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opinion did not last long; now Sharif faces his inability to control or
restrain the army and the failure of both his policies towards India and
towards the Pakistani Taliban. On the economic front the IMF loan is only
providing temporary respite, as the currency remains under heavy
pressure and efforts to resolve the power generation sector crisis seems
to be leading nowhere.
Honeymoon over
Nawaz Sharifs insistence in improving relations with India is creating a lot
of trouble for him, as the Pakistani army is expressing its hostility to his
plans by pursuing an increasingly aggressive policy in Kashmir, where
cross-border raids are more and more common. Out of 150 violations of
the ceasefire since 2003, 40 have taken place in just 30 days this autumn.
The Indian government is particularly upset because there are elections in
2014 in India and the nationalist BJP is mounting a serious challenge for
the ruling Congress, so Indian Prime Minister Singh is publicly attacking
Sharif for his failure to restrain his own army. It all looks likely to end up in
a miserable failure for Sharif.
Sharif is also achieving little in terms of reaching a peace settlement with
the Pakistani Taliban; the killing of Hafizullah Mehsud in November might
have been the nail in the coffin of negotiations; cynics say that the
Americans deliberately killed him in order to forestall an agreement, which
would have diverted the Pakistani Taliban towards Afghanistan. Then later
in November another strike killed some commanders of the Afghan
Haqqani network, a protg of the Pakistanis, and one of the Haqqanis
himself was assassinated in Pakistan by unknown hands. In Washington
there is dissatisfaction for what the Pakistanis have been able to bring to
the table in recent months in terms of negotiations with the Afghan
Taliban and some suspect the Pakistani game is to buy time, appease the
Americans but without really delivering much to them, just enough to get
the IMF to release the US$ billions Islamabad needs. Perhaps the
Americans have decided to up pressure on a beleaguered Pakistani
government?
Sharif also faces pressure from Iran. After relations between the two
countries improved greatly under the PPP government, Sharif is suspected
by the Iranians of being too dependent on Saudi support. In November a
raid carried out from Pakistani territory by a radical Sunni Islamist group
killed 14 Iranian border guards. Perhaps the Pakistani authorities had no
role in it, but questions will surely be asked, particularly at a time when
Islamabad is trying to convince the Iranians to fund the whole cost of
Summary 2013
Pakistan has been anything but a frequent source of good news in recent
years, but the start of the year was quite catastrophic for the country, to
the point that some observers are beginning to think that what seemed
unconceivable a few months ago, a new military takeover, is perhaps not
so unrealistic anymore. Even some sections of the press are voicing their
disappointment in democracy and their hope for a benevolent dictator
but the last one of that description General Musharraf is currently under
arrest by order of the judges and worse, has inevitably now become the
object of the revenge of the current prime minister Nawaz Sharif, whom
he displaced during his takeover of the state, in which ever-present
corruption had apparently reached the depths, with the then Sharif
government leading the way.
Incidentally, over the years when Musharraf was in charge, he had a firm
hand with the Islamist terrorists as well as with public corruption. It was
the last time in which Pakistan looked to the outside world, as though it
came under nuclear threat from Iran or whoever, and the Saudis needed
a credible response. Then there are warheads assigned to them in
Pakistani military depots, giving the Kingdom a credible nuclear response
to any threat, without having to go through the internationally supervised
process of seeking to develop their own hardware, that is at the source of
US Iranian standoffs. The Kingdom after all largely paid for the Pakistanis
achieving nuclear status
As a reward for growing Pakistani collaboration, the White House seems
open to a deal over drone strikes inside Pakistani territory. In fact in recent
months US drone strikes in Pakistan have declined considerably, probably
a result of deliberate restraint. Nawaz Sharif has also a reputation of being
genuinely keen on pacification with India, in the hope of allowing trade
between the two countries to grow many fold from the current US$2.35
billion (already up on 2011 when it was US$1.94 billion), but on this front
he has so far been far less successful, as the Pakistani army is opposed to
any such opening and has made its views clear by stoking up tension on
the Indian border. The renewed violence could well get much worse as
militant groups are believed to be getting ready to redeploy away from
the Afghan border towards Kashmir once again.
In the meanwhile Sharif is also intent on strengthening ties with China. In
July he visited China and signed several economic agreements, which will
bring more Chinese investment to Pakistan. Trade between the two
countries already reached US$12 billion last year. Sharif remains also
committed to his policy of appeasement with Pakistans militants and
proposes peace talks, which have proven controversial in the past.
The June IMF forecast saw the Pakistani economy growing 3.5%in 2012/13,
a low rate for a country like Pakistan, whose population grows at 1.8% per
year. The most immediate problem of the new government, however, is
that foreign currency reserves are shrinking so fast that Pakistan might
not even be able to meet its US$6.5 billion debt repayments due in the
2013/2014 fiscal year. Currently the reserves stand at US$6.5 billion, but
they halved over the past year and continue falling at the rate of about
US$500 million a month. The Nawaz Sharif governments economic plans
are being viewed favourably by rating agencies and lenders. The plan is to
boost investment through cutting 34.5% of the money spent on subsidies
and improved tax collection; the latter should be achieved by relying on
energy consumption to identify large firms and tax them. There is also talk
of closing tax loopholes. Sharif wants to cut by a third the nondevelopment federal budget. The government also has plans to turn
around loss- making state firms such as Pakistan international Airlines;
equivalent of about two months worth of imports and there are US$2.7
billion worth of debt repayments scheduled between now and end June. So
far this year foreign exchange reserves have been eroding at the rate of
about US$500 million a month. The risk is that of a crisis of confidence
and a run on the Pakistani rupee. In this context it is easy to understand
why, despite clear indications of the country shifting closer and closer to
China in its long term economic planning, in the short term Islamabad has
to warm up to Washington in order to secure new loans. Efforts to expand
Pakistans tax base are not achieving much in part because more and
more of the economy is going under cover. The informal share of the
economy seems to be growing, with even relatively large companies
disconnecting from the state. New estimates place the size of the informal
economy at 74% to 91% of the formal economy.
Over the last 12 months the Karachi stock exchange soared 44%, making
it one of the best performers in the world, despite its reputation for
instability and lack of adequate regulations. What justifies this
enthusiasm? Difficult to say, as the economic predicament remains very
challenging. The Sharif government promises to reduce the fiscal deficit to
4% from the current 8.2%, as well as to reduce the debt from 63.5% of
GDP to 58% without introducing any new taxes. But Pakistan will have to
spend 30% of its GDP in 2013-14 to pay back maturing debts, up from
25% in 2012-13; this makes it the financially most exposed amongst
developing countries.
Despite clear indications of the country shifting closer and closer to China
in its long term economic planning, in the short term Islamabad has to
cosy up to Washington in order to secure new loans. Efforts to expand
Pakistans tax base are not achieving much in part because more and
more of the economy is going under cover. The informal share of the
economy seems to be growing, with even relatively large companies
disconnecting from the state. New estimates place the size of the informal
economy at 74% to 91% of the formal economy.
The other chronic illness of the Pakistani economy, power shortages, also
promise to get worse soon, as Pakistan State Oil is on the verge of
bankruptcy because of a liquidity crisis, and will be forced to cut sales on
credit to Pakistan state agencies, a development which will in turn lead to
a reduction in power supply and more blackouts. Pakistan State oil is owed
by electricity companies US$1.5 billion, while having debts to suppliers for
US$1.23 billion.
The main effort of the government is based on price increases, which
Summary 2012
elections. In the first two months of this fiscal year, the government has
already borrowed 33 billion rupees more than the corresponding period
last year from the banks.
The government now hopes that foreign direct investment will rise this
year to $2.5 billion, as a number of deals seem to be in the making,
particularly in the energy sector, where foreign investment is particularly
needed. In 2011-12, foreign direct investment was just US$813 million,
from US$5.4 billion in 2008. Among these projects is a US$600 million
wind power plant, to be built by the Norwegians, while investment seems
to be forthcoming from South Korean, Chinese and Indian companies. On
the energy front the Iranians have offered in July to complete the gas
pipeline to Pakistan, which is already being completed on the Iranian side
of the border. The sanctions against Iran make it unlikely that foreign
companies will show interest in the project, hence the Iranian offer. The
Iranians are so keen on completing the project that they have also offered
credit to Pakistan for US$500 million to complete the pipeline. These
developments are important because resource generation inside Pakistan
remains highly constrained and only foreign investment can provide the
level of funding required to resolve infrastructural problems and increase
economic growth.
Despite the long crisis, consumer spending remains high in Pakistan, at
US$75 billion (40% of GDP). Much of it fuelled by growing remittances
from abroad, now reaching US$11.2 billion a year. As the professional
skills of Pakistan labour migrants grow, so do their remittances. This
translates into purchases of luxury items like high-end cars, which might
seem at odds with the general state of the economy. The increasingly
difficult position of the Pakistani state is the worst aspect of the crisis.
