ADVOCACY AND NEGOTIATION: A PROCESS FOR CHANGING

INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES 1997 (5-B

edition)
by
John Ruthrauff
Tania Palencia
Rob Everts
edited by Elizabeth Zechmeister
CONTACT: John Ruthrauff
Center for Democratic Education
8403 Colesvilee Rd., Suite 720
Silver Spring, MD 20910-3368 USA
Tel. 301-589-9383
Fax: 301-589-3505
email. cfepp@aol.com
Copyright 1997 by the Center for Democratic Education

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary
Definition of Advocacy
Background
Goal
Power Analysis
Objectives
Strategies
Activities
Tools for Advocacy
Letter Writing
Meetings with Key Actor
Demonstrations
Negotiations
Case Study #1: Influencing a World Bank Consultative Group Meetings: Guatemala
Case Study #2: Influencing a Social Investment Fund: Jamaica
Case Study #3: Influencing a Domestic Violence Act: Belize
Center for Democratic Education

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Advocacy, lobbying, and negotiation are actions which organizations and individuals take to
exert pressure for changes in a specific policy or behavior of a government, an organization,
or possibly a single individual. This article presents a summary of the elements to be taken

into account in the design of an advocacy campaign for non- governmental, popular, and
community based organizations.
1. DEFINITION OF THE GOAL: First one must choose and define a problem or target for
the campaign. This should be a specific issue which members of an advocacy campaign wish
to change -- a policy or behavior which is the focus of the campaign. It is vitally important to
have a very specific and narrow focus for the campaign. It is also essential that all groups in
an advocacy campaign alliance are in agreement with the selection and definition of the target
of the campaign. The goal is a statement of the desired change in the long term, generally over
several years.
2. POWER ANALYSIS: A power analysis is a breakdown of who makes decisions concerning
the goal and how these decisions are made. It is an analysis of the principal actors who can
influence or make decisions about the goal -- allies and opponents. The allies and opponents
examined in the power analysis should be only those actors with influence over the specific
goal selected for the advocacy campaign. A power analysis focuses on understanding the
networks and relationships between persons and key institutions. It is important to identify
who makes decisions on the goal. Relationships and interconnections between actors are also
key. After completing a power analysis it is important to review the goal to determine if it is
possible to achieve.
3. OBJECTIVES: It is necessary to develop several (3-5) objectives for the short term (1 to 18
months) which lead to the goal. Definitions of the objectives should be clear and limited.
Objectives are statements of the desired changes in behavior or policy in the short term which
directly contribute to reaching the goal. Obtaining objectives can be considered minicampaigns.
4. STRATEGY: A strategy is developed to influence the principal actors of the power analysis
who can make or influence changes related to the objectives of the campaign. A strategy
includes gaining access to influence advisors to the key actors. A strategy should include a
variety of resources, for example: reports of experts, peer pressure and moral arguments from
churches and others, the media, and direct advocacy and negotiation by leaders and
participants in the campaign. It is important to have proposals to change policies, not just to
criticize them. It is also important to take into account the general political atmosphere,
including considerations of institutional and personal security.
5. ACTIVITIES: These are the vehicles to achieve the strategy. Activities should increase the
pressure or reduce the forces of opposition to achieve objectives. Not all activities are equally
useful. Activities chosen should produce the greatest pressure for achieving objectives in the
short and long term.
6. EVALUATION: Each activity, action, or campaign should be evaluated immediately
following its completion -- how to improve the strategy for the next activity or campaign. The
evaluation should focus on impact (Did the activity lead toward the goal?), leadership (Were
the leaders prepared? How did they respond in the situation?), and logistics (Were materials
adequate, people in the correct locations, etc.?).

DEFINITION OF ADVOCACY

In this manual advocacy, lobbying and negotiation have the same definition: actions which
organizations and individuals use to exert pressure for changes in a specific policy or behavior
of a government or institution. These can be, for example, social investment funds, the World
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, or international donors, such as, the United
Nations Development Program or the United States Agency for International Development.
Advocacy:

Is a process to force changes in institutional or governmental policies and behaviors.

Is a process in which it is possible to involve various organizations and individuals.
Is a process which is open and public.
Is a process which requires proposals for changes and does not only criticize.
Is a process in which groups of citizens establish the right to change their societies by
changing the institutions which control the society.
Is a fundamental process in a truly democratic society.

Principles of Advocacy:
1. Advocacy, lobbying, and negotiation are processes, not isolated events.
2. Groups need to select issues for advocacy which are most important to them.
3. Advocacy is a process which involves education and training of participants and new
leaders on the substantive issues as well as on lobbying methods and leadership skills.
4. The development of new leaders is key to successful campaigns. Campaign leadership
should reflect the diversity of the membership including gender, ethnicity, race and
class.
5. Campaigns should work to model the values and principles for which the campaign is
striving. A decision making process needs to be established which is open and
democratic yet sufficiently rapid to be able to respond to changing situations.
6. Campaigns are accountable to the base they represent, the members of the alliance.
7. Alliances with other organizations which support the same specific issue are key. It is
not necessary for all groups involved in an alliance to agree on all the other issues
addressed by their organizations. Alliances with international NGOs can also be very
useful.
8. Written material is necessary to carry out advocacy campaigns. Well researched and
accurate reports are essential for this process, not just anecdotal reports which can be
ignored by key actors for lacking a valid methodology. Reports must be brief, begin
with an executive summary, and contain carefully researched information. Anecdotal
evidence is subject to the accusation that it has no value because it is subjective.
9. In advocacy campaigns it is useful to establish relationships with the individuals to be
influenced. This means that the same people should work with the same target
organizations over a period of time. As a result, it is not useful to frequently change
the persons involved with direct advocacy activities.
10. It is necessary to know the reality in which the campaign is operating, to know the
principal causes which impede work, and to establish priority solutions.
11. To achieve changes it is essential to have the ability to solidly focus energy and
resources on a very narrow issue.
12. Small scale gains are needed before attempting larger scale victories. At the beginning
of a campaign it is necessary to work on objectives for very specific and limited
changes which can be readily achieved.

