CANON 9

Adm. Case No. 6290

July 14, 2004

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly
immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be
married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain
a false marriage contract,1which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila.
Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila2and the National Statistics Office (NSO)3 prove that no
record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two are
stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio 4and Felicisimo Tenorio III.5 But
in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio 6 and John Cedric Tenorio,7 another
date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora
Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her
co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1)
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar;
(2) converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case
against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the
statement "Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal activities and
transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit, she
declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February
1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of
Quezon City.8 Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the
dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it
was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant
and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of
conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of
Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business
Name.9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same had already
been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the
words "Isang bala ka lang" on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to get
even with her. She terminated complainant's employment after receiving numerous complaints that
the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of processing their passports
and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is
politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should they
initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted
the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service
to the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a Reply
to respondent's Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties
also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the
respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal
practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office12 where
the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication
Radio Group identification card13 signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is
identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's husband even appeared in
court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her husband nor
allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband
appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the
complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon
cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead ofCristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her
signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo
A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office.14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in
Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she
applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the
marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO.
The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her marriage
were merely an oversight.15

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing
that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus,
she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in
the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead of CristalTenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip
Communication Radio Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by
respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his
appearance as counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the
private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus,
Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The
modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of
law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more
severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted
with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint
filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on
record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed
accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not
substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case by

convincing evidence.17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof.
In Gerona vs. Datingaling,18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must
await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer
and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one's
self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law
office for the general practice of law.19 Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the
respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She
admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law
office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office. 20 That is a blatant
misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the respondent
assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the
identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears the signature of the
respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record as attorney in this
Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 6622

July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with
unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of
fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondents first
marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file
a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the record.4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted
for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of
fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent
filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August
2005.8
Complainants Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial

consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latters numerous petitions for
corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged
that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the
corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his
work with respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are
due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section
27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts
to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching
to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients
signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts
of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted
a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National
Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage
thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the
second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the
third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13
Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not
an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant
was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent also
alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the
sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his
law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the
legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial
aspect of the case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of
the said company.19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had
been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the
said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and
names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three
marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that
took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The
second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at
the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The third Marriage
Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on
7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was
described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed
against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent
further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage
Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion
and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were
purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory
hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not
attend the hearing,30respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension
of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had
filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be
bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two
(2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125,
was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the

Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the
criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding,
the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions
for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the
administrative case against him be submitted for resolution. 36
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. 37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondents administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to
prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated. 39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence
that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latters first
marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission
recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. 41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August
2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him
was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the
marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He
further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed
bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the
annulment of Marriage Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed
their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents disbarment. 44
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the
rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the formers share in the
fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees
for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant
solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the
existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share
the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainants allegations in this case had
not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by
respondent to advertise the latters legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the
report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent

as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the formers loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is
considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related
to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if
it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08
of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate
this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into
by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these
documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for
resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded by his
argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
1wphi1

and satisfactory proof.54In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that
respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions
tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he
had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare
the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two other women aside from his wife.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO,
which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a
person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not
presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil
actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found
that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code. Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance
of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while
his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct
which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly
be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of
the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral
conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6116

August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission,
later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable
and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late
Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was
reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed
commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or

about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap
assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to
17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of
his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children,
and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business5 without the required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee
basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and
claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16,
1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction
against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint. 6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
Report and Recommendation8dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be
disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in
their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11,
1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has
violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit
with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well

as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 13Consequently, We find no reason to disturb
the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath 14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently
established. A "business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of customers to
whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a single person
without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot
be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.
1wphi1

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded
that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and as member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under
scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the case,
We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the
Lawyers Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon
9 of the same Code andSUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
notice hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5given by the Bar Office when he went home to his
province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he
had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; 8 and "the matter of signing in
the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioners gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant petition, subject to
the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of
law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this

Courts attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own
lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took
him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna happen. At the same time, its a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen. And, finally its the right thing to do. I have to
come here sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere
to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this
privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of
the profession.
1wphi1

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his
acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oathtaking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed
was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue

practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to
the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. 28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of
liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice
of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the
Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed
to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of
law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice
of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 10
A.C. No. 5624

January 20, 2004

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido
and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer "by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order."1
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from
each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James
Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants custody. Complainant
filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to
the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, "James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay
City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to
him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals
which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.2 Complainant called up her lawyer
but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by
respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals,
but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted
that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she
refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take
them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding
policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and

settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a
statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate
courts resolution/order.3 In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to
sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City.
This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and
NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the
hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant
rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the
morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a
verified petition4for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the
children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant
verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 5 from
the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of
their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath
by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court
of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that
another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. 6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the
modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his
reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of
Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact
that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first,
in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No.
3898,7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought
the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor
children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is
presumed to have participated in its fabrication.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be
devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with
due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients
cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. 8 Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility
states:
1wphi1

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 9 The
lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel
and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another.10 By
calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator",
hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the
period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years,
which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar
and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.

ADM. CASE No. 4495

October 8, 2008

ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. APOLONIA A. C. SOGUILON, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.
against respondent Atty. Apolonia A.C. Soguilon. Complainant accuses respondent of misconduct,
concealment of the truth and misleading the court.
Respondent acted as counsel for the petitioner in LRC No. Q-7195 (95) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 93. In his letter1 dated 15 September 1995, complainant
narrated that in the course of the presentation of evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution,
respondent introduced as evidence the certified copy of the technical description and the sketch plan
of the land both issued by the Land Management Services. The documents were subsequently
marked as Exhibits "F" and "G," respectively.
A closer study of the documents however revealed that they contained the following notations:
a) In re Exhibit "F"
Note: This is not an updated survey data. This might have been already superseded by subsequent
subd./cons. surveys, Amendment, correction or [c]ancellation by the order of [the] court or by the
Regional Executive/Technical Director, DENR. This is not valid for land titling/Registration and for
preparation of deed of sale and/or transfer of right.
b) In re Exhibit "G"
Note: This plan is used for reference purposes only.2
The above-quoted notations notwithstanding, the trial court allowed reconstitution of the title. As
such, complainant submitted that respondent was remiss in not calling the attention of the trial court
to the notations indicated in the documents, emphasizing her duty to avoid concealment of the truth
from the court.

In his Supplemental Letter3 dated 25 October 1995, complainant additionally charged respondent of
committing fraud. For one, complainant alleged that the requirements of Section 12 in relation to
Section 3(f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 were not observed as the petition failed to state the
"names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property or the owners of
the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property." Secondly,
respondent allegedly manifested untruthfully to the trial court that her client had complied with the
requirements of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) when in fact there had been no compliance.
And finally, complainant contended that per the certification issued by the Deputy Register of Deeds
of Rizal Province, TCT No. 17730, the title sought to be reconstituted, was missing as of the
inventory conducted in September 1981. As such, complainant asserted, there was no basis for the
claim that the said title belonged to one Gregorio Agabao.
In answer to these allegations, respondent submitted to this Court her Comment 4 dated 6 April 1996
wherein she refuted all the charges against her. Anent the annotations on the documents,
respondent stated that she could not be charged of concealing facts from the court as she had
submitted the documents without alteration for the evaluation of the trial court. With regard to the
alleged non-observance of the requirements of R.A. No. 26, respondent countered that she had to
merely rely, as she did, on the documents and information supplied to her by her client. As to the
charge of having fraudulently claimed compliance with the LRA requirements, respondent averred
that she submitted the documentary requirements to the LRA through certified copies thereof which
were all received by the records clerk of said office. Lastly, concerning the contention that the
certification issued by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Rizal Province did not contain the name of
the real owner, the location and the metes and bounds of the property referred in the certification, as
well as the name and purpose of the person who requested for it, respondent asserted that she had
nothing to do with the preparation of said certification and therefore cannot be blamed for any of the
lapses committed by the one who issued it.
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both
parties presented their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
After investigation, the Commissioner made the following findings and recommendation:
As to the charge of misleading the court by not pointing out the notations in the technical description
and sketch plan, there appears to be no malice or intentional machination to mislead the court.
Indeed, the said notations were not hidden or manipulated by Respondent. x x x It is clear that
Respondent and the trial court committed error that should be characterized as "reversible error"
in the absence of proof of intentional machination or collusion.
The same findings are true for the charge of deliberate omission of persons entitled to notice under
R.A. No. 26. The said omission should have been fatal omissions that should have jeopardized the
petition for reconstitution of title. Nevertheless, it was allowed by the trial court to prosper.
Furthermore, there appears to be no reason for Respondent to disbelieve or not to rely on the
representation made to her by her client.
As to the alleged fraudulent claim of compliance with LRA requirements, it is noted that the trial
judge of RTC, Quezon City, Branch 93 x x x did not cite Respondent in contempt of court.

xxxx
Clearly, what should have been fatal omissions on the part of Respondent, as counsel of the
petitioner in the Petition for Reconstitution (LRC Case No. Q-7195 [95]) were allowed to pass without
challenge. A simple perusal of the Decision dated June 5, 1995 (In Re: Petition for Reconstitution of
TCT No. 17730, LRC Case No. Q-7195 [95]) x x x shows that there was reversible error on the part
of the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93 of Quezon City.
xxxx
x x x However, the disciplinary process does not punish errors, mistakes or incompetence. Errors
and mistakes are corrected by legal remedies such as motions for reconsideration, appeals, and
petitions for relief. The reversal of the June 5, 1995 Decision of the trial court has remedied the error
committed.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent did not commit any act for which she
should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned.
It is therefore recommended that this CASE BE DISMISSED for lack of merit. 5
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution6 dismissing the complaint based
on the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Funa. The parties were furnished with copies
of the IBP Resolution. On 6 September 2005, the Court received a Petition7 from complainant
praying that his administrative complaint be reinstated on the basis of the appellate courts
pronouncements in its: (1) Decision dated 30 January 19978 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 40897
entitled Edith R. Agabao v. Hon. Demetrio B. Macapagal as RTC Judge, Br. 93, Quezon City, ADEZ
REALTY, INC.., AGUEDO EUGENIO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and (2) Decision dated
29 March 20049 in C.A. G.R. CV No. 59363 entitled In the Matter of the Petition for the
Reconstitution of TCT No. 17730 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal under R.A. No.
26 Edith R. Agabao v. Adez Realty, Inc. and the Republic of the Philippines, affirming the Order
dated 22 February 200610 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93 which set aside the reconstitution
previously ordered.
The crux of the controversy is whether respondent maliciously misled the court by failing to point out
material notations in the documents she had submitted; whether she deliberately omitted mention of
certain persons entitled to notice under the law; and whether she fraudulently claimed that she had
complied with the LRA requirements or whether all these omissions could be considered honest
mistakes or errors.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the Commissioner.
The Court agrees with the Commissioners evaluation that respondent did not employ deceit or
misrepresentation in acting as counsel for the petitioner in the petition for reconstitution of title. Anent
respondents failure to point out the notations in the documents she had submitted, in the Courts
opinion, the Commissioner correctly observed that there was absence of proof that respondent had

intended to mislead or deceive the trial court. In fact, the said notations were laid bare for the trial
courts evaluation. There were no attempts on respondents part to manipulate or hide them.
As regards respondents failure to state in the petition certain persons entitled to notice under the
law, specifically the parties allegedly in possession of the properties, respondent unflinchingly
countered that she had duly asked of her client the names of the persons having interest in the
property subject of the title sought to be reconstituted.11 In fact, the petition for reconstitution filed
before the court contained the names and addresses of the adjoining land owners. 12 And even in
retrospect, it appears that there was no reason for respondent to disbelieve the representations
made by her client on the matter.
Regarding respondents claim that she had complied with the LRA requirements when in truth she
had not, the Court concurs with the Commissioners finding that respondent was not sufficiently
informed that compliance was insufficient and improper.
In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required
is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. 13 In the
present case, the Court finds that complainant, who notably owns one of the properties subject of
the title sought to be reconstituted,14 and is consequently an adverse party, failed to present clear
and preponderant evidence to show respondents guilt of the charges he had leveled against her. In
any event, it is worth mentioning that the prejudice, if any, caused by respondents oversight against
complainant and other interested parties had been rectified later on by a different judge who set
aside the order of reconstitution.15
All told, the lapses of respondent were committed without malice and devoid of any desire to dupe or
defraud the opposing party. They are innocuous blunders that were made without intent to harm. As
plain acts of inadvertence, they do not reach the level of professional incompetence. While
professional incompetence is not among the grounds of disbarment enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court yet there are instances where a lawyer may be disciplined for
inexcusable ignorance as the list is not exclusive. Indeed, the Court is convinced that respondent
should not be sanctioned.
Pertinently, the Court expressed in Mendoza v. Mercado,16 to wit:
An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is
not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, "no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it
should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law."
(Montorious v. Jefferys, 2 Car. & P. 113, cited in In Re Filart, 40 Phil. 205, 208).17
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Resolution of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated 25 June 2005 in Adm. Case No. 4495 is AFFIRMED. The
administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent Atty. Apolonia A.C. Soguilon is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3294 February 17, 1993

MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ODILON C. MALLARI, respondent.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.