Whilst revenues are affected negatively by economic downturn at home,
expenditure on subsidies has increased dramatically. The government
insists in constantly underestimating the amount it is going to spend on
electricity subsidies; in fact the gap between government plans and reality
has been widening fast. In 2008-9, it allocated Rs 77 billion but spent Rs
99 billion; in 2010-11 it allocated RS 32 billion and spent almost RS 285
billion. Now the government expects GDP growth to bounce back
somewhat in 2012, to 4%, a projection endorsed by the UN (ESCAP) but by
few others. USAID, for example, projects it at 3%, from 2.4% in 2011.
The Asian Development Bank believes that growth in Pakistan will
accelerate in 2012 because of the growing volume of remittances from
Pakistanis working abroad. Workers remittances have increased by 11.9%
in the first 11 months of the current financial year, reaching almost US$16
team), at least compared to the two main parties. Whether Imran and
Nawaz Sharif (two big egos) can get along is however difficult to say. More
importantly, would that make much of a difference for Pakistan? It would
likely lead to better relations with Saudi Arabia and probably worsen
relations with the US further. The relationship with China would of course
remain steady, as political parties have a consensus on that.
It seems that the PPP government now hopes to thread along until the
forthcoming elections, perhaps in the expectation that the judiciary,
increasingly perceived by the public as being hand in glove with the PML
opposition party, will overplay its hand and discredit its anti-corruption
campaign as fractionally biased. Even so, President Zardaris legal
defence against the Supreme Court appears very weak. Most observers
believe that he has something to hide. Some observers now even believe
that the Supreme Court might collude with the military in dissolving the
democratically elected government and replacing it with an extended
caretaker government. Such a development would fall not much short of a
coup, but it is not very likely because of the fact that the Supreme Court
and the military do not like each other very much, and have clashed in the
past. Moreover, elections are not that far away and the opposition is
widely expected to win them, so why not wait?
President Zardari has been busy consolidating his partys influence in
Sindh, in order to make sure that even if it were to lose a majority in the
parliament it would still have a base from where to fight back. The
profligate spending of the government might have helped in this regard.
In recent weeks Zardari has wooed away from PML-N and PML-Q highly
influential notables in parts of Sindh, where they are able to elect national
and Sindh Assembly representatives. He also worked to re-establish
connections with old allies and most importantly negotiated a new deal
with the MQM, which controls the bulk of the votes in Karachi. The deal
with the MQM might have been a bit too generous, as other Sindhi parties
have been complaining vociferously; Zardari is now engaged in damage
limitation, but the MQM commands more seats in the parliament than any
of the rivals.
In September finally Prime Minister Ashraf has agreed to the Supreme
Court demand that he seek the reopening of corruption investigations
against the president by withdrawing the earlier direction to the Swiss
authorities that they freeze graft probes against Zardari. In fact Zardari
seems unlikely to face prosecution anyway, as under international laws he
can expect to be granted immunity. Before Ashrafs move, law minister
Naek visited Switzerland to assess the implications of reopening the
elections and they might not want to join a losing team. This was the
position articulated recently by the PML-Q, which demanded that the
power crisis be resolved before 2013; this is of course technically
impossible because investments take time to produce results and they are
mostly still at the planning stage. President Zardari has long neglected the
issue and is now trying to convey an image of concern and commitment to
increase power generation.
Such is the despair, that Pakistan is not just negotiating electricity imports
for 1,100 MW with Iran, but also discussing imports of 500 MW with India.
There are also talks of electricity imports from Central Asia and Russia,
which have surpluses of electricity, but these are far away countries and
such plans might not make much sense. Currently Pakistan produces most
of its power from oil, which is expensive because of the high prices. Other
plans being discussed include the building of wind farms and of coalbased power stations. In short, the government is desperately trying to
catch up after long inactivity.
The PPP, however, had in recent months gained some new lease of life
because of former prime minister Gilanis greater assertiveness vis--vis
the military and the judiciary. From December onwards Gilani had been
making the point that the army cannot be allowed to be a state within the
state, while the party as a whole has started accusing the judiciary of
being much more heavy-handed towards the PPP than towards the PML-N,
or the army itself. These accusations have found some support among the
public.
The disqualification of Prime Minister Gilani by the Supreme Court in June
came as a surprise as Gilani seemed to have survived his court
appearance earlier this year unscathed. The Supreme Court move takes
Pakistan into uncharted constitutional territory, but in political terms it
does not necessarily weaken the PPP-led government: many PPP
sympathisers were already arguing that the Supreme Court was
specifically targeting the PPP in a political vendetta. This feeling was
strengthened when the first replacement candidate chosen by the PPP,
Makhdoom Shahabuddin, former minister of health, was immediately
charged by the Supreme Court in connection with a scandal in the
procurement of medicines and had to be dropped. Then another PPP
figure, Raja Ashraf, was selected. This is not the end of the crisis however,
as presumably the Supreme Court will not place the same demands on
Ashraf that it placed on Gilani: to help the investigation on allegations of
President Zardaris corruption. In any case, the crisis does little good to
Pakistan and is not likely to encourage foreign investors, who have already
to Rs590 billion for the whole of the previous financial year. The
government has already announced that in the 2012-13 budget there will
be no tax rises, but expenditure will go up to soften the impact of the
crisis on the people (and to win back votes for the government). Now
many fear that further rises in oil prices might make the economic
situation fully unsustainable, particularly if any military action against Iran
were to take place. A good cotton harvest is expected to push economic
growth up to 3.5%-3.8%, compared to a mere 2.4% last year, but the
investment rate is expected to fall further from the 13.4% of last year, the
worst rate in almost 40 years. Some observers therefore foresee a budget
deficit reaching 7% of GDP. The exchange rate to the US dollar is expected
to worsen, compounding the problems created by the high price of energy
sources. The government might then be forced to go back to the IMF, but
it is unlikely that the austerity measures that the IMF will demand can
ever be implemented. The fact that in recent years, the country has been
relying more and more on oil and less on gas, for energy generation also
compounds the vulnerability to oil price shocks the reliance on oil has
gone up from 82% in 2009 to 86% today.
Although the rupee lost 7.3% against the dollar over the last year, it is
now under further renewed pressure, as international aid dwindles and the
trade deficit worsens. Inflation reached 10.8% in March. Exports are
crumbling due to the European economic crisis and by March they were
down 18.8% over a 12 month period. Although foreign currency reserves
have increased slightly in March to US$16.6 billion, this was largely due to
a strong increase in remittances from abroad, which reached US$9.73
billion in July-March 2012, compared with $8.02 billion in the same period
last year.
Petrol prices have crossed the Rs100 per litre mark for the first time in the
history of Pakistan. Still the countrys landlord elite is spared the trouble of
paying tax, while the countrys powerful and expensive army is courted by
the politicians of the main parties and receives greater and greater budget
allocations. Even in 2012-13 military expenditure will rise by 50 billion
rupees, compared to an existing military budget of 500 billion rupees.
The sense of economic decline is reinforced by the endless succession of
scandals. The most recent scandal concerns the illegal sales of a drug
named ephedrine, which has caused shortages of various medicines in the
countrys pharmacies; the son of former Prime Minister Gilani is implicated
in the scandal. Reports of corruption in the postal service have also
emerged recently, which might contribute to the terminal crisis of yet
another state agency (after the railways and the PIA airline).
this mobilisation might not change much. It might, however, help the
campaign of the PPP versus Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N, who argue in
favour of appeasing the Pakistani Taliban and making a deal with them.
The Gilani government was once again on the verge of collapse in January,
as another coalition partner quit the ruling coalition. The MQM officially
quit over the inability of the government to tackle the rising prices of fuel;
the party holds 25 seats in the parliament and is decisive in retaining a
majority for Gilani. The government had decided to raise the price of fuel
by 9% as a result of an increase in international fuel prices, but the move
immediately proved very unpopular. Consumer prices as a whole rose
15.5% in 2010, putting a lot of pressure on the poorest (largest) strata of
the population. Negotiations started after the MQM quit and it was not
long before the government rescinded its decision to raise the price of
fuel; then the MQM decided to re-join the government. The opposition
PML-N tried to benefit from the situation, presenting itself as a reasonable
opposition which negotiated with the government to convince it to abolish
the price increase. In reality the opposition was not likely to call for a no
confidence vote, since in that case it would have needed to prove that it
had a majority of its own. The PML-N would probably have struggled to
gather the smaller parties around itself and even if successful, it would
then have needed to form a government in the middle of a very difficult
economic situation. The issue of how to pay for the growing cost of fuel
remains of course unaddressed. The American government and the IMF
protested against the decision to reverse the price increase; the
economists, including some who until recently were advising the
government, are also disappointed with the move and see it as a further
indication that the ever weaker government is no longer able to take
rational economic decisions, one of its few selling points until the end of
2010. The budget deficit will increase by 0.2-0.3 percentage points as a
result of this decision; the budget deficit for the current financial year if
projected by some analysts as high as 8%.
