Vivarium

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14
1976

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XIV 1976

E. J. BRILL - LEIDEN

23:33:20 PM

VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE
AGES AND RENAISSANCE

editors

advisory
committee
publishers
published

vivariumis devotedin particularto the profane side of

and theintellectual
lifeoftheMiddle
mediaevalphilosophy
Renaissance.
and
Ages
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- J.
G. Braakhuis,(Nijmegen)- F. F. Blok,(Amsterdam)
IJsewijn,(Louvain).
oftheEditorialBoard: Prof.L. M. de Rijk.
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Contributors

23:33:20 PM

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XIV (1976)

. . KNEEPKENS
Utrecht

"Mulier Quae Damnavit, Salvavit" : A

Note on the Early Developmentof the
Relatio simplex

L. M. de RIJK
Leiden

Some Thirteenth
CenturyTracts on The
Game of ObligationIII

26

rpd p. orb an
Utrecht

Anonymi Teutonici commentum in

Theodoli eclogam e codice Utrecht,
U.B. 22 editum(4)
50

e. j. ash worth
Waterloo, Ontario

"/ Promise You a Horse': A Second

Problem of Meaning and Referencein
Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth
62
CenturyLogic (j) . . .

G. R. Evans
Reading, Berks.

St. Anselm's Analogies

Jerome v. brown
Windsor, Ontario

fohn Duns Scotus on Henry of Ghent's

Arguments for Divine Illumination:
The Statementof theCase
94
"
William Heytesbury'sPosition on In solubles": One Possible Source
114

paul v. spade
loomington,
Indiana

81

L. M. de RIJK
Leiden

Richard Billingham's Works on Logic

E. j. ASHWORTH
Waterloo,Ontario

"/ Promise You a Horse"- A Second

Problem of Meaning and Referencein
Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth
CenturyLogic (2)
139

. H. KNEEPKENS

AnotherManuscript of the REGULAE

DE MEDI I S SY LLABI S maistriWilleimt: Cambridge
, Corpus Christi College, 460
156

Nijmegen

BOOKSRECEIVED

121

!59

23:33:20 PM

Vivarium
XIV, i (1976)
i( Mulier

Quae Damnavit , Salvavit"

A Note on theEarly Developmentof theRelatio simplex*

C. H. KNEEPKENS

I. Introduction
the paragraph on the rapportsofthe relativesto theirantecedents,
In of his Notices et extraits
} Charles Thurot observed for the period
from the late Antiquity until the middle of the twelfth
centurya servile followingof the medieval grammariansof Priscian's
doctrine on the relatives. Only in Peter Helias' Summa he noticed
a firststep on the path of independence: the division, not found in
Priscian, of the relatiointo the relatiodirectaand the relatioindirecta.2
A furtherstage of developmentThurot foundin the tracts dating from
the middle of the thirteenthcentury: a systematical treatmentof the
relatio and the relatives in one section. In his Notices he printed an
extensive fragmenttaken fromthe Summa de constructione
of master
Poncius the Provencal,3later, in 1886, completelyedited by Fierville.4
Poncius' section on the relatives [De relativis)5 can be divided into
two main parts: on the relatio and on the relatives. The paragraph
on the relatiostartswith a definitionof the relatio, ascribed to Priscian :
'
Relatio est, ut ait Priscianus, antelate rei repetitiovel representatio'
.
Next a division of the relatio into eleven kinds is given, among which
there are five couples :
* This paper,in a firstdraft,was read at the International
for
Symposion
MedievalLogic and Semantics
, Leyden/Nijmegen,
1974. I wishto expressmy
cordialthanksto Prof.L. M. de Rijk and Drs H. A. G. Braakhuisfortheir
and criticisms.
I am indebtedalso to MrsDeborah
manyand usefulcomments
Gil who was so kindto readthispaperand to correctso manyclumsyoffences
I madeagainsttheEnglishgrammar.
1 Ch.Thurot,Noticeset extraits
dediversmanuscrits
latinspourservir
l'histoire
desdoctrines
au moyen-ge,
Noticeset Extraits. . ., t. XXXII, 2,
grammaticales
Paris 1869 (anast.repr.Frankfurt
am Main 1964),pp. 355-72.
2 Thurot , 356.
1869
p.
3 Thurot
i86, pp. 356-7.
4 Ch. Fierville,
Unegrammaire
latineinditedu XIIIe sicle,Paris 1886. The
Summa de constructione
of master Poncius is edited in the AppendixII,
pp. 177-92.
5 Fierville1886,
pp. 186-90.
I

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1. a. ecleptica: 'qui legitdisputai*

b. non-ecleptica: 'homoqui legitdisputt';
'
'
2. a. directa: hic legitqui disputt
b. indirecta: 'ille legitquem video';
'
3. a. intrinseca: 'idem legitet disputt
'
b. extrnseca: T. legitqui disputt ;
'
4. a. intrasumpta: Sortesdiligitse'
b. extrasumpta: 'homolegitqui disputt']
5. a. mutua: 'Ule qui legitdisputt
'
6. a. personalis: 'Prus legitqui disputt
'
b. simplex: mulierdampnavitque salvavi.
The relatiosimplex, on its turn, is subdivided into seven subkinds:
1. when the antecedent supposits for an appellat[iv]um(!)t and the
relative for another appellat[iv]um: 'mulier dampnavit que salvavi ;
2. when the antecedent supposits for the sort (maneries), and the
relative for the same: 'homo est dignssima creaturarum
, cui competit
uti ralione' ;
3. when the antecedent supposits forthe sort, and the relative foran
'
appellat[iv]um: serpensestcaUidissimumanimal, qui venitad mulierem';
4. when the antecedent supposits for an appellat[iv]um, and the
relative for the sort: 'homo currit,qui est dignssima creaturarum']
5. when the antecedent supposits for the noun itself (materialiter),
'
and the relative for the res (= appellatum): homo est appellativum
nomen, quod (!) currit';
6. when the antecedent supposits for the res, and the relative forthe
: 'homo currit, quod est appellativumnomen';
noun itself (materialiter)
in
7. when the antecedent and the relative supposit for the sort
'
or
celeste
sidus
est
animal
latrabile
est
'canis
,
quod
equivocation:
'
manus mee, que vosfecerunttclavis confixesunt'.
The paragraph on the relatives starts with the division of the
relatives into the relativa substantiae and the relativa proprietatum
,
and is furtherdevoted to the rules forthe use of the relatives in the
proposition,and to some exceptional cases.
The followingdefinitionsof the relatiopersonalis and of the relatio
simplex attracted Thuros special attention:
The relatioextrnseca
was lackingin Fierville'smanuscript.I suppliedit
fromThurot1869, p. 357.
2

23:33:30 PM

'Personalisrelatioest,quandoantecedens
supponitpro unoappellativo( !)
et relativum
proeodem,ut P. legit,qui disputt.
Simplexest,quando antecedenssupponitpro uno appellativo(!) et relativumpro alio, ut in theologiamulierdampnavit,
que salvavit.'7
He supposed their originin the logical theories of the earlythirteenth
century,8and brought them in relation with the suppostilo simplex
and personalis,key-notionsin the medieval Terministlogic.9
The oldest mention of the relatiosimplexknown to Thurot occurred
in a line of Alexander de Villadei's Doctrinale, dated by Thurot in the
firstpart of the thirteenthcentury.10Here only one kind of the relatio
simplexas such was given:
tibiquandoquerelatiosimplex
'Occurretque
F emina,quae clausitvitaeportam
, reseravi.11
Thurot printed immediately after these lines the comment from
theso-called Glose'Admirantes', datingfromthemiddle ofthethirteenth
century.This commentarypointed at the parallel between the relatio
and the suppositiosimplexpersonalis,12The glossator
simplex/personalis
firstgives three ways of the use of the notion of suppositio simplex
'
'
'
[i. homo est species'; 2. homo est animal 3. piper venditurhic et
Rome'.]. Next he states that the relatio simplex has been called so a
privationepersone, and discusses the meaning of persona here. In this
context persona cannot signifyeither the accident of the verb nor of
the pronoun, nor the individua essentia rationalis nature (i.e. the
Boethian definition), but persona has to be accepted here as the
7 Thurot
1869,pp. 357-9.
8 Thurot1869, pp. 357-8: 'Les dnominations
et les dfinitions
des relatio
la logiquedu temps(and he adds
simplexet personalisont t empruntes
in a note: 'La terminologie
et la thorielogiquede la suppositio
n'apparaissent
est dans
pas avantle XIIIe sicle.Le plus ancientexteou je aie rencontre
le Doctrinald'Alexandrede Villedieu).Suivantles logiciensune termegnral
du XIIIe
ou, commeon disaitds le commencement
dsignesubstantivement,
sicle,supposepour (supponitpro) la classe ides laquellesa signification
est rapporte,commedans homoestspecies,animalestgenus,ou pourtoutce
commedans omnishomoest
qui est comprisdans l'tenduede sa signification,
animal.La premiresuppositiotait appellesimplex
, la secondepersonalis.
On disaitde mmede la relatio
'.
9 For the
ofTerminist
development
logic,see L. M. de Rijk,logica modernorum.A Contribution
to theHistoryofEarly Terminist
Logic,I (Assen1962),
II, i, 2 (Assen1967).
10 Thurot1869, 28: 'Alexandrede Villadieua donc vcu et critdans la
p.
moitidu XIIIe sicle'.
premire
11Das Doctrinaledes Alexanderde Villa-Dei,ed. D.
Reichling,Berlin1893,
w. 1449-50;Thurot1869, p. 360: 'Alexandrene connat qu'une espce de
relatiosimplex'
.
12Thurot
1869,pp. 360-1.
3

23:33:30 PM

res individua accidentibuscircumscripta,ut sunt tempus,locus,figura

- for they make a thing an individual thing, and show that it is a
res singularis- , or as the individuumof a species. And so the adjective
personalis in relatiopersonalis must be taken. Thereforein the term
relatio simplex the adjective simplex indicates the removal of the
collection of accidents needed for an individuano, and so the word
used in the relatiosimplex does not stand foran individuum,but fora
genus or a species. However, in the proposition'mulierque dampnavit,
salvavi, the question rises whether the relative que refersto idem
numero Relatio personalis) or to idem specie Relatio simplex). If it
refers to idem numero, the proposition is false, for then the real
identityof Eve and Mary has to be accepted. If it refersto idem specie,
the proposition is false too, since a species cannot damn nor save.
But if we want to maintain the dicta antiquorum,the glossator says,
we have to mix up in such locutions the intentiospeciei and the
intentioindividui,and understand them as follows:mulier,i.e. a thing
of this species, dampnavit, and a thing of the same species salvavit.
Any furthersubdivision of the relatio simplex, as given by Poncius,
does not occur in the Glose.
Whereas the texts printedby Thurot on this subject, can all be dated
in the thirteenth century, the notions of the relatio simplex and
personalis do already occur in some writingsdating fromthe twelfth
century. In this paper I will trace the development of the relatio
simplexaccordingto some of these texts dating fromthe early twelfth
century.In a followingpaper I will sketch a second stage of development: the incorporation of the relatio simplex into the theories on
syntax by the grammarians of the late twelfthand early thirteenth
century. And in a furtherstudy I intend to examine the use made
of the relatiosimplex in the tracts that belong to the traditionof the
early Terminist logic fromthe later quarter of the twelfthuntil the
middle of the thirteenthcentury.
In the above mentionedtracts on the relatiothe example 'mulierque
damnavit,salvavi or slightvariations of it, have been frequentlyused
forillustratingthe relatiosimplex. Since it is a common procedure for
medieval grammarians and logicians to take the same example for
illustrating a certain question, even if terminologyand doctrinal
point of view differ,I propose to use, in a firstinstance,this example
typical of the relatiosimplex,as a guide forthe investigationson the
development of the relatiosimplex.
4

23:33:30 PM

II. The Early Twelfth Century Texts

A. Peter Abailard
'
The example mulierque damnavit, salvavi or a slight variant of it
occurs three times in the Abailardian writings:
I. The Logica 'Ingredientibus (the gloss on the Perihermeneias).lz
In the discussion on the true affirmativecategorical propositions
(de veris affirmationibus)Abailard claims that the formal structure
of all the dicta of propositions of this kind is aliquid esse aliquid quod
'
9
'
ipsum est. The propositions homoest animal and Socratesest animal9f
Abailard continues, both say hominemesse animal, but the former
does so simpliciterand the latter determinate
. Abailard now makes
two remarks on the proposition ' Socrates est animal* with regard to
the above given formalstructure.We must note that since ' Socrates
estanimal9says Socratemesse illud quod ipse est, the nominalpredicate
phrase illud quod ipse est is used here in the proposition neutraliter,
,
just as if it was said that quae res ipse est refersto animal simpliciter
so that it does not obtain fromSocrates, the subject, any determinate
meaning.
The same question is dealt with in the Sententie secundum M.
'
Petrm,XXVI ,14where is argued that the proposition Socrates est
9
homo says Socratemesse id quod ipse est. Here we must not take 'id'
discretesecundumpersonam, but indifferenter
tam secundumnaturam
'
9
quam secundum personam. In the Logica Ingredientibus Abailard
'
illustrates this process of referringwith two examples per mulierem
intravitmors, per eandemvita9and 'mulierquae damnavit,ipsa salvavi.
According to Abailard the pronouns eandem and quae/ipsa are used
here indifferenter
and not personaliter
, since the meaning of e.g. the
latter example is: mulier, a thing of this sex, damnavit, et eadem,
a thing of the same sex, salvavit, so that eadem is used for: the same
secundum indifferentiamsexus, and not for: the same secundum
identitatempersonae. This kind of relatio Abailard calls the relatio
indifferens, and it can occur when the appellative noun to which
the relative refers,is a noun habens nominationemconfusam.
' in: Peter Abaelards
13Logica 'Ingredientibus
, ed.
Philosophische
Schriften
. Geyer,Beitrge. . ., XXI, 1-3,Mnsteri. W. 1919-1927,esp. Vol. 3: Die
Glossenzu ! 'Epjxeveta,
pp. 307"53 (esp- pp. 396-7). For the text, see
AppendixA.
14L. Minio-Paluello,
Twelfth
Century
Logic, Textsand StudiesII, Abaelardiana
indita
, j. Superperiermeneias
secundum
M. Petrm,
XII-XIV, 2. Sententie
Roma1958,p. 118.Forthetext,seeAppendixC.
5

23:33:30 PM

Abailard further points to a similar use of the demonstrative

pronouns, that also can be used generaliterand confuse instead of
personaliterand discrete.The example for this kind of demonstratio
is taken fromthe Benedictiofontis in S abbato sancto: For the priest,
'
when he says qui pedibus super te ambulavit,qui te in vinum (aquam
9
Abailard) convertitintends to say tui similem,since his words have
to be accepted de natura elementi
, and not de identittepersonae.
'
returns
to
his
Now Abailard
example Socrates est animal' At the
same way, he says, as the demonstrativepronouns can be used non
, the relatives 15can refergeneraliterand confuse
personaliteret discrete
to a nomen confusae significations. Therefore if the proposition
'
9
'
Socrates est animal says Socrates est esse aliquid quod ipse est', i.e.
est esse animal quod ipse est, the relative quod refersto animal without
any restrictingforce,but generaliter and confuse, and the' proposition
'
Socrates est esse animal quod ipse est9is equivalent to Socrates est
9
animal et ipse est animal .
Abailard finishesthe discussion with the remark that the relative
clause quod ipse estis a sort of determinaloof the predicate.
2. The TheologiaChristiana (Lib. III).16
The second place in the Abailardian writingswhere the example
'
mulier etc.9occurs, is in the third book of the Theologia Christiana.
In this book Abailard deals with the application of dialectics to
theological questions, and especially to problems concerning the
Holy Trinity. In the paragraphs 89-115 he lists up the objections
made against the orthodox doctrine by dialecticians who refused
to accept the unitas essentiaeand the trinitaspersonarumat the same
time. In the paragraphs 116-186 Abailard deals with their objections,
and one of the argumentsin this dispute is formedby the distinctions
he makes in the notions of idem and diversum(paragraphs 136-164).
Idem can be accepted, according to Abailard in the Theologia17 in
fiveways: idem essentiasive numero, idemproprietate,idem definitione,
16It must be noted that Abailardhere does not make a clear distinction
we will meetin
betweenrelativenounsand relativepronouns,a distinction
and whichgoesback to Priscian,II, 18.
thetractsofthelate twelfth
century,
ie PetriAbaelardiOperaTheologicaII, TheologiaChristiana
, TheologiaSchomediaevalisXII, Turnhout1969,
larium,ed. E. M. Buytaert,CC Continuatio
esp. pp. 249-50.For thetext,see AppendixB.
17Cf. BuytaersIntroduction
, p. 26; see also J. Jolivet,Artsdu languageet
chezAblard,Etudes de philosophiemdivale,t. LVII, Paris 1969,
thologie
pp. 285 sqq.
6

23:33:30 PM

. Dealing with idem

idem similitudine and idem pro incommutato
idem
a
remark
on
as
he
a
relative
adds
pronoun in subject
definitione
position in a proposition. And according to Abailard the relative
pronoun idem can only be used as subject term in the meaning of
'
. So when we say mulierdamnavit
idem numero, or of idem definitione
mundumet eadem salvavi, the propositionhas two meanings: a true
one and a false one. For if the relatiois taken ad identitatemnumeri,
i.e. if the personaliter numerosame woman is understood to have
damned and to have saved, the proposition is false. But if idem is
accepted to be ad identitatemdefinitionis,so that eadem only means
the same quantum nomenmulieris simpliciter
, the proposition will be
true.
3. The SententiesecundumM . Petrm, II. Sophisms about 'totum'.18
As Minio-Paluello indicates in his introduction to the Sententie,
the same discussion as in the Ingredientibusoccurs in this work.19
In the solution of the firstsophism about 'totum', the author of the
Sententiepoints at the twofold use of the relative (dictio relativa):
eitherit referspersonaliter quasi discrete
, secundumscilicetidentitatem

or
identitatemnature,
secundum
,
persone
indifferenter simpliciter
idest convenientievel similitudinis rerum iuxta causam inpositionis
premissi nominis. This distinctionis not an arbitraryone, for since
the relatioaccordingto the author always happens to be in accordance
with the things (res), it is built upon the identity of the things. And
as the distinctionin the identitasrerumcan be made into an identitas
'
secundum personam (e.g. idem est Marcus quod Tullius') and an
identitas secundum naturam sive speciem (e.g. 'idem est Petrus quod
Marcus'), so in the relatio the distinctioncan be made into a relatio
secundum identitatempersone, and a relatio secundum identitatem
nature. Of both kinds an example taken from Sedulius is given: a)
secundum identitatempersone: 'non quia qui summus pater est, et
filius hie est' (Carm. Pasc . I, 319), explained with the words: non
est eadem utriusque persona, and b) secundum identitatemnature:
'
sed quia quod summuspater est, etfilius hie est' (Carm. Pasc . I, 320),
i.e. eiusdem naturehec estpersona. In the same way the relatioin the
'
'
proposition homo sculpit qui pingi or homo sculpit et idem pingi
can be accepted either ad personam, or ad speciem sive naturam
18Minio-Paluello
1958,pp. 115-8.For thetext,see AppendixC.
19Cf. Minio-Paluello
's Introduction,
pp. XXXIX- XLI, and M. T. BeonioBrocchieriFumagalli,The Logic of Abelard
, Dordrecht1969, esp. pp. 92-3.
7

23:33:30 PM

And as a specimen of the latter kind of

humanitatis indifferenter.
relatio, the author adduces the proposition 'mulier que dampnavit,
salvavi, and he explains: non circa eandempersonam,sed circa noturam
sexus muliebris.. .Eva quippe dampnavit,Maria salvavit.
Next he adds a remark that another example of this kind of relatio
appears in Priscian 'ubi videlicetde "sui" loquitur'. This does not,
however, as Minio-Paluello adds in a note, refer to Priscian XII,
1-3, the introductoryparagraphs to the pronouns, but to Priscian
XVII, 115:
ille sibi donat,Virgiliusse celebra. et pro
'. . . ut 'ille sui miseretur,
quodapud Graecosquidem
compositoGraeco,ut diximus,accipitur,
actumsuumvel in posseset vel in se reflectit
in tribusinvenitur
personis,
sionemsuam. . 20
Here the relative quod litteraliterrefersto compositoGraeco, but
in fact to IfxauTou,
and .
Some lines furtheron in the Sententiethe question ofthe demonstratio
ad naturamis discussed too, with the example taken fromtheBenedictio
fontis.
So we find in the Abailardian writingsthe distinctionin the relatio
and the act of referringinto :
A. the relatio secundum identitatemp ersonae/numeri,and referri
;
personaliteror determinate
naturae or definiB. the relatiosecundumindifferentiamjidentitatem
aliter et confuse. This
tions;, and referrisimpliciterjindif
ferentergener
kind of relatioAbailard calls also the relatioindifferens.
From the above quoted passages it appears that Abailard was
fullyacquainted with the distinctionin the relatio, and that he applied
it in his logical discussions. But he does not supply us with the very
reason for this distinction; he merely makes use of it: a relative
that refers to an antecedent term nominationis or significationis
confusae,causes a relatio indifferensor confusa, and it is on its turn
a relative confusae significationistoo, we must not wonder about
this distinction,forit has its analogy in the identitasrerum. When we,
'
however,examine the frequentlyused example mulieretc' , it appears
that the use of the relatives in this proposition is in disconformity
20Prisciani GrammaticiCaesariensis Institutionum
Libri
Grammaticarum
Latini,II-III), Leipzig
XVIII, ex. rc. M. Hertz,Vol. I-II (= Grammatici
(Italics are mine).
1855-9(anast. repr.Hildesheim1961), Vol. II, p. 16810-3.
8

23:33:30 PM

with the requirementsmade by Priscian in regard with the use of the

relative (pro)nouns in a proposition:
pro aliquo nomineproprioponi et certassig'Propriumest pronominis
.21
nificare
personas'
'Hoc idem,idest 'qui', quotienssubiungitur
nomini,quomodo apud
sed etiamad id
Graecos,necesseest non solumad nomenpraepositum,
subiunctum
alterumverbumproferri,
ut Virumcano, qui veni. si nominativonominativus
ad eandempersonam
verbareferuntur'.22
adiungitur,
The medieval grammarian now had to choose between disavowing
Priscian or the author of the authorative saying, and takinghis refuge
to the figura, i.e. to solve the problem by means of a locutio nonpropia orfigurativa,i.e. a relationon-propria.
Apart fromthe grammarians,the medieval theologians,who were
mostly grammarians too, must have clearly felt the need for this
distinction in the relatio as the examples used for illustratingthe
relatioindifferensby Abailard show.
The distinctionbetween the both kinds of relatio, secundumidentitatempersonaeand secundumidentitatem
naturae, is neithera grammatical
nor a theological one. It was derived fromthe resultsof the reflexions
made in the discussionson the universalia: so it is a philosophicalone ;
it was constructedupon the Abailardian, i.e. anti-realistic,adaptation
of William of Champeaux' indifferemia-theovy
:
'In nullisergohocinuenisuteademsubstantiasit,cumpersonesintdiuerse.
Namubicumquesuntpersoneplures,pluressuntet substantie,
uel ubicumuna tantuminuenitur
et persona; nisiinilia summa
que una estsubstantia,
essentiaque, cumin rerumcreationemirabilisappareat,in sua mirabilior
cogitaturnatura.Et ut omneambiguitatis
genusexeludamus,uides has
duas uoces "unum" scilicetet "idem" duobus accipi modis,secundum
indifferentiam
et secundumidentitatem
eiusdemprorsusessentie.Secundumindifferentiam,
ut Petrumet Paulumidemdicimusessein hoc quod
sunt homines,quantumenim ad humanitatempertinet,sicut iste est
rationaliset ille; et sicut iste est mortaliset ille. Sed si ueritatemconfiteliuolumus,non est eademutriusquehumanitas,sed similis,cum sint
duo homines.Sed hic modusuniusad nturmdiuinitatis
nonest referendus ne, quod fideicontrarium
est, hac acceptionetresDos uel tressubstantiascogamurconfiteli.
Secundumidentitatem
uero,prorsusunum et idem dicimusPetrumet
Simonem,Paulum et Saulum,Iacob et Isral qui, cum singulisingulas
habeantsubstantias,singulinon plus quam singulashabentpersonas'.23
21Priscian,II, 18 = ed. Hertz,I, p. ss13"4.
22Priscian,XVII, 30 = ed. Hertz,II, p. 12712~e.
23Edited
et moraleaux XIIe et XIIIe
by Dom . Lottinin his Psychologie
d'histoire
sicles,tomeV, Problmes
littraire:
L'coled'Anselmede Laon et de
Guillaumede Champeaux,
Gembloux1959,pp. 192-3.
9

23:33:30 PM

So we can observe that an incongruitywith respect to the grammatical rules gradually developed to an institutionalizedincongruity,
so that we may speak of a figura, and got its theoreticalframeby the
interaction of logic and grammar,probably stimulated by questions
asked fromthe part of the theologians.
The interest Abailard pays to this kind of rdatio, arises fromits
usefulness for his logical inquiries. Abailard makes the well-known
distinction between the significatiorerum (nominaiio or appellatici),
the extensional or denotative meaning-functionof a word, and the
significatiointellectuum(the later significatioin a strict sense), the
intensional or connotative meaning-functionof a word.24 Another
distinction Abailard makes in the meaning-functionof the noun,
is based upon the notions discretioand confusio(i.e. discretejdistincte
25
econfuseindiscrete). These distinctions, when in
opp. non-distinct
combination applied to the nouns, result in: i. nomen significationis
confusas 2. nomen nominationis confusae 3. nomen nominationis
discretae.From these only the formertwo are of interestforthe rdatio
indifferens.
Ad. I. Every noun used intensionally is a nomen significationis
confusae. In the inherence theory of predication the predicate term
is always accepted intensionally: connoting the universal nature
that inheresin the subject (a concretum),e.g. the proposition'Socrates
est animal' expresses that the universal nature of animal {= status
animalis or the esse animal) inheres in the subject Socrates.As
24For the distinctionbetweenthe significatio
rerumand the significatio
see L. M. de Rijk,Logica Mod. II, i, p. 194: 'The
intellectuum
Abailard,
by
' is
intellectuum
term1significatio
reserved,
then,forthesignificatio
only,while
rei accordingto the firstpointof view receives
what was called significatio
the name appellatioor nominatio'
; and J. Pinborg,Logik und Semantikim
Mittelalter.
Ein berblick
, Stuttgart1972,pp. 51-2: 'Er (sc. Abailard)nimmt
in derextensionellen
seinenAusgangspunkt
Deutung: AlleWrter- wirsehen
Aushiervon den Syncategoremata
ab, die nur mit den kategorematischen
- sind Namen (durchappellatio,oder
drckenzusammenetwas denotieren
Abaelardssignificatio
in der Terminologie
rerum).Wenn wir aber die BewirSchwierigkeiten
bekommen
rerumreduzieren,
deutungauf die significatio
und mit den Verben,derenBedeutungauf diese
mit den Allgemeinbegriffen
beschriebenwird.Sie konstituieren
Weise nichterschpfend
ja einenInhalt,
inder kein Ding ist. Diese Art der BedeutungnenntAbaelardsignificatio
aus den denotierten
tellectuum.Sie ist eine Abstraktion
Einzeldingen:man
intellectuum
und seinersignificatio
darfalso nichtvon einemAllgemeinbegriff
schliessen'.
aufetwasExtensionelles
25Cf.Beonio1969,p. 93; forthetermsdiscretus
see also De Rijk,
and confusus,
and
Mod.
II,
1,
592.
pp. 590-1
Logica
2e For the inherence
theoryby Abailard,see L. M. de Rijk m his Introduction
10

23:33:30 PM

we have seen 27this propositiondeterminate

says hominemesse animal,
est
animal
est.
Socrates
esse
i.e.
By usingtherelativesillud, quod
quod ipse
referringto animal Abailard gets in conflictwith the requirementsof
the grammarians,since they have to referto a certapersona, so that
'
by application of it in the proposition Socrates est esse animal quod
9
ipse est the indeterminate meaning-functionof animal here would
be restricted. Therefore Abailard takes up the relatio indifferens
in order to make a relatioto a nomensignificationisconfusaewithout
any restrictingforce.
Ad 2. In the 'Introductions parvulorum' Abailard also gets in
conflictwith the restrictiveforcethe relative pronounshave according
to the grammarians.28
In the discussionon themultiplicitas
propositionis
ex relationepronominisAbailard rejects the opinion that any multi'
plicitas in propositionsof the type omnishomodiligitse' can be based
upon a multiplicitaspronominis; there is according to Abailard no
multiplicitasat all: Like omms homo has an indeterminateor nondistinct meaning in the proposition,the relative, since it refersto a
vox confusaesignificationis
, causes a relatioconfusa. It must, however,
be emphasized that homo in the quoted proposition ' omnis homo
*
'
as animal in Socrates
diligitse is not used in the same meaning-function
est animal as clearly appears from the discussion Abailard devotes
to the suggested multiple sense of the proposition 'omnis homocurri
in the Logica 'Ingredientibus
'29 He speaks here of indiscretenominare
to PetrusAbaelardus,Dialctica,2nd ed., Assen 1970, p. XLII: 'Inherence
theory.Accordingto this theorythe copula of an affirmative
proposition
statesthe inherenceof a "universalnature"signified
by the predicateterm,
in the individuumdenotedby the subjectterm'; and Pinborg1972, p. 53:
'Die inhaerentia-Theorie.
Nach dieser wird das Prdikat intensionell
aufInhalt (significatio
gefasst,d.h. es stehtfrseinen(allgemeinen)
per se). Die
copula drcktaus, dass dieserInhalt sich im Subjekt als Formfindet.Das
indemdas Prdikatberalle odereinige
Subjektwirdextensionell
aufgefasst,
oderkeinederDenotatades Subjektesaussagt'.
27See above,p. 5.
PietroAbelardo
ed. M. Dal Pra, Roma/Milano
, Scritti
filosofici,
1954 [19692],
pp. 235 sqq. For thetext,see AppendixD.
29Ed. Geyer,PeterAbaelards,
p. 463: 'Sed dicitur,quod si omnissingula
in voce cui apponiturmultiplicem
colligitquae continentur
propositionem
facit,velutsi hominiappositumcolligatSocratemet ceterosqui continentur
in homine,<tale>est,cumdicitur:'omnishomocurri, si dicatur:'Socrates
currit,Plato curriet sic de ceteris.Sed ad hoc dico,quod non est verum,si
colligitsinguloshomines,quod multiplicempropositionem
faciat, quippe
indiscreteet indifferenter
sic singuloscolligit,ut non distingut,qui sint,
eos nominatnondistinguendo
quia sicut'homo'indiscrete
qui sint,ita 'omnis'
appositumhominiindiscreteeos colligitet hoc solumdicitur,quod quicquid
est homo,est animai (currens?), sed qui sinthomines,non distinguitur'.
II

23:33:30 PM

with regard to the subject term homo, and of indiscretecolligerewith

regardto the universalsign omnis.We have here a noun used extensionally30. And what Abailard calls a noun significationisconfusae in
the Introductionesfiarvulorum,he calls more precisely a noun Habens
'
nominationemconfusamin the Logica Ingredientibus: mulier in the
'
example mulierquae damnavit,ipsa salvavit'31 When Abailard makes
a relatioto a noun nominationisconfusae, he has to take his refugeto
the relatio indifferenstoo, in order to avoid the attributionof a significanodeterminataby the relative.
B. William of Conches

In his Glosulesuper Priscianum William of Conches 32also comments

on Priscian, XVII, 30, the place where Priscian speaks about the
fourways the relative qui and its oblique cases can referto the antecedent.33William proves to be well aware of the conflict Priscians
requirement as to de nominativoad nominativmcauses in respect
'
to propositions of the type as mulier etc He offerstwo solutions:
eitherwe appeal to the well-knowndictum that the Holy Bible is not
submitted to the rules of the grammarians,or we state that here we
have to do with a locutiofigurativa:
'mulierque dapnauit
hoc essefalsumcuminueniatur
[f.98rb]'Sed dicerent
saluaui, tarneneademmulierdapnauitet saluauit.Quibusrespondemus uel quod diuina pagina,ut dominaarcium,nulliarti subiacet,uel
quod illa locutiosit figuratiua.Est enim sensusillius: idem sexus et
dapnauitet saluauit.Et sic hoc nomenmulieribi est nomensexus,non
persone/.34
It is remarkable that William here does not speak about the relatio
Isimplex,since he appears to be acquainted with this kind
indifferens
of relatio, as can be proved by his comment on Priscian, XVII, 115,
where he uses the term relatiogeneralis:
[f.8]'et acce. p. con. gre. Et subdit,idesteaitoi,hocestcompositum
terciepersone.Sed ne aliquisputetquod in sola terciapersonaessetcomEt sic est generalisrelatio'.
positumpronomen.
30See above,p. 10.
31See above,p. 5.
32For the grammarian
Williamof Conches,hisworks,theMSS, and his posisee E. Jeauneau,Deux rtion in the learnedworldof the twelfthcentury,
dactionsdesglosesde Guillaumede Conchessur Priscien,in: RTAM,27 (i960),
pp. 212-47;and De Rijk,LogicaMod. II, i, pp. 221-8.
33See above,p. 9, . 22.
34I quote the Ms Paris, BN lat. 15130',thispartis also printedby Jeauneau
i6o, p. 240.
12

23:33:30 PM

How we have to accept generalisin this context, can be illustratedby

the discussion on the meaning of the pronouns {ad Priscian, XII, 3),
wheregeneralisis used in opposition to firaprius,here the equivalent
:
of discretus
determinatus
'is de quo iamDixi. Exemplumestubirelatiuum
is positum
[ff.8ovb-8ira]
in responsione
facitsecundamcognitionem
de re de qua precessitaltera
illamdictionem
ad quam refertur.
Sed queriturcumdicamus
cognicio
'homo per idem
an idemfaciat[fiatMS] ibi [inMS] secunambulai,
mouetur',
dam cognitionem
de re de qua precessitcognitioper hoc nomenhomo
.
Nam nonpossumusdicerequod idemibi facitcognicionem
de resignificata
de re nominata
perhoc nomen,cumilludnichilnisispeciemsignificete
per ipsum,com illud nichilnomintnisi singuloshomines;et de nullo
hominumibi fitsecundacognitio.Ad quod dicimusquod de rebusdiuerse
fiuntcognitiones,
scilicetalie generales,alie proprie,alie substantiales,
alie accidentales.Cum igiturdicimus'homoambula, generlemfacimus
de eo cognitionem
et id quod homo est res illa de qua sermoest. Cum
uero dicimus'idemmouetur'
, de eadem facimuspropriamcognitionem,
idest quod ille idem homo qui ambulat,mouetur.Et sie [f.81ra] fit
secundacognitioet propriade eadem re de qua precessitgeneraliscognicio. Vel dicamussieud se prius,ut exposuimus,quod omnespersone
uerborumnotabilessunt et certe,quod nemo debet dicerequi proprie
uelit loqui 'homoambula, nisi pro aliquo hominumdiffinite
hoc dicat.
Et tuncfacitprimamcognitionem
perhoc nomenhomode aliquohominum
et propriam.Et cum postea subdit'idemmouetur'
, facitper hoc nomen
idempropriamet secundamcognitionem
de eodemhomine.'.
As appears from this comment, William does not generally like
to accept a sort of relatio simplex as belonging to the common and
grammatical way of speech. This fact can be illustrated, too, by his
commenton Priscian, XII, i :
refertur
ad appellatiuum
[f.76vb]'Dicimusenimquod etiamubi:pronomen
nomen,ibi poniturpro proprionomine,idest in significatione
proprii
idestad significandum
Nam si
nominis,
aliquamindiuiduamsubstantiam.
dicatur'homoambulat,idemmouetur'
, istud pronomenidemponiturad
substantiam.
enimperhoc pronomen
significandum
propriam
Intelligimus
idemquod illeidemhomoqui ambulat,mouetur.Si dicaturquod nescimus
de quo sit sermo,dicimusquia uerumest; sed ille qui
perilludpronomen
forsitanseit pro quo profrt'homoambulatet de eodemuerum
profert,
estquodmouetur'
. Et siue sciatursiue nesciaturde quo hominesit sermo,
tarnensciturper pronomenidemquod ille qui ambulat,mouetur;quod
si nomenrepeteretur.
Nam tunc propositiones
nesciretur,
possuntesse
uereuel falsepro diuersis,ut si diceretur'homoambulat,homomouetur'
.
Sed cum pronomenrelatiuumibi ponitur,pro eodemuere sunt semper
ambepropositiones
uel false,ut cumdicitur'homoambulat,
idemmouetur'
,
ad ea<n>dempersonamreferendus
est actusuterque'.
C. The Gloss 'Licet Multi In Arte'
The Ms Oxford
, Bodl. Canon. mise. 281 contains on ff.ir - 83v a gloss
on the Priscian minor: 35
35For the
of thisMs, see L. M. de Rijk, SomeThirteenth
description
Century
13

23:33:30 PM

Inc. prol.: Licet multiin artegramaticaprecipuiconstructionum

expositionemuobis( !) reliquerint
in suistarnenexpositionibus
minusdiligentes
...
Inc. glos.: Priscianusigiturde arte gramaticase tractaturum
proponens
cumtriasintipsiusmateria. . .
Des.: . . . non,inquam,ita dicitur'egolegohomo',sed quotquothabeat
debentprecedere
uerbum.
nominatiuos,
In the same hand some notes on the interpunctionand on metrical
questions are added. A differenthand wrote on ff. 84v - 8yY a tract
on logic.36As to the datation and localisation of the gloss there is no
external criteriumextant,37but some of the views expressed in the
gloss stand in close affinitywith those of William of Conches, e.g,
the explanation on the terms transitivasand intransitivas, sc. with
io transitivaand intransitiva,by means of the
regard to the construct
terms corporeusand incorporeus
,38the discussion on the meaning of
the nouns39 and the view that the participle of the present tense
Tractson theGameof Obligation
, in: Vivarium,XIII (1975),pp. 22-54,esp.
pp. 22-3.
36Editedby De Rijk 1975,pp. 26-54.
37Thereare someslightindications,
apart of the doctnnaryone: the use of
the e - caudatain stead of the usual e in someplaces (Ms: s. XII) ; dealing
'
withthesoloecism,
theglossator
givestheinstance:'utmodofaciuntNormanni;
in examples.
theuse ofthenameofChartres
38Ms f. 2r: 'Et nota quosdamterciummembrumconstructionum
signare,
sed partimhoc
uidelicetmixtam,idest nec transitiuamnec intransitiuam,
'
' Dicunt enimrationemnon
partimillud, ut Socratesalbus uidetPlatonem
esse, unde potiusiudiceturintransitiua
quam transitiuauel econuerso,cum
habeat partes intransitiue
iunctas,ut Socrateset albus, et alias transitiue
iunctas,ut uidetet Platonem.Hoc autem dicuntistiusnominisintransitiua
sit ex hoc nominetransitiuum,
uimpenitusignorantes,
cum enimcompositum
et in priuatoriapartcula.
quod datumest per positionemsue significationis,
Sicut diciturcorporeumaliquid habens corporei,incorporeumnichil,ita
intransitiuum
nichil'.For the view
transitiuum
aliquid habens transitionis,
'Sed dicentconheld by William,see Ms Paris, BN lat. 15130, f. 85rb_va:
cumuerboet obliquoin diuersispersonis
structionem
que habetnominatiuum
ut 'SocratesdiligitPlatonem'.
necintranssitiuam,
nec tantumesse transsitiuam
duas
dictiones
habet
omnis
dicimus
[f.85va] transsitiue
Quibus
quod
que
coniunctashabeat,transsitiuaest. Item
coniunctas,etsi multasintranssitiua
diciturtranssitiuaquam
dicunt: Quare pocius propterpartemtranssitiuam
? Contraquod dicimusquod hoc nomen
intranssitiua
propterintranssitiuam
intranssitiua
priuatiuumest, hoc nomentranssitiuanon. Est autem priuaest de quo nichil
tiuorumnaturatotumcontrarium
negare,ut incorporeum
ut quando dico 'istud
non priuantcontrarium,
est corpus.Sed non-priuatiua
non nego.Potestenim
estcorporeum',
aliquam eius partemesse incorporeum
ut homo. Sic igitur
aliquid esse corporeumet partemhabereincorpoream,
nichil
haberenon potest,sed transsitiuam
intranssitiua
partemtranssitiuam
habereintranssitiuam'.
prohibet
39Ms f. i9r"v: 'Sed nota: Cum nomen signifcetsubstantiam,non tamen
omnenomen.Quedamenimsignificant
qualitatem,ut albedo,quedam aliud.
14

23:33:30 PM

cannot be construed with a verb of the future tense,40so that I

surmise that the gloss belongs to the intellectual area of Chartres
and Paris of the middle of the twelfthcentury.
In the same way as William of Conches the glossator comments
on Priscian, XVII, 30, too. To the objection made against Priscian's
'
, he answers that
requirementillustrated by the example mulier etc.1
the relative here is used non proprie (i.e. figurate), or that the Holy
Bible is not submittedto the rules of Priscian:
'
[f.I4r] 'Sed si opponaturde ista constructionemulierque saluauit,
non
est
dicendum
quia proprie
poniturqui ibi uel diuina
dampnaui,
paginanonsubiacetregulisPrisciani.'.
Priscian, XVII, 115 is also commented on by the glossator in nearly
the same way as William does, but he speaks of relatio simplex in
stead of generalis:
, non
[f.47r] 'Et nota illud simplicemrelationemfaceread compositum
ad eaitoy.Aliterenimesset falsum.Compositum
enimhabentin tribus
personis,eaitoyin sola terciahabent.Sed quia auctor dicturusest in
sequentibuscompositaprimeet secundepersonecarerepluraliet pluralia
eaitoyloco eorumsuccedere,ideo illud quod ad eaitoyhoc modo potest
referri.'.
D. Thierryof Chartres
The example 'mulieretc also occurs twice in the writingsof Thierry
of Chartres:
. . . Item. Nota quedam nominafuisseinuentaad quedam significanda
et ad
alia appellandauel nominanda,quedamad eademsignificanda
et appellanda.
Omna enimappellatiuaaliud significant
et aliud appellant,nommant.Significantenimremillam de qua per se prolataintellectum
et ideo
constituunt,
nullamrem discretamsignificant.
Ipsa enim per se prolata nichildiscrete
faciuntintelligi.Res autem dicunt<ur>appellare,quia eis conueniuntper
Verbi gratia.Cum aliquis proferthanc uocemhomo,nullum
appellationem.
hominem
facitintelligi,
sed remquandamessecommunem
omnibushominibus,
idesthominem;et ideo remillamsignificat.
Singulosautemhominesappellat.
Sed hoc nomenSocrates[f.igv] idem[ideoMs] significat
et appellat,et omnia
. For William's
proprianominanichilenimaliud significant
quam appellant'
view,see De Rijk,LogicaMod. II, 1, pp. 223-4.
40Ms f. 56v: 'sciendum tamen. Licet
participiaet infinitiuapredictasint
presents
temporiset preteriti
inperfecti,
possunttamenconstruicumpreterito
et plusquamperfecto
in significatione
idestsigniperfecto
preteritiinperfecti,
ficandoinceptionemrei et non perfectionem.
Cum enim dicitur'scribens
non fitibi hic intellectus,
ut quidamputant:scripsiet profeci.Tunc
profeci',
enimhaberetscribenssensumpreteriti
perfectiquem nunquamhabet. Hune
autemintellectumconstituit:scribebam,profeci.Et nota quod si iungatur
cum preteritoplusquamperfecto,
eundemsensum.Similiterin sensutantum
preteriti
inperfecti
iungiturinfinitiuus
[infinitiuis
Ms] eis. Cum futuroautem
15

23:33:30 PM

1. In the Lectiones in Boethii librum De Trinitate (written after

41
1148) at the lemma sed hec predicamenta Thierrydeals with the
'
diversityin predication of the predicamenta:secundumrem, e.g. homo
'
est iustus', and extra remte.g. Socrates est in foro'42 Explaining the
formerkind of predication, Thierry argues that in the proposition
'homo est iustus', iustus is predicated secundum rem from man, for
id de quo agitur, i.e. homo,is id quod de eo predicatur,i.e. iustus. He
ends the discussion with a remarkon what he calls the genus locutionis
'
here used: est id quod de eo firedicatur'.This way of speech is not a
correctone, but is used moredocentis,as in propositionsof the type
'
'homo est animal quod est genus', Socrates est homo qui est species'.
In these propositions the relative qui/quae/quodis equivalent to the
'
conjunction et, as is also the case in the example mulierque salvavit,
dampnavi, i.e. et mulier salvavit et dampnavit. So' the proposition
'
Socrates est homo qui est species' is equivalent to Socrates est homo
et est species', since 'qui pro et'. For a furtherdiscussion of this kind
of propositions Thierry refersto his logical activities: 'Sed in logica
de hoc satis diximus43
2. As Hring indicates in a note on the above mentioneddiscussion
in the Lectiones the same question recurs in Thierry's Glosa super
Boethii librum De Trinitate To the proposition 'alter est homo ex
eo quod homo, alteriustus ex eo quod iustus quod est qualitas',*5Thierry
'
adds the remark that such relatives, i.e. quod in the clause iustus
in sensupreteriti
nonpossuntconiungi,
imperquia nec in sensupresents,
alter istorumsensuumnecessario
fecta Si enim diceretur'legensproficiam',
uel dumlegebam,proficiam;
ibi esset:aut <dum>lego,proficiam,
quod totum
eri (Hab.
'ueniensuenie,'audienssapientior
nichilesset.Si tarneninueniatur
2, 3; Prov.i, 5), dicendumest ea nominaesseet nonparticipia'.For William's
view,whollyin accordancewiththe one expressedhere,and the reactionof
see R. W. Hunt, Studieson Priscianin theTwelfth
the later grammarians,
CenturyII, The Schoolof Ralph ofBeauvais,in: Mediaevaland Renaissance
Studies,II (1950), pp. 1-56,esp. pp. 42-3; and Jeauneaui960, pp. 229-30.
41Commentaries
and His School,ed. N. M.
on Boethiusby ThierryofChartres
of the Lectiones
for
the
datation
Toronto
, see
123-229;
1971,
pp.
Hring,
before1148.
p. 23: 'Hence theGlosawas hardlywritten
Hring'sIntroduction,
.
Lectiones
The sameconsiderations
applyto Thierry's
42Hring1971, pp. 200-1; the lemmais fromBoethius,De trinitate,
IV, 43
Ma. 1962,p. i82e). For the text, see
(ed. E. . Rand, London/Cambridge
AppendixE.
43See forthe questionof Thierry'slogica (or Logica), Karin M. Fredborg,
on Cicero'sDe Inventione
The Commentary
, in: Cahiers
of Thierryof Chartres
de l'Institutdu Moyen-gegrec et latin,7 (1971)PP- *-34>esP- P- 344Edited by Hring1971,pp. 257-300.
45Hring1971,p. 290. For thetext,see AppendixE.
16

23:33:30 PM

quod est qualitas', are here used improprie, so that they make a relatio
simplex. For, he continues,if they were used proprie, both verbs had
to referto the same suppositum,which would make the proposition
false. Thierry illustrates this problem with an example also given
'
in the Lectiones: Socrates est homo qui est species' This proposition
would mean, if the relative qui were used here proprie, that Socrates
is man as well as species: Quod falsum est!
E. John of Salisbury
When John of Salisbury in the 20th chapter of the second book of
his Metalogicon46 states that an universale according to his view is
quod mens communiterintelligit. . . quod vox communitersignificai, he
immediatelypoints at the problem this definitioncauses with respect
to the rules of the ars grammatica,since according to this ars the
meaning of the relatives may not be vague, but has always to be
restrictedfrom an infiniteto a definite meaning by a determinatio
personae aut actus aut alterius actionis. Whenever there is not any
certain or definitebase for the relatio, there cannot be a relatio, at
least not without a vitiumor a figura. So in the case of relative clauses
of the type quod promittitur,quod significatur
, quod intelligiturthe
of
the
act
the
verb
must
be
object
expressed by
somethingdiscretum,
at least in order to constitute a propria relatio. In opposition to this
kind of relatio, John sets the relatio in genere,in which no definite
thingis at the basis of the relatioand in which the relativeshave not a
determinate signification,if we want to save the true sense of the
proposition. He gives three examples of this kind of relatioin genere:
'
mulierque salvavit,damnavi ;
'
lignumquod mortis,et vitecausam dedi ;
.47
'quas Boreas aufert,revehitmitis Z ephirusfrondes*
The relativesin these propositionsdo not, accordingto John,referto
, but theyremainin genere.And at the
aliquid diffinitum
quod discernant
same way the relatives in the above mentioned clauses about the
universaliahave to be accepted: They do not referto anythingdefinite,
but remain also in genere.
46Ioannis Saresberiensis
Episcopi CarnotensisMetalogiconLibri IUI, rec.
. . I. Webb,Oxford1929,PP-97~n6, esp. pp. 101-5.For thetext,see AppendixF.
47Bothius,Cons.I. M. 5. 20.
17

23:33:30 PM

Next John explains his view on the universalia with a discussion

centered around the example 'quod significaturhoc nomine 'homo',
species est'. He underlines it with the statement that if one attends
the relatio simplex que fit in genere,18there are no troubles with the
foregoingpropositions; but if one looks for Userdio, it would not become clear what is meant as discrete,i.e. in the case of a relatiopropria.
Like Abailard, John also deals in this context with the proposition
'omnis homo diligit se'. First he states that every demonstrativeand
relative word is used either non satis proprie (simplexrelatioque fit in
genere) or refersto a definiteobject: 'aut certoet sua ratione definito
innititursubiecto'{relatiopropria) ; otherwisethey are deprivedof their
very function. There is, however, also an abuse of the relatio: ex
causa commoditatisin the proposition 'omnis homo diligit se'. John
calls it a relatiolicentiosa,49
The two grammatical texts show that the grammariansof the first
part of the twelfth century were aware of the problems that rose
around propositionsof the type 'mulier etc.'. They solved them with
the help of a figura,but they did not use in this case the relatiosimplex!
generalis. In fact they refused to speak about this distinctionin the
paragraphs devoted to the relatio and the relatives, and even more:
William of Conches expressly refused to accept a significatioconfusa
or generalis of the (relative) pronouns, a requirementfor the relatio
simplex. It must also be noted that Peter Helias in no part of his
Summa mentioned the relatiosimplex. On the other hand, they knew
this notion well and used it in their comment on Priscian, XVII, 115,
to which the Master of the Sententiealso referred.Quite in opposition
to the attitude of the grammarians is that of the logicians: Thierry
and Johnmade in a ratherextensiveway use ofit. The real application
of it in the writingsof Thierry remains somewhat obscure, since we
have only two referencesout of his theological works at our disposal,
48McGarry'stranslationin The Metalogicon
, Berkeley
of Johnof Salisbury
and Los Angeles1955, must be correctedon this point.McGarryfailedto
see the technicalmeaningof relatiosimplex
, quefit in genere
, and translated
'Plane si relationemsimplicem,que fit in genere,quis attendat. . with
etc It is,however,
ifonelooksonlyfora simplegeneralrelationship
'Evidently,
but of the relatiosimplex
not a questionof a generalrelationship,
,
definitely
i.e. the relatioquefitin genere
, the same as Johnsomelinesbeforecalledthe
relatioin genere.
49So Johnspeaksofthreekindsofrelatio
: 1) therelatiopropria; 2) therelatio
= figura; 3) the relatio
, but non-vitiosa
simplex,in fact a relatioimpropria
licentiosa.
18

23:33:30 PM

but according to his own words he dealt with propositionsof the type
in which the relatio simplex occurs, in his logical writings.50And in
John's discussion on the universais the relatiosimplexappears to be a
usefultool in order to explain his view.
When we summarize the firststage of development of the relatio
simplex, we firstare confrontedwith Priscian's two requirementswith
respect to the meaning of the pronouns and the use of the relative
noun qui in proposition,that musthave caused problemsin connection
withsome authoritativesayings. In developing the theory of meaning
of the universal nouns the logicians were confrontedwith the same
problems: As trained grammariansthey solved it with the application
of a logical distinction: the second component of the term relatio
indiff er ens /gener alis /simplex is a logical notion. Especially the
logicians developed this distinction further and made a frequent
use of it in their discussions, without, however, to forgetits grammatical origin.
This attention from the part of the logicians is maybe the reason
why the grammariansshowed less interestin it: They explained this
way of speech by means of a figura] thisfigura did not belong to the
traditional corpus of the figurae: It was part of the mos docentisof
the logicians.
Utrecht
InstituutvoorLaat Latijn
AppendixA
PeterAbaelardsPhilosophische
ed. . Geyer,Beitrgezur GeSchriften,
schichte
derPhilosophie
undTheologiedesMittelalters,
i. W.,
XXI, 1-3,Mnster
1919-27.
'
, pp. 396-7:
Logica Ingredientibus'
, cum dicitur de omnibusveris affirmationibus,
Quaeritur
quod dicunt
aliquidesse aliquid quod ipsumest, utrum,aliquid esse aliquid,quod ipsum
est', sit in vi nominisvel orationis.Et fortassedicitur,quod in vi nominis
omniumdictorum
aifirmati
varumcategoricarum,
propositionum
quod nonest,
iam noneri impersonaliter
positum,quo ut nomenaccipitur ulla significatiopartiumattendetur illud tempushabebuntad quod referantur,
ullam coniunctionem
attendimusaffirmationis
in verbishuiusmodi,per
fat,quia non est omninoin vi orationis
quae doctrinasensusaffirmationis
est ,aliquid esse aliquid quod ipsumest'
accepta.Unde potiusconcedendum
in vi orationisaccipi et ,aliquid' ubicumqueponitur,nomenest omniumtam
exsistentium
sicutet quando dicituraliquid esse id
quam non exsistentium,
50See above,p. 16.
19

