Dur and Mateo 2013 Gaining Access or Going Public Interest Group Strategies in Five European Countries

European Journal of Political Research : , 2013
doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12012
Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in five

European countries
ANDREAS DR1 & GEMMA MATEO2
1
Department of Political Science and Sociology, University of Salzburg, Austria;
Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg, Austria
Abstract. Interest groups differ in the strategies they use to influence public policy. Some
mainly try to gain access (i.e., have direct contact with decision makers), whereas others tend
to go public by launching campaigns that aim to mobilise the broader public. In this article
it is argued that group type namely the distinction between business associations, professional associations and citizen groups is a major determinant of the choice of strategy. The
effect of group type, however, is conditional on the groups endowment with material
resources and the issue context: the differences across group types are largest for resourcerich associations and associations active in distributive policy fields. Original data from
surveys of national associations in five European countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland,
Latvia and Spain) enable the assessment of this argument. The theoretical expectations are
supported, with the results having relevance for the normative evaluation of political
systems and the positive study of interest group influence.
Keywords: interest group strategies; inside lobbying; outside lobbying; interest group access;
survey
Introduction
Interest groups use a large variety of tactics to influence public policy. The
debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which was
negotiated between 2008 and 2010, illustrates this point. In 2010, PIN-SME, a
business association representing European small and medium-sized enterprises in the information and communications technology sector, sent a letter
to all members of the European Parliament (EP) alerting them to provisions
in the Agreement that were of concern to Internet providers. Then, in the first
half of 2012, a large number of citizen groups organised Europe-wide antiACTA days in opposition to the Agreement. Taking a pro-ACTA stance, the
Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie circulated a press release in support of
ACTA in April 2012 and the International Chamber of Commerce distributed
a position paper emphasising the gains that would accrue from ratification of
the Agreement. Less publicly, a large number of groups contacted decision
2013 The Author(s)
European Journal of Political Research 2013 European Consortium for Political Research
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ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO
makers directly to make their voices heard. What explains this variety in the
choice of tactics and, in turn, the strategies of the different groups to influence
public policy?1
We argue that group type namely whether a group is composed of firms,
has professionals as members or acts on behalf of a potentially large number
of individuals that can only expect diffuse benefits from the groups activities
is the main determinant of interest group strategy. The effect of group type,
however, is conditional on a groups endowment with material resources and
the issue context. Especially business associations that are resource-rich and
active in distributive policy fields should focus on inside lobbying, whereas
citizen groups should consistently rely on an outside strategy. We also expect
professional associations, which represent the interests of individuals working
in a particular profession, to lean towards the use of an outside strategy, except
when lobbying on distributive policies. These expectations derive from the
assumption that groups, at the same time, try to influence policy and secure
their membership base. How a group balances these two objectives can be
expected to vary systematically depending on its type, its resources and the
issue context.
Original data collected in five European countries (Austria, Germany,
Ireland, Latvia and Spain) about interest groups use of tactics with respect to
national legislation offer us a unique opportunity to examine our argument.
The case selection allows us to control for a variety of variables that may have
an impact on the choice of strategy, such as the size of a country and the system
of interest intermediation. We asked a total of 2,161 associations of different
types to complete a questionnaire and received 880 responses, which is a
response rate of 40.7 per cent. The questionnaire contained questions on the
frequency with which the groups use a series of tactics that allow us using
factor analysis to measure the groups relative reliance on an inside strategy.
Bivariate and multivariate tests support our argument.
In presenting this argument and testing it empirically, we contribute to the
growing literature on interest group strategies (Schlozman & Tierney 1986;
Gais & Walker 1991; Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz & Kryer 2012). Our specific
contribution is to show how the effect of group type on strategies is conditional
on group resources and issue context. Unravelling the determinants of interest
group strategies, however, also has relevance beyond the specific literature on
lobbying strategies. First, numerous studies of interest group access to decision
makers have revealed a bias in favour of resource-rich and/or business groups
(Schattschneider 1960; Lowery & Gray 2004; Greer et al. 2008; Dr & Mateo
2012).A question which this raises is whether resource-poor and citizen groups
can offset this access disadvantage by way of outside lobbying. Given the
normative ideal of roughly equal access to decision making by all interests,
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GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?
responding to this question has major normative implications. Second, studying the determinants of interest group strategies is important because if such
groups choice of strategy heavily depends on the institutional opportunity
structures, an institutional reform that favours one strategy may bias the
representation of interests in that political system. A decision to make a
political system more open to direct lobbying, for example, may benefit some
groups more than others. Finally, for studies of interest group influence, it is
imperative to know how much leeway groups have in the choice of strategy
that is, to what extent strategies are predetermined by the institutional context
and group and issue characteristics (Dr 2008). Strategies are an independent
variable in studies of influence if, and only if, they are not fully determined by
factors that also have a direct impact on influence.
We will develop our theoretical expectations before discussing the surveys
used to collect data on interest group tactics and the operationalisation of our
dependent variable and the explanatory variables. In the empirical part we first
rely on bivariate and trivariate charts to examine our theoretical expectations
and then present the results of the multivariate models. The conclusion provides a brief summary of the argument and the findings.
Explaining interest group strategies

