RULE 76 DIGESTS

CASE 1 - HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN V. SALAS (1992)

FACTS:
Remedios Vda. de Tiosejo died and left a will bequeathing to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces) all her properties and designating Jesus Fran as executor. Fran file a petition with
CFI of Cebu for probate of the will.
Private (Salas was the judge) respondents (PR) who are sisters of the deceased filed a Withdrawal
of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate of the Will where they manifested that they have no
objection over the allowance of the will and over the issuance of letters testamentary to Fran.
In 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will and appointing Fran as
executor. No claim was presented against the estate. In 1973, the court approved the Project of
Partition
.
(NOTE: The following allegations are not crucial to the issue as the relevant issue is WHEN TO FILE. I
included them for recit purposes. Basically, the SC favored Frans contentions but also in the end
simply ruled that the action of PR is time -barred)
In 1979, PR filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment asking the court to
declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the will. They alleged
that (a) they were not furnished a copy (b) the will is a forgery (c) they were not notified of any
resolution or order on filing of their opposition nor of the authorization for the clerk of court to receive
the evidence (d) the reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void (e) the project of partition
contains no notice of hearing and they were not notified (f) Fran signed the partition as administrator
and not as executor (g) Fran did not submit any accounting as required and (h) Fran never istributed
the estate (in general, fraud attended the proceedings)
Fran refuted all these protestations (a) PR are in estoppel because they filed the said Withdrawal; the
order directing the Clerk of Court to receive evidence was read in open court; PR Gandiongco signed
the Partition and PR Espina submitted a certification that she received notice of hearing therefore and
has no objection (b) there was an actual distribution of the estate. To top it all, PRs children mortgaged
their respective shares in favor of a bank.
Respondent Judge (RJ) declared the will void finding that the signature of Remedios was a forgery
and reopened the proceedings. This was issued before the restraining order applied by Fran from the
SC was served on RJ.
PR Gandiongco filed an affidavit admitting that she received notice of hearing and her share of the
estate and that she signed the Omnibus Motion without reading it and that she wished to withdraw her
participation in the Omnibus Motion and in the Opposition, only to withdraw such through a Joint
Manifestation with PR Espina.
However, PR Gandiongo again filed a second affidavit confessing that she signed the Joint
Manifestation only upon PR Espinas request.

ISSUE / HELD
W/N private respondents Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration can prosper

NO
RATIO
The following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to set aside or attack the validity of a
final judgment:
(1)Petition for Relief under Rule 38 if the Rules of Court which must be filed within 60 days after
learning of the decision, but not more than 6 months after such decision is entered;

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(2)By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari ; or by collateral attack, assuming that the
decision is void for want of jurisdiction;
(3)By an independent civil action under Art. 1114 of the CC, assumning that the decision was obtained
through farud and Rule 38 cannot be applied.
PR had lost their right to file a petition for relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus
motion for reconsideration was filed exactly 6 years 10 months and 22 days after the rendition of the
decision, and 6 years 1 month and 13 days after the approval of the Project of Partition to which they
voluntarily expressed their conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the testate
proceedings.
PR did not avail of the other 2 modes of attack.
The probate judgment of November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle it,
had passed beyond the reach of the court.
The decree of probate is conclusive upon the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on
any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceeding.
Other matters:
The Project of Partition was signed by PR Gandiongco proving it had actual knowledge thereof.
PR were present when the order authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive evidence was read in court.
The Clerk of Court can receive evidence as laid down by jurisprudence, and it is not necessary for the
Clerk to take an oath.
It is not necessary that the original of the will be attached, as clear from the Rules of Court. Given
this, it is found that a copy of the original will was attached in the petition and it is not disputed that
the original of the will was submitted in evidence.
The availability of the will since 1972 for PRs examination renders completely baseless their claim of
fraud on Frans part. Assuming arguendo that there was fraud, such fraud is not of the kind which
provides a sufficient justification for a Motion for reconsideration or a Petition for Relief from Judgment.
Such fraud must be extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved. Petition granted

CASE 4 - G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988

JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R. INFANTE, MERCEDES RINFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE,
FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK and JOAQUIN RINFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN RINFANTE, respondents.
Facts: On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a
petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y
G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees.
On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no
oppositor appeared.

