations may pursue. Several typologies less on ad hoc interest group classifications and
propose categorizing interest groups according concentrate more on uncovering the substantive
to their primary economic, civic, recreational, factors that create and transform interest group
or identity-group attributes (Baumgartner organizations.
and Leech, 1998; Knoke, 1990a; Schlozman
and Tierney, 1986; Smith, 2000).4 Another
important topic is the relationship between la- policy research institutes
tent and manifest interests and alleged “false
consciousness” arising when individuals’ ex- Policy research institutes, also called think tanks,
pressed preferences fail to reflect their class lo- can be defined as organizations with expert
cations. Presumably, organizational interest for- members that study policy issues, actively seek
mation results from internal power struggles, to inform policy makers and other constituen-
negotiation, and persuasion among factions that cies, and try to influence the policy-making pro-
ultimately define the collective purposes and cess (Stone and Garnett, 1998). Policy research
goals. Some analysts apparently assume that institutes typically are nonprofit organizations
organizational interests are accurately revealed with relative autonomy from governments, uni-
by explicit mission statements and leaders’ ex- versities, and political parties, although they may
pressed preferences for particular policy deci- maintain formal and informal links – financial
sions. Others argue that such interests emerge and personnel – with these organizations, and
through complex interactions between organi- cooptation may occur in some cases. Their au-
zational properties and external actors. For ex- tonomy from other organizations varies from
ample, business association interests are jointly case to case and across countries, which compli-
shaped by attributes of the represented industries cates defining the line separating policy research
(“logic of membership”) and by properties of la- institutes from university research centers, gov-
bor unions and state institutions (“logic of influ- ernment research organizations, temporary gov-
ence”) (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). Unions ernmental investigative commissions, party re-
confront similar dynamics, leading to distinct search departments, or for-profit consulting
collective action problems for business and la- agencies. All these kinds of organizations, in-
bor interest organizations (Offe and Wiesenthal, dependently of any formal linkages they main-
1980). We urge that theorists give greater attain with governments, parties, and universi-
tention to specifying how members and leaders ties, perform the same activities and have similar
goals, an aspect that must be considered by re-
4 searchers assessing the numbers and influence
The Gale Encyclopedia of Associations, a prime
source of information on more than 144,000 U.S. and of organizations conducting policy research in
international organizations, classifies them into seven- different political systems (for a typology of pol-
teen categories reflecting their primary constituencies, icy research institutes see Weaver and McGann,
beneficiaries, or goals; for example, trade and pro- 2000).
fessional associations, social, welfare and public affairs The members of policy research institutes
organizations, religious, sports and hobby groups. The
U.S. Internal Revenue Service tabulates tax-exempt conduct research and analyses that combine aca-
organizations under two dozen headings, such as charita- demic and policy-relevant features. Some insti-
ble, religious, educational, scientific, civic leagues, social tutes are mainly committed to advancing schol-
welfare, local employees, labor, agricultural, horticul- arly basic and applied political research and to
tural, business leagues, chambers of commerce, real estate evaluating government problems. In other cases,
boards, social and recreational clubs, fraternal beneficiary
societies, cemetery companies, and state chartered credit their primary goal is to engage in political ad-
unions. For neither schema is any systematic theoretical vocacy and set the policy agenda, by influenc-
principle evident. ing the content and decision making of public
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policies or by shaping the ideas around political lack strong connections to the societal groups
debates through different channels and at sev- they claim to represent because they are rarely
eral policy-making stages. In their advocacy ac- membership organizations, and their staff and
tivity, some institutes pursue a more-or-less ex- administrators are usually social and political
plicit ideology (e.g., neoliberal, social democrat, elites (Domhoff, 1998). Also, on some occa-
and ecological), whereas others try to give their sions, they are too closely tied to governments
analyses an objective scholarly character. Some or specific interests (Stone, 2000).
institutes complement their research and analysis The most relevant aspect for studying pol-
activities with education, training, and informa- icy research institutes as components of spe-
tion dissemination programs. Their constituen- cific interest groups consists of assessing their
cies vary from governments, bureaucrats, po- role in infusing ideas to advance the agendas of
litical parties, international organizations, non- the groups they belong to, thus helping to de-
governmental organizations (NGOs), SMOs, velop and advance their ideological stances and
unions, businesses, churches, foundations, and policy interests (Domhoff, 1996, 1998; Sklair,
any other consumers of research, policy analy- 2001). Studies of these organizations’ roles in
ses and ideological argument. In most occasions, promoting social and economic ideologies sug-
these constituencies – together with individual gest that their activities may be a determina-
donors – fund institute activities, which may tive factor in achieving the groups’ political
constrain them to satisfy their funders’ expec- goals (Cockett, 1995; Ricci, 1993; Stefancic
tations. By remaining uncritical of their sup- and Delgado, 1996). These studies reveal, es-
porters’ policies and political views, institute pecially in the United States but also globally as
credibility as impartial policy analysts may suf- in cases of widespread neoliberalism, a typically
fer. When policy research institutes conduct unbalanced political struggle on the intellec-
research for nongovernmental constituencies, tual plane, with conservative, business-oriented,
they may act as advocates between those groups neoliberal think tanks having disproportional
and the policy makers. presence and impact in the polity compared to
Policy research institutes try to influence pol- think tanks with other ideological orientations.
icy makers by presenting analyses and arguments That imbalance originates in the larger finan-
in seminars, offering expert advice upon request cial support those conservative think tanks re-
or publicizing their research in the mass me- ceive from foundations, the constrictions that
dia, specialized publications, and conferences. liberal foundations created by wealthy capitalists
These activities may help in socially construct- pose to criticisms of capitalism and their orien-
ing a common framework to improve commu- tation toward action projects supporting the dis-
nication among the diverse actors involved in advantage rather than to ideological intellectual
policy debates, to inform the general public projects, and the fact that liberal and leftist intel-
and broad scientific communities, and to en- lectuals more often have full-time academic jobs
hance governmental transparency and account- and rarely write for policy purposes (Stefancic
ability (Weaver and McGann, 2000). Some in- and Delgado, 1996).5
stitutes also contribute to broadening the pub- Although policy research institutes have ex-
lic debate on policy issues and communicating isted for more than a century in some West-
the views of diverse and underrepresented social ern countries, they recently increased in num-
groups. Given these emphases and their creation ber and variety of research interests, size, and
by nonstate entrepreneurs, policy research insti- resources. Some recent studies cataloging this
tutes often present themselves as civil society or- type of organization estimated that more than
ganizations. Nevertheless, these institutes do not 1,200 exist in the United States (Hellebust,
always enhance societal democracy. They can
actually restrict civil society pressures, partici- 5
About the role of foundations in public policy see
pation, and access to the public debate. More- Colwell (1980, 1993), Jenkins and Shumate (1985), and
over, in many cases, policy research institutes Allen (1992).
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1997; about U.S. think tanks see Abelson and The impact, political status, and involve-
Lindquist, 2000; Ricci, 1993; Stefanic and ment of policy research institutes in policy-
Delgado, 1996) and more than 600 in West- making processes vary across countries and
ern Europe (Day, 2000). Policy research in- among institutes. Although measuring their
stitutes can also be found in Asia (Langford performance is difficult (some indicators are
and Brownsey, 1991; Yamamoto, 1995) Africa, media citations and numbers of appearances
the Middle East (CIPE 1997), Eastern Europe before legislative committees), their effective-
(Stryuck, 1999), Latin America (Levy, 1995), ness seems dependent on specific polity char-
and other regions (see Stone, Denham, and acteristics as well as institute features, strate-
Garnett, 1998, and McGann and Weaver, 2000, gies, and sociopolitical environments (Weaver
for analyses in several world regions and coun- and McGann, 2000; Weiss, 1992). Political sys-
tries and of specific think tanks).6 Although the tems with strong party unity, cabinet solidarity,
research literature primarily investigates insti- permanent senior civil service, or a traditio-
tute activities at the national level, either within nal high presence of interest-group represen-
specific countries or comparatively across na- tatives formally participating in the policy-
tions (Stone, et al., 1998), since the late 1980s making process may limit the opportunities
an increasing number of prominent think tank for think tanks to participate apart from gov-
turned to regional and global policy issues such ernmental and party activities. Highly decen-
as foreign policy, national development, or envi- tralized and fragmented political systems allow
ronmentalism. Their constituencies can also be greater access to policy makers, as in the United
international governments and NGOs, multi- States, where presidential candidates usually
national corporations, and other transnational hire think tanks to prepare policy position pa-
actors. Some institutes are not nationally but pers for their electoral campaigns (Abelson,
regionally bounded. For example, at the Euro- 2000). The revolving-door phenomenon of staff
pean Union level, these organizations are typ- experts moving from institutes to government
ically concerned with European policy issues. offices and back again boosts governmental con-
Others participate in international networks and fidence and political legitimation of institute ad-
engage in research collaborations and scholarly vice. Among institute characteristics, their en-
exchanges and even establish subsidiaries outside dowments and funding resources, the quality of
their home countries that can provide political their staffs, and consequently of their research
assistance to develop civil society, democratic, output, may all affect their influence over and
and economic institutions. Examples of inter- demand from policy makers. Countries differ
national networks are the Global ThinkNet, in appropriate political, legal, and intellectual-
which brings together directors of the world’s scholarly environments for policy research in-
leading think tanks, and the Global Develop- stitutes to acquire optimal quantity and quality
ment Network, which convenes many policy of financial and human resources. Also for in-
research institutes specializing in development stitutes aiming to shape public policy debates,
(Stone, 2000). the potential for mass-media appearances is an
indispensable influence activity, whereas actual
media access depends on their recognition and
6
acceptance as legitimate policy players. Overall,
Prominent U.S. policy institutes include the Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Brookings the ideological orientation of policy research in-
Institution, CATO Institute, Heritage Foundation, stitutes, their affiliation with powerful interest
National Bureau of Economic Research, and Rand groups, or simply sharing common values with
Corporation, whereas examples from other nations in- these groups, may be key factors differentiating
clude the Centre for European Policy Studies, Latin which institutes have high access and impact on
American Faculty of Social Science, Institute for
Democracy in South Africa, Japanese National Institute the public and the policy-making process, inde-
for Research Advancement, and Australian Institute of pendently of specific characteristics of national
International Affairs. political environments.
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policy networks entire policy network (Brass, 1995; Knoke and

Guilarte, 1994). Five basic types of interor-
One important perspective on interest group ganizational relations, which typically exhibit
participation in public policy making, which contrasting network structures, include resource
seeks to transcend the arid debate over plu- exchange, information transmission, power re-
ralism versus corporatism, is the application of lations, boundary penetration, and sentimental
sociopolitical network perspectives to policy attachments (Knoke, 2001:65). Although many
domains characterized by multiple interorga- network ties involve voluntary resource ex-
nizational relations (Börzel, 1998; John, 2001; changes, governmental mandates – such as legis-
Knoke, 1990b; Richardson, 2000; Thatcher, lation and administrative regulations – typically
1998). A policy domain comprises a set of inter- impose and enforce interorganizational arrange-
est group organizations, legislative institutions, ments on a policy domain.
and governmental executive agencies that en- Analysts seek to understand policy network
gage in setting agendas, formulating policies, formation, the persistence and change of net-
gaining access, advocating positions, organiz- work relations over time, and the consequences
ing collective influence actions, and selecting of policy network structures for interest group
among proposals concerned with delimited organizations, governmental agencies, and the
substantive policy problems, such as national policy domain as a whole. Comparative ana-
defense, education, agriculture, or welfare lysts examine the unique historical roots of na-
(Burstein, 1991; Laumann and Knoke, 1987:10). tional differences in the structural relations be-
Policy proposals may involve proactive solutions tween state institutions and organized interest
to solve perceived problems, such as reforming groups and their consequences for policy pro-
the U.S. national health care system (Skocpol, cesses and outcomes (e.g., Baumgartner, 1996).
1996), or reactive efforts intended to block or An expanding volume of empirical policy net-
evade changing the status quo, such as restor- work studies spans the levels of analysis rang-
ing farm price subsidies. Social network the- ing from cities (Melbeck, 1998; Stokman and
ories make three basic assumptions about mu- Berveling, 1998), states (Mintrom and Vergari,
tual influences between networks and actors in 1998), regions (Ansell, 2000; Grote, 1998), and
a domain: (1) the social structure of any com- industries (Raab, 2002) to national (Maman,
plex system consists of the stable patterns of 1997; Schneider, 1992), multilevel (Benz and
repeated interactions connecting actors to one Eberlein, 1999), transnational nongovernmen-
another; (2) these social relations are the pri- tal (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 1999), and global
mary explanatory units of analysis, rather than policy networks (Ronit and Schneider, 1999;
the attributes and characteristics of the individ- Witte, Reinicke, and Benner, 2000). Because
ual actors; and (3) the perceptions, attitudes, we lack space to review this vast empirical liter-
and actions of actors are shaped by the multiple ature, we concentrate on conceptual and theo-
structural networks within which they are em- retical themes.
bedded, and in turn their behaviors can change The earliest policy network schemes were
these networks’ structures (Knoke, 2001:63–4). criticized for metaphorical overkill, rampant
That is, actors can be strongly proactive agents terminological confusion, and typological pro-
who strategically manage their diverse net- liferation (Dowding, 1995, 2002; Thatcher,
work connections to reduce uncertainties aris- 1998). Many initial conceptualizations simply
ing from their pursuit of organizational advan- described a policy network as a set of state
tage (Galaskiewicz, 1985). and private-sector political actors. The theo-
Applied to policy domains, social network retical challenge was to move beyond generic
theory directs researchers’ attention toward the metaphors by using rigorous network principles
causes of multiplex interorganizational ties and to specify explanatory models that allow ana-
their subsequent effects on both the level of lysts “to understand what goes on within pol-
individual organizational behaviors and of the icy networks” (Raab, 1992:78; also Pappi and
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Henning, 1998). Kenis and Schneider (1991) energy, and science – compelled greater par-
framed a useful definition involving three fun- ticipation by professionals, consultants, and re-
damental network elements as follows: search experts. The variety of unique national
institutional responses to these historical trans-
A policy network is described by its actors, their link-
formations spawned an array of policy network
ages and its boundary. It includes a relatively stable
set of mainly public and private corporate actors. models designed to explain those developments.
The linkages between the actors serve as channels During the eighteen-year Conservative regime
for communication and for the exchange of infor- of Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John
mation, expertise, trust and other policy resources. Majors, British policy making shifted from en-
The boundary of a given policy network is not in the trenched subgovernments (i.e., policy domains
first place determined by formal institutions but re- at the national ministerial level) that tightly con-
sults from a process of mutual recognition dependent
trolled the consensual policy agendas character-
on functional relevance and structural embeddedness.
istic of corporatism, toward more fluid and un-
Several analysts, particularly British schol- predictable forms of interest group consultation
ars, tried to identify the key policy network and intermediation with government ministries
dimensions typifying national network struc- (Richardson, 2000:1009–11). British political
tures according to their differentiated plu- scientists elaborated a “policy community” con-
ralist and corporatist features (Atkinson and cept to describe self-organizing groups drawing
Coleman, 1989, 1992; Jordan and Schubert, policy participants from government bureaucra-
1992; Rhodes, 1985, 1990). One analyst con- cies and related pressure organizations ( Jordan,
structed an especially complex typology, involv- 1990; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1990;
ing eight dimensions, that classified eleven types Wilks and Wright, 1987). The rising power
of relations between state agencies and orga- and influence of British interest groups to in-
nized interest groups (van Waarden, 1992). He fluence authoritative resource allocations and
concluded that policy networks had three pri- policy outcomes was evident from their in-
mary dimensions: (1) the numbers and types creased political exchanges and informal rela-
of organizational actors involved (ranging from tions within these policy communities. By the
monopolistic to unlimited), (2) the major net- 1990s, the “hollowing out” of the state sec-
work functions (ranging from organizing lobby- tor, new public management practices, and ris-
ing to implementing public policies), and (3) the ing intergovernmental management had thrust
balance of power between state and private or- networks into “a pervasive feature of [human]
ganizations. But, static typologies carry limited service delivery in Britain” (Rhodes, 1996).
capacity to explain which conditions facilitate Rhodes concluded that policy network auton-
the emergence, development, and consequences omy threatened to undermine reforms rooted
of distinctive policy network configurations. in market competition and challenged gov-
The rich variety of alternative policy net- ernability by resisting central state guidance.
work models proposed by British, American, Marsh and Smith (2000) proposed a dialecti-
and German researchers reflects several sub- cal model of policy network change involving
stantial changes in the polities of advanced mutual relations among structure, agency, con-
industrial societies in the 1970s and 1980s. texts, and policy outcomes. They applied the
Common trends toward decreased govern- model’s causal and feedback relations to explain
mental regulation, greater privatization, and changes in British agricultural policy since the
more reliance on market transactions in vari- 1930s.
ous domestic policy domains generated remark- In the United States, the historic post–
ably open and fluid state interest-group rela- Watergate institutional reforms and the so-called
tions (Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett, 1998; Reagan revolution shattered the cozy “iron tri-
Hulsink, 1999; Swann, 1988). The growing angles,” binding a captive federal agency and
scope and technical complexity of many pol- a subservient congressional subcommittee to
icy domains – such as environmental, health, corporate clients, that had long dominated the
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political agenda and policy decisions. In their involve short-term, shifting coalitions assem-
place arose diffuse, malleable “issue networks” bled to fight collectively to influence the for-
of experts and information brokers, where mul- mulation and outcome of authoritative pol-
tiple streams of policy solutions chaotically com- icy decisions. The communication and resource
peted in unpredictable “garbage can” processes exchange structures enable the domain’s orga-
(Gais, Peterson, and Walker, 1984; Heclo, 1978; nizations to identify potential collaborators and
Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury, 1993; opponents of a policy event. Typically, opposing
Kingdon, 1984). Political sociologists analyzed action sets, consisting of subsets of domain orga-
policy networks from an explicit social exchange nizations sharing common policy preferences,
perspective on interorganizational relationships pool their political resources and pressure gov-
among governmental, corporate, and interest ernmental decision makers to choose a policy
group organizations. Their structural analyses outcome favorable to their interests. Once the
emphasized the patterns of multiplex ties across policy decision occurs, these coalitions break
information, resource, and political support apart as subsequent events give rise to new
networks among organizations with overlapping constellations of organized interest groups. The
policy interests. These interorganizational con- resulting patterns are fluid, continually changing
nections enable shifting organizational coali- network structures. Yet, despite this microlevel
tions to mobilize their combined political flux, national policy domains remain compar-
resources in collective actions that attempt to atively stable, socially constructed macrosys-
influence the outcomes of public policy deci- tems whose boundaries and constituents per-
sions (Browne, 1998; Hula, 1999). sist over long periods (Burstein, 1991; Knoke,
This interorganizational approach to policy 2004).
networks provided the theoretical and method- The changing structural relationships be-
ological foundations of the organizational state tween the German state and its civil society,
model that Laumann, Knoke, Pappi, and their especially following reunification, triggered an-
colleagues developed from their comparative alytic examination of “webs of relatively sta-
analyses of the U.S. national energy and health ble and ongoing relationships which mobilize
policy domains and the U.S., German, and dispersed resources so that collective (or paral-
Japanese labor policy domains (Knoke, Pappi, lel) action can be orchestrated toward the so-
Broadbent, and Tsujinaka, 1996; Laumann and lution of a common policy problem” (Kenis
Knoke, 1987; see Knoke, 1998, for a detailed and Schneider, 1991:21). The Germanic ap-
overview of these projects). The organizational proach treats policy networks as a distinct par-
state model conceptualizes national policy mak- ticular form of governance that provides an
ing as a process conducted by formal organiza- alternative to hierarchical and market mech-
tions rather than by individual elite persons who anisms for resolving conflicting policy pref-
act as agents of their organizational principals. erences (Börzel, 1998:258–62). Functionally
These core players are distributed across such autonomous subsystems of mutually interde-
broad public- and private-sector categories as la- pendent governmental and private-sector in-
bor unions, business associations, corporations, terest organizations jointly coordinate pub-
public interest groups, state and local govern- lic policy making through their disaggregated
ment associations, executive agencies and min- problem-solving interactions. In the absence of
istries, and legislative committees. In every pol- central hierarchical authorities possessing suffi-
icy domain, some organizations may be involved cient legitimate power to impose political so-
in dozens of policy issues and dozens of legisla- lutions, cooperative policy blocks (based on
tive, executive, and judicial policy events. Given communication, trust, support, resource ex-
their divergent organizational interests and frag- change, and other interorganizational relations)
mented attention spans, no leading organiza- provide an informal institutionalized framework
tion can control or even dominate a domain’s with the capacity to mobilize sufficient po-
policy making. Rather, most policy struggles litical resources for successful complex policy
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bargaining and collective decision making and Richardson, 1993; Streeck and Schmitter,
(Benz, 1995; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Mayntz, 1991). European peak associations that repre-
1993). sent broadly encompassing industrial, commer-
cial, and agricultural business interests began to
form immediately after the Treaty of Rome in
interest organization systems 1958, and peak groups representing workers and
consumers were formed in 1973. But numer-
European Union ous more-specialized sectoral associations also
formed (654 had already registered by 1985),
The European Union produces a large amount which were rarely affiliated and never subordi-
of public policy, resulting in the emergence and nated to the European peak associations. The
institutionalization of stable policy communities Commission encouraged these specialized as-
and interest-group networks that establish regu- sociations and established a procedure for rec-
lar relations with EU formal political institutions ognizing their special European status, which
(Coen, 1998; Fligstein and Sweet, 2001, 2002; implied privileged access to its deliberations.
Greenwood, 1997).7 The EU constitutes a new Initially, the Commission attempted to confine
political structure for interest groups in addition lobbying to certified European associations, but
to the national and subnational political insti- subsequently it permitted an increasing volume
tutions of each member state. And the relevant of direct contacts with national interest repre-
interest group systems at both these levels are sentatives.
altered by the presence of the EU system that, For few years after 1968 and until the early
in some instances, provides a lobbying alterna- 1970s, coincident with the accession to power
tive for national and subnational interest orga- of social democratic parties in major member
nizations (Coen, 1998). Neofunctional theory countries, an ambitious program was inaugu-
of European integration predicted the creation rated to extend supranational authority over a
of an interest-group system fostered by the EU wide range of social policies. Macroeconomic
institutions, especially by the European Com- and social policies were discussed in a series
mission (Haas, 1958). The Commission, as the of Tripartite Conferences with European peak
primary initiator of policy making in the EU, associations, national representatives of capital
depends heavily on consultations with interest and labor, officials of national governments,
group representatives, national government em- and the Commission (Streeck and Schmitter,
ployees, and technical experts for drafting reg- 1991). The labor movement seemed about to
ulations and monitoring compliance. That sys- receive similar substantive concessions and insti-
tem developed a character closer to pluralist than tutional privileges at the European level, com-
to corporatist: although interest group access parable to rights it was obtaining simultaneously
to the EU was institutionalized, the system rein member countries. This expectation ended
mains organizationally fragmented, nonhierar- in 1978 when the strongest proponent of Euro-
chically integrated, internally competitive, and corporatism, the European Trade Union Con-
with little control of peak associations over their federation, withdrew its support due to lack of
affiliates or of associations over their members progress and rising dissent within its ranks fo-
(Greenwood, Grote, and Ronit, 1992; Mazey mented by ideological divisions and interest dis-
parities across national labor movements (Visser
7
By 1992 the Commission estimated the presence of and Ebbinghaus, 1992). Two other factors also
3,000 interest groups in Brussels and up to 10,000 em- contributed to prevent the anticipated break-
ployees working in the lobbying sector (CEC, 1992:4). through (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991). First,
This estimation includes “listening posts” to gather insignificant business factions interested in cen-
formation on funding opportunities or policy initiatives tralized negotiations with labor were absent.
and did not include those individuals who visit Brussels
to lobby without being based there. Many of those em- European businesses, represented in Brussels by
ployees are experts on technical issues considered in the both lobbyists for individual firms and sectoral
policies. trade associations, are primarily interested in the
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protection and regulation of their product mar- reduced risk of policy failures. The system also
kets. They have refused to support the transfer reduces risks for the interest organizations by
of social policy matters from national to Euro- enabling them to influence the policy process
pean arenas by denying European peak associ- or, at least, to know what is going on (Mazey
ations the authority to negotiate binding com- and Richardson, 2001a). Interests groups have
mitments on behalf of their national business an incentive to participate in the European pol-
constituencies. Second, the unanimity princi- icy processes to avoid adverse effects of new reg-
ple, which guided most decisions of the Eu- ulations. Interest groups also lobby to promote
ropean Council until 1986, enabled any inter- the creation of new legislation to regulate their
est group seeking to block a policy initiative activity, which can disadvantage nonparticipant
to obtain the needed support of just one na- rival groups unaware of the importance of the
tional government willing to cast its veto in the European policy process or less able or willing to
Council. Finally, for the foreseeable future the mobilize the necessary resources to participate.
EU interest-group system seems unlikely to per- In this sense, once a set of interest groups began
form macrocorporativist policy making because to participate in European-level policy making,
it still lacks two necessary conditions to make others were bound to follow to avoid the nega-
it feasible: autonomous redistributive capabil- tive consequences of the resulting policy regu-
ity and a relative political equilibrium among lations (Coen, 1998; Fligstein and Sweet, 2001,
class organizations (Schmitter, 1996; see Falkner, 2002; Mazey and Richardson, 2001). Most in-
1998, for an optimistic view in that regard). terest groups engage in transnational European
Multiple lobbying venues exist within the policies, but some participate to destabilize na-
multilevel political system of the European tional rules and regulations that they oppose.
Union (Mazey and Richardson, 2001b) but the The system also includes social movement or-
main interest group target has been the Euro- ganizations that usually engage in noninstitu-
pean Commission. Lobbying pressures on the tional forms of pressure at the national level but
national representatives in the European Coun- some either accommodate their political activity
cil operate at the domestic level within each at the European level to the institutional chan-
member state rather than at the EU level. Na- nels established by the EU institutions for lobby-
tional lobbying also influences the implemen- ing (Marks and McAdam, 1999) or get their in-
tation of EU directives inside the states (Coen, terests represented in the European institutions
1998). The European Parliament has adopted by pressuring their national political authorities
a restrictive approach to lobbying as a result (Tarrow, 1995).
of criticisms about corruption, and the other Although the Commission prefers to deal
EU institutions have only minor roles in policy with Euro-associations that aggregate national
making. Conversely, the European Commission interests groups, and has encouraged NGOs to
recognizes the utility of a robust interest-group participate, in practice it cannot rely solely on
system and actively promotes its development such organizations for consultations because it
by a clearly stated preference for open consul- must ensure the technical robustness of the pol-
tations with interest groups representing broad icy proposals (the Commission decides much of
constituencies (CEC, 1992).8 The system con- the detail of policies). The Commission mo-
stitutes a source of information, support, and le- bilizes all the stakeholders involved in a pol-
gitimacy for the Commission, contributing to a icy issue, which may prefer direct lobbying or
forming ad hoc coalitions to mediation by Euro-
8
The Commission has attempted to regulate the con- associations.9 Mazey and Richardson (2001a)
sultation process to manage more effectively the scattered distinguished between “thin” and “thick”
interest-group system. The result has been a very basic
set of guidelines and voluntary codes of practice sup-
9
plemented with informal rules and norms (Greenwood, Euro-associations on specific issues, about 800 by
1997). One goal of these regulations is to discourage 2000, experience a complex and slow process of con-
corruption relations, which are sanctioned by exclusion sensus building and usually lack internally the technical
from the policy process. expertise required in many policy decisions.
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institutional sites where consultations can occur. gay and lesbian rights, and other identity-group
The former are open sites such as very large con- social movements that erupted during the 1960s
ferences, forums, or seminars, whose partici- and 1970s. Reacting to new regulatory agencies,
pants often have rather weak or no relationships. such as the Environmental Protection (EPA) and
Thin sites allow the Commission to demonstrate Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA), busi-
an open and accessible policy-making style and ness advocacy associations inundated Washing-
facilitates legitimation of the policy process and ton seeking political relief from mushrooming
the identification of key players and points of federal regulations. The numbers of registered
consensus. Thick sites consist of restricted loca- lobbyists and advocacy groups increased dramat-
tions involving only the key players. They have ically in the last four decades of the twentieth
more intense and regular relationships over time century (Heinz et al., 1993). Post–Watergate
and allow detailed technical negotiations about reforms of the 1970s curtailed autocratic con-
issues, and as a result Commission officials at- gressional committee chairmen while increasing
tempt to obtain practical and sound policy pro- subcommittee autonomy, giving interest groups
posals within the wider parameters established numerous access points to press their policy
in the thin sites. claims and grievances.
Finally, as the set of topics of this section about Those reforms also vastly expanded the role
the EU indicates, research has focused on the ac- of political action committees (PACs), which
tivity of interest groups on EU institutions, spe- solicited, pooled, and dispensed electoral cam-
cially the European Commission, where more paign donations by corporations, trade associa-
interest intermediation activity occurs. This ap- tions, labor unions, and interest groups. Many
proach to the issue of interest groups and EU critics concluded that the ensuing deluge of po-
has been one-sided. Until recently analysts have litical money, especially loosely regulated “soft
tended to disregard the study of other side, con- money” contributions made directly to politi-
sisting of analyzing the effects of EU integration cal parties, ultimately corrupted American pol-
and policy making on the member states’ inter- icy making by allowing wealthy business donors
est group systems, as well as those of candidate unhindered access to and influence over elected
countries seeking to join the EU. Research has officials whom they had financially backed
recently started on these kinds of processes, sug- (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller, 1998; Sabato
gesting the relevance of the penetration of na- and Simpson, 1996). However, evidence that
tional politics by issues defined at the EU level connects campaign contributions directly to
and the nation state polity as a still valid and public policy outcomes is mixed, suggesting that
necessary arena of interest intermediation that any relation between donors and recipients op-
balances the lack of EU social policy (Grote and erates more subtly than via an overt quid pro
Schmitter, 1999). quo exchange of campaign money for congres-
sional votes (Goidel, Gross, and Shields, 1999;
Grenzke, 1989; Mizruchi, 1992; Wright, 1996).
United States Research on U.S. interest-group participa-
tion in policy making emphasizes the impor-
The policy influence actions and impacts of U.S. tance of organizational coalitions to influence
interest groups respond to political and institu- the outcomes of specific public policy events.
tional changes, particularly historical ideolog- Interest groups with shared interests in passing
ical shifts in legislative, executive, regulatory, or defeating particular legislative proposals co-
and judicial conditions (Berry, 1977; Schlozman alesce into temporary coalitions that pool their
and Tierney, 1986; Vogel, 1996). In the New political and financial resources and coordinate
Deal, labor unions entered the Democratic a lobbying campaign targeted at relevant pub-
Party’s electoral coalition. Public interest groups lic policy makers (Hula, 1999). Typically, short-
and their liberal sociopolitical agendas flour- term coalitions fight collectively over a specific
ished during the civil rights, antiwar, feminist, policy event and then disband after the political
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authorities rendered their decision. Subse- defined as coalitions of organizations that hold
quently, new coalitions band together, com- the same preferred event outcome (passage or
posed of different participants lured by the sub- failure of a bill), communicate directly or in-
stantive policy interests at stake in a new pol- directly with one another about policy affairs,
icy proposal. Many coalitions are assembled and and consciously coordinate their policy influ-
led by an enduring set of core organizations, ence activities. Labor unions and business asso-
primarily the peak or encompassing organiza- ciations were the primary coalition leaders in all
tions with broad mandates to defend and ad- three nations, frequently taking opposing posi-
vance the policy interests of sizable constituency tions on legislative bills and almost never col-
(Hojnacki, 1997). Examples of peak associations laborating in the same action set even on rare
from diverse policy areas include the AFL–CIO, occasions when they preferred the same policy
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Medi- outcome.
cal Association, and Sierra Club. Debate continues to rage over the influence
Network analysts revealed that global pat- by business, labor, and public interest organi-
terns of information exchange among politi- zations on public policy outcomes. PAC do-
cal organizations were structured around their nations, organizational resources, and lobbying
common interests in national policy domains. coalition activities are just three factors in com-
A policy domain comprises the set of orga- plex political calculations by Senators and Rep-
nizations and institutions engaged in conflicts resentatives, which also include these politicians’
over specific proposals to solve substantive pol- party affiliations, personal ideology, perceived
icy problems, such as national defense, educa- constituency preferences, and instincts for self-
tion, agriculture, or welfare. Researchers ap- preservation. By assisting public officials behind
plied an organizational-state conceptualization the scenes to shape technically arcane details
to investigate how interorganizational commu- of legislative and regulatory proposals, lobby-
nication networks generated collective action ists reaped the fruits planted by campaign funds.
campaigns by interest groups in the U.S. national This view of political money as mainly a door-
energy, health, agriculture, and labor policy do- opening device is consistent with John Wright’s
mains (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Heinz et al., (1990) analyses of two controversial bills con-
1993) and in a comparison of U.S., German, sidered by the House Ways and Means and the
and Japanese labor policy domains (Knoke et al., Agriculture Committee in 1985. He concluded
1996). The latter study found that the more cen- that the Representatives’ committee votes were
tral an organization in both the communication best explained, not by PAC money, but by the
network (measured by policy information ex- total number of contacts they had with groups
changes) and the support network (measured on each side of the issue. “Consistent with
by resource exchanges), the higher was its rep- the popular notion that money ‘buys’ access
utation as an especially influential player in la- but not votes, campaign contributions influ-
bor policy. Similarly, greater centrality in both enced voting decisions indirectly through lob-
networks led to more involvement across nu- bying” (1990:433–4). Similarly, interest groups
merous legislative events in six types of politi- achieved greater subjective success in influenc-
cal influence activities, including coalitions with ing federal agency rule making through formal
other organizations. In the U.S. and German procedures (e.g., commenting on proposed rules
cases, the communication centrality effect was and participating at public hearings).
much stronger than the support centrality effect Information networking and coalition for-
on both organizational reputations and politi- mation are indispensable tactics for organized
cal activities, whereas the pattern in Japan was interest groups to stay abreast of policy op-
just the reverse (Knoke et al., 1996:120). De- portunities and to persuade policy makers to
tailed analyses of specific legislative decisions adopt to their preferred solutions. Disjointed
showed that most national labor policy fights policy struggles, in which no factions attain per-
were conducted by relatively small action sets, petual domination, are more consistent with
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pluralist theories of power structures than with principles, and methods to investigate collec-
corporatist or class-based explanations of the tive actions by interest organizations to influ-
U.S. policy process. The centrifugal pulls of nar- ence state policy-making institutions. But, we
row industrial, occupational, ethnic, and geo- recognize that the organizational state model
graphic interests split fragile coalitions and di- of interorganizational networks in national pol-
lute interests group capacities to achieve their icy domains currently remains theoretically un-
political goals. Among the consequences of in- derspecified as a logically coherent explanatory
tensified lobbying by large numbers of interest structure. It also ignores several central themes
organizations, in the context of party polar- of alternative perspectives, such as class con-
ization and persistently divided government, flict, electoral constraint, governance institu-
was increased political overload, ungovernabil- tions, and elite leadership.
ity, and policy gridlock – the inability to en- We also consider that any research program
act significant proposals on the national policy mainly concerned with concluding about clas-
agenda (Rose, 2001; Skocpol, 1996). Chronic sifying interest group systems relative to a variety
policy log jams plagued not only the United of models and overtime is a task of little benefit.
States but also Japan, South Korea, the United Specially, because it requires an inductive sim-
Kingdom and other European democracies as plification of political reality, whereas we rather
the twenty-first century dawned. contend the need of emphasizing its complex-
ity by considering the possibility that insights
of research made under different foundational
conclusion approaches and of research in other fields show
to be relevant to an accurate reflection of the
Future research should concentrate on con- different processes intervening in the cases an-
structing and testing more comprehensive the- alyzed. This call to accurate complexity rather
oretical explanations of the origin, develop- than abstract simplification is especially perti-
ment, and impact of organized interest groups nent in the study of conflicting interest among
on national policy-making systems. Various plu- social actors, where unstated assumptions, mis-
ralist, Marxist, elitist, and corporatist theories specifications, and inaccurate statements about
could benefit from more rigorous specification, who benefits from pressure on state officials can
refinement, and modification of their origi- be easily interpreted as fruit of interested research.
nal premises, as well as by integrating research Some examples of complex aspects in the
from alternative approaches to power and po- study of interest group activities that deserve
litical action. We urge interest-group theorists consideration in further research are relation-
to incorporate perspectives paying greater at- ships (formal and informal connections, finan-
tention to cultural, social constructionist, struc- cial and personal support) among associated
tural, and institutionalization processes, as ana- organized interest groups, social movements,
lyzed by scholars with other research objectives and political parties acting collectively to achieve
in political sociology and in such related fields common goals; processes of transformation
as economic sociology, organization studies, and from interest groups to political parties or vice
political economy (e.g., Fligstein, 1990, 2001; versa; effects of the changing ideological and
Garret, 1998; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000; structural political context on the formation and
Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez, 1997; operation of interest groups (the EU case is
Perrow, 1986, 2002; White, 2002). For interest- an important example because of its dynamic
group research to flourish in the twenty-first development); variation in the political power
century, its sociological practitioners must forge of business groups resulting from the chang-
stronger intellectual ties to specialists studying ing relevance of their activities (e.g., as a con-
interest groups, particularly social movement sequence of economic globalization) for states’
and state organization analysts. Our personal economic objectives; organized policy disorga-
preference is to apply social network concepts, nization (i.e., tacit intentional activity on the
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part of groups aiming to block the progress of to pressure-group actions. The alternative forms
policymaking initiatives they do not want to of linkage between these states and their civil so-
advance); and consideration of inclusions and cieties undoubtedly means that interest-group
exclusions (both of groups and ideas) in polit- theories and research methods created for ad-
ical processes as a result of “structural power” vanced Western democratic nations must be
(i.e., the ability of actors to exert power with- substantially altered to fit other conditions. A
out expression of rational individual decisions closely related research issue is the impact that
but rather through cultural institutions and rou- thousands of nongovernmental organizations,
tine behavior embedded in political or relational such as the World Trade Organization and
structures). Amnesty International, have on national and lo-
Another significant challenge ahead is to ex- cal interest-group systems. As NGOs proliferate,
tend interest group research to the developing they become increasingly important players in
nations of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin influencing public policies in education, health,
America, and the Middle East. Some countries trade, justice, environmental, and other national
in these geographic areas lack the full range policy domains. Eventually, emerging networks
of Western democratic norms and institutions, that closely connect transnational advocacy or-
such as multiparty competitive elections and ganizations to local interest groups may give cre-
a free press, that both stimulate and respond dence to a new adage: “all politics is global.”
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chapter fifteen
Corporate Control, Interfirm Relations,

and Corporate Power1
Mark S. Mizruchi and Deborah M. Bey
In a democracy, citizens possess an array of rights debate began to lose steam in the early 1990s.
and privileges. Among these benefits is that all By the turn of the twenty-first century, few so-
citizens are viewed as equal in the eyes of the law. ciologists or political scientists were writing on
No one is intrinsically endowed with a dispro- the topic.
portionate set of political privileges. All citizens Despite the apparent decline in attention
have a right to pursue their political objectives, given to the concentration of power, there seems
as long as they do so in a legally sanctioned to be no reason to doubt its relevance. A series
manner. of scandals swept the business world at the turn
Although all citizens in a democracy have for- of the twenty-first century in the wake of a
mal political equality, some are able to exercise major stock market downturn and recession.
more power than others. Sometimes this occurs Concerns about the role of money in politics,
within the confines of normal political action, and the role of corporations in national polit-
when one group develops a position that garners ical debates, remain strong. We believe that an
widespread support. In other situations, some assessment of theory and research on national
actors may have resources that provide them power structures, especially in light of changing
with an advantage independent of the quality world conditions, is warranted.
of their ideas. In this chapter we examine the debates con-
No observer of modern democratic societies cerning the structure of power in developed
denies that some political actors have signifi- capitalist societies. Because much of this de-
cantly more power than others. The issue is bate involved the role of large corporations, we
how this power is distributed, both the extent to pay particular attention to the issues of corpo-
which it is concentrated among a relatively small rate control and business political activity. We
group and the extent to which the structure is begin by briefly recapitulating the debates
malleable. For several decades, beginning in the from earlier decades. We show that arguments
1950s, social scientists engaged in a vigorous de- about the concentration of political power ul-
bate about the level of political inequality and timately hinged on conceptions of the role of
its effect on the functioning of democracy. This corporations in capitalist societies. After dis-
cussing the relations among corporate control,
1 corporate power, and democracy, we present
Research for this chapter was supported in part
by the Werner Reimers Foundation and the Volk- four perspectives that have been proposed
swagen Foundation. Please direct correspondence to to account for these relations under current
Mizruchi at the Department of Sociology, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 48104 phone (734) 764- conditions. We conclude with an assessment
7444, FAX (734) 763-6887, email mizruchi@umich. of these perspectives and an agenda for future
edu. work.
310
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Corporate Control, Corporate Power 311
democracy, capitalism, and accurate, this picture implied that the divisions
corporate power among the elite – the precondition for democ-
racy according to pluralists – were either nonex-
All contemporary democratic societies are based istent or, if they existed, insignificant. Much of
on systems of representation. In a theoretical the debate over whether the United States and
representative democracy, citizens form posi- other developed capitalist countries were demo-
tions on issues and convey their views to elected cratic thus became a debate over the extent to
representatives, whose job is to make policies which their elites were unified.
consistent with those positions. In writing about Two important questions flowed from this
American society in the early twentieth cen- issue. First, of whom does the elite consist, and
tury, Joseph Schumpeter (1942) observed that second, are some components of the elite more
most citizens were apathetic about politics and significant than others? Regarding the former,
were not actively engaged in the political pro- not all participants in this debate were explicit
cess. Instead, political elites were able to operate about exactly who were the elites about whom
basically unimpeded, without significant input they were writing. Most members of Hunter’s
from their constituents. If democracy is based local elite were officials of major corporations
on representatives responding to the public, and banks, but his elite also included noncorpo-
Schumpeter asked, then how could the system rate professionals (most of whom were lawyers),
function if the public was largely inactive? government officials, the idle rich, and even two
The answer, Schumpeter suggested, was that labor leaders. For Mills, the national “power
political elites were fundamentally divided. As elite” consisted of the heads of leading corpora-
long as one group of elites was without power, tions, the government (primarily the executive
its members could appeal to the public to re- branch), and the military. Critics of Hunter and
place the incumbents with those presumably Mills did not dispute the existence of elite mem-
more favorable to their interests. Democracy, bers of society nor did they take issue with the
for Schumpeter and later observers (Galbraith, claim that these elites were primarily the leaders
1952; Lipset, 1962), was redefined as a sys- of major organizations. They argued instead that
tem whereby elites competed for the votes of because the electorate had the ultimate say in
a largely passive electorate. This position, later who maintained office, office holders, regardless
known as “elite pluralism,” became the domi- of their social background, must be responsive
nant perspective among political scientists dur- to their constituents.
ing the mid-twentieth century. On the question of whether some compo-
Elite pluralism was sharply challenged by nents of the elite were more important than
some sociologists, most notably Floyd Hunter others, some Marxist critics (see, for example,
(1953) and C. Wright Mills (1956). Hunter, in Sweezy, 1968[1956]) argued that despite the
a study of elites in a large Southern city, and multiple institutional backgrounds of elites, ul-
Mills, in a study of national elites in the United timately it was business elites who played the
States, both concluded that American society dominant role. Interestingly, the early plural-
was dominated politically by a small group of ists who addressed this topic were willing to
leaders that included both the heads of major concede that business elites had the potential to
organizations as well as top political officials. dominate. What prevented this from occurring,
These elites, according to Hunter and Mills, and allowed democracy to continue, according
formed a largely cohesive community, unified to these thinkers, was the fact that business it-
not only through common interests in maintain- self was politically divided. In an early study,
ing their privileges but also through common Galbraith (1952) acknowledged that corpora-
socialization experiences (including attendance tions had the potential for enormous power.
at elite prep schools and universities), common Because different industries had inherently con-
membership in social clubs and policy-making flicting interests (what Galbraith called “cou-
organizations, and social and kinship ties. If ntervailing power”), however, business was
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312 Mark S. Mizruchi and Deborah M. Bey
unable to operate as a unified political actor. (see Mizruchi, 1982, for a discussion of these
This was demonstrated in a subsequent study works). There is now some question about just
by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1972[1963]), who how dominant the U.S. banks were during this
showed that members of different industries period (Roe, 1994).2 There was little contro-
frequently held conflicting views (and acted versy within the sociological community writ-
in opposition to one another) with regard to ing during the mid-century, however. If ever
protective tariff legislation. Dahl (1958) pro- there was a period in American history when
vided a theoretical expression of this position. a unified capitalist class existed, these theorists
As Dahl argued, for a group to be powerful it argued, the period from 1890 to 1920 was it.
must have both a high level of resources and a Many of the sociologists who acknowledged
high level of unity. Even groups whose mem- the high degree of business unity in the early
bers have enormous amounts of the former will twentieth century did so to argue that the cap-
not be an effective political force unless they also italist class had disintegrated during the follow-
have the latter. Large corporations clearly have ing decades. Much of the empirical basis of this
significant resources, but as long as conflicts of argument rested on a single study, Berle and
interest exist across industries, corporate elites Means’ classic work, The Modern Corporation and
will not operate as a unified political actor. Private Property (1968[1932]).
the roots of business disunity: The Berle and Means Thesis

the role of corporate control
The Modern Corporate and Private Property ap-
The acknowledgement that business, if unified, peared in the early stages of the Great Depres-
could constitute a threat to democracy shifted sion, but it was more a product of the 1920s
the focus of the debate toward the degree of or, more generally, the period after 1890 that
business unity. A number of social scientists, in- culminated in the stock market crash of 1929.
cluding sociologists, had made observations on Although the book is best known for the au-
this topic, often in discussions of social change thors’ focus on ownership and control, that is
during the twentieth century. A widely held only one component of their discussion. Berle
view among American sociologists was that dur- and Means began by arguing that capital in
ing the rise of the large corporation at the the United States had become heavily con-
turn of the twentieth century, American busi- centrated during the early 1900s, resulting in
ness was dominated by a powerful group of a relatively small number of highly powerful
financiers, who controlled several corporations companies. Because of the large and increasing
simultaneously, a system akin to the system size of corporations, and because of the conse-
of bank dominance then prevalent in Germany quent difficulty of maintaining substantial family
(Hilferding, 1981[1910]). Chief among this holdings in individual firms, stockholdings in
group in the United States were people such large U.S. corporations gradually dispersed. The
as J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, George consequence of this dispersal, according to Berle
F. Baker, and James Stillman. Morgan, for ex- and Means, was the usurpation, by default, of
ample, through his investment firm J. P. Morgan power by the firm’s managers. These managers,
& Co. and a group of major banks, was widely whose interests were not necessarily identical
believed to have effective control over several to those of the firm’s owners, were viewed
nonfinancial corporations, including U.S. Steel, as a self-perpetuating oligarchy, unaccountable
International Harvester, and several railroads. to the owners who had elected them. In an
Although histories of the time describe cleav- analysis of the 200 largest U.S. nonfinancial
ages, such as that between Morgan and Rocke-
feller, they also describe a system of cross-cutting 2
Virtually all observers continue to believe that
alliances and ultimate community of interest German banks had a high degree of power at the time.
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corporations in 1929, Berle and Means found industrialized capitalist countries (in which he
that 44 percent of them could be defined as included Britain, France, and Germany, as well
“management controlled,” meaning (based on as the United States) had become “a plurality of
their operational definition) that no individual partly agreed, partly competing, partly simply
owner held as much as 20 percent of the firm’s different groups.” These authors thus conceded
stock. In only 11 percent of the firms did the that something akin to a dominant capitalist class
largest owner hold at least a majority of the existed in the United States in the early years of
firm’s shares. the last century but that because of the separa-
Berle and Means were concerned about the tion of ownership from control, this class had
separation of ownership from control in part dispersed, unable to realize itself as a unified
because they believed that managers would in- block. Because, in the Berle and Means view,
creasingly lack accountability to investors. Of the owners of capital no longer controlled their
equal importance, however, was their concern enterprises and those who controlled did not
about managers’ lack of accountability to society own, Dahrendorf went so far as to claim that
in general. Berle and Means thus wrote of a we had transcended capitalism altogether.
small group, sitting at the head of enormous Rather than sharing Berle and Means’ sus-
organizations, with the power to build (and picion of managerialism as ushering in a dan-
destroy) communities, to generate great pro- gerous era of concentrated economic power,
ductivity and wealth, but also to control the American sociologists and other social scientists
distribution of that wealth, without regard for thus praised the new system as a further exten-
those who elected them (the stockholders) sion of democracy. This was reflected in state-
or those who depended on them (the larger ments about “peoples’ capitalism,” in which
public). Berle and Means, in the tradition of the widespread dispersal of stockholdings meant
Thomas Jefferson, expressed considerable con- that corporations were, for practical purposes,
cern about this development. Their point that publicly controlled, as well as in formulations
elected officials (the board of directors) could about the “soulful corporation” (Kaysen, 1957),
be far removed from and unaccountable to their concerned as much about its position as a re-
voters (the stockholders) raised concerns similar spected member of the community as with its
to those raised by Schumpeter and Lipset about pursuit of profit. In fact, the pursuit of profit was
the possible lack of democracy in the political deemed no longer necessary, as great size, mar-
system. ket power, and weak and disorganized stock-
Many postwar sociologists took a very dif- holders allowed corporate managers to pursue
ferent interpretation of Berle and Means, how- alternative goals, including sales (Baumol,
ever. In these works, authored by scholars such 1959), growth (Galbraith, 1967), or a combi-
as Daniel Bell (1960), Ralf Dahrendorf (1959), nation of strategies (Marris, 1964). Corporate
and Talcott Parsons (1960), the separation managers, freed from the dictates of stock-
of ownership from control was viewed as a holders (as well as bankers and other outside
harbinger of increased democracy. In Dahren- forces), were stripped of the entrepreneurial
dorf ’s (1959) view, for example, the separation of spirit, transforming instead into bureaucratic
ownership from control led to the “decomposi- “organization men.” To quote Dahrendorf once
tion of capital.” In Riesman’s words (1953:242), again (1959:46), “Never has the imputation of
“the captain of industry no longer runs busi- a profit motive been further from the real mo-
ness” and thus “no longer runs politics.” Echo- tives of men than it is for modern bureaucratic
ing this view, Bell (1960:42) suggested that managers.” Ownership of capital no longer
“[n]o longer are there America’s ‘Sixty Fam- even mattered for understanding peoples’ life
ilies’ [the title of a popular book from the chances. As Blau and Duncan put it in the intro-
1930s]. . . . The chief consequence, politically, is duction to their classic analysis of occupational
the breakup of the ruling class.” In Dahrendorf ’s status attainment (1967:6), class, “defined in
words (1959:47), the business community in terms of economic resources and interests . . . , is
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no longer adequate for differentiating . . . [those] management controlled if no individual own-

in control of the large capitalistic enterprises ership interest held at least 20 percent of the
from those subject to their control because the firm’s stock. In reexamining Berle and Means’
controlling managers of the largest firms today data, Zeitlin found that of the eighty-eight firms
are themselves employees of corporations.” (44 percent of the 200 largest U.S. nonfinan-
cials) classified as management controlled, for
nearly half of them Berle and Means were unable
implications for business to locate the largest holder and thus classified
political unity the firms as management controlled by default.
The prevalence of management control may
If corporations were controlled primarily by have therefore been considerably lower than
the bureaucratic managers who ran their day- Berle and Means suggested.
to-day affairs, their leaders could now be con- A study during the 1960s by Larner (1970)
cerned primarily with the interests of the firm might have rendered Zeitlin’s point moot, how-
rather than a set of larger class interests. It was ever. Using a more conservative indicator of
for this reason that political scientists such as management control, 10 as opposed to 20 per-
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter could find members of cent, Larner found that 84 percent of the largest
different industries falling on opposite sides of 200 U.S. nonfinancials in 1963 could be clas-
political issues. The identification with one’s sified as management controlled. Regardless
immediate firm thus created the precondition of the validity of Berle and Means’ findings,
for countervailing power to flourish. Firms were Larner’s study appeared to demonstrate that the
like atoms, bouncing from issue to issue, find- managerial revolution was now, as Larner put it,
ing common cause with some but disagreement “close to complete.” Zeitlin was unwilling to
with others. It was precisely the kind of con- accept this conclusion, however, because of two
dition that, according to Schumpeter, allowed other studies that appeared around the same
democracy, however imperfect, to exist. time. In the first, an article published in For-
Critics of pluralism mounted several re- tune, Robert Sheehan (1967) found a substantial
sponses to this argument. Some critics rejected ownership interest in approximately 30 percent
Berle and Means’s empirical analysis. Others ac- of the 500 largest U.S. nonfinancial corpora-
cepted Berle and Means’s findings while reject- tions, compared to the 19 percent that Larner
ing the implications that later interpreters drew had found for the full 500. In the second,
from them. Still others were either neutral on Philip Burch (1972), through an exhaustive
Berle and Means or were critical of selected parts analysis of the business press between 1950 and
of their discussion. In the following sections 1971, argued that as many as 60 percent of
we describe several major responses to pluralism the 500 largest U.S. manufacturing and min-
and their implications for the level of business ing firms could be viewed as owner controlled.
unity. Zeitlin argued that using an arbitrary cutpoint
for ownership control, such as 10 percent, was
invalid because detailed analysis of the history
Rejection of Berle and Means: of firms often revealed substantial ownership in-
The Social Class Model terests that were not evident in company filings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Except for a handful of left-wing critics, virtu- Although some sociologists, most notably
ally all observers of American society between Michael Useem (1996), acknowledged a resur-
the 1930s and early 1970s accepted Berle and gence of stockholder activism beginning in the
Means’ thesis of the separation of ownership 1980s, few observers believe that owner con-
from control. This relative calm ended with trol is a widespread phenomenon in the Amer-
the publication of an article by Maurice Zeitlin ican economy. Even if Zeitlin has exaggerated
(1974). Berle and Means had classified a firm as the level of owner control in the United States,
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it is worth noting that the United States, is an ownership from control. They argued, however,
anomaly internationally. A study by La Porta, that the large corporations now run by managers
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Schleifer (1999) indicates behave no differently from those run by own-
that the United States is virtually alone, accom- ers. Both remain subject to the dictates of the
panied only by the United Kingdom, in the ex- market. The capitalist class still existed, accord-
tent of stock dispersal in its leading corporations. ing to Baran and Sweezy, but it was now lodged
Ownership remains considerably more concen- in corporations rather than in a social class that
trated, even to the point of being fused with existed outside the firm.
control, in nations such as France, Germany, The behavioral component of managerial
Italy, and South Korea. At the same time, even Marxism had similarities with the neoclassi-
if Zeitlin is correct that ownership and con- cal economic view of the firm. Neoclassical
trol are more fused in the United States than economists continued to assume the existence
most believe, it does not follow that there is a of competitive markets, whereas Baran and
cohesive capitalist class. The families that con- Sweezy assumed oligopolistic ones, but both
trol particular firms are not necessarily linked saw firms as responding to market pressures.
and they may have directly conflicting inter- This meant that whether managers or owners
ests. Zeitlin argued that members of a dominant controlled individual firms was irrelevant to
social class transcend the individual firms they the firms’ behavior. Studies of firm profitabil-
control and their kinship and other ties create ity across ownership types seemed to sup-
an overarching unity. Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1988) port these claims. Although Monsen, Chiu,
provided some evidence of this in the Chilean and Cooley (1968) and Palmer (1973) found
context. That some capitalist families coalesce some tendency for owner controlled firms to
across firms does not necessarily mean that sys- earn higher profits than management-controlled
tematic conflicts are absent, however. Business firms (which one would predict if, as manage-
historians of the United States have noted that rialists argued, management-controlled firms
Morgan and Rockefeller interests were gener- were less profit-oriented), Kamerschen (1968)
ally opposed to one another, at least until the found no such effect, and the differences found
compromise reached after the 1901 struggle over in the first two studies were quite small. In the
the Northern Pacific Railroad (Cochran and most comprehensive study on the topic, Larner
Miller, 1961[1942]). Even if owner control is (1970) found only negligible differences –
dominant, then, it does not ensure the existence slightly higher profits among the owner con-
of a cohesive capitalist class that acts as a unified trolled firms, but differences of little substantive
political force. significance. In a study of chief executive fir-
ings among the 500 largest U.S. manufacturers
in 1965, James and Soref (1981) found that the
Berle and Means without strongest predictor of dismissals was the extent
the Consequences: Managerial Marxism to which the firm’s profits had declined in the
previous year. Whether the firm was owner or
A second response to Berle and Means, some- management controlled had no significant ef-
times referred to as managerial Marxism, was fect. Since that time, some authors have found
most commonly associated with two Marxist ownership to have an effect on certain firm be-
economists, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (Baran haviors. Palmer and Barber (2001), for exam-
and Sweezy, 1966).3 Baran and Sweezy accepted ple, found that owner-controlled firms were less
Berle and Means’ findings on the separation of likely to engage in acquisitions during the 1960s
than were management-controlled firms. There
3
has not been widespread support for the idea
Although not explicitly within a Marxist frame-
work, Edward S. Herman’s Corporate Control, Corporate that owner and management-controlled firms
Power (1981) remains the most comprehensive expres- behave differently with respect to profit orien-
sion of this position. tation, however.
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Although the managerial Marxist approach of mechanisms that allow for the mitigation of
deviated from traditional managerialism, its po- conflicts of interest. Mizruchi (1992) has re-
litical theory had an undeniable resemblance to ferred to these as “mediating mechanisms.” Sev-
pluralism. If corporations were now indepen- eral have been posited, including those internal
dent entities run by managers, would the busi- and external to firms, industries, and the busi-
ness community not evolve to a series of “partly ness community as a whole. Five in particular
agreed, partly competing, partly simply differ- warrant discussion: elite social ties, interlock-
ent groups,” as Dahrendorf had argued? What ing directorates, policy-making organizations,
mechanism was there for capitalist class unity? financial institutions, and the inner circle.
The answer, according to Baran and Sweezy,
was that class unity was built into the system. Elite Social Ties. In addition to kinship ties, some
At the industry level, large corporations en- theorists, dating back to Mills (1956), and in-
gaged in what the authors called “co-respective” cluding G. William Domhoff (1967) and Ralph
behavior, in which they rarely engaged in se- Miliband (1969), have argued that members of
rious competition. Across industries, corpora- the corporate elite hail disproportionately from
tions might differ on day-to-day issues, but all privileged social backgrounds. This common set
members of the corporate community were of experiences is presumed to give elites a sim-
united on the basis of their shared support of ilarity of outlook that leads them to develop a
the system. Any threat to capitalist domination similar set of political interests. Common so-
would therefore result in a quick coalescence cialization experiences also create a degree of
among firms. This shared interest may be gen- social connectedness that helps forge an elite
uine, but it is a weak basis on which to posit unity in adulthood. This unity is then reinforced
overall business unity because the vast majority by common memberships in local elite institu-
of Americans, whether capitalist or not, accept tions, including social clubs. Domhoff argues
the legitimacy of the existing system. Although that these common social ties create a unity of
Baran and Sweezy make a credible claim for how outlook that brings those who do not have elite
members of particular industries might share origins into the fold.
political interests, their model thus contains no Although there is considerable evidence that
clear structural basis for corporate political unity members of the corporate elite have more ad-
across industries. Without such a basis, members vantaged origins than members of the general
of different industries could as easily oppose as population, corporate CEOs in more recent
coalesce with one another. If so, the precondi- decades are as likely to be drawn from profes-
tions exist for business conflict, and hence plu- sional and managerial origins as from elite so-
ralist democracy. ciety (Useem and Karabel, 1986). Moreover, as
with kinship ties, common socialization experi-
ences and social ties may contribute to a similar-
The Role of Mediating Mechanisms: ity of outlook, but they may not be sufficient to
Contemporary Elite Theory override structural conflicts of interest that oc-
cur between firms in different industries. Social
Both the social class theory proposed by Zeitlin connections may thus facilitate corporate polit-
and the managerial Marxism suggested by Baran ical unity in some cases, but they are unlikely to
and Sweezy include mechanisms that could cre- be a sufficient basis for the unity of business as
ate political unity among some sectors of the a whole.
business community. Neither perspective can
handle the possibility that systemic sources of Interlocking Directorates. No mediating mecha-
intercorporate conflict remain, however. On nism has received more attention than that of
what basis is it possible for business as a whole the interlocking directorate (Mizruchi, 1996).
to achieve a unified political position? What is The presence of individuals who sit on two
needed, several observers have argued, is a series or more corporate boards has been evident for
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more than a century. This presence has led to Policy-Making Organizations. Elite policy-making
charges of interfirm collusion to fix prices (even organizations such as the Business Roundtable
leading to an outlawing of ties between firms have also received attention as a mediating
competing in the same markets) as well as to mechanism. The goal of these organizations
suggestions that the heads of large corporations is to serve as a meeting place for corporate
are part of a cohesive clique that runs the coun- leaders, who often use them to develop po-
try. Members of a board of directors are bound sitions on political issues that best reflect the
by law to act in the interests of the stockholders views of the corporate community as a whole.
who elected them. When a person sits on the Domhoff (1979) discussed in detail the ways in
board of two firms that do business with one an- which these policy-making organizations gen-
other, the director faces a potential conflict of erate ideas and disseminate them to political of-
interest. If the two firms have a disagreement, in ficials. In other cases, these organizations are
whose interest will the director act? One possi- involved in direct political activity. An exam-
bility is that the interlocked director can serve ple of the latter has been provided by Whitt
as a mediator in the event of a conflict. (1982) in his study of mass transit proposi-
Most interlocks, even those involving banks tions in California during the 1960s and 1970s.
and nonfinancial firms, do not involve cus- In the period after World War II, San Fran-
tomer/supplier relations. Most outside directors cisco business elites, especially those in the
of firms, who are likely to include lawyers and financial and real estate sectors, were increas-
accountants as well as CEOs of other firms, are ingly concerned about congestion from au-
chosen because of their ability to provide advice. tomobile traffic, which threatened the value
These individuals are often friends of the CEO, of property in downtown San Francisco. The
and interlock ties often reflect elite social con- Bay Area Council, an organization of local
nections (Mace, 1971). Because of this, even business elites, developed a plan to address this
pluralist theorists such as Arnold Rose (1967) problem. Members of the financial and real es-
believed that interlocks facilitated cohesion tate community suggested a mass transit sys-
among firms. Studies from the early twentieth tem that would feed people from suburban
century to the present have shown that the areas to downtown, thus allowing people to
vast majority of large U.S. corporations are work downtown without driving. Leaders of
tied together into a single, connected network major oil companies with offices in the Bay
(Mizruchi, 1982; Davis, Yoo, and Baker, 2003). Area initially objected to the plan, fearing that
Similar results have been found for European it would divert people from their cars, lead-
(Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott, 1985), Latin ing them to consume less gasoline. Discussions
American (Ogliastri and Davila, 1987), and East within the Bay Area Council allowed members
Asian (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi, 1992; of both sectors to work out a compromise, to
Keister, 1998) countries. At the same time, in- the point that the oil companies actually contri-
dividuals in interpersonal networks tend to be buted funds for the proposition to support the
connected to millions of others within a rela- mass transit plan. The business community was
tively small number of steps (Watts, 1999). The thus able to approach the state as a politically
fact that firms are connected through interlocks unified force.
may therefore reflect only the natural patterns of To the extent that policy-making organiza-
social networks that occur in all settings. Even if, tions are capable of forging a consensus, they
as Rose suggested, interlocks provide firms with could play a significant role in facilitating unity
a high degree of cohesiveness, most firms are among corporations. The question is how often
neither directly nor indirectly interlocked with such groups are able to mitigate cross-industry
one another. Interlocks may in some cases be conflicts. In the study by Bauer, Pool, and
capable of facilitating corporate political unity. Dexter (1972[1963]) cited above, there was
Whether they produce cohesion for the entire no organization capable of resolving disagree-
business community is less clear. ments between members of different industries.
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Where they exist, therefore, policy groups may to contribute to the same political candidates
help forge a unity of outlook and behavior and support the same positions on issues than
among members of the business community. It were firms without such links. It was unclear
is less clear that such groups are always present whether the banks played an active role in pro-
or, even if present, able to accomplish this goal. ducing this similar behavior, however. Second,
even if one accepts that banks were dominant
Financial Institutions. Based on data from the during the period Mintz and Schwartz were
1960s, Mintz and Schwartz (1985) argued that analyzing, a series of changes have occurred
large commercial banks in the United States ex- since the early 1980s that significantly reduced
ercised a broad “hegemony” over the business the banks’ power (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999).
community. Although the banks did not directly Rapid changes in technology and the regulatory
control nonfinancial corporations, as was com- environment led U.S. corporations to reduce
mon in the early part of the century, nonfi- their reliance on banks for capital and led in-
nancial firms remained dependent on banks for dividuals to reduce their deposits in commercial
financing, which allowed the banks to set limits banks. Both the number of commercial banks
on the firms’ behavior. The banks’ power in the and the proportion of corporate debt acquired
business world was reflected, according to Mintz from commercial banks declined by one-third
and Schwartz, in the fact that they tended to oc- between 1979 and 1994 (Davis and Mizruchi,
cupy the most central positions in networks of 1999:220). Large commercial banks responded
interlocking directorates. Bank boards typically to the loss of their traditional franchise by chang-
hosted large numbers of CEOs from major non- ing their focus from lending to financial services,
financial firms, thus serving as meeting places such as capital market services, foreign currency
for the leading figures in the business commu- exchange, and derivatives. This change in bank
nity. Politically, banks facilitate business political strategies had the effect of altering the social
unity for two reasons, according to Mintz and role of commercial banks within the Ameri-
Schwartz. First, given the huge capital needs of can business community: As Davis and Mizruchi
most major financing schemes, the banks typ- (1999) document, the largest banks substantially
ically act collectively and therefore are them- reduced the number of executives of major cor-
selves unified. Second, because capital is a uni- porations appointed to their boards, thus losing
versal resource, the banks have no allegiance to their place at the center of the interlock net-
any particular industry. If disputes arise between work. It is unlikely, as we enter the twenty-first
different segments of the nonfinancial commu- century, that commercial banks are a primary
nity, the banks are thus in a position to resolve mechanism for businesswide political unity.
the dispute in a way that maximizes the benefit
for business as a whole. The Inner Circle. An alternative to the bank
Mintz and Schwartz’s argument about the hegemony model, but based on similar princi-
dominant position of banks was supported by ples, was proposed by Useem (1984). Drawing
a considerable amount of evidence, both anec- on earlier arguments by Zeitlin and Domhoff,
dotal (the plethora of cases of bank interven- as well as concurrent work by Ratcliff (1980),
tion into corporate affairs) and systematic (the Useem argued that the business community can
repeated finding of high bank centrality in in- be roughly divided into two segments. The vast
terlock networks). Moreover, their model pro- majority of firms, Useem suggested, were rel-
vides a more explicit mechanism for business atively small and pursued their own interests,
unity than do either the social ties or direc- which, as pluralists suggested, were as likely to
tor interlocks arguments. The model has two be opposed to one another as in concordance. At
shortcomings. First, there is little evidence that the top level of the corporate community, how-
the banks in fact play a mediating political role. ever, was a relatively small group of executives
Mizruchi (1992) found that firms that were in- who spanned two or more firms simultaneously.
terlocked with the same banks were more likely This group, because of its exposure to multiple
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perspectives and the social cohesion resulting who believe that the state acts in the interest
from its frequent contact, was able to develop a of the capitalist class but that the class itself is
“classwide” interest, in which its members were incapable of taking a unified political initiative.
conscious of the long-run interests of the busi- We now turn to one such argument.
ness community as a whole. This “inner circle,”
which included both bankers and other leading
corporate figures, thus performed for Useem a The Role of the State
function similar to that played by banks in Mintz
and Schwartz’s model. Although the inner circle The arguments presented earlier all show that
was not specifically concerned with capital allo- at certain points, some businesses are capable
cation to particular industries, it was concerned of acting as a unified force. Yet none of them
with the overall health of business. has yielded incontrovertible evidence that busi-
A considerable amount of evidence, both ness as a whole is consistently able to reach
quantitative and qualitative, was consistent with such a consensus. Mintz and Schwartz’s bank
Useem’s argument. Useem (1979), Soref (1976), hegemony model contains a mechanism for
and Ratcliff, Gallagher, and Ratcliff (1979) systemwide unity, but the evidence on the de-
showed that there was a group of heavily clining power of banks in the past two decades
interlocked directors who were disproportion- makes it difficult to argue that the banks are ca-
ately represented on the boards of local and pable of being a unified political force for busi-
national policy-making, civic, cultural, and ness as a whole. If the business community is
philanthropic organizations. Useem’s (1984) in- not capable of consistently acting as a unified
terviews with CEOs from American and British political actor, are the pluralists not correct that
companies revealed that those who sat on two countervailing power will reign?
or more boards were more likely than nonin- One possibility is that there might exist an
terlocked directors to express views commen- institution external to business that could play a
surate with a “classwide” consciousness. Unlike mediating role. Several theorists, most notably
most of the studies cited above, Useem also pre- Nicos Poulantzas (1973), made this argument.
sented evidence on corporate leaders’ interest In Poulantzas’ view, sectors of the business com-
and involvement in political activities on be- munity are saddled with inherent, irreconcilable
half of their firms. Several of the multiple di- conflicts of interest. In this context, the role of
rectors interviewed by Useem explained that the state is to act in the interest of the business
the political processes in which they were in- community as a whole, to do for business what
volved (such as providing advice on the ap- business is incapable of doing for itself. To fulfill
pointment of top political officials) required this function, the state must have a certain au-
the adoption of a communitywide, as opposed tonomy because it is often necessary to act in the
to a firm-centered, perspective. This study interest of one sector of business against another.
therefore extends Whitt’s findings that demon- The state thus plays a role analogous to that of
strated the possibility of collective action on the the banks posited by Mintz and Schwartz.
part of leading representatives in the business Poulantzas provided a model for how the state
community. in a capitalist society can operate in the interests
One of Whitt’s key findings was that even of business even when business is not internally
when it was unified, the business community unified. He thus circumvented Dahl’s argument
did not always achieve its goals. Similarly, Useem that unity is necessary for a group to be power-
does not demonstrate that the inner circle, ful. The problem with Poulantzas’ argument is
either in Britain or the United States, consti- his assertion that the state acts in the interests of
tutes a ruling class that regularly prevails. These business. Because this is the case by definition,
studies do show the possibility of unified politi- the model is nonfalsifiable. Whatever action the
cal action within the business community, how- state takes, even if it appears to run counter to
ever. This is significant because there are those the goals of various segments of the business
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community, is assumed to be in the interest of situations in which business political unity oc-
the capitalist class as a whole. This means that curs, but there are other situations in which
when the U.S. Congress passed social security it does not. Identifying the conditions under
legislation or pro-labor legislation guarantee- which unity and conflict occur might be prefer-
ing the right to strike, this was done because able to continuing to argue over whether either
it was in the long-term interests of business, de- phenomenon exists in the abstract. In a series
spite the fact that the business community over- of works culminating in a 1992 book, Mizruchi
whelmingly opposed such measures. Certainly (1992) argued that business is neither inherently
one could make a plausible case for such an in- unified or divided but rather that unity is best
terpretation. The possibility that Congress was treated as a contingent phenomenon. The fo-
responding to the wishes of the voters repre- cus should therefore shift toward identifying the
sents an equally plausible alternative, however. conditions under which business unity occurs,
In addition to its nonfalsifiability, Poulantzas ig- he argued.
nored the possibility that business has internal To do this, it was necessary to deal with one
mediating mechanisms that enable it to resolve of the most vexing problems in this debate:
its own disputes. As we have seen, there is con- the absence of systematic, behavioral data on
siderable evidence that such mechanisms exist, corporate political activity. During the 1980s,
even if they do not operate in all cases. data on the campaign contributions of corpo-
Poulantzas’ model set the stage for theorists to rate political action committees (PACs) in the
make even stronger claims about the autonomy United States became widely available for the
of the state with respect to business. We discuss first time. There is considerable debate over
this in a subsequent section, but before doing the meaning of these contributions and, as is
so we must address Poulantzas’ assumption that well-known, there are several alternative forms
business is incapable of or unwilling to act as of business political action. The weight of the
a unified political force. To what extent is this evidence suggests, however, that corporations
assumption warranted? view PAC contributions as expressions of the
firms’ perceived political interests (see Mizruchi,
1992; Chapter 5; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott,
A Contingency Approach 1992). In addition to examining corporate PAC
to Business Unity contributions, Mizruchi also conducted a con-
tent analysis of corporations’ positions on polit-
The preceding discussion suggests that there are ical issues, as reflected in their testimony before
a number of mechanisms, including ones in- congressional committees.
ternal to the business community itself, that If business unity is conditional, under what
could generate business political unity. In none conditions is it likely to occur? The model that
of these cases, with the possible exception of Mizruchi posited focused on two key medi-
the finance hegemony model, is there a mediating mechanisms: economic interdependence
ating mechanism that could plausibly be posited and interfirm social relations. Firms operating
to encompass the entire capitalist class, even if in industries that were heavily dependent on
it operated in the way its proponents suggested. one another for sales and purchases might be
The finance hegemony model, at least its sug- assumed to have conflicting interests, as the
gestion about the role of banks in securing cor- auto and steel industries have historically ex-
porate political unity, lacks empirical support. perienced (Prechel, 2000). High levels of inter-
We must reluctantly conclude that despite the dependence may be a source of unity, for two
significant efforts of a number of leading schol- reasons: First, a unit upon which another is de-
ars, the evidence that business is politically uni- pendent may be able to coerce, either overtly
fied remains inconclusive. or covertly, desired behavior out of its part-
One possible solution to this problem is ner. In Whitt’s study, for example, a group of
to treat business unity not as an either/or banks that had originally agreed to support a
proposition but as a variable. Clearly there are proposal to divert highway funds to the building
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of mass transit subsequently changed their posi- Mizruchi’s study demonstrated that director
tion. Whitt’s interviews revealed that this change interlocks and other types of interfirm ties had
was a result of the banks’ concern about how genuine consequences for political behavior. It
the oil companies, on which they were depen- raised a theoretical question, however: Simply
dent, might react. A supplier may think twice because mediating mechanisms, where they ex-
about supporting a position opposed by one of ist, contribute to similar political behavior does
its largest customers. A second reason that in- not necessarily provide support for the business
terdependent firms may exhibit political unity unity theorists. The problem is that mediating
is that even when dependence is mutual, both mechanisms are not ubiquitous. Where they ex-
parties are likely to have a stake in maintain- ist they increase the probability of unified action.
ing a smooth working relationship (Emerson, Where they are absent, unified action is often
1962:33), an example of what is called bilat- absent as well. Given the conditional existence
eral deterrence (Lawler, 1986; see also Keohane of the mediating mechanisms, to what extent do
and Nye, 1977). This means that high levels of Mizruchi’s findings demonstrate anything be-
interdependence, even when relative symme- yond the fact that business represents a series
try is present, are also likely to lead to unity of of “partly agreed, partly competing, partly sim-
action. ply different groups” (Dahrendorf, 1959:47)?
Firm political unity can also be forged by the Mizruchi did find that instances of unified be-
mediating mechanisms described above, includ- havior greatly dwarf those in which firms po-
ing interfirm social relations. The most widely litically oppose one another (see also Clawson,
used indicator of interfirm social ties is the pres- Neustadtl, and Bearden, 1986). That political
ence of director interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996). If unity is more common than opposition does
socially connected firms are likely to be politi- not prove that business is fundamentally unified,
cally unified, then we should expect firms that however.
share board members to engage in similar po-
litical behavior. At the same time, if financial
institutions play a mediating role in interfirm Is Business Unity Necessary?
conflicts, then firms that share directors with the
same financial institutions should also be dispro- The discussion in the previous section leads to
portionately likely to engage in similar political two possible conclusions. The first is that the
behavior. contingent nature of business unity provides
To test these hypotheses, Mizruchi examined support for pluralism: developed capitalist so-
the 1,596 dyadic relations among fifty-seven cieties contain the preconditions for democracy
large U.S. nonfinancial corporations. Using after all. A second possible conclusion is to ques-
PAC contribution data from the 1980 election tion whether business unity is a necessary con-
and corporate testimony before Congress be- dition for business power.
tween 1975 and 1987, he found that pairs of Virtually all theorists discussed above assumed
firms (dyads) that operated in industries with that corporate political power is predicated on a
high levels of interdependence were more likely unified and politically active business commu-
to contribute to the same candidates and take nity. Those who did not, including Poulantzas,
the same positions on issues than were pairs argued that the role of the capitalist state was
without such interdependence. Although di- to uphold the interests of business. Other than
rect interlocks between firms had mixed effects an assertion that this was the case, there was
on similar political behavior (not significantly no mechanism in Poulantzas’ model that ex-
positive with respect to PAC contributions but plained why the state would operate in corpo-
significantly positive with respect to positions rations’ interests, especially if it had the degree of
on issues), indirect interlocks through financial autonomy that Poulantzas assigned it. Without
institutions were consistently positively associ- some demonstration of direct corporate influ-
ated with similarities of both types of political ence, it was difficult to explain theoretically how
behavior. business dominance could occur. A solution
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to this problem was proposed by Fred Block viously, is that the topic of corporate political
(1977). Block argued that the state did indeed power has received little attention among sociol-
operate in the long-run interests of business as ogists since the early 1990s. There have been so-
a whole. It did this not because of its inherent ciological analyses of corporate political activity
function to uphold the interests of the capitalist (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott, 1992; Clawson,
class, however. Rather, the state had its own in- Neustadtl, and Weller, 1998), some excellent
terests in maximizing its revenue. The best way reviews of the area (Roscigno, 1992) and, more
to do this was to ensure that business continued recently, studies of corporate leaders’ individual
to invest and procure profits, because the state’s participation in politics (Burris, 2001; Dreiling,
revenue was based not only in taxes placed on 2000). Studies on the power structures of devel-
corporations but also on workers’ wages. The oped capitalist societies and the role of corporate
latter would be forthcoming only to the extent influence have been few and far between, how-
that business continued to invest. A state that ever. Meanwhile, potentially significant changes
engaged too heavily in redistributive economic have occurred worldwide that cry out for assess-
policies, Block argued, would be subject to a ment. To what extent are the theories discussed
“capital strike.” Businesses would simply refuse above relevant to understanding the world of the
to invest, which would lead to an economic twenty-first century? What alternatives, if any,
downturn, decreased revenue for the state, and have appeared in their place?4
vulnerability for elected officials. Our examination of recent literature yields
The same year as the publication of Block’s four approaches, at varying levels of elaboration,
essay witnessed the publication of a major work that can be applied to understanding the nature
by a pluralist political scientist, Charles E. Lind-
blom (1977). In observing American politics, 4
One possible reason for the decline in attention to
Lindblom reluctantly concluded that corporate the topic of corporate and elite power was the rise, dur-
interests tended to dominate to an extent that ing the 1980s, of what became known as the “state-
was dangerous for a democratic society. In try- centered” model. This approach, usually associated with
Theda Skocpol (1980), adopts a largely Weberian view
ing to explain business’ power over the state, of the state, viewing it as an entity with its own set of in-
Lindblom independently reached a conclusion terests, able to set the parameters within which nonstate
virtually identical to Block’s. Because the state actors operate. External groups, including business, are
was ultimately dependent on business for its rev- thus viewed as, if not dominated, then heavily influenced
enue, there was a built-in tendency for the state by state actions. The emergence of this approach led to
a debate between Skocpol and Jill Quadagno (writing
to favor policies that accorded with the general from a perspective similar to that of Poulantzas) over
interests of business. Interestingly, Lindblom also the origins of Social Security legislation in the United
saw the business community as strongly politi- States (see Skocpol, 1980; Quadagno, 1984; Skocpol and
cally active, and successfully so. As with Block, Amenta, 1985; Quadagno, 1985) and, subsequently, be-
however, the state’s susceptibility to business in- tween Skocpol and Domhoff (see Domhoff, 1986/1987;
Skocpol, 1986/1987) on the same topic. The state-
fluence was due to its dependence on business centered approach brought a welcome acknowledge-
confidence for its revenue. The dominance of ment that much of significance occurs within as well
business, and the state’s dependence on it, raised as outside the formal political apparatus. One possibil-
serious concerns about the viability of Ameri- ity for its wide acceptance may have been that it was
can democracy, Lindblom argued. seen as the primary alternative to the Marxist-oriented
theories that had begun to dominate political sociology
following the discrediting of pluralism. The fate of the
Clinton health care plan in the early 1990s served as a
four contemporary approaches reminder that the state can still be dominated by power-
ful external interests, however. A fruitful alternative that
At this point we have come full circle. Busi- acknowledges the reflexive relation between state and
nonstate political actors has been presented by Laumann
ness may not be unified but it may dominate and Knoke (1987), who argue that the lines separating
nonetheless. The difficulty with assessing this the two are often difficult to discern. We discuss this
argument, along with the others described pre- work in a subsequent section.
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of corporate political unity and power in devel- officials and that often form the basis of policies
oped capitalist societies. These include the view enacted by the state. The members of the power
proposed by Domhoff, which is an updated elite, especially those drawn from the social up-
but essentially similar version of his earlier elite per class, may be less visible in the contemporary
theoretic model; an approach that flows from world than in earlier years. Most of these lead-
recent work by Michael Useem, suggesting that ers continue to come from relatively privileged
institutional stockholders have become the pri- backgrounds, however.
mary centers of power in the American busi- As in his previous works, Domhoff assembles
ness community; a model, proposed by Gerald a staggering amount of evidence, both quan-
Davis, which suggests that there is no longer an titative and qualitative, to support his argument
identifiable group of power holders in the busi- that the power elite dominate American politics.
ness community but rather that power now rests Although the argument is compelling, it raises
in the anonymous forces of the capital market; questions as well. Domhoff has become increas-
and an argument, developed by several theorists ingly sensitive to the fact that the dominance
both in North America and (especially) Britain, of the elite is not all-encompassing, that the
suggesting that economic globalization has sig- elite suffers defeats, including ones driven by
nificantly affected the relations between business elected officials responding to public opposi-
and the state in developed capitalist societies. We tion. He does not address whether the power of
discuss each of these in turn. the elite has varied over time, however. Vogel
(1989) shows that during the late 1960s and
early 1970s, when the consumer and labor
An Elite Theory for the 2000s movements were relatively strong, corporations
suffered a series of political defeats, including
Among contemporary proponents of an elite the formation of the Environmental Protection
perspective, no one has been more prolific Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and
than G. William Domhoff. Through a series of Health Administration. By the late 1970s and
books dating back to the original Who Rules early 1980s, business was far more successful
America? (1967), Domhoff has continually re- politically, pushing through a series of measures
fined his argument, taking into account criti- and preventing others, including holding off the
cisms, developments in scholarship, and changes potential repeal of the Taft–Hartley Law that
in the larger society. His most recent state- was vehemently opposed by the labor move-
ment is a 1998 revision of Who Rules America? ment. Domhoff argues that the idea behind the
Although his argument has become increas- EPA was actually formulated and initiated by
ingly sophisticated over the years, Domhoff ’s the power elite. He acknowledges that business
model of the turn of the twenty-first century eventually came to oppose the agency, but Vogel
American power structure looks very much presents equally convincing evidence that busi-
like the one he proposed more than three ness opposed its formation from the start. Even
decades earlier. Domhoff argues that a power if Domhoff is correct that such policies are for-
elite, drawn from the social upper class, cor- mulated primarily by or at the behest of the
porate leaders, and officials of policy-making power elite, his model does not explain why the
organizations, collectively dominates American business community was forced to develop such
politics. These elites are generally, if not per- a plan in the first place. Domhoff ’s view that the
fectly, cohesive, sharing outlooks and political elite perpetually dominates thus raises questions
positions as a result of their similar backgrounds, about nonfalsifiability not unlike those directed
social ties, and shared economic interests. They at Poulantzas’ model of the capitalist state. As
play a major role in politics through their fund- in previous versions of elite theory, Domhoff
ing of and (in some cases) participation in also does not demonstrate that the policies
policy-planning organizations whose goal is to enacted by the state are opposed by the major-
formulate ideas that are then conveyed to elected ity of the electorate. Unless one can show this,
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it is always possible to argue that elected offi- dissatisfied with company managers would sell
cials are being responsive to their constituents. their stock. As the sizes of their holdings have
Despite its problems, it would be imprudent increased, the ability of institutionals to sell
to reject Domhoff ’s model out of hand, espe- when they are dissatisfied has become more
cially because (as we discuss in a later section) limited. As a consequence, Useem suggests, in-
corporations now place greater effort on lob- stitutional investors have become increasingly
bying the state than at any time in American active in attempting to directly influence cor-
history. Clearly, Domhoff’s argument remains porate policies.
a major source of potentially useful empirical Despite the potential power of institutional
analyses. investors, Useem makes no claim that they
constitute a cohesive elite such as that de-
scribed by Domhoff, or even the “inner circle”
The Role of Institutional Investors described by Useem himself in his earlier work
(1984). Those making the decisions, Useem
A second approach for understanding the struc- suggests, are professional money managers,
ture of corporate power has been advanced by many of whom not only have no origin in the
Useem (1996). To understand Useem’s posi- social elite but do not even belong to policy-
tion, it is worthwhile to return to the Berle and making organizations or elite social clubs. Some
Means thesis about the separation of ownership leading institutional investors represent long-
from control. As we noted earlier, it seemed in- standing, powerful, and connected firms such
disputable by the 1970s that, contrary to most as Citigroup and Bankers Trust (although the
developed nations, the United States had wit- latter, as of this writing, is owned by Deutsche
nessed a significant amount of stock dispersal. Bank). Those who manage company pension
In the 1980s things began to change. The U.S. funds are increasingly tied to professional rather
stock market had performed poorly during the than intraclass networks (1996:267–9), however,
1970s. Companies were in relatively weak eq- and they often see themselves as having conflict-
uity positions. In the view of some finance eco- ing interests with the managers of the firms in
nomists (Fama and Jensen, 1983), firms were which they invest. It seems a considerable stretch
“undervalued,” ripe for takeover by alternative to suggest that the money managers of institu-
management teams that would “right” the com- tional investors have replaced either the owning
pany, thus increasing its stock price. As Useem families or commercial banks of earlier decades
(1996) noted, managers began to come under as the basis of a cohesive capitalist class. But as
increasing pressure from stockholders. Nearly discussed in the following section, this does not
one-third of the Fortune 500 received takeover necessarily mean that corporate power is any less
bids during the 1980s (Davis and Useem, pervasive.
2002).
Many of the ownership groups that launched
takeover bids during the 1980s were individu- Control Via the Capital Market?
als and members of firms devoted specifically to
buying and selling companies. The largest sin- An argument related to Useem’s but more ex-
gle block of stockholders by the 1990s was not plicitly oriented toward accounting for the co-
individuals, however, but institutional investors: hesion and power of business has been presented
mutual funds, pension funds, bank trust depart- by Davis (1999). Drawing on the Davis and
ments, charitable endowments, and other orga- Mizruchi (1999) study described earlier, Davis
nizations. As of 1994, institutionals owned 57 argues that there is no longer a single, identi-
percent of the stock in the 1,000 largest pub- fiable group of dominant economic actors in
licly traded U.S. companies, up from 43 percent the U.S. economy. Rather, pressures for both
in 1985 and just 16 percent in 1965 (Useem, firms and the state to conform emanate directly
1996:25). Traditionally, stockholders who were from the capital market, whose influence has
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increased significantly since the early 1980s. The argues. This point is by itself not new. It is
absence of a single dominant group does not consistent with discussions by several theorists
mean that managers are autonomous. In fact, discussed earlier, including Baran and Sweezy
pressures from the capital market render man- (1966), Useem (1984), and Mizruchi (1992),
agers less powerful today than during the heyday as well as Herman (1981), who suggest that
of managerialism in the 1950s and early 1960s, firm behavior is driven by systemic constraints,
Davis argues. The difference is that there is now which render the backgrounds of corporate of-
no single, consciously organized interest that ficials irrelevant.5 What makes Davis’s argument
oversees business as a whole in the way that unique is his stipulation that it is the capital mar-
Mintz and Schwartz argued that the leading ket, the sum total of investors’ assessments of
banks did. Not even institutional investors per firms, that drives corporate behavior. In tracing
se constitute such a group. Instead, corporate the larger implications of his view, Davis notes
managers face pressure from an amorphous, but the similarity between his “capitalism without
no less real, source. The implication is that this capitalists” conception of the economy and the
may leave them in an even more precarious situ- earlier argument of Block (1977). “[T]he ruling
ation than during the periods of family or bank class does not rule” (1999:20), Davis says, quot-
control. ing Block. “[R]ather, structures and policies are
At the core of Davis’s argument is his claim driven by anticipations of their economic con-
that the institutional and legal structure sur- sequences, because those who manage the ‘state
rounding the American corporation makes con- apparatus’ rely for their tenure on economic
trol by owners, or a capitalist class in general, vibrancy” (1999:20–21).
unnecessary. Although corporations in most de-
veloped countries are controlled by families,
who transmit their control through inheritance, Managerial Autonomy Redux
or banks, Davis accepts the Berle and Means
argument and the evidence of more recent an- One of the most shocking business events of
alysts (La Porta et al., 1999) in noting that U.S. the past several decades occurred in 1970 when
corporations are dominated by managers. What the Penn Central Railroad declared bankruptcy.
is especially distinctive about U.S. firms, accord- This episode stunned the business commu-
ing to Davis, is that maximizing the share price nity because only months earlier, the company
is viewed as the firm’s primary legitimating pur- had appeared to be on a strong financial foot-
pose, toward which the systems of corporate law ing. It was subsequently revealed that the firm’s
and managerial compensation are devoted. Not accountants had misled the board by provid-
only does the system not require large owners ing an unjustifiably optimistic picture of the
or banks to ensure that managers focus on share company’s financial condition. This example
price, but such outside intervention is viewed became a textbook case for the dangers of
as disruptive to such a focus. Here Davis differs unchecked managerial control, exactly what
from Useem, who notes the role of institutional Berle and Means had warned of four decades
investors in pressing managers to focus on the earlier.
firm’s share price. The models of Useem and Davis, despite their
Because the focus on share price is built differences, are both based on an assumption that
into the system and because the process oper- the managers of large corporations at the turn
ates more smoothly when firms are manage- of the twenty-first century face external pres-
ment controlled, Davis suggests that the concept sures beyond those experienced by managers
of class is irrelevant to the understanding of of the Penn Central period. In Useem’s case,
corporate behavior. “Whatever their class back- managers are subjected to pressures from an
ground, corporate elites are compelled to vow
allegiance to ‘shareholder value’ and to ac- 5
See Bowman (1996:chapter 6) for a detailed discus-
cept the market’s judgment” (1999:15–16) Davis sion of this issue.
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increasingly active group of institutional stock- firm. Its insiders were the ones who gained the
holders. For Davis, managers must be respon- most from the government’s largesse. In addi-
sive to the investment community in general, tion, the scandals as a whole and the stock mar-
regardless of how dispersed that community is. ket crash that accompanied them led to a loss
Despite the increase in stockholder pressure of several trillion dollars of net worth. Certainly
posited by both Useem and Davis, the corpo- some individuals capitalized on the scandals, but
rate world was rocked by several major scandals they did so at the expense of other investors,
in the late 1990s, on a scale at least as large as many of whom were relatively small and pow-
the Penn Central bankruptcy. The most note- erless but some of whom, including a number
worthy of these was the collapse of Enron, but of institutionals, lost significant amounts of
several others were significant as well. These money. If anyone in the capitalist class bene-
cases appear to be examples of managers, un- fited from these scandals, it was a selective seg-
monitored by outsiders, running amok. They ment and not the class as a whole. Meanwhile,
call into question the arguments not only of these events suggested that managers still had
Useem and Davis but of Domhoff as well. the ability to operate unaccountable to outside
In the case of Enron, the company’s auditors, forces, including their own boards. The cap-
Arthur Andersen, were allegedly complicit in ital market and institutional stockholders cer-
providing inflated views of the company’s per- tainly place constraints on managers, as Davis
formance that caught the firm’s investors and and Useem suggest, but these constraints are not
employees off-guard. Enron’s board members all-encompassing.
have at this writing denied knowledge of the
accounting improprieties, as had Penn Central’s
board members. It was the firm’s inside offi- Corporate Political Activity Redux
cials, most notably its CEO, Kenneth Lay, who
allegedly profited from them. At the same time, A further question must be raised against the
several aspects of the case suggest that both the neostructuralist view that the state is automat-
firm’s connections to other firms and its po- ically responsive to business: If that were the
litical activity may have insulated it from earlier case, why would corporations place such effort
detection and may yet insulate its managers from on lobbying and PAC contributions? That busi-
further sanctions. The largest accounting firms, ness is politically active is a staple of Domhoff ’s
of which Andersen may have been the best model. By positing the importance of business
known, have moved increasingly into consult- political activity, Domhoff implies that without
ing as well as auditing. Andersen’s consulting such efforts, there would be no assurance that
income from Enron amounted to half of its to- the state would act in the interests of business.
tal business with the firm, and the firm may That is tantamount to accepting the belief that
have had an incentive to avoid offending Enron’s the United States is a democracy. Yet the very
managers (Time, January 17, 2002). At the same domination of pressure by corporate interests
time, Enron had contributed more than $5 mil- raises questions about the effectiveness of demo-
lion to federal elected officials and the firm had cratic institutions.
close ties to several officials in President George The dominance of corporate interests in pres-
W. Bush’s administration. This led to specula- sure group competition is not universally ac-
tion that both the contributions and ties were cepted. As we have seen, Vogel viewed business
sources of the Bush administration’s relatively domination as a reality, but a contingent one. At
lenient stance toward the energy industry. Even various points, noncorporate groups have exer-
if Enron benefited from these connections, cised considerable power, Vogel argued. A com-
however, it does not appear to have been at prehensive study of health and energy policy
the behest of either its stockholders or another by Laumann and Knoke (1987) yielded simi-
external group such as bankers. Enron appears lar conclusions. Although corporate and indus-
to have been a clearly management controlled try interests were extremely active and highly
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influential, groups other than business, such Lindblom (1977) and later Dahl (1982) warned,
as associations of health professionals, were American democracy may be in serious peril.
also able to exercise influence. Moreover, as
Laumann and Knoke argue, actors within the
state often had their own agendas and entered Corporate Control and Power Outside
into issues as one of several interested actors. North America
One fundamental issue does suggest the dom-
inance of corporate interests, however: the sheer Although the empirical examples we have used
magnitude of their resources. In two major stud- in our discussion have focused primarily on the
ies (Clawson et al., 1992, 1998), Clawson and his United States, the theories at the basis of this
colleagues have shown the ways in which corpo- discussion were designed to apply to devel-
rations use lobbying and PAC contributions to oped capitalist societies in general. Dahrendorf,
achieve their legislative goals. PAC funds are sig- in his discussion of the separation of owner-
nificant because fundraising requirements have ship from control, referred to Great Britain,
now disqualified all but the most well-endowed France, and Germany as well as the United
candidates from seeking elective office. Claw- States. Miliband’s discussion of the backgrounds
son, Neustadtl, and Weller note that in 1996, the of government officials was based on an anal-
average major party candidate in House elec- ysis of Britain. Poulantzas’ model of the struc-
tions raised nearly five thousand dollars per week tural imperatives of the capitalist state was drawn
(and the average winning candidate raised nearly from his study of the French bureaucracy. And
seven thousand dollars per week) over a two- Useem’s examination of corporate political ac-
year period. The only way to raise such sums, tivity was based on a comparative analysis of the
the authors argue, is to seek backing from large United States and Britain. It is not evident, how-
donors, most of which are major corporations. ever, that the theories developed in the United
This renders it nearly impossible for a candi- States, in particular the Berle and Means the-
date strongly opposed to corporate interests to sis and the reactions to it, apply to other parts
succeed. of the world. To what extent have the various
Of course, even under these conditions there models tested on U.S. data been applied to non–
is still the issue of business unity. To return to U.S. settings, and what level of support have they
the earlier arguments of Schumpeter, Galbraith, received? A full answer to these questions would
and Lipset, if corporate interests are split, do require at least a chapter of its own, if not a full-
they not nullify one another? Perhaps firms are scale monograph. We can, however, offer a few
so active politically because they are competing general observations.
with other firms, or industries. There is one im- First, with perhaps the exception of Great
portant piece of evidence against the counter- Britain, the extent of stock dispersal outside the
vailing power argument, however: As Clawson United States has been considerably lower than
et al. show, both in these works and in an earlier in the United States. The early data analyzed by
study (Clawson et al., 1986), corporations may Dahrendorf (1959) and a more thorough anal-
pursue different interests but they rarely engage ysis by Scott (1979) indicated historical trends
in head-to-head conflict. Similarly, Mizruchi toward stock dispersal in all of the world’s most
(1992) found that in testimony before Congress, industrialized countries. In a more recent study
instances of corporations sharing a position on that we cited earlier, however, La Porta, Lopez-
an issue outweighed cases of opposition by a four de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) found that the
to one margin. In their PAC contributions, pairs United States and the United Kingdom are
of firms were more than nine times more likely outliers in terms of the relative levels of stock
to contribute to the same candidates as to can- dispersal. To the extent that ownership and con-
didates opposing one another. If corporations trol remain more closely fused in nations such
opposing one another is an important condition as Germany, Italy, and South Korea, the debates
for the functioning of democracy, then, as both over the implications of stock dispersal become
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less relevant. This does not mean that families a whole takes precedence over the well-being of
and individuals remain the dominant owners particular firms, have been widely established in
virtually everywhere outside the United States East Asia, as evidenced by the keiretsu in Japan
and United Kingdom. Variation remains, from (Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln et al., 1992), the chaebol
the strong family influence in South Korea and in South Korea (Lee, 2000), and the jituanqiye
Chile to the stronger institutional presence in in Taiwan (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988). Keister
France and Germany. LaPorta et al.’s findings (1998), using data on Chinese business groups,
do suggest the possibility that the nature of the found a positive effect of director interlocks on
business communities in many parts of the world firm profits. Carrington (1981) found a positive
cannot be accounted for in terms of the separa- interlock/profits association in Canada, as did
tion of ownership from control. Meeusen and Cuyvers (1985) in Belgium, but
Second, although it is not fully determin- little evidence for such a link has been found in
ing, there is an evident connection between the United States.
the theories of corporate power and the na- Finally, the structures of corporate elite net-
tionality of their proponents. The arguments works have been studied, with considerable
developed by Domhoff and Miliband were al- success, in such nations as Chile (Zeitlin and
most certainly influenced by the relatively high Ratcliff, 1988) and Colombia (Ogliastri and
level of elite representation in key govern- Davila, 1987) and several European nations
ment positions within the United States and (Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott, 1985). The latter
United Kingdom. Similarly, Poulantzas’ alterna- study revealed extensive structures of corporate
tive perspective, which deemphasized the social interlocks in virtually all industrialized coun-
backgrounds of state officials, was undoubtedly tries in Europe. These studies have in some cases
influenced by his focus on France, with its large posed challenges to widely held views. Ogliastri
civil service bureaucracy, staffed largely by those and Davila, in a study of the power structures of
with middle-class backgrounds. The theorists’ eleven mid-sized Colombian cities, found, con-
national backgrounds do not fully account for trary to an earlier argument by Walton (1976),
their perspectives. Both Domhoff and Miliband that the more economically developed the city,
have been sharply criticized by their own com- the greater its concentration of power. Taira and
patriots, for example. A fuller account of exactly Wada (1987) showed the ways in which the ca-
how the national backgrounds of various theo- reer life cycles of Japanese elites, beginning in
rists have affected their analyses of relations be- the state bureaucracy, with subsequent move-
tween corporations and the state would be a ment into positions in private corporations, fa-
fruitful area for further study. cilitate cooperative relations between business
Third, it is intriguing to observe the extent and government. Scott (1987) traced the varying
to which theories developed within the United systems of interfirm relations in Britain, France,
States apply with greater relevance outside the and Germany to the distinct histories of the
United States than inside. Mintz and Schwartz’s three nations; the prevalence of small, family-
bank hegemony model was controversial in owned firms in Britain, alliances of large banks
the United States even during the late 1970s and companies in Germany, and financial and
and early 1980s, when nonfinancial corpora- family-based “interest groups” in France. And
tions’ use of external financing was at extremely more recently, Windolf (2002) has completed
high levels. Although its applicability to con- an extensive comparative study of corporate
temporary Germany may be limited as well, networks in ten countries, from Western and
historically, the dominance of German banks Eastern Europe to the United States, providing
was widely accepted. Mintz and Schwartz, detailed analyses of the organizational and his-
Mizruchi, and others spent considerable effort, torical factors accounting for variation among
with only partial success, to identify coherent them.
business groups in the United States. Yet busi- Less evident in these works, and still too rare
ness groups, in which the health of the group as in the United States, as well, are systematic
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analyses of the effects of corporate network in the same way that threatening to move to an-
structures on firm political behavior and the other location within a nation provides leverage
political consequences of such behavior. These over local governments. There is controversy
data are admittedly difficult to identify, and regarding just how extensive and/or new the
where they do exist, such as PAC contribution globalization process is, however. Although the
data in the United States, their meaning and in- relative frequency of cross-national economic
terpretation are not always clear. Even if there activity increased significantly between the end
were data sources in non–U.S. countries analo- of World War II and the 1990s, the level was
gous to corporate PAC contributions, and even approximately the same in 1997 as it was in 1914
if their meanings were clear within their na- (Fligstein, 2001). The proportion of economic
tional context, the ability to draw comparative activity occurring within national boundaries
inferences would be limited. It is perhaps for remained well above 80 percent even during
this reason that comparative discussions of the the 1990s. Some institutions, such as Ameri-
role of corporate power have tended to oper- can banks, moved overseas during the 1960s and
ate at a highly abstract level. Just as considerable 1970s but actually reduced their foreign opera-
attention has been paid to the development of tions after 1980 (Mizruchi and Davis, 2004).
comparative data sources for the cross-national If globalization has weakened the ability of
study of social mobility, it might be useful for capitalist states to regulate their domestic busi-
political sociologists to begin thinking about a ness communities, then corporate elites would
similar effort to develop cross-national data on have greater power with respect to their states
corporate political behavior. at the turn of the twenty-first century than
they did three decades earlier. This may be the
case, but there is no evidence to demonstrate
Globalization it. Those studying the process of globalization
have focused on its effects on general domestic
The level of international economic activity as and foreign policies, such as welfare provisions.
a proportion of world GDP nearly tripled be- Whether globalization is the cause of reduced
tween 1953 and 1997 (Fligstein, 2001:196–7). welfare expenditures in the West is a hotly de-
The process spread especially rapidly after bated issue. There is virtually no empirical work
the deregulation of national financial markets on the extent to which the political power of do-
brought on by the 1973 collapse of the Bret- mestic business communities has increased dur-
ton Woods agreement, which had fixed inter- ing this period. Both this issue, and the degree of
national currencies to the dollar. Several scholars internationalization of corporate elites, are areas
have suggested that with the increasing global- that clearly warrant greater scrutiny.
ization of economic activity, national govern-
ments have lost the ability to regulate their own
business communities (Cerny, 1997; Frieden, conclusion
1991; Strange, 1996). If these formulations are
accurate, it would follow that business elites have The rise of the modern corporation has brought a
become increasingly powerful with respect to concentration of economic power which can com-
individual capitalist states. The internationaliza- pete on equal terms with the modern state . . . ,where
its own interests are concerned, it even attempts to
tion of economic activity also raises the ques-
dominate the state. The future may see the economic
tion of whether elites have become intertwined organism, now typified by the corporation, not only
cross-nationally over time. One possible out- on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even
come of this might be the disappearance, or at superseding it as the dominant form of social organi-
least the dispersal, of national corporate elites. zation. (Berle and Means, 1968[1932:313])
The extent to which corporations have the
ability to move capital outside their borders cer- The period from the 1950s to the 1980s
tainly gives them leverage over their host states, saw a ferocious debate among American social
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scientists over the concentration of political are as politically active, through lobbying and
power in developed capitalist societies. This de- campaign contributions, as they have ever been.
bate yielded scores, perhaps hundreds, of studies, This does not necessarily demonstrate that cor-
and the sophistication of the work on all sides porate power as a whole is increasing. As Robert
increased significantly over time. The debate be- Dahl noted many years ago (1958), for a group
gan to lose steam in the early 1990s, however, to be powerful requires not only resources, but
and few sociologists any longer write about the also unity. Corporations pursuing their own in-
role of economic elites or study such processes terests, without an organized mobilization, may
(for exceptions, see Dreiling, 2000; Burris, cancel each other out. Conversely, there is ev-
2001). The world has changed since the heyday idence for the diffusion of corporate behavior
of the power structure debate. American firms across networks that did not exist two decades
(although not, as we have seen, American banks) ago, and even early pluralists such as Lindblom
have become more global, as have firms based (1977) and Dahl (1982) eventually conceded
in other developed nations. The banks’ po- that business was a disproportionately power-
litical position within the business commu- ful actor. What implications do these networks
nity has declined. Older, visible families such have for corporate political power? Is business
as the Rockefellers have disappeared. Yet we mobilized at anything approaching its level in
do not know what, if anything, has arisen in the late 1970s? Is business less organized now
their places. We outlined four current per- because collective action is less necessary, be-
spectives that have been advanced to account cause of the successes of the past? Can business
for the role of corporate power in contempo- be a powerful political actor without any orga-
rary developed societies. All four approaches re- nization at all, but simply by virtue of its struc-
quire attention, and all four require empirical tural position and the consequences, even inad-
analysis. vertent ones, that its behavior generates? What
We do not know what these new studies of role, if any, has the globalization of economic
corporate power will reveal. Although corpora- activity played in this process? Can we develop
tions face pressures from stockholders, and the systematic, cross-national comparisons of cor-
capital market in general, that they did not face porate political activity, and if so, what results
twenty-five years ago, they appear to be acting will they yield? There is no shortage of impor-
largely on their own rather than as members tant questions for sociologists, and other social
of a larger corporate community. Corporations scientists, to address.
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chapter sixteen
Social Movements and Social Change1
J. Craig Jenkins and William Form
introduction “movement-centered” (Lofland, 1993:289–91),

thus neglecting their possible impact on social
Social movements have traditionally been de- change in the broader society. When movement
fined as organized efforts to bring about so- outcomes have been studied, they have typi-
cial change (cf. Jenkins, 1983; McAdam and cally focused on immediate public policy effects
Snow, 1997:xviii–xxv; McCarthy and Zald, and not the broader institutional and cultural
1977:1217–18; Tarrow, 1998:4–6; Wilson, changes central to long-term movement objec-
1973:3–4). Yet, as several scholars have noted tives. Understanding social movement change is
(Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander, 1995; central to political sociology because the field
Giugni, 1998, 1999; Huberts, 1989; Lofland, is defined as the study of social power (see
1993:347–8), whether and how they actually chapter 1). Similarly, social movements are de-
cause social change has received little atten- fined as organized efforts to bring about so-
tion. Social movement research has long fo- cial changes in the distribution of power. This
cused on questions of emergence and partici- chapter reviews the current status of the social
pation. Some attention has been paid to imme- movement field and outlines a theoretical and
diate social movements outcomes but scant atten- methodological strategy for developing a the-
tion has focused of social movement change. By ory of social movement change.
the latter, we mean the distinctive contribution We use “social movement change” in pref-
of social movements to change net of ongoing erence to social movement “success” for several
changes and social processes. Many studies have reasons. First, the question of “success” typically
examined the short-term or immediate out- asks whether the outcomes were intended or in
comes of movements, for example, life course the interest of social movement actors. Not only
change (Fendrich, 1993; McAdam, 1988), pol- are there frequent internal movement disagree-
icy enactment (Burstein, 1985; Burstein and ments over desired outcomes, but movements
Freudenberg, 1978; Costain, 1992), and pol- may also have important unintended outcomes.
icy implementation (Button, 1989; Handler, The question also arises whether intended out-
1978), but few have placed these processes in comes actually benefit the claimed beneficiaries
a multivariate framework and controlled for of movements. As Amenta and Young (1999)
the relevant societal influences. Most studies of argue, the central question is the creation of col-
movements have focused inward and have been lective goods for movement beneficiaries, that
is, those claimed to be primary to benefit from
1
We benefitted from the comments of Verta movement activity. We refer to these alternatives
Taylor, Wayne Santoro, Joan Huber, and two anonymous as social movement outcomes. Second, “success” is
reviewers as well as the assistance of Steve Boutcher. typically analyzed as a social movement effect, that
331
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332 J. Craig Jenkins and William Form
is, in terms of specific immediate consequences framed in terms of interorganizational networks

of social movements, as in altered life courses or and the interaction of collective action and po-
changed laws. litical opportunities. We outline the major the-
Analyzing social movement change requires a ories and then assess how movement strategies
causal analysis that not only demonstrates an as- and tactics impact social change. The major
sociation between the movement and specific impediment to such an approach has been the
outcomes but also shows that movement pro- absence of a conceptual framework for iden-
cesses contribute independently or in addition tifying the relevant factors and a methodology
to other potential causes. Such an analysis also for distinguishing social movement effects from
identifies the mechanisms involved in bring- other factors. We outline such a methodology
ing about change. The analysis involves placing and, in the conclusion, identify new directions
movements in a broader societal context that infor research.
cludes ongoing social changes, the structure of
the state, prevailing political alliances, existing
ideologies and cultural resources, and the struc-
ture of major social institutions relevant to the social movements: concepts
change in question. and contribution
What are relevant social movement outcomes?
Gamson (1975[1990]) distinguishes two: (1) We adopt Meyer and Tarrow’s (1998:4) concep-
acceptance and (2) new tangible advantages. tion of social movements as “collective chal-
Some argue (Goldstone, 1980) that acceptance lenges to existing arrangements of power and
without tangible gains (i.e., cooptation) is a type distribution by people with common purposes
of failure. However, Taylor (1989) has shown and solidarities, in sustained interaction with
that organizational survival at some minimal elites, opponents and authorities.” Two fea-
level may eventually act as a catalyst to move- tures stand out in this definition. First, social
ment revitalization. The question arises, What movements entail “collective challenge” (i.e.,
constitutes a “tangible advantage”? Most stud- organized attempts to change institutional ar-
ies focus on visible advantages, such as the rangements through contentious as well as con-
enactment of favorable laws (Burstein, 1985; ventional collective action). Such changes may
Santoro, 2002) or additional public expenditures center on public policies, which has been the
(Albritton, 1979; Jaynes, 2002; Jennings, 1983), major focus of study, or they aim at broader
but they may ignore matters of policy imple- changes in the structure of social institutions, the
mentation (Andrews, 2001), institutional and distribution of social benefits, and conceptions
cultural changes (Chaves, 1997; Katzenstein, of social rights and responsibilities. Although
1998; Staggenborg, 1998), and the distribu- some movements create a single formal move-
tion of socially valued resources (Eckstein, 1982; ment organization (SMO), most operate in
Kelley and Klein, 1980). As Weber (1946:chap- multiorganizational fields (Curtis and Zurcher,
ter 8) early observed, tangible gains also include 1973) of competing small groups knit to-
increased status or prestige, favorable cultural gether by interpersonal networks that have com-
adaptations, and the reorganizations in lifestyles mon goals, targets, and ideology (Diani, 1995;
of everyday life. These changes reflect changes Gerlach and Hine, 1970). By using contentious
in the distribution of social power that may be as well as conventional tactics, social movements
brought about by social movements. attempt to create uncertainty in the eyes of
This essay begins by defining social move- their targets and thereby pressure them to alter
ments and their potential contribution to politi- their practices. The second feature of social
cal sociology. It then discusses the major theories movements is their inherent political character.
of social movements and how they handle social Movement goals typically include changing the
change, arguing that they point to the need for distribution of power and authority and their
an institutional analysis of the political system impact depends on sustained interactions with
P1: JsY
Social Movements and Social Change 333
other political actors, most notably political al- grievances, resources, organization, and cultural
lies, opponents, and authorities. solidarities, but their goals diverge due to in-
Bringing social movements into the core of teractions with political authorities. Where au-
political sociology promotes a better under- thorities resist mildly, cooperate or are neutral,
standing of the processes that generate social and make no effort to eliminate the movement,
change. We argue that, in democratic polities, a reform movement is likely to emerge. Where
social movements are critical catalysts for social the state adopts a repressive exclusionary stance
change. Recognizing this corrects a key problem and is too weak and/or ineffective at repression,
with existing theories of social change. Since the a revolutionary movement is likely, especially
early 1960s, standard social change theories (e.g. when it is reinforced by alliances with other po-
functionalist, evolutionary, conflict, and diffu- litical contenders (Goodwin, 2002).
sion) have failed to provide a general explanation Significantly, this type of political process ex-
of social and political change. Some argue that planation does not eliminate the need to analyze
a general theory is impossible and that a bet- existing networks, the distribution of resources,
ter approach develops contingency arguments and the structural limits of existing institutions
about specific institutional mechanisms that op- and ideologies. The political processes shaping
erate in delimited contexts (e.g. Chirot, 1994; movement mobilization and its effects are em-
Tilly, 1995). In place of holistic change theories, bedded in institutions, a key point in functional
the best we can develop are explanations that arguments about system breakdown and equi-
capture path-dependent and historically specific librium that social movement scholars often ne-
changes. glect. The same processes are also embedded in
Whatever the merits of this position, we agree long-term evolutionary changes, including the
that social movement change is usually the prod- changing population of organizations and the
uct of specific sequences of political interactions institutional selection mechanisms that favor
between social movements, their allies, oppo- the survival of specific types of SMOs (Edwards
nents, and authorities. For example, political and Marullo, 1995; Hannan and Freeman, 1989;
revolutions are partially explicable in terms of Minkoff, 1995, 1998).
the interactions among political contenders and A critical concern is whether social move-
the underlying networks and alliances that con- ments are working with or against the evolu-
strain these interactions (Tilly, 1978:chapter 7). tionary trends in society. The societal contexts
Similar processes operate in democratic reform of movements must be considered to define
cycles (Tarrow, 1998:chapter 10). Drawing on the limits of existing institutions as well as
political event data mapping of civil politics, their contradictions that may spark movements
Jenkins and Bond (2001) proposed an index of and the changes they bring about. Finally, it is
conflict carrying capacity based on the multi- important to understand the antagonisms and
ple interactions of civil contentions, state repres- structural limits within the “parent structure”
sion, and confrontational violence. They serve (Schwartz, 1975) or major the social institu-
as “early warning” signals of political crisis in tions in which social movements are embed-
the onset of generalized political violence, vio- ded. Such structures define not only the interests
lent regime change, and geno-politicides. These under contention but also the interinstitutional
sequences depend on the mobilization and deci- alliances and interdependencies that shape their
sions of specific actors (most notably movement power, interests, vulnerabilities, and their ca-
leaders and political authorities) and they reveal pacities to resist change. Drawing on geopolit-
regular predictable patterns of interaction that ical theory, Collins (1995) argues that the col-
may lead toward or away from political crises. lapse of the USSR was structurally based and, at
Movement goals and strategies are also criti- most, triggered by mass mobilization. Although
cally shaped by political interactions. Goldstone he may have underestimated the importance
(1998) argues that both reformist and revo- of the mass protests (Bunce, 1999; Jenkins and
lutionary movements emerge out of similar Benderliglou, 2003), he correctly emphasized
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Non- Political Actors Governmental

Institutional Actors
Institutional Actors
Actors
Legislative
Bodies
Parties
Education
Policy Economy
Executive
Social Movement Changes Welfare
Sector Religion
Family
Interest Groups
Courts and
Agencies
Mass
Communications
Figure 16.1. Sector Relations in the Public Policy System.
the importance of ongoing structural contra- rather, it is a scheme for identifying the ma-
dictions of the Soviet system and in glasnost, jor institutions and organizations with which
perestroika, and other internal reforms. movement interact when bringing about pos-
sible change.
For any given movement, the parent institu-
a movement/society framework tion and the other three sectors constitute an
external organizational environment in which
To understand movement/society interactions the movement interacts in the process of ad-
an interinstitutional network approach must be vancing its aims, goals, and values. Our ap-
used. Figure 16.1 outlines a general frame- proach treats the macrosocietal structure as ex-
work of the social structures within which so- isting prior to social movements, defining the
cial movements are embedded. For the sake of latter as emerging out of society (which must
simplicity, we divide society into four sectors: be specified) and responding to groups in this
(1) social movements; (2) governmental insti- larger structure. The analysis proceeds from the
tutions, such as legislatures, courts, chief exec- societal system to the specific social movement
utives, and agencies; (3) political interest orga- (from the macro to micro) rather than the other
nizations, such as political parties and interest way around (Blau, 1994:chapter 6). To ana-
groups; and (4) other social institutions of mass lyze movement/society interaction and its out-
communication, education, economy, welfare, comes, the appropriate methodology focuses on
and religion. In open, democratic, pluralistic interorganizational bargaining treated as forced
societies, these four sectors constitute an in- exchanges in bounded or constrained rational
teractive system of interinstitutional bargaining, choices (Form, 1990). SMOs include both the
conflict, and change. In authoritarian regimes, formal organized structures as well as the diffuse
the sectors are constrained by the extent of informal networks that shape collective action.
state control over other institutions. This sec- Unlike traditional exchange theory (Coleman,
tor framework does not provide a causal model 1990), bargaining is neither individual nor vol-
for the study of movement impacts on change; untary but bounded by enduring externalities
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(Form, 1990). Among them are institutionalized omy and that institutions vary in their indepen-
conflicts of interest that are embedded in unbal- dence, rules, logics, practices, and oppositions.
anced exchanges and define the major conflict Institutional autonomy is considerably reduced
lines of society (class, regional, others). In their in authoritarian polities and in less developed
attempt to bring about change, social move- societies. With this “society-centered” view of
ments get changed, shaped, and redefined by in- social movement change in mind, we now turn
teracting with other groups in society as well as to specific social movement theories and ex-
their political allies and opponents (Della Porta amine the extent to which they consider and
and Rucht, 1995). explain social change.
In short, social movements are nested in
an interinstitutional field defined by both the
social movement theories: their logics
parent structure against which they have spe-
and how they handle change
cific grievances and the other institutions with
which the parent structures interact. Both shape
We focus on five major theories: (1) early sym-
the possible alliances among movements, their
bolic interactionist theories of collective be-
opponents (including countermovements), and
havior, (2) functionalist treatments, (3) resource
other actors. Social movements are nested in
mobilization, (4) political opportunity, and (5)
an interorganizational field that the participants
newer ideas about framing and collective iden-
may or may not recognize (which itself has
tity construction. All argue that social changes
important consequences). Movement outcomes
contribute to the rise of movements, creating
emerge out of multidimensional organizational
strains, new resources, opportunities, and ideas
bargaining that encompasses competing with
about change, but only the last three actually
some groups, cooperating with others, arriving
discuss social movement change. In general,
at accommodations with still others, and even
these discussions have gradually evolved from
open antisystem activity.2
microexplanations of movement emergence3
We do not adopt the simplistic functionalist
to analyses of how the institutions shape so-
position that all parts of the system in Figure
cial movement outcomes and, most recently, to
16.1 have equal power to change each other. In
multivariate analyses of social movement change
“postmodern” capitalist societies, institutional
in a societal context.
holders of economic, social, and cultural capital
vary in their hegemony over subordinates as well
as each other (Bourdieu, 1990; Collins, 1975). A Early Symbolic Interactionism
multiplicity of potential conflicts impinge on the
extent to which particular actors become mobi- Early theorists advanced collective behavior ex-
lized and develop alliances with and against par- planations that focused on symbolic interaction
ent structures and their allies. The valid insight and paid little attention to movement outcomes.
of functionalism recognizes institutional auton- Park’s (1934) entry on “Collective Behavior”
in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (which
2
A useful comparison is Giugni’s (1998:388) “move- had no entry for social movements) focused on
ment-centered” approach, which focuses on the interac- the collective unrest and circular reaction pro-
tion of the movement with its immediate environment
in terms of how movement claims, actions, and their
cesses that create contagion and bring individu-
interactions with “outside events and actions” produce als to join crowds. Blumer (1969) systematized
change. Our framework differs in that it starts from the these processes into stages: problematic situa-
larger interinstitutional system (or society) and specifies tions, the breakdown of behavioral norms that
the effects of movement actions on the social change
field. We term the first movement-centered in that it starts
3
from the movement and its immediate environment, Significantly, Heberle (1951) outlined a macro ap-
whereas ours is a “society-centered” framework that proach to social movements that put movements at the
starts from the interinstitutional system within which center of political sociology but, until the late 1960s, this
a movement is embedded. challenge was not taken up by others.
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lead to circular reaction, milling, collective ex- ignored questions of social movement change.
citement, and crowd action. Turner and Killian The analyses were interpretive and descriptive,
(1957, 1972, 1987) stripped this theory of the typical of case studies of single SMOs.
assumption that collective behavior is irrational
by emphasizing the influence of symbolic inter-
action and information on defining problematic Resource Mobilization and
situations that in turn lead to the emergence of Political Opportunities
new norms. Such “emergent norms” (the pro-
cess of emergence not explained) may eventually The social movements of the 1960s stim-
lead to the construction of social movements. ulated a reassessment of theories that led to
Turner and Killian classified and described types the development of resource mobilization and
of social movements, their stages of develop- political opportunity theories. They empha-
ment, and leadership. Successful social move- sized the role of movement strategies and po-
ments become institutionalized and presumably litical opportunities in bringing about social
bring about social change (Killian, 1964). How- movement change. Although formally distinct,
ever, the authors provided no analysis that dis- the two theories are typically used together.
tinguished successful from failed movements or McCarthy and Zald (1973) argued that contem-
dealt with difference in social movement out- porary movements were becoming professional-
comes and change. ized. They rely not only on paid professionals to
mobilize transitory activists but also on discre-
tionary time schedules, media events, and move-
Functionalism ment sponsorship by government agencies, pri-
vate foundations, and social welfare institutions.
Smelser (1962) outlined a functionalist approach Oberschall (1973) emphasized the importance
that proposed a “value-added” framework to of material and organizational resources in the
explain different types of collective behavior. mobilization process (especially preexisting sol-
Arguing that inconsistencies among the com- idarity networks and leadership). In an analysis
ponents of social action (values, norms, motiva- of the southern civil rights movement, he doc-
tion, and situational facilities) create structural umented the important role that sympathetic
strain and the development of generalized be- third parties (northern whites and political au-
liefs, Smelser argued that six factors (structural thorities) played in creating effective of civil dis-
conduciveness, strains, generalized beliefs, pre- obedience. Barkan (1984) argued that this third
cipitating factors, mobilization, and social con- party support was activated by the repressive vio-
trol) always operate to create collective behavior. lence of southern authorities against nonviolent
Arguing that “any kind of strain may be a de- protestors which, in turn, proved central to real-
terminant of any kind of collective behavior” izing the policy changes advocated by the move-
(1962:49), he argued that the form of collective ment. Specifying the idea of political opportu-
behavior depends on the interaction of the other nities associated with these arguments, Eisinger
five factors. Yet, despite pointing to the impor- (1973) analyzed protests in U.S. cities. He found
tance of mobilization and social control (i.e., that closed or highly open city governments
the interaction of movements and authorities), were less likely to encourage protests than cities
Smelser did not examine movement outcomes with mixed or intermediate opportunities. An
or change. inverted U pattern operates. In closed systems
In sum, both of these early collective behav- (the left foot of the inverted U), repression and
ior theories focused on questions of movement perceived lack of effects discourage protest; in
emergence and participation but, apart from open systems (the right foot of the inverted U),
simplistic ideas about natural life cycles and the protest is unnecessary.
implicit assumption that institutionalized move- Defining “success” in terms of acceptance
ments have some undefined impact, the theories and tangible movement gains, Gamson (1975
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[1990]) analyzed a sample of fifty-three “chal- (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; van Dyke, 2003;
lenging groups” in the United States between Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone, 2003).
1800 and 1945 and found that the more suc- Dynamic opportunities are centered in the
cessful movements (1) “think small” and pursue immediate institutional environment of social
nondisplacement and single issue goals, (2) use movements and are “relatively volatile, shift-
selective incentives and enjoy external sponsoring with events, policies and political actors”
ship, (3) employ unruliness (including violence) (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:277). Central to
but are not targets of violence, (4) have cen- movement success are such factors as elite divi-
tralized and formal structures that discourage sions, governmental control strategies (includ-
fractionalization and provide combat readiness, ing excessive and erratic repression), support
and (5) are active during crisis periods (war and from political allies, and short-term crises (e.g.,
economic depression), and (6) have more rad- oil spills and airplane crashes) that create “policy
ical competitors. Below we refer to this strat- windows” for political advocacy (Kingdom,
egy of combining “thinking small” with un- 1984:173–4).
ruliness as “radical reformism.” Focusing on the The general assumption here is that elites and
importance of political allies and neutral elites, polity members typically oppose the entry of
Jenkins and Perrow (1977) compared three farm new groups into the system, even those pursuing
worker union movements and demonstrated moderate change, because they threaten existing
that third-party support from labor and lib- rules of political access and alliances. However,
eral interest groups combined with govern- new developments may occur that lead elites
mental neutrality created successful unioniza- and polity members to take neutral or even sup-
tion, whereas repression and weak allies led to portive stances toward movements. Analyzing
failure. the development of African American protests,
The key variables in this discussion are re- McAdam (1999[1982]) argued that the mecha-
sources and political opportunities. Resources in- nization of cotton production reduced the need
clude any capacity for carrying out collective for Jim Crow racism as a labor control device.
action, ranging from tangible resources (money, Because United States Cold War foreign policy
space, publicity) to people resources (leadership, made the racial caste system a diplomatic lia-
expertise, access to networks and decision mak- bility, the Eisenhower administration supported
ers, volunteer time and commitment) and so- domestic civil rights reforms. Party competition
cietal resources (social status, legitimacy, name and a closely divided government led to relaxed
and issue recognition) (Freeman 1979:170–6). repression and symbolic concessions that en-
As Tilly (1978:7) argued, the key factors are “the couraged African American protest (Piven and
ways that groups acquire resources and make Cloward, 1977:213–21, 231–5; McAdam 1999
them available for collective action.” People and [1982]:156–60, 169–72). Speaking of the op-
societal resources are central, especially the skills portunities behind the general protest wave in
and networks of leaders and organizers who play the late 1960s, Jenkins (1985:218) claimed that
a critical role in devising innovative strategies “In the context of a series of closely contested
and tactics (Ganz, 2000). Political opportunities re- (Presidential) elections in which the margin of
fer to “the probability that social protest actions victory was often less than one percent, two
will lead to success in achieving a desired out- swing voting blocs (African Americans and the
come” (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001:182). Ana- new middle class) became increasingly decisive
lysts distinguish between dynamic and structural in the electoral calculations of political elites.”
opportunities as well as between cultural and in- Costain (1992:232–24) argued that close presi-
stitutional aspects (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). dential elections and narrow margins of party
Important questions also arise about when and control in Congress created bipartisan toler-
how potential supporters collectively perceive ance and thus support for the early women’s
opportunities (see below) and whether threat or movement. Jenkins et al. (2003) showed that
opportunities are more central to mobilization divided governments and northern Democratic
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power created opportunities for African Ameri- input structures are closed (West Germany and
can protests. These opportunities influenced the France).
emergence of movements, their goals and strate- Opportunities need to be distinguished from
gies, and the likelihood of social change. threats that constitute “costs that social groups
Structural opportunities are more stable features will incur from protest, or that it expects to suffer
of political institutions and culture that change if it does not take action” (Goldstone and Tilly,
only gradually over decades. “From the stand- 2001:183). The core argument of “prospect
point of social movements, these aspects are theory” (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988) is that
essentially fixed and given, barring dramatic negative sanctions are intrinsically more mo-
and unforeseen changes beyond their control” tivating than positive rewards. Some scholars
(Gamson and Meyer, 1996:277). Comparing use this theory to argue that threats (not op-
the strategies and policy impact of the anti- portunities) are central to protest (Berejikian,
nuclear movements in four Western democra- 1992; van Dyke, 2003) and that movements are
cies (United States, West Germany, Sweden, more focused on preventing “bads” than secur-
and France), Kitschelt (1986) argues that the ing “goods.” Tilly (1978:134–5) makes the ad-
more accessible the state, the more moderate ditional points that groups are more responsive
the movement, and the more likely the move- to threats because they tend to inflate the value
ment gains. Thus, antinuclear movements in of resources already under control, overestimate
the United States and Sweden relied on lob- the potential negative impact of threats, and can
bying and litigation that were accompanied by respond more quickly to threats by using exist-
little protest. Limited access to authorities in ing networks and practices. In contrast, re-
France and West Germany produced oppo- sponding to new opportunities requires time-
sitional protest. Moreover, policy innovation consuming mobilization.
seemed dependent on the capacity of the state Several studies have found that threats stimu-
to implement changes. In Sweden, a strong state late protest possibly more than do opportunities
was able to implement new energy policies that (Francisco, 1995; Rasler, 1996; van Dyke, 2003).
emphasized conservation and alternative fuels, The net impact of threats on social movement
whereas in the United States, a weak state pro- change is less clear. Meyer (1990) shows that the
duced a policy stalemate (i.e., the antinuclear bellicose foreign policy rhetoric of the Reagan
movement imposed procedural obstacles to nu- administration about “survivable nuclear war”
clear plant construction but had little effect on stimulated the mobilization of the nuclear freeze
introducing innovation in energy policies). In movement but once the proposal was adopted
France, limited access to authorities blunted by Democratic party leaders (an opportunity ef-
movement influence and allowed a strong state fect), it was watered down to a nonbinding con-
to continue to expand its nuclear power indus- gressional resolution, and the movement fizzled.
try. In West Germany, the combination of weak Insofar as protests sustain mobilization, they may
access with weak state capacity created opposi- contribute to social movement change. How-
tional protests and a stalemate in energy policy. ever, in Jasper and Poulsen’s (1993) comparative
In sum, institutional structures channel in- analysis of the animal rights campaign, the goals
teractions between movements and authorities and mobilization of the protestors likely were
and thereby shape movement goals and strate- less critical to the outcome than the vulnerabil-
gies. The structures also facilitate or impede a ity of the targets, their public relations blunders,
reactive learning process among elites. Move- and the mobilization of countermovements.
ment impacts on policy are larger where polit- What is the relative importance of resources
ical access is greater and policy capacities are and opportunities with respect to social move-
strong (Sweden). Impacts are limited to pro- ment change? The evidence suggests that both
cedural changes where political access is open are important. Cress and Snow (2000) found
but policy capacities are weak (United States). that both the organizational resources and po-
Finally, movement impact is minimal where litical allies of homeless groups contributed to
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prohomeless policies in U.S. cities net of a our movement/society framework makes clear,
range of other factors. In their study of the bringing a broad range of processes to bear on
Townsend movement, Amenta, Carruthers, and movements is vital: changes in public opinion,
Zylan (1992) coined the term political media- the perceptions and practices of the protestors
tion model to depict how political opportuni- themselves, and their interactions with other
ties mediate the impact of mobilization on pol- institutions, such as the mass media, religious,
icy change. The larger Townsend clubs gained and educational institutions. Finally, the theo-
larger old-age pensions but only in the con- ries share a rationalist bias in conceptualizing in-
text of the political opportunities afforded by terests as given, fixed, and unproblematic. This
liberal state Democratic parties and strong state has led to simplifying the process of collective
agencies charged with protecting old-age recip- decision making as nothing more than aggre-
ients. Political opportunities provided the en- gated individual decision making (Ferree, 1992;
abling context that made protest effective in Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Melucci, 1989). In
bringing about changes. response to these concerns, new interactionist
Critics have pointed to several problems with arguments have been offered about the framing
resource and opportunity theories (Goodwin of grievances and the construction of collective
and Jasper, 1999; McAdam, 1996a; Zald, 2000). identities.
First, the often-exploratory studies have illus-
trated plausible causal processes but they lack
conceptual clarity and methodological rigor in Newer Symbolic Interactionism: Framing,
selecting control variables. Key terms such as re- Identity, and Ideology
source and political opportunity have been used in
ad hoc and inconsistent ways. McAdam (1996a) The core framing argument (Snow and
and Tarrow (1996) improved the situation some- Benford, 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and
what by specifying multiple hypotheses about Benford, 1986) is that movement leaders and
the impact of opportunities on social movement participants construct collective definitions of
change. And several other studies (e.g., Amenta their immediate environment. They externalize
et al., 1992, 1994; Burstein, 1985; Burstein blame by attributing grievances to the mutable
and Freudenberg, 1978; Cress and Snow, 2000; policies and practices of institutional elites, and
Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam and Su, they propose concrete social changes to alleviate
2002) have used systematic comparisons and these problems. Cress and Snow (2000) showed
multivariate techniques to show that both re- that the framing activities by advocates for the
sources and opportunities are central to move- homeless contributed to favorable city policies
ment outcomes. net of organization, opportunities, and protest
Second, much of this work has neglected sub- tactics. Voss (1996) argued that limitations in
jective and cultural aspects of movements and the “working class republican” frame offered by
has taken a narrow view of formal political pro- the elites of the nineteenth-century Knights of
cesses. Opportunities and resources are often Labor contributed to movement’s collapse in the
defined in terms of external objective situa- face of strike defeats. The framing limitations in-
tions that movement leaders activists may not cluded opposition to state intervention (which
perceive. That is, researchers have assumed that could have countered employer organization
testing actions are ubiquitous and persistent in and repression), overestimates of worker/middle-
“everyday resistance” (Scott, 1991) and that ac- class alliances, and absence of “fortifying myths”
tivists will eventually discover the opportuni- (i.e., beliefs about the inevitability of success)
ties and resources. This may or may not be to sustain member mobilization in the face of
the case because cultural biases and informa- defeats. Although employer repression and or-
tion gaps may result in missed opportunities ganizational weakness were likely more critical
(Sawyers and Meyer, 1999) as well as over- factors in the union’s collapse, these were inter-
estimates of resources and opportunities. As twined with and reinforced by framing failures.
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Framing contests need to be analyzed in the the media, and political authorities. A major
context of our movement/society framework focus of in the production of collective claims
(Figure 16.1). Movements, countermovements, is constructing collective identities for both ac-
the mass media, other third parties, and the state tors and their targets, typically framed in dyadic
are constantly involved in competitive battles “we/them” terms. Another focus refits existing
over the framing of grievances, issues, and the cultural materials that emerge out of interac-
repackaging of cultural outlooks to get issues tions with other actors in the larger sociopolit-
on the political agenda and to advance pet pro- ical environment (Figure 16.1). Although new
posals (McCarthy, 1996). By honing news rou- identities and solidarities often emerge during
tines, “pegs,” and other framing devices, and contentious episodes (Fantasia, 1988), most of
by adapting to them to issue-attention cycles, them are informally constructed in loosely inte-
movements more likely gain media attention grated small networks of “critical communities”
and thereby get their issues on the political (Rochon, 1998) composed of informal leaders
agenda and influence public policy. This ex- and organizers who debate grievance frames and
plains why professional public relations compa- collective identities, which they then test out in
nies and political consultants who market po- their recruiting and publicity. A leadership cadre
litical campaigns are often mimicked by SMOs with the ability to modify frames and collective
involved in institutional advocacy (Berry, 1997). identities helps in gaining immediate movement
Frames must be considered in conjunction goals and perhaps eventually bring about social
with strategies and tactics. Analyzing the civil change.
rights protests in the 1950s and 1960s, McAdam Collective identities are enacted and main-
(1996b) argued that Martin Luther King’s “rad- tained through identification rituals that provide
ical reformist” frame worked to evoke pre- movement activists positive self-identifications
dictable responses from five major audiences. while attributing negative labels to opponents,
It simultaneously provoked white segregation- dominant groups, and outsiders who seek to
ists (including local police and officials) into denigrate the movement (Taylor and Whittier,
extreme racist violence which, in turn, mobi- 1995). These identities also provide activists
lized sympathizers of the movement to non- with a sense of movement history and con-
violent demonstrations. Both received sympa- tinuity, thereby sustaining mobilization dur-
thetic media coverage that outraged the general ing periods of latency (Della Porta and Diani,
public, thereby compelling a reluctant federal 1999:89). At the same time, identities define po-
government to intervene favorably. Effective litical boundaries between supporters and oth-
frame management links grievance definitions ers, thereby generating trust among movement
and collective identities to specific tactics and actors. Marwell and Oliver (1993) demonstrate
strategies that target several audiences that may how collective identity is critical for addressing
have discrepant views. “free-rider” problems by generating a “critical
Resource mobilization theory’s largest prob- mass.”
lem is its failure to deal with collective identity It is nearly impossible to assess the indepen-
and ideology. Although some researchers have dent impact of collective identity on movement
advanced cultural interpretations of collective outcomes because collective identity is inter-
identity while treating beliefs as arising simply dependent with and inseparable from collec-
from the minds of movement actors (Eyerman tive action. More difficult is the assessment of
and Jamison, 1991), a more fruitful approach identity effects on social movement change. Yet
examines political interactions to identify how some scholars have attributed identity effects
collective identities are constructed and recon- on such life course outcomes as career choice,
structed. The identities are not phenomenolog- sustained movement involvement, and marital
ically given. They are socially constructed out stability (Fendrich, 1993; McAdam, 1988). Im-
of interactions among movement leaders, po- portantly, tactics, identities, and frames of some
tential supporters, targets, countermovements, social movements may spill over onto other
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movements and countermovements (Meyer and well as to specific strategies and tactics. McAdam
Staggenborg, 1996; Meyer and Whittier, 1993). (1996b) contends that ideational conceptions of
On a collective level, it is impossible to disen- framing are less relevant than analyses that link
tangle the effects of identity construction from ideas about grievances and solutions to specific
collective action because at this level they insep- strategies and tactics. Thus, collective identity is
arably and simultaneously constructed. A more an important construct that emerges from this
effective approach examines the construction process.
of collective identity as a micro process where We underscore the irreducible interrelations
specific interactions and sequences can be iso- among ideology, framing, and collective iden-
lated. In sum, the inclusion of collective identity. Movements cannot be understood outside
tity construction and related arguments on the of some conception of their goals and under-
framing of grievances and ideological work are standings (Zald, 2000). As Dalton (1994) shows
important correctives to an overly rationalistic in his analysis of the West European environ-
approach to mobilization. mental movements and Brulle (2000) in his
Because all social movement have their “per- analysis of the U.S. one, ideologies are fun-
ceptual frames” and collective identities, the so- damental to strategy and tactical choices as
cial and cultural effectiveness of the messages well as the interactions of movements with
that their leaders convey to potential participants their societal environments. At the same time,
affect their identification with and their support there is the methodological challenge of how
of the movement, thereby strengthening its sur- to separate objective and subjective aspects.
vival and ability to achieve goals. This occurs Banaszak (1996) argues that the failure of the
when movement claims resonate with the tra- Swiss women’s suffrage movement to secure
ditions, daily experiences, and the social reali- women’s suffrage earlier (1971 at the Federal
ties of potential supporters and third-party au- level and 1991 in the last cantons) resulted
diences (Babb, 1996). Presumably, when frames from the movement’s commitment to cantonal
and collective identities converge, the probabil- sovereignty and its refusal to consider pursu-
ity of movements having an impact on change ing a Federal amendment. Critically, this cul-
increases. When anomalies, contradictions, and tural belief that was shared by the movement,
nonaligned frames and identities appear, move- opponents, and bystanders was anchored in
ments experience problems of morale, inter- the decentralized structure of the Swiss state.
nal factionalism, and strategy disagreements. In A decision to “think outside the institutional
short, social movement can bring about change box” likely would have spurred significant op-
when they develop frames and identities that position. In short, analysts need to distinguish
resonate both with potential supporters and between institutional environments, situational
third parties (including the mass media) and resources, and opportunities of movements and
when they map an effective strategy to exert their collective perceptions, beliefs, and identi-
leverage against opponents. ties. All of these need to be brought together in
The relationship among framing, collective a single analysis.
identity, and ideology is debated. Oliver and
Johnson (2000) contend that framing and ide-
ology are distinct and that framing is limited Syntheses
to the rhetoric used to conceptualize claims
about grievances and social problems. Con- In response to these arguments, several scholars
versely, ideology provides a broader a map of have proposed integrating resource, opportu-
movement goals, methods, strategies, as well as nity/threat, and framing/identity/ideology ex-
a collective identity. Snow and Benford (2000) planations to account for social movement
respond that framing is best understood as a cen- change (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988,
tral component of ideological work that links 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001).
grievance claims to broader movement goals as They are all needed to tap different aspects of
P1: JsY
social movements that may affect their out- Goals

