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    Manticora Venerabilis
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    The papers collected in this issue represent voices (sometimes divergent) in a renewed discussion over the origin and meaning of Nominalism. Nominalism' was a position on the ontological status of universal concepts, introduced by Roscelin and modifiedbypeterabelard.

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    VIVARIUM - VOL. 30, NOS. 1-2, 1992

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    The papers collected in this issue represent voices (sometimes divergent) in a renewed discussion over the origin and meaning of Nominalism. Nominalism' was a position on the ontological status of universal concepts, introduced by Roscelin and modifiedbypeterabelard.

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    137 views288 pages

    Vivarium - Vol. 30, Nos. 1-2, 1992

    Uploaded by

    Manticora Venerabilis
    The papers collected in this issue represent voices (sometimes divergent) in a renewed discussion over the origin and meaning of Nominalism. Nominalism' was a position on the ontological status of universal concepts, introduced by Roscelin and modifiedbypeterabelard.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 288

    Vivarium

    Volume

    30
    1992

    Reprintedwiththe permissionoftheoriginalpublisher
    by
    Periodicals Service Company
    Germantown,NY
    2013

    09:07:05 AM

    Printed
    onacid-free
    paper.
    Thisreprint
    wasreproduced
    from
    the
    bestoriginal
    edition
    copyavailable.
    NOTETOTHEREPRINT
    EDITION:
    Insomecasesfullpageadvertisements
    which
    donotaddto
    valueofthisvolume
    havebeenomitted.
    thescholarly
    volumes
    somereprinted
    Asa result,
    mayhaveirregular
    pagination.

    09:07:05 AM

    CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXX (1992)


    WilliamJ.Courtenay

    Introduction

    Constant
    J.Mews

    Nominalism
    and Theologybefore
    Abaelard:NewLightonRoscelinof
    Compigne

    C.H. Kneepkens

    Nominalism
    and Grammatical
    Theory
    intheLate EleventhandEarlyTwelfth
    Centuries
    AnExplorative
    34
    Study

    JohnMarenbon

    Vocalism
    and the
    , Nominalism
    Commentaries
    on theCategories
    from
    theEarlierTwelfth
    51
    Century

    StenEbbesen

    WhatMustOne Have an Opinion


    About

    62

    C.G. Normore

    Abelardand theSchoolofthe
    Nominales1

    80

    Y. Iwakuma

    NominalesThe
    Twelfth-Century
    Posthumous
    SchoolofPeterAbelard...97

    J.Martin
    Christopher

    TheLogic oftheNominales,or,The
    Rise andFall ofImpossiblePositio

    110

    David Luscombe

    TheSchoolofPeterAbelard
    Revisited

    127

    MarciaL. Colish

    PeterLombardandAbelard: The
    andDivine
    OpinioNominalium
    Transcendence

    139

    WilliamJ.Courtenay

    PeterofCapua as a Nominalist

    157

    IwakumaYukioand
    StenEbbesen

    Logico- TheologicalSchoolsfromthe
    SecondHalfofthe12thCentury
    :A
    ListofSources1
    173

    Nominalism
    Twelfth-Century
    Bibliography

    21 1

    AllenBck

    Avicenna'
    s Conceptionofthe
    Modalities

    P. Mack

    Valla'sDialecticintheNorth2: Further
    Commentaries
    256

    217

    Reviews

    276

    BooksReceived

    284

    09:07:05 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    INTRODUCTION
    WILLIAMJ. COURTENAY
    The papers collected in this issue represent voices (sometimes
    divergent) in a renewed discussion over the origin and meaning of
    Nominalism. Throughout most of the presentcentury
    twelfth-century
    there was little question over what Nominalism' was or when and
    throughwhom it enteredphilosophical debate. From thebriefaccount
    given by Johannes Turmair (Aventinus) in the sixteenthcenturyto
    the firstfull-scalestudyby Josef Reiners in 1910, Nominalism' was
    a position on the ontological status of universal concepts, introduced
    by Roscelin and modifiedby Peter Abelard, which rejected the view
    that such universais referredto real entitiesor corresponded to common natures that inheredin things(res) but were instead mere names
    or labels ( nomina
    ) that referredto linguistic or conceptual entities.1
    Scholarly debate focused almost entirely on differencesbetween
    Roscelin and Abelard, and the degree to which the label Nominalism'
    was an appropriate descriptionfor Abelard's position on universais.
    Althoughby no means the last word, the position arrived at by Jean
    chezAblardand in
    Jolivet in his magisterialArtsdu langageet thologie
    was
    to
    substitute
    in place of
    Non-realism'
    subsequent publications
    Nominalism' as a descriptionfor Abelard's thought.2
    Two developmentsin the 1980s fundamentallyaltered the termsof
    traditionaldiscussion. The firstwas the gradual collectionof twelfth- a
    and thirteenth-century
    referencesto the opinions of the Nominales
    M.-D.
    Chenu
    and
    Arthur
    earlier
    in
    the
    process begun by
    Landgraf
    centurybut expanded significantlythroughthe manuscript research
    and editorialeffortsof scholars in the Netherlands and at the Institut
    forgraeskog latinskMiddelalderfilologiin Copenhagen.3 The second
    was the suggestion,foreshadowedby Chenu, Landgraf, and Gabriel
    Nuchelmans and independentlyproposed by Calvin Normore and
    William Courtenay in papers written in 1986, that the label
    - and thus the
    Nominales
    original meaning of nominalism- did not
    1J. Turmair,
    Annales
    ducum
    Boicarum
    Werke
    , VI, c.3, in Smtliche
    , vols.2-3,ed. S.
    Riezler,vol.3 (Mnchen1884),200-2;Reiners1910.
    2 Jolivet1969;
    1981.
    3 Chenu1934,Jolivet
    1935-36;
    1943;Pelster1944-46;Hunt1950;De Rijk1962,
    Landgraf
    1967,1975,1988;Green-Pedersen
    1977,1984;Braakhuis
    1980;Kneepkens
    1982,
    and Nielsen1983;Ebbesenand Iwakuma1983,1990;
    1987;Ebbesen,Fredborg,
    Iwakuma1992a.
    1

    09:07:11 AM

    resultfroma position on the ontological statusof universaisbut rather


    froma theoryof propositions as bearers of truth,based on a theory
    of the unity of nouns and theirfunctionin propositions.4Courtenay
    took the furtherstep of calling into question Abelard' s relation to the
    group known as the Nominalesand thus his relation to nominalism.
    The thrustof these two papers was not to dismiss five centuries of
    consensus but to raise the possibilitythat the
    historical/philosophical
    fifteenth-century
    understanding of nominalism adopted and disseminated through Turmair may have been incorrectlysuperimposed
    on the twelfthcentury,and thatboth the originalmeaning of the label
    and the role played by Abelard need to be re-examinedand proved on
    the basis of a freshreading of all the evidence, instead of assuming the
    validityof the traditionalview and fittingthe new evidence into that
    pre-establishedpicture.
    To facilitateand speed up this endeavor, it was thoughtdesirable
    for those involved in the assembling and analysis of the texts and
    theses of the Nominalesas well as those challengingthe traditionalview
    should meet togetherwith otherswho had expertiseon these issues or
    who had worked on Abelard and his 'school'. The task at hand was
    to abandon as much as possible presuppositionsformedby the traditional view and to constructa picture of the thoughtof the Nominales
    initially only from contemporary references to their opinions.
    Through the financial support of the National Endowment for the
    Humanities and the Burdick-Varyfundsof the InstituteforResearch
    in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin, this goal was
    realized at Madison, Wisconsin on October 3-5, 1991.
    The sequence of papers as presentedat the conferencewas designed
    to move fromquestions of origin and background in the late eleventh
    and early twelfthcenturiesto the role of Abelard, the opinions of the
    Nominales
    , and finallyto the impact on theologyin the second half of
    the twelfthcentury. Much of that arrangementhas been retained in
    the published sequence, but the presentorder attemptsto group pieces
    on the basis of the interrelationof content.The firsttwo papers, those
    of Mews and Kneepkens, examine issues in the pre-Abelardian
    period, respectivelylogic and theology in Roscelin and the grammatical background forthe theoryof the unityof the noun. The next
    paper, thatof Marenbon, directsits attentionto logic and the question
    of universais in the generation of Abelard. The theories of the
    4 Nuchelmans
    1987;Courtenay
    1973;Normore
    [1986],1991a.
    2

    09:07:11 AM

    Nominalesin the thirdquarter of the twelfthcenturyand theirrelationship to the thoughtof Abelard are examined by Ebbesen, Normore,
    Iwakuma, and Martin. Finally, the theologicaltraditionfrom1140 to
    1200 is exploredby Luscombe, Colish, and Courtenay fromthe standpoints, respectively,of the followersof Abelard, the use Lombard
    makes of 'nominalist' theories, and the place of nominalism in the
    thought of Peter of Capua. The footnotesof all articles have been
    simplifiedaccording to the textsassembled by Iwakuma and Ebbesen
    as well as the bibliographyat the end.
    A consensus emerged during the conferenceon several issues- a
    result that might otherwise have taken years to achieve, First,
    althoughthe reasoningdifferedamong various participants,therewas
    , which appear in
    agreement that the labels Nominalisand Nominales
    texts soon after 1150, designate positions and persons active in the
    third quarter of the twelfthcentury,certainlynot before 1140. The
    demise of the Nominalesas an active 'school' was variouslydated from
    C.1180 (Iwakuma) to 1210 (Courtenay). Second, it was accepted that
    the originsof the Nominaleslie in the closely related areas of logic and
    grammar,althoughwhethertheywere natural successorsto the Vocales
    (Iwakuma, Ebbesen, and Marenbon) or representeda markedlydifferentapproach (Courtenay, and to some extent Normore) was not
    resolved. Third, therewas also agreementthatwhatevermeaning lay
    behind the label, it did have some connectionwith Abelard, although
    the precise nature of that relationshipremained in dispute. Fourth,
    what had initiallyseemed opposing views on origin, namely a theory
    about universaisvs a theoryabout nouns and propositions,began to
    be seen as related elements in a broader and more complex 'system'.
    Which of thoseelementswas more importantforthe originof the label
    Nominales
    , however, still remained in dispute.
    It is to be expected (and probably healthy)that the authors of these
    papers, each privilegingand interpretinga slightlydifferentgroup of
    source texts,should not speak with one voice. And the complexityof
    theirreasoning does not easily allow them to be aligned preciselyon
    differentsides of the 'unresolved' issues. The points of agreement,
    however, have considerably advanced research on the origin and
    meaning of nominalism in the twelfthcentury. As others begin to
    study the texts assembled and provisionally interpretedhere and in
    recent articleslisted in the bibliography,it is expected that the early
    decades of nominalism- and thus the history of an important
    philosophical movement will come into better focus.
    Madison, Wisconsin

    09:07:11 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    Nominalism and TheologybeforeAbaelard:
    New Light on Roscelin of Compigne
    CONSTANT J. MEWS
    Roscelin of Compigne is commonly remembered as one of those
    modern "heretics of dialectic'' who, according to St Anselm, "do not
    thinkuniversal substances to be anythingbut the puffof an utterance
    (flatumvocis),who cannot understand colour to be other than a body,
    or the wisdom of man differentfrom the soul."1 Anselm accused
    Roscelin of blindlyapplying to the Trinityan inane logic that denied
    the real existence of universais. Roscelin reportedlyargued that the
    Father, Son and Holy Spirit had to be three separate things in God
    ifone was not to argue that the Father had become incarnate withthe
    Son. Anselm considered such speculation both logically absurd and
    spirituallydangerous.
    Anselm' s savage summary,deliveredc. 1093, has been instrumental
    in moulding subsequent perception of Roscelin as an unspiritual
    '
    '
    logician a 'maverick' in the words of Richard Southern.2A more
    positive angle on his achievementwas presentedalmost seventyyears
    later by Otto of Freising, who remarked that Roscelin was the first
    vocumin logic.3 Otto was comparing
    person to establish the sententia
    Abaelard' s rash application of this doctrineto theologywith the prudent reflectionof Gilbert of Poitiers on the vocesof trinitarianbelief.
    Far fromcriticizingRoscelin's thought,Otto supportedpreciselythat
    definitionof the three divine persons as three things which Anselm
    1 Anselm,De incarnatione
    verbi
    Anselmi
    Opera
    [henceforward
    DIV'> ed. F.S. Schmitt,
    II 9.20-10.1.Fora fulldiscussion
    ofAnselm's
    Omnia
    1938-68,
    VI, Rome-Edinburgh
    aboutRoscelin,see Mews 1991,55-97.Fullertreatment
    ofcontemporary
    writing
    as wellas arguments
    aboutRoscelin,
    forhisauthorship
    ofvariouswritings
    testimony
    in a forthcoming
    in thispaperwillbe putforward
    mentioned
    study.
    2 Cf. RichardSouthern,
    in SaintAnselm.
    A Portrait
    ina Landscape
    , Cambridge
    1990,
    he went,buthe was irrepressible,
    and he
    176: "Roscelinmadeenemieswherever
    touchednothingthathe did notexacerbate.Far morethaneitherBerengar
    or
    execration
    and condemnation
    on their
    Abelard,who- thoughtheybothbrought
    soberand wellversedtheologians,
    heads- wereessentially
    Roscelinwas alwaysa
    causeofdissension
    wherever
    he went."
    3 OttoofFreising,
    I 48, ed. G. WaitzandB. De Simson,HannoverGesta
    Frederici
    Leipzig1912,69.
    4

    09:07:18 AM

    had abhorred. In Otto's mind, Abaelard had blurred the substantial


    distinctionbetween persons which he considered Gilbert to uphold.
    Unlike Anselm, Otto thought that there was nothing intrinsically
    wrong with the new emphasis on vocesin logic.
    AlthoughJohn of Salisbury considered Roscelin a logician whose
    opinions on voceshad fallenintooblivion, Otto's judgement has tended
    to prevail.4 His comments about Roscelin and the sententiavocum
    inspiredAventinus in the early sixteenthcenturyto identifyRoscelin
    as founder of 4'a new way of philosophizing" that came to include
    Abaelard, Ockham, Buridan, and Marsilius of Inghen. Aventinus
    considered medieval philosophy to have been an inane civil war
    betweenrealistsand nominalists,initiallyinstigatedby Roscelin.5 The
    mythology which subsequently developed around Roscelin as
    nominalist"hero and rebel" has shown no sign of abating, notwithstandingFranois Picaves dissectionof the legend.6 In focussingon
    nominalism as a cohesive school of medieval thought prefiguring
    "modern philosophy", we are heir not only to Aventinus' reading of
    the historyof philosophy, but perhaps to his misreading as well.
    Anselm never claimed that Roscelin had established a new school
    of dialectic, only that he was just one of a new breed of "modern"
    dialecticians. The author of the HistoriaFrancica, writingin the early
    twelfthcentury, noted in a less polemical vein that Roscelin, like
    Robert of Paris and Arnulfof Laon, was a followerof a certainJohn
    who taught dialectic to be an ars vocalis.7 Robert of Paris may be the
    4 Metalogicon
    II 17 (ed. Webb93).
    5 Annales
    Ducum
    Boiariae
    VI 3, ed. S. Riezler,Munich1884,II 200-2[initially
    publishedIngolstadt
    on hisencounter
    withnominalist
    1554].GeraldStrausscomments
    inParisinHistorian
    inanAgeofCrisis.TheLifeandWork
    Avenphilosophers
    ofJohannes
    tinus
    1477-1534
    Mass. 1963,33-5.
    , Cambridge
    6 See forexampleHeinrichChristian
    derBegriffe.
    Der
    Meier,MachtundWahnwitz
    Ketzer
    Aalen 1974,whichadds littleto Picavespioneering
    Roscelin
    Roscellinus,
    ,
    ettholgien
    la lgende
    etd'aprs
    l'histoire
    philosophe
    , Paris19112,a muchenlarged
    d'aprs
    version
    ofthe1896edition.See tooEike-Henner
    W. Kluge,Roscelin
    andtheMedieval
    Problem
    of Philosophy,
    14 (1976),405-14.
    , in:JournaloftheHistory
    ofUniversals
    Medievalnominalism
    hasitsownnotinconsiderable
    formostrecent
    views
    literature;
    see Normore
    1991a.I am indebted
    to Courtenay
    for
    1987,201-17and Courtenay
    metoseethisarticle
    intypescript,
    as forthesamereasontoYukioIwakuma,
    allowing
    whois preparing
    an articleon Vocales
    nominalists.
    , orearly
    7 Historia
    Francica
    Historiae
    Francorum
    , ed. A. Duchesne,
    IV, Paris1641,89Scriptores
    90 andbyM. Bouquet,Recueil
    deshistoriens
    desGaules
    etdela France
    XII, Paris1781,
    4
    3: 'Hoc tempore
    tamindivinaquamin humanaphilosophia
    floruerunt
    Lanfrancus
    Cantuariorum
    episcopus,Guido Langobardus,
    MaingaudusTeutonicus,Bruno
    In dialcticaquoque hi potentes
    Remensis,
    qui posteavitamduxitheremiticam.
    extiterunt
    vocalemessedisseruit,
    Ioannes,qui eandemartemsophisticam
    sophistae:
    5

    09:07:18 AM

    Robert who, according to notes attached to the Glosuleon Priscian in


    the Chartres MS Bibl. mun. 209, f. 86v, held that the substantive
    verb did not 4'have any substances'' but signified substantial differencesof a thing.8All we know of Arnulfof Laon is thathis teaching
    about voces
    , like that of Roscelin, was satirised withina poem in the
    Codex Udalrici
    . 9 I will come back to the unknown John later in my
    paper. While scholars have often glumly lamented the paucity of
    documentaryevidence relatingto early nominalism, I want to suggest
    that our sources may not be so scarce, if we extend our gaze to
    theology and grammar.
    The Trinitarian
    of Roscelin
    theology
    Roscelin' s dialecticand theologyare known more throughhis critics
    than throughhis own words. Anselm was informedof his argument
    about the Trinityin 1090 byJohn, a highlyplaced Roman cleric and
    formermonk of Bee sent by Pope Urban II to act as advisor to Fulco,
    the newly appointed monastic bishop of Beau vais. He reported that
    Roscelin argued thatthe threepersons could not be one thingor otherwise the Father must have become incarnate with the Son.10 We can
    RotbertusParisiacensis,
    RoscelinusCompendiensis,
    Arnulfus
    Laudunensis.Hi
    Ioannisfuerunt
    etiamquamplures
    habuerunt
    auditores."
    sectatores,
    qui
    8 Noteseditedby Hunt 1941-43;repr.in Collected
    Papers31: "Magisteruero
    Ruobertus
    dixithocuerbum
    nonhaberesubstantias
    aliquas,sedpotiussubstantiales
    diferentias
    cuiuslibet
    reisignificare
    de qua predicatur
    et illasdifipsumsubiectum,
    ferentias
    esseactionem
    illiusuerbi,utcumdicimus'Homoest',hie 'est' significai
    rationalitatem
    etmortalitatem,
    etinaliissimiliter."
    On thisChartres
    MS, seebelow,
    p. 14.
    9 Ph. Jaff,
    Bibliotheca
    rerum
    Berlin1869,V 187.
    Germanicarum,
    10Anselmreproduces
    theargument
    III
    128(ed. Schmitt
    quotedbyJohnin Epistola
    inDIV {I 282,285;II 4, 6-9):"Si < + indeoDIV2> tres
    270-71),almostverbatim
    suntunatantum
    resetnonsunttresres< + unaquaequeDIV12> perse
    personae
    < + separatim
    DIV2> , sicuttresangeliauttresanimae,ita tarnen
    utvolntate
    et
    omninosintidem:ergopateretspiritus
    sanctus
    cumfilioincarnatus
    est.' "
    potntia
    In Epistola
    136 (III 279) to Fulco,bishopofBeauvais,Anselmomitsthesyllogistic
    formofRoscelin'sargument
    in orderto makeit seemevenmoreabsurd:"dicitin
    deotrespersonas
    essetresresab invicem
    sicutsunttresangeli,itatarnen
    separatas,
    ut sitvoluntas
    et potestas;
    autpatrem
    et spiritum
    sanctum
    esseincarnatum;
    et tres
    deosverepossedici,siususadmitteret."
    GillianR. Evans'claiminAnselm
    andTalking
    about
    GodyOxford1978,98 that"Apparently
    hadbeensaying
    Roscelin
    thatLanfranc
    andAnselmhadbothagreedthattheFatherandtheHolySpirithadbeenincarnate
    withtheSon" is a considerable
    distortion
    of theargument
    to Anselm.
    reported
    inaccurate
    is Southern's
    claim(StAnselm.
    A Portrait
    , 176) thatRoscelin
    Similarly
    musteitherbe so separatethatthey
    "assertedthatthethreePersonsoftheTrinity
    could(ifconvention
    thatallthreemust
    Gods;orsounited
    allowed)be saidtobe three
    6

    09:07:18 AM

    onlylament thatAnselm was unable to findany of Roscelin' s writings


    which mighthave explained this argument.
    Roscelin's logic has similarly been made notorious by negative
    '
    caricature. Abaelard mocked as 4'insane' his opinion that no thing
    was made up of parts, parts being only vocesjust like species
    , and that
    since a house was nothingotherthan wall, roofand foundation,ifone
    of its parts was a thing, that thing would have to be part of itself.11
    Abaelard makes Roscelin look a fool by transformingobsession with
    vocesinto an atomised view of realitywhich failedto recognisethat the
    partswere only a whole whenjoined together.In a letterto the bishop
    of Paris (c. 1120) Abaelard similarlyridiculed his teacher for explaining the scripturalwords "the part of a piece of fish" (Luke 24: 22) as
    referringto part of a vox rather than of a thing.12Like Anselm,
    Abaelard wanted to present Roscelin as an incompetentdialectician
    whose insistenceon definingtermsas vocesled to conclusions thatwere
    patentlyabsurd. In the face of such a bad press, can we make any
    sense of these ideas?
    The only document so far confidentlyattributedto Roscelin is a
    long and angryletterto Abaelard, castigatinghis ungratefulpupil for
    a varietyof offences,of which the most serious was to minimise the
    differencesbetween the threepersons of the Trinity. It was identified
    13
    by Schmellerwithin a BenediktbeuernMS in 1849. The malicious
    havebeenincarnate
    inChrist."Roscelinwassayingthattheyhadtobe threethings
    with
    thattheFather
    becameincarnate
    (notthree
    gods),ifonewastoavoidconcluding
    theSon.
    11Dial., 554-5:"Fuitautem,memini,
    nostri
    taminsanasententia
    Roscellini
    magisti
    ut nullamrempartibus
    constare
    veliet,sed sicutsolisvocibusspecies,itaet partes
    adscribebat.
    Si quisautemremillamquedomusest,rebusaliis,pariete
    scilicet
    etfunconstare
    si resillaque est
    taliipsumargumentatione
    damento,
    diceret,
    impugnabat:
    paries,reiilliusque domusest,parssit,cumipsadomusnichilaliudsitquamipse
    et fundamentum,
    pariesettectum
    parserit.
    profecto
    pariessui ipsiuset ceterorum
    Atveroidemquomodosuiipsiusparsfuerit?
    Amplius:omnis<pars> naturaliter
    cumse nullomodo
    priorestsuototo.Quomodoautempariespriorseetaliisdicetur,
    priorsit?"
    12Epist.14, ed. E.R. Smits,Peter
    Letters
    IX-X1V,
    Abelard.
    1983,280:"Hic
    Groningen
    sicutpseudodialecticus,
    itaet pseudochristianus,
    cumin Dialcticasua nullamrem
    sedsolamuocempartesastruat,
    itaetdiuinampaginamimpudenter
    uteo
    peruertit,
    locoquo dicitur
    dominuspartempiseisassicomedisse,
    partemhuiusuoeisque est
    reiintelligere
    piseisassi,nonpartem
    cogatur."ThetextinPL 178,358Dis corrupt.
    Thiswas possibly
    a veiledsuggestion
    thatRoscelinwas skating
    nearBerengarian
    in hisexegesis
    ofa traditional
    "eucharistie"
    verse.
    heresy
    13J.A. Schmeller
    thetextwitharguments
    foritsauthenticity
    from
    Munich,
    published
    Clm4643,ff.93v-99r
    der
    in
    the
    Klasseder
    Abhandlungen
    (s. xii)
    philosophisch-philologisch
    derWissenschaften
    Akademie
    Bd. 5.3 Munich1849,187-210;itwas
    Kniglich
    Bayerischen
    re-edited
    62-80.
    byReiners1910as an appendix,
    7

    09:07:18 AM

    insultsin thisletterhave tended to attractmore attentionthan its solid


    speculative reflection.Although Reiners re-editedthe letterin 1910,
    he did not analyse its contents,presumably because it did not touch
    on what he believed to be the essence of nominalism- universais and
    the relationshipbetween parts and whole. The letteris mostlyabout
    the argument that one had to respect the pluralityof persons within
    the Trinity.14Roscelin was fascinated by Augustine's comment that
    what the Greeks described as one essence, three substances, that
    Latins called one substance or essence and threepersons.15The identificationof person and substance made sense in the lightof Priscian's
    definitionthat a nomensignifiedsubstance and quality. In the case of
    names applied of God:
    onethingandanother,
    whether
    topartsor
    anynounsdo notsignify
    according
    toqualities,
    buttheysignify
    neither
    dividedintopartsnor
    itself,
    onlysubstance
    We do nottherefore
    changedthrough
    qualities.
    signify
    person
    through
    anything
    otherthanthrough
    substance
    thatwe are accustomed
    outofa certain
    , granted
    habitofspeechtotriple
    totri, notsubstance
    , as theGreeksareaccustomed
    person
    . Neither
    indeedis ittobe saidthattheyerrin beliefin theTrinity
    plesubstance
    - as
    becausetheyspeakdifferently
    from
    us,fortheybelievethesameas us,since
    we havesaid- person
    or essence
    . substance
    thesamethingin
    signify
    completely
    God. Forinspeechthereis diversity,
    inbelief
    therewouldnot
    unity;otherwise
    be a Church
    amongtheGreeks.Foriftheythemselves
    sayonething
    byspeaking
    thus,I do notsee whywe lie bysayingthesamething.16
    Roscelin does not deny the unityof God (as Anselm maintained), but
    emphasizes thatplural names are applied out of linguisticconvention.
    14Augustine's
    Detrinitate
    isthemostfrequently
    citedwork;there
    areextracts
    toofrom
    hisDe baptismo
    De coniugiis
    adulterinis
    adlitteram,
    De anima
    , Deagone
    christiano,
    , De Genesi
    eteiusorigine,
    InIohannis
    124, Epist.147, De doctrina
    tractatus
    Christiana.
    Other
    euangelium
    arefrom:Prudentius,
    extracts
    ; Gregory,
    , Moraliainlob; Leo,
    Peristephanon
    Epistolae
    Sermo
    De fide
    22, Ambrose,
    , De spiritu
    sancto'Isidore,Etymologiae
    ; Jerome,Contra
    Vigilantium.
    15Cf.Epist.adAbaelardum,
    ed. Remers70,72,74,quoting
    VII
    De trinitate
    Augustine,
    4 n. 7 (CCSL 50, 259). See tooDe trinitate
    V 8-9(CCSL 50, 216-7).
    16Epist.adAbaelardum,
    ed. Reiners72: "Sciendum
    estvero,quodinsubstantia
    sanctaetrinitatis
    nominanonaliudetaliudsignificant,
    ad partes
    sivequantum
    quaelibet
    sive quantum
    ad qualitates,
    sedipsamsolamnoninpartesdivisam
    necperqualitates
    mutatamsignificant
    substantiam.Non igiturper personamaliud aliquid
    licet ex quadam loquendiconsuetudine
    significamus,
    quam per substantiam,
    soleamus
    nonsubstantiam,
    sicutGraecitriplicare
    soientsubstantriplicare
    personam,
    tiam.Nequeverodicendum
    errent
    est,quodinfidetrinitatis
    substantiam,
    triplicando
    credunt
    sive
    quia licetaliterdicantquamnos,id tarnen
    quodnos,quiasicutdiximus
    siveessentiain deo prorsus
    idemsignificant.
    In locutione
    personasivesubstantia
    enimtantumdiversitas
    est,in fideunitas.Alioquiniam nonessetapud Graecos
    ecclesia.Si autemipsisic loquendoverumdicunt,quarenos idemdicendomentiamur,nonvideo."
    8

    09:07:18 AM

    Following Priscian's definitionpersonasignifiesa substance, although


    not- in God's case - a quality, as this would suggest mutabilityin
    God. The argument runs diametricallycounter to Abaelard's identificationof a divine person with an attributelike power or wisdom.
    We use eithersingular or plural names of God "only on behalf of the
    wish of speakers to whom such a convention of speech is pleasing".
    In language thatrecalls Abaelard's summaryof his teachingon parts,
    Roscelin argues:
    Whentherefore
    we varythesenamesor proffer
    themin thesingular
    or in the
    onething
    rather
    thananother,
    but
    plural,wedo thisnotbecauseitmight
    signify
    towhomsucha habitofspeechis pleasbyvirtue
    onlyofthewillofthespeakers
    weredifferent
    ing.Forifthere
    partsthere[inGod]so as tospeakofoneperson
    and another
    substance,
    perhapstherewouldbe a reasonwhywe speakofone
    another
    in thepluralas we sayofa man- sincea body
    thingin thesingular,
    - thatthereis onesoulbutmanybodiesbecause
    is onepart,thesoulanother
    of thedifferent
    is thereone qualitysignified
    partsof thebody;but neither
    - as we have
    substance
    or essence
    , or anotherthrough
    through
    person
    , because
    no quality.17
    alreadysaid- in God thereis completely
    There is an inexorable logic to his argument that the proper names
    'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' must each signifya substance ifnone
    signifya quality. This is not language about the substance of God, but
    discussionofthreedifferent
    nomina
    , each of whichhad itsown identity,
    as the cityof Rome was Rome and water was water.18The Greek definition of the Trinity as a pluralityof substances appealed because it
    fittedwith Priscian's definitionof a noun, modifiedin only a limited
    way. All utterancesused of God had to obey the rules of language.
    One of these rules was the every noun, even those used of God,
    signifieda substance. Such "grammatical Platonism" (to use a term
    coined by Jean Jolivet) might be uncomfortableto those who prefer
    to believe with Anselm that modern logicians did not believe in
    17Ibid.73: "Quando
    sivesingulariter
    sivepluraliter
    ergohaecnominavariamus
    prononquia aliudunumquamalterumsignificet
    hoc facimus,
    sed prosola
    ferendo,
    Si enimdiversae
    volntate,
    loquentium
    quibustalisloquendiususcomplacuit.
    partes
    ibi essent,utalterapersona,
    alterasubstantia
    fortassis
    ratioaliquaesset,
    diceretur,
    curunumsingulariter,
    alterum
    uthominis,
    pluraliter
    proferremus,
    quia alia parsest
    aliaanima,unamanimam
    sedpluracorpora
    corpus,
    dicimus,
    propter
    corporis
    partes
    diversas.Sed equealia qualitasperpersonam,
    alia persubstantiam
    velessentiam
    in deo nullaprorsus
    sienificatur,
    quia sicutiamdiximus,
    qualitasest."
    18Ibid.74:
    in hac pluralitate
    secundum
    "Quae ergodifferentia
    personarum
    nos,
    substantiarum
    vero secundumGraecossit, perquiramus.
    Nihilenimaliud est
    substantia
    filiiquamfilius,
    sicuturbsRomaeRoma
    patris
    quampater,etsubstantia
    est,et creatura
    aquae aqua est."
    9

    09:07:18 AM

    universal substances.19Roscelin believed thatwords signifiedthingsat


    a very literal level. He wanted to respect the identityof every proper
    noun invented by man. His proper nouns are like the individualised
    reliefsof a Romanesque capital, each a human utterancesignifyingin
    its own way a substantial realitybeyond.
    Astonishingly neither Schmeller nor Reiners noticed that
    immediately preceding Roscelin's letter in the Benediktbeuern
    manuscriptoccur two shorttheologicalessays closelyrelatedin literary
    style.The firstexplores both common ground and differencesbetween
    God and creation, with particularreferenceto the Trinity,definedas
    a pluralityof things. The second, inspired by a homily of Augustine
    on John, explains the contrastbetween Christ's special love forJohn
    and Peter's special love forChrist in termsof the contrastbetween the
    active life of this world and the contemplative life of the world to
    come.20 These are the only theological items within an otherwise
    secular manuscript.21
    The firstessay, which we shall call Notandumest after its incipit,
    helps explain the argument criticized by St Anselm. In some things
    God and creation are similar: just as differentaccidents of the same
    substance cannot be identifiedwith each other, so the Father cannot
    be identifiedwith the Son or the Holy Spirit. In God however, unlike
    creation, the divine persons are not divided between substance and
    accident. There is a trinityin God, which can be described as three
    persons or threeres.The authoritycited forthisclaim is the Greek definition of the persons as three ousieor substances.22The underlying
    19Cf. Jolivet,1966and, in relationto Abaelard,
    Jolivet,1975a,532-43.Jolivet
    on
    of Bernardof Chartres
    of theteaching
    foundations
    examinesthegrammatical
    desrapports
    inElments
    oftheproblem
    a widersurvey
    within
    substance
    pourunetude
    imMittelalter
    undErkenntnis
    au moyen
    etl'ontologie
    entre
    la grammaire
    , ed.
    ge, in: Sprache
    within
    his
    Berlin1981, 135-64.Allthesepapershavebeenreprinted
    A. Zimmerman,
    dulangage
    Doctrines
    Ablard.
    mdivale.
    dela pense
    , Paris1987.
    Aspects
    20Augustine,
    toAnne-Mane
    124(CCSL 36,680). I amindebted
    inIohannem
    Tract,
    Bouchforthisidentification.
    21Thesetextsfollow
    worksol Seneca(copiedin thesamehand),lhe letter
    on from
    on Boethius'De
    a commentary
    is followed
    by adviceon castinga horoscope,
    anda late
    oflearning
    fromHughofSt Victoron thedivision
    an excerpt
    arithmetical
    a separate
    oflogic.The firstpartofClm 4643,originally
    treatise
    twelfth-century
    texts.Foran editionofthesetwotexts,
    ofhistorical
    a variety
    contains
    manuscript,
    Some
    NewTexts
    andRoscelin:
    seemystudy
    StAnselm
    oftheir
    anddiscussion
    authorship,
    1
    n.
    andTheir
    //,
    above).
    (see
    Implicationsforthcoming
    22f.91v:"In istisconueniunt
    Namincreatuns
    etcreature.
    In alusdifferunt.
    creator
    eiusdemsubuelpluraaccidentia
    uelplurespartes,
    ueleru<n>t pluressubstantie,
    Namindeosunt
    estibi.Hoc autemnonesti<n> creatore.
    exquo pluralitas
    stantie,
    10

    09:07:18 AM

    argumentis the same as in Roscelin's letter:with each divine person


    thereis no accidental quality, only a distinctsubstance. Human words
    inevitablysuggest plurality. Such language is far removed from the
    eternal simplicity.
    A similarantithesisis central to an anonymous essay found within
    a Durham Cathedral manuscript(A. IV. 15) containing the firstbook
    of Abaelard's TheologiaChristiana
    in its earliestknown recension.23This
    which
    we shall call Est una afterits incipit, explains on rational
    text,
    4
    groundshow thereexisted a 'one and perfectunityin which there is
    '
    a certainwonderfultrinity.' The images used to describe this trinity
    are unconventional. The standard Augustinin explanation,
    developed by Boethius, had been that the three divine persons were
    threerelationswithinGod. Est una describes each as differentiated
    by
    - a term used by Aristotlein the
    a habitudo
    to describe an
    Categories
    individual's disposition. 'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' are names
    invented to signifythree ineffabledistinctionsin God.
    Each is described
    to theproperty
    of theGreek
    singlyas a person;according
    as threesubstances.
    Forwhatsubstance
    is forthe
    languagetheyare described
    Greeks,thisis soundedbyLatinsas person
    ; and thesethreepersonsarefound
    in certain
    to be spokenofas things,
    butinfrequently.24
    manuscripts
    The author then answers the conundrum "if the Father and the Holy
    Spirit are of the same substance, then the Son is begotten of the
    substance of the Holy Spirit" by identifyingeach attributeas a propriumof each person. The essay closes with an allusion to Romans 1:
    19-20: "To such a thoughtyou may say that the philosophersof the
    world rose throughvisible created things." One can arrive at the doctrine of the Trinity by reflectingon categories of the natural world.
    necintelligere.
    Nonsunttressubstanquedamtria;homodicere(f.92r)nonpotest,
    eiusdem
    substantie.
    Trespersone
    ueltres
    tie,equetrespartes,
    equetriaaccidentia
    resdicipotest.
    Hoc enimdicitautoritas.
    Grecidicunttresusie,id esttressubstantie,
    sedaccipiunt
    substantias
    propersonis.
    Quid autemsintillepersoneuel illetresres,
    nonpotest.
    Namnequesuntsubstantia
    Sed indeononsunt
    explicari
    equeaccidens.
    inmediata
    etaccidens.Ita aliutestincreatore,
    aliutincreaturis.
    Necest
    substantia,
    mirum
    si factor
    a sua factura
    diffrt."
    23I firstnotedthistextwithin
    of theDurhamMS in Peter
    Abelard's
    description
    Christiana
    andTheologia
    'Scholarium'
    in:RTAM, 52 (1985),113-5,
    re-examined,
    Theologia
    in thisstudyI had notthenrealisedthatit was followed
    although
    by threeother
    texts.
    patristic
    "
    24D f.66v: Persona
    tarnen
    dicitur
    de hiset singulariter
    ut dicaturprimo,persona
    secundoet tertio;et ita dicaturiii personeet etiamsecundum
    proprietatem
    grece
    tressubstantie.
    linguedicuntur
    , hoca latinis
    Quod enimestapudgrecossubstantia
    sonatpersona
    etinueniuntur
    isteiiipersone
    inquibusdam
    codicibus
    dicires
    , sedrare."
    11

    09:07:18 AM

    Its author imitatesthe methodof Anselm's Monologion


    : initialreflection on divine unity is transformedinto reflectionon the necessary
    4
    pluralityin God, to which the names of persons' and 'substances' are
    variously applied by Greeks and Latins. This argument, which St
    Anselm reminded potential criticshad been upheld by Augustine, is
    central to Notandumestand to Roscelin' s letterto Abaelard as well as
    to Est una. Their common theme is that 'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy
    Spirit' are each proper nouns with an identityas distinctas plural
    substances or things. Roscelin picked up Anselm's perception
    (inspired by Augustine) that there were differentpossible ways of
    describing the ineffabletruthof the divine trinity.However, where
    Anselm tended to emphasise the continuity between human and
    divine language, Roscelin focussed on the gulf between human
    language and divine simplicity.
    and the "Glosule" on Priscian
    Person-things
    Where did the idea come from,so reprehensibleto St Anselm, that
    a divine person could be identifiedwith a thing?Althoughthese texts
    buttresstheirargument by quoting Augustine, the image is not to be
    found in his writings.Even Abaelard in his Sic etNon only raked up
    one, relatively obscure text by Rufinus, to support the claim.25
    Anselm's invectivehas tended to make us search forits stimulusin his
    dialectic, in particular his supposed belief thatjust as the world was
    composed of radically discrete entities,none of which shared a common or universal nature, so the three divine persons were also
    radically discrete. It is oftenassumed that Roscelin was not a serious
    theologian. Did not Abaelard mock his literalism in considering a
    whole (like a house) simply as its parts (a wall, roof and foundation)
    instead of recognisingthatthe partswere only a whole when theywere
    joined together?Such criticismcan mislead us ifwe read it as a guide
    to Roscelin' s ontology rather than as a comment on his analysis of
    every term, genus, species or part, as a vox. Roscelin' s unstated
    authorityin his letterto Abaelard was Priscian, the great analyst of
    voces.The names Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are voceseach of which
    25Onlyn. 37 of forty-two
    in q. 8 "Quod non sit multitudo
    rerumin
    excerpts
    oftheSicetNon, ed. B. BoyerandR. McKeon,Chicago1976-77,135
    trinitate...",
    speaksof pluralthings,Rufinus,Comm.in Symb.
    Apostolorum
    (CCSL 20, 139):
    luciset producit
    "Quomodoigniscaelestis
    generaiex se ipsosplendorem
    vaporem,
    et cumsinttriain rebus,unumsuntin substantia,
    ita trinitas
    estuna maiestas."
    12

    09:07:18 AM

    refersto somethingcalled eithera person (by the Latins), a substance


    (by the Greeks) or a thing. As this kind of person could not signifya
    quality in God, it had to signifya substance. This theologyderives
    fromrigorousacceptance of the universal validityof Priscian's definition of the meaning of a noun.
    Anselm classifiedRoscelin as one of those ' 4modern dialecticians"
    who did not believe that universalisubstances were anythingbut a
    flatumvocis.According to the HistoriaFranckathese dialecticians were
    inspired by John, "who taught dialectic to be a vocal art". The
    seminal author forany speculative discussion of vocesin the eleventh
    was beginning to
    centurywas Priscian, whose Institutiones
    grammaticae
    in
    the
    Ars
    maior
    of
    so
    beloved
    of CarolDonatus,
    outstrip popularity
    ingian schoolmasters.Was Roscelin inspiredby contemporarydialectical discussion of Priscian's grammatical categories? Anselm refers
    ratherdisparaginglyto such inquiryinto Priscian' s ideas at the end of
    the De grammatico
    when he complains to his disciple of "the extentto
    which dialecticiansin our timesare at loggerheads about the question
    which you put- whethergrammaticus
    , classifiedby Priscian both as a
    noun and an adjective, was a substance or a quality.26The De Grammaticowas his responseto such debate. Are these the same dialecticians
    as he warns against in the De incarnatione
    verbi?
    In no other eleventh-centurycomposition is dialectical interestin
    grammarmore evidentthan in theanonymous Glosuleon books I-XVI
    of theInstitutiones
    Grammaticae.
    Its author is concerned throughoutwith
    the causae inventionum
    of the individual vocesdiscussed by Priscian.27
    The earliestcompletewitnessis Cologne Cathedral MS 201, probably
    dating fromthelate eleventhcentury.Its textcontains a recensiondifferentfrom,and possibly earlier than that found in fourother manuscripts, all from the early twelfthcentury: Metz, Bibi. mun. 1224,
    ff. Ira-11Orbfr0m eastern France; Paris, BN nouv. acq. lat. 1623,
    26De Grammatico
    I 168;cf.D. P. Henry,TheDe Grammatico
    , ed. Schmitt
    ,
    ofStAnselm
    Notre-Dame
    1964,pp. 88-91.
    27Theimportance
    oftheGlosule
    wasfirst
    indicated
    byHunt,1941-43.See too:Fredborg1977;id., SomeNotesontheGrammar
    , in: CIMAGL, 37
    ofWilliam
    ofConches
    Grammar
    Philoso(1981),21-41;herchapter
    , in:A History
    Speculative
    ofTwelfth-Century
    , ed. PeterDronke,Cambridge
    177-86.Forwhatfollows
    on the
    phy
    1988,especially
    and incunable
    tradition
    oftheGlosule
    I am indebted
    to thepioneering
    manuscript
    discoveries
    ofMargaret
    Works
    thePrinted
    Editions
    Gibson,TheCollected
    1470ofPriscian:
    '
    'Glosule
    1859yin: StudiMedievali,
    ser.3a 18(1977),249-60and TheEarlyScholastic
    '
    toPriscian
    Grammaticae':
    theText
    anditsInfluence
    in:
    , Institutiones
    29
    235, ibid., (1979),
    54. I am grateful
    tooto C.H. Kneepkens
    forcomment
    on itstext.
    13

    09:07:18 AM

    ff. lr-54v an abbreviated text fromSaint-Benot-surLoire; Brussels,


    Bibi. roy. 3920, ff. 12ra-vb(the prologue). The now destroyedChartres MS, Bibl. mun. 202, ff.lr-68v,contained additional passages not
    found in the otherMSS. None of these MSS identifyan author to the
    '
    Glosule.Our only attributionis to a Johannes de aingre" mentioned
    in the colophon to the 1488 incunable edition of Arrivabenus, a
    printerof Mantua who relied on a good manuscriptverylike thatnow
    in Metz.28 An impossible form in Latin, de aingrecould well be a
    printer's corruptionof dei gratia, the traditionalinterpretationof the
    name John. The device "by him whose name means the grace of
    God" is used to indicate the author of anothervery influentialglosule
    on the Pauline epistles writtenin 1102 and closely related to those
    attributed to Bruno of Rheims (also concerned with the causes of
    words, in this case of St Paul).29 Whether these two glosuleare by the
    same author still has to be investigated. There is a dry irony in the
    author of a Priscian commentary so concerned with the causes of
    words being identifiedas "John by the grace of God".
    One word whose cause the Glosuleis much concerned with, is 'person', defined by Priscian in relation to a verb: the firstis one who
    speaks about himself,eitheralone or withothers;the second is the one
    28 1488unfoliated
    e.g. 1492f.226; 1511f.204): "Iohannis
    (resetin othereditions,
    arcem[al. artem]possedit:
    de aingre:summosqui interexpositores
    grammaticae
    ' Cf.
    finit.'
    desideratissimum
    uolumine
    omnibus
    commentum
    supermagnoPrisciani
    textoftheGlosule
    253n. 14. The Arrivabenus
    Works
    Gibson,TheCollected
    ofPriscian
    Veniceedition
    ofPrisofthe1496-97
    a microfilm
    is accessible
    reproduction
    through
    theirseriesItalian
    within
    cian'sOpera
    , published
    Company
    bytheGeneralMicrofilm
    Mass. 1980-,Roll 463 item2. Subsequent
    1601, Cambridge,
    BooksPrinted
    Before
    heldin theRareBooksroomofRutgers
    areto theVenice1511edition,
    references
    notalleditions
    I ammostgrateful.
    towhosestaff
    Unfortunately
    Library,
    University
    sharethesamefoliation.
    29The information
    toParis,BN lat.14442:"In nomine
    theinitalrubric
    comesfrom
    sancti.Incipiuntur
    epistolarum
    pauliab iliovidelicet
    glos[u]le
    patrisetfiliietspiritus
    de iherusolima
    inannoquocons[u]lpictaviensis
    cuiusnomengratiadeiinterpretatur
    toWilliamVII ofPoitou,dukeof
    rediit."A. Stoelennotesthatthiscouldonlyrefer
    in
    in 1101,butwaspresent
    at Poitiers
    wholeftforJerusalem
    Aquitaine1086-1126,
    leChartreux
    attribues
    Bruno
    1102,Lescommentaires
    , in: RTAM,25 (1958),
    scripturaires
    thisauthoron theeucharist
    177-247at 186n. 11. Stoeleneditsa longpassagefrom
    surl'eucharistie
    etla *Lettre
    deS. Anselme'
    inBruno
    leChartreux
    , in:RTAM,
    ,JeanGratiadei
    34 (1967),18-83.
    30Instit.
    tres,
    VIII 101,ed. Keil II 448: "Suntigiturpersonaeverborum
    Gramm.
    ad
    ut
    'dico
    se
    sola
    vel
    cum
    de
    secunda,
    dicimus',
    aliis,
    est,
    quam
    loquitur
    prima quae
    dequa extraseetillam,
    deipsavelsolavelcumaliis,ut'dicisdicitis',
    tertia,
    loquitur,
    ad quamdirigit
    sermonem,
    prima,ut'dicitdicun.etprimaquidem
    positaloquitur
    tertia
    enimdemonstrantur,
    et secundaverborum
    sunt,praesentes
    personaefinitae
    utdefiniatur."
    estitaqueegetplerumque
    veroinfinita
    pronomine,
    14

    09:07:18 AM

    spoken to about himself,and the thirdis the one spoken about apart
    fromoneselfand the person being addressed.30Applyingthe Boethian
    res-vox
    antithesisto the senses of 'person' as used by Priscian, the commentatorconsiders 'person' as both realis(the thingbeing referredto)
    and vocalis(the word itself). He anticipates his explanation of Priscian's discussion in VIII 101, with a remark on VIII 66 about the
    relativepriorityof the firstperson over the other two persons. Here,
    he glosses a person as a thing.31Could this have been the point of
    '
    departureforRoscelin's trinitariantheology?In the TheologiaSummi
    boni' Abaelard refutes Roscelin's definition of the Trinity as a
    pluralityof thingsby explaining that Priscian' s definitionof 'person'
    referredto threeproperties.32He is here criticisingan idea, not just
    of Roscelin but one laid down in the Glosule.
    The commentatorexplains himself more fully when expounding
    Priscian's definitionof 'person' in VIII 101:
    Thewordpersoncanbe takenindifferent
    ways:foritmeansa certain
    quality,
    whichwe can callpersonality
    and thisprothemselves,
    adjacentto thethings
    in thatqualitywhichwe call persons
    perly;it designates
    things
    participating
    thanksto thethingwhichtheyreceive;it [thewordperson]is also takenin
    - a quality
    ofanother
    ofsignifying
    designation
    quality,
    namely
    personal
    things
    verbs:forwhenI say44 'I read'is a person"I do notsay
    adjacenttopersonal
    thatinthisverbis thatthing
    rather
    themeaning
    ofthings
    "personality",
    subjacenttopersonality;
    so saying" 41 read'is a person"is "signifying
    a personal
    thing."33
    31I citetheGlosule
    to the1502edition(e), corrected
    wherenecessary
    according
    by
    reference
    to theCologneMS (K). K 35vae 114v:"Alia similitudo
    de ordinepersimiliter
    sonarum,
    quod dicitsicutin dictisaliismodispraeponitur:
    prima
    persona
    aliispersonis
    hascausas:quiaperipsam
    realem
    , id estperprimam
    praeponitur
    propter
    ab ipsaostenditur
    secunda
    realis:quia ad ipsamloquitur
    significatam
    primaet tertia
    realis:quiade ipsaloquitur,
    etuereperprimam
    ostenditur
    secundaet tertia:namnisi
    sitprima
    realisnoneritsecundaveltertia;
    nondicitnonesseresquae dicuntur
    (-unt
    ea requaedicitur
    etiamdestructa
    e) secundaettertia
    persona
    prima;sedsubhacprononremanere
    utdicantur
    secundaettertia
    siue(si nonsite) alia ressubhac
    prietate
    utdicatur
    aliis,quiaomnis
    proprietate
    primaetideoetiampreponitur
    primapersona
    naturaliter
    estantecausatiua
    id estantesuoseffectus."
    (propriis
    K) causaefficiens
    32TSumII 108,p. 153; TchrIII 175,p. 261.
    33VIII 101K 40vbe 123v:
    uerborum
    <personae
    [Sm/i
    igitur
    tres>]"Sciendumhanc
    uocempersona
    diuersisaccipimodis:significai
    enimquandamqualitatem,
    quam
    uocarepersonalitatem
    et hoc proprie;dsignt
    possumus
    ipsisrebusadiacentem,
    etiamresiliaqualitate
    participantes
    quas solemusuocarepersonasgratiareiquam
    etiamin designatione
    alterius
    scilicet
    suscipiunt;
    accipitur
    qualitatis
    significationis
    rerum
    namcumdico"lego
    personaJium
    quae qualitasadiacetuerbispersonalibus;
    estpersona"nondicohuicuerboinessepersonalitatem
    remillamimmosignificationemrerumpersonalitati
    et estdicere"lego estpersona",id est
    subiacentium,
    rempersonalem.
    Itemaccipitur
    uerbasignificationem
    significans
    personasignificans
    "
    rerumpersonalium
    participantia.
    15

    09:07:18 AM

    In identifying'person' as both 'word' and 'thing', the commentator


    was tryingto clarifythe reason behind the impositionof thisparticular
    word. The firstperson was both "that thingwhich spoke about itself'
    and, as a word, "that which signifieda thingspeaking about itself'.
    One had always to ask whether'person' was being used as a thingor
    as a word. "A thingis the cause of the vox",34 In this case the personthing was the cause of the word 'person'. The commentatorwanted
    to distinguisha word fromthat which it signified.By twelfth-century
    standards,thisterminologymightseem clumsy,but it was an attempt
    all the same.
    The commentatordid not accept some people's interpretationthat
    "about oneself" in Priscian's definitionhad to enunciate an action or
    a passion about oneself,distinctfromthe firstperson of the pronoun.35
    He argued that the same person lay behind the pronoun as the verb.
    The comentator then proferredas the opinion of "certain people"
    (i.e. himself)the explanation he had already presentedas his own, that
    Priscian was referringto 'person' both as a thing and as a word,
    imposed to designate somethingreal. Expanding on Priscian's definition of the firstand second persons as finite,he noted that "I read"
    representsthe speaker as "You read" representsthe one spoken to.
    " or
    This was true according to themselves"m/reales
    according to their
    " ut vocales". The third
    infinite
    needed to be
    person, being
    meaning
    a
    defined by a pronoun to be finitething in itself.
    The commentator's concern to distinguish the cause of 'person'
    (i.e. the thing) fromthe word itselfis only one example of his desire
    to establish the causes of those vocesanalysed by Priscian. He was
    particularlyinterestedin expanding upon those oftenbriefpassages in
    which Priscian tried to establish philosophical principles to different
    34Ibid.: "Cum igitur
    hisquattuor
    modisetsinedubioaequiuocepersona
    accipiatur:
    duas tantum
    scilicet
    Priscianus,
    personehic tractat
    significationes
    agitde persona
    secundum
    rerumpersonalitati
    subiectarum
    et in
    significationem
    (K designationem)
    uerborum
    suntei secundarie:
    cumdebetdifdesignatione
    quae duae significationes
    utsuperius
    finire
    earnperprimam,
    diuidit
    secundam
    etterconiugationem
    personam
    tiam:in qua dicerem(K 41ra)satisinnuitur
    diffinitio
    personae.Nam personam
    dicimusrealemquaeuel dese loquitur
    deipsauel de qua
    , uel ad quamprimaloquitur
    uocalemuerouocemhancpersonam
    loquiturprimaad secundam,
    significantem.
    Prima
    est.Hie diffinit
    et secundum
    remet secundum
    uocem:et
    primampersonam
    facit.Res enimestcausauoeis:etsicdicitresiliaestprima
    competenter
    quae
    persona
    sermonem
    de quocumque
    habitm
    siuedesesiuede alio:
    , id estquae profert
    loquitur
    eccerealis.Primauoealisestquae significai
    remloquentem
    dese,ethancnobisinnuit
    cumdicitquaeloquitur
    dese, id estprofert
    uocemse significantem."
    35VIII 101K 41ra 123v.
    16

    09:07:18 AM

    4
    partsof speech. Every noun had a thing' or resas its cause. This principle may help us understand the trinitarianargument St Anselm
    foundso perplexing.While Priscian never explicitlyidentifieda noun
    witha thing,he did say thatit was "a part of speech which distributes
    a common or a proper (i.e. particular) quality of subject bodies or
    things to each" (II 22). Priscian's definitionof a noun takes for
    grantedthe primaryexistenceof subject bodies or things.A quality is
    what thesebodies or thingsshare. When explaining that it was proper
    to a noun to signifysubstance and quality [II 18], the commentator
    observed that here Priscian was not using substance in its customary
    sense of "a thingwith subsistingaccidents", but in a broader sense
    of all essence. In his lengthygloss on the definition,he preferredto
    use substance to referto the specific thing:
    thatsubstance
    forwhichitwasfoundtodesignate,
    either
    [A noun]... signifies
    from
    another
    orsimilar< through
    > thesharing
    separate
    through
    anyproperty
    ofanyproperty.
    Forpropernamesarefoundand imposedso thattheyalways
    somecertain
    others
    somecertain
    signify
    personseparatefrom
    through
    properties.Propernounsarefoundto designate
    substances
    in thattheyare separate
    in theirproperties.
    ... Similarly
    commonnames[appellativa
    J are foundto
    substances
    similar
    toothers
    inanyquality,
    as mansignifies
    designate
    manywith
    one commonproperty,
    and mortality,
    becausesinceman
    namelyrationality
    thatoneas muchas thisone,itsignifies
    a certain
    common
    to
    signifies
    property
    be inall,inwhich
    thatis properties,
    aretheespecialcause
    theyagree.Qualities,
    ofthefinding
    ofnouns.Forifnounswerefoundonlyto designate
    substances,
    so manydifferent
    nounswouldbe superfluous,
    sincethisname"substance"
    wouldsuffice;
    butsincesubstance
    inas muchas theyareorexist
    signifies
    things
    in themselves
    iftakenstrictly,
    itdetermines
    inthesethings
    neither
    corporality,
    whiteness
    orblackness
    oranything
    elseofthis
    animation,
    sensibility,
    rationality,
    kind.Itwasnecessary
    tofinddifferent
    nameswhichdetermined
    theseandother
    different
    themselves.36
    qualitiesin things
    36II 18K 13rae 24v: Proprium
    estnominis
    substantiam
    [
    significare
    ] "... scilicet
    significai
    illamsubstantiam
    ad quamdesignandam
    estinuentum,
    ueldiscretam
    ab aliaperaliuel similem
    communionem
    alicuiusproprietatis.
    quamproprietatem
    Propriaenim
    nominasicsuntinuenta
    etimposita
    utsemper
    signifcent
    aliquamcertam
    personam
    ab aliisperaliquascertasproprietates;
    discretam
    nonenimsuntinuenta
    difpropter
    ferentiam
    sed tantumad discernendas
    in substantiis
    substantiarum,
    proprietates
    utpotest
    uideriin Socrate.Socrates
    certam(K 13rb)personam
    existentes,
    significai
    etdiscretam
    ab aliisnoninsubstantia
    essesedperhasproprietates
    quodSophronisci
    filius
    cumenimeademsubstantia
    sitin omnibus
    est,quodpoetaet alia huiusmodi;
    hominis
    mortale
    et nondiffrant
    indiuiduis,
    quia omnishomoestanimalrationale
    nisiinqualitatibus,
    inuentasuntpropria
    nominaad designandas
    substantias
    in hoc
    in suis proprietatibus.
    Similiter
    quod suntdiscretae
    appellatiuasuntinuentaad
    substantias
    similes
    aliisinaliquaqualitate,
    uthomosignificai
    designandas
    plurescum
    unacommuni
    scilicet
    cumrationalitate,
    et mortalitate,
    proprietate,
    quia cumhomo
    tambeneiliumquamistumsignificet,
    significai
    quandamcommunem
    proprietatem
    esse in omnibus,in qua conueniunt.
    Sunt ergoqualitates,id est proprietates
    17

    09:07:18 AM

    The commentatorinsists that substance and quality are not signified


    in the same way, as if both substance and quality are nouns. Rather
    a noun names a substance:
    a qualitynot by
    becauseit [thenoun] is imposedon it, whilesignifying
    anddetermining
    in relation
    toa substance.
    butbyrepresenting
    nomenclature,
    Forthisreasoneverynounhas twomeanings,
    onethrough
    on the
    imposition
    ofthequalityofthesubstance,
    so
    theotherthrough
    substance,
    representation
    thething
    orofothermen,bynaming
    that'man'signifies
    ofSocrates
    it,deterand mortality
    aboutit byrepresentation.37
    mining
    rationality
    The commentator was aware that his interpretationdid not please
    everybody.Some wanted nouns to name substance and qualityjoined
    together,so that "Socrates" was the name both of the substance and
    of the accidents which informedit: "which is proved not to be by
    many and various arguments".38 The refutationof their argument
    Namsi propter
    causainuentionis
    nominum.
    solassubstantias
    designandas
    praecipua
    inuenirentur
    inuentaessenttotdiuersa,cumsolumhocnomen
    nomina,superflue
    in quantum
    sed quia substantia
    restantum
    substantia
    ad hocsuficeret;
    significat,
    in ipsisrebuscornec determinai
    si proprieaccipitur,
    sunt,uel per se existunt
    rationalit
    uelnigredinem
    animationem,
    sensibilitatem,
    atem,albedinem
    poreitatem,
    necessefuitinueniri
    nominadiuersaquae hasdiuersas
    uelaliquidaliudhuiusmodi,
    in ipsisrebusdeterminarent."
    et aliashuiusmodi
    qualitates,
    37Ibid.[ = De Rijk,LM II. 1, p. 228 n.]: "Notandum
    esttamenquodnomennon
    etqualitatem
    itaututriusque
    consubstantiam
    insimul
    scilicet
    nuncupatiue,
    significat
    nominat
    iunctisitnomenuel utriusque
    tantum,
    perse nomensit,sed substantiam
    uerosignificai
    nonnuncupatiue,
    immorepresenquia ei fuitimpositum,
    qualitatem
    substantiae
    circasubstantiam;
    tandoetdeterminando
    propter
    quamtamennotandam
    unaperimpositionem
    fuitimpositum.
    Quareomnenomenduashabetsignificationes:
    uthomo
    in qualitate
    in substantia,
    alteram
    ipsiussubstantiae,
    perrepresentationem
    id estnominando
    remSocratiset ceterorum
    hominum,
    perimpositionem
    significai
    et mortalitatem
    et hocrepresentando."
    circailia rationalitatem
    determinans
    38Ibid.: "Similiter
    albumperimpositionem
    quia
    corpusidestnuncupatiue,
    significat
    etalbedodicantur
    alba", in
    qui dixit"dicaturhaecresalba", nondixit"substantia
    uerosignificat
    ut prinalbedinem
    per representationem,
    quo notaturimpositio,
    aequeplacet;uoluntenimquidamnomina
    ciplemcausam.Sed istudnonomnibus
    substantiam
    etqualitatem.
    Verbigratia,
    hoc
    nominare
    scilicet
    coniunctum
    utrumque
    et accidentium
    nomen"Socrates"dicitnomenesse substantiae
    quibusformatur
    et cetera
    substantia
    filiationem,
    albedinem,
    lineam,Sophronisci
    [/-antur-entie];
    illam
    accidentia
    Socratem
    dicuntesse partescomponentes
    {e 25r)quae informant
    etuariisnecessariis
    substantiam
    Socrates;
    quodnonessemultis
    quae dicitur
    primam
    reiSocratiscumipse
    Si enimalbedoessetparsconstitutiua
    probatur
    argumentis.
    albedoeritfundamentum,
    et ita fundamentum,
    Socratessitprimasubstantia
    quod
    uelperse uelcumaliisiunctum
    estinconueniens.
    Numquamenimaliquodaccidens,
    substantiae
    scilicetet
    Itemsi Socratesestnomenutriusque
    eritsustentamentum.
    inconstituidestea accidentia
    illudquodactualiter
    illasformas,
    accidentium,
    suscipit
    Namnequeestresperse existens
    nihilesseprobatur.
    tioneSocratis
    [K subsistens],
    Si dicatur
    nonestaccidentalis.
    Si dicaturesseresperse subsistens
    necaccidentalis.
    nonestaccidentalis,
    esse resperse subsistens
    quia homospeciesessenonpotest;
    immo
    necaliudhuiusmodi
    actualiter
    homoenimensspeciesnecalbedinem
    suscipit
    18

    09:07:18 AM

    formsan importantpart of his discussion of a noun. "For ifwhiteness


    was a constitutivepart of the thing of Socrates, since Socrates is a
    proper(or particular)substance, thuswhitenesswill be its foundation,
    . For no accident can ever be a
    which is inappropriate {inconueniens)
    foundationeitherin itselfor joined with another. Renouncing thereforethisopinion, we say that Socrates designates a substance affected
    with qualities, which 'I' and 'you' signify,but they do not represent
    there qualities.,,
    The distinctionbetween substance and quality distinguishesPriscian's approach to a pronoun fromthatof Donatus. Like most ancient
    grammarians,Donatus had taughtthat pronouns stood fora noun in
    general. Priscian on the otherhand had insistedthat a pronoun stood
    for a proper noun.39 His commentatorunderstood Priscian to teach
    that pronouns signifiedpure substance, unlike nouns which signified
    substance with quality.40It was not only 'person' that the commentatoridentifiedas 'thing'; any pronoun came under a similar category
    as it signifieda thing or a substance, devoid of any quality.41
    The commentatorwas fascinated by the implication of Priscian's
    distinctionbetween subject and quality in the definitionof a noun.
    Roscelin of Compigne took thisdistinctionforgrantedwhen discussing the threeproper nouns 'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' as three
    subjects. He definedthemvariably as thingsor substances, not signifyingqualities because thiswould denote variabilityin God. While the
    Glosuleis not concerned with theologicalissues, it does lay down very
    precise rules about the meaning of a proper noun. Glossing Priscian's
    tantum.Socratesiterumnon potestesse quia est pars substantiae
    potentialiter
    Socratis
    secundum
    hancsententiam.
    Rursussi Socrates
    et sicde
    nominat
    utrumque
    ceteris
    nominibus
    nullaesseconuincitur.
    Debentenimpropronominum
    significatio
    nominapuramsubstantiam
    Sed cumdicamin designationem
    Socratis
    significare.
    "Tu legis"etSocrates
    substantiam
    etqualitatem,
    tuutrumque
    dsignt
    designabat;
    Renunciandoergo huic sententiae
    dicimusSocratem
    quod est inconueniens.
    substantiam
    affectam;
    designare
    quamdamqualitatibus
    quamipsamsignificant
    ego
    et tu,sed nonrepresentant
    ibi qualitates;
    quod facitSocrates.Hoc autemin hac
    sententia
    attendendum
    quodSocratesipseetsiplureshabeatformas
    quamhomoet
    aliudsuperius,
    noncrescit
    tarnen
    ab illisin quantitate."
    quodlibet
    39IrneRosierandJeanStefanini,
    mdivales
    dupronom
    Thories
    etdunom
    , in:
    gnral
    De Ortu
    Grammaticae.
    Studies
    inmedieval
    andlinguistic
    inmemory
    grammar
    theory
    ofJanPinSten Ebbesenand KonradKoerner,Amsterdam, ed. G.L. Bursill-Hall,
    borg
    1990,285-303,esp. 288.
    Philadelphia
    40See n. 36 above;see tooGlosule
    on XIII, 31.
    41Glosule
    on II 29: liQuihabeatsignificare
    omnemillamremad quamproferatur.
    Habetsignificare
    eteasdemproprietates
    uoxad quamrefertur";
    cf.
    quasdeterminai
    Rosierand Stefanini,
    295.
    19

    09:07:18 AM

    comment about nouns applying to "subject bodies and things", the


    commentator suggested that Priscian could here be referringto two
    kinds of substance- corporeal and incorporeal.42One possibilitywas
    thatincorporealsubstance were things,while bodies were visible to the
    senses (alternativelybodieswere substantial things, while thingswere
    accidental). When explaining Priscian's definition,the commentator
    "
    4
    preferredto explain 'subject bodies and things" as corporeal and
    42II 22 K 14rae 26r [passagesnot in K are in smalltype]:" Nomen
    estpars
    earum
    a se inuicempartibusorationisper proprietates
    > . Distinctis
    < orationis
    sufficienter
    breuiterannotatasde singularum
    tractat,
    incipiensa
    proprietatibus
    deindeaccidenenimeiuspriusponitproprietates,
    nominehocmodo.Substantiales
    Tractat
    tractatus
    totusnominis
    in quibustractandis
    talesproprietates
    peneuersatur.
    exprima
    habent
    ftcationem
    idestsecundum
    secundum
    denomine
    autem
    inuentionem,
    quam
    signi
    primam
    uocis.
    formam
    Conetsecundum
    etsecundum
    eius
    diffinitione
    estinprima
    inuentione,
    ethymologiam
    quod
    secundum
    nominis
    autemin nomineduo cumiliotertio
    siderantur
    quaetria
    ipsius
    ethymologia
    etUOcis
    scilicet
    denomine
    I significationem
    tractatum
    totum
    ilium
    compositionem,
    dispont
    ipsae
    tamsubstantialis
    nascitur
    exquibusduobusomniseiusproprietas
    quamaccidentalis.
    illaproprietas
    substantialis
    eniminestnomini
    Secundum
    quae ineius
    significationem
    formam
    Secundum
    cumqualitate.
    substantiam
    scilicet
    diffinitione
    notatur,
    significare
    illud
    nomen
    innomine
    sine
    forma
    etcompositio
    ualet
    secundum
    tantum
    UOcis
    quod
    ponet
    compositionem,
    estalbedo.
    utabalbum
    anderiuatiuum
    idestansitprimitiuum
    abaliquo,
    uelnonsitsumptum
    sumptum
    Cumenimnomendiffiniens
    distribuit.
    subdiuisione
    hancautemdiffinitionem
    Nomen
    in comdiuiditqualitatem
    deberetdicerenomensignificai
    substantiae,
    qualitatem
    istam.Nomenaliudproprium,
    etacceditperhocad diuisionem
    munemetpropriam
    Res
    etinincorpoream.
    incorpoream
    Diuiditetiamsubstantiam
    aliudappellatiuum.
    coretomnesresaliorum
    substantiam;
    uocatsubstantias
    propter
    predite
    incorpreas
    uocatomnes
    uelcorpora
    subiacent:
    corporeis
    porauocatistauisibiliaquae sensibus
    Notaiterum
    resomnesaccidentales.
    ressubstantiales,
    ponit
    quia prosignificatone
    modo
    a tribuendo,
    Nomenenimdicitur
    distribuit
    exequendouocisaetymologiam.
    id estsignifcatiua
    nonestparsorationis
    diffinitionem,
    prosingulauerbaprosequemur
    utsignificando
    nisisignificet,
    antedebetappellari
    uox. Nullaenimuoxparsorationis
    nonquodsemper
    uocatutsupraindictione
    iuuarepossit.Etpartem
    orationis
    sensum
    cumaliisiunctaeffici
    sedquiaaptumestad hocutparsorationis
    inoratione
    consistt,
    terminado
    dicat;ab huiusdiffinitionis
    possit.Cum ergonomenpartemorationis
    id est
    excludit.
    etomnesuocesnonsignificatiuas
    Sequitur
    quodparsdistribuit
    syllabas
    uel id est uidelicet
    uel propriam
    diuersamscilicetcommunem
    tribuit;
    qualitatem
    siuererum
    tributam
    uelpropriam
    communem
    unicuique
    corporum
    qualitatem
    significationem
    Sensusest: Nomen
    siueincorporeae.
    hoc estsiue ilia subiectasintrescorporeae
    ueluthomo
    aliisperaliquamcommunem
    uelsimilem
    remsubiectam
    qualitatem
    significat
    et unitosin eiusdemconuenientia
    qualitatis,scilicet
    significat
    pluresconsimiles
    uel {K 14rb)dissimilem
    ab omnibusaliisperpropriam
    et mortalitatis
    rationalitatis
    accidentium
    , utSocratesperproprietatem
    quae nunquamerittotaeadem
    qualitatem
    ita tarnen
    scilicetab omnibusaliis dissimilem;
    illampropriam
    in alio significat
    sedperuerbumin quo
    substantiae:
    ut perse nondicatinessequalitatem
    distribuit
    in
    sedperuerbum
    substantiae:
    a uerboetpartiquae dicuntinessequalitatem
    differt
    non
    uerba
    dicunt
    inesse:
    a
    et
    uerbo
    differt
    principaliter
    quia
    quae
    particulo
    quo
    ut
    uel ita distribuit
    et illaminessesignificant
    uel passionem:
    corpussed actionem
    a uerbis
    circaearnperquoddiffert
    substantiam
    nomint
    qualitatem
    representando
    quae nihilnominant."
    20

    09:07:18 AM

    and arithmetica
    , two of the examples
    incorporeal things". Grammatica
    cited by Priscian, the commentatoridentifiedas appellative nouns of
    incorporeal things. He rephrased Priscian's definition: "a noun
    signifiesa subject thingor somethingsimilar to othersthroughsome
    common quality, as 'man' signifiesseveral similar [men] united in the
    coming togetherof one quality, namely rationalityand mortality."
    One question included in the printedversion of the Glosule, found
    in all MSS except the Cologne recension, touches directlyon universais: ' 'whethercollectivenouns, words of universais accepted in their
    universality,are appellative or proper." Its author concludes thatthey
    were appellative according to their initial invention, because when
    they were firstfound, they were found to signifyindividual things;
    thereforeindividual substances are said to be firstsubstances because
    words were firstimposed on them.43The insertedpassage elaborates
    upon an existingtheme of the Glosule, that the original purpose of a
    noun, as laid down by Priscian was to apply to individual things.
    A sharp awareness of sensible reality informsthe commentator's
    perspectiveon language. When 'man' signifiedthat human species as
    a proper name, that universal nature which it designated was understood as a one and single man. This was quite separate from 'man'
    as an appellative, its original sense:
    buttothat
    theword'man'referred
    He whofound
    nottothatunformed
    species,
    moras sensible,
    tothesenseswhich
    heconsidered
    rational,
    thing
    (res)subjacent
    in thisnature.
    talandthushe imposed
    thisname'man' on all others
    agreeing
    minded
    Ifafterwards
    a rational
    Therefore
    'man'byitsnatureis an appellative.
    common
    fromall mento one certain
    someanalogywithotherthings
    through
    conceived
    itin theintellect
    initself,
    notin thenatureofthings,
    thingconstant
    itwiththisname'man','man'oughtnotforthisreason
    alone,anddesignated
    a specialsubstance
    nor
    neither
    be calleda proper[noun],sinceit designates
    to many.44
    specialquality,rather
    [a quality]common
    43Ibid.'[Textnotin K in smalltype]:"Et sciendum
    dataest
    quod haecdiffinitio
    subiectorum
    unicuique
    quasiin collectione
    quia nonsingula(e 26v)nominaattribuunt
    uelpropriam'
    communem
    uel potestdicide singulisomnenomendistribuii
    qualitatem
    scilicetsi plurasubiectasunt
    subiectorum
    communem
    uelpropriam
    qualitatem
    unicuique
    de
    Obicitur
    si unumuniquamuisimproprie
    hocmododistribuere
    accipiatur.
    pluribus,
    de
    decollectiuis
    Item
    nominibus
    etqualitatem
    nominibus,
    significant.
    plur<aJ>ibus
    quaesubstantiate
    sunt
    sint
    anpropria.
    insuauniuersalitate
    utrum
    uocibus
    uniuersalium
    Appellatiua
    appellatiua
    acceptorum
    inuenta
    fuerunt
    adsignificanda
    indiuidua
    inuenta
    secundum
    inuentionem,
    primam
    quiaquando
    primm
    fuerunt
    eisimposita.
    substantiae
    ideosubstantalia
    indiuidua
    dicuntur
    fuerunt,
    prius
    primae
    quiauocabula
    has
    etproprium,
    soluunt
    Item
    deomnibus
    secundum
    diuersas
    sequentia
    partim
    queritur
    quod
    appcllatiuum
    obiectiones."
    44II 22 K 14rbe 26v:Et commune.
    diffinitione
    indeper
    Positanominis
    exemplicat
    dicenscommunem
    demonstrai
    nomen,uthomo
    partes
    qualitatem
    quidemcorporum
    eademreperitur.
    indiuiduis
    Notaquia
    etmortalitatem
    rationalitatem
    quaeindiuersis
    21

    09:07:18 AM

    The commentator was interestedin the way universal names were


    formedby the mind throughan analogical process.45The conclusions
    he arrived at were quite differentfromthose of Boethius in his commentarieson the Isagogeof Porphyrybecause he took Priscian's definition of a noun as his point of departure. Such a distinctionbetween
    proper and appellative nouns is incidentallyalso pivotal to the argument of a small essay on universais attributedto mag. R. in a Compigne MS which maintains that a species is a vox, as distinctfromthe
    universal thing platonically contemplated by the mind.46
    Adjectives, Priscian had noted, derive froma quality and were common to many (II 25). His commentatorunderstoodthis to mean that
    theywere appellative because theysignifya common quality or quanThey derive froma
    tity,as in a white (or black or short)grammaticus.
    do
    not come froma
    he
    because
    grammaticallythey
    explains
    quality,
    from
    white
    than vice versa.
    Whiteness
    comes
    rather
    noun.
    qualitative
    "If anyone asks what common propertywhitenessdesignates, we say
    that it signifiesan incorporeal thing in that it is brightand contrary
    to black/ ' 'White' signifiednot a substance, but a quality which could
    be increased or diminished withoutconsuming the subject, "as when
    we say Socrates is whiterthan Plato, we say thisbecause of the several
    parts which he has occupied by whiteness,or when we say Socrates is
    less white than Plato, it is to be said because of the fewer parts of
    whiteness".
    This account recalls St Anselm's rebuke that modern dialecticians
    could not consider colour to be anything other than a body, or a
    cumautem
    ut proprium
    nomenaccipitur,
    quandohomospeciemillamsignificai
    homoesseintelligatur;
    uelutunusetsingularis
    ilianaturaquamdsignt
    uniuersalis
    iudicandum
    essede
    arbitrantes
    homoappellatiuum
    affirmant,
    semper
    quidemtarnen
    nominibussecundumnturminuentionis
    ipsorumnominum;non secundum
    ionis:qui auteminuenitpriushancuocem
    modum(K 14va)significai
    quemlibet
    sed ad remsensibussubiacentem
    ad illamspecieminformem,
    homo,nonrespexit
    mortalem
    rationalem,
    sensibilem,
    sicque illi praesenticum
    quam considerauit
    hocnomenhomoimposuit.
    omnibusaliisin hac naturaconuenientibus
    Itaqueex
    est. Si autemposteaanimusrationalis
    naturahomoappellatiuum
    per quandam
    aliarumrerumductusremquandamunamex
    similitudinem
    [K quadam-dine]
    nonquancommunem
    hominibus
    omnibus
    quasiperse constantem
    [#subsistentem]
    solointellectu
    in rerum
    tum[K numquam]
    natura,itase habentem
    concepii,
    eaque
    deberediciprohochomouidetur
    nontamenpropter
    hocnomine
    homodesignauit,
    immocommunem
    necpriuatam
    substantiam
    qualitatem,
    prium,cumnecpriuatam
    designet.
    pluribus
    46Editedby JudithDijs, Two Anonymous
    Tractson Universais
    12th
    , in:
    -Century
    113-17.
    28 (1990),85-117,especially
    Vivarium,
    22