A considerable volume of literature deals with the determinants of interest
group strategies (Berry 1977; Schlozman & Tierney 1983; Kollman 1998;
Binderkrantz 2005; Beyers 2008; Berkhout 2010). This literature makes use of
a variety of labels to classify interest group strategies, including: inside and
outside lobbying (Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Gais & Walker 1991; Kollman
1998; Kriesi et al. 2007); access politics and information and protest politics
(Beyers 2004); administrative, parliamentary, media and mobilisation
strategies (Binderkrantz 2008; Nownes & Freeman 1998); and judicial politics, grassroots lobbying and schmoozing (Nownes & Freeman 1998).
As with other aspects of interest group behaviour and influence (Dr & De
Bivre 2007), existing studies indicate that the institutional context (Beyers
2004; Mahoney 2008; Woll 2012) and group (Schlozman & Tierney 1986; Gais
& Walker 1991) and issue characteristics (Beyers 2008; Binderkrantz & Kryer
2012) determine groups choice of strategy. While not disputing the relevance
of all these factors, we go beyond the current literature in stressing the conditional effect of group type, group resources and issue context. In so doing, we
rely on the inside and outside lobbying terminology, where inside lobbying
refers to activities that are directly aimed at influencing decision makers and
outside lobbying to activities that aim at mobilising and/or changing public
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opinion. The three types of groups we distinguish between are: business associations, professional associations and citizen groups.2 Business associations
are groups that have either firms, or associations of firms, as members. This
includes both broad business associations, such as chambers of commerce, and
sectoral groups. Professional associations champion the interests of a specific
profession, such as lawyers, medics or artists. Citizen groups have a potentially broad membership and defend interests that are not directly related to
the professions of their members or supporters (Berry 1999: 2), such as environmental protection or development aid.
Several earlier studies have proposed that group type is relevant to the
choice of strategy. The expectation raised by these studies is for citizen groups
to engage in outside lobbying and business groups to focus on inside lobbying
(Schlozman & Tierney 1986: 431432; Maloney et al. 1994; Binderkrantz 2008;
Berkhout 2010: 115). We agree with this expectation for two broad reasons.
First and most importantly, citizen groups (and, to a slightly lesser extent,
professional associations) constantly struggle to maintain and enhance their
member and/or supporter base. Owing to collective action problems (Olson
1965), these potential members and supporters of groups that mainly defend
diffuse interests tend to be little informed about policy debates and the successes and failures of the groups.
Citizen groups therefore face a trade-off when deciding whether to focus
on inside or outside lobbying. They realise that inside lobbying, on average, is
more effective than outside lobbying in terms of influencing decision makers
(Grant 2000: 20; Mahoney 2008). In many cases, however, the successes that
result from inside lobbying will be little visible to the groups broad constituency. In contrast, when opting for outside lobbying, citizen groups may not be
able to achieve their stated goals. However, the public campaign provides
publicity to citizen groups among a broader audience, which may ensure the
survival of the organisation (see also Gais & Walker 1991: 106; Binderkrantz
2008: 179). In balancing impact and survival, we expect citizen groups to favour
survival and thus opt for an outside strategy. While the problem of survival is
not as severe for professional associations as it is for citizen groups, the relatively large number of potential members that characterise many professional
associations also creates an incentive to design lobbying activities in a way that
favours the objective of member recruitment.
This logic applies to a far lesser extent to business associations with a
clearly defined constituency for which political decisions have concentrated
costs and benefits. These concentrated costs and benefits should ensure that
firms have an incentive to watch closely the activities of the association of
which they are members. Firms can also be expected to have a greater capacity
to judge whether the strategy pursued by the association enhances members
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interests since they can feel the consequences of successful or failed campaigns
on their balance sheets.3 Importantly, we expect this difference between business associations and citizen groups to exist even in political systems in which
access to decision makers is easy or in which outside strategies are particularly
ineffective, for example, because public opinion has little impact on decisions
taken. Groups struggling with collective action problems will always have an
incentive to engage in outside lobbying.
Second, we also expect business associations and citizen groups to differ
in their choice of strategy because of the exchange goods they possess. Business associations tend to be well endowed with specialised information that
is in high demand with decision makers, making it easier for them to gain
access to political institutions (Bouwen 2004; Dr & Mateo 2012). Citizen
groups, in contrast, tend to be better endowed with resources (such as volunteers) that are important for outside tactics. These differences in the type
of resources groups possess make an inside strategy relatively cheaper for
business associations and an outside strategy relatively cheaper for citizen
groups.4 Professional associations again can be expected to be in the middle:
their members hold a lot of specialised information, but collective action
problems makes it difficult for professional associations to mobilise this
information in exchange for access. The two points together result in the
following hypothesis:
H1: Business associations rely relatively more on an inside strategy than
citizen groups and professional associations.
The existing literature on interest group strategies also discusses the role of
groups endowment with material resources. Some authors consider outside
lobbying a strategy of the weak. Access, then, should be positively related to
the possession of material resources (Grant 2000). Others, however, stress that
outside lobbying is also costly, possibly more so than inside lobbying (Kollman
1998; Thrall 2006). Our reasoning is that while some outside tactics (may)
indeed require substantial amounts of material resources (e.g., organising a
street protest or a press conference), others (e.g., press releases or internet
campaigns) are relatively cheap when compared to most inside tactics. We,
therefore, expect resource-rich associations to be more likely to engage in
inside lobbying than resource-poor associations. More importantly, we expect
that the effect of material resources depends on the type of group, with each
type using additional resources mainly to further its preferred strategy. Business associations can be expected to employ any additional resources to
further cultivate their inside strategy. In contrast, citizen groups and professional associations will use additional resources to engage in outside lobbying,
2013 The Author(s)
which should help them maintain their base of members and/or supporters.
The hypothesis that follows from this argument is:
H2: Material resources increase business associations and decrease
citizen groups and professional associations reliance on inside lobbying.
This conditional effect may be the reason for the inconclusive results of studies
with respect to the effect of material resources on the choice of strategy.
Several characteristics of the issue a lobbying campaign focuses on may
also be relevant to the choice of strategy (Binderkrantz & Kryer 2012). We
argue that the level of conflict on an issue should matter to the choice of
strategy (Gais & Walker 1991: 104). The level of conflict, in turn, should be
influenced by whether an issue is of a distributive or a regulatory type (Lowi
1964). In the case of distributive issues, business interests and professional
associations can expect concentrated gains from lobbying, with little opposition from other business or professional interests as the costs of the policy are
spread thinly across a large number of actors. In such a situation, they have an
incentive to focus on inside lobbying since an outside strategy may draw
attention to a lobbying campaign that is best carried out covertly.
The situation changes when they lobby on regulatory issues: here the
expectation is for different coalitions of business and professional interests to
face each other on opposite sides of the debate. Both sides then may be pushed
towards an outside strategy to gain an advantage over the adversary. Whereas
we expect business and professional associations to adjust their strategy to the
type of issue, we do not expect the same of citizen groups. Should the latter
manage to get mobilised on distributive issues at all, they have the same
incentive to rely on outside lobbying as in the case of other types of issues. We
thus expect that:
H3: Business groups and professional associations engage in relatively
more inside lobbying if they are active on a distributive issue than if they
are active on a regulatory issue, while the issue context does not have an
impact on citizen groups choice of strategy.
Collecting data on interest group tactics