comes. To be sure, this results in longer and more
detailed description. It also requires more effort Virtually all researchers agree that, at least in
and imagination to bring together qualitatively democratic polities, social movements that pur-
different streams of data and a novel method- sue reformist or incremental goals (as opposed
ology that captures the interaction among the to displacement and radical change) are more
three explanations. likely mobilize support (especially third parties)
Two multivariate strategies have been sug- and confront less repression, thus increasing the
gested to bring about this analytic synthesis. probability of obtaining tangible gains (Derksen
Some researchers have used multiple regres- and Gartell, 1993; Gelb and Palley, 1981).
sion and event history methods to assess the This accords with Gamson’s (1975[1990]) earlier
relative importance of the factors (Cress and findings on the advantages of “thinking small.”
Snow, 2000; McAdam and Su, 2002; Minkoff, In contrast, Schwartz and Paul (1992) argue that
1997). This has the virtue of providing clearer “consensus movements” (i.e., those that pursue
causal inference by identifying the relative im- moderate goals with broad public support) are
portance of various factors. Others have adopted less likely to generate significant social change
a qualitative-comparative approach by using case than “conflict movements” aimed at structural
studies to identify conjunctural combinations of change that have the support of determined mi-
factors that influence the likelihood of specific norities. However, empirical studies fail to sup-
outcomes. Still others have used qualitative cate- port this argument. Movements with displace-
gorical analysis (Amenta et al., 1992, 1994; Cress ment goals that aim to revolutionize society are
and Snow, 2000) and historical comparative typically met with repression and hostility. A
analysis (Goodwin, 2002; Wickham-Crowley, more effective movement stance is “radical re-
1992). Both qualitative approaches appear to be formism” (i.e., combining moderate goals with
fruitful, but the former seems to provide better militant tactics). In many nondemocratic poli-
inferential control. ties, movements may have no choice but to pur-
In all approaches, it is critical to underscore sue structural changes, making this debate less
the societal embeddedness of social movements. relevant.
The task of accounting for changes brought
about by social movements cannot be addressed
without explicitly mapping their external orga- Tactics
nizational environment and testing the various
theories of how social movements and other ex- The second component of “radical reformism”
ternal factors contribute to the process. is tactics. Are protests and violence effective in
the sense that they create disruptions and uncer-
tainties, thereby spurring elites to make conces-
social movement strategy, tactics, sions? Several have argued that unruliness and
and outcomes violence contribute to tangible gains (Gamson,
1975[1990]; Piven and Cloward, 1977), where-
Multiple criteria exist for gauging social move- as others point to backlash by third parties
ment impact. Most studies have focused on tan- (Schumaker, 1975, 1978) and the importance of
gible gains linked to policy enactment, but oth- mobilizing public opinion through persuasive
ers have dealt with policy implementation and protests (Burstein, 1985; Burstein et al., 1995;
institutional change. A growing literature is fo- Burstein and Linton, 2002). Although several
cusing on cultural change and everyday life and studies have found positive effects of the 1960s
some attention is being given to broader distri- urban riots on social welfare spending at the
butional change. We begin with public policy city and national level (Eisinger, 1973; Isaac and
studies and then address the need for a broader Kelly, 1981; Jennings, 1983; Jaynes, 2002), oth-
social change agenda. ers have found negative effects (Welch 1975) and
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mixed and no effects (Albritton, 1979; Button, Another critical factor is public opinion.
1978; Feagin and Hahn, 1973; Kelly and Snyder, Lipsky’s (1970) framework for discussing protest
1980). Button (1978) argued that the effec- as a resource focused on media coverage and
tiveness of riots varied over time with short- public opinion. Protest creates pressure on elites
term welfare benefits under Democratic rule, by mobilizing public opinion and sensitizing
but once the Nixon administration was elected, elites to it, thereby placing the issue on the po-
positive welfare benefits disappeared and were litical agenda. Lohmann (1993:319) advanced a
replaced by a dramatic growth in the funding of “signaling” model in which elected officials use
federal police. This finding fits both the back- mass political activity to gauge the preferences of
lash proposition and the argument that disrup- the electorate. Protest and unruliness can serve
tiveness has greater impact during the expan- as information signals to policy makers, suggest-
sion phase of protest cycles (Brockett, 1991) and ing that vocal opinions may spread to others.
with favorable political alignments. At the same Burstein and Freudenberg (1978) found that
time, Button (1989) showed that protest and ri- anti-Vietnam war protests stimulated congres-
ots had short-term benefits (electing city gov- sional roll-calls on war issues up through 1970,
ernments more responsive to African American but thereafter the mounting “costs” (battle fatal-
interests) but thereafter protest had little policy ities and rising financial costs) of the war became
impact. Examining the allocation of city budgets central and protest had no effect. This suggests
in 1982, Jaynes (2002) showed that earlier lev- that protests had an agenda effect but no effect
els of nonviolent protest contributed to greater on policy enactment. Similarly, in a study of
investments in social welfare and housing net congressional floor motions on equal employ-
of population growth and budgets for core city ment legislation, Burstein (1985) found that civil
functions, whereas riots stimulated greater po- rights protest had no direct impact on policy en-
lice spending. Some of the effects may have been actment, but it did heighten the salience of the
indirect and mediated through the election of issue for the public and elites, thereby helping
more responsive officials. to get the issue on the political agenda.
One approach argues that unruliness is effec- A more complex argument focuses on the
tive under favorable political opportunities but victimization of protestors by authorities and
not in repressive or (perhaps) highly open poli- countermovements. In the southern civil rights
ties. Thus, the interaction of unruliness with movement, violence by police and white supre-
mixed or moderate opportunities produces pol- macists against “radical reformers” stimulated a
icy benefits. Several reanalyses of the Gamson favorable shift in public opinion that put civil
data are compatible with this, even though they rights legislation on the political agenda and
did not test for the interaction effect of un- pressured federal officials to overturn Jim Crow
ruliness and mixed opportunities (Frey, Deitz, (Garrow, 1978; McAdam, 1999[1982]). Where
and Kaloff, 1992; Mirowsky and Ross, 1981; police were restrained, protests were blunted and
Steedly and Foley, 1979). Goldstone (1980) ar- had little effect on public opinion and policy
gues that, once one removes the “displacement” (Barkan, 1984). A final argument is Morris’s
challengers from the Gamson data and focuses (1993) thesis that mass disruption, not public
only on tangible gains, the sole factor influenc- opinion or third-party pressure, was critical to
ing benefits is a crisis period. During crises, the the desegregation and voting rights gains in the
direct antagonists are more vulnerable, whereas Birmingham civil rights campaign. This was,
the likelihood of favorable allies and elite neu- however, a single critical battle in a complex
trality is greater. This finding resembles our campaign and may not be generalizable to the
“moderate opportunity context” argument and overall process of overturning Jim Crow racism.
suggests that the strategy of unruliness and re- A key omission in this debate is the failure
lated factors is irrelevant. Yet, it is possible that to distinguish forms of protest. It takes three
unruly tactics are more effective in a context of major forms (1) conventional (i.e., legal de-
moderate opportunity. monstrations, marches, and petitions), (2) civil
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disobedience (i.e., sit-ins and occupying build- This suggests that large protests that use con-
ings), and (3) violence ( Jenkins and Wallace, ventional tactics contribute to getting issues on
1996; Tarrow, 1998:94–100). Most research fo- the political agenda and that unruly protests
cuses on conventional or on undifferentiated (i.e., small violent protests) are central to pol-
“protests,” whereas much of the debates focuses icy enactment. Police violence against moderate
on unruliness (i.e., civil disobedience) and vi- protestors also promotes agenda access, but it re-
olence. Schumaker (1978) offers the novel ar- duces policy enactment. These results are net of
gument that violence and conventional protest controls for war costs (conscription and military
are more effective, whereas civil disobedience, deaths) as well as the number of conscientious
which lies in between in terms of militancy, is objectors (another mobilization measure) and
least effective. In contrast, Tarrow (1998:chap- news coverage. Omitted was the fiscal cost of
ter 6) argues that civil disobedience is more ef- the war that Burstein and Freudenberg (1978)
fective because it creates uncertainty in the eyes found was critical after 1970. The number of
of targets (e.g., authorities), whereas violence protests was also negatively related to antiwar
reduces uncertainty by polarizing conflicts and shifts in public opinion, which suggests a popu-
forcing other parties to choose sides. Violence lar backlash to the protests. Yet, violent protests
often legitimize official repression and discour- had mildly positive effects, indicating that the
ages third-party alliances. Thus, civil disobedi- intense demands associated with unruly protests
ence should be more effective, especially in the did produce an antiwar shift in public opinion.
context of favorable political opportunities. In At the same time, antiwar public opinion was
contrast, conventional protest lacks uncertainly positively related only to congressional attention
because protest tactics increasing receive pop- to the issue (agenda setting), but it was unrelated
ular support (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). Con- (or weakly so) to the direction of congressional
ventional protests often draw larger support and voting (policy enactment). Overall, these find-
they often serve as “signals” to authorities that ings suggest that conventional protests had an
movement are gaining broad public opinion agenda-setting impact on congressional action
support. but unruly protests produced favorable changes
To evaluate these various claims of protest in both public opinion and policy enactment.
effects, multivariate analysis is needed to cap- Confronting this finding presents social
ture all the major political processes involved. movements strategists with a strategic dilemma:
The most exhaustive test to date is McAdam “To be maximally effective, movements must
and Su’s (2002) analysis of protest effects on be disruptive/threatening, while nonetheless ap-
(1) congressional roll-calls and (2) propeace pearing to conform to a democratic politics
votes during the Vietnam war. They found quite of persuasion” (McAdam and Su, 2002:718).
different processes behind these two types of The early civil rights movement was able to
policy change. For the first, police violence balance this “disruptive/persuasion” dilemma
against protestors and larger protests promoted with a stance of radical reformism, but the
roll-calls net of controls for antiwar public opin- anti-Vietnam war movement did not. It splin-
ion and other “cost” factors. This supports the tered into “radical radicals” and more moder-
“functional victimization” and “signaling” the- ate conventional protestors. A similar split de-
ories and their importance for getting issues on veloped in the African American movement
the political agenda. But policy enactment (i.e., during the late 1960s. Rising urban riots and
propeace votes) appears to have been driven by black nationalism led to diminishing policy im-
violent protests and smaller demonstrations. An- pacts (McAdam, 1999[1982]:chapter 8; Meier
tiwar public opinion was only weakly relevant. and Rudwick, 1973). However, by this time
Signaling, as conventionally understood, did the major policy gains of the civil rights move-
not hold; in fact, large demonstrations worked ment had already been initiated, possibly ac-
against propeace votes. counting for the different political legacies of
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the two movements. The civil rights movement Other studies have also examined the in-
sustained itself through the present with signifi- teraction of protest and political opportunities.
cant African American and general popular sup- Jenkins and Perrow (1977) and Jenkins (1985)
port. The anti-Vietnam war movement, despite found that political allies with neutral or sup-
helping to halt the war, left little organizational portive elites enabled farm worker protests and
or cultural legacy and had only a marginal policy strikes to be effective, thereby securing tangi-
legacy. ble gains in unionization. Likewise, the enact-
Other studies have examined whether protest ment of the major civil rights bills during the
effects depend on favorable public opinion. 1960s depended on partisan competition for the
Costain (1992:132–5, 150–5) used structural votes of Blacks and middle-class White liberals.
equations to show that rising women’s move- These contributed to governmental neutrality
ment activities, interacting with favorable pub- and support along with tactical innovations by
lic opinion toward a female presidential can- the movement and patronage from liberal foun-
didate, resulted in the enactment of favorable dations and advocacy organizations (McAdam,
women’s policies. In a related study, Costain and 1999[1982]). Similarly, Eisinger (1973) and
Maksotoric (1994) showed that favorable me- Button (1989) found that mayor/ward forms of
dia attention mediated the effects of move- city governments created more favorable poli-
ment actions to keep women’s issues on the cies when Black protests were combined with
political agenda. Others, however, found that electoral efforts. Amenta et al. (1992) argued
protests had direct effects on policy enactment. that political opportunities provided by re-
Santoro (2002) reported that the early civil formed political parties, strong legal protections
rights protests served as “dramatic events” that, of voting rights, and strong policy capacities
independent of public opinion, increased favor- of states contributed to Townsend movement
able federal civil rights policies, whereas later influence on state old-age pensions during
(post–1965) protests had less dramatic effects. the New Deal. The authors labeled this pro-
Their impact was mediated by favorable public cess, the “political mediation model.” Similarly,
opinion. McCammon, Grambly, Campbell, and Mowery
Another option for social movement activists (2001) found that state ratification of the 19th
is to combine protests with insider tactics. In amendment on women’s suffrage was facili-
their study of city policies, Browning, Marshall, tated by state constitutions that had expanded
and Tabb (1984) showed that minority protests women’s rights and had previously passed leg-
alone had little policy impact, but they did when islation that permitted women to vote, as in
they were combined with electoral mobiliza- school elections.
tion strategies. Silverstein (1996) reported that It is important to specify the opportunity
the “double-barreled” threat of protests with context in which radical reformist strategies
high-profile litigation with heavy media cov- work best. Irish nationalists in the late 1960s
erage of animal rights campaigns, combined to initially modeled their protests on the U.S. civil
force research labs and companies to alter their rights movement, but they failed to rally Protes-
policies on animal experimentation. Apparently, tant workers to their cause. Instead, the latter
the same formula extends to public policies. In supported the “unionists” and violent repres-
a study of successful funding of a local Com- sion of the nonviolent protestors, which eventu-
munity Action Program in Mississippi in the ally led to an underground revolutionary move-
1960s, Andrews (2001) showed the effectiveness ment by the Irish Republican Army (Maguire,
of combining strong protests by NAACP chap- 1993). Similarly, as Ghandi learned in his “Hi-
ters with electoral support for the Mississippi malayan blunder” in Amritsar in 1919 (Mehda,
Freedom Democratic Party. Local activists used cited by Tarrow, 1998:109), civil disobedience
a combination of lobbying and protests to pro- against a ruthless authoritarian regime may be
mote CAP funding. politically disastrous. Potential support groups
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lacked sufficient autonomy to serve as effective and influence to grow (Diani, 1995). Yet, when
allies and state repression destroyed the move- very aggressive social movements appear to be
ment. Conversely, political democracy increases achieving their goals, they may provoke coun-
the supply of potential political allies, thus im- termovements (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996)
proving the probability of successful protesting. that interrupt the movement’s agenda and blunt
However, even totalitarian regimes with its impact on policy. The spiraling of movements
strong incorporative institutions (government and countermovements may result in stasis and
sponsored trade unions, professional societies, no change. Because these processes are embed-
and sports clubs) may be vulnerable. Elite dis- ded in a complex interinstitutional context, the
agreements on how to deal with structural context must be taken into account to under-
economic and other problems and widespread stands movement influence.
unrest may make nonviolent protests sustain- Together, the studies reviewed above have
able and effective. In East Europe during the made a convincing case that social movements
late 1980s, elite disagreements over the need do have an impact on the political agenda, the
for internal reforms eventually led to a legiti- enactment of public policies, and policy im-
macy crisis that fostered a receptive environment plementation. The evidence suggests that simi-
for nonviolent protests and a series of “velvet lar processes operate in changing social institu-
glove” revolutions (Bunce, 1999; Jenkins and tions, such as churches, the military, and families
Benderliglou, 2003; Oberschall, 1996). (Chaves, 1997; Katzenstein, 1998; Staggenborg,
The recognition that social movements op- 1998). Finally, social movements may have some
erate in multisector fields (Figure 16.1) with effects on the societal distribution of mate-
different elite strategies, political alliances, and rial and social rewards (Eckstein, 1982; Jaynes,
interorganizational networks calls for a more so- 2002). Thus, Jacobs and Helms (2001) found
phisticated analysis of their impact. Traditional that African American protests spurred changes
analyses have focused on single SMOs dedicated in federal income tax rates, especially during
to a single issue, thus limiting the scope of anal- Democratic presidencies that favored more pro-
ysis to only the actors involved. But most social gressive tax rates.
movements operate in multiorganizational fields More studies are needed that address the
and are involved in more than one issue. Individ- broad institutional and structural impacts of
ual activists are also typically involved in multi- movements. They will need to introduce multi-
ple issues. As Mueller’s (1994) study of the early variate controls and extend the historical period
women’s movement found, internal factions and under study. The study of movements within
schisms generated new ideologies and tactics the complex interinstitutional environment that
that accelerated popular mobilization, politi- they attempt to change will require a stronger
cal acceptance, and eventual policy victories. methodology, an issue to which we now turn.
Moreover, the different SMOs with their diffuse
informal networks make movements less vul-
nerable to repression (Gerlach and Hine, 1970). how to study social movement change
Due to “radical flank” effects (Haines, 1984), the
agitation of “radical radical” movement actors As stated in the section on a critical distinction
may make moderate movement leaders more ac- must be made between social movement outcomes
ceptable politically. They will have greater access (i.e., the immediate consequences of move-
to political elites and resources and greater in- ments) and social movement change (i.e., move-
fluence on the enactment of favorable policies. ment outcomes in a causal sense). Causation re-
There may also be spillovers effects of movement quires not only showing a correlation between
activity to other activists. So long as favorable movements and specific outcomes but also that
prospects for policy change endure, intramove- the movements factor in causing change, net
ment rivalries and ideological differences typi- of other change factors. Indirect or medi-
cally are restrained, which allows mobilization ated effects must also be examined, as well as
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moderated effects that appear only in specific edge of the institutional linkages between liberal
contexts. Movement outcomes may take the foundations promoting civil rights change, re-
form of acceptance, tangible gains, institutional ligious leaders, government agencies involved
changes, altered lifestyles, cultural change, as with civil rights issues, and party ties with
well as the redistribution of resources. When all issue constituencies. On the opposition side,
of these have taken place, the movement may knowledge is required of the White supremacist
have actually caused change in the structure of countermovement opposing racial change, their
social power. political allies in business and labor unions, le-
Determining causal social change is a com- gal impediments, and local customs and insti-
plex challenge (Giugni, 1998, 1999; Earl, 2000). tutions. To be sure, new organizations arise out
We have stressed that social movement change of the interaction of movements with their im-
cannot be explained if the researcher focuses mediate environment. Although these new or-
solely or primarily on the movement. Past re- ganizations can be easily identified, other con-
search has largely followed this “movement- nections in the movement’s broader institutional
centered” approach (Lofland 1993:346–7) by environment may be only dimly seen by the am-
focusing on specific immediate consequences of ateur. Yet, they may be critical to the eventual
movements. Such an approach cannot gauge the outcome of the movement campaign.
consequences relative to social changes already The major blind spot of social movement re-
in progress. Nor does it control for the other searchers has been the institutional embeded-
factors bringing about change. Because move- ness of social movement changes. By focusing
ments as processes arise from social conditions, solely on the movement, researchers may be
and because their outcomes are shaped by in- able to draw inferences about the motives and
teractions with social institutions and other so- behavior of activists, and immediate movement
cial processes, the researcher must also examine outcomes, but can say little about whether the
the sectors of society that have been involved movement contributes to social change. Move-
and continue to be involved in the change. In ments rarely obtain their ideal goals, but yet
short, as we have stressed, the study of social they may still have a significant societal im-
movement change requires probing the interac- pact. Only experts know the interinstitutional
tion between movements and their societal con- environment of movements and the opportu-
texts. nities and constraints it provides. To capture
The study of social movements is not for ama- changes beyond immediate movement effects,
teurs but for experts who have profound knowl- the researchers must consider the interinstitu-
edge of the specific sectors of society that im- tional environment of the movement and ex-
pinge on movements. Society is an abstraction. amine how and if the movement has changed it
Thus, the expert is one who has concrete and in any way.
comprehensive knowledge of the specific or- Stryker (1989), for example, showed that
ganizations, bureaus, and institutions involved lawyers in the National Labor Relations Board
with the movement under study. Focusing on promoted the growth of unions despite a hostile
the movement alone will not yield knowledge White House and independent of efforts of the
of the movement’s historical and contemporary labor movement. Governmental capacities also
institutional environment. The researcher needs regulate the extent to which movement goals
prior knowledge of that. For example, a stu- can be implemented. Courts, for example, may
dent of the U.S. civil rights movement should create movement access, but they have limited
know the history of race relations, the main enforcement powers that enable movement vic-
movement organizations, sympathetic organiza- tories to translate into social change (Handler,
tions that monitor the political and social envi- 1978).
ronment, and organizations involved in advanc- Studies inspired by political opportunity/
ing or blocking civil rights change. Concretely, threat, political process, and political media-
this requires, among other things, prior knowl- tion theories seek to discover the allies and
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opponents of social movements. These stud- these requirements, but most studies have met
ies can be evaluated and ranked in terms of only part of them.
their thoroughness in documenting the institu- Movement investigators must become more
tional environment in which movements oper- dedicated to constructing adequate research de-
ate. The best are longitudinal multivariate anal- signs. Too many studies have been open-ended
yses that address the institutional environment ethnographies or histories with little theoretical
within which movements act (e.g., public opin- guidance or concern about making valid infer-
ion, the activities of potential allies and oppo- ence. Without prior consideration of the nature
nents, as well as the interactions between move- of the sample, the causal processes hypothesized
ments and their immediate environments). Few (including an appropriate time duration), appro-
studies consider the full set of criteria needed priate scaling, and analytic methods, a cumula-
to draw valid inferences about social move- tive body of knowledge about social movement
ment change. Research on social movement change cannot be attained. Lacking these at-
outcomes and change need to be cumulative, tributes, even the best studies will yield only
have an explicit research design, draw formal illustrative hypotheses about social movement
hypotheses, and rigorously test for the range of outcomes and perhaps crafted stories about so-
the relevant factors. cial movement heroism and defeats. Although
As in other areas of sociology, social move- moral story telling is a honorable profession, it
ment research requires multivariate designs with is not to be confused with rigorous sociological
relevant controls, especially for ongoing social analysis.
changes in the arena under investigation. Only Several scholars have outlined additional
a longitudinal research design can capture the methods that would strengthen social movement
mechanisms, causes, and conditions of changes. research (Earl, 2000; Lofland, 1993). We have
Although cross-sectional and inductive studies little to add to their suggestions. Causal ana-
are useful for developing hypotheses and illus- lysis and rigorous research design require un-
trating them, one cannot infer change from tra- derstanding the societal context within which
ditional case studies. Sophisticated scaling may the movement operates, especially the interin-
be required to measure the changes. Content stitutional relations that set the pattern of all-
analysis of documents may be needed to iden- iances and opposition that might lead to social
tify framing, changes in norms and laws, the movement change. In searching for change, we
creation of new organizations, and other insti- cannot be limited by the specific goals of the
tutional processes. Valid inference also requires movement or by the immediate outcomes of its
attention to sampling. Many movement schol- efforts, we must also search for the indirect and
ars are recruited from the movement they study unintended consequences that flow from move-
or are research amateurs who support a movement activities. Although the research findings
ment and want to study it. Their easy access may be useful to social movement leaders, our
to movement personnel and organizations may central concern it is to improve the quality of
yield good storytelling, but it discourages careful the methods and the theory of social movement
attention to research design. Although probabil- change.
ity sampling may not be feasible in most social
movement contexts, the sample that is drawn conclusions
should have integrity and reasonably represent
its universe. Because the relevant arguments on Our central message is simple. Social move-
societal processes refer to different levels of ag- ment researchers need to confront the issue of
gregation, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) demonstrating social movement change. This
may be needed to capture embedded processes. requires going beyond the study of social move-
Some studies, such as McAdam and Su (2002) ment outcomes to look at the broader societal
and McCammon et al. (2001), have met most of context within which these outcomes occur. If
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movement scholars fail to respond to this call, Existing research also suggests that movements
they risk being accused of trivial pursuits. Cu- play a catalytic role in keeping issues alive and ac-
riously, until recently, this issue has received celerate ongoing processes. They may not be the
little attention. Past failure to address this is- prime determinants of change (as supporters are
sue may be explained by the fact that many prone to assume or wish) but they do contribute
scholars have been personally identified with to social change by getting issues onto the polit-
their favorite movement and neglected good ical agenda, changing public opinion, and sensi-
methodological standards. To be sure, to meet tizing elites to social problems and public opin-
them requires overcoming formidable difficul- ion. Social movement effects may accumulate
ties, theoretical imagination, long-term studies and, in combination with these other social pro-
to meet standards of longitudinal design, and cesses, produce significant social changes. Such
multivariate controls that tap external societal speculation can only be hardened into firm gen-
factors. eralization when researchers construct reliable
Although social movement research should and empirically based causal models that cap-
continue to focus on sustained collective chal- ture the contribution of all participants in the
lenges to the social order, these need to be exchange process.
amined in the context of the social system of What are the implications of these demands
support and opposition, the networks of infor future movement theory and research? Most
teracting movements, other interest groups and importantly, the study of movements must be
political parties, governmental institutions, and open to ideas from other parts of the disci-
other social institutions. It also requires focus- pline. Other subareas of sociology have pio-
ing on multiple movement outcomes, includ- neered most of the theories and methodologies
ing indirect and unintended consequences as that we have discussed. Resource mobilization
well as assessing the contribution to ongoing so- theory came out of organization studies, stimu-
cial change. In addition to public policy change, lating the field to attend to the collective con-
this includes changes in institutions, culture, and trol over resources and the impact of movement
everyday life. As Burstein (1998) points out, this strategies on outcomes. Organizational ecology
is pure and simple politics, the grist of political theory has provided new insights into patterns
sociology. This argues for treating social move- of organizational structure, and framing theory
ments as core to political sociology. drew on Erving Goffman’s ideas about the so-
Pursuing this research program risks conclu- cial psychology of everyday life to analyze the
sions that most social movements are marginal construction of collective grievances and iden-
to social change. But recent studies strongly tities. The study of social movements lies at the
support the suggestion that certain features of intersection of many specialties, especially strat-
movements actually move society. We predict ification, political sociology, and complex orga-
that “radical reformism” effectively catalyzes so- nizations. We should capitalize on this strategic
cial change, puts issues on the political agenda, position and open up dialogues with all these
moves public opinion and third-party actors to and other specialties. Surely, the production of
intervene, and prods elites and institutions to new knowledge will deepen understanding of
adopt changes. Movements may also alter cul- how new social movements arise, how pub-
tural understandings and the organization of lic policy is determined, and how institutions
everyday life. Some of them are surely sec- get restructured. Obviously, students of social
ondary agents that accelerate or decelerate the movements need to be more broadly trained
rate of social change already occurring in society. than most students in other specialties, and prac-
Others may initiate and monitor ongoing titioners need to undergo continuous retool-
changes in the daily operations of institutions ing. In this process, although each subfield offers
that respond to changes in their environment. little, they accumulate into a bonanza.
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chapter seventeen
Toward a Political Sociology of the News Media
Michael Schudson and Silvio Waisbord
Sociologists have offered three different, if some- Macroinstitutional approaches typically, but
times overlapping, responses to the question not inevitably, minimize the role of human
“how does journalism work?” Those who take agency and imply that structural conditions
a macroinstitutional approach argue that the alone account for most of the features of news
structure of the state and the economic founda- content. Microinstitutional approaches stress the
tion of news organizations account for the pro- power of routines, convention, and social pres-
cess of news making and the content of news. sures on journalists but generally hold that jour-
Little can be understood about news, this posi- nalists can resist, sabotage, bend, or challenge
tion asserts, without addressing the political and these constraints without normally losing their
economic conditions that underlie the work- lives or their jobs. Cultural approaches may em-
ings of news organizations. A second approach phasize either a role for human agency, where
stresses that microinstitutional practices and cul- individual reporters and editors can select for
tures shape how news is gathered, produced, and their own purposes from among a variety of cul-
distributed. Understanding journalism requires tural types, myths, and traditions, or they may
an examination of occupational routines in the stress the force of cultural archetypes, holding
relations between reporters and their sources as that journalists will not succeed in getting much
well as a study of professional rules and values notice for a story unless they link it to prevailing
in the newsroom. Depending on the specific (and conservative) myths, archetypes, and nar-
political and economic context, organizational ratives.
and occupational demands may constrain jour- Our position is that these three approaches are
nalists’ daily job more than advertisers, securities complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
analysts, corporate managers, or general politi- Political, economic, social, and cultural dimen-
cal conditions. A third approach emphasizes the sions need to be integrated to understand the
constraining force of broad cultural traditions production and distribution of news and its ap-
and symbolic systems. In this view, news is story- propriation by audiences (Garnham, 1990:10).
telling, a form of cultural expression more than Reductionism, whether in its political-econo-
a market commodity or the product of an occu- mic, organizational, or culturalist expression, fails
pational practice. It is a structured set of genres to grasp the complexities of journalism. An
of public meaning making that comes from and approach that sees news as free-floating cultural
reaches out to enduring myths, narratives, val- formations needs to be sensitive to specific po-
ues, and symbols. Journalism selectively taps into litical and economic structures as well as to the
the cultural repertoire of societies as shown in procedures and norms that journalists follow in
journalists’ penchant for drama, conflict, rituals manufacturing news. By the same token, studies
of communion, and human interest events. that see journalism as an unmediated reflection
350
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Political Sociology of the News Media 351
of state and market pressures and journalists as Or one might want to know how journalistic
stenographers to economic interests miss how practices affect election outcomes, by influencing
much the structures of journalistic work tran- voters, or policy outcomes between elections, by
scend different economic systems and political affecting public opinion. (For a brief but author-
regimes. They also disregard how much news itative review of the impact of media on public
as a sense-making form is suspended in “webs policy, see Paletz, 1998, but note his conclusion
of meaning” that likewise cut across economic that media influence on policy “varies according
interests and political regimes. to the type of issue, stage of process, time frame,
Only an integrated approach can account for and political and media systems” and depends
changes and continuities in the relationship be- on “what is covered, how often, and how it is
tween journalism and society. An integrated or framed.”) Do the news media, perhaps by virtue
multidimensional approach is also an antidote to of their corporate organization where the press
the functionalism that typically underlies reduc- is staunchly commercial, promote support for
tionism. The idea that specific forms of news conservative candidates? Or do the news me-
are functional to specific socioeconomic and dia, perhaps because of an organizational profit
cultural orders does not capture the dynamism motive or because of a critical and adversarial
and conflict that characterize journalism and so- news culture, stress scandal to the detriment of
cieties in general. Yes, much of journalism is incumbents of any stripe? Or do the news me-
repetitive, predictable, and routine, but the press dia have a leftward or rightward political tilt?
is hardly the mechanical cog that neatly fits or Do the media set the political agenda for the
exactly meets the presumed needs of any po- public? Media scholars for a long time took
litical, economic, or cultural order. Moreover, “agenda setting” to be a leading and powerful
functionalist studies conclude what they assume, mass media influence – the capacity of the press
that is, that journalism is the well-oiled con- not to tell people “what to think” but “what to
veyor belt of grand political-economic designs think about” in Bernard Cohen’s classic formu-
or deep-seated cultural forces. In doing so, they lation (Cohen, 1963). Today, the agenda-setting
contribute little to understanding conflict and hypothesis is treated more circumspectly, even
change both in journalism as an institution and by its advocates (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987);
in the varieties of news coverage it produces. agenda-setting effects “are not necessarily pow-
How does journalism work in relationship erful, consequential, and universal” (McLeod,
to and as a component of politics? It depends Kosicki, and McCleod, 2002:227). In fact, news
on what one means by politics. One might resources and events in the world the media cover,
fer to political culture, to election results and rather than the choices or slants the media in-
policy outcomes, or to the ways in which the dependently and variably produce, account for
media stand inside political processes as a quasi- the largest agenda-setting effects (McLeod et al.,
governmental institution. With respect to polit- 2002:227) and substantial media efforts to de-
ical culture, questions arise about the role of the fine an agenda (like the emphasis of the British
news media as general tutors of popular attitudes press on the European Monetary Union as a
toward politics. Is the press a force that speaks for campaign issue during the 1997 elections) may
political parties or is it a force that assumes a crit- have no measurable impact on the public (Nor-
ical attitude toward partisanship? Does the press ris, Curtice, Sanders, Scammell, and Semetko,
encourage attitudes of respect for law and pro- 1999).
cedure, government generally, and politicians in Or one might recognize that the news media are
particular, or does the press stimulate cynicism a kind of quasi-official institution of government, that
about politics and public officials? Does journalis, an agency that, publicly owned or privately
ism effectively relay information even if it does held, has become part of the daily operation
not change attitudes? Does it condition attitudes of government because government officials are
without necessarily influencing action or polit- oriented to it and make plans, policies, and
ical engagement? strategies in relation to it (Cook, 1998). In this
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352 Michael Schudson and Silvio Waisbord
case, how do the news media constitute contem- or information acquisition that are normally the
porary governmental operations and, implicitly, dependent variables. If the larger influences of
how does that make the process of governing the media are to confer status on particular indi-
different from the past when the media may viduals and institutions, to disseminate the lan-
not have been so central to the governmen- guage and orientation for the construction of
tal process? In many countries, an expanding national and personal identities, and to provide
array of news media outlets as well as increas- a forum for and a model of reasoned debate
ingly powerful norms of publicity and demo- in a “public sphere,” then the media may have
cratic suspicions of decision making behind enormous political consequences without their
closed doors have encouraged a transformation being amenable to standard instruments of mea-
of political styles and strategies that incorporate surement (Schudson, 2003).
the press as an element of politicians’ everyday Moreover, “effects” studies overwhelmingly
work. focus on the influence of the media on general
It is difficult to know how the media af- audiences, not the effect of reporting on insti-
fect politics without recognizing that politics tutions. For instance, in the United States and
affect the media, too. Different political insti- increasingly elsewhere, “going public” has be-
tutions and different political cultures constrain come a strategy of choice for politicians when
and contextualize the operations of journalism they run for office, shifting their campaign
in different ways. It is also difficult to address the spending to television advertising instead of sup-
mediapolitics relationship in a general way be- porting armies of people to walk precincts. It
cause what counts as “media,” like what counts has also become a favored strategy for govern-
as “politics,” is variable. For the most part, we ing, with presidents seeking to influence leg-
will assume that the media are newspapers, mag- islation in Congress by rallying public opinion
azines, television, radio, and Internet organiza- to their side rather than by directly negotiat-
tions run by full-time professionals who identify ing with legislators (Kernell, 1986). Both Euro-
themselves as journalists, whether or not they pean and North American observers insist that
are formally trained or licensed as journalists. as the influence of political parties has receded,
However, we note the lively discussion about the news media have become power brokers or
the political influence of entertainment media, at least the forum in which struggles for power
where practitioners do not claim to be journal- are waged (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Patter-
ists but do address political questions, and the son, 1993:17). Still, the worldwide perception
growing discussion about the role of individ- of “mediatization” suggests the kind of political
ual Internet news providers, who may be self- and institutional shift that cannot be measured
appointed pamphleteers. by attitude surveys or election results.
A comprehensive review of the debates on For our purposes, journalism is the practice of
questions about “media effects” is beyond our producing and disseminating information about
purview here. (For one useful recent review, see contemporary affairs of general public interest
McLeod et al., 2002.) Most work in the “me- and importance, usually on a regularly sched-
dia effects” tradition in mass communication uled, periodic basis through newspapers, maga-
studies emphasizes social psychological and cog- zines, radio and television, or the Internet. The
nitive psychological generalizations based over- emphasis on “general” news practices excludes
whelmingly on American research and pays little specialized news-gathering services, everything
attention to cross-national differences or institu- from the information that intelligence agencies
tional or cultural variations in media organiza- gather and disseminate to strictly limited au-
tions that might influence results. In any event, diences to the tens of thousands of specialized
this research literature is maddeningly incon- newsletters and magazines for people in particu-
clusive. In part, this is because what may be lar occupations, churches, or voluntary associa-
the most important media effects are the least tions or people who pursue certain hobbies and
amenable to measurements of opinion change so forth. We focus almost exclusively on news
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produced in organizations, such as newspapers, in Swedish broadcasting and Finnish cable tele-
or units of organizations, such as news divi- vision (Picard, 1998:201).
sions of television networks, whose primary aim Where the news media are not controlled by
is news production. Other culture-producing corporations, they are generally voices of the
organizations, notably entertainment-oriented state. Dominant media, whether commercial or
television, may be important in disseminating state-sponsored, typically support political un-
news as part of comedy routines. There is in- derstandings that reinforce the views of political
dication that increasing numbers of people pick elites. No distinction is normally made between
up news from entertainment programming such economic and state interests as, in Lenin’s well-
as, in the United States, “Late Night With known formulation, the state is an instrument of
David Letterman,” “The Tonight Show With the bourgeoisie to promote its interests. Draw-
Jay Leno,” or “Saturday Night Live.” These pro- ing from Karl Marx’s theorization of capital-
grams, however, do not gather news, are not ex- ism and neo-Marxist analyses of “the dominant
pected to be authoritative, and do not employ ideology,” political economy scholars have ar-
journalists. Nor, regrettably, is there much of a gued that the current media order serves highly
social science literature that examines them. The concentrated corporate interests and reinforces
line that separates “news” programming from the economic, political, and cultural status quo.
“entertainment” programming is surely more This line of work was especially prominent and
blurred than it used to be but, for all of its lim- persuasive in a number of British studies that
itations, we employ it and focus on the “news” held that all kinds of media representations –
side of the distinction. on the BBC or in the British newspapers –
expressed and reinforced the ideology of dom-
inant classes and interests (Golding and Mur-
macroinstitutional approaches dock, 2000; Miliband, 1973; Murdock, 1982).
to news Media legislation legitimizes and consolidates
media concentration. Mindful of not offending
A set of studies has stressed the importance advertisers and politicians, corporate media pro-
of macroinstitutional structures to understand duce bland coverage that simultaneously per-
news organizations, namely how political and petuates existing power relations and hides
economic forces affect the workings of media conflicts or opposition and alternatives to the
institutions. dominant system. The result is news coverage
The political economy scholars who have tailor-made to the goals of a powerful minor-
tended to dominate media studies since the ity that helps to sustain inequalities in a capital-
1970s generally hold that corporate owner- ist system. Regardless of actual conflicts among
ship and commercial organizations necessarily a diversity of groups and interests in capitalist
compromise the democratic promise of pub- democracy, the fundamental structure and op-
lic communication. They find either that there erations of the media system remain unchanged.
is an inherent contradiction between capitalism This view, prominent in media studies begin-
and democracy (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; ning in the 1970s, later ran afoul of critics who
McChesney, 1997) or that there is an invari- doubted the coherence of a dominant ideology
able tendency of unregulated markets toward (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1984) and ar-
monopoly that in the marketplace for news re- gued that ideologies are in any event “as fraught
duces a democracy’s multitude of perspectives to with contradictions as are any other histori-
fewer and fewer voices (Bagdikian, 2000). Major cal phenomena” (Hallin, 1994:31). Critics de-
media conglomerates control more and more of nied that the media are effective in reinforcing
the world’s media. Other observers note, how- dominant power structures and argued em-
ever, that some countries with relatively critical phatically in a variety of “audience studies”
media have very high concentrations of owner- that the mass audience in general and specific
ship, even higher than in the United States – as subgroups (notably women) in particular were
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not easy dupes of media propaganda but exer- new world” of unfettered competition and free
cised choice, agency, and their own interpretive expression or at least a loosening up of new
schemes in making sense of media fare ( James communicative possibilities. There is consider-
Curran, 2002, provides a lucid and fair-minded able optimism in many quarters that the Internet
history of these controversies). offers a vast new location for dissent, diversity,
Main tenets of this argument, sans the Marx- and political activism ( Jenkins and Thorburn,
ist critique of capitalist media, are also found 2003; McCaughey and Ayers, 2003). Political
in the writings of critics of conglomerization, economists respond by arguing that a multi-
for whom cost-cutting measures and higher channel environment may superficially suggest
profit expectations, which corporations favor the coming of media choices, but new technolo-
and Wall Street adores, eliminate critical, hard- gies (such as the Internet) have been swallowed
hitting journalism that serves democratic ends. into the corporate order. Markets do not effec-
There is a kind of “market censorship” at work tively reflect audiences’ preferences but rather
that leads media to minimize coverage of pol- business interests (McChesney, 2000). Others
icy matters that might impinge directly on their suggest that growing use of the Internet justifies
economic interests (Picard, 1998:209). In view neither utopian hopefulness nor glum despair
of increasingly rigorous, cost-conscious man- that new media will be subjected to corporate
agement in newsrooms and the mergers and control just like old media; instead, actual uses
buyouts in media corporations since the early of the new technologies may suggest an acceler-
1980s, questioning the merits of corporate me- ation or amplification of group-centered, plu-
dia is not the exclusive province of leftist critics. ralistic politics. As Bruce Bimber has argued,
Mainstream critics in or close to the news busi- the new media may lead pluralism to “take on a
ness itself view recent technological and market fragmented and unstable character, through the
changes with alarm. When a “new news” re- rapid organization of issue publics for the du-
sponds to corporate concerns and technological ration of a lobbying effort, followed by their
imperatives, the ethics of professional journal- dissolution” (Bimber, 1998:156).
ism seem increasingly under assault (Bagdikian, From a viewpoint that stresses the impor-
2000; Downie and Kaiser, 2002; Fallows, 1996; tance of political competition and conflict in
Kalb, 1998; Roberts, 2000). developed democracies comes a different charge
Still, free-marketeers and a variety of aca- against political economic pessimism. Because
demic moderates find the anticorporate, things- the latter typically holds a rigid view of how
keep-getting-worse argument analytically un- powerful elites control news, they are insensi-
convincing and empirically wrong. In an era of tive to change and variation in news. An in-
media mergers, they observe, news has grown fluential work in a political economy tradition,
no more uniform nor has reporting embar- Edward S. Herman’s and Noam Chomsky’s
rassing to big business diminished (Graber, Manufacturing Consent (1988), holds that the me-
2002:47). Recent policies and technological india “serve to mobilize support for the special
novations have made contemporary media mar- interests that dominate the state and private ac-
kets more open than before (Compaine and tivity” (1988:xi) and that the propagandistic role
Gomery, 2000). The availability of cheaper of the American press is not in any essential way
technologies for producing and distributing different from the role Pravda played in the So-
news content coupled with the deregulation of viet Union. Of course, the U.S. press as a whole
media markets has facilitated the entry of new is hardly antibusiness, or anti–law-and-order, or
companies. The current post-Fordist, Internet pro–gun control or strongly in favor of gov-
landscape, populated by megacorporations as ernment environmental regulations over corpo-
well as a vast array of medium and small com- rate prerogatives. However, sometimes it offers
panies, is hardly a bleak, uncompetitive “me- extensive critical coverage of greedy laborato-
dia monopoly.” Business responds to the pref- ries, corporate polluters, trigger-happy police,
erences of audiences, and the result is a “brave homophobic thugs, racist officials, domestic
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abusers, and pedophilic priests. It also provides commercial incentives and less allegiance to the
criticism of the high salary levels of corporate political establishment (Mazzoleni, Stewart, and
executives, price gouging in the energy busi- Horsfield, 2003). The popular appeal of extreme
ness, crude corporate grabs for tax breaks, and rhetoric and personality-centered politics makes
accounting industry collusion with the busi- for symbiosis between neopopulist movements,
nesses they are supposed to assess. Nor is there commercial incentives, and what a study of news
evidence that such reporting has declined as cor- coverage of right-wing movements in Austria
porate mergers have increased (Graber, 2000). calls “newsroom populism” (Plasser and Ulram,
One cannot approach journalism as a one- 2003).
dimensional institution that obsequiously and These complications and contradictions sug-
inescapably collaborates in the maintenance of gest that the claim that the press generally re-
social order. inforce established power needs much greater
Still, it seems fair to conclude that the main- precision and careful study in different political-
stream news media are generally establishment economic contexts. For instance, outside of the
institutions and that even where they have rela- United States and other developed democracies
tive autonomy from government control, either with large advertising and consumer markets,
by commercial organization or arm’s-length the balance between business and political forces
public ownership, they are willingly intertwined is different. Applied to non-Western contexts,
with the purposes and practices of government. assumptions about the dangers of commercial
“In sum,” writes media scholar Gianpietro Maz- media underestimate the state’s role in media
zoleni, “the news media tend to take the side operations whether in authoritarian or liberal
of the defenders of the status quo” (2003:11). democratic regimes. In most Third World coun-
Within this generalization are many variations tries, the state has been the largest advertiser,
of consequence for politics. Are the media more partially due to the fact that governments have
or less open to dissident voices and challenging owned large and key businesses in the context of
perspectives? The general answer is that it de- protected, inward-looking economies. Even as
pends less on the character of the media than some economies have experienced a transition
on the degree of consensus in the political es- to the market since the early 1980s, government
tablishment. When political elites are relatively officials are still able to control resources that af-
united, the media typically reproduce and rein- fect media economies and, despite privatization,
force their views. Where elites are sharply di- remain in control of large advertising budgets.
vided, the media reproduce and amplify the di- They dole out resources to lapdog media and
visions. As Daniel Hallin puts it in his study of punish critical news organizations through a va-
American news coverage of the Vietnam war, in riety of means (cutting advertising, inspecting
a time of consensus the media are “consensus- accounting books, verbal and physical violence,
maintaining institutions,” but when consensus favoritism in the allocation of state-owned bank
breaks down, they contribute to “an accelerat- loans). In fact, “too little market” has been re-
ing expansion of the bounds of political debate” sponsible in some contexts for why states have
(Hallin, 1994:55; see also Bennett, 1990). had the upper hand in media dealings, par-
Are the news media more or less engaged in ticularly when controlled by military regimes
reporting on politics in the first place? There or civilians oligarchies characterized by nepo-
is evidence that as commercial incentives in tism and corruption. State paternalism in me-
news institutions overtake professional commit- dia policies in the Middle East (Sreberny, 2000),
ments, political coverage declines. Conversely, clientelistic networks and practices (Hallin and
some kinds of nonestablishment politics, like Papathanassopoulos, 2002) or state depotism in
right-wing neopopulist movements, have been many African media systems (Ette, 2000; Tettey,
adopted and covered more by tabloid or popular 2001) attest to the fact that states, not markets,
media and radio talk shows than by establish- continue to be the main opponents of media
ment media – that is, media with more purely diversity.
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Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that A similar case is post–Tiananmen Square China
some studies (even those critical of the problems as Yuzhei Zhao (1998) demonstrates. Despite
of market-dominated media) have concluded the tightening of party control after Tianan-
that the expansion of the market economy men Square, there has also been a rapid com-
in some media systems has positive effects. In mercialization of the popular press and a prolif-
the case of Zimbabwe, Helge Ronning and eration of sensational, entertainment-oriented
Tawana Kupe argue that “the market can further tabloids that compete with the established press
media diversity, particularly . . . foreign media for advertising revenues. The audience for com-
capital . . . provides the impetus for great me- mercial media has grown rapidly at the ex-
dia pluralism” (2000:171). In Latin America, pense of traditional party organs. Media out-
large news organizations have investigated gov- lets in the “commercial” sector still cater to the
ernment officials in ways that state-dependent party’s propaganda needs, but they try to “estab-
news organizations could not, partially because lish a common ground between the Party and
they attract substantial business advertising. the people” through covering popular topics
This does not mean that foreign capital is the (Zhao, 1998:161). The state continues to closely
key to a free press. In many Central Amer- monitor political news, but with economic, so-
ican countries, the entrance of foreign capi- cial, and environmental issues the commercial
tal (mainly, Mexican media barons) intensified press operates with relatively little constraint. In
the closeness between media organizations and response to commercial competition, even Cen-
dominant political powers (Rockwell and Janus, tral China Television, the most influential sta-
2001). Nor does it mean that market-based me- tion in the country, has tried new news formats
dia do not limit expressive freedom. Unchecked that test the limits of orthodoxy to please the
commercialism and growing conglomerization public.
of newspaper and broadcast markets strongly Both state and market limit media content,
limit the capacity of newsrooms to cast a wide but this does not make the comprehensiveness
net and cover issues fairly (Fox and Waisbord, and severity of means, the coherence of mo-
2002). Still, in state-dominated media systems, tives involved, or the consequences of controls
business-oriented media often usher in new pos- enacted just the same. Public criticism of state
sibilities. The strengthening of media organiza- policy is invariably easier in liberal societies with
tions that are economically less dependent on privately owned news outlets than in authoritar-
the state introduces the possibility that some ian societies with either state or private owner-
might take partial distance from government of- ship. The situation of the media in the Middle
ficials. East and most African countries has been de-
The analytical problem is that, particularly in scribed in similar ways: watchdog journalism or
underdeveloped countries, market and state in- any form of critical reporting faces an uphill bat-
terests are entangled in complex ways that are tle when states directly control media outlets or
not captured by pure models of either market influence coverage through a variety of formal
competition or state domination. This is the and informal means (Downing, 1996; Koltsova,
conclusion of a number of recent studies in re- 2001; Tettey, 2001).
gions and countries as diverse as China (Bin, The distinction between “market” and “state”
1999), Western Europe (Mancini, 2001; Pa- organization of media, or between commercial
pathanassopoulos, 2001), and Latin America and public forms of broadcasting, masks impor-
( Jones, 2001; Waisbord, 2000). Contemporary tant differences within each category. For exam-
media systems are experiencing a transition be- ple, in the United States, the First Amendment
tween partisan or state control and market con- tradition inhibits government intervention in
trol. In postcommunist Russia, too, business the news media more severely than in European
tycoons, politicians, and media personnel have democracies. In Norway, Sweden, France, and
struggled over power and jockeyed for position Austria, governments for several decades have
(Downing, 1996; Sparks and Reading, 1998). subsidized newspapers directly, especially to
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strengthen newspapers that offer substantial government officials exercise considerable

political information but receive little adver- power in newsmaking and in the construc-
tising revenue. These policies have sought to tion of reality. Whether at the national or local
stop the decline in the number of newspapers level, daily journalism is about the interaction of
and so to increase public access to a diversity reporters and government officials, both politi-
of political viewpoints. There is no indication cians and bureaucrats. The center of news
that the subsidized newspapers are more likely generation is the link between reporter and
to withhold criticism of the government than official, the interaction of the representatives of
other newspapers; in fact, one Norwegian study news bureaucracies and government bureaucra-
indicates just the opposite (Morschetz, 1998; cies. “News,” as Leon Sigal put it, “is not what
Skogerbo, 1997). happens, but what someone says has happened
or will happen” (Sigal, 1986:25).
The “someone” is usually a government of-
microinstitutional approaches ficial, whether a police officer or a politician.
to newswork Government officials are informed. Their in-
formation is judged to be authoritative and their
News organizations may be constrained by po- opinions legitimate. And they are eager to sat-
litical and economic structures of ownership isfy the cravings of the news organizations. They
and control, but daily reporting follows spe- make information available on a regular basis in
cific rules that define the practice of journalism a form that the media can easily digest. As a
even across different structures. News is not de- Brazilian editor remarked, “All of us have been
termined only by macroinstitutional conditions, educated professionally according to the idea
but is the product of bureaucratic and occupa- that the government is the main source of in-
tional routines and rules. In fact, the definitions formation, that everything that happens with
of news and the norms of professional journalis- it is important. . . . That’s the journalistic law of
tic practice are surprisingly similar across widely the least effort. It’s faster and easier to practice
varying political-economic conditions for me- journalism based in the world of government
dia operations. Even if powerful commercial or than putting emphasis on what’s happening in
state interests have the upper hand in newsmak- society” (Waisbord, 2000:95). Studies of media
ing, they do not operate in conditions of their that see the process of news production begin-
own choosing. In particular, they must accom- ning in the newsroom – rather than in the halls
modate local constraints of the news-gathering of power are too “media-centric” (Schlesinger,
and news-writing process. 1990). Sources matter.
A microinstitutional or social organizational Among government sources, routine govern-
perspective holds that news is less a report on a ment sources matter most. That is, most news
factual world than “a depletable consumer prod- comes to the news media through ordinary,
uct that must be made fresh daily,” as sociologist scheduled government-initiated events like
Gaye Tuchman put it (Tuchman, 1978:179). It press releases, public speeches, public legislative
is not a gathering of facts that already exist; in- hearings or deliberations, press conferences, and
deed, as Tuchman has argued, facts are defined background briefings for the press. In some
organizationally – facts are “pertinent informa- countries, reporter-official relations are especially
tion gathered by professionally validated meth- routinized. The most famous case is that of the
ods specifying the relationship between what is Japanese Kisha clubs. These clubs of reporters,
known and how it is known . . . In news, veri- which date to the early twentieth century, are
fication of facts is both a political and a profes- maintained by the news organizations that pro-
sional accomplishment” (1978:82–3). vide their membership. They are formal asso-
One of the consistent findings in the sociol- ciations of reporters from different media out-
ogy of the media is that in many media sys- lets assigned to a particular ministry and granted
tems, including liberal Western democracies, privileged – but highly controlled – access to the
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minister and other high officials. Because most from the source’s perspective, it is a form of
clubs are connected to government agencies, ventriloquism by which they dictate the news
news takes on an official cast. The daily asso- and advance their own interests through a
ciation of reporters at the clubs contributes to reporter (Waisbord, 2000:108).
a uniformity in the news pages; reporters are The capacity of journalists to write critically
driven by what is described as a “phobia” about about government even when government is
not writing what all the other reporters write the primary source of information has grown
(Feldman, 1993; Freeman, 2000; Krauss, 2000). in recent decades as government institutions
At the other extreme, consider Dutch foreign become more open to public surveillance and
affairs journalists. more decentralized and democratic in opera-
tion, as the news media adopt a more pro-
They do not pound the halls and knock on doors fessional and critical style, and as commercial
in the Foreign Ministry, as American journalists do.
Rather, they work for the most part at home, reading,
incentives to produce shock and scandal over-
thinking, perhaps phoning an officials whom they take interpersonal pressures for collegial and
know, writing if the muse visits, and not writing congenial reporting. In the United States, cam-
if she does not. Since their output is personal and paign coverage of both Democratic and Re-
thus explicitly subjective, there is little basis among publican contenders in newspapers, news mag-
them for the competitive spirit that animates Amer- azines, and television grew significantly more
ican coverage of foreign-affairs news and that results negative in the 1980s and 1990s than it had been
in a convergence of judgment of what that “news”
is. (Cohen, 1995)
in 1960 (Patterson, 1993). In Britain, journal-
ists conducting television news interviews were
These correspondents are remarkably indepen- originally very deferential to politicians but in
dent; they do not have much interaction with the 1960s and 1970s became more and more
one another, do not generally know one an- adversarial (Clayman and Heritage, 2002:55).
other, and are generally ignorant of or indiffer- A more alert, professional, cynical, and com-
ent to the work styles of their nominal peers. petitive press corps, observed in many coun-
Reliance on government officials does not tries around the world, has more eagerly sought
guarantee progovernment news. Official wrong- out scandals and more readily taken advantage
doing is itself a form of government news and, of accidents that discredit powerful institutions,
as such, is more likely than other forms of both public and private (McNair, 2000; Tun-
wrongdoing to become the subject of journal- stall, 2002). There has been what media scholar
istic investigations (Waisbord, 2000:94). It is Regina Lawrence terms a shift from institution-
difficult to muckrake the government without driven to event-driven news (Lawrence, 2000) –
the government’s cooperation. Journalists may and though this is a shift of degrees rather than a
have rumors, leads, leaks, or near-certain know- wholesale information of news making, it makes
ledge of a government misdeed, but normally news more invasive and potentially unsettling.
they cannot go to print or air within the con- The significance of studies of reporter/source
ventions of the craft without getting confirma- interaction lies not only in detailing the dy-
tion from a well-placed figure. Whether sources namics of news production but in evaluating
in the government are officials seeking to pro- the power of media institutions as such. Media
mote the government’s position or other offi- power looms large if the portrait of the world the
cials lobbying for alternative positions within media present to audiences stems from the pref-
the government and therefore seeking to dis- erences and perceptions of publishers, editors,
credit their superiors, sources use the press to and reporters unconstrained by democratic con-
their own advantage. In Latin American jour- trols. However, if the media typically mirror the
nalism, the practice of one insider using the views and voices of established (and democrat-
press to spread scandal about another insider ically selected) government officials, then the
even has a name – denuncismo. From the reporter’s media are more nearly the neutral servants of
perspective, this is quick and dirty journalism; a democratic order. To note a recent example,
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policy experts widely attacked American televi- since the 1960s has become increasingly medi-
sion news for pushing the United States to inter- ated by publicity. More actors participated, more
vene with military force in Somalia in 1992 by actions took place in public view, and more leg-
showing graphic scenes of starving people. But islators were freed from internal hierarchies of
the networks picked up the Somalia story only legislative committees and individual seniority
after seven senators, a House committee, the full to behave as policy enterpreneurs (Cook, 1989;
House, the full Senate, a presidential candidate, Zelizer, 2004). Although political systems gen-
and the White House all publicly raised the is- erally have grown more media-centered, differ-
sue. When the networks got to it, they framed ences among them remain substantial. German
it very much as Washington’s political elites had and British politics, for example, remain notably
framed it for them (Mermin, 1997:397; see also more party-centered than the American media-
Livingston and Eachus, 1995). This does not centered system (Pfetsch, 1998). This is a good
mean the TV stories made no difference; clearly example of how politics affects media as much as
they rallied public support for intervention. The media affect politics – where there is a presiden-
so-called “CNN effect,” even if it does not de- tial rather than a parliamentary political system,
cisively influence a policy outcome, may shape and where party organization and party loyalty
the way policy decisions are made – for example, is stronger, there is not so much of a vacuum for
shortening response time or raising the salience the media to fill.
of a particular foreign policy issue (Livingston, The efforts of politicians today to control
1997). But where did the TV story on Somalia their coverage in the news is an effort to regain
come from? From established, official sources. their footing in a newly open and uncertain po-
Similarly, the behavior of the American press in litical environment. In the U.S. Congress, for
questioning the Vietnam War emerged precisely example, the old system – of committee meet-
because official sources themselves were deeply ings closed to the press, of the avoidance of roll-
divided. The press went about its normal busi- call votes and floor debates, of a relationship
ness of citing official leaders – but at a time when of “overcooperation” between press and politi-
officials were at odds with one another (Hallin, cians – is long gone, and it is no wonder that
1986). politicians resort to pollsters, media consultants,
There has been concern in the United States and “spin doctors” (Cook, 1989). Media scholar
and increasingly in Europe that the depen- Raymond Kuhn suggests that recent British dis-
dence of journalists on sources has intensified cussion of the dangers of spin doctoring stems
in the past decade as candidates, parties, and from an effort of journalists themselves to re-
officeholders grow more sophisticated in ma- assert their own power in relation to the politi-
nipulating the news. There is no question that cians they depend on (Kuhn, 2002:66).
politicians have grown increasingly oriented The finding that official sources dominate the
to communicating with the public through news is often presented as a criticism of the me-
the media. When politics is organized to give dia. If the media were to fulfill their democratic
greater weight to public opinion, the news me- role, they would offer citizens a wide variety
dia obviously become a greater focus of con- of opinions and perspectives, not just the nar-
cern for parties, candidates, and government row spectrum represented by those who have
officials. Campaigns, once dominated by old attained political power. Herbert Gans issued a
hands who knew the precinct leaders, has be- call for “multiperspectival news” in his classic
come dominated by media consultants, advertis- Deciding What’s News (1979) and has renewed
ing and public relations specialists, and pollsters. that plea in Democracy and the News (2003). But
More government bureaus and more govern- there is an alternate view also consistent with
ment officials hire press secretaries and others to democratic theory. What if the best to hope
direct their relations with the news media. In the for in a mass democracy is that people eval-
United States, for example, the work of legisla- uate leaders, not policies? What if asking the
tion in Congress was once “an inside game” that press to offer enough information, history, and
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context for attentive citizens to make wise de- they are reporting (Gans, 1985). American jour-
cisions on policies before politicians act is ask- nalists, more than their European counterparts,
ing the impossible? It may be a more plausible, are committed to an ideology of objectivity that
if more modest, task for the media, consistent emphasizes fair representation of the positions
with representative democracy, that citizens as- of the leading parties to a political dispute and
sess leaders after they have acted (Zaller, 1994). keeping one’s own political views from shaping
There has been more attention to reporter/ the news account (Donsbach, 1995; Patterson,
official relations than to reporter/editor rela- 1998:22). They are professionally committed to
tions, despite some suggestive early work on shielding their work from their personal po-
the ways in which reporters engage in self- litical leanings. Moreover, their political lean-
censorship when they have an eye fixed on ings tend to be weak. Several close observers
pleasing an editor (Breed, 1955). Case studies have found leading American journalists not so
of newswork regularly note the effects – usu- much liberal or conservative as apolitical (Gans,
ally baleful – of editorial intervention (Crouse, 1979:184; Hess, 1981:115).
1973:186; Gitlin, 1980:64-5; Hallin, 1986:22; Even so, the imputation of bias stemming
Mortensen and Svendsen, 1980). But most re- from the social background of journalists does
search has focused on reporters’ gathering of not go away. Critics and activists who advocate
news rather than on its writing, rewriting, and the hiring of more women and minorities in the
“play” in the press. Some research suggests that newsroom share the intuition that the personal
the play of a story may matter a lot. Hallin values journalists bring to their jobs color the
(1986), Herman and Chomsky (1988), and Lip- news they produce. Did hiring practices adopted
stadt (1986) all argue that in the press of a liberal in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, de-
society such as the United States, lots of news, signed to develop a newsroom more representa-
including dissenting or adversarial information tive of the population by gender and ethnicity,
and opinion, gets into the newspaper. The ques- transform the news product itself ? News should
tion is where that information appears and how have become more oriented to groups often
it is inflected. subordinated or victimized in society. Anecdo-
If one line of research emphasizes the power tal evidence (Mills, 1989) suggests that a chang-
of organizational constraints and professional ing gender composition of the newsroom influ-
values in news production, another insists they enced news content, but other reports suggest
are no bulwark against a bias in news that that definitions of news have not dramatically
emerges from the social backgrounds and per- changed (Beasley, 1993:129-30). There seems
sonal values of media personnel. S. Robert some reason to believe that more minorities and
Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter women in the newsroom make the press more
(1986) made the case that news in the United responsive to a broader constituency. At the
States has a liberal “bias” because journalists same time, in the United States there has been
at elite news organizations are themselves lib- concern, even consternation, that the growing
eral. Their survey of these journalists finds that affluence of national journalists who increas-
many describe themselves as liberals and tend ingly report by accessing databases from their
to vote Democratic. (A 1992 national sample computers rather than walking city streets sep-
of journalists also finds them more liberal and arates them from direct contact with ordinary
more Democratic than the adult population as a Americans (Greider, 1992).
whole, but not so liberal or Democratic as elite
journalists in the Lichter survey. See Weaver and
Wilhoit, 1996.) cultural approaches
The Lichter et al. approach has been criti-
cized for failing to show that the news product Where a microinstitutional approach finds in-
reflects the personal views of journalists rather teractional determinants of news in the rela-
than the views of the officials whose positions tions between people, a cultural perspective
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finds symbolic determinants of news in the re- example, some newly defined crimes receive
lations between “facts” and symbols. A cultural only occasional or episodic press coverage and
account of news helps explain generalized im- others, with better institutionalized support in
ages and stereotypes in the news media – of a “victim industry,” receive more systematic
predatory stockbrokers just as much as hard- and ongoing treatment (Best, 1999). What is at
drinking factory workers – that transcend struc- stake here is the interaction of general cultural
tures of ownership or patterns of work rela- and specific social-organizational dimensions of
tions. Journalists write not news items so much news.
as news “stories” and they follow, knowingly Consider also the role of the media in “moral
or not, conventions of storytelling that drama- panics” (Cohen and Young, 1973) in which the
tize, simplify, and focus on individual character media heightens public anxiety and fears by de-
and responsibility (Schudson, 2003). Regardless voting nonstop attention to rare occurrences
of differences in the political-economic struc- that are thought to pose terrible dangers and
ture of media systems longitudinally or cross- risks to society. Rather than being a true reflec-
nationally, what is defined as news across cul- tion of reality, both the amount and the kind
tures shows remarkable similarities. Journalism of attention the media devotes to specific fears
taps into the cultural reservoir and imagination respond to what journalists consider newswor-
of specific societies, but similarities in news cov- thy and to issues that resonate with prevailing
erage of hard and soft news are noticeable. Jour- cultural fears (Glassner, 1999). Several studies
nalism is a specific cultural form that, as Jean have charged the media for recklessly and irre-
Chalaby argues, was born in nineteenth-century sponsibly exaggerating the likelihood of certain
Britain and United States. More recently, how- events (e.g., specific types of crime, food poison-
ever, journalistic cultures across regions have ing) and demonizing certain groups and citizens
shown a number of similarities in the cover- (e.g., immigrants). It seems likely that the me-
age of tabloid news (Sparks and Tulloch, 2000) dia normally follow prevailing cultural anxieties
and election campaigns (Swanson and Mancini, more than they invent them. When the broader
1996). culture changes, so do the media. In the United
One need not adopt assumptions about uni- States and Britain, news coverage of homosex-
versal properties of human nature and human uality, for example, has changed enormously in
interest (although it would be foolish to dismiss the past generation, despite a universal cultural
them out of hand) to acknowledge that some anxiety about anomalous social categories, cate-
aspects of news generation go beyond what so- gories of persons or things that disrupt standard
ciological analysis of news organizations is nor- cultural classifications. Gays and lesbians appear
mally prepared to handle. Why, for example, are much more in the news today than fifty years
violent crimes so greatly overreported in rela- ago and are covered much more “routinely” as
tion to their actual incidence? The overreport- ordinary news subjects rather than moral tales
ing has been documented not only in the United (Alwood, 1996; Gross, 2001).
States (Katz, 1987) but in Britain, where it takes With respect to politics, the “feeding frenzy”
place not only in the popular press but also is a kind of media stampede rather than a gen-
(to a lesser degree) in the midmarket and qual- eral public neurosis. In the case of President
ity press (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994:185). A Bill Clinton’s affair with a young White House
deep fascination with violence and moral trans- intern, Monica Lewinsky, Washington insiders
gression crosses national political cultures. and the news media were in full stampede while
Although it makes sense to assume that broad the general public, although titillated, did not
and long-lasting phenomena – such as heavy find the President’s marital infidelities changed
news coverage of crime over two centuries their views of his capacity to govern (Zaller,
across many societies – will have deep cultural 1999).
roots, it is also important to recognize fash- The cultural dimension of news concerns its
ions, trends, and changes in crime coverage. For form as well as its content. News is a form of
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literature. It draws on cultural traditions of nar- lyricism” (1992:108). This kind of code switch-
rative. Among the resources journalists work ing occurred in Israeli print journalism in cov-
with are the conventions of storytelling, pic- ering the martyred Prime Minister Yitzhak
ture making, and sentence construction they in- Rabin. In life, Rabin was covered critically as
herit from their own cultures, with a number journalists took his political moves to be within
of vital assumptions about the world built in. the sphere of legitimate controversy, but in
For instance, television news in the United death, Rabin was absorbed into the sphere of
States typically presents information “themat- consensus (Peri, 1997).
ically,” whereas newspapers use an “inverted How the storytelling styles of journalism af-
pyramid” structure that places the most im- fect policy debates of election outcomes has not
portant aspects of a story at the top and re- been a topic of research, nor is it clear how
lates the rest in descending order of importance. it might be. Scholars who focus on narratives
This inverted-pyramid form is a peculiar de- in the news and broad cultural influences on
velopment of late nineteenth-century Ameri- them emphasize either that news reproduces ex-
can journalism that broke from a conventional isting stereotypes (Entman and Rojecki, 2000;
chronological reporting and so implicitly autho- Gilens, 1999) or that journalism’s competitive
rized the journalist as an expert able to assess quest for audiences leads it to make use of the
“importance” within a set of events. In political most accessible, popular, soap opera, melodra-
coverage, this helped redefine politics itself as a matic story lines or that particular political fig-
subject appropriately discussed by experts rather ures get quickly typecast in ways they are never
than partisans (Schudson, 1982). able to escape – Gerald Ford as clumsy, Bill Clin-
Most research on news production takes it ton as slippery. These features of news are not
for granted that, at least within a given na- divorced from the political economy of news
tional tradition, there is one common news stan- or its social organization but would seem to be
dard among journalists. This convenient sim- more easily understood in relation to a society’s
plification merits critical attention. Reporters cultural presuppositions and requirements of the
who may adhere to norms of “objectivity” in craft of storytelling.
reporting on a political campaign (what me-
dia scholar Daniel Hallin calls the “sphere of
legitimate controversy”) may report gushingly conclusions
about a topic on which there is broad national
consensus (the “sphere of consensus”) or may None of the three perspectives by itself can ac-
write derisively on a subject that lies beyond the count for what we might want to know about
bounds of popular consensus (the “sphere of de- how journalism works. Take just one important
viance”) (Hallin, 1986:117) it is as if journalists example. There is a shift, reported in a number
were unconsciously multilingual, code switch- of studies from around the world, toward re-
ing from neutral interpreters to guardians of so- porting styles that are more informal, more inti-
cial consensus and back again without missing a mate, more critical, and more cynically detached
beat. After September 11, 2001, television re- or distanced than earlier reporting (McNair,
porters and anchors spoke more quietly and 2000). British television interviewing changed
somberly than usual, and moved from a nor- from a style formal and deferential toward politi-
mal to a “sacerdotal” journalism, a journalism cians to a more aggressive and critical style
of consensus and reassurance rather than of ar- that makes politicians “answerable to the public
gument and information. Elihu Katz and Daniel through the television news interview” (Scan-
Dayan have shown how television journalists nell, 1989:146). Japanese broadcasting changed
in Britain, the United States, Israel, and else- in a similar direction under the influence of
where, in moments of high ceremony, such as a news anchor Kume Hiroshi, whose “alien-
royal wedding, or high tragedy, like a state fu- ated cynicism and critical stance toward society
neral, abandon a matter-of-fact style for “cosmic and government” appears to have charmed a
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younger, more urban, and more alienated gen- authority, redefinition of gender roles, pri-
eration (Krauss, 1998:686). The Swedish press vatism, individualism) affect how news is re-
grew more critical (Djerf-Pierre, 2000). Nor- ported?
way’s most popular newspaper, Verdens Gang, has All of these shifts are involved. A combina-
adopted the melodramatic framework of tabloid tion of macro- and microinstitutional develop-
journalism in covering politics. “Politicians in ments coupled with broad cultural transforma-
a way become human beings, while the vot- tions have produced news that is not a stand-in
ers become customers” (Eide, 1997:179). New for political-economic interests nor simply the
investigative aggressiveness in Latin American perpetuation of cultural traditions. Just as some
journalism may be related. In Brazil, Argentina, news stories reflect (or fail to question) domi-
and Peru, revelation of government scandals nant powers (whether they are defined in terms
emerges not from old-fashioned partisan jour- of class, gender, race, sexuality, geopolitics, cul-
nalism but from a new, more entertainment- ture), other coverage both articulates and inter-
oriented journalism that adopts stock narratives rogates social tensions and struggles.
and a telenovela-style personality-focused mor- Journalism is not simply an agent of domina-
alizing style. Scandal becomes a form of en- tion in liberal societies nor of dissent, nor is it
tertainment and may contribute to political a forum that offers equal play to all views or all
cynicism (Waisbord, 1997:201). coherent views or even all views with substan-
Meanwhile, in the tabloid press, talk radio, tial popular support. The vast universe of news
and elsewhere, unsubstantiated speculation and is neither the result of one set of concurrent fac-
sometimes even blatant partisanship (particu- tors nor is it a standardized, unvarying product.
larly right-wing commentary) have become It is the outcome of a messy dynamic that es-
widespread and have even been rationalized (as capes a single logic and it cannot be understood
more democratic, more responsive to popular as a neat response to systemic need.
taste, more free from a culture of deference An analytical approach that integrates macro-
and stiff respectability). This is especially sig- and microinstitutional factors as well as cultural
nificant because tabloid journalism has gained trends would benefit from taking a historical and
a measure of respectability and more than a comparative perspective. Thinking about the
measure of notice among mainstream journalists media as political institutions has typically been
(Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Sparks and Tulloch, ahistorical, ignoring possibilities for change in
2000; Thompson, 2000). Depending on ide- the nature of news. It has rarely been compar-
ological sympathies as well as beliefs about the ative. Comparative research is cumbersome, of
role of the press in democratic governance, one course, and it is conceptually bedeviling. How
could find these changes worrisome or encour- can news be compared across countries when,
aging – or both. in one country, the press is primarily national
Normative judgments aside, how do we ac- and in the next regional and local? How can
count for these changes? Are they linked to comparison be made between the news media
modifications in political-economic structures in a country where intellectual life is concen-
(including patterns of ownership, the coming trated among a few media outlets in a capital city
of new technologies, transformations in politi- and another where it is highly dispersed? Media
cal regimes, legal frameworks)? Did they happen studies are genuinely linked to national politi-
because of changes in the process and culture cal issues – they are an academic meta-discourse
of news making (the relations between re- on the daily defining of political reality. The
porters and sources, the personnel composition motive for research, then, is normally con-
of newsrooms, the rise and consolidation of al- ceived in isolation from comparative concerns.
ternative sources of information, the affirmation If this strengthens the immediate political rele-
of a competitive ethos among journalists)? Or vance of media studies, it weakens their longer-
did large cultural trends (post-Vietnam, post- term value as social science. A nuanced under-
Watergate, post-1960s, postfeminist distrust of standing of “how journalism works” requires
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a historically situated, cross-national perspec- is today no common paradigm or framework

tive to grasp the relations among the factors that for comparative analysis of the media in politi-
shape the production of news. cal sociology. There is scarcely even a common
Comparative research may take different vocabulary or a common set of intellectual icons
forms. There is much to be gained from com- (apart from Walter Lippmann, 1921), not even a
parison across countries that share a political common professional meeting ground with rel-
and cultural heritage (Waisbord, 2000) or across evant journals and associations spread across the
countries that share a set of liberal democratic fields of political science, sociology, journalism,
institutions (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) or across and communication. This domain of work at
similar news events in countries with similar present is characterized by both a high degree
press traditions (Pujas, 2002; Mazzoleni et al., of intellectual incoherence and at the same time
2003). The growth in recent years of compar- a high degree of novel and ambitious explo-
ative studies is encouraging, even though there ration.
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0521819903t18.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 August 27, 1956 14:2
part iii
THE STATE AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS
365
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366
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chapter eighteen
State Formation and State Building in Europe
Thomas Ertman
In political sociology, state building is usually themselves inspired by the older writings of
understood to mean the process by which states Max Weber, Otto Hintze, and Karl Marx.
are created and then establish and consolidate These works of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
their monoply of legitimate violence over a above all pointed to the centrality of war and
given territory by constructing a durable admin- preparations for war as the key factor driving
istrative, financial, judicial, and military appara- forward the expansion and rationalization of
tus. Though the first examples of state building state capacities among European polities. In the
in the widest sense may have occurred more 1990s a younger generation of scholars such as
than four thousand years ago in the ancient Brian Downing and Thomas Ertman refined
Near East and China, it was post-Roman state and modified this key insight. More recently,
building in Western Europe, lasting from about approaches and questions derived from rational
the fifth century a.c.e. until the end of the choice theory and the cultural turn within the
Napoleonic period, that brought forth the mod- social sciences have injected a renewed intellec-
ern state with a modern bureaucratic infrastruc- tual dynamisn into this field and opened up areas
ture at its heart. As the progenitor of a state for future research.
form that has since been adopted or imposed on
the rest of the globe, the case of European state
building is of more than just historical interest. the “founding fathers” of state
It reveals to those nations in Africa, Asia, and building theory: otto hintze
Latin America still grappling with problems of and max weber
state consolidation the tremendous difficulty of
erecting honest, efficient, and legitimate infras- Together with his more famous contemporary
tructures while at the same time suggesting a va- Max Weber (1864–1920), the unorthodox Ger-
riety of ways in which this may yet be achieved. man historian Otto Hintze (1861–1940) laid the
Sociologists and political scientists in the groundwork in his many wide-ranging essays for
English-speaking world took up the task of much recent theorizing about European state
explaining the process of state building in building. Himself the son of a minor Prussian
Western Europe in an intensive way begin- local government official, Hintze learned the
ning in the 1960’s. A new concern to “bring historian’s craft by spending twenty-two years
the state back in” to the social sciences in- editing a voluminous collection of administra-
spired a series of field-defining works by Rein- tive documents from the reigns of Frederick
hard Bendix, Barrington Moore, Stein Rokkan, William I and Frederick the Great before writ-
Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, Perry Anderson, ing the official history of the Hohenzollern
Immanuel Wallerstein, and others that were dynasty (Hintze, 1915). Yet in addition to this
367
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368 Thomas Ertman
mainstream academic research, which gained constitutional history. Furthermore, the model
him a chair at Berlin University in 1902, Hintze of European state building found in these works
also wrote a series of articles (1902, 1906, 1910, differs in key respects from the war-centered
1913) that sought to account for variations in theory summarized above. Three reasons seem
outcome to the state-building process found responsible for this shift in Hintze’s interests
across Europe during the eighteenth century. away from Prussia and toward an almost ex-
He groups these outcomes into two main clusive concentration on comparative European
categories: absolutist government with bureau- political development and especially the devel-
cratic administration on the continent and par- opment of representative institutions (Ertman,
liamentary government with nonbureaucratic 1999a): his marriage in 1912 to a young aca-
administration through local notables in Eng- demic and former student whose research area
land. How does Hintze explain these divergent was ancien regime France; health problems that
outcomes? The clearest statement of his answer forced him by 1920 to give up both teaching and
can be found in Hintze (1913:427–8) as follows: his editorship of the most important publica-
What then is the cause of this pronounced institu-
tion series on Prussian history; and the collapse
tional differentiation? . . . The reason lies above all in of the Hohenzollern monarchy and the advent
the fact that on the continent compelling political of democracy to Germany, which altered the
imperatives held sway which led to the development intellectual concerns or Erkenntnisinteresse mo-
of militarism, absolutism and bureaucracy, whereas tivating his work in the direction of a greater
such pressures were not present in England . . . . It was interest in the geneology of parliamentarism as
above all geographic position that had its effects. well as absolutism.
Hintze argues in effect that it was military pre- The fruits of Hintze’s new thinking can be
ssure – war itself – but also the threat of war – see above all in two articles (1924, 1930) in
emanating from neighboring land forces – that which he presents an argument to account for
drove rulers in medieval and early modern variations in medieval and early modern state
Europe to concentrate power in their own hands building that differs in significant ways from that
by eliminating or emasculating representative found in the pre-1914 essays. In those works it
bodies and to construct professional bureaucra- was principally the degree of threat from land
cies to administer standing armies and the inforces resulting from relative geographic expo-
frastructure needed to pay, equip, and provision sure that determined whether a given European
them. Because England was protected from a di- polity developed in an absolutist or parliamen-
rect land threat by the Channel, pressures toward tary direction. Hintze (1930) presents a far more
absolutism and bureaucratization were less pro- complicated model, however (Ertman, 1999b).
nounced, thereby permitting Parliament to sur- Here he claims that a tendency toward abso-
vive and eventually share executive power with lutism had been present in France, the German
the Crown. Put another way, Hintze’s argument states, Naples and Sicily, and Aragon long be-
can be reduced to the following proposition: the fore the great European conflicts of the six-
greater the degree of geographic exposure to teenth and seventeenth centuries, which in his
which a given medieval or early modern state earlier writings were presented as the princi-
was subjected, the greater the threat of land war- pal reason behind that political outcome. The
fare, and the greater the threat of land warfare, root cause of this tendency, Hintze goes on
the more likely an absolutist and bureaucratic to argue, was that in France, Germany, south-
outcome to state building. ern Italy and northern Spain, the self-governing
After 1918, a marked change in Hintze’s writ- counties of the Carolingian period – which in
ings is clearly visible. Whereas before that date other areas of the continent proved to be an
about two-thirds of his publications were de- effective barrier against absolutism – had been
voted to Prussian history, this figure falls to only broken apart during the middle ages by the
10 percent during the Weimar period, to be re- spread of feudalism. Rulers in these regions won
placed above all by works on state building and back the authority lost during the feudal period
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State Building in Europe 369
and recentralized power by constructing bu- level of threat from land armies to which those
reaucratic infrastructures that took over the task states with two-chamber assemblies were ex-
of local administration. When these rulers called posed, located as they were far from the Eu-
together representative assemblies during the rope’s principal battlefields in Germany, Italy,
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, they could France, and the Low Countries. Though Hel-
no longer be built around the now-dissolved muth Koenigsberger (1977), Thomas Ertman
counties. Instead, delegates were grouped ac- (1997; but see also Ertman, 1999a), and oth-
cording to their legal status into chambers rep- ers have criticized Hintze’s argument concern-
resenting the clergy, nobility, and the burghers ing assembly types in some details, it remains a
of the towns. With the help of their new bureau- brilliant and far-reaching attempt to account in
cracies and the precepts of Roman law they em- a parsimonious way for the distribution of abso-
ployed, rulers were soon to gain the upper hand lutist and nonabsolutist states across early mod-
in relation to assembles deeply divided along sta- ern Europe that too often has been overlooked
tus lines well before large-scale warfare finally in the English-speaking state-building literature.
engulfed the continent. If Otto Hintze concentrated in his later works
In other parts of Western Europe, by con- on uncovering the historical roots of modern
trast – notably England and Scotland, Castile, political regimes, his contemporary Max We-
Scandinavia, and Poland and Hungary – feu- ber devoted much energy to explaining the na-
dalism was either nonexistent or did not af- ture and origins of another product of Euro-
fect the pattern of local government. Hence in pean state building: modern bureaucracy. For
these areas self-governing counties and towns Weber, the most common form of rulership in
survived. Thus, when representative assemblies most times and places, including the medieval
were created there during the central and later and early modern West, is patrimonial rulership
middle ages, rulers felt it politically expedient in which the ruler exercises patriarchal author-
to group delegates from the counties and towns ity over a staff that extends out beyond his or her
into a separate chamber to complement a first private household (Weber, 1978:1013). From
chamber composed of the bishops and mem- this perspective, then, the state-building process
bers of the higher nobility who made up the can be seen above all as a struggle between patri-
monarch’s council. Lacking a bureaucratic ap- monial rulers and their staffs over control of the
paratus, Hintze argues, rulers in these regions “means of administration” such as rights to and
on the periphery of Western Europe were ill- income from offices. In the Near East and Asia,
equipped to subjugate assemblies whose mem- according to Weber, rulers were for the most
bers fought vigorously to defend the autonomy part able to maintain control over the means
of local government from which they derived of administration thanks to private mercenary
their own political and social power. As Hintze armies and theocratic legitimacy and to intro-
summarizes (1930:139): duce an “arbitrary” form of patrimonialism, best
exemplified by sultanism, in which their per-
. . . [I]n the lands with the older, two-chamber type
of assembly, the representative element was able to
sonal will reigned supreme. Such oriental rulers
stand up to and often defeat rulers lacking in strong often built extensive administrative staffs whose
administrative staffs. Here the path of development officials they could remove when they pleased,
clearly favored parliamentarism, just as it had ab- yet such patrimonial infrastructures differed fun-
solutism [in those areas with tricurial, status-based damentally from modern bureaucracies because
assemblies]. The classic case of the former is Eng- they lacked a rational, hierarchical organization
land . . . . Also Poland with its aristocratic parliamen- of offices, professional training for officehold-
tarism, and Hungary as well.
ers, and established administrative procedures
In a point of congruence with his earlier writ- (Weber, 1978:231–2, 1020, 1040–1).
ings, Hintze claims that this tendency toward Western Europe, in Weber’s view, experi-
parliamentarism was further reinforced by the enced a very different pattern of development,
relative geographic isolation and hence lower one in which staffs were able successfully to
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370 Thomas Ertman
appropriate the means of administrative from capitalist enterprise through gradual expropriation of
their sovereigns. First, an extreme form of the independent producers.
“estate-based” (staendische) appropriation, feu-
dalism, engulfed large areas of the West during Weber implies that this transition from patrimo-
the early and central Middle Ages. Although nial administration to modern bureaucracy first
rulers successfully restored central authority took place in the early modern West because
with the help of newly constructed adminis- it was only there that two necessary precondi-
trative staffs, the officials manning these staffs tions of such a transition were met: the pres-
soon won strong rights over their offices, up to ence of centers of professional training in the
and including hereditary ownership. As Weber form of universities and of autonomous cities
writes (1978:1028): “The typification (Stereotyp- whose burghers were willing to place their con-
ierung) and monopolistic appropriation of the siderable financial resources at the disposal of
powers of office [in the West] by the incumbents the crown (Weber, 1978:240–1). Yet even given
as members of such a legally autonomous sodal- these favorable backround conditions, European
ity created the estate-type (staendischen) patrimo- rulers required a very strong incentive to un-
nialism [as opposed to the arbitrary type].” Thus dertake the arduous and politically costly task
although in Europe, unlike Asia, it was the staff of replacing patrimonial with rational adminis-
rather than the ruler that gained control over the trations. Where did this incentive come from?
administration, that administration remained Weber’s answer is very similar to that found
equally patrimonial, characterized by a lack of in the pre-1914 writings of his contemporary,
separation between office and officeholder, a Hintze (1978:972): “In most cases, as mentioned
typified rather than rationalized organizational before, the bureaucratic tendency has been pro-
structure and the tendency to exploit the rev- moted by needs arising from the creation of
enues attached to the office for private gain. standing armies, determined by power politics,
Yet unlike rulers in the East, those in the West and from the related development of public fi-
had by the eve of the French Revolution already nances.” Hence it was geopolitical competition
begun to transform their patrimonial infrastruc- among Europe’s polities that gave rise to the
tures into modern bureaucracies. This decisive modern state.
step in the emergence of the modern state in- Given the similarities that Weber invokes be-
volved the appropriation of an appropriating of- tween the emergence of modern capitalism and
ficialdom by the ruler and its replacement not, of modern bureaucracy, it is surprising that he
as under sultanism, with an equally patrimonial does not explore the possible religious roots of
staff fully beholden to the royal will but rather the latter phenomenon but falls back instead on
with a new corps of university-educated offi- a Hintze-like explanation highlighting the role
cials without rights to their offices organized in a of war and preparations for war. Ironically, such a
functional hierarchy. Weber compares this mon- religious hypothesis was taken up by none other
umental process to the separation of peasants than Otto Hintze himself in an article published
and craftsmen from the means of production in the Historische Zeitschrift (Hintze, 1931). Re-
that ushered in modern capitalism (1946:82) as leased after 1920 from all academic and editorial
follows: obligations, Hintze was free to read more widely
than he had before, and among the fruits of
Everywhere [in the West] the development of the this new freedom were three extended reviews
modern state is initiated through the action of the of works by and about the recently deceased
prince. He paves the way for the expropriation of Max Weber and one on the writings of Weber’s
the autonomous and “private” bearers of executive friend and Heidelberg colleague Ernst Troeltsch
power who stand beside him, and of those who in
their own right possess the means of administration,
(Hintze, 1922, 1926, 1927a, 1927b). At about
warfare, and financial organization, as well as po- the same time, a collection of documents was
litically usable goods of all sorts. The whole pro- published concerning the conversion of the Ho-
cess is a complete parallel to the development of the henzollern dynasty to Calvinism in 1613. This
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occasion provided Hintze with the incentive to 1981; see also Gorski, 2003) has confirmed the
investigate whether ascetic Protestantism might extensive exchange of ideas and personnel be-
not have played the same revolutionary role in tween Calvinist elites in the Netherlands and
the political sphere that Weber had assigned to Brandenburg-Prussia during the reign of the
it in economic life (Ertman, 1999b). Great Elector, he has also pointed to the impor-
In (1931), Hintze argues that reason of state tance of both the neostoicism of Justus Lipsius
is the “spirit of modern politics,” the perfect and of German pietism in shaping the reception
pendant to Weber’s “spirit of modern capital- of reason of state in Germany and in Europe
ism.” Just like the latter, it possessed an elective more generally. The influence of religion and
affinity with the worldview of Calvinists, in this of other secular worldviews on European state
case those in the Netherlands and France rather building is a topic that remains woefully under-
than in the British Isles. The coolly realistic – researched in political sociology, and a revival
and highly successful – power politics of the of interest in this area over the past decade (see
Dutch rebels and of the Huguenot leader Henri below) represents one of the most encouraging
de Bourbon (the future king Henri IV) forced trends in current research in the field.
their competitors, according to Hintze, to adopt
a similar approach to international relations.
The ruthless dynamism of reason of state was the renaissance of state building
alien to the conservative, peaceable Lutheranism theory in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
of many seventeenth century German states.
The new spirit was imported into Brandenburg, As Otto Hintze was composing his late essays in
however, with the conversion of the Elector Jo- the 1920s and early 1930s, interest in the prob-
hann Sigismund to Calvinism. Henceforth the lem of European state building was already on
Netherlands and their anti-Spanish ally, France, the wane. That interest would revive again over
would serve as the models that would fire the four decades later among sociologists and polit-
ambitions of successive Hohenzollern rulers. It ical scientists in the English-speaking world and
was above all, Hintze contends, the ascetic, me- lead to a wave of new state-building literature
thodical approach to work of the Great Elec- that has not yet abated. This renaissance in state-
tor and his grandson, Frederick William I, in building theory can be traced to three sources:
both cases directly inspired by a pietistic vari- first and foremost, a general turn back toward
ant of Calvinism, that would allow them to classical social theory, and especially the works
transform Brandenburg-Prussia from a minor of Marx and Weber, in reaction to the behav-
German state into a great power in less then ioralism, pluralism, and structural-functionalism
a hundred years. dominant across the social sciences during the
Hintze’s presentation of his broader argument 1950s and 1960s; second, the Social Science
is sketchy – most of “Calvinism” is taken up Research Council’s large-scale project on the
with a detailed discussion of the circumstances comparative development of states and nations,
surrounding Johann Sigismund’s conversion in which culminated in 1975 with the publica-
1613 and is of interest primarily to specialists. It tion of the agenda-setting volume The Forma-
was not the author’s intention to provide con- tion of National States in Western Europe edited by
vincing proof of his larger points but rather to Charles Tilly, (Tilly, 1975); and finally, the dis-
revive and deepen, buttressed by the work of covery of the writings of Hintze thanks to the
Weber, a claim about the possible relationship appearance of Felix Gilbert’s collection The His-
between Brandenburg-Prussia’s special path of torical Essays of Otto Hintze, also in 1975 (Hintze,
development and Calvinism that had once been 1975).
put forward, to little effect, by Hintze’s teacher, Significantly, it was a monograph by the
Gustav Droysen. How has more recent schol- Weber scholar and future cotranslator of Econ-
arship judged Hintze’s efforts? Although Ger- omy and Society, Reinhard Bendix, that reintro-
hard Oestreich in a number of articles (1970, duced the study of European state building to
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372 Thomas Ertman
the social science agenda. In his book Nation- to rent their land to tenant farmers, thereby lay-
Building and Citizenship, first published in 1964 ing the groundwork for the alliance between
and reprinted in an expanded edition in 1977, commercially oriented noble landlords and the
Bendix rechristens Weber’s modern state as the urban bourgeoisie that, according to the author,
“nation-state” and defines it in contrast to the defeated royal absolutism in the Civil War and
patrimonial state of medieval and early mod- set England down the road to capitalist democ-
ern Europe. He writes (1977:128) the following: racy. Similar demands for taxes across the Chan-
“The modern nation-state presupposes that this nel in turn drove wine-growing French nobles
link between governmental authority and in- to extract ever more revenue, often with the
herited privilege in the hands of families of nota- help of royal officials, from their beleaguered
bles is broken . . . [T]he decisive criterion of the peasants. At the same time, the state’s practice
Western nation-state is the substantial separation of selling offices and granting economic privi-
between the social structure and the exercise leges to insiders alienated a significant portion
of judicial and administrative functions.” Thus of the bourgeoisie that was excluded from the
Bendix in this work employs “nation build- royal bounty. Thus it was the particular (patri-
ing” principally to refer not to a state-initiated monial) state-building strategy pursued by suc-
campaign of cultural centralization and stan- cessive French governments that furthered the
dardization, as would Lipset and Rokkan (1968), alliance between bourgeois outsiders and disad-
Eugen Weber (1976), Eric Hobsbawm (1990), vantaged workers and peasants that was in turn
or Benedict Anderson (1991) but rather to the responsible for the Revolution. Even clearer
extension of a uniform central authority across for Moore is the Prussian/German case, where
the entire national territory through the con- the cooperation between the royal bureaucracy
struction of a modern bureaucratic infrastruc- and a militarized aristocracy to maintain labor-
ture to replace patrimonial practices and per- repressive agriculture made possible the revolu-
sonnel, a process that would be of fundamental tion from above that over the long run created
concern to the subsequent state-building liter- favorable conditions for the triumph of fascism.
ature, just as it had been to Weber and Hintze. In a brilliant 1973 review, Theda Skocpol
Like Weber, Bendix stresses the crucial role (1973) acknowledged that Moore attributes
played by autonomous urban communes and more significance to the state than is usual in
Protestant sects in laying the groundwork for works influenced by Marx, but she claimed that
this breakthrough to the modern state in West- he ultimately “remains within the Marxist the-
ern Europe (1977:194–5). Yet he lends even oretical tradition,” a tradition characterized by
greater weight to the movement from below for an inadequate political sociology that prefers “to
equal citizenship, first in the form of equality explain political struggles and structures as func-
before the law and then in demands for wider tions of class structures and struggles” (Skocpol,
political participation. 1973:36–7). To build on Moore’s achievements
Two years after the appearance of Bendix and to move beyond him, Skocpol argues, it
(1964/1977), Barrington Moore published his is necessary to modify his analytic framework
classic Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy to include “the independent roles of state or-
(Moore, 1966). Though European state build- ganizations and state elites” (Skocpol, 1973:37)
ing was not the central concern of a book that and to move away from an exclusive focus on
sought to account for what it termed three paths “intrasocietal structures and practices” (Skocpol,
to the modern world, the important role played by 1973:36) toward one that incorporates the in-
absolutist bureaucracies in propelling England fluence of the world economy and international
and France toward democracy and Germany state systems on individual polities.
toward fascism nonetheless stimulated renewed A year later another major historical-
interest in the early modern state. Thus for comparative monograph in the Marxist tradi-
Moore it was the absolutist state’s demand for tion appeared that certainly did not limit itself
taxes that led wool-producing English nobles to intrasocietal structures and practices: the first
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volume of Immanuel Wallerstein’s The Modern 1974b) were inspired above all by the works of
World System (1974). A central theme of this Marx, but also by those of Weber and of Hintze,
book is the role that states played in the emer- with whose writings Anderson had become ac-
gence and reproduction of what Wallerstein calls quainted in the original. In Lineages Anderson
the “European world economy” beginning in seeks to account for three outcomes to the state-
the late fifteenth century. In a chapter enti- building process in the West: a mild form of
tled “The Absolutist Monarchy and Statism,” absolutism found in Western and Southern Eu-
he argues that “the development of strong states rope (France, Spain), a harsher version of abso-
in the core areas of the European world was lutism further to the east (Brandenburg-Prussia,
an essential component of the development Austria, Russia), and a few exceptional cases
of modern capitalism” (Wallerstein, 1974:134). (England, the Dutch Republic) where abso-
Monarchs in the core were able to strengthen lutism was swept away by a precocious bourgeois
their states, according to Wallerstein, by em- revolution.
ploying four methods (Wallerstein, 1974:136, Anderson traces these divergent outcomes
157): bureaucratization through the sale of of- to what he calls the “uneven development of
fices, the monopolization of force through Europe” (1974a:213) rooted in the fact that
the creation of standing mercenary armies, in- some parts of the continent (latter-day Britain,
creased legitimation through the propagation of France, Iberia, Italy and southern and western
the doctrine of divine right, and the cultural ho- Germany) had been part of the western Ro-
mogenization of the subject population through man Empire prior to the Middle Ages, whereas
the elimination of religious pluralism. others (northern and eastern Germany, eastern
Although all of these mechanisms were un- Europe, Scandinavia) had not. In the former re-
doubtedly employed across the continent from gions, feudalism emerged independently from
the fifteenth century onwards, the true test of a fusion of Roman and Germanic institutions,
any theory of early modern state building is leaving a landscape characterized in the thir-
its ability to account not only for similarities teenth century by parcelized sovereignty, au-
but also for differences in state structure found tonomous towns, and serf-based agriculture. In
within this single economic and cultural area. the “colonial” East, however, royal authority
Wallerstein contends that the strongest (Waller- was stronger, towns were weaker, and peasants
stein, 1974:134) and most centralized (Waller- were generally free.
stein, 1974:162) states were found in the Eu- The great economic and social crisis of the
ropean core. Yet as Theda Skocpol has pointed fourteenth century decisively deepened the di-
out in her 1977 review of his book, this cor- vision between Europe’s two halves, according
relation does not appear to hold water. On to Anderson. In the West, it weakened noble
the one hand, it would be difficult to classify landlords but strengthened the towns and royal
the nonabsolutist core states England and the authority, thereby paving the way for the tri-
Netherlands as either strong or centralized com- umph of royal absolutism that protected the
pared to their absolutist neighbors France and interests of an ailing aristocracy by creating
Spain, and on the other, military powers Prus- standing armies that could be used both for for-
sia and Sweden clearly were both strong and eign conquest and to enforce noble property
centralized although they belonged to Europe’s rights. In England and Holland, however, the
semiperiphery rather than its economic core bourgeoisie proved strong enough to thwart this
(Skocpol, 1977:64). As Skocpol explicitly men- absolutist project. In the East, crisis undermined
tions (Skocpol, 1977:65), the work of another the position of the towns and peasantry rather
theorist, Perry Anderson, does a considerably than the nobility, thereby permitting the latter
better job of accounting for this pattern of state to introduce a “second serfdom.” Meanwhile,
development. rulers in seventeenth century Brandenburg-
Anderson’s Passages from Antiquity to Feudal- Prussia, Austria, and Russia were able to take
ism and Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974a, advantage of the military pressure from Sweden
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374 Thomas Ertman
to establish highly militarized bureaucratic- Rokkan’s chapter was at least his third pub-
absolutist regimes to counter this threat. lished version of his “conceptual map of Eu-
Anderson’s sweeping study is noteworthy for rope.” A fourth was to appear two years af-
two reasons. First, it set a high standard for ter his premature death in 1979 (see Lipset and
future research on European state building by Rokkan, 1968; Rokkan, 1973, 1981). Precisely
choosing as his object of study the political what these “maps” aimed to explain was never
development of the entire continent from the exactly specified: in some versions it was varia-
Roman Empire until the eve of the French tions in Western European party systems and in
Revolution. Second, although Anderson for the others ease of transition to mass politics or the
most part employs variations in socioeconomic success or failure of democratic consolidation
structure (presence/absence of serfdom, relative during the interwar years. In reality, the expli-
strength of bourgeoisie/towns) to account for candum was something like the comparative po-
the contrasting trajectories of Western and East- litical trajectories of the Western European states
ern Europe, he also assigns warfare a greater during the modern period. Although Rokkan
role in his model than one would expect from does not specifically set out in his conceptual
a neo-Marxist scholar. In so doing, he antici- maps to account for variations in the process
pated the centrality of war and preparations for of state building in Europe, the framework he
war in the state-building literature of the 1970s lays out there can equally well be applied to this
and 1980s. For all of its eloquence and ana- problem.
lytic acuity, however, Anderson’s study suffers In his contribution to Tilly (1975), Rokkan
from a number of defects. First and foremost, posits four “dimensions of variations” that can
he cannot explain how the same two factors account for divergent patterns of development
that led to bureaucratic absolutism in Prussia and across the continent: distance northward from
Austria – a serf-based economy and an acute Rome (i.e., from the direct influence of the
security threat from an aggressive neighbor – Catholic Church); distance east or west from
resulted in nonbureaucratic constitutionalism in the “trade-route belt,” an area densely studded
Poland and Hungary. Furthermore, it remains with cities running from the Low Countries in
unclear why England and the Dutch Repub- the northwest to northern Italy in the southeast;
lic should have departed from the dominant degree of concentration of land ownership; and
path of development in Western Europe and degree of ethnic and/or linguistic homogeneity
installed constitutionalist rather than absolutist (1975:575–6). The underlying puzzle Rokkan
regimes. is attempting to explain here is why state build-
One year after the appearance of Anderson’s ing, understood as the consolidation of central
two volume study, The Formation of National state power, appears to have been much eas-
States was published (Tilly, 1975). This work was ier on the periphery of Europe (Britain, Scan-
the penultimate installment in the SSRC’s mon- dinavia) than in the older, more economically
umental “Studies in Political Development” se- developed areas at the heart of the continent
ries, a series that had heretofore primarily fo- that remained highly fragmented until late in the
cused on the dynamics of political change in nineteenth century. His answer is that consoli-
the twentieth century outside of Europe and dation was hindered by the presence of wealthy,
the United States. With this book, attention autonomous cities and of the “rival power” of
shifted toward the European past and the lessons the Catholic Church, both of which had much
it might hold for nations grappling with prob- to lose from successful centralization. At the
lems of state formation and state building today. same time, state consolidation was aided by con-
Its most influential contributions proved to be centrated landholdings and the existence of a
the introduction and a concluding chapter by strong ethnic/linguistic “core.” As Rokkan says,
editor Charles Tilly and a piece by Stein Rokkan “Paradoxically the history of Europe is one of
(Rokkan, 1975). center formation at the periphery of a network
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of strong and independent cities: this explains city-states – without a strong center or a contin-
the great diversity of configurations and the ex- uation of feudal patterns of rule (1975:26). To
traordinary tangles of shifting alliances and con- understand why the national state won out, we
flicts” (1975:576). must, Tilly stresses, adopt a prospective rather than
The most telling criticism of Rokkan’s “con- a retrospective approach, looking forward from
ceptual map” has come from his fellow con- a landscape crowded with perhaps five hundred
tributor Charles Tilly (1981b:118–23; see also autonomous political entities in 1500 and fol-
1981a). Rokkan, in Tilly’s view, has rendered an lowing their fate rather than beginning with the
accurate understanding of European state build- twenty-five states that survived until 1900 and
ing difficult by taking a retrospective view of tracing their origins. This prospective analysis is
this process, in other words by looking back rendered somewhat easier by the fact that West-
into the past from the vantage point of those ern Europe around 1500 was characterized by a
polities that survived into the late twentieth high degree of cultural homogeneity thanks to
century rather than looking forward from the the presence of a single Church, a widely used
early Middle Ages. Furthermore, although he written language (Latin), common legal, admin-
laudably focuses on the choices among various istrative and agricultural practices, similar family
alternatives made by state-building leaders, he patterns, and a network of trade links spanning
underplays the extent to which such choices the continent (1975:14–19).
were constrained and often resulted in unan- So why then did the national state prove
ticipated consequences. Finally, and most im- victorious? Tilly’s answer is simple and powerful:
portantly, war and preparations for war play al- war. As he states (1975:74): “Preparation for war
most no role within Rokkan’s scheme (Tilly, has been the great state-building activity.” Or,
1981b:123). Charles Tilly’s own writings on in an even more famous formulation (1975:42),
European state building, beginning with his in- “War made the state and the state made war.”
troduction and concluding chapter to The For- A decentralized Europe of competing polities
mation of National States in Western Europe (1975), was a continent filled with armed conflict, and
seek to correct these deficiencies while at the the national state proved better able to mobilize
same time incorporating the unique insights the resources necessary to fight wars effectively
found in Rokkan’s work. than any of its rivals. It did this by building bu-
Tilly’s contributions to the SSRC volume are reaucratic infrastructures capable of recruiting
above all important for the way they frame a and supplying armies and of collecting the taxes
bold new question about state formation and from an often recalcitrant population needed to
state building in Europe and for the preliminary finance those armies. A question that Tilly does
answer they provide. Tilly asks how it was that not seek to answer directly in these pieces but
one particular political form, a centralized, dif- will take up later is how one might account for
ferentiated polity enjoying a monopoly of coer- variations within the dominant form of the na-
cion over a well-defined territory that he calls tional state, though he implies that such varia-
the “national state” (1975:27) and others have tions would be affected by, among other things,
termed the “sovereign, territorial state” (e.g., relative geographic position (isolated or open)
Ertman, 1997; Spruyt, 1994), defeated its com- and the ease with which resources could be ex-
petitors and became the dominant political form tracted from the population (1975:40).
in the West and then in the rest of the world as Tilly’s next major contribution to the state-
well. For, as Tilly stresses, there certainly were building literature (Tilly, 1985) also appeared in
competitors. From the perspective of the central a volume sponsored by the SSRC, the agenda-
Middle Ages, at least three other kinds of poli- setting collection Bringing the State Back In edited
ties could have triumphed in Europe: a single by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and
empire, a “theocratic federation” centered on Theda Skocpol and published in 1985. In her
the Church, a trading network – presumably of introduction to that volume, Skocpol invokes
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376 Thomas Ertman
Weber and Hintze’s conception of the state as He argues instead that a polity might avoid bu-
an autonomous actor as an alternative to the reaucratization and possibly absolutism as well
society-centered views of politics held by neo- despite intense military pressure if it possessed
Marxists and neopluralists alike. Her call to take abundant resources that could be readily ex-
historical cases and data seriously added further tracted. Thus in this piece Tilly puts forward a
dynamism to the field of historical-comparative more sophisticated argument than that found in
research initially stimulated by the appearance the early Hintze by bringing together geopolit-
of Bendix, Moore, Anderson, and Tilly’s studies, ical and economic factors (size and extractabil-
Gianfranco Poggi’s elegant overviews The Devel- ity of revenue sources, in turn determined by
opment of the Modern State (1978) and The State the relative weight of agriculture and commerce
(1990), and the world systems theory of Im- within a given economy) to explain differences
manuel Wallerstein. in the size and character of early modern states.
In his short but provocative contribution, Tilly expanded these ideas into a general the-
Tilly takes up a number of themes touched ory of European state building in his mono-
upon in Formation. He repeats the dictum that graph Coercion, Capital and European States. AD
“War makes states” (1985:170), but here his 990–1990 (1990). He adopts the same prospec-
main argument centers on explaining differ- tive approach advocated in Tilly (1975), but
ences among national states rather than why is more specific in identifying three diver-
the latter triumphed over other kinds of poli- gent paths of political development in late me-
ties. Tilly states (1985:172): “Variations in the dieval and early modern Europe (1990:30): a
difficulty of collecting taxes, in the expense of “capital-intensive” path followed by the city-
the particular kind of armed forces adopted, in states and city-confederations of northern Italy,
the amount of war making required to hold off Switzerland, southern Germany and the Low
competitors, and so on resulted in the principal Countries; a “coercion-intensive” path found
variations in the forms of European states.” He on the continent’s eastern and northern fringes
later elaborates on what he means by “variations (Poland, Hungary, Russia, Scandinavia); and fi-
in the difficulty of collecting taxes” (1985:182): nally an intermediate path of “capitalized co-
ercion” exemplified by England, France, and
In the case of extraction, the smaller the pool of re-
sources and the less commercialized the economy,
later Brandenburg-Prussia. It was this third path
other things being equal, the more difficult was the that “produced full-fledged national states ear-
work of extracting resources to sustain war and other lier” and beginning in the 1600s “proved more
government activities; hence, the more extensive was effective at war, and therefore provided a com-
the fiscal apparatus, . . . On the whole, taxes on land pelling model for states that had originated in
were expensive to collect as compared with taxes on other combinations of coercion and capital”
trade, especially large flows of trade past easily con- (1990:30–1).
trolled checkpoints.
How can we in turn account for the exis-
Tilly illustrates this point by contrasting the case tence of these three separate paths? Tilly ar-
of Brandenburg-Prussia, a state that, he claims, gues that they come about because of the very
built a large bureaucracy to extract scarce re- uneven distribution of capital across Europe at
sources from a poor country in aid of its military the time during the central middle ages when
efforts, with that of England, whose abundant large-scale warfare began to spread throughout
commercial resources permitted it to get by with the continent. Taking up Rokkan’s idea of a
a much smaller state apparatus. “city belt,” he claims that financial resources
Like Hintze, Tilly sees war and preparations were heavily concentrated in a city-filled cor-
for war as the principal stimulus for “war mak- ridor running from northern Italy to the Low
ing,” yet he questions the tight link posited by Countries. Rulers attempting to centralize co-
the former in his pre-1914 writings between ercive resources in this area were thwarted by
degree of military pressure and the size of the city-states, city-empires, and urban federations
state apparatus built in response to that pressure. jealous of their independence. These polities
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then employed their superior capital resources to Britain and France, or in Poland and Russia were
purchase coercive means through military con- roughly similar, why did one polity in each pair
tractors and other entrepreneurs, thereby avoid- become absolutist, whereas the other did not?
ing the necessity of building bulky adminis- This was a question to which Michael Mann
trative apparatuses to perform such tasks. By tried to provide an answer in the sections on
contrast, the polities of Eastern and Northern European state building in the first volume of
Europe were poor in cities and hence in capi- his The Sources of Social Power (1986). Here he
tal. In response to military pressures, they first acknowledges (p. 433) the inspiration provided
reacted with imperial expansion (cf. the Pol- by Tilly (1975) and up to a point his argument
ish, Hungarian, Russian, and Swedish empires). parallels that being developed by Tilly at about
To extract the meager resources found among the same time. Thus Mann also sees state build-
the largely peasant populations under their con- ing in the period after 1500 dominated by the
trol, they either constructed bulky bureaucracies demands of warfare, and like Tilly he contends
(Russia) or, in a less effective strategy over the that the varying distribution across the continent
long run, relied on the direct coercive authority of war’s “raw materials” – money and men – led
of powerful landowners (Poland and Hungary). to alternative paths of development. He writes
Because the regions just to the east and es- (1986:456) the following:
pecially the west of the city belt were endowed
with moderate concentrations of capital, states Thus a very rich state could pay for and adminis-
there could pursue a middle course, centralizing ter armed forces that were fairly separate from the
rest of its civil activities . . . . Or a state that had some
coercive power while at the same time encour- wealth but that was rich in manpower could gen-
aging further growth in the urban economies erate large, competitive armed forces with a fiscal-
that they had to tax to pay for standing armies manpower extraction system that was more central
and bureaucracies. This mix of capital and co- to its own overall administration . . . . Over the next
ercion proved to be the most effective at ex- centuries the major Italian republics . . . . Holland,
tracting and organizing resources for war and and England were favored by their wealth, and Aus-
hence polities employing either more capital- tria and Russia by their populations and relatively
uniform state machineries. Spain and France enjoyed
intensive or more coercion-intensive methods both advantages and, indeed, they came closest to
of mobilization were forced to imitate states like military-led political hegemony over Europe.
France or Prussia or to fall back into insignif-
icance and possibly lose their independence as This sounds very much like Tilly’s capital-
a consequence, as happened to Poland, Hun- intensive, coercion-intensive, and capitalized
gary, and, somewhat later, Venice (1990:130–60, coercion patterns of state building, though in
187–91). this schema England is placed in the first cat-
As with Rokkan’s “conceptual maps,” the egory along with the polities of Rokkan and
great strength of Tilly’s approach is that he seeks Tilly’s “city belt” rather than in the third along
to integrate the material development of the with France and Spain. This key shift then
continent into his analysis of European state allows Mann to identify these different “ex-
building in a way that does not simply reduce tractive regimes” with particular political out-
political to economic interests. Furthermore, he comes (1986:456): “. . . we shall see that these
does this in a manner that goes beyond Rokkan “fiscal” and “mobilized” alternatives develop
because his perspective is generally prospective into “constitutional” and “absolutist” regimes.”
and, at least in Tilly (1990), he identifies a set Poland is identified as a state that failed to
of variations in outcome for which he hopes to adopt any effective extractive regime and hence
account. The explanatory power of his model is was crushed, disappearing altogether from the
weakened, however, by its difficulties in explain- map (1986:489–90). These suggestive ideas are
ing variations in the form of government within not developed at any length in Mann’s vol-
each of the three trajectories. Thus, one might ume and hence retain the character of hypothe-
ask, even if the mix of capital and coercion in ses. Attempts to account for divergent political
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378 Thomas Ertman
outcomes (absolutist vs. nonabsolutist regimes) summarizes his argument concerning the diver-
would, however, remain a major concern of gent impact of the military revolution as follows
the state-building literature over the coming (1992:239–40):
decade.
Countries faced with heavy protracted warfare that
required substantial domestic resource mobilization
suffered the destruction of medieval constitutional-
recent trends in the literature ism and the rise of a military-bureaucratic form of
on european state building government. Second, where war was light, or where
war needs could be met without mobilizing dras-
Since the early 1990s, three broad theoretical tic proportions of national resources (through for-
eign resources, alliances, geographic advantages or
orientations have dominated the research on
commercial wealth), conflict with the constitution
European state building within political science was much lighter. Constitutional government en-
and sociology. The first of these, represented by dured . . . . Third, where war was heavy and pro-
the work of Brian Downing and Thomas Ert- tracted, where domestic politics prevented military
man, has continued to focus on the way warfare modernization and political centralization, and where
shaped divergent patterns of state development the benefits of foreign resources, alliances, geography
and hence might be called neo-Hintzean. A or economic superiority were not available, the coun-
try lost its sovereignty to strong expansionist states.
second orientation, which has gained in im-
portance over the decade, derives its inspiration Thus the rulers of France and Brandenburg-
from rational choice theory and has been partic- Prussia, their states geographically exposed and
ularly interested in exploring issues of taxation, forced to rely primarily on domestic taxa-
consent, and rent seeking in the state building tion and recruits to feed their military ma-
process. Finally, the most recent trend to emerge chines, swept aside representative institutions
in this field has been a “culture turn” found in and erected absolutist regimes with bureaucratic
the work of Julia Adams and Philip Gorski, who infrastructures, whereas the leaders of England,
have brought a concern with gender, the fam- the Dutch Republic, and Sweden, protected by
ily, and religion to the study of the medieval and geography and enjoying access to substantial fi-
early modern state. nancial resources – in the first two cases due
Accounting for variations in political out- to domestic wealth and in the third thanks to
come to the state-building process in Europe foreign subsidies – could meet their military
stands at the heart of Brian Downing’s mono- needs without eliminating representative insti-
graph The Military Revolution and Political Change tutions or constructing large bureaucracies. Fi-
(1992). The starting point for Downing’s argu- nally, Poland is the best example of a state that,
ment is the fact, frequently noted by Weber and though under severe military threat, was pre-
Hintze, that the medieval West was unique in vented from meeting this challenge because of
possessing a whole array of institutional arrange- domestic politics and was eventually destroyed.
ments that checked royal power – the rule of law, Downing’s model is similar in many respects
a developed conception of rights, autonomous to Mann’s, though it is presented and supported
cities, decentralized military organization and in much greater detail. It represents the most
above all representative institutions – institutional developed version of a “fiscal-military” alterna-
arrangements that Downing collectively terms tive to the more narrowly “geopolitical” theory
medieval constitutionalism. The changes in mili- found in the pre-1914 works of Hintze, one that
tary technology and the resulting explosion in identifies both the (geographically determined)
the size and cost of armies generally known as military threat from surrounding powers and the
the “military revolution” of the sixteenth and type and availability of financial and manpower
seventeenth centuries placed tremendous strain resources as key causal factors in accounting for
on these institutions as rulers sought to find the divergent state-building outcomes. As such, it
money and men necessary to defend themselves can be seen as the culmination of a line of ar-
against – or attack – their neighbors. Downing gument initiated by Tilly (1975).
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Like Downing, Thomas Ertman in his Birth central causal role played by war and prepa-
of the Leviathan (1997) seeks to explain variations rations for war. Yet what this standard litera-
in both political regime and in the character of ture overlooks, he maintains, is that although
state infrastructures found across Europe at the geopolitical competition may have had a cru-
end of the early modern period. He contends cial impact on the state-building process, the
that this problem is worth examining anew be- onset of such competition was “nonsimultane-
cause research by historian John Brewer (1989) ous” – that is, it did not affect all states or re-
has undermined a central assumption of the gions at the same time. This mattered for the
state-building literature from Hintze and Weber same reasons that the nonsimultaneous onset of
to Downing: namely that eighteenth-century industrialization mattered in the process of Eu-
Britain with its strong Parliament, geographic ropean economic development: because rulers
isolation, small standing army, and abundant who were not forced to expand their infrastruc-
commercial wealth neither needed nor pos- tures until later (after about 1450) could take ad-
sessed a large, fiscal-administrative infrastruc- vantage of new institutions and “technologies of
ture of the kind associated in this literature with rule” not available to early state builders; because
absolutist states like France and Brandenburg- such late state-building rulers could draw from
Prussia. In fact, as Brewer and Geoffrey Holmes a larger pool of trained administrative, finan-
(1982) have shown, Britain possessed a fiscal- cial, and military personnel; and because they
administrative infrastructure larger in both ab- could learn from the mistakes of the early state
solute and per capita terms than that of Freder- builders. For all of these reasons, Ertman ar-
ick the Great’s Prussia and just as bureaucratic gues, late state builders (like Prussia’s monar-
(Ertman, 1997:12). Indeed, as Brewer has writ- chs) were – other things being equal – able to
ten (1989:68), the British Excise “more closely win the battle with their staffs over control of
approximated . . . Max Weber’s ideal of bureau- the means of administration and construct pro-
cracy than any other government agency in tomodern bureaucracies, whereas earlier state
eighteenth-century Europe.” Although consti- builders (such as the kings of France or Spain)
tutionalist Britain and absolutist Prussia both tended to lose the battle with their staffs and
possessed modern bureaucracies, a substantial were saddled with patrimonial infrastructures
literature on absolutist France and Spain as well (1997:25–8).
as on constitutionalist Poland and Hungary has To explain variations in political regime, as
underlined the fact that the infrastructures of all opposed to variations in infrastructure, Ertman
these states most closely approximate Weber’s employs a different argument, one inspired by
category of “stereotyped” or appropriated pat- Hintze’s lesser known work of the post-1918 pe-
rimonial administration. riod. Developing further the claim put forward
Ertman thus claims that, contrary to an as- by Hintze (1930), Ertman contends that because
sumption held by most of the literature on all rulers were interested in freeing themselves
state building, political regime and infrastruc- from the constraints of “medieval constitution-
tural type did not covary in early modern Eu- alism,” especially given the intense geopolitical
rope but instead cross-cut one another, thereby competition of the period after 1450, the key
producing four kinds of outcomes to be ex- factor in determining whether they would suc-
plained – bureaucratic absolutism (German ceed in this was the degree of resistance said
states), bureaucratic constitutionalism (Britain), rulers encountered from their representative as-
patrimonial absolutism (France, Iberian, and semblies. Two chamber assemblies with their
Italian states), and patrimonial constitutional- roots in autonomous units of local government
ism (Poland, Hungary), rather than the tradi- such as those found in England, Poland, and
tional two – bureaucratic absolutism and non- Hungary proved to be most durable, whereas
bureaucratic constitutionalism. In attempting to tripartite estate-based assemblies with no such
account for variations in infrastructure, Ert- links to local government such as those in
man agrees with the standard literature on the France, Iberia, Italy, and Germany invariably
P1: JZP
380 Thomas Ertman
succumbed to rulers’ attempts to concentrate 1990) North highlights the centrality of estab-
legislative as well as executive power in their lishing a system of equitable property rights to
own hands. In addition, Ertman points out lower the transaction costs involved in nego-
that if representative assemblies survived and re- tiating and enforcing contracts and hence en-
mained vigorous throughout the early modern courage economic activity. However, he also
period, they could and did influence the char- emphasizes the fact that, given the prevalence
acter of the state infrastructures that collected of inefficient property rights both in the Euro-
and disbursed the taxes they voted and adminis- pean past and in the wider world, such a system
tered the laws they approved. Thus in England, is obviously very difficult to construct and in-
parliamentary support made possible the efforts stitutionalize. A principal reason for this is the
of reformers to replace a patrimonial infrastruc- “predatory” behavior of rulers – whether indi-
ture with a protomodern bureaucracy, whereas viduals or collectivities – who will attempt to
in Poland and Hungary noble-dominated rep- shape property rights to maximize their own
resentative institutions blocked rulers’ attempts income, most often to the detriment of eco-
to build just such bureaucracies in the face of nomic growth more generally (North, 1981:21–
sustained military pressures, fearing that they 31; Levi, 1981, 1988:10–40).
would give rulers the upper hand in their strug- This basic framework has inspired two main
gle with the assemblies. At the same time, be- strands of research on the medieval and early
cause such assemblies had either ceased to meet modern state by those employing a rational
altogether or ceded all influence over legislation choice approach. One of these roughly corre-
in France, Iberia, Italy, and the German states af- sponds to the problem of explaining variations
ter the late 1500s, they could do little to either in political regime in the neo-Hintzean litera-
reform entrenched patrimonial administrations ture, the other to the problem of explaining vari-
in the first three areas (“Latin Europe”) or block ations in infrastructural type. Thus both North
the construction of protomodern bureaucracies and Levi have explored the conditions under
across Germany (Ertman, 1997:19–25, 28–34; which rulers might be willing to enter into
for critical discussions of Ertman, see Gorski, durable bargains with representative institutions,
1998, 2003, and Mahoney, 1999). leading to constraints on their predatory be-
If Downing and Ertman carry forward, in havior and the creation of an efficient property
their contrasting ways, an older, war-centered rights system, by comparing the cases of late me-
tradition of work on European state building, dieval England and France (Levi, 1988:95–121;
over the course of the 1990s research in this area see also Bates and Lien, 1985; North, 1981:147–
has come to be dominated by two other theo- 57; North and Thomas, 1973:82–84, 98–101).
retical orientations with quite different intellec- They argue that the weaker bargaining position
tual roots: rational choice and culture-centered of English monarchs in the absence of a cred-
analysis. Neither has as of yet sought to explain ible invasion threat, combined with the lower
variation across the entire continent in the man- transaction costs associated with central bargain-
ner of Hintze, Rokkan, Tilly, or Ertman, but ing in a smaller and more homogeneous coun-
both have instead concentrated on single-country try led the latter to enter into cooperative ar-
studies or comparisons involving a more lim- rangements with Parliament (see also Kiser and
ited number of cases. The foundations for a Barzel, 1991). The subsequent breakdown in
rational choice approach to the European past trust between the monarch and Parliament, and
were laid in the 1970s and 1980s by the Nobel the establishment of parliamentary supremacy
Prize-winning economist Douglass North and after 1688 have more recently been examined
his political science colleague Margaret Levi. In from a rational choice perspective by Ferejohn
his path-breaking writings on economic history (1993) and North and Weingast (1989). Jean-
beginning with The Rise of the Western World Laurent Rosenthal (1998) has explored the rea-
(North and Thomas, 1973) and Structure and sons why seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Change in Economic History (1981; see also North, French monarchs refused to revive the Estates
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General despite the revenue gains this would and Joachim Schneider (1994) have also ana-
have brought. He argues, echoing a point made lyzed the tax collection system of early mod-
earlier by Levi (1988:121), that they did not do ern Prussia and claim that certain nonbureau-
so because they correctly perceived that this in- cratic features of this system, including the use
creased revenue would be purchased at the in- of royal spies to monitor tax officials and the
tolerably high price of a loss of autonomy in right of arbitrary dismissal retained by the ruler,
foreign and military affairs. increased the overall efficiency of collection by
A second issue addressed in several ratio- heightening the control capacity of the princi-
nal choice contributions is that of administra- pal.
tive insiderism and inefficiency – patrimonial- Over the past decade, some of the most sig-
ism, in Weber’s terms. The predatory theory nificant new contributions to the literature on
of rule explains this outcome by the tendency European state building have come from sociol-
of rulers to trade rights, including monopoly ogists Julia Adams and Philip Gorski, both of
rights to office, in exchange for revenue gains whom have called into question various fea-
in the absence of constraints imposed by, for tures of the rational choice approach. Adams
example, a permanent representative institu- and Gorski were important contributors to the
tion (North, 1981:149–50). North has subse- 1999 collective volume State/Culture, edited by
quently stressed that dysfunctional institutional George Steinmetz. This volume seeks to revital-
arrangements brought about by the granting ize the study of state formation and state build-
of monopoly rights can reproduce themselves ing by allowing it to partake of the fruits of the
over long periods of time (1990:51–3, 92– “cultural turn” now ongoing in sociology, an-
104). In his monograph Fountains of Privilege thropology, history, and, to a lesser extent, po-
(1994), Hilton Root shows how ancien regime litical science. In its ambitions Steinmetz (1999)
France’s pervasive “cronyism” – the allocation strongly resembles Evans, Rueschemeyer, and
of rights to office and monopoly control over Skocpol (1985). In Adams’ piece (1999), she
key state functions and economic activities to criticizes the rational choice model of wealth
relatives and clients – led to dysfunctionality on and power-maximizing predatory actors for
such a scale that, under conditions of intense neglecting the crucial role played by the pursuit
geopolitical competition, regime collapse was of family honor and prestige among the elites
the inevitable outcome. Conversely, the perva- of the early modern period. In her own work
sive electoral corruption in eighteenth-century on the Netherlands, she has tried to elaborate
England served to redistribute wealth to a wider, an alternative model.
socially mixed electorate without impeding the In two further articles, Adams (1994a, 1994b)
wealth-creating function of a market economy contends that the driving force behind state de-
largely free from state control (see also the cri- velopment in the seventeenth-century Dutch
tique of Root in Rosenthal, 1998:78–79). Republic was the desire of the male heads of re-
Another way to conceive of the problem gent families to secure the future of their lineages
of patrimonialism is from the point of view by acquiring proprietary rights over public po-
of principal-agent theory. Rulers (principals) sitions. Their success in this enterprise led to the
must delegate administrative duties to their kind of “familial” patrimonial state that resisted
staffs (agents), but controlling and monitoring attempts to introduce rational-legal bureaucracy
these agents, especially under conditions of poor and eliminate damaging economic privileges.
communication, is an extremely difficult task Adams implies that this type of patriarchal
(North, 1981:25). Edgar Kiser (1994) has used patrimonialism was not limited to the north-
agency theory to argue that rulers will employ ern Netherlands but was in fact found across
tax farming when the size of the area from early modern Europe. This argument is devel-
which taxes are to be collected is large and oped in much greater detail in Adams (2005).
their existing administrative infrastructure pro- The most original aspect of her work is the
vides poor capacities to control agents. Kiser way it combines a contemporary gender-based
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382 Thomas Ertman
perspective with an older analytic framework conclusion

(Weber’s concept of patrimonialism) that has
been underutilized in the state-building liter- What conclusions can we draw from the case of
ature. European state building for the state builders of
One of Philip Gorski’s first published pieces, today? At first glance, the European experience
“The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Bureau- might seem of only limited relevance because,
cracy” (1995), also involved a critique of rational as theorists from Hintze to Anderson, Tilly, and
choice, in this case of Kiser and Schneider’s arti- Ertman have stressed, war was a decisive fac-
cle “Bureaucracy and Efficiency” (1994). Here tor driving forward the expansion and reform
he maintains that the efficiency of the Prus- of administrative, financial, military, and judicial
sian tax administration can be explained not infrastructures across the continent. Yet over the
by the use of patrimonial control mechanisms, past two centuries, as over a hundred new states
as claimed by Kiser and Schneider, but by the in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Eu-
largely Calvinist makeup of that administration. rope have come into being and sought to con-
Prussian monarchs wisely chose their coreli- solidate themselves, they have only rarely faced
gionists for these sensitive bureaucratic positions the kind of acute geomilitary pressure that was
because Calvinist congregations, with their in- ubiquitous in Western Europe for over seven
trusive examinations of their members, provided centuries, from the central Middle Ages until
an extra check on the honesty and diligence of 1815 or, one might even argue, 1989. Only in
Calvinist officials. Though he echoes him in his the post-1945 Middle East have something like
title, Gorski’s search for the religious roots of European conditions obtained. It seems reason-
modern bureaucracy recalls Hintze (1931) more able to admit, then, that the portion of the state-
than Weber. building literature that explores the differential
Gorski’s larger project is to bring religion effects on state structures of long-term military
back into the study of European state build- pressures might be of only limited significance
ing and he has been especially critical of Ert- for most of today’s developing polities.
man for neglecting this causal factor. Although There is, however, another side of that litera-
Gorski cites Weber and Foucault as his primary ture that is supremely relevant to contemporary
sources of inspiration, his project very much state builders. A theme even more common than
resembles that of the German scholar Gerhard war links the writings of the neo-Weberians
Oestreich, who was also particularly influenced (Bendix), neo-Marxists (Wallerstein and Ander-
by Hintze’s “Calvinism” essay. In several articles son), and neo-Hintzeans (Ertman) with those
(1993, 1995, 1999) as well as in his book The of rational choice and cultural theorists like
Disciplinary Revolution (2003), Gorski, inspired Levi, Root, and Adams: the pervasiveness in
by Weber and Foucault, has sought to show that the European past of patrimonial practices like
religion was at the root of a “disciplinary rev- proprietary officeholding, tax farming, and fi-
olution” during the early modern period that nancial cronyism with their attendant ineffi-
affected religious, social, and political and mili- ciency, arbitrariness, and large-scale diversion
tary behavior. Although Calvinism provided the of public funds into private hands, a perva-
main impetus for this revolution, it also spread siveness of which the endemic corruption and
as a result of imitation and post-Tridentine re- rent seeking in the public administrations of
forms to Lutheran and Catholic areas as well. many developing states today is reminiscent. As
However, this revolution was most intense in the European case clearly illustrates, the cre-
Calvinist-led states like the Dutch Republic and ation and expansion of administrative and fi-
Brandenburg-Prussia and hence religious differ- nancial institutions represents a unique oppor-
ences can go a far way toward explaining vari- tunity for personal and familiar enrichment
ations in social welfare regimes and in politi- and social aggrandizement because it involves
cal and administrative mores across the conti- the extraction of wealth from the tax-paying
nent. population and its concentration – ostensibly
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for the public good – in the coffers of the state. mises with powerful socioeconomic groups to
Once amassed, such wealth presents an inviting ward off liberalization or democratization, and
target to rent-seeking groups, be they govern- such compromises may prevent the status level-
ment officials, local party bosses, the military, ing that Weber claims is a necessary prerequi-
or employees of state enterprises. Further, such site for any successful bureaucratization. Finally,
groups, whether in medieval and early mod- the work of Hintze and Gorski implies that a
ern Europe, nineteenth-century Latin America, certain ideational component (e.g., Calvinism
or twentieth-century Africa and Asia, will at- or some functional equivalent) might be neces-
tempt to structure the state apparatus in their sary for modern bureaucracy truly to take hold.
own interest with little concern – especially in Nonetheless, some contemporary states in Asia
the absence of geomilitary pressure – for the such as Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
consequences of their actions for their coun- seem to have been able to build effective modern
try’s long-term defense capabilites or economic bureaucracies under different forms of authori-
competitiveness and will fiercely resist all efforts tarian rule.
at fundamental reform. The alternative solution is the one first devel-
How might it be possible to resist the rent- oped by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
seeking deformation of state institutions during Britain: the monitoring of administrators by an
and after the state-building process? The Euro- autonomous legislature. Such a legislature nor-
pean experience as interpreted by Hintze, Ert- mally brings with it circumstances favorable to
man, Root, Kiser and Schneider, and Gorski the expansion of financial markets, because it
suggests two answers. One of these is an au- provides credible backing for government debt
thoritarian solution pioneered in Brandenburg- issues and to a relatively free press and the dy-
Prussia and, to a lesser extent, in other German namic public sphere associated with it. Both fi-
states in which a monocratic executive closely nancial markets and a vigorous investigative press
monitors the activities of its administrators, us- possess strong incentives to concern themselves
ing powers of arbitrary dismissal to impose hon- with the honesty and efficiency of state offi-
esty and efficiency. Such pressure from above cials – and thereby act to reinforce direct moni-
may, as in Brandenburg-Prussia, induce a strong toring by legislative committees – in the interest
sense of corporate identity among these admin- of taxpayers concerned about how their money
istrators, leading them to campaign for both is being spent. Yet this insight merely begs the
education-based restrictions on entry and for question of what conditions allow for the cre-
basic rights like life tenure to protect themselves ation of a durable, autonomous legislature. Here
from the unbridled will of their employer. How- the classic answer of DeTocqueville, recently re-
ever, the shortcomings of this solution are clear. iterated by Ertman, has lost none of its topicality:
First, the degree of protection from cronyism participatory local government. The manage-
and other forms of rent seeking depends on ment by citizens of their own affairs at the local
the consistency and high quality of the supervi- level and the bonds of solidarity it creates still
sion emanating from the executive, a condition seems the best foundation on which to build
that is in no way assured. Second, monocratic strong legislatures and the honest and efficient
regimes most often must enter into compro- state infrastructures that they can guarantee.
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chapter nineteen
Transitions to Democracy1
John Markoff
from structures to transitions countries of the midtwentieth century were the

democratic ones. He argued that growing na-
Explaining the interest of social scientists like tional wealth reduced the stakes in social con-
himself in democratic transitions, one eminent flicts and made democratic compromise attrac-
student of the subject recalls: “I’m Polish and I tive to rich and poor alike at the same time as
got involved with democratization for the first fostering a large middle class with tolerant values
time by being beaten by police in 1957 at a (Lipset, 1981[1960]:27–63).
student demonstration when the government Barrington Moore, to take a very different
closed a student newspaper. I left Poland; I came example, argued that when peasant majorities
here; I went to Chile; saw democracy being were able to participate in social revolutions at
destroyed there; and came back to the United an early stage in economic development, demo-
States” (Przeworski, 1997:6). What is to be un- cratic rights became secured early; when such
derstood is a process – democratization – not a revolutions had not taken place, economic de-
stable state of affairs. It may be undone (as in velopment tended to produce two kinds of po-
Chile). It involves serious conflict. It is shaped litical outcome, neither of which boded well
by parties in such conflict (such as troublemak- for democracy. In the first path, industrialization
ing students and order-defending police), whose supported the interests of narrow agrarian elites
actions, achievements, and understandings even- and the highly conservative authoritarian states
tually lead scholars to their own new under- they favored (a variant of which led down the
standings. road to fascism). An alternate second path led to
At the moment when government violence twentieth-century communist revolutions from
got our witness to thinking, and for a couple of below as revolutionary parties succeeded in mo-
decades after that, much scholarly reflection saw bilizing the large numbers of those left out from
democracy resting on elements of social struc- the benefits of economic growth. It was only
ture or culture not found in all countries. Places the early opening up of the political system by
endowed with certain constellations of eco- revolution that avoided both options and laid
nomic interests or imbued with certain kinds of the groundwork for democracy (Moore, 1966).
values would be those likely to have democratic Both Lipset, in telling us that wealthy coun-
government, those less endowed or imbued less tries tended to develop democratic practices,
likely. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, and Barrington Moore, in connecting the out-
pointed out that the economically developed comes of conflict between lords and peasants
centuries ago to the functioning democracies of
1
Thanks for valuable suggestions on an earlier draft: today, directed us to seeing democracy as a state
Thomas Janoski and Charles Tilly. of affairs, not as something made and unmade
384
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Transitions to Democracy 385
in the present. Lipset and Moore, different as significance in forging democratic institutions
their specific arguments are, encourage us to (Collier, 1999; Houtman, 2001; Rueschemeyer
look for some set of conditions that provide the et al., 1992)? Such questions have continued to
soil in which democracy will grow, but they engage scholars of democracy. But in the last
tell us nothing about what growth is, nor about quarter of the twentieth century or so, many
how human action brings democracy into (or turned from the question of favorable environ-
out of ) existence. So Przeworski (1997) sug- ments, whether conceived culturally or struc-
gests that anyone interested in making democ- turally, to the question of transition. How and
racy would be led into a different kind of the- why does one arrive at democracy from some
oretical inquiry; one presumes the same would other starting point?
hold for anyone interested in unmaking democ- This new vantage point was not primarily ar-
racy as well. rived at because scholars had exhausted the ear-
The general notion that democracy was sig- lier questions (which they were continuing to
nificantly favored or retarded by some charac- debate), nor because of some major empirical
teristics of national societies was a venerable one. flaw in the data upon which the earlier ques-
In the midnineteenth century, John Stuart Mill tions rested. Despite much arguing about detail,
was a great champion of self-government for the and about how it was to be explained, a recent
people of England and favored representative reexamination of the contention that as a sta-
institutions. But he held self-rule inappropri- tistical tendency it is the richer countries that
ate for some of Britain’s colonies and wrote in have democratic governments showed it hold-
considerable detail of the subtleties of providing ing up rather well (Diamond, 1992; see also
decent government for a place like India that “is Przeworski et al., 2000; Rueschemeyer et al.,
not fit to govern itself ” (Mill, 1977[1861]:568). 1992).
One can readily see in Mill a theory that some It was the vivid demonstration of the dynamic
peoples are endowed with characteristics that aspects of democracy that brought the subject of
make democracy likely to emerge and flour- transition to center stage: antidemocratic transi-
ish, whereas others (particularly some of those tion, first of all. The defeat of the fascist powers
ruled by Britain) are deficient in those essen- in World War Two was followed in short order
tial traits. One could readily imagine one of his by the restoration of democratic rule in West-
chapter titles being used in the social science ern Europe and the implantation of democratic
writing of a century later: “Under what social rule in some new places as well. This was soon
conditions representative government is inap- followed by the withdrawal of the European
plicable” (Mill, 1977[1861]:413–21). Lipset sees colonial powers from their colonies, many of
the ancestry of his own variant of such theo- which began independence with democratic
ries to be a great deal more venerable still when constitutions.
he attributes to Aristotle the view that viable By the 1960s, however, it had become ap-
democracy is possible “only in a wealthy soci- parent that more democratic practices in many
ety in which relatively few citizens lived at the poorer countries were giving way to less demo-
level of real poverty” (Lipset, 1981:31). cratic practices, dramatically putting the collapse
Scholars debated precisely which elements of of democracy on the scholarly agenda. Although
culture or which constellations of economic in- the geography of democratic collapse reinforced
terest were most favorable. Some took issue, for the weightiness of structural elements for some,
example, with Lipset’s contention that a demo- and cultural elements for others, an imaginative
cratic culture tended to be rooted in the prag- group of scholars called attention to the undo-
matic values of the educated middle classes by ing of democracy as a process. Instead of try-
interest inclined to cut deals and by educa- ing to locate the missing structural or cultural
tion inclined to tolerance (Lipset, 1981:92–7). ingredients, such scholars tried to reconstruct
Did such formulations misunderstand the inter- the steps by which democracy was undone. The
ests of the working classes and underrate their multivolume collection of case studies that Juan
P1: JZP
386 John Markoff
Linz and Alfred Stepan (1978) put out in the outcome. One important student of the subject
late 1970s stressed the interplay of actors rather in the 1970s indeed thought the dissolution of
than the irresistibility of social forces, the con- an “authoritarian” regime was far more likely to
tingent and often unexpected outcome of strug- give birth to another authoritarian regime than
gles rather than the determinism of structures a democratic one, a position he came to modify
and cultures. in light of the great democratic wave that fol-
When a new, quasi-global wave of democ- lowed (Linz, 2000:33, reflecting on work orig-
ratizations began in the 1970s, they were ob- inally published in 1975).2
served by scholars many of whom had be- One early generalization drew on observation
come intrigued by the dynamics of transitions of the disappointed hopes that some democrats
from democratic rule and who readily turned had placed in the abandonment of empire that
to the dynamics of transitions to democratic followed World War Two. The European colo-
rule. In the 1970s, Western Europe’s remaining nizers had been gravely weakened, the greatly
authoritarian states democratized; in the 1980s strengthened United States was unenthusiastic
many South American militaries relinquished about restoring European colonial domination,
power to elected civilians; in 1989 one East and a variety of national and revolutionary
European communist regime after another fell movements were making it very costly to try
and the successors set about writing democratic to restore the prewar order. The result was that
constitutions; in the 1990s authoritarian orders in the quarter-century following the end of
fell in several Asian countries and by the begin- World War Two centuries of European colo-
ning of the twenty-first century observers noted nial conquest were brought to an end. Although
the frequency with which power was chang- what were widely called the “new states” often
ing hands in African states holding multiparty started with democratic constitutions, it was not
elections for the first time (Bratton and van de long before many of them experienced military
Walle, 1997; Huntington, 1991; Markoff, 1996; coups, declarations of martial law, outlawing
Swarns and Onishi, 2002). Over that turbulent of opposition parties, or successful revolution-
last quarter of the twentieth century, scholars’ ary movements with little inclination toward
attention became increasingly drawn to the tra- democratic politics. Many observers concluded
jectories by which one regime gave way to an- that colonial rule was an inauspicious starting
other. Those with a comparative bent sought point (e.g., Shils, 1960). A more nuanced for-
to identify recurrent processes and, in so do- mulation noted that democratic politics seemed
ing, were rethinking what an appropriate theory more likely to endure in former British colonies
ought to look like. than others, from small Caribbean states to giant
Transitologists, as some practitioners of this India (Weiner, 1987:18–21).
flourishing field of intellectual inquiry were call- The Indian case alone occasioned a large lit-
ing themselves (e.g., Schmitter with Karl, 1994), erature, partly because it was the world’s largest
were soon addressing a host of challenging democratic state, and partly because its demo-
issues. cratic character was in defiance of many a theory
that made structure and culture determinative.
It had vast poverty; much illiteracy; and enor-
transitions from what to what? mous linguistic, cultural, and ethnic divisions –
all widely held inimical to democratic practice.
Starting Points
2
As originally formulated in 1975: “We therefore
Were the prospects for democratization af- should be careful not to confuse the instability of author-
fected, and if so, in what ways, by the starting itarian regimes with favorable prospects for competitive
democracy. The alternative to a particular authoritarian
point? Nondemocratic political orders might regime might be a change within the regime or from one
unravel, but as many observers have long noted, type of authoritarian rule to another, if not permanent
that was hardly any guarantee of a democratic instability or chaos . . . ” (Linz 2000[1975]:269).
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Its large population was for the most part not indigenized and established national good
Christian and for those who might highlight government traditions; and
with Huntington (1991:72–3) that “[a] strong r Experiences with electoral and represen-
correlation exists between Western Christianity tative institutions at the local and regional
and democracy” – which some might variously levels that, despite limitations of suffrage
attribute to Christian respect for the individual rights and of the authority of those elected,
or to its egalitarian strand – its religious mix created an elite socialized in democracy.
would have seemed unlikely to provide needed (Weiner, 1987:19–20)
cultural resources. The significance of caste in-
equalities, moreover, would not have seemed es-
pecially favorable, either. The problem with this theory is that many
India, therefore, was a particularly promising British colonies left colonial rule to travel down
site for noting the importance of processes, of nondemocratic paths as in Nigeria, Kenya, or
how democracy was forged and how it was sus- India’s neighbor, Pakistan (the latter with a
tained, and of how to get to democracy from British administrative history in common with
somewhere else (Kohli, 2001). Its scholars have India’s). Whatever role British as opposed to
stressed such things as the mobilizational strate- other colonial domination may have played, it
gies pursued by the dominant independence must have been in interaction with other things.
movement and the forms of challenge mounted (I think there are some serious empirical diffi-
by that movement to British rule. The stress culties about the benign administrative legacy as
on unity against the British and the democratic well.3 )
aspects of the movement’s internal decision Some scholars aimed at developing tax-
making helped put in place the habits and in- onomies of nondemocratic regimes and hoped
stitutions of negotiated compromise within the to identify favorable and unfavorable starting
Indian National Congress; the choice of nonvi- points for democratic transition. “Totalitarian”
olent confrontation helped avoid the large num- regimes would seem a good deal less promis-
bers of heavily armed independence fighters ing than “authoritarian” ones to invoke one
habituated to violence that have bedeviled a important distinction (Linz, 2000). Totalitarian
number of other cases. In addition, one could regimes have dominating ideologies and great
point to the ways in which the new Indian con- concentrations of power; authoritarian regimes
stitution provided for groups that might feel shut are more pragmatic and more pluralistic. A pub-
out of power at the national level to be weighty lic discourse of utopian goals would seem quite
at the state level and thereby more inclined to inimical to cultivating the habits of compromise
be loyal to the overall structure. and limited success that many hold part and
Some scholars were less inclined to stress the
particularities of the Indian movement for in- 3
Despite the frequency of claims that British rule left
dependence and the care with which its new in its wake a modern, capable, and honest civil service,
constitution was crafted, setting this case instead there is reason for skepticism about such adjectives. The
among others that moved from British colonial most important systematic comparative rankings of cor-
domination to democracy. (By contrast, “[n]ot ruption, for example, found that of ninety-one coun-
a single newly independent country that lived tries measured in 2001, four of the world’s top five were
former British colonies (Bangladesh, Nigeria, Uganda,
under French, Dutch, American, or Portuguese and Kenya); in 2002 among a slightly larger collec-
rule has continually remained democratic” tion of cases, these were still among the top nine with
Weiner, 1987:20.) Aspects of British rule that Bangladesh and Nigeria again at the very top. Although
led to such an outcome were: democratic India has not been quite at the pinnacle, its
comparative location is still quite high, its administra-
r The establishment of effective govern- tive history is shared with top-ranked Bangladesh, and
its citizens have a sense of widespread corruption. (See
ing structures from courts to police to Transparency International 2001, 2002:264–5; Pavarala,
civil services that, after struggles, became 1996.)
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388 John Markoff
parcel of the essential give and take of demo- nondemocratic regimes is by no means identical
cratically managed conflicts. The absence of au- to identifying the causes of democratization.
tonomously organized political actors, indepen- It would be difficult to make out that many
dent of the state, makes it difficult for a would-be very robust generalizations about starting points
democratic movement to negotiate a transition for political transitions had emerged from such
with those powerholders who might be open to classificatory activity. Consider the very plausi-
change. ble argument about the disadvantages to those
Postcommunist Europe provides an impor- seeking to construct democracy of working
tant naturally occurring social experiment for with the materials at hand in these highly per-
observing some theoretically very significant sonalistic regimes. Many observers would have
processes. By 1989, the states under Commu- agreed with Linz (2000[1975]:153) that the
nist rule had moved away from totalitarian- Dominican Republic in its decades under
ism to very different degrees and in different Rafael Trujillo was a good example of a sultanis-
ways (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and tic regime. Yet, as Jorge Domı́nguez (1993:3)
Toka, 1999). Despite widespread use of the to- points out, its “transit to democratic politics in
talitarian label to characterize the communist the late 1970s preceded most of Latin America’s
regimes of Eastern Europe, many of them had democratic transitions of the decade that fol-
altered a great deal in many ways from the time lowed.” And despite what another scholar calls
of Stalin. Well before 1989, few in or out of “a troubled history,” since that moment it “can
power any longer believed in the foundational be considered a political democracy” (Hartlyn,
vision, for example, but the degree to which 1993:150, 159).
varied viewpoints could be openly expressed All this seems to suggest that there are many
differed considerably from country to country. paths to democracy and ways to get there from
It will be interesting to observe how differences diverse starting points and that the ways that
in postcommunist starting points are playing starting points constrain possible paths is only
out: In different trajectories towards democracy? very imperfectly understood.
In different kinds of democracy? In differ-
ent mixes of democracy and nondemocracy?
As time passes since the great upheavals of End Points
1989 we will increasingly be able to assess em-
pirically whether such differences do lead to By the beginning of the twenty-first century,
different end points, different paths, both, or very many more people in very many more
neither. countries than ever before in human history
Another type of nondemocratic regime is the had governments that made claims to demo-
highly personalistic pattern of rulership some cratic rule. Yet although such regimes tended
were denoting as “sultanism,” characterized by to have elections, they varied considerably in
an extremely narrow ruling stratum cemented other important attributes, sufficiently so that
by loyalty to some leader subject to little con- observers were qualifying their democratic char-
straint by interest groups, ideology, law, or or- acter. Some rulers, although validated by elec-
ganized bureaucracies. Supporters are granted toral victories, wielded power subject to very lit-
personal rewards and others submit in fear. tle of what U.S. citizens would call “checks and
The building blocks of a future democratic or- balances” and ruled over countries in which in-
der would seem in short supply. Such regimes dividuals were subject to arbitrary government
may be particularly vulnerable to revolution- actions. Those so subject might well include
ary overthrow (Goodwin, 2001) but this hardly leaders of opposition movements who could be
makes a democratic outcome of such revo- targets of violence by state authorities (some-
lutions terribly probable (Stinchcombe, 1999). times semiconcealed, as when off-duty police-
This is an important reminder that identification man or soldiers in civilian garb formed “death
of actual and potential sources of instability in squads”), or potentially independent news
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media subject to government takeover, harass- in the 1990s took note of the frequency with
ment, fines, or closings. The new country of which presidents formulated key aspects of their
Belarus that emerged from the breakup of the economic policies through secretive meetings of
Soviet Union would provide many examples of their chosen teams of advisors, with little input
such practices. Some observers began to speak by business groups let alone labor, and shielded
of the rise of “illiberal” democracies as opposed from public scrutiny and legislative debate. If
to “liberal” ones to categorize such cases and need be, sweeping plans could be imposed con-
might even suggest that it was primarily illib- stitutionally by emergency decree. Some presi-
eral democracy that was on the rise (Diamond, dents made use of such powers even when fa-
1999:24–63; Zakaria, 1997). vored policies would have passed as ordinary
In still other cases, governments that were law to bypass the normal wheeling and deal-
by many criteria democratic were profoundly ing of democratic politics or perhaps even just
deficient in supplying services that citizens had to demonstrate who was the boss. [The cham-
come to expect from any government, demo- pion of this particular mode of governing was
cratic or otherwise. In Brazil, for example, the Argentina’s Carlos Saúl Menem, who issued
restoration of civilian rule was followed by an 244 such decrees between 1989 and 1993, eight
extraordinary deterioration of citizen safety as times as many as had been issued in the previous
crime rates soared. Brazilians who could af- 136 years (Linz and Stepan, 1996:200–4).]
ford it were making their homes into fortresses, Some scholars began to speak of “delega-
police violence rose in tandem with criminal- tive democracy,” in which vast powers are
ity (Caldeira and Holston, 1999), and enthusi- democratically delegated to powerful executives
asm for democracy soured as large numbers of (O’Donnell, 1994). Others saw the ascent to
Brazilians responded to polls that they were in- power of unelected “technocrats,” the bearers
different as to whether Brazil was a democracy of the technical knowledge used in designing
or not. In 1989, a few years after the Brazilian the president’s policies (Conaghan and Malloy,
military relinquished power, 39 percent of a na- 1994; Markoff and Montecinos, 1993). One
tional sample “completely” agreed that “the po- fruitful direction of research was taking note of
lice attack and kill innocent people” and another variation from country to country and from mo-
39 percent “partially” agreed. (The main reason ment to moment in the relative power of pres-
so many Brazilians were of this view was that it idents and congresses in order to try to tease
was quite accurate.) A rise in vigilantism sug- out what was distinctive about the 1990s and
gests that for some, the problem was that the beyond and what was simply a continuation of
police were not getting the right people. It is Latin America’s long-standing patterns of pow-
not surprising that three years later, 24 percent erful presidencies.
of Brazilians held that “For people like me, a But one important observation suggested that
democratic and a nondemocratic regime are the there actually was a new form of legislative as-
same” and another 22 percent were of the view sertiveness. Faced with presidential power, the
that “In some cases, a nondemocratic govern- legislatures were no longer prone to look for
ment could be preferable to a democracy” (Linz military allies to overthrow the president by
and Stepan, 1996:176, 172). To cover such cases coup but to use such constitutional measures
of democratizing states that were failing to meet as impeachment as never before, and presidents
significant needs, some observers began to speak (as in Brazil) might now sometimes be driven
of “low-quality democracy.” from office without any tanks driving up to
A different sort of issue was posed by states the presidential palace. Congresses in turn were
in which democratic procedures did elect pres- often being propelled into action by popular
idents and legislatures but in which those presi- protest. If democratic politics includes execu-
dents had the authority, and used it, to insulate tives seriously challenged by street demonstra-
themselves from ongoing democratic debate. tions and congresses but not by the national
Students of several countries in South America armed forces, there is a case that in the 1990s
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390 John Markoff
Latin American conflict patterns were looking 1997). And others yet again thought the divid-
in some ways, if pretty turbulent, more demo- ing line between democracy and authoritarian-
cratic than in the past (Pérez-Liñan, 2003). Al- ism was often blurry, with many regimes rou-
though some were stressing the failures of such tinely thought of as democratic having signif-
democracy, others saw things, on balance, as icant authoritarian elements – and vice versa
progress (Mainwaring, 1999). (e.g., Baretta and Markoff, 1987).
Other observers took note of “hybrids” – However formulated, one of the lessons some
significant democratic elements in combina- scholars took away from their study of transi-
tion with significant nondemocratic ones (e.g., tions was that it was perfectly possible to create
Karl, 1995). Iran was a particularly notable in- some sort of democracy that would disappoint
stance. Following the overthrow of the Shah in the hopes of many democrats. As two of the
1979, the pull and tug of revolutionary forces most eminent students of transitions put it at the
with differing ideas about how the new Iran close of a magisterial survey: “We also unhappily
was to be governed led to a complex and acknowledge that some countries will consoli-
evolving structure. A parliament and president date democracy but will never deepen democ-
are chosen by competitive multiparty elections. racy in the spheres of gender equality, access
But there is also a Supreme Leader, a Council to critical social services, inclusive citizenship,
of Guardians, an Expediency Council, and an respect for human rights, and freedom of infor-
Assembly of Experts (who are predominantly mation. They might, indeed, occasionally vio-
Islamic clerics), who play a significant role in late human rights” (Linz and Stepan, 1996:457).
choosing each other, and who can both nullify Some thought that much of this was a symptom
acts of parliament and stymie presidential initia- of the difficulties of democracy in the global
tives (Chehabi, 1995; de Bellaigue, 2002). Far circumstances of the early twenty-first century
from achieving institutional permanence, much (Markoff, 2003a).
about the Iranian political system is in tension,
including tension between its more and its less
democratic features. As a younger generation Paths
comes to maturity skeptical about continued
clerical domination of daily life, Iranian voters The realization that there was more than one
are less and less prone to give electoral victo- path to democratization came early in the great
ries to clerical personnel. The postrevolutionary wave that began in the 1970s, because two
parliament began with a clerical majority; by neighboring countries displayed strikingly dif-
2002 clerics were only 12 percent of deputies ferent patterns. Samuel Huntington (1991:3),
(de Bellaigue, 2002:17) and a president sup- with some plausibility, actually dates the incep-
ported by those who hoped for reform was in tion of “[t]he third wave of democratization of
deep conflict with a Supreme Leader, who still the modern world” from the launching of a
had the upper hand. coup by junior officers of the Portuguese army
The evident empirical reality was that rein April, 1974. A year and a half later, the death
cent transitions were not all transitions to the of Francisco Franco, head of the government
same place. Some scholars sharply distinguished of neighboring Spain for the three and a half
“broken-backed” from “complete” democracy decades since his forces triumphed in its Civil
(Rose et al., 1998:200–1, 217–23). Others sug- War, provided the challenges and opportuni-
gested that much being called democracy was ties that led to that country’s democratization.
better understood as an authoritarian vari- The Portuguese process was marked by military
ant (e.g., Linz, 2000:34). Still others thought conspiracy in the course of an African colonial
“democracy” needed much adjectival qualifi- war that was going badly, mass mobilizations
cation and that theoretical advance in under- in capital and countryside, and a Communist
standing required more nuanced categorizations Party taking a radical stance under pressure from
(Collier and Adcock, 1999; Collier and Levitsky, groups more radical still. The Spanish process
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was marked by initiatives from a governing es- central political actors in Spain, for example, it
tablishment not under any of the delegitimat- was easy to recognize their significance in South
ing pressures of economic crisis or military fail- America (e.g., Karl, 1986).
ure commonly assumed to be the triggers of Or consider a more complex example. One
significant change, a great deal of out-of-sight of any number of things that apprehensive ob-
negotiation, and two rival left parties mak- servers might well have thought endangered
ing significant compromises with the parties of a democratic outcome in Spain – “the most
the right. The two cases came to be touch- dangerous” in the view of Linz and Stepan
stones in the literature on transitions for many (1996:99) – was the potential challenge to
reasons: the existing state on the part of Catalans and
Basques, for many of whom a sense of regional
r Markedly contrasting transitions in close and cultural distinctiveness was augmented by
geographic, cultural, and linguistic prox- the bitterness of defeat by an alien Spanish state
imity was a powerful stimulus to compar- in the Civil War. Rather than accept a de-
ative research and reflection mocratizing Spain as a superior homeland, in
r They occurred so early in the global wave fact, Basque separatists who embraced violent
that scholars of later democratizing epi- tactics sharply increased their actions following
sodes elsewhere were likely to look at later Franco’s death. The possibility of mutually re-
cases with concepts developed in scrutiny inforcing hostile identity claims producing es-
of Spain and Portugal calating violent polarizations and the possibility
r The Spanish case particularly struck many of military attempts to derail democratization –
observers as “a miracle: one of a handful of the military were a particular target of separatist
countries that since World War I have es- violence – loomed large.
caped the economics, the politics, and the Beyond Spanish particulars, some students of
culture of poor capitalism” (Przeworski, democracy have argued that conflicts defined in
1991:8). The sense of the miraculous was ethnonational terms are generally less amenable
all the greater in that Spain had acquired a to democratic give-and-take than those defined
reputation for a murderously violent politi- in class terms (e.g., Diamond, Linz, and Lipset,
cal culture. That it was Portugal’s transition 1995:42). For one thing, it is easier to imagine
that was the more troubled and its postau- what a compromise on what wage policy, say,
thoritarian social order also more troubled might look like than a compromise on accept-
lent more force to the comparison of the able symbols of national identity.
two cases In light of such potential hazards, it is note-
r Although the great cluster of democratic worthy that democratizing Spain held national
transitions of the next decade were geo- elections at an early stage, not only giving demo-
graphically far from Iberia, their concen- cratic legitimation to its central authorities but
tration in South America probably made inducing provincial political actors to become
for easier diffusion across the south Atlantic involved in forging alliances at the national level.
of a conceptual apparatus honed in Spanish Only after the creation of a nationally legiti-
and Portuguese mated authority and national parties in which
provincial actors were implicated were regional
The Iberian cases, and especially the Spanish elections held. By considerable contrast, Linz
instance, have by now generated a vast literature and Stepan point to the Soviet Union. The
and a lot of ideas that have exercised consider- March 1989 elections in that vast and power-
able influence on scholars of transition processes ful country reserved for the Communist Party
elsewhere (e.g., Graham, 1992; Gunther et al., a third of the seats in the Congress of Peo-
1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996: 87–129; Maxwell, ple’s Deputies, which in turn chose the Supreme
1986; Maravall and Santamarı́a, 1986). Having Soviet, hardly a procedure that gave that body
noticed the importance of agreements among much democratic legitimation. When elections
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392 John Markoff
were held the following year in the Soviet to the extent they did, those who lived through
Union’s republics, not only were they not orga- the transition would very likely experience it as
nized by Unionwide parties, but they endowed a rupture, as a sharp break with the previous state
the new republic governments with a good deal of things. This is not a bad first approximation
more democratic legitimation than the Union’s of Portuguese or Argentine experience.
central government. This helps us understand On the other hand, powerholders within the
how it was that Boris Yeltsin, based in the old order might be central players, either find-
Russian Republic, could successfully challenge ing a home within the new or at least negoti-
the Soviet Union (Linz and Stepan, 1996:370– ating their phased withdrawal from the scene;
400). things might unfold for some time under the
There is a good deal about this account worth legal structures of the old with a new founda-
further debate. Someone of a more structuralist tional document delayed; significant aspects of
bent might wonder whether more weight needs the transition might derive their legitimacy from
to be given to the Soviet policy which made na- the involvement of those identified with the old
tionality a matter of considerable significance, order rather than from their radical repudiation
particularly by organizing job privileges in the of the old order. In short, we might have some-
republics for “titular nationalities” (thus Kazakhs thing that some of those identifying with the old
would have advantages in Kazakhstan). This order would experience as a reform of that or-
produced ethnically defined political actors all der, of its modification to fit new circumstances,
over the Soviet Union who hoped for change rather than its overthrow.
or who feared change. Others might wonder On closer scrutiny, rupture and reform of-
whether the Spanish case should be thought ten turn out to be intertwined, and indeed the
of as a blueprint foolishly missed in the failing very claim that some ongoing process of polit-
Soviet Union or whether it was not possible to ical change is rupture or reform is itself some-
do likewise because of the entrenched strength thing that might be deployed by actors in that
of the Communist Party. conflict. Powerholders in the old order would
But even to discuss such issues is difficult not only tend to favor reform to the extent that
without reference to that Spanish case, because they favored change at all but would very likely
it has become paradigmatic. If Iberian experi- prefer to have whatever it is that was happening
ence imparted a particular vocabulary into the understood to be reform so that:
discussion of transition, the next decade’s varied
South American experiences of military with- r There would be a place for them within
drawal enriched that vocabulary still further, as the new order; or, failing that,
observers noticed the enormous differences be- r They could be held to have played an
tween the step-by-step restoration of civilian au- honorable part in bringing about change,
thority in Brazil and the collapse of military rule which would not humiliate them and re-
in Argentina. What are some of the key con- pudiate all their works.
cepts transitologists have extracted from Iberian
experience or abstracted from Latin American Those in opposition under the old order
political vocabulary? would very likely have a more complex set of
In a first, rough approximation, a transition preferences. Those favoring socially radical goals
might be thought of as ruptura or a reforma. That (of many imaginable sorts) might well prefer a
is, new political actors might suddenly appear rupture, in part for the sorts of mobilizational
as established ones fled or were rudely shoved opportunities seen in the Portuguese case. For
aside, new symbols of identity and legitimate those Basque separatists for whom a successfully
authority might be invented or old ones that negotiated democratic transition threatened to
had been discarded brought back, mass mobi- limit the appeals of radical separatism by incor-
lizations might be major components of a crisis, porating some Basque groups within the give-
and the language of revolution might be in- and-take of a democratized Spain, polarizing
voked. Not all such elements might appear, but violence could seem a promising strategy to
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disrupt deals and derail reform. In other tran- about such models was whether this particular
sition situations we might well find a moderate simplification did not bypass one of the central
opposition that hopes to avoid the hazards of problematic issues of political life, namely the
mass mobilization and cuts a deal to effect a ne- achievement of a political identity as itself a dy-
gotiated transition, yet for its own legitimacy namic process (Lichbach and Seligman, 2000).
within the opposition camp tries to define that A second very important set of issues swirled
deal as a negotiated rupture. around the notion of interests – whether these
In many of these processes, the pull and tug were to be taken as somehow prior to the ac-
of various interests attempting to move the tran- tions to be explained and thereby exogenous to
sition this way and that, would generate deals, the explanatory model or whether interests, like
and the Spanish case, with its explicit pact of identities, might not be a dynamic product of
Moncloa4 provided a convenient paradigm. interaction and conflict as much as an element
Transitologists came to speak of a “pacted” tran- in conflict.
sition, rendering into something approximating O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) get a good
English the Spanish pactada. deal of mileage by imagining an authoritarian
establishment confronting an opposition, with
both establishment and opposition divided on
deals and strategies the proper way to deal with the other. This
particular simplification has been given an espe-
Armed with such concepts, the empirical anten- cially elegant formulation by Przeworski (1991).
nae of transitologists were attuned to deals (and We may think of the authoritarian forces, cur-
found them). This coincided with the flowering rently in power, as composed of Hardliners and
of “rationalist” modes of explanation in the so- Reformers. These authoritarians confront op-
cial sciences. Having discovered pacts, whether position Moderates and Radicals. One might at
explicitly formulated as in Spain or Venezuela, first blush think that a reform process is most
or tacitly adhered to, one could ask what sorts probable when authoritarian Reformers are far
of things might lead a rational actor to embrace stronger than Hardliners and opposition Moder-
some particular pact and what sorts of strategies ates far stronger than Radicals. Reformers and
might that actor follow to induce other actors to Moderates than make common cause and the
do so. If a social scientist could construct some outcome is democracy (at least if their common
suitably simplified model of the actors involved, cause includes democracy). Were one to assume
and pay due attention to their interests, one that Reformers and Moderates are more or less
could think about democracy as a particular set the same thing, this might be the case. In a po-
of rules and then ask under what circumstances sition to ignore Hardliners and Radicals, they
might rational actors be induced into playing just join forces to do what they will.
by those rules. One could also ask under what If one makes what is no doubt a far more real-
circumstances might such rules constitute a self- istic assumption in many cases that the interests
locking process in which it was in the interests of Reformers and Moderates are significantly
of actors who had at one point accepted those different, than matters are not nearly so simple.
rules to continue to do so. Reformers want to clean up the regime, not end
One rather frequent simplification was to it; Moderates want change, but do not care for
treat collectivities as though they were a single radicalism. So what gets Reformers and Mod-
actor writ large: “labor,” for example, or “the erates together despite the gulf between them?
establishment.” One important line of debate Fear of Hardliners is one of the things that might
get Moderates to give ground to less unaccept-
able Reformers. It may, therefore, be in the in-
4
At Spain’s Moncloa Palace, the major parties in 1977 terest of Reformers not to squelch Hardliners
formally agreed to a cluster of compromises on poten-
tially explosive socioeconomic issues, an action widely but to support them from time to time. And it
taken to have made possible the following year’s agree- may be that fear of Radicals is one of the things
ment on a democratic constitution. inducing Reformers to accept more of the
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394 John Markoff
position of less noxious Moderates. So a bit of zation literature converged in suggesting a focus
radicalism may be very much helpful in getting on the dealings of elites of various sorts.
the program of Moderates to win the support
of Reformers. r The paradigmatic Spanish case experi-
It is an open question whether there is greater enced important moments in which the
payoff in understanding democratic transitions leaderships of the major contending parties
through further elaboration of such (with luck) got together and worked out deals, impart-
shrewdly crafted simplifications, or in carrying ing much impetus to the scholarly search
out the empirical research to provide us with for analogs in other cases.
rich and inherently far more complex accounts r Beyond the Spanish case, the new empiri-
of actors in the process of arriving at strategies, cal stress on deal making and pacts tended
discovering their interests, and constituting them- to focus on those who negotiated those
selves as actors. pacts rather than on the collectivities for
Although the two intellectual activities may which they negotiated.
(sometimes) be mutually supportive or (some- r Beyond the empirical particulars, the new
times) in fruitful mutual tension, they are cer- theoretical taste for exploring the con-
tainly not identical. No amount of thought on ditions for transition and for democratic
the situation confronting abstractly imagined stability in terms of small numbers of
Moderates and Radicals will tell you what actu- abstractly conceived actors also tended to
ally happened as the Brazilian military, seeking replace complex and problematic collectiv-
to give itself a bit of democratic legitimation, ities by unitary actors who in turn could
organized elections whose rules were designed readily be identified with publicly recog-
so as to have its supporters dominate and whose nized leaderships and at the limit, perhaps
rules were continually redefined because (a) the even preferably, with a single individual.
supporters generally did not do well enough and
(b) the supporters turned out to not be docile Political scientists developed refined analy-
enough. The opposition, as in the abstract for- ses of the various ways in which elites nego-
mulation, divided into those willing and those tiated settlements by research into the facts of
unwilling to participate in such elections – but individual instances. Students of Spain, for ex-
the abstract formulation does not tell us at all ample, might write of the meeting in 1978 in
about what was said, about which arguments a Madrid restaurant between representatives of
prevailed, about what the oppositionists actu- several major parties as the moment “[a] new
ally decided to do, about how the military and decision-making style was initiated” (Gunther,
its civilian supporters reacted, or about how the 1992:59). Apart from the advantages to theory
oppositionists debated the next steps, let alone building in thinking of the forging of democ-
the climate of fears and hopes on all sides, and racy as primarily the outcome of the activities
the sense of defeat, triumph, loyalty, and be- of a small number of actors, there were signifi-
trayal, also on all sides. (On all of which see cant methodological advantages as well. An en-
Skidmore, 1989.) On the other hand without terprising researcher, if blessed with adequate
these or some other abstract formulation, no charm, could gather essential information by
general principles will be discerned. simply interviewing the participants in a rather
small number of meetings. The empirical study
of the achievement of solidary actions by shifting
elites and others collectivities would generally be a more dif-
ficult matter. One may speculate that for
One matter that has occasioned some debate, U.S.-based researchers studying recent de-
but less debate than it should, concerns identi- mocratizations abroad, with limited budgets
fying the principal actors in democratizations. and constrained by the finitude of summer
Several distinguishable trends in the democrati- breaks and sabbaticals, looking for the evidence
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provided in talks with a dozen key participants Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001). It is not even very
would be extremely appealing. The same might plausible that there would be much democrati-
well apply even to researchers from less well- zation for us to be studying without a good deal
funded universities in less rich countries, whose of transgression by townspeople and villagers in
resource constraints – funds, libraries, time away many times and places (for an argument about
from teaching – would often be substantially one episode, see Markoff, 1995), but there is
greater. a good deal of room for thinking through the
But the stress on elites may bypass many im- different kinds of weight of elites and others in
portant issues. Why did representatives of Spain’s different episodes as Collier’s (1999) work sug-
Socialists get into that restaurant meeting in the gests.
first place – and why was it important that repre-
sentatives of the communists (not at the restau-
rant) held prior discussions with the Socialists? the challenge of definition
To answer such a question requires the study
of the forms of organization of Spain’s workers, Although democracy is a very old word that re-
their relationships to left parties, the possibilities ferred to one among several imaginable forms
of disruption of elite plans should they not be of government in antiquity, in the late eigh-
included and a whole host of harder-to-research teenth century the word took on considerable
issues (Fishman, 1990). new baggage. Europeans had generally used the
Let me elaborate this point. Students of the term to refer to what was taken to be an unde-
Spanish process have called our attention to (as sirable and fortunately unworkable arrangement
Linz and Stepan, 1996:92–3 put it): (at least for any large, modern state). The 1780s
seems to be the moment that the word democrat
the moderating role of the king, the construc- came into use (Brunner, et al., 1972–84:821–
tive leadership of Santiago Carrillo (the leader 99), an indication that there were people iden-
of the Spanish Communist Party), the prudence tified with the notion that democracy was to be
of Cardinal Tarancón (the leader of the Spanish created now.
Catholic Church), the support and courage of Gen-
eral Gutiérrez Melado (the chief of staff to the
It is quite a difficult matter to sort out what
Spanish Army), the political astuteness of Josep it was those late-eighteenth-century democrats
Tarradellas (the exiled leader of the Catalan regional understood democracy to be. As in many sit-
government), the parliamentary negotiating abilities uations of conflict, it is a great deal easier to
of Torcuato Fernández Miranda, and the cooperation say what they were against than what they were
of the conservative leader Manuel Fraga . . . . for: they opposed the institutions of the monar-
chical, aristocratic, and corporate orders with
The abstractly imagined theorization of in- which they were familiar. But they had little
terests, situations, strategies and alliances may desire to recreate the institutions they, as ed-
help shed light on the degree to which mod- ucated Europeans, would have associated with
eration, prudence, courage, astuteness, and ne- “democracy,” namely the institutions by which
gotiation were stable attributes of individuals or ancient Athens was governed. Nor were they
strategic options in relationships among these staunch advocates of many of the practices most
actors. But they will not tell us why these par- people at the onset of the twenty-first century
ticular actors mattered, a question that takes us would identify with democracy. Few among
well beyond these individuals. that first generation of democrats wanted vot-
More broadly still, some would urge us to re- ing rights for women, virtually none wanted
think the role of workers’ movements in demo- election-contesting rival political parties, most
cratic episodes (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; were comfortable limiting voting rights to those
Collier, 1999) or the role of social movements of a certain income, many approved of signifi-
and contentious politics in the entire history cant restrictions on press freedoms, and many
of democratizations (Markoff, 1996; McAdam, accepted slavery.
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396 John Markoff
If we look through the various indexes that procedures; constitutionally, “governmental and
quantitatively inclined social scientists were us- nongovernmental forces alike” carry on conflict
ing to measure democracy by the late twenti- within the “laws, procedures, and institutions”
eth century, we can be confident that as dif- of democracy.
ferent as these indexes are from each other not Some transitologists have debated the pre-
a single one would classify as terribly demo- cise weight afforded to behavioral, attitudinal,
cratic a country with women denied the right or constitutional elements (Diamond, 1999:64–
to vote, significant numbers of poorer men simi- 116; Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela,
larly denied, significant limits on press freedoms, 1992). But one wonders how precision is to be
and large numbers held in slavery. This simple achieved: to return to the Linz and Stepan spec-
imaginary act of measurement makes us real- ification, how do we know which actors are
ize that democracy has undergone considerable “significant,” when do they “seriously” work
reconceptualization over the past two centuries to undo democracy, how much of a majority is
or so. Most of the people involved in redefin- “a strong majority,” and so forth? The concept is
ing democracy were not academic researchers, supposed to help us find an island of at least some
arguing with each other over the superiority of limited stability in the river of transformation,
one classification scheme or another, but people yet Linz and Stepan point out that even consol-
involved in political struggles, including power- idated democracies can be overthrown (1996:6)
holders in government palaces and movements and Diamond not only speaks of “deconsoli-
in town and countryside. dation” but suggests that it may be “easier to
Because social movements have continued to observe” (1999:67).
be part and parcel of the fabric of democracy, The point of the consolidation concept is to
just what it is that constitutes democracy will help us identify some conditions that are favor-
continue to be debated, and social scientists, like able for giving democracy a more than transitory
other citizens, will have different views from quality (Schedler, 2001:67), but it is not obvi-
each other. The meaning of democracy will ous that current conceptualization has given us
continue to be in flux. To study democracy is more than a comforting word that on scrutiny
to study a moving target. points us again in the direction of understand-
ing change. We can expect that in response to
such doubts, theorists hoping to get a handle on
consolidation and interim regimes stability will be working to refine the consoli-
dation notion, whereas others will balance di
Some researchers hoped to identify some fixed Palma’s striking phrase with the equally strik-
state in the midst of, or perhaps at the end ing observation of Charles Tilly (1997:213) that
of, all this flux and attempted to distinguish “sites of democracy always display the sign Un-
a consolidated democracy from one in the pro- der Construction.”
cess of construction. There is a general agree- One of the fruitful ways in which the con-
ment among proponents of such a concept that cept of consolidation actually accentuates at-
a regime may be held to be consolidated when it tention to processes as well as states is that it
is, in the memorable and much-quoted phrase of calls attention to governmental processes on
Giuseppe di Palma (1990:113), “the only game the way to consolidation. Transitions do not
in town.” In one particularly interesting ef- only have a beginning and (maybe) an end, but
fort at precision, Linz and Stepan (1996:5–7) there is a politics of transitional governance it-
explain that such a state may be said to exist self, of provisional, caretaker, interim regimes.
when certain behavioral, attitudinal, and con- These regimes are made up variously of peo-
stitutional conditions are satisfied. Behaviorally, ple committed to democracy, people committed
“no significant” actors are trying “seriously” to to heading somewhere else but claiming demo-
end democracy or break up the state; attitudi- cratic commitments, people following the main
nally, “a strong majority” embraces democratic chance of the moment, and beneficiaries of the
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old order who hope to find a place in the new. of the victors. The early twentieth century,
Such actors may find the state of the in-between in summary, was a moment when many tran-
to be itself highly rewarding and if they are sitions toward democracy were occurring: in
powerful enough the interim regime may be- some countries democratic constitutions were
gin to acquire a permanence of its own. The adopted for the first time; in other coun-
claim of making democracy may provide its own tries long-standing traditions were reinvigorated
form of legitimation. So it turns out that part through significant change in political practice.
of what is involved in explaining democratiza- Most of the new, postwar democracies were
tions is not only how modern authoritarianisms overthrown in what many took to be the gen-
and other forms of nondemocratic regime un- eral collapse of democratic government in the
ravel but how provisional and interim regimes 1920s and 1930s. By the time many of the re-
are superseded rather than drift toward perma- maining democracies were overrun by fascist
nence. The subject is beginning to receive some armies, there was good reason for concern over
very insightful attention (Shain and Linz, 1995), whether democracy had much of a future. But
and could use more. the Second World War was not only followed by
a restoration of democracy in Western Europe
but also the implantation or reimplantation of
macrotransitions democracy in places where it had been miss-
ing or had done poorly. The European restora-
The subject of transitions is not exhausted by the tion was followed by the independence of many
study of individual transitions. We need to con- European colonies that often marked that mo-
sider the temporally clustered bursts of democ- mentous event with a democratic constitution.
ratization in the world and the changing con- Simultaneously a number of other states joined
tent of what was at issue in those clusters. In the the democratizing tide (such as Costa Rica,
twentieth century, we can identify three such Brazil, and Venezuela). Although this second
democratic waves (Green, 1999; Huntington, democratic wave, too, was reversed by military
1991; Kurzman, 1998; Markoff, 1996). coups and martial law proclamations, as we have
Early in the twentieth century a significant seen, the last portion of the twentieth century
number of countries became more democratic. saw a third wave, geographically the most ex-
In 1906 Finland became the first country in tensive.
Europe to enfranchise women. The year 1911 During this third wave, some students of
brought an end to most of the powers of the democracy were examining the waves, not just
British House of Lords, thereby increasing the specific national instances of transition. Many
powers of the elected House of Commons. In questions may be raised, few of which have been
1912 Italy ended restrictions on voting by men settled by existing research.
and Argentina enacted major suffrage reform.
In 1913 Norway adopted universal suffrage, the r Why have certain historical moments been
United States shifted to direct election of sena- those in which many democratic transi-
tors, and France adopted an effective secret bal- tions are occurring?
lot. r Why, at those moments, are democratiza-
Claiming participation in the rising tide, tions occurring in some countries but not
President Woodrow Wilson of the United States others?
justified his country’s entry into the First World r Why are some of those transitions longer
War by proclaiming it a war for democracy. lasting than others? (Some hardly get off
When only the democratic powers emerged the ground, others are derailed in short or-
from the catastrophe with their political systems der, and still others endure for a very long
intact, the new states that emerged on the ruins time).
of empires in Central and Eastern Europe usu- r What variants of democratization and what
ally adopted constitutions that resembled those fusions of democratic and authoritarian
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398 John Markoff
forms become institutionalized in partic- have been organized in strikingly different