23:33:30 PM

quod non est, ut ,chimaeraest homo' vel ,chimaeraest chimaera'vel cum

oratio,,aliquid
potesthaec impersonalis
,aliqui nomencommunefitomnium,
se haberead omnessensuscateesse aliquid <quod> ipsumest' generaliter
quae personalibusterminisconstant,ut
goricarumverarumaffirmationum,
contineataliquid esse aliquid, sicut et
huius quoque sensus propositionis
istarum:,homoest animal'vel ,margaritaest lapis'. Ex quo apparetquod et
esse animal,
,homoest animal'et ,Socratesest animal'utraquedicithominem
dicat hominemesse animal,alteradeterminate
cum tamenalterasimpliciter
proponathominemhune esse animal.Propositioitaque dicenshominemesse
id dicitquod homoest animai,alia quod Socratesest
animalalia simpliciter
animalvel Plato,et sic de aliis.
Attendeetiam,quod cum ,Socratesest animal' dicat Socratemesse illud
ponitur,ac si dicatur:quae res ipse
quod ipse est, ,illudquod est' neutraliter
ita quod ex Socratequod subiectumest,
refertur
est, ad animal simpliciter
determinatam
nullamsignificationem
accipit,sicut et cum dicitur:,permulieremintravitmors,per eandemvita' vel ,mulierquae damnavit,ipsa salnon personaliter,
si dicatur:
vavit' indifferenter
pronominareferimus,
ut
mulierdamnavitet eadem,id est,res eius sexussalvavit,scilicetsimiliter,
videliceteadem secundumindifferentiam
sexus, non secundumidentitatem
habentsicut
relationem
personaedicatur.Nec sola pronominaindifferentem
habet confusamnominationem,
et nomen appellativumad quod refertur,
verumet demonstrativa
confusam,
quae nullopraemissoindigent,
pronomina
non personalemsignificationem
habent,veluticum sacerdosaquam positam
benedicensait: ,qui pedibussuperte ambulavit,qui te in aquam convertit',61
id est ,tui similem'ut non de identittepersonae,sed de natura elementi
Non hanc enimpersonaliter
dictumintelligatur.
aquam, dicimus,calcavitvel
mutavit,sed elementmeiusdem.Sicut ergo demonstrativis
pronominibus
et discreteutimur,sed generaliteret confuse,
quandoque non personaliter
veluticum
sic etiamrelativis,cum ad nomenconfusaesignificationis
refertur,
dicimus:quod Socratesest animai,dicit: Socratesest esse aliquid quod ipse
est,id est esse animal,quod, scilicetanimal,ipse est, quod tantumvalet
si dicatur:diciteumesseanimalet ipse est animal.
Et attendequod illudsuppositum
,quodipse est' ad sensumhuius,Socrates
est animal' non pertinet,sed quaedam est determinatio
praedicati,velutisi
dicatur:quod Socratesest animal,dicit eum hominemesse animal qui est
est subiectinec in sensumpropositionis
determinatio
venit,cum
philosophus,
nil de philosophiasignificetur.
in propositione
Appendix
Petri AbaelardiOpera Theologica,ed. E. M. Buytaert,Turnholti,1969*
Mediaeualis,XII.
, Continuatio
CorpusChristianorum
, III, 144 [pp. 249-50]:
TheologiaChristiana
supra positas
144. Et secundumhas quidemtantumduas significationes
relatiuesupponisolet hoc pronomenquod est 'idem',hoc est aut secundum
Cumenimdicimus
definitionis.
identitatem
numeri,aut secundumidentitatem
'mulierdamnauitmundumet eademsaluauit',duo suntsensus,unus quidem
numerifiat relatio,ut uideliceteadem personaliter
falsus,si ad identitatem
et damnasseet saluasse; alius sensusuerus,si
numeromulierintelligatur
definitionis
ad identitatem
signisupponaturidem,ut uidelicettantummodo
61Benedict
io fontisin S abbaiosaneio.
20

23:33:30 PM

ita repetitum:'mulierdamnaui
fietquantumnomenmulierissimpliciter,
et 'muliersaluaui, quod quidemuerumest propterEuam et Mariam.'.
Appendix
L. MinioPaluello,Twelfth
Century
Logic.Textsand StudiesII. Abaelardiana
inedita
, Roma, 1958.
Sententie
secundum
M. Petrm,XVI-XXX [pp. 115-9]:
[XVI] Cum dicitursenariusperficiex quaternarioet dimidietateeius,
istud'eius*ad hocnomen'quaternarium'
duobusmodisreferri
potestsecundum
vim verborum,hoc est vel secundumpersonamvel secundumspeciemsive
naturamquaternarii.Duobus quippe dictio relativa ad premissarefertur:
modo quidem personaliteret quasi discrete(secundumscilicetidentitatem
simpliciter
secundumidentitatem
nature,id
persone),modo indifferenter
est convenientievel similitudinis
rerumiuxta causam inpositionispremissi
nominis.[XVII] NaturamquippeBoetius52dicit"similitudinem
rerumnascentium",ac si apertedicat easdemres esse uniusnatureque operationenature
similessunt ad invicem.Unde hoc nomenquod est 'homo' naturedicimus,
communeestnaturaliter
multisrebussecundum
quod ex una ipsiusinpositione
hoc quod invicemsibi naturaliter
suntsimiles(in eo scilicetquod unaqueque
eorumsit animalrationalemortale)
; hoc veronomen'Socrates'personepotius
dicimusquam nature,quia per ipsumdiscretiopersonemonstratur,
non convenientiamultarum
rerumquibusdatumsit secundumsimilitudinem
alicuius
nature.[XVIII] Et hanc interrogationem
"quid est homo?" naturedicimus,
istam "quis est iste?" vel "que est ista?" dicimusesse persone;unde, ad
illud,vocabulumnatureseusimilitudinis
respondemus
(quodvidelicetmultorum
communeest secundumhoc quod sibi invicemmultasimiliasunt),ut 'homo',
'animal'; ad istud vero,vocabulumpersoneseu discretionis
(quod videlicet
unam rem determinate
ac discretesignificai),ut 'Petrus','Marcha'. [XIX]
Sicutergoidentitatem
rerumduobusmodisaccipimus,uno quidemsecundum
personam(ut 'idemest Marcusquod Tullius'),alio modosecundumnaturam
sive speciemseu quacumquesimilitudine
(ut 'idem est Petrusquod Marcus',
utpotehomovel animalsicut et ille), ita relatioque sempersecundum<res>
fit,duobusmodisaccipiturscilicetsecundumidentitatem
personevel nature.
[XX] Circaidentitatem
quidempersonerelatiofitnegativeapud Sedulium
ibi: "non quia qui summuspaterest,et filiushic est" 53(ac si apertediceret
"non est eademutriusquepersona");affirmative
autemcircanaturamrelatio
fitapud eundemubi statinisubditur:"sed quia quod summuspaterest, et
filiushic est" 54(ac si diceret"eiusdemnaturehec est personaet ilia", hoc
est "similissive indifferens
in natura divinesubstantie").Ibi itaque 'qui'
relativumnomensecundumeandem personamrelativeponitur,hic 'quod'
secundumnaturamrelativesupponitur.[XXI] Sed et cum dicimus"homo
sculpitqui pingit"vel "homosculpitet idempingit"potestrelatioaccipivel
ad eandempersonam(ut videlicetidem personaliter
homo utrumquefaciat)
vel ad speciemsive naturamhumanitatisindifferenter
(id est simpliciter
62Minio-Paluello1958, 115: 'boethius, In
p.
Categ.I, P.L. 64, 166a "ratio
similitudo
nascentium".
(notin thesenseof'definition')
naturae,ipsa nimirum
Cf.Abailard'sGlosaein Porph. (57. 29-30Geyer)and in Perierm.(315.21-22).'.
53C. Sedulius,Carmen
paschale,I, 319.
54Ibid.,I, 320.
21

23:33:30 PM

secundumintelligentiam
, ac si iterumipsumnomenquod
premissinominis)
et discerneretur
"homosculpit","homo pingit" (quod
est 'homo' repeteretur
etiam pro diversispersoniscontingereposset). [XXII] Nam cum dicimus
"nullumsimileest iudcui est simile",si vera sit enuntiatio,
accipiendaest
secundumidentitatem
relatiotantummodo
persone,ut videlicetnulla res sit
ea personaliter
cui similissit. Ut, cum Socratessit similishomini(verbigratia
quod nonsit homo,sed tantum
Platoni),nontarnenideo verumest simpliciter
quod non sit ille homocui est similis.[XXIII] Similiteret, cum dicimus"si
aliquod totumest, quelibetpars illius totiusest" vel "eiusdemtotius",ad
personamfaciendaest relatio.Quippe,cum omnisdomustotumsit,et paries
sit parsdomus,nontarnenverumest quod, si domusest,quelibetparsdomus
est; alioquinsequereturquod, si hec domusest, quelibetpars illiusalterius
domusest (hocscilicetperregulamostendipotestquod,si domusest,quelibet
Nec hoc similiter
verum
parsilliusdomusest que est,non domussimpliciter).
est quod,si hec domusest,hic pariesest (licethie pariesparssit domus); sed,
si domusest, parieseiusdemdomus <est> que est (omnisquippe domusex
aliquo parieteconstat,sed nonomnisex hoc). [XXIV] Cumverodicimushoc
"mulierque dampnavitsalvavit", non circa eandem personamsed circa
nturm sexus muliebris<
> (scilicet salvavit): Eva quippe
huiusmodi
dampnavit,Maria salvavit. Priscianus56 quoque constructionum
relationemnon ad personamfacit,ubi videlicetde 'sui' loquitur.Sed etc.
[XXV] Huiusmodiregula "quotiens aliqua res speciei non est aliquid,
conaliqua res generisnon est illud <idem>" huiusmodiargumentationem
firmemus:
"quidamhomononestalbus,ergoquoddamanimalnonest album".
si per "illud idem" relatiosecundumidenti[XXVI] Non valet confirmatio
tatempersonefiat,ac si dicamus"quoddamanimalnon est illudidemanimal
quod homoest". Nempehoc nonpossetostendi,quod quoddamanimalomnino
cumin ista argunon est album,sicuthabebatconclusio.[XXVII] Similiter,
"Socratesest homo" enuntiare"Somentationedicimushanc enuntiationem
cratemesse id quod ipse est", istud 'id' non secundumpersonamdiscrete
tam secundumnturmquam secundumpersed indifferenter
proferimus,
sonam illud accipimus.Non enim propositioproponitSocratemesse illam
iliumhumanamnturmhabere,hoc
personamque ipse est, sed enuntiamus
esthominemesse,sicutet cumdicimus"Socratesesthomoet Plato estidem".
At veroetc.
66 hanc regulam"si quid fit aliquid, non est illud
[XXVIII] Aristoteles
hoc
ad
inducit
probandumquod, si homo fitpulcher,et non est
quod fit"
secundum
persone(nonsimpliciter
pulcher.Si relatiofitsecundumidentitatem
cuiuscumquepremissinominis)non potestex regulaexigentia
intelligentiam
ostendiproposita,"si fitpulchernon est ille pulchercumipse fit".
[XXIX] Non solum relatiovocis ad naturamfit quandoque,verumet
cumin benedictione
demonstratio,
aque dicitur"qui te de lateresuo produxit"
vel "superte ambulavit"vel "in te baptizatusest".
vel "in vinumconvertit"
Hic quippe non ad personampresentsaque sed ad speciemsive naturam
loquitur, si ita diceret:"qui te produxit,
aquatici elementiindifferenter
similiter
hoc esteiusdemnatureelementm,
aqua sitsicutet tu".
quodvidelicet
demonstratio
modo ad personam
relatio
tam
Cum
quam
itaque
[XXX]
facile est solvere
proprie,modo ad naturamquodammodoaccommodetur,
de eo quod dicitur"senariusperficiex quaternario
quod superbisopponebatur
56Priscianus,Inst.gram.XVII, 115.
56Minio-Paluello1958,p. 118: 'Cf.Aristoteles, De int. 7 (17* 33"34: 7- 2930)/.
22

23:33:30 PM

et dimidietate
eius"; ita scilicetut hoc ad nomen'quaternarii'nonpersonaliter
ac si videlicetipsumnomeniterum
sive indifferenter
sed simpliciter
referatur,
"ex quaternario
et dimidietate
et diceretur
quaternarii(cuiuscumrepeteretur
et binarioaliquo quocumque".
hoc est ex quaternario
que scilicetquaternarii),
AppendixD
PietroAbelardo
, ed. M. Dal Pra,Roma/Milano,
, Scritti
1954 [19692].
Filosofici
SuperTopicaglossae,p. 235 sqq. :
sententiaquam
[p. 2352*sqq.] Nobis tarnennon placethaec multiplicitatis
volunt.Sive enimsimpliciter
relationepronominis
dicam: omnis
contingere
homodiligit,sive apponamse, nulla est pronominis
Qui enim
multiplicitas.
putatperomnishomodiligitse denominanquod et Plato se diligatet Socrates
se diligatet ita de singulis,fallitur.Cum etenimomnishomodiciturindeterfit, distinguitur
minate,non distinctehominumsignificatio
personaliter
qui sint.Unde et cum supponiturse confusaeest relationis,sicut praemissa
vox confusaeest significationis
ad quam refertur.
Nec distinguuntur
homines
sed generaliter
diciturquod se unusquisquediligit,
personaliter
qui se diligunt,
quisqusille sit. Cum vero dicitur:Socratesse diligitet similiterPlato et ita
de singulis,
verumetiamqui illi sintdeternon solumde omnibusostenditur,
esse volumusetiam illam quae ait:
minatur.Unde nullo modo multiplicem
Omnishomodiligitse ... [p. 2374sqq.] Similiterres per se existensquando
universalitatis
vel particularitatis
signa suscipitad unumsensumsicut universalemvocem oportetaccomodari,ut huiusmodioratio eque praedicata
faciatenuntiationem.
Sed opponitquod ut dicitur
equesubjectamultiplicem
Socratesestres per se existenset Plato estresper se existens,
oportetsensum
orationispraedicataevariari secundumrelationempronominisfactam ad
hicad Platonemdeterminate
diversasubiecta;ibi quippead Socratem,
refertur
nonita esse; immomagisilludse referendum
Ad quod respondemus
pronomen.
in diffinitione
est ad hoc nomenquod est res,praemissum
praedicata,veluti
si dicam: Socratesestanimaidiligensse et Platoestanimaidiligensse ad animai
illudse et ita idemestpraedicatum
nonad subjectaanimalisrefertur
simpliciter
'
in utraqueenuntiatione
;.
AppendixE
on Boethiusby ThierryofChartres
and his School,ed. N. M.
Commentaries
Hring,Toronto,1971.
I. Lectiones
in BoethiilibrumDe Trinitate
IV, pp. 200-1:
a et cetera.Hue usque de predicamentis
43 sed predicament
agens
notauituim predicamentorum
secundumsubiecta: quod scilicettalia sunt
Hie ostendituim predicationis
predicamentaqualia subiecta permiserint.
eorum:scilicetdiuersitatem
predicationis.
Predicamentorum
seeundumrem,alia ueroextra:
namquealia predicantur
scilicetnon secundumrem.Secundumrempredicaturaliquid de aliquo cum
id de quo agiturest id quod de eo predicaturuelut cum dicitur:homo est
Id enimde quo agituri.e.
iustus,iustussecundumremde hominepredicatur.
homoest id quod de eo predicatur:scilicetest iustus.Iustus enimde homine
predicate. Et nota genuslocutionis:est id quod de eo predicatur.
Moredocentisloquiturquod uerbisaliisutiturin doctrinis,
aliis in disputacionibus.Et est hec loquutiotalis qualis est hec: homoest animalquod est
23

23:33:30 PM

genus,Socratesest homoqui est species.Et relatiuum[f.44] ualet "et" ut

mulierque saluauitdampnauiti.e. et muliersaluauitet dampnauit.57
Et in
eodemmodo.Socratesest homoqui est species,Socrates
predictislocutionibus
est homoet est species: qui proet.
44 Et suntconcedendeomnesiste locutiones:Socratesest homoet eadem
resest species:homoest animalet eademresest genus.Sed nonest concedendum: Socratesesthec reshomoque est species: homoest hecres animalquod
est genus.Sed in logicade hoc satisdiximus.
dicimusilludidemdicimusde hac:
Quod autemde huiusmodilocutionibus
id de quo agiturest id quod de eo predicatur.Sicut de Socrateagiturin hac
: Socratesest homoet Socratesest id quod de eo predicatur
propositione
quia
est homoet homode Socratepredicatur.Ita intelligendum
est. Et de consimilibuseo modointellige.
il. Glosasuper oethiilibrumDe Trinitate
IV, p. 290:
27 Homo uero aliis debet ut anime et corporiid ipsumquod est. Nec
est ipsa que uel sibi substantialiasunt uel accidentaliaquia alter est homo
ex eo quod homo,alter iustus ex eo quod iustus quod est qualitas.
Huiusmodirelatiua ut uere dicanturimproprieponunturut simplicem
faciantrelationem.Nam si proprieponerenturhie, ut docet Priscianus,58
necesseesset ut si diceretur:
ut utrumquead idem subpositumreferretur
Socratesest homo qui est species oporteretSocratemet hominemesse et
speciem.Quod falsumest.
Appendix F
IOANNIS SARESBERIENSIS EPISCOPI CARNOTENSIS METALOGICON Libri IIII, rec. Cl. . I. Webb, Oxonii,1929.
Lib. II, c. 20:
intelligitet ad singulariamulta
pp. 101-6: Ergo quod mens communiter
et eque de multisuerumest,
significat
eque pertinet,quod uox communiter
indubitanter
uniuersaleest. Sed et hoc ipsum,scilicetquod intelligitur
, quod
est, ut nequaquam ad disputandi
benigniusinterpretandum
significatur,
decurratur
que ex sui natura,nisi
angustiaset artisgramaticesubtilitatem,
dictionesinfinitasesse non patitur;
uenia licentieimpetrata,demonstratius
autdeterminatione
sednecrelatiuasuagasessepermittit,
quinearumsignificatio
personeaut actus aut actionisalteriuscoartetur;siquidemrelatiuadictioest
rem,ut de qua precessitsermouel cogitatio.Itaque cumdicitur:
que signifcat
exercet,relatiuedictiones,
Sapiens est et felixqui bona nouitet ea fideliter
actus cognoscendideterscilicetqui et ea etiamsipersonamnon exprimant,
artantur.Necessetamenest aliquem
minationea sua quodammodoinfintate
unumdictionibussubessequi et bona noueritet exerceatet ex eo sit felix.
sit in quod cadat relatio,non contingitsine
Nam ut nichilcertumet finitum
in genere,et dicat stipulator:
uitio aut figura.Vnde si equus promittatur
aut
sanus
michi
est; cum omnisequus sit aut
est,
eger
Equus qui
promissus
57Hring1971,p. 200: '5 (mulier)Abelard,Theol.ehr.III; P.L. 178,1249D:,
mulierdamnavitet eadem salvavit. Sent. sec. mag. Petrm
; ed. L. MinioPaluello 2, 118. Williamof Conches,Glosson Prisciancitedby E. Jeauneau,
Glosesde Guillaume240. J. Jolivet,Arts289. 6 (Socrates)Glosa IV, 27/.
58Ibid., p. 290: ii (Priscianus)Inst. XVII, 5, 30; ed. Hertz 2, 127. .
24

23:33:30 PM

snusauteger,arguitur
Nondico:
nugari,eoquodnonestequusquisiteipromissus.
Nonest,eo quodnonexistt,namet illudquod nonexistit,ut partusArethuse,
sed quia species,id est res discreta,
deduciturobligationem,
in certissimam
generisnon attingit.Cum enimdico: Quod promittitur,
Quod
obligationem
et similia,discretumaliquid promissioni
aut
Quod intelligitur,
significatur,
subiectumest, si tarnenpropriaest ipsa relatio;fiunttarnen
significationi
relationesin genere,que saluo intellectuuerinequeuntreuocariad speciem;
ut cum dicitur:Mulierque saluauitdamnauit;Lignumquod mortiset uite
causam ddit; et: Quas Boreas aufert,reuehitmitisZephirusfrondes.59
Sic
et in his que predixi,relatiuasdictionesaccipiendasarbitror,
ut nondecurrant
ad speciem,id est ad diffinitum
sed subsistantin
aliquod quod discernant,
genere.. . . Existentiumenim a natura certusest finis,et singulasuis ab
inuicemproprietatibus
discretasunt, sed eorumdemest plerumqueminus
finitacognitioet quodammodoconceptiouaga. Nec istis preiudicatquod
ferein omniumore celebreest, aliud scilicetesse quod appellatiuasignificant
et aliud esse quod nommant.Nominantursingularia,sed uniuersaliasignificantur.
Plane si relationem
que fitin genere,quis attendat,presimplicem,
cedentibusnichilobest; si uerodiscretionem
querit,fortenonpalam est quod
discernant.Regulariterproditumest quia demonstratioprimam,relatio
secundamfacitcognitionem.
Porrocognitiorem,quatenusnouit,sibi quadam
mentiscapacitatediffiniens
ut nec primanec secunda possit
circumscribit
procederecognitio,si res usquequaque occurratanimoinfinita.Omnisenim
scientiasiue notitiacreaturefinitaest; soliusautem Dei, quoniaminfinitus
est, scientiainfinita;suo tarnenfine, scilicetinfinito,quamlibetinfinita
certissime
et immensitatis
sue scientiaet sapientia,cuius numerus
diffinit,
aut finisnon est, circumscribit.
Sed nos modulumhumanumprosequimur,
qui non primam,non secundam,non tertiam,sed nec aliquam rei infinite,
nisi quod ignotaquatenusinfinitaest, sibi scientiegloriamuendicat.Omnis
aut relatiuesignificat,
aut non satis proprie
itaque dictio,que demonstratiue
innititur
subiecto; alioquinsuo priuaponituraut certoet sua rationedefinito
bunturofficio;cum ratio cognitioniscertitudinis
finemquerat aut teneat.
ex causa commoditatis
Frequenstamenest usurpatioet illicitorum
plerumque
multusest usus. Admittitur
eorumquibus
itaque non modoad cauillationem
de quauis materiasatisest oggarrire;
sed etiamad statuendam
in auditoribus
bonefideiueriintelligentiam,
quia 'omnishomodiligitse'. Quod si ex relatiue
dictionisproprietate
discutas,incongruedictumfortecausabariset falsum;
siquidemnec omnisomnemdiligit,nec aliquis est qui diligaturab omni,ut,
siue collectiuesiue distributiue
accipiaturquod dictumest 'omnis',pronomen
relatiuum
necuniuersitati
necalicuiomnium
'se', quod subiungitur,
singulorum
ueraciter
aptetur.Est itaquelicentiosarelatioet,quasilegissueueniaimpetrata,
fidemuniuersalisde singularumueritateconuincit.. . . Ergo sicut cognitio
certitudinem
et relatiua,que aut primamaut alteram
querit,sic demonstratiua
faciuntcognitionem,
certoet definitoinnituntur
subiecto,et illud,si proprie
fuerintposita,animosingulariter
ostendunt.

59 Webb192g, 102: 'Vt cum dicituretc.: Nam alia mulier

p.
quae salvavit,
sc. Maria, alia quae damnavit,sc. Eva; aliud lignumquod mortiscausam
dedit,sc. arborscientiae,aliud quod vitae, sc. crux Christi.Sic etiamaliae
suntfrondes
invereZephyrus.'
quas abstulitBoreasin hieme,aliae quas revehit
25

23:33:30 PM

Vivarium
XIV, i (1976)
Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on The Game of Obligation

L. M. DE RIJK

III.

The Tract De petitionibus coiraHorum, usually attributedto

William of Sherwood
of Sherwood (born between 1200-10, died between
1
2
William
1266-71) is commonly considered the author of not only a
3
tract De obligaiionibus but also a short tract called in the
only manuscript (Paris, B. N. Lot. 16. 617, f. 64*) Petitionescontrariorum.4 This small work deals with the solution of logical puzzles
( sophismata) that arise fromhidden contrarietyin the premissesof an
argumentation.
The aim of this paper is to publish the shortertract fromthe Paris
manuscript and to investigate its attributionto Sherwood.
i - The Manuscript Paris, B. N. Lot. 16.617
This parchment codex, formerlySorbonne 1797, consists of 224
folios grouped into sexternios (with the exception of the quires
ff.209-224) ; two fly-leavestaken froma Bible manuscript and numbered in red color precede. The backside of the formerfly-leafcontains
a registerdressed by the librarian of the Sorbonne, Gayet de Sansale 5
at the end of the 18thcentury.
1 The mostextensivebiography
of Sherwoodis foundin NormanKretzmann,
to Logic translatedwithan introduction
Introduction
Williamof Sherwood's
and notes.Univ. of MinnesotaPress,Minneapolis1966,Introd.pp. 3-12.
2 See Kretzmann,
op. cit.tp. 15.
3 This workis found in an unpublishedLouvain thesis (1963): Romuald
GreenO.F.M., An Introductionto the Logical TreatiseDe obligationibus
;
withcriticaltextsof Williamof Sherwood(?) and WaltherBurley:vol. I:
Introduction
; vol. II CriticalTextsof Williamof Sherwood(?) and Walther
seebelow,p. 28.
Burley.Greenis notrightin doubtingSherwood'sauthorship;
4 In myopinion,we have no conclusivereasonto attributethistractto Sherwood.See below,p. 31.
5 The sameregister
(alsoby thehandofGayetde Sansale)is foundinB.N. Lat.
16.390and datedthere1783.I owe thegreaterpartofthedetaileddescription
of MS. B.N. Lat. 16.617 to the kindnessof Wle Marie-Thrse
d'Alverny.
see the eighthchapterof the Einleitungto my
For a detaileddescription,
26

23:33:46 PM

This codex seems to be of paramount importance forthe historyof

thirteenthcentury logic. It consists of three main parts: ff.1-170;
171-205, and 206-224. The same hand that wrote the second main
part, added on f. 224v:
de Sorbonaex legatom. ptride
Iste liber est pauperummagistrorum
Lemovicisquondamsocii domushuius. In quo continetur
( /) tractatus
communiagramaticeet logice.
vel ars opponendiet respondendi,
The first main part, measuring 222 x 167 mm (written surface
168 x 108 mm) was written (in one column of 34 lines each) by
differenthands dating fromabout 1300 (See below, p.28). It contains
the followingitems:
William of Sherwood, Logica, edited by Grabmann as
Introductionesin logicami
, edited by J. Reginald O'Donnell
23-4: Id., Syncategoremata
C.S.B, fromour Ms and Oxford,Digby 55.'
8
4r-5ov: an anonymous tract De insolubilibus, which, together
withthe next item was ascribed by Grabmann (followedby
Kretzmann) to our William as one treatise.9
:
another
5ov-54v
anonymous tract De insolubilibus, edited by
H. A. G. Braakhuis with the title: TractatusSorbonnensis
alterDe insolubilibus.10
, another copy
54V-2V: William of Sherwood's De obligationibus
of which is found in Venice, Bibl. Marciana , Z. L. 302
(= X 204), ff.I5ira-i55va (f. 155va Expliciunt obligationes
ir-23r:

editionof the so-calledTractatusde modoopponendiet respondendi

in the
derPhilosophie
Germanseries:Beitrge
zurGeschichte
und Theologie
desMittelto be publishedin 1977.
alters,Mnster,
6 in: Sitzungsberichte
der BayerischenAkademieder Wissenschaften,
Philosophisch-historische
Abteilung1937. Heft 10, Munich1937, PP- 30-104. A
small part of it is foundanonymousin theVenicemanuscript,
San Marco,
Z.L. 302,ff.i6ira-i62ra(s. XIV).
7 in: MedievalStudies3 (1941),48-93.
8 For this tract,see Paul VincentSpade, The MediaevalLiar: A Catalogue
oftheInsolubilia-lterdXmQ
, Toronto1975,pp. 26-28.It was editedby MarieLouise Roure,La problmatique
des propositions
insolublesau XIII e sicleet
au dbutdu XIVe, suiviede l'ditiondes traitsde W. Shyreswood,
W. Burleigh
et Th. Bradwardine,
in: Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
etlittraire
du moyenge
37 (197),
248-261.
9 For thisPPsee below,p. 30.
adscription,
10 TheSecondTracton Insolubiliafoundin Paris,B.N. Lat. 16.61J.An Edition
of theText withan Analysisof Its Contents,in: Vivarium5 (1967),pp. 111145 [131-145].
27

23:33:46 PM

:
62V-4V
64v-i3ir:
I3ir-i6iv:
i6iv-I70v:

11 two other
copies (Erfurt
magisti W. de Syrewode;
Amplon. Q. 259, if. 209r-2i4v and Paris, B. N. Lai. 16.130,
ff.nov-ii4r) wrongly attribute the work to Walther
Burley). Our MS has (f. 62v): Exphciunt obhgationes
magisti W. Father Green made a critical text on the
basis of all the manuscriptsextant.12
our Petitioneecontrariorum.
Lambert of Auxerre, Summa logicae, edited by Franco
Alessio fromthis manuscript.13
An anonymous tract De modo opponendi et respondendi
(editionprepared by L. M. de Rijk).14
An anonymous tract De communibus artium Uberalium
(De logica: ff.i6iv-i68r; De gramaiica ff.i68r-i9v;
De quadruvialibus: ff.i69v-i7Pv).15

The second main part (ff.171-205) and the third one (ff.206-224),
both measuring 224 x 165 mm (155 x 122 mm), were written, in
two columns of 43 lines each, by two hands dating fromthe end of the
thirteenth century (one hand: ff.171-220; the other ff.220-224).
The firstmain part, in which our Petitionescontrariorumare found
was written by one, English, hand, which was located by Robert
Steele 16in Oxford.
The codex as a whole (ff.1-224) was dated by Charles Thurot 17and
Grabmann 18as belongingto the end ofthe thirteenthcentury.Leopold
11Green'sdoubtas to Sherwood'sauthorship
due to
is (quiteunfortunately)
an Explicitbyrunning
hisignorance
oftheMediaevalscribes'habitto underline
or erasure.
it; wordsweresuppressedby expunction
through
12See above,p. 26,n. 3. The openingsectionofthisworkis also found(anony; this fragment
mous) in MS Chambry27, ff.270^271v (s. XIII ad finem)
Latinus I,
is foundin the Englishpart of the manuscript.
(Cp. Aristoteles
458 (codexa pluribuslibrariisgalliciset anglicisexaratis).
13Lambert Auxerre.Logica (SummaLamberti).Prima edizionea cura di
Franco Alessio,Pubblicazionidella Facolt di Letteree Filosofiadell' Universitdi Milano LXI, Florence1971. For the otherMSS, see Vivarium7
(1969),160-162(whereTroyes2401shouldbe readas 2402).
14See above,p. 26, n. 5.
15It is also foundin B.N. Lat. 16.390,ff.i94ra-2o6vb,
but in a ratherdifferent
redaction.
ie Opera hactenusineditaRogeriBacon, Fase. XV
nunc primm
ediditRobertSteele,Oxford1940. XVIII.
17Noticesetextraits
des doclatinspourservir histoire
de diversmanuscrits
trinesgrammaticales
au moyenge,in: Noticeset extraitsdes manuscritsde
la BibliothqueImprialeXXII, 2, (Paris1868,518).
18op. cit.,15-16.
28

23:33:46 PM

Delisle placed it at the beginningof the fourteenthcentury.19Robert

Steele did not date it.20O'Donnell seems to be quite rightin saying 21
that to establish whether a handwritingbelongs to the end of the
thirteenthcenturyor the beginningof the fourteenthis ratherdifficult.
In his opinion our codex could have been writtenat the end of the
thirteenthcentury,since there are no traits in the script which would
lead to place it undubitably in the fourteenthcentury.
However, this much seems to be certain: the firstmain part of our
manuscriptdid not belong to the libraryof Peter of Limoges (d. 1304
or 1306) who bequeathed the second and third main parts to the
Sorbonne. Our firstmain part (ff. 1-170) was added later on to part of
the Peter of Limoges codex, which originally consisted of B. N. Lat .
16.390, ff.135-206 plus . N. Lat. 16.617, - 171-224.23 Of course,
the second and third main parts belonging to Peter of Limoges'
legacy to the Sorbonne must have been written before his death
(1304 or 1306). The date of the first main part, however, remains
uncertain. I am inclined to consider the handwritings current
Oxford bookhands such as found as early as the last quarter of the
thirteenthcentury. I think, the important thing is its undubitably
English origin.24
2- The ascription of the logical works found on ff.ir-64v to William
of Sherwood
The works commonly ascribed to William of Sherwood are all
written by the same English hand on five sexternios,to which two
more folioswere added in order to finishthe text of De obligationibus
(ff.ir-62v; the Petitioneecontrariorumwere added on the space left:
ff.62v-64v; a smaller English hand wrote the Summa Lambertiright
afterthe Petitioneecontrariorum
on ff.64^131 r).
The firstwork, the so-called Introductions in logicamare explicitly
ascribed to William of Sherwood in our manuscript, in the margin
19Inventairedes manuscrits
latinsde la Sorbonneconservs
la Bibliothque
Imprialesous les numros15.176-16.718du fondslatin (Paris 1870).
20Loc. laud.
21op. cit..46.
22See L. Delisle, Le cabinetdes manuscrits
de la Bibliothque
NationaleII
(Paris 1875), 169,and L. M. de Rijk, workquoted,above,p. 26,. 5, Achtes
Kapitel,section(3).
23See L. M. de ijk,ibid.
24D'Alvernydoesnotdoubtthisorigineither.
29

23:33:46 PM

of f. ir: IntroductionesmagistiGuillelmi de Shyreswodein logicarti.2*

The same holds good for the Syncategoreumata
; the Paris MS has
de
f.23r: SincategoreumataMagisti Guillelmi Shireswode; the Digby
MS: Sincategreumata (!) magisti Willidmi de Sirewode (f. 205ra,
in the margin) and Expliciunt sincategreumatamagisti Willelmi de
Sirewode (f. 224rb).
whichalso certainly
Between these works and the De obligationibus,
belong to our author, two other logical works are found. Grabmann
and Kretzmann are wrongin takingthemforone tractDe insohtbilibus,
which,togetherwith the Obligacionesand Petitionescontrariorum,
they
think to have been writtenby William of Sherwood; in Kretzmann's
opinion these works "closely resemblethe Introductionesand especially
the Syncategorematain the authoritiescited, in the examples chosen,
and in their terse, clear style".28 However, (1) the supposed tract
De insohtbilibus (ff.46v-54v) consists of two differenttracts, the
latter of which is writtenin a rather exuberant style much differing
from William's 27 and (2) the absence of any ascription of the two
tracts on insolubilia is striking,as compared with the explicit attributions of the other works. I think, Miss Roure was rightin putting a
question-mark after William's name in her edition of the work. It
could have been writtenby William,28but we have not a single piece
of firmevidence for attributingit to him.29
25I thinkthe titleIntroductiones
to referonlyto the firstpart of the work
(ed. Grabmann,
30-45).
26Kretzmann,
remarkable,
op. cit.,21. It is highly
op. cit. 15; cfr.Grabmann,
indeed,that FattierGreen(op. cit. 193) mustconcedethat his readingof De
on
failed to find anythingsignificant
and Syncategoreumata
obligationibus
Sucharguments
forassuminga commonauthorship.
whichto base an argument
as givenby Grabmannand Kretzmannare ofno use,unlessdetailsofsignificantsimilarities
be given.
27See the editionmentionedabove, p. 27 n. 10, and Braakhuis'introduction,
p. 112and 129.
28See Vivarium7 (1969),93, whereI arguethat the attribution
lacks good
as Spade (op.cit.,26) makesmesaying.
ratherthanthatit is spurious,
grounds,
29O'Donnell(editionad. loc.)and Kretzmann
thinkto findan explicitreference
to theInsolubiliain the Syncategoreumata,
p. 58, ed. O'Donnell:Possentautem
ad tractatum
insolubilium
hic tangiquaedamdifficultates
quae usque
spectantes
The lattertranslates(op. cit.15, n. 57): "Certaindifficulties
alias differuntur.
to the treatiseon insolubilia,whichare beingset aside untilthe
pertaining
others<are treated),could be mentionedhere". In my opinionwe have to
. Quae usquealias differuntur
insolubilium
read: . . . tractatum
, and to translate:
are put offuntilanother
". . . a discussionof insolubilia.These difficulties
occasion";alias hereis an adverbratherthana nounand,ifa noun,alii (other
ones) is not ceteri(theothers)and, finally,usqueis not usquead. Well,the
does not allowto speakof "an explicitreference
correcttranslation
", the only

23:33:46 PM

The same can be said of the Petitiones contrariorum

, which are
also handed down anonymous in our manuscript. A comparison with
William's authentic works, especially the De obligationibus
, might
an
I
it so
some
for
did
not
find
however,
ascription;
produce
support
far. Again, our manuscript does not give a solid reason to attribute
the work to William. I propose to call it Tractatus SorbonnensisDe
petitionibuscontrariorum.
3- Paris or Oxford tradition?
Let me concede that I have not been able so far to locate the
Petitionescontrariorumin a specific tradition.30The only aim of this
section is to combat the opinion that, if William of Sherwood would
appear to have written our tract, the Petitiones contrariorumwere
writtenat Paris.
Professor Kretzmann says that, whether or not Sherwood was a
student at the University of Paris, we have several reasons for believingthat he was a master there.31"Because of Sherwood's influence
over logicians and metaphysiciansknown to have been at Paris in the
years 1240-48'', he thinksit reasonable to suppose that he was masterin
the Arts Faculty there during all or most of that period.32To my
mind,none of the argumentsadduced are conclusive enoughto assume
William's teaching at the Universityof Paris.33 Let me discuss these
arguments.
(x) "In the firstplace, he lived at a time when scholars were,indeed,
to a degree which is hardly intelligiblein modern times, citizens of
the world" and when "almost all the greatest schoolmen
taught
at Paris at one period or other of their lives".34 This argumentsays
only that, if we find firmevidence for William's being a master in
Paris, we need not wonder, since almost all the greatest schoolmen
reference
beinga rathervagueone to somediscussionofinsolubilia.Moreover,
nowherein the insolubiliatractsof our MS a clue is foundforthe supposed
reference.
(See the editionsmade by Roure and Braakhuis).
30Of course the title proposed,TractatusSorbonnensis
only refersto the
Sorbonnemanuscript.
31op. cit.,3-4.
32op. cit.,8.
33Thereis, on the
a valid argumentin supportof the view that
contrary,
Williamwrote(one of) his logicalworksoutsideParis. See below,p. 37.
34op. cit.,4, witha reference
to HastingsRashdall,The Universities
ofEurope
in theMiddle Ages,I, 540.
31

23:33:46 PM

taught at Paris. However, he mighthave been a remarkableexception

to the rule.35
(2) "Secondly, in each of his two main works Sherwood uses an
example with a Parisian setting: in one case the Seine, and in another
the University". Kretzmann refers to the so-called Introductiones,
p.8729-30ed. Grabmann ('quicquid currit,habet pedes', Secaria currit;
ergo Secaria habet pedes') and to the Syncategoreumata,p. 82 ed.
O'Donnell (Et est unum sophisma tale: 'nullus homo legit Parisius
nisi ipse sit asinus').
Geographic references found in exempla of logical propositions
do not always prove the same thing. I want to distinguishfourtypes:
(1) the occurence of a geographic-nameof wide repute {Roma, Troia,
Mare Africumetc.)
1.1 in a neutral context
1.2 in a significantcontext
(2) the occurrenceof an unusual geographic name
2.1 in a neutral context
2.2 in a significantcontext.
ad 1.1 : Such examples as found in Abailard, Dialctica (I, 64-21ed.
De Rijk) :
Unde maximeMagistinostrisententia,memini,coniirmabatbinarium,
ternariumceterosquenumrosspecies numerinon esse nec numerum
non esset. namque
genuseorum,cuius videlicetres una naturaliter
consistunt
etin ilio qui estAntiochie
Romehabitante
unitatesin hochomine
atque huncbinariumcomponunt.
do certainly not prove that Abailard (or his Master) wrote his work
(c.q. that the scribe copied the work) in Rome, in spite of the formula
hoc homine Rome habitanteas opposed to ilio qui est Antiochie.Nor
does the followingexample :
Ibid. 7910ff:At vero de substantiali(sc. loco) maiorest consuetudo,at
Romeessevel TarentivelAntiochie
[Romeis herementioned
7 times].
nor:
Ibid. III, 39617:'si estRome,nonestParisius'.
For that matter,Paris, whereAbailard wrotehisDialctica is mentioned
only twice, Rome and Antiochia more frequently.
36Of course,Professor
s givingthisargument"in the firstplace"
Kretzmann'
does not mean that he attachesmuchvalue to it apart frommorespecific
- See alsobelow,p. 39,n. 66.
evidence.
2

23:33:46 PM

So Peter of Spain, in his Tractatus, which were certainlynot written

in Paris,36has the usual example: Sequana currit (see below, p. 35,
n. 46.). So Abailars using Mare A/rum and mare Ponticum (Dial.
Ill 426 36_37)
has no significancewhatsoever.
To my mind, examples of this type do not prove anything.
ad 1.2: Here the well-knownexample (e.g. Fall. Parvip., Log. Mod. I,
'
'
: piper venditurhie et Rome ; the contexts prove that the
562 25"26)
'
propositionis not uttered (written) in Rome. The formula Parisius
'
lego (Ars Meliduna III, cap. 1, Log. Mod. Ill, 319) also belongs to
this type. So 'ipse vadit Romani' (Fall. Vindob.; Log. Mod. I, 534 5-e)
seems to imply the speaker's location outside Rome. Peter of Spain
Tractatus XII, 34.: 'quotienscumque fuisti Parisius, fuisti homo;
sed bisfuisti Parisius; ergo bisfuisti homo' seems to suggest that Peter
did not write his work in Paris.37 Abailard, Dial . Ill, 431 28"29(hec
enim unitas hominis Parisius habitantis et illa hominisRome manentis
hune faciuntbinarium; cfr.V, 576 5_7)seems to imply that he wrotein
Paris (as he actually did), but a comparison with Dial. I 64 19-20
(see above) does raise some doubts as to the conclusiveness of the
formerpassage. One more example is found in the Ars Meliduna
where Paris as the place of compositionis opposed to Orleans.38That
the tract on obligations, edited in the second paper of this series
(Vivarium 13 (1975), 26-54) was written (or copied) in Paris appears
from the context of the example given: .... (ego sum Parisius*;
hoc est quoddam verumrepugnans (see ibid., 24). In his Prologue to
the Expiicatio aphorismatumphilosophicorumWilliam of Doncaster
'
'
(s. XII) uses Anglicus in a context which makes Miss Olga Weyers
correctlyconclude that both the authors and his pupil (addressee),
Leo or Leontinus, are Englishmen living elsewhere at the time the
workwas written.39As a matter of fact the work was probably written
in Chartresor, at least, under the influenceof that School.40
36Cp. the Introduction
to myeditionof thework,pp. LVII ff.
37 See ibid.
38Log. Mod. II i, 280. Cfr.ibid.: quid aliud est Parisius
quam collectiodomorumin hoc loco sita?.
39William of Doncaster,
, edited
Expiicatioaphorismatum
philosophicorum
withannotations
by Olga Weyers,Leiden-Kln1976,Pro/.,7: Tibi,Leontine,
scribo.Cur? Equum enim est ut amicus amico, AnglicusAnglicoscribat;
"ifbothhad beenin England(at thattime),therecouldhave beenno reason
forourauthorto pointto theirbeingcompatriots
as a motiveforthededication
ofthework".(MissWeyersin herIntrod.,1).
40See op. cit.,3-4.
33

23:33:46 PM

These examples may give some clue as to the author's (or the
copyist's) location, although the contextual support is sometimes
open to dispute.
ad 2.1 : An example of this type is found in the Introductionesfound
in MS Paris B. N. Lat. 15.170:
ad Parisiusquam econverso'.
'Similiter:plus est de MonteMartyrm
(Log. Mod. II I, 447), Montmartrebeing a name of just local reputation. The Summa Soph. Elench. gives (Log. Mod. I, 327 ie) as an
example : 'quod estBcwome,non est Rome' (cp. : Tract,dedissimulitudine
argumentorum,ibid., 476 M). Here a relationship of the author (or
his source) with Bologna, Italy is apparent, which suggests the
influence of Albert of Paris, indeed.41The Summe Mettensesfound
in MS Paris, B. N. Lat. 11.412 has 'Mosella curri instead of the
usual 'Secana curri. This made me consider Master Nicholas of
Metz a possible author of the work.42That Peter of Spain's Tractatus
were written in the North of Spain or the South of France can be
gathered from the striking names Legionenses, Astoricenses, and
Zamorenses (all referringto the North fo Spain: Lon, Asturia and
Zamora) in the presumablyoriginalredactionof the work.43Garlandus
Compotista'sgivingGolopia (Guipen near Maastricht,The Netherlands)
as an example has made me situate him in the circleof Lige schools.44
All the examples of this type seem to point to the author's (or
copyist's!) acquaintance with the place occurringin the examples. A
fifteenthcenturytract on logic writtenat Cambridge has in the tract
De obligationibusnot only the usual 'tu es Rome' but also 'tu es
45
Cantabrigie' ; 'Rome' does not give any hint, of course, but it seems
that the unusual 'Cantabrigie'does.
ad 2.2 : This type runs parallel with our type 1.2. The example foundin
the Fall. Parvip., Log. Mod. I, 59720: 'Rex venitAurelianis' (= 'came
41See Log. Mod. I, 85-88; 98-100.In SummaSoph. Elench.I, 304*4*the
smallItalianTownLuna is usedin an example.
4SLog. Mod. II I, 451.
43See my Introduction
to the edition,pp. LVII ff. It shouldbe borne in
mind that in the thirteenth
centurythese two regionsformeda cultural
extantcame fromToulouse.
unityand that the oldestcommentary
44See myIntroduction
to theeditionofhisDialctica,XXX.
46See L. M. de Rijk,LogicaCantabrigiensis.
A Fifteenth
CenturyCambridge
de philosophie
Manualof Logic,in: Revue internationale
29(1975),[297-315],
301.
34

23:33:46 PM

from Orleans') seems to exclude Orleans as the place of composition

(c.q. of the copying) of this work,but to imply a certain acquaintance
with that region, and therefore,point to a French origin. The Ars
Meliduna mentions Chartres as a foreign town: Carnotum etiam
secundum hoc fiet Parisius, si edificia transferanturvel populus
huius civitatis (= Paris) adillam (= Chartres)transferatse. (Log. Mod .
II I, 324). So the same work mentions the Loire as a foreignriver
(ibid. 280).

To sum up this discussion I give some general rules:

1. one has to consider firstif a geographic clue is only due to the
copyist's activity. The great number of variants in the example
of exemplwn in Peter of Spain's Tractatus are quite convincing
in this respect.48Of course, if only one manuscript of a work is
extant, the question is hard to decide.
2. the mere occurrence of geographic names of great repute seems
to lack conclusiveness; a complicating factor is that the great
reputemightjust be the resultofits frequentuse in famousexamples
(our 1.1), rather than of the importance of the town, river, etc.,
themselves.47
3. The mere occurrence of unusual names, especially those used
instead of the one usual in the example under consideration,does
certainly point to the origin of the tract (or the copy!) (our 1.2).
The
occurrenceof geographicnames (usual or unusual) in a context
4.
clarifyingthe speaker's (writer's) geographic situation (our 1.2
and 2.2) are of great importanceto locate the writer(orthecopyist!).
4e To compareVon Hertling'sand Mandonnet'sincorrectview about the
Parisianoriginof ThomasAquinas'Quaestiodisputatade spiritualibus,
based
on the occurrenceof Sequana (otherMSS having otherriver-names)
in it,
whereasits Italian originis explicitlytestifiedby two thirteenth
century
See Grabmannin the Einleitungto his editionof Sherwood's
manuscripts.
Introductiones
in Logicam(quotedabove,p. 27, n. 6), 17.
47A remarkable
exampleis foundin the Fallaciae added to the Logica Cum
sitnostrawhichmostprobablyis of Englishoriginand writtenby Williamof
Leicester(seeLog. Mod. II 1, 443): 'Secanacurriis notfound,buttheneutral
is instancedin all manu'aqua curri(see below,p. 36). HoweverMontmartre
estterravellapis'). Oxford.DigbyMS
scripts('quicquidestde MonteMartirum
tra2, f. 50r. I think,thisexamplewas takenoverfromthe Parvipontanean
ditionin whichthe Oxfordtraditionfoundits starting-point.
Furtherinvesare eagerlyneeded.
tigations
35

23:33:46 PM

5. Virtual certaintycan be attained, if,and only if,in the greaterpart

of the manuscript either (a) an unusual name is given instead
of the one usual in that particular example, or (b) a name occurring in a context which unambiguously clarifies the author's
position.
What about William's use of geographic names ? The firstexample
'Secano, curri is an usual example illustrating the second modus
,
equivocationis.It is found side by side with the example 'prata vident*
not before the thirteenthcentury, to my knowledge. The Fallacie
Vindobonenses [Log. Mod . I 501 25) and the Tractatus Anagnini
[Log. Mod . 112, 328 21) have the neutral 'fluvius curri. The Fallacie
'
added to the Cum sit nostra: aqua curri. (Oxford,Digby MS 2, f. 51).
Peter of Spain, Tractatus (writtenc. 1230) has both examples (VII,
I0I 13-19)
'
quicquid ridet, habetos
sed pratumridet
'
ergopratumhabetos ;
'
quicquid currit,habetpedes'
Secana currit
ergoSecana habetpedes'.
The occurrence of 'Secana curri in Peter's Tractatus, which were
certainly not writtenin Paris, proves that William's having 'Secana
curri is not a safe indication to locate his writing (teaching) the
Introductionesin Paris.48
The second piece of evidence commonlyadduced in order to prove
:
the Parisian setting of William's works (Syncaregoreumata,8245"46
'nullus homo legit Parisius nisi ipse sit asinus') proves nothing. It
can be seen as an Oxford master's ironical joke directed against his
Parisian rivals as well as a Parisian master's self-irony,let alone the
possibility that as early as in William's days the sentence already
enjoyed the vogue it had in late thirteenthand fourteenthcentury
Sophismata collections.
48For that matter,when dealingwiththe use of place-namesin Medieval
Philosophy
examplesKretzmannalso refersto Gilson,Historyof Christian
withSherwood's'Secana rui
in theMiddleAges,679-680,who in connection
that not someParisianscribe(italicsmine)copying
pointsto the requirement
the nameof the Seine forthat of another
William'stextin Paris substituted
river.Kretzmann,however,does not seem to considerit, as he says that
" Sherwood
(italicsmine)uses an examplewitha Parisiansetting".
36

23:33:46 PM

William's De obligationibus brings a welcome surprise, indeed.