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Private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte, during the proceedings, private respondent was
appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging
that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition
to the probate of the will.
The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees
is a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of the will.
Ruling : Yes.
Ratio:
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.
The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving
the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and
deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days
before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in
like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner;
also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence
be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day
of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of
a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that
the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The
petition for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and
devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the
notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not
satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
RULE 76 - CASE 5/6
RODELAS VS ARANZA
RELOVA, J.
RULING: The photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the
court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested,
at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If
contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been
lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only

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evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic
copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if
any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before
the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will
may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined
by the probate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means
of a photostatic copy.
HELD: YES
FACTS: Appellant filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will and the
issuance of letters testementary in her favor. Oppositor-appellees, Aranza et al. opposed the petition
on the following grounds:
xxx
xxx
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
xxx
Following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the
probate of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.

Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss (of the appellees) was denied by the court. The
appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to law and
settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. The court set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo
B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof
cannot stand in lieu of the original.
Hence, this petition.
CASE 7 - NUGUID vs NUGUID naa na sa RULE 75
CASE 8 - G.R. No. L-39247

June 27, 1975

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In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR.
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI;
AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN___________________________
AQUINO, J.:
Facts:
Testator Leodegaria Julian (Julian) died at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband and six
children. In her will, she stated that: (a) That she was the owner of the southern half of 9 conjugal
lots; (b) That she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from her father; (c)
That it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husbands
lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. (d) That after her
husbands death, that her paraphernal and all conjugal lands be divided in the manner set forth in the
will.
In effect, Julian disposed of in her will her husbands conjugal assets. Her son, Felix Balanay, Jr.
(Balanay Jr.) filed a petition for probate of the will. This was opposed by his father (Balanay Sr.) and
Avelina Antonio on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and preterition.
Balanay Sr. later withdrew this opposition through a Conformation of Division and Renunciation of
Hereditary Rights wherein he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their six children.
The probate of the will was further opposed by Atty. Montaa (who purported to be a lawyer of Balanay
Jr.) and two others, saying that the will was void because it effected a compromise on future legitimes
and that no notice to creditors were issued. So, in its order it dismissed the petition for the probate,
converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to
creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing.
Issue:
1. Whether it was correct to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity.
2. Whether the probate court was correct in declaring that the will was void and in converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
3. Whether it was correct to issue notice to creditors without first appointing an executor or regular
administrator.
Held:
1. YES. The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity has been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
2. NO. The will should have been upheld, considering that its alleged defects have been cured by the
husbands conformity. The husbands conformity had the effect of validating the will, without prejudice
to the rights of creditors and legitimes of compulsory heirs. The rule is that the invalidity of one of
several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions if the
first invalid disposition had not been made. An interpretation that will render a testamentary
disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will. Thus,
with respect to provision (a) above, the illegal declaration does not nullify the will. It may be
disregarded. As to provision (c), it would at most be effective only fromthe date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the co-ownership.
3. NO. A notice of creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. It is the
executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the estate and to pay
such claims when duly allowed.
CASE 10 - GALLANOSA v. ARCANGEL

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GR L-29300, June 21, 1978

FACTS: Florentino Hitosis died on May 26, 1939. He was survived by his brother Leon Hitosis. In
Florentinos will, he instituted Tecla as his heir, to be substituted in case of predecease, by Pedro
Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia. Pedro was Teclas child with her first husband. He also instituted his
protg Adolfo Fortajada as his heir.

On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No. 3171). The notice of hearing was duly published. Leon and his
nephews and nieces opposed the petition.

Judge Pablo S. Rivera, on October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as
executor. Gallanosa spouses and Adolfo Fortajada submitted a project of partition covering, among
others, 61 parcels of land. The partition was approved by Judge Doroteo Amador in his order of March
13, 1943, thus confirming the heirs' possession of their respective shares.

Leon and the heirs of Florentinos deceased brothers and sisters filed an action against Gallanosa for
the recovery of the 61 parcels of land, alleging that they had been in continuous possession of those
lands. Judge Anatolio C. Maalac dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata in his order of
August 14, 1952. No appeal was made.
Twenty-eight years after the probate of the will, an action for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino
Hitosis and for the recovery of the same sixty-one parcels of land was filed.
ISSUE: WON the will may be annulled after the decree of probate had become final.
HELD: NO.
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that a will may
take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The
probate of the will is mandatory.
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will.
That means that the testator was of sound trial disposing mind at the time when he executed the will
and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in
the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine trial is not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a
criminal action for the forgery of the will.
It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with respect to
private respondents' complaint, The 1952 order of dismissal rendered by Judge Maalac in Civil Case
No. 696, a judgment in personam was an adjudication on the merits (Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of
Court). It constitutes a bar by former judgment.