PER CURIAM:
On January 11, 1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an administrative complaint against his
former counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged in 1984 to handle
his defense in Criminal Case No. 6608 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where he was
charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986, Mariveles instructed Attorney
Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent did.
However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, totalling 245 days, which he
obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal
of the appeal.
Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was subpoenaed by the trial court to
appear before it for the execution of the decision which had become final.
Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal, Cancellation of Entry
of Judgment and Admission of Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, but it was denied by the
appellate court.
He sought relief in this court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs. Court of Appeal, et al.") which,
on March 13, 1989, granted his petition, ordered the Court of Appeals to cancel the entry of
judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate the appeal, and admit the appellant's brief filed by his
new counsel. The Court said:
It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant which
led to the dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily warrant the
reinstatement thereof. However, where the negligence of counsel is
so great that the rights of accused are prejudiced and he is prevented
from presenting his defense, especially where the appellant raises
issues which place in serious doubt the correctness of the trial court's
judgment of conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied

to avoid a miscarriage of justice. These teachings of jurisprudence

are present in the case at bar.
On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to file the
brief, for reasons unknown and without any cause imputable to
petitioner, amounted to deliberate abandonment of his client's interest
and justifies reinstatement with consequent due consideration of
petitioner's appeal through a new counsel. (pp. 106-107, Rollo).
On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and held hearings. On March 3,
1992, it submitted to this Court a report/resolution finding:
In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our Code of
Professional Responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the
course of that practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation
of his client and thus disgrace the law profession. The last thing that his peers in the
law profession and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines would do is to disrobe a
member of the profession, for he has worked for the attainment of his career burning
the midnight oil throughout school and passing the bar. The undersigned, however,
could not find any mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty.
Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instill and maintain
the respect and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession. (pp. 249250, Rollo)
The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated not only appalling
indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregard for
his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of abandonment and
dereliction of duty toward his client and hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal profession
and to immediately cease and desist from the practice of law. Let the Office of the Court

Administrator and the Executive Judges of the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Judicial Regions,
be furnished with copies of this resolution for dissemination to all the courts in those regions.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6442

October 21, 2004

HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
For violation of the lawyers oath, Judge Mariano S. Macias, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
Petition for Administrative Discipline against Atty. Alanixon A. Selda. 1
The facts are undisputed. On January 24, 2000, respondent Selda withdrew as counsel for one
Norma T. Lim, private protestee in Election Case No. SE-01 entitled Ruth Maraon v. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers, Salud, Zamboanga del Norte, and Norma T. Lim for Annulment of Election,
etc.2 He basically submitted as ground for his withdrawal that he could not cope up with the pace of
the proceedings in view of his workload. He claimed that the hearings of the election protest case
would run from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and he still had to attend to his other cases including classes
at Philippine Advent College, which start at 5:30 p.m. on Mondays and Wednesdays.
In light of these representations, complainant granted the Motion and ordered respondent relieved of
all his responsibilities as counsel for private protestee. However, on May 22, 2000, respondent
executed an affidavit disavowing his grounds for withdrawing as counsel for private protestee. He
swore that he only filed the Motion on account of the pre-judgment of the case by complainant, who,
on several occasions insinuated to him that his client would lose in the protest. He stated that he
was convinced that chaos would result if his client were unseated, and withdrawal from the case was
his best recourse.
On the basis of respondents affidavit, his former client and private protestee in subject election
protest case, moved for the inhibition of complainant. On June 2, 2000, complainant granted the
motion for his inhibition if only to disabuse any doubt on his impartiality. But on August 23, 2000, this
Court set aside complainants inhibition after finding no strong and valid reason therefor, and
directed him to continue hearing the case and to resolve it with reasonable dispatch.
Deploring the act of respondent as "serious deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct as a lawyer and in
utter violation of the lawyers oath," complainant requested the IBP to investigate the matter and

recommend to the Court an appropriate penalty against respondent. On January 30, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline3required respondent to answer. He failed.
On November 21, 2003, after several postponements filed by the parties, their failure to personally
appear before the IBP investigating commission, and the request of complainant to resolve the case
on the basis of the pleadings, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and
recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
The Board, in its Resolution No. XVI-2004-122 dated February 27, 2004, adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Maala. It reduced the suspension of
respondent to six (6) months; hence, the transmittal of the case and its records to this Court for final
resolution4 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court, viz:
Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. x x x x (b) If the Board, by the vote of a
majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from
the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP on the culpability of respondent.
All members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, "do no falsehood" and
"conduct [themselves] as [lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients." These particular fundamental principles are
reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically:
Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court,
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice.
When respondent executed his affidavit of May 22, 2000 retracting his reason for
withdrawing as counsel for Norma T. Lim, he acknowledged, under oath, his
misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as lawyer and failed to
abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer.5 In fact, this obligation
to the bench for candor and honesty takes precedence.6 Thus, saying one thing in his Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel for Private Protestee and another in his subsequent affidavit is a transgression
of this imperative which necessitates appropriate punishment.
The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the facts of the case. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, viz:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The circumstances in this case demand that respondent be imposed suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year. This serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the
court, the legal profession and the public. For indeed, "if respect for the courts and for judicial
process is gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as a society." 7
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the February 27, 2004 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case
No. 02-921 isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Alanixon A. Selda
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, to commence upon receipt of this
Decision. He is further sternly warned that a repetition of a similar offense will call for a more severe
consequence.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of respondent with the Office of the
Bar Confidant. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all its chapters, and to all the courts in the land.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 8481

August 3, 2010
[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]
ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint1 dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P. Lazatin, counsel of Servier
Philippines, Incorporated for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines,
Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and
exemplary damages.
On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.2 It held that Ebanen voluntarily resigned
from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed.
Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31, 2003, the
NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.3
Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a
Resolution4 dated May 5, 2003.
Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 77968. In a Decision5 dated January 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the findings of the NLRC that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there was no constructive
dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution 6 dated April 30,
2004.
Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However, in a
Resolution7 dated August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the CA, thus,
denied said petition. Ebanen filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied with finality in a
Resolution8 dated October 11, 2004.
Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolutions
dated August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19, 2005, the Court denied
her motion.9
Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being a prohibited
pleading and noted without action Ebanens third motion for reconsideration. 10
On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action Ebanens Motion
for Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2005, in view of the
entry of judgment on February 17, 2005.11
On February 17, 2005, the Courts Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already become final and
executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment 12 has been issued.
However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida, filed a second
complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive
dismissal against Servier, now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-07222-05.

Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the
rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
Subsequently, in a Resolution13 dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both Ebanen and Atty.
Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint against them.
On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.14 Both respondents admitted the filing of
the second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter
was null and void for want of due process, since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces
tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor
Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since the decision was null
and void for lack of due process. As a result, they claimed that there was also no violation of the rule
on forum shopping.15
On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.16
On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds of res
judicata and forum shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from employment
and was not constructively dismissed.
On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants failed to appear.
Ebanen manifested that she is not a lawyer.
Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter of Atty. Leonardo
Aurelio (Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is
employed as associate lawyer.
He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier.
He claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and reviewed all the
pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for Ebanen in the said labor case.
Atty. Relamida admitted, however, that during the filing of the second complaint he took over as
counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio.17 He also admitted that during the pendency of the
first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings and signed as counsel for Ebanen. 18
Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to
represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due
to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata.19 He maintained that
he did not violate the lawyers oath by serving the interest of his client.
Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a violation of the rights of
Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty. Relamida violated the

rules on forum shopping for the same act of filing a second complaint. As a consequence, they are
being made to defend themselves in a case that has been settled before the labor tribunals and
courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that the filing of the second complaint was also a blatant violation
of the rule on res judicata. Hence, Servier prayed that Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to
his abuse of the processes of the courts.
On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent
Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It imposed no sanction on
Ebanen for being a non-lawyer.
In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty of violating
the rules onres judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida abused his right of
recourse to the courts by filing a complaint for a cause that had been previously rejected by the
courts.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification as to
penalty the report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty. Relamida be suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata and forum shopping.
On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant complaint be
re-docketed as a regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida.
We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When
they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the
sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they took,
lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid or consent to the same."20
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and violation of the rule
on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second complaint against
Servier. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it had the
effect of an adjudication on the merits. He was aware of all the proceedings which the first complaint
went through as by his own admission, he participated in the preparation of the pleadings and even
signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally.21 He knew that the decision in the subject case had
already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed the second complaint, it
involved the same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified the same on the ground of
nullity of the previous dismissal.
His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was only to
protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior complaint
deserves scant consideration. He should know that once a case is decided with finality, the

controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits
of his victory, while the other party is obliged to respect the courts verdict and to comply with it. 22
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining
its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar
cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. Thus, the following requisites should concur:23
x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions,
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration
of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be
punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself
to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties
as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear
to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res
judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a
lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of
the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or malice." 25
The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs
the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any
conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such
lawyers duty.26 This we will not tolerate.
1avvphi1

In cases of similar nature,27 the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months suspension from
the practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find that, in this case, the
suspension of six (6) months from practice of law is proper.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which found
respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata and Forum
Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the

practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6198

September 15, 2006

RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge of
unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a
doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for
whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the
case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya]
filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the
case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he
even retired and he is now receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number
of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and
"file the appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or
anything else to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with
"misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice," 5 was

referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating

commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. 7 Atty.
Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side,
admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.8 Later he explained in his
memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms
without going to trial"9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement
(or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case and
therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant. 11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation
finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and recommending that he be "suspended from the
government military service as legal officer for a period of three months."13 This was adopted and
approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate
in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth
and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the
lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." 17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative
case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the
hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he
had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse
for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade
responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway
but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case. 18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, 19 cannot absolve
him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for
the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of

good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of
mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the case amicably
among comrades in arms without going to trial,"21perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what
he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the
proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no
justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace
among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state
as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty.
Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to
settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that
end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in
part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of
law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension
from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to
determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal
officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of
legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's
Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a
consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to
impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of
this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for
suspension from the practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty.
Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability
somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation,
the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of
material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. 23 And finally,
since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance. 24
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that
a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the
practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to
compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for TWO MONTHS.He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate General's Service.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 1900

June 13, 2012

RODRIGO A. MOLINA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is the undated Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines(IBP) finding Atty. Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical conduct and
recommending that he be reprimanded.
The Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint for disbarment2 filed by Rodrigo A.
Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the Court on May 5, 1978. The complaint alleged,
among others, that complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and
Breach of the Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de Leon) before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the counsel of record for accused de Leon in both cases was
Atty. Magat; that a case for slight physical injuries was filed against him (Molina) by de Leon as a
counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the private prosecutor; that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a
motion to quash the information on Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority on the sole
ground of double jeopardy claiming that a similar case for slight physical injuries was filed in court by
a certain Pat. Molina (Molina); that based on the record, no case of slight physical injuries was filed
by Molina against de Leon; that Atty. Magat was very much aware of such fact as he was the
counsel and private prosecutor on record of de Leon from the very start of the case way back on
May 24, 1974; that Atty. Magats act of filing the Motion to Quash was a malicious act done in bad
faith to mislead the court, thus, a betrayal of the confidence of the court of which he is an officer; and
that Atty. Magat likewise committed willful disobedience of the court order when he appeared as
counsel for de Leon on two (2) occasions despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice
of law.

