Dynamics of Limited War

Dynamics of Limited War

Jasjit Singh, Director, IDSA
Military history would indicate that some of the wars of the 20th century
have been "total" in all respects, the most notable being the World War II.
But the overwhelming majority of wars have been limited, with the
limitation operating in transparent or in obscure ways. The superpowers
fought over 300 wars (since 1945) across the globe. But they were all
limited, conditioned essentially to the goal of avoiding a direct clash due
to the dangers of escalation to nuclear weapons and the consequent serious
risks of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Proxy wars in developing
countries have been the most common phenomena although other ways of
breaking out of such limitations have been sought by many countries. Among
these, use of terrorism across borders has been the most frequent which has
grown in scope and effect as, to paraphrase Clausewitz, an "extension of
war by other means." Pakistan's senior military officers have been
propagating the doctrinal base of the use of terror interpreted as
sanctioned by the Holy Quran as the means of "total" war.1 But this paper
is restricted to the field of conventional war, with war itself being
defined as a continuing contest between armed forces of states. The aim is
to explore the dynamics that affect such wars in our own context and
environment, especially in placing limits on the conduct of war. Similarly
peace keeping, enforcement and related operations, important in themselves,
are not included in the framework of current examination.
It is necessary for purposes of our discussion to define what we mean by
limited war. The context is of regular military operations by a state
against regular military of another state. The distinction which would
define limited war, especially affecting developing countries, is the aim,
scope and extent to which conventional military forces are employed against
those of another state.
Transmutation of War
The nature of war has been undergoing some basic changes during recent
decades, and this provides the pointer to the type of wars we are likely o
experience in the 21st century. Territorial wars in the past were fought
for (human and mineral) resources where the industrially superior states
(mostly of Europe) controlled military technology and this also helped them
to control populations. The de-colonisation process, starting in the middle
of 20th century, ensured that populations could no longer be kept under
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control against their will. Advances in technology and globalisation of

economic activity have also made the earlier necessity of human and natural
resources less critical since the locus of power shifted in favour of
trade, technology and financial control. The only resource base which might
trigger armed conflict at the level of an inter-state war in the coming
decades is that of oil and gas. In fact, this was the central reason for
the last real territorial war in 1990-91 when Iraq invaded Kuwait to annex
it.
Nuclear weapons have limited the aim, scope and extent of war among states
that possess such capabilities (and their allies) because of the
tremendously destructive potential of such weapons.2 As Martin Creveld
writes, "From Central Europe to Kashmir, and from the Middle East to Korea,
nuclear weapons are making it impossible for large sovereign territorial
units, or states, to fight each other in earnest without running the risk
of mutual suicide."3 Total and unlimited conventional war has been
relegated to the backyard of history since the age of imperial colonies,
which was a major factor making war a global phenomenon, has long passed
away. States simply do not have the means to conduct a total war, unless
they use nuclear weapons. And this would result in MAD, nullifying any
possible political goal for which it might have been started.
But modern states are also increasingly vulnerable even to conventional
war. A conventional weapon attack on nuclear power stations, for example,
could result in a hundred Chernobyls in Europe. It may be recalled that the
accident in the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal (which resulted in 3,000 dead
and over 5,000 injured in December 1984) could be replicated by a 500-kg
conventional High Explosive (HE) warhead. The potential damage of
conventional war may be judged from the fact that nearly two million tonnes
of chemicals are abroad in transit or storage at any one time in Europe.
While fire-bombing caused much of the damage to the cities in the World War
II, asphyxiation is likely to be the major cause of casualties of
conventional attacks of tomorrow in society that relies so extensively on
synthetics.
Modern precision guided weapons make it possible to execute damage of the
scale carried out during the strategic bombing campaign in World War II
with a fraction of the earlier air effort. It is not merely that the highly
organised, industrially developed states would be so vulnerable to
conventional warfare. The developing states are even more vulnerable
because of the few high value assets they possess which have been acquired
through investment of scarce resources. The case of Iraq, where development
has been set back perhaps more than three decades, first by Iranian air
attacks and later by the US-led coalition air campaign is a prime example.
If nuclear war and total global war are no longer viable propositions as an
extension of politics by other means, the only choice available to states