We carried out surveys of national associations in five European countries
between 2009 and 2012: Austria and Germany in 2011; Ireland in 2009; Latvia
in 2012; and Spain in 2010. The advantage of this selection of countries is that
it brings together small (Austria, Ireland and Latvia) and large (Germany and
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Spain), corporatist (Austria, Ireland and Germany) and pluralist (Latvia and
Spain), and old democracies (Austria, Germany and Ireland) and new democracies (Latvia and, to some extent, also Spain). We use this variation to control
for the impact of the institutional setting on interest group strategies. Relying
on surveys rather than on the web coding of activities (as done by Berkhout
2010) allowed us to also obtain data from smaller associations, with less sophisticated web pages.
We contacted a total of 2,161 associations with slightly varying sample sizes
across the five countries (the Appendix contains more information on both
sampling frames and country samples).5 We tried, as much as possible, to
implement a similar sampling method for each of the surveys. Our aim was to
establish, in all five countries, a random sample of business associations, citizen
groups, labour unions and professional associations that are potentially
involved in lobbying. Where possible, we only included national-level associations and excluded regional ones as the selected countries differ widely in
degree of decentralisation. We did not consider religious associations, sports
associations, purely scientific associations and leisure groups because they are
beyond the scope of this project. The existence of a web page was a minimum
criterion for inclusion in our sampling frames for both pragmatic (the need to
get contact information) and substantive reasons (we decided to focus on
associations with at least a minimum degree of organisation).
While the sampling frames vary slightly across countries, the resulting
country samples are quite similar. This is supported by the fact that each
country sample includes a relatively large number of small and resource-scarce
associations. No fewer than 29 per cent of the associations that responded
indicate that they do not have any paid staff. Nevertheless, due to the web page
criterion, visible associations are slightly overrepresented in our samples compared to the population. The distribution across types of associations (see
Appendix Figure 1) is quite similar to that reported in other studies (see
Bernhagen (2012: 7) for comparison), with the exception of Austria where our
sample contained more citizen groups than business associations.
The response rates across the five countries are similar, ranging from 43 per
cent in Spain to 36 per cent in Latvia (see Appendix Figure 2a). The overall
response rate is 40.7 per cent (880 responses) a rate that is similar to those
achieved in comparable projects.6 Several checks confirm that the nonresponses do not introduce a systematic bias in our results. First, we compared
the response rates across types of groups (see Appendix Figure 2b). While
professional associations were slightly more likely to respond, the response
rates for citizen groups and business associations are similar.7 Second, using
data collected from web pages for associations that did not respond to our
survey, we checked for systematic variation in response rates based on the age
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of the associations. As of 2012, the mean age of all associations that we