BACKGROUND
In its broadest sense advocacy brings together associative groups and individuals to influence
the design, execution, and change in the policies and behavior of institutions which have
power over them. At the same time, advocacy is a fundamental and long term process within
democratic societies in which groups of citizens have the right to influence political
institutions.
Participants in advocacy campaigns should have a clear idea of whose interests are defended
by their work, that is, who are the persons who share directly in the benefits of their advocacy
work. This is important for two reasons -- first, because it is this base group which provides
the necessary political force in an advocacy campaign, and second, advocacy work must
follow a rhythm which is often different from that of the base group. Both rhythms must be
synchronized to avoid competition for organizational resources, centralization, and
demagoguery.
As a result, and since advocacy is such an important process, it should follow certain norms in
order to be effective. The following is a list of these norms:
1. Groups involved should identify the issue for which advocacy will be carried out.
2. It is important to understand the selected issue and to have enough information on it to
be able to argue consistently.
3. Advocacy participants should be prepared to get into intensive and extensive work.
They should assume that this is a collective task in which it is necessary to have:
o a democratic leadership recognized by the group,
o an explicit division of labor so that actions do not become centralized,
o the responsibility of informing and training themselves in order to fulfill the
division of labor,
o the responsibility of reporting and achieving consensus with the base groups or
associates they represent, and
o the ability and efficiency to make rapid, timely decisions.
4. A work plan should be developed which contains a clear definition of the advocacy
topic, the desired goal, the power analysis, the objectives to bring about the goal, the
strategies to be carried out, and a chronology of activities which are sufficient to bring
about the desired result.
5. Finally, advocacy campaigns are fluid and do not follow the exact path designed by
the advocates. The various results of actions taken should be evaluated and weighed
against what was projected. If actual results vary from projections, immediate steps
should be taken to correct this imbalance. The faster these corrective actions are taken,
the more probability exists that the desired goal will be reached.
The following is a summary of elements to be considered in the design of an advocacy,
lobbying, and negotiation strategy for non-governmental, popular, and community based
organizations.

THE GOAL
The goal is a statement of desired changes in the long term. It is important to clearly
determine the fundamental goal of any type of project to be carried out. It is useful to
establish the goal by open, participative brainstorming followed by debate and by a process of
refining and prioritizing resulting ideas. The goal should be clear, understandable, and limited.
It is important that the goal be attainable. For the selection of a goal, certain key points should
be kept in mind, such as:

Is the goal specific or is it subject to a variety of interpretations?

Is the goal reachable?
In what time period can the goal be reached?
Are sufficient resources (financial and human) available to reach it?

POWER ANALYSIS
The power analysis is a breakdown of those individuals who make decisions within the
institution or entity which is the subject of the campaign. The power structure of a
government or an international organization is complicated, but can generally be determined.
It is necessary, before undertaking an advocacy campaign, to understand the power structure
of the target institution, its decision making methods, the timing of its decisions, and its
objectives.
Additionally, it is important to identify the actors who make decisions regarding the goal of
the campaign. These actors may be supporters or opponents of a particular policy, and may
have influence over the achievement or blockage of the desired changes within a specific
issue.
A power analysis also focuses on the networks and relationships between key persons and
institutions and how to influence them. It is important to understand which are the persons
and institutions who want to change current policy and which want to maintain that policy.
Within these relationships and connections the power analysis should also identify the persons
and institutions which have influence over or provide advice to the actors being studied.
It is useful to construct a "power map" or diagram of the key actors who can influence the
goal of the campaign. At the center of the "map" is the most important actor controlling the
attainment of your goal. Surrounding this key actor are the other actors who can influence the
key actor and their relationship to each other. The "power map" should include both
opponents and allies to the campaign. Look for patterns in relationships between key actors.
Look for the power available to the alliance's members. Be aware of the gender, class, racial,
and ethnic dimensions of the situation.
Upon completing the power analysis it is important for the alliance to revisit the goal. Is the
goal achievable given the power analysis? Does the alliance have sufficient power to win
significant victories in the campaign? The power analysis may show that the goal selected by
the alliance is impossible to achieve. If this is the case the alliance needs to decide if it wants
to continue working on the campaign as a "symbolic campaign" or "educational campaign"
where they do not expect to win any significant victories. However, this is the time for a
campaign to select a more realistic goal, before too many resources have been spent on a
loosing campaign. It is dangerous to continue working on a campaign with no chance of

victory if the members of the alliance have not agreed to a symbolic or educational campaign.
If members of a campaign are not aware of the impossibility of achieving victories they will
become discouraged and either withdraw from the campaign and/or refuse to join a future
campaign.
In summary, it is necessary for a power analysis to identify:

The forces or actors which maintain the policy or behavior.

The forces or actors which are pushing for a change in policy or behavior.
The actors who have influence over a change in policy or behavior.
The influences to which principal actors are subject.
Key decision making times. What is the agenda or schedule for decisions?
Revisit the goal after the power analysis to be sure it is achievable.

OBJECTIVES
Objectives are statements of the changes in behavior or policies during the short or medium
term which will contribute to reaching the goal. While there can be many objectives, it is
recommended that three to five be selected which are clear, understandable and which help to
directly reach the goal. It is extremely important to focus on a few of the most important
objectives.
The objectives should be determined as is the goal: gather many ideas, prioritize the ideas,
and then select the most important. Care should be exercised to select objectives which
contribute to reaching the goal. Objectives must be carefully analyzed and questioned in order
to select those which meet the above criteria. A few key points for the selection of objectives
are:

They should be specific, clear, and understandable.

They should be attainable.
They should contribute to achieving the goal.
They should be analyzed in terms of time for implementation, in comparison with
others.
Are funds available, or can they be obtained, for the implementation of the campaign?

To achieve each objective it is generally necessary to develop a strategy and activities -- to

mount a mini-campaign. These mini-campaigns are useful for the development of experience
and skills by the leaders and participants in the overall campaign.
A final point in terms of fund raising: since it is important to have monies for the
implementation of these projects, it is advisable that one of the objectives indicate, for
example, "raise sufficient funds to implement the campaign."