CASE 11 - G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989

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BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE
GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and ANTONIO R. DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
FACTS:

Petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the private respondent
Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the
late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila,
was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contigent fee would be thirtyfive per cent (35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will.

Petitioner Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was
terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." (Llanes, the lessee of the
subject property whom respondent intends to eject is the brother-in-law of Petitioner)
He filed a motion to intervene but was declined by the court. Despite the notice of termination of his
service, petitioner continued participating in the litigation. Even after the will was disallowed by the
probate court for failure to observe the formalities required by law, petitioner appealed the case. He
also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario. The
trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for substitution.
The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus praying that the trial court be
ordered to give due course to his appeal and to grant his motion for substitution.
ISSUE:
May a person having indirect interest in a will interfere in its probate? NO

RULING:
The dismissal of the petition for mandamus was proper, for while it is true that, as contended by the
petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is
presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and
requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements
were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the
motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the
probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a
prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occassion to rule that one who is only
indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus:
... the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that
thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or
necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not
be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the
estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso,
35 Phil. 244, 246.)

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Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held:
We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that notice of an
attorney's lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his
client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case his
client is awarded a certain sum by the court.
CASE 12 - BUTIONG VS. THE SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED MINING
GR No. L-13938
FACTS:

Pedro Butiong commenced Special Proceedings No. 737 for the probate of a document
purporting to have been executed by Harris as his last will and testament.

Paragraph IV of said Exhibit G reads:

I hereby make, appoint and constitute Pedro Butiong, who is my adopted son and whom I have
reared and brought up since he was still about 2 years old, as my sole and universal heir of all
my properties located in the Philippines, consisting of shares of stock and interest in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mining Co., Inc., located at Mabuhay, Surigao, Surigao, and of shares of
stock, interest and 1% per cent royalty in the Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., located at
Siano, Surigao.

The Surigao Consolidated Mining opposed the probate upon the ground of forgery.

The lower court issued an order admitting the disputed document to probate. Hence, this
appeal by said Company.

Butiong maintains that the lower court erred in entertaining appellants opposition and in not
dismissing its appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the appeal should have been dismissed.

HELD: Yes. It is well-settled that one who has or can have no interest in succeeding a decedent cannot
oppose the probate of his alleged will. Appellant herein does not claim to have such interest in the
succession to Christian Harris. Accordingly, the lower court should not have considered its opposition
to the probate of Exhibit G, much less given due course to the present appeal.

CASE 13 - SUMILANG V. RAMAGOSA

TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA PABELLA and
ANDREA RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.

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FACTS
Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and
testament of Hilarion Ramagosa. Said document institutes Mariano as the sole heir of the testator.
The petition was opposed by two oppositors, who questioned the due execution of the
document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be
his last will and testament. Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also claimed that they, instead of
Mariano, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased.
After Mariano presented evidence and rested his case, oppositors moved for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground that decedent revoked his will by implication of law six years before his death
by selling the parcels of land to Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario so that at the time of the
testator's death, the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.
On the other hand, Mariano moved to strike out oppositors pleadings on the ground that the oppositors
have no interest in the probate of the will as they have no relationship with the decedent within the
fifth degree. The lower court ruled in favor of Mariano stating that the allegations of the oppositors go
to the very intrinsic value of the will and since the oppositors have no standing to oppose the probate
of the will as they are strangers, their pleadings are ordered stricken out from the record.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the probate court should pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will.
(2) Whether or not the oppositors have the personality to oppose the probate of the will.

HELD
Issue No. 1
The petition being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity
only. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature (Nuguid vs. Nuguid).
To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with
the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only
purpose of the proceedings . . . for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines
and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et al. vs. CFI of Manila)
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one
thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and
distribution
The revocation invoked by the oppositors is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent
acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the
particular devise or legacy.
Issue NO. 2
Moreover, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that they "have no relationship
whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to
the deceased whose will is under probate." They do not attempt to show that they have some interest
in the estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies
of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, support the said court's finding in this respect.

