JURISPRUDENCE ON JURISDICTION

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
Taruc vs. CA
Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the
1987 Constitution specifically provides that:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.

The expulsion/excommunication of members of a

religious institution/organization is a matter best
left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws
and canons, of said institution/organization. It is
not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities
in
the
performance
of
their
discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is
for
the
members
of
religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just
church regulations.

In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of

Appeals, SC enunciated the doctrine that in
disputes involving religious institutions or
organizations, there is one area which the Court
should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary
differences.
Clark vs. Mondragon
Under the doctrine of non-interference, a trial
court has no authority to interfere with the
proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction, much
less to annul the final judgment of a co-equal
court.
In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
v. IAC, SC declared that a court has no jurisdiction
to restrain the execution proceedings in another
court with concurrent jurisdiction.
The consolidation of the two civil cases is also not
possible in line with the doctrine on noninterference.
Go vs. Clerk of Court
No court has the power to interfere by injunction
with the judgments or orders of another court of

concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant

the relief sought by injunction. This doctrine of
non-interference is premised on the principle that
a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
may not be opened, modified or vacated by any
court of concurrent jurisdiction.
Pacific Ace vs. Yanagisawa
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference
dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over
the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to
the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque
RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the
Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati
RTCs resolution of the issue and created the
possibility of conflicting decisions. Cojuangco v.
Villegas states: The various branches of the
[regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as
they have the same or equal authority and exercising
as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction,
should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere
with their respective cases, much less with their
orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously
lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice. The matter is further
explained thus:
It has been held that "even in cases of
concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also,
axiomatic that the court first acquiring
jurisdiction excludes the other courts."
In addition, it is a familiar principle
that when a court of competent
jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case, its
authority continues, subject only to
the appellate authority, until the
matter is finally and completely
disposed of, and that no court of coordinate authority is at liberty to
interfere with its action. This doctrine
is applicable to civil cases, to criminal
prosecutions, and to courts-martial.
The principle is essential to the proper
and orderly administration of the laws;
and while its observance might be
required on the grounds of judicial
comity and courtesy, it does not rest
upon such considerations exclusively,
but is enforced to prevent unseemly,
expensive, and dangerous conflicts of
jurisdiction and of the process.

RETROACTIVE EFFECTS
Aruego vs. Court of Appeals
The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or
civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance,
and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes
of the case.
Subido vs. Sandiganbayan
The petitioners invocation of the prohibition
against the retroactivity of penal laws is
misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a
penal law. Penal laws or statutes are those acts
of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violation; or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide for their punishment. R.A. No. 7975, in
further amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, mode of appeal,
and other procedural matters, is clearly a
procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules
and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion, or those
which refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Moreover, the petitioners even suggest
that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute;
one which cures defects and adds to the means
of enforcing existing obligations.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas, SC ruled that for the
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original
jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed
by public officers or employees under the
aforementioned 4(a)(2), it was not enough that
the penalty prescribed therefor was higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it was likewise
necessary that the offenses or felonies were
committed in relation to their office.
The following provision of 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975, then applies:
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying the positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758 ... exclusive jurisdiction
therefor shall be vested in the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.
Yu Oh vs. Court of Appeals
In the case of Cang vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that "jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the

statute in force at the time of the commencement

of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court." R.A. No. 7691 was not yet in force at the
time of the commencement of the cases in the
trial court. It took effect only during the pendency
of the appeal before the Court of Appeals. There
is therefore no merit in the claim of petitioner
that R.A. No. 7691 should be retroactively applied
to this case and the same be remanded to the
MTC. The Court has held that a "law vesting
additional jurisdiction in the court cannot be
given retroactive effect.
Lahom vs. Subido
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Court concluded
that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The petition to
adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at
the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the
right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without
being joined by her husband, according to the
Court had become vested.
In Republic vs. Miller, Supreme Court ruled
that the controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed.

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy
True is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively
by law, and as the lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of the
case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings.
La Naval vs. Court of Appeals
Distinctions, pertinent to the case, between the
court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, on the one hand, and its lack of
jurisdiction
over
the subject
matter or
the nature of the action, upon the other hand,
should be useful.