In February the Gilani cabinet resigned in order to allow a major overhaul
of its own structure, from one of the largest governments of the world (54
ministers) to a more modest 22-members cabinet. Many observers have
judged this a cosmetic move meant to distract attention from the failure
of the government to implement more serious reforms; the Pakistani
public does not seem impressed either. The key ministers are still all
there, except for Foreign Minister Qureshi. Another populist measure that
the government has been discussing with the opposition PML-N is a 25%
cut in the salaries of government officials working in grade 17 or above.
The salaries had just been increased by 50% in the 2010-11 budget. On
most other issues government and opposition remain divided. Nawaz
Sharif and the PML-N are opposed to the introduction of the planned
general sales tax, insisting instead that the government should cut
expenditure and curb corruption.
On the internal political front the two branches of the PML, PML-N and
PML-Q (the pro-Musharraf faction) are trying to form an alliance for the
future parliamentary elections. This is a very opportunistic move, as the
two parties were bitterly at odds when Musharraf was still around. With
him going, however, the PML-Q had nowhere to go. The Islamic parties,
sensing the weakness of the government, are once again trying to come
together to contest the next elections as a coalition. The assassination in
March of Pakistan's minorities affairs minister, Shahbaz Bhatti was another
blow to the government and once again exposed its inability to contain
the wave of terrorism shaking the country. Quite the contrary, the
government responded to the murder by announcing that it has no
intention of reviewing the blasphemy laws, against which Bhatti had been
campaigning. In the FATA, the government is struggling to maintain the
support of the various tribal militias which sprang up to contain the
Taliban; feeling neglected by Islamabad and forced to take the brunt of the
Talibans attacks, some of these militias are now threatening to drop out.
One of the consequences of the rift over the fuel prices has been the
postponement of a decision over the planned sales tax. Opposition to the
new tax is also strong and the MQM is opposed to it too. Still the
government is under international pressure to get out of the impasse
somehow, if for no other reason that it needs the next tranche of the IMF
US$11 billion loan to be released. Government and opposition are
negotiating a reform programme, which the PML-N insists should be
focused on a 30% budget cut. On the table are the restructuring of stateowned money-losing companies and a new price mechanism for electricity
and gas. Among the best known companies that face restructuring are
Pakistani Airlines and Pakistan Steel. The government welcomes the
dialogue with the opposition, because whatever decision will be taken will
not be very popular, and it would like to spread the blame! The opposition
however demands as a prize for its co-operation the ouster of corrupt
politicians, a concession which could fragment the ruling coalition even
further. One wonders how far that could go (and still be able to ensure a
quorum in the parliament)?
In July the governor of the Central Bank Shahid Kardar resigned over
major differences with the cabinet, in particular concerning the failure of
the government to reduce expenditure. The determination of Prime
Minister Gilani to launch a public bank in Sindh, was also opposed by
Kardar. This is a new hit at the credibility of a government which floats at
very low levels of public support. The government also suffers because of
the renewed power supply crisis; the blackouts are more and more
frequent and last longer and longer. The power generation and supply
sector is a mess, with 30% of the electricity produced still being stolen not an environment where investing is an attractive proposition! People
and businesses increasingly have to rely on electricity generated by small
diesel generators, but that is a major additional cost and an inefficient
way of producing power.
Islamabads relations with Washington will likely continue to fluctuate in
2011; Washington knows what the Pakistanis are doing in Afghanistan, it is
very upset but cannot figure out how to convince the Pakistanis to
downsize their ambitions there. Now Washington says that it does not
necessarily plan to leave Afghanistan in 2014 or 2015 (but few in Pakistan
or elsewhere believe that the Americans will not disengage). The Pakistani
army is more and more upset with the Americans, because they do not
want to play its game, but at least in the short term, Pakistan needs the
US as much as the US need Pakistan. The difference is that the Pakistani
military are infinitely more at ease with playing and living in a permanent
Following the latest meeting with the Pakistani authorities, the IMF has
stated that Pakistan needs to expand its fiscal base. The general sales tax
reform is also still waiting to be implemented and the IMF has given time
until the end of September for that to happen.
The Americans and the Pakistanis continued trading blows in July.
Washington arrested an alleged Pakistani agent, who reportedly was
lobbying in favour of the cause of independent Kashmir, amongst other
ways, by contributing illegally to the electoral campaigns of Congressmen
and Senators. In the US Congress the hatred of Pakistan is reaching new
heights; a Republican Congressman proposed an amendment which would
have banned aid to Pakistan, but it was rejected 5 to 39 because the
Democrats lined up behind the Administration. Still even Administration
officials like Admiral Winnefeld now openly discuss how Pakistan uses
proxy groups to pursue its aims in Afghanistan, mentioning the Haqqani
network explicitly. Admiral Mullen accuses the Pakistani government of
complicity in the assassination of journalist Saleem Shahzad. Secretary of
Defense Panetta indicated that Al Zawahiri, the successor to Bin Laden, is
hiding in Pakistani territory. All of this is obviously true, but even
articulating it is taken as a terrible insult by the Pakistanis, particularly the
army. The Republicans are now pushing to link civilian aid to Pakistani
cooperation, for example by handing over Bin Laden's wives, but the
Democratic majority in the Senate is aligned with the more realistic
approach of the Administration. Secretary of State Clinton recently hinted
from India, which she was visiting, that Pakistan supports terrorist groups
and this should not be tolerated, something particularly painful for
Islamabad to hear because it sounded like an endorsement of Indian views
on this subject. Most importantly, the US suspended US$800 million of
military aid to Pakistan. US$300 million of that money is reimbursement
for operations carried out by the Pakistani army, so that the state budget
will be affected directly and negatively.
The Pakistanis retaliate by hinting that the reduction in military aid will
force them to abandon their deployment on the border with Afghanistan
and therefore downgrade their counter-terrorist efforts. Pakistan has
already expelled 100 US military advisers and is threatening to close the
base from which the US drones were operating; recent drone strikes have
been launched from Afghanistan. The Pakistani authorities claim that ISAF
supplies travelling to Afghanistan have caused US$7 billion worth of
damages to Pakistan's roads and reminds everyone of the 5,000 Pakistani
soldiers and paramilitary who died fighting terrorism, as they say.
US-Pakistani relations showed no sign of recovering in August. The
produce more power. The government is also discussing the TAPI project
with Turkmenistan and a project of importing liquified gas, but none of
these is moving ahead fast enough. The government is also trying to send
a signal that the debts owed by the state to the power generation
companies; the cabinet has ordered the relevant ministries to pay the first
Rs25 billion to be paid out soon. If the long-standing debts are effectively
cleared, the power generation companies might be in a better position to
increase production to capacity levels. The total amount owed is
estimated at between Rs300-400 billion.
The violence in Karachi is having obvious effects on the economy: foreign
investment in Pakistan fell 77% in the first two months of the 2011/12
fiscal year. The tax-GDP ratio is in decline again and stands at 9.5%, as
the government has lost interest in the IMF as a source of funding, while
inflation is now around 14%. There have now been cases of trains
stopping on the tracks for lack of fuel: Pakistan Railways is on the verge of
financial collapse, not even Pakistan State Oil will supply diesel to it! The
government has been transferring money to Pakistan Railways to keep it
going, but the money has mostly been spent for salaries and little has
been left for repairing the trains and buying fuel. Now the government is
trying to make some money by blackmail: recently it approached the US
authorities, aware of their upset at Pakistani negotiations with the Iranians
over a gas pipeline connecting the two countries. It proposed that Pakistan
abandon the deal with the Iranians, in exchange for an American offer of a
deal for the production of nuclear energy similar to that enjoyed by India.
The Americans, who initially seemed to have had a muted reaction to the
announcement of the Irano-Pakistani deal, are now threatening sanctions
against Pakistan if the deal goes ahead.
On the other hand there is more and more turmoil within the army, where
opposition to cooperation with the Americans is reaching new heights. The
Corps commanders have now to show that they are receptive to the rage
of the junior and middle officers. Evidence of collaboration of armed force
officers with the terrorists is mounting; some decisive action was taken
when officers were arrested in June for collaborating with Hizb-ut-Tahrir,
one of many extremist Islamist organisations operating in the country.