That the tract was not writtenin Rome appears twice:
de presentiinstanti,
B.N. Lat. 16.617,56v: Item. Positofalsocontingenti
negandumest ipsum (viz. that moment)esse. Quod sic probatur.Sit A
nomenpresentsinstantis;nomen,dico, discretumet non commune.
Cum igiturte esse Rome sit modo falsum,impossibileest quod modo,
sivein A, sitverum.
esse albumvel te esse
Ibid. 59v: Sumaturautemhec disiuncta:'Socratem
Rome', et ponatur.Et proponaturSocratemesse album.Respondendum
hec: 'tu es Rome*.
est "dubie!", quia ipsa est dubia.49Deindeproponatur
estneganda,quia falsanonsequens.50
Paris appears not to be the place of compositioneither:
Ibid.,55v-56r:Item. Dicunt quidam quod, posito falso contingenti,
illi, hoc modo. Ponatur
contingitprobarequodlibetfalsumcompossibile
te esseRome.51
Deinde proponatur:"'te esseRome' et 'te esse episcopum'
Deinde:
suntsimilia". est concedenda,quia vera52et impertinens.53
'tu es episcopus*
. est concedenda,quia sequens ex posito et bene
concesso,ut patet. Et sicut hoc falsumprobatur,sic quodlibetaliud
illi.
falsumcompossibile
non potestprobari,quia, si proponeretur
Falsum autemincompossibile
ipsumesse simileei quod ponitur,essetnegandailia. Verbigratia[56*"]
si proponatur
hec: "'te esse Rome'et 'te esseParisius' suntsimilia", hec
est neganda,quia rpugnt.Similitersi proponatur:"'te esse Rome' et
54; sequitur
'teesseasinum'suntsimilia", hec estnegandaeoquodrpugnt
enim65: si 66tu es Rome,'te esseRome' non est similealicuiimpossibili,67
et sic ei quod est teesseasinum.
The text is pretty clear. The adversaries [quidam) assert that,
whenevera falsum contingenshas been posited as an initial statement
( positum), everyfalsum whatsoever,if only not incompatiblewith that
49Sincethe otherpart of the disjunctiveproposition
may be the trueone.
50i.e. it is (a) actuallyfalseand (b) nonsequens,sincethe truthof the other
partis dubious.
61Your stayingin Rome is a falsumcontingens
an additional
(and,therefore,
of thistract).
argument
againstRome as place of composition
52That bothare ofthe sametruthvalue (similia, viz. false)and compatibility
withthepositumis true.
53Impertinens
sc. posito.
64Sc. thewholeproposition
withthepositumas posited,
(hec)is incompatible
i.e. withthe truthof 'tu es Rome any incompatibility
of te esse Romeand
te esseasinumis not at stake,now; forthat matter,te esseRomeand te esse
asinumare not incompatible.
65Onlythe exampleof the necessarily
false(falsumimpossibile)
to
is referred
in thissentence.
5e Thiscondition
is fulfilled,
as 'tuesRome' is thepositum
ofthisobligation
game.
67A necessarily
falsecan onlybe considered
trueif it is used as a positumin
an obligationgame,since the positioof a statementimpliesthe postulation
ofitstruth.
37

23:33:46 PM

positum (icompossibileilli), can be proved to be true. In the game of

obligation adduced to clarifytheir theory te esse Rome is the falsum
contingenswhich is posited, and te esse epsicopum the falsum which
is not incompatible with the positum. So we may conclude that the
person addressed in the adversaries' example is (a) not a bishop and
(b) not staying in Rome.
In his replyWilliam apparently sticks to the same falsum contingens
as a positum ('te esse Rome') and gives as his falsum incompossibile:
'
'
He esse Parisius and He esse asinum apparentlyinstancingboth kinds
of falsum,viz. falsum contingens(He esse Parisius ') and falsum impossible (the necessarilyfalse), viz. He esse asinum', and so most adequately
opposing to the adversaries' theory that everyfalsum compossible
posito whatsoever (quodlibet)can be proved. We may conclude that the
addressee in William's example is neither staying in Rome nor in
Paris. So his example, in which the fourmanuscriptsextant 58all read
Parisius , excludes the Parisian setting and rather points to Oxford
as the place of originof William's De obligationibus.
Concluding this part of my argument, I am afraid that we have
to reject "most probably" Grabmann's view that William's Introductions were writtenin Paris 59and ProfessorKretzmann's who thinks
to find a Parisian setting in William's works. If William's logical
works, all of which were found in a manuscript of definitelyEnglish
80
origin (Paris, B. N. Lat. 16.617) were all writtenat the same place,
Oxfordshould come into consideration,not Paris.
61
Finally, Kretzmann's last argument is that
who showsignsof havingbeen influenced
"all the philosophers
directly
wereat Paris at sometimeduringa span of
by Sherwoodor his writings
yearswhenhe certainlycould have been lecturingthere,givenwhat is
knownofhis laterlife."62
I shall try to show that, as far as sound philological evidence is concerned, the class of "the philosophers who show signs . . . . etc."
proves to be an empty one so far.
First, a preliminaryremark. Kretzmann's statements: "Naturally
then, Sherwood had his greatestinfluenceon other logicians" (op. cit.t
68Apart fromour Paris,B.N. Lat. 16.617: Paris B.N . Lat. 16.130,f. iiirb;
Venice,San MarcoX 204 (Z.L. 302),f. 151;Erfurt,
Amplon,Q. 259,f. 209vb.
69See theEinleitung
to his editionofthework,17.
60See above,p. 29.
61For a discussionof his firstand secondargument,
see above,pp. 31 ff.
62op. cit.,4.
38

23:33:46 PM

"
4), and apparently metaphysiciansas well as logicians learned from
Sherwood at Paris" (op. cit., 5), take it for granted that William
actually taught in Paris, apparently on the base of the two foregoing
arguments, which have now turned out to lack all conclusiveness,
c.q. to be wrong.
Nevertheless, let us consider the philosophers who are supposed
to show Sherwood's direct influence.
"
(a) Peter of Spain, who studied and lectured at Paris before he
leftforSiena in 1245" (op. cit.,4), and
(b) Lambert of Auxerre,who taught logic at Paris around 1250 (ibid).
(c) Albert the Great who, in his Commentary on Aristotle's Prior
Analytics, "treats the notion of "appellation" as Sherwood does
ratherthen as Peter of Spain does"; (op. cit., 5)
(d) "Aquinas seems to be using Sherwood's analysis of modal propositions in his own short treatise De propositionibusmodalibus"
(ibid.).
ad (a) : In my Introductionto the edition of Peter of Spain's Tractatus
some evidence is broughtforwardthat the Tractatuswere writtenin the
63
early 1230's and that Peter of Spain could not have had the opportunity of attending lectures in Paris during the period (1240-48) of
William's supposed stay in the Arts Faculty there.64
ad (b) : Since Lambert of Auxerre is likely to have writtenhis Summa
Logicae at Troyes (or Pamplona?) rather than in Paris, between
1253-57 and publishedit afterwardsin Paris when he was a memberof
the Black Friar's Convent of St. Jacques, at some date between
65
1257-76, most likely about 1260 - , Lambert's stay in Paris some
time duringthe period of 1240-48seems not to be impossible. However,
I cannot find significantresemblances between Lambert's work and
William's which would support the view that Sherwood had a direct
influence on Lambert, let alone that he influenced him at Paris**
For that matter,Kretzmann only refers(op. cit.,4, n.8) to Grabmann:
83See myIntroduction
to Peter'sTractatus,
LXI.
84See ibid.,
LXVIII.
85See mynoteon the date of LambertofAuxerre'sSummule,
in: Vivarium7
(1969),160-162.
88I do not reallythinkone momentthatLambertof Auxerreever
stayedin
Oxford(wherehe couldhave had a fruitful
timewithhis Dominicanbrothers,
the logiciansRobertBacon and RichardFishacre,indeed).However,if any
dependenceof Lambert'son Sherwoodcould be shown (quod non'), this
dependencycouldbe locatedin Oxfordand (usingan argumentad hominem
39

23:33:46 PM

"As evidencethat these three treatises67 "belong together",Martin

on
Grabmann(
) 68cites a later thirteenth-century
commentary
Aristotle'sOrganon"based on the writingsof these threelogicians."
UnfortunatelyKretzmann was deluded by this remarkof Grabmann's .
As a matter of fact, the latter's source is Warner-Gilson,Catalogue of
Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King's Collections J,
(London 1921), p. 60 ad Royal MSS 12F. XIX (not: IX, as Grabmann
has), where the authors referto MS Oxford,Bodleian Library,Digby
2, formerlyThomas Allen, in 16 no 13 (ratherthan Grabmann's siglum:
69
Digby Mise . 1603). This codex contains the logic compendium
Cum sit nostra, edited (without its Fallaciae) in Log. Mod. II 2, which
can definitelynot be characterized as based on the worksof Sherwood,
Peter of Spain and Lambert of Auxerre, whatever "being based on
their works" may mean.
ad (c) : In his In I Arist. Anal . Priora , Albert the Great mentions
what is called there the 'rules of appellation' :
I. 10, p. 474 a-b ed. Borgnet:Ad haec autem solvendaet similia(i.e.
problemsconcerningthe conversionof propositions)duo praenotanda
et consequentiarum.
sunt,scilicetregulaeappeUationum
Regulae autem
'
sunt quod nomen'homo
supponensverbo praeteritivel
appellationum
futuritemporis
potestappellareprohominequi est vel qui fuit,si verbum
est preteriti
temporis;vel pro hominequi est vel qui futurusest, si est
estad verbum
Adhucautemverbumresolvendum
verbumfuturi
temporis.
Et secundumhas regulascumdicitur:
substantivum
praesentis
temporis.
'nullus
puereritsenex', sensusest quod nullusexistenspuer,vel futurus
'
est
puer, senex; et haec vera est sicutsua conversa,haec scilicetnullus
nullus
existens
iam
enim
sensus
senexeritpuer'; est
senex, vel
quod
futurussenex,est puer.
As a matter of fact Kretzmann's communication completely
relies 70 on Grabmann's, which, in its turn, goes back to Prantl's
against ProfessorKretzmann)Lambert's stay therecould be supportedin
sayingthat "in the firstplace, Lambertlived at a timewhenscholarswere,
in moderntimes(italicsmine)
indeed,in a degreewhichis hardlyintelligible
citizensoftheworld".
67Peter's,William'sand Lambert'sare meant.
8 Kretzmannwrongly
berdie lateinischen
refersto Grabmann'sForschungen
in the series:Beitrgezur
des XIII. Jahrhunderts,
Aristotelesbersetzungen
Geschichteder Philosophieund Theologie des Mittelalters
XVII, H. 5-6
undFundezu den
Forschungen
(Mnster1916) insteadof his Handschriftliche
des PetrusHispanus,des spterenPapstesJohannes
Schriften
philosophischen
AkademiederWissenschafder Bayerischen
XXI , (t 1277)in: Abhandlungen
ten,Phil. Hist. Abt. Jg.1936,Heft9, Mnchen1936,pp. 40419 The foliation24r-95r
is notcorrecteitherand due to Macray'scatalogue.See
Log. Mod. II I, 55-5970That thisis thecase not onlyappearsfromKretzmann's
reference
(op. cit.,
40

23:33:46 PM

Geschichteder Logik im Abendlande, (Leipzig 1867) III, 106. Nothing

proves that Albert here goes back to Sherwood. It is Sherwood himself who disturbs the illusion of Albert's dependence on nobody else
but Sherwood, in preceding the rule by the most significantphrase
(p. 84s ed. Grabmann): Et solet (sic!) assignari talis regula. As a
matter of fact the rule is found as early as in the twelfth-century
Fallacie parvipontane, 56333-35
; 564e-8; edited in Log. Mod . I).71
Sherwood's rules most closely resemble those given by the Oxford (!)
tract Cum sit nostra(edited in Log . Mod. II 2, 415-451) :
, V, 45027-45i8:Dicendumest de regulis.Et est
Logica Cum sit nostra
communisnonrestrictus
ad terminos
nonpresentes
primatalis: terminus
supponensverbo de presentiet non habentivim ampliandi,supponit
Alia regula: terminuscommunisnon
solum
pro presentibus
restrictus
supponensverbode preterito
potestsupponerepro presentibus
vel pro preteritis
Item: terminuscommunissupponensverbo
de futuropotestsupponerepro presentibus
vel pro futuris.
Williamof Sherwood,Introd.,8224"26:
Terminuscommunisnon restrictus
habens sufficientiam
appellatorumsupponensverbo de presentinon
habentivim ampliandisupponittantumpro hiis que sunt.
Et soletassignaritalisregula:terminus
communis
Ibid.,848"11:
supponens
verbode preterito
Et
supponittam pro presentibus
quam pro preteritis.
similiter:supponensverbode futurosupponittam propresentibus
quam
profuturis.
Our conclusion must be that Albert did not need Sherwood's
lectures to be acquainted with these well-known(solet assignari!)
rules and that the former'ssupposed dependence upon the latter is
only based on a loose note of Prantl's in which is spoken of a certain
similaritybetween Albert and Sherwood, not of a relation of dependency between them.
ad (d): Prantl (III, 117) asserts that in his De propos, modalibus
Thomas Aquinas once (!) copied Sherwood almost verbatim:
of Sherwood,
5, n. 13) but also fromhis pointingto p. 106 of his translation
whereappellationis defined,insteadof p. 126, wherethe rule is given: "a
commontermbeingthe subject of a pastrtenseverb suppositsforpresent
thingsas well as forpast things;likewisea commontermbeingsubjectof a
future-tense
verb suppositsforpresentthingsas well as forfuturethings."
(Kretzmann,
p. 126 wronglytranslatessupponensverbowith"suppositingin
connection
witha verb",the participlesupponens(withthe dativecase verbo)
herehavingits originalgrammatical
senseofbeingthesubjectof; in connection
withwouldrequirean ablativecase precededby cum).
71Cp. the Tractatusde univocatione
Monacensis,Log. Mod. II 2, 34421sqq.;
Introd.paris,ibid.,3723.sqq. ; Cum sit nostraV 45027sqq. ; Dial. Monac. VI,
Tract,deproprietatibus
sermonm
224-231;
II, 7232-72734.
41

23:33:46 PM

nr720,ed. Spiazzi72: Modiautemqui compositionem

De propos,modalibus
suntsex,scilicet'verum'
,
, 'falsum 'necessarium'
, 'impossibile'
determinant,
'
'Verum' autem et 'falsum'nichiladdunt supra
', contingens'.
possibile
cum
inesse. Idem enim significatur
significationspropositionumde
' et 'Socrates
73currere
estfalsum
dicitur:'Socratesnoncurriet ' Socratem
73currereest verum'.
curriet 'Socratem
Sherwood has (40e-4i* ed. Grabmann) :
Modi autem sunt sex, scilicet'verum'
,
, 'falsum','possibile','impossibile'
'
. Sed quia duo priminon faciuntpropositionem
', 'necessarium'
contingens
ab enuntiationede inesse,ideo74illi omittantur.
modalemdifferentem
Well, Aquinas' definitionof modus resemblesthe one given by Peter of
Spain rather than Sherwood's:
Aquinas; nr 719: Est autem modus determinateadiacens rei, quae
substantiquidemfitper adiectionemnominisadiectivi,quod determinai
vum,ut cumdicitur'homoestalbus'; vel peradverbium,
quod determinat
bene'.
verbum,ut 'homocurrit
Peter of Spain, TractatusI 19, p. ii18"22:Modus est adiacensrei determinate. Et habetfieriper adiectivum.Sed quia adiectivumest duplex:
est enim quoddam adiectivumnominis
, aliud autem verbi,
ut adverbium
Sherwood,Introd.,p. 4o28*31:
oportetscirequid sit modus
sie: modusest
et proprie.Communiter
modusigiturdiciturcommuniter
alieuiusactus; et secundumhoc convenitomni adverbio.
determinatio
Propriesic: modus est determinatepredicatiin subiecto.
Again, there is not any reason to think that Aquinas here "copies"
(as Franti says) Sherwood or is dependent upon him.
For that matter, we have to realize at the outset that similarities
between authors of compendia of logic are to be explained as the
natural result of these authors' standing in the common tradition of
logical teaching, to such an extent, indeed, that one may speak of a
"universe of similar doctrines", be it true that certain groups with
some special similaritiesmay be discernedwithinthe great traditional
lines. The question of whetheror not thereexists indebtednessbetween
certain authors, should be solved within that framework.So only
explicit references or quotations can prove such a relationship.
The general conclusion of this section should be that there is no
single piece of evidence in support of the view that William of Sherwood ever taught logic in Paris. We need no longer think that he
taught in the Arts Faculty there and better assume that he did not.
71Divi ThomaeAquinatis. . . Opusculaphilosofihica,
Turin-Rome
1954,p. 243.
,s Spiazziwrongly
has Socrates.
,4 Grabmannwrongly
has unde.
42

23:33:46 PM

4- Edition of the Text

TRACTATUS SORBONNENSIS
DE PETITIONIBUS
CONTRARIORUM
SIGLA
5
Sc
Sm
<

= codex Sorbonnensis(= Paris, B.N. Lat. 16.617, olim Sorbonnensis1797)

= eadem manuscorrigens
5
- eadem manusin margine5
> = supplevi
Introducilo

62v

1 Sophismata quedam habent solvi per aliquem locum sophisticum,

75
quedam autem per manifestationemrepugnantie. Et de istis est
adpresens intentio. Ista autem repugnantia provenit ex hoc quod
aliqua duo prius concessa sunt et postea petitur aliquid stare cum 5
ipsis prius concessis cuius oppositum sequitur ex necessitate ex
preconcessis.Unde qui talia sophismata debet solvere, per manifestationemtalis repugnantiedebet solvere.Et si non manifestaret,
numquam
solveret. Omnis autem <solutio> talium sophismatum est petitio
contrariorum. Assignat autem Aristotiles in Secundo Odavi Topi-
coYum76 quot modis contingit petere contraria. Et secundum unum
modum istorum modorum provenit ista petitio contrariorum. Qui
modus est talis. Si quis petat contrariumeius cuius oppositum sequitur
ex necessitate, manifestum est quoniam petit talia duo ex quibus
erit contradictioopposita.77
15
Et ut habeamus cognitionemtalis petitionis accipiamus quoddam
exemplum in quo fittalis petitio.
Sophisma
2 Sit omnis ille Marcus qui opponit homini sibi inequali, et solum,
et Tullius sit equalis Marco, et solum, et Sortes opponat Tullio. Inde: 20
'Sortes aut est Marcus , aut non est Marcus' Si est Marcus et opponit
Tullio, ergo opponit homini sibi equali. Nullus talis est Marcus. Ergo
2 Sophismata]< > Opta 5
solutio]suppl.ont.S
7 preconcessis]S cuius oppositum 17 quo] Sc quod 5
ad ig SophismaSm
sequituradd. S delevitSe
8 manifestaret]
manifestant
5
21 opponit]Se opponat5
9 solveret]solvetSc . S
75Sc. quae habentsolvipermanifestationem
repugnantie.
78TopicaVIII 13, 163a 14-28.
77Ibid., 163a 21-24.
43

23:33:46 PM

io

15

20

25

Sortes non est Marcus. Et si non est Marcus et opponit Tullio, ergo
opponit homini sibi inequali, cum Tullius sit inequalis omni non
Marco. Omnis talis est Marcus. Ergo Sortes est talis. Ergo Sortes est
Marcus.
3 Et sciendum quod manifestare quod aliquid sit repugnans
preconcessis in isto sophismate et in aliis talibus, non est solvere
huiusmodi sophismata sicut est solvere sophismata false positionis,
sed manifestare quomodo aliquid petitur stare cum preconcessis
cuius oppositumsequitur ex necessitate ex preconcessis,et manifestare
quod eius oppositum sequitur de necessitate ex preconcessis. Et sic
est solvere huiusmodi sophismata.
4 Unde in proposito sic esse ostendo. Dico hanc esse possibilem
quod omnis homo opponens sibi inequali sit Marcus et solum et quod
Tullius sit equalis omni Marco et solum. Sed cum petit hanc Sortent
opponete Tullio, dico hanc esse inconpossibilem, quia suppositis
primis oppositum eius sequitur de necessitate, quia nec homo Marcus
nec homo non Marcus potest opponere Tullio. Ergo Sortesnon potest,
quia omne quod est, aut est Marcus aut non est Marcus. Et si nec
Marcus nec non Marcus potest opponere Tullio, ergo nullus potest. Et
'
hec est contradictiohuius: Sortes opponit Tullio' Quod Marcus non
possit opponere Tullio probo sic. Nullus Marcus opponit homini sibi
equali. Sed Tullius est equalis omni Marco. Ergo Marcus potest
opponere Tullio. Quod non Marcus non possit opponere Tullio probo
sic. Nullus non Marcus opponit homini sibi inequali. | Sed Tullius 6
est inequalis omni non Marco. Ergo non Marcus non potest opponere
Tullio. Ergo nullus. Ergo cum petit istam: aliquid opponens Tullio
stare cum premissis,monstrandumest quod eius oppositum sequitur
ex premissisde necessitate,sicut dictum est.

Sophisma
30 5 Simile est hic. Volo quod omne videns sibi dissimile sit album,
'
et solum. Et volo quod aliquid videat album. Inde: videns album aut
est album, aut non est album'. Si est album et videt album, videt sibi
simile. Nullum tale est album. Ergo videns album non est album. Si
ad 5 solutioSm
19 nulluspotest]Sc nullo(Pannec)5
21 probo]probatio5
9 cuius]Se cumS
23 probo]probatioS
et] S del.Sc
10 preconcessis]et est manifestare 25 non marcus]Sc non marcusnon
marcusS
quod eius oppositumsequiturde
ex preconcessis
add. S ad 30 SophismaSm
necessitate
Sc
delevit
44

23:33:46 PM

non est album et videt album, videt sibi dissimile. Omne tale est
album. Ergo videns album est album.
6 Et dico quod hec est possibilis quod omne videns sibi dissimile
sit album et solum. Et hec propositio habet hec duo in se, ratione
dictionis exclusive: 'omne videns sibi dissimile est album', 'nullum 5
videns sibi simile est album' Et cum dicit: 'Volo quod aliquid videat
album", dicendum est quod ista rpugnt prime,quia, concessa prima
propositione, eius oppositum sequitur ex illa de necessitate, hoc
scilicet: 'nil potest videre album', hac ratione: nullum album videt
sibi simile; sed album est simile albo; ergo album non potest videre 10
album. Similiternullum non album videt sibi dissimile.Sed album est
dissimile non albo. Ergo non album non potest videre album. Ergo
cum album non album potest videre album, nil potest videre
album, quia quidquid est, est album vel non est album. Ergo, supposita
prima propositione, quandocumque proponitur hec aliquid videre 15
album, monstrandumest quod eius oppositum de necessitatesequitur,
ratione predicta. Dico ad hec quod sophisma solvitur.
Sophisma
7 Appellai A omnem hominem videntem quem non tangit, et
solum, et appellai tactum a quolibet A , et solo A . Et volo quod 20
'
Sortes videat B. Inde: Sortes aut est A , aut non est A' Si est A, ergo
tangit et videt B. Ergo videt hominem quem tangit. Nullum tale
est A . Ergo Sortes non est A . Et si non est A , ergo non tangit B.
Ergo videt hominem quem non tangit. Omne tale est A. Ergo Sortes
est A .
25
8 Ad hoc dicendum quod hec est concedenda: appellat A omnem
hominemetc.' Similiteret hec: ' appellat tactuma quolibetA etc.' Et
quandocumque hec proponiturSortemvidere , hec est neganda, quia
oppositum eius ex necessitate sequitur, ex premissis, hoc scilicet:
'nil potestvidereB' quia A non A potest videre , suppositis 30
primis. Quod A non potest, probo sic. Nullum A videt hominem
quem tangit.Sed omne A tangitS. Ergo nullumA videtB. Quod non A
non potest videre B, probo sic. Nullum non A videt hominem quem
non tangit. Sed est non tactum ab omni non A . Ergo non A non
potest videre B. Et sic A non A potest videre B. Et quicquid 35
est, est A vel non A . Ergo nichil potest videre B. Ergo eius oppositum
ad 3 SolutioSm
11 dissimile][simile]dissimile5
12 alterum
album]Se . S

ad 19 SophismaSm
21 primmA] Sc . S
ad 26 SolutioSm
45

23:33:46 PM

rpugnt, scilicet aliquid videre. Ergo, quandocumque aliquis petat

istam stare cum premissis,dicendum quod ista rpugnt et monstrandum est quod eius oppositum sequitur de necessitate,ratione predicta.
Sophisma
A
omnem
hominem docentem discipulum a quo
9
Item.
5
Appellat
non docetur, et solum; doceat omne A, et solum. Et volo quod
doceat B. Inde: 'C aut est A, aut non estA'. Si est A, ergo docetur a B.
Et docet B. Ergo docet discipulum a quo docetur. Sed nullum tale est
A. Ergo non est A . Si non est A, ergo non docetura B. Et docet | B. 63*
io Ergo docet discipulum a quo non docetur. Omne tale est A. Ergo
est A.
10 Ad quod dicendum quod hec est concedenda: 'appettai A etc.';
et hec similiter: ' doceat etc.'. Et quam cito petit docere, hec
est neganda, et non quia C,78 sed quia nil potest docere , quia,
15 primisconcessis, A nec non A potest docereB. Quia A non potest,
probo. Nullum A docet discipulum a quo docetur.Sed omne A docetur
a B. Ergo nullum A docet B. Quod non A non potest docere B, probo
sic. Nullum non A docet discipulum a quo non docetur. Sed nullum
est docens non A. Ergo nullum docetur a non A. Ergo si nec non A
20 potest docere B, nichil potest docere B, primis premissis concessis
dico.
Sophisma
1 1 Item. Appellat A omnem formamde qua non predicate suum
sumptum, et solum; et sit convertibilecum omni A, et solum; et
25 sit principale ad . Inde: ' aut est A, aut non est A'. Si est A, ergo
est B. Ergo predicatur de C. Ergo est formade qua predicatursuum
sumptum. Sed nullum tale est A. Ergo non est A. Si non est A, ergo
non est B. Ergo non predicatur de C. Ergo est talis formade qua
non predicatur suum sumptum. Sed omne tale est A. Ergo est A .
12 Ad hoc dicendum quod appellatio de A est concedenda; similiter
30
et de B. Et cum petit quod sit principale ad B, hec est neganda,
quia, concessisprimis,eius oppositumsequiturex primisde necessitate,
ad 5 SophismaSm
ad 23 SophismaSm
23-24suum sumptum]Se sumptum
suumS

ad 23-24albedo, suum sumptum

:
album,convertbile
cum A: disgregativum.principale ad B:
Sm
disgregatio.
ad 30 SolutioSm

n se. nonpotestdocereB.
46

23:33:46 PM

scilicet quod nil sit principale ad Bt quia nec A nec non A . Quod A
non potest esse principale ad probo. De nullo A predicatur suum
sumptum.Sed de omni A predicaturB. Ergo de nullo A est5 sumptum.
Quod non A non potest, probo. De nullo non A predicatur B. Cum
ergo de omni forma non A predicatur suum sumptum, ergo nullius 5
formenon A est sumptum. Ergo nulla forma non A est principale
ad B. Et sic, sumptis primis,nichil est principale ad B.
Sophisma
13 Item. Sit ita quod Sortes videat tantum omnem hominem non
videntem se.79 Inde: ' Sortes aut videt se, aut non videt se'. Si videt 10
se, ergo est homo videns se. Sed nullum talem videt. Ergo non videt
se. Si non videt se, ergo est homo non videns se. Sed omnem talem
videt Sortes. Ergo videt se.
14 Ad hoc dico quod prima lex 80 habet in se duas sibi contradicentes. Prima talis est: 'Sortes videtomnemhominemnon videntemse' ; 15
secunda est talis: ' Sortes non videtaliquem hominemvidentemse'. Sed
oppositum huius sequitur ex prima. Sequitur enim, si Sortes videt
omnem hominem non videntem se, quod videt aliquem hominem
videntem se, quia si videt omnem hominem non videntem se, ipse
non est homo non videns se, quia si est homo non videns se, tunc 20
ipse videt se. Et si videt se, tunc videt aliquem hominemvidentem se.
Ergo ipse non erit homo non videns se. Ergo videt se. Et ita videt
aliquem hominem videntem se. Et hec est contradictio,huius scilicet
prime; et, prima concessa, sequitur ex ipsa. Unde prima est neganda,
quandocumque proponeturadpresens.
25
Sophisma
15 Item. Appellai A omne enuntiabile,et solum, quod est verum de
eo de quo prima pars alicuius depositi est vera. Sit Sortes gramaticus
et sciat se esse gramaticum,et Plato musicus et sciat se esse tantum
musicum. sit quoddam enuntiabile et nescis quod. Deponatur 30
alteram istorumscire aliud enuntiabile ab et esse verum de Sorte
2 probo]probatioS
22-23et . . . se] Se . S
ad 27 SophismaSm
4 probo]probatioS
ad 9 SophismaSm
28 alicuius]Se . S est vera] Sc
ii
. S
talem]tale S
ad 14 SolutioSm
ad 31 alterum] scilicet sortem vel
19 non] Sc . S
platonemSm
vidensse] Se . S
19-20ipse. . . alterum
79omnemhominem
non videntem
se = 'everybodywho does not see himself'.
80lexhere=
petitm.
47

23:33:46 PM

vel Platone. Et certificote quod sit hoc enuntiabile Platonem esse

'
musicum. Inde: aut est A, aut non est A' Si est A et Plato seit
tantum , ergo Plato seit tantum | A. Ergo Plato non seit aliud ab 64*
A . Ergo Platonem scire aliud ab A est falsum. Ergo alteram istorum
5 scire aliud ab A non est verum de Platone. Et est verum de Platone,
quia est musicus. Ergo est verum de eo de quo prima pars depositi
non est vera. Ergo non est A. Si non est A, ergo est aliud ab . Et
Plato seit . Ergo seit aliud ab A. Ergo alteram istorum scire aliud
ab A est verum de Platone. Et hec est prima pars depositi. Et est
io verum de Platone. Ergo est verum de eo de quo prima pars depositi
est vera. Ergo est A .
16 Unus modus est respondendiquod petit quod si sit A , quod non
sit A, et converso. Ex prima enim petit quod, si aliquid est verum de
eo de quo prima pars depositi est vera, quod illud sit A . Et ita petit
15 quod, si est verum de eo de quo istud est veram alterumistorum
scire aliud ab A, quod sit . Et ita81,si istud est verum de Platone,
quod idem est quod Platonem scire aliud ab A, quod sit A . Sed
Platonem scire aliud ab A cum tantum seit , hoc est non esse A.
Ergo petit quod, si non sit A , quod sit A.
20
17 Item.82 Ex prima petit quod, si aliquod enuntiabile sit veram
de eo de quo prima pars depositi non est vera, quod illud non sit A.
Ergo petit quod, si sit verum de eo de quo prima pars depositi non
est vera, quod non est A . Ergo petit quod si prima pars depositi non
sit vera de Platone, de quo est verum, quod non sit A. Ergo petit
25 quod, si alterum istorum scire aliud ab A non est verum de Platone,
quod non sit A . Sed Platonem non scire aliud ab A, cum Plato sciat
C, est esse A. Ergo petit quod, si sit A , quod non sit A.
18 Intellige quod hie sunt multa que non sunt cause. Ut lex facta
de Sorte et item lex facta de sub occultatione; item lex facta de
30 Platone. Indifferensenim esset sive positum sive dubitatum esset.
Item quod dictum est de altera parte depositi nichil est. Sufficiet
enim pars una. Item depositum disiunetumnichilfacit.Dico ergoquod
3 tantum]Se . 5 A] S non est
consequenssicutnec hic: tantum
homo currit,ergotantumhomo
est add. S
5 et . . . piatone]Se . S
9 prima]Sc . S
ad 12 SolutioSm 12 est] Sc . S
81sc. petit.
82Hic est aliusmodusrespondendi.

25 Platone] S non est verum de

piatone et hoc est quod plato
non sciat aliud ab a add. Sc
bisadd. S
26 aliud]Sc aliquidS
31 priusest] [esset]est S
32 pars] [altera]parsS

48

23:33:46 PM

remanent hee sole cause: appellai A omne enuntiabilequod est verum

de eo de quo Platonemscire aliud ab A est verum, et solum tale; et Plato
sit musicus et sciat se esse tantummusicum.Et intelligequod si diceret:
'Plato seit non esse', non habet sophisma. Oportet enim illud esse
verum de Platone quod tantum scitur a Platone. Et hiis solis habitis 5
habetur deductio, sic: 'C aut est A , aut non estA'. Siest A ,
sufficienter
ergo Plato seit tantum A. Ergo Platonem scire aliud ab A non est
verum. Et ita non est verum de Platone quod A non est verum de
Platone. EtC est verumde Platone. Ergo etc. Si non est A, ergoest aliud
ab A. Ergo Platonem scire aliud ab A est verum de Platone. Ergo etc. 10
19 Et dico quod nichil quod est verum de Platone, tantum scitura
Platone, quia quiequid est verum de Platone vel est verum de Platone
scire aliud ab A vel de Platone non scire aliud ab A . Sed tale
tale tantum scitur a Platone. Ergo etc. Probatio prime. Quia quod est
verum de Platone scire aliud ab A est A et non <scire> aliud ab A, 15
(quia illud non est A >, ex ratione de A. Ideo quod est verum de
Platone scire aliud ab A non tantum scitur a Platone, quia si tantum
64? scitur a Platone scire | aliud ab A, esset ipsum aliud ab A et non A.
20 Circa illud quod ego dixi: quia quod est verum de Platone
scire aliud ab A est A, ideo non tantum ipsum scitur a Platone; 20
item: quod est verum de Platone non <est> scire aliud ab A , quia
illud non est A , ex ratione de A ; - item: illud non scitur a Platone,
quia non seit aliud ab A , quia tunc esset ipsum A. Quia ergo ipsum A
quod est verumde Platone <est> scirealiud ab A quod est verum
de Platone, ideo non scire aliud ab A quod est verum de Platone 25
scire aliud ab A tantum scitur a Platone. Et ita nichil quod est verum
de Platone tantum scitur a Platone. Cuius contrariumpetit tertia lex.
EXPLICIUNT PETITIONES CONTRARIORUM
Leyde
FilosofischInstituut
WitteSinget yi
ad i appellatiprimalex Sm
19 circa . . . ego] contraillud quod
ad 1-2 alius processus sophismatis
ergoSc sciturilludergoS
21 alterum
proximoantepositiSm
est] suppl.. S
ad 2-3 et Plato sit musicus:secunda 22 alterum
illud]Sc . S
lex Sm
23 seit]Sc sit 5
4 non esse] Sc d non esset 5
ipsumA] Sc ipsumnon est A S
8-9quod . . . piatone]Sc . S
24 alterum
est] suppl.. S
ad ii Solutio huius ultimiprocessus 25 ideo] Sc similiter
5
Sm ii a] Sc de 5
non . . . verumde Platone] 5e
. S
15 scire]suppl.. S
16 quia ... A] suppl.. S
26 nichil]Sc quod nichilest 5
17 A] Sc A est A et nonaliud 5
27 tantum]5e et sic S
49

23:33:46 PM

VivariumXIV, i (1976)
Anonymi Teutonici commentum in Theodoli eclogam e codice
Utrecht, U. . 22 editum (4)

RPD . ORBN

interomnesGrecos primo
133 Grecorum
primus
Postquam

seminavitin humo
humi dentes
sevit

Quos necdum
Ne

inquirit
vestigat

fieret
paciatur

litteras
grammata

illevir
Catmus,

lentes i. serpentis
habentis
septem
semptemplicis
ydri.

mala
morte interferii
fortuna
sinistro:
mersit
fato
serpens se sibulandoostendit
esse draconem.
idem
,se sibulata

ponitur Fabula et dicit quod catmus primus grecorum

Hic invenit litteras Grecas, postquam seminavit in terramseptem
dentes cuiusdam serpentis, quos fortuna adhuc non subMERSeraT.Et ne catmus fieretserpens,sibulavt ad modum serpentis.
Nota, sicud patet per Ovidium 30 Methamorphosios,1
Agenor fuit
rex potens et dives, qui habuit filiam pulcherrimam,quam Iupiter
dilexit, et quicquid Iupiter ad hoc fecerat,non poterai eam acquirere
per quamcumque subtilitatem. Quare tandem mutavit se in thaurum
pulcherrimumintrans pratum quoddam, quod iacuit iuxta Castrum
Agenoris regis. Quo facto domicella filia regis una vice descendit
in pratum mitigane et liniens istum thaurum. Thaurus vero senciens
domicellam flexis genibus misit se ad terram. Quod videns puella
ascendit thaurum. Thaurus autem surrexitet cum maxima velocitate
ad mare properavit. Quod videns puella perterritaest maxime capiens
cum una manu cornu thauri et cum reliqua caudam et sic thaurus
cum ea saltavit ultra mare. Postquam igiturthaurus venit ad alteram
partem maris, mutavit se in hominemeconverso et sic istam puellam
defloravit.Agenor autem rex percipiensistud vocavit filium
smini dicens sibi quod numquam rediret nisi sorore sua inventa.
1 Met.3, 50SS.;F. Ghisalberti,
d'Orlans
, p. 207.
Arnolfo
a siBiLATOdoPicardus,f. 30v Osternacher,
1902.
50

23:33:56 PM

CATMUSautem exivit querens hinc inde sororem suam poterat

invenire. Sed tandem veniens iuxta quandam civitatem intravit
templm Phebi et rogavit Phebum, ut veliet sororem suam demonstrare.Phebus autem responditdicens "Exi templmet dum inveneris
bovem precedentem, sequere eum quousque requieverit et ubi
requiescat, ibi edifica mihi civitatem et vocabitur nomen eius Boecia
a bove"} Et illa civitas hodierno die vocatur Thebe. Qui catmus
sequens bovem qousque requieverit et [f. 26v] proponensibi edificare
civitatem misit suos ministrospro aqua et semento. Qui dum aquas
de puteo haurirent,fregeruntydriam suam et cecidit in puteum ita
quod magnum fecitstrepitum,propterquem serpens quidam habitans
in puteo suscitatus est et omnes ministros interficit.catmus vero
videns quod ministrisui non reverterentur,ivit illuc ad puteum et
vidit ministros mortuos et serpentem sugere sanguinem eorum.
Quare iuravit hoc vindicare vel ipsemet interficeretura serpente.
Incepit igiturcatmus pugnare cum serpentesic quod tandemserpentem
interfecit.Quo interfectocatmus stetit et vidit super serpentem et
miratus est super magnitudinesua. Et interimquedam vox descendit
dicens ad eum "catme, quid miraris? Tu mutaberis in serpentem,
nisi semines dentes serpentis in terram", catmus ergo seminavit
dentes illius serpentis et ex illis surrexerunt milites armati, qui
inceperuntmutuo pugnare. Quod videns catmus incepit,ne mutaretur
in serpentem, ad modum serpentis sibulare et sic reversus est ad
locum, ubi edificavitcivitatem.
Nota moraliter per istam filiam possumus intelligere scienciam,
pro qua oportet laborari, si debeat descendere in animam, sicud
Iupiter laboravit pro filia. Sed per intelligimus pigrum,
qui non vult laborare ad plenum et intrata templm Phebi, i. scolas,
et petit quod possit invenire scienciam, sed tunc demonstraturad
bovem, scilicet quod faciat machinam ubi bos requieverit,i. mittitur
ad agriculturam et mechanicas artes, quia ineptus est ad scienciam.
Sed tandem videns ydriam suam fractam et ministrosinterfectos,i.
quinqu sciencias, properat ad serpentem qui interfeciteos, i. ad
illam ruditatem et ignoranciam, et interfecitserpentem, i. expelt
ignoranciam et ruditatem. Et tunc vox desuper clamat quod videat,
ne mutetur in serpentem sicud prius. Sed ipse ad modum serpentis
sibulat totaliter illud quod potest sibi nocere expellens ex parte
1 Cf.Isid. Et. 14,4, 11; Hygin.178,6.
a intracod.; intratcod.MnchenSB elm5243,/. IJ3V.
51

23:33:56 PM

serpentis,i. ruditatis vel ignorancie. Et tunc habita victoria seminai

septem dentes in terrain,i. septem artes liberales, ex quibus surgunt
milites armati inter se mutuo pugnantes, i. loyci a sophiste grammatici philologicietcetera.
Item allegorice per puellam possumus intelligere vitam eternam,
que fuit nobis sublata, sed per labores Iovis, i. Xpisti, est nobis
reparata et per vestigia catm, i. cuiuscumque laborantis pro ea.
Et sicut [f. 27r] CATMUSbinterfecitserpentem, sic edam quilibet
diligenter laborans interfciet tortuosum serpentem, i. dyabolum,
qui tot ministros interfecit a principio mundi usque ad mortem
Xpisti.
inventusin undis
137 Raptus aquis Moyses
tota
Omnis

Moysem terra
eum
regio

divinaciones
magorm
everteret c artes.
magicas

bhorruit
circumflua
timuit

talifluvioEgipti
Nilo:

cumsociissuis
Pharaonem
ldeos submergendo
interfecit
fluctibus hostes;
Eduxit cives , submersit
dat
testimonium
illiushabitantes
Egipti mortem
adhuc mare rubrum.
exiscium d testatur
Memphios
Hic est alia Historia et dicit quod moyses raptus ab aquis evertt
magicas artes et tota terra Egipti timuit eum et eduxit populum
Israheliticum ab Egipto, et omnes inimici eorum submersi sunt,
sicud ADHUCTESTATURMARERUBRUM.
Nota, sicud scribiturExodi primo capitulo,1 Ruben Symeon Levi
Isaghar Benyamin Dan Neptalim Gath et Asar intraverunt cum
Iacob patre suo terramEgipti et crevitex eis populus magnus vocatus
populus Israel. Qui populus fuit contemptus ab Egipciacis et in
servitutem redactus, quia Pharao rex Egipti precepit obstetricibus,
ut omnen masculum Hebreorum interficerentet femellasreservarent.
Sed quia timuerunt Deum, non fecerant ita sicud rex preceperat.
Quapropter Pharao precepittoti populo suo dicens TQuicquidmasculini
sexus natum fuerit,in mare proicite et quicquid feminini,reservate"!.2
Postea vero, sicud scribitur3 Exodi 2, surrexitquidam de domo Levi,
8 Exod.2, ss.
2 Exod. i, 22.
1 Exod. i, ss.
a loyci= logici,cf.RevisedMedievalLatin Word-List,
s.v. logicus.
CATSMUS
cod.
c everterat OdoPicardus,f 3ir Osternacher,
I02.
d exiscium= exicium.
52

23:33:56 PM

qui recepit uxorem et illa concepit et peperit filium. Quem dum

respexit propter eius pulchritudinem, abscondit tribus mensibus.
Sed quia non potuit diucius reservare puerum, fecit fiscellam de
cirpisa liniens earn cum pice, ponens in ea puerum ad flumen. Qui
dum nataverat per distancias satis remotas, visus est a filia Pharaonis
regis, que stetit ut lavaret manus suas. Videns istud attraxit et
invenit pulcherrimumpuerum vagientem et miserta est sui dicens
("Hieutique de infantibusHebreorum estl.1 Et dedit puerum cuidam
matrone nutriendum et promisit ei mercedem. Cum autem puer
adultus esset, matrona tradidit eum filie regis, que recepit ipsum in
filiumadoptivum et dedit sibi hoc nomen Moyses, quasi de s, i.
AQUis sumptus.2 Postea vero Moyses vidit quendam Egipciacum
contra Hebreum pugnare et respiciens nullum vidit, quare Egipciacum
interfecitet sepelivit eum. [f. 2yv] Alia vice vidit duos Hebreos pariter
litigare. Tunc dixit ad ilium, qui pretendebat iniuriam ("Curpercutis
proximum tuumPI3 Ac ille respondit TQuis constituit te principem
et iudicem super nos ? Vis me occidere, sicud eri occidisti Egipciacum ?1 4 Que verba audivit Pharao, quapropter moyses timuit
valde et fugit. Dum, sicud scribitur5 Exodi 30, moyses pascebat
oves ipsius Ietro nepotisbsui ; cum ergo moyses semel duceretgregem
ad montem Dei Oreb, apparuit sibi Deus in fiamma ignis de medio
rubi, et vidit moyses rubum inflammatumardere et non comburi.
Et dixit Dominus MOYSy "Noli appropinquare hue, depone calciamenta de pedibus tuis, quia locus in quo stas terra sancta est,
et ego sum Deus patris tui, Deus Abraham Deus Ysaac et Deus
Iacob". Tunc moyses abscondit faciem suam ausus fuit plus
videre illic. Tunc dixit Dominus "Vidi affliccionempopuli mei Israel
in Egipto. Ergo descendi, ut liberarem et ducerem eum in terram
fluentem lac et mei. Veni et mittam te ad Pharaonem, ut educas
populum meum de Egipto, et ego ero tecum", moyses respondit
dicens "Domine, si vadam ad eos et dicam: Deus patrum vestrorum
misit me ad vos, et si forte querant: Quod est nomen eius?, quid
dicam ?" Dixit Dominus "Tu respondebis hec verba: TEgo sum qui
sumi,6et dices populo Israel: TQui est misit me ad vos, Deus patrum
vestrorum"!.7Sed ego scio quod non dimittet vos Pharao rex nisi
per manm fortem. Ergo extendam manum meam et percuciam
2 Cf.Exod. 2, 10.
3 Exod. 2, 13.
4 Exod. 2, 14.
Exod.2, 6.
6 Exod. 3, 14.
7 Exod. 3, 14s.
Exod.3, ss.
a cirpis= scirpls.
b nepoticod.; nepotiscod.MnchenSB elm5243,
f. iJ4r.
53

23:33:56 PM

Egiptum. Et quando vos exibitis, spoliabitis Egiptum". Respondet

MOYSES "Domine, non credent mihi". Tunc dixit Dominus "Sume
virgam, quam proicies in terram". Et statim moyses proiecit in
terram et conversa est virga in colubrum, et statim moses incepit
fugere. Tunc Dominus dixit "Capias colubrum per caudam". Et
fecit moyses. Tunc statim coluber mutatus est in virgam. Tunc
dixit Dominus "Hoc signum facies eis et si adhuc non crediderint
tibi, dabo tibi aliud signum". Et dixit "Mitte manum in sinum tuum
et extrahe eam". Et moyses faciens istud invenit manum suam
leprosam. Tunc dixit Dominus "Repone manum in ff.28*] sinu".
Quod faciens invenit manum pulchram ut prius. Tunc dixit Dominus
"Si non credant istis duobus signis, accipe aquam fluminiset eam
fundesuper terram,et verteturin sanguiner". Cui moyses " Domine,
ego sum tarde lingue". Respondit Dominus fQuis fecit os hominis
aut quis fabricatus est mutum et surdum, videntem et cecum, nonne
ego?!1 "Vadas igitur et ego ero in ore tuo. Ecce fratertuus Aaron
eloquens est, ipse veniet in occursum tui. Ponas tunc verba mea in
ore-suo", moyses autem fecit ut precepit ei Deus et invenit fratrem
Aaron in via et ibant pariter in Egiptum. Congregatis senioribus
populi Israel dixit Aaron, sicud acciderat, et facta simt signa, ut
2
predictum est, et credidit populus. Postea, ut scribitur Exodi 4t0,
moyses et Aaron venerunt ad Pharaonem dicentesa dicit
Dominus Deus Israel: Dimitte populum, ut sacrificetmihiin deserto!.3
Respondit Pharao FQuis est Dominus, ut audiam vocem eius et
dimittampopulum Israel? Nescio Dominum et Israel non dimittaml,4
ita quod Pharao plus induratus augmentavit frequenter dolorem
et laborem populi Israel. Quare moyses clamavit ad Dominum "Ecce
filii Israel non audiunt me. Quomodo audiet me Pharao?" Tunc,
sicud scribitur5 Exodi 5t0, dixit Dominus "EDUcam vos de terra
Egipti et eruam vos de Servitute", moyses autem, ut scribitur6t0
capitulo,iecerat illa signa coram rege, sicud preceperat sibi Deus.
Pharao autem videns hoc vocavit sapientes et malficos suos, qui
eciam acceperunt virgam percucientes cum ea, et versa est in draconem per ARTEmmagicAm. Sed virga Aaron devoravit virgaseorum.
Tunc dixit Dominus ad MOYSEm "Cor Pharaonis induratum est et
non vult dimitiere populum meum", ita quod moyses et Aaron iuxta
4 Exod.5, 2.
3 Exod.5, i.
2 Exod. 5, ss.
1 Exod. 4, Ii.
5 Exod. 6, ss.
Exod.7, ss.
a dicentemcod.' dicentescod.Guelferb.
212 (185 Heimst.),
f. iS<sTcod.Mnchen
SB clm5243,f. 174r.
54

23:33:56 PM

preceptum Dei cum virga percusserunt ad fluvium et AQUa versa

est in sanguinem et pisces mortui sunt ita quod Egipciaci foderunt
puteos unde biberent, sed nihil profuit. Quare, sicud scribitur
capitulo,1dixit Dominus ad MOYSEm"Vade ad Pharaonem et die:
dicit Dominus Deus, dimitte populum meum, ut sacrificet, et si
nolueris dimittere, ego percuciam omnes terminos Egipti ranis sic
quod fluviiebuliant ranas, que intrabuntdomus tuas cibos et poculos".
Et dixit ad Aaron quod extenderet manum suam super fluvios et
super rivos AQuarum, [f. 28v] ut exirent rane super terram Egipti.
Et factum est ita. Hoc videns Pharao rogavit MOYSEm et Aaron
dicens "Orate Deum, ut auferat ranas a me et a populo meo et ego
dimittam populum Israel". Sed breviter qualitercumque plagavit
Deus Pharaonem et suos diversisplagis, ipse semper mansit in duricia
sua nolens dimittere populum, ut satis patet per capitula Exodi
sequencia. Item, ut scribitur Exodi decimo 4t0 capitulo,2 populus
Israel terram Egipti exivit recipiens secum aurum et argentum,
pueros et iumenta. Pharao autem videns hoc paravit se ad insequendum eos ita quod habuit bene sexingentoscurrus,et cum maximo
exercitu sequebatur eos. Postquam vero moyses et filiiIsrael venerunt
ad quoddam Castrum prope mare, retrospexerunt videntes Egipciacos cum maximo exercitu sequi eos et valde clamantes
ad Dominum et ad MOYSEm dicentes "0 moyses, ad quid nos deDuxisti de terra Egipti? Nonne fueruntibi sepulchraa sufficiencia?
Nonne melius esset quod serviremus Egipciacis quam quod hic
?"
Quibus moyses TNolitetimere,state et videte magnalia
Dei, que facturas est hodie, quia Egipciacos, quos nunc videtis,
nequamquam plusb videbitis in eternum. Dominus pugnabit pro
vobis et vos tacebitisl.3 moyses autem clamavit ad Dominum. Cui
Dominus "Quid clamas ad me? Extende manum tuam cum virga
super mare et divide ipsum, ut gradiantur populi Israel in medio
mars per siccum, et ego glorificaborin Pharaone et exercitu eius".
Tunc angelus Domini precedebat eos et columina nubis cum eo.
Et sic mare rubrum intraverunt et stetit AQUa ad dexteram et
sinistramsicud murus. Pharao autem et sui credentes sequi submersi
sunt quotquot erant sic quod nullus ex eis evasit. Et sic Dominus
liberavit eos in die illa de manu Egipciacorum et ab ilio die populus
1 Exod. 8, ss.

2 Exod. 14, ss.

3 Exod. 14, 13s.

a pulchracod.; sepulchraExod. 14, 11.

b ultrasuprascr.
55

23:33:56 PM

Israel TIMUITDominum et moyseii. Et tunc, sicud scribiturdecimo

5t0 capitulo, MOYSES et filii Israel cantabant hoc carmen, quando
venerunt ultra mare ad terram TCantemus Domino, gloriose enim
1
magnificatus est, equum et ascensorem proiecit in mare! etcetera,
ut patet in finePsalterii.
Item notandum moraliter per populum Israel intelligiturfidelis
percussionempaciens a malis propterbona opera sua.
Item allegorice per MOYSEmintelligiturXpistus, per virgamlignum
snete crucis. Nam sicud moyses [f. 29r] redemit populum Israel
cum virga percussa ad mare rubrum, sic eciam Xpistus redemit
populum suum per lignum snete crucis percussumad mare rubrum,
i. sanguinem suum preciosum.
calidas

desiderium
Iovis
filieAgenorispulchritudo
forma
medullas
Europe

141 Summa

Iovis

Movit et in

bovem
thaurum deitatis

se. Iupitermutai vestem

vertit
amictum:

i. utAgenor
etse
rexarmar
se. Iupiter illiusregis contralovem
filia
defiorata
Agenoris arma
Virgine stuprata non passus
i. dedit ei Europam,que estterciapars mundi
Nomen donat ei, quod habet pars tercia mundi.
Hic Pseustis extenditFabulam prius recitatamibi grecorum primus 2
et videtur quodammodo resumereeandem Fabulam, ex quo patet quod
Pseustis in disputacione sua multum debilitata. Sentencia est quod
pulchritudofilie agenoris, de quo prius dictum est, movit medullas
et mentem iovis ita quod Iupiter mutatus est in thaurum, ut deflorareifiliamregis. Sed hoc STUPRumagenor rex proposuitvindicare,
sed Iupiter dedit ei in emendam PARtemmundi,scilicetEUROPam.
Notandum quod prius tactum est quomodo Iupiter amans filiam
agenoris regis mutavit se in thaurum etcetera. Procul patuit et
Pseustis ampliat quodammodo illam Fabulam dicens quod agenor
videns sic filiamspoliatam magnum congregavitexercitumproponens
hoc vindicare. Quod percipiens Iupiter misit ad eum promittenssibi
facere tantum honoris quantum confusionis fecisset sibi. Quare
Iupiter considerane quod non posset sibi dare melius clenodium vel
regnumquam EUROPam,que est 3a pars mundi, unde veniuntlapides
1 Exod. 15, i.