The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears,
he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to
waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction.

In Wang Laboratories, Inc., vs. Mendoza, this

Court has ruled that if the defendant, besides
setting up in a motion to dismiss his objection to
the jurisdiction of the court, alleges at the same
time any other ground for dismissing the action,
he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. In the process, it has
equated the matter to a situation where, such as
the defendant invokes an affirmative
relief against his opponent.
Xxx whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action
shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court). This defense may be interposed at any
time, during appeal or even after final judgment.
Such is understandable, as this kind of
jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the
courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
determine or conveniently set aside.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action, in
concept, differs from jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Illustrated, lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action is the situation that arises
when a court, which ordinarily would have the
authority and competence to take a case, is

rendered without it either because a special law

has limited the exercise of its normal jurisdiction
on a particular matter or because the type of
action has been reposed by law in certain other
courts or quasi-judicial agencies for
determination. Nevertheless, it can hardly be
questioned that the rules relating to the effects of
want of jurisdiction over the subject matter
should apply with equal vigor to cases where the
court is similarly bereft of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action.
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably
raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to
dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an
answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a
waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of
affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as
an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the nature of the
action, the invocation of this defense may be
done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor
the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let
alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being
legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious
and exceptional circumstances, such as
hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor
waiver shall apply.
Rudolph Lietz vs. Registry of Deeds
A distinction between jurisdiction and venue must
be drawn. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of an action is conferred only by law. It
may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon
a court which otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action. On the other hand, the venue of an action
as fixed by statute may be changed by the
consent of the parties, and an objection on
improper venue may be waived by the failure of
the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In
such an event, the court may still render a valid
judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be
left to the consent or agreement of the
parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional,
and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict
their access to the courts as it relates to the
place of trial.
In Dacoycoy v. IAC, questions or issues relating to
venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the
laying of venue is procedural rather than
substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a
relation between the plaintiff and the defendant
and not between the court and the subject

matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction,

touches more of the convenience of the parties
rather than the substance of the case.
Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. The court may only
dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis
pendentia, res judicata and prescription.
Barba vs. Court of Appeals
While it is true that in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, jurisdiction is determined by the
nature of the action as pleaded in the complaint,
a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
In an unlawful detainer case, the defendants
possession was originally lawful but ceased to be
so by the expiration of his right to
possess. Hence, the phrase "unlawful
withholding" has been held to imply possession
on the part of defendant, which was legal in the
beginning, having no other source than a
contract, express or implied, and which later
expired as a right and is being withheld by
defendant.
Where the cause of action is unlawful detainer,
prior possession is not always a condition sine
qua non. A complaint for unlawful detainer should
be distinguished from that of forcible entry. In
forcible entry, the plaintiff has prior possession of
the property and he is deprived thereof by the
defendant through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. In an unlawful detainer, the
defendant unlawfully withholds possession of the
property after the expiration or termination of his
right thereto under any contract, express or
implied; hence, prior physical possession is not
required. This is especially so where a vendee
seeks to obtain possession of the thing sold. Xxx
in ejectment cases, therefore, possession of land
does not only mean actual or physical possession
or occupation but also includes the subjection of
the thing to the action of ones will or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right, such as the execution of a
deed of sale over a property.
In an unlawful detainer case, the only issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of
the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the party litigants.
Consequently, the filing of an action for
reconveyance of title over the same property or
for the annulment of the deed of sale over the
land does not divest the municipal trial court of
its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful
detainer case before it and the same may not be