In his Answer,3 Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the filing of the motion to quash was concerned,
he was really under the impression that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2) charges was indeed
filed and that the said motion was opposed by the other party and was denied by the court. He
admitted his appearances in court while under suspension. He explained that his appearance in the
December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the court that the accused was sick and to prevent the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused. In the January 9, 1978 hearing, he appeared
because the accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony be finished. Atty. Magat begged
for the indulgence of the court and conveyed his repentance and apology and promised that the
same would not happen again.
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation.4 Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records of the case to the IBP for proper
disposition.
In his Report and Recommendation5 dated March 20, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
found merit in the complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be reprimanded and
fined P50,000.00. It stated that:
This Commission finds it hard to believe that respondent would have mistakenly been under the
impression that a case for physical injuries was filed against his client when there was no such case
filed. Respondent was either negligently reckless or he had mischievous intentions to deceive the
trial court. In any case, he committed a transgression for which he should be punished.
However, the graver sin of respondent is, and this he admits, that he appeared as counsel before a
trial court on at least two (2) occasions notwithstanding the fact that he had been suspended by the
Supreme Court from the practice of law. Despite professing his contrition in his Answer, this
Commission is not convinced. Otherwise, respondent should have had, at the onset of the
proceedings, admitted to his misdeeds and put his fate squarely with the disciplinary body. Yet, he
proceeded to fight the charges against him.
Moreover, if respondent was indeed moved by altruistic intentions when he made those
appearances before the trial court despite having been suspended, he could have so informed the
Presiding Judge of his plight and explained why the party he was representing could not attend. Yet,
what he proceeded to do was to enter his appearance as counsel. Indeed, it is beyond doubt he
trifled with the suspension order handed by the Supreme Court.
If there is one thing going for respondent, it is that the passage of time with which this case remains
pending makes it difficult to impose a penalty of suspension on him. Under normal circumstances,
this Commission would not have thought twice of suspending respondent. However, the acts
committed by respondent occurred over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would not be fair to now
impose a suspension on respondent, more so considering that he is, in all likelihood, in the twilight of
his career.
On the other hand, there is still a need to discipline respondent if only to set an example to other
lawyers that suspension orders of the Supreme Court cannot simply be ignored. Thus, it is the
recommendation of the undersigned that respondent be meted a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS

(P 50,000.00) and that he be heavily reprimanded for his actions, the passage of time
notwithstanding.6
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed its Resolution 7 adopting the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not with respect to the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.8
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that there was a deliberate intent on
the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges
on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and untruthful statements in
his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that was really
filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was
filed.
Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court on two occasions despite having
been suspended from the practice of law by the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney without authority to do so. It provides:
1wphi1

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Underlining supplied]
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic intentions when he appeared before the trial
court despite having been suspended, he could have informed the Presiding Judge of his plight and

explained why the party he was representing could not attend. On the contrary, Atty. Magat kept his
silence and proceeded to represent his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Administrative Case No. 1571 September 23, 1999

PARALUMAN B. AFURONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANGEL G. AQUINO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a verified letter-complaint for disbarment, filed on December 22, 1975,
by Paraluman B. Afurong against Atty. Angel G. Aquino, for filing frivolous harassment cases to delay
the execution of a final decision, committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion for Postponement, and
misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the Citizens Legal Assistance Office.
1wphi1.nt

The antecedent facts show that on April 2, 1974, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint for ejectment
with the City Court of Manila for non-payment of rentals against Victorino Flores. 1 The court rendered
judgment on May 27, 1974 in favor of petitioner Paraluman Afurong. The court then issued a writ of
execution on February 17, 1975, which was served on Victorino Flores in March 1975.
Facing eviction from the land he was occupying, Victorino Flores sought the assistance of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office. His case was assigned to Atty. Angel G. Aquino, an employee of
said office at the time.
On April 3, 1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed with the City Court of Manila a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order. 2 On May 9, 1975, the petition, after due
hearing, was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Atty. Aquino subsequently filed on May 29, 1975, with the Court of First Instance of Manila a Petition
for Certiorariand Prohibition. 3 The court set the pre-trial conference on December 12, 1975.
Notwithstanding the fact that he was separated from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office on October
1, 1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed on December 11, 1975, an Urgent Motion for Postponement,

signing his name as counsel for Victorino Flores and indicating the address of the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office at 715 Gastambide, Sampaloc, Manila as his office address.
In the aforesaid Urgent Motion for Postponement, Atty. Aquino stated that he would be unable to
attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on December 12, 1975, at 9:00 a.m., of Civil Case No.
97976 because he needed to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus Case 4 before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court that same day and hour.
However, a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court stated
that a decision had been rendered on the aforementioned special proceedings case, and that there
was no hearing in connection with the case on December 12, 1975, for there was nothing more to be
done in the proceedings and the same was declared closed and terminated. 5
Thus, on December 22, 1975, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint 6 with this Court for disbarment
against Atty. Angel G. Aquino.
According to complainant, appropriate punitive sanction should be meted to Atty. Angel G. Aquino for
filing frivolous harassment cases in the form of Civil Case Nos. 97265 and 97976, and for giving
false allegations in his Urgent Motion for Postponement.
Complainant emphasized that when Civil Case No. 97976 was set for pre-trial on December 12,
1975, at 9:00 a.m., respondent falsely represented that on the same date and hour, he would attend
the hearing also on said date and time of Special Proceedings No. D-00326, entitled "In the Matter of
the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ ofHabeas Corpus of Lordeliza V. Sohnrey".
Complainant further contended that Atty. Angel G. Aquino misrepresented himself as an attorney of
the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, using the name and address of said Office to postpone the pretrial hearing of Civil Case No. 97976, on December 12, 1975, despite the fact that he had been
separated from office at the time.
On February 13, 1976, respondent filed with this Court his Answer 7 to the complaint denying the
charges against him, contending that such acts had been done without malice.
He admitted, however, that at the time of the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 97976 set on December 12,
1975, he was no longer connected with the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, for he was "included as
one of the employees purged by the President in a list published in the newspapers last October 1,
1975." 8 Yet, he reasoned, "Not wanting to remove the case from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office by
appearing as private counsel for the petitioner and still unable to wait for my reinstatement which I was
informed was forthcoming, I decided to file a motion to postpone the pre-trial conference of the case."
He also conceded that, "In order to give more "force" to my motion for postponement, I indicated
therein that I had to attend the hearing of another case before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court." 9
He further admitted that the filing of the motion with the facts so stated "might have caused some
delay", but justifies such act by stating that "such filing was prompted by some circumstances which

we can consider as inevitable and unavoidable at the moment." He adds, "If I shall be given another
chance to continue handling the case, I promise that this mistake shall never be
repeated." 10
In a Reply filed on April 6, 1976, 11 complainant asserted that Atty. Angel G. Aquino was declared guilty
of contempt of court and correspondingly fined by this Court in a Decision 12 dated February 26, 1976, for
making false allegations in his Urgent Motion for Postponement.
On May 3, 1976, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. The parties agreed, however, to hold the case in abeyance until the termination of
Civil Case No. 97976. 13
Effective June 1, 1988, all cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General were
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and
disposition as provided in the Revised Rules of Court. 14
On May 22, 1997, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report, 15 finding that
respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino failed to perform his duties expected of an attorney as provided under
the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in force at the
time of the commission of the acts in question. Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose
recommended that respondent be penalized with six (6) months suspension.
On July 26, 1997, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the report and
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. 16
We agree.
The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. 17 The decision in Civil Case No. 231552 had reached finality and
execution of such decision was being effected. Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a petition
for certiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for it than to delay the execution of a valid
judgment.
Furthermore, respondent committed falsehood when he stated in his Urgent Motion for
Postponement that he had to attend the hearing of a special proceedings case the same day as the
pre-trial of Civil Case No. 97976. Respondent himself admitted that he only included such statement
"in order to give more 'force'" to the Urgent Motion for Postponement. Such act violates the Canons
of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to avoid the concealment of the truth from the court.
A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.
In this case, Atty. Aquino stated false allegations in his motion for postponement which delayed the
execution of a valid decision. It is worthy to note that the lower court correctly declared respondent in
contempt of court for conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, in violation of Section 3 (d), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. 18

Moreover, Atty. Aquino purposely allowed the court to believe that he was still employed with the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office when in fact he had been purged from said office. That he was
awaiting reinstatement to the same position at the time does not remove the fact that he was
misrepresenting himself to the court. By doing so, he has violated his duty to employ, for the purpose
of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor,
and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law. 19 He could have delegated the case to another lawyer in the same office.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino guilty of malpractice and
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six (6) months commencing upon receipt of notice
hereof.
Let this decision be spread in the personal record of respondent in this Court and copies thereof
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall provide all its chapters with copies
thereof, and the Office of the Court Administrator which shall forthwith provide with copies thereof all
other courts through the respective presiding Justices and Executive Judges.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7828

August 11, 2008

JUDGE ALDEN V. CERVANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JUDE JOSUE L. SABIO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional retirement
on November 23, 2005. Some of the cases lodged in his sala were ejectment
cases filed by Extra-Ordinary Development Corporation (EDC) against the
clients of Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio (respondent). It appears that respondent
had filed motions for inhibition of complainant "on the basis of the fact that
EDC gave him a house and lot putting into serious doubt his impartiality,
independence and integrity." The motions were denied.
After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated
April 6, 2006,1 sought the investigation of complainant for bribery.

In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated

March 6, 2006 of Edwin P. Cardeo,2 a utility worker in the MTC of Cabuyao,
stating that, inter alia, orders and decisions of complainant were not
generated from the typewriter of the court but from a computer which the court
did not have, it having acquired one only on May 2, 2005; that there had been
many times that a certain Alex of EDC would go to the court bearing certain
papers for the signature of complainant; that he came to learn that a
consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or decision released
by complainant in favor of EDC; and that he also came to know that attempts
at postponing the hearings of the complaints filed by EDC were thwarted by
complainant as he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.
By Resolution of August 30, 2006,3 this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006
Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) relative to
respondents complaint against complainant, approved the recommendation
of the OCA to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit, "the complaint being
unsubstantiated and motivated by plain unfounded suspicion, and for having
been filed after the effectivity of his optional retirement" (underscoring
supplied).
Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint4 of
complainant against respondent, for disbarment.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
From the Report and Recommendation5 of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Randall C. Tabayoyong, it is gathered that despite the January
12, 2007 Order for respondent to file an answer to the complaint, he failed to
do so, prompting the Commissioner to declare him in default.
It is further gathered that after the conduct by the Investigating Commissioner
of a mandatory conference on May 25, 2007, the parties were ordered to file
their respective position papers. In compliance with the Order, complainant
submitted his verified position paper.6 Respondent did not.
Defined as issues before the IBP were:

(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the

complainant before the Office of the Court Administrator in Admin Matter
OCA IPI No. 06-1842-MTJ was malicious, false and untruthful.
(2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondents complaint
against herein complainant false and untruthful, it noting that respondents
complaint was dismissed by this Court due to insufficiency of evidence which,
to the IBP, merely shows a "failure on the part of respondent to prove his
allegations" against complainant.
Noting, however, this Courts August 30, 2006 Resolution finding respondents
complaint "unsubstantiated and motivated by plain, unfounded" suspicion, the
Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent "knowingly instituted
not only a groundless suit against herein complainant, but also a suit based
simply on his bare suspicion and speculation." (underscoring supplied)
On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery
charge against complainant, respondent violated the proscription of the Code
of Professional Responsibility against "wittingly or willingly promot[ing] or
su[ing] any groundless suit" including baseless administrative complaints
against judges and other court officers and employees.
The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that
while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the allegations in
respondents affidavit-complaint against herein complainant were false,
the evidence nonetheless show[s] that respondent had knowingly and
maliciously instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his unfounded
suspicions against complainant;7 (Underscoring supplied)
and that he violated Canons 10,8 11,9 & 1210 and Rule 11.0411 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility under his oath of office.