to use destructive force for political purposes is through limited
conventional war, sub-conventional war with military type weapons, and the
use of coercive military force without necessarily resulting in war. The
overall result has been a reducing potential of war down to limited wars,
and from that point an expansion of opportunities for limited wars, subconventional wars and use of force without war as shown in Table 1.
Factors Limiting War
It can be argued that any modern war would remain limited unless
consciously expanded to a total war. On the other hand, a total war would
involve the substantive use of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and/or other
attempts to affect the survival of a state. The important point is to try
and assess the factors that result in limiting war so that the true
dimension of the nature of limitations and their impact can be understood
and factored into policy. These could be briefly summed up in the following
paragraphs.
Political Goals
These are obviously the most crucial and over-riding since employment of
military power normally serves a political purpose. By definition,
political goals in a limited war will have to be curtailed and, therefore,
very carefully defined. As the goals keep narrowing, the scope for error
keeps increasing.
Some examples from the Kargil War may be helpful to illustrate the points.
If Pakistan had undertaken the aggression across the Line of Control in
Ladakh in 1998 with a limited political objective, then it was obvious that
the scope for error would be high. The purpose of military operations would
not result in internationalisation (if that was the goal) of the Kashmir
issue beyond what has existed. Or if the establishment of a bridgehead
across the Line of Control was to seek negotiated cease-fire along an
altered line, this depended entirely on Indian willingness to accept the
change. This was obviously unlikely. But if the goal (as this author
believes) was larger than that to spread into the Indus and Shyok valleys
with hard-core militants while Pakistan Army held the dominating heights
overseeing Srinagar-Leh road, then its future depended entirely on the
nature and extent of Indian military-political response. And here Pakistan
made its more fundamental errors of assumptions. Such errors may not have
an over-riding impact in a full-scale war (even of short duration) since
failure in one area could be compensated by success in another. But in
limited war the margin of error reduces tremendously, and the victor would
normally have taken care to make the least mistakes.
The political factors may be classified into the following elements with
each singly or collectively affecting a particular situation:
(a) Territorial Objectives
Capturing and occupation of territory used to be the most important
political objective in earlier times, essentially, since control of
territory used to imply control over human and material resources. This, in
fact, was the strongest motivation for the colonial wars and imperial rule.
However territory has lost its value as the aim of wars for a variety of
reasons. De-colonisation and the dramatically enhanced political
consciousness of peoples makes it extremely difficult to hold populations
under subjugation against their will, especially, when an activist
international community would inevitably be an important influence.
Globalisation of economy and means of production have dramatically reduced
the necessity to physically occupy territories as used to happen till mid20th century. The only resource base tied to territory that could trigger a
war now is the hydrocarbon resource. But territory has not eliminated
itself from the political aims of war. In fact territory would continue to
be an important objective for military action in relation to at least three
purposes:
(i) Salami-slicing of the adversary's territory where each slice does not
attract a major response, and yet the process over a time would result in
gains of territory. China's strategy of salami slicing during the 1950s on
our northern frontiers is a typical example which led Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru to describe this as a Chinese concept of "mobile
frontiers." It is possible that Pakistan attempted the salami-slicing goal
in Kargil last year.
(ii) The second possibility is that of occupation of the adversary's
territory to use it as a negotiating chip. India's occupation of Pakistan's
territory in 1965 and 1971 wars falls into this category.
(iii) Occupation of territory may also be undertaken for demonstration and
psychological goals which may convey signals of victory in war, and also as
demonstration to other elements like the militants and insurgents. The
occupation of symbolic places or territory would be a prime target in such
cases. Such signals by the occupying force may also be meant entirely for
domestic audience.
(b) International Reaction
The international community, especially the Organisation of Economically
Developed Countries (OECD) countries have been projecting South Asia as a
nuclear flash-point. It is generally believed that the international

