Consti II - Mico

gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother.
11 Her only brother BBB also went out in the

company of some neighbors.12
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186228
March 15, 2010
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year
old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 1 the real name and the personal
circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity,
including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; 13 removed his pants, slid inside the
blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear; 14 warned her not to shout for help while
threatening her with his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. 16 He proceeded to
mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina."17
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. 18 Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out
late.19 BBB decided to take AAA with him.20 While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house,
AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father.21 Upon reaching their grandmothers house,
they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, 22 after which, they sought the assistance of Moises
Boy Banting.23
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. 24 He invited appellant to
the police station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped
AAA because he was unable to control himself.26
The Facts
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. 27 Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula,
Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
In an Information dated 21 September 2000, 2 the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED
RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody
discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident28
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA,
a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.3
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him was
ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging
in a heated argument,29 and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.30 He went further to narrate
how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 4 During the pre-trial conference, the
prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the
medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old
when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. 5 On trial,
three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; 6 her brother BBB;7 and one
Moises Boy Banting,8 a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
9
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. AAAs father, the appellant, was
having a drinking spree at the neighbors place. 10 Her mother decided to leave because when appellant
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime. 31 Shortly after,
AAA arrived.32 She answered back when confronted.33 This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on
her buttocks.34
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the afternoon. 35 Finding nobody
at home,36 he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy
Banting.38They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters. 39 He later learned that he was under
detention because AAA charged him of rape.40
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 1
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its
decision41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and
minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 42 It also ordered him to
indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary
damages of P25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS 44 by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN. 45 The appellate court found that appellant is not
eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00.46
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January
2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x.
She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to
Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly
conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman
x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x
x.1avvphi1
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants notice of appeal. This
Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs, 48 but both
manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings. 49
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during
custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at
bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private
complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him
guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt,50 because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB; 51 (2)
his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in
violation of his constitutional right;52 and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.53
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a
"bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution.
Our Ruling
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 59 this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay
bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping
peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."60
47
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and the
credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the
confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid
waiver of such requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan 55 is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for
under Article III, Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the
admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the
private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be
deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on
11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to
serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level." 61 The
composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay
Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood
Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.62
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on
the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not
deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."63
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that
BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives,
proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister to
the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64 appellant argues that "where the testimonies of two key
witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and
their story a mere concoction."65
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is
likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a
minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge. 68 As correctly pointed out by the Court
of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family
invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also
bring their fathers into the gallows of death.69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is
unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and
embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime
was not in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to one
who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving
and lasting gratefulness.71 Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail
for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of
shame.72 It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose
morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is
entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a close relative. 73
Elements of Rape
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not
simply stand together because:
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the
applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 199774 to the case at bar.
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking incident
since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of
Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with Vicente
at that time.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat or intimidation." 75 The death penalty shall be imposed if
it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent."76
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the
help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for,
which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs
testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the
penetration of appellants penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of
her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was committed.77Further, when such testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is
sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. 78
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to
affect the veracity of the testimonies. 66 In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that
such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.67
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the
accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes
for violence and intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with his fist and
a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head.80
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is
viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate." 81 "Alibi and denial must be supported by strong
corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility." 82 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must establish two elements (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was
committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
commission.83 Appellant failed in this wise.
parole and to pay AAAP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the
instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were specifically
alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by
both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial admissions within the
contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00,
the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here, the
rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty, the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto 84 and P75,000.00 as
moral damages.85 However, the award of exemplary damages should have been increased
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.86 Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly
imposed considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant would have been
appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. 87 We further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on
appellants non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that "persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetuaby reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995
PEOPLE
OF
THE.
vs.
MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On the belief that the case for the prosecution depends in the main on his own extrajudicial confession
which he claims is inadmissible, accused Marlo Compil y Litaban filed a demurrer to evidence instead
of presenting evidence in his behalf. The trial court however denied his demurrer, admitted his
extrajudicial confession, and found him guilty of robbery with homicide. Now before us, he maintains
that his extrajudicial confession was extracted without the assistance of counsel, thus constitutionally
flawed.
As submitted by the prosecution, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ
Furnitureslocated along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its
proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way into the furniture shop
through the window grills they detached on the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located.
Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded the two (2) maids of the owners into the bathroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood
Furniture, along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their
bedroom. Sensing however that something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door to
peek. Suddenly, a man placed his arms around her neck while another poked a balisong at her nape. She
was pushed back into the bedroom and ordered to open the drawers where she kept money. A third man
ransacked the bedroom. They then tied her hands behind her back, stuffed her mouth with a towel, and
took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth P30,000.00.
Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the
bathroom, heard Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the two
(2) men guarding them had already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho, dashed out of
the bathroom and proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary, the two (2) maids
untied her hands and took out the towel from her mouth. They then rushed to the ground floor where
they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of furniture which were in disarray. He
succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.
In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives
of the Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that evening, while with his girlfriend
Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw his co-workers Marlo
Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the
information of Bartolome to the police investigators who also learned that the trio who were all from
Samar failed to report for work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go
to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his sister's child.
Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, and Jenelyn
Valle went to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions.
From the records of the parish they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar Mabini stood as
godfather in the baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez. Immediately they proceeded
to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and his companions already left the day
before, except Compil who stayed behind and still planning to leave.
After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accused
Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to
Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling. However after regaining his
composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting
officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil
was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On their way back to
Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was
with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were
and his participation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture
shop since he would be recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went inside.
Compil said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they
all met in Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio
Pakit, where they shared the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for
Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go home to their respective provinces.
From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to the house of
Pablo Pakit who confirmed that his younger brother Rogelio, with some six (6) others including
Compil, went to his house past midnight on 23 October 1987 and divided among themselves the money
and jewelry which, as he picked up from their conversation, was taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. They
drank beer until past four o'clock the next morning.
On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer
Melencio Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville Compil and brother-inlaw Virgilio Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of the WPD admitting his
participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators of the crime as Jose
Jacale, Baltazar Mabini, Amancio Alvos, Rogelio Pakit, a certain "Erning" and one "Lando," and
asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by Jose Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who were the
masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work for MJ Furnitures where he
was the foreman.
Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations in Manila,
Paraaque and Bulacan but failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.
On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil.
Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the prosecution
had rested, the accused represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to
evidence.
On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49, 1 denied the demurrer, found the accused
guilty of robbery with homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his constitutional
rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the police officers started interrogating
him from the time of his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at the Tayabas Police Station, and while
on their way to Manila . . . . (he) was made to confess and declare statements that can be used against
him in any proceeding." 2 And, the belated arrival of counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual
execution of the written extrajudicial confession did not cure the constitutional infirmity since the police
investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements from him the day before, which extracted
statements formed part of his alleged confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admission of
(his) oral . . . and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of other witnesses" 3 which are
replete with "serious and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions." 4
In People v. Rous, 5 the Third Division of this Court held that an extrajudicial confession may be
admitted in evidence even if obtained without the assistance of counsel provided that it was read and
fully explained to confessant by counsel before it was signed. However we adopt our view in Gamboa
v. Cruz 6 where the Court En Banc ruled that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of
the offense." We maintained this rule in the fairly recent cases of People v. Macam 7 and People v.
Bandula 8 where we further reiterated the procedure
. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf . . . Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be in admissible in evidence.
In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation
upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas
Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents
again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the
crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract
incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed
extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus 9 we said that admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained to the
accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the records, the
latter's constitutional rights and the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession.
While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details which
could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the
investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity.
Nevertheless, we find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We give credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Linda Hermoso, Pablo Pakit and Jenelyn
Valle. We believe that Linda Hermoso saw the accused and Mabini in the vicinity of MJ Furnitures just
before the commission of the crime. While Hermoso may have contradicted herself on some minor
incidents, she was straightforward on this specific instance
FISCAL FORMOSO (re-direct):
Q. You said that you saw Marlo and Puti (Baltazar Mabini) together with Jessie when you were inside
the jeep, is it not?
WITNESS HERMOSO:
circumstances as gleaned from the factual findings of the trial court form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. 13 Hence even disregarding accused-appellant's oral and written confessions, as we do, still the
prosecution was able to show that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery with homicide.
While it may be true that the arrest, search and seizure were made without the benefit of a warrant,
accused-appellant is now estopped from questioning this defect after failing to move for the quashing of
the information before the trial court. Thus any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and
by participating in the trial. 14
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was this before you went to sleep?
A. Yes, sir. 10
Time and again it has been said that minor inconsistencies do not impair the credibility of witnesses,
more so with witness Hermoso who only reached Grade Two and who as the trial court noted had
difficulty understanding the questions being propounded to her. In fine, in the absence of evidence to
show any reason why prosecution witnesses should falsely testify, it is fair to conclude that no improper
motive exists and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
We have repeatedly ruled that the guilt of the accused may be established through circumstantial
evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proved; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 11 And there can be a conviction based on circumstantial evidence
when the circumstances proven form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 12
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused through the following
circumstances: First, accused Marlo Compil and Baltazar Mabini who are both from Samar worked
in MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were familiar with the floor plan of the shop. Second, on the
night of the incident, they were seen in front of MJ Furnitures. Third, they were seen going to the rear
of the furniture store. Fourth, robbers forcibly entered MJ Furnitures through the back window on the
second floor. Fifth, some two (2) hours after the commission of the crime, at around two o'clock the
following morning, they were in a house in Bangkal, Makati, dividing between themselves and their
five (5) other companions the money and jewelry taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sixth, they all failed to
show up for work the following day. Seventh, accuses Compil turned ashen, was trembling and
speechless when apprehended in Tayabas, Quezon, for a crime committed in Manila. Certainly these
The argument of accused-appellant that the trial court should have convicted the arresting police officers
of arbitrary detention, if not delay in the delivery of detained persons, is misplaced. Suffice it to say that
the law enforcers who arrested him are not being charged and prosecuted in the case at bench.
Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of accused-appellant that granting that he had participated in
the commission of the crime, he should be considered only as an accomplice. Disregarding his
extrajudicial confession and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his behalf, the Court is left
with no other recourse but to consider only the evidence of the prosecution which shows that the
perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. For, direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy 15 which
may be inferred from the acts of the accused during and after the commission of the crime which point
to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. 16Thus circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to prove conspiracy. 17 And where conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all, and each is
to be held in the same degree of liability as the others. 18
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar as it
finds accused-appellant MARLO COMPIL y LITABAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with homicide. Consequently, he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties
provided by law.
Accused-appellant is also directed to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Manuel Jay in the amount of
P50,000.00, plus P35,000.00 as actual damages. He is further directed to return to Mary Jay the jewelry
worth P30,000.00, and if he can no longer return the jewelry, to pay its value.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133026
February 20, 2001
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
GALGARIN
alias
TOTO, accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry Galgarin
alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once shared.1wphi1.nt
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened Gerry
Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed
him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the
unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free
himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled
when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for
safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he collapsed
on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him
to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive medical attention. According to the
autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which penetrated the heart."1
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin
was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting
his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after
attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was
waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where
they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for
Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown
over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through the testimony of Clara
Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis Aquino standing outside the Soundlab Recording
Studio, a barhouse owned by him, when Galgarin suddenly approached them and without any prior
warning stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned lover who harbored illfeelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized Edward and Gerry because the street was
sufficiently lighted.2
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door neighbor of Dennis, who
testified that a little past six o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Gerry Galgarin together with a
companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab
Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she heard a Instinctively, she
instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for cover while she anxiously waited for her seven (7)year old daughter Josephine who was out of the house for an errand for her. Soon enough she heard
Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying because she said herKuya Dennis had been shot and
stabbed.3
Josephine confirmed her mother's testimony and even said that she had seen Gerry Galgarin stab
her KuyaDennis and she could remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose.4
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino
and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both
accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the
archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of Dennis.
Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his common-law wife Maria
Marasigan give birth to their first born. He stayed with her until the 16th of October when she was
discharged from the Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.5
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and
Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into
temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched
from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan
police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported the alibi of accusedappellant. However, she admitted that when she registered the child's birth on 13 December 1993 or
more than two (2) years after the delivery, she informed the civil registrar that the child's father was
"unknown."6 His story was also confirmed by Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his co-workers at
the Kainan sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who testified that accused-appellant was fetched by a
neighbor from the restaurant in the early afternoon of 14 October with the news that his wife was having
labor pains.7
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was
induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was
constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of
the Constitution.8
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the police
officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his
confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of hostility
towards him. The court gave credence to the arresting officers' assertion that it was even accusedappellant who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national television for Edward
to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support his
allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified by treachery 9 and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino P50,000.00
as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages. The case against his nephew and coaccused Edward Endino remained in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement as soon as he
could be arrested.10
In his Appellant's Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his alibi and admitting his
videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime on 16 October 1991 as he
was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth on the 14th of that month, is not persuasive.
Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony of Cornelio Tejero Jr.,11 Philippine Airlines Load Controller of
the Puerto Princesa City, that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on their passenger manifest
for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could not be relied upon inasmuch as he himself
admitted that they could not be sure of their passengers' real identities. The testimonies of accusedappellant's co-workers that he was in Antipolo on 14 October 1991 did not fortify his defense either
since these witnesses did not categorically state that they saw him in Antipolo in the evening of 16
October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the one who
stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leong's identification of
accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous manner. Her confidence as to the
attacker's identity was clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him having a mole below his nose,
which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to implicate accused-appellant, a
complete stranger to them, if there was no truth to their assertion. As for Clara, her naming of accusedappellant as her boyfriend's assailant was not done out of spite, but was impelled by her desire to seek
justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellant's guilt, probably with intense incriminating effect, were his
immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt at jailbreak 12 revealing a guilty conscience, hence, his
persistent effort to evade the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening
his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part
of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit
sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he
could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic
with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision13 Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino,
and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused was
coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting
one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, 14 it is prudent that trial courts are
reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all
probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of
the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.1wphi1.nt
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper
and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this
where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under
coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described
as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore
should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a
difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating
polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents itself is
whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless, the
crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply standing
on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the accused's criminal
design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the slightest provocation from
him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.15
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant GERRY GALGARIN
alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P72,725.35 as actual damages, isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
is further ordered to compensate the decedent's heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional
and mental anguish. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 151286
direction where he heard the shots and, from about a hundred meters away, saw a short man wearing
green clothes running away. At first, he ignored the occurrence but when he saw people trooping to the
vicinity, he joined the crowd and there saw a dead woman on the ground. The woman was later
identified as his cousin and neighbor, Elva "Ka Elving" Ramos-Jacob.5
March 31, 2004
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
AZCUNA and CATALINO DUEAS, JR., appellant.
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
On December 6, 1996, Dr. Nenita S. Hernandez, municipal health officer of Baler, Aurora, conducted
a post mortem examination on the victim. Her autopsy report showed the following:
DECISION
I - Head:
CORONA J.:
1. wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape about 1 cm. diameter at the right parieto-temporal area.
Before us on automatic review is the decision,1 dated October 26, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal Case No. 2220 finding the appellant, Catalino Dueas,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by evident premeditation and
attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. Appellant was sentenced to death.
2. wound, gunshot, exit, stollate in shape, edges everted about 1.5 cm. diameter with an exposed brain
matter and fractured bone fragment located at the temporal area, right side.
On April 1, 1997, Provincial Prosecutor Charlaw W. Ronquillo filed with the RTC Baler, Aurora an
information charging appellant with the crime of murder:
II - Arm:
3. wound lacerated about 1.5 cm. long at the right parietal area.
1. wound lacerated 4 cm. long, lateral aspect, right wrist.

That at about 8:00 oclock in the morning on November 29, 1996 at Gabgab Buhangin, Baler, Aurora
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused who was convicted of Murder on
October 2, 1990, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and use of an unlicensed firearm,
did then and there, attack, assault and use personal violence upon Elva Ramos-Jacob, also known as
Elving Jacob, by shooting her at the head with a .38 caliber revolver that caused her death not long
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.3
The following facts are uncontroverted.
Appellant was a convicted felon for the crime of homicide 4 in Criminal Case No. 1414 in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 66, Baler, Aurora. He was serving sentence in the Iwahig Prison Farm, Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan, when he escaped from confinement on July 11, 1995.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
The most probable cause of death was brain damage and hypovelmic shock due to gunshot wounds of
the brain.6
In a manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrated what it viewed as the factual
antecedents of the case:
On December 18, 1996, appellant tried to enter the house of one Benny Poblete in Brgy. Buhangin,
Baler, Aurora, without permission. Benny and his father Harold Poblete tied appellants hands until the
police arrived. Police Officer Noel C. Palmero then apprehended and detained appellant at the Baler
Police Station.
The next day, or on December 19, 1996, appellant sought voluntary confinement for "safekeeping"
because there were threats upon his life brought about by his involvement in the aforementioned
incident of theft against the Pobletes.
On November 29, 1996, at around 8:00 a.m., Cesar Friginal was cutting grass in his rice field in Sitio
Gabgab, Brgy. Buhangin, Baler, Aurora, when he heard two gunshots. He instinctively turned to the
Right after his apprehension, appellant intimated to Police Officer Palmero that he has information
regarding the death of Ka Elving. Police Officer Palmero then instructed appellant to think about it over
(sic) first.
Four days after or on December 23, 1996, Police Officer Palmero asked the still detained appellant if he
was ready to divulge the information regarding Ka Elvings death, to which appellant answered yes.
Appellant was then informed of his constitutional rights, including the right to secure the services of a
lawyer of his own choice. Police Officer Palmero told appellant that if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he would even be provided with one for free.
By eleven oclock that same morning, Atty. Josefina S. Angara, upon the polices invitation, arrived at
the Baler Police Station to talk to appellant. Atty. Angara spoke with appellant in private for about thirty
(30) minutes. Appellant blamed Benny for kicking him and causing him to suffer chest pains. Atty.
Angara asked appellant what really happened. Before long, appellant admitted that he was
commissioned by Benny to kill the victim. Atty. Angara warned him of the seriousness of his
implications but appellant was adamant in confessing to the murder of Ka Elving. The lawyer-client
conference was briefly interrupted by lunchtime. By one-thirty in the afternoon, however, the inquisition
resumed. Between the hours of three thirty and four oclock in the afternoon, appellant completed
his Sinumpaang Salaysay where he confessed to the killing of Ka Elving. The statement of appellant
was initially written on pad paper, thereafter it was typewritten. However, by the time the Sinumpaang
Salaysay was finalized, it was already past office hours such that the attestation before the municipal
mayor was postponed until the following morning.
Afterwards, because of persistent chest pains, appellant was then brought to the Aurora Memorial
Hospital to be medically examined. However, Police Officer Palmero did not inquire as to the results of
the medical examination. The results of the medical examination were not offered in evidence.
The following morning, December 24, 1996, appellant, who was escorted by the police, was brought
before the then Municipal Mayor of Baler, Aurora, Arturo S. Angara. Mayor Angara read the
signed Sinumpaang Salaysay before administering the oath. He probed appellant if the signature
appearing in the Sinumpaang Salaysay was his and whether he understood the contents of the said
document. Subsequently, Mayor Angara affixed his signature on appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay.
In substance, the contested Sinumpaang Salaysay states that Benny Poblete commissioned one Cesar to
kill Ka Elving. Cesar, in turn, contacted appellant for the hit. For more than a week, appellant and Cesar,
together with a certain Manny Gonzales, stalked the victim. On November 29, 1996, appellant acted as
a lookout while his companions shot the victim.7
On the other hand, appellant testified that, before noon on December 14, 1996, 8 he went to the house of
one Benny Poblete to see his brother-in-law, Erwin Bernardo, who was working for the Pobletes. Since
his brother-in-law was not around, Harold, son of Benny Poblete, invited him to a drinking spree. While
they were drinking, police officers Alfredo Miel and Amoranto Aquino arrived and arrested him. He was
brought to the municipal hall where he was forced to admit the killing of Elving Jacob. For three
consecutive nights, he was mauled. As a result, his eyes became swollen and his chest ached. Unable to
endure the pain any longer, he owned up to the crime.9
On December 23, 1996, PO3 Noel C. Palmero, in the presence of Atty. Josefina Angara, took appellants
statement. Appellant claimed that neither investigating officer Palmero nor Atty. Josefina Angara
apprised him of his constitutional rights during the custodial investigation. The following day, he was
brought to Mayor Arturo Angara before whom he swore to his affidavit containing his confession. 10
Dr. Roberto A. Correa of the Aurora Memorial Hospital testified that he conducted a medical
examination of the appellant at around 2:00 p.m. on December 23, 1996. During the examination, he
found a three-inch lacerated wound on appellants right arm and a biositis tenderness (inflammation of
the muscle) in his right scapular area. He further testified that the lesions were caused by a sharp
instrument. Aside from these lesions, Dr. Correo did not notice any other injuries on the body of the
appellant.11
On rebuttal, Atty. Angara belied the accusation of Dueas. She testified that at past 10:00 a.m. on
December 23, 1996, policemen came to her office and requested her to assist the appellant who was
then under custodial investigation. She arrived at the police station at past 11:00 a.m. and was
introduced to the appellant. During her private conversation with the appellant, she apprised him of his
constitutional rights and told him that whatever he said could be used against him. She discouraged him
from giving his confession but appellant was determined to do so. The questioning resumed at about
1:30 p.m. and lasted up to 4:00 p.m. While the investigation was going on, appellant complained of
chest pains so she requested that appellant be brought to the hospital for medical attention.
PO3 Palmero was also presented as rebuttal witness. He disclaimed mauling the appellant. He admitted
that appellant was indeed complaining of chest pains but it was allegedly the result of the kick by
Harold Poblete. In contrast with his previous declaration that he fetched Atty. Angara at around 3:30
p.m. to assist appellant during the investigation, PO3 Palmero now claimed that the interrogation lasted
about three hours, that is, from 1:00 p.m. up to about 4:00 p.m. on December 23, 1996. He also declared
that appellant was given medical attention after the interrogation. 12
Relying principally on the extrajudicial confession of the appellant on December 23, 1996 (which was
later repudiated), the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of the crime charged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Catalino Dueas, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder qualified by evident premeditation, and considering
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and in the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and further orders him to
indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages and to pay the costs.
TANONG: Alam mo ba at naipaliwanag ng iyong abogado na anumang salaysay mo sa pagsisiyasat na

ito ay maaring gamitin laban sa iyo?
SAGOT: Opo.
The Court finds no merit in the insinuation of the defense that Atty. Josefina Angara was not Dueas
own choice as counsel for the interrogation (TSN, October 4, 2001, p. 4).
SO ORDERED.13
xxx
xxx
xxx
Hence, this automatic appeal.

According to appellant, the extrajudicial confession which the trial court relied on heavily for his
conviction was infirm because the confession was secured through force and intimidation, a violation of
his constitutional rights.
For the State, the OSG filed a manifestation and motion in lieu of appellees brief, seeking the reversal
of the challenged decision and the acquittal of Dueas on the ground of involuntariness of his
extrajudicial confession. The OSG underscored the fact that it was forced out of appellant by means of
threats, violence and intimidation, thus violating his rights.
The appeal is meritorious.
In convicting the appellant, the court a quo reasoned as follows:
The extrajudicial confession of accused Dueas, Jr. was freely and voluntarily given and that his
retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated contrivances and efforts of
exculpation.
The statement (Exh. B-Stip.) itself reveals that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement
on pre-interrogation advisories, thus:
PASUBALI: Ikaw Catalino Dueas, Jr., ipinagbibigay alam ko sa iyo, na ikaw ay inuusig sa isang
kasalanan, pinapaalala ko sa iyo na sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas ay karapatan mo ang manahimik
at hindi sumagot sa mga tanong ko sa iyo at magkaroon ng Abogado ng sarili mong pili, ito ba ay
nauunawaan mo?
SAGOT: Opo.
In the present case, accused even admitted that he trusted Atty. Angara when he signed his sworn
statement in the presence of the said counsel (TSN, November 23, 2000, p. 9).
Absent any showing that the lawyer who assisted the accused was remissed (sic) in her duties, it can be
safely concluded that the custodial investigation of Dueas was regularly conducted.
As could be observed, the confession is replete with details that could not have been concocted by the
police authorities. According to Dueas, he is one of those who killed Elva Jacob; that his companions
were Manny Gonzales and one Cesar; that Benny Poblete contacted Cesar who in turn contacted him
(accused) for the purpose of killing Elving Jacob because his (Benny Pobletes) daughter Rhea who died
in September, 1996 might still be alive were it not for the witchcraft of Elving Jacob and her siblings;
that he (accused) was contacted by Cesar in November, 1996 at the market near the terminal of Baliwag
Transit in Cabanatuan City; that he and Cesar were together when they went to Baler, Aurora and they
just fetched Manny Gonzales at the gasoline station in Maria Aurora, Aurora; that they hatched the plan
of executing Elving Jacob in the middle of November, 1996 at the house of Benny Poblete; that at that
place and time, Cesar was given three thousand pesos (P3,000.00); that he (accused) did not know Cesar
well but could describe the latters distinctive features; that Cesar and Manny Gonzales were armed
with a .38 cal. revolver; that they conducted a surveillance on Elving Jacob for more than a week to
determine her movement in going to and from the ricefield she is working on at Sitio Gabgab, Brgy.
Buhangin, Baler, Aurora; that on November 29, 1996, at about eight oclock in the morning, they
positioned themselves under a canal, feigning to be catching fish, until Elving Jacob passed by; that his
two companions followed Elving Jacob, while he remained on top of the canal and acted as a look out;
that, not long thereafter, he heard two gunshots; that they left the scene and reunited at Santiagos house
in Brgy. Suklayin, Baler, Aurora; that on December 18, 1996, at around one oclock in the afternoon, he
was instructed by Cesar to go to the house of Benny Poblete to collect the balance of five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00); and that he was arrested there by the police. "The confession is replete with details
that only the confessant could have known and which, therefore, show that the confession was executed
voluntarily (People vs. Jimenez, 105 SCRA 721)."
Also, the confession of the accused is exonerative in nature as it points to other member of the group as
the triggerman. "The exculpatory tone of admission of the crime and the abundance of details negate
violence and maltreatment in obtaining a confession. A guilty person seldom admits his guilt fully and
completely. He has a tendency to explain away his conduct or minimize his fault or crime or shift the
blame to others."
PROS. RONQUILLO TO THE ACCUSED
xxx
Q Why?
xxx
xxx
Q Did you file any charge to (sic) the policemen who mauled you?
A No, sir.
The defense tried to impress to the Court that the policemen subjected the accused to cruel and painful
punishment to extract his confession, thus:
A BECAUSE I HAVE NO ONE TO TELL ON AND I AM AFRAID FOR THEM, SIR (sic). (TSN,
November 23, 2000, p. 11)
ATTY. NOVERAS TO THE ACCUSED
A review of appellants extrajudicial confession discloses certain facts and circumstances which put his
culpability in doubt.
Q During the third time they mauled you and told you to admit responsibility for the death of Elving
Jacob, what happened?
Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, persons under custodial investigation have the
following rights:
A I already admit (sic) because I could not bear the pain anymore, Sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q What else, if there are any?

A They could (sic) not allow me to sleep. They just throw water on me so I could not sleep or rest.
(TSN, October 4, 2000, pp. 3-4).
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
But,
Q You said you were forced and intimidated to give the confession in connection with the death of Mrs.
Jacob, did you tell Atty. Angara about the fact?
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
(4) x x x
xxx
xxx
A I did not.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions covered by this constitutional provision: (1)
those resulting from third degree methods like torture, force, violence, threat and intimidation, and (2)
those given without the benefit of the Miranda warnings.14
Q Why?
A HOW COULD I TELL THAT WHEN THE POLICE OFFICERS WERE THERE SURROUNDING
ME? (Emphasis ours) (Ibid, p. 6)
xxx
xxx
Viewed against this backdrop, certain circumstances in this case need to be carefully reviewed and
considered.
xxx
On December 18, 1996,15 appellant was arrested for theft on the request of a certain Benny Poblete. PO3
Palmero admitted that at the time of the arrest, appellant was not committing any crime. He was
detained overnight without any charges. The following day, PO3 Palmero claimed that appellant
supposedly sought "voluntary confinement for his own protection." The police blotter entry, however,
was not offered in evidence. Only a certification of such entry was presented, which certification was
not even signed by appellant. Under the circumstances, the "voluntary confinement" tale appears to be
an afterthought to cover up the appellants illegal arrest and detention. No person in his right mind,
already behind bars, will still seek "voluntary confinement" when there are no charges against him.
Appellant executed his sworn statement on his alleged involvement in the killing of Ka Elving on
December 23, 1996 or five days after his arrest. Immediately after accomplishing the affidavit, appellant
sought medical attention, during which Dr. Correa found positive marks of violence on the latters body,
an indication that physical coercion occurred at one point from the time of his arrest up to the execution
of his extrajudicial confession. The only purpose of the maltreatment could have been to force him to
admit guilt against his will. When confronted on this matter, rebuttal witness PO3 Palmero had nothing
but evasive and unresponsive answers:
A Because I could not remember anymore the person who accompanied him.16
The trial court considered appellants claim of maltreatment as but a lame excuse. It stated that the
failure of the accused to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the person(s) who
allegedly maltreated him, although he had the opportunity to do so, meant that the confession was
voluntary. But appellant adequately explained why he did not tell anybody about the police brutality he
had suffered. He testified:
Q You said you were forced and intimidated to give the confession in connection with the death of Mrs.
Jacob, did you tell Atty. Angara about that fact?
A I did not.
Q Why?
A How could I tell that when the police officers were there surrounding me.17
Q Did you personally bring Dueas to the hospital?
On cross-examination, appellant made the following declaration:
A I could not remember, anymore, Sir. But he was brought to the hospital.
PROS. RONQUILLO
Q Are you sure of that?
Q Did you file any charge to (sic) the policemen who mauled you?
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir.
Q If you could not remember anymore if you were the one who bring (sic) him to the hospital, do you
know who was the police officer who brought him?
Q Why?
A I do not know the jailer at the time.