ular places? And why? ways and to remarkably different degrees.
r Does the nature of democracy alter from One of the notable distinctions of the third
one wave to the next and, if so, in what wave is the widespread contraction of social
ways? safety nets. Despite an extensive literature
on innovations in this area, much remains
This last question overlaps with the question in controversy among scholars, including
of innovation: where and when were innova- the unusually limited nature of U.S. wel-
tions in democratic practice created? And why fare measures (Huber and Stephens, 2001;
did some innovations but not others come to Janoski and Hicks, 1994; Marshall, 1950;
be widely taken up – perhaps even redefining Piven and Cloward, 1997; Skocpol, 1992;
democracy? Turner, 1993).
We find, for example, that:
r Women’s suffrage, although rejected at If there are such broad differences in pro-
the onset of modern democracy in the cesses that are typical of different waves, per-
late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen- haps we need, theoretically, to think through
turies, was gradually adopted in country how democratization might proceed differently
after country, starting in places that were given differing political, economic, or cultural
not world, regional, or national centers of contexts. This is quite a separate question from
power. The first national state with equal whether some contexts simply bar democratiza-
voting rights for women at the national tion altogether – barring some routes does not
level, for example, was New Zealand; the necessarily mean barring all routes. To follow
first country in Europe, Finland; the first one suggestion, for example, there may be both
U.S. state, Wyoming (Markoff, 2003b). “strong-state” and “weak-state” trajectories. In
r The issues that were important differed the former, and far more common scenario, an
from wave to wave. One study suggests that effective but undemocratic state develops first
issues of human rights were not nearly as and then is democratized. The less common
important in democratic transitions earlier weak-state scenario develops consultative insti-
in the twentieth century as they were at its tutions at an early point and only later brings
end but “labor activism and leftist politics” an effectively functioning national government
were more important (Green, 1999:105). into being. This second case is no doubt consid-
A second study argues that the first clus- erably rarer because weak states are often gob-
ter of transitions was taking place in coun- bled up by rapacious neighbors or consumed
tries that had achieved effective national by democracy-destroying civil warfare, but
states with codified and enforced bodies nineteenth-century Swiss history might offer a
of law, whereas the late-twentieth-century fair empirical approximation (McAdam et al.,
democratizations have often seen the insti- 2001:264–304).
tution of voting with broad suffrage rights
but without the effective rule of law (Rose
and Shin, 2001). connection across borders
r Despite the very old argument that un-
der democratic rules the very numerous A focus on time entails attention to space. If
voters with lesser incomes would effec- democratizations are temporally clustered, then
tively expropriate the fortunes of the better explaining that clustering will consider social
off, rights of poorer people to tax-based processes that operate across national frontiers.
material benefits have in different coun- Although it may be abstractly conceivable that
tries developed on different timetables, similar social processes are unfolding in many
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separate national states separately, the likelihood may sometimes be weighty, too. And power-
that transnational connection has something to holders, operating in part in a transnational
do with democratization would seem strong, arena confront social movements that them-
even a priori. But a bit of history makes the point selves are shaped by a variety of transnational
a great deal stronger. No one could sensibly processes (Markoff, 1996:20–36).
study the democratization of European states As the third wave focused researchers on
at the end of the eighteenth century without transitions, some increasingly paid attention to
taking into account the French armies and the such transnational dimensions (e.g., Hunting-
reactions of worried or hostile powers to that ton, 1991:31–46; Robinson, 1996; Whitehead,
threat. Nor could anyone usefully examine tran- 1986).
sitions from or to democracy in the 1940s with-
out taking the actions of the German armies and
then the American armies into account. Alfred challenges to scholarship
Stepan surveyed the varying paths to “redemoc-
ratization” since World War Two and identified Such considerations introduce challenges to scho-
three variants “in which war and conquest play larship at once conceptual, theoretical, methodolog-
an integral part.” He goes on: “The great ma- ical, and historical.
jority of historical examples of successful rede-
mocratization, most of them European, in fact Conceptual Issues
fall into these first three categories” (Stepan,
1986:65). In 1690, a century before the invention of the
Warfare is only one kind of transnational pro- word democrat signaled that a new history of
cess with enormous consequences for the history democracy was beginning, a learned French dic-
of democracy. Let us think of democratizations tionary could define democracy with deceptive
as outcomes of the interaction of powerholders simplicity as “Form of government in which
and of movements that challenge them, with the people have all authority” (Furetière, 1970
a lot of variation in the significance of the [1690]). Because very few thought democracy
powerholders (including divisions among them) either possible or desirable for large states, there
and the movements (including divisions among was no need to specify precisely how such a gov-
them). Movements often and powerholders al- ernment was to be organized, how the people
ways exist in a web of social connection that were to exercise their monopoly on authority, or
crosses national frontiers. Movements take up even how one would know who those authori-
ideas from elsewhere (ideas about goals, strate- tative people were. One hundred years later real
gies, possibilities, threats, organization), some- people in the new United States, revolutionary
times involve participants who bring experi- France, and other places were struggling with
ence from elsewhere, sometimes make use of how such a government might be organized,
resources from elsewhere, sometimes enter into and people have been struggling over this ques-
alliances with movements elsewhere, and occa- tion ever since.
sionally form transnational organizations. Pow- Social scientists attempting to define democ-
erholders in one national state need to think racy have pondered how to weigh various ele-
about other states: about their military threats or ments that since the late eighteenth century have
vulnerabilities; about their successes worth im- been frequently been presumed by someone
itating and failures worth avoiding; about their to be vital. Some of these suggested elements
possible provision of resources, and about their are:
relative prestige in a variety of transnational are-
nas. So it is not only foreign armies that may im- r Some collection of personal rights on
plant, nourish, deform, discourage, or destroy which even governments are not to in-
democracy. Foreign funds and foreign models fringe
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400 John Markoff
r Some collection of personal rights on which agree with the challenge). Under a political
even governments are not to infringe, system with a claim to democracy, “This isn’t
except as provided by law democracy” is a common rallying cry for the ag-
r A very large proportion of residents having grieved. The continual negotiation of challeng-
rights to vote for the incumbents of state ing movements and powerholders continues
office to refine – and sometimes sharply alter – what
r A very large proportion of residents having democracy means in practice. Social scientists
a bundle of rights that are the same for all who study democracy are studying mutation.
r All offices exercising effective power be- This is not merely because of the recent stress
ing accountable to electorates directly or on studying a process, democratization, rather
indirectly than a state, democracy, but because the point
r Military forces subject to civilian authority toward which democratization is tending keeps
r The right for those who so desire to form moving, sometimes a little bit and sometimes a
a political party to contest elections great deal (Dahl, 1998; Markoff, 1996).
r Credible vote counts In a nutshell, democracy has been a concept
r A level of civil liberties sufficient for an of people engaged in political struggle at the
election to be a genuine contest same time that it has been a tool of analysis of
r A high level of citizen participation in elec- social scientists. From the moment democrats
tions came into the world at the end of the eigh-
r A high level of citizen participation in pub- teenth century, “democracy” escaped from the
lic life generally philosopher’s study. It has been a term of ap-
r Sufficient substantive equality in wealth probation and disapprobation in political strug-
and other resources so that political con- gles as people use or withhold the label to sup-
tests take place on a level playing field port or challenge a political program, a group
of incumbents, a movement, or a regime. So-
cial scientists were hardly immune. By many
It would be easy enough to add to this list. common definitions, a twentieth-century po-
Even a cursory study of the literature will read- litical system in which some significant group
ily demonstrate considerable difference among of adult citizens is excluded from the right to
social scientists as to which of these elements vote by force is not democratic (see, e.g., Linz,
they regard as essential to a good definition 2000[1975]:58) yet very few social scientists fol-
of democracy, which extraneous, which per- lowed the logic of such definitions to con-
nicious, and which suggest useful distinctions clude that the United States did not become a
among subtypes of democracy. Much scholarly democracy until the 1960s. (For exceptions see
writing on democracy at the beginning of the Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens, 1992:122;
twenty-first century is skeptical about the ante- Therborn, 1977:17.)
penultimate item and even more skeptical about Faced with this challenge, there are several
the penultimate (e.g., Nelson, 1987), and most ways to proceed. We might try to collect a wide
scholars reject the final item completely, pre- variety of definitions of democracy and seek out
ferring to define democracy as a set of formal some limited common core. We might, as is
procedures for the selection of incumbents. commonly done by social scientists in the early
Since the late eighteenth century, many gov- twenty-first century, agree to select only proce-
ernments have been inclined to evoke demo- dural elements, construct a multiplex set of pro-
cratic legitimation even when they do not ad- cedures that approximates practice in the world’s
here to institutions and practices that many richer countries, and regard poorer countries
social scientists would call democracy. But even as democratic if they approximate those pro-
when they adhere to such practices, movements cedures. We might choose a definition that
of many sorts often challenge such claims (and approximates the political system we think de-
may sometimes find some social scientists to sirable. We might think of the mutability of
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definition as a fascinating subject in its own right who are currently excluded. There is also
and make the study of the differing meanings of the very important possibility that democ-
democracy in different times and places, and to racy will also open the way to antidemo-
different people, a subject of scholarly inquiry cratic movements, a subject beginning to
all its own. (It is surprising how little research receive the attention it deserves.
has been done following this last option.) r The multidimensionality of notions of
democracy often creates conflicts among
those who seek to advance on one di-
Theoretical Issues mension at the expense of another that
is more important to other people. From
For many reasons, democracy is an invitation to De Tocqueville on, many have recognized
change. These include: that big principles like “equality” and “lib-
r At the idea level, its legitimating formula erty” may often be in contradiction. De
Tocqueville (1990[1840]:93) tellingly titled
of popular rule can readily be drawn on one chapter in Democracy in America “Why
to challenge the democratic character of Democratic Peoples Show a More Passion-
current procedures. People who believe in ate and Enduring Love for Equality than
some abstract conception of democracy are for Liberty.”
frequently disappointed by democracy in
practice (Hermet, 1984:137). The gap be-
In the 1960s in the United States it was com-
tween dream and reality leads some to dis-
mon on university campuses for some to de-
own democracy in principle, others into
nounce student demonstrators as undemocratic
cynicism, still others into pragmatically
because they did not honor widely accepted
embracing existing procedures and down-
procedures at the same time as the demon-
playing the dream. But others yet again at-
strators denounced powerholders as undemo-
tempt to improve reality.5
r On the level of organization, its legiti- cratic for not acting on a wide range of legiti-
mate grievances. Such encounters often lead to
mating formula of popular rule is virtu-
change, sometimes very significant change.
ally an invitation to social movements to
The theoretical challenge is to get a handle
press their causes. When rulers claim to
on the many kinds of dynamism that democra-
rule on behalf of the many and by their
tization involves.
consent, it is difficult to prevent the many
from speaking for themselves. Some of the
movements will call for redefining politi- Methodological Issues
cal procedures, enlarging the rights of some
whose rights are limited, or including some The comparative study of democratizing
episodes has at least two difficult challenges to
5
Concern about the gap between many broad no- confront.
tions of democracy and the actuality of all existing po-
litical arrangements led Robert Dahl to favor the term Measurement. The post–World War Two tradi-
polyarchy for political systems that meet certain demo- tion of comparative inquiry into the conditions
cratic criteria while reserving democracy for political sys-
tems that meet more of them. Some existing systems, that favored democracy, when engaged in by the
for Dahl, are polyarchic because mass electorates have statistically inclined, demanded empirical indi-
an opportunity to choose the incumbents of office in cators of “democracy” that could be system-
competitive elections but none are democratic because atically collected (Inkeles, 1991). It was read-
all existing political arrangements are highly inegalitar- ily recognized that this was not a simple mat-
ian. If, to use this terminology, we ever manage to move
beyond polyarchy toward democracy to any significant ter, primarily for two reasons. First of all certain
degree, the study of transition will acquire a whole new kinds of data were hard to come by in reliable
subject matter (Dahl 1971, 1998). form for large collections of countries. How, for
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402 John Markoff
example, do you obtain good indicators of the be compared to the same national case at other
extent of “freedom to organize parties” for a moments. In considering the United States, for
broad collection of cases? Second, and more per- example, if we are measuring democracy before
plexing, was the absence of consensus on what the 1960s how are we to weigh the severe lim-
it was we needed good indicators of. Issue two its on the right to vote of African Americans
would mean that even if there were no problem in one large region of the country? How are
in obtaining reliable data there would remain we to weigh the widespread limitations on the
differences among scholars on what the needed voting rights of the numerically far fewer Na-
data were. A discussion of these issues on the eve tive Americans? How are we to weigh the rising
of the late twentieth century democratic wave numbers of people who since the 1980s have lost
(May, 1973) shows how these issues were already the right to vote as convicted felons (in some
appreciated. states for life)?7
Serious as these issues were, the measurement These difficulties are pointed up in a fine re-
question became far more serious as scholarly at- view of noteworthy attempts at creating a large
tention turned to issues of transition. It would database for the comparative study of democra-
not be enough to have measures that might tization. One annually collected body of data in
identify democracy with some institutions that the 1990s raised its standards for regarding var-
could sharply distinguish democratic and non- ious practices as moving in a democratic direc-
democratic states at some moment in time. We tion as well as assigned governments on the left
now needed measures that would track changes lower scores than those on the right for com-
within particular national contexts but also that parable deviation from democratic practice. A
would be able to accomplish this for substantial second data set gives little weight to the extent
numbers of national cases.6 of popular participation and none to civil liber-
Should we focus on relatively easy-to-assess ties. A third is so narrowly focused on whether
practices in order to get comparable indicators there are competitive elections that it classi-
for many cases? It would, for example, be far fies as democratic cases where political liberties
easier to get reliable indicators of whether op- were so restricted that the elections were a cha-
position parties were legally tolerated than to be rade, including one where the head of govern-
confident we knew the degree to which parties ment was actually chosen by the armed forces
competed on a level playing field. For the for- (Mainwaring et al., 2001:53–60).
mer we only need to know the law, but for the It is a cause for methodological concern that
latter we need to know a great deal about how differing measures of democracy might yield
electoral laws are applied, whether police and different results in particular studies. Pamela
judges are following those laws, whether oppo- Paxton (2000) has shown, for example, that
sitions operate under a climate of nonlegal but studies making claims about the dating of
real violence (which may only exist away from “democracy” wind up with very different re-
the eyes of reporters), whether incumbents have sults if they do or if they do not regard equal
the capacity to falsify results, and whether the voting rights for women as part of their defini-
mass media are under the control or influence tion.
of the incumbents or (even more difficult to no- Although the focus on democratization as
tice) their committed supporters. a process is bound to lead to continued ef-
But there are also very difficult questions forts to develop superior measures and to refine
about how even reliable information is to be
joined to other information in forming an over- 7
“Nationwide, 14 percent of black males are barred
all judgment to be compared to other cases or to from voting because they are in prison or have been
convicted of felonies. In Alabama and Florida, nearly
one out of every three black men is disfranchised, and in
6
Noteworthy data sets along these lines are described Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Virginia, Washington
in Karatnycky (1998), Marshall and Jaggers (2000), “Pol- and Wyoming, the ratio is only slightly lower” (Keyssar,
yarchy Dataset” (2000), and Przeworski et al. (2000). 2000:308; see also Uggen and Manza, 2002).
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existing measures, it is not likely that there will transnational connections, however, we can see
ever be a consensus among researchers that some that comparative studies when conceived as
measure is so clearly superior that it drives in- something like an experimental replication un-
ferior measures from the field. The so-called der varying conditions are not adequate to the
measurement problem is only in part a ques- task at hand. The study of transitions within
tion of collecting good indicators. The difficul- national states demands attention to social pro-
ties surrounding definition are not simply fail- cesses that cross the frontiers of those states.
ures of researchers to think clearly enough or to Historical Issues. Sociologists sometimes
track down comparable measures for a variety hope or even assume that historians have pro-
of national cases. More fundamentally, it is be- vided them with the raw materials which they
cause democratization is inherently a complex, can use to test theory or – for those of an in-
debated, and mutating concept. ductive turn of mind – on which they can con-
struct theory. Because the history of democracy
The Transnational Dimension. As usually con- involves very different sorts of actors (the pow-
ceived, comparative inquiry examines separate erful and the challengers, for example) and has
national experiences, identifies their points of unfolded in many places that are connected to
similarity and difference, and attempts to iden- each other, getting the history right is itself a
tify (a) recurrent patterns that appear despite the major challenge. Examining social processes that
diversity of cases, (b) distinctive patterns that ap- brought, and bring, elites and plebeians into in-
pear despite the similarity of cases, or (c) the teraction across national frontiers will make de-
range of variation and the causes of that varia- mands on the practice of history, as it will on
tion (Tilly, 1984). In light of the very important other social science disciplines (Markoff, 2002).
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chapter twenty
Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements
Jeff Goodwin
The sociological study of revolutions has made 1997), and Ellen Kay Trimberger (1978) are just
enormous explanatory strides during the past a few of the scholars who have made important
two decades. We now understand much better contributions to this tradition.
than previously both the “classic” revolutions Following the groundbreaking work of
in England, France, and Russia and more re- Charles Tilly (1978) and Theda Skocpol (1979),
cent revolutions in so-called developing soci- moreover, a veritable explosion of sociological
eties (e.g., China, Vietnam, Cuba, Iran, and studies of revolutions – much of it compara-
Nicaragua). Some scholars have also fruitfully tive as well as historical – has occurred. Works
examined the collapse of communism in the by John Walton (1984), Farideh Farhi (1990),
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a pecu- Jack Goldstone (1991), Tim McDaniel (1991),
liar type of revolution, and there is a growing Timothy Wickham-Crowley (1992), Eric Sel-
literature on so-called Islamist movements as a bin (1993), Carlos Vilas (1995), John Foran
revolutionary phenomenon. According to Ran- (1997b), Mark Katz (1997), and Misagh Parsa
dall Collins, “The most striking accumulation (2000), among others, have further enriched our
of knowledge” in the field of macrohistory “has understanding of revolutions. And these works
taken place on Marx’s favorite topic, revolution” are just the tip of an intellectual iceberg that
(1999:3). includes innumerable historical case studies of
Sociologists have been especially interested in particular revolutions and revolutionary move-
understanding “great” or “social” revolutions, ments.
that is, revolutions that bring about not only a
change of political regime but also fundamen-
tal economic and perhaps cultural change (but what is a revolution?
cf. Tilly, 1993). Social scientists in the United
States in particular have been especially fasci- The word revolution has two general, “ideal-
nated with such revolutions – perhaps because typical” meanings in the social sciences, neither
of the often strenuous efforts by their own gov- of which is inherently more correct or accurate
ernment to prevent or reverse such revolutions, than the other, although each raises somewhat
or perhaps because the United States itself was different questions for social analysts. According
borne of a revolution that some analysts consider to the broader definition, revolution (or political
“great” or “radical” (e.g., Lipset, 1988; Wood, revolution) refers to any and all cases in which
1992). Crane Brinton (1965[1938]), Barrington a state or political regime is overthrown, sup-
Moore (1966), Chalmers Johnson (1982[1966]), planted, and/or fundamentally transformed by
Ted Robert Gurr (1970), Samuel Huntington a popular movement in an irregular, extraconsti-
(1968), Eric Wolf (1969), Jeffery Paige (1975, tutional, and/or violent fashion. Revolution in
404
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Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements 405
this sense includes successful national indepen- theoretical approaches

dence and secessionist movements. This defi-
nition assumes that revolutions, at least those The theoretical literature on revolutions and
worthy of the name, necessarily require the mo- revolutionary movements has grown quite ex-
bilization of large numbers of people against tensive and complex. It encompasses numerous
the existing state – unlike, for example, coups schools of thought and generations of analysts.1
d’etat or “palace revolutions.” [Some scholars, Instead of reviewing this entire literature, which
however, have analyzed so-called “revolutions simply cannot be done adequately in the space
from above” that involve little if any popu- of a chapter, I will limit myself to an examina-
lar mobilization prior to the overthrow of the tion of the approaches that have most influenced
state (see, e.g., Trimberger, 1978).] As Leon sociologists: modernization theory, Marxist the-
Trotsky (1961[1932]:xvii) once wrote, “The ory, and state-centered approaches. Modern-
most indubitable feature of a revolution is the ization theory was most influential during the
direct interference of the masses in historic 1950s and 1960s and Marxist theory during the
events.” 1960s and 1970s. State-centered analysis has be-
According to the other, narrower definition, come more prominent during the past two
a revolution (or social revolution) entails not only decades.
mass mobilization and regime change but also Modernization theory links revolutions to the
more or less rapid and fundamental social, eco- transition from “traditional” to “modern” soci-
nomic, and/or cultural change during or soon eties, that is, to the very process of “modern-
after the struggle for state power. (What counts ization” itself. Traditional societies, in this view,
as “rapid and fundamental” change, however, is are characterized by fixed, inherited statuses and
open to dispute.) Social revolutions in this sense roles; simple divisions of labor; social relations
are also called “great” revolutions. regulated by custom; local and particularistic at-
Both of these definitions suggest that revo- tachments to the family, clan, tribe, village, or
lutions are the result, to a greater or less ex- ethnic community; and thus very limited and lo-
tent, of popular mobilizations and/or revolution- calized forms of political participation. Modern
ary movements. A revolutionary movement may be societies, by contrast, are distinguished by social
defined as that type of social movement which mobility and achieved statuses and roles, formal
attempts to overthrow, supplant, and/or fun- equality, complex divisions of labor, social rela-
damentally transform state power. (Most social tions regulated by legally enacted rules, broader
movements, by contrast, try to pressure exist- collective identifications with “the nation,” and
ing authorities to enact social reforms.) The na- mass political participation in national states.
ture and extent of social, economic, and cultural Most modernization theorists argue that
change advocated by revolutionary movements revolutions are especially likely to occur in so-
varies greatly. Some revolutionary movements called transitional societies, that is, societies un-
do not seek to change society much at all; dergoing very rapid (albeit uneven) moderniza-
they simply seek state power. Others seek very tion. Revolutions themselves, moreover, serve
extensive and deep transformations of the so- to push forward the modernization process.
cial order, the economy (especially the distribu- “Revolution,” argues Samuel Huntington, “is
tion of property and wealth), and the culture. thus an aspect of modernization. . . . It will not
Of course, some revolutionary movements are occur in highly traditional societies with very
much more successful than others; in fact, only low levels of social and economic complexity.
a few such movements actually seize power. Nor will it occur in highly modern societies”
When revolutionaries fail to seize power, we
1
may speak of a failed revolution. Other revolu- Guides to this literature include Cohan (1975),
Goldstone (1980, 2001, 2003), Zimmermann (1983:
tionaries may succeed in taking power, but fail chapter 8), Kimmel (1990), Collins (1993), Foran
in realizing their broader goals of social transfor- (1993), and Goodwin (1994). This and the following
mation. section draw on Goodwin (2001).
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406 Jeff Goodwin
(Huntington, 1968:265). In Walt Rostow’s suffered most heavily under the eroding onslaught
evocative phrase, revolutionaries are “the scav- of the new economic and political systems carried
engers of the modernization process,” and com- to Asia by the West in the course of the past cen-
munism in particular “is best understood as tury or so . . . . If iron discipline, rigid hierarchies, and
unquestioning obedience are among Communism’s
a disease of the transition to modernization” most detestable features in the eyes of truly free men
(Rostow, 1967[1961]:110). everywhere, they may yet spell security, order, and a
Why is this so? Modernization theorists have meaningful place in the world for the social splinters
developed a number of explanations that link of contemporary Asia.
rapid modernization to the development of
During the 1950s, a large literature explained
revolutionary movements. These explanations
the “appeals of communism” and radical na-
usually hinge on some sort of “lag” or lack of
tionalism in much the same terms as Benda’s
fit between different social institutions, which
(see, e.g., Almond et al., 1954).
are putatively “modernizing” at different rates.
Modernization theorists, however, generally
Thus, Huntington argues that revolution, like
do recognize that even very rapid moderniza-
“other forms of violence and instability, . . .
tion does not automatically lead to revolutions.
is most likely to occur in societies which have
It is at this point that many of them emphasize
experienced some social and economic devel-
the role of politics: The success or failure of rev-
opment [but] where the processes of political
olutionary movements, they claim, depends on
modernization and development have lagged
how incumbent governments respond to rev-
behind the processes of social and economic
olutionary movements and to the broader so-
change” (Huntington, 1968:265).
cial problems created by rapid modernization.
More psychologically inclined theorists sug-
More specifically, if a “modernizing elite” con-
gest that rapid modernization unleashes a “rev-
trols the government and responds flexibly and
olution of rising expectations” – expectations
creatively to such problems – by “resynchro-
that a stagnant or suddenly depressed economy
nizing” values and the social structure, for ex-
may prove unable to meet, thereby creating the
ample, through “conservative change” – then
widespread anger and sense of “relative depri-
revolution will be avoided. Conversely, “elite
vation” of which revolutions are made (see,
intransigence,” as Chalmers Johnson puts it,
e.g., Gurr, 1970). Still others have argued that
“always serves as an underlying cause of revo-
rapid modernization may “dis-synchronize” a
lution” ( Johnson, 1982[1966]:97). Huntington
society’s values and social structure. Accord-
similarly argues that revolutions “are unlikely
ingly, revolutionaries who offer an alternative
in political systems which have the capacity to
set of values that better “fits” the social struc-
expand their power and to broaden participa-
ture will become influential (see, e.g., Johnson,
tion within the system.” “Ascending or aspiring
1982[1966]; Smelser, 1962). And for still oth-
groups,” he concludes, “and rigid or inflexible
ers, rapid modernization destroys the “integra-
institutions are the stuff of which revolutions are
tive” institutions that held traditional societies
made” (Huntington, 1968:275).
together, creating a sense of meaninglessness (or
Having come this far, one might expect mod-
“anomie”) or uncertainty about one’s place in
ernization theorists to discuss at some length
society (or “status anxiety”); revolutionaries, in
the factors that explain the flexibility (or lack
this view, may become influential in transitional
thereof) of different types or configurations of
societies because they are able to replace the
states and political regimes. Curiously, however,
institutions that modernization undermines. As
one finds little such analysis. Even Huntington,
Harry Benda (1966:12–13), an analyst of Asian
the most “state-centered” of modernization
communism, has written,
theorists, offers only a vague generalization in
it is not inconceivable that in Asia (as elsewhere) this regard:
Communist movements as such provide a substitute
for decayed or vanishing institutions – the family, the The great revolutions of history have taken place
clan, the tribe, or the village community – that have either in highly centralized traditional monarchies
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(France, China, Russia), or in narrowly based military of the core have proven surprisingly immune to
dictatorships (Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Cuba), or this form of social change.
in colonial regimes (Vietnam, Algeria). All these po- One notable aspect of this historic reversal
litical systems demonstrated little if any capacity to
of Marxist expectations is that recent “Third
expand their power and to provide channels for the
participation of new groups in politics (1968:275). World” revolutions have relied heavily on social
classes deemed secondary (at best) to the clas-
Unfortunately, this formula is not altogether sic socialist project, particularly the peasantry,
helpful. Not all colonial regimes, after all – in rather than on the industrial proletariat. Instead
fact, relatively few – were overthrown by revolu- of being built on the technological foundations
tions. Moreover, even if those colonial regimes of advanced capitalism, moreover, socialism has
that were so overthrown did indeed collapse be- arguably been one of the means by which some
cause they lacked the capacity to incorporate relatively “backward” countries have attempted
new groups, what might explain this? Similarly, to “catch up” with the advanced capitalist core.
not all military dictatorships – even “narrowly In short, rather than being a successor to capital-
based” military dictatorships – have been top- ism, socialism has been something of an histori-
pled by revolutionaries. Again, if those that were cal substitute for it in many developing societies.
so toppled actually fell because they lacked the Moreover, the former Soviet bloc, China, and
capacity to incorporate new groups, how can Vietnam have recently begun transitions from
we explain this? To answer to these questions, socialism to capitalism, thereby reversing the
we require an approach that examines states and presumed course of history according to the
state capacities more closely than does the mod- traditional Marxist model. Indeed, this type of
ernization perspective. transition was virtually unthinkable to Marxists
Like modernization theorists, Marxists also in the not-so-distant past. Even dissident Marx-
view revolutions as occurring in “transitional” ists and socialists who were harsh critics of au-
societies – only in this case the transition, which thoritarian “state socialism” in the Soviet bloc
is seen as the result of class struggle, is from by and large did not anticipate such a transi-
one economic mode of production to another. tion to capitalism. On the contrary, many ex-
That said, the specific character of recent revo- pected, or at least hoped, that state socialism
lutions has come as something of a surprise, and would be democratized from below by popu-
poses a theoretical anomaly, to Marxists. To be- lar movements; the communist elite that had
gin with, the socialist or communist orientation expropriated capitalist property would itself be
of many revolutions in the capitalist “periph- expropriated, in this scenario, by the people.
ery” has virtually “stood Marx on his head.” As Instead, communism is now widely viewed, as
Ernest Mandel (1979:11) notes: the Eastern European joke goes, as the longest
and most painful route from capitalism to . . .
In general, traditional Marxism looked upon rela- capitalism.
tively backward countries – those of Eastern and How exactly have Marxists attempted to re-
Southern Europe, and even more those of Asia and solve the theoretical anomaly of socialist rev-
Latin America – in the light of Marx’s well-known olutions occurring in the capitalist periphery?
formula: the more advanced countries show the more Many (following the lead of Lenin, Trotsky,
backward ones the image of their future development and Mao) begin by pointing to the weakness
as in a looking glass. This led to the conclusion that
of the capitalist or bourgeois class in devel-
socialist revolutions would first occur in the most
advanced countries, that the proletariat would take oping societies. Peripheral bourgeoisies – or
power there long before it would be able to do so in “lumpenbourgeoisies,” as Andre Gunder Frank
more backward countries. has termed them – are small, only partially dif-
ferentiated from feudal landowning elites, and,
In fact, not only have a series of avowedly so- partly for these reasons, heavily dependent on
cialist revolutions occurred in the capitalist pe- the state for economic opportunities and protec-
riphery, but the industrialized capitalist societies tion from challenges from below. Consequently,
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408 Jeff Goodwin
capitalist classes in the Third World have proven by contrast, are thought to waiver in their po-
unwilling or unable to play their “historic litical allegiances, whereas rich peasants (not to
role” of leading antifeudal, democratic revolu- mention landlords themselves), who hire wage
tions in the manner of their European coun- labor, have usually been regarded as counter-
terparts. Ironically, “bourgeois” revolutions in revolutionary. Thus, developing societies with
Third World societies must thus be made by large middle and rich peasantries are not likely
the working class – guided by vanguard par- to generate strong revolutionary movements.
ties – in a strategic alliance with the peasant More recently, however, this general pic-
majority in such societies. But because such an- ture has been questioned in various ways by
tifeudal revolutions are made by worker/peasant neo-Marxist or Marxist-influenced scholars of
alliances, they may, unlike Europe’s bourgeois peasant politics. Eric Wolf (1969), for exam-
revolutions, more or less quickly attempt to ini- ple, argues that landowning middle peasants,
tiate a transition to socialism. Third World rev- not rural workers or poor peasants, are in fact
olutions, to use Trotsky’s phrase, thus assume most likely to be revolutionary. Wolf, who ex-
the form of “permanent” or “uninterrupted” amines peasant involvement in the Mexican,
revolutions that undertake socialist as well as an- Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Algerian, and
tifeudal policies or “tasks” (Trotsky, 1961[1932]; Cuban revolutions, views peasant rebellious-
see also Löwy, 1981). A similar line of argu- ness as a reaction to the disintegrative effects of
ment about socialist revolutions has been in- “North Atlantic capitalism” as it penetrates tra-
troduced into academic social science by Bar- ditional societies (1969:276–82). He argues that
rington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and landowning middle peasants, as well as “free”
Democracy (1966), which emphasizes the role of peasants who are outside landlord and state con-
the peasantry in such revolutions. trol, are most likely to rebel, both because their
Marxists do recognize, however, that strong way of life is more threatened by capitalism
revolutionary movements have not emerged compared to other social groups and because
in all developing or peripheral societies. This they are better able to act collectively to pre-
has been variously attributed to unexpectedly serve their traditional ways.2 As Wolf puts it, “it
strong peripheral bourgeoisies, to a lack of rev- is the very attempt of the middle and free peasant
olutionary leadership, or to the fact that not all to remain traditional which makes him revolu-
types of peasants are inclined to support revo- tionary” (1969:292). Wolf does, however, rec-
lutionary movements – although just what sort ognize that poor and landless peasants have also
of peasants are revolutionary, and why, has been become involved in revolutions when and inso-
the subject of much debate. far as they can be mobilized by “external” polit-
For many Marxists, rural producers whose ical and military organizations – organizations,
mode of life most closely approximates that of moreover, that typically seek to do much more
urban workers are, not surprisingly, the most than preserve “traditional” ways of life (Wolf,
likely stratum to ally with such workers. Con- 1969:290).
sequently, landless rural workers and, to a lesser Wolf ’s arguments have been contested by
degree, poor peasants (especially tenants) with Jeffery Paige, who argues that sharecropping
very little land have usually been considered by tenants and migratory “semiproletarians,” not
Marxists as the most revolutionary social strata middle peasants, are the most revolutionary
in the countryside. These groups are seen as rural strata. Like Wolf, however, Paige also
having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with links “agrarian revolution” to the penetration
landowners as well as an “objective” interest of world capitalism into preindustrial societies
in socialism, understood as the collective self- and, more specifically, to the creation of “export
management of production. These groups are
revolutionary, in other words, or will eventu- 2
Craig Calhoun has argued that urban artisans have
ally become so, by virtue of their economic been more revolutionary than the urban proletariat for
class position. Landowning “middle” peasants, similar reasons (1982:chapter 6).
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enclaves.” (Paige’s influential 1975 book, in fact, Marxists have also said too little about
is subtitled Social Movements and Export Agri- the conditions that determine whether rev-
culture in the Underdeveloped World.) And Paige olutionary movements, whatever their class
also agrees with Wolf – as against the traditional composition, will succeed or fail in actually
Marxist view – that landless rural workers are overthrowing the state. The failure of any par-
unlikely revolutionaries, being more inclined to ticular revolution presumably indicates that class
support merely reformist political movements contradictions have not yet fully “matured” or
that seek better wages and working conditions. that the revolutionary class or class alliance has
Unlike Wolf, however, Paige argues that rev- not yet attained a critical mass. However, under-
olutionary movements develop because share- standing the success or failure of revolutionary
croppers and semiproletarians are wage-earning movements requires something rather less spec-
cultivators who face a dominant, noncultivating ulative and more specific: a close examination
class that derives its income from more or less of the states that revolutionaries have sought to
fixed landholdings (as opposed to capital invest- overthrow.
ments), the control of which is nonnegotiable.
And Paige, unlike Wolf, argues that revolution-
ary socialist movements in particular are “in- the state-centered perspective
ternally generated, not introduced by outside
urban-based parties” (1975:62). If modernization theorists attribute revolutions
Thus, whereas modernization theorists view to overly rapid modernization and Marxist the-
the development of revolutionary movements orists view revolutions as products of class strug-
as a consequence of very rapid modernization, gles unleashed by capitalist globalization, state-
and their success as a consequence of intransi- centered analysts explain revolutions in terms
gent elites, Marxists tend to explain recent rev- of fluctuations in the nature and extent of state
olutions in the periphery as a reaction to the power. Sociological studies of revolution in this
incorporation of “backward” societies – or at state-centered tradition include Chorley (1943),
least those with the “right” kinds of peasants – Skocpol (1979), Goldstone (1986, 1991), Snyder
into the capitalist world economy. These revo- (1992, 1998), Collins (1993, 1999), and Good-
lutions, in other words, are ultimately a reaction win (2001). According to Collins, this perspec-
to capitalist imperialism or globalization. tive has “created a paradigm revolution in the
Are the Marxists right? Or rather, which theory of revolution” (1999:3). But why “priv-
Marxists are right in their search for the “re- ilege” the state in this way when revolutions are
ally” revolutionary peasantry? All and none, I obviously complex historical processes that in-
have argued (Goodwin, 2001). In fact, a wide volve multiple economic, social, cultural, social-
variety of rural as well as urban strata – includ- psychological, and voluntarist factors (Emir-
ing poor, middle, and rich peasants as well as bayer and Goodwin, 1996)? For two general
urban wage earners and middle strata – can and reasons. First, successful revolutions necessar-
have played important roles in particular revolu- ily involve the breakdown or incapacitation of
tionary movements. They have done so, how- states. Of course, revolutions obviously involve
ever, not simply as exploited classes, but also much more than this, and states do not break
and more directly as excluded and often vio- down in precisely the same way – although wars
lently repressed state subjects. For while class and fiscal crises induced by wars or geopolit-
and economic grievances do often play an im- ical pressures are usually to blame. Still, there
portant role in revolutions, recent scholarship would be no revolutions to study (or to emu-
suggests that the roots of revolutionary move- late or denounce) if states did not at least oc-
ments are found in the specific type of po- casionally break down or were otherwise inca-
litical context in which class relationships and pacitated, whether from the efforts of revolu-
economic institutions (among other factors) are tionaries themselves or for some other reasons.
embedded. This “state-centered” idea is now widely if not
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410 Jeff Goodwin
universally accepted not only among scholars of facilitated and even encouraged by that subset
revolutions but also among large numbers of so- of violent and exclusionary authoritarian states
cial scientists more generally (see, e.g., Collins, that are also organizationally incoherent and
1993). militarily weak, especially in outlying or iso-
There is, however, a second and perhaps lated areas of the national society. Other things
more interesting reason for centering the state being equal, the political context that is most
in a study of revolutions: Strong revolutionary conducive to the formation of strong revolu-
movements of whatever social composition and tionary movements is found in those societies
ideological orientation, and whether they actu- in which indiscriminately repressive and disor-
ally seize state power, only emerge in opposition ganized states possess geographically and socially
to states that are configured and act in certain delimited power, that is, low-capacity authoritar-
ways. There is a sense in which certain state ian regimes (Tilly, 2003). Revolutionary move-
structures and practices actively albeit uninten- ments, for their part, have become especially
tionally help to form or construct revolutionary powerful actors when they have been able to
movements as effectively as the best professional organize in opposition to such regimes broad
revolutionaries. State structures and practices multiclass (and, if necessary, multiethnic) coali-
invariably matter, in other words, for the very tions with strong international support. The
formation as well as the subsequent fate of rev- formation of such coalitions has been encour-
olutionary movements – and they generally do aged and facilitated (again, quite unintention-
so in quite unintended ways. ally) by especially autonomous – or socially
Why is the development of revolutionary “disembedded” (Evans, 1995) – authoritarian
movements dependent upon particular state states that exclude and repress not only lower
structures and practices? First, people will usu- classes (i.e., peasants and workers) but also mid-
ally not join or support revolutionary move- dle and even upper or “dominant” classes. In
ments when they believe that the central state fact, such autonomous, exclusionary, disorga-
has little if anything to do with their everyday nized, and weak states are particularly vulner-
problems. In other words, few people – even able to actual overthrow by revolutionary move-
when they are poor and palpably exploited – ments – and not necessarily by the largest or best
seek to overthrow states (perhaps risking their organized revolutionary movements. This vul-
necks in the process) that seem peripheral to nerability derives in part from the fact that such
their most pressing concerns. Second, few peo- states tend to preclude the sort of political open-
ple join or support revolutionaries – even when ings that have elsewhere incorporated impor-
they are more or less in agreement with their tant social groups into institutional politics and
demands or ideology – if they feel that do- thereby limited the appeal of revolutionaries.
ing so will simply make them the targets of Revolutions are unlikely, in fact, where the state
state violence or if they believe that they can has institutional linkages with nonelite groups,
obtain much or even some modicum of what is organized in a rational-bureaucratic fashion,
they want, politically speaking, through some and effectively governs throughout the terri-
routine, institutionalized, and therefore low-risk tory of the national society. For these reasons,
channel for political claim making (e.g., vot- revolutions are unlikely in most democratic
ing or petitioning). Other things being equal, societies.
people, like electric currents, seem to take the The preceding ideas can be figuratively rep-
path of least resistance. As Trotsky once put it, resented. Figures 20.1 and 20.2 describe con-
“People do not make revolution eagerly any ceptual spaces in which empirical states may
more than they do war . . . . A revolution takes be located. Figure 20.1 provides a concep-
place only when there is no other way out” tual map of states as a function of their orga-
(1961 [1932], III:167). nization (bureaucratic/rational or patrimonial/
More specifically, the formation of revolu- clientelistic), on the one hand, and of the relative
tionary movements has been unintentionally inclusiveness or exclusivity of the political regimes
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Figure 20.1.
to which they are attached, on the other – rang- Several basic claims about the relationship
ing from liberal/inclusive democratic regimes, between states and revolutionary movements
at one extreme, to exclusionary/repressive dic- are represented in Figures 20.3 and 20.4. The
tatorships, at the other. Figure 20.2 adds an ad- shaded area in Figure 20.3 indicates the type of
ditional variable, namely the extent of the state’s states that tend unintentionally to “incubate,”
infrastructural power, that is, the state’s capacity or encourage the formation of, revolutionary
to enforce its will and to do so throughout the movements, namely, those states that are es-
national territory. pecially exclusionary and yet infrastructurally
Figure 20.2.
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412 Jeff Goodwin
Figure 20.3.
weak. Political exclusion, especially indiscrim- tructurally strong states are generally able to re-
inately violent exclusion, tends to “push” or press disloyal opponents, even if political ex-
channel excluded groups into revolutionary clusion provides the latter with an incentive to
movements – and the state’s weakness prevents rebel.
it from destroying such movements. By con- Not all states that “incubate” revolutionary
trast, more inclusionary states may confront movements, however, are necessarily vulnerable
considerable opposition, but this tends to be to actual overthrow by such movements. As Fig-
less radical in its ends and means; and infras- ure 20.4 indicates, only a subset of states that
Figure 20.4.
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unintentionally nurture revolutionary move- why do revolutions – and

ments is especially vulnerable to being over- revolutionary movements – occur
thrown, namely, those exclusionary yet weak when and where they do?
states that are also organized in a patrimonial
or clientelistic as opposed to bureaucratic fash- The fact that state breakdowns, particularly
ion. The key idea here is that patrimonial states the incapacitation of armies, create the type
do not easily allow for the sort of reformist ini- of political opportunities necessary for full-
tiatives that would successfully counter a popu- fledged revolutionary change is one of the best-
lar revolutionary movement. Patrimonial states known ideas to emerge from state-centered
cannot easily jettison unpopular leaders, incor- analyses of revolution; it is a point that is cen-
porate new groups into decision-making pro- tral, for example, to Theda Skocpol’s influential
cesses (or state offices), or prosecute a coun- state-centered study, States and Social Revolutions
terrevolutionary war in a rational or efficient (1979). In fact, Skocpol explains not only why
manner. transformative, class-based revolts from below
Of course, these claims have a probablistic, could occur in France, Russia, and China but
“other-things-being-equal” quality. Revolu- also the origins of the political crises that created
tionary movements do not only or automati- such opportunities in the first place. Indeed,
cally form or seize power in the context of a one of the more interesting claims of Skocpol’s
specific type of state – although certain types of study is that the political crises that made revolu-
states are clearly much more vulnerable to revo- tions possible in France, Russia, and China were
lution than others. Nor are states the only factor not brought about by revolutionaries; rather,
that matters for the formation of revolutionary conflicts between dominant classes and au-
movements; a very broad array of economic, tonomous state officials – conflicts, Skocpol em-
cultural, and organizational factors may con- phasizes, that were produced or exacerbated by
tribute to the development of such movements geopolitical competition – directly or indirectly
and influence their political fortunes. Still, there brought about such crises, thereby opening up
is a tendency among some scholars to view rev- opportunities that rebellious lower classes and
olutionary movements as the products of rapid self-conscious revolutionaries seized, sometimes
social change, intense grievances, certain class years later.
structures or land-tenure systems, economic de- By illuminating the origins of, and the po-
pendency, imperialist domination, and/or the litical opportunities created by, these types of
actions of vanguard parties abstracted from the state crises and breakdowns, state-centered ap-
political context in which each and all of these proaches help to explain the classic puzzle of
factors are embedded. (Still other scholars treat why revolutions occur when and where they
political context as a simple reflex of one or do. Indeed, it has become virtually obligatory
more of these factors.) The central claim of the for scholars to note that people are not often
state-centered perspective is that a close exam- rebellious in the poorest of societies or dur-
ination of states as a reality sui generis, to use ing the hardest of times; and even where and
Durkheim’s expression, is invariably crucial for when people are rebellious, and strong revo-
understanding the formation and fate of rev- lutionary movements form, they may not al-
olutionary movements. Political context is not ways be able to seize state power – unless, that
simply one more variable to be examined by is, they are able to exploit the opportunities
the conscientious scholar of revolutions (on the opened up by state breakdowns. “It is the state
order of “educational attainment” or “median of the army, of competing armies,” Barring-
income”), but a “force field,” so to speak, that ton Moore has noted, “not of the working
mediates and powerfully refracts the effects of class, that has determined the fate of twentieth-
the wide range of factors that typically impinge century revolutions” (1978:375). Of course,
on the development and trajectory of revolu- revolutionaries need not wait for such oppor-
tionary movements. tunities to appear. They often topple states,
P1: JZP
414 Jeff Goodwin
especially infrastructurally weak states, through ter 4; Tilly, 1993; Tarrow, 1998). Indeed,
their own efforts. Revolutionaries may create the fact that a despised state must actively
their own political opportunities as well as seize protect certain institutions and groups will
preexisting ones. itself serve, in many instances, to delegiti-
Indeed, state power and its breakdown cannot mate and stigmatize those institutions and
alone explain (or predict) revolutions; analysts groups.
also need to explain why and how specifically For this reason, “ruling classes” that do
revolutionary movements are able to take ad- not directly rule may be safer than those
vantage of these crises – or create such crises – which do; other things being equal, that
and actually seize power. After all, an organized is, some measure of state autonomy from
revolutionary movement simply may not exist the dominant economic class may act as a
or possess sufficient leverage within civil society bulwark against revolution. In such con-
to take advantage of (or create) a state crisis. In texts, contentious, antielite actions may
such cases, state power will be reconsolidated – be chronic, in such forms as pilfering,
if it is reconsolidated at all – by surviving factions malingering, sabotage, riots, strikes, and
of the old regime or by political forces that es- demonstrations; yet such actions are un-
chew any significant transformation of the state likely to escalate beyond a local or, at most,
or society. regional level in a way that would seri-
So why are groups with a revolutionary ously and directly threaten a strong state.3
agenda or ideology sometimes able to attract And yet rebels are not revolutionaries, ac-
broad popular support? Research suggests that at cording to most definitions, unless they
least five distinctive state practices or character- seriously contend for state power. Thus,
istics help unintentionally to engender or con- if and when domination is widely per-
struct strong revolutionary movements; these ceived to be purely local, then revolution
practices and traits, moreover, are causally “cu- is unlikely, no matter how oppressive that
mulative,” in the sense that a strong revolution- domination is felt to be.
ary movement is more likely to develop the It follows that states that mitigate or
more they characterize a given state. even abolish perceived economic and so-
cial injustices are less likely to become
1. State sponsorship or protection of unpop- the target of political demands (revolu-
ular economic and social arrangements. In tionary or otherwise) than those that are
certain societies, economic and social seen to cause or perpetuate such injus-
arrangements – particularly those in- tices. On the other hand, a state that sud-
volving people’s work or livelihood – denly attempts to reform unpopular in-
may be widely viewed as unjust (that is, as stitutions that it has long protected may
not simply unfortunate or inevitable). Yet not be able to preempt thereby a revolu-
unless state officials are seen to sponsor or tionary challenge; on the contrary, such
protect those arrangements – through le- reforms, or even attempted reforms, may
gal codes, surveillance, taxation, conscrip- be perceived as signs of the state’s weak-
tion, and, ultimately, force – specifically ness and, accordingly, will simply serve to
revolutionary movements are unlikely to accelerate revolutionary mobilization. We
emerge. People may blame their particular might term this the “too-little-too-late
bosses or superiors for their plight, for ex- syndrome.” As De Tocqueville argued,
ample, or even whole classes of bosses, yet “the most perilous moment for a bad gov-
the state itself may not be challenged (even ernment is one when it seeks to mend its
when the aggrieved are well-organized 3
and the political context is opportune) un- As James C. Scott (1990) has emphasized, class strug-
gles “from below” only very rarely break out of their
less there exists a widely perceived sym- localistic and necessarily disguised forms, even when in-
biotic or dependent relationship between equalities, class identities, and oppositional subcultures
the state and these elites (see, e.g., chap- are quite salient.
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ways . . . . Patiently endured so long as it of French absolutism bred, by contrast,

seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes a political culture characterized by a
to appear intolerable once the possibil- utopian longing for total revolution –
ity of removing it crosses men’s minds” even though French social conditions
(1955[1856]:177). were comparatively benign by European
In sum, grievances may only become standards of the time (1955[1856]:part 3,
“politicized” (that is, framed as resolvable chapter 1).
only at the level of the state), and thereby a Accordingly, neither open, democratic
basis for specifically revolutionary move- polities nor authoritarian yet inclusion-
ments, when the state sponsors or pro- ary (for example, “populist”) regimes have
tects economic and social conditions that generally been challenged by powerful
are widely viewed as grievous (e.g., Tilly, revolutionary movements, although there
1986:chapter 9). State practices thus help are certainly exceptions (see below). By
to constitute both a distinctive target and contrast, chronic exclusion of mobilized
goal for aggrieved groups in civil society, groups from access to state power is likely
namely, the state itself and its overthrow to push them toward a specifically rev-
(and reorganization), respectively. olutionary strategy – that is, extralegal,
2. Exclusion of mobilized groups from state power militant, and even armed struggle aimed
or resources. Even if aggrieved groups di- at overthrowing the state (e.g., Seidman,
rect their claims at the state, they are 1994). Such exclusion, after all, serves as
unlikely to seek its overthrow (or radi- an object lesson in the futility of legalis-
cal reorganization) if they manage to at- tic or constitutional politics (i.e., “play-
tain some significant share – or believe ing by the rules”). Exclusionary author-
they can attain such a share – of state itarian regimes tend to “incubate” radi-
power or influence. Indeed, even if such cal collective action: Those who special-
groups view their political influence as ize in revolution tend to prosper under
unfairly limited, their access to state re- such regimes, because they come to be
sources or inclusion in policy-making de- viewed by many people as more realis-
liberations – unless palpably cosmetic – tic and potentially effective than politi-
will likely prevent any radicalization of cal moderates, who themselves come to
their guiding ideology or strategic reper- be viewed as hopelessly ineffectual. Partly
toire. In fact, the political “incorpora- for this reason, virtually every powerful
tion” of mobilized groups – including revolutionary movement of the past cen-
the putatively revolutionary proletariat – tury developed under an exclusionary po-
has typically served to deradicalize them litical regime, including the Bolsheviks
(see, e.g., Bendix, 1977; Mann, 1993: in Russia (Kaiser, 1987), the communists
chapter 18; Roth, 1963). For such groups in China and in Southeast Asia (Bianco,
often view this sort of inclusion as the first 1971; Pluvier, 1974; Young, 1991), Cas-
step in the accumulation of greater influ- tro’s July 26th Movement in Cuba (Pérez-
ence and resources; in any event, they are Stable, 1998), the broad coalition that op-
unlikely to jeopardize their relatively low- posed the Shah in Iran (Arjomand, 1988;
cost access to the state – unless that state Parsa, 2000), and the guerrilla movements
itself is in deep crisis – by engaging in of Central America (Booth and Walker,
“disloyal” or illegal activities. 1993; Vilas, 1995; Wickham-Crowley,
Political inclusion also discourages the 1992).
sense that the state is unreformable or an 3. Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state
instrument of a narrow class or clique violence against mobilized groups and op-
and, accordingly, needs to be fundamen- positional political figures. Like political
tally overhauled. De Tocqueville em- exclusion, indiscriminate state violence
phasized how the exclusionary nature against mobilized groups and oppositional
P1: JZP
416 Jeff Goodwin
figures is likely to reinforce the plausibil- 4. Weak policing capacities and infrastructural
ity, legitimacy, and (hence) diffusion of power. Of course, no matter how iniq-
the idea that the state needs to be violently uitous or authoritarian a state may be –
“smashed” and radically reorganized. For or the society which it rules – it can al-
reasons of simple self-defense, in fact, peo- ways retain power so long as it is capable
ple who are literally targeted by the state of ruthlessly repressing its enemies. Such
may arm themselves or join groups that a state may in fact have many enemies
have access to arms. Unless state violence (including revolutionaries), yet they will
is simply overwhelming, then (see the sub- prove quite ineffective so long as the state’s
sequent text) indiscriminate coercion tends coercive might remains overwhelming.
to backfire, producing an ever-growing Long before a state breakdown, how-
popular mobilization by armed movements ever, revolutionaries may become numer-
and an even larger body of sympathizers ous and well-organized if the state’s polic-
(see, e.g., Gurr, 1986; Mason and Krane, ing capacities and infrastructural power
1989). Revolutionary groups may thus more generally are chronically weak or
prosper not so much because of their ide- geographically uneven. Guerrilla move-
ology per se, but simply because they can ments, for example, have typically pros-
offer people some protection from vio- pered in peripheral and especially moun-
lent states. Many studies of revolutions tainous areas where state control is weak or
emphasize that groups have only turned nonexistent: The communist movement
to extralegal strategies or armed struggle in China grew strong in the northwest
after their previous efforts to secure periphery, Castro’s movement in Cuba’s
change through legal means were violen- Sierra Maestra, and El Salvador’s guer-
tly repressed (see, e.g., Booth and Walker, rilla armies in that country’s mountain-
1993; Kerkvliet, 1977; Walton, 1984). ous northern departments (see, e.g., Wolf,
Like political exclusion, indiscriminate 1969:chapter 6, on Cuba; Pearce, 1985,
state violence also reinforces the plausi- on El Salvador). And revolutionaries are
bility and diffusion of specifically revolu- doubly fortunate if they confront states
tionary ideologies, that is, ideologies that and armies that are ineffectual due to
envisage a radical reorganization not only corruption or bureaucratic incoherence
of the state but of society as well. After all, – traits that are often purposively fos-
a society in which aggrieved people are tered by ruling cliques or autocrats who
routinely denied an opportunity to redress fear palace coups (Snyder, 1992, 1998).
perceived injustices, and jailed or even In such situations, revolutionaries them-
murdered on the mere suspicion of polit- selves may bring about or accelerate state
ical disloyalty, is unlikely to be viewed as breakdowns not only through direct mili-
requiring a few minor reforms; such peo- tary pressure but also by exacerbating con-
ple are more likely to view such a society flicts between states (especially personal-
as in need of a fundamental reorganiza- istic dictatorships) and dominant classes
tion. In other words, violent, exclusion- and between states and their foreign sup-
ary regimes tend to foster unintentionally porters. These types of conflicts, in ad-
the hegemony or dominance of their most dition to creating the general insecurity
radical social critics – religious zealots, associated with revolutionary situations,
virtuous ascetics, socialist militants, and may accelerate state breakdowns by cre-
radical nationalists, for example, who view ating economic downturns that bring on
society as more or less totally corrupted, fiscal crises for states (see Foran, 1997b).
incapable of reform, and thus requir- 5. Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that
ing a thorough and perhaps violent re- alienates, weakens, or divides counterrevolu-
construction (see McDaniel, 1991: cha- tionary elites. As these last remarks sug-
pter 7). gest, autocratic and so-called neopatri-
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monial (or “sultanistic”) dictatorships are In sum, certain types of states are not only
especially vulnerable to revolution (see, liable to break down and thereby to create
e.g., Chehabi and Linz, 1998; Dix, 1984; the sort of political opportunities that strong
Foran, 1992; Goldstone, 1986; Good- revolutionary movements can exploit; certain
win and Skocpol, 1989; Snyder, 1992; states also unintentionally foster the very for-
Wickham-Crowley, 1992). In fact, such mation, and indeed “construct” the hegemony
regimes not only tend to facilitate the or dominance, of radical movements by politi-
formation of strong revolutionary move- cizing popular grievances, foreclosing possibil-
ments but also cannot easily defeat such ities for peaceful reform, compelling people to
movements once they have formed; ex- take up arms to defend themselves, making radi-
amples of such regimes include the dic- cal ideologies and identities plausible, providing
tatorships of Dı́az in Mexico, Chiang in the minimal political space that revolutionar-
China, Batista in Cuba, the Shah of Iran, ies require to organize disgruntled people, and
Somoza in Nicaragua, and Ceauşescu weakening counterrevolutionary elites, includ-
in Romania. As especially narrow and ing their own officer corps. This is a sure recipe
autonomous regimes, such dictatorships for social revolution.
tend to have few fervid supporters; their
arbitrary exercise of power also tends to
why no social revolutions in the
alienate certain state officials and mili-
post–cold war era?
tary officers as well as vast sectors of so-
ciety – including middle strata and even
The world has witnessed considerable ethnic
elites in addition to lower classes. In
conflict and several regime changes during the
fact, because dictators often view eco-
post–Cold War era, including popular revolts in
nomic and military elites as their chief
Indonesia and Serbia that unseated dictators.4
foes, they may attempt to weaken and di-
Yet not a single great or social revolution has oc-
vide them in various ways, even though
curred in the period since 1989, nor does one
such groups share with dictators a con-
seem likely in the immediate future. How are
servative or counterrevolutionary orienta-
we to explain this theoretically?
tion. By weakening counterrevolutionary
Of course, great revolutions have always been
elites, however, dictators may unwittingly
relatively rare and unexpected. Those who have
play into the hands of revolutionaries, be-
planned (or simply predicted) revolutions have
cause such elites may thereby become too
failed much more often than they have suc-
weak either to oppose revolutionaries ef-
ceeded. During the two centuries prior to the
fectively or to oust the dictator and reform
Second World War, in fact, there occurred
the regime, thereby preempting revolut-
exactly three social revolutions: the French,
ion.
Russian, and Mexican. Many more revolutions
Of course, not all dictators are equally
occurred during the Cold War era, but al-
adept at controlling their armed forces and
most all of these were incubated by, and over-
rival elites; their incompetence or inca-
threw, three rather peculiar types of political
pacity in this regard does not bode well for
order that have now almost completely passed
them personally, but it may prove decisive
from the scene: the rigidly exclusionary colonies
in preempting revolution. For if civilian
of relatively weak imperial powers (Vietnam,
and military elites can remove corrupt and
Algeria, Angola, Mozambique); personalistic,
repressive dictators, and perhaps institute
“above class” dictatorships (Cuba, Iran, Nica-
democratic reforms, they thereby under-
ragua); and dependent, Soviet-imposed com-
mine much of the appeal of revolutionar-
munist regimes (Eastern Europe) (see Goodwin,
ies. In fact, this is precisely what happened
2001).
in the Philippines in 1986 with the ouster
of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos (Parsa,
2000; Snyder, 1992). 4
This section draws on Goodwin (2003).
P1: JZP
418 Jeff Goodwin
Some have suggested that capitalist globaliza- indignation aroused by an unacceptable status quo as
tion has destroyed the very rationale for rev- in the attraction exercised by an existing blueprint for
olutions. According to this perspective, state the future. The most powerful argument in the hands
of the left in Latin America – or anywhere else – has
power – that great prize of revolutionaries – has
never been, and in all likelihood will never be, exclu-
been dramatically eroded by the growing power sively the intrinsic merit or viability of the alternative
of multinational corporations and transnational it proposes. Its strong suit is the morally unacceptable
financial institutions and by the increasingly character of life as the overwhelming majority of the
rapid and uncontrollable movements of capi- region’s inhabitants live it. (Castañeda, 1993:254)
tal, commodities, and people. These realities,
There is no reason to believe that in the fu-
according to Charles Tilly, “undermine the au-
ture people will accept the depredations of
tonomy and circumscription of individual states,
authoritarian states and shun revolutionaries on
make it extremely difficult for any state to carry
the grounds that state power “ain’t what it used
on a separate fiscal, welfare or military pol-
to be.”
icy, and thus reduce the relative advantage of
The current period has not exhibited the
controlling the apparatus of a national state”
same scale of revolutionary conflict as the Cold
(1993:247). In other words, the more globaliza-
War era primarily because of the wide diffusion
tion diminishes and hollows out state power, the
of formally democratic and quasi-democratic
less rational becomes any political project aimed
electoral regimes throughout much of Latin
at capturing state power, including revolution.
America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia and
Historically, however, there has been a strong
Africa since the early 1980s. This is a devel-
positive correlation between a country’s exposure
opment for which revolutionaries themselves
to external economic competition and the size
can take considerable credit. And yet, be this
of its public sector (Evans, 1997). Rather than
as it may, these types of regimes are powerfully
uniformly diminishing states, in fact, globaliza-
counterrevolutionary. It is not coincidental, in
tion has been just as likely to spur attempts to
fact, that no popular revolutionary movement
employ and, if necessary, expand state power for
has ever overthrown a consolidated democratic
the purposes of enhancing global competitive-
regime. Certainly, no consolidated democracy
ness. Some have argued that globalization is itself
is today even remotely threatened by a revo-
a project of strong states (Weiss, 1997). Popular
lutionary movement – not in Western or East-
support for revolutionaries, in any event, is usu-
ern Europe, Japan, North America, Costa Rica,
ally not based on estimations of their likely suc-
Australia, or New Zealand. As one noted soci-
cess in enhancing the autonomy of a country’s
ologist has written,
fiscal policy or even its long-term global com-
petitiveness. Rather, ordinary folk have typically There is now no substantial reason to believe that
supported revolutionaries when the latter have marxist revolutions will come about in the foresee-
spoken up for them when no one else would (or able future in any major advanced capitalist society.
could), provided for their subsistence, defended In fact, the revolutionary potential – whatever the
their traditional rights and, not least, protected phrase may reasonably mean – of wageworkers, labor
unions and political parties, is feeble. This is true of
them from state violence. As Jorge Castañeda the generally prosperous post–World War II period;
has argued, mass support for revolution typi- it was also true of the thirties when we witnessed the
cally derives less from attractive visions of the most grievous slump so far known by world capi-
future – although such visions have been im- talism. Such facts should not determine our view of
portant for intellectuals – than from a widely the future, but they cannot be explained away by ref-
shared conviction that the status quo is simply erences to the corrupt and corrupting “misleaders of
unendurable: labor,” to the success of capitalist propaganda, to eco-
nomic prosperity due to war economy, etc. Assume
all this to be true; still the evidence points to the fact
The rationale for revolution, from seventeenth- that, without serious qualification, wageworkers un-
century England to Romania at the close of the sec- der mature capitalism do accept the system. Wherever
ond millennium, has always lain as much in the moral a labor party exists in an advanced capitalist society,
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it tends either to become weak or, in actual policy of maintaining the fight for social goals within the
and result, to become incorporated within the wel- framework of civil debate . . . . Where a government
fare state apparatus. (Mills, 1962:468–69; emphasis in has come into power through some form of pop-
original) ular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least
an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla
These words were written in the early 1960s – outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibili-
although they require not the slightest revi- ties of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.
sion – not by a conservative but by the radical (1985[1960]:50–1)5
sociologist C. Wright Mills.
Why is democracy so inhospitable to rev- With very few exceptions, to paraphrase Alan
olutionaries? First and foremost, democracy Dawley (1976:70), the ballot box has been the
pacifies and institutionalizes – but does not elim- coffin of revolutionaries.
inate – many forms of social conflict. Seymour Does the foregoing mean that political radi-
Martin Lipset (1960:chapter 7) has aptly referred calism and militancy go unrewarded in demo-
to elections as a “democratic translation of the cratic societies? Hardly. Democracy, to repeat,
class struggle.” Indeed, democracy “translates” does not eliminate social conflict; in fact, in
and channels a variety of social conflicts – in- many ways democracy encourages social con-
cluding, but not limited to, class conflicts – into flict by providing the institutionalized “political
party competition for votes and the lobbying space” or “political opportunities” with which
of elected representatives by “interest groups.” those groups outside elite circles can make
Of course, this “translation” involves distortions claims on political authorities and economic
and has sometimes taken violent forms, espe- elites (Tarrow, 1998). Not just political par-
cially when and where the procedural fairness ties, then, but a whole range of interest
of electoral contests has been widely questioned. groups, trade unions, professional associations,
But the temptation to rebel against the state – social movements, and even transnational net-
which is rarely acted on without trepidation, works become the main organizational vehi-
given its typically life-or-death consequences – cles, or “mobilizing structures,” of political
is partly quelled under democratic regimes by life in democratic polities. But these institu-
the knowledge that new elections are but a few tions of “civil society” are generally just that –
years off and with them the chance to punish civil. Their repertoires of collective action in-
incumbent rulers. clude electoral campaigns, lobbying, petitions,
Even more importantly, democracies have strikes, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, and
generally provided a context in which ordinary civil disobedience – forms of collective action
people, through popular protest, can win im- that may be undertaken with great passion and
portant concessions from economic and polit- militancy (and sometimes for quite radical ends),
ical elites, although this often requires a good and which sometimes involve or provoke vio-
deal of disruption, if not violence (Gamson, lence, but which are not aimed at bringing down
1975; Piven and Cloward, 1977). But armed the state.
struggles that are aimed at overthrowing elected Democracy, then, dramatically reduces the
governments rarely win extensive popular sup- likelihood of revolutionary change, but not be-
port unless such governments (or the armies that cause it brings about social justice (although jus-
they putatively command) effectively push peo- tice is sometimes served under democracies).
ple into the armed opposition by indiscrimi- Formal democracy is of course fully compati-
nately repressing suspected rebel sympathizers. ble with widespread poverty, inequality, racism,
As Che Guevara wrote: sexism, and social ills of all sorts, which is why
Karl Marx criticized “political emancipation”
It must always be kept in mind that there is a neces-
sary minimum without which the establishment and 5
Unwisely, Guevara later abandoned this view, claim-
consolidation of the first [guerrilla] center [ foco] is ing that even democracies could be toppled by revolu-
not practicable. People must see clearly the futility tionaries.
P1: JZP
420 Jeff Goodwin
and so-called bourgeois democracy in the name trous socioeconomic effects on working people,
of “human emancipation.” The prevalence of may actually help undermine authoritarianism
poverty and other social problems is precisely and preserve democratic and quasi-democratic
why extraparliamentary movements for social regimes. This may explain the striking coin-
justice so often arise in democratic contexts. cidence of globalization and democratization,
These movements, however, almost always view which many analysts view as contradictory, since
the state as an instrument to be pressured and the early 1980s. Elisabeth Wood, for exam-
influenced, not as something to be seized or ple, has shown how globalization facilitated de-
smashed. mocratization – and defused revolutionary chal-
A new era of widespread revolutionary con- lenges – in El Salvador and South Africa: the
flict will surely dawn, if this analysis is correct, integration of domestic markets into the global
if the most recent wave of democratization dra- economy and “the growing hegemony of ne-
matically recedes – if, that is, the new democra- oliberal economic policies made it unlikely that
cies and quasi-democracies in Latin America, postconflict states would have the capacity to
Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa are replaced implement confiscatory redistributive policies
by violent authoritarian regimes. (Revolution- that would threaten elite interests. Deviation
aries are unlikely to overthrow such regimes, from the neoliberal model would be punished
however, unless they are unusually weak or sud- by capital movements” (Wood, 2000:15). Glob-
denly weakened; for even powerful revolution- alization thus provided an incentive for previ-
ary movements, we should recall, do not always ously authoritarian economic elites to finally
succeed against strong states.) A widespread re- accept the full political inclusion of subordinate
version to violent authoritarianism seems un- classes, because the latter would have limited
likely, however, if only because economic and means to threaten elite interests. In effect, elites
political elites, including even army officers, accepted democracy, while their opponents ac-
seem increasingly aware of the growing costs of cepted capitalism.
political violence in a globalized economy and Revolutions, in sum, will undoubtedly con-
of the unique vulnerabilities of narrow dicta- tinue to occur in those societies characterized by
torships in particular. The United States gov- a combination of gross economic injustices and
ernment has become increasingly astute at “sac- extreme political exclusion and repression by
rificing dictators to save the state” (Petras and weak or suddenly weakened states. This combi-
Morley, 1990:chapter 4), that is, preempting nation of factors, however, is less prevalent than
revolution by abandoning or replacing dicta- in the past and may become rarer still. The po-
tors (e.g., Marcos, Duvalier, Noriega, Mobutu, litical contexts, especially, that new movements
Suharto, and Milosevic) in favor of more against global capitalism currently confront, and
broadly based and even formally democratic are likely to confront for the foreseeable fu-
regimes. ture, are not nearly as conducive to revolution
Democracy may be an especially powerful as during the Cold War era. As a result, most of
barrier to revolution in an age of capitalist these movements will attempt to enact reforms
globalization. And globalization, in turn, may by winning a share of power through electoral
help underpin democracy. Certainly, the un- means or through the pressure of nonviolent
precedented speed and mobility of capital in demonstrations.
the current era hang like the sword of Damo-
cles over those on both the left and right who
would disrupt predictable business climates and research frontiers
“investor confidence.” In the new world or-
der, the fear of capital flight or boycott may Sociologists currently have a much better un-
stay the hand of would-be Pinochets as well derstanding than previously of the factors that
as that of would-be Lenins. Globalization, in explain why strong revolutionary movements
other words, notwithstanding its often disas- emerge when and where they do as well as why
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some but not all of these movements are actually so powerful during the Weimar period
able to seize power. What, then, are the research (Brustein, 1996; Luebbert, 1991)? Why
frontiers in this corner of the social sciences? did Chileans (albeit a minority) elect as
Any list is likely to be somewhat arbitrary, but president a radical like Salvador Allende
four directions for future research on revolutions (Sigmund, 1978)? Was France on the cusp
and revolutionary movements seem especially of a revolution in 1968 (Singer, 2002)?
promising. Why did elections in which a range of
leftist parties participated fail to defuse the
1. Anomalous cases. Trying to account for the- Shining Path insurgency in Peru (Gorriti,
oretical anomalies is always helpful for ad- 1999)? Were these regimes actually less
vancing a research program. Scholars of liberal or democratic than they appeared?
revolution will undoubtedly benefit from How were ordinary people radicalized in
thinking harder about two particular sets these contexts? Why exactly did democ-
of anomalous cases: first, cases in which racy fail to “tame” revolutionaries? Did
theory and past research would seem to economic or cultural factors somehow
indicate that revolutions (or strong revolu- “trump” political factors in these cases?
tionary movements) should have occurred, 2. Culture (including emotions). For some years
but none have; and second, cases in which now scholars of social movements have
theory and past research would seem to been trying hard to synthesize structural
indicate that revolutions (or revolution- and interest-based accounts of move-
ary movements) should not have occurred, ments with perspectives that emphasize
but they nonetheless have. The former culture, including (increasingly) emotions
set of cases would include all those nar- (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). Importantly,
rowly based, repressive regimes that have this work has generally not attempted to
exhibited an unusual capacity to survive portray the ends and means of movements
over an extended period, even in the face as arbitrary or irrational, but has rather
of intermittent opposition [for example, forcefully challenged overly narrow con-
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, Burma, China, ceptualizations of interests and rationality.
North Korea, and Iraq (before the U.S. A good deal of this work has influenced
invasion of 2003)]. A key question here sociologists of revolution, but structuralist
is whether the survival of such regimes – thinking remains especially powerful –
and the weakness or absence of revolu- arguably, too powerful – in this subfield.
tionary movements – is based mainly or Thus, new insights into revolutions are
solely on the state’s infrastructural power likely to be generated by testing ideas that
or armed might or depends on differ- have been fruitfully employed by cul-
ent factors whose importance has perhaps tural sociologists (see, e.g., Gorski, 2003;
been underestimated (for example, a state- Hunt, 1984; Sewell, 1985; Sohrabi, 1995).
backed ideology, including nationalism, a Among the questions that merit attention
cult of the leader, or debilitating divisions are the following: Are certain cultural
among the regime’s opponents). contexts more conducive to collective
The second set of cases would include action and revolution than others? Can
those contexts in which revolutionary certain cultural contexts derail or abort
movements have fared reasonably or even an incipient revolutionary movement in
exceptionally well even though they con- an otherwise propitious political context?
fronted relatively liberal and/or democra- Why do revolutionary movements – or
tic regimes (for example, Weimar Ger- at least their leaderships – exhibit par-
many, Chile before 1973, France in May ticular ideological orientations and not
1968, and Peru during the 1980s). How others? And how do these orientations, and
was the Nazi movement able to become the cultural idioms of the movement’s
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422 Jeff Goodwin
rank-and-file, shape the outcomes or ac- what conditions might revolutionaries –

hievements of revolutions? if revolutionaries they be – opt for this
3. Islamist movements. If Marxism-Leninism “civil” strategy?
was the dominant revolutionary ideol- Other Islamic movements have emplo-
ogy of the last century, Islam may be yed terrorism as a tactic, that is, the de-
the dominant revolutionary ideology of liberate targeting of noncombatants for
the present. Since the Iranian Revolu- political ends (e.g., in Algeria, Israel/
tion of 1979, scholars have been curious Palestine, and Kashmir). In fact, revolu-
about the conditions that encourage the tionary movements of various ideologi-
dominance of militant Islamists in revo- cal orientations have sometimes emplo-
lutionary movements or coalitions (Arjo- yed terrorism as part of a larger strategy
mand, 1988; Parsa, 2000). What factors of guerrilla warfare (e.g., in Northern
have led Islamists, as opposed to other Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Peru). But we
radical leaderships (including Marxists and still know relatively little about such tac-
radical nationalists), to dominate certain tical choices (but cf. Irvin, 1999). Why
oppositional movements in the Islamic do some armed insurgencies employ ter-
world (Esposito, 1999)? What are the spe- rorism but not others, and what difference
cific appeals of Islam – and to whom ex- does it make? Indeed, why have some rev-
actly does Islam appeal – in these contexts olutionaries turned to armed struggle in
(Wickham, 2002; Wiktorowicz, 2001)? the first place? Why have others opted for
And why have some Islamists rejected mil- nonviolent resistance or even the “parlia-
itant politics (Moaddel, 2002)? mentary road” to revolutionary change?
4. Strategy and tactics. Some Islamic move- And what are the costs and benefits of
ments are attempting to revolutionize these various strategic and tactical choices?
their societies “from below” (e.g., in Which strategies work in which contexts,
Egypt), without seizing state power, by and why?
dominating or refashioning important so-
cial and cultural institutions in “civil soci- These are just some of the questions, of
ety” (Berman, 2003). This strategy calls course, that merit further inquiry by sociologists
into question the very meaning of the of revolution. If the past is any guide, scholars
concept of revolution. Is it possible to will continue to reexamine historical cases of
make a revolution without seizing state revolutions and revolutionary movements with
power? Can a movement be revolution- new theoretical ideas and hypotheses, and new
ary that does not seek political power? revolutions may even come along – unexpect-
How much and what kind of change can edly, as always – to provide new fodder for so-
be effected through this strategy? Under ciological analysis.
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chapter twenty-one
Regimes and Contention
Charles Tilly
How do diverse forms of political contention – gle in competitive capitalism but not elsewhere.
revolutions, strikes, wars, social movements, They dog every analysis of revolution, which
coups d’état, and others – interact with shifts must consider whether certain kinds of con-
from one kind of regime to another? To what tention regularly promote revolutions as well
extent, and how, do alterations of contentious as whether revolutions regularly generate cer-
politics and transformations of regimes cause tain kinds of contention. Yet we have no coher-
each other? Does virulent violence necessar- ent theory of links between regime change and
ily accompany rapid regime transitions? These contentious politics. We have, that is, no widely
questions loom behind current inquiries into accepted and empirically defensible account of
democratization, with their debate between how prevailing forms of popular struggle vary
theorists who consider agreements among elites and change from one sort of political regime
to provide necessary and sufficient conditions to another, much less why such variation and
for democracy and those who insist that democ- change occur. At least two obstacles bar the path
racy only emerges from interactions between to coherent theory: first, that the relationship
ruling-class actions and popular struggle. They between regime change and contentious politics
arise when political analysts ask whether (or is surely complex, contingent, and variable; sec-
under what conditions) social movements pro- ond, that no codification of variation in regimes
mote democracy and whether stable democracy has commanded wide assent.
extinguishes or tames social movements. They This chapter will not unveil a general theory
appear from another angle in investigations of of regime change, of contentious politics, or of
whether democracies tend to avoid war with their interaction. It rests, indeed, on a set of
each other. At least as context, they loom large premises denying the possibility of a general,
in every historical account of popular politics. lawlike theory in this domain:
They figure centrally in any analysis of interac-
tions between democracy and power. although political change is causally coherent, it is
The same sorts of questions recur in studies of also path-dependent
industrial conflict, where one school of thought r as a consequence, it is crucial to trace effects of
opines that strikes represent breakdowns in bar- existing precedents, models, practices, and con-
gaining that could be pursued more efficiently nections on any particular sequence of changes
r whole sequences and structures rarely or never
by other means, another school of thought
repeat themselves
argues that strikes entail compromises of labor r smaller-scale causal mechanisms do, however,
with capital and thereby integrate workers un- recur in a wide variety of settings
wittingly into capitalism, whereas a third view r explanation of changes in contention, in
treats strikes as rational, essential means of strug- regimes, and in their interaction therefore has
423
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424 Charles Tilly
two components: 1) identification of crucial Thus if a single ruler (a monarch) promoted his
causal mechanisms, 2) analysis of how preced- own self-interest instead of the common good,
ing and existing conditions affect the concate- he became a tyrant; if an aristocracy similarly
nation and sequence of those causal mechanisms
r even at the unattainable limit of exhaustive ex- used governmental power exclusively for its own
planation, a satisfactory account of interaction
advantage, the regime became an oligarchy; and
between regime change and contentious poli- if the majority in a constitutional government
tics would not take the form of general laws for likewise sought only their own benefit without
large sequences or structures but of constraints regard to the commonwealth, their regime be-
on combinations and sequences of mechanisms. came a democracy.
(Tilly, 2001) According to Aristotelian principle, proper
monarchy rested on rule by the best man, aris-
This chapter simplifies such an enormous tocracy on rule by the richest and best men,
agenda by singling out broad correspondences and constitutional government on rule by free
between regimes and forms of politics as indi- men. (For Aristotle, ineluctable nature con-
cations of what must be explained. First, the demned women, like slaves, to inferiority.) Be-
chapter reviews some well-known classifica- cause the rich are usually few in number and the
tions of regimes to draw out their implica- free poor many in number, reasoned Aristotle,
tions for variation and change in contentious as a practical matter aristocratic regimes gen-
politics. Next, it synthesizes ideas from those erally mean rule by the few in the common
schemes in a new map of regime variation and interest, constitutional government rule by the
change. Then, it surveys likely correlates and many, likewise in the common interest. Per-
consequences of regime change with an eye versions into tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy
to identifying causal mechanisms deserving fur- arise where rulers – one, few, or many – place
ther attention. Throughout, it focuses on mech- their own interest above the common good.
anisms embodied in political contention: dis- Democracy’s characteristic perversion, in this
continuous, collective, public claim making by Aristotelian view, consists of discrimination by
political actors. Contentious politics runs the the governing poor against both the state’s col-
range from popular rebellion to strikes, electoral lective interest and the interests of the rich.
campaigns, and social movements (McAdam, To be sure, Aristotle recognized distinctions
Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001). The chapter ends not within his major types of regime, for example
with answers, but with proposals for a research five types of democracy, of which the fifth
program.
How shall we map regimes? At first, Aristotle is that in which not the law, but the multitude, have
made it all seem vividly simple: “The true forms the supreme power, and supersede the law by their
of government . . . are those in which the one, or decrees. This is a state of affairs brought about by the
demagogues. For in democracies which are subject
the few, or the many, govern with a view to the to the law the best citizens hold the first place, and
common interest; but governments which rule there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not
with a view to the private interest, whether of supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the peo-
the one, or of the few, or of the many, are per- ple becomes a monarch, and is many in one; and the
versions” (Barnes, 1984:2030). This reasoning many have the power in their hand, not as individ-
led to a straightforward typology of all govern- uals, but collectively . . . this sort of democracy is to
mental forms: other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of
monarchy. (Barnes, 1984:2050–1)
True Perversion In these circumstances, furthermore, dema-

Monarchy → Tyranny gogues often stir up the rabble to attack the
Aristocracy → Oligarchy rich and thereby seize power for themselves. In
Constitutional → Democracy this way, democracy turns into tyranny. When
Government he got to details, Aristotle allowed for plenty
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Regimes and Contention 425
of transitions and compromises among his three Broadly speaking, recent analysts of relations
pure types. among regime types, regime transitions, and
Aristotle proceeded repeatedly from ostensi- forms of public politics have arrayed them-
bly static categories to dynamic causal processes. selves along a continuum whose two ends we
In thinking through the effects of different mil- might call Principle and History. Despite em-
itary formats, for example, he offered a shrewd ploying historical illustrations, Aristotle situated
causal account: his analyses fairly close to the continuum’s Prin-
ciple end: regardless of their proximity or dis-
As there are four chief divisions of the common tance in space and time, one regime differed
people, farmers, artisans, traders, labourers; so also from another to the extent that their rationales,
there are four kinds of military forces – the cavalry, premises, or organizing principles differed. His-
the heavy infantry, the light-armed troops, the navy.
When the country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong
torical encyclopedias, in contrast, frequently
oligarchy is likely to be established. For the security of place themselves at the continuum’s other end,
the inhabitants depends upon a force of this sort, and treating regimes as different to the extent that
only rich men can afford to keep horses. The second they operate in different times and places (see,
form of oligarchy prevails when a country is adapted e.g., Stearns, 2001). At both extremes, accounts
to heavy infantry; for this service is better suited to of regimes become quite descriptive – at the
the rich than to the poor. But the light-armed and the Principle extreme, attempts to capture the inter-
naval element are wholly democratic; and nowadays,
where they are numerous, if the two parties quar-
nal coherence of fascism or state socialism, at the
rel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the History extreme, attempts to identify the partic-
struggle. (Barnes, 1984:2096–7) ularities of Ming China or Tokugawa Japan. The
extremes do not much interest us here, but loca-
In the Politics, Aristotle confined his systematic tion of competing regime classification regimes
discussion of political contention to revolutions, along the continuum matters. For explanatory
which meant forcible overthrow of regimes by strategies vary systematically along the contin-
ostensible subjects of those regimes. In passing, uum. Toward the Principle end concentrate in-
however, he also mentioned factional struggles, quiries into necessary and sufficient conditions
conspiracies, and collective resistance to gov- for different types of regimes (Dogan and Higley,
ernmental demands. In each case, he treated the 1998; Dogan and Pelassy, 1984; Held, 1996;
form of regime as an outgrowth of the balance Spruyt, 2002). Toward the History end, we find
among local forces (notably among the rich, the searches for recurrent processes – notably in-
middle class, and the poor) tempered by histori- cluding path-dependent processes – that regu-
cal circumstance. He then explained contention larly cause regime changes without producing
as a joint outcome of that balance and the regime identical outcomes (Collier and Collier, 1991;
type, again tempered by historical circumstance. Mahoney, 2001, 2002; Mahoney and Snyder,
Without developing his observations at 1999).
length, Aristotle clearly saw regimes as having Consider Marxist accounts. Beginning with
their own characteristic forms of contention, Marx’s own work on precapitalist economic
and changes of regime as resulting largely from formations (Marx, 1964), Marxists have usu-
political contention. In contrasting regimes, dif- ally taken positions near the midpoint, but on
ferent ruling coalitions pursued distinct strate- the History side modes of production gener-
gies of rule, which altered the incentives and ate each other in well-defined historical se-
capacities of various constituted groups within quences, with struggle that emerges from a
the state to defend or advance their own in- given mode’s internal contradictions driving the
terests by acting collectively. Aristotle explained transition to the next mode (see, e.g., Anderson,
struggles of his time by combining the perspec- 1974a, 1974b). But within each mode, the
tives of rationalists and structuralists, millennia logic of productive relations shapes a politi-
before anyone used those labels (for those labels, cal regime that implements the power of the
see Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). mode’s dominant class. Thus in the communist
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426 Charles Tilly
manifesto simplification bourgeois revolution A similar distribution of analyses appears in

destroys feudal regimes and replaces them with the comparative study of welfare states. Al-
parliamentary regimes implementing bourgeois though often departing from the relatively
interests. My great teacher Barrington Moore historical account of British welfare policy for-
criticized the classic Marxist account, but re- mulated by T. H. Marshall (Marshall, 1950; see
placed it with another account located at almost also Barbalet, 1988; Turner, 1997), recent efforts
precisely the same position on the Principle/ have concentrated on two largely unhistorical
History continuum (Moore, 1966). A special- questions: what conditions promote the devel-
ist in Russian politics and a close student of opment of different degrees and kinds of social
Russian history, Moore attributed more im- provisioning? What effects do different systems
portance to class relations within agriculture of social provisioning have on the actual social
than have most Marxists. Although sharing with lives of citizens in different types of regimes?
Marx the idea that parliamentary democracy Once again, the range runs from close compar-
resulted from bourgeois predominance, Moore ison of particular cases in a search for crucial
argued that commercialization of agriculture, differences to quantitative comparisons of many
elimination of great landlords, and proletar- regimes in which different levels or aspects of
ianization of the peasantry (rather than the provisioning or social experience turn into vari-
rise of industry itself) together opened the ables to be explained by a variety of theoretically
way toward bourgeois predominance. Yet for motivated predictors (Esping-Anderson, 1990;
Moore, as for Marx, changing configurations Goodin, Headey, Muffels, and Dirven, 1999;
of class generated regime transitions through Hage, Hannemann, and Gargan, 1989; Janoski
struggle. and Hicks, 1994; Ruggie, 1996).
Moore’s analysis inspired a great deal of subse- Thomas Janoski offers a complex version in
quent work on regime transitions (e.g., Andrews his Citizenship and Civil Society, which com-
and Chapman, 1995; Collier, 1999; Downing, pares liberal, traditional, and social democratic
1992; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, regimes with regard to their delivery of citizen-
1992; Skocpol, 1979; Stephens, 1989). More ship rights and obligations. (Although Janoski
than anything else, analysts in Moore’s lin- compares many countries, the United States ex-
eage have sought to explain how democratic emplifies the liberal type, Germany the tradi-
regimes replace nondemocratic regimes. There tional type, and Sweden the social democratic
they confront a host of theorists who oper- type.) After specifying how to recognize the
ate closer to the Principle end of the con- three types of regimes, Janoski traces their ori-
tinuum, looking for necessary and sufficient gins to different combinations of prevailing class
conditions of democratic regimes. In a con- and status ideologies with the interests that they
venient if risky simplification, many students represent. He then dares to relate regime types
of contemporary democratization distinguish to forms of contention:
two main types of regime: authoritarian and
democratic (e.g. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Social democratic regimes with the franchise as an or-
ganizing issue, trade union strength, left party power,
and Limongi, 2000). Their work ranges from strong self-administration, and proportional represen-
close comparison of particular cases in a search tation have high rights and low demonstrations in an
for crucial differences to quantitative compar- open system. Traditional regimes are similar to social
isons of many regimes in which authoritarian- democratic regimes except that they bottle up dis-
ism and democracy become the low and high content in what tends to be an elitist political system
ends of the same variable: degree of democracy creating more riots and demonstrations. On social
(Anderson, Fish, Hanson, and Roeder, 2001; closure they are split into colonizers with more open
naturalization and mobility who develop greater tol-
Arat, 1991; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; erance and rights, and non-colonizers with closed
Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Dawisha and naturalization and little social mobility who develop
Parrott, 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Linz and Stepan, more authoritarian regimes. And liberal societies who
1996; Vanhanen, 1997; Yashar, 1997). never had the franchise as a labor organizing issue,
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Figure 21.1. Robert Dahl’s Classification of Regimes.
developed weak trade unions, have much less left we might locate a great many other regimes –
party power, and in general have a weak state. The for example, the thinly ruled nomadic empires,
results are a low level of rights and obligations in urban federations, composite dynastic states, and
a society that is open to integrating immigrants, city-empires that governed much of Europe five
and the highest amounts of social mobility. ( Janoski,
1998:222–3)
hundred years ago.
What Dahl calls contestation enters his clas-
Although his book contains plenty of historical sification as a bundle of rights; at the liberal
material, this passage shows us Janoski organiz- extreme (1) freedom to form and join organiza-
ing his explanations around a search for neces- tions, (2) freedom of expression, (3) the right to
sary and sufficient conditions behind different vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) compe-
sorts of citizenship. tition by political leaders for support, (6) alter-
Rather than criticizing, codifying, or synthe- native sources of information, (7) free and fair
sizing these various approaches to typification elections, and (8) institutions for making gov-
of regimes and regime transitions, let me re- ernment policies depend on votes and other
construct just two exemplary analyses, one on expressions of preference. Regimes vary enor-
the Principle side of our continuum, the other mously, as Dahl declares, “in the extent to which
closer to the History end of the continuum. For the eight institutional conditions are openly
Principle, take Robert Dahl. For History, take available, publicly employed, and fully guaran-
S. E. Finer. teed to at least some members of the politi-
Robert Dahl’s treatment of approximations cal systems who wish to contest the conduct
to democracy has a distinctly Aristotelian air. of the government” (Dahl, 1975:119; see also
As summarized in Figure 21.1, Dahl’s use- Lindblom, 1977). His closed hegemonies accord
ful scheme distinguishes two dimensions of such rights to no one, his competitive oligarchies
variation: inclusiveness, the extent to which peo- extend them to a small elite, his inclusive hege-
ple under a given regime’s jurisdiction have the monies entertain no such rights, and his pol-
right to participate at all, and liberalization, the yarchies open them to much of the population.
extent to which participants in the regime have Note that under the label contestation Dahl is
rights to contest conditions of rule. Dahl adds to speaking about institutionalized rights to oppo-
Aristotle recognition of very inclusive regimes sition, not about the character or frequency of
that allow little public contestation, which Dahl contention.
calls inclusive hegemonies. He also leaves a large Noninstitutionalized public contention en-
open space among his four corner types, where ters Dahl’s story incognito, as demands (of
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428 Charles Tilly
PALACE
CHURCH NOBILITY
FORUM
Figure 21.2. Samuel Finer’s Typology of Regimes.
unspecified form) that regimes remove causes of Italian city-states, for example, Finer observes
of extreme inequality, as disputes in which one that thirteenth-century patriciates often closed
segment of the population appears to threaten their ranks to newcomers. “But as they did so,”
the survival of another, as the formation of revo- he remarks,
lutionary oppositions, and as foreign conquest.
His scheme therefore challenges us to specify They came under pressure from the less wealthy or
the interaction between regimes and the rights newly wealthy elements demanding a due share in
embedded within them, on one side, and con- office; the so-called ‘democratic’ movement. These
tentious politics that sometimes adopt rightful elements, characteristically, used their guild organi-
means and sometimes defy them, on the other. zations to channel their pressure, so that the strug-
The work at hand includes relating regimes gle looks like craft-guilds trying to break the politi-
and regime change to prevailing distributions of cal monopoly of the wealthier and more prestigious
merchant-guilds. In Italy . . . these excluded elements
(1) actors, actions, and identities in contentious formed themselves into sworn associations and called
politics, (2) conditions for emergence of con- themselves the ‘People’ – the popolo – and tried to
tentious politics, and (3) trajectories and out- assert their claims by revolt. But what happened in
comes of contentious politics. Italy is but the paradigm case of what was occur-
Samuel Finer’s posthumous History of Govern- ring in much of urbanized Europe as the thirteenth
ment provides another neo-Aristotelian handle century began to close: resistance to the oligarchy,
for the classification of regimes. After stipulat- violence, even revolution. (Finer, 1997:954)
ing that one can classify regimes along a ter-
ritorial dimension (city, national, or empire), Pursuing other ends, however, Finer does not
divide decision-making personnel into elites examine relationships – empirical or causal –
and masses, and distinguish decision implemen- among regime types, political transitions, and
tation by bureaucracies and armed forces, Finer forms of contentious politics. This chapter con-
ultimately settles, like Aristotle, for a focus on centrates, in contrast, on asking how and why
the social character of a regime’s ruling per- political contention varies from one regime type
sonnel. As represented in Figure 21.2, Finer to another, and how contention interacts with
identifies four pure types: Palace (monarch and movement from regime to regime.
following), Nobility (privileged class), Forum Following the premises laid out earlier, let
(segments or representatives of populace), and us approach that pair of questions here in pro-
Church (priesthood). The diagram’s double- found skepticism about the existence of neat
headed arrows portray likely paths of movement correspondences between regime type A and
from one regime type to another and likely lo- action X, emergence process Y, or trajectory Z.
cations of mixed regime types. On the contrary, we should search for rough
Contention thrusts its way repeatedly into empirical regularities in hope of accomplish-
Finer’s accounts of particular regimes. Speaking ing two distinct objectives: first, to specify what
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theoretically telling similarities and differences tuted actors lacking routine access to govern-
must be explained by any causal account of mental agents, and intermittent actors – outside
contention; second, to place firmly on the governments, international organizations, third
agenda how historically accumulated models, parties, and so on – based outside the zone of
memories, understandings, and social relations the government’s jurisdiction.
– for example, residues of the Mongol empire’s To make such a model fit the complexities of
previous hegemony in a given region – affect the real political processes, we must complicate it:
operation of contentious politics. The challenge show the government as less like a unitary star
is therefore to create two rough conceptual and more like a galaxy, with multiple centers
maps – one of regimes, the other of contentious and hierarchies, often competing, rather than a
politics – whose similarities and differences pose single unitary point; vary the sharpness of the
crucial questions of causation. polity’s boundary; allow for jagged or blurred
In meeting this challenge, we have deplorably edges to the government’s jurisdiction; recog-
little systematic analysis to build on. Analysts nize that contenders (both members and chal-
commonly recognize the concentration of social lengers) vary in strength and coherence; note
movements (narrowly defined) in parliamen- that a given individual or group within a gov-
tary democracies, the vulnerability of weakened ernment’s jurisdiction may belong to multiple
despotic regimes to revolution, the greater fre- contenders or none at all.
quency of coups d’état where military forces We must also put the model into mo-
exercise great autonomy, and a miscellany of tion, with the government shifting, contenders
near-tautologies such as the prevalence of strikes changing, and claim making fluctuating. Finally,
under industrial capitalism or the concentra- we must place polities within their historical and
tion of peasant revolts in large-landlord sys- cultural settings, recognizing at a minimum that
tems. But we have no well-established general previous and adjacent forms of government pro-
mapping of variation in the forms and dynam- vide powerful templates for the creation of new
ics of contentious politics across the multiple governments; as a consequence, history and cul-
types of governmental regime. Existing formu- ture constrain the operation of ostensibly gen-
lations, furthermore, suffer major weaknesses: eral processes such as repression and political
first, little insight into interactions between con- mobilization. We are dealing with mutual claim
tentious political processes and their settings, for making and responses to claim making among
example, in the ways in which contentious poli- unequally powerful contenders in the presence
tics incited by certain sorts of regime transforms of at least one government.
those regimes; second, no effective account of The simple polity model opens the way
interpretation, for example, in the interplay to a taxonomy of all regimes since Aristotle’s
between understandings that pervade routine era. The taxonomy shifts away from the
noncontentious politics and those that inform Aristotle/Finer emphasis on the identity of rul-
contentious claims. Much less, then, do we ing classes to the Dahlian emphasis on political
possess a dynamic causal account that explains relations between rulers and ruled. The classi-
interconnections between regimes and con- fication concentrates on relations between gov-
tention. ernments and polity members. It operates as a
Let us therefore take a leaf from Aristotle, function of five dimensions:
creating a simple taxonomy of regimes on the
way to reasoning about variations, trajectories, 1. Governmental capacity (actual impact
and transformations of contentious politics. The of governmental action on activities and
term regime, in this context, refers to any dis- resources within the government’s juris-
tinctive configuration of a polity: connections diction, relative to some standard of qual-
among a government, members of the polity ity and efficiency): low (0) to high (1)
defined by their routine access to agents of that 2. Breadth of polity membership: ruler
government, challengers consisting of consti- alone (0) to every person under a
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430 Charles Tilly
government’s jurisdiction belonging to at Although I make no effort at deriving precise

least one polity member (1) measures of these five elements here, we can
3. Equality in polity membership: radically imagine history since Aristotle’s time as unfold-
unequal (0) to every person who being before an immense scoreboard that displays
longs to a polity member has equal access five fluctuating numbers for each state. The ex-
to governmental agents and resources (1) planatory problem is then to identify and explain
strength of collective connections between those fluctuations, on one
4. Consultation among polity members hand, and changes in the character, intensity, and
with respect to governmental personnel, trajectories of contention, on the other.
policy, and resources, considered as a mul- The five dimensions are logically distinct: to
tiple of (a) how binding that consultation some extent we can analyze variation within
is, and (b) how effectively that consul- each dimension independently. Nevertheless,
tation controls governmental personnel, they (or rather the causes embedded in them) in-
policy, and resources: from nonbinding teract so strongly that much of the logical space
and ineffectual (0) to binding and deter- they imply is empirically empty. Low-capacity
mining (1) governments, for example, rarely or never pro-
5. Protection of polity members and per- vide their polity members with extensive pro-
sons belonging to them from arbitrary tection from arbitrary action by governmental
action by governmental agents: no pro- agents. Nor do very broad polity membership,
tection whatsoever (0) to complete pro- very unequal polity membership, and binding
tection (1) consultation of polity members long (if ever)
cohabit. In general, it looks as though substan-
Thus 10011 (high capacity, narrow polity mem- tial increases of governmental capacity propel
bership, unequal polity membership, strong broadening of polity membership when the es-
consultation, extensive protection) describes an sential resources for the government’s operation
idealized powerful oligarchy, or perhaps even come from the population within the govern-
a valid aristocracy in Aristotle’s view. The fig- ment’s jurisdiction, because struggle over those
ures 11100 (high capacity, broad polity member- resources lead to provisional bargains that es-
ship, equal polity membership, no consultation, tablish mutual rights and obligations between
no protection) describe an idealized totalitarian governmental agents and providers of resources.
state, Aristotle’s worst dream of tyranny. The se- Thus a whole theory of governmental trans-
ries 00000, finally, designates utter anarchy. All formation awaits articulation in the form of
real governments fall somewhere between, with causal propositions linking the five dimensions.
the average Western capitalist country, relative to For now, however, the salient questions concern
all states that have ever existed, scoring perhaps variation in contentious politics as a function of
.75 on capacity, .80 on breadth, .75 on equal- a regime’s location with respect to the five di-
ity, .70 on consultation, and .85 on protection. mensions taken singly.
Translated into Janoski’s regime types, the rela- Governmental capacity does not enter the
tive scores of democratic regimes might run as definition of democracy, yet it strongly af-
follows ( Janoski, 1998:33–8): fects the chances for democratic processes. In
principle, one could imagine broad political
participation, relative equality of individuals or
Social other social units, binding collective consulta-
Element Liberal Traditional Democratic
tion, and protection in the absence of an en-
Capacity .80 .85 .90 forcing government. Anarchists and utopians
Breadth .80 .85 .90 have often taken the relative democracy of some
Equality .85 .80 .95 crafts, shops, and local communities as war-
Consultation .80 .90 .85
Protection .75 .80 .95
rants for the feasibility of stateless democracy
on a large scale. The historical record, however,
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0 1
Capacity
A D
ZONE
N E
Breadth A M
OF
R O
C C
CITIZEN-
Equality
SHIP
H R
Y A
Consultation
C
Y
Protection
Figure 21.3. A Five-Dimensional Taxomony of Regimes.
suggests another conclusion: where govern- sive, polity membership involves some signifi-
ments collapse, other predators spring up. In cant share of a government’s subject population,
the absence of effective governmental power, some equality of access to government exists
people who control substantial concentrations among persons who belong to polity members,
of capital, coercion, or commitment generally consultation of those persons makes a differ-
use them to forward their own ends, thus cre- ence to governmental performance, and persons
ating new forms of oppression and inequality. belonging to polity members enjoy some pro-
If high governmental capacity does not define tection from arbitrary action can we reasonably
democracy, it looks like a nearly necessary con- begin to speak of mutual rights and obligations
dition for democracy on a large scale. directly binding governmental agents to whole
We cannot, however, draw from such an ob- categories of persons defined by their relation
servation the comforting inverse conclusion that to the government in question – that is, of cit-
expansion of governmental capacity reliably fos- izenship. Although citizenship of a sort bound
ters democracy. In fact, expanding governmen- elite members of Greek city-states to their gov-
tal capacity promotes tyranny more often than it ernments and elite members of many medieval
causes democracy to flower. In the abstract cal- European cities to their municipalities, on the
culation that sums over all governmental expe- whole citizenship at a national scale only be-
riences, the relationship between governmental came a strong, continuous presence during the
capacity and democracy is no doubt asymmet- nineteenth century. Figure 21.3 sums up the five
rically curvilinear: more frequent democracy dimensions, showing the locations of anarchy,
from medium to medium-high governmental democracy, and citizenship.
capacity, but beyond that threshold substantial Democracy builds on citizenship, but does
cramping of democratic possibilities as govern- not exhaust it. Indeed, most Western states cre-
mental agents come to control a very wide range ated some forms of citizenship after 1800, but
of activities and resources. over most of that period the citizenship in ques-
Citizenship, in this view, forms only on tion was too narrow, too unequal, too non-
the higher slopes of the five continua. Only consultative, and/or too unprotective to qualify
where governmental capacity is relatively exten- their regimes as democratic. The regimes we
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432 Charles Tilly
loosely call “totalitarian,” for example, typically tested election. This political culture of democ-
combined high governmental capacity with racy limits options for newcomers both because
relatively broad and equal citizenship, but af- it offers templates for the construction of new
forded neither binding consultation nor exten- regimes and because it affects the likelihood that
sive protection from arbitrary action by agents. existing powerholders – democratic or not – will
Some monarchies maintained narrow, unequal recognize a new regime as democratic.
citizenship while consulting the happy few Over the long run of human history, the vast
who enjoyed citizenship and protecting them majority of regimes have been undemocratic;
from arbitrary action by governmental agents; democratic regimes are rare, contingent, recent
those regimes thereby qualified as oligarchies. creations. Partial democracies have, it is true,
In searching for democratic regimes, we can formed intermittently at a local scale, for ex-
take relatively high governmental capacity for ample in villages ruled by councils incorporat-
granted because it is a necessary condition for ing most heads of household. At the scale of
strong consultation and protection. We will rec- a city-state, a warlord’s domain, or a regional
ognize a high-capacity regime as democratic federation, forms of government have run from
when it installs not only citizenship in general, dynastic hegemony to oligarchy, with narrow,
but broad citizenship, relatively equal citizen- unequal citizenship or none at all, little or no
ship, strong consultation of citizens, and signifi- binding consultation, and uncertain protection
cant protection of citizens from arbitrary action from arbitrary governmental action. Before the
by governmental agents. nineteenth century, large states and empires gen-
Both consultation and protection require fur- erally managed by means of indirect rule: sys-
ther stipulations. Although many rulers have tems in which the central power received trib-
claimed to embody their people’s will, only gov- ute, cooperation, and guarantees of compliance
ernments that have created concrete preference- on the part of subject populations from re-
communicating institutions have also installed gional powerholders who enjoyed great auton-
binding, effective consultation. In the West, rep- omy within their own domains. Seen from the
resentative assemblies, contested elections, ref- bottom, such systems often imposed tyranny on
erenda, petitions, courts, and public meetings of ordinary people. Seen from the top, however,
the empowered figure most prominently among they lacked capacity; the intermediaries supplied
such institutions; whether polls, discussions in resources, but they also set stringent limits to
mass media, or special-interest networks qualify rulers’ ability to govern or transform the world
in fact or in principle remains highly controver- within their presumed jurisdictions.
sial. Only the nineteenth century brought
On the side of protection, democracies typ- widespread adoption of direct rule, creation of
ically guarantee zones of toleration for speech, structures extending governmental communi-
belief, assembly, association, and public identity, cation and control continuously from central
despite generally imposing some cultural stan- institutions to individual localities or even to
dards for participation in the polity; a regime households, and back again. Even then, direct
that prescribes certain forms of speech, belief, rule ranged from the unitary hierarchies of
assembly, association, and public identity while centralized monarchy to the segmentation of
banning all other forms may maintain broad, federalism. On a large scale, direct rule made
equal citizenship, and a degree of consultation, substantial citizenship, and therefore democ-
but it slides away from democracy toward pop- racy, possible. Possible, but not likely, much
ulist authoritarianism as it qualifies protection. less inevitable: instruments of direct rule have
At the edge of the five-dimensional space that sustained many oligarchies, some autocracies, a
contains democratic regimes, furthermore, pre- number of party- and army-controlled states,
vious historical experience has laid down a set and a few fascist tyrannies. Even in the era of
of models, understandings, and practices con- direct rule most polities have remained far from
cerning such matters as how to conduct a con- democratic.
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Of course, we could array regimes along controlled resources, and likely governmental
other dimensions than capacity and democ- reactions become more crucial to those projects.
racy – size, multiplicity of internal governments, Conversely, in the presence of weak govern-
and directness of central control immediately mental capacity, most contentious politics oc-
come to mind. Let us retain our grip on the curs with little or no governmental involvement,
problem, however, by following the leads drawn and a high proportion of governmental inter-
from Aristotle, Dahl, and Finer. We concen- vention meets concerted resistance. A number
trate on two sorts of regime variation: from of empirical inferences follow from these argu-
undemocratic to democratic regimes and from ments, for example:
low-capacity to high-capacity governments. We
concentrate on these two aspects of regime 1. The greater governmental capacity, the
variation for several reasons: (1) because they larger share of all resources and activities
have attracted more theoretical and empirical within a polity affected by governmen-
attention from students of popular politics than tal action, hence the more likely claims
have such aspects as uniformity of governmen- directed at government agents.
tal administration or multiplicity of governmen- 2. The less governmental capacity, the
tal units; (2) because within recent centuries higher the proportion of all claim mak-
they have made very large differences to the ing consisting of violent competition be-
character, trajectories, and dynamics of con- tween nongovernmental groups.
tentious politics; and (3) because even over the 3. The less governmental capacity, the more
longer run the position of a regime with re- popular direct action against renegades,
spect to capacity and democracy has (as any good moral reprobates, and agents of central
Aristotelian would expect) profound effects on authority.
the quality of its contentious politics. 4. The less governmental capacity, the more
Let us return to the democratic pentagon: ca- clandestine retaliatory damage, the more
pacity, breadth, equality, consultation, and pro- concerted resistance to outside threats,
tection. I spell out a line of reasoning about the more localized action, the closer ties
regime variation in contentious politics as a of claim making to embedded (rather
dimension-by-dimension set of arguments – than detached) identities, and the more
call them conjectures, hypotheses, or specula- variation in claim making’s cultural con-
tions. The arguments rest on knowledge lim- tent.
ited mainly to recent Western experience. I offer 5. The less governmental capacity, the
no conjectures that I know to be contradicted higher the proportion of governmental
by substantial evidence. The conjectures there- interventions that consist of violent pre-
fore invite refutation from specialists who know dation and/or exemplary punishment,
better. hence the greater probability of violent
Why and how should we expect variation resistance.
in governmental capacity to affect contention? 6. Beyond some threshold, governmental
Most generally because higher capacity means capacity correlates with directness of
(a) governmental agents have the incentive and rule, hence with the likelihood that claim
means to intervene in a wider range of so- makers and objects of claims will be gov-
cial interactions within the government’s zone ernmental agents rather than empowered
of action, (b) governmental actions, for what- intermediaries or essentially autonomous
ever ends undertaken, affect a wider range of powerholders.
actors and interactions, hence stimulate the 7. Higher governmental capacity, on av-
interested parties to make offensive, defen- erage, depends on greater extraction of
sive, or deflecting claims of their own, (c) resources from the subject population,
whatever projects contenders and third parties hence produces a greater frequency of
undertake, governmental agents, government- contests over extraction of resources that
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434 Charles Tilly
subjects have committed to nongovern- 11. The narrower is polity membership, the
mental enterprises. higher the share of all open contention
that directly defies authorities, hence oc-
All these hypotheses lead to concrete compar- curs at a distance from the forms of claim
isons among regimes and forms of contentious making prescribed or rewarded by au-
politics. They have the advantage of straight- thorities.
forward research implications, but the disadvan- 12. The broader is polity membership, the
tage of focusing on static high/low compari- higher the share of all open contention
sons. that occurs at the immediate edges of
What about breadth of polity membership? prescribed political forms, for example
At the narrowest, no one who is subject to as social movements or diversion of au-
the authority of a given government enjoys any thorized public ceremonies.
rights or mutual obligations binding them to 13. A curvilinear relationship exists be-
governmental agents and governmental agents tween the breadth of polity membership
to them. At the broadest, everyone who is sub- and the frequency with which dissident
ject to that authority enjoys citizenship. Cat- polity members bid for support of non-
egorical citizenship is then either identical to members by promoting their inclusion:
or highly correlated with polity membership. rarely in the case of extremely narrow
With that understanding, we might expect to or extremely broad polity membership,
find a strong difference in means of contentious more frequently in between.
claim making between narrow and broad poli- 14. The greater a split within a polity, the
ties, with (a) claim makers (especially nonmem- more frequent such coalitions. Thus a
bers of the polity) in narrow polities tending to dynamic of inclusion, exclusion, and
approach governmental power indirectly and/or contention begins to emerge. Once
covertly through informal networks, corruption again, the hypotheses lead to fairly crisp
of governmental agents, external power-hold- static comparisons, but fall short of spec-
ers, terror, or subversion and (b) challengers in ifying dynamic cause/effect relations.
broad polities frequently adopting means simi-
lar to those employed by polity members – al- And equality of polity membership? Perfect
though just different enough to call attention to equality of polity membership does not re-
their distinctness and disruptive potential. quire equality of wealth, power, or well-being,
Here are some more specific hypotheses that but absolutely identical relations of all to gov-
follow from this line of reasoning: ernmental agents. Absolute inequality of polity
membership does not require deep inequal-
8. Broadening polity membership incites ity of life condition, but person-to-person and
alliance-formation and claims of recog- group-to-group differentiation of relations to
nition, satisfaction, and membership by governmental agents. (It is nevertheless probably
still-excluded actors. true, as Aristotle suggested, that great inequal-
9. Narrowing polity membership incites ity of material condition promotes inequality of
anticipatory resistance and alliance for- polity membership because affluent actors use
mation by threatened polity members. their means to influence the political process
10. The narrower is polity membership, the and the performances of governmental agents,
more frequently subjects will approach thus increasing inequality of polity member-
governmental power indirectly and/or ship itself.) No government has ever extended
covertly through informal networks, perfect equality of polity membership, if only
through corruption of governmental because all exclude certain segments of the
agents, through external powerholders, subject population – notably children, felons,
through terror, or through subversion. and certified incompetents – from full benefits
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of governmental power. Even very democratic greater the inequality of polity member-
governments with extensive rights of citizenship (see Tilly, 1998:chapter 7).
ship differentiate benefits and obligations of cit-
izenship by gender, age, military service, penal Thus, according to this line of argument, both
status, and officeholding. equality and equalization have strong impacts on
These arguments have strong implications for the character of contentious politics. To move
contention-by-regime maps. The more equal into dynamic territory, however, we would have
polity membership is, for example, the more to look much more closely at actual processes
the polity will respond to challengers’ effective that alter patterns of inequality.
displays of WUNC: worthiness, unity, num- Binding consultation? Democratic theorists
bers, and commitment. (This should be the often focus on elections as the critical institu-
case because WUNC signals a contender’s cations. Popular elections have, indeed, served as
pacity to intervene effectively in routine con- a crucial technology for consultation – bind-
sultation and to attract support of other con- ing or otherwise. But note that even in strongly
tenders in doing so.) The more unequal polity electoral regimes an interplay typically occurs
membership, on the other hand, the greater among electoral campaigns as such and (a) dis-
the differences among channels by which displays of potential electoral strength by collective
tinct segments of the population make claims, actors outside of electoral campaigns, (b) legisla-
hence the greater the variability in condi- tive performance, (c) candidate-selection pro-
tions for effectiveness of a given actor’s claims. cesses, including payment for campaign costs,
(“Channels” means not only the course of and (d) payoffs to supporters. In any case,
claim making itself but also coalition formation, some degree of binding consultation also occurs
characteristic interactions with authorities, cen- in various sorts of regimes through operation
tripetal vs. centrifugal orientations, and reper- of patron/client networks, virtual representa-
toires.) Other related hypotheses include the tion, plebiscites, recall, referendum, consulta-
following: tive assemblies, polls, petitions, lobbying, pay-
offs, public rituals, and weapons of the weak.
15. The more equal polity membership, the Let us concentrate here relatively public, trans-
greater the frequency with which losers parent, and institutionalized forms of binding
in binding consultation accept the out- consultation.
come, hence the rarer contentious out- This reasoning suggests strong interactions
comes to such consultations, including between contentious politics and binding con-
violence. sultation. The more extensive and binding is
16. The more equal polity membership, the consultation of polity members, for example,
greater the resemblance among the claim the more shared interpretations arise from pub-
making repertoires of different con- lic discussion. Conversely, the less extensive and
tenders. (This despite incessant efforts at binding is consultation, the more shared inter-
marginal innovation differentiating one pretations emerge from unofficial, underground
claimant or claim from the next: variety conversations and bifurcate between (a) subver-
within an extremely limited compass.) sive indirect discourse of the sort that James
17. Equality of polity membership, net of Scott (1985) calls “weapons of the weak” and
other effects, bears a curvilinear relation- (b) public dramaturgy drawing on unmistakable
ship to size of polity: greater for interme- references to widely known symbols, legends,
diate sizes than for very large and very events, dates, and persons. More detailed hy-
small polities. potheses follow:
18. The more extensive exploitation and op-
portunity hoarding (hence categorical 19. Predominant forms of consultation (e.g.,
inequality) in the base population, the elections vs. audiences at court) strongly
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436 Charles Tilly
affect the location and forms of con- 27. The more uniform is consultation across
tentious politics, especially in the presence an entire population (obviously a function
of democracy and extensive govern- of breadth and equality of polity member-
mental capacity. Parapolitical and con- ship) the more similar are claim making
tentious claim making shadow routine repertoires across that population.
politics. 28. Claim making increases with social, tem-
20. The more extensive and binding the con- poral, and geographic proximity to major
sultation of polity members, the greater consultations.
the clustering of contention around peri- 29. Mobilized contenders excluded from ma-
meters of institutionalized consultation. jor consultations commonly act to disrupt,
21. The more extensive and binding is con- counter, or intervene in those consulta-
sultation of polity members, the greater tions.
the prominence of detached (rather than 30. The less binding consultation, the more
embedded) identities in collective claim sensitive the response of contenders to
making. fluctuations in opportunity and threat
22. Presence of civil liberties – freedom of on two fronts: change in their relations
speech, assembly, association, and belief as to the current regime, change in rela-
well as due process with respect to govern- tions between the regime and outside
ment agents’ seizure of persons and prop- actors.
erty – enhances consultation and channels
contention toward perimeters of institu- What about protection of polity members
tionalized consultation. against arbitrary action of governmental agents?
23. Extensive binding consultation promotes Here we enter a conceptual and theoretical
adoption of claim making forms that de- thicket for two reasons: first, because “arbi-
pend on extensive organization and prepa- trary” implies a standard of even-handed due
ration rather than springing from noncon- process that is extremely difficult to state gen-
tentious daily routines such as marketing, erally and a priori, and, second, because even
working, drinking, or attending religious more so than binding consultation, protection
services. involves incessant negotiation of particular ar-
24. Extensive binding consultation promotes rangements with governmental agents, as when
forms of claim making that broadcast ca- demonstrators clear their planned marches with
pacity, threat, and/or intentions to act – police or welfare administrators bend their rules
both individual and collective – rather to mitigate hardship. Nevertheless, we can per-
than immediately engaging the actions in severe by thinking of a rough scale including
question. Such forms dramatize the wor- positive elements such as publicity of govern-
thiness, unity, numbers and commitment mental claims on citizens, routine availability of
both of direct participants and of popula- review and redress, and uniformity of agents’
tions they claim to represent. practice across social categories. We can also
25. Extensive binding consultation pro- consider negative elements such as absence of
motes targeting of regional or national government-protected paramilitary forces, se-
power holders, including governmental cret forms and loci of detention, or extensive
agents. domestic espionage. This general approach sug-
26. Extensive binding consultation promo- gests strong hypotheses concerning intercon-
tes activation of detached collective id- nections between protection and contentious
entities: identities broader than or sep- politics, for example:
arate from those that inform routine
social relations (e.g., workers in general 31. The more protection, the greater the clus-
rather than machinists in this particular tering of contention around perimeters of
shop). institutionalized politics, and the less the
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employment of forbidden means of claim bust analogies, and (4) use it again to specify
making. scope conditions for robust analogies when they
32. The less protection, the higher the pro- appear.
portion of claim making directed to To bring some of these scattered arguments
seizures of governmental power, fragmen- together and confirm the utility of concen-
tation of governmental power, or estab- trating on governmental capacity and democ-
lishment of autonomy from governmental racy/undemocracy, let us explore implications
power. of the scheme for a crucial problem in con-
33. The less protection, the greater the cen- tentious politics: similarity in repertoires among
trality of patron/client relations in con- different forms of contentious and noncon-
tention. tentious political interaction. By contentious
34. The less protection, the greater the repertoires I mean collective claim-making rou-
propensity of all contenders to acquire tines that characterize any pair of politically con-
their own coercive force. stituted actors. The theatrical metaphor con-
35. The less protection, the higher the pro- veys the sense in which such claim making
portion of claim-making events involving generally consists not of bureaucratic form fil-
violence. ing but of improvisatory and contingent perfor-
36. The less protection, the greater the re- mances, based on previous experience, draw-
liance of claim-making challengers on ing on existing understandings, social relations,
protected social locations and on identi- and known practices. Contentious repertoires
ties grounded in everyday social relations – always include limited numbers of such perfor-
that is, embedded identities. mances, far fewer and far narrower than the in-
37. The more differentiated protection by so- teractions of which the parties would be tech-
cial category, the greater the differentia- nically capable.
tion of contentious repertoires. Let us generalize the idea of repertoire to
designate all the claim-making performances
This long string of hypotheses is, of course, no commonly employed within a given regime. In
more than that: a set of reasoned conjectures general, we should expect high-capacity gov-
about what we might expect close examination ernments to feature more uniform means of
of regime variation in contentious politics to claim making (whether contentious or other-
show us, constrained by whatever I know (or wise) than low-capacity governments for several
think I know) about actual variation in con- reasons: high-capacity governments connect
tentious politics within Western regimes over dispersed actors, including challengers, more
the past few centuries. It therefore constitutes an effectively with each other, thus promoting
agenda for inquiry, not a set of firm conclusions. their mutual learning and collaboration in the
My inquiry, furthermore, does not aim at em- formulation of claims; obtrusive high-capacity
pirical generalizations linking types of con- governments themselves generate higher pro-
tentious politics to types of regime, much less portions of all contention, hence imprint their
general laws from which such empirical gener- own rhythms and structures on claim-making
alizations might follow. Instead, I am trying to routines; and such governments also tend to
(1) establish rough empirical regularities spec- create uniform administrative organization
ifying what sorts of variation valid theories of throughout their territories as compared with
contentious politics must explain, (2) formu- the regional particularism of low-capacity gov-
late partial but powerful causal analogies that ernments, a circumstance that increases the sim-
cross boundaries of regimes and contentious po- ilarity of situations stimulating and channeling
litical forms, (3) use the map of variation to claim making in different segments of the
promote study of contentious episodes differ- population under a high-capacity government’s
ing significantly in setting and form, thereby control. For these reasons, modular repertoires –
demanding analytical finesse and requiring ro- bundles of performances easily transferred from
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438 Charles Tilly
HIGH CAPACITY UNDEMOCRATIC HIGH CAPACITY DEMOCRATIC
PRESCRIBED CONTEN-
PRE-
TIOUS SCRIBED CONTEN-
TOLER- TIOUS
ATED
TOLERATED
FORBIDDEN
FORBIDDEN
LOW CAPACITY UNDEMOCRATIC LOW CAPACITY DEMOCRATIC
PRE- CONTENTIOUS
SCRIBED CONTENTIOUS
PRE-
TOLERATED SCRIBED
TOLERATED
FORBIDDEN
FORBIDDEN
Figure 21.4. Configurations of Political Interaction under Different Types of Regimes.
one locality, population, issue, or organization performances, but they tolerate quite a range;
to another – should prevail in high-capacity whereas military conscription, tax payments,
governments. and replies to censuses come close to being com-
What about differences in repertoires be- pulsory for affected parties in democracies, even
tween democratic and undemocratic regimes? registering to vote remains voluntary in most
Figure 21.4 schematizes a crude first cut. It democratic regimes. Conversely, high-capacity
argues that both governmental capacity and nondemocratic regimes commonly prescribe a
democracy affect overlaps among prescribed, wide range of public political performances
tolerated, forbidden, and contentious public po- while tolerating few others. They also forbid
litical performances. How? First, democratic a much wider variety of claim-making perfor-
regimes absolutely prescribe relatively few such mances.
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Second, democratic regimes draw con- cies build on relatively low-capacity govern-
tentious claim making toward their prescribed ments, any leads we can find to the operation
and tolerated forms of expression because access of low-capacity democratic regimes should illu-
to power and recognition regularly pass through minate struggles going on in the contemporary
effective uses of those forms; thus electoral cam- world.
paigns and sessions of legislative assemblies be- These conjectures about variability of reper-
come foci of claim making, even on the part toires require refinement and empirical veri-
of contenders that currently exercise little or no fication. They nevertheless fit recent Western
power. High-capacity nondemocratic regimes, history well enough to encourage us in thinking
in contrast, typically exclude contentious issues that regimes varying along the two major axes –
and actors from prescribed and tolerated forms governmental capacity and undemocracy/
of claim making, with the consequence that dis- democracy – generate significantly different
sidents make their claims either by covert use qualities of contentious politics. Governmen-
of tolerated performances such as public cere- tal capacity and democratization therefore get
monies or by deliberate adoption of forbidden much more attention than other aspects of
performances such as armed attacks. regimes. But we break down the analysis of de-
But governmental capacity matters as well. mocratization into four dimensions: breadth of
According to the arguments embedded in Fig- polity membership, equality of polity member-
ure 21.4, low-capacity undemocratic regimes ship, strength of consultation, and protection.
tolerate a relatively wide range of contentious At our most general, then, we are asking how
claim making, for three reasons: (1) they lack a regime’s position within the five-dimensional
the means to prescribe many performances, and space interacts with the character, trajectory,
therefore settle for tribute, ritual obeisance, and and dynamics of contentious politics within that
a few other services from subjects; (2) they regime.
also lack the means to police small-scale con- Here is the first question that emerges from
tentious claim making throughout their nomi- such an agenda: How does the character of
nal jurisdictions; (3) their efforts to impose cul- a regime affect (a) the forms of contentious
tural and organizational uniformity throughout politics that occur within its perimeters and
their jurisdictions remain weak and ineffectual, (b) the dynamics of contentious politics within
with the consequence that actions, emergence its perimeters? Our second question follows:
processes, and trajectories of contentious poli- How do changes in a regime’s character affect
tics vary greatly from region to region and sector changes in forms and dynamics of contention?
to sector. Translation: how do “changes in (1) govern-
On the democratic side, similar arguments mental capacity, (2) breadth of polity mem-
apply. Low-capacity democratic regimes have bership, (3) equality of polity membership,
rarely formed in history and even more rarely (4) strength of collective consultation, (5) pro-
survived; most have taken no more than a lo- tection of polity members from arbitrary ac-
cal scale. When they have existed, however, they tion by governmental agents” affect changes in
have typically prescribed few performances, tol- “(6) repertoires of contention, (7) paths of claim
erated a great many, and passed a great deal of making, (8) parties to claims?”
their public life in contention among conflict- Which leads effortlessly to the third question:
ing claims, factions, and forms of action. From How do changes in repertoires of contention,
long Mediterranean experience with city-states, paths of claim making, and parties to claims af-
Aristotle recognized the vulnerability of low- fect characteristics and trajectories of regimes?
capacity democratic regimes to takeover by fac- More particularly, we are searching for par-
tions and to external conquest. They also ap- tial causal analogies in these respects that
pear to fragment easily into polities organized cut across considerable ranges of regimes and
around rival – or at least distinct – governments. contention. Those sought-for causal analo-
Because many of today’s emerging democra- gies three main clusters of phenomena: actors,
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440 Charles Tilly
actions, and identities in contentious politics; change they imply; those static relations de-
the emergence of contention; and trajectories serve closer empirical attention. In a partly sep-
of contentious struggle. arate enterprise, we should be examining such
Most of the answers I have proposed here change processes within well-defined histor-
cling to comparative statics: they say what sorts ical settings where we can identify available
of political contention we might expect to find models of political practice as well as current
at different positions along the five continua or international constraints on regimes and con-
at best what sorts of changes we might expect tentions, for example, in the turbulence of East-
to see as a regime moved along the continua. ern Europe’s postcommunist political change. A
That happens partly because taxonomic reason- third somewhat different research line follows
ing invites comparative statics, partly because the particular mechanisms such as brokerage and
causal arguments in and behind these conjec- identity formation across different regimes and
tures remain gross or poorly articulated. varieties of contention, for example, by looking
Nevertheless, reflection on regime variation for causal analogies between their operation in
and contention opens a promising program nationalism, ethnic conflict, and nonethnic so-
for research. The comparative program locates cial movements. The agenda will keep students
different contentious processes along the five of comparative politics and political contention
dimensions of regimes and the trajectories of busy for quite a while.
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chapter twenty-two
Theories and Practices of Neocorporatism
Wolfgang Streeck and Lane Kenworthy
The modern territorial state and the capi- Variation among modern types of government,
talist market economy superseded a political– between the utopian extremes of anarcho-
economic order that consisted of a plethora syndicalism and Rousseauian radical liberalism,
of corporate communities endowed with tradi- rotates around the relationship between terri-
tional rights and obligations, such as churches, torial and associative rule (Table 22.1). In the
estates, cities, and guilds. Organized collectiv- Ständestaat (state of estates) conceived in the
ities of all sorts, more or less closely related to constitutional debates of nineteenth-century
the economic division of labor, regulated coop- Germany as a conservative alternative to liberal
eration and competition among their members democracy, territorial rule is exercised by dele-
and negotiated their relations with each other. gates of corporate groups, which are the princi-
While themselves changing under the impact pal constituents of the state. Later, in the twen-
of modernization, they often resisted the rise of tieth century, dictatorial state rule often used
territorial bureaucratic rule and the spread of state-instituted corporate bodies as transmission
market relations, sometimes well into the twen- belts of a governing party; this is what Schmit-
tieth century. But ultimately they proved un- ter (1974) referred to as “state corporatism.” In
able to prevent the victory of the state form of European postwar democracies, by comparison,
political organization and of the self-regulating territorial rule, which now took place through
market as the dominant site of economic ex- parliamentary representation, shared the public
change. Modern liberalism, both political and space with social groups organized on a more
economic, in turn aimed at abolishing all forms voluntary basis and entitled to various forms
of intermediary organization that intervene be- of collective participation and self-government,
tween the individual and the state or the mar- provided they recognized the primacy of par-
ket. In the end, however, it failed to eliminate liamentary democracy. This, in essence, is what
collectivism and had to accommodate itself to the literature is called in “neocorporatism” or
both political faction and economic coopera- “liberal corporatism” (Schmitter, 1974; Lehm-
tion. bruch, 1977). Finally, in more strictly liberal po-
Twenty-first-century political communities litical systems, organized groups are tolerated
are all organized by territorial nation-states. But by the constitutional order on condition that
these had to learn to incorporate organized they limit themselves to lobbying the parliament
collectivities and elements of a collective–asso- and refrain from claiming rights, however cir-
ciative order in their different configurations cumscribed, to authoritative decision making.
of bureaucratic hierarchy and free markets. As a type of governance, this configuration of
441
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442 Wolfgang Streeck and Lane Kenworthy
Table 22.1. Type of Government as a Result of Interaction Between Territorial State and
Associative Order
Territorial State Type of Government Associative Order

Does not exist Anarcho-Syndicalism Prevents state formation
Guild Socialism
Constituted by associations Ständestaat Controls territorial rule
Controls associations State Corporatism Constituted by the state
Sharing public space with Liberal Corporatism Group self-government under
associations Neocorporatism parliamentary democracy
Tolerates associations Pluralism Parliamentary lobby
Outlaws associations Radical Liberalism Does not exist
territorial state and associative order is here re- illegal any intermediary organization that repre-
ferred to as “pluralism” (Schmitter, 1974).1 sented subsections of the citizenry and thereby
Our discussion is divided into five sections. interfered with its direct relationship with the
The first describes the origins of neocorpo- state.
ratism and its conceptualization in political In the spirit of thinkers such as Rousseau
thought, and the second does the same for the (1964) and Madison (1973), nineteenth-century
early post-World War II period. The third sec- liberalism remained suspicious of collective or-
tion addresses the distinction between corpo- ganization below the nation-state, holding on
ratism and pluralism and then discusses corpo- to an atomistic image of political life in which
ratist organizational structure, concertation, and autonomous individuals were the only legiti-
private-interest government. Section 4 reviews mate constituents of the political order. Sub-
theory and research on the impact of corpo- national collectivism of all sorts, including re-
ratism on economic performance. In the fifth ligious organization, was suspected of diverting
section we address current tendencies that un- loyalty from the national state and was seen as a
dermine democratic corporatism. threat to both political unity and individual lib-
erty. Similarly in the emerging capitalist market
economy, collective organization and coopera-
corporatism and the political tion were perceived as conspiracy against free
constitution of modern society competition. Not surprisingly, the political and
economic strands of liberal anticollectivism eas-
In the French Revolution, modern politics be- ily blended into each other.
gan as a revolt against a political order that rec- When faced with political or economic or-
ognized people, not as individuals, but only as ganization among its citizenry, the liberal state
members of established social groups. The revo- felt called upon to suppress factionalism or con-
lution abolished the estates and postulated a di- spiracy in restraint of trade. However, state inter-
rect, unmediated relationship between citizens vention in the name of political unity, individual
and a state conceived as a republic of individuals. freedom and economic liberty, to safeguard the
A law passed by the Assembly in 1791 – the Loi proper individualism of the republic and of the
le Chapelier, named after its author – declared marketplace, may have paradoxical implications.
A political doctrine that relies on a strong state
1 to make society fit its premises borders on to-
For a differing use of “pluralism” that encompasses
corporatism and specifies the above type of pluralism as talitarianism. In societies in which collectivism
“hyperpluralism,” see Dahl (1982:chap. 4). On “organi- and factionalism are deeply rooted, enforce-
zational pluralism,” see Hicks and Lechner (this volume). ment by a strong state of a liberal political and
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Theories and Practices of Neocorporatism 443
economic constitution may require considerable Korporationen – as the “second moral root” of
repression. Not only may this infringe on the the state alongside the family, was read by some
very liberty it is claimed to protect, but it may as a call for a return from egalitarian parliamen-
also become too demanding on the state and re- tarism to a corporatist state of estates. Thus Adam
sult in an overturn not just of the government, Mueller (1922 [1809]) developed for Metter-
but of the republic as well. nich the concept of a Klassenstaat (class state)
The paradoxes of liberalism become partic- in which organized groups would jointly reg-
ularly obvious where collective organization is ulate production and coordinate their interests
related to social class. Working class collectivism through negotiations, in ways radically differ-
in nineteenth-century Europe was partly a rem- ent from French liberalism and Adam Smith’s
nant of premodern feudal society. But it also of- market economy. Although this never became
fered protection against a liberal economy that more than a constitutional blueprint, it later pro-
subjected sellers of labor power to the same self- vided the background for a search for a synthe-
regulating markets as owners of capital. Trade sis between liberal and traditional elements of
unions and mass parties enabled the working political order. Given that countries like Ger-
class to take advantage of freedom of contract many had not gone through a radical–liberal
and of democracy and share in the benefits of Jacobine revolution, the inclusion in the mod-
the new order (Marshall, 1964). That they in- ern state of group-based forms of nonmajori-
terfered with the free play of market forces and tarian governance seemed less paradoxical there
intervened between the individual and the state than in France, where this required the over-
mattered less for them. throw of a revolutionary tradition (Lehmbruch,
A state attacking working class organization 2001).
in the name of either political individualism or By the end of the nineteenth century, the
free labor markets risked being perceived by liberal program was challenged by various sorts
a sizeable number of its citizens as an instru- of collectivism in the name of a need for so-
ment of class rule. As the nineteenth century cial reconstruction after what was widely re-
went on, then, the question became how to garded as a failure of the “liberal experiment”
accommodate organized collectivities in a lib- (Polanyi, 1944). To the European Right, a cor-
eral polity and free-market economy. Appar- poratist Ständestaat remained an alternative to
ently national societies were too large and too liberal democracy well into the interwar period
heterogeneous for the state to be their only focus of the twentieth century. Corporatist thinking
of social integration and political loyalty – just deplored the disorder and social conflict brought
as the market was too anonymous and unpre- about by party competition and the market
dictable for individuals, especially those who economy. Catholic social doctrine, in its attempt
had nothing to sell but their labor power, to have to limit the power of the national state with
confidence in it without additional protection. its liberal–secular tendencies in general, and its
The stubborn persistence of collectivism inside antagonism toward Roman Catholic “interna-
the nation-state and the market indicated that tionalism” in particular, favored political rep-
the Rousseauian program of atomistic republi- resentation on the basis of professional groups,
canism was in need of amendment. sometimes with and sometimes without inde-
If factions were unavoidable, and rooting pendent trade unions. It also insisted on the
them out was either impossible or possible “natural” right of subnational, or prenational,
only at the price of liberty or domestic peace, social groups to an autonomous conduct of their
what status to assign to them in a modern affairs, mainly in defense of Catholic charities
political order? In Germany and the coun- and schools against being absorbed in compul-
tries where German intellectual influence was sory national social security and educational sys-
strong, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1983 [1820]), tems. In countries with a significant Catholic
which described corporate associations – community, this issued in a constitutional
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principle of “subsidiarity,” under which the sensually adjusting production to the needs of
state must refrain from activities that smaller so- society, end the extraction of surplus value, and
cial entities can perform by themselves and in- as a result make organized repression by a bu-
deed is obliged to help them independently to reaucratic state apparatus unnecessary. Left syn-
govern their affairs. dicalist corporatism shared with the corporatism
More radical corporatists proposed to resolve of the Right its collectivism and its rejection
the social and economic crises of modernity by of the liberal state and the market economy,
compulsory organization of society along the while it differed from it in its anticapitalism,
lines of industrial sectors and producer groups, antinationalism, and antistatism, as well as in its
which were to serve as the modern equivalents progressive culture and politics (Korsch, 1969
of the guilds and estates of the past. Joint organi- [1922]).
zation of workers and employers as “producers” Why did both Left and Right versions of
in “vertical” sectoral corporations was to put an a corporatist political order fail to become a
end to class conflict and replace it with coopera- viable alternative to the modern nation-state?
tion in production. Represented by hierarchical One reason was that a polity based on orga-
organizational structures, the relations of coop- nized producer groups tended to be incompat-
eration, competition, and exchange that made ible with the social and economic dynamism
up the industrial economy were to be returned of a modern economy and society. As Max
to political control. Mussolini in Italy, Franco in Weber (1964:221 ff.; 2002 [1918]) had already
Spain, and Salazar in Portugal conceived of the pointed out, a Ständestaat presupposes a static so-
political organization of the corporatist state as cial structure that makes it possible to assign each
reflecting the organic structure of society and its individual to one of a small number of broad
economic organization, thus providing for supe- but still internally homogeneous social cate-
rior governability in the national interest com- gories. The more dynamic a society becomes,
pared to the conflict and disorder caused by the Weber argued, the more frequently individuals
abstract formalism of parliamentary democracy have to be reassigned, new categories created
and by the vagaries of free markets. Whereas tra- and others abolished, while the total number of
ditional corporatists had called upon organized groups would be continuously rising with grow-
groups to limit the power of the modern state, ing functional differentiation. A polity modeled
the state corporatism of the twentieth century after the group structure of a modern society
tried to use corporatist organization as an in- would therefore be ultimately unmanageable.
strument of state rule. Similarly, economic corporatism, such as syn-
Antiparliamentarism was not confined to the dicalism or any other form of “producer-based
Right, and neither was the idea of a political and democracy,” would be governed by producer
economic order based on corporate associations conservatism resisting adjustment of production
instead of individuals (Table 22.1). Syndical- to changing demand. Ultimately it must amount
ism, anarcho-syndicalism, guild socialism and to a dictatorship of producers over consumers,
similar movements, which survived in different acceptable only in a world of stable technol-
strength in a number of countries until World ogy and static, traditionalist demand for a nar-
War II, strove for a polity of self-governing “pro- row range of elementary products and services.
ducer groups” that had neither place nor need Indeed in the real world, no corporatist or-
for capitalists, state bureaucrats, parliaments, and der, whether rightist or leftist, ever survived for
political parties. Workers councils – Räte in more than a few years. In the Soviet Union as
German and Soviets in Russian – freely elected well as in the right-wing corporatist regimes of
and easily recalled by their constituents, the “as- the interwar period, the councils and syndicates
sociated producers,” were to take the place of that were supposed to be the ultimate author-
both the market and the state. Councils were to ity soon came under the control of a dictato-
plan the economy democratically from below, rial state party sufficiently detached from the
overcome the “anarchy of the market” by con- social structure to override static group interests
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in the name of economic progress or military eral parliamentary democracy and the market
mobilization. What on the surface remained a economy reached its high point in a number of
corporatist constitution soon became a facade European countries after World War II. In the
for dictatorial state rule. 1970s, it came to be referred to as neocorpo-
An alternative to liberalism on the one ratism or liberal corporatism.
hand and syndicalism, the Ständestaat, and state One of the first to provide a coherent ra-
corporatism on the other were attempts to ac- tionale for a liberal corporatist political order
commodate organized groups in liberal demo- was the French sociologist Emile Durkheim
cratic polities and find some form of coex- (1858–1917). In the Preface to the 1902 second
istence of territorially and functionally based edition of his Division of Labor in Society (1893) –
political representation. In the United States in titled “Some Notes on Occupational Groups” –
particular, but to differing degrees also in the Durkheim reminded the reader of the main
other Anglo–American countries, this involved result of his investigation, namely that the pro-
recognition of organized collectivities as inter- gressive functional differentiation of modern so-
est groups, with constitutional rights to lobby ciety is a source of both disorder and order, of
the democratically elected parliament. “Plural- anarchy and anomy as well as of social integra-
ist” admission of organized interests was con- tion. Anomy, according to Durkheim, is caused
ditional on acceptance by the latter of a strict by the rise of “industrial society” and the in-
division between themselves and state author- creasing importance in social life of a highly dif-
ity. To prevent organized interests from “captur- ferentiated economy, whereas integration may
ing” the state, membership in them had to be result from mutual interdependence of actors
strictly voluntary and their organizations prefer- specializing on different activities. For inter-
ably small, specialized, internally homogeneous, dependence to result in cooperation, however,
democratic, and in constant competition with mutual trust is required, which in turn pre-
each other and with other organizations under- supposes reliable rules. These a liberal state
taking to represent the same interests (Truman, cannot on its own provide: “Economic life,
1951). because it is specialized and grows more special-
In Continental Europe by comparison, Ro- ized every day, escapes (the state’s) competence
man Catholic and social democratic traditions and . . . action” (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]:5).
merged to give rise to various forms of “sharing This is no longer so if “professional associations”
public spaces” between states and organized so- organized to reflect the structure of economic
cial groups (Crouch, 1993). Subnational com- relations are charged with elaborating the gen-
munities that the rising nation-state had been eral rules made by the state to fit their special cir-
unable or unwilling to break up were con- cumstances (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]:25). Cor-
ceded semipublic authority to make binding ci- porate associations are also optimally suited to
sions for and enter into commitments on behalf enforce professional codes of conduct, provide
of their members, in exchange for coordinat- mutual assistance, regulate professional training,
ing their core activities with the government. and so on. “A society,” Durkheim concluded,
Social groups that were allowed various forms “composed of an infinite number of unorga-
of self-government in the public domain, typi- nized individuals, that a hypertrophied state is
cally under de facto obligatory if not compul- forced to oppress and contain, constitutes a ver-
sory membership, included churches, farmers, itable sociological monstrosity . . . A nation can
unions, employers, small business, and the lib- be maintained only if, between the state and the
eral professions. The resulting blurring of the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of
boundary between the state and civil society in- secondary groups near enough to the individ-
volved a delicate balance between individualism uals to attract them strongly in their sphere of
and collectivism, individual rights and group action and, in this way, drag them into the gen-
rights, and competition and cooperation. The eral torrent of social life . . . ” (Durkheim, 1964
integration of organized groups into both lib- [1893]:28).
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democratic state building, free under legal immunities, protection, and even
collective bargaining, and facilitation. As T. H. Marshall (1964) pointed
neocorporatism after 1945 out, collective industrial agreements could be
regarded by governments as economic contracts
The “postwar settlement” in the European negotiated in the market, and thus as an outflow
countries under American influence after 1945 of civil rights rather than as coercion by illegit-
was a successful attempt to reconcile a capi- imate political force. Whereas private compul-
talist economy with mass democracy and pre- sion would have challenged the territorial state’s
vent a return of the political and social divi- monopoly of force, private contracts were in a
sions that had destabilized Europe in the inter- liberal order properly left to themselves.
war period. Central to it was the neocorporatist Free collective bargaining became widely es-
inclusion of worker collectivism in the liber- tablished immediately after World War I, only
alized political economies of the reconstructed to be eliminated again in the 1920s and 1930s in
European nation-states. Like in World War I, many countries in the name of national unity,
labor inclusion was prefigured by wartime poli- individual liberty, free competition, economic
cies of national unity. It was also a consequence planning, or all of the above. Its worldwide
of the leading role of the Left in antifascist re- return after 1945 was part of the complex po-
sistance movements, the collaboration of tradi- litical compromise that was the postwar settle-
tional elites with right-wing governments or the ment. Using different legal instruments, demo-
German occupation, and the presence of a com- cratic states exempted unions from conspiracy
munist alternative to capitalism in Eastern Eu- and anticartel laws and accepted national col-
rope. Where the institutionalization of national lective wage bargaining as a major element of
systems of industrial relations involved the ex- the machinery of public economic policy. In
tension of collective rights to organized labor return, unions in the tradition of social demo-
at the level of the national polity, it followed cratic reformism recognized private property,
the model of other nonmajoritarian constitu- free markets and the primacy of parliamentary
tional provisions in countries whose cohesion democracy, limiting themselves to the direct
depended on protection of ethnic or religious pursuit of economic goals through collective
groups from being overruled by natural ma- bargaining and to the indirect pursuit of political
jorities (“consociational democracies”; Lehm- goals through lobbying the parliament and sup-
bruch, 1974; Lijphart, 1984; Rokkan, 1966). porting sympathetic political parties. Whereas
The incorporation of labor in postwar demo- government refrained from direct intervention
cratic capitalism as a separately organized in wage setting – let alone enforcing free price
group – unlike the vertical corporations of state formation in the labor market – unions gave
corporatism that also included capitalists – had up previous ambitions to put themselves in the
developed out of the institution of “free collec- place of the government or the state, in ex-
tive bargaining.” Rooted in nineteenth-century change for being recognized as legitimate co-
Britain, free collective bargaining emerged governors of the emerging postwar democratic
where states recognized their inability to sup- welfare state. The successful integration of the
press the collective action and organization of trade union movement in the liberal political
workers, short of civil war with uncertain event. order was indicated by its gradual abandonment
Where trade unions, like British craft unions in of the political strike and its more or less explicit
the mid-eighteenth century, were prepared to concession to use the strike only for economic
pursue their interests primarily in the economic purposes.
sphere, governments were happy to abstain from Although the legal and political forms in
direct intervention in a class conflict they found which free collective bargaining became insti-
difficult if not impossible to pacify. Instead tutionalized differed between countries, from
they let unions and employers set the terms of the perspective of the state the new group
employment between themselves, increasingly rights were granted on condition that they were
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responsibly exercised. Unions, for their part, with the abortive general strike of 1949 and
insisted that their autonomy in representing the firm establishment of enterprise unionism
their members was not derived from the state, in the 1950s, Japanese trade unionism had be-
but reflected rights that preceded the modern come effectively eliminated as a national po-
state and its constitution. Even for more re- litical force. Second, inclusion of labor at the
formist unions, conceiving of free collective enterprise level only, although it is inclusion in
bargaining as a conditional privilege granted “corporations” and may also give rise to exten-
by the state was no more than legal fiction. In sive labor–management cooperation, is not cor-
their view, collective bargaining ultimately re- poratism as it is not based on associations capable
sulted, not from the state, but from the capacity of suspending market competition. It is there-
of workers collectively to withdraw their labor fore better referred to as enterprise paternalism
and bring the economy to a halt. Generally in (Streeck, 2001).
neocorporatist arrangements, whether collec- In Western postwar democracies, unions that
tive rights are original or delegated by the state used their autonomy responsibly became recog-
often was deliberately left open to avoid conflict. nized, in practice if not in law, as performing a
What exactly the status of unions was in the public function that the liberal democratic state
postwar settlement – part of the state, or “state found difficult to perform: the creation of so-
in the state” – was not just a legal subtlety. In cial order and the provision of social peace at
most European countries, responsible behavior the workplace. With time, what had originally
of unions in collective bargaining could not ef- been a struggle for power between workers as-
fectively be enforced on them by hierarchical sociations and the modern state could thus be
means. As states had to respect free collective redefined, in a Durkheimian way, as a matter of
bargaining – for constitutional reasons, for rea- an efficient allocation of functions between pri-
sons of political expediency, or both – union re- vate and public organizations together govern-
sponsiveness to the needs of national economic ing the public domain. To compensate unions
policy became a matter, not of authority, but for wage and political moderation, states granted
of political exchange (Pizzorno, 1978), in which them legal privileges and institutional guaran-
government paid for union cooperation with a tees, again to different degrees and in different
wide range of political side payments. The sta- ways in different countries. Unions were also
bility of the postwar political economy thus de- invited to share in a wide range of economic
pended on a precarious give-and-take between policies in tripartite arrangements that included
government, business, and the organized eco- them together with employers and the govern-
nomic interests of the working class, in which ment, making trade unionism part of the public
social and political integration were purchased policy machinery and of the implicit constitu-
by the provision of material benefits rather than tion of postwar democracy. In this way, the orga-
enforced by coercive state authority. nized collectivism of the working class became
Postwar democratic corporatism involved the integrated in liberal democracy and the mar-
inclusion of organized labor not only at the ket economy, conditional on its political and
workplace, but also in national politics. Also, economic moderation as well as on the abil-
the “corporations” on which neocorporatism ity of the reconstituted nation-state to provide
is based are not large firms – as the concept for material prosperity and organizational sup-
might suggest especially to speakers of Ameri- port.
can English – but intermediary associations of
groups of individuals or firms in similar posi-
tions and, as a consequence, potentially com- neocorporatism: organizational
peting with one another. Reference to the structure and political functions
Japanese case as one of “corporatism without
labor” (Pempel and Tsunakawa, 1979) is there- In the 1970s, political science and sociology dis-
fore to be qualified in two respects at least. First, covered neocorporatism as a European anomaly
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from the perspective of what had in the mean- state authority and the voluntary organization
time become a predominantly American, plu- of civil society, corporatist theory and practice
ralist theory of interest politics. Authoritarian blur the boundary between state and society
state corporatism of the Portuguese and Spanish as the state shares authority with private
sort, and various Latin American dictatorships interest associations, using the latter as agents
modeled after it, were still around. They of public policy by coordinating their behavior
provided the backdrop for the observation that or delegating public functions and decisions
in many, now perfectly democratic, European to them. In a corporatist context, private
countries, interest groups were organized and interest representation thus shades into public
behaved in ways reminiscent of corporatist sys- governance. In the pluralist view, organized
tems. Research on interest-group corporatism interests are relegated to the input side of the
in liberal democratic polities centered on two political process, where they may have a right
subjects in particular: on the organizational to be heard before decisions are made. Under
structure of interest groups and on the way corporatism, by comparison, social interests
these were made to act in line with more participate not only in the making of binding
general, public interests. A central topic became decisions but also in their implementation. As
the relationship between, on the one hand, the corporatist associations assume responsibility
organization of group interests in established for the compliance of their members with
intermediary associations (the structural aspect of public policies, they help the state overcome
neocorporatism) and, on the other, the political inherent limits of legal regulation and direct
coordination between interest associations and intervention.
the state (the functional aspect; Lehmbruch and The pluralism–corporatism distinction may
Schmitter, 1982). be read either as one between two types of gov-
As a system of interest organization, demo- ernment or between the ideal world of liberal
cratic neocorporatism has been conveniently theory and the real world. It is often taken to sig-
described in relation to interest-group pluralism, nify the extreme ends of a continuum on which
sometimes as its polar, ideal–typical opposite and extant regimes of interest politics in liberal
sometimes as a variant of it (Hicks and Esping- democracies can be located. Whereas originally
Andersen, this volume). In structural terms, there was a tendency to classify entire societies,
pluralist theory most commonly conceives of or polities, in terms of their being more or less
interest politics as free competition among a corporatist, later on the discussion became more
variety of organizations in a market for political subtle and allowed for different sectors in a soci-
representation, whereas in corporatist systems ety to be differently corporatist in their organi-
selected organizations enjoy a representational zation and policy making (“macro” vs. “meso”
monopoly. Organizational autonomy under corporatism; Cawson, 1985). The same applied
pluralism contrasts with direct or indirect state at the regional level where corporatist gover-
intervention in the internal affairs and the struc- nance arrangements and practices were claimed
tural makeup of interest organizations under to have emerged without the support of the
corporatism, favoring members over leaders or national state. Moreover, in addition to the co-
leaders over members depending on who is ex- existence of different types of state–society re-
pected to be more reasonable from the perspec- lations in a given country, it was realized that
tive of state policy. even interest groups that were organized in a
With respect to function, under pluralism corporatist fashion sometimes relied on pluralist
organized interests are tamed by competition pressure tactics in pursuit of their objectives, or
and the primacy of public legislation, whereas used pluralist and corporatist strategies simulta-
corporatism depends on political incentives and neously. Vice versa, interest groups were found
sanctions to make interest groups cooperate with to behave responsibly and cooperate with state
public purposes. Unlike the sharp division in policies even in the absence of corporatist or-
liberal democratic theory between hierarchical ganizational structures. Over time, research also
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began to extend to organized groups represent- themselves with collective goods, or where –
ing less vested interests than unions and business like at the regional level – hierarchical state au-
associations, such as charities and social move- thority is not present. Generally, whereas con-
ments concerned with issues like the environ- certation regulates the relationship – the terms
ment. These, too, were studied in terms of the of exchange – between economic groups differ-
more or less pluralist or corporatist character of ently located in the economic division of labor,
their structures and relations with the state. self-government involves cooperation between
As to the functional aspects of corporatist competitors in pursuit of common objectives,
arrangements, it is helpful to distinguish be- sometimes on the basis of explicit bipartite
tween concertation and self-government. Concer- agreements with the state. Whereas concerta-
tation refers to efforts by national governments tion serves to contain distributional conflict,
to make unions and employers exercise their self-government mobilizes the economic ben-
right to free collective bargaining in such a way efits of cooperation.
that it is not at odds with national economic Unlike pluralism, democratic corporatism
objectives; it turns collective bargaining and lacks a coherent normative justification. The
its agents into instruments of macroeconomic memories of antidemocratic, authoritarian state
management coordinated between the state and corporatism linger on and make corporatist
organized social groups that command indepen- ideas suspect. Catholic advocacy of the sub-
dent political capacities. The principal example sidiarity principle carries with it a traditional
is tripartite incomes policies, first under Keyne- communitarianism that conflicts with the mod-
sianism and, in the 1990s, in national employ- ernist and statist tradition of social democracy.
ment pacts. Concertation achieves moderation Leftist support for collective bargaining, in turn,
of wage demands through extended or “gen- is often accompanied by fears of loss of union
eralized” political exchange, offering unions in autonomy due to incorporation in government
particular a variety of material or institutional economic policy, and by rejection of “class col-
concessions to make them behave “in concert” laboration.” Social democratic hopes for state
with government policies. intervention to bring about greater equality also
Self-government, by comparison, involves stand in the way of unambiguous support for
diverse forms of collective participation of or- corporatism. Liberals eschew corporatism for its
ganized groups in public policy at the national anticompetitive, monopolistic institutions and
or subnational level. It may result from accom- its inherent collectivism. Conservatives, often
modation by the state of powerful group in- together with the republican Left, fear for the
terests or from technically expedient devolu- unity and integrity of the state. Whereas the for-
tion of state functions to organized civil society. mer associate corporatism with a “trade union
It may also result from social groups cooper- state,” the latter are afraid of state capture by
atively producing collective goods for them- special sectoral or business interests using priv-
selves that state and market fail to provide, or ileged institutional positions to block majority
from any mixture of the above. Collective self- decisions. Democratic theory warns of a “cartel
government, with varying degrees of state fa- of elites” rendering the parliament power-
cilitation and legal formalization, may relieve less, while economic theory deplores the rent-
the state from demands for regulation or ser- seeking and the allocative inefficiency allegedly
vices that it would find difficult to satisfy, but caused by suspension of competitive markets.
it also may amount to particularistic capture of Fears of a totalitarian state takeover of civil soci-
public authority. It can therefore be analyzed ety exist alongside fears of the conflicts inherent
from both a power and a problem-solving per- in the latter tearing apart the state or making it
spective. Self-government is often found in the subservient to democratically illegitimate spe-
cooperative – “third” – sector of the economy cial interests.
where groups operating between the hierarchy In the following subsections we first discuss
of the state and commercial markets provide neocorporatist organization, that is, the structural
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dimension of corporatism. Following this we bution. This enables associations to enter into
turn to the functional aspects of neocorporatism, stable relations of “generalized political ex-
addressing concertation and self-government in change,” where present concessions may be
turn. traded for as yet undetermined and legally not
enforceable future rewards. It is these and similar
processes of interest definition and adjustment
Structure: Organization that distinguish corporatist interest intermediation
from pluralist interest representation and indicate
Regarding structure, neocorporatist interest or- the transformation of a pluralist interest group
ganization differs from its pluralist counterpart into an intermediary organization.
in that collective interests are organized in few The rise of interest intermediation may in
rather than many organizations, which are broad part be attributed to internal factors, such as the
instead of narrow in their domain and central- interests of professional staff in safe jobs, ca-
ized and broadly based instead of specialized and reer advancement, and acceptance by a larger
fragmented (Schmitter, 1974). Interest differ- professional community. This mechanism fig-
ences between constituent groups are as much ures prominently already in the writings of Max
as possible internalized in encompassing orga- Weber (1964:841ff.) and Robert Michels (1989
nizations, and the management of interest di- [1911/1925]). Staff interests represent the eco-
versity becomes in large part a matter of the nomics of organization, such as the need to
internal politics of associations instead of the protect past investment in collective action
public political process. Charging associational capacities by regularizing the existence of the
leaders with the aggregation and transformation organization. In addition, the literature on neo-
of diverse special interests into more broadly de- corporatism also points to external factors con-
fined common, adjusted interests, corporatist or- tributing to what Schmitter and Streeck (1999
ganization allows them considerable discretion [1982]) call organizational development, in par-
in selecting which interests to represent and act ticular incentives held out and supports pro-
upon as those of their members. Corporatist as- vided by the state and other interlocutors. The
sociations can therefore be seen as active pro- reason why the latter might favor corporatist
ducers instead of mere purveyors of collective intermediation over pluralist representation is
interests. the political moderation they can expect to come
Corporatist organizational form affects the with large size, encompassingness, professional-
substance of collective interests in a variety of ization, organizational continuity, and central-
ways. The higher discretion enjoyed by the lead- ization. Large and stable organizations not only
ers of encompassing associations enables them develop powerful interests in their own sur-
to observe technical considerations in addition vival that militate against political adventures,
to political ones. Technical perspectives are in- but they can also negotiate on a broader range
jected in the internal deliberations of associa- of issues, which increases the variety of possi-
tions, especially by professional experts based in ble package deals. Moreover, as Mancur Olson
staff departments that smaller organizations can- (1982) has explained, encompassing organiza-
not afford. Experts are crucial in defining col- tions internalize not only a diversity of special
lective goals more instrumentally, making them interests but also much of the damage they do if
more acceptable to the organization’s interlocu- they stray too far from the general interest.
tors (more “moderate”) and thus more likely There are several inducements and supports
to be accomplished (more “realistic”). Leader- the state and other actors can offer interest
ship autonomy also makes it possible for cor- groups to persuade them to assume corpo-
poratist associations to take a long-term view ratist organizational forms. To help overcome
of collective goals and postpone the gratifi- pluralist fragmentation, interlocutors may talk
cation of demands, for example, in the hope only to organizations that exceed a certain size
of expanding the resources available for distri- or qualify as majority representative of their
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constituency. Privileged access strengthens the interest organization and its constituents is shaped
position of the leadership in relation to the by the interest perceptions and demands of the
members, as these cannot hope to be effec- latter, by the willingness of the members to
tively represented if they join a competing orga- comply with decisions made on their behalf,
nization. Elimination of competition may also by the means available to the organization for
contribute to political moderation as it relieves controlling its members, and by the collective
leaders of the need to outbid each other in benefits and outside inducements the organiza-
militant demands potentially more appealing to tion has to offer. Together these constitute an
the membership than moderate policies. Inter- organization’s logic of membership. The interac-
locutors furthermore may provide associations tion between an interest organization and its in-
with material support, to enable them to build terlocutors is governed by the demands the orga-
a strong bureaucracy and offer their members nization makes on the latter, the support it has
“outside inducements” (Olson, 1971) – services to offer to them, the compromises it is willing
that unlike their political achievements they and able to negotiate, and the extent to which
can withhold from nonmembers to increase the it can “deliver” its constituents – as well as by
appeal of membership. the constraints and opportunities inherent in the
External support for organizational develop- relevant political institutions, especially for the
ment and political moderation may include tacit establishment of lasting relations of political ex-
or open assistance in recruiting or retaining change, the concessions offered to the organi-
members, which can take a variety of forms zation, and the degree to which the organiza-
from moral suasion to compulsory membership tion is granted privileged access and status. This
(like in Chambers of Commerce and Indus- interaction reflects the organization’s logic of in-
try in some Continental European countries). fluence.
Assistance with recruitment helps associations As the demands made on intermediary or-
deal with the “free rider” problems that increase ganizations by their members and interlocutors
as their policies become more compatible with may be contradictory, their leaders typically
general, public policies. Here in particular neo- confront difficult choices. Interest representa-
corporatist interest organization becomes rem- tion in a pluralist mode is controlled by the
iniscent of traditional corporatism, also because logic of membership and emphasizes the au-
organizational assistance may be accompanied thentic representation of members’ interest per-
by – more or less subtle – intervention in an ceptions and articulated demands. Political in-
association’s internal process, in the name of as- fluence, however, often depends on a capacity to
sociational democracy or political moderation. moderate and compromise member demands,
Unlike state corporatism, however, intermedi- and so may a stable supply of organizational re-
ary organizations in liberal democracies remain sources. However, if interest associations adapt
ultimately free to refuse cooperation with the to the logic of influence, they are drawn away
government, regardless of the extent to which from their members and into their target en-
the state may help them with their organiza- vironment, in the process assuming corporatist
tional problems. traits. For example, whereas the logic of mem-
In a simplified model, the organizational dy- bership speaks for the formation of homoge-
namics of intermediary organizations derives neous and, by implication, small (“pluralist”)
from their simultaneous involvement in two organizations, the logic of influence tends to
environments, the social group from which place a premium on interest organizations being
they draw their members (membership environ- broadly based and representing more general in-
ment) and the collective actors in relation to stead of highly special interests. To build lasting
which they represent these (influence environment; relations of political exchange with their inter-
Figure 22.1). The two environments are gov- locutors and thereby enhance their own stability
erned by different “logics” (Schmitter and and security, interest organizations may have to
Streeck, 1999 [1982]). Interaction between an acquire organizational characteristics that make
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Figure 22.1. The Logics of Membership and Influence.
it more difficult for them to procure legitimacy be seen as arbitrage between markets for mem-
for themselves under the logic of membership. bership and influence. Pluralist interest repre-
In fact, intermediary organizations that become sentation transforms the interest perceptions of
too distant from their members and too closely its clients into political demands and extracts
involved in the logic of influence may turn into concessions from its interlocutors to provide
extended arms of the government (i.e., into its constituents with collective benefits (Figure
quasi-governmental agencies) or become repre- 22.1). Neocorporatist interest intermediation in
sentatives of interests opposed to those of their addition exchanges member discipline for orga-
constituents (“yellow unions”). nizational privileges under the logic of influ-
Striking a balance between member-res- ence, and private governance for member com-
ponsive but weakly organized, fragmented, and pliance under the logic of membership. In this
competitive pluralism on the one hand and cor- it uses the compliance of its members as a re-
poratist institutionalization in their target en- source in its dealings with its interlocutors, just
vironment on the other is the central political as it relies on its organizational privileges in
and organizational problem of neocorporatist turning its constituents into members, trying
interest intermediation. Successful intermedia- to keep an equal distance between the differ-
tion requires stable relations of exchange with ent dictates of the logics of membership and
environments subject to different and sometimes influence by drawing on one to stay clear of the
contradictory logics of action; in a sense it may other.
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Function: Concertation to specify the conditions under which tripartite