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It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat
Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate like a creditor. (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R. No. L- 18753, March 26, 1965.)
The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the
court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention
in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be
heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)

CASE 14 - Acain vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio
Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary on the premise that
Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose
and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs.

The will contained provision:

Xxx. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties,
lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall
be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura,
Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.

Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be
heirs.
The oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile
deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss.

After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction.

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered
the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied; petitioner filed this present
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision.

Issue:

Whether Petitioner has interest to allow him to intervene in a probate proceeding.

Held:

No, In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have
an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor
or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or
a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual

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item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the
Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation
of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child
and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has
no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special
Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
15 - ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs CA
Facts:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died on Febury 25, 1964. He was survived by his widow, the herein
petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador,
both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen
Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the
court of first instance (CFI) of Cebu, alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in
Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left
real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
On 12 March 1964, petitioner Rosa filed a petition with the CFI of Quezon City for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the
surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa filed in said Cebu court
an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964.
On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's
motion to dismiss "until after the CFI of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that
document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco."
Such order of the Cebu court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or
set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in
the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10
April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to
entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in view of the alleged
exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal
reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." The said court further
found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
Respondent Lourdes's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964
asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court
was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied.

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Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's order admitting the will to probate and naming
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (CA) to bar the Quezon City
court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the CA rendered a decision in favor of respondents and against the herein
petitioner, holding that: Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of
the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which
first attached. It also issues writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain
perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders
and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's
express wish in his testament.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent CA, dated 8 July 1965;
hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon
City court.
Held: Yes.
Rationale:
1. Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, and specifies that "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. A fair reading of the Rule since it deals
with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court
with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in
order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided
with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition
before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take
cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second
court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
This exactly what the Cebu court did.
Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order
holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting
its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the
will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and
leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise
by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between

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the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had
his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus
indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer
to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition
and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
2. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, the Court
upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate
of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in
accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his
estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly
that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found
that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace
the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed,
the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to
the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of
a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
3. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration
that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a)
the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo" are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left
his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a
constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State.The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction
thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." The Quezon City court acted regularly within
its jurisdiction in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition
for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision.
16 - Atillano Mercado vs. Santos (1938 Case)
Important points:
1. WILLS; CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DUE EXECUTION OF A PROBATED WILL. Section 625 of the Code
of Civil Procedure is explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will. It
provides: "No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the
Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of
real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as
conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound
and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace,
fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.

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3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDING "IN REM." The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem.
The provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice
to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody,
even against the State.
4. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however
strong. The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any
proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
5. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST FORGER OF A DULY PROBATED WILL. Upon the facts stated in
the opinion of the court, it was held: That in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which
had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
FACTS:

On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for
the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the testimony
of Benigno F. Gabino, one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June 27, 1931, admitted the
will to probate.

Almost three years later, on April 11, 1934, the five intervenors herein moved ex parte to reopen the
proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings.
Because filed ex parte, the motion was denied. The same motion was filed a second time, but with
notice to the adverse party. The motion was nevertheless denied by the probate court on May 24,
1934. On appeal to this court, the order of denial was affirmed on July 26, 1935. (Basa v. Mercado, 33
off. Gaz., 2521.)
It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., sixteen months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa,
intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a
complaint against the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above
indicated. The petitioner was arrested. He put up a bond in the sum of P4,000 and engaged the
services of an attorney to undertake his defense. Preliminary investigation of the case was continued
twice upon petition of the complainant. The complaint was finally dismissed, at the instance of the
complainant herself, in an order dated December 8, 1932.
Three months later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor charged the petition for the second time
with the same offense, presenting the complaint this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico,
Pampanga. The petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond in the sum of P4,000, and engaged
the services of counsel to defend him. This second complaint, after investigation, was also dismissed,
again at the instance of the complainant herself who alleged that the petitioner was in poor health.
That was on April 27, 1933.
Some nine months later, on February 2, 1934, to be exact, the same intervenor accused the same
petitioner for the third time of the same offense. The information was filed by the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga in the justice of the peace court of Mexico. The petitioner was again arrested, again put up
a bond of P4,000, and engaged the services of defense counsel. The case was dismissed on April 24,
1934, after due investigation, on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified had already
been probated and there was no evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix
appearing thereon, but that, on the contrary, the evidence satisfactorily established the authenticity of
the signature aforesaid.
Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal, on May 9, 1934, moved in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted on May 23, 1934, and, for the
fourth time, the petitioner was arrested, filed a bond and engaged the services of counsel to handle his