STRATEGIES
Strategies refer to the way in which we plan to influence the principal actors identified in the
power analysis, and thus bring about the desired change. A strategy should be the result of the
power analysis and focus on an objective of the campaign. In other words, we must be certain
that obstacles, resources, and opportunities for change have been identified. Additionally, a
strategy should:

Identify allies and opponents who can influence the outcome.

Identify advisors to key actors.
Work to reduce the influence of opponents.
Realize that it may be possible to change the perception of the goal and objectives in
order to reduce opposition to them.

Within these strategies it is necessary to influence advisors, arrange for pressure from the base
and, if possible, involve public opinion makers and public figures. In addition it is useful to
gain support from the media in order to increase pressure for change as well as to bring the
topic to public light.
In establishing strategies it is also important to keep an open mind and avoid prejudices.
Every subject of analysis is unique and different from others; as a result strategies should not
be imitations of others, although others should be studied for possible lessons. A strategy
should include a variety of resources, such as:

Expert reports and opinions,

Pressure from peers,
Moral arguments from community leaders, churches, and other sources,
Pressure from allies including, possibly, other governments and international financial
institutions,
The communications media, and
Direct advocacy, lobbying, and negotiation from participants.

Generally, it is necessary to have direct contacts between the authorities and the participants
in the campaign. It is important to have proposals for change and not simply to criticize.
Finally, it is necessary to take into account the general political situation, including
considerations of personal and institutional security.
The following is a list of key questions for developing an adequate strategy: *Does the
strategy relate to at least one of the objectives?

Does it respond, at least partially, to the power analysis?

Can it be completed within the limits of the campaign's resources and allies.
Does it make use of the campaign's strengths and exploit the weakness of your
opponents?

ACTIVITIES
Activities are the tasks and tactics to be put into practice in order to implement the strategy,
and thus achieve the desired objectives of the advocacy campaign. Tasks are the actions which
are carried out while tactics are the means and opportunities to carry out actions.
The selection of necessary actions is often defined in the definition of the strategy. It is from
the strategy that the answers come to the question of how to achieve the objectives and from
which follows a list of tasks to be carried out. The first step is to list activities, answering the
questions of which and how many activities can be carried out. It is important to determine if
one has the capacity of carrying out these tasks.
There are a variety of types of activities which follow from a strategy:

Political:
These are related to the power analysis and focus on achieving the goal and objectives.
They include pressuring politicians and staff through direct meetings, letters, petitions,
demonstrations, etc., and coordination with allies.
Dissemination:
This includes the communications media, press conferences, articles, paid
announcements, etc.
Economic:
These include developing the resources necessary to carry out the campaign, travel
expenses, communications, etc.
Organizational:
This includes workshops to keep the base up to date, increase its members, help them
to identify with the campaign, etc.
Administrative:
These include correspondence, secretarial tasks, meetings, photocopies, and phone and
fax calls.
Once a list of possible tasks has been identified, it is necessary to define certain points: who
will carry out these activities, how long will they take, and which are the most urgent
activities with the highest priority. In order to achieve clarity, it is important to answer a
number of questions:

Which activities are priority, which secondary, and which low priority?
Which activities can be carried out simultaneously?
Who is the target of the activity?
Who will carry out the activity?
How long will it take to carry out the activity?
Where will the activity be carried out?
How should the activity be evaluated?

TOOLS FOR ADVOCACY

Each campaign will require a variety of activities or tools for advocating the changes
necessary to achieve the goal and/or objectives. Tools need to be adjusted for the appropriate
local culture and social base. Tools should also be appropriate to the knowledge and skills of
the participants.
This section will outline the use of a number of possible tools.
1. Letter Writing
Letter writing is a basic tool for communicating a point or position of an alliance. Letters
should have a number of characteristics. Be brief. The letter should be no more than one or
two pages. Documents and materials can be attached to the letter but the letter should be short
and to the point. The tone of the letter should be firm but courteous. You should never make
threats in a letter. The author(s) should be comfortable with anything in the letter being made
public, published in a newspaper, or sent to an opponent. After a brief introductory paragraph
the letter should clearly state the purpose or point of the communication. Try to mention

something which you agree with the recipient of the letter. It is important that the letters have
correct spelling and punctuation. Always keep a copy of the letter. All signers of the letter
should receive a copy. It is often useful to send copies of the letter (cc:) to other influential
actors, for example: the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, or USAID
representatives.
2. Meetings with Key Actors
Any advocacy campaign will usually entail direct, face to face meetings with the key actors
you are trying to influence. It may be very difficult to arrange for a meeting with a key actor
and therefore each meeting needs to be carefully planned.
The following items need to be planned:

The key points to be raised in the meeting.

The position of the alliance on topics expected to be addressed in the meeting.
Who will speak for the alliance in the meeting. Leaders should reflect the makeup of
the constituency of the alliance including women and indigenous peoples.
Agreements or positions acceptable to the delegation.
How decisions will be made DURING the meeting.
Contingencies need to be planned for. For example, if you have an appointment with
the Minister of Natural Resources and he/she sends an aide do you refuse to meet with
him/her and insist on a meeting with the minister or hold the meeting and/or request a
further meeting with the minister.
Meetings need to have some method of accountability and follow-up. This may be a
report to be issued at a certain date or a follow-up meeting to review progress.
Any points agreed to in the meeting should be confirmed in writing.

3. Demonstrations/ Vigils
Demonstrations, vigils, or mass gatherings of supporters for pressuring a government or
organization should be used only occasionally, be very carefully planned, and be part of an
overall strategy. These take a great deal of resources and effort but may be ignored by the key
actors you are trying to influence. They can be a drain on an alliance's resources and thereby
prevent you from conducting other, more effective activities.
If after a power analysis, setting objectives, and developing a strategy a demonstration, vigil ,
or mass gathering is the most effective form of pressure it needs to be very carefully planned
and executed. Points that need to be considered include:

The specific target of the demonstration.