He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of

P5,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution,12 informs that on
November 22, 2007, it adopted the following Resolution adopting and
approving with modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED,with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents
violation of Canons 10, 11 and 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of
Professional responsibility for filing a groundless suit against
complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern
Warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. (Emphasis in the original)
The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.
Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a lawyer
is to be disciplined, the evidence against him should be substantial,
competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on mere allegations,
conjectures, suppositions, or on the basis of hearsay.13
No doubt, it is this Courts duty to investigate the truth behind charges against
judges and lawyers. But it is also its duty to shield them from unfounded suits
which are intended to, among other things, harass them.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the
amount of Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar questioned act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 11
A.C. No. 5332

July 29, 2003

JOHNNY K.H. UY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. REYNALDO C. DEPASUCAT, WILLIAM O. SU, and CELSO DE LAS ALAS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint filed by Johnny K.H. Uy against respondents lawyers, Reynaldo C.
Depasucat, William O. Su and Celso delas Alas, for gross misconduct.
Complainant Uy together with UBS Marketing Corporation (UBS) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Bacolod City (Branch 43) an action for reconveyance of real property, cancellation of titles and
recovery of ownership and possession, with damages against SK Realty, Inc. and Uys sisters, Ban
Hua U. Flores and Ban Ha U. Chua, together with their children, namely: Leonardo U. Flores, Gloria
U. Chan, Lily Uy, Lilian Uy, Lilen Uy, Stephanie Chua, Melody Chua, Wee Kiat Y. Tan, Theresa
Regalado and Yolanda Kilayko, all clients of herein respondents. Upon filing of the said case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-9051, complainant Uy and UBS caused the annotation of the notice
of lis pendens at the back of the certificates of title of defendant SK Realty with the Register of
Deeds of Bacolod City. Subsequently, in a resolution dated November 9, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. Defendants moved for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens which the trial court granted in a resolution dated December 8, 1995. 1
Complainants Uy and UBS filed their appeal before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CAG.R. No. 57171. After the parties had filed their respective briefs with the Court of Appeals and
before the latters resolution submitting the case for decision was released on March 10, 1999,
respondents filed a pleading dated March 1, 1999, entitled, "Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority
of the Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-Confessed Briber of Judges" which contains the following
statement:
10. That, Plaintiff-Appellant Johnny KH Uy had, in fact, confessed to "Bribery and Telling On" of
judges, after the judges allegedly refused to give in to their "demands", by using illegally taped
conversations both actual and by telephone, copies of the decision of the court a. in case no. A.M. No. RTJ-92-863, against the Hon. Judge Renato Abastillas, hereto
attached as Annex "C", and also
b. in case no. A.M. RTJ-92-880, against the Hon. Judge Bethel K. Moscardon, hereto
attached as Annex "D".2

In the instant administrative complaint, Uy alleges: Respondents, as members of the Bar are sworn
not to do falsehood or consent to the doing of any in court, nor should they mislead the appellate
court by their false, malicious and libelous imputations against him. Respondents filing of the subject
Manifestation was for the purpose of putting him in a bad light so as to obtain a favorable judgment
for their clients. Respondents without any provocation, reason and justification and completely
unmindful of his honor and feelings submitted such Manifestation and furnished copies of the same
to persons not even parties to the case. The subject Manifestation contains groundless and false
imputations which are totally immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent to the appealed case.
In their joint supplemental verified comment with counter motion to cite petitioner for contempt of
court, respondents Su and Depasucat contend: Uys admission that he negotiated for a favorable
outcome of a criminal case formed part of the decision in Lee vs. Abastillas, docketed as Adm. Case
No. RTJ-92-863 which led to the dismissal of Judge Abastillas from the service. The bribery
imputation is true. The "bribe and tell scenario" covered by the said Manifestation was already of
public knowledge as it already formed part of the said administrative decision. There was no
indiscriminate distribution of such Manifestation to strangers just to malign the complainant.
Assuming that the allegations in the Manifestation had painted complainant in a bad light, the same
is considered as an absolute privileged communication. The Manifestation is relevant as it was filed
primarily in response to the extra-judicial, illegal and improper attempt of Uy to reinstate a lis
pendens. Uy had tried so many times to annotate a lis pendens on the subject properties and filed
so many cases involving the same properties and therefore, all his mischiefs are relevant and
material to the appealed case.
In his Comment, respondent delas Alas contends: He appeared as counsel of Uys siblings in other
cases. He signed the Manifestation as a collaborating counsel after he had read the transcript of the
proceeding where Uy admitted having bribed Judge Abastillas. He is convinced that Uy does not
hesitate to corrupt or destroy the character of persons to suit his needs, thus he must be exposed.
Uy has predilections to file cases against opposing lawyers and to seek inhibition of judges and
justices whenever adverse rulings were rendered against him, thus, his active participation in bribing
a judge is not totally immaterial and irrelevant to the appealed case.
Acting on the pleadings of the parties, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.3
On April 6, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline through Investigating Commissioner Julio C.
Elamparo, submitted its report, to wit:
Accordingly, the issue may be simply stated as follows: Should the respondents be disciplined for
having authored and filed the said manifestation.
....
The undersigned commissioner fully agrees with the respondents that the allegations in their
manifestation with respect to the fact that the complainant is a briber of judges are true and correct.
In fact, records show that complainants former counsel has been disbarred by the Supreme Court

because of the bribing incident referred to in the said manifestation. It cannot therefore be said that
the respondents did falsehood or misled the Court of Appeals when they filed their manifestation.
Does the privilege of filing of a pleading with correct and truthful allegations carries with it the license
to use abusive, offensive, menacing or otherwise improper language?
In this jurisdiction, it cannot be doubted that communications either written or oral made in the
course of judicial proceeding are classified as absolutely privilege communications. However, this
doctrine applies only in such cases where the statement is relevant or pertinent or material to the
case. In this respect, respondents failed to convincingly demonstrate the materiality or relevance of
such statement like " Johnny Kh Uy has a track record of making a mockery of our judicial system
had, in fact confessed to "Bribery and Telling On" of judges, after the judges allegedly refused to
give in to their "demands", by using illegally taped conversation both actual and/or by telephone"
in the appealed case involving recovery of property and cancellation of title. Furthermore, if such fact
is relevant, why did the respondents make such fact known to the Court of Appeals only when the
appealed case has already been submitted for decision. Respondents timing makes their claim of
good intention a doubtful claim. It seems that the real intention is to influence the Court of Appeals in
an improper way.
It cannot be doubted that as an advocate, a lawyer has the right to be zealous in the prosecution or
defense of his clients cause. In fact, it is incumbent upon him to point out errors, arbitrariness or
injustices. He is allowed sufficient latitude of remark in furtherance of the causes he advocates for
his client. But in the exercise of this right, it is incumbent upon him to act with justice and to give
everyone his due.
It is settled that a lawyer who uses abusive or abrasive language shows disrespect to the court and
disgraces the Bar. He then invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power as respect for
the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the respondents, for having used offensive and
abusive language in their "MANIFESTATION OF USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS FROM A SELF-CONFESSED BRIBER OF JUDGES" which has no relevance
in the factual and legal issues then pending resolution before the Court of Appeals be warned that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.4
On June 29, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.5
We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondents have used offensive and abusive language
but instead of mere admonition respondents should be reprimanded.
The statement made by respondents that complainant Uy had bribed a judge in A.M. No. RTJ 92863 was duly proven. Uy who appeared as witness in the said administrative case filed against
Judge Renato Abastillas of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Branch 50), 6 testified that he
gave money to the Judge in consideration of the dismissal of a case in which he had an interest.

This admission was lifted from the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings therein
submitted by the respondents and quoted in the Abastillas decision which was promulgated in 1994.
However, we find nothing on record that supports the statement of the respondents that Uy had also
bribed a judge in Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation vs. Katalbas-Moscardon, docketed as
AM RTJ 92-880 which we have decided in 1995. 7 Notably, in their joint affidavit filed before the
Commission, respondents Depasucat and Su stated that "the pattern of corruption and illegal wire
tapping was repeated by the complainants disbarred lawyer Enrique S. Chua, in A.M. RTJ-92-880,
in re Hon. Judge Bethel K. Moscardon, thus institutionalizing the malevolent practice". However,
there was nothing that showed Uys participation therein. In fact, a reading of the courts decision in
the Moscardon case revealed that it was Atty. Enrique Chua, the lawyer of Uy, who was involved in
the said case as a witness in the corruption of Judge Moscardon and the name of Uy was never
mentioned at all. Moreover, during the hearing, the investigating commissioner took note that there
was no copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes of A.M. RTJ 92-880 presented. Respondents
were not able to substantiate their statement that Uy was involved in two bribing incidents to be
branded as "briber of judges". Respondents have partly made a false imputation against Uy. Halftruths are equally if not more pernicious than outright lies.
Uy claims that assuming arguendo that he had bribed a judge, the same is irrelevant and impertinent
to the appealed case where the subject Manifestation was filed. On the other hand, respondents
contend that the filing of the subject Manifestation was not attended by malice; that it falls under the
protective mantle of an absolute privileged communication.
The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings,
including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that
are absolutely privileged has been enunciated in a long line of cases. 8 Said doctrine rests upon
public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental
result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant
slanderer.9 The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public
service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare,
the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses
may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a
criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. 10 Lawyers, most especially, should be
allowed a great latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they
uphold,11 and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of
phrase.12 However, such remarks or comments should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy
and propriety.13
We have stated the test of relevancy, thus:
xxx. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters
privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privileged does not extend must be
so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can
doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it
need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be

legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the
subject of inquiry in the course of the trial xxx14
Applying the above rule to the subject Manifestation, we find that the statement that Uy is a briber of
judges is not relevant to the issues presented before the appellate court. Although Uy was shown to
have admitted bribing a judge, the incident did not happen in the case appealed to the Court of
Appeals where the assailed Manifestation was filed. It was not at all pertinent to Uys action for
reconveyance of real property, cancellation of titles and recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages. Moreover, if respondents truly believe in the relevancy of the bribing incident to the
appealed case, they could have stated the same in their pleading filed in the trial court in 1995 or in
their appellees brief filed before the appellate court considering that the Abastillas case had already
been decided in 1994.
Respondents claim that the subject Manifestation was filed primarily in response to the extra-judicial,
illegal and improper attempt of the complainant to reinstate a cancelled lis pendens which is subject
of the appealed case. While the notice to annotate a cancelled lis pendens was filed by Uys counsel
with the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on October 26, 1998, the same was denied by the
Register of Deeds on January 25, 1999 for the reason that the cancelled notice of lis pendens can
only be re-annotated by a court order. Undoubtedly, the action taken by Uy was improper since the
propriety of the cancellation of the notice was one of the issues raised by Uy before the appellate
court. Thus, respondents who had knowledge of the same have the duty to inform the appellate
court, which respondents have done by filing the subject Manifestation. However, respondents went
overboard by further stating in the Manifestation that complainant "had in fact confessed to Bribery
and Telling On of judges, after the judges allegedly refused to give in to their demands, by using
illegally taped conversations-both actual and/or by telephone". It belied their good intention and
exceeded the bounds of propriety, hence not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of
contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. 15 A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. 16 It must be remembered
that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.17 It has been said that a lawyers
language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 18
It is the duty of the respondents as members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged.19
The IBP aptly observed that the Manifestation was filed only after the appealed case had already
been submitted for decision which made respondents claim of good intention in filing the same a
doubtful claim. While the records show that the subject Manifestation was filed with the Court of
Appeals on March 1, 1999 and the appellate courts resolution submitting the case for decision was
dated March 10, 1999, we agree with the IBPs conclusion that the filing of the Manifestation was a
clear attempt on the part of the respondents to influence the mind of the court against complainant
Uy and to decide the appeal in favor of their clients.
We find respondents to be at fault and therefore they should be reprimanded for having done so. A
higher penalty is not called for considering that it is clear that respondents were merely over-zealous
1wphi1

in ensuring the victory of their clients and, that they honestly thought, although erroneously, that by
branding complainant as a "briber of judges", they were justifying their allegation in the Manifestation
that complainant "has a track record of making a mockery of our judicial system".
In their Comment, respondents Su and Depasucat pray that complainant be cited for contempt of
court for denying under oath that he is a confessed briber of judges and of accusing respondents of
indiscriminately furnishing copies of the subject Manifestation to strangers in the appealed case.
We find nothing contemptuous on Uys desire to protect his honor from what he perceived to be
defamatory imputation against him since it is within his right to do so. While he may have denied the
established fact that he bribed Judge Abastillas, however, his denial as to the other bribing incident
was proven to be true since respondents failed to substantiate the same. Furthermore, although Uy
failed to prove his allegation that respondents indiscriminately furnished copies of the subject
Manifestation to strangers to the appealed case, the same is not grave enough so as to warrant the
exercise of contempt powers of the Court. There was no sufficient showing of bad faith in Uys filing
of the present administrative complaint against respondents.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the respondents are hereby REPRIMANDED for
MISCONDUCT in using offensive and abusive language in their Manifestation and WARNED that a
repetition of the same in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The motion of respondents to cite complainant in contempt is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1698

