ROSEWOOD PROCESSING, INC., petitioner, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION,

NAPOLEON C. MAMON, ARSENIO GAZZINGAN, ROMEO C. VELASCO, ARMANDO L. BALLON, VICTOR
E. ALDEZA, JOSE L. CABRERA, VETERANS PHILIPPINE SCOUT SECURITY AGENCY, and/or ENGR.
SERGIO JAMILA IV,respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 116476-84. May 21, 1998]

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: The complainants were employed by the security agency as security guards. Napoleon Mamon was
assigned as office guard for three days without pay as it was alleged that it was only an OJT. He was
transferred to the residence of Mr. Benito Ong with 12 hours duty a day receiving a salary very much less than
the minimum wage for eight (8) hours work until he received an order transferring him to Rosewood
Processing. He was required to render also 12 hours duty every day with a salary of P2,600.00/month. He
was not given his pay for two days allegedly because the payroll could not be located so after 3 to 4 times of
going back and forth to office to get his salary, he gave up because he was already spending more than what
he could get thru transportation alone. Petitioner asked for the relief of Mamon and other guards at Rosewood
because they came to know that complainants filed a complaint for underpayment with the National Labor
Relations Commission. He was reassigned but then again was floated until his assignment to Mead Johnson
Philippines Corporation. The security agency received summons of their complaint and the agency asked the
said guards to sign a quitclaim so that they can be retained by the agency. He was given time to think it over.
However, he was relieved by the main office. The other guards suffered the same fate of transferring from one
establishment to another but receiving a meager amount of salary. The labor arbiter held petitioner jointly and
severally liable with the security agency as the complainants indirect employer. The respondent Commission
likewise dismissed petitioners appeal, because it was allegedly not perfected within the reglementary ten-day
period. Petitioner received a copy of the labor arbiters Decision and it filed its Memorandum of Appeal
3. However, it submitted the appeal bond twelve days after the expiration of the period for appeal per Rule VI,
Sections 1, 3 and 6 of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. Thus, it ruled
that the labor arbiters Decision became final and executory. In the assailed Order, Respondent Commission
denied reconsideration, because petitioner allegedly failed to raise any palpable or patent error committed by
said commission.
Issue: Whether the appeal from the labor arbiter to the NLRC was perfected on time
Ruling:
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final
and executory. The Labor Code provides:
ART. 223. Appeal.Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed
to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards,
or orders. xxx In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision involving a monetary award in labor cases
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The lawmakers intended the posting of the
bond to be an indispensable requirement to perfect an employers appeal.