The number of demonstrators necessary to make an impact.
The logistical requirements necessary to transport and supply the demonstrators (food,
housing, sanitary facilities, public address system, etc).
The need for media coverage for a successful demonstration. Remember that you can't
control how the media reports the demonstration and they may accentuate negative
aspects, for example unruliness or law breaking on the part of the demonstrators.
Permits needed to conduct a legal demonstration.
The selection of speakers and other public leaders for the demonstration. It is
important that members of the alliance have representatives in public positions.

The physical security of the demonstrators both during the demonstration and
traveling to and from the demonstration site need to be considered.

4. Negotiations
During an advocacy campaign it is expected that an alliance will need to enter negotiations
with key actors. It is important to remember that a negotiation is a give and take. An alliance
needs to enter negotiations with the understanding that it will not be able to obtain its full
position -- it will need to compromise on some of its points. It is important for the alliance to
decide several key points prior to starting negotiations:

When beginning negotiations an alliance should ask for the best possible results it
desires but be clear on fall back positions and on the minimum agreement it will
accept.
An alliance needs to present itself in the negotiations in a manner which will build its
power -- this includes the composition of the negotiating team, dress, discipline in the
negotiating team, timing, and presentation of positions.
A negotiating team needs to be selected with representatives from the key
organizations from an alliance. The team needs to have a clear focus, established
leadership, and clear roles for its members. The team needs to know if it can negotiate
a final position or if it needs to bring the best offer back to the membership of an
alliance.
The negotiating team needs to have as much information as possible on who is serving
on the opposing team. It is useful to know what their position will be and to
understand what their interest is in negotiating.
The team should be willing to caucus if it is unsure of the next steps or how to respond
to an offer.
The team should NEVER argue or disagree with each other in front of the opposition.

CASE STUDY #1
Influencing a World Bank Consultative Group Meeting: Guatemala
Introduction
Each year the World Bank hosts 20 to 25 Consultative Group (CG) meetings in Paris to allow
donor countries and multi-lateral development institutions to meet with a single applicant
country from the Third World. Prior to the meeting, the World Bank prepares an economic
analysis of the applicant country, and the applicant country presents their economic analysis
and projects for which it is seeking international financial assistance.
In June 1995 the World Bank hosted Consultative Group meetings on Guatemala, El Salvador
and Nicaragua. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are not permitted to participate in,
or observe, the CG meetings without an invitation from their government. These meetings are
extremely important for civil society because they set the framework for loans and donations
to the country for the following three to five years. It is possible, however, for NGOs to have
input into the meetings by preparing a position paper for presentation to governments and to
multi-lateral financial institutions prior to the Consultative Group meeting.

This is a case study of work undertaken by NGOs in Guatemala, the United States, Canada,
and Europe prior to the World Bank Guatemala Consultative Group meeting of June 1995. It
will examine the development of a core group of Guatemalan non-governmental organizations
who organized to respond to the government's position as well as the international support
work. The case study will examine the development and implementation of an advocacy
strategy by Guatemalan organizations to influence the international donors attending the CG
meeting.
Guatemala Campaign
1994
In the winter of 1994 the World Bank announced plans to host a Guatemala Consultative
Group meeting in June of that year. In April several non-governmental organizations in
Guatemala approached the Director of the Center for Democratic Education (Center) and
requested assistance in their preparation for the World Bank Consultative Group (CG)
meeting on Guatemala. This CG meeting was postponed and subsequently linked to the
signing of the Guatemalan peace accords. An "informal" (non-pledging) Consultative Group
meeting on Guatemalan was held in June 1995. In the spring of 1994 the Director of the
Center for Democratic Education began a series of visits to Guatemala designed to assist the
local organizations to more clearly understand the role of Consultative Group meetings. The
Center provided information and technical assistance to local organizations as they prepared
for the CG meeting. Each trip (which totalled nine during the 15 months leading up to the
June 1995 CG meeting) involved a variety of activities:

Individual meetings were held with NGO leaders concerned about the Consultative
Group meeting.
Briefing documents on the CG meeting were distributed in Guatemala.
Meetings were held with the Technical Team, established to represent local
Guatemalan organizations in the process, and
Assistance was provided to the Technical Team on the development of an advocacy
strategy.

In July 1994 a Working Group of U.S. NGOs was organized in Washington, DC by the Center
for Democratic Education under the auspices of the Economic Issues Task Force of the Latin
American Working Group. The purpose of the U.S. Working Group was to develop support
for Guatemalan organizations in their efforts to have input into the Consultative Group
meeting.
This alliance of US organizations was key to the success of the campaign and brought
together individuals with experience on Consultative Group meetings. The alliance provided a
number of key resources to the process:

It pooled the knowledge of CG meetings from a dozen U.S. organizations.

It provided ideas and served as a sounding board for advocacy strategies.
It provided feedback to the Guatemalan organizations on the process, their position
paper, and their advocacy strategy.
It provided speakers and contacts for the Guatemalan workshop on the Consultative
Group meeting.
It developed and implemented the idea of a sign-on letter.

It provided the contacts and organized the Guatemalan NGO delegation to

Washington.

During 1994 donor countries and multi-lateral development agencies organized an informal
secretariat in Guatemala to coordinate preparations for the meeting. This secretariat included
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nation
Development Program (UNDP). Most of the secretariat work was undertaken by the UNDP
which convened a number of meetings of the donor countries, including one at the
ambassadorial level, to coordinate preparation.
In November two federations of NGOs began work on the CG meeting: COINDE (Council of
Guatemalan Development Institutions) with 12 member organizations and CONGCOOP
(Coordination of NGOs and Cooperatives for the Accompaniment of the Population Affected
by the Internal Armed Conflict) with 23 member NGOs.
The Deputy Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was very
helpful as the campaign progressed and met with members of the Technical Team in the
spring. The Central America office of USAID in Washington, DC was also very helpful in
sharing information about the CG meeting.
1995
During the early months of 1995 the Guatemala Technical Team expanded to include three
additional NGO federations who were members of Forum of NGO Coordinations (Foro de
Coordinaciones de ONGs): ASINDES (Asociacin de Entidades de Desarrollo y de Servicio
No Gubernamental), COMG (Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala), and Foro de
ONGsy Cooperantes. The Team developed a draft position statement which was revised and
focused over a period of several months. The NGO position paper included six major points :

Implementation of the MINUGUA recommendations (UN Human Rights mission to

Guatemala).
Guatemala Government's commitment to providing funds for the reconstruction
process.
The strengthening of the Technical Commission created by the Accord for the
Resettlement of Populations Uprooted by the Armed Conflict.
Participation of the Civil Society in the Secretariat for Peace, Development and
National Reconstruction (SEPAZ).
The creation of an Intersectoral Commission for social auditing and verifying the
transparency of the implementation resources.
The eradication of traditional practices that promote secrecy of the plans of the
reconstruction process.