contacted is 36.4 years (with a standard deviation of 33.8 years) and for those
that responded, 35.8 years (with a standard deviation of 33.6 years). This
suggests that respondents and non-respondents have similar characteristics.
Finally, we examined whether groups that appear in the EUs Transparency
Register (http://europa.eu/transparency-register/) were more likely to respond
to our survey. The response rate of these associations, however, is nearly the
same as for the overall sample (43.5 per cent as compared to 40.7 per cent for
the full sample). We are, therefore, confident that the non-responses do not
introduce a systematic bias in our data.
Our questionnaire asked associations to specify how frequently they use a
series of tactics with respect to national legislation (Please indicate how often
your organisation uses the following actions to influence national legislation).8
The precise tactics we mentioned were: direct contact with policy makers
and/or public officials; participation in meetings organised by political institutions; preparation of detailed position papers; distribution of folders and brochures; organisation or participation in demonstrations and/or street actions;
distribution of press releases; organisation of press conferences; and initiation
of public debates on the Internet.9 Respondents could indicate how frequently
they use these tactics: never; less than yearly; once a year; about 25 times a
year; about 69 times a year; about 1015 times a year; approximately
biweekly; or on a weekly basis.10 We converted these responses into values of
yearly contacts, meaning that a group that indicated that it never uses a tactic
received a value of 0, and one that uses a tactic on a weekly basis got a
value of 52. Figure 1 demonstrates that there is considerable variation in the
use of the various tactics, with groups relying much more on direct contact
with decision makers and press releases, than on Internet campaigns and
Figure 1. Mean frequency of use of tactics for all associations and per country.
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demonstrations. Interestingly, however, differences across countries are relatively minor, with only Ireland and Latvia diverging from the pattern of the
other countries.
Operationalisation
We rely on factor analysis to progress from the tactics included in our survey
to strategies.11 Factor analysis reduces a large number of correlated variables
to fewer unobserved factors. The advantage of this method in identifying
underlying strategies is that the data themselves determine the weighting of
each item that is included in the resulting index (whereas a simple additive
index either gives equal weight to each tactic or requires the researcher to
assign weights in a largely discretionary manner).12 A disadvantage of factor
analysis is that it is partly discretionary, especially with respect to the number
of factors that are extracted. Fortunately, in our case, both the Kaiser criterion,
which emphasises the number of eigenvalues larger than 1, and the scree test,
suggest the extraction of two factors. The two factors capture 44 per cent of the
variance across the eight variables. We use orthogonal rotation to facilitate
interpretation of the resulting factor loadings. Our final regression scores,
however, are hardly affected by the choice of rotation method (the correlations between the orthogonal and oblique scores are 0.98 for inside lobbying
and 0.95 for outside lobbying).
The two factors we extract clearly capture the insideoutside typology most
frequently used in the literature (see Figure 2). Directly contacting decision
makers, participating in meetings and preparing position papers load highly on
the first factor, and demonstrations, press conferences and press releases on the
second.We first use these factor loadings to calculate regression scores for each
group.13 Each group has two scores: one for its use of an inside strategy, and one
for its reliance on an outside strategy. Since we are interested in the relative
importance of the two strategies for a group, we then calculate a relative score
by dividing the difference of the two values by the sum of the two values
inside outside . We call the resulting variable Relative inside. The advantage
inside + outside
of this score is that it eliminates differences in levels of overall activity as we only
want to assess which strategy a group favours and not how much lobbying it
undertakes. Moreover, the resulting score has the useful property that values
larger than zero indicate that an association engages in more inside than outside
lobbying, and values lower than zero that it does more outside lobbying.Across
associations, 426 (58 per cent) engage in more outside and 308 (42 per cent) in
more inside lobbying. The mean value across all our associations is -0.01 (the
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10
Figure 2. Factor loadings.

Note: The figure shows the factor loadings for the various tactics across the two dimensions.
EV = eigenvalue.
median is -0.003). This value indicates that the two strategies are of approximately equal importance to the average group.
We have used the following predictors in the analysis. In order to capture
H1, we classified the groups into the three types of association business
associations (Business), citizen groups (Citizen) and professional associations
(Professional) using web searches, with two people coding the variable
independently of one another and then resolving conflicting classifications
since the distinction between business and professional associations, especially,
is not always clear-cut. Two variables allow us to gauge an associations endowment with material resources, as required to test H2. On the one hand, Staff is
the (natural logarithm of the) overall number of employees in an association
(many may work in areas other than interest representation).14 On the other
hand, Staff advocacy is the number of employees that specifically deals with
interest representation and public relations.15
The most difficult predictor to measure is the extent to which an association
is active in distributive issues (H3). Unfortunately, we do not have information
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on all the specific policies an association has lobbied on.What we have are data
regarding the importance (on a five-point scale, from not at all important to
very important) of 13 policy areas for our associations.16 In order to map these
policy fields onto Lowis (1964) typology, we rely on his own discussion (in
which he mentions public land and resource policies, infrastructure projects,
clientele services for employers, employees and farmers, and tariff-related
trade policy as examples of distributive policies) and a study that classified
some 45 administrative agencies in the United States, based on the Lowi
typology (Furlong 1997). Starting from these two sources, we categorise agriculture, development, energy, industry, research and transport policy as distributive fields. As opposed to policy fields, such as environment and consumer
protection, these areas tend to be characterised relatively less by general rules
and relatively more by the provision of subsidies and funds to specific constituencies. The value that we use in the analysis is the difference between an
associations engagement in distributive policy fields and regulatory policy
fields, divided by its overall engagement across all policy fields (Distributive).
Finally, we control for the effect of countries political institutions since a
key strand of research on interest group strategy emphasises the importance of
the institutional context within which lobbies are active (Beyers 2004: 215;
Mahoney 2008; Woll 2012). The system of interest representation that is,
whether a country is of a pluralist or a neo-corporatist type seems of particular relevance to the choice of strategy. Corporatism, as defined by
Philippe C. Schmitter (1974: 9394) in a classic essay, is
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories
in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders
and articulation of demands and support.
Evidently, the controls on [the] articulation of demands and support
should matter for interest group strategies. Indeed, a recent study expects (but
does not actually empirically demonstrate) considerable differences in lobbying behaviour between corporatist German-style consensus politics and pluralist UK lobbying (Berkhout 2010: 116). In the following analysis, we control
for the effect of political institutions with the expectation being that corporatist systems, on average, favour an inside strategy. We accomplish this by
including a dummy variable (Corporatism) with the value of 1 for Austria,
Germany and Ireland the three corporatist countries in our study. This
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classification of countries, as corporatist and pluralist, is based on data from