community would adopt an activist position in case of a war in this region
and try to put pressure for controlling and terminating it. By the same
logic, the UN becomes an active agency in trying to limit the war as indeed
it did in 1965 and 1971. Similarly, lack of support or even sanctions and
other punitive actions by the great powers (as happened in 1965, equating
the aggressor and the victim) could be a significant factor in imposing
limitations on a war.
(c) Economic Factors
Economic factors are likely to constitute a major factor in placing
limitations on a war because they play a major role in the building of
capabilities. Restrictions on funds for defence would lead to lowered
preparedness which in turn would result in limiting the ability of the
country to apply military power. In fact, adequate military power may
simply not be there if un-preparedness has become endemic. The constraints
that our army faced in 1962 is but one example. It can also be argued that
Pakistan Air Force was forced to stay out of harm's way during the Kargil
War since it had failed to keep up its modernisation owing to a of reducing
defence budget since the early 1990s. This situation had been forced on
Pakistan because of the economic mess that the country's leaders had placed
it in.
(d) Human Resources
Human resources can place severe limitations on a country's ability to
prosecute a war. Perhaps the most important of these is the question of
casualties in war, both, one's own as well as that of the adversary, not to
talk of collateral ones. Most democracies are increasingly sensitive about
casualties in war, and India is no exception. This can place a severe
limitation on the way a war has to be fought.
Military Imperatives
There are a number of military imperatives that define the limitations on
war. These are briefly discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.
(a) Nuclear Weapons
The most important limitation on war is due to the presence and impact of
nuclear weapons in the environment where military power is sought to be
applied. The scale and nature of destruction caused by nuclear weapons, and
the reality that there is not credible defence against such weapons creates
conditions where either the likely use of such weapons is controlled (and,
ideally, eliminated) or the countries concerned risk a nuclear holocaust.

In a situation of nuclear asymmetry, of course, the imbalance in this
capability would almost completely constrain the non-nuclear state from
fighting a nuclear-armed one. The degree to which this factor affects two
nuclear armed states is dictated by:
(i) The degree of nuclear asymmetry,
(ii) Vulnerability and survivability of the states and their nuclear
arsenal,
(iii) Political and military objectives,
(iv) Level of conventional military capability and the ability to fight
successfully within the imperatives of a nuclear overhang. Lower levels of
conventional capability would impose greater limitations on the employment
of conventional military power.
(b) Military Factors
A number of factors now impinge on the employment of military for political
purposes. The most important of these is the limitation that military power
itself has to face and hence the political goals have to be tailored to
such limits. The main imperatives affecting military power may be summed up
as follows:
(i) Political limitations impose limitations on the creation and employment
of military power. This is inevitable in modern states, especially liberal
democracies, where rationale of military power rests in political goals and
control.
(ii) Reducing defence forces and defence budgets constraining the ability
of nations to fight.
(iii) High cost of modern weapon systems and their replacement functioning
as a restraining factor.
(iv) Technological factors, especially where there are significant
deficiencies and adverse relationship with that of the adversary.
Defining Victory
The issue of defining victory in a limited war poses unique challenges. By
the very definition, another country cannot be captured. Nor would it be
possible to destroy the military power of the adversary in its totality in