8 Versus133.

56

23:33:56 PM

preciosiradices harbarum et aromata et cetera mercimonianobiliora:

quapropterEUROPadiciturab eu, quod est bonum, et ripa, quia melior
pars vel ripa tocius mundi. Unde tres sunt partes principales tocius
mundi, scilicet Europa Asia et Affrica.Dedit ergo EUROPamagenori
pro emenda et sic facta est pax inter eos.
Item notandum quod morale prius positum et allegoria possunt
eciam ad propositumreduci.
145

nobilem
Insignem vitulum

i. fecerat
confiando
conflaverat
ignis et aurum

se. ludeoruminobediens
fratris
Moysi manibus furit
Ex Aaron
rebellis:
digitis. Insanit turba
progeniesilliusviri
Stirpe Levi
postquam

mitigavit
Domini

compescuit iram,
sacerdotalis
casula
perpetuo
Pontificalis ei datur infula iure perhenni.
[f. 29 v]

Hic est alia Historia, et est sensus quod populus Israel pro magna
parte rebellis erat sic quod compulit aaron in absencia Moysi
quod ipse fecit coqui AUReuM vitulum, quem populus adoravit pro
Deo. Sed illi qui erant de STiRPe levi, non concenserunta ei. Ergo
PONTiFiciumperpetue DATUmest eis.
Notandum, sicud scribitur Exodi i6t0 capitulo,1 quando populus
Israel per tempus ultra mare rubrumfuerat,semel descendit maxima
fames inter ipsum ita quod clamavit ad Moysem "Utinam mortui
essemus in terra Egipti, ubi sedebamus super ollas carnium et commedebamus panes in saturitate! Quare eduxisti nos hue, ut nos
occideres fame?" Quapropter dixit dominus ad MOysem FEgo pluam
vobis panem de celo, egrediaturpopulus et colligat per dies singulos,
et temptem eum utrum ambulant in legem meam an noni.2 Et die
sexta parent pro sabbato. Dixit ergo Moyses ad populum Tdominus
dabit vobis vespere carnes edere et mane panes in saturitatel.3 Et
factum est ita, quia misit Deus vespere carnes, scilicet poturnices,b
in habundancia et pluit eis manna, i. panem celestem album et rotundum, quem cum vidissent, dixerunt ad invicem "man man", i. "quid
est hoc, quid est hoc?" 4 Man enim Ebrayca interieccio ammirantis
1 Exod. 16, ss.
2 Exod. 16,4.
3 Exod. 16,8.
4 Cf.Exod. 16, 15.

a concenserunt
= consenserunt.
b poturnices
= coturnices,
videExod. i6, 13.

57

23:33:56 PM

est et inde manna dicitur.1Et dixit Moyses "Iste est panis, quem
dedit vobis dominus ad vescendum. Quilibet colligat, ut sufficiat
sex diebus. In die septima non colligite, quia sabbatum domini
est et ideo tune non invenietur". Verumptamen populus in sabbato
exivit ut cogeet manna, sed non invenit. Postea, ut scribitur
Exodi decimo 7 capitulo, populus exivit desertm et transtulit
se in Raphadim, ubi non erat aqua ad bibendum. Quare clamavit ad
Moysen "Da nobis aquam ut bibamus! Cur eduxisti nos de terra
Egipti, ut occideres nos et filiosnostroset iumentapersitim?" Moyses
vero clamavit ad DOMiNumdicens "DOMiNe,quid faciam huic populo ?
Si non habuerit aquam, lapidabit me". Cui dominus "Percutias
virgam tuam super petram Horetht, et fluent aque". Et factum est
ita, et omnes saturati sunt aqua. Tunc, ut sequitur Exodi decimo
90 capitulo, mense 30 ab egressionede Egipto transtuleruntse versus
montem Synay et ibi construxerunttabernacula, ubi dominus vocavit
Moysen, ut ascenderei montem et informareipopulum in legem Dei.
Dixit ergo Deus Moysi "Non potent populus ascendere montem,
quia si ascenderei, percuterem ipsum et periret". Moyses autem
descendit et dixit populo [f. 3o1] istud et iterum ascendit montem.
Et tunc, ut scribiturvicsimo capitulo [Ego sum dominus Deus tuus,
qui eduxi te de terra Egipti de domo servitutis. Non habebis deos
alenos coram me.2 Non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. Memento
ut diem sabbati sacrifices,sex diebus operaberis, septimo autem die
sabbatum domini Dei tui est.3 Honora patrem et matrem, ut sis
longevus super terram.4 Non occides, non mechaberis, non facies
furtum, non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium,
non concupisces bonum proximi tui nec desiderabis uxorem eius nec
bona sua.5! Tunc, ut scribiturvicsimo primo capitulo, dixit ulterius
Deus "Qui percusserithominemvolens occidere eum, mortemoriatur.
Qui autem improvise octidit, constituam sibi locum quo fugere
debeat. Qui percusserit patrem aut matrem, morte moriatur. Qui
maledixerit patri vel matri, morte moriatur. Si viri fuerintrixati et
alter percusserit alterum, ut lesus surgat ambulabit cum bculo,
penas et expensas medici restitut. Oculus eruetur pro oculo. Si bos
vel bestia interficiatquempiam, lapedetur; non commedanturcarnes
eius". Et sic de multis aliis, ex quibus tota lex sumpta est. Et tunc,
ut scribitur vicsimo 20 capitulo, dixit dominus ad Moysen "Qui
seduxerit virginem, dotabit earn vel sit uxor sua. Malficos non
1 Cf. Walafr.Strab.Glossaorditi.,Lib. Exod.,cap. 16, 15 (PL 113,col. 239).
5 Exod.20, 13SS.
4 Exod. 20, 12.
3 Exod. 20, 7ss.
2 Exod. 20, 2.

58

23:33:56 PM

pacieris vivere. Qui coieritcum iumento,mortemoriatur.Qui immolt

diis aliis, a solo Deo occidetur. Advenam non affliges,quia advene
fuistis in terra Egipti. Vidue et pupillo non nocebitis; si leseritis
eos, clamabunt ad me et audiam clamorem eorum et indignabitur
furormeus et percuciamvos. Non opprimesproximumtuum pauperem
cum usuris. Principi populi tui non maledices. Decimas tuas et primicias non tardabis offerre.Et viri sancti eritis mihi". Et tune vicsimo
3 capitulo dicit ["Omnia que dixi vobis, custodite!.1 Et multa alia
precepitDeus Moysi,ut patet ibi, et tunc Deus tandem finivitsermonem
suum cum Moyse et dedit sibi duas tabulas scriptas cum digito suo.
Et quia populus vidit quod Moyses moram faceret ita quod non
descendit de monte, in quo fuit per quadraginta dies et noctes, venit
populus ad AARONfratrem Moysi dicens TSurge fac nobis deosl.2
AARONaudiens hoc dixit quod portarent [f. 30v] ei aurum et faceret.
Et breviter aaron fecit eis AUReuMvitulum et edificavit sibi altare
ut fieret sic immolacio, et dixit aaron TCras solempnitas domini
eritl.3Surrexeruntergo de mane et dederuntsibi olocausta et inceperunt
ludere. Deus autem, cui nihil est absconditum, dixit ad Moysem
rVade descende, peccavit populus tuus, quem eduxisti de terra
Egipti!.4 Et narravit sibi Deus secundum quod populus fecerat,
et dixit "Video quid populus iste est. Dimitte me, ut iRAscaturfuror
meus contra eos et deluam eos de terra". Moyses vero orabat DOMiNum
dicens "Cur DOMiNe, iRAsceris contra populum tuum? Rogo quod
parcas ei, ne dicant Egipciaci quod eduxi eum de terra Egipti, ut
interficeremeum. Quiescat ira tua et recordare Abraham Ysaac
et Iacob servorumtuorum,quibus iurasti per temetipsum multiplcale
semen eorum sicud stellas celi". Et statim dominus placatus est et
sessavit ira sua. Moyses vero de monte descendit et portavit duas
tabulas secum. Iosue autem videns Moysem dixit ad eum TUlulatus
pugne auditur in castrisi.5Cui Moyses "Non est ita. Ego audio voces
cantancium". Cum ergo Moyses intrasset castra et vidit vitulum et
tripudia Iudeorum, iRAtus est valde et proiecit tabulas in terram ita
quod fractesunt. Et cum maximo strepituaccepit vitulum conterens
ipsum in pulverem, quem miscuit cum aqua et dedit filiis Israel ad
bibendum, et dixit ad aaron "Quare fecistihoc?" Respondit aaron
TNon indigneturdominus meus, tu enim nosti populum istum, quia
promptus est ad malum!.6 Et narravit sibi ulterius quomodo populus
compulerat eum ad faciendum vitulum. Moyses autem stetit in
1 Exod. 23, 13.
2 Exod. 32, i.
3 Exod. 32, 5.
4 Exod. 42,7.
5 Exod.32, 17.
e Exod. 32, 22.
59

23:33:56 PM

porta castrorum dicens "Qui sunt amici Dei et mei, veniant ad me".
Et statim venerunt omnes filii de domo levi, quibus dixit
dixit dominus Deus Israel : Ponat vir gladium super femursuum et eat
de porta ad portam castrorumet occidat unusquisque fratremamicum
et proximum suuml.1 Filii autem levi exiverunt et interfecerunt
omnes, qui steteruntin causa vitul, ita quod occiderunt circa tria
milia hominum. Quo facto dixit Moyses ad filios levi ("Consecrastis
hodie manus vestras unusquisque in filio et fratresuo, ut detur vobis
benedicciol.2Altero autem die dixit Moyses ad eos "Peccastis [f. 3i1]
peccatum maximum eo quod adhesistis diis alienis. Ascendam ad
DOMiNum et orabo pro vobis". Moyses autem ascendit orans ad
DOMiNumet dixit "Dimitte eis hanc noxm aut dele me de libro tuo,
in quo me scripsisti". Cui dominus TQui peccaverit mihi, delebo eum
de libro meo. Tu autem vade et duc populum istum illuc quo locutus
sum. Angelus enim meus precedet te. In die autem ulcionisvindicabo
hoc peccatuml.3 Verumptamen dominus percussit populum pro
reatu vitul. Tunc, sicud scribiturExodi tricsimo30 capitulo, dixit
dominus ad Moysem "Vade, descende de loco isto tu et populus
tuus in terram, quam iuravi Abraham Ysaac et Iacob fluentemlac
et mei, et angelus precedet te". Moyses autem fecit hoc, sicud patet
tricsimo40 capitulo, dixit dominus ad Moysem "Esto paratus mane
ut ascendas in montemSynay et stabis mecum super verticemmontis.
Nullus ascendat tecum nec videatur quispiam nec eciam oves vel
boves pascantur in eo". Moyses autem recepittabulas et mane surgens
ascendit montem Synay, ubi dominus descendit ad eum per nubem.
Et ibi clamavit Moyses ad DOMiNum per diversas oraciones. Cui
respondit dominus "Ego inibo pactum et faciam signa, que nusquam
visa sunt super terram". Et sic de multis aliis que tangunt decern
precepta, et ibi breviter dominus fecit fedus cum Moyse. postquam
ergo Moyses quadraginta diebus et noctibus fuisset ibi quod non
commederet panem eque biberet aquam, descendit de monte
tenens duas tabulas in manu, aaron autem et filii Israel videntes
Moysem descendere perterritisunt valde eo quod facies sua erat
cornuta et erant illa cornua copiose claritatis,quia fueratcum Deo. Et
Moyses cooperta facie dicebat filiisIsrael omnia, que sibi Deus dixerat
in monte Synay. Et tunc populus obtulit primiciaset de frugibussuis
domino Deo, sicud ipse preceperat. Et tunc ponitur ultra in aliis
capitulis de machinis tabernaculorum de altaribus et de ornamentis,
1 Exod. 32, 27.

2 Exod. 32, 29.

3 Exod.32, 33s.

60

23:33:56 PM

que fiebant de auro et argento, et sic de fingulis,ut patet in Exodo,

qui continet 40 capitula.
Item notandum quod per Moysen intelligitur quilibet doctor
bonus et fidelis, qui ad studium tamquam ad montem ascendit et
descendit iterum a studio cum facie cornuta claritate scienciarum
ad docendum alios.
Allegoriceper MoysenintelligiturXpistus Iesus, qui eduxit populum
Israel, i. humanam naturam, [f. 3iv] a persecucione Pharaonis,
i. dyaboli, per mare rubrum, i. per sanguinem suum. Iste Moyses
ascendit in montem, ubi transfiguratusest et locutus cum patre ita
quod propterfaciemcomutam claritate duo apostoli, qui secum erant,
non poterant eum videre. Eciam Xpistus est ille Moyses, qui per
percussionemvirgea, i. lancee, procuravit populo Israel, i. fideli, ne
siti perierent, aquam baptismum eterne purgacionis et sanguinem
suum in potum eterne reformacionis.Eciam iste Xpistus est Moyses,
qui 2a vice ascendit montem Oliveti et ulterius ab ilio ad patrem
et in die Penthecostesdescenditin spiritucum facie cornuta ad modum
flamme ignis in confortacionemomnium fidelium.
Utrecht
InstituutvoorLaat Latijn

Continuabitur

a feriecod.; virgecod.Guelferb.
212 (185Helmst.),
/. i6iv.
6l

23:33:56 PM

Vivarium
XIV, i (1976)
"I

Promise

You a Horse"

A SecondProblemofMeaning and Reference

in Late Fifteenth
and Early SixteenthCenturyLogic (i) *

E. J. ASHWORTH

logicians associated with the University of Paris in the late

The fifteenthcentury and the first part of the sixteenth century
were at one with their medieval predecessorsin their attempt
to formulatea unified theory of the referenceof such general terms
as 'horse'. To be successful,any such theory has to give a plausible
account of what happens to general terms in modal and intentional
sentences, and the logicians I am concerned with clearly tried to deal
with this problem. However, because of the rather standard way
in which logic texts tended to be organized, the relevant material
has to be sought in various places. In an earlier paper, I made a
detailed study of the reference the word 'horse' was said to have
in the modal sentence, "For ridingis required a horse"; and in order
to carry out that study, I had to draw material fromthe discussion
of contradiction, of conversion, and of supposition.1 In this paper,
I intend to make a detailed study of the referencethe word 'horse'
was said to have in the intentionalsentence "I promise you a horse",
and my material will be drawn fromthe discussion of contradiction,
of conversion,of supposition and of appellation.21 shall firstexamine
* I wouldlike to thankthe Canada Councilforthe grantswhichmade the
researchforthispaperpossible.
1 ""For Ridingis Requireda Horse": A Problemof Meaningand Reference
XII (i974)>
in Late Fifteenth
and Early SixteenthCenturyLogic". Vivarium,
pp. 146-72.
2 Enzinas, Pardo and de Soto discussedthe matterin the contextof their
discussionof contradiction;
Celaya, Coronel(Prima Pars), Sbarroyaand de
Soto discussedthe matterin the contextof theirdiscussionof conversion;
Hieronymusof St. Mark and MartinezSiliceo discussedthe matterin the
contextof theirdiscussionof supposition;Tartaretusdiscussedthe matterin
the contextof his discussionof descent;and Coronel(SecundaPars), Dorp,
Mercariusand Pardo discussed
of St. Mark,Major,Manderston,
Hieronymus
the matterin the contextof theirdiscussionof appellation.It will be noted
that some authorsdiscussedthe matterin morethan one place. For details
at theend ofthepaper.Oftheauthorscited,
ofthetexts,see thebibliography
of St. Markand Sbarroyaare not,so fras I know,specifically
Hieronymus
62

23:34:04 PM

each of the argumentsthat was used, showingits place in the general

body of logical doctrine; then I shall present four typical texts,
togetherwith an analysis of the pattern of argument found in each.
One text will deal with the problem in the context of contradiction,
one in the context of conversion, one in the context of supposition,
and one in the context of appellation. In this way I hope to show
what problems intentionalsentenceswere seen to raise forthestandard
theoryof reference,and how these problems were dealt with.
Part One. Discussion
The standard theory of reference held by medieval and postmedieval logicians is best captured by the doctrine of personal supposition, which I shall sketch brieflyin order to lay the foundations
for my subsequent discussion.3 It was agreed that there were some
"
contexts such as 'Horse' is a word" and " Horse is a species" in
which general terms were not used to refer to particular objects,
but it was thought that in most contexts these terms did refer to
particularobjects, and it was then that theywere said to have personal
supposition.There were said to be various typesofpersonalsupposition,
three of which, determinate, merely confused, and distributive,
concernme here. A termwith determinatesuppositionhad disjunctive
reference,in the sense that the sentence in which it appeared was
logically equivalent to a disjunction of sentences, each of which
exhibited a singular term in place of the original general term. Thus,
"Some horses are brown" is equivalent to "Horse! is brown or horse2
is brown or ... or horsen is brown." A term with merely confused
supposition had disjoint reference,in the sense that the sentence
in which it appeared was logically equivalent to a sentence with a
disjoint subject or predicate. Thus, "All horses are animals" is equivalent to "All horses are animal or animala or ... or animaln''
though it should be noted that 'horse' would have to be analyzed
associatedwithParis,thoughtheyare clearlyinfluenced
by Parisianlogicians.
For medievaldiscussions
oftheproblem,see P. T. Geach,"A MedievalDiscussionof Intentionality"
in LogicMatters(Oxford,1972) 129-138,and J. Trenton a Problem
man," VincentFerrerand His Fourteenth
CenturyPredecessors
of Intentionality"
in ArtsLibraux.et Philosophieau Moyenge (Montral/
Paris,1969)951-956.
3 For a fulldiscussion
ofsupposition
see E. J. Ashworth,
theory,
Languageand
Period (Dordrecht-Holland/Boston-U.S.A.,
Logic in the Post-Medieval
1974)
77-100,207-223.For the medievaloriginsof the theory,see L. M. de Rijk,
Vol. II. The Originand Early Development
LogicaModernorum.
oftheTheory
ofSupposition
(Assen,1967).
63

23:34:04 PM

out first, since distributive supposition took priority over merely

confused.Finally, a termwith distributivesuppositionhad conjunctive
reference,in the sense that the sentence in which it appeared was
logically equivalent to a conjunction of sentences. Thus, "All horses
are animals" is equivalent to "Horse is an animal and horse2 is an
animal and . . . and horsen is an animal." If one carries out the full
analysis of a sentence along these Unes, as when "All horses are
animals" is analyzed into "Horsej is animal or animala or ... or
animaln and horse2is animali or animal2 or . . . animala and . . . and
horsen is animal or animal2 or ... or animaln", it becomes clear
both that general terms are taken to referto membersof classes and
that sentences are shown to be true only when appropriateidentities
(or non-identities,in the case of negative sentences)between members
of classes have been established.
The sentence "I promise you a horse" was seen as problematic
both in itself and in relation to other propositions. So far as the
proposition itself was concerned, it was normally taken to be true,
given the appropriate circumstances,but difficultiesarose when the
attempt was made to demonstrateits truthin terms of the standard
theory of personal supposition. In its relation to other sentences,
difficultiesarose fromthe attempt to find a contradictorywhich did
not share the same truth-value and to find simple conversion which
did share the same truth-value. The most obvious candidate for a
contradictorywas "No horse to you I promise" [.Nullum equum tibi
promitto],yet given the standard theory of personal supposition,
this sentence seemed to be true. It also seemed to imply the other
candidate for a contradictory,"It is not the case that I promise you
a horse" [Non promittotibi equum], which would then also be true,
even though the original proposition, "I promise you a horse" was
itself true. For conversion, one candidate was "A horse to you I
promise" [Equum tibipromitto],yet this seemed to be false, especially
in the light of the apparent truth of "No horse to you I promise".
The same problem also arose from a standard rule of appellation
which licensed the inference from "I promise you a horse" to "A
horseto you I promise". Here the antecedentis true,but the consequent
seems to be false, even though the rule was accepted as valid. If
the truth of "I promise you a horse", given the appropriate circumstances, were to be demonstrated, and if the laws of contradiction,
conversion and appellation were to be maintained in their standard
form,it was obviously necessary to offeran analysis of the sentences
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23:34:04 PM

in question whicheitherdeparted fromor refinedthe analysis provided

by the theoryof personal supposition.
The truthof "I promiseyou a horse" was normallytaken to depend
on whether an appropriate form of words had been uttered.4 Some
authors added that it was also necessary to have the intention of
handing over a horse,5and Domingo de Soto said that for a promise
to be obligatory it had to be both logically and morally possible.
One cannot bind oneself to do what cannot be done, or what ought
not to be done. So far, logicians were on safe ground, because they
were concentrating on the performatoryaspect of promising. The
problem arises when one switches to the referentialaspect and asks
what horse it is that is promised. However, before this question is
explored, two obvious sources of difficultycan be dealt with. The
first involves the differencebetween a definite and an indefinite
promise. "I promise you a horse" clearly has differentimplications
from "I promise you this horse" or "I promise you Brunellus",
where singular termsare employed.7It also has differentimplications
from"I promiseyou all the horses there are", where 'horse*is distributed.8 It was only the indefinitepromise, "I promise you a horse",
that was the subject of debate.
The second source of difficultywas the obvious fact that people
oftenpromisethingswhich do not exist, as when a craftsmanpromises
some object whichhas not yet been made.9 This difficulty
was normally
overcome by means of the doctrine of ampliation, wherebyin certain
contexts a term's reuigeof referencecan be extended to past, future,
possible and impossible objects. 'Promise', like the related word
'owe', was said to extend the range of referenceof the term governed
by it not only to futureobjects,10but also to possible objects.11The
purpose of this distinction was presumably to allow for unfulfilled
promises. If the potter promises a jug, and then makes a jug in fulfilmentof his promise, one could say that this jug was the future
object promised; but if the potter dies aftermaking the promise,then
4 Coronel,
PrimaPars',Major,cxxxivvo.Cf.Celayaon thetruthof"Promittens
equumplatoniestrex".
5 Enzinas,xviiiif. ; Mercarius.
e De Soto,lvi.
7 Dorp; Coronel,SecundaPars; Manderston;
Mercarius.
Cf.Burleigh,15.
8 Manderston.
9 Mercarius.
10MartinezSiliceo,lxiiivof.
11Celaya; Enzinas,xxvv0; Mercarius;Manderston.For a medievalsource,
see PeterofMantua.
65

23:34:04 PM

the jug he promised, although possible, never comes into existence.

Some authors even allowed impossible objects into their universe
of discourse,12on the grounds that people could promise something
impossible, such as a chimera, presumably without realizing that it
was impossible. There was a little discussion of how far ampliation
extends in such contexts as "I promise you all my horses".13Logical
rigour demands that I hand over to you every horse which could
possibly be mine and this, de Soto added, is somethingI cannot do.
However, common sense dictates that what I must hand over in this
case is simplythose horses which are or will be mine.
What was said about ampliation points directlyto the main problem
concerningthe referenceof 'horse' in "I promiseyou a horse". Whether
one admits possible and impossible objects or not, and whatever
the criteriaof identityforsuch objects mightbe, it is made quite clear
that the objects referredto are individuals, Moreover, if the original
sentenceis to be shown to be true,theremust be one or moreindividual
horses (of whatever ontologica! status) of which it is true to say "I
promised you this horse". The problem appears in its most acute
form if 'horse' is taken to have distributivesupposition, as Pardo
and his follower Hieronymus of St. Mark preferred,14
but, as they
pointed out, the problem is not radically altered if one adopts the
most common view, that 'horse' has merely confused supposition
in this context.16Supposition theorystill demands that verificationbe
possible forat least one of the individuals listed in a disjoint predicate,
yet it seems absurd to say "This is the horse I promised you", when
the promise might be fulfilledby handing over any one of a number
of horses, and when the promiser had no definite horse in mind.
Of those authors I am concernedwith,only Pardo and Hieronymus
of St. Markmade thislast point explicitly,and even so, theirdiscussion

12Enzinas,xxvT0;de Soto, lvi. Mercariuswrote"Nam ly debeoampliaiterminmsequentem

ab eo rectumad possibiliaet ultrafortassis."
13Enzinas,XXV
v0;de Soto,lvi.
14Pardo,xciiivo:Hieronymus
of St. Mark,QuestionXII.
15Pardo, xxxiiivo,said "in ymaginabile
verificalide
est aliquod disiunctum
nonvideturquomodo
pro aliqua parte... Et similiter
aliquo quin verificetur
promittohune vel hune vel hune equum. Et tarneneque promittohune
..."
equumequehuneequumequehuneequumequehuncequumpromitto
see e.g. Dorp;
For the claim that 'horse' has merelyconfusedsupposition,
lxxix.'Promise'
of St. Mark,QuestionI; de Soto,lv; Tartaretus,
Hieronymus
was said to be a specialsignofconfusion
; thatis, it producesmerelyconfused
saidthat'horse'had determinate
inthetermitgoverns.Manderston
supposition
in "I promiseyou a horse",but thisdoes notseemto have beena
supposition
popularview.
66

23:34:04 PM

was largely directed toward the problem of appellation, of which I

shall say more below. However, such considerations were clearly
operative in the works of Paul of Venice and those who were most
directly influenced by him, namely Paul of Prgula, Menghus
Blanchellus Faventinus and Chrysostom Javellus. They all said
that 'horse' would have immobile supposition in "I promise you a
horse": that is, the general term could not be replaced by a disjunction of singular terms, even though the general term was still
said to have merely confused supposition.16The reason given was
that the premisses for descent, namely "I promise you a horse" and
'These are all the horses there are",17could be true while the conclusion, "I promise you this horse or this horse or this horse" was false,
because no actual horse was promised.18Thus, these authors clearly
did not allow singular terms to pick out non-existent individuals,
though it is not so clear what they took general terms to referto.
Martinez Siliceo agreed that 'horse' had immobile supposition; 19
but Pardo and Hieronymus of St. Mark mentioned this view only to
reject it. They both said that allowing immobile supposition in one
instance opened the door to a wholesale rejection of the validity of
descent, or the process of inferringa sentence containing singular
terms from a sentence containing a general term. Pardo added the
more forcefulargumentthat it makes no sense to deny descent if one
still wishes to say that the general term in question is accepted for
a range of individuals either disjunctively, disjointly or confusedly,
for the latter claim can only be substantiated if one replaces the
sentence containing the general term with a sentence containing
the appropriate singular terms.20One could put this point another
way and say that if the sentence containing singular terms cannot
be verified,it is not clear how the sentence containing the general
term can be verifiedif the general term has no functionother than
to referto the individuals picked out by the singulartermsin question.
Another solution to the problem of saving the truth of "I promise
16Paul of Venice,Logica Magna, 20vo;BlanchellusFaventinus,50; Paul of
Prgula,34; Javellus,178.Theyall used the example"Promittotibi denarium"exceptforPaul of Prgulawho used "Promittotibi panem".
17For a discussionof thisextrapremiss,see Ashworth,
Languageand Logic,
216-219.
18BlanchellusFaventinus,50. On the samepage the commentator
Manfrdus
de Medicismakesthe same point.Cf. Javellus,178.
19MartinezSiliceo,lxiiivo.
20Pardo,xciiirof.; Hieronymus
ofSt. Mark,QuestionXII.
67

23:34:04 PM

you a horse" involved the claim that this locution was improper,
and should be replaced by a more complex sentence, such as "I must
bringit about that you will have a horse fromme".21As was acknowledged, this view was derived from Ockham, who had said that "I
promise you a horse" was equivalent to "You will have one horse
by means of my gift".22Major said that this view was spurned by all,
and only Dorp and Pardo gave it serious consideration.Dorp pointed
out that since there are various ways of bringingit about that you
will have a horse, includinghanding over Brunellus and handing over
Favellus, the same doubt as beforecan be raised. That is, am I obliged
to hand over all horses, or none, or one particular horse but not
another? Pardo considered two formulations.The first,"By means
of my giftyou will have a horse" was inadequate because it omitted
the notion of obligation.23The second, "I must bring it about that
you will have a horse from me" did not solve the problem of how
it can be true that I ought to give you a horse when there
is no particularhorse which I ought to give you.24Hence, thereseemed
to be no advantage to be derived from abandoning the original
locution, "I promise you a horse".
The most common way of arguing that "I promise you a horse"
was false involved looking not at the sentence itselfbut at its passive
formulation,"A horse is promised to you by me" [Equus promittitur
tibi a me].25It was argued that since the passive sentence could be
inferredfromthe active, and since it was false, it followed that the
active sentence itself was false. The reason for the falsity of the
21Dorp Wrote"Debeo taliterfacerequod ex partemeihabeasequum";Major,
wrote"Faciam quod ex donohabeasequuma me"; MartinezSiliceo,
cxxxivV0,
wrote"Dono
lxiiif.,wrote"Tu habebisequumde donomeo"; Pardo,xxxiiiivo,
meo habebisequum" and, xciiivo,"Debeo taliterfacere ex parte mei quod
habeasequum".
22Ockham,198: "Unde ista: 'Promittotibiequum',valet istam: 'Tu habebis
equumunumex dnomeo'." Cf.RichardofCampsall,219.
23Pardo,xxxiiiivo.
24Pardo, xciiivo."Sed iste modusnon declaratqualiterista sit vera debeo
tibidareequumcumnullussit equusquemdebeotibidare".
26Celaya; Enzinas,xxiiiiv0;Major,cxxxv;Sbarroya,xxxvV0;Pardo,xxxiiiivo.
I have used thewordingof Enzinasfortheexamplesin thisparagraph.Dorp
and Tartaretus,lxxix,in theirdiscussionof Buridan'ssolution,acceptedthe
inference
as not onlyvalid but sound.They both arguedfrom"Debeo tibi
equum" to "A me debeturtibi equus" and finallyto "Equus debeturtibi a
is foundin Heytesbury,
me". The active-passive
90 f.; and passive
argument
are discussedby Burleigh,13ff.,Ockham,197ff.,and Richard
formulations
of Campsall,219. The readershouldbewareof T. K. Scott's translationof
Buridan,137-143,sinceScott translatesactivesentencesas passive.
68

23:34:04 PM

passive sentence was that all the descendents were false. That is,
if the general term was replaced by a series of singular terms in the
appropriate way the sentence containing singular terms was demonstrably false. Normally 'horse' was taken to have determinate supposition here, so that one would descend to "Horse is promised to
you by me or horse2 is promised to you by me or . . . or horsen is
promisedto you by me" ; yet of none of these horses is true to say that
that very horse was promised to you. Pardo suggested that 'horse'
should retain merely confused supposition in the passive sentence,
and accordingly prefixedthe sentence with 'a.', a special sign which
produced merely confused supposition in the term followingit; but
this move did not alter the truth-value of the sentence.26Various
ways of dealing with the problem were put forward. One common
suggestionwas that the true passive was "There is promised by me
to you a horse' [Promittitura me tibi equus] 27but this too could be
argued to be false by means of supposition theory. The subject-term
is now "a thing promised by me" [promissuma me] but this has no
supposition, since there is no individual of which it is true to say
"This is the thing promised by me".28 Hence the sentence is false,
because any affirmativesentence one or more of whose terms fails
to referis false. Another suggestionwas that some sentences have no
passive formulation,29a view which Sbarroya explicitly rejected.30
Finally, Major, who discussed the example "Debeo tibi equum",
'
'
suggested that debetur was an incomplex word, so that one could
not use the reformulation"ens debituma me".zl However, he did
not regard this as offeringa satisfactorysolution and said that if
one follows the above lines of argument, "I owe you a horse" will
indeed turn out to be false.
The arguments about the simple conversion of "I promise you a
2e Pardo, xxxiiiivo.For the use of 'a' as a special quantifier,
see my paper
and theUse of SpecialQuantifiers
in EarlySixteenth
"MultipleQuantification
CenturyLogic'' NotreDame JournalofFormalLogic (forthcoming).
27Celaya;Enzinas,xxiiiiv0;Major,cxxxv;
Sbarroya,xxxvV0;Pardo,xxxiiiivo.
Cf.Heytesbury,
90.
28Celayaattributed
thisargumentto Simonof Lendenaria,thoughI do not
findit in hisdiscussion
ofthisparticular
example,176f.Cf.Enzinas,xxiiiivo;
Major,cxxxv; Sbarroya,xxxvvo;Pardo,xxxiiiivo.
29Celaya; Enzinas,xxv; Sbarroya,xxxvV0.
Celaya and Sbarroyaboth cited
"Ly omnissignificaialiqualiter"as an exampleof an activesentencewhich
had no passive.
30Sbarroya,xxxvV0.
31Major,cxxxv.
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23:34:04 PM

horse" were closely linked with the arguments about the inference
to the passive sentencein two of the sources. Both Celaya and Sbarroya
examined the view that "The king promises a horse to Plato" cannot
be converted to "Promising a horse to Plato is the king" [Promittens
equum Piatoni est rex] because the latter was true and the former
false, given the argumentspreviously examined.32Coronel considered
the case of "I promise you a penny" and said that although this
was true,its simple conversion,"A penny I promisedyou" [Denarium
promittotibi] was false,because its descendentswere false.33Otherwise,
little attentionwas paid to the problem of conversion.
The argumentthat all the descendents of "A horse I promise you"
are false turns up again in the discussion of the proper contradictory
for "I promise you a horse". If the descendents are indeed false,
it follows immediately that "No horse I promise you" [.Nullum
] is true; and ifthisis the contradictoryof "I promise
equumtibipromitto
a
we
have
a case in which two contradictoriesare both
you horse",
true.84If the preferredcontradictoryis "It is not the case that I
promise you a horse" [Non promittotibi equum], then one can argue
that this too is true, on the grounds that it follows from"No horse
I promise you".38 Enzinas argued that "I promise you a horse" and
"It is not the case that I promise you a horse" were both false. The
formeris false because it implies the false sentence "A horse I promise
you", and the latter is false because it is the contradictoryof an
affirmative"I promiseyou a horse" whichis truewhen the appropriate
words have been uttered.3
The arguments about descendents also turn up in the discussion
of the last logical problem connected with "I promise you a horse",
namely the status of the rule of appellation whichlicensesthe inference
from "I promise you a horse" to "A horse I promise you". Again,
if the descendents of "A horse I promise you" are false, it follows
that that sentence is false, and thus we either have a case of an inferencefroma true sentence to a false sentence,37or we must reject
the possibility of making promises altogether because, given the
3JCelava; Sbarroya,xxxvv0.Cf.de Soto,bcx,fora similarformulation.
33Coronel,PrimaPars.
34Pardo,xxxnvo;de Soto,lv.
35Coronel.SecundaPars.
36Enzinas,xxiiiif.
37Dorp; Manderston;Pardo,xciii.Cf.de Soto,lvi, who considered
the argumentthat if the rule is valid, it will followthat one will be obligedto give
everyhorse.This pointis discussedbelowin the contextof Buridan.
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23:34:04 PM

falsity of the consequent, the antecedent will always be false.38

We have now reached the point at which one of the two main
solutions to the problem can be stated, namely that of William
Heytesbury.39In essence, this view, as described by the logicians
I am concerned with, was as follows.40The inference"I promise you
a horse,thereforea horse I promiseyou" is invalid, because it disobeys
the rule that one cannot argue from a sentence containing a term
with merely confused supposition to a sentence in which the same
termhas determinatesupposition.41By the rule of opposites it follows
that the inferencefrom"No horse I promise you, thereforeit is not
the case that I promise you a horse" is also invalid, since it moves
from a sentence in which 'horse' has the opposite of determinate
supposition to a sentence in which 'horse' has the opposite of merely
confusedsupposition.42However, the antecedent, "No horse I promise
you" is to be accepted as true, because of the falsity of "A horse
I promise you".43 This gives rise to the paradoxical result that one
can say truly "I promise you a horse which I do not promise you"
[.Promittotibi equum quem tibi non promitto
J.44This did not involve
the acceptance of two contradictoriesas being both true, since "No
horse I promise you" was not regarded as the contradictoryof "I
promise you a horse". Some authors explained why this was so by
introducing a distinction between complete and incomplete distribution.45A term was said to have complete distributionif, in the
absence of the distributingsign it would have determinatesupposition;
but it was said to have incomplete distributionif, in the absence of
the distributing sign it would have merely confused supposition
because of some special sign such as 'promise'. A rule was then introduced to the effectthat if there is a proposition in which a term has
merely confused supposition because of a special sign, that term
38Coronel,SecundaPars.
39Heytesbury,
90-90.Cf.SimonofLendenaria,177.
40Coronel,SecundaPars, givestheclearestaccount.
41Coronel,SecundaPars; Dorp; Major, cxxxv; Pardo, xxxiii. Cf. Enzinas,
xxiiiivo.
42Coronel,SecundaPars',Major,cxxxv.
43Coronel,SecundaPars', Major,cxxxivv0;Pardo, xciiivo.Mercarius
agreed
that"A horseI promiseyou" was false.
44Coronel,Secunda Pars', Major, cxxxv; Tartaretus,lxxix; Pardo, xxxiii.
Heytesbury,117, had ''Promittotibi denariumquem non promittotibi".
Cf.Paul of Venice,Sophysmata,
37, and Paul of Venice,LogicaMagna, 28.
46Pardo, xxxiivo,xxxiii.Cf. Tartaretus,lxxviiivo;
of St. Mark,
Hieronymus
QuestionI.
71

23:34:04 PM

must have incomplete distributionin the contradictoryof the first

proposition. This excluded "No horse I promise you" because in this
sentence 'horse' has complete distribution. The true contradictory
was "It is not the case that I promise you a horse"; and "I promise
you a horse" and "No horse I promise you" were subcontraries
because they could both be true.46De Soto added that "A horse I
promise you" and "It is not the case that I promise you a horse"
were contraries, since they are both false if I have promised you a
horse.47He also said that on this view, "I promise you a horse" was
trueifI had promisedyou Brunellus,since appellation was notinvolved.
Although this solution coped very well with the problems which
arose in the context of conversion and contradiction, it was not
Presumgenerally accepted,48and Buridan's solution was preferred.49
ably this was because Heytesbury,who wroteonly in termsof personal
supposition, had failed to capture the element of intentionality
involved in such sentences as "I promise you a horse", whereas
Buridan had tried to capture this elementby appealing to the doctrine
of appellation. This doctrine is obscure in many respects,but one of
the claims it involved was this. Some verbs, such as 'know' and
'understand' cause the term followingthem to "appellate its proper
reason",50 or, in other words, to bring the concept to which it is
subordinate into play.51Thus, if it is true that I know a man [cognosco
hominem
], I must have a concept of humanity, whereas if it is true
that a man I know [hominemcognosco] I must be acquainted with
somethingthat happens to be a man, but I need not be able to pick
him out by virtue of that description,and I may not even possess
the relevant concept. This doctrine was easily applicable to such
words as 'promise', because when an object is promised, it must be
promised under a certain description.This is so even when one takes
into account the differencebetween knowing on the one hand and
promisingon the other.52The firstactivity, it was claimed, involves
46De Soto,lvi. Cf.Enzinas,xxvf.
47De Soto,lvi.
48Cf. Coronel,SecundaPars',Major,cxxxv; Pardo,xciiiv0;de Soto, lvi.
49See Buridan,Sophisms,137-143.
60Buridan,in Dorp, wrote"... terminussequens dictionemsignificantem
rectusa tali dictioneet terminans
actumimportatum
actumanimeinteriorem
rationem."
pertalemdictionemappellatprecisesuampropriam
61Thereis somedisputeaboutwhatBuridanmeantby 'ratio1(see Trentman,
952 f.) but the logiciansI am concernedwithclearlyused it as equivalentto
'conceptus'.Indeed,Tartaretuswrote,lxxix, 'ratio seu conceptus'.
58Pardo, xciii. Mercariuswrote "... concedo quod isti terminipromitto/
72

23:34:04 PM

concepts directlyas its objects, whereas to promise is to will to place

oneselfunder an obligation,53and it cannot be regarded as a purely
intellectual act, for that would entail that one could bind oneself
simplyby understandingor by assentingto a proposition.54Nevertheless, to grasp what is being willed, or what the obligation is, one
must have concepts; and as a result one can say with Dorp that the
object of the promise and the object of the ratio by means of which
the promiseis made are the same.55
Buridan's view, as described by the logicians I am concerned with,
is as follows. Since the verb 'promise' is an intentional one, the
inference"I promise you a horse, thereforea horse I promise you"
is a valid instance of the rule that one can argue from a sentence
in which a term follows an intentional verb to a sentence in which
that term precedes the verb and which as a result does not involve
appellation.56In this context, the rule that one cannot argue froma
sentencein which a termhas merelyconfusedsuppositionto a sentence
in which the same term has determinatesupposition does not apply.57
The sentence "A horse I promiseyou" is true as indeed is the quantified sentence "Every horse I promise you" [ equum tibi
58 and the rule that one cannot
promitto];
argue from a sentence
in which a term is not distributedto a sentence in which that term
has distributivesupposition does not apply here either, so that one
can validly argue "I promise you a horse, thereforeevery horse I
promiseyou".59The argumentforthe truthof "Every horse I promise
obligor/important
aliquem actum anime interiorem
quiquidempresupponit
et illa est quam appellanttales terminisuperterminm
quandamcognitionem
sequentem."
63Coronel,SecundaPars',Hieronymus
of St. Mark,QuestionXIV. The latter
wrote:"Unde promissioest actus voluntatisquo quis vult se obligareet talis
actusinterdumest singularis.interdum
est communis,
ut si dicam.promitto
tibiequumlypromitto
communem
cuicorrespondet
appellatactumpromissivum
noticiacommunisequi qui ad omnemequumterminatur.
ita quod sicut per
noticiamcui subordinatur
ly equus omnisequus est cognitus.ita per actum
iliumpromissivum
omnisequus est promissus."Cf. Pardo, xciiif.
54Coronel,SecundaPars.
56Dorp wrote"... promissioest actus voluntatis non fertur
in obiectum
qui
nisi secundumaliquam rationemprimam.Sed promittendo
equum promisi
sicsecundum
rationem
communem
omniequoconvenientem
: ergoilla promissio
debetfieriin omnemequum: consequentia
tenet,quia ratiosecundumquam
fitpromissio:et promissiohabentidempro obiecto."
66Dorp;
Celaya; Coronel,Secunda Pars', Enzinas, xxvV0;Major, cxxxv;
Manderston;
Tartaretus,
lxxix; Pardo,xxxiii.
57Dorp; Tartaretus,
lxxix.
58Dorp; Enzinas,xxvv0;
Major,cxxv.
5#Dorp;
lxxix.
Tartaretus,
Celaya; Major,cxxxv; Manderston;
73

23:34:04 PM

you" was simply that it is absurd to concede that nothinghas been

promised, and since there is no greater reason to say that I have
promised one horse rather than another, it follows that all horses
have been promised.80Another argument was that just as every
horse is known by means of the concept to which the word 'horse'
is subordinated,so every horse is promised by means of the concept
involved in the act of promising."1However, it does not follow from
this that the purchaser is under an obligation to hand over every
horse, for he can fulfilhis promise by giving just one,68"I promise
you a horse" and "No horse I promise you" are not contradictories
That is, the ratio
on this view, because the appellation is different.63
of 'horse' is evoked by the firstbut not the second sentence. The true
contradictoryof "I promise you a horse" is "It is not the case that
I promise you a horse", and the sentences "I promise you a horse"
and "No horse I promise you" turn out to be contrariesbecause they
are both false if I have promised you Brunellus by name.64In the
same case, "A horse I promise you" and "It is not the case that I
promise you a horse" are both true, and hence are subcontraries.65
Various paradoxes arose fromBuridan's view, four of which were
frequentlymentioned.The firsttwo, which were discussed by Buridan
himself,were that from"I promise you a horse" it followsboth that
the King of France's horse I promise you and that two horses I
promise you, even though I can fulfilmy obligation by handing over
just one of my horses.66The third was that if the King promises
Plato one horse and the Pope promises Plato a thousand, as many
horses the King owes as does the Pope [rextotequos debetplotoni quot
papa].97 Finally, if Socrates says to Plato "I promise you something"
[Promittotibi dare aliquid] it followsthat a hundred measures of wine
eo Dorp; Coronel,SecundaPars-,Enzinas,xxvv0;Major,cxxxv.
61Hieronymus
of St. Mark,QuestionXIV, see quotationin note 53; Dorp,
see quotationin note 55. Manderstonsaid ". . . non stat haberenotitiam
hominisquin per earnquilibethomocognoscatur".Cf. de Soto, lvi; Pardo
xciiiv0.In replyto theobviousobjectionthatone mighthave a conceptof an
object withoutbeingacquaintedwitha singleactual instanceof an object,
thedoctrineofampliationcouldbe invoked.
J Dorp; Celaya; Coronel,Secunda Pars-, Enzinas, xxvvo; Major, cxxxv;
Manderston;Sbarroya,xxxvi; de Soto, lvi; Tartaretus,lxxix.
*s De Soto,lvi; Pardo,xxxiiiv0.
4 De Soto,lvi.
16De Soto,lvi.
Dorp; Pardo, xciiivo.Tartaretus,lxxix,has the firstparadoxand Major,
cxxxv,thesecond.
" Major,cxxxv.Cf.Celaya;Enzinas,xxvi.
74

23:34:04 PM

Socrates owes Plato, but that he can fulfilhis obligation by handing

over one flagon of wine.88All these paradoxes were solved in the
same way. When the name of the thing promised comes after the
verb, we have an exact description of what it is that was promised,
but when the name comes beforethe verb all we know is that we have
some descriptionor other of the things that were promised; and that
this thing can only be demanded in disjunction with all the other
things that fit the description by means of which the promise was
made.69 Thus, if I promise you a horse, the King of France's horse
and two horses (taken divisively rather than collectively) are both
referentsof 'horse', and it is only as such that I can be said to owe
them to you. If I promise you a certain number of horses,then every
horse in the world can be viewed as an individual component of that
collection which I owe you, and thus both the King and the Pope
owe everyhorse in the world. If I promise you something,everything
in the world is picked out by that descriptionand thus I can be said
to owe everythingin the world under its own particular description,
so long as the particular description precedes the verb. One cannot
argue "A hundred measures of wine I owe you, thereforeI owe you
a hundredmeasures of wine".70
Some problemswere seen to arise even when the descriptionof the
thing promised came after the verb. If one promises to give a horse
which is worth a hundred dollars, it seems clear that one should
fulfilone's promise by giving a horse which is worth that at the time
it is handed over.71If one hands over a horse which was worth a
hundred dollars at the time the promise was made but which is now
worth only ten, the recipient will be rightly aggrieved. However,
if one promises a hundred ducats in a chest,72or a sleeping horse,73
it does not seem to followthat the ducats must be in the chest or the
horse still be asleep when they are handed over. Enzinas said that
68Manderston.
Cf.Celava; Major,cxxxv; de Soto,lvi.
69Tartarei
us, lxxix, wrote "Non me obligavi ad solvendumequum regis
francie:nec potestipsumpeterenisisub disiunctione
ad alios equos quia non
me obligaviad solvendumequum regis franciesecundumillam rationem
secundumquam diciturequus regisfrancie:sed obligatiofuitfactasecundum
rationemspecificam
omniequo." Cf. Dorp.
convenientem
70Cf. Dorp's explanationof
why "A horseI promiseyou" does not entail
"I promiseyou a horse".When I have promisedyou Brunellus,the firstis
trueand thesecondfalse.
71Enzinas,xxvV0;de Soto,lvi.
72Enzinas,xxvV0.
73De Soto,lvi.
75

23:34:04 PM

one should solve these problems by consideringthe intentionof the

promiser with respect to the factors mentioned. If the omission of a
factor reduces the value of the thing promised, then the promise
win not be fulfilled,but if it makes no differencethen the promise
will be fulfilled.74
Pardo, who was echoed by his follower,Hieronymus of St. Mark,
raised some questions about the problem of descent.75If appellation
were not involved in "I promiseyou a horse", any replacementof the
general term 'horse' by singular terms seemed to be false, as has
already been argued; but the entrance of appellation into the picture
only seems to make the matter more complicated. If it is true that
the termfollowingan intentionalverb has merelyconfusedsupposition,
then we will descend to "I promise you horse or horse2 or ... or
horsen", but given appellation theory, this implies that I have a
disjunctive concept corresponding to "horse or horse2 or ... or
horsen", which may well be false, even when it is true that I possess
the general concept 'horse'. This situation does not alter essentially
if one argues that 'horse' has determinate supposition or, as Pardo
himself preferredto say, distributivesupposition. Pardo considered
three solutions. One, which has already been discussed, involved
the claim that the term after an intentional verb has immobile supposition. A second involved the claim that descent can only be to a
sentence in which the singular terms precede the verb, as in "Horsej
or horse2 or . . . or horsen I promise you"; but this solution was
dismissed on the grounds that the corresponding ascent, that is
the inference from the sentence containing singular terms to the
sentence containingthe general term,was invalid. The thirdsolution,
which was, that of Pardo himself, involved quantification over
individual acts of promising.One must make sure, he said, that the
other terms in the sentence maintain their original supposition when
desceiit takes place, and one can do this by using special signs such
as 'b.' which indicates that the term followingit has determinate
supposition. Thus, if 'horse' has distributive supposition one will
descend to "Hunc equutnb. promittoet hunc equum b. promitto", or,
if one preferred,one could descend from 'promitto'first,and thus
arrive at "This horse by this promise I promise and this horse by this
promise I promise and so forall the others" [Hunc equumhoc promissione promittoet hunc equum hoc promissionepromittoet sic de aliis].
74Enzinas,xxvv0.
76Pardo,xciiiv0f.; Hieronymus
ofSt. Mark,QuestionXII.
76

23:34:04 PM

This multiplicationof acts of promisingseems to have little to recommend it, especially if one bears in mind both that a descent was said
to be valid only if the correspondingascent was valid, and that
ascent in this case seems to involve the inferenceof a sentenceinvolving
appellation from a sentence which does not involve appellation.
So far all the interpretationsof "I promise you a horse" which I
have considered have involved a refinementof the analysis provided
by the theoryof personal supposition,but therewas one interpretation
which departed from that analysis altogether, by claiming that
'horse' had simple rather than personal supposition.76Such a claim
was not popular, because it involved the postulation of universais,
whetherapart fromindividuals or not, as the referentof general terms
in certain contexts, and it was mentioned by Major and Tartaretus
only to be dismissed.77John of Giogovia specifically claimed that
'horse' had simple supposition,78but he did not discuss the matter
in detail, and only Sbarroya and de Soto gave this interpretationany
serious attention.79The former put forward this view in order to
show that the passive "By the King is promised a horse to Plato"
[A rege promittiturequus plotoni] was true. The complex "by the
King promised to Plato" [a regepromissumplotoni] does have supposition, he said, and can be verifiednot by the senses but by the
intellect.80He appealed to Duns Scotus to support the claim that what
is signifiedby "thing promised" or 'horse' is not the universal by
itself, nor the individual aggregate of matter and form, but the
fundamentumspeciei which is found in every horse. It follows from
this both that no individual horse is referredto and that the promise
can be fulfilledby handing over an individual horse.81 De Soto's
78For a medievalsourceforthatview,see Ferrer,60 ff.
77Major,cxxxivV0;
lxxviiiv0.
Tartaretus,
78Johnof Glogovia,xviiivo.Cf. Breitkopf;Greve,xiivo;Hundt,clxxi.
79Sbarroya,xxxvv0f. ; de Soto,lvV0f.
80Sbarroya,xxxvV0
f. wrote:' 'Et ad argumentum
contrahoc: negaturquod
a
ly regepromissum
platoninon supponat.Et ad probationem:
quando dicis
de nulloest verificabile.
quod illudtotumaggregatum
Distinguo:vel ad sensum: et sic concedo:vel ad intellectum:
et sic nego.Nullusenimequus particularisdebet signarised species equina fundamentaliter:
prout abstraitab
universalitate
formaliet a particularitate
qui est modus distinctusab illis
duobus.sciliceta naturaconsideratain particulari
et ab ipsa consideratacum
suo formali:proquo vide D.S. in opusculo30 de enteet essentia.Et hoc dico
quia promissionon adit supra formalespeciei: nec supra aggregatumex
formali
et materiali:sed suprafundamentum
in quolibet
specieiquod reperitur
equo singulari.et pretereaimpletpromissumquemvisequumdando."
81Cf.Burleigh,ii ff.
77

23:34:04 PM

discussion was less elaborate. It hinged on the question of whether

such verbs as 'promise' were appellative, as Buridan had maintained,
or were special signs of confusion, as Heytesbury had maintained.
He offeredthree argumentsto show that 'promise' was not a special
sign of confusion,82but he did not discuss the question of what the
claim that it was an appellative term entailed. He merely stated
that the term following an intentional verb probably had simple
supposition[acproindetalemaccusativumfartassesimplicitssupponere].
On the whole, it seems fairto say that the logicians I have examined
failed to produce a theory of the referenceof general terms which
applied with equal success to all contexts. Some, like Sbarroya,
betweenintentional
foundthemselvesforcedto emphasize the difference
and non-intentional contexts by postulating completely different
types of referent.Some, like Heytesbury, overlooked the difference
altogetherin theirappeal to personal supposition.Some, like Buridan,
recognizedthat termsin an intentionalcontext have a functionwhich
goes beyond that of referringto individual objects; but they were
unable to say with precisionjust how this broader functionwas to be
reconciled with the referentialfunction.However, one thing is common to those who struggled with the logical problems caused by
"I promise you a horse". That is, they managed to save the validity
of those inferencesthey were concernedwith,eitherby so interpreting
sets of sentences that they were not to be counted as instances of the
inferencesin question, or by so interpretingsets of sentences that
they came out to have the desired truth-values,and could no longer
be cited as counter-examples to a general rule. Thus, they were
successfulas logicians,if not as philosophersof language.
Waterloo, Canada
Universityof Waterloo