Vatter and Bernauer (2009). Appendix Table 1 provides univariate statistics
for all the variables described in this section.
Bivariate and trivariate analysis

H1 leads to the expectation that business associations engage in more inside
lobbying than both citizen groups and professional associations. Figure 3 supports this expectation. The mean values for business associations, professional
associations and citizen groups are 0.07, -0.04 and -0.08, respectively. The
differences across types are statistically significant (t = 5.52, p < 0.01 for
business/citizen and t = 3.92, p < 0.01 for business/professional). To put these
and subsequent values into context, the difference between business associations and citizen groups amounts to half a standard deviation or a move from
the median to the third quartile of Relative inside. As the values of Relative
inside may hide important variation across tactics, we also checked this
hypothesis at a more disaggregated level. This reveals that professional associations are generally less active than both business associations and citizen
groups. Nevertheless, they are relatively more active in outside tactics:
Figure 3. Choice of strategy by type of group and level.

Note: Higher values suggest a greater relative reliance on inside lobbying. The whiskers
show the standard errors of the means.
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distributing folders and brochures, initiating public debates on the Internet,

and organising, or participating in, demonstrations and/or street actions.
H2 suggests that material resources increase business associations and
decrease citizen groups and professional associations reliance on inside lobbying. Figures 4a and 4b partially support this theoretical expectation.
Figure 4a demonstrates that, as expected when comparing associations with a
large staff, business associations rely much more heavily on an inside strategy
than citizen groups, whereas resource-poor groups of both types converge on
an outside strategy. Professional associations largely behave as expected, with
the exception of medium-sized groups that engage in more inside lobbying
than predicted. Figure 4b confirms the trend for business associations and
citizen groups when using Staff advocacy as a proxy for resource endowment.
Again, however, resource-rich professional associations carry out more inside
lobbying than expected following H2.
In H3 we emphasise that the effect of group type on group strategy is
conditional on the policy field in which groups are active. In Figures 5a and 5b,
we analyse this idea by showing, based on policy field, the difference in the
means of the variable, Relative inside, between citizen groups and business and
professional associations, respectively. These means are calculated for associations that indicated that a policy field is important, or very important, for them.
Figure 5a demonstrates considerable differences between citizen groups and
business associations in the impact of policy field on their choice of strategy.
Business associations engage in more inside lobbying than citizen groups
Figure 4a and 4b. Resources, type of group and choice of strategy.

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Figure 5a and 5b. Choice of strategy and policy field.

Note: The figures show, by policy field, the extent to which business and professional
associations engage more in inside lobbying than citizen groups. Distributive policy fields are
highlighted in bold.
across all policy fields, but the difference is particularly pronounced in policy
fields that we characterised as distributive: energy, industry and transport
policy. In contrast, there is only a minor difference between the two types of
groups in the case of regulatory policy fields (migration, employment and
health). Figure 5b shows that, contrary to citizen groups, professional associations mirror business associations move towards inside lobbying in distributive policy fields. With only few exceptions (agriculture and development
policy), the two figures, therefore, support our argument that business and
professional associations diverge in their strategy from citizen groups when
lobbying on distributive policies, and converge when lobbying on regulatory
policies. Overall, these initial tests have supported our hypotheses.
A multivariate analysis of the choice of strategy

We performed more rigorous testing of our hypotheses with multivariate
statistics estimating the models using multilevel linear regression with
random intercepts at the country level to account for the fact that associations
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15
are clustered by country.17 Due to a slight deviation from normality of our