    09:07:18 AM

    universal to be a flatumvocis.Such ideas, I suggest, were inspired by


    the speculativeaspects of Priscian's thinkingabout voces
    , in particular
    as interpretedby the Glosule.Its author's definitionof a person or any
    other noun as a 'thing' flowed from his desire to distinguish the
    substance of any noun fromthe qualities with which it was informed.
    He did not deny that a common substance like 'man' was shared by
    differentindividuals, but he reserved the word 'thing' primarilyfor
    whatever was differentiatedby some accident. He argued that if
    whitenesswas a constitutivepart "of the thingof Socrates", it would
    have to be part of the foundationof Socrates, an absurdity.47
    Here I must voice disagreementwith the suggestionof Reilly and
    Fredborg that the Glosule could be the work of William of
    Champeaux.48 They suggestthat the Glosule'$ analysis of the substantive echoes William's understanding(according to Abaelard) that in
    "Socrates is white", grammaticallythere was a conjunction of the
    essence of Socrates and whiteness,even thoughthiswas different
    from
    the dialecticalsense.49The Glosuledoes not make a distinctionbetween
    47See aboven. 38.
    "
    48Huntcommented
    of a
    , 219 n. 1) thattherefollows rejection
    briefly
    (Studies
    view" in the sentenceon II 18: "Iterumquando diciturverbum
    Nominalist
    verbasic:velinherere
    istamvocem,quod
    significare
    ipsuminherere,
    perscrutentur
    nichilesset,velsignificatum
    nonpotestessepropter
    illius,quoditerum
    supradictas
    rationes."
    Therejection
    herehowever
    isofanyform
    ofinherence,
    notofnominalism.
    TheGlosule
    continues
    itsrejection
    ofanyideathatwitha verblikecurrit,
    cursio
    inheres
    initssubject,
    anopinion
    heldby"magister
    noster
    V." andalsorejected
    byAbaelard
    in Dialctica
    thatWilliammightbe its author,although
    , 123. Hunt speculated
    a passagein theHistoria
    calamitatum
    to indicate
    thatWilliamlectured
    on
    misreading
    Priscian
    Helias'Summa
    Priscianum
    I-Ill: anEdi(art.cit., 209-10).L. Reilly,Petrus
    super
    tionandStudy
    (D.Phil.Diss.,AnnArbor,Michigan1978),579-80arguedin favour
    ofHunt'ssuggestion
    onthegrounds
    thatsum"has a two-fold
    both
    nature,
    signifying
    actionandsubstance".
    Yetthepassagequotedin n. 49 indicates
    thattheGlosule
    did
    notconsider
    whiteness
    to inhereinitssubjectin thissenseofest.Another
    argument
    raisedbyReillyisthatWilliam
    isreported
    as saying
    that"humanity"
    isnotthesame,
    butissimilar
    intwomen,ed.O. Lottin,
    etMorale
    1959,192,
    , V, Gembloux
    Psychologie
    , (perhapsafterbeingbestedin debatebyAbaelard?).Fredborg
    echoingtheGlosule
    notesa connection
    betweenthedoctrine
    of Williamof Champeaux(according
    to
    Abaelard's
    ofhismaster)
    thatthereweretwosenses,dialectical
    and
    negative
    critique
    toa proposition
    andthedistinction
    between
    andpredicative
    grammatical,
    copulative
    functions
    oftheverbesse
    in: Twelfth-Century
    Grammar
    , inSpeculative
    ,
    , 178-88.
    Philosophy
    49Abaelard,
    diLogica
    , ed. MarioDal Pra,Scritti
    , Florence
    Super
    Topica
    19692,272-3:
    "Dicebantenimquodcumdicitur
    Socrates
    estalbus
    rerum
    , alia estconiunctio
    quam
    alia quamattendunt
    ... et hii [grammatici]
    dialectici.
    tantum
    grammatici,
    copulationemessentiaefundamenti
    albedinisad Socratemattendunt.
    ... Hanc utique,
    secundum
    hancsententiam,
    sensusduos,unumdialecticum
    singulaepropositiones
    estet quodammodo
    secundum
    alium
    qui largior
    inhaerentiam,
    superior
    simplicem
    estcircacopulationem
    ... Nolumus
    essentiae.
    autem
    grammaticum
    quideterminatior
    23

    09:07:18 AM

    two simultaneous senses, grammatical and dialectical, in a single


    possiblefunctions(copulative and
    proposition, only between different
    predicative) of the substantive. It insists that one cannot interpret
    '
    "Socrates is white'' as 4' thisthing[Socrates] is thatthing[whiteness]'
    4
    in the same way as 'a dog is a barking animal". While William may
    have accepted certain ideas of the Glosule, Abaelard's explicitcriticism
    of William- justifiedor not- is a more elaborate formof an argument
    already raised in the Glosule.It cannot be used to argue William was
    its author.
    A newly discovered draftof two chaptersof the De incarnatione
    verbi
    ,
    less polished than the final version, shows clearly how Anselm
    countered Roscelin' s literalism by applying principles developed in
    the De grammatico
    to plural words used of God.50 One had to ask
    whethera word signifiedperse or peraliud. In imagininghis adversary
    looked at everythingas a collection of parts, Anselm was creatinga
    straw man in order to demolish spurious arguments. The term resis
    not the central concept of Roscelin's thought. His theme is that all
    language, including that about the Trinity,had to obey grammatical
    rules and that every word is distinctfromits meaning. Roscelin may
    have borrowed the termresfromthe Glosuleon Priscian to referto the
    meaning of that voxwhich was a proper noun, in this case 'Father',
    'Son' and 'Holy Spirit'. Far fromquestioning the unity of God, he
    was only pointing out that in so far as these are proper nouns of
    human origin, they must referto separate things.
    In the MonologionAnselm had argued that there were three nscio
    quid in God that could be described as eithersubstances or persons.51
    Afterthe work had been criticizedby Lanfranc (to whom he had submitted it for censure) Anselm included in its preface that passage of
    which justified the equivalence of the Greek
    Augustine's De trinitate
    definitionwith the Latin formula, even though it was strictlydenied
    by the so-called "Athanasian Creed". What had most irked
    Roscelin's critic,John (then engaged in defendingFulco's recentand
    hotlycontestedappointmentto the see of Beau vais), was thatRoscelin
    was claiming Anselm' s support forhis argument.52The essay Est una
    aliumattendant
    aliumsensum
    dialectici,
    grammatici.
    unquamutinconstructionibus
    et dialectici
    Sed idemex eademconstructione
    et grammatici."
    intelligant
    50See myStAnselm
    I (n. 1 above).
    andRoscelin
    51Monologion
    I 85-86.
    c. 79, ed. Schmitt
    52According
    of Beauvais
    to an entryaddedto an eleventh-century
    martyrology
    at hisdeath(9 Julyofan
    tothechapter
    cathedral
    a Roscelinus
    bequeathed
    grammaticus
    textsstudiedgrammar,
    unknown
    books,mostly
    logicand rhetoric,
    year)fourteen
    24

    09:07:18 AM

    reads as a deliberate attempt to demonstrate superficial continuity


    withthe argumentof theMonologion
    , withthe addition of resto thepersona!substantiaidentification.We know that Ivo of Chartres asked
    Roscelin to write such a palinode to clear his name.53 Its
    unacknowledged authorityis Priscian, as interpretedby the Glosule.
    Roscelin followed the commentary in emphasising the radical
    discretenessof every proper noun as a separate thing.
    Anselm criticizedexcessive literalismin understandingthe Trinity.
    While Anselm thoughtthat the meaning of a word could change by
    being used per aliud., Roscelin rejected the notion that a word could
    change its meaning. His strictattitudeto individual vocesalso earned
    the ire of Abaelard, who emphasised that Priscian' s definitionof the
    threepersons as "he who talks", "he who is spoken to" and "he who
    is spoken about" related to properties and not things. Roscelin' s
    thinkingabout resas what was signifiedby vocesderived fromapplication of the Glosule's Boethian categories to Priscian. In engaging in
    withsometheology:
    "Roscelinusgrammaticus
    deditlibrossuos Sancto
    although
    Petro:Augustinum
    de doctrinaChristiana,
    PrissuperJohannem,
    Augustinum
    Rethoricam
    de inventione,
    Boetium
    sianum,
    Arismeticam,
    Macrobium,
    Dialecticam,
    de consolatone,Virgilium,Oratium,Juvenalem,Ovidiummetamorphoseon,
    Statium
    ettroparium."
    ThisRoscelinalsobequeathed
    hishousein the
    Thebados,
    cathedral
    cloisterand eightarpenni
    of vinesat Hosdenc,eightkilometres
    from
    Beauvais.LopoldDelisle,Notice
    surunmanuscrit
    del'abbaye
    deLuxeuil
    en625, in:
    copi
    Notices
    etExtraits
    dela bibliothque
    desmanuscrits
    nationale
    , XXXI.2, Paris1886,149-64,
    at 160;seetooHenriOmont,Recherches
    surla bibliothque
    del'glise
    cathdrale
    deBeauvais
    ,
    Paris1914,2-3.A Roscelinus
    ofSaint-Pierre,
    is mentioned
    in
    , cantorofthecathedral
    a charter
    of17May 1072as having
    a canonofComNevelon,
    joinedwitha certain
    a smallcompigne,in requesting
    bishopGuyofBeauvais(1063-85)to establish
    ofcanonsinthechurch
    ofSaint-Vaast,
    Beauvais,ofwhichtheyhadthecare;
    munity
    cf.PierreLouvet,Histoire
    dela villeetcitdeBeauuais
    , Rouen1613;repr.Marseille
    etantiquitez
    dupasdeBeauvaisis
    I 694, Beauvais1631-35,
    1977),III 480-2andHistoire
    5; GalliaChristiana
    IX, Paris1751,709.Theoriginal
    (Beauvais,Archives
    municipales
    GG 251) is citedand commented
    on byAnnieHenwood-Reverdot,
    SaintL'glise
    Etienne
    deBeauvais.
    Histoire
    etArchitecture
    their
    , Paris 1982,9. UrbanII confirmed
    theapparent
    ordeathofFulco.There
    privileges
    onlyinAugust1095,after
    deposition
    was alonghistory
    ofrivalry
    between
    bishopGuy,patronofthisRoscelin,and the
    ofbishopFulco,Anselm's
    Muchis explained
    aboutthepolitical
    cirfamily
    protg.
    cumstances
    behind
    thedesiretosilenceRoscelin
    ifhewasoneofthose
    ofCompigne,
    clericsofBeauvaisopposedto Fulco'ssimoniaca]
    appointment
    (cf.Anselm'sEpist.
    124).
    53Letter7 in Yvesde Chartres.
    , I ed. JeanLeclercq,Paris1949,26:
    Correspondence
    "Resttigiturut palinodiam
    scribaset recantatis
    vestemDominitui,
    opprobriis
    fuisti
    quampublicescindebas,
    publiceresarcias,
    quatenus,sicutmultisexemplum
    sicde caeterofiasexemplum
    Sic enimbonoodorepraecedente
    correctionis.
    erroris,
    etpristinum
    fetorem
    et a nobiset ab aliisdiligiet colligi,et beneficiis
    consmente,
    poteris
    ampliari."
    25

    09:07:18 AM

    argument with Roscelin on the Trinity, Abaelard drew on the


    underlying concerns of the Glosule, while being impatient with its
    excessive use of the term res.
    Roscelin's debt to the Glosuleapplies not just to his definitionof
    'person', but to his understandingof language as a whole. The commentator's explanation that 'person' was both voxand resis only one
    example of the way in which he expanded upon the tentativedialectical speculations in Priscian. He was particularlyinterestedin the
    precedentPriscian had set of tryingto re-establishthe rules of correct
    Latin, freefromcorruption,on the patternof the ancientGreek grammarians. Priscian' s comment that younger grammarians were the
    more perspicacious prompted the commentator to reflect that
    linguisticknowledge had been expanding fromits earliest days. The
    first" inventor" of words may only have establishedfourlettersin his
    life(presumablyof the name of God). The next generationcould learn
    them in one day and so findthe otherlettersof the alphabet.54Not all
    subsequent changes were necessarilygood, being done to please rather
    than forany rationalreason.55One had to imitatethe best the ancients
    could offer.Language was acquired graduallyand thus had to be subject to rules of human origin.
    The commentator wanted to understand the reasons behind the
    invention of words. The philosophical definition of a vox as the
    smallest unit of air sensible to the ear which opened Book I enabled
    him to launch into a long discussion of the nature of vox as distinct
    from res,56 4'Philosophers deal with the definitionsof things, gram54I 2 K lrh-lva
    . Arguitur
    e 2V:" Cuiusauctores
    iuniores
    perspicaciores]
    quanto
    [quanto
    Et benea iunioribus
    quia sunt
    potuerunt
    redargu,
    inquamsciliceta iunioribus.
    etdiligentia,
    etueresuntperspicatiores,
    florent
    id est
    quia etingenio
    perspicatiores,
    sic ex ingenioscientia.Ideo post
    ex floreprocedit,
    arteualent,quia sicutfructus
    studiiualet
    additdiligentia
    nisi
    , quia nihilprodestper ingenium
    florere,
    floruisse
    eos esse
    uenire.Et hoc,id estperspicatiores
    ad maturitatem
    faciatflorem
    studium
    uiderisi iuniores
    Nondebetmirum
    auctoritate.
    omnium
    grammaticae
    comprobatur
    cumprimusinuentor
    in inuentione:
    artisdicuntur
    pertotamuitam
    perspicatiores
    insolodiepoterunt
    iuniores
    inueniendis:
    litteris
    elaborasset
    forsitan
    suaminquattuor
    ad
    successorum
    Ita peradditionem
    etpostex sua partealiasreperire.
    eas addiscere,
    iuniores
    estnonarbitror
    sed postquam
    consummata
    istaarsincreuit,
    perfectionem
    esseperspicatiores."
    55k jvbe 2V:"Suntenimqui corrigunt
    prosoloplacitoet nonproaliquacausa
    rationabiliter
    prospecta."
    56K lvbe 3V:"Philosophi
    de littera
    Priscianus
    uocem
    tractaturus,
    definiunt
    [esseaerem].
    ne perignotum
    uocemut genussuumpositurus:
    litterae
    et in descriptione
    genus
    a philosophis
    datamconuenienter
    uocisdiffinitionem
    ignotamspeciemdiffiniret,
    uero
    diffinitiones
    Est autemphilosophorum
    rerum;grammaticorum
    praemittit.
    26

    09:07:18 AM

    "
    marians with formingthe etymologies of voces
    . Opinions differed
    among philosophersas to thenature of thissmall quantityof air. Some
    said that animals lived fromthis air which they breathe in and out;
    otherphysicisaid that animals got life not fromthis small quantityof
    air, but from that air which stretchesup to heaven and which by
    uocumaethimologias
    formare.
    Vel ad maioremauctoritatem
    diffinitionis
    dicit
    diffiniunt
    uocem:ut auctores
    diffinitionis
    nominati
    et
    commendabilem
    philosophi
    autenticam
    reddant
    dicentes
    uocem
    esseaerem
    tenuissimum.
    Ideo
    ipsamdiffinitionem,
    dicittenuissimum
    tenuisestrespectu
    quia aernaturaliter
    aquae et terrae;qui dumab
    animalihauritur
    collatoria
    aditus,etperillainteriora
    perarteriarum
    angustos
    usque
    ad pulmonem
    fittenuior,
    inattractione
    si quamsordem
    sibiab
    attrahitur,
    deponens
    exterioribus
    ut sicutuinumpostcolationem
    contraxerat,
    liquidiusquam priusin
    emissioneuero per easdem arteriarum
    si quid adhuc
    angustiasregrediens
    illamexuit,et tuncdemumfittenuissimus.
    retinebat
    Sed quia homo
    spissitudinis
    ueldormiens
    sinealicuiusuocisinformatione
    emittit
    additictum
    id
    cogitans
    spiritum,
    estpercussum;
    et quia possetpercuti
    essetuox,
    digitoin orepositoet nontarnen
    estnaturalibus
    instrumentis
    ad uocemformandam,
    uidelicet
    intelligendum
    lingua
    De istoaerequemitaattrahunt
    etemittunt
    palatolabiisdentibus.
    animalia,diuersa
    philosophorum
    opinioest.Aliienimdicuntanimaliauiuereexistocorrupto
    aere,qui
    nosundiquecircumscribit
    etemissionem.
    Phisicitamenalitersenperattractionem
    animalia
    exnostro
    aerequi adeospissusestuitamsuamcontinuare
    tiunt,
    quiadicunt
    (K 2ra)nonposse,sedex iliosuperiori
    qui estextraglobolunaeusquead firmamentmquinostri
    aerisconsideratione
    tenuissimus
    illumdiuinadispositione
    est,etdicunt
    uias et quosdamporosad nos descendere,
    et animaliaper
    perquasdamlatentes
    arterias
    ad pulmonem
    illumattrahere.
    In primis
    estan uoxsicdiffinita
    quaerendum
    speciessit aeris,id est significet
    aliquamremuniuersalem
    quae sit speciesin
    substantiae:
    praedicamento
    quoddicimusnonesse.Vox enimaeresin essentia
    sui,
    scilicet
    inhocquodsuntaeresnonsignificai,
    setpotiusex quadamaccidentali
    causa
    in hoc scilicetquod percussisuntnaturalibus
    instrumentis.
    Dicimusergohoc
    uocabulum
    uoxaccidentale
    a quadamqualitate,
    uel
    esse,idestsumptum
    percussione
    alianonsecundum
    Nonestergosubstantialis
    uocem,sedsecundum
    significationem.
    diffinitio
    si uoxaeremnonsignificet.
    Hancdiffinitionem
    praemissa
    aJiqui
    putantse
    hanchypoteticam
    in suaerationis
    exordioponentes:
    si uoxestaeret est
    infringere
    '
    duasregulas
    unamAugustini
    corpus.Huicprobationi
    supponunt:
    qui dicit 'nullum
    in eodemtempore
    totumin diuersislocisreperitur";
    alteram
    corpusindiuiduale
    Boetiiquaeest,"idemsermototusetinteger,
    cumomnibus
    scilicet
    suiselementis
    ad
    auresdiuersorum
    in eodemtempore,
    peruenit
    quasi in diuersislocisest." Inde
    inferunt:
    auctoritate
    uox poterit
    igituruox nonestcorpus.Salua autemutriusque
    si quodBoetiusdicitrecteintelligatur.
    Estenimuerumquoduox
    corpusremanere
    formaliter
    eademet nonmaterialiter
    in eodemtempore
    diuersorum
    repletauditum
    utputaiactolapideinaqua fitorbis.Hicueroorbisisteuicinasundasimpellens
    alium
    orbemfacit,et illealiumet sic multiorbesmateriaquidemet locodiuersi:sed in
    formaidem a primoilio orbe formantur.
    Eodem modo aer in ore loquentis
    naturalibus
    instrumentis
    formtus
    uicinosimpellit
    aeres,et in sua conficitur
    forma,
    etitafitutuoxeademsecundum
    formam
    sitinorationibus
    diuersorum.
    Sedquantum
    ad materiam
    utitadicam,aerumdiuersa.Potestigitur
    esseut nullum
    diuersorum,
    totum
    indiuersis
    locishabeatur,
    eterituoxcorpus,
    etipsa
    corpusineodemtempore
    secundum
    id estsonisimilitudinem,
    eademin eodemtempore
    in diuersis
    formam,
    auditur
    locis.Ethancsimilitudinem
    de aqua ponitBoetius
    inprologo
    quempraemittit
    in musica."
    27

    09:07:18 AM

    divine dispositiondescends into our lungs. The second interpretation


    fittedin with the bigger argumenthe soughtto present,that a voxdid
    not signifya universal substance, but was rathersomethingaccidental, so called fromits percussive quality. While some argued thatrules
    established by Augustine ("no individual body could be found in differentplaces at the same times") and Boethius ("the same word comes
    complete to the ears of differentpeople at the same time in different
    places'') that a voxcould not be a body (as distinctfroma universal
    substance), these rules had to be interpretedcorrectly.When a word
    reached differentpeople, it was a similar sound ratherthan the same
    sound which all heard.
    The commentator'sdiscussion of vocesprovides an excellentillustration of his thinkingabout parts and wholes. Voceswere all quite distinct
    fromeach other. No individual thing could be the same in different
    places. Only God, who was truly incorporeal and underwent no
    change, remained the same in all places.
    whiteness
    ofa wallwhichrestson different
    Justas thecontinuous
    things
    [i.e.
    walls]is said to be one, notbecausethatwhiteness
    adjacentto thispartis
    thesameas thatofanother
    andjudged
    individually
    partbutbecauseitis similar
    tobe calledthesamein thesamespecies,likewise
    'man'once
    whenI articulate
    and I pronounce
    thesamevox'man' at another
    time,although
    theyareessenandmaterially
    thatitisas ifI havearticulated
    voces
    one
    , I affirm
    tiallydifferent,
    vox
    We say as if informed
    , becauseof [their]similitude.
    by one becauseof
    and therefore
    one vox.bl
    similitude,
    There is a striking similarity here to the arguments Abaelard
    attributed to Roscelin about parts and wholes. The commentator
    insisted that the words of Boethius and Aristotleabout voxand oratio
    had to be rightlyconstrued:
    57Ibid.: "Nulla enimres indiuidualiter
    (e 4r) totain diuersislocisesseaffirmari
    nisisolusdeusqui uerumincorporeum
    utunaessentialiter
    remaneat,
    est,et
    potest,
    qui nullammutabilitatem
    recipere
    potest.Ad hoc respondeo
    quod sicutcontinua
    unadicitur
    albedoparietis
    nonquia iliaalbedoquae huic
    fundatur,
    quae in diuersis
    sedquia similis
    estet
    partiadiacetsitiliaindiuidualiter
    quae in alia partefundatur,
    eademspecieiudicatur
    uocarieadem;itacumprofero
    homosemeletaliauiceeandem
    et quamuisdiuersaesintessentialiter,
    etmaterialiter
    uocem,id esthomopronuncio,
    similitudinem
    affirmo.
    eandemuocemprotulisse
    uoces,tarnenpropter
    quasiunam
    aerisunaforma
    cumindiuersis
    uocisa diuersis
    audientibus
    Similiter
    partibus
    suscipi
    uideatur,tarnenilla qualitatiuaforma,quae huic parti aeris copulataest
    esse illamundealia parsaeriseffecta
    estnonpotestprobari.Nos
    indiuidualiter,
    tarnen
    similitudinem
    uocamusetpropterea
    unam
    quasiunaminformationem
    propter
    uocem."
    28

    09:07:18 AM

    of Aristotle,
    definea voxas a quantity...
    Others,armedby theauthority
    Deceivedbytheambiguity
    oforatio
    , theydo notrealisethatthewordsignifies
    one thingas a quantity,
    as a substance.58
    another
    An issue raised very brieflyby Priscian allowed the commentatorto
    bring ideas of Boethius and Aristotleto bear on the physical nature of
    the words which grammarians analysed.
    His keythemeis thatno voxsignifiesnaturally.It is a physicalobject
    on whichmeaning is bestowed by the one who formsit by strikingair.
    Priscian distinguishedarticulate sounds, in other words sounds "apt
    to be spoken to show the sense of the speaker'' fromthose "natural"
    sounds which were inarticulateand not utteredfromany intentionto
    signify. The commentator recognised that Boethius approached
    in evaluating meaning by what was generated in
    language differently,
    the mind of the listener. Priscian' s physical analysis of sound attracts
    the commentator'ssympathy.Meaning is defined by what a speaker
    wishes to say ratherthan any quality discerned in the language itself.
    Roscelin extended the Glosule*
    s insightinto language as an artefact
    to words used of God. The message of Est una, Notandumestand the
    letterto Abaelard is that the only underlyingunity is that of God.
    Roscelin's refusalto accept that the threepersons of the Trinity constituteda common 'thing' was the result of applying litterallythe
    Glosule's grammatical definitions to trinitarian doctrine. He was
    inspiredby itsperceptionof individuadwords as physicalobjects, each
    with its own dimension, each radically differentfrom the other.
    58Ibid.: "Est alia sententia dicitomnesillosaeressimul
    quae
    acceptossimulunam
    uocemetnullum
    eorumperse,sedhocparumualorishabet.Aliterquidamrespondentobiectionibus
    dicentes
    tantum
    uocemesseaeremplectro
    praemissis
    linguaeformtmetnullumalium.Affirmant
    enimeandemuocemperuenire
    eodemtempore
    ad auresplurium
    in diuersislocisexistentium,
    nonsecundum
    sui essentiam,
    sed
    secundum
    uelalicuiusdicitur
    auditum,
    esse,
    quemadmodum
    lapisinoculisplurium
    nonsecundum
    sui substantiam
    sed secundum
    tantum,
    uisum,et in hac sententia
    cumpraedictis
    iterum
    oppositiones,
    quaesequentur
    quiescunt.
    Opponitur
    praemissae
    diffinitioni,
    quae dicituocemesse aeremquod Boetiusin secundocommentario
    Periermeneias
    dicituocemesseaerispercussionem
    perlinguam,
    quod si aerispercussioqualitati
    uocemeidemsupponinecesseest.Sed si quisdiligenter
    supponitur,
    dictaBoetiiconsideret,
    inuenietuocemqualitatinon supponi.Non enimdicit
    uocemesse percussionem,
    sed aerispercussionem,
    id est aerempersimpliciter
    Alii ueroAristotelica
    auctoritate
    muniti
    cussum,et est dictumad expressionem.
    uoceminquantitate
    dicitenimAristoteles
    inquantitate
    orationem
    esse.Sed
    ponunt;
    inquopraedicamento
    estspecies,ibidemoportet
    etiamessegenusilliusspeciei.Huic
    obiectioni
    sic respondeo,
    orationis
    illam
    quia istiaequiuocatione
    deceptinesciunt
    uocemquaeestoratio,aliudsignificare
    inquantitate,
    aliudquandosubiicitur
    uociin
    substantia.
    Vocesenimeaedemsaepeetsignificant
    et
    substantiam
    quodamrespectu,
    aliorespectu,
    utcorpusistauox."
    quantitatem
    29

    09:07:18 AM

    Anselm found this teaching, that a universal substances was nothing


    but a "puff of air", reprehensible.Rarely in the historyof logic, has
    such weight been given to a single derisoryand misleading remark.
    Like the commentator, Roscelin might have considered genus and
    species as voces.The Glosuleauthor did not deny that a universal was
    a res, but insisted that the words we used of that universal were voces
    and had to be analysed as such. The accusation that "modern dialecticians' ' did not believe in the real existenceof universais is a red herring distractingus fromtheirconcern with the nature and meaning of
    voces.
    The res-vox
    distinctionRoscelin used was too crude forAnselm and
    Abaelard when applied to the Trinity. Nonetheless, Roscelin shared
    with Anselm and passed on to Abaelard, a desire to uncover the
    "causes" of language about the Trinity. Whether one spoke of person, like the Latins, or substance, like the Greeks to referto thatwhich
    was plural in God, one was dealing with human attemptsto define
    what was ultimately ineffable. While Anselm and Roscelin both
    accepted that such language was always subject to rules of signification, theydisagreed on what these rules were. Anselm was perhaps the
    more original when it came to the interpretationof Priscian.
    The Glosuleilluminates the comment of the HistoriaFrancicaabout
    Roscelin learning from the mysteriousJohn that dialectic is an ars
    vocalis, a discipline founded on voces. To call this John "an early
    nominalist" is to fall into the same trap as Aventinus- reading into
    the past a school of thought which never had such a clear-cut
    existence. While the application to dialectic and theologyof Priscian's
    reflectionon nouns was taken for granted in the mid twelfthcentury
    by people like Gilbert of Poitiers and John of Salisbury, there was
    inevitablymuch disagreement as to the implicationsof this process.
    Polarisation between masterswas an inevitableconsequence of a fluid
    intellectualenvironment.The distinctionHermann of Tournai drew
    between those who taughtdialectic in voceas against in rewas between
    "empty talkers" unlike "real philosophers". We should be wary of
    interpretingsuch groupings as distinct philosophical schools with a
    "real" existencebeforethe mid twelfthcentury.There is no evidence
    that Roscelin denied the reality of universal substances as Anselm
    claimed.
    The interrelationshipbetween study of vocesand philosophy as a
    whole is explained within the prologue to the Glosule. Priscian's
    primary intentionis teach people to speak grammatically:
    30

    09:07:18 AM

    I saygrammatically
    from
    which
    as different
    teaches
    dialectic,
    speaking
    according
    totruth
    andfalsehood
    andfromrhetoric,
    whichteachesspeaking
    to
    according
    thedecoration
    comesfirst,
    ofwordsandphrases.
    Oftheseartsgrammar
    because
    one oughttoknowhowto makeappropriate
    or
    joiningofwordsbeforetruth
    ofeloquenceis learnt."59
    or thedecoration
    falsehood
    Grammar was a part of logic, a subject which could be divided into
    what was sermocinalis
    (to do with language) and what was disertiua(to
    do with findingarguments). Through this "linguistic"' ( sermocinalis
    )
    part, grammarwas led back to logic as ifto its genus.60The threearts
    of logic, with those of ethics and physics, derived fromthe "Greek
    springs" of which Priscian spoke at the outsetof his work.61This idea
    had been expressed in similar termsin an eleventh-centurypoem on
    the seven liberal arts found in a manuscript of Saint-Evroul.62
    The tradition
    of theGlosule
    Not all previous thinkershad agreed that grammar was an integral
    part of logic.63 Alcuin and others who followed Isidore of Seville
    divided logic into the arts of analysing and findingarguments,dialectic and rhetoric.(ConfusinglyIsidore had also suggestedthatlogic was
    another name for dialectic.)64 By contrast Clement, teacher in the
    59Glosule
    dicoad dif, ed. Gibson,StudiMedievali,20 (1979),249: "Grammatice
    ferentiam
    et rethorice,
    ueritatem
    et falsitatem,
    dialectice,
    que docetloquisecundum
    ornatum
    uerborum
    etsententiarum.
    que docetloquisecundum
    Quibusartibus
    prior
    est grammatica,
    facereconuenientem
    coniunctionem
    dicquia priusscireoportet
    tionum
    uel ornatus
    addiscatur."
    quamueritasuel falsitas
    eloquentie
    60Ibid.249-50:"Nec dubitandum
    , cuiusestipsagrammatica
    quinlogice
    supponatur
    terciapars.Logicealia parsestsermocinalis,
    alia disertiua.
    Disertiuaparteshabet
    inuentionem
    etiudicium,
    et rethoricis
    conueniunt.
    Sermocinalis
    que solisdialecticis
    uerogrammaticorum
    ac perearnad logicamuelutad suumgenusgrammatica
    est;
    "
    reducitur.
    61Ibid.251: "Celebrasse
    rum
    dicoderiuatam
    aJonte
    Greco
    etorigo
    ' Grecienimfuerunt/onj
    omniumartium,quia earuminuentores
    fuerunt.Cum dicitderiuatam
    alludit
    latineenimartesquasiriuisuntgreceinuentionis.
    Et
    metafore,
    quiadixerat
    jontibus'
    etiamcelebrasse
    omne
    , per hoc uocatstudiaquia in naturisrerum
    genusstudiorum
    uehementior
    animiapplicatio
    exhibenda
    studiorum
    est;etneinomni
    inuestigandis
    genere
    et sutoriam
    artemet alia seruiliaofficiaadditgenusdico
    acciperemus
    pictoriam
    lucesapientie
    sicut
    , quia seruilesartesmentisoculos non illuminant
    prefulgens
    philosophia."
    62Printed
    in PL 151,729-32fromAlenon,Bibl.mun.10.
    63On earlymedieval
    classification
    oftheartes
    Eineverschollene
    , seeBernhard
    Bischoff,
    derWissenschaften
    in:AHDLMA,25 (1958),5-20,reprinted
    in
    , first
    Einteilung
    printed
    hisMittelalterliche
    Studien
    , I, Stuttgart
    1966,273-88.
    64Isidore,
    PL
    Etymologiae
    (ed. Lindsay)II.xxiv.7,butcf.I.ii.l; Alcuin,De dialctica,
    101,952C.
    31

    09:07:18 AM

    court of Louis the Pious and author of an Ars grammatica


    included
    a
    of
    as
    subdivision
    a
    itself
    with
    dialectic
    of
    rhetoric,
    grammar
    species
    An
    .65
    into
    De
    mundi
    constitutione
    interpolation
    pseudo-Bede's
    logica
    explained that there were two definitionsof logica, one strictthat it
    comprised dialectic and rhetoricanotherloose, thatit was a sermocinalis
    scientiaembracing dialectic, rhetoricand grammar.66
    The Glosule, like the didactic poem, adhered to the view that
    included grammar within logic.67 Roscelin of Compigne likewise
    absorbed fromthe mysteriousJohn the idea thatdialecticwas "a vocal
    ar' Abaelard reacted against Roscelin' s literalisticinterpretationof
    definitionsof Priscian. For him logic and dialectic were synonymous.
    Grammatical issues he dealt with in the firsttractof the Dialctica, the
    "book of parts". I have suggested elsewhere that his lost Grammatica
    or "reconsideration of the predicaments", to which he alludes in his
    , was a reworkingof the firsttract of the Dialctica
    TheologiaChristiana
    and that it contained new ideas about the relationship between
    substance and quality.68While Abaelard tended to presenthimselfas
    a great innovator in dialectic and to be silent about his debt to past
    masters, he was in fact developing a speculative traditionrooted in
    grammatical reflectionof the late eleventh century.
    Further manuscript discoveries may well illuminate the extent of
    Roscelin's influenceon thistraditionfurtherthan I have been able to
    do here. I have not had time to discuss the fascinatingcommentary
    on Psalms 1-25, attributedto Roscelin (with good reason I would
    argue) by Stegmller. This work, surviving in six twelfth-century
    manuscripts,suggestthatRoscelin was one of themost philosophically
    65Clementis
    arsgrammatica
    20.3
    15, ed. JoannesTolkiehn,
    Supplementband
    Philologus.
    (Leipzig1928),p. 10.
    66PL 90,908B:''Logicaestdiligens
    ratiodisserendi,
    etmagistra
    iudicii;sicdefinita
    stricteaccipitur,comprehendens
    tamenrhetoricam
    dialctica.Large vero sic
    describitur:
    in tria,in dialecticam,
    scientia,et dividitur
    Logicaest sermocinalis
    See also CharlesJones,BedaePseudepigrapha
    rhetoricam,
    , Ithaca
    grammaticam."
    notesthattheseinterpolations
    donotoccurinthesurviving
    1939,39. CharlesBurnett
    MSS ofPseudo-Bede,
    thanthe12thcentury,
    noneearlier
    De Mundicelestis
    terrestrisque
    constitutione
    Institute
    andTexts10,London1985,11.
    , Warburg
    Surveys
    67Ibid.ed. Gibson251: 14Celebrasse
    dicodoctrinam
    omnis
    eloquen
    tie,id est scientiam
    totiuslogice;ethicincludit
    doctoseteloquentes
    reddit.
    Doctriuium,
    quodhomines
    trinam
    dicoderiuatum
    afonte
    Grecienimfuerunt
    Grecorum;
    artium,
    fonsetorigoomnium
    latineenimartesquasi riuisuntgreceinuentionis.
    Et etiam
    quia dixerat
    fontibus'
    omne
    celebrasse
    studiorum
    ethicamet physicam,
    in qua
    , perhoc comprehendit
    genus
    quadriuium."
    physicacontinetur
    68Mews1987.
    32

    09:07:18 AM

    minded scripturalexegetes of his generation.69Much remains to be


    explained about his precise contributionto the study of dialectic. I
    hope however to have suggestedthat he is not a thinkerwho springs
    out of nowhere. Roscelin studied at Rheims, a citywitha proud tradition of classical scholarship since at least the time of Gerbert of
    Aurillac.70There is no betterwitness to this classical revival in the
    eleventh centurythan the Glosuleon Priscian. Its author, I suggest,
    was theJohn who taught Roscelin that dialectic was an art that dealt
    withvoces.It mightbe worthinvestigatingwhetherits author could be
    who came to Saint-Evroul in
    John of Rheims, the famousgrammaticus
    a
    monk
    there
    until
    his death in 1125 and who,
    1076/77, remaining
    to
    according Orderic Vitalis, was continuouslyengaged in the study
    of the ancients.71The Chartres MS of the Glosulecontained a list of
    twenty-eightbooks borrowed from Saint-Evroul.72 Bee was not the
    only centre of philosophic discussion in late eleventh-century
    Normandy.
    The Glosuleindirectlyexerted an enormous influence on twelfthcenturythought,not least throughits impact on William of Conches
    and Petrus Helias. It may be worthstudyingits influenceon Gilbert
    of Poitiers and the whole Chartrian tradition. Otto of Freising may
    have exaggerated Roscelin' s originalityin initiating interestin the
    sententia
    . John of Salisburyconsidered him to be someone whose
    vocum
    had
    opinions
    long since been overtakenby the achievementsof Gilbert
    and Abaelard. Nonetheless, Roscelin did play a significantrole in
    emphasizing thatboth dialectic and theologyhad to be based on clear
    understandingof the meaning of individual voces.St Anselm was not
    wrong in recognizingthe intellectualchallenge which he presented.
    Clayton, Victoria
    Monash University
    69Stegmller,
    Biblicum
    no. 7516. He is certainly
    mistaken
    however
    in
    Repertorium
    to Roscelinthecommentary
    on Psalms26-150in theTroyesMS, Bibl.
    attributing
    mun.1750(inwhichtheentire
    collection
    is attributed
    to "magister
    Bruno".Forfull
    discussion
    ofthiscommentary,
    seemyforthcoming
    StAnselm
    andRoscelin
    : Some
    study,
    NewTexts
    andTheir
    II (see n. 1 above).
    Implications
    70Epist.adAbaelardum,
    ed. Reiners
    65.JohnR. Williams
    documents
    theimportance
    oftheschoolat Rheims,perhapswithout
    sufficient
    on itsrolepriorto
    importance
    TheCathedral
    School
    intheEleventh
    29 (1954),
    Gerbert,
    , in: Speculum,
    ofRheims
    Century
    661-77.
    71OnJohnofRheimsandintellectual
    lifeat St Evroulinthisperiod,seetheeulogy
    ofOrdericVitalis,Ecclesiastical
    , ed. MarjorieChibnall6 vols.,Oxford1972History
    comments
    ofChibnallin I 11-23.
    80, III 166-70,andtheintroductory
    72TheChartres
    MS contained
    on a flyleaf
    a listofbooksborrowed
    from
    thisabbey
    toanother,
    toH. Omont,Catalogue
    desmanuscrits
    desbibliothques
    according
    gnral
    publiXI Chartres
    , Paris1890,108.
    quesdeFrance
    33

    09:07:18 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    Nominalism and GrammaticalTheory
    in theLate Eleventhand Early TwelfthCenturies
    An ExplorativeStudy
    C.H. KNEEPKENS

    Up to the present, we know of only two explicit referencesto a


    nominalist statementand one explicit referenceto a realist statement
    in late eleventh- and twelfth-century
    grammatical treatises (List of
    In
    &
    cf.
    no
    no
    12
    addition, we findthe phrases sententia
    Texts,
    13;
    25i).
    Realium!Nominaliummentioned as examples in a description of the
    ' in an
    term 4sententia
    anonymous gloss commentaryon Priscian, the
    so-called Glose 'Promisimus'(Hunt 1950; List of Texts, no 25h). However, since the glossator does not add any doctrinal material, this
    referenceonly indicates the currentinterestin theiropposition. This
    does not imply that we do not find any further mention of
    vocalist/nominalistor realist positions in grammatical works. When
    the grammarians explained their interpretationof Priscian's description of the meaning functionof the noun {Inst. gram.II, 18) or commented on Priscian's answer to the question "quid estanimalrationale
    mortale?"{op.cit. XVII, 35), theysometimesrevealed theirontological
    commitments.Nearly all of them appear to have adhered to a nonnominalist position, whereas typicallyvocalist or nominalistviews as
    portrayedin other sources are seldom referredto. From this we may
    conclude that even in the dominating realist atmosphere of the late
    eleventh and early twelfthcenturiesgrammarwas not liable to realist
    or nominalist positions. However, this did not prevent some grammarians, while discussing particular semantic aspects, to show their
    preferencesfor one position or the other'.1
    1 Sometimes
    onewhichis suitable
    forthe
    weevenfinda doublesetofobservations:
    Priscian
    fortheNominalists,
    in an anonymous
    comRealistand another
    e.g.
    gloss
    "
    "
    mentary LicetMultiin Arte (MS Oxford,Bodl.Lib., canon,misc. 281; cf.
    35. Priscian
    1976,13-5& 19871,47-53)adPriscian,
    saysthatwhen
    Kneepkens
    " is XVII,the
    rationale
    mortale
    intends
    to be
    thequestion" quidestanimal
    asked, questioner
    homo
    statesthatitis "common
    aboutthespecies,namely
    informed
    , ofwhichPriscian
    in thefollowing
    comments
    to all people".The glossator
    way:(f. 16v)"thatspecies
    is theLatinverb)all people;or,the
    toall people,thatis: itfits(convenit
    is common
    itcan alsobe explained
    in another
    continues,
    way:thatspecieswhichis a
    glossator
    34

    09:07:25 AM

    So a directlink between a particulargrammarian and 12th-century


    logical nominalismor non-realism(Jolivet1981; cf. Courtenay 1991a,
    14) cannot be shown on doctrinalgrounds.2Nor can it be proven that
    the grammaticalthoughtof the Priscian traditionwas particularlypromotingnominalism. Yet it has been claimed that grammaticalthought
    paved the way fornominalism,especially forwhat is called theological
    nominalism3 which recently has been claimed even to have been
    "primary" with regard to "logical nominalism'' (Courtenay 1991a,
    13, 28; cf. Normore 1987).
    Theological nominalism is immediatelyconnected with the discussions of the identityof God's knowledge and the identityof the belief
    of the People of God.4 There are different
    ways in which an object of
    God's knowledge or an article of faithwas formulateddepending on
    where on the time-scale God's knowledge is referredto, or when an
    article was believed. Some theologians tried to explain these differencesby claiming only one enuntiabile
    which was behind the several
    formulationsof the same object of knowledgeor articleof faithdiffering only withrespectto the tense of the infinitiveverb. In theirview,
    this enuntiabilewas realized in enuntiabiliain several tenses which
    . To use two
    appear as inflectedforms of "the original enuntiabile"
    famous examples: Abraham believed that Christ would be born, we
    believe that Christ has been born: Abraham's and our belief is the
    same belief, although the way in which it is expressed has changed
    because of the movement of time, which is expressed by a change of
    tense. In the same way is illustrated the tension between God's
    is common
    toall people,thatis: itfitsall peopleby
    specialword{speciale
    vocabulum),
    a nominalist
    Themovetowards
    madebythis
    appellation
    position
    {perappellationern)".
    in thisalternative
    becomesclearwhenwe compareit withthe
    glossator
    exposition
    madeinthecommentary
    remark
    onPriscian'
    whichbelongs
    s De constructionibus
    tothe
    Glosulae
    tradition
    1978,114-6).Herethenoun
    (MS Orlans,B.m.90; cf.Kneepkens
    homo
    is saidtobe thecommon
    nameofall men,whereas
    thespeciesis "in all men"
    (p. 373a).
    2 ExceptforthecaseofRalphofBeauvais(cf.Listoftexts,no. 25i).Unfortunately,
    thetwoworks
    havecomedowntous,areofa rather
    level
    byRalphwhich
    elementary
    oftheNominales
    and do nothavemuchinformation
    aboutthedoctrine
    (cf.Listof
    texts,no. 13).
    3 Fortheso-called
    seeChenu1935-36,
    Chenu1957,90nominalism",
    "theological
    107, Landgraf1943,Nuchelmans
    1973, 177-89,Normore1987and Courtenay
    1991a.
    4 For an in depthdiscussion
    of the far-reaching
    of "theological"
    consequences
    nominalism
    fortheothertheological
    of language,see
    aspectsand thephilosophy
    1991a,20 and Normore
    1987,206-10.
    Courtenay
    35

    09:07:25 AM

    knowledgethatthe world would be created, whichwas trueknowledge


    beforethe creation of the world, and the statusof thisknowledge after
    the creation of the world.
    On the face of it, this solution must have sounded odd to mediaeval
    ears, and some of these theologiansdefendedtheirtheoryby referring
    to the adjective albus, which though having a masculine formalbus, a
    feminine form alba and a neutral form album, remains one and the
    same adjective albus.5 Later on, by authors of the middle of the thirteenth century, this phenomenon was called the unity of the noun
    ), and the theologianswho supportedthis in this debate
    (unitasnominis
    nominales.
    called
    were
    The notion of the unityof the noun is clearlygrammaticallybased.
    '
    '
    Chenu (1935-36/1957) saw the rootsof this 'theological' nominalism
    hidden in early twelfth-century
    grammatical thought,especially in a
    the
    denominatives
    on
    which, according to John of Salisbury
    theory
    {Metal. Ill, 2), was maintained by Bernard of Chartres. This famous
    scolaeof Chartres (/Z. 1120; Southern 1970, 61-85) maintained
    magister
    that the denominatives principally signifiedthe same as the words
    which theywere derived fromand only differedin consignification.So
    the principal significationof albedo, albumand albetis the same, but
    their consignificationsdiffer.Chenu's surmise is clear. In Bernard's
    grammatical theorywe also find the principal meaning preserved on
    the one hand, and the differencesbetween the several parts of speech
    which were only caused by the differencesin consignificationon the
    other. And ifnot this theory,what other grammaticaltheorycould be
    the cradle of the notion of the unity of the noun?
    Recently, the introductionof Bernard of Chartres and his semantic
    theoryinto the doctrine of the unity of the noun has been criticized
    (Courtenay 1991a, 22). It has been argued that in the writingsof
    Aristotle,Augustine and Anselm of Canterbury the importantingredients were already present, viz. consignification,the oneness of the
    noun and verb based on an underlyingmeaning and the secondary
    status of tense. Furthermore,Bernard's theorywas said not to be a
    theoryof the unity of the noun, but a Platonizing interpretationof
    Aristotle's section on the denominatives. This criticismis, to a great
    extent, correct. There is no compelling reason to accept Bernard's
    teaching as the root of theological nominalism. On the other hand,
    5 Forthesimilar
    inthedoctrine
    ofthe
    ofthisgrammatical
    phenomenon
    application
    see Valente1990,73.
    Trinity,
    36

    09:07:25 AM

    saying that the theorymentioned by John was only Bernard's interpretationof a small section of Aristotle'sCategories, does not do full
    justice to the Old Master of Chartres. Furthermore, it has been
    argued that in the discussions of the universais the transition of
    vocalism to nominalism was only possible, after a process of delingualizationof the noun, which was closely connected to the notion
    of the unity of noun, had come about (Courtenay 1991a, 25).
    At present,one of the firsttasks will be to investigatewhetherthere
    existed some sort of theoryof the unity of the noun in late eleventhand early twelfth-century
    grammar, and if so, what was its impact on
    the linguistic status of the noun. As has been rightly observed
    (Courtenay 1991a, 22), the ingredientsmay have been present, but
    they needed to be brought togetherin order to obtain an operative
    theoryor notion. In a firstinvestigationI foundtwo domains in which
    such a unity of the noun could have been developed.
    2. The theory
    of theunityof thenoun
    2. 1 The doctrine
    of denomination
    The firstdomain in which one can look forthe origin of the notion
    of the unityof the noun is the doctrineof the denominativeswhich we
    have already met in the discussion of Bernard's theory.Here we must
    bear in mind that therewere two doctrinesof denomination operative
    in thisperiod. One belongs to logic and has its roots in Aristotle'sfirst
    chapter on the categories. According to the glossing master of one of
    the Priscian commentariesin the NotaeDunelmenses
    (Hunt 1943, 196" causae rerum'
    the
    Aristotelian
    concentrated
    on
    the
    8),
    approach
    Accordingto the glossing master, the otherdoctrineof denomination
    is to be found in Priscian and has a purely grammatical character
    are
    verborum
    focusingon word derivation: the originesand formationes
    said to be its subject. The grammariansof the period under discussion
    were acquainted with both theories,6but Aristotle's conception of
    6 Cf. NotaeDunelm
    . , f. 77ra: "Notandumetiamaliteraccipidenominatiuum
    ab
    Aristotile
    et alitera Prisciano.
    ab albedine
    Aristotiles
    enimdicitalbumdenominan
    ad causasrerum,
    Priscianus
    ueroalbedinem
    ab albo respiciens
    respiciens
    quasiad
    et informaciones
    uocabulorum."
    origines
    Fora similar
    seetheso-called
    Tractatus
    opinion
    (Vat.lat. 1486;cf.Fredborg
    1977),
    f.29ra: "Nota Priscianumacciperedenominatiuum
    contrariomodo quam
    Aristotilem.
    uocisrespicit
    Quodindeprocedit
    quodquia istead formationem
    que fit
    mutatione
    ueladditione
    littere
    uelliterarum,
    utiusticia
    fita iustus,
    iusti
    , additaeia,ille
    ueroad sensummaximerespiciens,
    quod requirit
    priusesse remin aliquoquam
    tarnen
    nomenrecipiat,
    iustus
    et similiauocauitdenominatiua.
    37

    09:07:25 AM

    denomination was by far the most influentialforthe developmentof


    grammatical thought(Jolivet 1974 & 1975).
    Another aspect, which we have to bear in mind, is that in the
    Aristoteliandiscussion only nominal derivationis considered. Aristoand fortis.The
    tle considers relationshipssuch as thatbetweenfortitudo
    same tendency we find in Boethius' commentaryon the Categories.
    and the
    Here Boethius identifiesthe protagonistsas the nomen
    principale
    nomentransfiguratum
    (which only differsfrom the nomenprincipaleby
    means of a casus). According to Boethius, who introducesthe Platonic
    notion of participation into the doctrine of denomination (Jolivet
    1975, 225), three conditions must be met before one can speak of
    denomination: the formal participation on the level of the res
    {albedo!albus), the material participationon the level of the noun, and
    finally transfiguration,for there must be an "external" difference
    between both nouns.
    In the grammatical commentariesof the late eleventh centurythe
    Aristotelian-Boethiantraditionof denominationwas enlarged withthe
    doctrine of a semantic affinitybetween verb and adjective. A central
    notion of the verb-adjectiverelationshipis the resverbi
    , about which
    the Mediaevals found material in Priscian. Basically, every verb
    signifiesits resverbiin a special, viz. verbal, manner as inhering.What
    exactly the resverbiwas and what its ontological status was, was not
    made clear, but there was a common agreement based on Priscian
    (XVIII, 43) thatyou could findthe resverbiby looking at the meaning
    of the respectiveinfinitives,since the infinitivewas considered to be
    the name of the resverbi
    , which generallycould also be representedby
    cursus
    a verbal noun: legeremeans lectio
    , alberealbedoand so on.
    } currere
    of the cognate
    the
    function
    to
    be
    This was also considered
    denominative adjective albus and the participle currens.It turned out
    that legitsignifiedlectioas inhering, legensdid the same, whereas a
    also signifiedlectioin an inheringposi(substantive) noun such as lector
    tion. The resultwas that the grammariansbuilt up a sortof Platonizing semantic web based on Boethius' interpretationof Aristotle'sdoctrine of denomination, enlarged with Priscian's doctrine of the res
    verbi
    , which could be reduced to the principal significationof the nomen
    principale.
    It appears from the texts that the outlines of this approach were
    commonly accepted in the early twelfthcentury(Jolivet1975, 232-3).
    We meet it forinstance in Abaelard's writings(Jolivet 1975, 233-4).
    There was less consensus, however, about the ways in which the parts
    38

    09:07:25 AM

    of speech agreed and differed.Bernard of Chartres accepted an agreewhich he regarded


    ment on the level of the principalissignificatio
    to the level of
    res
    and
    the
    differences
    the
    to
    verbi,
    assigned
    equivalent
    the consignificatio
    .7 We find this view also mentioned in the Notae
    Dunelmenses
    (f. 93ra-b) and the Tractatus.In these texts, however, we
    8 or
    alio modo
    do not find the term "consignificare"
    , but only significare
    the observationthatthe differencesmust be looked fornot in the prin, since verbs signifywith tenses and
    cipal meaning, but in the accidentia
    Other grammarians
    moods and nouns do so withoutthese accidentia.9
    the criterionfor the
    considered for instance the principalissignificatio
    categorizationof the parts of speech, or made a distinctionin theprinsubstantialis
    between significatio
    , which in the case of a
    cipalissignificatio
    accidentalis
    verb indicated the verbal signification,and the significatio
    ,
    which stood forthe resverbi.10
    We have to admit, the doctrine of the significativeidentityof the
    denominativestaken in a wider sense was too non-specificto be the
    directsource of the notion of the unityof the noun and we do not find
    it mentionedin this context. On the otherhand, those theorieswhich
    claimed a differencebetween noun and verb which was only based on
    the accidentia
    as the glossatorof
    and spoke of the significationis
    identitas
    7 Incidentally,
    we mustbearin mindthatconsignificatio
    is thetermwhichwasused
    wholivedaboutforty
    byJohnofSalisbury,
    yearslaterthanBernard
    (cf.J. Pinborg,
    DieEntwicklung
    derSprachtheorie
    imMittelalter
    , 1967,32 & 34).
    8 NoteDunelm.
    f.93rb:"Et beneconcedunt
    albedo
    et album
    idemsignifiquodalbet,
    modis."
    cant,seddiuersis
    9 Tractatus
    nullam
    (Vat. lat. 1486),f.43vb:"Nota in hac principali
    significatione
    essedifferentiam
    interquedamnominaet uerba,ut interalbumet albet
    , et sedens
    nomenet sedet.
    Et ut plusdicamintersignificationem
    et uerborum
    supradictorum
    nullasecundum
    hancsignificationem
    Namquemadmodum
    uerinuenitur
    differentia.
    bumactum[actiuum
    quod [hocMS]
    [passiuum
    MS] uel passionem
    MS] secundum
    insuntsignificant,
    sicutet supradicta
    resquas primonotantnonsimpliciter,
    sed
    Sed licetin hoc nullasit differentia,
    tarnenin
    inherent,
    inquantum
    significant.
    accidentibus
    in temporibus
    et modis.Verbaenimcummodiset
    magnaest,scilicet
    actumuel passionem
    inesse,nominauerosineillissignificant."
    temporibus
    10Notae
    Dunelm.
    itaqueillamprimam
    (DurhamMS), f.35ra:"Secundum
    generlem
    etprinciplem
    ac substantialem
    uerbisignificationem
    hicagitde uerbo.
    Obicitur
    autemadiectiua
    lector
    nominainhocnondifferre
    a uerbo,utab albusalbet,
    a legit.
    Concedimus
    quodhocet uolumus.Cum enimomneuerbumex naturasua
    sitadiectiuum,
    nondebetdifferre
    immoconuenire
    cumadiectiuis
    siue
    quibuslibet
    nominibus
    siuealiisin modosignificando
    Non estinconueniens
    bis
    [inconueniens
    cumquibus[analiisMS] nominibus
    in significatone
    sua
    MS] si uerbumconuenit
    dumtarnen
    aliomodoconueniat
    aliouerboetalionomini,
    uerboscilicet
    principali,
    utsignificatio
    nominiuerout accidentalis,
    cumlicetin hoc
    substantialis,
    presertim
    in multistamenaliisdiffrant."
    quoquomodoconueniant,
    39

    09:07:25 AM

    the oldest version of the Glosulae already had done,11 must


    undoubtedlyhave contributedto an atmospherewhich stimulatedthe
    developmentof such a notion based, forthe most part, on a combination of the absolute predominance of principal significationover
    secondary significationand common origin.
    words
    2. 2 The domainof inflected
    The otherdomain in which a unityof the noun could be spoken of,
    is farmore restricted.It can be recognisedforinstancein observations
    such as those by Godfreyof Poitiers and Saint Bonaventure about the
    words albus!-bal-bumwhich being three voces
    , are neverthelessone
    noun, or which being three nouns, are nevertheless not different
    nouns (Chenu 1935-36; Courtenay 1991a, 16-7). It is obvious thatthis
    is the direct domain of the inflectedformsand that the unity of the
    declinables is at stake, as was also recognisedby the Mediaevals themselves.
    Here too, the approaches of grammar and logic turn out to be
    diametricallyopposed. In Aristotle'sDe interpretatione
    (c. 2, 16bl; c. 3,
    16bl 7-8) and in Boethius' commentarieson thiswork,the Mediaevals
    found the view that the casus of a noun and the casus of a verb were
    not a noun and a verb respectively.This view opposed the position
    maintained by the grammarians, who believed that case, mood and
    tense were accidentia
    , and did not affectthe categorical status of the
    declinata.On thelevel of semanticsit was the grammarians' view which
    was not only generallyadhered to by the grammarians,but also by the
    logicians. Abaelard's position is evident in this respect {Dial 125, 23): the casus rectusand the oblique cases are of the same signification,
    and the
    althoughtheirconstructionalbehaviour is absolutelydifferent,
    same holds true for the adjectives albus, alba and album: the same
    meaning, but of a differentgender.12The author of the Introductiones
    MontanaeMaiores,13who was doctrinallycognate withAlberic of Paris,
    11Glosulae
    nullam
    significations
    (MS Kln,201), f.28ra:"Nota in hac principali
    essedifferentiam
    internominaquedamet uerba,utinteralbum
    etalbet... Sed licet
    in accidentibus
    tarnen
    in temporibus
    nullasitin hocdifferentia,
    magnaest,scilicet
    hancsignifications
    uolentes
    deuitare
    identitatem
    et modis.... Quidamtarnen
    12A similarviewis heldin theTractatus
    (Vat.lat.1486, f.48va).The verbalforms
    in themodeofsignifying,
    sincethe
    thesamelectio
    andlegisignify
    , butdiffer
    legebam
    it as beingimperfect,
    thelatteras perfect.
    former
    signifies
    13Preserved
    cf.E.P. Bos,La thorie
    dela
    in MS Paris,BN, lat. 15141,47r-104rb;
    ' ' danslesIntroductiones
    in:
    dela "uoxsignificatiua
    adplacitum
    Montanae
    Maiores,
    signification
    73-90.
    Gilbert,
    40

    09:07:25 AM

    said (f. 49r) thatthereare two definitionsof the noun: A strictdefinition which removes oblique cases, infinitenouns etc. from being a
    noun, viz. the Aristoteliandefinition,and a large definitionwhich
    includes all the nouns, oblique nouns, adverbs etc., at least iftheyare
    "of a certainsignification7
    ' 14So essecertaesignificationis
    was a criterion
    for being classifiedas a noun.
    An interestingpoint of the Montanist's discussion of the noun is
    that he is strugglingwith a problem which put anachronisticlyshows
    some resemblance to the distinctionbetween the lexeme and wordforms(cf. Lyons 1981, 101). It is asked whetherthe oblique cases of
    the proper noun Socrates'are separate nouns. The author admits that
    the noun Socratis
    is the proper noun of the man
    , Socratiand Socratem
    but
    he
    refuses
    to
    call
    Socrates
    forthat reason binomial. This
    Socrates,
    noun Socratis
    the
    he
    ,
    continues, is not thisnoun Socratem
    ,
    genitivecase,
    the accusative case, (that is: the word-formsare not the same) nor is
    it another noun (that is: it does not belong to another lexeme), but it
    "
    is the same noun: " idemcumilio nomen
    (that is: both are word-forms
    of the same lexeme):15albus!alba!albumare formsof the same lexeme,
    which in modern notation would be writtenas 'albus'.
    In my view, the Alberican approach is not only a fine example of
    the way in which the notion of the unityof the noun was operative in
    order to cope with the linguisticproblem of the relationshipbetween
    14MS Paris,BN lat.15141.f49ra:"Ad quoddicimus
    quodduesuntnominis
    [modi
    et uerbi,una laxa secundum
    quemadmodum
    exp.MSC]diflnitiones
    quam omnia
    aduerbia
    certesignificationis
    etobliquinominum
    etnominainfinita
    nominasunt,hec
    scilicetuox significatiua
    ad placitumsine tempore
    cuius nullaparsseparataest
    omnibus
    Estalia difinitio
    istispotestassignari.
    nominis
    significatiua,
    que diffinitio
    strictior
    secundum
    etobliquietnominainfinita
    a nomine
    remouenquametaduerbia
    tur. Vnde Aristotiles
    ait: "Catonis et Catoni non sunt nomina,sed casus
    nominum...."
    15 MS Paris,BN lat. 15141,f.49ra:"Rursus
    "Socratesestnomen;ergo
    opponitur:
    est proprium
    uel appellatiuum.
    Et cumnonsitappellatiuum,
    undeestproprium
    cumnonsitalterius.
    Et si estSocrates
    nomenSocratis,
    Socrates
    habethoc
    Socratis,
    nomenSocratiset eademrationeSocrate<m>,
    Socrate.Et ita uocaturhocnomine
    concedere.
    Nos nonconSocratis,
    Socrati,Socratem,
    Socrate,quodestabsurdum
    cedimusquod uoceturaliquis [f.49rb]Socratisuel uocationemfierinisi per
    nominatiuum
    etuocatiuum,
    uthicuocetur
    Socrates
    uelo Socrata.Adquod
    [Socrates]
    dicimusesse concedendum
    quod hoc nomenSocratisSocrati,-temest proprium
    nomenSocratis.Et Socrates[-tisMS] habethocnomenSocratiset Socratem.
    Non
    tarnen
    habetpluranomina,
    Et hocnomenSocratis
    nonest
    quia iamessetbinomius.
    hoc nomenSocratem
    nec aliudnomen,sed idemcumilio nomine.Sed quamuis
    habeatSocrateshoc nomenSocratem,
    non potestuocariistonomine,sed potest
    nomineistoet uocarinominequodestidemcumisto."
    appellari
    41

    09:07:25 AM

    several forms of one word (the lexeme/word-formaspect), it also


    paved the way forthe acceptance of a lexeme status of a noun which
    is not equivalent to the status of being a mental noun.
    Another interestingsource fora theoryof a noun at the level of the
    lexeme in connection with the unity of the noun does not date back
    to early decades of the twelfthcentury, but to the 1160s, viz. the
    Summa"Brevesit" by Robert of Paris (ed. Kneepkens 1987II). But it,
    in turn, has an earlier predecessor.
    Near the end of the firstbook (97-103) Robert of Paris quite comprehensivelydiscusses the semantic and taxonomie relationshipof the
    nominato theirdiminutiva
    , e.g. Antoniusand its diminutiveAntoniaster.
    One of the problemswhich these nouns give rise to is whethertheyare
    two different' 'nouns' ' or one "noun". To illustratethe problem in
    more depth, Robert appends the question whetherthe Latin formand
    and Hubert,are one name or
    the French formof a name, e.g. Robertus
    whetherthe person who can be called by both names is binomial. His
    conclusion is that they are the same noun. He supports this view by
    These
    pointingto the Latin noun homoand the Greek noun anthroopos.
    nouns are the same noun, not, however, the same Greek noun or the
    same Latin noun, but just as eo and is are the same verb, but not the
    same monosyllabic or disyllabic verb. This identityof the noun is
    based by Robert on the identityof theirdefinition.For the Greek definitionof man and the Latin definitionof man are the same definition,
    because according to Boethius the definitionsare the same for all
    people. Thus the words which are definedby means of the same definition must be the same word.
    "
    What is meant by " idemnomen in this context?At firstglance, it
    seems that we are at the crossroads of two traditions of mental
    language. One has its rootsin Augustine's observationson the interior
    word.16This interiorword is not the word thatcan be pronounced nor
    the mental counterpartof an utterable word conceived of in a vocal
    sequence in the mind. It is that word of the rational animated being,
    which precedes all the signs by means of which it can be expressed,
    and findsits origin in the knowledge which remains in a man's mind.
    It cannot be pronounced nor conceived of in any vocal sequence,
    which is a condition necessary for its being a word of any human
    16Cf.G. Nuchelmans,
    entaal,
    HetMentaals,
    detaalvanhetdenken
    , in: id., Wijsbegeerte
    '
    desMitcordisZurSprachphilosophie
    Meppel1976,153-72and H. Arens, Verbum
    7 (1980),13-27.
    telalters
    , in: Historiographia
    Linguistica,
    42

    09:07:25 AM

    language, as Augustine argues {Trin. XV, xi, 20). So it is the word


    whichdoes not belong to any spoken language (e.g. Trin.XV, x, 19).
    We find these three ways of "speaking" repeated in Anselm's
    Monologion
    (c. 10). Anselm argues thatwe can use our tongue and say
    for instance "man", and we can tacitlyconceive of the same name
    'man'. Thus farAnselm is in absolute conformity
    withAugustine. But
    Augustine's third way of speaking, the real interior word, is subdivided into two kinds by Anselm. One happens by means of a picture, the other by means of reason. The latter takes place when one
    considers for instance man's universal nature: " animal rationalemortale1' . The words of the thirdway of speech as Anselm emphasizes in
    Aristotelian-Boethianwords, are naturaliaand the same forall nations
    (.Monol. c. 10).
    The other traditionstems from Boethius' commentaryon Aristotle's Perihermeneias.
    Boethius, working in the tradition of the Greek
    Aristotlecommentators,distinguishesbetween a writtensentence, a
    vocal sentenceand a sentenceon the level of the intellectus
    or concepts
    We
    find
    this
    triad
    mentioned
    (Nuchelmans 1976, 157).
    by Robert in
    his section on the diminutives,where he explicitlyrefersto Boethius'
    threekinds ofwords withthe terms:nomen
    and
    , nomen
    scriptum
    prolatum
    nomenintellectum
    (ed. Kneepkens 1987II, 101, 21-2).
    It is undoubtedly tempting to accept that the notion of the
    '

    "unspoken word" underlies Robert's statement that homo and


    4
    ' are the same
    noun, but such an interpretationdoes not
    anthroopos
    to
    be
    correct.
    Anselm'
    s interpretationof Augustine shows that
    appear
    the Mediaevals of the late eleventh centuryrecognised two formsof
    mentallanguage in Augustine's words. One is based on psychological
    imagination,and the otheris based on reason. The latterindisputably
    . Robert joins both
    approaches the Aristotelian-Boethian"intellectus"
    traditions by attributingto the definitiothe role of the Boethian
    intellectus.
    He is able to do so because Anselm had already explained
    the universal essence of man with the help of the definitionof man.
    Furthermore,Anselm himselfhad already made a directlink between
    these two traditions.The problem is, however, that the AugustinianAnselmian "interior word", and Boethius' intellectus
    or definitionare
    exactlythat which this "idem nomen" should be the noun of. Moreover, in my opinion it is not correctto postulate "a thirdnomen": the
    nouns homoand anthroopos
    are said to be the same noun, but otherwise
    as in the case of the definitions,Robert does not say that these nouns
    "- a
    are the same noun " apud omnes
    condition necessary for being a
    43

    09:07:25 AM

    mentadnoun- but they are said to be the name of somethingwhich


    is the same for all people, and thereforethey are the same noun.
    We find an earlier version of Robert's discussion in Abaelard' s
    bus1
    in his Logica 'Ingredienti
    commentaryon Aristotle'sDe interpretatione
    But
    Abaelard
    still
    of
    voces
    and
    not
    of
    speaks
    (ed. Geyer, 323, 17).
    nomina(Jolivet1981, 176; Courtenay 1991a, 25). CriticizingAristotle
    in this respect,Abaelard argues that it happens that the voces(Jolivet
    1981, 184) of various languages are the same according to the same
    way of signifyingthe same thing. For, Abaelard continues, anthroopos
    "
    signifiesthe same thingin the same way as homo, viz. thatit is animal
    '
    '
    rationalemortale. In modern terminologyAbaelard and Robert would
    have said: The Greek lexeme 'anthroopos' and the Latin lexeme
    'homo' are the same lexeme, that is theyhave the same meaning and
    significativefunctionin their respectivelanguages.
    Concluding this part of my article, I would argue that in the
    linguisticthoughtof the firsthalf of the twelfthcenturythe unity of
    the noun (or verb) or rather the identitywas an operative notion.
    When we compare the approaches of the generation of Bernard of
    Chartres and the Alberic/Robertperiod, we see that in addition to the
    interestin the identityof meaning on the level of denominativeaffinity
    (denomination taken here in a wider sense) the grammariansand logicians of the later period paid increasing attentionto the identityof
    words which differedonly by inflection,and to the related semantic
    problems.
    Furthermore,the followingthreeaspects undoubtedlycorroborated
    the position of the noun as an appropriate successor of the transient
    flatusvocisin the theoryof the logicians who adhered to a vocalist position (Courtenay 1991a, 25): first(1) the tendencyto detach the noun
    from its spoken language forms,giving rise to the development of a
    mediaeval counterpart to the modern lexeme, second (2) the claim
    that the diversityof the languages was no impedimentto the identity
    of correspondinglexemes, and third(3) the yet remaining languagebound character of the noun. This happened not only on the level of
    predication theories, but also in semantics as the substitution of
    Abaelard' s voxwith Robert's nomenshows.
    Anotherpoint which deserves our attentionin thiscontextis thatin
    their commentaries on Priscian grammarians comprehensivelydealt
    with the verbal infinitive.They discussed the phenomenon of the res
    verbi
    , and considered the constructionaland semantic aspects of the
    infinitive.Furthermore,we find extensive discussions of the several
    44

    09:07:25 AM

    tenses of the verb and of the distinctionbetween time and tense. But
    it is surprisingthat the grammarians did not mention the problem
    which will occupy the nominalisttheologian: the semantic differences
    betweenthe different
    tensesof the infinitives.This is the more striking
    since Abaelard had already manifestlydealt with the problem of the
    dictumpropositionis
    . In his discussion of Abaelard's view on the
    status
    of the denotatum of the dictumpropositionis
    ,
    ontological
    Nuchelmans (1973, 156) has referredto Abaelard's inclinationto considerthe whole dictumas a sortof name or noun ("quasi nomen
    ") of that
    which is expressedby the propositionitself.We findseveral analogies
    between Abaelard's conception of this "quasi-nomen" and the "real
    noun". Abaelard speaks of its "impositio"; the vocal sequence
    " in the
    " Socrates
    " '
    currit
    curriestverum"functions
    proposition Socrates
    as subject and is not a proposition itself,but it is the noun of that
    "
    which is given the attribute"true": " nomeneius cui uerumattribuitur
    (Dial. 150,20). It must be noted thatAbaelard, who in his theological
    works dealt with theological and epistemological problems caused by
    enuntiabiliawhich differ only in tense (ed. Mews, TS, 61 sqq.;
    Courtenay 1991a, 23-4), in his Dialecta did not even touch upon the
    differencebetween ilSocratem
    currere"and " Socratemcucurrisse"
    . Even
    the grammarians of the second part of the twelfthcentury, who
    devoted separate quaestiones
    to the several aspects of the substantivated
    infinitive and entered upon the constructional status of object
    language sentences within a metalinguistic context avoided
    elaborating on this topic. Petrus Hispanus, the author of the Absoluta
    cuiuslibet
    defended a nominalisticview on the de dictoand de re interpretation(ed. Kneepkens 1987, IV, 71; cf. List of texts,no 50c), but
    one looks in vain in his workforthe problem of the infinitivesor rather
    dictawith a view to theirdifferenttenses. The only conclusion I dare
    to draw at thispoint is thatthiswas material which was not dealt with
    in grammar, but remained reserved for the theologians. The grammarians were only interestedin congruencyand constructionanalysis.
    " and
    In this respect the propositions " Christumnatumesse est verum
    " Christum
    "
    nasciturum
    esseestverum do not differ.God's knowledge,the
    status
    of
    the
    ontological
    object of epistemicverbs and truthand falsity
    are not the grammarian's concern. But as soon as de dictoand de re
    problems arise, the grammarian is present in order to distinguish
    between the various constructionalrelationships.