However, in a number of cases, this Court has relaxed this requirement in order to bring about the
immediate and appropriate resolution of controversies on the merits. Some of these cases include: (a)
counsels reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter that the aggrieved party may
appeal xxx within ten (10) working days; (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c) prevention of
miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation
pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; and (d) special circumstances of the case combined
with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved. In Quiambao vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, this Court ruled that a relaxation of the appeal bond requirement could be justified by substantial
compliance with the rule. In Globe General Services and Security Agency vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court observed that the NLRC, in actual practice, allows the reduction of the appeal bond
upon motion of the appellant and on meritorious grounds; hence, petitioners in that case should have filed a
motion to reduce the bond within the reglementary period for appeal.
We hold that petitioners motion to reduce the bond is a substantial compliance with the Labor Code. This
holding is consistent with the norm that letter-perfect rules must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice. Where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, the equities of the
case must be accorded their due weight because labor determinations should not only be secundum
rationem but also secundum caritatem. A judicious reading of the memorandum of appeal would have made it
evident to Respondent Commission that the recourse was meritorious. Respondent Commission acted with
grave abuse of discretion in peremptorily dismissing the appeal without passing upon -- in fact, ignoring -- the
motion to reduce the appeal bond.
We repeat: Considering the clear merits which appear, res ipsa loquitur, in the appeal from the labor
arbiters Decision, and the petitioners substantial compliance with rules governing appeals, we hold that the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing said appeal and in failing to pass upon the grounds alleged in
the Motion for Reconsideration.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 182915 : December 12, 2011]
MARIALY O. SY, VIVENCIA PENULLAR, AURORA AGUINALDO, GINA ANIANO, GEMMA DELA PEA,
EFREMIA MATIAS, ROSARIO BALUNSAY, ROSALINDA PARUNGAO, ARACELI RUAZA, REGINA RELOX,
TEODORA VENTURA, AMELIA PESCADERO, LYDIA DE GUZMAN, HERMINIA HERNANDEZ, OLIVIA
ABUAN, CARMEN PORTUGUEZ, LYDIA PENNULAR, EMERENCIANA WOOD, PRISCILLA ESPINEDA,
NANCY FERNANDEZ, EVA MANDURIAGA, CONSOLACION SERRANO, SIONY CASILLAN, LUZVIMINDA
GABUYA, MYRNA TAMIN, EVELYN REYES, EVA AYENG, EDNA YAP, RIZA DELA CRUZ ZUIGA,
TRINIDAD RELOX, MARLON FALLA, MARICEL OCON, AND ELVIRA MACAPAGAL, PETITIONERS,
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO., INC., RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 189658]
SUSAN T. DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO., INC., MARIALY O. SY, VIVENCIA
PENULLAR, AURORA AGUINALDO, GINA ANIANO, GEMMA DELA PEA, EFREMIA MATIAS, ROSARIO
BALUNSAY, ROSALINDA PARUNGAO, ARACELI RUAZA, REGINA RELOX, TEODORA VENTURA, AMELIA
PESCADERO, RICHON APARRE, LYDIA DE GUZMAN, HERMINIA HERNANDEZ, OLIVIA ABUAN, CARMEN
PORTUGUEZ, LYDIA PENNULAR, EMERENCIANA WOOD, PRISCILLA ESPINEDA, NANCY FERNANDEZ,
EVA MANDURIAGA, CONSOLACION SERRANO, SIONY CASILLAN, LUZVIMINDA GABUYA, MYRNA
TAMIN, EVELYN REYES, EVA AYENG, EDNA YAP, RIZA DELA CRUZ ZUIGA, TRINIDAD RELOX,
MARLON FALLA, MARICEL OCON, AND ELVIRA MACAPAGAL, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Fairland is a domestic corporation engaged in garments business, while Susan de Leon (Susan) is the
owner/proprietress of Weesan Garments (Weesan). On the other hand, the complaining workers (the workers)
are sewers, trimmers, helpers, a guard and a secretary who were hired by Weesan. These workers filed with the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint for underpayment and/or non-payment of wages and other
monetary benefits against Susan/Weesan. The latter filed before the Department of Labor and EmploymentNational Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a report on its temporary closure for a period of not less than six months.
As the workers were not anymore allowed to work on that same day, they filed an Amended Complaint and
another pleading entitled Amended Complaints and Position Paper for Complainants to include the charge of
illegal dismissal and impleaded Fairland and its manager, Debbie Manduabas (Debbie), as additional
respondents. A Notice of Hearing was thereafter sent to Weesan requesting it to appear before Labor Arbiter
Ramon Valentin C. Reyes (Labor Arbiter Reyes). On said date and time, Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo (Atty.
Geronimo) appeared as counsel for Weesan and requested for an extension of time to file his client's position
paper. Atty. Geronimo also entered his appearance for Fairland and again requested for an extension of time to
file position paper. Atty. Geronimo filed two separate position papers - one for Fairland and another for
Susan/Weesan. The Position Paper for Fairland was verified by Debbie while the one for Susan/Weesan was
verified by Susan. To these pleadings, the workers filed a Reply.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for having lack of merit. The workers filed their appeal which was
granted by the NLRC. Respondents are, therefore, ordered to reinstate complainants to their original or
equivalent position with full backwages with legal interests thereon until actually reinstated and fully paid, with
retention of seniority rights and are further ordered to pay solidarily to the complainants the difference of their
underpaid/unpaid wages. Hence, Atty. Geronimo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, Fairland filed
another Motion for Reconsideration through Atty. Melina O. Tecson (Atty. Tecson) assailing the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC over it, claiming that it was never summoned to appear, attend or participate in all
the proceedings conducted therein. It also denied that it engaged the services of Atty. Geronimo. The NLRC
however, denied both motions for lack of merit. The CA's First Division denied Fairland's petition. It affirmed the
NLRC's ruling that the workers were illegally dismissed and that Weesan and Fairland are solidarily liable to
them as labor-only contractor and principal, respectively. The CA's Special Ninth Division reversed the First
Division's ruling.