(to be continued)

82De Soto,lvi, said: (i) The verbcontainsno universality;

(2) no descentis
theverb; (3) "I promiseyoua book" meansI
possiblefromthetermfollowing
to singulars
promiseyoua bookundertheconceptofa bookwithoutreference
[Quia sensus huius/promittotibi librum/est/promittotibi librum sub
rationelibri,non descendendoad singularia,que est expositiosimplicissupab appellationerationis].
positionisprovenientis
78

23:34:04 PM

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BlanchellusFaventinus,
Menghus.Subtilissime
expositiones
super
questionesque
Summulismagisti
Pauli Veneti. . . Venetiis,1542.
Breitkopf,Gregorius.Parvorumlogicaliumopusculum. . . Liptzigk,1507.
[No pagination]
Buridan,John.Sophismataburidani.Parisius,1493. [No pagination]
Buridan,John.Sophismson Meaningand Truth,translatedand withan introduction
by T. K. Scott.New York,1966.
Burleigh,Walter.De puritateartis logicaetractatus
longior,Witha Revised
EditionoftheTractatus
editedby Philotheus
Boehner.St. Bonavenbrevior,
ture,N.Y., 1955.
Summularum
Celaya, Johannesde. Expositio in primumtractatum
Magisti
Petrihispani.Parrhisiis,
[1515 ?]. [No pagination]
Coronel,Antonius.PrimaPars Rosarii.Parisiis,1512. [No pagination]
Coronel,Antonius.SecundaPars Rosarii.Parisiis,1512. [Partlypaginated]
on JohnBuridan'sSummulade dialctica[Lyon],
Dorp, John.Commentary
1497. [No pagination]
liberprimus.Lugduni,1528.
Enzinas,Fernandode. Oppositionum
dialecticisin Vol. I of Oeuvresde Saint
Ferrer,Vincent.De supposicionibus
Vincent
editedby H. Fags. Paris,1909.
Ferrier,
Greve,Henricus.Parvalogicalia.[Leipzig,149- ].
William.Tractatus
de sensucomposito
etdiviso.
Heytesbury,
gulielmiHentisberi
. . . Venetiis,1494.
ReguleeiusdemcumSophismatibus
ofSt. Mark.Compendium
Hieronymus
preclarum
quodparvalogicaseu summule
dicitur.Coloniensi,
1507. [No pagination]
totiuslogices.Lyptzk,1507.
Hundt,Magnus.Compendium
Venetiis,1572.
Javellus,Chrysostom.
LogicaeCompendium.
Petri
Johnof Giogovia. Exercitium
superomnestractatus
parvorum
logicalium
Hispani.Argentine,
1517.
Major,John.Libriquosin artibus. . . in lucememisit.Lugduni,1516.
William. Tripartitum
in
Manderston,
epithomaDoctrinaleet compendiosum
totiusdialectices
artisprincipia,s. 1., 1530. [No pagination]
MartinezSiliceo,Juan. Siliceusin eius primamAlfonseam
sectionem
in qua
elementa
primariadyalectices
comperiuntur
argutissime
disputata.Salamantice,1517.
Petrus.MagistiPetrimercarii
normanni
Tractatus
deargumentatione
Mercarius,
etpartibuseiusremotis
. . . s. 1.,1500. [No pagination]
Ockham,William.SummaLogicae: Pars Prima,editedby PhilotheusBoehner.
St. Bonaventure,
N.Y., 1957.
Medulladyalectices.
Pardo,Hieronymus.
Parisius,1505.
Paul ofPrgula.LogicaandTractatus
deSensuComposito
etDiviso,editedbySisterMaryAnthony
Brown.St.Bonaventure,
N.Y., Louvain,Paderborn,
1961.
Paul ofVenice.Sophysmata.
Venetiis,1493.
Paul ofVenice.LogicaMagna.Venetiis,1499.
PeterofMantua.Logica.Venetiis,1492. [No pagination]
Richardof Campsall:E. A. Synan,The Universaland Supposition
in a Logica
attributed
to Richardof Campsallin Nine MediaevalThinkers,
editedby
J. R. O'Donnell.Toronto,1955.
Summularum
Sbarroya,Augustinus.
Expositioprimitractatus
MagistiPetri
Hispani.Hispali,1533.
SimonofLendenaria.Suprasexsophismata
: see Heytesbury.
dialectice.
Soto,Domingode. Introductiones
Burgis,1529.
Petrus.Expositioin SummulasPetriHispani. Parrhisiis,
Tartaretus,
[1520?].
79

23:34:04 PM

Vivarium
XIV, 2 (1976)
St. Anselm' s Analogies

G. R. EVANS

Vitalis tells us that St. Anselm's pupils kept records of

his 'figurativesayings' : tipici sermones.1Among the reports of
Orderic
Anselm's talk which have been preserved by his close companions, his disciples and his admirers, a number of accounts of his
sermonsand 'table-talk' are to be found. The recent edition of some
of this material 2 contains versions of many of the similitudineswhich
may be attributable to Anselm, or which are indisputably his in
origin. If only because a good deal of this material was originally
designed to be delivered orally, it might be said to belong quite
properly to a rhetorical tradition. The 'rhetorical' nature of the
similitudinesmay, however, be more preciselyidentifiedif we regard
them as examples of the practice of inductio, or argumentby analogy.
The author of the Liber Anselmi de humanis moribusexplains that
the work contains a series of analogies whose purpose is to enable the
message of the text to be held in the memoryas long as possible :
suo interiectas
loco diximus,
Haec de humanismoribusper similitudines
quo diutiusmemoriateneantur.3
Whetheror not this statementof purpose, like the similitudinesthemselves, derives directlyfromAnselm himself,it certainlysuggests that
Anselm's use of analogy had a rhetorical source. The two terms
memoria4 and locus belong to the art of memorization,and to that of
topics; the term similitudo itself, and the related term exemplum,
belong to technical rhetorical usage. It seems not unreasonable to
suggestthat Anselm's analogies should be viewed as rhetoricaldevices.
Sic aliquidpersimilitudinem
recolendumdictumdiutiusmemorie
tenetur,
recentius.5
que memoriaoccurrit
1 HistoriaEcclesiastica,
ed. M. ChibnallII (Oxford1969),p. 296.
2 Memorials
andF. S. Schmitt(London1969).
ofSt.Anselm
, ed. R. W. Southern
3 Memorials, 93.8-9.
pp.
4 On
see F. Yates, The ArtofMemory(London1966).
memory,
0 Memorials,
p. 93.11-12.
8l

23:31:55 PM

A saying which makes its point by means of analogy is held in the

memory longer and is more easily recalled; the spiritual guidance
contained in the De humanis moribus is to become the possession of
the listenerin such a way that he can draw on it frommemory.
Professor Southern points out that the only direct evidence as to
the formthese pieces originallytook lies in the Prologue to Alexander's
Liber ex dictisbeatiAnselmi,6whereAlexander, (a monk of Canterbury),
says that his work contains:
in comviriAnselmi. . . quae cumloqueretur
quaedamde dictismagnifici
litterisquam brevisdilaberentur,
mune,ut potui,excepi ... ne memoriae
simepotuicommendavi,
penes me cupiensilia reservari.7
Alexander has listened hard and writtendown what he can remember
in case it is forgotten; but he has done so quam brevissime
, as briefly
as possible. Excepi , too, may suggest that he has made extracts. For
various reasons these are clearly not entirerenderingsof what Anselm
has to say. What is memorable- the concrete, the colourful,what is
most immediately related to ordinary life, has survived. Few of
Anselm's listenerswould have found the elements of abstract thought
in his argumentas invitinglymemorable as the colourfulillustrations
which reinforce that argument. Like the agentes imagines of the
Rhetoricaad Herennium,8they consist of lively and vivid images. It
seems possible that in the Similitudines we have a selection from
Anselm's sermons and discourses made, not as a summary of the
argument, but as a collection of exempla, his essentially rhetorical
illustrationsof that argument,which serve to make it easier to understand, to make it easier to rememberand, most important of all, to
make the argumentitselfmore cogent. Anselm's use of analogy should
perhaps be seen as essentially a formof argument by inductio.
This view of Anselm as a 'rhetorical' writerseems to be borne out
by ProfessorSouthern's commentthat the words spoken by St. Anselm
in commune, as Alexander puts it, 'may mean either in the monastic
chapter or in formalsermons'.9That is, these illustrationscome from
formalrather than informaldiscourse, and may thereforehave been
subjected, in their original form,to Anselm's usual rigorousstylistic
scrutiny.The formin which these works have been transmittedto us
makes it impossibleto judge theirstyle as ifit were Anselm's. The men
8 Memorials,
p. 19.
7 Memorials,
p. 107.5-9.
8 Rhetorica
ad Herenmum,
III, xxn.37.
9 Memorials,
p. 19.
82

23:31:55 PM

who transmitted Anselm's sayings were chiefly interested in their

context, in the moral and spiritual counsel they gave, not in their
function as part of a complex literary and theoretical composition.
But it seems unlikely that Anselm's sermons and his addresses were
casually put together; everywherein his writings there is evidence
of his immense conscientiousnessand carefulness10 and his sense of
literaryform.
Eadmer, Anselm's biographer and friend, shows an awareness of
the dimension of style in the Prologue to his De beatitudineperennis
vitae which suggests that he was conscious of the stylisticcare with
which Anselm composed his talks. His view of the matter is that an
appropriatestylemakes a propervehicle formaterial whichis beautiful
and pleasing in subject-matter [materia . . . pulchra et appetibilis). It
is the subject-matterwhich is of importance, and the elegant flowof
words must convey that subject-matter convincingly:
materiasiquidempulchraet appetibilis,cum narratursermoneincultoet
soletnonnumquam
audientisanimumquam
magisoffendere
contemptibili,
demulcere.Quapropter
vereorne hocipsumin meo factoalicuicontingat,
scilicetne materiadecensindecentistylodigesta,id apud hominum
mentes
efficiat,ut quae priusper se sine scriptoplacebat,ex scriptideinceps
foeditatevilescat.11
is lovelyand appealing,whenit is spokenofin
Even ifthesubject-matter
to
an unpolished
andcoarsestyleit sometimes
presentsa stumbling-block
Therefore
I am
the listener'smindratherthan a sourceof edification.
afraidin case that is truehere,and lest pleasingmatterexpressedin an
unpleasingstyleshouldhave such an effecton men's mindsthat what
seemsless, not
pleasedthemin its own rightbeforeI wrote,afterwards
more,desirable.
The concern for the convincing and pleasing of an audience, the
awareness of the power of stylisticcontrivances to alter the attitudes
of the listener and to make him more receptive, show a rhetorician's
approach. We meet a similar view in Anselm's Cur Deus Homo,
whereholythingsare said to requirean appropriatestylisticexpression:
si tam decorammateriamincomptoet contemptibili
dictamineexarare
praesumo.12
It would be a presumption,says Anselm, if he were to employ too
lowly a style in writingof such high matters. The term contemptibilis
10For example,Letters
42, 43, 60, 64 (S III) emphasisehisexactingcarein the
to Anselm'swritings
are to AnselmiOpera
oftexts.All references
transcription
Omnia,ed. F. S. Schmitt(Rome/Edinburgh
1938-68)6 Vols. = S.
11Memorials,
p. 273.18-24.
" 11.49.21-2.
83

23:31:55 PM

recalls Eadmers usage; perhaps this was a matter on which he had

heard Anselm speak.13There are two elementshere: that of the proper
expression of spiritual matters in such a way as to do honour to God,
and that of the expression of spiritual matters in such a way as to
make them not only delicious but digestibleto those who receive them
- and this reflectsa rhetorician's concern for
persuasiveness.
If, then,the SimilitudinesrepresentremnantsofAnselm's own work,
they were orally delivered works, an equivalent of the speeches of
classical orators,in that they were intended to make theirimpact on
an audience immediately and by ear alone. There is no provision for
the slow scrutinyof argument which was possible- and necessaryforthe reader of Anselm's densely-packedand closely-arguedtreatises.
Anselm had to make his points in such talks, as a Roman oratormight,
by the use of exempla,)in the Similitudinesit is preciselythose exempla
which survive, in the formof separate, detached pieces of argumentby-analogy.
Anselm's analogies have a structural functionin that they match
exactly the portions of argument with which they are paired. They
are tailored to fitinto a formally-disciplined
method of demonstration.
This becomes more evident when the 'detached' analogies of the
Memorials are set beside the analogies which occur in the Cur Deus
Homo, for example, where they take their place in a continuous
sequence of reasoning or argumentation.
The similitudinest as we have them, show evidence of having been
fashionedfromthe raw material of Anselm's observationoflife around
him; they are artificial constructs made from natural materials.
Eadmer, in his Vita, describes several of the analogies which Anselm
drew fromobservation of ordinaryevents.14The spontaneous comparison of a boy who has trapped a bird with the Devil who has a hold
on the human soul, drew a moral fora moment out of a small event.
Such comparisons then became part of Anselm's stock of analogies;
they were the raw material of the sermons or talks later delivered
formally,in commune.R. W. Southern lists several analogies which
appear in more than one of the works printedin the Memorials or in
the Vita Anselmi.15Rhetoricians in classical times stored just such a
13Augustine'sDe doctrina
Book IV, containsa description
of the
Christiana,
threestylesdistinguished
anda discussion
oftheirbest
byclassicalrhetoricians,
use in Christianrhetoric.
14Eadmer's LifeofSt. Anselm
, ed. R. W. Southern
(Oxford1962),pp. 35-6,37,
7> 74-5,77n>89,90.
15Memorials,
p. 11.
84

23:31:55 PM

stock of commonplaces in their practised memories; Anselm's reuse

of 'edited' material on a number of occasions demonstrates the
deliberate and conscious way in which he made the most of the
material to hand, and matched it to the capacity and experience of
his audience. Eadmer's anecdotes belong perhaps to the genre of the
Vita. Anselm's analogies have a quite different rhetorical and
stylisticfunction and suggest that the adaptation he made shows a
'rhetorician's'concern.
This is not to imply that the terms similitudoand exemplumheld
an exclusively rhetoricalmeaning forAnselm. He uses both terms in
a variety of ways. Some of the terms of classical rhetoricmay have
found their way into eleventh centuryusage throughthe medium of
patristicand contemporaryScripturalcommentary;16they may have
held a number of alternative meanings in both common and technical
usage without entirely losing their technical rhetorical connotation.
But the consistencyof the formof Anselm's analogies in many respects
suggests that when Anselm used similitudo or exemftlumto signify
analogy, he intended something specific.
Anselm's similitudinesfall into two groups- those contained in the
treatises and those collected by others. They tend to follow a consistentpattern, perhaps most noticeable in the De humanis moribus.
The analogy is given in detail, and then its referenceto a doctrinal
or theological or spiritual matter is demonstratedby means of pointby-pointcomparisons. The elementsof the metaphor fitexactly; each
item has its counterpartin the spiritual explicatio. The structuralrelationshipbetween the parts of the analogy is the same as that between
the parts of the argument. In Similitudo 75-6 17 a king has a large
town in his kingdomwith a strongcastle in which thereis an impregnable keep. The town contains some sound and some unsound houses.
The king has a strong enemy who often rides into the town and
carries off the inhabitants of the unsound houses. He cannot steal
those who flee for refuge to the castle, unless they look out of the
window and are thus exposed to attack. Those held withinthe protection of the keep are perfectlysafe. The parallels between Christian
souls and the inhabitants of the town, between the castle and the
16Lanfranc,
forexample,speakson occasionofprobatio
orproof,and ofvarious
aspectsof topicsin the Pauline Commentaries
printedin PL 150. See, too,
M. Gibson,Lanfranc'
s Commentary
on thePaulineEpistlesin: JournalofTheologicalStudies(1971),pp. 86-112.
17Memorials
, pp. 66-7.
85

23:31:55 PM

monastery,the special drawingof attentionto the dangersof continued

attachment to the world among monks, are spelt out patiently and
point-by-point.The analogy is carefully constructed so as to match
its counterpart meanings exactly.18
The analogies which appear in the Cur Deus Homo formpart of the
argument, but, removed from their context, they show the familiar
characteristics of point-by-pointcorrespondencebetween matters of
common experience and theological issues In the fourthchapter of
Book One, Boso says that the arguments of the faithfulseem to unbelievers to be like pictures, They are beautiful and pleasing in the
way that pictures are :
Omniahaec pulchraet quasi quaedampicturaesuscipiendasunt.19

But the painter paints on solid material so that his work may last :
Nam qui pieturamvult facere,eligitaliquid solidmsuperquod pingat,
ut maneatquod pingit.Nemoenimpingitin aqua vel aere,quia nullaibi
manentpicturaevestigia.20
If unbelievers say that the arguments advanced are mere pictures
painted on clouds, it is necessary to show them the solid ground of
truth on which the 'pictures' are painted:
quasi super nubem pingerenon existimant.Monstrandaergoprius est
veritatissoliditasrationabilis.21
Here the analogy with painting agrees point by point with the
argument. It has the function of making an abstract idea easier to
understand,by renderingit concrete; it rounds out the reader's understanding by providing an illustration. It also adds cogency to the
argument by providing an analogous piece of evidence which is
'common knowledge', and whose reliability cannot therefore be
doubted. If the reader is able to accept the truth of the analogy, he
is led to accept the truth of the argument which it substantiates.
Thus Anselm's analogy meets his readers' needs on every level of
understandingand experience necessary to convince all kinds of men.
18G. Shepherd,in his editionof the AncreneWisse (London1959) (Parts 6
and 7), remarkson a numberof parallelsbetweenAnselm'ssimilitudines
and
his prayersand meditations,
and certainthemesof the AncreneWisse; the
authorseemsto have knownand used theseworksof Anselm.See pp. xxviii,
ofAnselm'sanalogiesin monastic
circles
xliii,55, 60, 62. The lastingpopularity
theirpurposewithstriking
success.
suggeststhattheyfulfilled
19S, II. 51.16-17.
20S, II.51.18-21.
21S, II.52.2-3.
86

23:31:55 PM

That is his stated aim; in the firstchapter of the Cur Deus Homo he
explains that the problem of the necessity for the Incarnation is one
which concernsnon solumlitter
ati sed etiamilliterati,22It is the rhetorician's task to make his argumentsconvincing to all kinds of men, in
classical rhetoric,while the arguments of the dialecticians require a
specialist knowledge for their appreciation. Anselm's practice, then,
would seem to have good rhetoricalprecedent.
In Chapter Nineteen of Book I Anselm describes God's concern for
the people He redeems, by a typically 'developed' analogy, in which
the relationshipsof the characters and the events and theirsequence
are carefullyand precisely matched with the events they represent.
This analogy (whichBoso himselfcalls a similitudo)offersa conspectus
of Anselm's skill in handling the technique:
A. Ponamusdivitemaliquemin manuteneremargaritam
pretiosam,
quam
nulla umquampollutiotetigit,et quam nulluspossitalius amovere
de manueiusnisiipso permitiente,
et earndisponatrecondere
in thesaurumsuum,ubi sintcarissimaet pretiosissima
quae possidet.
B. Cogitohoc,velutantenos sit.
A. Quid si ipse permittat
eandemmargaritam
ab aliquo invido excutide
manu sua in caenum,cum prohiberepossit,ac postea earnde caeno
sumenspollutamet non lotam in aliquemsuum mundumet carum
locum, deineeps illam sic servaturus,recondat? Putabisne illum
?
sapientem
B. Quomodohoc possum? Nam nonnemeliusessetsatis,ut margaritam
suam mundamteneretet servaretquam pollutam?
A. Nonne similiterfaceretdeus, qui hominemangelissociandumsine
ut accensus
peccatoquasi in manusua tenebatin paradisoet permisit,
invidiadiaboluseumin lutumpeccatiquamvisconsentientem
deiceret
- si enimprohibere
- ;
velietdiabolum,non possettentarehominem
nonne,inquam,similiter
faceret,si hominempeccatisordemaculatum
sine omnilavatione,id est absque omni satisfactione,
talem semper
mansurum
saltemin paradisum,de quo eiectusfuerat,reduceret
?
B. Similitu
dinemsi deushocfaceret,
negarenonaudeo,et idcircoeumhoc
facerepossenonannuo.23
'Let us put the case of a rich man holding in his hand a precious
pearl', says Anselm. Ponamus may mean 'let us postulate'; but it
seems here to indicate some exercise of the imagination more vivid
and immediate. Anselm is conjuring up the circumstancesas though
the episode were takingplace in frontof him. Boso says that he under22S, ll.48.5-6.
23S, II.85.6-25.
87

23:31:55 PM

stands the situation vlut ante nos sit, 'as though it were taking place
beforeour very eyes'.
This recalls Quintiliano comment that comparatio is a means of
placing a matter sub oculos. It is as though the affairwere not merely
being described, but set directlybeforethe audience's gaze:
Illa vero,ut ait Cicero,sub oculossubiectiotum fierisoletcum resnon
universased perpartis.24
gestaindicatursed ut sit gestaostenditur,
It bringsthe material to life by means of a detailed and lively account
of the event or circumstance.In keepingwiththis is the fact that much
of Anselm's vocabulary here seems to have been chosen forits concrete
and tangible qualities: tenere; tetigit
; amovere; disponed,all referto
the touching or moving of the pearl. The pearl is struck out of its
owner's hand {excuti)into the mud and filthof the ground.The owner
picks it up (sumens); before he puts it away (recondat)in its proper
place, he will surely clean it. Similarly, {similiter),God, who held
{tenebat)or 'se man in paradise, as if in his hand {quasi in manu sua)
will surely lead him back to the place from which he was cast out
{eiectus),cleansed of the maculatum of sin. In the explanation of the
analogy, Anselm uses words to describe the spiritual meaning of the
concrete example he has given which are just as colourfulas those in
which he firstdescribes the episode of the pearl. In lutumpeccati; sine
omni lavatione, have lutum and lavatione used metaphorically.Only
once {quasi in manu sua) does Anselm say 'as if to show that he is
meaning fromthe literal to the metaphorical. His structransferring
tural analogies gain a great deal of their force fromthe use of terms
as well as subject-matterimmediatelyrecognizable and acceptable to
the reader or listener- and with the added impact of concrete detail.
They function,in a sense, as the agentesimaginesof the Ad Herennium
do, non multas vagas, but exact and specific, made brilliant not
by the startling details which the author of the Ad Herenniumrecommends, but by the perhaps equally memorablepractice of making
a novel or strikinguse of familiarmaterial. The differencemay reflect
nothingmore than a change of taste. These devices, quo magisinsignita
sit forma, help to fix a structural complex of ideas in the mind by
means of a technique which has its originsin classical rhetoric.
The circumstancesof Anselm's life provided, by modern standards,
a limited range of material fromwhich analogies might be fashioned;
had he chosen to draw on literaryexamples, he would no doubt have
S4Quintilian,
Institutio
OratoriaIX.ii.40.
88

23:31:55 PM

found scope forfancifulimaginings in the material provided by the

classical poets. He, like all contemporarymasters, taught grammar
to schoolboys from such texts.25As it was, he restrictedhimselfto
the stuffof natural life around him; plants and animals and his own
observationofnatural phenomenagave himsubject-matterforanalogy.
The De conceptuvirginali, forexample, commentson the way in which
'nature' seems to draw light thingsupwards and 'heavy' thingsdownwards: Natura levis sursum,gravia deorsumtrahit,26and how the earth,
dug over and sown with seeds, produces plants and trees whetherit
willor not: terramaliquando volntateprius colenteetseminantealiquando
nullo voluntatisoperepraecedenteherbaset arboresinnmerasproducere
et eas fructificare
facit.27Anselm has, of course, no means of knowing
what laws underly these natural phenomena, but he makes a point
of the fact that these are thingswe know fromdirect observation,not
fromwhat we are taught: quae facilius visu quam doctrinacognoscimus.28
Whatever works of 'physica*may have been available to his contemporaries Anselm displays no book-knowledge of the theory of the
natural sciences. His intentionis to restricthimselfto analogies which
all his friendsand pupils would immediately understand. Even the
analogy of the wild beast held by chains,29or that of the rudderless
ship,30would have presented no problems, even to those who have
not seen such things for themselves, because the component parts
of the image are generally recognizable.
These familiar items make up several analogies. Plants reappear
in chapter IX of the De ventate, in a discussion of wholesome and
poisonous plants : si esses in loco ubi scires esse salubresherbaset mortferas, sed nescires eas discernere.'If you were in a place where you
knew there were curative and poisonous herbs, but you did not know
how to tell them apart . . . ' 31 Both De grammaticoXII 32 and De
liberiate arbitrii V 33 have horses and oxen employed in analogies.
There is considerable variety in the way these analogies are put
together,and in the purposes they serve. Use of material ready-to25S, II. Letter64. Anselmconfessesto Maurice,an
ex-pupil,thathe always
foundsuchexercisestedious.
26S. II.153.29-30.
27S, II. 153,30-154.1.
28S, II. 154,1-2.
29S, II. 146.8-9,cf.De casu diaboli,26, S, 1.
274.20-2.
30ibid.
31S, I.189.10.
32S, 1.156-9.
33S, I.216.
89

23:31:55 PM

hand and commonplace does not necessarily make for dull and
repetitive arguments, any more than it did for the classical orator,
with his stock of rhetorical commonplaces. Anselm's range, even
within the limits he sets himself,is considerable: light, sight, and
blindness, colour, the naked man and his tunic, drunkenness and
sobriety, a steward and the household for which he is responsible,
pieces of wood and stones, all come to mind. Some of these images
are clearly prompted by Boethian precedents, but Anselm makes
them his own.
Much more importantis the range of conceptual purposes to which
Anselm is able to apply this material. Analogies are not restrictedto
the comparison of like with like, and, as Cicerorecommends34Anselm
is able to make his analogies serve purposes of contrast and contrariety,too. The steward sees to the feedingof a household, but the
master,rather than the steward, is the provider,because not all that
belongs to the master also belongs to the steward. But everything
which belongs to the Father is equally the Son's.35 Here the analogy
shows the 'opposite' ofitselfto be true of the Godhead. In De concordia
I.iv Anselm asks whetherany two actions could seem more 'opposite'
than coming and going: Quae namque magis ofifiositasunt quam adire
et abire? But when someone goes fromplace to place he both comes
and goes: idem ire est adire et abire.ze Here the analogy is intended
to make its point by forcingthe reader to stop and think again. It
is the very familiarityof the subject-matter of the imagery which
helps Anselm to bring his readers up short. The understandingruns
automatically into its accustomed paths; Anselm stops it by showing
the inconsistency present in the natural, unquestioned assumption
with which we began.
At a . more philosophically challenging level, Anselm employs
analogies as a means of approach to some of the problems of 'nothingness', and a series of related difficultiesassociated with the need to
come to an understandingof 'what-is-no; he attempts to do so by
making comparison with something which is immediately understandable as having existence. In the De conceptuvirginali xxiii he
discusses whether the seed of something which has not yet come to
be that something,is in itself something or nothing.37In chapter V
34Cicero,Topica,ed. H. M. Hubbell (London1949),iii.15-17and xi.46-49.
36S, II. 214.2-6,De processione
Spiritussanciixiv.
38b, II.253.2-4.
37S, II.162-6.
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23:31:55 PM

of the same work, and in the De casu diaboli xxvi, the imagery of
helmsman and rudder, wild beast and chains is concerned with the
question of how the absence of somethingmay be said to be a cause :
the absence of a rudder causes the ship to be wrecked; the absence of
chains, or a bridle, causes the beast to run amok. Another kind of
difficultyis touched on in more than one analogy concerned with
writing. In the De conceptuvirginali iv we are reminded how when
someone writes in error, the writingremains, even after the writer
has ceased to write: verbigratia cum in scribendoquod scribinon debet
,38So we see how the
transitscriptio, qua fiuntfigurae quae remanent
performanceof an evil deed may sometimes cause a lasting result,
even when the will to evil and the evil action itselfare over and done
with. These illustrationshelp the reader to grasp the general shape
of what are sometimes profound philosophical problems, with at
least sufficientfirmnessfor the purposes of the piece of argumentin
hand. Anselm makes use of his very ordinary source-material at
several levels, fromthe simple pastoral analogies with whichwe began,
to such problematical cases as these.
There seems, then, some reason to regard Anselm's use of the
similitudoboth in the treatises and in his talks and sermons, as in
some sense a rhetorical practice, or at least a method which brings
togetherelements of rhetoricaltheorywith contemporarymethods of
theological exposition. Professor Southern comments that 'this kind
of talk struck men as something new'.39What prompted Anselm to
make his new use of an old technique was the presence of souls in
need of instruction.The capacity forunderstandingand remembering
which his pupils showed governed his methods of teaching. Like any
good orator,this oratordei adapted his utterance to his audience ; like
any skilled rhetorician,he strove to make what he said memorable
by its immediacy and by the vigour of its impact, and in order to do
that he furnishedhis argumentwith exempla; he even argued by means
of exempla.
In the First Recension 40 of the De incarnatione Verbi Anselm
declares that neither the dialectical deceptions of the sophisma nor
the misleading powers of the colours of rhetoricwill persuade him to
alter the orthodoxyof his views :
3*S, II.145.2-3.
39St. Anselmana hisBiographer
1966).
(Cambridge
40See F. S. Schmitt,Cinq recensions
de /'Epistolade incarnatione
Verbi,in:
RevueBndictine
(1939),p. 275.
91

23:31:55 PM

nscio credo quod aliquis mihihoc dialecticissophismatibus

possit
coloribusmihi posse
concludere;sed certussum nullumhoc rethoricis
persuadere.41
His objection is clearly to the abuse of dialectical methods, not to
their use at all in the context of theological discussion. In a later
passage, he describes the dangers of launching too early into difficult
questions, where the untrained may be led astray by the multitudeof
,42 Anselns range of
sophistries: multiplicia sophismatumdiverticula
methods of argument and demonstrationvery evidentlyincludes not
only dialectical techniques, but those techniques which the classical
rhetoriciansclaimed for their own. As well as proof by syllogism,we
find instances of argument by inductio: Anselm explains that he has
heard that Roscelin argues that the three Persons of the Trinity are
like three angels. The pagans defend theirlaw; the Jews defend their
law; thereforethe Christian, too, must defend his faith in the face
of such a challenge:
legemsuam,
Pagani defendunt
Iudaei defendunt
legemsuam.
fidemnostram.43
debemusdefendere
Ergo et nos Christiani
Such an argument fromanalogy, or similarity,carries conviction not
because it shows how a conclusion proceeds froma series of premises
as it were 'vertically',but ratherhow the 'horizontal' likenessbetween
two self-evidentstatementsand a third (which requires 'proof') serves
to make the final statement more convincing.
An explicit example of argument from similitudo occurs in the
following passage:
Sed forsitanipse non dicit: 'sicutsunttresangeli',sed ille qui mihieius
sed solummodo
hanc ex suo posuitsimilitudinem,
mandavitquaestionem,
alicuiussimilitudinis.44
essetresres,sineadditamento
trespersonasaffirmat
Perhaps, says Anselm, trying to do Roscelin all possible justice,
Roscelin did not himselfadd the analpgy 'like three angels', but said
merely that the three Persons of the Godhead are distinct; perhaps
the analogy was added by the transmitterof the story. It thus seems
to have been a common practice to add some illustrativeexample to
the bald statement of a proposition,either to make the case clearer,
or to make it more convincing.
41S, 1.282.25-7.
42S, 1.284.31.
43S, 1.285.22-5.
44S, I.288.32-5.
92

23:31:55 PM

However ably Anselm manipulates the formalsyllogism,it does not

appear to have been his preferredmethod of argument,and it is clearly
far from being the only method with which he was familiar. He
prefersto arrive at his conclusionsby othermeans. In the De grammaticoAnselm asks his pupil merelyto 'tes his conclusions by means of
syllogisms.45With a skill and flexibilitywhich argues a considerable
mastery of all the forms and methods of argument available in his
day, Anselm deploys a series of techniques of argumentationin what
seems at times almost the spirit of the classical rhetorician.Anselm
triesto take his reader by storm,to overwhelmhis objections by means
of all the formsand varieties of argumentto which the human reason
will respond. Among these, the analogy has an importantplace.
The similitudinesmay perhaps, then,be seen as essentiallyrhetorical
bothin the use that is made of them in argumentand in theirliterary
function. Anselm was following established traditions in several
respects. Yet, in Professor Southern's view, Anselm's addresses to
his community were new. As he points out, there are few twelfth
centurymanuscripts of the works which contain the Similitudines.46
They were not to become popular until the thirteenthcenturywhen
their appeal was to philosophers who found material for logical
exercises in Anselm's divisions and subdivisions, as well as to the
preachersof sermons.The similitudoitselfwas a device of only limited
use to dialectical writersof the twelfthcentury.Abelard speaks of an
image of the Trinity he has just employed as a similitudo, and says
that he proposes to look for another.47But such usages are rare.
The peculiarly Anselmian nature of the similitudines lies in the
rigorous discipline he imposed in the structure of his analogies, and
in the care he took to make themfrommaterialfamiliarto his audience ;
we should not be surprisedto findhim using the technique at all. The
similitudowas nothing new; it was not even rediscoveredby Anselm.
But he made new and perhaps unprecedentedlyfulluse of its possibilities. In Anselm's hands the similitudo becomes a worthy tool of
Christianrhetoricalargument.
Reading, England
Departmentof History
45S, 1.147,21-2.
46St. Anselmand hisBiographer
, pp. 221-2.
47 TheologiaChristiana,ed. M. Buytaert,CorpusChristianorum
Continuatio
MedievalisI, p. 304.1234.On the "Nile image"hereand in Anselmsee my
article,St. Anselm'sImages of Trinity,in: Journalof TheologicalStudies
(1976),pp. 12-23.
93

23:31:55 PM

Vivarium
XIV, 2 (1976)
John Duns Scotus on Henry of Ghent's
Arguments for Divine Illumination:
The Statement of the Case *

JEROME V. BROWN

I. Introduction
some time,it has been generallyconceded that Henry of Ghent
For (P-I293) was one of the more significantinfluencesin the intellectual development of John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308).1
Henry, also known as Doctor Solemnis,2was secular master in the
Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris from 1276 to 1292,
except for a brief period when he was suspended fromhis teaching
duties because of his participation in the quarrel between the regular
and secular masters over the confessional privileges.3A member of
* Muchof the researchforthis articlewas supportedby a grantfromThe
Canada Council.
1 See E. Gilson,JeanDuns Scot (Paris: J. Vrin,1952),10; E. Bettoni,Duns
Scotus: TheBasic PrinciplesofHis Philosophy
, B. Bonansea,tr. (Washington,
to
D.C. : The CatholicUniversityof AmericaPress,1961), 20-21.Referring
on thispoint),Bettonicontends
Gilson(withwhom,he says,he is in agreement
thatScotusis notso muchan adversaryof Henryas a, "... companionwith
a common
whomhe discussesproblemsin orderto clarifyand strengthen
Aristotelian
doctrine."Scotusis describedas movingwithinthesamePlatoniclineofthoughtas Henryand agreeswithhimon the substanceofhisteachingdisagreeingwith him only on certainparticularpoints so that he can
"... in its essentialtraits,so as to makeit a stronger
presentAugustinianism.
and less rigidsystemin regardto Aristotelianism."
Thereis certainly
muchin Scotusthatwouldlendcredenceto Bettoni'sview.
Our own positionremains,however,that he has overstatedthe case forcooperation.Scotuswas muchmoretheCriticofHenrythanBettoniwouldhave
us believe.And thistraditionof opposingScotusto Henryis to be preferred
to the olderFranciscantraditionof opposinghimto ThomasAquinas.Even
theoldertradition
whileacknowledging
Gilson,in hismassivestudy,continued
his attention.
thatit was'Henryof Ghentto whomScotuswas directing
2 On one possiblemeaningof this ratherambiguoustitle,see J. V. Brown,
in: Recherches
de thologie
ancienneet
DivineIllumination
in HenryofGhent,
mdivale(henceforth:
RTAM), XLI (1974),180.
3 The secularmasters,
oforder-priests
everanxiousto limittheprivileges
(such
maintained
as theFranciscansand theDominicans)teachingat theUniversity,
that sins confessedto a regularwereproperlyabsolvedonlywhenconfessed
in 1290and
againto a secular.Pope NicholasIV ruledin favouroftheregulars
94

23:32:05 PM

the papal commission which drew up the list of 219 propositions

condemned by Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277, he seems
to have represented the more conservative strain of philosophical
thinkingat the University in the last quarter of the 13th century.
Certainlyin his writingshe reveals himselfas a staunch supporterof
Augustine and not at all in sympathy with the Latin Averroists,or
heterodox Aristotelians,as they are sometimes called.4
Scotus, also known as Doctor SuUilis, could have studied under
Henry at Paris, but there is absolutely no evidence that he did so.5
It is by no means certain in what year he went to Paris, but probably
it was not until 1292 or 1293 when, aftera briefperiod at Oxford,he
took up his studies with Gonsalvus of Spain and remained with him
until 1296. Surely, then, it is safer to assume that it was throughhis
writtenworks rather than throughhis lectures that Henry exercised
his influenceon the Subtle Doctor. The texts, unfortunately,present
special problems of their own.
in the dispute.Henryprotestedthe imimposedsilenceon the participants
positionof silenceand was promptlysuspendedfromhis teachingdutiesby
the Papal Legate,CardinalBenot Gaetani (later,Pope BonifaceVIII). See
Yves M.-J.Congar,Aspectsecclsiologiques
de la query
elle entremendiants
et
sculiers
dansla seconde
moitidu XIIIe sicleetle debutdu XIVe, in: Archives
d'histoiredoctrinale
et littraire
du moyenge (henceforth:
AHDL), XXXVI
(1961), 50; J. Marrone,The Absoluteand OrdainedPowersof thePope: An
UneditedText of Henryof Ghent,in: Mediaeval Studies (henceforth:
MS),
XXXVI (1974),21-22.
Henrygave theopeningaddressat theCouncilof FrenchBishopsconvened
at Paris in 1289. According
to Congar(p. 48, n. 26), the councilwas heavily
conservative
and strongly
forthemendicants.
opposedto confessional
privileges
Marrone(pp. 21-22) portraysHenry as conservative. . . but cautiousand
so.
compromisingly
His suspension
fromteachingmusthavebeenshortlived,
forhe was disputing
at Parisbothin 1290and in 1291.See JosGmezCaff
Quodlibeta
arena,Crono, in:
logia de la Suma de Enriquede Gantepor relacina sus Quodlibetos
XXXVIII (1957), I33I JeanPaulus,Henride Gand: Essai sur
Gregorianum,
les tendances
de se mtaphysique
(Paris: J. Vrin,1938),XV-XVI.
4 Henryhimselfexpresslyrefersto his presence
on
amongthe 16 theologians
the Commission
of 1277. See R. Macken,La temporalit
radicalede la crature
selonHenride Gand,in: RTAM,XXXVIII (1971),220.
The definitive
accountof the lifeof Henryis stillthatof FranzEhrle,Beiberhmter
Scholastiker
in: Archiv
, I, HeinrichvonGhent,
trgezu denBiographien
frLiteraturund Kirchengeschichte
des Mittelalters,
I (1885),365-401.Also
translated
surla biographie
deHenrideGand,
by J. Raskop,Recherches
critiques
dit le DocteurSolennel,in: Bulletinde la socithistoriqueet littrairede
Tournai,XXI (suppl.),1887.
6 What we know
of Scotus,togetherwithappropriatesources,is givenby
Gilson,AppendixI, 670-672.See also, C. Balie, ''Duns Scotus,John/'in The
New CatholicEncyclopedia(New York: McGraw-Hill,
1967-),IV, 1102.
95

23:32:05 PM

Neither the Summa QuaestionumOrdinariarumnor the Quodlibetu,

the two major works of Henry and the only ones whose authenticity
is unquestioned, has as yet appeared in a critical edition.6 In fact,
until recently,neitherworkwas even readilyaccessible.7As yet, therefore, there is simply not enough evidence available to make even a
tentative judgment about the adequacy or inadequacy of the texts as
we have them.
With regard to the texts of Scotus, we are in a much betterposition
thanks to the effortsof Fr. Carlo Balie and his colleagues on the
Scotist Commission.What had been lacking was a critical edition of
Scotus' major Commentaryon the Sentencesof Peter the Lombard,
the so-called Opus Oxoniense,as well as a critical edition of that work
which Balie, almost fiftyyears ago, referredto as the startingpoint
in the evolution of the thought of the Subtle Doctor. We refer of
course to the early Commentaryof Scotus knownas the LecturaPrima.
A fair estimate of the attitude of Scotus towards Henry demands a
close examination of the parallel texts in these two works.8
6 On worksofdoubtful
SerParticipado
see JosGmezCaffarena,
attribution,
en la Metafisicade Enriquede Gante(Rome: Gregorianum,
y Ser Subsistente
in Librum
op. cit.' JohnP. Zwaenpoel,The'Quaestiones
1958),ix-x; J.Marrone,
to theEscariolManuscript,
to Henryof GhentAccording
de Causis* Attributed
in: Unitas, XXII (1959), 799-809;R. Macken,La LecturaOrdinariaSuper
Henride Gand(Paris: Nauwelaerts,
attribu
SacrantScripturam
1972); Beryl
in: RTAM,XX
on theHexaemeron
byHenryofGhent,
Smalley,A Commentary
(1953),60-101.Mackenremarksthat the list of doubtfuland spuriousworks
attribu
: R. Macken,Le De poenetentia
to Henryis notyetfinished
attributed
in: RTAM, XXXVII
Note complmentaire,
Henry (sic) de Gand retrouv?
(1970),150.
7 A facsimileeditionof the uaesnonumUrdinariarum
:
(nenceortn
oftheQuodlibeta
Quod.)in
(henceforth:
SQO) appearedin 1953,and a facsimile
areto thesetwoeditions.SQO. 2 vols.Paris:IodocusBadius
1961.Allreferences
Ascensius,1520. (Facsimileeditionissued at St. Bonaventure,N.Y.: The
FranciscanInstitute,1953,2 vols.)Quod.2 vols.Paris: IodocusBadius Ascensius, 1518. (Facsimileeditionissued at Louvain: BibliothqueS. J., 1951,
2 vols.)
The methodof textcitationis givenin Brown,p. 180,n. 1, or in eitherof
worksby the same author:Sensationin HenryofGhent:A late
the following
in: Archivfr Geschichteder
mediaevalAristotelianAugustininsynthesis,
Philosophie,LII (1971), 238-239;Henryof Ghenton InternalSensation,in:
X (1972),15-16.
JournaloftheHistoryof Philosophy,
in studyingHenryof Ghent'stheory
On the textualproblemsencountered
see Paulus,1.
ofknowledge,
8 Here we can say something
about the inadequaciesof previouseditionsof
The CriticaleditionoftheOpusOxonion theSentences.
Scotus'Commentaries
enseis beingeditedunderthe title,"Ordinatio"(henceforth:
Ord.),a general
thattheworkwas dictatedby Scotusto a scribe,thenrevised
wordindicating
whichis simplya
froma Reportata,
and added to by himself.
Thus,it differs
96

23:32:05 PM

There can be little doubt that Scotus, when consideringthe problem

of divine illuminationin both the LP and in the Ord had beforehim
all the relevant texts of Henry of Ghent.9While dating must remain
tentativein the case of all fourworks,it is certain that the LP antedated the Ord.; 10that the SQO and the Quod, were composed side-byworkcompiledfromstudents'notes.See Balie,Les commentaires
de JeanDuns
Scotsur les quatreslivresdes sentences
(Louvain: Bureauxde la Revue, 1927),
ix-xv;246,n. 1; R. G. Wengert,TheDevelopment
oftheDoctrineoftheFormal
Distinction
in theLecturaPrimaofJohnDuns Scotus
, in: The Monist,XLIX
(1965), 586. The meaningof the termis also dealt with in an extended
introduction
to the criticaleditionitself.See I. Duns Scoti. Opera Omnia,
underthe directionof C. Balie, Civitas Vaticana,
by the ScotistCommission
Typis PolyglottisVaticanis,1950passim, vol. I, 142*-144*;161*; 172*.
In this studythe textswithwhichwe are especiallyconcernedappearin
Ord.tvol. Ill, publishedin 1954,and in LecturaPrima (henceforth:
LP), vol.
XVI, publishedin i960. On Balic's estimateof the LP, see his,Les commentairesde JeanDuns Scot . . . , 56-87.
Priorto thepublicationofthiscriticaledition,thetwomostfrequently
used
editionsoftheOpusOxoniense
werethoseoftheIrishFranciscan,
LukeWadding
and M. Fernandez-Garcia.
The LP was notpublishedat all beforethe edition
of the ScotistCommission.
Waddingeditedthe OperaOmniain 1639and this
was theeditionreissuedat Parisin 1893by Vivs.'Waddingacceptedthe view
thatScotusdid onlytwo Commentaries
on the Sentences
: the Opus Oxoniense
and the ReportataParisiensia.So he merelytook the editionof 1478 and
it withcodex Vat.Lat. 876. His divisionsof the Opus Oxoniense
corrected
are
, forexample,are not dividedintopartes.See the
inadequate:the distinctiones
to thecriticaleditionoftheOperaOmnia,I, 130*; 142*;285*-287*.
Introduction
Fernandez-Garcia
editedthe Opus Oxoniense
in 1912. He wentto the Venice,
1490 text of BernardinusRizus, accordingto the emendationof Gratianus
Brixianus.Fernandez-Garcia
himselfstatedthat this 1490 text is preferable
to thatof WaddingVivs. Thereis a greatdeal of materialin the lattertext
whichshouldnot be thereat all, and thereis muchleftout whichshouldbe
there.See OperaOmnia,I, 130**1
31*.
In thisstudy,references
to the Ordinatio
appearby book,distinction,
part,
; volumenumberoftheOperaOmnia,
question
page and sectionnumber.Thus:
"
"Ord.,I, 3, i, 4; III, 160, 262," refersto, Ordinatio
, Book I, distinction
3,
part i, question4; VolumeIII of the criticaledition,page 160,section262."
to theLP are handledin a similarfashion.Thus: "LP, I, 3, 1, 3;
References
"
XVI, 302,191/'refers
to, LecturaPrima,Book I, distinction
3, part1, question
3; VolumeXVI ofthe criticaledition,page 302,section191."
9 The paralleltextswe are considering
are: LP, I, 3, 1, 3 and Ord.,I, 3, 1, 4. In
bothcases,the criticaleditionunequivocally
identifies
Henryof Ghentas the
authorof thepositionwhichScotusis reporting.
10A pointnow generallyconceded,but at one timehotlydisputed.See the
Praefatioto the LP in the criticaleditionof the OperaOmniaof Scotus,vol.
in vol. XVII, i*-4*; i2*-i3*,and Ord.,I, I57*ff.
XVI, xi, and theProlegomena
How Scotisticis the LP ? Longpr,in 1952, was maintainingthat there
betweenthe LP and the Opus Oxoniense.
are, "seriousdoctrinaldifferences/'
he was a bit vagueaboutwherethesedoctrinaldifferences
were
Unfortunately,
to theLP, vol. XVII, i*-4*.The editorsofthecritical
located.See Prolegomena
editionare themselves
muchmorecircumspect
in thematter.The questioncan
97

23:32:05 PM

side roughlybetween 1276 and 1292; 11that Scotus did no lecturing

on the Sentencesat Oxford or elsewhere before 1297.12
betweentheLP and the parallel
comparisons
onlybe answeredafterfurther
textsin the Ord.See Praefatioto theLP, vol. XVI, xi. It is preciselysucha
here.
studythatwe are undertaking
comparative
cited(see n. 8 supra),Wengert
In his articlepreviously
concludedthatthere
differences
betweentheLP andtheOrd.withregardto
wereno majordoctrinal
of thelanguagein
the firstsevendistinctions.
Onlythe increasedtechnicality
theOrd.makesthemdifferent.
572.Thereis justicein hisremarkthat
Wengert,
iftheLP was in factundertheeyesofScotuswhenhe was composing
theOrd.,
we shouldhardlyexpectto findthelaterworkto
then,"Undersuchconditions
differ
muchfromthe first.Afterall, one doesn'tmakemassiverevisionsin a
margin."Ibid.,586.
11Paulus himself,
thatwhilethefifteen
as earlyas 1938,acknowledged
Quod.
of Henrycould be dated between1276 and 1292,in manycases, individual
Quod,admittedof morethanone date. Paulus,XV-XVL SubsequentscholarSee R. Macken,Les Quodshiphas been unableto eliminatethe uncertainty.
parisien,in: RTAM,XXXVI (1970),
libetsd'Henride Gandetleur exemplar
81, n. 26.
thattheSQO and the
Again,Paulus,Ehrle,Glorieuxand othersrecognized
overthe durationof
but side-by-side,
Quod,werecomposednot successively,
career.See Paulus, XVI-Xyil, n. 4, and R. Macken,La
Henry'sprofessorial
d'Henride Gand,in: RTAM,
divinedans la philosophie
thorie
de l'illumination
XXXIX (1972), 88-89.But the major studyon this pointremainsGmez
to
Caffarena's,
Cronologia(see . 3 supra). Thereare at least 100 references
to theQuod,in the SQO (Cronologia
theSQO intheQuod.; at least70 references
,
116).Ifwe allow1276-1292as thedatesfortheQuod.,thenwe can concludethat
thefirst20 articlesoftheSQO axepriorto Quod.I (p. 130),but therestofthe
SQO was composedat the same timeas the variousQuod.See the schematic
chartin,Cronologia,
133.
12But he maywellhave beendoingsomeroughdraftworkon a commentary
whilestudyingat Paris between1292/93and 1296. It is of courseperfectly
theLP withina year(say,1297),thenimmediately
possiblethathe completed
began workingon the Ord.,whichhe had in fairlycompleteformwhenhe
returnedto Paris in 1302. See Balie, "Duns Scotus,John,"1102; Bettoni,3.
to assigna date to theLP (Balie,
thatit was difficult
In 1927,Balie affirmed
de JeanDuns Scot . . ., 56-87).Overthe years,the task has
Les commentaires
becomeno easier.Even theeditorsofthecriticaleditionhad to be contentwith
to the LP, vol.
assigningit to the broadperiod,1296-1302. See Prolegomena
XVII, 13*.Sincethesamedatesmustbe assignedto theOrd.,thisis tantamount
to sayingthattheLP has notbeendatedat all. .
to boththeLP and the Ord.to
One needonlyconsultthe indicesauctorum
see the extentof the SubtleDoctor'sacquaintancewiththe worksof Henry.
aboutthedepthofhis underThis,ofcourseis notto makeanyprejudgments
standingofwhathe read.Scotusrefersto Henryonlyonceby name: "... ut
habetura Gandavoin Summa,et vide articulooctavoquaestionesecunda,in
solutionetertiiargumenti."
Ord.,prologus,
pars5, qq. 1-2; I, 183,270. But on
to by
ofpositionsfoundin Henryand referred
thebasis oftheiridentification
wouldhaveit that,whenworking
Scotus,theeditorson theScotistCommission
on the LP, Scotushad beforehimall 15 Quod.,and all 75 articlesofthe SQO.
theLP,
See LP, vol. XVI, 521-532;vol. XVII, 541-544.SincetheOrd.followed
forthemorematureworkshouldbe obvious.
theimplications
98

23:32:05 PM

Recognizing that futurerevisions of dates are not likely to affect

the issue in any substantial way, we would now like to consider the
accounts of Henry of Ghent's arguments on the need for a special
divine illumination given by Scotus in his Lectura Prima and in his
Ordinatio. Limiting our considerations to the opening sections of the
two questions,13we propose to note the differencesbetween the two
reported statements of Henry's case and further,to note to what
extent, if any, these differencescan be explained in terms of the
acquisition of a deeper understanding of the thought of Henry by
Scotus when he composed his later and more mature Commentaryon
the Sentences,14
II. The Accountin the "Lectura Prima

'