a limited war as noted earlier. Hence, the historical concept of victory
would not apply in the case of limited wars. How shall we then seek victory
in such wars? Since only a part of the military power of a country would be
applied in a limited war, the question of annihilation of the adversary
does not constitute an option unless war is expanded to a full-scale
conflict. It needs to be remembered that any expansion of a limited war,
for whatever reasons, closer to a full-scale war also shifts it closer to
the nuclear threshold.
A limited war is more likely to result in a standoff or stalemate between
two warring states since the level of destruction itself has to be
carefully controlled. Clausewitz' dictum of targeting the will of the
nation and destruction of its military power, therefore, can be fulfilled
only partially. This is also a reason for some countries seeking to conduct
an asymmetric war by using the weapon of terror.6 The problem is that as
war starts to move down the intensity spectrum, victory and defeat shift
more into political and psychological dimensions. And, between a bigger
country and a smaller country, a standoff in a limited war is likely to
create the image of the smaller country having won. And, perceptions are as
important as reality. The Sino-Vietnam War is an example. A bigger country,
on the other hand, must be seen to unambiguously defeat the smaller country
to obtain the conclusion of victory. Thus it becomes important to find ways
and means to ensure the type of dominance in limited war that would qualify
as victory.
Strategic Doctrine
The foregoing discussion would lead to the conclusion that the importance
of the strategic (politico-military) doctrine is much higher in the case of
limited wars than those that are full-scale, leave alone total wars.
The central driving force for planning for defence, whether articulated in
specific documentation or not, remains the strategic doctrine for defence
that a country adopts. The world at large, and India in particular, is
already in the midst of a major revolution - that of rising expectations,
aggravated by the information revolution where the increasing gap between
expectations (and aspirations) and satisfaction (and actuality) constitutes
the biggest factor of instability. India's primary strategic priority and
goal must continue to remain the rapid and well-managed socio-economic
development. This requires a stable and durable environment of peace and
security at global, regional, national, and societal levels. The strategic
doctrine for national security will naturally have to be anchored in this
framework.
The twin goals of credible and affordable defence capability really grow
out of the national strategic doctrine. But we have not clearly articulated
our strategic doctrine so far, even 52 years after independence. The
Estimates Committee of the parliament had expressed its unhappiness at the
absence of a clearly spelt out doctrine for India's defence.7 Subsequent
examination by the Standing Committee of Defence of the parliament had also
been critical of this shortcoming.8 The broad guidelines for defence
planning, in fact, raise more questions than they answer.9 In the absence
of a well established doctrine, there is a strong tendency to simply keep
on building on the existing force levels and structures in what can only be
described as an add-on strategy. Inevitably, such an approach also tends to
be highly reactive to changes in the security environment and the potential
adversary's force postures. An overall defensive philosophy only tends to
reinforce this reactive characteristic. This would create serious handicaps
in a limited war.
Lack of articulation of the strategic doctrine operates against the
building and sustaining of a national consensus on defence policies. This
might have worked earlier because the looming threats, comparatively easily
perceived, during the first three decades of our independent existence
created their own dynamics of consensus. The Cold War itself permitted a
high level of autonomy and flexibility. Our own security could be
structured on the basis of the certainty and predictability inherent in the
Cold War dynamics. Even more important, we had access to sources of
military equipment and technology at (political and economic) costs that
were affordable. This had resulted in an average of 3.1 percent of the
national GDP being devoted to defence during the quarter century since
1962. The parameters governing these factors have altered in fundamental
ways; and this itself requires a close scrutiny of the strategic doctrine,
especially for the future.
India's primary strategic objective, of necessity, must continuously seek
durable peace and security so that socio-economic growth and development
can be pursued without adverse impulses. The prevention of war and removal
of the threat of war become important constituents in such a strategic
framework. This would necessitate measures that not only reduce the risk of
war and conflict, but in reality include even attempts to understand and
reduce the threat perceptions of potential adversaries. In essence, there
is a fundamental need to move from the classical paradigm of competitive
security towards a co-operative model of inter-state security.10 Necessary
precautions would, obviously, have to remain in place to cater for a
potential adversary pursuing its own objectives and strategies. Thus
deterrence would have to be a central factor in the doctrine, while dtente
(at the ideal level) and strategic stability (as the optimum framework) are
pursued vigorously in a sustained way. The strategic doctrine should be
able to synthesise these two divergent, and even conflicting, demands on
national strategy formulation.
It is not necessary in the present study to go into a detailed examination