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defense. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year until February 18, 1934, when the Court of
First Instance ordered that the case be tried on the merits.
The petitioner interposed a demurrer on November 25, 1935, on the ground that the will alleged to
have been forged had already been probated. This demurrer was overruled on December 24, 1935,
whereupon an exception was taken and a motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal were filed.
The motion for reconsideration and the proposed appeal were denied on January 14, 1936.
The case proceeded to trial, and forthwith petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the
will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the
will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof.
The motion was overruled and the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from further proceedings in the matter.
The injunction was issued and thereafter, on June 19, 1937, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
for certiorari, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Three justices dissented in a separate
opinion. The case is now before this court for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of the will of Petitioners deceased wife is a bar to his criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will.
Ruling:

Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a
probated will. It says: "SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No
will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the
Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court
of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution." (Emphasis
ours.)
In Manahan v. Manahan (58 Phil., 448, 451), we held: ". . . The decree of probate is conclusive with
respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding
In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said:j"The probate of a will by the probate court having
jurisdiction thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also
conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will,
and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery." (Emphasis ours.)
As our law on wills, particularly section 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure aforequoted, was taken
almost bodily from the Statutes of Vermont, the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State relative
to the effect of the probate of a will are of persuasive authority in this jurisdiction.

The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as
a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is
granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. This court held
in the case of Manalo v. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47 Phil., 938):

"The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of
them.
"Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over
all such persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that may be rendered after said
proceeding is binding against the world."virtua1aw library

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Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an incontrovertible presumption in
favor of judgments declared by it to be conclusive. library
The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any
proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
The majority decision of the Court of Appeals cites English decisions to bolster up its conclusion that
"the judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to the due execution
and genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not for the purpose
of punishment of a crime."
"A judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked collaterally although the will was forged;
and a payment to the executor names therein of a debt due the decedent will discharge the same,
notwithstanding the spurious character of the instrument probated. It has also been held that, upon an
indictment for forging a will, the probate of the paper in question is conclusive evidence in the
defendants favor of its genuine character. But this particular point has lately been ruled
otherwise."cralaw virtua1aw library
The dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals in the instant case under review makes a
cursory study of the statutes obtaining in England, Massachusetts and Florida, and comes
to the conclusion that the decisions cited in the majority opinion do not appear to "have
been promulgated in the face of statutes similar to ours." The dissenting opinion cites
Whartons Criminal Evidence (11th ed., sec. 831), to show that the probate of a will in
England is only prima facie proof of the validity of the will (Op. Cit. quoting Marriot v.
Marriot, 93 English Reprint, 770); and 21 L. R. A. (pp. 686-689 and note), to show that in
Massachusetts there is no statute making the probate of a will conclusive, and that in
Florida the statute (sec. 1810, Revised Statutes) makes the probate conclusive evidence as
to the validity of the will with regard to personal, and prima facie as to real estate. The
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Florida cited by the majority opinion, supra, refer
to wills of both personal and real estate.
Although in the foregoing case (State v. McGlynn) the information filed by the State was to set aside
the decree of probate on the ground that the will was forged, we see no difference in principle between
that case and the case at bar. A subtle distinction could perhaps be drawn between setting aside a
decree of probate, and declaring a probated will to be a forgery. it is clear, however, that a duly
probated will cannot be declared to be a forgery without disturbing in a way the decree allowing said
will to probate. It is at least anomalous that a will should be regarded as genuine for one purpose and
spurious for another.
The American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the question as to whether or not the
probate of a will bars criminal prosecution of the alleged forger of the probated will. We have examined
some important cases and have come to the conclusion that no fixed standard may be adopted or
drawn therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of diversity of statutory provisions obtaining in
different jurisdictions. It behooves us, therefore, as the court of last resort, to choose that rule most
consistent with our statutory law, having in view the needed stability of property rights and the public
interest in general.
To be sure, we have seriously reflected upon the dangers of evasion from punishment of culprits
deserving of the severity of the law in cases where, as here, forgery is discovered after the probate of
the will and the prosecution is had before the prescription of the offense. By and large, however, the
balance seems inclined in favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does the law surround the
execution of the will with the necessary formalities and require probate to be made after an elaborate
judicial proceeding, but section 113, not to speak of section 513, of our Code of Civil Procedure
provides for an adequate remedy to any party who might have been adversely affected by the probate
of a forged will, much in the same way as other parties against whom a judgment is rendered under
the same or similar circumstances. (Pecson v. Coronel, 43 Phil., 358.)
The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time,
but in no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of probate, on the