    45

    09:07:25 AM

    and thediscussionof theuniversais


    3. A noteon grammatical
    theory
    Finally, I would like to make some observationson the role which
    grammatical theory played in the nominalist discussions on the
    universais. In my view the relationshipbetween noun and definition
    which we have met in the discussion on the identityof the noun might
    have played an importantrole in the move fromthe focus on the vox
    to the nomenwithin this theory.
    The famous codex Orleans 266 has preserved in the pages 276a to
    281a a treatisewhich is called in the manuscript" Positiovocumsententiae". 17The text startswith Porphyry'sdescriptionof the genusin the
    translationof Boethius (II, 4, ed. S. Brandt, 179-80): " quoddepluribus
    '
    etdifferentibus
    speciein eoquodquidsitpraedicatur(cf. 181, 14-5), whereas
    the speciesis described in the same words the only differencebeing
    1.
    "
    ilnumero
    "
    After some
    differentibusinstead of specie differentibus1
    proposes to startwith
    general remarksthe author of the /W/zo-treatise
    4
    an inquiry into the universal, universale
    , which he defines as 'that
    which is aptumnatumpraedicaride pluribus". Next, threedefinitionsof
    are given, the second of which is of special interest
    the termpraedicatum
    to the author. In it he defines the term praedicatumas ilquodlibet
    vi substantivipresents
    vocabulumalii coniugibileveraciteraffirmative
    to
    the
    in
    this
    author,
    praedicatum
    interpretationis applied in
    According
    ,18Next, the definitionof the universale
    the definitionof the universale
    given in the beginningof the treatiseis rephrasedwiththe help of this
    estquodui substantiui
    : li Universale
    uerbipresents
    definitionof praedicatum
    estpluribus".
    etprorsusconiungibile
    ueraciter
    Obviously it is of great importanceto the vocalist or nominalistto
    '
    remain on the ' 'linguistic' level. On the other hand, he needs to be
    in contact withthe extra-linguisticworld which in his view consistsof
    individuals only. Furthermore,there is on the level of language a
    pluralitywhich he must avoid, viz. a pluralitywhich could be caused
    by signification,which taken here in a strictersense opposes nominatio.
    For when Socrates is sittingand reading and is being pointed at by the
    speaker, the followingtwo propositionsare true:
    (x) this sittingbeing is Socrates
    and
    (x) this reading being is Socrates,
    17An editionbyDr. Y. Iwakumais forthcoming.
    18Incidentally,
    : a linguistic
    is a vocabulum
    thisimpliesthattheuniversale
    entity.
    46

    09:07:25 AM

    which would lead to the admission of the proper noun Socratesinto the
    category of universais. For legensand sedensare not only different
    (spoken) words, theyare also differentin theirprincipal signification,
    '
    '
    since 'sitting' represents sessio and 'reading' 'lectio', and therefore
    plura,19
    To get around this difficultythe author introduces the semantic
    : plura in the definition of the universal must
    notion of nominatio
    indicate a pluralitybased on nominatio.That is why he inserts:plura
    nominatione.
    Nominatiois a technical term which belongs to the doctrine of
    nominal signification.Although in detail some of the texts show a
    was commonly used to
    divergenceas we shall see, the term nominatio
    indicate the denotative or rather 4'naming" functionof the noun.
    in the strictsense, which in its turn was
    Nominatioopposes significatio
    said to indicate the relation between the name and a quality or a
    nature with referenceto the thing denoted. We find this theoryheld
    in both camps: the vocalists/nominalistsand the realists. William of
    Conches, a realist, explicitly argued that the noun homo names
    , i.e. the individual men, and not the quality
    {nominat)ipsos homines
    which it signifies: " significai communem qualitatem omnium
    hominum"
    {LogicaModern., II, 1, 224). The nominalistAbaelard maintained a similar position. He claimed that the noun homodenotes
    {nominat)Socrates, that is the individual man, but signifiesman's
    mortale
    nature: animalrationale
    {Dial. 562-3), of course conceived of by
    Abaelard only as a concept.
    It appears thatthe author of the Positioalso adhered to thiscommon
    and nominare
    of nominatio
    , but he neverthelessconsidered
    interpretation
    it appropriateto eliminate another,deviatingapplication of nominatio.
    19MS Orlans266,p. 276b:"Quia uniuersale
    estquodui [scr.qui MS] substantiui
    et prorsus
    estpluribus.
    ueraciter
    [scr.subiectum
    coniungibile
    MS] uerbipresents
    Pluraautemoportet
    uthec'<hoc> sedens'et 'hoclegens'
    accipiin nominatione,
    nonsunt,quiaeandempersonam
    de quibusSocrates
    multainnominatione
    predicatur
    habent.
    significare
    ex partesubiectiponitur,
    est
    Opponitur
    quia cum etiamSocrates
    coniungibile
    et[inMS] animali,
    pluribus,
    quiahomini
    que plurasuntinnominatione,
    quiaanimal
    talequidsignificat,
    ab homine.
    quodnonsignificatur
    Ad quoddicimusquodeis quidemconiungi
    non
    potest,
    apponiueroeis prorsus
    Predicati
    autemapponi[potest
    uero
    subiecti
    MS,sedexp.]est,idestsuperponi,
    potest.
    etquasisubiectum.
    Etilludetiamdicipotest,
    etanimal
    diuersain
    subponi
    quia homo
    nominatione
    nonsunt,quiaaliquidab aliquocontentum
    ab alteroetiampersonaliter
    contineri
    habet."
    47

    09:07:25 AM

    He felthimselfchallenged to meet the objection that the noun Socrates


    put in subject position is also able to be joined to liplura' since it can
    be joined to the nouns homoand animalin predicate position:
    (x) Socratesesthomo
    and
    (x) Socratesestanimal
    "
    "
    which are " plura in nominatione"
    , for animal signifiesa tale quid
    which is not signifiedby the noun homo.Our author points to the difference between a noun in subject position and predicate position,
    , and
    whereby incidentally he uses the verbs supponereand apponere
    of
    we
    are speaking
    words in
    argues that in regard to universais
    predicate position only. But he also denies that these nouns, animal
    in nomination,since the thingwhichis denoted
    and homo, are different
    one
    of
    the
    can
    also personally be denoted by the other one.
    two
    by
    " becomes clear
    What is meant by the adverb " personaliter
    e.g. from
    Ralph of Beauvais' observation on persona( Gl.s. Donatum,21,2 sqq).:
    it is the individual essence of a rational creature. The emphasis, howessencia,which
    ever, is on 'individual'; personais not said of a communis
    is signifiedby a universal noun but not denoted. This means that our
    vocalist author as well as Abaelard and William of Conches use
    in regard to individuals only. On the otherhand it turnsout
    nominatio
    that the position which he attacks was not invented 4pour besoin de
    la cause", but a view really maintained in the early twelfthcentury.
    The anonymous glossator
    We find it referredto in the Tractatus.20
    20MS Vat.lat. 1486,f. 17ra:"Huic sententie
    opponitur
    quod qualitasnominis
    notetMS' animal
    nomint
    uidetur
    esse,utcumhomo
    [MSfinmarg.
    parsnominat[iu]i
    iliatalitasparsessenominati.
    uidetur
    ei illamtalitatem,
    taleattribuendo
    licetconstet
    iliaspecialis
    Sicutanimaltale,scilicet
    Adquodrespondendum.
    natura,
    ex animaliperillamqualitatem
    , tamennonestiliaduoconiuncta,
    quamponithomo
    utsedensnonestpersonaet
    animaletqualitas,sedestanimalsicformtm,
    scilicet
    itacumdicimus
    homo
    animaitale,idestspecialem
    nominare
    sessiosedaffecta
    sessione,
    idestanimaiet qualitatem
    coniunctam,sed
    naturam,non nominamus
    utrumque,
    homo.
    actuillaproprietate
    animaiformtm
    quamei attribuit
    uel aliamsubstantiam
    ad primamredeamus
    Demissaergohac sententia
    nominum
    enimtriplicem
    nominidemusquam et pleriqueponunt.Considrant
    unam in substantia,
    secundamin qualitate,terciamid quod
    significationem:
    hocnomen
    et adiectiuis
    discrete
    uideamus.
    Socrates
    nominatur,
    quodin substantiuis
    habetspecialem
    naturam
    eandemquamsuperius
    substantiam
    hominis,
    qualitatem
    homo
    substantiam
    ueroindiuiduam
    remcuipositum
    est.Similiter
    nominat
    diximus,
    remcui et
    uerospecialem
    habetanimalipsum,qualitatem
    quam prius,nominat
    reiquamnominant
    substantiam
    habentmateriam
    datumest.Ita etalia substantiua
    in id quodnominatur."
    id quod redigit
    materiam
    uel quasimateriam,
    qualitatem
    48

    09:07:25 AM

    argues thatthe "common view" maintains that nominal signification


    has three aspects: the significationof the substance, the signification
    of the quality, and the nomination. In practice, this theorysays that
    the proper noun Socrates
    has as its substance the special nature of man,
    viz. homo, as its quality socratitas,
    and it signifiesboth of these, but it
    nominates the individual thingon which it was imposed. In the same
    way the common noun homohas as substance animal also called
    "materia", and as quality humanitas,
    but it nominatesthe " specialisres"
    to which it has been given: homo, which is not an individual. The
    glossatorsummarizeshis positionby sayingthatthe substantivenouns
    have as substance the matterof the res, which theynominate (e.g. in
    thecase ofhomo
    : animal), as quality thatwhichreduces ( redigit
    ) the matter to that which is nominated, homo{resspecialis).
    So it turnsout thatthe notion of nominatio
    was of paramount importance to the nominalistpositionin the debate on the universais. It kept
    the whole predicationon the level of language; not only the predicate
    but also the subject of the predication was a term or rather a noun.
    This fact was even referredto in the grammatical treatises, as the
    observationby Robert of Paris shows (List of texts no 12). Furtherintroducedthe noun as a product of imposition, not
    more, nominatio
    as a mere voice which existed only during the time of its pronunciation, the challengedflatus vocis. Besides, nominatioas taken by the
    author guaranteed a direct link between the outer world and the
    predication: forthe subject term of the predication always names an
    individual being.
    4. Final remarks
    Summing up my investigationsI would like to make the following
    final remarks:
    1. The Aristotelian-Boethiantheoryof denomination, enlarged by
    the grammatical theoryof the resverbiand the logical theoryof the
    affinityof verb and adjective, created a semantic atmosphere which
    was appropriate forthe development of the notion of the unityof the
    noun. It must be stressed,however, that we do not findit mentioned
    in this context.
    2. The confrontationof the grammaticaldoctrineof the identityof
    the principal significationof the forms of the declinabiliawith the
    Aristoteliantheory of a fundamental differencebetween noun and
    verb and theirrespectiveoblique cases, in connection with the doc49

    09:07:25 AM

    trineof binomyand the Boethian traditionof the identityof the definition, compelled the twelfthcenturyscholarsto elaborate a sortof "lexeme' ' notion, the unitas(identitas)nominis
    , with the result that they
    could speak about a noun not directly bound to any individual
    language without, however, leaving the level of vocal language.
    It must be noted that in the grammatical texts one does not find
    referencesto the problem of tensed infinitivesnor the question of what
    is called the identityof the enuntiabile
    (Courtenay 1991a, 17). These
    of
    the
    of the logician and the
    domains
    were
    apparentlypart
    problems
    not
    concern.
    were
    the
    grammarian's
    theologian; they
    3. I have not found a specific grammatical theory which was
    exclusively related to (logical or theological) nominalismjust as Porconstruiand the
    retan linguistics, for instance with its substantive
    related
    was
    to Porretan
    status
    of
    the
    predicate noun,
    significative
    thought. On the contrary,grammatical doctrine turned out to have
    been neutralto realism and vocalism or nominalism,and could inspire
    both theories.
    4. If the introductionof the grammaticalor rathersemantic notion
    into the theoryof predicationof the vocaleswas not responof nominatio
    sible for the shiftfromvoxto nomen
    , it undoubtedly supported it.21
    Katholieke UniversiteitNijmegen
    InstituutOudeLetteren
    21Thanksare due to Drs. Th. Harmsenforhishelpwiththetranslation
    ofthis
    article.

    50

    09:07:25 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    Vocalista,Nominalism and the Commentarieson
    theCategories from theEarlier TwelfthCentury
    JOHN MARENBON

    Commentaries on Aristotle's Categoriesare a rich, and hardly


    logic.1 The
    explored, source of informationabout twelfth-century
    evidence theyofferabout nominalism supportsthe traditionalview of
    its originsagainst those historianswho have argued that the nominales
    were so called, not because they were said to describe genera and
    , but because they adhered to a theoryof the 'unity
    species as nomina
    of the noun.'2 This paper will explore three main aspects of this
    evidence: the use of the word nomenin logic; the controversybetween
    Abelard and Alberic over universais; and the originsof the thesisquod
    semelestuerum,semperestuerum.
    and theCategories
    1. Nomina, nominanominum
    Those who argue against the traditionalaccount of the origins of
    nominalism point out that, whilst a number of thinkersin the early
    twelfthcentury held that genera and species are uoces, and whilst
    Abelard subsequentlymodifiedthis view, and described universais as
    sermones
    , thereis much less evidence that Abelard or anyone else described theirpositionas being thatgenera and species are nomina
    .3 And
    so the nominales
    can hardlyhave acquired theirname because of their
    views about universais. But the linguistic usage of Abelard and his
    contemporaries was less fixed than this argument allows. Even
    William Courtenay, the most eloquent proponentof the view, admits
    that in both of his long PorphyrycommentariesAbelard did referto
    universaisfromtime to time as nomina
    .4 The background to thisusage
    is provided by Boethius's commentaryon the Categories.
    1 SeeMarenbon,
    Medieval
    latin
    commentaries
    fora catalogue
    andgeneral
    discussion
    ofthe
    - ee. (C 8).
    material.
    tothiscatalogue
    aremadeinbrackets
    References
    inboldprint
    2 Firstsuggested
    in Chenu1934and 1935-36(1957),theviewis presented
    in detail
    in Courtenay
    1987.
    1991a;cf.also Normore
    3 Courtenay
    1991a,p. 15.
    4 Courtenay
    1991a,n. 23.
    51

    09:07:37 AM

    Boethius explains that, in discussing the ten categories (which are


    the most general genera), Aristotlewas concerned with words, rather
    than directlywith things: words, however, considered not as the sub5
    jects of grammaticalinvestigation,but in that theysignify(160 A). In
    his introductionhe describes the ten categories interchangeablyas
    .6 and he begins by making a distinctionbetween
    uocesand as nomina
    nominaof the firstimposition(which signifythings,such as the words
    forthe categories) and nominaof the second imposition(termsof grammatical description,which signifyjust otherwords) (159 A-C). Nomen
    was thus established as a useful alternative to vox when a term is
    needed which means 4word' not in the sense of a physical sound, but
    commenas that which signifies.The early twelfth-century
    Categories
    taries show clearly how this usage was absorbed. In C 8, probably
    fromc. 1110-1120, nomenis used oftenin passages taken directlyfrom
    Boethius; otherwise it occurs in phrases where the commentatoris
    contrastingtheuse of a word in the firstor second imposition a nomen
    rerum
    , as he puts it, or a nomenuocum.7But once it is used as a direct
    alternative to uox;8 and this tendency becomes marked in the interpolations to C 8 probably dating from the 1120s9 and in Abelardo
    .10
    long commentaryon the Categories
    5 References
    are to thecolumnsof Patrologia
    s Categories
    to Boethius'
    commentary
    Latina64.
    6 Forexample:4In hocigitur
    et
    nominibus,
    est,de primisrerum
    operehaecintentio
    nomen
    ressignificantibus
    de vocibus
    disputare (159C); 'Haec ... unumsubstantiae
    ... unumtamennomen
    concludens
    nomine
    continentur
    includit... uno quantitatis
    omniaqualitatis. ..' (160C-161A);'... de primisvocibus
    , primarerumgenera
    nomina
    nam
    ...' (161A): '... ad multitudinem
    ipsadispertit;
    generum
    significantibus
    sedsecundum
    rerum
    rerum
    orationem,
    generasuntnonsecundum
    quoniamdecern
    dividit...' (163AB); 'Quoniamhicde
    indecern
    voces
    praedicamenta
    significationem
    tractatus
    habetur...Y184A).
    nominibus
    7 This commentary
    is foundin ParisBN lat. 13368,ff.195r-214v;
    Munichelm
    14458, ff.95r-102r(incomplete);London BL Royal 7.D.XXV, ff.55r-63r
    version:VaticanReg. lat. 230,ff.41r-71r.
    (See Mareninterpolated
    (incomplete);
    0
    ofthe
    treatment
    andcommentaries
    bon,Glosses
    , 6 forthisdating,where( 7) a fuller
    nomen
    enimsubstantia
    willbe found.)Eg. 'Accipitur
    introduction
    tothiscommentary
    nomen
    uocum
    ...' (VaticanReg. lat.230,f.44v).
    substantia
    rerum... Itemaccipitur
    note,are foundalso in theother,
    (This passage,and thatquotedin thefollowing
    manuscripts).
    uninterpolated
    8 'Quandoautemsubstantia
    Substan... tunchabethancdescriptionem.
    nomen
    uocum
    fundamentum
    est. ..' (ibid.)
    tiaestuoxiliaque aliarumuocum
    9 'Sed quia Aristoteles
    est
    de rebussubstantialibus
    perhocnomen
    quodestsubstantia
    modisaccipitur,
    diuersis
    hecuoxqueestsubstantia
    etindiuersis
    tractaturus,
    preceptis
    huiusuocissignificatio
    perfundamentum
    aperiendauidetur'(ibid.); '... substantia
    ... Vnde funuoces
    earum,ponensin eis sustentationem
    , scilicetnomina
    significai
    ad reset ad uoces.
    estequiuocum
    damentum
    (ibid.,ff.44v-45r)
    10All references
    are to Geyer'
    s editions
    s logicalcommentaries
    to Abelard'
    (191952

    09:07:37 AM

    Voxremained the standard termto contrastwith res,and those who


    .n
    rejected the position that universais are things were called uocales
    But thinkerswere troubled by the physical connotations of uox. Both
    the writer of C 8 and Abelard try to avoid these problems by
    distinguishingcarefullybetween uocesin essence, regarded as physical
    things,and uocesregarded as bearers of signification.12Eventually, in
    his later long commentaryon the Isagoge,13Abelard decided to solve
    the problem by defininganother term, sermones
    , to mean words as
    institutedby humans to signify,and lettinguocesstand for words as
    physical entities. By this terminologyuniversais, are, of course, sermones
    , not uoces(522: 10-524:20). Abelard chose sermoratherthan nomen
    as his term, partlyperhaps because he wanted to insist on his own,
    precise technical definition, and partly because he thought that
    - could be uniververbs- which it would sound strangeto call nomina
    sais (18:1-2). He was aware, however, that he risked bewilderinghis
    readers by the use of a termin a new, technical sense, and so he was
    , to gloss it withthe
    careful,almost immediatelyafterhe firstuses sermo
    4
    sermonm
    sive nominum
    familiarnomen
    : Quid enim aliud est nativitas
    ,
    , ex
    quam hominum institutio?Hoc enim quod est nomensive sermo
    hominum institutionecontrahi (522:17-19). It would be surprising
    if, afterhis criticismof uoxtheories,Abelard and those who followed
    his views on universaisshould have continued to be called uocales; but
    not at all implausible that theyshould have been called, not afterthe
    termsermo
    , but afterthe more familiar,if less accurate, nomen.
    One passage in Boethius's commentaryon the Categories
    provides
    another reason why the title nominaleswould have been thought
    appropriate. In order to explain why it does not followfrom'Socrates
    haecdecern
    nomina
    multis
    de
    vocavit,
    1933):Eg. 112:8-12:'Quod igitur
    primasvoces
    causisaccipipotest.
    Possunt
    secunnamqueprimaediciineo quodde eisintenditur
    dumprimamnominum
    ... Est namqueduplexvocum
    ...;'
    impositionem
    impositio
    116:35-117:3:
    'Arbitror
    autemhancdisiunctionem
    magisconpraedicamentorum
    sideratam
    secundum
    vocum
    naturasrerum... Sed
    significationem
    quamsecundum
    secundum
    nominum
    haecratiovisaest
    profecto
    significationem
    11See Iwakuma1992b.
    12C 8: 'Videndum
    illamsententiam
    unaquodsecundum
    quoduoxestinsubstantia,
    esseconsiderata
    est.... Secundum
    quequeuoxsecundum
    proprium
    primasubstantia
    hocueroquoduoxesttantum
    inquantitate
    nullauoxin proprio
    essesuoprimauel
    secundasubstantia
    est.' VaticanReg. lat. 230,f. 45rb;Abelard(earlierlongcomon Porphyry)
    37:40-38:40.
    mentary
    13Known,from
    itsopening
    sociorum.
    Constant
    words,as theLogicanostrorum
    petitioni
    Mews(1985,77-8)has suggested
    a datebetween1120and 1124,butan evenlater
    datingis notimpossible.
    53

    09:07:37 AM

    is a man' and 4Man is a species' that 'Socrates is a species', Boethius


    explains (176D) that species and genera sunt quodammodonominum
    nomina.He probably intends merelyto say that theword'species' and
    theword 'genus' are words which describe other words rather than
    logicians, such as the writerof C 8
    things.14But early twelfth-century
    took the passage as supportingthe position that universais are words,
    not things.15Abelard takes Boethius's remark in the same way and
    extends it, so as to make it support even more clearly his theoryof
    universais. In the sophism 'Socrates is a man, 'Man is a species',
    'Socrates is a species', it is not merely (as Boethius had noted)
    'species' which is not predicated in substance. The middle term,
    'man', Abelard adds, changes its meaning fromthe major premise,
    where it is the name of a thing,to the minor premise, where it refers
    to itself(133:24-31). And Abelard may have used this passage more
    prominentlyon another occasion, if credence can be given to a
    twelfth-century
    gloss on Priscian which attributesto Abelard a work
    entitledIncipiuntnominanominum.16
    2. Abelardand Albericon universais
    One of the earliestreferencesto the nominalistsis John of Salisbury's
    remarkthatAlberic was 'a verykeen opponent of the nominalistsect'
    (List no. 5). Does this mean that he was an opponent of Abelard and
    his followers? Courtenay thinks this conclusion is not proven,
    although he does trace an opposition between Abelard and Alberic
    over the 'unity of the noun' and over parts and wholes.17From their
    , however, it can be shown both that Alberic
    exegeses of the Categories
    attacked Abelard over the nature of the universais, and that this differencemarksa fundamentaldivision between theirunderstandingsof
    the place of language withinlogic.
    14As Reiners1910,6-8rightly
    explains.
    15'Confirmt
    ... uoces
    in eodemcommento
    etiamBoethius
    [sc.superCathegorias]
    nominanominum
    essegeneraet species,dicenset generaet species'quodammodo
    of thenominalist
    sunt",VaticanReg. lat. 230, f. 41v. A 'realistrepresentation
    someas
    2486
    in
    Vienna
    in
    an
    found
    represents
    (P
    20)
    commentary
    Isagoge
    theory'
    nominum'
    are'nominatantum
    fivepredicables
    thatPorphyry's
    by
    (discussed
    holding
    see below,p. 101).
    Iwakumain hisarticlein thiscollection:
    16Cf. Barrow,Burnett,
    to theglossPromisimus
    Luscombe1984-85,269 (referring
    ,
    OxfordLaud. lat.67, f. 22r)
    17Courtenay
    1991a,16, 25-6.
    54

    09:07:37 AM

    Abelard' s long commentary on the Categoriesis well known.


    Alberici exegesis of the work can be reconstructedfroma varietyof
    sources. In Paris Arsenal 910 (Ar), an importantlogical collection,
    thereis a fragmentof a commentaryon the Categories
    (C 21: ff. 143rintroduction
    and
    the
    very firstglosses.
    144r) which includes only the
    By its polished styleand its lack of referencesto a master or masters,
    it appears to be a particular master's own exposition of his views.
    Since a number of the comments it contains correspond exactly to
    what in C 15 and C 17 are recounted as Alberic's views, there is a
    strongprobabilitythat this fragmentcomes from a commentaryby
    Alberic himself,or is veryclosely related to such a work. Ar contains
    another commentary(C 20: ff. 147r-162v) which covers about the
    firsthalf of Aristotle's text. It too puts forwardmany of the views
    known to be Alberic's, but is less full and less polished than C 21.
    Close to the beginning it attributesa view which is very probably
    Alberic's to 'the master'.18There seems everyreason to take thiscommentaryas the work of a pupil, based on Alberic's teaching. Then
    thereare the two commentariesC 15 and C 17, whichgive an impression of the debates about the Categories which took place on the Mont
    Saint Genevive in the 1130s.19 Finally, there is another, very
    incompleteCategories commentaryalso in Ar (C 16: ff. 145r-147r),
    which consists just of the discussion on most of the chapter on
    substance. This commentatorremarksabout a certain view which he
    has just mentioned: 'In Alberic's time, this was the opinion of
    everyone, which Alberic himselfcondemned, in the followingway'
    and he proceeds to give Alberic's argument (f. 145v). From this it is
    clear that C 16 was writtensome time afterAlberic lectured on the
    Categories, but by someone who thought Alberic's views still
    valuable.
    The opposition between Abelard and Alberic over the nature of
    universais is clearest in their treatmentof the categoryof substance.
    Abelard argues thatAristotle'sdivision of substances intoprimaryand
    secondary is hard to understand if it is supposed to be a division of
    things,ratherthan words. If it is taken as a division of things,Aristotle
    will be 'saying that, of the things which are substances, some are
    universal, some singular, as if one were to say: of man, that is the
    18See n. 24 below.
    19See De Rijk 1966,31-9.
    55

    09:07:37 AM

    thing which is man, one is universal, another particular' (141:2-4).


    Abelard objects that this statementwould have the unacceptable consequence of making what is universal exactly the same as what is
    singular. He admits that Boethius took the division to be one of a
    genus into species. But on this view primarysubstance would be a
    species of substance, which it cannot be, since everysubstance- 'that
    is, every individual of substance'- is primarysubstance. Moreover,
    one of the species, secondary substance, would contain universal
    substance, which is what is being divided. These difficultiesare
    avoided, he concludes, if the division is taken as one of words (in
    which case it is of an accident into accidents) (141:16-24).
    Alberic's views are very different.He is willing to recognize that
    'substance' is a word with many differentmeanings. But the sense in
    which 'substance' means 'the name which signifiessubstance' is not,
    he says, a significatio
    but rathera trans
    latio- a metaphoricalratherthan
    a literal sense of the term.20The division of substance into primary
    and secondary substances is, he claims (citing the authority of
    Boethius's commentaryon the De interpretatione
    which Abelard mentions but rejects),one of a genus into species. The commentaryprobably writtenby a pupil of Alberic's (C 20) adds a referenceto 'obstinate
    people who say thatthe division is of an accident into accidents.' They
    say that Aristotle's division means: 'of the words which signify
    substance some are discrete in their signification, some nondiscrete...'. This view is emphatically rejected. According to it, the
    commentator says, neither primary nor secondary substance is
    substance or is contained in any of the Categories.21The commentator
    recognizes as a possible argument against seeing the division as one
    of genera into species the factthatthisimpliesrealism about universais
    'which is regarded as an objection by them.' But the commentator
    happily accepts that 'primaryand secondarysubstance are substances
    20C 16: 'Accipitur
    etiamsubstantia
    substantiam.
    Sed non
    pronominesignificante
    estsignificatio,
    immotranslado'(f. 145r);C 20: 'Dicituretiam< substantia
    > pro
    nominesignificante
    ut hic: 'omnissubstantia
    uideturhoc aliquid
    substantiam,
    - quodpotiusesttranslatio'
    significare'
    (f. 150r)
    21 'Quidamtarnenobstinati
    dicuntearn[sc. hancdiuisionem]
    esse accidentis
    in
    accidentia,et dicunthanc diuisionemtalemesse: 'substantiaalia prima,alia
    substantiam
    alia estdiscreta
    secunda',id estuox significans
    , alia est
    significations
    uel alia estsignificans
    substantiam
    uthocaliquid,alia ut qualequid ...
    indiscreta,
    hocnecsubstantia
    Sed secundum
    necin aliquo
    primanecsecundasuntsubstantia,
    continentur.'
    ParisArsenal910,f. 150r.
    predicamento
    56

    09:07:37 AM

    '
    and things existing in themselves and calls on the authority of
    Boethius's commentaryon Porphyryin his support.22
    than merely
    Abelard had done more in his reading of the Categories
    in
    he
    advocated
    to repeat and reinforcethe position
    commentingPorphyry. The approach to significationwhich underlies his view of
    universaisaffectsthe veryway in whichhe elucidates Aristotle'sintention in the work. Certainly, Abelard wishes to stay within the main
    lines of Boethius's interpretation.He allows that one of the reasons
    4
    why the categoriesare called firstwords' is that theyare words of the
    firstimposition. 'Although "substance" and "quality" are in a certain way the names of words', he remarks,'they are not treated here
    in thatsense', but ratheras names forthings(1 12:23-5). Yet, by a few
    subtle changes to otherwiseBoethian phrases, Abelard insinuates his
    own views. He cites with approval Boethius's statementof Aristotle's
    intention- 'to discuss the firstwords signifyingthe firstgenera of
    thingsin thattheysignifythings' but he immediatelyadds the gloss:
    'that is, to reveal their significationaccording to the natures of the
    thingssubjectto them' (111:18-21); and, in the passage which follows,
    instead of followingBoethius (161 A) in mentioning the ten genera
    referredto by the ten category-words, he prefers to speak of ten
    'natures' of all things (111:26). The expression is carefullychosen,
    since in Abelard's terms'natures' are not themselvesthings. And, at
    the end of the introductorysection, Abelard strikesout more boldly,
    withthejudgement that 'this distinctioninto categoriesis based rather
    on the meanings of words than the natures of things. For, as regards
    the naturesofthings,thereis no reason why Aristotleshould not have
    set out fewer or more categories than he did' (1 16:35-117:2). 23
    Abelard's view is, then, that whilst a study of the Categories does
    reveal somethingabout how thingsare (in this sense it is, as Boethius
    said, concerned with words signifyingthings, not words signifying
    otherwords), the ten Categories themselvesare not things, and their
    organization does not even reflecta fundamental patterningin the
    order of things,but merelya featureof how language signifiesthem.
    22 si hecestdiuisiogenerisin speciestunc... generaquaedamesseresperse
    habeturapud eos ... Ad hec autemomniaque
    existentes
    quod proinconuenienti
    et
    substantiam
    in primisdicentes
    breuemsolutionem,
    obiectasuntfacimus
    primam
    in
    Boethius
    et resperse existentes,
    essesubstantias
    secundam
    quodetiamtestatur
    tractat.'ibid.
    et speciebus
    de generibus
    ubiquestiones
    commento
    superPorfirium
    23The sameviewis putin theearlierofAbelard's
    on Porphyry:
    longcommentaries
    54:32-4.
    57

    09:07:37 AM

    Alberic rejectsthiswhole line of approach. Not only does Abelars


    talk about the 'natures' of things(as opposed to theirgenera) vanish;
    he also attacks Abelard's fundamental idea that the scheme of ten
    some, instead of
    categories is based on language. He mentions that
    '
    first
    words' for the
    saying that Aristotle's intentionis to discuss the
    4
    firstgenera of things,say the ten firstwords'. Alberic objects to the
    insertionof ten': it is foundnowhere,he says, in Boethius's commentary. And anyway is not the case, he believed, thatthereare ten words
    which signifythe ten genera of things.24
    Alberic's differenceswith Abelard covered many areas.25 But the
    evidence here, along withthat in Part II, makes it most plausible that,
    when John of Salisbury described Alberic as an opponent of the
    nominalists, he was referringto his attacks on the followers of
    Abelard, and that one of the central issues he had in mind was the
    nature of universais.
    '
    3. Abelardand ' Quod semelestuerum
    , semperest uerum
    is that
    One of the positionsmost commonlyattributedto the nominales
    in
    .26
    This
    est/erit
    uerum
    uerum
    est
    semel
    appears
    apophthegm
    , semper
    quod
    none of Abelard's survivingworks,but it has been recognized that, in
    withoutparallels in the Theologia
    a passage of the Theologiascholarium
    a similaridea is proposed in connecSummiBoni or TheologiaChristiana
    tion withGod's knowledgeofAbelard's birth.27In C 17, however,the
    thesis quod semelest uerum
    , semperest uerumis explicitlymentioned as
    'Master Peter's', by which the commentator doubtless means
    Abelard's.28 One of Abelard's argumentsfor this position, the com- dicunt
    24C 21: 'Sic igitur
    de primisuocibus
    estAristotelem
    dicendum
    disputare
    in
    hoc
    commento,
    uocibus';sednusquam
    (f. 143r);
    reperitur
    primis
    quidam'de decern
    non.Sed
    habetur4decern
    uocibus',in quibusdam
    C 20: 'In quibusdamcommentis
    'decern'utsitdoctrina
    meliusest,utdicitMagister,
    generalior
    quodibinonhabetur
    et quia etiamnonsuntdecernuocesque decernrerumgenera[rerum]
    significant'
    (f. 147r).
    25See n. 32 below,andcf.De Rijk 1966and Martin1986and 1987.
    areaisomaae
    tothisdoctrine
    26List
    oftextsnos.46; 50a,b; 51a;52d;bzd.Keerences
    wordsin nos.64a; cf.44a,e; 52e; 64c; 65a.
    in different
    27TS, 526: 821-837;cf.Normore
    1991a,23 (& cf.27).
    1987,207 andCourtenay
    28(Thepassageisunfortunately
    >
    mcertain
    places). < secundum
    corrupt
    obviously
    > P<etrus> quodsemelestuerum,semperest
    dicitM < agister
    hancauctoritatem
    uerumet semperfuituerum,et sempererituerum,et quod < semel> fuit
    < uerum
    >, semper erit uerum, semper est
    >, semper fuit < uerum
    quam
    uerum:ut 'Socratessede hoc uerumsemperfuitquia opiniosecundum
    hoc uerumest immobilis;
    ergoilluduerumsemperest. Set [etiam]
    concipitur
    58

    09:07:37 AM

    mentatorsays, concerns the object of faith.Abelard wishes to say that


    the prophecy'A virginshall give birth' means thata virginwill (in the
    future) give birth and, since this is not (now) the case, what the
    prophetsaid was untrue. And so he argues that what the prophetsaid
    (the dictum
    ) is always true and never false,but it is signified(now) not
    by the proposition 'a virgin shall give birth' but 'a virgin has given
    birth.' But quod semelest uerum
    , semperest uerumis also linked to the
    of
    Aristotle's
    passage
    Categories
    being discussed at thispoint. The relation might seem puzzling, since Aristotle seems to be proposing
    exactlytheopposite position- thatthe same statement( oratio
    ) or belief
    {opinio) varies between being true and false depending on the circumstancesin the world ('Socrates is sitting'is true when he is sitting
    and becomes falsewhen he stands up).29 It becomes clearer, however,
    in the lightof Abelard' s discussion of this passage fromthe Categories
    in his Logica ingredientibus
    and Dialctica, and in the light of another
    thesis which C 15 also attributesto Abelard at this point.
    Aristotle has identified the capacity to receive contraries whilst
    remainingnumericallyone as distinctiveof substance (4al0). He then
    considersthehypotheticalobjection thatstatementsand beliefstoo can
    receive contraries,since theyare trueat one time, false at another. He
    begins his answer to it by explaining that substances, unlike
    statementsand beliefs, receive contrariesby a change in themselves.
    <non> semper
    eadempropositione,
    significatur
    quia quandoquesignificatur
    prode futuroquando res non
    positionede futuro:tunc significatur
    propositione
    ad<h>uc est,ut antequamSocratesesset,hocuerumsignifcabatur
    hac propositione'Socratessedebitin tali instantiin quo modo sede; et, Socratestante,
    hac propositione
    'Socratessedit'(ms. sedet),et ita idem uerum
    signifcabitur
    a diuersis
    significatur
    propositionibus
    perdiuersatempora.
    Quod etiamprobatper
    dietaprofetarum
    etsacramenta
    hocmodo.Dicitprofeta
    'uirgopariet'.Hec propositio
    setuirginem
    estfalsum;
    dixit
    significat
    uirginem
    parituram,
    parituram
    ergoprofeta
    falsum.
    Etnehocinconueniens
    ideodicendum
    estdictum
    estuerumet
    concedamus,
    setnonsignificatur
    hacpropositione
    falsum,
    numquam
    'uirgopariet',setista'uirgo
    SocratesiurauitPlatonidaturum
    in die
    nummum
    peperi.Similiter
    (ms.spniliter)
    transacto
    diedominico,
    hocestfalsum,
    iurauit
    falsum.
    Etne
    dominico;
    ergoSocrates
    hoc inconueniens
    sequatur,dicendumest quod hoc- SocratemPlatonidaturum
    - estuerum,setnonsignificai
    in die dominico
    nummum
    < ur> hac propositione,
    'Socratesdabitnummum
    in diedominico'
    setista,'Socratesdeditnummum
    in die
    dominico.'
    latfol.624,f.83v).It islikely
    thatthepreposition
    before
    hanc
    auc(Berlin
    toritatem
    at thebeginning
    of thepassagewhichthegrammar
    requiresis secundum
    becausetheprevious
    sentence
    reads'Oratioetopinioomnino
    immobilia
    perseueran
    toAristotle's
    viewthatstatements
    andbeliefs
    do notthemselves
    (a reference
    change,
    butrather
    Forreferences
    in C 15 toMasterP. ( = Abelard),cf.De
    circumstances).
    Rijk1966,33-4.
    29
    4a20-4bl5;Arist.lat. I, 53:13-54:10.
    59

    09:07:37 AM

    In his commentaryon the Categories


    and in the Dialctica.Abelard asks
    bothers
    Aristotle
    to
    add
    his
    explanation, since the objection is
    why
    obviously inapposite forvarious reasons.30In particular,he explains,
    statements and beliefs are excluded by the requirement that what
    receives contraries is numerically one. The objection supposes that
    'Socrates is sitting'is numericallythe same statementevery time it is
    uttered. This is indeed, Abelard admits, a common way of talking,
    but not an accurate one.31What he seems to have in mind is a distinction between sentences and the statementstheyare used to make. He
    bringsthisout farmore clearlyby anotherpositionwhich is attributed
    to him at the same point in C 15 (and also in C 17). According to the
    commentator, Master Peter says that 'the verb refersto the instant
    before it is spoken.32As the objections the commentator goes on to
    rehearse confirm,Abelard was arguing that, if I say, 'Socrates is sitting*, the statementI express is that Socrates is sittingat t, where t
    is the moment before I begin to make the remark. By doing this, he
    brings out in terms of time the differencebetween sentences and
    statements.A temporally-indefinite
    sentence such as 'Socrates is sitwill
    a
    statement
    different
    ting'
    express
    every time it is uttered. The
    to Abelard just before: that
    of
    this
    is
    the
    attributed
    position
    corollary
    the same statementwill need to be made, at differentpoints of time,
    by differentsentences. And since even sentenceswhich are temporally
    indefinitein formexpress statementswhich are temporallydefinedby
    referenceto the time of theirutterance,what is once true will be true
    always.
    The passage from C 15, is then, shows that the nominalist thesis
    estuerumwas explicitlyproposed by Abelard
    , semper
    quodsemelestuerum
    30Categories
    161:5ff.;Dialctica
    , ed. de Rijk,53:11ff.
    commentary,
    31 quippeoratio
    sedenteSocrateet quae profetur
    eo stante,nonest
    quae profetur
    eademnumero... sed magissecundumhominum
    acceptionem'
    (161:20-24);cf.
    Dialctica
    on Porphyry,
    , ed. cit., 54:14-18;cf. also theearlierlongcommentary
    38:11-15.
    32'Dicit M < agister
    ad illudinstansquod
    > P<e trus> quod uerbumrefertur
    antecedit
    prolationem.'
    (Berlinlat.fol.624,f.83v);and', forC 17, De Rijk1966,
    error
    Petridicentis
    sedeestaliaoratio
    p. 45: 'Hie confunditur
    Magisti
    quod Socrates
    ...' Thesameposition
    prolataa Socrateetaliaprolataab eodeminalioinstanti
    (not
    in C 20, thecommentary
    attributed
    to anynamedmaster)
    is attacked
    by
    probably
    a pupilofAlberic's(ParisArsenal910,f. 153v);andC 17 shareswithC 20 oneof
    - thatitwouldmakeitimpossible
    themainarguments
    to
    againstthisthesis
    directly
    It seemsprobable,then,thatthiswas anotherarea on
    contradict
    anystatement.
    whichAlbericattacked
    Abelard.
    60

    09:07:37 AM

    himselfand it also suggeststhat the background to the view lies, not


    in theories about the 'unity of the noun', but in speculation about
    statements and beliefs in the context of Aristotle's views about
    substance and contraries.
    Cambridge
    TrinityCollege

    61

    09:07:37 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    What Must One Have an Opinion About
    STEN EBBESEN

    In this paper I want to give an impressionof the sort of issues that


    interested, united and divided philosophical schools (sectae) in the
    second half of the twelfthcentury. Insider- and outsider-testimonies
    combine to suggest that membership of a secta was defined by
    adherence to a " creed" (professio
    ) constitutedby a numberoftheorems
    (positiones
    ), virtuallyall connected with the Old Logic. I shall argue
    that Nominales formed a school in this sense, named after the
    trademarkslogan genusestnomen
    , whereas Realesdid not not: any nonnominalist1group could be thus called. I shall produce new evidence
    suggestingthat Nominaleswere the spiritual children of master Peter
    (Ablard?).
    Several outsider sources ascribe certain theses to Nominalists, Porretans etc. In three texts insiders list theorems of their respective
    school and then provide a rationale for each item on the list.
    2
    The biggest of the three is the Compendium
    LogicmPorretanum
    (henceforwardComp.Porr.)withsome 116 theoremslisted and proved.
    The firstperson plural is used in a way that clearly identifiesthe
    author's group as followersof Gilbert of Poitiers, and the theorems
    confirmthat he representswhat outsiders called Porretani.He occa'
    sionallyadmits dissentin the group, sayingthat "some of our people'
    have another opinion than the rest.
    SectaMeludina(henceforwardS.Mel.) lists 53 theorems. In our sole
    copy (Ms London, B.L., Royal 2.D.XXX) the ensuing discussion
    3
    only covers theorems1-3 and partly4. The author explicitlyidentifies
    his sectaas that of Melun. Like his Porretancolleague he admits occasional dissent in the group:
    1 I use 'nominalist'
    and 'realist'as translations
    ofthesources'nominalis,
    realis
    ; no
    connotations
    to follow
    are intended
    thetwowordsas usedin thispaper.
    modern
    2 Ebbesen,Fredborg
    & Nielsen,1983.I quotebytheorem
    number.
    Whenquoting
    textsI do notrespect
    thisandothermedieval
    theorthography
    ofeither
    manuscripts
    butclassicizeall waythrough.
    or editors,
    3 See De Rijk1967,at 11.1:283-286.
    I refer
    to thethesesbythenumbers
    assigned
    to thembyDe Rijk.
    62

    09:07:50 AM

    nondicerenisicontentum
    nostrorum
    individuum
    Consueverunt
    tarnen
    quidam
    est
    secundum
    loco sub speciespecialissima
    quod omneindividuum
    proximo
    et noneconverso.
    (Ms cit.,f.97vB)
    primasubstantia
    S.Mel, discusses each theoremat lengthwithdigressionson mattersof
    similar interest, instead of focussing sharply the reason for the
    theoremas does Comp.Porr..
    Nominalium(henceforwardPos.Nom.).*
    Finally, we have a Positiones
    This
    nostrae.5
    The titleis my invention,inspiredby the incipit:Positiones
    work lists some 17 theorems; the subsequent proofs, forno apparent
    reason, stop afterN 4. The firstperson plural is used in a way that
    but probably indicatesthatthe author speaks
    could be pluralismaiestatis
    on behalf of a group which he contrastswith that of the realists(Text
    60).
    Many school theoremsare at firstblush as outrageous as the Stoic
    paradoxes ("Only the sage is rich etc."); they were meant to attract
    attention.In the competitionforpupils a list of a school's paradoxical
    opinions may have had an advertisingfunctionsimilar to that of a
    restaurantmenu displayed in the window. The Porretansclaimed that
    Omnenomensignificaiduo (Comp.Porr. 1.8)' yet Omnenomenaequivocum
    una sui prolatione
    unumsolumsignificat
    (1.10). The Melun people held
    that Nullum nomenest aequivocum(S.Mel. 13);6 and Nulla species
    praedicatur
    (S.Mel. 8). The nominalists insisted that nothing grows
    (Texts 26, 37, 40b, 53), and Pos.Nom. enhances the provocation by
    loudly advertisingthat "we" hold that opinion in the teethof no less
    an authoritythan Aristotle.The paradoxical nature of school theses
    is expresslymentioned in Text 26 (they are inopinabiliato outsiders;
    cf. Text 37), and anothercontemporarynoticesthe surprisingfactthat
    obviously false propositions have reputable thinkers for their proponents:
    falsaquae tamennondicuntur
    multasuntmanifeste
    inopinabilia,
    quia a viris
    < thusMeludinenses
    suntposita,utnullum
    nomenesseaequivocum
    authenticis
    ,
    cf.above>, nomenessegenus<thus Nominales
    >?
    What, then, must one have an opinion about? First and foremost,
    controversial points relating to Logica Vetus. Some texts attribute
    4 Editedin Ebbesen1991.Editio
    in Pelster1944-46,rp.Amsterdam
    1971.
    princeps
    5 References
    ofthetype"Text8", "Text60" etc.aretothelistoftextspublished
    in thisissueof Vivarium.
    byY. Iwakumaand myself
    6 Cf. theextracts
    from
    ArsMeliduna
    in De Rijk1967II. 1, 297.
    7 S. Ebbesen,Anonymi
    Aurelianensis
    I Commentarium
    in Sophisticos
    Elenchos
    , in:
    CIMAGL 34 (1979),68.
    63

    09:07:50 AM

    overtlytheological propositionsto certain schools, but none occur in


    the listsproduced by insiders, not even in S.Mel, whose author claims
    to deal exhaustivelywith the tenets of his school.:
    dicta
    Meludinaeprofessionis
    quae ratiodisserendi
    (quamea parsphilosophiae
    consummatur
    inhuiusoperisvolumine
    etintegra
    estsibiducemelegit)perfecta
    (Ms London,B.L., Royal2.D.XXX, f.95rA).
    cognitio
    Admittedly, the parenthesis may not have been so parenthetically
    meant; if it wasn't, the author only claims that his treatiseprovides
    fullinformationabout the sect's dialectics,not about all of its doctrine;
    but Jacques de Vitry's story about the bishop who had been a
    nominalist when teaching the arts (Text 53) supports the notion that
    the school-definingtenets all belonged to logic.
    I shall now treatof some selected theorems,firstsome with a clear
    , inclusive of Boethius' logical
    background in the exegesis of Ars Vetus
    opuscula, then some which could be suspected of having no such connection; I will tryto find one even in their case.
    Such are the many that conlinkedto Isagogeor Categories.
    (I) Theorems
    cern universais and singulars,equivocity,categories,and predication.
    In several instances one school's thesis was obviously formed as an
    answer to another's (though we cannot always tell which came first).
    de aliThe very firsttheoremof S.Mel, is Nullumsingulare
    praedicatur
    quo and we are told that there is a good reason to startthus:
    estnullumsingulare
    de aliquo.De quo
    veroprimm
    praedicari
    Propositorum
    dissensio
    maximasoletfieri
    ad utramque
    contradica controversantibus
    partem
    de singulari
    rationibus.
    sentiat
    nostrae
    inductis
    tionsmultis
    Quidigitur
    professionisopinioprimoestpertranseundum.
    (mscit.95vA)
    There was indeed disagreementon the point. The Porretansheld that
    In omni propositionein qua aliquid praedicatur,praedicatursingulare
    (Comp.Porr. 2.8). But if Porretans and Melun people sometimesheld
    opposing opinions, they also shared some. S.Mel, asks utrumomne
    eteconverso
    sit individuum
    (ms cit., f. 97vB), and we are told of
    singulare
    a minor disagreement in the sect, but also that they agree that omne
    estsingulareet noneconverso
    individuum
    (e.g. "this animal" is a singular
    but no individual), which is identical to Comp.Porr, theorem 3.28.
    Similarly, S.Mel. 53 is partially identical with Comp.Porr. 2.3.
    The question about singulars and individuals arises naturallyfrom
    a discussion of Porphyry's universais. As with other mereological
    problems, its relevance to Trinitarian and C histological discussions
    (cf. Text 10) indubitably contributedto the interestit attracted,but
    64

    09:07:50 AM

    '
    '
    as the conceptsof "par and ' 'whole' were routinelyused in a great
    variety of philosophical contexts one should not overstress the
    theologicalbackground. There were lots of reasons to talk about such
    mattersin dialectic class.
    Of all questions relating to the Old Logic the most famous is and
    was "What sortof entitiesare universais?" Godfreyof St Victor (Text
    18) uses the differentviews about what a genus is to distinguish
    between realists and nominalists,and also makes special mention of
    the collectivistaspect of Porretan lore on what a genus is.
    I know of no self-styledrealis, and the theses attributedto realesby
    othersmake it clear, I think,(a) thatit is a collectivetermdesignating
    all non-nominalists,and (b) that the distinctionbetween realists and
    nominalistsis primarilyused in connectionwith the subject of universais and the significatesof general termsand propositions. Only four
    basic theses are attributedto realists, viz.:
    Realistthesis/7/. A genus is a thing(genusestres), and not a name
    of some sort. (Text 43. In Text 18 [1] is stated indirectlyby contrastingthe excusable errors committed by realists with the inexcusable madness of those who believe that a genus is a name.)
    The case of the genus is clearly meant to be paradigmatic for
    universais(cf. Text 5), and withthesis[1] come the corollaries "What
    is signifiedby a common noun like 'man' is a universal not a status"
    (Text 13), "In predication a thing is predicated of a thing" (Text
    22a), "An individual is not a predicable because it does not signifya
    natural thing" (Text 48d), and "There is somethingbesides the particular" (Text 60).
    Realist thesis[2]. The truths signified by true (and, of course,
    tensed) propositions,and objects of belief, knowledge and power are
    not tenseless.8(Not stated in exactly these terms; see Texts 29, 44a,
    52d; cf. 70).
    8 I hereassumethatthenominalist
    viewrejected
    theobjects
    construed
    bytherealists
    ofbelief,
    andpoweralikeas dicta.CalvinNormore
    has pointed
    outthat
    knowledge
    4
    thismight
    notbe trueandthattheirreasonforacceptingQuicquid
    deuspotuit
    potes
    *
    be altogether
    different
    from
    theirreasonforaccepting
    deusscivit
    sci
    might
    Quicquid
    andforclaiming
    thatthepatriarchs
    offaith
    believed
    inthesamearticles
    as Christians.
    thatnominalists
    heldthatGod can whatever
    he could
    However,theinformation
    whereas
    realists
    wereuncertain
    aboutthematter,
    occursas a noteonPeterLombard,
    Sentences
    I d.44c.2,andis meanttoinform
    us thattheviewPeterdefends
    thereis that
    ofthenominalists;
    butwhatPeteractually
    saysis thatjustas God alwayswillsand
    knows
    whatever
    He willedorknewatsometime,so He alwayscanwhatever
    He could
    at sometime.Lestanydoubtshouldlingeraboutwhatsortofthings
    be submay
    ' Peterillustrates
    sumedunder'quicquid
    hispoints
    withthethreepairsofpropositions,
    65

    09:07:50 AM

    Realistthesis[3]. Nothing followsfromthe impossible (Text 59).


    Realistthesis[4]. Something grows (Text 70).
    Notice that all four theses are just the common-sense answers to
    startlingnominalistclaims. They owe theirexplicitformulationto the
    nominalist theses which they deny.
    At least one man presentshimselfas a nominalist(the Anonymous
    of Text 22b), and two more seem to do so (Godfrey of Poitiers and
    Peter of Capua, but Godfrey's case hangs on a sim in Text 48c which
    may, for all I know, be a private reading of one manuscript; and in
    Peter's case we are in a disputational contextin which a firstperson
    need, perhaps, not referto the master or his sect).
    This is a satisfactory overlap between what the self-styled
    nominalist(s) consider(s) nominalistdoctrine, what the anti-realistof
    Pos.Nom. presentsas 'our theorems', and what outsiders attributeto
    "
    nominalists. A well-attestedtheorem is Universals, such as genera
    and species are nouns/names" ( nomina
    ; see
    , but in Text 4 vocabula
    Texts 4, 44c, 60) withvariants,such as "Some names are universais"
    (Text 5), and the handygenusestnomen(Text 18 [wherenominalistsare
    contrastedwith realists and the latter exempted fromthis madness];
    nisi
    40a, 44d [whereit is added thatperhocnomen"genus" nonsupponitur
    "There
    is
    the
    come
    corollaries
    central
    thesis
    With
    the
    nothing
    vox].)
    besides the particular" (Text 60), and "In predication a term is
    "
    predicated of a term, not a thing of a thing (Text 22a), as well as
    "What is signifiedby a common noun is a specificor generic status"
    (Text 13).
    Apparentlytherewas less diversityamong nominaliststhan among
    realists on the question of universais. Perhaps not so strange if we
    think of how the question was conceived by, e.g. the author of Ars
    Meludina:
    estquodest
    universale
    dfinit:
    inlibroPerihermeneias
    sicAristoteles
    Universale
    de
    i.e. praedicabile
    de pluribus,
    natumpraedicari
    aptumnatumpraedicari
    sit
    res
    an
    terminus
    utrum
    sc.
    illud
    Sed
    sit,
    contingit
    quid
    praedicabile
    pluribus.
    aliiresi.e. teressepraedicabilia,
    solosterminos
    dubitare.
    Quidamenimponunt
    minorum
    Bodleian,Digby174,f.218vB)
    significata.
    (Ms Oxford,
    That is, the question is conceived in the form"is it common terms
    or things signifiedby such terms that are universal?" The common
    'Deusscivit
    1Deus
    V'Deusseitse
    se resurrecturum
    Deuspotest
    resurrexisse',
    resurgere
    potuit
    '/'
    resurrexisse
    and tellsus thattheyare
    Deus
    vult
    and 'Deusvoluit
    resurrexisse7
    resurgere
    on thesamePeterLombard
    commentator
    parallel.Cf. also theanonymous
    strictly
    passagein Text50a-b.
    66

    09:07:50 AM

    termsare taken forgiven, the universais are sought. The realist who
    identifiesuniversaiswithsignificatesought to tellus what sortof thing
    he thinkscommon termssignify.The nominalistdoes not have to do
    that to answer the question about universais since he identifiesthem
    with what was given. This opens the possibilitythat the 'nominalist'
    label was applicable to people with very differentviews on, e.g., the
    significationof general terms, but just sharing the creed that only
    words are universais. The lone source thatsays theythoughtcommon
    nouns signifystatus(Text 13) could be thinkingof a typicalnominalist
    view ratherthan the only one.
    9
    '
    '
    '
    Nevertheless,I doubt that nominalesresembled reales in being a
    blankettermforseveral groups withno institutionaland fewdoctrinal
    bonds to join them. As we have seen, at least one man identifies
    are often
    himselfas a nominalis.Second, and most important,nominales
    not just contrastedwith realists but treated as parallel to, and conand Adamitae(Texts 11,
    trastedto, such groups as Montani,Porretani
    a
    can
    of
    and
    47, 53),
    they
    exemplify group people with special tenets
    or Adamitae(Text 21). Third, the
    (Text 37) just as can Meludinenses
    nominalistsare said to have held several theses with no obvious connection to the question whetheruniversalityis a propertyof words or
    of things(see, e.g., Text 48a); and at least one theoryof considerable
    complexity is ascribed to them, namely the one which by
    distinguishingbetween a person and the substance/essencewhich is
    that person (Texts 33a, 40b), allows the substance to cease to exist
    withoutendangeringthe person. The "Nothing grows" thesispresupposes the distinction (persons grow, substances do not, they are
    destroyedand yield their place to new ones if someting is added to
    them; cf. below). Such a complex theorywas scarcely the common
    propertyof several schools with otherwise differentviews. Finally,
    Godfreyof St Victor (Text 18) expresslyoperates with severedschools
    of realists without subdividing nominalists. This fits well with the
    testimonyofJacques de Vitrywho identifiestwo groups of people first
    as nominalistsand Adamites, then refersto them as nominalistsand
    realists(Text 53); apparently, ' realists' in his generic name forthose
    whose specificname is 'Adamites', whereas nominalists cannot be
    divided into species.
    The Adamites were considered realists, and so were the Melunpeople. Both rose to the nominalistchallenge, but theydid not present
    a united front. The Adamites accepted the proposition Hoc genus
    "ammalia" estgenushuic speciei "homo" (Text 21, cf. 55-56); S. Mel.
    67

    09:07:50 AM

    denies it in theorem39, Nullumnomen


    universale
    pluralisnumeri
    significai
    vel singulare
    ; - though the author of Ars Meliduna(ms. cit., 221vB) is
    less strict,holding that both the nominative plural and the oblique
    formssignifythe same universal as the nominative singular.
    or Boethianopuscula. Several
    (II). Theoremslinkedto Peri hermeneias
    theoremsmay derive fromthe study of Perihermeneias
    , and this is the
    obvious background forS.Mel. 40 about the requirementsa proposition must fulfilif somethingis to be predicated of something.De differenti topicisclearly lies behind theoremsconcerning inferencesand
    the notions of argumentatio
    and argumentum
    {S.Mel. 22, 23, 26, 43;
    Comp.Porr. 2.17, 2.19, 2.20, 3.40, 3.41). Many theorems in
    Comp.Porr, derive from Gilbert of Poitiers' commentaries on the
    OpusculaSacra, but also belong in purely logical contexts.
    aboutmolecular
    are many, but often dif(III). Theorems
    propositions
    ficultto link to the exegesis of some particulartext,as both the Organon
    and several Boethian opusculahave contributedto the developmentof
    this branch of logic, which attractedso much attentionin the twelfth
    centurythatGodfreyof St. Victor saw fitto characterizethe followers
    of Alberic with a crypticremark that probably alludes to their views
    about the proposition 'Socrates is well or ill* or 'if Socrates is well,
    Socrates is not ill'. An Albrican is one
    cuiusSortesaegersit,sed nonmanetsanus.
    Sed quia velociter
    transit
    homovanus
    etiamdummoritur
    maneatinsanus.(Text18)
    According to Text 25b the Albricans thoughtthat the inference'X is
    a man, thereforeX is a man or an ass' is invalid. The Porretans
    disagreed: Omnis disiunctaest vera cuius altera pars tantumest vera
    {Comp.Porr.2.27); i.e. theywould not proscribepropositionswithdisjoined predicates which are such that no subject that at any time
    satisfiesone of the predicatescan ever satisfytheother. The same matter is debated in Introductiones
    Montanae Maiores (henceforward
    I. Mont.Mai. ; ms Paris B.N. lat. 15141, about ff.65v-67r),9 and one
    of the standard examples is Socratesestaegervelsanus, which ought to
    be acceptable even to those who do not allow just any pair of disjoined
    predicates. I. Mont.Mai. accepts such propositions because 'ill' and
    'weir may apply in turn to a given subject (they permutantur)
    . This
    9 ApartfromthemsI havehadaccessto a partial
    byProf.E.P. Bos,
    transcription
    whomI wouldliketo thank.
    68

    09:07:50 AM

    mightbe the sort of view Godfreyalludes to, and he may also have
    in mind a thoughtexpressedin I. Mont.Mai. to the effectthat 'Socrates
    is ill or weir is no categoricalproposition: it performsno predication
    but indicatesthateither'ill' or "well" is a predicate of Socrates. I.e.,
    in the propositionin which illness is actually predicated of him (. est
    aeger)no trace remains of his potential health ( sed non manetsanus).
    Thus we may have an interpretationof Godfrey's firstline, the sequel
    however remains undeciphered.
    Alternatively,Godfreycould be alluding to the debate about locus
    ab immediatis.It appears from Introductiones
    Montanae Minores
    ("I. Mont.Min. '^10 and I. Mont.Mai, ms cit. f. 77rB-vA, that the
    ,
    group to which these authors belong accept Si Socratesnon est aeger
    Socratesestsanus and reject the claim that this legitimatesthe proof
    (1) Si nulla res est, nullus asinus est
    (2) si nullus asinus est, nullus asinus est sanus
    (3) si nullus asinus est sanus, omnis asinus est aeger
    (4) si omnis asinus est aeger, omnis asinus est
    (5) si omnis asinus est, quaedam res est
    (6) ergo si nulla res est, quaedam res est.
    I. Mont.Mai. accepts (2) but rejects(3); the consequence, he says, holds
    is asserted (i.e. if thereis an existentialpresupposionly ifa constantia
    thus:
    si
    nullus
    asinusestsanus, cumsitanimal,omnisasinusestaeger.
    tion),
    Perhaps, then, we should emend Godfrey and read Cuius Sortesaeger
    sit, si nonmanetsanus, and take the followingverses as a referenceto
    a claim that Si Socratesnonest,Socratesnonestsanus is true. We could
    then paraphrase Godfrey's satire thus:
    TheAlbrican's
    Socrates
    Yet,
    maybe ill,butthenhehasshedhishealth/sanity.
    heloosestheproperty
    ofbeingillbydying,
    thishappensso fastthathe
    though
    has no timeto exchange
    it forhealth/sanity:
    in deathhe can stayin-sane.
    Or, perhaps the Albrican claim was that while health and illness cannot be propertiesof the same subject, illness and death (in the sense
    of dying) can; hence, paradoxically, the minor calamity, illness,
    destroyshealth, whereas the major calamity, death, does not destroy
    the propertythat succeeded health. This interpretationwas suggested
    to me by an anonymous commentatoron the Categories
    :
    Soletquaeride morte
    etvitautrum
    sintprivatio
    ethabitus,
    sedquandofittalis
    an quaeratde illamorte
    unde
    quaestiodebemus
    ipsumquaerentem
    interrogare
    10Ed. De Rijk1967II. 2, 67.
    69

    09:07:50 AM

    an de illaundedicitur
    mortuum."
    dicitur
    moriens
    (Ms Paris,BN, lat. 17813,
    f. 50rA)
    Or, finally,the Albrican view may have been that the Socrates who
    was healthyis in some sense replaced withanother one on the advent
    of disease, while the passage frombeingjust ill to dyingdoes not affect
    his self-identity.Anyhow, whatever the thesis really was, it surely
    belongs in a debate which drew at least part of its original inspiration
    The example of
    from chapters 10-11 (on opposites) of the Categories.
    the sick and healthy Socrates sufficesto show that much.
    The same chaptersmakes a commentatorwithnominalistleanings,
    Anonymus D'Orvillensis,11 introduce the "Nothing grows" thesis.
    Firsthe relatesan argumentpurportingto show thatwithhis view that
    variaiessenomnisdemptio
    partisetomnisadditioetomnispartiumtranspositio
    tiam totiushe cannot make sense of the proposition sanumpotestesse
    , for what is ill cannot cease to be so withoutloss, acquisition
    aegrum
    or transpositionof some part; so, if it ceases to be ill it ceases to be,
    and consequently it cannot be well. To this he answers that quicquid
    sanum <and thus cannot be ill>, etquicquidest
    estsanumestnaturaliter
    idemhomoqui estsanuspotestesseaeger.The
    , tarnen
    aegrum
    aegrumnaturaliter
    answer exploits the essence/person distinction.12 The man's
    ' 'essence' ' ceases to be when
    parts are added, lost or rearranged,but
    the person, "this man", persists.
    ch. 15, the same author spends much
    In his commentson Categories
    deminutio
    time on generatio,corruptio,argumentation
    , and ends by
    tamenquod
    Concedimus
    nominalism
    from
    standard
    by saying
    deviating
    than
    is
    more
    the
    deviation
    crescit.
    real, for
    However,
    apparent
    aliquid
    the
    fewer
    essentia
    with
    he denies the identitybetween the thing(
    parts
    )
    and its successor. The smallerthingceases to be, the biggercomes into
    being out of its predecessor plus some additional parts. 'Grows'
    describes the genesis of the successor thing, its predecessor does not
    grow.
    11See Ebbesen1991,at 438ff.
    12Cf. Ms Oxford,
    in my
    Bodl.L., D'Orville207,f.3rA,on Cat.ch. 2 (notprinted
    1991paper):Itemnobis,quidicimus
    quodmodositsialiqua
    quodnihileritSocrates
    nihilest
    estinhochomine,
    sicobicitur:
    "Risibilitas
    velsubtrahatur,
    parsei addatur
    eraserit,ergoin nulloeritin
    hiehomoquoderaserithiehomo,et haecrisibilitas
    utin subiecto."Ad hocdicipotest
    quodhaec
    quo modosit,ergononestin homine
    licet
    sedin persona,
    hominis
    nonin essentia
    estin homineutin subiecto,
    risibilitas
    etaliudessentiae.
    tamenaliquidconvenit
    idemsitpersonaquodessentia,
    personae
    nonhaec
    confuse
    estin homineut in subiecto,
    Vel dicaturmeliusquod risibilitas
    sedquaedam,et erasquaedameritin hochomineut in subiecto.
    risibilitas,
    70

    09:07:50 AM

    Theorems 3.9-12 of Comp.Porr,all concern wholes


    (IV) Mereology.
    and parts. 3.12 (cf. Text 11) mentionsan inter-schooldebate concern, but also that most schools agreed that a collective
    ing totacontigua
    whole is several things(plura); the Melun school appears to have been
    the exception, for S.Mel. 31 says Nullus populusest plura. The two
    schools agreed that no part of an integralwhole is a differentthing
    fromthe whole {Comp.Porr.3.11, S.Mel. 20), but Comp.Porr.3.10 adds
    that every whole is a differentthing fromits part.
    If these mereologicaldebates have an origin in the exegesis of auctores
    topicisand
    , Boethius' section on locus a totoin De differentiis
    Categoriesch. 6 (on quantity) might be the places. Anonymus
    D'Orvillensis on Cat. 6 says:
    estsubqua invenitur(?)
    omnisresquamcitoipsa
    Itemaliquaspeciesquantitatis
    ut numerus.
    est,et nullatalisestqualitatis,
    Quam citoenimaliquidest,est
    sub hac forma
    unumvel plurasecundum
    quod dicitBoethiusin commento
    vocis:4'Quamcitoaliquaresest,estunumvelplures".Quidamab hisverbis
    estplures
    eliciebant:
    talemsensum
    "Quam citoresest,estunum,ut simplex;
    etitaaliquidestpluresres,etsicaliquidestsuaepartes.Nos
    res,utcomposita",
    unumsolumhabet
    sic dicimus:"Aliqua resestunum,i.e. aliquisterminus
    ut
    uthocnomen'Socrates';aliquisterminus
    plurahabetappellata,
    appellatum,
    Bodleian,D'Orville207,f. 7rA)
    'populus'.(Ms Oxford,
    Comp.Porr,theorems3.20-23 are about the "successive congregative"
    whole called time. We learn that each concretethinghas its own time
    {mora),which is concomitant with its formin the same way that its
    truthand unity are. A thing's temporal location is the collection of
    other moraeco-existingwith its own. The moradoes not count as an
    item of the ontology since it just adiacet(like the relation of being to
    the right),whereas real forms44are in" theirsubject. This account of
    time is a tidierversion of thoughtsfound in Gilbert of Poitiers, who
    also sketchedhow an analogue of this time-theorycould be applied to
    in a late 12th-centurySentences
    divine eternity;13
    commentarywe find
    an epigrammaticformulationof his thoughts:
    esse
    aeternitatem
    dicentium
    Hie breviter
    estquorundam
    opinioannotanda
    Patr.136:
    dieshominis
    moramquae adiacetdeo. (SummaBreves
    , msBamberg,
    3vA)
    Quite elegant. The Porretan principle that the structuresof natural
    language must be preservedin theological discourse is respected; and
    no inconveniententityis introducedsince eternityjust adiacet.Notice,
    13De frinitale,
    onBoethius
    1.4.82,in NikolausM. Hring,TheCommentaries
    byGilbert
    , StudiesandTexts13,Toronto1966,at 131f.
    ofPoitiers
    71

    09:07:50 AM

    however, that in Comp.Porr,there is no mention of eternity,only of


    time.
    Boethius' theological opuscula played an undeniable role in the
    development of Porretan time theory,but thereare other sources too.
    Comp.Porr,theorems3.20-23 all show a concern about the unity and
    multiplicityof time, and so do S.Mel. 4 and 45. The same concern
    sitan plurain ms.
    found expression in a question An unumsolumtempus
    Wien NB lat. 2459 ff. 104vA-105rA,14and underlies the Albrican
    sunt(Text 24), and this establishes a link to
    thesis that Omniatempora
    ch. 6. I quote two anonymous commentators:
    the exegesis of Categories
    Ms BerlinStaatsbibl.
    2 624,f.84vA-B:Quidamdicuntquodnullumtempus
    northepresent
    est [... Neither
    thepast northefuture
    is, theyargue
    ] Dicit
    etfuturum
    suntpartes
    quodpraeteritum
    tempus
    magister
    A(lbericus)
    principales
    ex quibuspraesenstempusconstat;ut Augustus
    estpars
    temporis
    praesentis
    succedit
    in anno,sicpraeteritum
    et futurum
    anni,id estparticulariter
    tempus
    non tarnensuntsi tantum
    succeduntin praesentitempore,
    particulariter
    ex hisquae nonsunt,quia ex praeterito
    est,quodconstituitur
    praesens
    tempus
    Si verodicatur
    nonexistit
    etfuturo.
    "Nonexistente
    totum",hoc
    parteprincipali
    existentiam
    de illistotisquaehabent
    moram
    estintelligendum
    secundum(?)
    paruttempus
    etvox
    successionem,
    tium,et nonde hisquae existunt
    perpartium
    et cursus.Potesttarnenprobaripraeteritum
    tempusesse, quia praeteritum
    [est]
    tempusest id secundumquod aliquiddiciturprius,ergopraeteritum
    > tempus
    estidsecundum
    est;< futurum
    quodaliquiddicitur
    posterius,
    tempus
    'Omnepraeteritum
    est.[...] Si autemopponatur
    tempus
    tempus
    ergofuturum
    nonsequitur,
    esta carnibus',
    est,ergoabstinendum
    est,ergoquadragesima
    quia
    nonquicquidestnuncest.
    Ms Padova,Bibi.Univ. 2087,f.28rA:Vidimusquid sittempusperdefiniexquibuspartibus
    Hicdiversae
    suntsententiae;
    nuncvideamus
    constet.
    tionem,
    et futuriet
    Quidam enim dicuntquod tempusnon est totumpraeteriti
    inqua sententia
    suntsibilatores.
    Aliidicuntquodtempus
    esttotum
    praesentis,
    in qua sententia
    fuitAristoteles
    et Boethius,
    et
    et futuri
    temporis,
    praeteriti
    sie opponitur:
    "Praeteritum
    etiamest Alb(ericus)[...]. Nostraesententiae
    sedpraeteritum
    nonest,ettempusest,ergo
    tempus
    tempusestparstemporis,
    Simili
    aliquidquodnonest <est> parseiusquodest". Fallosimilietratione.
    inaestate,sedrosanonest,ergoaliquidquodnonest
    sic:rosaestherbaflorens
    4est' dissimiliter
    in aestate.Rationesic, quia hic terminus
    est herbaflorens
    '<
    id est
    dicitur
    >
    est
    cum
    praeteritumtempus parstemporis*
    quia
    aeeipitur,
    fuisse
    cumcontingit
    "conti<n>git praeteritum
    tempus
    ipsum
    partem
    temporis
    fuisse",sedcumdico'praeteritum
    tempusnonest' id est"non existit",ideo
    nonsequitur.
    S. Mel. 19 states that Nullius hominispars estanima and the same thesis
    is defended in Ars Meliduna. 15It is the resultof a debate anchored in
    would
    . Arborporphyriana
    commentarieson Porphyry'schapterDe specie
    14EditionbyY. Iwakumain preparation.
    15Ms Oxford,
    inDe Rijk,1967II.l, 315.
    Extracts
    Bodl.L., Digby174,f. 223rB-vB.
    72

    09:07:50 AM

    seem to make rationalitya propertyof bodies (man is a rational corporeal substance, i.e. a rational body). But doesn't rationalitybelong
    to the soul ratherthan to the body? Are body and soul parts of man?
    And if so, can the whole man and one of his parts share a predicate
    withoutsharingit with the other? Two twelfth-century
    commentaries
    on theIsagogereportmasterP(eter),s views on thismatter.16According
    to theone in ms Wien, ONB, lat. 2486, he held thatproperlyspeaking
    'man' is a name of the body only, and this is also the sense when we
    say thatman is rational, forthatjust means thathe is a body animated
    by a rational soul. Then it is objected that on Peter's view man is a
    thingthat neitherunderstandsnor discerns nor sees nor uses reason,
    since man is a body, and by Peter's own avowal all these activities
    necdiscerbelong to the soul alone: sedquodhomositresquae nequeintelligit
    nitnecvidetnecrationeutitur,ille <i.e. Petrus> concedit
    necpro inconvenientihabet.Which is exactly the paradoxical thesis that Text 26
    ascribes to the nominalists!
    The nominalistview was not shared by the author of Comp.Porr.His
    theorem 3.5 is Solus spiritusest rationalis,and he explains that some
    aberrant members of his school accept 3.6, Omnishomoest corpuset
    , because in normal usage both bodily and spiritualpredicates
    spiritus
    are said of the whole man ('Socrates is white' 'Socrates is rational').
    Himself,he rejects3.6, forstrictlyspeaking spiritualpropertiesbelong
    to the spiritonly, corporal ones to the body only, and properlyspeaking Socrates in his soul ratherthan his body. The author wants us to
    believe that he is in accord with Gilbert, but it more looks as if the
    ' 4aberrant"
    group was so.17
    (V) Enunciables.Several theorems in S.Mel. (15, 37f.) and Comp.Porr.
    (2.10, 4.2-16) deal withenunciables (enuntiabilia!
    dicta).This is a typical
    12th-centurysubject of interest.The nominalist view that truthsare
    sempiternal is of theological relevance, but it may have been formulated in the exegesis of Categories
    5, 4a34ff.,where Aristotleclaims
    thatpropositionsand opinions may change truthvalue. The commentatorin ms. Padova, B. Univ. 2087 says that master Peter denied the
    identityof 'Socrates is sitting' uttered at tj with 'Socrates is sitting'
    utteredat t2, on the ground that theydo not signifythe same, forthe
    tense of verb makes a location in absolute time, viz. the moment of
    16See De Rijk1966,at 24-29.
    See Gilbert,
    De Trinitate
    1.2.73-85,ed Hring,94-97.
    73

    09:07:50 AM

    utterance, part of the proposition's meaning.18There is but a short


    tensed propositionswhich are
    step fromthisto holding thatdifferently
    true respectivelybefore, during and aftersome event signifyone and
    the same dictum/truth.
    And, in fact,commentingon the same passage
    of the Categories
    , the anonymous of ms. Berlin, Staatsbibl. 2 624,
    f.83vA says:
    "oratioetopinioimmobilia
    < Propter
    > hancauctoritatem
    dicit
    persvrant".
    M(agister)P(etrus):Quod semelestverum,semperestverumet semperfuit
    verumet sempereritverum;et quod fuit<verum>, sempereritverum,
    semperest verum,ut Socratemsedere,hoc verumsemperfuit,quia opinio
    secundum
    hocverumestimmobilis,
    quamconcipitur
    ergoilludverumsemper
    est. Sed non [non:etiamcod.] sempersignificatur
    eadempropositione,
    quia
    de futuro;
    tuncsignificatur
    de
    quandoquesignificatur
    propositione
    propositione
    futuro
    quandores non acihucest,ut antequam Socratesesset,hoc verum
    hac propositione
    'Socratessedebitin taliinstanti'
    in quo modo
    significabatur
    hac propositione
    'Socratessede et ita
    sedet;et Socratestantesignificabitur
    idemverumsignificatur
    a diversis
    propositionibus
    perdiversatempora.
    Quod
    etiamprobatperdictaprophetarum
    et sacramenta,
    hocmodo:Dicitpropheta
    sed virginem
    "Virgopariet",haecpropositio
    significat
    virginem
    parituram,
    estfalsum,
    dixitfalsum.
    Et ne hocinconveniens
    conparituram
    ergopropheta
    estdictumesse[esta.c.] verumetnumquam
    cedamus,ideodicendum
    falsum,
    sed <nunc> non significatur
    hac propositione
    'virgopariet'sed ista'virgo
    peperi.
    occasionedby theSophisticiElenchi?Some Melun people
    (VI) Theorems
    held that Nulla quinqusuntduo et trianecduo et triasuntquinqu{S. Mel.
    4
    28; also Text 16a). The sophism Five are two and three' derives from
    Aristotle'sSophistici
    Elenchi4, 166a33, and we may wonder, as did one
    did not join Aristotlein
    12th-centuryscholar,19why the Meludinenses
    saying that thereis a fallacyof composition and division (i.e., that in
    one sense we are dealing with one proposition with a compound
    predicate, viz. 'five are two-and-three', in another sense with a conjunction of propositions, viz. 'five are two, and five are three').
    The theorem is discussed in Ars Meliduna,20and according to
    Fallaciae Melidunaeit fell under a more general Melun theorem, viz.
    Nulla coniuncta
    estveranisi verasit disiuncta
    , necdisiunctanisi verasit coniuncta(Text 16a). The firstpart of thisrule seems to statethata proposition depraedicato
    copulatoshould always be treatedas a conjunctionof
    18Ms. cit.,20rB:cumprofero
    inhocinstanti
    significat
    ipsumsedereinhocinstanti,
    et cumprofero
    in alio instanti
    eumsederein alio instanti,
    significat
    ergosignificat
    aliud,ergononesteadem.Morecontext
    quotedbyDe Rijk1966,45.
    19See Ebbesen& Iwakuma1991,47-112,
    at 83.
    20See De Rijk 1967II. 1, 334f.
    74

    09:07:50 AM

    propositions.This is strangeenough, but when the second part of the


    rule is added, the effectis even stranger,since disjunctivepropositions
    turnout to be equivalent to conjunctiveones. One mightthinkthe formulation is just sloppy and that the rule about disjunction should be
    understoodto mean 'no disjunctivepropositionis true unless eitherof
    its parts could be true' so that the purpose was to avoid declaring
    Socrates is a man or a
    pearl' a true proposition and yet be able to
    sunt
    rationaliavel irrationalia
    Omnia
    animalia
    (= S.Mel. 27). But
    accept
    FallaciaeMelidunae'srule about dis- and conjunctionlooks suspiciously
    like the same source's rule about conditionals viz. Nulla hypothetica
    'e ex quitus constatsint verae.
    <i.e. conditional> est veranisi categorico
    amount
    to
    two
    rules
    the
    saying that no molecular proposiTogether
    tion is true unless all its constituentpropositionsare so. Now, a wellknown Melun thesis is Ex falso nihilsequitur(Texts 18, 21, 38; S.Mel.
    11). If you add what a later age expressed by saying Ex falso nonnisi
    falsum,you have the formulationEx falso nonsequiturverumnecex vero
    falsumwhich Text 23 ascribes to the Melun people, and which is for
    all practical purposes equivalent to the thesis that no conditional is
    true unless its constituentcategoricals are so. It looks as if a rule that
    was invented to deal with conditionals was extended to conjunction
    and disjunction and thus was overstretched.
    The proposition'Five is two and three' comes fromthe Elenchi, but
    we can now see that the Melun theorem belongs in a debate about
    molecular propositions that moves within a universe of problems
    establishedbeforemen startedto studythe Elenchi.All that book contributedwas an example.
    S.Mel. 24, Omniselenchus
    estnecessarius
    may depend more
    sophisticus
    importantlyon studyof the Elenchi, but its ultimateorigin could conceivably be exegesis of a Boethian passage, such as the end of De differentiis
    topicisI.
    The best candidate for an origin in Elenchiexegesis in Pos.Nom. 6,
    "Being is predicated univocally of all things", because it is accompanied by a referenceto Zeno that presupposes acquaintance with
    Elenchich. 10, though the thesis itselfdoes not: the standard
    Sophistici
    doctrinewhich it rejects, viz. that 'being' is not univocally related to
    all things,was available fromPorphyry'sIsagoge.
    or Topics? Not a single school theoremseems
    (VII) Aristotle's
    Analytics
    to presuppose acquaintance with Topicsor PriorAnalytics
    , though the
    author of Comp.Porr,had some familiaritywith both. Similarly,with
    one possible exception (see later), there is no trace of influencefrom
    75