There is no evidence the Hizb-ut-Tahrir was involved in any specific act of
violence and the move seems aimed at showing that the army is taking
action, while at the same time safeguarding its own powerful radical
Islamist networks within the armed forces. In a concession to the angry
officer corps, the army has blocked food and water supplies to US drone
bases in Pakistan. Of symbolic value is the arrest of several individuals,
accused of having collaborated with the Americans in tracking down
Osama bin Laden. Now many wonder what could happen if an antiAmerican coup actually takes place, or if in a more likely scenario, Chief of
Staff Kayani himself is at some point forced to go as far as demanding a
complete cessation of drone attacks inside Pakistan. The Pakistanis do
have the leverage to impose such a change, if they chose to: 70% of
supplies to ISAF in Afghanistan still come through Pakistan. When they
blocked supplies to Afghanistan in Torkham last autumn for 11 days, it was
panic in NATO. Although potentially the northern route through Russia and
Central Asia could replace the Pakistani route, surely the Russians would
demand major political concessions for this.
Background:
Formed in 1947 with the partition of British India, the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan has seen alternating civilian and military regimes throughout the
six decades of its life. It is now ruled by a semi-military regime following a
military coup by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. Parliamentary
negative effect of the high oil prices was a rising trade deficit, which
reached a record US$6.5 billion during the first half of 2005-06, whereas
the government had projected a trade deficit of just US$4 billion for the
whole year.
Exports did well, but imports grew even faster. The latest report of the
State Bank of Pakistan shows that the current account deficit continues to
grow and has now reached 4.3% of GDP, mainly due to massive imports of
vehicles and cellular phone sets.
The current government forecast for the 2006-07 fiscal year of a US$9.6
billion deficit does not appear very realistic, even if a number of measures
to boost exports have been approved. Not least because of the
earthquake in Azad Kashmir, the budget deficit is expected to increase
this year to 3.7% of GDP, before declining to 3.3% next year. Government
debt as a percentage of GDP has been steadily declining since 2003-04
and is projected at just below 50% by 2006-07. The increase in the budget
deficit (from 3% last year to 3.7%) will be the most noticeable economic
effect of the earthquake, as the region hit by the disaster contributes only
marginally to the national GDP.
Observers were not too impressed with the new 2006-07 budget, on a
number of counts. With the forthcoming elections and the pressure from
the IMF and other international organisations to reduce the burden of
military expenditure, it was expected that the defence share of the
Pakistani budget would have gone significantly down this year.
Perhaps a reflection of the position of President Musharraf, Defence
Expenditure will rise by 12%, which will keep defence expenditure close to
5% of GDP according to most estimates. India's still growing military
expenditure is also likely to have created the conditions for this increase.
Due to the forthcoming elections, social expenditure is also going up,
pushing the budget deficit up despite the expected large increase in
revenue due to the ongoing privatisation program. The deficit is targeted
at a high 4.2% of GDP, although the 2005 earthquake is invoked as an
explanation for failing to maintain the previous, lower target. Some
observers point out that the government has understated the privatisation
proceeds by as much as US$3.4 billion, leaving space for additional
expenditure in the months preceding the elections. On the whole
expenditure is to go up 19%, with peaks in development spending (up
52.6%), especially health care, utilities and education, but the electoral
climate is also evident in the 15% increase in the wages of state
employees, the 15-20% increase in pension payments and widespread
subsidies for oil products, fertiliser, cement and foodstuff. Despite the
government's commitment to expand the revenue base, the measures
taken in the budget are modest and will deliver additional revenue
corresponding to just 0.3% of GDP.
INWARDS INVESTMENT
Foreign investment in Pakistani stocks trebled in 2005, but still stood at a
rather puny US$450 million, in a market whose total value is US$53
billion. Although Pakistani stocks grew by 60% over the last 6 months,
they are considered by analysts to still be cheaper than most other Asian
stocks. Many companies are expected to be privatised over the next two
years and this should stimulate the growth of the market. More in general,
foreign investment in Pakistan is growing and is expected to double to
US$3 billion this year. Economic growth is reckoned to be held down by
the high losses of the power sector, which is affected negatively by
corruption and inefficiency. There is currently already a power shortage of
500 megawatts, despite the fact that half of the population does not have
access to electricity, and the shortage is projected to grow to over 5,500
megawatts by 2010, increasing at the rate of 1,000 megawatts per year.
Although the country has a huge hydroelectric potential, it is not fully
exploiting it because of political issues and lack of sufficient funds to
invest.
At present, the strongest interest in investing in Pakistan comes from its
'near-abroad,' oil-rich investors based in Saudi Arabia and Dubai, who see
opportunities in industries such as building, electricity, infrastructure and
motor vehicles. Optimistic Pakistan observers estimate that as much as
US$4 to 5 billion might come yearly from these sources, out of a potential
total of as much as US$6 to 7 billion. If this potential was to be fulfilled,
that would mean nearly doubling foreign direct investment in the country,
up from US$3.5 billion in 2005-06. Indeed, this seems the only way
through which Pakistan might be able to cope with its fast rising current
accounts deficit. The optimism of these observers is for the moment being
shared by the markets, as showed by the stability of the Pakistani Rupee,
which in July was trading at around 60 to a dollar, just 1.5% lower than a
year earlier. Pakistan's central bank is hostile to the idea of devaluing the
Rupee in order to address the trade imbalance, preferring to rely on a
tight monetary policy.
One of the most daring plans on the economic reform agenda is to raise
the tax-to-GDP ratio, which currently stands at 10%, one of the lowest in
the world. On the other hand, the plan does not look so daring any more
when it is considered that the ambition is to raise it by just one
percentage point over the next five years, to 11%, when in the
neighbouring countries it is already reaches 15-19%. At present, tax
collection is actually declining and it is only because of rising customs
revenue that government income is going up. This upwards trend is only
expected to be temporary, as it reflects high oil and gas prices. For this
reason, the State Bank is calling for an expansion of the tax net, with an
improvement of collection in areas of the economy which are under-taxed,
such as agriculture, services and equity markets.
A recent World Bank report praised Pakistan for its progress during 20012005 in reducing poverty, which the Bank estimates to have declined by
five percentage points. The Bank in its report identified the privatisation of
the banking sector in Pakistan as a major factor of success in promoting
economic growth and hence reducing poverty. However, fiscal discipline
remains a key weak spot of Pakistan. For example, 11 major banks and
other financial institution, now in private hands, have not filed tax returns
for the last three years. No measure has been taken against the violators
of the law.
President Musharraf is trying to push Pakistan's economic development
towards heavier and more profitable industries and hopes that this year
Pakistan will export goods worth US$18 billion and that the same figure
will rise to US$20 billion next year. He is at the same time trying his best
to present Pakistan as full of attractive investment opportunities, including
in the energy sector, where exploration is going on at 22 different places
both inshore and offshore.
The latest two were in May: the plan to create a network of vocational and
professional schools and the creation of so-called Reconstruction
Opportunities Zones in the North-West Frontier Province. Such zones
would allow duty-free production of industrial goods and therefore
stimulate economic development in this tribal region, currently affected
by a growing insurgency movement. On the other hand, Pakistan's ranking
in the Alternate Solutions Institute's Economic Freedom Index is slipping. It
ranks now 98, compared to 90 in 2002 (out of 127 countries), a fact which
is not likely to sound attractive to investors. The main problems are
reported to be weak legal structures, security of property rights,
regulations of credit, labour and business, as well as inadequate access to
credit and limited freedom to exchange with foreigners.
Although in recent years Pakistan has received pretty positive reporting
about the status of its economy, some critical voices do exist. At the end
of April a respected former vice-president of the World Bank, Shahid Javed
Burki, warned that Pakistan risks a financial crisis of the type which hit
Mexico in 1994. His main concern was the possible convergence of a large
current account deficit, speculative business activity and a weak banking
system. Other economists agree that a further increase in oil prices could
make the trade deficit unmanageable. The latest figures show that the
trade deficit is widening indeed and was up 93.7% in July-April 2005/06
over the same period of 2004/05. Although exports continue to grow
quickly and were up almost 18%, imports grew much quicker, by over
40%. Remittances from abroad are growing very fast this year, with an
increase of 24.3% over the previous year. Over US$2 billion were sent to
Pakistan so far in 2006-7, with an obvious positive impact on the economy.
Pakistan is facing growing difficulties in securing reliable supplies of gas, a
problem which is beginning to dog other Asian economies too. Although
the Pakistani government launched three separate projects in recent years
to secure supplies, none of them seem about to be finalised. The Qatar
project seems to have completely collapsed after the Qatari government
declared that its gas reserves were insufficient for justifying the
investment required by a pipeline. The Turkmenistan pipeline through
Afghanistan will remain on hold until the security situation in that country
improves decisively. There is now a major question, after Turkmenistan
has signed a massive new supply deal with Russia as to whether they
have the remaining capacity to justify the investment and risks of a
pipeline to Pakistan and eventually India. Finally, the Iran pipeline faces
the opposition of the US government, although this project seems to be
the only one with any hope of making further progress in the short term.