successfully pleaded in abatement of an action

for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. This is
because an ejectment suit is summary in nature
and the same cannot be circumvented by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership over the
property.
Milagros Barco vs. Court of Appeals
It should be emphasized that jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or the subject matter is
conferred by law.
It should be stressed that in a petition for
annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an
abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute
lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means
absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
The question of whether a court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter can be answered simply
by determining if on the basis of the complaint or
petition the court has, under the law, the power
to hear and decide the case.
Herrera v. Barretto explains:
Xxx jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished
from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to
decide a cause at all, and not the decision
rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.
Where there is jurisdiction of the person and
subject matter xxx the decision of all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
that jurisdiction.
Hilado vs. Chavez
The well-entrenched principle is that the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or
reliefs sought therein. In Movers-Baseco
Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing
Corporation, we ruled that the jurisdiction of the
court over the nature of the action and the
subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a
motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the
defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same
is retained up to the end of the litigation.
The MTCC does not lose its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case by the simple expedient of a
party raising as a defense therein the alleged
existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive

evidence to determine the allegations of

tenancy. If after hearing, tenancy had in fact been
shown to be the real issue, the court should
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Laresma vs. Abellana
It must be stressed that the regular court does
not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by
the simple expedient of a party raising as a
defense therein the alleged existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is
the duty of the court to receive evidence to
determine the allegations of tenancy. If, after
hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be
the real issue, the court should dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and
the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the
law at the time the action was commenced.
Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter
or nature of an action is conferred only by law
and not by the consent or waiver upon a court
which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action or the
subject matter of an action cannot be cured by
the silence, acquiescence, or even by express
consent of the parties. If the court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may
dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio.
A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null
and void; hence, it could never logically become
final and executory. Such a judgment may be
attacked directly or collaterally.
Insular Savings vs. Far East
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine
a cause - the right to act in a case. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred by law and not by
the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it
exists.
Montaer vs. Carpio
Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the
action and its subject matter does not depend
upon the defenses set forth in an answer or a
motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant or result
in having "a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple
stratagem. Indeed, the "defense of lack of
jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of
fact does not render the court to lose or be
deprived of its jurisdiction."

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the

payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If
the party filing the case paid less than the correct
amount for the docket fees because that was the
amount assessed by the clerk of court, the
responsibility of making a deficiency assessment
lies with the same clerk of court. In such a case,
the lower court concerned will not automatically
lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on
the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the
docket fees. As "every citizen has the right to
assume and trust that a public officer charged by
law with certain duties knows his duties and
performs them in accordance with law," the party
filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk
of courts insufficient assessment. However, the
party concerned will be required to pay the
deficiency.
Cudiamat vs. Batangas Savings
While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on
the subject matter can be raised at any time and
is not lost by estoppel by laches, the present case
is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file
and relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu
RTC when the parties had already been given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence
in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which
had, in fact, decided petitioners complaint (about
two years before the appellate court rendered the
assailed decision) would be an exercise in futility
and would unjustly burden petitioners.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES

Meat packaging vs. Sandiganbayan
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in
civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons. Furthermore,
the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the
courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case, and will bar said party
from later on impugning the court or bodys
jurisdiction.
Ancheta vs. Ancheta
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a
judgment or final order of the RTC filed under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or
subject of the action, the petitioner need not
allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of
new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order
issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and
void and may be assailed any time either
collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting
such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred
by laches.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon, we
held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court
over the person of the defendant either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission
to its authority or by service of summons. The
service of summons and the complaint on the
defendant is to inform him that a case has been
filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend
himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the
demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without
such service in the absence of a valid waiver
renders the judgment of the court null and
void. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court
on the person of the defendant even if he knows
of the case against him unless he is validly
served with summons.
Rapid City vs. Villa
Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Dy enlightens:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the
defendant in a civil case is acquired
either by the coercive power of
legal processes exerted over his
person, or his voluntary
appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an

affirmative relief is deemed to have

submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule
that we have had occasion to
declare that the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time
to file answer, for reconsideration
of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the
courts jurisdiction. This,
however, is tempered by the
concept of conditional appearance,
such that a party who makes
a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the
courts jurisdiction over his person
cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is
thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates
as an exception to the general rule
on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the
jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant must
be explicitly made, i.e., set forth
in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do
so constitutes voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, especially in instances where
a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for
resolution.