, Scotus asks,
Early in the Lectura in Librum Primum Sententiarum
"Whether the human intellect in the present life (intellectusviatoris)
can naturally understand any certain and genuine truth without a
15 The
very form of the question is
special illumination by God."
indicative of the caution with which the Subtle Doctor approached
philosophicalissues. He is concerned not with the intellectof an angel,
but only with the intellectof man ; not with the intellectof man in any
after-life(e.g. in statubeato),but only with that intellectin its present
state; not with just any truth,but only with the certain and genuine
truthwhich was also the concern of Henry of Ghent; 16not with any
general illumination by God, but only with a special illumination.
We immediatelylearn something about this last-mentioneddistinction. "Illumination" is apparently being thought of as closely tied to,
if not identical with, "causality." Fire can burn flax in virtue of a
13Specifically,
to LP, I, 3, 1, 3; XVI, 281-289,144-161and Ord.,I, 3, 1, 4;
III, 123-132,202-217.
14The Prolegomena
to theLP remarkson how muchmoremature,especially
in method,is the Scotusofthe Ord. comparedto the ScotusoftheLP. There
is one examplegivenby theScotistCommission
whichshowsthatin a certain
sectionof the LP, Scotus,thoughallegedlydealingwitha positionof Henry,
simplydid not have time to investigatewhat the SolemnDoctor actually
- so intentwas he in diviningthe mindsofmenlike
thoughtaboutthematter
fortheirinterpretations.
Aristotle
and Augustine
In the Ord.,however,on this
sets forththe positionof Henry.
verypoint,Scotusclearlyand confidently
See Prolegomena,
11*.
16 Utrumintellectusalicuiusviatorispossit naturaliterintelligere
aliquam
certamveritatem
et sinceramabsque specialiinfluentia
a Deo, . . ." LP, 1, 3,
i, 3; XVI, 281, 144.
"sincera
16The expression,
occursin theveryfirstquestionofHenry's
Veritas,"
SQO. See SQO, I, 1 obj. 2m; I, iA.
99

23:32:05 PM

general divine illumination; no special divine illuminationis needed.17

'
This would mean, then, that to ask, 'Whether the human intellect
in the present life can naturally understand any certain and genuine
truth without a special illumination by God," is to ask whetherGod
exercises any kind of special causality in the acquisition of intellectual
knowledge. Positively, says Scotus, we may rephrase the original
question and ask, ". . . whether God is the ratio of understandingall
those thingswhich are understood by our intellect." 18Phrased in this
way, our question now has a more familiarring to it. Quite early in
the SQO, Henry of Ghent explains that divine illumination does not
involve a direct knowledge of God. God illumines only as a ratio.1*
Henry appeals to Augustine in support of his position, and it would
be safe to say at this point that Scotus is bothered not so much by
what he conceives to be the erroneous epistemology of Henry as he
is by what he thinksis an abuse by Henry of the authorityof Augustine. In the LP at least, the refutationof Henry of Ghent's theoryof
divine illumination and its relation to our knowledge of the Veritas
certa et sincera always remained only a part of what Scotus thought
to be a much more significant project, viz., the defense of "true
Augustinism" against those who would make the illustrious Father
of the Church the author of a theory of knowledge which denied to
man the ability to have any certain knowledge of Veritas through
his own intellectual effortsalone. The battle between Henry of Ghent
and John Duns Scotus was, in large measure, a battle over whose
interpretationof Augustine was the correct one.
In this battle, Scotus is not one to gloss over the problems. He
admits that it is the texts of Augustine which create the difficulty.20
Against the words of Augustine, however, we must place the classic
text of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans: "The invisible things
17 "... sicutignispotestcomburere
Dei, absque
stuppamgeneraliinfluentia
is, of course,a central
specialiinfluentia:..." LP, 281, 144. The distinction
See SQO, I, 2 ad im;
featureofHenryofGhent'stheoryofdivineillumination.
I, 8N and 2c; I, 4B; I, 8c; I, 18E. It is discussedby R. Braunin hismonograph,
: St. Paulus-DruckeHeinrichs
vonGent(Freiburg
Die Erkenntnislehre
[Schweiz]
of illumination
rei,1916), 76. The idea of therebeinggradations
goes back at
leastto St. Augustine(See E. Gilson,TheChristian
Philosophy
ofSt. Augustine,
L. E. M. Lynch,tr. (NewYork: RandomHouse,i960), 93-94),and Scotuswas
characterof the questionposed. See LP,
certainlyaware of the Augustinin
282-283,145-150.
18 ... an Deus sit ratio mtelligendi
ommaquae mtelliguntur
ab mtellectu
nostro. . ." LP, 281,144.
19 See SQO, I, 2c; I, 6H-I. On ratio,n. 22 infra.
20See LP, 282-283,145-150.
IOO

23:32:05 PM

of God are seen as they are made known throughthose things which
are made/' 21 Now if the immutable rabionesaccording to which all
creatures are made are the "invisible things of God" (and there is no
question in the mind of Scotus that they are), and if the Apostle is
correct,then the creaturesthat are made must be known firstand the
immutable rationes must be known by means of them.22Any interpretationofAugustinewhichwould have him say that these immutable
rationesare the ratio of knowing all other things must, therefore,be
erroneous."... Thereforerationesof such a kind are not the ratio of
23
knowingall thingswhich we know with certainty."
Just such an erroneous interpretationis to be found in of
Ghent. Taking a distinction well-known to Augustine- viz., the
distinction between verum and Veritas - and making it his own,
Henry says that without any special divine illuminationby God, one
can know the verum, but that without such a special illumination,
one cannot have any knowledgeof a genuineand immutableVeritas.24
21Rom.,I, 20.
22For Henry,a ratiois a, "... modusessendiquae nomineentisnonexplicatur
necintelligitur."
SQO, XXXIV, 3 res.q. ; I, 214 "O". See also, Brown.Henry
withthedigitzero,
ofGhenton InternalSensation,24-26.To avoid confusion
enclosedin quotationmarks.On therationesin
foliosection"O" is henceforth
206-208.
see Gilson,TheChristian
Philosophy
ofSt. Augustine,
Augustine,
23"... non igiturhuiusmodirationessunt ratio cognoscendiomnia quae
certi
tudinalitercognoscimus."LP, 283, 151. This sed contra deserves
closerattention.It appearsvirtuallyunchangedin Ord.,I, 3, 1, 4; III, 126,
207,and we willconsiderit onceagainin the appropriate
place. See pp. 103-5
is known
infra.The immediatepointbeingmade by Scotusis that something
oftheeternalrationes.
The relevanceofthis
withcertainty
priorto a knowledge
outmuchmoreclearlyin theOrd.
to thetextsquotedfromAugustine
is brought
on
Whatthesedcontrasaysin relationto the SolemnDoctor'sownarguments
theneedfora specialdivineillumination
is notmadealtogether
clearin either
work.
24"Ad quaestionemistam dicuntquidam quod intellectusnosterpotestintelligereillud quod verumest, absque specialiinfluentiaa Deo, non tarnen
absque speciali
potestintelligere
aliquamsinceramveritatemet immutabilem
"
influentia."
LP, 283, 152. The use of the plural, dicuntquidam,"is worth
to
noting.Scotusis, at thispoint,eitherbeingquiteellipticalin his reference
a positionwhichhe believesto be held by others
Henry,or he is reporting
us to, "HenricusGand.,
besidesHenry.The editorsare correctin referring
Summa,a, 1, q. 2 in corp.(I, f.4B)," butdo theygo farenough? We thinknot.
Surelythesituationmaybe similarto thatofLP, 307,189where,in connection
in lumine
withan instanceof,"omnesconcedunt
quodpropriedicimurintelligere
to Alexanderof Hales, Bonaventure
intellectus
agentis,etc.,"we are referred
in a noteaffixed
and Thomas.Or perhapsit is similarto thesituationdescribed
to LP, I, 3, 3, i ; XVI, 327-328,256.There," dicuntquidam"is takenas referring
to Henryand RichardofConington,
"... qui sententiam
HenriciGandavensis
101

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One can know what is true, but one cannot know the immutable truth.
According to Scotus, Henry argues as follows.
The intention25of ens is prior to the intentionof verum, since the
formerintentionis absolute while the latter designates a relationship
to an exemplar. 'Therefore, the intellect can know the intention of
ens although it does not know the Veritas and conformityitself;
and consequentlyit can know that which is verum beforethe Veritas
is known." 26 But surely nothing attributed to Henry so far justifies
simply
sequitur,..." In theOrd.,in theparalleltext,thesameviewis referred
to Henry.See Ord.,I, 3, 3, 1; III, 222,366.
On the verum and the Veritas in Augustine,see G. Bardy et al., tr.
MlangesDoctrinaux,Vol. X: Oeuvresde Saint Augustin(Paris: Descle De
La doctrine
del'illuminaBrouwer,1952),701,n. 2, and R. Jolivet,
augustinienne
tion,in: MlangesAugustiniens
(Paris: MarcelRivire,1931),71-72.
25Intentio.On its backgroundin Avicenna,see J. Rohmer,La thorie
de I abdans l'colefranciscaine Alexandrede Hals Jean Peckham,in:
straction
deaugustinisme
AHDL, III (1928),107,and E. Gilson,Les sources
grco-arabes
to Gilson'sinterpretation
in: AHDL, IV (1929),54-55.According
avicennisant,
are sensiblequalitiesof bodiesnot perceivedby the
of Avicenna,intentiones
externalsenses.See Avicenna,Lib. VI Nat.,parsI, cap. 5 (Venice,1508),fol.
whois Henry's
5. Pegismakesthepointthatit is Avicennaand notAristotle
master.See A. C. Pegis,FourMedievalWaystoGod,in: The Monist,LIV (1970),
318.
The wordis also usedby Averroes.See Commentarium
Magnumin Aristotelis
ed.
De Anima Libros,Book II, secs. 40-44 and 55-57; F. StuartCrawford,
[Mass.]: The MediaevalAcademyof America,1953),193-198and
(Cambridge
213-217.
is not purelya beingof reason.Priorto its being
For Henry,an intention
In its
but not actually,composedof intentions.
known,a thingis potentially,
- such as 4'rational,"
relationto a cognitivepower,the thing'sintentiones
"sensible"and "vegetable"in "man"- becomeactual.See Quod.,V, 6 res.q.;
needsthe constantpresenceof
I, 161L and 12c; I, 171X-Y. Thus, an intentio
source.See Quod.,III, 12c; I, 65F.
a cognitivepoweras its generating
however(as in manyotherinstances),the texts
In thismatterof intentio,
fromtheLP simplydo not permitthe unqualifiedjudgmentthat Scotusis
usingthe vocabularyof Henryaccompaniedby the depthof meaningwhich
as usedby the SubtleDoctorwhen
affixedto it. Thus,intentio,
Henryhimself
Henry,maymeanno morethan"notion"or "concept."The concrete
reporting
of the SolemnDoctorwouldbe
foundin the writings
of intentio
connotation
absentand to thisextentalso wouldthe reportof Henrygivenby Scotusbe
deficient.
in Brown,Sensation
in HenryofGhent
in Henry,see further
On intentio
in Scotuscan
26-27.Intentio
252-255and HenryofGhenton InternalSensation,
but it may also be merelylogicalin character.
have a concreteconnotation,
See LP, I, 3, i, 1-2; XVI, 270-271,121; Wengert,576-577;M. FernandezGarcia,LexiconScholasticum,
360-361.
2e "Igiturintellectus
intentionem
entis,licetnon cognoscat
potestcognoscere
et conformitatem
; et perconsequens,
ipsumquod verumest,
ipsamveritatem
Veritas."
LP,
153.
284,
potestcognosciantequamcognoscatur
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23:32:05 PM

this conclusion? Indeed, in the light of what Scotus has reported of

Henry's thought, the conclusion hardly makes any sense. Scotus
immediatelysets out to rectifythis situation.
Accordingto Henry,says Scotus, while verum designatesa relation27
ship to an exemplar, it is grasped in an act of simple apprehension
by the intellect.But Veritas can only be apprehendedin the intellect's
activity of composing and dividing.28Arguing fromthis, we can now
prove that the verum can be understood without any special divine
illumination.
It is unfittingthat nature be frustratedin its own proper act ; the
intellect's proper act is to understand and know the verum; therefore,it is unfittingforthe intellect to be frustratedin this act, which
is exactly what would happen if,by purelynatural means, the intellect
could not know the verum. Thus, the intellect can know the verum
by natural means and without any special divine illumination.29
Similarly, we can now prove that we do need a special divine
illuminationto know the Veritas. Veritas is definedas the conformity
of the intellect to an exemplar. But, as Plato has it in the Timaeus,
there is one exemplar which is created and another exemplar which
is uncreated. Veritas, therefore,must also be two-fold.30There is
conformityof the intellect to the created exemplar and conformity
of the intellect to the uncreated exemplar. In the firstcase, Veritas
is the conformityto the thing itselffromwhich the exemplar comes ;
the exemplar and measure of the Veritas is the thing itself. It is of
this Veritas that Aristotlespeaks. Presumably, it is a Veritas which
is neither sincera nor certa.31
27"... intellectu
simplici..." aretheactualwordsofScotus.See LP, 284,154.
28"... Veritasautemnon cognoscitur
nisi ab intellectucomponente
et divi"
dente,. . . Ibid.
29See LP, 285, 155.
30"... et ideo duplexVeritas:..." LP, 286, 156.
31"Unde Veritasquae est respectuexemplarisfacti,est Veritascreata a re,
cuiusexemplaret mensuraestresipsa,undeVeritasistaaccipitur
parconformitatem intellectusad rem,et istamveritatemposuitAristoteles,
quam dicit
causariab intellectu
in intellectum
agenteet phantasmate
possibilem."Ibid.
Scotushas,on thispoint,a remarkable
feelingforthethoughtofHenry.He
seemsperfectly
aware that the verum/veritasdistinction
as it appears in
Henryis in factfarmoresubtlethanit mightappearat firstglance.Scotusis
distinction
betweenVeritas
quitecorrectin seeingHenryas makinga further
plain and simple and Veritas sincera et certa. At least this seems to
be a valid inference
fromwhatthe SolemnDoctorsays about a notitiabeing
certain twodifferent
senses.In one sense,a notitiacan be certainasmuchas it
is freefromerrorand we can have no doubtsabout its Veritas. In another
sense,a notitiais certainasmuchas we see its Veritas clearlyin the lightof
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23:32:05 PM

To possess Veritas which is both sincera and certa, we must

have a special divine illumination and the eternal rationes. This is
because: (i) the object itself is mutable and thereforecannot cause
the immutabilitywhich is the mark of Veritas sincera; (2) the soul,
in itself receptive of error, is only made more changeable by the
mutable objects it receives, and thereforeneither can it cause the
immutabilityneeded for Veritas sincera; (3) the created exemplar,
whetherit representsan object when the knower is in a waking state
or itself as an object in a dream, cannot distinguishthe verum from
what is only "like" the verum and thereforecannot bring about the
immutabilitysought. In arguments (1) and (2), Henry, according to
Scotus, cites the authority of Augustine in support of his position.32
But how is this special divine illumination to be explained?
How does it operate ? The questions are no less pertinentwhen addressed to Augustine than when addressed to the Solemn Doctorperennial thornsin the side of commentatorson both men!
According to Scotus, Henry's solution lies in his teaching that a
being can have a pluralityof rationeswhile remainingone in essence.33
This, presumably,is what Scotus has in mind forhe recounts Henry's
explanation in the followingway. The Solemn Doctor is not saying
that it is by knowing the divine essence that we know other things.
We know the divine essence in a general attribute. This general
attributeis the ratiounder which God is knownto us ; it is not the ratio
which makes it possible for us to have Veritas sincera about other
the intellectin the mannerin whichwe see a visibleobjectin thelightofthe
sun. See SQO, II, ic; I, 23, and also, GmezCaffarena,
Ser Participado
16-18,wherethe claimis made that whatwe are in factdealingwithherein
of logical
Henry is a doctrineof Veritas whichrestson a simpleconfusion
truthand ontologicaltruth.
32See LP, 287-288,157-159.
33 "Res autem iam dicto modo intellectaest fundamentum
intentionum
et
rationum.Super idem enim re fundantur
et rationesdiversae."
intentiones
Quod.,V, 6 res.q.; I, 161K. See also,ibid.,161M.
On themeaningofratioand intentio,
see nn.22 and 25 supra.Ratioin Henry
is not synonymous
withintentio
is possibleonlywherethereis a
. An intentio
relationbetweena resand a cognitivepower(see Paulus,224-225).But a ratio
(a modusessendi)is possibleevenwhenthereis no relationto a cognitive
power.
wouldperforce
be a ratioinasmuchas if therewas no basis in
Everyintentio
act fora cognitiverelationship
thentherecouldbe no such
to be established,
See SQO, XL VIII, 2 ad 2m; II, 31P.
cognitiverelationship.
But forScotus,an intentio
power.
mayexistpriortotheactivityofa cognitive
See LP, I, 3, i, 1-2; XVI, 270-271,121.Thisverysametextalso suggeststhat,
forScotus,a ratiotoo has an independence
of cognoscitive
activity,muchas
it does forHenryof Ghent.
104

23:32:05 PM

things. It is under another ratio that divine essence is the cause of

knowing.
"
And this "under another ratio is possible because sometimes the
divine essence is related to our intellect as an indirectlight and sometimes as a direct light. In the latter case, it illumines so that we can
know the light itselfand this is the way the blessed know, but not the
human intellect in its present state. When the divine essence is only
indirectlyilluminingthe human intellect,it is the ratio of our knowing
in three ways.34 This is possible only if, in this case, we view this
indirectillumination as a special divine illumination, over and above
any general divine illumination. This is completely in accord with
what Augustine says.35
To sum up then: according to Scotus in the Lectura Prima, Henry
is saying that genuine and certain Veritas is had when we have,
(1) an exemplar received fromthe thing and inheringin the intellect;
(2) another exemplar- not made and not inhering in the intellectbut rather diffusingitselfthroughthe intellect. These two exemplars
give us one certain ratio of knowing the Veritas sincera.36
"
"
III. The Accountin the Ordinatio
In the Ordinatio} Scotus asks a question very similar to the one with
which we have been dealing in the Lectura. "Whether any certain
and genuine truth can be naturally known by the human intellect in
the present life [ab intellectuviatoris) without a special illumination
of the uncreated light?" 37The question appears to be the one asked
in the earlier Lectura, but there are two differencesthat call forcomment. In the LP , Scotus had asked about, "... a special illumination
38
(influentia)by God." Now he asks about, "... a special illumination
39
(illustratio)of the uncreated light." The switch from the "God"
34The "threeways"arenotelaboratedon by Scotus.He is, nevertheless,
quite
correct.See SQO, I, 3c; I, 9B.
36See LP, 288-289,160.
36"Dicuntigiturquod tuncacquiritur
sinceraVeritasquando unumexemplar,
non inhaerens,sed per illapsumibi existens;tunc habeturuna
non-factum,
ratiocognoscendi
certa,et habetursinceraVeritas/1
Ibid.,289, 161.
37"... quaeroan aliqua Veritascertaet sincerapossitnaturaliter
cognosciab
intellectu
viatoris,absquelucisincreataespecialiillustratione."
Ord.,I, 3, i, 4;
in the
III, 123,202. The answerofScotus,wemightnote,is farmoreextensive
Ord.thanin the LP. Thereare twenty-eight
pages devotedto thequestionin
thelatterwork;forty-nine
pagesin theformer.
38"... specialiinfluentia
a Deo." LP, 281,144.
39"... lucisincreataespecialiillustratione."
Ord.,123,202.
105

23:32:05 PM

of the LP to the "uncreated light" in the Ord. may indicate on the

part of Scotus a more developed awareness in the later work of the
significanceof the light-metaphysicsfound in the works of Augustine
"
and Henry. The language of illustration in any event, is certainly
more common in Henry than is the language of "influential 40 Not
just a special illumination by God, in other words, but a special
illuminationby God now understood under a ratio, under a mode of
being, not designated by the name "God" itself, viz., "God" under
the ratio of the "uncreated light."
That Scotus had a better understandingof Henry's divine illumination theoryof knowledge when he wrote the Ord. than when he wrote
the LP may or may not be borne out by what immediately follows
the statement of the question in the Ord. As we have seen, in the LP ,
Scotus not only puts the question, but gives it a cursorygloss before
presentingthe texts of Augustine. The question really asks about a
special illuminationby God as opposed to that general divine illumination whereby, for example, fire burns flax; the question really asks
whetherGod is the ratio of our understandingwhatever we do understand.41
This cursory gloss of the question is absent from the Ord. Did
Scotus feel that the present formulationof the question was so obviously in the style of the Solemn Doctor that the cursorygloss was
no longer necessary? Or did he feel, by the time he wrote his Ord.,
that the influenceof Henry had diminishedto such an extent that a
commentator on the Sentences no longer needed to be particularly
concerned about the historical background of the question? We are
inclined toward the view that Scotus felt that a cursorygloss was no
longer necessary. While the Solemn Doctor is only once referredto
by name in the Ord., his positions in general are certainlypresented
in a far less oblique and elliptical fashionthan they were in the LP.42
The texts of Augustine which apparently support the position that
a special divine illumination is needed are presented by Scotus as in
" is foundin
40" Illustratio
SQO, I, 2c; I, 6I-K; 2 ad "im sed contra;I, 8S; 3c;
ad
I, 8A; 4
5m; I, 13L; Quod., IX, 15c; II, 383X. Influentialhowever,is
foundonlyinSQO,I, 2c; I, 4B and hereHenryis talkingaboutthedistinction
betweenthe influentia
specialisdivina.We have
generalisand the illustratio
and specialisdivina.
ofinfluentia
foundno instanceofthe conjuntion
41See LP, 281, 144.
42 See n. 24 supra.The use of thepluralis strikingly
absentfromthe Ord.In
whenreporting
the maturecommentary,
says: "In
Henry'sposition,Scotus
ista quaestioneest opiniouna talis,..." (Ord.,126,208), and, " Contraistam
. .. (Ibid.,132,218).
opinionem.
106

23:32:05 PM

the Lectura, but he has added a few more texts in the Ord. and, what
is perhaps more important still, in the mature commentaryhe does
make an attempt to defend the position that Augustine did in fact
hold to the view that in some cases at least, no certain and genuine
truthcould be known without a special illumination of the uncreated
light.43We may surmise that Scotus, in the interval between the LP
and the Ord., had become conscious of the real strengthof the Augustinism of men such as Henry of Ghent.
Yet even in the presentationof the texts fromAugustine,the Subtle
Doctor is careful to gloss them in such a way that they will admit
of an interpretationaltogether differentfromthat of Henry, and we
mightadd, one that will prove more congenial to his own interests.
Thus, he defends the position that not only does Augustine say
'
that 'unchangingrationes" (incommutabilesraliones) are necessaryfor
a knowledge of Veritas certa et sincera, but he identifiesthese
*
'
"unchanging rationes with the "eternal rationes that are in God.44
The argument in support of this is that, according to Augustine, the
unchangingrationes are known only to a few. Augustine must, then,
be talking about the eternal rationes and not about firstprinciples,
since firstprinciplesare common and knownto everybody.45The point
of the argument is clear. Augustine may have been arguing for the
need of a special divine illumination to know genuine and certain
truth,but he did not mean that such an illumination had to be universally applicable in any and all instances. He specificallyexcludes
knowledge of first principles. The truth of these can be known,
Augustine is saying, without any special divine illumination. The
argumentof Augustine, as interpretedby Scotus, is based, therefore,
on the exception to what is being proved!
The sed contraargumentis the same text fromPaul that was given
in the LP, and the gloss here does not differmarkedly fromthe one
given in the earlier commentary.46In the Ord., the argumentis that
the "eternal rationes" are the "invisible things of God" which are
known fromcreaturesand that, "... thereforebeforea vision of these
is had a certain knowledge of creatures is had." 47 We would note,
43See Ord.,124-125,202-206.
44See ibid.,124-125,204.
45"... si autemintelligeret
de primisprincipiis,
nonestpaucorumpervenire
ad
illa, sed multorum,
quia omnibussuntcommuniaet nota." Ibid. 125, 204.
46Rom.I, 20. See p. 6 supra.
47"... igiturante visionemistarumhabeturcerta cognitiocreaturarum."
Ord.,126,207.
107

23:32:05 PM

first of all, that while this argumentmay be relevant to some theory

of divine illumination held by somebody in the Middle Ages, it is
certainly not relevant to the theory of divine illuminationof Henry
of Ghent.48When the Solemn Doctor argued that for a knowledge of
genuine and certain truth, we needed a special illumination of the
uncreated light, he was certainly not contending that the need for
such a special illuminationwas forthe expressed purpose of obtaining
a knowledge of the eternal rationes.On the contrary: he was arguing
that such a special illumination could not possibly involve, in any
shape, manner, or form,a knowledge of the eternal rationes.What is
more, the relevant sections of the Ord.; those texts where Scotus is
recountingthe opinio Henrici, simply do not reveal that he misunderstood the Solemn Doctor on so important a point.49
We must ask ourselves, then, exactly what was Scotus doing in this
sed contraargumentin both the LP and in the Ord. ? We would suggest
that at this point, Scotus is not consideringthe position of Henry at
all and, further,that he is not really offeringa sed contrato the texts
of Augustine either. What he is doing is interpretingthe text from
the Epistle to the Romans in such a way as to render it consistent
with the texts of Augustine (or at least, consistent with his own
interpretationof the texts fromAugustine). In this way, he labours
to deprive Henry of the support of those texts of Augustine, and limits
divine illumination in Augustine to the relatively narrow area of
knowledge of the eternal rationes.This in turn permits the Subtle
Doctor to develop a theoryof knowledgerelatively freeofAugustinin
encumbrances.
That the sed contrastands in this relation to the previouslyquoted
texts of Augustine is not immediately evident in the earlierLP. This
is because the key to an understanding of the relationship lies in
Scotus' interpretationof Augustine as saying that the "unchangeable
"
"
rationes are the same as the "eternal rationes and are not, there48See Brown,DivineIllumination
in HenryofGhent,181-186.
49See pp. 126-132,sees.208-217,discussedm pp. 16-20infra.Andwhilehe does
notbelabourthepointin theLP (seepp. 9-10supra),thereis littleevidenceofa
either.
in the earliercommentary
seriousmisunderstanding
50 "Thus, whenwe say that the mindis immediately
subjectto the divine
Nowin what
and thenecessary.
ideas,we makeit subjectto theunchangeable
ofAugustine's
wayis it subjectto them,andto whatdegree? Oneinterpretation
replyto thisquestionwouldhave himsay thatthe subjectionof the human
mindto thedivineideasmeanssimplythatthemindseestheideas.Thereis no
lack oftextsto supportthisinterpretation."
Gilson,The Christian
Philosophy
80.
St.
Augustine,
of
108

23:32:05 PM

fore,the same as firstprinciples, because the unchangeable rationes

are known only to a few, while firstprinciples are known to many.51
But it is precisely this crucial gloss of the text of Augustine which is
absent from the LP ,52The Ord. puts the matter in a much clearer
perspective. Augustine's position is that a certain knowledge of first
principles is possible without any special divine illumination. This
is supported by St. Paulin his Epistle to the Romans. A certain knowledge of creatures must exist prior to any knowledge of the eternal
rationes.
As in the LP, Scotus now moves on to a detailed account of the
opinio Henrici.5*As was the case with the statement of the question,54
there is present in the LP at this point an interpretivestatement of
Scotus which is absent from the Ord. The point being made in the
LP text is the ratherobvious one about naturally knowingthe verum,
but not knowing the Veritas sincera without a special divine
illumination.55Its absence fromthe Ord. creates no problem, though
doubtlessly it would be helpful to someone still not altogether confident of his grasp of Henry's position. Again, therefore,we must
suggest that the absence of this particular statement fromthe later
commentarymeans that Scotus had reached a level of understanding
of Henry which made its presence unnecessary.
The Ord. account of Henry's position is, in general, much tighter
and better ordered than is the LP account. Gone is the hastily-drawn
conclusion about knowing, "...
that which is verum before the
Veritas is known," 56 together with the subsequent attempts at
supplying the missing premisses. Scotus is now much more sure of
himselfand the whole movement of his thought is much smoother.
Among general intentions, Henry argues, ens comes first because
it is absolute, and Veritas comes second because it bespeaks a relationship to an exemplar. Therefore, ens can be known under the ratio
51See p. 107 supra.
52The crucialcharacterofthepassagewas
undoubtedly
recognized
by an early
scribe.The textfromtheOrd. was interpolated
intotheXP. See theapparatus
criticus
of the ScotistCommission
in LP , 282, 148.
53Ord.,126-132,208-17.
54See p. 106 supra.
65"Ad quaestionemistam dicuntquidam quod intellectusnoster
potestinilludquod verumestabsquespecialiinfluentia
a Deo, nontarnenpotest
telligere
intelligere
aliquam sinceramveritatemet immutabilemabsque specialiinfluentia."
LP, 283,152.
56See pp. 101-3supra.
109

23:32:05 PM

of ENTiTASwithout being known under the ratio of Veritas.57 It is

this conclusion, and not the one about the verum being known before
the Veritas is known,which can be proved in respect of the intellect.
Indeed, it is precisely fromthis proof that we derive the distinction
between the verum and the Veritas.
ens is grasped in an act of simple apprehension58which precedes
the intellect's act of composing and dividing. This grasping of ens in
an act of simple apprehension is what Henry means by conceiving
that which is verum. But the ratio of Veritas is apprehended only in
that act of composingand dividingwhichfollowssimpleapprehension.59
Scotus would have it, then, that for the Solemn Doctor, ens can be
known apart from the Veritas precisely because, since the latter
bespeaks a relationshipto an exemplar, it can be grasped only by an
act of the intellectwhich presupposes that act of the intellectwhereby
ens is grasped. It is from this apprehension of ens that the notion
of verum arises.
With this before us, we can now proceed, as in the LP, to show
that the verum can be known without any special divine illumination.
Basically, the accounts of Henry's position given in both works are
the same on this point, and we need not repeat what we have already
said.60The case is much the same with the argumentsallegedlyproving
that we can have no knowledgeof the Veritas withouta special divine
illumination. The Ord. account is more explicit on the nature of the
created exemplar and the uncreated exemplar. The formeris now
identified as, ". . . the universal species caused by the thing . . .
57"Intentioprimaestentis,... et ratioest,quia 'entitas'estabsoluta,'Veritas'
dicitrespectumad exemplar.Ex hoc sequiturquod ens possitcognoscisub
rationeentitatislicetnon sub rationeveritatis."Ord.,126,208.
58"... simpliciintelligentia
..." are the wordsof Scotushere,not,"... intellectusimplici..." as in theLP. See n. 27 supra.Againthechangeseemstobe
morein keepingwiththevocabularyof the SolemnDoctor.See, forexample,
SQO, LVIII, 2 ad 3m; II, 131L and Quod.,V, 25 res.q. ; I, 204I.
59"Haec etiamconclusioprobaturex parteintellectus,
quia enspotestconcipi
illudquod verumest; sedratioveritatis
et tuncconcipitur
simpliciintelligentia,
et dividente.Compositionem
et
non concipiturnisi intelligentia
componente
divisionem
Ord.,127,208.
praeceditsimplexintelligentia."
80See p. 103supraand Ord.,127,209.Note,however,
thatScotusbeginstheOrd.
accountwith,"Si autemquaeraturde notitiaentis,sive eius quod verumest,
" is absentfromtheLP account.It is found
..." The languageof"notitia
quite
oftenin thewritings
ofHenry.See, forexample,SQO, I, 10 ad 3msed contra;
I, 20I; ii ad im; I, 21E; 12c; I, 21I-22I,and Quod.,IV, 8c; I, 97M and 98P.
The wordis also used frequently
especiallyin theDe Trinitate.
by Augustine,
See De Trin.,IX, 6, 9; LP, 42, 965-966.
IIO

23:32:05 PM

"
the latter is identifiedas, "... the idea in the divine mind . . . 61
The two-foldkind of Veritas is again referredto,62and it was Aristotle
who developed the theory of the Veritas which is derived fromthe
created exemplar. The Philosopher, however, now finds himself
coupled with Augustine, who also taught that there was a Veritas
which could be known merely fromthe created exemplar!
What can Scotus be doing at this point ? The answer is that he is
doing exactly what he says he is doing- giving the opinio Henrici,
and this, once again, in a manner far more faithfullyad mentem
Henrici than in the account in the LP.63
The simple fact of the matter is that while the Subtle Doctor may
have had a greater understanding of Henry's work when he was
writingthe Ord. than when he was writingthe LP , in the matter of
the presentation of Henry's own case at least, there were no radical
revisions in his ideas in the interval between the two commentaries
on the Sentences. The three arguments explaining why Veritas
sincera et certa cannot be known without a special divine illumination 64are virtuallythe same in both the LP and in the Ord. accounts,
indiexcept that theyare more logically presentedin the latterwork,65
cating that confidenceand sureness on the part of Scotus about which
we have already written.66
This is equally trueofthe account ofHenry's
of
how
in such a way as to divinelyillumineus
God
acts
explanation
in some special way withouttherebymakinghimselfan object known.67
61"... 'exemplarcreatum'est species universaliscausata a re, 'exemplar
increatum'
estidea in mentedivina,..." Ord.,128,210. It is worthnotingthat
in thepassagewhichScotushas beforehimat thispoint,Henrydoesnotequate
' withtherathersubstantive
the 'exemplar
increatum
and independent,
'idea in
mentedivina* The uncreatedexemplaris the 'ars divina'whichcontainsthe
ideal rationesof all things."... ars divinacontinensomniumrerumideales
rationes,..." SQO, I, 2c; I, 5E. Again,theidea beingconveyedby Henryis
that of a pluralityof rationesdependentupon and locatedwithinthe divine
unity.See n. 22 supra.
82See pp. 103-4subra.
83On many pointsin his theoryof knowledge,Henry sees Aristotleand
each otherand not as opponents.For
Augustineas mutuallycomplementing
someexamples,see myarticlepreviously
cited: Sensation
in HenryofGhent
...
84See p. 104 supra.
85See Ord.,128-130,211-214.
88See p. 109 supra.
87See Ord.,130-131,214-216,and pp. 103-5supra.In the Ord.account,Scotus
mentions
by name the threeways in whichGod illumines."Poniturautem
rationemrespectuactus videndi,
qualiterhabeat (seil,lux increata)triplicem
scilicet:lucisacuentis,specieiimmutantis
et characteris
sive exemplarisconfigurants;..." Ord.,131,216. In theLP account,he merelystatesthatthere
arethreeways.See n. 34 supra.
Ill

23:32:05 PM

IV. Conclusion
Perhaps better than anywhere else, the differencesbetween the
Scotus of the LP and the Scotus of the Ord. are revealed in the concluding statement of the opinio Henrici in each of the two works. In
the LP, Scotus says: "They say thereforethat genuine truth is thus
acquired when one exemplar is received fromthe thing, inhering in
the intellect,togetherwith another exemplar, not made, not inhering,
but existing there diffusedthroughit ; hence there is had one certain
ratio of knowing and genuine truth is possessed." 68 In the Ord., he
says: "Finally it is added that the perfectnotion of truthexists when
two exemplar species concur in the mind: one, viz., the created one,
- so we touch
inhering; the other, viz., the uncreated one, diffused
69
the word of perfecttruth/'
Now it is anything but clear how two exemplars can be reduced
to one ratio cognoscendi,but it is still less clear what is meant by the
ratherpoetic, "to touch the word of perfecttruth." It is, nevertheless,
the poetic image which leads us more surely to the text in Henry
which serves as the common source of both the statement in the LP
and the statement in the Ord.10In the latter work, the Subtle Doctor
displays not so much a more profound understandingof Henry as a
tendencytoward a more faithfulrepresentationof the Solemn Doctor's
thought and a stricteradherence to his vocabulary and formulae.Far
from diminishingin importance, Henry's ideas came to preoccupy
Scotus more and more in the period between the earlier and later
commentaries.
It is evident also that Scotus had sharpened considerably his own
logical tools. He cannot be blamed if they failed him in this instance.
How two exemplars become one ratio cognoscendiis simply not a
logical problem, though it is central to an understandingof Henry's

88"Dicuntigiturquod tuncacquiritur
sinceraVeritasquandounumexemplar
non
et aliud exemplar,non-factum,
est acceptuma re, inhaerensintellectui,
sed per illapsumibi existens;tunchabeturuna ratiocognoscendi
inhaerens,
certaet habetursinceraVeritas/'LP, 289, 161.
89"Ultimoadditurquodperfecta
notitiaventatisestquandoduaespeciesexemscilicetcreata,alia illapsa,scilicet
in mente: una inhaerens,
plaresconcurrunt
veritatis."Ord.,131-132,217.
verbumperfectae
noncreata- etsiccontingimus
70 Istis siquidemduabusspeciebusexemplanbus[sett,speciesacceptaa re et
et ex duabusconfectauna
speciesquae est causa rei) in menteoccurrentibus,
rem cuius sunt exemplar,mens concipiatverbum
rationead intelligendum
"
veritatisperfectae
informatae, SQO, I, 3c; I, 10G.
112

23:32:05 PM

theory of divine illumination. His choice of the more imprecise, "to

touch the word of perfecttruth/' perhaps indicates to us that Scotus
had come to understand just how true this is.
Windsor, Ont., Canada
Universityof Windsor

23:32:05 PM

Vivarium
XIV, 2 (1976)
William Heytesbury's Position on "Insolubles" :
One Possible Source

PAUL VINCENT SPADE

I
the first chapter of his Regulae solvendi sophismata,1William
In Heytesbury sets out his view on the so-called "insolubles"paradoxes or antinomial sentences such as the famous Liar
paradox.2 Heytesbury'sposition was veryinfluentialin the subsequent
insolubilia-litzrzXme} In the Prologue to his Regulae, however,
Heytesburydenies that the position he maintainsin that firstchapter
is originalwith him; it was already known when he wrote the Regulae
in 1335.4
Primmigiturcapitulumnotamsed nonnovmde insolubilibus
summm
declarabit.6
This disclaimer presents a puzzle. For in fact there is no known
treatmentof the insolubles that both antedates Heytesbury's chapter,
at least so far as we can tell, and also maintains, or even mentions,
1 See WilliamHeytesbury,
Tractatus
de sensucomposito
et
gulielmiHentisberi
cumsophismatibus,
Declaratio
Gaetanisupraeasdem
diviso,Regulaeeiusdem
(Venice:BonetusLocatellusforOctavianusScotus,1494 [Hain 8437]). Copy
at University
ofChicagoLibrary.I am preparing
a translation
and studyofthe
firstchapterof the Regulae.
2 On the earlyhistoryof the mediaevaldiscussions
of these"insolubles",see
in: FranciscanStudies
-Literature,
my The OriginsoftheMediaevalInsolubilia
is surveyedand studiedin my
33 (I973)pp. 292-309.The mediaevalliterature
The Mediaeval Liar: A Catalogueof the Insolubilia-Liter
ature, ("Subsidia
InstituteofMediaevalStudies,1975).
Mediaevalia",vol. 5; Toronto:Pontifical
3 In additionto severalanonymousauthors,the
following
logiciansadopted
or at leastusedHeytesbury's
: AngeloofFossampositionin theirownwritings
brone,CajetanofThiene,JohnofConstance,
JohnDumbleton,
JohnofHolland,
JohnHunter,Johnof Wesel,JohnWyclif,Paul of Prgula,Paul of Venice,
Ralph Strodeand RobertFland. See the discussionin The MediaevalLiar,
ad loc.
4 The date is givenby JamesA. Weisheipl,Ockhamand SomeMertonians,
in:
MediaevalStudies30 (1968),pp. 163-213at p. 196,whereWeisheiplquotesthe
de HyttiscolophonofoneMS. oftheRegulae:"Datus Oxoniea mag.Wilhelmo
byria.D. MCCCXXXV."
6 Regulae,ed. cit.,f. 4va.
114

23:32:11 PM

exactly the position he adopts there. There are several treatises that
hold the same view, but none that can be dated with any confidence
before Heytesbury's. Moreover, the later authors who explicitly
attributethis view to someone by name always mention Heytesbury,
or a subsequent writer influenced by Heytesbury (such as John of
Holland 6), and no one earlier.7
I believe that, as a result of a recent publication by L. M. de Rijk,
we are now in a position to resolve this puzzle and to offerone possible
source forHeytesbury'sview. In orderto understandwhat is going on,
let us look firstat Heytesbury's procedure in his firstchapter. He
'
'
begins by consideringfour attempts to 'solve' the insolubles. The
firstsuch attempt is Roger Swyneshed's.8The second and third views
are attributedto John Dumbleton and Richard Kilmingtonin Cajetan
of Thiene's commentaryon this chapter, although these attributions
appear to be spurious9:
Prima hamm positionumest Suisset. Secunda ponitura Dulmentone.
in Sophismatibus
suis.10
Tertiaest RichardiClientonis
The fourthview Heytesbury describes as follows11:
quod
Quartaopinioet ultimarecitandastatuitsibi tamquamprincipium
insolubile
nullusestcasus12possibilis
qualitercumque
qui aliquidsimpliciter
includat.Unde non est iste casus possibilis,scilicet,quod haec propositio
13et quod ilia praecise
'Falsum est' vel aliqua talis sit omnispropositio
significet
quod falsumest,quia ex hocsequiturfalsumesseverumet ambo
simulessefalsa.Sequunturetiammultatahainconvenientia
contradictoria
haec pronunc.
quae pronuncnonexpeditrecitare.Et ideosufficiunt
This fourth view, Heytesbury says, will be his own. He raises
objections to each of the four opinions in turn,and observes that the
6 See TheMediaevalLiar, itemXXXVIII.
7 See TheMediaevalLiar,passim.
8 See my RogerSwyneshed's
Insolubilia: Editionand Comments
, forthcoming.
9 See TheMediaevalLiar, itemsXXXVI and LV.
10Cajetanof Thiene,In RegulasGulielmiHentisberi
recollectae,
publishedwith
theeditionoftheRegulaecitedabove,f. 7va.
11Ed. cit.,. 4vb.
12A "casus" is a hypothetical
situation,the "case". The termis also used for
situationor "case".
a setofsentences
a hypothetical
describing
13For mediaevalnominalists
a sentenceis a particular
such as Heytesbury,
fade
utterance
or inscription
token,notthetype).Sinceutterances
(a sentenceofsentences
is forHeytesbury
canbe erased,theexistence
awayandinscriptions
a contingent
affair.Hence it is perfectly
possiblethat the singlesentence
'A falsehoodexists' should have been the only
(utteranceor inscription)
sentence.
115

23:32:11 PM

objections to the fourthview are difficultif not impossible to answer

with complete satisfaction14:
Multae possentfierihujusmodiobjectionescontraistam responsionem
vel impossibilein totosatisf
acere.
quibus essetdifficile
Heytesbury claims indeed that this is so forany attempt to solve the
paradoxes; he recognizes that "something has to give somewhere".15
Nevertheless, he thinks that the fourthview is the best of the lot,
and ought, despite the objections, to be upheld16:
Contratresprimasopinionesarguitur
primoconjunctim
perunummedium,
Posteacontraquartamquam interalias
deindecontrasingulassingulatim.
acereasserosicutnec
Earn vero non in totumsatisf
reputosustinendam.
aliquam quia hoc non video esse possibile.Aestimotarnenipsam inter
omnesmagisessepropinquamveritati.
After considering the objections against the first four opinions,
Heytesbury sets out his definitionsof an insoluble casus and of an
insoluble sentence, and gives his five famous rules for responding to
insolubles in disputation.17The details of these definitionsand rules
need not detain us now.18Sufficeit here to say (a) that they do not
appear in any earlierwriter,to the best of my knowledge,and (b) that
in view of Heytesbury's statement that the fourthopinion is the one
that ought to be maintained, it would seem to followthat the definitions and rules later in the chapter give simplya more detailed account
14Ed. cit.,f. 6rb.
15Thisis a significant
liketheearlywriters
Mostmediaevalauthors,
admission.
in the modernhistoryof the paradoxes,thoughtthe insolublesrestedon a
simple,althoughperhapssubtle,"mistake".Once the mistakewas foundand
that wouldbe all therewas to it. In the passagequotedat n. i6,
corrected,
however,Heytesburyat least implicitlyrecognizesthat the lesson of the
paradoxesgoesdeeperthanthat,thatno solutioncan be had withoutsacrificing
part of our triedand trustedconvictionsabout truthand logic.To the best
to havereachedthis
is thefirstmediaevalwriter
ofmyknowledge,
Heytesbury
- if not the onlyone. Nevertheless,
himselfis not alrealization
Heytesbury
ofthefirst
in thispointofview.For at theverybeginning
consistent
together
afterthe generalprologueto the Regulae
, Heytesbury
chapter,immediately
view: thereis a "correct"solutionto the
expressesthe earlier,moreconfident
igiturrediens
paradoxes,butwe simplyhave notfoundit yet: "Ad propositum
Dicit Philosophusin Praedide insolubilibus
dicamquid aestimoaffirmandum.
camentis
7, 7b 31-33],'Quadraturacircuiietsi sit
quarto capitulo[Categories
dicendumesse sentio
scibilis,nondumtamenscita est'. Cum quo consimiliter
solvipossuntnondumtamensolutasunt."{Ed. cit.,f.4.va.)
quod licetinsolubilia
16Ed. cit..f. 5.
17Ed. cit.,ff.6rb-7ra.
18See The MediaevalLiar, itemLXIX, and myforthcoming
translationand
studyofthetext.
116

23:32:11 PM

of the fourthopinion described more brieflyearlier in the chapter, in

the passage quoted above. The conjunction of (a) and (b) makes
Heytesbury's disclaimer of originality,in his Prologue, puzzling.19My
proposed resolution focusses on (b).
II
In a recent study of the early mediaeval obligationesliterature,
in
this
L.
M.
De
has
a
published
journal,
Rijk
presented text that
be
might just possibly
Heytesbury's source.20This text De Rijk calls
ObligationesParisienses. It is not about insolubles at all, at least not
directly;instead it concernsthat still little-knowntype of disputation
called "obligatio". Nevertheless,the anonymous author of this text,
writingat the beginningofthe thirteenthcentury,21
says some thingsin
passing that bear on our question. Consider,forexample, the following
passages.
Si veronon fiatconvertibile
cum'falsumponi' in temporepositionis,
considerandomi
est an ex ea fitinsolubileet si sic,casus tibiterminatur.
Solet
tamennullumtale a quibusdamin positione
recipiquod nonpotestcadere,
quia fitinsolubileex casu.22
Ad aliud dicendumquod bene sequitur:'tu concedis
, non tamen
falsum'
- ea enimconcessafitinsolubile
- necestexigenda
concedendaestconclusio
eiusprobationec estneganda.23
alterum
Que autemhabentunumcontradictorie
necessarium,
oppositorum
tantumrecipiatur
in depositione,
nisiimpediat
impossibile,
proimpossibili
insolubile.Et propterhoc hec disiuncta:'falsumdeponivel non deponi',
non est deponibilis,nec pro toto nec pro partibus,quia hec per se est
necessaria:falsumnondeponi,hec autemest impossibilis
: falsumdeponi;
et cumhoc estinsolubile
si deponatur.24
Aliecircumstantie
que causantinsolubilein falsapositione,cassandesunt
etiamin depositione.25
The exact force of these passages can, of course, only be seen in
context.Nevertheless,it is clear fromthe passages that the anonymous
19Note thatCajetanofThiene,in his
on thischapter,attributes
commentary
thefirstthreeopinionsby name,butis strangely
silentaboutthepriorauthorSee the
shipof the fourth,
despiteHeytesbury's
explicitdenialof originality.
textquotedabove at n. 10.
20L. M. de Rijk, SomeThirteenth
Tractson theGameofObligation,
Century
II,
in: Vivarium13 (1975),pp. 22-54.
21On thedate,see ibid.,p. 26.
22Ibid.,p. 36 lines29-32.
23Ibid.,p. 38 lines24-26.
24Ibid.,p. 48 lines26-32.
25Ibid.,p. 49 lines11-12.
117

23:32:11 PM

author will not allow the respondentin a "disputatio de obligationibus"

to admit any casus, or to concede any proposed sentence,that leads to
what he calls an "insoluble". This is just the way Heytesburydescribed
the fourthprevious opinion when he firstintroduced it early in his
chapter: "no casus is possible which in any way includes anything
that is simply insoluble." 26
Moreover,thereis additional reason to thinkthat perhaps this text,
or one in the same tradition, lies behind Heytesbury's position on
insolubles. Heytesbury's view has it that no insoluble sentence,in the
circumstancesthat make it paradoxical, signifiesexactly as it seems to.
For instance, suppose that Socrates utters only the sentence 'Socrates
is speaking falsely'. Heytesbury holds that if that sentence signifies
exactly as it seems to, that is, ifit is taken at face value, a contradiction
results: the sentence is true if and only if what Socrates is saying,
namely, that very same sentence, is false. Hence the sentence in those
circumstancesdoes not signifyexactly as it seems to; it is not to be
taken at face value. How then is it to be taken ? Heytesbury's answer
is that, if it is not stipulated by the opponent when he sets up the
hypotheticalcase, the respondentis under no duty to say exactly how
the sentence signifies. He should simply decline to answer that
question.
This is the import of Heytesbury's famous third rule,27and was
taken by later authors to be one of the most characteristicaspects
of Heytesbury's position. Some later authors objected to this feature,
thinkingit was nothingmore than an evasion of the most important
issue. A respondentin disputation might well avoid an embarrassing
contradiction by adopting Heytesbury's position, but he has hardly
advanced our understanding of insolubles very much. In short, the
objection goes, Heytesbury's position is "sophistry" in the worst
sense.28
Compare this characteristicfeature of Heytesbury's view with the
followingpassage fromthe ObligationesParisienses :29
Solutio. Positio est recipienda.Et negatoSortemesse asinumconcedenda
esse
: falsum'. Et nonsequitur:'ergotunegas,Sortem
est hec; 'turespondes
. Possumenimrespondere
asinum*
'falsumest',non negandoSortemesse
asinum.Hec autemneganda.'tu respondes:
falsumestaliudfalsum<a>
26See thetextabove,at n. 11.
27Ed. cit.,f. 6va.
28See, forexample,theanonymous
Commentarium
in insolubilia
in
Hollandrini
TheMediaevalLiar, itemV, at pp. 24-25.
29De Rijk,op. cit.,p. 38 lines3-11.
118

23:32:11 PM

Sortemesse asinum'.Ex cuius oppositoet hac: 'tu respondes

: falsum'
esseasinum.Quo concessosi queratur
sequiturte negare<aliud> a Sortem
quid aliud, huic questioninon debet satisfiedin falsa positione,quia
hoc essetfalsumnonsequens.
quidquidredderetur,
The exact logic ofthis passage is obscure,even in context.The situation
is this. The opponent in the disputation observes that it is possible for
you (the respondent)to concede that Socrates is an ass. Whethersuch
a concessionis rightor wrong,it is still possible. And since it is possible,
the opponent assumes that it is the case. (This is the ' 'positing" of a
hypothetical"casus".) Then he proposes to you the sentence 'Socrates
is an ass' If you concede it, then you have conceded somethingimpossible on the basis of a hypothetical casus that is quite possible.
Such a response on your part would be incorrect.On the other hand,
if you deny 'Socrates is an ass', then the opponent proposes to you
the sentence 'You reply "It is false" ' That is true in fact, since that
is what you replied,and it is moreoverconsistentwith the hypothetical
casus. Therefore,you should concede it. If you do, however, then it
seems to follow fromwhat you have conceded that you have denied
that Socrates is an ass. But this is inconsistentwith the hypothetical
casus, which was that you concede that Socrates is an ass. Hence there
is a dilemma which the anonymous author tries to resolve in the
passage just quoted.
The author's solution consists in observing that fromthe sentence
'You reply "It is false" ', which you have conceded, it does not follow
that you have denied that Socrates is an ass. On the contrary,you
denied somethingotherthan that Socrates is an ass. (It is here that the
logic of the passage is obscure.) But if you are asked just what else it
is that you have denied, you do not have to answer that question.
The parallel between this and the characteristicfeatureof Heytesbury's thirdrule should be obvious. This supports the hypothesisthat
it was this text, or another one in the same tradition, that stood
behind Heytesbury's chapter on insolubles. But whether this hypothesis is true or not, whetherthere is any real influenceon Heytesbury
by this text, or by another one in the same tradition,it certainly is
true that Heytesbury's position was already, in certain essential
respects,a "known but not a new" position, as he puts it, at the time
he wrote the firstchapter of his Regulae.
The exact sense in which this is so must, however, be carefully
delineated. It remainstrue that no known author priorto Heytesbury
maintained the definitionsand rules in the later parts of his chapter.
119

23:32:11 PM

Nevertheless,it is also true that the anonymous author of the ObligationesParisienses already maintained the kernelof Heytesbury'sview :
that no casus is to be admitted as possible if it in any way "includes"
'
anythingthat is 'simply insoluble". The anonymous author does not
tell us what he means by an "insoluble" . Heytesbury's definition,it
seems, is his own original contribution.30Again, it is true that the
anonymous author of the ObligationesParisienses already maintained
somethingremarkablylike the characteristicfeature of Heytesbury's
third rule. It was left to Heytesbury, however, to generalize and
formulatethis rule precisely, and to apply it to insolubles.
Thus it appears that point (b) at the end of section I, above, must
be properly understood. Heytesbury does think that his definitions
and rules are part of the fourthopinion he had earlier described. But
they are part of that opinion not, at least so far as we know, in the
sense that anyone before Heytesbury had actually formulatedthose
definitionsand rules as carefullyand systematicallyas Heytesburydid.
Rather they are part of that opinion only in the sense that they
conformto it and are suggested by it. Heytesbury's apparent originality in his definitionsand rules may thereforebe reconciled with the
explicit disclaimer in his Prologue.
Bloomington, Indiana
Indiana University

30Notethat,forHeytesbury,
to say thata casusis a "casus ofan insolubel"is
notto say thatit "includessomething
simplyinsoluble"in thesensein which
a casus "includessomething
thatis ruledout by thefourthopinion.In effect,
simplyinsoluble"if and onlyif it is a "casus of an insoluble"in the sense
and also providesthat the insoluble
specifiedby Heytesbury'sdefinition,
sentencein that casussignifies
exactlyas it appearsto- thatis, thatit is to be
and thesecondofhisfive
twodefinitions
takenat facevalue.See Heytesbury's
rules,ed. cit.,f. 6rb-6va.
120

23:32:11 PM

VivariumXIV, 2 (1976)
Richard Billingham' s Works on Logic

L. M. DE RIJK

Professor Alfonso Maier published 1 Iiis most useful workSinceedition {strumentodi lavoro) of Richard Billingham's Speculum
puerorumevery student of Mediaeval logic has been acquainted
with that famouswork which exertedsuch a great influencein the fourteenth and fifteenthcenturylogic curriculum,especially in the schools
of Eastern and SouthernEurope. Elsewhere 2 1 have tried to show that
Billingham's work is part of a certain tradition of similar works on
the truth and falsityof propositionsand certainly not unique in the
genre nor at its origin.3
As a matter of fact several other works on logic are ascribed to our
author. Bale mentions4 Consequentie
, Obligationes
, Abstractiones,Conclusiones, Fallaciae, .... Speculum puerile, AbbreviataG. Kylmynton
,5
Tabula logicae. Poole 6 scratched the Tabulae as works of our Richard
and ascribed them to a Riardus Billyngham, socius collegii Martonensis (!) Oxonii. However, our Richard belonged to the Mertonians.7
Those Tabulae seem to be referredto in the Catalogue of the Library
of Syon Monastery Isleworth (ed. M. Bateson, Cambridge 1898, 21
c. 12): Tabula secundum ordinem alphabeti super libros logicos et
physicos tam naturales quam morales secundum Ricardum de Billyng1 AlfonsoMaier,Lo 'Speculum
siveTerminus
estin quem' di Riccardo
puerorum
A
Centro
italiano
di studisull' alto
Estratto
da
Billingham.
GiuseppeErmini,
Medioevo,Spoleto1970,297-397.(= Studia medievalia3, (1969),297-397).
2 L. M. de Rijk, ThePlace ofBillingham's
in 14thand15th
Speculumpuerorum
withthe Editionof Some AlternativeTracts in:
Century
Logical Tradition,
StudiMediewistyczne
16 (1975),99-153.
3 Forthatmatter,
extantwhichis (wrongly,
thereis anotherSpeculum
puerorum
it wouldseem) attributed
to our author.See below,p. 124.
4 JohnBale, Scriptorum
illustrium
maiorisBritanniaequam nuncAngliamet
ScotiamvocantCatalogus,
Basle 1559,460.
5 = Sophismataabbreviata.... per RicardumBillingham
; see Bale, Index
Britanniae
ed. R. Lane PoolewithhelpofM. BatesonOxford1902,80.
scriptorum
e loc.laud.,304.
7 Gir.JamesA WeisheiplO.P., Repertorium
m: Mediaevalbtudies
Mertonense,
31 (1969),[174-224L176.
121

23:32:18 PM

ham.8 Finally Frans Ehrle9 attributed a tract entitled Restrictiones

to Richard Billingham, on the base of the Erfurt Statutes of 1449 :
Item,Parva Loycalia,sc. suppositiones,
confusiones,
consequentie,
ampliaet insolubiliadebent
restrictiones
tiones,appellationes,
Biligam,obligationes
disputanin exercitiis
permediumannum.
However, Konstanty Michalski rightly proposed to read here:
restrictiones
, Billingham, taking the name Billinghamforthe Speculum
10
um.
or
puer
As a matter of fact there is a tract Restrictionesextant in a Vienna
manuscript ( VPL 5162, I0iv-i02r) following(withthe announcement:
Sequitur alius textus)the Suppositionesy Ampliationes,Appellationes,
and Restrictionesof Marsilius of Inghen:
et appellationibus,
est de ampliationibus
Ine. : Postquam determinatum
et de alienationetermini
a sua
de restrictionibus
resttnunc determinare
status
secundum

est
Et
considerandus
quem
primo
suppositione.
Statusenimultraquem terminus
terminus
sepe
ampliatur restringitur.
est suppositioterminipro omnibus
ampliaturet citra quem restringitur
suis suppositis,aut omnisuo supposito,sibi adequatecorrespondentibus,
vel correspondente,
temporispreterite
(/) vel
respectuunius differentie
ut 'homocurri
solumvel futuri.
tantumvel preteriti
,
Exemplum
presents
eri.
'homoestanimai', 'Adamfui, *Antichristus
a sua suppositipotestterminm
Expl.: Septimaregula: negatioinfinitans
one alienare.Exemplumut 'nonhomocurrivel 'homononenses. Et sic
est finis.Sequituretc.etc.
MagistiRichardi.
Explicittextusrestrictionum
I am sure that this Richardus cannot be Billingham, First. Billingham is never called magisterRichardus, but always RichardBillingham
or Billingham {Biligam, Berlingham, etc.) Second. This tract is charac8 For thatmatter,the entrycontinues:Item.CanonvelInstructorium
eiusdem
exordiaquorundam
operisposttabulamsecundumeundem.Item. Capitulorum
in finelibri.
huictabulecorrespondencium
librorum
(!) et philosophie
logicorum
in Vienna,Oesterreichische
NationalA workofthistypeis extant(anonymous)
cod. 2506,ff.240r-296v
bibliothek,
(s.XIV, English,it seems).
9 Der Sentenzenkommentar
Petersvon Candia, des spterenPisaner Papstes
Mnster
AlexanderV. Beitrgezur Philosophieund Theologiedes Mittelalters,
i.W. 102 202.
10La physiquenouvelle
au XIVe sicle,
courants
et les diffrents
philosophiques
au XIVe siclein theseries
La philosophie
p. 20, nowin: KonstantyMichalski,
zur Philosophieund ihrerGeschichte,
Abhandlungen
Opusculaphilosophica.
s suggestion
. herausg.vonKurtFlasch,MinervaFrankfurt
1969p-226.Michalski'
and confusiones
is certainlyright.For that matter,the suppositiones
are, no
thoseof
worksby ThomasManlevelt,the consequentie
doubt,the well-known
WilliamSuton mostly(especiallyin CentralEuropeanmanuscripts)
wrongly
and restrictiones
ascribedto Manlevelt,whereasthe ampliationes,
appellationes
may have been thoseby Marsiliusof Inghenor thoseby Hugo Capellanus.
122

23:32:18 PM

teristic of the Central European tradition and is quite alien to the

English curriculum.