Q Were you still in the police station when he was brought back?
A Maybe I was not there.
Q Did you try to inquire what was the result of the examination being conducted upon Catalino Dueas?
A Not anymore, sir.
A Because I have no one to tell on and I am afraid for them, sir. (sic)18
Furthermore, the trial court misapplied the rule that a confession is presumed voluntary where the same
contains details and facts unknown to the investigator which could have been supplied only by the
perpetrator of the crime. In People vs. Abayon,19 we held:
It is a settled rule that where an alleged confession contains details and is replete with facts which could
have possibly been supplied only by the perpetrator of the crime, and could not have been known to or
invented by the investigators, the confession is considered to have been voluntarily given. This rule,
however, was erroneously applied by the trial court in the case at bar.
Q Why?
The facts and details contained in at least three of the confessions, those of Reynaldo Abayon, Mariano
Aragon and Jose Juarez, were already known to the PC investigators at the time the statements were
allegedly signed by the said accused-appellants. The three confessions referred to all appear to have
been executed after the body of the deceased Pedro Eslamado had been exhumed by the PC team on
July 15, 1971. Abayon's statement is dated July 16, Aragon's statement, July 22, and Juarez' statement,
July 23, 1971. On those dates, the PC would have known details and facts such as, that Pedro Eslamado
was abducted and killed, where his remains were buried, that he was tied around the mouth by towels,
that his hands were tied with shoe strings, all of which were stated in the confessions.
In this case, the police authorities already knew of the murder of Ka Elving. As succinctly pointed out
by the Office of the Solicitor General:
PO3 Palmero, right after appellants arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that he would confess his
participation in the killing. As he testified on cross-examination:
Q On December 18, 1996, when you arrested him what did he actually told (sic) you?
A Before we put him in jail at the Baler Police Station he told us that he has (sic) to reveal something
about the death of Elvira Jacob.
Q So you already know that on December 18, 1996 that whatever Catalino Dueas will reveal to you
will give you lead in solving the investigation in connection with the death of Elvira Jacob, isnt it?
A Yes, sir.
xxx at the time of the execution of the extrajudicial confession, and even before appellants arrest,
the post mortem examination was already available to the police. Data regarding the murder weapon,
the wounds sustained by the victim, the whereabouts of the cadaver were properly within the knowledge
of the investigating officers. The latter, then, could have easily filled up the details of the crime in the
extrajudicial confession. It must be emphasized that the presumption of voluntariness of an extrajudicial
confession arises only when the replete details could have been supplied by no other person but the
perpetrator himself [People vs. Base, 105 SCRA 721 (1981)], which is not the case here.
Also worth mentioning is the belated appearance of Atty. Angara, incidentally not of appellants choice,
who assisted him in the execution of his extrajudicial confession. This fell terribly short of the standards
demanded by the Constitution and Section 2 of RA 7438. 20 Appellant was arrested before noon on
December 18, 1996. The extrajudicial confession was taken five days later, on December 23, 1996. Atty.
Angara testified that policemen came to her office at past 10:00 a.m. on December 23, 1996 requesting
her to assist a suspect under custodial investigation. She arrived at the police station at around 11:00
a.m. and conferred with the appellant for about 30 minutes. The interrogation resumed after lunch and
lasted till 4:00 p.m.
From the foregoing, it is evident that appellant had already been in detention for five days before he
came to be assisted by a lawyer, just before he was about to put his confession in writing. We entertain
no doubt that the constitutional requirement was violated. In People vs. Bolanos,21 we held that:
An accused who is on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already under
custodial investigation and should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. According to
Q So, you still waited until December 23, 1996 for that revelation, isnt it?
A Yes, sir. Thats all, your honor.22
Well-settled is the doctrine that the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting a confession, even through the slightest
coercion which might lead the accused to admit something untrue. 23 What is sought to be avoided is the
"evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an
offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him." 24 These constitutional
guarantees are meant to protect a person from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical,
atmosphere of such investigation.25
Finally, the court notes the material discrepancy between the testimony of PO3 Palmero and that of Atty.
Angara. When PO3 Palmero was first put on the witness stand, he testified that he fetched Atty. Angara
to assist appellant at about 3:30 p.m. on December 23, 1996. The interrogation lasted more or less an
hour. However, on rebuttal, PO3 Palmero changed his story and declared that the interrogation of
appellant lasted about three hours from about 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. The adjustment in the time cited
may have been made to conform to the earlier testimony of rebuttal witness Atty. Angara who said that
the interrogation of appellant lasted from about 1:30 p.m. up to about 4:00 p.m. But how could the
interrogation of appellant have taken place within that time-frame when, according to Dr. Correo and
the appellants medical record, the doctor conducted his medical examination of the appellant at around
2:00 p.m. on December 23, 1996?26
In view of the foregoing, since the extrajudicial confession of appellant was given in violation of the
safeguards in Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, we hold that the appellants extrajudicial
confession dated December 23, 1996 was inadmissible as evidence. And with the exclusion thereof, the
record is bereft of any substantial evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction. While it is true that
one Cesar Friginal was presented as a witness by the prosecution, his testimony did not implicate the
appellant in the murder of Elving Jacob, the witness having said only that he saw a short man in green
clothes running away from the vicinity of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal Case
No. 2220, convicting appellant Catalino Dueas, Jr., is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder and his immediate release is ordered unless there is
reason to return him for confinement at the Iwahig Prison Farm in Puerto Princesa City or to detain him
for some other valid cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to inform this Court of his compliance
within ten days from receipt of this decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
prejudice, and by reason or on occasion of said robbery, with the use of a deadly weapon, and lewd
designs, had carnal knowledge of one LUZVIMINDA AQUINO Y AREVALO, and then attacked,
assaulted and stabbed one ARNEL CERICOS Y MICIANO with the same weapon, thereby inflicting
upon the latter serious physical injuries.
G.R. No. 112035 January 16, 1998

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
PANFILO CABILES alias "NONOY", accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
(p. 7, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant's co-accused, Jaime Mabingnay, was neither apprehended nor arraigned, whereas
accused-appellant was arraigned on both original and amended informations. After trial, following the
entry of a not guilty plea, the above-quoted verdict was rendered. Hence, the instant appeal.
Accused-appellant, Panfilo Cabiles, alias Nonoy, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Branch 124, Kalookan City), finding him guilty of the
crime of Robbery with Rape, as follows:
As deduced from the prosecution's evidence which came primarily from the testimony of Marites Nas
Atienza and Luzviminda Aquino, the inculpatory facts are as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Panfilo
Cabiles aliasNonoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Rape as charged and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Art. 294
of the Revised Penal Code; to indemnify the victim Luzviminda Aquino in the amount of P30,000.00 as
consequential damages. Said accused is also ordered to return to Marites Nas Atienza the stolen Seiko
Wrist watch worth P1,500.00 and one gold ring worth P500.00 and if unable to do so, to pay said victim
the corresponding prices of these articles as shown above; to reimburse Marites Nas Atienza the amount
of P1,000.00 in cash and to pay the costs.
Marites Nas Atienza, a housewife whose husband was abroad, was residing at No. 224 Malambing St.,
Amparo Subdivision, Kalookan City. On the eve of November 5, 1989, she was asleep with her 1 1/2year old daughter, Erica Dianne Atienza, inside her room at her house. Approximately two steps away
from her bed, Luzviminda Aquino, Marites' housemaid, was sleeping on a sofa. The house has an area
of about 29 square meters. The main door is located at the kitchen. In the kitchen, there is a stairway
leading to a store. To the left of the house is the bedroom where the three were asleep. The place was
illuminated by the light coming from a 25-watt electrical bulb which was outside the room's window
(tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 6; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 20-24, 28; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 4, 6, 8, 10, 17).
The accused shall be entitled to the full period of his preventive imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code provided with the conditions enumerated thereon have been complied with.
At around 1:15 o'clock on the morning of November 5, 1989, a man suddenly barged into the house of
Marites by destroying the kitchen door and removing the lawanit wall thereof, thus enabling him to
reach the lock inside. The man suddenly poked a 6-inch kitchen knife on the right side of Marites' neck.
This awakened her. She was told not to shout, otherwise she would be killed. Then the man placed
masking tape on her mouth and ordered her to bring out her money and jewelry. At the point of the
knife, Marites, while carrying her baby, went to the cabinet outside the room, took cash amounting to
P1,000.00, a Seiko watch worth P1,500.00, a lady's wristwatch with the trademark "Chanel" (also
referred to in the records as "Channel") worth P850.00, a bracelet worth P500.00, and a ring worth
P500.00, and gave them to the man. Afterwards, they went back inside the bedroom and Marites sat on
her bed, still cuddling her baby (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 7-8, 11-12, 40; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 19, 30,
31). Marites later identified the man as accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 86-87, Rollo.)
Through an Amended Information, accused-appellant, together with the additional accused, was charged
as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of November 1989, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and violence, with
intent of gain, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry away one (1) gold ring worth P500.00, one (1) ladies
seiko watch worth P1,500.00, cash money worth P1,000.00, one (1) bracelet worth P500.00 and
wristwatch (Channel) worth P800.00 belonging to one Marites Nas Atienza, to the latter's damage and
Meanwhile, Luzviminda was awakened by the crying of Marites' baby. When she was about to shout,
the man poked the knife on her left side, causing her an injury. The man then told her, "Huwag kang
sisigaw kundi papatayin kita." Meanwhile, Marites sat on the bed, trembling with fear, as she cuddled
her baby. The man also placed masking tape on Luzviminda's mouth. Thereafter, he forcibly held both
of her arms in front of her. Notwithstanding her struggle to hide her hands at her back, accusedappellant succeeded in tying her hands at the front with the use of a piece of shoestring (tsn, March 5,
1990, pp. 9-10, 16; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 34-35; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 6-9, 27, 34, 44). Luzviminda
likewise later identified the man as accused-appellant.
The man then went to the store which was only about 4 to 5 steps away from Marites' bed. He ransacked
the same in search for more valuables. Thereafter, he took a bottle of beer from the refrigerator and
began drinking. Afterwards, he returned to the room and sat beside Luzviminda (tsn, March 5, 1990, p.
10; tsn, April 5, 1990, p. 25).
While the man continued to hold the knife, he tapped Luzviminda's thigh. When he was about to
consume the beer, he started removing Luzviminda's pants and underwear while still holding the knife
with his right hand. The man then rolled down his short pants to his thighs. He poked the knife on
Luzviminda's right side and despite the latter's resistance, he succeeded in inserting his sexual organ into
Luzviminda's private parts after forcibly lying on top of her. Luzviminda struggled and kicked,
accidentally hitting with her right foot the knife thus causing her injury. All the while, Marites was still
cuddling her daughter, as she sat on her bed in extreme fear. She was witnessing Luzviminda being
raped by the man. While on top of Luzviminda and continuously doing the sexual act, the man uttered:
"Isusunod ko ang Ate mo pagkatapos ko sa iyo." Upon hearing those words, Marites tried to escape by
asking permission to prepare milk for her baby (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 11-14, 16-17; tsn, April 5, 1990,
pp. 36, 38, 40, 42; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 10-11, 13-14, 27).
While carrying her child, Marites was able to run to the house of her neighbor, Arnel Cericos, from
whom she asked for help. Ceriro's house was approximately twelve steps away from Marites' house.
Marites decided to hide at Ceriro's house. When Cericos entered the room, the man was still on top of
Luzviminda. However, upon seeing Cericos, the man stood up right away and stabbed Cericos four
times. Afterwards, they chased each other outside the house. Meanwhile Luzviminda put on her pants
and ran toward Cericos' house (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 18-19; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 15, 18).
When Marites learned that Cericos was injured, she rushed back to her house to administer first aid to
him. Cericos sustained a stab wound on his chest, two stab wounds on his left arm, and a stab wound on
his right arm. Cericos then complained of difficulty in breathing. Consequently, Marites brought him to
a physician, one Col. Javier, for treatment. When Cerico's complaints continued, Marites decided to
bring him to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City at about 4 o'clock that morning (tsn, March 5, 1990,
pp. 19-22).
Attending physician Dr. Emmanuel Quedding noted that Cericos sustained four stab wounds of different
sizes, the most serious of which was the lacerated wound on the interior chest which required Cericos to
be placed under observation for 8 to 12 hours. Dr. Quedding found that the wounds, if deep enough,
could result in the laceration of the lung, heart, and some arteries and consequently, the victim's death.
After advising Cericos not to work for about one week or more, he was permitted to leave the hospital at
about 1 o'clock that afternoon (tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 4-5, 10, 12).
For her part, Luzviminda, at 9 o'clock that morning, went to the Kalookan Police Department and
reported what happened to her. On November 6, 1989, upon referral by the chief of the Northern Police
District, Kalookan City, Luzviminda subjected herself to a physical examination conducted by Dr.
Carmelita Belgica, a medico-legal officer. Resultantly, Dr. Belgica found on Luzviminda's right foot "a
laceration, healing, measuring 3.5 cm. with scab formation and peripheral edema at the medine
melcolus, right side . . ." Her genital examination results showed an old healed laceration indicative of
sexual intercourse possibly occurring three months before the date of examination. Dr. Belgica
expounded that although the physical examination results manifested that the occurrence of sexual
intercourse three months before could have caused the laceration, she did not discount the possibility
that sexual intercourse also took place on November 5, 1989 without any injury at the genital area, as it
"cannot be consulted medically because the opening is wide enough" (tsn, January 10, 1990, pp. 3-6, 810).
Later, on November 8, 1989, at about 1:40 o'clock in the afternoon, Corporal Luciano Caeda and Pcf.
Manuel Rodriguez of the Kalookan City Police Station, along with Romeo Nas, brother of Marites,
went to a sash factory warehouse at the Marivic Compound, Kalookan City. Outside the factory edifice,
they saw accused-appellant sleeping on a bench. Romeo Nas saw that accused-appellant was wearing a
bracelet which the former recognized as the bracelet taken from Marites. Upon being awakened,
accused-appellant, told the three men that the other things he took from Marites were inside a plastic
bag at the factory building. Consequently, Pcf. Rodriguez went inside the building to get the plastic bag
and it was found to contain a woman's undershirt, a light blue shirt, and a wristwatch with the brand
name "Chanel" which was the one taken from Marites (tsn, April 10, 1990, pp. 4-5, 7-8, 11, 14, 16, 25).
The following day, November 9, 1989, at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Marites saw accusedappellant at the Kalookan City Police Station. The latter admitted his guilt and pointed to Jaime
Mabingnay, Marites' brother-in-law, as the one who asked him to commit the crime. Marites further
recalled that she saw accused-appellant at Mabingnay's house on November 5, 1989, before the crime
took place (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 30; tsn, April 10, 1990, pp. 33-36).
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, relied and banked on denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant denied even having gone to Amparo Village, Kalookan City. He denied having raped
Luzviminda Aquino. He said that the first time he ever saw Marites was at the Kalookan City Police
Station on November 9, 1989. He said the same thing about Luzviminda (tsn, August 23, 1990, pp. 4-6).
Regarding the day of the incidence, accused-appellant testified that on November 5, 1989, at 1:30
o'clock in the morning, he was at Marivic Subdivision, sleeping with his wife. He had been residing at
the Marivic compound starting October 30, 1989 as he was designated by the owner of the place to
watch over the premises (tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 4).
insufficient to prove the commission of the same or any of the physical injuries penalized in Subdivision
1 of Art. 263 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to accused-appellant's arrest which took place on November 8, 1989 at around 1 o'clock in the
afternoon, he testified that he was lying on a bench at the Marivic Compound when three men in
civilian clothes arrived. He did not know the reason for his arrest. He, however, admitted that a
"Chanel" lady's watch was recovered from him at the time of the arrest but insisted that he owns the
watch, the same having been pledged to him by his cousin Elizabeth Abantao when he was still at
Wright, Samar, and which was later sold to him. He denied that a plastic bag with stolen contents was
recovered from him by his captors. He said he only saw the contents of the bag when he was under
detention at the Kalookan City Jail. As regards his sworn statement containing a confession to the
commission of the crime, he said he was forced by the policemen at the station to execute the same. He
did not read it and was just forced to sign it. He was not assisted by counsel during that time (tsn,
August 23, 1990, pp. 6-9).
Accused-appellant argues as his sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He stresses the following arguments, to wit: (1) that the
medico-legal officer said several times that the sexual intercourse occurred three months before the
incident complained of; (2) that verbal admissions are inadmissible against the accused; (3) that the
bracelet and the "Chanel" watch and even the "improbable" shoestring were the products of a poisonous
tree, not having been the fruits of a lawful warrantless arrest; and (4) that his identification based on his
built and voice is not an effective one.
Accused-appellant's version of the event was corroborated by: (a) his wife Soledad Cabiles who testified
that she slept with accused-appellant at Marivic Subdivision in the evening of November 4, 1989; (b)
Conrado Bacoy, Sr., owner of the woodcarving factory watched over by accused-appellant, who testified
that accused-appellant and his wife were allowed to sleep within the factory premises; and (c) Melchor
Mabini who aside from supporting accused-appellant's alibi, also said that accused-appellant's captors
did not have a warrant when they made the arrest.
The trial court found no merit in accused-appellant's defense. It found that his identity was well
established, based on the testimony of Marites and Luzviminda who were adjudged as credible
witnesses. From the testimony of said witnesses, the trial court likewise observed that: (1) at the time of
accused-appellant's arrest, he was wearing a bracelet which was said to be owned by Marites; (2) that a
shoestring was found inside the plastic bag which accused-appellant stated as his own when he led the
arresting officers to the factory compound at Marivic, Baesa, Kalookan City; and (3) that said shoestring
was the one used by accused-appellant in tying Luzviminda's hands before she was raped. The trial
court likewise noted accused-appellant's confession before Marites and in the presence of Amy
Maliwanag, a council woman of Amparo Subdivision and Linda Pilahan, that accused-appellant's
robbed and raped Luzviminda, and that Jaime Mabingnay instructed him to do so, to cause the blindness
of Marites, and to kill her. Mabingnay was said to have promised to help accused-appellant to get a job
abroad and to help the latter financially. However, accused-appellant took pity on Marites' child.
As regards the crime of serious physical injuries, which, as charged in the Amended Information, was
allegedly committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the trial court found that the evidence is
We affirm the trial court's decision.
We shall first discuss the procedural matters and circumstances surrounding the charge.
Accused-appellant, corroborated by defense witness Melchor Mabini, contends that his arrest was an
alleged warrantless one. However, such irregularity was only raised during trial. In regard to this delay,
this Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived (People v. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95 [1995]; People vs.
Rivera, 245 SCRA 421 [1995]). Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does
not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused (People vs. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239 [1995]).
And it is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had
been filed and the accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction
rendered against him (People vs. Llanaresas, 248 SCRA 629 [1995]).
As regards the evidentiary weight of accused-appellant's sworn statement wherein he confessed to the
crime charged, and his verbal confession made before robbery victim, Marites Nas Atienza, we rule
against the validity of the written confession but uphold the admissibility of the verbal confession.
In People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental requirements needed
for admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing.
Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement containing his confession
(tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 9). Although this assertion is uncorroborated, accused-appellant's free will and
volition in signing his confession will not cure the defect that it was made without assistance of counsel.
An admission made without the assistance of counsel during custodial investigation is inadmissible in
evidence. (People vs. Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482 [1995]). Even if the confession of an accused speaks the
truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given (People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541
[1995]). An uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that
is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Cabintoy, 241
SCRA 442 [1995]).
2. Two witnesses (Marites Nas Atienza and Corporal Luciano Caeda) testified that at the time of
accused-appellant's arrest, he was wearing a bracelet (Exh. "F") which Marites recognized as the one
she surrendered to accused-appellant during the robbery on November 5, 1989 (tsn, March 5, 1990, p.
35).
In contrast, accused-appellant's verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is, however, admissible in
evidence. The case in point is People vs. Andan (G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997) where we ruled that
the accused's verbal confession made in a private meeting with the municipal mayor, spontaneously,
fully and voluntarily done, is admissible in evidence since it is not covered by the requirements of
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the mayor as a
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
the accused orally admitted having committed the crime as in the case at bar.
Q Now, what was your basis in saying that it was the accused who was the one who poked a kitchen
knife on you?
In any event, we agree with the prosecution's contention that accused-appellant's conviction was
deduced not on the basis of his admission of guilt, but on the trial court's assessment of the evidence
presented before it.
The question has already been answered, your Honor, his height, his built and his voice are the basis for
her knowing accused Panfilo Cabiles.
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's finding as to the credibility of prosecution witnesses
Marites Nas Atienza and Luzviminda Aquino, the victims of robbery and rape, respectively. The timetested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses as they testify (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]; People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191
[1995]; People vs. Cajambab, 240 SCRA 643 [1995]; People vs. Moran, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]). A
perusal of the testimony of both witnesses convinces us even more that there is no strong and cogent
reason to disregard the trial court's findings.
We agree that the identity of accused-appellant was sufficiently established through the following
circumstances:
1. The room where the crime was committed covered a very small area of 29 square meters (tsn, April 5,
1990, p. 24). It was illuminated by a lighted electric bulb outside the jalousie window of said room (tsn,
April 26, 1990, p. 17). The victims could have easily noticed the physical features of their assailant,
who was later identified as accused-appellant.
In this light, we are swayed by Marites' spontaneous and straightforward testimony on how she
recognized the culprit, to wit:
A His height, his built, especially his voice, were my basis, sir, in saying that he was the person who
poked the knife on me.
Q What is so particular in his voice that you know that it was the voice of the accused in this case?
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A. Because I have seen him once and I heard his voice when he went to the house of my brother-in-law,
Jaime Mabingnay, on the last week of October, 1989.
FISCAL SISON:
Q When you said Jaime Mabingnay, he is one of the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell us how far is that house of Jaime Mabingnay to your house?
A. About six (6) steps away from our house, sir.
Q. And when you heard the voice of Panfilo Cabiles, what were they doing then inside the house of
Jaime Mabingnay?
Marites' identification of accused-appellant is corroborated by Luzviminda's identification of accusedappellant as her rapist, as follows:
A They were having a drinking spree in the sala of the house of Jaime Mabingnay which is just in front
of the door of my house, sir.
Q. Aside from that admission, what other basis have you to say that the accused was that person if there
is still any?
Q When you saw them drinking, what time was that?
ATTY. ILAGAN:
A Around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, sir.

Q And up to what time did you see him inside the house of Jaime Mabingnay?
I object, your Honor, because there is no basis and after the witness answered that the only sign she
knows of the accused is when at the police headquarters he admitted before De Leon to have allegedly
sexually played on her, so I object.
A I saw him there for about an hour and I don't know whether or not he slept there.
FISCAL SISON:
Q Before last week of October, have you seen him?
If she has other basis, your Honor, aside from that admission he made.
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
COURT:
We object to the question on the basis of, first, there is no basis; second, the Fiscal interpreting in
Tagalog gives an advance sign for an answer to the witness, your Honor.
Witness may answer.

WITNESS (A):
FISCAL SISON:
His voice and his built, sir.
Q So that at the time in October, that was the first time you saw the accused in this case, I am referring
to Panfilo Cabiles?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL SISON (Q):

You mentioned about his built, when he had sexual intercourse with you that was you said at about 1:15
in the morning, how come you were able to see the built of the accused at that time?
Q Have you heard what he said?

A: Because the light coming inside thru the jalousie window illuminates the inside of the room, sir.
A No, sir. But I heard his voice when he greeted my sister Imelda Nas.
(tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 16-17)
Q When he greeted your sister Imelda Nas, where was he?
Q: What awakened you?
A He was there sitting at the sala while he was drinking with Jaime Mabingnay.
Q Where was your sister at that time?
A: Because the baby of Ate Tes was crying and that awakened me, sir, and when I opened my eyes I saw
that there was somebody standing.
A. She was standing at the door of Jaime's house and I was behind her.
Q: And that person that you saw standing was facing his back to you, correct?
A: No, sir. He was facing my direction.

Q: So this person you said was facing in your direction was between you and your Ate Marites, is that
what you want us to understand?
A: Yes, sir.
1. Luzviminda testified that she was raped by accused-appellant. No young Filipina would publicly
admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that is the truth, as it is her natural
instinct to protect her honor. (People vs. Delovino, supra; People vs. Namayon, 246 SCRA 646 [1995];
People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]).
2. Luzviminda's testimony is corroborated by that of Marites who herself witnessed the rape (tsn, March
5, 1990, p. 16).
(tsn, April 26, 1990, p. 34.)

3. Aside from the bracelet, the arresting officers found a "Chanel" lady's wristwatch (Exh. "G") which
Marites likewise recognized as another of the objects taken by accused-appellant during the robbery.
Accused-appellant's assertion that said watch is his own is not persuasive. Aside from the fact that his
testimony is not corroborated, we likewise make the practical observation that "Chanel" is not an
ordinary watch brand. It would be too much of a coincidence that a watch of the same not very ordinary
brand as that involved in the robbery subject hereof was pledged to accused-appellant.
The trial court correctly cited the evidentiary presumption that a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act (Sec. 3[7], Rule 131,
Revised Rules of Evidence). In People vs. Newman (163 SCRA 496 [1988]), we ruled that where the
accused offers no satisfactory explanation as to the fact of his possession of stolen properties, such
evidence would abundantly incriminate him and proves that he took them with animus lucrandi. In the
case at bench, all that accused-appellant could offer as defense was denial which is a weak defense. The
defense of denial, if uncorroborated by clear and convincing proof, is considered self-serving evidence
undeserving of any weight in law (People vs. Macario, 240 SCRA 531 [1995]).
Accused-appellant strongly relies on the finding of NBI Medico-Legal Officer, Carmelita Belgica, that
upon physical examination of the rape victim, it was found that the hymenal lacerations took place three
months before the date of examination, to rule out his commission of the crime of rape. We are not
persuaded.
Any prior sexual intercourse which could have resulted in hymenal laceration is irrelevant in rape cases
for virginity is not an element of rape (People vs. Delovino, 247 SCRA 519 [1995]). Hence, it is of no
moment that there is a finding that sexual intercourse occurred three months earlier than November 5,
1989. Too, the rape could have been so slight as to leave no traces upon examination, for complete
penetration of the female organ is not necessary to constitute rape (People vs. Soan, 243 SCRA 622).
The mere penetration of the penis by entry thereof into the labia majora of the female organ suffices to
warrant a conviction for rape (People vs. Sanchez, 250 SCRA 14 [1995]). The following circumstances
are significant:
3. The shoestring that was found inside the plastic bag is also an indication of accused-appellant's
commission of the crime of rape. Luzviminda identified said shoestring as that which was used on her to
effect the crime of rape.
Lastly, accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fail considering that he was positively
identified by Marites and Luzviminda as the author of the crime. We have consistently ruled that alibi,
like denial, is inherently weak and easily fabricated. In order to justify an acquittal based on this
defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the crime scene during its commission (People vs. Pontilar, G.R. No. 104865,
July 11, 1997; People vs. Sumbillo, et. al., G.R. No. 105292, April 18, 1997; People vs. Gamiao, supra).
In the case at bench, accused-appellant admitted being at Marivic Compound at Baesa, Quezon City,
during the night of the incident. He was allegedly with his wife (tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 4). Defense
witness Melchor Mabini even attested that the couple spent the night at the compound on the eve of
November 5, 1989. But did Mabini watch over the couple the whole night? It is not impossible for
accused-appellant to sleep at the Marivic Compound on the night of November 4, 1989 and
surreptitiously leave the premises at midnight to get to Kalookan City. The distance between Quezon
City and Kalookan City is not significant.
Anent the award of consequential damages, we increase the indemnity in favor of rape victim
Luzviminda Aquino from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence. We affirm the
awards concerning the amounts corresponding to the value of the items stolen, the same having been
established through the testimony of Marites Nas Atienza, including the P1,000.00 awarded for costs.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record, the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification above-stated.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112177
That as a consequence of the felonious act of the accused, the heirs of the deceased suffered damages in
the amount of P25,000.00 each, representing indemnity for death, loss of earning capacity and moral
damages.
January 28, 2000
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
TITO ZUELA y MORANDARTE, MAXIMO VELARDE y DE LOS REYES, and NELSON
GARCIA y TEMPORAS,accused-appellants.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
PARDO, J.:
On March 26, 1987, all three accused, were arraigned with the assistance of their counsel, and pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued.
The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito
Zuela y Morandarte from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Branch
24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentencing each of them
to reclusion perpetua, and to pay jointly and severally the amount of one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendao and John Abendao, and fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.2
On July 29, 1985, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Julian C. Ocampo III filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur an information charging accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson
Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte with "robbery with triple homicide" committed as
follows:
That in the evening of April 27, 1985 in Camagong, Cabusao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding each other, with intent to
gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with violence and intimidation gainst
[sic] persons, that is by shooting and stabbing one Hegino Hernandez, Sr., Maria S. Abendao and JohnJohn Abendao, thereby inflicting upon them mortal injuries that caused their instantaneous death, take,
rob and carry away the following personal properties belonging to the said Maria Abendao, to wit:
(1) Cash money
(2) one gold ring
(3) one Seiko wrist watch
P 21,000.00
P 750.00
P 1,250.00
On June 1, 1985 Maximo Velarde was arrested at Magallanes, Sorsogon, while accused Nelson Garcia
and Tito Zuela were arrested at Cabusao, Camarines Sur on June 4, 1985 and June 9, 1985, respectively.
The evidence established the following facts:

Maria Abendao was engaged in business. She has a store operated a passenger jeepney and engaged in
the buy and sale of palay. Her house cum store was beside that of her sister Romualda Algarin's house,
by the roadside in Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Romualda also had a store.1wphi1.nt
Accused Nelson Garcia was Maria's store helper. Accused Tito Zuela alias "Anting" helped Romualda
in her store during palay season. The other accused Maximo Velarde was known to Romualda because
she met him at a birthday party held at Maria's house on April 19, 1985. The three accused were friends.
On April 27, 1985, Maria made three (3) deliveries of palay on board to her jeepney, driven by Hegino
Hernandez, Jr., to the ricemill of Gerardo Benitez in San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. Every
delivery costs seven thousand (P7,000.00) pesos. The three deliveries were made at 9:00 in the morning,
2:00 in the afternoon and 7:30 in the evening.4
Between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening of that day, from a distance of five (5) arms length, Romualda
saw the three (3) accused board the jeepney of Maria, bound for San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
Because the jeepney was filled with palay, they merely hold on the railing of the jeepney.5 There were
other passengers namely, Pablo Abendao and Roberto Echiaca.6
Gerardo Atienza, the buyer of palay, saw Maximo inside the jeepney during the second and third
delivery of palay to his ricemill. 7 For each delivery, Gerardo paid Maria the amount of seven thousand
(P7,000.00) pesos.
P 23,000.00
The following morning, the bodies of Hegino Hernandez, Maria and John-John Abendao were found
in rigor mortis condition at New Poblacion, Cabusao, Camarines Sur.8
Dr. Restituto Sampilo, municipal health officer of Cabusao, found Maria in a reclining position on the
front seat of the jeepney. John was in a semi-kneeling position, facing his mother with both hands
clasping her left hand. Hegino was at the steering wheel with his body, from the abdomen up, resting on
the side of the vehicle and his head outside of it. 9 A bullet that exited from Hegino's left eyebrow caused
the wound near his right ear.10
Maria had a horizontal stab wound at the front part of her neck just above the xyphoid process. 11 Her
seven (7) year old son, John, had a three (3) inch slashed horizontal wound at the front base of the neck,
a two (2) inch wound on the left upper arm and two (2) stab wounds on the lateral side of the neck at the
junction of the right shoulder.12 Hegino had a small wound with slightly depressed edges, about an inch
from the highest tip of the right ear, a wound with everted and lacerated edges above the middle part of
the left eyebrow, and seven (7) stab wounds at the back.13
Though there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how the crime was committed with the
testimony of Romualda Algarin, which was in turn based on the extrajudicial admission given by
Maximo Velarde to Romualda when she visited the latter at the Camaligan municipal jail on June 6,
1985.
Maximo, Tito and Nelson conceived the plan to hold-up Maria while drinking in front of Romualda's
store because Maximo needed money for his fare to Manila.
When the palay-laden jeepney of Maria left for Libmanan, Camarines Sur Maximo, Tito and Nelson
boarded it. They alighted at sitio Cagumpis, Camagong, Cabusao, Camarines Sur to attend a
wedding.14 Maximo was supposed to board the jeepney on its way back to Barcelonita, while the other
two (2) accused, Tito and Nelson would wait along the road at the crossing of New Poblacion and
Camagong, Camarines Sur to board the jeepney and hold-up Maria.
Everything went according to plan. Nelson and Tito hailed the jeepney at the crossing of Cabusao,
Camarines Sur. Upon reaching an uninhabited place, Tito alias "Anting" told Velarde: "Oragui na ngaya
ang driver."15Maximo poked a gun at the driver and shot him. He also shot Maria at the neck when the
latter shouted.16
Nelson and Tito alighted from the jeepney. Nelson went to the front side of the jeepney, while Tito
approached the right front side of the jeepney, in the process stepping on the sleeping John-John who
was then awakened. The boy stood up and said, "You will see I will tell my father that you killed my
mother."17 To avoid being identified by the boy, Tito told Maximo "Oragui na ini." 18 Maximo took hold
of the boy's hair and slashed his neck.
Tito took Maria's money and divided it, each accused receiving about seven thousand (P7,000.00) pesos
from the loot.
Tito and Nelson went back to Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Maximo proceeded to Manila.
On June 1, 1985, Lt. Ernesto J. Idian, Station Commander, Cabusao Police Station, Cabusao, Camarines
Sur assisted by two (2) other policemen, arrested Maximo in Magallanes, Sorsogon. Though no warrant
of arrest had been issued, Maximo was immediately brought to the Camaligan police station in
Camaligan, Camarines Sur where he was investigated and asked to give a written statement in the
presence of Atty. Jose Ocampo from the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Naga City.19
On June 4, and 9, 1985, Tito and Nelson were taken into police custody without a warrant. They
underwent custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel because no lawyer could be found in
Cabusao, Camarines Sur.
On the last page of each accused's confession appeared a statement, in their own handwriting, to the
effect that they voluntarily gave their statements and that no one coerced or promised them anything to
admit responsibility for the crime.
Maximo, Nelson and Tito signed their individual statements before Judge Lore R. Valencia Bagalacsa,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur on three (3) different dates. 20 She followed the
same procedure and line of questioning, using the local dialect, in ascertaining the voluntariness of the
three (3) accused's confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and his companions to leave her and the accused
inside the chamber.21Satisfied that they were properly apprised of their rights and that they voluntarily
executed their statements, she had them sign their individual extrajudicial statements.
Antonio Abendao, the husband of Maria, was working at Saudi Arabia when his family was killed. He
came to know about the tragic death of his wife and son through an overseas call from his brother
Renato Abendao. When he learned about it, he became unconscious. He arrived in the Philippines five
(5) days after.22 He knew Nelson Garcia because he was the son of his cousin. He was also familiar with
Tito Zuela, but he did not know Maximo Velarde. He spent twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for the
funeral of his wife and son. He gave one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos financial assistance to the family
of their driver, Hegino.23
On the other hand Maximo, Tito and Nelson interposed common defenses: (1) denial and (2) that they
were tortured and forced to make a confession. In addition, Tito and Nelson claimed they were not
assisted by counsel when their confessions were taken, while Maximo alleged the defense
of alibi saying that he did not leave Magallanes, Sorsogon anytime in 1985.
On June 1, 1985, five (5) persons, led by Lt. Idian, went to the house of Maximo Velarde in Magallanes,
Sorsogon to fetch him because his parents wanted him at Cabusao, Camarines Sur as his brother Benito
Velarde died. He was shown the picture of the cadaver of his brother. Maximo went with the group of
Lt. Idian on board a red car and traveled to Naga City, arriving there between 7:00 and 8:00 in the
evening.
In a dark place before reaching Naga City, the driver stopped the vehicle to urinate. Before the driver
could return, Maximo felt a hard object hit his head and he passed out. When he regained
consciousness, he was already handcuffed. Pointing a gun at him, Lt. Idian told him that he had two
choices, either to die or sign the statement they prepared because his brother had wronged them. He was
warned not to tell anyone that he was mauled. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Camaligan municipal
jail.
Two days later or on June 3, 1985, Maximo was brought out of the jail and ushered into a small room
where he saw three persons, namely Lt. Idian, Atty. Jose Ocampo from CLAO; Naga City and Pat.
Gonsalo Refe, a police investigator from Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Atty. Ocampo read to him the
contents of a prepared statement, which in substance mentioned that some people died and that he was
responsible for their death. Maximo refused to sign. Atty. Ocampo stepped out of the room, followed by
Lt. Idian and he overheard that he would be made to sign the statement in Atty. Ocampo's office in Naga
City. Atty. Ocampo then left and Lt. Idian returned to the room.
Upon Lt. Idian's return to the smaller room, he kicked Maximo in the stomach and poked a gun at him.
Consumed by fear, Maximo promised that he would sign the prepared statement. He was then handed a
piece of paper and ordered to copy its contents on the prepared statement. Found on page 5 of his
extrajudicial confession was this statement, in his own handwriting:
Opo binasa ko po ang apedabeth na ito na may 5# pahina na pawang totoo at sasareling kagustohan at
walang nantakot o nangako.24
On June 4, 1985, Maximo again signed the statement before Judge Lore R. Valencia Bagalacsa,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. From the time accused Maximo was arrested,
he was never released. Maximo denied that he saw and talked to Romualda on June 6, 1985 at the
Camaligan municipal jail because he had been detained at the Libmanan municipal jail since June 4,
1985.
For his part, Nelson Garcia denied any knowledge of the crime. On June 4, 1985, the group of Pat.
Gonsalo Refe went to his house and invited him to the office of Lt. Idian. He was brought to the
Camaligan Police Station. Upon their arrival, Lt. Idian talked to him and tried to convince him to
confess to the killing of the Abendaos. Because Nelson refused, Lt. Idian brought him upstairs and
mauled him. He was transferred to Nage City jail, where he was detained for two (2) hours.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Cabusao Police Station where Pat. Rodolfo O. Cario subjected him to
another investigation. Because of his continued refusal to confess, he was mauled again, this time by
Pat. Cario.
To avoid further injury to his person, on June 5, 1985, Nelson Garcia was forced to sign the prepared
statement. He was neither informed of its contents nor assisted by counsel. He was handed a piece of
paper, the contents of which he was ordered to copy, in his own handwriting, and in substance was
similar to what Maximo was ordered to copy as his own extrajudicial statement. He was brought to the
office of Judge Bagalacsa that same afternoon so that he could sign his extrajudicial statement.
From the time he was invited to the office of Lt. Idian, Nelson was never released from police custody.
He was first detained at the Libmanan municipal jail, and later on transferred to the Tinangis Penal Farm
in Pili, Camarines Sur. Though he suffered physically from the beatings he got from the policemen, he
was never permitted to see a doctor. His relatives were not able to visit or talk to him because the
policemen prohibited visitors.25
Like Nelson, Tito alias "Anting," denied participation in the crime. On July 9, 1985, Pat. Refe invited
him to the office of Lt. Idian in Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Upon arrival at the police station, he was
investigated about his knowledge of the crime. Failing to elicit any information from him, he was
brought to Libmanan jail where he spent the night.
The following day, Tito was again brought to Cabusao Police Station and presented to Lt. Idian. In Lt.
Idian's office, he was investigated about his involvement in the crime. When he could not provide any
answer, he was made to board the police jeep, to be brought back to the Libmanan jail.
Along the way, the police jeep stopped and Pat. Cabrera got off and kicked Tito who fell to the ground.
He heard a gunshot and was shown the piece of paper that he was ordered to sign before Judge
Bagalacsa. He was threatened with death should he refuse to sign the prepared statement. Out of fear for
his life, Tito promised to sign. Thereafter, they boarded the police jeep and proceeded to the office of
Judge Bagalacsa Libmanan, in Camarines Sur.
Upon arrival at the office of Judge Bagalacsa, he was ordered to sign the statement without the
assistance of counsel and without being informed of its contents. Thereafter, he was brought to
Libmanan municipal jail and later to Tinangis Penal Farm. Like his co-accused, he was never released
from police custody from the time of arrest.
On August 26, 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the three (3) accused of robbery
with homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after a careful and serious evaluation of the evidence presented by the prosecution and
the defense, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable doubt, that the three (3) accused
Maximo Velarde, Tito Zuela and Nelson Garcia had committed the crime of Robbery with Homicide
and, therefore, sentences them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay
jointly and severally an indemnity in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS for the Heirs of Maria Abendao and John Abendao and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS for the Heirs of Hegino Hernandez, without imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Art. IV, Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means, which vitiates
the free will, shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.27
The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information on the crime from the suspected offender. It is at this point that the law requires the
assistance of counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or
confessions from the person undergoing interrogation. In other words, "the moment there is a move or
even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel."28
GIVEN this 26th day of July, 1993 at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
Presiding Judge26
SALVADOR
G.
CAJOT
On the same day, all three (3) accused filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.
In their appeal, accused-appellants claim that the trial court erred in:
(1) relying on Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial confession notwithstanding the violation of his
constitutional rights;
(2) giving full faith and credit to Romualda Algarin's testimony; and
(3) finding all three (3) accused guilty as charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering that there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime, the extra-judicial
confessions of the three (3) accused play a pivotal role in the determination of their culpability. The
Court is duty-bound, therefore, to resolve the issue of whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were
executed in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, in light of the fact that the crime
took place in 1985.
The pertinent provision of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Lt. Idian's team apprehended appellant Maximo in Magallanes Sorsogon on June 1, 1985 when no
warrant had been issued for his arrest. Immediately thereafter, the arresting peace officers investigated
appellant Maximo. His statement was reduced in writing when they were in Camaligan, Camarines Sur.
It was in Camaligan that CLAO lawyer Ocampo was summoned to assist appellant Maximo in the
execution of his written confession. Atty. Ocampo was not present during the entire duration that
accused Maximo was subjected to custodial investigation as could be inferred from the testimony of Pat.
Rodolfo Cario, to wit:
Q: And after taking the statement of Velarde, what did you do with the statement of Velarde?
A: It was presented to Atty. Ocampo.
Q: Do you want to tell me that inspite of the fact that he was present when the confession was made you
still present the statement to Atty. Ocampo?
A: In order to let him sign the statement.
Q: And where did Atty. Ocampo sign the confession of Velarde?
A: It was sign [sic] at Naga because he went ahead.
Q: Do you mean to tell me now that after the confession was made, the confession was left to you and
after the confession was brought to his office at the CLAO Office in Naga, is that what you want to tell
this court.
A: We went to Naga with Lt. Idian and Velarde.

Q: But it remains a fact that Atty. Ocampo was already at Naga when the statement of Velarde was
presented to him for signature, is that correct?
A: Yes he went ahead to Naga.29
There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these facts, we
are constrained to the rule that Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in
evidence.30 "An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel
that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence."31
The respective sworn statements of appellants Tito and Nelson were likewise inadmissible in evidence
because they were executed without the assistance of counsel. Despite the fact that the reason for the
absence of lawyer during the custodial investigation was the scarcity of lawyers in the area, the Court
could not be lenient in this case. The absence or scarcity of lawyers in any given place is not a valid
reason for defying the constitutional mandate on counseled confessions.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured
by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa.
Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants' sworn statements did not leave a void in the
prosecution's case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement to
Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is admissible
in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court
stating that the "act, declaration for omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him." The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to Romualda's testimony.
In People vs. Maqueda,32 we held:
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand
on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights.
Masqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation,
but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it
was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on
government, declaring the rights that exist without the governmental grant, that may not be taken away
by government and that government has the duty to protect; or restrictions on the power of the
government found "not in particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that
keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited." They are the
fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority.
In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the
Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals.
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence
against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People (183 SCRA
196 [1990]), this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he
gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admission. (Emphasis supplied) 33
And in the recent case of People vs. Andan34 the Court reiterated the doctrine enunciated in
the Maqueda case. In Andan, the Court said that "when the accused talked with the mayor as confidant
and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional
rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having committed the crime." Of course, accused-appellant Maximo attempted to
discredit Romualda's credibility as a witness when he swore that he could not have been in Camaligan
on June 6, 1985 because since June 4, 1985 until some three weeks later, he was detained at the
Libmanan jail.35 The trial court correctly disregarded this self-serving uncorroborated assertion.
The defense failed to attribute any ill-motive on the part of Romualda for testifying on accusedappellant Maximo's admission and therefore the presumption that in so testifying, she was impelled by
no other reason than to tell the truth, stands. The fact that she is related to two of the victims did not
render her testimony incredible. Relationshipper se is not proof of prejudice.36 She might have been
mistaken as to the date when she talked with accused-appellant Maximo while he was detained
considering the more than three-year gap between June 1985 and September to October 1988 when
Romualda testified. However, it is not necessary that the witness should be able to fix accurately the
date of the conversation in which the admission was made. What is important is that the witness is able
to state the substance of the conversation or declaration.37
Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's admission sealed not only the latter's fate but also
that of appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused because the latter has no opportunity to crossexamine the confessant and therefore, as against him, the confession is hearsay, 38 is not applicable here.
What is involved here is an admission, not a confession. Wharton distinguished these terms as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt.39
Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witness Romualda on
accused-appellant Maximo's declaration. They could have questioned its veracity by presenting
evidence in support of their defenses of denial and alibi so they could put to test Romualda's credibility.
Having failed to do so, Romualda's testimony, which the trial court correctly considered as credible,
stands unscathed.
Romualda's testimony on the substance of accused-appellant Maximo's admission standing alone, may
not be the basis for conviction of the appellants. However, such testimony, taken with circumstances
duly established by the prosecution, point unerringly to accused-appellants' culpability. These
circumstances are: (1) accused-appellants and the victims were all residents of Barcelonita, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur, a small barangay where everyone knew everybody; (2) accused-appellants Tito and
Nelson helped in the stores of the sisters Maria and Romualda a week before the incident; (3) Romualda
saw the three accused-appellants as they boarded Maria's jeepney during its last palay delivery to
Libmanan; (4) Gerardo Atienza saw accused-appellant Maximo with Maria's group during the jeepney's
second delivery of palay; (5) Atienza saw accused-appellant Maximo riding in Maria's jeepney after the
last delivery; (6) after the commission of the crime, accused-appellants Tito and Nelson no longer went
to the store of Romualda; (7) accused-appellants never attended the wake of the victims, and (8)
accused-appellant Maximo fled to Manila.
These circumstances form an unbroken chain, which, by themselves lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that accused-appellants were the culprits in the robbery with homicide. 40 Under the law,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient basis for conviction as long as: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved, and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 41 These requisites were
present in this case.
Accused-appellants' diverse course of action after the commission of the crime, with accused-appellant
Maximo going to Manila and accused-appellants Tito and Nelson staying in Barcelonita, do not negate
their guilt. As regards accused-appellant Maximo, his flight to Manila and to Magallanes, Sorsogon with
no plausible explanation therefor is a clear indication of guilt. 42 With respect to accused-appellants Tito
and Nelson, their decision to stay in Barcelonita did not mean that they were not equally guilty as
accused-appellant Maximo. As this Court once said:
Accused-appellant argues that had he participated in the crime, his natural reaction would have been to
flee. We do not agree. Each culprit behaves differently in externalizing and manifesting his guilt. Others
may escape or flee which circumstance is strongly indicative of guilt, while others may remain in the
same vicinity so as to create a semblance of normalcy, careful not to arouse suspicion in the
community.43
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of accused-appellants before, during and after the commission
of the crime, which indicate a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.44 Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the conspiracy are also guilty as principals in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless there is no
proof that they tried to prevent the crime. 45 There is no evidence that any of the accused-appellants
desisted from the malevolent intent of the others to kill the victims during the robbery. As such, they
shall equally bear the responsibility for the resulting crime.
Treachery was not alleged in the information but the suddenness of the assault upon Hegino and Maria
from behind was proven reasonable doubt. As such, treachery may be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance.46 As regards seven-year-old John, even if the manner by which he was
attacked was not shown, treachery may be deemed to have attended his killing. Treachery exists when
an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death.47
The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized in
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly considered the crime as robbery with
homicide and not "robbery with triple homicide" as charged in the information. The term "homicide" in
Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense, embracing not only the act which results in death but also all
other acts producing anything short of death.48 Neither is the nature of the offense altered by the number
of killings in connection with the robbery.49The multiplicity of victims slain on the occasion of the
robbery is only appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous
situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be
treated in the same way that robbery with multiple killings would be.50
Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. By the presence of two aggravating circumstances, namely, treachery and multiplicity
of slain victims, the proper penalty should be death in view of Article 63 (1) of the same
Code.51 However, considering that when this case happened, the imposition of the death penalty was
proscribed, the proper imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. The heinousness of the crime they
committed notwithstanding, accused-appellants may not be deprived of such favorable factor in their
case.
The Solicitor General's plea for modification of the penalty in accordance with Republic Act No. 7659
which "has already expressly converted reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty" and on account of
the decision in People vs. Lucas,52 is untenable. It must be stressed that the Lucas ruling has been
reconsidered and, accordingly, the Court has held:
After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court
concludes that although Section 17 of the R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent
to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty.53
The trial court failed to award the heirs of Maria Abendao the amount of twenty three thousand
(P23,000.00) pesos in reimbursement of the stolen cash, ring and wristwatch and the expenses
amounting to twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for her wake and that of her son, which were duly
proved.54 The heirs are entitled to those amounts as reparation of the damage caused by accusedappellants. They shall also be liable for exemplary damages in view of the presence of two aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime.55
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the decision of the trial court. The Court
renders judgment finding accused-appellants Tito Zuela y Morandarte, Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes,
Nelson Garcia y Temporas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences each of them to reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay civil indemnity of one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendao and John Abendao and fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, Jr.
In addition, the Court sentences each of the accused-appellants solidarily to pay the additional amounts
of forty three thousand (P43,000.00) pesos as reimbursement of damages to the heirs of Maria
Abendao, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages to the heirs of each of the three
(3) victims.1wphi1.nt
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127493 December 8, 1999
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ORLANDO LABTAN y DAQUIHON (At Large), alias BEBOT, HENRY FELICIANO y
LAGURA and JONELTO LABTAN (At Large), accused, HENRY FELICIANO y
LAGURA, accused-appellant.
That on March 28, 1993, at more or less 10:30 o'clock in the evening while inside a motor vehicle in the
national highway at Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named with intent to gain
and against the will of the owners, by means of violence against and intimidation of persons, or force
upon things with the use of knives which they were conveniently provided with, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and criminally take, rob and carry away money or cash amounting to P720.00, pioneer
stereo, booster and twitters owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko Diver
wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all amounting to P10,800,00, against their will, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended parties in the total sum of P10,800.00 Philippine Currency.
PUNO, J.:
Contrary to and in violation of PD 532.
Accused-appellant Henry Feliciano appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 25 1 convicting him of highway robbery and robbery with homicide on the basis of a sworn
statement which he repudiated during the trial.
On April 23, 1993, an information 2 was filed against Henry Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto
Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about April 16, 1993, at about 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, at Buntong, Camaman-an,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, and with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of violence, take, rob
and carry away P30.00/cash money to the damage and prejudice of the offended party (Florentino
Bolasito); that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them (accused) to
steal, take and carry away the P30.00 money, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their number and strength and with intent to kill, accused Orlando Labtan y
Daquihon, alias Bebot Labtan and Jonelto Labtan, treacherously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon Florentino Bolasito thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries: "Shock due to
multiple stab wounds heart", with the use of a (sic) knives/bladed weapon which accused are
conveniently provided, which directly caused the death of the said Florentino Bolasito.
Only accused Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the
Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where he was detained
while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were tried together.
The prosecution's case was mainly anchored on the three-page sworn statement executed by Feliciano,
originally in Visayan language, before the Cagayan de Oro City Police station, viz: 4
Preliminary: You Henry Feliciano y Lagura, I would like to inform you that you are here in [the] Theft
and Robbery Section of Cagayan de Oro City Police Station to be investigated regarding an incident
wherein a certain driver whose name is Florentino Bolasito, a resident of Abellanoso St., of this City
(sic). Said driver was killed on April 13, 1993, whose body was found at Tipolohan, Camaman-an of
this City since you knew everything about it.
I would like to inform you that according to our law you have the following rights:
1. You have the right to remain silent, and not to answer incriminating questions which will be used as
evidence against you.
2. You have the right to choose an attorney to defend you in this investigation.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 299 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. That if you can't (sic) get a lawyer, I can give you a counsel de oficio to defend you.
Subsequently, another information 3 dated May 20, 1993 was filed against Henry Feliciano and Orlando
Labtan charging them with highway robbery committed as follows:
Certification
This is to establish the fact that I myself voluntarily executed this certification and hereby affix my
signature hereunder on the _________________ day [of] April, [1993 in the] City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines.
Q: Tell me your name, age, occupation, residence and other personal circumstances?
A: I, Henry Feliciano, 25 years old, married and a resident of Kolambog, Lapasan of this city and I am
[a] jeepney driver of this city.
Sgd. Henry Feliciano y Lagura

Q: Up to this time, are you still driving?
(Affiant)
A: No more, sir.
Assisted by his lawyer:
Q: What is then your work at this time?
Sgd. Pepito A. Chavez
Notary Public
A: I go [to] work [with] my friends like Orlando Labtan alias Bebot Labtan who are residents of
Kolambog, Lapasan of this City.
Until Dec. 31, 1993
Q: From what time did you go along with this [sic] persons?
PTR No. 10843256 1/8/93
A: Since the month of February, 1993.
Q: Before we (will) proceed [with] this investigation, did you understand all those rights I narrated to
you?
Q: From the time you go (sic) with them, what have you done, if any?
A: Yes, sir [,] I understand everything.
A: On March 1993, I participated in a hold-up of a certain driver Mr. Roman Mercado 5of Tablan who
owned a jeep I use[d] to drive (before) and we got a car stereo including the jeep. Then, we brought the
jeep to Buntong, Camaman-an and the driver, however, we freed the driver later.
Q: Will you get a lawyer of your own to defend you in this investigation?
Q: What else?
A: No, sir. I can't (sic) pay the services of lawyer.
Q: Since you will not get your own lawyer, will you agree that I'll (sic) give you Atty. Pepito Chavez as
your counsel de oficio in this investigation?
A: On March 1993 we hold-up (sic) a collector of my brother whose name is Carmen Tan y
Feliciano 6 and we were able to get cash of P2,080.00; [a]nd, there was also [a] certain jeep, owned by
Mr. Mangano that we carnapped and brought (it) to Aglayan, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
A: Yes, sir. I agree that Atty. Pepito Chavez will be my lawyer for the ascertainment of the truth.
Q: With the latest incident, what have you done?
Q: What is your highest educational attainment?
A: Last April 16, 1993, we held-up a certain driver of [a] "PU Minica" whose name is Florentino
Bolasito of Abellanosa St.
A: Grade 4 only at Baongca, Bukidnon.