Issue: Whether the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission became final and executory
Ruling: Yes. We grant the workers' petition (G.R. No. 182915) but deny the petition of Susan (G.R. No.
189658).
Petitioner's contention is unacceptable. The fact that Atty. Romeo B. Perez has been able to timely ask for a
deferment of the initial hearing, coupled with his subsequent active participation in the proceedings, should
disprove the supposed want of service of legal processes. Although as a rule, modes of service of summons are
strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, such procedural
modes, however, are liberally construed in quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial compliance with the same
being considered adequate. Moreover, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired not
only by service of summons but also by voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.
`Appearance' by a legal advocate is such `voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction'. It may be made not
only by actual physical appearance but likewise by the submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of
the court or tribunal.
Even if we are to apply Sec. 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Labor Arbiter cannot be expected to require
Atty. Geronimo to prove his authority under said provision since there was no motion to that effect from either
party showing reasonable grounds therefor.
ARTICLE 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards. - (a) the Secretary of Labor and Employment or any
Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu
proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from
the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final
decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or [R]egional Director, the Commission,
the Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or Voluntary Arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the responsible
officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said

decision, orders or awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such responsible
officer to appropriate administrative sanctions.
As correctly pointed out by private respondent in its Comment to the petition, Article 224 of the Labor Code
does not govern the procedure for filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the decision of
the NLRC but rather, it refers to the execution of `final decisions, orders or awards' and requires the sheriff or a
duly deputized officer to furnish both the parties and their counsel with copies of the decision or award for that
purpose. There is no reference, express or implied, to the period to appeal or to file a petition for certiorari as
indeed the caption is `execution of decisions, orders or awards'. Taken in proper context, Article 224
contemplates the furnishing of copies of `final decisions, orders or awards' and could not have been intended to
refer to the period for computing the period for appeal to the Court of Appeals from a non-final judgment or
order. The period or manner of `appeal' from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65 pursuant
to the ruling of the Court in the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC. Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended,
states that the `petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or resolution
sought to be assailed'.
Corollarily, Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC expressly mandates that `(F)or the
purposes of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards
or orders by the counsel of record.' Although this rule explicitly contemplates an appeal before the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC, we do not see any cogent reason why the same rule should not apply to petitions for certiorari
filed with the Court of Appeals from decisions of the NLRC. This procedure is in line with the established
rule that notice to counsel is notice to party and when a party is represented by counsel, notices
should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds
emanating from the court should be sent. It is to be noted also that Section 7 of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure provides that `(A)ttorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to
bind their clients in all matters of procedure'' a provision which is similar to Section 23, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. More importantly, Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made
upon his counsel.
To stress, Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final decisions, orders or awards bothto the
parties and their counsel in connection with the execution of such final decisions, orders or awards. However,
for the purpose of computing the period for filing an appeal from the NLRC to the CA, same shall be counted
from receipt of the decision, order or award by the counsel of record pursuant to the established rule that notice
to counsel is notice to party. And since the period for filing of an appeal is reckoned from the counsel's receipt of
the decision, order or award, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for their finality is likewise the
counsel's date of receipt thereof, if a party is represented by counsel. Hence, the date of receipt referred to in
Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in force New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides that decisions,
resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the same,
refers to the date of receipt by counsel. Thus contrary to the CA's conclusion, the said NLRC Decision became
final, as to Fairland, 10 calendar days after Atty. Tecson's receipt thereof. In sum, we hold that the Labor Arbiter
had validly acquired jurisdiction over Fairland and its manager, Debbie, through the appearance of Atty.
Geronimo as their counsel and likewise, through the latter's filing of pleadings on their behalf.

FELIPE O. MAGBANUA, CARLOS DE LA CRUZ, REMY ARNAIZ, BILLY ARNAIZ, ROLLY ARNAIZ,
DOMINGO SALARDA, JULIO CAHILIG and NICANOR LABUEN, petitioners, vs. RIZALINO
UY, respondent.

