1.3.

COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Improvised Explosive Devices are alternative weapons used
by insurgents, thus becoming the most important threat to the troops
dislocated in the operations theatres. IEDs are difficult to detect and
are cheap to achieve, as they use different types of materials,
maintenance mechanisms and explosives
(military commercial or homemade ones), sometimes empirically
improvised.
IED represent an efficient weapon for the insurgents, terrorists and
non-state actors, who are not always related to a political state and
who do not limit their actions to some geographic borders. Their
motivation is usually an ideological or religious one and does not
share the same features with the classical ones, state vs. state. These
are usually organized in non hierarchic structures (cell nonlinear
networks). This structure is similar to the communication one, to the
INTERNET, while its non linear character provides the outstanding
survival. It is based on several means to communicate and also on a
decentralized command-control system. Some of these networks may
be independent and may act not only in an operation theater, but also
in a quite limited area. Others are connected to developing coordinated
attacks, as part of an international terrorist organization. The quick
advance of the communication technology (internet, mobile phone)
provides the means to accomplish the communication in a light and
costless manner.
IEDs may be defined as devices accomplished ad-hoc (non
commercial ones) which benefit from an initiation mechanism and
from explosives capable to harm, wound or even destroy and create
panic2
Counter IED (C-IED) is one of the most important NATOs
priorities and is based on specific goals:
Acquiring knowledge on the existing IEDs types and on the
developing technologies;
Developing new procedures and doctrines in order to detect and
neutralize IEDs safely;
Developing the means to gather information and to research, in
order to detect the IED placements and their facilities.

According to some specialists in the field, C-IED must dispose of

the following:
I. Life saving
This is primordial to any other approach. Taking into account this
demand, public safety is more important than the operators life itself.
II. Getting back to normal
All these safety procedures must be developed accordingly, as to
reset the state of normality, depending on the security level.
III. Criminal evidences gathering and maintaining
IV. Propriety preserving3
Comprehensive Political Guidance CPG, agreed by NAC in
December 2005, acknowledges the complexity of the strategic security
environment, where NATO continues to act, highlighting the fact that
IED represents one of the asymmetric threats imposing a significant
challenge to NATO forces attending the present operations. Proving
efficient and used by NATO opponents4, there is definitely an
operational requirement to improve the abilities to counter attack the
threats, by means of IED.
The nations participating in different operations have settled a
minimum set of priorities in the field of C-IED. These
recommendations refer to training performing, long before arriving in
the operational theatre.
Nevertheless, the countries engaged in these missions have set
other goals, such as the necessity to provide the C-IED capabilities for
the operational forces, up to 2010, in order to:
Predict the using, detecting and neutralizing the IED attacks;
Protect against IED attacks effect;
Explore IED events and forbid the networks meant to support
IED attacks;
This requirement aims at providing the necessary C-IED capabilities,
in order to improve the active and passive
protection measures, by means of identifying technological and
procedural solutions.
PRESENT PRIORITIES
We distinguish ten fields of action, such as:
large aircraft protection;

 harbors protection against water surface threats and also under

water ones;
helicopters protection against reactive projections;
accurate launching of the forces special operations;
detecting, protecting and destroying CBRN weapons;
developing the necessary technology as to gather accurate
information, to supervise, to acknowledge and set the terrorist targets;
neutralize the explosive elements and the consequences
management;
defend against the trench mortar attacks;
protect the important infrastructure;
accomplish non lethal capabilities.
The main sensitive points of the training system are:
Most training activities, before being deployed, do not have an
educational character, as the practical aspects benefit
from a short period of time, on the battlefield; many of these lessons
are only theoretical issues and have been developed as power point
presentations.
The training quality is inappropriate, as:
the training area does not correspond to the reality of the
deployment environments;
the training process was performed with EOD instructors or
with engineers (C-IED training is complex, imposing knowledge from
different military fields);
the training was accomplished by means of using different
vehicles and equipments from the operation theatre.
Nevertheless, the main identified shortcomings were:
29% of the staff does not benefit from IED research training and
from the indices meant to alert about any threat;
48% of the staff does not benefit from the necessary skills
to protect sensitive areas, to gather and handle the evidences;
it is trained as to set the C-IED capabilities specific positions,
within NATO or at national level.
DOCTRINAL ASPECTS
AJP Doctrine 3.15 was reviewed and promulgated by Nations as an
emergency, in October 2008, and should havebeen revised every 6 to