The rising cost of steel is however pushing the estimated cost of the
project upwards, having now reached over US$7 billion. Moreover, Iran is
trying to extract a gas price higher then India or Pakistan would like to
pay.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In international politics, the short-term position of Pakistan seemed to be
ascending at the beginning of the year. Relations with India were slowly
improving, while the Americans still needed Pakistan. The improvement in
the relations between India and Pakistan is reflected in the trade between
the two countries, which is expected to reach US$1 billion this year, up
from US$600 million last year, thanks to the launch of the South Asian
Free Trade Area Agreement (SAFTA) and to the opening of a number of
roads and railways between the two countries. Previously, most of the
trade between the two countries was illegal. Smuggling was estimated at
US$2 billion in 2004-05, but this year estimates have fallen to about US$1
billion. Pakistan was also regaining some influence in Afghanistan, both at
the government and tribal levels. However, in the longer term Pakistan
had something to worry about. Clearly the US would like to have India as
their main partner in South Asia, a development which could only go at
Pakistan's expense. Moreover, because the relations with India are
improving only slowly, it might take a while before Musharraf has some
real gains to show for what many consider a bold move. This worries were
highlighted in march, which had started well for Musharraf, as President
Bush, during his visit to the country, had showed his commitment to the
reaffirmation of the strategic partnership between the US and Pakistan
and had praised the Pakistani counter-terrorist effort. However, a few days
later the announcement by the same Bush Administration of an
agreement to share nuclear technology with India was greeted with
dismay if not surprise in Islamabad. The announcement reminded the
Pakistani government that the strategic balance in the region is slowly
shifting in India's favour.
The Pakistani government is clearly irritated by the growing cosiness of
the relationship between India and Afghanistan and the US, as
demonstrated by Afghanistan's President Karzai's trip to that country,
which followed President Bush's own trip. Both Karzai's and Bush's trips
evidenced how India is emerging as a preferred partner in the region.
Pakistan will try its best to prevent the Indo-Afghan partnership from
taking off, for example by not allowing Indian goods to reach Afghanistan
via the land route, forcing them instead to travel by sea, which is a much
more expensive detour.
The relationship between Musharraf and the Bush Administration has been
worsening markedly over the last few months. The Americans came out
with explicit criticism of Musharraf in April, demanding free and fair
elections in 2007, civilian rule and civilian control over the armed forces,
therefore implicitly criticising Musharraf's double role as president and
chief of the armed forces. The Americans also refused to recognise the
Baluchistan Liberation Army as a terrorist organisation, sending a signal
that they might not support a ruthless anti-insurgency campaign in
Baluchistan.
While the Pakistani government reacted angrily to US criticism and
demands, at the same time it placed an order for 77 F-16 fighters, worth
US$3.5 billion. It is likely that the purpose of the Pakistanis is to test how
resolute the Americans are in their effort to step up pressure on Musharraf
and push him towards what they think is the right path. The Americans
would like to see Musharraf become a more conventional president, but it
is still not clear how far they are ready to go if he resists and remains in
full control of government. He might in fact be tempted by the possibility
likely the backlash following the killing by the army of Bugti, one of the
leaders of the Baluchi autonomist movement. Throughout Pakistan the
reaction to the killing has been overwhelmingly negative and has
precipitated into action even those Baluchi nationalists who seemed ready
to work within the Pakistani political system.
Summary 2007
Since general elections are planned for January 2008, year 2007 will see a
build up to that event, with the different political groups positioning
themselves along the political spectrum. The ability of the opposition to
maintain its unity is quite doubtful and President Musharraf will no doubt
play his cards carefully in order to make it even more divided. He will
probably distribute his favours in such a way as to create jealousies and
rivalries. During late 2006 he seemed to be targeting the PPP as a possible
future partner, in line with the attempt to cast himself as an enlightened
and progressive partner of the western world. During February the
government continued its offensive to establish liberal credentials with an
eye to the forthcoming elections. The latest development is the
amendment of family laws, so to grant women forced into unwanted
marriages with the option to dissolve the marriage. He knows, in any case,
that the Islamic parties will not openly confront him as long as they think
that they will have a relative freedom of manoeuvre with regard to
Afghanistan. Signs of the difficulty with which the opposition is trying to
create an effective common front continued in January. The pro-Musharraf
front, by contrast, has already signed an agreement to jointly contest the
elections, despite some divisions within the PML. The divide and rule
tactics of Musharraf and his supporters are in part the reason for the
splintering of the opposition. The reform of the Hodood ordnances
concerning the legal rights of women has cast Musharraf as a relatively
progressive president. It contrasts, as all Pajkistanis are aware, with a
military presidential predecessor, General Zia, who put the Hodood laws
onto the statute book. Following his statements against extremism and
the need for people to vote for moderates and not religious extremists,
rumours have been circulating about the possibility of an alliance between
the ruling PML and Benazir Bhutto's PPP, although the leaders of the
former officially denied it. What is already clear is that Nawaz Sharif's PML
and most of the other parties of the Alliance for the Restoration of
Democracy are willing to boycott the elections if these are held under
Musharraf, while Benazir Bhutto's PPP is inclined to participate. Even the
MMA, the alliance of Islamic parties, is divided on whether to contest polls
under Musharraf. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam seems inclined to run in the
elections, while Jamaat-e-Islami has declared that it will boycott them. Of
course, a deal with the PPP would imply that the PML and Musharraf would
abandon the alliance with the MMA, a development that the Americans
and the Europeans are very likely supporting wholeheartedly. Probably the
main source of opposition to such a deal is the PML itself, as they would
have then to share a substantial amount of power with the PPP at the
expense of their own men.
In March Musharraf's self-confidence was badly shaken by what seems to
have been a major mistake in sacking the country's chief justice,
particularly for not having even bothered to present a serious justification
for the act. Commentators believe that Musharraf might have feared that
the judge might have forced him to relinquish the command of the armed
forces, despite the fact that he appointed him two years ago. Masharraf's
desire to continue to serve in both positions was clashing with Pakistan's
constitution and pro-Musharraf and anti-Musharraf forces disagreed over
whether a simple majority or a two-thirds one is needed to change the
constitution. The chief justice would have had to pronounce himself on
this matter, but most observers did not doubt that he would side with
Musharraf. Even if in the past he had taken some bold steps, such as
criticising the authorities over the disappearance of hundreds of suspects
of anti-government activists, many were surprised when in February the
judge expressed his opinion in public, that Musharraf could not continue to
serve as both President and Chief of Staff of the army. The wave of
protests which followed the sacking has shaken much of Pakistan's
population from its apolitical torpor. It is seen by quite a few as has having
the potential to develop into a direct threat to the power of the
General/President. Musharraf's efforts to build a liberal image in order to
prepare the ground for a shift in alliances (after the future parliamentary
elections) are now in tatters and attempts to rig the elections will face a
more alert population. The PPP represents the real threat, as it maintains a
fair degree of popularity, while Nawaz Sharif's PML has been greatly
weakened by the fact that most of its base has split to form a proMusharraf party. A measure of how Musharraf has been weakened is also
given by the fact that rumours started circulating concerning US plans to
dump him. Although this seems premature, it is quite possible that policy
and diplomatic circles in Washington might be exploring alternative
scenarios, given the growing difficulties of their ally. Increasingly voices
are heard in Washington, stating that doomsday will not necessarily follow
if Musharraf falls.
Internally, Musharraf's popularity was beginning to be dented by the rising
tide of terrorism and non-political crime, which the security agencies seem
unable to control. Youth gangs increasingly hold sway over much of
Pakistan's cities. Image concerns also did no good to Musharraf's
popularity, such as when European countries banned PIA planes from
landing there due to safety concerns. Even the policy of the government
in the NWFP is coming under growing criticism for its inconsistencies. After
having signed protocols with pro-Taliban elements in the two Waziristans,
the armed forces have in some occasion carried out operations against
militants, undermining at least in part the protocols. The result is a
confused situation in the region, between war and peace.
In yet another sign that Musharraf is no longer able to control effectively
the Pakistani political scene, during May bloody riots hit the city of
Karachi. The riots hurt Musharraf for two reasons. First, he had built an
image of an effective manager who was much more competent than his
civilian predecessors at maintaining law and order. The fact that the riots
had an ethnic character only made things worse. Second, the riots were
organised by one of Musharraf's allies, the MQM party, against supporters
of the opposition. As a result they probably sank any prospect of a deal
with the opposition PPP. In the new situation created by the riots, which
killed over 40, it has become politically unfeasible for the leadership of the
PPP to strike a deal with Musharraf. Some observers believe that Benazir
Bhutto and her feudal allies within the PPP might still be inclined towards
a deal, as the best alternative to outstanding corruption charges being
pressed forward. However, the urban-based leaders of the party, who
have a more social-democratic background, are resolutely opposed. That
the possibility of a deal is now off is also confirmed by Musharraf's own
statement that both Bhutto and the leader of the opposition Muslim
League are barred from returning to the country before the forthcoming
legislative elections. Last month it had seemed that the way had been
cleared for Bhutto to return. This development also represent a major
upset for Washington, which had been sponsoring a Musharraf-Bhutto
alliance as the only option able to stabilise Pakistan and offer a plausible
option to inject more 'democracy' in the system. Washington seems to
have believed that Bhutto alone would not be able to control the military
and confront the radical Islamists, while at the same time it was obvious
that Musharraf is running out of steam.