[G.R. No. 161003. May 6, 2005]

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be terminated and closed, stating that the judgment
award as computed had been complied with to the satisfaction of [petitioners]. Said Manifestation was also signed by the
eight (8) [petitioners]. Together with the Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit of [petitioners], attesting to the receipt of
payment from [respondent] and waiving all other benefits due them in connection with their complaint. All of them
confired that they have received P 40, 000 however claimed that they are only paid partially. Six (6) of the eight (8)
[petitioners] filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be considered closed and terminated as they are already
satisfied of what they have received (a total of P320,000) from [respondent]. Together with said Manifestation is a Joint
Affidavit in the local dialect of the six (6) [petitioners] attesting that they have no more collectible amount from
[respondent] and if there is any, they are abandoning and waiving the same. The Labor Arbiter issued an order denying the
motion for issuance of writ of execution and [considered] the cases closed and terminated . On appeal, the [National Labor
Relations Commission (hereinafter NLRC)] reversed the Labor Arbiter and directed the immediate issuance of a writ of
execution, holding that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered and that quitclaims and releases are
normally frowned upon as contrary to public policy. The CA held that compromise agreements may be entered
into even after a final judgment. Thus, petitioners validly released respondent from any claims, upon the
voluntary execution of a waiver pursuant to the compromise agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement and the quitclaim were valid.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioners argument fails to convince. Article 2040 of the Civil Code does not refer to the
validity of a compromise agreement entered into after final judgment. Moreover, an important requisite, which
is lack of knowledge of the final judgment, is wanting in the present case.
The Petitioners vehemently argue that a compromise of a final judgment is invalid under Article 2040 of the
Civil Code, which we quote: Art. 2040. If after a litigation has been decided by a final judgment, a compromise should
be agreed upon, either or both parties being unaware of the existence of the final judgment, the compromise may
be rescinded. Ignorance of a judgment which may be revoked or set aside is not a valid ground for attacking a
compromise.
The first paragraph of Article 2040 refers to a scenario in which either or both of the parties are unaware of
a courts final judgment at the time they agree on a compromise. In this case, the law allows either of them
to rescind the compromise agreement. It is evident from the quoted paragraph that such an agreement is not
prohibited or void or voidable. Instead, a remedy to impugn the contract, which is an action for rescission, is
declared available. The law allows a party to rescind a compromise agreement, because it could have been
entered into in ignorance of the fact that there was already a final judgment. Knowledge of a decisions finality
may affect the resolve to enter into a compromise agreement. The second paragraph, though irrelevant to the
present case, refers to the instance when the courts decision is still appealable or otherwise subject to
modification. Under this paragraph, ignorance of the decision is not a ground to rescind a compromise
agreement, because the parties are still unsure of the final outcome of the case at this time.
There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered into after final
judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of
contracts, not by when it was entered into. As provided by the law on contracts, a valid compromise must have
the following elements: (1) the consent of the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the
subject matter of the compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation that is established. Petitioners voluntarily
entered into the compromise agreement. These circumstances also reveal that respondent has already
complied with its obligation pursuant to the compromise agreement. Having already benefited from the
agreement, estoppel bars petitioners from challenging it.
On validity of waiver:
The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine its validity. There
is no law requiring the presence of a counsel to validate a waiver. The test is whether it was executed
voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and whether the consideration for it was credible and reasonable. The law is
silent with regard to the procedure for approving a waiver after a case has been terminated. [49] Relevant,
however, is this reference to the NLRCs New Rules of Procedure: Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to
the whole or any part of the dispute, the same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their respective
counsel, or authorized representative, if any, before the Labor Arbiter. The settlement shall be approved by the Labor
Arbiter after being satisfied that it was voluntarily entered into by the parties and after having explained to them the terms
and consequences thereof.