dependent variable (leptokurtosis), we also bootstrapped coefficients and
standard errors. However, this hardly changed either the estimated coefficients
or the standard errors and, in no case, impacted the substantive interpretation
of the findings. Furthermore, using multiple imputation, we checked whether
missing observations for some of the predictors influence our results. Again
however, the results are substantially the same as those presented below.
Appendix Table 2 provides more information on the multiple imputation procedure and the obtained results.
Model 1, which includes the predictors relating to group type, group
resources, policy type and institutional structure, but no interaction effects,
supports H1 (see Table 1). As expected, both citizen groups and professional
associations engage in less inside lobbying than business associations. The
predicted difference of -0.15 in the dependent variable when moving Citizen
group from 0 to 1 is equivalent to a move from the median to the third quartile
Table 1. Explaining the choice of strategy
Predictor
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Citizen group
0.15*** (0.03)
0.04 (0.05)
0.16*** (0.03)
0.05 (0.05)
Professional
0.09*** (0.03)
0.02 (0.05)
0.09*** (0.02)
0.02 (0.05)
Staff (log)
0.03*** (0.01)
0.08*** (0.02)
0.03*** (0.01)
Distributive
0.07 (0.08)
0.07 (0.08)
0.29** (0.12)
0.08*** (0.02)
0.28** (0.12)
Citizen*
Staff (log)
0.07*** (0.02)
0.07*** (0.02)
Professional*
Staff (log)
0.08*** (0.02)
0.07*** (0.02)
Citizen*
Distributive
0.41** (0.19)
0.40** (0.19)
Professional*
Distributive
0.31* (0.19)
0.29 (0.19)
Corporatism
Constant
N
Countries
AIC
s2 (between
countries)
0.03 (0.04)
0.03 (0.07)
0.03 (0.04)
0.07*** (0.04)
0.04 (0.04)
0.03 (0.04)
0.00 (0.03)
0.07** (0.04)
690
690
690
690
5
320
324
322
326
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Note: The coefficients are estimated using multilevel regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
2013 The Author(s)
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of Relative inside. Associations with a larger staff are more likely to adopt an
inside strategy. The substantive effect of this variable, however, is quite small:
an increase of 0.04 in the dependent variable when shifting Staff from the first
to the third quartile. This resource effect is robust with the use of Staff advocacy as a proxy for resources. Interestingly, when including a quadratic term to
account for the possibility of a non-linear effect of Staff, that term is statistically significant and all the other results remain the same. This result offers
some support to authors such as Kollman (1998), who suggested that outside
lobbying may also benefit from resources.
With regard to the remaining variables, the dummy variable for associations in corporatist countries is positive but not statistically significant. This
does not, however, mean that the system of interest intermediation is irrelevant. Estimating the model without random intercepts, the coefficient for
Corporatism is positive and weakly statistically significant (while all other
results remain identical). The random intercepts thus capture some of the
cross-country variance that a fixed-effects model attributes to Corporatism.
Further research is required to establish the precise impact of this variable on
interest group strategies. Finally, engagement in distributive policy fields does
not correlate with an associations strategy.
In Model 2 we test H2 namely that the effect of group type is conditional
on groups endowment with material resources. The results support this expectation. The positive and statistically significant effect of Staff in this model
suggests that more resources mean more inside lobbying for business associations.18 The interaction effect for citizen groups with interest group staff is
negative and statistically significant. To facilitate the interpretation of this
coefficient, Figure 6 shows that, as the staff size increases, business associations
increasingly opt for an inside strategy. The evidence hence supports the first
part of H2 relating to business associations. Contrary to our expectation,
however, resources do not move citizen groups and professional associations
towards an ever-greater reliance on outside lobbying; they just stick to the
same strategy, independent of their endowment with material resources. The
results are substantively the same when using Staff advocacy instead of Staff as
the predictor in the interaction term.
H3 proposed that business and professional associations that are active in
distributive policy fields are more likely to engage in inside lobbying than those
that are active in regulatory policy fields. Model 3 tests this expectation by
including an interaction effect between type of group and engagement in
distributive policy fields. As expected, the interaction effect for Citizen group
with Distributive is negative and statistically significant. Surprisingly (as we did
not expect a difference between Professional and Business in this respect), the
coefficient for the interaction effect including professional associations is also
2013 The Author(s)
17
Figure 6. The effect of group type for different levels of resources.

Note: The figure shows the predicted effects of different staff sizes (logged) on Relative
inside, while keeping other variables at the mean or the mode. The dotted lines indicate the
95 per cent confidence intervals.
negative and weakly statistically significant. Figure 7, which again plots the
interaction effect, confirms the part of H3 dealing with business associations: it
shows that business associations and citizen groups converge in their strategy
when lobbying on regulatory policies, but diverge when lobbying in distributive
policy fields. Finally, all interaction effects are included in a single model (Model
4). The results are very similar to those reported for models 2 and 3 but the
coefficient for Professional*Distributive is no longer statistically significant,
which brings this result closer to our theoretical expectations. Overall, this
multivariate test of our argument has substantially supported our hypotheses.
Conclusion
Relying on primary data from surveys in five European countries, we have
demonstrated that the distinction between business associations, professional
2013 The Author(s)
18
Figure 7. The effect of group type in distributive and regulatory policy fields.
Note: The figure shows the predicted effects of different levels of engagement in distributive
policy fields (Distributive) on Relative inside for both citizen groups and business associations, while keeping other variables at the mean or the mode. The dotted lines indicate the
95 per cent confidence intervals.
associations and citizen groups explains a considerable part of the variation

across groups in the choice of strategy. While this is an interesting conclusion per se, we find even more noteworthy the fact that the effect of
group type is conditional on group resources and the issue context. Differences
between the various types of groups are most pronounced for resourcerich associations lobbying for distributive policies; they are smallest in regulatory policy fields and for groups with few material resources. Interestingly,
while we did not systematically test for the impact of country characteristics,
our data suggest that the differences across (European) countries in lobbying
strategies are relatively minor, compared to the other variables used in this
study.
A normative implication of our findings is that institutional engineering is
unlikely to radically alter the set of views considered by policy makers. Citizen
groups and professional associations seem inherently more inclined towards
2013 The Author(s)
19
an outside strategy, largely independent of the institutional context. This does