Q: Will you tell us how the driver was killed and who killed them?
Q: In other words, you know how to read Visaya?
A: I know[,] sir how to read Visaya including English but I can't (sic) understand deep English.
A: On April 16, 1993, at 2:30 in the afternoon, I, Bebot Labtan and Jonelto Labtan [were] hang[ing]
around outside Ororama Superstore at J.R. Borja St., of this City, and the three of us went to a place
where most of PU Minica cars were parked. We were able to board one PU Minica driven by an old
man.
Q: As you boarded the PU Minica where did you go?
A: We ordered the driver to take us to Buntong, Camaman-an of this City. When we arrive[d] thereat,
Jonelto told us that he will visit his girlfriend while Bebot Labtan alighted, we remained inside the
vehicle. As [the] driver demanded for the fare, however, we have no money to pay. Suddenly, I saw
Bebot Labtan and Jonelto Labtan took a knife and stabbed the driver.
Q: When (was then) were you arrested by the police authorities of the Theft and Robbery Section?
A: On April 20, 1993, while we, I and Bebot Labtan were at Tambo, Macasandig of this City waiting for
the truck of Mr. Aberrastori to ride to bring us to Valencia, Bukidnon, we were apprehended by the
policemen near the store of Mrs. Carmen Tan. It was then that time where Bebot Labtan was shot at his
feet and the two knives were confiscated.
Q: I have no other questions, do you have anything to say.
A: No more. sir.
Q: After stabbing the driver, he died, and so Jonelto Labtan drove the PU towards Tipolohon and we
leave (sic) behind the body of the driver, instead of me getting out from the car (sic), Jonelto did not
stop the car (sic), so we proceeded towards Aluba Subd. and we left the PU Minica there.
This is to certify that I have read the foregoing statements consisting of three (3) pages of which I have
initiated and signed in the presence of Atty. Pepito Chavez, Attorney de Officio, and I state that it is true
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
A: After you left the PU Minica at Aluba, where did you go?
Sgd. Henry Feliciano y Lagura
Q: I went home at Balolong of this City, and I do not [know] where my companions proceeded.
(Affiant). 7
Q: Who then stabbed the driver?
A: The one who stabbed [the driver] [,] sir[,] was Jonelto Labtan and Bebot Labtan.
Q: Did (sic) you able to get some money from the driver?
A: Jonelto Labtan was able to get P30.00, and we brought (sic) a (sic) coconut wine at Kolambog,
Lapasan.
Q: With respect to this (sic) two (2) knives which were taken from you and Bebot Labtan, what can you
say about this (sic) knives?
A: These two (2) knives, sir, the sharp knife with a knife case is owned by Bebot Labtan, this double
blade is owned by Jonelto Labtan.
Q: Are these [the] knives which were used by Bebot Labtan and Jonelto Labtan in stabbing the PU
Minica driver if you know?
A: Yes, sir. Bebot Labtan used this knife with a knife case, but this knife which is double bladed was not
used, the other kitchen knife like a fan knife which was left inside the PU was used by Jonelto in
stabbing.
In addition, the prosecution presented the testimony of Ismael Ebon that on March 28, 1993, at 10:30
p.m., he was driving along Bugo Highway, when two (2) men boarded his jeepney. He identified the
men as Henry Feliciano and Orlando Labtan. Suddenly, Bebot Labtan pointed a double bladed knife on
the right side of his neck. Feliciano then took the steering wheel and proceeded to Bolonsori. When they
were near the house of a certain Policeman Lapis, Feliciano stopped the jeep. The two then divested him
of his watch, P700.00 cash, car stereo, two (2) tweeters and one (1) booster. They threatened to kill him
should he report to the police. However, when the two left, he proceeded to the Puerto Police Station
and reported the hold-up. He then went to the garage and told Roman Mercado, the owner of the
jeepney, that he was robbed. That night, the two of them reported the robbery to the Cagayan de Oro
City Police Station. Ebon also stated that he knew Feliciano because the latter previously worked as
driver of Roman Mercado. 8
When the defense presented its case, only accused Henry Feliciano testified for his behalf. His defense
consisted of an alibi and a repudiation of his sworn statement. He told the court that on March 28, 1993,
when Ismael Ebon was held-up, he was in Maasin, Baungon, Bukidnon, his birthplace. He did not deny
Ebon's claim that they were acquainted for he used to work as driver of Roman Mercado. However,
when his driver's license expired on January 20, 1993, he went home to Bukidnon. On April 20, 1993,
he went back to Cagayan de Oro City and stayed at the residence of his sister, Carmen Tan, who lives in
Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. At 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Carmen asked him to buy snacks at a
nearby store. While buying the snacks, he heard a shot and when he looked around, he saw a man lying
on the ground. Two men in civilian clothes poked their guns at him. One of them asked him whether he
was a companion of the man lying on the ground. He said no. The two men brought him to the police
station. The man lying on the ground was brought to the hospital. At the police station, the two men
asked him to confess whether he was a companion of the person who was shot. He said no. They asked
him whether he was one of those who robbed Ismael Ebon. Again, he said no. He was questioned for
about an hour during which he was hit "at the right and left breast, at the right and left ribs, and at the
left side of [his] face." Afterwards, he was locked up in jail. In the morning of the following day, he was
investigated and mauled for two hours. Again, he was asked whether Orlando Labtan was his
companion. He insisted that he was not Labtan's companion for he does not even know him. After the
investigation, a policeman approached him and brought a piece of paper for him to sign. He asked
whether it was possible for him to read the contents. The policeman answered, "No need, just sign so
that we can finish it." They then started to maul him. He was forced to sign the paper. At around 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of April 22, 1993, he was brought to the office of Atty. Pepito Chavez. He was
told to sit down while Atty. Chavez signed the papers. He did not know what was happening. Atty.
Chavez did not even talk to him before signing the document. He was then brought back to jail. 9
ON THE CHARGE OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN

ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, THE TAINTED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE
ACCUSED EXECUTED IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.
Finding the sworn statement executed by Feliciano credible, the trial court convicted him and imposed
the following penalties: 10
The appeal is meritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds accused Henry Feliciano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation in the crime of robbery with homicide and hereby
sentences the accused to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party the sum of P50,000.00
and to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 representing funeral expenses and to pay the cost.
This court hereby finds also the accused Henry Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
highway robbery committed on March 28, 1993 and sentences the accused to an indeterminate penalty
of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as the minimum term to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term and to indemnify Roman S. Mercado
the sum of P8,000.00, representing the value of the P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and twitter and to
indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist watch divested from him and
to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 11
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the trial court:
I
II
ON THE CHARGE OF HIGHWAY ROBBERY, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BELIEVING THE
COMPLAINANT DRIVER WHO, IT TURNED OUT, FROM THE POLICE BLOTTER, SAID THAT
THE PERPETRATORS WERE INITIALLY UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS THEN LATER IDENTIFIED
ACCUSED FELICIANO WHOM HE KNEW VERY WELL AS A FELLOW DRIVER.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE AND HIGHWAY ROBBERY.
Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of persons under custodial
investigation are provided as follows:
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.
In People v. Macam 12, the rational for the guarantee, was explained in this wise
Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch
as the accused "was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public
prosecutor." However, as the result of the changes in the patterns of police investigation, today's accused
confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system well before his trial begins (U.S. v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 S Ct 2568 [1973]). It is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel
guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at
present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where
the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."
Q: You already investigated the accused in this case at 8:00 o'clock in the morning on April 22, 1993?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Of course, when you investigated the accused in the morning, he had no counsel yet?
13
Thus, in People v. Gamboa , we stated that:

A: I just interviewed him.
[T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense. The moment there is a move or even urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent
or inocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Q: We will just use the word interview. Was he assisted by counsel when you interviewed him in the
morning?
A: None.
Q: What was the subject matter of the interview in the morning of April 22, 1993 to the accused Henry
Feliciano? (sic)
We find that accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso
Cuarez testified that he started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993 regarding his
involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not
been apprised of his right to counsel.
A: About the PU driver that was killed.
On cross-examination:
Q: So that in the morning of April 22, 1993 you already had an idea, more or less, who committed or
who killed the PU driver by the family name Bolasito, am I correct?
Atty. Carlo Mejia

Q: What [time] did you report to your office on April 22, 1993?
SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez
A: I reported at eight o'clock in the morning.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q: What time was Henry Feliciano brought to your office on April 22, 1993? What time did you start to
investigate Henry Feliciano on April 22, 1993?
A: In the morning, at 8:00 o'clock, when I reported for work.
Q: Of course, he related to you everything that transpired regarding that alleged death of a PU driver?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: All that time in the morning of April 22, 1993 the accused was not assisted by a legal counsel.
A: Not yet.
Q: What time did you decide to bring the accused to the office of Atty. Chavez on April 22, 1993?
A: About 10:00 o'clock in the morning of April 22, 1993.
Q: Are you trying to impress us that in the morning of April 22, 1993 you also brought the accused
Henry Feliciano to the office of Atty. Chavez?
A: At 8:00 in the morning, I just interviewed him and at 10:00 o'clock in the morning I brought him to
the office of Atty. Chavez.
Q: Are you trying to impress [upon] us that you brought accused Henry Feliciano to the office of Atty.
Chavez at 10:00 o'clock in the morning and in the afternoon also you brought him to the office of Atty.
Chavez?
Q: Do you remember having assisted in the investigation of one Henry Feliciano on April 22, 1993 at
about 3:30 in the afternoon when the said Henry Feliciano was (sic) investigated whose written
statement was taken by SPO1 Cuarez in the presence of Cabigon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was this statement taken?
A: No more. In the afternoon Atty. Chavez was the one who came to our office because that was what
we agreed in the morning. 14
At that point, accused-appellant had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel.
In Navallo v.Sandiganbayan 15, we said that a person is deemed under custodial investigation where the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a
particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
When SPO1 Cuarez investigated accused-appellant Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in the
killing of jeepney driver Bolasito as shown by the joint affidavit of SPO4 Johny Salcedo and SPO1
Florencio Bagaipo who were the ones who arrested Feliciano. In their affidavit dated April 21, 1993, the
two police officers stated:
in the investigation conducted to (sic) Henry Feliciano, he admitted and confessed to us for (sic) his
involvement of (sic) the death of the PU driver together with his companion Bebot Labtan, and the same
was identified by many victims of robbery hold-up in this City. And also during the investigation, Henry
Feliciano admitted to us regarding their confiscated bladed knife as the very weapon used in the
stabbing of the PU minica driver.
The prosecution tried to establish that Atty. Pepito Chavez provided effective and independent
counselling to accused-appellant Feliciano which cured the initial lack of counsel. However, this is
belied by the very testimony of Atty. Chavez showing he performed his duty in a lackadaisical fashion:
A: At the office of the Theft and Robbery Section at Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw.
Q: How did you happen to assist Henry Feliciano in the taking of his written statement?
A: Because SPO3 Cuarez approached me in my office and requested me to assist Henry Feliciano in the
taking of his testimony.
Q: What time was that when SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez came to your office and requested you to assist
Henry Feliciano?
A: If I can remember right, Police Officer Cuarez came to my office about three o'clock in the
afternoon.
Q: Where is your office in Cagayan de Oro City?
A: Located at Pabayo-Gomez.
Q: What did you do after Alfonso Cuarez came to your office and requested you to assist in the taking of
the written statement or sworn statement of Henry Feliciano?
A: I told him I will follow later because at that time when he came to my office I was working on some
paper works.
Assistant City Prosecutor Nicolas C. Caballero, Jr.
Q: When you said him, you were referring to Alfonso Cuarez?
Q: Atty. Chavez, you stated that you are a practicing lawyer in Cagayan de Oro City as well as in
Misamis Oriental?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Pepito Chavez

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after you told him you will follow later?
A: At about 3:25, if I remember right, I was able to come to Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw particularly
the office of the Theft and Robbery Section.
Q: When you arrived at the Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw, who were there?
A: About one armslength (sic).
A: Police Officer Cabigon and Cuarez.
Q: What about Eleuterio Cabigon?
Q: Who else were there? What about Henry Feliciano?
A: About three meters near.
A: Yes, I have also seen Henry Feliciano.
Q: Did Alfonso Cuarez participate in your discussions or conference with Henry Feliciano?
Q: If you see again Henry Feliciano, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes. He sometimes clarified some answers propounded by Henry Feliciano in the course of the
investigation.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For example, what answer?
Q: Look around if he is present in the courtroom?
A: As far as I can remember, the question was reduced into writing.
A: (Witness pointing to a person with a green t-shirt and when asked his name he answered Henry
Feliciano.)
Q: What did you do after you arrived at the office of the Theft and Robbery Section and saw Henry
Feliciano, Cabigon and Cuarez?
Q: Before that, I am referring to the point where you had a conference with Henry Feliciano before the
start of the investigation; where was Alfonso Cuarez?
A: He was listening to us.
A: I started my investigation or confrontation with Henry Feliciano informing him, appraising him of
his constitutional right to counsel, that he has a right to remain silent and appraise him if it is his desire
that I be his lawyer because I told him if he has no desire that I will be his lawyer, then he can look for
another.
Q: Was there a participation of Alfonso Cuarez during your discussion?
Q: What else did you inform him or asked him aside from what you testified already?
Q: And these questions were the ones you testified a while ago.
A: I told him did you come to confess or testify because of fact that the police offered you some
consideration or money where you promised of release.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was the reaction of the said Henry Feliciano?

A: As far as I can remember, Henry Feliciano told me that he is forced to testify only to tell the truth.
A: Yes, he was the one typing the questions asked by me and the answers propounded by Henry
Feliciano.
Q: After that, what happened after you asked these questions and you got the answer from him? What
did Alfonso Cuarez do to him?
A: Alfonso Cuarez told him that is it really his desire . . . we are giving you Atty. Chavez as your
counsel. Are you willing? And he said yes.
Q: While you were conferring with Henry Feliciano, where was Eleuterio Cabigon and Alfonso Cuarez?
Q: What was the answer of Henry Feliciano?
A: Alfonso Cuarez was there listening to us.
A: He answered in the affirmative.
Q: How far away from you?
Q: Exactly, how did he answer?
Q: While these questions were asked of Henry Feliciano, as you testified a series of robberies were
committed, what did you do? What was your reaction?
A: Yes, I am very much willing.

Q: After that, when did the investigation start?
A: At first, I interrupted with the answer of Henry Feliciano thinking that it was not the truth or it might
be that the testimony will be counted against him in the court. So, I whispered to him if it is the truth,
and he insisted it is the truth.
A: About 3:30 in the afternoon.

Q: When you whispered to him, you are referring to Henry Feliciano?
Q: After Henry Feliciano, as you said, answered in the affirmative, what happened then?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Before I started the formal investigation to [sic] him, I reiterated that question about his desire to
take me as his counsel, and he again answered in the affirmative.
Q: Atty. Chavez, after the termination of the investigation which was taken by SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez in
your presence of SPO4 Eleuterio Cabigon on one Henry Feliciano, what happened after that?
Q: After that, for the second time, what happened?

A: Then I started his investigation.
A: I examined the question and answer taken, then I read it to Henry Feliciano, appraised him,
translated to him, clarified to him after he testified.
Q: Were you the one who investigated him?
Q: What was the reaction of Henry Feliciano?
A: At first, it was Alfonso Cuarez. Sometimes, I interrupted in the investigation.
A: He willingly listened to my explanation and clarification about what he confessed.
Q: How did Alfonso Cuarez start the investigation?
Q: And after listening to your explanation, what happened?
A: In the appraisal of Henry Feliciano of his constitutional rights.
A: I required him to sign. Before finally requiring to sign, if you will change your mind about what you
confessed, you still have the right to.
Q: After that, what happened?

Q: What did Henry Feliciano say?
A: As far as I can remember, he proceeded with the incident where Henry Feliciano was involved in a
series of robberies.
A: It is the truth; and after being clarified, he willingly signed the confession.
Q: While these questions were being asked of Henry Feliciano, where were you?
Q: After Henry Feliciano signed the same written statement of (sic) him, what did you do?
A: I was there.
Q: How many meters away from Henry Feliciano?
A: After that, Alfonso Cuarez, Henry Feliciano and me (sic) went to my office to have that notarized, so
that when I came to the Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw for the taking of the confession of Henry
Feliciano, I was not bringing with me my bill and other paraphernalias (sic).
A: About one arm's length, I sat behind him.
Q: When Henry Feliciano signed the written statement, where were you, Cabigon and Alfonso Cuarez?
A: The same location at that time when Henry Feliciano was taken his confession (sic).16
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside
the accused. In People v. Bacamante 17, the term "effective and vigilant counsel" was explained thus:
Q: How many times have you utilized Atty. Chavez to assist prisoners under the custody of the Cagayan
de Oro Police Department?
necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the
signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is
made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed
innocent.
A: As far as I can remember, three times already.
In People v. dela Cruz 18, an effective counsel was characterized as:
A: It is not the Cagayan de Oro Police who paid but it is only my initiative to give him.
one who can be made to act in protection of his [accused's] rights, and not by merely going through the
motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a law degree.
Q: It is only on your own personal initiative to pay Atty. Chavez?
Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that stage of custodial
interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of the
confession itself and SPO1 Atanacio's version of the manner in which he conducted the interrogation
yields no evidence or indication pointing to her having explained to the appellant his rights under the
Constitution. Indeed, from our earliest jurisprudence, the law vouchsafes to the accused the right to an
effective counsel, one who can be made to act in protection of his rights, and not by merely going
through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a law degree.
Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not explain to
accused-appellant the consequences of his action that the sworn statement can be used against him
and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail.
We also find that Atty. Chavez's independence as counsel is suspect he is regularly engaged by the
Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the services of counsel.
He even received money from the police as payment for his services:
On cross-examination:
Atty. Carlo Mejia
Q: Mr. Alfonso Cuarez, how long have you known Atty. Chavez?
A: I know him for a long time ago (sic).
Q: Is Atty. Chavez being paid by your office to assist detained prisoners?

A: Sometimes we pay him P400.00 but if we have none, he will assist for free.
Q: So Atty. Chavez is paid by the Cagayan de Oro Police Station?
A: Yes.
Q: And, of course, Atty. Chavez, if you have the money, also accepts the money you pay to him?
A: Yes, sir.
In People v. Deniega 19, expounding on the constitutional requirement that the lawyer provided be
"competent and independent", we stated that:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic laws
previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress the
primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a
custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing
individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and
independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as possible, the choice
of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is
important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine,
peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this
Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
"contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could
not afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person
authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person
authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials
are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas,
the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic."
Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he wants to avail of the
services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel if he so desires or that one could be
provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate. In this case,
appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether he was
willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means, be interpreted as waiver of his right
to counsel of his own choice.
In People v. Sahagun 20, we stated that the constitutional requirement that a lawyer should be
independent was not complied with when a lawyer who just happened to be following-up a case at the
NBI was asked to counsel the accused:
We also find the fact that Atty. Chavez notarized the sworn statement seriously compromised his
independence. By doing so, he vouched for the regularity of the circumstances surrounding the taking of
the sworn statement by the police. He cannot serve as counsel of the accused and the police at the same
time. There was a serious conflict of interest on his part. 22
[T]he counselling given by Atty. Dizon to Villareal was not sufficiently protective of Villareal's rights as
an accused as contemplated by the Constitution. To start with, Atty. Dizon is not really known to
Villareal. He was requested to act as counsel because he happened to be at the NBI following-up a
client's case. Given that circumstance, it cannot be expected that Atty. Dizon would give an advice to
Villareal that would offend the agent conducting the investigation. Thus, it appears that Atty. Dizon did
no more than recite to Villareal his constitutional rights. He made no independent effort to determine
whether Villareal's confessions were free and voluntary. . . .. He did not inquire from Villareal how he
was treated in the last 24-hours. He did not seek any of Villareal's relatives or friends to find out if he
has any defense which Villareal was not free to disclose due to his confinement.
Atty. Dizon's lack of vigilance as a counsel is likewise underscored by the fact that he himself testified
that Villareal gave his confession under the impression that he was only a witness and not an accused in
the case. This revelation should have jolted Atty. Dizon and should have driven him to exert extra
efforts to find out whether Villareal was tricked in making his confession. Again, he did not take an
extra effort.
In People v. Januario 21, the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants was their own
extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and with the
assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI. We held that
(s)uch counsel cannot in any wise be considered "independent" because he cannot be expected to work
against the interest of a police agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later he in fact was
admitted into its work force. For this violation of their constitutional right to independent counsel,
appellants deserve acquittal. After the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible
evidence remains in the Court's records to overturn another constitutional right: the right to be presumed
innocent of any crime until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In People v. de Jesus 23, we stated that an independent counsel cannot be a special counsel, public is
private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to
the accused.
We have examined the three-page sworn statement allegedly executed by Feliciano and we failed to see
any badge of spontaneity and credibility to it. It shows signs of what we call stereotype advice to which
we have already called the attention of police officers. In People v. Jarra 24, we said:
[T]he stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of "legal form" or mode. Police investigators either automatically
type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their
handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Since April 27, 1992 when Republic Act No. 7438 25 was enacted, the constitutional rights of persons
under custodial investigation have been further operationalized:
Sec. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained, or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers.
(a) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains
or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known
to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided
that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested does not know how to read and
write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained
person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouses, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as
chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by the person in the presence of
his counsel; otherwise such waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or
conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national
non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights or by any
international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's
immediate family shall include his or her spouse, fiance or fiancee, parent or child, brother or sister,
grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
On the charge of robbery with homicide, the only evidence presented by the prosecution was the sworn
statement which we have found inadmissible. Thus, we are forced to absolve accused-appellant of this
charge. With respect to the charge of highway robbery, the prosecution presented the testimony of
Ismael Ebon. However, Ebon failed to identify Feliciano as the perpetrator when he reported to the
police immediately after the incident:
CASE NO. 2143 dated 0030 H 29 March 93. Ismael Ibon y Petalcorin, 27 m (sic), of Reyes Bugo,
CDO, driver of PUJ Bugo Liner bearing Plate No. KBJ-748, and Christopher Impoc y Amba, 16, s ( sic),
of Zone 4, Tablon, this City, jointly came to this OKK-CIS and reported that they were allegedly
victimized by two unidentified robbers who was (sic) armed with a (sic) knives and taken from the
possession of the above driver his cash money P700.00 and took our stereo Pioneer Brand with Booster
and twitter. The incident was (sic) occurred at Agusan, this City, and the suspect was desembarked (sic)
at Camaman-an, this City at 10:30 p.m., this date. 28
Ismael Ebon and accused-appellant Feliciano are acquainted. There is no reason for Ebon to withhold
the identity of the perpetrator except for the fact that he was not certain of it. 29 Consequently, there is no
evidence pointing to Feliciano as one of those who held-up Ebon.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the trial court is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Henry Feliciano
is ACQUITTED on both charges of robbery with homicide and highway robbery due to lack of
evidence to sustain a conviction. The Director of the New Bilibid Prisons (NBP) is directed to inform
this Court compliance with the Decision within ten (10) days from its receipt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, it is disappointing to see how up to now some police officers still sidestep the
constitutional mandate, the consequence of which is all too familiar the inadmissibility of the
statement, confession, or admission taken. 26
In People v. dela Cruz 27, we stated that "a confession made in an atmosphere characterized by
deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled would be rendered valueless
and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by non-compliance with the procedural and substantive safeguards
to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further implemented and ramified by
statutory law."
EN BANC
G.R. No. 145566
From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December 15, 1996, at or around 9:00 p.m.,
Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group which included Roger Capacito and his wife and
the spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence located at Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe,
Cebu.3
March 9, 2004
PEOPLE
vs.
DINDO
DECISION
OF
THE
"BEBOT"
MOJELLO, appellant.
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way home, he saw his niece,
Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together some
thirty meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota. 4 Since he was used to seeing them together on
other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this. He proceeded to his house. 5
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, finding
appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death.1
Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an
Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows:2
That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay
Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal
knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency, against her
will and consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act
and in pursuance of his criminal design, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack,
assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different
parts of her body which caused her death.
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family was informed that the body of
Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site and
saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was devastated by what he saw. A
remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to protect his niece. He even attempted to take his
own life several days after the incident.6
Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City. On
an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the
dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His
confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao.
Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who
later on voluntarily signed it.7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T.
Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan. 8 On December 21, 1996, an
autopsy was conducted on the victim's cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal Branch of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII.9
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal lacerations positively indicate that
the victim was raped.10 He observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions on her neck
show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia. 11 He indicated the cause of death as cardio-respiratory
arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries to the head and the trunk. 12
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty." Trial followed.
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the extrajudicial confession executed by
appellant is admissible in evidence; and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
We now resolve.
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the alleged extrajudicial
confession which he executed on December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers that the confession
which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. 13 He argues that he was not
knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before the confession was taken from
him.14 Hence, his confession, and admissions made therein, should be deemed inadmissible in evidence,
under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
dignity and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the underlying mission of custodial investigation
to elicit a confession.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12,
par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional
requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is
valid and therefore admissible in evidence.
We are not convinced.

At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial investigation enshrined in
Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda
rights" stemming from the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v.
Arizona.15 It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the ultimate refuge of individuals
against the coercive power of the State.
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain
silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk
to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if
he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was based on the leading case
of People v. Galit16 and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,17 rulings subsequently incorporated into the present
Constitution. TheMiranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified form where the right to
counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent and independent counsel preferably of the
suspect's own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements
compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the presence of counsel.
Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to provide
for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona. The purpose of
the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the investigatory to the
accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects a measure of
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of
his Miranda rights under the Constitution.18 The court a quo observed that the confession itself
expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. 19 As further proof of the
same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was
requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant. 20 Appellant manifested on record his
desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the
investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional
rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and not to
do so if he was not sure of his answer.21 Atty. Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of
the trial of the present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation of the
Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in representing
appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the record that Atty.
Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting
a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.22
We ruled in People v. Continente23 that while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under
custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not
available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's appointment
during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the
statement before the swearing officer.24
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. In People v. Dumalahay,25 this Court held:
The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they were properly apprised of their right to
remain silent and right to counsel, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee.
At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused proceeded to the office of Atty. Rexel
Pacuribot, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All of the three accused,
still accompanied by Atty. Ubay-ubay, subscribed and swore to their respective written confessions.
Before administering the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot reminded the three accused of their constitutional rights
under the Miranda doctrine and verified that their statements were voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot
also translated the contents of each confession in the Visayan dialect, to ensure that each accused
understood the same before signing it.
No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify falsely against the accused. Their
participation in these cases merely involved the performance of their legal duties as officers of the court.
Accused-appellant Dumalahay's allegation to the contrary, being self-serving, cannot prevail over the
testimonies of these impartial and disinterested witnesses.
More importantly, the confessions are replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the
accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind
to which violence and torture have been applied. These factors are clear indicia that the confessions
were voluntarily given.
waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the
December 23, 1996 custodial investigation which elicited the appellant's confession should nevertheless
be upheld for having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1. Even though improper interrogation
methods were used at the outset, there is still a possibility of obtaining a legally valid confession later
on by properly interrogating the subject under different conditions and circumstances than those which
prevailed originally.26
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered into
the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1
of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior to
conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect,
notably Cebuano, a language known to the appellant, viz:27
PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY) : Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos sa usa ka inbestigasyon diin ikaw
gituhon nga adunay kalabutan sa kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong paglugos kaniya.
Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw adunay katungod sa pagpakahilom ning maong inbesigasyon
karon kanimo ug aduna usab ikaw ug katungod nga katabangan ug usa ka abogado nga motabang
karon kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon. Imo ba nasabtan kining tanan? (DINDO MOJELLO, you are
hereby reminded that you are under investigation in which you were suspected about the death and
raping of LENLEN RAYCO. Under the Constitution you have the right to remain silent about this
investigation on you now and you have also the right to have counsel of your own choice to assist you
in this investigation now. Have you understood everything?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been
concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the
extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the
statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater
reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which
dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Human ikaw sayri sa imong katungod ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod
sa pagpakahilom, gusto ba nimo nga ipadayon nato kining inbestigasyon karon kanimo? (After you
have been apprised of your rights under our Constitution to remain silent, do you want to proceed this
investigation on you now?)
The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each of the accused gave the same detailed
narration of the manner by which Layagon and Escalante were killed. This clearly shows that their
confessions could not have been contrived. Surely, the three accused could not have given such identical
accounts of their participation and culpability in the crime were it not the truth.
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Gusto ba usab nimo ug abogado nga makatabang kanimo ning maong
inbestigasyon? (Do you want counsel to assist you in this said investigation?)
Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's apprehension by the police
authorities violated the Miranda doctrine on two grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and (2) improper
APPEARANCE : Atty. Isaias Giduquio is appearing as counsel of the affiant.
TUBAG (QUESTION) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Ako usab ikaw pahinumdoman nga unsa man ang imo isulti karon dinhi
magamit pabor o batok kanimo sa Hukmanan, nasabtan ba nimo kining tanan mo nga mga katungod
nga walay naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal kanimo o nagsaad ba ug ganti sa kaulihan? (You are also
hereby reminded that all your statements now will be used as evidence against or in your favor in any
court of justice. Have you understood all your rights with nobody coercing or forcing you, or mauling or
promising a reward in the end?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo (Yes.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Andam ka nga mohatag ug libre ug boluntaryo nga pamahayag? (Are
you now ready to give your free and voluntary statement?)
In People v. Pia,30 we held that "where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or
violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to officers who administered the oaths; where
they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged maltreatment; where
there appears no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by
a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating
voluntariness of confessions." The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file
charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so,
manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. 31 To hold otherwise is to facilitate the
retraction of his statements at the mere allegation of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or
inducement, without any proof whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that another indicium of
voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession which could have been known only to the
declarant.32

xxx
xxx
xxx
(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)

xxx
xxx
x x x.
The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such confession. 28 Appellant was
properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession of appellant was subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of
MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the
contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He subsequently acknowledged
that when appellant subscribed to his statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of
Court were present as well as other people.29
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of the Miranda
doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving credence to
the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to
execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who threatened
him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand the contents of
the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect
in his daily discourse.
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion or
coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims
that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. 33 Bare assertions will certainly
not suffice to overturn the presumption.34
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was
overborne at the time he confessed.35 In cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of
voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of the
confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains unrebutted by his
failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to ensure that a suspect
has been properly apprised of his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in the paramount
public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal justice relies on the faithful
adherence to the Mirandadoctrine. Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police authorities is
central to the criminal justice system;Miranda rights must in every case be respected, without exception.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of
culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree itself
is not poisonous.
Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape with homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty despite the
glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In his Brief, he argues that the evidence
against him is insufficient to warrant his conviction of rape with homicide.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled with the corpus delicti as
established by the Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us to no other
conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco on December 15, 1996. It passes
the test of moral certainty and must therefore be sustained.
Mojello is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Lenlen Rayco,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the victim. Neither is the
circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of the rape a homicide
was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical evidence further precludes us from connecting the
slaying of the victim to her sexual assault, given the quantum of proof required by law for conviction.
No estimated time of death was given, which is essential in making a connection with the appellant's
story that he went home after a night of drinking. The time when he and the victim were headed towards
the seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996 until the time when the victim's
lifeless body was found at or about 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1996 had a time variance of between six
to seven hours. Although the circumstances may point to the appellant as the most likely perpetrator of
the homicide, the same do not constitute an unbroken chain of events which would lead us to a
reasonable conclusion that appellant was guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are gaps in
the reconstruction of facts and inferences surrounding the death of Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to
boxing the victim when she shouted, then hurriedly ran away. The cause of death of Lenlen was cardiorespiratory attack due to asphyxiation and physical injuries; she was strangled to death and left on the
seashore as manifested by the frothing in her lungs. No physical, scientific or DNA evidence was
presented to pinpoint appellant as the person who killed the victim. Fingerprints, if available, would
have determined who committed the homicide. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of rape with
homicide considering the insufficiency of evidence which thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt for the said special complex crime.
Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory rape, the victim Lenlen Rayco
being then eleven years old. The sexual assault was necessarily included in the special complex crime
charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.
The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 is awarded upon the finding of the fact of rape. 36 Moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 may likewise be given to the heirs of the victim without need of proof in accordance with
current jurisprudence.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bogo, Cebu,
Branch 61 in Criminal Case No. B-00224 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Dindo
THIRD DIVISION
CONTRARY TO LAW: With the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and
reward. 3
G.R. No. 95089 August 11, 1997