deals were achieved, such as the political com-
The literature on national neocorporatist “con- plexion of the national government, the degree
certation” reached a first peak in the late 1970s of independence of the central bank, or the size
and early 1980s. It focused on the management of the country. Much attention was paid to the
of national economies after the wave of worker organizational structure of unions and employer
militancy in the late 1960s and the oil shocks of associations, especially whether they conformed
1973 and 1979 (Cameron, 1984; Crouch, 1985; to a corporatist pattern or not and whether con-
Katzenstein, 1985; Lange and Garrett, 1985; certation and cooperation between the state and
Pizzorno, 1979; Scharpf, 1987; Schmidt, 1982). organized groups was possible also with a more
The issue was what government and employ- fragmented and pluralist structure of industrial
ers could do to make unions that had become relations.
stronger than ever moderate their wage demands For a while, neocorporatist concertation
in the context of a negotiated incomes policy, seemed a generally applicable recipe for the joint
where statutory incomes policies were impossi- management of a Keynesian political economy
ble for constitutional, technical, or political rea- by a democratic state and independently orga-
sons. Tripartite national policies agreed between nized social interests. It soon turned out, how-
government, employers, and unions were to ever, that concertation was difficult to trans-
safeguard macroeconomic objectives such as low port to countries like the United Kingdom with
inflation, low unemployment, a stable exchange traditionally fragmented and adversarial inter-
rate, and high growth while respecting the right est groups. Moreover, the concessions that had
of unions and employers to free collective bar- to be made to unions became more expensive
gaining. Neocorporatist concertation efforts re- with time and more often than not only moved
flected a Keynesian political economy in which inflation forward into the future or caused an
full employment was a responsibility of the gov- accumulation of public debt. Not least, unions
ernment that it had to live up to if it wanted frequently failed to deliver on their promises of
to survive politically, and for which it had in wage moderation as they came under pressure
principle the necessary tools available in the from their members. In other cases, cooperative
form of fiscal and monetary intervention. Po- unions suffered a loss of confidence on the part
litically guaranteed full employment, however, of their constituents, which ultimately forced
increased union bargaining power and thereby them to withdraw from concertation.
gave rise to inflation, unless unions could be In the early 1980s, the neoconservative gov-
persuaded not to use their bargaining power to ernments of the United States and Great Britain
the fullest. proved that labor-exclusive monetarist methods
The neocorporatist literature of the time of bringing down inflation were not only effec-
identified a variety of concessions govern- tive but also politically sustainable, even though
ments and employers offered to unions in they involved high rates of unemployment. As
tripartite package deals, including tax relief inflation rates in OECD countries declined and
for low-income earners, more progressive in- converged at a historic low, research on corpo-
come taxes, improved pension benefits, ac- ratism shifted from incomes policy and demand
tive labor market policies, increased educational management to collective infrastructures, like
spending, growth-promoting infrastructural in- support for vocational training and technologi-
vestment, expanded rights to workplace rep- cal innovation, that both free markets and state
resentation, and organizational security. Com- hierarchies seemed to have difficulty providing
parative research explored whether countries on their own. Again the question was whether
that succeeded in negotiating tripartite national corporatist organization of social groups and co-
agreements performed better economically than operation between them and the state resulted
liberal or pluralist countries with more adversar- in better economic performance than a plural-
ial institutions and practices. Research also tried ist separation of state and society that left the
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economy to the free play of market forces. Al- political planning – the end of the “planning
though requisite organizational forms remained euphoria” of the 1960s and 1970s – that debates
an issue, most of the research on “supply-side began to revolve around a need for Staatsentlas-
corporatism” looked at subnational regional, tung, or relief of the state from an overgrown
sectoral, or workplace-level institutions pro- policy agenda (Scharpf, 1992).
moting cooperation between state and society Perceptions of state failure coincided with a
or between competitors, rather than the national tendency in Western societies at the time toward
arrangements and macroeconomic policies that privatization of state activities and deregulation
had been at the center of early research on cor- of markets. The latter was based on an emerg-
poratism (Streeck, 1984, 1992). ing presumption that a free play of market forces
Research on national incomes policies re- was better suited to resolve complex issues of
vived in the 1990s in the context of efforts of allocation and production than state interven-
European governments to bring down persis- tion. There were also, however, attempts to de-
tent unemployment and meet the strict crite- velop an alternative response to the deficiencies
ria for accession to European Monetary Union of state intervention, one that avoided the risk
(Pochet and Fajertag, 2000). National employ- of market failure succeeding state failure. In this
ment and stability pacts were proposed and ne- context, a variety of forms of collective par-
gotiated that aimed at bringing union wage- ticipation in policy making were rediscovered
setting behavior in line with the imperatives that extended far beyond collective bargaining
of a monetarist macroeconomic policy and the and the concertation of incomes policies. Some
need, resulting not least from the neocorpo- involved an explicit delegation of governance
ratist bargaining of the 1970s, to consolidate functions to parapublic institutions and agencies
public budgets (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000). offering opportunities for participation to af-
Pacts also involved sometimes far-reaching re- fected social groups. Others licensed organized
forms of social security (Baccaro, 2002). Union groups to regulate matters of common interest
cooperation with governments seemed to de- themselves and free from state interference.
pend on a variety of factors. Unlike in the Like incomes policy, the incorporation of
1970s, however, governments of the Left were interest groups in public policy making may
not significantly more successful than conserva- be explained in terms of both power politics
tive governments in negotiating national pacts. and functional expediency. From the former
Moreover, whether the organizational structure perspective, institutions of self-government are
of national unions was corporatist or not seemed a concession of the state to the independent
to be largely irrelevant (Regini, 2000). power of social groups and are therefore liable
to turn into private bridgeheads in the public
sphere. From a functional or policy perspective,
Function: Self-Government self-government increases a society’s problem-
solving capacity as it makes for a better interface
Much of the political science literature of the and more efficient cooperation between state
1980s was concerned with the limits of state in- and civil society – in a Durkheimian sense draw-
tervention and of the problem-solving capacity ing on subgroup solidarity as a public resource
of governments. Whereas traditionally attention and mobilizing the productivity advantages of
had focused on the input side of political sys- cooperation between competitors. Rather than
tems, it now shifted to the technical difficulties imposing its policies on society from above or
facing legislators and state bureaucracies on the turning them over to the market, a state in a
output side: for example, in fine-tuning policies neocorporatist system governs in part through
to meet increasingly differentiated needs and in negotiations with and devolution to organized
ensuring that programs were correctly imple- social groups, using them for public policy func-
mented. In Europe it was in the context of rising tions they are better able to perform than a pub-
disillusion with social democratic pretensions at lic bureaucracy.
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Taking off from the literature on concerta- ations achieve institutionalization in the public
tion, the writings in the 1980s on neocorpo- sphere and gain in status and security. They and
ratist devolution of governance to organized their members may also prefer self-regulation
civil society emphasized the potential contri- over potentially heavy-handed state interven-
bution of interest associations to social order tion. Groups may furthermore be afraid of in-
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). Especially in competence on the part of state bureaucracies,
European countries with corporatist or Catholic making it unpredictably more costly to be po-
traditions, interest associations were observed to liced by them than by themselves. Governments,
share in public responsibility in policy sectors for their part, must be able to identify situations
such as product standardization, quality control when the organized private interest of a social
and certification, vocational training, environ- group can be made compatible with the pub-
mental regulation, research and development, lic interest of society. They also must have at
and welfare provision. Here, group interests their disposal organizational incentives and ma-
as defined and acted upon by firmly institu- terial compensations by which to move group
tionalized associations seemed to be compatible interests close enough to the public interest for
with general, public interests, so that associa- the independent pursuit of the former to con-
tions could be given both autonomy and au- tribute to the latter. In particular, states must
thority. Arrangements of this sort were often find ways to prevent a decay of self-government
bilateral, involving the state and a particular or- through “agency capture” by rent-seeking in-
ganized group; they involved groups with ideal terest groups and to ensure that the power of
interests, such as churches or new social move- organized interests can for the practical purposes
ments, no less than economic interests like those of public policy be treated as devolved and del-
of farmers or of firms in particular sectors; and egated public power, even if it is in fact not
they tended to be concerned with market regu- derived from the state. Domesticating group in-
lation or the supply of services or infrastructural terests in this way requires, among other things,
facilities, rather than with the management of reserve state capacity enabling the government
demand. credibly to threaten direct intervention in case
Group self-government through associa- self-government fails to meet its public respon-
tions – the “public use of private organized sibilities.
interests” (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) – en- Moving beyond narrower concepts of pri-
riches the repertoire of the state and expands the vate interest government through associations,
toolkit of governance. Public recognition and the mainly American literature on “associative
organizational support are to transform pluralist democracy” explores decentralization of deci-
interest groups into disciplined “private inter- sion making to local actors and facilitation of
est governments,” both inducing and enabling cooperation between them as an alternative
them to define the interests of their members to centralized state intervention (Cohen and
with a view to their compatibility with the pub- Rogers, 1995; Cohen and Sabel, 1997). With
lic interest. By enlisting the support of associ- corporatist theory, this literature shares an em-
ational self-interest, the state mobilizes expert phasis on self-organization below and within the
information that it would be unable to build state performing functions of rule making and
and maintain itself. As association members usu- collective goods production that liberal states
ally have more confidence in their representa- cannot satisfactorily perform. Informed mainly
tives than in state bureaucrats, private interest by research on regional economies drawing on
government also tends to have fewer problems informal social capital for better economic per-
of legitimacy and greater powers of persuasion formance (Trigilia, 1990), theories of associative
than direct state regulation. democracy attribute less significance than the
Self-governance also benefits the involved corporatist literature to formal organizational
associations. By assuming responsibility for reg- structures. Instead they rely mostly on the cul-
ulating the behavior of their members, associ- tivation of informal social relations between a
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variety of local actors united in a search for com- have an adverse short-term effect on employ-
parative advantage in competition with other ment or inflation-adjusted wages, which are the
regional economies. principal concerns of union negotiators. For in-
stance, if a firm raises prices, this is likely to have
little impact on the living standard of its workers.
the economic effects of corporatism Even if the firm chooses to reduce employment,
those laid off should be able to find work else-
A substantial part of the empirical research on where as long as wage increases and layoffs are
neocorporatism since the late 1970s has con- not generalized throughout the economy. Thus,
sisted of quantitative comparative analysis of where bargaining is decentralized and uncoordi-
corporatism’s economic impact. Numerous at- nated, there is an incentive for unions to pursue
tempts have been made to score the eighteen or a strategy of wage militancy.
so most affluent OECD countries on a corpo- By contrast, if wage negotiations cover a large
ratism scale (for detailed discussion see Kenwor- share of the workforce, union bargainers can
thy, 2001; Kenworthy and Kittel, 2002). Early be reasonably sure that a large wage increase
measures focused on interest group structure, of will have an adverse impact on their mem-
which there are three chief dimensions: repre- bers. When firms representing a sizable share of
sentational coverage (e.g., union density), or- the economy raise prices, the resulting inflation
ganizational centralization, and organizational offsets or nullifies the wage gains of most
concentration. Since roughly the mid-1980s, workers. Similarly, if layoffs are economy-
measures of concertation have played a more wide, employment opportunities will diminish.
prominent role. These have focused primarily Centralized or coordinated wage setting thus
on the degree of centralization or coordination generates an incentive for wage moderation, as
of wage setting. Fewer attempts have been made interest groups are forced by their size and struc-
to measure interest-group participation in pub- ture to internalize the negative impact of aggres-
lic policy in general – that is, apart from wage sive bargaining.
setting. Many researchers have created compos- Many researchers have assumed a linear rela-
ite corporatism measures that combine infor- tionship between wage-setting centralization or
mation about various aspects of interest-group coordination and wage restraint. However, some
structure and/or concertation. have proposed that the effect is hump-shaped,
Research on the economic effects of corpo- with high and low levels of centralization best
ratism has focused chiefly on macroeconomic at generating labor cost restraint (Calmfors and
performance, especially unemployment and in- Driffill, 1988). Others contend that corporatist
flation. Most heavily studied has been the im- wage setting yields superior performance out-
pact of centralized or coordinated wage setting. comes only in combination with particular types
Three causal mechanisms have been hypothe- or levels of central bank independence (Hall and
sized. Franzese, 1998), leftist government (Lange and
First, centralized or coordinated wage set- Garrett, 1985), unionization (Kittel, 1999), or
ting may yield low unemployment or inflation public sector unionization (Garrett and Way,
by engendering wage restraint. The general logic 1999). Still others hypothesize that the effect
is simple, although specific applications can be is both hump-shaped and interactive with cen-
complex (Franzese, 1999; OECD, 1997). If em- tral bank independence or the monetary regime
ployees bargain aggressively for high wage in- (Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Iversen, 1999).
creases, employers can do five main things in One glaring weakness of research in this area
response: raise productivity, raise prices, reduce is the limited empirical investigation of the as-
profits paid out to investors, reduce investment, sumed causal mechanism. Only a handful of
and/or reduce the number of employees. When studies have actually examined the relationship
wages are bargained separately for individual between wage setting and labor cost devel-
firms, none of these responses will necessarily opments (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Kenworthy,
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1996, 2002; Layard et al., 1991; OECD, 1997; an association between corporatist wage set-
Traxler et al., 2001; Traxler and Kittel, 2000). ting and low unemployment or inflation in the
Most have looked only at the statistical correla- 1970s and 1980s (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Calm-
tion between wage setting and macroeconomic fors and Driffill, 1988; Cameron, 1984; Garrett,
performance and have simply presumed that the 1998; Hall and Franzese, 1998; Hicks and Ken-
link between wage setting and labor cost re- worthy, 1998; Iversen, 1999; Janoski, McGill,
straint, and also between labor cost restraint and and Tinsley, 1997; Kenworthy, 1996, 2002; La-
performance outcomes, is as hypothesized. yard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1991; Scharpf, 1991
A second potential link between corporatist [1987]; Soskice, 1990; Traxler et al., 2001). In
wage setting and unemployment is economic the 1990s, however, inflation rates converged
growth. One of the outcomes of centralized or across affluent OECD nations, and restrictive
coordinated wage determination, achieved ei- monetary policy coupled with growing em-
ther informally or explicitly in corporatist pacts, ployer leverage led to substantial wage restraint
may be greater investment, which in turn tends in traditionally noncentralized and uncoordi-
to spur more rapid growth of economic out- nated countries such as Canada, France, the
put (Lange and Garrett, 1985). Faster growth, United Kingdom, and the United States. Con-
in turn, increases employment. sequently, at least one recent study finds no
A third hypothesized link is government policy. effect of corporatist wage arrangements on un-
Policy orientations are seen as a key determinant employment in the 1990s (Kenworthy, 2002).
of cross-country differences in unemployment. Empirical analyses of the macroeconomic im-
Policy makers in countries with centralized or pact of interest-group participation in policy
coordinated wage setting are likely to feel more making have been considerably less common,
confident than their counterparts in countries but findings have tended to be favorable, even
with fragmented bargaining that labor cost in- into the 1990s (Compston, 1997; Kenworthy,
creases will be moderate. Thus, they should tend 2002; Traxler et al., 2001).
to worry less about wage-push inflation. This The bulk of research on the effects of cor-
may increase their willingness to adopt an ex- poratism has dealt with macroeconomic perfor-
pansive monetary or fiscal policy, an active labor mance, but a number of studies suggest that its
market policy, or other policies that reduce un- impact may be no less important, and perhaps
employment. By contrast, policy makers in na- more so, for the distribution and redistribution
tions with less coordinated wage arrangements of income. Unions tend to prefer smaller pay dif-
may feel compelled to resort to higher levels ferentials, and centralized or coordinated wage
of unemployment in order to keep inflation setting increases unions’ leverage over the wage
in check (Hall and Franzese, 1998; Kenworthy, structure. Because differentials are more trans-
1996; Soskice, 1990). parent if wages are set simultaneously and collec-
Although much of the research on the im- tively for a large share of the workforce, central-
pact of corporatism on economic performance ization may reinforce union preferences for low
centers on wage setting, some studies have em- pay differentials. Furthermore, low pay inequal-
phasized union participation in economic polity may be one of the things unions ask from
icy making. Unions desire low unemployment. employers in exchange for pay restraint. Empir-
The more input unions have in economic pol- ical findings have tended to yield strong support
icy decisions, the more likely it would seem that for the hypothesis that corporatist wage setting
government policies will give priority to fight- is associated with lower pay inequality (Alder-
ing unemployment (Compston, 1997). To the son and Nielsen, 2002; Iversen, 1999; OECD,
extent that the respective policies are effective, 1997; Rowthorn, 1992; Rueda and Pontusson,
the result should be lower rates of joblessness. 2000; Wallerstein, 1999).
Although there are some dissenting findings There also is reason to expect a link be-
(OECD, 1997; Smith, 1992; Therborn, 1987; tween corporatism and the redistributive ef-
Western, 2001), most studies have discovered forts of government. Unions may demand more
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generous redistributive programs in exchange women or immigrants, who are not well rep-
for wage moderation, and regularized partici- resented within traditional corporatist arrange-
pation by unions in the policy-making process ments.
may heighten their influence. Here, too, there The nation-state, once the opponent and
is empirical support in the literature (Hicks, later the sponsor of organized group interests, is
1999:chap. 6; Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998; being transformed by economic and social inter-
Hicks and Swank, 1992; Swank and Martin, nationalization. Exactly to what effect is, how-
2001), though it is difficult to disentangle the ever, far from clear. Heightened capital mobility
impact of concertation from that of related fac- has rendered firms less dependent on the domes-
tors such as social democratic government. tic institutions of any one country, increased the
desire of employers for flexibility of labor and
labor costs, and impaired the capacity of govern-
the future of neocorporatism ments to deliver on political deals. The break-
down of centralized wage bargaining in Sweden
In the span of two decades, corporatism was in the early 1980s, and the elimination of for-
hailed as an effective model of governance in af- mal interest-group representation on the boards
fluent countries (Katzenstein, 1985; Schmitter, of several public agencies in the early 1990s,
1981), dismissed as irrelevant in an era of in- are frequently cited as an example for the de-
ternationalization and restructuring (Ferner and cline of labor-inclusive democratic corporatism
Hyman, 1998:xii), and rediscovered by policy in its historical connection with Keynesianism
makers and scholars as a potentially superior and the social democratic welfare state.
way of managing rapid economic and politi- On the other hand, observers have expressed
cal change (Auer, 2000; Hassel and Ebbinghaus, skepticism about the degree to which globaliza-
2000; Pochet and Fajertag, 1997; Regini, tion is likely to alter national institutional struc-
2000; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). What lies tures and policy choices (Berger and Dore, 1996;
ahead? Garrett, 1998; Hollingsworth and Streeck, 1994;
The future of neocorporatism is bound up Kitschelt et al., 1999). Nonmarket institutions
with the ongoing transformation of social struc- can offer competitive advantages to firms that
ture on the one hand and of the nation-state on may outweigh their costs. Quantitative analyses
the other. Social groups in advanced societies, by Traxler et al. (2001) suggest little if any con-
certainly the producer groups of the industrial vergence in interest-group organization, wage-
age, have become less cohesive and more diffi- setting arrangements, and interest-group partic-
cult to organize into centralized, monopolistic, ipation through the late 1990s. However, they
and hierarchical associations. For example, with do find evidence of a trend toward “organized
the decline of Fordist industrial organization and decentralization” of wage bargaining, whereby
Keynesian economic policy and the growing wages are set largely at the sectoral level but
prominence of the service sector, unionization coordinated informally across sectors (see also
has fallen almost everywhere and the degree of Iversen, 1999; Thelen, 2001). Meanwhile, neo-
union centralization has declined in many coun- corporatist pacts dealing with issues such as wage
tries (Traxler et al., 2001; Western, 1997). Gen- restraint and labor market and social security
erally social structures today seem to generate reform have played a prominent role in the
less stable group identities and give rise to more Netherlands and Ireland – two countries widely
individualistic perceptions of interest that may viewed as European economic success stories
make an encompassing association’s “logic of over the past decade. Similar pacts have been
membership” intractable. Moreover, the pro- forged or renewed in Norway, Finland, Bel-
ducer groups that formed the principal con- gium, and Italy (Auer, 2000; Hassel and Ebbing-
stituency of postwar democratic corporatism are haus, 2000; Molina and Rhodes, 2002; Pochet
shrinking in size while other groups with dis- and Fajertag, 1997; Regini, 2000; Visser and
tinct political interests have emerged, such as Hemerijck, 1997).
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Generally, changes in the capacities of the interest groups and replace self-government
nation-state in the course of internationaliza- with more publicly accountable state control.
tion seem to have different and partly contradic- In this they have followed a spreading lib-
tory consequences for neocorporatism. Where eral discourse that suspects any form of orga-
national states lose control to international mar- nized collectivism of particularistic rent-seeking
kets, they become unable to underwrite tripar- and places its hope on a strong state recreat-
tite bargains, in which case a decline in state ing free markets and defending them against in-
capacities is associated with a decline in asso- terference by “distributional coalitions” (Olson,
ciational capacities. At the same time, where 1982).
governments can no longer keep capital captive, Although internationalization may make na-
they may depend on organized groups to cre- tional states part with neocorporatism, it may
ate institutional conditions and infrastructures simultaneously open up new opportunities for
attractive to investors. Also, states that come un- group self-government by “nongovernmental
der international pressure to balance their bud- organizations” in state-free international set-
gets, like the member states of the European tings. Prospects for a transnational renaissance
Union, may need the cooperation of still pow- of prenational corporatism are, however, uncer-
erful trade unions for institutional reform and tain. Group cohesion beyond the nation-state
wage restraint. In such instances, state weakness tends to be weak. Also, the very absence of
may enhance rather than diminish the role and state authority that might empower organized
power of associations. groups deprives them of institutional support.
On the other hand, most nation-states to- (In addition it makes it impossible to hold them
day have embarked on a strategy of liberaliz- accountable to a public interest.) Internation-
ing their economies. Liberalization implies a ally there are only few organized groups ca-
greater role for markets and regulatory author- pable of making binding rules for themselves,
ities, at the expense of both discretionary state not to mention correcting international market
intervention and corporatist bargaining. In part outcomes by negotiated redistribution. Other
liberalization responds to pressures exerted by than competing states, the main actors in the
internationalization for increased competitive- international arena are large firms, increasingly
ness and openness of national economies; the transnational in character, with ample resources
latter may require replacement of corporatist to pursue their interests individually, uncon-
self-government, for example of financial mar- strained by union or government pressure forc-
kets, with more transparent and internation- ing them into international class solidarity, and
ally accountable state regulation. There also, indeed with a growing capacity to extricate
however, may be domestic reasons for liberal- themselves from associative governance at the
ization, among them certain long-term effects national level (Streeck, 1997).
of neocorporatism after its peak twenty years Where there is something resembling neo-
ago. These include overblown social security corporatist interest intermediation above the
systems, rigid labor markets, high and persis- nation-state, it seems heavily dependent on the
tent unemployment, a widening gap between sponsorship of international organizations like
a shrinking group of well-represented insiders the European Union. In its effort to develop
and a growing group of disenfranchised out- statelike properties, the European Union has
siders, and the defense by trade unions of a so- long cultivated a substructure of organized in-
cial policy and labor market regime that reflects terests from which it hopes to draw increased
the social structures and economic conditions legitimacy. But although the European Union
of the 1970s rather than of the present. Es- attracts a great deal of lobbying, this is far from
pecially in countries where trade unions and, congealing in a corporatist system. Most of it
to an extent, employers use their institutional continues to be nationally based, as national in-
position to veto change, governments have felt terest organizations hesitate to transfer authority
challenged to limit the influence of corporatist to their European peak associations. Although
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the European Commission relies and indeed making in pursuit of those interests. Yet the
depends greatly on information and expertise long-term sustainability of such arrangements
furnished by organized interests, devolution of is open to question. Regions, not being states,
decision-making powers to organized interests is are unable to insert coercive power in the vol-
rare. Nor has the “social dialogue” between the untary relations between their citizens. In par-
Commission, the European trade union con- ticular, they may lack the capacity to provide
federation, and European business developed the kind of support required to transform unsta-
into tripartite concertation, mostly because na- ble, voluntaristic, pluralistic interest groups into
tional actors, including national governments, mature ones capable of attending to the larger
jealously defend their autonomy. All in all, even sectoral, regional, or national interest. For ex-
in the European Union international interest- ample, regionally based unionism would have
group politics is as a rule far more pluralist to do without external sources of associational
than in national systems (Streeck and Schmit- monopoly, without authoritative stabilization of
ter, 1991). bargaining arenas, and without recourse to a
The same holds for corporatist arrangements public sphere balancing the manifold advantages
at the regional level within and, sometimes, employers enjoy in the marketplace.
across national borders. Much of the literature If the twentieth century that witnessed the
on “industrial districts” stresses the commonal- ascendancy of the modern nation-state was “still
ity of interests held by workers, employers and the century of corporatism” (Schmitter, 1974),
policy makers in a number of subnational ar- the same may not be true for the postnational
eas, and the advantages of negotiated decision twenty-first century.
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chapter twenty-three
Undemocratic Politics in the Twentieth Century

and Beyond1
Viviane Brachet-Márquez
Unser National Sozialismus ist die Zukunft Deutschlands. antidemocratic ideologies, parties, and toler-
Trotz diese Zukunft wirtschaftlich rechts-orientiert wird, ated practices outside and within established
werden unsere Herzen links orientiert bleiben. Aber vor democracies. Instead of clearly characterized
allem werden wir niemals vergessen, dass wir Deutschen “regimes,” to which we may unambiguously
sind.2
– Adolf Hitler, 1932 Annual Congress of the
assign a democratic or undemocratic label, we
National Socialist Democratic Party often find a patchwork of mixed democratic
and undemocratic ideologies, mentalities, rules,
Socialement je suis de gauche, économiquement je suis de and entrenched practices. This is especially true
droite, et nationalement je suis de France!3 of countries that have only recently emerged
– Jean Marie Le Pen, 2002 presidential from colonial rule and those recently returned
campaign speech for the Front National
to elected civilian government after bloody dic-
To write about undemocratic politics after the tatorships. But it is also true of more established
fall of the Berlin Wall and in the midst of democracies, to wit the astounding success of
widespread democratization in Central Europe Haider in Austria and Le Pen in France.
and Latin America may look like a vain effort to All these manifestations have stimulated an
revive a fast-dwindling subject. Yet, even if the active and fast-expanding beehive of research,
age of Soviet or Nazi totalitarianism seems over but one also extremely fragmented: by dis-
and many autocracies are fast being propelled – ciplines, geographical areas, periods, and, in-
by financial necessity if by anything – toward evitably, languages. As a result, we are confron-
democratic openings, we are now experienc- ted by a series of geographically restricted
ing a period in which undemocratic politics debates that speak to relatively small groups of
are manifested as much in sundry dictatorships, specialists. This chapter is an attempt to pull dif-
fundamentalisms, and bloody civil wars as in ferent threads out of this fast-growing literature
so as to establish possibilities of dialogue be-
1
My heartfelt thanks to Guillermo Alonso, Eugenio tween them. It should also help us to better
Anguiano, Flora Boton, Cas Mudde, Tony Tillett, and understand the political dynamics of recently
my anonymous reviewers for their critical comments on
redemocratized countries. In that sense, the
the first draft of this chapter. This chapter is dedicated
to my uncle Freddy Staehling, who faced totalitarian debate on undemocratic politics is inseparable
fascism in Buchenwald. from that on democracy.
2
Our national socialism is the future of Germany. Rather than shoulder the impossible task of
Although this future economically leans to the Right, reviewing thoroughly this extremely broad and
our heart will stay on the Left. But above all, we will
never forget that we are German.
heterogeneous field, this chapter maps out the
3
Socially, I stand on the Left, economically, on the main research programs and issues that have
Right, and nationally, I stand for France. guided work on undemocratic politics in the
461
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462 Viviane Brachet-Márquez
past half century. Due to its importance in ini- Europe and Latin America; and the third on sul-
tially defining the field, the lion’s share is given, tanistic regimes, referring to Asia and Africa as
in the first part, to the regime approach to well as some countries in Latin America.
undemocratic politics. The second part deals
with movements against authoritarian and sul-
tanistic regimes and the extreme reaction on The Totalitarian–Fascist Debate
the Right that has come in their wake. The
third part focuses on movements and parties that In totalitarian regimes, Linz (2000) wrote, the
show strong undemocratic tendencies yet func- state asserts its monopoly over power and im-
tion within established democratic contexts. poses exclusively one ideology on the basis of
which it attempts the total mobilization of the
population through a single party and various
undemocratic politics from a organizations controlled by the same. This defi-
regime perspective nition points to a structural institutional view
of totalitarianism (as also in Mann, 1997), as
Regime categories and types are taxonomical opposed to one emphasizing culture and ide-
devices that order polities according to sets of ology (Ahrend, 1968; Marcuse, 1967; Burrin,
abstract categories and then serve as summary 2000) or origins (Korchak, 1994). Despite wide
statements to refer to empirical cases. Although differences, most authors recognize three major
few analysts would ever claim that regimes are components of totalitarian regimes: (1) an all-
unchanging, typification carries implicitly a be- encompassing ideology setting forth a program
lief in the relative stability over time in the of radical transformation of society and calling
characteristics singled out for any given type. for the extermination of all people suspected
(And indeed, without such an assumption, why of incompatibility with or enmity toward said
typify at all?) Up until the 1980s, students of program; (2) a centrally controlled state bureau-
undemocratic politics made extensive use of cracy at the service of this ideology, with vir-
regime types, pairing them up with countries in tually unlimited authority and modern means
ways that have underplayed change and empha- of communication, propaganda, surveillance,
sized essence. Since then, they have been used and repression; and (3) a mass party controlled
more flexibly to refer to families of regimes with by the state to implement this transforma-
common grounds despite important differences tion, involving the willing or forced partici-
(Kershaw and Lewin, 1999) and to character- pation of the whole population. Some authors
ize phases or episodes through which polities also include the leader principle (Friedrich and
evolve, allowing for a shift of our attention from Brzezinski, 1965; Burrin, 2000), the presence
essential characteristics and stable structures to of state terrorism (Ahrend, 1968; Friedrich
differences, transitions, and change. and Brzezinski, 1965), and militarist expansion-
Following Juan Linz’s initial typification, un- ism (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965). Needless
democratic polities have often been classified as to say, important differences opposed Stalinist
either totalitarian or authoritarian (Linz, 2000). USSR to Nazi Germany in many of these re-
Such a division, however, either forces many spects. Whereas the socialist ideology was highly
cases into the wrong camp or leaves them out codified and inscribed in policy, Nazi shib-
altogether.4 There have been, de facto, three boleths came closer to millenarist statements
relatively distinct debates using the regime (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1968). Whereas the
approach: the first over totalitarianism versus Nazi Party was relatively successful in mobiliz-
fascism involving interwar Europe; the sec- ing the population from the base up, the distrust
ond over authoritarianism focused on Southern generated by Stalinist propaganda and the ter-
4
At the height of the Cold War, all communisms and ror its police methods inspired are said to have
fascisms were commonly considered “totalitarian,” but pushed the rank and file toward withdrawal and
such views have been revised since then. depolitization.
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Undemocratic Politics in the Twentieth Century and Beyond 463
Taken in its strictest definition, totalitari- section of close to 100 million people (Fairbank,
anism would seem to refer only to Stalin’s 1992:383).7 After Mao’s death in 1976, the
purges and Nazi Germany’s implementation of regime veered back to authoritarianism in the
the “Final Solution.” Yet should our concep- context of a commodity economy (Bragger and
tion of this phenomenon be less historically or Reglar, 1994), offering estranged elites and mi-
culturally limited, other examples come to nority factions token presence in the legislature
mind. Can China’s 1957–8 Hundred Flowers5 in exchange for their unconditional support of
period be classified as totalitarian? The ideolog- party rule (O’Brien, 1990:155). In this light,
ically based purge of those intellectuals and stu- the 1989 Tienamen Square massacre and sub-
dents who had responded to Chairman Mao’s sequent repression of protesting students can be
appeals to self-crititicism would suggest that it interpreted as a manifestation of authoritarian-
can. The violence of the criticism that erupted ism rather than totalitarianism, bearing in mind
out of this opening (especially, and surprisingly that even “limited” pluralism is not to be found
for Mao, from young students educated under in the Chinese brand of that regime type.
communism) led to the rectification campaign- Like totalitarianism, fascism8 has been de-
ing whereby officials were made to do regular fined in a number of ways, from so general
spells of manual labor. Yet because this repres- as populist ultranationalism (Griffin, 1995)9 to
sion targeted a limited number of people and so specific as to fit only the Italian case, as by
no wide popular mobilization was engineered Gentile – the regime’s official philosopher –
by the state to justify its actions, a good case can (from Payne, 1995:5, or Gentile, 1975). Some
be made that this period should remain under definitions focus on origins (Paxton, 1995;
the general label of authoritarianism.6 By con- Korchak, 1994), others on cultural–ideological
trast, totalitarianism seems appropriate to char- characteristics (Ahrend, 1968; Burrin, 2000;
acterize China’s 1966–76 Cultural Revolution, Sternhell and Sznajder, 1994) or structure (Linz,
during which the masses (especially the ado- 2000; Mann, 1997). Some have restricted the
lescent Red Guards) were ideologically radi- term to the interwar period (Rémond, 1982),
calized and mobilized by the state in order to whereas others apply it to a wider range of pe-
serve as instruments to purge a very wide cross- riods and cases (Sternhell et al., 1994).
From the Marxist camp, rather than defini-
5
The name came from a sentence in a 1956 unpub- tions, we have interpretations as to the origin
lished speech by Mao: “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let and purpose of fascism. For the Third Inter-
a hundred schools contend.” The first referred to the lit-
erary field, though it later took on a wider connotation,
national, fascism is understood to emerge in
whereas the “hundred schools” referred to the flourish- the context of the monopolistic and imperial-
ing of philosophical debates during the third and fourth ist stage of capitalist society, being simultane-
centuries b.c. (MacFarquhar, 1960). ously the product of its contradictions and the
6
The regime’s rigid policy of forced reeducation to-
ward intellectuals and artists is said to have “thawed”
when, following the Hungarian 1956 rebellion, Mao 7
Such purges, unlike their Russian or German coun-
started pondering how his rule might be made less op- terparts, fell short of executing their victims. Although
pressive. The ideological basis for such an opening could a large number of purged leaders committed suicide un-
be found in the “mass line” which established that infor- der the pressure of the treatments they were made to
mation must be gathered from the masses before deci- endure, many survived. Deng Xiaoping, for example,
sions were taken, so that the latter must, in turn, accept was purged twice during the Mao era.
said decisions as their own. However, the twin principle 8
The word fascism comes from the Latin fasces, which
of “democratic centralism” also established that all issues designated the insignia of official authority in Ancient
must be discussed within the CCP, so that whatever cri- Rome. It consisted of an ax head projecting from a bun-
tique emerges from the grassroots could be conveniently dle of rods. Mussolini adopted this symbol in 1919 as the
condemned as deviationist if it failed to meet with the emblem of the Italian fascist movement to represent the
approval of the center, as happened in 1957. For informa- union of the masses with the head of the state.
9
tion on the Hundred Flowers period, see Macfarquhar “A genus of political ideology whose mythic core in
(1960) and Fairbank (1992). On the Cultural Revolu- its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist
tion, see MacFarquhar (1974) and Fairbank (1992). ultra-nationalism” (Griffin, 1991:4).
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particular form it takes in its antiproletarian reas fascism (to wit, many Latin American au-
action (Milza, 2001; Beetham, 1983). For Thal- thoritarian regimes discussed later). It is still ar-
heimer, however, rather than the final phase of guable that Spain was fascist during the early
capitalism, fascism expressed the greater power part of Franco’s rule due to the closeness to the
held by capitalist relations on political forms caudillo of the fascist Falange, but it soon be-
leading to bonapartism (1967:15). Closer to the came clear that the Catholic conservative oli-
ground, Gramsci held that Mussolini’s fascism garchy held the reins and that Franco had to
was only partially a class phenomenon that nev- govern with their approval and little mobiliza-
ertheless served the interests of the bourgeoisie tion from below. Spain thus failed to fulfill three
by destroying the organizational links forged be- major requirements of fascism – state supremacy,
tween workers, thereby making them into a population mobilization, and a strong ideology.
fragmented helpless mass incapable of recover- Likewise, Salazar’s Portugal, while using some
ing their power with the return of democracy fascist slogans, as did Austria’s conservative gov-
(Gramsci, 1924). ernments under Englebert Dollfus and Kurt von
Despite the multiplicity of definitions, inter- Schuschnigg, also remained within the tradi-
pretations, and historical forms, fascist regimes tional conservative camp. Radical fascist move-
or periods have displayed similar characteristics: ments also developed in most Central European
the absolute primacy of the state and its chief; countries in the interwar period11 – especially
the submission of the individual to the state in Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania
understood as the unified will of the people; (Payne, 1995) – but did not succeed in in-
and a rejection of democracy, bourgeois val- stalling fascist governments (except in Croatia),
ues, and rationalism in favor of martial virtues, which led analysts to conclude that traditional
combat, and conquest. On paper (and in many conservatism was as inhospitable for fascism as
writings), fascism appears to have differed lit- established democracy. Fascist movements also
tle from totalitarianism, including its mystical developed in interwar Western Europe, partic-
fervor for remaking the nation and conquer- ularly in France (Soucy, 1986), but by 1938,
ing beyond its borders. Yet in historical fact, it they had lost much of their impetus (Winock,
has departed from totalitarianism first in falling 2001:266) and not even German occupation
short of pursuing its ideological program with could breathe new life into them. As for
the same ruthlessness as Stalinism or Nazism and the Vichy government under Nazi-occupied
second in the necessity it faced of negotiating France, analysts have concurred to give it
clientelistic relations with preexisting elites and mere traditional conservative credentials (Milza,
institutions in the de facto absence of absolute 2001; Burrin, 2000; Winock, 1990; Soucy,
state power over them. 1999).
Who were the nontotalitarian fascist states? The single most disputed and unresolved is-
Although everyone agrees on placing Mus- sue is the origin of fascism, beginning with the
solini’s Italy in that category, considerable dis- insistent “why Germany” question. The be-
agreement reigns when dealing with Spain, lief in German exceptionalism dominated early
Austria, or Central Europe. Preston (1990) ar- debates, projecting, as Eley (1995) argued, a cul-
gued that Franco’s record, which in the case of turally and historically deterministic view ex-
the repression of the working class is said to have plaining triumphant Nazism as the inevitable
been worse than Germany’s,10 should place him outcome of a backward society held back by pre-
squarely in the fascist camp, forgetting that au- industrial authoritarian traditions (as in Moore,
thoritarianism can be every bit as murderous 1966; Dahrendorf, 1968; Gerschenkron, 1943).
The last decades have thrown doubt on die-
10
Franco’s rule claimed hundreds of thousands of lives hard commonplace explanations of the rise of
and forced hundreds of thousands more into exile. The
dictatorship is said to have executed a quarter-million fascism in Germany and Italy as either caused
people, maintained concentration camps, and sent troops by the Depression, revanchist resentment against
to fight for Hitler on the Russian front. On the evolution
of Franco’s regime, see Linz (1970b). 11
See Wippermann (1983).
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the Versailles Treaty settlement, or the atavistic take power. As for racism, it is well-known
racism of the German nation. It has been shown that far from being restricted to Germany, anti-
that in the Depression years, industrial pro- Semitism was so widespread in Central Europe
duction dropped more sharply in Czechoslo- (especially Poland and Croatia) that the popu-
vakia (61%) than in Germany (39%), and that lations of these countries virtually delivered the
Germany’s sharper drop in relation to Norway’s Jews into German hands. Hamilton (1995) has
and Denmark’s (15%) or Sweden’s (11%) was also shown the weakness of cultural explanations
explained by lower predepression levels of in- of Nazi success in Germany.
dustrial activity in these countries (Luebbert, Equally in dispute is Moore’s view of the
1991:307–8). Unemployment between 1929 road to democracy versus fascism (Moore,
and 1933 was just as high in Scandinavia as in 1966)15 and its recent revival by Stephens (1989)
Germany, and hyperinflation affected Poland as and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens
much as Germany. Even in Austria, a country (1992).16 They propose to relax Moore’s the-
as burdened as Germany by an imperialist and sis on the rise of fascism to state that the pres-
conservative past and a strong fascist movement, ence of a large landed class blocks the devel-
no fascist regime took power during the pre- opment of democracy or facilitates its eclipse
war period despite a 38 percent decline in in- by limiting the kinds of alliances which other
dustrial production. As for Italy, where fascism classes can make. Accordingly, the alliance be-
took power in 1922, long before the Depression, tween the Junker class, capitalists and the Nazi
its industrial activity actually rose by 11 percent Party in interwar Germany, and the failure of
during the 1929–33 period (Luebbert, 1991: the middle and working classes to form the
307–8). By contrast, in Spain, where industrial alliance that would have saved the Weimar
production fell by only 18 percent, a fascist- Republic, is explained by the sheer presence of a
dominated coalition did rise, eventually destroy- powerful agrarian class. Capitalists, allegedly too
ing Spain’s fledgling democracy, admittedly with dependent on the state for industrial policy, are
some help from Nazi Messerschmidts. said to have absorbed the authoritarian politics
The thesis of military revanchism (Milza, of the agrarian elites, a view strongly disputed
1987; Collins, 1995; Linz, 1976; Macherer, by Blackbourne and Eley (1984), whereas the
1974) has fared no better. Granted that Spain’s German working class, although one of the best
military may still have been smarting from their organized in Europe, is said to have been too
1921 defeat against Kabyl rebels in Northern “isolated” to defend its interests.17 Furthermore,
Morocco and from the Spanish–American War
of 1894,12 but Austria and Hungary had also suf- 15
Stephens (1989) summarized Moore’s thesis of the
fered defeat in 1918 yet did not become fascist fascist road in the following way: (1) the landed upper
regimes.13 Lastly, in Portugal, where the pre- class must be strong and retain considerable power in
conditions for the rise of fascism had all seemed a democratic interlude; (2) agriculture must be labor-
repressive, but employ political rather than market con-
present,14 the fascist movement was unable to
trol over peasant laborers; (3) there must be sufficient
industrialization so that the bourgeoisie is a significant
12
General Sanjurjo, veteran of the Spanish–American political actor; and (4) the bourgeoisie is kept in a po-
War, was the initial head of the military conspiracy litically dependent condition as industrialization is aided
against the democratic government. His accidental death by the state.
16
in an airplane crash allowed Franco to take leader- Regarding Europe, Stephens, 1989 and Ruesche-
ship. meyer, Stephens, and Stephens, 1992 will be used in-
13
This is not to say that the use of fascia as emblems terchangeably, as the chapter on Europe in the latter is
or anti-Semitism were not widespread in these countries identical with Stephens, 1989.
17
as in most Central European countries. Rather than this cryptic argument that the
14
These conditions were: modernism and futurism, German working class was “isolated,” the fact that
nationalism, traumas resulting from World War I, a German communists at the time were divided between
worker offensive, anticommunism, young army officers the “deviationist” social democratic wing and die-hard
politicized by the extreme Right, the fascia avant la lettre adherents to the Third International may partially ex-
of Sidonio Pais, the emergence of mass politics, and the plain their relative weakness in the face of early attacks
crisis of legitimacy of liberalism (Pinto, 1995). by the Nazi Party. Equally credible is Gramsci’s position
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rather than attempt to explain the rise of fascism, democratic labor forces were established before
as Moore did, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) lim- or soon after WWI” (Payne, 1995:130).
ited their forecast to an “authoritarian path,” This interpretation also somewhat clears up
so that in the end, they leave unanswered the the puzzle of the alliance between agrarian aris-
questions of why agrarian conservative forces in tocrats and fascists that the simple “presence of
Germany, Italy, and initially, Spain, should have agrarian elites” does little to explain: Where a
allied with fascism rather than followed a straight long parliamentarian and universal male fran-
authoritarian path. Using the same set of data18 chise tradition had existed, conservative forces
but measuring the strength of the landowner could rely on established conservative parties to
class as percent agricultural laborers, Luebbert defend their interests and obtain benefits with-
(1987) found no correlation between agrarian out having to question the republican frame-
social structure and fascism. work. The temptation to incorporate fascist
Breaking with a straightforward class view, forces into the conservative alliance in order to
Luebbert (1991) has proposed instead that where reestablish a conservative tradition interrupted
liberal parties overcame middle class cleavages by the democratic interlude occurred in con-
and attracted working class support before 1914, texts with little experience in parliamentarian
liberal democracy emerged, as in France, Great politics or voting among the masses. Once the
Britain and Switzerland, but where they did alliance was established, what happened is not
not, “the only coalition that could provide an something that can be deduced from any set of
adequate political majority would be one that structural variables.
joined an urban class with a rural class un- Unsatisfied with either Luebbert’s or Payne’s
der either social democratic or fascist leader- explanations, Brustein (1996) answers the ‘why
ship. . . . When the family peasantry sided with Germany’ question by focusing on the 37.3%
urban workers, the result was a social democratic vote in favor of the nazi party in 1932 which
regime. When it sided with the urban middle led to the fateful conservative-nazi coalition that
classes, the outcome was fascism” (Luebbert, put Hitler in the Chancellor’s seat in 1933. Based
1991:10–11). This interpretation puts perhaps on a classification by economic interest groups
too much weight on party politics, which, in of nazi party members, he argues that German
the absence of universal male suffrage (that came voters responded rationally to the nazi program
after World War I for countries that took the fas- of economic recovery more than to the anti-
cist path), were oligarchical in nature. Following semitic and xenophobic appeals which it shared
Payne (1995), the explanation behind the pat- with most other conservative parties. Granted
tern found by Luebbert may have been that the that too much weight has been put on the ide-
road to democracy represented “broad political ological aspects of nazi appeal, it is questionable
participation relatively early in the era of mod- that the whole answer to German exceptional-
ern politics, [while] for those societies in which ism can be found in a sudden surge of voters’
universal male suffrage arrived only in 1919, it preference. Such vote was only crucial because
would turn out to have come too late, at least it was followed by Hindenburg’s single decision
for the interwar generation” (Payne, 1995:130). to form a coalition government with the Nazi
Also in agreement with Luebbert’s findings is party, which opened the door for what hap-
the fact that “in the surviving parliamentary pened later, but even then did not completely
regimes, alliances of liberals and moderate social determine it.19 Apart from history, the social
19
To recall a more contemporary example of a
(1924) that fascism in effect destroyed working class or- similar scenario, but a different outcome, in 2000,
ganization. Jacques Chirac, head of the France’s center Right, re-
18
The countries included were Sweden, Denmark, fused to form an electoral coalition with Le Pen’s ultra-
Norway, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, France, conservative Front National. Whereas Hindenburg’s deci-
Finland, Britain, Austria–Hungary, Spain, Italy, and sion plunged Germany into a national and world tragedy,
Germany. Chirac’s probably avoided one.
P1: JYT
sciences have had so far little to say about such cialism in Chile. To some analysts, this suggested
radical historical switchpoints. a conservative reaction to such upheavals, de-
The present tendency is a more contingently spite the fact that the same kind of political
constructed view of Germany’s or Italy’s fates mobilizations in Mexico (under Cárdenas in
(Eley, 1995; Burrin, 2000; Furet and Nolte, 1934–9) had had no such consequence, and that
1998), which leaves some space for nonsocio- neither Chile nor Uruguay had gone through
logical factors and for the unexpected. any previous populist era yet had also fallen into
A safe conclusion from this whole body of re- the authoritarian mold. Guillermo O’Donnell
search is that Germany, although undoubtedly named this new phenomenon “Bureaucratic
burdened by a heavy authoritarian past, shared Authoritarianism” (BA) in Modernization and
conditions pointing to a traditional authoritar- Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (1973), a book that
ian future with most of Central and Southern built upon Linz’s concept, yet took it further
Europe.20 But only in Germany and Italy by merging it with the debate on dependent
did fascism develop into full-blown regimes, capitalism21 and Stepan’s work on the profes-
something so far left unexplained by social sci- sionalization of the military (1971, 1973). The
ence that should perhaps be catalogued among concept was immediately heralded as a major
the accidents of history. turning point, providing, so it seemed, just the
key to the puzzle over the cascading break-
down in the 1960s and 1970s of Latin American
Authoritarianism populist protodemocracies.22 The importance
of Linz’s and O’Donnell’s work on authoritari-
Although, as we have seen, authoritarianism anism and that of others following (O’Donnell,
was widespread in Europe and elsewhere early 1979; Malloy, 1977; Collier, 1979) also lies in
in the twentieth century, it had not been pre- their questioning of the then still dominant ideas
cisely defined until Linz characterized Spain un- on modernization, which had predicted immi-
der Franco as belonging to a class of “political nent democratization for the relatively advanced
systems with limited, not responsible, political industrialized countries of Latin America. To-
pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ide- gether with the ongoing debate on dependent
ology, but with distinctive mentalities, without capitalism, these works opened an extremely
extensive, nor intensive political mobilization, rich and fruitful debate.
except at some points in their development, and The conceptual birth of authoritarianism also
in which a leader or occasionally a small group had important policy repercussions, insofar as in
exercises power within ill-defined limits but ac- their strategic alliances against potential Soviet/
tually quite predictable ones” (Linz, 1970a:255). Cuban expansionism, U.S. policy makers found
This new perspective was soon to acquire rel- authoritarian governments politically more ac-
evance with the widespread eruption of a new ceptable allies than other undemocratic rulers,
kind of undemocratic rule in Latin America, a fact that in no small part contributed to the
which abruptly ended the era of protodemo- legitimation and consolidation of these regimes.
cratic populist mobilizations in Argentina, With the change of policy in the Carter ad-
Uruguay and Brazil, and that of democratic so- ministration, however, and the generally dismal
20
In Hungary, a revolutionary Marxist dictatorship
was replaced by the rightist opposition; in Bulgaria, 21
On dependence theory, see the works of Fran-
Stomboliski’s progressive government was overrun in cisco Weffort, Octavio Sunkel, Theotonio Dos Santos,
1923 by a radical right alliance; in Romania the gen- Gunder Franck, Celso Furtado, Anibal Quijano, Im-
uinely fascist Legion of the Archangel Michael became very manuel Wallerstein, James Cockcroft, Edelberto Torres
powerful by the mid-thirties; in Spain, Primo de Rivera Rivas, José Nun, Ruy Mauro Marini, and Cardoso and
instituted a right-wing dictatorship from 1923 to 1930, Falleto.
22
followed by Franco from 1936 to 1976; right-wing coups In Brazil in 1964, in Argentina in 1966, and again
took place between 1926 and 1929 in Greece, Poland, in 1976 after a brief respite; in Uruguay in 1973; and in
Lithuania, and Portugal. Chile in 1973.
P1: JYT
economic performance of these regimes,23 they tained by import substitution industrialization

lost internal as well as external support, thereby (ISI). Finally, at stage three, the rise of BAs was
preparing the grounds for the third wave of said to have coincided with the end of the easy
democratization that began in 1983 with Ar- phase of import substitution (of light consumer
gentina. industry), leading to domination by a military–
At first glance, little discrepancy between technocratic elite and based on a phase of capi-
Linz’s and O’Donnell’s ideas on authoritarian- talism excluding popular sectors from the ben-
ism is apparent if we focus on regime structures efits of new capital-intensive industrial growth.
only. In contrast to Linz, however, O’Donnell O’Donnell’s economic explanation of the rise
gives primary importance to the social base of bureaucratic authoritarianism had a mixed
of regimes: BA regimes are said to rest on reception, particularly his hypothesis of the
a coalition of high-level military and business “deepening” and “exhaustion” of import sub-
technocrats working in close association with stitution industrialization alleged to have caused
foreign capital. They exclude subordinate classes it (Serra, 1979; Cardoso, 1979), with calls for
(outlawing any kind of political organization a more actor and ideology mediated view
thereof and persecuting labor, peasant, or ur- of the transition from populist to orthodox
ban popular leaders with Dirty War techniques) market-oriented economic policies (Hirshman,
and are therefore “emphatically antidemocratic” 1979). A second kind of critique concerned the
(Collier, 1979:24). The “limited pluralism” overextended use of the concept of BA, which
included in Linz’s definition is hereby given came to describe almost any Latin American
an important corrective: Because BA regimes nondemocratic regime in the 1970s, whether
included only a very small elite, their politics populist and inclusionary, as postrevolutionary
can hardly be “plural”; if anything, factional. Mexico, or elitist and exclusionary, as Chile
Equally absent from O’Donnell’s BA is the no- under Pinochet or Argentina under the mili-
tion of “mentality,” a somewhat obscure con- tary junta from 1976 to 1983.25 To palliate this
cept in Linz’s definition that is difficult to under- problem, analysts resorted to appending a wide
stand except as a somewhat run-down ideology. variety of qualifiers in order to distinguish be-
The most important difference between the tween various kinds of authoritarianisms, par-
two authors is that Linz aimed at typifying ticularly “inclusionary” or “populist” versus
the structural characteristics of authoritarian- “exclusionary” or “bureaucratic.”
ism regardless of origin or policies, whereas Despite the relative narrowness of the BA
O’Donnell was theorizing on a particular his- scheme, however, O’Donnell’s concern for the
torical sequence of regimes ending up in the alliances and coalitions backing up these kinds
birth of BAs in Latin America. At stage one, of regimes has been crucial to understanding
oligarchic democracies, which ruled in Latin the latter’s logic and evolution, easily translat-
America from the nineteenth century to the
Depression, were supported by economic elites regimes with some authoritarian traits, but basically al-
(mostly landed, but also mining) whose power lowing policy demands for social welfare and progressive
was based on the export of primary products to labor legislation to be met.
25
industrialized countries. At stage two, these oli- In the case of Mexico, the term was applied de-
spite three glaring contradictions with the definition of
garchies were overthrown by protodemocratic
BA: the inclusion of the popular sectors (via state cor-
populist leaders,24 based on multiclass coalitions poratist mechanisms) since the 1930s, the presence of
of urban elites and popular sectors and sus- a more populist than technocratic governing elite until
the 1980s, and the preservation of import substitution
23 well into the 1980s. Even in the 1990s, when neolib-
Except in the case of Chile where steady growth
was eventually achieved, but at a very high cost to the eral policies were at their zenith, a facade of inclusion of
majority of the population that has been excluded from the masses via tailored welfare programs was preserved.
the new prosperity. Above all, Mexico’s military was nowhere on the polit-
24
It is important to note that the term “populist” ical map at any time since the 1910 revolution (or even
in the Latin American context connotes inclusionary before then).
P1: JYT
ing into today’s concern for the social com- unlimited power to disregard all human rights
position supporting or weakening the stabil- in the fanatical pursuit of anticommunism and
ity of newly reestablished democracies. In fact, national security ideology (Barahona de Brito,
as O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead’s vol- 1997:25) have tended to be overlooked. In the
umes on democratic transitions (1986) have second, the importance for redemocratization of
shown, we owe the demise of these dictator- both overt and covert antiregime popular mo-
ships to the dissolution of the unholy alliances bilizations during the dictatorships received too
that had made BAs possible – between blandos little attention.
and duros26 within the military and between the As a result, democratization was overwhelm-
military and capitalists. ingly attributed to top-down elite negotiations
The debate on authoritarianism was soon to and deliberate “crafting” from above (Di Palma,
be interrupted sine die when Argentina returned 1991).29 Likewise, the nondemocratic ways dis-
to civilian rule in 1983, following the Malvinas played by some of the new democracies (as
military fiasco,27 shortly followed by Uruguay in Argentina under Menem or in Peru under
(1984), Brazil (1988), and Chile (1989). These Fujimori) were given short shrift. But more than
transformations were immediately (and some- anything, what failed to develop as a central de-
what hastily) heralded as “democracy,” despite bate is the growth of extreme right-wing move-
the enduring presence of the military in several ments capable of establishing themselves as le-
countries (conceptualized as military guardian- gitimate interest groups and parties in the new
ship by Loveman, 1994; Agüero, 1992; and democracies. As we shall see below, such phe-
Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán, 2000) nomena are also found in old democracies, and
and the absence, in many cases, of constitutional important work is currently underway to un-
guarantees of democracy, basic citizens’ rights, derstand the reasons for their growth.
or the rule of law, all of which were expected
to eventually appear with democratic consol-
idation. As a result, the potentially enduring Sultanistic Regimes
overlap between authoritarianism and democ-
racy received little attention.28 The tendency A category of undemocratic regimes that fits
to think of authoritarian regimes as indivisible neither the totalitarian nor the authoritarian
units had left relatively little room for the study mold is sultanism, a term Linz originally bor-
of subregime forces at work, alternately making rowed from Weber to signify an extreme form
such regimes more extreme than Linz’s defini- of patrimonialism in which authority is solely
tion warranted or working toward their future based on personal rulership exercised without
dissolution. In the first case, virtually totalitarian restraint, unencumbered by law, values, ideol-
institutional enclaves that had given the military ogy or custom, and where loyalty to the ruler
signifies total submission based on a mixture of
fear and greed (Chehabi and Linz, 1998a). In
26
Literally, soft and hard. such contexts, corruption is the golden rule and
27
In which the military junta confronted Britain’s
claims over the Falkland Islands (or Malvinas Islands, as human rights abuse a key instrument to maintain
called by the Argentines) and lost dismally. the status quo (Chehabi and Linz, 1998a). The
28
Important exceptions are characterizations of same phenomenon has been diversely coined as
countries (including old democracies) as patchworks “patrimonial praetorianism” by Rouquié (1984
of “rule” and “unrule” of law (see O’Donnell, 1993;
and 1987), “mafiacracy” by Wickham-Crowley
Mendez, O’Donnell, and Pinheiro, 1999; Fox, 1994 on
the persistence of the enduring mixtures between au- (1992), “kleptocracy” by Evans (1995), or sim-
thoritarianism and liberalism; and Fatton Jr., 2002 on the ply “neopatrimonialism,” each term emphasiz-
persistence of sultanism in Haiti). Also, as some regimes ing a different facet of the phenomenon. As for
in Central America have failed to pass even the light
29
test of minimal shumpeterian democracy, they have been For a critical review of the theorization on demo-
recognized as permanent hybrids (Karl, 1990; Schmitter, cratic transition in Latin America, see Brachet-Márquez
1991). (1997).
P1: JYT
all typifications, this definition designates a fam- because circumstances are favorable, which
ily of regimes rather than a prototype against dovetails with Przeworski’s (1986) claim that ex-
which cases can be measured, so that in fact, tremely illegitimate regimes will survive as long
many variants are included, such as the presence as key actors do not perceive alternatives. Ac-
in some cases of remnants of democratic insti- tors may also mistakenly perceive alternatives
tutions (although not functioning as such), as in and launch rebellions that are crushed (as the
Batista’s Cuba or under the Shah in Iran. Other Kurds under Sadam Hussein in the 1980s).
typical cases are Haiti under both Duvaliers, Although most authors acknowledge the im-
the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, Zaı̈re un- portance of external support for sultanistic
der Mobutu, the Dominican Republic under regimes, they usually gloss over it as just an-
Trujillo, the Philippines under Marcos, or other variable among many representing favor-
Uganda under Idi Amin. In sultanistic regimes, able conditions for the rise of that type of rule.
all autonomous institutions and organizations It is perhaps time that we give this component
disappear, becoming the personal property of the importance it deserves, acknowledging that
the ruler, so that these regimes are, in some sultanistic regimes arise and remain viable for
sense, stateless. As in totalitarianism, all forms decades precisely because such support is forth-
of social organization, save the most elementary coming, with a virtually unlimited source of
ones (e.g., the family, the shop, the neighbor- wealth, such as oil revenues (as in the case of
hood), are banned and destroyed, thereby re- Iraq and Iran). Without such resources, armies
ducing society to a shapeless mass. and militias cannot be trained or armed, intelli-
Sultanistic regimes usually evolve from other gence services and informers cannot be paid, 30
forms of rule: Duvalier was democratically supporters cannot be bought, and imports can-
elected in 1957, as was Ferdinand Marcos in not compensate for the ransacked economy. In
1965. They can also emerge from the break- other words, left to their own devices, sultanistic
down of clientelistic democracy or the de- regimes simply devour their own until no sup-
cay of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, as porters are left standing. Hence they can only
in Ceaucescu’s Romania (Chehabi and Linz, be maintained in power artificially.
1998b). Some of the conditions that facilitate the From 1945 to the 1970s, sultanistic regimes
rise of sultanism parallel those of totalitarianism: were the scourge of Africa, Latin America and
modernization in transportation, communica- Asia, surging and waning in tune with the
tions, military and police techniques, and the willingness of respectable democracies (France,
development of a minimal civil bureaucracy to Great Britain, Belgium, the United States) to
provide a base of financial administration (al- continue supporting them despite the atroci-
though nowhere near the organizational capac- ties they openly committed. In the McCarthy
ity of the totalitarian state). Other conditions – era, liberal nationalists in Iran led an initially
the isolation and extreme poverty of the masses successful coup against the Shah, immediately
to ensure passivity and massive doses of foreign followed by a CIA-engineered countercoup,
aid – are peculiar to this form of despotism. after which the regime turned sultanistic and
Snyder (1998) asserted that structural condi- SAWAK, the newly created intelligence agency,
tions are insufficient to explain the rise or decay began to torture and execute presumed oppo-
of sultanism, proposing instead a combination of nents (Parsa, 2000). Likewise, 1954 marked the
strength of opposition with what he calls “struc- end of democratic rule for Guatemala when the
tural conditions,” but may be more properly un- CIA sided with the most extreme right-wing
derstood as events or circumstances. For exam- forces of the country to unseat the democratic
ple, opposition may be weak, but the regime Jacobo Arbenz administration, guilty of having
can be toppled by a combination of unforeseen carried out a land reform in a country where
events, such as an earthquake (as in the case of
Nicaragua) or a U.S. invasion (as in the case 30
Mobutu had a multiplicity of intelligence services
of Panama under Noriega). Vice versa, oppo- that terrorized the population and fought among them-
sition may be strong, but the regime endures selves for turf and revenue (Willame, 1992).
P1: JYT
debt peonage was still the rule. By contrast, the Argentina). The regimes emerging from revo-
Carter administration’s policy of nonsupport to- lutions against sultanism can be socialist in all
ward regimes perpetrating human rights viola- its variants of authoritarianism (as in Vietnam
tions was paramount in limiting the Shah’s use of or Cuba), left radical (as the Sandinista govern-
military force against his people in the 1970s.31 ments in Nicaragua), or clerical guardianships
Subsequently, the Reagan and Bush adminis- (as in Iran and Afghanistan).
trations had no objection to the slaughter of the
opposition in Iraq and Syria (Katouzian, 1998).
Seen in this light, sultanistic regimes are not movements against authoritarian and
just old-fashioned authoritarian regimes that sultanistic regimes
somehow take a bad turn all on their own, but a
phenomenon that owes its existence to the con- Insofar as democracy shuns the use of vi-
figuration of international relations. Far from olence, armed insurgency, even against to-
disappearing with the end of the Cold War, talitarianism or authoritarianism, is inevitably
they have acquired new strategic importance undemocratic.32 As such, the study of armed
in the war against terrorism and extremism, so movements cannot be altogether omitted from
that neopatrimonial regimes in Saudi Arabia, a broad debate on undemocratic politics as de-
Kuwait, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, or Nigeria can still fined in this chapter. Armed rebellion is de-
count on the full support of Western democ- fined here as the extralegal ideologically justified
racies. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that such use of violence in the name of a greater com-
regimes are more likely to take hold in prelegal mon good (socialism, territorial independence,
virtually stateless societies with a long history of or some brand of radical welfare state), which
arbitrary rule and the absence of rights of any in turn may trigger violent repression.33
kind, exemplified by Iran, Haiti, and countless Rather than fight injustice at home, the first
postcolonial African and Asian countries. wave of armed insurgents in Latin America
What happens to sultanistic regimes when (1959–67)34 followed Guevara’s path, as ana-
they break down? It is no great surprise that lysts have generally agreed (Castañeda, 1993;
they are less likely than other undemocratic Wickham-Crowley, 1992). Contrary to their
regimes to evolve into democracies (Chehabi model, however, these insurgents quickly lost
and Linz, 1998b:37), due to the virtual ab- all contact with the moderate Left despite the
sence of autonomous institutions, the social fact that they were fighting neither unrelent-
disorganization wreaked by terror, and elite ma- ing military or sultanistic regimes (excepting
nipulation of democratic procedures. This may Guatemala), nor wars of national liberation,
explain why revolutionary upheavals are more
32
likely to arise and be successful in sultanistic A democratic way of preparing for the demise of
than other kinds of nondemocratic regimes (as a dictatorship would be exemplified by the clandestine
organization of antiregime social movements and par-
in Pahlavi’s Iran, Somoza’s Nicaragua, Batista’s
ties, as in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship and
Cuba, or the Saigon regime in South Vietnam). Poland under communist rule. This is not to say that
In cases of negotiated transitions to democracy, undemocratic action is not needed in order to force un-
the best that can be expected are resistant democratic regimes out of power. But should such ac-
hybrids of democracy and authoritarianism (as tion fail to be underwritten by democratic activists, the
regime that ousts undemocracy from power is likely to
in present-day Central America) or military
be undemocratic itself.
guardianships (as initially in Chile and 33
We should note that the qualifier of “totalitarian”
as applied by some to armed insurgent movements is
31
Following the success of the Iranian social revolu- inappropriate insofar as these lack a state, and therefore
tion led by Khomeini in 1978 and the 1979 Sandinista the dimensions of state organization (bureaucracy, party,
victory in Nicaragua, however, both the Carter and the military, police) and state terror that are essential to the
Reagan administrations made the prevention of yet an- concept of totalitarianism.
34
other revolution a policy priority (Goodwin, 2001:203). This first wave started in 1959 with the Cuban
For an assessment of Iran’s evolution since its revolution, revolution and ended in 1967 with Guevara’s death
see Esposito (2001). (Wickham-Crowley, 1992).
P1: JYT
as Fidel Castro and his allies initially had where officers from Latin American coun-
(Wickham-Crowley, 1992). tries were trained in methods of guerilla war-
This first wave of insurgents were radicalized fare, counterinsurgency, and intelligence; taught
university-educated young men,35 scornful of the doctrine of national security; and warned
the moderate Left or their respective gov- against the dangers of world communism.39
ernments’ accommodations with the center After the first wave of insurgency seemed to
or the Right. The political situations they die down and the urban guerillas briefly follow-
faced represented a broad gamut from radi- ing from it had quickly been decimated,40 a new
cal populism (as the government that followed wave of rural armed insurgency, less amateurish
Bolivia’s 1952 revolution) to moderate Left and more deadly, took hold in Latin America.
(as Romulo Betancourt’s social democratic gov- The repression also turned more vicious, as
ernment in Venezuela);36 to conservative au- paramilitary groups and death squads multiplied,
thoritarian (as Peru under Belaunde)37 all the clandestinely paid by various sources, among
way to extremely violent military regimes as in others their own governments. In this period
Guatemala. Despite these differences, the revo- again, the only successful guerilla war was that
lutionary repertoire was virtually the same in ev- aiming at national liberation against the univer-
ery country: Bourgeois democracy was a sham, sally hated (even in business circles) sultanistic
and armed insurgency the only means to build regime of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua.41
socialism. Thereafter, however, the U.S.-supported con-
Although it failed militarily, the first wave servative military “Contra” response to the vic-
of insurgency began winding up the enor- torious Left-oriented Sandinista regime led to
mous machinery of repression that would carry the latter’s demise and a negotiated transition to
to power four military dictatorships in the parliamentary democracy.
Southern Cone (Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Rather than try to win militarily, a second
and Chile) and further entrench those al- kind of armed insurgency, as exemplified in
ready in power in Central America. This re- El Salvador, managed to maintain a stalemate
action boosted the rolls of the Army School against government forces until the peace ac-
of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone,38 cords of 1992, thereafter agreeing to disarm
in order to participate in democratic elections.
35
Estimated from the number of the dead, between In Colombia – the only country in which
1964 and 1978, 64% of the guerillas were educated up- armed insurgency antedated the Cuban revo-
per middle class, 33% manual workers, and 3% tech-
nical. Among the officially tortured (i.e., not count-
ing the “disappeared”), 55% were college educated, 12%
technical, 25.9% students, and 10% university professors against communism, they had been convinced that the
(Castañeda, 1993:93). victory of the “subversives” would signify their down-
36
In 1947–8 Betancourt had headed a government fall, in the same way as Castro had executed 600 officers
that had carried out social reforms without heeding the of the Batista army.
39
conservative backlash, which led to a military coup that To this day, officers accused of violating human
ousted him from power. During his 1959–64 adminis- rights during the Dirty War claim that they were saving
tration, he carried out a substantial agrarian reform and their country from the communist scourge and doing
repelled three (right-wing) military rebellions. their patriotic duty when torturing their prisoners to
37
Belaúnde carried out a largely cosmetic agrarian death (Payne, 2000).
40
reform in 1964 that distributed infertile jungle sections The Tupamaros in Uruguay, Mir in Chile, Mon-
to landless peasants rather than the arable land held by toneros in Argentina (the surviving Left wing of Pero-
oligarchic families (Seligmann, 1995). nism), and Marighellas in Brazil.
38 41
According to Wickham-Crowley’s sources (1992: Yet after achieving the only successful revolution
77), between 1950 and 1973, close to 30,000 men were in Latin America after the Cuban revolution, the sandin-
trained in Panama and the United States and over 40,000 istas proceeded to impose Soviet-style land collectiviza-
in other countries (probably their own). By contrast, tion and forced conscription on peasants and Miskito
the estimated number of guerillas trained in Cuba is indigenous people (many of whom had sided with the
around 3,000. The elites trained by the United States revolution), who then engrossed the files of the contras
are reported to have been exceptionally strong in their fighting the revolutionary government with the help of
antiguerilla feelings. In addition to their indoctrination the Reagan administration (Payne, 2000).
P1: JYT
lution42 – the stalemate has continued uninter- government(s) of failing to respect indigenous
rupted, leading to de facto territorial division people’s citizenship and local self-government
between the two camps. In Peru, the extremely rights, so that it represents, paradoxically, de-
authoritarian Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining mands for more democracy than the ruling
Path) – born in Ayacucho in 1969 – was ini- regime has been willing to grant its native pop-
tially backed by substantial popular support ulation, despite the end of one-party rule in
(Degregori, 1990) but met its final defeat in 2000.44
the mid-1990s through a combination of mili- The history of military violence against the
tary reprisal and peasant self-defense (Degregori status quo in Latin America would not be com-
et al., 1996).43 As for Guatemala, where guerilla plete if it did not include Juan Velasco Alvarado’s
warfare grew throughout this period, especially military coup in 1968 that unseated Peru’s
in the mostly indigenously populated high- oligarchic patrimonial regime (Stepan, 1976).
lands, it was decimated by the especially violent Rather than represent conservative forces, how-
government military forces, estimated by the ever, the military government that followed
Catholic Church to have killed some 200,000 (1968–75) carried out a vast agrarian reform and
people – most of them unarmed civilians – be- radical industrial and mining reforms. But it also
tween the early 1960s and the signing of the imprisoned its opponents, closed dissenting ra-
peace accords in 1996 (Goodwin, 2001:198). dio stations and newspapers, and suspended civil
The newest outbreak of armed insurgency, liberties.
in this case wholly indigenous except for its Although repression was the first reaction
military chief (the subcomandante Marcos), took to armed insurgency, it was not invariably the
place in Mexico in January 1994, in the poorest only one, as noted by Goodwin (2001:199). In
and most densely indigenous state of Chiapas. the 1980s, semidemocratic elections were un-
In this case, however, the military phase lasted dertaken by the military in El Salvador and
only a few weeks, followed by a tenacious (but Guatemala in which Christian democratic (cen-
so far unsuccessful) attempt on the part of the trist) and moderate social democratic parties
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) were able to take part. The reasons for such
to negotiate with three successive governments openings were, first, the absence of any clear
constitutional changes in the status of indige- military victory after years of fighting, and, sec-
nous Mexicans. The movement has accused the ond, the U.S. demand that some form of demo-
cratic process be instituted as the condition for
42
From 1949 to 1965, Colombia underwent a period continuing to finance counterinsurgency effort,
known as La Violencia, in which various insurgent groups
confronted government forces and peasants formed in-
evidencing once again the influence of the sup-
dependent republics in order to protect themselves. In port or nonsupport of democracy by the United
1965, these first groups were destroyed by the military. States.45 These elections, although highly un-
Thereafter, the Colombian Communist Party (one of satisfactory from a strictly democratic view-
the very few to have participated in insurgency) declared point, can nevertheless be credited for having
that all forms of struggle should be undertaken, thereby
exposing even civilian nonviolent groups to paramilitary
44
assassinations (Castañeda, 1993:90). For more detail on the religious origin in lib-
43
The war period was extremely violent, as reflected eration theology of this most unusual movement, see
in a net population loss of 23.3% in the Ayacucho region Womack (1998), Harvey (1998), and Legorreta Dı́az
and mass migration from isolated villages in the High- (1998). For the question of democracy in zapatismo, see
lands (Degregori et al., 1996:16). An important change Harvey (1998). For an overall view of the movement
occurred when armed and trained peasant civilian de- from guerilla to political movement as stated by subco-
fense committees (or Rondas Campesinas) were formed. mandante Marcos, see Le Bot (1992, 1995, 1997). For the
This approach substituted the previous policy of treating problem of regional autonomy for indigenous groups,
the indigenous population a priori as suspect of collabo- see Diaz Polanco (1991).
45
ration with the Shining Path (not unlike the United States Nevertheless, in 1982 the Reagan administration
in Vietnam during the 1970s). Peasants, on the other decided to remove Guatemala from the list of human
hand, were motivated to collaborate with the army after rights offenders, after which money from international
Sendero’s leadership started substituting their own cadres donors could pour into the country unimpeded by any
for local peasant leaders via assassination. legal obstacle (Goodwin, 201:203).
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interrupted the upward spiral of violence that the latter a patina of democratic respectability
had approached genocidal levels in both coun- and, in some cases, substantial electoral suc-
tries, and therefore to have prepared for peace cesses. The variety of contexts and forms of
negotiations. Thereafter, the notorious “intelli- right-wing politics that have developed in the
gence” branches of the police were disbanded last two decades has led to important defini-
both in Guatemala and El Salvador, and death tional disagreements among specialists, divided
squad violence abated (Goodwin, 2001:201). between those typifying the extreme Right as
But the extreme Right also took advantage of old traditional versus new postindustrial (Ignazi,
the opportunity to organize its own political 1997); populist, neopopulist, or national–
parties and democratically take up positions in populist (Betz and Immerfall, 1998; Mudde,
the system, so that they were able to effectively 2001); “radical” or “ultra” Right in terms of
veto the reformist legislation proposed by vic- its distance from the center; or conservative an-
torious centrist forces (Goodwin, 2001: 202). tistatist (economically liberal) versus national-
Finally, although armed rebellion and ist populist and state-centered (Mudde, 2000b).
paramilitary terrorism has been far less com- Overarching these classifications, a broad cate-
mon in postwar Europe than in Latin America, gory of “extreme” parties and movements has
we should mention the separatist Basque ETA, been defined as “opposing in terms of ideas or
which has fought for independence from Spain action the fundamental values or institutions of
throughout the authoritarian period and down democratic regimes” (Mudde, 2002:135), con-
to the present,46 and Ireland’s IRA, a seem- trasting with conservative or radical Rights that
ingly permanent feature of politics in the United accept democratic rules of the game.47
Kingdom. To these must be added the recent For the purpose of this discussion, a broad
alarming growth of neo-Nazi armed groups in four-way distinction is drawn between right-
Germany and Sweden despite (or perhaps be- wing parties and movements oriented on the
cause of) their lack of political representation one hand toward the market, or neoliberals, and
in these countries (Mudde, 2002) and the ac- those oriented toward the state as an instru-
cumulation of terrorist military and paramili- ment for the redefinition of politics and soci-
tary actions during the civil war in the former ety, or neopopulists. On the other hand are ul-
Yugoslavia (Mudde, 2000a), without omitting traconservatives that keep their actions within the
the ongoing bloody struggle between Russian confines of democratic politics (although call-
troups and Chechnia nationalist rebels in the ing for a radical revision of such politics), and
former Soviet Union. the “extreme Right,” which resorts to extrainsti-
tutional violence (Figure 23.1). Although these
discontents and dissidents distinctions come close to those advocated by
Mudde (2000b), they encompass more right-
The last two decades, as many analysts agree wing formations than he envisages. Neverthe-
(Betz, 1998; Hainsworth, 2000b; Merkl and less, it does not imply a clear divide in every
Weinberg, 1997; Plotke, 2002:xxix), have seen a case, as some ultraconservatives cumulate a lib-
general shift toward the Right in most democ- eral view of economics and a neofascist view of
racies, old or new. As a result, the Right and how the state should act, whereas other groups
extreme Right have come to overlap, giving implement a double strategy of clandestine vio-
lence and loyal participation in democratic com-
46
ETA (Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna), founded in 1959, petition.48 Some groups also move strategically
grew out of the Basque Nationalist Party and survived between ultraconservatism and extreme right
throughout the Franco regime despite severe repression.
From 1975 on, despite the granting of regional auton- 47
For a further discussion of Western extremist
omy and pardon offered to ETA members renouncing groups, see Hewitt (2002), Abedi (2003), and Eatwell
terrorism, the number of killings and assassinations mul- and Mudde (2003).
48
tiplied tenfold over what had existed during the Franco As Ireland’s IRA and its political party Sinn Fein,
regime. or Basque country’s ETA and its party Herri Batasuna.
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Unión Nacional de Carapintadas

Propietarios (Argentina)
(Brazil)
Front National Pro-Life

(France) (USA)
Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs Socialist Party
(Austria) Of Serbia
(Yugoslavia)
Figure 23.1. A Taxomony of Undemocratic Movements and Parties
categories, depending on available opportunities the extreme right/neoliberal cell, whereas sev-
and constraints. Finally, we find cases, particu- eral fundamentalist groups such as Pro-Life or
larly in Central Europe, in which the previous communist–nationalist parties such as Milo-
communist past and populist nationalist present sevič’s Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička Par-
are so mixed that it is difficult to place them tija Srbije) could be counted among neopopulist
along a Left–Right continuum. extreme right movements.51
Movements in all four categories have in For Western Europe (Germany, the
common a capacity to mobilize resentment and Netherlands, and Flanders), Mudde (2000) has
fire their respective constituencies into relatively codified the ideological profiles of extreme right
long-term electoral and/or violent action. Ul- parties in four points: nationalism (including
traconservative neoliberals such as Brazil’s Unión monoculturalism); xenophobia (also including
Nacional de Propietarios (UNP), made up of large homophobia, antileftism, and antifeminism);
landowners, have opposed any kind of agrar- the “strong state” of law and order; and welfare
ian reform, first by force and then electorally chauvinism (i.e., only for the truly national
(Payne, 2000). Ultraconservative neopopulist population). To these, some parties also add
parties such as France’s Front National, led exclusionism (often defined as the “separation”
by Jean Marie Le Pen,49 or Jörg Haider’s of races) and historical revisionism (revising the
xenophobic nativist Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs past in the case of German or Flemish extreme
(Austria’s Freedom Party) (Morrow, 1998; An- right parties).
tidefamation League, 2001) capitalize on pop- This four-point list, although arguably re-
ular disillusionment with mainstream politics, flecting the cases under study, is bound to lose
crises of representation in old party systems, some of its validity outside of Western (and
antielitism, and xenophobic feelings toward im-
migrants (variously blamed for economic de-
perpetrated assassinations of individuals considered “sub-
cline, falling welfare coverage and standards,
versives” (i.e., communists) even after the Cold War had
unemployment, or rising crime) (Hainsworth, ceased. They paint their faces in order to both disguise
2000a:9). Given their association with neolib- themselves and advertise for their group when carrying
eral military dictatorships, paramilitary groups out their “missions.”
51
such as Argentina’s Carapintadas50 would fit into Although it might seem counterintuitive to place
Pro-Life and Milosevic’s party in the same category, it
illustrates that these say nothing about the severity of the
49 breaking of democratic rules. Pro-lifers bomb abortion
On Front National, initially created in 1972 with
former collaborationists and fascists, see Mayer (1990), clinics in defiance of democratically enacted law making
Camus (1996), and Hainsworth (2000b). abortion permissible, whereas Serbian nationalists have
50
Carapintadas (literally, “painted faces”) is an ex- used fascist methods (hiring paid mobs to stir up ethnic
treme right clandestine military organization that has conflict, perpetrating ethnic cleansing, etc.).
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probably also Eastern) Europe,52 where extreme cally clustered extremist groups may raise or the
right movements share a certain nostalgia for the specific ideological rallying points they may de-
fascist past, clearly reflected in three out of the fine, their most important family resemblance
four key values (excluding welfare chauvinism) may lie in the tactics they use to mobilize their
selected by Mudde. But it is doubtful that we membership and gain access to political power.
could find a general list of unifying myths and Payne (2000) sees what she calls “uncivil move-
cultural narratives globally shared by all groups. ments” as mobilized through “political agents,”
We should, however, be able to build matching who “frame” contemporary events in ways that
value lists and group typologies for the United echo the concerns and fears of their intended
States, where racism and anticommunism have audience by drawing on cultural symbols and le-
defined the identity of right-wing groups for gitimating myths that connect movements with
decades, starting with McCarthyism, continu- recognized villains and heroes. Framing is said to
ing with the John Birch Society (Bell, 2000), involve naming, which transforms given events
and moving to ever-novel forms of religious into political threats, and hence catalysts for po-
fundamentalism (Christian Coalition), paramili- litical action; blaming, which identifies a com-
tary groups (the Militias), or white supremacism monly held scapegoat that takes the blame for
(The New Order, Liberty Lobby).53 Another named problems; aiming, which convinces the
grouping may be achieved with postdictatorship intended audience that the severe threat which
Latin American countries where the immense the blamed group represents for the nation
and advancing mass of the poverty-stricken in “leaves the movement no alternative save radi-
need of redistribution and the demands for cal political action” (Payne, 2000:23); and finally
the prosecution of Dirty War crimes consti- claiming, which asserts the possibility of defeat-
tute major rallying points for the Right. Finally, ing the named culprit, thereby convincing the
a fourth cluster might group Mid-Eastern and intended audience that it can be defeated, pro-
Asian countries where fundamentalist Islamics vided that the movement is vigilant and that its
have been the only dissident groups to have sur- members take action.
vived the repression of modernizing authoritar- Far from being peculiar to the Right, such
ian or sultanistic regimes, and whose religious patterns show the ways in which relatively
traditional values have in some cases been in- marginalized (civil or uncivil) social movements
corporated into the official discourse in an ef- of all creeds are able to create and maintain their
fort by states to expand their power over society base of support in society, so that their actions
(Macfarquhar and Resa Narr, 2001).54 can be seen as prompted by the prior organiza-
The list could be further expanded. Yet more tional necessity of “inventing” and crystalizing
than the variety of issues regionally and histori- symbolic communities via the continuous suc-
cession of framing processes. What actions are
52
actually undertaken, rather than directly flow
In Central Europe, where a few extreme right par-
out of a set of preestablished values, are the con-
ties took power right after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
many more have achieved continuous minority presence tingently and circumstantially-constructed con-
in parliaments and usefulness as legitimate coalition part- sequence of the interaction between leaders and
ners, in contrast with Western Europe where conserva- members as played out within the structured po-
tive parties have shunned them. On Eastern Europe post- litical frameworks in which these take place.
communist politics, see Kopecký and Mudde (2003). For
a list of major ultraconservative and extreme right politi-
cal organizations, see Camus (1999) and Mudde (2000a,
2002). concluding remarks
53
On the extreme Right in the United States, see
Bell (2000), Plotke (2000), Hewitt (2003), and Michael In this chapter, I have defined the major research
(2003). programs and debates that figure prominently in
54
On extremism in Muslim countries, see
Macfarquhar and Resa Narr (2001), Dekmejian a broad field of inquiry on undemocratic pol-
(1995), Faksh (1997), Marty and Appleby (1995), Kepel itics. As we have seen, major old unresolved
(1984), Willis (1996), and Wickham (2002). issues (e.g., the class versus cleavage nature of
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the path to democracy or fascism, the “why constitute permanent threats of return to un-
Germany” question, the origins and economic democratic rule. Perhaps, then, the concept of
underpinnings of authoritarianism) are still be- totalitarianism would be more useful as a qual-
ing debated and new evidence brought in the ifying than as a substantive term, so that com-
balance. But new ones have also been created munist or fascist regimes can be labeled as to-
by the entry of formerly authoritarian regimes talitarian in specific cases and periods only. In
into the democratic camp, thereby raising new that way, we would avoid the forced compari-
questions and opening up new areas for inquiry. son between the substantive aspects of regimes
Rather than summarize the literature and ar- as distinct as Stalin’s USSR, Hitler’s Germany,
guments reviewed, these concluding remarks aim or Mao’s China.
at pointing out some key proposals and direc- All this means that both totalitarianism and
tions for inquiry, out of which new research pro- fascism continue to have some heuristic value in
grams can emerge or old ones further develop the examination of current undemocratic pol-
to produce important scholarship in the future. itics, but only as long as they are used both
precisely and flexibly. Revisiting Russia’s and
Central Europe’s precommunist and communist
Are Fascism and Totalitarianism a Thing pasts in that light, for example, is an opportune
of the Past? and important task, not only to set the record
straight on how those regimes really functioned
Totalitarianism, as narrowly defined, is cir- from 1945 to 1989, but also to better understand
cumscribed to two countries and periods – the variety of cultural and structural departure
Nazi Germany and Stalinist USSR. Efforts to points in the transition to democracy found in
stretch the concept to other cases have failed that region. In short, totalitarianism and fascism
or amounted to mere Cold War propaganda. as they have existed in the twentieth century
These two cases are therefore to be clearly dis- were unique and therefore unrepeatable, but the
tinguished from nontotalitarian ones of either concepts constructed to capture these phenom-
communist or fascist regimes. In other words, ena continue to be useful if properly unpacked
the two (rather distinct) totalitarianisms that and judiciously applied to new situations.
sprang to life in the interwar period were both
unique and rare clusters of antecedents, circum-
stances, ideological currents, agents, and events Should We Continue to Speak about
never to be repeated. Yet, new totalitarianisms Authoritarianism?
with their own nonreproducible specificities
have subsequently emerged (and may continue Despite Linz’s and O’Donnell’s efforts to
to do so in the future), as the example of China’s systematize the concept authoritarianism has
Cultural Revolution suggests. Moreover, some proved so protean that it can hardly refer to a
extreme left or right movements have waited in single family of regimes, hence the many qual-
the wings but failed to win politically. For ex- ifiers usually appended to the term. Neverthe-
ample, Peru’s Shining Path had all the markings less, Linz’s original typification of the postfas-
of a Maoist-style totalitarian regime to-be and cist phase of Franco’s Spain continues to func-
in fact enforced totalitarian rule over a good part tion as a useful conceptual beacon insofar as it
of Peru’s territory in its late period. Likewise, clearly distinguishes authoritarianism from tra-
fascist elements are still lingering or new neo- ditional autocracies on the one hand, and from
fascist regimes waiting for the appropriate cir- fascism or totalitarianism on the other. Con-
cumstances and alliances of today’s neopopulist trasting with traditional domination, authori-
parties with ultraconservatives and/or the mili- tarian governance relies on modern bureaucracy
tary. Totalitarian practices have also appeared in and technologically advanced means of surveil-
resistant institutional enclaves, such as the mil- lance and repression, and is therefore a thor-
itary and paramilitary in Latin America, which oughly modern phenomenon. In contrast with
have proven difficult to extirpate and therefore fascism and totalitarianism, it does not mobilize
P1: JYT
the masses into action based on a transforming research carried out has done much to clear the
ideology (or does so only in earlier phases, as way for the work that is now urgent if global ter-
most postfascist or postrevolutionary regimes). rorism and rogue sultanistic and authoritarian
In every case, however, it cripples the capacity of states continue to take center stage in inter-
civil society to organize itself independently of national politics. This initial work has estab-
the state, and as such creates obstacles to demo- lished that far from being a variety of author-
cratic citizenship for decades after its demise. itarian regime, sultanism is a peculiar form of
A major task for future research, and one so patrimonial rule distorted by access to inter-
far neglected in favor of characterizing regimes national alliances and modern means of re-
in toto, is to investigate the survival or reappear- pression. In the Weberian sense, whereas au-
ance in democracies of authoritarianism in given thoritarianism is a rationally organized form
groups and subnational regions and within spe- of autocracy (especially in its bureaucratic–
cific institutional niches. In doing so, we may authoritarian form) that must include some
discover that far from being alien to democratic plebiscitarian elements (especially in its more
practices, such authoritarian standards as clien- inclusionary form), sultanism is a profoundly
telism, regional bossism, and the selective ap- irrational and disorganized form of despotism
plication of the law plague new as much as old devoid of any rule limiting state power or so-
democracies. cial base of legitimacy, which sustains itself by
Another major research program to be devel- terror. In sum, it is modern in its means of re-
oped is the investigation of the dynamics of tran- pression and irrational in its form of organiza-
sitions from different varieties of authoritarian- tion.
ism to democracy, while finding a good balance Broadening the stage within which sultanism
between theorization and case studies. Case has been studied, we might ask whether this
studies will keep us in contact with the unique kind of extreme undemocratic rule is the in-
historically constructed nature of the ways in evitable consequence of global international
which people and leaders transform their par- politics as dominated by the United States, as
ticular authoritarian structures into democratic opposed to largely home-grown phenomena. In
ones (or fail to do so), and will put some meat the Cold War era, the answer given by Western
on such concepts as quickly negotiated (Spain) powers was a clear yes, insofar as sultanistic
versus delayed “natural” transitions (Mexico), allies were considered preferable to commu-
transitions from territorially balkanized situa- nist enemies. In the name of that principle,
tions (e.g., Central America, Colombia) ver- these powers (especially the United States) have
sus those from situations of strong central state not only tolerated, but also outright supported,
hegemony, or unplanned transitions from mili- regimes perpetrating untold atrocities as well
tary disasters (as Argentina’s) or economic col- as helped them to crush many a genuine na-
lapse (Warsaw Pact countries) versus planned tional rebellion, in order to check the po-
ones (Brazil, Chile). In other words, far from tential creation of communist strongholds on
being a task for the past, the study of authoritar- the international checkerboard. In the post-
ianism will continue to be an important aspect Cold War era, however, the answer is no
of the study of democratic as well as undemo- longer so clear, as past experience with for-
cratic politics, whose development should lead mer “allies” such as Panama’s Noriega or Iraq’s
to a more nuanced view of the differences as Sadam Hussein has failed to bear the anticipated
well as connections between the two. fruits.
At the opening of the new century, a new
Exit Cold War Sultanism, Enter Post-Cold phenomenon calling for research has been
War Sultanism? emerging in some Muslim countries: Islamic
movements in Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey
Although sultanism has not occupied the lime- have been electorally marginalized in favor of
light in the study of undemocratic politics, the moderate Muslim leaders who are nevertheless
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critical of U.S. policy in their region.55 Should tablish or further consolidate extremely harsh
such independent-minded leaders be forcibly and exclusionary authoritarian regimes, some-
removed from power in favor of despots more thing that represented a huge step back for
closely alined with NATO powers as in the democracy in a region where progressive coali-
past, are we likely to see more extremist Islamic tions of urban middle classes, popular masses,
movements gaining popularity and electoral and new industrial elites had established early
strength? Iran’s postrevolutionary trajectory sug- in the twentieth century protodemocratic pop-
gests that stigmatizing unfriendly regimes may ulist regimes willing to extend the benefits of
entrench more deeply their clerical theocratic industrialization to the masses.56
elements and destabilize their reformists, while Third, and most importantly for the future of
Panama’s and Iraq’s cases show that supporting democracy, as these new bureaucratic authori-
despotic and corrupt sultanistic power can back- tarian regimes outlawed and mercilessly pursued
fire. In the future, understanding the rise and fall all forms of independent political representation
of sultanistic regimes in the context of interna- and participation (while experimenting with
tional politics will contribute to a better under- exclusionary neoliberal policies on the disen-
standing of such phenomena and show the close franchised masses), the apprenticeship of peace-
relation between politics in established democ- ful adversarial politics that, for some countries,
racies and undemocratic politics in the Third had started as far back as the 1830s was violently
World. interrupted, thereby setting back the clock of
democracy for decades.
It does not follow, however, that we should
Did Left Rebellions and Right Reactions consider authoritarianism the necessary conse-
Ease or Block the Way to Democracy? quence of leftist uprisings. For example, the re-
action of the French government to the May
The historical itinerary of Latin America’s two 1968 student uprising in Paris can in no way
successive waves of Marxist insurgency and their compare to the savage treatment of the very sim-
repression may be significant for an understand- ilar student uprising of October 1968 in Mexico,
ing of the dynamics of undemocratic politics. where hundreds were mercilessly machine-
First, it is clear that armed insurgencies, what- gunned by the police and thousands remained
ever the good intentions of their initiators, were political prisoners for years. The interaction
no midwives to peace or prosperity in the re- between leftist uprisings and authoritarian re-
gion, let alone political liberty, even in the two action must therefore be historically contex-
cases where they were successful. It is recognized tualized. Perhaps, then, the main reason that
that international forces were paramount in revolutions rarely breed democracy has less
either defeating (Nicaragua) or hardening to do with the intrinsic nature of these so-
(Cuba) the regimes that followed upon these cial convulsions than with the fact that they
revolutions, so that not all the responsibility can look back to nothing better in their past
should be laid at the door of the movements than ruthless patrimonial, sultanistic, or colo-
that launched them. Yet in both cases, the in- nial rule (as in Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua,
surgency started as national revolutions backed or Vietnam) and therefore lack any familiar-
by multiclass coalitions, so that the option to ity with the essential ingredients of demo-
evolve toward some form of democracy was not cracy.
irremediably closed.
Second, unsuccessful armed rebellions coa-
56
lesced the political forces necessary to either es- Both in Argentina during the Peronist eras (1946–
55 and 1973–4) and in Mexico during the Cárdenas years
(1934–40), important social reforms were carried out,
55
Information of recent elections in Muslim coun- such as social security for industrial labor and civil ser-
tries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey was taken vants. Cárdenas also distributed more land to the landless
from Samaha (2002). peasants than all of his antecessors put together.
P1: JYT
Is the Electoral Participation of Extreme fact, but also closely intertwined in ways that are
Parties a Threat to Democracy? still to be systematically spelt out and evidenced.
It follows that advancing in the task of explain-
In old as well as new democracies, the exis- ing undemocracy is inextricably connected with
tence of ultraconservative or extremist groups that of finding approaches to democracy that
and parties must be tolerated as long as they do do not treat undemocratic manifestations as ac-
not step outside of democratic rules. From ex- cidental, epiphenomenal, or destined to disap-
amining their electoral record in Western and pear as democracy gradually becomes “the only
Central Europe, they appear as little more than game in town.” In these final considerations,
marginal and ineffective rabble-rousers. There I outline the ways in which we may build re-
are two reasons for taking such reassuring con- search programs around two broad postulates:
clusions with some skepticism, however. First, (1) democratic and undemocratic politics are
most available analyses base their conclusions linked within democracies; and (2) democratic
on national elections, thereby disregarding the and undemocratic politics are linked interna-
importance of subnational processes. Territorial tionally.
extremist movements such as the Basque and
Irish nationalists are still the exception rather
than the rule, but new ones are emerging (in Democratic and Undemocratic Politics
Chechnia, among Turkish and Iraqi Kurds) and are Linked within Democracies
old ones being rekindled (as in Corsica). Re-
search must therefore assess the more local and This may happen in a number of ways. I
regional dimensions of the territorial entrench- will restrict these last comments to two typi-
ment of extremist and ultraconservative poli- cal situations: (1) when democratic procedures
tics within democracies. A second reason for are used as legitimate cover in order to send out
skepticism is that we cannot predict from elec- undemocratic messages or carry out undemo-
toral results obtained in normal conditions the cratic deeds; and (2) when democratic proce-
role some of these groups may play in alliance dures are made to systematically misfunction for
with others in the aftermath of some national some groups (blacks, immigrants, women, the
emergency comparable, for example, to what poor), thereby covering up for prejudice, exclu-
occurred in the United States on September 11, sion, or downright aggression. In the first case,
2001. So far, the extreme Right in Western democracy lets in undemocracy by extending
Europe has maintained friendly relations with its legal mantle too far, whereas in the other, it
Middle Eastern leaders shunned by the West,57 fails to extend it far enough.
but given the right circumstances they could An example of the first kind is the use of
easily take electoral advantage of any widespread democratic elections by some parties in order
Islamic terrorist activity on their respective na- to establish an undemocratic regime, as when
tional territories. Islamic parties participate in democratic elec-
tions with the explicit intention, should they
win, of denying full citizenship to women and
final considerations on the giving overriding authority to unelected cler-
relation between democratic ics. At the subnational level, we may exemplify
and undemocratic politics the overextended use of democratic principles
when child pornography is legally tolerated in
As suggested by various works reviewed in this the name of freedom of speech and therefore
chapter, undemocracy and democracy are not without regard for the rights of minors, when
only opposed in principles and juxtaposed in a party includes undemocratic principles in its
platform or forms an electoral coalition with
57
Jörg Haider visited Sadam Hussein in 2002, and one that does, or when a democratically elected
Jean Marie Le Pen made pronouncements in favor of body enacts laws violating democratic princi-
Palestinian nationalism on several occasions. ples. A third kind of example is the inclusion
P1: JYT
of undemocratic principles in democratic con- sources are often scarce. What kind of regimes
stitutions such as the provision that the military are more likely to make “deals” with candidates
may lawfully take power when they judge the in such contests and be handsomely rewarded
national interest to be in danger (as in present- should these win? Authoritarian and sultanistic
day Argentina, Chile, and Brazil).58 regimes with a long history of deals with demo-
Undemocracy resulting from the failure to cratic regimes (arms deals, drug deals, money
provide equal protection of the law to all is il- laundering deals, aids deals, etc.), who there-
lustrated every day when the police fails to ad- fore can be trusted not to blow the whistle.
equately protect the poor from crime, when Should the candidate who has benefited from
municipal sanitary trucks somehow “miss” low- such contributions win, undemocratic politics
income areas, or when ghetto schools produce have entered democracy through the back door,
little more than functional illiterates. It is also il- so to speak: The elected government is com-
lustrated when the law is enforced so selectively mitted to sustaining the benefactor’s undemo-
that some ethnic groups are overprosecuted cratic regime.60 Democratic countries have also
while others are underprosecuted, when the po- knowingly hired criminals, as when the post-
lice stand by while extremists attack defense- war U.S. government found it necessary to hire
less citizens, or when illegal and life-threatening recognized Nazi criminals as spies against the
activities go virtually unchecked.We are all fa- Soviet Union.61
miliar with most of these examples but unac- Rather than exceptions unworthy of our so-
customed to treating them as manifestations of ciological attention or objects offered for our
undemocracy, as opposed to inefficiency, re- self-righteous disapproval, such cases represent
source scarcity, or individual misconduct. opportunities for analizing undemocratic prin-
ciples and realities not as phenomena distinct
from and opposed to democracy, but as part and
Undemocratic and Democratic Politics parcel of the dynamics of democracy (and un-
Are Linked Internationally democracy).
As seen in the review of sultanistic regimes,

undemocratic politics of the worst kind tak- 60
An empirical example that has come to the author’s
ing place in the Third World are often created attention may serve as an illustration. The context is a
and nurtured by established democracies that are presidential election in an established Western democ-
racy in which X, a candidate, has successfully negoti-
wont to prefer unconditional submission to a re- ated a $30 million medical aid package for Isthmus, a
spect for human rights or democratic principles recently democratized ex-sultanistic regime. Only $15
as criteria for selecting their allies.59 We are also million worth of aid material have arrived at its destina-
familiar with such facts as well as accustomed to tion (although invoiced for $30 million), some of it not
attributing them either to the myopia of individ- medical, because Y, the health minister, was involved
in an arms deal. The loop has been closed: Democracy
ual statesmen or to the zero-sum game calculus feeds upon undemocracy, which in turn thrives on de-
these make, ostensibly in the national interest. mocracy.
61
Democratic elections, for example, require These facts have recently been revealed with the
funds in ever-growing amounts. Yet national opening of U.S. postwar archives. Among those hired
was Hermann Höfle, who organized the deportation
of all Jews from Warsaw, Dublin, Radom, Cracovia,
58 and Lvov; supervised the construction of extermina-
For more illustrations of these principles, see
Zakaria (1997). tion camps in Sobibor, Treblinka, and Belzec; and was
59
As a recent example, Human Rights Watch reports the mastermind behind the construction of gas cham-
that Iraqi dissident Nizar Al-Khazraji, favored by the bers in these camps. In 1983, when Barbie (alias Lyon’s
United States against Sadam Hussein, has been prose- Butcher) was arrested in France, the U.S. Justice Depart-
cuted by the Sorö tribunal in Denmark (where he re- ment apologized to the French government for having
sides) for failing to protect civilians in wartime and com- hired in 1947 the man responsible for the deportation of
mitting grievous crimes against the Kurds during the war French Jews and assisting in his flight to Bolivia in order
between Iraq and Iran (from Le Monde, November 28, to evade French justice. For more details, see Le Nouvel
2002). Observateur, July 11–17, 2002.
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chapter twenty-four
State Bureaucracy
Politics and Policies
Oscar Oszlak
The present chapter will analyze the theme of The subject of bureaucratic power has been
public bureaucracy in politics and implement- treated in the literature from several perspec-
ing policies from the perspective of the power tives. Rourke (1984), for example, considered
relations in which the bureaucracy intervenes as that the power of bureaucracies derives mainly
an actor in the political process and the institu- from two sources: “(1) their ability to create
tional arrangements established for implement- and nurse constituencies and (2) their techni-
ing public policies and attaining their goals. The cal skills that they command and can focus on
involvement of bureaucracy in politics raises the complicated issues of public policy” (1). At the
question of its relative power vis-à-vis other same time, bureaucracy is seen as the one perma-
actors, whereas its intervention in the process nent institution in the executive branch and for
of public policy implementation is related to that reason “it enjoys a certain degree of auton-
its performance (or productivity) in achieving omy” (Cayer and Weschler, 1988:67). In Ripley
policy goals.1 and Franklin’s (1982:30) synthesis, “bureaucrats
are not neutral in their policy preferences; nor
1
Productivity and power constitute the variables are they fully controlled by any outsider forces.
most frequently treated in the literature ( Jacob, 1966; Their autonomy allows them to bargain – suc-
Ilchman and Uphoff, 1969; Ilchman, 1984; La Porte,
1971; Rourke, 1984; Shafritz and Russell, 1996). Garvey cessfully – in order to attain a sizeable share of
(1995:65) referred to these two variables in terms of a preferences.” Hence, limitations on their power
“dilemma of democratic administration” when he sug- are a central issue. Rourke (1984) argued that
gested that “administrative action in any political system, its limits stem not only from the competitive
but especially in a democracy, must somehow realize two pressures from outside but also from factors re-
objectives simultaneously. It is necessary to construct and
maintain administrative capacity, and it is equally neces- lated to the way in which organizations operate
sary to control it, in order to ensure the responsiveness and bureaucrats behave within their own habitat
of the public bureaucracy to higher authority.” The au- (competition among bureaucracies, internalized
thor would probably agree that building administrative restraints, ethical codes, internal procedures,
capacity has to do with increasing productivity, whereas testing performance, representativeness).
control from, and deference to, higher authority involves
mainly a power relationship. In a similar vein, Przeworski In turn, bureaucratic productivity (i.e., effi-
(2002:212) suggested that “one cannot eliminate politics ciency plus effectiveness, in Ilchman and Up-
from public administration: this is a project with author-
itarian overtones. One can only control its forms and service and the legitimacy of government action. Again,
moderate its magnitude.” In another recent study, it was performance is another name for productivity, whereas
held that no matter what types of reform have been legitimacy can be viewed as one of the manifestations of
implemented or attempted and no matter in what polit- power (see, for example, Cleaves, 1974; Ilchman and La
ical, economic, and social context, civil service reform Porte, 1970; Wilson, 1989; Rama, 1997; Coplin et al.,
in general aims at improving performance of the civil 2002).
482
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State Bureaucracy 483
hoff ’s view) has been related to the extent to process of structural differentiation and func-
which this institutional apparatus is able to suc- tional specialization, nor does its development
cessfully achieve the goals and policies that jus- follow a planned and coherent design. Rather,
tify its existence – an outcome that generally its formation generally describes a sinuous, er-
depends on a complex combination of idiosyn- ratic and contradictory pattern, in which rem-
cratic and historical circumstances. nants of various strategies and programs of
These issues will be tackled from both his- political action can be observed.
torical and theoretical approaches. In the first Public bureaucracies are the concrete coun-
section, public bureaucracy will be presented as terpart to the ideal–abstract notion of state seen
an outgrowth of public policy. In this analysis, as the main instance for the articulation of social
I will introduce some remarks about the pro- relationships, or as the conjunctive tissue that
cess of state formation, of which the emergence holds a society together. Most modern bureau-
and development of bureaucratic organizations cracies were formed as part of the process of
is one of its main features. In the second section, state building, which occurred in Europe, the
I will present a framework for interpreting the United States and Latin America mainly dur-
internal dynamics of bureaucracy, by identifying ing the nineteenth century, except for England
a number of variables and dimensions that may and France, where this process took place ear-
explain different levels of efficiency and effect- lier. In turn, state formation can be viewed as a
iveness. Finally, section three will reexamine component of a more encompassing process of
the old politics–administration dichotomy in the social building, in which several other compo-
light of our main question: the involvement of nents gradually come into being as well: nation
bureaucracy in politics and in implementing pu- building (understood as widespread and shared
blic policies. A few concluding remarks will su- feelings of belonging within a territory), a cit-
mmarize the main points raised in this chapter. izenry, a system of production relationships, a
marketplace, the structuring of social classes,
bureaucracy as an outgrowth and the consolidation of a “pact” of political
of state policies domination.
To some extent, the state embodies this com-
Let us begin with a few general propositions. plex social formation. When fully developed, it
Instead of being an ideal type doing or not do- exhibits a number of features that may be la-
ing various tasks, a public bureaucracy is what beled “stateness,” that is, the set of attributes fea-
it does. It is an outgrowth of politics and it turing a “national state.” Following Nettl (1968)
is shaped by the nature and contents of pub- and Oszlak (1982), the main traits of “stateness”
lic policy. It is, at the same time, the material are: (1) the externalization of power, (2) the in-
expression of the state2 – viewed as a concrete stitutionalization of authority, (3) the diffusion
institutional apparatus – and the executing arm of control,4 and (4) the capacity to reinforce
for implementing its policies. It is also one of a national identity. The first attribute implies
the state attributes and the main instrument for acquiring external recognition of sovereignty
achieving and maintaining its other attributes of
4
“stateness.”3 It is not the outcome of a rational Diffusion of control is a correlate of centralization
of power. To be effective, state power at the central level
2 must rely on various forms of presence within a national
As distinct from the state seen as the ideal–abstract
instance of social articulation. territory. For example, the establishment of a territori-
3
In this sense, the bureaucracy is not coterminous ally based army corps was an early mechanism whereby
with the state: It is simply its material embodiment. The new national states deployed military forces to control
notion of “state” also includes external recognition by rebellions and upheavals against their authority, conquer
other states, a legal order, a monopoly of coercion, a land in the hands of Indians, or fight wars against for-
power of taxation, and a capacity to create symbols of eign powers. Similarly, the building of physical infras-
nationality as attributes that clearly exceed the concept tructure or the creation of a centrally managed school
of an institutional apparatus. The subject will be dis- system within the entire territory constituted other ways
cussed in detail later, when considering the formation in which the national state made its presence felt within
of national states. the nation’s borders.
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484 Oscar Oszlak
by other nation-states. Most Latin American, the formation of technical personnel stresses ac-
African, and Asian countries gained recognition tivities which were difficult, costly, and often
from the United States and Western European unwanted by large parts of the population. All
countries immediately after, or even during, were essential to the creation of strong states; all
their wars of independence, without having ac- are therefore likely to tell us something impor-
quired most of the other attributes of stateness. tant about the conditions under which strong
The second one implies achieving a monopoly or weak, centralized or decentralized, stable or
of the use of coercion within a given territory, unstable, states come into being.”
as the Weberian definition suggests.5 The third Historically, the expansion of capitalism has
trait has a twofold composition: (1) attaining a found a decisive impetus in the increasing capac-
capacity to extract fiscal resources from soci- ity of national states to undertake and surmount
ety on a regular basis, both for reproducing the developmental obstacles. To a large extent, their
bureaucracy itself and for performing its role in growing ability to mobilize resources for this
achieving law and order, economic progress, and purpose had an immediate effect on the scope
social equity; and (2) developing a professional- of its institutional domain. This process implied
ized body of civil servants, able to conduct the the expropriation from civil society and subna-
ever-increasing business of governing.6 Finally, tional governments of a series of functions that
the fourth attribute requires the state appara- came to form part of its own operational realm.7
tus to produce symbols that reinforce a people’s Those functions were related to the satisfaction
sense of belonging, feelings of nationality, and of societal needs in such areas as defense, justice,
beliefs in a common destiny. transportation, infrastructure, public health, and
A national state can emerge and develop in- the like. The issues thus incorporated into the
sofar as, in its still embryonic form, it begins to state’s agenda represented a selective portion of
demonstrate a capacity to solve social issues that the social problematic, the functional terrain
transcend parochial demands and are concerned opened as the national state came into existence,
with (1) the very creation of a capitalist mode thereby creating a new division of labor. The
of production and (2) the welfare of the people state agenda was multiplied and expanded as it
embraced by this social formation. In his edited further incorporated new issues required by the
volume on The Formation of National States in very functioning and progress of society.
Western Europe, Tilly (1975:71) indicated that In some cases, the new division of labor im-
“the extractive and repressive activities of states” plied a definitive functional transfer from sub-
was one of the original biases of his book, adding national to national states, as in the case of
that “[T]he bias was deliberate. The singling monopoly of coinage, armed forces, foreign re-
out of the organization of armed forces, tax- lations, and the like. In other cases, the state and
ation, policing, the control of food supply, and the market shared a common area of services, as
5
in school and health services or in transporta-
There are recent examples of countries that have
lost, at least in part, this attribute. Former Yugoslavia
tion. Finally, the new capacities acquired by the
disappeared as a state federation as a result of a bloody nation-states as they developed allowed them
civil war; Colombia is heavily involved in fighting nar- to intervene in other critical areas, such as the
cos and paramilitary irregular forces that control part of building of infrastructure or the negotiation of
the national territory. The American Civil War stands international funding. Along this process, the
as a nineteenth-century illustration of a national state
in which the pretense of monopolizing coercion by a
national and subnational states, the market, and
central government was overtly questioned. the nongovernmental organizations of society
6
No national state can survive without attaining a
capacity to ensure a regular source of income through
7
taxation. Tax collectors have been the first and main bu- This expropriation process was originally observed
reaucratic cadres of the newly created states. In turn, the by Karl Marx in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the
creation of a more extended and professionalized civil State. For further references on the process of state for-
service marked the beginning of modern state bureau- mation, see Tilly (1975), Skocpol (1979), and Oszlak
cracies (cf. Raadschelders and Rutgers, 1996). (1982).
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drew up new boundaries and changed the con- In their more updated versions, the trio is
tents of their respective agendas. composed of governance (order), development
Obviously, without an agenda, the state – and (progress), and equity (the social question) – in
its bureaucracy – would become meaningless. It other words, the formidable challenges facing
would imply that its role is needless, that soci- most underdeveloped and many developed so-
ety can handle community problems on its own cieties. This continuing presence is nothing but
and can be self-administered – as was envisioned the manifestation of a permanent tension among
by anarchism, communism,8 or even some ul- its components, observable in capitalist systems
traconservative positions calling for a minimal incapable of establishing a stable formula for
state. reconciling the conditions of democratic gov-
The formula that symbolized the process of ernance, sustainable growth, and equitable dis-
state formation and gave essential content to tribution of income, wealth, and opportunities.
the public agenda was expressed in the motto Under these circumstances, the state agenda be-
“order and progress,” which, on the one hand, comes ever more complex and contradictory, as
signaled the need to establish (1) who would be- the issues contained turn out to be much more
come legitimate members of (and who would difficult to solve, given rising social expectations
be excluded from) the new mode of capitalist and scarce resources.
organization that was taking shape; and (2) what It has already been indicated that, as the pro-
rules of the game ought to be institutionalized cess of state (and social) formation advanced,
so that economic transactions became stable and the resolution of the issues constituting the so-
foreseeable, thus promoting the development cial agenda was distributed among the state (at its
of productive forces through the articulation various jurisdictional levels), the market, the or-
of the classical factors of production (land, la- ganizations of civil society (NGOs), and a num-
bor and capital) and, therefore, according to the ber of noninstitutionalized and solidarity social
vision of the time, making indefinite progress networks. Figure 24.1 illustrates this functional
possible.9 distribution, providing some examples of goods
Attention to the multiple macro and micro and services contained in the various sectors’
manifestations of these two issues gave content agendas.
to a policy agenda that began to expand at the Although the frontiers separating these dif-
pace of the very advancement of society and ferent sectors moved over time, through suc-
the state. Toward the end of the nineteenth and cessive expansions or contractions, there is little
early twentieth centuries, both in Europe and in controversy about the fact that the state ter-
America, the unequal opportunities provided by ritory showed a growing expansion that only
capitalism to different social sectors revealed that seems to have come to a halt recently, involv-
economic progress was obtained at the expense ing new forms of intervention in society’s af-
of increasing social inequity. The so-called social fairs. This new role of the state, which acquired
question and the fights conducted around it at different “incarnations” over time (i.e., as
the political level “completed” a trio that was entrepreneur, employer, subsidizer, regulator),
destined to maintain a permanent place in the began to be questioned about two decades ago,
state agenda. giving way to a new displacement of the frontier
lines that revealed a greater protagonism of the
8
In a famous statement, Lenin (1971) held that the
other three sectors (the market, the NGOs, and
state would wither away in the transition from socialism the informal social networks) as well as a transfer
to communism. of state responsibilities from the national to the
9
In the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon subnational levels of government (see arrows in
was still referring to this formula in their old original Figure 24.1). Privatization, decentralization, de-
terms when he pointed out that “[S]ome people say
progress comes before order. Some say order comes be- monopolization, deregulation, and contracting
fore progress. Both miss the mark. The point is that in a out appeared as the main manifestations of this
free society, order and progress must go together.” process. Taken as a whole, these policies were
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486 Oscar Oszlak
Figure 24.1. Social Division of Labor.
part of the so-called first generation of state re- needs, demands, perils, and contingencies fac-
forms based on the Washington consensus.10 ing their evolution. As suggested, the state is
Does this mean that the state is no longer a major – if not the main – institution capa-
necessary?11 Societies would probably be bet- ble of deploying the human, organizational, and
ter off had they not to confront the myriad of technological resources needed to meet most of
those challenges. Other economic and social ac-
10
This reform movement originally developed under tors do play a more or less important role in
President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, whose solving many of these issues, but there is little
governments made strong structural adjustments and car-
question that the state exerts a role that cannot
ried out several changes in the administration mainly
to surmount their fiscal crises. Later on, in 1989, the be delegated. As a matter of fact, if judged by
Washington consensus approved John Williamson’s ten- most indicators (i.e., budget and personnel size,
point proposal for restructuring Latin American states number of agencies, percentage of state employ-
(1) fiscal discipline, (2) reordering public expenditure ment with respect to the economically active
priorities, (3) tax reform, (4) liberalizing interest rates,
population), the state shows almost no signs of
(5) a competitive exchange rate, (6) trade liberalization,
(7) liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, disappearance.
(8) privatization, (9) deregulation, and (10) property Returning to our main line of argument,
rights extension to the informal sector. Despite its tar- every issue included in the state agenda creates
geted goals (i.e., introduce reforms in Latin American
countries), this philosophy of state reform was also ap-
plied in many other developed and underdeveloped tional) state because it no longer generates real economic
countries. activity, having lost its capacity to function as a critical
11
In his book The End of the Nation State, Ohmae participant in a globalized world. The twin contradic-
(1995) presented the provocative thesis that the nation- tory forces of regional integration and decentralization
state is becoming superseded by a regional (suprana- are, to many observers, a clear trend in this direction.
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a “tension” that only disappears when it is re- ter’s alleged efficacy to satisfy those needs or de-
moved from the agenda, either because the un- mands. From a static point of view, one may
derlying problem has been “solved” or the issue “freeze” and classify the functions of bureau-
was temporarily deferred to be handled some- cracy in terms of relatively permanent features.
time in the future. In any case, the state must For instance, Ripley and Franklin (1982) sug-
take a stand or position on the subject before gested that bureaucracies have been created for
any issue is somehow solved or postponed for the following different purposes: (1) to provide
future resolution. So do other political actors certain services that are the natural province of
having something to do with the values or in- government responsibility; (2) to promote the
terests at stake (i.e., political parties, business interest of specific economic sectors in society
corporate organizations, labor unions, interna- such as farmers, organized labor, or segments of
tional organizations, public opinion, the media, private business; (3) to regulate the conditions
NGOs, and so on). Public policies are simply the under which different kinds of private activity
sequence of stands or positions taken by gov- can take place; and (4) to redistribute various
ernmental and bureaucratic institutions (i.e., benefits, such as income, rights, and medical
legislature, the presidency, central government care, so that the less fortunate and less well-off in
agencies, public enterprises) acting in the name society get more of these benefits than they or-
of the state regarding the issues included in the dinarily would have (cf. Oszlak and O’Donnell,
public agenda. The particular choices made for 1976; Meny and Thoening, 1992; Aguilar
solving those issues end up generating a social Villanueva, 1996).
dynamics featured by conflicts and confronta- However, bureaucracies evolve: New func-
tions among actors holding different and often tions may be assigned to or removed from their
contradictory views. domain; their structures may become more diff-
The courses of action adopted imply, at least, erentiated and complex; new coordination mec-
two different things: (1) that solutions to the hanisms may be required; and they may gain or
issues have been identified, involving a cause– lose resources. These dynamics may be viewed
effect relationship between employing certain in terms of a deliberate process intended to adapt
instruments and obtaining the results sought; a given resource combination to the achieve-
and (2) that there is a commitment to create ment of certain ends.12
agencies or governmental units that may con- This reasoning may be plausibly extended to
tribute to solve the issue or, in case they already any field of public management. In each of them
exist, to allocate the resources needed for ful- will be observed an intimate relationship bet-
filling their respective mission. Hence, (1) the ween the issues contained in the state agenda,
incorporation of issues or social problems that the stands taken in the process of “alternative-
the state chooses or is forced to take on as part specification” (Barzelay, 2002), and the insti-
of its responsibilities, and (2) the stands taken tutional mechanisms (including resource allo-
by individuals or agencies assuming the repre- cations) established for handling and solving
sentation of the state, are the main generators them. The particular configuration of bureau-
of bureaucratic organizations, which are created cracy at each time will be a historical prod-
and/or endowed with resources to handle and uct resulting from confrontations and disputes
solve these issues. around “who will get what, when, how,” as
The process of institutional development of
the national state (i.e., the formation of a 12
Downs (1967:10) considered that “[T]he major
bureaucracy) has not been fortuitous. It always causes of growth and decline in bureaus are rooted in
has responded to a particular interpretation of exogenous factors in their environment. As society de-
velops over time, certain social functions grow in promi-
certain needs or social demands and has re- nence and others decline (. . .) the interplay between
sulted in resource allocation patterns and insti- external and internal developments tends to create cer-
tutional arrangements grounded upon the lat- tain cumulative effects of growth and decline.”
P1: JZP
488 Oscar Oszlak
Lasswell once put it. Very often, bureaucracies North Korea, or totally nonexistent in
become a conflict arena for settling these dis- others, such as CostaRica. Or it may have
putes, whereby the agencies involved (and other been critical in earlier times (as it occurred
political stakeholders) take stands, build al- in most Latin American countries during
liances, develop strategies, and put into play var- the nineteenth century). A revenue ser-
ious types of resources in order to make their vice has been established as a direct result
respective positions predominant. of the need to sustain the state apparatus
For the time being, I will present a brief sum- itself, allowing it to play its public man-
mary of the points discussed so far: agement role. Regulatory agencies of pri-
vate business or public agencies may have a
1. State emergence and formation are in- key relevance in the state agenda of inter-
timately related to the development of ventionist governments or may be totally
other components of the overall so- insubstantial in more liberal ones. More
cial building process, namely nationhood, generally, the relative importance of wel-
capitalism, a class structure, and a sys- fare, education, science and technology, or
tem of political domination, as abundantly domestic security, as illustrations of issues
proven by the European and the Ameri- composing the state agenda, may be esti-
cas’ experience. mated by the size and resources allocated
2. Along this process, the state acquires a se- to the agencies in charge of solving the
ries of attributes (stateness) of which the corresponding issues within the bureau-
gradual formation of a professional ma- cratic apparatus.
chinery (a civil service, a public bureau- 5. Hence, the state bureaucracy can be con-
cracy) becomes of special interest for our ceived of as the institutional crystallization
analysis. of public policies and state activity, mani-
3. This institutional apparatus is formed and fested through bureaucratic agencies that,
grows as an increasing number of social along the implementation process, end up
issues are incorporated into the state defining the nature of the state they em-
agenda. Partly, this incorporation requires body.
the expropriation of functional domains 6. From this vantage point, the state (and its
from subnational states or civil society or- bureaucracy) is what it does – a proposi-
ganizations previously in charge of sat- tion that takes us back to my initial state-
isfying social needs; and partly it entails ment in this section.
the development of a previously inexistent
capacity to assume more demanding re- This interim conclusion-cum-proposition
sponsibilities, made possible by the very should be explored further by presenting an
formation of the state and its new, ex- analytical framework that may serve to examine
panded possibilities for resource mobiliza- the internal dynamics of bureaucracy and its
tion. effect on its productivity.
4. The particular composition of the agenda
and the positions taken by the state (pub-
lic policies) determine the type of solu- bureaucratic productivity:
tion devised to solve the agenda issues and, an analytical framework
therefore, the configuration and charac-
teristics of the resulting bureaucracy. For In a most general way, public bureaucracy has
example, a military bureaucracy (armed been defined as “the totality of government of-
forces and defense institutions) may be fices or bureaus that constitute the permanent
central in the present-day agenda of cer- government of a state . . . (it) refers to all of
tain states, such as the United States or the public officials of government – both high
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and low, elected and appointed” (Shafritz and From a different standpoint, Weber also con-
Russell, 1996:215).13 Similarly, Lindblom and sidered bureaucracy as the form of organization
Woodhouse (1993:57) considered that “bureau- most compatible with the requirements of a cap-
cracy is the largest part of any government if italist system, but at the same time, as a threat or
measured by the number of people engaged or stumbling block along the process of democra-
by fund expended.” Jacob (1966:34), in turn, tization. Ever since his ideal type came to schol-
argued that “bureaucracy may be thought as a arly attention, the literature on the sociology of
complex system of men, offices, methods and organizations and public administration has de-
authority which large organizations employ in veloped many different theoretical models that
order to achieve their goals.” Finally, Downs have tried to capture and explain the main fea-
(1967) established as primary characteristics for tures of bureaucracy; its manifold organizational
defining bureaucracy: large size, full-time mem- forms; and its performance, power, behavior,
bership and economic dependency of members, and other like attributes. For heuristic, rather
personnel hiring, and promotion and retention than explanatory purposes, I will present an an-
on a “merit” basis. alytical framework that will be used to examine
Basic similarities can be observed among the most significant dimensions and variables re-
these definitions, but in terms of its structural lated to our subject.15
arrangements, Weber’s conceptualization of We may characterize bureaucracy – the in-
bureaucracy remains as a more abstract and stitutional state apparatus – as a system of pro-
compelling characterization. His ideal type is duction formally invested with the mission of
featured by a number of well-known traits: satisfying certain goals, values, expectations, and
(1) bureaucrats are arranged in a clearly defined social demands. According to its normative
hierarchy of offices; (2) they are compelled by framework, the bureaucracy employs resources
the impersonal duties of their offices; (3) units (human, material, financial, technological) and
and positions are arranged in a chain of com- combines them in various ways in order to pro-
mand; (4) the functions are clearly specified duce a variety of results or products – expressed
in writing, so there is a specialization of task and in the form of goods, regulations, services, and
a specified sphere of competence; and (5) the even symbols – somehow related to its defined
bureaucrat’s behavior is subject to systematic goals and targets. The nature of the normative
control.14 framework, the way resources are structured,
and their volume and quality will elicit certain
13
Lane (1999:1) underlined the inexistence of a behavior patterns that, in turn, may affect the
unique organization: “In actuality, there are many ad- quantity and quality of the products obtained.
ministrative agencies rather than a single government Let us consider the basic elements of the pro-
bureaucracy, and these organizations have difficulty co- posed model in greater detail.
ordinating activities and sometimes even compete with
each other.” Instead Cayer and Weschler (1988:57) point
out that “bureaucracies are dynamic organizations which
permeate our governmental system. While they have Productivity
features that facilitate their ability to accomplish the pur-
poses of government, they also have features that inhibit Bureaucratic productivity may be defined as the
their effectiveness and especially their responsiveness to
elected leaders and the general public.”
capacity of bureaucracy to generate public value.
14
We can see a peculiar tension between the refer-
ence and the meaning of the concept of bureaucracy. specify what is its range of application. It could be the
On the one hand, if it is taken for granted that “bu- case that their various properties are not generally true
reau” refers to existing organizational entities within the of existing bureaus (Lane, 1999).
15
public sector, then there hardly exists any single theory This model was originally developed in my unpub-
that adequately portrays the distinguishing characteristic lished doctoral dissertation (Bureaucracy and Environment:
of such entities. On the other hand, if we start from a on bureaucratic productivity in Uruguay, University of
specified concept of bureaucracy, then we must try to California, Berkeley, 1974). See also Oszlak (1972).
P1: JZP
490 Oscar Oszlak
Moore (1998) identified success in the public of productivity in providing similar goods or
sector with carrying out state activities in such a services.
way as to increase their value for the public, both But services and regulation have never been
in the short and the long run.16 Ceteris paribus, measured well in economics or elsewhere. For
the generation of public value will be higher example, there are many underdeveloped coun-
the greater the degree of alignment and congru- tries in which public schools provide a free
ence between the goal function (or combination lunch to their poor students, besides the rou-
of objectives and targets) pursued and the pro- tine educational programs. If measured exclu-
duction function technically required to achieve sively on the basis of the latter, their efficiency
them. Two elements may be distinguished in this would surely fall below schools not offering such
definition: (1) the degree of goal achievement, services. Or, as a different example, regulatory
that is, the relationship between goals and out- agencies find it difficult to evaluate their perfor-
puts (effectiveness); and (2) the employment of mance regarding the control of prices, degree of
the least quantity of inputs by product unit or security, compliance with investment plans, ser-
the highest level of production at a given level vice quality, market competitiveness, and other
of inputs (efficiency).17 aspects related to the activity of their regulated
This definition carries serious operational enterprises. In any case, recent efforts at identi-
problems, particularly concerning what and fying benchmarks and indicators of bureaucratic
how to measure, because its two elements – eff- productivity have brought considerable progress
ectiveness and efficiency – have as a common in this area.19
referent a highly abstract and heterogeneous
“product” (cf. Rourke, 1984; Lindblom and
Woodhouse, 1993; Beetham, 1993; Yarwood Environment
and Nimmo, 1997; Allison, 1999; Blau and
Meyer, 1999; Coplin et al., 2002).18 There are, Our model assumes that the physiognomy of
to be sure, clear similarities between the ser- the state apparatus and its levels of performance
vices provided by state-owned and privately run are intimately related to the characteristics of
public utilities companies (i.e., fuel, electricity, the social and political contexts that frame its
telephone services). In fact, there should not activity. This information is concretely referred
be many differences between state and private to the existing policy agenda and the nature of
companies in terms of measuring their levels the social structure at the historical juncture un-
der analysis (Pfeffer, 1982; Allison, 1999; Knack,
2000; Provan and Brinton, 2001; Considine and
16
The author points out that sometimes this may Lewis, 2003).
imply increasing the efficiency, efficacy, or impartial- As the government takes stands vis-à-vis so-
ity in the missions presently defined, whereas at other cially relevant issues contained in its agenda, it is
times, it may take introducing programs that respond to
new political aspirations or redefining the organizational
likely that a new agency will be created to solve
mission. a given issue or additional resources will be al-
17
Admittedly, this is just one possible way of con- located to already existing agencies (Oszlak and
ceiving efficiency and effectiveness together, under the O’Donnell, 1976; Rama, 1997; Wilson, 1999).
common label of productivity. I would not take issue at Efforts at carrying out government projects, ini-
other possible conceptualizations, and would rather use
my approach to advance the argument further. tiatives, and priorities lead, within the state ap-
18
In this sense, Allison (1999:18), following Dunlop, paratus, to multiple organizational arrangements
affirmed that “there is little if any agreement on the and operational styles, the nature of which is, to
standards and measurement of performance to appraise a
government manager.” In turn, Beetham (1993:34) in-
19
dicated that “the ‘product’ of government is not specific Compare the conclusions reached in Oszlak (1973)
and readily measurable” and concluded that “decisions and other articles in the same journal with those ar-
about how to define or measure ‘effectiveness’ are thus rived at in more recent contributions (Ruffner, 2002;
themselves qualitative or political judgments.” Heinrich, 2002; Helgason, 1997).
P1: JZP
a large extent, the result of how social conflicts at bottom, are expressed in certain specific
are settled within this institutional arena. targets.21
To specify the impact of these forces requires For example, several years ago, the Argentine
the consideration of: (1) the nature of the polit- government owned three ships that conducted
ical regime; (2) the level of economic develop- research on fishery. These ships were at sea
ment, the patterns of capital accumulation and around 200 days per year. The Chilean gov-
distribution of social output, and the degree of ernment, in turn, owned two ships navigating
the country’s external vulnerability; (3) the rel- a total of 300 days per year. Obviously, Chilean
ative weight of sectorial interests, the strength of ships performed much better than the Argen-
their corporate organizations, and the degree of tine ones in terms of actual research done. The
control they exert on the state apparatus; (4) the reason for the low level of performance in the
prevailing social conditions (in terms of human latter case was mainly due to the lack of profes-
development, welfare, educational level, social sional personnel, the low level of maintenance
mobility, people’s expectations, and degree of of the ships, and the difficulties in providing the
consensus or social warfare); and (5) the weight necessary material inputs (fuel, special research
of tradition and cultural traits, such as the exten- instruments, etc.) for doing the job. Hence, the
sion of clientelism and political patronage, or the Argentine ships remained safely docked and idle.
diffusion of values compatible with democracy Therefore, there are two ways in which the
and efficiency of public management. inconsistency between a goal function and a
production function may occur. The first way
is when the factors of production (i.e., infras-
Resources tructure, personnel and operating expenses) are
inadequate for the task at hand. The second way
Next, we must consider the resources employed is when the composition of human resources
by the bureaucracy (probably the most tangible (i.e., the combination of managerial, profes-
expression of its existence) in achieving its mis- sional, technical, and nonspecialized personnel)
sion. Variables under this analytic dimension in- is not the right one. In Oszlak (1972), I have
clude the nature of the diverse resource compo- coined the expression “excess-lack syndrome”
nents, their volume, capacity, adaptability, per- to refer to this simultaneous existence of super-
tinence, and possibilities of articulation, taking numerary workforce (usually for certain routine
into account the goals pursued. Thus, the state tasks) and insufficient personnel for performing
apparatus can be conceived of as a production other critical functions, thus creating bureau-
system that combines its resources in varying cratic deformity.
ways and proportions, which defines a given 21
Both at the global state apparatus or at that of spe-
“production function” deemed to meet a par- cific bureaucratic agencies, there is a frequent lack of
ticular “goal function.”20 In budgetary terms, accord between the bureaucracy’s goals and the resource
this means that the possibility of achieving cer- combinations employed to reach them. The causes are
tain levels of productivity will depend, in part, manifold: incongruent normative frameworks, agencies
on the allocation of right combinations of per- purposely devoid of a mission, outdated or unnecessar-
ily complex procedures and practices, lack of coordi-
sonnel, material goods (i.e., infrastructure), and nation, weak planning and control systems, unbalanced
services, aligned with the goals sought which, allocation of human resources, and demoralized person-
nel with few incentives and low self-esteem. These situa-
tions are more common the higher the country’s political
instability and, consequently, the more contradictory or
20
The notion of “production function” has been bor- antagonistic the nature of the political projects held by
rowed from classical economics, where land, labor, and successive governments or regimes. To a great extent,
capital were considered as the basic factors of produc- this lack of fit is reflective of a persistent, invisible, and,
tion. Land can now be equated to infrastructure, labor perhaps, involuntary violation of a golden rule of public
to human resources, and capital to nonpersonal goods management: A goal function and a production function
and services required for maintenance and operation. should be congruent.
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492 Oscar Oszlak
Norms accordance with predetermined goals and pro-

cedures.
Resource combinations are not fortuitous but The normative framework may also comprise
respond to a set of norms that establish guide- the cultural patterns in which the bureaucracy
lines for action and provide the legitimate in- operates, which may prevail within the society
struments to ensure that the activities carried out at large or in specific agencies or units. Given
by bureaucratic agencies are in line with those this dual nature of culture, I consider it as a con-
criteria. Basically, this system operates through textual constraint and treat it as such in the next
three mechanisms that follow an analytic (but section.
not a temporal) sequence, because they keep
a certain hierarchical relationship where more
concrete norms translate more abstract and dif- Structures
fuse directives.22
The first mechanism is aimed at ensuring that Bureaucratic productivity is strongly condi-
the output of bureaucracy corresponds to social tioned by the relative complexity and adequacy
demands and is congruent with the institutional of the organizational structures. Three main fea-
goals. By applying this mechanism, goals are set, tures define this analytic dimension: (1) the de-
priorities are established, targets are approved, gree of structural differentiation, namely the extent
and this normative set is trasmitted to the overall to which the hierarchical structure is disaggre-
organizational structure. In essence, it provides gated in terms of relatively autonomous units
action guidelines for deciding which activities and the resulting stratification; (2) the degree
will be required to produce the type, volume, of functional specialization, that is, the technical
or scope of government’s output. Examples are specificity required at the operational level and
the type and volume of services to be provided, the resulting scheme for the division of labor
the incursion into entrepreneurial activities, the (or management structure); and (3) the degree
degree of intervention in the regulation of so- of interdependence – the extent to which the ef-
cial and economic activities, or the scope of its fectiveness of any organizational unit is subor-
repressive function. dinated to, or depends on, the performance of
The other two mechanisms have a more in- other units.
strumental character. One of them serves to as- Structural differentiation and functional spe-
sess different strategies of political action and to cificity may give way to duplication or over-
formulate policies and plans that would trans- lapping of organizational units and functions.
late, at the operational level, the broad guidelines Under democratic regimes, in which the func-
and options giving contents to the normative tioning of the political system becomes more
system. Planning, administrative methods and open and competitive, the tendency toward
procedures, and resource allocation policies are duplication and overlapping is heightened, be-
some of the main instruments of this type. The cause the mechanisms of political representation
third, and last, mechanism is the sanctions sys- are firmly embedded within the bureaucratic
tem, which sets the domain for the exercise arena.
of authority, providing the means to ensure The greater the differentiation, specialization
its application and thereby regulate superior– and interdependence, the higher the degree of
subordinate relationships. It therefore represents complexity and uncertainty of public manage-
the instrument that those in authority apply ment and, consequently, the greater the need
to ensure that activities will be conducted in to establish proper mechanisms for articulation
and integration. Interdependence may be of (1)
22 a hierarchical type, where individuals receive or-
“How these rules work together to allow individ-
uals to realize their productive potential is a question of ders from superiors and/or give orders to sub-
importance in resource management in particular, and ordinates, constituting a network of authority
public administration in general” (Evans, 1997:187). relationships; (2) a functional type, defined as the
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network of technical and normative relations problems of uncertainty requiring diverse forms
resulting from the exchange of information or of redundancy in order to maintain an accept-
the application of knowledge to material goods; able level of confidence in the system (Landau,
or (3) a budgetary (or resource-exchange) kind, 1969).
where interdependence is based on competi- Integration mechanisms help establish a more
tive allocation among units of material and fi- expeditious decisional process and facilitate the
nancial resources originating from a common coordination of activities. In turn, coordination
source. is conditioned by the relative effectiveness of the
A fluid information and communication sys- authority structure that regulates the legitimate
tem is an asset of the most effective mecha- exercise of power within the bureaucratic orga-
nisms for articulation and integration. It tends to nization, clarifies the hierarchy of roles, and allo-
reduce bureaucratic isolation and makes mon- cates the means of control and execution of the
itoring, control, and performance evaluation decisions attributable to each specific role.23 As
possible. Another asset is coordination, which may be observed, all of these variables belong-
exists when the activities and behavior of ining to the structural level of our model maintain
dividuals and organizational units are guided complex, mutually determining relationships
by criteria of complementarity in the satis- regarding norms and resources, indirectly affect-
faction of common objectives. A basic condi- ing the levels of bureaucratic productivity.
tion for achieving coordination is convergence
of ends (identity, congruence, compatibility).
Otherwise, efforts to achieve consensus among Behavior
the intervening parties would prove fruitless.
Another condition is that actors have suffi- Administrative behavior is the last significant di-
cient degrees of autonomy to make adjust- mension for our analysis. The characteristics of
ments or adaptations required by interdepen- the resources employed and allocated by the
dence. Mintzberg (1999:121) observed that the public sector, the demands and norms orien-
defining element of the bureaucratic structure is tating state activity, and the various structural
that “coordination is obtained through internal- arrangements that constrain the integration or
ized norms which predetermine what should be coordination of resources set the coordinates
done.” for administrative behavior. In other words, the
Given bureaucratic fractioning, resulting conduct of public servants is not totally unex-
from functional decentralization and autono- pected or random: It is highly influenced by
mization, coordination of activities among or- their personal traits (age, experience, level of
ganizational units often turns out to be either instruction); by their individual goals and their
unnecessary or impossible. Hence, each unit degree of compatibility or conflict with the in-
tends to function within close compartments, stitutional objectives; by the material resources
even when its activity is technically linked to at their disposal; by the nature of the norms
that of other units. To a great extent, this frag- and the type of external demands to which they
mentation of bureaucracy may be explained must respond; by the opportunities for interac-
by symbiotic relationships between bureaucratic tion and the kind of relationships they establish
agencies and organized sectors of society. In with their peers, superiors, and subordinates; or
their search for legitimacy and resources, these
agencies try to mobilize influential clients, al- 23
One possible way of articulating interorganizational
though the relationship often may lead to relationships requires submitting the units involved to
bureaucratic capture of the agencies by their some form of compulsion – based on impersonal prin-
clienteles. On the other hand, the functioning ciples, charismatic leadership, or threat of coercion – in
order to guide their actions in the direction of the goals
of an institutional system so loosely integrated, pursued. This is the essence of authority, that is, the for-
so reluctant to subordinate its activity to the mal capacity to decide and achieve that other execute
directives of “articulating” units, raises serious actions aimed at certain ends.
P1: JZP
494 Oscar Oszlak
by the evaluation and control procedures they authority, action, or time (O’Dwyer, 2002);
may face.24 (4) the presence of legitimate leadership in pub-
In the final analysis, it is the activity of hu- lic management (Rourke, 1984; Lee, 2002); or
man beings, manifested through behaviors, that (5) the levels of morality and accountability in
determines the level and quality of the products performance (Romzeck and Dubnick, 1987;
resulting from their organized action. Hence, Hellman et al., 2000; Roberts, 2002).
the efficiency and effectiveness of bureaucratic A depiction of the theoretical dimensions, va-
activity will depend, in an immediate sense, on riables, and relationships involved in the model
the conduct of civil servants, but such behavior just described can be seen in Figure 24.2. To
will be just exteriorizing the aggregate of envi- summarize the points made regarding the in-
ronmental, normative, and structural variables ternal dynamics of the state bureaucracy, the
that stimulate certain perceptions, generate atti- figure shows that demands, supports, and con-
tudes, and determine differentiated orientations straints comprise the environmental variables
toward action. operating at the input side of the bureaucracy.
Among the variables integrating this analy- Demands express social preferences and autho-
tical dimension, the following should be men- ritative policy decisions; supports include
tioned: (1) the degree of identification or mo- empowerment for public management and
tivation evidenced in the performance of the resource allocation; and constraints involve all
civil service (Perrow, 1986; Cook, 1999);25 (2) sorts of variables impinging on the autonomy
the level of existing conflict in intrabureau- and scope of bureaucratic activity (i.e., legal
cratic relationships (Thompson, 1967; Lane, bindings, social structural conditions, financial
1999); (3) the predominant orientations toward deficit, clientelistic pressures, cultural barriers).
Resources stand at the center of the triangle-
24
It may be objected that personal values also play a shaped bureaucracy. Resource combinations de-
fundamental role in determining behavior, but our con- termine the production function, but a pro-
cern here is the modal behavior of civil servants. There- duction function can only exist insofar as its
fore, from this perspective, they tend to become socially
shared values, which in turn constrain bureaucracy’s nor-
counterpart, a goal function, is set. The norma-
mative system. tive dimension, at the top of the triangle, is what
25 provides sense and orientation to the activity of
This subject has given rise to several typologies
of employees’ identification and attitudes. For exam- the bureaucracy, including decisions as to how
ple, Presthus (1962) pointed out three patterns of ac- resources should be spent to create public value.
commodation that seem to occur in an organization:
(1) upward-mobiles, the values and behavior of whom in- Norms (including legislation, culture, policies,
clude the capacity to identify strongly with the organi- and organizational rules) also determine how
zation, permitting a nice synthesis of personal rewards the bureaucracy is structured to perform its in-
and organizational goals; (2) indifferents, who tend to re- stitutional role. Structural variables (differenti-
ject the organizational bargain that promises authority, ation, specialization, integration), in turn, bear
status, prestige, and income in exchange for loyalty, hard
work, and identification; and (3) ambivalents, creative and on how resources are organized and assigned
anxious, whose values conflict with bureaucratic claims to various bureaucratic units, giving way to a
for loyalty and adaptability. In turn, Ripley and Franklin certain pattern of division of labor. Both nor-
(1982) found four types of bureaucrats in the implemen- mative and structural variables, in turn, affect
tation process: (1) careerists, employees who identify their bureaucratic behavior, whereas all three dimen-
careers and rewards with the agency that employs them
and whose main aim is to maintain the agency’s position sions (and their interplay) end up impinging on
and their own position within it; (2) politicians, who ex- productivity.
pect to pursue a career beyond the agency and whose However, we may also observe that in coun-
aim is to maintain good ties with a variety of sources ex- tering normative beliefs and expectations in
ternal to agency; (3) professionals, a group which derives the sense that norms determine structures, and
satisfaction from the recognition of other professionals;
and (4) missionaries, who are motivated primarily by their norms and structures determine behavior, we
loyalty to specific policy or social movements that sug- find that in some cases, norms ↔ structures ↔
gest certain configuration of policies as desirable. behaviors ↔ norms may function as mutually
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NORMS
DEMANDS
SUPPORTS OUTPUTS
CONSTRAINTS
RESOURCES:
HUMAN
MATERIAL
STUCTURES BEHAVIORS
FEEDBACK
Figure 24.2. Dynamics of Bureaucracy.
dependent and independent variables. For ex- where the regular succession of governments
ample, the organizational structure of a govern- through elections, the legitimate representation
mental agency will depend, in the first place, on of society through institutionalized mediations,
the mission and objectives (norms) guiding its the prevailing incremental decision-making
activity. And the behavior of its personnel will style, or the generalized recourse to bargaining
depend, in turn, on what are they supposed to and compromise constitute assumptions – rather
do (again, norms) and in what position of the or- than variables – of the political process. These
ganization (structure) they are placed. “Reverse traditions are so pervasive that speculation about
arrows” are usually identified with signs of bu- other possible scenarios cannot be mirrored in,
reaupathology. Goal displacement may be seen and hence, stimulated by, local circumstances.
as a situation in which behavior modifies norms, However, the alternation of political regimes
whereas unnecessary redundancy can be inter- exhibiting widely opposed ideologies and ori-
preted as behavior modifying structures. The entations and their respective impacts on –
extent of this phenomena varies widely depend- among other aspects – the policy framework,
ing on the specific context considered. In the the fate of the mechanisms of representation, or
next section I will introduce additional elements the style of state management raise a number
for understanding these perplexing dynamics.26 of issues and research questions that are com-
plex enough to render most current models and
conceptualizations inappropriate for capturing
bureaucracy, power, and public policy the complexity of these other realities. This is
especially the case when political instability and
Most academic work on the sociology of pub- regime shifts become not simply a short-lived
lic bureaucracy originates in national contexts “abnormality,” but rather the current state of
26
affairs.
This kind of analysis is akin to Philip Selznick’s Every new regime attempts to alter not only
(1949) analysis of the TVA, in which the focus is placed
on the structural conditions that influence behavior the power relationships within civil society, in
in formal organizations, with a special emphasis on line with its political conception and the need of
constraints. strengthening its social bases of support, but also
P1: JZP
496 Oscar Oszlak
the power structure within the state apparatus it- normative functions (i.e., legislation, planning,
self. To make a political project viable requires evaluation, control) will tend to design a system
action upon – as well as through – a preexisting of regulations, administrative structures, perfor-
bureaucratic structure. Increasing the degree of mance measures and standards, and sanctions
congruence between political project and public aimed at inducing lower level and front-desk
organization may lead to shifting jurisdictions, implementing units to perform in ways con-
hierarchies and competences, affecting estab- sistent with the programs and goals sought. In
lished interests and modifying power arrange- turn, these units will attempt to maintain a
ments and cultural patterns deeply rooted inside certain space of autonomous decision power,
the state bureaucracy. It is foreseeable that resis- so that the functional requirements associated
tances will be generated and behavior will be with the achievements of their formal goals are
elicited tending to impair the decisions made or made compatible with those requirements de-
the actions taken, or at least, to attenuate some rived from the need to satisfy other goals and
of their consequences. interests (i.e., clientelistic, institutional).27
Such tensions created inside the bureaucracy The power of bureaucracy has usually been
by shifting regime orientations and the adjust- compared to that yielded by other political and
ments produced by changing policies – some- economic actors, be they political parties, the
times viewed as signs of “bureaupathology” – parliament, the presidency, labor unions, corpo-
have received scant attention. Casuist, ad hoc rate business groups, and so on. The literature
explanations abound. Yet, a crucial question re- has given this subject a great deal of attention,
mains open to continuing controversy: What ever since Marxists in the 1970s–80s rediscov-
relevant dimensions and variables may explain ered Karl Marx’s notion of the “relative auton-
and predict congruence or conflict in the pro- omy of the state” in his 18th Brumaire of Louis
cesses of policy implementation? A systematic Bonaparte, and neo-Weberians started giving a
treatment of this subject confronts a funda- more political interpretation to Weber’s ideal
mental difficulty, namely the sheer number of type of bureaucracy and his warnings of “iron
intrabureaucratic and environmental factors in- cages.” For example, the Comparative Adminis-
tervening in such processes. However, progress tration Group (CAG)28 underlined this variable
in this field calls for a conscious effort at in- as a key factor for political development in de-
tegrating existing knowledge while keeping in veloping countries;29 Olson (1965) and Downs
mind the substantive, contextual, and histori- (1967) viewed it from the standpoint of col-
cal specificity of the public and private actors lective action; and another current of research
involved in the policy process. turned its attention to the study of bureaucratic
The implementation of most public programs capture (especially in cases of regulatory agen-
and policies demands the intervention of a com- cies) or, more recently, the theme received a
plex governmental structure and several deci- renewed interpretation by Evans (1996), who
sion units in the society. The performance of
this network will depend on whether the suc-
cession and articulation of individual behavior 27
On the simultaneous and conflicting interests pur-
turn out to be congruent with a given nor- sued by bureaucratic institutions and the true role thus
mative framework or a policy direction. Each played by the state, see Oszlak (1977).
28
The CAG emerged in the late 1950s as a new ap-
decision unit will be subject to the conflicts in- proach for the study of public administration, aimed at
herent in the decisions taken at each level (i.e., explaining the role and performance of bureaucracy in
degree of antagonization produced) and to the less developed countries. Initially sponsored by the Ford
uncertainty derived from lack of knowledge of Foundation and the United Nations, the group con-
the impact of decisions. Indeed, a good deal ducted research in many different countries, particularly
in Asia. It gained importance during the 1960s and main-
of the organizational mechanisms will be tained its momentum until the early 1970s.
destined to eliminate sources of conflict and 29
See, for example, La Palombara (1963) and Riggs
uncertainty. Those organizations in charge of (1964, 1971).
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introduced the concept of “embedded state fashion. Power resources are vital for reinforcing
autonomy.” institutional legitimacy and securing survival.
As a rule, each bureaucratic unit possesses a Both goals are intimately related: The more the
certain volume of power resources, which may legitimacy, the greater the chances of survival.
be composed of coercion, information, legiti- From a different perspective, Peters (1999)
macy, and economic goods. Access to the use observed that bureaucracy enjoys other impor-
of ideological mechanisms is usually considered tant resources: (1) its great agility, as compared
a powerful resource as well. Coercion may or with legislature, to act quickly on multiple is-
may not be applied legitimately, depending on sues, as it is free from following the legislature’s
the nature of the incumbent government and strict procedural rules for debate and decision;30
the extent to which governance is based on so- (2) its capacity to mobilize political affiliates in
cial consensus. Information is another important demanding greater budgetary allocations; and
source of power and the basis of bureaucratic ac- (3) the relatively high degree of autonomy of its
tivity at the functional level. Interaction within organizations and agencies. However, I would
bureaucracy entails a permanent exchange of argue that (1) these are not resources of power
information or the application of knowledge but rather outcomes deriving from the ones pre-
(an elaborate form of information) to material viously discussed, and (2) these outcomes may
goods. Economic goods are mainly the material or may not be forthcoming depending mainly
resources that bureaucratic units receive through on the nature of the political system being con-
the budget, for hiring personnel, investing in sidered. For example, under authoritarian and
infrastructure, and making the necessary main- patrimonialist regimes, or even in weak democ-
tenance and operation expenditures. Finally, le- racies, decisions may be highly centralized in
gitimacy is a source of power that may derive the executive, while legislature and the bureau-
from one or a bundle of variables: authority, sta- cracy may play an insignificant or merely formal
tus, leadership, consensus, and capacity to ma- role.
nipulate symbolic and ideological instruments. In view of these contingent outcomes, is it
The legitimacy of bureaucracy is a major re- possible to explain or predict the turn of events
source to substantiate its claim to continue to in a process of policy implementation? What
obtain the resources and supports that allow its power balances favor success in bureaucratic
existence. performance and productivity? In a most imme-
These various power resources are unequally diate sense, and given a certain level of power
distributed throughout the bureaucracy both in resources, performance will largely be explained
terms of absolute power possessed by different by the behavior of those in charge of manag-
agencies or units and in the particular coming the organizations – what Thompson (1967)
position of those resources in each case. For called “the variable human.” No doubt, the de-
example, monopoly of coercion by military bu- gree of motivation, the existing leadership, the
reaucracies has historically been a major source level of training, the orientation toward con-
of power for ousting democratic regimes. In flict, the search for power, or the formation of
turn, asymmetry of information between regu- coalitions are, among others, the kind of fac-
latory agencies and private companies in charge tors affecting the quality of the available human
of formerly state-owned enterprises has often resources and their probable action orientation.
caused the incapacity of the former to control But in turn, these expressions of bureaucratic
tariffs. Low budgetary allocations to certain wel- behavior are subject to four different types of
fare programs may lead to critical reductions in
30
social work, health, and education services. In The existence of a fluid network of formal and in-
other words, the quantity and composition of formal contacts that public administration services main-
tains with both the outside and with the top decision-
power resources may or may not support the making levels is seen by Subirats (1994) as an important
bureaucracy’s capacity to settle social conflicts resource for getting access and exerting influence on im-
and allocate values in a legitimately authoritative portant policy actors.
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498 Oscar Oszlak
constraints: technological, cultural, clientelistic, and istrative career fall within these organizational
political. support activities I will refer to as managerial tech-
nology.
Core and managerial technological compo-
Technological and Cultural Constraints nents31 may explain why organizations per-
forming similar activities are likely to present
Technological and cultural variables subsume similar technical and managerial features (Powell
most of the immediate determinants of bureau- and Di Maggio, 1991).32 Hospitals, schools,
cratic behavior. The joint consideration of these steel plants, or planning boards, operating in
variables is frequent in the specialized literature, widely different environments, may possess for
in view of the increasing concern with the trans- that reason a number of common traits. Certain
fer of administrative technologies whose criteria professional norms and standards contribute to
of rationality are incongruent with those preva- reinforce these similarities, by conforming a sort
lent in the recipient countries. of technological subculture that tends to prevail
Technological variables affect the function- beyond geographical or cultural barriers.
ing of a public bureaucracy in two ways. First, Also, cultural variables exert a homogenizing
there is a type of technology intimately associ- influence on bureaucratic behavior. The ways of
ated with the nature of the organization’s core perceiving and categorizing reality, the beliefs of
activity, for example, more or less standardized the efficacy of certain instruments for achiev-
processes for the production of electricity, the ing goals, the prevailing criteria of legitimacy,
supply of transportation services, or the pub- the attitudes toward authority, or the orienta-
lic registry of certain transactions. Hence there tions toward time are elements that concur to
is a technology which may present variations standardize interpersonal perceptions as to what
according to scale or degree of innovation but should be done or expected in a given situation –
responds to a basic process of production of the thus reducing uncertainty in the interaction.
good or service that is inherent to the activity, Of course, a distinction between organizational
demands a given type of cooperation, and con- culture within bureaucracies and societal cul-
strains the way the organization is structured. ture should be made because they often dif-
Usually, it is called the core technology. fer. Indeed, each culture has its own vision as
Second, any complex organization will at- to how public officials should behave, and the
tempt to eliminate the sources of uncertainty legitimacy of their roles is strongly pervaded
operating on its technological core, because by this cultural element.33 Nepotism, venality,
the legitimacy and survival or the organiza- absenteeism – for example, practices that Par-
tion strongly depends on the steady and effi- sons would have called particularistic – are part
cient functioning of its core technology. In other and parcel of certain cultures, or perhaps are
words, under norms of rationality the organiza- more widespread in some cultural milieus than
tion will seek to seal off its core technologies in others. In this respect, culture operates as an
from environmental influences, through the ap- homogenizing factor but, at the same time, as a
propriate management of input (i.e., preventive differentiating element vis-à-vis other cultures.
maintenance, supplies, personnel) and output
31
(i.e., disposition of products, marketing policy) In fact, these two kinds of technology are related
to what are better known as substantive versus support
activities (Thompson, 1967). To carry out these
organizational functions or as outside versus inside pro-
managerial activities, the organization must ob- duction.
serve certain rules and principles dealing with 32
These are core issues in the recent bibliography on
the integration of human resources and pro- the sociology of organizations. For instance, isomorfism
fessional expertise within a given technological among organizations has been discussed in Powell and
Di Maggio (1991).
system. Such aspects as span of control, depart- 33
French and German bureaucrats, for instance, have
mentalization, hierarchy, relationship between high status, pay, and privileges; U.S. bureaucrats have low
coordination and size, or patterns of admin- status, moderate pay, and few privileges.
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A great number of administrative reform pro- Clientele and its capacity for articulating de-
grams are precisely designed to operate upon mands will entail different exigencies in terms
these cultural traits, departing from a suppos- of compatibility between technology and cul-
edly universalistic conception which, at bottom, ture. In traditional societies, in which in-
is anything but a transplant of foreign cultural dividuals and organizations do not partici-
patterns disguised under the shape of neutral or- pate in narrow-interest networks that control
ganizational technologies. their behavior, ideology, tradition, or attach-
Already in 1964, Stinchcombe observed that ment to normative imperatives may be much
cultures in transitional societies often do not in- more important than self-control and self-
corporate the skills required for the operation determination. Feedback from society is very
of complicated technologies. Later on, this same low; consequently, individual bureaucrats need
author offered a provocative contrast between to be told what should be done instead of for
public organizations with different technologi- what purposes. The normal behavior pattern is
cal requirements, similarly subject to the Latin likely to follow “bureaucratic–normative” crite-
American cultural influence (Stinchcombe, ria rather than “professional–clientelistic” crite-
1964, 1974). In these societies, therefore, the ria (Mayntz, 1979). This indicates the important
homogenizing influences of culture tend to be- role played by bureaucratic clienteles and politi-
come constraints upon the organizations, that is, cal conditions as additional sources of constraints
factors retarding or interfering with organiza- of public organizations, a theme to which I now
tional action. In industrialized societies, on the turn.
other hand, the homogenizing effect of culture
goes almost unnoticed given the high degree of
congruence between technology and culture. In Clientelistic and Political Constraints
other words, the technological contents of cul-
ture are compatible with the cultural assump- In the late 1950s, Dill (1958) distinguished
tions of technology. four environmental groups potentially relevant
The foregoing observations present adminis- for defining and achieving organizational goals
trative reformers with some crucial questions. for private sector firms: (1) customers (both
What is the degree of tolerable incongruence distributors and users); (2) suppliers of materials,
between managerial technology and cultural labor, capital, equipment, and work space; (3)
patterns? How do incongruences affect bureau- competitors for both markets and resources; and
cratic efficiency and effectiveness? To what ex- (4) regulatory groups, including governmental
tent can reform activities force, or else overlook, agencies, unions, and interfirm associations.
the prevailing cultural patterns? These ques- State bureaucracies, however, differ from this
tions have no direct or easy answers. Bureau- pattern of functioning in some important re-
cratic units operating under different technolog- spects. First, the overall state apparatus may be
ical and environmental constraints will exhibit considered as one large and single organiza-
varying degrees of tolerance. In many cultures, tion, with few or no competitors, rather than
the symbolic value or ceremonial nature of cer- heterogeneous clients and “regulatory groups”
tain organizations, their consequent functional with varying capacity of control, depending on
sterility, or their utilization as mechanisms for the political context being considered. Second,
absorbing the unemployed are acceptable cri- the division of labor within this apparatus tends
teria of institutional legitimacy. Thus, in tra- to parcel out functions, jurisdictions, and com-
ditional contexts, technologically sophisticated petences in such a way that virtual monopo-
units, such as a planning board or a public ad- lies are created over the production of goods,
ministration institute, may sometimes survive as regulations, or services. Third, the normative
curious islands of modernization embedded in frameworks of these organizational units tend
a bureaucratic machinery whose dominant cul- to rely, at least formally, on criteria and direc-
ture is eminently adscriptive and particularistic. tives somehow external to the organization, in
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500 Oscar Oszlak
line with the division of labor previously men- introducing a “vertical” dimension in the policy
tioned. Fourth, clienteles tend to be “captive,” space. Under normal circumstances, the higher
given the monopolistic nature of most public the hierarchical level, the larger the functional
bureaucracies’ outputs and the interest networks “territoriality”; but at the same time, the more
generated around their supply. Hence, the con- diffuse the kind of interests linking the orga-
sideration of environmental actors in the case of nization with its clientele. In the policy space,
state bureaucracies needs a differing approach. a ministry of agriculture occupies a larger ter-
Two contextual dimensions appear particu- ritory than a rural extension agency. But the
larly relevant to the case of bureaucratic units former’s clientele is constituted by second- or
“linked” by processes of policy implementation: third-level corporate organizations whose inter-
the specific character of the bureaucratic clien- ests are surely much more aggregate and diffuse
teles and the nature of the political regime. The than those claimed by rural producers dealing
former are important in view of the demands, with the extension agency of our example.
supports, and legitimacy they may provide to This observation has important conse-
the various agencies according to their perfor- quences, because it is often asserted that the state
mance. In turn, different political regimes may lacks a defined position in this or that policy
also entail different normative frameworks and area. In studies carried out in two state tech-
management styles, with high probabilities that nological institutes in Argentina, the “lack of
certain policy areas – and consequently certain public policy” (i.e., agricultural or industrial)
agencies – will be favored at the expense of oth- appeared as a recurrent theme (Oszlak et al.,
ers. Let us take a closer look at the way these pa- 1971; Oszlak, 1984). The possibility of policy
rameters constrain the internal dynamics of state formulation in the area of research and extension
agencies – hence impinging on productivity. was thus automatically subordinated to the pre-
Every state agency struggles to gain positions vious formulation of a global policy for the over-
within the policy space; in this process, it defines all sector, within which the more specific policy
a “territory” or “functional domain.” A sharp would presumably become meaningful. In this
“territorial” sensibility usually affects bureau- conception, each policy area would resemble a
cratic behavior and the level of conflict among system of “Chinese boxes,” with policies keep-
agencies. As a result of interagency struggle for ing internal consistency among themselves and
domain building and maintenance, the physiog- gaining in specificity as the operational levels
nomy of the public sector becomes permanently are approached. Symmetrically, both the pub-
transformed by borderline expansions and con- lic agencies responsible for a functional area
tractions. As a source of agency power and legit- and their respective clienteles would also form
imacy, clients play a fundamental role in defining a system of “Chinese boxes” through diverse
the terms and outcomes of this struggle. How structural combinations somehow shaped as a
effective their role may be will depend, among pyramid.
others, on several circumstances: their social ori- Although this conception is not totally mis-
gin, their sheer number, their interest articula- taken, as it finds support in the formal orga-
tion capacity, their proximity and control of the nization of both the state and the corporate
bureaucratic agencies, and their significance in organizations, the underlying assumptions may
terms of the prevailing patterns of capital accu- not always be valid. In a study of the National
mulation and political domination. In this re- Institute of Industrial Technology of Argentina,
spect, clients may resort to similar power re- we found that the most successful industrial re-
sources as those discussed earlier in this section. search centers were those in which the clientele
A public agency may simultaneously occupy was more actively involved in the promotion
different policy spaces. These various locations and management of the centers, and in which
would help placing the organization within a the policy framework for the sector favored
functional – or public policy – map. The hierar- (or at least was not openly contradictory with)
chy defines levels of authority and responsibility, the projects and action programs of the centers
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(Oszlak, 1976). But the promotion of tech- Second were units facing scarcely organized
nology in a given branch of industry was not clients or, related with more traditional sec-
necessarily part of a global conception of tech- tors or branches, weakly linked with external
nological policy, nor did it assume consistency markets.35 Third were agencies with similarly
with some definition of the “general interest” widespread, unorganized clients facing equally
of society. Contrarily, in other situations we diffused demands as those of the second type but
found that the lack of articulation between the whose requirements of skills and technologies
output of an organization and the effective de- were scarce.36 At a different level of abstraction,
mand of its expected clientele led to situations in this invisible stratification of the public sector
which the initiative of the members of the orga- somehow replicates the very social structure of
nization, the influence of professional fashions, the country and the prevailing patterns of power
or the requirements of financial or technical as- relationships. It also suggests the existence of
sistance from international organizations played a close correspondence between social demand
a much more determining role in the defini- and bureaucratic productivity.37
tion of the institution’s normative framework
(Oszlak, 1972; Oszlak et al., 1971).
These illustrations suggest that, along with tation of economic policies, the regulation of economic
behavior, and financial activities. They also included cer-
the distribution of the policy space (e.g., the tain units that satisfied demands from the public sector
division of labor within the state apparatus) itself, such as planning agencies or regional and local
and the hierarchical structure that creates an- development agencies.
35
other form of bureaucratic articulation and in- Their functions benefited the community at large
(i.e., educational or sanitary programs, infrastructure
terdependence, an invisible stratification can be
with no external economies for dynamic activities).
imagined which has a direct bearing on the These organizations somehow reflected the technolog-
role played by the clienteles of state agencies ically backward, static, and unproductive character of
and the type of regime in power. For exam- the economic and social sectors served. Although the
ple, a study carried out in Guatemala (Martı́nez knowledge required to carry over their functions was
high, their capacity to process information was extremely
Nogueira, 1978) established a typology of bu-
low. The demands from society did not promote or-
reaucratic agencies based on the relationship ganizational innovations, and the available and installed
between the nature of the demands made by technology exerted a strong inertia. Among others, in-
the clienteles and the level of knowledge and stitutions in this category included those in the areas
the capacity shown by the agencies for process- of education, social welfare, foreign affairs, and certain
public utilities, such as telephone and gas.
ing information. The degree of specificity and 36
All organizations of this sort were heavily staffed at
articulation of demands emerged as a critical the operational level, showing very weak – or lacking
variable for differentiating three types of state altogeather – internal differentiation in terms of policy
organizations. First were those attending to de- formulation, planning, and programming of activities.
mands related with areas or activities consid- Many institutions used to outsource the elaboration of
projects or the execution of public works. But they ex-
ered as dynamic within the development model hibited a reduced capacity of analysis and fiscalization
given their capacity to generate surplus, their of the technical resources provided by the contractors.
links with foreign markets, and the productiv- They faced a high permanent turnover of their qualified
ity resulting from the technologies employed.34 personnel, who were attracted by the higher prestige
and dynamism of other public or private organizations.
Very often, these units were utilized as instruments of
34
State agencies related to these sectors revealed great political clientelism. This category included units of the
flexibility to adapt their internal structures, modes of op- presidency, agriculture, public works, communications,
eration, and resources to the requirements of changing ports, and some agencies working in the rural area.
37
circumstances. Their staff was composed of young, dy- Casuistic explanations often preclude this broad
namic members, frequently shifting between the private proposition. To illustrate the point, consider the area
and the public sectors. The critical value and the strate- of road maintenance, a favorite World Bank example.
gic character of their interventions assured the support In general, highway development projects operated by
of their clienteles. These institutions included, among the World Bank have not met with great success. As in
others, those engaged in the formulation and implemen- the cases examined before, the demand for this type of
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502 Oscar Oszlak
Regime Constraints enjoy greater capacity of organization and in-