of the issues involved. Suffice it to say that two broad alternative
doctrines could be adopted in the context of our fundamental strategic and
national interests:
(a) Defence of India, which itself can be achieved by a strategic defensive
or a strategic offensive strategy. Defence of India itself could be
structured on a doctrine of territorial defence of "every inch of
territory" or based on a more non-linear approach, or,
(b) Prevention of War, which would require credible deterrence even if at
the minimum level. If deterrence fails, we would need to prosecute the war,
so as to conclude it and disengage with maximum advantage to our national
interests at minimum costs, and in the shortest possible time.
A strategic doctrine along one of the above lines, (or for that matter any
other doctrine) also needs to be supported by an appropriate strategy
political, techno-economic, and military, to achieve the objectives flowing
out of the strategic doctrine. The important thing is that the national
strategy must seek to expand future options, retain a high level of
flexibility for future needs and contingencies, and remain affordable and
cost-effective. Even a cursory examination would reveal that we need, at
the very earliest, to move from the existing reactive, add-on, strategy to
a choice based strategy that looks at alternatives.
Between the above two options, the latter doctrine (of war prevention) will
serve our basic national interests much better. In fact, India had
practically, if not formally, adopted the doctrine of war prevention from
the very beginning. The holding back of military force during the 1947-48
conflict, the Panchsheel agreement of 1954, the Tashkent Declaration of
1966, the Simla Agreement of 1972, etc., are all evidence of attempts to
apply the war prevention doctrine. But its most visible manifestation came
in early 1990 when a resolute policy was put into practice to ensure that
the escalating irregular proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, besides the
sustained one in Punjab, would not erupt into a regular war as indeed did
happen in 1947, 1965, and (with some changes) in 1971.11
Deterrence will remain more critical in the conventional dimension in any
war prevention strategy, although deterrence in the nuclear arena will
inevitably possess a more apocalyptic dimension. Deterrence will require a
capability that is qualitatively and quantitatively superior to that of our
likely adversaries. But in the context of affordability it is necessary to
note that India maintained a level of spending at an average of 3.1 per
cent of the GDP for nearly thirty years. During these decades, India's
economic growth and human development indices kept improving steadily, even
if not so dramatically. This level of spending also provided a capability

which provided military victories in 1965 as well as the one which was
almost dramatic, in 1971. But above all, this capability provided the
deterrence against foreign adventure, and the visible effect has been that
unlike the earlier era, no war has been launched on us since 1965. This is
the practical demonstration of success of deterrence over three decades
with a 3.1 per cent investment of the GDP in defence.
It is possible to hypothesise, therefore, that an investment of this order
will continue to be affordable for us into the 21st century. The question
that we also need to consider is whether this level will be adequate, more
or less, for a credible capability in relation to the environment that it
seeks to secure the country against. The major factors that had kept the
costs of defence low were:
(i) Low manpower costs,
(ii) Modest cost of weapons and equipment acquired from the former Soviet
Union and mostly manufactured in the country, the poor cost consciousness
of our defence industry complexes notwithstanding,
(iii) Bulk of the acquisitions did not place a strain on the scarce hard
currency foreign exchange since they were accounted for in Rupee account,
and payable on low interest rate long term credits, and
(iv) China's military capability had kept declining since 1962 (till early
1980s) thus reducing the level of capability required for deterrence.
However, all these factors have undergone drastic changes in the recent
years. At the same time the defence capability must now take into account
the implications of Pakistan having acquired nuclear weapons since 1987
thus adding to the nuclearisation since 1964 when China went nuclear. At
one level, the issue of nuclear deterrence has to be addressed. But the
nuclearisation has also imposed the imperatives of limited war on the
conventional scenario which was not a factor earlier, at least, in respect
of Pakistan. China's defence modernisation programme is opening options for
it in the conventional field that were not really available as the SinoVietnam war and the 1986-87 Sumdurong Chu incidents showed. In addition,
the recession and retrenchment in global defence industry is now raising
the costs of weapons and equipment. Although a higher level would be
affordable in economic terms, politically it may be difficult to achieve in
spite of the parliament's Standing Committee of Defence having recommended
increasing the defence budget to four per cent of the GDP.12 Thus around
3.1 per cent of the GDP might be a reasonable planning figure.
The conclusion is inevitable that if India has to maintain a credible and