The Pakistani political landscape continued unravelling during July,
following an army attack on the Lal Masjid mosque to free it from the
control of Islamic extremists. The bloody fighting marked the beginning of
a jihad against Musharraf for the country's numerous extremists. The
militants in North Waziristan declared their truce with the government
over, while a wave of suicide attacks against Pakistani security targets
started sweeping the country. Musharraf is already arguing that a purely
civilian government would not be able to cope with the expanding terrorist
threat, while at the same time reassuring the Americans that no state of
emergency will be declared and that elections will be held on time. Many,
particularly the frustrated civilian politicians in Pakistan, are however
already accusing Musharraf of having deliberately provoked the religious
extremists in order to justify his hanging on to power.
President Bush is reportedly using the threat of a Congress under
Democratic control to scare Musharraf into delivering the goods, both as
far as relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan's internal affairs are
concerned. The Democrats have a tradition of not being very friendly with
Pakistani military regimes and Musharraf knows that, although in fact
many Republican congressmen are among the angriest at what they see
as Musharraf's betrayal.
After the Supreme Court ruled in August that Nawaz Sharif could return to
Pakistan, he did try to do so in September, only to be sent off to Saudi
Arabia after just four hours in his native land. While this outcome was not
unexpected, the attempt to re-enter the country appears to have
bolstered Sharif's popularity, particularly in his native Punjab . By contrast,
the popularity of the other main opposition leader, Benazir Bhutto, is
declining after she admitted to being negotiating a deal with President
Musharraf. At the end of August sources very close to Musharraf gave the
deal as 'almost done', following the apparent decision of Musharraf to
resign as army chief by 15 November. Musharraf apparently means to quit
as army chief if he is re-elected president, and to be sworn in as a civilian
president, a compromise between his desire to quit after being sworn in
and Bhutto's demand that he quits before the re-election. A deal might
cost dearly to Bhutto since Musharraf is becoming unpopular in Pakistan:
polls put those having a favourable opinion of him below 40%. While just a
few months ago Nawaz Sharif seemed to have very limited support, the
latest polls almost place Sharif and Bhutto neck and neck in terms of
popularity. In part because of this and in part because Musharraf further
compromised his credibility by ignoring the verdict of the Supreme Court
on Sharif's right to return, the Bhutto-Musharraf deal seemed once again
in doubt. She tried to raise her price demanding not only that Musharraf
resigns as chief of staff of the army and that corruption charges against
her are removed, but also that he drops the presidential power to sack the
prime minister. She also asked that Musharraf drops his PML-Q party and
expresses support for her PPP. The move might also be a result of doubts
concerning the durability of a deal with Musharraf. A Musharraf-Bhutto
deal would also be weak because it is seen in Pakistan as being sponsored
by the Bush Administration, which is utterly unpopular in the country.
Nawaz Sharif is also likely to hit hard at Bhutto if her corruption charges
are removed - but his own are not.
Some even within the cabinet seem to be betting that Musharraf will not
be able to maintain the situation under control. Not least because the
courts remain random pieces on the board, still with moves to be made.
Ishaq Khan Khakwani, Minister of State for Information Technology,
resigned in September over Musharraf's plan to be re-elected without
resigning as army chief first, maybe hoping to ingratiate Sharif and the
crowds. Aware that Sharif has been gaining ground after his 'brave act',
Bhutto is now planning to return to the country as soon as possible.
Musharraf in the meanwhile is also feeling under pressure from the army,
after episodes of mutiny and desertions in the NWFP. The intensified fight
against Islamic militants is not popular within its ranks. The shake-up of
the army's top positions in the second half of September might possibly
be related to this, although it mainly appears to be meant to place
Musharraf's loyalists in all key positions before he quits as army chief. It
must be remembered that if he resigns as army chief, another general will
be appointed to this powerful post!
By the second half of October it was still unclear whether the deal
between Musharraf and Bhutto was standing or had even been formalised.
Musharraf was re-elected as President with the abstention of PPP
parliamentarians. He even managed to get elected while still wearing the
uniform, contrary to what demanded by Bhutto, although he pledged to
quit the army by 15 November. The fact that he also selected former head
of intelligence Lt Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kiani as his deputy and successor in
the position of Chief of Staff seems to assure that he will indeed quit.
Benazir Bhutto was granted amnesty from corruption charges and
proceeded to return to Pakistan on 18 September, welcomed by a crowd
of at least 200,000, but uncertainty remained concerning forthcoming
rulings of the Supreme Court on the admissibility of Bhutto's amnesty and
of Musharraf's re-election. As a result Musharraf had that far avoided to
meet another key demand of the PPP, namely measures to guarantee free
and fair elections. Most observers believed that the Supreme Court would
confirm Musharraf's election.
Another question mark came from the falling popularity not only of
Musharraf but of Bhutto too. October polls put Musharraf's support at just
21%, a third of what he was polling a year earlier and half of what he was
polling this summer. The security crisis affecting the country is certainly in
part to blame for this, as many Pakistanis must have expected that living
in a soft dictatorship would at least have guaranteed a high level of
security and stability. Bhutto was at the same time being overtaken by
Nawaz Sharif as the best potential prime minister. Parliamentary polls also
placed the Sharif's Muslim League on top, with PPP a close second and
favour a boycott and those who want to vote, but despite earlier strong
support for a boycott, polls showed that a large majority was inclined to
vote after all. Although Musharraf seemed to have recovered some
support after declaring emergency rule, presumably because he showed
himself to have recovered some decisiveness, his support rate barely
reached 30%.
Among the opposition leaders Bhutto recovered some credibility after
returning to the country in the wake of the declaration of emergency and
after having taken a more confrontational stance against Musharraf, at the
expense of Nawaz Sharif, who at the end of the summer had briefly
emerged as Pakistans most popular leader. The result of the forthcoming
elections, assuming they will not be rigged, seemed at this point to
slightly favour the PPP, which was however expected to barely improve on
the previous elections, where it obtained 28% of the votes. The MMA was
split by the decision of one of its key components, Jamaat-i Islami, to
boycott the poll and its electoral fortunes are seen to be in decline. The
PML-Q has recovered some support following the emergency, damaging
the prospects of Sharifs PML-N; the two groups now stand neck and neck
in the polls. Although Musharraf lifted the state of emergency, he did so
just three weeks before the vote.
The rising climate of uncertainty is having a negative impact on foreign
investment, which declined by 16% during July-August, to US$319 million.
The uncertainty is beginning to be reflected in internal investment too:
privatisation proceeds declined by 7.7% in July-August, to US$376 million.
Lehman Brothers now advises that the risk of a Pakistani debt default is
rising significantly, while Standard & Poor's already cut its credit rating
outlook to "stable" from "positive" after the Lal Masjid mosque's incidents.
Another question was whether a new government will succeed in
controlling the rising violence in Pakistan. The attack on Bhutto's convoy
on 19 October clearly worried investors and Pakistani bonds fell by half a
point to 92.375/93.375 cents to a dollar. The October fighting in the tribal
areas was the most violent ever and featured repeated air strikes,
allegedly with significant civilian casualties.
December registered a further worsening of Pakistans trade deficit, which
during the first 5 months of the fiscal year showed a 32% increase over
the same period of the previous year. Many now see the deficit as one of
the major threats to Pakistans economic health. The fiscal deficit of the
government has also increased to 1.6%, up from 1% last year. The
forthcoming elections probably did not help, but the biggest increase in
expenditure has been in the defence budget. Financial commentators
remain however optimistic about the safety of investment in Pakistan,
Economic forecasts for Pakistan are divided. Some, like The Economist,
predict a modest slowing of the economy, to around 6% GDP growth in
2007/08. The Economist also predicts the current account deficit to keep
widening and is now seen as exceeding 5% of DGP already in the current
2006/07 fiscal year. The World Bank, on the other hand, is more optimistic
and predicts a modest acceleration of GDP growth to 7% in 2007, on the
basis of the forthcoming elections and the unlikelihood of fiscal or
monetary restrictive measures. At the same time, the World Bank sees a
rise in agricultural production and investments in both infrastructure and
textiles. The latest estimates by Merrill Lynch also see GDP growth at 7%
this year and the next, corporate tax collection is up 69% and foreign
private investment 147%. Musharraf will probably be able to afford a few
'presents' to endear himself to some sectors of the population. It was
recently announced that corporate tax will be reduced from 35% to 32%
this fiscal year. The government however received a lot of criticism in the
parliament recently; concerning the real dimensions of its economic
success. Topics of criticism ranged from a poverty rate suspiciously much
lower than that estimated by the World Bank, to the negative impact on
the competitiveness of the of high electricity tariffs. The government, on
the other hand, continues to announce economic success after success,
with the support of a rather tame press. During the first 6 months of 2006,
revenue collection increased by 27%, a surprising result given that the
government itself had projected a 17% rise. The achievement seems to be
due not only to a buoyant economy, but also to reforms which included
reduced rates and a simplified procedure.