terest articulation. The failures of the state bu-
The intrabureaucratic dynamics is also affected reaucracy regarding social welfare programs may
by the nature of the existing political regime. be partially compensated by voluntary organiza-
What is the specific weight of this explanatory tions, labor unions, parastate agencies, and so-
dimension, and how does it influence the pol- cial solidarity networks, that is, by institutions
icy process? Without falling into teleological which under these political circumstances play
or conspirative reasoning, it can be safely as- a significant role as mechanisms of social artic-
sumed that any incoming government or po- ulation. The situation is inverted under most
litical regime, in attempting to implement its antipopular authoritarian systems, in which reg-
governmental program, will try to control the ulatory policies and attempts at “regenerating”
policy options and the resources needed for their certain older patterns of social relations bring
achievement. For this purpose, it will try to in- into prominence state units in charge of repres-
crease the degree of congruence between polit- sion and control of social activities.
ical project and bureaucratic apparatus through: However, beyond differences in the substan-
(1) modifications in the priorities and contents tive policy sector considered (i.e., defense, edu-
of substantive policies, thereby affecting (posi- cation, energy), it is likely that the orientations
tively or negatively) the various sectors of society and propensities of the regimes in terms of re-
and, consequently, the state agencies and the bu- forming the “support” units and activities of
reaucratic clienteles related with such policies; the public bureaucracy will also differ. Changes
and (2) changes in the support activities of the in authority structures, redefinition of domain
public sector (i.e., managerial technologies, cul- boundaries, or reallocation of resources are typ-
tural patterns). Put another way, the regime will ical measures designed to reinforce or transform
try to act upon the technological, cultural, and deeply rooted practices. The programs of down-
clientelistic dimensions previously examined. sizing, decentralization, and budgetary reform
Regarding policy contents, Lowi (1972) dis- or changes in the ministerial organization charts
tinguished four types of policies (i.e., distribu- or in procedural rules should be observed as
tive, redistributive, regulatory, and constituent) conscious attempts of the government at con-
whose adoption or relative emphasis varies di- trolling its bureaucracy.
rectly with the political regime. For example, Modernizing authoritarian regimes exhibit a
by their very nature, populist regimes will give strong tendency toward using highly sophisti-
priority to programs of rural development, low- cated administrative techniques. The opposite
cost housing, public health, and mass education. is true of traditional authoritarian (or neopatri-
In general, these types of redistributive poli- monial) regimes, in which the dominant culture
cies tend to strengthen the position of the state is mainly prebendalist. In sum, political regime
agencies in charge of their execution and that and bureaucratic machinery may present vary-
of the social sectors benefiting from them. Un- ing degrees of compatibility in their cultural and
der these regimes, the popular sectors normally technological orientations and practices; but in
most cases the former will try to impose changes
on the latter, in line with its values and pref-
service is scarce and inarticulate. Most of the benefits erences. Hence, in revolutionary situations –
are enjoyed by motor vehicle operators and, indirectly,
by the population living within the area of influence of as has been the case of Nicaragua or Cuba,
the road. The demands, therefore, do not easily reach where the patrimonialist regimes of Somoza and
those in charge of maintenance. Community pressure Batista were succeeded by manifestly socialist
is low, particularly because awareness of road deteriora- regimes – the transformation of the public sec-
tion is gradual and almost imperceptible. There are in- tor has involved actions at the political level
stead much more incentives to direct the scarce resources
available to highway construction, where the benefits are (i.e., orientations and beneficiaries of state poli-
immediate, tangible, and, therefore, elicit the adherence cies) as well as at the cultural and technological
of governments and clienteles alike. levels.
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In order to counteract the initiatives of the In considering political regimes, two ques-
regime, the government agencies may resort to tions should be clarified: (1) What are the
several, more or less institutionalized, mecha- criteria for categorizing political regimes as a
nisms and practices. In the older agencies, there variable? and (2) How much of the variance in
is a sort of ministerial or departmental ideol- the intrabureaucratic dynamics can be attributed
ogy as to how certain matters should be dealt to this variable? To answer the first question,
with. In the more specialized ones, the man- the literature provides a full stock of labels to
agement of technical information often con- designate different regimes (i.e., liberal, author-
stitutes a powerful resource. The support of itarian, patrimonialist, socialist, theocratic), but
relevant clients, the establishment of informal consensus has not been reached. Sometimes,
relationships, or the existence of norms reducing different categories are used to refer to simi-
the scope of the regime attributes (i.e., ability to lar cases (i.e., fascism, corporatism, bureaucratic
remove personnel, civil servants’ right to strike) authoritarianism, totalitarianism). In addition,
operate as additional resources at the agencies’ there are problems in constructing typologies
disposal. that reasonably cover the universe of political
In turn, the organizations and civil servants regimes. Finally, no category is capable of com-
most directly related with the regime usually prehending the essentially dynamic and chang-
resort to various tactics and mechanisms for ining character of any regime; this has often led
creasing their control over the agencies. The to qualifications that attempt to account for
creation of integrating and supervising units – as a regime’s phases or “moments”: that is, im-
in the areas of planning, science and technology, plantation, tensions, transformation, transitions,
public enterprises –; the establishment of paral- “exit.”38
lel hierarchies – either the military corporation, The second question demands making rea-
as in most bureaucratic–authoritarian regimes, sonable assumptions about the proportion of the
or the ruling political party – as until recently variance in bureaucratic interdependence that is
in Mexico –; the creation of counter-staffs – explained by the nature of the regime or, for that
such as a general secretariat of the presidency, matter, by interactions with clients. The main
personal advisors, trustworthy personnel – ; the difficulty here lies in the fact that many of the
passing of legislation allowing the government features these relationships present are – as has
to get rid of public officials; or the setting up of already been discussed – culturally or technolog-
ad hoc units, outside the formal bureaucracy, are ically determined. Put differently, interdepen-
some of the instruments available to the regime dence is altered not only by exogenous variables
in power for overcoming bureaucratic obstacles but also by traditions and technical requirements
and inertia. of the relationship itself. In this sense, the intra-
Keeping in mind this complex interaction, bureaucratic dynamics would have a logic of its
the regime–bureaucracy relationship should be own, independent of the fluctuations and odds
specified in terms of different national settings of politics. Therefore, it is difficult to establish
and historical circumstances. I have argued that the “specific weight” of these permanent ele-
there is a causal relationship between political ments of bureaucracy and to isolate them from
regime and bureaucratic organization. Or, more those whose variation may be explained by al-
specifically, the various forms of bureaucratic in- ternative types of political regimes or by the na-
terdependence (or intrabureaucratic dynamics) ture of interactions with clients. However, these
are differently affected by the nature of the po- observations should not preclude further efforts
litical regime. The transformations of the public at building typologies and advancing proposi-
sector as a new regime takes power can partly tions about the way political regimes constrain
be explained by the kind of interactions occur-
ring once the incumbent powerholders try to
make the state machinery compatible with their 38
On the problems and limitations of concept build-
political designs. ing in the social sciences, see Oszlak (2001).
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504 Oscar Oszlak
bureaucratic dynamics – an exercise I tried sev- the resulting configurations are mixed, falling
eral years ago (Oszlak, 1984). quite apart from the “pure” cases suggested by
To round out this section, a few final remarks a particular typology.
should be added. First, on a closer analysis of the A fifth point, closely related to the previous
constraints mentioned, it appears that the tech- one, is that even the characterizations of politi-
nological and cultural ones seem to be more cal regimes should be carefully qualified before
strongly related to the performance and pro- comparisons with discrete national experiences
ductivity of a bureaucracy, whereas clientelis- are drawn. It can hardly be contended that the
tic and political constraints have as a common democracies established in Latin America, East-
concern the subject of power. Clearly, technol- ern Europe, Asia, or Africa all belong to the
ogy and culture directly affect the way the pro- same type. The differences are manifold: degree
duction function of bureaucracy is arranged – of consolidation of a party system, remaining
a central issue when trying to identify the influence of the military, relative hegemony of
reasons for its low performance. In turn, the the executive vis-à-vis other powers and polit-
concern with power is inherent in its relation- ical actors, diffusion of prebendalism, political
ship with clients, where bureaucratic capture strength of irregular military forces (i.e., narcos
appears as a main outcome; and in the interac- or guerrillas), and political weight of the civil
tions with the political regime, where the prob- service labor unions, among others.
lems of policy orientations and management
styles are of central importance. I would pick
up this hypothesis, and the next observations, as some final notes
topics for further research.
Second, if typologies of bureaucracies’ man- My introductory remarks were intended to pro-
agement styles (derived from political regimes– vide justification as to why the involvement of
bureaucratic dynamics matrices) are to be devel- public bureaucracies in politics and policy im-
oped, it should be considered that some features plementation can be adequately captured by a
may well be observed in all sorts of regimes. systematic analysis of power and productivity as
For example, diplomatic personnel tends to be- the main variables. For this purpose, the first
have as a closed stratum with clearly defined section proposed an examination of the histor-
hierarchies and high deference to authority, ical roots of bureaucracy as one of the main
whichever regime is in power. Or a common attributes of “stateness” and, in turn, as a com-
pattern of resource appropriation and allocation, ponent of the broader process of societal build-
based on a centralized treasury, has become the ing. This analysis revealed why and how a
current practice of governments facing stringent national state originates and develops, its agenda
financial difficulties, regardless of the ideological (and contents of issues that await decisions) is
or political orientations. formed, public policies (or stands on issues) are
A third important point is the increasing ho- formulated, resources are assigned, and institu-
mogeneity of countries with widely disparate tional arrangements are established for policy
historic and sociopolitical environments, as a implementation. The conclusion was that bu-
result of widespread diffusion of models and reaucracy can be viewed as an outgrowth of
formulas for public sector institutional strength- public policies inasmuch as it is what it does.
ening promoted by multilateral financial or- The second section presented a model that
ganizations and bilateral cooperation agen- attempted to explain the internal dynamics of
cies. bureaucracy in terms of the main analytical di-
Fourth, in those countries with high political mensions and variables intervening in the pro-
instability and frequent changes in the nature of cesses of resource allocation, particularly the
the political regimes, institutional “lags” in the constrains posed by the bureaucracy’s norma-
recurrent readaptation process tend to become tive framework, structural arrangements, and
chronic. Very often, their influence is such that behavioral patterns. Some relevant contextual
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variables and the way they may impinge on the A final dynamic element is the adaptation of
internal dynamics of bureaucracy were also con- state bureaucracies (at the national and subna-
sidered in broad terms. The main purpose of this tional levels) to the changes brought about by
model was to make tentative propositions about the processes of decentralization, privatization,
the way the interactions among these variables and deregulation.
end up affecting the productivity (i.e., the ef- By their very nature, the conflictive behavior
ficiency and effectiveness) of bureaucracy. One patterns within and between bureaucracies and
of the main conclusions of this section was that regimes tend to alter formal relations of interde-
productivity is strongly hindered by incongru- pendence presented in my analytic model, with-
ence between political and technical rational- out observing any formal rational scheme. Once
ity in the organization of bureaucracy activity, adopted, they become institutionalized and ex-
leading to various manifestations of bureau- ist side by side with prescribed behavior. It is
pathology. this coexistence that introduces an element of
In the third section, the model was devel- permanent contradiction and induces a coun-
oped further by incorporating several aspects terpoint of “formal prescription–adaptive be-
related to the power relationships that bureau- havior” in which certain patterns of interaction,
cratic agencies and units maintain with politi- truly guiding expectations, attitudes and behav-
cal actors outside their domain, especially with ior, get settled. To find out and explain these
the incumbent regime. An examination of dif- behavioral patterns (i.e., why bureaucracies act
ferent sorts of power resources in the hands the way they do; how do they use power) and
of bureaucratic agencies and other political ac- to incorporate them as a datum of reality with-
tors appeared to provide some clues regard- out assuming pathology may lead to processes of
ing how each source of power may affect the policy formulation and implementation perhaps
implementation of public policies. To this ef- less ambitious, although probably more sensitive
fect, it was suggested that bureaucratic activity to the complexity of the intrabureaucratic dy-
and performance may be differently affected by namics and to the constraints of the political
technological, cultural, clientelistic, and regime environment. The prospects of institutional de-
constraints. Each of them was then explored in velopment for effective policy implementation
some detail. largely depend on this increasing awareness.
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506
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0521819903agg.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 August 27, 1956 23:26
part iv
STATE POLICY AND INNOVATIONS
507
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chapter twenty-five
Comparative and Historical Studies of Public Policy

and the Welfare State
Alexander Hicks and Gøsta Esping-Andersen
The welfare state and sociology grew up in tan- that nations, one after the other, eventually con-
dem. The cornerstones of the modern welfare verge in adopting and expanding social policies
state were erected in the late nineteenth cen- suggests that, yes, there exist common under-
tury, first in Germany and soon thereafter across lying causal forces behind the modern welfare
most of Western Europe. This was during the state. These may, as Wilensky (1975) empha-
same era in which sociology, as an academic sizes, be largely “nonpolitical,” namely long-
discipline, was founded. Such coincidence is term economic growth, demographic aging,
hardly accidental. Both evolved out of prevail- and the emergence of modern bureaucracy. But
ing controversies on how to address the ‘social most political and historical sociologists argue
question’; how to ensure order and consensus otherwise.
in an increasingly individualized, atomized, and The chief contribution of historical sociol-
seemingly polarizing society; how to respond to ogy lies in its careful differentiation of the causal
the commodification of both needs and labor; logics pertaining to the epoch in question. Rim-
and how to manage the changing balance of po- linger (1971), followed by Flora and Heiden-
litical power that, predictably, would result from heimer (1981), Alber (1982), Ashford (1986),
democratization. and Baldwin (1990), show convincingly that the
The Western welfare states did not evolve first steps toward social legislation came in con-
uniformly as industrialization and democra- servative, indeed authoritarian, polities bent on
tization unfolded. Indeed, the beginnings of perpetuating the reign of absolutism against the
modern social policy appear to belie any con- double onslaught of laissez-faire liberalism and
nection at all. The pioneers were autocratic socialism. In the first phase of welfare state de-
Germany and Austria, and the laggards par excel- velopment, what scant democracy marked in-
lence were the democratic and industrial leaders, novators could not have played a very large role
such as the United States and Great Britain in welfare state emergence (Esping-Andersen,
(Rimlinger, 1971). Furthermore, today’s pro- 1990). In such authoritarian states as Bismarck’s
totypical examples of highly advanced welfare Reich, fledgling, politically estranged workers’
states – the Scandinavian – would, until the movements and parties might set the stage for
1930s, have appeared comparatively undevel- autocrats by raising the specter of socialism but
oped. This apparent paradox has stimulated an could have none but indirect effects on welfare
especially long-standing and intense sociologi- policy (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hicks, 1999).
cal debate over welfare state development. Cer- This brings us to the second major phase
tainly, an explanation of the social origins of in welfare state development – the so-called
a phenomenon may not be a good guide to Golden Age of Capitalism, spanning the 1940s–
later development. Nonetheless, the very fact 1960s. Indeed, this was the era in which the
509
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510 Alexander Hicks and Gøsta Esping-Andersen
concept of the welfare state was coined (by Gus- effective political rights – hence the eighteenth-
tav Moller in Sweden and Lord Beveridge in century battles for political democracy. Once
Britain) and in which modern democracy be- again, according to Marshall, the conquest of
came fully institutionalized. The main politi- political citizenship soon provoked calls for so-
cal protagonists of social reform were now social rights simply because political rights are only
cial democratic parties (in Northern Europe and really effective if all citizens command adequate
Britain) or Christian Democrats (in Continental economic resources and security. In brief, Mar-
Europe).1 The political sociology of the welfare shall sees the welfare state as a centuries-long
state has taken its lead not so much from history fruition of the fight for equality of citizenship
as from contemporary variations in “welfare and rights. In this respect, his theory is a mod-
stateness,” that is, from international differences ern echo of Thomas Paine’s revolutionary call
in comprehensiveness, generosity, or egalitari- for “the rights of man,” which was written (1791)
anism. Its main question is not what drives broad just after the American and French Revolutions.
historical or comparative convergence but the Marshall’s concept of the welfare state has
opposite: How do we explain the vast differ- been hugely influential in modern sociology,
ences in the welfare states of today? both because it is historical (albeit faintly tele-
ological) and because it implicitly identifies
criteria for judging “welfare stateness.” Social
what is the welfare state? rights imply a double negation of the pure mar-
ket economy. On the one hand, rights imply
The welfare state has, for decades, been a truly decommodification, that is, a relaxation of the pure
controversial topic in the social sciences. Yet, commodity status of both labor and goods.2 So-
it is not wholly clear that sociologists are al- cial policy means that individual social risks are
ways debating the same phenomenon. What do recognized as a common responsibility, that cit-
we mean by the “welfare state”? Definitions izens’ well-being is at least partially made in-
basically condense into three types. Wilensky dependent of the marketplace, of charity, or of
(1975) provides one widely shared definition, familial support. Welfare guarantees imply that
emphasizing a basic guaranteed social minimum workers need not accept any job at any price.
for citizens, or income maintenance. In order On the other hand, still according to Marshall,
to distinguish between welfare states, he simply social citizenship promotes new social solidarities,
adopts social expenditure levels (in his words, a more collective social community. If all citi-
“welfare effort”) as a percent of GDP. Therborn zens enjoy identical entitlements, regardless of
(1983) takes this logic one step further, arguing social class, status, color, or gender, the welfare
that a state is only a welfare state if more than state de facto reconfigures the prevailing social
half of its outlays are destined to citizens’ wel- stratificational order, implanting a modicum of
fare. A second, unquestionably far more influ- universalism and equality where, otherwise, at-
ential, view takes its cues from T. H. Marshall’s omization, individualism, class, or narrow cor-
(1950) theory of social citizenship, by which he porate loyalties would prevail.3 It follows that
means an explicit social contract between gov- Marshall’s concept of the welfare state is useful
ernment and citizens very analogous to civil and both as a guide to interpret the history of social
political rights. His basic idea is that citizenship
has evolved historically around a progressively 2
This admittedly awkward concept derives from Karl
expanding sets of entitlements, all interdepen- Polanyi’s (1944) classical analysis of the commodifica-
dent. When, in the seventeenth century, civil tion of labor in the rise of capitalism and has been in-
rights began to crystallize, it soon became ev- corporated into sociology by Offe (1984) and Esping-
ident that these needed to be safeguarded by Andersen (1990).
3
For an extensive discussion of the doubly egalitar-
ian and emancipatory meaning of Marshall’s concept,
1
Roosevelt’s New Deal in the United States can be see Esping-Andersen (1990:chap. 1). For a wide-ranging
regarded as an American version of European social theoretical and empirical study of social citizenship, see
democracy (Amenta, 1998; Hicks, 1999). Janoski (1998).
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Comparative and Historical Studies of Public Policy and the Welfare State 511
policy and to analyze international differences Nordic countries, in which eligibility and rights
in welfare state goals and accomplishments. are shared equally by all citizens regardless of
The third type of definition is primarily influ- prior earnings, employment, or other status. A
enced by the writings of Richard Titmuss (1958, second, prevalent in the United States and other
1974), who was the first to develop a framework Anglo-Saxon nations, seeks deliberately to limit
for welfare state comparisons. Writing just af- benefits to the demonstrably needy alone, as-
ter World War II, he was already then struck by suming that the majority can satisfy its wel-
the noticeable differences in welfare state evolu- fare needs in the marketplace. A third organizes
tion. At that time Britain, along with the Nordic social protection around occupational status
countries, seemed to be moving toward a very groups in the form of contributory social insur-
comprehensive idea of the welfare state, empha- ance schemes. This approach is especially dif-
sizing equal and universally shared rights to all fused among the Continental European nations
citizens as well as a broad notion of social enti- with their long-standing “corporatist” legacies,
tlements. Other countries, the United States in distinctions based on social rank and hierarchy,
particular, were heading toward a more mini- and the strong link between employment record
malist, ungenerous, targeted, and market-biased and social entitlements.
approach to social protection. To capture these The concept of decommodification is
differences, he distinguished between the insti- premised on the assumption that citizens in mar-
tutional and residual welfare state models, respec- ket economies are already “commodified.” This,
tively. as a large feminist literature has argued, is a prob-
Much recent scholarship has been devoted to lematic assumption as far as women are con-
the specification of salient welfare dimensions, cerned (Orloff, 1993; O’Connor, 1996; Sains-
by and large following the leads of Marshall and bury, 1994). In order to establish greater gender
Titmuss. Decommodification is one such key equality, the major welfare state challenge
dimension, usually measured as the strength might simply be to aid women’s employment
of social entitlements and citizens’ degree chances and ability to pursue careers – which
of immunization from market dependency. would call for policies to commodify. Indeed,
It should therefore capture levels of benefit because family obligations traditionally are the
generosity, conditions of entitlement, and dura- main impediment to women’s emancipation,
tions of eligibility (Esping-Andersen, 1990). All policies that help commodify women are si-
told, unconditional benefits with high income multaneously defamilializing, that is, they ex-
replacement rates are potentially more decom- ternalize familial welfare responsibilities, such
modifying. In contrast, if entitlements depend as care for small children or the elderly. Simi-
on lengthy contribution records or on means- larly, many potential workers are separated from
tests or if they are targeted narrowly to the poor, the employment relationship due to exclusion,
their potential for decommodification is clearly unemployment or handicaps, and here the ob-
circumscribed. To exemplify, welfare states like jective would be to help re-commodify citizens.
the Scandinavian with universal and free health In these terms, we may compare welfare states
services, guaranteed income replacement dur- in terms of their support for working moth-
ing illness; and Scandinavian unemployment or ers (“women-friendly policy”), their accent on
maternity/paternity benefits are more decom- “active labor market policies” (worker retrain-
modifying than, say, those of the United States, ing, placement, or direct job provision), or,
where neither universal health care nor legis- more generally, services aimed at strengthening
lated sickness and maternity benefits even exist – people’s market power (Janoski, 1994; Supiot,
a clear demarcation of its residual character. 2000).
A second key dimension has to do with social The sociological conceptualization of wel-
solidarities. The literature usually distinguishes fare states is now dominated by the idea of dis-
between three main (and, as presented here, tinct real-world models, thus rejecting the no-
rather stylized) approaches to risk-pooling. tion that they can be compared simply along a
One is universalism, particularly stressed in the single linear dimension – such as social spending
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levels. The locus of welfare provision is key to ism in coverage and eligibility. Paradoxically, it
many typologies, mainly because it prefigures is in this regime that we find a maximum effort
the nature of social rights, levels of decommodi- to both decommodify and to “re-commodify”
fication, and also models of “solidarity.” Welfare workers: Very powerful income guarantees go
state scholars are often myopically focused on hand-in-hand with efforts to facilitate employ-
government welfare provision, forgetting that ment for all. The Nordic countries stand out
markets are normally the principal source of internationally in terms of their commitment to
well-being for most citizens throughout most “defamilialize” welfare obligations as a means to
of their lives, and that the family, albeit wan- further gender equality.
ing, does remain a principal source of welfare The indicators discussed so far measure public
responsibilities. How social welfare provision is welfare constituent aspects of welfare regimes.
allocated between the three pillars is what de- Predictably, many of these should correspond
marcates any given welfare regime. to systematic differences in welfare “outcomes,”
In this vein, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) such as rates of income redistribution or poverty
distinguishes between, first, a “conservative” reduction. Table 25.1 provides a synthetic com-
(mainly Continental European) welfare regime, parison of the world’s advanced welfare states,
one that gives primacy to families’ responsibil- utilizing both welfare regime types (which de-
ity to see after their own. Its “familialistic” bias fine columns) and elements and outcomes of
goes hand-in-hand with a continued adherance welfare regimes (in rows). To give a more con-
to the conventional male-breadwinner model, crete idea of the main differences, means-tested
meaning undeveloped family- and “women- benefits account for almost 20 percent of all so-
friendly” policy. In addition, this model is cial transfers in the United States, but for only
largely based on social insurance schemes, typ- 1 percent in Sweden. Private pension plans ac-
ically organized according to narrow corpo- count for more than a fifth of total pension
ratist, occupation-based solidarities. A second – spending in the United States, compared to
“liberal” – regime stands out for its promar- 6 percent in Sweden and a low of 2 percent
ket bias and residual definition of government in Italy (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The Scandi-
welfare obligations. The Anglo-Saxon coun- navian welfare states manage to reduce poverty
tries, with the United States their prototype, levels by over 40 percent, compared to only
exemplify this regime. Its chief characteristics 15 percent in the “liberal” cluster (Hicks and
include a limited array of governmental social Kenworthy, 2003). The most recent data (mid-
obligations (for example, the absence of uni- 1990s) show a postredistribution poverty rate for
versal health care, family, or maternity benefits the United States at 19 percent, compared to
in the United States), generally modest social about 6 percent for Scandinavia and 8–10 per-
benefit levels, strict criteria for eligibility, a pref- cent for Continental Europe (Esping-Andersen,
erence for targeting public money very nar- 2002:Table 2.3). Most telling, perhaps, are fig-
rowly to the “needy” rather than the citizenry at ures on (re-) commodification, that is, facilitat-
large, and active encouragement of market so- ing the employment of all citizens. Recent data
lutions (such as stimulating employer-provided show that the share of households with no per-
occupational- or individual savings plans). A son employed is about 18 percent in the United
third major regime, epitomized by the long- Kingdom, while less than half that in Denmark
standing role of social democratic parties in (Esping-Andersen, 2002:Table 2.5).
the Nordic countries, promotes Titmuss’s idea
of the institutional welfare state by defining
the scope of public welfare responsibilities ex- political sociological analyses
tremely broadly, by giving high priority to social of welfare states
equality and redistribution, by actively attempt-
ing to secure citizens’ welfare “from cradle to Sociologists have examined welfare states from
grave,” and by striving toward broad universal- two distinct angles. On one side there exists a
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Table 25.1. Welfare State Models and Welfare Policy Indicators
Regime Elements Regimes

and Outcomes Conservative Liberal Social Democratic
Population coverage occupational selective universal
Role of private market for welfare low high low
Target population (male) employed the poor all citizens
Decommodification medium low high
Defamilialization low low high
(Re-)commodification low medium high
Redistribution poverty reduction low low high
Reduction medium low high
Note: Conservative regimes includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and
Spain. The liberal regimes includes Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.
The social democratic regime includes the Nordic countries. The Netherlands is the most difficult
case to classify, combining universalistic traits and strong redistribution (with low poverty reduction),
yet remaining strongly familialistic. Also, Canada deviates from the liberal model (as the UK once did)
because of strongly universalistic program coverage – a trait also once prevalent in the U.K.
long tradition of explaining the causes of wel- a direct link between political democracy and
fare policy and cross-national welfare state vari- social citizenship, most famously formulated by
ations. On the other side, there is a vast literature T. H. Marshall (1950). As discussed earlier, he
examining how social policies in turn affect so- saw the modern welfare state as the latest expres-
cial inequalities. The former is primarily inter- sion of a centuries-long process of democratiza-
ested in establishing the long-term root causes tion that began, in the eighteenth century, with
of welfare state development; the latter is pri- the struggle for civil rights, continued in the
marily concerned with what kinds of outcomes nineteenth century with the extension of polit-
any given welfare model engenders. ical citizenship, and progressed in the twentieth
century with social citizenship rights. Marshall
shied away from pinpointing exactly how such
The Political Sociology of Welfare States progressive democratization came about. This,
however, has been a leading question in postwar
Inevitably, the welfare state will have major im- political sociology of the welfare state.
plications for income distribution. Hence, it lies In other words, most sociological debate has
at the heart of the age-old issue of “Who gets been about the role of political power in ex-
what from government?” (Lasswell, 1950; Page, plaining welfare state evolution and variation,
1983). Not surprisingly, the welfare state has be- especially in the rich and stable democracies.
come a major test case for theories of democ- The welfare state emerges as a focal point across
racy and power. The theoretical origins go back the entire array of theoretical perspectives in
to turn-of-the-century controversies over par- political sociology, be it in the pluralist tra-
liamentary democracy and reform, especially dition (Lipset, 1983 [1961]), in elite theory
as they were played out in labor movements. (Heclo, 1974), in class analytical perspectives
On one side, Marxist–Leninists saw parliamen- (Korpi, 1979, 1982), in the institutionalist tradi-
tarism as little more than a “talking shop,” an tion (Lowi, 1964), or in gender-centered writ-
unlikely source of democratic popular power. ings (Orloff, 1996; Skocpol, 1992). The cen-
Real power, in this view, lay in the control of trality of the welfare state is especially evident
private property. On the other side, reformist in comparative and historical sociology (Bendix
socialists and liberals believed that progressive and Lipset, 1966; Amenta, Bonastia, and Caren,
parliamentary majorities could effectuate gen- 2001; Myles and Quadagno, 2002; Green-
uine change. Sociological theory, likewise, sees Pedersen and Haverland, 2002).
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The theories that guide the comparative his- kinship systems (including declining birthrates
tory of welfare states range from the relatively and increasing female labor-force participation),
unidimensional to more complex synthetic ac- improvements in the relative social standing of
counts. In most cases, the welfare state has been interest groups, the spread of mass education,
characterized either in terms of overall social the emerging prominence of experts and in-
spending levels or in terms of the emergence, tellectuals, increasing social mobility, conver-
adoption, and evolution of core social protec- gence in production systems (from the erstwhile
tion programs, like pensions or unemployment Fordist model toward “flexible specialization”),
insurance. the adoption of a set of core social programs
(such as old-age pensions, unemployment pro-
Modernization Theory. One of the single most tection, and health care), and a fall in civil vio-
influential perspectives comes from moderniza- lence (Wilensky, 2002:70–3).
tion theory, which, in structural-functionalist Marxism represents a second, long-standing
terms, stresses the impact of industrialism developmental theory, albeit one of “modes of
(Giddens, 1973:217–19). In this theory, new productions” rather than society, and, within
needs for security emerge due to the transi- Marxists’ currently dominant mode of produc-
tion from agriculture to industry, which, in tion, of capitalist society rather than industrial
turn, fosters urbanization and the shift from (and postindustrial) society, and, finally, of “cap-
small communities and close personal relations ital accumulation” rather than economic de-
to impersonal exchange. This transition creates velopment. Stressing structural constraints built
imperatives for adaptation (such as social pro- into capitalist economies, Block (1977) argues
tection), but also the administrative and eco- that the limits of possible reform are overdeter-
nomic means to do so (Kerr et al., 1964). mined by a tacit understanding among politi-
Wilensky and Lebeaux (1964), Wilensky (1975), cal actors that the capitalist economic structure
and Stinchcombe (1985) represent this theoret- cannot be transgressed. Hence, reform becomes
ical tradition, arguing that the modern welfare limited to a narrow repertoire of policy that is
state is to be understood in terms of industri- consistent with the reproduction of the system.
alization and economic growth. Because pop- Quadagno (1988) has applied this perspective to
ulation aging accompanies growth, it is to be the empirical case of New Deal social-security
expected that pension expenditures (and gen- pension legislation.
eral expenditures in which pension spending
figures large) are strongly correlated with levels Ruling Class Theory. Some studies stress the di-
of economic development. Empirically, it has rect causal force of capitalist actors in public pol-
been shown that social spending correlates with icy making. Domhoff (1970), Quadagno (1984),
GDP, levels of industrialization, and demo- and Jenkins and Brents (1989, 1991) all argue
graphic variables (Wilensky, 1976; Pampel and that capitalist agenda setting prefigures social
Williamson, 1989; Usui, 1991; Williamson and policy agendas and, through them, policies. Yet,
Pampel, 1993; Collier and Messick, 1975). Ex- Skocpol and Amenta (1985) and Amenta and
amining longer historical periods, Hicks (1999) Parihk (1991) argue that the case for capitalist
shows that economic development is a necessary determination of New Deal policy flies in the
(but hardly sufficient) condition for early pro- face of observable and decisive capitalist oppo-
gram adoption. Hicks (1999) also demonstrates sition. Swenson (1997) presents a more hedged
that politics – class mobilization in particular – argument, suggesting that key capitalist repre-
is most crucial for early program consolidation sentatives appeared dominant in New Deal re-
in relatively developed nation-states. forms primarily because they had been incorpo-
More recently, Wilensky (2002) identifies rated into policy making by New Deal politi-
eight convergent tendencies of rich democracies cians. That is, he builds a case for the struc-
that he attributes to the broadly common expe- tural power of capitalists in policy reform by
rience of industrialization. These are changes in identifying the micromechanisms at play in the
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process of accommodating powerful potential (1982), in particular with his notion of resource
resistance. However, in a comparison includ- mobilization as the key to effective power. Ba-
ing Swedish postwar welfare policy, Swenson, sic to his argument is the inherent asymmetry
(2002) argues that leading capitalists here played in power that comes from capitalists’ control of
a more direct and active role. This is contested by the means of production. But, Korpi argues, this
Huber and Stephens (2001), who argue that his asymmetry can be rectified to the extent that
case confuses strategic accommodation with an wage earners are capable of translating their nu-
underlying opposition to extant policy. Swen- merical majorities into de facto power. To Ko-
son does not generalize the argument to welfare rpi, this primarily depends on a simultaneous
states in general, but quantitative comparisons process of electoral and associational mobiliza-
by Swank and Martin (2001) provide some evi- tion and of worker political unitification. His
dence for prowelfarist effects of organized busi- argument helps identify the more precise mech-
ness communities. anisms that may or may not produce strong cor-
Pulling these studies together, the evidence relations between Left party rule and welfare
suggests that welfare state development may be state development.
merely limited, or even promoted, by a po- Studies of the role of Left party influence pro-
litically organized business community. How- vide only scattered and unsystematic evidence
ever, further investigation seems mandated by for the period up to World War II (Rimlinger,
the contrary view of business and welfare policy 1971; Luebbert, 1990; Hicks, 1999). As previ-
that emerges from Huber and Stephens (2001) ously mentioned, the early phase of social policy
and other studies that link business interests development was mainly one of predemocratic,
to anti-welfare secular centrist and conserva- authoritarian rule. We must also recall the ex-
tive parties (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, 1993; treme rarity of any stable Left government prior
Castles, 1998). According to Hacker and Pier- to the Great Depression 1930s – indeed, the rar-
son (2002), any strong conclusions are made ity of sustained Left rule outside of Scandinavia
difficult by such basic theoretical and method- and the antipodes before the 1950s (Mackie and
ological problems as a failure to distinguish and Rose, 1982; Flora, 1983; Hicks, 1999). Still,
investigate multiple mechanisms of exercising Hicks (1999) provides some evidence of more
influence, a failure to distinguish between busi- indirect effects through pre-Depression worker
ness power in systems more or less open to un- mobilization into trade unions and in electoral
fettered capital flight, a misspecification of class action; and occasional participation in govern-
preferences, and the inference of influence from ments seems also to have yielded prowelfare ef-
ex post correlation between actor preferences fects. His study documents a strong correlation
and outcomes. According to these authors, once between the consolidation of all major social
one corrects for these deficiencies, neither busi- programs in the 1950s and strong interwar and
ness dominance nor weakness appears clear- immediate postwar unionization rates.
cut. Instead, marked variation in business influ- Evidence for the entire postwar era is far more
ence over time and across institutional settings extensive, although not unambiguous. Some,
emerges. like Castles and McKinlay (1978), Korpi (1982),
Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993), Huber and
Class Mobilization Theory. To the extent that Stephens (2001), and, to an extent, Franzese
welfare states imply more equality and social (2002), find support for a Left-support/Right-
security, one would expect that working class opposition interpretation of welfare state de-
movements and Left parties have played a ma- velopment, but other studies find only spotty
jor role in their rise and development. In fact, evidence, or no evidence at all (Pampel and
the “Left party” or “working class mobilization” Williamson, 1989; Hicks, 1999; Iversen, 2001;
thesis has come to dominate the political so- Swank, 2002; Williamson and Pampel, 1993).
ciological debate. Its theoretical underpinnings The correlations appear to be period-sensitive.
are closely associated with the work of Korpi When we limit our perspective to the 1960s and
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early 1970, evidence in favor of a Left-effect Korpi, 1982; Cameron, 1984; Swank, 1988;
seems quite strong (Hewitt, 1977; Cameron, Lijphart, 1999). Moreover, a number of more
1978; Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1982; Swank, complex and temporally sensitive models of-
1988; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber, Ragin, fer evidence of positive neocorporatist effects
and Stephens, 1993; Castles, 1999; Huber and on welfare policy. (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991;
Stephens, 2001:chap. 6), and this effect may ex- Crepaz and Lijphart, 1992; Hicks, 1999; Swank,
tend into the early 1980s (Huber and Stephens, 2002). Moreover, though the neocorporatist–
2001:chap. 6). By the late 1980s and 1990s, welfare nexus appears quite robust in a range
however, one tends to see an erosion of con- of studies that simultaneously estimate effects
sistent Left–Right partisan differences. Perhaps of Left partisanship (Hicks and Swank, 1992;
this erosion pertains because Left governments Hicks, 1999; Swank, 2002), definitively gaug-
began to embark on (usually limited) welfare ing the balance of Left party and neocorpo-
retrenchment. Perhaps it is an artifact of strong ratist findings is hampered by multicolinearity
post-World War II leftist reform (Hicks, 1999) between measures of neocorporatism and Left
or the result of a statistically misconceived fo- party power (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Hicks,
cus on levels of, rather than changes in, wel- 2002).
fare policy (Kwon and Pontusson, 2002) and It has also been suggested that less institu-
poor specification of time lags. In any case, there tional forms of mobilization, such as strikes and
is no doubt that recent recalibrations of wel- protests, might put pressure on the political sys-
fare state programs that define comparative wel- tem to promote social welfare. This has been ar-
fare regimes reflect the pattern of ideological gued with reference to movements of the poor
dominance with far more radical retrenchment (Piven and Cloward, 1971) and also of work-
and privatization occurring in “liberal” welfare ers (Korpi, 1982; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens,
states, such as the United Kingdom and New 1993). This line of argument has lost centrality
Zealand. In contrast, there has been very little in in the comparative literature, but retains some
the way of free-market reform in the “conser- importance in studies of particular nations and
vative” continental welfare states (Scharpf and periods (Isaac and Kelly, 1981; Fording, 2001).
Schmidt, 2000; Pierson, 2001). Interestingly, In fact, comparative studies have produced only
the configuration of regime ideology and wel- inconsistent support for the thesis.
fare reform in this age of “retrenchment” ap- Most of the studies we have reviewed so far
pears to situate social democrats, cautious ratio- have focused mainly on social insurance pro-
nalizers of the welfare state, in the center of a grams and, in particular, on social insurance
continuum anchored by liberal “reformers” at spending shares of GDP. Some studies have at-
one pole and conservative guardians of the old tempted to disaggregate the welfare state in or-
welfarist order at the other pole. der to arrive at more fine-grained measures of
Unionization represents an important com- welfare effort and outcomes, including, for ex-
plementary dimension within the class analytical ample, indicators of the strength of entitlements,
interpretation – particularly in terms of neocor- the universality of coverage, and degrees of in-
poratist policy making (which reflects degree of come redistribution or poverty reduction. In-
union bargaining coordination and confedera- deed, there are good reasons for this because
tional centralization and monopoly). Stephens overall spending levels may prove to be ambigu-
(1979) and Hicks (1999:chaps. 2, 4) find strong ous measures of a welfare state. To give two
cross-sectional correlations between social spen- examples: One, some countries (e.g., Austria)
ding and prior union strength. Although tem- spend a very large amount on benefits to privi-
porally sensitive evidence that union density leged civil servants, and this will naturally weigh
accounts for welfare effort is less than defini- substantially in overall spending data; two, heavy
tive, there is ample evidence that neocorpo- spending levels do not necessarily capture wel-
ratism promotes welfare spending, both in sim- fare effort and can even represent a poorly func-
ple cross-sectional models (e.g., Stephens, 1979; tioning welfare state, unable to stem a tide of
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social problems (especially, but not solely, un- judicating among competing class-linked (and
employment). The latter problem is amply il- nonclass) explanations.
lustrated by the Thatcher era in Britain, when
spending continued to rise notwithstanding de- State-Centered Approaches. Many authors trace
liberate efforts to weaken the social safety net: welfare state development to the workings of
Spending rose because social problems rose. the state itself, emphasizing the self-interested
A number of studies suggest that such disag- propensities of state personnel, the centrality
gregated specifications of the welfare state give of public bureaucracies in framing the political
added support for the class mobilization thesis, agenda and in driving policy development and
in particular for the impact of Left party or trade implementation, as well as the state’s historical
union power. Examples include analyses of the role in the process of nation building.
generosity and universalism of pension, unem- The latter is, indeed, a key theme in studies
ployment, and sickness insurance (Palme, 1990; of early welfare development, and many studies
Kangas, 1991; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Carroll, emphasize how central states, often controlled
1994). by aristocratic and monarchical elites, adopted
As regards recommodification or public en- social policy for the purpose of stabilizing or
hancement of workers’ employability, Janoski’s aggrandizing absolutist rule (Rimlinger, 1971;
(1992) study of active labor market policy (or Flora and Alber, 1983). Many studies have also
ALMP) in Germany, the United States, and emphasized the key role that public bureaucra-
Sweden found evidence for a strong association cies have played in the policy-making process.
between the strength of social democratic par- Heclo’s (1974) comparison of postwar social re-
ties and the share of ALMP spending in GNP, form in Britain and Sweden stands as a land-
a finding replicated by Hicks and Kenworthy mark study within this tradition of early wel-
(1998). There is similarly evidence that the en- fare policy innovations. Overall, there exists a
hancement of female employment levels is pos- rather broad and diverse specification of what
itively related to social democratic power, while exactly are the mechanisms at work as bureau-
negatively related to Christian Democratic rule cracy shapes policy. Some studies stress the state
(Hicks and Kenworthy, 2003). personnel’s capacity for sophisticated diagnoses
Studies of income redistribution tend to pro- and prescriptions for social problems (Weir and
vide quite strong support for a Left power hy- Skocpol 1985); others, the role of administrative
pothesis, but also for the salience of labor unions precedents and policy legacies (Skocpol, 1985;
and neocorporatism (Von Arnheim, Corina, Ashford, 1986); and still others point to the cen-
and Schotsman, 1982; Hicks and Swank, 1984; tral state’s role in reforming clientelistic and pa-
Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, and Stephens, tronage systems (Orloff and Skocpol, 1984).
2003; Moller, Bradley, Huber, Nielsen, and Another group of studies put the emphasis
Stephens 2003; Hicks and Kenworthy, 2003). on constitutional structures, such as the exis-
Studies of the taxation side of redistribution tence of majoritarian parliamentary government
(such as tax progressivity) are few and far be- (Lijphart, 1984); the degree of centraliza-
tween (but see Alt, 1983; Campbell and Allen, tion of policy administration (Hage, Gargan,
2001; Myles and Pierson, 1997; Kenworthy and Hanneman 1989; Amenta and Carruthers,
and Pontusson, 2002; Swank and Steinmo, 1989); or the degree of federalism as opposed to
2002). centralized, unitary statehood (Lijphart, 1984;
Although studies that adopt aggregated and Hage, Gargan, and Hanneman, 1989; Hicks and
more differentiated welfare state measures often Swank, 1992; Mann, 1993). Huber, Ragin, and
conclude in favor of a Left power theory, the de- Stephens (1993) have, additionally, emphasized
bate remains far from settled. Comparative anal- how constitutional structures with many inbuilt
yses are hampered by limited sample sizes and veto points may help obstruct social spending
pervasive colinearity between variables. Hence, and reform. They suggest that federal (as op-
they have so far fallen short of definitively ad- posed to unitary) systems disadvantage working
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class movements (see also Dahl, 1982; Lijphart, centrist – and especially Christian Democratic –
1984, 1999; Immergut, 1989; Skocpol, 1992). A governments are as likely as Left governments to
somewhat similar impediment to welfare state promote social spending (Castles and McKin-
growth has been traced to bicameral legislatures lay, 1978; Pampel and Williamson, 1985, 1989;
(with twice the legislative hurdles) and presiden- Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hicks and Misra, 1993;
tial systems. A major problem with this litera- Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, 1993; Ragin,
ture is the unclear causal connection between, 1993b). Indeed, many heavy-spending welfare
say, federalism and inequality. It may, as most states were primarily developed by either lib-
studies assume, be that federalist polities produce erals or by multiclass-based Christian Demo-
greater interregional inequalities. But it may also cratic movements, in particular in the Nether-
be that it is regional inequalities which, in the lands and in Southern Europe (Van Kersbergen,
first place, spur political decentralization. It is 1995; Berghman, Peters, and Vranken, 1987;
not unlikely that the entire process is endoge- Roebroek and Berben, 1987; Baldwin, 1990;
nous, as Alvarez-Beramendi (2003) shows. Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, 1993).
Basic to the pluralist view is the idea that the
Pluralist Theory. Pluralist (and neopluralist) the- political agenda is set by groups able to wield
ory, as the name suggests, assumes that politics “swing votes,” by the lobbying activities of in-
and power derive from a plurality of sources, be terest organizations more generally, and by the
they cultural (e.g., ethnic, religious, regional, routine administration of statutorily encoded
linguistic) as well as “classes” (Lijphart, 1984), entitlements (Pampel and Williamson, 1989;
or more narrowly defined economic interests Franzese, 2002). It has also been argued that
and associations (Dahl, 1982; Williamson and newly mobilized voters (disproportionately low
Pampel, 1993). status and prowelfarist) tend to augment wel-
Because this tradition is open-ended as far as fare outlays (Dye, 1979; Pampel and Williamson,
cause is concerned, its empirical emphasis is ori- 1989; Mahler, 2001).
ented toward the preferences of political actors
in very specific settings (Alford and Friedland, Welfare “Regimes.” The literature we have re-
1985:22). It does not assume that there exists – as viewed so far typically is focused exclusively on
the class analytical tradition often does – a set of the welfare state and its programs or expenditure
inherent and relatively impermeable collective commitments. The concept of welfare regimes
interests that drive social history. seeks, on the other hand, to specify the welfare
Pampel and Williamson’s (1989) work repre- state’s relative position within the broader wel-
sented a revival of the pluralist tradition in welfare mix – in particular in relation to market and
fare state research. In it they highlighted the po- family provision of welfare (Esping-Andersen,
litical importance of citizen groups with vested 1990, 1999).
interests in welfare programs, such as retirees. Although theoretical development remains
Such groups act as organized voting blocks and, unsystematic, there has been a visible growth
predictably, as their numbers swell so does their in the application of the regime concept within
lobbying power – hence the seminal rise in pen- comparative research. Comparatively speaking,
sion benefits, and hence the difficulties of re- there is strong evidence that advanced democra-
forming pension systems. The evidence in fa- cies cluster around three (or arguably four) ba-
vor of this argument is quite strong, especially sic welfare regime models. Indeed, these end
in terms of explaining social benefit generosity up pretty much identical to the distinct wel-
and growth (Pierson, 1994, 1996; Huber and fare state models discussed above. Consider-
Stephens, 2001). ing the qualitatively different constellation of
Different versions of pluralist theory emerge welfare provision that characterizes the “so-
in the literature that stresses the multiple ide- cial democratic,” “liberal,” and “conservative”
ological and political roots of welfare state regimes, it also easily follows that we may re-
growth. Many studies show, for example, that quire a different set of explanations to account
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for each. Put differently, the long historical pro- as well as strategies of welfare reform. Scharpf
cess that has resulted in apparently orthogo- (1999) and Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) have in-
nal welfare models, most likely, is not com- vestigated how emerging new employment and
putable with one common explanation. As a welfare trade-offs take very different forms de-
matter of fact, the very labels that describe the pending on the characteristics of a nation’s wel-
different regimes were deliberately chosen so fare regime.
as to highlight what, in each model, appeared Yet another literature has emerged that
to be the dominant political impulse – and stresses a more dichotomous conception of in-
explantory root. Hence, in Esping-Andersen’s ternational political economies. For example,
(1990) analyses, the Continental European wel- Iversen (1999) and Hall and Soskice (2000)
fare regime is largely the historical product of identify two distinct “production regimes,” and
strong absolutist legacies combined with a dom- Hicks (1999) suggests a bimodal distribution
inance of Christian Democratic rule in the post- of nations in terms of neocorporatist policy
war democratic era. In turn, the “social demo- making. Much of this work draws directly on
cratic” regime arose primarily out of a long Esping-Andersen’s analyses of regimes. Linking
and sustained rule by social democratic par- the concept of production and welfare regimes,
ties, combined with an unusually unified and De Beer, Vrooman, and Schut (2001) suggest
powerful trade union movement. Of particular that differences in welfare state perfomance are
importance here has been the chronic weak- well captured by a simpler welfare regime di-
ness of the political right (Castles, 1978). The chotomy that coincides with a social and liberal
“liberal” regime, finally, represents countries in production regime, and simultaneously with
which neither labor movements nor predemo- neocorporatist policy making.
cratic conservative forces ever managed to hold Evidence in favor of a simpler two-regimes
sway, thus ensuring a lasting dominance of lib- view comes also from Hicks and Kenworthy
eral (if often “reform-liberal”) policy. This dom- (2003), who stress welfare dimensions rather
inance has been additionally advantaged by the than regime categories. They argue that a di-
absence of strong and unified trade union move- mension arraying welfare states along a con-
ments (except, perhaps, in the cases of Australia tinuum ranging from “social democratic” to
and, for a time, New Zealand.4 “liberal” better explains redistributive and la-
There has also evolved a fairly volumi- bor market policy outcomes than does Esping-
nous literature that examines the second-order Andersen’s three-regime classification.
policy consequences within specific welfare There is one final point that needs to be
regimes (Scharpf, 1999; Scharpf and Schmidt, stressed. Because the literature is dominated by
2000; Pierson, 2001; Huber and Stephens, cross-sectional comparisons at one point (or
2001, Swank, 2002; Pontusson, 2003). Pierson’s within one period) in history, welfare state (or
(1994, 2001) work, for example, has highlighted regime) classifications tend to become ahistor-
how specific regimes, once consolidated, pro- ical and may very easily miss out on important
duce unique policy path dependencies that, in shifts and historical volatility. As Hicks (1999) ar-
turn, overdetermine solutions to new problems gues, the basic logic of social policy within one
regime may change character from one era to
4
another. Similarly, countries that once formed
For additional (and often critical) assessments of the
political roots of welfare regimes, see Castles (1993), part of one type of regime may end up very
Huber and Stephens (2001), Swank (2002), and Hicks differently as time passes. As we noted earlier,
and Kenworthy (2003). There has been substantial con- Britain stands as an epitomy of “regime shift-
troversy about the precise number of distinct welfare ing,” starting out in the postwar era as strongly
regimes. Castles (1993) argues that the antipodean coun- “social democratic” in terms of its universalistic
tries, Australia in particular, simply do not fit. Ferrera
(1996) insists that Southern Europe constitutes a distinct ideals of social citizenship, only to end up as a
“fourth” welfare regime, in particular due to pervasive nearly prototypical example of “liberalism” as
clientelism and a very incomplete welfare state. privatization accelerated and as universal rights
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eventually were transformed into targeted assis- socialism in the Weimar Republic, believed that
tance programs.5 social reforms push the frontiers of the social-
ist ideal forward even if such reforms are im-
plemented with other motives in mind. Sim-
the social stratification of welfare ilarly, the first Swedish socialist government in
the 1930s was firmly convinced that social policy
Welfare state policies affect social inequalities is a first step toward a more classless and egali-
and therefore also the overall system of social tarian society. Such views found their way into
stratification. Child allowances diminish eco- mainstream postwar sociological theory. T. H.
nomic inequalities among families; mass edu- Marshall (1950) saw the postwar welfare state
cation has been promoted as a vehicle for elimi- as the bearer of the social citizenship ideal that,
nating inherited class privilege; maternity leave to him, implied a frontal attack on the class di-
and child care are meant to equalize gender re- vide. Lipset (1960) went even further, arguing
lations. that economic prosperity, coupled to social re-
Sociological analysis has always combined its form, transformed the “workers’ question” into
interest in isolating the causes of welfare state a democratic class struggle – by which he meant
evolution with a focus on whether, indeed, wel- a society in which class perhaps remained a lin-
fare states “make a difference.” To sociologists gering source of collective identification but of
this is primarily a question of distributional re- little else, since such important correlates of class
sults, of inequalities. as poverty, insecurity, or unequal life chances
Until the postwar years, the main issue had had been eradicated sufficiently to diffuse revo-
to do with the social class divide. There is sub- lutionary class conflict.
stantial disagreement as to how welfare states af- Recent research in social stratification sug-
fect class inequalities. Orthodox Marxists have gests that such optimism was exaggerated. Stud-
always claimed that the welfare state, despite ap- ies of comparative class mobility as well as edu-
pearing to level inequalities is, in practice, de- cational attainment show consistently that the
signed to reproduce class domination (Muller opportunity structure has not become more
and Neususs, 1973; O’Connor, 1973). But most equal, that social origins matter as much today as
sociologists favor the view that social policy they did in the past (Eriksson and Goldthorpe,
is genuinely instrumental in diminishing class 1992; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993; Solon, 1999).
differences. As a hypothesis, this idea dates This may seem surprising considering the mas-
back to early social democratic thought. Eduard sive postwar expansion and democratization of
Heimann (1929), a major exponent of reformist education systems everywhere. The chief ex-
planation is that formal education by and large
replicates prevailing social inequalities, despite
5
Large, principally descriptive literatures on the wel- greater seeming equality of access to educa-
fare state in less developed nations, newly industrializing
nations, and the welfare states of these nations are by- tional resources than to economic and social
passed here. These literatures are too extensive for brief rewards. Hence, the mechanisms of class inher-
inclusion, too emergent at this moment on Web sites itance must lie elsewhere. But where? One im-
around the world for timely treatment right now. How- portant clue comes from the consistent find-
ever, it is important to note that Williamson and Pampel ing that Sweden (with Denmark and possibly
(1992) provide an excellent entree to the literature on
former British colonies in South Africa and Asia, Mesa- the Netherlands) does exhibit a decline of social
Lago (1978) provides a necessary introduction to Latin inheritance effects among the young cohorts.
American welfare states, whereas Brown and Hunter Eriksson and Goldthorpe (1992) as well as Shavit
(1999) and Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) docu- and Blossfeld (1993) speculate that this may be
ment the emerging analytical sophistication of this Latin explained by Sweden’s extraordinarily egalitar-
American literature around the millennium. On Asian
and post-Soviet welfare states, the reader is referred to ian welfare state, in particular its effective abo-
Aspalter (2002), Deacon (2000), Lipsmeyer (2000), and lition of child poverty. Because Denmark and
Ost (2000). the Netherlands also stand out internationally
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in terms of very little child poverty, the causal in final levels of both inequality of disposable
link appears credible. But there is an alterna- income and of poverty that are each about half
tive welfare state-based explanation, namely that of those in the United States (Smeeding et al.,
the equalization of opportunities is primarily 1990; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997).
the result of universal, high-grade day care for Why exactly this is the case is the source of
preschool children. This arguably helps equal- some controversy. The first, and most obvious
ize cognitive abilities, especially to the benefit argument, is that less generous and comprehen-
of those children who come from disadvantaged sive welfare states leave large welfare gaps un-
families (Esping-Andersen, 2004). met. Thus, the absence of family benefits and
During the 1960s, social scientists were universal health care in the United States is fre-
on the forefront in discovering the “new quently cited as a major reason for very high
poverty” (Harrington, 1962; Fermen, 1965). poverty rates, especially in families with chil-
They pointed to what appeared as a fundamen- dren. Second, all else being equal, one would
tal paradox: The welfare state had grown im- have assumed that a more targeted approach to
mensely and, yet, widespread poverty remained. poverty, as in the United States or Britain, would
This provoked a major sociological reassessment be far more redistributive than a universal ap-
of the link between social policy and the quest proach with equal benefits more or less across-
for equality, and in hindsight we can see a major the-board, as in Scandinavia. However, this is
redirection of social scientific research as a result. not the case. One answer lies in what Korpi and
The “class question” faded into the background Palme (1999) call the “paradox of redistribu-
and questions of persistent poverty and unequal tion.” The argument is that welfare states which
life chances came to the fore. In the United target benefits heavily to the poor enjoy scant
States, Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty was public support and, hence, the result is meager
very much inspired by social scientists such as benefits. In contrast, universalistic programs gain
Moynihan and economists associated with the universal support and as a consequence benefits
Institute for Poverty Research in Wisconsin. In are far more generous across-the-board. This,
Europe, likewise, there emerged a new breed of they argue, is a more effective strategy for elim-
social scientists closely linked to social demo- inating poverty. A third answer is that the real
cratic renewal, such as Walter Korpi (1979) in mechanism of poverty elimination lies not so
Sweden or Peter Townsend (1979) in the United much in public transfer payments to households,
Kingdom, all attempting to understand why os- but more in securing that men and women have
tensibly mature welfare states failed miserably to well-paid and stable employment. Mothers’ em-
eradicate the most simple and evident expres- ployment is, for example, the single most ef-
sion of inequality, namely abject poverty. fective assurance against child poverty (Esping-
As it happened, postwar economic growth Andersen, 2002). Put differently, we would do
and full employment, coupled with a major well in broadening our analytical lens to the in-
upgrading of social benefits and coverage, did terplay between social and employment policies
eventually bring down poverty rates in all ad- when we analyze welfare states’ impact on in-
vanced countries – especially among the el- equalities. We might also do well in the wake
derly (Atkinson et al., 1994; Kenworthy, 1999; of the Clinton-era contraction in welfare enti-
Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2002). Neverthe- tlements in the United States and New Zealand
less, comparative research on income redistribu- and the Bush-era increases in unemployment to
tion and poverty shows quite consistently that look to refining the analytical lenses with which
international variations remain enormous. For we address the political forces behind income se-
example, although pretax and redistribution in- curity and jobs policy (for example, Huber and
come inequality or poverty rates are quite similar Stephens, 2001; Swank and Georg-Betz, 2003;
in North America and Scandinavia, the redis- Hicks, 2003).
tributive impact of the Nordic welfare states is Research on welfare states and social strat-
far greater than the North American, resulting ification has recently moved in three new
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directions, in particular focusing on gender in- Nordic countries, with Belgium and France –
equalities, the new social exclusion, and, more are those in which the traditional emphasis on
generally, on the nexus between social protec- income maintenance has been replaced by a
tion and employment. Early feminist writings, greater concern for servicing families (Gornick
such as Pateman (1989) and Hernes (1987), ar- et al., 1997; Sainsbury, 1994, 1996). The evi-
gued that the welfare state institutionally repro- dence also points to a major second-order ef-
duces patriarchy in the public realm. As Hernes fect of gender egalitarian social policy, namely
saw it, women’s dependency on men undoubt- that the creation of labor-intensive public social
edly declines as women also acquire individual services jobs engenders occupational segrega-
social entitlements, but this merely implies a shift tion. Hence, the irony is that purportedly egal-
in the locus of dependency toward the state. To itarian policy helps reinforce gender-segregated
feminist scholars, decommodification through employment (Esping-Andersen, 2002).
social policy might apply to men, but not to The debate on social exclusion derives from
most women whose integration in the wage two concomitant structural trends in advanced
relationship was marginal or non-existent – societies. On one side, labor markets are giving
women were traditionally “precommodified.” rise to new “atypical” employment forms that,
The chief question had come to do with the coupled to rising wage disparities, seem to cre-
conditions under which welfare states actively ate a “two-speed” society in which a growing
helped women become “commodified” and proportion of workers are relegated to precari-
economically sovereign, at which stage social ous and low-paid jobs that, additionally, do not
policy would then “decommodify” women and permit adequate accumulation of social entitle-
men on a parity basis (Orloff, 1993; O’Connor, ments. This trend is further reinforced at the
1996). In the past years, we have seen a cu- household level, where one detects a potential
mulation of research on gender, family, and la- polarization between “work-rich” and “work-
bor market policy (Wilensky, 1990; Wennemo, poor” households. On the other side, techno-
1992, 1993; Sainsbury, 1994, 1996; Lewis, 1994; logical change is driving up skill requirements
Oppenheimer and Jensen, 1995; Misra, 2003, and this is especially to the detriment of less
1996; O’Connor, 1996; Gornick, Meyers, and skilled workers. In a sense, the “ante” for good
Ross, 1997; O’Connor et al., 1999; Misra, 2003; life chances is rising. All this implies that re-
Huber, Stephens Bradley, and Moller, Nielsen, search needs to change its focus from its erst-
2001). The literature demonstrates how welfare while rather static “snapshot” view of equality
policy, in particular parental leave schemes and (how many poor are there at any given moment)
daycare provision, is key to women’s economic to life chances and welfare dynamics.
independence. Over the past decade we saw a spectacular
There has evolved a large literature on growth in research on how welfare states affect
how different welfare states promote “women- long-term dynamics, such as entrapment in
friendly” policy, in particular with regard to poverty and exclusion (Gottschalk, 1997; Dun-
programs that reduce or eliminate the incom- can and Brooks-Gunn, 1997; Goodin et al.,
patibilities between motherhood and careers. 1999). As regards the state and poverty reduct-
Put differently, the issue became to what extent ion, one chief finding is that durations of pover-
welfare states actively “defamilialize” wel- ty, low pay, and exclusion (such as unemploy-
fare responsibilities (Saraceno, 1997; Esping- ment) seem to be powerfully correlated with
Andersen, 1999). Logically, research also exam- poverty levels. That is, countries where poverty
ines how social policies might help to create or exclusion is widespread tend also to be those
more gender equality in the distribution of where long-term entrapment is more likely
both paid and unpaid domestic work. Com- (Gottschalk et al., 1997). Put differently, wel-
paratively speaking, this research suggests that fare states like the Scandinavian not only boast
the most gender egalitarian welfare states – the low overall levels of poverty but, simultaneously,
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also pose few risks of entrapment. Gottschalk’s yes, it is possible, but certainly far less than
(1997) data suggest that the incidence of long- early welfare state theorists (and social demo-
term entrapment is five times higher in the cratic reformers) optimistically believed. The
United States than in European countries. This key conditions that emerge from the literature
has profound implications for how we under- would seem to include an effective eradication
stand inequality. If most citizens’ experience of of income poverty, especially in families with
poverty is short-lived (relieved by upward mo- children, the employment of mothers (which
bility), the experience of poverty is unlikely implies a comprehensive, service-intensive wel-
to be harmful for overall life chances. Long- fare state), and, more generally, low unemploy-
term entrapment, however, is much more likely ment.
to have negative repercussions throughout life. Also, the debate on social exclusion and em-
The long-term effects of poverty and welfare ployment trends has increasingly been linked
deficiencies have also been documented in re- to second-order welfare state effects. Esping–
cent research on child poverty. Duncan and Andersen (1990:part II) and also Kohli et al.
Brooks-Gunn (1997), for example, show that (1991) show that welfare policy became central
poverty in early childhood leads to substantially in the management of deindustrialization and
less schooling, higher dropout risks, lower earn- mass unemployment after the 1970s. For exam-
ings in adulthood, and, worst of all, to high ple, the Nordic countries’ expansion of social
risks of reproducing the poverty syndrome once services generated a female-driven growth of
they form families. Herein lies most probably the service economy and overall employment
a key mechanism that helps explain a curious levels, whereas the Continental European wel-
finding from comparative educational stratifica- fare states reinforced a low-employment equi-
tion research. In the most authoritative study librium by utilizing early retirement as a vehicle
so far, Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) find that the for clearing labor markets.
impact of class inheritance on children’s ed- Similarly, Iversen (1999), as well as Scharpf
ucational attainment remains as strong as al- (1998) and Scharpf and Schmidt (2001), have
ways in Western countries, except in Sweden emphasized the dysfunctional aspects of social
(and possibly also Denmark and the Nether- insurance financing (associated with heavy con-
lands), where one identifies a noticeable weak- tributory burdens on employers) and of overly
ening of the social origins effect. The explana- generous pension benefits in terms of promot-
tion given is that Sweden’s welfare state has been ing high unemployment and of limiting gov-
doubly effective in equalizing the social condi- ernments’ financial ability to expand public ser-
tions of childhood: first by virtually eliminating vices. There is also a growing literature on how
poverty in families with children, thus strength- public labor market regulation interacts with so-
ening parental resources; second by universaliz- cial policy to produce divergent employment
ing early child care provision, thereby helping and wage outcomes (Traxler, 1996; Traxler and
to compensate for unequal cognitive and cul- Kittle, 1999; Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittle, 2001;
tural resources among families of different class Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2001; Streeck,
position (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996). Danziger 1992). Indeed, one very important insight is
and Gottschalk (1997) provide a rich review of that employment regulation and social secu-
related issues in the United States. rity policy are often rival alternatives to the
The literature on poverty reduction points same underlying problems, namely worker inse-
to what may be the single most crucial strati- curity. Broadly speaking, the Nordic countries
fication dimension of social policy, namely the (with the Netherlands) have favored fairly un-
extent to which welfare states can indeed help regulated labor markets while placing security
create genuinely more equal life chances and guarantees within the welfare state. In contrast,
bridge the traditional class divide. If one were countries like France, Germany, and Italy stand
to sum up what we so far know from compara- out in terms of highly regulated (“rigid”) la-
tive research, the answer would be a cautious bor markets, primarily intended to safeguard the
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earnings and jobs of the prime age male bread- the postwar influence of Left parties, consider-
winner. ing that Christian Democratic movements have
been key in a large number of countries. We
should also be very cautious not to adopt a too
conclusions one-dimensional causal interpretation of wel-
fare state growth. Political actors (of all col-
If we view the comparative political sociology ors) promoted policy under constraints and in
of welfare states in historical-analytical terms, a nation-specific institutional contexts. Thus, the
number of principal empirical conclusions stand impact of political parties is conditioned by gov-
out quite sharply. One is that different histori- ernment and constitutional structures. For ex-
cal epochs were guided by different sociopolit- ample, what is feasible for Left governments
ical actors. It is, for example, evident that early in a unified state may not be so in a federal
social reform was primarily guided by conser- system.
vative actors, however varied the forces pres- Many also believe that globalization is chang-
suring their action. Likewise, it is largely after ing the conditions for welfare state policy, par-
World War II – entirely after the onset of the ticularly in terms of putting downward pressures
Great Depression – that working class move- on social spending and taxing. Although sys-
ments emerged as central and decisive players. tematic research on such effects is still nascent,
But it would be erroneous to view postwar wel- the belief seems to enjoy rather limited empir-
fare state development as a simple contest be- ical support (Garrett, and Mitchell, 2001). In-
tween “labor” and “capital” or between Left and deed, there is evidence to the contrary, namely
Right. In many countries, the leading impulse that the heightened risks of the new econ-
behind social reform has been Christian Demo- omy find response in terms of augmented social
cratic parties (and their associated unions). What spending as welfare states strive to indemnify
the comparative “welfare regime” literature and recompense increasingly vulnerable pop-
informs us is that social democratic and Chris- ulations (Rodrik, 1997, 1998; Garrett, 1998a,
tian movements are far from simple func- 1998b). However, there is also evidence that
tional equivalents. Welfare states ends up be- welfare states have begun to restrict entitle-
ing qualitatively different, depending on which ments and reduce benefit generosity, although
kind of political force has spearheaded social so far at the margins (Pierson, 2001; Huber
reform. and Stephens, 2001; Swank, 2002). Whether
If we move from a broad sweep of welfare changes in spending and generosity are driven
state history toward a more fine-grained exami- by globalization, or by other parallel forces such
nation of specific periods, the causal logic seems as population aging, remains unclear. It may be
also to change. During the 1930s and 1940s, that we are entering a new epoch in which, once
welfare state development was hardly a perva- again, the causal connections between politics
sive outcome of Left governments, but the as- and welfare policy are being rewritten. If we are,
cendance of these along with labor movements we are unlikely to know so for years or perhaps
and worker protests did pressure upgrades of even decades. As the title of this chapter itself
welfare states during these decades and made suggests, the comparative, historical political so-
worker mobilization a force to be reckoned ciology of welfare states can only arrive at firm
with. The importance of Left rule becomes causal inferences by examining data out of the
even more evident when we turn to the post- historical past. What we can continue to count
World War II “golden age.” Yet, in this epoch on is that the welfare state shall persist for some
new causal forces undeniably gained impor- time as a major nexus in the determination of
tance, chief among them demographic change, “Who gets what from government?” and, thus,
but also the rise of neocorporatist systems of in- as a major focus in the politics of social stratifica-
terest intermediation in some countries. Again, tion, especially of stratification by the state. We
we should also be cautious not to exaggerate can also expect that welfare states will remain
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key sites of conflicts over social citizenship, over world of increasing demographic strain on pub-
who has it fully and over what social citizenship lic budgets due to societal aging, high and in-
entails. For example, will women have parental transigent unemployment, and globally intensi-
leave rights and public child care? Will gay part- fying economic competition (Esping-Andersen,
ners’ survivors have entitlements? 1999, 2002; Huber and Stephens, 2001)? These
We began by referring both to the early de- questions motivate much sociological work and
velopment of the sociology “in tandem” with help inform the policy making and, thus, the
the welfare state and to the orientation of early politics of the age (e.g., Green-Pedersen and
sociologists to “the social question” in the age Haverland. 2002). To touch on the new, at-
of commodification. Today the sociological fo- tention is being directed to the role of busi-
cus on “Who gets what from government?” en- ness and the business class that is beginning to
tails a major component of the sociological sub- bring to it the same kind of empirical atten-
fields of social stratification and political soci- tion that had been concentrated upon welfare
ology, indeed also involves a major portion of states in the last decades of the twentieth century
political economy in economics and political (Swank and Martin, 2001; Hacker and Person,
science as well as in sociology. Today sociolo- 2002; Swenson, 2002; Hicks, 2003). On these
gists are increasing concerned with the “social matters, sociologist are addressing governments
questions,” old as well as new. To touch on rel- as well as each other (Esping-Andersen, 2003;
atively old ones, how are welfare policies re- Myles and Quagagno, 2002). In the current
lated to citizenship and citizenship to welfare era, as in the nineteenth century, sociology –
policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Janoski, indeed social science – and the welfare state ma-
1998)? How do we sustain social safety nets in a ture in tandem.
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chapter twenty-six
Women, Gender, and State Policies
Joya Misra and Leslie King
Gender is about power. Norms, traditions, and the state in gendered policies may discourage
values concerning gender have served to main- some types of feminist mobilization (Miller and
tain a system of inequality in virtually every so- Razavi, 1998). But as Sainsbury (1999:270) sug-
ciety. From the moment a person is born, the gests, “Irrespective of whether the state is con-
state is involved in upholding and maintaining ceived of as a structure or a terrain, the state is a
gender as an institution: Birth certificates always crucial site in regulating and constructing gen-
include the sex of the child (typically allow- der relations. It is too important an arena not to
ing for only two possibilities), sending a mes- enter because of ideological antipathy or fears
sage that this is an important axis of difference. of co-option.”
State policies often reflect patriarchal norms Feminist work underscores the complex, dy-
and may constrain both men’s and women’s namic, and fluid nature of the state (Alvarez,
choices. Yet states also may serve as arenas 1990). Lynne Haney (1996:759) argues, “The
for challenging traditional gender norms (Gor- state is not simply an abstract, macro-level
don, 1990). Feminist political sociologists have structure; it is also a complex of concrete
called attention to both the gendered impact institutions . . . . ” There is not only variation
of state policies and structures and how gender across states – within one country, policies may
ideologies and gendered social patterns shape both reinforce and challenge traditional gender
politics (Wilson, 1977; Gordon, 1990; Ward, norms. Indeed, one policy may empower cer-
1990; Orloff, 1993; Bose and Acosta-Belén, tain groups of women and limit the opportuni-
1995). ties of other groups of women (Misra and Akins,
1998). Rather than seeing states as either simply
Feminists1 tend to view states and state poli- reinforcing traditional gender norms or serving
cies with some ambivalence. Although some as a site for challenging gender norms, we must
feminists view the state as an agent of change view states as complex institutions, situated in
and use the state to create legislation that may a larger societal context, and composed of ele-
equalize women’s and men’s opportunities, oth- ments that are both patriarchal and empowering
ers view the state as antithetical to feminist goals to various constituents.
(MacKinnon, 1989; Sharp and Broomhill, 1988; In our analysis, we focus on gender and
Brown, 1992). Ambivalence about the role of on women. An ideal approach to an analysis of
gender and state policy would focus on how
1
The term “feminist” here refers to people work- state policy affects and constructs women, men,
ing to alleviate gender inequalities; by “feminist goals” and transgendered people. But whereas our
we refer to efforts to reduce gender inequality, broadly understanding of the gendered content of state
defined.
526
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Women, Gender, and State Policies 527
policies derives in large part from an understand- gender and politics

ing of gender as a social construct and a social
structure, much of the scholarly work on policy Orloff (1996:52) defines gender relations as “the
implications focuses on how women are affected set of mutually constitutive structures and prac-
by state policy. In the area of mobilizing for tices that produce gender differentiation, gender
policy change too, scholarship focuses mostly inequalities, and gender hierarchy in a given so-
on women as opposed to “gender.” Women ciety.” Gender roles exist as powerful social con-
have often organized and sought to affect state structs, which shape policies in a variety of ways,
policy as “women” or “feminists.” Men obvi- such as when policies are based on the idea that
ously organize to affect state policy; however, men are primarily breadwinners and women
they rarely do so explicitly as “men” but rather are primarily caretakers. In addition, state poli-
as “gay men” or “workers” or any number of cies have “gender-specific consequences,” even
other affiliations or identities, even while norms when they do not appear to have a “gender-
of masculinity are embedded in their efforts and specific content” (Alvarez, 1990:260). How-
the resulting policy. ever, state policies regarding gender have a va-
We begin by discussing the politics of gender. riety of outcomes. As Orloff (1996:56) argues,
Women serve as political actors in a variety of in- there is “variation in the effects of social poli-
terest groups – for example, as members of reli- cies on gender: Male dominance is not necessar-
gious groups, women’s movements (both formal ily reproduced; indeed it is often transformed.
and informal), or labor movements – as well as in Some amielioration is possible, although it is
their roles as state actors – for example, as party sometimes coupled with greater regulation by
officials, political leaders, and bureaucrats (Bock the state.”
and Thane, 1991; Skocpol, 1992; Koven and The types of policies adopted and the gen-
Michel, 1993; Stetson and Mazur, 1995; Misra, dered content and/or implications of those poli-
2003). We then move from this discussion to cies vary enormously both between and within
focus on state policy and gender in three policy states. At least five important factors affect the
areas: labor market policies, social welfare poli- gendered implications of state policies: (1) po-
cies, and population policies. We limit ourselves litical resources and institutions, including the
to these three in order to provide a certain level political parties in power, and the responsive-
of depth in our analyses of these areas.2 These ness of government to interest groups, social
policy areas have generated the greatest levels movements, and other elements in civil society;
of comparative feminist research; trends in these (2) the strength of interest groups and social
policies are also mirrored in many other policy movements; (3) the ideologies prevailing among
areas. In addition, these areas are often not pre- policy makers and other powerful players; (4)
sented together (but see O’Connor, Orloff, and the degree of state autonomy and capacity to
Shaver, 1999), and the links between them have make and enforce policies; and (5) cultural,
not been fully explored. We show how poli- legal, social, political, and economic histories
cies vary across regions and countries, as well and traditions. These factors all influence each
as within countries, which serves to illuminate other as well as state policy, yet we believe it
the roles states play in policy making vis à vis is instructive to separate them out for heuristic
gender. purposes.
First, political institutions, including specific
2
We leave out discussions of many other policy areas, political parties, influence the gendered content
including other health care policies, educational policy, and impact of social policies. Powerful political
marriage and divorce law, criminal justice, credit, hous- parties influence the content and approach taken
ing, tax policy, etc. For thoughtful analyses of these is-
to gender. For example, conservative religious
sues, we encourage readers to turn to the existing lit-
erature (Sainsbury, 1996; Staudt, 1998; Conway, Ahern, parties may emphasize policies that uphold tra-
and Steuernagel, 1999; Mazur, 2002). ditional gender roles and/or limit reproductive
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528 Joya Misra and Leslie King
rights. In addition, women’s representation in The responsiveness of government to social

government may influence policy outcomes, al- movement organizations and civil society as a
though it is by no means a predictor of feminist whole also explains a great deal. Where states
policy making. are more permeable to social movements, these
In most political systems, women are vastly movements, including feminist movements, will
underrepresented (Peterson and Runyan, 1993). have more dramatic effects. States may, however,
Women on average comprised only about 14 be open to certain social movements, such as re-
percent of national parliament members world- ligious groups, but not to others, such as feminist
wide in 2002 (UNIFEM, 2003:40).3 Women groups (Meyer, in press; Costain, 1992).
are similarly underrepresented in nongovern- Second, interest groups and social move-
mental organizations, both national and inter- ments can profoundly affect the gendered na-
national, governmental bureaucracies, and other ture of state policies. Women’s movements
important institutions. Indeed, women rarely have made considerable progress toward effect-
make up more than 5 percent of officeholders ing social change and are engaged in shap-
and decision makers in unions, political parties, ing a wide array of economic and social poli-
special-interest organizations, and bureaucracies cies (Basu, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Jaquette, 1994;
(Peterson and Runyan, 1993:55). Stetson and Mazur, 1995; Afshar, 1998; Jaque-
Many states (as varied as Chile, Italy, Poland tte and Wolchik, 1998). Yet there are differ-
and China) have developed women’s policy ences in the organization and approaches of
machineries (“state feminism”), which con- women’s movements. Women’s strategies for
nect feminist movements to state actors (Al- mobilizing differ based on their needs, re-
varez, 1990; Stetson and Mazur, 1995, 2000; sources, and experiences as well as the open-
Matear, 1997; Waylen, 1997; Howell, 1998; ness of state institutions (Gordon, 1990).5 Even
Sawer, 1998; Mazur, 2001). Stetson and Mazur where women have been engaged in policy
(2000:618) find that women’s policy machiner- making and policy development, the resulting
ies may advocate for feminist proposals, but policies do not necessarily support all women
are most likely to be effective when allied (Lewis, 1992; Pedersen, 1993; Gordon, 1994;
with the Left, and while the Left is in power, Mink, 1995; Misra, 1998a). Indeed, women may
and when there is a vibrant context of au- mobilize in right-wing, fundamentalist, and na-
tonomous radical and reformist women’s orga- tionalist movements (Moghadam, 1994; Basu,
nizations (Stetson and Mazur, 1995; Randall, 1995a, 1999). For example, Power (2000) shows
1998). Not surprisingly, state feminism is often how conservatives mobilized an anti-Allende
only symbolic or may work in contradictory women’s movement in Chile by using essen-
ways (Alvarez, 1990; Valiente, 2001; Mazur, tialist gender ideologies about women’s roles as
2001).4 mothers, although these ideologies cut against
the class interests of many of the participating
women.6
3
The Beijing Platform for Action suggested that
5
countries should pursue a benchmark of 30% women’s For example, in the United States Gordon notes that
representation, but by 2002 only eleven countries (as var- white women relied upon their “wealth and connec-
ied as Mozambique, Costa Rica, Germany, and Sweden) tions” to lobby for welfare legislation whereas minority
had attained this target; all of these nations had legislated women’s welfare activism “was often indistinguishable
or adopted quotas (UNIFEM, 2003). from civil rights activity” (Gordon, 1990:24).
4 6
In Chile, SERNAM (Servicio Nacional de la Alvarez (1990:20) notes that throughout Latin
Mujer) incorporates gender into public policy but has America, upper and middle class women have orga-
been fairly limited in its ability to empower women nized to demand women’s rights, but that incorporating
(Matear, 1997; Waylen, 1997). Howell, (1998:181) notes women and gender issues into policy making has repro-
that state feminism in China has promoted women’s duced rather than overturned existing gender inequali-
rights and reduced gender inequality, but has also “of- ties. Although in some cases, such as Peronist Argentina
ten subordinated gender interests to national economic and socialist Cuba, women’s movements have signifi-
development goals.” cantly improved the conditions of women’s lives; in many
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Many women’s movements have helped cre- tries with a dominant ideology of individualism
ate policies supportive to (at least some) women. and free-market capitalism may conversely avoid
However, these movements also shape, reflect, social spending. In some countries religion is
and use existing gender ideologies. For exam- a dominant ideology linked to the state. For ex-
ple, women’s movements have at times fought ample, policy makers in Catholic countries (e.g.,
for suffrage by appealing to notions of women’s Poland) or countries drawing on Islamic legal
ability to bring nurturing and morality to pol- systems (e.g., Iran) may support certain types of
itics – a strategy that may emphasize women’s policies that limit women’s choices. Similarly,
difference from men in ways that limits women’s in the United States government leaders influ-
opportunities. Similarly, women’s movements enced by conservative Christian ideology may
have supported the development of family poli- oppose abortion.
cies at times by emphasizing the importance Fourth, some states have greater resources and
of supporting women’s caretaking roles over thus have a greater financial capacity for provid-
workforce participation (Pedersen, 1989, 1993). ing certain services or programs in response to
These strategies do not always lead to emancipa- citizen needs or demands. Limited funds and/or
tory outcomes, as they may reinforce essentialist a dearth of appropriate bureaucratic structures
views of gender.7 As Gordon (1994:8) argues, to might limit a state’s capacity, whereas relation-
understand this “apparent paradox,” we should ships with corporations, international lending
recognize “feminism as a historically and con- agencies, other nongovernmental organizations,
textually changing impulse.” Policies shaped by and/or other national governments may also
women reformers may still reflect classist, racist, limit a state’s autonomy (see Bello, 1994). For
nationalist, and paternalistic ideologies. example, although many state leaders may rec-
Of course, women’s movements are not ognize the challenge that families face in bal-
the only movements explicitly concerned with ancing work and home, only certain states may
gender-related issues. Conservative fundamen- have the autonomy and the capacity to provide
talist or nationalist movements, such as Le Pen’s universal free child care for children over three.
National Front Party in France, may focus on Developing countries may have fewer resources
upholding the “traditional” family and push for expensive social programs or may be limited
for policies supportive of family wage models in the level of social provision they can provide
and/or abortion bans (King, 2002). Historically, by lending requirements imposed by organiza-
some labor movements have secured rights for tions such as the World Bank.
male workers to the detriment of women work- Finally, cultural, legal, social, political, and/or
ers (see Milkman, 1990). economic histories of specific locations may af-
Third, the prevailing ideologies among polit- fect state policies (Ferree, 1994). For example,
ical leaders and policy makers also matter. Pol- Saguy (1999, 2000) explains how feminists in
icy makers in countries with strong socialist- France have had difficulties convincing lawmak-
oriented ideologies, such as Sweden, may favor ers to pass strong sexual harassment legislation.
social spending, thus providing a safety net for Lawmakers and others often see sexual harass-
the poor, a disproportionate number of whom ment as an “American” and a “puritan” idea
tend to be women. Policy makers in coun- that conflicts with their notions of France as a
sexually tolerant society. In Romania, abortion
cases women’s movements have been co-opted by dom-
was banned as part of former dictator Nicolae
inant groups. Ceausescu’s pronatalist program. The abortion
7 ban was extremely unpopular and was one of
For example, Marilyn Lake (1993:393) argues that
Australian women were unsuccessful in using the ide- the first laws overturned when Ceausescu was
ology of motherhood to pursue a radical change in so- deposed. Subsequently, due to this history, abor-
cial policy, because “within the confines of a patriarchal
state, in which citizen and worker are defined in mas- tion has remained legal in Romania even as
culine terms, neither ‘sameness as’ nor ‘difference from’ some other Eastern European countries restrict
men will produce a genuine democracy for women.” access to the procedure (Verdery, 1996).
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These factors help explain the gendered vari- as increased economic insecurity, greater secu-
ation in state policies around the globe. Political lar state power, global cultural homogenization,
structures and opportunities, social movement changes in education, increased migration, as
organizing, ideologies, state capacities and au- well as the growth in women’s rights (Keddie,
tonomy, and the specific historical contexts of 1998). Conservative movements may then use
countries all matter in explaining how gender changing gender roles (such as an increase in di-
has been incorporated into state policy making vorce) as a symbol for many others types of social
and how gender relations have been affected by change; targeting women’s rights may be simpler
these policies. than targeting the larger political and economic
In addition to these factors, we wish to high- changes in society. (Mernissi, 1988; Feldman,
light three major global trends that are currently 2001; Moghadam, 2002; Afkhami, 2001). Both
affecting state policies as they pertain to gender: nationalists and fundamentalists may press for re-
(1) the growing impact of neoliberalism, an ide- gressive reproduction policies, such as outlaw-
ology that promotes state retraction from social ing or limiting abortion (Vuolo, 2002). Such
policy in favor of market reliance; (2) the rise movements may also work to uphold patriar-
of both religious and nationalist conservative chal norms among families and limit women’s
movements, which often promote state support rights regarding marriage and family law (Haeri,
for traditional gender roles; and (3) international 2001).
feminist organizing. Finally, international feminist organizing ac-
The growing power and prevalence of ne- tively shapes and attempts to change interna-
oliberal ideology promotes state retrenchment tional and state policies regarding economic de-
(Razavi, 1998). Neoliberalism is deeply cen- velopment, employment policy, social welfare,
tered around free-market ideology, seeing state and population policy, as well as many other
interventions in markets as problematic and en- policies (e.g., those addressing violence against
couraging states to limit provisioning. As a re- women) (Walby, 1997; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).
sult, industrialized countries have undergone a For example, women’s international NGOs
process of “welfare state restructuring” while have played a crucial role in placing gender-
developing countries have responded to “struc- related issues on the agenda of a wide va-
tural adjustment” – both rolling back the state’s riety of organizations, including the United
role in social welfare (Daly and Lewis, 1998; Nations Development Programme, the Inter-
Della Sala, 2002). Such restructuring has helped national Labour Organization, and the World
reinforce and reconstitute gendered (and other) Bank, which have then played important roles in
patterns of inequality across a wide range of na- shaping not only international but also national-
tions through a decline in both social spending level policies (Miller, 1998). In addition, inter-
and social care services. Sparr (1994:17) notes, national women’s conferences, such as the U.N.
“In cutting back on public services . . . gov- conferences, have set agendas for redressing gen-
ernments have implicitly relied on a quiet army der inequalities at the state level.
of wives, co-wives, mothers, daughters, aunts, In the next several sections of the chapter,
grandmothers, sisters, female friends and neigh- we describe how employment policies, wel-
bors to pick up the slack.” fare policies, and population policies reflect
In addition to the rise of neoliberalism, the and shape gender relations in a wide range of
rise of conservative religious and nationalist countries, including relatively wealthy indus-
movements also affects the gendered nature of trialized countries and a broad array of devel-
state policy. Fundamentalist religious and na- oping contexts.8 Examining these policies re-
tionalist movements often have agendas that in- veals both ideas and assumptions about gender
clude specific notions about gender relations.
The rise of these movements often relates to 8
“Developing” is a term imbued with many mean-
tensions due to economic and political glob- ings. Although we use the terms “development” and
alization within a capitalist world-system, such “developing” in a very broad way to characterize
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as well as certain gendered implications of poli- in a variety of political factors, including state in-
cies, whether such policies are gender-specific stitutions, the strength and pressure of women’s
or technically “gender-neutral.” movements, religious movements, and particu-
lar political parties, as well as existing gender and
religious ideologies.
gender and employment Women play a central role in the global
economy. Jobs throughout the world have been
States play an important role in shaping the affected by the “feminization of labor,” as
workplace for men and women. Scholarship on women have increasingly joined the labor force
gender and work grapples with a number of is- (Moghadam, 1999). In addition to women’s
sues, including how state policies both support increasing employment in low-paid manufac-
workers and contribute to their exploitation turing and service sector work, the number
in gendered ways. Additionally, scholars address of well-educated professional women workers
the reconciliation of work and family caregiv- (particularly in public sector jobs) has been
ing. In this section, we begin by describing increasing throughout the world (Moghadam,
gendered employment patterns and then discuss 1999). Yet, in every type of work, from bank-
several sets of policies related to gender: policies ing to manufacturing computer chips, women
related to economic development, antidiscrim- tend to occupy the lowest positions in the hier-
ination policies, and policies oriented toward archy, in sex-segregated jobs with less pay and
balancing unpaid care and labor force participa- job security (Acevedo, 1995; UNIFEM, 2003).
tion. Although women have gained opportunities
Employment patterns vary significantly across in the labor market, they remain responsible for
countries and across a number of other fac- household work and child care. On average,
tors, such as region, age, class, race, and eth- women receive lower wages than men and of-
nicity. Currently, women are more likely than ten are employed in occupationally segregated
men to be engaged in agricultural work or jobs. In addition, women are more likely than
“informal” sector manufacturing and services men to be involved in home-based work, part-
(UNIFEM, 2003). Women’s share of “formal” time work, casual, and temporary employment
nonagricultural employment varies from 8 per- (Moghadam, 1999). These troubling trends may
cent in Pakistan to 53 percent in Lithuania and result from a lack of policies that protect women
the Ukraine; however, in most nations, women’s against gender discrimination and provide ad-
share of formal nonagricultural employment equate job-protected leaves and child care. In
is 30 to 40 percent (UNIFEM, 2003:Table 4, the last several decades, more antidiscrimination
33).9 Of course, these statistics underestimate policies and work–family reconciliation policies
women’s work in a number of ways. In ad- have been adopted, as we discuss below. These
dition to participation in formal employment policies have in many cases been adopted in re-
captured by government statistics, women often sponse to the pressure of women’s movements.
play critical roles in the economy through their
domestic labor and caregiving work, subsistence
agricultural work, and/or informal sector work. Women’s Employment and Economic
In addition to demographics, culture, and tra- Development
ditions, state policies also shape these different
levels of labor force participation. Indeed dif- Gender is deeply intertwined in the structure
ferences across countries may reflect differences of labor markets and development strategies.
Although women have always been involved
extremely diverse nations, we recognize the problems in productive work, state development strate-
inherent in these terms.
9
These data are limited as they rely on governmental gies have created and recreated certain gen-
indicators of formal employment for a subset of coun- dered models of work. Women workers often
tries. experience low wages, in many cases below
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subsistence, justified by employers by the notion eign investment by creating an economic envi-
that women workers are not “breadwinners.” ronment appealing to business, with low-wage
In addition, many women face poor working workers and limited tax and tariffs. These states
conditions and little or no opportunity for ad- recognize women workers as ideal participants
vancement (Ward and Pyle, 1995). in low-wage labor-intensive export production
For many decades development policies as- (Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Sassen, 1998). In many
sumed women’s economic dependence on men, cases, state actors, as in Taiwan, deliberately use
despite clear evidence of women’s productive existing gender ideologies and inequalities to
contributions. Economic development policy create a low-wage labor force of presumably
initially emphasized incorporating men into “docile” women as part of their attempt to lure
new forms of agriculture and industry, without companies to their shores (Gallin, 1990; Hsiung,
recognizing the independent roles of women 1996). For example, to try to attract companies
in production (Boserup, 1970). For example, some governments have advertised the idea that
policies providing small loans for agricultural women in their countries are hard workers with
upgrades targeted men, assuming that women “nimble fingers,” perfect for working in elec-
would benefit through their relationships with tronics or clothing factories (Mies, 1998).
their husbands and were not directly involved Export-oriented production receives signif-
in agriculture (e.g., India) (Lisk and Stevens, icant attention, in part because the numbers
1987; Sen and Grown, 1987; Ward and Pyle, of these jobs have grown dramatically and be-
1995). Similarly, development policies disadvan- cause, worldwide, women make up the majority
taged women by supporting men’s involvement of workers in export-processing zones (Staudt,
in the large-scale production of goods, to the 1998).10 States support these gendered patterns
detriment of the women left out of production of employment by leaving many forms of work
or those involved in small-scale production (e.g., unregulated, by not enforcing certain labor reg-
Sierra Leone) (Lisk and Stevens, 1987). Involv- ulations (e.g., minimum wages) for jobs in
ing men in large-scale production both dimin- which women are the primary employees, and
ished women’s status and forced women into by encouraging women to do home-based sub-
working more hours in order to replace men’s contracted work through government programs
former roles in subsistence activities (Acosta- and loan programs (Lim, 1990; Ward, 1990;
Belén and Bose, 1995). However, in recent Ward and Pyle, 1995; Hsiung, 1996).11 In addi-
decades, development policies more explicitly tion, states may limit the organization of workers
consider women’s roles as workers and how to (particularly women workers) into labor unions
engage women in workforce participation. and in other political forums (e.g., South Korea)
Although women have been incorporated (Enloe, 1989; Gallin, 1990; Hsiung, 1996).
into many different types of work, including With trends toward subcontracted work and
a wide variety of professional occupations, the increasing “informalization” of work in
many scholars have concentrated attention many countries, state regulations now provide
on women’s incorporation into manufactur- even less support for many workers than in
ing, particularly export production. Histori- the past (Beneria and Roldán, 1987; Ward and
cally, women in countries such as England and Pyle, 1995).12 Global corporations subcontract
the United States found jobs in textile facto- 10
As export-oriented jobs become less labor-in-
ries, piecework shops, and coal mines (Gordon,
tensive and increasingly mechanized and automated,
2002). Employers paid women workers lower men are winning back these positions in some regions of
wages than men, using gender ideologies about the world (Sklair, 1993).
11
the centrality of women’s roles as caretakers, Some scholars suggest that these jobs are always
rather than workers, to justify low pay. More exploitative to women; others suggest that women use
these jobs and their wages to empower themselves (Ong,
currently, many developing states, including 1987; Ward, 1990; Lim, 1990; Safa, 1993; Kabeer, 2000).
Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, and Mex- 12
Informal work refers to work that is not regu-
ico, to name but a few, seek to attract for- lated by the state, often untaxed, and without benefits
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to local factories and home-based workers, in Thailand, have been complicit in promoting sex
part because subcontracting allows corporations tourism (Enloe, 1989).
to “pay lower wages than in factories, bypass Neoliberal policies (often imposed in devel-
provision of benefits, and avoid protective leg- oping nations by international lending agencies
islation” (Ward and Pyle, 1995:45). States and such as the International Monetary Fund and
corporations from Sri Lanka to England draw World Bank) have also impacted development
upon existing gender ideologies about women’s strategies and women’s employment. Neolib-
place in the home, encouraging women to take eral structural adjustment includes trade liberal-
these low-paying and insecure jobs because they ization measures, cutting subsidies on products
allow women to combine caregiving and work and services (e.g. food, water, electricity, etc.),
(Boris and Prugl, 1996). Even where labor laws limiting labor market policies such as wage re-
are established, they do not apply or are not en- straints, as well as cutting, privatizing, or severely
forced for this work. limiting social welfare programs (Laurell, 2000;
An example of state involvement in infor- Sparr, 1994). As a result, poverty and income
malizing the work process is the Taiwanese inequality have increased in many developing
state program “Living Rooms as Factories,” nations. In response, women have increased
which provides small loans to families pur- their roles in subsistence production and in-
chasing machines for women to do home- formal work activities (due to changes in agri-
based work and establishes day care centers for cultural, employment, and trade policies) and
home-based workers (Hsiung, 1996). Taiwanese caregiving (due to cutbacks in health services,
state-sponsored programs enforce women’s “tra- education, and child care) (Folbre, 1994; Sparr,
ditional” role in the home by encouraging 1994; Dewan, 1999; Laurell, 2000).13 The
women to do home-based work, along with re- Egyptian state, for example, has cut back on
inforcing women’s traditional gender roles by paid maternity leave and child care services,
offering classes on applying cosmetics and chil- which may limit some women’s access to the
drearing. Although corporations profit from paid labor force and strengthen conservative
such arrangements, spending less on overhead Islamic forces that emphasize women’s place in
and wages, the state’s role “is sometimes in di- the home (Hatem, 1994).14
rect conflict with women’s interests; more gen- Clearly, then, state policies, including those
erally it fails to protect women against capitalist influenced by international organizations, have
exploitation” (Hsiung, 1996:53–4).
Informal sector work also includes women’s 13
In her analysis of the effects of structural adjust-
involvement in low-paid jobs in clerical or tele- ment across the globe, Sparr (1994) discusses: increas-
marketing services, domestic service, the sex ing numbers of poor women; increasing numbers of
trade and tourism, and agriculture. As part of women looking for income-generating work, includ-
their development strategies, various governing informal sector work; increasing levels of women’s
unemployment; increasing gender differentials in wages,
ments have used gender ideologies and inequal- working conditions, and types of work; increasing do-
ities in promoting specific types of informal mestic and caregiving responsibilities and subsistence
work. The Filipino government, for example, farming work for women; slowing of progress in girls’
has a program focused on exporting women education; lower levels of food consumption for girls
around the world to work as domestic workers and women, worsening rates of girls’ health and mortal-
ity rates and changes in women’s fertility rates; women’s
and sex workers, as well as nurses and caretakers greater reliance on credit; greater levels of domestic vi-
(Chang, 2000). Some governments, including olence and stress; and increasing numbers of women-
headed households and other changes in household
structure.
14
(Karides, 2001). The expansion of informal work has However, Moghadam (1997, 2003b) argues that
occurred in both industrialized and developing coun- women’s access to the Egyptian labor market has been
tries. For example, Del Boca (1998:127) estimates that limited less by changes in maternity leave and more by
the informal economy makes up 20–30% of the Italian low wages, high unemployment, traditional gender ide-
GDP. ology, and the gender division of labor.
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helped shaped gendered patterns of employ- women could be denied access to managerial
ment in developing contexts. In many cases, positions or fired if they married or became
states still reinforce traditional gender norms re- pregnant (Huckle, 1988; Conway et al., 1999).
garding women’s place in society. Even when Many countries adopted equal pay and equal
they wish to increase women’s labor force par- treatment policies by the end of the 1970s (van
ticipation, states do not always necessarily pro- Vleuten, 1995; Määttä, 1998; Mazur, 2002).
vide adequate supports for women workers. Sexual harassment and affirmative action poli-
cies were put into place primarily in the late
1980s and 1990s, whereas comparable worth
Antidiscrimination and policies have been more selectively adopted. Yet
Equalization Policies countries have implemented these policies in-
consistently.
Women compose ever-larger proportions of the Antidiscrimination policies target unequal
workforce, in a wide variety of occupations, but access and treatment or discrimination in hiring
at the same time women continue to be rel- (e.g., a man considered for a child care position)
egated to low-paying, gender-segregated jobs or promotion (e.g., a woman considered for a
(Moghadam, 1999). Even where women and managerial position), and strike down previous
men share similar educational achievement lev- discriminatory legislation. Other policies focus
els, there are still important differences between on equal pay for equal work by gender or equal
men’s and women’s perceived and actual care- treatment by gender. Sexual harassment policies
giving responsibilities, which shape women’s also address discrimination on the basis of gen-
and men’s employment opportunities. How- der, usually focusing on conduct that may affect
ever, many states (particularly, industrialized employment, interfere with a worker’s perfor-
countries) have attempted address gender dis- mance, or create a hostile work environment
parities in employment, although these policies (Conway et al., 1999). Affirmative action or
do not eliminate gendered labor market pat- “positive action” policies redress inequalities by
terns. giving preferential treatment to women appli-
Women provide a fairly flexible low-cost sup- cants who have the same qualifications as men
ply of labor (Hantrais, 2000). However, there are applicants.15 In Europe, these policies have had a
significant variations in women’s labor force par- wider scope, addressing issues of public aware-
ticipation rates, levels of part-time employment, ness and diversifying occupational options (de
and wages relative to men (UNIFEM, 2003; Jong and Bock, 1995).
Acevedo, 1995; Gornick, 1999; Van Doorne- Yet despite the adoption of these policies in a
Huiskes et al., 1999; den Dulk et al., 1999; Daly, number of nations, occupational gender segre-
2000). Women’s movements and pressure from gation continues to exist in all countries. Gen-
international organizations, such as the United der segregation not only separates women and
Nations and the International Labour Orga- men in the labor force, but also supports wage
nization, have encouraged a number of coun- disparities, as jobs dominated by women gen-
tries (such as the United States and Denmark) erally pay less.16 Although some women have
to adopt policies focused on antidiscrimination, made inroads into jobs previously dominated by
sexual harassment, affirmative action, and commen, there has also been an increased feminiza-
parable worth (Gornick, 1999), and broaden tion of female-dominated occupations, which
women’s employment opportunities.
These laws are both meant to correct for em- 15
These policies may also provide opportunities for
ployment discrimination on the basis of gender racial and ethnic minority workers.
16
and address patently unfair gendered differences For example, in the United States, child care work-
ers ( jobs dominated by women) are paid less than park-
in wages and working conditions. For exam- ing lot attendants ( jobs dominated by men), even though
ple, in the absence of antidiscrimination legisla- caring for children requires greater skill and responsibil-
tion in the United States through the 1960s, ity (Folbre, 2001).
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means that overall, little progress has been made policies are not always enforced or only apply
(Plantenga and Tijdens, 1995; Anker, 1998; to some working mothers.17 Maternity benefits
Budig, 2002). For example, Den Dulk et al. may serve as a disincentive to hire women
(1999:13) estimate that 60 percent of working workers (Alvarez, 1990; Folbre, 1994; Griffith
women in the European Union are employed and Gates, 2002) or may be “implemented
in three broad occupational groupings – sec- and financed in ways that [restrict] women’s
retaries and clerks, service workers, and care- employment opportunities and [reinforce] a
workers. Comparable-worth policies and job traditional division of labor in the home”
classification systems address the wage dispar- (Folbre, 1994:223), in part because they are not
ities created by occupational gender segrega- provided as “parental” leaves for both men and
tion, by ensuring that jobs requiring the same women, but as leaves for women.
level of skills, education, and responsibility earn Almost all wealthy industrialized states pro-
the same wages (Schippers, 1995). Although vide maternity leaves that include time off from
such policies do not abolish occupational gen- work and protections from job loss as well as cash
der segregation, they challenge the norm that benefits of up to 100 percent of usual earnings
women-dominated occupations should pay less (SSA, 1999, 2002, 2003; Daly, 2000; Meyers
simply because the work is done by women (Van et al., 1999).18 Paid paternity leave policies ex-
Doorne-Huiskes, 1995). However, comparable- ist in a few countries, usually for only a brief
worth policies do not deal with the problem of time after the birth of a child (Plantenga and
women’s involvement in part-time and other- Hansen, 1999; Lohkamp-Himmighofen and
wise “atypical” employment – often jobs with Dienel, 2000; Daly, 2000), and some nations also
lower wages, limited benefits, and which rarely provide family leaves for caretaking for other
allow for advancement. These positions allow family members. Parental leave varies in signif-
women greater flexibility to continue labor icant ways. For example, in Sweden, parental
force involvement and also provide care for their leave can be taken as a block or in short periods
families, but also carry significant disadvantages until the child reaches the age of eight. In many
(McRae, 1998). countries, parental leave can alternate between
parents, and in Sweden and Austria, some of the
leave is lost if men do not take it. Parents are most
Gender, Care, and Employment likely to take advantage of parental leave policies
where leaves are well-compensated (Lohkamp-
Gender is apparent in the complex of policies Himmighofen and Dienel, 2000).
that address the needs of workers with care obli- Child care policies also play an important role
gations. States increasingly address the issue of in reconciling family and work life. Whereas
balancing care and employment through “rec- maternity and parental leave may help guarantee
onciliation” policies, such as family leave and women’s return to employment, child care
child care. As Hantrais (2000:2) argues, these
policies go beyond “measures designed to bring 17
In many developing countries, eligible women can
women into line with men as workers, to gen- take a maternity leave and receive a certain proportion
der policy aimed at tackling socially constructed of their earnings for a period before and after the birth
inequalities at work and in the home.” Simply (often about four months around the birth), although
these programs usually only include women working in
put, women will only reach equality with men a formal nonagricultural position and rely on employee
in employment when men reach equality with contributions as well as employer and state contributions
women in caregiving (Lohkamp-Himmighofen (SSA, 1999, 2003).
18
and Dienel, 2000). The United States has the least generous policy,
Although many countries around the world although it recently adopted the Family and Medical
Leave Act, which allows some employed men and women
(such as Morocco and Colombia) provide to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for
maternity leave and benefits (Social Security a family member, including women who wish to take
Administration, 1999, 2002, 2003), these maternity leave (Conway et al., 1999).
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allows women to remain fairly continuously work, and unemployment. Other programs ex-
employed. Again, there are significant differ- ist to provide health care as well as funds and ser-
ences cross-nationally in the public provision vices for families living in poverty. Such policies
of or support for child care. Several countries, may be universal (providing flat-rate benefits
notably Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, to all citizens regardless of need), employment-
France, and Finland, offer publicly provided related (providing benefits based on the length
child care to infants and toddlers; many more of employment and earnings), and/or means-
wealthy states offer publicly provided child care tested (providing benefits for those who drop
to children over three (Plantenga and Hansen, beneath a certain benchmark of economic need)
1999; Michel, 1999; Meyers et al., 1999; Daly, (SSA, 2003).
2000; Marchblank, 2000). Women’s groups in Welfare policies are rich sites for exploring
a variety of developing contexts have recently how gender ideologies affect policy and how
made demands for child care programs and policies differentially affect men and women.
policies (Alvarez, 1990; Matear, 1997; Wazir, Gender ideologies have been central to the con-
2001; Sorj, 2001). Yet successful child care struction of these polices and due to lower earn-
policies must address the wide diversity of ings and greater caregiving duties, women are
experiences in most developing countries (rural also more likely to live in poverty and require
versus urban, factory versus informal work). For the assistance of welfare policies. Welfare pro-
example, Matear (1997:104) found that Chilean vision may reinforce gender biases by covering
child care policies were not developed “in men workers more often than women work-
response to women’s gender-specific needs to ers or by expecting women to provide care
be replaced in their reproductive, nurturing role for family members. Yet social welfare policies
to enter the labor market,” but simply to “allow also help ameliorate needs such as poverty and
employers in a certain export-oriented sector may at times also work to create greater lev-
central to state development strategies greater els of gender equity between men and women
profit by drawing in mothers as low-paid, (Misra and Akins, 1998; Borchorst, 1999; Sains-
temporary workers.” bury, 1999). These policies have complex and
Although other policies also shape gendered sometimes contradictory effects, transforming
patterns in employment, we have highlighted a but not necessarily ending male dominance, and
number of the most central employment-related often regulating women’s lives in exchange for
policies. In the next section, we examine social meeting certain needs (Orloff, 1996; Hernes,
welfare policies, which are inextricably bound 1984). The effects of these policies also vary
up with employment policies. The feminiza- based on the class, race, ethnicity, nationality,
tion of poverty can primarily be explained by immigration status, age, sexuality, marriage sta-
women’s lower wages in the labor market and tus, and ability status of the recipients. While
the effects of women’s care responsibilities on some policies may advantage certain groups of
labor force participation. Employment policies women, they may disadvantage other groups
play a key role in ensuring the welfare of the (Boris, 1995; Gordon, 1994; Mink, 1995; Misra
population. However, almost all states have var- and Akins, 1998; Lewis, 2000). In addition, al-
ious forms of safety net programs for those who though some welfare policies have been adopted
need it. in keeping with pronatalist and/or religious
aims, women’s movements have also played a
major role in putting welfare policies on politi-
gender and social welfare policies cal agendas.
Welfare generally provides assistance for those

who are unable to support themselves through Social Welfare Policies
earnings. Welfare programs insure families
against loss of earnings due to old age, disability, Some variant of a welfare state exists in almost
or death, sickness and maternity, injuries due to all countries, but developing nations generally
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cannot boast extensive welfare states, in part headed by women are not reached through
due to requirements imposed by lending agen- employment-related social welfare programs,
cies and limited state budgets. The wealth- either because women are not employed or not
iest countries – Western European nations, employed in the right types of jobs (e.g., formal
Japan, Canada, the United States, Australia, work in settings with many employees) (Folbre,
and New Zealand – generally have the most 1994). For example, domestic workers, who
developed welfare states. Eastern European, are mostly women, are not covered by pensions
Latin American, and the newly industrializ- in many nations.
ing Asian countries tend to provide the next One example of gender-differentiated policy
best level of social welfare programs. Eastern exists in survivor benefits. In many nations,
European policies reflect earlier expansive pro- widows automatically receive survivor benefits,
tections, although without appropriate funding whereas widowers only receive such benefits if
levels, these protections are often ineffective clearly dependent (usually aged or disabled) on
(Lakunina, Stepantchikova, and Tchetvernina, a wife’s earnings (Folbre, 1994). Widows are
2001; Makkai, 1994; Kapstein, 1997). Many often more likely to receive benefits if they are
Latin American nations offer significant social caring for children or are older, but younger
welfare policies, but these policies often benefit and childless widows (or those who remarry)
only more privileged sectors of society (Folbre, still usually receive a lump-sum payment (SSA,
1994). Industrializing Asian nations provide lim- 1999, 2002). Widowers caring for children do
ited welfare states that tend to accentuate eco- not receive survivor benefits or receive lump
nomic policy over social policy (Holliday, 2000). payments when they remarry. Such policies
Poorer countries in Asia and Africa may pro- clearly assume a male-breadwinner model of
vide pensions and other work-related policies, earnings, while also encouraging women’s roles
but often cover only employees at firms with in caregiving and women’s remarriage after the
five or more workers. Extremely poor coun- death of a spouse. Although these gendered
tries, particularly in Africa, generally only pro- assumptions may support women who may not
vide policies covering work-related injuries for have other economic opportunities, they reflect
certain workers and pensions for public em- and reinforce a system that limits women’s
ployees (SSA, 1999, 2002). However, there re- opportunities and ties women to caregiving
mains significant variation beyond these simple roles.
descriptions. For example, public sector work- States may also use social welfare policies
ers in many developing countries, for exam- to achieve greater levels of gender equality.
ple, throughout the Middle East and North Three strategies aimed at gender equity include
Africa, have received very generous benefits, in- the universal breadwinner strategy (equal em-
cluding free health care, paid maternity leaves, ployment opportunities for men and women),
and child care. However, such programs ex- the caregiver-parity strategy (compensating and
clude many workers, including farmers, home- supporting caregivers), and the earner–carer
workers, domestics, and informal sector workers strategy (enabling both men and women to be
(Moghadam, 2003a). both earners and carers) (Sainsbury, 1999). The
In many nations, social welfare policies first strategy may come at the expense of car-
reflect assumptions that each family has a male ing, as in the United States, where men and
breadwinner in a job that pays high wages women are both engaged in the labor force but
and provides benefits. Almost all countries where there is little state support for caregiving.
assume a model of partnerships between men The second may reinforce a gendered division
and women, gendered divisions of labor, and of labor, as in the Netherlands, where until re-
gendered employment systems (Lewis, 1992; cently policies encouraged women to focus on
Sainsbury, 1996; Orloff, 1996). Benefits through caregiving. The earner–carer strategy, pursued
social insurance are often targeted toward men by countries such as Sweden and France, may
workers, assuming that they provide for needy be the most effective at achieving gender equity,
women and children. Indeed, many families though it is not without its challenges (as Joan
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Acker [1994] suggests, Swedish women still look women are more likely to be involved in caring
very tired). It is clearly difficult to disentangle la- for family members, at times at the expense of
bor market policies from social welfare policies. their labor market participation, and are more
Policies oriented toward single mothers, seen likely to be hired in low-paying caregiving
as transgressing traditional gender roles, can be positions.
particularly illustrative of gendered norms and All in all, social welfare policies both rein-
expectations. For example, poverty is often high force and challenge traditional gender roles. Al-
for families headed by lone mothers, because though social welfare policies have reinforced
women earn less in the labor market than men gendered norms, particularly in the gendered
and their caregiving duties may also preclude division of work and care, in recent years poli-
employment or full-time employment. In cies have shifted toward creating greater gender
Sweden and France, employment-related equality. Yet neoliberal restructuring may lead to
policies such as child care and parental leave, greater levels of gender inequality, particularly
along with transfers for single-parent families, when restructuring relies on women to meet
help prevent many lone mother families from social welfare needs.
falling into poverty. In the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands, transfers to lone parents
gender and population policy
have played a key role in addressing poverty. In
Germany, where tax and child care policy have
Most states seek to engineer their populations,
discouraged many married mothers from work-
mainly through migration and/or fertility po-
ing, policy has reinforced the employment of
licy. Although all types of population policies
lone mothers (Misra, 1998b; Lewis and Hobson,
have implications for gender, we restrict our
1997; Ostner, 1997; Hobson and Takahashi,
discussion to fertility policy, which seeks to
1997; Kilkey and Bradshaw, 1999). Lone
lower or raise birthrates. Sixty-eight percent of
mother families stave off poverty most success-
all national governments have explicit fertility
fully when benefits and services are universally
policies (United Nations, 2003). These state
available and labor market participation is high,
attempts to alter fertility reinforce and reshape
as in Sweden and France (Lewis and Hobson,
gender relations, first, by shaping reproductive
1997; Sainsbury, 1996; Borchorst, 1999).
rights, and second, by affecting the structure of
Neoliberal restructuring has profoundly af-
social welfare policies that support families. We
fected social welfare across a variety of nations.
begin by discussing antinatalist efforts, ex-
Industrialized states have increasingly privatized
amining population control and reproductive
care (sending care provision to private, non-
health in developing countries, and then we
profit, and voluntary sectors) while also mar-
delineate attempts to raise fertility. Finally, be-
ketizing state provision of care (contracting out
cause of its centrality to women’s reproductive
specific services and providing funds to families
autonomy, we examine state policy as it pertains
to negotiate care) (Knijn, 2000). For example,
to abortion.
in France, restructuring has meant a weakening
of state-provided care for young children in
favor of subsidies to families hiring individual Antinatalist Policies
caregivers. Such changes have disadvantaged
poor and working class families and increased Currently, eighty-six countries (45 percent of
disparities between families. Driven by the the world’s nations) have policies to reduce fer-
requirements of structural adjustment policies, tility (United Nations, 2003). Many develop-
developing countries have similarly privatized ing governments have received Western (especi-
care, expecting families and nongovernmental ally U.S.)19 support for population control
organizations to meet care needs once met by
the state. As a result of these changes in coun- 19
Three main ideas influenced international policy
tries across the globe, from Jamaica to Indonesia, on population growth – that high fertility limits eco-
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programs, and aid has often been contingent of people worldwide. However, policy mak-
on the institution of family planning programs. ers and researchers have often failed to closely
However, many state leaders institute policies examine the social contexts in which various
without international pressure because they are birth control devices might be used or whether
convinced that population growth needs to slow they enhance women’s health and well-being
in order for economic development to occur (Hartmann, 1995). Many women, especially
( Jain, 1998). poor women (in both wealthy and poor coun-
Until the mid-1990s, when a new paradigm tries), have suffered negative health conse-
emerged from the United Nations Confer- quences from approaches to birth control pro-
ence on Population and Development, popu- moted by family planning workers, including
lation control policies relied almost exclusively dangerous medications and some devices that
on the provision of contraception, sterilization, have caused disabling side effects (Hartmann,
and sometimes abortion. Teresita De Barbieri 1995). In addition, birth control no longer
(1994:261) contends that “the design of pop- marketable in wealthy countries (such as high-
ulation policies and family planning programs estrogen oral contraceptives and the Dalkon
has been dominated by a male perspective and Shield IUD – known to pose serious health
cut from a technocratic cloth . . . . ” Population risks) has been sold in poor countries (Dixon-
control programs have typically targeted women Mueller, 1993).
and ignored men’s role in reproduction. Often Governments have sometimes allowed re-
numerical targets have been established, which searchers to do clinical trials on contraceptives
seek to attain specific rates of contraceptive us- without ensuring that women were fully in-
age (Bandarage, 1997). According to Dixon- formed (such as Norplant trials in Brazil – see
Mueller (1993:52), “Within most family plan- Barroso and Corrêa, 1995). In addition, some
ning programs, the quality of reproductive health family planning workers, intent on achieving
services was sacrificed to the quantity of family their target number of contraceptive acceptors,
planning acceptors, the safety of contraceptive have failed to describe common side effects of
methods sacrificed to efficiency and technical contraceptives or sterilization. Coercive prac-
effectiveness.” tices have been documented as well. Bandarage
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a strong (1997:71) notes that “coercion does not per-
feminist critique of these policies emerged. tain simply to the outright use of force. More
Although feminist researchers diverge on the subtle forms of coercion arise when individ-
need for population control,20 most agree that ual reproductive decisions are tied to sources
women have borne a disproportionate share of survival like the availability of food, shel-
of the burden of such efforts. Access to birth ter, employment, education, health care and so
control may provide men and women with on.” Sterilization abuse has occurred in many
more reproductive choices – indeed family plan- parts of the world as part of population control
ning programs have been beneficial to millions programs (Bandarage, 1997; Hartmann, 1995).
For example, in Puerto Rico a mass steriliza-
tion program took place from the 1950s to
nomic development, hurts the environment, and could the 1970s; many women were sterilized with-
lead to social instability. U.S. interest in population con- out their knowledge (Hartmann, 1995). Other
trol derives from these ideas and the various movement
groups and NGOs espousing them (see Hartmann, 1995;
countries, among them India, have also engaged
also see Demeny, 1998). in mass sterilization campaigns, sometimes of-
20 fering financial incentives for sterilization to
Some feminist researchers and activists believe pop-
ulation growth impedes development and that fertility desperately poor people. China’s “one-child
reduction is a worthy goal (Dixon-Mueller, 1993; also policy” has subjected some women to forced
see Presser, 1997). Others take issue with the notion that
population growth must impede development and view abortions (Greenhalgh, 2001). Most coercive
population control programs of any ilk with suspicion practices have been targeted at women. One of
(see Hartmann, 1995). the few instances of coercive practices aimed at
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men – the mass sterilization campaigns of In- tion depends on the elimination of discrimina-
dia in the early 1970s – resulted in mass riots tion against women, the Cairo Program repre-
and, some claim, led a temporary collapse of the sents a joining of feminist and neo-Malthusian
ruling party; since then, policies in India have goals. The new paradigm called on states to
generally targeted only women (Corrêa, 1994). “empower women to actively participate at all
A second critique of population control poli- levels of social and economic activity, a change
cies is that they have ignored existing inequali- that would result in lowered fertility and im-
ties and power structures or, in some cases, even proved survival for women and their children”
sought to control population growth among the (Mundigo, 2000:323). The program recom-
poor, fearing social turmoil. Population control mends that governments work to expand the
may do little to reduce inequalities; instead, it educational opportunities of girls and women;
simply serves as a distraction from more pressing reduce violence against women; address gender-
economic inequalities (see Hartmann, 1995). based income disparities; and reduce infant,
Fertility control projects may also fail to consider child, and maternal mortality (United Nations,
the social and cultural contexts in which fertility 1994, 2003). Such an approach requires inte-
decisions occur. For example, women may bear grating economic and social welfare policies, as
many children because children, especially sons, well as others, into reproductive planning. An
add to their status and well-being. Fertility con- important component was the call to integrate
trol policies often do little to address unequal family planning with other reproductive health
gender arrangements. De Barbieri (1994:260) services (United Nations, 2003).
explains that, “the inequality between men and In addition, the role of men in reproduction,
women globally, at the family level, and in inter- previously ignored by researchers and policy
personal relationships has gone unquestioned. makers, was made explicit in the Cairo Program
Quite the contrary: Population policies seem to of Action:
aim to preserve the existing social order, with
its hierarchies and divisions.” Men play a key role in bringing about gender equality
In recent decades, researchers have linked since, in most societies, men exercise preponderant
gender inequalities to fertility control, argu- power in nearly every sphere of life, ranging from
personal decisions regarding the size of families to
ing that family planning policies might better the policy and programme decisions taken at all levels
achieve their goal of lowering fertility if exist- of government. (United Nations, cited in Mundigo,
ing power structures changed (Dixon-Mueller, 2000:324)
1993). In the absence of educational and
employment-related opportunities for women, The program also cited the need to “assign high
fertility may remain high even when broad ac- priority to the development of new methods
cess to contraceptives exists. At the 1994 United of fertility regulation for men (United Nations,
Nations Conference on Population and De- 2003:17). Since the conference, more research
velopment in Cairo, “feminist activists suc- investigates men’s role in reproductive decision
ceeded in essentially rewriting the script for making (Mundigo, 2000) and many govern-
international population policy, transforming ments report having introduced programs aimed
the agenda from the achievement of demo- at involving men in reproductive health (Sadik,
graphic targets to the enhancement of women’s 1997).
sexual and reproductive health, choice, and The Cairo Program was a victory for femi-
rights (Greenhalgh, 2001:852). Feminists at nists (although see Hartmann, 1997 for a critical
Cairo succeeded in bringing about a paradigm discussion of Cairo Consensus); however, im-
shift – away from “population control” with its plementation has been uneven. Barriers include
narrow emphasis on fertility reduction, to re- “social and cultural influences, infrastructure
productive health and women’s education and and accessibility problems, and economic con-
empowerment. Hodgson and Watkins (1997) straint” (Sadik, 1997). Neoliberal structural ad-
claim that, in asserting that population stabiliza- justment policies, for example, have hindered
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some governments from expanding maternal family benefits. Some countries outlawed abor-
and child health care or even girls’ education. tion and contraception for pronatalist reasons as
Whereas some population control programs well. In the 1960s and 1970s, many newly inde-
have moderated their activities, others have pendent countries adopted pronatalist stances.
changed little. For example, China’s govern- For example, Moghadam (2003a:95) explains
ment has softened its approach to population that, in the 1960s, the Algerian government’s
control, exploring ways to improve the quality demographic policy “was predicated on the as-
of care (Greenhalgh, 2001). India’s family sumption that a large population is necessary
planning program abolished targets in 1996. for national power.” Currently, twenty-six states
However, Indonesia’s program merely gave have explicit policies to increase fertility (United
targets another name – “demand fulfillment” Nations, 2003), and most of these policies rely
(Hartmann, 1997). Jocelyn DeJong (2000:948) on various types of incentives.
reviewed national case studies (covering forty A central feminist question on pronatalism
countries) of implementation of the Cairo focuses on whether nationalist ideologies lead
Program and found that these studies “share states to encourage births to members of a
the consistent finding that the progress in im- specific collectivity. Some scholars argue that
plementing the far-reaching reforms advanced pronatalist policies spring from conservative na-
by the ICPD has depended very much on the tionalist ideologies which, because they tend
political situation of the countries in question.” to advocate “traditional” gender roles, con-
More progress has been made in open and flict with feminist goals of gender equality
democratic rather than closed political con- (Hamilton, 1995; Heng and Devan, 1992;
texts. Despite the uneven implementation, the Yuval-Davis, 1989).21 Nationalist leaders often
program agreed upon at the Cairo Conference oppose abortion for pronatalist reasons and ad-
is significant. Nations and NGOs charted a vocate “traditional” family values (e.g., Jean
new direction for reproductive health and Marie Le Pen in France – see King, 2002).
family planning with emphasis on redress- Yuval-Davis (1989:93) argues that, in Israel,
ing institutionalized gender inequalities and “pressures to define and reproduce the national
human rights. collectivity . . . have constituted Israeli Jewish
women as its national reproducers.” Yuval-Davis
argues that in Israel women’s roles and, ulti-
Pronatalist Policies mately, legal rights have been constructed and
defined through debates surrounding various
Though far more national governments have demographic policies. Bracewell (1996) explains
policies to lower fertility rates than raise them, that pronatalism in Serbia has been oriented to-
ever-increasing numbers of states express con- ward restoring a precommunist view of the fam-
cern that their birthrates are too low, for both ily, where women were primarily homemakers
nationalist and economic reasons. Countries and mothers. In the Serbian discourse, Albanian
with generous health care and social security women become “baby machines.”
programs are especially worried that these sys- Just as women have borne most of the burden
tems will become unstable as an ever-increasing of antinatalist policies, women have also tended
proportion of the workforce enters retirement. to be more affected than men by pronatalist
Pronatalism has emerged as a dominant politi- efforts, especially when reproductive rights are
cal ideology at various historical moments. Re- curtailed. Historically some states have outlawed
sponding to downward trends in birth rates, abortion and contraception – or made them
many Western European countries – including
Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, and Spain – 21
In some instances, population policies influenced
instituted pronatalist-inspired family policies in by nationalist ideologies have historically affected mem-
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. bers of racial and ethnic minority populations differently
At the center of these policies was a system of from the dominant population.
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difficult to obtain – for pronatalist reasons (King, to contraceptives and abortion and (indirectly)
2002). More recently, women’s access to abor- by achieving social, political and economic op-
tion and even contraception has sometimes portunities, such as the right to participate freely
been affected by state pronatalist agendas. For in the labor force or even, as in France, the
example, Israeli women seeking abortion face right to more equal representation in govern-
numerous obstacles, including expense, bureau- ment (parité). Increasingly the overall trend in
cratic hurdles, and the necessity to prove need many low-fertility countries seems to be toward
for the procedure to a hospital committee, due policies that are more gender-neutral than in the
to the state’s interest in increasing birthrates past (King, 2002), though this does not neces-
(Portugese, 1998). In 1995, the Serbian govern- sarily translate into a transformation of existing
ment instituted a more restrictive abortion law gender roles.
for pronatalist reasons. In addition, state interest A key question for feminists is whether the
in raising birthrates has occasionally resulted in state’s desire for more children can be translated
severely repressive reproductive policies, such as into “women-friendly” social policies. Some ar-
those instituted in Romania in the 1970s and gue that pronatalism has led lawmakers away
1980s that “turned women’s bodies into instru- from family policies that would truly advance
ments to be used in the service of the state” feminist goals ( Jenson and Sineau, 1995). But
(Kligman, 1992:365). Abortions were outlawed the earliest comprehensive family policies owe
and contraceptives made unavailable. Women their existence in large part to the desire of some
were unable to mobilize politically against these government leaders to increase national fertility
pronatalist measures; they resisted by seeking rates (Pedersen, 1993; Ohlander, 1991). Alena
clandestine, often dangerous, abortions. Heitlinger (1991, 1993) argues that, although
However, states mostly rely on incentives, not all pronatalist policies help women, there
including a variety of employment and social is no inherent incompatibility between prona-
policies, including family allowances, housing talism and feminism. Indeed, women’s equity
subsidies, tax breaks for dependent children, could serve as the impetus for states to institute
and/or paid family leave, to attempt to coax social policies broadly defined as pronatalist.
citizens to bear more children. Such programs The extent to which the goal of greater
have the potential to be helpful to both women gender equality can be merged with pronatalism
and men who have children. Gender ideologies may turn out to be an important question.
invariably influence the construction of such Fertility is declining around the world and
incentives and the extent to which policies cor- in welfare states fertility rates are at all-time
respond to feminist principles varies. For exam- lows. While the number of states claiming their
ple, leave programs that allow parents to spend fertility is too high is leveling, the number
time at home with young children may (implic- of states expressing concern over low fertility
itly or explicitly) encourage more women than continues to rise (from sixteen states in 1976
men to do so. Such policies may, however, en- to thirty-four in 2001 – United Nations,
courage men to spend more time on carework 2003). But because such efforts have too often
if, for example, family leave programs provide been associated with ethnonationalist, racist
such incentives (as in Austria and Sweden). and antifeminist ideologies, many feminist
Historically, women have had relatively lit- researchers and activists will likely continue to
tle impact on government decisions to create be wary of any state efforts to regulate fertility.
fertility policies and little input as to the shape
of those policies (Maroney, 1992; Yuval-Davis,
1989). Often, such policies have resulted from Abortion and State Policy
nationalist concerns or state interest in eco-
nomic development. More recently, feminist Because of its centrality to women’s ability
movements in many countries have influenced to control their fertility, feminist researchers
reproductive policy by helping to secure access have paid particular attention to abortion policy
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(Brand, 1998). In some countries, abortion has ever, almost everywhere hard-won reproductive
been linked to government attempts at popula- rights are threatened by conservative nationalist
tion engineering. In such instances, the desires and/or religious forces.
of state leaders may take precedence over the
needs and desires of individual citizens. A glar-
ing example is China, where abortion has been discussion and conclusions
a tool of state-sponsored fertility control.
In other countries, abortion is less closely Using examples from three policy arenas – em-
linked to state desires to raise or lower fertility; in ployment, social welfare, and population – we
those locales where abortion is legal, the right to have shown how state policies may reinforce
abortion has often been the result of long, hard and/or reshape gender roles. Some state policies
struggles, typically led by feminist activists. In are explicitly gendered in that they presuppose
such cases, women’s groups and their allies have differences between men and women. These
sought from the state the right to legal and safe policies may exploit existing gender inequali-
abortion and, in some cases, for state funding ties, such as policies to create an inexpensive
of abortion. State regulations vary dramatically female workforce. Some seek to redress gender
and abortion policies tend to change over time inequalities, such as antidiscrimination and affir-
in response to pressure groups, changes in polit- mative action policies. Other policies are techni-
ical leadership, technological innovation, and so cally gender-neutral but have gendered effects,
on. For example, abortion became legal in the such as parental leave policies that allow par-
United States in 1973 as a result of a Supreme ents to take unpaid time off of work to spend
Court ruling (Roe v. Wade), which, while le- time with children. Within the current social
galizing abortion throughout the country, left context, these policies may reinforce existing
open the possibility for the states to regulate the gender roles because women tend to earn less
procedure. Thus, in the United States, access and are thus more likely to forgo their salary
to abortion has become more restricted since to engage in care work at home. In addition,
the mid-1970s. In France, by contrast, femi- reproductive policies may more profoundly af-
nists lobbied the state for legislation to legal- fect women, who must bear the most of the
ize abortion. Policy makers sought to construct cost of unwanted pregnancies or unwanted fer-
a policy that would be a compromise between tility control. Finally, lack of state involvement
religious groups, women’s groups and other par- often has gendered implications as well. For ex-
ties, including pronatalist groups (see Glendon, ample, if states fail to institute or enforce laws
1987). The result was a law, passed in 1975, to address sexual harassment or gender discrim-
that made abortion legal under fairly restricted ination, existing inequalities continue. If states
circumstances; since then, those circumstances fail to provide assistance with child care, lone
have become more broadly defined (King and mothers may fall into poverty. If states neglect
Husting, 2003). In Poland, the ascendance of to address disparities in income, such gender in-
the Catholic Church in the postcommunist era equalities may persist.
has led to restrictions on the right to abor- Employment, social welfare, and popula-
tion, which was previously available on demand. tion policies are inextricably woven together.
Poland now has one of Europe’s strictest abor- Employment policies oriented toward giving
tion laws. women greater economic opportunities within
As this discussion of population policy shows, the labor market may be related to limiting so-
states have used population policies to pursue cial welfare benefits for women and their fam-
a variety of goals; yet these policies have had ilies. Reproductive policies also shape women’s
strongly gendered effects. In many cases, poli- workforce participation, as women’s disadvan-
cies in both pronatalist and antinatalist contexts tages in the labor market are in part due to their
have become more aligned with feminist goals, role in reproduction, but women may also be
in large part due to feminist organizing. How- encouraged to bear children (future workers)
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(Pyle, 1997). Indeed, social welfare and em- tain cultural, political, and economic changes
ployment policies aimed at reconciling family (Vuolo, 2002). As Moghadam, (2000, 2002)
and work life may have significant effects on points out, women’s movements now must be
women’s reproductive choices. Social welfare understood as global, including supranational
policies may also stigmatize women who cannot goals, strategies, organizations, and constituen-
provide for their families through employment cies. Transnational feminist movements help de-
or who are viewed as breaking societal norms velop new criteria for women’s rights and have
regarding reproduction within stable marriages. significantly affected employment, social wel-
Some population policies (such as the U.S. se- fare, and population policies at both national
lective antinatalist policy that seeks to lower the and international levels (Bock and Thane, 1991;
birth rates of unmarried teenagers) instituted Koven and Michel, 1993; Basu, 1995a; Stetson
with the idea that lower birth rates will ulti- and Mazur, 1995; Rupp, 1997; Ali, Coate, and
mately reduce poverty may draw attention away Goro, 2000; Bull, Diamond, and Marsh, 2000;
from underlying problems of poverty and lack Moghadam, 2000, 2002).22 In an increasingly
of educational and employment opportunities globalized world, women’s movements shape
(see Luker, 1996). In addition, policies such as not only local and national governance, but also
parental leave and subsidized child care, for ex- international governance, which then reinforces
ample, can support higher birth rates, promote local and state policy making. Although the po-
employment, and help reduce poverty, espe- litical and economic processes of globalization
cially among lone mothers. Although no two have led to the increased dispersion of neoliberal
countries take the exactly same route, in every ideologies and to conservative fundamentalist
nation, countries combine population, employ- ideologies that may undermine and disempower
ment, and social welfare policies to respond to women, globalization has also led to an increase
perceived needs, including the needs of the state, in transnational feminist organization that pro-
the needs of capital, and the needs of men and vides women with resources, strategies, and sup-
women. port. Future research should further explore the
In this chapter, we have illustrated how state impact of these global alliances on policy.
policies have gendered implications. Yet al- Future research should also focus greater at-
though the state poses structural constraints to tention on how policies shape men’s lives and
women, it also acts as an arena in which women men’s roles in society. State policies shape men’s
may seek to redress gender-based inequalities roles as workers, citizens, and fathers just as they
or to address gender-based need. The com- shape women’s roles as workers, citizens, and
plex of factors we discussed at the beginning of mothers (Hobson, 2002). In addition, more re-
this chapter – political resources and structures; search needs to explain why policies differ (or
the strength of interest groups and social move- do not) across a range of contexts. Much re-
ments; prevailing ideologies; the degree of state search on gender and social policy focuses on
autonomy and capacity to make and enforce particular cases; other research explores only a
policies; and cultural, legal, social, political, and range of similar nations. However, as we try to
economic histories and traditions – shape gen-
dered policy choices. Intersecting with these
22
factors are global trends including the increas- Women’s movements must also remain located
within specific local political and economic contexts
ing power of neoliberal ideology, the growing (Basu, 2000). However, transnational feminist move-
power of conservative nationalist and/or reli- ments can reflect the vitality and richness of grassroots
gious movements, and increased feminist orga- organizing (Alvarez, 2000; Sperling, Ferree, and Risman,
nizing. 2001; Thayer, 2001). Thayer (2001) shows how partici-
Perhaps the most positive sign for the future pants in a rural Brazilian women’s movement create their
own meaning within a transnational feminist context,
has been the global alliances that have brought defending their autonomy from the larger movement
feminists together from around the globe to and appropriating and transforming transnational femi-
share tactics and information and demand cer- nist discourses.
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point out, there are similarities that cut across ing policies then support these assumptions. By
very different nations, even while there are dif- examining how policies and gender relations are
ferences that cut across similar countries. We intertwined, political sociologists can develop
need more comparative and cross-national re- a better and more thorough understanding of
search that does not overgeneralize, but devel- both policy making and the nature of states.
ops contextualized explanations for the patterns
that occur.
Both in their development and impact, states acknowledgments
and their policies are simply not gender-neutral.
Gender is reinforced and reconstructed through We appreciate the research assistance of Jessica
the variety of policies that states enact. Some of Cichalski, Penelope Dane, Sabine Merz, and
these policies may be very explicit in their gen- Jonathan Woodring, and the excellent com-
dered approaches, as when policies address gen- ments of the anonymous reviewers and editors,
der discrimination or abortion. Other state poli- Amrita Basu, Betsy Hartmann, Ivy Kennelly,
cies are gendered more implicitly, as when states Madonna Harrington Meyer, Valentine
provide employment-related pensions for full- Moghadam, Stephanie Moller, Sarah Wilcox,
time workers, without recognizing that women and Millie Thayer. This material is based upon
workers are less likely to be covered and that work supported by the National Science Foun-
such a pension scheme simply reproduces gen- dation under Grant #SES-0095251, the Social
der stratification. Indeed, almost all policies have and Demographic Research Institute, and the
been created with certain gendered assumptions Center for Public Policy and Administration at
about men’s and women’s roles in society; result- the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.
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chapter twenty-seven
The Politics of Racial Policy
Kent Redding, David R. James, and Joshua Klugman
Politics and race have been intimately inter- to mend intraclass divisions on the basis of uni-
twined since the inception of notions of racial versalistic, nonracial policies that serve work-
difference and the beginnings of race-based slav- ing class interests as a whole. If, on the other
ery at the dawn of the modern era. Moreover, hand, one finds that political elites used racial
race-conscious public policies constructed and mobilization strategies and race-conscious pub-
reflected racial identities and inequalities since lic policies to win and maintain state power,
that time, creating what we have called “racial then a different set of policy prescriptions may
states” ( James and Redding, this volume). The be in order. If the past enforcement of race-
color-conscious policies of the past created race conscious policies created durable race identi-
inequalities that are durable (Brown, 2003; Tilly, ties and inequalities, then racially specific state
1998). The current rush toward “race-neutral” remedies become much more plausible, even
or “color-blind” policies that tend to mask race necessary, in certain circumstances. The hard
inequalities emphasizes the importance of un- choice between color-conscious policies that
derstanding how politics and race affect each reduce inequalities but reinforce identities and
other. color-blind policies that leave inequalities in-
This chapter examines the literature on the tact must be understood and considered care-
causal linkages between race and public policy fully.
from the beginnings of race-based slavery to the Our aim in this chapter is not only to con-
present. Different theoretical understandings of sider how racial state politics and policies were
the interactions between race and politics are erected on the basis of divergent racial identi-
important not only because of how they ex- ties and inequalities, but also how politics and
plain racial politics and policies of the past, but policies are implicated in the creation of race
because they also shape our understanding of identities and inequalities. Suffrage is a primary
the racial dilemmas of the present. If one thinks focus because without it, excluded groups have
that racism has been the primary motivator of no institutionalized mechanism to promote and
racial exclusions and consequent racial inequal- defend their civil and social rights. Without the
ities, it may be easier to believe that eliminat- vote, excluded groups remain excluded.
ing racism and state-enforced color-conscious We begin by examining U.S. policies con-
policies will cause racial inequalities to disap- cerning civil and political rights in the pre-
pear as well. An allied or complementary per- Emancipation era. Next we review the politics
spective that views intraclass conflict between of postslavery enfranchisement and disfranchise-
workingclass blacks and whites as the prime moment before examining how the civil rights
tivation for black exclusion and race inequali- movement provoked the dismantling of racial
ties may lead to color-blind policies that seek state structures in the United States (see James
546
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The Politics of Racial Policy 547
and Redding in this volume) and the passage black explains the shift (Morgan, 1975).
of civil rights legislation including the Voting Fredrickson’s (2002:30–1) recent masterful sur-
Rights Act of 1965 and its subsequent emen- vey of racism argued that a fully developed an-
dations. We then consider the literature on two tiblack racism developed much later and that
core policy areas of the modern welfare state, enslavement of Africans in the early colonial pe-
welfare policies and public education as well riod “could easily be justified in terms of reli-
as research on public opinion regarding these gious [whether they were converted Christians]
policies, especially those that are race-conscious. and legal status without recourse to an ex-
Finally, we examine the power of color-blind plicit racism.” Surely economic and even epi-
policies to legitimate white advantage and black demiological factors were key factors in this
disadvantages in liberal democracies, especially transition to African enslavement, but politi-
those with white majorities.1 cal factors associated with the legal status of
persons were particularly important (Engerman,
1986; Galenson, 1981). As British citizens, in-
race and suffrage in the unites states dentured servants retained state-protected natal
rights, which their masters were obliged to re-
Disfranchisement before 1865 spect. For example, masters could beat servants
and slaves to enforce work discipline, but colo-
From the fifteenth through the nineteenth cen- nial courts protected servants against unfair pun-
turies, expanding commodity markets in Eu- ishment (Smith, 1947). Importantly, Europeans
rope for sugar, cotton, tobacco, coffee, and other could choose the place of their servitude and
products stimulated the demand for greater sup- most refused transportation to the plantation re-
plies of servile labor to work the plantations and gions from the eighteenth century on. African
mines of the Americas. Weak states throughout slaves could not avoid the plantation regions and
large areas of sub-Saharan Africa left large pop- were citizens of no state in Africa or America
ulations vulnerable to the armed predations of that would defend their interests.
stronger states that supplied the expanding mar- By the time of the American Revolution,
kets for slaves. Just as political factors have always African slavery was well-established in the
shaped the freedoms enjoyed by laborers as their United States. Even though some of the nation’s
interests conflicted with those of landowners, founders recognized the hypocrisy of arguing
large-scale slave labor systems required states to for political liberty on the one hand while si-
defend the power of slave masters to discipline multaneously subjugating Africans on the other,
slave labor, capture and return runaways, and postrevolutionary state building actually resulted
quash slave rebellions. in the further institutionalization of slavery. At
White servile labor was replaced by black the Constitutional Convention, white Southern
slavery in much of the Americas between 1600 slaveholders refused to even debate the future of
and 1800, but it is by no means clear that slavery and achieved most of their aims regard-
preexisting racial prejudice of white against ing it, most notably the three-fifths rule that
counted slaves as three-fifths of a white citizen
1
A caveat: The literature on the political sociology with respect to representation and taxes in the
of racial policy is vast, covering some 500 years of his- Constitution. Only on the question of the slave
tory, spanning the globe, and covering a gamut of topics
that runs virtually as wide as the study of politics in gen- trade did the convention leave open the door
eral. Our review is necessarily selective. Throughout, we for strong congressional intervention at a later
focus primarily on the literature on black–white racial date, a result possible because the Southern states
politics as it applies to the United States, but we make were divided on the issue (Cooper and Cooper,
references and comparisons to analyses of race and poli- 1991:106–7).
tics in other areas of the world. Even with this focus, our
attempt to cover the literature reflects our judgments as In the wake of the revolution, some slave-
to key issues and developments rather than any effort to holding states allowed manumission of slaves, a
be exhaustive. practice which was more common in the upper
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548 Kent Redding, David R. James, and Joshua Klugman
South states of Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, Rights Act of 1875, were at the core of Re-
and Delaware. Free blacks were allowed to vote construction. The amendments abolished slav-
in many states (including some in the South) in ery (Thirteenth); established due process and
the immediate postrevolutionary period; how- equal protection of the laws (Fourteenth); and
ever, those rights were increasingly revoked such barred suffrage restrictions on the basis or race,
that by 1855 only five states, all in New England color, or previous condition of servitude (Fif-
(excepting Connecticut), allowed free blacks to teenth). These first attempts to address race in-
vote. Further, the federal government did not equalities with what we now call color-blind
allow black suffrage in U.S. territories. In 1857, policies made possible an extraordinary political
the Supreme Court ruled that neither free nor mobilization by African Americans in the late
slave blacks could be citizens of the United States 1860s and early 1870s that resulted in high rates
(Keyssar, 2000:54–8 and appendix A.4). of participation and office-holding. Estimates of
As such low numbers suggest, nowhere in black turnout put black voting rates at above
the Americas was slavery in danger of withering 50 percent in most Southern states during
away economically at the time that it was abol- the 1880s and into the 1890s (Kousser, 1974;
ished (Eltis, 1983). Strong states with dynamic Redding and James, 2001). Black office-holding
economies based upon free-wage labor where in Southern states during Reconstruction was
abolitionist ideologies flourished imposed abo- also substantial, and included virtually every of-
lition on weaker states. Britain played the dom- fice but that of governor. An average of 268
inant role in abolishing the transatlantic slave black men served in the state legislatures of ten
trade and, finally, in the worldwide abolition of Southern states in the sessions between 1868
slavery. Britain outlawed the slave trade in 1808 and 1876; moreover, two black senators and
and freed the slaves in its West Indian colonies fourteen black representatives served in the U.S.
in 1833 over the strenuous objections of slave Congress during the same period. More than
owners. The United States prohibited the im- 1,000 served in some local capacity. Though still
portation of slaves after 1808 and the Civil War hardly representative of population proportions,
led to abolition in 1865. By the 1870s, all of the the numbers of officeholders are truly amaz-
major European and American maritime and ing when considered against the backdrop of
commercial powers had acquiesced to British recent history; moreover, they compare favor-
pressure and outlawed the slave trade. Brazil be- ably, for example, to estimates of the numbers
came the last state in the Americas to abolish of women voters and officeholders in the wake
slavery in 1888. of the adoption of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution (Valelly, 2004:chap. 4).
Though the national Republican Party and the
Enfranchisement and Disfranchisement affiliated, social movement-like Union League
after 1865 provided important resources for black political
mobilization, much recent research has empha-
If the brutal legacy of slavery remains the fore- sized the self-organization of African Americans
most reason for the stubborn persistence of racial themselves.
inequality, prejudice, and discrimination in the This unprecedented political incorporation
twenty-first century United States, the spec- of a new racial group in the wake of its enslave-
tacular failure of post-Civil War Reconstruc- ment suffered early setbacks even as it advanced.
tion and the subsequent development of dis- Those setbacks included Supreme Court deci-
franchisement and segregation may rank a close sions that weakened Republican efforts to re-
second. This failure not only delayed American strict the southern white electorate through loy-
efforts to reckon with race, but also played its alty oaths and undermined and greatly narrowed
own role in deepening racial rifts. the scope of the statutory implementation of the
Three constitutional amendments, and statu- Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (Valelly,
tory laws to implement them, such as the Civil 2004). Other early setbacks included large-scale
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white resistance from groups such as the Ku every aspect of life and imposed de jure measures
Klux Klan in the form of violent intimidation, to ensure that subordination.
lynching, and electoral fraud, and the reces- Others focused on more general status and
sion of 1873 that sapped Republican resources economic interests in accounting for harden-
and will. The compromise of 1877, an oft-used ing white racism (Stampp, 1965). William Julius
marker for the end of Reconstruction, made Wilson (1978) saw poor white fears of economic
Garfield the president in the disputed election competition with blacks as the key motive force
of 1876 in exchange for the final withdrawal of behind racial oppression, which segued with his
troops from the South. claim about the declining significance of race
In spite of these setbacks and some de facto in the late twentieth century. Perman (2001)
disfranchisement and segregation, race relations also found racial motivations as a central im-
in the Southern states remained fluid in signifi- petus to disfranchisement in the South during
cant ways. Black suffrage (and, to a lesser extent, the 1890s.2 The racial explanations of the fail-
black office-holding) persisted, with average ure of Reconstruction and the resulting racial
black turnout rates estimated at greater than disfranchisement and segregation dovetail with
60 percent in 1880 and still above 40 percent more contemporary accounts of racial politics
in 1892 (Redding and James, 2001). Nonethe- that trace the changes in policy associated with
less, beginning in the late 1880s, Southern the so-called second reconstruction of the civil
states adopted poll taxes, literacy, and other suf- rights movement era to shifts in the attitudes
frage restrictions. Those laws, among other fac- of whites toward blacks (Chong, 2000; Page,
tors, virtually eliminated black voting by 1904. 1992).
Accompanied by the adoption of rigid Jim The tendency to make racial attitudes the
Crow segregation measures, disfranchisement “deus ex machina that independently ex-
had devastating effects and marked the final plain. . . the course of events” (Foner, 1988:xxvi)
death knell for efforts to reconstruct racial pol- has been criticized on the grounds that “his-
itics in the wake of the Civil War and Emanci- toric prejudices, however powerful and per-
pation (Valelly, 1995). vasive, do not by themselves do the work of
Different accounts have been offered to ex- political organization” (Kantrowitz, 2000:3).3
plain the failure to incorporate African Amer- Poor whites, sometimes seen as the key source
icans into the American polity. Though they for such racism, were profoundly unorganized
overlap and combine in many cases, we con- prior to the late 1880s. The exceptions were the
sider four accounts of this failed incorporation: Southern Farmers’ Alliance and Populist Party,
racial attitudes, class exploitation, war and which did succeed in organizing a large number
the international context, and institutionalist– of smaller white farmers. By and large, however,
constructionist approaches. the Populists initially opposed rather than led
Racial attitudes have long been thought by efforts to restrict suffrage. Any account of race
many to lie at the core of racial conflict and must show how it worked as a vehicle for power
discrimination. If, as Sumner suggests, “state- in a particular social context.4
ways cannot change folkways,” then racial in-
2
equality will persist absent changes in atti- This line of argument emphasizing race as the key
tudes. Historians such as Williamson (1984), to southern history has a long history. See also Phillips
(1928), Cash (1991 [1941]), Key (1984 [1949]), and
Donald (1981), and Litwack (1998) all suggest
Degler (1972).
that Southern race relations deteriorated as the 3
See also Harold D. Woodman (1987:259–60), who
turn of the century approached. In this view, more broadly surveyed race arguments and concluded:
younger blacks born in freedom asserted them- “The explanation is potent, ubiquitous, and timeless.
selves more forcefully against de facto discrim- But it is just this universality that some insist weakens
racism’s explanatory power; anything that explains ev-
ination and segregation and white paternalism erything in the end explains nothing.”
was displaced by a much more radical form of 4
Barbara Fields (1982:146, 156) in particular argues
white supremacy that sought black deference in that scholars must analyze racial ideologies and attitudes
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Du Bois (1935) was among the first to de- to previously excluded groups in the name of
velop a class-based analysis of Reconstruction, national unity or as an inducement or reward
developing Beard’s and Beale’s arguments that for national service (Markoff, 1996). Whereas
the Civil War and its aftermath was, among the late nineteenth century provided no inter-
other things, an economic revolution which national impetus for the ongoing incorporation
marked the triumph of Northern business in- of blacks into the American polity,6 the 1950s
terests. Among the recent class-based explana- were a much different time. The Cold War,
tions, some research adapts Barrington Moore’s in particular, has been found to have spurred
(1966) argument that the dominant landed up- the federal government, especially the execu-
per class, in alliance with a dependent middle tive branch, to side increasingly with the civil
class, produced a conservative industrialization. rights movement’s quest for full civil and polit-
This “Prussian road” to modernization did not ical rights for African Americans. As Dudziak
allow for the development of the bourgeois so- (2000:100) succinctly put it, “racial segregation
cial structures and values necessary to support a interfered with the Cold War imperative of win-
democratic capitalist system. To make this thesis ning the world over to democracy.”7
work for the South required showing the per- In the previous three types of explana-
sistence of the landed elite through Emancipa- tions, political institutions and mobilization are
tion, war, Reconstruction, and the instability derivative, a product of preexisting social struc-
of the last two decades of the nineteenth cen- tures or configurations of states. Institutionalists
tury. This persistence fatefully determined how are less apt to see classes and races as ready-made
modernization and politics developed (Billings, political actors than as contingent factors whose
1979; Wiener, 1978). The continued prevalence form is shaped by the institutional arenas (the
of planter elites and labor-repressive agriculture type of electoral system, the traditions of the
doomed both poor whites and blacks to an ex- party system, the degree of state centralization,
tremely lopsided economy and an elitist, repres- etc.) in which actors vie for power. In this view,
sive political system ( James, 1986; 1988; Rues- stateways can and do change folkways associated
chemeyer, Stevens, and Stevens, 1992: 127–9). with race and also can shape how classes form
Class analyses solve at least one problem as- as they vie for political power.8
sociated with the race arguments – that of mo- Kousser (1974) provides one means of getting
bilization capacity. In contrast to poor whites, around disputes about race and class by putting
planter elites were, of course, very organized. political institutions at the core of his under-
Even the Ku Klux Klan terror activities were standing the failed incorporation of blacks at
in the late 1860s and early 1870s largely orga- the end of the nineteenth century. In his ac-
nized and led by white elites.5 The same can count, dominant southern white planters used
be said of the massive disfranchisement white their overwhelming power and the racism of the
supremacy campaigns of the 1890s. Both cam- white majority to mobilize blacks out of poli-
paigns could be said to have resulted from class tics. They did this, he argues, once the threat of
interests (Keyssar, 2000; Kousser, 1974). Northern intervention diminished after 1890,
While downplaying society-centered expla- after putting down the strong internal political
nations based on race and class, a third line of
6
argument focuses on states within the interna- The Civil War itself, of course, was a crucial im-
petus toward emancipation as blacks soldiers played an
tional arena, especially in the context of wars.
important role in the Union victory. That role, in turn,
Wars or the threat of war can induce states to became an important argument for extending suffrage
extend suffrage rights and/or policy concessions to black males via the Fifteenth Amendment.
7
See also Klinkner and Smith (1999), Plummer
within specific historical contexts in order to understand (1996), and Von Eschen (1997).
8
them. See also Frederickson (2002:75), who argues that In that sense, these more political and institutional
“racism is always nationally specific.” accounts are not far from work on class that stresses the
5
See Allen W. Trelease (1971:51–3, 115, 296, 332, contingent nature of class formation, such as work in
354, 363) and Paul Escott (1985:156–7). Katznelson and Zolberg (1986).
P1: JZP
opposition of blacks and Populists through the changes in social relations wrought by postwar
use of large-scale fraud and often violent intim- economic transformations, subverted the domi-
idation at election time. The disfranchisement nant hierarchical or vertical organization of pol-
of blacks was only fully achieved when white itics by the Democratic Party and generated a
elites changed the rules of politics, using institu- significant degree of black political solidarity.
tional mechanisms such as poll taxes and literacy White elites, however, were able to regain the
tests to shut out black and poor white voters.9 upper hand by using their superior resources
Kousser takes race and class positions and inter- to co-opt and trump such innovations and em-
ests as given to explain how political institutions bed their power in racially exclusionary laws. In
were used to incrementally disfranchise blacks these accounts oriented toward institutions and
and solidify racial divisions. mobilization, politics are seen as an inventive
By contrast, Anthony Marx (1998) stresses the and constructive struggle within the constraints
ways that state building is deeply implicated in and opportunities created not only by societal
race making in the United States, Brazil, and forces but also by formal and informal institu-
South Africa. In Marx’s view, ethnic, regional, tions.
and class divisions among whites may threaten The implementation of a one-party racial
state-building efforts and therefore encourage caste system in the South at the end of the nine-
elites to generate racial exclusionary laws that teenth century, combined with the less formal
unify whites by subordinating blacks. Such laws but still sharper drawing of the color line in the
in turn generate black political identity, which North and West, was brutal, rigid, and thor-
can then be used as mechanisms of mobilization oughly institutionalized. Once established, the
to threaten social stability and force the relax- Southern racial state persisted for more than half
ation of such laws. Thus, state making and race a century. It took no less than the disappearance
making are dynamically linked. of labor-intensive cotton agriculture, the great
Though Marx is somewhat vague on how migration of blacks to Northern and Southern
divisions among whites generate enough white cities, and the power of the civil rights move-
unity to make blacks into scapegoats and im- ment to change the way race was institutional-
plement racially exclusionary laws, recent work ized within U.S. state institutions.
tackles issues of identity formation and mobi-
lization more directly. Kantrowitz (2000), for
enfranchisement once again: the civil
example, focuses on the ideological manifes-
rights movement and the state
tations of such mobilizing processes through
an examination of the “reconstruction” of
The civil rights movement ranks among the
white supremacy by South Carolinian white
most important social movements in U.S. his-
supremacist Ben Tillman. Gilmore (1996) looks
tory. It not only directly led to the demise of
at the way in which class, race, and gender in-
the Southern Jim Crow state system and dramat-
tersect in the generation of power. Finally, like
ically extended democracy in the United States,
Smith (1997), Redding (2003) argues that race
but it also served as a model and stimulus for
making is a by-product of efforts toward po-
many other domestic and international social
litical mobilization in unstable democratic sys-
movements of liberation (Morris, 1999). The
tems. He examines the complex interplay be-
political sociology of the civil rights movement
tween elites’ manipulation of political and racial
has reflected and also led the general trajectory
identity and the innovative mobilizing strategies
of the social movement literature itself over the
marginalized groups adopted to combat disfran-
course of the past three to four decades.10
chisement. These latter innovations, along with
10
This review of the civil rights movement focuses
9
See Kousser (1974), generally and especially chap. 9 on the social science literature. For reviews of the rather
and Table 9.4, p. 244. See also his (1999) Colorblind In- large historical literature on the topic, see Fairclough
justice, chap. 1. (1990), Lawson (1991), and Engles (2000).
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Early sociological analyses of the civil rights Morris’s account focused more singularly on
movement parted ways with tendencies of the the organizational side, developing an account
collective behavior tradition by emphasizing the that zeroed in on black agency as central to both
essential rationality of the actors’ grievances and the origins and the outcome of black insur-
their efforts to address them as well as the polit- gency. To be sure, Morris stressed the changes
ical nature of the struggle. Nonetheless, such in structural conditions (especially urbanization
studies often maintained an emphasis on the and growth of the black church) that made
spontaneous (rather than the planned and or- such agency possible. Nonetheless, Morris was
ganized) nature of movement mobilization and much more skeptical than McAdam and oth-
tactics (Killian, 1968; Matthews and Prothro, ers (Barkin, 1984; Garrow, 1978) about the
1966; Meier and Rudwick, 1973; Zinn, 1964). importance of factors external to the move-
Theorists more closely associated with mobi- ment, be they political opportunities, outside
lization approaches also argued that some parts resources and allies, the media, or the fed-
of the movement were not very organized eral government (Morris, 1984, 1993). Instead,
(Oberschall, 1973; Piven, 1977), which fit with Morris focused on what he called “indige-
a notion that marginalized groups lacked suf- nous” factors such as the mobilization of in-
ficient resources to develop organizational ca- ternal resources; strong linkages to mass-based
pacity. Instead, the success of the civil rights secondary associations, especially black churches
movement was linked to its ability to be sponta- and the culture and charisma lying within
neously disruptive or garner strategically placed them; and the use of innovative tactics and
(usually elite) allies that bolstered the group’s strategies.
power. As noted previously, a number of recent stud-
McAdam (1982) and Morris (1984) produced ies have cited the importance of the interna-
studies of the civil rights movement that at- tional context, especially postwar anticolonial
tacked a number of the central claims of both struggles and the Cold War, in creating allies for
resource mobilization and classical collective be- the movement and inducing greater federal in-
havior theory. Those two studies, now twenty volvement in the South in the 1950s and 1960s
years old but still among the most widely read (see Dudziak, 2000; Plummer, 1996; Skrentny,
political sociological analyses of the civil rights 1998; Von Eschen, 1997).
movement, and perhaps of movements in gen- Other scholars turned (with the more general
eral, developed different but still largely com- movement literature itself ) to neglected issues
plementary accounts. of gender, culture, and movement outcomes.
Arguing for what he called a “political pro- Black women such as Rosa Parks, Fannie Lou
cess” model, McAdam put organizational ca- Hammer, Diane Nash, and Ella Baker as well as
pacity and political opportunities at the core countless female activists of lesser renown played
of his analysis of the generation, successes, a crucial role in the movement, but only recently
and eclipse of the civil rights movement. The have scholars begun to fully analyze the interac-
organizational capacity of the movement was tion between gender and race in shaping move-
strengthened by the decline of the Southern ment mobilization and success. Robnett (1997)
cotton economy; by the subsequent migration examined how high levels of patriarchy could
of blacks to cities and the North; and by the both shunt the contributions of women to the
growth of the black church, black colleges, and background and also facilitate the development
the NAACP. Such changes, along with the shift of black women as crucial “bridge” leaders be-
in black political preferences to the Democratic tween the mass of local activists and the more
Party and favorable federal government action formal (male) leadership. In this interstitial po-
(coming largely at the end of World War II), sition, women were often more radical given
opened up opportunities for black insurgency their proximity to the grassroots and freedom
that had not been there before, according to from interactions with state authorities (see also
McAdam. Herda-Rapp, 1998).
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Coinciding and overlapping with work on and shift public perceptions, movements gener-
gender by Robnett, Ling, and Monteith (1999), ated policy concessions from political elites and
and Irons (1998) has been a more general recog- helped produce changes in public opinion with
nition of the importance of cultural factors. respect to racial inequality and public policy
Although neither McAdam (1982) nor Mor- concerning it (Garrow, 1978; McAdam, 1982;
ris (1984) ignored culture, more recent works Morris, 1984; Morris, 1993; Piven, 1977). This
put culture at the core of the analysis. Chappell, “dramatic events approach” (Santoro, 2002) sees
Hutchinson, and Ward (1999), for example, ex- the widespread sit-ins and the Birmingham and
amined the importance of dress and the pre- Selma protests of the early 1960s, and the dra-
sentation of “respectable” images that shaped matic media coverage of them, as leading di-
movement activities whereas Platt and Fraser rectly to the early presidential executive or-
(1998) examined movement frames and dis- ders dealing with racial discrimination, the 1964
courses. Still other recent studies examine the Civil Rights Act, and the 1965 Voting Rights
importance of music and its influence on the Act. Burstein (1985) focuses less on the move-
construction of ideas and identities in the movement events themselves than on liberalizing
ment (Eyerman and Jamison, 1998; Ward, 1998) public opinion as being key to such legislative
that keyed the movement’s political successes.11 changes. Recent research by Santoro (2002) at-
One of the more interesting lacunae in the tempts to reconcile these two claims by argu-
literature on the civil rights movement involves ing, at least with respect to fair employment
how little we know about the opposition to laws, that dramatic movement events explain the
the movement. There are exceptions touching first wave of racial policy responses. Movement
on institutional- and class-oriented opposition events, since they subsided in number and in-
(Bloom, 1987; James, 1988) as well as works by tensity in the early 1970s, however, cannot ex-
historians such as Roche (1998), and Chappell plain subsequent policy developments such as
(1994) and early work by Bartley (1969) and the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act
McMillan (1971). As Engles (2000:842) has as well as fair housing laws and subsequent ex-
pointed out, “the failure to explore the seg- tensions of the Voting Rights Act. Here more
regationists would certainly disappoint Gunnar conventional political processes, especially pub-
Myrdal, who argued more than fifty years ago lic opinion, come into play.
that the real racial problem was in the white Skrentny (1996), on the other hand, takes a
mind.” different view, at least with respect to affirma-
There is little doubt that the civil rights move- tive action. His evidence suggests that this pol-
ment had a dramatic impact on U.S. politics and icy developed not because of demands from the
policy. Civil rights protests, urban riots, and seg- civil rights movement (which was initially wary
regationist violence have typically been seen as of race conscious policies) or shifts in public
the main catalysts for breakthrough legislation opinion (which was solidly against such poli-
and court rulings with respect to voting rights, cies). Rather, one of the many ironies of this
equal employment opportunity, fair housing, policy was that it was incrementally developed
and school desegregation. Because of their ca- and then promoted by white government and
pacity to sow social disorder, create electoral in- business elites (many of them Republicans) as
stabilities, open the United States to interna- a form of “crisis management” to quell urban
tional criticism in the context of the Cold War, riots and burnish the American image abroad
during a time of Cold War.
11
See also McAdam’s (1999) new introduction to the
second edition of his (1982) book. Newer studies are analyses of public policies
increasingly examining the ways in which the cultural
content of black churches may facilitate and sometimes
inhibit civil rights movement mobilization (e.g., The dramatic social movement activity of the
Calhoun-Brown, 1998; Patillo-McCoy, 1998). 1960s produced transformations of political
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institutions in the United States and stimulated registration rates dramatically. Black registra-
a rich body of public policy research that con- tion rates apparently approached those of whites
tinues to grow. A comprehensive review of the as white mobilization stimulated black coun-
literature on public policies focused on racial in- termobilization (Alt, 1994). The disadvantage
equalities is beyond the scope of this chapter (see of “agricultural labor dependence,” so promi-
Brown, 2003). Instead, we provide a selective nent earlier, disappeared by 1971 (Alt, 1994).
review of important works that we believe are Black voter turnout still lags white turnout na-
illustrative of the breadth of the issues addressed tionally, but continued to increase slightly be-
and then discuss the political forces that under- tween 1994 and 1998 (from 39 to 42%) as white
mined support for such policies and produced turnout declined (from 51 to 47%) (Gaither
an impetus toward color-blind policies. The cri- and Newburger, 2001). As expected, legislators
tique of the racial state ( James and Redding in are more receptive to the interests of minority
this volume) provides the critical framework for groups if they are enfranchised and vote (e.g.,
evaluating the nature of the policies adopted and Kousser, 1999; Lawson, 1985, 1990; Lublin,
enforced in different contexts. A strong ten- 1995).
dency away from color-conscious policies and As the enfranchisement of racial minorities
toward color-blind policies is apparent, but the appeared complete, scholarly attention shifted to
multilayered and fragmented U.S. state structure the electoral representation of minority group
produces a variety of impacts on race inequali- voters. Because racially polarized voting per-
ties. We focus first on policies that affect political sists, the election of black candidates depends
and civil rights and then turn to a variety of so- heavily on the black proportion of the elec-
cial welfare policies that are impacted by political torate. Furthermore, candidates continue to
and civil rights (Marshall, 1992 [1950]). mobilize constituencies by making racial appeals
(Mendelberg, 2001). Black candidates for pub-
lic office seldom win elections in districts that
Voting Rights do not have black majorities (Grofman and
Davidson, 1994; Handley and Grofman, 1994).
Matthews’ and Prothro’s (1966) classic analysis The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) prohib-
of the denial of voting rights to African Amer- ited changes in the boundaries of electoral dis-
icans ended in 1960 just before the passage of tricts if those changes would dilute black vot-
the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Compared with the ing strength. In 1982, the VRA was amended
huge amount of research on the politics of black to strengthen the protection of minority vot-
disfranchisement during the period from about ing rights and enhance their ability to elect
1877 to 1910, research on the reenfranchisement representatives of their own race if they chose
of blacks and other minorities has been limited. to do so (Davidson, 1994). As a result of Jus-
Historical accounts analyze the forces leading to tice Department actions and private litigation
the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the ef- in the early 1980s to enforce the new provi-
fects of increasing levels of black voter turnout sions of the VRA, the number of black ma-
immediately thereafter (e.g., Keech, 1968; Law- jority districts grew and the number of black
son, 1976; Lawson, 1985, 1990). James (1988) elected officials increased appreciably (Grofman
found that the areas of greatest resistance to black and Davidson, 1994; Handley and Grofman,
enfranchisement were governed by local state 1994). The Democratic Party traditionally sup-
structures serving areas where labor-intensive ported the creation of black majority districts
cotton agriculture persisted and depended on because black voters vote overwhelmingly for
black agricultural labor. Alt (1994) found that Democrats. On the other hand, Republicans
the elimination of state-enforced registration have been able to turn this initial Democratic
obstacles (e.g., literacy tests and poll taxes) and advantage in black voting into a disadvantage.
allowing federal examiners to intervene at the By concentrating black voters in black ma-
local level to register black voters increased black jority districts, Democratic strength in other
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districts is diluted, making Republican victories evidence that black elected officials and whites
there more likely (Kousser, 1999; Lublin, 1995; elected with the support of large black con-
Thernstrom, 1987). stituencies support policies that are more con-
Deliberately redrawing electoral district sistent with the stated interests of blacks than
boundaries to create black majority districts is is otherwise the case (Canon, 1999; Kousser,
an example of a racial state policy ( James and 1999; Thernstrom, 1987).12 Such evidence on
Redding in this volume) and has been subjected black representation has led some to argue for
to heavy criticism for that reason. Thernstrom changing the winner-take-all U.S. representa-
argues that the VRA, a law originally intended tional system in ways that will make greater
to prevent the racist disfranchisement of South- black office-holding more likely (Guinier,
ern black voters, has been turned into “a means 1994).
to ensure that black votes have value – have the While incorporation of African Americans
power, that is, to elect blacks” (1987:4). Nev- into U.S. politics remains today a contentious
ertheless, the trajectory of recent U.S. Supreme issue, in Britain (which is, among European
Court decisions is moving toward color-blind countries, closest to the United States in terms
criteria for drawing electoral district bound- of having a settled ethnic minority where skin
aries. Kousser’s massive study documents this color – as opposed to nationality, culture, or re-
trend in detail and concludes that the Court’s ligion – is a major marker of distinction), polit-
motivation for weakening the protection for ical rights for its ethnic minority never required
black majority districts is a thinly disguised at- the national government’s intervention, as in the
tempt to enforce white supremacy rather than United States. As Hansen (2000) points out, due
equal rights (1999). to the prerogatives of the British Empire, immi-
Another voting rights issue that is beginning grants from Commonwealth societies like Ja-
to draw greater attention is the larger number of maica and India were, until 1962 (when Britain
blacks who have been disfranchised by virtue of severely restricted immigration from the Com-
a felony conviction. Uggen and Manza (2002) monwealth), defined as British subjects who
estimate that nearly 2 million blacks, more than had the right to vote in elections. Ironically,
7 percent of the black voting age population, British racial minorities have less political power
have been disfranchised in this way. They also es- at the national level than do African Americans –
timate that felon disfranchisement laws and high they do not have a major organization at the na-
rates of crimination punishment may have al- tional level, nor have they been allowed to have
tered the outcomes of numerous elections since racial caucuses within the political parties or
the 1970s. in Parliament (Layton-Henry, 1992; Lieberman,
With the increase in black voting brought by 2002; Teles, 1998). Frederickson (1998) and
the Voting Rights Act and other political re- Teles (1998) also suggest that racial identity
forms, black office-holding grew dramatically. among minorities is weaker in Britain than in
In 1970 there were fewer than 1,500 black the United States, making it a less suitable basis
elected officials in the United States; by the for political mobilization.
year 2000 there were close to 9,000. The U.S.
Congress had only twelve black members in
1970 but nearly forty in 2000. Still, in terms of Social Welfare and Housing Segregation
percentages, the overall numbers remain quite
low for the most part. While blacks make up William J. Wilson and his colleagues provided
more than 12 percent of the U.S. population, a voluminous and influential stream of research
the 9,000 blacks in office represents less than 2 on the continuing high levels of poverty among
percent of all elected officials. At the state leg-
islative level, the figure is closer to 7 percent, 12
See also Frymer (1999), Swain (1993), Whitby,
whereas representation in Congress is nearly 9 (1997), and Whitby and Krause (2001) for recent re-
percent (U.S., 2000; U.S., 2002). There is strong search on this issue.
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African Americans in the United States (1987, residential segregation is perhaps the most pow-
1996, 1999). His recent research identifies a erful cause of the creation and maintenance
variety of causes of poverty among African of racial identities in the United States today
Americans (e.g., loss of jobs in black residen- ( James, 1994; Tilly, Moss, Kirschenman, and
tial areas, poor qualifications among black job Kennelly, 2001). By shaping racial identities, res-
seekers, residential segregation, white racism idential segregation reproduces the motivation
and discrimination, etc.), but none attribute that perpetuates race discrimination. Perhaps
any continuing causal impacts to state insti- recognizing the liberal state’s inability to force
tutions. Rather than enforcing racial oppres- people to live in racially integrated neighbor-
sion, the state now promotes “racial equality” hoods, Massey recommends that more resources
(Wilson, 1978). Wilson’s underdeveloped the- and commitment of will to the enforcement of
ory of the state coupled with an understand- fair housing laws as the principal instrument of
ing of the white electoral majority’s widespread desegregation. Massey joins with Wilson in rec-
opposition to color-conscious policies designed ommending color-blind solutions for current
to eliminate race inequalities (e.g., affirmative problems of race inequality. Schill (1994) points
action) led him to advocate color-blind poli- out that antidiscrimination enforcement alone is
cies to reduce class inequalities. Because blacks ineffective in dismantling the racial concentra-
are disproportionately poor, they would bene- tion of poverty and argues that federal policies
fit disproportionately from any federal program of locating low-income housing in white subur-
designed to reduce poverty. Hence, politically ban areas are essential. Nevertheless, Schill also
possible color-blind antipoverty policies are pre- advocates a color-blind, class-based policy. Wil-
ferred over color-conscious policies that alienate son and Massey show that the legacies of color-
whites and tend to help middle class blacks more conscious policies linger in the race inequalities
than “truly disadvantaged” whites and blacks of today, but have difficulty devising color-blind
(Wilson, 1987, 1996). policies that will correct them.
Douglas Massey and his colleagues also pro- Studies that theorize the state show that
duced a massive volume of research on the causes color-blind policies have different impacts de-
of African American poverty (e.g., Massey and pending on the organizational structure of the
Denton, 1993). Their research establishes the state. The political scientist Robert Lieber-
links between residential segregation and the man (1998) covers some of the same terri-
asymmetry in the concentration of poverty for tory as Quadagno (1988, 1994), but provides
whites and blacks (Massey, 1990). Racial seg- a nuanced model of the state that reflects the
regation concentrates poor African Americans multilevel, hierarchical model of organizational
in high poverty areas at high rates and, by con- structure advocated by Lehman (1988). As did
trast, disperses poor whites to more affluent ar- Quadagno, he identifies the difference between
eas. As segregation concentrates black poverty, it programs that are federally administered ac-
also concentrates blacks in neighborhoods with cording to universal criteria and national pro-
higher crime rates and myriad other social prob- grams administered through racially biased or-
lems (Massey, 1990, 2001; Massey and Denton, ganizations shaped by locally powerful parochial
1993). Racial segregation is an obstruction to interests. In addition, Lieberman claims that
black residential mobility, which, in turn, in- the organizational institutionalization of who
hibits black social mobility. pays and who benefits shapes political support
Color-conscious state policies in the past are for the social welfare programs and the polit-
prime contributors to racial differences in the ical identities of contributors and beneficiar-
concentration of poverty in the present (Massey ies.
and Denton, 1993). Continuing patterns of la-
Policies with egalitarian benefits and contributory fi-
bor market and housing market discrimination nancing will produce self-generating, perpetual, and
also exacerbate the disadvantages of the de- unified constituencies, whereas discretionary, non-
pressed neighborhoods that are home to large contributory policies will have constituencies that are
numbers of African Americans. In addition, more fragmented and separated politically from the
P1: JZP
general population. The structure of benefits and fi- workforce. UI provided an honorable link to
nancing also influences the relationship of beneficia- the welfare state for the black middle class, but
ries to other elements of the political system, partic- had little to offer poor African Americans who
ularly their status in the public mind as “deserving” were isolated and cut off from the labor force
or “undeserving,” “honorable” or “dishonorable.”
(Lieberman, 1998)
(Lieberman, 1998).
Lieberman’s analysis of social welfare policy
Lieberman analyzes the historical trajectory of in the United States provides three important
three social welfare programs to evaluate the ad- qualifications to the theory of the racial state.
equacy of his claims. Old Age Insurance (OAI) First, all color-blind policies are not the same.
was nationally administered and funded by con- The way that social policies are institutional-
tributions from beneficiaries who were selected ized within the organizational structure of the
according to egalitarian criteria. Aid to Depen- state has a profound impact on the maintain-
dent Children (ADC) was a noncontributory ing or exacerbating of racial inequalities. Sec-
program administered locally according to the ond, the administration of social welfare policies
discretion of state and local officials who dis- through local political institutions that have dis-
criminated against blacks. Unemployment In- cretionary power in determining program eligi-
surance (UI) provided an intermediate case be- bility and benefits produces unequal provision
tween OAI and ADC. of social benefits. If locally powerful interests
Because agricultural and domestic workers are motivated by racial bias, social provision will
were originally excluded from OAI and be- be racially biased. Third, locally administered,
cause blacks were disproportionately employed need-based, social welfare policies tend to re-
in agriculture or domestic work, few blacks ben- inforce racial politics and identities. Racial po-
efited from OAI during the 1930s. Amend- larization tends to stigmatize the target welfare
ments during the 1950s finally extended OAI program and its beneficiaries.
to agricultural and domestic workers, and blacks
were brought into the system without stigma-
tizing the program. OAI is still the most pop- Other Policies
ular and most fairly administered welfare pro-
gram in the United States. By contrast, political The trend toward color blindness in policy
struggles surrounding ADC stigmatized it as an formation and implementation is apparent in
entitlement program for blacks that they had other social policy areas. For example, color-
not earned. Discriminatory administration of conscious policies such as busing to desegre-
ADC through parochial local institutions even- gate public schools are being abandoned even
tually became the target of black protest politics, though many public school systems, especially
which ratified the racial stigmatization of the those in the largest cities, have disproportionate
program in the minds of many whites. Without numbers of white or blacks students assigned to
the protection of national political institutions, them. Supreme Court decisions increasingly re-
the racial politicization of ADC at the local level lease public school districts from within-district
led to the “political degeneration of welfare” mandatory desegregation policies that were im-
and the “political construction of the urban un- posed as a remedy for the racially discrimina-
derclass” (Lieberman, 1998). tory policies of the past (e.g., Armor, 1995;
The intermediate case of Unemployment In- Orfield and Eaton, 1996). Cross-district reme-
surance produced intermediate results as ex- dies are not required unless it can be shown that
pected. UI was administered fairly across racial the boundaries between districts were drawn
lines and did not become mired in racial poli- with discriminatory intent, an almost impossible
tics as did ADC. Nevertheless, because UI was standard to prove.
administered through parochial local institu- The administration of public schools in the
tions and because it was largely funded through United States is fragmented into thousands of
employer rather than employee contributions, public school districts. The forces that created
it tended to reinforce racial divisions in the the patterns of residential segregation in urban
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areas contribute to the racially unequal as- in the United States – was a constraint that
signment of students to schools (Massey and the Commission for Racial Equality (the British
Denton, 1993; Orfield, 1978; Orfield and counterpart to the EEOC) could not overcome
Eaton, 1996). The network of school dis- (see also Teles, 1998). Both Lieberman (2002)
tricts creates a decision environment that allows and Teles (1998) also highlight the importance
whites with sufficient resources to escape send- of the lack of political power of British minori-
ing their children to schools with substantial ties at the national level compared to that of
black enrollments if they choose. Thus, the African Americans.
fragmentation of metropolitan schooling into The moves away from race-conscious poli-
many independent districts increases segrega- cies and toward color-blind policies discussed
tion between districts ( James, 1989; Orfield, earlier reflected broader events and trends in
Bachmeier, James, and Eitle, 1997). Political U.S. class and racial politics. As noted previ-
boundaries between districts insulate white ma- ously, both the Johnson and Nixon admin-
jority districts from desegregative policies and istrations pushed affirmative action programs;
shape the residential housing choices of whites those programs, however, presented both diffi-
by serving as markers that distinguish “good” culties and opportunities for the two parties. For
neighborhoods from “bad” (Weiher, 1991; Democrats, promulgation of such policies could
Wells and Crain, 1997). As in the case of social solidify black support for the party. However,
welfare programs, the fragmented, multilevel to the extent that policies such as the Philadel-
institutional structure that provides public phia Plan attacked racially exclusionary hiring
schooling in the United States also provides practices in predominantly Democratic build-
racially unequal schooling environments for stu- ing trade unions, they could cause intramural
dents and contributes to the maintenance of fights in the Democratic coalition. The Nixon
racial identities. Similar patterns are typical of administration, in spite of its surprisingly strong
studies of affirmative action, labor market dis- early support of affirmative action, changed its
crimination, and racial inequalities in crimi- rhetoric rather quickly when it saw it could use
nal justice (e.g., Brown, 2003; Hawkins, 2001; “quotas” as a wedge issue between labor unions
Kennedy, 2001; Moss and Tilly, 2001; Skrentny, and minorities (Skrentny, 1996; Edsall and Ed-
1996, 2001; Swain, 2001; Walker, Spohn, and sall, 1991).
DeLone, 2004). A number of research studies that address
Nonetheless, scholars have noted the paradox these concerns have yielded mixed results. In
that antidiscrimination policies are stronger and their (1999) book, Manza and Brooks trace
more “race-conscious” in America, the epitome the roles of social cleavages (race, class, reli-
of being a “weak state,” than in stronger states gion, and gender) in voting during presiden-
with antidiscrimination laws such as Britain. tial elections from 1952 to 1992. Although they
Lieberman (2002) argues that the fragmented find that the aggregated impact of class cleav-
nature of the U.S. government proved to be an ages (i.e., differences between managers, pro-
unexpected strength for antidiscrimination en- fessionals, the self-employed, the skilled and
forcement. The U.S. Equal Employment Op- nonskilled working classes, and people outside
portunity Commission (EEOC) was able to use the labor force in vote choice) has fluctuated
its power of publicity, the courts, and its alliance with no apparent trends, they do find evidence
with the NAACP to overcome weak White that skilled and unskilled workers showed a
House support and congressional hostility and sharp decreases inDemocratic support in the
pursue a “collective, race-conscious enforce- late 1960s and late 1970s, respectively (although
ment of Title VII [of the 1964 Civil Rights both groups are more likely than not to vote
Act]” (Lieberman, 2002:148). In Britain, the Democrat). The consequence of these shifts
weak support, if not outright hostility, of the is that the class compositions of Democratic
British national government – which is more and Republican voters have converged over
centralized and has a stronger executive than time.
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Meanwhile, differences between blacks and enough, Frymer finds that the CBC dedicated
nonblacks in vote choice have increased over more of its efforts to economic and welfare poli-
time, with African American support for the cies that would benefit both blacks and whites
Democrats jumping to over 90 percent start- than to civil rights).
ing with the 1964 presidential election, whereas However, as a result of ensuing Demo-
white Democratic support has tended to hover cratic defeats in presidential elections, white
between 40 and 50 percent. Moreover, Manza Democrats began to accept the political neces-
and Brooks show that during elections when sity of distancing their party from African Amer-
black/nonblack differences in vote choice are ican interests, a strategy epitomized by Bill Clin-
heightened, the impact of an individual’s class ton, whose commitment to civil rights rarely
position is muted, suggesting a zero-sum rela- went beyond symbolic gestures (Frymer, 2002).
tionship between class and race cleavages. Weak- In the legislative realm, the Democratic Party
liem (1997) also finds that the impact of class on also refused to support legislative initiatives by
vote choice is depressed in states with a high the CBC, such as its attempts to pass full em-
proportion of African Americans (although this ployment legislation during the Carter adminis-
negative effect of black population on class vot- tration (despite the fact that the Democrats were
ing decreases over time). This zero-sum rela- the majority party in Congress). When white
tionship between class and race cleavages, as well Democratic congresspeople did ally with the
as the fact of declining working class support for CBC, it was usually on issues that had bipar-
the Democrats, suggests that Democratic sup- tisan support, such as the 1982 Voting Rights
port for the civil rights agenda has alienated the Act. Black Democrats have been instrumental
white working class. However, the evidence is in promoting contract set-asides for minorities
not wholly consistent with this claim. Manza and blunting domestic spending cuts in behind-
and Brooks (1999) find that racial attitudes do the-scenes committee work, but their success
not explain all of the working class shift toward in crafting legislation in committee depends on
the Republicans. Instead, workers’ evaluations congressional rules that thwart the majority will,
of the national economy and their increased such as the seniority system for committee chairs
hostility toward welfare policies were the ma- (Frymer, 1999).
jor factors leading to their alienation from the Even though African Americans provide the
Democrats. highest support for the Democratic Party of any
Frymer (1999) details how the cross-pressures racial group, Frymer (1999, 2002) argues the
of increased black and declining white work- Democratic Party takes its black constituency
ing Class support affected the Democratic Party. for granted and will rarely support policy initia-
Due to the civil rights movement and Cold War tives that would benefit minorities (or the poor
pressures (discussed previously), the Democrats in general, for that matter), in an effort to win
were able to pass landmark civil rights legisla- white support. He concludes that the effective
tion such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 exclusion of minorities from the agenda-setting
Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing process is an inevitable outcome of a two-party,
Act. After Nixon’s election and the fiasco of majoritarian electoral system, and that nothing
the 1968 Democratic Convention, the Demo- less than major electoral reform will fully incor-
cratic Party became the major vehicle for the porate blacks in American politics.
civil rights agenda. The party reformed its nom-
inating process, giving grassroots movements
more influence over which candidate would be public opinion and race
nominated. Black Democratic Congresspeople
formed the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) We now turn our attention to the public reac-
in 1970 and worked to draw attention to issues tion to these policy efforts to ameliorate racial
of employment, poverty, civil rights, and human inequality. After justifying the study of public
rights in Latin America and Africa (interestingly opinion on racial issues, we describe the trends
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in whites’ and blacks’ support for government Trends and Patterns14