    09:07:50 AM

    the Posterior
    Analytics,
    though several masters fromthe later 12th century must have studied that work even if they did not teach it.21
    (VIII) Grammar.A few grammatical propositionsoccur in our corpus
    of theses. There are four in Pos.Nom., all criticadof Priscian, viz.
    (11) Syllaba potest habere infinitatempora in metro.
    (12) Interiectiosub adverbio collocanda est.
    (13) Priscianus est insufficiens,quia species troporumnon erudivit.
    (14) Nulla constructioest vitiosa.
    Of these at least N 11 may have its origin not in the exegesis of Prician but of Categories
    ch. 6, where Anonymus D'Orvillensis says:
    Nos dicimusquod productioet correptio
    vocis sed
    non suntquantitates
    essetquantitasvocis,ergo si
    qualitates.Si enim productiovel correptio
    minueretur
    vocisminueretur
    est
    quantitas
    ipsavox,sedeademvocaliscorrepta
    et tarnen
    nondecrescit.22
    et producta,
    Two theorems in Comp.Porr, apparently undercut the grammatical
    distinctionbetween noun and verb, between participleand noun, and
    between the active and the passive voice: 1.5 Eadem dictioestnomenet
    verbum
    , 1.21 Omneactivumetsuumpassivumidemsignificant
    quomodoetiam
    et
    suum
    nomen
    verbale
    but
    are
    ,
    appearances
    participium
    deceptive. The
    for
    those
    theses show they were not meant to change
    proofs offered
    grammar.
    An anonymous grammarian makes the Porretans hold that Nomen
    in appositonulliusestpersonae(Text 25d). But he makes it clear that this
    thesis, though genuinely grammatical, is a by-productof the sect's
    views on predication. According to Text 25e they considered a
    genitiveending in -tusas a criterionforbelonging to the word-classof
    pronouns ratherthan adjectives. This sounds like pure grammar,but
    once again it may well be a by-productof somethingelse, possibly
    Trinitarian theology, in which such words as unus and solus play a
    crucial role. We do have a fragmentof a grammarcomposed by a Porretan.23But neitherin- nor outsidersseem to have thoughtspecifically
    grammatical theses were an importantpart of what distinguisheda
    Porretan fromthe rest of mankind.
    21See, e.g., thetextsin S. Ebbesen,Anonymus
    Aurelianensis
    //,in: CIMAGL 16
    Aurelianensis
    I Commentarium
    inSophisticos
    Elenchos
    , in: CIMAGL
    (1976); id. Anonymi
    34 (1979).
    22QuotedfromEbbesen1991,435.
    23See K.M. Fredborg
    & C.H. Kneepkens,
    Porretana
    Grammatica
    , in: CIMAGL 57
    (1988), 11-67.
    76

    09:07:50 AM

    The same applies to the Meludinenses, whose Nulla oratioest


    imperfecta
    (S.Mel. 33) of course operates with the grammatical notion
    of perfection,but probably was a by-productof theirlogico-semantic
    views. Similar considerationsapply to the view attributedto Montani,
    that demonstrativepronouns are not parts of speech (Text 25a); and
    to a Parvipontanean thesisabout the functionof relativepronouns and
    attributiveadjectives (Text 49); it probably originated in investigations of the truth-conditionsof propositions with embedded predicates.
    Conclusions
    The temporal distributionof referencesto the schools show that
    theirgreat time was the mid-late 12th centurywith at most a feeble
    after-lifein the 13th c. Anonymus D'Orvillensis just may and the
    authorofPos.Nom. probablydoes belong to the early 13thcentury.He
    may have been the last nominalist.
    All non-theologicaltheses attributedto schools by in- or outsiders
    fall within the fields of enquiry defined by the old logic withjust a
    Elenchiand a tinylittledose of Priscian. The only
    sprinkleof Sophistici
    possible exceptions are some theorems of Pos.Nom. that may owe a
    debt to books that became available only in the second half of the
    twelfthcentury.The prime suspects are theorems3-5, 10 and 15, viz.
    (3) Nihil augmentatur
    (4) Non contingitaliquid moveri
    (5) Non est actio nisi per poros.
    (10) Grammatica, dialctica et rhetoricasunt scientia una
    (15) Omnis scientia est demonstrativaet nulle topica.
    etcorruptione
    (3) is statedin explicitdefianceofDe generatione
    , and (4)
    of the Physics
    , but this may just be an attemptto make old goods look
    modern. (3) reallyis just theold " Nothinggrows", as is stronglysuggested by Anonymus D'Orvillensis:
    Concedimus
    tamenquodaliquidcrescit
    enimnilaliudestquam
    [...], crescere
    augmentan
    (Ebbesen,1991,440)24
    "
    '
    Nothingmoves' has a betterclaim to an origin in discussions of the
    new Aristotle,but perhaps it is just an extensionof 4'Nothing grows";
    24Noticethatat
    15al3 "TranslatioBoethi"has crementum
    Categories
    , whereas
    "Translatio
    hasaugmentum.
    composita"
    77

    09:07:50 AM

    a slightly less radical extension is actually found in Anonymus


    D'Orvillensis:
    dicimusquod omnisdemptiopartiset omnisadditioet omnis partium
    variatessentiam
    totius(Ebbesen,1991,438).
    transpositio
    As it stands, Pos.Nom.'s proof of (4) employs terminologyfrom the
    , but it is easily rephrasable in termsthat were available prior
    Physics
    to any acquaintance with the Physics.
    Theorem 10 is stated to be contradivisionem
    Alpharabii, but does not
    for its formulationrequire acquaintance with his work. Theorem 15
    was probably inspiredby the Posterior
    , but could be a revampAnalytics
    a
    discussion
    the end of Boethius' De
    of
    one
    of
    originatingin, e.g.,
    ing
    I.
    differentiis
    The one proposition that surely presupposes acquaintance with a
    new book is "There is no action except via pores", for it is only
    etcorruptione
    intelligiblewhen seen on the background of De generatione
    1.8.
    With these exceptions the non-theologicaltheoremsreflecta stage
    of development reached already about 1150, as far as spheres of
    interestare concerned, though some may have received their final
    shape somewhat later. Thus many of the theorems of Comp.Por. are
    recognizable in Gilbert of Poitiers' works, but he did not formulate
    them as neatly as his pupils. Perhaps we can go furtherback in time
    than 1150. For all I know, virtuallyall the theses could have sprung
    fromthe debates of the predecing decades. We have to except one or
    more of the Pos.Nom. theoremsalready discussed and perhaps a couple
    that seem to presuppose acquaintance with SophisticiElenchi(section
    VII above).
    Perhaps not all the theological theses that later sources attributeto
    schools could be older than 1140/50,but many of them do have roots
    that far back. More than is generallyrecognized may have startedas
    theorems of secular logic. None occurs in any of the lists.
    I will tentativelyconclude that the school division was created by
    masters of arts who were pupils of the great masters of the meriod
    1120-40. Like members of religious groups, members of the
    philosophical sects identifiedthemselvesby theiradherence to a creed
    formulatedin the early days of the sect, consideringwhateverviews
    theymighthold in new fieldsirrelevantto theirsectarian affiliationas
    long as these new views did not interferewith the creed, which contained (almost) solely propositions pertaining to the logic that had
    developed fromexegesis of Logic Vetus.
    78

    09:07:50 AM

    Theologians issued fromthe same logic school could not help sharing many theologicalpositions,and someone steeped in Porretanlogic
    is easily recognizable whateverhe writesabout. A pervading Porretan
    smell clings to the " somebodies' ' criticizedforwrong opinions in the
    Sentences-c
    ommentaryBrevesdieshominis(ms Bamberg, Patr. 136) and
    Humbertus names them as proponents of many (wrong) theological
    views (Text 36). Did the school distinctionscarry over fromthe arts
    to theology?Perhaps only in the sense thatoutsiderscould reasonably
    label as Porretan or Nominalist such theological theses as were
    (characteristically)held by adherentsof one or the othercreed in logic.
    Perhaps not in the sense that any theologymaster advertised himself
    as Porretan or Nominalist. It mightbe all rightto belong to a sectain
    logic, but though Alain of Lille dared write Regulae CaelestisIuris,
    wouldn't a list of positionesnostraein theology look like settingup a
    haeresis?
    Copenhagen
    Institute
    of Greekand Latin

    79

    09:07:50 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    Abelard and theSchool of theNominales1
    C G. NORMORE

    Philosophical confusion is often a sign of historical confusion. A


    position or an argument grows up withina particularhistoricalcontextas a solution to a particularset of problems,and when the context
    and the problems change and the original context and problems are
    forgotten,the argument is oftenleftorphaned, ripe for exploitation
    and misunderstanding.At this point philosophersmay put it to new
    and ratherawkward uses under the illusionthatthesewere the original
    uses. Differentphilosophers tryto twistthe terminologyand concepand incompatibledirections
    tual resourcesin what are really different
    while intending to use them as their teachers did. The result is
    muddle.
    This seems to be the situation with Nominalism. Even a cursory
    glance at the current philosophical scene will reveal that the term is
    now applied to a motley of views about universais, about abstract
    objects, about whether there are natural necessities and even about
    principles of parsominy and plenitude. Most of these views seem
    logically quite independent of one another and seem to be even about
    very differentsubjects, and yet philosophersare, on the whole, quite
    unaware of this and often,just because the terminologyis common,
    seek to fitthe views into a common framework.
    So much confusion is a likely sign of a fairlydeep and fairlyold
    misunderstanding about what Nominalism was. To uncover such
    misunderstandingis a task best undertakenfroma position of methodological innocence. Let us suppose thatwe do not know at all what
    Nominalism is and tryout to seek out its origins in the earliest texts
    we have. What do we find?
    A plausible startingpoint is the supposition that 'nominalism' is a
    position (or cluster of positions) having to do with nomina.Equally
    plausible is the suggestionthatthese positionsare conncectedwiththe
    1 Thispaperwascompletely
    inthePhilosoProfessor
    rewritten
    whileI wasa Visiting
    Irvine.I wouldliketothankU.C.I,
    oftheUniversity
    ofCalifornia,
    phyDepartment
    suchan hospitable
    environment.
    thereforcreating
    and mycolleagues
    working
    80

    09:07:56 AM

    twelfth-century
    group referredto as the Nominalesand the fourteenthto in the fifteenth-century
    referred
    as Nominalistae.
    But
    centuryfigures
    who were thesegroups, whywere theyso-called and what do theyhave
    to do with one another?
    1. Abelardand theNominales
    There seems to have been no one before Abelard who is explicitly
    linked with the Nominales in the texts we have. On the other hand,
    Abelard is linked with them threetimes in early texts. First, the Gesta
    Fridericiof Otto of Freising speaks of him as someone who held the
    'sententia vocum seu nominum'.2 Second, the Metalogicon
    of John of
    Salisbury speaks of Alberic as a bitterenemy of the 'secta Nominalis'
    in the same breathas he speaks of Abelard' s leaving Paris, and in such
    a way that it would be natural to read the text as suggestingthat he
    was thereforea bitter enemy of Abelard too.3 Third, the De Nugis
    Curaliumof Walter Map speaks of him as 'princeps nominalium'4
    These are all early and reliable witnessesleaving littleroom fordoubt
    that Abelard was at least a significantfigureamong the Nominales.
    Was he the founderof the group? The best evidence to the contrary
    seems to be the text fromOtto of Freising mentioned above. There
    Otto explicitlyclaims that it is Roscelin who 'firstin our time established the sententiavocumin logic'. Otto then goes on to speak of
    Abelard as 'holding the sententiavocumseu nominumin the natural
    faculty'and as 'incautiously introducingit into theology'.5If we can
    safelyidentifythe 'sententia vocum' and the 'sententia nominum' as
    Otto seems inclined to do, then we have good reason to think that
    whoever founded the group it was certainlynot Abelard.
    But, despite Otto's apparent identificationof them, there is reason
    to doubt that the sententia
    vocumis the sententia
    nominum.First, there is
    of
    remark
    in
    the
    John
    Salisbury's
    Metalogiconthat the opinion that
    'voces themselvesare genera and species' has 'vanished readily with
    its author' at the very moment that textsabout the Nominates begin
    to appear.6 Second there are several texts,all admittedlyratherlate,
    which explicitlydistinguish 'nomen' and 'voces' and ascribe to the
    2 Listoftexts,6.
    3 Ibid.,8.
    4 Ibid., 19.
    5 Ibid.,6.
    6 Metalog.
    II, 17 (ed. Webb,93).
    81

    09:07:56 AM

    Nominales the thesis that 'unum nomen est plures voces' or its
    equivalent.7 While it is possible that someone might carefully
    distinguishvocesand nominaat the same time thatothersidentifytheir
    vocumor sententia
    nominum
    as the sententia
    views indifferently
    , it is not
    in
    there
    are
    the
    reasons
    advanced
    particularly plausible. Third,
    an
    that
    the
    vocales
    were
    earlier
    for
    Iwakuma ([1992b])
    thinking
    group
    (perhaps associated with a certainJohn, Roscelin's teacher) who were
    supplanted by the Nominales around the middle of the twelfthcentury.8From thisperspective,as Iwakuma pointsout, Otto's identification can be seen as a sign that he saw historicaland doctrinal continuitybetween the two 'sententiae', but not as evidence thatthe term
    'Nominales' was used of anyone before Abelard.
    What of the positive evidence that the Nominales were in any sense
    Abelard' s followers.Otto says that Abelard held the 'sententiavocum
    seu nominum' in natural philosophyand introducedit into theology,
    and Walter Map says that he was 'princeps' among the Nominales.
    We know thatAbelard was a charismaticand popular teacher,and we
    have no evidence at all of his followers(who must have been many)
    being called by any other name. We must conclude, then, that either
    he did not found a distinctiveschool or that the Nominales are that
    school.
    On the other hand I know of no text which both identifies
    itselfas
    and
    no
    text
    which
    'our
    master'
    and
    calls
    Abelard
    Nominales
    fromthe
    in thetextas Abelard's to the Nominales. The
    attributesviews identified
    identificationof the Nominales as Abelard's followerswould, then,
    have to rest squarely on finding them characterized by distinctive
    theses which we have independent reasons to thinkof as in some way
    peculiar to Abelard.9
    2. OpinioNominalium
    If we examine the textswhich we can date more or less securelyto
    before 1230 and which mention the Nominales we finda fairlylarge
    and disparate collection of theses attributedto them. These include:
    7 Listoftexts,52c,52f,54a.
    8 The keytexthereis theHistoria
    desGaules
    etdela
    deshistoriens
    Francica
    in Recueil
    France
    1991,p. 14.
    , vol. 12 (Paris1877)3; cf.Courtenay
    9 The needto finddistinctive
    theseswhichAbelardand the
    thesesand notmerely
    in Courtenay
    bothheldis emphasized
    Nominales
    [1992a].
    82

    09:07:56 AM

    ) are universais10
    1) Some names ( nomina
    est
    nomen'11
    'Genus
    (two attributions)
    2)
    12
    3) Genera and species are vocabulaor voces
    4) Nothing save a vox is supposited forby this name 'genus'13
    5) No complex sermois a genus or species14
    6) Almost every whole is its parts15
    7) 'Nulla res (or nihil) cresci16 (Four attributions)
    8) 'Aliquid' is not properlyspeaking superior to 'homo'17
    )
    9) There is a differencebetween suppositionforthe person {persona
    and supposition for the thing ( essentia
    ) so that 'Socrates' and 'that
    which is Socrates' supposit differently18
    19
    10) To be Peter is essequernand not essequid
    11) Terms are predicated of terms not things of things20(two
    attributions)
    12) Topical loci are not required (apt) for syllogisms21
    13) One may not infernegative claim from an affirmative22
    14) It is not the case that "Posito falso possibili, potest concedi et
    probari quodque contingens"23
    15) 'Quidquid potuit potest'24
    16) The same belief can be expressed by a futuretensed claim at
    one time (e.g. that the Messiah will come) and a past tensed claim
    (e.g. that the Messiah has come) at another25(four attributions)
    17) 'Unum nomen est plures voces'26
    18) That the act and the concomitantvoluntas are the same sin.27
    10Listoftexts,5.
    11Ibid.,40a, 44c.
    12Ibid.,4.
    13Ibid.,44d.
    14Ibid.,22b.
    15Ibid., 11.
    16Ibid.,26 cf.also37, 40b,48c,48d,and 53.
    17Ibid..33b.
    18Ibid.,33a, 33b,48d.
    19Ibid.,40b.
    20Ibid.,22a; cf.also 12.
    21Ibid.,20.
    22Ibid.,23.
    23Ibid.,58.
    24Ibid.,29.
    25Ibid.,44e,46, 48b,52d+ f.
    26Ibid..52c.
    27Ibid.,48a.
    83

    09:07:56 AM

    In this list the these most frequentlyand most widely attributedto


    the Nominales are number 7, the claim that nothing grows, and
    number 16, the claim that the same articlesof faithcan be expressed
    using differenttenses. There is another clusterof very closely related
    theses (8-10) above which could all be characterizedrathervaguely as
    claiming that there is a significantdifferencebetween picking out X
    and pickingout thatwhich is X. Then thereare the linkings(in theses
    1-5) between genera and species and nominaor vocabula.One way of
    testingthe connection between Abelard and the Nominales is to see
    whether these widely attributed theses are indeed Abelardian and
    whetherthey are distinctivelyAbelardian.
    But firstwe must get as clear as we can about the views the
    Nominales held. Since we do not have any extensive treatisewhich is
    both uncontroversiallyfrom the Nominales and which discusses the
    views of the school in detail this can at most be done tentatively.First
    then about predication. In his early Summa BreveSit Robert of Paris
    attributes to the Nominales a distinctionbetween the subject of a
    predication which they say is a term and the subject of a locution
    which theysay is a thing.28If we suppose thatthe Nominales held that
    predicationis fundamentallya linguisticaffairbut thatwhat language
    is about in the sense of what is picked out by linguisticexpressionsare
    thingsin the world, then thisfallsinto place. It also suggestsa connection withone of the most characteristicthesesof the Nominales- that
    the same thingcan be picked out by expressions in one tense at one
    time and in another tense at another. Perhaps the simplest way to
    make sense of this is to suppose that an accusative infinitivesignifies
    and
    what withoutontological prejudice we may call a state-of-affairs
    consignifiesthe time of that state of affairsfromthe point of view of
    the speaker. Thus two accusative infinitiveconstructionswhich differ
    only in tense will signifythe same state of affairs. In the extended
    sense suggested by Robert of Paris we can regard that state of affairs
    as the subject of a locution like 'That the Messiah would come was
    what Abraham believed' This picture connects in a natural way as
    well withthe thesisabout the unityof names throughvariation of case
    and of gender. Such variation would be thought of as producing
    changes of consignification(changes, if you like, in how things are
    signifiedbut not in whatis signified).If we suppose thatthe Nominales
    28Ibid., 12.
    84

    09:07:56 AM

    thought that only a change in what was signifiedcould produce a


    change in which expression (e.g. which name) was under consideration, then we have the 'unity of names' doctrine.
    If we turn to the views of the Nominales about 'universais' one of
    the thingswhich leaps to mind is that most of these ascribed to them
    in this area are not about just any universais in the sense which
    everyone in the period understood the term 'universal' - i.e. what is
    fitto be predicated of many- but about genera and species. We are
    told thatthe Nominales thinkthat genera are nomina
    , thatsomenomina
    are universais, and that the Nominales feignthat genera and species
    are vocabula.We are also told that 'genus' itselfstands fora voxon their
    view. Perhaps most importanthere is to get clear about what is not
    being claimed. It is not being claimed that all universais- i.e.
    , only that
    everything fit to be predicated of many- are nomina
    some- the genera and species- are. Second we are told that at least
    'genus' standsfora vox.This last point, I think,fitswell withthe much
    repeatedclaim thatthe Nominales draw a distinctionbetween predications of (say) 'Socrates' and predicationsof 'that which is Socrates'.
    The differenceseems to be that a term like 'Socrates' could on differentoccasions pick out differentsubstantia.Perhaps on any given
    occasion Socrates is one such substantia
    , but Socrates mightbe different
    on differentoccasions. If we ask then what the term 'genus'
    substantia
    picks out on a given occasion the answer mightbe 'that vox' pointing,
    forexample, to a token of 'homo'. We could then correctlysay (pointing to the vox) 'That is a genus'. This does not mean that we would
    have to say thata genus is a vox.A genus is a nomenand differentvoces
    may be the same nomen.Still a voxmay be a nomenand some vocesare
    genera.
    This also suggestsa way of understandingthe thesis 'nihil crescit'.
    In what is probablyour earliestreferenceto this thesisthe anonymous
    Parisian author of the Commentary
    on theSophisticiElenchiputs this as
    'nulla res crescit'. If we take this as a perspicuous renderingand put
    it togetherwiththe suggestionthat 'aliquid' is not superior to 'homo'
    (Thesis 8 in the above list of theses of the Nominales) it suggeststhat
    the Nominales could well admit that (say) 'Socrates grows' while
    or reswhich is Socrates grows. Two of our
    denyingthat the substantia
    textsmake veryclear thatthe thesisthatnothinggrowsdoes not entail
    thatPeter does not grow or that a man does not grow. Thus the thesis
    is specificallyabout the behavior of certain expressions- 'aliquid',
    'res' and 'nihil' it seems.
    85

    09:07:56 AM

    There are a large number of logical theses attributed to the


    Nominales. Among these is the rejection of the (derived) rule of
    Obligatiothat any contingent sentence follows from a false positum
    (Thesis 14 above). By itselfthishas littleconnectionwithany debates
    we know of in the logic of the time, but the reasoning attributedto the
    Nominales as the basis for rejectingthe rule provides a strongbasis
    forattributingto them also the rejectionof the principlethat fromthe
    Parisienses
    impossible anything follows. According to the Obligationes
    the Nominales rejectthe reasoningwhichleads to the derived rule that
    any contingentsentence followsfroma falsepositumbecause theyhold
    that ifthat reasoningwere valid, thenwe could by the same reasoning
    conclude froma falsepositumto an impossibility.The reasoningwhich
    supports the derived rule can be illustratedas follows:
    Suppose thatas a matterof factSocrates is black and thatthepositum
    of our Obligatiois 44Socrates is white"
    1)
    2)
    3)
    4)
    5)
    6)

    Socrates is white
    Socrates is white and you are not a bishop
    Not (Socrates is white and you are not a bishop)
    Socrates is white
    Not (You are not a bishop)
    You are a bishop

    (the positum)
    (rejected)
    (conceded)
    (conceded)
    (conceded)

    6 has to be conceded
    The argumenthere is relativelystraightforward.
    because it is the negation of 5. 5 is conceded because it followsby disjunctive syllogism(or the third Stoic indemonstrable)from3 and 4.
    4 is just the positum.3 is conceded because it is the negation of 2. 2
    is rejected because it is false and it doesnotfollowfrom1.
    The Nominales hold, according to the text,that ifwe replace "you
    are not a bishop" in 2 by the opposite of somethingimpossible, the
    For example if we replace it by "God
    argument will stillgo through.
    exists" and so get
    2') Socrates is white and God exists
    we will be able, by the same reasoning as before, to conclude
    6') God does not exist
    This is obviously unacceptable and so they reject the procedure.
    Why, we mightask, are the Nominales the ones to point this out?
    Why doesn't everyone reject the procedure? The answer is that ifwe
    replace "You are not a bishop" by a necessarytruth(the opposite of
    an impossible) in 2, most would regard the resultingsentenceasfollow86

    09:07:56 AM

    , and so not irrelevant,and thus to be conceded


    ingfromthepositum
    ratherthan rejectedas 2 was. This is because ifyou accept a) that the
    necessary followsfromanything,and you accept b) that the positum
    followsfromitselfand you accept c) that if B followsfromA and C
    followsfromA, thenB&C followsfromA, thenyou have to accept that
    T followsfrom 1. Thus if you deny that T follows from 1, as the
    Parisienses
    Nominales did according to the Obligationes
    , you must give
    that
    the
    Nominales
    To
    of
    or
    c.
    one
    a,
    b,
    gave up b or c
    suppose
    up
    would be to ascribe to thema verystrangelogic indeed and one which
    commentsfromthe author of the Obligawould suggestratherdifferent
    The only plausible conclusion then is that theyreject
    tionesParisienses.
    a - that the necessary follows fromanything. But if you accept that
    fromthe impossible anythingfollowsand accept contrapositionyou
    are committedto a. There is certainlyno reason to think that the
    Nominales gave up contrapositionand so the only plausible conclusion is that they also rejected the rule that from the impossible
    anythingfollows.
    This is a rather lengthy chain of reasoning but it is a chain of
    reasoningwhichwould immediatelysuggestitselfto a logician reflecting on the argumentin Text 58 and certainlyto anyone trained in the
    involves. I suggest that
    Parisienses
    kind of dialectic that the Obligationes
    it provides very strong reason to think that the Nominales did not
    accept either that from the impossible anything follows or that the
    necessary followsfromanything.
    If, indeed we have good reason to thinkthat the Nominales were
    committedto rejectingthese 4paradoxes of strictimplication' then we
    have another problem. In the anonymous De CommunibusDistinctionibusin Vat. lat. 7678, it is claimed that according to the opinion
    of some Nominales 4'fromthe impossible anythingfollows". It would
    seem thenthateitherwe must discard one of these sources or suppose
    that they reflecta differenceof opinion among the Nominales. I will
    returnto this below.
    The briefdiscussion above leaves several thesesof the Nominales in
    logic and grammar to be explained as well as the strikingviews that
    almost every whole is its parts and that the act and the voluntas are
    the same sin. Our texts tell us so littleabout these claims that there
    is no way to test a theoryabout why the Nominales hold them unless
    we anchor it elsewhere. As we shall see in a moment if we allow
    ourselvesto treatAbelard as a characteristicNominalis these textstoo
    become intelligible.
    87

    09:07:56 AM

    3. OpinioAbaelardi
    Abelard was a master of may subjects- among themlogic, philosophy of language, ethics and theology.In each of these areas he carved
    out a distinctivereputation and distinctivepositions. The definitive
    study of Abelard' s philosophyis far frombeing writtenand too little
    is known to try to identifya small body of central intuitionswhich
    would connect his many views. Her I can hope only to point some of
    his more strikingphilosophical theories which may be connected to
    what we know of the Nominales.
    Abelard's logic is distinctive.As ChristopherJ. Martin has argued,
    while he was among the very firstto discover and employ propositional logic in the Middle Ages, he mixed thisdiscoverywitha conservatism about inference.29The core of his account of inferencewas a
    division of inferencesinto perfectones which needed no topical locus
    as a justificationand imperfectones whichhad to be reduced to perfect
    ones by a topical rule.30Aristotle's syllogisticprovided a paradigm
    case of perfectinference.In advocating this picture Abelard was taking a stand on a controversialissue in twelfthcenturylogic namely
    the relative positions of syllogisticand topical inference.He was also
    accepting thesis 12.
    Abelard's relationto topical inferenceis, on the whole, unusual. He
    , and because he rejects this locushe rejects
    rejects the locusab oppositis
    the claim thata negative followsfroman affirmativeor vice versa. He
    rejects all of these because he has a batteryof argumentsdesigned to
    show that if theyare accepted one will be able to derive froma given
    claim the negation of that claim. It is (as Christopher Martin has
    shown) a basic principle of Abelard's logic that one cannot derive a
    claim from its negation. From this basic principle also follows
    Abelard's rejection of the Parvipontanean thesis that "from the
    impossible anythingfollows". There are other grounds on which one
    might reject the Parvipontanean thesis (Robert of Melun's followers
    seem to have done so because of a view that entailmentis a real relation among things, for example), but it is not easy to conceive a
    coherentposition differentfromAbelard's and plausible in the twelfth
    centurywhich would have one give up exactly the logical principles
    Abelard abandons. It is strikingthatthe Nominales too abandoned the
    29Cf. C .J.Martin,TheLogicoftheNominales
    in thisissue.
    30Cf. Dialctica
    III, 256 11.30-35.
    88

    09:07:56 AM

    view that one can infera negative from an affirmative.Unlike the


    froma negative which many later logicians
    inferenceof an affirmative
    rejected on the ground that affirmativeshave existentialimport and
    negatives do not, the rejectionof the inferencefromnegative to affirmative seems hard to motivate forother than Abelardian reasons. If
    we take it togetherwiththe commitmentof the Nominales to denying
    that anythingfollowsfromthe impossible, it suggests a close connection with Master Peter.
    If we turn fromLogic to Metaphysics we find Abelard advancing
    an interconnectedset of theses in ontologywhich have some startling
    consequences. Abelard holds that the only resthere are are individual
    forms and individual essentiae.Like many of his contemporarieshe
    seems to have been an atomistabout matter.Abelard has an extremely
    sophisticatedaccount of identityand differenceand he seems to have
    had a deep interestin what is reallythe Chrysippean growingparadox
    (though it is unlikelythathe knew of the ancient discussion of it). The
    growing paradox has several formsbut one simple one is just this.
    Suppose thatSocrates is identicalat a given time witha particularcollection of matterand forms.Call the collection A. Since A is a particularcollectionof matterand forms,adding more matterwould yield
    somethinga littlebigger than A; call it B. B is not identical with A
    (for one thingit is bigger). But if Socrates is identical with A, then B
    is not identical with Socrates either. Abelard worries about various
    formsof this problem in several places including his Dialcticaand his
    .31 In his TheologiaChristianaBk. Ill Abelard faces
    TheologiaChristiana
    and differenceamong the members of the
    of
    sameness
    the problems
    Trinitywitha theoryof identityformulatedwiththe growingparadox
    in mind. Abelard workshere withtwo distinctrelations: thingscan be
    the same (or not) and can be diverse (or not). It is possible to have a
    non-diversitywithout having sameness. For example a thing is not
    numericallythe same as one of its parts but is not numericallydiverse
    from it either. Abelard distinguishes numerical sameness and differencefromessential sameness and difference.A thingand its proper
    part are essentially diverse even though not numerically diverse.
    Again sameness of essentiadoes not guarantee the next level of
    , and thissameness does not guarantee
    sameness, sameness ofproprietas
    sameness of definition.Individuals have definitions.32The notion of
    31Op. cit.p. 42Iff.
    32Theseclaimsareworked
    in Theologia
    inOpera
    outanddefended
    Christiana
    theol.
    Ill,
    147-157.I owemuchhereto MonikaAsztalos,PeterKingand MartinTweedale.
    89

    09:07:56 AM

    essentiaat work here has littlein common with the notion as we find
    in Aquinas, forexample. An essentiais typicallywhat is picked out by
    a bare demonstrative- that, pointing towards Socrates. Abelard
    insists that any change of parts creates diversityof essentia.Hence if
    Socrates loses a fingerwe no longerhave the same essentia
    , thoughsuch
    a loss does not create numerical diversityand we do not have a differentSocrates before and after. Abelard applies his account to the
    Trinity (where we have sameness of essentiabut not sameness of proprietas)and to the analysis of augmentation where an essentiacannot
    be said to grow, thougha person can. This seems to be preciselythesis
    7.
    Abelard is probably most famous as a semantic theoristand forhis
    account of the behavior of general terms- especiallyspecies and genus
    terms. On occasion he seems to accept Aristotle's suggestion that a
    and nominates
    and
    sentenceconsistsminimallyof a name whichsignifies
    time. On other occasions he
    a verb which signifies and consignifies
    claims that names too consignifytime and change their nomination
    with time. Abelard seems to claim consistentlythat names nominate
    things, express propertiesand have statuses. A status for Abelard is
    constructionspick out statuses, and
    not a thing. Accusative-infinitive
    definitions.In his
    Abelard claims thatdifferentstatusesyield different
    mature work,at least, Abelard claims thata genus or species is a name
    sermo(Thesis 5) and he carefullydistinguishesbetween a
    or incomplex
    name or sermoand a vox.33A voxand a sermohe claims to be wholly
    the same in essentiabut to be differentin institution(and so we might
    and definition).34Because a sermoand the correspondadd in proprietas
    ing voxare identicalin essence, we can assertboth 'Genus est vox' and
    '
    'Genus est sermo' (Theses 2 and 4). Because he uses 4sermo and
    in his discussions of genera and species,
    'nomen' quite indifferently
    we can also commit him to 'Genus est nomen' (Thesis 2). Because
    theyare not the same in propertyor definition,we can assert 'sermo
    est genus' and 'all sermones are voces' withoutbeing committedto
    'Vox est genus'. On the more general question of which expressions
    are universais Abelard claims that verb and infinitenames as well as
    finite names count, but he does not suggest that verbs of infinite
    names could be genus or species terms.35It seems thenthathe accepts
    every one of thesis 1-5.
    33AbelardLI p. 16 1.19-22fortheviewthatonlyincomplex
    sermones
    areuniversais.
    34AbelardLNPS p. 522 110-32.
    35AbelardLI p. 17.
    90

    09:07:56 AM

    In Ethics Abelard is famed forhis view that value lies not in acts
    but in what in his Scito Te Ipsumhe calls 'consents' to acts. Abelard
    insiststhat whetheror not the external act is performedand whether
    or not one has a voluntasto performthe act are both ethicallyirrelevant. What mattersis the consentalone. Such a view requires only the
    shiftfromthe vocabulary of consent to that of voluntas(in some ways
    a more traditionalterminologyforthis notion anyway) to yield thesis
    18.
    Finally, in modal theoryAbelard was famed forthe view that God
    could only do what he did in factdo. This position Abelard founded
    on a more general position- that what is possible for X is just what
    is compatible with the nature of X. In formulatingthis position
    Abelard seems to have had in mind Boethius' discussion in his Second
    of the differencebetween
    Commentaryon Aristotle'sDe Interpretatione
    Stoic and peripateticviews of modality. The Stoics, Boethius says,
    regard as possible forX whateveris compatible with X and the attendant circumstances. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, regard as
    possible for X whatever is compatible with the nature of X alone.
    Abelard seems to have endorsed the peripatetic view and to have
    understood 'nature' in such a way that thingsof the same kind have
    the same nature. In God's case Abelard' s view entailed that since perfectgoodness was part of God's nature, God could do only what was
    forthebest, i.e. what he did do. In any case though, since the natures
    of thingsdo not change with time, Abelard is committedto the view
    that what is possible forX at one time is always possible for X, i.e.
    to thesis 15.
    4. Is theopinioNominaliumtheOpinioAbaelardi?
    The thumbnailsketchI have just given of some of Abelard' s views
    will no doubt sound familiar.There is not a single thesisin the above
    list of theses attributedto the Nominales which conflictswith a view
    of Abelard' s. Nearly all of them are explicitlyasserted somewhere by
    Abelard and those which are not can be easily defended fromothers
    of Abelard' s known views. Even if we look at theses attributedto the
    Nominales in the thirteenth
    centuryonly one, the attributionto 'some
    nominales' of the view that everythingfollows froma contradiction,
    raises any difficulties.Even these difficultiesare not very serious
    because even if we omit the (non-negligible) risk of scribal error or a
    misunderstandingon the author's part, we could explain the conflict
    91

    09:07:56 AM

    between this and the rejection of the thesis I argued above to be


    Parisiensesas the result of confusionamong
    implicitin the Obligationes
    Abelard' s followersabout how to respond to the devastatingattack on
    Abelard' s theoryof inferencemounted by Alberic of Paris.36
    Thus there seems to be an uncanny similaritybetween Abelard's
    views and those attributedto the Nominales in our early texts. Is the
    similarityenough to fatherthe Nominales on Abelard. I thinkthat it
    is. The only other alternative would be to see Abelard as basically
    reflecting,refining,and elaboratinga complex set of views whichwere
    already held by others(by the mysteriousvocalesperhaps). This is not
    impossible, but it does seem unlikely. Abelard is the only figure
    securely linked by name with the Nominales, attributionsto the
    Nominales are not found during his lifetimeor before but are found
    within twentyyears of his death, and there is an uncanny similarity
    of complex and frequentlyunusual doctrine over a wide range of
    subjects.
    5. WhyweretheNominalesso-called?
    There are, so far as I know, three plausible accounts of where the
    Nominales get their name. The traditionalaccount is that theywere
    so called because they held the view that genera and species were
    names. The second view (which Stephen Menn has proposed to me
    in conversation), is that the name comes from their characteristic
    account of predication. The thirdview, which both W.J. Courtenay
    and I have defended, is that the sobriquet comes froma set of theses
    which they held about the unity of the name.37 Are we in a position
    to evaluate these proposals?
    Let us firstconsider the traditional view. There can be no doubt
    that the traditionalview is a medieval view; Zenon Kaluza has shown
    that Jean de Maisonneuve, Jean Gerson and others associated with
    them around 1400 explicitly identify the Nominales as so-called
    because of their views on universais.38 What is not clear is how
    authoritativethat identificationis. De Maisonneuve et al. seem to be
    36I pursued
    thislineofthought
    in TheTradition
    In thatpaper
    Nominalism.
    ofMedieval
    incallingtheAlberic
    I persisted
    wholaunched
    thisattack*Alberic
    ofRheims'.I owe
    to W.J. Courtenay
    and C.J. Martin.On theauthenticity
    thecorrection
    of the
    Nominalist
    21 impossible
    1992aand Iwakuma1992a.
    rule,see underCourtenay
    37Cf. Normore
    (1991a).
    38Kaluza 1988.(1985),Courtenay
    92

    09:07:56 AM

    relyingalmost exclusivelyon remarksAlbertus Magnus made about


    the Nominales and perhaps especially on a passage fromAlbert's Liber
    de Praedicabilibus
    (Text 61). Here it is explicitlyclaimed that "those
    who are called Nominales say that commonness exists only in the
    intellect.Moreover theyclaim that the intellectis bare of preexisting
    dispositions,'39
    Two thingsare worthnotingabout thistext. The firstis thatAlbert
    does not say that the Nominales are so-calledbecause they held this
    claim about communitybeing found only in the intellect.Indeed it is
    not easy to see how such a view could give rise to the name
    ' Nominales' unless it were
    accompanied by a very strong theoryof
    mental language. The second is that Albert is almost among our
    witnessesin suggestingthatthe Nominales make a claim about intellectualcommonness. Several early textssuggestthat the Nominales think
    that genera and species are linguisticitems in some sense, but none
    suggestthattheyare in any way mental items. The only independent
    connection between the Nominales and the idea that genera and
    species are in some way mentalis found in a note which K.H. Tachau
    foundin a manuscriptof William of Auxerre's SummaAurea.40Tachau
    suggests that the note is in a thirteenthof fourteenthcenturyhand,
    and the author in a list of three differencesbetween Nominales and
    Reales puts firstthat " Reales say genera and species to be something
    in re, Nominalessay themto be nothingin re but to be certainconceptiones
    animae."41 It is difficultto assess thiswitnessand at this point it seems
    mostplausible thatwhat both Albertand the anonymous author of the
    note have done is take the connection among the Nominales between
    genera and species and vocabula and turnit into a connectionbetween
    genera and species and intellectusor conceptiones. Within a midthirteenthcenturymilieu the slide is understandable enough.
    Outside of the fifteenthcentury Albertine tradition there do not
    seem to be texts claiming that the Nominales take their name from
    theirviews about universais. Even the anonymous author of the note
    just mentioned simply includes the position about universais in a list
    of significantdifferencesbetween Nominales and Reales which also
    includes the notoriousarticlesof faithand 'nihil cresci theses. There
    are however several texts which distinguishthe Nominales and the
    39Kaluza 1981,19.
    40Listoftexts,70.
    41Ibid.
    93

    09:07:56 AM

    Resiles in termsoftheirpositions about universais. Besides those mentioned above both the Archpoet and Godfrey of Fontaines rely for
    theirdramatic effecton theirreaders knowingthatthe Nominales and
    Reales had different
    views of universais.42There can be no doubt then
    that a position about universais was associated with the Nominales
    both early and often.Associating a group with a position is not, however, the same thing as claiming that theywere named forthat position and the factremains thatthereis no hard evidence connectingthe
    appearance of the term'Nominales' withtheirviews about universais.
    The second view- connecting the term 'Nominales' with their
    views about predication- has not been sufficiently
    explored. The root
    intuitionhere- thatNominalism is theview thatnames and not things
    are involved in predication- receivesdirectsupportfromText 12 and
    is suggested by Text 22a. Although I cannot explore it furtherhere,
    it deserves, I think, serious attention.
    The thirdview, that the Nominales were so-called because of their
    view that a name was invariantunder changes of case and of gender,
    and more metaphoricallythat the significationof an expression was
    invariant under changes of tense as well, is the only view to receive
    direct support before the last few years of the fourteenthcentury. In
    Bk.l d.41 a. 2 q.2 of this Commentary
    on theSentences
    of PeterLombard
    Bonaventure expressly endorses the view. He opens the passage by
    alluding to the view of those who say that 'albus', 'alba' and 'album',
    althoughtheyare threevocesand have threemodes of signifying,carry
    the same significationand so are one name.He continues by drawing
    the analogy withenuntiabilia
    which differin tense yet signifythe same
    thing, and he concludes by saying that "this was the opinion of the
    Nominales whoare calledNominalesbecausethey
    foundtheirpositionon the
    the
    name
    ."43
    unityof
    Bonaventure is not in this passage claiming that the distinctive
    thesis of the Nominales was that variation in gender did not vary the
    name. He is rather claiming that that was a special case of a more
    general thesis which is also alluded to by William of Auxerre (Text
    52c), namely the thesis that sameness of significationmakes for
    sameness of a nomen.
    The texts linking the Nominales with the thesis that sameness of
    42ForthepassagefromtheArchpoet
    see thepaperofC.J. Martinin thisvolume;
    forGodfrey
    ofFontaines
    see listoftexts,18.
    43Listoftexts,64a.
    94

    09:07:56 AM

    significationentails sameness of nomenare not quite as old as those


    linkingthem with problems about universais, but they are nearly as
    frequentand the differencein their age is at most one generation.
    Although Bonaventure does not display any extensive knowledge of
    Nominalist views, what he says in the few passages in which he
    discusses themis otherwiseconfirmedby othersources. It seems then
    thatwe have no good reason to discount his testimonyabout how the
    name arose. Thus while none of the three theoriesmentioned above
    has been eitherproved or disprovedbeyond reasonable doubt, it is the
    thirdview which the preponderance of evidence slightlyfavors.
    6. Nominalesand Nominalistae
    Even as recentlyas fiveyears ago thereseemed to be no way of connectingup the ascriptionof the term 'Nominales' in the twelfthcenSince the modern
    turywiththe term 'Nominalistae' in the fifteenth.44
    term 'Nominalism' seems as connected to the fifteenth
    centuryas to
    the twelfth,thislack of continuitymade it veryunclearjust what is was
    that the modern usage was supposed to go back to. With the publication of Zenon Kaluza' s Les QuerellesDoctrinales Paris all that has
    changed. Kaluza has, I think,cleared up one of the more important
    historicalquestions about medieval nominalism by showing that at
    least one strand of the fifteenth
    centuryuse of the term 'Nominales'
    can be traced back to Albert the Great's remarks about the twelfth
    century Nominales. Kaluza has done more; he has shown that
    century
    preciselybecause it is parasiticupon Albert's use, the fifteenth
    use of 'Nominalistae' is, at least in the mouths of some, to pick out
    a position (or a range of positions) about the problem of universais.
    Kaluza' s workmarksa significantstep in our understandingof how
    the twelfthcenturyNominales and the fifteenth
    centuryNominalistae
    came to be connectedhistorically,but it raises a number of new questions. The Albertine tradition seems to have thought of the labels
    'Nominales' and 'Nominalistae' as pejorative. Yet by the time of the
    Royal Edict of 1473 which bans the teaching of nominalism at Paris
    therewere clearlydoctors who identifiedthemselveswith these labels
    and who seem not to have regarded the Albertineaccount of what the
    labels signifyas definitive.If the letterrespondingto the Royal Edict
    44This was thesituation
    whenI wroteTheTradition
    Nominalism
    , for
    ofMedieval
    example.
    95

    09:07:56 AM

    is to be taken seriously,the problems of universaisdid not loom large


    in the minds of these doctors as what united them.45
    7. A Fable
    Very littleabout the Nominales is beyond reasonable doubt. For the
    moment we are like Timaeus, in the realm of the likely story. Here
    is the one I would tell:
    Once upon a time a number of thinkersincludingperhaps Roscelin
    and the Garlandus of the Dialctica, began to think that many differences among words- especially genus and category words and
    tense and gender indicators- did not reflectany differencesin things.
    They began to claim thingslike "Vox est genus". They had a brilliant
    studentin Peter Abelard who saw thatthe views theywere advancing,
    though on the righttrack, were far too crude and invited refutation.
    Abelard significantlychanged the views while preserving much of
    their spirit. He began to claim that semantics was the province, not
    of the bare word (the vox) but of the significantword (the nomen)and
    the significantexpression (the sermo)and to utterclaims like "Nomen
    est genus" and "Albus et alba idem nomen sunt". He attracted
    studentsnot merelybecause of theseviews but because of his brilliance
    and his original and articulated work in a variety of fields. People
    began to talk about Abelard and his group as Nominales. Abelard in
    due course died but the movement, unified by reverence for his
    memory and close adherence to his teaching, survived into the end of
    the twelfthcenturyand the memory of it never quite faded away.
    This is a likely story. It fitsthe evidence adduced and it fitsother
    things too like the DialcticaArs which William, bishop of Lucca,
    donated to the Church of St. Martin in that city and which refersto
    Abelard as 'the Philosopher'- a sobriquet later reserved forAristode
    alone. Perhaps most important it suggests a line of philosophical
    research. By thinkingof Abelard and the Nominales and figureslike
    the author of the DialcticaArs as parts of a single if loosely defined
    movement we can hope to get new insightinto the position each held.
    Universityof Toronto
    Ezindale College

    The Ohio State University

    Department
    of Philosophy

    45Forthisepisodecf.L. Thorndyke
    Records
    andLifeintheMiddle
    University
    AgesNew
    York(1944),355ff.
    96

    09:07:56 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    Nominales
    Twelfth-Century
    The PosthumousSchool of PeterAbelard
    IWAKUMAY.

    *was
    The label 'nominales
    originallyattached to those who belonged
    to the logic-schoolof Peter Abelard. It is one of several schools active
    in the second halfof the 12th-century.In thispaper I shall discuss why
    nominales
    were so called (1-2), when theyappeared (3) and disap'
    '
    peared (4), and what was understood by nominalesin the 13thcentury(5).
    and nominales
    1. The unitasnoministheory
    were called so because of
    Bonaventure (#64a)! says that nominales
    44
    their holding the unitas-noministheory, or the thesis 'albus' '-a'
    '-um' sunt unum nomen". Two more 13th-centurysources attribute
    the theoryto nominales
    (# 52c, 54a). Supported by these sources, M.D. Chenu and W.J. Courtenay argue thatthe basis of the nominalism
    was in the unitas-nominis
    theory,and they search under this presupof
    the nominalism into teachings of masters
    for
    the
    position
    origin
    other than Abelard.2 It is true that nominalesactually held the unitasnoministheory.3 But still the testimonies on which Chenu and
    Courtenay rely turn out to be unreliable, if we study 12th-century
    sources.
    1 The numbers
    with
    arethosein IwakumaY. & S. Ebbesen,Logico-theological
    volume
    A ListofSources
    theSecond
    Schools
    , in thepresent
    Century:
    from
    Halfofthe12thofthisjournal.
    2 Chenu1935-36;Chenu1957;Courtenay
    1991a.
    3 A 12th-century
    treatisein ms Vienna,VPL 2459, ff.107v-lllra,discusses,
    withotherthesesof nominales
    theory
    (cf. n. 20 below),theunitas-nominis
    together
    (109va-b)as follows:
    "Quaeritursi 'albus,-a, -um' sitidemnomenvel diversa.
    Quidamdicuntquoddiversa;quidamquodidemnomen;aliidicunt<quod> hoc
    nomen'albus'estpluranomina,nontampluraasserentes
    (] asserentibus
    ms)quod
    sitnominadiversa.< Primis
    > sicopponitur Contranos: 'albus,-a, -u<m>
    estidemnomen,<ergo> nullamterminatione<m>
    habethocnomen<'albus'>
    contraillosqui dicuntquod
    quamnonhabeathocnomen'alba'. Fallacia Item
    "
    pluranomina,nontarnen
    plura,sie opponitur
    97

    09:11:17 AM

    The unitas-nominis
    theorywas firstproposed in somewhata different
    formula,viz. "oblique cases are the same noun as theirnominative".
    This theoryis against what Aristotlesays in his De interpretatione
    (2,
    "
    16a32-bl, transi.Boethii): 'Catonis' autem vel 'Catoni' et quaecumque talia sunt non sunt nomina, sed casus nominis". In his Dialctica
    Peter Abelard gives commentsto thisAristotle'sidea to the effectthat
    cases or gender; and
    significationremains the same throughdifferent
    that
    'Cato'
    and 'Catonis' are
    in his Logica Ingredientibus
    explicitlysays
    the same noun in so far as one pays attentionto the identityof their
    signification.4It is almost certain that Abelard was the firstperson to
    theory in these forms,since none of the
    propound the unitas-nominis
    commentaries gives similar comments to
    extant earlier PerihermeniasAristotle's phrase.5
    By Abelard' s last days thisissue became a matterof discussion. The
    Introductiones
    Montanae maioressays as follows (Ms Paris, BN, lat.
    15141, f. 49ra-b):
    'Socrates'estnomen,ergoproprium
    velappellativum;
    et
    Rursumopponitur.
    cumnonsitalterius;
    etsi est
    cumnonsitappellativum,
    estproprium;
    Socratis,
    'Socrates'nomenSocratis,Socrateshabethoc nomen'Socratis',et eadem
    ratione<'Socrati'> 'Socrate<m>' 'Socrate';et ita vocaturhoc nomine
    concedere.
    'Socratis''Socrati''Socratem''Socrate',quodestabsurdum
    'Socratis'velvocatioestfieri
    Nosnonconcedimus
    quodvocetur
    aliquis/49rb/
    et vocativum,
    ut hicvocetur
    Socrates'Socrates'vel 'o
    nisipernominativm
    esseconcedendum
    Socrates
    quodhocnomen
    (] socrataMr)'. Ad quoddicimus
    nomenSocratis,
    et Socrates(] socratis
    'Socratis''Socrati''-em' estproprium
    nontarnen
    habet
    , quia
    pluranomina
    Ms) habethocnomen'Socratis'et'Socratem',
    nam(] inMs) hocnomen'Socratis'nonest
    non(] tamMs) essetbinomius(!);
    cumilionomen.
    Sed quamvis
    hocnomen'Socratem'necaliudnomen,sedidem
    nonpotest
    vocariistonomine,
    sedpotest
    hocnomen'Socratem',
    habeatSocrates
    cumisto.
    nomineisto,et vocarinominequodestidem
    appellari
    This work reportsthe teachings of Alberic of Paris in the mid-12thcentury,and oftencontraststhem with those of Peter Abelard. In the
    4 See Dial., 124.36-125.15,
    and LI , 344.14-17.
    5 FortheextantPerihermeneiascommentaries
    and thebriefdating,seeJ. Marenbon
    All ofearliercommentaries
    thatAristotle
    intends
    interprete
    bythe
    [forthcoming].
    noun.Onlytwoofthe
    phrasetoexcluseobliquecases(as wellas infinite
    nouns)from
    listedtheresay thatAristotle
    17 extantcommentaries
    definition
    to
    givestwo-fold
    infinite
    nounsandobliquecasesas nouns,anda
    noun,a looseonewhichincludes
    strict
    onewhichexcludes
    them.Theyare H15 (msParis,BN lat. 15015,f. 183va),
    datedto mid-1
    130's,and H10 (ms Paris,Bibl.Arsenal910, f. 166va),datedby
    Marenbon
    after1120,butI aminclined
    todateitlater.Bothofthemwerelaterthan
    Abelard'sworks,
    mostpresumably
    and therefore
    undertheinflutheywerewritten
    enceofAbelard'sunitas-nominis
    theory.
    98

    09:11:17 AM

    passage quoted above the name of Abelard is not mentioned. However, it is highlyprobable that in his last days Abelard taught the
    unitas-nominis
    theory,whichhe had arrivedat in his youngerdays; and
    Alberic followed him in this issue, though otherwise being a bitter
    opponent of Abelard.
    Montanae maioresprovides evidence that the
    The Introductiones
    Albricani
    , followersof Alberic, asserted the unitas-nominis
    theoryas well
    as nominales.Moreover, Porretaniaccepted the unitas-nominis
    theory,
    that
    asserts
    Porretanum
    too. Thesis 1.2 of the Compendium
    plures
    logicae
    vocesesse unumterminm
    , or oblique cases are the same noun as the
    suntunumnomen
    ,
    nominative; and Thesis 1.3 assertsthatpluresdictiones
    '
    9
    or 'albus*'-a '-um are the same noun.6
    These two questions are dealt with as the same one in another
    source, a treatise in Ms Munich elm 29520(2) (an unfoliated fragment). The treatiseis a product of the Petit-Pontschool, as I argue
    elsewhere.7Unfortunatelyonly the beginning part is extant. It tells
    s view on the issue:
    nothingof Parvipontani
    cumsuisobliquis,et diversi
    soletessequaestio:utrumnominativus
    Generalis
    ab altero,sintidemnomenvel diversa
    nominativi
    quorumunus formatur
    est
    nomina,ut 'albus' 'alba' '-bum','Socrates''-ti'. Circa quod multiplex
    hos(] hi(us)ms)nonsolumesseidemnomen,sed
    qui dicerent
    opinio.Fuerunt
    Contraquossic.
    etveritati.
    obvitrationi
    etiameandemvocem.Quodprorsus
    Aliquidestparshuiusvocis'albus',quodnonestparshuiusvocis'alba', et e
    ... (thereis one line
    converso;
    ergohaecvoxnonestilla. Et hocab Aristotile
    more,butitis damagedto be illegible)....
    ArsMelidunareportsvarious opinions to thisissue propounded in the
    second half of the century(Ms Oxford, Bodl. libr., Digby 174, ff.
    21 lvb-213ra):
    utrum
    obliquuscumsuorectodicendussit idem
    Consequenter
    ergoquaeritur
    nomenvelnon.
    invenitur
    opinio.Dicuntenimquidam obliTriplexsuperhocmodernorum
    alii
    eo quodaliasiteiusterminatio;
    quumessealiudnomenquamsuumrectum,
    etinstitutio
    dicunt
    obliqui
    quodsitidemnomen,eo quodeademsitsignificatio
    etrecti;alii quodnecidemnecaliud;nonidem,quia noneademestvocistervel
    minatiorecticumobliquo;nonaliud,quia nonalia est eius significatio
    institutio
    quamrecti.
    et usui,et ex
    auctoritati
    Et primaquidemopiniorpugnt
    grammaticorum
    .../212ra/....
    inconvenientia.
    ipsamultasequuntur
    dicentium
    Secundam
    diximusesseopinionem
    obliquoscumsuisrectisesse
    identitatem
    etinstitutionis.
    Sed haeciterum
    idemnomenpropter
    signifcationis
    Dicuntenimquidam eorumobliquoscumrectoesseet idem
    opiniovariatur.
    6 Ebbesen/Fredborg/Nielsen
    1983,3.
    7 IwakumaY. [1992a],3. (ed.)
    99

    09:11:17 AM

    nomenet eandemvocem;et sicutidemnomenita et eandemvocemplures


    habereterminationes,
    voxet institutio;
    quia ad essenominisduo exiguntur,
    undecumdicitur
    "hoc nomen'homo'esthocnomen'hominis' sensusest,
    i.e. haecvoxesthaecvox,ethabeteandeminstitutionem.
    Alii verodicuntrectumcumobliquisesseidemnomen,sedessediversas
    vocespropter
    diversas
    teret sicpluresvocesesseidemnomen.
    minationes;
    Sed hisposterioribus
    multipliciter
    potestobici
    Notandum
    dictionibus
    declinabilibus
    ergoquoniameorumquae conveniunt
    Etquae
    quaedamsibiinomniterminatione,
    quaedamnoninomniconveniunt.
    omnemterminationem
    attribu
    insunt,
    (] quodMs) secundum
    possunt
    qualibet
    terminatione
    dictionis
    uthocnomen'albus'estadiectivum
    nominata,
    mobile,
    est alicuiuscasus,generis,numeri;similiter
    hocverbum'curri
    declinatur,
    esttertiae
    estalicuiusmodi,personae,
    temactionem,
    signifcat
    coniugationis,
    suntvera.Quae veronon
    poris,et huiusmodi;
    quae peromnesterminationes
    secundumomnemterminationem
    insunt,possuntattribuinon <nisi>
    nominando
    ut nomenquod profertur
    ab istoest masculini
    terminationem,
    estfeminini,
    estneutri,
    tantum
    hocnomen'albus'
    generis,
    positoquodprofrt
    in hac terminatione;
    similiter
    in '-us', in '-a', in '-um', est
    terminatur
    nominativi
    eodemmodoverbum
    ab istoest
    casus,estgenitivi;
    quodprofertur
    indicativi
    futuri,
    praesentis
    temporis,
    modi,imperativi,
    praeteriti,
    optativi,
    infinitivi.
    Sed si velimusnominareterminationem
    dictionis,ilia sola erit
    nominanda
    secundum
    illi convenit,
    ut hoc nomen
    quam istudpraedicatum
    'albus'estmasculini
    et hocverbum
    'curro'primaepersonae;
    sednon
    generis,
    similiter
    dices:hocnomen'albus'estfeminini
    velhocverbum
    'curro'
    generis,
    estsecundaepersonae,
    nonconvenit
    alteriistarum
    dicquia talepraedicatum
    tionumin hac terminatione
    velin illa. Itaquenominata
    terminatione
    dictionis
    nonerit,utdiximus,
    sivecopulandum
    non
    aliquidattribuendum
    quodei/212rb/
    conveniat
    in illaterminatione.
    Similiter
    nominando
    non
    pluresterminationes
    eritaliquidattribuendum
    illasterminationes.
    Unde
    quod noninsitsecundum
    nonestverumquodhocnomen'albus,-a, -um'sitalicuiusgeneris,
    quia non
    estalicuiusgeneris
    secundum
    omnesillasterminationes,
    sedmagisaliquorum;
    nechocnomen'dominus,
    domini,domino'"estalicuiuscasus,sedaliquorum.
    Fortassis
    autemnechocipsumbenedicitur
    domini'estnomen",
    'dominus,
    vel " 'curro,curris,-it' estverbum",sicutnec istud"haec species'homo,
    homini'praedicatur
    de aliquo".
    hominis,
    Nec tarnen
    solutioquamdiximuspotestinfirmari
    hocmodo..../213ra/....
    Nunc tertiaeopinioniobviandum,
    quae scilicetasserit'homo' 'hominis'
    essevoces,sed necidemnomennequediversa
    diversas
    Suntetiamal ii qui nonrecipiunt
    hancvocemesseillamnecaliamab ea, sicut
    necnomen.Atverohancopinionem
    multaeex supradictis
    rationibus
    videntur
    interimere,
    ideoquenihilaliudnunccontraearndicemus
    quamquaedictasunt
    prius.
    It is evident thatMeludinenses
    , too, held the unitas-noministheory,but
    in a differentform,viz. according to them oblique cases are not only
    the same noun but also the same voice as the nominative.
    These pieces of evidence8 prove that in the second half of the 12th-noministheory was held by rather many logic
    century the unitas
    8 Thereis another
    textdiscussing
    theissuefromthestand-point
    that
    12th-century
    nounsfrom
    thenominative.
    See Ms Oxford,
    Bodl.Libr.,
    obliquecasesaredifferent
    Digby174,f.242vb.
    100

    09:11:17 AM

    formula.It cannot be exclusively


    schools, each witha slightlydifferent
    attributedto nominales
    , as the 13th-centurysources say. And if so, the
    '
    '
    label nominalescannot stem from their holding that theory as is
    asserted by Bonaventure.
    2. Whywerenominales
    calledso?
    As is well-known,Peter Abelard developed the theorythat universais are sermones
    , not vocesas had traditionallybeen formulated.J.
    Reiners argues that Abelard took sermoto be identical to nomen
    , and
    laterhis theoryof universais came to be formulatedas ' 'universais are
    9
    nomina".9Thus J. Reiners suggeststhatthelabel 'nominalesoriginated
    fromtheir theoryon universais in this formulation.
    " is
    The formula 4'universais are nomina
    frequentin 12th-century
    VII- 12 ; cf.
    sources (#5, 18, 40a, and John of Salisbury's Polycraticus
    etiam 25i, 43). It is thereforeverylikelythatthe label comes fromthat
    formulation.It is highly improbable, however, that nominalesthemselves adopted the formula. Abelard would never agree with the formulation, since forhim not only nouns but also verbs and participles

    are universais. And a text writtenby a nominalis10


    says 'universalia
    termini sunt, et ... quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam sunt alii
    termini".
    ' when
    Even realists were cautious of using the term 'nomen
    they
    I
    know
    on
    universais.
    intend
    their
    rival's
    to
    discuss
    theory
    sincerely
    threerealistrepresentationsof the nominalisttheory.(1) A treatiseon
    universais (#4), where the nominalist theoryis formulatedin terms
    of vocabula.(2) Porphyry-commentaryin Ms Vienna VPL 248611;
    there the term 'nomina3 is used togetherwith 'vocabula' and 'termini*
    ,
    but 'nomina' does not play a central role. (3) Ars Meliduna II (Ms
    Oxford, Bodl. Libr., Digby 175, f. 218vb):
    sicAristoteles
    Universale
    in libroPerihermenias
    (De Int.I, 17a39-40)dfinit:
    universale
    estquod estnatumpraedicari
    de pluribus,
    i.e. praedicabile
    aptum
    9 Reiners1910,46: "So stellt
    Ablarddiesermones
    gleichmitdenNamen",58: "So
    istdie LehreAblards
    mitdemLosungswort
    nomen
    in denVordergrund
    getreten".
    10Ms Paris,Bibl.Arsenal910,ff.141va-142vb,
    at f. 141va.
    11M. Grabmann,
    inhisEin Tractatus
    deUniversalibus
    undandere
    Inedita
    ausdem
    logische
    12.Jahrhundert
    imCod.lat.2486derNationalbibliothek
    in Wien
    , in: MediaevalStudies,
    9 (1947),65-70,editedthetexton ff.lr-4ras an independent
    treatise
    on universais.
    LaterDe Rijk1966,24, discovered
    thatthesametextis included
    in thePorphyryon ff.45r-60v
    ofthesamemanuscript.
    commentary
    101

    09:11:17 AM

    de pluribus.
    Sed illudpraedicabile
    natumpraedicari
    seil,sitres
    quidsit,utrum
    aut terminus,
    dubitari.Quidam enimponuntsolos terminos
    esse
    contingit
    aliires,i.e. terminorum
    solosterminos
    praedicabilia;
    significata Ponentibus
    vel singularia,
    ... (therefollow
    esse universalia
    manifeste
    obvitAristoteles
    '
    fromAuthorities
    quotations
    againstthenominales
    thesis).
    ' is used.
    Here only the term 'termini
    '
    1
    The term vocabula appears in (1) and (2) above. The latter(2) was
    writtenin the mid-12th-century12;
    and the former(1) is dated around
    the same period, since it sometimesstilluses the term 'voces',the keytermof the nominalisttheoryin the earlierstage. The ArsMeliduna(3),
    where the key-termis 'termini
    ' is dated to 1170/1180. 13Presumably
    nominalesadopted in the mid-12th-centurythe term 'vocabula' instead
    of Abelard' s 'sermones'as the key-termto express their theory,and
    then gradually shiftedto the term 'termini'.The term 'termini'would
    be betterthan 'sermones'
    or 'vocabula'to express what Abelard means,
    since for Abelard the universais are only those words which can be
    terms, predicate terms in particular.
    "
    One can conclude, then, that the formula " universais are nomina
    was originallycoined by realistsas a rough and inexact one. Realists
    would have mocked their adversaries, attaching them the label
    'nominales
    '. Nominalists gradually accepted the label to referto themas
    the case in a nominalisttext,14but theynever accepted the
    is
    selves,
    formulationitself.
    3. Whendid nominales
    appear?
    I have elsewhere shown that earlier nominalistswere called vocales
    ,
    15The label 'vocales' was later
    and theirtheorysententia
    vocum.
    replaced
    by 'nominales'.When did it happen?
    The label 'vocales' must have been derived from the early
    nominalists' theorythat universais are voces,not res.And the replacement of the label into 'nominales'must have had somethingto do with
    the transformationof the nominalists' view fromthe pox-theory
    to the
    sermois firstrecorded in
    theory. As is well-known, the rmo-theory
    Abelard' s Logica ('Nostrorumpetitioni sociorum" written in ca.
    1120/24(?). 16This is the terminus
    post quemof the appearance of the
    nominales.
    12See De Riik1966,30.
    13See Hunt1975,18,n. 8.
    14A treatise
    on predication
    (#22b),wheretheauthorsays"nos nominales".
    15IwakumaY. [1992b],
    1.
    16I tollowthedatingbyC. Mews1985.
    102

    09:11:17 AM

    antequemis suggestedbyJohn of Salisbury's Metalogicon


    The terminus
    11-10 (#8), the earliest source with definite date where the word
    '
    'nominales
    appears. John describes therehis apprenticeshipin France
    '
    '
    between ca. 1136 and 1146/7. Was the term nominalesalready currentin the period ofJohn's apprenticeship,or should we thinkof 1159
    was completed?
    when the Metalogicon
    The latter is more probable. For in a Porphyry-commentarya
    vocalisis attacked as holding the sermotheory (Ms
    theory, not voxf.
    lat.
    Bodl.
    Laud.
    libr.,
    Oxford,
    67,
    7rb-va):
    aucethocpluribus
    Dicuntquidamgeneraetspeciesessesermones
    incomplexos,
    .../7va/....Ad eiusdem(= huiusopinionis)
    confirmare
    conantur.
    toritatibus
    utamur.Ut enimdicimus,aucinfirmationem
    propriisargumentationibus
    toritates
    adducerealienoest uti testimonio.
    Itaque quod et per hoc genus
    circaomne
    monstratum
    etpropriis
    rationibus
    'animal'idoneis
    testimoniis
    fuerit,
    : hocgenus
    nemomortalium
    constare
    ambigat.Vocalis
    genusetomnemspeciem
    'animal*
    esthocnomen'animal'.Cantaber:
    ergohocgenus'animal'estaliquid
    longcounter-arguments
    quodesthocnomen'animal'velnon... (therefollow
    '
    ofCambridge,
    or Guarinus
    againstthevocalisthesis)....
    byCantaber,
    I date this commentaryto 1140's. For, first,this commentaryadopts
    the rather elaborated heads which R. Hunt calls 44type D + type
    C"17; it was hardly before ca. 1140, and indeed all the Porphyrycommentaries written before the 1130' s adopt heads of type C.
    Secondly, this commentary reports a lecture of Guarinus of Cambridge, who later became abbot of St Albans between 1183 and 1195;
    thereforehis mastershipwas hardlyearlier than 1140's. Thirdly, it is
    improbable thatthiscommentaryis dated afterthe mid-12th-century,
    because the logicanovaliteratureis never mentioned. If my dating is
    , not
    correct,thenold Abelard and his followerswere stillcalled vocales
    nominales.
    '
    '
    Other earliest sources referring to nominales are the Summa
    elenchorum
    ( #addendum).
    sophisticorum
    ( #5) and De figurissyllogismorum
    18
    The formeris dated to 1155/60. The latter,a collectionof instantiae
    17See R. W. Hunt,TheIntroductions
    in: Studia
    in theTwelfthtothe'Artes'
    Century,
    inhonorem
    Martin
    mediaevalia
    admodum
    Patris
    Reverendi
    , Bruges1948,
    Raymundi
    Josephi
    85-112(repr.inhisTheory
    ofthiscommentary
    , 117-44).Forthebeginning
    ofGrammar
    whichenumerates
    those
    headsof typeD, see De Rijk 1967,80. After
    discussing
    todiscusstheheadoftypeC (f.6rb):"Assignatis
    heads,thecommentary
    proceeds
    illisquae circaartemextrinsecus
    de eis quae circahunclibrum
    erantconsideranda,
    Ea sunthaec:quaesitauctoris
    suntinquirenda
    restt
    dicendum.
    materia,
    quae intencui partiphilosophiae
    tio,quismodus,quis ordotractandi,
    quis finis,quistitulus,
    supponatur,
    quae sitcausacompositionis".
    18De Rijk1962,
    89.
    103

    09:11:17 AM

    against the valid modes of syllogism,is fromaround the same period,


    exclude the date before the
    too. For, on the one hand, the instantiae
    it
    would
    the
    mid-12th-century.On
    other,
    hardly be dated after the
    '
    '
    mid-12th-century,since it still calls followersof Abelard vocales as
    19Otto of
    well as 'nominales'.
    Freising suggests, too, that even in the
    '
    '
    late 1150' s the word nominaleswas still feltas new-fangled. In his
    Gesta Friderici(#6) written in 1156/58 he refers once to "sententia
    '
    vocum
    M, the name attached to the vocales theory, and he calls it at
    . It suggeststhat Otto had
    vocumseu nominum"
    another time " sententia
    . All these sources
    some hesitation to say simply "sententianominum"
    '
    '
    was
    label
    'vocales'
    the
    indicate that
    graduallyreplaced by nominalesin
    the 1150's.
    Several logic-schoolsrivaled nominales
    , presumably in Paris, in the
    second half of the 12th-century.The earliest record of the rivalryis
    (ft7a), where John mocks followersof
    John of Salisbury's Entheticus
    Adam of the Petit-Pont,Robert of Melun, Alberic of Paris, and Peter
    Abelard (John does not referthere to Porretani
    , or followersof Gilbert
    was writtenin 1154/62. By the
    of Poitiers, but why?). The Entheticus
    period the school-founders,including Abelard, are known to have
    died or retiredfromlogic-teaching. It means that their schools were
    '
    *
    succeeded by theirdisciples. The label nominaleswas coined in place
    '
    '
    for vocales in the rivalryof those schools.
    was characterizednot only by holding (1) the
    The school of nominales
    nominalisticview on universais (#4), but also many othertheses: (2)
    nonsequiturnegativa( #23), (3) ex negativanonsequitur
    ex affirmativa
    afirtotum
    est
    omne
    nisi
    est
    nullum
    ,
    plures
    fere
    mativa,(4)
    praesens (5)
    tempus
    estargumentum
    , (7) locinonsuntaptisyllogismi
    ( #20),
    ( #11), (6) propositio
    nihil
    crescit
    and
    est
    verum
    verum
    ,
    , semper
    (#26,
    (9)
    (8) quicquidsemelest
    40b). All of these theses originate fromAbelard's teaching.20And the
    rival schools did not usually share the theses.21The 12th-century
    19Ms Wolfenbttel,
    Guelf.56.20Aug.8, f.81v:"Secundus
    HerzogAugust-Bibl.,
    ... Vel sic: omnesvocalessunt
    sicfalsificatur.
    moduseiusdem( = secundae)figurae
    suntlitterae,
    sed nulliclericim(agistri)
    litterae,
    ergonulliclericim(agistri)
    P(etri)
    ' ' . The sametreatise
    sententiam
    tenentes
    alsocallsclerici
    < sunt> vocales
    magisti
    P(etri)
    *is not
    '
    *
    #
    see
    addendum.
    Petri
    Petri'nominales
    abbreviated);
    (here magisti
    20As fortheorigin,see Abelard'sDial., 395.7-400.6and 547.27-555.19,
    forthe
    222.35-38
    Abelard'sSuperTopica
    theses(2)/(3)and(4)/(5)respectively;
    ,
    glossae
    (ed.
    for(5) and(6). As for(7) and(8), seen. 32/33and37 below.
    Dal Pra)and319.30-31
    inn. 3 abovediscusses
    TheViennatextmentioned
    affirmatively
    (2), (3), (6) and(8).
    21Thereis littlespaceto provethisclaim.
    104

    09:11:17 AM

    nominales
    developed a systemof whole logic consistingof these theses
    and of otherscommon to rival schools like the unitas-nominis
    theory.
    4. Whendid nominales
    disappear?
    It is without doubt that nominalescompletely disappeared by the
    mid-13th-century.Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas
    9
    Aquinas all referto nominalesopinions in past tense ( #61, 62d, 64a-c,
    65a, cf. etiam 50c-d, 71).
    It is highlyprobable, however, thatnominales
    ceased to be active far
    earlier. As is shown in 1 above, the unitas-nominis
    theorywas held not
    Porr
    and
    but
    Meludinenses
    nominales
    etani,
    , each
    ,
    Albricani,
    by
    only by
    witha slightlydifferenttone. William of Auxerre leftthe earliest false
    theorywas to be exclusivelyascribed
    testimonythat the unitas-nominis
    to nominales
    ( #52c). William's Summaaureais dated between 1215 and
    1229.22Assuming that he wrote his Summain his thirties,his apprenticeshipat Paris would have been around 1200 at the earliest. If so,
    thenaround the turnof the centurytheyhad lost the exact knowledge
    9doctrine.
    schools and ofthe nominales
    of therivalryofthe 12th-century
    It means that the schools disappeared ten or more years earlier.
    It is certain that the other 12th-centuryschools rivaling nominales
    , Montani,
    disappeared by the end of the century.As for the Albricani
    and Meludinenses
    , no 13th-centurysources referto them at all. Faint
    or Adamitaeare sometimes discovered in 13thechos of Parvipontani
    but
    Gervase of Melkley's Ars versificatoria
    sources;23
    , dated to
    century
    121624and the earliestsource fromthe 13th-century,says ' 4Parvipontani olim...censuerunt..."
    is
    (#49, cf. etiam 56). The name of Porretani
    very often mentioned in the 13th-centurysources; but Humbert of
    Balesma's Summa, which is dated to 1194/1200,25already refersto Porretani9
    s doctrinesin past tense (#36c-d).
    Among the 12th-centuryschools, the Petit-Pontschool was without
    doubt active when Alexander Nequam studied there between ca.
    1175-82.26The Meludinenses
    , too, were certainlyactive in 1170's, if,
    and it is verylikely,Hunt's dating oftheArsmelidunato 1170/80is cor22J. Ribaillier,
    Guillelmi
    Summa
    Altissiodorensis
    aurea
    ; Introduction
    Magisti
    gnrale
    (=
    Bonaventurianum
    1987,16.
    Spicilegium
    XX), Paris/Roma
    23See Lewry1983.The sourceshe collects
    thereare #39b,42, and 55-57.
    24Farai1924,37.
    25Heinzmann
    1974,20-24.
    26ForthedateofAlexander
    s studyin Paris,see Hunt1984,4.
    105

    09:11:17 AM

    rect.27And the Compendium


    logicaePorretanum
    mightpossiblyhave been
    writtenaround the same period, maybe slightlyearlier.28It is concluded, then,thatthose schools disappeared verysoon afterproducing
    those fruitsof theirdoctrine, if my previous conclusion is correctand
    the memoryof the rivalryof the schools was already forgottenaround
    1200. This swiftdisappearence of the schools would need explanation.
    I am inclined to consider that it had something to do with the
    reorganizationof education at Paris promotedby Pope Alexander III
    in 1170's. But thisis a major problem beyond the scope of thispresent
    study.
    and
    A source appears to contradictmy claim above, viz. nominales
    other rival schools disappeard around the 1180's. It is a 13th-century
    99 #
    nostrae
    treatise*' Positiones
    ( 60), whichenumeratesand proves theses
    "contra opinionem realium". But was the anonymous author a real
    nominalist?
    Most of the positionesenumerated there are completelyalien from
    those of 12th-centurynominales.Some similarityis found only in the
    firstpositio, viz. universais are nomina
    ; and in the third,viz. nothing
    But the formulationof the positionesare spurious. The
    augmentatur.
    formeris formulatedin terms of 'nomina', which 12th-centuryreal
    nominales
    would not have accepted as is argued in 2 above; the latter
    9 but the
    is formulated"nothing augmentatur9
    ,
    genuine formulationis
    . Moreover, the rationes
    to prove them are completely
    "nothing crescit99
    differentfrom 12th-centuryones. There is another question on the
    anonymous author. He sometimes disagrees with Aristotleand sides
    withZeno (positiones
    3, 4, 6, & 15); he also challengesPriscian in favour
    11 & 12). But it is highlyunlikelythatthere
    of a Stoic theory{positiones
    were people who sincerelytried to attack such authoritiesas Aristotle
    or Priscian in favour of Zero or Stoicism.
    99is not a work
    For these reasons I consider the " Positiones
    nostrae
    by
    a real nominalist, but a record of a school exercise in which one was
    demanded to prove nonsenses, including those which were supposed
    to be of the notoriousnominales.
    The term 'positio3does not mean there
    a positive assertion,but an assumption to be taken as true only in the
    course of the exercise. The termis used in such sense in 13th-century
    '
    3
    J
    literature.
    writings,thus positiofalsi or 'positioimpossibilisin obligatio27See n. 13 above.
    28See theintroduction
    to theedition(cf.n. 6 above),vii.
    106

    09:11:17 AM

    5. The 13th-century
    nominalesin theology
    Among the 12th-centurylogic-schoolsthe names of 'nominales'and
    'Porretani'
    survived the next century.But it is in theologyratherthan
    in logic that sources fromthe centurymention their names.
    In the sphere of logic, neithernominales
    nor Porretani
    are known to
    have been active in the 13th-century,unless the anonymous author of
    the {(Positionesnostrae"(#60) had been a real nominalis.Two more
    '
    logic textsmentionnominalestheories( #58-59). But none of them are
    supportedby 12th-centuryreliable sources. Or rathertheyare simply
    false. For instance,the source #59 attributesto nominales
    the thesis"ex
    not
    ", but this is a theoryof Parvipontani,29
    impossibili
    quidlibetsequitur
    of nominales.One may say that 13th-centurypeople were ready to
    attributeany such eccentrictheories to nominales.
    In the sphere of theologysources began to mention nominalesand
    Porretaniin the last decades of the 12th-century(seil, sources after
    #29), that is to say after the disappearance of the logic-schools.
    Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers, the foundersof those schools, were
    influentialbut notorious theologians. They were known to have been
    condemned at councils.
    Very few 13th-centurymanuscripts are extant for Abelard' s
    works,30while rathermany forGilbert's. It suggeststhat 13th-century
    people had littleinterestin Abelard' s works,while Gilbert's continued
    to be copied and read. It was possible to referto Porretani'
    s doctrine,
    3
    '
    directlyaddressing Gilbert's works. Porretanusin singular came to
    referby itselfto Gilbert of Poitiers (#54b, 62a, 63, 66d); and 'Por' in
    retani
    plural simplymeant thosewho followedGilbert in thisor that
    '
    '
    theory.31But the relation between nominalesand Abelard's doctrine
    was not so straightforward.His teachings were transmittedthrough
    several channels, more or less inexactly.
    Abelard asserts that God always knows, wills, or can do what he
    once knows, wills, or can do.32 His successors in logic, the 12th, reformulatedthis idea into a formirrelevantto the
    centurynominales

    29See Iwakuma[1992a],1.
    30SeeJ. Barrow/Ch.
    Burnett/D.
    Luscombe1984-1985.
    31Albert
    theGreatreports
    thatsomeofhiscontemporaries
    Gilbert
    hadnot
    thought
    *and 'Porretani
    ' in #62b.
    erred(#62c).Cf. alsoAlbert'susageof 'Porretanus
    32See hisIntroductio
    adtheologiam,
    orthelongerversion
    oftheTheologia
    "Scholarium",
    PL 191,col. 1103Aand 1104A.
    107

    09:11:17 AM

    divine nature, viz. 'quicquid semelest verum


    , semperest verum'.33In
    Peter
    Lombard
    adopted Abelard' s theory
    theology,on the otherhand,
    in his Sentences (I, dist. 41, c. 3 and dist. 44, c. 2); and in his solution
    he touched on the immutabilityof the object of faithacross time (I,
    "
    dist. 41, c. 3). This was one of the roots of theologicalnominalism".
    NeitherAbelard nor Peter Lombard explicitlysay what are the objects
    of the immutable divine knowledge,will, and volition,or what are the
    articlesof faithcommon to Christiansand the Patriarchs.Theologians
    in the thirdquarter of the 12th-centurydeveloped several theoriesto
    explain the immutabilityof the divine knowledge, etc., or the com.34It was after
    monness of the faith;but theynever referredto nominales
    the last decades of the centurythat theologians began to associate a
    thesis,or to remark
    semper
    type of the theorieswiththe nominales'semelin these respects( #29, 44a,
    thatPeter Lombard speaks as ifa nominalis
    44e, 4635, 48b, 50a-b, 51a, 52d, 51f).
    Another root of the theological nominalism is in the question
    whethervoluntasand actusare the same sin or not, which Peter Lombard does not definitelyanswer in his Sentences (II, dist. 42, c. 1). As
    is well-known, Abelard argues in his Ethica that the sin is par
    excellence in voluntasratherthan in actus. In the thirdquarter of the
    12th-centurysome theologiansassertedthattheyare the same sin, and
    used to referto the unitas-nominis
    theoryas an analogy, viz. according
    to them, voluntasand actus, though differentin themselves, are the
    same sin, just as 'albus' 'alba' 'album',though differentin themselves,
    are the same noun.36 They would not have mentioned the unitasnoministheoryif it had not been widely accepted by logic-schools in
    their day. In the early 13th-century,however, theologians began to
    ascribe the same-sin theoryfalselyto Abelard,37and consequentlythe
    33Salisbury,
    and Neckm,
    Nat.rerum
    to
    III-32,200.22-201.3
    , c. 173,refer
    Metalog.
    thosewhoheldthethesis.
    nominales
    Theyareundoubtedly
    (see #46a,50a-b,51a,52d,
    62d,70).
    34See relevant
    andBandinus,
    passagesofUdo,SimonofTournai,PeterofPoitiers,
    all citedin A. Landgraf
    1943,199-204.
    35In ourlist,we date #46to 1206/10,
    G. Lacombe,La vieetlesoeuvres
    de
    following
    Prvostin
    to Landgraf
    , Kain 1927,181.Butitshouldbe datedto 1188/94,
    according
    1973,154.
    36SeeJ. Varichez(ed.), LesDisputationes
    deSimon
    deTournai
    , Louvain1932,Disp.
    II c. 14(PL 211,
    59,Q.4 (169),andDisp.93,Q.3 (270);PeterofPoitiers,
    Sententiae,
    col. 989C7).Bandinusin hisSententiae
    col. 1068D),mentions
    , II Dist.42
    192,
    (PL
    the"unitas-verbi",
    of 'amo'and 'amas' Cf. alsoa passageofUdo's
    or thesameness
    on PeterLombard'sSententiae
    , citedin Landgraf
    1943,201f.
    commentary
    37See thepassageofPeterofCapua's Summa
    citedin Landgraf
    1943,202,n. 81.
    108

    09:11:17 AM

    same-sin theory togetherwith the unitas-nominis


    theory to nominales
    that
    the
    unitas-nominis
    #
    It
    is
    also
    noticeable
    theorywas
    ( 48a, 52c, 54a).
    thesis until
    never mentioned in the same contextsas the semel-semper
    Bonaventuredid so ( #64a). The formertheorywas never taken as the
    basis of the latteruntil the mid-13th-century.
    The thirdroot of the theological nominalism is in the 12th-century
    9 thesis "nihil cresci' The thesis
    nominales
    played a role in Trinityin
    and
    after
    decades
    before
    1200
    theory
    (#40b, 48c, cf. etiam 33a-b,
    ' retained the
    'nominales
    38
    And
    the
    label
    48d, 53, 70).
    very
    lastly,
    memoryof the nominalisti view on universalis,though in the inexact
    "
    formula"universais are nomina
    (#40a, 44c-d, 60, 70, cf. etiam 61).
    These are all that 13th-century people understood as
    thesis associated with a type
    "nominalism", viz. (1) the semel-semper
    of theoryto explain the immutabilityof God's knowledge, etc. (2) the
    unitas-nominis
    theoryassociated withthe same-sin theory,(3) the thesis
    "nihil cresci', and (4) the nominalistic view on universais. Some of
    them are genuine theses of the 12th-centurynominales
    , but some are
    not. And the other aspects of the whole systemof logic developed by
    the 12th-century nominaleswere forgotten. Some 13th-century
    theologians tried to defend the nominalisticviews, particularlythose
    Some even professedto be
    Sententiarum.
    supposed to be of the magister
    as Peter of Capua did ( #44c). But theirnominalismwas connominales
    siderably differentfrom that of the 12th-centuryoriginal one. The
    nominalism was taken as such during the 13th-century,and became
    the basis of the furtherdevelopment in the next century.
    Fukui, Japan
    Fukui Prefectural
    University
    38According
    likesubstantia
    doesnot
    nature
    to #40b,thethesis
    meansthata universal
    areinterrogated
    a persona
    likePeterdoes;andnatures
    by 'quid',while
    grow,although
    between'quid'and 'quis'can be tracedbackto
    by 'quis'."Thisdistinction
    personae
    " and "Nostrorum
    sociorum"
    Abelard'
    s Logica Ingredientibus
    (36.23-26and
    petitioni
    between'aliud'and 'alius'
    ed. Geyer).Cf.alsothesametypeofdistinction
    537.26-33
    in hisDial. 549.16-18.