The government estimate that foreign investment will reach US$6.5 billion
this year. Just before the riots, the Karachi stock exchange had hit an alltime high. The Lahore stock exchange showed no sign of concern for the
political situation over the last several weeks. The fact that the Pakistani
rupee has been appreciating against the dollar despite the ever-increasing
trade deficit is also a sign of enduring confidence. Following Moody's
recent upgrade of Pakistan's debt, Islamabad is even planning a new issue
of foreign currency denominated bonds to finance its infrastructural
projects, although some observers are beginning to argue that Pakistan
will have to offer a higher yield to offset a rising perception of political and
security risk. The fact that the government is exceeding its own targets in
terms of raising more revenue helps in maintaining the confidence of the
creditors, even if Islamabad continues to borrow more than most
economists would like to see.
According to the latest figures, covering the period up to 30 June,
remittances from the Gulf countries are up 28% on the previous 12
months. In part this is due to the fact that Pakistani banks offer better
rates than the banks in the Gulf, but it is also taken as a sign of hope in
Pakistan's economic performance and stability. Remittances from other
countries are also up, including from the US (+17%). However, there are
signs that this confidence might be beginning to be dented. The increase
was mainly concentrated in the months preceding the recent crisis. In
June, the average increase in the remittances was just 9%, compared to
average monthly increase of 19.5%. In November, the monthly increase
had exceeded 45%. At the same time Pakistan's trade deficit has reached
its highest level ever during the 2007 fiscal year, despite record exports
which for the first time have crossed the US$17 billion mark. The 3.4%
increase in exports is well below government's hopes and is attributed to
some analysts to the deteriorating political situation in the country.
Imports, in the meanwhile, grew even faster to over US$30 billion, a 6.9%
increase on the previous year. Some observers criticise the government
for favouring cheap credit to consumers who use it to purchase expensive
luxury items, a major factor in the continuing rise of the deficit.
Among recent releases are figures showing that the banking sector was
continuing to grow very fast. Banking is already one of the comparatively
most developed sectors of the Pakistani economy and during 2006 assets
grew by another 17%. The Pakistani banking system is considered one of
the best among emergent economies in terms of capital adequacy, asset
quality and profits. The real estate sector also seems to be holding on well
despite the international crisis, having dropped by just 3% by September.
On the other hand, the government avoid reporting on public companies
like the railways or Pakistani Airlines, which are reportedly making huge
losses.
On the economic reform front, the government has announced the
privatisation of the state oil company and three state banks. These
privatisations are part of wider plans to sell US$15 billion of state-owned
companies over the next five years, in order to contribute to the
repayment of US$36 billion of overseas debt. A previous attempt to sell
the state oil company had failed in 2004 because the bidder failed to
honour its commitments. There seems to be strong interest among
international investors for the banks, particularly from Britain where
Standard Chartered has already a stake in a Pakistani bank. The general
trend of foreign investment in Pakistan is positive. According to the
Central Bank, foreign investment in Pakistan reached US$3.3 billion during
the second half of 2006, as opposed to US$3.5 billion during the whole of
the 2005/6 fiscal year.
Pressure on Pakistan for its role in fomenting unrest in Afghanistan went
surprising many as most pundits were betting on the more popular Amin
Fahimi, who indeed was quite disappointed of the choice and threatened
to leave the PPP. Although the PML-N voted for Gilani with the PPP, Nawaz
Sharif was reportedly unhappy about the fact that the PPP got both the
premiership and the presidency of the National Assembly. Both Gilani and
Fahimi belong to the feudal wing of the PPP, which shows who really
controls these parties.
On top of this economic turmoil, the ruling coalition actually split in May
over the inability to agree a strategy for the re-instatement of the
Supreme Court judges sacked by Musharraf. Nawaz Sharifs quick exit
from the coalition barely three months after the elections suggest being a
junior partner in government did not suit him; he probably sees as much
more advantageous to criticise the government from the ranks of the
opposition, particularly as high food prices and a complex economic
landscape demand unpopular decisions in Islamabad.
The new civilian government too struggled to control the wave of
insurgency and terrorism which has been shaking the country over the
last several months. Despite having talked tough be fore the elections, the
politicians seem now inclined to resort to negotiations not dissimilar to
what Musharraf had been doing and the army might be even less
motivated to adopt a more confrontational attitude versus the insurgents.
The position of the army has been somewhat ambiguous. Chief of Staff
Ashfaq Parvez Kiani has once declared his desire to stay out of politics,
then the army's support for the president. It is worth noting, however, that
until the beginning of March his line of action seemed to be diverging from
Musharraf's. While the latter seemed ready to align closer and closer with
the Americans in the effort against the militants, Kiani wanted to resume
negotiations and keep military operations to a minimum. While the army
was initially hostile to a fill fledged counter-insurgency campaign, the
rising losses are now hardening its stance versus the militants and Kiani
might have to get tougher too. Although the militants have lost much of
their popularity inside Pakistan when they started killing other Pakistanis
(as opposed to Indians or Afghans or foreigners), there is almost no
support inside Pakistan for an alliance with the Americans against the
militants. The latter, maybe sensing the shift, are now openly offering
truces to the elected politicians.
Relations with Washington and the new civilian government became soon
tense and the Americans stopped exchanging information with the
Pakistani security services about their cross border operations and have
openly accused the ISI of cooperating with the Taliban. Previously,
and military, also contributed to widen the gap between US and Pakistan.
According to opinion polls, in July support for President Musharraf
continued to fall and reached an all time low of 9%. As many as 83%
declared that they wanted the President out. Polls, for what they are
worth, do show that PML-N is now the preferred choice of voters, with
36%, while the PPP trails behind with 32% and is seen as losing ground.
Although this is likely an inflated figure, it did reflect a surge in popularity.
Nawaz Sha rifs approval rate was now 82%, massively up from the 46%
he polled two years earlier, as opposed to Gilanis 64%. The PML-Q
suffered from Musharrafs unpopularity and was attributed a mere 4% in
the polls. In practice it seemed to be on the verge of disintegration and
therefore it made an unattractive future partner for the PPP, let alone the
fact that PPP voters also seemed to strongly oppose such option.
The reaction of the business community to the new alignment of forces is
likely to be cautious. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto was followed by
days of rioting and violence, which severely disrupted the economic life of
the country and contributed to create a climate of uncertainty and
insecurity. In particular, power cut s got worse after the rioters damaged
transmission lines; the textile and steel industries have been damaged
particularly badly. The rail network also suffered significant damage.
Although the Karachi stock exchange did not experience any collapse after
Bhutto's killing, it is remaining for the moment muted and is no longer
breaking record after record. The State Bank of Pakistan, however, revised
its inflation forecast upwards, from 6.5% to 6.5-7.5%, while the GDP
growth forecast has been cut to 6.6-7% from 7.2%. Most foreign observers
believe that the inflation rate is higher than official figures suggest and
will climb higher than forecasts. A steep decline in services exports during
November, the last month for which data is available, might reflect the
impact of rising worries over the political situation. However, remittances
continue to grow and were up 19% on the previous period during JulyDecember, although being measured in dollars this might reflect in part
the depreciation of the American currency. In January Tullow Oil, an
European company specializing in oil and gas exploration, announced it
was leaving the Pakistani market. Although oil and gas exploration in
Baluchistan and NWFP have been hampered by the violence, the move
seemed to reflect the prospect of higher profits elsewhere more than any
concern about political risk (prices of gas in Pakistan are very low). If the
political change will appear to be leading to more stability, investors'
confidence might recover from a recent decline; however should the
politicians return to the corrupt and incompetent practices of the previous
civilian governments, such confidence might soon be eroded. On the
whole the Pakistani political system still looks vulnerable and precarious.
The general economic direction is unlikely to change, but the mood in the
streets is getting darker. Shortages in supplies of wheat and flour and
power cuts are irritating the lower strata of society. It is likely to get worse,
because so far the government has not been passing on to consumer s
higher oil prices, allowing the government deficit to continue worsening.