A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is
pending shall be approved by him, if after confronting the parties, particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they
understand the terms and conditions of the settlement and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them and the
agreement is not contrary to law, morals, and public policy.
This provision refers to proceedings in a mandatory/conciliation conference during the initial stage of the
litigation. Such provision should be made applicable to the proceedings in the pre-execution conference, for
which the procedure for approving a waiver after final judgment is not stated. There is no reason to make a
distinction between the proceedings in mandatory/conciliation and those in pre-execution conferences.
The labor arbiters absence when the waivers were executed was remedied upon compliance with the
above procedure. The Court observes that the arbiter made searching questions during the pre-execution
conference to ascertain whether petitioners had voluntarily and freely executed the waivers. The Court
declines to rule on the allegation that respondents counsels encroached upon the professional employment of
petitioners lawyer when they facilitated the waivers. The present action is not the proper forum in which to
raise any charge of professional misconduct. More important, petitioners failed to present any supporting
evidence.
(Additional: A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order
to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. They adjust their difficulties in the manner
they have agreed upon, disregarding the possible gain in litigation and keeping in mind that such gain is
balanced by the danger of losing. Verily, the compromise may be either extrajudicial (to prevent litigation) or
judicial (to end a litigation). A compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public
policy; and must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. To have the force of
law between the parties, it must comply with the requisites and principles of contracts. Upon the parties, it has
the effect and the authority of res judicata, once entered into.
When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon
the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the
force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or
forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an
instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
Following these basic principles, apparently unnecessary is a compromise agreement after final judgment
has been entered. Indeed, once the case is terminated by final judgment, the rights of the parties are settled.
There are no more disputes that can be compromised.)

MIGUEL DELA PENA BARAIRO, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and MST MARINE SERVICES
(PHILS.), INC. G R. No. 189314 June 15, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts: Miguel Barairo (petitioner) was hired by respondent MST Marine Services (Phils.) Inc., (MST) for its principal,
TSM International, Ltd., as Chief Mate of the vessel Maritina, for a contract period of six months. He boarded the vessel
and discharged his duties but was relieved ostensibly for transfer to another vessel, Solar. Petitioner thus disembarked in
Manila. Petitioner was later to claim that he was not paid the promised stand-by fee in lieu of salary that he was to
receive while awaiting transfer to another vessel as in fact the transfer never materialized. Petitioner signed a new
Contract of Employment for a six-month deployment as Chief Mate in a newly-built Japanese vessel, M/T Haruna. He
was paid a one-month standby fee in connection with the Maritina contract. Petitioner boarded the M/T Haruna but he
disembarked a week later as MST claimed that his boarding of M/T Haruna was a sea trial which, MST maintains, was
priorly made known to him on a stand-by fee. MST soon informed petitioner that he would be redeployed to the

M/T Haruna but petitioner refused, prompting MST to file a complaint for breach of contract against him before the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Petitioner claimed, however, that he was placed on forced vacation when he was made to disembark from the
M/T Haruna, and that not wanting to experience a repetition of the previous termination of his employment aboard
the Maritina, he refused to be redeployed to the M/T Haruna. Then POEA Administrator Rosalinda D. Baldoz penalized
petitioner with one year suspension from overseas deployment upon a finding that his refusal to complete his contract
aboard the M/T Haruna constituted a breach thereof. On appeal by petitioner, the Secretary of Labor, by Order noting
that it was petitioners first offense, modified the POEA Order by shortening the period of suspension from one year to six
months. The Office of the President (OP), dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The OP held that appeals
to it in labor cases, except those involving national interest, have been eliminated. Petitioners motion for partial
reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Whether the claim by the petitioner shall prosper.
Ruling: No. Following settled jurisprudence, the proper remedy to question the decisions or orders of the Secretary of
Labor is via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, not via an appeal to the OP. For appeals to the OP in labor cases have
indeed been eliminated, except those involving national interest over which the President may assume jurisdiction. The
rationale behind this development is mirrored in the OPs Resolution of June 26, 2009 the pertinent portion of which
reads:
. . . [T] he assailed DOLEs Orders were both issued by Undersecretary Danilo P. Cruz
under the authority of the DOLE Secretary who is the alter ego of the President. Under the
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.[10] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It cannot be gainsaid that petitioners case does not involve national interest.
Petitioners appeal of the Secretary of Labors Decision to the Office of the President did not toll the running of
the period, hence, the assailed Decisions of the Secretary of Labor are deemed to have attained finality.
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that
the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory
privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law
is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules
regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it
becomes the law of the case irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court - not
even the Supreme Court - has the power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of
finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at

the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final at some definite date fixed by law.[11] (underscoring in the original, emphasis supplied)

At all events, on the merits, the petition just the same fails. As found by the POEA Administrator and the
Secretary of Labor, petitioners refusal to board the M/T Haruna constituted unjustified breach of his contract of
employment. For, as noted in the assailed DOLE Order, if petitioners rights has been violated as he claims, he has
various remedies under the contract which he did not avail of. Parenthetically, the Undersecretary of Labor declared that
the real reason [petitioner] refused to re-join Haruna on November 30, 2004, is that he left the Philippines to join
MT Adriatiki, a vessel of another manning agency, which declaration petitioner has not refuted.