12 months. This is the main document to fundament the necessary

funds and equipments for C-IED training:
As for IED threat, this is significant, not only due to its lethal
effects, presented in the operation theatres, but
also from the strategic effects point of view, unbalanced, if compared
to the challenging tactical means, if the adversaryuses a capable
information campaign;
The adversarys implementing the IED threats by means of the
IED system acting in three recurrent stages5:
plan and resource providing;
execution;
exploring.
In order to counter attack this system, it is recommended to
perform the C-IED activities based on three concurrent strategies:
1. IED neutralizing system;
2. device neutralizing (soon these had been set);
3. education and training.
The strategies are applied at operative and tactical levels by
means of six key operational activities (KOAs), suchas: (1)
prediction, (2) preventing (physical and intelligence), (3) discovery,
(4) neutralizing (temporary one by meansof physically electronic and
permanent jamming) (5) effects diminishing (by means of the
technical, tactical andintelligence activities) and (6) intelligence
exploring.
KOAs are implemented by C-IED experts totally integrated in the
Units staff, according to the operational situation.
PRACTICAL MEANS TO APPLY THE C-IED STRATEGIES
The IED neutralizing system implies actions against opposing,
political, social and cultural systems. This also implies the
development of certain simultaneous activities, at a political, strategic,
operative and tactic level, meant to destroy
the IED providing network. The systems neutralizing actions are
developed in order to destroy the IED accomplishing and using
capabilities. The common activities to reach these goals are:
discouraging, intelligence operation development, law enforcing,
forbidding the providing of specialty device, the arresting of the

belligerents and encouraging the implementing of any external

pressure in order to stop the IED using. It is important to fully
cooperate with the civilian authorities,
internationalorganizationsandnongovernmental organizations,
intelligence local agencies and police forces.
The devices neutralizing includes the identification of the efficient
action tactics, techniques and procedures, our own
force protection and IED destroying, marking and identifying
technology. This strategy consists of tactical actions developed at an
operative level, focused on detecting preventive device placing and on
effects reducing.
The C-IED capabilities are accomplished by means of training the
specific education, in order to integrate the C-IED
knowledge within a curriculum common to all training and
educational institutions. In the same time, it provides the common data
base for the allies and partners, for the experiences in the C-IED field
(technological, tactical, technical and
procedural speaking).
Next, we have detailed some of the present concerns in the field of
capability development:
Route Clearance Packages using (RCP);
MineResistant Ambush Protected concept (MRAP); this is not
different from the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HMMWV, thus providing the small sized units, the accomplishing of
the counter insurgence missions, developed in a state of increased
mobility, with protection capabilities and fire power; the equipments
and the platoons may use MRAP vehicles: protection
coordinates,scouting, raids, embarked combat patrols, traffic
checkpoints, convoys security, escort, medical assistance, protection
of the transported personnel;
Providing the electromagnetic compatibility of the Electronic
Counter Measures systems ECM, by
means of a soft used to assist the ECM managers in their jamming
system programming activity; in the present, the frequency
management prototype is under tests;
Developing common capabilities CBRN C-IED/ EOD, focused

on developing capabilities, others than the equipments: training,

conceptions and doctrines;
Accomplishing sensor systems in order to send the Imaging,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISR;
Providing the intelligence availability, by means of the Battlefield
Information Collection and
Exploitation System BICES;
Assisting the nations in order to accomplish the capabilities using
Mobile Advisory Team MAT6.
Success in C-IED actions is based on a multitude of tasks and
efforts. Successful C-IED operations start with the full
understanding of the adversary and of the IED attack common
activities. These activities provide the leaders success, the
planning, the financing, the material support, the bomb achieving, the
target selecting, and the attack selecting and
performing. A holistic approach for the commandant and decision
makers to understand the means of the IED attack.
A team has developed its activity in Romania, during 8-12
December 2008 requirements help them identify the vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities may be explored in order to interrupt the
adversary events chain. It is neither necessary nor possible to try to
interfere in preventing the IED detonating. But isolating or attacking
the key actions (resources or groups of people) gives the commandant
the possibility to provide an offensive campaign, in order to prevent
the adversary in reaching his own goals, by means of IEDs.
TYPES OF IED
Out of standards concepts, IED is regarded and analyzed
according to their implementing means and/or according to their
placement environment. Radio-controlled IED (RCIED) is long-range
implemented by means of electro magnetic waves (radio, microwaves
and radar signals).
CWIED (Command Wire IED, cables and connectors).
TIMED IED is programmed to explode at a certain period of time
and from a certain distance. (According to mechanical, electronic and
timed devices).

VOIED (victim operated IED) IED operated by the victim, in

case of a human action and intervention (lifting, opening, etc.)
SIED (suicide [persone borne] IED) represents a planned IED,
intentionally released by the person transporting it (usually walking
but it could also be transported in a vehicle, bicycle, or motorbike).
VBIED (vehicle borne IED) represents the IED of a considerable
size installed on/in a vehicle, or motorbike.
PROJECTED IED long-range ballistic released IED (improvised
mortier, improvised grenades, missile launched from improvised
releasing platforms).
Unknown others than SIED, SVBIED, and VBIED as their
initiating means cannot be established.
ISAF Level Standardized Events:
explosion an event other than an IED attack;
IED attack an event where IED has been developed according
to the initial intentions;
IED attack attempt an IED or IED components discovery
before their being placed;
finding IED or components finding ever before being located;
secret catch hidden materials to be used for a future action;
hoax discovering inoffensive elements, which had been
conceived in order to represent a IED;
false a so called IED element, but which turns out to be a nonIED element, a discovery, a secret deposit or a fake;
turning in locals or non-governmental organizations turn in a
IED or IED components to the friendly forces.
Within these three stages 1. plans and resources providing 2.
execution 3. exploring, there are certain critical points, common to any
IED system, as following:
1. Preventing implies neutralizing, capturing and liminating the
bomb manufacturers and support networks, thus interrupting the chain
of events ever before placing the device and discouraging the public
support for IED users. It is developed by means of independent
operations or by means of complex interacting actions openly/secretly
developed, in order to identify the targets, the interdiction or their
fighting,