March 3, 2008
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1523-MTJ)
JAIME RACINES, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. MORALLOS and SHERIFF III BENJAMIN CABUSAO, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Complainant Jaime Racines (Racines) was required by the Court in its Resolution dated November
22, 2007 to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing a baseless and
unfounded administrative case.
Racines filed on December 17, 2003, a Complaint against Judge Jose P. Morallos (Judge Morallos)
and Sheriff Benjamin Cabusao, Jr. (Sheriff Cabusao) of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch
68 of Pasig City, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,1 other deceits,2 violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act,3violation of Article 32 of the New Civil Code, Section 1, Article III of

the 1987 Constitution, and the Code of Judicial Conduct. 4 The Court, finding the evaluation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to be in accord with law and the facts on record, affirmed its
recommendation and dismissed Raciness complaint in the Resolution dated November 22, 2004.
The Court held that there was nothing in the records to show that Judge Morallos was moved by
improper motive when he rendered the decision in Civil Case No. 9681; 5 neither was there anything
to show that Sheriff Cabusao used his position to influence the outcome of the decision; and in any
event, the proper recourse was to elevate the case to a higher court for review, and not through an
administrative case. The Court, in the said resolution also directed Racines to show cause within 10
days from receipt thereof, why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing an utterly
baseless and unfounded administrative case.6
Racines through counsel, Atty. Onofre D. Manalad, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 which the
Court denied with finality in the Resolution dated March 2, 2005 for lack of substantial argument. The
Resolution likewise admonished Racines and his counsel to desist from initiating baseless
complaints.8
On March 29, 2005, the OCA received an Earnest Motion for Clarification 9 filed by Racines through
Atty. Manalad which the Court treated as a second motion for reconsideration in the Resolution
dated May 25, 2005. The Court denied the motion for being a prohibited pleading and directed that
no further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in the case.10
On June 19, 2007, Racines by himself, filed a Pagpapaliwanag claiming: He received the Courts
Resolution dated November 22, 2004 only on March 30, 2007 and he was able to file his explanation
only at this time since he had to look for a lawyer who would explain it to him. The complaint and the
other documents which Atty. Manalad prepared were all written in English and because he fully
trusted Atty. Manalad, he immediately signed the same even though Atty. Manalad did not explain it
to him. Had Atty. Manalad fully explained the documents to him, he would not have signed the same,
as he had no intention of filing a baseless administrative case against respondents. If there was
anyone who should be punished, it was Atty. Manalad because he deceived him into filing a
baseless administrative case.11
The Court required Atty. Manalad to comment on Raciness Pagpapaliwanag.12
In his Comment, Atty. Manalad avers that Racines is being used by Gerry Chua, lessor of the
Viajeros Market and Chuas lawyer Atty. Edgardo Galvez against him (Atty. Manalad), since he is
assisting the officers of the Pasig Fruits & Vegetables Vendors Association (PFVVA) in their cases
against Chua. Racines, who was for several years a sergeant-at-arms of the PFVVA, was pirated by
Chua to lead a group of goons to harass his co-vendors into giving up their stalls. Atty. Manalad
claims that he would not have initiated an action against an incumbent trial court judge had no
grievous correctible error been committed in bad faith at the expense of truth and justice. He also
asserts that the allegations in the complaint against Judge Morallos are substantiated by the
admission of the parties in their pleadings, and that he filed the charges against respondents at the
instance of Racines who was even crying when he was pleading before Atty. Manalad for legal
assistance.13
The Court finds both Racines and Atty. Manalad guilty of indirect contempt.

Persons guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.14 The Court, in the exercise of its
inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all
other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, may motu proprio initiate proceedings
therefor.15
The Court has held that unsubstantiated charges serve no purpose other than to harass judges and
cast doubt on the integrity of the entire judiciary.16 The filing of clearly unfounded or malicious
complaints seriously affects the efficiency of the members of the judiciary in administering fair,
speedy and impartial justice.17 The Court, mindful of the proliferation of unfounded or malicious
administrative or criminal cases filed by losing litigants and disgruntled lawyers against members of
the judiciary, therefore issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC18 which took effect on November 4, 2003 with
the aim of preventing or at least discouraging the filing of such cases to protect the orderly
administration of justice.19 It provides in paragraph 1 thereof that if upon informal preliminary inquiry it
is found that the complaint is unfounded, baseless and merely intended to harass respondent,
complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. And if
the complainant is a lawyer, he may be further required to show cause why he or she should not be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.
1avvphi1

In the present case, Racines, through his lawyer Atty. Manalad filed a case against Judge Morallos
and Sheriff Cabusao, imputing to them corrupt and criminal acts on the mere basis of Judge
Moralloss decision. The complaint stated that Judge Morallos "distorted the facts" in his "anomalous
decision" and committed the crimes of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, causing undue injury
to Racines, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and estafa by means of other
deceits.20 The complaint also questioned Judge Moralloss integrity, impartiality and professional
competence, all on the basis of his decision on the ejectment favoring the plaintiff therein, Jellicom
Manpower and Transport Services owned by Sheriff Cabusao, with Racines as defendant. The
complaint also claims that Sheriff Cabusao, Judge Morallos and Gerry Chua, lessor of the property,
conspired with one another in commiting the wrongful acts for which they are liable to pay
damages.21
Unfazed by the order of the Court directing Racines to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt for filing a baseless complaint, Racines, through Atty. Manalad even filed two motions for
reconsideration, reiterating their baseless claims.
Racines tries to escape liability by saying that Atty. Manald did not explain the contents of the
pleadings to him, because if Atty. Manalad did, he would not have signed the same.
The Court is not convinced. It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act22and unless the requirements for proper substitution were made, a lawyer enjoys the
presumption of authority given him by his client.23 Racines does not deny that the signatures in the
pleadings were his. He also does not claim that he was prevented by Atty. Manalad from reading the
contents thereof. He only said that since he fully trusted Atty. Manalad he immediately signed the
documents. From the foregoing, it is clear that Racines acquiesced and gave his stamp of approval
to the pleadings filed in court. Considering however that he is not learned in the intricacies of law, the
Court finds the penalty of reprimand with warning to be sufficient in his case. 24

As to Atty. Manalad, the Court finds that a greater penalty is in order. As a member of the bar, he
should know better than to file an unfounded administrative complaint. 25 He is bound by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Rule 11.04 thereof states that a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge
motives not supported by the records. Canon 11 also enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the
respect due to courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. 26 His
claim that he filed the charges against respondent at the instance of Racines cannot free him from
liability. As the Court has pronounced, a clients cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as
many suppose, but to the administration of justice. 27 As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the
duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice. For
violating Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds that a fine of five
thousand pesos is proper in his case.28
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Jaime Racines and Atty. Onofre D. Manalad guilty of Indirect
Contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Atty. Onofre D. Manalad is
ordered to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS within ten (10) days from finality of herein
Resolution, while Jaime Racines is REPRIMANDED. Both are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of a similar act may warrant a more severe action by this Court.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8920

September 28, 2011

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommending that he be reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B.
Baculi, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The
respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao
City.
Background
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment2 with the Commission on Discipline of the IBP against
the respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 113 and 124 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of
Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised
him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned
that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, "Then cite me!" 5 Judge Baculi
cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, "Judge,
I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" 6 Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to
escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second
time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the courthouse,
apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file
gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!"
and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building. 7
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued shouting and
punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.8
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640, an
ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he modified on
December 14, 2007. After the modified decision became final and executory, the branch clerk of
court issued a certificate of finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ
of execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction.
Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the
jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
The respondent filed his Answer,9 essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who disrespected
him.10 We quote from his Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against him once
inside the court room when he was lambasting me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I just submit the
Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument because he wanted to have an occasion to
just HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER,
when he said "YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT" making it an
impression to the litigants and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT,
MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.

25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]

xxxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi
could have just made an order that the Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for
resolution, but what he did was that he forced me to argue so that he will have the room to
humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his
Commissioners Report,11 Commissioner De la Rama stated that during the mandatory conference
on January 16, 2009, both parties merely reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings.
Both parties agreed that the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom
would be submitted for the Commissioners review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and the
transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows: 12
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the respondent was calm.
He politely argued his case but the voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the
mandatory conference, it was also observed that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch
whenever he speaks. In fact, in the TSN, where there was already an argument, the complainant
stated the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you
do not want to appear before my court, then you better attend to your cases and do not appear
before my court if you do not want to be corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words "we are very sorry" [ were] actually uttered by Atty. Battung while
the judge was saying the quoted portion of the TSN)
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions when the
undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?
*

Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to present our
evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules on
summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant.
Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him.
But after hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at
the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases to be called. They
must have observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al.,
they stood as one in saying that it was really Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the
latter cautioned him "not to shout."
The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:
Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00.
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross ignorance of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
Court: Next case.
Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished)
Court: The next time
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear

Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to see me, see me
after the court.
Next case.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts
and judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The
respondents argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due
consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he
created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. What the respondent should
have done was to file an action before the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge
Baculi did not act according to the norms of judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that
the respondent had misused the judicial processes to frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that the
respondent be reprimanded.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the
courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court
personnel. The respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many
witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and
acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him
for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the courtroom and
disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against the person, the position and
the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and
flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts,
cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he
represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.13 that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the
judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latters role, stature and
position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge
Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent
effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence
and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with
sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer
cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while the
Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty of six (6) months suspension.
We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.
In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor,14 we suspended
Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and for violating the Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances
against a judge in newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs violations are no less
serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings where the
respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before the litigating public. His actions were
plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive
to the integrity of the judicial system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department
of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5921

March 10, 2006

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City,
Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A.
Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30,
against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("respondents").
Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion")
in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos"). 4 The
Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos
appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was
sitting as pairing judge.
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments
rendered in favor of Veneracion.5 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as
REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997.
Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered
by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the
1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax
Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is
ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.
SO ORDERED.6
Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) 7 dated 30 July
2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent portions of which read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual

and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x
x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing
the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:
1awph!l.net

x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT period
of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the
Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff.
This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part of
the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is
an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to
a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE
base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that
The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over
the Subject-Matter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is
determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is
backed up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the
Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiffs HOUSE:

THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS
committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the
ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and
ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial
MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight!8
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a
fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. 9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain
why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating"
contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her Explanation, Comments and Answer,11 Velasco-Jacoba
claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will
show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case." 12 VelascoJacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the
Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of
justice."13 She rationalized as follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking
adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-byside x x x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic picture of total and utter
disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hardhitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just
articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good
fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must
believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The
matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x
x x14
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake [they] may
have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have stepped on the line and
gone out of bounds." She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the
record.15
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her
with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.16

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on
her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said
"O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be
filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on
her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." 17 This pleading turned
out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then
suspension from the practice of law.18
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting
any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her
imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a
senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over." 19 At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom
should have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadezabecause "[Veneracion] had already
filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and
before the Ombudsman."20
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law
Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of
knowingly rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance 21 and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge became the subject of a
preliminary investigation23 by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge,
Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed on 28 August 2001 with the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain
why he should not be held in contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion
for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against VelascoJacobas statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. 26 Judge
Lacurom later rendered a decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to
pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP
Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient notice. 28
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended
the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months. 29 IBP Commissioner Navarro
found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which
amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority."30 Although the remarks were not directed at
Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at "his position as a judge, which is a smack on the
judiciary system as a whole."31