    109

    09:11:17 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    The Logic of the Nominales,
    or, The Rise and Fall of ImpossiblePositio
    CHRISTOPHER J. MARTIN

    1
    Introduction
    The twelfthcenturyNominaleswere withoutdoubt the followersof
    Peter Abaelard and they were probably so called on account of their
    theoryof universais. As my witnessI call the Archpoetwho on a Sabbath nightprobably in 1164 or 1165 had a vision of heaven where, he
    tells us:
    vidinecHomerum,
    Hie necAristotilem
    et rerum,
    nominum
    tarnen
    de sententiis
    de naturis
    atquespecierum
    generum
    verum.
    Augustinus
    magnusmihiprotulit
    Posthecad archan
    gelmloquensMichaelem,
    qui regitperangelospopulumfidelem,
    ut secretaceiem,
    ab eo summonitus,
    neminirevelem.2
    et celiConsilia
    Though Bonaventure's account of how theNominalesgot theirname
    is surelya red herring,3the Nominalesdo seem to have maintained the
    unityof propositionalcontentsin the face of variationsin tense. What
    we know of their views suggests, indeed, a simpler reason for their
    name than that offeredby Bonaventure. They apparently held that
    accusative infinitiveconstructionsmay serve as names for what is
    signified by the corresponding propositional tokens. These
    nominalizations are called 'quasi-names' by Abaelard.
    I thinkthat we are safest,however, ifwe followthe Archpoet since
    as far as we know he had no philosophical axe to grind. Chenu' s
    association of the Nominaleswith the realist Bernard of Chartres is
    entirelyuntenable.
    1 Thisisanextract
    a muchlonger
    from
    paperofthesametitle.In ordertosavespace
    inPart2, and
    withPart1,condensed
    theargument
    I havedoneawayalmostentirely
    I hopeat sometime
    inthefootnotes.
    references
    allbutthebaresttextual
    suppressed
    to publishthepaperin itsentirety.
    2 Heinrich
    desArchipoeta
    Die Gedichte
    1958,TextV, p. 62.
    , Heidelberg
    Krefeld,
    3 Listoftexts,64a.
    110

    09:11:24 AM

    Just like today's anti-realistsAbaelard derived conclusions about


    entailmentand argumentfromontologyand philosophical semantics.
    Where today's anti-realistsare intuitionists,however, Abaelard and
    the Nominaleswere connexivists. Connexive logic has as its leading
    idea that 4no propositionshould implyor be implied by its own negaand is
    tion'.4 Since halfof this principle is found in the PriorAnalytics
    , it was bound to be acknowledged
    Hypothetico
    reportedin de Syllogismo
    in some form by all dialecticians. Abaelard held that the most
    peculiarlyproperprincipleof Nominalist logic followedfromthe basic
    connexive principle.This is the claim thatconditionalswhose antecedent and consequent differin quality are false. To understand the
    character of Nominalist logic it is thus necessary to understand the
    nature of Abaelard' s support for connexivism and in particular why
    he advocates this account of the conditional.
    Abaelard' s connexivism ultimately rests upon an ontology of
    individual formsand I so will begin with a very brief survey of this
    and its relationshipto his theoryof language. The main part of the
    paper explores Abaelard' s theoryof logical relations and its application by the Nominales.In particularI propose that theywere probably
    the inventorsofpositioand thattheyrediscoveredthe Liar. I conclude
    witha discussion of two paradoxical claims made by his followersbut
    not by Abaelard and some suggestions about the later historyof the
    logic of the Nominales.
    A VeryBriefSummary
    1. Abaelard'
    s Ontology:
    The mediaeval problem of genus and species is not the same as the
    modern problem of universais. Mediaeval discussions concern a very
    limited range of predicates and have three distinct aspects,
    , on the other
    ontological,epistomologicaland semantical. We moderni
    hand, tend to be generous with respect to candidate predicates but to
    limitourselvesmainly to questions of ontology.A crucial differenceis
    that two mediaevals might both have radically individualistic
    ontologies, or even the same ontology, but yet offerquite different
    resolutionsof the problem of universais. Their differentaccounts of
    predicationcould easily allow each to abuse the other as a proponent
    rerum.
    of the sententia
    or sententia
    nominum
    4 See A.R. Anderson
    & N. Belnap,Entailment
    , vol.1,29.8,'Connexive
    implication',
    p. 438.
    Ill

    09:11:24 AM

    That said, it is Abaelars ontologyto which we must look ifwe are


    to understand his account of the conditional. I propose that he may
    be characterisedin contemporaryterms as a transferabletrope antirealist. Abaelard as I read him thus offersan account of substance and
    nature like that recentlyfound in Metaphysics
    Zeta by Frede and Pat, however, Abaelard is
    zig. Perhaps unlike Aristotlein the Metaphysics
    also committedto individual accidental forms.To Socrates*individual
    whiteness, for example and Sophroniscus' individual paternitywith
    respect to Socrates. These forms cannot exist apart from the
    substances to which theynow adhere but beforetheirattachmentthey
    mighthave gone elsewhere. Unlike Ockham, Abaelars anti-realism
    does not extend to a radical or even moderate reductionof thevarieties
    of forms.
    For Abaelard' s theoryof the conditional what is cruciallyimportant
    is the differencebetween what I will call external
    and internal
    relationships
    structure.External relationships hold between distinct existents.
    Between substances, for example or between a substance and its
    accidents. The strongestconnection that can hold in this case is that
    A is strictlyinseparable fromB if it
    of what I call strictinseparability.
    is impossible forA to exist and B not to exist at the same time. The
    internalstructureof an existenton the otherhand consistsof the relations which hold in virtue of its being the kind of thingthat it is. The
    relations, forexample, between a kind of substance and its material
    essence, or between the various substantial formsthat constitutethis
    essence. According to Abaelard the connectioncharacteristicof internal structureis that of what I call conceptual
    : A is concepinseparability
    tually inseparable fromB just in case being A requires being B in the
    sense that being B is part of the meaning of 'A'
    Abaelard insists that in imposing the name 'man' on a particular
    existentthe original impositormay have no notion at all of its internal
    structure. In doing so, however, he is in effect stipulating that
    speakersof his language will call a man whateverhas an internalstructure exactly resemblingthat of the sample. It is assumed, of course,
    that we can recogniseothermen as exactlyresemblingeven ifwe cannot give an account of theirinternalstructure.According to Abaelard
    the act of original impositiongives the word 'man' its sense. Justwhat
    the sense is is something which the philosophical logician must
    discover and which he does, according to Abaelard, by cooperating
    with the natural scientist.It is crucial fora dialectician to discover the
    sense of words since otherwisehe will be at a loss to distinguishtruth
    112

    09:11:24 AM

    fromfalsehood and so a sound argument from an unsound one. In


    particularhe will not be able to recognise a true conditional when he
    sees it or to prove that it is true, since what is required for the truth
    of a conditional,according to Abaelard, is thatthe sense of the antecedent contain the sense of the consequent.
    Furthermore,and importantly,Abaelard maintains that proper
    names have a sense. When Sophroniscus chose a name forhis son, the
    child still had to acquire most of those featureswhich we know and
    love. The baby was neitherbald nor pot-belliedand thoughhe probably had a snub nose, he mightnot have had one. The name 'Socrates'
    was introducedby Sophroniscus solely to designate a particular man,
    and it has forits sense just the sense of 'man'. 'If Socrates is Socrates,
    then Socrates is a man' is thus a true conditional.
    The late antique theoryof consequences as it appears in the account
    of the conditionaland the topics presentedby Boethius is an attempt
    to characterise the various internal and external relations of
    substances. Abaelard' s reconstructionof it is absolutely remarkable.
    The ancienttheory,however,was a theoryof the relationshipbetween
    of simple predicates,which Boethius characterisesas res,
    the significata
    rerum.Its concern
    or sometimes,like Priscian, as essentiaor existentia
    rerum
    was to establish consequentiae
    , the relationships between the
    predicatesor the formsin virtueofwhichsomethingis, say, a man and
    able to laugh. There is no notion of propositionalcontentavailable for
    the theory and so no suggestion that the relationships in virtue of
    which conditionals are true are relationships between contents, or
    affairs.The logic of such a theoryis quite properlyconnexstates-ofive: it followsimmediatelyfromthe principle of non-contrarietythat
    a contrarycannot be a consequence of its contrary.Abaelard on the
    other hand insists that conditionals are true in virtue of relations
    between propositionalcontents.
    2. Abaelardand theLogic of Propositions
    Abaelard is famous for his insistence that the ultimate bearers of
    truthand falsityare not propositional tokens nor the understandings
    constitutedin our minds when we hear themutteredbut rathera quite
    different
    kind of item. It seems to me that these items, what it is that
    propositionssignifyin virtueof theirbeing used to assert something,
    are what we would now call states-of-affairs.
    On this account of propositional meaning a non-quantifiedaffir113

    09:11:24 AM

    mative categorical proposition and the correspondingmental token


    and are true if that state-of-affairs
    is
    signifya positive state-of-affairs
    a nonthe case, that is iftheworld is as it is said to be. Mutatismutandis
    In
    quantifiednegative propositionsignifiesa negative state-of-affairs.
    theDialcticaAbaelard preemptsBoethius' terminologyand uses ' essen' to
    rei as well as ' essentiaand existentia
    tia rei and ' existentia
    rerum
    designate what is signifiedby affirmativepropositions.He introduces
    ' non-existentia
    rei!rerum1
    for as it were' the things subject to negative
    In
    the
    and the glosses on de TopicisDifferen
    Ingredientibus
    propositions.
    tiis he calls the same items dicta.
    rei!rerumor dicta as the bearers of truth and
    To referto existentia
    it
    if
    misleads
    implies any suggestionof a furtheritem in virtue
    falsity
    of some relationshipto which theybear the truth-valuesthat theydo.
    are ratherwhat we would now call truth-makers,and
    These existentiae
    when he is discussing Cat. 10 on what ' underlies' affirmationand
    negation it is clear thatthisis how Abaelard thinksof them. He follows
    rei!rerum
    and nonexistentia
    not as true
    Aristotleand speaks of existentia
    or false but as being or not being.5
    This is all well and good and as transferabletrope anti-realist
    Abaelard seems bound to introduce states-of-affairs
    in addition to
    substances and their accidental forms. It just will not do to
    characterisethe world as consistingof this man and that man, of this
    whiteness and that whiteness. It remains to be said where the
    whitenessesbelong since it is not of their nature to be attached to a
    particularsubstance. The moral of the argumentis generallytaken to
    be that states-of-affairs
    have to be introduced into the ontology.
    Abaelard famouslyargues forjust the opposite conclusion. For him
    existentiae
    are not res since they are neither substances or
    rei/rerum
    forms.They are, however, what it is that have logical propertiesand
    stand in logical relations; they are necessary, possible, logically
    opposed to one another, entail one another and so on. The need to
    ground logical relations is, indeed, a major argumentforintroducing
    of propositions.The othercandidates are
    them as one of the significata
    for the most part transitoryand certainlydo not have the necessary
    connection required for the truthof conditionals.
    What Abaelard has hitupon is the concept of propositionalcontent.
    At the same time he seems to be the firstmediaeval to give clear
    account of the concept of a propositional operation. That is of an
    5 LI, 275; compareDial, p. 293.
    114

    09:11:24 AM

    operation forformingpropositionalcontentsfrompropositionalcontents. For example forformingfromthe contentsof the propositions


    'Socrates is a man' and of 'Socrates is an ass* each of which says one
    thing about the world the content of 'if Socrates is a man, then
    Socrates is an ass' and of 'Socrates is a man and Socrates is not an ass',
    each of which,Abaelard maintains, also says only one thingabout the
    world.
    In one sense there are exactly as many truthsas there are truth
    as thereare states-ofmakers, since thereare as many states-of-affairs
    as
    of
    these
    as
    there
    are
    nominalized
    and
    affairs,
    proposimany
    just
    tions. But in another sense we may ask a question which Abaelard
    would presumably have rejected as ill-formed:How many kinds of
    are there?Abaelard himselfexplicitlyrecognisesaffirstates-of-affairs
    and also consequences. Disjuncmative and negative states-of-affairs
    to the former.
    tions reduce to the latterand particularstates-of-affairs
    Beyond thishe is perhaps committedto modal and temporal states-ofaffairsbut not, I think,to general states-of-affairs.
    Abaelard shows great care in settingout the theory of existentiae
    or dictaand, in particular, in discussing sameness of content
    rei!rerum
    in the face of differencein tense when dealing with divine knowledge
    in the Theologia'Scholarium'.6We must thus treat with caution the
    reportsfromSt. Bonaventure and St Thomas that the Nominalesdealt
    with this problem by claiming that differentenuntiabiliasignifythe
    same res.
    Abaelard insiststhatfora conditionalto be truethe antecedentmust
    be inseparable fromthe consequent in the sense that it is impossible
    forthe antecedentto be truewhen the consequent is false. This condition of strictinseparabilityis not sufficient,however, to capture the
    relation of consequence, or entailment, between states-of-affairs.
    Indeed Abaelard claims that it does not even express a genuinely
    hypotheticalconnection but is rather entirelycategorical. He notes
    that if it were accepted as necessary and sufficient,then anything
    would followfroman impossibility.
    The conditionthatAbaelard proposes as necessaryand sufficient
    for
    the truthof a conditionalis that the antecedentrequires
    the consequent
    in that the sense of the antecedentcontainsthat of the consequent, the
    antecedent is thus conceptually inseparable from the consequent.
    Abaelard maintainsthatthisconditionis satisfiedparadigmaticallyby
    6 TSch
    , III.61.
    115

    09:11:24 AM

    the conditionalisations of the moods of the categorical and


    entailment
    in the sense
    hypotheticalsyllogism.Each of these is a perfect
    that in virtue of its complexio,
    or form,it is clear that fromthe truth
    of the antecedentthe truthof the consequence follows.Like Aristotle,
    Abaelard has nothing mor to say on this point. There can be no
    appeal to reason against someone who will not concede the truthof
    such conditionals. As an alternative characterisation of perfect
    entailmentsAbaelard proposes they obey the principle that uniform
    substitutionpreserves consecution.
    Abaelard claims that the connectionbetween antecedentand consequent is the same forall the figuresof both varietiesof syllogism.The
    differencebetween the firstand the otherfiguresis one of evidentness.
    The less evident secondary figuresmay be shown to be valid by conversion to the firstfigure.
    In satisfying the condition of uniform substitutabilityperfect
    entailmentsdifferfrom imperfect
    In these the sense of the
    entailments.
    antecedent does indeed contain that of the consequent, but it does so
    in virtue of a topical relationship. Consecution is preserved in such
    cases only by the substitutionof terms the subject things of which
    stand in the appropriate topical relationship.
    More to the point, Abaelard claims that conditionals true in virtue
    of a topical connection may be proved to someone who is in doubt
    about them. Indeed in the Dialctica the theory of the topics is
    presentedalmost entirelyas an apparatus forproving conditionals. It
    seems to followthat conditionals true on the basis of a topical connection have the status of what we would now call analytic a posteriori
    truths.Thus to prove 'if something is a man, then it is an animal':
    1. Of whatever a species is predicated so is its genus, 2. man' is a
    species of 'animal'; therefore3. if somethingis a man, then it is an
    animal. 1. is the maximal proposition of the argument and so an a
    prioritruth. 2. is a truthabout a relationshipbetween words established by the original impositor, although he may well not have
    realised that it holds- suppose a man was not one of his paradigms for
    'animal' . The cooperation ofphysiciand dialectici
    would thenhave been
    that
    to
    discover
    the
    necessary
    topical relationshipholds and what they
    if
    would have discovered is, anythingis, an analytic truth.
    Though Abaelard maintains thatthe paradigms of trueconditionals
    are conditionalised syllogisms,he refusesin general to allow that an
    argument is good if and only if the correspondingconditional is true.
    He realises that all that is needed for a good argument is that its
    116

    09:11:24 AM

    premissesare true and that it is impossible forthem to be so without


    the conclusion also being true. Thus the strictinseparabilityrejected
    forthe truthof a conditional is just what is wanted for
    as insufficient
    thevalidityofan argument.It followsthatAbaelard cannot allow conditionalisation as a means for generating true conditionals. Many
    topics, for example, will warrant a truth-preservingmove from
    premissesto conclusionbut will not provide an entailment.Abaelard' s
    refusalto grantconditionalisationamazed John of Salisbury but was
    accepted at least by implicationby the author of the SummaDialctica
    Artis1and ought to be a characteristicfeatureof Nominalist logic.
    Another and related characteristic is recorded as an error
    .8 Abaelard insists that no locus is needed to support a
    Nominalium'
    or
    syllogism to guarantee the correspondingconditional. A syllogistic
    inferencemay be set out in a general rule but such a rule is not a maximal proposition. The principle that uniform substitutionpreserves
    consecutionrequires no particularrelationshipbetween substituands,
    but that it mention such a topical relationshipis one of the defining
    featuresof a maximal proposition. The problem here forAbaelard is
    thatBoethius characterisesde TopicisDifferentiisas an investigationof
    whichloci are suited to syllogisms.The best thatAbaelard can do with
    thisis to propose that Boethius had in mind that one of the premisses
    of a syllogism might be construed as assigning a locus for the
    enthymeme formed from the other and the conclusion. But as he
    points out the maximal propositionsappealed to in this case will not
    in general support containmentof sense.
    Abaelard insists that entailment, or consequence, holds between
    states-of-affairs.
    In an extremelyimportantbut dense and rathercorrupt section of the Dialcticahe presentsa series of argumentsagainst
    those who would construelogical relations as holding between things
    signifiedby the termsappearing in true conditionals. The occasion for
    the discussion is the need to clarifythe rules for the manipulation of
    conditionals. In particular Abaelard proposes that it does not follow
    from the fact that a conditional expresses a consequence that if its
    antecedent is destroyed,then its consequent is destroyed. In opposition he brings forwardsomeone who I will cadi a termist.
    The termist
    points to examples such as sickness and health which are related by
    7 Guglielmo
    VescovaDi Lucca,Summa
    Artis
    Dialecta
    , LorenzoPozzi(ed.), Padua
    1975.
    8 Listoftexts,20.
    117

    09:11:24 AM

    immediate opposition. They are exclusive and exhaustive alternatives


    forthe class of subjects of which theyhold. Boethius maintains that a
    conditional of the form 'if it's not A, then it's B' holds only if A and
    B are immediate opposites. For such conditionals,then, it is true that
    ifthe antecedentdestroyed,the consequent is also destroyed,i.e. ifit's
    A, then it's not B'.
    In response Abaelard claims that this featureof immediate opposition is not relevant to the concepts of antecedent and consequent
    deployed in the rules forthe manipulationof conditionals. The termist
    wants to account forthe relationshipof consequence by appealing only
    to the nature and properties of things as set out canonically in
    Boethius' account of the topics. Abaelard insistsagainst him that the
    connection should be understood less narrowlyin terms of the relaIf he is rightto claim thatthereare contionsbetween states-of-affairs.
    states-of-affairs
    which cannot be reduced to a relabetween
    sequences
    this
    not merely be a matter of
    between
    will
    tionship
    things,
    In
    Abaelard
    maintains
    thatthetermistwill be
    redescription. particular
    embarrassinglyat a loss to give an account of certain consequences
    with impossible antecedents. To account for conditionals with such
    antecedentsis one of the major problemsoflater twelfthcenturylogic.
    They are not, however, the only problem for the termist.Abaelard
    challenges him to find a connection between the termsof the antecedent and consequent to account for the truthof the followingconditionals: (CI) if every animal is a stone, then some stone is a stone;
    (C2) if Socrates is Brunellus (i.e. Brunellus the ass), then Socrates is
    a man; (C3) if Socrates is an animal, then Socrates is a man.
    Let us consider C2. It is embarrassing to the termist,since:
    ofBrunellus
    andmaninthesecondconsequence
    ... ifweattend
    totheopposition
    ofonerequires
    thepredication
    ofother.9
    howcanwegrantthatthepredication
    Indeed the termist,followingBoethius' account of the dialectical
    loci, ought, if anything, to maintain its contrary: 'if Socrates is
    Brunellus, then Socrates is not a man'. Appealing to the maximal
    propositionforopposites thatifone of a pair of opposites is predicated
    of something,its opposite is removed.
    Abaelards proof of C2:
    C2.1
    C2.2

    If Socrates is Brunellus, then Socrates is Brunellus,


    if Socrates is Brunellus, then Brunellus is Socrates,

    9 Dial., 293.
    118

    09:11:24 AM

    C2.3 . ' if Socrates is Brunellus, then Socrates is Brunellus and


    Brunellus is Socrates.
    if Socrates is Brunellus and Brunellus is Socrates, then
    C2.4
    Socrates is Socrates,
    if Socrates is Socrates, then Socrates is a man,
    C2.5
    if Socrates is Brunellus, then Socrates is a man.
    C2.6
    According to Abaelard, termiststry to avoid embarrassment in
    three ways the firsttwo of which present themselves as complaints
    about the 'dissimilarityof the middle' and so the improprietyof the
    appeal to the transitivityof entailment.10
    Is Unsound
    [A] TheArgument
    Those objecting in this way insist, in effect, that considered
    independentlyof the argument, C2.5 is true in virtue of Socrates
    being essentiallya man. Abaelard agrees with them. They go on to
    claim, however, that since the supposition made in the antecedent of
    C2.1 is incompatiblewith Socrates' being a man, C2.5 as it appears
    in the argument is false. Abaelard argues to the contrary that
    'Socrates', 'Brunellus', and 'man' have the same sense throughout
    and that C2.5 would only be threatenedby a categorical assumption
    thatSocrates is Brunellus. He furtherargues thatthe position adopted
    by thesetermistsis incoherentsince theyclaim that fromthe supposition thatSocrates is Brunellus it followsnot that Socrates is a man but
    that he is an ass. But as Abaelard points out this entailmentis on aill
    fourswith the one which they reject. He generalises the ad hominem:
    opponents of this sort offerno coherent account of conditionals with
    impossibleantecedents.Abaelard insiststhatsome must be rejectedas
    false and others accepted as true but the termisthas no way of nonarbitrarilydistinguishingone sort fromthe other.
    Is Valid
    [B] The Argument
    A second group of termistscontinue to claim thatthe argumentfails
    because of the differencein meaning of the putative middle but they
    concede thateach of the conditionals is true as it appears in the argument. They maintainthatthe argumentdoes not in factinstantiatethe
    10Dial 288-305.
    119

    09:11:24 AM

    proper formulationof the transitivityof entailment, since this must


    include a proviso that the terms are construed in the same way.
    Against them Abaelard insiststhat (i) the satisfactionof such a clause
    can never be read offthe termsof an argument and (ii), once again,
    the senses of the termsin theseargumentsdo not vary fromone occurrence to the next. His point is, I think,that the sense of expressions
    are constructed4by addition' fromthose of theircomponentsand not
    vice versa.
    Abaelard goes on to offera number of otherargumentsin the most
    importantof which he proves by contraposingthe premissesand conclusion of an argumentwhich theyaccept the soundness of one which
    he claims they must reject.
    Isn't Embarrassing
    [C] The Argument
    The last group of termistsclaim to accept the premissesof the argument and its validitybut to findnothingat all embarrassingabout the
    conclusion. They maintain thatthe antecedentof C2.1 amounts to the
    supposition that being Brunellus is not opposed to being a man.
    Abaelard insists that this is not so, and if it were so the argument
    would be quite a differentone in which the antecedentof C2.1 would
    express an identity.The intentionhere is quite otherwise. Brunellus
    is an ass and Socrates is a man and being a man is opposed to being
    an ass. Abaelard claims that the only way to avoid embarrassmentis
    to adopt his own account of consequence as a relationshipbetween
    what it is thatpropositionsassert. In particularhe connectsthe consequent of C2. 1 to the antecedentby appealing not to a topical connection but ratherto a basic principlesof his ontologyand philosophical
    semantics:
    Forhowcouldthesubstance
    ofSocrates
    either
    as Socrates
    be something
    elseor
    holdofitas Socrates,
    ifititself
    shouldnotbe whatitis saidtobe and
    something
    remainunderoneessence.Butifititself
    shouldremain
    thepeculiar
    of
    property
    Socrates
    it is necessary
    justas it is locatedwiththename'Socrates',certainly
    thatit havethenatureofman.11
    The firsttwo responses of the termistshave them maintainingthat
    in a union withBrunellus Socrates would not remain a man. Abaelard
    has argued thattheycannot have him becoming an ass either.Though
    Abaelard thinksit incoherent,a natural thesis for a termistto adopt
    11Dial., 302.
    120

    09:11:24 AM

    would thus be that nothingfollowsfroman impossible combination.


    Strikinglythis is just the theoryattributesto the Reales in one discussion of the Parvipontanian principle that everythingfollowsfroman
    Montane
    impossibility.12Furthermore,according to the Introductiones
    the
    bitter
    most
    Minores
    at
    least
    ,
    opponent of
    by implication,Alberic,
    in
    the
    combination
    Socrates
    the Nominales
    ,13argued that
    impossible
    would not retain his nature. Here, then, is another, and perhaps the
    deepest, reason why the Reales and Nominalesmight have been so
    named. In calculatingconsequences the Realesinsistthatone attendto
    the res. Abaelard maintains to the contrary,as presumably did the
    Nominales
    , that what is crucial is names and their imposition.
    BeforeI move on to Alberic and the schools, however, let me mention a quite remarkable and previously unnoticed use to which
    Abaelard puts his theoryof the conditional. A conditional, he claims,
    is true if and only if the sense of the antecedent propositioncontains
    that of the consequent. Thus Aristotle's argument for fatalismfrom
    division and Boethius' argument from divine foreknowledgefail.
    Abaelard' s solutionis thatof Chrysippusthoughwith a quite different
    distinctionbetween conditionals. Indeed Abaelard seems to require
    for the truthof a conditional what the Peripatetics did, rejectingas
    only categorical inseparability the criterion for truth proposed by
    Chrysippus. We cannot inferthe necessityof the futurefromdivine
    foreknowledgesince:
    tobe equalsand
    ... although
    theeventandGod'sprovidence
    ofitareconceded
    associates< comitantia
    > , thereis no necessary
    between
    themsince
    entailment
    is understood
    in theassertion
    neither
    oftheother.14
    Abaelard' s solution to the argument from division, on the other
    hand, is to appeal to a corollaryof the requirementof containment,
    the most characteristiclogical thesisof theNominales
    , thatconditionals
    with antecedent and consequent of differentquality are false. The
    premissthatifeverythingis necessary,then nothingoccurs by chance
    is just such a conditional.
    This is all quite wonderful but trouble is very close at hand.
    Abaelard does not prove directlythat opposites cannot be related by
    containmentbut rather taking the basic connexive principle as his
    12Listoftexts,59.
    13Listoftexts,8.
    14Dial., 219.
    121

    09:11:24 AM

    axiom forcontainmenthe argues that the contradictoryof thatprinciple followsif we accept a conditional connecting opposites.
    The flaw in Abaelard' s marvellous constructionwas eventually
    noticed by Alberic. He argued that Abaelard must accept that if
    Socrates is a man and not an animal, then Socrates is not an animal,
    but if Socrates is not an animal, then Socrates is not a man, and if
    Socrates is not a man, then it is not the case that Socrates is a man
    and not an animal, so if Socrates is man and not an animal, then it
    is not the case that Socrates is a man and not an animal. Alberic's
    argumentasks forverylittlein order to obtain its conclusion. A conditional which Abaelard agrees is true, simplification,contraposition
    and transitivity.
    Another source tells us that 4pressed with this argument Master
    Peter conceded it to be necessary' 15And indeed he might since he
    himselfhad shown how to block most of the plausible ways of avoiding
    it. He is committedto simplification,since he explicitlyaccepts repetition and strengtheningthe antecedent. He also insists, as we have
    seen, on transitivityespecially in the face of impossible antecedents.
    The obvious principleto give up would be contraposition.Abaelard
    holds that the consequence expressed in an imperfectentailment
    instantiatesan explanatoryconnectionbetween antecedentand consequent as a law of nature. It is certainlynot unreasonable to maintain
    that explanitorinessdoes not survive contraposition.But Abaelard is
    in a difficultposition here since, although his support for the contrapositive of a true conditional turns on a proof by reductiowhich
    guarantees only strict inseparability, he employs exactly the same
    device to derive the secondary from the primary figures of the
    syllogism. Lower the status of the contrapositiveand there seems no
    reason to accept that any but the primaryfiguressatisfythe containment condition. All well and good, you may say, perhaps we can
    finallymake sense of Aristotle'sclaim thatthe primaryfiguresare evident in a way that the others are not. For Abaelard, however, as for
    us, all syllogismshold equally in virtue of their form,and he surely
    would not have bought the primaryfiguresat the expense of the rest.
    MontaneMinores16and the ArsMelidunatell us that
    The Introductiones
    15In thecommentary
    on Boethius'desyll.hyp.in BerlinLat. Fol. 624 quotedby
    L.M. de Rijk 1966,1-57esp. 54.
    16'Introductiones
    Minores1
    Montane
    , in: L.M.4de Rijk1967II. 2, 9-71,p. 66,correcting
    thetextin theobviously
    , OxfordDigby174,ff.211necessary
    ways;ArsMeliduna'
    241,ff.235ra-vb,
    quotedin L.M. de Rijk 1967II. 1, 352-3.
    122

    09:11:24 AM

    some people, presumablytheNominales


    , responded to the argumentby
    in
    that
    effect,
    claiming,
    simplificationto the negative conjunct fails
    when the conjunctsare of mixed quality, since in such a combination
    the negation is 'not so strong' as when it occurs adone. This is a possible response, and it recalls a recentdistinctionbetween negation plus
    conjunctionas a cancellationof contentand negation plus conjunction
    as explosion of content. It would be difficultfor Abaelard to accept,
    however,since he must regard the copulative combination of affirmation and negation as negative if he is to save as paradigms of entailmentthe syllogismsof the firstfigurewithnegative consequents. Furthermore nothing in the argument for simplificationsuggests any
    independentreason fordisallowing strengtheningof the antecedentof
    a repeated affirmativewith a negative proposition. The cancellation
    view of negation would also, of course, require us to give up
    simplificationto the affirmativeconjunct, but unfortunatelywe seem
    to have been leftwith no record of the view of the Nominaleson this
    point.
    Had they insistedon it theywould have been well on theirway to
    the development of something more like modern connexive logics.
    These typicallysave simplificationas a rule of inferenceat the expense
    of conditionalsimplificationand the deduction theorem. We do know
    that in the face of Alberici argument something like this was
    who seem to have rejected simplificationin
    advocated by the Porretani
    any form. The Montani, followingAlberic, adopted the termistposition criticisedby Abaelard and maintained that what grounds transitivityis a connectionbetween predicates,and that the conditions for
    the application of the rule are not satisfiedhere. Two extreme alterand the Parvipontani
    . The
    natives are representedby the Melidunenses
    first maintained that not only does nothing follow from an
    impossibility but indeed nothing follows from a falsehood. The
    followersof Adam Parvipontanus, on the otherhand, and temporarily
    the victorsin the debate, seem to have given up the containmentcondition and embraced the ' paradoxes' of strictimplication.
    These alternative accounts of the conditional became available
    around about the middle of the twelfthcentury. Not long afterwards
    the earliestsurvivingaccount of obligationes
    must have been written.It
    between
    and
    distinguishes
    possible
    impossiblepositio and explicitly
    the
    of
    the
    Adamitorum
    in thelatter. It was
    rejects
    application
    consequentia
    not
    a
    written
    of
    Robert
    follower
    of
    Melun and probapresumably
    by
    bly not by one of Gilbert of Poitiers or Alberic, since there seems to
    123

    09:11:24 AM

    be no restrictionof simplificationnor any suggestionthat transitivity


    rests upon a connection between predicates.
    That leaves the Nominales
    , and one of themis surelythe most plausible candidate forauthor of the TractatiEmmerani,For though theyare
    rathergarbled, both the semantical and syntacticalconstraintsplaced
    thereupon the notion of followingunder an impossible
    positioare those
    of Abaelard' s containment conditional.
    If the Nominaleswere the inventors of positio, they must also be
    leading candidates forthe honour of having rediscoveredthe Liar and
    its solution by cassatio.Note, however, that the majorityof evidence
    on the early Liar and on cassatioin particularcomes fromthe ObligationesParisienses
    , which in view of a referenceto the inapplicabilityof
    the consequentia
    Nominaliumin a particular argument was presumably
    not writtenby one of them.17
    There is furtherevidence that at least the TractatusEmmeranusde
    was writtenby a Nominalis
    . We know froma couple
    ImpossibiliPositione
    of sources that the Nominalespropounded the paradoxical thesis that
    nothinggrowsand fromone source thattheyalso assertedthatnothing
    moves. Normore has argued that Abaelard is committedto both of
    thesethesesbut ifwe examine his workswe findthathe accepts neither
    of them. He certainlyconsiders both claims, but in each case offers
    accounts of movement and change to save the appearance.
    we finda quite differentstory.The
    Turning to the TractatiEmmerani
    treatise on impossiblepositiois much occupied with the varieties of
    union. It distinguishesas did Abaelard but in an un-Abaelardian way
    between essence and person and proposes that there may be a union
    of one or of both of these. Obviously the questions of the characterof
    the Trinity and the Incarnation are in the background here:
    It is to be notedthatsometimes
    thereis a unionofessenceonly,sometimes
    of
    of bothessenceand person.And grantedthat
    personsonlyand sometimes
    essenceandpersonare thesameand thatonecannotexistwithout
    theother,
    nevertheless
    one of themmayindeedbe understood
    without
    theother.And
    becauseit maybe understood
    it maybe positedsinceimpossible
    comes
    positio
    aboutwithrespect
    to understanding.
    The essenceis thesuppositum
    understood
    without
    formandthepersonis thesuppositum
    understood
    withform.
    Andnote
    thatthoseterms
    arecalledessential
    whichareso predicated
    ofa wholeas tobe
    ofeachofitsparts,forexample'body','wood'andthelike.Those
    predicated
    termsarecalledpersonal
    whichareso predicated
    ofa wholethattheyarenot
    of each partof it, forexamplethe term'man' and the term
    predicated
    'animal'.18
    17Martin1992.
    18Tractatus
    Emmeranus
    deimpossibili
    , in L.M. de Rijk,SomeThirteenth
    positione
    Century
    Tracts
    ontheGame
    12 (1974),94-123,120.
    , Vivarium,
    ofObligation
    124

    09:11:24 AM

    The Tractatusgoes on to note that neuter adjectives are essential


    terms, a point earlier made by Abaelard, though he has it that they
    denote a nature ratherthan a person. We are then given some rules
    for predication. If a union is of essences, then an essential term
    predicatedof one of the members must also be predicated of the other
    but not so a personal term. Posit the essential union of Socrates and
    ' must be conceded but not
    estidemquodBrunellus
    Brunellusand ' Socrates
    4SocratesestBrunellus'
    . So also, presumably,as Abaelard argues, 1Pater
    9
    estidemquodFilius but not ' PaterestFilius' For personal union it is just
    9but concede
    estidemquodBrunellus
    the opposite, we must deny ' Socrates
    9
    '
    9
    4
    ' Socrates
    estBrunellusand so, presumably, Deus estHomo but not Deus
    estidemquod Homo9.
    The Tractatus
    claims thatamongst formsthereare some, like blackness
    and whiteness, which belong to both essences and persons. Others
    such as growthand decrease belong only to persons. Though we are
    not told so it seems reasonable that we should deny the predicationof
    the correspondingpredicates of essences, that is we should deny 'this
    body grows' and 'something <aliquid> grows'. But if we deny that
    something grows we must grant its opposite: 'nothing grows'. If
    'movement' is a formbelongingonly to persons then we will have the
    second paradoxical thesis too.
    The TractatusEmmeranusis the last text that I know to mention
    Abaelard' s logic for the conditional. Towards the end of the twelfth
    century a new theory and classification of the conditional was
    developed perhaps based on a reading of Book V of the Topics. The
    containmentrelationis stillmentionedas characteristicof natural conbesides formaland
    ditionals,but theseoftenappear as an afterthought
    simple conditionals. They are importantfor Scotus, however, since
    just the conceptual separabilitycaptured by the distinctionbetween
    the two kinds of necessityacknowledged by Abaelard is required to
    locate a formal distinction. Not surprisinglyScotus makes use of
    positio.What is curious, however, is that while Ockham has
    impossible
    nothingto say about natural conditionals beyond claiming that they
    are evident to everyone, he does nevertheless recognise impossible
    positio.In factthe SummaLogicaeseems to provide the last account of
    this obligatioin the middle ages.
    Ockham obviouslyhas his doubts about impossible
    positioand in conif
    there
    is
    his
    of
    it
    he
    use
    for the device.
    discussion
    asks
    any
    cluding
    He grants that there is and claims surprisinglythat it is sometimes
    useful for investigatingthe distinctionof things. Perhaps the reason
    125

    09:11:24 AM

    that impossible
    positiodisappears afterOckham and so the last trace of
    the twelfthcenturyNominalesin the fourteenthwas the realisationthat
    talk of evidence to everyone is much too vague to ground the use of
    the device. On the otherhand any attemptto provide a special conditional foruse under impossible hypothesesruns the riskof providing
    a tool for making the sort of distinctionsthat Abaelard and Scotus
    were so fond of but which the great fourteenthcentury Nominalist
    abhorred.
    Auckland
    The University
    ofAuckland

    126

    09:11:24 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    The School of PeterAbelard Revisited
    DAVID LUSCOMBE

    My concern in this paper is not withworks of logic associated with


    Peter Abelard but withwritingsof a theologicalkind containingmaterial which is similar to that also found in Abelard' s own writings.1
    To theseworksof theology,largelycollectionsof sentencesbut also
    including some works of biblical commentary,I gave attentionin a
    book whichI published in 1969 under the titleTheSchoolofPeterAbelard
    and with the sub-title The Influenceof AbelardosTheologyin theEarly
    ScholasticPeriod.2After the passage of more than twenty years I
    welcome Professor Courtenay's mandatumto me to revisit what I
    called, followinga well-establishedconvention,the school. Whetheror
    not this school looks any differentnow than it did two decades ago is
    one legitimateconcern of this colloquium which seeks to raise new
    questions and to explore differentpossibilitiesthan I have previously
    made
    done. When John of Salisbury, as he tells us in his Metalogicon,
    a returnvisitto the Mont Sainte-Genevive afteran absence of twelve
    years to see again the contemporariesand pupils of Abelard, he was
    disappointed to find that they had not progressed one bit; John's
    enquiries revealed nothingthat had not been known earlier.3Perhaps
    not in the case of John and the logicians from 1136 to 1148, but my
    1 SeeJuliaBarrow,
    Part3 ofthis
    DavidLuscombe
    CharlesBurnett,
    1984-5,183-302.
    doctrine
    abouta fewworkswhichputforward
    Checklist
    (259-261)givesinformation
    ownwritings
    aboutAbelard's
    Part2 givesinformation
    identifiable
    as Abelard's;
    (240ofAbelardian
    3 ('The Diffusion
    Writings',
    258). See alsoLuscombe1969:chapter
    on logicand theology
    somedetailsofwritings
    byAbelard
    inspired
    60-102)includes
    5 and 10 (143-172,224-260)examine
    as wellas ofthosewritten
    byhim;chapters
    fromAbelard'sschool.
    worksoftheology
    2 See n. 1 above.
    3 'Iucundumitaqueuisumest,ueteresquos reliqueram
    et quos adhucdialctica
    in montereuisere
    cumeis superambiguitatibus
    detinebat
    socios,conferre
    pristinis,
    Inuentisuntqui
    mutuacommetiremur
    utnostrum
    invicem
    ex collatione
    profectum.
    Adquaestiones
    fuerant
    uisisuntprocessisse.
    etubi.equeenimad palmum
    prstinas
    nec propositiunculam
    unam adiecerant.
    dirimendas,
    Quibus urgebantstimulis,
    in uno dumtaxat,dedicerant
    eisdemet ipsi urgebantur.
    Profecerant
    modum,
    nesciebant.
    modestiam
    Adeoquidem,ut de reparatione
    eorumpossetdesperari',
    of K.S.B.
    , 11.10,ed. J.B. Hall withtheassistance
    Johnof Salisbury,
    Metalogicon
    CCCM 98, Turnhout
    1991,li 83-93.
    Keats-Rohan,
    127

    09:11:34 AM

    hope is that a freshreturnvisit to Abelars followersin theologywill


    reveal some freshconsiderations.
    When consideringthe theologicalliteratureof the twelfthcenturyin
    all its diversityand quality, we should remember that the writings
    which are either ascribed to Abelard or which contain features
    characteristicof his teaching are not especially numerous or very
    much copied but theywere remarkablein theircontentsand character
    and caused considerable controversy.
    We have knowledge, in the firstplace, of Abelard's own books,
    in its many successive versions4and his Ethics.5
    especially his Theology
    Then there are the various collections of sentences. Of prime importance here are the Sentences
    called the Sentences
    of MasterPeterAbelard
    From
    time
    to
    time
    been
    have
    called
    the Sentences
    (SPA).6
    they
    ofHermannbecause a certain Hermann names himselfin one version of the
    work. But Peter Abelard names himselfin another version.7Clearly
    this collection of sentences representsthe teaching given by Abelard
    to studentsas reportedor copied, perhaps by some of those students.
    This is a well writtenwork; it is far frombeing a set of loose reporta
    tiones.
    Other collectionsof sentencesalso summarise Abelard's theological
    teaching in more or less similar ways to that found in SPA : the short
    Sentences
    Parisiensesedited
    ofSt. Florian( SF) forexample,8 the Sententie
    which
    I
    and
    cadi
    SPI.9
    In thisway we may distinguishthe
    by Landgraf
    firstcollectionof the Paris Sentences
    fromSP2 which is a second collection of Sentences
    also reportingAbelard's teaching and found in the
    same MS of the Bibliothque nationale, latin 18108. 10
    4 TSum
    , TSch,Tchr,Tsch.
    5 Peter
    Abelard's
    Ethics
    . AnEdition
    with
    Translation
    andNotes
    Introduction,
    English
    byD.E.
    OxfordMedievalTexts,Oxford1971.
    Luscombe,
    6 Mostrecently
    editedby S. Buzzetti,
    Sententie
    Petri
    Abelardi
    Hermaistri
    (Sententie
    manni
    dellaFacoltdi Letteree Filosofia
    dell'Universit
    di Milano
    ), Pubblicazioni
    101. Sezionea curadell'Istituto
    di StoriadellaFilosofia
    3, Florence1983.AlsoPL
    178,1695-1758.
    7 Buzzetti,
    ofauthorship
    and suggests
    thatone
    op. cit.,4-6 explainstheproblem
    Hermannus
    revisedthetextoftheSentences
    ofAbelardandthat,in so doing,
    magister
    hisnamewherethenameofPetrus
    hesubstituted
    appearsinonegroupofmanuscript
    Constant
    Abelard
    , in:
    copiesofthework.See further
    J. Mews,TheSententie
    ofPeter
    RTAM, 53 (1986),130-84.
    8 Sententie
    Florianenses
    Patristicum
    , ed. Heinrich
    Ostlender,
    XIX, Bonn
    Florilegium
    1929.
    Ed. Arthur
    Ecrits
    d Abelard.
    deI ecole
    Textes
    indits
    , Spicilegium
    Landgraf,
    theologiques
    sacrumLovaniense.
    Etudeset documents
    14, Louvain1934.
    10Ed.J. Trimborn,
    DieSententiae,
    mis
    so,ausderAbaelardschule,
    Quoniam
    Cologne1962.
    128

    09:11:34 AM

    All the featuresthat are common to these sentence works derive


    from Abelard and from Abelard alone. Of especial concern to
    Abelardo criticstowards the end of his career was a lost work which
    was simplycalled Libersententiarum
    Petri(LS). Abelard denied
    magisti
    was
    written
    it.
    It
    taken
    into
    account
    by Bernard of Clairvaux,
    having
    William of St. Thierry and Thomas of Morigny as theyprepared for
    the condemnationof Abelard. Some of the work can be reconstructed
    on thebasis of the quotations made fromit by Abelard' s accusers, and
    an edition of as much of the textas survivesin thisway was published
    11
    by Constant Mews in 1986.
    Some additional textshave also come to light.In the BritishLibrary
    MS, Cotton, Faustina A.X (saec. XII1) there are lengthyloose notes,
    written in the margins of an Anglo-Saxon work, which report
    Abelardo ethical teachings.12This is not a structuredsentence collection like thoseI have just mentioned,merelya set of reportationes
    or jottings. They show an especial interestin the notion that sin is not act
    or deed, that forgivenessis not obtained by anythingthat man or the
    church does. This writerusefullyamplifies,although in small ways,
    what we otherwiseknow mainly fromAbelard' s littlework on Ethics,
    the Scitote ipsum.
    I showed in my book on The Schoolthat in addition to the narrow
    but consistentstream of sentence works which contain neat doses of
    Abelard' s own teachings, there also developed another narrow and
    less consistent stream of hybrid sentence collections which mixed
    togethersentencesof Abelard and teachingsfromthe school of Hugh
    of St. Victor.13Leading examples of this currentof writingare the
    of Omnebene (SO)15 As
    of Roland (SR)1* and the Sentences
    Sentences
    to
    recentlyas 1988 Charles Burnettbrought lightanother such collection, a Summasententiarium
    by a certainAlberic who was a monk in the
    Veneto.16 His collection is sometimes long-winded. It cites magister
    Petrusexplicitlyon seven occasions, and incorporates passages from
    11Mews,TheSententie
    168-83.
    12N.R. Ker,Catalogue
    Oxford1957,194-6.
    ofManuscripts
    containing
    Anplo-Saxon,
    13TheSchool
    Abelard
    s Disciples
    10('Abelard'
    andtheSchool
    , especially
    ofPeter
    chapter
    ofSt. Victor',224-60).
    14Ed. A.M. Gietl,DieSentenzen
    1891.
    Rolands
    , Freiburg
    15Theseareinedited
    extracts
    wereprinted
    inthenotestoGietl's edition
    of
    although
    SR andDr.JuliaBarrow
    ofNottingham)
    hasprepared
    formea fulledi(University
    basedon all theknownmanuscripts.
    tion,as yetunpublished,
    16Ch.S.F.Burnett,
    A newtext
    Abelard"
    Dossier?
    , in:AHDL 1988,
    forthe"School
    ofPeter
    7-21.
    129

    09:11:34 AM

    Abelars Theologiaas well as fromSPA. Alberic also includes passages


    that correspondto a version of SPA that has not so far come to light.
    This means, incidentally,that Alberic's Summahas now to be taken
    into account in constructingthe new edition of SPA. Like ill the
    writersof all the other sentence works fromAbelard' s school, Alberic
    distinguishes sins from acts and from will; and like all the other
    followersof Abelard he attaches the propertiesof power, wisdom and
    love to the threepersons of the Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost
    respectively.
    These, then,are some of the textsthathave to be taken into account
    both collectivelyand singlywhen, as historiansof medieval thought,
    we tryto evaluate the trendsor the tendenciesforwhichAbelard may
    be held to have been responsible. We have a recognisable body of
    material, large enough to enable comparison and cross-checkingof
    contents to take place.
    There is a second preliminaryconsiderationthat I wish to propose.
    This owes everythingto the work ofJean Jolivetand especially to the
    closing pages of his justly celebrated book on the Artsdu langageet
    17
    thologie.Jolivetargued that Abelard is betterrepresentedas a nonrealist ratherthan as a nominalist, as a dereifier,especially in logic.
    However, at the end of his book Jolivet widened the scope of his
    enquiry beyond grammar and logic. He suggested that in all his
    thought, including his theology and his ethics, Abelard was always
    dereifying, always evading res, always evacuating terms of the
    thingness which people tended to put into them, always seeing in
    words the power to convey meaning flexiblyand variably. This is as
    much part of Abelard's effortin the Prologue to his Sic et non, in his
    Theologiaand Ethics as it was in his commentaries on the logic of
    Boethius. One identical method, one unifiedphilosophyof language,
    was employed throughoutAbelard's oeuvre.To this momentJolivet's
    is the most dominant and convincing general interpretationof
    Abelard' s thought. It still occupies a uniquely importantposition. It
    does contain some troublesome spots, as when Joliveton p. 362 goes
    beyond his demonstrationof the unityof Abelard' s method and style
    to speak of "un systmebien articul". In factAbelard tended to fire
    away at almost every possible target. Opportunism and consistency
    marched together,but he had diverse inclinationsto try to keep in
    17Arts
    dulangage
    etthologie
    chezAblard
    mdivale
    , Etudesde philosophie
    LVII, Paris
    to thesecondedition.
    1969;secondedition1982.I refer
    130

    09:11:34 AM

    step. On earlier pages (p. 353, p. 354 n. 59) Jolivet described


    Abelard' s thoughtas a curious amalgam which preserves,along with
    the dereifyingimpulse, elements of Platonism and which recognises
    that are real, although beyond time and
    relationshipsor habitudines
    left
    behind
    a
    number of unresolved issues.
    He
    language.
    With these two preliminariesstated, I would like in the main part
    of thispaper to bring togethersome illustrations,taken fromthe various sentencecollectionsassociated with the school of Abelard, of how
    Abelardian 'non-realism' was applied withinhis school to a range of
    issues belonging to the realm of Christian belief and doctrine. The
    common featuresand the common structureas well as contentsof the
    sentence collectionsof the school should be kept in mind.
    Christian belief, what is needed for salvation, consists of three
    things- faith,charityand sacrament.18The sentence collections are
    accordingly divided into three parts: first,a section on God, the
    Trinityand Christ; then sectionson sacramentsand on ethics. Of the
    greatest interest,and also among the best preserved in the manuscripts,are the discussions of God and Trinity,and I shall delay commenting on these until I have considered some other matters more
    briefly.These mattersrelateto the redemption,charity,merit,virtue,
    vice, sin and the remission of sin. On these mattersAbelard' s main
    viewpointsare shared by his school, though oftenwith some loss of
    nuance.
    Firstthe redemptionand the attackmade by Abelard, as previously
    also by Anselm of Canterbury,on the theoryof the devil's right.The
    devil had no ius wherebyto hold captive fallenmankind. This view is
    : the devil held
    prominentin the thirdfragmentof the Libersententiarum
    fallenmankindcaptive until the death of Christ but only because God
    had permittedhim to do so.19 As Roland writes, ius has its propria
    18Tria sunt,ut arbitror,
    in quibushumanesalutissummaconsistit,
    scilicetfides,
    caritaset sacramentum,
    S/Mc.l, ed. Buzzetti25; PL 178,1695A.Cf. SF c.l, ed.
    Ostlender
    146;SR, ed. Gietl1; SO, ed.
    1; SPI, ed. Landgraf
    3; SP2, ed. Trimborn
    Barrow(MunichStaatsbibliothek
    Cod. sim.168(= M) p. 151; Naples,Biblioteca
    and Mews1.1,//.
    NazionaleMS VII C 43 ( = N) io. 1). Also,TSch,ed. Buytaert
    11.
    ed. Buytaert
    1-2;tsch,
    19LS Fragment
    3, ed. Mews177-8.SPAc. XXIII, ed. Buzzetti
    102-3,//.14-37;PL
    SF c.30,ed. Osdender14. Also,Abelard,Commentary
    onSt.Paul,
    178,1730C-31A:
    totheRomans,
    ed. E.M. Buytaert,
    Petri
    Abaelardi
    1, CCCM II,
    opera
    Epistle
    theologica
    Turnhout
    henceforth
    as Comm.
    1969,114-15
    (thisworkisabbreviated
    Rom.).Likewise
    intheologiam
    theanonymous
    Ecrits
    Ysagoge
    ( = YT) II, ed. Arthur
    Landgraf,
    thologiques
    lard, 156.
    Ab
    del'cole
    131

    09:11:34 AM

    and the term is not used properly in this context of the


    significatio,
    power exercised by Satan. Dominiumis the correctterm, the fact of
    domination over fallen man, not a rightfullordship.20What ratio,
    therefore,needs to be discovered for Christ's incarnation, life and
    or opusforeitherthe incarnationor the
    death? Was thereany necessitas
    crucifixionas a means of redeeming mankind? For God could have
    In factGod chose to take
    redeemed mankind sola iussioneor soloverbo.21
    on a human nature in order to display divine love and wisdom to
    mankind tamverboquamexemplo
    , the example being an example of obedience even unto death, the verbumbeing preaching and spoken
    teaching.22
    Moving on to ethics, R. Wielockx has drawn attentionrecentlyto
    23These
    certain interestingaspects of the Abelardian notion of caritas.
    are picked up in the sentencecollectionsin the school. The Ciceronian
    and utilewas familiarenough to moralists
    distinctionbetween honestum
    in the Middle Ages; in definingcaritasas amorhonestus
    , and not as
    the
    utilitatem
    sentence
    collections
    were
    caritaspursued propter
    ,
    aliquam
    in
    a
    was set
    Christian
    followingin the stoic tradition.But amorhonestus
    contextas well: caritasis love of God forGod's sake and love of one's
    neighbour also but forGod's sake. We should do nothing,whetherit
    be eating food, going to sleep or gettingmarried, forany otherreason
    than for God's sake. Augustine had writtenof charitythat it has its
    climax in and ultimatelyconsists in the enjoyment or fruitioof God
    himself.But theAbelardian school distillsout all notion of recompense
    or reward. Charityis love of God forGod's sake; it is thereforedefined
    simply and strictlyfor what it is, not forwhat it entails.24
    A similar comment may be made about Abelardian perspectives
    concerning merit and blame. Merit and blame are not conditional
    upon human achievement. Merit, forexample, is not attached to the
    20SR, ed. Gietl161-2.
    21LS fragment
    Rom.116.
    4, ed. Mews178; Comm.
    22LS fragments
    6-9,ed. Mews 178-9;SPA c.XXIII, ed. Buzzetti103-5,PL 178.
    ed. Osdender15. Cf. Abelard,Comm.
    SF
    Rom.117-8.
    1731A-1732A;
    23R. Wielockx,La sentence
    De caritate
    et la discussion
    surl'amour
    , in:
    scolastique
    58 (1982),50-86,334-56;59 (1988),26-45.
    Lovanienses,
    Ephemerides
    Theologicae
    24SPAc.I, XXXI, ed. Buzzetti
    SF
    25-6,139-40,PL 178,1695B-D,1747C-1748A;
    C.2,ed. Ostlender
    1-2;SPI , ed. Landgraf
    5, 48-51;SR ed. Gietl314-22.See also
    Abelard,TchrV.51-2,ed. Buytaert
    369-70;tsch13-15ed. Buytaert
    405; TSchI, 3-8
    ed. Buytaert
    andMews319-21.Wielockx
    note)showsthatAbelardand
    (seeprevious
    hisfollowers
    wereinfluenced
    morerecent
    thanAugustine,
    Dedoctrina
    Chrisbywritings
    tianaIII. 10.16,CCSL 32, 87. See also YT I, ed. Landgraf
    85-91.
    132

    09:11:34 AM

    act of martyrdomor the practiseof fasting.Rather, as SPA say, it consists in the will alone: a good will brings its own reward; merit and
    blame are not created by external conduct. This is not only because
    meritand blame are independentof the sphere of behaviour external
    to the human will- the sphere of acts- but also because the fragility
    of creation is such that meritand blame are functionsof divine grace
    which enable or disable the human will. But man can himself- using
    freewill and reason (with which to choose between good and evil)accept or not accept God's grace.25
    The decoupling effectedby Abelard (especially in his Ethics) of the
    notion of sin from res is well enough known. Abelard's followers
    similarlyremove the notion of sin fromthe sphere of acts and locate
    it inwardlyin the mind which knowledgeablyopts forcontemptof the
    creator. Sin is distinguishedfromvice, fromall external materiasuch
    as temptationor concupiscence. Like Abelard, the school workedhard
    to purifythe concept of sin of all non-essential ingredients.26
    Likewise the economy of forgivenessis separated fromthe external
    spectrumof requirementscomprisingconfession,ecclesiasticalabsolution and satisfaction. Forgiveness by God and the human sigh of
    remorse are simultaneous and coincident and inside the mind; an
    external frame of requirements is needed but to serve wider
    purposes.27
    These examples show how Abelard and his school scraped away all
    superficialities that may obscure the thinking mind of the
    knowledgeable believer. A clear, knowing choice or consent or even
    contemptthat is exercised in response to the grace proferred,and to
    the perfectionof the goodness displayed, by God is all that ultimately
    counts. The place of externalitiesin relationto the workingsof reason,
    conscience and understandingwas sharply circumscribed.
    Finally I must turnto God about whom it was always necessaryfor
    the Abelardians to say at once that God is beyond language. As SPI
    , the rules of the arts,
    explain, the art of division, the use of vocabula
    25LS fragments
    15-16,21,ed. Mews180-2,183;SPAc.XXXIV,ed. Buzzetti
    153-5;
    PL. 178,1754-6;
    SF c.27,ed.Ostlender
    13;SPI ed. Landgraf
    57-60;YTed. Landgraf
    91-2.Cf. Abelard,Ethics
    on Romans
    , ed. Luscombe26-9,48-51;Commentary
    , ed.
    240-2.
    Buytaert
    26LS fragment
    24-5,ed. Mews183;SPAc.XXXIII, ed. Buzzetti150-1;PL. 178.
    106-9.
    1753A-D;SPI , ed. Landgraf
    55-6; YT, ed. Landgraf
    27SPAc.XXXV-XXXVII,ed. Buzzetti
    156-63;PL. 178. 1756A-8D;YT, ed. Laned. Luscombe98-127.
    dgraf207-16;SR, ed. Gietl243-9.Cf. Abelard,Ethics,
    133

    09:11:34 AM

    are of no help to philosopherswho tryto learn about God.28 This was


    in fact like an 'official health warning': the Abelardians did not in
    practise prohibit the use of uocabula. The school, like Abelard,
    defendeda theoryof transferenceor translationof meaning. Thus, we
    continue to use personal names- father,son and spirit- to designate
    three persons in the Trinity. Nonetheless, the names of Father, Son
    and Spiritsunttranslata
    a propriissignificationibus
    in order to signifypersons in the Trinity.29Yet the dissimilitudines
    that are therebycreated
    are not total; the names reflectlimited likenesses: resille, as both the
    author ofSP2 and SO write,quarumnominasumuntur
    debent
    habere
    aliquam
    cum re ilia ad quam significandam
    ,30 Thus the
    sumuntur
    similitudinem
    Father is like a fatherwho begets a son fromown being; the Spirit is
    like the breathwith which a mothershows her feelingsto her creature.
    of God. By the
    Nonetheless, such personal names are used improprie
    - ifindeed theydid not themtime Abelardo censors had highlighted
    in 1139 to 1140 it
    selves provide- that adverb in the Libersententiarum
    was easy, although wrong, for William of St. Thierry to allege that
    Abelard and his supportershad denied three divine persons.31
    Several of the compilersof the sentencecollectionsgo to some trouble to reproduce Abelard' s summaries of differingnotions of persona.
    In grammar, a person is one who speaks to another, is spoken to by
    another, is spoken about. In rhetoric, a person is someone about
    whose actions or speech someone else argues or speaks. In Boethius,
    a person is substantiarationalis individua.32For all their many
    resemblances, it is here on God and the Trinity that Abelardian
    sentence collectionsmost display characteristicdifferencesof selection
    and emphasis. The SPA , which have a good claim to representthe
    actual teaching of Abelard, are in fact the closest of all to being an
    28SPI , ed. Landgraf
    6-7.CfTSum11.64-74,
    andMewsII.546-678;Tchr
    ed. Buytaert
    IL 1338-1570;TSch11.75-93,
    ed. Buytaert
    III. 115-30,ed. Buytaert
    and MewsIL
    1138-1399.
    29SP2, ed. Trimborn
    176,IL 22-4.Cf. SPAc.XV, ed. Buzzetti73, /.4; PL. 178.
    1716D.SO is verysimilartoSP2, ed. Barrow(M p. 163,N fo.27v).
    30SP2, ed. Trimborn
    creaturae
    ilhusinsteadofcumre
    176,//.25-7(Trimborn
    prints
    ilia).SO, loc. cit.
    31LS fragment
    1, ed. Mews177.
    32SPA c.XIII, ed. Buzzetti70-1;PL. 178. 1715D-16C;SFc.lO, ed. Ostlender
    5;
    SPI , ed. Landgraf
    182;SO, ed. Barrow(M pp. 164-5,N
    30; SP2, ed. Trimborn
    and Mews,II. 1003-59;Tchr
    ed. Buytaert
    fo.29).Cf. Abelard,TSum11.106-12,
    III. 174-81,ed. Buytaert
    and MewsII.
    II. 2153-2231;TSchII. 104-9,ed. Buytaert
    1520-1612.
    134

    09:11:34 AM

    anthologyof quotations fromthe Bible and the Fathers. SP2 , on the


    other hand, boldly eschew quotations from the authorities and are
    seriously philosophical. What, they ask, does individuamean in
    Boethius' definition of a person as substantiarationalisindividua?
    Individuummeans that which nonpotestdividi. An atom is individuum
    because it is too small to be divided. Steel which is too adamantine to
    be fracturedis individuum.Anythingthat is predicable of one thing
    only is an individual.33SP2 painstakinglyexamine, in the light of
    Boethius' definition,the question of persons in the Trinity: a divine
    , because God the Son was joined to man in unam
    person is not individua
    personamthrough the Incarnation; yet there had not been two
    separable persons, God and man, before the Incarnation occurred.
    That was one reason forquestioning the use of the noun, person, in
    the Trinity.A second reason is that,on Boethius' definitionof person,
    there would be not one but three rational substances in one God.34
    Why, then, if the word person raises problems when used of the
    Trinity, do Christians use it? The sentence collections, even where
    theyblend Abelardian with Victorine teachings, are reasonably consistentand persistentin their answer. Person, in the Trinity, means
    not substance but property. The distinctionswithin God are not
    distinctionsinto threeindividual, rational substances, but distinctions
    into threepropertieswhich are power, wisdom and charity.Together
    these threepropertiesof power, wisdom and charityconstituteperfec35
    tion of being; they constitutethe summumbonum.
    Still, the writersof the sentencecollectionsare not contentto let the
    matter rest there, having challenged the notion of person in the
    Trinity and having reproduced Abelard' s idea that three properties
    togetherconstitutethe summumbonum.They also raise, like Abelard,
    the question whythereis a Trinity,notjust one undivided permanent
    substance. The propertiesof power, wisdom and charityconstitutea
    supreme goodness, but why cannot onedivine person be this power,
    wisdom and charity?Why threepersons? The answer given is that in
    order to persuade men to worshipGod a display of a diversityof pro33SP2, ed. Trimborn
    182.Cf. SO, ed. Barrow(M p. 165,N fo.29-29v).
    34SP2, ed. Trimborn
    182-6;SO, ed. Barrow(M p. 165,N os. 29v-30).
    " LS fragment
    1,ed. Mews177;SPAc.V, ed. Buzzetti
    34-6;PL. 178.1699C-1700D;
    SPI , ed. Landgraf
    SR, ed. Gietl21-5,46; SO, ed.
    7-13;SP2,ed. Trimborn
    188-204;
    Barrow
    Nfos.12-13).Cf.Abelard,
    TSum1.2-9,ed. Buytaert
    andMews
    (A/pp.158-9,
    II. 20-97;Tchr
    IL 49-101;TSchI. 30-5,ed. Buytaert
    andMews
    I, 4-7,ed. Buytaert
    Ii 336-89.
    135

    09:11:34 AM

    perties is helpful:people will fearGod iftheyperceive his power, they


    will love him iftheylearn of his wisdom and experiencehis love. And,
    although the sentence collections are not fullyexplicit on this point,
    an appreciation of God's propertieswill be easier if each of the three
    propertiesis speciallyand properlyassociated withone of threedivine
    persons, power withthe Father, wisdom withthe Son and charitywith
    the Spirit.36
    The problems associated with use of names forGod are verydominant in the sentence collections. They distinguishtwo principal types
    of name. On the one hand thereare personal names whichare the particular names of each of threedivine persons: Father, Son and Spirit.
    On the other hand, there are natural or substantialnames which are
    common names of the essence of God.37 These latterare of two kinds.
    One of these is of names secundum
    se or ex se: thus when we say God
    is immense or omnipotentor just or wise or eternal we apply names
    to God's substance. The second kind of natural names of God is of
    names which arise in respect of the relationship between God and
    creation: examples are just, merciful, creator etc.38 In SPA these
    names secundumnos or respectu
    creaturarum
    are either temporal names
    such as creator or lord, or they are eternal names such as provident
    or prescient.39However, SP2 are not so easily satisfied.To say that
    God is immense and just and eternal is certainlyto use names secundum
    se because iftherewas no creation God would stillbe eternal,just and
    immense. But these same names are also names secundum
    nos: God is
    immense respectu
    rerumque nonsuntimmense
    he
    is
    eternal
    tem,
    respectu
    40And thisleads SP2 to take the furtherunusual
    .
    porum
    step of qualifying Abelard' s argument that the distinctionsin God are distinctions
    between complementary properties. The distinctions between (for
    example) God's wisdom, justice and mercy are not distinctions
    between differentproperties but distinctions between the diverse
    36SPAc.V, ed. Buzzetti
    SP2, ed. Trimborn
    35-8;PL.178, 1699D-1702A;
    188-94;
    SO, ed. Barrow(M pp. 158-9,Affos.12-13).Cf.Abelard,TSum1.2-4,ed. Buytaert
    andMewsli 21-49;TChr1.4-6,ed. Buytaert,
    II. 49-87;TSch.1.28-35,ed. Buytaert
    and Mews,II. 324-89.
    37SPAc.XIV, XVII, ed. Buzzetti
    72, 79-80;PL.178. 1716CD,1720A-B;SP2, ed.
    Trimborn
    174;YT, ed. Landgraf
    258,260,263-4;SR, ed. Gietl43-8;SO,ed. Barrow
    (M pp. 163-4,Nos. 27-28v).
    38SF C.9,ed. Ostlender
    4 ('Quaedamnominacompetunt
    Deo ex se, quaedamex
    176.
    SP2>ed. Trimborn
    nobis');
    39SP2ted. Trimborn
    176.
    40SP2, ed. Trimborn
    176.
    136

    09:11:34 AM

    intellectus
    whichmen formin the lightof theirdiverse reactionsto God
    acting wisely,judging justly and forgivingmercifully.41Once again
    we see, as in Abelard' s Ethics, the switchfromnouns to adverbs, from
    what to how. An effortis made in the school of Abelard to definethe
    names of God from both an intrinsicand an extrinsic viewpoint.
    Moreover, SP2 find the pluralityof the non-personal names of God
    somewhat unnecessary.
    Beforeleaving this matterof names, one final point must be made
    about the Incarnation. The Incarnation for the Abelardians is not a
    union of two persons. Abelard's followersdeny that two natures or
    two substances are fused in one person. Divinityjoined to humanity
    remains divinityjust as bones joined to flesh remain bones. So it is
    improperor figurativeto say, propos of Christ, that God was made
    man or was made flesh.42Out of this objection was born the doctrine
    usually known as Christological nihilism.43
    Nowhere in the Abelardian sentence collections need we expect to
    find brand names such as nominalesor Abelardiani. But the
    resemblances between the texts of the school and Abelard' s own
    writingsspeak louder than any label in favour of the existence of a
    distinctiveschool of thoughtwhich was inspired by Abelard himself.
    For a while in the twelfthcenturyconsiderable interestwas shown in
    Abelard's teachings. This interestdwindled afterthe 1170s or so. The
    Victorines and Peter Lombard had by then provided a counterbalance; the condemnation of Abelard in 1140 had identified
    troublesome spots. This does not mean that Abelard' s followers
    achieved little.To be overtakenis not necessarilyto fail; Abelard and
    his school had radically changed the agenda of theological discourse.
    Their new agenda was largely about names, as I have tried to show.
    As Otto of Freising wrote in his GestaFriderici(I, 47) Abelard had at
    the time of his firstcondemnation at Soissons in 1121 appeared to
    - whereas the
    reduce the persons of the Trinityto vacuanominatantum
    churchfaithfully
    suisque
    taughtthatthe threepersons were resdistinctae
    as
    Otto
    And
    Abelard
    discretae.
    wrote,
    had,
    incautiously
    proprietatibus
    41SP2, ed. Trimborn
    180.
    42SPAc.XXIV ed. Buzzetti106-9;PL 178. 1732-4;SF c.34 ed. Ostlender
    16-17;
    SPIyed. Landgraf
    31-2;SR ed.Gietl172-9;SO,ed. Barrow
    (M p. 187-9,C( = Monte
    dellaBadiaMS 386) pp. 69B-70B).Cf. Abelard,TSchIII. 74-81,
    Cassino,Archivio
    ed. Buytaert
    andMewsII. 991-1112. YTdoesnotfollow
    Abelardinthis,ed. Landgraf
    164.
    43See Luscombe1969,250-2,272-3.
    137