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
NICOMEDES FABRO, FRANCISCO DIMALANTA, AMADO ALCALA, WILLIAM HOGE
and "JOHN DOE," accused, NICOMEDES FABRO, accused-appellant.
On August 10, 1987, Dimalanta and Appellant Fabro, with the assistance of Counsel de oficio Romeo C.
Alinea, pleaded not guilty. On September 8, 1987, Accused Alcala entered the same plea. The other two
accused, William Hoge and "John Doe," were never arrested or arraigned.
In the course of the trial, both Accused Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail. 4 Thus, only appellant was
presented as witness by the defense.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
On June 25, 1990, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The 1987 Constitution guarantees persons undergoing custodial investigation the rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel. The Constitution impels strict compliance with these requirements because a
confession of guilt given during such investigation constitutes formidable evidence against the accused
on the principle that no one will knowingly, freely and deliberately admit authorship of a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience, particularly where the facts given could have been known only by
appellant. On the other hand, any allegation of force, duress, undue influence or other forms of
involuntariness in exacting such confession must be proven by clear, convincing and competent
evidence by the defense. Otherwise, the confession's full probative value may be used to demonstrate
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Statement of the Case
These doctrines are applied by the Court in deciding this appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, 2 in Crim. Case No. 364-87, finding the accused guilty of
murder and sentencing them toreclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds accused NICOMEDES
FABRO, FRANCISCO DIMALANTA and AMADO ALCALA guilty beyond the shadow of a doubt of
the crime of MURDER as charged in the information, with three aggravating circumstances and
pursuant to Article 248, and hereby sentences them (to) the maximum penalty of death. However, with
the abolition of death penalty, accused shall suffer reclusion perpetua, with costs against the accused.
The Court orders the accused collectively to indemnify the heirs of Dionisio Joaquin (in) the sum of
P30,000.00. 5
On June 29, 1990, a Notice of Appeal direct to the Supreme Court was filed in the trial court in view of
the penalty imposed, reclusion perpetua. As Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail during the proceedings
before the court a quo, their appeal is deemed dismissed pursuant to Rule 124, Section 8 of the Rules of
Court 6 and Supreme Court Administrative Circular 2-92. 7 Hence, only the appeal of Fabro will be ruled
upon. 7-A References to Dimalanta and Alcala in this Decision are made only to complete the narration
of the case, and thus will affect only Fabro.
The Facts
In an Information dated June 11, 1987, Second Assistant Fiscal of Olongapo City, Jesus P. Duranto,
charged Nicomedes Fabro, Francisco Dimalanta, Amado Alcala, William Hoge and a certain "John Doe"
with murder committed as follows:
That on or about the twelfth (12th) day of April 1987, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring confederating together
and mutually helping one another, accused Nicomedes Fabro armed with a gun, with intent to kill and
with treachery, evident premeditation and in consideration of promise of reward, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot (sic) therewith one Dionisio Joaquin and as
a result thereof, the latter suffered shock and Hemmorhage Massive, Secondary to Gun Shot Wound
which directly caused his death shortly thereafter.
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented five witnesses: (1) Dr. Richard Patilano who conducted the autopsy on the
remains of the victim; (2) Sgt. Felipe Bolina, the police investigator; (3) Anthony Beck, companion of
the victim; (4) Conrado Joaquin, the victim's father; and (5) Atty. Isagani Jungco, the IBP President
(Zambales Chapter) who was presented as rebuttal witness. Among the documentary evidence
submitted were the sworn statements of appellant, Beck, Dimalanta and Joaquin, and the joint affidavit
of Sgts. Bolina and Lappay. The prosecution's version of the facts, as summarized by the Solicitor
General in the Appellee's Brief, 8 is as follows:
Sometime in the second week of April, 1987, a strike was held by workers on the premises of the Casa
Blanca located at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. Dionisio Joaquin, the victim, was one of organizers
thereof. He sought the assistance of friends, among whom was Anthony Beck, a stevedore and resident
of Olongapo City (pp. 28-31, TSN, May 24, 1988).
At about 6:00 P.M. on April 11, 1987, Joaquin and Beck were at Whisky Bar fronting the Casa Blanca,
at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. They were conversing while resting at the veranda of said Whisky
Bar, fronting the Casa Blanca where a picket was being conducted by their co-strikers. Both had fallen
asleep, as they lacked sleep the previous nights, on a chair near each other with their feet resting on the
veranda railings (pp. 39-46, ibid).
Anthony Beck fell asleep at about 4:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 12, 1987. Shortly
thereafter, at about 5:00 to 5:30 in the morning, he was awakened by gun report. Opening his eyes, he
saw Joaquin dead, with a single bullet wound on the forehead. Blood was oozing from Joaquin's head.
Seeing a man running away from where he and Joaquin were seated, Anthony Beck then gave chase.
The fleeing man turned left on an alley and then right on another. Beck lost him at the second turn. He
saw an old man who inquired why he was chasing the fleeing man. Beck told the old man of the
shooting incident. Then and there the old man told Beck that the man he (Beck) was running after was
"Badong", later identified as the accused Nicomedes Fabro (pp. 54-62, ibid).
Police officers from the Olongapo Metrodiscom, led by Sgt. Felipe Bolina, proceeded to Fabro's
residence at about noon that same day. They failed to apprehend Fabro as he was allegedly then asleep.
The accused (Fabro) was surrendered by his sister to the CIS the following day (pp. 12-14, TSN, July
18, 1989).
At 6:00 o'clock that night, April 13, 1987, Fabro was interrogated by CIS personnel and grilled for about
two (2) hours (pp. 16-19, supra).
At that juncture, CIS investigator Santiago requested Fabro to sign a document, which turned out to be
his extra-judicial confession/admission (Exh. "F"). Accused Fabro (claims that he) was not allowed to
read the document, neither were its contents read to him (pp. 24-26). A certain Atty. Isagani Jungco was
however present when he signed the document (p. 28, supra; pp. 2-18, TSN, March 19, 1990).
The defense presented its only witness in the person of the appellant. No documentary evidence was
submitted. The counter-statement of facts, as narrated in the six-page Brief for the Appellants, 9 reads as
follows:
The version of the defense as testified to by Nicomedes Fabro was that at two o'clock in the morning of
April 12, 1987, he stopped ferrying passengers and slept on a sofa at the Whiskey River Club, located
on a terrace of said club. When he laid down and rested at the sofa, there was also another person who
was seated on the sofa and was more or less one arm's length away from him. The man was then asleep
but (Fabro) only knew his face but not his name. While sleeping, he was awakened by the shout of one
of his companion saying "may binaril, may binaril". The shout was very loud and after shouting the man
ran towards Olongapo City. Accused according to him was standing and looking at the bloodied person
who was more or less two arms length away from him. The bloodied person was at the balcony of the
Whiskey River Club.
Accused was surrendered to the CIS by his sister on April 13, 1987. Nicomedes Fabro claimed that he
was made to sign a document without allowing him to read the contents. According to accused Fabro,
investigator Santiago told him that if he will not sign the document something will happen to him. Atty.
Isagani Jungco was present when he signed his name, however, the document was already prepared and
ready for signature.
Trial Court's Findings
In its Decision, the trial court leaned towards the version of the prosecution; 10
From the evidence presented by the prosecution, both testimonial and documentary, the Court finds
these facts to be indubitable. That in the early morning of April 12, 1987, between 5:00 and 5:30, the
deceased Dionisio Joaquin who was sleeping side by side with Anthony Beck on the terrace of the
Whiskey Bar, opposite Casa Blanca, Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City, was shot in the head at close range
by accused Nicomedes Fabro. The deceased was bleeding with blood oozing from the forehead when
found by some Olongapo police and Sgt. Bolina, a PC soldier who arrived at the scene. The deceased
was found on a chair, his feet raised on the veranda with his head inclined back.
xxx xxx xxx
While it appears from the transcript that co-accused Francisco Dimalanta executed an extra-judicial
statement (confession) (pp. 24-25, TSN, Feb. 2, 1988), Dimalanta himself was never presented in court
as defense witness, as both accused Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail during trial.
Version of the Defense
Anthony Beck who was asleep side by side with the deceased was awakened by a shot and even heard
the "kalansing" of the bullet, chased the person whom he saw running away after the shot was fired. He
testified that when he was chasing the man he did not yet know his name but he could identify him.
Beck made the identification when accused Fabro was mixed with other people getting clearance at
164th PC Company Office. Beck positively identified the accused when he testified in Court.
xxx xxx xxx

Beck testified that Dionisio Joaquin was an organizer of a labor organization and that the latter invited
the former to support the strikers.
Sgt. Bolina thru his investigation learned the identity of the man who was running away from the scene
of the crime as Nicomedes Fabro. Upon learning the identity of the suspect, Bolina went to the parents
of Fabro whom he knew personally and requested that Fabro be surrendered to him. Bolina learned later
that the suspect was surrendered to the CIS. After the CIS investigation, Nicomedes Fabro gave his
confession in the presence of Atty. Isagani Jungco who was called to assist the suspect. In his
confession, Fabro implicated Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala.
The confession of Dimalanta coincide in all materials points with the confession of Fabro. Dimalanta
narrated how he was promised the amount P10,000 by a certain Bill Hoge and how he was paid of
P5,000.00 as initial payment and the balance to be paid after the killing is accomplished. The P5,000.00
initial payment was shared by the three accused.
From the foregoing, the trial court established the existence of conspiracy among the three accused. The
trial court further found the testimony of Beck unbiased, truthful and credible.
Finally, the court below held that the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and consideration of price or reward.
Assignment of Errors
From reliable information received by Sgt. Bolina and the other policemen, they learned the identity of
two other suspects, namely: Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala. From unconfirmed reports these
two Dimalanta and Alcala participated in the killing of Dionisio Joaquin. The confession of Fabro
confirmed that indeed Dimalanta and Alcala were his co-conspirator.
Appellant interposes the present appeal, faulting the trial court:

I
xxx xxx xxx
For not considering the defense of alibi when there is doubt as to the identity of the suspect.
. . . . (Sgt.). Lappay testified that he was present during the investigation of Fabro. Fabro in his presence
admitted his participation and pointed to Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala and one Ernesto de
Guzman. It was in early morning of April 14, 1987 that de Guzman and Dimalanta were apprehended
along Rizal Extension, they being neighbors. Alcala was arrested at above street.
II
After analyzing and weighing all the pieces of testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court
declined to give credence to the uncorroborated claim of appellant that he was asleep at the terrace of
the Whiskey Club at the time of the incident. The court a quo also rejected his contention that he was
coerced into signing a confession, since the solitary verbal "threat" allegedly made by the investigator
was vague and not backed up by the use of actual physical force. After considering the presence of the
counsel (Atty. Jungco) who assisted the appellant and his co-accused during the custodial investigation
as well as in the execution of their respective sworn statements, the lower court admitted in evidence
their extrajudicial confessions.
The confession of Appellant Fabro was summarized by the lower court, thus:
In the confession of Nicomedes Fabro he narrated how Francisco Dimalanta offered him P10,000.00 to
kill a man, how the gun was given him and how they observed the movements of the victim to the time
of the killing. While Nicomedes Fabro did the actual shooting, accused Alcala and Dimalanta were
present awaiting the outcome of the shooting.
For not considering the admissions and confessions as inadmissible as violative of the Constitution.
III
For not considering the statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses as hearsay.
IV
For presuming that conspiracy exists.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is not meritorious. In view of the incriminatory nature of appellant's confession, the Court
will tackle the second assigned error ahead of the first.
First Issue: Admissibility of Appellant's Confession
A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or

inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the
commission of a crime. 11 But before it can be admitted in evidence, several requirements have to be
satisfied.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which came into effect on February 2, 1987, requires
that:
conscience. 16 When all these requirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the
burden of proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused. 17
Admittedly, the case of the prosecution hinges on appellant's confession. The defense maintains that the
same is inadmissible for the following reasons: (1) appellant's confession was extracted under threat and
intimidation; (2) the lawyer's (Atty. Jungco's) participation was only as a witness during the signing of
the prepared confession and not during the investigation or interrogation itself; and (3) appellant was
made to sign the confession without having read it and without the presence of counsel.
As proof thereof, the defense quotes appellant's statements during direct examination: 18
Q. And what did (CIS Investigator) Santiago tell you if he told you anything?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Santiago told me that if I will not sign it, something will happen to me.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
Q. But you will admit before this Court that before you affixed your signature, the document was shown
to you by Santiago, did he not?
Moreover, Article III, Section 17 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right of the accused against selfincrimination, provides:
A. No more, I was just made to sign.

Q. Do you want to impress the Court that you just affixed your signature without you being allowed to
read the documents or the investigator Santiago did not even read unto you the contents of the
documents?
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given:
A. No sir.
1.
Freely
trickery; 12
and
voluntarily,
without
compulsion,
inducement
or
2. Knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial investigation of his
constitutional rights; 13 and
3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its consequences. 14
Once admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal experience of
mankind can accept as being within the realm of probability. 15
Such uncorroborated and anemic allegations are insufficient to render appellant's confession
inadmissible. Rather, they appear to be a mere subterfuge designed to impute constitutional infirmity to
the conduct of the custodial interrogation.
The more credible evidence is the rebuttal testimony of Atty. Jungco showing adherence to the
constitutional requirements. Atty. Jungco testified that after he apprised appellant of his constitutional
rights to be silent and to have counsel during the investigation, the latter waived them in his (Atty.
Jungco's) presence. Thus: 19
ATTY. DE DIOS:
A confession meeting all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is
supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and
deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and
Q Atty. Jungco, I would like to bring your attention to April 13, 1987, do you remember having been
called to assist an accused detained at the CIS Office, Camp Maquinaya, Olongapo City?
A Yes, I was then the President of the IBP of Zambales-Olongapo Chapter and the CIS people
approached me if I will help them in the waiver, to be present when waiver will be signed by the person
before the CIS,
A He understood because he said "Yes".
Q Waiver of what?
Q Thank you. Atty. Jungco, at the last page and this is the end of his confession, there is a signature of
Nicomedes Fabro, were you present when he signed the last page of his testimony?
xxx xxx xxx
A Waiver of the right to counsel and the presence of counsel during the taking of his investigation.
xxx xxx xxx
Q To refresh your memory, Atty. Jungco, I am showing you a statement which has been marked as
Exhibit F for the prosecution, please go over this before I ask my question.
A At the time that he signed this, I was there present because I was talking then with their Chief there
which is I think Capt. Flores and before I left, this statement was completed.
ATTY. DE DIOS:
A (Witness going over the document handed to him) I recognize this statement.
Q Thank you. Atty. Jungco, when you signed this first page and when Nicomedes Fabro signed this
waiver, do you remember whether or not there was already a statement prepared?
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q Can you explain what is this Pagpapatunay wherein you are witness to that?
A At the time that he signed this, the investigation has not yet began because precisely, I was asked to be
present because of the waiver. And after he signed his waiver and I signed it also in his presence, I was
talking with Capt. Flores and they were taking his testimony at that time.
A I was present when Nicomedes Fabro during the time that I was there signed his waiver of the right to
have counsel at the time of the taking of his testimony.
Then, afterwards, before I left.

Q Now, it is the waiver of the accused to counsel, will you please tell the Court if you advised him of
his rights and effect of such waiver?
xxx xxx xxx
A Before he signed this waiver, I apprised him of his rights under the Constitution, that is, the right to be
silent, the right to counsel and that any statement that he will make in any investigation may be used for
or against him in any court of law and after that, I asked him if despite his right to have counsel present
during the taking of his testimony, he still waives that right to counsel and he said "Yes" and he signed
that statement there. As a matter of fact, in this Pagpapatunay, the last sentence "Pumirma ako . . . . sa
harapan ni Atty. Isagani Jungco, IBP President." (Sgd) Nicomedes Fabro".
Q Atty. Jungco, was that advice given in Tagalog or in English?
A It was given in Tagalog and in English.
This adherence to the Constitution is further confirmed by the confession itself. It starts off with
a Pasubali 20wherein appellant was informed of his constitutional rights and a Pagpapatunay which
confirmed that he understood said rights. Both parts also serve as a written proof of appellant's waiver in
fulfillment of the requirements of the Constitution.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the testimony of Atty. Jungco was replete with details as to how
he informed and warned appellant of the consequences of the waiver of his right to counsel. Thus, he
argues that there is no room for doubt that appellant was indeed assisted by counsel when he waived his
right to counsel during the time that his statement was taken, and not only at the time he signed it as
claimed by appellant.
The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. Nor is there any
evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. 21 The indelible fact is that he was
Q Did he understand your admonition or your reminders concerning his right?

president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a lackey of the
lawmen.
Doubts that Atty. Jungco's assistance to appellant was not independent since he was engaged by the CIS
Investigators are further dispelled by the fact that he was sent 22 to the CIS Office by Sgt. Bolina who
personally knew appellant's parents and was a friend of his brother-in-law. 23 He took the trouble to
ensure that a lawyer was present during the taking of appellant's statement, even though he (Bolina)
would not be there. Ineluctably, appellant, by his uncorroborated, puerile and matter-of-fact claim,
failed to overcome the presumption that Atty. Jungco regularly performed his official duty as an officer
of the court in giving assistance to persons undergoing custodial interrogation. 24 Upon the other, the
overwhelming evidence is that he did performs such duty faithfully.
Perhaps the most telling indication that appellant's confession was voluntary is the fact that said
confession contained exculpatory claims 32 (Question Nos. 5, 7, 8 and 9) and facts that only the appellant
could have known (Question Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 20 and 29). 33
Thus, we can only affirm the following findings of the trial court:
Neither can the Court accept that accused Nicomedes Fabro was only forced into giving a confession.
The Court cannot even for a while believe that he was only forced to give his statement when the
accused himself stated that he was not even once hurt by any of the CIS investigators. In (fact), he was
even told to rest.
Atty. Alinea:
After the prosecution has shown that the confession was obtained in accordance with the aforesaid
constitutional guarantee, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to obtain it rests
on the accused. 25 InAntillon vs. Barcelon, 26 the Court imposed a high degree of proof to overthrow the
presumption of truth in the recitals contained in a public instrument executed with all the legal
formalities.
In People vs. Pia, 27 the Court held that where the accused failed to present credible evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their person, e.g., where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their
alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies;
and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, their
confession should be considered voluntary. 28
Appellant has miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the use of force or
intimidation on his person to secure his confession. The records show that appellant's confession was
sworn and subscribed to before Fiscal Jesus Dorante, to whom he could have and should have voiced
his objection, if any. Quite the contrary, Fiscal Dorante certified that he personally examined appellant
and was convinced that the latter gave his statement freely and voluntarily and that he understood the
contents of his confession. Appellant's failure to voice out his complaints is tantamount to a
manifestation that indeed he waived his right to counsel in the presence of Atty. Jungco in accordance
with the Constitution. 29 His assertion on appeal that he was intimidated into giving said confession rings
hollow and too late. 30
This claim is further belied by appellant's lack of complaint, or even any mention thereof, to his sister
and relatives who visited him at Camp Maquinaya where he was detained for one year. 31 This reinforces
the trial court's ruling.
Q And immediately after your sister left, your interrogation by the CIS agents started, that is correct
or it is not?
A No, sir I was asked to clean.
Q What portion or portions of the CIS headquarters were you ordered to clean?
A The ceilings.
Q And after cleaning the ceiling of the CIS headquarters, what was the next order to you?
A They asked me to rest.
(TSN, July 18, 1989, pp. 15-16.)
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after cleaning the car of Capt. Flores, what was your next chore or activity?
A I cooked food for them.
Q And these activities became routinary and ordinary for how many days?
A I stayed there for a year and that was the routinary work I did. (TSN, July 18, 1989, p. 23)
The only alleged threat to him was that "Santiago told me that if I will not sign it something will happen
to me." (TSN, July 18, 1989, p. 26). Nothing was mentioned about actual physical force used on
accused. 34 . . .
We hold that appellant's confession was properly admitted by the trial court as part of the prosecution
evidence.
Second Issue: Defense of "Alibi" vs. Positive Identification
The defense argues that, although alibi is the weakest defense, easily fabricated and concocted,
nevertheless is gains strength when there is doubt as to the identity of the suspect. Although appellant
admitted that he was sleeping next to the victim when the latter was shot, he claims that Witness Beck
could not have seen the face of the person running away from the crime scene since it was still dark at
that time. Beck had just awakened, so it would have taken some time before his eyes could have
adjusted. Thus, the defense speculates that the identification of appellant by Beck was "coached and
suggested" by the investigators who fetched him and prepared his second statement.
Back's testimony that appellant was the man he chased contravenes the contention that appellant was
sleeping one arm's length away from the victim; that appellant was only awakened by shouts that
somebody was shot; and that he stayed at the crime scene for a time during the investigation. Moreover,
the denial is directly contravened by his confession that he shot the victim.
In light of this confession, the denial is actually a belated retraction of said confession. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that repudiation and recantation of confessions which have been obtained in accordance
with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable. 37 They have negligible probative
weight.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that appellant's denial is totally unconvincing. Appellant's
uncorroborated testimony is: (1) that he just happened to be asleep at the terrace of the Whiskey Bar; (2)
that appellant who resided nearby, for no explainable reason, elected to sleep on the same veranda
during the very same night that the victim was shot; (3) that he was awakened only by the shouting of
people and not by the sound of the gunshot; (4) and finally, that he stayed at the scene of the crime for
about 30 minutes without anybody noticing that he was there at all. 38
These arguments do not inspire belief. Beck claimed that he saw appellant running away from the scene
of the shooting. In answer to the trial judge's clarificatory questions during the cross-examination, the
witness replied that, when he opened his eyes after hearing the gun report, he saw a person who
immediately ran away. 35 Beck testified that he was appellant's face while chasing the latter, although he
did not catch up with appellant. 36 Therefore, from the time he was awakened until the lost the appellant
during the chase, Beck saw appellant's face. Subsequently, in open court, he pointed to appellant as the
man he had chased. This fact was not lost on the defense; thus, the defense claimed that, considering the
time of the incident (5:00 to 5:30 a.m. in mid-April), there would have been insufficient daylight to
permit clear and positive identification of the culprit by the witness.
Third Issue: Alleged Hearsay Evidence
The defense claims that this "weak" identification by Beck strengthened appellant's "alibi," which is
actually and more accurately a denial in view of appellant's admission that he was at the scene of the
crime. However, giving it a different name does not increase its probative value. A denial, like other
defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is independently assessed.
When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative
value of the denial is negligible. Otherwise, credibility of testimonies and their evidentiary weight come
into play. The well-settled rule is that the assessment by the trial court of credibility and weight of
evidence is accorded the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
substance which would have affected the result of the case.
Fourth Issue: Existence of Conspiracy
The defense claims that the identification of appellant was hearsay because appellant's name was
allegedly given to Witness Beck by a certain Eduardo Ragonton who, however, was not presented as a
witness. We cannot sustain this. The fact remains that Witness Beck was able to identify appellant in
open court because he had seen the latters face that fateful night. 39 While Beck may not have known the
name of the appellant, he was certain about the latter's identity. Indeed, appellant's name which was
supplied by another person to Witness Beck may be considered hearsay; but appellant's identity which
the said witness personally knew is not.
The defense raises this issue without elaborating further or offering any evidence in support thereof.
We are not persuaded. In fact, the conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused appears indubitable.
The decision of the trial court states that:
From reliable information received by Sgt. Bolina and other policemen, they learned the identity of two
other suspects, namely: Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala. From unconfirmed reports these two (,)
Dimalanta and Alcala(,) participated in the killing of Dionisio Joaquin. The confession of Fabro
confirmed that indeed Dimalanta and Alcala were his co-conspirators.
xxx xxx xxx

In the confession of Nicomedes Fabro he narrated how Francisco Dimalanta offered him P10,000.00 to
kill a man, how the gun was given him and how they observed the movements of the victim to the time
of the killing. While Nicomedes Fabro did the actual shooting, accused Alcala and Dimalanta were
present awaiting the outcome of the shooting. 40
The said decision further elaborates:
The confession of Dimalanta coincided in all material points with the confession of Fabro. Dimalanta
narrated how he was promised the amount of P10,000.00 by a certain Bill Hoge and how he was paid
P5,000.00 initial payment was shared by the three accused. 41
The acts of the accused show that they were animated by the same purpose and were united in their
execution. When, by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object each doing a part so that their acts though apparently independent were in fact
connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of sentiment conspiracy
may be inferred. 42
From appellant's confession, it is clear that Dimalanta offered him money to kill Joaquin; that, together
with Alcala, they observed the movements of the victim; that prior to the shooting, they had attempted
to kill the victim at the D & E Fast Food Restaurant; and that at the time of the shooting, on April 12,
1987, Dimalanta and Alcala were at or near the scene of the crime, acting as lookouts and awaiting the
outcome of the killing. 43
That the crime was committed in consideration of a price has been satisfactorily shown by appellant's
confession. From the confession also, evident premeditation is manifest from the fact that on April 10,
1987, appellant was approached and hired by Dimalanta to kill the victim; that the appellant clung to his
determination to kill the victim even after an unsuccessful first attempt on April 11, 1987 at the D & E
Fast Food Restaurant; and that a sufficient lapse of time had passed giving the appellant a chance to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.
In U.S. vs. Manalinde, 45 the Court held that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
offer of money, reward or promise are not incompatible and may be appreciated together, one being
independent of the other.
Treachery is shown by the fact that appellant, after several days of observing the movements of the
victim, shot the latter while he was asleep. 46 The means of execution (1) gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) showed that such method was deliberately or
consciously adopted. 47
Although all three circumstances (price, premeditation and treachery) were proven, only one will be
appreciated to qualify the killing to murder and the two others can be used only as generic aggravating
circumstances.
However, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should also be appreciated in appellant's
favor, as he surrender to the CIS in Camp Maquinaya on April 13, 1987, thus, offsetting one generic
aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Aggravating Circumstances
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with slight modification, i.e., the indemnity
is INCREASED to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence. 48
The trial court held that the following circumstances attended the killing:
SO ORDERED.
1. The crime was committed in consideration of a price. Dimalanta was promised P10,000.00 by Hope
to look for a killer. P5,000.00 was actually paid. In turn Dimalanta secured the services of the
triggerman, Fabro in exchange for money. Alcala was paid for his participation in the plan.
2. With evident premeditation, the accused directly aiming the gun at a (sic) close range; and
3. Treachery, by shooting the helpless victim while asleep to insure its execution without risk to the
killer. 44
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109143
October 11, 2000
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN, AMADO B. BELANO, DANILO OBENIA
and
RUFINO
VALERA,
JR., accused,
PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN and AMADO B. BELANO, accused-appellants.
sa inyo layunin ng sulat kong ito upang ipahiwatig sa yo na ang pakikibaka pang kalawakang
pakikibaka ay humihingi ng tulong sa iyo Tay "Erning" Siguro alam mo na amg aming pakay lalo na sa
aming pangangailangan pinansyal upang magamit sa kilusan bigyan mo po kami ng halagang 8,000.00
at ito po ang aming inaasahan "okey" inaasahan ko po at maghihintay kami doon sa kabilang ilog
papuntang nalisbitan dalhin mo ang "jeep" mo iyan ang aming palatandaan alas 4:00 p.m. July 22,90
inaasahan po namin ang iyong pakikipakaupira at inaasahan po namin na walang ibang makakaalam.
"Okey salamat sigi po maghihintay kami alas 4:00 mamaya.
"MELCO GROUP
DECISION
"KA BONG
PARDO, J.:
"MABUHAY ANG N.P.A."
The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte, Branch 40,
Daet1 finding accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay the heirs of
the victim, Renato Cuano, indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), funeral expenses of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and actual damages for unrealized income in the amount of one million
forty six thousand pesos (P1,046,000.00). The trial court also ordered that alias warrants of arrest be
issued against accused Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. who are at large.2
On the same day, at around eight oclock in the morning (8:00 a. m.), Lacson instructed Renato to take
his passenger jeep and to proceed to his "gold field" in Nalisbitan to get his collectibles from the field.
This was the last time Lacson saw Renato alive.8
Also on the same day, Lacson told his employee, 9 prosecution witness Elizer Obregon (hereinafter
referred to as "Elizer"), to go to the crossing of Nalisbitan, 10 the place mentioned in the letter to
investigate who the persons demanding money were.11
We state the facts.

The victim was Renato Cuano (hereinafter referred to as "Renato"). Prosecution witness Ernesto Lacson
(hereinafter referred to as "Lacson") was the uncle and employer of Renato, who was the caretaker of
his gravel and sand truck.3
On July 21, 1990, Renato came to see Lacson and informed him that armed and hooded persons 4 were
asking for money amounting to six thousand pesos (P6,000.00). The amount was reduced to six hundred
pesos (P600.00) and finally to two hundred pesos (P200.00).5
On July 22, 1990, Lacson arrived home from church. His wife handed him a letter delivered to her by a
child. In the letter, purportedly members of the N.P.A. demanded eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) from
him.6 We quote the letter:7
Elizer complied and reached the place at around five oclock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of the same
day.
Upon reaching the place, Elizer saw Renato and spoke with him. In the vicinity, Elizer saw accused
Basilio Baybayan, Pedro Taliman and Amado Belano. At that time, accused Sgt. Pedro Taliman and
C1C Basilio M. Baybayan were members of the Camarines Norte Constabulary/Integrated National
Police Command.12 Elizer saw two other civilians in their company.13
Elizer then saw accused Pedro Taliman and Basilio Baybayan take Renato 14 to a hilltop, where he was
guarded by accused who were armed. Elizer heard one of the accused say that Renato must be taken as
"he must be acting as a lookout (for Lacson)."15
"Sayo TaTay Erning
Elizer then proceeded to Bagong Silang and reported to Lacson that Renato was taken by accused Pedro
Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano.
"Rebolusyonaryong pagbati sa yo/
A custodial investigation was conducted.