The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP Commissioner Navarros Report and
Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three
months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court,
together with the documents pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus: 33
xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge
Lacurom is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case are raised before the
Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari
and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court
involving the same issues we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was
dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view of the pending Certiorari case
before the Court of Appeals;
5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present
complaint should likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari
case by the Court of Appeals.34(Emphasis supplied)
The Courts Ruling
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacobas contention that the present complaint should be
considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary
injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to
nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26
September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying respondents respective motions for inhibition; and
(2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners
allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court." 36
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is
neither identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Courts dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for
being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacuroms orders in Civil Case No. 2836
could not be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a petition for certiorari
assailing the same orders is pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties
and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that the challenged

order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is
administratively liable.37
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The corresponding
implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against
Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001
motion. Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 3.Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that
it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or
indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew
it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the
motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court
document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her
husbands request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing
each others pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to VelascoJacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years,
[she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other." 38 By
Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act
of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of
the 30 July 2001 motion.39
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001
motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author of
the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition
did not contain a denial of his wifes account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the
motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to
be gigantic and monumental."40

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her
reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was raised
only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had
been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobas
assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the
outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him. 41 This petition
for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacobas
handiwork.42
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object
timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. 43 This waiver
applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of
Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the following words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult
to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that
the words created "a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect." 44
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July
2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. 45 However,
even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001
motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and
decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyers language may
be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession.46 The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem
in the courts and trust in judicial administration.47
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified
language but also to pursue the clients cause through fair and honest means, thus:

Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client
in instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case
No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacuroms sala. The Courts attention is drawn to the fact
that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the
cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.
Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In
Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six
months because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of property despite the
lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him ofP550 which his client gave him as filing and
sheriffs fees."48 In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties
when he failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in the dismissal of his clients appeal. We
imposed the penalty of one year suspension.49
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay
conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section
415 of the Local Government Code.50
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a
stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of whether respondents have
conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the bar and
officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of
law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat
a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
ROBERT M. VISBAL,
Complainant,

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1432

Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),

- versus -

JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, Tacloban City,
Respondent.

Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 3, 2004

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a sworn complaint,[1] Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal

charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Branch 1, Tacloban City with Violation
of Rule 3.05,[2] Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and/or Failure to Decide a
Case Within the Reglementary Period, Gross Inefficiency, Misconduct, Bias and
Partiality relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-07-20.[3]

Complainant avers that respondent Judge failed to decide Criminal Cases

Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-07-20 within the 90-day period from submission of the
partiess memoranda. Hence, complainant prays that respondent Judge be held
administratively liable as well as criminally liable for Violation of Article 174 [4] of
the Revised Penal Code for his failure to disclose in his Certificates of Service
from June 1999 that the subject cases were pending decision.

Complainant further alleges that respondent Judge displayed bias in favor of

the accused in the above-mentioned criminal cases by his tolerance of the defenses
late filing of pleadings and failure to appear in court despite due notice. He claims
that respondent Judge harbored a grudge against him because his wife filed an
administrative complaint against the latter.

In his Comment,[5] respondent Judge denied the allegations in the

complaint. He alleged that the subject cases were originally pending before the
sala of Judge Paulino A. Cabello but were subsequently transferred to him after
Judge Cabello inhibited himself from hearing the cases. He explains that his
inability to dispose of the cases within the prescribed period was due to the failure
of his staff to bring the cases to him for proper action. It was only on December 1,
1999 that his attention was called regarding these two cases which had been
submitted for decision. However, after going over the memoranda of the parties
and other pleadings, he found that the only way to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused is through a full-blown trial. Thus, he scheduled the cases for
trial. He admits that he was unable to report the pendency of these two cases in his
Certificate of Service because he was unaware that the period to decide them had
already lapsed.

Respondent further averred that the administrative case [6] filed by

complainants wife against him was already dismissed by this Court in a
Resolution dated August 11, 1997.[7] He notes that complainant has the propensity
of filing administrative cases against judges and fellow prosecutors, and he even
filed an administrative complaint against Judge Cabello for inhibiting himself from
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-07-20.

On May 8, 2002, the complaint was docketed as a regular administrative

matter and referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City for investigation, report and recommendation.

Executive Judge Leonardo B. Apita inhibited himself in a letter dated June

13, 2002[8] stating that he was related to respondent Judge within the 6 th degree of
affinity. Thus, the case was referred to Vice Executive Judge Salvador Y. Apurillo.

In his Report dated March 24, 2003,[9] Judge Apurillo concluded that
respondent Judge indeed failed to resolve the cases within the reglementary period,
but found that part of the blame was attributable to his staff. Since respondent has
a caseload of more than 1,000 cases, it could really happen that some important
matters may be overlooked. While many lawyers try to help out judges by filing
motions for early resolution, this did not happen in the subject cases. If respondent

Judge was to be faulted at all, it would be for his failure to devise a system to keep
track of the cases pending before him and to efficiently manage his personnel. For
his transgression, Judge Apurillo recommended that respondent Judge be sternly
reprimanded.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the factual
findings of Judge Apurillo but recommended that respondent Judge be fined in the
amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00).

As per Resolution of the Court dated February 11, 2004, [10] both
complainant[11] and respondent[12] manifested their willingness to submit the case
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.

The reasons adduced by respondent for his delay in rendering judgment in

Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-07-20 are not novel. A judge cannot take
refuge behind the mistakes and inefficiency of his court personnel. [13] He is
charged with the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising them
to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.[14] Indeed, he is
ultimately responsible for ensuring that court personnel perform their tasks and that
the parties are promptly notified of his orders and decisions. [15] It is his duty to

devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court to enable him to monitor
the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition.[16]

If respondent Judge could not decide the case within the reglementary
period, all he had to do was to ask from this Court a reasonable extension of time
to dispose of the case, which may have been granted.[17]
Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
state:
Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without
delay.
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In this connection, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 states, inter

alia, that:
3.
Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed
by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication
and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or
matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of
submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a
period of three months to do so. . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)

We find the penalty recommended by the OCA not commensurate to the

misconduct committed by respondent.[18]
Section 7, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, [19] classifies
administrative charges as serious, less serious or light. Undue delay in rendering a
decision or order is subsumed under less serious charges under Section 9. Pursuant
to Section 11 (B) of the same Rule, such offense is punishable by suspension from

office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more
than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00. Therefore, the imposable penalty warranted in this case is a fine of
P11,000.00.
The resolution of this case will not, however, be complete without passing
upon complainants unusual proclivity of filing several administrative cases against
respondent. A verification with the Docket and Clearance Division of the OCA
discloses that complainant prosecutor had so far filed the following administrative
complaints against respondent Judge:
1)

A.M. OCA-IPI No. 00-944-MTJ for Nepotism. Complaint dismissed on

18 February 2002;

2)

A.M. OCA-IPI No. 02-1262-MTJ for Dishonesty

Misconduct. Complaint dismissed on 9 July 2003;

3)

A.M. OCA-IPI No. 02-1299-MTJ for Grave Misconduct, Malfeasance and

Conduct Prejudicial to the Service. Complaint dismissed on 26 March
2003;

4)

A.M. OCA-IPI No. 97-360-MTJ for Grave Abuse of Judicial Authority,

Gross Ignorance of the Law and Serious Misconduct filed by Asuncion
Baldonaza, wife of complainant. Complaint dismissed on 11 August 1997;

5)

A.M. No. MTJ-03-1471 for Gross Inefficiency. Respondent was fined

Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00) on 22 January 2003;

6)

A.M. No. 02-1432 for alleged Failure to Decide Cases Within the
Reglementary Period, Misconduct, Bias and Partiality. This is the case
under evaluation.

and

Gross

Complainants obsessive prosecutorial zeal in filing administrative charges is

not limited to respondent Judge because a verification with the Docket and
Clearance Division of the OCA reveals that said complainant has, to date, filed no
less than 31 administrative cases, inclusive of the foregoing complaints against

respondent, against MTC judges, RTC magistrates and other court personnel of
Leyte, to wit:
A.

Against RTC Judges of Leyte:

1)

OCA-IPI No. 02-1615-RTJ for Grave Misconduct v. Judge

Leonilo C. Apita, Branch 7, Tacloban City. Complaint
Dismissed on 03 September 2003;

2)

OCA-IPI No. 99-873-RTJ for Gross Ignorance of the Law,

Grave Abuse of Authority and Acts Prejudicial to the Service
v. Judge Leonilo C. Apita, Branch 7, Tacloban
City. Complaint Dismissed on 01 January 2000;

3)

OCA-IPI No. 03-1770-RTJ for Knowingly Rendering Unjust

Judgment v. Judge Salvador Y. Apurillo, Branch 8, Tacloban
City. Pending;

4)

OCA-IPI No. 03-1656-RTJ for Knowingly Rendering Unjust

Judgment v. Judge Salvador Y. Apurillo, Branch 8, Tacloban
City. Complaint Dismissed on 06 August 2003;

5)

OCA-IPI No. 00-967-RTJ for Failure to Decide Case within

90-day period v. Judge Pepe P. Domael, Branch 37, NavalBiliran. Complaint Dismissed on 24 July 2000;

6)

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1096 for Irregularity in Granting Bail v.

Judge Getulio Francisco, Branch 6, Tacloban City. Complaint
Dismissed on 11 January 1995;

7)

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1490 for Falsification of Certificate of

Service v. Judge Frisco T. Lilagan, Branch 34, Tacloban
City. Fined P1,000.00 27 July 1999;

8)

OCA-IPI No. 97-365-RTJ for Grave Misconduct, abuse of

Judicial Authority and Oppression v. Judge Roberto A.
Navidad, Branch 9, Tacloban City. Complaint Dismissed 11
March 2002;

9)

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1744 for Violation of Canon 3.05, Code of

Judicial Conduct and Failure to Decide Case within the

Reglementary Period v. Judge Rogelio C. Sescon, Branch 9,

Tacloban City. Fined P11,000.00 16 August 2003;
10)

B.

C.

OCA-IPI No. 03-1879-RTJ for Undue Delay in Resolving

Civil Case No. 2002-11236 v. Judge Roberto C. Sescon,
Branch 9, Tacloban City. Pending;

Against other MTC Judges of Leyte:

11)

OCA-IPI No. 98-631-MTJ for Gross Incompetence,

Negligence and Grave Misconduct in Office v. Judge Paulino
A. Cabello, MTCC, Branch 2, Tacloban City. Complaint
Dismissed 23 August 2000.

12)

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1306 for Gross Ignorance of the Law,

Grave Abuse of Judicial Authority and Negligence v. Judge
Rodolfo C. Ramos, MTC, Jaro, Leyte. Fined P3,000.00 20
March 2001;

13)

OCA-IPI No. 04-1576-MTJ for Grave Misconduct and Gross

Ignorance of the Law v. Judge Wenceslao C. Vanilla. Pending;

Against Court Personnel:

14)

OCA-IPI No. 03-1585-P for Violation of pars. 1 & 2 of

Administrative Circular No. 24-90 and other Guidelines on
Stenographers and Inefficiency v. Gemma Almadden, Court
Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 9, Tacloban City. Pending;

15)

OCA-IPI No. 02-1262-MTJ for Dishonesty and Gross

Misconduct v. Felicisimo Anota, Clerk of Court, MTCC,
Tacloban City. Reprimanded 09 July 2003;

16)

OCA-IPI No. 00-957-P for Violation of Section 5 (a), R.A.