    09:11:34 AM

    applied the sententiavocumseu nominumto theology.44In 1139-40,


    William of St. Thierry complained that Abelard was stillattenuating
    the realityof thedivine persons by speakingof theirnominaas impropria
    and by focussingon what is significativam
    potiusquam realem
    Here was a powerful current of theological thought. It was not
    called nominalist but it was much concerned with nominal issues.
    Sheffield
    The University
    of Sheffield
    44GestaFriderici
    1.47,ed. MGH, Scriptores
    XX, Hanover1868,376.
    imperatoris
    thequestionofwhether
    Abelardcertainly
    theTrinity
    consisted
    ofa real
    regarded
    ofpersonas ofgreatconcern
    to hiscontemporaries:
    'Autenim,inquiunt,
    diversity
    in solisuocabulisconsistit,
    hecdiversitas
    nonin re ... autin resolaet
    personarum
    non in uocabulis,aut simulin re et in uocabulis1,
    TSum11.44('primaobiectio
    aduersustrinitatem'),
    ed. Buytaert
    and Mews //.397-401.Cf. TchrIII.90, ed.
    II. 1148-51.
    Buytaert
    45Disputatio
    Petrum
    PL 180,532A,256D.
    adversus
    Abaelardum,

    138

    09:11:34 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    PeterLombard and Abelard:
    The Opinio Nominalium and Divine Transcendence
    MARCIA L. COLISH

    This paper has a double inspiration. One is my own investigation


    of Peter Lombard's doctrine of God, as part of a larger study of his
    theology. The second is the discovery, on the part of William J.
    Courtenay, following Artur Michael Landgraf, Marie-Dominique
    Chenu, and Johannes Schneider, of the factthatthe Lombard appeals
    to an argument derived fromthe Nominalesof the early twelfthcentury. Citing this argument, whose earliest expression he traces to
    Peter Abelard, Courtenay describes it as "the principal opinio
    Nominalium
    , namely, that whateverGod at one time knew, willed, or
    was able to do, He always knows, wills, or is able to do. By the third
    quarter of the twelfthcentury, this theoryhad been reduced to the
    axiom: once it is true, it is always true {semelest verum
    , semperest
    in
    Abelardo
    stated
    As
    this
    out,
    principle,
    verum)."1 Courtenay points
    a unitary
    have
    rests
    on
    the
    nouns
    idea
    that
    Theologia"scholarium",
    signification,although they also have other consignificationswhen
    they are used in propositions that include verbs in differenttenses,
    voices, or moods. In the Theologia"scholarium",Abelard uses this
    notion to supportone of his most notorious ideas, the claim that God
    cannot do better,or other, than He does.2
    There is another argument of the Nominales
    , mentioned in passing
    and Schneider called
    to
    which
    Chenu,
    Landgraf,
    by Courtenay,3
    attentionearlier, a parallel analysis of verbs. According to this view,
    a verb signifiestwo things, an action and the time when the action
    takes place. A single action is signified,irrespectiveof the time. The
    time is only a passing circumstance.It is a consignificationwhich does
    not alter the proper significationof the verb. Thus, the nominalist
    estverum
    maxim, semelestverum
    , can be applied just as easily to
    , semper
    1 Courtenay
    "He" inreferring
    tothedeityinthisquota1990,46. I havecapitalized
    tionforthesakeofconsistency.
    2 Ibid.,46-50.
    3 Ibid.,46, 56 nn. 8, 12.
    139

    09:11:47 AM

    propositions stating actions as to propositions making statements


    about the thingssignifiedby nouns. As these earlier scholars note, the
    Lombard makes express referenceto this nominalist argument concerning verbs in his treatment of God's power.4 For his part,
    Courtenay adds as well that the Lombard reprises Abelard' s
    nominalist argument in his treatmentof God's knowledge. As with
    Abelard, Courtenay observes, he uses it to defend God's
    immutability.At the same time, the Lombard turns the self-same
    argument against Abelard, in attackinghis claim that God cannot do
    better or other than He does.5
    It is preciselythe Lombard's appeal to this nominalistprinciple of
    the semantic unity of nouns and verbs and his concurrent antiAbelardian application of it that I want to address in this paper. At
    firstglance this looks like a paradox or inconsistency. But, I will
    argue, the Lombard's tacticsare perfectlycomprehensiblein the light
    of the doctrine of God which he defends more generally,in the light
    of his views on what we can know about the divine nature, and in the
    lightof how he sees the functionof the artesin helping us to clarifyour
    ideas in so doing. In this connection, what is at issue is not only the
    nominalistic understandingof nouns and verbs but also the type of
    logic which thisunderstandingaccompanies. As forthe firstpoint, the
    Lombard seeks to reclaim forwesternChristian thoughta theologyof
    divine transcendence.6In this theology the deity is seen as absolute
    being, being as such, the supreme metaphysicalreality.Man, according to Peter, can gain an understanding of this reality through
    metaphysicalreasoning. He views the deityas utterlyinexhaustiblein
    Himself and as totallyunconditionedand unbounded by His workings
    in the creation and man. At the same time, Peter's goal is to dePlatonize the nature of God. For him, God's actions are always free.
    They are never constrained,eitherby anythingexternalto Him or by
    4 Landgraf
    DieLehre
    1943,192-4,199;Chenu,1957,93,96,99;Johannes
    Schneider,
    vomdreieinigen
    inderSchule
    Gott
    desPetrus
    Lombardus
    , Mnchen1961,43-4,53.
    5 Courtenay
    1990,53-5.
    6 To
    oftheLombard's
    doctrine
    ofGodareErmenegildo
    Berdate,thebestaccounts
    diDioinPierLombardo
    48 (1956),
    tola,Il problema
    , in:Rivistadifilosofia
    neo-scolastica,
    followed
    diePierLombardo
    nelQuattro
    135-50;closely
    byGuiseppeLorenzi,Lafilosofia
    libridelle
    Sentenze
    4 (1960),24-8.Alsoimportant,
    for
    , in: PierLombardo,
    particularly
    hisemphasis
    onGodas essence,
    areCornelio
    deinomi
    divini
    Fabro,Teologia
    accenting
    nelLombardo
    e inS. Tommaso
    4 (1960),79-81;EtienneGilson,
    , in: PierLombardo,
    Pierre
    Lombard
    etlesthologies
    d'essence
    , in: Revuedu moyenge latin,1 (1949),61-4;
    Die Lehre
    , 25-30,224-6.
    Schneider,
    140

    09:11:47 AM

    any internal necessity of His own being. In considering God's


    manifestationsof Himself ad extra
    , Peter views them as God's effects,
    not as emanations or as participationsof the divine being. For this
    reason, the Lombard takes sharp exceptionto the theologyof Abelard,
    because he sees it as too economic, treating God as knowable
    primarilyor exclusivelyin the lightof His action in the cosmological
    and charismaticorders. By preciselythe same token, he objects with
    equal forceto other economic theologies of the day, be they those of
    Hugh of St. Victor, the Chartrains, or Rupert of Deutz.
    But, Peter singles out Abelard in particular as his target for two
    otherreasons. First,in his own estimation,what Abelard has done has
    been to take the eternityof God, which ought to be seen as transcendent, and to collapse it into God's created and time-boundordinance.
    And second, the nominalist analysis of nouns, by means of which
    Abelard buttresseshis own economic inversionof the Lombard's own
    theologicalpriorities,is also articulatedin the contextof a logic that,
    in the Lombard's view, is ill adapted to the scrutinyof metaphysical
    objects of knowledge, and above adi,the deity. In clarifyingthe Lombard's objections to Abelard' s use of the opinio Nominaliumand in
    showinghow he makes his own countervailingapplication of thatsame
    principle,it will help to examine the wider frameworkin which both
    Abelard and the Lombard develop their arguments.
    It was Abelard who made the initial sally here, and he did so in
    treating the question of divine providence, foreknowledge, and
    predestinationand theirrelationshipto futurecontingents,or, alternatively stated, the relationship between necessity and possibility.
    This alternativeis not a matterof mere, idle phraseology.For, the first
    and most importantpoint to be made is that Abelard viewed this
    whole issue primarilyas a logical, not as a theological, one. He takes
    it up, initially,in his early logical works,writtenbeforehe decided to
    move on to theology.When he did make that transition,he retained
    the logical mode of handling it. This fact is worth noting, in and of
    itself.Equally importantis the kind of logic that Abelard draws out
    of, or applies to, the Boethian-Aristotelianmaterials which he makes
    his point of departure. In this connection, his understandingof the
    scope of logic itselfneeds to be recalled, since it affectspowerfullyhis
    overall methodand also the kinds of claims he will be able to make for
    his logical argumentson thissubject when he transposesthem into his
    theological works. Notwithstandingthe fact that he begins by commentingon the Aristoteliantexts available in the Latin school tradi141

    09:11:47 AM

    tion, Abelard takes from Boethius and sharpens a Stoic-Megaritic


    approach to logic bound by its own rules. In his earliestworks,he confirms that, for him, logic is a science of discourse, not a mode of
    analysis whose goal is to seek verificationof its conclusions in the
    world of nature or in the ontological order. Concepts may, initially,
    derive from things. But, once in the mind, they are usable, comprehensible,and meaningfulin propositionalformapart fromthings.
    It is the internal structureand relations of the propositionsand the
    termsthat comprise them that determinethe truthclaims theymake.
    Asserted initially in his commentaries,7these same principles are
    developed by Abelard in his own logical treatises,both in his express
    statements defining the nature and scope of logic as such8 and,
    implicitly,in his reformulationsof syllogisticargumentsdrawn from
    his authorities, in which arguments that involve priority and
    posteriorityin time, or conditions that are verifiableempirically,are
    converted into propositions and syllogisms that display exclusively
    logical relations.9The fact that Abelardo logic is not envisioned by
    him as capable of establishing any truthbut the intrapropositional
    truth of logic itself has received general recognition from modern
    students of his philosophy.10The fact that a logic understood as a
    science of discourse, not as a science of things,a logic understood as
    having jurisdiction only within its own realm and as unable to
    establishtruthanywhereelse, would make an imperfectinstrumentof
    theological analysis was also noted, in the early 1140s, by disciples of
    Gilbert of Poitiers, and held against Abelardo theologicaluse of logic
    7 See, forexample,
    inCategorias
    Editto
    PeterAbelard,
    ; Editio
    ; Glossae
    super
    Porphyrum
    dilogica
    in: PeterAbelard,
    Scritti
    Aristotelem
    deInterpretation,
    , 2nded., ed. Mario
    super
    dal Pra,Firenze1969,3, 61, 84-5,105-6,110-3.
    8 LI 17,20-1,28-9,60-1;112-5;307-10,320-2;LNPS,585;Dialctica
    , 2.1.1.4,2.28,
    153-60,163-4,210-3.
    9 Dial. 3.1.4, 4.1.2 ff.,270-309,469-532.
    10Dal Pra, intro.to his ed. of PeterAbelard,Scritti
    Beoniodi logica
    , xxii-xxiii;
    tr.SimonPleasance,DorBrocchieri
    1974,153-63;TheLogicofAbelard,
    Fumagalli,
    Philos.
    drecht
    ,
    Schriften
    1969,13-23,28-36;Geyer,comm.onhised.ofPeterAbelard,
    etthologie
    chezAbelard
    Heft4, 621-33;Jolivet,
    , 2nded.,
    1977,312-8;Artsdulangage
    Paris,1982,19-22,44-5,67-72,74-7,96-104,229-335;Tweedale,1976,93-5,130-7,
    : A Critical
    TheLogicofDivineLove
    185-8,210; RichardE. Weingart,
    Analysis
    ofthe
    areDe Rijk,
    dissenters
    Oxford1970,11-31.The principal
    Abailard,
    ofPeter
    Soteriologe
    xcv-xcviii
    andLucia
    Dialctica
    intro.tohised. ofPeterAbelard,
    xl,lv-lix,
    , xxiii-xxviii,
    " Roma
    deintellectibus
    deAbelardo
    e il "Tractatus
    UrbaniUlivi,Lapsicologia
    ,
    1976,85-93,
    ofa purely
    formal
    De Rijkinholding
    thattheachievement
    95-100,whofollows
    logic
    arriveat thatdestination.
    s goalbutthathe didnotactually
    was Abelard'
    142

    09:11:47 AM

    on just that account.11It does inspire Abelard at times to argue that


    theological language is metaphorical, or to invoke arguments from
    theological appropriateness. But it does not dampen his enthusiasm
    for the claim that dialectic, "to which the judgment of all truthor
    '
    itasubiecta
    seufalsitatisdiscretio
    falsityis subject' (cui quidemomnisveritatis
    of
    the
    Catholic
    faith
    used
    to
    demonstrate
    the
    should
    be
    teachings
    est)
    and to refuteheretics.12
    The firsttheological topic to which Abelard gives logic this somewhat ambiguous assignment, on his own accounting of it, is God's
    providence and futurecontingents.Abelard takes up this issue forthe
    where he indicates, by his very
    firsttime in his Logica ((ingredientibus'
    address to it, his desire to treatit as a technicaltopic in logic. He urges
    that the subject of future contingents be taken out of a temporal
    frameworkaltogether.Past, present,and future,to be sure, are conditions that occur in nature. But the problem, he argues, should be
    treatedon a purelyconceptual and not on a natural level.13Our concepts, whatevertheir content,exist as if in the present. This report,
    fromthe precinctsof logic, is used by Abelard to reinforcethe analogy
    between the soul's present memory,
    made in Augustine's Confessions
    as
    attention,and expectation reducible to the soul's presentaction and
    the eternityof God, dwelling in the eternal present. But Abelard' s
    analysis, unlikeAugustine's, is based on the workingsof logic, not on
    those of human psychology.One can, he notes, argue against those
    who think that God's providence is undermined by natural contingencyand human freewill, equating God's providencewithuniversal divine determinism.This can be done, he shows, as Augustine had
    done it, by distinguishingbetween providence and predestination.As
    he reads this distinction, providence is understood as God's
    foreknowledgeof what will happen, whether good or bad, whether
    caused by God Himself or by the actions of men or other secondary
    causes. On the otherhand, predestinationis confinedto God's determination of those thingsHe wills to occur by His own directagency,
    specifically the granting of grace to the elect. As with the late
    Augustine, Abelard holds that this grace has two aspects. It prepares
    11NikolausM. Hring,ed., DieSententie
    Gisleberti
    Pictavensis
    /,2.38magisti
    episcopi
    Gisleberti
    Pictavensis
    39, in: AHDL, 45 (1978), 119; idem,ed., Die Sententie
    magisti
    II: Die Version
    derflorentiner
    episcopi
    Handschrift
    , 2.38-39,in: AHDL, 46 (1979),54.
    12Dial., 4.1 prologus,
    470.
    13LI , 26-7.
    143

    09:11:47 AM

    the elect to respond to God's call and it helps them to perseverein it.
    Strictlyspeaking, predestinationis the grace of preparation,and it can
    be distinguishedfromthe giftthat makes salvation possible once that
    initial grace has been received. Since predestinationhas this consequence, we can say that its causative effectis always good. Now God
    knows fromall eternitywhich men He will endow with grace. He also
    knows which sins men will commit, althoughHe does not cause them.
    This Augustinin attack on the question is in no sense the whole
    story,forAbelard; nor, in his estimation,is it the most interestingway
    to address it. He next introducesBoethius's repriseof the key chapter
    where a more strictlyphysical and
    in Aristotle's De Interpretationen
    of
    account
    necessity,possibility,and contingencyis provided.
    logical
    9
    of
    that
    In chapter
    work, Aristotleframesthe issue in termsof a sea
    battle that may or may not be foughttomorrow.There is always the
    possibilitythat the captains may cancel the battle because the rulers
    they representhave settledtheir differences.Or, hostilitiesmay still
    prevail, but bad weather may prevent the battle from taking place.
    The natural or human contingenciesinvolved in these possibilitieslie
    within the structureof natural laws and the nature of man. But
    whetheror not they will be activated so as to prevent or call offthe
    battle is a matterof chance or contingency.With thisanalysis in mind,
    Abelard now distinguishesprovidence fromfate. Fate he sees as the
    natural necessitiesbuilt into the physical order. Fate is ineluctable in
    the sense that, once the relevantphysical laws of cause and effectare
    set in motion, the outcomes flowingfromthemwill necessarilyfollow.
    God knows that these consequences will occur if these physical laws
    are activated, since He created the universe with the natural laws in
    question. At the same time, agreeing with Aristotle and Boethius,
    Abelard observes that there are areas of contingency and human
    choice here which determine whetheror not these natural laws, and
    theirconsequences, will be activated in a particularinstance. He adds
    that there are also physical events which God permits to happenmiracles, for instance- even though theyoccur outside of the causal
    nexus of thelaws of physics.This observationaside, along withAristotle and Boethius, he accents the idea that creatures, as they are
    created, possess certain built-in capacities to do or to refrainfrom
    doing what theychoose. Giving an Aristotelianexample here, he notes
    that a man, by nature, is capable of sittingdown, but whetherhe will
    do so at a particular moment is a matterof choice, not necessity,on
    his part. The same analysis applies to a man's capacity to sin. The fact
    144

    09:11:47 AM

    thatGod knowshow the man will exercise thiscapacity does not mean
    thatGod causes him to sin, just as God does not personallycause the
    other outcomes that are effectsof contingencies.
    Thus far, Abelard has shiftedan initiallyAugustinin argument
    preoccupied with grace and predestinationto an Aristotelian argument forpossibilityand contingencyas compatible witha universe in
    whichnaturallaws impose theirown physicalnecessities. He now proceeds to shifthis argumentonce again. Still another way of handling
    the problem is to transposeit fromthe realm of necessity,possibility,
    and contingencyas theyoperate in the natural order to the realm of
    modal propositions.This option is even more attractiveto Abelard,
    since, once the subject has been reformulatedin these terms,the propositionsin which theyare framedexpress the ideas of possibilityand
    necessityand theirrelationshipsaccording to the formadstructureof
    the propositionsused. The conclusions flowingfrom these propositions can be evaluated in termsof whetherthey followlogically from
    their antecedentsquite independent of times, places, and conditions
    thatmay or may not existin the physicalor metaphysicalorder. From
    thisperspective,Abelard now seeks to expose the logical fallacyof the
    claim thatGod errs if it can be shown that anythingcan happen in a
    way differentfrom the way in which it does happen. The rule he
    invokes here is this: if the antecedent is possible, the consequent
    attaches the judgment "Yes, it is possible" to the proposition itself,
    not to the subject matter or content stated by the antecedent. His
    treatmentof this rule is a clear articulation of the strictlylogical
    approach to theproblemof possibilityand necessityhe is talkingat this
    juncture, an approach which he also advocates as more elegant and
    satisfactorythan the ones that he had set forthbefore presentingit.
    If one applies this kind of logical analysis to the question of
    foreknowledgeand predestination,as defined above, it follows that
    propositions admitting of possibility and contingency can be constructedfrompropositionsin which foreknowledgeis asserted. Also,
    '
    as Abelard points out, it depends on how the word 4' differently'
    {aliter)is used in propositionsthathypothesizeon whetherthingscould
    have turnedout differently
    than the way they do turn out. Alitercan
    be used as a relativeterm,and also as a negative term. Its causal force
    is strongerin the latterusage. In the formercase, when aliteris used
    as a relativeterm,the presenceof logical possibilitycan be entertained
    without a contradictionwith foreknowledge,in stating a contingent
    claim. The use of hypotheticalsyllogismsto structurethe propositions
    145

    09:11:47 AM

    in question here itselfemphasizes the formal quality of the logical


    analysis involved.14
    It is perfectlyobvious what Abelard is tryingto accomplish in this
    handling of the question of God's foreknowledgeand future con"
    tingentsin the Logica ingredientibusIn moving froma theological
    account derived fromthe late Augustine to a physicalaccount derived
    fromAristotleto a strictlylogical account of the issues, to which he
    is guided by Boethius, he places his argumentsin, what is, for him,
    an ascending order of importance and persuasiveness. Even though
    Abelard gives a far more elaborate treatmentof the De interpretations
    formulationof the problem than Boethius does in his commentaryon
    that work, taking it throughits paces in great detail, and offeringa
    host of variant syllogisticformsin which the ideas involved can be
    stated, situatingthem withinthe larger contextof the logical rules for
    affirmation,negation, and contradiction, and yoking them to an
    express discussion of hypothetical syllogisms, equipollent propositions, and theirprobative force,he ends by reducing the Aristotelian
    position to the position of formallogic far more systematicallythan
    Boethius does. Abelard grants more authorityto logic understood
    purely as a science of discourse than to anythingelse in his handling
    of this problem, reading across Aristotleand across Boethius himself
    to obtain a more consistentlypost-Aristotelianlogic than his sources
    provide. He shows his instinct for moving away from theological
    reasoning, in redefiningthe divine nature, or propositionswhich refer
    to it, as part of the subject matterof logic. While Abelard does admit
    that the debate at issue can be approached in other ways, the other
    alternativesare clearlyless compellingand persuasive, forhim. Above
    all, the logical sense of propositions is his point of conclusion,
    whateversense theymay have in the worldof physicalor metaphysical
    reality.
    Abelard also takes up these same questions in his Theologia
    <(
    "scholarium".His argumenthere is similarto thatin the Logica ingre"
    dientibus
    except for the fact that he frames the issue of futureconhere
    along the lines of Aristotle'saccount of the sea battle in
    tingents
    De interpretatione
    9, giving attention to the claims made in terms of
    natural law as well as in terms of logic itself.The main differences
    between his initial treatmentof the subject and this one are that, in
    the Theologia((scholarium'
    ' Abelard wants to accent man's freedom
    14Ibid.,426-47.
    146

    09:11:47 AM

    and responsibilityin the moral lifeunder the heading of contingency;


    and he wants to emphasize more stronglythe point that God can suspend the natural law when He performsmiracles. From a logical
    standpoint,it is also at this precise juncture that Abelard framesthe
    question of the compatibilityof God's eternalforeknowledgeand contingent events in the light of the nominalist theory of the unitary
    significationof the noun, although its consignificationin statements
    using the past or futuretenses of the verb may reflectshiftsin our
    knowledge or in our descriptionof what the noun signifies.15Let us
    keep in mind the company in which this nominalisttheorytravels,in
    Abelard' s presentationof it.
    Abelard returnsto the argument offeredin the Logica "ingredientibus" fora thirdtime in his most mature logical work, the Dialctica,
    there offeringa refinementon it.16He reprises the point that past,
    present,and futureare categories irrelevantto God, since He lives in
    the eternal present. He also repeats the observation that God so
    ordains thingsthatsome events are capable of occurringcontingently,
    and that, when this happens, these contingenciesdo not conflictwith
    divine providence. Nor do events which, as God ordains them, occur
    of necessityas consequences of the laws of nature which He put in
    place. In thiswork, Abelard moves as well fromthe Augustinin and
    Aristotelianargumentsto attach the idea of possibilityto the logical
    relations between antecedent and consequent propositions that formulate the alternativesin hypotheticalform.At the same time, in the
    DialcticaAbelard admits that the idea of necessityalso attaches properly to actual natural outcomes, and that, even propositionally,a
    futurecontingentcan only be defended as a possibility.This conclusion impartsa rathermore Aristoteliancoloration to his handling of
    "
    necessityand possibilitythan he had given to it in theLogica ingredien
    tibus". Another shiftis that, in the Dialctica,he omits the distinction
    between God's foreknowledgeand God's causation in treatingdivine
    providence. He collapses these two ideas into a view of providencethat
    takes it to mean God's legislationfor,and action in, the natural order,
    and not merely God's oversight of that order. The theme of
    predestinationand grace likewise departs fromAbelard' s agenda in
    this work. These shiftsin emphasis notwithstanding,the bottom line
    15TSch
    , 3.5, 3.87-116,526,536-47.
    16Dial., 2.2.10-11,217-22.
    147

    09:11:47 AM

    for his handling of the entire question, both early and late, remains
    logic as a science of discourse done, and not the divine nature.
    By express contrast with Abelard, when the Lombard addresses
    himself to the same constellation of ideas, he does so in an unambiguously theological way. The firsttopics he takes up in Book 1 of
    the Sentencesdeal with the Trinity and the theological language
    appropriate to denote the divine nature as such and, alternatively,to
    denote the persons of the Trinity vis--vis each other. As he shiftsto
    the next part of the book, he remarksthatall the remainingquestions
    that he plans to address there deal with the divine nature possessed
    equally and in common by all members of the Trinity.This condition
    applies, in force, to all God's actions relative to the creation and
    man.17 Peter's observation is a rejoinder to Abelard in two ways. In
    the firstplace, it attacks Abelard' s attributionof the names power,
    wisdom, and goodness as proper names to the Father, Son, and Holy
    Spirit. Secondly, the firstissue he takes up under the heading of God's
    action ad extra
    , divine providence, foreknowledge,predestination,and
    futurecontingents,is raised expressly fromthe standpoint of God's
    knowledge, not thatof human logic. In introducingthe subject in this
    way, the Lombard makes it clear thathis chieffocus is going to be the
    divine nature as a theological and metaphysicalreality. While God's
    role as a cause in the physical order is going to receive some attention
    and while care is going to be paid to the logical consistencyof his
    arguments, and to those of thinkerswhom he criticizes,Peter never
    lets the reader forgetthat he is writingabout God here, and that the
    subject at issue is not a mere pendant to, or illustrationof, the sciences
    of natural philosophy or logic.
    God's knowledge is one and simple, he begins. Yet, it can be
    thought of, in relation to man and the creation, in terms of foreknowledge, disposition, predestination,and wisdom. Foreknowledge
    is God's knowledge, fromall eternity,of all thingsthat will happen,
    whether for good or for ill. Disposition can be regarded not only as
    God's general governance of the universe but also as His
    foreknowledgeof the laws of nature that He will put in place before
    He creates them. Similarly, predestinationcovers the preparation of
    17PeterLombard,Sententiae
    inIV libris
    distinctae
    , 1, d. 35, c. 1, 3rdrev.ed., ed.
    1971-81,I, 254.
    IgnatiusC. Brady,2 vols.,Grottaferrata
    18Ibid.,c. 1-6,I, 254-8.On predestination
    as thegraceofpreparation
    in theLomdesPetrus
    imBreisgau
    Lombardus
    bard,seeJohannSchupp,Die Gnadenlehre
    , Freiburg
    1932,105-15,141-58,204-6.
    148

    09:11:47 AM

    grace whichGod grantsdirectlyto His elect and His salvation and coronationof them with bliss in the next life, as well as His knowledge
    from all eternityof who they will be. Wisdom, finally, is God's
    knowledge of all things, whether past, present, or future.18Having
    mentioned the dimension of time in settingforththese definitions,
    Peter next addresses a set of problemsnot raised by Abelard, but ones
    with which Hugh of St. Victor and Honorius Augustodunensis had
    wrestled ineffectivelyearlier in the period.19 In so doing, he
    acknowledgesthe factthat he has a responsibilityto respond to questions, posed by othermastersof the day, that are properlytheological
    and not just logical. Supposing that there were no temporal order at
    all, and hence no futurein which events not yet in being might take
    place, and given thatGod's knowledgeis one withHis essence, would
    this not mean, he asks, that God's very being would be in jeopardy?
    Peter answers this question in the negative. As he observes, when we
    speak of God's foreknowledge,disposition, and predestinationwith
    respect to the created world and man, we speak in a relative sense
    {relative,ad aliquid),just as we do when we referto the deity as the
    creator. Such activitiesvis--visother,created, beings as these relative
    termsdenote in no sense exhaust or diminish the infinitereservoirof
    being as such which the divine nature possesses, prior to and apart
    from the creation. Further, there are two ways of regarding
    foreknowledge.First, ifwe consider the subject matter,the future,on
    which God's foreknowledgeis exercised, as capable of being there,or
    not, then His foreknowledgecan be understood as relative to the
    future.But, secondly,ifwe thinkof the knowledgethatGod possesses,
    withwhich He is able to know the futurewhen it eventuates, then we
    speak of His knowledge with respect to His essence, whetheror not
    the temporalworldexists at all, or any particulareventualitythatmay
    take place withinit. In any event, since He is eternal, God knows all
    thingsfrom eternity.His knowledge is not limited by the temporal
    order applying to creatures.20
    This solution responds effectivelyto the dilemmas propounded by
    Hugh and Honorius and at the same time addresses a question, raised
    but not answered by the author of the Summasententiarum
    ,2 of whether
    19Honorius
    Elucidarium
    Paris1954,
    , 1.13,1.15,ed. YvesLefvre,
    Augustodunensis,
    Desacramentis
    PL 176,211D-213B.
    363;HughofSt.Victor,
    christianae,
    1.2.14-18,
    fidei
    20PeterLombard,
    Sent.
    , 1, d. 35, c. 7-9,I, 255-8.
    21Summa
    sententiarum
    , 1.12,PL, CLXXVI, 61C-62C.
    149

    09:11:47 AM

    God foreknowsthose futurecontingentsthat are not going to eventuate. For, as Peter continues, he next makes the point that, in the
    second sense of foreknowledgewhich he has just indicated, God's
    knowledge is of His essence; it would be incorrectto say that,because
    He knows all things,all the thingsthat He knows are God or thatthey
    share in His essence. Here, he stresses,we have to distinguishbetween
    what God is, and what God has in His presence or has within Him.
    As an illustrationof that point, Peter notes, God knows who the elect
    are; but the elect are human, not divine. They are in God's presence,
    not His nature. Similarly,God knows the evils thatwill occur, without
    being identifiedwith them,just as He knows the good thingsthatwill
    occur and that He will approve, good outcomes which, in this case,
    He helps along, to a greateror lesser extent,being partiallyor wholly
    an auctoras well as a knower. For, the creation and the temporalorder
    are fromGod. They are not of God; that is, theyare not of the same
    nature as God. It is at thisjuncture thatPeter acknowledgesthe utility
    of Abelard' s distinctionbetween the unitary significationof a noun
    and the differingconsignificationsit may have in statementsusing the
    past, present, and future tenses of the verb. He also indicates the
    limitationsof thisargument,fromhis own perspective.22What is strikingly Lombardian about thiswhole analysis is Peter's success in finding a cogent substituteforthe reductionof this problem to an exercise
    in formallogic. At the same time, he retains a philosophical no less
    than a theological perspectiveon it, by grounding the subject in the
    metaphysical distinction between God viewed in His transcendent
    essence and God viewed in those aspects of His being thatHe displays
    in His relations with other beings.
    Peter moves on, then, to a series of other questions pertinentto
    God's foreknowledgethat had been raised and, in his view, answered
    unsatisfactorilyby other masters. He deals in a swiftand streamlined
    manner with God's foreknowledgeand its relationshipto causation,
    relying here on Augustine and other patristic sources and not on
    Boethius and Aristotle. Foreknowledge, he agrees, is not causative.
    There are some things that God knows, contemplatingthem in His
    own mind before He brings them into phenomenal existence as their
    one and only cause, as is the case with the created universe. In this
    example, He causes the thingsHe knows, not vice versa. In the case
    22PeterLombard,
    Sent.
    , 1,d. 36,c. 1-5;d. 41,c. 3, I, 258-63,293.Thisis thepoint
    notedbyCourtenay
    1990,53-5;see also Courtenay
    1991a,11-48.
    150

    09:11:47 AM

    of contingencies, such as the willed actions of created beings who


    possess freewill, God foreseesthe consequences of contingentactions
    but does not cause them. His lack of direct causation here is in no
    sense a failingor imperfectionin the divine nature, or in the divine
    foreknowledge.For, He freelychose to create beings withfreewill and
    He knows how they will freelyexercise it.23This section of Peter's
    discussionremindsthe reader thatthe divine nature is the perspective
    fromwhich he thinksthis topic ought to be examined. The exercise
    is designed to enlightenthe reader about God, the subject of thisbook
    of the Sentences
    , not about the behavior and constitutionof creatures.
    Another featureof God's foreknowledgethat requires discussion,
    not only in and of itselfbut because of its bearing on predestination,
    is its immutabilityand its exhaustive coverage. As Peter observes,
    God's knowledge, like His essence, cannot change, enlarge, or
    diminish.God may directHis attentionto thisor that subject, or not,
    withoutchanging His knowledge. Since He is omniscientand always
    has been, He knows thingsthathave not yet occurred in the temporal
    order, and beings that have not yet come into existence. In the case
    of contingentoutcomes, He knows whetheror not they will occur.
    With respect to such futureevents, beings, and outcomes, this does
    not mean thatGod knows thembetterwhen theydo occur. For, while
    theyare conditioned by time, He is not; He has always been omniscient. In thisrespect,God cannot know more than He knows because
    thatwould be a self-contradiction,
    a point on which Peter agrees with
    24
    the author of the Summasententiarum.
    As forpredestination,Peter notes, remindingthe reader of his definition of terms at the beginning of this section of Book 1 of the
    Sentences
    , predestinationis included in what God foreknowsbut it is
    differentfromforeknowledge.Foreknowledge is not causative, while
    predestinationis causative, referringspecificallyto God's directdecision to extend the grace of preparation and perseverance to those
    people He chooses to save.25Here Peter summarizes the standard late
    Augustinin teaching that was the consensus position on predestina23PeterLombard,
    Sent.
    Future
    , 1, d. 38, I, 257-79.See CalvinNormore,
    ,
    Contingents
    in: Cambridge
    Medieval
    etal., Cam, ed. NormanKretzman
    History
    ofLater
    Philosophy
    Peter'saccenton God's freedom
    here.
    bridge1982,363-4,whonotes,correctly,
    24PeterLombard,
    Sent.,1, d. 39, c. 1.1-4.3;d. 41,c. 3, I, 280-3,292-3.Cf.Summa
    Die Lehre
    sent.,1.12,PL CLXXVI, 63A-64D.On thispoint,see Schneider,
    , 54.
    25PeterLombard,
    Sent.,1, d. 39, c. 4.3, I, 283-84.Petermakesthesamepointin
    Sermo
    Die Lehre,
    112,PL CLXXI, 860C. See Schneider,
    55, 57-60.
    151

    09:11:47 AM

    tion in this period. At the same time, he uses the argument just
    developed on the immutabilityof God's foreknowledgeto criticizeversions of thatteachingthathe findsaberrantor problematic. In the first
    place, there is the question raised by Abelard and debated by the
    author of the Summasententiarum
    and by Roland of Bologna26 as to
    whetherGod can alterthe number of theelect. Given theway in which
    Peter has framed his argument here, he can dispose of the idea that
    God could make such a change as a non-question, not only fromthe
    standpoint of God's will but also in the light of God's immutable
    omniscience. Just as God does not alter His eternal decree, so, since
    He knows eternallywhat that decree will be with regard to His elect
    and since His knowledge never changes, the alteration of God's
    There is also the question of
    arrangementshere is a non-possibility.27
    the relationbetweenelectionand the behavior of the elect. Here, Peter
    wants to criticizethe position of William of Champeaux and Anselm
    of Laon, who argued that God chooses the elect in the light of their
    praevisa merita.2*For the elect, predestination enables them to be
    justified, to live uprightly,to resist temptation,to persevere in the
    good, and to attain beatitude in the next life. God foreknowsthat the
    elect will respond appropriatelyto the grace He extends to them,just
    as He knows that the reprobate will fall into sin, although in the first
    case He actively prepares the elect for their salvation while He
    prepares nothingforthe reprobate. But, Peter insists,withAugustine
    and against Anselm and William, God does not choose the elect
    because He foreseesthat theywill respond positivelyto His grace and
    earn merit. Rather, what He foresees is the fact that His grace will
    provide the elect with the enabling condition for their acquisition of
    merit afterthe fact.29
    In the case of God's foreknowledgeand related matters,as can be
    seen fromthe above, Peter demonstratesclearlythat thisconstellation
    of ideas can be treated in as sweeping a manner as needs be, embracing issues of genuine theological interest and pertinence which
    Abelard omits as well as those he includes, from the perspective of
    26RolandofBologna,DieSentenzen
    Rolands
    1969
    , ed. Ambrogius
    Gietl,Amsterdam
    im Breisgau1891ed.), 62-67;Summa
    sent.,1.12,PL CLXXVI,
    (repr.ofFreiburg
    63A-64D.
    27PeterLombard,Sent.
    , 1, d. 40, c. 1, I, 285-86.
    28Sentences
    ofAnselm
    , 240,ed. OdonLotofLaon, 11; Sentences
    ofWilliam
    ofChampeaux
    etmorale
    auxXIIeetXIIIesicles
    tin,in: Psychologie
    , Louvain1959,V, 22, 199-200.
    29PeterLombard,Sent.,1, d. 40, c. 2-d.41, c. 1,1, 286-92.
    152

    09:11:47 AM

    God's knowledge. Throughout, he grounds his support for the compatibilityof contingencyand freewill with divine foreknowledge,and
    withthe existenceof directdivine causation in some areas, not on the
    relationsbetween necessityand possibilityin natural philosophyor in
    logic but in thedistinctionbetween the transcendentGod and the God
    Who acts, in a varietyof ways, in the world He created, but without
    being exhausted or consumed by His economic role.30 Peter's
    resolutelymetaphysicaladdress to this question enables him to put it
    on as philosophicala foundationas is true forAristotleor forAbelard,
    although it is a metaphysicalfoundation,and one that also affordsa
    good vantage point fromwhich to consider the specificallytheological
    dimensions of these problems as well.
    While space does not permit as extended an analysis of the topic,
    the Lombard's handling of the related issue of whetherGod can do
    better, or different,than He does, and his rejection of Abelard's
    negative answer to that question, yields additional evidence as to why
    he findsAbelard's reasoning, and the uses to which Abelard puts it,
    , Abelard's
    fundamentallywrong-headed. In the TheologiaChristiana
    him
    to
    tackle
    this
    as
    a
    leads
    to
    conflate
    God's
    problem
    urge
    logician
    power with God's will, forcinghim to conclude that God always acts
    in thebest possible way, since a consequent statinga divine action that
    is not good or just cannot followlogically froman antecedent stating
    thatHe is good and just. As Abelard puts it: "What He wills, He must
    will necessarily,and what He does, He must do necessarily" ( Quae
    , necessario
    vult,necessario
    velit,et quaeJacit
    facial.) Logical necessityconstrains God's behavior, behavior which, he states, takes place
    inevitabiliter.3i
    Reformulatingthis claim in the Theologia"scholarium}'
    Abelard stillframesit in the language of antecedent and consequent
    propositions,but shiftshis accent to the nature of God as a perfect
    being. Since God is perfect,Abelard reasons, He must always act
    perfectly,as a necessityof His own being. The perfectionof God's
    being thus entails, for Abelard, the perfectionof the exercise of His
    will. Hence, God could not have made a betterworld.32This version
    30Thisorientation
    is alsofoundintheLombard'sPaulineexegesis.See PeterLomPauli ad Romanos
    bard, In Epistolam
    , 1:7, 8:29, PL CXCI, 1310B-1311D,
    1449B-1450B.
    31Tchr
    , 5.42,366.
    32TSch
    ofthispointis provided
    , 3.27-64,511-27.A gooddiscussion
    by Lawrence
    UseoftheTimeaus
    Moonan,Abelard's
    , in: AHDL, 56 (1989),30-3,72-4.
    153

    09:11:47 AM

    of the argument imposes a metaphysical as well as a logical


    necessitarianismupon the deity.
    It is, among other things, preciselyin order to freeGod fromthe
    axiological necessitarianism with which Abelard encumbers Him,
    whetherlogically or metaphysically,that the Lombard takes his own
    stand. His aim is to liberate God simultaneouslyfroman economic
    theology and fromthe limits of logic understood purely as a science
    of discourse. His emphasis on God's freedomis reflectedby his placement of this topic under the heading of God's omnipotence, and by
    his reimportinginto the discussion an Augustinin distinctionwhich
    Abelard had dismissed, the distinction between God's power and
    God's will, employed as well by recent thinkerssuch as Anselm of
    Canterbury. From this perspective,God's power is His ability to do
    whatever He wills.33In actuadpractice, according to Peter, what God
    does is good and just. But, he argues, this factimposes no constraints
    upon the choices God might have made and it does not limit His
    capacity to have done what He has chosen not to do. In making His
    just and good choices, God remains free. Bringing to bear on this
    question an argumenthe had made concerningGod's foreknowledge,
    where he had argued that divine omniscience includes the range of
    options out of which God selects the actions that He decides to perform,Peter observes that the force of the Augustinin distinctionto
    which he adheres is decidedly not to reduce God's power to the scope
    of whateverHe actually wills to do, but rather,just the reverse. What
    the distinctionmeans is thatGod not only is capable ofdoing whatever
    He wills, but also that whatever He can do always remains more, in
    principle, than what He actually does do. What the Lombard is
    articulating here, although without using this terminology,is the
    distinctionbetween God's absolute and ordained power.34So acute is
    Peter's desire to emphasize the principlethatGod always remains free
    to act differendythan the way in which He chooses to act that he does
    not hesitate to maintain that, although Christ was incarnated,
    crucified,and resurrectedonce for all, if God willed it, He could be
    33The besttreatment
    in theEarly
    of thissubjectis Ivan Boh,DivineOmnipotence
    andOmnipotence
    inMedieval
    : Islamic
    and
    Sentences
    Omniscience
    , in:Divine
    ,Jewish
    Philosophy
    Christian
    , ed. Tamar Rudavsky,Dordrecht1985, 193-200.See also
    Perspectives
    Die Lehre
    Schneider,
    , 39-41.
    34PeterLombard,Sent.,1, d. 43, I, 298-303.This pointhas been notedby
    Courtenay,1990, 55; MariateresaBeonio-Brocchieri
    Fumagalliand Massimo
    Bari1989,254-5.
    della
    medievale
    da Boezioa Wyclif,
    Parodi,Storia
    filosofia
    154

    09:11:47 AM

    incarnated, crucified,and resurrectedagain. It is in defense of this


    extreme example of his general point that Peter brings forwardthe
    nominalistanalysis of the unitarysignificationof the verb firstnoted
    by Landgraf, Chenu, and Schneider. On the analogy of the action
    signifiedby the verb, God's power is always the same. What He was
    able to do in the past, He is able to do in the present or the future:
    " Deum
    semper
    posseetquidquidsemelpotuitid esthabereomnemillampotentiamquam semelhabuit
    . "35
    If anything,this nominalist argument concerning the verb is even
    more appealing to Peter than the nominalistargumentconcerningthe
    noun which he applies to God's knowledge. For, the dimension of
    time is built into the verb, by its verynature as a part of speech. This
    fact enables him to underscore the transcendence of the timeless,
    omnipotent God over the things He decides to do in the temporal
    order, relative to creatures. Peter's use of this argument thus allows
    him to stay in the essentially metaphysical arena within which he
    plants his standard in treatingthe divine nature. While the Lombard
    is not so forthright
    as the early Porretansin hoistingAbelard explicitly
    on his own logical petard, he agrees with them, implicitly,that logic
    seen only as a science of discourse is indeed a feebleinstrumentforthe
    work of theological research.
    With respect to the Lombard's contribution to the history of
    nominalism in the twelfthcentury,then, we may offerthree conclusions. First, fromour considerationof Abelard' s case, it is clear that
    the opinioNominaliumcould be, and was, yoked to a post-Aristotelian
    kind of logic. From our consideration of the Lombard's case, it is
    equally clear that the opinioNominaliumcould just as easily be yoked
    to a mode of reasoning deemed capable of yieldingcogent ontological
    thinker
    conclusions. In this respect, the fact that a twelfth-century
    he
    mean
    is
    that
    Nominalium
    does
    not
    the
    automatically
    espouses
    opinio
    or necessarilyrequired to embrace one ratherthan the other of these
    different
    conceptionsof logic. Second, it was not just the factthat the
    Lombard was a theologian but his particular agenda as a theologian
    who sought to affirmGod's omnipotence and God's essence as the
    35PeterLombard,
    is at c. 2.4, 306.
    Sent.
    , 1, d. 44,c. 2.1-4,I, 305-6.The quotation
    withtheverbis atc. 2.3, 306: "Verbaenimdiversorum
    Thecomparison
    temporum,
    adiunctaadverbiis,
    eundemfaciunt
    et diversis
    diversis
    sensum,
    prolatatemporibus
    dicimus:Istepotestlegerehodie;erasautemdicemus:Istepotest
    utmodoloquentes
    potentia."
    legisse,velpotuitlegereheri;ubi uniusreimonstratur
    155

    09:11:47 AM

    transcendentmetaphysical realitythat accounts for both his borrowings fromAbelard and his more fundamentalhostilityto Abelard in
    thisarea. And, finally,thanksto the rapid and enduringsuccess of the
    Lombard's Sentences
    as a textbook,he was able to place both his position on divine transcendence,the distinctionbetween God's absolute
    and ordained power, and the opinio Nominaliumwith which he
    bolsteredthese teachingssquarely beforethe eyes of his scholasticcontemporariesand successors.
    Oberlin, Ohio
    OberlinCollege

    156

    09:11:47 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    Peterof Capua as a Nominalist
    WILLIAMJ. COURTENAY

    Peter of Capua holds a special place in the textual historyof the


    Nominales.Throughout the period from the mid-twelfthto the midthirteenth century- the period from which come most of our
    - only one
    references to the Nominalesor the opinionesnominalium
    author whose name we know identifieshimselfas a nominalist: Peter
    of Capua ( #44c).* Many figureshave been so described in the earlier
    '
    4
    literature,but that 'naming' or labeling, no matterhow accurate it
    may or may not be, is based on positions maintained or the witness
    We have, it is true, several
    of others, not on self-identification.2
    1 Christopher
    thispaperthatthestateinthediscussion
    Martinsuggested
    following
    in whichPeter
    ment"Nos Nominales"(#44c)shouldbe readas directdiscourse
    ...") and
    Nominalist
    butallowsa fictional
    notforhimself
    ("Haec oppositio
    responds
    Realist("Haec species...") to addressthereader.The case wouldbe
    a fictional
    inOxford,
    similar
    tothatin theanonymous
    Bodl.,Laudlat.
    commentary
    Porphyry
    Canter,
    and
    the
    vocalis
    has
    the
    author
    where
    speak
    67,f.7 (cf.Iwakuma's
    paperabove)
    ofthepassagewouldbringtheCapua evidence
    forthemselves.
    Thisinterpretation
    werea
    moreintolinewithwhatotherwise
    appearstobe thecase:thattheNominales
    thatbytheendof
    in thethirdquarterofthetwelfth
    sectamonglogicians
    century,
    rather
    thanstillactive,andthatCapualike
    remembered
    thecentury
    theyweresimply
    tocreatecontrasting
    andReales
    oftheNominales
    other
    appliedthepositions
    theologians
    is thefactthatinthe
    In favor
    ofthisinterpretation
    totheological
    solutions
    questions.
    andeven
    contrasts
    ofa question
    orresponsio
    solutio
    positions
    Capuasometimes
    portion
    andRealis( #44a,44b,44d).AsattracoftheNominalis
    doessobyusingthecharacters
    makesitunlikely.
    ofCapua'sSumma
    thestyle
    andstructure
    tiveas I findthissolution,
    ofthe
    a position
    whenmentioning
    discourse
    direct
    Nowhere
    elsedoesCapuaemploy
    whenCapua says"nos dicimus"in his
    or Realist.Moreimportantly,
    Nominalist
    hisownposition,
    it is invariably
    to a question,
    solution
    e.g. Vat. lat. 4296,f. 2rb:
    quia ..."; Vat. lat.
    quod...; Nosdicimus
    "Quidamdicuntquod...; Aliiconcedunt
    f.4va: "Nos vero
    adiectiva
    omnia
    ibid.,
    4304,f.4rb:"Nos verodicimus
    quod
    fi.26ra:"Nos dicimus
    'talis'vel 'qualis' dicimus
    ibid.,
    quodperhocnomen
    " The last
    examplecomesearlierin thesamequestion
    quodnonestaliussensus
    as thetextunderdiscussion.
    2 In theuniquemanuscript
    ofStephenLangton'sglosson Lombard'sLibrisentennos".
    on divinepoweris introduced
    tiarum
    , thenominalist
    by "secundum
    position
    for
    between
    'nos' andtheabbreviation
    ofscribalconfusion
    Butgiventhepossibility
    with'reales'inthesamepassage,theeditor
    andgiventhejuxtaposition
    'nominales',
    is the
    thisreading
    Arthur
    emended'nos' to read'nominales'.
    Supporting
    Landgraf
    in Peter
    The statement
    tradition
    thatplacesLangtonamongthePorretani.
    scholarly
    Allmanuscripts
    ofCapua'sSumma
    is notsubjecttodoubtor textual
    interpretation.
    so farexamined
    read"nos Nominales".
    157

    09:11:54 AM

    '
    "
    anonymous textsthat stem fromthis group or school,' two of which
    do have self-identification:specificallya late twelfth-century
    treatise
    on predication( #22), the so-called Positiones
    nostrae
    #
    and
    proba( 60),
    bly the Vienna Quaestionesuncovered by Iwakuma (#24). But with
    anonymous texts we have no way of going behind these works to
    explore the academic contextand teaching traditionfromwhich they
    derive. The case of Peter of Capua is all the more precious to us
    because it may affordus preciselythat opportunity.3
    Peter of Capua is not yeta household name in the historyof twelfthand thirteenth-century
    thought,although his importance in his own
    day as a Paris master was considerable. Peter's theological Summa,
    presumably an outgrowthof his lectures as regentmaster at Paris, is
    dated to 1201-1202 by its dedication to Walter, Archbishop of
    Palermo.4 At some point beforeOctober 1206 he resigned a prebend
    as canon at Tours, presumably in favour of one at Sens.5 Whether
    continuouslyteaching or not, he was still active as regent master at
    Paris in the autumn of 1218 when Pope Honorius III wrote him on
    November 16, requesting that another scholar, Matthew of Scotland,
    3 In theremainder
    ofthispaperthename'Peter',without
    further
    has
    identification,
    forPeterofCapua. Othertwelfth-century
    'Peters'(e.g., Peter
    personal
    supposition
    PetertheCantor,and PeterofPoitiers)
    Abelard,PeterLombard,PeterComester,
    willbe mentioned
    fullname.
    by
    4 Thisdedication,
    mentioned
    in Chartularium
    Universitatis
    byDeniflein hisfootnote
    Parisiensis
    andE. Chatelain,
    vol.I (Paris1889),85(subsequently
    cited
    , ed. H. Denifle
    as CUP), presumably
    occursin one or moreofthemanuscripts
    ofCapua's Summa
    citedbyDenifle:MonteCassino354 and 475,andMontpellier
    (Bibi.de l'colede
    340. M. Grabmann,
    Die Geschichte
    derscholastischen
    Methode
    mdicine)
    , II (Freiburg
    Denifle
    knewthese.
    1911),532-4,addedVat. lat.4296and4304,although
    probably
    desmatres
    enthologie
    deParisauXIIle sicle
    BythetimeofP. Glorieux,
    Rpertoire
    (Paris
    hadbeenexpanded
    toninewiththeaddition
    ofMunichClm
    1933),265,thenumber
    14508(identified
    Vat. lat. 4303,ParisBN lat. 483,andextracts
    in
    byGrabmann),
    F. Stegmller,
    Paris,BN lat. 15972,ff.156r-165v
    (identified
    byLandgraf).
    Reper
    torium
    commentariorum
    insententias
    Petri
    Lombardi
    (Wrzburg
    1947),321addedAdmont
    a workknown
    387,Melk337(198)and843(19),andTodi51. Capua alsoauthored
    as Lexicon
    contionatorium
    or Rosaalphabetical
    , Arsconcionandi
    variously
    Bruges253,
    Charleville
    230,Douai 433, MonteCassino255,Paris,Mazarine1007and 1008,
    ParisBN lat. 16894and 16896,Troyes114.
    5 Papalletter
    tothedeanandchapter
    ofSt. Martinat Tours,Register
    ofInnocent
    III (PL 215, 994): "ut resignationem
    praebendae,
    quam in ecclesiavestratenuit
    dilectus
    P. Capuanus,canonicus
    Senonensis Glorieux,
    filius,
    magister
    ,
    Rpertoire
    Innocent's
    letter
    tomeanthatPeterexchanged
    a canonry
    atSoissons
    265,interpreted
    forone at Sens,butthatis notstipulated.
    After
    Peter'sresignation,
    Innocent
    had
    ofthatprebend
    at TourstothebishopanddeanofNotreDameat
    giventhecontrol
    Parisin favorofpapallyrecommended
    suchas thenextrecipient,
    candidates,
    John
    ofCangeiaco.
    158

    09:11:54 AM

    be permitted to incept as master of theology.6 We do not know


    whetherPeter and his fellowmasters, William de Pont d'Arche and
    Richard the Englishman to whom Honorius also addressed his letter,
    were successfulin persuading the chancellorof Notre Dame, Philip de
    Grve, to grant the license. The chancellor may only have been
    abiding by the bull of Innocent III in 1207 restrictingto eight the
    number of regents in theology at Paris.7 Either by expansion or
    substitutionan opening in the Paris magisteriumwas soon created.8
    William de Pont d'Arche was elected bishop of Louvain soon after
    Honorius's request, and in the followingspring Peter of Capua was
    made Patriarch of Antioch and, a few months later, cardinal deacon
    of St. George.9 The restof Peter's career lay in papal service. He died
    in 1242, probably in his seventies.
    Those are the known details of Peter's life, most of them recorded
    Universitatis
    in a footnotein the Chartularium
    Parisiensisand expanded
    only slightlyby subsequent scholars.10But what can we conjecture
    6 Reg. Vat. Honor.Ill, an. 3, ep. 113,f. 25, editedin CUP, I, 85.
    7 CUP I, 65; Courtenay,
    and
    attheUniversity
    Careers
    ofParisintheThirteenth
    Teaching
    Fourteenth
    Centuries
    , NotreDame 1988,26-30.
    8 It is notknown,however,
    Matthewin factreceivedthelicenseand
    whether
    oftheology
    at Paris
    Thisnamedoesnotappearamongtheknownmasters
    incepted.
    after1218.
    9 Forhispromotion
    ofAntioch
    toPatriarch
    (Apr.25, 1219)see Reg. Vat. Honorn
    CUP I, 85. In Augustof1227Peter,then
    takenfrom
    III an. 3, ep. 417;information
    ofrelicsandprecious
    a grant
    cardinal
    deaconofSt.George,oversaw
    objectstoClairvaux;PL 185,1771.
    10Apartfromoccasional
    ofscholastic
    textbooks
    in nineteenth-century
    mention
    phiMartin
    into
    our
    well
    unstudied
    until
    was
    of
    Peter
    century.
    essentially
    Capua
    losophy,
    derscholastischen
    Methode
    threepagestohimin hisGeschichte
    devoted
    Grabmann
    , and
    inGlorieux
    andStegmller
    mention
    he received
    (see above,note4). Butitwasnot
    until1940thatCapua becamethesubjectofa separatestudy.In thatyearArthur
    underthetitle:"A Studyofthe
    an articlein NewScholasticism
    published
    Landgraf
    ofPeterofCapua." The word"latitude"is onlyoneofa series
    Latitude
    Academic
    one
    thearticle
    wordsthatthetranslator
    ofill-chosen
    used,andinordertounderstand
    as faras
    as bestonecan whattheGermantext,neverpublished
    hasto reconstruct
    forhis
    PeterofCapua wasexamined
    tosay.After
    I know,wasattempting
    Landgraf
    undder
    oftheological
    on a variety
    issues;see F. Holbck,Die eucharistische
    position
    LeibChristi
    , Rome1941,150,160,165-66,189,213,222;A. M. Landgraf,
    mystische
    derFrhscholastik
    Literatur
    dertheologischen
    indieGeschichte
    1948,
    , Regensburg
    Einfhrung
    etmorale
    1954,347,844; L. Hdl,Die
    , vol.4.2,Gembloux
    109;O. Lottin,
    Psychologie
    i.W.
    derSchlsselgewalt
    Literatur
    undderTheologie
    derscholastischen
    Geschichte
    I, Mnster
    1960,218,258,259,277,289-96,304,371,378,379,381,383-5,389;J. Grndel,
    imMittelalter
    derMenschlichen
    vondenUmstnden
    DieLehre
    1963,87,
    , Mnster
    Handlung
    der
    Die Unsterblichkeit
    151,260-72,316., 391,396,402,571,649; R. Heinzmann,
    desLeibes
    SeeleunddieAuf
    169,172,
    , Mnster1965,122-9,130,137,165ff.,
    erstehung
    197,247;J. Baldwin1970,I, 45.
    159

    09:11:54 AM

    about the early career and intellectualformationof Peter? He must


    have taughttheology,presumablyat Paris, at least one year beforethe
    completion of his Summa, probably much longer. In lightof the close
    similarity(indeed, extensive borrowing) between his Summaand the
    of Peter of Poitiers (regent at Paris from 1167 to 1205), it is
    Sententiae
    likely that he studied theology under Peter of Poitiers and thus
    academically stands within the tradition of Peter Lombard. If he
    studied philosophyat Paris beforeturningto theology- and his Summa
    shows familiaritywith the techniques and terminology of litterae
    - this would probably have been in the 1180s.
    saeculares
    Before assessing Capua's relation to former and contemporary
    mastersand the possible implicationsof such links forthe presence of
    a nominalistschool among theologians at Paris in the decades before
    and after1200, we firstneed to look closely at the positions thatPeter
    fourtimes in his
    identifiesas nominalistic.Peter refersto the nominales
    Summa.The firstinstance occurs in his chapterson divine knowledge
    and foreknowledge,specificallyin the contextof the question whether
    God knows somethingthathe previouslydid not know.11The problem
    here, as discussed earlier in the twelfthcentury,is thatas thingscome
    into existence,propositionsabout themeitherchange theirtruthvalue
    (e.g. "Peter of Capua exists" was true in 1200 and false in 1100) or
    are expressed in differenttenses (e.g. " Peter of Capua will exist" and
    " Peter of
    Capua does exist"). Similarly, God's knowledge
    since he knows the existingPeter at one point in
    changes,
    presumably
    time and does not know Peter as existinga centuryearlier or later.12
    Peter attributesto the Realist the position that the contentof God's
    knowledge changes across time as thingsbegin or cease to exist. But
    for the Realist that does not mean that God becomes more knowing
    or less knowing, since the faculty or power of knowing does not
    increase or diminishby reason of the objects of knowledge,just as the
    power or facultyof sight does not increase or diminish by reason of
    the number of objects seen. The Realist, in Peter's view, grounds the
    11PeterofCapua, Summa
    , c. 17 (in listoftexts,#44a).
    12If thequestionoftheimmutability
    ofdivineknowledge
    is posedin termsofan
    increase
    ordecreasein whatGod knows,theimplication
    ofquantitative
    changecan
    thatthetotalnumber
    be avoidedbynoting
    ofknown
    remains
    thesame.
    propositions
    is either
    whena proposiaffirmative
    ornegative,
    andconsequently
    Everyproposition
    trueorceasestobe true,itscontrary
    tionbecomes
    becomes
    thenumber
    true,keeping
    ofpropositions
    thesame.Ifthequestion,
    in terms
    of
    is posedqualitatively
    however,
    no suchsolution
    seemspossible.
    changesin content,
    160

    09:11:54 AM

    immutabilityof divine knowledge in the immutabilityof the divine


    capacity for knowing, not in the contentof God's knowledge which
    changes withchangingobjects, whetherunderstood as things,events,
    states of affairs,or propositions about things, events, and states of
    affairs.
    The Nominalist on the other hand, according to Peter, maintains
    thatPeter's existence,in the sense of the proposition'me esse', always
    signifiedand was always true, and thus was always known by God.
    Put another way, if God from all eternityknows that Peter would
    exist, God in eternityknows the proposition 'me esse' as true. Peter
    does not expand on this teaching because it was familiar to his
    audience and potentialreaders. It was what was known in this period
    13
    as the classic opinioNominalium.
    Just as a nomensignifiesat any point
    in time and has the same significationacross time, although it may be
    cases in propositions,and just as a verb signifies
    expressedin different
    tenses in prothe same across time althoughit is expressedin different
    in
    different
    tenses at difidentical
    so
    propositionsexpressed
    positions,
    ferentpoints in time signifythe same thing. The contentof the belief
    of all the faithfulis identical across time despite the fact that
    Abraham's faithconcerningChrist was expressed in the futuretense
    and that portionof the Christian creed is expressed in the past tense.
    Similarly, God's knowledge is the same across time despite the fact
    thateventschange and the tense structureof propositionsabout those
    events changes. Thus the immutabilityof God's knowledge for the
    Nominalist is grounded in the belief that that which is signifiedby
    (i.e., the significatimi
    of) a true proposition does not change, despite
    structures.Semelestverum
    events
    and
    tense
    , semperestverum'
    changing
    if the significatum
    of a propositionis ever true, it was and will always
    be true.14
    The theoryof nominaon which the Nominalist theoryof propositions was based did not originate with Abelard nor, as Chenu suggested,withBernard of Chartres, but was already a fundamentalpart
    of ancient grammar. It was commonly accepted that the nominative
    case of nouns and the present tense of verbs were primary, and the
    oblique cases and non-presenttenses were secondary and subsumed
    under nominative nomina and present-tense verbs. Moreover,
    13Seelistoftexts,#29,46,48c,50a,50b,51a,52d,52f,62d,64a,64c,65a,70,71.
    14See especially
    Chenu 1934;Chenu 1935-36;Chenu 1957; Nuchelmans
    1973;
    1991a.
    Courtenay
    161

    09:11:54 AM

    significationwas a function only of these nominative nominaand


    present-tenseverbs. Other cases and tenses co-signified.15
    Although Peter does not at this point apply the distinctionbetween
    signification and consignification, which was usually used by
    between a nomenand its oblique
    nominalisttheologiansto differentiate
    cases or between a verb and its tenses- thus the slogan: one nomen
    ,
    in
    his
    form
    of
    elsewhere
    this
    Peter
    does
    voces
    analysis
    employ
    many
    Summa.Here he restrictshis analysis to the companion theses that the
    of a proposition, once true, is always true, and that the
    significatum
    immutabilityof God's knowledge,just like the identityof beliefwithin
    the Church across time, is based on that principle.16
    Peter followsthis passage with a discussion of whetherGod is able
    to begin to know something.17Again, he describesthe Realist position
    as believing thatjust as somethingthat is not true is able to begin to
    be true, so God is able to begin to know something as true which
    previously was not true. The Nominalist, by contrast, argues that
    '
    statementsthat are not true are able to be true, but theydo not begin
    to be true'. Truth is not a process thatadmits of gradual change. Propositions are eithertrue or false. Thus God is able to know something
    that he did not know, but he is not able to begin to know something,
    just as someone who is not predestined is able to have been
    predestined, but he is not able to begin to be predestined.
    The identityor oneness of the Church's faithacross time, fromthe
    Patriarchs to Peter's own day- i.e., the assertion of the unity of the
    object of belief, which was the opinioNominaliumto which Chenu and
    Nuchelmans devoted most of their attention when discussing
    15Forexample,
    'ofPhilo','to Philo',
    OnInterpretation
    2: "The expressions
    Aristotle,
    ofthesecases
    notnouns,butcasesofa noun.The definition
    and so on, constitute
    3:
    thesameas thatofthenounproper..." OnInterp.
    ofa nounis in otherrespects
    carrieswithit thenotion
    to itspropermeaning,
    "A verbis thatwhich,in addition
    arenotverbs,buttenses
    'hewillbe healthy'
    'he washealthy',
    oftime.""Similarly,
    liesinthefactthattheverbindicates
    ofa verb;thedifference
    time,whilethe
    present
    thosetimeswhichlieoutsidethepresent."See alsoPristensesoftheverbindicate
    Latini,
    , ed. M. Hertz,in: Grammatici
    cian,Institutiones
    Leipzig1855,I, 54.
    grammaticae
    ofthesetheories,
    seeCourtenay
    On theearlier
    1988;Courtenay
    [1992b].
    background
    16It is interesting
    as described
    to notethattherealistposition,
    byPeterofCapua,
    andevents
    butseemstograntthat
    inthings
    theobjectofknowledge
    doesnotground
    and
    events.
    Peter'sRealistsseemstatements
    about
    is
    concerning
    things
    knowledge
    is aboutenunciables
    rather
    thanthings.
    Theyalsogrant
    inglygrantthatknowledge
    orobjectsofknowledge
    thatthecontent
    changein spaceandtime,
    changeas things
    doesnotchange.
    ofdivineknowledge
    thepoweroffaculty
    although
    17PeterofCapua,Summa
    , c. 17 (in listoftexts,#44a).
    162

    09:11:54 AM

    nominalism- is directlyaddressed by Peter the last time he mentions


    a positionof the Nominalists.18As described by Peter, the Nominalist
    positionis thatAbraham never believed thatChrist nowwill come but
    thatChristthenwould come. Althoughthe beliefof Abraham and contemporaryChristians is expressed in differenttenses, it is one and the
    same faith. The significationof true propositions remains the same
    across time.
    , it is not surAlthough not identifiedas opinions of the Nominales
    that
    Peter
    solves
    the
    of
    the
    prising
    problems
    immutabilityof divine
    volition and power in preciselythe same way he solved the problem
    of the immutabilityof divine knowledge. Not only are the facultiesof
    divine volition and action unaltered and unrestrictedby the implementationof God's will or by eventsin time; what God wills and does
    remain the same throughouteternity,unchanging and immutable.
    Once willed, always willed. What God was once able to do, he is
    always able to do.19
    In an earlier chapter Peter asks whetheractions, undeterminedto
    a particulareffect,are fromGod, i.e., come under the will of God.20
    - the
    It is here that Peter identifieshimself among the Nominales
    second time that he uses the label. Peter constructsa hypothetical
    situationin which all actions are evil. Yet the genus 'action' itself,like
    all genera and species, is part of the nature of thingsand is therefore
    fromGod. One mightconsequentlyargue that individual instancesor
    applicationsof action were also fromGod, and thus God would be the
    cause of evil. Peter hastens to point out that this opposing argument
    or hypotheticalcase does not argue against the Nominalist position- " since we
    nonestcontranosNominales
    say that genera and species are
    nomina
    , and all nominaand any applications or impositionsof them are
    fromGod."
    One mightinferfromthis passage thatthe Nominalesin Peter's day
    were credited with the position that genera and species were only
    categories made up of individual instances, and thus if the genus
    'action' was fromGod, then all individual actions or cases that go to
    make up that genus are also from God. But this is, for Peter, a
    misunderstandingof the Nominalist position. Nomina have a reality
    18See listoftexts,#44e.
    19Peterof
    , c. 12(Vat.lat.4304,fol.6rb);c. 13 (Vat. lat.4304,fol.
    Capua,Summa
    6vb).
    20PeterofCapua,Summa
    , c. 26 (in listoftexts,#44c).
    163

    09:11:54 AM

    apart from individual instances or cases, since it is the propertyof


    nominathat they can be predicated of many individuals. Universais,
    as nomina
    , are built into the very nature of thingsby God and are not
    creations of the human mind thathave no basis in externalreality.As
    nomina
    , in contrastto voces
    , genera and species are part of the inherent
    structureof reality, not a product of language and human conceptualization.
    A differentunderstandingof nominaand voces
    , however, seems to be
    in
    the
    third
    of
    the
    four
    where
    the Nominalesare
    operative
    passages
    mentioned.21 Chapter forty-sevenof Peter's Summa addresses the
    theological virtues, beginning with faith. Peter poses a case in which
    a Jew might believe God to be a rational substance of an individual
    nature, and thereforebelieves God to be a person, since thatis the definitionof a person. But 'person' has a different
    meaning when applied
    to creatures than when applied to the creator, and one has to understand how a word is being used in a propositionor argument. Thus,
    when a Catholic is asked whethera Jew believes God to be a person,
    the answer would be 'no', since the Jew's understandingof 'person'
    is not what a Catholic would understandby the Father, Son, and Holy
    Spirit. Similarly, a Nominalist would concede that a Realist reckons
    'genus' to be a noun, because according to the Nominalist the noun
    'genus' in a sentence or propositiondoes not supposit except as a vox,
    although the Realist thinks it to be a nomen.But if questioned, the
    Realist would say that he does not believe 'genus' to be a nomen
    because somethingother than a verbal sound {vox) is signifiedby the
    noun 'genus'. So too theJew might say that he believes God to be a
    person, since he would believe that somethingelse is signifiedby the
    noun 'person' than a Catholic believes.
    The steps in Peter's discussion here are difficultto follow,and there
    may be some corruptionsin the text. It appears on the surfaceto suggest that the Nominalist equates nomenand vox, while the Realist is
    brieflycreditedwith the position that 'genus' is a nomen.We are best
    served by reading the passage in light of Peter's main point. Just as
    the Jew and Catholic understand very differentthings by the word
    'person' {persona
    ), so too the Nominalist and Realist understand very
    differentthingsby the word nomen
    , and perhaps also by the word vox.
    We should be careful, therefore,not to read the Nominalist position
    according to the Realist's understandingof these terms. The debate
    21PeterofCapua, Summa,
    c. 47 (in listoftexts,#44d).
    164

    09:11:54 AM

    between the two groups on this issue was just as much at crossmeanings of the same word, as a debate
    purposes, plagued by different
    over the nature of God.
    a
    Christian
    between a Jew and
    These thenare thepassages in which Peter mentionspositionsof the
    Nominales
    , a group with which, in one of the passages, he apparently
    allies himself.Two of the positions concern the objects of divine and
    human knowledge and/or belief, and they follow the classic
    Nominalist theory of enunciables: once a proposition is true, it is
    always true. The other two passages concern genera and species.
    However one interpretsPeter's treatmentof this second issue, it is
    clear thatby 1200 Nominalistswere associated with a particularposition on the question of universais. But it is unclear to what extentthat
    position resembles what has traditionally been thought to be
    'Nominalism'.
    Perhaps some light on this question of the relation of Peter's
    Nominalesto the discussion of genera and species can be shed by looking at the othertextsreferringto the Nominaleson thisissue. In the list
    compiled by Iwakuma and Ebbesen there is a sizable group. Taking
    elenchorum
    these in the order assembled, the Summasophisticorum
    , dated
    by De Rijk c.1150 but more likelylater, indicates that the Nominales
    distinguishedpropernouns fromappellative nouns, placing universais
    in the latterclass because it is theirnature to be predicated of many.22
    Nothing in this passage necessarilyrelates it to the modern notion of
    , nor does it speak of voces.We
    nominalism, nor does it define nomina
    have more to go on with Ralph of Beau vais' s GlosaesuperDonatum,
    writtenbetween 1150 and 1175.23Building on Augustine's definition
    of person as the individual essence of a rational creature, essence is
    furtherdefinedas thatwhich is signifiedsubstantiallyby a noun. And
    because essence is signifiedsubstantiallyby a universal noun, just as
    the noun 'man', the Realists call thisa universalwhile the Nominalists
    call it a special or general statuswhich, since person is not of thiskind,
    the term 'individual' is added.
    The nominalisttreatiseon predication,presumablydating fromthe
    last half of the twelfthcentury, limits the application of the terms
    'genus' and 'species' to one-word nouns.24 It gives as a rule of this
    22See listoftexts,#5.
    23See listoftexts,#13.The reference
    ofstatus
    hereto a theory
    maybe linkedto
    Abelards views;see Tweedale1976.
    24See listoftexts,#22b.
    165

    09:11:54 AM

    group that no compound or multi-wordexpression {sermocomplexus)


    can be a genus or species, presumably because the latter are
    designated only by appellative nouns. This is contrasted with the
    Realist position, which apparentlyheld that a definitionof a genus is
    itselfa genus,just as a definitionof a species is itselfa species. Another
    anonymous treatiseon universais, presumably dating fromthe same
    period, maintained that the Nominalists believed that genera and
    species are words and supported this position by appealing to Aristo,25For Aristotle,one describes a primarysubstance bettle's Categories
    ter by statingits species ratherthan its genus.26But since Stating' is
    proper to words, genera and species are words {voces).Again, Aristotle
    maintained that substances signify.27And since 'to signify'is proper
    to words, so genera and species are words. One immediate reaction
    to this text is to argue that for the Nominalists nominaand vocesare
    interchangeable,which iftruewould lend supportforIwakuma's view
    that the Nominalesderived from the Vocales.We must, however,
    remember that this treatise is anti-Nominalistand not an unbiased
    witness. We also should recall Peter of Capua's observation that
    Nominalists and Realists understand differentthingswhen theyhear
    the words nominaand voces.It is perhaps less a matterof two different
    views on universais than two differentunderstandingsof what nomen
    and vox, as words, signify.
    At the end of the centuryAlexander Nequam in his Speculumspecula
    tionumnoted that the nominalist affirmationthat 'genus is a noun'
    does not mean they hold that diverse species withina genus are one
    noun, nor does that affirmationfullyor adequately reflecttheirposition.28This passage in particular should be read alongside Peter of
    nostraey
    Capua's remarks.In the Nominalist Positiones
    dating probably
    fromthe early thirteenthcentury,their stated position on universais
    is that universais such as genera and species are nouns.29 But that
    statement,without furtherelaboration on what is meant by 'nouns'
    and whethertheyare only nouns, does not take us very far. It is not
    in the second quarter of
    until Albert the Great's Liberdepraedicabilibus
    the thirteenthcenturythat the Nominalist position on universais is
    construed to mean that universais are only in the intellect.30
    25See listoftexts,#4.
    26Categories
    , c. 5 b 10).
    27Ibid.,3 b 10. (2
    28See listoftexts,#40a.
    29See listoftexts,#60.
    30See listoftexts,#61.
    166

    09:11:54 AM

    These statementson genera and species, with the exception of the


    late witness of Albert the Great, are not, as I have suggested, as
    Nominalist positionon universais
    helpfulin defininga twelfth-century
    as theyfirstappear. Every grammarian would accept that the words
    'genus' and 'species' are nouns. Many of the statementswe have just
    examined say littlemore than that. And in the "game" of obligations,
    it was common practiceto temptan opponent into a fallacyby accepting as simple supposition what was meant only as material or personal supposition, or by equivocations or confusions in meaning.
    Moreover, much of the language is simply terministlogic that does
    not clarifywhetherthe categories themselves,not just the words, are
    only in the mind.31 A furtherdifficultyis that while some antinominalist texts seem to make nominaand vocesinterchangeable,far
    more texts,especiallythe pro-nominalisttexts,distinguishthem from
    each other. Nominamight be thoughtof as fallingwithin the larger
    category of verbal sounds (voces). Voceswas also the label used for
    inflectionsof nouns and verbs that only consignify,while nomina
    Most importantly,forthe Nominales,nominawere the bearers
    signify.32
    ofmeaning apart fromthe particularsof timeand place. It may be that
    the so-called nominalistposition on universais did not grow out of vox
    theory(verbal sound, not a 'thing') as has been suggested, nor the
    view that common natures or universais are mere names as opposed
    to real entities,but has anotherorigin.33Just as the Nominalist theory
    of propositional truthwas based on the timeless meaning of nomina
    (i.e., behind tensed propositionsthat are true lies an untensed form
    that is always true as believed, known, willed at any point in time),
    31In thiscontextit is well to recallDe
    between''logical
    Rijk's distinction
    nominalism"
    and "philosophical
    nominalism"
    in his introduction
    to Abelard's
    Dialctica
    believethatlogicis an arssermocinalis
    ' xci-xciv.
    , thatit
    Logicalnominalists
    is aboutlogicalentities
    andthewaylanguages
    andonlyindirectly
    hasexteroperate,
    nalreality
    as itsprincipal
    thatphilosophical
    nominalism
    object.De Rijkmaintained
    orsubjectivist
    thatwecannotreallyknowextra-mental
    conceptualism,
    namely
    things
    becausetheyaredependent
    on andshapedbythehumanmind,wasneverseriously
    or defended
    entertained
    in themedieval
    nominalism
    period.Logical(or medieval)
    an indirect
    linkbetween
    whichmight
    be thought
    accepted
    logicandexternal
    reality,
    ofas logic'ssecondary
    object.
    32See, forexample,Williamof Auxerrein listof texts,#52c.Cf. Rolandof
    Summa
    Cremona,
    , in listoftexts,#54a.
    33In discussing
    realist
    Abelard,De Rijknoted(Dialctica
    , xciii)thattherespective
    andnominalist
    ofuniversais,
    whilehavingreceived
    themostattention
    interpretations
    in discussions
    of realismand nominalism,
    are onlyparticular
    oftwo
    applications
    different
    viewson thenatureoflogic.
    radically
    167