CELESTINO VIVIERO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HAMMONIA MARINE SERVICES, and
HANSEATIC SHIPPING CO., LTD. respondents. [G.R. No. 138938. October 24, 2000]
Facts: Petitioner Vivero, a licensed seaman, is a member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's
Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP). The Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by AMOSUP and
private respondents provides, for the grievance procedure providing for a Voluntary artbitration Committee. As
found by the Labor Arbiter , Complainant was hired by respondent as Chief Officer of the vessel "M.V. Sunny Prince".
On grounds of very poor performance and conduct, refusal to perform his job, refusal to report to the Captain or the
vessels Engineers or cooperate with other ship officers about the problem in cleaning the cargo holds or of the shipping
pump and his dismal relations with the Captain of the vessel, complainant was repatriated. Complainant filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal at Associated Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) of which
complainant was a member. Pursuant to Article XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, grievance proceedings were
conducted; however, parties failed to reach and settle the dispute amicably, thus, complainant filed [a] complaint with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The law in force at the time petitioner filed
his Complaint with the POEA was EO No. 247.[
While the case was pending before the POEA, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the POEA had nojurisdiction over the case considering petitioner Vivero's failure to refer it to a
Voluntary Arbitration Committee in accordance with the CBA between the parties. Upon the enactment of RA
8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the case was transferred to the Adjudication
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The Labor Arbiter, on the basis of the pleadings and
documents available on record, rendered a decision dismissing the Complaint for want of jurisdiction.
[4]
According to the Labor Arbiter, since the CBA of the parties provided for the referral to a Voluntary Arbitration
Committee should the Grievance Committee fail to settle the dispute, and considering the mandate of Art. 261
of the Labor Code on the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, the Labor Arbiter clearly
had no jurisdiction over the case.[5]
Petitioner (complainant before the Labor Arbiter) appealed the dismissal of his petition to the NLRC. On 28
May 1998 the NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the record was clear that
petitioner had exhausted his remedy by submitting his case to the Grievance Committee of AMOSUP. The
NLRC then remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. It was further raised in the CA. But
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondents. It held that the CBA "is the law between the parties
and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.

Issue: Whether the NLRC is deprived of jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases whenever a CBA provides for
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration proceedings. Or, phrased in another way, does the dismissal of
an employee constitute a "grievance between the parties," as defined under the provisions of the CBA, and
consequently, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrators, thereby rendering the NLRC
without jurisdiction to decide the case?
Ruling: On the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters, Art. 217 of the Labor Code provides - Art.
217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - xxx (2) Termination disputes. xxx(4) Claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
However, any or all of these cases may, by agreement of the parties, be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator
or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for adjudication. Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code provide Art.
261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly,
violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this
article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with
the economic provisions of such agreement. The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the
Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same
to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Art. 262. Jurisdiction Over Other Labor Disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon
agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining
deadlocks (emphasis supplied).
The case is primarily a termination dispute. It is clear from the claim/assistance request form submitted by
petitioner to AMOSUP that he was challenging the legality of his dismissal for lack of cause and lack of due
process. The issue of whether there was proper interpretation and implementation of the CBA provisions
comes into play only because the grievance procedure provided for in the CBA was not observed after he
sought his Unions assistance in contesting his termination. Thus, the question to be resolved necessarily
springs from the primary issue of whether there was a valid termination; without this, then there would be no
reason to invoke the need to interpret and implement the CBA provisions properly.
In San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission[21] this Court held that the phrase "all other
labor disputes" may include termination disputes provided that the agreement between the Union and the
Company states "in unequivocal language that [the parties] conform to the submission of termination disputes
and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration." [22] Ergo, it is not sufficient to merely say that parties to the
CBA agree on the principle that "all disputes" should first be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator. There is a
need for an express stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination disputes should be resolved by a Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, since the same fall within a special class of disputes that are
generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law. Absent such
express stipulation, the phrase "all disputes" should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict traditionally
within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, i.e., disputes relating to contract-interpretation, contractimplementation, or interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Illegal termination disputes not falling within any of these categories - should then be considered as a special area of interest governed by
a specific provision of law.