In February the Technical Team drafted a fund raising proposal to European and U.S. funders.
This included a work plan, drafted by the Center, that was to become the Technical Team's
advocacy strategy. Just prior to the educational workshop Lutheran World Relief awarded the
first grant to the campaign allowing the workshop to proceed on schedule. Subsequently both
DIAKONIA of Sweden and Oxfam-UKI funded the campaign.
A positive relationship was developed with staff of the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) directing the secretariat work. This resulted in members of the Technical Team

meeting with a staff member and his presentation at a workshop on the Consultative Group
meeting held by the Technical Team in March.
In March the Technical Team held a workshop to orient a larger group of Guatemalan
organizations to the Consultative Group meeting and to enlist their support. Workshop
speakers included: Lisa Haugaard of the Latin American Working Group, a UNDP official,
and a staff member of NITLAPAN, a research center in Nicaragua, who had worked on the
Nicaraguan CG meeting. The Guatemalan government refused several invitations to speak at
the workshop. The Center provided background briefing papers and World Bank materials for
workshop participants. Attended by over 50 individuals and organizations, the workshop was
highly successful in mobilizing support in the civil sector for the Consultative Group meeting.
By the end of March the position platform had been endorsed by the Guatemalan Civil Sector
Assembly which greatly broadened its backing. The Civil Sector Assembly was established to
assist with the peace negotiations and included: non-governmental organizations, human
rights organizations, political organizations, women's organizations, religious organizations,
Mayan organizations, unions and popular organizations, research organizations and
universities, news organizations, and small and medium sized businesses.
The Latin American Working Group wrote and distributed a cover letter for the Guatemalan
position paper. This was signed by almost 20 U.S. organizations and was sent to officials prior
to their meetings with the delegation.
In May the Guatemala government issued an invitation to the non-governmental organizations
to be observers on the government's delegation to the CG meeting. However this invitation
was made following the publication of the government's position paper. Since the NGOs had
not been allowed input into the government's position they refused to accompany the
delegation to Paris because this would imply their endorsement of the government's position.
In June the Technical Team sent a three member delegation to Washington which met with a
wide range of officials at the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, International
Monetary Fund, and U.S. Departments of State and Treasury as well as a the U.S. Agency for
International Development. The delegation had individual meetings with each of the three
U.S. representatives to the Consultative Group meeting. They received praise in the meetings
concerning their professionalism, organization, and diligence. The delegation also met with
the Economic Issues Task Force of the Latin American Working Group and the Washington
Office on Latin America hosted a briefing for Washington organizations and congressional
staff.
Results
This first effort on the part of Guatemalan non-governmental organizations to have input into
the Consultative Group meeting met with surprising success. Initially few outsiders believed
that Guatemalan organizations could unite behind a combined platform. This was
accomplished by March of 1995.
During the visit to Washington the delegation received praise and respect for their
professionalism and work in preparing their position platform. The position platform had been
provided to participants prior to each meeting, allowing the discussions to be specific and
productive. The World Bank meeting included six members of the Central America team with

the lead economist for Central America chairing the session. The meeting lasted over two
hours and was ended by the Guatemalan organizations.
During the Consultative Group meeting three important events occurred:

The Guatemala government admitted that the participants in the Consultive Group
meeting had been lobbied by the Guatemalan NGOs.
The head of the U.S. delegation, Mark Schneider, Assistant Administrator at the U.S.
Agency for International Development, read the key points of the Guatemalan NGO
position paper during his presentation.
The Guatemalan government publicly agreed to involve Guatemalan civil sector in the
preparation of the government's position prior to the next Consultative Group meeting.

Advocacy Chronology
1. Briefing documents were developed and distributed to Guatemalan NGOs by the
Center for Democratic Education.
2. NGO allies were recruited in the U.S.
3. A Technical Team of NGOs began preparing for the CG meeting. Initially this
consisted of two NGO federations, COINDE and CONGCOOP, as well as a number of
individual NGOs including the research center AVANCSO. Later additions of other
NGO federations including: ASINDES (Asociacin de Entidades de Desarrollo y de
Servicio no Gubernamental, USAID funded), CONG (Consejo de Organizaciones
Mayas de Guatemala), and Foro de ONGs y Cooperantes.
4. A funding proposal was submitted by the Guatemalan NGOs to U.S. and European
funders.
5. The Guatemalan NGO Technical Team developed a position platform.
6. Allies were recruited in Canada and Europe.
7. The Guatemalan Technical Team held an educational seminar to broaden participation
and to orient local organizations to the CG meeting. The Latin America Working
Group and Center for Democratic Education assisted with the seminar which was
funded by Lutheran World Relief.
8. The position platform was endorsed by Guatemalan NGOs and the Civil Sector
Assembly
9. The position platform was presented in Guatemala to:
o Guatemalan Government
o embassies whose countries would attend the CG meeting
o U.S. Agency for International Development
o United Nations Development Program
o Inter-American Development Bank.
10. The platform was translated into English.
11. The platform was presented by a Guatemalan NGO delegation to Washington, DC.
Each official visited received a copy of the platform prior to their meeting.
o World Bank
o Inter-American Development Bank
o International Monetary Fund
o United States government: USAID, State and Treasury Departments
12. Plans were made for Guatemalan NGOs to present the platform to the following
organizations and countries but due to a lack of time and resources the delegation did
not visit them. The position platform was presented by Northern NGOs to:

United Nations Development Program

Canadian government
Belgium government
United Kingdom representative at the World Bank
13. Other governments that were targeted but were not approached by the Guatemalan
Technical Team or Northern NGOs due to a lack of time and resources:
o Spain
o Sweden
o Germany
o France
o Norway
o European Union
o
o
o
o

Campaign Strategy Design:

Goal:
To insure input into the World Bank's Guatemala Consultative Group meeting by the
Guatemalan civil society, including non-governmental and popular organizations.
Power Analysis:
1. The Guatemalan government is perceived negatively by the international financial
community.
2. The Guatemalan government strongly desires a successful Consultative Group meeting.
3. The World Bank wants civil society input into the Consultative Group meeting.
4. The United States government wants civil society to have input into the Consultative Group
meeting.
Objectives:
1. To form an alliance of non-governmental organizations with other sectors of the civil
society.
2. To develop a common position that alliance members can endorse.
3. To develop alliance support among the key countries and financial institutions attending the
Consultative Group meeting.
Strategies:
1. To develop a unified position within civil society concerning the Consultative Group
meeting.
2. To enlist the support of friendly governments for the position of the civil society.
3. To enlist the support of international NGOs in the U.S., Canada, and Europe.
4. To present the civil society position to key actors prior to the Consultative Group meeting.
Activities:
1. Guatemalan NGOs discuss the possibility of influencing the Consultative Group meeting.
2. A working group of US NGOs is developed to support the Guatemalan civil society
position.
3. A draft position paper is circulated among NGOs interested in the Consultative Group
meeting.
4. The position paper is endorsed by the FORO de ONGs.
5. The position paper is endorsed by the Civil Sector Assembly.
6. The position paper is presented to the Guatemalan government and foreign embassies.

7. The position paper is presented to the World Bank, I DB, IMF, and U.S. Departments of
State and Treasury, and USAID during a Guatemala Civil Society delegation visit.
Epilogue
In the fall of 1995 the Civil Society Assembly established a Technical Commission to prepare
for the next Consultative Group meeting. This group met with President elect Alvaro Arz in
January 1996 and he re-affirmed the government's commitment to involve the Civil Sector
Assembly in the preparations for the next Consultative Group meeting which was held in
Brussels on January 21-22, 1997.
In 1995 the Technical Commission of the Assembly asked the Center to develop an
international support network. Working closely with the Copenhagen Initiative for Central
America (CIFCA), the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC), the
International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Canada), and the Latin
America Working Group in Washington, over 50 NGOs in the US, Canada, and Europe were
enlisted to assist the campaign.
In April 1996 the Technical Commission held a three day training workshop for members of
the Assembly on lobbying campaigns, the European Union and the Consultative Group
meeting. This training was conducted by the Center for Democratic Education, a Copenhagen
Initiative for Central America member (the Central America Human Rights Committee,
London), and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).
In December the Foro de Coordinaciones de ONG de Guatemala published a position paper
which was followed by the publishing of a position paper by the Civil Society Assembly. In
addition the Center for Human Rights Legal Action circulated a position paper focusing on
human rights. Prior to the Consultative Group meeting the Foro de Coordinaciones de ONG
and the Assembly issued a combined position paper. In January 1997 the Copenhagen
Initiative for Central America (CIFCA) organized a two week delegation visit to Europe for
representatives of the Foro de Coordinaciones de ONG and the Civil Society Assembly. The
position papers were presented to the counties and institutions attending the CG meeting.
The Inter-American Development Bank hosted the Guatemala Consultative Group meeting
January 21-22, 1997 in Brussels. During the meeting $1.9 billion was pledged for loans and
grants to Guatemala for implementation of the peace accords. The advocacy campaign by the
Civil Society Assembly and Foro de Coordinaciones de ONG resulted in a number of
improvements in the U.S. position as well as impacting on Canada, the European Union, and
European countries.
A number of important events occurred during the campaign's final months: The Guatemala
Civil Society Assembly and the NGO Forum agreed on a combined position statement. A U.S.
NGO sign-on letter was sent to the Office of Management and Budget requesting an increase
in the amount of funds allocated by the U.S. to implement the peace accords. A second U.S.
NGO sign-on letter was sent to the U.S. Agency for International Development, the State
Department, and the Treasury Department supporting the Guatemalan positions vis-a-vis the
Consultative Group meeting. The Canadian Council for International Cooperation's
Guatemala Working Group submitted a sign-on letter to the Canadian Foreign Minister in
support of the Guatemalan positions.

A Latin America Working Group delegation met with a Guatemala government delegation and
with Mark Schneider, U.S. AID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and head of the
U.S. Delegation. CIFCA (Copenhagen Initiative for Central America) published a research
paper on the impact of European Union funding in Guatemala, La Poltica de Cooperacin de
la Unin Europea Hacia Guatemala: Un an lisis preliminar, 1996. CIFCA also sponsored a
Guatemala civil society delegation to Europe for two weeks. The delegation included two
members from the Civil Society Assembly and two from the NGO Forum. Three additional
members from COPMAGUA, an alliance of 175 Mayan organizations, joined the delegation
for a number of meetings. The CIFCA delegation visited France, Germany, Spain, the
Netherlands, and Belgium to present their position to governments and NGOs.
In Brussels a meeting was held for the delegation with Mark Schneider, Stacy Rhodes (U.S.
AID-Guatemala), and Liliana Ayalde (U.S. AID-Central America). This meeting was
primarily for the four COPMAGUA members. Mark Schneider agreed that they should meet
again in six months with Stacy Rhodes for an assessment of the implementation of the
accords. The US position improved significantly during 1996: The U.S. pledged $260 million
over four years, subject to Congressional action. This is up from the original $19 million
commitment for 1997. The U.S. assistance program is premised on the successful
implementation of the institutional and policy reforms in the substantive accords. The U.S.
position focused on:

Establishing a Justice Strengthening Commission to improve the access to and

functioning of the judicial system.
Enacting an Organic Law for the national civilian police.
Increasing expenditures in health and education by 50%.
Increasing tax revenues by 50%.
Signing an upper credit tranche (Stand-by) arrangement with the International
Monetary Fund.