On July 23, 1990, Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte. He went to the
police station upon invitation of police corporal Cereno to "assist" accused during their custodial
investigation.16 Accused executed extra-judicial statements, confessing to the commission of the crime.
On February 26, 1991, accused Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan and Amado B. Belano were
arraigned. They pleaded "not guilty."23 Accused Danilo Obenia24 and Rufino Valero, Jr. were not
arraigned because they remained at large.
It was during this custodial investigation that accused Basilio Baybayin confessed to prosecution
witness Sgt. Bonifacio Argarin that he participated in the killing of Renato because Renato did not give
them the money they were demanding. This confession was given without the assistance of counsel and
was not reduced to writing.17
On March 21, 1991, accused waived the pre-trial conference25 and trial ensued.26
On May 29, 1992, the trial court declared the case submitted for decision.27
On September 24, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which provides:
On July 23, 1990, police authorities, accompanied by accused Basilio Baybayan went to the place
indicated in a sketch prepared by accused Pedro Taliman. 18 It was in the place indicated that they found
the cadaver of Renato.19 This was the same place or hilltop where prosecution witness Elizer saw
Renato being guarded.20
On July 24, 1990, a medical officer of Labo, Camarines Norte issued a certificate of death of Renato
Lacson Cuao, stating as cause of death, the following:21
"Immediate cause : a. Irreversible shock due to massive hemorrhages
"Antecedent cause : b. Internal and External secondary to
"Underlying cause : c. Gunshot wound and multiple stab wounds."
On December 18, 1990, Provincial Prosecutor Pascualita Duran-Cereno filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Norte an information for murder against accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan,
Amado Belano, Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. alleging:
"That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 22, 1990, at Crossing of sitio Malisbitan, Brgy.
Exiben, municipality of Labo, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to
kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, assault, attack, stab
and shoot one RENATO CUAO alias LAPOY, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wound and
multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body, and which injuries were the proximate cause of
the death of said Renato Cuano alias Lapoy, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado
Delano are all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged, and are hereby
each sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment) (sic). The accused
are furthermore jointly and severally ordered to pay the heirs of the victim for his death the amount of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and for funeral expenses the amount of ten thousand (P10,000.00)
pesos, and considering that the deceased victim was only 27 years old when killed and applying the
formula (2/3 x [80-27] - life expectancy of the American Table of Mortality, said deceased victim has
still 44 years more to live were he not killed by the accused. Therefore, since he was employed and
receiving monthly salary of P2,000.00 his unrealized income for the 44 more years of his life
is P1,046,000.00 for which the accused likewise are jointly and severally ordered to pay.
"Considering that accused Danilo Obenis and Rufino Valera, Jr., are still at large, let an alias Warrant of
Arrest be issued against them. In the meantime, let the records of the case be archived and reinstated as
soon as they are apprehended.
"SO ORDERED."28
On October 28, 1992, the decision was promulgated. 29 However, accused Basilio M. Baybayan was not
present,30 despite due notice.31
On October 30, 1992, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of accused Basilio M.
Baybayan.32 The warrant of arrest was returned unserved as he could not be found.33
On November 11, 1992, accused Pedro G. Taliman filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.34
On May 26, 1993, we resolved to accept the appeal.35
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
22
We state at the onset that while counsel for accused represents all five accused in this appeal, the benefit
of this appeal is only accorded accused-appellants Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan 36 and Amado
B. Belano.
If in the aforecited cases, we disregarded the extra-judicial statements of the accused, how much more
must we do so now, given that it was the mayor himself, and not just the provincial attorney, that
assisted accused-appellants?
The other two accused Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr., were not arraigned. 37 Thus, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
Even assuming that the right to counsel was orally waived during custodial investigation, 43 still the
defect was not cured. The Constitution expressly provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the
presence of counsel.44This, accused-appellants did not do.
The rule on trial in absentia cannot apply to Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. In People v.
Salas,38 the Court declared that one of the requisites for trial to proceed in absentia is that the accused
had been arraigned.
Now, the merits.
Accused-appellants submit that the extra-judicial confessions on which the trial court relied were
inadmissible in evidence because they were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. 39 We
agree with accused-appellants on this point. The extra-judicial statements alone cannot be a basis for
conviction.
However, while we agree that the extra-judicial statements of the accused are inadmissible in evidence,
we find that there is still sufficient evidence to convict.
While no one saw the actual killing of Renato, circumstantial evidence proved its commission. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential, when to insist on direct testimony would set felons free. 45
Rule 133, Section 4 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence provides:46
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides:

"(a) There is more than one circumstance;
"Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waivedexcept in writing and in the presence of counsel (underscoring ours)."
Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their custodial
investigation.
In People v. Culala,40 we held that the extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant was
inadmissible as he was "assisted" by the incumbent municipal attorney. In People vs. Bandula,41 we held
that a municipal attorney could not be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. We
reasoned that as legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor
and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the
maintenance of peace and order. It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake
the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests.
Besides, lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are suspects. In many areas, even less obvious than that obtaining in the present
case, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. 42
"(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt."
In the present case, we find the following circumstances attendant:
First, Renato was last seen alive in the company of accused-appellants. This was the substance of
Elizers testimony. The trial court did not find reason not to believe him. Neither do we.
It is the trial court and not this Court that had the opportunity to observe Elizers manner of testifying,
his furtive glances, his calmness, sighs or the scant or full realization of his oath. 47 The trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to respect.48
Second, accused-appellants, two other civilians, Renato and Elizer were the only persons present at the
Nalisbitan crossing, on July 22, 1990, at five oclock in the afternoon. The place and the time are
significant. This was the very place, the very date and more or less the time of day indicated in the letter
of demand that Lacson received.49 While Renatos and Elizers presence in the area was explained, the
presence of accused-appellants in that area and during that crucial time can be only explained by the
fact that accused-appellants were the very ones demanding money from Lacson.
xxx
a. I saw, sir, Renato Cuao was taken by Mr. Taliman and Belano, sir.
"Facts or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent
with his innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court."50
xxx
q. Now, when you go back taking the same route what did you see if any?
Third, motive is apparent. Renato was first approached by accused-appellants with an oral demand.
Renato relayed the demand to Lacson.51
a. When I was on my way back taking the same route my way was blocked by Belano and Taliman
accompanied by civilian and inquired from me whether I was the driver of the jeep.
The oral demand was followed up with a written demand.52

q. What was your answer if any?
When Renato passed through the Nalisbitan crossing, he was driving Lacsons jeepney. This was the
very jeepney indicated in the letter. The letter instructed Lacson to bring money and to drive a specific
jeepney to Nalisbitan. Yet, when accused-appellants confronted Renato, he did not have the money they
demanded.
a. I denied being the driver of the jeep, sir.
The fact that Renato was the driver of the jeepney indicated in the letter can explain accused-appellants
reason for killing him.
a. I denied being the driver of the jeep because I saw already Renato Cuao on top of the hill on a cut
guarded by Baybayan with a ccivilian in their company, sir.
This conclusion is supported by Elizers testimony.1wphi1 We quote the pertinent portions:53
xxx
"q. Now, you said you were requested by Mr. Lacson to proceed to that crossing of Nalisbitan for you to
see the person who was demanding money and identified themselves as members of NPA. Were you
able to go to that place?
q. The question of this Court is why did you say that this Renato Cuao is being guarded?
q. Why did you deny being the driver of the jeep?
a. Yes, sir.
a. They are guarding Renato Cuao, sir, because that is the person they have conferred with to whom
they have relayed the demand of money and he is the driver of the jeep. He is the one who pretended to
be the driver of the jeep.
q. What time was that?
xxx
a. I reached the place more or less 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of that same date July 22, 1990, sir.
q. Now, when Amado Belano asked you whether you know Renato Cuao and you denied it, what more
did Amado Belano ask you if any?
q. What did you do when you reached that Nalisbitan Crossing?

a. Upon reaching the place at the crossing of Nalisbitan I have talked with Renato Cuao who asked
where I was going. I have not confided to him that I was doing surveillance work on the person
demanding money from Ernesto Lacson and so I proceeded. I walked and upon reaching a point I have
seen Basilio Naybayan in the company of two (2) civilians and I continued with my walk and ahead of
them I saw Mr. Taliman with Belano and I did not notice that I was followed by Mr. Renato Cuao.
a. Amado Belano further made a statement that it is better for them to take along that man, referring to
Renato Cuao, because Renato Cuao might be acting as a lookout."
The letter54 provided that "no one else should know" 55 about the demand. Thus, Renatos presence
would naturally alarm accused-appellants.
Motive is a key element when establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence. 56 Coupled with
enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was
the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.57
Fourth, Renatos corpse was discovered in the same place where he was held and guarded by accusedappellants.58
Fifth is the facts of death of Renato, which is the corpus delicti of the crime.
However, while Renatos death in the hands of accused-appellants was proven, we find that the manner
of killingwas not so evidenced. There was no showing of treachery.
Treachery exists when the accused employs means, methods, and forms which directly and specially
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.59 Treachery, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.60
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte, Branch 40, Daet, dated
September 24, 1992 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Pedro G. Taliman,
Basilio M. Baybayab and Amado B. Belano are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE,
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and in the absence of any
modifying circumstance, are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Accused-appellants are jointly and severally ordered to pay the heirs of Renato Cuao, moral damages
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and civil indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00). The award of actual damages for funeral expenses and unrealized income is
DELETED.
The case is archived as to accused Danilo Obenis and Rufino Valera, Jr., until their arrest and
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Costs against accused-appellants.
In the absence of proof as to how the killing was perpetrated, the crime committed was homicide.
61
SO ORDERED.
The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period. 62 The Indeterminate Sentence
Law applies.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Renato Cuao one million forty six thousand pesos (P1,046,000.00)
as actual damages for unrealized income. We delete this award as it is not supported by receipts. The
testimony of Renatos father as to how much Renato was earning at the time of his death is self-serving
and hearsay.
The trial courts award of actual damages for funeral expenses in the amount of ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos is likewise deleted. The claim is not supported by any receipt. The rule is that every
pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence before it may be awarded. 63
An award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is proper.64 Renatos
father testified that because of his sons death, he felt "great pain" and his wife suffered some "sleepless
nights" and "cried for several days."65
The trial courts award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for wrongful death is
affirmed. This can be awarded without need of proof other than the death of the victim.66
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133188
As presented by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:

July 23, 2004
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, appellant.
THE
appellee,
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession.
This appeal particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be
considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging appellant with Murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996, about 2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a bladed instrument (tres
cantos), with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez
Tatoy, by stabbing her with said bladed instrument, hitting her on the vital parts of her body, thereby
inflicting upon her physical injuries causing:
"CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK & HEMORRHAGE SEC. TO STAB
WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK (POSTERIOR ASPECT)"
as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge,2 and trial thereafter ensued.
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecutions evidence, aside from appellants
extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin @ Hapon, together
with Rico and Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo, were drinking "Red Horse" beer in
Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the group at around 1:00 in the morning, saying he has a
headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to Lorega proper. A few minutes later,
they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard Jaquelyn 3 Tatoy, her goddaughter, asking
for help. Isogan got two flashlights and they proceeded upstairs to Jaquelyns house. The first to go up
was a certain Moises, followed by the brothers Rico and Romy Magdasal, while Noel and Cardo
remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge and the "walling" of the main door were damaged, as
if it were kicked open, and only the light in the kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the
stairs and another in thesala, which he claims belong to appellant. When they went into the kitchen,
they saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up on the floor, with her head inside a plastic container.
Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later found a tres cantos with blood
on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified to be appellants. 4 A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes
and tres cantos for safekeeping which were later turned over to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide
Section, Ramos Police Station. The person who turned over the objects to Policeman Tariao was not
identified.5
At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius Yosores and Armando
Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of the information given by Rico Magdasal
that the shoes andtres cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to appellant. Together with Rico,
they went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily staying, and found him
sleeping. Appellant was wearing a bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods told appellant that he is a
suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato
Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the shirt he was wearing and he told them that it was in
Wilson Magdasals house. It was Edgar Magdasal who found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the
soiled clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his tanods to take appellant to the police station. 6
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario Monilar
of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his constitutional
rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan,
the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter told him that he
will be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon, he conferred
with appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told him that
appellant was ready to give his statement.7 Appellants extrajudicial confession, which was taken down
completely in the Cebuano dialect,8 reads:
Pasiuna: Mr. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, pahibaloon ko ikaw nga ubos sa atong batakang balaod
(Constitution) aduna kay katungod nga pahibaloon sa imong mga katungod, sama sa imong katungod sa
pagpakahilum, ingon man duna kay katungod sa pagdamgop/pagpilig sa abogado o manlalaban aron
motabang kanimo niining maong imbestighasyon nga may kalabutan sa kamatayon ni Jaqueline Tatoy
niadtong mga alas 2:30 sa kaadlawon kapin kongkulang niadtong petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembra 1996,
didto sa Brgy Lorega proper, Siyudad sa Sugbo. Kong ugaling dili ka maka-abot pagbayad o
pagpangitago abogado aron motabang kanimo karon, ako isip negrepresenttar sa Estado mohatag akong
abogado kanimo. Nasabtan ba kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ka ang akong katungod?
Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo ug kasamtangan nga nagpuyo sa Brgy Lorega proper duol sa
kapilaya San Roque apan ako lumad nga taga Bo. Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu diin didto ano nakatungha sa
grade six.
Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, diin ka man?
Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang kauba ko sa pag-inom si Rico Magdasal
didito sa Brgy Lorega Proper ug taodtaod niadto nilakaw ako libot sa sitio Itom Tuta ug dayon nakong
saka sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy sa Brgy Lorega nianang pagka mga alas 2:20 sa maong
petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa akong tuyo sa pagkawat sa ilang colored nga TV.
Pangutana: Pahabloon ko usab ikaw nga sumala usab sa atong Batakang Balaod, anfg tanan nga imong
isulti karon dinhi, mahimong magamit ebedensya pabor o batok kanimo sa bisan asaing husgado sa
atong nasud. Nasabtan be usab kini nimo?
Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga colored?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ko usab kanang taan.
Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa ilang TV, diin ka man punta deretso.
Pangutana: Tinuod ba gayod nga nasabtan pag-ayo nimo anf mao nimong mga katungod ug anadam ka
ba nga moperma karon dinhi timailhan sa imong tina-aw nga nga pagsabut? ingon man andam ka ba sa
pagsulti sa matuod walay lain kon kili ang matuod lamang gayud?
Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang ilang TV.
Tubag: O
Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si Jaqueline Tatoy nga naghidga sa ilang
may terrace ug nidagan siya padulong sa kusina nila ug diha-diha akong siyang ginsunod, gilayog ug
gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi sa akong tres kantps nga hinagiban (Gidtudo ni Eliza rang Tres Kantos
nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas nga Jaqueline Tatoy).
Tubag: Oo, andam ako nga mpemar Sir ug ania karon dinhi ai Atty Parawan ang among Brgy Captain
nga maoy akong giisip nga abogado nga akong pinili nga maoy motabang kanako karon. Aron sa
pagmatuod, ako kining pirmahan ning ika petsa 16 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996.
Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored TV.
Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo anf maong TV?
Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?

...
Pangutana: Sunlion ko, andama bas a pagsulti sa matuod Elizar Tomaquin kon dili ang matuod lamang
gayud? Ingon man andam ka ba nga modawat sa resulta o linugdangan niini?
Tubag: Oo, andam gyud ako.
Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan nga circumstacia o rmay kalambigitan
sa imong pagkatawo, sa imong grado, imong trabaho, imong pinuy-anan ug uban pa?
Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o apelyedo sa akong mama sanglit dili man
kasado and akong mama ug papa. Ang apelyedo sa akong papa, Cabagui ug and akon angga Hapon.
Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko makahinumdom kon diin to siya maigo. Basta
manadaghan to nako siya dunggaba ginamit ko ang akong Tres kantos.
Pangutana: Gawas nga imo to siyang gidunggab, wala ba nimo pahimudsi and iyang pagkapbabye o
wala ka bay plano sa pag rape kaniya niadtong higayona?
Tubag: Wala gyud to nako siya pahimudsi og wala gyud koy tuyo sa pag rape niya. Ang ako ra gyud nga
tuyo mao ra gyud and pagkawat sa ilang TV apan kay nisiyagit man siyang nakaila man kayo siya nako,
nahadlok kong mahibaw-an sa ako untang pagkawat sa ilang TV, hinungdan nga ako siyang gilayog ug
gidunggab makadaghan.
Pangutana: Nganog nakahibawo or nakaila ka man nga si Jaqueline Tatoy tong naisiyagit ug imong
gidunggab?
Tubag: Duna ma hayag nga suga sa elektresidad sa ilang may kusina.
Pangutana: Kaila ba nimong daan si Jaqueline Tatoy?
Tubag: Wala na akoy ikadugang pagsulti ni bakwion ba hinnon. Nao kana ang tanan.
Pangutana: Andam ka ba pagperme niini sa pagmatuod nga wlay tawo nga nagpugos, naghulga, nagsaad
ug gnate o nag hadlok ba hinoon kon dili sa imong kaugalingon nga kabubut-on lamang.
Tubag: Oo, andam ako pageram. Aron matuoron kining tanan kini akong permaahn ning petsa 16 sa
Diusyembre 1996, Siyudad Sugbo, Pilipinas.9
Tubag: Oo, Sir ka saw ala pa ang among hitabo permi man kong nagtan-awan sa ilang TV.
Pangutana: Human nim dunggaba si Jaqueline Tatoy unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat?
Tubag: Dihang sa akong pagtoo nga patay na siya, ako naidagan agi sa pultahan nga akong gisikaran
dayon kanaog subay sa hagdan didto nabiyaan nako ang akong sapatos.
Pangutana: Diin ka man paduiong dagan?
Tubag: Didto ako padulong sa akong gipuya-an sa ilang Wilson Magdasal sa maong Brgy.
Pangutana: Unya unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat og nahibaw-an?
Tubag: Niadtong hapon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, didtoy mga Brgy Tanods sa balay ni
Wilson Magdasal diin ila akong gipangutaan tali sa maong hitabo og igo lan ako nitudlo sa akong white
Slave shirt nga akong gihumulan ug tubig sa planggana sa tumong nga makuha ang mansa sa dugo nga
pinisik sa akong paggdunggab patay ni Jaqueline Tatoy.
Pangutana: Ngano ug unsa may diay kalabutan niadtong maong slaveless white shirt nimo?
Tubag: Mao na ang akong gisul-ob dihang akog kawaton unta ang TV nila ni Jaqueline ug sa iyang
pagsiyagit ako siyang gidunggab-dunggab patay. (Elizar Yomaquin postivo nga nitudlo ug niangkon sa
maong whitel sleve less shirt)
Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha didto so hagdan sa balay nila ni
Jaqueline Tatoy human siya nakit-i nga patay, unsa may imong ikasulti niini?
Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang hagdan human sa hitabo ug gain sa
akong pagdagan akong napatiran kadtong ilang container.
Pangutana: Sa pagkakaron, wala na akoy ipangutana kanimo. Ikay aduna ka pa bay ikasul ti o bakwion
ba hinoon sa mao nimong gipamahayag nga naglangkob sa duha ka pahina lakip niining maong pahina?
On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico Magdasal and three
other persons. His version of the incident is that it was Rico who committed the crime and not him.
Appellant testified that Rico asked his help in stealing the television set from the Tatoys residence.
When Jacquelyn saw them, she ran towards the kitchen but she did not reach it as Rico had stabbed her
on the back with the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who owns the tres cantos, as well as
the pair of shoes, left inside Tatoys house. Afraid of what happened, appellant went home to Wilson
Magdasals house and slept there. He was awakened the next morning by barangay tanod Julius
Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also boxed and poked a gun at him. Appellant claims that Rico and
Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the presence of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he
was brought to the latters house. He was made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a
family while he is single.10
Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked him to
sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help him with his
expenses.11
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for brevity) rendered its decision on
October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, accused Elizar Tomaquin is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPERTUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of Jaquelyn Tatoy in the
sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused is, however, credited in full during the whole
period of his detention provided he will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and
regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this appeal.
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED
ON HIS UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION;
2. THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) GAVE FULL CREDENCE AND
FULL FAITH ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;13
Appellants extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano dialect. Rule
132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents written in an unofficial
language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or
Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial.
The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than the
official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by the
official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original
and translation sent to this court.14 In this case, there is no official translation of appellants extrajudicial
confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the rule, then
appellants extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted by the trial court as evidence for the
prosecution.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the parties and the
judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano
in which the document was written,15 such extrajudicial confession was appropriately considered by the
trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato Parawan, is admissible in evidence against
him. There is no need at this point to secure an official translation of the confession to English.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric.
It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.16
As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of Barangay
Lorega, Cebu City. Under the 1991 Local Government Code, a barangay captain performs the following
duties and functions:
(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such powers
and perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general welfare of
the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;
...
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor
and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions; . . .17
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in
his barangayand ensure peace and order at all times.
In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall be deemed as such. In
applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board,
or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall
also be deemed a person in authority.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel of
appellant.
In People vs. Culala,18 the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot be an independent
counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the
mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the
maintenance of peace and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. Thus, the Court held that he is no better
than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.19
Q What transpired during that conversation with the accused.
This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman,20 and People vs. Velarde,21 where we further ruled that a
municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution.
Q And may we know what did he answer?
A I asked him. Are you going to get me as your lawyer?
A Yes, Cap. Okay Cap.

Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawans role as a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping
officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal
assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could
not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial
confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel,
one who will effectively undertake his clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest. 22
Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An
"effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As held in People vs. Velarde:23
. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview,
counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to
remain silent or terminate the interview.24
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation
to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional
rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.25
The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant cannot be fittingly described as effective and
vigilant. As testified by Atty. Parawan, hereinbelow quoted verbatim, this was what transpired when he
went to the Ramos police station to assist appellant during the investigation:
Q What happened when you arrived at the Ramos Police Station at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon
of December 16, 1996?
A I go (sic) to the room where Policeman Monilar and the accused and had a conversation with the
accused.
Q When you said "Cap" what did he mean by that word "Cap."
A Being a Barangay Captain.
Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of choice. What did you do next if any?
A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the implication of your admission, you
will be imprisoned.
Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his confession that could be because of
that confession. What was his reaction?
A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: "Because of this confession you will be imprisoned."
Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would execute that affidavit of confession he
would surely be imprisoned?
A No I even continue that "why did he do that?"
Q And what did he answer?
A He answered to me that he was drunk at that time.
Q And so what transpired next?
A So I told him are you willing now to give your confession, then policeman Monilar went inside the
room and we had that investigation.
Q Now how was the investigation of the accused done?
A It was made in a question and answer form.
Q And in what language were the questions framed?
or explain to appellant the questions being propounded by SPO2 Monilar. He did not even bother to ask
appellant if the extrajudicial confession he was about to execute was being voluntarily given.
A In the vernacular, vesaya.

Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his own testimony
that he already suspected appellant as having committed the crime when the latter was brought to his
house by thebarangay tanods, viz.:
Q What did you do during the question and answer form of investigation?
A I just observed them.
Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession was over?
Q Being an attorney naturally your first question to your arresting tanods was where was he arrested and
how was he arrested and what is the reason why he was arrested. Correct?
A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my Barangay.
A Yes.
...
...
Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an Attorney did you immediately inquire
what had happened before you arrived like; Did you start the investigation? did you inquire from that
from Mr. Monilar?
Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the Barangay Tanods could explain to you
the circumstances of his arrest you already started to ask questions like; Why did you have blood in
your pants. Where is your t-shirt you wore. Where did you get that information since you were not in
the house of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?
A He was already preparing this top portion here.

A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds. So when I saw blood stains
with all probability it might come from the victim. It was conclusion something like when I saw that tshirt stained with blood.
INTERPRETER:
Q Witness pointing to the upper portion of the certification up to the signature to that portion above the
names typewritten thereon.
...
Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top most portion to that portion
immediately right before the typewritten name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty. Fortunato Parawan you were
not around. Correct?
26
A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with Monilar.
Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the morning of December 16, 1996.
When appellant intimated that he was willing to confess and requested the presence of Atty. Parawan,
SPO2 Monilar called up Atty. Parawan and informed him of appellants decision. Atty. Parawan arrived
at the Ramos Police Station only at 2:00 in the afternoon. 27 By the time Atty. Parawan arrived, the
investigation had already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked and elicited information from
appellant. Worse, Atty. Parawan merely "observed" during the entire investigation and failed to advise
Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the conclusion of mine (sic) that Elizar Tomaquin
one of your constituents in the Barangay was already on your conclusion in mine (sic) the killer of
Jacquilyn Tatoy before your tanods turned it over to the police for investigation. Is that what you are
telling Atty. Parawan?
A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring him to the Homicide.28
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellants rights as
an accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of
the crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it.
It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawans qualification as a competent and
independent counsel because he was his choice.
As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, "(A)ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations
should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning, but the
word "preferably" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling his defense.29 What is imperative is that the counsel should be competent and independent.
That appellant chose Atty. Parawan does not estop appellant from complaining about the latters failure
to safeguard his rights.
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and competent counsel as
required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, even if gospel
truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was the barangay captain of Brgy. Lorega
where appellant resides, and apparently, appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his rights. The latter,
however, fell short in tending to the trust reposed on him. Appellant did not finish Grade 1 and does not
know how to read and write.30 As between him and Atty.
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the sufficiency of
extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole basis for convicting
accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality and ruthlessness, the impulse to find
the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to take shortcuts and disregard constitutional
and legal safeguards intended to bring about a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are
punished. Our courts, in the process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central
role in bringing about this assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered by law
enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the Constitution. If the
standards are not met, the Constitution provides the corresponding remedy by providing a strict
exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of (Article III,
Section 12(1) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."
Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellants predicament, Atty. Parawan
should have known better and exercised his sound judgment before conceding to appellants choice. But
it did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as appellants counsel and instead, he even let
appellant go through the investigation and execute the extrajudicial confession knowing fully well that
he was biased as regards appellants innocence. Quoted verbatim, Atty. Parawan testified thus:
Q Atty. Parawan comparing yourself to the accused who is a graduate of Batchelor (sic) of Law
compared to your constituent who is jobless, illiterate [and] of low intelligence. The question is this: It
did not occur to your mine (sic) to inhibit yourself despite the request by telling the accused as barangay
Captain there could be a conflict of interest and bias that I would not be in (sic) effective counsel or
assistance to you. Did it not occur toy our mine (sic) or not?
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People vs.
Deniega,32 stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet the exacting
standards of the Constitution:
Without appellants extrajudicial confession, the prosecutions case now teeters precariously on
circumstantial evidence, namely:
(1) Rico Magdasals testimony that:
A It did not occur to my nime (sic).
(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of December 16, 1996;
...
(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyns residence belongs to appellant; and
Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you assist a suspect in the police station
and the circumstances he was arrested the best assistance a lawyer could give is would be to tell the
accused to remain silent. Would you agree?
(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and white sando shirt on the night of the crime, which
blood-stained shirt was found among the soiled clothes in Wilson Magdasals house;
...
A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time.31
(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendozas testimony that

appellants sando shirt and the tres cantos was of human origin.33
the
blood
stains
on
These circumstances, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate positively and convincingly that it was
appellant who killed Jaquelyn.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict
if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.34 As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilty.35
The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person.
For one, appellants act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning does not establish
appellants whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. There is nothing in the testimony of Rico
Magdasal and the other prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant indeed went to Jaquelyns
house after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her residence. If at all, what was proved is
that appellant was found by the barangay tanods sleeping at home in the afternoon of the same day.
Added to that is the prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody of these valuable pieces of
evidence.
Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes and tres cantos were given to
a certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later turned over to a Policeman Tariao of the Ramos Police
Station. Zabate, however, did not identify the person who turned over the objects to the police. 36 There
was no showing who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was not presented to identify if
these were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyns house and turned over to the
police. Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness stand so as to confirm if those articles were the
same evidence turned over to him and later presented in court. Ordinarily, it would not be indispensable
for the prosecution to allege and prove every single fact of the case. But in this case, the pieces of
evidence are crucial to the prosecutions case. Also, the fact that a civilian obtained and received the
evidence, the possibility that the integrity of these articles could have been compromised cannot be
ignored. The Court even noted that during his direct examination, SPO2 Monilar was confused as to
whether the pair of shoes presented in court was the same ones that were turned over to the police. It
turned out that the marking he made on the shoes were washed off because at one time, the shoes fell in
the canal located in front of the police station and they had to clean and wash the shoes! 37 Such sloppy
handling renders the chain of custody of those pieces of evidence dubious, and damaging to the
prosecutions case.
And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that it was found in the scene of
the crime merely proved that he was in the residence of Jaquelyn at some point in time. But it does not
prove when particularly he was there, his authorship of the crime or his motive for being
there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not being an
element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence of the commission
of the crime is purely circumstantial.38
The prosecutions evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellants guilt is mainly the
testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however, is uncorroborated. The rule is that the testimony
of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such testimony positively establishes the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.39 Moreover, the doctrine of long standing that the testimony of
a lone witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused applies only to eyewitnesses.
Thus, an uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the
evidence itself is in serious doubt.40Ricos lone testimony is not sufficient to establish appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
In addition, appellant vehemently denied Ricos allegations. According to appellant, it was Rico who
actually owns the pair of shoes and tres cantos; that it was he who bid appellant to go to the Tatoys
residence and lift their TV set; and that it was Rico who stabbed Jaquelyn. Considering appellants
denial and his different version of the incident, it became incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut
appellant's allegations with further evidence to corroborate the statement of Rico. It must be noted that
there were other persons present during their drinking spree, namely, Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and
a certain Cardo. These persons could have been presented as witnesses to back up Ricos claim but the
prosecution did not do so. Rico testified that appellant owned the tres cantos found by the stairs; but
Rico also stated he only "heard" that the tres cantos was found by the stairs.41Who found the tres
cantos that was supposed to have been used to stab Jaquelyn? The neighbor who allegedly found it by
the stairs was not presented in court to identify if the tres cantos presented by the prosecution was the
alleged weapon in the stabbing of Jaquelyn. Such failure of the prosecution to corroborate the material
points of Ricos testimony weakened their case.
The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the white sando shirt that appellant was
allegedly wearing at the time of stabbing Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal later found bloodstained
among the soiled clothes.
First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he was wearing, he told them
that it was in Wilson Magdasals house. According to barangay tanod Armando Zabate, it was Edgar
Magdasal who found the shirt, "somewhat wet and bloody," among the soiled clothes. 42 Edgar
Magdasal, however, was not presented to testify as to where he found the shirt, the state the shirt was in
when he found it, and how he knew that it was the shirt worn by appellant.
Second, Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza testified that the bloodstains on
appellants sando shirt, as well as the tres cantos, were human blood.43 Mendoza, however, did not
conduct further tests to ascertain the type of blood found on these pieces of evidence nor did he match it
with the victims blood type,44 hence, it does not connect the bloodstains to the herein victim. In People
vs. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant and found positive
of type O blood has no probative value since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not taken
for purposes of comparison.45
The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres cantos.
Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven. Proof of the
guilt of the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity. Although appellants defense is weak,
conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from the weakness of the
defense. In this case, the prosecutions evidence is not strong enough to justify a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.46 Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
WHEREFORE,
appellant
Elizar
Tomaquin
is
hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant unless
he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of his release, or the
ground for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice of herein decision.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The others remained at
large.
G.R. No. 97936 May 29, 1995