No. 6713 v. Felicisimo Anota, Clerk of Court, Branch 1,
MTCC, Tacloban City. Admonished 15 April 2002;

17)

OCA-IPI No. 03-1658-P for Violation of SC Circular No. 2490 dated 12 July 1990 & other related circulars, Neglect of
Duty v. Teresita Calleja, Clerk of Court V, RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City. Complaint Dismissed 18 February 2004;

18)

OCA-IPI No. 02-1299-MTJ for Conduct Prejudicial to the

Best Interest of the Service v. Joseph Daya, Interpreter,
MTCC, Branch 1, Tacloban City. Complaint Dismissed 26
March 2003;

19)

OCA-IPI No. 02-1461-P for Violation of the Manual for

Clerks of Court v. Anne Beth Polo-Igano, Clerk of Court II,
MTC, Pastrana, Leyte. Complaint Dismissed 24 March 2003;

20)

OCA-IPI No. 03-1658-P for Violation of SC Circular No. 2490 dated 12 July 1990 and other related circulars, Neglect of
Duty v. Salome Montezon, Stenographer, Branch 7, Tacloban
City. Complaint Dismissed 18 February 2004;

21)

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1096 for Irregularity in Granting Bail v.

Blanche A. Salino, Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 6, Tacloban
City. Complaint Dismissed 11 January 1995;

22)

OCA-IPI No. 97-235-P for Violation of R.A. No. 6713,

Section 5 (a) v. Edgardo M. Tutaan, Clerk of Court, MTC,
Palo, Leyte. Admonished 18 June 1997;

23)

A.M. No. P-00-1408 for Violation of R.A. No. 6713 v.

Gonzalo Velarde, Clerk of Court, MTC, Alangalang, Leyte.
Complaint Dismissed 25 April 2001;

24)

OCA-IPI No. 00-998-P for Failure to Respond to a Letter v.

Flordeliza Villanueva, Cashier, MTCC, OCC, Tacloban
City. Complaint Dismissed 21 January 2002;

25)

OCA-IPI No. 02-1262-MTJ for Dishonesty and Gross

Misconduct v. Flordeliza Villanueva, Cashier, MTCC,
Tacloban City. Reprimanded 09 July 2003.

In a Resolution dated July 7, 2004, the Court directed complainant to show

cause why he should not be held administratively liable for his propensity for filing
false charges against officials and employees of the court within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from notice. Complainant thereafter filed his Compliance
stating that although some of those administrative complaints may not have
merited the judicious evaluation of this Court, it is his honest belief that the

administrative complaints he filed were well-founded. Furthermore, he had noble

intentions of particularly bringing to the attention of this Court the abuses and
irregularities in the lower court for appropriate action.
We find complainants explanation unsatisfactory. His propensity to litigate
raises doubts as to how he could find the time to perform his duties at all. Such an
excessive tendency to complain even the slightest of administrative infractions in
some of the cases constitutes an oppressive and gross abuse of legal
processes. This imposes on the precious time of the Court and impedes the speedy
and efficient dispensation of justice. Complainant should be reminded that it is the
duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court not to foment suits among individuals.
A lawyer owes to society and to the court the duty not to stir up
litigation. The Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not,
for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding. [20] Thus, a
lawyer is ordered not to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator of concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and justice.[21] In fact, lawyers are called upon to resist the
whims and caprices of their clients and to temper the latters propensity to litigate
because the Lawyers Oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to
his clients.[22]
The foregoing dictum which is embodied in the Canons of Professional
Responsibility applies with equal vigor to lawyers in the government service like
complainant.[23] Indeed, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly states that
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.[24]

Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the
public service because public service is a public trust.[25] A lawyer does not shed
his professional obligations upon assuming public office. [26] In fact, his
professional obligations should make him more sensitive to his official obligations
because a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public eye.[27]
It is worthy to note that complainant has already been cited by this Court
in Visbal v. Ramos[28] for wantonly making baseless charges for malfeasance thus:
We must stress that gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation. It
therefore behooves complainant to be more circumspect in hurling this charge.
Indeed, a person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure
of the grounds for the accusation, or else be found ignorant of the law, as in
this case. Judges, while expected to be a cut above the rest in the legal profession,
are not inured to the strain concomitant with baseless and unfair aspersions on
their competence. They certainly deserve a better treatment, especially from a
prosecutor who should know, at the very least, the basic provisions of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis and italics supplied).

Complainant is therefore guilty of misconduct, defined as the transgression

of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment.[29]
Given the prevailing facts of this case, a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) should suffice.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1)

Ordering

respondent

Judge

Marino

S.

to PAY a FINE of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00); and

Buban

2)

Ordering Prosecutor

Robert

M.

Visbal

to PAY a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).

Both complainant and respondent are likewise STERNLY WARNED that a

repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8954

November 13, 2013

HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863
captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge
Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863,
Judge Manahan issued an Order dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from
hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
1

More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges,
would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary
action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction.
2

Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores.
Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation.
3

In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez
(Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as follows:
4

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal
docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores
appeared as counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and
was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his PreTrial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records without
prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty.
Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of
respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE
compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010
giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that
failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010 stating
among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and
fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
1wphi1

6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution
commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the
foregoing divine and human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary
conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of
compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again

failed to appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent
Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in
your sala.
5

The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.
6

The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.

Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial courts order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected
not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong,
as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."
8

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine
interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to
voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which
must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be
done within the confines of reason and common sense.
9

However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent.
Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of
law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem
it proper to fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
10

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 12
A.C. No. 6273

March 15, 2010

ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
An Information for Estafa1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa
(complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto
(respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the involvement
of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court
granted.2 Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied 3
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of
Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them.4
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service
Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on
October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of Directors (the Board),
including her and the General Manager.5 The notice was signed by respondent.
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt.
Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then current Board, 6 Gerango,
complainants predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed
others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.

On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises,
the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to
complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal from the Board and as
members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties
of their positions.7
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special
General Assembly.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the
questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCOs
By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. 8 The RDs Resolution of February 21, 2002
was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.
In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that
respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID
AND CONSENT TO THE SAME11
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION12
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL13
X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN
THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW14
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES
COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY
AS WELL15
Despite the Courts grant,16 on respondents motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment,
respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with,18 but just the same he failed to comply.19
The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.20
It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the following
issues:

1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly the following:
1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal [processes].
1.2 Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
1.3 Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
1.4 Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law.
1.5 Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyers oath,
particularly the following:
2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein
2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court
2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same
2.4 will delay no man for money or malice
3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for disbarment
or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court.21
Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether,
on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by respondent. 22
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position
papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time,
did not file any position paper.
In her Report and Recommendation,25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found
respondent guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been previously suspended
for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the
complaint, however, for lack of merit.26
1avvphi1

On Motion for Reconsideration,27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the
GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall
support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated
the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file
any and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar 28 teaches:
x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree
of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with
the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her
disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment
for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes.29 (Citations omitted).
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six
months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have
received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when
he had not.31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty
this time is thus called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice
of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5469

August 10, 2004

RICARDO A. FORONDA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARNOLD V. GUERRERO, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The instant disbarment case arose when Ricardo A. Foronda, acting as attorney-in-fact for Ramona
Patricia Alcaraz and Concepcion D. Alcaraz, filed a verified Letter-Complaint 1 dated June 29, 2001
with the Office of the Bar Confidant charging Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero with abusing "procedural rules
to defeat the ends of substantial justice by filing appeals, complaints and petitions to frustrate and
delay the execution of a judgment."
The Antecedents
The complainant alleged that his principals, Ramona and Concepcion Alcaraz, filed Civil Case No.
Q-44134 entitled "Concepcion Alcaraz, et al. v. Romeo Coronel, et al." for specific performance and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83. The case involved a parcel of
land which the defendants therein sold to the Alcarazes, and, thereafter, while the case was pending,
to Catalina Balais-Mabanag. Assisted by her husband Eleuterio Mabanag, and with the respondent
as their lawyer, Catalina intervened in the case.
On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered a Decision2 in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant to
execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land embraced in
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, together with all the improvements existing thereon, free
from all liens and encumbrances and once accomplished, to immediately deliver said
document of sale to plaintiffs, and upon receipt thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay
defendants the whole balance of the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name
of intervenor is hereby cancelled and declared to be without any force and effect. Defendants
and intervenor, and all other persons claiming under them, are hereby ordered to vacate the

subject property and deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim for damages and
attorneys fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors, are hereby
dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.3
The Mabanag Spouses, through the respondent as their counsel, appealed the decision to the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 23000. In its Decision4 promulgated on December 16,
1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Unsatisfied with the judgment of
the appellate court, the respondent elevated the matter to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 103577.
The petition for review was dismissed, and the judgment appealed from was, likewise, affirmed in
toto in the Courts Decision5 dated October 7, 1996.6 The Court found that the questioned sale of the
parcel of land between therein petitioners and Mabanag on February 18, 1985 was correctly upheld
by both courts below.
Thereafter, according to the complainant, the respondent, acting for and in behalf of his clients, the
Mabanag Spouses, filed several cases7 questioning the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 103577. The
complainant contended that the multiple pleadings and actions pursued by the respondent indicate
that he violated his oath as an officer of the court and breached the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers. The complainant thereafter prayed that the instant complaint be referred
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for proper investigation and action. 8
The Respondents Defense
The respondent, for his part, filed a Motion to Cite Complainant and Counsel in Contempt Without
Prejudice to Disciplinary Action Against Counsel,9 alleging that in an attempt to cause disrepute,
dishonor and to cast aspersion on him, the complainants counsel virtually "published and made
known publicly" the instant administrative case against him by filing a Manifestation in Civil Case No.
Q-01-43396 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80. According to the respondent,
this grossly violated the confidentiality in administrative proceedings.10
In his Comment,11 the respondent did not deny that the decision in Civil Case No. Q-44134 was
already final and executory, as it had already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in their respective decisions. The respondent put forth the following arguments to
justify the dismissal of the instant complaint:
A. THE SUBSEQUENT CASES FILED INVOLVED LEGITIMATE AND VALID RESORT TO
JUDICIAL PROCESSES AND REMEDIES; HENCE, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE
CHARGE THAT THE RESPONDENT COUNSEL HAS ABUSED PROCEDURAL
PROCESSES TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
B. THE COMPLAINT MUST AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM
SHOPPING AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
C. THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE IS PREMATURE CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTERS
RAISED THEREIN ARE STILL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN PENDING CASES; HENCE,
ITS OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL IS APPROPRIATELY CALLED FOR AND WARRANTED.12

The respondent was vehement in denying that he abused legal processes and remedies, as the
issues raised in the subsequent actions he filed were valid and meritorious, the resolution of which
were indispensable for the orderly administration of justice. Thus:
It is basic that a counsel may resort to all legal reliefs and remedies available and to invoke
all pertinent provisions of the law and rules, to protect the interest of a client in order that
justice may be done and duly administered. In fact, it is not only the right of a counsel to do
so but rather, it is his bounden and sacred obligation as an officer of the court and as an
advocate who is tasked to protect the interest of a client within the bounds of law.