as following:
a) forbidding the adversaries freedom to move or transport the
components;
b) forbidding the possibility to place IED and the adversaries
capability to communicate;
c) influencing the adversaries ability to get and use the resources;
d) diminishing the adversaries ability to foresee and detect his own
actions by means of psychological operations;
e) preventing the attacks against friendly forces;
f) advanced knowledge of the adversaries tactics, techniques and
procedures and also of their efficiency;
g) continuously assessing the common operational situation and intime and accurate information on these aspects;
h) increasing the vigilant state and also the knowledge level of the
operation area;
i) avoiding the action patterns using and also preventing the
possibility to become easy target for IED attacks;
j) using as means of action: intelligence gathering, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), hidden actions and patrols;
k) conducting open and hidden scouting offensive military actions,
in order to forbid the adversary to use ammunition,
equipments and facilities to obtain precious information and protect
their own potential targets.
2. Effects diminishing (protection) is based on destroying actions,
focusing, blocking or redirecting the explosion
energy, the projectiles or other harmful elements (shrapnel), personnel
and critical equipment protection during operations, by means of
reducing the exposure to some IED effects possible targets, such as:
a) explosion and/or terrorists controlling;
b) providing an increased state of vigilance;
c) developing passive and active capabilities to reduce the effects of
the explosions;
d) providing light protection efficient equipments of the platforms,
of the structures, and of the personnel;
e) destroying, focusing, blocking and redirecting the explosion
energy or the shrapnel;

f) increasing the surviving capabilities during certain events and the

immediate usage capabilities of the ammunition
against potential aggressors;
g) creating safety areas, in order to reduce IED effects against
potential targets;
h) using TTP in order to reduce the time, and increase the distance
to the area where IED can be used against a potential target;
i) accelerating and increasing the efficiency of the leading process
in terms of reaction and evacuation actions;
j) avoiding the setting of action patterns and of the predictable
behavior ones;
k) developing, checking and rehearsing before missions;
l) performing defensive scouting activities, in order to locate IED
placements, hidden ammunition and armament, which might lead to
confirming the inexistence of IED devices;
3. Detecting is developed in order to identify and locate the
adversary, the explosive devices and the component parts, the
equipments, the logistic activities and the infrastructure to provide the
accurate information for the operators and decision makers.
These activities are as following:
a) detecting the adversaries activity;
b) developing IED detecting capabilities/IED components, control
ones, and also the area and the crowds;
c) developing the ability to clean and even control the routes and
the areas by means of technical devices and personnel aid;
d) using long range detection;
e) increasing the check points capabilities, in order to detect IED
materials;
f) detecting CBRN materials;
g) conducting long range persistent surveillance;
h) conducting criminal actions, in order to follow the bomb
manufacturers and/or users;
i) improving the priorities information requirement list (PIR)
strictly connected to IED operation decisive points;
j) providing the connection and synchronization between detection
means and interest areas according to PIR.

4. Neutralizing refers to eliminating possible events owed to IED

manipulation by friendly forces and is performed in order to explore
the technical and biometrical data.
When there is no guarantee to perform a safe IED, by the friendly
forces or there is a danger to face a premature explosion, the activities
must prevent IED developing in the time and place previously chosen
by the terrorists. There are specific activities, such as:
a) neutralizing IED components and providing the continuity for the
friendly system functioning;
b) investigating IED/hidden place/CBRN from a safety distance or
using the manual means and exploring the discovered materials;
c) destroying any explosive materials immediately after their being
explored;
d) forbidding any terrorists actions ever before their detonating the
device;
e) conducting proactive actions against suicide bombers
f) performing all possible operations using RCIED counterattacking
electronic equipment (Counter Radio Controlled
IED Electronic Warfare CREW).
5. Intelligence exploring. It is the process to record and analyze
contextual information (places, events) and their associated elements
(evidence). Therefore, we can understand the means to operate the
IED threat, the device capabilities and criminal relations. The
intelligence exploring is performed:
a) First level in the field, by means of specialized equipment
(Weapons Intelligence Teams WIT).
b) Second level operation theatre by means of laboratories
(Theatre Exploitation Laboratory TEL).
c) Third level outside operation theatre (Terrorist Explosive
Device Analytical Center TEDAC/USA, Defense Science and
Technology Laboratory DIST/UK).