Trial proceeded only as against the three.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand up for
themselves. Thus, it protected those under custodial investigation with the all-important right to counsel.
We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the scales of justice. For denial of
his right to counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another , did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one DR. DEMETRIO
Z. MADRID, in the manner as follows: on the date and in the place aforementioned, the said accused,
one armed with handgun, pursuant to their conspiracy blocked the way of the said complainant who was
on board a Mercedez Benz crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of) Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, this
City, and did then and there, by means of violence and intimidation against persons, take, rob and carry
away his cash money amounting to P6,600.00; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat, worth
P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth P155,000.00; one (1) 3 karat gold ring worth P80,000.00;
one 2 karat gold ring, domino style, worth P27,000.00; one (1) solid gold bracelet worth 363,600.00,
Philippine Currency, belonging to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended party in the total amount aforementioned; that on the occasion of the robbery and
pursuant to their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and taking advantage the(ir)
superior strength, with the use of handgun, shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the
said offended party, thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which resulted to the
insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of said LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such amount as may be awarded to them under
the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law. 1
The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private complainant DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID
spent the night at his boarding house, located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street, Bago-Bantay, Quezon City. He
wanted to return that night to his residence at Project 6, Quezon City. However, his driver, Lorenzo
Bernales, advised him not to leave that night for Bernales overheard that the group of Balbino and
Bienvenido Echavez would rob him on his way home. He heeded the advice.
It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again asked his driver to bring him to his main
residence in Project 6, Quezon City. While traversing Road 14, a gray-reddish car overtook the
Mercedes Benz he was riding and blocked their way. Three (3) men swiftly alighted from the car
blocking them and barged into his Benz. The first grabbed the driver's seat and pushed his driver to the
other side of the seat. The second occupied the right side of his driver. The third sat beside Dr. Madrid at
the back sent and punched him. Simultaneously, the man at the right side of his driver pulled out his gun
and announced a hold-up. 2
The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch, studded with diamonds,
worth P155,000.00, a three (3) carat diamond ring worth P80,000.00, another two (2) carat domino-style
ring, surrounded with diamonds worth P27,000.00, a necklace worth P27,000.00, a bracelet worth
P50,000.00, and his wallet containing P6,600.00. 3
After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the malefactors stopped his car and alighted.
The worst came. The man at the right side of his driver shot the latter at the chest before fleeing. Dr.
Madrid and his driver were rushed by concerned citizens to the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Two hours
later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound he sustained. 4 Dr. Madrid
survived. 5 He reported the incident to the Quezon City police. When no action was taken on his case, he
filed his complaint with the Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS). 6
Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the Special Operations Group headed by
Capt. Raul Boac, after a surveillance of the suspects, interrogated Bienvenido Echavez in Camp Crame.
Two days later, they apprehended Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. They turned them over to the
Investigation Department of the CIS. 7
Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared that even
before the investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that he was
the one who shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid. 8
In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, Pursal
informed that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer. 9 In due time, Atty. Diosdado
Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer who
was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to
where Lucero was.
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He explained
to Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any statement to the
investigators, and that even if he has already given a statement, he may refuse to sign it. He observed no
reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his
advice.
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. When the investigator started
asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt. Emilio
Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need, he could be reached at his residence.
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The
extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by
Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined Exhibit "C" and explained to
Lucero its Legal implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily. Lucero
replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then signed Exhibit "C". 10
complainant. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS agent brought him to a clinic inside Camp Crame. The
doctor saw the contusions on his body. He advised that he be treated. The CIS agent refused and they
left the clinic.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he
only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times
before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "C") 11 under duress. He denied
engaging the services of Atty. Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during
his actual custodial interrogation.12
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court,
however, convicted accused Lucero. The dispositive portion of the Decision 13 reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA
are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence; and
2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide. Alejandro Lucero is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7, 1988, he was at his house in Caloocan
City. He woke up at 6:30 a.m., stayed at his house the whole day repairing the upholstery of a
customer's chair. He was then with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and his wife Mylen Lucero. He worked
until 5 p.m. that day.
Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2) months after the commission of the crime.
He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his
house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was He was
blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police
officers. Later, he identified one of the men to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS Special Operations
Group.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed
of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the
On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of the deceased victim
Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages
for the mental anguish suffered by his family; and b) to pay Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid the sum of
P363,600.00 representing the cash money, and money value of the jewelries and wristwatch he lost due
to the robbery at bar.
SO ORDERED. 14
Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of error:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCES (SIC) OF
THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT, NOT CREDIBLE, UNRELIABLE,
DOUBTFUL AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S CONVICTION
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

ALLEGED CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT
CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS CASE.
point, Dr. Madrid said he could identify two of the malefactors. 16 In his affidavit, Dr. Madrid presented
he could identify all three. 17 Appellant's conviction cannot be made to rest on this nebulous
identification by Dr. Madrid.
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (MADE
IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION) WHICH WAS OBTAINED THRU FORCE, VIOLENCE AND
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE OR ENGAGED BY ANY
PERSON ON HIS BEHALF OR APPOINTED BY THE LOWER COURT AND THEREFORE
SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.
Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial confession.
4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME

CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY THE PROSECUTION.
5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF HIS DEFENSE OF
ALIBI AND NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE; AND INSPITE OF
THE LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
6. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND NOT
ACQUITTING HIM LIKE HIS CO-ACCUSED AND ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS [THE
ECHAVEZ BROTHERS] OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
We find the appeal meritorious.
The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the complainant, and
(b) his extra-judicial confession admitting his participation in the crime. We find that the evidence
proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.
Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who identified
appellant, is seriously open to doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record that appellant had to participate
at the police line-upfour (4) times before he was finally identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no reason for
the ambivalence. The robbery took place in broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no mask.
They drove them around for three (3) hours. Considering these circumstances, there is no reason for Dr.
Madrid's failure to immediately identify appellant.
We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. Madrid during the trial. Initially, Dr.
Madrid claimed that he could identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold-up. 15 At another
The 1987 Constitution 18 requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should
be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and
fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. 19We take pride in constitutionalizing this right
to counsel even while other countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We
have sustained the inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without any apology.
The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Indeed, it did not
impose a rigorous respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was "substantial" compliance with the
requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the intent of the Constitution. The records show that
Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second
night of appellant's detention. More exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked
with appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant
although his impression was that appellant understood him. 20 Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the
custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a
friend. His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under
custodial interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense. It was during his absence that
appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled confession for the next
day, appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of these
agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it
voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of the confession. Atty.
Peralta was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel was not infringed. We
disagree.
We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel
but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at bench clearly demonstrate that
appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. In People v. De Guzman, 21 we held that in
custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when
the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from
the accused. In this case, at the crucial point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left
appellant to attend the wake of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled extrajudicial a confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was unprotected from mischief cannot
convict.
Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak defense.
Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Given the uncertainty of appellant's identification and the
inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession, there is no thread of evidence to criminally inculpate
appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City , Branch CIII, convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of robbery with homicide is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
group which took down the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises, but he did not recognize the
three (3) other crewmembers.
G.R. No. 102786 August 14, 1998

ALEJANDRO
B.
DE
LA
TORRE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 18, 1991, which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finding petitioner Alejandro B. de la
Torre guilty of qualified theft and sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month,
and 11 days, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day, as maximum, and ordering him to indemnify the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO), the offended party, in the amount of P41,786.000.
The facts are as follows:
Based on the statements of Alexander Manalo, Felino Olegario, Edgar Enopia, and Danilo Garcia,
Assistant City Prosecutor Demetrio Macapagal filed on July 13, 1989 an information charging petitioner
de la Torre with Qualified Theft as defined in Arts. 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
That on or about the 11th day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, ALEJANDRO DELA TORRE Y BERNAL, being then employed as leadman of a
5-men service crew of linemen of MERALCO, with grave abuse of confidence, in conspiracy with his
co-accused JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and CHARLES DOE, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the
following properties owned by the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) which were installed at the
premises of the CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL AND SMELTING CORPORATION (CAPASSCO), located
at No. 292 P. dela Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, this City, customers of the aforesaid
MERALCO, to wit:
In the afternoon of April 18, 1989, Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO assigned to
inspect six electric meters installed in the premises of the Cathay Pacific Steel and Smelting
Corporation (CAPASSCO) on De la Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, discovered
that the said electric meters were missing. He reported the loss to the MERALCO office in Ortigas
Avenue, Pasig City. On April 20,1989, Manalo and Felino Olegario, also of MERALCO, gave
statements to the Northern Police District at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City regarding
the loss of the electric meters. They suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have damaged the
electric meters while tampering with them and that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have
removed the electric meters. They expressed suspicion that MERALCO personnel were involved.
One (1) GE Type C-9,
Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded to the scene of the crime and
inquired from people he saw there if they had seen the electric meters being taken down from the post
near the gate of CAPASSCO. According to Enopia, one of those he asked, Danilo Garcia, said he had
seen at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989 four crewmembers in a MERALCO service truck, with the
number 522 painted on its side, removing the electric meters. Acting on this lead, Enopia asked
MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of whom turned out to be petitioner de la Torre. It appears
that MERALCO service truck number 522 had specific crewmembers assigned to it.
120 volts, Co. No. 41 GD-558 2,870.94
On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD headquarters for investigation. They were
included in a line-up of eight (8) persons. Garcia pointed to petitioner de la Torre as the leader of the
D4A-2, 3 phase, Co. No. 41D4AW-92 4,997.06
120 volts, Co. No. 42GRM-219 P13,025.00

One (1) GE Type VW-63-A,
120 volts, Co. No. 41G208 4,997.06
One (1) GE Type V-63-A,
One (1) GE Type G-9,

139 volts, 3 phase, No. 42GRIM 1091 13,025.00
One (1) WH Type
One (1) Reactive Meter,

No. 41CA-34 2,870.94

with an aggregate value of P41,786.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, represented by FELINO R. OLEGARIO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
The case was raffled to Branch 92 of the RTC of Quezon City, presided over by Judge Pacita CaizaresNye. Trial was held from December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. In a decision rendered on March 16,
1990, Judge Caizares-Nye, relying heavily on the testimony of Garcia, found petitioner de la Torre
guilty of Qualified Theft and thus sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month,
and 11 days of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum; and
ordered him to pay MERALCO the amount of P41,786.00.
Petitioner de la Torre appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending first, that his constitutional rights
were violated during the custodial investigation conducted in the case; second, that the RTC erred when
it admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when the same were not formally
offered; third, that the RTC took into account hearsay evidence in arriving at its judgment; and fourth,
that the uncorroborated testimony of Garcia was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. However, the Court of Appeals 2 affirmed the lower court's decision. 3 The Court of Appeals
subsequently denied reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
First. Petitioner de la Torre alleges violation of his constitutional rights under Art. III, 12 (1) of the
Constitution which provides that "any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
Petitioner de la Torre claims he was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have the assistance
of counsel during the investigation conducted on July 4, 1989 at the NPD headquarters, where the
crewmembers of MERALCO service truck number 522 were presented in a police line-up. He further
invokes the exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same 12 that "any confession or admission obtained in
violation of [this rule] shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
In Gamboa v. Cruz, 4 this Court ruled that "no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the
right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of
counsel." 5 However, this applies only from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions
for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information from the accused. A police lineup is not considered part of any custodial inquest because it is conducted before that stage is reached. 6
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other crewmembers of MERALCO truck
number 522, was merely included in a line-up of eight (8) persons from which he was picked out by
Garcia as the leader of the group which had removed the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises.
Until then, the police investigation did not focus on petitioner. Indeed, no questions were put to him.
Rather, the questions were directed to witnesses of the complainant. There is, therefore, no basis for
petitioner's allegations that his rights as a suspect in a custodial interrogation were violated.
Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses when the fact is that before they testified, their testimonies were not formally offered as
required by Rule 132, 35 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, as held in People v. Java: 7
. . . Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to be considered, it
should be formally offered and the purpose specified. . . .
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became effective on July 1,
1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of the trial after all the witnesses
had testified. With the innovation, the court is put on notice whether the witness to be presented is a
material witness and should be heard, or a witness who would be testifying on irrelevant matters or on
facts already testified to by other witnesses and should, therefore, be stopped from testifying further.
. . . Sec. 36 of the aforementioned rule requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of
a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no
objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first
time on appeal will not be considered. 8
Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of Appeals. He thus waived his objection by his
failure to raise it at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence in the trial court. As already
noted, the trial in this case took place from December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. That was after the
adoption of the new rule which required that the offer be made at the beginning of the testimony of a
witness. Petitioner should have invoked this rule and objected to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, if not before each of their testimonies, then at least at the time their testimonies were
formally offered at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence. Not having done so, he
must be deemed to have waived his objection based on this ground. Consequently, the trial court
committed no error in considering the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in its decision despite
the fact that such testimonies had not been offered before they were given.
Third. Petitioner claims that, in violation of the hearsay rule, written statements pertaining to disputed
facts were considered by the trial court in its decision without presenting the declarants at the trial for
examination.
Rule 132, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally." The reason for this rule is two-fold: to afford the judge the opportunity of observing the
demeanor of the witness and to allow the adverse party a chance of cross-examining him.
Although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party's counsel,
it is nonetheless without probative value. The explanation for this is given in People v. Valero, thus: 9
down the six electric meters from the MERALCO post at the CAPASSCO compound. According to
Garcia, he noticed the Meralco truck parked below the Meralco post outside the CAPASSCO gate. The
truck was equipped with a crane-like structure to which was attached a basket in which two men rode.
The basket was raised toward the Meralco post while two or three men remained on the ground next to
the Meralco truck. One man was giving instructions to the men removing the meters. Garcia recognized
the truck to be that of Meralco because of its familiar orange color. Thus, he testified:
Q: While conversing with your friends at a sidewalk beside CAPASSCO, did you observe any unusual
incident?
A: There is, sir.
Q: Could you please tell us what is this unusual incident that you observed?
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out
of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In this case, documents material to the guilt of the accused were admitted without the prosecution
presenting in court those who executed them, to wit: Exhibit M, certification signed by a certain G.B.
Pilapil, Jr., which states that MERALCO did not send out any personnel to inspect the electrical
installations at CAPASSCO during the period April 11, 1989 to April 12, 1989; Exhibit N, certification
issued by one Vitaliano A. Dizon, which states that MERALCO did not receive any complaint from
CAPASSCO concerning the electric meters in question during the same period; and Exhibit P,
certification given by a certain E.M. Lopez, Jr., stating that MERALCO did not authorize any of its
employees to remove the subject electric meters.
These documents contain statements of facts and, therefore, those who made them should have been
presented in court so that they could be cross-examined by the defense. Otherwise, whatever matter they
contain is hearsay and, consequently, without probative value.
Fourth. We likewise agree with the final point raised by petitioner, namely, that the evidence for the
prosecution at the trial is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court
convicted petitioner solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Danilo Garcia.
Garcia claimed that at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989, while he was waiting for his wife in front of
the CAPASSCO compound on P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, he saw
petitioner supervising the other crewmembers of a MERALCO service truck number 522 in bringing
A: Yes, sir, a MERALCO truck was parked and the basket was being raised to the post.
Q: And could you please tell us what happened after the basket was raised to the post, Mr. Witness?
A: While the basket was being raised to the post with two (2) men on board, another one was giving
instructions from below.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the adjustment of the basket, what happened, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, they opened the box that was attached to the wall of CAPASSCO while the other one was
tampering the meters and handing it to his companion who was with him in the basket.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, could you recognize the two (2) men aboard the basket if you have the opportunity of
seeing them again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the other man who was giving instructions on the ground? Can you recognize that person
if you have the opportunity of seeing him again?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: Will you look around inside the courtroom if he is here?
. . . the presence of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness could be an indication of truth. A
witness whose testimony is perfect in all aspects, without a flaw and remembering even the minutest
details which jibe beautifully with one another, lays himself open to suspicion of having been coached
or having memorized statements earlier rehearsed.
A: No, sir.
Q: I will show you photographs of several persons. Can you identify the person whom you saw giving
instructions on April 11, 1989?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
(Witness pointed to a photograph of Alejandro de la Torre which appears on the bailbond filed by the
accused.)
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you remember the body number of the truck, Mr. Witness?
On the other hand, if, as Garcia said, he noticed that the MERALCO men were "tampering with the
meters," it is a source of wonder why he did not report the matter to the barangay authorities.
Not only is the testimony of Danilo Garcia improbable. His credibility as a witness is likewise doubtful
in view of the testimony of Pio Bautista, a council member of Barangay San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City. He testified that Danilo Garcia was not known to residents of P. de la Cruz Street in San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. According to Bautista, he made inquiries upon the request of
petitioner de la Torre concerning the residence address of Garcia. Bautista testified:
Q: . . . Were you able to make some exhaustive inquiries of Mr. Danilo Garcia which he said in his
sworn statement "nakatira sa looban of P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Quezon City?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Body number 522, sir.
Q: And then what happened when you went in looban, P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City?
Q: You stated that it was Body No. 522. Why do you say that it is 522, Mr. Witness?
A: Nobody was able to tell me that a certain Danilo Garcia resides in that place. 12
A: It so happened that I won in the jueteng, sir. 10
Evidence to be believed must come from a credible witness and must itself be credible.
To be sure, the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the conviction of the
accused if it is credible, positive, and constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the latter is guilty.
However, in the case at bar, the answers given by Garcia to questions asked during his direct
examination fall short of this standard. First, Garcia must have an extremely acute sense of perception to
recall a feature of the MERALCO service truck, such as its number, which at the time had absolutely no
significance for him. His claim that he remembered the number because it was the number of a winning
bet in "jueteng" is too facile to be convincing. Second, Garcia must have a phenomenal memory to be
able to recall almost three months after the incident the appearance of a complete stranger whom he had
seen only once. The removal of electric meters by crewmembers of MERALCO was hardly a
remarkable event that would have deserved the attention to detail that Garcia, a mere chance passerby,
apparently lavished upon it. As this Court said in People v. Ibal: 11
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and petitioner Alejandro B. de la Torre is
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on
'Cash advances of other officials' under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules."
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented by his
Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A.
Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING,
ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992;
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO,
CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO,
Private Respondent, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative
inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera
Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19,
1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private
respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavitcomplaint dated November 16, 1989, 1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of
official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of
falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00
for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the
use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private
respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it
impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private respondent accused Lumiqued
with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the months of
April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total
amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government "by deliberately concealing
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, 3 charged Lumiqued with oppression and
harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to
retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued
Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The
order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City
Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They were
mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their
report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counteraffidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer
submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondent's complaints. The
committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, 4 Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed
against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by private
respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He
claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondent's execution of an
affidavit of desistance. 5
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted,
however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of the five service
vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional Director of the
DAR. He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the course of his
travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he
attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to him by drivers for
reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to determine whether they
were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify that the same were validly issued
by the establishments concerned in order that official transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried
out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his companions
were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out
of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who
readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own receipt so
that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop,
corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990. 6 With respect to the accusation that he
sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the
amount was actually only P6.60. Any error committed in posting the amount in the books of the
Regional Office was not his personal error or accountability.
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sacred Heart Hospital
on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date was upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued).
The records do not disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of his confinement and
inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel. The records likewise do not
show that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of respondent's condition on any reasonable date
after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992, respondent was already being
assisted by counsel.
To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring
unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification 7 of DARCAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash advances on record
as of December 31, 1989.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness and
thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with the documentary evidence annexed thereto, such that
a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted is already possible.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that private
respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due to her
prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required applications for leave of
absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of her application
for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second application for leave of absence in view of her
failure to file the same immediately with the head office or upon her return to work. He also asserted
that no medical certificate supported her application for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and dishonest
because a COA examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to November 23,
1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned the amount on
January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued asserted that she
should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs that would not require handling of cash and
money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not
assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable
him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for
resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 alleging that he suffered
a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently
because
the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992, 9 State Prosecutor
Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989 yet,
justice can not be delayed much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July 31,
1992, 10finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. It made the following findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds the
evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his
gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate
receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the
respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15" show that the actual average purchase made
by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used
by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the
greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times
the value of what he actually spends. While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have
been falsified, the motive, the pattern and the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the
government has, nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had in
effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of 108.45
liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also
admitted having signed the receipts.
Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying receipts
constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal offense for Malversation through
Falsification of Official Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year
1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances totaling to about
P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers
covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification issued by the Administrative
Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences (sic).
the
DOJ. 14 Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the investigating
committee could no longer act on his motion for reconsideration. He added that the motion was also
prematurely filed because the Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilon's
recommendation. 15
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No.
52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline
receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent's act in relieving the
complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is
noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges against her ( sic). The
recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almost
six months after the respondent's order relieving the complainant was issued. His act in harassing a
subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part
of the respondent who is a head of office.
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and accountant of
the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable is untenable. The receipts in question were signed by
respondent for the purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly issued by the commercial
establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official business for which it was intended.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact, this only
show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to have the cases against him dismissed. He could not
have given a certain Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of incurring
unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from office,
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the
same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that the filing
of the affidavit of desistance 11 would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the matter considering
that what was at stake was not only "the violation of complainant's (herein private respondent's)
personal rights" but also "the competence and fitness of the respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public
office." He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call for "a punitive action against the
respondent on the initiative of the DAR."
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of "the findings of the Committee"
with the DOJ. 12 Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra indorsed the motion to the investigating
committee. 13 In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating committee informed
Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee "had no more authority to act on the same (motion for
reconsideration) considering that the matter has already been forwarded to the Office of the President"
and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased when they transmitted their report to
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as
respondent would want us to do.
In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with all the benefits accorded to him by
law and existing rules and regulations." This petition was basically premised on the affidavit dated May
27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having
authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner Lumiqued's being an "honest
man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were "altered." 18
Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he
was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. 19 On May 19, 1994, 20 however,
before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing
denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice
Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a
nutshell, it prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased
Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed
from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994." 22
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel
during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was
in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the
hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If
suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the
waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during
custodial investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke
the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own
choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining
if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The order
issued by Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee to
conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint for oppression, dishonesty, disgraceful
and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director, Department of Agrarian Reform,
Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created . . . 24
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution.
This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at
the filing of a criminal case for malversation through falsification of public documents in its report and
recommendation.
Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation 25 conducted against Lumiqued appears to
have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice system in accordance with
the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system, 26 conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function.
By its power to "perform such other functions as may be provided by law," 27 prosecutors may be called
upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance
with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel. 28 In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as
Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of
Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 29 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and
Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 30 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued 31 clearly show that he was
confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative
in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there
are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose
of maintaining the dignity of government service.
Furthermore, petitioners' reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on the
Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation stating that a respondent in an
administrative complaint must be "informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his
choice," 32 is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to cases brought before
the Civil Service Commission. 33 Secondly, said resolution, which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect
fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation, 34 much later than the July
1992 hearings of the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same
committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus, at the July
3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of his option to secure the services of counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against Director Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued is present. The
complainant is present, Janet Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has just been furnished with a copy of the
counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you have a counsel, Director?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to see him, he told me, Sir, that he has already set a
hearing, morning and afternoon today.
RSP EXEVEA:
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your counsel? You are willing to proceed with the
hearing even without your counsel?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting for the supplemental affidavit you are going to
present to us. Do you have any request from the panel of investigators, Director Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident. . .
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to assist me and was the one who prepared
my counter-affidavit is already engaged for a hearing and according to him he is engaged for the whole
month of July.
CP BALAJADIA:
RSP EXEVEA:
You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?
We cannot wait . . .
DIR. LUMIQUED:
CP BALAJADIA:
That is my concern. 35 (Emphasis supplied)

In the course of private respondent's damaging testimony, the investigating committee once again
reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:
Why don't you engage the services of another counsel. The charges against you are quite serious. We are
not saying you are guilty already. We are just apprehensive that you will go through this investigation
without a counsel. We would like you to be protected legally in the course of this investigation. Why
don't you get the services of another counsel. There are plenty here in Baguio . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with this even without your counsel?
I will try to see, Sir . . .
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
CP BALAJADIA:
A. I think so, Sir.
Please select your date now, we are only given one month to finish the investigation, Director
Lumiqued.
CP BALAJADIA:
RSP EXEVEA:
Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to proceed with the assistance of counsel but
you said that you can take care of yourself so we have no other alternative but to proceed. 36 (Emphasis
supplied).
We will not entertain any postponement. With or without counsel, we will proceed.
CP BALAJADIA:
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:

CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we asked for and Director Lumiqued, if
you have other witnesses, please bring them but reduce their testimonies in affidavit form so that we can
expedite with the proceedings. 37
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of counsel.
Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being represented by a counsel. The last time he
was asked to invite his lawyer in this investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer to represent him in
this investigation?
seminars both here and abroad. 39 Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without the help of
counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he entertained during the hearings he
was able to attend. In his statement, "That is my concern," one could detect that it had been uttered
testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or skepticism implicit in the question, "You are
confident that you will be able to represent yourself?" despite his having positively asserted earlier,
"Yes, I am confident." He was obviously convinced that he could ably represent himself. Beyond
repeatedly reminding him that he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he
is confident of his ability to defend himself, the investigating committee could not do more. One can
lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told me that he had set a case also at 9:30 in the
other court and he told me if there is a possibility of having this case postponed anytime next week,
probably Wednesday so we will have good time (sic) of presenting the affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this to the panel. The charges in this case
are quite serious and he should be given a chance to the assistance of a counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been furnished him only now and this has
several documents attached to it so I think we could grant him one last postponement considering that
he has already asked for an extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment. 38
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital. Prior to
said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the committee of his confinement. Consequently because
the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had already submitted his counteraffidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This did not mean, however, that
Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to due process.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
In Nera v.Auditor General, 40 the Court said:
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to
be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was
not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard
is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all
except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as
it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. 41 An actual hearing is not always an
indispensable aspect of due process. 42 As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to
be heard is the very essence of due process. 43 Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied
if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. 44 Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever
irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee. 45
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. 46 In the early case
of Cornejo
v.Gabriel
and
Provincial
Board
of
Rizal 47 the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee
of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronouncement has been
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1, on accountability of public officers, as
follows:
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government,
graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of Science
major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent training
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is
deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be
invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the
countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 48 In this case, it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued
did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon
Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on
the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that
findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by
substantial
evidence,
even
if
such
evidence
is
not
overwhelming
or
preponderant. 49 The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. 50
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee's recommendation of
dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of
discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity. Strong
evidence is not necessary to rebut that presumption, 51 which petitioners have not successfully disputed
in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule, the
penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service." The instant petition,
which is aimed primarily at the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits," plus back wages
from the time of Lumiqued's dismissal until his demise, must, therefore, fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108494 September 20, 1994
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
SAMUEL
MARRA
y
ZARATE,
ALLAN
PETER DOE, PAUL DOE and TOM DOE, accused.
TAN, alias "Allan
Yao,"
The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy Din, positively identified appellant as the triggerman in the killing
of Nelson Tandoc. Din recounted that at around 2:00 A.M. on March 7, 1992, he and his friend, Nelson
Tandoc, were conversing with each other in front of Lucky Hotel located at M.H. del Pilar Street,
Dagupan City, which was owned by the witness' father and of which he was the administrator. He
noticed a man pass by on the opposite side of the street. The man made a dirty sign with his finger and
Din informed Tandoc thereof. The man repeated his offensive act and called them by waving his hands.
Infuriated, they followed the man until the latter stopped in front of the Dunkin' Donuts store at the
corner of Arellano and Fernandez streets. They demanded an explanation from the man but they were
not given any. 7
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y
Zarate, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the crime of murder for the
fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992. 1 On June 4, 1992, an amended information was
filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan Yao," was indicated as an accused instead of John Doe. 2 A warrant
of arrest was thereafter issued against Allan Tan 3 but the same was returned unserved, 4 hence trial
proceeded with regard to herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone.
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on May 15, 1992. 5 After trial
on the merits, judgment was rendered by the court below on October 8, 1992 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of
Nelson Tandoc the sums of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P50,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00
as moral damages, and the costs. 6
At that instant, two men arrived and one of them inquired what was going on. Tandoc informed him that
they were just demanding an explanation from the man. Din was surprised when Tandoc unexpectedly
slapped one of the two men. A brawl ensued, with Tandoc clashing with the two men while Din
exchanged blows with the man who made the dirty finger sign. After the fisticuffs, their three opponents
ran away in a westward direction. 8
Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel. When they were about to enter the place, they
noticed that the men with whom they just had a fight were running towards them. Sensing danger, they
ran inside the annex building of the hotel and immediately secured the lock of the sliding outer door.
They entered a room and waited until they felt that the situation had normalized. After ten to fifteen
minutes, thinking that the men were no longer in the vicinity, they left the room. Having decided to go
home, Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a sudden, Din saw Appellant, who at that time was
wearing a security guard's uniform, shoot Tandoc with a revolver. There was a fluorescent bulb installed
at the front of the hotel which enabled Din to identify the assailant. Tandoc was shot in the middle of the
chest and he fell down. Then, Din saw four to five men scamper away from the scene. 9
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, "Tol, I was shot." The latter tried to chase appellant and his
companions but he failed to catch up with them. Din and his wife then brought Tandoc to the Villaflor
Hospital. The victim was taken to the emergency room but he expired an hour later. 10
At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan City Police Station
received a report about a shooting incident at the annex building of the Lucky Hotel. He proceeded to
the crime scene along with SPO4 Orlando Garcia, SPO3 Mauricio Flores and SPO3 Noli de Castro.
Upon their arrival about five minutes later, they were informed by the wife of Jimmy Din that the victim
had been brought to the Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the hospital where Din informed them
that he could recognize the man who killed Tandoc and that the killer was, at that time, wearing the polo
shirt of a security guard's uniform. 11
They decided to proceed to an eatery called "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." Seeing the security guard of a nearby
bus company, they inquired from him if he knew of any unusual incident that happened in the vicinity.
The guard said that he saw the guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together with some companions, chasing
two persons running towards M. H. del Pilar Street. He further added that the man was wearing a polo
shirt of a security guard's uniform. Asked where that particular guard might be, he pointed to a man
eating inside the eatery nearby. The man eating was not in a security guard's uniform. 12
They approached the man and inquired whether he was the security guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw,"
which the latter answered in the affirmative. After a series of questions, they learned that he was Samuel
Marra, that his tour of duty was from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00 A.M. the following day, that
he was still on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of March 7, 1992, and that the firearm issued to him
was in his house. Upon their request to see the firearm, they proceeded to Marra's residence at Interior
Nueva Street. 13
When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an aparador and handed it to De Vera.
De Vera also found five live bullets and one spent shell. Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of the gun,
De Vera asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter denied ever having done so. Abruptly, De
Vera asked him point-blank why he shot Tandoc. Marra at first denied the accusation but when informed
that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in self-defense, firing at the victim only once. Tandoc
allegedly had a samurai sword with him at the time of the incident. However, persistent efforts on the
part of the policemen to thereafter locate said bladed weapon proved futile. Marra also admitted that
prior to the incident, he chased the victim and Din. The officers then took Marra to the police station
where he was detained. 14
Meanwhile, De Vera went to Villaflor Hospital from where he fetched Din and brought him to the police
station. There, Din definitely identified Marra as the assailant. During the investigation, De Vera also
found out that Marra had not firearm license. 15
Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan City, testified that he conducted an
autopsy on a certain Nelson Tandoc. He found a gunshot wound on the victim with the point of entry of
the left side of the anterior chest wall and the point of exit at the lower left portion of the right
shoulder. 16
Prosecutor Gregorio Gaerlan, stepfather of the victim, testified on the funeral, burial and other expenses
incurred by the family. He declared that they paid Funeraria Quiogue P25,000.00 for its services;
Villaflor Hospital, P2,875.00 for the confinement of Tandoc; St. John Memorial Cathedral, P350.00;
Eternal Garden, P3,000.00 for the interment fee and P150.00 for the rent of the tent during the burial;
and that they spent P2,300.00 for the video tape expenses and P11,800.00 for food and drinks during the
wake. 17
Understandably, appellant gave a different version of the incident. Marra declared in court that he used
to work as a security guard at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" from seven o'clock in the evening to six o'clock in
the morning of the following day. On March 6, 1992, he reported for duty at seven o'clock that evening
as was his usual practice. At around four o'clock down of the following day, he went home to change his
clothes. He proceeded to the Five Star Bus Terminal which was adjacent to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." He
saw Neneng, the cashier of said eatery, and together they ordered arroz caldo. Later, at about 5:00 A.M.,
he was approached by four policemen who inquired if he was a security guard. He answered in the
affirmative. He was also asked about his sidearm. When he answered that it was at his residence, they
all went to his house to look for it. After he handed over the firearm to the policemen, he was brought to
the city hall where he was detained. 18
Under cross-examination, he insisted that when he handed the gun to the policeman, there were five live
bullets, and not four live bullets and one empty shell as claimed by the prosecution. Prior to the
incident, he had never met Jimmy Din nor does he know of any cause why Din would harbor any ill
feelings against him. 19
After a careful scrutiny of the records and an objective evaluation of the evidence, the Court is not
disposed to reverse the judgment of the lower court, the decision of the latter being amply supported by
the established facts and fully sustained by the applicable law.
In assailing the decision of the court below, the defense argues that "Jimmy Din . . . was not able to
identify the assailant in a definite and believable manner." It goes on to state further that " Jimmy Din
was inside the hotel when Nelson Tandoc was shot and his vision was o(b)structed by the door. Jimmy
Din was also not familiar with the accused. Under the circumstances by which he allegedly witnessed
the shooting, how could be identify clearly an assailant at the distance of 45 meters?" 20
Appellant's counsel is only partly correct, having conveniently failed to mention other vital parts of
Din's testimony. An impartial review of said testimony readily reveals that Din was indeed in a position
to know the identity of the assailant. Firstly, Din knew for a fact that the persons he and Tandoc fought
with near the Dunkin' Donuts store were the same men who chased them while they were on their way
back to the hotel because he was able to take a good look at them. During the chase, he naturally turned
around to look at the men who were running after them and who were at that time in front of the
Balingit Trading store which was well-lighted. 21 It logically follows that they were the same persons
who were waiting for them when they later came out of the hotel, and he was familiar with their
identities because of their previous encounter.
Secondly, we do not agree with appellant that the door blocked the view of Din. Said door, partly made
of plywood, had a spring hinge which makes it possible for the door to close by itself. However, at that
time the spring hinge had been weakened by long and constant use such that it would take some time for
it to close the door, thereby allowing Din sufficient opportunity to have an unobstructed view of the
scene outside. 22
Thirdly, Din was quite near the victim and appellant, which proximity, enabled him to clearly see what
really happened. He thus readily perceived the actual shooting at the time when Tandoc pushed the door
open. At that precise moment, Din was at the left side of Tandoc and about four to five meters away
from the assailant. 23
Lastly, the place was brightly illuminated by a 20-watt fluorescent bulb installed on the outside wall in
front of the hotel. Marra was only about three meters away therefrom. Such physical conditions would
undeniably afford a clear view from inside the hotel of the immediate area outside and in front of the
same where the incident took place.
The prosecution presented another vital witness in the person of Sgt. Reynaldo de Vera, whose
testimony we shall repeat here for easy reference. In capsulized form, De Vera narrated the sequence of
events that happened after he and his companions went to the crime scene to conduct an investigation.
Having received information that a man in a security guard's uniform was involved in the incident, they
sought information from a security guard of a nearby bus terminal. Said security guard pointed them to
Marra, who at that time was eating in acarinderia nearby. Informed by Marra that his gun was at his
residence, they all went to Marra's residence to get the same. After receiving said firearm, De Vera
asked appellant why he killed Tandoc but Marra initially denied any participation in the killing.
Nevertheless, when confronted with the fact that somebody saw him do it, Marra admitted the act
although he alleged it was done in self-defense. This testimony of De Vera as to the confession of Marra
is of significant weight, but the admissibility thereof shall also be passed upon.
Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(a)ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. . . . ." The critical inquiry then is
whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked selfdefense. We believe that he was not so situated.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way . It is
only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on
a particular suspect,the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. 24
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission. There
was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could have refused to
answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all go to his residence. The
police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They
were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been merely informed that the suspect was
wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. As we held in People vs. Dy: 25 "What was told by the
accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an
ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal
custodial investigation. 26 The trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that
compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant
case, . . . ."
Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. de Vera assumes a dominant dimension because it totally destroys the
defense of denial cum alibi subsequently raised by appellant. In his answers to Sgt. De Vera, appellant
expressly admitted that he shot Tandoc, albeit with an exculpatory explanation. This admission of Marra
is in complete contrast to the statements he later made in open court.
In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against him and, in
certain circumstances, this admission may be considered as part of the res gestae. In a similar situation
involved in the aforecited case ofPeople vs. Dy, this Court held:
. . . the oral confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that "he had shot a tourist" and that the gun
he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police
(t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9) is competent evidence against him. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against him (Sec. 29 [now
Sec. 33], Rule 130). It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that, any
person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People vs. Tawat,
G.R. No. 62871, May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431). (Italics supplied.)
In any event, even without his admission, the case against appellant has been duly established by the
other evidence of the prosecution, as earlier discussed. However, persistently arguing for an acquittal,
the defense points out that when the police officers saw Marra, he was not in a blue uniform whereas
Din testified that the person who shot Tandoc was wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform.
This is a puerile argument since appellant himself removed any lingering doubts on this point. He said
that on ending his tour of duty at 4:00 A.M. of March 7, 1992, he decided to go home to change clothes,
after which he went to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" to eat. This explains why, at the time the police officers saw
him, he was already in civilian clothes. The shooting had taken place earlier at around 2:00 A.M. At that
time, Marra was still in his security guard's uniform, being then on duty.
However, while we agree that the crime committed by appellant was murder qualified by treachery, we
reject the finding that the same was aggravated by nighttime. No evidence was presented by the
prosecution to show that nocturnity was specially sought by appellant or taken advantage of by him to
facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure his immunity from capture. 27 At any rate, whether or
not such aggravating circumstance should be appreciated, the penalty to be imposed on appellant would
not be affected considering the proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at the time when
the offense in the instant case was committed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate guilty
of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil liabilities therein stated is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
interdiction for life and perpetual absolute disqualification, to pay Jicelyn Lansap P30,000.00 for moral
damages, and to pay the costs.
G.R. Nos. 104492-93 May 31, 1994

PEOPLE
OF
vs.
ORLANDO FRAGO, accused-appellant.
THE
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

V. Dennis M. Socrates for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ORLANDO FRAGO was charged before the court a quo with rape and attempted rape, docketed as
Crim. Cases Nos. 9144 and 9145, respectively.
In Crim. Case No. 9144, the Information states that in the early morning of 26 September 1990, at about
four o'clock, in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan, the accused Orlando Frago
. . . entered the sleeping room of the house belonging to Fortunato Moral where JICELYN LANSAP
was sleeping, thereby Jicelyn Lansap was bodily carried by accused Orlando Frago to a nearby house
belonging to Dado Andor and with lewd design did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
lay with and have carnal knowledge with said Jicelyn Lansap who at that time was deeply asleep,
against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of Jicelyn Lansap.
In Crim. Case No. 9145, the Information alleges that in the early morning of 26 September 1990, at
about three forty-five, in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan, the accused Orlando Frago
. . . entered the room of the dwelling house of Philip Pastera where one RONALYN PASTERA, a girl 9
years of age, was sleeping, and once inside the room, with lewd design did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously hold her head and bodily carry said Ronalyn Pastera, thus commencing the
commission of a felony of Rape directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution
which would produce the said felony by reason of causes other than the spontaneous desistance of the
accused, that is, Ronalyn Pastera was awakened and shouted for help, thus forcing the accused to
release Ronalyn Pastera and ran away.
On 1 October 1991, after trial, the court a quo rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of rape in
Crim. Case No. 9144 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of civil
In Crim. Case No. 9145 for attempted rape, the accused was acquitted on "reasonable doubt occasioned
by lack of clear and convincing evidence that the accused Orlando Frago indeed performed against
Ronalyn Pastera overt acts constituting commencement of the commission of the crime of rape."
In view of the acquittal of the accused in Crim. Case No. 9145, we are here called upon to review only
his conviction in Crim. Case No. 9144 for rape.
In holding appellant liable for rape, the trial court based its decision mainly on its finding that the
accused was positively identified by his victim, complaining witness Jicelyn Lansap, and that there was
no ill motive on her part to testify against him.
Jicelyn Lansap, a 15-year old high school student, was boarding in the house of one Fausto Morales in
the poblacion together with her cousins Susan and Adea Bansil. The version of the prosecution is that
before proceeding to the boarding house of Jicelyn Lansap, the accused, an ice cream vendor, first went
to the residence of Ronalyn Pastera at around three forty-five in the morning and surreptitiously entered
Ronalyn's bedroom where she was sleeping. He fanned her face with his handkerchief and then lifted
her bodily from the floor. He was about to take her out of the room when she suddenly woke up and
screamed for help thus prompting her father to respond immediately by switching on the lights. As a
consequence, the accused had to drop Ronalyn on the floor and run out of the house. The prosecution
would seem to infer that from the house of Ronalyn where he failed in his alleged attempt to defile her,
the accused next went to the boarding house of Jicelyn some fifty meters away.
According to Jicelyn, she and her cousins went to bed at about eight o'clock in the evening of 25
September 1990. Then at around five-thirty the following morning, she was awakened by appellant who
was already strangling her. She shouted for help so that he immediately ran away. She felt pain all over
her body, more particularly in her private part, and discovered that she was no longer wearing her skirt
and underwear. To her consternation, she found herself in the vacant house of a certain Dado Andor. So
she lost no time looking for her way home. Upon reaching her boarding house, she narrated her
harrowing experience to her cousins who in turn related the incident to her mother.
At eight o'clock that morning, Jicelyn and her mother went to the hospital where she was examined by
Dr. Marcela Remegio who found Jicelyn with "Labia Majora and Minora still coaptated and with sign of
external struggle . . . contusion, abrasion all over face . . . around neck . . . scratch marks on both medial
surface of thigh . . . vulva swollen . . . presence of fresh hymenal laceration at six o'clock . . .
[e]xamination for the presence of spermatoza was positive . . . physical virginity lost." 1
On the same day, Ronalyn's father and Jicelyn reported the incidents to the police authorities. Both
Ronalyn
and
Jicelyn
identified
the
accused
as
their attacker in the police line-up on 28 September and 8 October 1990, respectively, and then filed
their formal complaints against him.
On his part, appellant seeks sanctuary in the alcove of denial and alibi. He claims that at nine o'clock in
the evening of 25 September 1990, he was already asleep with his wife and children. He woke up at six
o'clock the following morning. He was very tired that night because he was vending ice cream in
thepoblacion the whole day.
In his appeal, appellant imputes error to the trial court in convicting him on the basis of an identification
which was made without the assistance of counsel and according credence to the story of Jicelyn, which
he considers fantastic, thereby denying his constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that it was during his detention, when he was not assisted by counsel, that he was
identified by Jicelyn. Thus he invokes People v. Hassan 2 where this Court affirmed the right of an
accused to counsel at all stages of the proceedings, the most crucial of which is his identification, and
denial thereof entitles him to acquittal.
We cannot sustain the argument. We quote hereunder the pertinent portions constituting the ratio
decidendi in the Hassan case
. . . The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr., was made to confront and identify the accused alone at the
funeral parlor, without being placed in a police line-up, was "pointedly suggestive, generated confidence
where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subverted his reliability as eyewitness.
This unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification, which revolts against the accepted
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither
our respect nor acceptance" (citing People v. Cruz, No. L-24424, 30 March 1970, 32 SCRA 181, 186;
People v. Olvis, et al., G.R. No. 71092, 30 September 1987; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29169,
24 SCRA 663, 679).
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness
and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage the identification of the accused. 3
While the infringement of the constitutional protection to the rights of the accused should result in the
acquittal of the accused in proper cases as a matter of course, appellant's reliance on Hassan is
misplaced and shows a deficient comprehension of our rationalization therein. We acquitted the accused
in that case because, among other things, of its peculiar factual milieu. There was no line-up of suspects.
There was only the accused. Thus, we observed:
As it turned out, the method of identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive
moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The
police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness Samson, in the
funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an
uncounselled confession . . . (italics supplied) 4
In contrast, Orlando Frago was singled out by Jicelyn in a police line-up composed of ten
persons. 5Some were stout while others were slim, but almost all of them were mustachioed and five
were long-haired. 6 InGamboa v. Cruz, 7 we were explicit
The
right
to
counsel
attaches
upon
the
start
of
an
investigation,
i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-cited
provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several
cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the
right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not
part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The
Solicitor General states:
When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held yet to
answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not
yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory
to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail
of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US
478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held
to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel
because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to
counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he
was identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police . He was,
therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the
police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he but the
complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the
complainant while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to counsel
had not accrued (Italics supplied). 8
This ruling was reiterated in the recent case of People v. Santos. 9 We similarly find in the case at bench.
There is nothing in the records which shows that in the course of the identification from the police lineup the police investigator sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant. Thus far, we
agree with the prosecution.
But we sustain the defense on the insufficiency of the identification of appellant Orlando Frago.
A careful dissection of the testimony of Jicelyn herself indubitably shows that she has no reliable basis
for pointing to the accused as the person who raped her. She says that his face was covered; that he had
long hair; that while the person who raped her had high nose (matangos) his nose is just "katamtaman";
that she did not have the opportunity to observe the height of the rapist; and, that the only evidence of
sexual intercourse is the result of the medical examination.
Appellant argues that the "contusion, abrasion all over the face, around the neck, presence of scratch
marks on both medial surface of thigh" 10 did not necessarily indicate resistance on her part, contending
further that it is a matter of judicial notice that passionate kissing and petting could normally produce
"injuries." According to him, Jicelyn herself disclosed that she had a suitor for whom she had "feelings
of affection," thus concluding that she may have submitted herself to him.
A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction, reverence to which remains undiminished to this day, is that
the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of
opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or substance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. This is due to the fact
that the trial court is in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. 11
There are indeed reasons to deviate from the general rule. We have examined carefully the entire
transcript of stenographic notes and we do not hesitate to conclude that the exception to the rule must be
applied. There was no positive identification of Orlando Frago by Jicelyn. Her testimony on direct
examination supports this conclusion. While she would make it appear that she was able to positively
identify the accused, her account of the incident proved otherwise.
There seems to be no question that, on the part of the Pastera sisters, they may have recognized
appellant positively because their room was lighted with a wick/gas lamp 12 and he was not wearing
anything on his face. 13 They identified him on 28 September 1990, 14 whereas Jicelyn pointed him out
only
on
8 October 1990. 15 The possibility that Jicelyn had conferred with the Pastera sisters regarding the
identity of the accused before she testified is not remote because they were neighbors. 16 As a
consequence,
when
Jicelyn
testified
on
13 August 1991, she gave the same description of her attacker as that given by Ronalyn Pastera.
Under the circumstances, we are inevitably drawn to the conclusion that Jicelyn's identification of
Orlando Frago was merely patterned after the identification made by the Pastera sisters. This is then
aderivative, not positive, identification. The identification then of appellant by Jicelyn is doubtful. 17 Her
testimony, standing alone, does not satisfy that quantum of proof required to support a judgment of
conviction. The material discrepancies therein engender perplexity as to its veracity and reliability.
Besides, it appears highly incredible that Jicelyn could be bodily lifted from her room in her boarding
house and taken some three hundred meters away to the vacant house of Dado Andor where she was
supposedly abused 18 without awakening her and her two cousins who were all sleeping side by side
with
her. 19 Moreover, we find the following observations of the Solicitor General decidedly speculative,
hence, unacceptable
. . . appellant's earlier act of fanning his handkerchief over the face of Ronalyn Pastera evidently shows
that there was something in it, most likely drug, to induce her to remain sleeping. This same method was
apparently employed by appellant to Jicelyn Lansap that kept her sleeping while being taken to another
house and therein raped by him, 20
because a mere reading of Ronalyn's testimony on cross-examination would indicate that she did not
smell any substance emanating from her attacker.
Appellant's denial and alibi are inherently weak, but the prosecution cannot rely on their frailty to
enhance its cause. The prosecution must draw its strength from its own evidence. As has been oftrepeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account and the
proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime
has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction.
prosecution, its evidence has miserably failed to pass that conscience test.
21
Unfortunately for the
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant ORLANDO FRAGO guilty of
rape in Crim. Case No. 9144 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is ACQUITTED as his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It appearing that he is detained, his immediate release from
custody is ordered unless he is held for another cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971
RICARDO
DE
LA
CAMARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City (Branch II), respondents.
Demosthenes Mediante, Puro Velez, Francisco Fabe, Federico del Puerto and Pelaez, Jalandoni &
Jamir for petitioner.
Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara,
in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional
mandate prohibiting excessive bail. 1 The merit of the petition on its face is thus apparent. Nonetheless,
relief sought setting aside the above order by reducing the amount of bail to P40,000.00 cannot be
granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from the provincial jail, thus rendering this case
moot and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of lower court judges, to set forth
anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed in fixing the amount of the bail
sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a constitutional right.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay,
Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for
his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on November
25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple
frustrated murder 2 and another for multiple murder 3 against petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot
Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on January 14, 1969, came
an application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was
no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise mantained his
innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting
its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its
evidence.
Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even
if he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00
for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the
Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to
respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00bond,
either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a motion for reconsideration to
reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances concerning the
issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would disprove any
charge that he wasguilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challengedorder
would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He sought the
dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance for both the petitioner and
respondents with the former, upon written motion, being given thirty days within which to submit a
memorandum in lieu of oral argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same period from receipt
thereofto file his reply. Such a memorandum as duly submitted by petitioner on April 6, 1971.
Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a supplemental answer wherein he
alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then remained at
large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit, towhich petitioner
countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with this plea: "The
undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondent's
prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the
fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition that calls for the resolution of
this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras who maybe awaiting the
clear-cut definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail." 4
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for certiorari is not warranted, still,
as set forth at the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic should not
preclude thisTribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligationof fidelity on
the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of theConstitution that excessive bail shall
not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence
of guilt is strong. 5 Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof liberty is honored in the observance and
not in the breach. It is not beyondthe realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime,
especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarceand thus frustrate the
hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
language of Cooley, a "mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the
attendance of the accused" for the subsequent trial. 6 Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this
right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather
than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat,
temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition,
the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a
guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. 7 As construed in the latest American
decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and
declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus purpose is
"excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." 8
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount
of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for the
other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of
constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00
for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department
of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the twooffenses.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be
indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor v. Abano. 9 The guidelines in the fixing of bail was
there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the
accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from
justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other
cases." 10 Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the
above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must
stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our
supervisorypowers to provide the required remedy." 11
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim
irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such
an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to
the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate
of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the
position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of escaping from
confinement, reduced as he must have been to a stateof desperation. In the same breath that he was told
he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would
bebeyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a
right could not be availed of. There would have beenno disappointment of expectations then. It does call
to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." 12 It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left
resentment and bitterness in its wake.Petitioner's subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he
is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for repudiation
from this Court.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an alleged
reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest characterization
of such a result is that there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such a meaning was
ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to doso would be to reduce the right to bail
to a barren form of words. Not only isthe order complained of absolutely bereft of support in law, but it
flies in the face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war with thecommand of reason.
With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to
nullify the above order.
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 100
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141529
June 6, 2001
FRANCISCO
YAP,
JR.,
aka
EDWIN
YAP, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on
change of residence and travel abroad.
(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence
that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court;
(2) The Commission of lmmigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a hold departure
order against accused-appellant; and
(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of Court for
safekeeping until the court orders its return;
(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-appellant's bail bond,
the dismissal of appeal and his immediate arrest and confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.5
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City 1 and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision
correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for
each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20)
years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he
had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated February
17,1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said
court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking
the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this
motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private
complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative
of his right against excessive bail.
The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals 4, issued on October 6, 1999, upheld the recommendation
of the Solicitor General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of AccusedAppellant Pending Appeal" is hereby GRANTED. Accused-appellant Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a. Edwin
Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five Million Five Hundred Thousand
(P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following conditions, viz. :
A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent
court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the
provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .5 million.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail for the
provisional liberty of the petitioner on his civil liability.
The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and travel
in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied
him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00,
which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany
Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the
accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. He prays that bail be reduced to at
least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa under the
1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he posted during the trial of the
case.6
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 101
On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to
the Court of Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the
penalty imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of the offense of which
petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil
liability but also to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The Solicitor General further pointed out
the probability of flight in case petitioner is released on bail, it having been established that petitioner
was in possession of a valid passport and visa and had in fact left the country several times during the
course of the proceedings in the lower court. It was also shown that petitioner used different names in
his business transactions and had several abodes in different parts of the country.
As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the Court of
Appeals requires is notice in case of change of address; it does not in any way impair petitioner's right
to change abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence during the pendency of
the appeal.
Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which
states:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the
accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail
bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing
by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another
crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to
the adverse party.7
There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of
allowing bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian
reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission he went out of the
country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to
peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. 8 The obvious rationale,
as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail in an excessive amount
could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abano,10 this Court made the
pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the
latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory
sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.
xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being
required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge
would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal
of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that
any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of
escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath
as he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional
liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically
that such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations
then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope,
a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." XXX11
At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to
consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 102
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;

(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump
bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may
include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to
the court and to make an accounting of his movements.12 In the present case, where petitioner was found
to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court of Appeals required the
confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure order against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail
bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and
the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts.
Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that
the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of petitioner's right to bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, 13 or whenever so required
by the Court14. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required
but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 15 To fix bail at an amount equivalent
to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00).is to permit the
impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of;
this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability
which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner's submission that bail in the instant case be set at
P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29,
2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the amount of fraud is P142,000.00
or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). True, the Court has held that the Bail
Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although
technically not binding upon the courts, "merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of the
Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the enforcement of criminal laws." 16 Thus,
courts are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to
its significance in the administration of criminal justice. 17 This notwithstanding, the Court is not
precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond
Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.
It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is non-capital offenses is
discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and circumstances
exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or
his bail previously granted should be cancelled. 18 In the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion
to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong
reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact convicted by the trial court. 19 In an earlier case,
the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco's disquisition on why bail should be denied after
judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion; thus:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only
where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view
it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction
that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before
conviction.xxx20
Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC,
and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years --the
maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal Code.
Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and
the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the
amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty
imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount
of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and
that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 103
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court", claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode
and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the
Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order. 21 In fact, the petition submits
that "the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape.
Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is already unnecessary." 22
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision.23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely
required to inform the court in case he does so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced
from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 104

Consti II - Mico

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gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother.

11 Her only brother BBB also went out in the

March 15, 2010

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 2

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 6

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 7

February 20, 2001

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 8

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 10

March 31, 2004

1. wound lacerated 4 cm. long, lateral aspect, right wrist.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 12

TANONG: Alam mo ba at naipaliwanag ng iyong abogado na anumang salaysay mo sa pagsisiyasat na

Hence, this automatic appeal.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 13

PROS. RONQUILLO TO THE ACCUSED

ATTY. NOVERAS TO THE ACCUSED

Q What else, if there are any?

Q Did you personally bring Dueas to the hospital?

On cross-examination, appellant made the following declaration:

Q Are you sure of that?

A I do not know the jailer at the time.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 17

G.R. No. 112035 January 16, 1998

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 19

We affirm the trial court's decision.

Q When you saw them drinking, what time was that?

A Around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, sir.

Q Before last week of October, have you seen him?

Witness may answer.

FISCAL SISON (Q):

Q Have you heard what he said?

A: No, sir. He was facing my direction.

(tsn, April 26, 1990, p. 34.)

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 23

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 24

January 28, 2000

The evidence established the following facts:

A: We went to Naga with Lt. Idian and Velarde.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 30

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 31

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 32

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 33

Sgd. Henry Feliciano y Lagura

Until Dec. 31, 1993

PTR No. 10843256 1/8/93

A: Since the month of February, 1993.

A: Yes, sir [,] I understand everything.

Q: With the latest incident, what have you done?

Q: What is your highest educational attainment?

A: Grade 4 only at Baongca, Bukidnon.

ON THE CHARGE OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN

The appeal is meritorious.

Thus, in People v. Gamboa , we stated that:

A: About the PU driver that was killed.

Atty. Carlo Mejia

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 37

Assistant City Prosecutor Nicolas C. Caballero, Jr.

Q: When you said him, you were referring to Alfonso Cuarez?

Atty. Pepito Chavez

A: About one armslength (sic).

A: Police Officer Cabigon and Cuarez.

Q: What about Eleuterio Cabigon?