affordable defence capability, some fundamental decisions are required to
be taken. The longer it takes to come to grips with the issues involved the
more difficult and costly will the decisions be. On the other hand, the
changes taking place also offer an opportunity to make some fundamental
changes so that we have a more affordable and credible defence capability
to meet future challenges.
Defence through Deterrence
The strategic priority and core security interest of India will continue to
remain the prevention of war. As it is, the probability of war in the
foreseeable future is low. But if it does take place, its impact is likely
to be far greater than that of earlier wars. It also needs to be noted that
the next war, if and when it takes place, is most likely to be a limited
war because of the nuclear factor operating in relation to both our major
neighbours. Deterrence would play a major role in preventing war as well as
fighting a limited war.
Deterrence Dimensions
Deterrence may be achieved by denial or through punishment (or a
combination of both). All components of military power are capable of
providing deterrence through denial, especially if close co-ordination
between the three services is achieved. However, it is in the punishment
dimension that the individual components of military power start to have
different capabilities and roles.
The land forces are simply irreplaceable in terms of deterrence by denial.
But they have very little capability to provide deterrence through
punishment except through destruction of the adversary's land forces. But
in a limited war such a situation may not be possible without the risk of
escalation across the nuclear threshold. This also raises the question of
escalation control which is so critical in a limited war between countries
possessing nuclear weapons. Once engaged in combat, land forces cannot be
disengaged unless one side or the other concedes defeat, or a cease-fire is
agreed upon. Consequently, escalation control is poor where land forces are
employed.
In our context, we also need to consider the scenario where land forces
strike inside the territory of the adversary after deterrence has failed
and war has been initiated. There would be a high risk of a threat of
escalation across the nuclear threshold if a deeper strike takes place
although the actual depth for that threshold would be a function of the
importance of the area where the intrusion was taking place. The threshold
in barren desert area would naturally be higher than, say, populated areas
of Punjab. The issue that defence planners will have to come to terms with
is the actual scenario where if a nuclear threat is held out it should be
treated as credible.
On the other hand, naval forces would provide a balanced set of
capabilities for deterrence both by denial as well as by punishment.
Similarly, naval forces possess a significant capability in terms of
escalation control. This attribute, in fact, had been invaluable in the
"gun-boat diplomacy." The ability to engage and disengage at will had
provided naval power the ability to select the place and time of benefit to
it for waging war, and this was a major factor in ensuring that the most
successful colonial powers were, in fact, maritime states. But naval forces
are restricted to the maritime environment which may not be of direct value
in dealing with a war, say, in the high Himalayas. This limits the scope of
utility of naval power for deterrence.
Air power, especially combat air power, intrinsically possesses attributes
which provide it with deterrence through denial as well as punishment.
Aircrafts can fly across national boundaries and geographical barriers to
hit targets deep inside hostile territory. Highly calibrated escalation as
well as disengagement control is possible with the use of air power. This
would be a great asset in a limited war.
Hypothetically, what might have been our choices if the Indian Army had not
been able to take the key heights in the Kargil War by end-June of 1999?
Our tactical situation would have been extremely difficult and embarrassing
to say the least. The question that must be considered here is: what would
our options under these circumstances be, and what would be the
implications of those options? The following theoretical scenarios would
have had to be considered:
(a) Escalate by counter-attacking in area other than the Kargil sector.
This was being advocated by many senior retired officers at that time. If
followed, this course of action was most likely to have resulted in
heightened fears of a nuclear exchange and a combination of pressure by the
international community and domestic public opinion would have resulted in
a cease-fire. This would have resulted in the Line of Control being shifted
eastward besides re-opening the Kashmir issue to UN/third party political
intervention.
(b) Employ the naval forces to attack Pakistani land or naval assets in a
controlled and calibrated manner. This would allow control over engagement
as well as dis-engagement. But it is not certain whether it would achieve
commensurate results. The distance from the main axis of the battle in
Kargil also would have reduced the impact. There would be every likelihood
of Pakistan escalating to a full-scale war in response if it perceived it

to be advantageous.
(c) Use combat air power to attack sensitive targets across the Line of
Control (for example, bridges across the Indus River in Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir). This would indicate a resolve to escalate if the adversary was
not willing to withdraw and India was forced to continue fighting from a
position of disadvantage. There would still be a risk that the war would
expand to a full-scale level. But it would be more likely that a calibrated
air strike would extract only an air power response. Superiority in the
air, then, would be the key factor in deterring the use of air power by the
adversary.
Surprise and Response
One of the most important characteristics of limited war is the factor of
surprise since its achievement could make a material difference to the
outcome of the war. Land forces have intrinsic friction which results in a
greater time for response with requisite firepower. This could be crucial
in limited war, forcing a possible escalation with its consequent
implications. However, air power has the attributes to respond rapidly with
firepower and mobility to cope with almost all situations where the
adversary may have achieved strategic or tactical surprise. But, it is
equally important to ensure that air power is suitably geared for such
tasks.
In conclusion, therefore, the deterrence attributes of the components of
military power especially in the context of limited war may be summed up as
follows:
Table 2
Service Deterrence Deterrence
by Denial by Punishment
Land Forces Yes No
Naval Forces Yes Limited
Air Forces Yes Yes
Conventional Deterrence and Force Modernisation
Conventional deterrence, relegated by the nuclear weapons states in pursuit