    09:11:54 AM

    so it is the abilityof nominato embrace many entitiesin time and many


    individual cases withoutchange of meaning or truththat reveals why
    certain typesof words can be predicated of many individuals and yet
    retain meaning and truth. Put another way, universal words can be
    predicated of many individuals because nominaretain an identityof
    tensed propositions about the same truth.
    meaning in differently
    Turning now from the positions Peter identifiesas Nominalist to
    other aspects of his thoughtthat coincide or relate to what we know
    to be nominalistic from other sources, two observations can to be
    made. First, as was stated above, whereverPeter treatsproblems of
    divine knowledge, will, and power, his solution coincides with the
    position of Lombard that was generally viewed as Nominalist.
    Whatever God knows, he always knew; whatever God wills, he has
    always willed; whateverGod can do or could have done, he always can
    do. The objects of divine knowledge, will, and power, understood
    of true profromthe standpointof divine capacity and the significatum
    the same,
    at
    time
    remain
    some
    true),
    positions (i.e., propositions
    of
    Peter's
    method
    and
    undiminished.
    Second,
    theological
    unchanging
    analysis, i.e. his way of approaching theologicalproblems, is through
    the studyof termsand theirmeanings. Chapter afterchapter,moving
    from God and the Trinity to Christ and the Church, are arranged
    around the analysis of terms( nomina
    ) in theologicalstatements,particularly the creed and scripture.Peter's opening chapter is a discussion
    of the nomen'Deus', followedby the treatmentof the names forGod
    and divine attributesas nomina.3*
    Adjectives and adverbs used in the
    traditionalstatementsabout God, the Trinity,and the relationof persons are also treated as nomina.35The approach is an analysis of
    34PeterofCapua,Summa
    'Deus'." Ibid.,
    , c. 1(Vat.lat.4296,fol.Ivb): "De nomine
    SanctussuntDeus
    concedi:FiliusetSpiritus
    fol.2rb:"Nos dicimus
    quia sanepotest
    de Deo.,,
    etsituna essentia
    ibiessentialiter,
    de Deo, et hocnomen'Deus' ponitur
    Sicutenimhicnomen'Deus', ita
    Ibid.,fol.2vb:"De sapientia
    genitavelingenita.
    Similiter
    ethicnomen'sapientia'...." Ibid.,fol.3ra:"De hocnomine'principium'.
    ethocnomen'principium':
    Ibid.,
    quandoquepersonaliter."
    quandoqueessentialiter,
    an sitconfol.4va: "Cum autemhocnomen'iustus'significet
    essentiam,
    quaeritur
    ibiessen'Pateret Filiussuntiusti'.Si enimhocnomen'iusti'supponit
    cedendum:
    "
    "De
    numeralibus
    c.
    27:
    essentiae
    sunt
    tiampluraliter,
    Ibid.,
    plures
    ergo
    scilicet'duo' vel 'tres'." Ibid.,c. 28: "De hoc nomine'Trinitas'vel
    nominibus,
    'trinus'."
    35Ibid.,c. 5: "De adiectivis,
    de Deo essentialiter."
    scilicet
    nominibus
    quaedicuntur
    Ibid.,Vat. lat. 4304,fol.4vb: "Nos verodicimusquod perhocnomen'talis'vel
    inpraedictis
    locutionibus."
    essentiam
    Ibid.,c. 8: "De hocnomine
    'qualis'signifcat
    'aequalis'." Ibid.,c. 9: De hocnomine'similis'."
    168

    09:11:54 AM

    theological statements through the techniques of terminist logic,


    especially supposition.
    This method of theological analysis was not the approach of Peter
    Lombard, but it was also not inventedby Peter of Capua.36 As Martin
    Grabmann noted at the beginning of this century, and as Arthur
    Landgraf furtherdocumented, Peter of Capua borrowed extensively
    fromPeter of Poitiers both in contentand approach.37 Although the
    subjects treated as well as theirorder differbetween Capua's Summa
    and Poitiers's Sententiae
    , the same analytical techniques are employed
    in bothworks. In his second chapterPeter of Poitiers setshis program:
    that theologicaldiscourse and analysis has to do with words, and the
    words used in theologicalstatementsfallinto various grammaticaland
    logical groupings.38 Theological expressions are further divided
    between words that are only vocal (sola voce), such as 4simile' and
    'aequale*, and those that also have signification(et voceetsignificatone),
    such as 'Pater', 'Filius' .39 From there on the chapters revolve around
    the analysis of nominasuch as 'persona', 'aliquis', ' unus' 'voluntas', etc.,
    applyingthe rules of theologicalvocabulary established in his opening
    two chapters and identifyingthe fallacies that occur in theological
    syllogismswhen seeminglyvalid equivalents or circumlocutionsare
    substitutedin these syllogisms.40The same approach and techniques
    are evident in several of Peter of Capua's contemporaries, most

    36It shouldbe notedthatalreadyin Lombardand in


    conprevioustheologians
    siderable
    attention
    was givento theprecisewording
    and meaningof theological
    andhowthemeaning
    can changewithchangesin wordorder,evenin
    statements,
    an inflected
    suchas Latin.
    language
    37Grabmann,
    Geschichte
    derscholastischen
    Methode
    to
    , was thefirstto call attention
    on PeterofPoitiers.
    MostofGrabmann's
    discussion
    wasabout
    Capua'sdependence
    thescholastic
    structure
    beforehim.
    employed
    by Capua and by Peterof Poitiers
    Grabmann
    alsonotedtheterminological
    approachthatCapua appliedto thesame
    issuesas Lombard
    hadtreated.
    numerous
    Landgraf
    produced
    parallel
    passagesinhis
    ofPeterofCapua".
    "StudyoftheAcademicLatitude
    38PeterofPoitiers,
    Sententiae
    , ed. P. S. MooreandM. Dulong,NotreDame 1961,
    sciendum
    I, 10: "His itaquepraemissis,
    vocabulorum
    quodquae de Deo dicuntur
    aliaDeo conveniunt
    ab aeterno,
    aliaex tempore.
    Nectamenintelligendum
    estaliqua
    ab aeterno
    vocabula
    convenire
    Deo eo quodsintab aeterno,
    sedquiacuiuslibet
    eorum
    ab aeterno
    Deo convenit."
    Ibid.:"Eorumquae relative
    dicuntur
    aliasunt
    significano
    relativa
    solavoce,ut'similis','aequalis',secundum
    quosdam;aliavoceetsignificatone,ut 'Pater','Filius',et huiusmodi."
    39Ibid., 11.
    40See, forexample,
    3, 4 and following.
    chapters
    169

    09:11:54 AM

    notably in Prepositinus of Cremona, but also to some extent in


    Stephen Langton.41
    When we move beyond the circle of Peter of Poitiers, Peter of
    Capua, and Prepositinus we find that the Nominalist solution to the
    problems of divine knowledge, volition, and power, as well as the
    analysis of theologicalproblemsthroughnominawere thecommon propertyof a much broader group of Parisian theologians at the end of
    the twelfthcentury.Most theologians, to some extent,employed terministlogic, suppositiontheory,and the language of significationand
    consignification.And most of those who commented on Lombard's
    text or who were influencedby it found his solution to the problems
    of divine knowledge, volition, and power persuasive. It should be
    added that these groups are far fromidentical. Stephen Langton, for
    instance, in his gloss on Lombard, employed terministlogic while
    eitherignoringor being noncommittalon the principleof semelverum
    ,
    semperverum.42
    Does this mean that Parisian theologywas dominated or at least
    heavily influence by a group of theologians who saw themselves as
    belonging to a Nominalist school? Or is it the case that many
    theologians, no matter what their general orientation or affiliation
    might be, adopted or applied the opinioNominaliumnot because they
    were Nominalists but because this was the opinion of the Lombard or
    because it was in itselfa persuasive solution or an attractiveformof
    41On Prepositinus
    dePrvostin
    seeG. Lacombe,La Vieetlesoeuvres
    , Kain 1927,esp.
    ededuzione
    storica
    della
    distruttura
    Analisi
    L 'Otodossia
    e lagrammatica.
    168-70;G. Angelini,
    thisaspect
    diPrepositino
    trinitaria
    , Rome1972,whichinpartexplores
    precisely
    teologia
    was a
    One problemwiththeviewthatPrepositinus
    of Prepositinus's
    theology.
    on theobjectsof
    is thathe seemstohavehelda restheory
    nominalist"
    "theological
    knowledgeand belief;see Nuchelmans1973, 177-85.On Langtonsee Der
    Mnster
    desKardinals
    Sentenzenkommentar
    1952,
    , ed. A. M. Landgraf,
    Stephan
    Langton
    44
    ut hoc nomen'essentia';alius
    aliusessentialis,
    e.g. 7: Nota,quod terminorum
    ut'Pater','Filius',et
    ut'paternitas',
    'filiado','spiratio';aliuspersonalis,
    notionalis,
    Non
    tamensupposita
    est
    vera:
    Pater
    Haec
    Sanctus'.
    perpaternitas.
    ergo
    'Spiritus
    de
    notio."The approachis notusedin PetertheCantor'sSumma
    sonasupponitur
    ofthatworkdoesnotlenditself
    consiliis
    etanimae
    sacramentis
    , butthesubjectmatter
    oftheTrinity.
    as wellas thedoctrine
    to terminist
    analysis
    42Langtonchosenotto comment
    on God'sknowledge
    on thecrucialthirdchapter
    secin bookI, dist.41 ofLombard'sLibriSententiarum
    , andat theequallyimportant
    Sentenzenkommentar
    tionon divinepowerin dist.44, Langtononlyremarked,
    , 62:
    "SecundumNominales,
    quicquidpotuit,potest.SecundumRealesaliter,quibus
    thatthe
    haecdubiaest:quicquidpotuitpotest."ThisviewofLangtonpresupposes
    of"Nominales"is inerror,
    ofthiswork,whichreads"nos" instead
    solemanuscript
    as Landgraf
    concluded.
    170

    09:11:54 AM

    analysis? I am inclined toward the latterview.43 For Peter of Capua,


    '
    taking his "nos Nominales' statement at face value, being a
    Nominalist and being a Lombardian may have been the same thing.
    In conclusion I want to make a few observationsand, I hope, raise
    some questionsforfurtherinquiryand discussion. First,thoseof Peter
    of Capua's generationthoughtof the Nominalesprimarilyin termsof
    language and logic, part of secular letters, not as a school or an
    as a
    approach among theologians. Peter of Capua's self-identification
    Nominalist, iftrue, recalls his early years as a studentof logic, not his
    membershipin a contemporarytheological 'school of thought'. Jacques de Vitry's anecdote about Maugrinus (#53) suggests that
    Nominalist logicians could later in life become theologians and even
    bishops, retainingelementsof theirearlier training.Some theologians
    around 1200 applied Nominalistpositionsto theologicalquestions and
    believed thatthe Nominalist theoryof enunciables was especiallywellequipped to solve problems relatingto the object of belief,knowledge,
    or volition, even if those solutions failed in the eyes of many subsequent theologians.
    Secondly, nothing in Peter of Capua suggests that he saw an
    Abelardian backgroundto eitherthelogical or theologicaltenetsof the
    Nominales.In theologyhe would have traced his Nominalist solutions
    to Lombard, not Abelard, and on the side of secular lettersthere is
    also no indication that Capua saw any Abelardian ancestry. In fact,
    his sole referenceto Abelard suggestsa stance of opposition, not of distant discipleship.44 Moreover, the majority of references to the
    Nominalescome in the last quarter of the twelfthcentury,two generations afterAbelard. To talk about them as disciples of Abelard when
    not even the anonymous textsso acknowledge Master Peter calls for
    some rethinking.Whateverparallels may existbetween these textsand
    those of Abelard- and the parallels are many- , the Nominalesdo not
    seem to be self-conscious
    disciples of Abelard in the same way as the
    theologians and texts identifiedby David Luscombe.45
    43Prepositinus,
    forexample,
    referred
    totheNominales
    as iftheywerea grouptowhich
    he didnotbelong.Moreover,
    he seemstohaveheldtoa restheory
    on theobjectof
    belief.
    44Peterof
    , Vat. lat. 4296,f. 27ra:"Ad hocdicuntquidamet hoc
    Capua,Summa
    dicebat,ut fertur,
    Abaialardus,
    quodactuset voluntas,
    quamvissintdiversa,sunt
    tamenidempeccatum,
    nechabentproinconvenienti
    si aliquodpeccatum
    estduo,
    immoetiamtria."
    45Luscombe1970.
    171

    09:11:54 AM

    Thirdly, as Calvin Normore and I independentlyargued some time


    back, nominalism seems initiallyand primarilyto have concerned a
    theory of propositions as bearers of truth,and the significationof
    nouns in propositions.To the degree thatit came to embody a theory
    of universais, it grew out of significationand a view of the proper
    sphere of logic. The question is not whetherevery genus and every
    species is a noun. Grammar teaches that much. And it is the nature
    of nouns that are not proper to be predicable of more than one
    individual thing. Such an approach does not address the question of
    whethersuch nominaare creations of the human mind or have some
    basis in externalreality.Perhaps we should be more inclinedto accept
    Peter of Capua's descriptionof the Nominalist position, namely that
    nominaare part of the nature of thingsand that theirimpositionsare
    fromGod, not man.
    Madison, Wisconsin
    University
    of Wisconsin

    172

    09:11:54 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 1 (1992)
    :
    Logico-TheologicalSchoolsfrom the Second Half of the 12th Century
    A List of Sources1
    IWAKUMAYUKIO and STEN EBBESEN

    Severallogico-theological
    areknowntohavebeenactiveinthesecondhalf
    schools
    ofthe12thcentury.
    Thisis an exhaustive
    ofthesources
    collection
    weknowinwhich
    arereferred
    tobyname.We haveonlyomitted
    theHelistae
    , who
    anyofthoseschools
    Promisimus
    appearsolelyinGlossa
    (seetextsin Hunt1940/43,
    pp. 52-54).Forthetwo
    schoolsknown,WaldicellHWaldilli
    and vocales
    , see sourcesin De
    early12th-century
    Our collection
    does not
    Rijk 1966,p. 4 and Iwakuma1992b, 1, respectively.
    includepassagesinwhichtheadjective
    fora school-name
    is attached
    to thenameof
    theschool-founder
    toAdam).
    attached
    (e.g. Parvipontanus
    The following
    school-names
    occur.
    Adamitae
    21, 52e,53, 55-57,(cf.42).
    Albricani
    18, 24, 25b.
    11.
    Coppausi
    Gilebertini 33c,34.
    Meludinenses16b,21, 23, 25c,38, (cf. 15, 16a).
    Montani
    10, 11, 25a, 36n,41a, (cf. 1).
    nominales 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19,20, 22b,23 25h,26, 29, 30, 31, 32,
    33a-b,35,37,39a,40a-b,44a,44c-e,45,46,47,48a-d,50a-d,51ab, 52c-d,f,53, 54, 58, 59, 61, 62d,64a-c,65a, (cf.60).
    Parvipontani 14, 18, 24, 39b,49, (cf.2, 7b, 26, 28, 41b,42).
    Porretani
    17,18,25d-g,27,36a-m,44b,47,52a-b,62a-b,62e,63,65b,66a-e,
    67a-b,68, 69, (cf.etiam11,62c).
    reales
    5,9, 13,18,22a-b,25h-i,29,31,32,35,43,44a,44c-d,45,46,48cd, 52d,53, 59, 60.
    Robertini
    18.
    The Coppausi
    areotherwise
    unknown
    andno convincing
    hasbeenfound
    explanation
    forthename,whichis undersuspicion
    of beinga scribalerror.Thereis also a
    reference
    wellbe a locative
    'in Chartres';
    no
    , whichmight
    (No. 3) toCarnoti
    genitive
    Carnotenses
    havebeenotherwise
    foundso far.
    ofSt. Victor,whowasnota member
    ofanyoftheaboveschools,in his
    Godfrey
    Fonsphilosophiae
    thatin his day therewerefiverivalsects,the
    (No. 18) reports
    and foursortsofreales
    nominales
    Robertini
    and Parvipontani.
    , viz. Porretani,
    Albricani,
    in hisEntheticus
    schools.
    JohnofSalisbury
    (No. 7a) seemstoalludetofourdifferent
    We thenarriveat thefollowing
    oftheschooldivisions
    in thesecondhalfof
    picture
    the12thcentury.

    1 We wouldliketoexpress
    hereoursincere
    to Dr. C.H. Kneepkens,
    and
    gratitude
    Mrs.K.M. Fredborg,
    Dr. I. Rosierand Prof.K. Tachau,whoprovided
    thetexts
    numbered
    whogavemuchgood
    25h,17,43 and 70, and to Prof.W.J.Courtenay
    adviceandinformation.
    173

    09:12:08 AM

    followers
    of othernames
    John
    he whocorrects
    errors
    of
    Abelard
    PeterAbelard
    nominales
    Gilbert
    ofPorretaGilebertini
    reales Porretani he whobelieveshimself
    Albricani to be wiserthanhisown AlbericofParis Montani(?)
    Alberic
    master
    Godfrey

    Robertini he whosmellslikeMelun RobertofMelun Meludinenses


    ofthe
    Inhabitant
    "ModicusPons"
    Parvipontani

    AdamofBalsham
    'Parvipontanus' Adamitae

    betweenschool-names
    and particular
    thinkers
    The correlations
    proposedin the
    In particular,
    newnoruncontroversial.
    W. Courtenay
    abovetableareneither
    ([1986]
    thetraditional
    ofnominales
    identification
    as followers
    1991a,[1992a])haschallenged
    ofPeterAbelard.
    areidentical
    wasfirst
    ThatMontani
    andAlbricani
    byDe Rijk(1966).Hunt
    proposed
    Promisimus
    bothnamesinGlossa
    theyreferred
    (No. 25a-b),thought
    (1950),whofound
    tothink
    so (thusSouthern
    andsomescholars
    havecontinued
    totwodifferent
    schools,
    ofideninfavour
    1982,p. 114.Kneepkens
    1987,I p. 373).In fact,theonlyargument
    onMtSainteGenevive
    (henceMontani
    ); butsodidAbelard
    tityisthatAlberic
    taught
    andRobertofMelun(seeJohnofSalisbury,
    Metalogicon
    11-10).Threeconsiderations
    viz.(a) Glossa
    Promisimus
    usemore
    theidentification,
    doesnototherwise
    speakagainst
    Alberic
    is notknown
    tohavetaught
    thanonelabelforthesameschool;(b) Whereas
    are of a
    almostall the thesesthatthesourcesascribeto theMontani
    theology,
    school-names
    are derivedfromthefounder's
    character;
    (c) Generally
    theological
    thatwerealsoappliedtothe
    name(Adamitae
    , Robertini
    , Gilbertini
    ) ortheyareadjectives
    Porretanus
    Montanus
    founder
    ,
    (Meludinensis,
    Parvipontanus,
    ), butno sourcecallsAlberic
    toWilliamdeMonte.
    to himand not,as commonly
    unlessNo. 41a refers
    supposed,
    is lessdoubtful,
    butone worry
    ofMeludinenses
    withRobertini
    The identification
    Is itnotstrange,
    rather
    thanas a logician.
    Robertwonfameas a theologian
    remains.
    is theological?
    toMeludinenses
    then,thatnoneofthethesesascribed
    Theyall belong
    to thesphereoflogic.
    intothenature
    research
    ofsourceswillstimulate
    further
    We hopethiscollection
    ofsources
    andwouldbe grateful
    tobe informed
    of12th-century
    andidentity
    schools,
    we haveoverlooked.
    Editorial
    principles
    in a roughchronological
    order.
    The textshavebeenarranged
    fromwhichsourcewe quoteeachtext.
    The sign(#) indicates
    theirinformation
    editions
    wedo notin generalreproduce
    Whenquotingprinted
    emendations.
    and conjectural
    aboutvariantreadings
    wenormalize
    theorthography
    andusethefollowfrom
    Whenquoting
    manuscripts
    ingconventions:
    addition
    or interlinear
    'X/ X is a marginal
    bythescribe.
    buthas beenaddedbyus.
    <X> X is in no manuscript,
    174

    09:12:08 AM

    butshouldbe deleted.
    [X] X is in themanuscript(s),
    buthas beendeletedbythescribe.
    [[X]] X is in themanuscript,
    ofX and Z as XYZ.
    consisting
    X(Y)Z We solvetheabbreviation
    toexhaustivity.
    do notpretend
    underLit. ( = relevant
    Theentries
    literature)
    see
    Fora keyto theabbreviations
    (author'sname + datewhennecessary),
    thebibliography.
    List
    1

    to De Rijk 1966p. 38)


    ANON., IN CATEGORIAS
    (late1130'saccording
    a 'Monte',
    denominative
    nonsumitur
    Dicimusquodhocnomen'montanus2'
    triaessentnecessaria,
    sumptum,
    quia ad hoc <ut> essetdenominativum
    nomenetutnomenadiacentis
    ethaberet
    essetin subiecto
    utproprietas
    scilicet
    insubiecto,
    itaquod
    existentis
    a nomine
    < sum> ptiessetsumptum
    proprietatis
    et differret
    in fine.Quia omniahuicdeficiunt,
    cumeo in principio
    conveniret
    ab abitatione
    ab eo. Sed sumitur
    sumptum
    quare non est denominativum
    hocnomine'montanus',quod sumitur
    Montis.... Set hicrusticus
    participai
    monte:ergomonsestin eo.
    a 'monte',ergoet re;sicparticipt
    denominatiue
    2 Itisdoubtful
    De Rijk(1966p.
    thisword
    ismeant
    as a school-name,
    whether
    although
    isa MonofAlberic
    ofParis,
    theanonymous
    a follower
    itasevidence
    that
    author,
    37)takes
    1987p. 274f.
    tanus.
    Cf.thediscussion
    byLewry
    MS Padua,Bibl.Universitaria
    2087,f. 4vb.
    Lit. De Rijk1966p. 37 (#), Lewry1987p. 274f(#).

    GOLIAE
    METAMORPHOSIS
    Interhoset aliosin parteremota,
    ParviPontis
    nonloquorignota,
    incola3,
    in iota,
    195
    directis
    disputabat
    digitis
    et quecumquedixerat
    erantperse nota.
    3 Thisisa reference
    toAdamParviponianus
    , nottohisschool.
    Terzaserie
    aus
    Ed. Huygens,
    R., Mitteilungen
    , in:StudiMedievali,
    Handschriften
    III, 1962,p. 771(#).
    1954p. 163.
    Lit. Minio-Paluello
    49

    S
    ANON., IN PERIHERMENIA
    TRANSPOSITANOMINAET VERBAIDEM SIGNIFICANT(DeInt.10,
    20bl).
    Ne alicuivideretur
    siclegithunetransitm:
    noster
    quodtransposita
    Magister
    removet
    Aristoteles
    nominaet verbavariarent
    sensusorationis,
    illuddicens:
    inquibustransponunTRANSPOSITANOMINAET VERBA,i.e. orationes
    turnominaetverba,IDEM, i.e. eosdemintellectus,
    SIGNIFICANT,uthaec
    oratio'estalbushomo'et haec'homoestalbus'. .../262a/...
    intellectus
    sed
    habentur,
    MagisterGuidodicitquod numquamcompositi
    sicutipereuunt(!)
    vocesproferendo,
    sicet simplices
    intellectus.
    Sed secundum
    estuerusuel falsus.
    hocnullusintellectus
    Carnotidicuntorationem
    intellectum
    eteumposse
    in
    simplicem
    significare
    Jundari
    anima- habentenimmirumquomodocompositus
    in re
    intellectus
    fundetur
    175

    09:12:08 AM

    sicutnonestmirum,
    caren'tepar/tibus.Undedicimusnoressemirandum,
    est
    in
    re
    < composita
    >.
    unitas
    'est/
    'res
    simplex
    rex)/
    quae
    (]
    quod
    Ms Orlans,Bibi.mun.266,pp. 261b-262a
    (#).
    1987I p. 374.
    Lit. Kntfepkens
    4

    DE UNIVERSALIBUS
    etspecies
    sibiconfingere
    uocabula.
    nominales,videntur
    Alii,scilicet
    Quod
    genera
    In primoper Aristotelem
    dicentemin
    videturhaberiposse multipliciter.
    Si quis assignet
    Praedicamentis:
    quid sit,convenientius
    primamsubstantiam
    estvocumproferri,
    proferens
    speciemquam genus;proprium
    assignabit[ur]
    in Praedicamentis,
    quare generaet speciessuntvoces. ... ItemAristoteles
    ait:Omnissubstantia
    videtur
    etindividuis,
    etspeciebus
    loquendode generibus
    estvocum,
    autemproprium
    hocaliquidsig< nifi> care;significare
    quaregenera
    et speciessuntvoces....
    Clm 29520(2(fragment)
    Ms Mnchen,
    (#).

    to De Rijk
    ELENCHORUM(1155/60according
    SUMMASOPHIST1CORUM
    1962,p. 89)
    alia 'temptando',
    Etdicitur
    quiatamdiutemptat
    'temptativa'
    (seil,disputatio)
    Ut
    quem,quasi velitad<d>iscere, quousqueducateum ad inconveniens.
    sunt
    sic:
    "nominum
    reales
    dicunt
    nominales
    propria,
    erga
    quedam
    quidam
    quedam appellativa;que autemsunt appellativa,sunt nata predicaride
    igitur
    quedamnominasuntuniversalia".
    pluribus;
    Ms Paris,Bibi.Nat.,lat. 15141,f. 3vb.
    Ed. De Rijk1962p. 276.3-7(#).

    OTTO OF FREISING, GESTAFRIDERICI (1156/58)


    Rozelinum
    Habuittarnen
    quenprimopreceptorem
    (seil.PetrusAbaelardus)
    et post
    in logicasententiam
    vocum
    instituit,
    dam,qui primusnostris
    temporibus
    Guillelmum
    ad gravssimos
    Laudunensem,
    viros,Anshelmum
    Campellensem
    dictorum
    Catalaunensem
    pondustamquam
    migransipsorumque
    episcopum,
    induens
    nondiusustinuit.
    Indemagistrm
    vacuumiudicans
    acumine
    subtilitatis
    ininventionum
    subtilitate
    nonsolumad phylosophiam
    Parisius
    venit,plurimum
    animisutilium
    ad iocoshominum
    sed et pro commovendis
    necessariarum,
    monachusin
    valens.Ubi occasionequadamsatisnota non bene tractatus
    ac meditationi
    lectioni
    est.Ibi dienoctuque
    effectus
    sanctiDyonisii
    monasterio
    intantum,
    utpostalide litterato
    efficitur
    incubans
    de acutoacutior,
    litteratior,
    sui
    solutus
    ad
    abbatis
    obedientia
    ab
    docendique
    publicum
    prodiret
    quodtempus
    in naturali
    tenens
    seunominum
    assumeret.
    Sententiam
    officium
    rursus
    ergovocum
    docenset
    admiscuit.
    noncautetheologiae
    facltate
    Quarede sanctatrinitate
    sedres
    trespersonas,quas sanctaaecclesianonvacuanomina
    scribens
    tantum,
    et fideliter
    hactenus
    et pie credidit
    discretas
    distinctas
    suisqueproprietatibus
    eadem
    caeteradixit:Sicut
    inter
    nonbonisususexemplis,
    nimisadtenuans,
    docuit,
    etfiliusetspiritus
    essentia
    estpater
    etconclusio,
    itaeadem
    oratio
    estpropositio,
    assumptio
    sanctus.
    Ed. G. Waitz,MGH in usumscholarum
    46, p. 69 (#).
    1991app. 14-15,32-33,Iwakuma[1992b].
    Lit. Normore
    p. 203,Courtenay

    176

    09:12:08 AM

    7
    a

    JOHN OF SALISBURY,ENTHETICUS(1154/62)
    49
    novusauctorin arte,
    IncolasumModiciPontis,
    essemeum:
    dumpriusinventum
    glorior
    quoddocueresenes,necnovitamicaiuventus,
    inventum
    iurofuissemei!
    pectoris
    53
    circumdat
    Sedulameiuvenum
    turba,putatque
    nonnisiveraloqui."
    grandiaiactantem
    dicaxredolet
    Isteloquaxminimumque4
    Melidtunum
    ,
    Albrico
    creditur
    doctioristesuo,
    hicAbaelardi.
    57
    errores
    verbosus
    corrigit
    4 minimumque
    siced.,annimiumque
    legendum?
    Ed. JanvanLaarhoven
    I, p. 109(#).
    II
    1954p. 163,Van Laarhoven
    Lit. De Rijk1967Pt 1 p. 288,Minio-Paluello
    p. 263.
    meusa Chonchis
    Willelmus
    205
    Hunc( = Furvum)
    saepelegebat,
    amat.
    huncetiamnosterPontilianus5
    5 a reference
    toAdamParvipontanus
    II, p. 277,n. 206,&p. 263,
    (?); cf.VanLaarhoven
    n. 49b.
    Ed. Van Laarhoven
    I, p. 119(#).
    II p. 277.
    Lit. Minio-Paluello
    1954p. 164,Van Laarhoven

    JOHN OF SALISBURY,METALOGICON
    (1159)
    Deindepostdiscessum
    eius( = Abaelardi),
    uisusest,
    qui michipreproperus
    enitebat
    et
    adhesimagistro
    dialecticus
    Alberico,
    qui interceteros
    opinatissimus
    eratreueraNominalissecteacerrimus
    impugnator.
    Ed. Webbp. 78.6-10(#).
    1991ap. 16.
    Lit. Reinersp. 59 n. 1, Courtenay

    JOHN OF SALISBURY, EPIST. 238 MAGISTRO BALDEWINO


    ARCHIDIACONO
    EXONIENSI(1167/8)
    Nostipridem
    nominalium
    tuorum
    eo michiminuspiaceresententiam,
    quodin
    totaconsistens
    rerumnon assumpserit,
    cum rectum
    sermonibus
    utilitatem
    indubium
    sitquodresquaeritphilosophia,
    nonuerba.Vtergocomsapientibus
    Benedicto
    pendiosius
    agamtecummeorummorerealium,exlitteris
    quaenostro
    directae
    suntcolligesin quo calculocausasacerdotii
    et regni.
    uersetur
    Ed. W.J.MillorS.J.& C.N.L. Brooke,TheLetters
    Vol. II,
    ofJohnofSalisbury,
    Oxford1979,p. 450 (#).
    Lit. Du CangeV p. 604,Reinersp. 59 n. 2, Courtenay
    1991app. 15-16.

    10 ANON., QUAESTIONESTHEOLOGICAE
    Itemquaeritur
    utrum
    Christus
    habuerit
    animametcorpusetcaputet
    partes,
    MontaniMs) dicuntquodethabuit
    pedes.Ad hocquidam(etinmargine
    scripsil
    haspartesethas(] hocMs), etquodaliquaparsestvelp(erson)aex illiscomsedaliposita;nontarnen
    aliquidestexilliscompositum,
    quia nullasubstantia,
    qua p(erson)a.Contrahoc ....
    177

    09:12:08 AM

    Ms Oxford,
    Bodl.Libr.Laud., lat. 105,f. 249va(#).
    Lit. Hunt1950p. 89.
    11 COMPENDIUMLOGICAE PORRETANUM ( 1155/70)
    Atcumfereab omnibus
    totum
    dicatur
    disgregativum
    plura,ettotum
    contiguum
    dicaturesse plura; quod tarnena Montanis negaturac <a> raris6
    <conceditur>nisia Nominalibus
    et Coppausis,quideomni
    toto
    concedunt
    Jere
    Sed hecpositiononab omnibus
    nostredoctrine
    quodsitsuepartes.
    professoribus
    a quibusratioveritatis
    noninvestigatur.
    recipitur,
    6 quodtamcn
    - raris
    ante
    totum
    habet
    Codex
    editores.
    , transposuerunt
    contiguum
    Ms Oxford,
    f.
    Christi
    21rb.
    Corpus
    College250,
    Ed. Ebbesen/Fredborg/Nielsen
    1983,p. 39 (#).
    Lit. Normore
    p. 204,Ebbesen& Iwakuma1983p. 81.
    12 ROBERT OF PARIS,SUMMA'BREVESIT' (1160,according
    toKneepkens)
    Similiter
    etaliudpredicatorii,
    locutioni
    ut'Socrates
    est
    apudNominalesaliudsubicitur
    homo1:
    scilicet
    homo
    subicitur
    sed
    iste
    terminus
    sitie
    hocnomen
    Socrates,
    tile,
    locutioni,
    *subicitur
    'Socrates
    predicationi.
    Ed. Kneepkens
    1987II, pp. 162.32-163.2
    (#).
    13 RALPH OF BEAUVAIS,GLOSESUPERDONATUM (1150/1
    175)
    Personamsic definiuit
    Augustinus:
    personaest indiuiduaessenciarationalis
    creature.
    Essenciadicitur,
    nomine
    substantialiter.
    quodsignificatur
    Quia essencia significatur
    nomine
    uniuersali
    substantialiter
    uthocnomine
    'homo',quaeest
    Nominalesuerodicuntstatumspecialem
    communis,
    quodRealesuniversale,
    - ethuiusmodi
    uelgenerlem
    nonestpersona- , ideoadditur
    'individua'....
    Ed. C.H. Kneepkens,
    Glosesvper
    Donatvm
    , (= Artistarium
    RalphofBeauvais,
    2),
    Nijmegen1982,p. 21.2-8(#).
    14 ARSMELIDUNA(1170/1180
    to Hunt1975p. 112n. 8)
    according
    Contraid veroquodpraediximus
    ad categoricam
    nonsequicontinuativam,
    sic
    obiciet
    sustinens
    necessarium
    exquolibet
    enuntiabili
    Parvipontanus
    sequi:'si Socrates
    esthomo,Socrates
    estanimal,ergosiesthomoestanimal,si esthomo'.Instantia ....
    Ms Oxford,Bodl.Libr.,Digby174,f. 236ra(#).
    Lit. De Rijk1967Pt 1 p. 277 & 356,Iwakuma[1992a].
    15 SECTAMELUDINE
    <S>ecta Meludina
    veluterroris
    medicina.
    Hac fitdoctrina
    nota,notagemina
    <M>eludinaeprofessionis
    quam ea parsphilosophiae
    quae ratiodisserendi
    dictaest,sibiducemelegit,perfecta
    etintegra
    inhuiusoperisvolumine
    consummaturcognitio.
    178

    09:12:08 AM

    Ms London,Brit.Libr.,Royal2 D XXX, f.95ra(#).


    1983p. viii.
    Lit. De Rijk1967Pt 1 pp. 282-283,Ebbesen/Fredborg/Nielsen
    MELIDUNAE
    16 FALLACIAE
    a

    Non
    nonesseduoettria
    estquinqu
    Meludinensis
    , necduoettriaessequinqu.
    positio
    necdisiunctam
    nisi
    nisiverasit/21rb/disiuncta,
    enimconcedimus
    coniunctam
    istam'duo ettriasuntquinqu',nec
    verasitconiuncta.
    undenonconcedimus
    istam'quinqusuntduo et tria',necistam'Socrateset PlatosuntSocrateset
    ...
    sicopponitur.
    Plato'.Nobistarnen
    f.
    lat.
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Nat.,
    4720A, 21ra-b(#).
    exquibus
    nullam
    esseveram
    nisicategoricae
    Meludinensium
    sententia:
    hypotheticam
    'si Socrates
    estasinus,
    sintverae.
    constat
    Undefalsaesthaechypothetica
    hypothetica
    'Socratesestasinus(] animal
    estanimal',quiafalsaesthaeccategorica
    Socrates
    huiushypotheticae.
    Ms)', quae estin constitutione
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Nat.,lat. 4720A,f. 22ra(#).

    17 ANON.,IN PRISCIANUMMAIOREM
    siccontra(?).... Item
    Dato enimhocnomen'homo'significare
    qualitatem,
    hoc quodlibetsubstantivum^
    nomenesse denominative
    accidetsecundum
    ab aliquaproprietate.
    Socrates
    denominatur
    etsic
    enima Socratitate
    sumptum
    de aliis,quae mentiuntur
    Porretani.
    s transcription
    K.M. Fredborg'
    (#).
    Ms Leiden,BPL 154,f. 59va.
    18 GODFREY OF ST. VICTOR, FONSPHILOSOPHIAE(1178)
    De modernis
    philosophis
    de nominalibus
    et realibus
    et primm
    245
    Addunt
    hicse sociosquidamnominales,
    Nomine,nonnumine,taliumsodales;
    Aliiuicinius
    assuntquosreales
    248
    res,quodsuntueretales.
    Ipsa nuncupauit
    Namsi proreatibus
    uariiserrorum
    Poterat
    realiumnomendicihorum,
    Tamenexcusabilis
    erroresteorum;
    mosestinsanorum.
    Menticontradicere
    252
    nomenessegenus,
    Namquemensuel cogitet
    mentisalienus,
    Solushoccrediderit
    Cumsittotgeneribus
    rerummundusplenus
    Cuiusgenusnomenestsempersitegenus.
    256
    Ceterum
    realiumsuntquamplures
    secte,
    a reaturecte,
    Quas reaiesdixeris
    noneuntdirecte
    Quia ueritramitem
    Nec fluenta
    260
    gratiehauriunt
    perfectc.
    Ex hisquidamtemperant
    Porri
    De Porretanis
    condimenta,
    contenta;
    Quorumgenuscreditur
    generis
    hiipredicamenta,
    Decernrerum
    triplicant
    179

    09:12:08 AM

    264
    ueterum
    Euertuntur
    perhocfundamenta.
    De Albricanis
    erratAlbricanus,
    Alitersedpariter
    CuiusSortesegersit,sednonmanetsanus;
    homouanus,
    transit
    Sed quia uelociter
    268
    maneatinsanus.
    Etiamdummoritur
    De Robertinis
    Herentsaxiuerticeturberobertine,
    Saxeeduritieuel adamantine,
    Quos nec rigatpluuiaequerosdoctrine;
    272
    mine.
    Vtantamnisaditumscopulorum
    nihil
    uere,
    Istifalsum
    litigant sequi
    posthocabiere,
    ipsimet
    Quamuistarnen
    millefere:
    nomine
    solo
    de
    fingunt
    Qui
    276
    Igiturpronihilolicethoscensere.
    De
    extruxerunt
    suis
    manibus
    Paruipontanis
    pontem
    Quidam
    fecerunt
    transitm
    Et peraquas facilem
    In quo sibisingulidomosstatuerunt,
    280
    nomenacceperunt.
    incole
    Undepontis
    Louvain/Lille
    Namurcensia
    Mediaevalia
    Analecta
    8,
    P.
    Ed.
    Michaud-Quantin,
    1956,pp. 43-44(#).
    1991app. 15-16,35-36.
    Lit. De Rijk 1967Pt 1 p. 282; Courtenay
    19 WALTER MAP, DE NUGISCURIALIUM(1181/2)
    indialetica
    quamin
    ... magisti
    Nominalium,
    qui pluspeccauit
    Petri,principis
    inillacontracorlaborauit,
    diuinapagina;naminhaccumcordesuodisseruit,
    et muitosin eosdemlaboresinduxit.
    Map,De
    Ed. M.R. James,rev.byC.N.L. Brooke& R.A.B. Mynors,Walter
    78
    Oxford
    Courtier's
    1983,
    Curialium:
    ,
    (#).
    p.
    Trifles
    Nugis
    1991c
    1977p. 128 n. 10, Normore
    Lit. Green-Pedersen
    p. 204, Courtenay
    n. 23.
    20 ANON., COM. HAEC EST ON DIF. TOP. (thesecondhalfof the 12th
    century)
    sintassignandi
    (Cf.PL 64,
    Etestconsilium
    quilociinquibussyllogismis
    aperire
    esse
    locos
    errornominalium
    destruitur
    quinegant
    col. 1173C).Et indemanifeste
    hanc Boethii,quoniamdicunt
    litteram
    , molesteexponentes
    aptossyllogismis
    locosesseaptossyllogismis.
    mediantibus
    enthymematibus
    lat.
    Bibl.
    Ms Paris,
    Arsenal, 910, f. 58va(#).
    1984p. 425,Nor1977p. 128& 142n. 88,Green-Pedersen
    Lit. Green-Pedersen
    morep. 204.
    IN SOPH. EL.
    21 ANON.CANTABRIGIENSISCOMMENTARIUM
    et
    estquae potestfieriad unuminterrogantem
    secundum
    Instantia
    opinionem
    'Si id
    utaturtaliargumentatione
    utsi aliquisMelidunensis
    nonad quemlibet;
    necid quodcurrit
    movetur,
    ergosi nihilmovetur
    aliquidmovetur;
    quodcurrit
    in universali,
    , et
    dariinstantia
    quoniamexfalsonihilsequitur
    movetur',
    poterit
    hocmodo:'Si
    inparticulari,
    etiamdariinstantia
    Poterit
    estnihilmoveri.
    falsum
    180

    09:12:08 AM

    estmargarita,
    Socrates
    nonestlapis,Socrates
    nonestmargarita;
    ergosi Socrates
    in similisecundum
    ut si
    Socrates
    estlapis'.Sed dabiturinstantia
    opinionem,
    'hoc genusanimalest genushuic
    quis Adamitautaturtaliargumentatione
    specieihomo,ergoomnishomoestanimal':'hocgenusanimaliaestgenushuic
    instantia
    inconspeciei<homo>, ergoomnishomoestanimalia'.Itemdabitur
    si quis Melidunensisfaciattalemargumentatrariosecundum
    opinionem,
    tionem:'istasuntopposita,
    unum,ab eodem
    ergode quocumquepraedicatur
    risibile
    suntparia,
    removetur
    reliquum':'haecspecieshomoet hocproprium
    haecspecieset hocproprium'.
    ergode quocumque
    Ms Cambridge,
    St.John'sCollegeD.12, f. 11Ova.
    Lit. Ebbesen& Iwakuma1983p. 84 (#).
    TIONE
    22 DE PRAEDICA
    a

    viverbisubstantivi
    termino
    dicitur
    Stricte
    copulari
    (praedicari
    seil.)terminm
    'Terminm
    etde praesenti
    veraaffirmativa
    <in> propositionefm]
    simpliciter.
    in
    estad differentiam
    termino
    dictum
    propositionum,
    hypotheticarum
    copulari'
    scilicet
    termino
    sedpropositio
    (]
    propositioni,
    copulatur,
    quibusnonterminus
    esthomo,Socrates
    ut'si Socrates
    sedMs)consequens
    antecedenti,
    (] sedMs) est
    nosteranimal'.Vel ad differentiam
    realium,qui dieuntremde repraedicari,
    minm
    de termino.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 14458,f. 56rb(#).
    Lit. De Rijk1967Pt 1 p. 48.
    non
    descriptio
    generis)
    quod haecdescriptio
    ( = Porphyrii
    Amplius[quaeritur]
    animatasensoligeneriprobatur
    in hunemodum,quia 'substantia
    conveniat
    de pluribus
    differentibus
    sibilis'estpraedicabile
    specieinquid
    quodpraedicatur
    etunivoce,
    deasino,de capra;ergohaecdescriptio
    (] inquitMr)
    quiadehomine,
    nosnominales
    convenit
    ei; ergoestgenus.Sedregulaestsecundum
    quodnullus
    animata
    sermocomplexus
    estgenusvel species;sed constatquod 'substantia
    haec
    sensibilis'
    est sermocomplexus;
    ergonon est genus.Et sibi convenit
    soligeneri.
    nonconvenit
    descriptio,
    ergohaecdescriptio
    Ad hocduplexestoppositio.
    Quidamenimdicunt,et maximereales,quod
    convenit
    omniet soligeneri;dicuntenimquoddefinitio
    (]
    praedicta
    descriptio
    differentia
    estgenusetdefinitio
    Ms)specieiestspecies.
    Mr)generis
    (] differentia
    est genusvel
    Nos autemnominalesdicimusquod nullussermocomplexus
    'tantum',et sic est
    species.Dicimustarnen
    quod addendaesthaecdifferentia
    differentibus
    de pluribus
    ordinanda:
    quod praedicatur
    genusestpraedicabile
    et univoce....
    speciein quidtantum
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 14458,f. 57r(#).
    Lit. De Rijk1967Pt 1 p. 48.

    23 FRAGMENTUMMONACENSE
    Contranominales
    autemcauteexaffirmativa
    coninferendo
    Ms) negativam'
    (] -rens
    traMelidunenses
    autemexvero
    vele converso
    falsum
    inferendo
    quocumquemodo.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm29520(2[unfoliated
    fragment]
    (#).
    Ed. Iwakuma1992.
    Lit. Ebbesen& Iwakuma1983p. 82, Normore
    p. 204,Iwakuma[1992a].
    181

    09:12:08 AM

    24 QUAESTIONESVINDOBONENSES
    <ex quo generesit> illecumquo < sermo
    Et estconsiderandum
    > conseritur
    Ms). Parvipontanis
    (] ParvisPontanis
    Ms) concedentibus
    (] conserunt
    necessarium
    : ... (counter
    quod (] qui Ms) ex quolibet
    (] -rioMs) qui<d>libet
    : ...
    .... ItemAlbricanis
    sunt
    omnia
    (] alb'icisMs) dicentibus
    tempora
    arguments)
    ....
    (counter
    arguments)
    Ms Wien,VPL 2459,f. 108va(#).
    Lit. Iwakuma[1992a]n. 7.
    25 GLOSS "PROMISIMUS" (thelastquarterofthe12thcentury)
    a

    demonstratiua
    Nota quod dialeticisub nominepronomina
    comprehendunt,
    sub
    necsuntpartesorationis;
    relatiuauerodicuntconsignificare,
    participium
    dicunaduerbia
    uelpassionem
    uerbo,quiaactionem
    quesinerespectu
    significat;
    habent
    non
    utbene,maleetsimilia;
    subnomine,
    turponunt
    queuerorespectum
    suntuinculapartium
    etconiunctiones
    dicuntessepartesorationis.
    Prepositiones
    Interiectiones
    orationis.
    ponuntsubnomine
    quasdam,aliasnon.TarnenMonorationis
    nonesse
    demonstratiua
    tanidicunt
    , quiaexdemonstratione
    partes
    pronomina
    non
    deberent
    dicereuerbaprimeetsecunde
    sedhacratione
    persone
    significant,
    habent.
    essepartesorationis,
    quia demonstrationem
    Ms Oxford,Bodl.Libr.,Laud. lat. 67, f. 46va.
    Lit. Hunt1950p. 51 (#), De Rijk1967pp. 255-7,Courtenay
    [1986]pp. 8-9.

    et communis,
    internominadubiigeneris
    Hec autemestdifferentia
    quod illis
    istisuero per copulationem.
    duo sub disiunctione,
    articulara
    preponuntur
    'Esthomo,ergoesthomo
    ad hecargumenta.
    instantias
    Albricaniindesumunt
    'Hie uel hec
    'Hic magister',
    uel asinus'.Fallacia.Declinatur
    ergodeclinatur
    Nichilest:bis deberet
    ponere'declinatur'.
    magister'.
    Bodl.Libr.,Laud. lat. 67, f. 66rb.
    Ms Oxford,
    1987I 298.
    Lit. Hunt1950p. 50 (#), Kneepkens
    nomen
    dicunt
    Hoc contraMeludinenses
    equiuocum.
    qui nullum
    Ms Oxford,
    Bodl.Libr.,Laud. lat. 67, f. 7Ivb.
    Lit. Hunt1950p. 50 (#), De Rijk1967Pt I p. 281.

    POSSUNT COMPLECTI OMNES PERSONAS(Inst.Gr.V 74,p. 186.22)


    et indesupcuiuslibet
    ad dictionem
    id estapplicari
    persone,
    pereuocationem
    ponitexemplain omnicasu.
    nomen
    contra
    estPriscianus
    Notaquodhicmanifeste
    quidicunt
    Por(retanos),
    substanDicuntenimquodcumnomensignificat
    essepersone.
    inapposito
    nullius
    sed
    estalicuiuspersone,
    substantiam
    indequod significat
    tiamcumqualitate,
    remde qua agitur
    ubi supponit
    Undein supposito
    nonindequodqualitatem.
    estalicuiuspersone;in appositoueroubi tantum
    apponitnonest
    qualitatem
    alicuiuspersone.Cum enimdicitur'Ego sum albus', ibi 'albus' tantum
    id estpertinet
    substantiam,
    quodibisignificat
    apponit.Nosdicimus
    qualitatem
    ad substantiam
    substantiam,
    Porre(ta)nidicuntquodnonsignificat
    suppositi.
    facitintelligi.
    necsubstantiam
    eiusintellectus,
    nonclauditur
    i.e. in substantia
    sunthec: cum dico 'Ego sum Socrates'ibi
    M(agistri)propria7
    Argumenta
    ueladiectiuum,
    Estsubstantiuum
    'Socrates'tantum
    ergo
    qualitatem.
    significat
    cumqualitate,
    substantiam
    estnominis
    Itemproprium
    adiectiuum.
    significare
    uel
    cumqualitate,
    substantiam
    sed 'Socrates'ibi nonsignificat
    ergouariatur,

    182

    09:12:08 AM

    de tertia
    dicitquodibieuocatur
    ItemPriscianus
    inui nominis.
    ergononponitur
    et proprie
    esttertie
    ad primam,
    persone,
    ergoibiestprime.Itemcumdicitur
    etnonexinstitutione,
    'Istudestalbum',per'album'qualequidsignifcatur
    ergo
    et cum dicitur'Ego sum homo', 'homo' significat
    quale quid, cum illud
    ex institutione.
    ItemPor(retani)et clericiMagistiPe(tri)He(lie)
    significet
    ibi
    dicuntomnesquodcumdicitur'Ego Socratessumhomo','ego' significat
    sed cumsitproprie
    circaquam Socratesdeterminat
    substantiam
    qualitatem,
    cumin propria
    cumqualitate,
    substantiam
    nomen,uidetur
    quodibi significet
    ibi retineatur
    significatione.
    7 M(agistri)
    corhaud
    dubie
    m(etadd.etexp.
    sicHunt
    , Mslegit
    propria
    dicit)
    propria;
    propria
    est.
    nominis
    ruptio
    proprii
    Ms Oxford,
    Bodl.Libr.,Laud. lat. 67, f. 74vb.
    Lit. Hunt1950pp. 51-52(#).
    e

    etsic
    in-iusessepronomina,
    habentia
    NotaquodPorre(ta)ni
    dicunt
    genetiuum
    et
    declinatione
    Ista'unus' 'solus'et similiadeclinantur
    pronominum
    probant:
    Isteloquitur
    Instantia.
    nisisua, ergoipsa suntpronomina.
    nondeclinatione
    nisisua lingua,ergoestAnglicus.
    et nonloquitur
    Anglice,
    Bodl.
    Ms Oxford,
    Libr.,Laud. lat. 67, f. 75rb.
    Lit. Hunt1950p. 52 (#).

    UNDE QUIDAM8 (Inst. Gr. VI 3, p. 196.21) Donatusquem secuntur


    Porre(ta)ni.
    8 Inst.Gr.VI3,p. 196.21
    : undequidam
    ea (seil,
    reads
    inter
    decepti
    pronomina
    posuerunt
    nullus
    unus,ullus,
    etc).
    Ms Oxford,
    Bodl.Libr.,Laud. lat.67, f. 75vb.
    Lit. Hunt1950p. 52 (#).

    HUMNIIOUES (Inst.Gr.VI39,p. 229.17)idestdii.Notaquodquandocumuel recipitadiectiuum,


    ut 'AliquisSocrates',uel in plurali
    que proprium
    Debet enim
    retinetur9
    ponitur,ut 'Aiaces', non in propriasignificatione
    unumaliquid,quare pluralitatem
    refugit.Ubi autemnon est
    significare
    ibinonestpartitio.
    UtenimdicitPorretanus:
    aliquisetquidamparpluralitas,
    Ubi autemnon
    de pluralitate.
    titiuum
    est,undesemperuultaliquidexcerpere
    estpluralitas,
    neclocumhabet.Quarenonconcedunt
    'Aliquisfenix',necetiam
    est.Ideoque
    ad proprium
    fierirelatio
    quiaetipsumpartitiuum
    per'qui' potest
    dicimusquod 'NullamputoPhillidanosti'(Ovid. Ep. II 105)quod 'Phillida'
    nonretinetur
    in propriasignificatione.
    9 ourreading
    read
    retinentur.
    , MsandHunt
    Ms Oxford,
    Bodl.Libr.,Laud. lat. 67, f. 77ra-b.
    Lit. Hunt1950p. 52 (#).

    Item.Notaquod sententiam
    animivoluntatem
    dicimusdefinitam
    scriptovel
    vocemanifestatam.
    Undesententia
    realiumdicitur.
    sententia
    nominalium,
    Ms Oxford,
    Bodl.Libr.,Laud. lat. 67, f. 46rb(#).

    CENSUALIS (Inst.Gr.VI23,p. 131.10)quodad censumpertinet.


    Secundum
    hancregulam
    dicidebeta 'res''ralis*.Undemagister
    R(adulphus)
    Bel(vacensis)
    deridendo
    eos semperdicebat'hocdicuntli rales(] raletMs)'. Dicimusquod
    'e' estinterpositum
    causaeuphoniae.
    183

    09:12:08 AM

    Ms Oxford,Bodl.Libr.,Laud. lat. 67, f. 63va(#).


    LiberTytan
    Lit. Hunt 1950p. 47; RalphofBeauvais,
    , ed. C.H. Kneepkens,
    Nijmegen1991,p. X.
    26 ANON.PARIS.COM.SOPH. EL. (ca. 1150/ca.1180)
    sit
    exquo genere
    estconsiderare
    veromodusducendiad inopinabile
    Proprius
    etsicinaliis,velcuiusopinionem
    an dialecticus
    an sitgrammaticus
    quidisputt,
    In qualibetenimopinionealiquidestquod aliarumprofessoribus
    profiteatur.
    velutiNominalium
    videtur,
    Ms) opinioquodnullares
    (] opinalium
    inopinabile
    est
    estid in quonullascientia
    homo
    crescit
    , nullus
    (] crescisMs), et quod quilibei
    ad opinione<m> terreri
    dicuntur
    nullaratio. Qui veromagisti
    J10
    intellectus,
    autem/ex
    eumesseregem.Comperto'
    esseasinumsequitur
    quodad Socratem
    verocomest.Respondenti
    eiuspositiointerroganda
    quo generesitrespondens,
    sed
    orationem
    modum
    estutdicatnonaccidere
    interrogantis
    inopinabile
    propter
    pro<pter> positionem.
    10 Qui - dicuntur]
    teneri
    dicuntur
    ad opinionem
    Fortasse
    Qui< dam> veromagisti
    eximpossibili
    utseil,auctorem
    deParvipontanis
    quidlibet
    sequitenentibus
    cogitasse
    scribendum,
    theseos
    eumdeauditoribus
    dicuntur
    scribenti
    dicamus.
    Parvipontanae
    Qui< dam> ... terrcri
    thesim
    dicuntur
    Nominalibus
    Sinvero
    dicendum
    erit.
    scribas,
    Parvipontanam
    Qui... teneri
    cogitasse
    tribues.
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Nat.,lat.4720A,f. 17rb(#).
    Ed. Ebbesen& Iwakuma1990.
    27 ANON., QUAESTIONES'1
    et eo est
    Sanctusaliquoestprocedens
    contraPorretanos:
    Spiritus
    Augustinus
    Sanctuset eodemestDeus.
    Spiritus
    11Thetheological
    ff.232-253,
    are
    lat.1708,
    inMsParis,
    Bibl.Mazarine,
    found
    questions
    Butthisattribution
    isfalse,
    aswasshown
    toPrevostin.
    inthemanuscript
    attributed
    byA.
    14
    in:TheNewScholasticism
    Latitude
    A Study
    Academic
    ofCapuay
    ofPeter
    ofthe
    Landgraf,
    atp. 65andp. 69f.
    (1940),pp.57-74,
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,lat. 1708,f. 252a.
    I - La
    Omnia
    Parisiensis
    Cancelarii
    Lit. G. Lacombe,Prepositini
    (1206-1210)
    Opera
    dePrvostin
    vieetlesoeuvres
    , Kain 1927,p. 55 (#); Courtenay
    [1986]n. 40.
    28 GUIDO OF BAZOCHES, EPISTULAIV (1175/90)
    autdisputantibus
    autspatiantibus,
    PonsautemParvus
    , autpretereuntibus,
    logicis
    est.
    didicatus
    Parisiensis
    Universitatis
    Ed. H. Denifle,O.P., Chartularium
    I, Paris1899,p. 56
    s deBasochis,Stockholm
    Guidoni
    Liber
    1969,p. 14.
    epistularum
    (#); H. Adolfsson,
    29 STEPHAN LANGTON, IN SENT. (1180's)
    I, dist.44, cap. 2
    Secundum
    nominales(] nosMs) quiequid
    Preterea".Secundum
    potest.
    potuit,
    Realesaliter,quibushecdubiaest:quiequidpotuit,potest.
    Ms Napoli,Bibl.Nazionale,VII C 14, f.90va.
    184

    09:12:08 AM

    Ed. A. Landgraf,
    DerSentenzenkommentar
    desKardinals
    , ( = Beitrge
    Stephan
    Langton
    zurGeschichte
    desMittelalters
    i.
    derPhilosophie
    undTheologie
    XXXVII-1), Mnster
    W. 1952,p. 62 (#).
    1943p. 186n. 12.
    Lit. Landgraf
    to BaldwinI p. 13)
    30 PETER THE CHANTER,IN COR.(1170's/97
    according
    vel'infletur'
    alterius,
    tanquamipse
    (1 Cor.4,6) proaltero,id estprodoctrina
    licetillesitNominaiis,illein alterius,
    cum
    meliorsitilio.Nonenimirascor,
    bonuspossitessesicutet ego.
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,lat. 176,f. 178v.
    1943p. 184n. 8 (#).
    Lit. Landgraf
    to BaldwinI p. 13)
    31 PETER THE CHANTER, INJOB.(1170's/97
    according
    nomenChristi,
    remad litteram
    etiametnontantum
    ... decernes
    contemplando
    ut potiussitrealisquamnominalistheologus.
    et humanitatem,
    seddeitatem
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,lat. 178,f. 22v.
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 184n. 8 (#).
    to
    ATUM(1191/92
    32 PETER THE CHANTER, VERBUMABBREVI
    according
    BaldwinII p. 245)
    deberemus
    debentessedomusuniusmorisundeambulare
    Itemscoletheologie
    scissuras
    utinsecularibus
    Cumquidamineisfaciunt
    indomodeicumconsensu.
    litteris,
    philosophia
    cogitur
    quidamreales,quidamnominales.Et sic celestis
    uthabetur
    inboeicio.
    de scissura
    vestium
    suarum
    Baldwin)
    conqueri
    (] conquere
    nilhabetistadomus.
    Sed privati
    Ms VaticanoRegin.lat.106,f.4ra-b;Paris,Bibl.Sainte-Genevive
    250,f.4vb.
    Lit. BaldwinII p. 69 n. 74 (#).
    33 PETER THE CHANTER,SUMMADE SACRAMENTEET ANIMAE CONto BaldwinII p. 245)
    SILIIS (1191/97
    according
    sitpera
    Item.Notaquodquidameoiumdicunt
    quodcumhomoilleassumptus
    suntVerbumet
    scilicet
    nullomodoconnumerabilia
    incarnatum,
    sona,Verbum
    Potesttarnen
    fierisermode homineilioitaquodnonde
    illehomoassumptus.
    nominales
    litteris
    secundum
    Verbo,sicutinsecularibus
    quodsubstanquidicunt
    eniminter
    tiaqueestSocrates
    desinit
    esse.Distingunt
    desinit
    Socrates
    esse,nontarnen
    et substantiam
    etpersonam.
    Nullaconnumeratio
    estinterSocratem
    essentiam
    licetnonloquarde Socrate.
    possumloquide illaessentia,
    que ipseest,tarnen
    Licetenimnon recipiant
    conSed istinon ob hoc uitauerunt
    obiectionem.
    Verbiad hominem
    numerationem
    connumerationem
    illum,tamenrecipiunt
    estduo,sicut
    diuinenaturead hominem
    illum.Vndeconcedunt
    quodChristus
    scilicet
    homoilleassumptus
    etdiuinanatura.Etitasecundum
    eos,ista
    priores,
    duopredicabilia,
    homoassumptus,
    diuinanatura,ponuntur
    de eodem,scilicet
    de Christo;neutrum
    tamende alio,quia necdiuinanaturaestillehomo,nec
    e conuerso.
    eos utraqueistarum
    Item.Secundum
    a
    estuera: 'Istehomoestassumptus
    a Verbo',quia si demonstretur
    Verbo','Istehomononestassumptus
    persona,
    185

    09:12:08 AM

    istehomo,istehomoest
    a Verbo.Si demonstretur
    istehomononestassumptus
    debent
    concedere
    a Verbo.Eademratione,
    istas;'Iesusestassumptus
    assumptus
    a Verbo',uthincsupponatur
    a Verbo','Iesusnonestassumptus
    homo,illinc
    Immodebent
    hancconcedere:
    'Iesusassumpsit
    Iesum'.Quodinconuepersona.
    in hocnomine
    niensest,cumnonsitequiuocatio
    Iesus,eo quodnonhabetnisi
    Si autemdicatur
    inhocnomine
    Iesusesseuniuocationem,
    unaminstitutionem.
    estquod proprium
    nomenfaciat
    hocinauditum
    id estuariamsuppositionem,
    uniuocationem.
    Preterea.
    Si concedunt
    istam:'Diuinanaturaetistehomosunt',debentconcederequod illehomocongrueet uerepotestdicere:'Ego et diuinanatura
    sumus'.Quod si est,ergoillehomoestalia personaa diuinanatura.
    Ed. Dugauquier1967,pp. 480-481(#).
    1991ap. 20 + 41.
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943pp. 189-90,Courtenay
    b

    cumhocnomenaliquidrectesitsuperius
    ad hocnomen
    Mirumesttarnen
    esthomoquinonestPater',ethecfalsa:
    homo,quomodohecsituera:'Christus
    'Christusest aliquidquod non est Pater',ut hoc nomen'aliquid' habeat
    eamdemsuppositionem
    quam habuithoc nomen'homo'. Quare nonpotest
    habere?Fortenonestrectesuperius
    hocnomen'aliquid'ad hocnomenhomo,
    sicutdicuntnominales.Vndesecundum
    eos,Socratesesthomoqui ipseerit,
    nontarnen
    estaliquidquod ipseerit.
    Ed. Dugauquier1967p. 493 (#), butwithslightly
    changedpunctuation.
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 190.

    Si dicaturquod modo,cumsit tantumpena,est a diabolo;ergoaliquod


    bonumesta diabolo,quiaomnispena,saltemineo quodpena,bonaestetiusta
    Gilebertini
    dicerequodoriginale
    inreiueritate
    non
    est,quiasolebant
    peccatum
    est peccatum,sed quedamobnoxietas
    siue conditiopriuandiuisioneDei.
    Iudicaturtamenpeccatumquia idemfacitquod peccatum,
    priuatsciliceta
    militis
    uisioneDei. Sicutetiamidemfacitdelictum
    serui,quia
    quod seruitas
    a mensaDominisui,sedmilespropter
    seruusnon
    peccatum,
    uterquepriuatur
    conditionem.
    peccatum
    aliquod,sed propter
    propter
    Ed. Dugauquier1967pp. 552-553(#).
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 39 + 75.

    34 ANON., QUAESTIONES
    ex partepredicamenti
    Dicuntad hocGilebertini
    tantum,
    quodunitasnotatur
    sunt
    et estsensus:'Pateret FiliussuntunusDeus', id estuniusdivinitatis,
    simul
    etnominaque attribuuntur
    unum,id estuniusessentie
    pluribus
    personis
    nonpredicant
    aliquidquodsitDeus,necsupponunt
    aliquidvelproaliquoquod
    sunttalianomina,utsupraostensum
    sitDeus,sedresoluenda
    est,etdicuntse
    inuenissein Hilarioquod nichilunicumest Deus. De nulloenimunicoet
    secundum
    eos,potestdici,hocestDeus.
    singulari,
    Bibl.
    Ms Paris,
    Nat.,lat. 3477,f. 2rb& f. 113va.
    Lit. Dugauquier1961p. 317 n. 101(#), Courtenay
    [1986]n. 75.
    35 HUMBERTOS DE BALESMA,SERMO(1192/93)
    Deo generare
    Ex hocsacroconiugio
    utranis
    bonorum
    valeamus,
    operumfilios
    lutoEgypti
    corvisdialectice
    relictis,
    supercadaverade pedesocratico
    logicalibus
    186

    09:12:08 AM

    Dei Patrisassumatur(!),
    crocitan
    tibusdimissis,
    nosex hac molaad dexteram
    nominalesvelnominaliter
    utsimustheologi
    reaies,nonneutraliter
    satagentes
    ut de caritateprius ordinatain nobis perplexisscripturarum
    neutrales,
    argentosponse Christi,scilicet
    dogmatibus<murenulas> vermiculatas
    nostreDeum per fanEcclesiefaciamus,
    caventesne in lectulovoluptatis
    tasticarum
    scientiarum
    noctescumphilosophis
    prophanis
    queratis,sed bonis
    civitatem
    Dei, ipsum
    operibusvigilescum vigilibussanctisqui custodiunt
    utlectulisacreScripture
    utinveniatis,
    nosvitaetdoctrina
    laborantes,
    queratis,
    existentes,
    ligna cedrinaauditorumvobis compaginanpossitislaqueara
    non ad questumvel gloriam
    ut verbumDei sincerepredicando,
    cipressina,
    veriSalomonis
    de LXtareginis
    secularem,
    sitis,nonde LXXXtaconcubinis,
    ne patrimonium
    in seculipompiset nugis
    caventes
    crucifixi
    vobiscommissum
    inutiliter
    sed visceraChristireficiendo,
    eius tegendo,
    nuditatem
    consumatis,
    illudpauperibus
    utillos,nondivites
    vobiscum
    commensales
    habeatis,
    erogetis,
    nec quisquilias
    vestrasporeisrelinquendas,
    vel secundivel terciipaismicas
    utsecundum
    lectionem
    lectamin
    pauperibus
    quasicanibusimmundis
    proiciatis,
    si vultisesseChristiani,
    nontantum
    Christo,
    nominales,
    quodparumvalet,sed
    etiamsemperreales,in vobissemper
    legatis.
    Ed. M.T. D'Alverny,
    Humbertus
    deBalesma,
    in:AHDL 1984,pp. 127-191,
    atpp.
    178-179(#).
    Lit. D'Alverny
    op.cit.,p. 128& 157.
    "
    36 HUMBERTUS, SUMMA" COLLIGITEFRAGMENTA
    accord(1194/1200
    ingto Heinzmann)
    a
    Circa artculos
    eiusdemet diversihaec primoproponitur
    /5va/quaestio:
    utrum
    idemsitdeoesseessentiam
    .... Conquodessepersonam.
    Quodprobatur
    tra....
    Solutio.Superha<n>c quaestionem
    fuitopinio.Quidamenim,ut
    triplex
    PetrusLongobardus
    etsequaceseius,dixerunt
    hocnomen'personam'
    magister
    esseessentiale;
    Robertus,
    quidam,utmagister
    personale;
    quidamvero,utPorretanimixtim,
    i.e. partim
    et /5vb/
    essentiale.
    personale
    partim
    Primidixerunt
    .... Secundidicunt.... Tertiidicunthocnomen'personam'
    essentiam
    etnihilominus
    distinctionem.
    Ethoc
    significare
    significare
    personalem
    secundum
    nominis
    Diciturenimpersonaquasi perse una vel
    etymologiam.
    unumutunumfaciat
    inessentiam
    etindistinctionem
    utsitsensus:
    personarum,
    istisuntpersonae,
    i.e. suntdistincti
    etunum;paterperse estpersona,
    i.e. per
    se distinctus
    etunum.Cumergodicitin plurali'istisuntpersonae',potiushoc
    nomen'persona'redundat
    inconsignificationem
    quaminprinciplem
    significationem.
    Concedunt
    secundum
    ergoquodhocnomen'persona'essentiale
    prinet personale
    secundum
    ciplemsignificationem
    consignificationem.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 28799,f. 5rb-vb
    (#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    b

    Et sumitur
    haec solutioex auetoritate
    Priscianidicentisquod omnenomen
    substantiam
    et qualitatem,sed aliud pro substantia,
    aliud pro
    significai
    subiectum
    qualitate,utputahoc nomen'albus' pro substantiasignificat
    utei concretam;
    ethocnomen'homo'pro
    albedinis,
    proqualitate
    albedinem(P)
    substantia
    hocetiamnomen'albedo',ut
    hominem,
    humanitatem;
    proqualitate
    placetPorretanis,pro substantia
    ipsamalbedinem,
    significat
    pro qualitate
    albendieffectum
    qui forte'albities'fictonominepotestvocari.Et ipsihuic
    inhaerentes
    in tantum
    extenderunt
    regulaenimispertinaciter
    eam,utdicerent
    187

    09:12:08 AM

    hoc nomen'deus' aliudprosubstantia


    et aliudproqualitatesignificare,
    stainter deum et deitatemsicut inter hominemet
    tuentesdifferentiam
    humanitatem.
    est....
    Quod falsum
    Ms Mnchen,Clm 28799,f. 13va(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    i.e. circapraedestinationis
    effecactionis,
    Sequiturviderecircapraedicatum
    tum:utrumseil,solapraedestinatio
    sitcausavitaeaeternaean etiammerita.
    ex auctoritate
    .... /33rb/
    Contra.Dicitauctoritas
    ....
    Quod sola haberetur
    Solutio.Propterhaec et alia dixerunt
    Porretanimeritanostranon esse
    causamsedviamvitaeaeternae,
    etquodnonpropter
    merita
    necex meritis
    sed
    meritadaturnobisvitaaeterna.Potesttamen....
    propter
    Ms Mnchen,Clm 28799,f. 33ra-b(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    de numeralibus,
    Secundoqueritur
    seil,an pluralitas
    sitdicenda
    personarum
    et an numerus
    et an sitibi ternarius.
    pluralitas
    auctoritate /42vb/Vel siccontraPorretanos,
    Quod probatur
    multiplici
    adessedeo et noninesse
    Contra
    /43ra/
    qui dicuntternarium
    hicopiniones.
    Solutio.Tresfuerunt
    'duo'
    Quidamenimneganthisvocabulis
    'tres''plures'ethuiusmodi
    .... Secundiettertii
    dixerunt
    significan
    pluralitatem
    his nominibuspluralitatem
    et huiusmodi,
    sed differenter,
    significan
    quia
    ternarium
    sui generissignifican,
    secundi,i.e. Porretani,dixerunt
    illumque
    adesseetnoninessepersonis,
    necesseillastrespersonas,
    similiter
    etinaliis.Tertiivero.... Ultimamveroopinionem
    ....
    videtur,
    quia potioret probabilior
    /43rb/Videturtamenet supradictae
    opinionesposse salvari.Quod enim
    - qui dixerunt
    dixit( = primaopinio),.... Similiter
    Petrus
    Porretani
    magister
    huiusmodi
    vocabulis
    numerum
    nonsignificari,
    etnon
    quiquidemadestpersonis
    inestnecestdeus- nonmultum
    a veroexorbitasse
    videntur
    Ms Mnchen,Clm 28799,ff.42va-43rb
    (#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.

    Porretani
    enimquasiinfinitas
    intrinitate
    introducunt
    proprietates,
    quasdicunt
    adesseetnoninesse,et [et]ideoalia proprietate
    dicuntillaspersonas
    ( = pater
    et filius)esseprincipium
    sancti.
    spiritus
    Ms Mnchen,Clm28799,f. 51rb(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.

    nonesseperQuidamvero,ut Porretani,dixerunt
    personarum
    proprietates
    etquasisinenumero
    intrinitate
    nam(] non
    sonas,multas
    fingentes
    proprietates,
    triaformarum
    seu proprietatum
    Ms) distinguunt
    genera,dicentes
    quod formarum
    aliaesuntsubsistentiae,
    aliaeinsistentiae,
    aliaeassistentiae;
    subsistentiae
    sunt proprietates
    substantiales
    ut
    praedicamenti
    quibus res subsistunt,
    animalitaset lapiditaset huiusmodi;insistentiae
    sunt formaeduorum
    seil,quantitates
    etqualitates,
    insunt
    quae itasubiecto
    praedicamentorum,
    quod
    secundum
    se afficiunt,
    et immutant;
    assistentiae
    dicuntur
    aliorum
    disponunt
    omnium
    etnoninsunt
    formae,
    praedicamentorum
    quaequidemassuntsubiectis
    sed quodammodo
    sed quodammodo
    secundum
    Boethium
    affixae
    extrinsecus,
    esse videntur,
    nec suntverinominisproprietas.
    Et iuxtahuncmodumin
    et
    subsistentiam
    seil.i.e. essentiam,
    theologicis
    quasiduplexgenusassignant,
    - , negantes
    assistentiam
    ut (] velMs) paternitatem
    et aliasproprietates
    proesse personas,et forteconcederent
    aeternam
    et temprietates
    paternitatem
    poralemunivocedici.

    188

    09:12:08 AM

    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 28799,f. 54ra(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    g

    Dicuntenimquidamhaec(] hcMs) nomina,seil,'pater'et 'filius',significare


    etappellare
    cumproprietate;
    alii,
    personas
    quidamveroproprietates
    personas;
    ut Porretani,quasi idemdicuntsed distinctius,
    dicentesquod haecnomina
    'pater'et'filius'prosubstantia
    personas,
    significant
    proqualitate
    proprietates.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 28799,f. 56vb(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    Itemcircaeundemarticulum
    essepatremsit
    potestquaerian paternitatem
    articulusfidei.Quod videturposse probari,quia universalis
    ecclesiahoc
    < n> turut Porretani,nihilominus
    qui' a /etsialiqui[d]dissentia
    dogmatizai,
    estuniversalis
    /59vb/
    hocconcedere,
    et itaer<r>ant Porretani.
    Solutio.Forteprimafalsa,quia praeter
    Porretanos
    multidixerunt
    nonesse
    et itanegaverunt
    essepatrem
    ' proprietates
    /inpersonis,
    paternitatem
    Si veroquaeritur
    maiuspeccatum
    sit,seil,an negarepaterquod illorum
    nitatem
    si ipsaestpater,an asserere
    essepatrem
    si ipsanon
    ipsamessepatrem
    estpater,potestresponden
    .... Itemuna solaestpaternitas
    patris,quia dicere
    et
    esset;sedde ea Porretanus
    quodpluresabsurdum
    negatipsamessepatrem,
    aliiconcedunt
    Solutio Oppositio Nonenim
    ipsamessepatrem;
    de eadempaternitate
    velproprietate
    de paterloquu<n>tur, sed Porretanus
    nitte
    etaliidepaternitate
    nectamenminus
    respectus,
    quaeesttantum
    persona,
    estuna solapaternitas
    patris.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 28799,f. 59va-b(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    Itempositoquodvirexlongotempore
    sanctissimus
    libidinis
    furore
    labatur
    in
    amoreminiquitatis
    vel
    fornicationem,
    numquiddiceturquod istepraeponat
    meretricis
    dilectioni
    dei
    Solutio.Ad hocdistinguebant
    Porretaniintercaritatem
    finalem
    et ferialem,
    earndicentes
    finalem
    subitaneas
    quae nonextinguitur
    perhuiusmodi
    passiones,
    velirae,et negantes
    libidinis
    illaessemortalia,
    i.e. mortedigna.
    putafurorem
    Latetenim,utaiunt,inradicecaritatis
    ad fructum
    quamv<i>s nonextenditur
    exteriorem.
    Ferialemearndicuntquae temporalis
    estradiemnonhabenset
    Etitasecundum
    deficit.
    eoscaritasestsimulcumhisquae
    tempore
    temptationis
    mortalia
    iudicantur.
    Si autemeis opponatur
    dicuntquod iliadicta
    auctoritas,
    suntmortalia
    invirotamen
    'in suinaturaeo quodsaepead mortem
    perducunt,
    non/.
    perfecto
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 28799,f. 106va(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    Porretanorum
    infundatur
    (] porretanori
    Ms) estopinioquodnullagratiavirtus
    veroomnium
    puero;aliorum
    quodeademprimagratiaquae daturadultodatur
    etpuero.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 28799,f. 152va(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    Circaformarum
    causamquaeritur
    de virtute
    an se ipsavel
    quo ipsasitvirtus
    ..
    alio,et si alioquo. .../154vb/.
    Solutio.Hoc videntur
    concedere
    adeostricte
    utetiamin trinitate
    Porretani,
    voluerint
    illudservare,seil,cumdicitur'deus est deitatedeus' aliud notet
    et aliudnominativus,
    ablativus
    undeetiamdixerunt
    deitatem
    nonessedeum,
    quodesterroneum.
    189

    09:12:08 AM

    Clm 28799,f. 154va-b(#).