The aim of this paper is to recollect all manuscript evidence for

Billingham'slogical works. At the outset, however, we have to discuss
our author's identity.
The Dictionary of National Biography distinguishes two persons
named Billingham, viz. a Benedictine monk (see below) and our
schoolman,
"whosenameappearsin therollsofMertoncollege,Oxfordbetween1344
and 1356 (Tanner, ibi. Brit.,p. 100), Tannerstatesthat he becamea
priestof Sion,but as thatreligioushousewas not foundeduntil1414 we
two different
mustsupposethat he has confounded
persons".[Diet,of
Nat. Biography
V, 32).
Emden,11who gives 19 differentspellings of our Richard's surname
distinguisheshim from a fifteenthcentury Benedictine monk from
Durham Cathedral Priory, who was "Proctor of Durham Priory at
the Roman Curia forthe purpose of combating the effortsbeing made
in Scotland to secure the detachmentof Coldingham Priory,Berwicks,
as a dependent cell Febr. 1465." The latter was certainly not an
author of logical works. The fourteenthcenturyBillinghamwas fellow
of Merton College in 1344 (still in 1361), subwarden in 1357 (still in
1361) and regent-masterof arts in 1349. $ee Emden, loc. cit.
Although nearly all tracts discussed below are found in fifteenth
centurymanuscripts only, it goes without any reasonable doubt that
our logician was the fourteenthcentury Mertonian.
i - Speculum puerorum
This work (called also Terminus est in quernor Speculum iuvenum)
was the most famous and most influentialtract on probationespropositionum (or terminorum),especially in the schools of Central and
Southern Europe, during the late Middle Ages. This work, as its
name-sakes, discusses the rules for proving all kind of propositions
. As
(thereforeit was also called De veritateas falsitatepropositionum)
is known, fourteenth century logic paid special attention to the
procedures of proving a sentence, as the philosophers of those days
11A. B. Emden,A Biographical
toA.D. 1500,
Register
oftheUniversity
ofOxford
I (Oxford)1957),188-189.
123

23:32:18 PM

focussed their attention on the search for certainty (when certitudo

and evidentiawere the key-words).
Richars tract opens as follows:
ut predicatum
et de quo preTerminusest in quem resolvitur
propositio
idestin proposi
tioneaffirmadicatur,oppositovel divisoessevelnonesse,12
tiva vel negativa;PrimoPriorm,
capituloprimo.Sed secundumBoetium,
13: terminosautem voco nominaet
Primo Topicorum,capitulosecundo
verbaquibuspropositionectitur. . .
The text has come down to us in two differentredactions, an English
and a Central European one,14the formerof which,also foundin most
of the Italian and Spanish copies of the work, is decidedly closer to
the original version. Maieru's text is based on the English-Southern
European version. For a number of manuscripts (of the two versions),
see Maier, op. cit., 302-317.
A differenttract going under the same title Speculum puerorumand
also attributed to Billingham, is found in the MS Ripoll 141 at
Barcelona, (ff.6or-67v; Explicit tractatus bilinguam (/) qui quidem
tractatus intitulatur speculum puerorum). It was edited from the
unique manuscript.15Except forone chapter (ch. 72) thereis a striking
parallelism between this tract and the one edited by Maieru fromthe
doctrinal point of view, but theirwordingsare quite different,as may
appear fromthe incipit:
Ideo terminmvoco omnem
ex terminis
Omnispropositio
componitur.
talemdictionem
quecumquesit ilia,ut
que potestesseparspropositionis,
dicit Boetius Secundo Thopicorum.Sed talium terminorum
quidam
communes.
alii autemtermini
dicunturterminidiscreti,
The discrepancybetween this tract,ch. 72 and the parallellous passage
in the Maier edition (pp. 3751-37620)seems to exclude Billingham's
authorship of the Ripoll tract, in spite of the explicit added by the
same hand that wrote the tract in our manuscript. But furtherinvestigations are needed.
12Aristotle,
Anal. Pr. I 1, 24.b6-18.
13De top.diff.I, col. 1175 (Migne).
14See Maier,op. cit.,Introd.3i8ff.Maierseemsto be wrongm distinguishing
ofthissupposed
: in factat leasttwomanuscripts
a thirdclass of manuscripts
class containquite different
tracts,whichalso go underthe name Terminus
estin quem,thefirstofwhichis EdwardUpton'sDe probationibus
propositionum,
in Venice,Z.L. 277 (1728),2r-5vand withtheauthor'sname
foundanonymous
in Worcester,
CathedralF 118, 43-45
(editedfromthe Venicemanuscript
in the articlequoted above (p. 121,n. 2), 104-118.Anotherworkofthesame
titleis the so-calledTractatusaureusfoundin Cambridge,
CorpusChristi244
thelattermanuscript
andeditedfrom
(ibid.,120-135).
(29-32)and378 (34v~45v)
16Articlequotedabove (p. 121,n. 1), 213-235.
124

23:32:18 PM

2 - A tract De sensu compositoet diviso

This tract, which in Billingham's Speculum is explicitlyreferredto
(p. 37912"14ed. Maieri) is found in the unique manuscript Paris,
B.N. Lat. 14.715, ff.79ra-82rb(dated March 1, 1378) and was edited
by Maier, op. cit. 387-393. Its attributionto Billingham in the manuscript is quite explicit (79ra: Incipit tractatusde sensu compositoet
diviso magistiRicardi Bilingam Anglici valde subtilis; 82rb: Explicit
tractatusde sensu compositoet diviso magistiRicardi Bilingam Anglici
valde utilis et brevis.Laudetur virgo egregiamaterde rmeloM aria amen
amen amen.)
3 - A tract on supposition
The manuscript Lat.misc. e 100 of the Bodleian Library at Oxford
contains several tracts ascribed to Richard Billingham. It was written
in Spain in the fifteenthcentury and purchased by the Bodleian
16
Library in 1954. I give a short analysis :
17 a
copy (originatingfromthe South of France) of Peter of
Spain's TractatusI-V
and18 50r-52ra tract on supposition; see below, pp. 126-8.
44r-45v
A
tract on ampliatio ascribed to Billingham; see below,
52-53
pp. 128-9
53v_55v A tract on appellatio ascribed to Billingham; see below,
pp. 129-30.
5-2
(62v is blank) a tract on consequentia'see below, pp. 130-1.
r
63
(63V is blank) the opening lines of the next item
Terminus
in quem tractatusminor compiled by a John of
4r-69r:
the Holy Cross (15th cent.) at Zaragossa; it is anonymous
in our manuscript but ascribed to this author in Rome,
Bibl. Casanatense 5445 (i57r-i74r). 19 It has been edited
(article quoted above, p. 121, n. 2) 137-152).
v
are
left blank
69^84
Formalitates
85r-90v
magistiAnthoniiIacobi
ir-43v

16For a description,
see BodleianLibraryRecords5 (1956),332.
17It is foliatedin Romannumerals
andthenumeralsXLV-XLVIIII havebeen
omitted;nothingis missing.
18See preceding
note.
19F. i74r: Et hec breviasufficiunt
de exponibilibus.
Hoc opusculumprimordiatumfuita Johannede Sancta Crucein studioCesaragustano
ad Dei primo
laudemet honoremet introductionem
puerorum.
ExplicitTerminusin quem.
Deo gratiaset beateMarie,Amen.
125

23:32:18 PM

another tract on supposition; Inc. : Ad evidenciam tractatus suppositionum pleniorem primo in generali aliqua
per ordinem sunt notanda
interOcam et Scotum
Controversie
I03r-i04r:
io6r-iiiv A physical tract (on matter, form,and privation).

9ir-i02v

The firsttract on supposition is here handed down secundumordinem

Magisti Verlingani (i) and explicitly ascribed to Billingham in two
other manuscripts(see below, pp. 126-8). It opens as follows:

sequens tractatus
44r: Ad abendum (/) veram notitiamterminorum
Primoquid est supositio
<supositionum> c memoriedebetcommendari.
et ubi non.
supponunt
(/),secundoquid estsuponere(/),tertioubi termini
Ad primmdico quod suppositioest proprietasterminisecundumquod
Verbigratia:'homo
ad aliumin propositione.
unus terminuscomparatur
curii(/)'; li 'homo'supponitrespectuhuiusquod dico 'curii'.Ad secundum
antealiumponere;ut in exemplo
dico quod suponereest unumterminm
posito.Ad tertiumdico quod terminisolumsuponuntin orationeet non
extraorationem.Ratio huius <est> quia supositio,ut priuspatuit,est
ad aliumin
secundumquod unusterminus
termini
comparatur
proprietas
non
unus
terminus
sed
extra
;
potest
comparali
propositionem
propositione
existens
nonsuponitsed solusterminus
ad alium.Et ideoextraorationem
nonsuponit.
in orationesuponitet extraorationem

It winds up as follows:
va subiectumsuponit
singulariaffirmati
5iv-52r: In omni propositione
discreteet predicatumdeterminate.Et sic sub subiectonon oportet
descenderealio modout dictumest. Sed sub predicatofitdescensusper
Item. In omnipropositione
singulari
negativa
propositionsdistiunctivas.
ut illa:
confuseet distributive,
subiectumsuponitdiscreteet predicatum
'Sortesnonesi asinus'.Et ideo (52r) sub subiectonon oportetdescendere,
Sed subpredicatooportetdescendere
inmediatus.
copulaquia estterminus
tive,ut supradictumest.
in generaliet in speciali
terminorum
Et sic patet de supositionibus
secundumordinemmaistriVerlingani(/).
EXPLICIUNT SUPOSICIONES
The same tract is found in Salamanca, Univ. 1735, 75r-77r(Incipiunt
nuncusuposiciones berlingam (/) que Ad veramnoticiamterminorum
pantur; in Toledo, Cabildo 94-28 (s XV), Ii6v-ii7v (anonymous) and
acephalous in Rome, Casanatense 5445> i04r-io8v, where it begins
with the division of suppositio propria, (line 21 in the Oxford copy)
and winds up as follows:
subiectum
affirmativa
io8r-v:Item.In omnipropositione
suponit
singulari
et sic (io8v) sub subiectononoportet
determinate
discreteet predicatum
cum quadamcatarocica(!) de
descendere
copulative distributive
copulatoextremo.Et ratio est quia terminusinmediatusest et sub tali
126

23:32:18 PM

descendereet sub predicatolicitum<est>

terminorpugntintellectui
descendere
distributive.
i negativasubiectum
Item.In omnipropositione
singular
suponitdiscrete,
confuseet distributive.
Ut ista: 'Sortesnon estasinus'. Ideo
predicatum
non oportetdescenderesub subiectosed sub predicatocopulative.
DEO GRACIAS.
Et hec suficiant
de suposicionibus.
Billingham's name is found in the colophon after the Consequentie
on f. ii9v: Expliciunt suposiciones et consequentie burlingam (/).
I know of two commentaries on this tract. Some fifteenthcentury
20
Spanish master named De Franquera of Salamanca wrote a rather
extensive one which is found in Salamanca, Univ. 1735, 9-4
(Incipiunt suposiciones a reverendo magistro de Franquera copilate).
Inc.: <E>xaudiende sunt preces
diligentiquas informat
karitaset amornondeseruithonestatis.
Porrostudencium
quorundam,
qui
ad scholasticamdisciplinamin logica capessendamquadam solercia
et honestam,
movebantur,
precamine,quia causam foventrationabilem
t sim cupienstraderegloriosof quendamtractatumde suposicionibus
terminorum
Deo copilare....
proposuisolicitesufragente
Ad cuius tractatusevidenciamplenioremprimoin generalialiqua per
ordinemprenotabo:secundo in speciali diciones (/) specialitermultiformes.... reserabo....
The same commentary is found anonymous in Segovia (Spain)
Cabildo de la Catedral, vitrina 31, pars media [sign,antiqua i-6j-82)}
94r-ii3r. The Salamanca manuscript (Univ. 1735) contains also some
notabiliafromthe hand of a fraterGarsia de Castello (77v-78V):

a fratreGarsiade
77v: IncipuntnotabiliaAd veramnoticiamterminorum
castellocopilatum(/).
Ad veram noticiam terminorumetc.Circaistudbreveopusduo sunt
notanda.Primoquomodointitulatur,
secundoin quotpartesdividitur.
Ad
dicoquod intitulatur
sic: incipittractatussuposicionum
Ad veram
primum
noticiamterminorum
hbendama Berlinganoeditus.Ad secundumdico
quod dividiturin duas partes,scilicetpreabulumet tractatum.Secunda
incipitibi: Suposicio est proprietas.21

No doubt, the Berlinganus (Verlinganus) mentioned as the author

should be identifiedwith our Richard Billingham,22who was widely
knownforhis Speculumpuerorum, especially in Southern (and Central)
Europe. The supposition tract which has probably been part of the
CambridgeLogic seems to go back, among other tracts,to Billingham's
20Cfr.the Segovia manuscript,ii3v wherethe rubricais found:
Sequitur
tractatusvocatus: Terminusestin quemcompositum
a venerabilimagistrode
cathedram
FranqueraSalamantine
regenti
{Inc. Nobilieffluens).
-1 The same authorcommentedupon the supposition
tract of the Logica
Cantabrigiensis
(see Salamanca,Univ. 1735,8or-82v).
22See also below,p. 131.
127

23:32:18 PM

work. For that matter, a Toledo manuscript (iCabildo 94-27, f.88v)

ascribes the Cambridgetract on suppositionto Billingham (88v: Sequitur de notabilibus. Notasuppositiones berlingani.Et nota quod ' quia
est redditiva rationis.) So the notabilia turn out to be on the Cambridge tract {Inc.: Quia ignorantibus suppositiones terminorum;ibid.,
ff.87r-88v;the commentary is found on ff.88v-95v).However, this
tract is nowhere else ascribed to Billingham, as far as I know.
4 - A tract on ampliation
The Oxford manuscript has an anonymous tract on ampliation as
its next item (52-5):
Unde anpliacio
Inc.: VIDENDUM est iam de anpliacione(!) terminorum.
est acceptiotermini
proaliquo (alio MS) vel pro aliquibusultrahoc quod
actualiterest proquo vel quibusaccipiturvel denotatur
accipi (dnottet
in qua ponitur.
accipiMS) <in> propositione
Dantur regule.PRIMA regulaest: terminussuponensrespectuverbi
de preteritoanpliaturad suponendumpro eo quod est vel fuit.Verbi
1
'.
gratia: albumfuitnigrum
quosdamquod omniaverbaadhuc(aduc
Expl.: Octavaregulaestsecundum
de presenti
que (quiaMS) habent(hancMS) naturam
MS) ipsisexistentibus
sive (sic MS)
transeundi< super>c rationem(ratioita MS) preteritami
ad presens,
suntampliativaterminorum
futuram
sivepresentem,
preteritum
vel futurum.
Sic ista verba: 'intelligo',
'ymaginor'etc. Verbigratia: linrosam',li 'rosa'estt(/)prorosaque estvelfuitveleritvelpotestesse.
telligo
benecolligitur
Notandumest quod anpliatioterminorum
aliquandoper
'quod est'. Unde quamvis in ista propositione:'albumeritnigrum'
'album'esttpro albo quod est vel erit,si tamendicamus'quodestalbum
eritnigrum'
. anpliatioest ablata peraddiccionem
(/)huiusquod dico 'est'.
Et sic potestexempli
<fi> caride quacumquealia (aliqua MS). Et hec de
dictasuficiant.
anpliationibus
EXPLICIUNT ANPLIACIONES.
The tract is explicitly ascribed to Billingham in Salamanca, Univ.
1735 (82v-83v; Incipiunt tractatus ampleationum (!) berlingami) and
in Rome, Casanatense 5445, (32r-34r; Expliciunt ampliationes Barlingam). Other anonymous copies are extant in Segovia, Cabildo,
vitrina 31 pars media, iv-2r and Toledo, Cabildo 94-27, 9-97. A
commentaryon this tract by Garsia (Notabilia super ampleationesa
fratreGarsia copilata) are found in Salamanca Univ. 1735, 8-84,
whereas the Toledo codex contains some anonymous notabilia (97').
5 - A tract on appellation
The next item in our Oxford manuscript is a tract on appellation
(53v-55v)128

23:32:18 PM

Inc. VIDENDUM de ampellacione(/). Apelado est proprietaspredicati

medianteverboquod
illudad illudproquo suponitsubiectum
comparando
Solemusenimdicere
diciturcopula (copulativaMS) illiuspropositionis.
ad verbumquodestcopula
in ordinatione
apelaresuamformam
predicatum
vocalissub qua
seu f sub eademvoce sistitterminus
illiuspropositionis,
inpropositione
iliainqua apellatsuamformam
esseverificaestpredicatum
demonstrante
illudproquo
de presentide pronomine
bilemin propositione
MS) cuiusestpars.De qua
(prepositionis
suponitsubiectumpropositionis
apellacionedanturalique regule.
de presentipredicatum
Prima regula est quod in omni propositione
sequensverbumapellatsuamformam.
Expl.: Sed positoquod lapis essetcaliduset tantumlaxat te, tunchec est
concedenda'calidumscisesselapidem'; istaveroneganda:'lapidemseisesse
calidum'ex eo quod hoc, demonstrando
lapidem,non scisessecalidum,
ut ponitcasus. Similiterposito <quod> Deus est sit omneA [quamvis
laxas te] hec est <concedenda> : 'A scis esseverum']nam ad veritatem
istiussuficitquod hoc scis esse verum,demonstrando
A, quod est hec
'
propositioDeus est'. Ista tamen< . . . . illegible....>, quare Deus est
nonscisesse A . Sed Deus estomneA. Igituretc.Conclusiohecsatispatet.
Tantumhec dicta suficiantde apelationibus.
EXPLICIUNT APELLACIONES.
Two other anonymous copies are found in the Segovia manuscript,
2r-4rand the Toledo codex, 97v-ioor, whereas the Salamanca manuscript,85r-87rexplicitlyattributesit to Billingham (Incipiunt apelaciones seu tractatus apelacionum berlingami). In this manuscript the
work is followed by a commentaryfromthe hand of our fraterGarsia
(87r-89v): Incipiunt notabilia super tractatumapelacionum berlingami.
Some other notabilia are found in the Toledo codex, ioov-ioir.
6 - A tract De consequentiis
The Oxford codex goes on by giving a tract on consequentia(5-2) :
ex antecedente
cumconInc.: CONSEQUENcia est quodam(!) agregatum
sequenteet nota consequentie.Et sunt note consequentiescilicet:'si',
Et (est MS) preterquamin conditioet consimiles.
'quia', 'ergo', 'etergo',
nalibuset causalibusantecedensest (et MS) illud quod peceditnotam
consequencie.
CONSEQUENCIARUMquedamestbonaetformalis,
quedammaterialis.
Consequenciamaterialisest ilia ubi antecedensest propositioinpossibilis
et nonintelligitur
in antecevel ubi (uniMS) consequensest necessarium
dente.Exemplumde primo,ut 'homoestasinus; ergohomoestcapra'; ista
antecedensest proposicioinconsequentiaest bona de materia,
1 quia
illegible
ergoDeus est';
possibilis.Exemplumde secundo: <
estbonade materia,quia consequensest necessarium
et
ista consequentia
nonintelligitur
in antecedente.
Ad cognoscendum
bonam et formalem
sunt
quamlibetconsequentiam
multeregule.Primotamen ponam regulasspeciales; deindeponam in
fineregulasgenerales.Primaregulaestista ....

129

23:32:18 PM

Expl. (6iv-2r):PROBANDUM quod ista propositiosit vera, sic debet

probari,sicutista: 'Deus <est>' probaturquod sit vera; nam illa prote(!) precisesic<ut> est; ergoestvera.Consequentia
positiosingnificat
Antecedens
neta difinicione
ad difiniendum.
probo(62r).Nam istaprecise
precise
significai
quodDeus est; et ita estquod Deus est; ergoillasignificai
vera.
sicutest. < Sicutest> in illis,et de qualibetpropositione
Nota quomodoimprobatur
propositiofalsa.Dico quod sic. Ut 'homoest
asinus'; istasignificai
precisesicutnonest; ergoilia estfalsa.Consequentia
patet. Antecedens
probatur.Nam significaiquod homoest asinus;et sic
non est; ergosignificat
precisesicutnonest.
Dico quodsic.Exemplum:
necessaria.
Notaquomodoprobatur
propositio
'Deus est'.Ista propositioprecisesignificat
quod cnecesse est esse; ergo
ipsa est necessaria.Consequentiapatet. Antecedensprobatur,quia ista
precisequod> Deus est; et sic est; ergoest
propositio'Deus est'significat
necessaria;ergo precisesignificatsic<ut> necesseest esse. [Similiter
de ista: aliqua]
sicut ista: 'homoest
Nota quomodoprobaturpropositioinpossibilis,
asinus'.Ista significat
precisequod nonpotestesse;ergoiliaestinpossibilis.
Antecedensprobatur.Nam illa
Consequentiapatet per difinitionem.
quod
significat
quod homoestasinus;et sic nonpotestesse; ergosignificat
non potestesse; igiturest inpossibilis.
sicut'homocurri; ista significat
De propositione
< precise
contingenti,
sicutcontingit
esse; ergoest contingens.
Consequentiapatet.Antecedens
probatur;quia ista propositio'homocurriprecisesignificat>quod homo
currit,<Et sic contingitesse; ergo significat
precise> est propositio]
esse.Ergo 'homocurriest propositio
sic<ut> contingit
contingens.
EXPLICIUNT CONSEQUENCIE.
This tract is found, with an explicit attribution to Billingham, in
Rome, Casanatense 5445, 108 Av-ii9v (Expliciunt supposiciones et
consequencie barlingam (/)) ; Ripoll 166, ir-5r (Expliciunt consequencie
Berlinguam (/)) and Salamanca, Univ. 1882, I20r-i23v (Incipiunt consequencie io (or: ro ?) berligem (/); Expliciunt consequencie edite a
magistroberlingamooxonie). In Gdansk (Danzig), Municipal Library,
cod. 2181, 68r-7iv the work is ascribed to a Guillelmusde <0>sma
(Expliciunt consequencie quas composuit reverendissimus doctor
Guillelmus de < O >sma).
An adaptation of the work is extant in Toledo, Cabildo 94-27, yoT86v. I know of two commentaries: our Segovia manuscript{vitrina3 J,
pars media) contains (5r-93v) an extensive commentary on Billingham's work called Tractatus consequenciarumde cerdone (?). It opens
as follows:
Gonsequenciaest quoddam agregatum etc. Hie poniturtalisconclusio
Et probatursic: nullumcomplexum
quod nulla consequentiadifinitur.
difinitur;consequenciaest quid complexum;ergo consequencianon
difinitur.
130

23:32:18 PM

Another commentary,dedicated to a frater Fernandus is found in

Salamanca, Univ. 1735, 3r-74v. It opens as follows:
tui ingenii
<R>ogasti me, fraterFernandealupne (/), ob lucidationem
<ut> in Consequentias
Berlingamaliquid de penuriameij intellectus
....
traderem
Consequncia est quodam (/) agregatum ex antecedentiet consequentiet nota consequencie.Tractatusistepotestdividiinpreambulam
et tractatum,
licetnon consuevitdividi.
A tract of the type of what is elsewhere called Obiectionescon23
sequentiarum and called here Contraconsequencie
Berlingam (see the
the
found
in
Casanatense
manuscript,I3ir-i55v.
colophon), is
Inc.: <C>ONSEQUENCIA est quoddamagregatumex antecedenteet
et nota consequencie.Et suntnoteconsequencie:'igitur',et
consequente
'ergo','si' et 'quia' et similia.Antecedensest quod peceditnotas conet causalibus;consequens est
sequenciepreterquamin condicionalibus
notamconsequencie.
quod subsequitur
Contraregulamarguitur.Et videturquod regulasit falsa.Et arguitur
sic: nullumcomplexumest difinibile;omnisconsequenciaest quoddam
complexum;
ergonullaconsequenciadifinitur.
Expl. Dico quod regulahabetveritatemubi fitin naturalimateriavel in
ubi fitaccidensinseparabile
ut estniger
materiaremotavel in contingenti,
dictum(dicoMS) de corvo.Et sic de aliis.Et quando ego dico 'homoest
animai',ergoomnishomoestanimai', 'homoestasinus; ergoomnishomoest
asinus',ibi arguoin naturalimateriaet non in remotaet in contingenti,
Et hec dictasuficiant.
ubi accidensest inseparabile.Quarenon <....>.
DEO GRACIAS.
EXPLICIUNT CONTRACONSEQUENCIE BERLINGAM.
The ascription of the Consequentiein the above-mentioned manuscripts to Richard Billingham finds some additional support in the
explicit of the Salamanca 1882 copy where Oxford is mentioned as
the place of composition. (See above, p. 130). Moreover, a Paris
manuscript(Bibl. Nat. Nouv. acq. lat. 258, which contains (i43r-i54v,
, explicitly ascribes the
s.XV) an incomplete tract De consequentiis
definitionof consequentiafound in our tract to Billingham:
Primonotaquod consequentia
secundum
143r: Sequiturde consequentiis.
SecundumBerlingamsic diffinitur:
diffinitur.
"condiversosdiversimode
ex antecedente
et consequente
cum
sequentiaest quo<d>dam agregatum
24 consequentiaest quedam
nota consequentie".Secundum Albertm
et consequentecum nota
propositio
ypoteticacompositaex antecedente
25(/) veriorimododiffinitur:
"conSecundumRrandulfum
consequentie.
cumnota consequentie."
sequentiaestillatioconsequentsex antecedente
23 So the well-known
tractof that name by Martinof Alnwick(= Mrtius
It shouldbe noticed
d. 1336),whichis extantin severalmanuscripts.
Anglicus,
that one of them,Toledo,Cabildo94-28 (s.XV) 73v-8gr,
calls Martin'swork
in thecolophon.
Contraconsequentie
131

23:32:18 PM

7 - A tract De obligationibus
The Salamanca manuscript Univ. 1735 contains (8gr-g5v) a tract
on obligation ascribed to Billingham (Incipit ars obligatoria a berlingamo magistro edita). I have not the manuscript at my disposal now.
An anonymous copy is found in Ripoll 166, 49-54, I quote fromthe
Ripoll manuscript:
Inc.: Obligacioest quedamars <mediante> qua opponenspotestliguare
ut ad suum placitumrespondeat.Vel aliter:obligacio
(!) respondentem
affirmative
velnegative
estquedamoraciomediante< qua> quisobliguatus
teneturrespondere
ad obligtm.Notandumest quod tres sunt species
scilicetposicio,deposicio,imposicio;aliquiponunt:institucio.
obligationis,
Primaregulaest ista: omnetibi positumsub formapositipropositum
scituma te essetalepositumnonrepugnans
positodurantetemporeobligaIntellectus
istiusreguleest quod ....
cionisest a te concedendum.
Expl.: Alia regulaest quod diciturdisiunctivauniversalisquando altera
ut 'tucurrisvelDeus est'; alio modoquandodisiunctiva
parsestnecessaria,
ut 'tues veltunones homo'; alio modoquando
fitex duobuscontradictoriis,
ut 'tu nones in ista domovel
est impossibile,
contradictorium
disiunctive
ex conest una copulativasibiimpossibilis
tues equus',eiuscontradictoria
istarum:'tu es in ista domoet non es in
tradictoriis
partiumdisiunctive
ista domo'
, quod est impossibile;ergo etc.Est sciendumquod nulla proest
posicio istarumdebet admitti,quia quilibetistorumterminorum
in deposicione.Etc.
est admittendum
necessarium
et nullumnecessarium
EXPLICIT ARS OBLIGATORIA. ALTISSIMO GRACIAS AGO. ETC.
Another copy is found in Rome Casanatense 5445, Ii9v-I3iv. The
work is incompletehere and not ascribed to Billingham by the incipit,
but preceded by the colophon: Expliciunt supposicioneset consequencie
barlingam. Incipiunt obligaciones. Finally, the opening lines of the
tract are found in our Toledo manuscript,94-27, f.63r:
<0>bligacio est quedam ars mediantequa opponenspotestligarereVel obligacioest ordinacio
ut ad suumplacitumrespondeat.
spondentem
vel negative
sive oraciomediantequa quis obligtusteneturaffirmative
Notandumestquodtressuntspeciesobligationes
ad obligtm.
respondere
videlicet
principalesquibus aliquis potestligare aliquem respondentem,
posicio,deposicioet aliqui dicunt:suposiciosed2e
Another Toledo manuscript (Cabildo 94-28) seems to contain (ff.i67rI7iv) an adaptation of the work.
24AlbertofSaxony.
26RadulphStrode.
M theremaimng
partoi 63v and 4r*vare ieit .
132

23:32:18 PM

8 - A tract De insolubilibus
The manuscriptsdiscussed above do not contain a tract on insolubles
and Spade's Catalogue 27 does not mention Richard Billingham as a
possible author of Insolubilia either. However I know of one manuscript in the Stiftbibliothekof Kremsmnster(Austria), CLXXXIX
(in Quarto, parchment 197 foil. c. 1400) which contains (23-24) a
tract on insolubles ascribed to Richard Billingham.28
I give its incipit and explicit.
Inc.: Dictis igituropinionibus
falsiscircainsolubilia,ponaturhec quam
inter
secundumveritatem,
ceteris
dumtaxat(dum
MS)
(!)
reputo
(quod
daxat (/)MS) verissime
scilicetquod omnis(omnesMS) casus
sustinenda,
in se claudit,
de insolubilisit removendus29(?), quia duo contradictoria
veraet propositio
falsa,vel quod illudsignificat
quod eademsitpropositio
aliterquam est, vel dicitfalsumet
precisesicud est et tamensignificat
precisedicitverum.Secundode aliis quibusdam.
Et ideo quando ponitur
Unde sciendumquid sit casus insolubilium.
aliqua propositioque cum casu significat
precisesicuttermini(veraMS)
pretendunt,
sequitureandemesse veramet eandemesse falsam.Verbi
: 'Sor dicitfalsum'
gratiaut si ponaturquod Sor dicatistampropositionem
sicud.termini
et
et nullamaliamet quod ista precisesignificat
pretendunt
Et ideoestnegandusquia,
quod tantumsitunusSor,casusestimpossibilis.
admissocasu, arguitursic: vel Sor dicitverumvel falsum;si verumet
tantumdicitistampropositionem,
ergoista propositioest vera; ergoest
totaliterita sicutista significat;et ista precisesignificat
quod Sor dicit
falsum
; et nullusest Sor nisiiste; ergo
; ergoita est quod Sor dicitfalsum
istedicitfalsum;ergononestita quod Sordicitverum.Si dicaturquod Sor
dicitfalsum,contra.
quod' negat casum,arguitur
Expl.: Sed contraregulamde insolubilibus
sie quod sitpossibilequod illa propositio
hocestfalsum'significet
breviter
'
precisequod hoc est falsum.Vel illa hocnonestverum'significat
precise
; 'hocest
quod hoc non est verum.Et primofaciamillamconsequentiam
falsum: ergohocestfalsum'.Consequentiaest bona, quocumquedemnstrate. Ergo demonstrate
consequenteconsequentiaest bona. Et antecedenssic precisesignificat.
Ergo consequens,quia aliternonvaleretconfalsomodo nisi falsum,
sequentia.Ut dato quod consequenssignificaret
est
sequiturex hoc quod non est verum,quia antecedenssic significando
verum.Si autemveromodo,sic quod Deus est,tunenonestformalis
consequentia.Secundosic. Ipsa precisesignificat
quod homoest asinus.Ergo
hoc est falsum,demonstrando
consequens.Ista consequentiaest bona et
antecedenspossibilesic significando.
Ergo consequenssic significando
de istohoc nonsignificat
illudestvel hocnonestverum,
precise<....>
27Paul VincentSpade, The MediaevalLiar. A Catalogueof the Insolubilia
Toronto1975.
Literature,
28I wishto thankthelibrarianoftheStiftsbibliothek
whowas kindenoughto
loan me the Library'smicrofilm
of thismanuscript.
It shouldbe noticedthat
theworkis not mentioned
in Bale's list (See above,p. 121).
29Cp. JohnDumbleton'sview (Spade, op.
cit.,65).
133

23:32:18 PM

quocumquedato antecedensest possibilesic significando

precisesicut
termini
demonstrato
(veraMS) pretendunt.
Ergoconsequens,
(demonstrando MS) consequente.
Et sic de alia.
Ad illudet ad similiadico quod in talibusconsequens
sic esse benesequitur
ad sicesse.Sed dubitoutrumconsequens
formaliter
sequiturex antecedente
sitbonavelnon; 'non'dico,quiapositum
quia dubitoqualiterilla responsio
anteoppositum.Propterhoc in talibusquerendumest de significatione
cedentset consequentis
et totiusconsequentie,
et sic de terminis.
Et aliter
non est aliqua propositioconcedenda,neganda,vel dubitanda.Et sic est
finis.
EXPLICIUNT INSOLUBILIA BILGAM (!)
I think the opening part of the work is missing in our manuscript.
However, its explicithas not been of any help eitherforfindingother
copies of these Insolubilia.
9 - A collection of sophisms called Conclusiones (Abstractiones)
Several manuscripts contain a set of 50 sophisms attributed to
Billingham under the title Conclusiones. In my opinion the title
Abstractionesmentionedby Bale (see above, p. 121) refersto the same
work. I quote from the oldest copy I know, Vienna, VPL 4698
(s. XIV, presumably 1373), io8r-H4v.
credis aliquam propositionem esse veram
(1) Inc.: <T>u
nullus
credit
esse veram; et tu credis aliquam proquam
positionem esse veram quam impossibile est te credere
esse veram; et similiter tu credis aliquam propositionem
esse veram quam non potes credere esse veram. Si conceditur conclusio (consequentia MS), tunc arguitur,accipiendo
conclusionem in antecedente. Concludatur igitur: (tu credis
aliquam propositionemesse verametillam nullus creditesse veram',
'
'
et universaliter: ergo tu non es aliquis homo (io8r).
credis aliqualiter esse qualiter esse non credis
(2) <T>u
(108r"v).
credis esse qualiter non credis esse. Probatur
Aliqualiter
(3)
ut prius (io8v).
(4) Aliqualiter credis esse qualiter non credis esse. Improbatur ut prius {ibid.).
(5) <T > u credis hominem esse asinum quando nil deciperis
et quando tu non decipis et quando solum credis sicut est.
Et sic de consimilibus(i08v-i09r).
*34

23:32:18 PM

(6) Tu credis hoc a precise significare Deum esse quando

credis hoc a precise significare quod homo est asinus et
quando nichil credis (109 r).
(7) Tu credis hoc a precise significare Deum esse et tu credis
hoc a precise significare hominem esse asinum (ibid.).
Tu
credis hominem esse asinum si homo est animai (ibid.).
(8)
(9) Tu credis hoc a < precise > significare qualiter non credis
hoc a significare (i09r v).
Tu
credis esse qualiter nullus homo credit esse [et qualiter
(10)
nullus credit] et qualiter tantum Sor credit esse (109v).
(11) Tu credis aliquem hominem currere quem nescis moveri;
tu credis aliquem hominem esse animai [hominem] quem
non scis esse animai, (ibid.).
(12) <T >u scis te scire a et impossible est te scire a (i09v-ii0r).
(13) Omnem propositionem quam nunc scis in eternum scies
(iior).
(14) Aliquid est scitum a te quod est tibi dubium (nor v).
(15) Aliqua duo sunt omnino compossibilia de numero illorum,
supponendo quatuor opposita, 'rex sede et 'nullus rex sede,
'Deus est' et 'nullus Deus est' (iiov).
(16) Aliqua est universalis falsa cuius quelibet singularis est
vera (ibid.).
incipis scire a quando non incipis scire a (ibid.).
(17) <T>u
desines scire antequam incipies scire (ibid.).
(18) <T>u
scis te decipere aliquem hominem quem non
(19) <T>u
decipis (nov-iiir).
est te plura scire quam tu scis. Quod
(20) <I>mpossbile
verum
sit
probatur arguendo sic ().
sophisma
scis Antichristum esse et Deum non esse. Quod
(21) <T>u
conclusio sit false arguitur (ibid.).
scis falsum esse verum et necessarium eses im(22) <T>u
possible (ibid.).
(23) Potest esse: rex sedet, nullus rex sedet (uir v).
(24) Asinus est animal quod risibile est (mv).
(25) Omne scitum a te est scitum a te (ibid.).
est falsum esse verum et impossible est
(26) <P>ossibile
falsum esse verum; possibile est sedentem ambulare et
impossibile est sedentem ambulare (ibid.).
Possibile
(27)
[falsum]est [verum] falsum esse verum sciri a te
et impossibile est falsum esse verum sciri a te (iiiv"ii2r).
135

23:32:18 PM

(28) Aliquod istorum esse verum seis et nullum istorum esse

verum seis (ii2r).
deceptum credit esse et illud quomodo
(29) <T>antum
esse qualiter deceptum credit esse {ibid.).
credit
deceptum
(30) Hoc a significai solum esse sicut hoc a non sinificat esse
(lI2v).
vera et pro quolibet instanti huius
(31) Una propositio <est>
hre erit vera et tarnen in quolibet instanti huius hre
ineipiet esse vera {ibid.).
(32) Possibile est impossibile esse possibile et impossibile < est
impossibile > esse 'possibile {ibid.).
(33) <1 >ta Sor precise credit sicut est quando deeipitur {Ibid.).
(34) <T >u scis Antichristum esse et Deum non esse. Probatur,
quia capio illam propositionem: 'Antichristusest et Deus non est';
ista est falsa (ii2v-ii3r) ; cfr. nr 21.
scitur (ii3r).
(35) <Falsum>
(36) Precise sicut est significai omnis propositio et tarnen
aliqua propositio est falsa {ibid.).
(37) Aliqua propositio erit vera in hoc instanti et post hoc erit
ita quod fuit falsa in hoc instanti (113v-)
scis a esse verum quando non scies a esse verum
(38) <T>u
( v)sunt duo opposita (aliqua duo MS) quorum
(39) <A>liqua
utrumque (unum MS) est falsum {ibid.).
scis quod impossibile est te scire {ibid.).
(40) <T>u
Sor est fortis quo Plato est fortior {ibid.).
(41) <S>olus
maximum istorum quod non est maximum
est
(42) Aliquod
istorum (ii3v-ii4r).
(43) Pono tibi istam disiunctivam: 'tu es asinus vel hoc est verum',
demonstrando per ly 'hoc' oppositum disiunctive (ii4v).
(44) Pono tibi ilium casum quod tu respondes affirmative ad
0 proprimum propositum et negative ad < secundum >
positum a me; qua admissa pono tibi illam: 'homo curri; si
conceditur,proponitur'homomovetur si negatur, contra: omne
sequens ad casum cum bene concesso est concedendum; igitur
sequitur ex opposito {ibid.).
est scriptum a te et hoc non est scriptum a te
(45) <H>oc
est
consequentia bona et formalis quam scis esse
(46) Aliqua
et tarnen consequens non potest esse
et
formalem
bonam
136

23:32:18 PM

(47)
(48)

(49)
(50)

verum cum antecedente oppositum consequentis potest stare cum antecedente [ibid.).
Verum differt a vero quod (probatur MS) impossibile est
differre a vero (ii4r-v).
scis Sortem scire a et Platonem non scire a et
<T>u
tamen omne quod est Plato seit (Sor. MS) a et nullum quod
est Sor seit a (ii4v).
< A >liqua copulativa est scita a te fore falsa cuius utraque
pars est tibi dubia [ibid.).
Expl.: Cuilibet respondenti concluditur: Tu es respondens.
Ergo tibi concluditur. Consequentia patet,quia sillogismus in
Darii. Et quod hec sit falsa probatur. Pono quod Sor respondeat
cuilibet homini et quod sibi concludatur, tunc < cuilibet> c
respondenti concluditur,quia Sorti. Et omne quod est Sor est
quilibet respondens. Ergo cuilibet respondenti concluditur.
Antecedens est verum per casum et consequens est falsum per
casum. Ad illud nego conclusionempro prima parte (per primam
partem MS). Et ad probationemnego consequentiam, quia non
plus sequitur nisi quod respondenti < cuilibet> c concludatur.
Et sic est finis Conclusionum magisti Richadi (/) Biligam,
Etc. [ibid.).