action to ensure racial equality and then re-
view the contending interpretations of these The most remarked-upon finding in research
trends.13 on racial attitudes is that since the civil rights
Studying individuals’ opinions on racial issues movement, whites have increasingly endorsed
is important for two reasons. First, individu- principles of equal treatment for blacks, which
als’ stands can influence broad political out- is the sentiment that blacks should be able to
comes such as policy. Some scholars are skep- go to the same schools, live in the same neigh-
tical of racial attitudes having an independent borhoods, enjoy the same public accommoda-
role in long-term shifts in racial politics and tions, and work at the same workplaces and jobs
view changes in whites’ sentiment toward blacks that whites do. Support for some of these prin-
as reflections of political actors maneuvering in ciples approaches 100 percent. Usually, how-
institutional arenas. However, even if one be- ever, white support for government interven-
lieves that racial attitudes are epiphenomena, it tion to enforce rights for blacks lags behind their
is plausible that aggregate public opinion can support for the principles in question. For ex-
spark or facilitate short-term changes in racial ample, although over the years white Ameri-
politics. This can occur through individuals vot- cans have told surveyors that whites should not
ing (Brooks 2000), policy makers heeding pub- keep black families out of white neighborhoods,
lic opinion (see Manza and Cook, 2002 for the whites are less disposed to favor open hous-
case that public opinion does influence state ing laws. This has led Schuman et al. (1997) to
actors, albeit contingently), or people thwart- coin the phrase “the principle-implementation
ing policies after their formulation (e.g., North- gap” to describe white endorsement for gen-
ern whites forming antibusing social movements eral principles of racial equality but reluctance
and fleeing to the suburbs in response to federal to support government implementation of those
desegregation efforts). principles.
Another reason for studying racial attitudes Affirmative action-like policies that require
is that they are a barometer of group relations. preferential treatment in jobs and university ad-
Jackman (1994), for example, argues that inter- missions elicit very low support from white
group attitudes reflect the messages and ideolo- Americans (usually less than 30 percent of
gies that not only percolate within groups, but whites support such policies). Studies using
are also the messages that are transmitted to the split ballot survey experiments show that whites
other group in a drawn-out process of inter- oppose preferential treatment regardless if the
group negotiation and persuasion. Thus, inter- beneficiaries are blacks or another disadvan-
group attitudes are not, as Jackman (1994:60) taged group, like women; but whites are more
puts it, “naively expressive,” but rather “com- likely to oppose preferential treatment ben-
municative and political” as well. efiting blacks than similar policies benefiting
women. Whites are much more amenable to
13
This section follows the public opinion and race “opportunity-enhancing” policies for blacks,
research agenda’s focus on whites and blacks. For work such as job training, educational assistance, and
that examines attitudes about Latinos and Asians or the companies’ outreach efforts to attract minor-
racial attitudes of Latinos and Asians, see Bobo and
ity applicants, but again they show greater sup-
Hutchings (1996), Bobo and Johnson (2000), Bobo and
Massagli (2001), Citrin et al. (2001), Huddy and Sears port for policies when the beneficiaries are not
(1995), Kluegel and Bobo (2001), and Sears et al. (1999). specifically black, such as low-income individ-
For recent work on public opinion toward immigrants uals or women (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Steeh
(who are usually considered ethnic outgroups) in Eu- and Krysan, 1996).
ropean societies, see Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman,
and Verbeck (2001), Lubbers, Scheepers, and Billiet
(2000), McLaren (2003), Meertens and Pettigrew (1997),
14
Pettigrew and Meertens (2001), and Scheepers, Gijs- Much of this section is based on Schuman, Steeh,
berts, and Coenders (2002). Bobo, and Krysan’s (1997) Racial Attitudes in America.
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Blacks show much higher support for prin- ity or not – indeed, whether one viewed blacks
ciples of equal treatment, government imple- as equal to whites – current politics over racial
mentation of those principles, and opportunity- issues hinge on broader political values and less
enhancing and affirmative action policies than on evaluations about blacks per se. While Sni-
whites do. Black Americans also show greater derman and Piazza (1993) agree that preju-
support for social welfare policies not related dice continues to exist among whites, its effect
to race than whites (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; on whites’ stands on racial policies is confined
Kinder and Winter, 2001; Schuman, Steeh, to the less educated. Among the well-educated,
Bobo, and Krysan, 1997). Black support for Sniderman argues, political views – namely,
most of these policies has remained at high lev- about the extent to which government should
els throughout the years with no clear trend, intervene in market processes – motivate po-
although there is some evidence that black sup- sitions on racial issues. Research bears out
port for preferential treatment declined in the Sniderman’s general claim that political values
1990s (Steeh and Krysan, 1996). Interestingly not directly related to race do substantially in-
enough, the principle–implementation gap also fluence whites’ support or opposition to race-
exists for blacks, although the gap is much targeted policies (Kinder and Sanders, 1996;
smaller than for whites. Sears, Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman, 1997;
Tuch, 1996).
theories of public opinion Generally speaking, authors in the race-
and racial politics centered approach believe that hostility toward
racial equality has survived the social changes
For the past two decades, social scientists have brought about by the civil rights movement,
debated interpretations of the changes in Amer- but this animus has changed form in the face
icans’ opinions on race policies and why so many of the empowerment of African Americans.16
white Americans oppose state efforts to ensure According to Jackman (1994), groups involved
black–white parity in social status and economic in expropriative, unequal relationships (includ-
resources. Although there are many contending ing blacks and whites) benefit by avoiding open
answers, at its core this debate boils down to the conflict that risks whatever stake they have in
extent of white hostility toward racial equality. the status quo. When the civil rights move-
On one side, scholars taking a “politics-centered ment successfully forced the state to extend
approach” (Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell, the franchise to blacks, they gained enough
2000) argue that this hostility is limited to Amer- political leverage to make blatant, Jim Crow
icans with little education and that much of racism costly and self-defeating. Where Jim
white disapproval of government intervention Crow racism was premised on categorical and
to help African Americans is grounded in com- inherent differences between whites and blacks,
mitments to meritocracy or laissez-faire princi- new forms of racism treat black–white differ-
ples. Researchers in a race-centered framework, ences as more differences of degree than of kind
however, believe that white antipathy to racial and do not attribute these differences to inher-
equality is the key element for understanding the ent qualities of whites and blacks. This new
changes in white support for racial policies.15 racism views black disadvantages as problems
Sniderman and colleagues (1997, 1996, 2000, largely of African Americans’ own making, and
1993) argue that contemporary racial politics not so much due to discrimination. It com-
represent a sharp break from the past. Whereas bines universalistic principles like individual-
politics during the Jim Crow era revolved ism to indifference toward existing black–white
around whether one was in favor of racial equal-
16
Due to space limitations, we try to present a coher-
15
For more extensive overviews of this debate, see ent synthesis of various race-centered works; for more
Krysan (2000) and Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, and Bobo information on disagreements among the race-centered
(2000). approaches, consult the references in note 15.
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inequalities, and thus provides a powerful justifi- Winter, 2001). Besides examining black–white
cation for whites to oppose remedies for black- differences in opinion, Bobo (1983, 2000; Bobo
white inequality in wealth, power, and status and Johnson, 2000) has also examined how per-
(Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith, 1997; Jackman, ceptions of group conflict vary among racial
1994). groups and how they motivate support or oppo-
A number of researchers have offered their sition to various racial policies, showing mixed
own versions of new racism; currently the results.
most prominent are symbolic racism (Kinder The race-centered approach makes a persua-
and Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988), racial resent- sive case that white opposition to racial poli-
ment (Kinder and Sanders, 1996), and laissez- cies is not reducible to political principles and
faire racism (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith, 1997). values and that white hostility to racial equal-
Usually, the new racism is measured by survey ity is still a potent political force. Though this
items asking respondents their agreement with perspective offers provocative insights on con-
statements that are tinged with either sympathy temporary U.S. politics, more work is needed to
toward African Americans or moral condemna- refine its ideas about group conflict and negotia-
tion (e.g., “Over the past few years, blacks have tion into falsifiable hypotheses (Schuman, 1995;
gotten less than they deserve” and “It’s really a Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell, 2000).
matter of some people not trying hard enough;
if blacks would only try harder they could be
just as well off as whites”). the power of color-blind policies
The new racism has powerful effects on to legitimate white advantage
whites’ policy opinions. Research shows that it
is the most powerful predictor of whites’ oppo- A crucial turn in the worldwide process of
sition to various racial policies, such as enforcing racial formation occurred after World War II
antidiscrimination employment laws, spending (Goldberg, 2002; Winant, 2001). White supre-
money to assist blacks, and affirmative action macy is gradually giving way to “racial dual-
(Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Sears, Laar, Car- ism” in which overt expression of racism is
rillo, and Kosterman, 1997). Scholars have also opposed, but the inequalities created by cen-
found that new racism and similar measures also turies of white supremacy are viewed as largely
temper support for other domestic policies not corrected. At the state level, this process is re-
directly related to race, such as welfare (Gilens, flected in the abandonment of explicit racial
1999; Kinder and Sanders, 1996).17 policies in favor of race-neutral policies. Winant
Other research in the race-centered frame- (2001) argues that protecting and extending
work focus on black–white cleavages in sup- race inequalities no longer needs “explicit state
port for racial policies and argue that these di- enforcement” as it did in the past because
visions represent the contrary group interests of race is hegemonic. Members of racial minor-
blacks and whites. These policies may not nec- ity groups consent to persistence of race in-
essarily help the individual blacks who support equalities because liberal democratic political
them or hurt the individual whites who op- institutions hide their causes. Explicit enforce-
pose them; the race cleavages occur because of ment of white supremacist policies now un-
perceptions that the policy would help or hurt dermines white supremacy; racial hegemony
the racial groups as a whole (Bobo, 1988; Bobo protects whites’ racial advantages by denying
and Kluegel, 1993; Jackman, 1994; Kinder and that they exist (Winant, 2001).
Studies of race policy trends in the United
17
Research using new racism concepts have been States concur with Goldberg and Winant
criticized on both conceptual and measurement (Brown, 2003; Kousser, 1999; Lublin, 1995).
grounds – see work by Sniderman and colleagues (2000,
1993) and Schuman (2000). For the defense of the con- For example, Brown et al. (2003) argue that
cept and its measures, see Sears et al. (1997) and Kinder whites fail to see the durable pattern of race
and colleagues (2000, 1996). inequality that accumulated over the decades
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to their advantage and to the disadvantage of whiteness18 interprets white advantage as enti-
nonwhites. The cumulative advantage enjoyed tlement and renders invisible the cumulative dis-
by whites is the direct result of color-conscious advantage suffered by nonwhites (Brown, 2003).
state policies that discriminated against blacks In every policy area, color-blind policies tend
in the past. Whites who agree with the lib- to leave inequalities unchanged, whereas color-
eral principles enshrined in the civil rights laws conscious ones reinforce white racial identities
view themselves as having no direct responsi- and stiffen white resistance to change. When
bility for the disadvantages suffered by blacks. whites are in the majority, they may be able
Whites are convinced that they are not guilty veto color-conscious policies that threaten their
of racism because they do not engage in or advantages or sense of entitlement.
support race-conscious policies that discrimi- But color-blind policies are also popular in
nate against blacks. Bonilla-Silva (2003) argues Brazil and South Africa, where whites are not
that liberalism’s emphasis on equal opportunity a numerical majority. Widespread belief in the
makes it possible for whites to “appear ‘reason- legitimacy of individual citizenship rights are re-
able’ and even ‘moral,’ while opposing almost all inforced by the institutions of liberal democra-
practical approaches to deal with de facto racial cies. The exercise of individual citizenship rights
inequality.” Whereas color-blind ideology was legitimizes racial inequalities by disguising them
once a powerful tool for racial justice because as the effect of individual choices. Just as Lenin
it attacked state-enforced race discrimination, (1943) argued that democracy is the “best pos-
it is now a “near-impenetrable shield, almost sible political shell” to legitimate capitalist ex-
a civic religion, that actually promotes the un- ploitation, liberal democracy is also the best
equal racial status quo” (Brown, 2003). possible shell to mask racial inequalities. (See
Policy makers who wish to reduce racial in- Anderson, 1976 on the power of liberal democ-
equalities face a dilemma. Color-blind policies racies to legitimate social inequalities.)
tend to protect white advantage by prohibit-
ing policy tools that would use race criteria
to redistribute resources from whites to non- conclusion
whites. Color-conscious policies, even modest
ones like most affirmative action programs, rein- This review of the political sociological litera-
force white race identities and white opposition ture on race reveals an increasing appreciation
to the policies. Advocates of color-conscious of the ways that race identities and inequalities
policies to reduce race inequalities (e.g., Bonilla- are both causes and effects of state making. The
Silva, 2003; Brown, 2003; Kousser, 1999) may disruption and turmoil caused by the civil rights
be correct that some whites, perhaps most, hide movement during the 1960s was the engine of
their preference for white advantage behind a change in the United States that drove state poli-
convenient mask of liberal values. Nevertheless, cies from an overt defense of white supremacy
advocates do not confront directly the claims and white advantage toward color-blind poli-
of critics (e.g., D’Souza, 1995; Sleeper, 1997; cies and institutional arrangements typical of
Thernstrom, 1987; Thernstrom and Thern- liberal democratic states. The trend toward
strom 1997) that color-conscious policies anger color-blind policies in the United States, which
whites and reinforce white-identity politics that is mirrored in other countries around the world,
the color-conscious policies are intended to
ameliorate. In some policy areas such as public 18
Brown et al. (2003:34) describe the inability of
school and residential segregation, white with- whites to see the cumulative advantage of whiteness
drawal or refusal to participate reduces or de- and the durability of black disadvantage as analogous to
stroys the effectiveness of color-conscious poli- the blindness of fish to the water that surrounds them.
Whites “cannot see how this society produces advan-
cies (e.g., James 1989; Massey and Denton, tages for them because these benefits seem so natural
1993; Peterson, 1981). In other policy domains that they are taken for granted, experienced as wholly
such as wealth inequalities, the normativity of legitimate.”
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has significant power to disguise race inequali- beginnings of the New World, racial inequal-
ties, making them appear natural rather than the ities and identities were created and sustained
result of color-conscious policies of the past or by political processes involving, on the one
the direct race discrimination in the present. hand, the mobilization of democratic electorates
In this chapter we have traced the trajec- and, on the other, the building of states and
tory of social policies bearing on race in the state policies. Third, the durability of race in-
United States. We argue that, due to the maneu- equalities continues to give life and meaning to
vering of white elites in political arenas, local, racial identities with asymmetric stakes in those
state, and national governments enforced both inequalities.
race-conscious and ostensibly race-neutral laws Fourth, so-called color-blind policies affect
that perpetuated racial hierarchy and inequality race inequalities, although in different ways than
up until the civil rights movement. The civil do color-conscious ones. Sometimes the imple-
rights movement tactically used dramatic events mentation of color-blind laws has the opposite
to pressure the U.S. federal government to attack effects of those intended. Constitutional lan-
white supremacy in elections, housing and labor guage providing for color-blindness in the en-
markets, and schools. The general trend in all forcement of equal protection of the laws, due
these domains was for the federal government to process, and equal access to the ballot was turned
initially formulate race-neutral policies banning into poll taxes, literacy tests (on their face, both
discrimination. Although these reforms proba- color-blind), and the separate but equal doc-
bly reinforced whites’ growing appreciation for trine, exacerbating and deepening racial divi-
equal treatment of African Americans and dis- sions for some eighty years past their adoption.
credited blatant racist politics, the reforms ulti- Of course, the white supremacy movement in
mately could not overcome racial discrimination the American South that succeeded in disfran-
that occurs in a white-dominated economy and chising blacks used color-blind laws in a color-
polity. While the civil rights movement had ex- conscious fashion. But even in the current era,
hausted itself by the early 1970s, the intervention color-blind laws have impacts on race inequali-
of the courts and the bureaucratic logic to obtain ties in ways not recognized by many.
measurable results led the United States to im- A trend toward color-blind policies in the
plement more race-conscious policies (such as United States is apparent, but the United States
majority–minority districts, school busing, and is not a unique case. Similar patterns are evident
affirmative action) intended to eliminate black in other countries that have many of the insti-
disadvantage. We suggest these policies had an tutionalized organizational features that define
unanticipated side effect: the retrenchment of liberal democratic states. We suggest that liberal
white racial identity hostile to efforts to ame- democratic institutional forms may be more ef-
liorate black–white inequalities. Consequently, fective in legitimizing racial inequalities than are
as the Supreme Court has ruled against racial racial states and, therefore, more stable. Racial
gerrymandering and as the Democratic Party states use race classification systems to differen-
has been strategically inactive on racial inequal- tially allocate citizenship rights and, therefore,
ities, the U.S. government has retreated from its create race identities consistent with the race
color-conscious policies. inequalities produced. States that produce and
In our reading of the literature on the politics defend white supremacy by protecting white
of race and racial policy, four themes emerge. advantages and denying full citizenship rights
First, racial inequalities are, in Charles Tilly’s to blacks are unable to disguise the political
apt phrase, “durable.” Once created, they are power needed to accomplish those ends. Whites
perpetuated by a variety of formal and in- are sometimes aware that their advantages stem
formal social mechanisms that are resistant to from their control of state power. Blacks real-
change. Second, whatever its roots in cultural ize that their disadvantages were and are im-
and economic processes, race has always in- posed on them by enforcement of racially biased
volved politics as both cause and effect. From the state policies. Using state power to reduce rather
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than increase race inequalities is contradictory Current public opinion research appears con-
because such policies reinforce the race identi- sistent with the claim that color-blind policies
ties that make the policies necessary in the first legitimate race inequalities, especially among
place. Enforcing race-conscious laws to over- whites, but more research is needed. Why are
come the effects of race identities makes the color-blind policies also popular in countries
identities of those involved more salient rather with nonwhite majorities? The historical legacy
than less.19 Hence, state policies that reduce race of past discrimination should tend to delegit-
inequalities motivate whites to oppose the poli- imate color-blind policies among those who
cies. Liberal democratic states, by contrast, tend were the victims of that discrimination. More
to disguise race inequalities as the natural result attention also needs to be paid to the role of so-
of the exercise of freedom. By denying policy cial movements in the policy formation process
makers the use of color-conscious tools to re- and, simultaneously, to their impact on categor-
duce race inequalities, liberal democratic states ical identities. As Omi and Winant (1994) and
protect and legitimate white advantages, even Tilly (1998) argue, social movements can also
those that were accumulated over a long his- create or reinforce categorical identities that, in
tory of racially discriminatory policies against turn, have implications for policies. As we have
blacks. suggested before, race-conscious policies such as
school desegregation and affirmative action have
19
Reed (2000; Reed and Bond 1991) suggests one resulted in the retrenchment of white identity
way out of this impasse – a social movement that mobi- and white racial resentment. State policy and
lizes a working class identity cutting across racial lines. state institution’s influence on racial identities is
Such a transracial movement would push the state to not only direct, but is also sometimes mediated
reduce economic inequalities and by doing so defang by social movements. Further research is needed
a white racial identity invested in white advantage. Of
course, this solution assumes that white workers and to understand this interaction of policy and so-
black workers can overcome the racial barriers that dicial movements and the consequences for racial
vide them. inequalities and identities.
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chapter twenty-eight
War, Militarism, and States

The Insights and Blind Spots of Political Sociology
Gregory Hooks and James Rice
Had this chapter been written a quarter of a cen- its unmanageable strategic liabilities, he
tury ago, it would have been a lengthy lament was one of few social scientists to pre-
over the silence of political sociology on the dict the collapse of the Soviet Union. He
topic of war. But such a focus would ring hol- emphasizes that political sociology offers
low at this time. It is now taken for granted that unique insights because it can weave to-
states wage war and that war making has molded gether a concern with the geopolitical and
the histories of states and politics more generally. the domestic political processes (Collins,
This is more than a grudging and half-hearted 1995).
acknowledgment. In fact, war figures promi- 4. In the realm of culture, Elias ([1939] 1982)
nently when leading sociologists paint with a is known for the study of the civilizing
broad brush. Consider these examples: process – a process in which the nobil-
ity and then all of European society was
1. In a sweeping history of social power, transformed. This transformation was set
Michael Mann (1986, 1993) distinguishes in motion by a change in the strategic
the military from other networks of power balance that tilted to the advantage of
and explains how military power has been the royalty, and away from the aristoc-
interwoven with cultural, economic, and racy. It is notable that the civilizing pro-
political power throughout human his- cess was set in motion and contributed
tory. Among other insights, Mann points to a transformation of military power. It
out that states, not classes and not firms, began as a pacification of warlords – and
declare and wage war. As war is waged, subsequently transformed European cul-
the state is transformed as are other social ture more generally. Arguably, Meyer et al.
institutions and the relations among them. (1997) discern a present-day civilizing
2. Charles Tilly (1975, 1990) points out that process. In this instance, it is not autarkic
the twentieth century was the bloodiest in warlords who are becoming civilized – it
human history – and provides little reason is the state.
to assume that wars will decline in ferocity 5. Wallerstein (2000) is not optimistic about
or importance. Moreover, if political soci- the state becoming more peaceful. In fact,
ology is to come to terms with (let alone he believes that the first half of the twenty-
anticipate) historically important political first century will be a “black period” as
transformation, wars are a central issue. the world system undergoes fundamen-
3. Randall Collins (1981, 1995) focused on tal change and the decline of U.S. hege-
the geopolitical to assess the durability of mony accelerates. In the past, devastating
states. Based on this assessment, especially and global wars have been integral to such
566
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War, Militarism, and States 567
a transition. Warfare and transformation of though political sociology was well-represented

the world system constrain and mold so- in these journals, we found surprisingly few ar-
cial reform and inequality. ticles addressing the issue of war – and those ar-
ticles discussing war rarely followed through on
Given the importance of the issues addressed the larger historical and theoretical issues raised
and the prestige of those raising the issue, the in prominent books.
study of war is clearly on political sociology’s We close this chapter by arguing that this
agenda. Nevertheless, for political sociologists, compartmentalized study of war leaves political
the study of war remains compartmentalized and sociology largely silent on some of the most im-
incomplete. This compartmentalization persists portant substantive and theoretical issues of the
despite the bloody wars of the twentieth cen- twenty-first century. Political sociologists rarely
tury – and the twenty-first century is dawn- contribute – and certainly not in the articles
ing with spectacular terrorist attacks, several published in sociology’s core journals – to dis-
wars in Central Asia, civil wars in several na- cussions of human rights, genocide, and other
tions, ongoing bloodshed between Israelis and issues that are beyond the scope of individual
Palestinians, and the United States pursuing an nation-states. Nor have political sociologists fig-
aggressive military policy in the Middle East. ured prominently in debates over the impact of
Moreover, due to their nuclear arsenals and globalization on the state – and whether or not
the deteriorating relationship between India and states will continue to be the dominant political
Pakistan, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has entity on the planet. By deepening the consid-
moved the “doomsday clock” to seven minutes eration of war and the international dimensions
before midnight (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, of war, political sociology can bring its insights
2002). Although it has examined and provided to bear in these important debates – and its un-
insights into the great wars of the past, political derstanding of domestic political processes will
sociology has very little to say about contempo- be enriched.
rary wars.
This chapter begins by documenting sociol-
ogy’s tendency to focus on domestic politics and an emphasis on the homefront
processes. Because war making is international
by definition, this domestic focus has made it Wallerstein (2000:112–13), relying on the Ox-
difficult for sociology to fully consider war mak- ford English Dictionary (OED), offers an insight-
ing and its interplay with the domestic pro- ful discussion of the etymology of “society.” Of
cesses at the center of sociology’s agenda. That the twelve definitions presented in the OED,
said, the study of war making has reentered the two first emerged at the beginning of the mod-
sociological debate over the past quarter cen- ern era: (1) “the aggregate of persons living to-
tury. The consideration of war and militarism gether in a more or less ordered community”
has been pronounced in prominent books that (circa 1639); and (2) “a collection of individu-
have examined state making, revolution, and so- als comprising a community or living under the
cial movements (Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1986, same organisation of government” (circa 1577).
1993; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1990). In turn, wars Shortly after the state had established its pri-
and militarism have received great attention by macy in early modern Europe, society is de-
students of social movements, democratization, fined in terms of a state. The state became the
and the welfare state. Given the influence of dominant political entity because of its singular
these authors and the wide acceptance of the im- ability to wield the means of violence. “Even-
portance of war, it comes as a surprise how rarely tually, the personnel of states purveyed violence
political sociological articles reflect this intellec- on a larger scale, more effectively, more effi-
tual shift. We examined each article published in ciently, with wider assent of their subject pop-
the American Sociological Review, Social Forces, and ulations, and with readier collaboration from
American Journal of Sociology from 1990–9. Al- neighboring authorities than did personnel from
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568 Gregory Hooks and James Rice
other organizations” (Tilly 1985:173). During rewarded with control over larger land holdings,
the modern era, society refers to the peoples reinforcing centrifugal tendencies (Elias [1939],
and territory controlled by states; and wars are 1982:17). From 1000–1500 a.d., the return of
a means of negotiation and conflict specific to long-distance trade and the increased circulation
states. Thus, Tilly (1985:181) defines war mak- and use of money tilted the balance of power
ing as efforts by states to eliminate or neutralize toward the crown and away from local aristo-
rival states “outside the territories in which they crats. As titular kings and queens became ac-
have clear and continuous priority as wielders tual sovereigns, they extracted resources from
of force.”1 the commercial activities concentrated in cities
Sociology – including political sociology – across a relatively large geographic area – but
has worked with a definition that assumes the aristocrats were constrained by the limited ge-
boundaries of states and societies coincide; it ographic reach of their fiefdoms and their eco-
has maintained a focus on the interactions of nomic assets were concentrated in land. States
people within a territory controlled by a state. outflanked the aristocracy because they exer-
As a subfield, political sociology examines the cised dominion over a much larger area and were
relationships between people and the state, pay- able to extract more flexible resources than aris-
ing special attention to challenges to the state tocratic rivals (Elias [1939], 1982; Mann, 1986,
emerging from within the polity. Because they 1993; Tilly, 1990).
involve military contests internal to a state, civil The rise of the state sets the stage for the
wars and revolution conform to these unspoken “civilizing process.” With the French state lead-
assumptions, and political sociology has pro- ing the way, emergent states disarmed and paci-
duced insightful analyses. However, interstate fied the warlords of feudal Europe – aristocrats
wars involve relations among states; on this front, became civilized. In contrast to their auton-
political sociology’s contribution has been halt- omy at the height of the feudal era, the power
ing and uneven. And this unevenness extends of warlords became increasingly dependent on
to issues related to war and militarism, includ- their relationship to the crown and delegations
ing human rights, and to the (mis)treatment of of royal authority to them. As the pacification
women and ethnic minorities (Enloe, 1990). of the warlords proceeded, “courtly forms of
conduct” eschewed the overt violence and in-
timidation of an earlier era, replacing this with
States and Societies
an elaborate set of customs and manners. In
turn, courtly manners and sensibilities diffused
Reflecting on the rise of the state in early
throughout society – influencing manners of
modern Europe highlights political sociology’s
eating, sexuality, household arrangements, and
omissions. From the decline of Charlemagne’s
interpersonal interaction (Elias [1939], 1982).
empire (circa 900 a.d.) until the rise of proto-
Elias’s account makes sense to contemporary
states in the fourteenth century, the dominant
readers because his unit of analysis was the emer-
political entity in Europe was the fiefdom. The
gent states of early modern Europe. That is, Elias
hegemony of the aristocracy was based on mil-
accepted and worked creatively with the defi-
itary power. Each fiefdom was largely autarkic;
nition that defines societies in terms of states.
civilian and military resources were extracted
Imagine for a moment that his unit of analy-
and controlled locally. Alliances of aristocrats
sis was the fiefdom. From the vantage point of
did make possible relatively large military cam-
the early twenty-first century, this is an obvious
paigns. But the lords on the victorious side were
mistake. Had Elias lived and worked during the
several centuries in which states were emergent
1
We drew on Tilly when defining war because our but feudalism remained the dominant mode of
focus is on war making of and between states. Although
this focus is broad, it nonetheless pushes to the margins organizing political and economic life, it would
or ignores altogether a variety of conflicts (e.g., guerilla, certainly be an understandable mistake. Nev-
colonial, and private war). ertheless, instead of seeing the state’s strategic
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advantage and the erosion of the aristocracy’s ple, the most notable war-related sociological
power due to a changing strategic environ- study of the World War II era was The American
ment, Elias would have been left to exaggerate Soldier (Stouffer et al., 1949). This was the initial
the processes and structures internal to fiefdoms work in the behavioralist tradition and, as was
that contributed to the “civilizing process.” In characteristic of the genre, this work was quan-
all likelihood, Elias would have explained the titative and expansive, involved the collabora-
emergence of “courtly forms of conduct” in tion of social scientists in leading universities and
terms of a collective shift among the aristoc- think tanks, funded by leading foundations (e.g.,
racy – and would have devoted little atten- Ford and Carnegie) and justified by national
tion to the changes in the strategic balance of security (Robin, 2001). Prominent sociolo-
power. gists, including Louis Guttman and Paul Lazars-
Elias is not the only author to have exam- feld, promoted behavioralism, and the disci-
ined this process (for accounts that stress polit- pline of sociology, especially social psychology,
ical and military phenomena, see Mann, 1986, was heavily influenced by it. Arguably, although
1993; Tilly, 1990; for an emphasis on the rise rarely mentioned by contemporary political so-
of the capitalist world system, see Wallerstein, ciologists, the behavioralist tradition should be
1989). But reflecting on Elias’s account is worth- counted as political sociology. The behavioral
while because it highlights several troubling si- sciences examined attitude formation and stabil-
lences of contemporary political sociology. For ity, with an emphasis on political attitudes and
a discipline that strives to give voice to the attitudes salient to a nation at war. But these
marginalized and to shed light on injustice, po- studies did not study social organization or the
litical sociology (especially U.S. political sociol- state, nor did behavioralism focus on social
ogy) is surprisingly silent on the military inter- transformation wrought by war. Stated simply,
ventions and atrocities committed by the United the study of war was isolated from the classi-
States. Nor has political sociology contributed cal foundations of sociology. Instead of examin-
prominently to the study of international hu- ing the macrosocial phenomena that concerned
man rights, including the (mis)treatment of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, the most visible
women and ethnic, racial, and religious minori- efforts of sociologists centered on the attitude
ties around the world. Instead, political sociol- formation of individuals, with political sociolo-
ogy’s focus has been internal to the nation-state. gists playing a marginal role in this endeavor.
The central issues have revolved around the dis- There have been notable exceptions to this
tribution of power and social resources within a domestic focus of sociology. For instance, Ray-
nation-state. Thus, despite the recognition that mond Aron (1959) provided a broad overview of
wars are important, the sociological study of war war in the twentieth century and was very con-
has maintained an overriding concern with the cerned with states and with the relations among
domestic consequences. Too often, the study of them. During and after World War II, Harold
militarism and war has been left to other disci- Lasswell (1941) theorized about the “garrison
plines, for example, history and political science state.” Drawing on Spencer’s notion of a mil-
(Hooks and McLauchlan, 1992). itant society, Lasswell made the case that mid-
century Japan was a “garrison state” consumed
with war and war making. More provocatively,
Ignoring War Lasswell raised the specter that an unforeseen
consequence of the World War II mobilization
From its inception in the nineteenth century may be that the United States would become a
and for most of the twentieth century, sociology garrison state. Although Lasswell’s works and his
assumed that peace is “normal” and wars were concept of a garrison state continue to resonate
temporary and reversible. Even when war could among historians and political scientists (see, for
not be ignored, sociology maintained a focus on example, Friedbeg, 2000), there is no sustained
domestic and endogenous processes. For exam- investigation of this topic in political sociology.
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For U.S. sociology, Morris Janowitz is the and his incisive criticism of structuralist Marx-
most visible sociologist who studied war. In a ism have been well-received and quite influen-
wide range of works, Janowitz examined the tial in sociology. However, because war making
profession of soldiering. Moreover, Janowitz does not fit into the domestic focus of sociology,
promoted an interdisciplinary study of war and his timely and insightful studies of militarism
played an instrumental role in the formation of and nuclear warfare attracted little attention.
the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces
and Society and the journal Armed Forces and
Society. Janowitz’s work extended to topics of War Reenters the Discussion
concern to political sociology. Most notably, he
was concerned with when and why the mil- When the state reclaimed its centrality to so-
itary, especially in developing societies, would ciological debate, the study of war reemerged
“leave the barracks” to exert direct control of a as well. Although a number of authors con-
government ( Janowitz, 1988; for a recent and tributed, the works of Moore, Skocpol, Gid-
insightful examination of military–civilian rela- dens, Mann, and Tilly were pivotal. In Social
tions, see Desch, 1999). Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Moore
By pointing to inequalities and the unseemly (1966) emphasized the decisive war that ce-
side of the polity, C. Wright Mills disrupted mented the demise of a landed aristocracy and
the American post-World War II celebration. the ascent of the bourgeoisie. Where the bour-
He also broke sociology’s silence on war and geoisie won, the nation-state was on a path to-
war making. Mills (1956) identified the milward political democracy. When the landed aris-
itary high command as one of the three pil- tocracy proved resilient, especially if agriculture
lars of the power elite. In defending this claim was based on coercive labor relations, the nation
and explaining the ascent of the military elite, was likely to be fascist in the middle of the twen-
Mills explored the social origins of military lead- tieth century. In her States and Social Revolutions,
ers and the transformation of military institu- Skocpol (1979) emphasized wars at home and
tions. Mills (1958) also wrote The Causes of World abroad. Her study of vulnerable states – French
War Three, an insightful examination of strate- (circa 1789), Russian (circa 1917), and Chinese
gic planning and preparations for nuclear war (circa 1945) – demonstrated that net of domes-
in the late 1950s. Although Mills is widely retic political processes and structures, these states
spected by political sociologists, his views of were crippled by failures in international wars.
militarism and war making have been set aside In each case, the ensuing revolutionary regime
(Hooks, 1992). Even William Domhoff, an out- was consolidated by civil war – and this war per-
spoken champion of Mills, rejects Mills’s views manently stamped the postrevolutionary state.
on the military. Whereas Mills thought military Charles Tilly’s impact has been striking. Few
elites ascended to become peers with economic authors have placed greater emphasis on the
elites during and after World War II, Domhoff manner in which states and wars are inter-
(1967:257) believes that “[e]vents and data of the twined – and fewer still have brought this is-
years since Mills wrote have made clear the sub- sue to the forefront of political sociology. Tilly
ordinate role of military men within the power (1975:42) provides compelling evidence to sus-
elite.” tain his assertion that “war made the state, and
In another vein and for other reasons, E. P. the state made war.” The symbiosis between
Thompson (1982) examined the issue of war. states and wars was central to his 1990 book,
Thompson’s antiwar activism emerged from his Capital and Coercion. In a project that resonates
deep concern over the Reagan-era nuclear arms with Moore’s, Dictatorship and Democracy, Tilly
race. Thompson placed stress on the U.S.’s insu- charts the paths to modernity taken by vari-
lated military bureaucracies and the dangers they ous European polities. He concludes that the
pose in the nuclear missile era. Although an his- availability of the means of production and the
torian, Thompson’s study of the working class means of coercion in the area over which a
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state exerts dominion molds the approach to cultural. In the contemporary era, with nation-
war making and domestic governance. That is, states the principal political entity, political and
European states with control over the means of military power are concentrated in the state.
coercion – but without a sizeable concentra- However, for much of human history – and by
tion of capital – often exerted sweeping control implication, in the future – the boundaries of
over society and postponed a democratic transi- political and military power may no longer co-
tion until well into the twentieth century (e.g., incide.
Spain). Conversely, such a state waged war by By the 1990s, the association between war
strengthening its ability to coerce, but lacked and state making was well established and un-
the ability to promote economic expansion and contested, providing fertile ground for further
technological innovativeness. The ultimate win- refinement and extension. Goldstone’s work is
ners in this competition among European states notable in this regard. Building on Skocpol’s ac-
were those that exercised sovereignty over a re- count of social revolutions, Goldstone (1991)
gion with both the means of coercion and capi- incorporates a concern with demographic and
tal (e.g., France and England). These states were other domestic pressures on states. Thus, Gold-
able to harness economic resources and tech- stone’s revised explanation of state breakdown
nological dynamism to further war aims. But couples a concern with the geopolitical and the
in so doing, a state compromised with leading traditional (domestic) issues of concern to soci-
economic institutions and elites – and it ne- ology. Randall Collins has touched on the issue
gotiated with the citizenry to serve as soldiers. of war and violence throughout his career (see,
Due to their approach to waging war, these na- for example, Collins, 1981). His recent works
tions tilted toward a democratic and pluralistic have drawn on the works cited above to advance
polity – and these domestic political bargains geopolitical theory. On the basis of this the-
stamped the strategic choices when these states ory, Collins (1995) predicted the collapse of the
waged war. For future inquiry, Tilly’s (1995) in- Soviet Union (within a fifty-year window) and
sistence that sociology must look to the relations makes the case that political sociologists cannot
among social actors can help push political soci- afford to ignore war and geopolitics if we are
ology toward a greater emphasis on the relations to understand the processes of political transfor-
among states and transnational political actors – mation and revolutionary change.
and away from a focus on dynamics internal to
nation-states.
In the early 1980s, British sociologists made War Examined, But Compartmentalized
a deliberate effort to rethink social theory
with recognition that war and warfare have Political sociology has begun to address an issue
stamped human history (see Shaw [ed.], 1984). that had been overlooked. But the consideration
In The Nation-State and Violence, Anthony Gid- of war remains compartmentalized and incom-
dens (1985) stressed that war is not an aberrant plete. The works highlighted in the previous
phenomena that influences society temporarily section were books – and the authors of these
and at the margins. Instead, states are based on books drew on and contributed to a literature
the ability to wage war; nation-states are forged in which historians and political scientists have
through violence. Moreover, violence remains been primary contributors and consumers. Our
central to states and their activities. Michael examination of the three leading journals in the
Mann made several contributions to the call for discipline over a ten-year period revealed that
renewed consideration of war (1988), and he there is little evidence that political sociologists
has maintained a concern with war in both vol- publishing articles have been influenced by the
umes of his study of social power (1986, 1993). books that have examined war.
Mann’s approach is notable because he sees mil- Table 28.1 summarizes the number of polit-
itary power as one of four major networks of ical sociology articles, including those dealing
power, the others being political, economic, and with war, relative to all other journal articles in
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Table 28.1. Political Sociology Articles 1990–1999 ciology articles and less than 2 percent of all
articles published between 1990 and 1999. A
Political Soc. Articles closer reading of these twenty-three articles re-
1990–94 All Articles Articles on War veals that war is rarely examined as an important
ASR 301 57 7 sociological dynamic in and of itself but rather
AJS 222 47 5 indirectly or as a context in which other issues
SF 260 36 4 of sociological interest are played out. The result
1995–99 is a striking lack of consideration of the inter-
ASR 293 51 3 dependencies, conflict, and cooperation among
AJS 224 50 3 nation-states in lieu of domestic issues internal
SF 275 46 1
to a nation-state.
1990–99
ASR 594 108 10 Examining these twenty-three articles reveals
AJS 446 97 8 an eclectic and varied approach. For example,
SF 535 82 5 Schuman and Rieger (1992) test Mannheim’s
total 1,575 287 23 theory of generational effects by analyzing de-
bates over initiating the Gulf War with Iraq in
1991. Using survey research, they discovered
the American Journal of Sociology, American Soci- individual attitudes toward the Gulf War were
ological Review, and Social Forces between 1990 contingent on which of two historical analo-
and 1999.2 We employed expansive criteria gies proved most salient: World War II or the
when classifying articles as political sociology Vietnam War. Individuals growing up during
and those addressing war. With that in mind, or in the aftermath of World War II were more
we determined that 287 articles addressed po- likely to find this experience as a relevant anal-
litical sociological concerns and twenty-three ogy to the Gulf War and, hence, support the
articles examined war. From 1990–4, sixteen ar- Gulf War. Those who grew up in the Vietnam
ticles examined war; from 1995–9 there were War era were more likely to select this analogy
only seven articles. These twenty-three articles and display opposition to the Gulf War. Shavit,
represent but a handful of the 287 political so- Fischer, and Koresh (1994) utilize the Gulf War
as a context in which to examine social network
2
We focus on The American Sociological Review, patterns in Haifa, Israel in coping with external
American Journal of Sociology, and Social Forces because threats, discovering Israelis relied more on kin as
these journals are prominent outlets for generalists. We
recognize that a number of other journals provide an opposed to nonkin, everyday networks in cop-
outlet for scholars specializing in the study of the war ing with the threat of missile attack.
and the military. If the concern were on the publishing Schwartz (1996) analyzes the invocation of
outlets of specialists, Armed Forces & Society, Theory cultural memory to elicit and maintain sup-
& Society, Politics and Society, and most notably, The port during World War II, arguing images of
Journal of Political and Military Sociology, are important
outlets. These journals have provided a space for articles Abraham Lincoln were used by local and fed-
on these topics, many of which follow through on eral agencies to clarify, legitimate, inspire, and
themes of state making and macrosociological inquiry rationalize the experience of war. The effect
(see, for example, Kourvetaris, 1991). Whereas the of World War II on divorce rates is the object
study of war and militarism is one among many of analysis by Pavalko and Elder (1990). When
topics considered by political sociology, these issues
are central to the “Peace, War and Social Conflict” compared to nonveterans, veterans of World
section of the American Sociological Association (for War II were more likely to divorce, although
additional information, see the section’s homepage: marriages established during the war were no
http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/pwasa/index.htm). more likely to end in divorce than marriages
The Peace, War and Social Conflict Web page also begun at other times. Studying a sample of eco-
provides links to several journals that make the study
of war and militarism a central concern: Peace Review, nomically disadvantaged young men, Sampson
Peace and Change, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and and Laub (1996) find evidence that overseas
Mobilization. duty during the World War II era, in-service
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schooling, and G. I. Bill training serve as so- vides contradictory evidence from eleven Latin
cial mechanisms promoting long-term socioe- American countries. Due to differing historical
conomic achievement. Gross (1994) examines circumstances, the experiences of Latin Ameri-
the motivations behind the rescue of Jewish in- can nations contrast with those of European na-
dividuals in Holland and France during World tions. Without the prior establishment of polit-
War II. He argues people were motivated by ical authority and without a link between such
religious and social norms and considerations organization and relevant social actors, war is
of social justice. Infrastructural variables such as not likely to contribute to institutional devel-
level of organization, social networks, and mate- opment, he argues. Sohrabi (1995) suggests rev-
rial support were also important determinants. olutions occurring from 1905–8 in the Ottoman
Wagner-Pacifici and Schwarz (1991) high- Empire, Iran, and Russia were inspired and le-
light the tension and ambiguity encountered gitimated by the idea of constitutional systems
in creating the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in of rule. He argues this “paradigm” or ideol-
Washington, D.C. They reveal the process of ogy of constitutionalism did not emanate from
memorializing this event pitted different social each country’s respective social structures but
constituencies against each other in a strug- was shaped by conceptions of politics and ap-
gle to articulate the meaning of a still much propriate goals that can be traced back to the
contested and controversial war. Addressing the French Revolution of 1789.
question of who fought in Vietnam, Gimbel With a focus on the United States, Hooks
and Booth (1996) search for the determinants (1990, 1993) examined the relationship between
of combat exposure risk among U.S. service- war and state making. He investigated the man-
men. They conclude that biosocial predisposi- ner in which the state pursued a distinctive
tions toward aggression and stress management agenda relative to powerful economic actors
are associated with degree of combat exposure, during World War II and the Cold War era.
and time-specific war conditions and battlefield This research highlights the important role the
strategies also structured the selection of indi- state has played in directing and shaping in-
viduals for combat. Bearman (1991) sets out dustrial policies in the post-World War II era
to explain desertion among Confederate sol- as a consequence of national security efforts.
diers during the U.S. Civil War. Challenging Across the World War II planning agencies, out-
individual-level variables of social class, occu- comes asserted by middle-range formulations
pation, status, and age, he argues men deserted of business dominance, structural Marxism, and
because their identity as Southerners was eroded state-centered theory find utility in varying in-
by an “emergent localism.” Soldiers replaced stitutional contexts depending on state goals
their “Southern” identity with their old local and needs (Hooks, 1993). In addition, Hooks
identity and no longer felt obligated to fight for and Bloomquist (1992) highlight the cumula-
the Confederacy. tive legacy of federal industrial investments dur-
Several articles regarding war do address the ing World War II for regional growth and de-
issues of state making and political transforma- cline of manufacturing in the United States from
tion that figure prominently in books authored 1947 to 1972. Hooks (1994) examined the re-
by political sociologists. Kowalewski (1991) uti- gional distribution of military bases, steel facto-
lizes a world system perspective to investigate the ries, and airframe plants. This study examined
association between core country intervention the regional impact of the U.S.’s rise to hege-
and revolution within peripheral countries from mony during the middle decades of the twenti-
1821–1985. He argues there is a positive corre- eth century.
lation between intervention and revolution and The relationship between the state and lev-
that this relationship became stronger during els of lethal conflict, as embodied in war, re-
times of world system restructuring and hege- bellion, homicide, and execution, is examined
monic decline. Challenging the assertion that by Cooney (1997). In contrast to a Hobbesian
war making builds states, Centeno (1997) pro- perspective that predicts a negative relationship
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between state development and lethal conflict, Despite the extensive treatment of war by po-
Cooney discovers cross-national conflict rates litical sociologists writing books, the political
appear to follow a U-shape. Lethal conflict is sociology articles appearing in the three lead-
high in the absence of state structures and when ing sociology journals between 1990 and 1999
the state is extremely strong or centralized, are only intermittently concerned or influenced
but declining between these extremes. Moad- by these debates. War and war making are often
del (1994) investigates the relationship between analyzed indirectly. In the following paragraphs,
levels of political instability and conflict in less we make the case that the failure to sustain the
developed countries relative to their differing discussions of war constrains the theoretical,
structural relations with developed countries. empirical, and substantive advances political so-
Cross-national evidence between 1970 and 1981 ciology can contribute to better understanding
reveals political conflict in less developed coun- war and the impact of war on society.
tries is indirectly correlated with position in the
world system, mediated by income inequality
and vulnerability to the destabilizing effects of the state of knowledge concerning
the world economy. In addition, the effects of war and politics
modernization on political conflict are found to
be linear and indirect, mediated by income in- The preceding discussion highlighted the ex-
equality and regime repressiveness. tensive examination of war as it relates to state
Military coups in postcolonial Africa can be building and social revolution – typically ap-
traced to ethnic antagonism stemming from cul- pearing in books that draw on and contribute to
tural plurality and political competition and the multiple disciplines. However, the articles gen-
presence of a strong military with a factional- erated by political sociologists and published in
ized officer corps and access to state resources, leading sociology journals have displayed far less
Kposowa and Jenkins argue (1993). However, concern for war and war making. Political so-
foreign capital penetration, they assert, deterred ciology has examined several issues related to
coups by strengthening states. Examining black war making in some detail. Still, the uneven and
African states between 1957 and 1984, Jenkins compartmentalized study of war leaves a number
and Kposowa (1990) provide further evidence of of questions unasked and answers incomplete.
the structural influence of ethnic diversity and
competition, military centrality, debt depen-
dence, and political factionalism as predictors of Topics Addressed by Political Sociologists
military coup activity. Boswell and Dixon (1990)
argue economic and military dependence pro- War and militarism has been considered when
motes domestic rebellion cross-nationally by in- their impact on domestic politics and economics
fluencing domestic class and state structures. have been visible. For the most part, sociolo-
Their research highlights the argument that gists have not dominated debate on these top-
dependency in the world economy and interna- ics and the issues of war and militarism have
tional state system shapes domestic political con- been side issues in the larger sociological debate.
trol. Barkey (1991), in addition, finds large-scale Nevertheless, war and militarism have crept
peasant rebellions within France in the seven- into the sociological understanding of economic
teenth century gained momentum by fostering growth, enfrachisement, welfare state, gender,
allies among other societal groups, particularly and environmental degradation.
the formation of strong peasant–noble alliances
in reaction to the absolutist state. The absence Economic Growth and Planning. States spend a
of peasant rebellions in the Ottoman Empire in great deal of money to wage war, and the firms
the seventeenth century, however, can be traced that deal with the state are often enriched. Al-
to the failure of peasant–landowner collabo- though this empirical observation is not con-
ration. troversial, there has been a great deal of debate
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over why states prosecute wars in this fashion that defense spending is inversely related to eco-
and whether economic benefits are restricted to nomic growth (Rasler and Thompson, 1988;
a handful of contractors – or if these benefits ex- Smith, 1980). This inverse relationship observed
tend to the entire society. Prominent economists in developed nations is explained by opportu-
(especially Keynesians) argued that the stimu- nity costs. Nations investing less in national se-
lus of twentieth-century wars provided stimu- curity are able to allocate resources to alternative
lation to the entire economy and that waging uses – civilian governmental programs or non-
war induced planning and technological innova- military commercial uses – and these alternatives
tion that extended far beyond defense contrac- are associated with a significantly higher rate of
tors (Galbraith, 1967). Beginning in the 1950s economic growth. This emphasis on the oppor-
and legitimated by Eisenhower’s warning of the tunity costs has figured prominently in studies of
military–industrial complex in 1961, a number the military–industrial complex in the United
of authors have called into question the claims States (Chan, 1985; DeGrasse, 1984; Dumas,
that militarism was beneficial (Melman, 1970; 1984).
Kaldor, 1981; Markusen and Yudken, 1992; Specific to the United States, Hooks (1990,
Tirman [ed.], 1984). While acknowledging that 1993; Hooks and Luchansky, 1996) provides ev-
selected firms have benefited, these critics pro- idence that the defense program was oriented
vide evidence that militarism diverts economic toward strategic objectives. By the same token,
resources toward unproductive purposes, bid- there can be little doubt that defense spending
ding up the cost of (and at times monopoliz- has played a decisive role in molding regional
ing) physical and human capital, especially in processes (Markusen et al., 1991). As concerns
high-tech sectors. Working from Marxist as- political sociology, these regional investments
sumptions, military-Keynesianism has been the did not follow the extant civilian industrial
focus of several studies (Baran and Sweezy, 1966; and scientific infrastructure – these investments
Griffin et al., 1982; O’Connor, 1973). These were guided by military priorities and reordered
works acknowledged the aggregate stimulus of America (Kirby [ed.], 1992; Markusen et al.,
the defense program and investigated the timing 1991; Hooks, 1994). Finally, during and after the
of increases in defense spending over time. The Cold War, the defense program became increas-
central conclusion was that the countercycli- ingly reliant on science and high-tech weaponry.
cal tendencies in defense spending were more To a large extent, military planners created “big
closely tied to the needs of the monopoly sec- science” in the Manhattan Project that produced
tor than they were to the overall dynamics of the first atomic bomb. Since World War II, sci-
the economy. ence and technology have been harnessed and in
Over the past quarter century, a number of important respects controlled by national secu-
quantitative and cross-national studies have ex- rity planners (McLauchlan and Hooks, 1995).
plored the trade-off between guns and butter. In
this literature, data have been collected on a sam- Political Enfranchisement and Welfare States. The
ple of nations with the goal of evaluating the re- association between war and political enfran-
lationship between military spending (guns) and chisement has been a recurrent theme in ac-
measures of economic growth and quality of life counts of state making. For the most part, po-
(butter). There is mixed evidence of an inverse litical sociology has concentrated on the role of
relationship – and several studies point to a pos- wars in the expansion of enfranchisement. The
itive relationship between militarism and eco- inverse of this relationship – that is, the tendency
nomic growth in developing nations (Bullock for democracies to defeat less democratic foes –
and Firebaugh, 1990; Chan, 1985; Mintz and has also been a focus of inquiry. Reiter and Stam
Stevenson, 1995). However, no studies suggest (2002) offer a novel account that challenges ex-
defense spending has stimulated growth among planations based on the greater economic might
the developed nations (see Mintz and Steven- of democracies or battlefield advantages associ-
son, 1995) – and several studies provide evidence ated with liberty and freedom. Instead, because
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elected leaders are ultimately held accountable Mann points out (1993), the Founding Fathers
to voters, Reiter and Stam make the case that were probably the richest and best-educated
democracies are less likely to go to war than au- revolutionary band in world history. When
thoritarian regimes – they enter wars when the drafting the Constitution, a strong case was ad-
likelihood of success is high. vanced that only the propertied classes – like
Downing (1992) sets out to explain the ori- those who drafted the Declaration of Indepen-
gins of both liberal democracy and absolutism dence and Constitution – should be allowed
in Europe. He focuses on predispositions to to vote and hold office. Eventually the prop-
medieval constitutionalism or the system of erty requirement was sharply reduced, grant-
decentralized government and the subsequent ing political enfranchisement to nearly all white
role of state relations and war in undermining males. Clearly, the combination of a transna-
such institutional structures. He argues medieval tional discursive community and an entrenched
constitutional arrangements predating modern- commitment to democracy among these revo-
ization and military conflict in the burgeon- lutionaries influenced this debate (Mann, 1993;
ing state system provided institutional, legal, Markoff, 1996). However, the victorious fac-
and ideological bases for the subsequent rise tion also placed great stress on the contribu-
of liberal democracy. Clearly weak or absent tion that the landless made to the Revolutionary
constitutional predispositions hampered emer- Army – and that fairness and political stability
gence of liberal democracy. He further exam- required the young nation to recognize the sac-
ines how war among major European states in rifice made by the landless. During World War II
the seventeenth century impacted constitutional and the Cold War, national security institutions
arrangements. Under pressure to mobilize mili- exerted a significant and sustained influence on
tarily, countries with weak constitutional struc- the lives of Americans and other societal institu-
tures and requiring extensive domestic resource tions (Segal, 1994). The G.I. Bill, for example,
mobilization were more likely to experience provided educational support for millions and
the emergence of military–bureaucratic absolu- facilitated a massive expansion of human capital
tion and the decline of constitutionalism. Con- and higher education, and educational benefits
versely, countries with stronger constitutional continue to provide an incentive for military ser-
arrangements and the opportunity to mobilize vice (Segal, 1994). In addition, affordable G.I.
foreign resources, enter into alliances, and pos- mortgages provide families with the opportu-
sessing domestic commercial wealth were less nity to own a home (Segal, 1994).
likely to experience the undermining of consti- World War I enhanced the effectiveness of
tutional form when faced with military conflict both the workers’ and the women’s movements
in the seventeenth century. in seeking voting rights in a number of coun-
Over the past 500 years, states have repeat- tries (Markoff, 1996). Following World War I,
edly sparked and often directed an expansion of the victors embraced opportunities to reshape
the manufacturing base to support ever-larger many European countries and assert greater
armies and navies. To wage war, states needed democratic structures. Mobilization for World
to accommodate leading economic and finan- War II across numerous countries in turn laid the
cial institutions – they were also obliged to de- institutional and economic policy foundations
velop the means to recruit armed forces that necessary for the reordering of state–society
represented a sizeable portion of the population relations and the creation of the postwar welfare
(Tilly, 1990). In the wake of a mobilization for state in Europe (Klausen, 1998; Markoff, 1996).
war demands for citizenship and fuller citizen- The enormous mobilization of men created
ship rights are “pressed by veterans and civilians chronic labor shortages and increased demand
who have risked life and limb for the country” for factory workers, a demand that necessitated
( Janoski, 1998:146). the incorporation of women into the industrial
War and its aftermath also influenced the con- workforce. Powerholders became increasingly
solidation of democracy in the United States. As aware of the requisite cooperation and sacrifice
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of workers, both and men and women, and to an expansion of the welfare state. Skocpol
soldiers who suffered or died during the war. (1992) documents the generous Civil War pen-
Possibly motivated by a perceived obligation, sions for Union Army veterans and their sur-
moral responsibility, or the fear of social revolu- viving dependents that placed the United States
tion, particularly in the defeated countries, the at the forefront of social provision in the late
idea of extending the right to vote gained mo- nineteenth century. Civil War veterans’ assis-
mentum within political institutions (Markoff, tance marks an important turning point in the
1996). political origin of social policy in America and,
Sustained war often facilitates the reshaping of for a time, the potential groundwork for the
state institutions and political relationships be- development of a “paternalist” welfare state in
tween the state and social groups (Kryder, 2000). which social provision is provided to protect
African Americans benefited from the World families headed by a male wage earner (Skocpol,
War II mobilization through reduced poverty 1992). Although the maternalist aspects of the
rates and increased employment opportunities, U.S. welfare state are distinctive, the association
largely a by-product of the central state’s pur- in timing between the growth of the welfare
suit of other war-related primary goals (Kryder, state and military mobilization has been com-
2000). During World War II, African Americans mon throughout the industrialized world. Af-
increasingly gained employment in semiskilled ter World War I, and even more decisively after
positions in urban industrial areas (Wilensky, World War II, the welfare state was extended
1975). The war provided a mix of social order and enriched throughout Europe (for a discus-
concerns and opportunity within which African sion of the importance of war on the British and
Americans could press their collective advan- American cases, see Amenta, 1998).
tage, though in the postwar years much of this
leverage evaporated and the advantageous polit- Contentious Politics and State Breakdown. Skocpol’s
ical effects of the war lessened (Kryder, 2000). (1979) pathbreaking investigation of social rev-
The U.S. military has advanced the expan- olutions was innovative because it simultane-
sion of citizenship rights to excluded groups, ously examined the geopolitical and domestic
particularly in regard to racial integration (see, pressures on states – and their interplay. In her
for example, Moskos, 1988), but we should not account of the French, Russian, and Chinese
adopt too sanguine a view regarding gender re- Revolutions, wars were pivotal. Specifically, in
lations, Segal (1994) argues. He notes the U.S. each instance, a spectacular geopolitical failure
military has lagged behind other societal institu- set in motion a decisive set of challenges to vul-
tions in terms of internalizing principles of gen- nerable states. Whereas constrained extractive
der equality. Women in the U.S. military, for ex- capacities and an anachronistic class structure
ample, have historically been barred from access left these states vulnerable, disastrous wars and
to many roles available to men. The relationship ruinous domestic consequences were of deci-
of U.S. military activities on women’s opportu- sive importance. Although his work comple-
nities has been termed “problematic, tense, and ments Skocpol’s, Goldstone (1991) places less
often abrasive” (Booth et al., 2000:319). A study emphasis on military failure in explaining state
of the impact of active-duty armed forces per- breakdown. His work places greater weight on
sonnel and women’s employment and earning intraelite conflict and fiscal strains (unrelated
in local labor markets, for example, reveals that to war). While successfully demonstrating that
in labor markets where the military is promi- military defeat is not a necessary condition for
nent, women, on average, experience lower an- state breakdown, Goldstone also provides evi-
nual earnings and higher rates of unemployment dence of a number of instances in which mili-
(Booth et al., 2000). tary defeat was of decisive importance (Collins,
Just as wartime mobilizations have been as- 1995). In the essay included in this volume,
sociated with an extension of political enfran- “Regimes and Contention,” Charles Tilly lays
chisement, so too they have lent momentum the groundwork for further consideration of the
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relationship between regimes and contentious ments. For instance, the World War II migra-
politics, including not only peaceful but violent tion of blacks out of the Southeast and towards
protest as well. Northern and Western cities sustained the U.S.
While social revolution and state breakdown civil rights movement in the postwar era. Urban
provide vivid examples, issues of peace and blacks played a decisive role in the 1960 presi-
war have figured prominently in the social dential election – and the black vote was certain
movement literature more generally. The re- to figure more prominently in future elections.
source mobilization literature, especially works In turn, urban blacks provided financial (often
by Charles Tilly (1978) and Sydney Tarrow channeled through churches) and other forms of
(1994), make this connection most forcefully. A support to embattled activists in the South. The
state’s geopolitical context, especially its engage- outmigration of blacks preceded World War II
ment in an international war, plays a direct role and continued after the war – but the sharp in-
in the mobilization of resources and the political crease in migration during the war was unparal-
opportunity structure available to social move- leled and its legacy for the civil rights movement
ments. Although there is no assertion that wars unmistakable.
necessarily give rise to social movements, wars
and related policies of mobilization are among
the most important events to spark and lend en- Political Sociology’s Blind Spots
ergy to contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly, 2001:51). Whether wars enhance sol- Despite the progress, political sociology’s un-
idarity and or give rise to a cycle of protest and derstanding of war and militarism remains in-
contention depends on the attribution of threat complete and uneven. In discussing these over-
and opportunity, how the war and its outcome sights, we start with specific topics that have
are framed, and the intersection with ongoing been overlooked. We end with a discussion of
politics of protest. Clemens (1996:218–21) of- larger theoretical and methodological issues. So-
fers an interesting account of Coxey’s Army, a ciology strives to see below the surface of society
late-nineteenth-century labor organization that to shed light on dynamics that are hidden from
drew on the Civil War experience to mobilize view and operate according to a logic that is
workers into an egalitarian movement modeled often counterintuitive. C. Wright Mills (1959)
on the image of the militia. Although effective in referred to this as the sociological imagination
mobilizing activists, the image of an army chal- (see also Portes, 2000). Moreover, “sociology’s
lenging the social order heightened the sense of complicated vocation” calls on the discipline to
threat and the repressiveness of the response by be a “field of moral and political concern for the
employers and the state. Directly and indirectly, world’s troubles” (Lemert, 2002:111). War and
the study of social movements and contentious militarism have been studied to the extent they
politics has been sensitive to the study of war are “seen” to impact on the established debates
and war making because very important protest in political sociology (see above). But other im-
cycles and revolutions have been set in motion portant issues – including those that reside be-
by wars and their aftermath. low the surface and are demonstrably related to
The preceding discussion of political enfran- issues of injustice and inequality – have been ig-
chisement and the welfare state placed little nored because they do not fit into established
emphasis – too little emphasis – on the social categories and concerns.
movements that demanded these reforms. In in-
stance after instance, war both provided a boost The Overlap of Military and Political Power. As
to social movement formation and transformed Wallerstein notes (see above), society has been
the political opportunity structure to the ad- defined in terms of a state – and states have
vantage of a social movement. Indirectly, the carved up (with modest exceptions) the entire
changes wrought by war and mobilization can planet into mutually exclusive geographic ar-
have important consequences for social move- eas. Thus, states are the quintessential containers
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of modernity (Giddens, 1985). Their very real coerce and administer into de facto economic
power and importance notwithstanding, social power. The nation-state no longer contains the
theory has in important respects reified states. economy, but the nation-state is constrained and
Mann (1986) provides a useful corrective be- dependent on a global economy. Although states
cause he documents that the geographic reach may survive, they will lose power if they are un-
of networks of political, economic, cultural, and able to control political, economic, and cultural
military power do not coincide. A reified view processes (Castells, 1997). Held (1995) spells out
of the state assumes that these four power net- the dilemmas for polities under these circum-
works are contained by a nation-state and con- stances. Democracy allows the enfranchised to
trolled (if indirectly) by the state (or by the na- exercise a measure of control over political deci-
tion’s dominant class or elites). But this has never sions. However, as globalization proceeds, many
been the case. Taking Europe 1000 to 1300 a.d. important issues are beyond the control of any
as an example, economic power was quite lo- state, for example, environmental problems cre-
calized and concentrated in fiefdoms, whereas ated beyond a nation-state’s borders, global eco-
cultural power (in the form of the Catholic nomic processes.
Church) transcended fiefdoms and states. States Of course, states have never completely
claimed dominion (political and military power) contained “their” society (Held, 1996:350–1).
over expansive areas, but this power was diluted, Waging war is the quintessential action of the
with the aristocracy largely autarkic within their state and a major contributor to state building.
fiefdoms. Problems persist if one moves forward But wars have also contributed to state break-
several centuries. Long after states usurped the down and have undermined the ability of indi-
power of the nobles, the networks and dynam- vidual states to control their own borders. When
ics of power continued to be messy and un- a state loses a war, it loses a measure of its own
even. Christendom continued to transcend all sovereignty and may well experience a crisis of
of Europe, and discursive networks that reached legitimacy. Even when states win, waging war
across Europe and North America challenged opens the borders and brings the nation-state
absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth into contact with other polities and economies
centuries (Mann, 1993). (Kolko [1994] recounts a number of the unan-
For those emphasizing the world capitalist ticipated transformations brought by war). Tilly
system (Wallerstein, 1989) and for students of (1995) makes an analogy to the study of hy-
international politics, states were never the ap- draulics. In this analogy, the state is a basin and
propriate unit of analysis, not even when states the various pressures on the state are comparable
were unrivaled as the pinnacle of political orga- to fluids flowing into the basin. The stability of
nizations. With increasing evidence of global- this basin does not rest on its ability to keep wa-
ization (Dunne and Wheeler [ed.], 1999; Hirst ter out – its stability is in successfully channeling
and Thompson, 1999; Sassen, 1998), a num- fluids in and out of a basin, that is, avoiding a
ber of scholars are questioning the state’s cen- catastrophic collapse and rapid outflow. Build-
trality and viability. Castells (1997) makes a ing on this analogy, the durability of states is not
forceful case that new information technolo- first and foremost their ability to close off “their”
gies and processes of globalization undermine society from outside contact; their durability re-
the autonomy and sovereignty of states. Many sides in an ability to channel flows and dynamics
economic transactions are no longer physically across national frontiers. The increasing perme-
located in one place but are instead enmeshed ability of nation-state borders under conditions
in a global financial and economic network of globalization implies that states must adapt to
(Castells, 1997:245; Held, 1996:343). Of course, unanticipated inflows and outflows. Given that
states were never able to dictate to corpora- war making has been one of the most impor-
tions – but the rapid shift toward a global, tant processes that has accelerated flows across
networked, and information-based economy national frontiers – the study of political stabil-
impedes the state from translating its ability to ity and state transition must pay careful attention
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to war making and to its transnational dimens- to standard definitions of states, neither
ions. controls military and political decisions.
For our purposes, the uneven overlap of po- The United States was in the forefront of
litical and military power is of special interest. nations that defeated Iraq in 1991 and
It is a testament to the state’s power that it has overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003.
been taken for granted that political and military Throughout the 1990s, the United States
power are controlled by a state and coincide with and its allies patrolled Iraqi airspace
the nation-state’s frontiers. But this taken-for- and demanded international inspection
granted assumption has never been accurate – of suspected military production centers.
and is certainly not the case now. The military Moreover, the United States repeatedly
reach of a powerful state extends beyond its of- bombed Iraq and maintained an em-
ficial geographic boundaries; this powerful state bargo that has resulted in tens of thou-
can constrain, guide, and at times directly con- sands of deaths from disease and malnu-
trol political decisions in weaker states. Con- trition. After removing Saddam Hussein
versely, weak states do not exercise full control from power, the United States molded the
over their own military forces, and their politi- postwar reorganization of the polity. As of
cal authority is compromised. History provides 2000, Afghanistan had endured decades
scores of examples; we discuss several recent and of civil war, Soviet occupation, and years
contemporary instances. of Taliban rule. In 2000, with thousands of
well-armed international Islamic warriors
1. Europe 1950–90: In the wake of World encamped, many suspected that control of
War II, the United States grudgingly ac- Afghanistan resided with Al Qaeda – and
cepted the Soviet Union’s sphere of in- not the Afghan state. The United States
fluence in Eastern Europe. The Soviet and its allies removed the Taliban from
Union directly intervened in the polit- power in Afghanistan. In the wake of the
ical reconstruction of Eastern European military intervention by the United States
nations and formed (and controlled) a and its allies, neither the Afghani nor the
diplomatic and military alliance among Iraqi state exerts sovereignty in the man-
these nations (Warsaw Pact). In several ner the sociological definition of the state
instances, Soviet troops were deployed – assumes.
most notably in Hungary (1953) and 3. U.S. interventions in Latin America: On
Czechoslovakia (1968) – to impose So- dozens of occasions and for a variety of
viet preferences. During the Cold War, reasons, the United States has intervened
the United States played the role of great in Latin America. Some of the more noto-
power in Western Europe. Although not rious examples include: supporting Pana-
as overt as the Soviet Union, the United manian secession from Columbia to facili-
States intervened to influence electoral tate the construction of the Panama Canal
processes in several European nations. (1903), assisting the overthrow of Chile’s
Through the Marshall Plan and the Bret- democratically elected Allende and assist-
ton Woods accords, the United States ing the installation of the Pinochet dic-
helped to revive Western Europe and im- tatorship (1973), mining Nicaragua’s har-
posed its preferences for liberalism (Block, bors (in violation of U.S. and international
1977). On the diplomatic and military law) to destabilize the Sandinista regime
front, the United States promoted the (1984), and assisting the overthrow of
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Guatemala’s democratically elected gov-
Organization and was the dominant voice ernment in 1954 followed by decades of
in this alliance (Leffler, 1992). support for nondemocratic regimes per-
2. Iraq and Afghanistan: Both Iraq and petrating a genocidal war on that nation’s
Afghanistan are nation-states, but relative indigenous peoples (see Chomsky, 1993).
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We have presented a number of examples ac.uk/] for useful links to discussions of human
in which a state’s actual military power does rights and globalization that makes links to po-
not extend to its own frontier, and with this litical and social theory). The Peace, War, and
compromised military control, a state’s con- Social Conflict section of the American So-
trol over political decisions is likewise compro- ciological Association routinely promotes the
mised. The near silence of political sociology study of human rights, genocide, and related
on these issues may be the result of the mis- issues. But political sociologists have not played
match between de facto military and political a prominent role. This marginal role is surpris-
power with official geographical boundaries of ing because political sociology has been con-
states. This mismatch flies in the face of Weber’s cerned with the expansion of rights – a rich
classic definition of the state: “A compulsory theoretical and research tradition has examined
political organization with continuous opera- the public sphere, establishment and enrichment
tions will be called a ‘state’ insofar as its admin- of democracy, and the welfare state ( Janoski,
istrative staff successfully upholds the claim to 1998). Nevertheless, because political sociol-
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical ogy – like sociology more generally – has ac-
force in the enforcement of its order.” When a cepted the nation-state as the unit of analy-
state is subject to external influence and control sis, political sociology has difficulty examining
(e.g., Latin America, Iraq, and Afghanistan that the transnational expansion of rights, especially
have experienced U.S. interventions), what does when this expansion erodes the sovereignty of
this imply about the “stateness” of the political the state.
organizations that govern these nation-states? Founded in the wake of World War II and
Does contemporary Iraq exercise a monopoly its many atrocities, one of the first agreements
over the legitimate means of violence within its passed by the United Nations was the Univer-
territory? Conversely, how does the contempo- sal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). But
rary United States and its assertion of military this declaration was founded on a contradic-
power across national boundaries fit with the tion. The members of the United Nations were
classic definition of the state? states – and states committed the most seri-
The examples we have selected highlight the ous violations of human rights. Moreover, as
reach of the United States beyond its geographic the Commission on Human Rights observed,
boundaries. No doubt, political sociologists are it had “no power to take any action in regard
well-aware of Cold War politics, developments to any complaints concerning human rights”
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and U.S. interventions (in Donnelly, 1999:73). There is much to criti-
in the Western Hemisphere and beyond. Nev- cize about the halting and ineffective interven-
ertheless, as an intellectual enterprise, political tions in support of human rights, with Bosnia,
sociology has had next to nothing to say about Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Iraq offering recent
these developments. We return to these topics in examples. Large and powerful nation-states have
the conclusion and make the case that examin- jealously protected their sovereignty – and have
ing war is essential to understanding states and resisted the imposition of a supranational def-
polities in general. For now, we build on this inition of human rights. The United States
discussion of the mismatch between de facto and China retain extensive reliance on capital
political and military power and the geographic punishment and high rates of incarceration de-
boundaries to discuss human rights – a topic that spite international condemnation. Russia’s bru-
political sociology has overlooked. tal tactics in Chechnya have been the subject
of international criticism – but this remains a
Human Rights. There has emerged a lively and national issue, as does China’s treatment of Ti-
important literature on human rights (for a sam- bet. Due to their extensive military and geopo-
pling, see Dunne and Wheeler [eds.], 1999; litical power, the sovereignty of these major
Hesse and Post [eds.], 1999; Ishay [ed.], 1997; see powers remains robust – and there is little likeli-
also The Global Site [http://www.theglobalsite. hood that a supranational force will intervene
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to guarantee human rights in the foreseeable tional authority with the power and authority
future. to supervise and discipline abusive states. These
Still, even if the dream of human rights guar- issues and the implications are the focus of the
antees remains elusive, states are now operating conclusion.
in a very different environment. At a discursive
level, even the world’s major powers are un-
der greater scrutiny and do feel some pressure discussion and conclusion
to comply with international norms of human
rights (Skrentny, 2002). The discursive context We believe that political sociology has been on
has been transformed by the presence and action the sidelines of debates that are of great impor-
of the transnational human rights community tance because it has failed to come to terms with
(including the U.N. Commission on Human issues of war and militarism. Political sociology
Rights and a host of nongovernmental organi- has contributed a rich and insightful research
zations), the ubiquity of televised news cover- tradition that has examined the expansion of cit-
age, and the ability of endangered populations izenship, class struggle, democracy, gender and
to document human rights abuses in real time racial injustice and struggles to eliminate them,
over the Internet (Castells, 1997; Kaldor, 1999; welfare states, and the politics of criminal justice.
Shaw, 1999). But this research has concentrated on the world’s
Collins (1995) argues convincingly that soci- richest and most powerful polities – ignoring
ology has made a significant contribution to the peoples and places in which citizenship is con-
study of revolution because it brings a robust un- strained, class differences are sharpest, democ-
derstanding of the domestic structures and pro- racy is diluted or nonexistent, gender and racial
cesses that impinge on states. By simultaneously injustice is manifest, welfare states are stunted
considering the domestic and the geopolitical, (if present), and the system of criminal justice
sociology has made an important contribution systematically violates human rights. Because
to the study of revolution. With Collins’s advice political sociology has been quite concerned
in mind, political sociology has much to offer with the human rights of citizens in the world’s
to the study of human rights. There are insight- dominant polities but unconcerned about the
ful studies of global civil society and of the role most obvious instances of inequality and injus-
nongovernmental organizations play in diffus- tice, an uncharitable but reasonable explanation
ing cultural idioms and in challenging individ- would suggest that political sociology is encum-
ual regimes (Meyer et al., 1997). But the study bered by ethnocentrism (Connell, 1997). We
of human rights will require a careful consid- believe that this explanation is ultimately in-
eration of states and war making. By and large, correct. Instead, we believe that the reification
the transnational effort to expand human rights of the nation-state generates political sociology’s
is directed toward the protection of individu- blind spots – and that coming to terms with war
als from the police and military of their home and militarism is a necessary step in ameliorating
states. Moreover, enforcing human rights re- this situation.
quires the existence of a supranational power In raising this criticism, we risk slighting im-
capable of controlling states. Thus, we return portant efforts that lay a solid foundation and
to a variation on Elias’s question. Whereas Elias others that have begun to fill this gap. Given
examined the process of pacifying and civilizing that we defended this assertion by reviewing
the aristocracy, we must examine the degree to the articles appearing in the three most visible
which states are becoming civilized. If there is sociology journals, we are especially likely to
evidence of a global civilizing process, the ques- overlook work that has appeared in other out-
tion is if this is largely a cultural process (a con- lets. With this in mind, we close by identifying
tinuation of a process of rationalization that has recent efforts to lay a foundation for the study
a long history) or will there emerge a suprana- of war in the twenty-first century.
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The world systems literature and the neoin- compared with likely alternatives!” Globaliza-
stitutionalist school have been asking the right tion is “weakening state structures, especially
questions. Both schools assert that a global dy- in their capacity to promote global public goods,
namic sharply constrains the range of options their traditional function of enhancing the qual-
for individual states – but they disagree sharply ity of life within the boundaries of the state, and
about the dynamics at work. For neoinstitution- their most recent role of assisting and protect-
alists, this global process is fundamentally cul- ing the vulnerable within their borders. Such
tural. For example, Meyer et al., (1997:150–1) trends, in turn, encourage disruptive ethnic and
argue that “nation-states are more or less ex- exclusivist identities that subvert modernist sec-
ogenously constructed entities – the many in- ular and territorial commitments to tolerance
dividuals both inside and outside the state who and moderation” (Falk, 1999:181). Long be-
engage in state formation and policy formula- fore an international polity can enforce human
tion are enactors of scripts rather than they are rights declarations across all states, it is probable
self directed actors” (Meyer et al., 1997:150–1). that the processes of globalization, the weakness
Specifically, states are molded by “global models of state structures, and neoliberal policies guid-
of rationally organized progress and justice” re- ing international politics will give rise to hor-
sulting in rhetorical support for human rights rific regional wars and brutal ethnic and civil
declarations – even if these pronouncements wars internal to nation-states. Indeed, the re-
rarely translate into a dramatic change in state cent wars and atrocities in Africa, Columbia’s
behaviors. The world systems literature iden- ongoing civil war, and the strife in Indonesia
tifies a global division of labor, including the bear witness to these tendencies.
challenges and impediments confronting indi- As noted, Elias examined the transformation
vidual states (Wallerstein, 1989). Although there of the dominant polities and the relations among
is hope for a dramatically more just and peaceful them. This transformation propelled the pacifi-
world in the medium to long run, Wallerstein cation of the aristocracy and the diffusion of the
believes the first half of the twenty-first cen- civilizing process throughout Europe. Elias had
tury will witness the decline of U.S. hegemony the benefit of 500 years to gain insight into the
and the ascent of a new hegemon. In the past, transformation of European polities. Although
these transitions have been dangerous, violent, the pronouncements of the state’s irrelevance are
and turbulent. During such transition, states did premature, we may be living through the dawn-
not display a commitment to progress and justice ing of an era in which the geographic reach of
(not even rhetorically) – instead states marshaled states is surpassed by global economic, cultural,
forces, waged war, and committed atrocities on political, and military processes. The civilizing
a grand scale. Wallerstein (2000) anticipates the process that Elias examined was in large mea-
current transition to be equally violent. Collins’s sure a consequence of (and a contributor to)
(1981, 1995) views on the barbarity of states a changing strategic balance in Europe. States
during high-stakes wars lend support to Waller- commanded the military resources to outflank
stein’s sober assessment. the aristocracy – in this new strategic context,
Students of human rights and international the politics, economics, and cultural context
politics are examining the prospects for the cre- transformed.
ation of a transnational polity capable of en- Although it has been notoriously difficult
forcing human rights treaties around the globe. to predict which states would be stable and
States are responsible for many of the atrocities which would experience wrenching transfor-
and human rights abuses in the twentieth cen- mation and breakdown, Randall Collins is opti-
tury, and the defense of state sovereignty under- mistic about sociology’s potential: “The macro-
mines international enforcement mechanisms. dynamics of political change is one of the longest
Still, as Falk observes (1999:181), “statism, like standing research interests in sociology; the pas-
democracy, is a normative failure unless it is sion and energy it has attracted over the years
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has given it a core of theory that can pro- marked by apparent reversals. Given that states
vide increasingly good service as more refined were built on war making and one of their deci-
theory is elaborated in the future” (Collins, sive advantages remains in this realm, wars and
1995:1589). The questions before political soci- war making will play pivotal roles in the sur-
ology are daunting. Our most important ques- vival or the eclipse of the state. Stated otherwise,
tion is no longer to identify which states will should it focus on domestic politics and en-
be stable and which will collapse; the task is dogenous political processes, political sociology
to anticipate whether or not states will survive will remain on the sidelines for one of the most
as the world’s dominant political organization – exciting and important debates of the twenty-
or if global or transnational entities will su- first century. But if political sociology fully con-
percede them. If the past is any guide, such a siders militarism and war making – through-
transformation will be a violent and confusing out the world – it would bring its unique
one, marked by instability in a large number of insights and rich tradition to bear on questions
polities. Should there be a shift away from the that are of central concern to the peoples of
state as the dominant political organization, this the world and rich with theoretical conund-
shift will undoubtedly be difficult to discern and rums.
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part v
GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL

SOCIOLOGY
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chapter twenty-nine
Globalization1
Philip McMichael
Globalization is widely perceived as the defining balization as the compression of time/space

issue of our times. Exactly what “globalization” (Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1996; Helleiner, 1997),
means, however, is unclear. Some commen- expressed for example in biopolitical disciplines
tators argue that the world is not necessarily (Hoogvelt, 1997:125). And there is the political
more integrated now than at the turn of the angle, emphasizing the global transformation of
twentieth century (Hirst and Thompson, 1996), the conditions of democratic political commu-
whereas others grant globalization only epiphe- nity, as “effective power is shared and bartered
nomenal significance in an era of transition to by diverse forces and agencies at national, reg-
a postmodern world system future (Wallerstein, ional and international levels” (Held, 2000:399),
2002:37). Positive definitions can take several challenging conventional, state-centered ac-
forms, in which globalization is viewed as a counts of world order. As an outcome, global-
process, an organizing principle, an outcome, a ization is usually understood as an inexorable
conjuncture, or a project. As a process, globaliza- phase of world development, in which transna-
tion is typically defined, in economic terms, as tional economic integration takes precedence
“the closer integration of the countries and peo- over a state-centered world (e.g., Radice, 1998;
ples of the world . . . by the enormous reduction Robinson, 2001).3 As a conjuncture, globaliza-
of costs of transportation and communication, tion has been viewed as an historically specific
and the breaking down of artificial barriers to ordering of post-Bretton Woods international
the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, relations, structured by the “financialization”
and (to a lesser extent) people across borders” of strategies of capital accumulation associated
(Stiglitz, 2002:9). As an organizing principle, it with a posthegemonic world order (Arrighi,
can be conceptualized as “deterritorialization” 1994), or as a form of corporate management
(Scholte, 2000:46), that is, as the explanans in of an unstable international financial system
accounting for contemporary social change, as (Amin, 1997; Panitch, 1998; Sklair, 2001). And
“the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local as a project, globalization has been viewed as an
contexts of interaction and their restructuring ideological justification of the deployment of
across indefinite spans of time–space” (Giddens, neoliberal policies privileging corporate rights
1990:21).2 Related to this is the notion of glo- (Gill, 1992; Cox, 1992; McMichael, 2004).
Any attempt to define the term, especially in
1
The author is grateful to Alicia Swords for back- a handbook such as this, needs to be clear about
ground research on the MST and to Dia Mohan, Raj
Patel, the editors, and reviewers for comments on ear-
3
lier drafts. See Block, 2001; Goldfrank, 2001; and McMichael,
2
For an extended and incisive critique of this theo- 2001 for cautionary responses to Robinson’s call for tran-
retical abstraction, see Rosenberg, 2000. scending a state-centered paradigm.
587
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588 Philip McMichael
its orientation. The above distinctions represent of material relations. And second, Polanyi’s use
emphases, which are not unrelated to one an- of this method to interpret the crisis of market
other, and concern how to represent current rule at the turn of the twentieth century con-
transformations. How to do that is the key ques- ceptualizes modern institutions as embedded in,
tion, perhaps underlining the directional and and ultimately subject to, political relations. In
compositional indeterminacy of globalization, other words, the trajectory of an institution like
as a discursive reordering of the world. Global- the market is only comprehended through an
ization has such institutional force as a discourse interpretation of its cumulative social and po-
that we need historical specification of why and litical consequences. Beyond an economic pro-
how this is so. Problematizing contemporary cess, market construction is a historical process
globalization as a form of corporate rule helps of governing resistances to social transformation
to situate it historically and clarify its relational via conceptions of sovereignty and rights. This
political dynamics. This requires two steps: first, is also the case with corporate globalization, a
understanding globalization as a general con- successor episode of instituting market relations
dition of the capitalist era (initiating world his- on a world scale. Polanyi provides a link be-
tory) and particularizing its contemporary form;4 tween the two episodes, not only historically
and second, demystifying globalization’s phe- but also methodologically, in his formulation of
nomenal, or empirical, forms (e.g., economic the “double movement” of instituting and re-
integration measures) by examining it through sisting market relations.
its political countermovements – as globaliza- The link between the formation of the
tion’s historical and relational barometer. Be- European nation-state system and corporate
cause globalization is realized at various scales globalization is that the latter emerges in op-
(global, national, regional, subregional), it can position to the protective shell of the nation-
be examined effectively through its multilayered state – what economists term “artificial barriers”
processes, registered in movements that operate to material flows across national borders. The
on different (but often interrelated) scales. ideology of corporate globalization champions
This chapter attempts to capture the con- “free” exchange, the logic of which is to reduce
tradictory relations of corporate globalization the historic frictions to global market relations
through an analysis of the movements that reveal in state regulations (sovereignty) and economic
its politics, rather than its broad and everyday subsidies (rights). In this sense, corporate glob-
trends. In order to demonstrate this fundamental alization represents a sustained challenge to the
property of corporate globalization, I draw on citizen state, rolling back the political and so-
Karl Polanyi’s (1957) exemplary account of the cial gains of the countermovements of the last
formation of the modern nation-state. In inter- century and a half (the “citizenship” bundle of
preting state formation through the prism of the economic, political, and social rights). The state
double movement of political resistance to the itself is transformed, as an instrument of priva-
institution of market relations, Polanyi provides tization, and its evident complicity in decom-
a dual legacy. First, his method of distinguish- posing modern citizenship fuels an alternative
ing substantive from formal economics identi- politics, informing a global countermovement.
fies the social dimension of such representations
the global countermovement 5
4
Examples of the use of the method of histori-
cizing forms of capitalist globalization include Arrighi This chapter argues that the global counter-
and Silver et al.’s multifaceted analysis of a series
movement both resembles and transcends the
of hegemonic/posthegemonic moments in the history
of world capitalism (1999); Arrighi’s “systemic cy-
5
cles of accumulation” associated with Dutch, British I use the singular “countermovement” to replicate
and U.S. hegemony (1994); and analysis of U.S. Polanyi’s usage, which portrayed the double movement
hegemony as a resolution to the crisis of British hege- as instituting and resisting market rule, across the nine-
mony (McMichael, 2000b). teenth and early twentieth centuries. As then, today’s
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Globalization 589
Polanyian double movement of implementation diverse resistances to global empire, articulated

of and resistance to economic liberalism. By em- thus: “We are fighting against the hegemony
phasizing the discontinuity with Polanyi’s dou- of finance, the destruction of our cultures, the
ble movement, I identify a distinctive dimension monopolization of knowledge, mass media and
of the politics of the global countermovement, communication, the degradation of nature, and
namely the rejection of the universalisms of the destruction of the quality of life by transna-
the project of modernity, that is, the linking tional corporations and anti-democratic poli-
of the inevitability of progress to the neces- cies” (World Social Forum, 2001).
sity of science in the service of the industrial The global countermovement nurtures a
state.6 The World Social Forum (WSF) slogan paradigm shift.7 Transcending the politics of
of “another world is possible” challenges the “underdevelopment,” it draws attention to the
neoliberal world vision, but from the perspec- choice facing the world’s peoples: between a
tive of strategic diversity. That is, another world path of exclusion, monoculture, and corporate
would respect diversity, understood here as crys- control or a path of inclusion, diversity, and de-
tallizing through imperial relations constituted mocracy. Baldly put, this is a historic choice in
by asymmetrical forms of power and differ- two senses. First, the discourse of diversity con-
ential forms of exclusion (quite distinct from founds the universalisms of modernity, through
“development/underdevelopment” relations). which powerful states/cultures have sought to
This variation, expressed in ethnic, class, gender, colonize the world with their singular vision.
racial, and sexual relations of inequality across And second, the historic attempt to impose the
the world, informs an overriding solidarity, as logic and force of market rule on the world ap-
expressed in the WSF. The WSF unifies those pears to be reaching its apogee. A protective
movement is emerging, viewing markets not
countermovement is quite heterogeneous – in politi- simply as objects of regulation but as institutions
cal goals, identities, scales, tactics, etc. – nevertheless its of corporate rule and espousing alternative so-
multiple networks, organizations, and movements in- cial forms.
creasingly harbor a sensibility of connection (through
strategic diversity) to a common world-historical con-
These alternative social forms draw on cul-
dition, as is evident in the politics of the World Social tural and ecological traditions and radical in-
Forum and as is noted by participating activist/analysts, terpretations of democratic politics. While em-
for example: “Whether located in obscure third world bodying a vision of another world, these diverse
cities or the centers of global commerce, the struggles social forms are strategic in sharing their re-
of the Global Justice Movements increasingly intersect
because they focus on virtually identical opponents: the
jection of neoliberalism. Whether the global
agencies and representatives of neoliberal capitalism – countermovement adopts a political superstruc-
global, regional, national and local” (Bond, 2001:7; see ture remains to be seen (Wallerstein, 2002:37).
also Starr, 2000).
6 7
Although modernity is an unfinished project, it David Held, although unprepared to view the
embodies the separations of nature and society and nation-state as an institution of Western hegemony,
culture and society, reason, secularization, sovereignty, considers this turning point as an indeterminate transfor-
specialization, instrumental or functional rationality, a mation of the question of sovereignty and rights: “glob-
scientific imperative, bureaucratization, and so forth. alization . . . has arguably served to reinforce the sense
Historically, these properties have come to define, or be of the significance of identity and difference . . . One
identified with, industrial capitalism. Early modernity’s consequence of this is the elevation in many interna-
idea of progress conceived of the possibility of domi- tional forums of non-Western views of rights, authority
nation of nature and the desirability of rational change and legitimacy. The meaning of some of the core con-
versus traditional eternities and divine rights, but in the cepts of the international system are subject to the deep-
modernity of the age of high colonialism, progress as est conflicts of interpretation, as illustrated at the UN
such became inevitable. Given the context, the project World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna ( June
of modernity now became the imperative condition of 1993) . . . If the global system is marked by significant
the West and its colonial empire – all societies were to change, this is perhaps best conceived less as an end of
follow the path of urban–industrial capitalism governed the era of the nation-state and more as a challenge to the
by nation-states legitimated by popular sovereignty and era of ‘hegemonic states’ – a challenge which is as yet
universal legal codes (see Araghi and McMichael, 2004). far from complete” (1995:94–5).
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Ideally, a superstructure drawing on emergent mensions. Both aspects lend themselves to in-
WSF networks among grassroots movements, corporated comparison,9 which views forms of
NGOs and unions, and respecting the princi- globalization as successively related instances of
ple of multiple overlapping jurisdictions (Cox, an historic world ordering in the modern epoch
1994; Held, 1995:137), would embody the dis- (see note 4), and interprets corporate globaliza-
tinctive cosmopolitan sensibilities of counter- tion as a product of its contradictory political
movement politics. These sensibilities reflect its relations – in particular the historical dialectic
world-historical foundations and/or the grow- of sovereignty and rights.
ing prominence of transboundary issues, creat-
ing “overlapping communities of fate” where
“the fortunes and prospects of individual po- modernity, rights, and sovereignty
litical communities are increasingly bound to-
gether” (Held, 2000:400). As perhaps the touchstone of modernity, sov-
The connections among movements as di- ereignty is institutionalized in the process of
verse as labor, feminist, peasant, environmen- nation-state formation and the construction of
talist, and indigenous organizations may not be citizenship rights. The rise of the modern state is
immediate, but the power of the movements premised on the emergence of civil society, the
lies in shared circumstances and reflexive di- realm of private property and individual rights.
versity. In this sense, corporate globalization How individual rights are translated into citi-
has distinctive faces, places, and meanings, con- zenship rights (and vice versa) and what those
cretizing it as a complex, diverse, and contra- rights entail depend on the transformation of
dictory unity conditioned by its multiplicity of property relations and state trajectories. The
resistances. This relationship is evident in the classic formulation of this evolutionary mod-
World Bank’s tactical embrace of social capital ernist view of citizenship was that of T. H.
and “voices of the poor” (Narayan, 2000), fuels Marshall (1964).
the tensions within the Washington Consensus8 Marshall defined citizenship as comprehen-
over the legitimacy or efficacy of globalization’s sive membership in the national community –
policy apparatus (cf. Stiglitz, 2002), and leads a historical resolution of the tensions between
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to encour- political equality in the state and economic in-
age “globalization with a human face.” equality in the marketplace. As the political
In short, this chapter’s specification of global- expression of the development of civil soci-
ization as corporate power highlights the process ety, citizenship derives from a process of for-
by which its contradictory relationships form malizing substantive rights in the state, from
it as an ongoing discursive project of market political, through economic, to social rights.
rule. From this perspective, globalization is a Political rights (as limited as they were to prop-
formative (and thereby unresolved) process. Al- ertyholders in the state) provided the precon-
though analysis may not resolve the question dition for economic rights (arising from labor
of what globalization is, it can usefully situate organization), which enabled the institutional-
this question diachronically and synchronically. ization of social rights in the twentieth-century
Diachronic analysis considers globalization’s
contextual (historical) dimensions, whereas syn- 9
Incorporated comparison is geared to dereifying the
chronic analysis considers its compositional di- social world as a relational process rather than a set of
categorical constructs; collapsing the externalist catego-
8
The Washington Consensus refers to that collection rization of social entities as discrete, independent cases
of neoliberal economic policies (trade and financial liber- to be compared; and collapsing metaphorical binaries
alization, privatization, and macrostability of the world like global/local (McMichael, 1990). The comparative
economy) uniting multilateral institutions, representa- juxtaposition of relational parts (such as rules and re-
tives of the international arm of the U.S. state, and as- sistances) progressively constitutes a whole, as a forma-
sociated G-7 countries enabling corporate globalization tive construct: here, a world-historical conjuncture, the
and, arguably, U.S. hegemony. “globalization project.”
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Globalization 591
welfare state (cf. Stephens, Rueschemeyer, and gious or regional collectivity, although they are
Stephens, 1992).10 rarely completely contained by it” (Yuval-Davis,
This interpretation of citizenship as the so- 2000:171).
cial democratic achievement informed much of The concept of global citizenship invokes the
the post-World War II political sociology liter- possibility of a global civil society (cf. Cox,
ature and its search for a progressive model in 1999), and whether (and in what sense) move-
the shadow of totalitarian regimes (cf. Polanyi, ments aimed at containing global market rule
1957; Bendix, 1964; Moore, 1965). The key are today reproducing the Polanyian protective
shortcoming of this interpretation was its state- impulse to secure social rights (cf. Bienefeld,
centered understanding of political outcomes, 1989; Bernard, 1997). Polanyi offers a world-
discounting imperial relations and their re- historical understanding of the derivation of
cursive impact on Western states and citizens rights: through the differential “discovery of
(Cooper and Stoler, 1997). Remarking on the society” across Western states embedded within
“institutionalized racism” in states in the post- a world market managed by international fi-
colonial era, Bryan Turner notes that the rise of nanciers. Polanyi’s account of the challenge to
citizenship was intimately associated with na- the market ideology of economic liberalism re-
tionalism, where citizenship involved “(1) an mains state-centered. It is framed by the con-
inclusionary criterion for the allocation of enti- temporary belief in the instrumentality of the
tlements, and (2) an exclusionary basis for build- nation-state as the vehicle of social protections.
ing solidarity and creating identity” (2000:135, In his (modernist) account, the question of
137), discriminating against traditional periph- rights is overdetermined by the question of state
eral cultures in Europe (cf. Hechter, 1975) and sovereignty.
reproducing this inclusionary/exclusionary re- Corporate globalization generates the cir-
lation in colonial states. cumstances in which the modern form of
Corporate globalization clarifies the world- sovereignty, although still relevant to counter-
historical and exclusionary dimensions of cit- movement politics, is challenged by alterna-
izenship as it erodes social entitlements and tive forms of sovereignty, referred to variously
redistributes people across national boundaries, as “globalization from below” (Brecher et al.,
complicating the question of sovereignty and 2000), “the anticapitalist resistance,” “global
citizenship. As David Held remarks: “there is a social justice movements,” or “democratic glob-
fundamental question about whether the rights alization.” Many of these forms embrace,
embodied in citizenship rights can any longer substantively, the idea of “subsidiarity,” situat-
be sustained simply within the framework that ing decision-making power at the lowest appro-
brought them into being” (1995:223). New priate levels/loci, transforming sovereignty into
conceptions of citizenship have emerged: from a “relative rather than an absolute authority”
cosmopolitan citizenship (Held, 1995) through (Brecher et al., 2000:44). Although it is impos-
mobility citizenship (Urry, 2000) to global citi- sible to detail the range of such movements, this
zenship (Muetzelfeldt and Smith, 2002), and in chapter draws on the examples of the regional
the notion of the “multilayered citizen,” where Mexican Zapatista, national Brazilian Sem Terra,
“people’s rights and obligations to a specific state and transnational Via Campesina movements to
are mediated and largely dependent on their identify such alternative social forms practic-
membership of a specific ethnic, racial, reli- ing a politics of subsidiarity that is, significantly,
cosmopolitan.
10 Explication of the tension between the con-
Marshall’s legalistic conception of rights obscures
the participatory dimension of citizenship, rooted in civil ventional, Polanyian countermovement (reasse-
society discourses of rights and obligations (see Janoski, rting national sovereignty against neoliberalism)
1998:17). These discourses inform the principle of au-
tonomy (structured self-determination) that underpins and the emergence of a decentralized transna-
the democratic project – whether in nation-states or in tional, “network movement” (Brecher et al.,
cosmopolitan political arrangements (Held, 1995:147). 2000; Hardt, 2002) suggests a crisis in the
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paradigm of modernity. While there is a vari- and whole societies struggled over the finan-
ety of reform and/or advocacy networks and cial austerity imposed by the gold standard on
nongovernmental organizations (from Amnesty national economies experiencing trade imbal-
International through Oxfam to Friends of the ances. These various mobilizations formed a his-
Earth), loosely defined as an emergent “global toric countermovement to the idea of the “self-
civil society” or an incipient organic “world regulating market.”
parliament” (Monbiot, 2003), we consider Under sustained popular pressure, govern-
here the discourse of three political movements intervened in the market, abandoned the
ments, with active constituencies, that refor- gold standard (the mother of all commodities),
mulate conceptions of sovereignty and rights and the early-twentieth-century world resorted
reflexively – that is, in critical relation to to socialism, fascism and New-Dealism. Out of
extant global power relations. Social science these experiments, at the end of a period of
conventions may view these as “peripheral” world wars, the Cold War divided the indus-
movements, but I regard this designation trial world between variants of social democracy
inappropriate in a global economy whose foun- (First World) and communism (Second World).
dations rest firmly on a dialectic of exploita- While the former turned services like unem-
tion/marginalization of the world’s majority ployment relief, health care, and education into
population. I focus on two features of modern public rights through a measure of decommod-
sovereignty addressed by these movements: first, ification and as a complement to market society,
the limits of formal sovereignty, institutionalized the latter abolished the separation of economics
in the liberal–modern binary of state/market and politics through central planning, repre-
(political/economic); and second, occlusion of senting an “enormous political challenge to
imperial relations as the historic crucible of the the social form of the modern states-system”
modern state. (Rosenberg, 2001:134).
For Polanyi, the movement of resistance
to the ideology of the self-regulating market
limits of the project of modernity turned on a public vision of society, based in
social protections, civil rights, and modern cit-
We begin with an account of Polanyi’s contribu- izenship. That is, the countermovements re-
tion, as it presages the politics of globalization. vealed the social character of rights and equality
The Great Transformation (1957), constructed in the state. But Polanyi’s conception of the great
around the process of the “discovery of soci- transformation as the “discovery of society” be-
ety,” locates the question of rights in the social trays an essentialism of modernity, in a primor-
regulation of the market. Polanyi termed the dial social interest recovered through the double
commodification of land, labor, and money a movement, obscuring the class, gender, eth-
fiction of economistic ideology, because these nic, and imperial relations constituting the state.
social substances are not produced for sale – State-sanctioned citizenship may be a universal
rather, they embody social relations. Their sub- ideal, but its historic practice has been marked
jection to market relations is a political act. The by relational strategies of alterity, privilege, and
fictitious nature of these commodities was re- exclusion (Isin, 2002). Although the state is rep-
vealed in the overwhelming social reaction to resented formally as the site of sovereignty (poli-
the rule of the market at the turn of the twen- tics), its substantive dimensions include the class
tieth century. Landed classes mobilized against and cultural politics of the relations of power,
the pressures of commercial agriculture, work- production, and consumption.11 That is, the
ers organized against exploitation of their la-
bor as a mere commodity whose price de- 11
The conventional understanding of the state as
pended only on its supply and demand and a one-sided and artificial “superstructure” of politics,
whose employment depended on business for- distinguished from an equally artificial and depoliti-
tunes beyond employee and employer control, cized “base” of economics, stems from the fetishism
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Globalization 593
state itself is, in part, a relation of production most modern states embody historic tensions
(Sayer, 1987) and reproduction (cf. Bakker and between formal secularism and historical layer-
Gill, 2003) and therefore part of the constitution ing of race, class, and ethnic political relations.
of the thought and practice of civil society. What is so distinctive about contemporary
The modernity paradigm represents the state globalization is that it exacerbates these ten-
as the realm of political sovereignty, linked to sions through state transformation. Under the
civil society via national forms of citizenship, but guise of formal sovereignty, states author the
historically states were constituted within im- deregulation of financial flows and the privati-
perial relations. That is, the substantive history zation of public capacity, decomposing national
of the state system is embedded in a complex political–economic coherence (Chossudovsky,
of global and regional, class, racial, and ethnic 1997) and elevating ethnic and racial hierarchies
power relations (cf. Wallerstein, 1974). The within and across states. At the global level, his-
modern state’s discriminatory modes of rule toric north–south relations shape currency hi-
contradict the rhetoric of European civility and erarchies and multilateral institutional power in
modernity (see, e.g., Davis, 2000). Racism was such a way as to distribute the costs of structural
integral to settler states, formed through geno- adjustment to the weaker and more vulnera-
cidal relations with indigenous peoples, and ble states and populations (Cohen, 1998). Under
colonial states – where, in Africa, exploitative the resulting austere conditions, states become
apparatuses were often based in state patronage the site and object of class, ethnic, and religious
systems formed through artificial tribal hi- mobilizations based in regional or national pol-
erarchies and land confiscation (Patel, 2002; itics. The insecurities and forced deprivations
Davidson, 1992:206, 257). With decoloniza- attending corporate globalization are expressed
tion, independence formally abolished racial in myriad ways, from food riots through land
discrimination and affirmed civil freedoms, but occupation to indigenous and fundamentalist
it often divided power within the new nation- movements demanding rights in the state. These
states according to the tribal relations (ethnic, tensions express the historic inequalities within
religious, regional) established via colonial rule a global states system constituted through the
(Mamdani, 1996:17–20). Similarly, the states uneven and incomplete project of postcolonial
in the Indian subcontinent were constructed sovereignty and development, to which we now
through the politics of partition in the mo- turn.
ment of decolonization, at the same time as the
state of Israel occupied and subdivided Palestine.
Whereas the modernity paradigm proclaims for- modernity and development
mal equality in the state, assimilating minorities
and deploying civil rights to correct historic Development emerged as part of the modernity
inequities of access to the state and market, paradigm, as a political response to the depre-
dations of the market. Its centerpiece was the
surrounding exchange relations. Social relations among problem of dispossession and displacement of
people appear as exchange relations between commodi- populations (both rural and industrial), through
ties, extinguishing the interdependence among peo- the consolidation of private property relations
ple and elevating their dependence on “economy” (in land or money–capital). As a result, “de-
(cf. Marx, 1967). The phenomenal independence of the
economy is matched by the phenomenal independence velopment” was reproduced on a broadening
of the realm of politics. Polanyi’s critique of the com- scale as governments sought to accommodate
modity fetishism of economism as simply unnatural ac- (and discipline) the expropriated to paid la-
cepts the fetishized social form of the state, occluding its bor systems within industrial capitalist relations
origins in the property relation, precluding an historical (Cowan and Shenton, 1996). This intervention
(and cultural) understanding of the phenomenon of mar-
ket rule, and perhaps obscuring the inevitable return of informed, on a world scale, a discourse of in-
what he referred to as “our obsolete market mentality” ternational development in the mid-twentieth-
(1971). century era of decolonization, targeting Third
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World poverty (Escobar 1995), clearly enun- through the state. In short, modernity is ex-
ciated by U.S. President Harry Truman on pressed in the state form, as a relation with na-
January 20, 1949: tional and international dimensions.
In world-historical terms, citizenship, demo-
“We must embark on a bold new program for mak- cracy, and development – all universal visions
ing the benefits of our scientific advances and in- implying political, social, and economic rights –
dustrial progress available for the improvement and were forged, as attributes of states, within the
growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperial-
colonial relationship and its disorganizing im-
ism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place
in our plans. What we envisage is a program of de- pact on the non-European world. The colonial
velopment based on the concepts of democratic fair relation conditioned these discourses, enabling
dealing” (quoted in Esteva, 1992:6). their projection as universal conditions chart-
ing the future of the non-European world (cf.
The discourse of development, as a “fair Cooper and Stoler, 1997:37). Together they in-
deal,” offered a vision of all societies moving formed the post-World War II “development
along a path forged by the Western world – project,” a discursive vehicle for the ordering
a path constituted by dispossession (cf. Davis, of world political–economy under U.S. hege-
2000). It was liberal insofar as it rejected colo- mony (McMichael, 2004). The U.S. strategy,
nialism and promoted self-determination, envi- representing development as a historic entitle-
sioning a national popular mobilization in the ment of the community of (new) nations, was, as
project of modernization and improvement of Immanuel Wallerstein (1995) put it, New Deal-
living standards. But it ignored the contribution ism writ large. Development was instituted as a
of colonial peoples, cultures, and resources to regime of “embedded liberalism,” premised on
European development; it forgot that the post- the deliberate organization of the world market
colonial states could not repeat the European around national economic priorities (Ruggie,
experience of development through colonial- 1982). In other worlds, it was a globally insti-
ism (other than through further dispossession tuted market, anchored in a now complete states
of rural and minority peoples via internal system.
colonialism); and it denied the intrinsic merit As the projection of the Anglo–American
of non-European cultures. welfare state into the postcolonial states system,
As an ideal, the development paradigm erases the development project combined aid with
the relation between the rise of modern cit- responsibility, especially adherence to the prin-
izenship in Europe and the horror of slavery ciple of the freedom of enterprise (Arrighi,
and colonialism, and offers the world a sin- 1994:68; Karagiannis, 2004). But the devel-
gle vision that flattens its diversity and spon- opment project was an unrealizable ideal in
sors an increasingly unsustainable monocultural an asymmetrical world order. Its four pillars
industrial system. The development paradigm combined national and international forms of
embodies a contradictory logic: It offers self- regulation. First, it responded to, and spon-
determination at the same time as it sus- sored, the completion of the nation-state system
pends self-definition (Rist, 1997:79). That is, via decolonization and the institutionalization
it frames self-determination as a property of of the principle of self-determination in the
the nation-state: an imposed Western discipline United Nations.12 Second, the 1944 Bretton
(cf. Mitchell 1988). Here, “development” re- Woods conference (creating the IMF and the
hearses the duality of modernity, which at
12
once celebrated the progressive Enlightenment This principle anticipated the post-Westphalian in-
principle of self-organization but contained it clusion of individuals (rather than just states) as subjects
through the device of state sovereignty (Hardt of international law and codification of human rights.
Held, noting the potential paradigm shift, suggests the
and Negri, 2000:74). Political sovereignty was logical conclusion of this vision is to challenge “the
thus constructed as a relationship of power, whole principle that humankind should be organized
channeling citizen and subject sovereignties as a society of sovereign states above all else” (1995:89).
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Globalization 595
World Bank) institutionalized the regulation of been hard-pressed to replicate the First World
monetary relations on a world scale. Unlike development path (cf. Grosfoguel, 1996). And
the nineteenth century, when world money third, the institutional structure of the develop-
was produced through private financial houses, ment project promoted transnational economic
post-World War II world money was produced integration through aid programs and foreign
through a combination of the U.S. Federal investment. Freedom of enterprise encouraged
Reserve (the U.S. controlled 70 percent of gold transnational corporate activity and generated
reserves) and an allied coalition of central banks an offshore dollar market that ballooned in
(Arrighi, 1994:278), with an IMF/World Bank the 1970s with the recycling of petrodollars.
loan system designed to stabilize currency ex- A global money market arose, and, with rapid
changes (aided by capital controls) and to incor- developments in information and communica-
porate postcolonial states into the development tion technology, global banks gained promi-
project. Third, national political–economies, nence and an era of financialization ensued
with considerable variation, regulated wage (Arrighi, 1994). Colin Leys (1996:7) captures
relations with combinations of Keynesian the transition to the “globalization project”:
macroeconomic policy and Fordist strategies to
By the mid-1980s the real world on which “develop-
stabilize expanding production and consump-
ment theory” had been premised had . . . disappeared.
tion relations. Fourth, the Marshall Plan and Above all, national and international controls over
other foreign aid programs driven by Cold capital movements had been removed, drastically cur-
War concerns infused the world economy with tailing the power of any state wishing to promote
military, technological, and financial relations national development, while the international de-
privileging U.S. corporate and geopolitical in- velopment community threw itself into the task of
terests. These four pillars instituted a world mar- strengthening “market forces” (i.e., capital) at the ex-
pense of states everywhere, but especially in the Third
ket within an ideal discourse of development,
World.
in which states were responsible for managing
national economic growth. Postcolonial states Ultimately, the globalization project repre-
sought to transcend the structural dependency sents an attempt to resolve the crisis of devel-
of the colonial division of labor by pursuing opment, which appears as the crisis of state
strategies of “import substitution industrializa- sovereignty. This crisis was immanent in the
tion” to build domestic manufacturing capac- contradiction between the ideal of national de-
ity, financed by continued patterns of exports velopment and transnational economic integra-
of primary goods and/or by bilateral technical tion (cf. Friedmann and McMichael, 1989).
and food aid and multilateral loans. The development project premise, that states
The development project, as an attempt to were supposed to organize national economies,
universalize the model of the citizen state, re- was undercut by the geopolitical and corpo-
mains unrealized. First, the nation-state was rate relations ordering the “free world” as an
essentially a West European institution (cf. international hierarchy of political and techno-
Davidson, 1992). It has had a troubled history logical relations. Transnational firms deepened
in Eastern Europe and the postcolonial world, the “material integration of social reproduction
where state boundaries intersect cultural group- across borders” (Rosenberg, 2001:134–5), com-
ings and where the in-migration of ex-colonials pounding the differentials among Third World
has accelerated the erosion of civil rights associ- states as global production chains fragmented
ated with neoliberal reforms. Second, geopoli- national economic sectors, preempting nation-
tics has conferred privilege on some states at the ally driven forms of capital accumulation and
expense of others. Industrialization of showcase, wealth redistribution, and new forms of global
or strategic, states of the Cold War (e.g., South finance exacerbated indebtedness among Third
Korea, Taiwan, Chile, South Africa) served to World states. These circumstances clarified the
confirm the development project while most paradox of formal sovereignty: first, in the aus-
of their erstwhile Third World partners have tere conditions imposed on overexposed Third
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World states via the debt regime of the past two Formal political sovereignty enables the en-
decades; and second, in the subsequent partici- forcement of market rule. The management of
pation of governments in implementing market the debt crisis by the Bretton Woods institutions
rule, via the institutions (WTO) and protocols illustrates this proposition. Bailouts of indebted
(FTAs) of the globalization project. states in the 1980s, and beyond, mandated
government enactment of austerity measures
under market-enabling conditions laid down
globalization and development:
by the IMF and World Bank crisis managers.
recycling the double movement?
Structural adjustment loans require combina-
tions of currency devaluation, wage reductions,
Arguably, globalization is the politics of institut-
removal of social subsidies, privatization of
ing a corporate market on a global scale. There
the state, and liberalization of foreign trade
are two sides to this coin: the restructuring of
and financial markets. Whereas these measures
states to facilitate global circuits of money and
were implemented on a case-by-case basis in
commodities (conventionally termed “opening
the 1980s, they were institutionalized in the
economies”), and the construction of multilat-
1990s as universal rules applying to a collec-
eral institutions and conventions securing this
tive sovereignty, although not without some
global “market rule.” It involves a reconfig-
(continuing) resistance (Chossudovsky, 1997;
uration of priorities and power within states,
McMichael, 2000a).
typically expressed in the ascendance of glob-
With the collapse of the Cold War in 1991,
ally oriented financial and trade interests over
the stage was set for a universal application
national developmentalist coalitions rooted in
of liberalization, under the leadership of the
labor and peasant unions and institutionalized
United States and its G-7 allies. In the
in urban welfare, education, and agricultural
GATT Uruguay Round (1986–94), plans were
ministeries (Canak, 1989). States are not disap-
afoot for extending trade liberalization mea-
pearing; rather, they undergo transformation to
sures from manufacturers to agriculture, ser-
accommodate global corporate relations and the
vices, and intellectual property. A powerful
requirements of sound finance, as interpreted
complex of transnational firms, including
by the multilateral agencies. Thus the condition
GM, IBM, and American Express, formed a
for the Mexican state signing on to the North
multinational trade negotiations coalition to
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was
lobby GATT member nations (New York Times,
the sale or dissolution of 80 percent of its 1,555
November 11, 1990). The outcome of the
public enterprises, the reduction of average tar-
Round was the creation of the World Trade
iffs on manufactured imports from 27 to 8 per-
Organization (WTO) with over 130 member
cent, wage reductions of up to 50 percent, a
states. Unlike the GATT, a trade treaty only,
shift from husbanding a national agricultural
the WTO has the power, through its dispute
and food sector to encouraging foreign invest-
settlement body, to enforce its rulings onto
ment in agro-exports, reducing rural credit and
member states. Should states refuse to com-
food subsidies, promoting food importing, and
ply, the WTO can authorize the plaintiff to
liberalizing access to the financial and trans-
take unilateral action. The ambit of the dispute
port sectors for foreign investors (McMichael,
settlement mechanism is wide: covering trade,
2004:135, 192). In these ways and more, the
investment, services, and intellectual property.
transformation of the Mexican state facilitates
the global deepening of relations of social repro-
nomic policy instruments, Held accentuates the ambi-
duction. The paradox of sovereignty is exposed guity of sovereignty: “While this alone does not amount
in the state’s performance of its historic task of to a direct erosion of an individual state’s entitlement to
organizing the (now global) market.13 rule its roost – sovereignty – it leaves nation-states ex-
posed and vulnerable to the networks of economic forces
13
In observing that financialization has reduced the and relations which range in and through them, recon-
options of even powerful nation-states regarding eco- stituting their very form and capacities” (1995:134).
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Globalization 597
Member states can lodge complaints against system). He suggests that the public/private
states deemed in restraint of trade with the disjuncture “explains part of the paradox of
WTO, whose ruling holds automatically unless sovereignty: why it is both more absolute in
every other member state votes to reverse it. its ‘purely political’ prerogatives than other his-
Consistent with the moderns conception of torical forms of rule, and yet highly ambigu-
political sovereignty, the role of the WTO is ous as a measure of actual power” (Rosenberg,
ostensibly to enforce market freedoms, by de- 2001:131). Thus, the moment of consolidation
politicizing the global economy. This implies of national sovereignty as a universal form via the
a general challenge to national laws and regula- development project simultaneously spawned a
tions regarding the environment, health, pref- powerful counterpoint in the state-sponsored
erential trade relations, social subsidies, labor corporate integration of economic relations on
legislation, and so on. Although the challenge a world scale. It is this dialectic that sparks de-
does not eliminate all laws, it seeks to harmonize bates about the fate of the state under globaliza-
regulation across the state system and to lower tion and underlies current tensions within the
the ceiling on democratic initiatives within the WTO, as the agency now responsible for insti-
national polity, especially those involving sub- tuting the self-regulating market. And it is this
national jurisdictions (Tabb, 2000:9). That is, tension that reveals the crisis of sovereignty.
instituting a self-regulating market on a global The crisis of sovereignty is expressed for-
scale reformulates and redistributes, rather than mally in declining state capacity to protect (all)
removes, sovereignty, simultaneously generating citizens as well as in the substantive challenge
resistances. by countermovements to modern understand-
The current challenge to national laws – and ings of sovereignty, both spurred by corporate
currencies – invokes a second cycle of Polanyian globalization. As Charles Tilly (1984) suggests,
countermovements in a rediscovery of society. historically capital inherited the state as a protec-
But instead of a historic movement, the discov- tion racket, subordinating peoples and cultures
ery of society now appears to have been a his- across the world to territorial administration and
toric moment rooted in the political history of refashioning the state via civic representation as
the West. This was the moment of consolida- a legitimizing and/or empowering relation with
tion of the nation-state. The maturing of so- its subjects. Arguably capital now owns or seeks
cial rights (and, therefore, of social protections) to own the state, via privatization and the dis-
was conditioned by the maturing of movements ciplines of deregulated monetary relations, and
for decolonization – ignored by Polanyi, but, has a diminishing need for substantive forms
arguably, just as significant in the process of of democracy associated with the twentieth-
completion of the nation-state system. The sig- century “discovery of society” (cf. Hardt and
nificance of this conjuncture lay not only in the Negri, 2000). In the twenty-first century, the
proliferation of new nations (and the creation of citizen state is “de/reregulated” as a market state
the United Nations), but also in the possibility in the service of global capital circuits, unleash-
of a sovereignty crisis, contained in the terms of ing a protective movement that is compelled
the development project. Here, while the post- to rethink the meaning of civil society and so-
colonial world of the UN enshrines the individ- cial rights. That is, the significance of corporate
ual sovereignty of states, the institutionalization globalization lies in the trajectory of the state
of a global states system occurs in a world struc- and the related question of rights.
tured by an international division of labor and
a hegemonic order premised on integration via
corporate, military, and financial relations. globalization and its
The crisis of sovereignty is revealed through countermovements
Justin Rosenberg’s concept of the “empire of
civil society” (the formal duality of public and In this era of globalization, we find a curious
private political realms across the modern states tension embedded in the discourse of universal
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rights. Globalization, as a discursive corporate of the nation-state yields to the sovereignty of

project, portrays the world’s future in singular, monetary relations.14 This transition was ef-
universalist, and abstracted terms – as moving fected by two, related, world events. First, the
toward a market culture enabled by Western sci- 1970s deregulation of financial relations subor-
ence and technology and promoting expanding dinated all currencies and, therefore, states, to
freedoms of capacity and choice. This is a partic- the rationality of global money markets.15 The
ular vision of the world, presented as a universal. second transitional event was the puncturing of
However, after fifty years of development, only the “developmentalist illusion” (Arrighi, 1990)
20 percent of the world’s population has the cash by the 1980s debt regime, preparing the ground
or access to consumer credit to participate in this for the project of globalization. The devastat-
market, and the remaining 80 percent do not ing devaluation of southern economies and so-
all necessarily aspire to Western consumerism cieties, imposed by the multilateral agencies on
(Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994:383). In fact, we behalf of finance capital, exposed the growing
find a proliferation of social movements pro- autonomy of global economic relations and the
claiming the universal right to be different. structural and institutionalized necessity of state
Instead of a politics of participation in the sponsorship of these relations.16
centralizing marketplace of development, coun- The potential erosion of individual national
termovements pose alternative, decentralized sovereignties was formalized in 1995 in the es-
conceptions of politics governed by locality tablishment of the WTO. In redefining devel-
(place, network, diaspora) and/or situated iden- opment as a global corporate project, the WTO
tity (where relations of class, gender, race, collectivizes the sovereignty of its member states
ethnicity, and environmental stewardship are as a general vehicle of market rule (McMichael,
specified world-historically). This is not a 2000a). Joseph Stiglitz confirms this in distin-
wholesale rejection of modern relationships guishing the WTO from the Bretton Woods
(technical, financial, landed) so much as a re- institutions thus: “It does not set rules itself;
formulation of the terms and meanings of these rather it provides a forum in which trade
relationships. The countermovements may seek negotiations go on and it ensures that its agree-
to subsume market relations to their particular ments are lived up to” (2002:16). The recom-
politics, but, “post-Polanyi,” these alternative position of sovereignty involves abstraction: Just
forms of sovereignty are governed not by the as the global economy reduces production sites
universals of the states system but by the partic- across the world to competitive replicates of one
ulars of locality/identity-based relations (which
may inform global network organizations, such 14
For an extended discussion of this, see Arrighi,
as Fairtrade Labelling Organizations Interna- 1998 and McMichael, 2000b. In this sense, Polanyi’s
tional and Via Campesina). Although this poli- claim that “the currency is the nation” was prescient.
15
tics is distinguished as locality/identity-oriented Thus: “When interest and currency rates are no
longer determined politically by legitimate institutions
politics, it is not postmodern in the sense of es- of the nation-state but rather are formed by global mar-
chewing a material politics. It is a politics born kets, the market dynamic can no longer be politically
of modern world-historical circumstances, of regulated according to directives which are incompati-
corporate globalization: It is only at the point at ble with it . . . Politics does not disappear, but its ratio-
which national sovereignty is universally called nality is synchronized with the economy” (Altvater and
Mahnkopf, 1997:463).
into question that the artificial separation of 16
As Jeffrey Sachs observed of IMF management:
politics from economics is fully revealed, en- “Not unlike the days when the British Empire placed
couraging alternative conceptions of political– senior officials directly into the Egyptian and Ottoman
economic sovereignty. finance ministries, the IMF is insinuated into the inner
The unclothing of the “empire of civil so- sanctums of nearly 75 developing-country governments
around the world . . . (which) rarely move without con-
ciety,” so to speak, is precisely the moment sulting the IMF staff, and when they do, they risk their
of transition between the development project lifelines to capital markets, foreign aid, and international
and the globalization project, as the sovereignty respectability” (1998:17).
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Globalization 599
another, so state organizations surrender their The aggregation of economic rights is not
particularity to the competitive relations of the so defining of this form of globalization as the
global money market. attempt to institutionalize property rights on a
In this recomposition of sovereignty, the cor- global scale. Sheer size or scale may distin-
porate empire reveals that the economic is guish the twenty-first-century corporation, but
political (and vice versa), spawning counter- the privileging of corporate rights over citi-
movements no longer captured by the abstrac- zens’ rights via institutional transformations is
tions of modernity, development, state, and more profound. Nowhere is this more dramatic
economy. The global countermovement, in re- than in the participation of states in the elab-
sisting privatization and the conversion of social oration of global market rule. Citizens under-
life into the commodity form, reformulates the stand this threat – from the 146 IMF food riots
political terrain in which reembedding of the in thirty nine countries, protesting the auster-
market can occur, producing a radical redefini- ity policies of the debt regime as social rights
tion of political economy. This is not just about to food subsidies shrunk (Walton and Seddon,
infusing a moral economy into an existing po- 1994), through broad civic protest over priva-
litical economy of nation states, which, under tization schemes to the exploration of alterna-
mid-twentieth-century circumstances became tive local forms of government (e.g., Argentina’s
the Polanyian realpolitik, for better or for worse neighborhood assemblies).
(cf. Lacher, 1999). It is about reformulating con- The successful resistance to the attempt to
ceptions of civil/human rights, the state, and privatize Cochabamba’s water system was a
development (cf. Mohan, 2004). turning point for popular mobilizations in Bo-
livia, formerly touted by the multilateral agen-
cies as a model for other low-income countries
property rights versus the commons (Farthing and Kohl, 2001:9). The corporate
consortium that purchased the city’s water dou-
When welfare systems and other public ser- bled prices and charged citizens for rainwater
vices are privatized, the meaning of citizenship collected on rooftops. Poor families found food
switches from membership of the public house- was now cheaper than water. The depth of pub-
hold with rights to social protections, to mem- lic outcry forced the city to resume control
bership of the market with rights to produce, of the water system. Citizen action thus de-
exchange, and consume. Citizens are regarded commodified a public good. However, if the
increasingly as “bearers of economic rational- WTO’s proposed General Agreement on Trade
ity” (Drainville, 1995:60), and access to goods in Services (GATS 2000) had been in place,
and services (some of which were once public) is such a reversal would have been practically
determined less by need and more by merit. As impossible. GATS, described by the WTO as
states restructure, rights to public goods dwin- “the world’s first international investment agree-
dle, replaced by uneven access to the market. ment,” targets the privatization of basic services
Neoliberal policies accentuate the individual (as such as health care, education, and water supply;
opposed to the civic) content of citizenship, infrastructures such as post, public transport,
subordinating social rights to economic rights, and communications; cultural services such as
which enables corporate claims on the state: “an broadcasting, films, libraries, and museums; as
aggregation of economic rights . . . constitutes a well as finance and tourism. Whereas GATS
form of economic citizenship, in that it em- may exclude services provided “under the ex-
powers and can demand accountability from ercise of government authority,” it does apply if
government.” Thus investors rather than cit- services have a commercial dimension or com-
izens “vote governments’ economic policies pete with the private sector, and, because gov-
down or in; they can force governments to ernments can liberalize more, but not less, under
take certain measures and not others” (Sassen, GATS, an expansion of regulation or public assets
1996:39). is ruled out (Coates, 2001:28).
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Privatizing public goods is also enabled by tics against the spatial abstraction inherent in
the intellectual property rights protocol in the the commodity relation and the monoculture
WTO, known as Trade Related Intellectual of modern scientific rationality. Vine Deloria
Property Rights (TRIPs). As a relational fea- Jr.’s claim that modernity’s obsession with time
ture of corporate globalization, it is premised on (as money) contrasts with the place-based epis-
the elimination, or incorporation, of the com- temology of nonmarket cultures (in Starr,
mons and at the same time crystallizes resistance 2000:189) echoes Marx’s observation that the
around the protection of indigenous knowl- logic of commodity circulation is the destruc-
edges and practices. The intellectual property tion of space by time. Arguably, the global south
rights regime originated in stemming pirating offers a multiplicity of examples of place-based
of Western products such as CDs, watches, and epistemology – whether ecologically and/or
so forth in the global south, but it now sanc- cosmologically driven peasant and indige-
tions a reverse biopiracy on a disproportion- nous cultures. Attempts to revalue local space
ate scale, threatening cultural rather than simply through constructing alternative currency rela-
commodity rights. Patenting microbiological tions or community-supported agricultures, es-
organisms, via TRIPs, protects monopoly rights pecially in the north, pursue a similar goal but
to seeds, plants, and plant products where they within a different historical relationship to capi-
have been genetically modified. By appropri- talist modernity (cf. Hines, 2000). By extension,
ating plant varieties developed over centuries, transnational networks, such as environmental,
TRIPs’ protection of Western scientific innova- fair trade, human rights, unions, and farmers’
tion invisibilizes alternative sciences of indige- movements, address concerns rooted in locali-
nous agriculture and biodiversity management ties that, together, unify their diversity. Coun-
(Shiva, 1997:8). terposed to the uniform market culture of
Within the WTO, the TRIPs protocol priv- corporate globalization, resistance is heteroge-
ileges governments and corporations as legal neous in time and space and yet well aware of
entities and disempowers communities and its world-historical context.
farmers whose rights to plant their crops are
subject to claims of patent infringement. One
global countermovement politics
model of resistance emerged in 1996 in the
Indian village of Pattuvam in the southern
Corporate globalization generates a range of re-
state of Kerala, when it declared its ownership
sistances, those highlighted here developing a
over all genetic resources within its jurisdiction
counterhegemonic politics based in the right to
(Alvares, 1997). This preemption of corporate
live by values other than those of the market.
genetic prospecting is protected by the Indian
Grassroots movements assert cultural diversity
constitution, which decentralizes certain powers
as a world-historical relation and human right,
to village-level institutions. By registering local
embodying what Sachs calls “cosmopolitan lo-
plant species and cultivars in local names, the
calism” (1992:112). The antimarket rule move-
village claimed collective ownership of genetic
ment is most evident in the global south, where
resources, denying the possibility of corporate
the tradition of the commons is more recent
patents applying to these resources and remov-
and/or where the empire has no clothes.
ing the property from intellectual rights.17 As
Revealing the nakedness of empire is decid-
Shiva observes: “The seed is, for the farmer,
edly postcolonial, in the sense that the crisis of
not merely the source of future plants and food;
development includes its (and the state’s) de-
it is the storage place of culture and history”
mystification. As the Zapatistas commented, in
(1997:8).
resisting the Mexican state’s embrace of NAFTA
The Pattuvam resistance exemplifies the sig-
(1994):
nificance of place in countermovement poli-
“When we rose up against a national government,
17
This notion comes from Raj Patel. we found that it did not exist. In reality we were
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Globalization 601
up against great financial capital, against speculation annihilation” (Cleaver, 1994:50). Zapatismo as-
and investment, which makes all decisions in Mexico, serted a politics of rights going beyond individ-
as well as in Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, the ual or property rights to human and community
Americas – everywhere” (quoted in Starr, 2000:104). rights, resonating with indigenous rights move-
ments elsewhere. As Neil Harvey observes: “If
Having confronted the paradox of state sovere-
citizenship in Salinas’ Mexico was contingent
ignty, the Zapatista uprising significantly unset-
on the economic competitiveness of each indi-
tled regional financial markets, contributing to a
vidual, the indigenous had little hope of surviv-
30 percent devaluation of the peso at the end of
ing either as citizens or as peoples” (1999:200).
1994. Arguably, the Zapatista political interven-
That is, Zapatista politics are not about inclusion
tion revealed the contingency of development
per se, but about redefining citizenship, calling
(as registered by Mexico’s 1994 admission into
for: “A political dynamic not interested in tak-
the OECD), implying that it was a confidence
ing political power but in building a democracy
trick of the globalization project:
where those who govern, govern by obeying”
“At the end of 1994 the economic farce with which (quoted in Harvey, 1999:210).
Salinas had deceived the Nation and the international The durability of the Zapatista resistance
economy exploded. The nation of money called the stems from a lengthy process, undertaken by
grand gentlemen of power and arrogance to dinner, Marcos and a small cadre band, of blending
and they did not hesitate in betraying the soil and the Zapatista critique of Mexican political his-
sky in which they prospered with Mexican blood.
tory with the “indigenous peoples’ story of
The economic crisis awoke Mexicans from the sweet
and stupifying dream of entry into the first world” humiliation, exploitation and racism” (Harvey,
(quoted in Starr, 2000:104). 1999:166). It exemplifies a world-historical sen-
sibility in bringing a cultural politics to the
The power of the Zapatista movement lies question of civil rights. The more substantive
precisely in its ability to situate its political in- notion of collective rights grounds the civic
tervention in cosmopolitan, world-historical project in place-based mobilization, based on
terms – relating its regional condition, through “historical memory, cultural practices, and po-
national, to global, relationships. This includes litical symbols as much as on legal norms”
linking the Mexican state’s participation in (Harvey, 1999:28). As a regional movement
NAFTA, which Subcomandante Marcos de- against empire and its state form, the Zapatistas
clared to be “a death sentence for indigenous particularize a universal notion of rights in
people,” to the historic colonization of Chiapas; blending ethnic, gender, and class relations into
and linking Zapatismo to resistance movements a process, rather than a structure, of democracy.
across the world: “we are the possibility that The particularization of rights, in a self-
(empire) can be made to disappear . . . tell it organizing movement addressing and redressing
(empire) you have alternatives to its world” tangible historical relations, is simultaneously a
(quoted in Starr, 2000:104–5). universal claim to substantive forms of democ-
The Zapatista uprising, timed to coincide racy, which I am arguing is the root of the global
with the implementation of NAFTA, was reve- countermovement. The conception of rights
latory rather than simply programmatic (Harvey, makes no prior claim to content, as movements
1999:199). It linked a powerful and symbolic and communities reserve the right to define for
critique of the politics of globalization with the themselves appropriate political and ecological
demand for civil rights linked to regional au- relations. Some movements consciously invert
tonomy. When the Mexican government tried the problematic of capitalist modernity, under-
appeasement through a National Commission stood here as a European universal legitimiz-
for Integral Development and Social Justice for ing global empire. Contemporary indigenous
Indigenous People and injecting funds into Chi- movements, from the Ecuadorian movement
apas, the Zapatistas rejected this as “just another (CONAIE) to the North American Inuit, affirm
step in their cultural assimilation and economic citizenship as a basic national and human right
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but view it as the vehicle for respecting the dif- tution’s sanction of the confiscation of unculti-
ferential rights of minorities, creating plurina- vated private property, not performing its social
tional states with varying degrees of autonomy. function. The method of direct occupation, met
Within the Zapatista movement, women have with state military and legal force, has exposed
questioned the premise of official indigenous the inequality of landed relations and the com-
state policies that dichotomizes modernity and plicity of the state in the centuries-old Brazilian
tradition, insisting on “the right to hold to dis- system of landed rule. National polls confirm
tinct cultural traditions while at the same time popular support of seizure of unproductive land,
changing aspects of those traditions that oppress and government administrators have recognized
or exclude them” (Eber, 1999:16). This involves that the cost of maintaining the same people in
blending the formal demand for territorial and urban favelas is twelve times the cost of legaliz-
resource autonomy with the substantive demand ing land occupation (Food First, Winter 2001).
for women’s rights to political, physical, eco- The priority given to producing staple foods
nomic, social, and cultural autonomy. for low-income consumers (rather than foods
Another compelling social experiment crys- for affluent consumers in cities and abroad) led
tallizing in the crucible of neoliberalism is the to an agreement with the da Silva government,
Brazilian landless workers’ movement, the Movi- for direct purchase of settlement produce for the
mento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST). national Zero Hunger campaign ( Jardim, 2003).
The Cardoso government’s neoliberal experi- The power of the movement resides not only
ment (1995–2002) subordinated Brazilian po- in its practice of securing landed “spaces of
litical economy to global financial capital in hope,” but also in its sponsorship of demon-
a late-twentieth-century context where 1 per- strations, marches, occupation of government
cent of landowners own (but do not neces- buildings, and negotiations through which it has
sarily cultivate) almost 50 percent of the land, managed to seize strategic moments in national
while 4.8 million families are landless. Between politics. The MST pursues a program called
1970–85, agricultural subsidies cost Brazil US “Project Brazil,” using alliance-building to de-
$31 billion. Since 1985 they have disappeared, velop a national alternative to the global corpo-
even as OECD member states’ agricultural sub- rate project. In articulating its agrarian struggle
sidies continue at US $360 billion a year. As with urban-based struggles (such as the Move-
the MST Web site claims: “From 1985 to ment of Homeless Workers and various favela or-
1996, according to the agrarian census, 942,000 ganizations), the MST draws on several themes
farms disappeared, 96% of which were smaller in Brazilian political history: liberation theology
than one hundred hectares. From that total, and Marxism, the “new unionism” of urban so-
400 thousand establishments went bankrupt cial movements of the basic church communi-
in the first two years of the Cardoso ties, and the Peasant Leagues. Through an initial
government, 1995–96.” Between 1985–96 rural alliance with the church, “the only body that
unemployment rose by 5.5 million, and had what you might call a capillary organization
between 1995–9 a rural exodus of 4 million across the whole country” (Stedile, 2002:79),
Brazilians occurred. While in the 1980s Brazil and its Pastoral Commission on Land (1975),
imported roughly US $1 million worth of the MST developed a national, but decentral-
wheat, apples, and products not produced in ized, organization spanning twenty-seven states
Brazil, from “1995 to 1999, this annual average (concentrated among descendants of European
leapt to 6.8 billion dollars, with the importa- immigrants in the south and mestizos in the
tion of many products cultivable . . . in Brazil” northeast). Dispossessed farmers comprise the
(www.mstbrazil.org/EconomicModel.html). majority of its membership, but in the more ur-
Since the mid-1980s, the MST has settled ban south in particular the MST includes unem-
400,000 families on more than 15 million acres ployed workers and disillusioned civil servants.
of land seized by takeovers in Brazil. The MST Originally autonomous of the Worker’s Party
draws legitimacy from the 1988 Brazilian consti- (PT), the MST has supported it electorally and
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Globalization 603
developed closer ties. Following the PT’s recent Although more recently the MST has linked its
success in the presidential elections, President da prospects to the success of the PT, it continues
Silva created a new Ministry for Economic Soli- a regenerative political culture based in agro-
darity, headed by an ex-seminary student active ecology, continuous learning, and community
in liberation theology and in the founding of self-reliance. In a transitional moment such as
the MST and supportive of its agrariant agenda. this, global justice movements reach beyond the
The formation of cooperatives (sixty by 2003) nation-state to more complex, and uncertain,
follows land seizures (large-scale for security). ideas of sovereignty, even as they position them-
The MST Settlers Cooperative System differs selves as transformative movements within the
from traditional cooperatives through social mo- states system.
bilization “transforming the economic struggle MST politics exemplify the mushrooming
into a political and ideological struggle.” Over movement across the world for “food sover-
and beyond the (often unforgiving) task of set- eignty”: a material and discursive counterpoint
tling hundreds of thousands of families on re- to the concept of “food security,” linked in
covered land, the political–economic novelty the 1980s to global agro-industries and bread-
of this movement lies in “linking up what it baskets supplying food through “free trade.”19
calls the struggle for the land with the struggle Food sovereignty insists on cultural and eco-
on the land” (Flavio de Almeida and Sanchez, logical integrity, and food quality, counter-
2000). The model of social appropriation in- posed to the agro-industrial fetish of quantity,
cludes democratic decision making to develop which has produced “scarcity in abundance,”
cooperative relations among workers and alter- expressed in the marginalization of local farm-
native land use patterns, and participatory bud- ing on a world scale (Araghi, 2000). Marginal-
geting, financed by socializing some settlement ization is a by-product of the corporate pursuit,
income (Dias Martins, 2000). The social project via WTO rules, of comparative advantages via
of the MST connects production and peda- farm sector liberalization. This involves exploit-
gogy, informing its work and study method of ing north/south asymmetries, where the aver-
education.18 age subsidy to U.S. farmers and grain traders is
The MST’s 1,600 government-recognized about a hundred times the income of a corn
settlements include medical clinics and training farmer in Mindanao (Watkins, 1996). Conser-
centers for health care workers; 1,200 public vative estimates are that between 20 million
schools employing an estimated 3,800 teach- and 30 million people have recently lost their
ers serving about 150,000 children at any one land due to the impact of trade liberalization
time. A UNESCO grant enables adult literacy (Madeley, 2000:75). Global food insecurity
classes for 25,000, and the MST sponsors tech- stems from the appropriation of land for the
nical classes and teacher training. Cooperative exports to affluent markets and by world mar-
enterprises produce jobs for thousands of mem- ket dumping of heavily subsidized but artifi-
bers, in addition to foodstuffs and clothing for cially cheap food by the grain-rich countries
local and national (nonaffluent) consumption. undermining peasant agricultures (McMichael,
2003).
18
Joâo Pedro Stedile, president of the MST, observes:
“Under the objective economic conditions, our pro-
19
posal for land reform has to avoid the oversimplification The trade principle justifying this global reconfig-
of classical capitalist land reform, which merely divides uration of agriculture informed the 1995 WTO Agree-
up large landholdings and encourages their productive ment on Agriculture, enunciated by the U.S. delegation
use. We are convinced that nowadays it is necessary to during the Uruguay Round: “The U.S. has always main-
reorganize agriculture on a different social base, democ- tained that self-sufficiency and food security are not one
ratize access to capital, democratize the agroindustrial and the same. Food security – the ability to acquire the
process (something just as important as landownership), food you need when you need it – is best provided
and democratize access to know-how, that is, to formal through a smooth-functioning world market” (quoted
education” (Orlando Pinassi et al., 2000). in Ritchie, 1993:25).
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The food sovereignty countermovement around the world is forcing the increased move-
seeks to revitalize cultural, ecological, and demo- ment of people.” The precondition of food
cratic processes in protecting local farming. sovereignty, in this vision, is access to credit,
It anchors its political–economy in alterna- land, and fair prices to be set via rules negotiated
tive, agro-ecological models producing substan- in UNCTAD, not at the WTO. And, as a polit-
tially higher, more diverse, and more sustainable ical alternative to the current corporate regime,
outputs of food than high-input industrial agri- “the active participation of farmers’ movements
culture (Norberg-Hodge, Goering, and Page, in defining agricultural and food policies within
2001:61). The Charter of Farmers’ Rights a democratic framework is indispensable.” The
issued by the international Seed Satyagraha specificity of these politics is that, while the
Movement for biodiversity asserts the rights to consumer movement has discovered that “eat-
land; to conserve, reproduce, and modify seed ing has become a political act,” Via Campesina
and plant material; to feed and save the coun- adds: “producing quality products for our own
try from food insecurity; and to information people has also become a political act . . . this
and participatory research (Nayar, 2000:21). Ex- touches our very identities as citizens of this
pressing the global solidarities of this counter- world” (http://ns.rds.org.hn/via/).
movement, MST National Committee member Via Campesina enriches the Polanyian sensi-
Joâo Pedro Stedile claims: bility for agrarian reform, declaring not only
that it is “an instrument to eliminate poverty and
“It’s not enough to argue that if you work the land,
you have proprietory rights over it. The Vietnamese
social differences,” but also that “peasants’ access
and Indian farmers have contributed a lot to our de- to land needs to be understood as a form of guar-
bates on this. They have a different view of agricul- antee of the value of their culture, autonomy of
ture, and of nature – one that we’ve tried to synthesize community, and of a new vision of preserva-
in Via Campesina. We want an agrarian practice that tion of natural resources for humanity and fu-
transforms farmers into guardians of the land, and a ture generations. Land is a good of nature that
different way of farming, that ensures an ecological needs to be used for the welfare of all. Land is
equilibrium and also guarantees that land is not seen
as private property” (2002:100).
not, and cannot be, a marketable good.” Instead
of simply regulating land and food markets, this
The several-million-strong transnational mo- perspective embodies the alternative principles
vement, Via Campesina (the MST is one of its of autonomy, sovereignty, and political–ecology
eighty-seven national members), asserts “Farm- common to the global countermovement. The
ers Rights are eminently collective” and enactment of this principle in communities (e.g.
“should therefore be considered as a different across Africa)20 or mass movements like the
legal framework from those of private property.” MST21 emerges most dramatically in the global
Uniting landless peasants, family farmers, agri-
cultural workers, rural women, and indigenous 20
Fantu Cheru documents the variety of “organized
communities, Via Campesina claims that:
struggles for subsistence” in Africa, where “peasants now
“biodiversity has as a fundamental base the recog- market their produce and livestock through their own
nition of human diversity, the acceptance that we channels, disregarding political boundaries and market-
are different and that every people and each indi- ing boards,” and self-organizing village development
groups create physical and educational infrastructures,
vidual has the freedom to think and to be. Seen
including cereal banks, grain mills and local pharmacies,
in this way, biodiversity is not only flora, fauna,
concluding that “Locally based co-operative movements
earth, water and ecosystems; it is also cultures, sys-
are the only ones that can realistically articulate an alter-
tems of production, human and economic relations, native vision of world order by creating new avenues of
forms of government; in essence it is freedom.” social and political mobilization” (1997:161–3).
(http://www.ns.rds.org.hn/via/) 21
Settlers do not automatically embrace the vision
of the leadership (Caldeira, 2004). While movements
Via Campesina privileges food sovereignty are never single-minded, the reflexive goals of the
over agricultural trade as the path to food secu- global countermovement tend to consolidate the vision
rity, noting that “the massive movement of food (Wright and Wolford, 2003).
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Globalization 605
south where the complicity of the political in the a human face”) may be distinguished from the
corporate empire has the starkest consequences. more visionary responses by movements to de-
The ecological principle stems from two velop alternatives (“globalization from below”).
sources: the critique largely from within The first set of responses includes the “strug-
northern, market societies of the social and gle to promote the subaltern discourse on hu-
environmental devastation from economic man rights,” for example, to operationalize the
monocultures; and the critique largely from “sleeping provisions” (Articles 25 and 28) of the
southern cultures that practice principles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
biodiversity and agro-ecology, through custom link rights to the elimination of poverty and to
and/or necessity. Insofar as the global counter- humane governance of the social and interna-
movements’ common object is to resist cor- tional order. The 1990s saw several conferences
porate globalization and state sponsorship of on environment, women’s rights, development,
commodity relations that threaten human com- population, and human rights address these con-
munities and habitats, it includes the tactical cerns, culminating in the UN Social Summit of
goal of social protection. However, in addition 1995 (Falk, 2002:71). Because globalization is
to regulating market relations, countermove- a power relation, we also find the multilateral
ments champion nonmarket polycultures and agencies, the Davos economic forum, and their
new forms of subsidiary political representation, spokespeople proposing to reform the G-7’s
asserting a new strategic right to diversity, in and monopoly of financial power by imposing a
across cultures. “Tobin tax” on cross-border financial trans-
actions and adopting the language of poverty
alleviation and improving transparency in gover-
conclusion nance in an attempt to close the legitimacy gap
(e.g., Stiglitz, 2002, Narayan, 2000). In other
As a discursive project of market rule, global- words, the double movement constitutes the
ization enlists the instrumentality of the mod- politics of globalization.
ern state in increasingly unaccountable policies As I have argued, the twenty-first-century
with profound, crisis-ridden consequences for double movement is different and links imme-
the politics of rights. This chapter argues that diate protective goals with transitional, vision-
the crisis of sovereignty stems from three di- ary practices exemplified in the mass movements
mensions of corporate globalization: first, the of the global south. One such linkage is evi-
erosion of citizenship rights in modern states dent in postcolonial politics, where the “African
via broad strategies of privatization and disman- Alternative Framework for Structural Adjust-
tling of social protections; second, the increas- ment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery
ingly evident “citizenship gap” associated with, and Transformation,” adopted by the United
for example, more than 50 million political and Nations Economic Commission for Africa, cri-
economic refugees, displaced indigenous peo- tiqued the neoclassical assumptions of the de-
ples, the 100 million unregistered domestic mi- velopment paradigm and offered a participatory
grant workers in China, 1 million to 2 million model of collective development goals rooted
modern-day slaves, and even subjects of south- in the specificity of African political cultures
ern countries in context of an exploding tourist (Ake, 1996:36–8). Although these institutional
industry (Brysk, 2002:3, 10–11); and third, the responses are vulnerable to the G-7 develop-
rising political claims for participatory alterna- ment establishment’s disproportionate financial
tives within the global countermovement. and discursive power to appropriate its crit-
In delineating these three dimensions, I draw ics, nevertheless they register the participatory
attention to the temporal layering of politi- and cosmopolitan politics maturing across global
cal responses to globalization. The immedi- communities in countless contexts, stimulated
acy of responses to current abuses of rights by the political deficits and social depredations
and human victimization (“globalization with of corporate globalization.
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Many of these contradictory circumstances (e.g., the conflict between the United States
stem from the crisis of development and its and the EU regarding GMOs, the intractabil-
global extension via the neoliberal project, pos- ity of the question of agricultural reform) and
ing as a neutral market-driven solution. In the global north’s overbearing treatment of the
this world-historical conjuncture, resistances re- global south. The collapse of the WTO Minis-
veal capitalist modernity as an imperial project, terial in Cancun (2003) revealed this power dif-
privileging corporate rights and depending on ferential. A renewed solidarity within the global
geopolitical and currency hierarchies. Contrary south (forming the Group of 21, led by Brazil,
to the early-twentieth-century dress rehearsal India, and China) and a parallel solidarity among
for global development, today’s countermove- global justice groups converged decisively to
ments reach beyond the formula of national stall the meeting, exposing undemocratic WTO
market regulation and wealth redistribution to proceedings and unequal agricultural trade
develop an alternative politics rooted in an eco- rules, GATS, and TRIPs protocols.
logical paradigm, rejecting modernity’s sepa- Although grassroots movements will by ne-
rations of politics and economics, natural and cessity develop their resistance, the short-term
social worlds, and rulers and ruled. Instead of the direction of the world order is complicated by
singular worldview associated with the modern the geopolitics of oil, U.S. unilateralism, and re-
state, this politics asserts the right to multiple active terrorism (Achcar, 2002). In addition, the
worldviews regarding democratic organization 1999 “global compact” (the “corporatization”
and the securing of material well-being through of a financially strapped UN) and the politics
cultural and environmental sustainability. of the 2002 UN resolution on weapons inspec-
The specificity of corporate globalization is tions in Iraq have deeply compromised the UN’s
that in universalizing a particular vision on ability to anchor an agenda of international law
a diverse world, it crystallizes that diversity dedicated to advancing social and human rights
in increasingly reflexive resistance movements reflecting multilateral rather than unilateral in-
marked by a strategic solidarity. More than a terests. For the foreseeable future, then, global-
global process of integration, globalization is a ization and its analysis will be overdetermined
contradictory set of relations conditioning its by a resurgence of bilateralism and questions
politics, and recurring crises, with no necessary concerning the militarization of the corporate
linear movement or outcome. The social exper- empire, the elevation of the rights of consumer–
iments of the countermovements and the “cos- citizens in this new world disorder, and equa-
mopolitan project” (Held, 2000), exemplified in tions of resistance with terror – sharpening and
the European Union, will continue in tension clarifying the contradiction between this world
with a WTO increasingly hamstrung by the in- and “another world” projected by the World
herent disorder of an asymmetrical states system Social Forum.
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chapter thirty
State Economic and Social Policy in Global Capitalism
Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens
Across the capitalist world in countries of vary- “best practices” have become more apparent
ing levels of development, the 1980s and 1990s because these raise the cost of production. As
witnessed a retreat of the state from interven- capital markets have become more open and
tion in the economy, reversing a trend that dates capital controls increasingly unworkable, capi-
back to the Great Depression. In the advanced tal in these countries moves elsewhere in search
capitalist countries, countries led by parties of of lower production costs. Thus, governments
varying political colors privatized state enter- must respond and reduce state intervention to
prises, reduced state regulations, liberalized cap- stem the outflow of capital. The hyperglob-
ital markets, and, to varying degrees, cut welfare alization thesis has Marxist (e.g., Amin, 1997)
state entitlements. In the Latin American and and neoliberal (e.g., Ohmae, 1995) proponents.
Caribbean economies, as in much of the rest of For the neoliberals, traditional social democratic
the less developed world, countries turned from policies are the targets of globalization; for the
import substitution industrialization (ISI) with Marxists, they are the victims.
high tariffs, capital market regulation, and high In the literature on advanced industrial soci-
levels of state intervention to neoliberal open, eties, proponents of the hyperglobalization the-
export-oriented models. sis are rare outside open economy macroeco-
The dominant interpretation among political nomics and business schools, as Hay (2002)
and journalistic observers has been that trends points out. Although it is commonplace to note
toward greater reliance on the market were both that economies have become more open in
products and manifestations of “globalization,” the past three decades, the effects of this in-
the increasing economic openness of the na- creased openness are highly disputed. Garrett
tional economies and integration of the world (1998) stakes out the diametrically opposed po-
economy. The academic version of this view, sition that globalization is positively related to
the “hyperglobalization thesis,” argues that the welfare state generosity, resurrecting the thesis
emergence of a single global market and global that economic openness generates demands for
competition has eliminated the political latitude “domestic compensation” and for productivity-
for action of national states and imposes neo- enhancing public goods characteristic of an
liberal policies on all governments. Proponents earlier generation of writings on comparative
contend that as markets for goods, capital, and, political economy, particularly the work on cor-
more recently, labor have become more open, poratism (e.g., see Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein,
all countries have been exposed to more com- 1985). In his comprehensive review of the ex-
petition and the liabilities of state economic in- periences of twelve advanced industrial soci-
tervention and deviation from market-oriented eties, Scharpf (2000) takes the middle ground,
607
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608 Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens
arguing that countries’ ability to shape macroe- demanded stabilization and liberalization of the
conomic policy and intervene in the economy economies. Third, as the reforms progressed,
has been reduced in large part due to interna- they created their own beneficiaries and thus
tional economic integration, but that this has strong political supporters for further liberaliza-
had a much more modest impact on countries’ tion and privatization, mainly among the largest
ability to pursue full employment, social se- entrepreneurs and in the financial sector. The
curity, and social equality. With regard to the reactions to these pressures for reform, however,
welfare state, Esping-Andersen (1999), Pierson were not uniform but rather heavily shaped by
(2001a, 2001b), and Myles and Pierson (2001) domestic power distributions and political insti-
contest the thesis linking globalization to re- tutions.
trenchment, particularly the neoliberal version The debate about the effects of economic
of it, citing other more important causes of stag- opening, deregulation, and privatization is still
nation and retrenchment such as changing de- in its beginning, given the relatively short period
mographic patterns, changing gender roles, the of time that has passed since their implemen-
changes in the rates of return on capital relative tation. The record shows that Latin Ameri-
to wage growth, and changing sectoral and oc- can and Caribbean countries experienced re-
cupational compositions of the economy (also newed economic growth in the 1990s, but with
Stephens, Huber, and Ray, 1999; Huber and high volatility because of vulnerability to exter-
Stephens, 1998, 2001). nal shocks. Most countries made some progress
In Latin America, the economic transforma- in reducing poverty, but not inequality. More-
tion has been much more dramatic than in ad- over, progress in poverty reduction in the 1990s
vanced industrial countries. In addition, it took did not even fully repair the damage done in
place in the midst of an economic crisis, which the 1980s. Given this modest record, the main
caused tremendous economic and social dislo- argument of the proponents of reform is that
cations. At the level of political and journalistic Latin America still is confronting deep struc-
debate, the hyperglobalization thesis is popular tural problems of long standing and that things
also. It certainly provides a convenient way to le- would be much worse without the reforms.
gitimize painful measures taken by governments Critics point to the high social costs of the
in the process of economic opening. Academic reforms in terms of increased inequality, low
explanations of the trend toward greater open- human capital formation, and lack of employ-
ness and reliance on markets, however, center ment in high productivity sectors. Unlike in ad-
around a combination of three factors, with dif- vanced industrial countries, there is also much
ferent emphasis put by various authors on one concern about the impact of the structural re-
or the other of these factors. First are the prob- forms on the quality of the emerging demo-
lems with ISI, particularly the chronic balance cracies.
of payments problems, which began in the 1950s In this chapter, we examine the evidence
and were glossed over because of easy access to on the extent of economic internationalization,
massive amounts of recycled petrodollars in the the interaction between domestic and interna-
1970s in the form of loans at floating interest tional causes of policy change, and the nature of
rates. Second, when international interest rates changes in state economic and social policy in
began to rise in the early 1980s, at the same advanced industrial countries and Latin Amer-
time as commodity prices fell, and the large in- ica and the Caribbean. We begin by document-
ternational banks reacted to solvency problems ing, quantitatively where possible, the extent of
of major debtor countries with a full stop of new the increase in economic internationalization in
lending, Latin American and Caribbean coun- the past four decades and then proceed to an
tries found themselves in a profound debt cri- analysis of the experience of advanced indus-
sis. This debt crisis then gave heavy leverage to trial countries and then Latin America and the
the international financial institutions (IFIs) that Caribbean.
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State Economic and Social Policy in Global Capitalism 609
dimensions of economic presence of all controls coded by the creators

internationalization of the index (Quinn and Inclan, 1997). As one
can see, many countries maintained significant
In this chapter, we limit ourselves to examin- capital controls in the Golden Age of postwar
ing the economic aspects of globalization. Eco- capitalism but by the 1990s only a few coun-
nomic internationalization can be broken down tries retained any controls. The change in ac-
into four dimensions: increasing integration of tual flows of capital is even more dramatic, with
markets for goods and for capital, growing in- both flow measures increasing more than eight-
ternationalization of production, and growing fold from the 1960s to the 1990s. By contrast,
strength of supranational bodies. Both trade and the trade flows increased modestly, by 30 per-
capital market openness can be indexed by the cent. The change in tariff protection was also
flows of capital or goods and services and by less dramatic than in the case of capital controls,
the barriers to flows (Tables 30.1 and 30.2). with EEC/EU external tariffs varying from 1
For capital markets, we have data on both con- to 19 percent depending on the sector circa
trols and flows. The data on tariff and non- 1960, to 1 to 5 percent in 1999. Across all
tariff barriers are spotty for the earlier period sectors, the advanced industrial countries im-
so we have not included them. This is un- posed average tariffs of 4 percent in 1999. Our
fortunate because variations in trade volume spotty evidence indicates that the correspond-
across countries are not very good indicators ing figure would have been around 10 percent in
of trade barriers, as size of the domestic mar- 1960.
ket is such an important determinant of vol- Table 30.2 presents similar data for Latin
ume of trade. Due to economies of scale, small America and the Caribbean. With regard to
countries cannot produce a full range of goods trade, most countries register significant in-
for domestic producers and consumers and must creases in trade flows, though there are some
import goods to satisfy these needs. Thus, small notable exceptions. Tariff barriers were very
countries may have very high trade barriers high, especially in the six countries that
and nonetheless have high trade flows. For in- fully adopted an inward-oriented ISI model
stance, in the 1970s Jamaica had very high tariffs, (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
nontariffs barriers, and quantitative restrictions and Uruguay). In those countries, average tariffs
on trade, yet exports and imports were still over were typically over 100 percent. The remaining
70 percent of GDP, far higher than most Euro- countries, while continuing to depend on ex-
pean countries in the 1990s when trade barriers ports from a few primary products, did eventu-
there were quite low (Stephens and Stephens, ally turn to ISI to develop a domestic consumer
1986). Fortunately, we do have data on trade goods industry and thus also imposed tariffs that
barriers for the EEC and six South American were very high by industrial country standards,
countries (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994:280), which, though not as high as in the six inward-oriented
though not completely comparable to the avail- countries (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994:297). The
able World Bank Data for the 1990s, do allow abandoning of ISI by both groups resulted in
us to sketch variations through time and across impressive reductions in tariffs: The average tar-
regions.1 iff level in the region in 1998 was only 10 per-
Table 30.1 presents the trade and capital mar- cent. Latin American and Caribbean countries
ket data for advanced industrial countries. The also liberalized capital flows, but on average
index of capital controls (columns 1 and 2) varies not nearly as dramatically as advanced indus-
from 0 to 100, with 100 denoting complete ab- trial countries, at least not by the mid-1990s.
sence of capital controls and 0 denoting the Whereas the average Quinn/Inclan index of
liberalization increased from 65 to 92 in ad-
1
The World Bank data are available at http://www. vanced industrial countries from the 1960s to
worldbank.org/data/databytopic/trade.html. the 1990s, it only increased from 68 to 77
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0521819903c30.xml
Table 30.1. Indicators of Economic Openness: Advanced Industrial Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Degree of Liberalization Outward Direct Borrowing on Trade
of Capital Controls Foreign Investment International Capital Markets Openness
CB779/Janoski
1960–73 1990–94 1960–73 1990–94 1960–73 1990–94 1960–73 1990–94