Thus, in Civil Case No. Q-91-31268, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which
is the first complaint, what was challenged therein is the eligibility of Ramona Patricia
Alcaraz, to own urban commercial lands, within the ambit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 185,
considering that she is not a Filipino citizen or at least, she does not appear nor was she
alleged to be so. Evidently, therefore, this is not intended to forestall the execution of the
judgment which must be executed, pursuant to the rules that is, in accordance with the
dispositive portion thereof. Otherwise stated, the execution, if it must be undertaken, must be
made in accordance with and consistently (sic) the dispositive portion thereof. It is well
settled that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive
portion of the decision.
As shown in the earlier narrations, the foregoing case is presently on appeal with the
Honorable Court of Appeals and is still pending thereat, up to the present.
With regards to the petition for certiorari filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals, docketed
thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 4770 (sic), whereby a decision was already rendered and such
decision is already final and executory, the issues therein disposed as raised, pertinently
pertained to the questioned and assailed Orders of the trial court which granted the writ of
execution, upon motion of parties who are purportedly the principals of the complainant and
his counsel. After the denial of the said petition and the finality of the judgment of such
denial, partial execution ensued and was not of course, even attempted to be forestalled by
the herein respondent counsel and his clients.
However, the execution being undertaken later on was shown to have been exceeded when,
despite the fact that there is no showing that the parties who were supposed to execute a
deed of absolute sale pursuant to the dispositive portion of the subject decision being sought
to be implemented, had refused or at least failed, after demand, to so execute and perform
the foregoing acts, the trial court ordered its branch clerk of court to perform the said acts. In
fact, it was pointed out that it does not even appear that the other parties whose acts are
sought, were already served with the writ of execution; hence, the trial courts act was
without basis and/or premature. Nevertheless, the trial courts branch clerk of court
notwithstanding, proceeded as in fact, executed the deed of absolute sale in favor of the
Alcarazes. This act of the trial court, with due respect, unduly created chaos and confusion,
which are antithetical to its function for an orderly administration of justice and the fair
approximation thereof.
The matter was, thereafter, complicated further, when despite the fact that the citizenships of
the Alcarazes were not indicated in the deed of absolute sale which appears to have been
presented with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the said Register of Deeds cancelled
the title of the client of the herein respondent counsel and issued a new title over the subject

property in favor of the Alcarazes and in order to validate and to give a semblance of legality
or color to the validity of the issuance of the said title, by making it appear that the Alcarazes
are Filipino citizens, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INDICATION OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP IN
THE SUBJECT DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, nevertheless, indicated in the new title that the
Alcarazes are Filipinos.
Thus, the herein respondent counsel, in behalf of his client and to protect their interest, this
time, was constrained to institute a petition with the Honorable Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 55576,whereby they assailed the jurisdiction of the trial judge in
decreeing the foregoing execution of acts not included in the disposition portion of the
decision being sought to be executed and to perform acts within the exclusive competence
and direction of the Register of Deeds pursuant to Providential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Board Registration Decree. This case is still pending with the Honorable Court
of Appeals up to the present; hence, it is misleading for the complainant to even insinuate
that a decision thereon is already final, which, of course, as shown in the earlier discussions,
are farthest from the truth.
While all of the foregoing issues were still pending as they are still pending up to the present,
the complainant and counsel, purportedly sold and transferred the subject property, using the
title being assailed and questioned in CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, to a third person, one Emelita
Mariano, with the purported deed of absolute sale being notarized by the same counsel of
the herein complainant, Atty. Oscar R. Ferrer, who is representing the Alcarazes in the
abovesaid cases; hence, he cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the said cases and
the issues involved therein which cast questions on the said title and, thus, rendered the
purported transfer or sale fatally defective.
True to his duty to his client and as an officer of the court and in order to maintain the
integrity, dignity and orderliness in the administration of justice, herein respondent counsel,
filed in behalf of his client, the Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-01-43396, on February 15,
2001, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for the annulment of the title issued in
favor of the third person, Emelita L. Mariano, for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale
to her and Damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
When no temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction were issued by the
trial court, herein respondent counsel, in behalf of his client, availed of the legally available
remedy of a special civil action of certiorari, assailing on jurisdictional/grave abuse of
discretion grounds, the refusal and/or failure of the trial court to issue the prayed for
preliminary injunctive reliefs, among others. Thus, respondent, as counsel for his client, filed
with the Honorable Court of Appeals, on July 24, 2001, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, which is still pending resolution of the said Honorable
Court up to the present.13
The respondent also alleged that the complainants failure to disclose the pendency of Civil Case
No. Q-01-43396 in the certification against non-forum shopping in the case at bar was in gross
violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of this, the respondent
reasoned, the complaint should be dismissed.
Finally, the respondent averred that the instant administrative case is premature, considering that
there are still issues to be resolved in the pending cases. As such, no cause of action could accrue

against him. The respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed for "utter and palpable lack of
merit."
In his Compliance and Comment,14 the complainant asserted that there was no malice nor
inaccuracy resorted to in the filing of the complaint against the respondent. The complainant averred
that he was constrained to file the instant complaint out of exasperation, if not desperation, upon the
instruction of his principals, so as to stop the respondent from continuing with his "dilatory and
obstructionist strategies" to deprive them of their rights already confirmed by the courts, from the
RTC to the Supreme Court. Thus:
In order to stall the execution of the favorable decision obtained by my principals
Concepcion Alcaraz and her daughter Ramona Patricia Alcaraz as early as March 1, 1989, in
Civil Case No. Q-44134, respondent acting in behalf of his clients, went to this Court three
(3) times in said case and several times also to the Court of Appeals on appeals, petitions for
certiorari, etc.
Although respondent admits the fact that the subject decision of the court a quo is already
final and executory, he insists that "the issues in the other cases are indeed different." He
argues in his comment that the issue in his petition (Annex "2" to Comment) pertained to the
issuance of a writ of execution to implement the abovesaid final and executory decision."
This is plain hair-splitting aimed to muddle the issues and ultimately mislead the Honorable
Court.15
The Recommendation of the Integrated Bar Of The Philippines (IBP)
Commission On Bar Discipline
On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-237, finding that
the foregoing recommendation of the Commissioner was fully supported by the records, as well as
the applicable laws. The Board found that the respondent violated Rule 12.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension for one (1) year.
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, the Court would like to stress that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own.16 As we held in the leading case of In re Almacen:17
Neither purely civil not purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. .18
As such, the instant complaint cannot be dismissed as prayed for by the respondent.

We agree that the respondent is administratively liable.

The respondent, by his own admission, filed multifarious petitions, motions and actions concerning
the sale of the property in question, after the Court already ruled in G.R. No. 103577 that the said
sale was correctly upheld by both the trial and appellate courts. He, thereafter, filed two other
initiatory pleadings before the RTC of Quezon City, namely, Civil Case No. Q-97-31268 and Civil
Case No. Q-01-43396. The same matter subject of the original complaint was elevated to the Court
of Appeals no less than four (4) times: CA-G.R. CV No. 65124, CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, CA-G.R. CV
No. 75911, and CA-G.R. SP No. 55576. And from there, the matter was again brought before this
Court twice: G.R. No. 135820 and G.R. No. 153142. 19
We concur with the following observations made by IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala in
her Report and Recommendation dated October 3, 2003:
The issue being raised by the respondent on behalf of his clients in all the complaints,
appeals, petitions and motions he has filed is the question of non-eligibility of Ramona
Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines and the nullity of the sale between Alcaraz and
the Coronels. These issues have already been passed upon and upheld by both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, the First
Division of the Court of Appeals "observed that Mabanags counsel, (respondent herein) has
questioned the non-eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines for
the nth time although as early as 30 July 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
47710 had already affirmed the lower courts ruling that the petitioner is not the proper party
to question the eligibility of Alcaraz to own property in the Philippines. The petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135820 upheld the right of Ramona
Alcaraz as one of the vendees in the deed of sale. The Supreme Court passed judgment on
her capacity to buy the property. The issue was recycled in CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, Entry of
Judgment was already issued by the Supreme Court on 2 January 1997.
However, petitioner has succeeded for more than five (5) years now to hold at bay the
full implementation of the judgment in point." Likewise, in dismissing the complaint filed
by respondent on behalf of his client before RTC QC Branch 83 docketed as Case No. Q-9731268 entitled Mabanag vs. Patricia Ramona Alcaraz, et. al. to declare Patricia Alcaraz
ineligible to acquire real property, the court observed that for failure of the plaintiffs to
get a favorable decision of the earlier case, they tried to prevent the execution by
disqualifying herein defendant. (Emphasis ours).
In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP [No.] 65783, a pertinent portion of the Court of Appeals
decision reads "While lawyers owe (sic) entire devotion to the interest of their clients right,
they should not forget that they are officers of the court bound to exert every effort to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice they should not, therefore, misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse the court processes (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 622)."20
It has, thus, been clearly established that in filing such numerous petitions in behalf of his client, the
respondent thereby engaged in forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a
favorable decision. An important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the

vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim
substantially the same reliefs.21
Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly
delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. 22 Such filing of
multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of
court. Needless to add, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously
delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act
with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and
are consistent with truth and honor.23
We note that while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the
court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 24
In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter, the respondent
violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. He also violated Rule 12.0225 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to
delay no man for money or malice."
We find that the IBPs recommended penalty of one years suspension from the practice of law is not
commensurate to the respondents transgression. He shall thus be meted a two-year suspension
from the practice of law, effective immediately.
WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping, respondent Atty.
Arnold V. Guerrero is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years.
The respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision. Let a
copy of this Decision be included in the respondents files which are with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7054

December 4, 2009

CONRADO QUE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

In a complaint for disbarment,1 Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final
judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court2(MeTC) and RTC3 in the unlawful detainer case
rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts
have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked
the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer
case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to
impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain
and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC
judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by
resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an
imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the
motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the
respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his
clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.4
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the
good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous
counsel of the respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the
petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment
of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

In his Answer,5 the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development
Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the
homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases
formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case
handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the
respondents present clients were the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity,
honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the
interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that these petitions were all based
on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful
detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud
committed by the complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly
detained property did not really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The
respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for
declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal
strategy to protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the
petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the
respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his observations and the notes he had
taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No.
Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them
from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31
out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules
on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the
Philippines in the second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was
no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his clients)
and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request
to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case. 6
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral
acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings
with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the
law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the
disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an
axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings7 before the IBP that the present complaint violated the
rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint
was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and

defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized
members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan8 (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan)
found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he
stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his
client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary
duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which
enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru means,
inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or
brazenly engage in forum-shopping.9
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the
unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions
of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.10
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing
two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for
declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer
case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.11
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence
showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for
annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the
presiding judge, all of which were untrue. 12
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents
explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom
were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To
the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by
claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of nonforum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the
respondents argument regarding his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of
title since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the
amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the respondent be suspended from

the practice of law for two (2) years.13 On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the
respondents suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.14
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed
unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should
carry.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the
respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders,
Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,15 we suspended the respondent from the
practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act
of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months. 16
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of
the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer
for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the
CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must
be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.17
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again
questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a
petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an
ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC
dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed. 18
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and
Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in the

unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were both dismissed "for lack of legal
personality on the part of the plaintiffs" to file the petition.19
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment
of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the
same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the
alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had
filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second
petition for annulment of complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the
respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC
and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means
allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already
uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these
attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice." By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and
obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning
parties in that case.20
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,21 as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the
filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court
processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial
procedure;22 and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 23
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions
involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure
favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of
the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most
obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared
towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had
become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood in
the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.

First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the
respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud
was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper
remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly
sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in
complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging
representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at
his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) 24
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed "that
the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void." 25 These conflicting claims,
no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse,
it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another
violation we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for
annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor
General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands 26 on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a)
the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the
proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition
without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone
stood as counsel for the "plaintiffs." In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel
the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his
clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel
have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in
the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the
counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED
DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING
PERIOD.27[Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the
respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse
partys motion to dismiss.28 The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the
respondents application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by
the adverse party.29 As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:

Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as
transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for
Reconsideration are not true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases
as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the
preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the
open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent
took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to
convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the
June 28, 2002 hearing. 30
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the
court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall
he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer "never to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."31 The respondent
failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in
the administration of justice,32 and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his
work.33 His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the
court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. 34 In case of conflict,
his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court. 35
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
clients x x x
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent
with truth and honor.36 He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute
clearly groundless actions.37 The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the
judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly
prohibits.

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of
deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation
against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases
previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition
for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was
filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the
respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his
professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to "conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional colleagues." He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.
Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is
now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice represented
parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in
the second petition for annulment of title.38
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of
judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals
did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a
majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already
gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of
lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged
in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so
proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with
which he was previously associated.39 As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the
respondents explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping
glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he
allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the
respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines
in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the
Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of
forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the
plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.

In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when
he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a
litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof,
without leave of court.40 The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case
constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer
for professional misconduct.41
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of
another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious."42 Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose. 43 As both
concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more
particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients.
We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all
obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC.
That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably
strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness
and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions,
considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of
cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are
simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer
judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to
note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case. 44 As we explained in Plus
Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of
truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest,
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and
honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end in view of
promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the
Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor

give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the
best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A
lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of
action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.45
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because the
counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument,
considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is
only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the
respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants
unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to
determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the
dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance.
For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information
of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.46
1avvphi1

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que
and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of
the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of
law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of
suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of
these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for
the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court
is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in
the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that
the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his
client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the
same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months.
We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his
past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of
justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated
December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of
Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01
and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should
beDISBARRED from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 13