After the elections it will be necessary to let prices grow, hitting the
population hard.
After much hesitation and under the threat of impeachment, president
Musharraf resigned in August. The coalition government in Islamabad had
decided to get rid of him at the beginning of the month, following an
apparent compromise between PPP and PML. The coalition seemed to
have agreed that he would not be prosecuted if he resigned, satisfying the
PPPs desire to leave Musharraf a way out. It appeared that a key factor in
Musharrafs decision to resign was the advice received from the top
echelons of the army that it was time to leave. PPP President Zardari
succeeded in being elected president in September, despite the PML-N
voting for its own candidate, after a part of the opposition agreed to
support his candidacy. Some observers only give Zardari only one or two
years before the army moves in to take power again, even if Chief of Army
Staff Kayani has ordered 200 military officers to return to the army and
leave the civilian agencies to which Musharraf had appointed them,
hinting a withdrawal from politics. Compared to his predecessors (his wife
and Nawaz Sharif), Zardari lacks many of the skills of the politicians and
starts with a low credibility from the outset. Moreover, everything seems
to be conspiring against him: the faltering economy, the expanding
insurgency and the worsening relations with the Americans. Despite his
stated desire to cooperate with Washington, the latters increasingly
aggressive operations in Pakistani territory are making things very difficult
for Zardari. Did the Americans merely lose their temper after so many
frustrating efforts to cooperate with the Pakistani military establishment,
or did they lack any trust in Zardaris chances of improving the situation?
The worst incident was in September, when Pakistani soldiers shot at
American troops allegedly preparing to enter Pakistani territory. Now that
president Bush has authorised raids inside Pakistani territory without the
authorisation of the Pakistani authorities, inevitably this kind of incident is
only bound to increase. If Islamabad fails to act on its statements to
protect the national territory from such kind of incursions, its credibility
will fade quickly, giving the army a good excuse to reassert itself,
although holding power right now in Pakistan, might truly be described as
holding the poisoned chalice.
tribal militias to contain the militants, but many raise doubts about the
long-term impact of such a strategy. Also some tribes seem to be balking,
faced with the campaign of direct reprisals by the militants, and are
seemingly trying to find an accommodation with them.
Zardari also appointed a new boss over the military intelligence service
(ISI), with a mandate to reform the agency. The ISI, theoretically under the
control of the Pakistan military High Command, has long held a reputation
as free-wheeling highly political agency, with its own agenda.
Pakistani international politics was dominated in December by the terrorist
attacks in Mumbai. The Indian intelligence services, backed by their
government, were soon claiming that the terrorists had come from
Pakistan and accused the Pakistanis of at least negligence. They
demanded that the Islamabad clamped down on terrorist groups based on
its territory and even threatened to leave all options open should
Pakistan refuse to hand in 20 terror suspects or at least wanted
criminals who had escaped to Pakistan. Of course, the Indians knew too
well that no Pakistani government would or could, ever bow to that kind of
overt Indian pressure; the statement was political theatre, meant to force
Washington into offering benefits to India in exchange for a muted
reaction to the attacks. The Indians know that the mere threat of
gathering troops at the border would force the Pakistanis to relocate most
of troops deployed to the Afghan border back to the Indian border, a
development that Washington must avoid. Zardari refused to hand over
any suspects, but he came under pressure from Secretary of State Rice to
cooperate with India in the investigations, which he probably would have
done anyway.
He then agreed to set up a joint Indian-Pakistani commission to
investigate the attacks, an unusual step which has been interpreted as an
indicator of a strong willingness in Islamabad to mend fences with Delhi.
Economic data released in May has been providing ammunition to the
pessimists. Despite claim that Pakistani industries continue to grow well,
frequent lay-offs of staff are reported in the media. Power cuts of as much
as 12 hours a day remain a common occurrence, while rioting related to
high food prices also contributes to cast a shadow on the economic
landscape. Most importantly, capital flight is significantly weakening the
Pakistani rupee, which in May reached 70 to a dollar, the lowest level in
many years and this despite the fact that the dollar is certainly not at
peak highs. For the moment being the government continues to show a
brave face and its economic development strategy seems to be still quite
in line with that of its predecessor. For example there is now talk of
opening new Export Processing Zones, which offer facilitations to exportoriented industries.
The financial landscape of Pakistan looks increasingly worrying and
international firms have reduced Pakistans rating. The Central Bank
forecasts the fiscal deficit of 20 07-8 to reach 6.5% to 7%, well above the
target of 4%. The current account deficit of the balance of payments is
forecast to reach around 7.5% of GDP, which would be an all20time high,
while the rupee depreciated 7.3% over the last year. Foreign currency
reserves keep falling and stood at US$10.9 billion in June, down from
$16.5 billion in October. The fact that as a result of the change in
government, politicians openly criticise the economic policies of recent
years, adds to uncertainty and weakens trust in the Pakistani economic
and financial system.
Despite IMF and World Bank pressure, the Pakistani government is
delaying any move to cut its subsidies on oil, gas and electricity. The
government is committed to cut its fiscal deficit from 7% to 4.7% next
year, which arguably cannot be done if the subsidies are not cut too. The
plan is to gradually phase them out, but it is not clear when the process
will start. Islamabad thinks it can afford the delay because it does not
seeks any more loans from the IMF and the US$1.5 billion which it expects
from the World Bank, is not linked to any cut in subsidies. When the
reductions will actually starts, it is likely that they will affect subsidies on
wheat rather than fuel. Indeed the government hinted that it plans to
completely eliminate wheat subsidies, despite the current high prices.
The crisis of the stock exchange was getting out of control by July and
investors were been rioting in desperation, an unusual sight in most
countries. The index lost 35% between mid April, when it reach its peak,
and mid-July. Foreign investment into the Karachi stock exchange, which
had reached US$1.76 billion in the June 2006-June 2007 period, had
practically entirely dried up. The crisis had many sources, but a perception
of weak leadership and of a fracturing coalition in Islamabad was the main
cause. The food prices crisis has been discussed in previous updates, but
a third crisis started hitting the Pakistani public hard in July, as the
government finally was forced to transfer higher fuel prices to the
consumers. Although the government had already increased fuel prices
five times since February, such increases fell far short of the actual growth
in international prices. In July instead petrol and diesel prices were
increased by 14%, an unprecedented rise in Pakistan, which immediately
led to street protests. Another piece of bad news which comes as no
USA and Saudi Arabia were rejected. Although the Chinese promised to
intensify their economic cooperation with Pakistan and to build two
nuclear power stations, they refused to inject US$1.5 -3 billion into the
countrys central bank, as requested by Islamabad, in the absence of
structural reforms. They only conceded a US$0.5 billion loan. The Saudis
refused to offer discounts on their oil. The government, which needs
US$10 billion to meet short term liabilities, is now considering to apply for
IMF help, a move which is considered as the last resort as it would imply, if
successful, a tightening of its economic policies: removal of subsidies,
tighter monetary policy and steps toward reducing the fiscal deficit, all of
which are expected. In mid-October the government already announced
its intention to completely abolish subsidies on fuel, a move in a direction
which must please the IMF. The World Bank and some donor countries will
cover part of the bill too.
The economic situation got rapidly worse, with electricity one hour on and
one hour off. By October the central bank had foreign currency reserves
for just two months of imports, after they had fallen by 75% in a year. The
failure to secure Chinese aid led to a further drop in the value of the
rupee, which at one point had lost almost a third of its value, making vital
imports even more expensive. The economic crisis in America is also likely
to affect Pakistan negatively, as remittances (forecast initially at US$7
billion) are expected to fall this year. Both Standard & Poor's, and Moody
have been rapidly downgrading Pakistans rating, which is now one of the
lowest in the world, and hint that they are considering downgrading again.
The balance of payments deficit, worsened markedly in the last quarter
(to end September), from US$2.3 billion to US$3.95 billion. The currentaccount deficit reached US$14 billion in September. Capital flight reached
US$1.2 billion a month over the summer and autumn. Foreign investment
in Pakistani shares more than halved and is expected to dive further. The
banking system was in deep crisis, with liquidity drying up despite the
injection of cash by the central bank. The countrys indebtedness was
rising twice as fast as one year ago. Economic forecast were constantly
being revised downwards: the IMF estimate has fallen to 5.4% GDP growth
this year and 3.5% next year. The allocation of resources to the deprived
classes, a key feature of the government0s programme, was already being
curtailed, while the focus shifted to rescuing the banking sector and
offering bank holidays to foreign investors. The government is now relaunching the privatisation programme, in the hope of raising some cash.
The Pakistani government seems to be counting on the support of Western
and conservative Gulf states to help preventing its economic collapse, but
the crisis has arrived at the wrong time. Pakistans allies will meet in
November to see what they can do, but cash suddenly is short these days,