JURISDICTION OVER THE RES

Republic vs. Hebierto
A land registration case is a proceeding in
rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired
unless there be constructive seizure of the land
through publication and service of notice.
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree
requires that the public be given Notice of the
Initial Hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting.
Property Registration Decree expressly provides
that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court, it still affirms its declaration
in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals that
publication in a newspaper of general circulation
is mandatory for the land registration court to
validly confirm and register the title of the
applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the
Property Registration Decree enumerated and
described in detail the requirements of
publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of
Initial Hearing, then all such requirements,
including publication of the Notice in a newspaper
of general circulation, is essential and imperative,
and must be strictly complied with.
Macahilig vs. Magalit
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by
the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the
law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective. In the latter
condition, the property, though at all times within
the potential power of the court, may not be in
the actual custody of said court.

JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUE/S

Lam vs. Chua

It is a general principle of law that a court cannot
set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide
questions except as presented by the parties in
their pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond
them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore
where a court enters a judgment or awards
relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or
the scope of its allegations the excessive
relief is not merely irregular but is void for
want of jurisdiction, and is open to
collateral attack.
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious
error for the trial court to have rendered
judgment on issues not presented in the
pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do
so.

JURISDICTION: SC, CA, RTC, MTC

Russel vs. Vestil
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court
is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of
said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, SC had the
occasion to rule that:
In determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought,
this Court has considered such where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated
in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation are those for specific performance,
support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment
of judgment; also actions questioning the validity
of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or
conveyance and to recover the price paid and for
rescission, which is a counterpart of specific
performance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are
also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by
the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed
value of the real property involved does exceed
P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds
P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it
is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction
under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject matter of
the complaint in this case is annulment of a
document denominated as "DECLARATION OF
HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
Barangay San Roque vs Heirs of Pastor
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless
of the value of the subject property.

The test to determine whether it is so was laid

down by the Court in this wise:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court
indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which
is not capable of pecuniary estimation,
this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in
the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount
of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief
sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support,
or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance. The rationale of the rule is
plainly that the second class cases,
besides the determination of damages,
demand an inquiry into other factors
which the law has deemed to be more
within the competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest courts of
record at the time that the first organic
laws of the Judiciary were enacted
allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).
Huguete vs. Embudo
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals, it was held that
what determines the nature of an action as well
as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought. Moreover, in Singsong v. Isabela
Sawmill, we ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one
the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is
in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount
of the claim. However, where the basic

issue is something other than the right to

recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).
Iniego vs. Puruganan
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery
of a sum of money for the damages suffered
because of the defendants alleged tortious acts,
and are therefore capable of pecuniary
estimation.
In a recent case, we did affirm the jurisdiction of a
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in actions for
damages based on quasi-delict, although the
ground used to challenge said jurisdiction was an
alleged forum shopping, and not the applicability
of Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
In determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance [now Regional
Trial Courts] would depend on the amount
of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought like suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a
mortgage, this court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
Piapi vs. Talip
Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil
cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(2)
In all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of,

real property, or any interest

thereon, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The Rule requires that the assessed value of
the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by
the claimant. It bears reiterating that what
determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners
complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of
land. Considering that their action involves the
title to or interest in real property, they should
have alleged therein its assessed value.
However, they only specified the market
value or estimated value, which
is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of
Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del
Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the
case.
Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the
law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and
determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred by law.
Section 33 of B. P. No. 129 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue
of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over
ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is

lodged with the first level courts. This is clarified

in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that embraces an action for forcible
entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of
physical possession of any land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three (3)
requisites have to be met for the municipal trial
court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs
must allege their prior physical possession of the
property. Second, they must also assert that they
were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third,
the action must be filed within one (1) year from
the time the owners or legal possessors learned
of their deprivation of physical possession of the
land or building.
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is
unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one
unlawfully withholds possession of the subject
property after the expiration or termination of the
right to possess. Here, the issue of rightful
possession is the one decisive; for in such action,
the defendant is the party in actual possession
and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendants right to continue
in possession. The essential requisites of
unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by
virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the
expiration or termination of the possessors right
to hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee
of the possession of the land or building after
expiration or termination of the right to
possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to
pay the rental or comply with the terms of the
lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the
action must be filed within one (1) year from date
of last demand received by the defendant.
A person who wants to recover physical
possession of his real property will prefer an
ejectment suit because it is governed by the Rule
on Summary Procedure which allows immediate
execution of the judgment under Section 19, Rule
70 unless the defendant perfects an appeal in the
RTC and complies with the requirements to stay
execution; all of which are nevertheless beneficial
to the interests of the lot owner or the holder of
the right of possession.
On the other hand, Section 19 of B.P. No. 129 on
Regional Trial Courts provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(2)
In all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, except actions for

forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of

lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of
real property which fall under the jurisdiction of
the RTC are: (1) the plenary action for the
recovery of the real right of possession (accion
publiciana) when the dispossession has lasted for
more than one year or when the action was filed
more than one (1) year from date of the last
demand received by the lessee or defendant; and
(2) an action for the recovery of ownership
(accion reivindicatoria) which includes the
recovery of possession.
These actions are governed by the regular rules
of procedure and adjudication takes a longer
period than the summary ejectment suit.
To determine whether a complaint for recovery of
possession falls under the jurisdiction of the MeTC
(first level court) or the RTC (second level court),
we are compelled to go over the allegations of
the complaint. The general rule is that what
determines the nature of the action and the court
that has jurisdiction over the case are the
allegations in the complaint. These cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.
This general rule however admits
exceptions. In Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was
held that while the allegations in the complaint
make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy
is averred by way of defense and is proved to be
the real issue, the case should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction as the case should properly be
filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations.
The cause of action in a complaint is not what the
designation of the complaint states, but what the
allegations in the body of the complaint define
and describe. The designation or caption is not
controlling, more than the allegations in the
complaint themselves are, for it is not even an
indispensable part of the complaint.
Springfield vs. RTC
With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129, the rule on
annulment of judgments was specifically provided
in Section 9(2), which vested in the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA) the
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of
B.P. Blg. 129 also vested the CA with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,

decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of

Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. As
provided in paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the quasijudicial bodies whose decisions are
exclusively appealable to the CA are those, which
under the law, R.A. No. 5434, or its enabling acts,
are specifically appealable to the CA.

Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not

specifically provide for any power of the RTC to
annul judgments of quasi-judicial
bodies. However, in BF Northwest Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, the Court ruled that the RTCs have
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the
decisions of the National Water Resources
Council, which is a quasi-judicial body ranked with
inferior courts, pursuant to its original jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
andmandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
in relation to acts or omissions of an inferior
court. This led to the conclusion that despite the
absence of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC
had the power to entertain petitions for
annulment of judgments of inferior courts and
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies of
equal ranking. This is also in harmony with the
pre-B.P. Blg. 129 rulings of the Court
recognizing the power of a trial court (court of
first instance) to annul final judgments.

Villena vs. Payoyo

The pertinent portion of Section 19 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the

subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds
One Hundred Thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds
Two Hundred Thousand pesos
(P200,000.00).
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose
subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought
must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation and
the jurisdiction of the court depends on the
amount of the claim. But, where the primary
issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable by the RTCs.
Verily, what determines the nature of the action
and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.
A case for breach of contract is a cause of action
either for specific performance or rescission of
contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as
a counterpart of an action for specific
performance, is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and therefore falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Atwel vs. Concepcion
In Lozon v. NLRC, this Court came up with a clear
rule on when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and
when it does not:
The operation of estoppel on the question of
jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether
the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was
tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on
appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by the consent of the

parties or by estoppel. However, if the lower

court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard
and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
the party who induced it to adopt such theory
will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume
an inconsistent position that the lower court
had jurisdiction....
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, a rule that had been
settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld
in decisions so numerous to cite is that
jurisdiction is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties... This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of

[Tijam v.]Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted,

however, that the holding in said case had been
applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstances involved in [Tijam
v.]Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from
the accepted doctrine of non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
[therein] not as the exception, but rather the
general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The rule remains that estoppel does not confer
jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the
cause of action or subject matter of the case.