not change, even for groups that have ample resources. We conclude that
institutional reforms that enhance access to decision makers will largely
benefit business associations. If decision makers are concerned with bias in the
representation of interests, they should consider other ways of taking a
broader spectrum of voices into account.
A further implication of our findings is that while the variation across the
types we have discussed is substantial, groups still have considerable leeway
in their choice of lobbying strategy, as supported by the fact that variation
across groups that form part of the same type is large. This means that interest group strategies need to be seriously considered in studies of interest
group influence.
Finally, in combination with a few other recent studies such as Binderkrantz
and Kryer (2012), our findings hint at the importance of issue characteristics
in explaining strategy choice. Future research should take this analysis even
further and also examine whether groups choices of tactics, when lobbying for
a specific issue, are interdependent. It seems at least plausible that groups
select tactics in response to the tactics chosen by other groups. Studying this
interdependence will require a research design that is radically different from
the one that has dominated this field of research to date.
Acknowledgements
Laura Baroni, Jan Beyers, David Marshall, Bernd Schlipphak, Michal Tatham
and participants at a seminar at the University of Salzburg as well as a panel at
the 2012 conference of the European Political Science Association provided
helpful feedback on an earlier version of this article. We also gratefully
acknowledge funding from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF, Grant M1217G16). The research would have been impossible without the willingness of
many interest group officials to respond to our survey. Finally, we are grateful
to Ilze Ruse for cooperation in carrying out the survey in Latvia.
Appendix
Sources used in selecting associations for the surveys
Austria: We contacted 138 associations included in the sterreichische Amtskalender (all associations in that publication that fit our criteria) and a
random sample of 262 associations from the Austrian yellow pages
2013 The Author(s)
20
(www.herold.at). Three associations approached us with the request to be

added to the survey, bringing the sample up to 403.
Germany: We created two random samples, one comprising 400 associations registered with the Bundestag (www.bundestag.de/dokumente/
parlamentsarchiv/sachgeb/lobbyliste/index.html) and the other 100 associations from the list maintained by the Verbnde Forum (www.verbaende.com/
files/ueber_verbaende/125ECC5B347540F68A5250EB56AD401E.htm). The
purpose of using two lists was to avoid our sample being biased in favour
of politically active associations that are more likely to register with the
Bundestag.
Ireland: We contacted all 402 associations included in the Administration Yearbook & Diary 2008 (www.ipa.ie) that fit our criteria.
Latvia: We used a list maintained by a private company (Lursoft;
www.lursoft.lv/). This list contained 247 associations that fit our criteria. We
added 48 associations that had participated in consultations organised by
Latvian ministries and 19 trade unions.
Spain: We created two random samples: one including 180 associations
from the Boletn Oficial del Estado (these are mainly business associations
and labour unions) and the other consisting of 320 associations from the
Registro Nacional de Asociaciones (these are mainly citizen groups and
professional associations) (http://servicio.mir.es/webasocia/). The former list
contains about 1,059 groups, and the latter about 35,000 associations and
950 federations. We added 15 labour unions that are active at the national
level (as, by way of the random samples, we had selected only five labour
unions).
Country samples
The resulting country samples are quite similar (see Appendix Figure 1). Business associations dominate in all countries with the exception of Austria.
Professional associations account for between 18.5 (Latvia) and 24 per cent
(Germany). When excluding a few outliers, moreover, the mean number of
staff employed by associations is very similar across countries, varying from 4.8
(Latvia) to 7.7 (Ireland) (with standard deviations varying between 8.5 and
12.3). The results are similar for the variable Staff advocacy.
2013 The Author(s)
21
Appendix Figure 1. Country samples.

Note: The figure shows the percentage of groups in each country sample that belong to the
various types that we distinguish.
Appendix Figures 2a and 2b. Response rates by (a) countries and (b) types of associations.
Note: the numbers on top of the bars are absolute numbers.The horizontal lines indicate the
overall mean response rate.
Response rates
Response rates are similar across the five countries, with Spanish associations
slightly more likely to respond than Latvian associations (see Appendix
Figure 2a). Also, across types of associations response rates do not vary a lot,
with the exception of professional associations that were more likely to
respond (see Appendix Figure 2b).
2013 The Author(s)
22
Univariate summary statistics

Appendix Table 1. Univariate summary statistics
Variable
Minimum Maximum
Mean
Median
Standard
deviation
Number of
observations
-1
-0.003
-0.06
0.3
734
Citizen
0.3
0.0
0.5
840
Professional
0.3
0.0
0.4
840
Business
0.4
0.0
0.5
840
Staff (log)
1.5
1.4
1.2
771
Staff advocacy
50
1.9
1.0
3.5
763
Age (log)
5.2
3.2
3.2
0.9
770
Budget
2.1
2.0
1.2
337
-0.02
-0.01
0.15
829
0.5
840
Relative inside
Distributive
-0.5
Corporatism
0.4
1
0.6
Multiple imputation
As a robustness check, we use the R package MICE to multiply impute three
predictors used in our models: Staff (69), Staff advocacy (77) and Distributive
(11) (Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011). Multiple imputation is preferable to listwise deletion if missingness is not completely random. While we
use the dependent variable to impute the predictors mentioned above, we do
not impute the dependent variable itself, as doing so would add noise to our
estimates (Von Hippel 2007). We impute five datasets and then pool estimates
across them. Appendix Figure 3 shows the original and the imputed variables
(rounds 1 to 5).
2013 The Author(s)

23
Appendix Figure 3. Multiple imputation.

Note: The figures show the original (light grey) and imputed (black) values for the five
imputation rounds for each of the imputed variables.
When using the imputed data, the results hardly change compared to those
presented in the article (see Models A1 and A2 in Appendix Table 2). In no
case does multiple imputation change the substantive interpretation of the
findings.
2013 The Author(s)