of their nuclear theology, has continued to play a crucial role in modern
times.13 Global trend indicates that most countries will increasingly seek
to avoid war as we have seen it; and deterrence that rests on accurate long
range strike capabilities, whether conventional and/or nuclear armed will
be a key factor in war prevention. At the same time, the preferred method
of employing military power for political purpose will centre on the use of
force that does not lead to continued armed conflict. This, coincidentally,
requires similar capabilities: high-technology long-range "surgical"
accurate strikes, which are best undertaken by (and in many cases, only by)
air power and naval forces. The very nature of such capabilities is such
that defence against them will need to rely on similar capabilities for
deterrence in future. Strategically, air power will assume increasing
importance in the coming years, especially in limited conventional wars.
During the Cold War, air power was the primary vehicle for strategic
nuclear deterrence to avert war. In the years ahead, air (and missile)
power will be the central tool for conventional deterrence, as well as
controlled punitive strikes for coercive diplomacy. Naval power in this
regard, would play a close second.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Asian countries from Israel to Japan
are already placing greater emphasis on stronger air forces (including
missile capabilities) and naval forces. China's military modernisation and
arms acquisition programme relies heavily on upgrading its air and naval
capabilities, besides long-range nuclear delivery systems. Given the nature
of its relationship with China, Pakistan will receive the spin-off benefits
of this modernisation in terms mostly of air power capabilities in the
coming decade. In spite of a substantive cut back in defence posture
worldwide, the US decided to create a new naval fleet (with powerful
integral combat air power) after the end of the Cold War. In the process,
power projection dynamics are changing from the traditional means and goals
related to territorial wars to functional power projection with
capabilities that can strike accurately at long distances, even if staying
power remains limited. Sensor technologies provide an important additional
dimension in enhancing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
capabilities while precision guidance of striking power adds greater
accuracy and lethality at long ranges.
NOTES
1. Brig. SK Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, (Lahore: WajidAlis, 1979),

with a foreward by General Zia ul-Haq, then Chief Martial Law Administrator
strongly recommending the interpretation.
2. More than 25 states now either possess nuclear weapons formally or
otherwise, or are protected by nuclear weapons through treaty arrangements.
3. Martin van Creveld, On Future War, (London: Brassey's (UK), 1991), p.194.
4. Organised and controlled by intelligence agencies (like CIA and ISI) or
groups created for this purpose.
5. For example, Mujahideen groups aided and abetted by intelligence
agencies.
6. This is the central theme of the interpretation of the Holy Quran by
Brigadier SK Malik of Pakistan Army (see note above) where the use of
terror as a weapon and making war total are deeply linked.
7. Report of the Estimates Committee of the 10th Lok Sabha, August 1992
8. See in particular the Sixth Report of the Standing Committee on Defence
(1995-96) Tenth Lok Sabha, New Delhi, March 1996, p.6.
9. See Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's speech in the parliament, May 14,
1995.
10. For a conceptual analysis and principles of co-operative security, see
Jasjit Singh, " Co-operative Security: Paradigm Change for International
Peace and Security in the 21st Century", paper presented at CSCAP Workshop
on Comprehensive Security, Kuala Lumpur, August 28-29, 1995.
11. See "It's all bluff and bluster", interview with General VN Sharma
Chief of Army Staff in 1990), The Economic Times, May 18, 1993, p.7.
12. "Defence Policy, Planning and Management", Standing Committee of
Defence (1995-96) Tenth Lok Sabha, Sixth Report, March 1996, p.37.
13. See Jasjit Singh, "Conventional Deterrence in the 1990s", Indian
Defence Review, vol.1.1, Jan 86, pp.45-60.

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