Other copies of this work are foundin Ripoll 141 (anno 1388) 68T-J4T
(Expliciunt Conclusiones magisti Ricardi debilinguam (!) bone et
utiles finite Oxonie); Sevilla, Colombina5-1-14 (= R. 10.461), 74-8;
Vat. Lat. 3065, 2irb-25vb; Padua, Univ. 1123, 2)ra-3irb,and incomplete in Worcester,CathedralF 118, 6ora-rband Vat. Lat. 3038, 39 va_vb
10 - The Sophism: Numquid scire sit credere
The MS Worcester F. 35 (s. XV) contains (i07ra-i09vb) a sophism
which is explicitly attributed to Richard Billingham (i09vb: Explicit
sophisma magistiRichardi Bylyngham quod sic incipit numquid scire
sit credere. Etc.) See Weisheipl, op. cit., 177. I cannot give further
details.
11 - A short tract De significatopropositionis
The same Worcester manuscript contains (i09vb-ii0va) a work
entitled in the colophon: intendo Bylynghamde significatoproposici*37

23:32:18 PM

vel negativa. See Weisheipl,

onis. It opens: Utrumproposicioaffirmativa
op. cit. 177; no furtherinformationavailable.
FilosofiseliInstituut
Witte Singel 71
Leiden
The Netherlands

138

23:32:18 PM

Vivarium
XIV, 2 (1976)
" I Promise

You

a Horse'

A Second Problemof Meaning and Referencein Late Fifteenth

and Early SixteenthCenturyLogic (2)*
E. J. ASHWORTH
Part Two. Texts and Analyses
A. Celaya : A Problemof Conversion
rexpromittit
istaestindefinita
arguitur.
principaliter
equumplatoni:
et non potestconvertisimpliciter:
igiturdicta nulla,minorprobatur.si
Septimo
in istam.scilicetpromitpossetin aliquamconvertimaximeconverteretur
tensequumplatoniest rexsed in casu secundaest vera: et primafalsa/igitur
non convertitur
in illam.Minorprobatur.positocasu quod rex dicat platoni
dabo tibi equum secundaest vera: et primafalsa,igiturassumptumverum
falsitasprimeprobaturbenesequiturrex promittit
equumplatoni.ergoequus
a regeplatoni.et consequensest falsumigituret antecedensquod
promittitur
benesequatur.patetquia arguitur
ab activa ad passivamfalsitasconsequentis
probatur.quelibetdescendensest falsa sub ilio terminoequus. ergola est
falsa, antecedensprobaturquocunque equo demonstratoista est falsa iste
a regeplatoni.ergoilia est falsa,antecedensprobatur.bene
equuspromittitur
a regeplatoni.ergoad promissum
sequituristeequus promittitur
adimplendum
falsum.ergoet anteoportetdare istumequum: et consequensest manifeste
cedenset falsitasconsequentis
probatur.nam si rex dat unumaliumequum
satisfaciet
promissioni.
Adhocargumentum
Et ad probationem
respondent
antiquinegandominorem.
in illam.et ad probationem
negantquod nonconvertatur
negantquodin aliquo
casu secundasit vera: et primafalsa,et ad probationem
negantquod bene
sequaturin illa consequentia.et ad probationem
negaturquod arguaturab
activa ad passivam.Et si petas passivamilliusactive: respondetur
quod est
ista: a regepromittitur
equusplatoni.
Contrahoc milittargumentum
Simonisde lendenaria
/querendoque sint
extremaillius propositionis.
sciliceta rege promittitur
equus platoni.nam
unumextremum
videturesse hoc totum/sciliceta regepromissum
platoni.
et istudtotumnonsupponit.Nam quocunqueequo demonstrato
/ista estfalsa,
hoc est promissum
a regeplatoni(ut antiquiconcedunt).Et per consequens
de uno extremonon
sequiturquod ilia est falsa/postquamest affirmativa
extrainstantias.
supponente
estopinionem
: nisidicatur
defendare
Propterhoc: igiturdifficile
antiquorum
illi active/sicut nulla passiva correspondet
quod nulla passiva correspondet
huicactive/ly omnissignificai
aliqualiter.Sed omniaista Buridanovisa fuere
irrationabilia
quare aliteropinatusest.
Pro cuiusintelligentia
notandumest quod ad hoc quod aliquidsitpromissum
vel promittatur
sufficit
quod promissiocadat supra aliquemterminm
qui
supponitprotali.
Ex istis sequiturquod ista consequentiabene valet tibi promittoequum.
* For the firstpart of this articleand the
see Vivarium,
XIV
bibliography,
(1976).pp. 62-79.
139

23:32:30 PM

Ratioest: quia a terminoappellantesuam

ergoquemlibetequumtibipromitto.
et distributum.
nonappellantem:
rationemad ipsummet
consequentia
propriam
ad distributum.
: et sic formaliter
estformalis
contingit
arguerea nondistributo
secundummentemBuridani
ad formamargumenti
Isto notatorespondetur
in illamscilicet
Et probationem
negoquod nonconvertitur
negandominorem.
nego quod primasit
equum platoniest rex. Et ad probationem
promittens
in
concedoquod bene sequaturin illa consequentia
falsa.Et ad probationem
qua arguiturab activa ad passivam. et negoquod consequenssit falsum.Et
ad probationem
equus.
nego quod quelibetdescendenssit falsa sub termino
a regeplatoni.
Et ad probationem
negoquodilia sitfalsa,isteequuspromittitur
est facta
Et ad probationem
negaturconsequentia.Ratio est: quia promissio
equussinealiqua restrictione.
perillumterminm
Contraistam solutionemarguitursequereturquod in casu dato ista esset
vera,scilicetquemlibetequumrex promittit
platoni:consequensest falsum:
igitursequela est lucida. Minorprobaturbene sequiturquemlibetequumrex
dareplatoni: et consequens
equumrextenetur
promittit
platoni: ergoquemlibet
est falsum.igitur falsitasconsequentisprobatur.quelibet descendensest
falsasub ilioterminoequus.ergoilia estfalsa:antecedensprobaturquocunque
/ista est falsaistumequumrex teneturdareplatoni.igitur
equo demonstrato
probatur.benesequituristumequum
quelibetdescendensestfalsa.Antecedens
rexteneturdariplatoni.ergooportetregemdareistumequumplatoniad hoc.ut
falsum.nam dando unum
et consequensest manifeste
satisfaciatpromissioni,
aliumsatisfaciet:igiturantecedens.
concedendosequelam:et negandominorem.
Ad hanc replicamrespondetur
Et nego
concedoquod bene sequaturin illa consequentia.
Et ad probationem
negoquod quelibetdescendens
quod consequenssitfalsum.Et ad probationem
sit falsasub ilio terminoequum.Et ad probationem
nego quod ista sit falsa,
scilicetistumequumrex teneturdare platoni.Et ad probationem
negoquod
scilicetistumequumrexteneturdareplatoni.
benesequaturin illaconsequentia.
ergooportetregemdare istudequumplatoni/ut satisfaciatsue promissioni.
Ratio est data: quia promissioest factaperillumterminm
equus sinealiqua
restrictione
platoni.
equumdet/rexsatisfaciet
quemcumque
propterea
Contraistamsolutionem
sequeretur
quodpositocumcasu argumenti
arguitur
/eque erunt.illa esset vera/quemlibet
quod nullisuntequi /neque fuissent
equum possibilemrex promittitplatoni.Similiteret illa quemlibetequum
possibilemrex teneturdare platoni. consequensest falsum.igiturfalsitas
sequeretur
quodsi rexdiceretplatonidabotibichimrm,
probatur.
consequentis
rex promittitplatoni: consequens
tunc ista esset vera/quamlibetchimrm
estfalsum.igiturfalsitasconsequentis
quodincasu argumenti
probo.Sequeretur
ista esset vera/quamlibetrem possibilemrex promittitplatoni.consequens
est falsumigitursequela probatur.si alteraest concedendamaximeest: ideo
: sed ex hoc/sequiturquod
quia ampliaturly chimerausque ad imaginabilia
rexpromittit
quelibetillarumestconcedenda.scilicetquamlibetrempossibilem
rexteneturdareplatoni.igitursequelavera.
platoniI quamlibetrempossibilem
concedendosequelamet negandominorem.
Ad hanc replicamrespondetur
concedosequelamstandoin ampliationede ly promitto:
Et ad probationem
nam postquam importt actum anime interioremampliat usque ad
concedoquamlibetillarum/
et ad probationem
imaginabilia:et negominorem:
rexpromittit
rempossibilem
scilicetquamlibet
platoni/quamlibetrempossibilem
rexteneturdareplatoniet negominorem.
Ex ista solutionesequiturquod si rex dicatplatonidabo tibi aliquid: tunc
rex quamlibetrem possibilemteneturdare platoni/et tarnendando unam
festucamsatisfacitplatoni.causa est tacta in solutionealteriusreplice.Nam
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etideo sufficit
est factaperiliumterminm
aliquidsinerestrictione.
promissio
darealiquamremproqua supponitilleterminus
aliquid.
unum
Sequitursecundoquod ista copulativaest possibilissortespromittit
turonumplatoni: et rex promittit
platoniquingentamilliascutorum:et tot
sortessicut rex platonipossibilitascopulativelucet. posito quod
promittit
sortesdicat platoni: ego dabo tibi turonum
/et rex dicat dabo tibi quingenta
milliascutorum.Nam bene sequitursortespromittit
platonituronum:ergo
sortesquemlibetturonumpromittitplatoni: et per consequensquodlibet
rexplatoni
scutumpromittit
platoniet ultraeliciturquod nonplurapromittit
quam sortes.
ANALYSISOF CELAYA
I. Main Thesis: ArgumentA
'
Major A. "The king promises a horse to Plato' is an indefinite
proposition.
Minor A. It cannot be converted simply.
Conclusion A. The thesis about simple conversion does not hold.
II. Proof of Main Thesis
1. Argument : Proof of Minor A
Major B. "The king promises a horse to Plato" would be converted
simply to "Promising a horse to Plato is the king", if it could be
convertedsimply at all.
Minor B. (a) "The king promises a horse to Plato" is false and
(b) "Promising a horse to Plato is the king" is true.
Conclusion B. Since they do not have the same truth-value,they
are not convertible.
2. Argument : Proof of Minor (b)
If the king says to Plato "I will give you a horse", then "Promising
a horse to Plato is the king" is true.
3. ArgumentD : Proof of Minor {a)
Major D. "The king promises a horse to Plato, thereforea horse
is promised by the king to Plato" is a valid inference.
Minor D. The consequent is false.
Conclusion D. The antecedent is false.
4. ArgumentE : Proof of Major D
It is an inferencefromthe active to the passive.
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23:32:30 PM

5. ArgumentF: Proof of Minor D

Every descendent of the term 'horse' is false, therefore"A horse
is promised by the king to Plato" is false.
6. ArgumentG: Proof of AntecedentF
Major G. Whatever horse you point to, 'This horse is promised
by the king to Plato" is false.
Minor G. "This horse is promised by the kingto Plato" is a descendent of the originalproposition.
Conclusion G. Every descendent of the term 'horse' is false.
7. ArgumentH : Proof of Major G
Major H. "This horse is promised by the king to Plato, therefore
to fulfilhis promisehe must hand over this horse" is a valid inference.
Minor H. The consequent is manifestlyfalse.
Conclusion H. The antecedent is false.
8. ArgumentI: Proof of Minor H
If the king were to hand over any other horse, he would still fulfil
his promise.
III. A Proposed Solution
Minor A is denied.
Conclusion is denied.
Minor (a) is denied.
Major D is denied.
ArgumentE is denied.
The proper passive of "The king promises a horse to Plato" is
said to be "By the king is promised a horse to Plato".
IV. Rejectionof theProposed Solution
The proposed passive is false because it is an affirmativesentence
with an extreme, "by the king promised to Plato", which does not
suppose. This is so because whatever horse one points to, "This is
the horse promised by the king to Plato" is false.
The solution is difficultto defend unless one is willingto claim that
no passive formulationof the sentence in question is possible.
V. The View ofBuridan
For somethingto be promised it is sufficientfor the promise to be
made througha term which supposes forthat thing.
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"To you I promise a horse thereforeevery horse to you I promise"

is a valid inference.
The reason for this is that there is a formallyvalid inferencefrom
a sentence in which a term appellates its proper reason to a sentence
in which that term does not appellate its proper reason, but
is distributed.
One can now reply to the main argument in accordance with
Buridan's views :
Minor A is denied.
Conclusion is denied.
Minor (a) is denied.
Major D is conceded.
Minor D is denied.
ArgumentF is denied.
Major G is denied.
Major H is denied.
VI. Argumentsagainst the View of Buridan
1. ArgumentJ
Major J. In the case given, it would follow that "Every horse the
king promises to Plato" is true.
Minor J. This consequent is false.
ConclusionJ. The implicationof this is clear.
2. Argument : Proof of Minor J
Major K. "Every horse the king promises to Plato, thereforeevery
horse the kingmust give to Plato" is a valid inference.
Minor K. The consequent is false.
Conclusion K. The antecedent is false.
3. ArgumentL: Proof of Minor
Every descendent of the term 'horse' is false, therefore"Every
horse the king must give to Plato" is false.
4. ArgumentM: Proof of AntecedentL
Major M. Whatever horse you point to, "This horse the king must
give to Plato" is false.
Minor M. "This horse the king must give to Plato" is a descendent
of the originalproposition.
Conclusion M. Every descendent of the term 'horse' is false.
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23:32:30 PM

5- ArgumentN: Proof of Major M

Major N. "This horse the king must give to Plato, thereforeit is
necessary for the king to give this horse to Plato in order to fulfil
his promise" is a valid inference.
Minor N. The consequent is manifestlyfalse.
Conclusion N. The antecedent is false.
6. Argument0: Proof of Minor N
If the king were to hand over any other horse, he would still fulfil
his promise.
VII. Reply to Argumentsagainst the View ofBuridan
Major J is conceded.
Minor J is denied.
Major is conceded.
Minor is denied.
ArgumentL is denied.
Major M is denied.
Major N is denied.
VIII. Some ProblemsArisingfromtheSolution
1. If there were no horses and never had been any nor ever would
be any, it followsthat every possible horse is promised by the king,
and that every possible horse the king must give to Plato. Yet the
consequent is false. By analogy, if the king said to Plato "I will give
you a chimera", it would seem that "Every chimera the kingpromises
to Plato" must be true, and that "Every possible thing the king
promises to Plato" must also be true (since 'chimera' was often said
to suppose for every possible object). Yet the consequent is false.
In reply it is denied that the consequents are false, since 'promise'
ampliates even to imaginaryobjects.
2. If the king says to Plato, "I will give you something", then
every possible thing he must give Plato; yet he can satisfyPlato by
giving him a dime.
3. If Socrates promises a dollar to Plato, and the king promises
5,000 dollars, neverthelessas much is promised to Plato by Socrates
as is promised by the king.
144

23:32:30 PM

. Coronel: A Problemof Appellation**

sic arguitursi regulaessetvera sequeretur
Quartoprincipaliter
quod sortes
non posset promittere
platonidare equum vel rem aliquam/consequensest
tis relinquitur.
falsumergo et antecedensfalsitasconsequen
Nota, nam si sic
in psalmovoveteet redditenec legistecodices tot stipulationibus
diceretur
Sed consequentia
consumeret.
probatur:namsi sic deturquod sortespromittat
tibiequum: et arguitur
sic duas contraplatoniequumperista verba promitto
dictoriasprobandoveras/tu concedisistam in nominesortispromittotibi
equum/probo negativamnon promittotibi equum: bene sequiturnullum
: et
equum tibi promittoergo non promittotibi equum ab equivalentibus
antecedensprobatur.quia nec brunellumtibi promitto
/ favellum,et sic
de singulis,ergo nullumequum tibi promitto
/per assensum:et antecedens
tibinonpromittonam hec est falsa
probaturuna singulariprobatabrunellum
tibi promittoquia non teneortibi dare brunellum
brunellum
quia sic tenerer
tibi dare omnem equum/consequensest falsum:ergo et antecedens,quia
tibi dando
si tenerertibi dare omnemequum.sequiturquod non satisfacerem
solutionede
tibi equum unumquod falsumest/igitur.Pro huius argumenti
quo ab antiquis sophistisdisputandumest advertendumhic quod duplex
entisberi
nonosophismateneutrum
oculum
estmodusdicendiprimusguillermi
et opushabendotu potesvidereet in multisaliis locissuorumsophismatum
culorum.Quidam modus dicendicontineturin sequentibuspropositionibus
vum: unde
quasi primaest/hoc verbumpromittoest specialesignumconfusi
in ista propositione
promittotibi equum ly equum stat confusetantumper
Secundapropositio
sequensest ista. consequentia
specialesignumconfusarum.
non valet promittotibi equum ergo equum tibi promitto:quia arguitura
licetnonhoc sitin ordine
confusaperspecialesignumad ipsamdeterminatam
nonvalere
ad multitudinem.
Tertiapropositio
sequensest hancconsequentiam
nullumequum tibi promittoergonon promittotibi equum cum arguiturex
oppositoad oppositum.Quarta propositiosequensest: ad hoc quod verum
teneatur
sit dicerede aliquo quod vere promittitoportetquod promittens
illuddarecumsitpromissioet hoc videturimportari
perrationem
promissioni.
ad formam
concessaaffirmativa
Quintapropositiosolutivaargumenti
negatur
negativa:diciturad probationemantecedenteconcessonegatursequela nec
cumille terminus
distribuatur
ab equivalentibus
equusin antecedente
arguitur
et in consequentedistribuatur
determinate
distributione
oppositasuppositioni
distributione
opposita suppositioniconfusetantum. Sexta propositioest:
tibiequumquemtibinonpromitto
estin ilio casu quod promitto
concedendum
patet.nam ut dictumest nullumequumtibi promitto:ergostanteilio casu
quilibetequus est equus quem non promitto:ergo bene sequiturpromitto
tibi equum quem tibi non promitto.Septimapropositioest: idem dicendum
sit sortesin extremanecessitateet
ad istumcommunemcasum theologicum
uni eorum
piato etiam habeat cicero unum panem unde possit succurrere
tantumconcediturquod ciceroteneturdare alicui istorumsed nulliistorum
teneturdarepanem:patet sic quia det panemsorticonstatquod hec est vera
non teneturdare panem platoniet si det platoninon teneturdare sorticum
non possitutriquedare, ergonullidando non peccat/quia si nullidet faciet
contrapreceptumquod idemteneturdare aliqui istorum.Octava propositio:
istudest dicendumad unumaliumcasumtheologicum
/suppositoquod sortes
teneaturex precepto diligeredeum concedendumest quod sortestenetur
teneturhaberenamquacumque
dei sed nullamdilectionem
haberedilectionem
83Coronel,SecundaPars.
145

23:32:30 PM

habita ipse soluitura preceptocuius tarnengravitatisessetpeccatumeius si

non est presentisspeculationis
omitteret
/et istummodumdicendiinsequitur
okamin primapartesue logicetractandode suppositione
personali.Aliusest
tibiequumqui consistit
modusdicendiburidaniin primosophismate
/promitto
er inquit potest
in sequentibuspropositionibus.
quarum prima est duplicit
promittiuno modo in universalialio modo in particulari.In universaliuno
modo aliquid promittitur
quando promissiofit per terminmcommuniter
quando promissiofit per
supponentempro ilio aliquid discretepromittitur
discretesupponentem
terminm
pro ilio exemplumprimiut si ego tibi dicam
promittotibi equum/exemplumsecundiut si ego tibi dicam promittotibi
Secundonotandumest quod
vel istumequumeodemdemonstrato.
brunellum
omneillud pro
communiter
supponentem
quando promissiofitper terminm
Exemplumut si ego tibi dicam
quo supponittalis terminuspromittitur.
tibiequumquemlibet
/hecpropositio
persuadetur.
equumtibipromitto
promitto
Namfactaillapromissione
quia absurdumapparet
aliquemequumtibipromitto
sed non est maiorratio
et nihilpromittere:
concedereesse verumpromittere
de uno quam de alio: ergoquilibetequus promittitur
quod eratprobandum.
tenetur
in universali
Tertiapropositioest: nonquicquidpromittitur
promittens
uni illorumdare.Pro quo adverad complendum
dare: sed sufficit
promissum
: unomodoabsolute:
tendumest quod dupliciter
aliquispotestad aliquidteneri
ad aliquid: teneriabsolutenihilaliud est quam si
alio modo sub disiunctione
vel promissionem
illud non fiatfietcontrapreceptum
quomodosortestenetur
Teneriad aliquid
dare elemosinam
platoniqui in extremanecessitateoccurrit.
nihilaliud est quam sic obligariad aliquidfaciendum
sub disiunctione:
quod
tenerinec fiet
licetilludnon fiatsi sit illud ad quod dicitursub disiunctione
teneor
vel promissionem
contrapreceptum
/quomodoin casu positoprincipali
si demtibiergoabsolutus
Nam si nondemtibibrunellum
tibidarebrunellum.
Sed ut dictum
a promissoet eodemdicendumest in aliis casibustheologicis.
Sed
illarumomissionum.
est in propositonon opus est inquireregravitatem
communiter
fiatperterminm
hicadvertendum
supponentem
quod si promissio
ad dandumquicquid
sumptumcum signo universaliobligaturpromittens
absolute,his duobusmodisdicendisvisispotestiseligerepro logica
promittit
est
discrimen
scientiasecundumlicetre considerata
primm:sed prosuperiori
ad nomen.Sed ex secundomododicendisequiturquod si sortesdicat platoni
promittotibi equum et ciceronipromittotibi omnemequum quicquid uni
dando
satisfaciet
alteriet e contra/sed primepromissioni
promittit
promittit
unumequum secundevero non. Sed hic queraturuna questioin parteutilis
velvoluntatis.
/an proactuintellectus
promissio
proquo supponitisteterminus
vel iudicativo.Si primum
Si primmvel pro actu apprehensivo
/sequiturista
conclusioquod quam primoego formoistammentalemdabo tibi equum ego
sumobligtusad dandumtibiequum.Si secundumsequiturquod quam primo
egoassentioquoddabotibiequumsumobligtusad dandumtibiequumquorum
falsum.Si dices supponitpro actu voluntatispro quo
utrunqueest manifeste
voloaliquidfacere:sequiturquod si sorteshabetvolitioniegrediendi
religionem
religionem
quod falsumest. Dicitur
quod ipse est obligtusad ingrediendum
quod supponitpro actu voluntatisquo vis aliquid diceretcognoscatunum
: et promissio
aliumactumvoluntatisquo intendiste obligaread sic faciendum
cum iuramento.Et hec de argumento
est superiusad votumet impertinens
quarto.

146

23:32:30 PM

ANALYSISOF CORONEL
I. Main Thesis: ArgumentA
Major A. If the rule were true, it would follow that Socrates could
not promiseto give Plato a horse or anythingelse.
Minor A. The consequent is false.
Conclusion A. The antecedent is false.
II. Proof of theMain Thesis
1. Argument : Proof of Minor A
Major B. If it were true that Socrates could promise a horse to
Plato, then two contradictorieswould be true.
Minor . (a) "I promise you a horse" is true and (b) "I do not
promiseyou a horse" is also true.
Conclusion B. It is not true that Socrates can promise a horse to
Plato.
2. Argument : Proof of Minor (a)
"I promiseyou a horse" is true if Socrates uses these words to make
a promise to Plato.
3. ArgumentD: Proof of Minor (b)
Major D. "No horse I promise to you thereforeI do not promise
a
you horse" is a valid inference.
Minor D. The antecedent is true.
Conclusion D. The consequent is true.
4. ArgumentE : Proof of Minor D
I do not promise you Brunellus or Favellus or any other horse,
thereforeby ascent it followsthat no horse I promise to you.
5. ArgumentF : Proof of AntecedentE
Major F. If "Brunellus I promise to you" were true, I would be
obliged to give you Brunellus, for I would be obliged to give you
every horse.
Minor F. The consequent is false.
Conclusion F. The antecedent is false.
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23:32:30 PM

6. ArgumentG: Proof of Minor F

Major G. If I were obliged to give you every horse, I could not
fulfilmy promiseby givingyou one horse.
Minor G. The consequent is false.
Conclusion G. The antecedent is false.
III. Heytesburs Solution
1. 'Promise' is a special sign of confusion which makes 'horse'
in "I promiseyou a horse" have merelyconfusedsupposition.
2. The inference"I promise you a horse thereforea horse I promise
you" is invalid because it goes from a sentence containing a term
which has merely confused supposition to a sentence in which the
same term has determinatesupposition.
3. By the rule of opposites, the inference"No horse I promise you
thereforeI do not promiseyou a horse" is also invalid.
4. For somethingto be promised, the promisermust be obliged to
give it.
5. Minor (a) is conceded and Minor (b) is denied.
Minor D is conceded but Major D is denied because 'horse' in the
antecedent has distributivesupposition and 'horse' in the antecedent's
contradictory has determinate supposition, whereas 'horse' in the
consequent has distributivesupposition and 'horse' in the consequent's
contradictoryhas merelyconfusedsupposition.
6. "I promiseyou a horse which I do not promiseyou" is conceded.
7,8 [theological examples]
IV. Buridan s Solution
1. Promises can be made throughgeneral or singularterms.
2. When a promise is made through a general term, everything
for which that term supposes is promised. Thus, if I say "I promise
you a horse", every horse I promise you. This is because it would
be absurd to say I promised you nothing, and because there is no
reason why one horse should be picked out rather than another.
3. It is not the case that one is obliged to give whateveris promised.
It is sufficientto hand over just one object.
V. ConcludingRemarks
Heytesbury's view may be chosen forlogic and Buridan's forhigher
science. But it is really a matter of words.
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23:32:30 PM

. Enzinas: A ProblemofContradiction
,84
Et confirmatur:
: promitto
istecontradicunt
tibiequumet nonpromitto
tibi
equum:et dantursimulfalse:ergopropositum:
consequentiaest manifestaet
tibi equumcumintentione
probaturminor:et volo quod dicamtibi promitto
dandi tibi equum non determinando
me magisad unumquam ad alium: in
hoc casu Veritasaffirmative
manifesta
est: quia sufficit
ad hoc quod ilia affirmativa sit vera quod faciampromissionem
que feraturin iliumterminm
ilia soletconcedicommuniter
in hoccasu: quaresi affirmativa
equum: similiter
est vera negativaeritfalsa: et hec affirmativa
est falsaergoambesuntfalse:
minorprobatur:benesequitur:promitto
tibiequum:ergoequumtibipromitto
:
et consequensest falsumut patet: quia quelibetsingularisest falsa sub ilio
terminoequum demonstrato
namque brunellohec est falsa brunellumtibi
hoc patet: quia si istumequumtibipromitterem
promitto
sequeretur
quod ad
illamoportetquod dem tibi istumequum.Sed hoc
implendum
promissionem
est manifestefalsum:igitur.Forte dicis quod ista consequentianon valet
promittotibi equum: ergo equum tibi promitto:quia arguitura confusa
ad determinatam.
respectuspecialissigniconfusivi
Contrahanc solutionemarguiturhec est falsa promittotibi equum: ergo
male dicitur:probaturantecedensbene sequiturpromittotibi equum: ergo
tibi a me: et consequensest falsumut patet igitur.Forte
equus promittitur
dices consequentiam
non valere: quia arguitura confusaad determinatam:
et quodilla propositio
nonhabetistampassivam: sedhabebithanc: promittitur
a metibiequus.
Contrahoc arguiturhec est falsapromittitur
a me tibi equus quia est una
affirmativa
cuius subiectumnon supponithoc namquepromissum
a me pro
nulloequo supponit:quia de nulloequo verificatur
quare sequiturillamesse
falsam
Circa confirmationem
due sunt opinionesquarumpriorcommunisest et
secundumearn respondetur
ad argumentum
sicut responsumest usque ad
ultimamreplicamad quam vel dicendumest illampropositionem
non habere
passivamvel negandaest ultimaconsequentiaet dicesquod nonoportetesto
sint vere quod Veritas,illarum
affirmative
quod huiusmodipropositiones
extremorum
presupponat
suppositionem
quando extremasunt: signaspecil
confusionis.
Et si queras quomodoopponuntur
iste due promittotibi equum
et nullumequum tibi promitto.Respondeoquod subcontrarie:
ut patet ex
regulasecundasecundicapitis.
AlteraestopinioBuridanitenentishancconsequentiam
essebonampromitto
tibi equum: ergoquemlibetequum tibi promittoet ad hoc quod sit aliquid
promissumvel promittatursufficitquod promissiocadat supra aliquem
terminmqui supponatpro tali et sic universaliter
a propositione
in qua
terminuspropriamappellatrationemad propositionem
in qua terminusnon
rationem
estbonaet vocaturterminus
appellatpropriam
consequentia
appellans
in propositoterminus
rationem
propriam
supraquemaditterminus
appellans:
et quod hec consequentia
sitbona promitto
tibiequum: ergoquemlibetequum
tibipromitto
probaturquia ad veritatemhuiusaliquemequumtibipromitto:
sufficitquod promissiofiat medianteiste terminoequus vel mediantesuo
casuali: et hoc patet ex argumentoquod si aliquis equus promittitur
cum
[non]sit maiorratiode uno quam de alio sequiturquod in tah casu quilibet
et per consequenshec est vera quemlibetequum tibi
equus promittitur:
promittoet tunc concedoquod hec est vera istumequum tibi promittoet
istam
quandoarguisin probandoillam: quia tuncsequiturquod ad implendum
84Enzinas,xxiiiivo,
xxv-xxvi.
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23:32:30 PM

promissionem
requiritur
quod ego dem tibiistumequum.Respondeonegando
hoc tarnen
quod hoc sequatur:quia quamvisistumequum tibi promiserim
fuitmediantepromissione
factacum ilio terminoequus vel suo casuali communitertentoet proptereaad implendumillam promissionem
satis est dare
unumequumquicunqueille fuerit.
Ex hoc patet quod ad implendumpromissionem
hanc quemlibetequum
tibi promittoque fitmediatehac non sufficit
quod dem tibi unum equum
quicunquefueritille sed requiriturquod quemlibetequum qui est vel erit
tibidabo.
Ex quo patetquod si promissio
fiatsic quemlibetequummeumtibipromitto
non sufficit
quod demtibiquemlibetequumqui nuncest meus quemlibet
equum qui aliquo temporeeritmeus.Sed requiritur
quod demtibi quemlibet
equumqui est vel eritmeus.
Et sic dicas communiter
crederetur
si tibi darem
adimpletampromissionem
quemlibetequumqui est meusnuncergononoportetquod demtibiquemlibet
quemlibetequum meumtibi
equum qui eritmeus: pretereain propositione
promittoille terminusequum meumpro quolibetequo qui potestesse meus
accipitur:ergo oportetad veritatemillius quod dem tibi omnemequum
possibilempostquamsupponitille terminusequus pro possibili.
Pro solutioneharumreplicarumnotandumest ly promittoampliaread
imoad 5. quia promissio
quatuordifferentias
temporis
potestsuperimpossibile
cadereet tunc standoin rigorehec promissioquemlibetequumtibi promitto
non possetad implerinisi omnemequumpossibilemdaremplatoni.Sed quia
est modo communiloquendi:ideo dico quod sufficit
appropinquandum
quod
dem quemlibetequumqui est vel eritet hoc ut satisfaciamus
modocommuni
quamvisnonde rigore.
Sed dubitabisutrumsi sic promittamtibi promittotibi equum valentem
centumscutasatisfacerem
si daremtibiunumequumqui valebithincad annum
decernscuta et nuncvalet centumrespondeoquod non satisfacispromissioni:
Sed oportetquod protemporeproquo illi das valeatcentumscuta.
Contrahoc arguitursequereturquod ad implendumpromissionem
hanc
promittotibi centumducatosexistentesin archa mea oportetquod quando
demtibiillosquod sintin archamea.
Ad hoc dubiumrespondeosicut dictumest: et pro solutionereplicedico
quod stando in communimodo concipiendioportetaspiceread intentionem
similiterdico quod quando aliquis facitaliquampromissionem
promittentis.
: et deinde nititur
cum intentionepromittendi
cum aliquibus circumstantiis
illam promissionem
aliquam illarum
adimplere:et omittatcircumstantiam
illiusaliquidtollat
quibus fuitfactapromissio:tuncsi omissiocircumstantie
rei promissesic quod res promissaminusvaleretpropteromissionem
circumstantie: tune non reputaturpromissiocommuniter
adimpleta:si vero nihil
et
tollat tunc iudicaturadimpletaesto quod omittatillam circumstantiam
hinc patet quod in promissionibus
communibus
qui caute proceduntsemper
in promissione
omnesper hoc patetad multa
faciuntexplicarecircumstantias
aha que circa hec possentadduci: et ex buridaniopinionesequiturhanc
vam esse possibilem
sortesquamlibetrempossibilem
promittit
platoni
copulati
et tamensatisfaciet
dandoei unumturonum
sue promissioni
patetsi promissio
fiatperhanc: sortespromittit
platonialiquid.
Sequiturpreterea quod hec consequentianon est bona quamlibetremtibi
promittoergoquamlibetremteneortibidare quamvisquidamconcdtillam
esse bonam: quia in casu precedentiantecedensest verumet consequensest
falsumly teneornon est verbumappellanspropriamrationemquare non
sequiturteneortibialiquiddareergoquamlibetremteneortibidare.
150

23:32:30 PM

turonumplatoniet cicero
Sequiturpretereaquod sortestantumpromittit
milleureoset tot promittit
sortesquot ciceroplatonipatetquia si promissio
sortisfiatper hanc sortespromittit
platonituronumet promissiociceronisfit
milleureosplatonituncinfinitauterquepromittit
per hanc ciceropromittit
quare tot unus sicutalter,infinitasimiliapoterisinferre
que cuicunquedisputantipatebunt.
ANALYSISOF ENZINAS
I. Main Thesis: ArgumentA
Major A. "I promise you a horse" and "I do not promise you a
horse" are contradictories.
MinorA. (a) The firstis false and (b) the second is false.
ConclusionA. The rule of contradictoriesdoes not hold.
II. Proof of Main Thesis
1. Argument : Proof of Minor A (b)
Major B. If I say "I promise you a horse", the affirmativeis true.
Minor B. If the affirmativeis true, the negative "I do not promise
you a horse", is false.
"
Conclusion . I do not promise you a horse" is false.
2. ArgumentC: Proof of Minor A [a)
"
Major . I promise you a horse thereforea horse I promise you"
is a valid inference.
Minor C. The consequent is false.
Conclusion C. The antecedent is false.
3. ArgumentD: Proof of Minor C.
Every descendent of 'horse' is false, for if one points to Brunellus
"Brunellus to you I promise" is false.
4. ArgumentE: Proof of ArgumentD
Major E. If it were true that I had promised you Brunellus, it
would follow that I would have to give you this horse in order to
fulfilmy promise.
Minor E. The consequent is manifestlyfalse.
Conclusion E. The antecedent is false.
III. Responses to II
I. ArgumentF: Response to Major
This inferenceis invalid because it argues froma sentence containing
151

23:32:30 PM

a term which has merelyconfused supposition to a sentence in which

that term has determinatesupposition.
2. ArgumentG: Response to ArgumentF
"I promise you a horse" is false, thereforethe proposed solution
is misconceived.
3. ArgumentH : Proof of AntecedentG
Major H. "I promise you a horse thereforea horse is promised to
you by me" is a valid inference.
Minor H. The consequent is false.
Conclusion H. The antecedent is false.
4. ArgumentI: Two Replies to Major H
(i) The inferenceis invalid because it argues fromthe confused to
the determinate.
(ii) the correctpassive is 'There is promisedby me to you a horse".
5. ArgumentJ : Reply to ArgumentI [ii)
The passive is false because it is an affirmativewith a non-supposing
subject, namely "promised by me".
IV. A CommonOpinion
The replies are as above up to ArgumentI.
At this point there are two possible responses:
(i) The active has no passive.
(ii) The last inference,Argument J, is to be denied, because the
truth of propositions whose extremes are special signs of confusion
need not depend on supposition.
"I promise you a horse" and "No horse I promise you" are said
to be subcontraries.
V. Buridan1s View
1. This inferenceis valid: "I promise you a horse thereforeevery
horse I promise you".
2. For something to be promised, it is enough that the promise
should be made by means of a term which supposes for that thing.
3. There is a valid inference from a proposition in which a term
appellates its proper reason to a proposition in which it does not.
152

23:32:30 PM

4- "I promise you a horse thereforeevery horse I promise you"

is valid because the promise is made by means of the term 'horse'.
Moreover,if some horse is promised, every horse is promised because
thereis no greaterreason forone to be picked out ratherthan another.
5. 'This horse I promise you" is true but it does not follow that
one must give that particular horse in order to fulfilthe promise.
Any horse will do.
VI. Some ProblemsarisingfromBuridan s Solution
1. If I promise all my horses, then strictlyspeaking I must hand
over every possible horse. However, common usage allows that I
should give every horse which is or will be [mine?].
2. If I promise a horse worth a hundred dollars, I will not fulfil
my promise if I hand over a horse which was worth a hundred dollars
but is now worth only ten. However, if I promise a hundred ducats
in my chest, they need not be in my chest when I hand them over,
forthis factordoes not affectthe value of the gift.
3. If Socrates promisesPlato something,it is true that everypossible
thinghe promises Plato and that he can fulfilhis promise by handing
over a dime.
4. One cannot argue "EverythingI promiseyou thereforeeverything
I am obliged to hand over to you".
5. If Socrates promises Plato a dime and Cicero promises Plato
a thousand dollars,as much Socrates promisesas does Cicero.
D. Hieronymusof St. Mark : A Problemof Supposition.85
Tercioqueroan ista sit concedendapromittotibiequumpositoquodpromiserimtibi unumequum.Quodsit falsaprobo,quia ly equumsupponitconfuse
et
tantumcum sequatur terminmimportantem
actum anime interiorem
tarnendescendendodisiunctimsub ly equum hoc pacto promittotibi hune
vel huneequumilluddisiunctum
pro nulla sui parteverificatur.
igitur
Pro solutionehuius ostendendum
est qualitersupponitterminussequens
dictionem
actumanimeinteriorem
circaquod diversorum
diversa
importantem
est sententia.Dicit namque opiniocommunisquod talis terminussupponit
confusetantumut si dicamcognoscohominem,
ly hominemsupponitconfuse
tantum.Similiter
dicendopromitto
equumly equumsupponitconfusetantum.
Aliiverodicunttalemterminm
huicrationi
supponereconfuseet distributive,
innitentes
quod actusimportatus
per tale verbumtenditin omneilludde quo
diciturterminussequensquapropterrationabilevideturquod talis terminus
85Hieronymusof St. Mark,QuestionXII. The earlierpart of this passage
is reproducedin Part Two of my paper "For Ridingis Requireda Horse":
A ProblemofMeaningand Reference
in theLate Fifteenth
and Early Sixteenth
XII (1974),PP-146-72.
Century
Logic, in: Vivarium,
153

23:32:30 PM

dicaturdistribui
Interhosmodossecundusvidetur
proquolibeteiussignificato.
magis apparens.Unde non video qua rationemoveaturprimusmodus ad
dicendumtales terminos
supponereconfusetantum.Dico tamenquicquidsit
de istismodusdicendiquod sive dicaturtalemterminm
supponereconfuse
tantumsive determinateaut confuseet distributive
nil mutaturquo ad
veritatempropositionis
et consimilisdifficultas
manetde descensu.Si enim
teneaturquod dicendocognoscohominem,
ly hominemsupponitdeterminate
aut confusedistributive
videturomnesdescendentes
esse falsaspositoquod
omniumhominumrepresentati
vum. Si
precisehabeamconceptumspecificum
vero dicaturquod supponitconfusetantumconsimiliter
remanetdifficultas.
Nam stathancesseveram,cognoscohominem,
et istamfalsamcognoscohunc.
vel hunc.vel hunchominem,et sic de aliis. cum per primamdenoteturme
habereconceptumcui subordinatur
iste terminushomoin significando.
Per
secundumautem denotaturme habere conceptumcui subordinaturhoc
disiunctum
hic vel hichomopossibileest autemmehabereprimmconceptum
non habendo secundum.Sed dices, qualiterergo debet fieridescensussub
terminis
qui sequunturdictionesappellantespropriasrationes.
Ad hoc suntdiversimodirespondendi.
Unus est modusqui dicitsub talibus
terminis
nonpossefieridescensum
rationisimpedientem.
propterappellationem
Sed iste modusdat viam nimislargamad fugiendum
factamper
probationem
descensum.Si enimadmittamaliquandonon posse fieridescensum.probatio
ista apparebitinsolida.Nam statimadversarius
sub quocunqueterminoposse
fieridescensumnegabit.Alius est modusdicendi.quod sub tali terminolicet
faceredescensummutandoappellationem
propriamrationisin appellationem
rationissub disiunctione
ad quamlibetaliam,ut si dicamcognosco
impropriam
hominem,sic debet fieridescensus,ergo hunc vel hunc hominemcognosco.
Sed iste modusdescendendi
non valet,quia ad hoc quod sit bonusdescensus
requiritur
quod e contrariovaleat ascensussicut declaratumfuitin materia
de descensu.sed ibi e contrarionon valet ascensu.scilicethunc vel hunc
hominemcognosco.ergo cognoscohominem,quia in casu antecedenspotest
esse verumconsequenteexistentefalso.Aliterergodicendumest supponendo
illam regulamalius dietamet maximeadvertendam
videlicetquod quandoest ut reliquiterminisub
sub aliquo terminoservandum
cunquedescendimus
sicut in
quibus non descendimuspro tot et tantisstentin descendentibus
descensa.Sed cum dico cognoscohominemly cognoscostat determinate
pro
omniumhominum.ergoin descendendo
representativis
conceptibusspecificis
sub ly hominemcavendumest ut ly cognoscoprecisetalesconceptusappellet.
ad ly cognosco.
addamusaliquemterminm
Ideo bonumestut in descendendo
omnium
qui sit signumquod ly cognoscopreciseconnotetconceptusspecificos
Sic ergodebetdescenditenendoquod ly hominem
hominumrepresentativos.
distribuitur.
ergohunchominemb. cognosco.et hunchominemb. cognosco
vel confuse
et sic de aliis.Si etiamdicasquod ly hominem
supponitdeterminate
tantum descendedisiunctivevel disiunctimprioremmodum servandoin
descendendone denoteturcognitiopropriaillorumsingularium
sequentium.
Ad propositum
equum(sively equumsupponat
applicandocumdicopromitto
in idemestmallem
determinate
siveconfusetantumsiveconfuseet distributive
cum queriturdescensumsub ly equum.Dico
tamentenerequod distribuitur)
quod debet descendiaddendoaliquod signumad ly promittodenotansquod
omniumequorumet tunesic
volitionibus
ly promittoaccipiaturpro specificis
est ergohunc equumb. promittoet huncequumb. promitto
descendendum
et sic de aliis. Et per hec patet quid ad argumenta
priusfactadicendumsit.

154

23:32:30 PM

ANALYSISOF HIERONYMUSOF ST. MARK

1. The Problem
"I promiseyou a horse" is false because 'horse' has merelyconfused
supposition and if one descends disjointly one will obtain a disjoint
predicate which is not verifiedforany of its parts.
'
2. The Supposition of Horse
There are various views about how a term followingan intentional
verb is to suppose. The common view is that it will have merely
confused suppostion, but a more plausible view is that it will have
distributivesupposition. Whether one assigns 'horse' merelyconfused,
determinate, or distributive supposition, one will face the same
difficultyconcerningdescent.
3. Proposed Solutions
(i) Descent cannot take place because the sentence involves appellation of reason .
This solution casts doubts on the whole process of descent and
ought to be rejected.
(ii) Descent can take place, but only to a sentence which does not
involve proper appellation. Thus one can argue "I know a man
thereforethis man or this man I know".
This descent is invalid because the correspondingascent is invalid.
(iii) A special sign should be used to make sure that the termswhich
are not descended from preserve their supposition. Thus, one should
descend to 'This horse b. I promise you and this horse b. I promise
you and so forall the others". This shows that 'promise' is accepted
determinatelyfor specific volitions directed to all horses.
Waterloo, Canada
Universityof Waterloo

155

23:32:30 PM

Vivarium
XIV, 2 (1976)
Another Manuscript of the
Regulae de mediis syllabis magisti Willelmi:
Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, 460
C. H. KNEEPKENS

a suggestionof the late ProfessorJ. Engels,WiltonDesmense

has editedtheRegulaede mediissyllabisofa certainmasterWilliamfrom
Following
its thenuniquemanuscript
Paris, B.N. lat. 14744,ff.256v-259v
(sigi.P)
in Vivarium,XI (1973),pp. 119-36.1 In the introduction
to the editionMr
DesmensepointedoutthatnotonlytheprefaceoftheRegulaedoesnotoriginate
frommasterWilliamhimself,
as alreadyThurothad observed,2
but that also
fiveadditions,each ofthemintroduced
withthewordsnotaor notandum,
were
insertedintothe originaltext,probablyby the compilerof the preface.3
The
of anotherMS containingthe text of masterWilliam'sRegulae
discovering
confirms
thatthetextoftheParisianMS is an interpolated
one,andsuppliesthe
evidencefora moreextendedcirculation
oftheserulesin theMiddleAges: this
MS, Cambridge,
CorpusChristiCollege,460, (sigi.) dates, indeed,fromthe
fifteenth
in England.4
centuryand was written
The firstpart (ff.1-85) of this MS (1 -f 182ff.)containsthreetreatises
of AlexanderNequam (ff.i-68r),5followedby fouranonymoustractson acofvariouslength6:
centuation,
f.
68
r:
twoshortnotes:
(1)
inc.: Nota quod omnisdictiolatinanon habensdeterminationem
latinam
inflexionem
latinamacuiturin fine,ut
secundumaliquamdeclinationem
Ioseph. . .
des.: . . . Item.Nota quod utraqueet pleraquein omnicasu seruantaccentum
sillabam.
superpenultimam
1 Sigi.Desmense.
2 Ch. Thurot,Noticesetextraits
de diversmanuscrits
latinspourservir l'histoire
desdoctrines
au moyenge,Noticeset extraits. . . vol. XXII, 2,
grammaticales
Paris,1869(repr.Francfort,
1964),p. 43. Sigi.Thurot.
3 Desmense,
pp. 121-2.
4 For a detaileddescription
of the wholeMS, see M. R. James,A Descriptive
in theLibraryofCorpusChristiCollegeCambridge,
CatalogueoftheManuscripts
Cambridge,1912, pp. 388-90. For the supposed,but rejectedprovenances,
cf. N. Ker, MedievalLibrariesof GreatBritain,2nd edition,London,1964,
pp. 139 and 189.
5 Cf. P. Glorieux,La facultdes artset ses matresau xiiiesicle,Paris,1971,
no 21/.
6 Cf.James,op. cit.: "... followedby two shortnotes,and then/ A tracton
accentuation.
/ de accentuin mediissillabis67 b / Vocalis ante vocalemin
diccionibus
latiniscorripitur
/Ends 85 b withsomegeneralrules. /- ut perlego
obaudit."
7 For the characteristics
of and the differences
betweenthe vowel-and the
see Desmense,
p. 123.
consonant-system,
156

23:32:40 PM

() ff.68v-79r:a tracton the accent and the quantityof the penultime

syllables[De accentuin mediissillabis (rubr.)],arrangedaccordingto the
7:
vowel-system
latiniscorripitur
...
inc.: Vocalisanteuocalemin dictionibus
Item.Dirutaa diruo,-is idem.EXPLICIT.8
des.
(3) ff.79-8v: a tracton thequantityof the penultimesyllables,arranged
accordingto theconsonant-system:
inc.: Arsquam cudolectoradiciturilla
hic monstroserieque sillabalongabreuisque
de mediisrectumlectoripandimususum.
A ante breuiatur,
ut agabus,cacabus,Arabis,relabo,-bas. . .
et
des.: ... ut Anna,Iohanna,Sua et F asga. Explicittractatusde productione
in mediissillabisfacienda.
correptione
(4) ff.83v-85v:a shorttracton accentuation:
inc.: Ad instructionem
minorumprimoqueriturquid sit accentus,secundo
accentusin
in quo et quomododebeat fieriaccentuset de differentia
latiniset in barbaris. . .
des.: . . . Versus. Simpliciumnormaformabiscompositarum
,
(?), ut perlego
obaudit.9
A closerinspection
to the
ofthetextsshowsthatthe tractarrangedaccording
viz. (3), is in factthe Regulaeof masterWilliam,however
consonant-system,
On theotherhand,thisversion
withouttheprefaceand thefiveinterpolations.
mentionedabove, that also occur,with
is precededby the threehexameters,
of Aimeric10and Seguin.They inslightvariants,in the old Arteslectoriae
thistractintothegenreofthearteslectoriae.
Besides,at theend two
corporate
sectionshave beenadded:
'
delubrum
, uolitabrum,
[f.83v] Candelabrum
quidamdebereproduciastruunt,
uentilarum.
Sed hec est regula:omnis
quia a longissuntderiuata:uolitarum,
uocalis naturaliterlonga,proptermutamet liquidamcoripinon potestnisi
En enimlatere,
solumin uerbalibus
nominibus.
deludoproducuntur
tenere,
uereri,
et metiri(P),cumlatebre
ueretrum
breuiantur.
, tenebre,
delubrum,
Amodoaduerbiumestoptandi.In fineaccentuantur
et omniain -ab,ut Ioab,
et omniaindeclinabilia,
ut Anna,Iohanna,Sua et F asga.'
In general has beenwritten
in a rathercarelessway and accordingly
suffers
frommanyclumsyreadings,e.g. [A ante] 11pautusin steadofplanuslector
P.
8 In the section anteD of this text,a certainFaustus is quoted: [f. 76v]
"Item. In -odususualiter,ut periodus,Marbodus,sed tantumin compositis,
fertFaustus carmine.Faustus: 'uoluaturlongissententiasub periodis'. . ."
and some lines below: "Vnde subditibidem: 'Vetus ars dicit lectorauult
periodus/ odos enimGreceproducidestintodam'." Cf. Seguin'sArs lectoria
(I quote the MS Grenoble,
municipale,
322/831,f. i2jY): "Faustus
Bibliothque
in Commentis:'uoluiturhec longissententiasub periodis'."A criticaledition
ofSeguin'sArs lectoria
is forthcoming.
For thepoet and grammarian
Faustus,
cf.H. Happ, Zur Lisorius-Frage,
ALMA,32 (1962),pp. 200 and 220.
9 Severalmastersare quoted,a.o. Alexanderde Villa Dei, Doctrinale,
Peter
Helias and the Ps.-PeterHelias (= Peterof Spain non-papa),Papias,Hugutio
and AlexanderNequam.
10TheArslectoria
ofAimeric
hasbeeneditedbyHarryF. Reijnders
in Vivarium,
IX (1971),pp. 119-37and X (1972),pp. 41-101; 124-76.For thehexameters,
cf.IX (1071),p. 126.
11I referto the text of the Regulaeby indicatingthe sectionin whichthe
quotedwordsstand.
*57

23:32:40 PM

P and arerepresentatives
ofthesamework,theyhighlydisagree
Although
on manyplaces,as is quite usual withsucha genreas the arteslectoriae
that
oftensuffers
froma livingtexttradition,
e.g.:
P [I anteC]

Similiterproprianominavirorumin Sed propriauirorum[uicorumMS] si

-icusproducuntur,
ut 'Henricus,Lu- habeant R ante I, producuntur,
ut
dovicus3.
Henricus.
Si nonhabeant,corripiuntur.
P [U anteC]

U ante breviatur,ut 'duco/ducas, U ante producitur

,
pretertraducis
Teucros' et 'volucres' et 'Penta- reduciscumsintnomina,et Pentateuteucum'si diptongondisiungas,pre- cumsi diptongon
disiungatur.
ter 'ducis, traducis, reducis', cum
suntverba,non nomina,et 'duco/-cis'
cumsuiscomposi
tis.
is that the Lisoriusquotationin P [U ante L]'
Anotherstrikingdifference
' ContraLisorius:
cristallinasecum'12is missing
Ipsa specularhabensconfert
in C, whereasin twoversusdifferentiates
occur:
in uerbisquereleporem13
0 anteR : in siluisleporem,
E anteS : auferta mepoesimet ponepoetapoesim.
betweenP and C, the bad
Bearingin mindthe considerabledifferences
conditionof the textin C, and the factthatP seemsto supplysubstantially
a reliabletext,we have to admitthat,at least forthe present,the value of
I will confinemy remarks
forthe textreconstruction
is scanty.Therefore,
oftheprinted
to thevariantreadingsof thatyieldundeniableameliorations
:
text.In fivecases suppliesthepreferable
reading
inuida
1 anteD : itumidaP Thurotf 14NumidaD esmense
I anteN: corpassinus
P Thurotf 15D esmense
coccinus
(= trugonus!)
0 anteN : tigonusP Thurotf 16 esmense
trigonus
E anteP: sepls.se P Thurotf 17sepis/-isDesmense
sepis,sepe
A anteQ : AdaquasP Thurot
: "nomdelieu"18Desmense
adaquo/-quas.
made by Mr Desmenseis
the greaterpart of the corrections
Furthermore,
supportedby thereadingsofC, but in twocases agreeswithP againstDes:
mense'sintervention
19
1 anteD : reuidetP
reuiditDesmense
A anteG: AstiagesP + AstianagesDesmense.
Nijmegen
22
Schoutstraat
12Cf.Hat>t>,
o-b.cit.,p. IQ4.
13Cf.Walther,
Proverbia
1964,no 12053a.
14 Thurot,
p. 431.
15Thurot,
p. 429.
16 Thurot,
p. 436.
17Thurot,
p. 435.
18Thurot,
p. 428.
19It mustbe notedthatthesectionI anteD variesat a highdegreein P and C.
I quotethepartin questionfrombothMSS:
Therefore
P: et a 'ledo' composita,ut 'allido, : uel a ledo composita,ut allido,
illido'; 'vidi, rides,fido' cum com- illido', fido cum suis
' compositis,
reuidet
, infidus,
positis, ut 'arridet,infidus,revidit arridet
reuidetMS).'
(Desmense,
158

23:32:40 PM

Books Received

Alberti Magni Opera Omnia.TomusXVII, Pars I (huiuseditionisnumerus

currens12): De unitateintellectus.Edidit AlfonsusHufnagel.De XV
Edidit
EdiditBernhardus
Geyer.Problematadeterminata.
problematibus.
Iacobus Weisheipl.De fato. Edidit Paulus Simon. Aschendorffsche
Verlagsbuchhandlung Mnster. 1975,XXXIX und 116 Seiten.Kart.
DM 138,- ISBN 3-402-03293-7.
HalblederDM 148,- ISBN 3-402-03294-5.
DM 152,- ISBN 3-402-03295-3.
Halbpergament
Band XVII, i enthltvierkleinere
WerkeAlberts:"De unitateintellectus
contraAverroistas"setzt sich mit einerThese arabischerPhilosophen,
namentlichdes Averroes,auseinander,wonach in allen Menschenein
einzigerIntellektvorhandensei und dieseralleinberlebe.Da es sichum
die Deutungder Lehredes Aristoteles
handelt,schlietsichdiese in der
Form einerQuaestio geschriebene
AbhandlungAlbertsa seine groe
das Pro und Contrader These auf
an; sie errtert
Aristotelesparaphrase
Weise.Sie istnachderMetaphysik
Alberts(etwa1263)
reinphilosophische
anzusetzen.Das Opusculum"De XV problematibus''ist die Stellungnahmezu Thesen,die an der PariserUniversittvon den Averroisten
wurden.Albert,der auf
vertreten
und dortim Dezember1270verurteilt
verrtnochkeineKenntnisvon
die AnfrageeinesMitbruders
antwortet,
Auchdas drittehieredierteOpusculum,
"Problemata
dieserVerurteilung.
aufeineAnfrage
stelltdieAntwort
determinata",
dar,diederOrdensgeneral
ber43 Thesenum Ostern1271 an dreiTheologendes Ordens,nmlich
richtete.
Der Traktat
Albert,Thomasvon Aquin und RobertKilwardby,
"De fato" handeltberden Einfluder Gestirne(wohlum 1256); nach
AlbertlegtdieserdemWillendes MenschenkeinenZwangaufundist nur
erkennbar.
vermutungsweise
Aristoteles Latinus, VI, 1-3: De sophisticiselenchis.TranslatioBoethii,
deMoerbeke,
Guillelmi
edd.Bernardus
G. Dod,
Iacobi,etRecensio
Fragmenta
E. J. BrillLeiden,1975. (XLII, 153 p.) clothGld. 71 (reviewwillfollow).
ofMedievalLearning.
J. E. Murdochand E. D. Sylla ed., TheCulturalContext
oftheFirstInternational
Science,
Proceedings
Colloquiumon Philosophy,
and Theologyin theMiddleAges- September1973. Edited withan introduction.Synthese Library 76. D. Reidel PublishingCompany,
Dordrecht-Holland/Boston-U.S.A.
- forlack
Fromthecover
historicalsociologyof science
: The comparative
of an adequate and moreeconomicalname- is as many-sidedas it is
not onlyof historical
This book exhibitsthe confluence
many-syllabled.
and sociologicalcontextsofscience,but also oftheconcrete
philosophical,
ofa particular
theological,
political,and legalcontextswhichinvestigation
159

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comparativecase studyrequires.The choiceof the particularperiod,its

of the results,is well describedin the Inrationale,and the fruitfulness
troduction.All scholarswill understandour admirationfor the skill,
and care withwhichMurdochand Sylla have broughtthe
intelligence,
preparedmaterialsand the reporteddiscussionsinto this beautifully
and lucidlyarticulatedbook.It was Murdochwhotookon the
integrated
the intellectualspectrumof interestsand
demandingtask of organizing
as the
in
as
that
resulted
originaland richan exploration
competences
affordedand this book presents.It showsagain how wide a
conference
of sciencecan
of conceptualissuesthe historyand philosophy
perimeter
generate,whentheyare conceivedin the fullercontextsof theirorigin,
as we do theeditors'noteof
and socialmilieu.Appreciating
development,
of social,political,and economicfactorsin
cautionabout the treatment
the analysisof medievalthoughtand culture,it also becomesclearto us
oftherelationsbetweenmaterial
and carefulinvestigation
that a rigorous
forcesis desiredin
cultureand bothconceptualactivitiesand institutional
orderto enlargeand deepenthesestudies.Need we add thatwe hope to
? We also expect
see otherperiodstreatedwithequal careand penetration
of modernsciencewillfindhereinsightsintotheirown
thatphilosophers
rootsoftheseproblems.
as wellas somehistorical
conceptualproblems,
Edizioni dell'AteneoRoma.
Ren Roques, Libressentiersvers l'rignisme.
LessicoIntellettuale
EuropeoIX.

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