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ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the action of a
court of first instance when that court refuses to grant relief.
After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and unappelable, and after the period
fixed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure has expired, the law as an expression of the
legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends there.
We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code
of Civil Code Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of
a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The resolution of the foregoing legal question is sufficient to dispose of the case.
From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to have the criminal proceedings
against him quashed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, without
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
17 - G.R. No. L-26743 May 31, 1972
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF CIPRIANO ABUT, deceased.
GENEROSO ABUT, petitioner, GAVINA ABUT, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FELIPE ABUT, PRESENTACION DE RODRIGUEZ and ABSOLUTO ABUT, oppositors-appellees.
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of
the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in
the original petition did not require that notice of the amended petition be published anew. All that
Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will,
either by mail or personally
Facts:
On August 4, 1965 Generoso Abut, one of the children of the deceased Cipriano Abut by his second
marriage and the person named as executor in a will allegedly executed by the said deceased, filed a
petition before the court a quo praying that after due notice and hearing the said will be approved and
allowed and that letters testamentary issue in his favor. In an amended order dated September 1,
1965 the court a quo motu proprio set the petition for hearing and further directed compliance with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. These procedural steps admittedly took place.
Opposition to the petition was filed by the children of Cipriano Abut by his first marriage, namely,
Felipe Abut, Presentacion de Rodriguez and Absoluto Abut, now appellees here.
During the pendency of the case below but before the court a quo could even start the formal hearing
of the petition, which had been delayed by several postponements, Generoso Abut, the original
petitioner who initiated the probate proceeding, died on January 10, 1966. This eventuality prompted
Gavina Abut, a sister of Generoso Abut and an heir and devisee under the will of the testator Cipriano
Abut, to ask the court a quo to substitute her in lieu of Generoso Abut and to admit an amended
petition wherein she prayed that the probate of the will be allowed and that letters of administration
with the will annexed be issued in her favor. For reasons stated in its order of July 2, 1966, hereinabove
quoted, the court a quo dismissed the petition originally brought by the deceased Generoso Abut,
"without prejudice to the filing of another petition pursuant to the requirements of the Rules of Court."
ISSUE:

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Whether or not the probate court correctly dismissed the petition simply because the original
petitioner who was the executor named in the will sought to be probated died before the petition
could be heard and/or terminated.
Stated otherwise, after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case involving probate of the will,
did the demise of the original petitioner during the pendency of the proceeding divest the court of such
jurisdiction and preclude the continuation of the case on the theory that the amended petition filed by
herein petitioner, who admittedly was a person having an interest in the estate, seeking to substitute
her in place of the original petitioner, but with a similar prayer for the allowance of the same will,
required a new publication in order to invest the court with jurisdiction.
RULING:
We find the dismissal of the original petition for probate and the refusal of the probate court to admit
the amended petition without a new publication thereof to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the court
became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76.
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the
petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in the
original petition 3 did not require that notice of the amended petition be published anew. All that
Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will,
either by mail or personally. In the case of Perez vs. Perez this Court explained:
Thus it appears that such "no notice" argument has no legal foundation. At any rate the
omission, if any, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court; it constituted a mere procedural
error that may or may not be the basis of reversal (Jocson vs. Nable, 48 O.G. 90). Indeed, this
Tribunal has ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested in the estate
through the publication of the petition in the newspapers (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 159;
Jocson vs. Nable, supra) which in this case admittedly took place.
Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural convenience, not
jurisdictional requisite. So much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted
from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not advised the decree allowing the
will does not ipso facto become void for want of jurisdiction ...
Jurisdiction of the court once acquired continues until the termination of the case, and remains
unaffected by subsequent events. The court below erred in holding that it was divested of jurisdiction
just because the original petitioner died before the petition could be formally heard. Parties who could
have come in and opposed the original petition, as herein appellees did, could still come in and oppose
the amended petition, having already been notified of the pendency of the proceeding by the
publication of the notice thereof.
The admission of the amended petition, of course, does not mean that Gavina Abut's prayer that she
be appointed administratrix with the will annexed is necessarily meritorious. It simply recognizes that
since the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the res, such jurisdiction continues until the
termination of the case. The first question that the lower court should hear and decide is the probate of
the will; and the question of whether or not Gavina Abut should be appointed administratrix must be
decided on the basis of the facts to be presented and after the will is proved and allowed, as provided
in Section 6 of Rule 78.
WHEREFORE, the order dated July 2, 1966 is set aside and the case is remanded below, with direction
for the lower court to admit the amended petition and thereafter proceed accordingly. Costs against
oppositors-appellees.