24
Appendix Table 2. Results relying on multiple imputation

Predictor
Model A1
Model A2
Citizen group
0.15*** (0.03)
0.07 (0.05)
Professional
0.09*** (0.03)
0.01 (0.05)
Staff (log)
0.02** (0.01)
0.07*** (0.02)
Distributive
0.07 (0.08)
0.31** (0.12)
Citizen*Staff (log)
0.05** (0.03)
Professional*Staff (log)
0.06** (0.03)
Citizen*Distributive
0.45** (0.19)
Professional*Distributive
0.35* (0.18)
Corporatism
0.04 (0.04)
0.04 (0.04)
Constant
0.01 (0.04)
0.06 (0.05)
734
734
Note: The coefficients are estimated using multilevel regression after imputing predictors
with missing observations. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Notes
1. We use the term tactic to denote a specific activity, such as contacting a decision maker,
and the term strategy to refer to a combination of tactics.
2. Since we only have a few labour unions in our database (which is a reflection of the
universe of associations that contains few unions compared to, for example, business
associations), we do not consider them in this article.
3. Many firms also engage in direct lobbying, independent of business associations, and
thus get firsthand information on what their business associations do. For direct lobbying
by firms, see Coen (1998).
4. This account of the interaction between groups and policy makers may be criticised for
underestimating the latters role in selectively granting or denying access. Our expectation, however, is that policy makers cannot ignore groups that possess the resources
such as political and technical information they need to achieve their policy objectives
and/or to ensure their re-election (see also Maloney et al. 1994).
5. In the smaller countries we exhausted the number of groups that fit our criteria; in the
two larger ones we selected a few more to have a good basis for inference.
6. Binderkrantz and Kryer (2012), for example, report a response rate of 44.9 per cent for
their survey among Danish interest groups. Eising (2009) achieved a response rate of
40.9 per cent.
7. In this figure and the resulting analysis, we have omitted seven associations that do not
fit our classification of group types. As mentioned above, we also omit labour unions
from the analysis.
8. We also asked about EU legislation, but do not use these data here.
9. We also asked about the mobilisation of other associations/interest groups and the hiring
of consultants, but did not include this information in the analysis as these two tactics
2013 The Author(s)
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
25
seem qualitatively different from the others (and factor analysis shows that they form
part of neither the inside, nor the outside, tactics).
The detailed response categories should allow us to avoid the issue, often present in
survey research on interest group strategies, of groups tending to indicate that they use
all tactics presented to them. See Berkhout (2010: 121) for a discussion of this issue.
Several previous studies also use factor analysis to operationalise interest group strategies (Gais & Walker 1991; Eising 2009; Barakso 2010).
Nevertheless, the correlation between the two strategies we derive from the factor
analysis and simple additive indexes of inside and outside lobbying tactics is very high:
0.82 for inside lobbying and 0.80 for outside lobbying.
Due to missing values on individual items, we lose 106 observations.
We use the natural logarithm of Staff to deal with occasional outliers.
Alas, a question on the financial resources of groups was only included in three of the
five surveys carried out and even these surveys have a large number of missing values for
this question. However, the resulting variable (Budget), which is an ordinal measure of
an associations financial resources that ranges from 1 (an annual budget of less than
100,000) to 5 (an annual budget of more than 5 million), can be used to assess how well
our proxies capture the notion of material resources. In fact, Budget is strongly and
positively correlated with both Staff and Staff advocacy (Staff and Budget: r = 0.71,
p < 0.01; Staff advocacy and Budget: 0.53, p < 0.01).
These are: agriculture, consumer, culture, development, employment, energy, environment, health, industry, migration, research, trade, and transport policy.
We used R (R Core Team 2012) and the R package lme4 (Bates et al. 2012) to perform
the analysis.
The coefficient for A in a model that includes an interaction effect between A and B
captures the effect of A conditional on B being 0. In this case, B is the type of group, and
B = 0 refers to business associations.
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2013 The Author(s)


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European Journal of Political Research : , 2013

Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in five

Department of Political Science and Sociology, University of Salzburg, Austria;

Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg, Austria

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

Explaining interest group strategies

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

Collecting data on interest group tactics

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

of the associations. As of 2012, the mean age of all associations that we

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

Figure 2. Factor loadings.

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

classification of countries, as corporatist and pluralist, is based on data from

Bivariate and trivariate analysis

Figure 3. Choice of strategy by type of group and level.

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

distributing folders and brochures, initiating public debates on the Internet,

Figure 4a and 4b. Resources, type of group and choice of strategy.

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

Figure 5a and 5b. Choice of strategy and policy field.

A multivariate analysis of the choice of strategy

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

are clustered by country.17 Due to a slight deviation from normality of our

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

Figure 6. The effect of group type for different levels of resources.

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

associations and citizen groups explains a considerable part of the variation

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

an outside strategy, largely independent of the institutional context. This does

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

(www.herold.at). Three associations approached us with the request to be

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

Appendix Figure 1. Country samples.

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

Univariate summary statistics

2013 The Author(s)

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

Appendix Figure 3. Multiple imputation.

2013 The Author(s)

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

Appendix Table 2. Results relying on multiple imputation

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

ANDREAS DR & GEMMA MATEO

GAINING ACCESS OR GOING PUBLIC?

2013 The Author(s)

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