In this case, however, while the parties did agree to make termination disputes the proper subject of
voluntary arbitration, such submission remains discretionary upon the parties. A perusal of the CBA provisions
shows that Sec. 6, Art. XII (Grievance Procedure) of the CBA is the general agreement of the parties to refer
grievances, disputes or misunderstandings to a grievance committee, and henceforth, to a voluntary arbitration
committee.
In the case at bar, the dispute was never brought to a Voluntary Arbitrator for resolution; in fact, petitioner
precisely requested the Court to recognize the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the case. The Court had
held that neither officials nor tribunals can assume jurisdiction in the absence of an express legal
conferment. In the same manner, petitioner cannot arrogate into the powers of Voluntary Arbitrators the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over unfair labor practices, termination disputes, and claims for
damages, in the absence of an express agreement between the parties in order for Art. 262 of the Labor Code
to apply in the case at bar. In other words, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Voluntary Arbitration is
mandatory in character if there is a specific agreement between the parties to that effect. It must be stressed
however that, in the case at bar, the use of the word "may" shows the intention of the parties to reserve the
right of recourse to Labor Arbiters.
The CBA clarifies the proper procedure to be followed in situations where the parties expressly stipulate to
submit termination disputes to the jurisdiction of a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. For
when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to
voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed. Non-compliance therewith cannot be
excused, as petitioner suggests, by the fact that he is not well-versed with the "fine prints" of the CBA. It was
his responsibility to find out, through his Union, what the provisions of the CBA were and how they could affect
his rights. As provided in Art. 241, par. (p), of the Labor Code - (p) It shall be the duty of any labor organization and
its officers to inform its members on the provisions of its constitution and by-laws, collective bargaining agreement, the
prevailing labor relations system and all their rights and obligations under existing labor laws.
It may be observed that under Policy Instruction No. 56 of the Secretary of Labor, dated 6 April 1993,
"Clarifying the Jurisdiction Between Voluntary Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters Over Termination Cases and
Providing Guidelines for the Referral of Said Cases Originally Filed with the NLRC to the NCMB," termination
cases arising in or resulting from the interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements
and interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies which were initially processed at the various
steps of the plant-level Grievance Procedures under the parties' collective bargaining agreements fall within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Art. 217 (c) and Art. 261 of the
Labor Code; and, if filed before the Labor Arbiter, these cases shall be dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack
of jurisdiction and referred to the concerned NCMB Regional Branch for appropriate action towards an
expeditious selection by the parties of a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators based on the procedures
agreed upon in the CBA.
As earlier stated, the instant case is a termination dispute falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, and does not specifically involve the application, implementation or
enforcement of company personnel policies contemplated in Policy Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy
Instruction No. 56 does not apply in the case at bar. In any case, private respondents never invoked the
application of Policy Instruction No. 56 in their Position Papers, neither did they raise the question in
their Motion to Dismisswhich they filed nine (9) months after the filing of their Position Papers. At this late stage
of the proceedings, it would not serve the ends of justice if this case is referred back to a Voluntary Arbitrator
considering that both the AMOSUP and private respondents have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter by filing their respective Position Papers and ignoring the grievance procedure set forth in their CBA.

After the grievance proceedings have failed to bring about a resolution, AMOSUP, as agent of petitioner,
should have informed him of his option to settle the case through voluntary arbitration. Private respondents, on
their part, should have timely invoked the provision oftheir CBA requiring the referral of their unresolved
disputes to a Voluntary Arbitrator once it became apparent that the grievance machinery failed to resolve it
prior to the filing of the case before the proper tribunal. The private respondents should not have waited for
nine (9) months from the filing of their Position Paper with the POEA before it moved to dismiss the case
purportedly for lack of jurisdiction. As it is, private respondents are deemed to have waived their right to
question the procedure followed by petitioner, assuming that they have the right to do so. Under their CBA,
both Union and respondent companies are responsible for selecting an impartial arbitrator or for convening an
arbitration committee;[30] yet, it is apparent that neither made a move towards this end. Consequently, petitioner
should not be deprived of his legitimate recourse because of the refusal of both Union and respondent
companies to follow the grievance procedure.