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NOTE:
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 read:
"SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will is
delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such court
shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively,
previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. The court shall
also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at
their place of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least
twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. ... Personal service of
copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
xxx xxx xxx"
18 - G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO, MANILA;
DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE
GUZMAN, respondents.

FACTS:
On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman, RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings .No. M-1436.
On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) vehicles
registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de
Guzman's but which are at present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein
petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent
must have the possession of said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late husband. On the
same day, the lower court issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the
deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of the private respondent.
In an order dated May 28,1987, the aforesaid motion was set for hearing on June 5, 1987. In this same
order, the lower court directed that all parties in the case be notified. However, no notice of the order
was given to the petitioner.

the lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be appointed as special administratrix, and
issued another order that the Administratrix Elaine de Guzman for appointment of Deputy Sheriffs

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RULE 76 DIGESTS
together with some military men and/or policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of Manolito de
Guzman.

Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above order. The petitioner resisted when
Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that
they were his personal properties.

Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's orders dated June 5, 1987 and June
8, 1987.

In a resolution dated June 10, 1987, the SC issued a TRO

PETITIONER COTENTS: that the order is a patent nullity, the respondent court not having acquired
jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the estate of
Manolito de Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks,
as mandated by the Rules of Court. The petitioner also stresses that the appointment of a special
administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion for having been made without giving petitioner and
other parties an opportunity to oppose said appointment.
Anent the June 8, 1987 order, the petitioner alleges that the immediate grant of the motion praying for
the court's assistance in the preservation of the estate of the deceased, "without notice to the
petitioner Pedro de Guzman, and its immediate implementation on the very same day by respondent
Elaine G. de Guzman with the assistance of respondents deputy sheriffs, at no other place but at the
home of the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, are eloquent proofs that all the antecedent events were
intended solely to deprive petitioner de Guzman of his property without due process of law." He also
prays that the respondent Judge be disqualified from further continuing the case.
ISSUE: whether or not a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes
notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

HELD: As early as March 18, 1937, in the case of Santos v. Castillo (64 Phil. 211) the court held that
before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of
the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased
and other indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will
or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated.

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RULE 76 DIGESTS

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private
respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased
person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito
de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings for
the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in the
settlement of the estate of the deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate"
of the deceased person but the determination of the properties comprising that estate must follow
established rules.

Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for letters of administration
is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition,
and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to
any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76.

It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the
petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons
within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world. Where no
notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to
have an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate
is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the
proceeding in that no person may be deprived of his right to property without due process of law.
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the
petition void and subject to annulment.

In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was
caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be
appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased
person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito
de Guzman.

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RULE 76 DIGESTS
Petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 of Makati are hereby
set aside. The case is ordered remanded to the lower court for the hearing of the petition with previous
notice to all interested parties as required by law.

24 - Alaban vs CA
Facts:
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, for the probate of the
Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado, who died on 26 October 2000 in
Janiuay, Iloilo. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On
30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision allowing the probate of the will.
More than four (4) months later, petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate
proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as
the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the
decedent.
The RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious.
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTCs decision. They
claimed that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several
conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to
a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to
implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to sign and
return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest in participating in the compromise
agreement so that they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of the will. CA dismissed
the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed their petition for the
alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own
Ruling:
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them,
petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would
benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for
failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory
judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic
fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the judgment

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RULE 76 DIGESTS
sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was
obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral
in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court.
The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them
of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as
they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the
probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

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