CASE STUDY #2:

Influencing a Social Investment Fund: Jamaica
Background
For the past several years the Jamaican government, with the assistance of the World Bank,
planned for the establishment of a Social Investment Fund (SIF). Social investment funds
were created in response to the debt crisis in Latin America as a part of economic structural
adjustment policies implemented under the direction of the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. Social investment funds are a partial response to the deepening of extreme
poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean which lacks any substantial "social safety nets",
e.g.: unemployment assistance, pension programs, or public health services and public
education in the rural areas.
The primary activity of a social investment fund is to make grants for small investment
projects of infrastructure and equipment in the areas of health, education, drinking water and
sanitation, environment, electrification, and community development, and in so doing
improve the living conditions of the country's poor.

In 1996 the Jamaican government established a Social Investment Fund (SIF) with the support
of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The Jamaican NGO
community had been involved in a World Bank sponsored workshop on the SIF in December
1995 but felt that they were not having sufficient input into the design of the Fund's operation.
Several NGOs invited the Center for Democratic Education to assist in a campaign to increase
the NGOs' influence over the Social Investment Fund. The Jamaican NGO Council decided to
launch a campaign to insure that several members of the SIF Board of Directors represented
the NGO community.
Chronology of Events
In December 1995 the World Bank, with the Planning Institute of Jamaica (a government
agency), hosted a three day workshop to introduce non-governmental and community based
organizations to social investment funds and to obtain their input into the design of the
Jamaican Social Investment Fund. However, despite their presence at this workshop, between
December 1995 and May 1996 the NGO community was not been involved in the process of
designing the Jamaican Social Investment Fund.
The Center for Democratic Education (Center) had conducted intensive investigations of the
social investment funds in El Salvador and Guatemala. Because of this work, in March 1996
the Social Action Center of Kingston, Jamaica requested the Center's assistance. Advice was
requested to help Jamaican non-governmental and community based organizations develop
influence over the operations of the Jamaican Social Investment Fund. This began a short
(five month) campaign to have NGO representatives included on the Board of the Jamaican
Social Investment Fund. In April 1996 the Director of the Center for Democratic Education
visited Jamaica for an initial round of meetings with federations of NGOs and community
based organizations and international financial institutions.
During these meetings it became clear that several federations of NGOs and community based
organizations wanted to develop a campaign to influence the Social Investment Fund. The
federations established the Jamaican NGO Council in early 1996.
The Center's Director also met with representatives at the World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank responsible for the Jamaican Social Investment Fund. The bank staff were
very helpful and informative and during these meetings four key points of information were
provided:
1. The World Bank planned to hold final negotiations and approval of the Jamaican
Social Investment Fund loan within two to three months.
2. The Jamaican government needed to appoint the Social Investment Fund Board of
Directors prior to final negotiations.
3. The Jamaican government was in the process (in May) of circulating a list of potential
members of the Board of Directors of the Social Investment Fund but had not finalized
the board list.
4. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank supported the concept of
NGO representatives on the SIF Board.
The Jamaican NGO Council decided to launch a campaign to insure that several members of
the SIF Board of Directors represented the NGO community, and that they be selected by the
NGO community. The immediate nature of key decisions by the Jamaican government and the

World Bank required the NGOs to move rapidly to influence the selection of the SIF Board of
Directors.
The Jamaican NGO Council met in early May and drafted a letter to Dr. Wesley Hughes,
Director of the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) which is part of the Ministry of Finance
and Planning. The letter proposed that the Council "submit a representative slate of suitable
NGO Sector candidates from which the Government could appoint a minimum of a third of
the JSIF Board." The letter also stated that the Council "would therefore like to meet with you
[Dr. Hughes] as a matter of urgency...." Copies of the letter were sent to the office of the
Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and Planning, the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the Ambassador from the Netherlands, and the British High Commission.
After some difficulty in reaching Dr. Hughes, a meeting was held in late May. This meeting
included four representatives from the Jamaican NGO Council. The Planning Institute of
Jamaica and the Jamaican Social Investment Fund were represented by Dr. Wesley Hughes,
Director, Planning Institute of Jamaica and three staff. Dr. Hughes agreed that the Jamaican
NGO Council could submit three names for the Social Investment Fund Board. The Council
met and decided to nominate nine individuals for one third of the positions on the Board.
Results
In July the Jamaican Cabinet approved a Social Investment Fund Board of seven individuals,
including two representatives, from the NGO community one of them nominated by the
Jamaican NGO Council (almost 30% of the Board). This action represented a major victory
for the new Jamaican NGO Council. It is the first time in Latin America and the Caribbean
that NGOs have been permitted to nominate board members for a social investment fund.
Campaign Strategy Design
Goal:
To establish a formal role for non-governmental and community based organizations in the
governance of the Jamaican Social Investment Fund.
Power Analysis:
Key points in the power analysis included:
1. The Board of Directors of the Jamaican Social Investment Fund are formally
appointed by the Minister of Finance and Planning, Dr. Omar Davies.
2. The Planning Institute of Jamaica will undertake the work of screening and developing
a list of candidates for the board.
3. Dr. Davies will need to clear the selection of the Board with the Prime Minister.
4. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank support the inclusion of
NGO representatives on the Board. In particular, the Jamaican mission of the World
Bank had established a reputation for encouraging participation of civil society in
bank projects.
5. The President of the World Bank, James Wolfinsohn, had given clear public messages
of support for participation of NGOs and civil society in bank projects.
6. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank have a great deal of influence
over the planning and implementation of the SIF operations. This influence will