Sweden 60 95 0.5 6 0.17 10.54 46 59
Norway 37.5 100 0.1 1.9 1.37 5.01 82 72
Denmark 75 100 0.2 1.6 1.01 3.91 60 65
Finland 25 87.5 0.2 1.5 0.92 9.63 45 54
0 521 81990 3
Austria 55 87.5 0.1 0.8 0.39 4.16 53 77

Belgium 75 100 0.3 3 0.35 2.77 77 138
Netherlands 75 100 1.3 6.6 0.41 4.01 92 99
Germany 100 100 0.3 1.2 0.05 1.85 40 62
France 72.5 90 0.2 1.9 0.09 2.69 27 44
610
April 28, 2005
Italy 72.5 90 0.3 0.7 0.42 1.91 31 39

Switzerland 97.5 100 0 4.4 0.06 2.21 61 69
8:59
Japan 50 70 0.2 0.7 0.09 1.46 20 18

Canada 93.75 100 0.3 0.9 1.69 4.91 40 56
Ireland 50 82.5 0 0.7 0.73 7.15 78 119
UK 46.4 100 1.1 4.5 0.45 4.61 41 51
USA 92.5 100 0.6 1.4 0.1 1.81 10 22
Australia 57.5 75 0.2 0.9 0.35 3.7 30 37
New Zealand 37.5 87.5 0.1 6.5 0.67 4.12 46 58
Mean 65.15 92.50 0.33 2.51 0.52 4.25 48.83 63.28
(1–2) Liberalism of capital controls. Quinn and Inclan (1997).
(3–4) Outward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Provided by Duane Swank (see Swank, 2002), originally coded from IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, various years.
(5–6) Total borrowing on international capital markets as a percentage of GDP. Provided by Duane Swank (see Swank, 2002), originally coded from IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics,
various years.
(7–8) Value of exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1997) based on OECD data.
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0521819903c30.xml
Table 30.2. Indicators of Economic Openness: Latin America and the Caribbean
1 2 3 4 5 6
Degree of Liberalization Outward Direct Trade
CB779/Janoski
of Capital Controls Foreign Investment Openness

1960–1973 1990–1997 1967–73 1990–98∗ 1960–73 1990–98
Argentina 71 86 .00 .63 12.69 18.42
Brazil 41 47 .02 .27 13.89 17.56
Mexico 80 75 n.d. n.d. 17.49 47.55
0 521 81990 3
Bolivia 96 89 .00 .03 59.22 48.88

Chile 53 58 .00 1.43 27.09 59.19
Colombia 53 59 .04 .36 27.05 34.79
Ecuador 77 89 .00 .00 36.1 57.26
Paraguay 76 81 .00 .03 29.96 86.43
April 28, 2005
611
Peru 77 92 .00 .03 36.5 25.89
Uruguay 88 100 .00 .01 26.77 43.42
8:59
Venezuela 90 72 n.d. .64 41.01 52.78

Barbados .44 .09 126.85 116.35
Costa Rica 92 88 .00 .05 57.43 85.91
Dominican Republic 46 55 .00 .00 43.87 67.86
El Salvador 27 84 .00 .00 51.85 54.02
Guatemala 71 100 .00 .00 33.78 43.21
Jamaica 50 81 .05 1.14 72.54 122.18
Nicaragua 89 69 .00 .00 57.6 87.2
Trinidad and Tobago 42 64 .00 .00 102.18 86.71
Mean 67.7 77.2 .03 .26 45.99 60.82
∗ 1992–98 for Argentina, 1994–98 for Jamaica.
(1–2) Liberalism of capital controls. Dennis Quinn (personal communication).
(3–4) Outward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Coded from IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, various years.
(5–6) Value of exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. World Bank, World Development Indicators CD–ROM (2000).
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in Latin America and the Caribbean. There developments in the advanced

is also much greater variation among coun- industrial countries
tries in the region than among advanced indus-
trial countries, with the larger countries (Brazil, Economic and Social Policies up to 1980
Mexico, Colombia) tending to maintain more
controls. Outward direct foreign investment re- In order to situate the retreat of the state and
mained at a very low level; only Chile, Jamaica, increase in market regulation in advanced capi-
Venezuela, and Argentina surpassed .5 percent talist societies, it is necessary to characterize the
of GDP.2 political economies of these countries about a
The third dimension of economic inter- decade after the close of the Golden Age of
nationalization is internationalization of pro- postwar capitalism, a point at which the de-
duction: the growth of transnational corpora- gree of state regulation was at its pinnacle. Be-
tions (TNC) and development and growth of ginning with the relationship between welfare
“global commodity chains” in which the man- state and production regimes, we take Soskice’s
ufacture and distribution of a product occurs (1999) distinction between coordinated mar-
in different countries organized by a single en- ket economies and liberal market economies
terprise and produced by either that enterprise as the point of departure for our conceptu-
or subcontractors (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, alization. Soskice emphasizes employer orga-
1994). Although there are no hard figures on nization and relationships between companies
the growth of the proportion of total world and financial institutions as defining character-
production accounted for by TNCs and global istics of production regimes. Employer organi-
commodity chains, case studies suggest that it zation takes three distinctive forms: coordina-
is substantial. Because a large proportion of the tion at the industry or subindustry level in most
expansion of these global production networks continental and Nordic economies (industry-
must occur through direct foreign investment, coordinated market economies – CMEs), coor-
the figures for the increases in DFI in Table 30.1 dination among groups of companies across in-
are probably a good indicator of the increase in dustries in Japan and Korea (group-coordinated
the internationalization of production. market economies), or absence of coordina-
The fourth dimension of economic internation in the deregulated systems of the Anglo–
tionalization is the growth of the role of suprana- American countries (uncoordinated or liberal
tional governing bodies: the international finan- market economies – LMEs). In coordinated
cial institutions (IFIs), such as the International economies, employers are able to organize col-
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and in- lectively in training their labor force, sharing
ternational organizations, such as the European technology, providing export marketing services
Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization and advice for R&D and for product innova-
(WTO). The growth in the influence of IFIs in tion, setting product standards, and bargaining
developing countries in the wake of the debt cri- with employees. The capacity for collective ac-
sis is extraordinary. In the case of the advanced tion on the part of employers shapes stable pat-
industrial countries, the expansion and deepen- terns of economic governance encompassing a
ing of the EU is without historical precedent, country’s financial system, its vocational train-
shifting vast areas of decision making from the ing, and its system of industrial relations.
national state to the EU (Schmitter, 1996:125). A central characteristic of the coordinated
We document the extent of the influence of economies is the generalized acceptance by all
these organizations below. major actors of the imperative of successful
competition in open world markets for trad-
able goods. Successful competition in turn re-
2
We were unable to obtain satisfactory data for bor- quires a high skill level of the labor force and
rowing on international capital markets. The data were the ability of unions to deliver wage restraint to
not comparable across countries and spotty in coverage. the extent needed to preserve an internationally
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competitive position. In the industry-coordi- low levels in the Christian democratic welfare
nated market economies of Central and North- states.
ern Europe, initial labor skills are effectively The liberal market economies can be divided
organized in companies or with strong com- into two groups based not on their welfare states,
pany and union involvement in public schools. which in both cases are residual, but on the ba-
Unions are organized mainly along industrial sis of wage regulation systems and tariff regimes.
lines and play an important cooperative role in Following Castles (1985, 1988), we distinguish
organizing working conditions within compa- the “wage earner welfare states,” Australia and
nies and in setting wage levels for the econ- New Zealand, from the liberal welfare states, the
omy as a whole. Banks and industries are closely remaining Anglo–American countries. Similar
linked, providing industries with preferential to the Latin American countries discussed be-
sources of long-term credit, or the state plays low, the antipodes followed an import substi-
a major role in bank ownership and performs tution policy of high tariff barriers on manu-
a similar role in preferential credit provision for facturing goods, with primary product exports
industry. In uncoordinated market economies, financing the cost of importation of consumer
in contrast to both types of coordinated econ- goods and inputs for the manufacturing sector.
omy, training for lower level workers is not un- The high tariffs were part of an explicit com-
dertaken by private business and is generally in- promise in which workers received high wages
effective. Private sector trade unions are viewed delivered by the compulsory arbitration systems.
as impediments in employer decision making, Outside of Australia and New Zealand, none
have little role in coordinating their activities, of the advanced industrial countries maintained
and are weak. Bank–industry ties are weak and high tariffs on goods. As previously mentioned,
industries must rely on competitive markets to the CMEs, particularly the smaller countries,
raise capital. were dependent on exports and defended open
Following Esping-Andersen (1990), within trade in international fora (Katzenstein, 1985).
the industry coordinated market economies, we Otherwise, the state was highly interventive, the
can distinguish two subtypes on the basis of their area of intervention varying by the particular
welfare state: The Nordic social democratic wel- political economy configuration of the coun-
fare states and the continental European Chris- try, although all had generous welfare states.3
tian democratic welfare states. Although both Some countries had large state sectors (Austria,
have very generous transfers systems, the social Finland, France, Italy, and Norway), and the
democratic type is more redistributive (Bradley state often subsidized investment and employ-
et al., 2003). The greater degree of central- ment in the enterprises. Most countries main-
ization of bargaining in the Nordic countries tained capital controls (Table 30.1) and heavily
which results in lower levels of wage disper- regulated internal capital markets. This allowed
sion reinforces this highly egalitarian pattern them to set interest rates below international
(Wallerstein, 1999). The continental countries’ interest rates and offer lower interest rates do-
intermediate degrees of bargaining centraliza- mestically to business investors. Some countries
tion still result in more wage equality than in (Finland, Italy, and Sweden, as well as Aus-
the liberal welfare states, which are character- tralia, Britain, and New Zealand among the
ized by enterprise level bargaining and weak LMEs) resorted to politically determined de-
unions. The main difference in the welfare state valuations in order to restore competitiveness.
configuration is the very high level of public Almost all countries pursued Keynesian coun-
health, education, and welfare services delivered tercyclical demand policies, and a number of
in the Nordic welfare states and the low level countries incurred large fiscal deficits in the
in the continental welfare states. The difference fight against economic stagnation in the 1970s.
in public social service employment results in 3
See Huber and Stephens (2001) and Scharpf (2000)
very high levels of female labor force participa- and the contributions to Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) for
tion in the social democratic welfare states and a more detailed country by country description.
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Some countries (Austria, France, Germany, and the possible exception of Switzerland, almost
Norway) used state-owned banks to subsidize all countries reluctantly retrenched welfare state
investment in both private and public indus- entitlements, though the cutbacks were modest
tries whereas in others the state budget was used in all but a few cases.4
for the same purpose. In all of the CMEs and The fact that there are parallel trends to-
most of the LMEs, public interest services such ward globalization and reduction of state in-
as telecommunications, mass transportation, en- tervention in the market does not, of course,
ergy supply, and public utilities were provided establish that they are causally linked. Let us
primarily by state monopolies insulated from first take increased exposure to trade where,
both domestic and international competition outside of Australia and New Zealand, the ef-
(Héritier and Schmidt, 2000). And finally, many fects of increased economic internationalization
countries used nontariff barriers, such as prod- have been most limited because, other than in
uct regulations, to protect domestic producers. those two countries, the advanced industrial
economies were very trade open at the begin-
ning of the globalization era and increases in
Changes in Economic Policies trade openness have been modest (Table 30.1).
and Globalization The one area in which one does detect a sig-
nificant impact of increased trade openness is
As Scharpf (2000) points out, the policies just the trend toward privatization and “marketiza-
outlined had been greatly reduced or aban- tion” of state enterprises. Even here the process
doned by the turn of the century. Many state- is complex and the lowering of tariff barriers
owned enterprises had been privatized, even by does not figure strongly in the picture. Perhaps
social democratic governments. Those which the most dramatic change is the public service
were not privatized were directed to operate monopolies, particularly telecommunications.
by market, profit-seeking principles; operating Here rapid technological change made what
without subsidies and no longer supporting em- were once natural monopolies into enterprises
ployment. Capital controls were eliminated and exposed to international competition. With the
domestic capital deregulated. Devaluation was advent of satellites and cell phones, governments
abandoned as a policy tool and twelve European could only prevent private alternative providers
countries adopted a common currency, com- from offering their services with increasingly
pletely eliminating even the possibility of us- draconian measures. The cost of using state en-
ing currency adjustment as a policy instrument. terprises to support employment, a common re-
The combination of the elimination of capital sponse to the crisis of the 1970s, forced govern-
controls and the fixing of currencies meant that ment after government to abandon the practice
international markets set national interest rates, in the course of the 1980s and attempt to put
effectively eliminating monetary policy as a state enterprises on a profit-making basis. Once
countercyclical tool and cheap interest rates this was accomplished, the logic of even having
as a measure to stimulate investment. Exter- the enterprises in the state sector disappeared
nal financial decontrol also limits a govern- and privatization was often the next step. The
ment’s ability to employ fiscal stimulation as a large budget deficits faced by many governments
tool, as fiscal deficits are considered risky by fi- made this a yet more attractive option.
nancial markets and either require a risk pre- Another pressure toward privatization was
mium on interest rates or put downward pres- growth of the scale of enterprises, as the op-
sure on foreign exchange reserves. For European timal size for competitiveness in sectors such as
Union countries, the deepening of European manufacturing outgrew the scale of the national
integration after 1990 further limited mone- 4
There have been cutbacks in the 1990s in Switzer-
tary and fiscal policy latitude and prohibited land, but these were overshadowed by the expansion over
nontariff trade barriers and subsidies to sup- the whole of the last two decades (Bonoli and Mach,
port investment and employment. Finally, with 2000).
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enterprises and the search for partners through tries under the provisions of the Single European
merger or absorption resulted in the dilution Act of 1987 by the beginning of 1993.
of the state-owned portion of the resulting en- As a result of the elimination of controls on
terprise or outright privatization. Finally, the capital flows between countries, governments
spread of neoliberal ideology primarily in par- cannot control both the interest rate and ex-
ties of the secular right but also of other po- change rate. If a government decides to pursue
litical tendencies, most notably New Zealand a stable exchange rate, it must accept the interest
Labor, further spurred on privatization. Neolib- rate that is determined by international financial
eral ideological commitments led governments markets. The absence of capital controls makes
to push privatization and marketization even the option of setting low interest rates while
to sectors that remained natural monopolies or accepting a depreciating currency unattractive
that were widely perceived by the public to be as it results in inflation, which greatly compli-
public services which should not be governed cates wage bargaining (see below). As a result
by market principles, such as education and of the decontrol of financial markets, competi-
health care. In such cases, the results of privati- tion from non-OECD countries for investment
zation/marketization were often less satisfactory funds (Rowthorn, 1995) and the worldwide
as in the privatization of British rails (Héritier debt buildup in the wake of the two oil shocks,
and Schmidt, 2000) and the marketization of real interest rates increased from 1.4 percent
health care in New Zealand (Kelsey, 1995). in the 1960s to 5.6 percent in the early 1990s
With regard to increased capital mobility, (OECD, 1995:108). As a result of decontrol of
there is compelling evidence that the opening domestic financial markets (which was in many
of capital markets and the very large increases cases stimulated by international financial dereg-
in capital flows shown in Table 30.1 have had a ulation), government’s ability to privilege busi-
large constraining influence on macroeconomic ness investors over other borrowers also became
policy. As Simmons (1999:41–3) points out, more limited. Countries that relied on finan-
whereas the early popular accounts stress tech- cial control to target business investment were
nological innovation, the revolution in elec- particularly hard-hit as businesses moved from a
tronic transfer, as the impetus for removing situation in which real interest rates offered to
capital controls, later more nuanced academic them via government subsidies, tax concessions,
analyses add market competitive, political, and and regulations were actually negative to a situ-
ideological factors. The technological innova- ation in which they had to pay the rates set by
tions and the growth of the offshore dollar international markets. In addition, in the pivotal
market in the 1960s and the collapse of the German economy, the increase in capital mobil-
Bretton Woods systems of fixed but flexible ex- ity weakened the bank–industry link, with cap-
change rates in 1971–3 set the scene for a round ital becoming less patient, less willing to wait for
of competitive deregulation led by the United the long-term payoff (Seils and Manow, 2000;
States in 1974, then Canada and the Nether- Streeck, 1997). External financial decontrol also
lands in the same year, and then by Germany limits a government’s ability to employ fiscal
and Switzerland later in the decade (Simmons, stimulation as a tool, as fiscal deficits are consid-
1999:41). Note that all of these countries were ered risky by financial markets and either require
characterized by relatively liberal foreign capi- a risk premium on interest rates or put down-
tal regulations in the 1960s already (Table 30.1). ward pressure on foreign exchange reserves. Fi-
Leftist governments tended to resist this move- nally, because of the interest rate penalty that
ment but by the mid-1980s, the ability of multi- international currency markets made countries
national businesses and financial institutions to with a history of devaluation pay, countries ef-
circumvent national controls and to exploit fectively dropped competitive devaluation as a
them for arbitrage influenced most governments policy tool and the twelve European Monetary
to abandon controls. The final vestiges of con- Union countries went so far as to completely
trols were eliminated in European Union coun- eliminate the possibility of currency adjustment.
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These developments put great pressure on to deepen European economic integration. The
wage bargaining systems in countries where average index of capital market openness shown
unions were at least moderately strong, at the in columns 1 and 2 of Table 30.1 was 2.5 in
same time as they pushed huge responsibil- 1973 and had been stable for a decade. It moved
ities for maintaining macroeconomic balance to 3.1 by 1985, the year of the announcement
and external competitiveness onto these sys- of the Single European Act, and then to 3.7
tems. With EMU membership or fixed ex- by 1993, the year than the act came into force.
change rates, the wage gains above the European In Sweden in 1985, five years before the Social
norm are translated immediately into loss of ex- Democrats reversed their stand to favor entry
port markets and thus into higher unemploy- into the European Community, the Swedish so-
ment. In this environment, inflation is the num- cial democratic government made the decision
ber one enemy of the bargaining system because to decontrol domestic capital markets because
nominal, not real, increases in wages undermine the development of “gray,” that is, not quite il-
export competitiveness. Without the fiscal and legal, credit markets had made the existing con-
monetary tools once available to combat unem- trols unviable (Feldt, 1991:260, 281–2).
ployment, the responsibility increasingly falls on The economic thinking that underlay the U-
the wage bargainers. turn of the French Socialists after their first eigh-
With containing inflation as the central policy teen months in office in the early 1980s and
goal and interest rates set by international mar- the Swedish Social Democrats’ “Third Way”
kets, it is not surprising that countries with cen- between Keynesian expansion and monetarist
tral banks dependent on government authority austerity introduced on their return to of-
moved to increase the independence of their fice in 1982 is consistent with the constrained
central banks, because such a move could in- macroeconomic choices outlined earlier. Thus,
crease the credibility of government policy in while it is possible that the neoliberal commit-
the eyes of international money markets and ments of social democratic policy makers, such
thus reduce interest rate premiums. The mon- as Swedish finance minister Kjell-Olof Feldt,
etary policy and institutional arrangements fa- led social democrats to abandon policies that
vored by the German Bundesbank and conser- were still viable – the countercyclical invest-
vative economists became the norm. ment funds come to mind here (see Pontusson
The remaining question in the area of mac- 1992:75–9) – it is probably the case that changes
roeconomic management is the extent to which in the broad parameters of macroeconomic pol-
these outcomes were products of inescapable icy were the inevitable result of the decontrol of
processes of economic internationalization or capital markets by the early liberalizers which
were partly or even largely products of volun- then forced such moves on others. Whether the
tary choices to deepen European integration, as early liberalizers’ hand was forced by the devel-
Hay (2002) contends, or of political decisions opment of offshore dollar markets and techno-
guided by neoliberal ideology. There is little logical innovations is a matter of dispute (e.g.,
doubt that fixed exchange rates/common cur- see O’Brien, 1992; Helleiner, 1994).
rency, independent central banks, macroeco-
nomic policy targeting inflation, no capital con-
trols, and so on are all policy commitments of Welfare State Retrenchment
the European Union and that meeting the cri- and Globalization
teria for entry into the EMU, particularly the
deficit, debt, and inflation targets, imposed eco- There is very little evidence from recent schol-
nomic austerity on many of the prospective en- arly studies, including our own (Huber and
trants. However, it is clear that the process of de- Stephens, 2001), supporting the neoliberal the-
control of capital markets, which was so critical sis that strongly and directly links welfare
in constricting the latitude for macroeconomic state retrenchment to globalization. The recent
management, substantially predated the decision quantitative work on social spending shows a
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very modest positive relationship between vari- that argues that they were largely unemploy-
ables measuring various aspects of economic in- ment driven. The countries where unemploy-
ternationalization and welfare spending (e.g., ment rose early (Denmark and the Netherlands)
see Garrett, 1998; Swank, 2002). However, initiated cuts in the mid-1970s; the countries
social spending data are particularly unsuited where unemployment rose late (Sweden, Nor-
for the study of retrenchment as spending can way, Finland) continued to expand welfare state
increase substantially due to the increase in entitlements until the late 1980s. The countries
recipients; the unemployed, disability pension- where unemployment levels remained very high
ers, early pensioners, and the retired.5 The few for a long time (e.g., the Netherlands) made
analyses of data that directly measure welfare deeper cuts than the countries where they re-
state entitlements (e.g., replacement rates in mained more moderate (e.g., Norway). This is
various programs) come to different conclu- not to say that all the policy changes were some-
sions about the determinants of retrenchment how dictated by economic constraints; percep-
(Allan and Scruggs, 2002; Hicks and Zorn, tions and beliefs about the effectiveness of dif-
2006; Korpi and Palme, 2001), perhaps be- ferent policies in achieving certain goals did play
cause they differ in both the statistical method- a role. Thus, the rising hegemony of neoliberal
ology and dependent variables. All three studies doctrines certainly contributed to the rollbacks.
agree that there are no statistically significant These rollbacks in most cases did no more
positive effects of globalization on retrench- than reduce the increase in welfare state ex-
ment, and Hicks and Zorn (2006) actually find penditures. In fact, if one looks at the aggre-
negative effects of trade openness and cap- gate data for the different welfare state types,
ital account openness on welfare state cut- the average annual increase in most indicators
backs. Both Hicks and Zorn (2006) and Korpi of welfare state expenditures in the 1970s was
and Palme (2001), which, unlike Allan and higher than it had been in the Golden Age, and
Scruggs (2002), are true studies of retrench- it continued to increase in the 1980s, though at
ment,6 find that fiscal deficits and/or unemploy- a slower pace than in the previous two periods.
ment are related to retrenchment, which squares Essentially, in the 1970s governments countered
with the results of comparative case studies. the deteriorating economic situation with tradi-
Based on our analysis of nine advanced in- tional Keynesian countercyclical policies, but by
dustrial countries (Huber and Stephens, 2001), the 1980s they had all realized that the rules of
the twelve case studies in Schmidt and Scharpf the economic game had changed and demanded
(2000), and Myles’s (1996, 2002) studies of new approaches. Still, the increase in claimants
North America – that is, sixteen of the eighteen of benefits kept pushing up expenditures.
advanced industrial countries in Table 30.1 – we Our data and case studies show a sharp decline
find that rollbacks in welfare state programs have in partisan effects on welfare state expansion/
been a universal phenomenon in the past two retrenchment.7 Curtailment of entitlements, or
decades. Our case studies indicate two differ- at best defense of existing entitlements, was
ent dynamics: ideologically driven cuts, which
occurred in only a few cases, and unemploy-
7
ment driven cuts, which were pervasive. It is the Our data analysis is based on social spending, which
timing and severity of the latter type of rollbacks is fraught with difficulties as noted above, and thus we
consider the case studies which do show a narrowing
of partisan differences to be more reliable evidence.
5 The three quantitative studies of entitlements mentioned
See Huber and Stephens (2001) and Allan and
Scruggs (2002). above come to differing conclusions on partisan effects:
6
The dependent variable in Allan and Scruggs (2002) Allan and Scruggs (2002) find that right government
is annual change in various replacement rates in the pe- is negatively associated with replacement rate changes,
riod 1975 to 1999. Although the study is clearly a study and Korpi and Palme (2001) find that left government
of the retrenchment era, part of the results are certainly is negatively related to retrenchment, while Hicks and
products of increases in replacement rates that occurred Zorn (2006) find that Christian democratic government
in many countries, especially early in the period. is most negatively associated with retrenchment.
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on the agenda everywhere. As Pierson argues possible to rule without a majority of popular
(1996, 2001; also see Huber and Stephens, 1993, support (single member districts and plurality
1998), the politics of retrenchment are differ- elections that allow parties with a minority of
ent from the politics of welfare state expansion. votes to enjoy large parliamentary majorities).
The Right was constrained in its ability to cut Given the crucial role that the rise in unem-
by the popularity of most of the large welfare ployment has had in stimulating welfare state
state programs, and the Left was constrained in retrenchment, we have to seek to understand
its ability to raise taxes to keep the programs on the reasons for the dramatic increases in unem-
a sound financial basis by the economic slow- ployment in the 1980s and early 1990s. Here
down. This is not to say that there have not we can only summarize the arguments we make
been significant differences in the rhetoric of elsewhere at length (Huber and Stephens, 1998;
political parties with regards to desirable wel- Huber and Stephens, 2001a:chap. 6–7). Let us
fare state reforms, but simply that electoral con- begin by dispensing with the standard neoliberal
straints worked against radical departures from argument on trade openness, that is, with in-
established welfare state models. creased trade openness, the countries with gen-
There were only a few cases of large-scale ide- erous welfare states and high wages were increas-
ologically driven cuts. The most dramatic were ingly exposed to trade competition and their
Thatcher in Britain, the National (conservative) generous social provisions made them uncom-
government in New Zealand, and the Reagan petitive in ever more open world markets. First,
administration in the United States. In the case increased trade openness is not a good candi-
of the Reagan administration, the cuts were fo- date for explaining dramatic change as it has in-
cused on cash and in kind benefits to the poor, a creased only modestly (see Table 30.1).
small but highly vulnerable minority, while So- Second, as we pointed out above, the gener-
cial Security was preserved by a large increase ous welfare states of Northern Europe were de-
in the contributions. In any case, the United veloped in very trade open economies in which
States cannot have been said to have made a the performance of the export sector was pivotal
“system shift” if only because it already had the for the economic welfare of the country. More-
least generous welfare state of any advanced in- over, retrenchment was unrelated to export per-
dustrial democracy. Only in Great Britain and formance. For instance, the export sectors of
New Zealand could one speak of an actual sys- countries such as Sweden and Germany were
tem shift from welfare state regimes that used to performing incredibly well in the mid-1990s at
provide basic income security to welfare state precisely the same time when the governments
regimes that are essentially residualist, relying of those countries were cutting social benefits
heavily on means-testing. Although the radical (Huber and Stephens, 1998; Pierson, 2001b;
changes in these two countries were certainly Seils and Manow, 2000). As Scharpf (2000:76–
facilitated by the fact that they had experienced 8) points out, there is no relationship between
the lowest growth rates of any two advanced in- total tax burden and employment in the exposed
dustrial countries for the period 1950–79, thus sector in advanced industrial societies, strong ev-
leading to a widespread view in the publics of idence that generous social policy does not make
both countries that a fundamental change was countries uncompetitive in world markets.
necessary, the changes in social policy, as op- The question then becomes what caused the
posed to neoliberal economic reforms in other increases in unemployment?8 Let us begin by
sectors, were deeply unpopular in both coun- observing that it was not the low level of job cre-
tries and did not have the support of the median ation, because employment growth after 1973
voter. We argue that the exceptional nature of
these two cases can be traced to their political 8
The following few paragraphs summarize our argu-
systems, which concentrate power (unicameral ments in Huber and Stephens (2001a:chap. 7; 2001b).
or very weakly bicameral parliamentary govern- See those writings for more detailed discussion and sta-
ments in unitary political systems) and make it tistical documentation.
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was as rapid as before (Glyn, 1995). Rather, ris- their causes) for welfare state retrenchment.
ing labor force participation due to the entry Pierson (2001a, 2001b) succinctly summarize
of women into the labor force is one proximate other pressures on the welfare state. The shift
cause of the increase in unemployment. The in- from manufacturing to services has slowed pro-
ability of the Christian democratic welfare states ductivity growth and contributed to the slowed
to absorb this increase either through an ex- economic growth noted previously. The growth
pansion of low-wage private service employ- of spending on programs legislated in the past,
ment as in the liberal welfare states or through most notably pensions and health care, stresses
the expansion of public services as in the so- national budgets. Population aging pushes up
cial democratic welfare states is one reason why spending, particularly on these two programs.
the unemployment problem in these countries The decline in fertility, which has been dramatic
has been particularly severe. The other proxi- in Christian democratic welfare states, threat-
mate cause is the lower levels of growth in the ens to greatly aggravate this problem in the fu-
post-1973 period. This in turn can be linked in ture (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The change in
part to lower levels of investment, which in turn family structure, the decline in male breadwin-
can be linked in part to lower levels of savings, ner families and increase in single mother and
to lower levels of profit, and to higher interest dual earner families, creates new demands for
rates. High interest rates is where globalization day care, maternity leave, and related programs
comes in because, as outlined previously, they (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002). The decline in
can be linked in part to deregulation of capital wage growth and increase in returns on capital
markets. Moreover, because decontrol of capital along with demographic change undermine the
markets made countercyclical economic man- PAYGO pension systems and make funded sys-
agement more difficult, it certainly raised un- tems more attractive, yet present the public with
employment in that regard also. a double payment problem in financing a tran-
Although we do think the evidence supports sition to a funded system (Myles and Pierson,
the view that financial deregulation has con- 2001). In sum, the rise in unemployment has
tributed to the rise in unemployment, it is im- been only one contributor to welfare state stress,
portant to recognize the importance of politi- and globalization in all of its manifestations has
cal decisions and conjunctural developments in been only one contributor to unemployment.
explaining the current high levels of unemploy- Thus, the contribution of economic interna-
ment in Europe. Though it almost certainly was tionalization to welfare state retrenchment is
not a conscious decision, or at least not seen in modest.
these terms, the Christian democratic welfare For Australia and New Zealand, it would ap-
states, faced with a growing supply of (female) pear that a case can be made for the globaliza-
labor, rejected the alternatives of creating a low- tion thesis in that changes in the international
wage market in private services along American economy did compel both countries to deregu-
lines or expanding public services (and thus rais- late markets and fundamentally change their sys-
ing taxes) along Nordic lines. As we pointed out tems of social protection. In these “wage earner
previously, the combination of the debt buildup welfare states,” social protection was delivered
in the 1970s and the policies required for ac- primarily by the compulsory arbitration system,
cession to the EMU imposed austerity on Eu- which assured the family of an adequate living
ropean countries in the 1990s. The mismanage- standard by providing a male breadwinner fam-
ment of the process of financial deregulation led ily wage and a number of social benefits from the
to a consumer boom and then real estate bust, employer to the wage earner. The formal wel-
which was the primary cause of the unemploy- fare state, that is, transfers and services delivered
ment crisis in Finland, Sweden, and to a lesser by the state, was rather underdeveloped by Eu-
extent, Norway. ropean standards. This distinctive Australasian
Nor do we want to overstate the importance political economy became unviable as a result of
of the increases of unemployment (whatever long-term secular changes in commodity prices
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and the entry of the United Kingdom into the capital markets, state investment in strategic sec-
European Community, with a consequent loss tors of the economy, regulation of DFI, and a
of preferential markets for Commonwealth ex- host of other regulatory activities.
ports. In both countries, the wage regulation As industrialization progressed, these coun-
system, which was the core of the system of tries faced the problem of integrating labor as an
social protection, was changed substantially – economic and political actor. The political inte-
in New Zealand altered completely – and this, gration took different forms, in some cases un-
along with the rise in unemployment, exposed der leadership of the state and in others through
workers to much higher levels of risk of poverty party–union alliances, but in all cases the state
than had earlier been the case. Add to this other played an active role (Collier and Collier, 1991).
marketizing reforms (see Castles et al., 1996; State corporatism was prevalent; in more in-
Schwartz, 1994a, 1994b, 1998), and it becomes clusionary and more exclusionary versions, and
apparent that the political economy of the an- even where state/ capital/ labor relations were
tipodes has converged on the liberal type. Thus, more pluralistic, there was a high degree of labor
in these two countries, it is accurate to say that market regulation. With industrialization and as
changes in the international economy forced part of the process of labor incorporation came
them to abandon policies which had protected the expansion of social insurance schemes to the
an uncompetitive manufacturing sector. urban working class. Social insurance schemes
had been introduced earlier for the most im-
portant pressure groups, such as the military,
latin america and the caribbean civil servants, and the judiciary, and then slowly
expanded to middle class groups and strategic
Economic and Social Policies sectors of the working class (Mesa-Lago, 1978;
up to the 1980s Huber, 1996). As a result of this process of grad-
ual expansion, the systems of social insurance
The first argument to make when discussing were highly fragmented and generally quite ine-
Latin America and the Caribbean is that the galitarian. What is crucial, however is that the
countries in the region are extremely diverse, entire edifice of social protection, from pensions
much more so than OECD countries. There are to family allowances and health care, was built
very small, extremely poor, still largely agricul- around employment and the male breadwinner
tural countries like Haiti, Nicaragua, and Hon- model, not citizenship rights. Women and chil-
duras, along with upper–middle income coun- dren were covered as dependents. This meant
tries with partly advanced industrial sectors like that coverage remained restricted to those em-
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico. So, any ployed in the formal sector. Even where the self-
generalizations are extremely hazardous. Never- employed were included on a compulsory basis,
theless, it is possible to point to some important their evasion rate in paying contributions was
economic characteristics that are shared by most very high, as contribution rates for them were
of these countries. Starting with colonization, set high. Employer contributions to social secu-
they were all shaped into raw material export rity reached in many cases comparatively high
economies. The effects of the Great Depression levels, but given the high tariff wall, employers
then generated incentives for ISI, and the more were able to pass the costs on to consumers.
advanced countries – Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Only six Latin American countries had built
Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay – began up a system of social protection that might
to implement pro-ISI policies; other countries, be called a welfare state, covering more than
such as Peru, Venezuela, and Jamaica, followed 60 percent of the economically active popu-
much later on this path. Pro-ISI policies en- lation with some form of social security as of
tailed high protective tariffs and nontariff barri- 1980. These countries are Argentina, Brazil,
ers to imports, preferential interest and exchange Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Uruguay; at least
rates for industrial investment and thus regulated three Caribbean countries, Bahamas, Barbados,
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and Jamaica, also belong to that category.9 An- in some countries were very high, as were ad-
other group of six countries had expanded ministrative expenditures of the systems. Em-
coverage to between 30 percent and 60 per- ployers attempted to evade payment of contri-
cent of the economically active population by butions or delayed payment for long periods,
1980 – Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, particularly during high inflation. Thus, there
Peru, and Venezuela. Coverage in the remaining was a Consensus on the need for reform, but
countries had remained below 30 percent of the again the types of reforms chosen have varied
economically active population, with the low- significantly.
est being the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
and Paraguay, with 12 percent, 12 percent, and
14 percent, respectively. Reforms in Economic and Social Policy
As noted above, ISI strategies began to run
into a variety of problems, which in turn man- The main points of the reform agenda, what
ifested themselves in recurring balance of pay- Williamson has aptly called the Washington
ments crises from the 1950s on. Still, with a Consensus, are reduction of fiscal deficits, to
variety of coping strategies the model was kept be achieved mainly through cuts in expendi-
alive and then received a new, albeit short-lived, tures, particularly in subsidies of all sorts; tax
lease on life due to the easy availability of loans reforms that cut marginal rates and broaden the
from international banks in the 1970s. The debt tax base; market determination of interest rates;
crisis of 1982, however, forced a reorientation. market determination of exchange rates, with
Since that time, every single country in Latin possible intervention to keep them competitive;
America and the Caribbean has been exposed import liberalization; liberalization of foreign
to pressures for reform. Yet, there are significant direct investment; privatization of state-owned
differences in the extent to which countries have enterprises; deregulation of all kinds of eco-
complied with these pressures. nomic activity; and protection of property rights
The austerity measures used to deal with the (Williamson, 1990:7–20). To this one should
recurrent balance of payments crises also put add the agenda for second-generation reforms,
pressure on the social security systems. In addi- that is, reforms in labor market policy, social pol-
tion, the pension components of social security icy, and political institutions, which was devel-
in the more advanced countries were experi- oped by the IFIs in the 1990s. The main points
encing severe financial pressures of their own of this agenda are liberalization of labor markets;
(Mesa-Lago, 1989). The pension systems had privatization of social security systems, primar-
matured and thus the ratio of working to re- ily pensions but also provision of health care;
tired people was deteriorating. The reserves that targeting of social expenditures on the neediest
should have been built up in the maturation groups; decentralization of responsibility for the
phase typically had been used for other state ex- provision of social services; and reforms of the
penditures, often for the health care component judicial system.
of social security. During periods of high infla- On average, the countries in the region
tion, there was often decapitalization of the pen- moved far in trade liberalization and financial
sion systems. Benefits in the privileged systems liberalization; they advanced less in privatiza-
tion, tax reform, reforms of social security sys-
9
These figures are drawn from Mesa-Lago (1994:22); tems, and decentralization of social services; and
he does not provide figures for Trinidad and Tobago or least in deregulation of labor markets and ju-
for any of the small Caribbean countries. Coverage fig- dicial reform. The average tariff rate was low-
ures vary widely among different sources, depending on ered from 49 percent in the mid-1980s to 11
whether legal entitlements or actual contributions are percent in 1999, and nontariff restrictions were
taken as the criterion. Mesa-Lago is the most prolific
researcher and writer on social security in Latin Amer- reduced from a coverage of 38 percent of im-
ica, and his figures can be accepted for the purposes of ports in the prereform period to 6 percent of
classification here. imports in the mid-1990s (Lora, 2001). Now, as
P1: JZP
we discussed above, in comparative perspective anything. Most of the privatizations affected in-
these tariff levels remain higher than in advanced frastructure, particularly energy and telecom-
industrial countries. Nevertheless, the lowering munications, and in some countries the banking
had a dramatic impact on many Latin Ameri- system (Lora, 2001).
can economies, particularly where it was done Reforms of the social security system are gen-
in a very short period of time. Many enterprises erally categorized into structural and nonstruc-
went bankrupt, which meant that many formal tural reforms, the former involving elements of
sector jobs were lost. privatization and the latter changing rules on
The decrease in the gap between the black financing and entitlements. Nine Latin Amer-
market and the regulated market exchange rate ican countries have implemented and a tenth
is one indicator of relaxation of foreign ex- has legislated full or partial privatization of the
change regulations. Deregulation in this area, pension system. In five cases, privatization was
along with fiscal and monetary stabilization total, with the public system being closed down;
policies and the renewed flow of capital to Latin in five cases it was partial, with the private sys-
America, led to a drastic reduction in this gap tem being supplementary or a parallel option
between 1988 and 1997, from over 100 per- (Muller, 2002). In the cases where the public
cent in some cases to around 5 percent. In the system survived, it typically underwent reforms
area of financial regulation, controls on interest as well to strengthen its financial basis. Reform
rates were abolished in all countries by 1995 and of the health insurance and delivery systems has
reserve requirements were reduced, but most been very heterogeneous, which makes a sum-
countries retained some forms of intervention mary assessment very difficult. In many cases,
in lending agreements (Lora, 2001). private insurance and delivery have expanded
In tax reform, a replacement had to be found their share, sometimes by design and sometimes
for revenues previously coming from taxes on by default. Generally, public resources have been
foreign trade, which fell from 18 percent of total targeted at the neediest sectors of the popula-
tax revenue in 1980 to 14 percent in the mid- tion, but even these sectors are expected to pay
1990s. Most countries adopted or substantially user fees.
increased value-added taxes, but collection rates Decentralization has been high on the re-
have remained lower than the statutory rates form agenda and most countries did transfer
(Lora, 2001). Marginal tax rates on personal in- some responsibilities and revenues to lower lev-
come and taxes on corporate profits were re- els of government, particularly in the area of
duced in virtually all cases. However, average tax social services, but again the actual reforms that
revenue has remained low; taxes made up only have been implemented are very heterogeneous
72 percent of total government revenue in Latin (Willis et al., 1999). On average, the share of
America in 1990–4, compared to 90 percent in state and local governments in total government
the OECD countries. Nontax revenue included spending increased from 16 percent in 1985 to
items such as natural resource rents and income almost 20 percent in the mid-1990s (IADB,
from state-owned enterprises. Income taxes and 1997:99). However, the variation is large, rang-
social security contributions accounted for 44 ing from 49 and 46 percent in the federal systems
percent of government revenue compared to 67 of Argentina and Brazil to less than 5 percent
percent in the OECD countries. Total govern- in small unitary countries, such as the Domini-
ment expenditure was on average slightly below can Republic, Panama, and Costa Rica (IADB,
25 percent of GDP, roughly half of the level of 1997:157). Even among the more decentralized
OECD countries (IADB, 1997:104–6). countries, there is considerable variation in the
The extent of privatization has varied consid- amounts of actual autonomy enjoyed by subna-
erably among countries; the cumulative value of tional governments in decisions on expenditure
privatizations between 1988 and 1999 reached and revenue generation (Garman et al., 2001).
5 percent or more of GDP in ten coun- In the areas of labor law reforms, the IFIs have
tries, whereas other countries hardly privatized been pressing for reduction of costs associated
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with laying off workers, relaxation of restric- mission on Latin America and the Caribbean
tions on the hiring of temporary workers, and a (ECLAC), only look at the nine countries with
lowering of social security contributions. They the longest history of implementing economic
have been arguing that these policies restrict em- reforms in the region and divide them into ag-
ployment creation in the formal sector. Yet, only gressive and cautious reformers, the former in-
six countries implemented significant reforms cluding Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru; the
in these areas between the mid-1980s and 1999 latter Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica,
(Lora and Panizza, 2002). This is understandable and Mexico (2000:14; 48). In general, Chile
in light of the fact that unemployment insurance is regarded as the prototype of the early and
is virtually nonexistent in Latin America, and radical reformer and Argentina of the late and
that virtually all social transfers and services are radical reformer, the former being highly suc-
tied to formal sector employment. Thus, loss of cessful and the latter experiencing economic
a formal sector job is a catastrophic event and chaos in 2001–2. There is also consensus that
labor has strenuously opposed such reforms. Peru, Jamaica, and Bolivia have introduced far-
Reform of the judicial system is important reaching reforms and that these reforms were
to the IFIs because of protection of prop- implemented rather rapidly in Peru and Bolivia.
erty rights and predictability of decisions in In contrast, Brazil, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and
case of a dispute between investors, particu- Venezuela are clearly regarded as slow and cau-
larly foreign investors, and the government or tious reformers.
private actors. Accordingly, the World Bank,
the Inter-American Development Bank, and
USAID have been supporting reform projects in Explanations of Reform Trajectories
a majority of countries in the region. However,
the concentration on reforms favorable for eco- Three main types of explanations have been ad-
nomic activities entailed a neglect of reforms in vanced to account for the differences among
the area of human rights in general, and specif- countries in the depth and speed of reforms: in-
ically of access for the underprivileged to the sulation of technocratic political leaders and/or
justice system for protection from police abuse. centralization of political power in the hands
Overall, not much progress has been made in of the executive, depth of the economic cri-
improving the independence, efficiency, and ac- sis and consequent leverage of IFIs and readi-
cessibility of the justice system (Prillaman, 2000; ness of leaders and the public to accept radi-
Jarquı́n and Carrillo, 1998). cal reforms, and coalitions of political leaders
Depending on the criteria and time points with winners from initial reforms for further
used, analysts come up with somewhat differ- reforms or changes in the balance of power be-
ent classifications of countries’ reform efforts. tween proponents and opponents of reforms.
For instance, the Inter-American Development These explanations are certainly not mutually
Bank, looking at their structural policy index exclusive; rather, they can be combined to some
in 1985/86 and 1995, lists Argentina, Chile, extent, and to some extent they explain differ-
and Jamaica as early reformers (above the av- ent phases of the reform process. Haggard and
erage in both 1985 and 1995); Bolivia, El Sal- Kaufman (1995) argue that in the early phases
vador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru as in- of stabilization and adjustment, centralized ex-
tense reformers (below in 1985, above in 1995); ecutive authority is crucial because winners are
Colombia and Uruguay as gradual reformers not defined yet but losers perceive the threat or
(above in 1985, below in 1995); and Brazil, reality of losses more clearly. Thus, the reforms
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, have to be imposed against opposition and with
Mexico, and Venezuela as slow reformers (be- little support from internal allies. For consolida-
low at both time points) (IADB, 1997:50). In tion of reforms, then, and progress in second-
contrast, Stallings and Peres, in a study spon- generation reforms, executive behavior needs
sored by the United Nations Economic Com- to become more predictable and new support
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coalitions have to be formed. The formation of governments did not attempt to change the ba-
support coalitions is particularly crucial in the sic parameters of the model in the 1990s further
case of social sector reform, where there are enhanced its legitimacy.
many stakeholders. Argentina is an interesting case of radical re-
Many authors have argued that depth of pre- form carried out by an unlikely candidate, the
ceding crisis is a good predictor of support for leader of the historically labor-based Peronist
reforms, but Weyland (1998, 2002) has offered party, Carlos Menem, who became president
the most theoretically coherent version of this in 1989 after running a vaguely populist cam-
explanation. He uses prospect theory, which paign. Clearly, in this case the disastrous ex-
holds that when people are in the domain of perience with heterodox stabilization programs
losses they are more ready to accept the risks of introduced by his predecessor, Alfonsı́n, who
reform, whereas being in the domain of gains resigned early in the midst of hyperinflation and
makes people, both leaders and the mass public, a deep fiscal crisis, strengthened Menem’s re-
risk-averse and thus opposed to far-reaching resolve and his capacity to obtain support for his
forms. Indeed, this explanation fares well in ex- reforms from his own party. Because the Peron-
plaining both cross-national differences and the ists for the most part controlled both houses of
timing of reforms. Depth of crisis has another congress, he faced little effective legislative op-
crucial effect which then tends to propel reforms position. He used various strategies to neutralize
forward. The deeper the crisis, the greater is the opposition from the unions, and with varying
leverage of the IFIs and thus the probability that success, from giving some of them participation
they will be successful in pushing their reform in ownership of privatized enterprises, com-
designs. pensating workers who lost their jobs, and al-
Chile is a special case, as it was the first lowing unions to run private pension funds, to
country to adopt radical neoliberal reforms, be- weakening others with simple dismissal of their
ginning in the mid-1970s. Certainly, executive members, thus exacerbating divisions in the
power was extremely centralized in Pinochet’s union movement that had deep historical roots
hands and opposition to the reforms was sim- (Murillo, 2001). The price stabilization brought
ply not tolerated. In the Chilean case, the eco- about in part by the convertibility plan, which
nomic reforms went way beyond what the IFIs tied the peso to the dollar, along with renewed
prescribed, as the reforms followed a political capital inflows and economic growth enabled
agenda as well, to remove the state from the Menem to win a second term in 1994. How-
center of decisions about distribution and thus ever, exchange rate parity and financial deregu-
as a target for collective action, and to atomize lation over the longer run led to a rising foreign
civil society (Garretón, 1989). Chile moved very debt and severe balance of payments problems.
rapidly in trade and financial liberalization and Internally, these problems were aggravated by
in privatization. The speculative boom created fiscal indiscipline, particularly among provincial
by these reforms ended in a spectacular financial governments. Inaction on the part of Menem
crash in the early 1980s, even before the general and his successor, de la Rua, ultimately led to
debt crisis in Latin America. In response, the a profound financial crisis and a default on Ar-
government expanded its role in the economy gentina’s foreign debt.
again temporarily, but at the same time it pro- Fujimori in Peru is another leader who cam-
ceeded with a full privatization of the pension paigned on a vague but clearly anti-IFI platform,
system and a very significant expansion of the only to make a 180-degree turn right after his
private sector in health care. The sustained high election to embark on a radical reform course.
economic growth rates experienced by Chile Like Menem, he followed a predecessor who
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, and the had pursued populist, nationalist, expansionist
comparatively low degree of volatility turned policies and presided over a spectacular eco-
the country into a poster child for advocates nomic disaster. Unlike Menem, he did not have
of neoliberalism. The fact that the democratic a strong party base and faced strong legislative
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opposition. His solution was to close congress in openness on social spending in Latin America,
a self-coup and thereafter continue to rule in a and they also found a significant negative effect
semiauthoritarian fashion, which was facilitated of an interaction term of trade increase and cap-
by the fact that his supporters gained a major- ital openness. They interpret these effects as re-
ity of seats in the new constituent assembly and flecting producer interests in lower tax burdens,
then the new legislature. an interpretation with which we would agree.
All three of these cases of rapid and profound However, if we want to go beyond expendi-
reform share the characteristics of a profound tures and understand the nature of reforms, we
crisis preceding the accession to power of an need to look for additional mediating mecha-
executive enjoying high power concentration, nisms that translate the growing integration of
albeit through different means. In Argentina world markets into concrete policy changes and
and Peru, leaders who had come to power on that can explain differential responses to market
an alternative platform were confronted with dynamics. The essential mediating mechanisms
disastrous economic conditions that left them were the debt crisis of the 1980s, the growing
few alternatives to adopting IFI prescriptions. power of the IFIs, and the spread of specific ed-
In Argentina, Menem was able to implement ucational and career patterns. The causes of dif-
the reform program through legal means com- ferential responses to world market dynamics are
bined with heavy political maneuvering due domestic political institutions and power distri-
to high party discipline and virtual control by butions between opponents and proponents of
his party over the legislature, whereas Fujimori reform.
in Peru dealt with political opposition through At the root of the reforms is clearly the debt
unconstitutional means. In Chile, the military crisis, and the debt crisis in turn is a result of the
regime ruthlessly repressed any opposition and growth of international financial markets. The
embarked on a process of economic and social growth and integration of international financial
engineering to destroy the chances for any pos- markets facilitated overborrowing in the 1970s,
sible reemergence of a mass movement of the put pressure on debtor countries through rising
Left, their equivalent of a profound crisis. interest rates in the early 1980s, and served as
Among the slow and cautious reform cases, catalyst for a general crisis when the large pri-
the combination of profound crisis and high vate banks all decided to stop new lending to
power concentration was not present, with the Latin America. It then propelled the IFIs into a
result that either no far-reaching reform pack- very powerful role, because agreements with the
age was presented by the executive or the pack- IMF were generally a precondition for any debt
age was blocked in the legislature or by pop- rescheduling agreements with private lenders
ular referenda. In Brazil, the fragmentation of and any bilateral or multilateral rescue packages.
the party system and the lack of party disci- However, it is important to emphasize here that
pline stymied reform efforts of presidents, and international financial markets were backed up
in Uruguay popular referenda played that role by the power and interests of economically pow-
in the case of pension reform. erful nations. The governments of these nations
decided that the burden of solving the debt cri-
sis was to fall exclusively on the shoulders of the
Globalization and Reforms debtor countries. Defaults were to be prevented
and debt relief was initially not even considered.
Certainly, globalization was the key driving A further mediating mechanism between
force behind the economic and social policy globalization and economic policy reform in
reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean, Latin America is the growth of educational and
much more so than in the OECD countries. career circuits that bring technocrats with neo-
In fact, Kaufman and Segura (2001) found con- liberal world views into powerful political po-
sistent statistically significant negative effects of sitions. These circuits bring promising Latin
both a short- and a long-term nature of trade American graduate students in economics to
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Ph.D. programs in the United States, where they have suffered from great volatility and vulnera-
absorb neoliberal economics. After graduation, bility to external shocks, and various financial
these economists often circulate between posi- crises, such as the Mexican peso crisis, the East
tions in the IFIs and in leading administrative Asian financial crisis, and the Argentine crisis
positions in their home countries. Thus, the of 2001–2, had ripple effects throughout the
IFIs find domestic supporters for their reform area. The boom and bust pattern can clearly be
programs who share a common worldview and linked to the reforms. Strong inflows of capi-
help to convince politicians of the necessity of tal in the context of liberalized capital markets
neoliberal reforms (Teichman, 2001). and trade led to an appreciation of the real ex-
Globalization then had an indirect effect on change rate, increasing trade deficits, excessive
the systems of social protection via the austerity expansion of the financial system, and increases
and structural adjustment policies implemented in private and public spending. When investor
in the wake of the debt crisis, and a direct effect confidence and capital inflows declined precip-
via the influence of the IFIs. Social expendi- itously due to some external shock, the booms
tures were reduced as a percentage of GDP and were followed by busts and governments were
in absolute terms in the 1980s, and they recov- forced into new rounds of austerity measures.
ered slowly in the early 1990s. Bankruptcies and Average growth performance was far from suf-
privatizations led to layoffs in the formal sector ficient to generate enough jobs to absorb the
and thus to loss of social security coverage of a growth in the labor force, and growth rates fell
large number of employees and their families. from an average of 4.1 percent in the first half
Though the IFIs had developed a clear concern of the decade to 2.5 percent in the second half
with the political sustainability of the economic (ECLAC, 2002:23).
reforms by the late 1980s, their reform plans Defenders of the reforms argue that Latin
did little to alleviate the plight of these employ- America’s main problems – insufficient export
ees. The approach of the IFIs was to privatize performance, high concentration of wealth and
pensions and large parts of health care and to income, high un- and under-employment, high
concentrate resources in targeted programs on poverty, and low tax revenue – are of a long-
the poorest sectors in the form of preventive standing structural nature. However, not only
health and nutrition programs and social emer- did the reforms not fulfill the promise of alle-
gency funds. These funds were to provide loans viating these problems, but at least in the case
to the poorest communities for economic and of concentration of wealth and income they
social infrastructure, social services, and some- also aggravated the problem. The largest firms,
times production ventures. In the 1990s, the IFIs with access to foreign financing and markets,
added a concern with human capital and began were in the best position to take advantage of
to promote investment in primary education. the liberalized markets and of privatization of
public enterprises, and thus to expand their
holdings, while many smaller enterprises went
Effects of the Reforms bankrupt. Among the many unfulfilled promises
of the reforms is the sluggish response of export
The most cited achievements of the reform ef- production; indeed, export increases have been
forts are a reduction of inflation through macro- lagging behind import increases (Baumann,
economic stabilization measures and a strength- 2002; Stallings and Peres, 2000:20–1). Unem-
ening of fiscal discipline, visible in smaller ployment increased from 4.6 percent of the la-
budget deficits. Also, after the lost decade of the bor force in 1990 to 8.6 percent in 1999. Also,
1980s, growth resumed in the 1990s as did cap- most of the jobs that have been created since
ital flows to Latin America, increasingly in the the early 1990s are in low-productivity and thus
form of direct investment. Renewal of capital low-wage sectors, principally in the informal
flows is attributed to economic liberalization in- sector (Tokman, 2002).
sofar as these reforms strengthened investor con- Most countries increased their social spend-
fidence. However, Latin American economies ing in the 1990s in both absolute terms and as
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a percentage of GDP; on average, social expen- its pension system, whereas five Latin American
diture rose from 10.4 percent in 1990 to 13.1 countries did so; no advanced industrial coun-
percent in 1999. This increase, however, even try slashed its government expenditure in half,
combined with economic growth, was far from as did Argentina between 1983 and 1989. Three
sufficient to lower poverty effectively and undo main factors account for these differences. First,
the damage done in the 1980s. Poverty did de- state intervention in the economy, particularly
crease from 48.3 percent of the population in protection of domestic production, had been
1990 to 43.8 percent in 1999, but this figure more extensive, so there was more to liberalize.
remained above the 40.5 percent of the pop- Tariff levels in the early 1980s were still at an av-
ulation who had been poor in 1980. In abso- erage of 45 percent, and average maximum tariff
lute terms, the number of poor people increased levels at 84 percent (Baumann, 2002). Second,
by 11 million in the 1990s (ECLAC, 2002:14– Latin America’s dependence on foreign capital
15). Nor was there any progress in reducing had been an incentive for overborrowing in the
inequality; Latin America remains the region 1970s, which in the context of the debt crisis
with the most unequal income distribution. In- of the 1980s gave great leverage to the IFIs to
deed, in some countries inequality continued to push the agenda of austerity and liberalization.
increase. What is crucial to point out here is that The rising debt burden greatly aggravated gov-
the two countries that performed clearly best in ernment deficits, which climbed above 5 per-
protecting the lowest levels of inequality were cent in the early 1980s in many countries and
Uruguay and Costa Rica (ECLAC, 2002:18), reached into the double digits in some. The
where structural reforms had been carried out IMF response was a slashing of public expen-
slowly and cautiously and the structural reform ditures. Indeed, total government expenditures
index in 1999 was below the regional average as a percentage of GDP declined between 1983
(Lora and Panizza, 2002). and 1989 from 20 to 10 percent in Argentina,
Given these experiences with two decades of 35 to 26 percent in Chile, 26 to 23 percent in
reform in economic and social policies, critiques Mexico, and 19 to 13 percent in Peru; the de-
of the Washington Consensus are assuming a cline in Uruguay and Costa Rica was smaller,
higher profile in policy-making circles in some from 20 to 18 percent and from 20 to 19 percent,
Latin American governments and even in some respectively (IADB, 1991:284–5).
IFIs. Most simply urge greater attention to hu- Third, domestic opponents of liberalization,
man capital formation and to state capacity for particularly labor unions and leftist political par-
implementing reforms properly, but others are ties, have been weaker than in advanced indus-
beginning to ask whether the reforms have not trial societies, and the democratic political insti-
restricted the state’s role excessively. In particu- tutions through which they might have resisted
lar, the recurrent financial crises and their ripple have been weaker also. Labor had been greatly
effects are putting the question of deregulated weakened through repression under the mili-
capital markets squarely on the table. tary regimes, and the economic crisis added to
its weakness (Drake, 1996). There are no reli-
able data on union density in Latin America,
conclusion but even if we take the higher end of McGuire’s
(1999) estimates, there is no doubt that density is
Advanced Industrial and Latin American much lower than in advanced industrial coun-
and Caribbean Societies Compared tries, with the exception of the United States
and France. Political divisions with long histor-
The extent of liberalization and privatization has ical roots further diluted the collective action
clearly been greater in Latin America and the potential of the union movement. With some
Caribbean than in advanced industrial societies, important exceptions, parties as institutions are
in both economic and social policy realms. Just rather weak in Latin America (Mainwaring and
to take a couple of dramatic examples: no ad- Scully, 1995), and parties of the democratic Left
vanced industrial society completely privatized are among the weakest. Only in Costa Rica and
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Chile can one speak clearly of effective partic- trenchment, so the edifice of the postwar welfare
ipation of democratic Left parties in national state stood intact as of 2002, and poverty and in-
governmental power in the 1980s and 1990s.10 equality did not rise significantly except in New
Relatedly, legislatures as institutions have often Zealand, Britain, and the United States with its
been too weak in the newly established democ- traditionally minimalist welfare state. The Latin
racies to oppose overbearing executives in the American countries, as we have seen, were not
implementation of radical austerity and liberal- so fortunate due to both more unfavorable in-
ization policies. ternal balances of power, greater influence of the
IFIs, and the differing posture of the relevant in-
ternational organizations (IMF and World Bank
Reflections on the Nature versus EU) on the appropriateness of neolib-
of Globalization eral solutions in the area of social policy. More-
over, the reality of political power and interests
In the visions of neoliberal academics and popu- continues to support globalization: Though the
lar journalism, the root cause of globalization is economic costs of currency speculations have
the inexorable operation of impersonal market been repeatedly demonstrated, the political will
forces assisted by advances in communications to reintroduce modest controls, such as the To-
and transportation technology. By contrast, our bin tax, is lacking, particularly in the United
account has emphasized how political the pro- States, one of the chief beneficiaries of the free
cess has been, with the decisions of govern- flow of capital.
ments, international organizations, and power-
ful economic interests figuring centrally in the
onward march of globalization. Although it is Agenda for Further Research
disputed whether the hands of the early capi-
tal market liberalizers were forced, as we men- In order to identify the relative impact of the
tioned above, it is indisputable that these gov- severity of the economic crisis, the leverage
ernments, all large actors in the international of the IFIs and private capital, the weakness of
economy, made these decisions to secure their democratic institutions, and the distribution of
own economic advantage. By sociological acci- political power on the types of reforms imple-
dent not yet fully understood, the size of the do- mented, we need more systematic comparative
mestic market is inversely related to union den- studies of countries at different levels of develop-
sity and by extension to the strength of the Left ment, in different positions in the world econ-
(Stephens, 1979, 1991; Wallerstein, 1989, 1991; omy, and with different historical experiences of
Western, 1997). Thus, countries where the Left democracy. For instance, one could hold the de-
was strong and had employed capital controls gree of consolidation of democratic institutions
as a tool to pursue its economic ends were not constant and vary the level of economic devel-
in a position to resist decontrol once the large opment and position in the world system (e.g.,
countries had liberalized their internal and ex- Australia and New Zealand versus Costa Rica
ternal capital markets. As a consequence, even and Jamaica as democratic systems with consid-
Nordic social democracy favored entry into the erable longevity, or Spain and Portugal versus
EU under the conditions of the Single European Chile and Uruguay as cases with relatively re-
Act by the end of the 1980s. However, with the cent democratization), or hold the level of eco-
exception of New Zealand and Britain, pro- nomic development constant and vary the de-
welfare state forces were able to resist radical re- gree of consolidation of democratic institutions
(e.g., Spain versus Australia and New Zealand)
10 in order to identify the effects of these variables
In Chile the reforms had been implemented under
the military dictatorship; the civilian governments of the on economic and social policy formation.
1990s left the new structures unchanged but significantly In order to gauge the room for policy choice
increased social expenditures. that remains open to governments within the
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constraints of the new international economic levels at the bottom, as measured by liter-
order, we need more systematic comparisons of acy tests (OECD/HRDC, 2001), are associated
countries with similar structural conditions and with higher degrees of inequality among ad-
political legacies but different reform trajectories vanced industrial societies (Huber and Stephens,
and outcomes in terms of growth, poverty, and 2001:95). We also know that inequality has in-
inequality. For advanced industrial democracies, creased over the past two decades in many Latin
there is a significant body of research on these American and Caribbean countries. What we
questions (e.g., Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; do not know is whether the reforms in so-
Huber and Stephens, 2001; Swank, 2002), but cial policy that have emphasized targeting the
not for developing countries. Within the Latin poorest groups have been able to counter the
American context, Uruguay and Costa Rica effects of this growing inequality on the qual-
should be given special attention in compara- ity of human capital. Given that investment in
tive analyses, as they have done better than other human capital is now recognized as crucial for
countries in protecting comparatively low levels economic development, it is clearly essential
of poverty and inequality. to understand whether the economic and so-
Finally, we need a better understanding of cial components of policy reform packages are
the consequences of neoliberal reforms for hu- mutually supportive or are working at cross-
man capital formation. We know that low skill purposes.
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chapter thirty-one
The Politics of Immigration and National Integration1
Thomas Janoski and Fengjuan Wang
In the United States the baby boom gen- poor; many if not most accounts are descrip-
eration will officially enter into retirement in tive” (2000:10). And in a recent review of theo-
2010 as massive numbers of retirees will leave ries of immigration policy, Eytan Meyers says
the labor force for the next twenty years un- that immigration policy “lacks . . . attempts to
til 2040. Europe and Japan’s baby boomers will debate the relative merits of various schools of
retire about ten years later. As a consequence, thought” (2000:1246). Unlike the theory-rich
massive labor needs will make immigration an welfare state literature, political sociology has
issue of intense political scrutiny and debate in largely ignored the politics of immigration. But
the first half of the twenty first century. Even be- in the late 1990s, a number of more explicit
fore these demographic shifts, immigration has political sociological explanations of immigra-
proven to be an explosive issue, with antiimmi- tion emerged (Brubaker, 1992; Soysal, 1994;
grant parties and attacks on foreigners in Europe Favell, 1988; Freeman, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1996;
and the withdrawal of welfare benefits and new Gimpel and Edwards, 1999; Carter et al., 1987;
forms of human smuggling in the United States. Hansen, 2000; Hollifield, 1992, 2000; Schmitter
Whether shielded or exacerbated by the busi- Heisler 2000; Tichenor, 2002; Geddes 2003).
ness cycle, the politics of immigration will be a This chapter reviews many of these theories and
cauldron of emotions and wills for the next half argues that political parties and their support-
century. ers will become more intensely involved in im-
But sociological theories explaining the poli- migration politics, and that more theoretically
tics of immigration and naturalization are not integrated theories of immigration based on
well-developed. Kingsley Davis calls explana- sending and receiving countries will be needed
tions of international migration “opaque to the- with increasing globalization.
oretical reasoning in general” (1988:245) and Because receiving and sending countries are
Barbara Heisler states that “we still lack a for- often vastly different in development – most re-
mal theory of immigration and immigrant in- ceiving countries are rich and democratic; most
corporation” (1992:638). Randall Hansen says sending countries are neither – theoretical ap-
that the “study of Commonwealth immigra- proaches to the politics of immigration must
tion and UK migration policy has been theory begin to recognize these differences. Conse-
quently, this chapter examines both the immi-
1
We appreciate the critical readings made by Robert gration politics in receiving democracies and
Alford, Alexander Hicks, and Mildred Schwartz in the emigration policies in sending countries, and
development of this chapter. Research assistance was
provided by Karen Diggs, Darina Lepadatu, and Chrys- then moves to naturalization and integration
tal Grey. Support was received from NSF Grant SES politics. In a final section, we consider a frame-
01-11450. work of transnational theory that can include
630
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The Politics of Immigration and National Integration 631
both sending and receiving countries in a more been equally bipartisan.” The beginnings of the
unified theory. French approach were forged in the French
Revolution, but subsequent amendments and
politics of receiving countries changes were relatively subdued (1992:35–
toward immigration 49, 50–72). W. Rogers Brubaker’s descrip-
tion of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
Four explanations delineate immigration to German immigration and naturalization poli-
receiving countries: (1) power resources or tics is mostly uneventful. Hansen found British
power constellation theories, (2) state-centric policy before 1962 to be based on “bipartisan
and institutional theories, (3) cost–benefit or ideological commitment” (2000:17). However,
economic theories, and (4) cultural and racial/ after the loss of empire, slow economic growth,
racialization theories. A section will follow these and two oil crises, the politics of immigration in
theories to discuss how public opinion fits into Britain heated up as Margaret Thatcher helped
the equation. pass one of the most restrictive immigration
laws in the developed world. Contentious pol-
Power Resources and itics followed in the United States, France, and
Constellation Theories Germany in the next two decades.
Consequently, more recent work emphasizes
Power resources theory explains immigration conflict. Daniel Tichenor (2002:35–40) indi-
politics on the basis of political party power, cates that even earlier American politics were
ethnic organization, and the balance of business more contentious than previously thought. To
and trade union power. More recently, it has some extent, a lack of direct party conflict
added how parties or coalitions shape and re- until the 1970s concealed conflicting coalitions
act to public opinion. Power constellation the- that cut across party lines. First, “immigration
ory builds on power resources theory but goes expansionists” collected largely Democratic
beyond class to emphasize status groups (race, “cosmopolitans” who wanted an expansion of
ethnic, and gender) and state structures (Huber citizenship rights (e.g., Jane Addams, Edward
and Stephens, 2001).2 The addition of these sta- Kennedy, Immigration Protective League,
tus factors is certainly useful in a cross-national American Jewish Committee, Mexican-
topic like immigration. American Legal Defense Fund or MALDEF,
Many views of Britain, France, Germany, and National Immigration Forum) and largely Rep-
the United States considered immigration pol- ublican “free-market expansionists” who were
itics to be low in salience and political con- more interested in easing labor shortages and
flict, but in the last thirty years this view has less interested in citizenship (e.g., William
given way to a recognition of contention and Howard Taft, Ronald Reagan, American Farm
party polarization. Marion Bennett (1964:170) Bureau, National Association of Manufacturers,
says that “If it must be said that the criticisms CATO Institute). These two groups opposed
of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 were bi- each other on most issues, but they both
partisan in nature, it must also be said that supported increased immigration. Second,
the defense of the law from its conception has immigration restrictionists included egalitarians
who wanted to expand citizenship rights but
2
For reviews of power resources theory and immigra- wanted to do it for labor and African Amer-
tion, see Fitzgerald (1996:56–64) and Ireland (1994:5– icans first (e.g., Frederick Douglass, Samuel
7). For power resources or class theory, see Castles and Gompers, Barbara Jordan, and the AFL) and
Kosack (1974, 1973/1985); Castles, Booth, and Wallace exclusionists who wanted to protect American–
(1984); Castles, Cope, Kalantzis, and Morrissey (1992); European culture and deemphasize new citizen-
Phizacklea (1980); and Miles (1982). On power constel-
lation theory, see Huber and Stephens (2001), Janoski ship rights (e.g., Henry Cabot Lodge, Patrick
(1998, 1990), and van den Berg and Janoski (Chapter 3 Buchanan, Peter Brimelow, the Immigration
in this volume). Restriction League, Federation of American
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632 Thomas Janoski and Fengjuan Wang
Immigration Reform). These two internally di- party in Germany are examples of large-scale
verse coalitions opposed each other with cons- anti-immigrant parties that have become pop-
iderable conflict despite the oblique positions ular in the last few decades.4 In comparison,
within each political party. anti-immigrant political movements have been
In Europe, party positions also split on immi- slower to develop in America.
gration. On the Right, the foreign office fac- Two factors increase interest among political
tion has been strongly in favor of immigration parties and cause political polarization. First, re-
from the Commonwealth to the United King- cessions and depressions create unemployment
dom when the empire was an issue (Hansen, and support for immigration wanes. Citizens
2000:26). The Right’s connections to employ- complain and ask for less immigration. When
ers have been important, especially during la- the economy booms, the issue becomes defused
bor shortages. But traditional or Tory-oriented and immigration decisions are made in the rel-
factions sometimes see immigrants from diverse atively quiet halls of power. But when the busi-
backgrounds as a threat to native cultural and re- ness cycle, which has been around for a long
ligious traditions (e.g., the inflammatory Enoch time, is coupled with asylum, there is a strong
Powell of the 1960s).3 On the Left, social demo- effect.
cratic and labor parties have often favored keep- Second, as immigration has increasingly in-
ing the labor supply low to reduce competition volved asylum and refugee issues since the 1980s,
among workers. But on the other hand, poor welfare state supports and services have in-
immigrants have often entered into the class and creased greatly. This has brought traditional Left
ethnic cleavages that have pushed workers to and Right divisions out of oblique coalitions,
the Left. The development of Green parties and party clashes on immigration policy have
in the 1990s brought support for immigrants due become commonplace and increasingly bitter.
to their humanitarian orientations (Kitschelt, For instance, Gimpel and Edwards (1999) show
1994: 164–5). Consequently, parties appear to that political party membership in the Congress
be quiescent, but cross-party coalitions pressed was weakly correlated with votes on immi-
their claims. gration bills before the 1980s, but thereafter
James Gimpel and James Edwards’s exten- political party membership was not only signifi-
sive empirical study (1999:152) concludes that cant but also the strongest factor when regressed
by 1982 U.S. immigration policy had become against legislative votes (1999:appendices 4–6).
highly divisive, moving political party positions The debates over new immigration laws in
from cross-cutting alliances to strong and in- France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
tense party polarization. Conservative parties have brought bitter resentments and threats for
have unified around an unfriendly position to- further partisan battles (TWIG, 2002; Hansen,
ward immigrants in order to stop or cap wel- 2002; Janoski, forthcoming; Feldblum, 1999).
fare state benefits for immigrants. In Europe, Party polarization on immigration has made it
far-left parties have often been in favor of in- a much more contentious issue as immigrants,
ternational free movement, though in practice refugees, and asylum seekers have penetrated the
where communist parties have had power as in welfare state. It also brings power constellation
France, this may dissolve in strategic maneuver- theory to the fore.
ing (Schain, 1990:262). Far-right parties often The two strongest interest groups in favor of
endorse a nationalist line. The National Front in immigration come from opposite ends of the
France, Vlams Blok in Belgium, and Republikaner class spectrum. Business federations and interest
3 4
The Republican Party in the United States has been France and Germany have also banned racist po-
a site of anti-immigrant politicians from the nationalist litical parties like Ordre Noveau in 1973 and the
Pat Buchanan to the more moderate governor of Califor- Schmierwellen in 1960, but Fennema concludes that ef-
nia, Pete Wilson. However, recently President George forts to fight intolerance by banning parties and speech
W. Bush has actively courted the Hispanic vote with undermine a multicultural and democratic consensus
some small success. (2001:140).
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groups favor immigration because an increase in such as the Federation of Associations of Sol-
the labor supply lowers wages, promotes flex- idarity with Immigrant Workers (FASSTI) in
ibility, and may provide employees with spe- France and city organizations in Germany (e.g.,
cific skills. For instance, since 1996 the Business Turkish Union of Berlin) (Soysal, 1994:84–118).
for Legal Immigration Coalition in the United The politics of business interests are fairly
States has worked hard for skilled worker im- straightforward, but those of ethnic groups can
migration, especially in the computer industry be quite tricky for politicians. Beyond direct
(Gimpel and Edwards, 1999:46–7). High-tech lobbying, offending an ethnic group can have
firm managers often testify before congressional serious consequences for a politician who has
committees on these issues. From the opposite a significant number of their citizens in his
direction, ethnic and some religious groups rep- or her home district or state. Representatives
resenting immigrants have favored increased im- from nonimmigrant areas are relatively immune
migration. In the United States the National to this source of pressure (e.g., Senator Alan
Council of La Raza, MALDEF, the League of Simpson from Wyoming). On the other hand,
United Latin American Citizens, and the Or- vociferous protest against immigrants may also
ganization of Chinese Citizens have lobbied for come from areas with many immigrants (e.g.,
increasing immigration (Gimpel and Edwards, Governor Pete Wilson of California). The re-
1999; Virgil, 1990). Church and humanitarian sulting offense done to second- and third-
groups have asked for more refugees and asylum generation immigrants may be long-lasting. As
seekers, but they have been less influential than a result, the decision to support or oppose im-
the business lobby and immigrant associations. migration and to what level of intensity may be
Also, the American Immigration Lawyers Asso- hazardous and fraught with future implications.
ciation has a small amount of political power, On the opposing side, labor unions tend to-
but mainly through its high expertise and cred- ward restrictions on immigration due to labor
ibility.5 competition, but also eventually see immigrants
Some European countries have encour- as future recruits for their movement. Labor
aged immigrant groups, while others have ig- unions prefer a labor shortage to a glut of
nored them. In Soysal’s regime approach, the lower-wage workers (Mink, 1986; Briggs, 1992,
corporatist countries have subsidized and then 2001) because it protects their standard of living
integrated ethnic interest groups into larger and job security.6 In the United States, Samuel
immigrant advisory councils (1994:79–83). As Gompers as the longtime head of the AFL
a result, the National Association of Finnish (1886–1924) and Dennis Kearney of the San
Associations and National Yugoslav Federa- Francisco-based Workingmen’s Party (1878–82)
tion, in Sweden, and the National Cooperation were labor leaders who strongly opposed im-
of Foreign Workers Organizations (LSOBA) migration. While immigration was very low
and Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation in the during the Depression, the CIO embraced im-
Netherlands have been strong and effective play- migrants when it started its industrywide rather
ers in molding integration policies. Switzerland, than narrow skill recruitment drives. However,
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany
6
have not subsidized immigrant groups; however, Ethnic competition creates real or imagined eco-
unassisted groups have formed and are active nomic threats along with cultural fears. In Olzak’s (1992)
model of ethnic competition, she finds that strikes and
union resource mobilization lead rather indirectly to eth-
5
By 1900, important groups included: the AFL, nic violence. What is tragic in the American case is that
Workingmen’s Association, and Immigration Restric- immigration may have threatened wages and job secu-
tion League. By 1947, these groups included: Citizens rity for native workers, but labor violence was often
Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion, American redirected against African Americans. Also, the native
Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born, Com- workers who were threatened by immigration moved
mon Council for American Unity, and Chinese Con- West during the 1800s and supplied the pressure for tak-
solidated Benevolent Association (Olzak, 1989; Riggs, ing lands from the indigenous tribes through a series of
1950). broken treaties and the Trail of Tears.
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Briggs (2001) maintains that successful union- reflexive pressure factor – the more immigrants
ization drives only occurred in the United States who enter the country and the longer they
when immigration was cut back from 1921 to stay, the more immigrants will naturalize to full-
1965. There has also been local African Ameri- citizen status. This leads to a lobbying group for
can sentiment in opposition to immigration, but these new citizens and their families, and these
black opposition tends to fade in the Congress people often need services and they are chan-
(Lim, 2001; Borjas, 1995; Gimpel and Edwards, neled toward labor and Left parties. Although
1999). push–pull theories are not political sociological
In a major shift of position, the AFL-CIO has theories, they fit into power constellation the-
recently courted legal and illegal immigrants, ory and national interests quite well.
especially Hispanics, who they see as potential States may develop specific policies for highly
union recruits. Thus, labor unions, like Left par- skilled workers. The Prussian government in-
ties, were torn between protecting wages by op- vited the Mennonites and other dissenting
posing immigration and recruiting immigrants groups because of their reputation for farming
into their base, but they are now favoring al- to clear swamps and rocky lands. The Russian
liances with immigrant workers. Haus (2002) government under Catherine the Great did the
and Watts (2002) show how labor unions in same when the Mennonites encountered reli-
France, Italy, Spain and the United States have gious difficulties with the Prussians (Stumpp,
moved decisively in this new direction. 1973). In the 1990s, Canada (and other coun-
Groups that oppose immigration for more tries) actively recruited wealthy Hong Kong
general reasons are much less influential. The capitalists to become citizens of Canada after
Federation for American Immigration Reform the communist government’s recent assump-
(FAIR) and Zero Population Growth (ZPG) tion of power in Hong Kong that made private
claim public-interest backing. In the United capital vulnerable. The United States has pur-
States, think tanks are relatively balanced with sued similar policies with such singularly high-
the CATO Institute for and the Center for Im- skilled workers as Albert Einstein and Werner
migration Studies against unlimited immigra- von Braun, and has offered special immigra-
tion (Gimpel and Edwards, 1999:45–55). tion status to computer programmers and media
States in general must be committed to eco- moguls. Australia and New Zealand have had
nomic growth to provide tax revenue for ser- such policies for a very long time, but in the
vices and to accumulate capital and achieve the 1980s they began to realize that cultural diver-
industrial capacity to wage war. This requires sity might produce economic growth (Freeman,
both business and labor support. States often 1994).
respond to the needs of firms with low-wage States also develop policies for low-wage
and/or highly skilled workers with open immi- workers. Migratory and guest worker programs
gration policies. In economic “pull” theories, have been instituted in Germany (Castles and
labor shortages in the wealthier country pro- Kosack, 1973, 1985) and a number of other
duce a need for workers (Ritchey, 1976:364– countries, including the United States with its
75; Petersen, 1978:554–6; Stahl, 1989; Molho, Bracero Program (Calivita, 1992; Craig, 1971).
1986; Massey, 1988). In economic “push” the- Sometimes governments set up recruitment of-
ories, the poverty of the sending country pro- fices in the sending countries. If they do not,
duces a strong incentive to emigrate to a wealth- there may be internal pressure to regulate the
ier country with high wages, public assistance, abuses of private or informal recruitment mech-
and perhaps more equality (Ritchey, 1976:375– anisms. And low-wage workers have often been
8).7 Applying push and pull to politics adds a vulnerable to global human smuggling networks
(Kyle and Kozlowski, 2001). Thus, whether as
7
Recent immigration can even be seen as a solution parties or coalitions that cross party lines, power
to the North–South problem of inequalities of resources constellation theory explains the pressure and
(Hein, 1993). resistance of immigration policies.
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State-Centric and Institutional Theories immigration and naturalization: the “imperial

approach” that is liberal as the United Kingdom
State-centric theories concern both the struc- and France described above, the “folk approach”
ture of bureaucracies to the prominence of that tries to protect the native citizens from for-
the empire and nation building where the eign incursions, the “republican approach” that
state plays an important strategic role (Ireland, is based on individual rights and obligations, and
1994; Fitzgerald, 1996; Hansen, 2000). Nation- the “multicultural models” that recognize the
building or empire-maintaining factors are an cultural rights of immigrants. This is a useful
important aspect of state autonomy and typology, but they do not provide an underly-
interests. Freeman (1979) looks at the politi- ing causal mechanism.8 The theory discussed
cal economy of immigration and racism, but by Freeman fits the imperial control model
this political economy argument combines with (the United Kingdom) and the folk model
a long-term state-centric position on immi- (Germany). But France seems to fit both the
gration. Freeman indicates that three aspects imperial and the republican model, and in some
of colonialism vary in importance. First, how ways it is difficult to differentiate between these
much does the colonizer portray its culture as two models except for the French preference for
universalistic (available to natives) or particu- direct political incorporation of the colonies
laristic (available only to colonizers)? Second, into the nation as opposed to the Common-
was the colony part of the colonizing country? wealth approach of the British.
This ranges from full incorporation (direct rule What Freeman does not discuss is Castles and
by the French state, for example), confedera- Miller’s “multicultural model” (1998:43–4) or
tion (indirect rule via British Commonwealth), what Janoski and Glennie (1995a) refer to as the
to direct but distant rule (the Germans and “settler country” approach. Settler states have
Belgians) (Albertini, 1971). Third, what bu- both a national security problem with indige-
reaucratic mechanisms were put into place to nous people and foreign colonial powers (i.e.,
manage economic and service production? This they need soldiers), and a labor market shortage
may range from creating new bureaucracies (the caused by the subsequent subjugation and near-
British railroads, for example) to using tribal or- genocide of indigenous peoples (i.e., they need
ganization to control agricultural production. workers and mothers). In the short term, the
The closer the colonies are geographically state actively promotes immigration for politi-
and culturally to the colonizer, the greater the cal economy purposes to solve these problems,
state’s promotion of immigration. The British but in the longrun these interests become state-
enshrined open immigration from their colonies centric features of each country or model. How-
in the British Nationality Act of 1948 and did ever, the settler countries break down into sev-
not even begin to restrict the entry of colo- eral subtypes. The United States has often been
nial subjects until 1962 (Freeman, 1979; Hansen, portrayed as a country of assimilation and its
2000). Freeman explains much of post-World language policy is a notable feature that distin-
War II immigration policy “as an attempt to guishes it from Canada’s multicultural or mosaic
remove rights of citizenship too generously ex- policy that promotes immigrant language rights
tended during the colonial period” (1979:38). and some self-governance (e.g., Quebec and
In French nationality law, Senegalese and Alge- Nunavit). Australia, New Zealand, and South
rians were treated as French citizens with privi- Africa have been unique in their long-term re-
leges to migrate to France. Other Africans were strictions on non-European immigrants, which
not treated as generously, but some had op- at the same time has reduced their immigration
portunities to become French citizens (Suret-
8
Canale, 1971:83–6; Johnson, 1971; Headrick, Their multicultural model is more under discussion
than concrete policies adopted by any particular country.
1978). Australia, Canada, and Sweden certainly do not accept
Castles and Miller (1998:39–45) have pre- all cultural difference and the formation of ethnic com-
sented four ideal types of citizenship that shape munities.
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levels and population growth. Recently, these the protection of immigrant rights (2000:237–
white-only policies have changed considerably 42). Patrick Ireland’s institutional channeling
and they are coming closer to the assimilating theory (1994:10) argues that political oppor-
or multicultural models ( Janoski and Glennie, tunity structures are constructed from immi-
1995a; Freeman, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; Joppke, gration laws with social and political rights,
1999). naturalization procedures, social policies (e.g.
States through their foreign policy and sub- education, housing, labor market and social as-
ject to some humanitarian and religious pres- sistance policies), and trade union, religious, and
sures will sometimes accept refugees, asylum political participation. Keith Fitzgerald’s (1996)
seekers, and other immigrations who are flee- sectoral theory of the state, which shows how
ing persecution by the sending state. After the policies differ by the ministries and adminis-
St. Bartholemew’s Day and other massacres trations that implement them, explains the dif-
(1572–1629), the Huguenots fled from France ferent outcomes of laws on legal immigration,
to Britain, Germany, and many other coun- refugees, and illegal immigration that result from
tries in Europe. Mennonites from the Nether- the different state structures (e.g., foreign office,
lands and Switzerland fled to Prussia and then border police, labor ministry, integration com-
Russia, only to flee again to the New World mittees, etc.) at work in each policy domain or
(1700s). The Puritans fled from England to the sector. He puts forward an especially complex
United States (1600–1700s); the European Jews version of state-centric theory that he calls “im-
and gypsies from Germany (1870–1940s) and provisational institutionalism.” For instance, the
Russia (1860s–present) to the United States, American state is neither strong nor weak, but
Israel, and other countries; the Bosnians to each particular policy sector of the state differs
Germany and much of Europe (1980s–90s); and tremendously in terms of how much it affects
the list goes on and on. States also create emi- and in what way it molds each policy (1996:60,
grants through their own policies in failed wars 81–9). The recent transfer of the Immigration
(e.g., Moluccans went to the Netherlands and and Naturalization Service to the Homeland Se-
the Hmong, Vietnamese, and Montangards en- curity Department in the United States demon-
tered the United States). strates how this theory works. Finally, the state’s
Immigrants often flee political persecution judicial system has largely steered clear of im-
only to find new religious and economic dis- migration in many countries, but increasingly
crimination. The West had strong ideological these “plenary powers” are being taken back by
and propaganda reasons for accepting Russian the courts in the United States and other Anglo–
and Warsaw bloc refugees, and the United Saxon countries (Spiro, 2002).
States has been particularly open to Cubans Although state-centric theories are useful in
because of Castro’s communist regime. But the explaining aspects of immigration politics, they
United States is not particularly welcoming to beg the question on causality because many
Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Haitian refugees. state organizations are created out of power re-
Immigrants fleeing noncommunist but equally sources and elite participation in the first place.
authoritarian regimes, whom the American gov- More often than not, current state structures
ernment labels “economic” refugees, have not were created in earlier bouts of power resources.
been accepted despite evidence of death squads. Power constellation theory incorporates their
A variety of approaches examine the struc- additional power without resort to a near tau-
tures of states using the core hypotheses of in- tology that the state causes state structure.
stitutional theory. Ruth Rubio-Marin (2000)
focuses on U.S. and German law and consti-
tutions, showing that each country has different Cost–Benefit and Economic Theories
constitutional protections for refugees or immi-
grants. Hansen indicates that the UK’s strong ex- Gary Freeman (1995, 1998) and Jeannette
ecutive and lack of a formal constitution hinders Money (1999) have applied James Q. Wilson’s
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Table 31.1. The Cost/Benefit Distribution Theory of Politics
Benefits
Costs Concentrated Diffuse
Concentrated Interest Group Politics: Groups A and B are Entrepreneurial Politics: Group A
both equally for or against the policy and benefits, though being in the minority,
they fight it out in high-profile battles and imposes all the costs on Group B.
determined by who has the most resources. Group A is led by a strong entrepreneur.
Examples: Illegal Immigration Reform & Examples: Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Immigration Reform Act of 1990
Diffuse Clientelist Politics: Group A benefits a Majoritarian Politics: Groups are in
great deal from the policy and does not agreement with most of society, and
encounter much opposition because the everyone expects to gain and pay. As a
policy costs do not generate opposition result, interest Groups A and B have little
because they are so diffuse. No Group B of incentive to form around such issues
any importance tends to form. A small because no particular segment of society
interest group takes advantage of specific will pay for such a diffuse benefit.
benefits. Nonpartisan politics prevail.
Examples: Immigration & Nationality Act Examples: Immigration Act of 1924,
Amendments of 1965, Immigration & Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952
Nationality Act Amendments of 1976,
Refugee Act of 1980
interest-based theory of costs and benefits to gration groups are agricultural growers in Texas
immigration as the third major type of theory. and California, the software industry in Oregon
Wilson (1980) posited that the costs and benefits and Washington, and the construction industry
of a policy fall into four combinations: “majori- in Germany. As a result, nonsalient policies are
tarian politics” where overall consensus causes passed to benefit specific groups and political
the policy to be passed because it affects every- competition between parties is largely avoided.
one and everyone benefits, “clientelist politics” But this model also helps explain historical
where a strongly organized but narrow group of changes in many countries. First, in the late
interests enacts their policy because no one re- 1800s, “majoritarian” politics largely prevailed.
ally opposes its diffuse costs, “interest group pol- Political parties passed immigration laws that al-
itics” where both sides are fully mobilized and lowed massive amounts of immigration. Despite
partisan, and “entrepreneurial politics” where the Know-Nothing Party and some initial la-
policies are least likely to pass because the op- bor opposition, these laws were not controver-
position is strong (i.e., the powerful bear the sial because large majorities believed in allowing
costs) and most people remain uninterested (i.e., a great deal of immigration to settle the land.
the masses receive diffuse benefits). (Please see The same political process produced the oppo-
table 31.1). site result when the Depression led to immigra-
Freeman’s purpose is to explain why coun- tion quotas to prevent further unemployment.
tries seem to pursue immigration policies con- The issue was not very controversial because the
trary to the majority’s interests to avoid labor public wanted it.
market competition. His clientelist model pos- Entrepreneurial politics operated in the 1880s
tulates that the legislative process is captured by when the costs of immigration were concen-
proimmigration interest groups, but the costs are trated on the working class in California, while
diffused to the whole population to whom im- the benefits were diffused throughout the coun-
migration is not salient. Examples of proimmi- try. Many workers felt that they were facing
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declining wages and poor working conditions concentrated and diffuse benefits. Second, ra-
due to Chinese immigration fueled by the tional choice logic requires tightly constrained
1868 Burlingame Treaty and the Southern Pa- situations. In the passage of many laws, the sit-
cific’s pro-Chinese hiring policy. Social move- uation is simply not tight enough. This defect
ment leaders like Dennis Kearney and Frank makes it difficult for the theory to explain cross-
Roney developed a form of “entrepreneurial” national results. For instance, why do employers
politics. Kearney’s Workingmen’s Party was in clientelist politics prevail in the United States
quickly fused with general anticapitalist feel- but not in Germany? The reason may be that
ings throughout the Democratic Party as the Germany has more powerful labor groups that
Philadelphia unions, who had not seen Chinese are not thrilled about increasing the numbers of
immigrants, mustered a demonstration of 3,000 low-wage workers. Cost–benefit analysis does
workers against Republican President Arthur’s not help explain this international difference.
veto of the first Chinese Exclusion Bill. Arthur Joppke (1999:18–22) also questions Freeman’s
soon signed an amended bill in May 1882. Thus, cost–benefit theory: (1) the legal process with
to avoid concentrated costs, diffuse benefits re- judges and courts is largely ignored in mak-
quire an entrepreneurial leader (Mink, 1986:71– ing decisions that vitally affect immigration law,
112; Hutchinson, 1981:73–84). (2) resistance to immigration in Europe is not
The “interest-group” model with politi- explained by clientelist politics, (3) the theory
cal polarization revived itself in the 1980s– does not distinguish well between nonimmi-
90s (Gimpel and Edwards, 1999). With con- grant European nations and settler countries,
centrated benefits for immigrant groups and and (4) the theory does not handle guest worker
refugees through welfare benefits and family re- and postcolonial immigration well. Point one
unification, and concentrated costs in the border is largely a state-centric criticism whereas the
states from Texas to California, the battle be- others question the theory’s ability to consider
tween political parties heated up. One can con- widely differing institutional contexts, which
clude that immigration policy falls into all four interacts with the point made above about tight
areas – majoritarian, entrepreneurial, clientel, constraints. Nonetheless, this approach may be
and interest group – depending on the context appropriate when the costs and benefits of im-
and historical period.9 migration appear to be diffuse and the issue has
While costs and benefits in a microeconomic low salience. When the battles become more
or rational choice theory provide some interest- pitched, the theory tells us little about events
ing insights, there are two additional problems. better explained by power constellation theory.
First, the actor in the mixed situations in the ty-
pology may be uncertain. The entrepreneur is
assumed to act for the diffusely interested ma- Cultural and Racialization Theories
jority against the concentrated industry insider.
But in clientelist politics, a nationalist leader like Cultural and race theories see racial bias in many
La Pen is also an entrepreneur who tries to im- largely white societies. Culture and race are,
pose costs on employer groups that need im- of course, not the same thing, but race has
migrants. So two entirely different models may frequently been tested as an indicator of cul-
apply to the same law. Low-wage employers in ture. We deal here with two types of theory –
France may get concentrated benefits with dif- racial/ethnic conflict theories and racialization
fuse costs, but entrepreneurial nativists may or- theories (Ireland, 1994:7–8) – and leave cultural
ganize diffuse benefits to impose a concentrated idiom theory for the section on naturalization,
cost on low-wage employers. The same situa- where it has the greatest impact.
tion predicts diffuse and concentrated costs, and First, a number of scholars have viewed race
or ethnicity as central to the passage of immigra-
9
For other critiques of Freeman’s theory, see Perl- tion laws and implementation of immigration
mutter (1996) and Brubaker (1992). policies. After World War II, the United States
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intended to reward its allies and aliens who actu- tion theory works much better with the “white
ally served in the military by making them “ra- Australia Policy” of immigrant exclusion, where
cially eligible for naturalization” (Hutchinson, it may be shown that the process was state- rather
1981:275). In these theories, racism may be than interest group-led (Castles and Davidson,
defined by ethnic, cultural, or religious at- 2000:chap. 3).
tributes that are attacked from both the political
Right and the mainstream (Solomos, 1995:43;
1993). Racism may affect public opinion, in- The Puzzle of Public Opinion
terest groups, and political parties. Thus, race about Immigration
can be one of many variables affecting political
outcomes as racial prejudice and discrimination Since the advent of polling, public opinion
may be deeply embedded in a country’s culture in the United States and other countries has
(Layton-Henry, 1984, 1992, 1996; Layton- been largely opposed or at least lukewarm
Henry and Wilpert, 1994; Mason, 1995; Miller, about immigration. Simon and Lynch conclude
1981; Moore, 1975; Heisler and Schmitter (1999:458) that in “no country – those with
Heisler, 1986, 1991; Huttenback, 1976; Park, long histories of admitting immigrants, those
1922, 1928; Rex, 1979; Rex and Moore, 1967). with more restrictionist policies, and those who
Second, racialization theories go beyond pre- have consistently kept a lock on their doors –
vious more societywide theories of race (Omi does a majority of citizens have positive feel-
and Winant, 1994). Racialization theories place ings about their current cohort of immigrants.”
the state in a central role in creating racist reac- Joel Fetzer find that opposition to immigration
tions to immigrants of different racial and eth- in the United States has ranged from a low of
nic groups. The citizenry as a whole is neutral 43.8 percent in 1953 to a high of 71 percent
toward immigrants, but the government racial- in 1982 (2000:165–6).11 Lahav finds that 54%
izes immigration in order to justify controls on of European Union citizens in fourteen coun-
immigration and the prosecution of crime and tries find that immigrants are a “big problem,”
other factors (Carter, Harris, and Joshi, 1987, and 84% of the members of the European Par-
1993, 1996; Dummett and Dummett, 1982; liament say that problems of immigration are
Dummett and Nicol, 1990; Katznelson, 1973; greater today than in the past (2004:83, 85). And
James and Harris, 1993; Paul, 1996; Solomos, these same citizens feel that immigration is “one
1993, 1995; Solomos and Back, 1995). In this of the most controversial issues on the politi-
view, the state plays a central role in creating cal agenda” and that “they want it controlled”
racism in order to justify its policies to con- (2004:106). Simon and Alexander conclude that
trol crime, reduce unemployment, and alleviate it is “something of a miracle that so many im-
crowding in housing. A number of sociolo- migrants gained entry to the US between 1880
gists have explained the politics of immigra- and 1990” (1993:244) because immigration has
tion by racialization, but Hansen (2000; see also been unpopular.
Dean, 1992) has argued strongly against it be- The public’s opposition to immigration does
cause the theory must show that state elites not work well with power constellation or cul-
cause immigration policy in a form of top- tural theories, though it falls into Freeman and
down racism, and he shows that this was not Money’s theory of nonsalience and interest-
the case in the United Kingdom.10 Racializa- group domination of immigration politics. We
would like to pursue the various class, cultural,
10
A more cultural approach comes from Shanks
(2001), who focuses on the structure of public inter-
11
est, policy, and causal arguments in U.S. immigration In Germany it has ranged from 50.3% in 1991 to
history. Although this is embedded in a larger question very recent lows of 26.0% in 1993 (Fetzer, 2000:171–2).
of international political economy and state sovereignty, This contrary result helped cause the major reversal
her approach is very much connected to cultural narra- in German laws that occurred in the last ten years in
tives. Germany.
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and political explanations of the public’s oppo- Citrin et al. (1997) found that Republicans
sition to immigration. In a national study of the wanted increased immigration but delays in pro-
United States, Citrin et al. (1997) found that viding benefits, and Democrats were more in
better-educated persons (i.e., often cosmopoli- favor of benefits but only slightly in favor of in-
tan liberals) are more likely to favor immigra- creased immigration. In three election-year sur-
tion and benefits for immigrants than less well- veys from 1992–6, Gimpel and Edwards found
educated persons. Otherwise, current economic that 3 to 5 percent more Republicans were in
status does not add much to the explanation. favor of reducing immigration, but 50 to 60 per-
Instead, more generalized opinions about the cent of people in both parties, depending on the
nation’s economy, the impact of immigration year, were opposed to immigration (1999:35–7).
on taxes, and a belief that immigration will im- The jury is still out on explaining attitudes to-
pact national culture have more impact. They ward immigration, especially because these re-
concluded that “enduring values and identifi- sults can be interpreted in three ways. In one
cations” about immigration have more impact view, the differences between parties are small
than “narrow self interest” on opinions (1997: and can be attributed to an “absence of par-
874). This could be interpreted as long-term tisan divisions” (Citrin et al., 1997:34). In an-
class and status (i.e., nation or ethnic) interests. other view, public opinion clearly wants to re-
Fetzer interprets his findings of substantial strict immigration when times are tough, (1919–
opposition to immigration to support a cul- 65), but overlooks immigration during better
tural theory of marginality (i.e., immigrants tend times when expansive legislation is passed and
to be of dissimilar religious and cultural back- elites have their way. As with national health in-
grounds) as well as often of low status (2000:20, surance plans, the American public often does
95–102, 112–16, 125–31).12 Most new immi- not get what it wants. Yet a third view sees the
grant groups were initially charged with be- Left, especially recently, pursuing immigration
ing impossible to assimilate, but some have suf- and naturalization expansion, while the Right
fered more than others from that stigma (i.e., pursues restrictions. In terms of theories, these
Catholics and Jews in the United States in results bolster Freeman’s theory, which says that
the 1800s, Asians and Africans in the 1900s, special-interest groups have largely co-opted
and Muslims in most European and Ameri- public opinion, mainly due to low salience, but
can countries today). Using zero-order corre- they also support power constellation theory
lations, Fetzer’s study found that cultural threats with recent party competition and battles over
(e.g., Protestant religion) were more impor- immigration laws.
tant than economic threats (e.g., low education)
in France and Germany, but economic threats
are nearly twice as important in the United politics of sending countries
States (2000:101–7). However, in regression toward immigration
equations, being poor and African American
in the United States, having a financial de- The politics of immigration in sending coun-
cline in France, and being old or unemployed tries is much understudied (but see Schmitter
in Germany all create an economic threat that Heisler, 1985). Most studies focus on how em-
is strongly opposed to immigration. In effect, igrants engineer their travels, with some study
multivariate analysis reversed the original find- of transnational return and communication oc-
ing that in Europe, cultural factors were more curring more recently. But sending countries
important than economic ones. find themselves in four basic geopolitical sit-
12
uations that affect their policies. First, senders
Perhaps the reason that the cultural theory does not that are close to a receiver are most often in a
work as well in the United States has to do with the major
immigrant group being Christian in the United States relationship of dependence due to weaker eco-
(i.e., Hispanics) and the major groups being Muslim in nomic and political positions. They may or may
France and Germany (i.e., Algerians and Turks). not have been a colony. Mexican emigrants are
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attracted to the strong economy in the United United Kingdom. Molluccans form a special
States, and some Mexicans and Central Ameri- group based on colonial military service. Af-
cans may be attracted to more political freedom. ter 1947, they emigrated to the Netherlands in-
In Europe, economic opportunity attracted the tending to receive Dutch assistance in retaking
Irish to the United Kingdom, Poles to Germany, the Mollucan Islands. When this promise went
and Finns to Sweden. Immigrants may also have unfulfilled, resistance movements and kidnap-
cultural, nationalist, or nation-building senti- ings followed. The Philippines exhibit a similar
ments. For the most part, these sending coun- relationship with the United States. Many Fil-
tries and their cultures are well-known to the ipino immigrants have served as stewards in the
receiving countries and there may be consid- U.S. Navy and other branches of the service.
erable cultural diffusion between them. Emi- During nursing shortages, American hospitals
grants can easily return, and remittances facili- ship or fly thousands of Filipino nurses to the
tate continued contact. Because regulations are United States, as the British did with West In-
easy to evade, illegal immigration will always dian nurses in the 1950s. Former colonial situ-
be a problem. Nonetheless, the relationship be- ations are complex, but for the most part, they
tween these countries will be relatively positive; promote further immigration.
there will be less persecution and greater immi- Third, migrants from sending countries at
gration. some distance from receiving countries who
Second, sending countries that were former were not colonized will be unfamiliar with the
colonies fall into a category of their own. Much receiving country’s language and culture. Em-
depends on the relationship between the re- igrants will often find themselves stranded and
ceivers and senders. Residents of the former in difficult positions because the passage to the
British colonies had privileged status in emigrat- receiving country is long and arduous. The eco-
ing to the United Kingdom and the Dominions nomic and political impetus to stay in the receiv-
(i.e., Canada, Australia, New Zealand). They ing country is often stronger due to the distance
were equal citizens throughout the Common- traveled. As return is linked to support, remit-
wealth with extensive rights (Hansen, 2000). tances may also decline due to distance. Because
Since 1962 that privileged status has been re- of the lack of information, recruiter abuses will
duced, but nonetheless, there are many eco- tend to be stronger and scandals may erupt, with
nomic, linguistic, and cultural connections from the receiving countries putting pressure on the
Jamaica to Calcutta. The former colonies of senders to control their emigrants. In the 1800s,
France have a rather complex legal situation German, Swedish, Japanese, and Russian im-
that ultimately favors emigration and the main- migration fit this pattern, and more recently,
tenance of some commonwealthlike arrange- Thailand and Turkey. Some receiving countries
ments. Citizens/subjects of the colonies were have had colonies with little emigration, mainly
technically part of France (Algeria, Tunisia, due to the shortness of the colonizing period.
Morocco, Martinique, and Vietnam). While this For example, it is estimated that fewer than
is no longer the case, many persons from these 100 immigrants from Namibia (German South-
areas could still choose to be citizens of France west Africa) and the Cameroon ever set foot
after independence. in Germany, much less settled there (Stoecker,
Colonial participation in the colonizer’s wars 1985, 1986; Walker, 1964). A similar situation
has an impact on immigration. The French prevails in Belgium with Zaire and in Japan with
integrated many colonial soldiers into their Korea and China.
armed forces as early as 1868, when Sene- A fourth category is really a subset of the third
galese regiments fought against the Germans as it only refers to China and Russia. These are
in the Franco–Prussian War (Headrick, 1978; noncolonies at some distance from the receiving
Mellors and McKean, 1984). In the Nether- country that have been or still are empires. The
lands, emigrants from Indonesia and Surinam main country here is China, which is a good
have found a similar situation as that in the candidate to consider separately. Because it is
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so large and potentially powerful, it continues was under intense pressure from receiving coun-
to supply large numbers of immigrants. Russia tries to control emigration, it was unable to do
could also fall into this category, but the case is so and only passed a few licensing laws to con-
a bit weaker. The reason we consider it sepa- trol the recruitment of emigrants. Governments
rately is that the sending country in this case is may also protest human rights violations of their
clearly poor, otherwise it would not be send- former citizens in the receiving country, as Japan
ing emigrants outside its borders in such large did in the 1920s with the United States. From
numbers, but it is also or has greater potential 1946 to 1970, France, Germany, and Belgium
to become a world power. This creates some concluded twenty-two bilateral agreements to
national security issues for receiving countries protect the rights of migratory workers from
and complicates sending country immigration Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria,
interests.13 Tunisia, and other countries (Schmitter-Heisler,
1985:474). Such agreements continue to be
negotiated.
Sending Country Policies
Second, governments may promote emigra-
Toward Emigration
tion by expelling dissidents, criminals, and pau-
pers. From 1572 to 1598, the Catholic French
Direct and unintended governmental policies
persecuted and then expelled the Protestant
toward emigration in sending countries range
Huguenots, forcing their emigration through-
from allowing large waves of immigration to
out Europe and the Americas. In the 1800s,
imposing heavy restrictions. While unintended
the Grosszimmern Affair emptied the Starken-
policies result from revolutions, civil wars,
burg jails in Hesse and the prisoners were sent
famines, and other calamities, these policies usu-
to America (Walker, 1964:85–7). Russia and
ally do increase emigration. But in this chapter,
Germany expelled radicals and Jews westward
we are mainly concerned with sending country
toward Europe and to the New World (Gatrell,
policies that are directly oriented toward emi-
1999). Though not as direct as these policies,
gration.14
the coolie trade that replaced many of the labor
Before World War II, sending countries pur-
needs after the end of slavery required at least
sued three policies toward emigration. First,
some cooperation from the sending countries
governments have tried to alleviate the plight
to function. The Mariel emigration from Cuba
of their nationals taken advantage of during
allegedly fell into this category.
the emigration process. For instance, during
Third, many sending states tried to prevent
the wave of German emigration from 1814
emigration, especially for skilled and highly ed-
to 1869, German governments were continu-
ucated workers (Cervantes and Guellec, 2002;
ally embarrassed by scandals. Many poor em-
Saxenian, 2002; Zolberg, 1978, 1981). In the
igrants found themselves stateless and stranded
1600s, France prohibited emigration without
in the Netherlands waiting to cross the Atlantic
passports and would not issue them to the perse-
(Walker, 1964). Other scandals erupted like the
cuted Huguenots; however, that did not forestall
Delrue Affair, when thousands of German em-
their mass emigration throughout Europe and to
igrants were sold off into indentured servitude
the Americas (Fahrmeir, 2000:101). In the late
in Brazil (Walker, 1964:97). Although Germany
1800s, many German states required that emi-
13
The two-by-two classification of distance and colo-
grants give up German citizenship upon leav-
nial status implies: colony–border, independent–border, ing the country (Walker, 1964:17), which made
colony–nonborder, and noncolony–nonborder coun- emigrants stateless and highly vulnerable during
tries. We have collapsed the first two categories and their travel to the receiving country. But these
divided the last by potential power. policies fluctuated: In good times, politicians
14
On how the international community may deal
with the resulting refugee flows from these problems, railed against the loss of skilled workers; but in
see Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, 2001, and bad times, emigration was a safety valve for the
Loescher, 1993. unemployed and political dissidents. After the
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unification of Germany in 1871, Bismarck ex- often feared for the safety of their families re-
pressed the opinion that “to immigrate was to maining in the country if they defected. Con-
betray the Fatherland, and the Fatherland had no trols over external emigration were strength-
responsibility” to protect emigrants (1964:178). ened by preventing the internal migration of
Somewhat reluctantly, Bismarck engaged in a rural workers to urban areas. In East Germany,
colonial policy that was a partial solution to em- the communist government sought to prevent
igration (i.e., emigrants could go to German emigration despite spectacular and often tragic
colonies in Poland, Africa, or Samoa). But Bis- escape attempts at the Berlin Wall. Nonethe-
marck knew that Prussia could not easily control less, many young adults still emigrated, leaving
emigration by direct legislation (1964:196). the demographic structure of the country seri-
Before World War II, Jewish emigration from ously tilted toward the aged. In Maoist China,
Germany constituted a brain drain, but the emigration was severely constrained because of
ideologically driven Nazi government was not national security and communist ideology as the
particularly concerned. In many ways, Jew- state controlled internal migration through in-
ish emigration functioned as an unemployment ternal passports and job assignments by use of
reduction program because many Germans labor market planning, which made external
moved into higher-paying jobs, took over busi- emigration all the more difficult (Biao, 2003:23–
ness properties, and otherwise prospered as a re- 7). Nonetheless, many emigrants flooded into
sult. Hence many Germans viewed emigration Hong Kong (Tu, 1996).
as positive rather than negative. But as World Two other factors prevented emigration from
War II drew closer, Germany sought to forbid communist countries. First, since unemploy-
emigration to protect the size of the labor force ment did not technically exist, it could not
and military, a policy somewhat different from be used to justify emigration. Second, politi-
the previous century. Similar controls were en- cal dissidents were not expelled but were more
acted in Japan as war approached. effectively silenced by sending them to prison
After World War II, sending nations pursued in Siberian Gulag or rehabilitation in north-
a wider variety of policies to protect, promote, west China. Further, emptying out jails and
or prevent emigration. First, the Turkish gov- receiving remittances from emigrants were to-
ernment passed laws to protect immigrants by tally ruled out for ideological and publicity pur-
requiring labor contracts and other stipulations. poses. To reinforce this, nationality laws prior
While the German government established re- to the 1980 reform made the overseas Chi-
cruitment offices in Turkey to negotiate con- nese throughout Southeast Asia (and the rest of
tracts, the Turkish government also established the world) Chinese citizens by descent (Chen,
offices in Germany to protect Turkish guest 1997). Consequently, the combination of com-
workers. These policies tended to be relatively munism and the Cold War led to more intense
formal in some cases (guest worker programs in control of emigration than in other sending
Europe) and informal in others (general immi- countries.
gration to the United States and Canada). As Another prevention policy was directly con-
institutions of international civil society have nected to the brain drain – repaying the state for
developed, interest groups and the UN have in- one’s education. In the USSR, sometimes dissi-
creasingly tried to protect immigrants, refugees, dent religious groups including Jews could ob-
and asylum seekers (Zolberg et al. 1989). tain permission to leave. But the government of-
Second, preventing emigration was more ten required that they pay back the costs of their
common during the Cold War than before or education, which could be expensive according
after. The USSR and the communist satellite to Soviet accounting practices. In recent-day
nations were among the few countries that tried China, potential emigrants have the choice of
to stop or heavily penalize emigration (Simon, serving the country for five to eight years after
1987). Most citizens were prevented from emi- receiving a university degree or paying 10,000
grating, and many sports and entertainment stars RMB for a bachelor’s degree, 12,000 RMB for
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a masters, and 18,000 RMB for a Ph.D. The (Turkey, 1987; Joppke, 1999). Although not of-
value of this amount of money varies accord- fering dual citizenship, China has increased in-
ing to one’s job, but it roughly translates into centives to return including offering skilled em-
five months’ pay, which may take years to save, igrants higher salaries, special tax rates, business
but it is much less than the 30,000 RMB pay- loans, housing subsidies, educational subsidies
ments often made to “snakeheads” for illegal for children, and even a “first meeting present”
immigration to the United States (China, 1993; (Biao, 2003:30). One province will give 100,000
Kyle and Kozlowski, 2001).15 Since 1996, the RMB as a “first meeting present” to returning
government has increased the cost of tuition by emigrants with advanced technology projects,
500 percent, and those who paid the higher tu- and another province will give a two-year in-
ition do not have to reimburse the government come tax waiver and reduced taxes for their
or work inside the country for five years. Al- companies (Sun, 2002, Tianjin City, 1998).
though most sending countries do not have ex- Because most sending countries are not
plicit laws concerning emigrating professionals democratic, they do not have open media that
and highly skilled workers, they may have other publicize or reveal the reasons that various poli-
general laws. For example, the Turkish constitu- cies have been created. Nonetheless, one may
tion states that “a citizen’s freedom to leave the refer to a “submerged power resources theory”
country may be restricted on account of the na- whereby factions within the government press
tional economic situation, civic obligations, or for one or another policy position. Since send-
criminal investigation or prosecution” (Turkey, ing countries often have surplus population,
1987, see also Saxenian, 2002). they are not so much interested in restricting
Third, some sending countries have recently emigration as a whole, but rather maintaining
adapted dual nationality policy to promote em- technical and profession employees whose loss
igration and possible return to their country, as may critically affect their economy and busi-
well as to increase remittance payments. This nesses. Consequently, business and economic
promotes transnational migration because dual development elites will place restrictions on the
nationals are more likely to return compared to emigration of skilled employees.
emigrants who must give up their original cit- However, since the fall of communism in
izenship. For example, the Mexican national- Europe and Russia and the loss of faith in au-
ity law of 1998 allows dual nationality for the tarky and import substitution policies, many
first time since the 1857 and 1917 constitu- less developed countries have shifted their poli-
tions forbade it (Ramirez, 2000). In addition, cies toward the free movement of nationals.
Turkish guest workers in Germany tended not Globalizing coalitions based on the market with
pursue German citizenship because they would entry into trade groups such as the EU (for
lose access to family lands and inheritances in Turkey), NAFTA (for Mexico), and the WTO
Turkey. In 1995, Turkey removed all restric- (for China) have replaced traditionalists or na-
tions on acquiring or inheriting property for tionalizing leftists.16 The “globalizing coalition”
its former citizens ( Joppke, 1999:205; Münch, must accept market principles and privatization
2001:107; Hammar 1985). And as Turkey has in order to enter these transnational organiza-
increasingly allowed dual nationality, especially tions. The free emigration of workers inside and
concerning its constitution, Germany has be- outside the country, whether highly expert or
come much more lenient in its own practices less skilled, and increased protection of human
rights are part of the bargain to gain large capital
15 16
Jobs vary considerably in pay. English majors can The EU’s rejection of Turkey’s bid for membership
easily start at 2,000 RMB per month working as an interin December of 2002 was a considerable blow to their
preter for a foreign or even domestic company. However, economic aspirations, especially as many other countries
engineering majors work for government construction were admitted and Turkey had instituted many human
companies, and they often start at only 800 RMB. Note rights reforms (Sciolino, 2002). Nonetheless, their EU
that RMB refers to Ren Men Bin. efforts continue.
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investments from advanced industrialized coun- are sometimes quite generous. They are most
tries. Not all the bargains will, of course, be needed among the Hmong, who come from
the same because some countries will continue hill tribe backgrounds, but less so for urbanized
to exert more control than others. Nonetheless, and educated Vietnamese. But how much these
free emigration is likely to become common for immigrants integrate into society often depends
sending countries. on attaining legal status as a citizen through nat-
uralization rather than simply consuming social
benefits.
the politics of nauralization, Although single-nation studies abound
integration, and nationalism (Schuck, 1998; Aleinkoff and Klusmeyer, 2000,
2001; Hansen and Weil, 2002), naturalization
Nativist organizations who oppose integration and integration laws have received little atten-
and naturalization have existed for a long time tion from political sociology when compared
in the United States (e.g., the “No Popery” to immigration policies, especially in cross-
and “Know-nothing” movements of the early national studies (but see Groot 1989, Rham
1800s), and the Ku Klux Klan after the 1870s 1990, and Weil 2001). There have been two
engaged in terror, murder, and other types of basic theories: one culture and the other power
violence. Nativist efforts to restrict immigra- constellations. First, Brubaker’s cultural idiom
tion through legislation are obviously legal, theory (1992, 1989) focused on citizenship and
yet scholars and various ethnic and immigrant nationhood in France and Germany. “Cultural
organizations are quick to label the legislative idioms” are ways of thinking and talking
activists of nativist organizations as “racist” about nationhood. His two cases demonstrated
(Hingham, 1965, Tatalovich, 1995). Freeman that cultural idioms were either quickly
(1985) and Briggs (1992) ask if countries do not forged in the crucible of the French Revo-
have the right to rationally pursue their interests lution or developed gradually over centuries in
and exercise their sovereignty. Fitzgerald (1996) Germany.
points out that immigration policies create new The French Revolution transformed “be-
national identities and have great consequences longing” to French society into active partic-
for culture, whether it involves language, religion, ipation based on rights and obligations within a
or the “national” way. Thus, immigration policy nation-state. Prior bases for membership came
also provides a playing field for national iden- from the cosmopolitan aristocracy in the ancien
tity and culture, and nativist and labor groups regime, and then in a new cosmopolitan world
may play their political hands in legislatures as of citizenship in the early revolution when even
they see fit. Tom Paine and George Washington were made
After World War II, welfare state and social French citizens. Modern citizenship began with
policies have been available to immigrants in closure upon the French nation-state, especially
Europe for a long time. In fact, the availabil- when political dissidents were executed and cit-
ity of social assistance and medical care rights izens were conscripted as part of their duty to
along with legal rights led to the claims that cit- protect the republic. Aristocrats could no longer
izenship through naturalization had lost its rai- be cavalier in their allegiance to the nation-state.
son d’etre (Brubaker, 1992; Soysal, 1994; Joppke, This cultural crucible created the French univer-
1999). Proposition 187 in California and subse- sal approach that allows immigrants to become
quent amendments to immigration laws at the a citizen if they assimilate to French cultural and
national level have led to restrictions on these political norms. Consequently, French natural-
social rights. However, those restrictions have ization rates are relatively high for a densely pop-
been successfully challenged in the American ulated country, and until recently the legal prin-
courts. Nonetheless, special assistance programs ciples of jus soli citizenship derived from birth in
for refugees and asylum seekers have provided the country according to “the law of the soil”
automatic supports and special services, which have equaled those of jus sanguinis citizenship
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based on one’s parents through the law of blood position fails to provide guidance in exploring
or descent (Brubaker, 1992:35–49).17 the unique cultural idioms of other countries.
Germany did not have such a leveling revo- Only the French had the French Revolution;
lution, and the development of citizenship was what explains the more open citizenship policies
connected to the estate or Stand, which is a in the United Kingdom and incredibly closed
highly particularistic rather than a universalis- policies in Japan? Cultural idioms are by nature
tic institution (Brubaker, 1992:50–72). As the idiographic and thus provide little guidance in
Stand evolved into the Ständestaat, multiple le- formulating hypotheses for many other coun-
gal communities developed rather than a sin- tries.
gle state, which continued to carry community- Third, naturalizing divergent neighbors dif-
and group-based notions of belonging to a state. fers from naturalizing distant strangers. Poles
The focus was inward rather than outward, were a long-standing cultural competitor to the
and the most extreme example can be found Germans not only on their border but also
in the German “hometowns” where member- within their territories. The Algerians and Mo-
ship meant livelihood (Walker, 1971). Although roccans were at arm’s length from the French
legal development took place within and be- across the Mediterranean Sea. Fourth, political
tween numerous German states, the eventual economy arguments discounted by Brubaker are
laws developed with the exclusion of the poor much more important than he indicates. The
(often migrating Jews from Russia), and later, of French decline in births was early and severe,
the “Slavic” Poles. The end result was an im- and military conscription was a major prob-
migration system based on jus sanguinis that has lem. Weil makes this point quite conclusively
brought millions of dispersed German ethnics in his history of French nationality (2002). Nei-
(Aussiedler) back from a Central or Eastern Eu- ther was a serious problem in Germany despite
ropean diaspora as full-fledged citizens. But until successive waves of emigration to the Ameri-
recently the system lacked principles of jus soli, cas. Fifth, the labor market for poor people and
and this caused great roadblocks to citizenship the invitation of rich people is as different as
for long-term guest workers and their children. Canada’s solicitation of rich Hong Kong busi-
Brubaker’s cultural idiom argument is the first nessmen and the avoidance of boat people (e.g.,
macrosocial explanation of naturalization and the Vietnamese in Japan and Haitians in the
how the long-term development of citizenship United States). Clearly, the race, class, and re-
laws in the two countries occurred. It has a num- ligious characteristics of immigrants do make a
ber of difficulties, however. First, the search for difference.
the genetic code of citizenship policies relies The second approach to naturalization comes
on unique events to have a continuous effect from the power constellation approach. Janoski
over centuries. One may easily look to other and Glennie (1995a, b), somewhat based on
historical periods for different cultural idioms. the early Freeman, put forward a regime theory
In the search for cultural idioms, one may go based on long-term state interests in integrating
back to the earliest foundings or later refound-
ings of the state. For instance, rather than focus- conquered Gaul at the beginning of the Middle Ages,
ing on the French Revolution, one may go back and then claim that the vanquished Gauls emerged victo-
to Clovis and the earliest nation-building pro- rious over the Franks in the French Revolution (Noiriel,
1996:72). The Teutonic knights or new Prussians in-
cesses in France.18 Second, this nation-forging termingled territories with the Poles and other groups,
and even in the areas that they controlled, native no-
17 bility complained of their isolation from the population
Usage of these two Latin legal terms is common,
but they do not form a typology that covers all natu- and importation of German peasants and townspeople
ralization law. For instance, the terms do not refer to (Carsten, 1954:10–27, 52–72; Graus, 1970; Bosl, 1970;
immigration of nonethnics and their subsequent natu- Bade, 1983, 1990, 1992, 1994; Schumacher, 1958). Are
ralization. the French are a product of fusion, the Germans the re-
18
Some French historians speak of the struggle of the sult of segregation? On nations before nationalism, see
nobility descended from the Frankish aristocracy who Armstrong (1982) and Smith (1988).
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foreigners. Long-term power resources explain to naturalization. For instance, residency peri-
the direction of state policy in three contexts: ods are five to seven years longer than in the
colonial powers, settler countries, and nonset- settler countries, and naturalization may be a
tler countries. In extending Freeman’s politi- privilege rather than a right (e.g., German res-
cal economy approach (1979), former imperial idency requirements have been ten years and
powers have fashioned an approach to immi- the Swiss require twelve). Immigrants are often
gration and naturalization that promotes their strictly defined as guest workers, which means
empires. France and Britain had open natural- that their status is temporary. Quantitative anal-
ization policies because they made promises to ysis of naturalization rates shows that a barrier
their colonies. If natives acculturated, learned index composed of eight components of nation-
the language of the colonial power, became ed- ality laws is a strong deterrent to naturalization
ucated even in the mother country schools, and rates within these countries ( Janoski and Glen-
served in the empire’s military forces, then colo- nie, 1995a, b; Janoski, 1998).19
nial natives were promised citizenship and the Yasemin Soysal provides an explanation of
right to immigrate to the core nation. Britain immigrant assimilation where politics plays a
tried to maintain the Commonwealth with such critical role. Soysal (1994:29–44) develops the
wide-open passports within the empire. In a dif- concept of “incorporation regimes” that draws
ferent way, black troops from Algeria and Sene- on aspects of immigration and naturalization
gal fought the Germans on French soil in the law. She focuses on the organizational re-
Franco–Prussian War, World War I, and World sponses of immigrant communities to discrim-
War II (Echenberg, 1991). Institutions were cre- ination and the state, and their subsequent in-
ated to maintain these long-term political eco- corporation into liberal, corporatist, and statist
nomic goals, and they had a half-life of two to regimes.20 In corporatist regimes like Sweden,
four decades as the empires receded. immigrant interest groups have received state
Settler countries have immigration needs for
19
two reasons. First, they frequently repressed an The components of this barrier index are: (1) good
conduct as measured by convictions and signing a state-
indigenous people causing 50 to 90 percent of ment, (2) willingness to integrate based on an oath, (3)
the indigenous majority population to be deci- language skills, (4) application complexity, (5) natural-
mated through fighting and/or disease, which ization fees, (6) naturalization as a right, (7) residency
created a labor shortage that must be filled requirement, and (8) jus soli for children born in the
through immigration. Second, they have na- receiving country (Janoski and Glennie, 1995a; Janoski,
Lepadatu, and Diggs, 2003).
tional security needs to continue the subju- 20
Soysal’s approach to incorporation regimes is par-
gation of the indigenous enemy and defend ticularly revealing because work had not been previously
themselves against colonizing and other foreign done on immigrant associations in Europe. However, she
powers. Consequently, settler countries then es- does not put her theory to the test with concrete mea-
tablished recruitment programs, easy natural- surement of incorporation regimes. In a preliminary ex-
tension of her work, we have coded the following vari-
ization, and promise social mobility and op- ables, with each being standardized with a range of 1
portunity. The United States, Canada, New to 0 (i.e., dividing by the highest score or other stan-
Zealand, Australia, and even South Africa have dardizations). The seven variables in the regime scale
fit this pattern ( Janoski and Glennie, 1995a; are: (1) years to 2002 that the central state has had an
Janoski, 1998:165–71; Çinar, 1994; Waldrauch agency directly responsible for immigrants, (2) central
and local channels by which immigrants can be repre-
and Hofinger, 1997). sented, (3) a dummy variable for state funding of ethnic
Noncolonizers have no particular interest in associations, (4) the years necessary for permanent resi-
immigration. Their institutions have been ori- dence, (5) the time required for unlimited work permits,
ented toward emigration over long periods of (6) being able to vote in local elections, and (7) being
time, and often, these states have been rather represented in works councils or other advisory forums.
Corporatist regimes were easy to delineate, with Sweden
authoritarian. Emigration may also induce feel- scoring 6.01 and the Netherlands 5.65 out of a possible
ings of cultural doubt and nationalism. These 7. Liberal regimes were somewhat easy to identify, with
countries will enact laws that have high barriers the United States scoring 2.13. However, statist regimes
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aid, protected the immediate interests of their ory explaining integration consists of: stage A –
ethnicity through services, and promoted their racist violence is an individual problem, stage
longer-term interests through lobbying. She B – society sees such violence as group-based,
claims that the different strategies of these ethnic stage C – the state initially responds to racist vio-
and immigrant groups have resulted in distinc- lence, and stage D – violence against foreigners
tive policies in the countries that she studied. becomes a state priority (1996:12–21). Witte’s
Statist regimes like France expect assimilation. stage theory provides detailed information on
But France is not open to immigrant associations the interaction of the state, political parties, eth-
because the French state provides little funding nic organizations, and integration councils.
to them, keeps them at arm’s length, and min- In comparing the United Kingdom, France,
imizes their influence (Kastoryano, 2002). Lib- and the Netherlands, Soysal’s work can be tied
eral regimes like the United States and Canada to Witte in developing a theory of civil society
neither encourage nor discourage group for- where frequent interactions between groups in
mation, but when groups form, they can in- civil society and with the state create different
fluence the political process just like other integration regimes. In keeping the deaths of
associations. immigrants at the lowest level, the most effec-
Types of immigrant incorporation regimes tive response to racist acts emerges in the dense
are similar to the types of welfare regimes corporatist network of the state and groups in
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). James Hollifield civil society in the Netherlands. Without these
(1992) suggests the guest-worker, assimilation- same networks in the public sphere, France’s re-
ist, and ethnic-minority. Hans Etzinger (2000) liance on statist conceptions of citizenship leads
suggests a six option approach to incorpora- to many more immigrant deaths per capita.
tion with cross-classification of individual versus The United Kingdom is in between with its
group approaches, and political, cultural, and race relations acts. Thränhardt (2000) adds Ger-
social/economic regimes. This yields individ- many into this four-country comparison as a
ual approaches with equal rights, liberal plu- country that clearly pursued an arm’s-length
ralism, and equal opportunity. Based on group or statist guest-worker model. The Dutch state
rights, multiculturalism, and the equality of re- approached integration by creating and then
sults, the group approach has been heavily advo- bringing an immigrant elite into all political
cated in the political theory literature, especially parties so that they will have immigrant lead-
concerning indigenous peoples, and applied to ers within their ranks (2000:171, 180). Dutch
immigrants in the multicultural approach in policies formed an elite consensus after some
Canada (Etzinger, 2000:107; Kymlicka, 1995; discussion with many groups throughout civil
Lipset, 1990). However, group rights of various society, and created a virtuous circle that kept
sorts have existed to some degree for a long time many ethnic minority issues out of the me-
(Janoski and Gran, 2002). dia (Thränhardt, 2000). Though Witte and
Rob Witte (1996) traces the development Thränhardt do not make use of Soysal’s regime
of ethnic and racial integration policies in the theory, it can be extended from her network
United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands. evidence in both an elite and group-based per-
He provides data on violence against foreigners spective.21
with an explanatory focus on the organizations
protecting and representing them. His stage the- 21
This regime theory and its overall characterization
of the Netherlands having less racial violence than the
were more difficult, with France scoring 3.55. This score other countries is backed up by public opinion. While
was hard to differentiate from the United Kingdom with not definitive and in need of further study, Meertens
4.48 and Switzerland and Germany with 3.66 and 2.41. and Pettigrew find that Dutch levels of blatant prejudice
It would appear that Soysal’s attempt to delineate in- toward Turks and blacks are much less than German (to-
corporation regimes is useful, but the category of statist ward Turks), French (toward North Africans and Asians),
regimes needs more directly relevant variables to ade- and British (toward Asians and West Indians) prejudices
quately separate it from the other two regime types. in the 1988 Euro-Barometer study (1997:66).
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As the European discussion implies, the Despite an impressive body of research, as-
American discourse on integration is much less similation/resilience theories have little to say in
group-focused. It looks less at regimes and more terms of macropolitical sociology. These theo-
at identity, networks, and local politics. As- ries center on the United States and are based on
similation with its new variant of segmented individual and social network phenomena, and
assimilation, including ethnic enclaves and eth- avoid the causes of different naturalization laws
nic resilience theory, are central to American and integration policies, although they criticize
discourse (Portes, 1997; Massey et al., 1998; laws for their ineffectiveness. Assimilation is use-
Waldinger, 2001). Assimilation theory has long ful in explaining neighborhood and local poli-
stressed differences in education, occupation, tics, but it does not explain cross-national vari-
and family status as important explanations of ations in policy. Thus, assimilationist and ethnic
behavioral (i.e., learning norms and values), resilience perspectives are protopolitical theories
structural (i.e., social mobility), marital (i.e., that explain immigrant identities that may then
intermarriage with native spouses), and self- lead to interest-group organization and lobby-
identification assimilation. The closer immi- ing for particular types of policies.
grants are embedded in socioeconomic, family,
and identity positions – work with natives, speak
the language, marry a native, interact with na- transnational theories and unifying
tives and upwardly mobile immigrants, and in- receiver and sender theory?
ternalize native culture – the more likely they
will assimilate. This theory has been connected Transnational theories will further impact polit-
to social networks of immigrants who engage in ical sociology in combining theories of sender
chain migration processes through their kin net- and receiver countries. First, under globaliza-
works from their country of origin. The more tion, immigration theory faces two trends. In
immigrants leave their ethnic enclave, the more one direction, the power of states and their
they will integrate and assimilate to the domi- sovereignty have lessened because of the rise of
nant culture (Liang, 1994; Massey et al., 1998). international organizations.22 Second, a trans-
Although segemented assimilation theory chal- national civil society has developed apart from
lenges some aspects of process and depth, as- states and governmental federations. In one ma-
similation is the dominant American political jor statement of this approach, Soysal combines
value. increasing immigration with a growing interna-
As opposed to assimilation theory, ethnic re- tional civil society to claim that there is a post-
silience theory proposes that ethnic groups resist national citizenship developing with transna-
naturalization and integration. Not only do im- tional membership principles independent of
migrants gain sustenance from social networks
and cultural maintenance in ethnic enclaves, but 22
While we are arguing for transnational theories,
they also prosper economically through ethnic we recognize that there are limitations. For example,
and more general business activities (Waldinger, the European Union (EU) is creating a new country,
2001). For example, Cuban immigrants in Mi- though few want to call it that and some deny it. The
ami have established an important economic and EU has gone beyond economic unity (e.g., free trade
political base. Resilience theory argues that eth- and a common currency) to create a new form of Eu-
ropean citizenship with political and social rights within
nics may then have conflicts with natives in res- a common legal system (Richardson, 2001; Brah, 2001;
idential neighborhoods and at work (Bélanger Leontidu and Afouxenidis, 2001). Immigration between
and Pinard, 1991) and that they may resist nat- EU countries is now internal migration without pass-
uralization and assimilation. As societies move ports or even reporting. A European identity is form-
more and more in a multicultural direction, eth- ing with German citizens tending to be the leader, and
the United Kingdom the laggard (Kostakopoulou, 2001;
nic resilience may gain strength with sending Kastoryano, 2002; Guild, 1996; Münch, 2001). Conse-
country language instruction and traditional re- quently, immigration within the EU is not strong evi-
ligious practices. dence of transnational behavior in the world.
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any one state. The transition from national cit- tion and Action Network, and Greenpeace).
izenship to postnational membership has four Soysal (1994) and Bauböck (1994) have consid-
aspects (1994:139–56). First, national citizen- ered these organizations’ influence to be large,
ship existed in a nation-state until about 1945, whereas other scholars are much more cautious
but postnational citizenship is a new phenom- ( Joppke, 1999).
ena with fluid boundaries that downplay the One target of these nongovernmental advo-
nation-states. Second, national citizenship tied cacy and action groups has been supranational
membership to a distinct territory, but post- government, such as the UN, NATO, WTO,
national membership has multiple statuses and the World Bank, and so on. The United States
locations. Third, membership was based on citi- and NATO have been somewhat effective in
zenship rights in a state where national rights are activating international human rights accords
grounded in positive law. Transnational mem- and protecting rights ( Janoski, 1998:40–1). The
bership views universal personhood as rooted WTO and World Bank have been targets for
in human rights without regard to national protest groups due to their adverse effects on hu-
boundaries. Finally, the nation-state was the man rights. For example, Human Rights Watch
source of legitimacy and organizer of mem- initially focused its activities around the rights
bership. Although the nation-state still provides outlined in the Helsinki Accord. Even as global
services and rights, the transnational commu- treaties constrain the activities of the private
nity now provides legitimacy, and international economy and the state sector, many of these hu-
civil society supervises it through a network of man rights treaties and accords also constrain the
nongovernmental agencies that lobby and make treatment of immigrants and refugees. The tri-
exposés, and supranational governments that or- als of Slobadan Milosevich, Rawandan leaders,
ganize and enforce human rights treaties. Thus, and Augusto Pinochet serve as examples of how
Soysal (1994), Bauböck (1994), Ong (1999), and human rights violators can be brought to trial in
Held et al. (1999) have made claims that have various tribunals. On the other hand, although
captured many scholars’ imaginations. the Zapatista rebellion brought the adverse af-
Transnational membership is pressured by the fects of globalization to the world’s attention, the
global interest groups and international human trials of corporations and the WTO are unlikely
rights organizations that both report on and to happen.
lobby for the rights of refugees, asylum seek- Another focus on transnational and post-
ers, and denizens of different racial and ethnic modern identity looks at the increase in dual
groups (Welch, 2001a). As reporting organiza- nationality and multiple identities, increasing
tions, Amnesty International (2002) and Human remittances and investments in the sending
Rights Watch (1999) have published summaries or home country, and flexible citizenship or
of the condition of rights in most countries in even superfluous citizenship. Both receiver poli-
the world, and lobby offending governments cies (encouraging French Islam as a nonrad-
through the press and electronic media so that ical and national alternative to international
receiver countries will cut off aid, assistance, and Islam) and sender policies (promoting Arabiza-
even trade. Direct action has also been initiated tion to Berbers and even Arabs in Algeria)
with consciousness-raising groups and activities have proven to be hazardous (Naylor, 2000:258–
similar to Witness for Peace, who has sent ob- 73). Nonetheless, composite identities are often
servers to be in harm’s way, which generates held together with a “segmented assimilation”
information and alters behavior to some degree (Portes, 1997), and “flexible citizenship” (Ong,
(Welch, 2001b; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Many 1999) allows immigrants to partake of many cul-
other international organizations have been in- tures during a time when travel becomes a minor
volved in human rights work and in develop- consideration. Another aspect of this research
ing other aspects of global civil society (e.g., the focuses on indigenous peoples and their land
International Labor Organization, International and other rights in the face of European im-
Human Rights Law Group, Foodfirst Informa- migrants (Tully, 1995; Kymlicka, 1995, 1996).
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While recognizing that identity is important to Our main point is that given the emphasis
interest-group and social movement activities, on globalization in sociological and other the-
much of the focus of this research has remained ories, one might easily see how a theory that
at the local and personal level (Appadurai, 1996) unifies the actions of sender and receiver coun-
and as yet is somewhat protopolitical. tries would be needed. World systems and glob-
Critics of these theories of transnational alization theories have a little bit to say about
membership challenge both the existence and this in that immigrants flow from the sender
the consequences of globalization. Joppke ex- to the receiver countries and that they are of-
plicitly criticizes Soysal’s transnational mem- ten exploited. But this is not enough for a
bership theory (1999:268–80) because human theory of immigration. What one might ex-
rights are not yet legally or politically insti- pect from a more developed theory would be
tutionalized. Even with external moral con- the meshing of different sender and receiver
straints, states really react to the pressures and regime types. In this last section, we can only
power resources of internal groups (1999:268). sketch out the beginnings of such a theory. In
Joppke claims that the evidence for declining Figure 31.1, we put the regime types of the
sovereignty exists neither for nation-states giv- receiver countries and the sending countries
ing up control of immigration policy to supra- together.
national states, nor for the claim that the abil- Past transnational organizations of empire and
ity of nation-states to control immigration is colonization (item 1) lead to different pairs of re-
waning (this is where considering the EU evi- ceiver and sending regime types (items 2 and 3),
dence of transnational trends rather than nation which produce some interesting matches be-
building confuses the issue). In fact, he says that tween different state structures (items 3 and 4)
technology is providing even greater resources with their associated factional or interest groups
to create “Fortress Europe” (1999:270). An- (items 5 and 6) including public opinion. For
other criticism is that international regulation example, Mexico and Turkey have reacted to
of nation-states and human rights has existed U.S. and German policies against dual nation-
to various degrees since the Treaty of Westfalia ality by relaxing their requirements that only
(1648). Berman (2001) indicates that an interna- Mexican and Turkish citizens could own land
tional law of nationality long existed (e.g., the and be entitled to inheritances (as discussed pre-
Treaties of Berlin of 1878 and Versailles after viously). In the opposite direction, the United
World War I, the Geneva Convention, and UN States and Germany have also relaxed their nat-
General Assembly Resolution 1514 on colonial uralization policies or embraced amnesties. In
independence). the past, immigration and naturalization poli-
But transnational arguments often exaggerate cies were contextualized by empires and com-
sovereignty claims. Weak states have never es- monwealths, but now they critically depend on
caped influence from stronger states, and even whether the sending country belongs to the
strong states existed within the constraints of a receiving country’s transnational organization
myriad of other states’ actions. One strong ar- (e.g., see item 8 with the EU, NAFTA, and
gument against transnational membership is that WTO). At the same time, international civil so-
rights require enforcement. For the vast major- ciety (i.e., see Amnesty International and UN
ity of cases, enforcement still depends on the Declarations of Human Rights, also in item 8)
law and police forces of nation-states. Despite has an impact on human rights within both
some recent developments mentioned above the sending and receiving countries. The re-
concerning crimes against human rights, insult is a relational creation of policies between
ternational law is still weakly institutionalized. receiver and sender countries. This framework
Most of its legitimacy is through voluntary ad- and its subsequent theoretical development, we
herence, and some nation-states can pull out believe, will increasingly replace much of the
of treaties just as easily as they sign them (e.g., current focus on one country, one law, and one
George W. Bush withdrawing from treaties). society’s agglomeration of immigrants.
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1-Centuries of
Transnational
Organization:
Empires, Alliances,
Colonization,
Commonwealth, etc.
3-Democratic States: 4-Nondemocratic