decrease following the approval by the World Bank and Inter-American Development
Bank's Boards of Executive Directors of the Jamaican Social Investment Fund loan.
7. The Jamaican government desired to be seen as open to input from the NGO
community and civil society in general. In fact, there was a chance that the
government would select an NGO representative for the Board, however, without
NGO input.
8. If the Jamaican government selected an NGO representative without input from the
NGO community the selected NGO would be perceived to be "in the government's
pocket", in other words too closely aligned to the government to represent the NGO
community.
Objectives:
1. To win the support of the World Bank for the Jamaican NGO Council's position.
2. To win the support of the Inter-American Development Bank for the Jamaican NGO
Council's position.
3. To win the right to select one third (1/3) of the Board of Directors of the Social
Investment Fund.
Strategies:
1. To utilize the World Bank's position of involving NGOs and the civil society in bank
projects to support the goal.
2. To make the appointment of an NGO representative without NGO input unacceptable.
This would change the perception of the goal of the Jamaican NGO Council and make
it more acceptable to the government and the World Bank.
3. To rapidly implement the campaign.
Activities:
1. Obtain the endorsement of the Jamaican NGO Council for the position of nominating
individuals to the SIF Board.
2. Send the Jamaican government a letter to state their position to nominate 1/3 of the
Board.
3. Send copies of the Jamaican government letter to the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and other key institutions.
4. Meet with the Director of the Planning Institute of Jamaica to press for the Jamaican
NGO Council's position.
5. Meet with representatives of the World bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank to press for the Jamaican NGO Council position.

CASE STUDY #3
Influencing a Domestic Violence Act: Belize
Background

In February of 1991, six model legislations were tabled at a Caribbean Economic Community
(CARICOM) Ministers meeting held in Belize. These models, because they all addressed
issues of major concern to women in the region (for example, domestic violence and sexual
harassment), created the impetus for developing gender focused campaigns. Because of
limited resources, however, there was a need for each country to prioritize this list of
legislation and work at passing them into local laws one at a time.
The Women Against Violence Organization (WAV) in Belize played a significant role in
helping Belize to develop its priority list by making strong arguments in favor of addressing
domestic violence as a number one concern for women in Belize. They made presentations on
the prevalence of domestic violence cases nationwide, and gave examples of frustration with
the lack of local institutional support for victims of domestic violence. Additionally, WAV
turned the public's attention to the media which was, at the time, saturated with stories of
murders resulting from unchecked cases of domestic violence. These graphic murders created
a further sense of urgency in passing the Domestic Violence Act, consequently convincing the
Department of Women's Affairs (DWA) to name domestic violence as the first of the six
gender campaigns to be conducted.
Campaign Strategy Design
Goal:
Passing a Belize Domestic Violence Act acceptable to the Belize women's community and the
Women Against Violence Organization (WAV).
Power Analysis:
The people who had the power to pass the proposed Act into law were the Ministers in the
Cabinet, and in particular, those named to the House of Representatives Committee on the
Domestic Violence Act. The people with direct access to these Ministers, such as loyal party
supporters, were therefore named as significant in determining the success or failure of the
campaign. Since in Belize the ruling party in the government rewards selective women who
are avid campaigners and loyal party supporters by appointing them to the National Women's
Commission, this group was considered important in developing an effective strategy for
passing the Domestic Violence Act.
Objectives:
1. To create an awareness of the dynamics of domestic violence.
2. To create an awareness of what is included in the model legislation on domestic
violence.
3. To ensure national input into the content of the proposed Domestic Violence Act.
4. To mobilize national support for the proposed Domestic Violence Act.
5. To generate financial support for the domestic violence campaign.
Strategies:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Research
Public Awareness Campaign
Networking
Official representations at key meetings of the Bill

Example of an Activity Work Plan:

Objectives
Activities
Tasks
o Who responsible
o When Resources needed

Create an awareness of the dynamics of domestic violence

A. Develop a one minute ad on domestic violence
Meet with UNICEF to discuss funding Department of Women's Affairs (DWA)
Draft script DWA
Select actors DWA
Hire technicians to produce ad DWA
Meet with media personnel to discuss free airtime DWA
Send tape to all media houses DWA
Monitor viewing schedule DWA
B. Visit Schools
C. Visit NGOs
Evaluation:
No formal evaluation was held, however the Department of Women's Affairs, along with the
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), has been monitoring the effectiveness of the
Domestic Violence Act. A pilot study of how the Act has worked in Orange Walk has been
completed. These results will be used to decide what adjustments, if any, are needed in the
application of the Act, or in the content of the Act itself. One of the trouble spots already
identified is the lack of systematization and documentation of cases presented to medical
personnel and the police.
This study will inform the next phase of the campaign which includes follow-up action to
make the Act as effective as possible. The public awareness campaign on the dynamics of
domestic violence and on the contents of the act are ongoing, through the Department of
Women's Affairs.
Lessons Learned:
1. A governmental body involved in an advocacy campaign may cause difficulties for the
public officers involved.
2. Networking with non-governmental bodies is an important aspect of an advocacy
campaign.
3. At times personal agendas can influence the outcome of a campaign.
4. Having international and regional support for the campaign is important.

Center for Democratic Education

The Center for Democratic Education was founded in 1986 for the purpose of educating the
U.S. public about the economic and political conditions in Central America. In 1993 the
Multi-lateral Development Bank Reform Project was established by the Center in response to
requests for assistance from non-governmental and popular organizational leaders in Central
America.
The Center responds to requests from organizational leaders in Central America and the
Caribbean for information and assistance on influencing the policies and programs of the
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.
The Center provides information and training in the design and implementation of advocacy
campaigns to non-governmental, popular, and community based organizations in Guatemala,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Jamaica, and Belize. This support enables organizations to analyze
and respond more effectively to the economic and social policies which Central American and
Caribbean governments are implementing in order to obtain World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank loans. Information is also provided in the United States to the public,
policy makers, and non-profit organizations.
The Center maintains a small staff in the Washington DC area and has part-time Associates
based in Guatemala, Jamaica, and Belize. The Center receives funding from private
foundations, individuals, and churches in the United States and Europe. It receives no funds
from the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, or the U.S. government.