Alliances/Blocs State Type
Liberal, Social demo- Authoritarian, Total-
cratic, & Traditional itarian, Sultanistic, &
states Democratizing states
2-Receiver 3-Sender
Regimes: Regimes:
a-Colonizers: a-Former Colony:
UK, France, India, Algeria
Netherlands b-Poor Neighbor:
b-Settler 9-Immigration/Naturalization Policies Mexico, Poland,
Countries: Receiver Sender Ireland, Korea,
US, Canada, Policies: Policies: Belgium, Italy,
Australia, Immigration, Emigration, Finland
New Zealand Naturalization, Brain drain, c-Noncolony
c-Noncolonizers: Integration, Protection, Nonempire :
Germany, Dual Remittances, Thailand, Iran
Switzerland, citizenship, Residual d-Empire &
Poland, Italy, Illegal entry rights Noncolony :
Japan China, Russia
5-Group Interests
Ethnic/racial, 6-Elite Factional
business, labor, Interests:
& gender groups; 8-Decades of Transna- Party factions,
Foreign policy groups; tional Organization: Economic, military,
Public opinion a-Governments: UN, & religious leaders
EU, NAFTA, WTO,
NATO, OPEC, etc.
b-International civil
society: Amnesty
International, Human
Rights Watch, etc.
Figure 31.1. The Matching of Receiving and Sending Country Regimes and Policies.
conclusion itics of immigration is getting more attention

and will become more central as labor shortages
Political sociology has been strongly focused on occur from 2010 to 2050. It is now clear that
explaining revolutions, dictatorship and democ- immigration research has now penetrated into
racy, race and gender politics, and the rise of political sociology.
welfare states, but not very much on immigra- In the past, state-centric, cost–benefit, and cul-
tion and naturalization politics. However, in the tural theories have been fairly popular theories
last decade, immigration, citizenship, and inte- explaining immigration politics. But as this chap-
gration policies have come to worldwide atten- ter has attempted to show, a power constellation
tion. And as welfare costs, terrorism concerns, theory that includes critical insights from state-
and increasing globalization increase, the pol- centric, institutional, and status-group theory
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can also provide a complex explanation of im- interaction of these various combinations of
migration and naturalization laws. It will be- regimes (e.g., colonizer–former colony, settler–
come increasingly important to explain the in- poor neighbor, noncolonizer–former colony,
terests of ethnic and racial groups, human rights, settler–empire/noncolony, etc.). This frame-
labor, and business groups in domestic and in- work is not a theory, but we offer it here as
ternational politics, that is, in both societal and a suggestion about where studies of immigra-
international civil societies. The relational dance tion should be going in the next twenty years.
among sending and receiving countries will re- Theories would emerge out of the combina-
veal a conducive approach to obtaining a better tions of sender and receiver countries develop-
explanation of the politics of immigration and ing particular policies, politics (i.e., immigrant
naturalization throughout the world. social movements and interest groups interact-
Cultural idiom theory needs work in the ing with parties, labor, and management), and
sense of being a theory in and of itself, but international civil society. This would require
one can envision a “strong cultural argument” the matching of sender country immigration
such as the one Philip Gorski provides con- and receiver country emigration, which may
cerning “pietization” driving the new structures be a daunting prospect because sender coun-
of the seventeenth-century state (1999, 2003), try data are much worse than receiver country
and perhaps we might have such a major change data, which leads to the next point.
with Muslim immigration or in the further ex- Second, in order to do this, immigration
planation of the politics of multiculturalism. and naturalization data must be strengthened
This would be as welcome as Weber’s view of from their surprisingly poor state. Although the
culture as the track changer that reroutes the OECD-SOPEMI reports (1983–2002) have in-
locomotive of political economy. But such creased the reporting of immigration and natu-
reroutings, though they may occur every few ralization data, they still rely on somewhat id-
centuries, do not provide the more track-laying iosyncratic national correspondents, and there
explanations of decades or half centuries that are are major gaps (e.g., Ireland still fails to re-
needed. And as the face of immigration politics port naturalization data and Austria does not
has changed in the last few decades with fiery publish many immigration figures). At a mi-
debates and polarized parties, power constella- crolevel, something like the Luxembourg In-
tion theory will have even more impact. Identity come Studies would be a boon to the mi-
studies may also develop more in a political soci- croprocesses and comparisons of immigration
ological direction with their movement into the and politics in many countries. As Fitzgerald
politics of interest groups and social movements. (1996) indicates, countries recreate and mold
With this theoretical orientation in mind, their identities through immigration policies.
where might the political sociology of immi- Finding out how this may be operating requires
gration go in the next decade? First of all, decent comparable data in a more consistent
more comparative work in the area needs to and cross-national form. Current ethnographic
be done to test various theories. For this to studies of immigration can often be excellent,
happen, theories of immigration and natural- but presently, it is difficult to aggregate them
ization need to do more in bringing receiver into a national reporting system.
and sender country interaction into focus. Too Sociological questions concerning the poli-
much research in this area has been either case- tics of immigration will be most prescient in
study material or descriptive studies of vari- the next few decades. When declining fertility
ous state policies masquerading under the ti- rates in the West (Spengler, 1979; Massey et al.,
tle of “the politics of immigration.” We present 1998) are coupled with globalization, receiv-
a framework to start the process. Rather than ing countries may very well undergo massive
saying globalization and transnational citizen- denativization and reculturation by immigrants.
ship are affecting immigration, one needs to Will the United States will become increasingly
come up with specific hypotheses about the Catholic as Hispanic immigrants come in large
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numbers? Will Europe become a society based In effect, ethnic nations cannot claim cultural
on Christian/Islamic cleavages, perhaps simi- dominance when they cannot reproduce their
lar to the Protestant/Catholic divisions of the culture with sufficient birth and fertility rates.
past? Do receiving countries have rights of self- The end result will provide exciting grounds for
determination to protect their own cultures as research in political sociology as receiving and
they have overrun the cultures of sending coun- sending countries make critical decisions about
tries through the global economy and media? their futures in the next half century.
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chapter thirty-two
Counterhegemonic Globalization
Transnational Social Movements in the Contemporary Global
Political Economy
Peter Evans
When people invoke “globalization,” they usu- construction of more equitable distributions of
ally mean the prevailing system of transnational wealth and power and more socially and eco-
domination, which is more accurately called logically sustainable communities, this literature
“neoliberal globalization,” “corporate global- and argumentation raises the possibility of what
ization,” or perhaps “neoliberal, corporate- I would like to call “counterhegemonic global-
dominated globalization” (cf. McMichael, ization.” Activists pursuing this perspective have
2000: chap. 29). Sometimes they are referring created a multifaceted set of transnational net-
to a more generic process – the shrinking of works and ideological frames that stand in oppo-
space and increased permeability of borders that sition to contemporary neoliberal globalization.
result from falling costs of transportation and Collectively they are referred to as the “global
revolutionary changes in technologies of com- justice movement.” For activists and theorists
munication. Often the two are conflated.1 alike, these movements have become one of the
Implicit in much of current discourse on most promising political antidotes to a system of
globalization is the idea that the particular domination that is increasingly seen as effectual
system of transnational domination that we only in its ability to maintain itself in power.
experience today is the “natural” (indeed in- Although the growth of membership and po-
evitable) consequence of exogenously deter- litical clout of transnational social movements
mined generic changes in the means of trans- is hard to measure, the burgeoning of their
portation and communication. A growing body formal organizational reflections – transnational
of social science literature and activist argu- NGOs – is well-documented. Their numbers
mentation challenges this assumption. Arguing have doubled between 1973 and 1983 and dou-
instead that the growth of transnational con- bled again between 1983 and 1993 (Sikkink and
nections can potentially be harnessed to the Smith, 2002:31). Perhaps even more important
than their quantitative growth has been their
1
Stiglitz’s (2002:9) definition is an interesting case ability to seize oppositional imaginations. From
in point: “Fundamentally, it is the closer intergration the iconic images of Seattle to the universal dif-
of the countries and peoples of the world which has
been brought about by the enoromous reduction of costs fusion of the World Social Forum’s vision that
of transportation and communication, and the breaking “another world is possible,” the cultural and ide-
down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, ological impact of these movements has begun
capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across to rival that of their corporate adversaries.
borders.” By seeing new commercial rules as simply re- As these movements have grown, an equally
moving “artificial barriers,” he naturalizes globalization.
Later in his analysis Stiglitz goes on to decry some of variegated body of social science literature has
the new rules – e.g., capital account liberalization – as begun to analyze, empirically and theoretically,
“unnatural” and indeed economically dangerous. the possibilities of a global countermovement
655
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656 Peter Evans
that would take advantage of the technological cepts like “frame alignment” and “resource mo-
capacities associated with generic globalization bilization” take on a different meaning when
and turn neoliberal globalization’s own ideolog- the “society” involved consists of an inter-
ical and organizational structures against itself, connected congeries of national political units
subverting its exclusionary rules of governance varying dramatically in their material resources
and logic of allocating resources. Yet, as is to be and cultural foundations (cf. Snow, 1986;
expected, the scholarly literature lags behind the Benford, 1997; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly,
growth of the movements themselves. 2001).
Any adequate theorization of contemporary Analytical, practical, and political motivations
globalization must include an analysis of anti- for focusing on oppositional transnational so-
systemic oppositional movements. Yet, with a cial movements are all intensified by growing
few exceptions (e.g., Boswell and Chase-Dunn, disillusionment with the currently hegemonic
2000; Gill, 2002; McMichael, this volume), dis- version of globalization. Margaret Thatcher’s
cussion of oppositional movements is usually admonition “there is no alternative” becomes
“tacked on” to the end of an analysis that is increasingly difficult to accept and the idea that
theorized primarily in terms of the logic of there might be something like “counterhege-
neoliberal globalization. From novel analyses monic globalization” correspondingly more at-
of contemporary globalization, such as Hardt tractive.
and Negri (2000), to encyclopedic treatments
like Held et al. (1999), structure and dynamics
of countermovements are afforded only a frac- hegemonic versus
tion the theoretical attention given to dominant counterhegemonic globalization
structures.
A careful analysis of countermovements is es- Despite the visibility and fervor of its supporters
sential to our understanding of the dynamics (e.g., Tom Friedman), neoliberal globalization
of contemporary politics. Without an analysis has proved a disillusioning disappointment to
of the organization and strategies of transna- ordinary citizens, not just in the global South but
tional social movements, our understanding of in the rich industrial core as well. More surpris-
the politics of global governance institutions like ingly, prominent development economists, who
the WTO, the Bretton Woods twins, and the might be expected to be its most fervent pro-
UN system is incomplete (see, for example, moters (e.g., Rodrik, Sachs, Stiglitz), are sharp
Fox and Brown, 1998; Evans, 2000; O’Brien, critics of neoliberal globalization and its govern-
2000; Wade, 2001). Correspondingly, nation- ing institutions. McMichael’s discussion sets out
states must increasingly take into account the these disappointments at length in Chapter 29
reactions of transnational countermovements and there is no need to reiterate them in detail
when they operate in global arenas. here, but a quick reminder is in order.
The analysis of transnational movements has Neoliberal globalization has delivered global
also become increasingly important to the un- financial volatility that regularly destroys pro-
derstanding of what might have earlier been ductive capacity (without stimulating the cre-
considered “domestic” politics. Contentious ativity that Schumpeter considered definitive of
politics at the national level is increasingly con- capitalist progress). Instead of accelerating the
taminated by global issues and movements, improvement of living standards for the majority
whether in the North or in the South. The- of the world’s population, it has been associated
orization of social movements cannot proceed with slowing growth rates (cf. Easterly, 2001).
without full consideration of the implications of It has often jeopardized the delivery of essential
transnational experiences (cf. McCarthy, 1997; collective goods like public health, education,
Tarrow, 2001, 2002; Khagram, Riker, and and a sustainable environment and it has exac-
Sikkink, 2002; Smith and Johnson, 2002). Con- erbated inequality within and between nations
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Counterhegemonic Globalization 657
to a degree that is destructive of the basic social transnational social movements and their theo-
solidarity. retical implications has growing appeal among
While generating a proliferation of electoral both political sociologists and activists. Unfor-
regimes and celebrating “democracy” in the ab- tunately, preoccupation with discovering new
stract, neoliberal globalization has undermined agents of social change also creates temptation
the possibility of democratic control over state to exaggerate the virtues and power of existing
policies and insulated the most fundamental pol- groups and networks and their ideologies.
icy decisions from even the fiction of democratic Avoiding inflated and unrealistic assessments
control. It has had pervasively corrosive effects of either the virtues or efficacy of those who
on any sense of self-worth that is based on lo- oppose neoliberal globalization is the first step
cal culture, difference, and identity. Finally, it is toward real understanding of their potential
now associated with a return to military adven- power. It must be admitted that the “antiglob-
turism whose potential future destructive effects alization movement” contains its share of irre-
are frightening to contemplate. sponsible nihilists. It must also be acknowledged
Despite its failures, few would deny that ne- that some alternative visions may be worse
oliberal globalization remains “hegemonic” in than the currently dominant one. It is entirely
the Gramscian sense of combining an ideolog- possible to oppose Western-dominated global
ical vision of “what is in everyone’s interests” capitalism with a vision that is more oppressive,
that is largely accepted as “common sense” authoritarian, and intolerant than neoliberalism,
even by subordinate and disprivileged groups as Al Qaeda illustrates. Likewise, “antiglobaliza-
with the effective ability to apply coercion tion” provides a handy “modern” gloss for a
when necessary to preserve the existing dis- multitude of old-fashioned, reactionary nation-
tribution of privilege and exclusion. To call alist agendas.
movements “counterhegemonic” therefore im- Nor is “counterhegemonic globalization” a
plies that they have the potential to undermine label that applies to the whole of the “global
the ideological power of existing hegemony and justice movement.” Some groups with goals
threaten the established distribution of privilege grounded in a vision of equity, human dignity,
(and exclusion).2 Likewise, “counterhegemonic and a sustainable relation to the environment
globalization” would entail building a global po- may reject the possibility of a progressive version
litical economy that used the shrinking of space of globalization. Instead of counterhegemonic
and facility of cross-border communication to globalization, these groups would reverse the ef-
enhance equity, justice, and sustainability rather fects of generic globalization and somehow re-
than to intensify existing forms of domination. trieve a world in which power and values could
For anyone who shares, even partially, dis- be defined on a purely local basis.
illusionment with neoliberal globalization, the Yet, ironically, even the celebration of local
prospect of a “counterhegemonic” globalization power and culture cannot escape the necessity
is alluring. It is hardly surprising that analysis of of constructing some form of “counterhege-
monic globalization.” Even those most com-
mitted to escaping the domination of modern
2
This is not to say that my use of the term “coun- universalisms often end up using global net-
terhegemonic” should be taken to imply a commitment
to complete dismantling of the current global market works and global ideologies. Universal citizen-
system. Although one can imagine that successful pur- ship rights are invoked to protect headscarves
suit of the changes these movements espouse might ulti- (Soysal, 1994). Transnational networks are mo-
mately lead to a “revolutionary” break, their immediate bilized to preserve local feastdays (Levitt, 2001).
demands are for “reforms,” including the recapture of The Internet played a key role in the Zapatista’s
earlier modes of capitalist market regulation. My use of
“counterhegemonic” is, therefore, quite different from defense of their local autonomy (Schulz, 1998).
the way in which Gramsci might have used the term, The reverse is also true. Just as the de-
which, of course, he did not (see Gramsci, 1999). fense of difference and quests for local power
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658 Peter Evans
require global strategies and connections, like- is innocent of sinister and reactionary projects.
wise transnational social movements must have It would be a disservice to the transnational
local social roots. Without the promise of movements themselves, as well as to ordinary
redressing the grievances of ordinary people citizens looking for relief from the disappoint-
where they live, transnational social movements ments of neoliberal globalization, to exaggerate
have no base and their capacity to challenge their power. Sometimes “soft power” (Sikkink,
established power is limited. If global corpo- 2002) can indeed successfully confront “hard”
rate strategies depend on creating deracinated domination, but the current hegemony of cor-
consumers incapable of collective action, coun- porate globalizers is supported by a full array of
terhegemonic strategies depend on the reverse. cultural and ideological machinery as well as a
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that partici- very solid set of coercive instruments. It will not
pants in transnational campaigns are often what be easily dislodged by even the most creative and
Tarrow (2003) calls “rooted cosmopolitans” – well-organized transnational social movements.
people whose activism begins with ties to lo- To have real effects, transnational movements
cal communities and is driven by the desire to must first be able to generate powerful cascades
improve the lot of members of those communi- of normative change and then use this ideolog-
ties. A constant dialectic between strategies that ical advantage to transform the hard structures
speak to local roots and strategies that leverage of established political and economic (and ulti-
global connections is fundamental to counter- mately military) power. It is a tall order.
hegemonic globalization. Even after we fully accept their flaws and lim-
The most powerful and challenging form of itations, the proliferation of transnational social
the local–global dialectic are the North–South movements with an agenda of counterhege-
divisions that have been inscribed in the struc- monic globalization is still one of the sub-
ture of the global political economy for 500 stantively exciting and theoretically provoca-
years and exacerbated by contemporary neolib- tive topics in contemporary political sociology.
eral globalization. This divide is built into global Whether or not the current global justice move-
structures of power, both public and private, ment is capable of making “another world” pos-
economic and cultural. If transnational social sible, analyzing its nature and implications, in
movements cannot find a way to transcend it, both practical and theoretical terms, must be
their political effectiveness will be fatally com- part of the core agenda of contemporary polit-
promised. ical sociology.
There are then some minimal caveats for any
useful analysis of the transnational social move-
ments that are involved in counterhegemonic the new organizational foundations
globalization. It must be about local political of counterhegemonic globalization
motivations and social structural foundations as
much as it is about transnational strategies, struc- Here I will focus on three broad families of
tures, and actions. It must recognize that lo- transnational social movements aimed at coun-
cal conditions of life are fundamentally differ- terhegemonic globalization: labor movements,
ent depending on where they are located in women’s movements, and environmental move-
our abysmally divided world. Most important, ments. Each of these movements confronts the
the desire to discover potent new agents for so- dilemmas of using transnational networks to
cial change must be balanced with dispassionate magnify the power of local movements without
skepticism. redefining local interests, of transcending the
Exaggerating the transformative power of North–South divide, and of leveraging existing
those groups whose efforts to build antisystemic structures of global power without becoming
global networks do appear grounded in a vi- complicit in them. Looking at the three move-
sion of equity and dignity is as bad a mistake as ments together is useful because it highlights
pretending that the antiglobalization movement the ways in which surmounting these challenges
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might produce common strategies and possibil- acterized much more by chauvinism than global
ities for alliances among them. solidarity, makes it even an even more unlikely
Before embarking on an analysis of these candidate to be a paradigmatic promoter of
three families of movements, however, I will “counterhegemonic” globalization. If ATTAC’s
briefly focus on two prominent organizations origins make it a very peculiar candidate to
that are plausible would-be agents of “coun- typify organizations aimed at “counterhege-
terhegemonic globalization” – ATTAC and the monic globalization,” its success at spawning
World Social Forum (WSF). If Seattle and the a network of politically active sister organi-
subsequent demonstrations that have plagued zations around the world is undeniable (cf.
the WTO, IMF, G-7, and World Economic Fo- http://attac.org/indexen/index.html). Hence a
rum are the favorite media images of “antiglob- quick look at ATTAC is one way of illuminat-
alization,” ATTAC and the WSF are paragons ing the ideology and strategies of counterhege-
of organizations explicitly designed to build monic globalization.
omnibus transnational networks aimed at trans- The best analysis of ATTAC is provided
forming neoliberal globalization into a so- by Ancelovici (2002). In Ancelovici’s view,
cial protection-oriented, market-subordinating, ATTAC’s ideology is essentially one of “associ-
difference-respecting mirror image. ational statism,” which essentially entails two
Looking at these groups underlines the orga- strategies of trying to reassert the primacy of
nizationally novel forms whose emergence has political/social decision making in the face of
been stimulated by neoliberal globalization. At the growing dominance of global markets. On
the same time, it highlights the degree to which the one hand it has a very traditional (French)
counterhegemonic globalization draws on long- affection for the regulatory power of the nation-
established social movements and ideological state. At the same time it rejects bureaucratic/
“tropes.” In both respects it provides the ideal representational/party control of public/
backdrop for analyzing the way in which the political decision making in favor of locally
labor movement, transnational women’s move- based participatory structures.
ments, and the global environmental movement In short, analysis of ATTAC suggests that
provide both an interwoven infrastructure for the political foundations of “counterhege-
reshaping globalization and a challenge to the monic globalization” involve a combination of
existing political sociology literature. Ruggie’s (1982) “embedded liberalism” (with
No examination of counterhegemonic glob- its emphasis on social protections rooted in the
alization can avoid examining ATTAC. Perhaps structures of the nation-state) and “New Left”
more than any other single organization it em- forms of participatory democracy. The World
bodies the proposition that agency in the face Social Forum – one of the most important orga-
of the purported power of neoliberal global- nizational forms of South-based “counterhege-
ization requires only ideological and organiza- monic globalization” – confirms this perspec-
tional imagination. Yet, ATTAC is a curious tive.
and, on the surface, very unlikely organization It is only a partial caricature to propose that
to fill this role. Its name – “Association pour the origins of the World Social Forum, which
la Taxation des Transactions Financières pour now arguably represents the largest single ag-
l’Aide aux Citoyens” (Association for the Tax- glomeration of South-based organizations and
ation of Financial Transaction for the Aid of activists, began as a sort of joint venture be-
Citizens) – suggests an organization doomed to tween ATTAC and the Brazilian Workers Party
obscurity. Even worse, the name does indeed (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT). Because the
reflect ATTAC’s initial focus on support for founding vision of the PT’s organizers was of
the Tobin tax (itself a relatively arcane idea a classic Marxist socialist mobilizational party,
embedded in the mechanics of neoliberal glob- the party’s involvement in the World Social
alization). Its homeland – France – an archetyp- Forum is further confirmation of the extent
ically “antiglobalization” political milieu, char- to which “counterhegemonic globalization” has
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660 Peter Evans
its roots in both quotidian struggles for dig- tion” than with the transformation of the inter-
nity and economic security in the workplace national labor movement.
and classic agendas of social protection (à la
Polanyi, [1944] 2001) in which the machin- labor as a global social movement 3
ery of the nation-state is heavily implicated (see
McMichael, 2000:chap. 29). Having been tagged by nineteenth-century so-
Even unsystematic participant observation of cialists as the preeminent agent of progressive
the meetings of the World Social Forum in social change, the labor movement was aban-
Porto Alegre, Brazil confirms this hypothesis. doned by most social movement theorists of the
The fact that the Workers Party controls the mid-twentieth century as primarily concerned
municipal administration of a major city and has with defending the privileges of a Northern
(until the 2002 elections) controlled the state aristocracy of labor in the face of challenges from
government as well has been essential to en- the South and hopelessly sclerotic in any case.
abling the infrastructural investments that make Now the tide seems to be turning again. Recent
a global meeting of thousands of participants and analysis of the U.S. labor movement has begun
hundreds of oppositional groups from around to argue for renewed appreciation of the poten-
the globe possible. At the same time, in part be- tial importance of labor as a progressive actor
cause of Workers Party sponsorship, both local (e.g., Clawson, 2003; Fantasia and Voss, 2004).
and transnational trade unions play a major role Curiously, the literature on transnational so-
in the WSF. cial movements still seems to reflect earlier
All of this suggests that counterhegemonic disenchantment. With few exceptions (e.g.,
globalization is not as “postmodern” as its ad- Kidder in Khagram et al., 2002), the case of la-
herents (and detractors) sometimes argue. To bor has not been well-integrated into this litera-
the contrary, rescuing traditional social demo- ture. A typical collection on transnational social
cratic agendas of social protection, which are movements focusing on European cases (della
otherwise in danger of disappearing below the Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht, 1999) offered indi-
tide of neoliberal globalization, is a signifi- vidual chapters on the campaign against inter-
cant part of the agenda of both ATTAC and national trade in toxic wastes, farmers protest
the World Social Forum. At the same time, movements, abortion rights movements, and
it would be a mistake to dismiss counterhege- indigenous peoples movements, but only two
monic globalization as simply “old wine in quick references to labor: one noting that “the
new bottles.” The gamut of variegated transna- labor movement seems to be particularly disad-
tional social movements that must be dealt vantaged by the developing European institu-
with in any account of counterhegemonic glob- tions” (19) and the other asserting that “Euro-
alization includes movements with organiza- pean labour unions are not taking advantage of
tional forms and ideological propositions that the possibilities for contentious politics at the
are novel and refreshing in relation to the old European level” (118).
agents of “embedded liberalism” (indeed AT- Why has labor not been seen as a promis-
TAC and the World Social Forum are among ing candidate for becoming a transnational so-
them). cial movement? Conventional ways of fram-
This blend of novelty and persistence is one ing labor’s relation to the global political econ-
of the most interesting features of counter- omy are central to the answer. The current
hegemonic globalization, whether one is most framing of the transnational politics of labor
concerned with a substantive analysis of the is dominated by what I would call a “geogra-
movement or with its implications for existing phy of jobs” perspective. In this perspective,
theoretical frameworks and conceptualizations. “Workers of the World Compete!” replaces
And, if one is interested in the blend of nov-
elty and persistence, there is no better place to 3
This section draws heavily on Anner and Evans,
start in analyzing “counterhegemonic globaliza- 2004.
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admonitions for transnational solidarity in the customers become convinced that basic human
neoliberal mantra. Even those hostile to ne- rights are being violated in the production of the
oliberalism tend to assume that geographic goods that bear its name. The trick, of course, is
competition for jobs precludes possibilities for building the mobilizational structures required
transnational solidarity (cf. Rodrik, 1997). In to take advantage of such political opportunity
the “geography of jobs” frame, preventing the (see Fung et al., 2001).
movement of jobs to the global South becomes Looking at paradigmatic cases like the now
the prime aim of workers in the North, erasing famous Kukdong case (Anner and Evans, 2004)
possibilities for North–South solidarity. illustrates the point. The original revolt of the
The “geography of jobs” perspective does Kukdong workers was the product of the usual
capture one important facet of reality. The in- miserable local working conditions combined
creasing ease with which capitalists move high- with unusual local courage and combativeness.
productivity technologies around the globe does Sustaining the struggle depended on an intri-
intensify the potential for cross-border com- cate transnational network that included local
petition among workers (cf. Shaiken, 1994). and U.S. NGOs as well as U.S. unions. Each
Nonetheless, as Miller (2003) points out, the organization in the network brought different
“geography of jobs” perspective is flawed even but complementary capacities to bear, creating
within an economic framework. Once political a robust and powerful braid of alliances. For ex-
and ideological dynamics are included, a creative ample, USAS (United Students Against Sweat-
reframing of labor struggles at the global level, shops), which fits the Keck and Sikkink model
similar to the one that analysts like Ganz (2000) of an organization whose leadership and mem-
and Voss and Sherman (2000) have described at bers are driven primarily by “principled ideas
the national level, becomes an intriguing possi- or values,” was able to provide campus mobi-
bility. lization and publicity (see Featherstone, 2002).
I will analyze the possibilities for transnational Workers’ Rights Consortium (WRC), a “mon-
labor solidarity by looking at three ways of fram- itoring” NGO also a product of the antisweat-
ing contestation: “basic rights,” “social con- shop movement, was able to credibly invoke the
tract,” and “democratic governance.” All three technocratic standards of “objective” investiga-
share one fundamental characteristic. They em- tion.
ploy what I have called elsewhere (Evans, 2000) Most interesting in terms of undercutting
“political jujitsu,” exploiting ideological propo- the “geography of jobs” perspective is the role
sitions universally acknowledged as basic to the of North American trade unions in the net-
hegemonic ideology of contemporary global work. The AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center pro-
neoliberalism and utilizing transnational organi- vided key expertise and international connec-
zational structures that neoliberal globalization tions. UNITE, which organizes textile and
has helped create (cf. Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and apparel workers in the United States, was also
Sikkink, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 2000; Smith and deeply involved. Why were North American
Johnson, 2002). trade unionists involved? Certainly not because
Global corporate networks built around UNITE was hoping to bring the Kukdong jobs
labor-intensive, “sweatshop” manufacturing in back to the United States. Many of the individ-
the South and brand-name marketing in the ual trade union activists within these organiza-
North create political opportunities along with tions were, of course, driven by the same sort
profits. Imbuing their brands with cultural value of “principled ideas or values” that motivated
is vastly more important to the profitability of NGO activists. More important, North Amer-
the overall corporation than production costs ican unions saw Kukdong workers as key allies
attributable to manufacturing labor. At the same in their own domestic struggles to delegitimate
time, the normative and ideological hegemony corporate adversaries by exposing them as vi-
of “basic human rights” makes it almost impos- olators of basic human rights, and generating
sible for a brand to retain its value once potential the kind of political advantage that is critical to
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662 Peter Evans
the success of the strategic campaigns that are form the carapace of the global economy con-
the focus of contemporary labor contestation tain political opportunities as well as threats.
in the North. The long-term collaboration between IG
Despite their importance, the industries in Metal in Germany and the Brazilian Metal-
which effective transnational alliances are built workers affiliated with CUT (Central Unica
around basic rights framings are a limited set. dos Trabalhadores) provides a good example. In
For labor to become a global social movement, 2001, when IG Metal was starting its spring
a broader range of industries and workers must offensive in Germany, the members of the
be involved. The idea of “social contract” pro- Brazilian Metalworkers union (CUT) working
vides one basis for expanding organizational for Daimler–Chrysler sent their German coun-
range. terparts a note affirming that they would not
Emblematic of the post-World War II accept any increased work designed to replace
“golden age of capitalism” was the hegemony lost production in Germany. This action grows
of the idea that relations between employers and out of a long-term alliance between the two
employees were more than a simple exchange unions that exploits transnational corporate or-
of labor for wages. The employment relation ganizational structures for counterhegemonic
came to be seen as embodying a social contract, purposes and has proven to be of practical value
one in which competent, loyal employees could to the Brazilian autoworkers in their struggle to
expect to be rewarded from the firm over the maintain some semblance of a social contract
long term. Employees also came to expect aux- in their employment relations. For example, in
iliary benefits that were less tightly tied to job the previous year when workers at Volkswagen’s
performance – primarily retirement, disability, biggest factory in Brazil went on strike trying
and health benefits, provided in combination by to reverse job cuts, Luiz Marinho, president of
employers and the state. CUT VW, was able to go to VW’s world head-
Emblematic of the contemporary global neo- quarters and negotiate directly with manage-
liberal regime is the effort to reconstruct em- ment there, bypassing the management of the
ployment as something closer to a spot market Brazilian subsidiary, and producing an agree-
in which labor is bought and sold with only the ment that restored the jobs.
most minimal expectations regarding a broader The successful 1997 UPS strike offers a
employment relationship. Around the globe – North–North example of how transnational al-
from Mumbai to Johannesburg, Shanghai to the liances can be built around the idea of social
Silicon Valley – jobs are being informalized, out- contract. One element in the victory was a
sourced, and generally divorced from anything very effective global strategy, one that took ad-
that might be considered a social contract be- vantage of previously underexploited strengths
tween employer and employee. in their own global organization – the Inter-
Precisely because the attack on the idea of la- national Transport Workers Federation (ITF)
bor as a social contract is generalized across all (Banks and Russo, 1999). Through the ITF, a
regions of the world, it creates a powerful basis World Council of UPS unions was created –
for generating global labor solidarity. I illustrate which decided to mount a “World Action Day”
the point with two examples: the emerging rela- in 150 job actions or demonstrations around the
tions of effective mutual support that join metal- world. A number of European unions took ac-
workers in Brazil and Germany and the success- tion in support of the U.S. strikers (Banks and
ful leveraging of transnational solidarity by the Russo, 1999:550).
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) Why were the Europeans so willing to take
in the 1997 UPS strike. In addition to demon- risks for the sake of solidarity with the IBT in
strating again that the “geography of jobs” per- the United States? The answer was summarized
spective cannot explain transnational relations in one of the ITF’s leaflets, “UPS: importing
among labor movements, these cases also fur- misery from America.” UPS was seen as repre-
ther illustrate how the corporate structures that senting the intrusion of the “American Model”
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of aggressive antiunion behavior, coupled with among them.4 The organizational reflection of
the expansion of part-time and temporary jobs this politics is the Alianza Social Continen-
with low pay and benefits and the use of subcon- tal/Hemispheric Social Alliance (ASC/HSA),
tracting (Banks and Russo, 1999:561). The Eu- a coalition of national umbrella organizations
ropeans also knew that they had a much better each of which represents a coalition of NGOs or
chance of reining in UPS operating in concert labor organizations. Headquartered first in Mex-
with the 185,000 unionized UPS workers in the ico and then in Brazil, the ASC/HSA brings
United States than they would ever have alone. women’s groups and environmental groups to-
Solidarity made sense and the logic of compe- gether with ORIT (Organización Regional In-
tition based on the geography of jobs made no teramericana de Trabajadores – the hemispheric
sense. trade union organization to which the AFL-
Although defending the idea of the employ- CIO and most other major national trade union
ment relation as a social contract is a project confederations belong).
that will draw broad sympathy, the actual orga- The ACS/HSA is only one of the possible
nizational efforts remain largely internal to orga- mobilizational structures that might be created
nized labor. Other global social movements may to democratize the creation of the hemisphere’s
be ideologically supportive, but not likely to be new “economic constitution” (which is what
mobilized. Given the fact that those who enjoy the FTAA is in reality), but it is an excellent
the privilege of a formal employment relation- illustration of labor’s potential to become not
ship with union representation is a shrinking just a global social movement, but a leading ele-
minority of the global population, the success ment in the broadest possible coalition of social
of labor as a global social movement depends on movements. To understand the possibilities and
being able to complement “social contract” and challenges of connecting the labor movement
“basic rights” campaigns with other strategies with other transnational movements, there is no
that have the potential of generating broad al- better place to start than with global feminism.
liances with a range of other social movements.
Contestation framed in terms of “democratic
governance” offers just such an opportunity. Building a Feminist Movement
The hegemony of “democracy” as the only Without Borders
acceptable form of governance is as pervasive
a part of contemporary neoliberal ideology as While the transnational women’s movement
“basic human rights.” However substantively also has a long history, global neoliberalism has
undemocratic the operation of the global neo- brought issues of gender to the forefront of
liberal regime may be in practice, invocations transnational social movement organizations in
of the principle of democratic governance are a dramatic way. Until there has been a revolu-
politically powerful. Global governance insti- tionary transformation of gender roles, the dis-
tutions, whether in the form of organizations advantages of allocating resources purely on the
like the WTO or in the form of international basis of market logic will fall particularly harshly
agreements like the FTAA (Free Trade Area of on women. The UNDP talks of a global “care
the Americas), are politically vulnerable targets deficit,” pointing out that women spend most
precisely because their procedures so often con- of their working hours on unpaid care work and
tradict neoliberalism’s supposed commitment to adding that “the market gives almost no rewards
democratic governance. for care” (1999:80). Others have pointed out
The FTAA is a good case in point (Barenberg the extent to which “structural adjustment” and
and Evans, 2004). In its fight to restructure other neoliberal strategies for global governance
the FTAA, the labor movement has been able
to move beyond a “geography of jobs” per- 4
For an analysis of an earlier evolution away from the
spective to one that focuses on range of so- geography of jobs perspective in the case of NAFTA, see
cial issues, democratic governance prominent Armruster, 1995, 1998; Kay, forthcoming.
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664 Peter Evans
contain a built-in, systematic gender bias (e.g., on Women and accused them of perpetuat-
Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart, 1987; Elson, 1991; ing colonialist power relations under the guise
Afshar and Dennis, 1992; Staudt, 1997). Con- of transnational unity (Spivak, 1996). Mohanty
sequently, it is almost impossible to imagine a (2003:226) summarizes the conundrum nicely:
movement for counterhegemonic globalization “The challenge is to see how differences allow
in which a transnational women’s movement did us to explain the connections and border cross-
not play a leading role. ings better and more accurately, how specifying
At first glance, women’s organizations have an difference allows us to theorize universal con-
advantage over transnational labor movements cerns more fully.”
in that they do not have to transcend a zero- One of the consequences of this debate is to
sum logic equivalent to that of the “geography force Northern-based women’s organizations to
of jobs” which would put the gendered interests develop a much more sophisticated perspective
of women in one region in conflict with those on development of “collective action frames”
in another region. Perhaps for that reason, the than the treatment normally found in the social
transnational women’s movement has been in movements literature. They have been forced to
the vanguard of transnational social movements reflect on the ways in which supposedly univer-
in the attention that it has devoted to struggles sal agendas can become ideological impositions
over how to bridge the cultural and political that erase the specific interests of less-privileged
aspects of the North–South divide and how to participants in the movement. This awareness
avoid the potential dangers of difference-erasing has, in turn, had the effect of strengthening
universalist agendas. the hand of local organizers in the South in
Like the labor movement, the women’s move- their bargaining for greater autonomy and fuller
ment’s ideological foundations are rooted in recognition of their locally defined interests and
a discourse of “human rights” (cf. Keck and agendas.
Sikkink, 1998; Meyer, 2001), but transnational Millie Thayer (2000, 2001, 2002) provides
feminism, much more than in the labor move- one of the most vivid and nuanced analyses of
ment, has wrestled with the contradictions of the debate “on the ground” within the transna-
building politics around the universalistic lan- tional women’s movement. In her study of the
guage of rights. Although no one can ignore relations between transnational feminist NGOs
the ways in which demanding recognition that and local women’s groups based in the backlands
“women’s rights are human rights” has helped of rural Northeast Brazil, Thayer (2001) shows,
empower oppressed and abused women across first of all, that “global scripts,” in this case an
an incredible gamut of geographic, cultural, and article by Joan Scott on the concept of gender,
class locations, any earlier naı̈ve assumptions that can in fact “make sense” to local women em-
there was a single “one size fits all” global fem- bedded in families and involved in class as well
inist agenda have been replaced by appreciation as gender struggles. Because the concept of gen-
that the goal is much more complex (see Basu der made sense for these women, and because
and MGrory, 1995; Alvarez, 1998, 1999; Barlow, of their creative ability to transform and rein-
2000; Bergeron, 2001; Naples and Desai, 2002; terpret the concept to fit local circumstances, it
Vuola, 2002). helped them to advance their local struggles.
On the one hand, the adoption of CEDAW Thayer’s work also illustrates how the goals
(Convention on the Elimination of All Forms and ideologies of the transnational women’s
of Discrimination Against Women) by the UN movement (including their awareness of the
might be considered the normative equivalent possibilities of “colonialist attitudes”) limit
of the environmental movement’s victories in the dominance of Northern NGOs, despite the
the Montreal Accord to limit CFCs and the enormous differences in resources between the
Kyoto Accord on global warming. On the other local Brazilian group and its Northern allies. Ac-
hand, critical feminists have examined UN access to the resources that are channeled through
tivities like the 1995 Beijing World Conference transnational networks does depend on the
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ability of locals to conform to more standard- informal sector experience the insecurity and
ized administrative procedures that transnational lack of “social contract” that appear to be the
support networks can understand and evaluate neoliberal destiny of all but a small minority of
(Thayer, 2002). At the same time, Thayer’s anal- the workforce, regardless of gender. If mem-
ysis also makes it clear that the ideology and bers of established transnational unions like the
goals of Northern-based transnational NGOs metalworkers are to succeed in building general
give local social movement organizations im- political support for defending the “social con-
portant political advantages in internal negotia- tract” aspects of their employment relation, their
tions. Northern-based transnational NGOs not struggles must be combined with an equally ag-
only know that their legitimacy in the eyes of gressive effort to expand the idea of the so-
funders and Northern supporters rests on their cial contract into the informal sector. Insofar
ability to transform the lives of local groups in as the women’s movement’s campaigns around
the South for the better. They themselves see livelihood issues have focused particularly on the
service to these groups as their goal. Conse- informal sector, it might be considered the van-
quently, when a legitimate local group questions guard of the labor movement as well as a leading
whether their local interests and goals are being strand in the movement for counterhegemonic
met, the question cannot simply be dismissed globalization more generally.
or suppressed. The “soft power” of norms and One response to the challenge of the in-
values is even more important within transna- formal sector has been the diffusion of the
tional movements than it is in their relations to “Self-employed Women’s Association” (SEWA)
dominant global structures, and this works to as an organizational form, starting in India and
the advantage of the South. spreading to South Africa, Turkey, and other
If its explicit and persistent confrontation countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and
of dangers posed by the North–South di- Africa, and eventually creating incipient in-
vide within the movement makes the women’s ternational networks such as “Homenet” and
movement an exemplar for other transnational “Streetnet” (Mitter, 1994). This is not only a
social movements, its potential influence in the novel form of labor organization. Because the
transformation of other movements is equally archetypal site of informal sector employment
important. The potential impact of closer al- is among the least-privileged women of the
liance between the women’s movement and the global South, it is simultaneously an organi-
labor movement offers a good example. Patriar- zational form that should help build the kind
chal organizational forms and leadership styles of “feminism without borders” that Mohanty
continue to divide the labor movement from (2003) argues is necessary to transcend the con-
the women’s movement (cf., for example, Bandy tradictions that have divided the international
and Bickham-Mendez, 2003), but the survival women’s movement in the past.
of the labor movement globally clearly depends
on its ability to become more feminist. Women
are not just important to the labor movement Global and Local Environmentalism
because both genders are now thoroughly in-
corporated into the labor market: they are also In the last decades of the twentieth century, or-
important because they occupy the positions in ganizations that focused on environmental is-
the global labor force that are most crucial to sues were the most rapidly expanding form
labor’s organizational expansion. of transnational NGO (Sikkink and Smith,
The numerically predominant situation of 2002:30). Starting as an almost nonexistent cate-
women in the global economy is one of precar- gory in the 1950s, by the 1990s they had become
ious participation in the “informal economy” – the most prevalent form of transnational NGO
a vast arena in which the traditional organiza- outside of human rights groups. A case can
tional tools of the transnational labor movement be made that the global environmental move-
are least likely to be effective. Women in the ment has also been the most effective of any set
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666 Peter Evans
of transnational social movements at changing and global concerns appears more daunting in
both the global discursive and regulatory en- the environmental arena. Some issues – such as
vironment. In short, the global environmental global warming and the ozone layer – seem in-
movement offers one of the best examples of trinsically global, whereas the politics of oth-
“counterhegemonic globalization” available. By ers, such as the health consequences of toxic
the same token, the arena of environmental pol- dumps, can be intensely local. The challenges
itics becomes one of the best sites for measuring of building a global organization that effec-
the limits of counterhegemonic globalization. tively integrates locally focused activities with
Environmental stewardship is almost by def- global campaigns would seem particularly chal-
inition a collective issue and therefore an issue lenging in the case of the environmental move-
that should lend itself to collective mobilization. ment.
Even neoclassical economic theory recognizes Despite the structural challenges it faces,
that environmental degradation is an external- the global environmental movement is usually
ity that markets may not resolve, especially if considered among the most successful of the
the externalities are split across national political transnational social movements. How do we
jurisdictions. Thus, environmental movements explain the relative success of transnational
have advantages, both relative to mobilization movements with environmental agendas? The
around labor issues, which neoliberal ideology first point to be made is how strikingly parallel
strongly claims must be resolved through mar- the political assets of the global environmental
ket logic if welfare is to be maximized, and movement are to those of the labor and women’s
relative to women’s movements, which are still movements, despite the obvious differences
bedeviled by claims that these issues are “pri- among them. This is true both of ideological
vate” and therefore not a appropriate target for resources and institutional ones. Once again,
collective political action (especially not collec- we see a counterhegemonic movement lever-
tive political action that spills across national aging the ideas and organizational structures
boundaries). implanted by hegemonic globalization.
The obstacles to trying to build a global en- As in the case of the labor and women’s
vironmental movement are equally obvious. To movements, political clout depends on the
begin with, there is the formidable gap that global diffusion of a universalistic ideology
separates the South’s “environmentalism of the affirming the value of the movement’s agenda.
poor,” in which sustainability means above all As the labor and women’s movements are able
else sustaining the ability of resource-dependent to leverage the ideological power of abstract
local communities to extract livelihoods from concepts like “human rights” and “democracy,”
their natural surroundings, and the “conserva- environmentalists can claim an impeccable uni-
tionist” agenda of traditional Northern environ- versal agenda of “saving the planet” and invoke
mental groups, which favors the preservation “scientific analysis” as validating their positions.
of fauna and flora without much regard for As in the other two cases, these ideological
how this conservation impacts the livelihoods resources are worth little without organizational
of surrounding communities (Friedmann and structures that can exploit them and without
Rangan, 1993; Guha and Martı́nez-Alier, 1997; complementary mobilization around quotidian
Martı́nez-Alier, 2002). The North–South di- interests. Nonetheless, the point is that once
vide in the global environmental movement may again, hegemonic ideological propositions are
be less susceptible to being portrayed as “zero- not simply instruments of domination; they are
sum” than in the “geography of jobs” perspec- also a “toolkit” that can be used in potentially
tive on the labor movement, but the logic of powerful ways for “subversive” ends.
division appears more difficult to surmount than The possibility of using governance struc-
in the case of transnational feminism. tures that are part of hegemonic globalization
Even aside from the difficulties of super- also applies in the case of the environmental
seding North–South divisions, integrating local movement. Even more than in the case of the
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women’s movement, the UN system has proved ernance institutions have given transnational
an extremely valuable institutional resource. As social movements an opportunity to shape an
in the case of the women’s movement, global emerging regulatory regime, which has the
conferences organized by the UN have played a potential to substantially modify the market
crucial role both in helping to solidify transna- logic of neoliberal globalization.
tional networks and to promote and diffuse One might argue that climate change is a
discursive positions. Pulver’s (2003) research on special case, that because climate change is an in-
climate change negotiations provides one of the trinsically global issue, it was possible to mount
most sophisticated analyses of how the institu- a global campaign without strong local foun-
tional resources provided by the UN system can dations that transcend the North–South divide.
be leveraged by transnational environmental This may be correct. Nonetheless, other exam-
movements (see also Lipschutz and Mayer, ples suggest that transnational environmental
1996; Betsill and Corell, 2001; Caniglia, 2000). networks can still make effective use of global
In Pulver’s view, the UN climate policy governance institutions, even when local foun-
process, including the 1992 Framework Con- dations and North–South solidarity are crucial.
vention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the Chico Mendes and his Amazonian rubber
annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) orga- tappers, as chronicled by Keck (1995, 1998) and
nized to review and assess the implementation Keck and Sikkink (1998), are the classic case.
of the FCCC, provides an institutional arena Transnational environmental NGOs interested
that works to the advantage of transnational en- in preserving Amazonian forests and an orga-
vironmental NGOs in three ways, even though nized local peasantry desperate to preserve their
the negotiations are formally between national extractive livelihoods in the face of the depre-
delegations. First, negotiations take place in an dations of local ranchers were able to jointly
atmosphere of “public-ness” – not only in the use the transnational connections that linked
sense that proceedings are for the most part open the Brazilian government, the World Bank,
to public scrutiny but also in the sense that po- and parochial but powerful U.S. politicians
sitions must be justified in terms of the “public to generate leverage that neither the transna-
good” rather than simply presented as reflecting tional NGOs nor the rubber tappers could
particular interests which must be taken into have dreamed of separately. Despite Mendes’s
account because of their proponents’ power. assassination, the fruits of his fight were institu-
This kind of discursive context lends itself tionalized in important ways in the subsequently
naturally to arguments about stewardship and environmentalist Workers’ Party Government
the promotion of sustainability while it is much in Mendes’s home state of Acre (Evans, 2000).
more awkward to introduce corporate concerns Such successes depend on combinations of
with managerial prerogatives and profitability. circumstance that are still unusual (as Keck
Second, and equally important according to and Sikkink’s [1998] comparison of Acre and
Pulver, the “public” actors who manage the Sawarak illustrates). Nonetheless, they are not
process on behalf of the UN system tend to be aberrations. The worldwide movement to limit
drawn from “epistemic communities” (Haas, the development of large dams also brings
1992) in which “science” and “stewardship” are local communities with immediate quotidian
valued. (Indeed, even the national delegations livelihood interests at stake (saving their homes
that end up at the COPs are more likely to from inundation) together with transnational
be sympathetic to these values.) Third, both environmental NGO networks. As in the
prevailing ideology and the preferences of rubber tapper case, the political vulnerability
meeting managers give environmental NGO of the World Bank has made it possible to
representatives a degree of influence on the use the machinery of global governance for
negotiations between national delegations that counterhegemonic purposes and both ideology
rivals or surpasses that of business and industry and practice at the global level have been shifted
representatives. In this case at least, global gov- (see Khagram, 2004).
P1: JZP
668 Peter Evans
Closer alliance with the women’s movement functionalist guardian angels that will prevent
could help bridge the global–local divide. The them from undercutting their own potential.
issues of urban “livability” that are becoming
increasingly central environmental issues in the
South are gendered in their impact. As in the The Potential and Pitfalls of
case of the gendered impact of structural adjust- Counterhegemonic Globalization
ment programs, the fact that women shoulder
a disproportionate share of the responsibilities I have focused here on positive examples, first in
for caring for children and families forces them the form of the general organizational advances
to bear the brunt of bad urban sanitation, represented by ATTAC and the World Social
precarious water supplies, and pollution-related Forum and then in the form of successes drawn
disease. To the extent that prominent transna- from the transnational labor, womens’, and en-
tional environmental organizations like Green- vironmental movments. Efforts at counterhege-
peace, Environmental Defense, or the WWF monic globalization do help shift the balance
were willing to focus more attention on such in local struggles in favor of the disprivileged.
issues, it would help bridge both North–South From apparel workers, to poor rural women,
and global–local divides. to rubber tappers, there are numerous exam-
Unless such opportunities are seized, the ples of how creating transnational connections
transnational environmental movement could can put new power into the hands of groups
move in a direction that will undercut its poten- that face insurmountable odds at the local level.
tial contribution to counterhegemonic global- Counterhegemonic globalization has also made
ization. The intensive, widespread, decades-old some headway with respect to global regulatory
debate over how to make sure that the women’s regimes. Nonetheless, any progress at the level
movement fully reflects the perspectives and of the global regulatory regime in what are de-
interests of its largest constituency (disprivileged fined as “noneconomic” areas has been more
women in the global South) rather than its most than counterbalanced by the deepening institu-
powerful members (elite women in the global tionalization of neoliberal rules with regard to
North) appears to have a harder time getting trade, investment, and property.
traction in the transnational environmental If discounting the potential of counter-
movement. hegemonic globalization would be a serious
The fact that the “scientific analysis” para- analytic error, exaggerating its potential or
digm provides significant advantage to envi- discount the pitfalls that lie in wait for these
ronmentalists in battles against degradation by movements as they develop would be, as I
corporate (and state) polluters may become underlined in the beginning of this chapter, an
a disadvantage when it comes to engaging in equally serious error. Now, with a better sense
internal debates over competing visions within of the organizational and ideological structure
the transnational environmental movement, of counterhegemonic globalization, it is time
making it easier for Northern activists to assume to revisit the issue of limitations and pitfalls.
that the solutions to environmental issues in the The most basic limitation is that none of the
South can be “objectively” defined from afar successes discussed here offers a direct prospect
rather than having to emerge out of debate and of shifting the basic trajectory of current
discussion with those immediately involved (cf. struggles over the shape of global trade and
Li, 2000; York, 2002). None of this is to suggest property rule. As the September 2003 WTO
that the environmental movement is doomed ministerial in Cancan indicated, putting sand
to go astray or end up fragmented. The point is in the gears of the neoliberal global project
that just as there is no “natural logic” that dic- depends on new creating political alliances
tates the inevitability of a corporate neoliberal that involve states as well as social movements.
trajectory for globalization, even the most suc- Future battles of this type over everything from
cessful counterhegemonic movements have no the FTAA to the completion of the Doha
P1: JZP
Round will be crucial to any future possibility ings in concrete organizational alliances is an
for building counterhegemonic globalization. even tougher challenge. Unless they can avoid
Transnational social movements, even in the pitfalls that lie in their own organizational
alliance with each other, cannot reshape these paths, superseding their current macropolitical
negotiations without collective action on the limitations is a utopian dream.
part of national delegations from the global Realistic awareness of limitations and pitfalls
South. Constructing a globally inclusive version must be balanced against the basic point
of “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982) – established in the initial rendition of optimistic
a reasonable minimal measure for the success examples. Global neoliberalism is not just a
of counterhegemonic globalization – is an structure of domination; it is also a set of ideo-
even more distant goal. Ruggie’s (1994:525) logical and organizational structures vulnerable
assessment that “[c]onstructing a contemporary to being leveraged by oppositional movements.
analog to the embedded liberalism compromise Global neoliberalism’s aggressive efforts to
will be a Herculean task” has not been substan- spread the dominion of market logic make it
tially changed by the more recent successes of easier for diverse movements to mount a com-
transnational social movements. mon program. As the gap between the formal
Current limitations should not, however, hegemony of global neoliberalism’s ideologi-
be discouraging in themselves. The politics of cal program and its substantive manifestations
counterhegemonic globalization are a politics grows more stark – most obviously in the case of
of institution building and alliance formation, “democracy” – shared opportunities for lever-
ideological innovation and reframing, of aging these ideological presuppositions increase.
the accretive accumulation of “soft power,” Ideologically neoliberal globalization gen-
leading, if successful, to “normative cascades” erates a transnational ideological toolkit that
and real shifts in the balance of power. If a counterhegemonic movements can draw on in
long succession of small victories (inevitably parallel ways from a variety of different social lo-
intermingled with defeats) leads eventually to cations. Structurally, global neoliberalism helps
major transformation, the process will only promote possibilities for alliance by different
make sense to skeptics well after the fact, much groups situated in divergent national contexts in
as the abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage similarly disadvantaged positions. Organization-
seem plausible (perhaps even “inevitable”) after ally, contemporary transnational opportunities
the fact (cf. Keck and Sikkink, 1998). reinforce the point, made by Tilly (e.g., 1991,
Pitfalls are a more immediate concern than 1995) and Tarrow (1998) among others at
apparent limitations. The kind of creative the national level, that just as oppositional
reframing that has allowed the labor movement movements can turn dominant ideological
to shift from preoccupation with the geography repertoires to their advantage, they can also take
of jobs to a focus on fighting for basic rights, advantage of existing governance structures.
the social contract, and democratic governance In some cases, such as the environmental and
is always vulnerable to being overwhelmed by women’s movements’ leveraging of the UN
immediate defensive concerns. Transnational system to help build transnational links and gain
environmental organizations are always in access to public space, the possibilities are obvi-
danger of slipping back into a traditional con- ous. In other cases, such as the use of the World
servation/preservation perspective that leaves Bank by the rubber tappers or the leveraging of
little space for building bridges to the resource- corporate structures via brand names and basic
dependent poor of the global South. Despite rights, they are only obvious after the fact.
its continual efforts at self-reflection, steering a Acknowledging the potential for use of
course between false universalism and unreflec- dominant governance structures brings us back
tive particularism continues to challenge the to the cases with which we began – ATTAC
transnational women’s movement. In all three and the World Social Forum. Leveraging dom-
cases, finding ways to embody unifying fram- inant structures will work only when there are
P1: JZP
670 Peter Evans
comparable oppositional organizations and net- successful. They have created new possibilities
works available to do the leveraging. Ultimately, for concatenation among existing transnational
the scope of these mobilizational structures networks as well as adding organizational
must transcend issue-specific and group-specific innovations of their own. Novel organizational
organizations. “Global civil society” (Lipschutz forms like these are reassurance that, whether
and Mayer, 1996; Wapner, 1995) requires an or not the possibility of another world has
organized agent of equivalent scope if it is been demonstrated, the potential for a more
to dislodge the highly organized system of robust and politically formidable movement for
domination that sustains global neoliberalism. counterhegemonic globalization is a social fact.
A new (post)modern prince in the form of a
“World Party” as advocated by Gill (2002) and
Chase-Dunn and Boswell (2003) is probably acknowledgments
too much of a leap, but trying to develop some
kind of omnibus transnational form still makes I would like to acknowledge the support and
sense. patience of the editors and the invaluable
The end result is likely to look more like a comments of Michael Burawoy, Hwa-jen
network than a bureaucratic tree and, by def- Liu, Simone Pulver, Sarah Staveteig, Millie
inition, will require unexpected organizational Thayer, Anna Wetterberg, Jodi york, and two
innovations. ATTAC and the World Social anonymous reviewers. The errors of omission,
Forum are encouraging precisely because their commission, and misconception that remain
unexpected organizational forms have been so are entirely of my own making.
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P1: JZP
CB779-AInd.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 August 27, 1956 19:17
Name Index
Abbott, Andrew 113 Arnold, Matthew 116

Abell, Peter 183 Aron, Raymond 569
Acker, Joan 136 Aronowitz, Stanley 117
Adams, Julia 4, 7, 11, 20, 24, 177–178, 181, 378, 381, Arrighi, Giovanni 588, 598
382 Arrow, Kenneth 184
Addams, Jane 631–640 Arthur, President 638
Adorno, Theodor 81, 121, 232 Ashford, Douglas E. 509
Agger, Ben 15 Aspalter, Christian 520
Alber, Jens 509
Aldrich, John H. 282 Bacchi, Carole 140
Alesina, Alberto 180 Bachrach, Peter 55, 57
Alexander, Jeffrey 67–68, 69 Bacharach, Samuel 11, 13
Alexander, Susan 639 Bailey, F. G. 120
Alfonsı́n, Raúl 624 Baker, Ella 552
Alford, Robert 4, 5, 6, 7, 60–61, 232, 233, 273 Baker, George F. 312
Al-Khazraji, Nizar 481 Baker, Kevin M. 127
Allan, James 617 Baker, Wayne 236, 243
Allen, Michael Patrick 220 Bakhtin, 125
Allende, Salvador 421, 580 Baldwin, Peter 509
Allison, Graham Jr. 490 Balibar, Atienne 159
Almond, Gabriel 8, 61 Banaszak, Lee Ann 341
Alt, James 180, 554 Baran, Paul 62, 315–316, 325
Althusser, Louis 76, 92, 120, 159 Baratz, Morris 57
Alvarado, Juan Velasco 473 Barber, Brad M. 315
Alvarez, Sonia E. 528 Barbie, 481
Alvarez-Beramendi, P. 518 Barkan, Steve 336
Altvater, Elmar 598 Barkey, Karen 574
Amenta, Edwin 19, 63, 64, 70, 275, 331, 339, Barrilleaux, Charles 282
345, 514 Bar-Tal, Daniel 196
Amin, Idi 469 Barth, Fredrik 8, 120
Aminzade, Ronald 191, 198 Barthes, Roland 8, 120, 153
Ancelovici, M. 659 Bartley, Numan V. 553
Anderson, Benedict 24, 127, 247, 249–250, 372 Bartolini, Stefano 206
Anderson, Perry 367, 373–374, 376, 382 Barton, Allen 233, 234
Andrews, Kenneth 345 Barzel, Yoram 183
Annan, Kofi UN Secretary-General 590 Bates, Robert H. 175, 183
Anner, Mark 660 Batista, 417, 469, 472, 502
Arben, Jacobo 470 Bauböck, Ranier 650
Arendt, Hanna 143–144 Baudrillard, Jean 8, 15
Aristotle 34, 55, 385, 424–425, 427, 429, 430, 433 Bauer, Raymond A. 312, 314, 317
785
P1: JZP
786 Name Index
Bauldry, Shawn 20, 30 Briggs, Vernon 634

Bawn, Kathleen 177 Brimelow, Peter 631
Bearman, Peter S. 573 Brinton, Crane 404
Becker, Gary 11, 174 Brooks, Clem 22, 213, 214, 216, 228, 241, 271, 272,
Beetham, David 490 273, 558–559
Belaúnde, 472 Brooks-Gunn, J. 523
Bell, Daniel 313 Brown, Michael K. 563
Bellah, Robert 128 Browning, Rufus 345
Benda, Harry 406 Broyles, Philip 220
Bendix, Reinhard 15, 98, 367, 371–372, 376 Brubaker, W. Rogers 256, 631, 645–646
Benford, Robert D. 239, 240, 241, 341 Brulle, Robert J. 341
Benhabib, Seyla 82, 151 Brush, Lisa 137
Bennett, Marion 631 Brustein, William 13
Bentham, Jeremy 116–127 Bryce, James 227, 266
Bentley, Arthur 55, 56 Bryson, Valerie 138
Berelson, Bernard 203, 204, 228, 230, 238 Bubeck, Diemut 139–140
Berezin, Mabel 127 Buchanan, Patrick 631, 632
Berger, Peter 62 Burch, Philip 314
Bergesen, Albert 83 Burke, Edmund 116, 266
Berle, Adolf A. 312, 324, 325, 327, 329 Burris, Val 220
Berlusconi, Silvio 2, 283 Burstein, Paul 242, 288–289, 343, 345, 349, 553
Bernstein, Basil 8 Bush, President George, 470
Bernstein, Eduard 73, 76 Bush, President George W. 326, 521, 632, 651
Betancourt, 472 Butler, David 231
Betz, Hans-Georg 284 Butler, Judith 155
Bey, Deborah 23 Button, James 343, 345
Beyer, Janice M. 278 Buzzell, Timothy 5
Biersack, Robert 219–220
Bimber, Bruce 354 Calhoun, Craig 122, 155, 408
Birchfield, Vicki 61 Calvert, Randall 179
Bismarck, 509, 643 Cameron, David 60, 64
Blair, Tony 214, 272, 283 Campbell, Angus 203, 204, 228, 230–231
Blake, William 14 Campbell, John L. 6–7, 63
Blau, Peter 7, 11, 41, 42, 44, 313 Campbell, Karen E. 345
Blee, Kathleen 11 Cárdenas, Lázaro 479
Block, Fred 60, 62, 322, 325, 514 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 602
Bloomquist, Leonard E. 573 Carrillo, Santiago 395
Blossfield, H.P. 520, 523 Carrington, Peter J. 328
Blumer, Herbert 227, 242, 335 Carruthers, Bruce 339
Boas, Franz 56 Carson, Rachel 118
Bobo, Lawrence D. 560, 562 Carter, Jimmy 209, 467, 470
Boix, Charles 61, 62, 64, 282 Castañeda, Jorge 418
Bond, Doug 333, 589 (2001) Castell, 142
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo 5, 563 Castells, Manuel 579
Booth, Alan 573 Castles, Francis G. 515, 519, 613
Booth, Karen 152 Castles, Stephen 635
Boris, Eileen 142 Castro, Fidel 416, 417, 471, 636
Borland, Elizabeth 46, 180 Cayer, N. Joseph 489
Boswell, Terry 83, 574, 670 Catherine the Great 634
Bottomore, Tom 4 Ceauşescu, Nicolae 417, 470, 529
Boudon, Raymond 8 Centeno, Miguel Angel 573
Bourdieu, Pierre 1, 8, 17, 73, 91–93, 95, 123, 125 Chalaby, Jean 361
Brachet-Marquez, Viviane 25 Chappell, Marisa 553
Brady, Henry E. 213 Charlemagne 568
Braun, Werner von 634 Charlot, Jean 268
Braungart, Richard 4 Chase-Dunn, Christopher 83, 670
Brents, 514 Cheru, Fantu 604
Brewer, John 379 Chiang, 417
P1: JZP
Name Index 787
Chirot, Daniel 83 Dı́az, 417

Chiu, John S. 315 Dı́az, Legorreta 473
Chodorow, Nancy 124 Dicey, A.V. 227
Chomsky, Noam 163, 354, 360 Dietz, Mary 148
Chong, Dennis 14, 180, 181–182, 183 Dietz, Thomas M. 285
Chorley, Katharine 409 Dilthey, Wilhelm 116
Chwe, Michael 179–180 Deacon, Bob 520
Citrin, Jack 631–640 De Beer, Paul 519
Clark, Terry Nichols 228, 273, 279 de Bourbon, Henri (the future king Henri IV) 371
Clawson, Dan 222, 223, 224, 327 de Gaulle, Charles 268
Clemens, Elizabeth 4, 7, 20, 58–59, 62, 63, 64, 70, de la Rua, Fernando 624
578 Deloria, Vine Jr. 600
Clinton, President William J. 63, 240, 272, 273, 322, Derrida, Jacques 8, 20, 118, 153, 162, 169
361, 362, 521 Dexter, Lewis Anthony 312, 314, 317
Clovis, King 646 Dill, William 502
Cloward, Richard A. 18, 29, 211 Di Maggio, Paul 62, 498
Cohen, Bernard 351 di Palma, Giuseppe 396
Cohen, Stanley 122 Disraeli, Prime Minister Benjamin 116
Cohen, Steven 220 Dixon, William J. 574
Cole, Tom 277 Dixon-Mueller, Ruth 539
Coleman, James Dobratz, Betty 1, 5
Coleridge, 116 Dogan, Mattei 273
Collier, 65, 395 Dollfus, Englebert 464
Collins, Randall 36, 88–89, 92, 95, 190, 333–334, Domhoff, G. William 1, 4, 55, 58, 74–75, 78, 93, 99,
409–410, 566, 571, 582, 583 220, 293, 316, 317, 318, 322, 323–324, 326, 328,
Colomy, Paul 67 514, 570
Connell, R.W. 122–123, 137 Domı́nguez, Jorge 388
Converse, Phillip E. 228, 230–231, 238, 239, 240 Donald, David 549
Cooley, David E. 315 Douglas, Mary 7, 120
Cooney, Mark 573 Douglass, Frederick 631
Cornell, Stephen 188–189, 190 Dowse, Robert 4
Coser, Lewis 4, 41 Downing, Brian 24, 367, 378–379, 380, 576
Costain, Anne N. 337, 345 Downs, Anthony 174, 182, 204, 487, 489, 496
Cox, Gary W. 282 Drainville, Andre 599
Crane, Diana 115 Droysen, Gustav 371
Cress, Daniel M. 338, 339 Duncan, George 523
Crepaz, Markus M.L. 61 Duncan, Otis Dudley 313
Crosby, Gretchen C. 561 Du Bois, W.E.B. 549
Crowley, William 472 Dudziak, Mary 550
Curran, James 354 Dunlop, 490
Cuyvers, Ludo 328 Durkheim, Emile 17, 44, 50, 125, 178, 180, 249, 413,
445, 454, 569
Dahl, Robert A. 36, 37, 55–56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 97, Duvalier, 469
291, 312, 319, 327, 330, 427–428, 429, 433, 442 Duverger, Maurice 268, 276
Dahrendorf, Ralph 87–88, 313, 316, 327 Dworkin, Ronald 148
Danziger, Sheldon 523 Dye, Thomas 4, 283
Dalton, Russell 267, 341
da Silva, President 603 Eber, Christine E. 602
Davila, Carlos 328 Edelman, Murray 8, 130, 283
Davis, Gerald F. 318, 323, 324–326 Edwards, James 632, 640
Davis, James A. 238 Einstein, Albert 634
Davis, Kingsley 630 Eisenhower President 575
Dawe, Alan 51 Eisenstadt, S. N. 4, 67, 98
Dawley, Alan 419 Eisinger, Peter K. 336, 345
Dawson, Michael C. 205 Elder, Glen H. 572
Dayan, Daniel 362 Eley, (1995) 464
De Barbieri, Teresita 539, 540 Elias, Norbert 566, 568–569, 582, 583
Diamond, Larry 396 Eliasoph, Nina 128
P1: JZP
788 Name Index
Ellikson, Robert 180 Franco, Francisco 390, 391, 444, 464, 466, 467, 474,
Elms, Laurel 213 477
Elshtain, Jean B. 139 Frank, Andre Gunder 407
Elster, Jon 172, 181, 183 Franklin, Grace 482, 487, 494
Emerson, Richard 11, 41, 42 Fraser, Michael R. 553
Engles, Charles W. 553 Fraser, Nancy 141, 144, 149, 150
Engels, Friedrich 73, 77, 269 Franzese, Robert J. 515
Epstein, Leon 276, 277, 278, 285 Frederick the Great 367, 373–379
Erikson, Robert S. 241, 242 Frederickson, George M. (see below; like this in biblio)
Eriksson, Robert 520 550
Ertman, Thomas 24, 110, 367, 369, 378, 379–380, 382, Fredrickson, George M. 547, 555
383 Freeman, Gary P. 635, 636–638, 639, 640, 646–647
Escott, Paul 550 Frenkel-Brunswik, Else 232
Esping-Andersen, Gösta 25–26, 78, 79, 112, 145–147, Freud, Sigmund 120, 162
244, 282, 510, 512, 519, 523, 608, 613 Freudenberg, William 343, 344
Etzioni Amitai 37 Friedland, Roger 4, 5, 6, 7, 22, 60–61
Etzioni-Halevy, Eva 284 Friedman, Milton 16
Etzinger, Hans 648 Frymer, Paul 559
Evans, Geoffrery 228 Fujimori, Alberto 624, 625
Evans, Peter 1, 4, 27, 98, 375, 381, 469, 492, 496, 660 Furet, François 127
Fairbank, 463 Galbraith, John Kenneth 311, 327

Fairclough, Norman 158 Gallagher, Mary Elizabeth 319
Falasca-Zamponi, Simonetta 127 Gamson, William 1, 2, 37, 43, 128, 239–240, 245, 332,
Falk, Richard 583 336–337, 342, 343
Farhi, Farideh 404 Gans, Herbert 359
Farley, Reynolds 192 Ganz, M. 661
Faulks, Keith 4 Garand, James 58
Feldt, Kjell-Olof 616 Garfield, President James 549
Fennema, Meindert 632 Garrett, Geoffrey 60, 175, 178, 607
Ferejohn, John 183, 380 Garvey, Gerald 482
Fernández Miranda, Torcuato 395 Gaudet, Hazel 228, 238
Ferre, Myra Marx 141 Geertz, Clifford 56, 116, 120, 252
Ferrera, Maurizio 519 Gellner, Ernest 247–248
Fetzer, Joel 639, 640 Gentile, Giovanni 463
Fields, Barbara 549 George III 55
Fine, Gary 17 Gerber, Alan 210
Fine, Terri Susan 279 Gerteis, Joseph 198
Finer, Samuel 427, 428, 429, 433 Ghandi, (Mahattma) 345
Finifter, Ada 230 Giddens, Anthony 26, 34, 35, 37, 39, 47, 50, 51, 62,
Fiorina, Morris 204 64, 123, 125, 134, 570, 571
Fischer, Claude S. 572 Gilbert, Felix 371
Fischer, Roger 13 Gill, Stephen 670
Fishkin, James 239 Gilmore, Glenda 551
Fitzgerald, Keith 636, 645, 653 Gimbel, Cynthia 573
Flacks, Richard 117 Gimpel, James 632, 640
Flavio de Almeida, Lucio 603 Gitlin, Todd 117, 130
Fligstein, Neil 131 Giugni, Marco 335
Flora, Peter 509 Glasberg, Davita 75
Foner, Eric 549 Glendon, Mary 148
Foran, John 130, 404 Glenn, Evelyn Nakano 142
Ford, Gerald President 362 Glennie, Elizabeth 635–636, 646–647
Form, William 23, 267 Goffman, Erving 349
Foucault, Michel 1, 8, 14, 17, 20, 35, 50, 118, 126, 137, Goldberg, David T. 187, 194, 195, 562
155, 158–159, 162, 170, 382 Goldstone, Jack A. 130, 333, 343, 404, 409, 571, 577
Fox (1994) 469 Goldthorpe, John H. 229, 273, 520
Fraga, Manuel 395 Gompers, Samuel 631, 633
France, Anatole 46 Goodin, Robert
P1: JZP
Name Index 789
Goodliffe, Jay 223 Heimann, Eduard 520

Goodwin, Jeff 24, 99, 104, 112, 130, 409, 473 Heinz, John 58, 59, 62
Gordon, Linda 141, 528, 529 Heitlinger, Alena 542
Gorski, Philip 10, 24, 131, 173, 378, 381, 382, 383, Heisler, Barbara 630
653 Held, David 589, 591, 594–596, 650
Gosnell, Harold F. 209 Helms, Ronald 346
Gottschalk, Peter 523 Henderson, David 238
Gould, Roger 67, 181 Herman, Edward S. 315, 325, 354, 360
Gouldner, Alvin 36, 46 Hernes, Helga 147, 522
Graber, Doris (not in bibliography) 283 Herodotus 128
Gramsci, Antonio 4, 82, 122, 159, 160, 163, 464, 466, Herron, Michael 210
657 Hibbs, Douglas 60, 64, 204
Granados, Francisco 23, 58–59, 267 Hicks, Alexander 4, 9, 18, 25–26, 60, 61, 63, 65, 70,
Granberg, Ellen M. 345 80, 442, 510, 514, 515, 516, 517, 519, 617
Granovetter, Mark 173, 174 Hill, Christopher 47
Great Elector 371 Hill, Samuel 230
Green, Donald 173, 183, 210 Hinchliffe, Joseph 242
Greenfeld, Liah 22 Hintze, Otto 19, 24, 97, 367–369, 370–371, 372, 376,
Greenstein, Fred 378, 379, 380, 382, 383
Grief, Avner 183 Hiroshi, Kume 363
Grier, Kevin 225 Hitler, Adolf 254, 461, 464, 477
Gross, Michael L. 573 Hixson, William B., Jr.
Guevara, Ernesto (Che) 419, 471 Hjelmslev, Louis 153
Gurr, Ted Robert 404 Hobbes, Thomas 34, 35, 36, 39, 138, 178
Gusfield, Joseph 232 Hobsbawm, Eric 247, 248
Guttman, Louis 569 Hobson, Barbara 20, 30, 138
Hodgson, Dennis 540
Haas, Peter M. 132 Hoffmann-Martinot, Vincent 279
Habermas, Jürgen 81–82, 121–122, 128, 144, Höfle, Hermann 481
158–159 Hofstadter, Richard 232, 236
Hacker, J. S. 515 Hollifield, James 648
Haggard, Stephan 623 Holmes, Geoffrey 379
Haider, Jörg 461, 475, 480 Homans, George 11
Hall, Peter 519 Honneth, Axel 82
Hall, Stuart 122 Hooks, Gregory 26, 573, 575
Hallin, Daniel 355, 360, 362 Hopcroft, Rosemary 176
Hammer, Fannie Lou 552 Horkheimer, Max 81, 121
Haney, Lynn 526 Hout, Michael 213
Hansen, John M. 212, 213, 555 Howarth, David 165
Hansen, Randall 630, 631, 639 Howell, William G. 561
Hantrais, Linda 535 Huber Stephens, Evelyne 27, 80, 111, 465–466, 515,
Hardin, Garrett 517, 519, 618
Hardin, Russell 175, 184 Huckfelt, Robert 205
Hardt, Michael 2, 84, 94 Hughes, John 4
Hartlyn, Jonathan 388 Hunt, Lynn 127
Hartmann, Douglas 188–189, 190 Hunter, Floyd 56, 311
Hartmann, Heidi 136 Huntington, Samuel 98, 99, 387, 390, 404, 406
Harvey, Neil 473, 601 Hussein, Sadam 470, 478, 480, 580
Hay, Colin 607 Husserl, Edmund 50
Heath, Anthony 201, 206, 214, 216, 232 Hutchinson, Jenny 553
Heclo, Hugh 517
Hebdige, Dick 122 Ikegami, Eiko 131
Heberle, Rudolph 335 Inglehart, Ronald 8, 61, 119, 229, 232, 235, 236, 243,
Hechter, Michael 46, 180 245, 269
Heckscher, Charles 13 Inkeles, Alex 237
Hegel, Georg F. W. 82, 443 Ireland, Patrick 636
Heidegger, Martin 117 Irons, Jenny 553
Heidenheimer, 509 Isherwood, Baron 7
P1: JZP
790 Name Index
Iversen, Torben 57, 60, 62, 63–64, 519, 523 Kirchheimer, Otto 121, 272, 276
Kiser, Edgar 14, 20, 30, 175, 177, 178, 183, 381, 382,
Jackman, Mary R. 560, 561–562 383
Jacob, Charles 489 Kitschelt, Herbert 269, 270, 338
Jacobs, David 242, 346 Kittel, Bernhard 456
Jacobs, Jane 118 Klingemann, Hans-Dieter
James, David R. 20, 22, 26, 195, 315, 554 Klinker, Philip 279
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall 283 Klugman, Joshua 22, 26
Janoski, Thomas 4, 9, 19, 27, 40, 80, 147, 148, Knight, Frank 14
426–427, 430, 510, 517, 591, 635–636, 646–647 Knight, Jack 175
Janowitz, Morris 4, 26, 570 Knoke, David 23, 58, 59, 70, 267, 303, 322, 326–327
Jasper, James 19–20, 338 Koenigsberger, Helmuth 369
Jasso, Guillermina 44 Kohli, Martin 523
Jaynes, Arthur 343 Kohn, Hans 22, 247
Jefferson, Thomas 313 Kolker, Aliza 4
Jenkins, J. Craig 23, 267, 333, 337, 345, 514, 574 Koresh, Yael 572
Johnson, Chalmers 404, 406 Kornhauser, William 232
Johnston, Hank 240, 341 Korpi, Walter 63, 78–79, 80, 146, 147, 282, 515, 521,
Johnson, President Lyndon 521, 558 617
Jones, K. 143 Kourvetaris, George 4
Joppke, Christian 638, 651 Kousser, J. Morgan 550, 551, 555
Jordan, A. Grant 290 Kowalewski, David 573
Jordan, Barbara 631 Kposowa, Augustine J. 574
Jowell, Roger 239 Krehbiel, Keith 175
Krysan, Maria 560
Kahneman, Daniel 179 Kuhn, Thomas 117
Kaiser Wilhelm II 266 Kuhne, Raymond 359
Kalberg, Stephen 15 Kupe, Tawana 359
Kamerschen, David R. 315 Kuran, Timar 182
Kane, Joshua 175 Kymlicka, Will 148, 149–150
Kantrowitz, Stephen 549, 551
Katz, Elihu 362 Lacan, Jacques 8, 10, 120
Katz, Mark 404 Laclau, Ernesto 20, 63, 82–83, 94, 155, 159–165,
Katz, Richard S. 270, 274, 276, 283 167–168, 169
Katzenstein, Peter 60, 61, 62, 64 Lake, Marilyn 529
Katznelson, Ira 100, 229, 269 Lamont, Michèle 128
Kaufman, Jason 269, 520 Lane, Robert E. 239, 245, 489
Kaufman, Robert 623, 625 Lange, Peter 60
Kautsky, Karl 73, 76 La Porta, Rafael 315, 327–328
Keane, John 82 Larner, Robert J. 314, 315
Kearney, Dennis 633, 638 Lasswell, Harold D. 488, 569
Keats, John 14 Lawler, Edward 11, 13
Keck, Margaret E. 661, 667 Lawrence, Regina 358
Keister, Lisa 328 Lawson, Kay 22, 274, 283, 286
Kenis, Patrick 302 Lay, Kenneth 326
Kennedy, Edward 631 Laub, John H. 572
Kenworthy, Lane 25, 456, 514–517, 519 Laumann, Edward 58, 70, 303, 322, 326–327
Keuchler, Manfred 267 Lazarsfeld, Paul 203, 228, 229, 230, 233, 234, 238, 569
Key, V. O. 56, 212 Lebeaux, Charles Nathan 65, 514
Khomeini, Imam 248 Lechner, Frank 18, 442
Kiewiet, Roderick 204 Lehman, Edward W. 4, 556
Killian, Lewis 336 Leifer, Eric 173
Kim, Jae-On 234 Leighley, Jan 210, 213
Kimmerling, Baruch 4 Lenin, Nikolai 353
Kinder, Donald R. 204, 562 Lenin, Vladimir 74, 163, 485, 563
King, Leslie 22, 26 Leno, Jay 353
King, Martin Luther 340 Le Pen, Jean Marie 461, 475, 480, 529, 638
Kingston, Paul 226 Letterman, David 353
P1: JZP
Name Index 791
Levi, Margaret 179, 183, 184, 380–381, 382 Mahoney, James 4

Levinson, Daniel J. 232 Mair, Peter 206, 276, 277, 283
Lévi-Strauss, Claude 120, 121, 127 Major, John 302
Lewin, Lief 12 Majstorovic, Steven 345
Lewinsky, Monica 361 Mandel, Eric 407
Leys, Colin 595 Mann, Michael 26, 39, 47, 89–91, 93, 95, 100,
Liberman, Robert C. 110–111, 367, 377, 378, 566, 570, 571, 576, 579
Lichbach, Mark 181 Mannheim, Karl 133, 572
Lichtenstein, Nelson 46 Manza, Jeffrey 22, 213, 214, 216, 228, 271, 272, 273,
Lichter, Linda S. 360 555, 558–559
Lichter, S. Robert 360 Mao 256, 463, 477
Lieberman, Robert C. 190, 556–557, 558 Mara-Drita, Iona 131
Liebert, Ulrike 152 March, James G. 280
Lijphart, Arend 61, 64, 281 Marcos, Ferdinand 417, 469, 470
Lincoln, Abraham 572 Marcos, Subcomandante 601
Lindbeck, Assar 244 Marcuse, Herbert 81, 121
Lindblom, Charles 61, 62, 64, 291, 322, 327, 330, 489 Marger, Martin 4
Lindenberg, Siegwart 181, 183 Marinho, Luis 662
Lindenfeld, Frank 4 Markoff, John 24
Lindholm, Marika 138 Marks, Gary 282
Ling, Peter J. 553 Marsh, David 302
Linz, Juan 98, 233, 234, 385, 388, 391, 396, 462, Marshall, Dale 345
467–468, 477–478 Marshall, T.H. 143, 144–147, 148, 426, 446, 510–511,
Lipset, Seymour Martin 1, 64, 98, 111, 203, 204, 227, 513, 520, 590–591
228–232, 233–234, 235, 240, 245, 266, 267, Martell, Luke 4
268–269, 270, 280, 313, 327, 372, 384, 385, 419, Martin, Cathy 515
520 Marwell, Gerald 340
Lipsius, Justus 371 Marx, Anthony 551
Lipsky, David 343 Marx, Karl 4, 17, 73, 77, 85, 86, 87, 116, 202, 247,
Lipsmeyer, Christine S. 520 248, 353, 367, 371, 372, 373–379, 404, 407, 419,
Lipstadt, Deborah 360 425–426, 484, 496, 569, 600
Lis, Catharina 49 Maslow, Abraham 236
List, Friedrich 260 Matear, Ann 536
Lister, Ruth 147, 151 Massey, Douglas 556
Litwack, Leon 549 Matthews, Donald R. 554
Locke, John 138 Mauss, Marcel 224
Lodge, Henry Cabot 631 Mayhew, David R. 282
Lohmann, Susanne 175, 343 Mayor Lee 55
Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio 315, 327 Mazey, Sonia 305–306
Lord Bolingbroke 266 Mazzoleni, Gianpietro 355
Lowi, Theodore 99, 107, 502 McAdam, Doug 337, 339, 340, 341, 344, 348, 552,
Luckmann, Thomas 62 553
Luebbert, Gregory M. 466–467 McCammon, Holly 345, 348
Luebke, Paul 5 McCarthy, John 336, 470
Luhmann, Niklas 69 McCubbins, Mathew 176, 282
Luke, Tim 15 McDaniel, Tim 404
Lukes, Steven 35, 51, 60, 61 McDonald, Michael P. 212
Luskin, Robert 239 McGarry, John 197
Lynch, L. 639 McGuire, James W. 627
Lyotard, Jean-Francois 8 McIntosh, Mary 136
McIver, John Paul 241
Macfarlane, Alan 128 McKelvey, Richard D. 184
Macfarquhar, 463 McKinlay, Robert 515
MacKinnon, Catherine 137 McMichael, Philip 26–27, 598, 656
MacKuen, Michael 241, 242 McMillen, Neil R. 553
Machiavelli, Niccolo 34 McPhee, William N. 230
Madison, James 266, 442 Mead George Herbert 82
Mahnkopf, Birgit 598 Means, Gardiner C. 312, 324, 325, 327, 329
P1: JZP
792 Name Index
Meeusen, Wim 328 Nader, Ralph 281

Melado, General Gutiérrez 395 Nagel, Joane 190–191
Mendes, Chico 667 Nagler, Jonathan 213
Menem, Carlos Saúl 389, 624–625 Nash, Diane 552
Merton, Robert 9, 65, 95 Nash, Kate 4
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo 520, 621 Negri, Antonio 2, 84, 94
Messick, Richard E. 65 Nelson, Robert 58
Metternich, 443 Nettl, J.P. 483
Meyer, David S. 332–333, 338 Neumann, Sigmund 121, 267, 279
Meyer, John W. 131, 566, 583 Neustadtl, Alan 224–225, 327
Meyers, Eytan 630 Nie, Norman H. 234
Michels, Robert 86, 87, 176, 266, 275–276, 279, 450 Nietzche, Friedrich 8, 260
Miliband, Ralph 74, 75–76, 77, 78, 98, 316, 327, 328 Nieuwbeerta, P. 214
Mill, John Stuart 385 Nisbet, Robert 34
Miller, John 661 Niskanen, William 176
Miller, Mark 635 Nixon, President Richard M. 343, 485, 558, 559
Miller, Warren E. 142, 228, 230–231 Noriega, Manuel 478
Mills, C. Wright 36, 37, 55, 65, 311, 316, 419, 570, 578 North, Douglas 3, 176, 380–381
Milosevich, Slobadan 650 Oakeshott, Michael 116
Minow, Martha 140 Oberschall, Anthony 36, 37, 173, 336
Mintz, Beth 318, 319, 325, 328 O’Connor, James 62, 77, 295
Mintzberg, Henry 493 O’Connor, Julia 11
Misra, Joya 11, 22, 26, 60, 61, 63, 70, 80 O’Donnell, Guillermo 393, 467–468, 477
Mizruchi, Mark 23, 222, 316, 318, 320–321, 324, 325, Oestreich, Gerhard 371, 382
327, 328 Offe, Klaus 76–77, 78, 290, 510
Moaddel, Mansoor 574 Ogliastri, Enrique 328
Mobutu 469, 470 Ohmae, Kenichi 486
Moe, Terry 173, 174–175 Okin, Susan M. 148–149
Moghadam, Valentine M. 533, 541, 544 Oliver, Pamela E. 240, 340, 341
Mohanty, Chandra 665 Olsen, Johan P.
Mondale, Walter 221 Olson, Mancur 181, 235, 280, 296–297, 450–451,
Money, Jeannette 636, 639 496
Monroe, J. P. 278 Olzak, Susan 633
Monsen, R. Joseph 315 Omi, Michael 187, 188, 189–190, 193–194, 565, 639
Monteith, Sharon 553 Opp, Karl-Dieter 180, 182
Montesquieu, 128 Orloff, Ann Shola 4, 7, 11, 20, 80, 101–102, 105, 527
Moore, Barrington 4, 26, 52, 98, 367, 372, 376, Orum, Anthony 4, 115
384–385, 404, 408, 413, 426, 465–466, 490, 550, Osborne, Thomas 227
570 Ost, David 520
Moran, Michael 173 Ostrogorski, Mosei 266, 275
Morgan, J. P. 312, 315 Ostrom, Elinor 175–176
Moro, Aldo 130 Oszlak, Oscar 25, 483, 490, 491
Morris, Aldon 343, 552, 553 Outhwaite, William 4
Mosca, Gaetano 86, 87 Overlacker, Louise 216
Mouffe, Chantal 10, 20, 63, 82–83, 94, 155, Owen, Dennis 230
159–164 Ozouf, Mona 127
Mowery, Christine 345
Mudde 474, 475–476 Page, Benjamin 237
Mueller, Adam 443 Paige, Jeffery 56, 404, 408–409
Mueller, Carole 346 Paine, Thomas 510
Munger, Michael 225 Paine, Tom 645
Murphy, Raymond 89 Paletz, David L.
Musil, Robert 118 Palme, Joachim 80, 521, 617
Mussolini, Benito 13, 116, 127, 444, 463, 464 Palmer, Donald 315
Mutz, Diana C. 209 Palmer, John 315
Myles, John 608, 617 Pampel, Fred 61, 65, 518, 520
Myrdal, Gunnar 553 Panebianco, Angelo 268, 275, 276, 278
Pappi, Franz Urban 303
P1: JZP
Name Index 793
Pareto, Vilfredo 86–87 Quadagno, Jill 1, 322, 514–517, 556

Parikh, Sunita 514 Quirk, Paul J. 242
Park, Robert 335
Parkin, Frank 89, 128, 236 Rabin, Yitzhak 362
Parks, Rosa 552 Ragin, Charles 4, 515, 517
Parsa, Misagh 404 Ratcliff, Kathryn 319
Parsons, Talcott 36, 44, 50, 65–68, 69, 72, 86, 93, 94, Ratcliff, Richard E. 315, 318, 319
98, 100, 268, 313, 498 Rawls, John 148
Passeron 17 Reagan, President Ronald 184, 244, 302, 338, 470,
Patel, Raj 600 472, 473, 486, 618, 631
Pateman, Carole 138–139, 522 Redding, Kent 20, 22, 26, 281, 551
Patterson, Thomas E. 283 Reed, Adolph, Jr. 565
Paul, Shuva 342 Regnerus, M. 210
Paxton, Pamela 402 Reinarman, Craig 239
Pavalko, Eliza K. 572 Reiter, Dan 575
Payne, 466–467, 476 Renan, Ernest 247, 251
Pêcheaux, Michel 158 Reuschemeyer, Dietrich
Pedersen, Ove 6–7, 269 Rhoades, Gary 67
Pepper, Stephen 7 Rhodes, R.A.W. 302
Peres, Wilson 623 Rice, James 26
Perkin, Harold Rieger, Cheryl 572
Perman, Michael 549 Richardson, Jeremy J. 290, 305–306
Perot, Ross 281 Riesman, David 313
Perrow, Charles 337, 345 Riker, William 175, 245
Peters, Guy 497 Rimlinger, Gaston V. 509
Petras, James 1 Ritchie, Mark 603
Pfaff, Steve 178 Ripley, Randall 482, 487, 494
Piazza, Thomas 561 Rivera, Primo de 466
Picard, Robert G. 283 Robinson (not in bibliography) 587
Pierson, Paul 61, 80, 107, 112, 184–185, 244, 515, 608, Robnett, Belinda 552, 553
618 Roche, Jeff 553
Pinochet, Augusto 471, 580, 624, 650 Rochford, Burke 239, 240
Piven, Frances Fox 18, 29, 211 Rockefeller, John D. 312, 315
Platt, Gerald M. 553 Roemer, John 172
Poggi, Gianfranco 376 Rogers, Mary 63
Polanco, Diaz 473 Rogers, Will 275
Polanyi, Karl 27, 510, 588, 591, 592–593, 598 Rokkan, Stein 59, 60, 98, 111, 268–269, 270, 280,
Pollock, Frederick 121 367, 372, 374, 376, 377, 380
Polsby, Nelson 56, 57 Rommele, Andrea 269
Pool, Ithiel de Sola 312, 314, 317 Romer, Thomas 225
Poole, Keith 279 Roney, Frank 638
Popkin, Samuel 212 Ronning, Helge 356
Poster, Mark 155 Roosevelt, President Theodore 510, 519
Poulantzas, Nicos 60, 75–76, 77, 98, 159, 319–320, Root, Hilton 381, 382, 383
321, 323, 327, 328 Rose, Arnold 61, 62, 317
Poulsen, Jane D. 338 Rose, Nikolas 227
Powell, G. Bingham 281 Rose, Richard 282
Powell, Walter 62, 498 Rosenberg, Justin 597
Power, C. 4 Rosenfeld, Susan 116–127
Power, Margaret 528 Rosenthal, Howard
Prechel, Harland 75 Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent 183, 279, 380
Prethus, Robert 37, 494 Rosenstone, Steven 212, 213, 271
Prothro, James Warren 554 Rostow, Walt 406
Przeworski, Adam 36, 60, 64, 111–112, 113, 215, 229, Rothman, Stanley 360
384, 385, 393, 470, 482 Rouhana, Nadim 196
Pulver, Simone 667 Rouquié, Alain 469
Putnam, Robert (not in bibliography) 61, 119 Rourke, Francis 482
Putin, Vladimir 257, 258 Rousseau, Jean Jacques 34, 116, 138, 143, 258, 442
P1: JZP
794 Name Index
Rowan, Brian 131 Sears, David O. 562

Rubio-Marin, Ruth 636 Segal, David R. 577
Rueschmeyer, Dietrich 1, 4, 80, 98, 111, 375, 381, Segura-Ubiergo, Alex 520, 625
465–466 Sekhon, Jasjeet 210
Ruggie, John 60, 659, 669 Selbin, Eric 404
Ruiz Sanchez, Felix 603 Selznick, Philip 495
Russell, Bertrand 35 Sen, Amartya 147
Sewell, William 7, 9, 61
Sachs, Jeffrey 598 Shah of Iran 390, 416, 417, 469, 470
Sachs, Wolfgang 600 Shalev, Michael 79
Saguy, Abigail C. 529 Shanks, Cheryl 639
Said, Edward 130 Shapiro, Ian 183, 238, 242
Sainsbury, Diane 526 Shaver, Shelia 11, 145
Salazar, Oliveira 444, 464 Shavit, Yossi 520, 523, 572
Salinas, Carlos 601 Sheehan, Robert 314
Salisbury, Robert 58 Shefter, Martin 58
Sampson, Robert J. 572 Shepsle, Kenneth 175, 184
Sanford, R. Nevitt 232 Sherman, Arnold 4
Sanjurjo, General 465 Sherman, R. 661
Santoro, Wayne 345, 553 Shils, Edward 252
Sartori, Giovanni 229, 267 Shiva, Vandana 600
Sartre, Jean Paul 150 Shleifer, Andrei 315, 327
Sassen, Saskia 599 Sigal, Leon 357
Sauder, Michael 22 Sigismund, Johann 371
Saussure, Ferdinand de 120, 153 Siim, Birte 147
Scarro, Susan E. 276 Sikkink, Kathryn 661, 667
Schaffner, Brian F. 282 Silverstein, Helen 345
Scharpf, Fritz W. 519, 523, 607, 614, 617 Simmel, Georg 11, 45
Schattschneider, E. E. 55, 57, 99, 282 Simmons, Beth 615
Scheler, Max 260 Simon, Herbert 179
Schelling, Thomas 116, 178, 179 Simon, J. 639
Schermerhorn, Richard Alomzo 189 Simon, Rita 639
Schill, Michael H. 556 Simpson, Senator 633
Schlesinger, Joseph 227, 267 Skrentny, John David 553
Schmidt, Vivien A. 519, 523, 617 Skidmore, Dan 75
Schmidtt, Carl 116, 161 Skocpol, Theda 1, 2, 4, 15, 19, 26, 56, 63, 80, 98–99,
Schmitter, Felippe 393, 441, 450 101–102, 103, 105–107, 108, 110, 129, 138, 240,
Schneider, Joachim 381, 382, 383 241, 280, 322, 372, 373, 375–376, 381, 404, 409,
Schneider, Volker 178, 302 413, 514, 570, 571, 577
Scholzman, Kay Lehman 213 Skowronek, Stephen 58
Schram, Sanford 45 Smelser, Neil 66–67, 336
Schudson, Michael 23 Smith, Adam 34, 72, 174, 178, 443
Schumaker, Paul 344 Smith, Anthony 127, 247, 248–249, 250
Schuman, Howard 560, 562, 572 Smith, Dorothy 142
Schumpeter, Joseph 86, 311, 313, 314, 327 Smith, Mark A. 242
Schuschnigg, Kurt von 464 Smith, Martin 302
Schut, Jean Marie Wildeboer 519 Smith, Rogers 551
Schutz, Alfred 123 Smooha, Sammy 196
Schwartz, Barry 572, 573 Sniderman, Paul M. 561, 562
Schwartz, Michael 38, 318, 319, 325, 328, 342 Snow, David A. 120, 125, 182, 239, 240, 338, 339, 341
Schwartz, Mildred 4, 267, 278 Snyder, James M. 225, 409, 470
Schwartz, Thomas 176 Sohrabi, Nader 9
Scott, Jack 279 Soly, Hugo 49
Scott, James C. 42, 44, 131, 414 Sohrabi, Nader 573
Scott, Joan 664 Sombart, Werner 269
Scott, John 327, 328 Somers, Margaret 15, 173
Scott, Richard 271 Somoza, Anastasio 417, 469, 472, 502
Scruggs, Lyle 617 Soysal, Yasemin 633, 646–647, 648, 650, 651
P1: JZP
Name Index 795
Soref, Michael 315, 319 Thränhardt, Dietrich 648

Soroka, Stuart 242 Thucydides 128
Soskice, David 519, 612 Tichenor, Daniel 631
Souder, Michael 271 Tillman, Ben 551
Sparr, Pamela 533 Tilly, Charles 15, 24–25, 26, 37, 40, 95, 98, 124, 337,
Spencer, Herbert 17, 569 338, 367, 371, 374–377, 378, 380, 382, 396, 404,
Sprague, John 205, 215 418, 484, 568, 579, 597, 669
Stacey, Judith 232 Titmuss, Richard 511, 512, 541
Stack, Carol 44 Tocqueville, Alexis de 55, 56, 128, 227, 244, 383, 401,
Staël, Madame de 116 414–415
Stalin, Joseph 121, 254, 472, 477 Torfing, Jacob 20
Stallings, Barbara 623 Tossutti, Livianna A. 285
Stam, Allan 575 Townsend, Peter 521
Starr, Paul 191 Traxler, Franz 458
Stedile, Joâo Pedro 602, 603, 604 Trelease, Allen W. 550
Stedman-Jones, Garth 8, 15 Trevelyan, 55
Steeh, Charlotte 560 Trice, Harrison M. 278
Steinmetz, George 4, 10, 131, 381 Trimberger, Ellen Kay 404
Steinmo, Sven 105–106, 108, 110 Tronto, Joan 139
Stepan, Alfred 386, 391, 396, 399, 467 Troeltsch, Ernst 370
Stephens, John D. 27, 80, 111, 234–235, 282, 465, 466, Trotsky, Leon 405, 408, 410
515, 516, 517, 519, 618 Truman, David 55, 56, 97
Stevens, John Trujillo, Rafael 388, 469
Stiglitz, Joseph 598, 655 Truman, Harry 594
Stillman, James 312 Tsebellis, George 13, 175
Stimson, James A. 241–242 Tuchman, Gaye 357
Stinchcombe, Arthur 65, 175, 499, 514 Turner, Brian 143
Stokes, Donald E. 228, 230–231 Turner, Bryan 15, 89, 591
Stomboliski, 466 Turner, Jonathan 4
Stratmann, Thomas 224 Turner, Ralph 336
Streeck, Wolfgang 25, 450 Turner, Stephen 124, 125
Stryker, Robyn 347 Turner, Victor 120
Su, Yang 344, 348 Tversky, Amos 179
Subirats, Joan 497
Sumner, William Graham 549 Uggen, Christopher 555
Swank, Duane 60, 61, 64, 284, 515, 519 Ury, William 13
Swedberg, Richard 15 Useem, Michael 314, 318–319, 323, 324, 325–326,
Sweeny, John 220 327
Sweezy, Paul 62, 315–316, 325 Usui, Chikako 65, 514
Swenson, Peter 514
Swidler, Ann 124 Van den Berg, Axel 19, 94, 196, 197
Verba, Sydney 8, 61, 119, 209, 213, 219,
Tabb, David 345 234
Taft, William Howard 631 Vigotsky, 125
Taira, Koji 328 Vilas, Carlos 404
Tarancón, Cardinal 395 Viterna, Jocelyn S. 281
Tarradellas, Josep 395 Vogel, David 323, 326
Tarrow, Sidney 332–333, 339, 344, 578, 658, 669 Vogel, Ursala 151
Tawney, R.H. 35 Voss, Kim 269, 339, 553, 661
Taylor, Charles 134, 149 Vrooman, Cok 519
Taylor, Verta 332
Teles, Steven M. 555, 558 Wada, Teiichi 328
Teune, Henry 111–112, 113 Wagner-Pacifici, Robin 130, 573
Thatcher, Margaret 160, 184, 302, 486, 517, 631, 656 Waisbord, Silvio 22–23
Thayer, Millie 544, 664–665 Wald, Kenneth 230
Therborn, Goran 510 Waldner, Andrew 177
Thompson, Edward P. 8, 15, 45–46, 52, 53, 115, 122, Waldner, Lisa 5
497, 570 Waller, Willard 41
P1: JZP
796 Name Index
Wallerstein, Immanuel 2, 83, 367, 373, 376, 566, 567, Winant, Howard 187, 188, 189–190, 193–194, 195,
578, 583, 594 562, 565, 639
Wallerstein, Michael 36, 60, 64 Winch, Peter 123
Walton, John 328, 404 Windolf, Paul 328
Wang, Feng Juan 27 Witte, Rob 648
Ware, Alan 278 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 153
Ward, Brian 553 Wlezien, Christopher 242
Washburn, Philo 4 Wolf, Eric 404, 408–409
Washington, President George 645 Womack, 473
Washington, Harold 209 Wood, Elisabeth 420
Watkins, Susan Cotts 540 Woodhouse, Edward 489
Wattenberg, Martin P. 274 Woodman, Harold D. 549
Weakliem, David 22, 205, 214, 238, 559 Worden, Steven 239, 240
Webber, Michael 220 Wright, Erik Olin 7, 63, 245
Weber, Eugen 265, 372 Wright, Gerald 241, 282
Weber, Max 4, 8, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19, 24, 35, 36, 47, 72, Wright, John 307
73, 84–85, 86, 87, 88, 94, 95, 96, 97, 116, 137, 172, Wrong, Dennis 34
173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 186, 202, 232, 267, 275, Wuthnow, Robert 10
332, 367, 369–371, 372, 373, 376, 378, 379, 381,
382, 444–445, 450, 463, 489, 569, 581 Xiaoping, Deng 463
Weiner, Martin J. 128
Weingast, Barry 173, 175, 178, 183, 184, 380 Yang, Guobin 178
Weller, Mark 327 Yeatman, Ann 137–138
Weschler, Louis 489 Yeltsin, Boris 392
Weyland, Kurt 624 Yishai, Yael 267, 270
Whiteley, Paul 228 Young, Iris M. 144, 150
Whitt, J. Allen 317, 319, 320 Young, Michael 331
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy 112, 404, 469 Young, John T. 238
Wilensky, Harold 65, 282, 509, 510, 514 Yuval-Davis, Nira 150, 541
William, Frederick I 367, 371
Williams, Fiona 142 Zald, Mayer N. 336
Williams, Kim M. 192 Zaller, John R. 240
Williams, Raymond 8, 122 Zeigler, Harmon 4
Williamson, Joel 549 Zeitlin, Maurice 1, 314–315, 316, 318
Williamson, John 61, 65, 486, 518, 520, 621 Zhao, Yuzhe 356
Willis, Paul 122 Zimmerman, Joseph F. 281
Wilson, James Q. 296, 636 Žižek, Slavjo 20, 155, 159, 161, 164, 166,
Wilson, President Woodrow 397 167
Wilson, Governor Pete 632, 633 Zorn, Christopher 617
Wilson, William Julius 549, 555–556 Zylan, Yvonne 339
P1: JZP
CB779-SInd.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 August 27, 1956 13:52
Subject Index
abortion policies 542–543 authoritarian regime 25, 232, 467–469, 478–479

accomodationist theory (contingency theory) 19, Bureaucratic authoritarianism 467
75 BA regimes 467
active labor market policy 457, 517 Azerbaijan 471
affirmative action 193, 534, 543, 558–559
Afghanistan 479, 580, 581 bargaining 453, 456–457
agency 134, 136–140 embedded in constraints 13–14
agonistic pluralism 82 multilateral 13
agrarian parties (see political parties) biopower 84
Algeria 45, 417, 422, 478, 641, 642, 647, Black Acts (United Kingdom) 48
650 Bolsheviks vs. Mensheviks 74
Al Queda (see terrorism) bricoulage 14–15
Angola 417 bureaucracy 25, 99, 176–177, 275–276, 278, 482–503
Anomie 260 behavior 493–494, 505
American Federation of Labor and Congress of bureaucratic purposes 487
Industrial Unions (AFL-CIO) 217, 220, 221, bureaucrats, types of 494
307, 634, (AFL) 633 bureaupatholgy 495, 496
American Immigration Lawyers Association capitalist expansion 484
633 civil society 484
American Medical Association 307 clientele constraints 499–501
Americans with Disabilities Act 238 Comparative Administration Group (CAG) 496
anti-abortion policies 542–543 conflict of technology and culture 499
anti-discrimination policies 534–535 constraints 498–504, 505
anti-globalization movements (see counter hegemonic creation (outgrowth of state) 483, 504
movements) culture 498–499
anti-immigrant parties (see extremist parties) definition 465, 489
anti-natalist (population control) policies 538 environment, environmental forces 490–491
Argentina 363, 389, 392, 397, 467, 468, 469, 471, 472, ideal type, Weberian 465, 489
475, 478, 479, 481, 491, 500, 528, 609, 612, interdependence 492
620–621, 622, 623, 624–625, 627 iron cages 496
Arkansas 255 management style 504
armed forces (see military) norms 492, 494
Army School of the Americas 472–478, 479 normative framework 492
Athens 395 policy 495–504
attitudes (see public opinion) political constraints 499–501
Australia 179, 256, 274, 418, 519, 537, 613, 614, 619, power 483, 496–498, 505
628, 634, 635, 639, 641, 647, 664 productivity 488–495, 505
Austria 278, 357, 373, 461, 464, 465, 475, 489, 509, regime constraints 502–504
516, 535, 542, 613 resources 491, 494, 497
Austria-Hungary 466 restructuring Latin American states 486
797
P1: JZP
798 Subject Index
specialization 492 Cancun 606

stateness (externalization, insstitutionalization, capillarity 6, 14, 126
diffusion, capacity) 483 capitalist class influence 221–222 (see also class)
structures 492–493 capacity, governmental (see state capacity)
structural differentiation 492, 494, 501 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 470
taxation 484 challenges to political sociology 5
technology 498 Chamber of Commerce (US) 307
Washington consensus 486 character 116–133
business (see interest groups, and corporations) Chechnya 581
Business for Legal Immigration Coalition 633 Chiapas 473, 601
Chicago 209
Cairo 540 childcare policies 535–536
Calcutta 641 Chile 315, 328, 384, 421, 467, 468, 471, 472, 478, 481,
California 58, 317, 632, 633, 637, 638, 645 491, 528, 580, 595, 609, 612, 620–621, 623,
Cameroon 641 624–625, 627, 628
campaign finance 207–216, 281 China 256, 356, 367, 404, 407, 413, 415, 416, 417,
capitalist class influence 421, 463, 477, 528, 539, 541, 543, 581, 605,
Committee on Political Education (COPE) 217 606, 641–642, 643–644
corruption (vote buying) Civil Rights Act of 1964 553
hard money 217–219 civil society 2, 21–23, 68, 82, 252, 253, 254, 299, 300,
in-kind donations 220–221 422, 448, 455, 484, 528, 590, 593, 597, 648
labor 221 global civil society 650–651
religious organizations 221 public sphere 128, 135
money, impact on politics 222–225 private sphere 135
access to politicians 225 citizenship 89, 135, 138–139, 143–147, 150, 193, 195,
candidates (who runs) 222–223 198, 254, 426–427, 431–432, 590–591, 605,
influence on legislators 224–225 (see also naturalization)
winners (who wins) 223–224 class 5, 22, 72–74, 84, 85–86, 94
political action committees (PAC) 217–220, 306, 307 bourgeoise class 407
Americans for the Republican Majority capitalist class 78
207–216, 281 class as party 86
Committee for Political Education (COPE) class elite 86–87
207–216, 281 class fractions 78, 121–122
National Rifle Association (NRA) 207–216, class interest 79
281 class struggle 78, 84, 91, 102, 107
Emily’s List 207–216, 281 declining influence 274
National Committee to Preserve Social Security decentering of 167
207–216, 281 democracy 427
National Committee for an Effective Congress middle class 107, 140, 465
207–216, 281 ruling class 414
regulations working class 78, 82, 122, 465
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 working class organization 443, 447
(McCain-Feingold Bill) 217 class theory (see also elite theory) 5, 22, 55, 72–74, 84,
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) 94
political action committees 217 coalitions 33, 245
soft money 217 collective action theory 181–182, 296–297
sources of money 216 collective behavior 336
business 217–219, 220 collective identity 125, 127–128, 150–151, 189
corporate officers and wealthy 219–220 Cold War 471, 477, 592
gender gap 220 Colombia 472, 478, 484, 535, 580, 583, 609, 612,
labor & AFL-CIO 217, 220 620–621, 623
leadership PACs 219 communism 406
individuals 219 concertation 449, 450, 453–454
religious groups 220 conflict carrying capacity
social cleavages 225–226 conflict theory 19, 94
soft money 217 analytic Marxism 80, 83, 93, 172
Canada 196, 241, 269, 270, 271, 273, 276, 277, 278, analytic Weberianism 172
279, 281, 328, 457, 537, 615, 634, 635, 641, associational democracy 83
643, 646–648 bio-power 84
P1: JZP
Subject Index 799
capital 91 Congo, Belgian (see Zaire)

cultural 91, 92 Connecticut 548
social 91 conservative parties 474, 475, 477, 480
symbolic 91 contention 24–25, 423, 428, 439, 440,
civil society 82 577–578
citizenship theory 89 conspiracies 425
class or Marxist conflict theory 72–74, 84, 94, contentious politics 24–25, 577–578
291–292 contestation 427
contingency 75, 95 democracy and 424
critical theory 81–82 inclusiveness 427
definition of conflict theory 72 liberalization 427
empire 84 factional struggles 425
exploitation (domination) 33, 85 mode of production
field theory (Bourdieu’s conflict theory) 91–93 principle-history continuum 425
hegemony 74, 82 repertoires 438–440
IEMP or Ideological, Economic, Military and resistance 425
Political Power Theory 89–91 revolution 425
inequality of authority theory (Dahrendorf) 87–88 contingency 68, 75, 95
Leninism 73–74 convergence 65
Marx-Engels’ theory 73–84 Copenhagen 142
Marxist pluralism (see post-Marxism) corporate liberalism thesis 75
Marxist theories of the state 73–74 corporate power 310–325, (see also corporations)
accommodationist theory 75 corporations 23, 288, 310–325, 353
accumulation 77 Bay Area Council 317
capitalist class control 74–75 Berle and Means thesis 312–314
contingency theory 75 business disunity 312–314
corporate liberalism 74–75 Business Roundtable 317
flanking subsystem 76 business unity 314–322
instrumentalism 74, 75, 77, 275 capital market control 324–325
legitimation 77 chaebol 328
structuralist Marxism 75 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 316, 317, 318, 319,
criticisms of 19, 94 345
media 95 comparative corporate control (outside America)
models of capitalism 79 327–329
multi-dimensional conflict theory 95 contemporary elite theory 316–319
neo-Gramscian theory 94 contingency theory 75, 320–321
neo-Weberian theories 88–89, 94 corepective behavior 316
networks of power 90 corporate political activity 326–327
political power elite theory (neo-Machiavellians) democracy and, 311–312
84–87 elite composition 311
post-Marxism (agonistic democracy) 82–83 elite hierarchy 311–312
power resources theory 38–39, 78–80, 81, 631–634 elite pluralism 311
criticisms of 56, 79–80 elite social ties 316
power constellation theory 80, 631–634 elite theory 323–324
resistance 84 financial institutions 318
retrenchment 80 globalization 329
reinventing Marxism 93 inner circle 318, 319, 324
revisionist theory 73, 74, 93 institutional investors 324
social closure 89 interlocking directorates 224–225, 317–318
social democratic theory (see power resources Jituanqiue 328
theory) keiretsu 328
state, relative autonomy of 77 managerial autonomy 325–326
structural functionalism 72 managerial Marxism 315–316
symbolic violence 92 networks 330
Weberian theory 86 pluralism (see elite pluralism)
welfare state regimes 79 policy-making institutions 317–318
working class strength theory (see power resources political power 322
theory) social class model 314–315
world systems theory 83, 94 state role 319–320, 322
P1: JZP
800 Subject Index
transnational corporations, multinational World Trade Organization (WTO) 668

corporation 612 Working Rights Consortium (WRC) 661
corporatism (see neo-corporatism) Zapatista 657
Corsica 480 Coxey’s Army 578
Costa Rica 397, 418, 488, 528, 620, 623, 627, Cracovia 481
628, 629 Croatia 464, 465
counter-hegemonic movements 590, 655–663 Cross-pressures 233, 234
AFL-CIO 661, 663 Cuba 404, 415, 416, 417, 466–467, 469, 471, 472, 479,
Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions 502, 528, 620–621, 642
for the Aid of Citizens (ATACC) 659–660, cultural capital 91, 92
668, 669–670 cultural theory 30, 115–127, 153
Conferences of the Parties (CoP) 667 capillary model 126
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of civic culture 119
Discrimination against Women (CEDAN) collective behavior (see crowd mentality)
664 conflict between civilization and culture 115
counter-hegemonic globalization 27–28, 656–660 conflict between Enlightenment and Romantic
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) impulses 115
473 critical theory 81–82, 121–122
environmental movement 665–668 crowd mentality 119–120
feminist movement 658, 663–665 cultural revolution in sociology 115
Framework Convention on Climatic Change disciplinary techniques 126
(FCCC) 667 enlightenment (see conflict between Enlightenment
Free Trade Area of the Americasm (FTAA) 663, 668 and Romantic impulses)
globalization 655–663 forms of culture 123
hegemonic globalization 656–658 collective identity 125, 127–128
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 659 class 128
labor movement 658, 660–663 gender 128
transnational labor solidarity 661–663 discourse 125
basic rights approach 661–662 frames 124–125
social contract 663 ideology 124
democracy 663 narrative 125
sweatshops 661 practice 125
Kudong workers 661 race 128
Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) religious 127
665 rhetoric 126
NGOs 655, 661, 664, 665–667 ritual 125
organizational foundations 658–660 sexual preference 128
pitfalls 668–670 text 125
rooted cosmopolitans 658 globalization 123
Rubber Tappers 667 hegemony 123, 129
social movements 658 ideology 124
environmental movement 658 Marxists 117
labor movement 658, 659–660 mass society 121, 130
women’s movement 658 media 130
Tobin Tax 605, 659 moral panic 129
UNITE 661–662 Post-modernism 117, 123
United Nations (UN) 581, 667 nationalism 127
UNCTAD 604 new institutionalism 131
UNESCO 603 normalcy 126
Unions revolution 129–130
AFL-CIO 661, 663 rational choice theory 133, 134
Central Unicados Trabalhadores (CUT) 662 the Right 118
IG Metal 662 romantic movement (see conflict between
International Transport Workers Federation 662 Enlightenment and Romantic impulses)
UPS Strike 662–663 social construction 115
World Bank 595, 667 social movement 129
World Economic Forum 659 synthesis 123
World Social Forum (WSF) 659, 660, 668, 669–670 state, inside the 131–132
P1: JZP
Subject Index 801
structuralism 120–121 paths 390–393

tool kit 124 starting points 386–388
underdeveloped themes 132–134 types of democracies 196
biography 133 associational 83
character 116–133 classical model 196
cognition 133 consociational democracies 196
emotions 132 ethnic democracy 196
leadership 133 Herrenenvolk democracy 196–197
strategy 133–134 multi-cultural democracies 196
zeitgeist 133 republican democracies 196
cultural turn 9–11, 16 Denmark 156, 244, 269, 274, 465, 466, 481, 512, 520,
culture 7, 19–20, 115–127, 153, 278–280, 496 534, 536, 617
cycles of power, 27 determinism 14–15
Czechoslovakia 580 overstated 15
development strategies 607–608, 614, 620, 621
Davos Economic Forum 605 discipline 126, 131
Delaware 548 discourse 10, 20, 125, 153
deliberation 2, 144 discourse theory 153
deliberative poll 239 accusations against 165–166
democracy 105, 113, 227, 255, 384–403, 419–420, 424, anti-foundationalist stance 155
427, 551, 659 chain of equivalence 167–168
associational 83, 451, 455 challenges 168–171
authoritarian regimes 386, 393 clarification 168–169
hardliners 393 core disciplinary issues 171
moderates 393–394 implications for critique, normativity and ethics
reformers 393–394 169
British rule theory of democracy 387 methodological questions 169–170
challenges 399–403 process of sedimentation 169
conceptual issues 401 role of researcher 170–171
historical issues 403 content analysis 157
methodological 403 critical discourse analysis (CDA) 158
theoretical 401 dialogue and conversation analysis 157
checks and balances 388 discourse 154, 161–163
civil war 391 discourse psychology 157
clusters 398–399 dislocation 164–165
deals 393–394 essentialist ontology 153, 155
definition 395–396 hegemony 163–164
democratic transition 24, 384–386 idealism 166
democratization 384–403 identity 153
elites 394–395 Marxism 156
fascism 385 nodal points 163
king, moderating role of 395 ‘political’ post-structuralist discourse theory (Laclau
military 389 and Mouffe) 159–161
coup 390 post-structuralism 155–157
pacted transition (pactada) 393 quasi-transcendental discourse 158
redemocratization 399 radical 166
restoration of democracy after World War II reflexivity 156
397 relativism 165–166
revolution 384 social antagonism 164
rupture and reform (ruptura/reforma ), social bases of politics (retroactive) 168
393 sociolinguistics 157
strategies 393–394 split subject 165
structures to transitions 384–386 Dominican Republic 388, 469, 621, 622
sultanism 388
totalitarian regime 387 economic policy 607–628 up to 1980 612–614
transitions 386–393, 397–398 capital
end points 388–390 capital market 617
macro-transitions 397–398 control 610–611, 614–615
P1: JZP
802 Subject Index
mobility 614–615, 616 England (see also United Kingdom of Great Britain) 34,
wage bargaining 616 48, 67, 177–178, 183, 264, 275, 368, 369,
changes in 616 372, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379–381, 385, 404,
Christian Democratic Parties 619 483, 532, 533, 571, 636
commodity chains 612 Enlightenment 115
comparisons 627–628 Enron 326
corporatism 620 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 174–175, 306,
debt crisis 612, 624 323
deficits 621 epistemology 6, 7, 16
devaluation 614 anti-foundationalist 155
Economic Committee on Latin American and the epistemic community 132
Carribean (ECLAC) 623 history of ideas 159
economic internationalization 609–612 Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 553
employer federation 612 essentialism 15
European Union (EU) 606, 612, 616, 628 Estonia 196
globalization 587, 607, 609–612, 614–620, 628 European Union (EU) 284, 304–306, 606, 612, 616,
hyperglobation 607 628
ideology 610–618 exchange theory 11–12, 14–15
import substitution industrialization (ISI) 607–608, expansion of the political 3
614, 620, 621 exploitation (domination) 33, 85
inequality 627 extremist parties parties (see political parties) 270
inflation 616
international financial institutions (IFIs) 608, 612, Falkland Islands 468
625, 626, 627, 628 fascism 258, 462–467, 477
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 594, 612, 625 favela 602
judicial systems 623 Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)
labor law reform 622–623 634
Latin America 608, 620–623 feminism 10–11
liberalization (see privatization) feminist 118
neo-liberalism 616 feminist theory 135–148, 663–665
openness 609–612 care, ethic of 138–139
privatization 608, 614, 621 challenges to feminist theorizing 149
reform effects 626–627 citizens
reform trajectories 623–626 gender differentiated 151
regimes 612 gender neutral 151
coordinated market economy (CME) 612–613, gender pluralist 151
614 citizenship theory 135, 138–139, 143–147, 150
liberal market economies (LME) 612, 613 civic republicanism 143–144
retrenchment 617 collective identities 150–151
tariffs 609 critical race and gender theories 142
tax reform 622 discourse on rights 148–149
trade 609–611, 612, 618 exclusion mechanisms 138
transnational corporations (TNC) 612 feminisms 135
unemployment 617–619, 620 femocrat 147
wage bargaining 616 global citizen 151
welfare state 608 identity, gendered 140
retrenchment 616–618, 620, 622 liberal feminist theory 136, 148
World Bank 623 membership 144–147
World Trade Organization (WTO) 612 multiculturalism 149–150
economic pressures 27 patriarchal state 137–138
Ecuador 623 participation 143–144
El Salvador 416, 420, 472, 473, 621, 623 participation rights 147
elites 91 post-colonial theory 142
elitist theory 2, 72–75, 84, 94, 292–293 post-modern theory 140–143
emigration 27, 640–645 public/private divide 138, 144
empire 84, 397, 597 social citizenship 144–147
employer association 612 (see also interest groups) state feminist theory 136
emotions 132 welfare state 138, 145–147
P1: JZP
Subject Index 803
Wollenstonecraft’s dilemma 138–140 Fair Trade Labeling Organization International 598

women friendly state 147 favelas 602
Finland 353, 397, 398, 458, 466, 536, 613, 617, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
619 596
Florence 34 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
framing theory (see social movements) 124–125, 599, 606
239–241, 339–340, 341, 476 globalization project 595
France 92, 115, 120, 183,196, 241, 251, 256, 258, 259, hegemony 588, 589, 594
264, 268, 270, 273, 313,315, 327–328, 338, International Monetary Funct (IMF) 594
357,368, 369, 371, 372, 373, 376,377, 378, modernity 590–596
379–381, 397, 399,404, 413, 421, 443, 457, Movement of Homeless workers (MHW) 601, 602
461,464, 466, 470, 475, 481, 483,522, 523, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra (MST)
529, 536, 537, 538, 541,542, 543, 571, 574, 602–603
613, 627,631–634, 635, 636, 638,640, 641, nation-state 588
642, 645–648 neo-liberal policy 599
Frankfurt 121, 122 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
free rider 79, 181, 296–297, 340, 451 596
fortifying myths 339 privatization (property rights) 599
Frankfurt school 81–82 public rights (the commons) 599–605
Fraternal Order of the Eagles 107 social movements 590, 597–599, 600–605,
functionalism (see also neo-functionalism) 44, 50, 93, 658
178, 336 Sem Terra, Via Campesino, Zapatista 591
sovereignty 590–592, 597
gender 135–148, 526–544, (see also feminism) gender Tobin tax 605
equality transnational corporations
Genoa 183 American Express 596
Germany 119, 121, 156,207, 241, 257, 258, 260, 264, GM 596
273,279, 281, 303, 307, 312, 313, 315, IBM 600
327–328, 359, 368, 369, 372, 373,376, Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
379–380, 421, 426, 441,443, 461, 462–463, 600, 606
464–466,474, 477, 509, 517,523, 528, 538, United Nations (UN) 594
541, 614,615, 618, 631–634, 635,636, 637, UNESCO 603, UNCTAD 604
638, 639,640, 641, 642–643, 644,645–648, Washington consensus 590
651, 662 Worker Party 602
Democratic Republic of (GDR) (also East Germany) World Bank 595
151, 182 World Social Forum (WSF) 589
Weimar Republic 198 World Trade Organization (WTO) 596–597, 598,
West Germany or Federal Republic of Germany 141, 599–600, 603
338 global civil society (see civil society and globalization)
glasnost 334 governance (see also state)
global capitalism 27, 587–604, 655–663 Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) 107
global justice movement 27 Greece 466
globalization 26–28, 29, 123, 284–285, 329, 587–604, Ancient Greece 143, 251
655–663 Greek city-states 34, 249
citizenship rights 590–591, 605 Guatemala 470, 471, 473, 501, 580, 621, 623
civil society 590, 593, 597
empire of civil society 597 Haiti 466–471, 620
Chiapas 601 Handbook of Political Sociology
CONAIE 601 place in field 4–5
corporate 588, 591 objectives 28
counter-movement 27–28, 588, 590, 591, 597–599, handbooks in political science
600–605, 655–660, 663 Hawaii 209
definition 587–588 hegemony 74, 82, 122, 123, 129, 130, 159, 163–164,
discursive project 27 588, 589, 594
development 593–597 Heidelberg 376
economic 587 Holland (See also Netherlands) 373, 573
empire 597, 600 Honduras 620, 623
European Union (EU) 591 Hong Kong 383, 634, 643
P1: JZP
804 Subject Index
Hawaii 142 inclusion 145, 147, 154, 415

Hungary 369, 374, 376, 377, 379–380, 464, 465, 466, political 145, 415
580 social 145
India 385, 386–387, 532, 539–540, 541, 555, 567,
Iberia (region of Spain and Portugal) 373, 379–380, 606
391 Indian National Congress 387
identity 153 (see also collective identity) indigenous peoples (see ethnic groups)
identity construction 162 Indonesia 417, 538, 541, 641
relations of difference in 162 inequality 40, 255
relations of equivalence in 162 inflation 453
ideology 124, 219, 231, 238–241, 278, 341, 414, 462, infrastructural power (of the state)
530, 533, 536, 538 institutional theory 3, 6, 103–109
ideologue 257 historical institutionalism 103–104
Illinois 277, 278 new institutionalism 103
imagined communities 127, 249–250, political institu6tionalism 109, 114
251 structural-political 104–106
immigration 27, 630–649 institutions 58, 63, 96
American Federation of Labor (AFL) 633,and interest groups 23, 58, 287–305, 445, 447, 528
Congress of Industrial Unions (AFL-CIO) collective preferences 297–298
brain drain 643, 645 corporations 288
British Nationality Act of 1948 (BNA) 635 corporatist theories of interest groups 293–295, 308,
Congress of Industrial Unions (CIO) 441–460
cost-benefit (economic) theories 631, 636–638 definition 287–289
cultural theories 631, 638–639, 653 elitist theories of interest groups 292–293, 308
declining fertility 653–654 European Union (EU) 304–306
dual nationality 644 financing (see resource mobilization)
emigration policy 642–645 formation 295–296
future research 653 foundational approaches (see theories of interest
immigration policy 631–640 groups)
institutional theory 635–636 governance 297
integration policy 645–649 interest group systems 304–306
interest groups Marxist theories of interest groups 291–292, 308
American Immigration Lawyers Association 633 neopluralism 290–291
Business for Legal Immigration Coaltion 633 pluralism (classical) 289–290, 308
CATO Institue 634 policy domains (see policy networks)
Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform policy networks 301–304
(FAIR) 634 policy research institutes 298–300
Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund 631, 633 political action committees (PACs) 306
National Immigration Forum 631 preferences (see collective preferences)
Zero Population Growth 634 problems 295–298
McCarran-Walter Act 631 organizational development 295–304
multicultural model 635 social movement organizations (SMOs) 288–289
naturalization policy 645–649 theories of interest groups 289–295
political parties 632, 637, 638, 644 think tanks (see policy research institutes)
political polarization 632–633 transformation (structural) 297
power resources (constellations) theory 631–634, US interest organization systems 306–307
652 voluntary associations 56, 288
public opinion 639–640 interlocking directorates 224–225, 317–318
racialization theories 631, 638–639 intermediation (see concertation and neo-coporatism)
receiving countries 631–640 international political sociology 18
regimes 633 interorganizational network 301–306
sectoral theory of the state 636 Iran 9, 258, 390, 404, 415, 417, 469, 470, 471, 479,
sending countries politics 640–645 481, 529, 573
transnational theory (unified framework) Iraq 257, 258, 265, 421, 470, 478–479, 481, 572, 580,
649–651 581
incentive 172–173, 297 Ireland 197, 207, 422, 458, 474
economic (purposive) 297 iron law of oligarchy 87, 176, 275–276, 296–297
selective 297, 337 iron triangles 302
P1: JZP
Subject Index 805
Israel 196, 256, 259, 262, 263, 270, 362–363, 422, 541, mass society 121, 130
572, 593 May 1968, events of
Italy 2, 119, 130, 207, 256, 258, 281, 315, 327, 368, McCarran-Walter Act 631
369, 373, 376, 379–380, 385, 428, 444, 451, media 2, 95, 283–284, 299, 350–364
458, 465, 466, 512, 523, 528, 541, 613 Agenda setting 351
Italian city-states 183 bias 360
concentration (see mergers)
Jamaica 538, 555, 609, 612, 620–621, 623, 628, 641 corporate control (see private control)
Japan 245, 251, 253, 264, 270, 307, 308, 328, 357, crime coverage 361–362
362–363, 418, 537, 612, 630, 641, 642, cultural constraining approach 350, 361–362,
646 363–364
Jituanqiue 328 dependence on politicians 359–360
Johannseburg 662 Dutch reporters 358
jus sanguinis 645 editors 360
jus soli 646 effects (see media effects)
election outcomes 351
Kashmir 422 entertainment 353
keiretsu 328 feeding frenzy 361
Kentucky 548 hegemonic view 130
Kerala 600 internet 354
Keyna 387 journalism 350, 352–353
kleptocracy 469 macro-institutional approach 350, 353–357, 363–364
Knights of Labor 269, 339 media effects 352
Korea 612, 641 micro-institutional 350, 357–360, 363–364
North Korea 421, 488 moral panics 361
South Korea 308, 315, 327, 328, 532, 595 narrative
Kudong 661 policy outcomes 351
Kuwait 465–471 power 358–359
print (newspapers)
labor law 48 private control 353, 356–357
labor movements 48, 80, 658, 660–662, 663 quasi-official institution 351
labor union 48, 622 state control 356–358
language games (linguistic systems) 153–154 story telling (see narrative)
glossematics 153 tabloid journalism 363
semiology 153 methodology 111, 113
structural linguistics 153 boolean (QCA) 113
Latin America 112, 620–623 comparative-historical 111, 113
Leadership 133 democratic research methodology 403
Leningrad 255 discourse 169–170
Leninism 93 methodological individualism 173
Libya 421 multivariate strategies 342
Lithuania 466, 531 refining public opinion 242–243
lobbying (see interest groups) Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF)
local/global gap 2 631, 633
Low Countries (Belgium and Holland) 369, 376 Mexico 281, 417, 467, 468, 473, 478, 479, 503, 532,
London 48 601, 609, 612, 620–621, 623, 627, 644,
Lvov 481 651–653, 663
Miami 649
Madrid 394 Michigan 201, 203, 227
Malaysia 532 micro-interactionist theory 7
managerial theory 67 (see also state-centric theory) migration (see immigration, emigration, and
Martinique 641 naturalization)
Maryland 548 military (see also war) 104, 262, 566, 575, 580
markets 174, 310, 324–325, 443, 459 Minnesota 209
equilibria 174–175 modernization 117, 250, 405–407
liberalization 459 limits of 156
Marxist theory (Marxism) 19, 73–75, 76, 77–78, 93, money and politics (see campaign finance)
117 moral panic 129
P1: JZP
806 Subject Index
Morocco 465, 478, 489, 535, 641, 642 cultural idiom theory 645–646
motives 172–174 dual nationality
instrumental action 173 global civil society 650–651
non-consequentialist action 173 incorporation regimes 647–648
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra integration 648
(MST) 602–603 jus sanguinis 645
Mozambique 417, 528 jus soli 646
multinational corporation (see transnational non-colonizers 647
corporations under corporations) 83, power constellation theory 646
93 settler countries 647
Mumbai 662 welfare regimes 648
Nazi regime 198, 258, 462–463, 465
Nairobi 142 neo-conservatism (see new right)
Namibia 641 neo-corporatism (also liberal or democratic
Naples 368 corporatism) 25, 62, 63, 105, 293–295,
Narrative 125 441–460, 620
National Association for the Advancement of Colored active labor market policy 457
People (NAACP) 345 Catholic traditions 449
nationalism 127, 247–250, 278 civil society 448, 455
civil religion 252 collective bargaining 446–447
civil society 252, 253, 254 compulsory membership 451
community 247 concertation (interest intermediation), 449, 450,
consciousness (as idea) 247, 251–255 453–454
constructivist 249, 251 consociational democracy 196
cultural chauvinism 248 corporate associations 443, 445–447, 662
definition 250–251 democratic state-building (after 1945)
democracy 255, 551 devolution (breakdown of corporatism) 454,
equality of membership 252, 255, 551 458–460
ethnic nationalism (see collectivistic and ethnic distributional coalitions 459
nationalism under types of ) distribution of income 457
ethnics 248 employer associations 612
globalization 247 economic effects 456–458
imagined communities 127, 249–250, 251 factionalism 442, 443
Jews in Europe and Palestine 262 function 447–450 (see also concertation and
modernist theory 250 self-government)
national liberation movements 261, 262 future of, 458–460
patriotism 248 generalized political exchange 445–447, 449, 450,
political effects 251–255 662
perennialist 250 inflation 453
primordialist 250 interest groups 445, 447
ressentiment 260, 263 intermediary associations 451–452
sovereignty 252, 255 Loi le Chapelier 442
structural (material) 247–248 liberalization 459
terrorism 264 meso-corporatism
types of, 255, 264–265, 551 micro-corporatism
collectivistic and civic nationalism 256, 257, 259 normative justification (legitimacy) 449
collectivisitic and ethnic nationalism 256, 257, organization 447–452
258, 259, 260, 264 origins of (political constitution), 442–445
individualistic and civic nationalism 256, 257 pluralist theory 448–450
pan-nationalism 264 structure (see organization) 447–450
voluntarist (see constructivist) self-government 454–456
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 479, 580 state corporatism (see corporatism, non-democratic)
naturalization 645–649 state of estates (Ständestaat) 441, 443, 444, 445
assimilation 649 structure (see organization) 447–450
barrier to naturalization index 647 subsidarity 449
citizenship syndicalism 444
civil society 648 taxes 453
colonizers 647 unemployment 453, 457
P1: JZP
Subject Index 807
wage restraint 453, 456–457 Business for Legal Immigration Coalition 633
working class organization 443, 447 Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International
union decline 458 598
workers councils (Räte, Soviets) 444 Federation for for American Immigration Reform
neo-functionalism 18–19, 44, 50, 54, 64–69, 93 FAIR 634
change 66–67 Fraternal Order of the Eagles 107
civil society 68 Friends of the Earth 592
contingent dynamics of conflict 67 Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) 107
convergence 65 Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF)
differentiation 66, 67, 69 631, 633
radical 69 Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra
structural 66 (MST) 602–603
uneven 67 Oxfam 592
functionalist tradition 64–67 Womens’ Christian Temperance Union 107
idealist conflation 67 Zero Population Growth 634
pluralism 65–66, 68 North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) 272,
revolution 67 596, 600–601
subsystem 66, 69 Norway 244, 356, 374, 397, 458, 465, 466, 536, 613,
value added 67 617, 619
Watergate scandal 68
neoliberalism 530, 533, 538, 599 Occupational Safety and Health Administration
neo-patrimonial regime (see sultanistic regime) (OSHA) 306, 323
neo-pluralism 18, 19, 54–64, 70, 290–291 OECD 601, 602
agency, extending the range of 55–60 Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) 192
agency, in context 60–62 Ontario 271
behavioral revolution 57 Oregon 637
business, privileged position of 62 organizational state model 304–306, 308
class, neglect of corrected 60–61 organized interest group (see interest groups)
classical pluralism 55–58, 98 Ottoman Empire (see Turkey)
corporate pluralism 59, 60 overlapping cleavages (see cross-pressures)
hyper-pluralism 59 overlapping networks of power 90
integration 63–64 overlords 40
neo-pluralism in brief 64
political resource theory Pakistan 387, 471, 567
political science, neo-pluralism popular in 70 Palestine 196, 262, 263, 264, 422, 593
pluralist tradition 55–58 Panama 470, 472–478, 479, 580, 621, 622
plurality of actors 56 Paraguay 621, 623
power resource premise 57 parental leave (reconciliation policies) 535–536
scope 56 Paris 479
structural power, neglect of corrected 61–62 party (see political party)
voice 58 peasants 40, 44, 408–409
nested games 13 free 408
Netherlands (see also Dutch Republic, Holland) 156, middle 408
177–178, 196, 207, 256, 270, 371, 373, 374, migrating semi-proletarians 408
381–382, 458, 466, 518, 520, 523, 537, 538, poor 408
615, 617, 636, 642 rich 409
New Deal 74–75, 296, 306 sharecropping tenants 408
new institutionalism 58, 63, 103, 172, 174, 176–178 perestroika 334
New Right 160 Peru 363, 421, 469, 472, 473, 477, 613, 620–621, 623
New York 121, 203 Philippines 417, 469, 641
New Zealand 398, 418, 516, 519, 521, 537, 613, 614, pluralism 2, 5, 19, 289–290, 308, 311, 448–450,
618, 619, 628, 633, 634, 635, 641, 647, 648 (see also neo-pluralism)
Nicaragua 404, 417, 469, 470, 471, 472, 479, 502, 580, Podesta 183
620, 623 Poland 268, 369, 374, 376, 377, 378, 379, 384, 465,
Nigeria 46, 471 466, 471, 528, 529, 543
Nobel Prize 3, 11, 380 policy 25–26
non-governmental organizations (NGO) 284, 299, 592 abortion 542–543
Amnesty International 592 active labor market 457, 511, 517
P1: JZP
808 Subject Index
Anti-discrimination 534–535 Green parties 82, 279, 284

anti-natalist (birth control and sterilization) 538 institutional environment 280–285
child care 535–536 iron law of oligarchy 87, 275–276
civil rights policies 553 Know-nothing Party 637
color blind policies 546, 554, 556, 562–563, 564–565 labor party (see socialist and social democratic)
economic 607–614, 628 left parties 477, 515–517, 524, 632
employment 531–536, 543–545, 553 liberal parties 271
disability policy 238 links to citizens 268, 272–274, 286
feedback 108–109 media 283–284
fertility (pro-natalist) 541–542 Nazi party 258, 462–463
health 307 neo-institutionalism 280
housing 555–556 New Democratic Party (Canada) 271, 277
immigration 630–649 non-governmental organizations 284
labor market 517, 531–536, 543–545 origins 268, 274
naturalization 645–649 party machines 101–102
pension 106 polarization 632–633
population 518, 543–545 Republican Party (US) 219, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276,
277, 282, 559
race 187–198 Republikaner Party (Germany) 632
women 106, 526–544 right parties 474, 475, 477, 480
voting policies 547–551, 553, 554–555 social bases of, 268–274
women friendly 522 social democratic parties 73, 105, 271, 272, 275, 276,
policy domain 2, 302, 307, (see also policy network) 279
policymaking 107, 108, 132 Swedish 105 (see also socialist parties)
policy network (see also policy domain) 287, 301–304 socialist parties 271, 276 (see also social democratic
policy research institute 23, 287, 298–300 parties)
political action committee (PAC) 217–220, 306, 307, Poland 276
320–321, 326–327 Serbia 475
Americans for the Republican Majority 219 Socialist Party of Serbia 475
Committee for Political Education (COPE) 217 state 280–283
Emily’s List 219 structure of, 275–278
National Committee to Preserve Social Secruity 219 ties to organized interests 268, 270–272, 274
National Committee for an Effective Congress 219 Union Nacional de Proprietarios (UNP) 474
National Rifle Association (NRA) 219 Via Campesino 591, 604
political economy theory 2, 72–74, 78–80, 83, 84, Vlaams Blok (Belgium) 632
88–89, 94 Workers Party (Brazil) (PT) 602
political outcomes 18 political power (see power)
political parties 22 political regime (see regimes)
anti-immigrant parties (see extremist parties) 270 political revolution (see revolution)
catch all party 272 political sociology
Carapintadas 475 status of 1
Catholic parties 79 survey of 3
Christian Democratic Parties population 518, 543–545
communist party, Bolsheviks 74, 279 Portugal 270, 390–391, 444, 464, 465, 466, 628,
conservative parties 647 642
John Birch Society 476 post-modern theory 3, 6, 10, 17–18, 117, 123, 156
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) post-structuralism 8
277 post-structuralist discourse theory (see discourse
culture of, 278–280 theory)
decline of parties 286 power 18, 19, 33
discipline, of parties 180–181 distributional power 38, 43
definition 267 exchange theory 41–42
Democratic Party (US) 219, 267, 273, 306, 360, hegemonic 74, 82, 123, 129
558–559, 638 infrastructural power 100, 110
Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich or military 566, 580
FP Ö) 475 overlapping power networks, 90
Front National 475, 529, 632 power analytics 158
globalization 284–285 power, definitions of 34–38, 47–49
P1: JZP
Subject Index 809
power resources 36–39, 43, 56, 57, 77, 78–80, 81, publishing in political sociology 1
631–634 purposive incentive 297
social power, history of 89–91
zero-sum 35–36 race and political sociological theory 20, 187–198
power constellation theory 19, 80, 631–634, 646 affirmative action 193
power elite (see conflict theory) antisemitism 465
power resources theory 36–39, 43, 56, 57, 77, 78–80, caution towards 197
81, 145, 631–634 census (example of political race construction) 190,
pressure group (see interest group) 191
privatization (see also liberalization) citizenship rights 193
proletariat 84, 122 civil rights movement 193, 195, 578
pronatalist policies 541–542 color blind policies 194, 198
protest 33, 336, 337–338, 343–346, 553 constructivist theories 187, 192–193
Prussia 10, 178, 368, 371, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 379, definition of race 188
381, 382, 383, 636, 643 democracies, five types related to group rights 196
Puerto Rico 211, 539 classical model 196
public interest group or PIG (see interest groups) consociational democracies 196
public opinion 2, 22, 227–244 ethnic democracy 196
attitudes 227–228 Herrenenvolk democracy 196–197
authoritarianism, working class 232 multi-cultural democracies 196
class politics 232–235 republican democracies 196
coalitions 33, 245 ethnicity, definition of 188
Columbia school 203, 228–230, 245, 272 group rights 193
cross-pressures 233, 234 identity 189
decline of the left 228–238 multi-racial category (see official race categories)
deliberation 239 Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) 192
economic development 235–238 official race categories 191–192
education 233, 238 organizational structure 194–197
democratic class struggle 231 political institutions 190–191
framing 239–241 political parties 191
ideology 231, 238–241 resistance 188
long-term change 235, 242 racialization 20, 188, 189–190, 194
Michigan school (see political science research) 201, segregation 195
203, 227, 228–229, 230–231, 245, underplay the importance of race 197–198
272 racial categories (see official race categories under racial
opinion leaders 221, 229–230 and ethnic theory)
overlapping cleavages (see cross-pressures) racial formation 188, 189, 194
policy feedback 243–245 racial identities 189, 190, 197
policy impact on public opinion 241–243 racial inequalities 197
political science research 228–229, 230–231, 245 racial policies 26, 546–565
post-material values (economic to cultural conflict) affirmative action 558–559
236–237 busing 557–558
public opinion impact on policy 241–243 Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) 553
race and public opinion theories 561–562 civil rights movement 181–182, 551–553, 563–564
politics-centered 561 color blind policies 546, 554, 556, 562–563, 564–565
race-centered 561 disenfanchisement 547–551
sample surveys 227 employment 558
schemas 239 enfranchisement 548–553, 554–555
short term opinion change 230–231, 235 Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 (EOA) 553
social cleavages 231–235, 245 housing policy 555–556
social movements 235 Jim Crow legislation 549, 561
sociological research 228–230, 245 Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 549, 550
status politics 232–233 National Association for the Advancement of
thermostatic model 244 Colored People (NAACP) 552
two dimensions of political ideology 232 new racism 561
values 228–237 party discipline 180–181
public policy processes 106–107 protests 553
public sphere 128, 144 public opinion 559–562
P1: JZP
810 Subject Index
public opinion, theories 561–562 path dependence 184

politics-centered 561 revolution 182
race-centered 561 social movements 182
public policies 553 sociological rational choice theory 172–174
racial state 546–547 tax administration 178
reconstruction 548–549 temporality 184
slavery 547–548 refugees 27
social welfare 555–556, 557 regimes 79, 258, 423, 502–504, 612, 647–648
suffrage in the US 547–551 authoritarian regime 258, 386, 393, 394, 467–469,
universalistic policy 546 477–478
Voters Rights Acts of 1965 (VRA) 553, 554–555 capacity 430–431, 433–434, 437–440
voting behavior 559 citizenship 426–427, 431–432
voting rights, 554–555 conjectures (hypotheses) 433–437
white advantage 562–563 conservative regime (see traditional)
racial project 188, 189–190 competing racial projects consultation 432, 436–437
racial state 187, 193, 194, 195, 197, 546–547 contention 24–25, 423
theories of the state 194–196 definitions of, 424–427
three types of racial states 194 democracy/undemocracy, 424, 427, 431–432,
radical flank 346 437–440
radical plural democracy 10 equality 435
Radom 481 exemplary analyses
rapprochement of theory (see also theoretical synthesis) by history 428–429
6 by principles 427–428
rational choice theory 6, 11–14, 16–17, 30, 133, 134, liberal regime 258, 426–427
172 mapping regimes 424–427
agency theory 176–178 membership in polity 434–435
agenda (future research) 185–186 polity model (by capacity, breadth, equality
behavioral economics 179 consultation and protection) 429–430
bounded rationality 179 protection 432, 436–437
budgets 177 regime theory 423
bureaucracy 176–177 regime transitions 423
civil rights movement 181–182 repertoires 437–440
collective action 296–297 social democratic regime 426, 427
company men 177–178 sultanistic regime 469–471, 478–479
coordination and focal points 179–180 traditional regime 426–427
criticisms of 173 taxonomy of contentious politics (by variations,
limits of 185 trajectories and transformations) 429–433
cultural models 181–185 totalitarian regime 387, 462–467, 477
development of theory welfare capitalism regimes 426–427, 648
better models of social structure 185 WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, commitment)
more complex micro-foundations 185 435
free rider 181 regime change 24, 423
functionalist theory 178 religion 38, 127, 252, 255, 258, 387, 579
game theory 182–183, 185 Calvinism 371
goals 173 Catholic church 579
incentives 297 religious identities 127
incomplete information 175 repertoires 124
jointly owned resources (common pool) 175–176 repertoires of action 124
legitimacy 179 repertoires of contention 438–440
methodological individualism 173 resistance 33, 40, 50, 53, 63, 84, 339,
models of culture 181–185 425
models of history 182–185 ressentiment 260, 263
models of political institutions 174–176, 181–182 resources 36–39, 56 (see also power resources theory)
motives 172–173 allocative 37
multiple equilibria 174–175 authoritative 37
nationalism 180 resource mobilization theory 336–338
new institutionalism 172, 174 revolution 24, 67, 104, 126, 129–130, 182, 261, 384,
norms 180–181 404–419, 425
P1: JZP
Subject Index 811
American revolution 261 power resources 36–43

anomalous cases 421 rational legal rule 84
bourgeois revolution 408 resistance 33
Chinese revolution 577 insurgency 40
contentious regimes 423 defiance 50, 63
corruption 416–417 resources 36–39
culture 421–422 allocative 37
definition (meaning) 404–405 authoritative 37
emotions 421–422 rulebreaking 18, 33–34, 35, 38, 49–53
French revolution 126, 127, 573, 577 rulemaking 18, 33, 34, 35, 38, 44, 52
grievances 415 rules as instruments of power 43–47
ideology 414 social construction 43
Islamic revolution 422 state as enforcer of rules 47–49
non-occurrence of revolutions 417–420 Statute of Laborers 48
occurrence of revolutions 413–417 structural power 38
peasants 408–409 traditional rule 85
relative deprivation 406 vassal 47
revolution from above zero-sum game 35–36
coup d’Etat 405 Russia 9, 163, 251, 255, 257, 258, 264, 270, 281, 356,
palace revolution 405 373, 376, 377, 477, 573, 581, 636, 641–642,
revolutionary movement 104, 405 644
rising expectations 406 USSR 9, 196, 198, 255, 256, 258, 270, 389,
Russian revolution 577 391–392, 404, 444, 462, 474, 477, 481, 566,
state breakdown (weak state) 409, 412, 577–578 571, 580, 643
state socialism 407 Rwanda 581
state structures 410
strategy and tactics 422 San Francisco 317, 633
theoretical approaches 405–409 SAWAK 470
Marxist theory, 407–409 Saudia Arabia 421, 471
modernization theory 405–407 Scandinavia 373, 374, 376
state-centered theory 409–413 Scotland (see also Great Britain) 369
unpredictability of 182 Seattle 655
rhetoric 126 Selma 553
rights 196 selective incentive 297
group 149, 193, 196 Sem Terra 591
individual 149 Senegal 647
ritual 125 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 472, 473
Romania 417, 463–467, 470, 529, 542 Sen Terra 591
Romanticism 116–117, 253 Serbia 166, 417, 475, 541
Rome 179, 251, 254, 374, 404, 413, 415, 428, Shanghai 662
463 sharecroppers 408
Roman Empire 373, 374 Sicily 368
Roman law 369 Sierra Club 307
Treaty of Rome 304 Sierra Leone 532
rules 18, 33–53 Silicon Valley 662
actionability 42–43 Singapore 383
agency 50–53 Sobibor 481
alternatives 43 social bases of politics 18, 29, 201–216, 286
charismatic rule 85 social capital 91
domination 33, 34, 35 social change 331–335
exchange theory 41–42 social cleavages, 22, 225–226, 231–235
labor law 48 social cleavages and voting 201–216, 231–235
landowner 41–42 class effects 214, 216, 231–235
lord 47 decline of left (class) 214, 228–238
peasant 40, 44 early postwar voting research 202–203
power 33, 36–42, 43 Columbia School 203, 228–230, 245, 272
power, definitions of 34–38, 47–49 Michigan School 201, 203, 227, 230–231, 245,
power imbalance 41–42 272
P1: JZP
812 Subject Index
economic models 204 structural opportunities 336–338

funnel of causality 203 tactics 339–342
gender effects 215, 220 threats 338
group consciousness (linked fate) 205, 215 Townsend Movement 339, 345
mechanisms (economic, social psychological, theories 335–342
network) 202, 205–206 framing 339–340, 341
opinion leaders 221, 229–230 functionalism 336
origins of research program 202–204 identity 340–341
participation 208–213 opportunity structure theory 337–339
group factors 209–210 rational choice 182
organizational factors 210–212 resource mobilization 336–338
recent trends 212–213 symbolic interaction 335–336, 339–341
social structural factors 209 syntheses 341–342
political parties 215 women’s movement 107, 118, 150, 346,
processes 202, 205–206 658
feedback 208 Zapatista 601, 602
group identification and conflict 207 social revolution (see revolution)
macro-political factors (unions, churches, parties) social welfare policies 101
207–208 socialist revolution 9
social structure 206–207 Somalia 359
religious effects 207, 215, 220, 221 South Africa, Union of (Republic of South Africa) 52,
religious right (Christian right) 210 191, 193–194, 196, 198, 268, 420, 563, 595,
social networks 205 635, 647, 665
cross-cutting networks 209, 233 Spain 368, 373, 379, 390–392, 393, 394, 444, 465, 466,
social-psychological models of voting 467, 474, 477, 478, 541, 571, 628, 642
203–204 sovereignty 252, 255
unions 207, 210, 215, 220 Sri Lanka 422, 533
voting behavior 213–216 Stalinism 462
registration 211–212 state 23–25, 47–49, 96, 253, 367–383
turnout 212–213 absolutism 368, 369, 372, 373
social democratic parties 73, 105, 271, 272, 275, 276, autonomy 100–101
279 authoritarian state 467–469, 477–478
social movements 23, 33, 150, 331–335, 658 breakdown (see revolution)
anti-nuclear movement 338 bureaucracy 25, 99, 176–177, 373, 482–503
anti-war movement 343 Calvinism 371
civil rights movement 336–338, 343 capacity 100–101, 102
Community Action Program 345 conceptual map of Europe 374–375
Coxey’s Army 578 corporatism 319–320
definition 332–333 estates (Stand) 370
dynamic opportunities 337–338, feminist theory 136
342–346 feudalism 368, 369
Ecuadorian movement (CONAIE) 601 parliament (representative assembly) 369
environmental movement 659 patrimonial state 369, 370, 382, 469
fortifying myths 339 racial state 193–194
framing 182, 334–335 sectoral theory of the state 636
goals 342 state building 98, 101, 367–382, 383
Islamic movement 422 state formation 110, 367–383
labor movement 658, 659–660 taxes 372, 376
opportunities 337–338, 339 extractive regime 377
outcomes 346, 348 war, crisis of legitimacy 579
protest 336, 337–338, 343–346 state-building theories 108
radical flank 346 cultural explanation 381–382
radical reformism 342–343 fiscal-administrative infrastructure 379
signaling 344 founders 367–371
social movement change 346–349 medieval constitutionalism 378, 379
social movement effects (see outcomes) paths 374
social movement organizations (SMOs) 182–183, capital intensive 374
288–289, 299, 332, 333 coercion intensive 376
P1: JZP
Subject Index 813
rational choice explanation 380–381 symbolic violence 92

renaissance 371–378 Syria 258, 421, 470
recent trends 378–382
state formation 110, 367–383 Tanzania 191
warfare 368, 375, 376, 377 taxes 105, 110, 178, 372, 376, 484, 622
state-centric theory 2, 96 tax farming 175, 177
bureaucracy 99 terrorism 264, 474, 580
causal force of state 99–100 Al Queda 580, 657
development of state-centric theory 98–101 Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) 474
example 101–102 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 345, 474
extending the theory 111–114 Texas 637, 638
historical argumentation, shift to 106–107 text 125
historical institutionalists 103–104 Thailand 532, 533, 641
links between macro and meso levels 67 theoretical synthesis
new institutionalists 103 divided theoretical arena 30
organizational turn 99 of political sociology 17–18, 28
path dependency 109 theory 18–20
patronage-oriented parties 101–102 conflict 19, 94
political identity shaped by states 96, 190 cultural 30, 94, 95, 115–127, 350, 361–362,
political institutional theory 96, 103–109 363–364, 631, 638–639
policy feedback 108–109 discourse 153
research practice 109–111 exchange 41–42
revolution 409–413 feminist 135–148, 663–665
rise of state-centric theory 97–98 frame 174, 334–335, 339–340, 341
state autonomy 100–101 functional 64–69, 72, 336
state building (state formation) 98, 101, 108, Marxist 19, 73–75, 80, 84, 117
367–382, 383 middle range theory 111
state capacity 100–101, 102 modernization 117, 405–407
states, basic viewpoint toward 96 neo-functionalist 18–19, 54, 64–69, 93
structural political institutionalism 104–106 neo-Weberian 88–89, 94
structured polity model 106 pluralist 289–290, 308
state-feminism 136 neo-pluralist 18, 19, 54–64, 70, 290–291
state formation 19–20, 24, 110, 131, 367–383 post-modern 3, 6, 8, 10, 17–18, 117, 123, 140–143,
strategy 133–134 156
status 85–86, 232–233 power constellation 19, 80, 631–634, 646
status groups 89 racialization 6, 11–14, 16–17, 30, 133, 134, 172
ethnic groups 187–198, 546–565 rational choice 172
gender groups 106, 526–544 revisionist 73, 74, 93
racial groups 187–198, 546–565 resource mobilization 336–338, 339
Weberian interpretations 89 state-centric 96, 367–382, 383
Statute of Laborers 48 symbolic interactionism (constructivist theory) 187,
structural functionalism (see functionalism and 192–193, 335–336, 339–341
neo-functionalism) Weberian 19, 86, 88–89, 94
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 118 world systems 83, 94, 583
sultanistic regimes (see also regimes) 25, 469–471, think tanks 23, 298–300
478–479 Center for Responsive Politics 219
neo-patrimonialism 469 Tibet 581
patrimonial praetorianism 469 Tobin tax, 605
subsidarity 449 totalitarian regime 25, 462–463, 467, 477
Surinam 641 trade 609–611, 612, 618
Sweden 207, 234–235, 244, 245, 274, 338, 353, 356, trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) 600,
363, 373, 378, 426, 458, 465, 474, 510, 512, 606
517, 520, 521, 523, 528, 529, 535, 536, 537, trade unions (see unions)
538, 541, 542, 617, 618, 619, 641, 647 transnational immigration model 649–651
Switzerland 196, 208, 274, 376, 466, 615, 633, 636, transnational movements (see counter-hegemonic
648 movements)
syndicalism 444 Treblinka 481
symbolic capital 91, 92 Tunisia 641, 642
P1: JZP
814 Subject Index
Turkey 9, 196, 478, 641, 642, 643, 644, 651, United States (also America) 5, 7, 23, 26, 46, 59, 67,68,
665 70, 71, 74–75, 97, 100,101–102, 105,
Ottoman Empire 196, 197, 573, 574 106–107, 108,110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117,
118,119, 142, 143, 151, 155, 183, 184–185,
Uganda 469 187, 188, 189, 190, 191–192, 193–194,195, 196,
Ukraine 531 198, 202, 203, 207, 208–225,229, 236, 237,
undemocracy 481 241, 242, 245, 251,255, 256, 258, 259, 262,
undemocratic politics 25, 461–481 264, 266,269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275,
authoritarianism 386, 393, 467–469, 477–479 276–277,278, 279–281, 282, 285, 286, 291,
BA regimes 467 293,294, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 302–303,
bureaucratic authoritarianism 467 306–308, 311–330, 336, 337, 338,339, 341,
CIA 470 347, 352, 353, 356, 358,359, 360, 361, 362,
dissidence 474–476 374, 384, 386,
397, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404,
Éjercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) 425,426, 445, 453, 457, 464, 470, 472,473,
473 476, 478, 480, 481, 483, 484,509, 510, 511,
extreme parties 479–480 512, 517, 521, 523, 528,529, 532, 534, 535,
extreme right 474 537, 539, 546–547,564, 566, 567, 569, 570,
fascism 385, 462–467, 477 573, 575,576, 577, 580, 581, 583, 594, 595,
framing (naming, blaming, aiming, claiming) 476 596, 603, 606, 607, 615, 626, 627,
628, 630,
hardliners 393 631–634, 635–636,638, 639–640, 641, 642,
insurgency 471–474 643,645, 647, 649, 650,651, 660, 661–663,
kleptocracy 469 667
left-right reactions 479 Uruguay 467, 468, 472, 539, 543, 544, 596, 609, 620,
regime perspective 462–471 623, 625, 627, 628, 629
Maoism 463, 477
NATO 479 Venezuela 393, 397, 472, 620–621, 623
Nazism 462–463 Venice 377
SAWAK 470 Veterans 106, 107, 178, 573, 576, 577, 578
School of the Americas 472–478, 479 veto politics 517
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 472 Via Campesina 591, 604
Stalinism 462 Vienna 589
sultanistic regimes 388, 464, 469–471, 478–479 Vietnam 1, 69, 344, 355, 404, 407, 417, 466–467, 471,
neo-patrimonialism 469 479, 572, 573, 641
patrimonial praetorianism 469 Virginia 548
totalitarianism 387, 462–467, 477 voluntary associations 58, 288, (see also
centralized state 462 non-governmental associations)
ideology 462 voting 22
mass party 462 and African Americans 402, 547–551, 553, 554–555,
Zapatismo 473 559
unemployment 453, 457, 617–618 Voting Rights Act of 1965 553, 554–555
unions 269, 443, 447, 458, 661, 662–663 (see also
AFL-CIO) Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) 75
National Labor Relations Board 347 war 26, 182–183, 368, 375, 376, 377, 572, 579
Union Nacional de Proprietarios (UNP) 474 blind spots 578–583
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, see USSR Civil War 569–570, (U.S.) 573, 578 ; (Spanish)
under Russia) 391
United Kingdom 101–102, 105, 111,112, 114, 115, veterans 577
119, 122, 123, 156, 184–185, 201, 202, 207, civilizing process 568–569
214, 216, 231, 234–235, 242, 255,256, 268, compartementalized war 571–574
273, 279, 302, 308, 313,315, 319, 323, 326, contentious politics 577–578
358, 359, 361,362, 373, 374, 377, 379, 446, economy and war 574–575
453,457, 466, 468, 470, 474, 509,510, 511, empire 568
512, 516, 517, 520, 521,538, 548–555, 558, enfranchisement and war 575–577
613, 618,620, 628, 631–634, 635, 636,639, European war 580
641, 646, 647, 648 genocide 567
United Nations 594 GI Bill of Rights 573, 576
UN Conference on Population and Development home front emphasis 567–570
UNESCO 604, UNCTAD human rights 567, 581–582, 583
P1: JZP
Subject Index 815
Latin American wars 580 social exclusion 522

Manhattan Project 575 social stratification 520–524
Middle Eastern war 580 state-centered theory 517–518
military industry complex 575 universalism 511
neo-institutional theory 583 women friendly policy 522
overlap with politics 566–578, 581 Wisconsin 58, 521
Persian Gulf war 572 women, policies toward 26, 106, 526–544
re-entry of war in sociology 570–571 abortion 542–543
social movements 578 affirmative action policy 534
state breakdown and war 577–578 anti-discrimination and equalization policy 534–535
state-making 573 anti-natalist (birth control, sterilization) policy 538
veterans 106, 107, 178, 572, 576, 577 Cairo Program of Action 540
Vietnam War 572, 573 causal factors of gender policy 527
warlords, pacification of child care 535–536
welfare state and war 575–577 civil society 528
world systems theory 368 economic development 531–534
World War I 121–122, 397, 466, 576, 647 employment 531–536, 543–545
World War II 54, 86, 97, 117, 118, 127, 317, 329, feminism 526–527
386, 397, 399, 569, 570, 572–575, 591, 638, feminization of labor 531
642, 643, 645, 647, 662 gender politics 490–491
Warsaw 478 gender relations 527
Washington 58, 637 global trends 530
Washington consensus 590 ideology 536
Washington D.C. 260, 573, 590 informalization of work 532
Watergate 68 interest groups 528
Weberian theory 19, 86, 88–89, 94 male breadwinner vs. universal breadwinner 537
analytic Weberianism 172 neo-liberalism 530, 533, 538
welfare states 25–26, 509–520 population 518, 543–545
active labor market policy (ALMP) 457, 511, 517 pro-natalist (fertility) policy 541–542
causal forces 524 reconciliation policy (family and maternity leave)
political forces 509–510 535–536
social forces 509, 514 rights 395, 398
child allowances 535–536 sexual harrassment 534
Christian democratic parties 510, 518, 524 social movements 528, 529, 658
citizenship 510–511, 513 Womens’ Christian Temperance Union 107
class mobilization theory 515–517 Federal Order of the Eagles 107
decommodification 511 social welfare policy 536–538, 545
de-familialization 511 UN Conference on Population and Development
definition 510–512 539
inequality 520–524 women friendly policy 522
left parties (mainly social democratic) 515–517, 524 Womens’ Christian Temperance Union 107
modernization theory 514 World Economic Forum 659
Marxist (ruling class) theory 514–515 working class 78, 82, 465
neo-corporatism 511, 516 Working Rights Consortium (WRC) 661
New Deal 510 World Social Forum 659, 660, 668, 669–670
old age pensions (social security in the US, social World Trade Organization (WTO) 309, 612, 659, 668
insurance elsewhere) 106 WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, commitment)
pensions 518 Wyoming 398, 633
political sociology of, 512–520
power resources theory 515–517 xenophobia (see nationalism)
pluralist theory 518
redistributive purposes 79 Yugoslavia 198, 474, 484
regimes (conservative, liberal and social democratic)
512, 518–520 Zaire 469, 641
fourth welfare state regime 519 Zapatismo 473, 601, 602
regime shifting 519 Zapatistas 591, 600–601, 657
rights of man 510 Zeitgeist 133
ruling class theory 514–515 Zimbabwe 356

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0521819903agg.xml CB779/Janoski 0 521 81990 3 April 26, 2005 21:34

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The handbook of political sociology

Written by a distinguished group of leading scholars, The Handbook of Political

Thomas Janoski is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Kentucky.

Robert R. Alford, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, City University of New

Alexander M. Hicks is Professor of Sociology at Emory University. His articles have

Mildred A. Schwartz is Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois at Chicago

The Handbook of Political Sociology

Cambridge University Press

© Cambridge University Press 2005

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of

First published in print format 2005

isbn-13 978-0-511-12505-8 eBook (EBL)

isbn-13 978-0-521-81990-9 hardback

isbn-13 978-0-521-52620-3 paperback

Political Sociology in the New Millenium 1

PART I: THEORIES OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

2 Neopluralism and Neofunctionalism in Political Sociology 54

3 Conflict Theories in Political Sociology 72

4 Institutionalist and State-Centric Theories of Political Sociology 96

5 Culture, Knowledge, and Politics 115

6 Feminist Theorizing and Feminisms in Political Sociology 135

7 The Linguistic Turn: Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek 153

8 Rational-Choice Theories in Political Sociology 172

9 Theories of Race and the State 187

PART II: CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ROOTS AND PROCESSES OF

PART III: THE STATE AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS

PART IV: STATE POLICY AND INNOVATIONS

27 The Politics of Racial Policy 546

PART V: GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Lexington, Atlanta, and New York, 2004

francisco j. granados (Sociology Department, Southern Methodist University) wrote “Interor-

david knoke (Sociology Department, University of Minnesota) is author of Changing Organi-

john markoff (Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh) Professor of Sociology, History

michael edward sauder (Department of Sociology, Northwestern University) is pursuing a

michael schudson (Communication Department, University of California, San Diego) is the

Political Sociology in the New Millennium

Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

2 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 3

4 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 5

to bloom is preferable to confining investigative challenge of synthesizing a disparate field. For

6 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

Figure 1.1. The Directions and Redirections of Political Sociology.

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 7

8 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 9

10 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 11

12 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 13

14 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 15

16 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 17

18 Alexander M. Hicks, Thomas Janoski, and Mildred A. Schwartz

two movements, represented by outward flow- migration/naturalization,genocide/asylum, and

From the future of theory to the task at hand, Theoretical Approaches

Introduction: Political Sociology in the New Millennium 19