    Ms Mnchen,
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    1

    et alia
    Solutio.Duae sunthic opiniones;una specialisPorretanorum,
    generalisomniumaliorum.Porret(an)ibene conceduntvirtutes/156vb/
    naturales
    esseetiamin pueronondum(] nundum
    dicentes
    eas
    Ms) baptizato,
    virtute
    fitpoliticaet
    dona.Et dicuntquodde naturali
    essequaedamnaturalia
    notandum
    de politicafitcatholica.Quod ut pleniusintelligatur,
    quod virtus
    dicitur:naturalis,politica,et catholica.Virtusnaturalisest vis
    tripliciter
    rebusa naturaet cumnaturasimulinsita,etdicitur
    virtus
    quaedamnaturalis
    virtus
    etestverenaturalis;
    esthabitus
    mentis
    bene
    nitens,
    politica
    quasiviribus
    virtus
    estgratiaquamoperatur
    deusin hominesine
    etc;catholica
    const(itutae)
    et fineset opera
    homine,
    qua nemopotestmaleuti.Et hae quidemperofficia
    estsimilia
    desimilibus
    virtutis
    naturalis
    suntdiscretae.
    Officium
    facere;
    specialia
    moreset
    virtutis
    civilisestcongruus< actus> ' personae
    officium
    /secundum
    velsua,quae duplexest,
    sedviseiusestutilitas
    reip(ublicae),
    institta
    gentis,
    estcongruus
    actusChristiani
    autemcatholicae
    et honor;officium
    seil,utilitas
    Christi
    etecclesiae.Finiseiusestsummum
    moresetinstitta
    secundum
    bonum,
    estillaluctaquamdescribit
    virtutis
    dicens
    i.e. deus.Opus naturalis
    apostolus
    etc.(Rom.7.14)" etibi"Spiritus
    venundatus
    concupisci
    "Ego autemcarnalis
    enimvirtus
    carnemetc.(Gal.5.17)". Naturalis
    adversus
    quae in quolibetest,
    rationis
    quaenecinCainpotu<i>t extingui,
    quae,utputo,
    ipsaestillascintilla
    contravitium
    a quibusdamsuperior
    vocatur,quae suppeditata
    parsrationis
    "Veliemihiadiacet,
    naturaliter
    cuiusestilludveliede quo apostolus
    reluctatur,
    autemnoninvenio(Rom.7.18)". Opera veropoliticaesuntopera
    perficere
    et huiusmodi.
    civilia,ut Romanorum
    Opera
    prudentiae,
    opera,seil,iustitiae,
    Et notaquodcumdicitur
    suntmerita
    catholicae
    vitae,seil,operaecclesiastica.
    ut referatur
    ad disposiet finemfaciunt
    sane intelligatur
    'officium
    virtutes',
    civilefacitde naturalivirtute
    ut sit sensus:officium
    tionemipsiusvirtutis,
    estad taleofficium,
    virtutis
    i.e. dispositio
    qua (] quo Ms) disposita
    politicam,
    de catholica.
    Etprimaquidem
    similiter
    naturalem
    essepoliticam;
    facitvirtutem
    secundanaturale,
    i.e. ex
    i.e. a naturaetcumnaturainsitum;
    dicitur
    naturale,
    seil,naturae
    tertia
    dicitur
    exmotibus,
    naturam
    naturaetsecundum
    proveniens;
    velnaturale
    estei
    i.e. naturaeconsentaneum
    homini,
    naturale,
    quia naturale
    De primafitsecunda,de secundafittertia.Itemprima
    talemhabereformam.
    tertiaest tantum
    /157ra/
    secundaesttantumofficialis,
    est tantumnaturalis,
    hominis
    desursum
    veniens.Nec
    et praeoperatione
    seil,sineartificio
    gratuita,
    melius' istapossunt
    /intelligi
    quam persimilitudinem
    quattuor
    supradictam
    eorundem.Exempli
    et naturalium
    membrorum
    proprietatum
    principalium
    et
    unumhabensnaturales
    membris
    causa: Cor estde quattuorprincipalibus
    ad
    exquibusdisponitur
    formas
    substantiales
    quaeadesseetabessenonpossunt,
    etcerebrum
    ethuiusmodi.
    Similiter
    animositatis
    etad officium
    sanitatis
    statum
    in corpore,
    hoc(] haecMs) est
    et reliqua.Quod ergoestmembrum
    principale
    forma
    hoc
    in anima;et quodestnaturalis
    visseupotentia
    membri,
    principalis
    invi. Etsicutaliquandoinnaturales
    naturalis
    estvirtus
    supervenientes
    qualitates
    et naturalesproprietates
    membroipsumaegrumefficiunt
    quoddammodo
    et forvimanimaecorruptam
    itavitiasupervenientia
    et opprimunt,
    superant
    ut vixeiusscintilla
    i.e. virtutem,
    mamnaturalem,
    extinguunt
    quoddammodo
    aliforma
    Haecautemprimanaturalis
    luctetur.
    morbum
    remaneat,
    quaecontra
    et
    in politicam
    formatur
    actualiter
    vitiispraevalens,
    quando quodammodo
    utdictumest.Sic qualitercumque
    opinio
    potestintelligi
    politicain catholicam,
    Porretanorum
    quodnemopotest
    Ms),etexquo sensudixerint
    (] porretinorum
    velramorum.
    rationeseil,radieiset nontrunci
    amittere
    caritatem,

    190

    09:12:08 AM

    estquodnullavirtus
    estnaturalis
    nisiforte
    Aliorum
    sententia
    dicatur
    generalis
    Istaeopinionessubtiliter
    in
    i.e. naturaeconsentanea.
    naturalis,
    perscrutanti
    nullovelin modicosibicontradicunt
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 28799,ff.156va-157ra
    (#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    etquodDavidhabuerit
    m Porretani
    dicuntquodcaritaspotestessecummortali,
    et homicidio;
    sedhocdicuntratione
    cumadulterio
    caritatem
    stipitis,
    quoniam
    habuiteamin radice,nonin foliis.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 28799,f. 181ra(#).
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.
    n

    a verbo,an
    Circaarticulum
    causaematerialis
    quaeritur
    quidsitassumptum
    ....
    /204vb/
    aliquishomovelnon
    lili de monteconcesserunt
    Solutio.Duae sunthicopiniones.
    quodquidam
    a verbo,nontamenpriusfuitquamassumptus,
    homoad litteram
    fuitassumptus
    etubireperitur
    inauctoritate
    ete converso.
    Aliinegaverunt;
    quodquidamhomo
    ibi nominehominis
    sitassumptus,
    humananatura,seil,animaet
    intelligitur
    In verbisergoconconsistere
    caro,etexillisduobusnegant
    aliquemhominem.
    sonabant
    Namutrique
    auctores
    sedinsensudissonant.
    conutriusque
    opinionis,
    fuisseassumptum
    a verbo,sed Montaninominehominis
    cedunthominem
    hominem
    excarneetanimasubsistentem,
    sedaliinomine
    quemdam
    intelligunt
    hominis
    etnonaliquemveri
    humanam
    tantum
    natura,seil,animametcarnem,
    hominem.
    Prioriopinioniconsentimus.
    nominis
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm28799,f. 204va-b.
    Lit. Heinzmann
    p. 14.

    V
    37 DIALECTICAMONACENSIS
    estquodestcontra
    omnium
    utmatrem
    nondiligere,
    vel
    Inopinabile
    opinionem
    utsolemesseoctiesmaiorem
    utsi
    terra,veleiuscumquo disputatur,
    plurium,
    sitnominaliset probetur
    ei quodaliquid
    crescit.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 14763,f. 108va.
    Ed. De Rijk1967Pt 1 p. 558 (#).
    Lit. Normore
    p. 205 n. 14.
    38 JOCELIN OF BRAKELOND,CRONICA(ca. 1200)
    nactaoportunitate,
    astansei a secretis
    dixi:'Duo sunt
    Egouerohocattendens,
    miror
    de uobis;'etcumquesisset
    que multum
    que duo: 'Unumest,quodadhuc
    intalistatufouetis
    sententiam
    Meludinensium
    dicentium
    exfalsonichil
    , et
    sequi
    ceterafriuola.'Quibuscumipserespondisset
    quoduoluit,adieciego: ...
    Ed. H.E. Butler,
    TheChronicle
    Londonetc.1949,pp.35-36
    ofJocelin
    ofBrakelond,
    COLit. Salisbury,
    Metalog.
    p. 78 n. 12,De Rijk1967Pt 1 p. 282.
    39 ALEXANDERNEQUAM,DE NATURISRERUM(1187/1204,
    to
    according
    Hunt1984p. 26)
    a Secundum
    doctrinam
    autemnominalium
    consimilis
    oritur
    objectioin hister191

    09:12:08 AM

    aliusestcomplexus,
    aliusincomplexus.
    Sic enimdividitur
    minis.Sermonm
    in sermones
    sermoincomplexus
    incomplexos.
    Ed. Th. Wright,
    RollsSeries
    34, London1863,p. 298(#).
    o mores,o studia,o inquisitiones!
    DocuereParisius.... Docuere
    O tempora,
    vel praemissorum,
    esse habitudinem
    ad illatum,
    licet
    argumentum
    praemissi,
    essedictum
    condi
    quorumfuitunusEthion,dicantargumentum
    Parvipontani,
    ab argumentatione.
    tionalis
    transfrmatele
    Ed. Th. Wright
    pp. 302/307
    (#).
    Lit. Lewry1983p. 11.

    40 ALEXANDER NEQUAM, SPECULUM SPECULATIONUM{ante1213


    to Hunt1984,p. 125;post1201Thompson
    1988p. 57)
    according
    a Sed utinsipientem
    et uirprudens
    sibi,queroa tequi catholicus
    es,
    relinquam
    utrum
    hocnomine'Deus'
    qui dicitincordesuo'NonestDeus' utatur
    insipiens
    in iliointellectu
    quo tu uteris,aut non.Si in iliointellectu,
    numquidpotest
    summum
    essenonesse?Si inaliointellectu
    utitur
    hocnomine'Deus'
    intelligere
    Deumnonesse,sedquoddamfigmentum
    quodintelligat
    quamnos,nonuidetur
    de Deo. In logicisquidem
    animinonesse.Vndeetiamuidetur
    quodnoncogitet
    dicerem
    nominalem
    nonopinari
    genusessenomen.Nonenimmagispossetquis
    rerum
    similitudinem
    diuersarum
    essenomen,
    opinarisubstantialem
    specierum
    esseasinum Licetquideminsipienti
    uideatur
    alicuiquod
    quamhominem
    hecsituera,'Deus nonest',nonob hocdaboquodintelligat
    Deumnonesse,
    sicutnominalis
    putathancesseueram,'Genusestnomen',sednonputatgenus
    essenomen.
    MediiAeviXI, Oxford1988,p. 57(#).
    Ed. Thompson,
    Britannici
    R.M., Auctores
    b Soletautemin logicisqueriutrumessePetrumsitessequem,et utrumesse
    Petrum
    sitessequid.Quibusdatis,infer
    ergo'Essequemestessequid'uelecontrario.Multisuntetpresertim
    iudicant
    de
    nominales,
    quieodemmodoprorsus
    diuine.Dicuntergo
    create,quo etde suppositione
    suppositione
    persone
    persone
    estessequemetnonessequid.Vndeetad hanc,'Quis curquodessePetrum
    'Petrus'.Ad hancautem,'Quid currit?',
    dicunt
    rit?',dicuntrespondendum
    'Substantia'.Vt enim aiunt, 'Petruscresci,non tamen
    respondendum
    'Substantia
    cresci.Sed nonnecrementum
    quodestin Petroestinsubstantia?
    Nonnehomospeciesest huiusgeneris'substantia'?
    Nonneesse Petrumest
    inferius
    ad esse substantiam?
    Nos uerodicimusquod hoc nomen'Petrus'
    undeessePetrum
    nonestessequemsedestessequid.
    quasiconcretiue,
    significat
    Ed. Thompson
    pp. 123-124(#).
    41 ALEXANDERNEQUAM, DE LAUDIBUSDIVINAE SAPIENTIAE(ca. 1213
    to Hunt1984p. 125)
    according
    Lincolniasinecolumna,
    a
    Lindisiae
    colutnen
    felixgente,repletabonis,
    Munifica,
    si te tuusillemagister
    Par tibinullaforet,
    adhucmoribus
    Informaret
    atquefide.
    sedmonsstabilisfideique
    columna,
    Montanus,12
    840
    Cui se coelestis
    paginatotadedit.
    192

    09:12:08 AM

    Montanus,meritis,
    honesti,
    pius,et servator
    fuit.
    dignafavore
    Veraquesimplicitas
    cathedram
    huicprimam
    secundam
    Contulit
    Genovefa,
    honos.
    Matervirgo,sacraevirginitatis
    Transiit
    ad montem
    Montanus,monterelicto;
    En montana
    Syonet loca celsatenet.
    sitsignumseu testisamoris;
    Haecdigressio
    lauseritistaminor.
    Condignafateor
    12Usually
    as a reference
    toWilliam
    deMonte.
    interpreted
    RollsSeries
    Ed. Th. Wright,
    34, p. 460 (#).
    Lit. De Rijk1967Pt 1 p. 442.
    Vix aliquislocusestdictamihinotiorurbe,
    parvacolumnafui.
    Qua ModiciPontis
    Hic artesdidicidocuiquefdeliter,
    inde
    Accessit
    studiolectiosacrameo.
    Ed. Th. Wright
    p. 503 (#).
    Lit. Hunt1984p. 5.

    333

    42 GILES OF CORBEIL, VIATICUS(ca. 1200)


    manarefluenta
    .... cessent
    2346
    13, Parvipontana
    adamantis
    columna
    fontis
    submissim
    deponatonus....
    13sicinoneofthetwoms,adaratici
    intheother,
    Adamatici
    conj.Rose.
    Viaticus
    designis
    etsymptomatibus
    Ed. V. Rose,EgidiiCorboliensis
    , Lipaegritudinum
    sae 1907,p. 97 (#).
    Lit. Lewry1983p. 11,Minio-Paluello
    1954p. 165.
    43 ANON.,SOPHISMATA
    GRAMMA
    TICALIA (late12thor early13thcentury)
    estressecundum
    . 14
    Genus
    quodrealesdicunt
    14'Genus
    - dicunt'
    isthesophismatic
    Thediscussion
    concerns
    itssyntax
    and
    proposition.
    notthedogmatic
    content.
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Nat.,lat. 3454,f. 45vb(#).
    44 PETER OF CAPUA,SUMMA(1201/2)
    a

    auteman Deus sciataliquidquodpriusnonscivit.


    Quaeritur
    quia seitmeesse,quodnonsemperscivit.
    Quod videtur,
    Solutio:Realisconcedit
    fuit
    quodsicut'meesse'estverumetnonsemper
    itaipsumseitmodoDeusetnonsemper
    necideoestscientior
    illudscivit,
    verum,
    sicutistevidetaliquidquod priusnonvidit,non tarnen
    habet
    quam fuerit;
    maiorem
    visum.Nominaiisdicitquodsicut'meesse'semper
    fuitverum,
    itaet
    Deus semper
    scivitillud;hocenima principio
    mundisigniflcabatur15
    hacpro'Petruserittune',ettuncDeus scivitsignificatum
    huiuspropositionis
    positione
    'Petruserit',16
    et ideoscivitmeesse.Secundum
    hosnihilseitquodab aeterno
    nonseiverit.
    CumDeus possitaliquidscirequod modononseit,quaeritur
    utrumpossit
    ineipere
    aliquidscire.
    193

    09:12:08 AM

    Solutio:Realisdicitquodsicutaliquidpotestincipere
    esseverum,itaDeus
    scireillud.Nominalisdicitquodsicutaliquidpotest
    esseverum
    potestincipere
    esseverum,ita Deus potest
    quodnonestverum,nonpotesttarnen17
    incipere
    scirealiquidquodnonseit,nontarnen
    scireillud;sicutistequi
    potestincipere
    nonestpraedestinatus
    essepraedestinatus,
    nontamenpotest
    esse
    potest
    incipere
    praedestinatus.
    15significabatur]
    si potest
    Similiter
    quaeritur
    praescire
    aliquid
    quodnonpraesciverit.
    dealiquodiscrete,
    verum
    ali/Si divisim
    'Responsio.
    est,i.e.potest
    intelligitur
    praescire
    sedhocnonconvenit
    Deo,se.praescire
    quid,etilludnonpraescivit,
    aliquid
    quodnon
    Add
    . VI.
    praesciverit
    16Petrus
    eritV2y
    DeuseritM a.c.,om.VIetM p.c.
    17nonpotest
    tamen
    'tamen/
    tamen
    V2.
    , necpotest
    Vl>necpotest
    M,necpotest
    scripsimus
    =
    =
    M
    f.
    #
    VI
    Vat.
    Clm
    14508
    7vB-8rA
    Ms
    Mnchen,
    Vaticano, lat.4296f.
    ( );
    7vB(#); V2-V at. lat. 4304:f. 7vA-B(#). The apparatus
    omitssomeminor
    variants.
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 185.
    in personis
    Quidamdicunt,ut Porretani,quod huiusmodi
    proprietates
    quidemsunt,sed nonsuntipsaepersonae;sedsuntproprietates
    personarum
    in essentiaveronec ipsaesuntnec suntipsa
    quasi adiacentes
    ipsispersonis,
    essentia.
    Ms Mnchen,Clm 14508f. 14vA(#).
    Itemgeneraetspeciessuntrerum
    naturae;ergosunta Deo. Ponoergoquod
    nullaactiositbona,nihilominus
    verumestquodhocgenus'actio'est,etipsum
    esta Deo, ergoaliquodeiusindividuum
    esta Deo.
    Haec oppositio
    nonestcontra
    nosNominales,
    Responsio.
    quiadicimus
    genera
    essenomina
    etspecies
    a Deo sunt.
    , nominaautemomniaet eorumimpositiones
    Reales18auteminstantargumento:
    Haec species'homo' 'est/ secunda
    estsecundasubstantia;
    immoprima,19
    substantia,
    ergoaliquodeiusindividuum
    secundo
    circailluddaturintelligi
    haec
    quiaprimooccurrit
    quodestindividuum,
    species'homo'vel <hoc genus> 'animal'.
    Instantia:Hoc genus 'dare elimosynam'
    est a Deo, ergo aliquodeius
    individuum.
    Quod estfalsum
    positoquodomnisfaciatcausainanisgloriae.
    18Realesetquaesequuntur
    adinanis
    insoloVIinvenimus,
    om.M etV2.
    usque
    gloriae
    19prima
    VI.
    scripsimus,
    primo
    Ms M= Mnchen,Clm 14508f. 26vB(#); K/= Vaticano,Vat. lat. 4296f.
    26rB(#); V2= Vat. lat. 4304:f. 26rB(#).
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 189.
    rationalem
    individuae
    Item,iste Iudaeus creditDeum esse substantiam
    nonpotest
    naturae,
    ergopersonam.
    Quia haecestdescriptio
    personae,
    aliquem
    formare
    intellectum
    circaremrationalem
    quinintelligat
    ipsamessepersonam.
    In Iohanneetiamdicitur
    "Est Paterquemvosdicitis,
    est
    quia Deus vester20
    etc." (Ioh.8.54); ergode Patrecredunt
    ipsumesseDeum,et sciuntquodnon
    potestpateressequin filiussit,ergohabentfidemde Filio;sic et de Spiritu
    et Unitatem.
    Trinitatem
    Sancto,et itacredunt
    si Iudaeuscredit
    Deumessepersonam,
    inhoccredit
    nec21
    Praeterea,
    falsum;
    estillapersona,
    sicetFiliusetSpiritus
    ergoDeusestillapersona.Patersimiliter
    Sanctussuntunapersona,
    etitatresperSanctus;ergoPateretFiliusetSpiritus
    sonaesuntuna persona.
    de
    Responsio.Catholicusdicitquod hoc nomen'persona'aliterdicitur22
    etpraedicta
    dataestde hocnomine'peraliterde creatura,
    creatore,
    descriptio

    194

    09:12:08 AM

    de creaturis.
    Cum ergoproponitur
    Catholicoan Iudaeus
    sona*proutdicitur
    Deumessepersonam,
    debetaccipere
    hocnomen'persona'proutaccipitur
    credat
    Catholicum
    nonsupponat
    apudeum.Cumergohocnomen'persona'secundum
    IudaeusnoncredatDeum
    nisipropersona
    PatrisvelFiliivelSpiritus
    Sancti,et23
    debetdicerequodnoncreditDeumessepersonam,
    sicut
    essealiquamillarum,
    'Realis putatgenusesse nomen',quia secundum
    Nominalisconcederei24
    nisivox,quam revera
    Nominalemper hoc nomen'genus'non supponitur
    Realisputatessenomen.Sed interrogatus
    Realisdiceret
    'Ego nonputogenus
    hocnomine'genus'quamvocem.
    essenomen',quia ipsedicitaliudsignifican
    Sic et Iudaeusdiceret'Ego credoDeumessepersonam',
    aliud
    quia crederet
    hocnomine'persona'quamCatholicus.
    significari
    Quod verodiciturin Iohanne"Est Pateretc." 'Pater' ibi poniturpro
    dicitur
    Vel dicaturquod
    'Creator'secundum
    quodtotaTrinitas
    paternobis.25
    et in creaturis,
    et tuncconcedeneodemmodoaccipitur
    'persona'in Trinitate
    ad
    dumquodIudaeuscreditDeumessepersonam,
    sednonestdescendendum
    Patrisvel Filiivel SpiritusSancti,nec est
    ut personam
    aliquamspecialiter,
    admittenda
    relatio,ut dicatur'Deus estvelnonest illa' sed tantumconfuse
    'persona'.26
    20vester
    VI etV2.
    noster
    M,utvidetur'
    21necVIetV2y
    nonM.
    22dicitur
    V2,om.M etVI.
    23et VI, itaM,om.V2.
    24concederei
    M etV2y
    concedit
    VI.
    25nobis
    M etVI,noster
    V2.
    26persona
    VI, personam
    M etV2.
    Ms M= Mnchen,
    Clm 14508f. 38vB(#); VI = Vaticano,Vat. lat. 4296 f.
    40rA-b
    omitssomeminor
    (#); V2= Vat. lat.4304:f.40vA(#). The apparatus
    variants.
    1943pp. 188-189.
    Lit. Landgraf
    etantiquorum.
    modernorum
    Item,aneademsitfides
    Quodvidetur,
    quiaauctoritas
    dicit:"Et quipraecedebant
    etqui sequebantur
    clamabant
    'Osanna' " id
    estpraecedentes
    adventm
    Christiet sequentes
    conveniunt
    in eiusfide.
    Contra.Abraham
    habuitfidem
    de Christo
    venturo
    etcredidit
    Christum
    venesse venturum'
    et
    turum,modernicreduntipsumvenisse.Sed 'Christum
    'Christum
    venisse'suntdiversa
    enuntiabilia
    siveeredita.
    Ergoaliudcrediderunt
    Christi
    moderni.
    antiquicircaadventm
    quamcredant
    Nominaliumquod Abraham
    Responsio.Possetdicisecundum
    opinionem
    credidit
    Christum
    esseventurum,
    namChristum
    esseventurum
    est
    numquam
    ipsummodoesse venturum,
    quod non crediditAbraham,immocredidit
    Christum
    venisse,quia istud,licetmododicaturhac 'Christusveni,olim
    dicebaturhac 'Christusest venturus';sed Abrahamtunc credebatquod
    dicebatur
    ista'Christus
    estventurus',
    etideocredebat
    Christum
    habuit
    venisse;
    tarnen
    fidemde Christoventuro,
    nonimportt
    Christum
    quia haeciunctura
    nuncventurum
    sedestsensus'de Christotuncventuro'.
    Sed cumnoncrediderit
    Christum
    determinate
    in aliquotempore
    venturum,
    neccredidit27
    Christum
    nuncvenisse,
    etideonec28
    Christum
    cumidem
    venisse,
    sit29
    secundum
    Nominalem'Christum
    nuncvenisse'et 'Christum
    venisse'.
    Christum
    etitaaliRevera,si inhocfiatvis,noncredidit
    Responsio.
    venisse,
    moderni
    sed nonestde hoccuran
    Abraham,
    quidcredunt
    quodnoncredidit
    dum,quia credidit
    aequipollens.
    27Sed{velSi)cumnoncrediderit
    ... noncredidit
    ... neccredidit
    Ml.
    Af,Sednoncredidit
    195

    09:12:08 AM

    28nccM, nuncVI.
    29sitVI,ponit
    (?) M.
    Ms AfMnchen,Clm 14508f. 39rA(#); VI= Vaticano,Vat. lat. 4296f.
    M and theapparatus
    omitsinsignificant
    in
    variants
    40vA(#).The textfollows
    VI.
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 186,Chenu1935/36
    p. 13,Chenu1976p. 94 n. 2.
    45 PETER OF CAPUA,IN ACT.
    Scolavelcollectione
    Libertinorum
    (Act.6,9). In unascolaeratsectaquorumin alia Cirenses,
    sicutnuncaliiNominales,
    alii
    dam,qui dicebantur
    Libertini,
    Reales.
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,lat. 176,f. 246.
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 183(#).
    46 PREVOSTIN, SUMMA(1206/1210)
    ... Si dicas,sicutdicuntNominales,quia quodsemel
    estverum
    eritverum
    ,
    semper
    secundum
    eosdicendum
    eritquodHabrahamcredidit
    Christum
    essenatum,et
    Christum
    essenasciturum,
    esse
    quod Habrahamnoncredidit
    quia Christum
    eos semperfuitfalsum...
    nasciturum
    secundum
    Ms Brugge,Stedel.bibl.237,f. 52v;Paris,Bibl.Nat.,lat. 14526,f.34v(#).
    Lit. Chenu1935/36
    p. 13.
    47 EVRARD OF BETHUNE, ANTIHAERESISCONTRAVALDENSES(1210)
    ... Lex enimab Euangelio,30
    alia quidemest,sed nonaliud.Zachariasenim
    fuitnonaliuda se
    mutus,fuitnonaliuda se loquente.Velumtempliscissum,
    nonaliuda se apertis.Eodempenitus
    clausa,fuerunt
    integro.Monumenta
    differ.
    enimnihilaliudest,quamapertio
    modo,lexab Euangelio
    Euangelium
    legis,quae eratobscura.Ne simusNominalesin hoc,sed potiusPorretani.
    & Prophetae
    laborantes
    in legeseminarunt;
    illudidem
    Quod enimPatriarchae
    messuerunt,
    Apostoli& Doctoresin Euangeliodesudantes
    quibusdictumest:
    ne pereant(Jo.6, 12).
    Colligite
    fragmenta,
    30ab Euangelio
    Ed.
    ourconj.
    , inEuangelium
    Ed. La Bign,Maximabibliotheca
    ..., Lugduni1677,XXIV, 1529b( = J.
    Triasscriptorvm
    adver
    svsWaldensivm
    sectam Ingolstadii
    Gretservs,
    1614,p. 49)
    (#).
    Lit. Du CangeV p. 604,Courtenay
    [1986]nn. 36, 44, 88.
    48 GODFREY OF POITIERS, SUMMA(1212/19according
    to Landgraf
    1973
    p. 171)
    a (In question"Utrumactuset voluntas
    sintidempeccatum
    veldiversa")
    Si sequamur
    viamNominalium
    dicerepossumus
    etactussunt
    quodvoluntas
    - de volntate
    idem31
    concomitante32
    dico,nonde praecedente
    quae
    peccatum
    nonconcomitatur
    actum.Etomnesillaeauctoritates
    veliequod33
    quaevidentur
    sint34
    diversapeccataintelligendae
    suntde volntate
    etactusubsepraecedente
    quente,nonde concomitante.
    196

    09:12:08 AM

    31suntidemKP, secundum
    B.
    32concomitante
    B.
    incerta
    KP,lectio
    33quodBP, quiaK.
    34sintBP, suntK.
    Stiftsbibl.
    Ms Brugge,Stedel.bibl.220,f. 3Ira (#); Klosterneuburg,
    299,f.
    36ra(#); Paris,Bibl.Nat.,lat. 15747,f. 36vtesteLandgraf.
    1943p. 189.
    Lit. Landgraf
    b

    idemquodnos")
    (In question"Utrumantiquipatrescrediderint
    id estde eisdem,secundum
    Dicimusquodeademestfides,
    omne,velsecunetsimiliter
    secundum
    eademfides,
    dumillos35
    quodressuntarticuli,
    qui dicunt
    Nominales.
    35velsecundum
    aliosK.
    illosB, secundum
    Stiftsbibl.
    Ms Brugge,
    Stedel.bibl.,lat.220,f.75ra(#); Klosterneuburg,
    299,
    f. 8lva (#).
    1943p. 187,Chenu1935/36
    Lit. Landgraf
    p. 12.

    of"Christus
    estmaiorse")
    (In discussion
    K
    concdt'senexestmeliorse puero'nontarnen
    UndecumPorphyrius
    117va/concederei
    'estaliuda se puero'vel 'alius'.
    'Socratesestaliudquamfuerisecundum
    Licettarnen36
    concederem37
    opinionemNominalium(qui, cum dicuntnihilcrescere
    , dicuntquod quodlibet
    eos38nonideoconcederem39
    instanti
    desinit
    esse),secundum
    corpusinquolibet
    substantiae
    diversae
    fuitfuturus
    'Christus
    estaliudquamipsesit'.Quia Socrates
    sednonpossumdicerede Christo
    necestiliasubstantia
    quod
    quaepriusfuerat,
    'Christus
    concederem42
    substantia
    quae ipsenonsit,sedbene41
    ipsesitaliqua40
    est aliud quam fueri.Sed43dicendout Realis negaremillam. Et sic
    addiperpartium
    quia licetdicamquodnihilcrescat
    responderem
    simpliciter,
    estsicrespondere.
    Catholicum
    dicoquodaliquidcrescit
    tionem,
    permateriam.
    nonestaliudquamfuerit44.
    Similiter
    licetsimNominaiis
    dicerem
    quodSocrates
    36tarnen
    incerta
    K.
    lectio
    B,
    37concederem
    B, concederet
    K.
    38Socrates
    nominalium
    estaliud- secundum
    eosK, hocsecundum
    quidicunt
    opinionem
    B.
    nihil
    estaliudquamfuerit
    crescere
    Socrates
    39concederem
    K.
    B, concederetur
    40aliquaK, a(li)aB.
    41beneB, om.K.
    42concederem
    B, concedere
    meK.
    43sedB, om.K.
    44etsicresponderem
    - quamfuerit
    K, om.B.
    Stiftsbibl.
    Ms Brugge,
    Stedel.bibl.220,f. 103vb(#); Klosterneuburg,
    299,f.
    117rb-va
    (#).

    est
    solafiliatione
    Adhocdico,sicutdicebaminrespondendo,45
    quodChristus
    a quolibet
    alioratione
    distinctus46
    estsufficienter
    individuum,
    quiasolafiliatione
    cuiuslibet
    omniumsuarumproprietatum
    sedquilibetaliusfascculo
    temporis;
    est individuum,
    sufficienter
    ratione
    quia47nullasua proprietate
    distinguitur
    sit
    cuiuslibet
    UndedicendoutRealisnondicerem
    temporis.
    quodindividuum
    praedicabile,quia non significaialiquam rem naturalem,est tamen
    undenonestdirecte48
    sub specie;/K 122rb/
    praedicamentale
    quia continetur
    nonest49
    enimin praedicamento
    sed subpraedicamento
    praedicamentale,
    Ad illud quod obicitquod intelligamus
    divinamnaturamab humana
    197

    09:12:08 AM

    dicoquod hocbene50
    estlicetsitimpossibile,
    itaquod
    separatam,
    intelligibile
    ex animoetcorpore.
    Si tarnen
    remaneat
    hocfieret,
    dicerem
    aliquidconiunctum
    etdicerem
    'istehomoincipit
    fuit,
    esse',immo
    quodilludconiunctum
    numquam
    %haec
    substantia
    esse' quodplusest.Si dicatquodeaedempartesquae
    incipit
    - nonvalet,
    sunteteaedemproprietates,
    priusfuerunt
    ergoidemcompositum
    nonenimposuitremoveri
    filiatio
    ab illisconiunctis51
    quiailludnovumindueret52
    essecumsubstantialem
    formam
    amitteret.
    Sed obicitur:
    manereidemcompositum
    sublatafiliatione;
    modo
    intelligatur
    haecestvera'hoccompositum
    esthomo';sedpriusnoneratpersonanisisola
    nonestpersona;
    sedsi nonestpersona,
    nonest
    filiatione,
    ergosublatafiliatione
    nonestpersona]53
    nonest
    homo;[sedsublatafiliatione
    ergosublatafiliatione
    homo.
    Ad hocdicimusquod nonesthoc54intelligibile.
    Idemestenimac si diceret
    sublata55
    filiatione".
    Tamenhaeccondipersonaistacomposita
    "Intelligatur
    tional estfalsa'si nonestpersonanonesthomo'secundum
    quod'si' sumitur
    Sic enimdebetsumiin omniimpossibili
    continuative.
    positione.
    etaliudessentiam,
    Nominalis,
    quidicitquodaliudestdemonstrare
    personam
    posset
    ad hancimpossibilem
    de facilirespondere.
    Potestenimconcedere
    positionem
    istas'hoc compositum
    fuit'demonstrato
    coniuncto
    ex corporeet anima;et
    concederei
    terminis
    et negaretsumptis
    essentialibus
    generaliter
    sumptis
    personalibus,sicuticoncedit'iste homoherifuit',non tamenconcedit'haec
    substantia
    herifuit';similiter
    'istehomocrevit',nontamen'haec substantia
    crevi.Et sicuthancdistinguerem
    'haecsubstantia
    animatasenmultiplicem
    sibiliscreviitaet hanc56'haec substantia
    individua
    rationalis
    naturaefuit',
    'substantia'
    et sic
    tantum,
    quia haecdictio'haec' potestadiungihuictermino
    demonstratur
    essentiaet alii termini
    et est sensus'haec
    veniuntappositive
    substantia
    rationalis
    naturae
    fuit',etsicvera,etnonsequitur
    quaeestindividua
    ad personalem;
    velhocsignum'haec' potestde'ergoistehomo'ab essentiali
    monstrare
    totalem
    definitionem
    'substantia
    sitpersonalis
    etc',et cumdefinido
    sicutet definitum,
    nondemonstratur
    ibi nisipersona,et ideofalsa.Similiter
    haec57
    vera'hoccompositum
    fuit',nontamen'istehomofuit'.
    45sicut- respondendo
    K, om.B.
    46distinctus
    B, distinctum
    K.
    47quiaB, quodK.
    48directe
    K, rccte
    B.
    49estK, om.B.
    50beneK, unum
    B.
    51ab illisconiunctis
    illisB.
    K' a coniunctis
    52novum
    indueret
    innovum
    B.
    K' induceret
    53sedsi nonestpersona
    - filiatione
    nonestpersona
    K' om.B.
    54hocK; om.B.
    55sublata
    K' subB.
    56hancB, haecK.
    57haec+ estB.
    Ms Brugge,Stedel.bibl.220,f. 106vb(#); Klosterneuburg,
    Stiftsbibl.
    299,f.
    122ra-b(#).
    49 GERVASEOF MELKLEY, ARS VERSIFICATORIA
    1216according
    to
    (before
    Faraip. 37)
    Adiectiuum
    solamueritatem
    notansestab omnicarminerepellendum
    per
    immediatam
    constructionem
    cumadhucindubiositan congruitas
    apposit(um),
    198

    09:12:08 AM

    talemdeterminationem.
    admittat
    olim,quicquidnuncdicamus,
    Paruipontani
    hanccensuerunt
    'Socratesqui estalbuscurri.Similiter
    ethanc:
    incongruam:
    enimquodofficium
    huiusrelatiui
    'Socratesalbuscurri.Dixerunt
    'qui'siisemper
    sicposite
    discretiue
    teneri
    ettalisdictionis
    adiectiue
    immediate
    . Undecumnon
    , similiter
    facerein termino
    discreto
    censuerunt.
    possettalemdiscretionem
    incongruam
    Moderniueronostridicuntquod hecdictio'qui' quandoqueamittit
    officium
    discretionis
    etretinet
    referendi.
    Similiter
    adiectiuum
    estquantantum
    officium
    sedsiuesitcongruasiueincongrua,
    hieestneuus
    tantum,
    doquenotaueritatis
    librifaciem
    estimmediata
    coniuncqui totam
    appositus
    deturpat.
    Que appositio
    tiouniussubstantiui
    cumaliosubstantiuo
    ut'MnsOssa'. Immediata
    diconon
    semperuoce tenus,sed quoad sensum,ita scilicetut terminus
    appositus
    exeademparteex qua estprincipale
    ut'Mariauirgo
    substantiuum,
    intelligatur
    Christum.'
    uirginum
    portauit
    Ms Oxford,BalliolCollege276,f. 132ra;Glasgow,Univ. Libr.,Hunt.511
    unfol.
    Lit. Hunt1950,pp. 54-55(#).
    50 ANON., IN SENT.
    a I, dist.41, cap. 3, n. 4
    OLIM SCIVIT. Magister
    inhoccapitulo
    nominalisestsequensillud58:
    quicestverum59,
    estverum.
    quidsemel
    semper
    NOS AUTEM CREDIMUS. Haec solumnominalibusvideturesse concedenda.60
    Sanequidempotestconcediquodaliudcredimus,
    aliudantiqui.
    58illudP, om.N.
    59verum
    P, om.N.
    60concedenda
    P.
    N,concedentia
    Ms Napoli,Bibi.Nazionale,
    VII.C. 14,f.109vb(#); Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,lat.
    to Landgraf
    758,f.46v (according
    1943).
    Lit. Landgraf
    1937p. 190,Landgraf
    1943p. 191f.
    b

    I, dist.44, cap. 2, n. 1
    POTUIT ERGO QUOD MODO NON. Hoc simpliciter
    falsum.61
    Potuit
    tarnen
    creareinhocinstanti,
    nonpotest,
    aliquid,uthancanimam
    quodmodo62
    cumsitiamab hericreata.Etitaaliquidfuitsubiectum
    divinaepotentiae,
    quod
    modononestsubiectum
    ei.63Magister
    nonprocedit
    hac
    PetrusLombardus64
    165
    Nominalisdicensquicquidsemel
    estverum
    via, immoprocedit
    tamquam
    semper
    estverum.
    61hoc- falsum
    P, om.N.
    62modoP' om.N.
    63subiectum
    eiN' ei subiectum
    P.
    64Petrus
    Lombardus
    P.
    N, autem
    65quicquid
    - verum
    P
    verum
    esseverum
    Ntsemel
    semper
    Ms Napoli,Bibl.Nazionale,VII.C. 14,f. llOra-b(#); Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,
    lat. 758,f. 48v(according
    to Landgraf
    1943).
    Lit. Landgraf
    1937p. 190,Landgraf
    1943p. 193.
    I, dist.46, cap. 7, n. 4
    NEMO POTEST DICERE ore,cordeetoperequodestverum.
    Opinioquorundam Nominaliumfuit:tu audis significatum
    huius 'angeli
    propositionis
    In propositione
    enimagitur
    canun,ergoaudisangeloscanere.Nonsequitur.
    199

    09:12:08 AM

    de re,etestsensus:tuaudisangeloscanere,idestaudis
    de dicto,inconclusione
    canentes.Item,tu dicishoc 'angeloscanere',ergotu dicisangelos
    angelos66
    Nonsequitur
    canere.67
    secundum
    eos. Hunemodmsolvendi
    videtur
    magister
    haberein hoccapitulo.
    66canere
    idestaudisangelos
    Ntom.P.
    67canere+ ergoP
    Ms Napoli,Bibi.Nazionale,VII.C. 14,f.llOvb(#); Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,
    lat.
    to Landgraf
    758,f. 51 (according
    1943).
    Lit. Landgraf
    1937p. 190f,Landgraf
    1943p. 194.
    d

    II, dist.3, cap. 3


    hocenuntiabile
    velattributum
    esteiscomQUOD SPIRITUS ERANT. Num68
    mune?Ita dicebant
    Nominales.
    quidam69
    68NumP, nuncN.
    69quidam
    P
    N,quidem
    Ms Napoli,Bibl.Nazionale,VII.C. 14,f.11Ivb(#); Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,
    lat.
    to Landgraf
    758,f. 55 (according
    1943).
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 196.

    51 ANON., SUMMA
    a
    Dicuntenimquidam,quod articulisuntenuntiabilia,
    scilicetChristum
    alia. Sed hocvidetur
    starenonposse,quoniam
    natum,passumet huiusmodi
    secundum
    hocaliifuerunt
    articuli
    aliimodernorum
    etitaaliafides.
    antiquorum,
    Set auctoritas
    sintvariata,tarnen
    fidesnonest
    dicit,quoniamlicettempora
    mutata.Adhocdicentforte
    ipsi,quoniamNominalessuntetfereomnesde hac
    esse natumest
    sententia,
    articuli,
    quod non alii fuerunt
    quoniamChristum
    etquodsemel
    estverum
    estverum.
    Sedhocsimiliter
    starenonpotest,
    verum,
    semper
    quia si Christumesse natumsemperfuitverum:ergo antiquihoc non
    crediderunt
    Christum
    nasciturum.
    Seddicitauctoritas:
    venquemillicredebant
    turumnoscredimus
    noscredimus
    venisse;quemillipassurum
    passumfuisse,
    credimus
    et huiusmodi.
    Itemhoc sic probatur
    indirecte:
    Antiquicredebant
    Christum
    nasceretur.
    subfuit
    natum,antequam
    Ergoipsierrabant.
    Ergofalsum
    articulis
    illorum.Quod nullaopiniovel sententia
    admittit.
    Propter
    predictas
    obiectiones
    vitandasdicuntquidam,quod Christum
    essenatumet huiusmodi
    nonsuntarticuli
    essenatumvelnascivelnasciturum
    fidei,setChristum
    esse,
    ut comprehendantur
    quelibettempora.Sed contraistossic: Judeicredunt
    Messiamvenirevelvenissevelventurum
    esse.Ergoidemcredunt,
    quodnos.
    Nonergoerrant.
    Aliidicunt,
    enuntiabilia
    nonsuntarticuli,
    sed
    quodhuiusmodi
    scilicet
    et huiusmodi....
    eventus,
    nativitas,
    passioet resurrectio
    Ms Vaticano,Vat. lat. 10754,f. 5.
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 187(#).
    Non est hoc dicere,quod ingenitum,
    b
    ItemAugustinus:
    etsi Filiumnon
    nilprohiberet
    diciingenitum.
    Setsi Filiumnongenuisset,
    nonesset
    genuisset,
    Pater.Si nonesset,non essetingenitus.
    Ergonondiceretur
    ingenitus:
    ergo
    falsum
    Ut Nominales,ad hocquidamdicunthanc
    est,quoddicitAugustinus.
    essefalsam:Si nonessetPater,nonesset.Et solvunt
    perinteremptionem.
    Ms Vaticano,Vat. lat. 10754,f. 19v.
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 190(#).
    200

    09:12:08 AM

    52 WILLIAM OF AUXERRE, SUMMAAUREA(1215/20)


    a Lib. 1, Tr. 5, cap. 2
    Ad hocdicuntPorretaniquod hocnomen'Dominus'significai
    quandam
    relationem
    que estdominium
    quo DominusestDominus,etillarelationonest
    divineessentie,
    sedassistit
    ei etincipit
    intempore
    assistere
    etextempore,
    scilicet
    quandoincipithabereservum.Eodemmodohoc nomencreator
    significai
    etillarelatio
    assistere
    divine
    quandamrelationem
    qua Deus estcreator,
    incepit
    oririab ea.
    essentie,
    quandocreature
    inceperunt
    Ed. J. Ribaillier
    Bonaventurianum
    1980I-IV,Spicilegium
    XVI-XIX,Paris/Roma
    87, I p. 70 (#).
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 36.
    b Lib. 1, Tr. 7, cap. 1
    Circaprimum
    notandum
    estquodde notionibus
    multesuntopicapitulum
    niones.DicuntenimPorretani
    quodmultopluressuntnotiones
    quamquinqu
    et quodnotiones
    nonsuntpersone.Aliidicunt...
    Ed. J. Ribaillier
    I p. 110(#).
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 36.
    c Lib. I, Tr. 7, cap. 1
    Ista etiamformafallitsecundum
    Nominalesqui dicuntquod unum
    nomen
    est
    voces.
    Positoquodnonsintnisiistetresvoces:canis,canem,cane;secunplures
    dumeosnonvalethecargumentado:
    omnenomenesthecvoxcanis;sedomnis
    voxestnomen;ergoomnisvoxesthecvoxcanis.
    Ed. J. Ribaillier
    I p. 115(#).
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 188,Courtenay
    [1986]n. 36.
    d

    Lib. 1, Tr. 9, cap. 2


    hecestvera:Deus potestscire
    Quodautemdicimusquodin hacsignificatione
    estde scientia
    rerumincomplexpluraquamsciat,in unosensuintelligendum
    arum;multaenimpossuntesse que nunquamerunt;sed de scientiaenuntiabilium
    nonestverum,
    scirealiquod
    reales,cumDeusincipit
    quia secundum
    desinit
    scireeiuscontradictorie
    Necvalet:Deus sciebat
    enuntiabile,
    oppositum.
    hocpriusetmodononseit;ergooblitus
    reiaccidit
    est,quiapertranscendentiam
    nominales
    estverum
    quodnonseit.Sed secundum
    quidicunt:quodsemel
    semper
    erit
    verum
    veldesinit
    , Deusnichilincipit
    scire,ethocmagisconcordat
    Augustino
    et Magistro
    in Sententiis.
    Ed. J. Ribaillier
    I p. 181(#).
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 185p. 201,Chenu1935/36
    p. 13,Chenu1976p. 94 n.
    2, Courtenay
    [1986]n. 36.
    Lib. 1, Tr. 14,cap. 1
    Dicitureniminlibro
    QuodDeussitubique,ostenditur
    primoauctoritatibus.
    Dominireplevit
    orbemterrarum Etperhocpatetnullam
    Sapientie:
    Spiritus
    esseopinionem
    Adamitarum
    universale
    unumnumero;
    si enimhoc
    qui ponunt
    una numero
    essetubique.
    esset,substantia
    Ed. J. Ribaillier
    I p. 261(#).
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 29.
    Lib. 3, Tr. 12,cap. 7
    Notandum
    esttamenquodquiaarticuli
    idemsuntformaliter
    eteffective
    apud
    modernos
    ideosoient
    Nominales
    dicerequodidem
    quietfuerunt
    apudantiquos,
    201

    09:12:08 AM

    articuli
    et apudantiquos,
    suntsimpliciter
    etquodarticuli
    non
    apudmodernos
    etabsolute;
    etsoient
    necfidessimpliciter
    suntmutati,
    dicerequodhecargumentado nonvalet:enuntiabilia
    mutatasunt;sed enuntiabilia
    suntarticuli;
    ergo
    suntmutati.Et estibifallaciaaccidentis.
    articuli
    Instantia.
    Hoc nomen'albus'
    esthecvox'albus';sedhecvox'albus'estaliavoxquamhecvox'alba'; ergo
    et estaliudnomen.
    III p. 221 (#).
    Ms J. Ribaillier
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 186.
    53 JACQUES OF VITRY, EXEMPLA(ante1227)
    105De Maugrinoqui excommunicauit
    Nominales.
    Hic est Maugrinus,cui quidamtrufator
    quem ego Parisiusvidi dixit:
    'DomineMaugrine,vos scitisquod Deus omniabonacreatet multiplicat
    ac
    crescere
    facit.Quidamautemscolaressuntin parochia
    vestraqui dicuntquod
    nichil
    crescit.
    Rogo vos quod die Dominica,quandoscolareseruntin missa,
    excommunicetis
    eos.' Vndefactum
    estquod prximaDominicadie, cumad
    conuenirent
    multiNominales,
    ecclesiam
    crescit
    , et
    quorum
    opinioestquodnichil
    eorumaduersariiAdamitequi contrariam
    tenentsentenciam,
    Maugrinus
    ait: 'Quidamsuntinhacparochiaheretici
    accensacandelacunctis
    audientibus
    asserunt
    qui Dei operibus
    derogantes
    quodnichilcrescit.
    Ego veroomnesqui
    eta liminibus
    hocdicunt,excommunico
    snetematris
    ecclesiesequestro.'
    Quo
    auditovaldeconfusi
    suntNominalesetgauisisuntReales.Episcopus
    autemin
    artibusParisiusdocueratet fueratNominalis;et vocatopresbytero
    ait:
    'Maugrine,
    quomodoaususes meexcommunicare?
    Ego enimsumNominalis
    etdicoquodnichil
    crescit.'
    Atilleobmutuit
    etiterum,
    neparochiam
    que magnis
    habundabat
    centum
    librisParisiensis
    monete
    se redemit.
    amitteret,
    prouentibus
    DieExempla
    Ed. J. Greven,
    ausdenSermones
    etcommunes
    desJakob
    vonVitry
    ,
    feriales
    1914,p. 62 (#).
    Heidelberg
    Lit. Normore
    p. 205.
    54 ROLAND OF CREMONA, SUMMA(1228/30)
    a
    ... Et possunt
    inducere
    Nominalium,
    prose opinionem
    qui dicuntquodistud
    nonvalet.Sit70quod nonsintnisiistetresvoces:albus,alba,
    argumentum
    album.Omnenomenesthecvoxalbus,sedomnisvoxestnomen,ergoomnis
    voxesthecvoxalbus,quod falsum
    est.
    70valet.Sitourconj
    ., valet,
    sicChenu.
    Ms Paris,Bibi.Mazarine,lat. 795,f. 17.
    Lit. Chenu1935/36
    p. 13 (#).
    b

    In librode sexprincipiis
    dicitur
    estsimplici
    et invariabili
    essentia
    quodforma
    consistens
    ... Ad illudquoddicitquodforma
    estsimplici
    etinvariabili
    essentia
    dicimus
    deomnibus
    consistens,
    formis,
    quodistudnonestverum
    equedicimus
    Aristotelem
    dixisseilludverbum,
    sed Porretanum71.
    71Seil.Gilbertm.
    Thisistheearliest
    false
    attribution
    oftheLiber
    sex
    toGilbert
    principiorum
    Porreta.
    Ms Paris,Bibl.Mazarine,lat. 795,f. 19v.
    Lit. L. Minio-Paluello,
    Amsterdam
    'MagisterSex Principiorum',
    Opuscula,
    1972,p. 539 (#); Lewry1987p. 257 n. 21.

    202

    09:12:08 AM

    55 ROBERT GROSSETESTE, QUIBUSMODISHABEANTRES SUBSISTERE


    (1220*s/35)
    HinceciamillaAdamitarum
    posicioque rebussecundum
    quodin se ipsissunt
    tribuit
    secundum
    nostro.Secundum
    quodeis conuenit
    quodsuntin intellectu
    enimquod in se ipsissunt,nichilidempartici
    patura multisita quod sitde
    substancia
    secundum
    ueroquodsunt<in> intellectu
    nostro,
    participancium;
    idema multis
    et estde substancia
    participatur
    participancium.
    Ms Assisi,Bibi.conv.138,f. 262va.
    Ed. Lewry1983p. 21 (#).
    56 ROBERT KILWARDBY,IN ISAG. (ca. 1240)
    Adidem,dicitBoeciusintercio
    De consolacione
    quodomnequod
    philosophie
    estideoestquia unumnumero
    nonestunumnumero,
    est;setuniuersale
    quia
    sicessetsingulare:
    nonest....
    igituruniversale
    Adaliuddicendum
    enimhecassumpcio,
    quodestfalsa:si recteumat,suberit
    uniuersale
    estquodest,ethecestfalsa;estenimquoest,estquiditasetessencia
    et formaindiuidui;
    nec estunumnumeroin quolibetsingulari
    ut posuerunt
    Adamite,setestunumpermodumsecundum
    quemformaperse considerata
    dicitur
    uel persimplicitatem
    sue essencie.
    una,scilicet
    perconuenienciam
    Ms Madrid,Bibl.Univ.72, f. 2va; Cambridge,
    Peterhouse
    206,f. 34rb-va.
    Lit. Lewry1983p. 7 (#).
    57 TRACTATUS EMMERANUSDE IMPOSSIBILIPOSITIONE
    Et notandum
    non sequitur
    quod in hac questioneex obligatione
    impossibili
    Undeconsequentia
    Adamitarum72nonestconcedenda
    in hacquesquidlibet.
    Sed tantummodo
    ilia consetione,scilicet
    quod eximpossibili
    sequitur
    quidlibet.
    quentiaest concedendain hac questionein qua intellectus
    consequentis
    in intellectu
    claudatur
    antecedentis.
    Undecumtantumtalisconsequentia
    sit
    admittenda
    inhacquestione,
    notandum
    nonestadmittenda
    quodconsequentia
    inhacquestione
    inqua negatio
    exaffirmatione.
    Undetalisconsequensequitur
    tia nonestconcedenda:
    'si homoest,nonestasinus'.Quod patet,si homo
    uniatur
    asinoomnmoda
    identitte.
    72sicMs,DeRijkreads
    Adamitorum.
    Ms Mnchen,
    Clm 14458,f.40va.
    Ed. De Rijk,SomeThirteenth
    Tracts
    on theGameof Obligation
    /, in:
    Century
    12 (1974),94-123,at p. 118(#).
    Vivarium,
    Lit. De Rijk1974p. 102f,Lewry1983p. 11 n. 29, Braakhuis
    p. 39.
    58 OBLIGA
    TIONESPARISIENSES
    Ex predictis
    huiusregule:
    patetVeritas
    Positofalsopossibili,
    potestconcediet probari
    quodquecontingens.
    Preterea.
    Sciendum
    quodpredicta
    regulanontenetsecundum
    consequentiam
    Nominalium.
    Si enimteneret
    secundum
    falsopossibili
    ipsos,contingeret
    posito
    falsiimpossibilis
    in copulativa
    probari
    quodqueimpossibile,
    supposito
    opposito
    cum posito.Fieretenim ilia copulativafalsumnon sequenssecundum
    203

    09:12:08 AM

    illiusetposito
    Nominales.Undeestnegandasecundum
    ipsos.Sed ex opposito
    faisum impossibile.
    sequitur
    Ms Oxford,Bodl.Libr.,canon,mise.281,f.85r.
    on theGameofObligation
    Tracts
    Ed. De Rijk, SomeThirteenth
    //,in:
    Century
    13 (1975),22-54,at p. 31 (#).
    Vivarium,
    Lit. Normore
    p. 204.
    59 ANON., DE COMMUNIBUSD1STINCTIONIBUS
    Solutio.Dicendumquod in veritatesecundumopinionemquorundam,
    ex
    veritatem
    tamensecundum
    eximpossibili
    nominalium
    scilicet,
    sequitur
    quidlibet;
    realium.
    et hocestsecundum
    nichilsequitur,
    opinionem
    impossibili
    Ms Vatican,Vat. lat. 7678,f. 81rb.
    onDistinctiones
    Tracts
    Parisian
    Ed. De Rijk,SomeEarlier
    , Nijmegen
    Sophismatum
    1988,p. 206 156(#).
    I p. 63, Courtenay
    1991p. 36.
    Lit. Pelsterp. 157,Braakhuis
    60 POSITIONESNOMINALIUMsivePOSITIONESNOSTRAE(early13thc.?).
    haecsunt.Primoconsentimus
    nostraecircauniversalia
    Positiones
    quoduniverrealium
    contra
    Secundoponimus
    sunt
    nomina.
    etspecies
    saliasicut
    opinionem
    genera
    ...
    Tertio
    nihil
    est
    particulare.
    praeter
    quod
    Ms Vaticano,Vat. lat. 7678f. 88ra.
    Ed. Ebbesen1991p. 431 (#); Pelsterp. 158.
    I p. 34.
    Lit. Braakhuis
    61 ALBERTUS MAGNUS,LIBER DE PRAEDICABILIBUS
    Sunttamenqui aliterea quaedictasunt,interpretantur
    dicentes,
    quodinsolis
    solus
    sintetquomodoessehabeant,
    suntiliaquoadnos,quaeutrum
    intellectibus
    illiqui
    haberedixerunt
    universalia
    Et tale esse in intellectu
    seitintellectus.
    univervocabantur
    Nominales,qui communitatem
    (ad quam particularia
    inintellectu
    esse
    tantum
    salium,dequibusdicuntur
    referuntur)
    ipsauniversalia,
    non
    dicebant.Nudosautemvocantintellectus,
    qui ad scibilequod accipiunt
    eorum
    ad speculationem
    intellectum
    habentpraescriptos
    habitus,
    qui disponant
    habitm
    conclusionum
    quaerit
    praescriptum
    quaein ipsosunt.Sicutintellectus
    et
    intellectus
    fit
    conclusio,
    praescriptum
    principiorum
    perquem
    principiorum
    et sic de aliis.Purosautemdicunt
    habitmnotitiae
    sibiquaerit
    terminorum,
    nonaccipiuntur.
    intellectus,
    phantasmate
    qui mediante
    omnia
    Ed. Borgnet,
    I, Parisiis1890,p. 19b(#).
    Opera
    62 ALBERTUS MAGNUS,IN SENT (1246)
    a I, dist.5, art.4
    Sed contra:.... 3. Item,In LitteravultquodPateressentia
    sit,et sapientia
    ad Patrem:
    sehabeant
    formaliter
    etsapientia
    quaePorsapienssit,quasiessentia
    in Deo compositio
    retanusdixit,quodreprehensum
    fuit,quia sicnotatur
    in nomine,
    intalibusnisicausaformalis
    Ad aliuddicendum,
    quodnonnotatur
    autemposuitin reipsa.
    et nonin re. Porretanus
    omnia
    Ed. Borgnet,
    XXV, Parisiis1893,p. 480b(#).
    Opera
    204

    09:12:08 AM

    I, dist.26, art.10
    Itemobjicitur
    fortius:
    AutPorretanus
    suamaliquidesseens
    ponitrelationem
    in divinis,autnihil.Si aliquid:tuncoportet
    ....
    Solutio.Dicendum,
    etfalsaethaeretica
    est,etab
    quodopinioPorretanorum
    Alexandro
    Undedicimus...
    Papa in concilioRemensicondemnata.
    Ed. Borgnet,
    omnia
    XXVI, Parisiis1893,p. 20ab(#).
    Opera
    I, dist.33, art.5
    divinae
    Utrumrelationes
    suntassistentes,
    sicutdixitGilbertus
    Porretanus?
    dicitur
    fuisse
    Gilberti
    sicutdicit
    Porretani,
    Quia veroisteerror
    quemtarnen,
    in concilioRemensiretractavit
    sanctusBernardus,
    et damnavit,consiliis
    humiliter
    ideo diligentius
    considerando
    suntistae
    Episcoporum
    acquiescens:
    rationes.
    ...
    Hoc considerantes
    dicunt
    tarn
    virum
    nonerrasse:
    et
    modernorum,
    quidam
    peritum
    inducunt
    rationes
    quibusprobant
    quodlicetdiversaopinariindivinis.Sedquia
    haeresis
    haecab ore auctorissui in concilioRemensidamnata:ideo contra
    sie: ...
    objicitur
    Ed. Borgnet
    XXVI p. 147b,150a(#).

    I, dist.41, art.6
    Si vellemus
    diceremus
    parumper
    sequiantiquamNominaliumopinionem,
    Deumscirequidquidseivit,ettuncdiceremus
    velenuntiabile
    quodpropositio
    quod
    semel
    estverum,
    erit
    verum.
    Sed unumnumero
    enuntiabile
    nonestresumensemper
    dumnisirespectu
    utcumdicitur:
    mundum
    foreestverum,
    ejusdemtemporis,
    illud verumest rationeaeternitatis
    antecedentis
    tempus.Si autemmodo
    debetresumi
    ratione
    eiusdem
    hocautemnonsignificatur
    resumatur,
    temporis;
    nuncutfuturum
    velpraesens,
    sedsignificatur
    utpraeteritum;
    ergosignificatur
    fuisseestverum;et mundum
    foretunc,et fuissemodo,
    peristam:mundum
    etiamenuntiabile
    unumet rationeejusdemtemporis
    verumest,sed diversis
    modissignificando
    Et hocpianeextrahitur
    de littera,
    itasolvit;
    quia Magister
    et tenendo
    illamNominalium
    opinionem,
    planumestrespondere
    objectis.
    Ed Borgnet
    XXVI p. 350b(#).
    Lit. Chenu1935/36
    1991a,n. 37.
    p li, Courtenay

    IV, dist.46, E., art.2


    Aliidicunt,
    utPorretani,
    est,uttollatur
    quodhaecdiminutio
    geometrica
    pars
    etnonsemper
    ejusdempropositionis
    persecundum
    suffragium,
    ejusdemquantitatis:
    utsi primum
    tollitpoenae
    secundum
    centesimam,
    suffragium
    suffragium
    tollit
    centesimam
    ettertiam
    centesimam
    illiusresidui:ei
    residui,
    aequaleprimo,
    sicmanetsemperpoena,eo quodestdivisibilis
    in infinitum.
    Ed. Borgnet,
    omnia
    XXX, Parisiis1894,p. 630b(#).
    Opera
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.

    63 ALBERTUS MAGNUS,PHYSICA(1251/52)
    Et ideo planumest Porretanum73
    mentiri
    dicentem,
    quod ultimasphaera
    movetur
    subsuperficie
    sua convexaetquoadillamin locoest,quia sicessetin
    locoextra,quodnonestcorpusdiversum
    ab ipso,etlocusessetsuperficies
    eius
    extraambientis.
    quodestin loco,et nonsuperficies
    corporis
    73Seil.Gilbertm.
    Cf.Ps.-Gilbert,
    SexPrincipiorum,
    Liber
    cd.L. Minio-Paluello
    Lai.
    (Arisi.
    1-7),1966Leiden,
    p. 47.8ff.
    Ed. Opera
    Omnia
    IV-1,Aschendorff
    1987,p. 228 (#).
    205

    09:12:08 AM

    64 BONAVENTURE,IN SENT. (1250/52)


    a I, dist.41, art.2, q. 2
    est
    Aliidixerunt
    contrarium,
    quia posuerunt,
    quod enuntiabile,
    quod semel
    estverum
    , et ita semperscitur.Et, ut meliuspateat,videndaest
    verum,
    semper
    eorumpositioet ratiopositionis.
    Fuerunt,
    qui dixerunt,
    quod albus,alba,
    tarnen,
    album,cumsinttresvoceset treshabeantmodossignificandi,
    quia
    suntunumnomen.Perhuncmodumdixeandemsignificationem
    important,
    erunt,quod unitasenuntiabilis
    accipiendaest non ex partevocisvel modi
    deinde
    sedreisignificatae;
    sedunaresest,quae primoestfutura,
    significandi,
    remhancprimoessefuturam,
    deinde
    tertio
    ergoenuntiare
    praeterita:
    praesens,
    non facietdiversitatem
    sed
    tertiopraeteritam,
    enuntiabilium,
    praesentem,
    deindepraesens,
    sitprimofuturum,
    tertio
    vocum.- Rursus,cumidemtempus
    rei,quod significatur
    peroratempusscilicetquod estmensura
    praeteritum,
    velforeconsignificent
    triatempora,
    ratione
    contionem;
    quamvisessevelfuisse
    sed variatur
    soluma partetemporis
    nondiversificam
    enuntiabile,
    significati
    currit
    Undesi dicamsemel:Socrates
    hodie,et erasdicam:currit74;
    significad.
    aliudtempus,
    etitaaliamactionem;
    enuntiabile
    detintelligere
    cumhocverbum
    Et quia, retenta
    eadem
    mutatasignificatione.
    nonestidem,quantumcumque
    etnonestidem,nisicumeadem
    enuntiabile
    semperestverum,
    significatione,
    ideodixerunt,
    retinetur:
    quodilludquodsemelestverum,semper
    significatio
    estverum.Etideo,cumDeusnihilobliviscatur,
    dicunt,
    quodomneenuntiabile,
    illirationi:omneenuntiabile,
    quod
    quod Deus seivit,seit.- Et respondent
    velteesse:ergoetc.;nondebetinferri
    sic:
    seivit,seit;sedseivittenasciturum
    Aliterestibifigura
    dictionis,
    quia
    ergoseit,teesse,sedsic:ergoseit,tefuisse.
    ad identitatem
    rei.- Et hocmodo
    in modosignificandi
    ab identitte
    procedit
    Et istafuitopinioNominalium,
    solvitmagister.
    Nominales,quia
    quidictisunt
    unitatem.
    suamsuper
    nominis
    positionem
    fundabant
    74currit
    siced.,anhericucurrit
    legendum?
    Ed. OperaOmnia
    I, Quaracchi1882,p. 740ab(#).
    1943p. 185,Normore
    Lit. Landgraf
    p. 206,Chenu1935/36
    p. 11,Courtenay
    1991ap. 17.
    b

    I, dist.44, art.2, q. 1
    de sciensicutad sophisma
    Adhocestduplexmodusrespondendi,
    Responsio:
    omninosit
    tia. Concessoenim,quod divinapotentiasecundumveritatem
    hanc:potest
    concedunt
    tamenNominalium
    secundum
    immutabilis,
    positionem
    suscitare:
    illationi:
    sedpotuitChristum
    ergoet
    quidquidpotuit.Et respondent
    sedsubalio:
    subiliotempore,
    modopotest;respondent,
    quodnondebetinferri
    verbisdiveradiunctum
    suscitasse,
    quia hocenuntiabile,
    ergopotestChristum
    estvera,etsialiter
    nonestidem.Ideodicunt,
    sorumtemporum,
    quodpropositio
    sive
    dictionis
    inferatur,
    assignantpeccatumin processusecundumfiguram
    accidens.
    secundum
    Ed. OperaOmnia
    I, Quaracchi1882,p. 791a(#).
    1943p. 186,Normore
    Lit. Landgraf
    p. 206.

    III, dist.24, art.1, q. 3


    etad perfecfideiestproprie
    Sedquoniamipseassensus
    supercomplexionem;
    sed etiamoportet
    de incarnatione,
    tionemfideinon tantumoportet
    cogitare
    suntenuniamfuisse:ideodixerunt
    incarnationem
    alii,quodarticuli
    credere,
    ad
    cumfidesquantum
    maxime
    circacomplexum,
    etquodfidesconsistit
    tiabilia,
    etde nullocreatopossit
    etcreatum,
    increatum
    simulrespiciat
    aliquosartculos
    quod prius
    ipsi increato,secundum
    esse, nisi secundumquod componitur

    206

    09:12:08 AM

    illudnoncapitnisipermodmcomplexionis,
    habitm
    est:si ergointellectus
    videtur
    illudponereet dicere,quod fidessitcircaverumcomrationabilius
    Et quoniamerranscircaverumcomplexum
    complexi.
    plexumsivesubratione
    sicutsi aliiudicatur
    ad differentiam
    haereticus,
    temporis
    simpliciter
    quantum
    ideonon
    vel
    incarnationem
    iam
    resurrectionem
    crederet
    futuram;
    factam,
    quis
    comsedetiamcircaverum
    fidem
    essecircaverum
    solumdixerunt,
    complexum,
    Et
    obiicias
    eis
    de
    mutatione
    si
    tu
    differentia
    sub
    determinata
    temporis.
    plexum
    secundum
    istorumenuntiabilium;
    fidei proptermutationem
    respondent
    tecurnonsuntmutata,
    Nominales,
    quia teessecursurum,
    quodenuntiabilia
    idemsignificant,
    etunumest
    indiversis
    rere,tecucurrisse,
    temporibus
    prolata,
    et unumesttempus,
    enuntiabile,
    proquo
    quia una estres,quamsignificant,
    remetveritatem,
    etideounumsuntsecundum
    quamvisvideantur
    proferuntur;
    Estoquod istaenuntiabilia
    essediversa.- Aliteretiamrespondent.
    vocaliter
    et
    sintdiversa,quia tamenuna estVeritas,cui fidesassentiiprincipaliter,
    secundum
    rationecuiusistaenuntiabilia
    credit,quae quidemnon mutatur
    nonpropter
    hoc
    licetipsa enuntiabilia
    diversitatem
    diversificentur;
    temporis,
    fidesnonmutata
    immoin diversis
    et diversificatur,
    fidesmutatur
    temporibus
    consistit.
    temdiversorum
    Sed quia positioilia Nominalium,
    quae dicebat,enuntiabilia
    nonapprobatur,
    immofalsaest,sicutin primo
    esseunum
    , communiter
    porum
    ....
    librofuitostensum;
    Omnia
    Ed. Opera
    III, Quaracchi1887,pp. 515b-516a
    (#).
    Lit. Landgraf
    1943p. 188.
    65 THOMAS AQUINAS,SUMMATHEOLOGIAE
    a

    I, Q. 14,art.15,ad 3
    idemesseenunAd tertium
    dicendum,
    quod antiquiNominalesdixerunt
    et esse natum:quia eademres
    nasci,et esse nasciturum,
    tiabile,Christum
    nativitas
    Christi.Et secundum
    hocsequitur
    perhaectria,scilicet
    significatur
    natum,quod
    quod Deus quidquidscivit,sciat:quia modo seitChristum
    essenasciturum.
    idemei, quodestChristum
    significat
    Roma
    Ed. Opera
    Omnia
    IV,
    1888,p. 195.
    (Leonina)
    1943p. 184,Normore
    Lit. Landgraf
    p. 206,Chenu1935/36
    p. 12,Courtenay
    1991a,n. 37 + 38.

    I, Q. 39, art.6, ad 1
    divinaenaturaehaec sitvera,Deus est
    Unde,licetpronullosuppositorum
    - Quodnonattendens,
    esttamenveraproessentia.
    Porretanus
    earn
    Trinitas,
    negavit.
    Ed. Opera
    Omnia
    (Leonina)IV, p. 406.

    66 THOMAS AQUINAS,IN SENT.


    a I, dist.26, q. 2, art.1
    ut Porretani,quod relationes
    in divinissunttantum
    Quidamdixerunt,
    assistentes.
    ...
    Quidamverodixerunt
    ... et hocattendentes
    dixerunt,
    quidamphilosophi
    quod relationonestaliquod unumgenusentium,nec estaliquidin rerumnatura;sed est tantum
    inomnibus
    etquodrelationes
    suntde intenentibus,
    quidamrespectus
    respersus
    tionibus
    secundis
    quaenonhabentessenisiinanima.Cui etiamPorretanorum
    videtur.
    Sed hocfalsum
    est:quia ...
    opinioconsentire
    207

    09:12:08 AM

    Ed. OperaOmnia
    (Vivs)VII, Paris1873,p. 328ab.
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.
    b

    I, dist.33, q. 1, art.1
    Errorenim iste qui in Litteratangitur,
    diciturPorretanifuisse,quem
    in rhemensi
    concilioretractavit.
    postmodum
    Ed. OperaOmnia
    (Vivs)VII p. 396b.
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.

    I, dist.33, q. 1, art.2
    enimdixerunt,
    Porretani
    suntinpersonis
    utassistentes,
    et
    quodproprietates
    nonsuntipsaepersonae.
    Sed hocnonpotestesse,quia ...
    Ed. OperaOmnia
    (Vivs)VII p. 399a.
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.
    I, dist.33, q. 1, art.5
    ... quodestsabelliana?
    etideoPorretanus,
    impietatis;
    qui primohocposuerat,
    retractavit.
    post,visohocquod sequitur,
    Ed. OperaOmnia
    (Vivs)VII p. 403b.
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.
    IV, dist.45, q. 2, art.2
    Et ideoPorretanialiummoduminvenerunt,
    dicentes,
    quodhocmodoprocediturin diminutione
    sicutproceditur
    in divisione
    poenarum
    persuffragia,
    tamenin infinitum
    dividipossunt,
    etnunquam
    linearum,
    quaecumsintfinitae,
    dumfitsubtractio
    nonsecundum
    eamdemquanconsumuntur,
    perdivisionem
    sed secundum
    eamdemproportionem;
    velutsi primoauferatur
    titatem,
    pars
    etsecundoquartailliusquartae,
    etiterum
    et
    quartatotius,
    quartailliusquartae,
    sic deincepsin infinitum.
    Et similiter
    dicunt,quod per primum
    suffragium
    etpersecundum
    diminuitur
    secunaliquotaparspoenae,
    parsaliquaremanentis
    dumeamdemproportionem.
    Sed istemodusmultipliciter
    defectivus
    invenitur.
    Primo,quia ...
    Ed. OperaOmnia
    (Vivs)XI p. 371a.
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.

    67 THOMAS AQUINAS,DE POTENTIA


    a Q. 7, art.9
    ... undeetPorretani
    relationes
    nonesseinhaerentes,
    sedassistentes,
    dixerunt,
    verumest,utposterius
    ostenditur.
    quod aliqualiter
    Ed. Quaestiones
    II, Taurini/Romae
    disputatae
    (Marietti)1953,p. 62va.
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.
    b

    Q. 8, art.2
    Undeetiamquidamtheologi,
    scilicet
    huiusmodi
    Porretani,
    opinionem
    usque
    ad divinamrelationem
    relationes
    nonessein personis,
    dicentes,
    extenderunt,
    sedeisquasiassistere.
    Et quia essentia
    divinaestinpersonis,
    sequebatur
    quod
    nonsuntessentia
    relationes
    divina;etquia omneaccidensinhaeret,
    sequebatur
    hoc solvebant
    verbumAugustini
    quod non essentaccidentia.Et secundum
    nonpraedicantur
    relationes
    de Deo secundum
    substaninductum,
    quodscilicet
    accidens.
    Sedad hancopinionem
    non
    tiam,necsecundum
    quodrelatio
    sequitur
    sitresaliqua,sedsolumsecundum
    radonem:
    omnisenimresvelestsubstantia
    velaccidens.

    208

    09:12:08 AM

    relationes
    essede secundis
    Undeetiamquidamantiquiposuerunt
    intellects,
    hocetiamPorretanos
    utCommentator
    dicitXI Metaph..Etideooportet
    dicere,
    Et sicsequetur
    rationem.
    divinaenonsuntnisisecundum
    quod
    quodrelationes
    distinctio
    noneritrealis;quodesthaereticum.
    personarum
    Ed. Quaestiones
    II p. 67ra.
    disputatae
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.
    68 THOMAS AQUINAS,DE VERITATE
    Q. 21, art.4
    Et hancopinionem
    secutisunt:dicebant
    enimquod
    aliquomodoporretani
    de creatura
    bonumsimpliciter,
    utcumdicitur
    homoestbonus,et
    praedicamus
    bonumaliquoaddito,utcumdicimus
    estbonushomo.Dicebantigitur
    Socrates
    non aliqua bonitateinhaerente
    sed
    quod creaturadiciturbona simpliciter
    bonitate
    essetbonitasdivina;
    prima,quasiipsabonitasabsolutaet communis
    sed cumdicitur
    creatura
    a bonitate
    bonumhocvel illud,denominatur
    creata
    bonitates
    creataesuntsicutet ideae particulares
    secundum
    quia particulares
    Platonem.
    Sed haecopinioa Philosopho
    ...
    improbatur
    multipliciter:
    Ed. OperaOmnia
    III1
    602a.
    (Leonina)
    p.
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.
    69 THOMAS AQUINAS,COMPENDIUMTHEOLOGIAE
    I, cap. 67
    sed
    Non autemdicipotestquod proprietates
    nonsintin personis
    predicte
    exterius
    ad eas se habeant,ut Porretanidixerunt.
    Ed. Opera
    Omnia
    (Leonina)XLII, Roma 1979,p. 102b.
    Lit. Courtenay
    [1986]n. 41.
    70 ANONYMUS
    , NOTULA(13th/14th
    c.)
    Internominales,
    de quibusin (] 1 trs.)lib. 3 tcapitulo61.0tetrealesestdifdicunt
    ferentia,
    quiarealesdicunt
    generaetspecies
    aliquidesseinre,nominales
    (] dicerent
    rs.)illa nihilesse, videlicetesse quasdamanimiconceptiones.
    ut
    Secundadifferentia,
    quia nominalesdicunttriaesse,scilicetenuntiabile,
    scilicetnega'Petrmnegavisse
    remsignificat,
    Christum'
    , quod ipsammet
    tionem
    dictum
    de re,scilicet
    Petri;secundo,
    ipsalocutioquaede redicit<ur> ;
    ut 'Petrus
    rem(s.r ] scilicet
    restrs.)de praesenti,
    tertio,
    propositio
    significans
    dicuntnominalesquod
    indicativum.
    Circaprimm
    perverbum
    nega,scilicet
    semel
    estverum
    tunc,igi; sedsemelfuitverumPetrm
    fuitverum
    semper
    negavisse
    turmodoestverumPetrm
    tuncChristum,
    necestdifferentia
    nisiin
    negavisse
    sedeademres.Realesdicuntnonesseverum,immoquodsemelfuit
    tempore,
    verumnumquam
    eritverum;- intelligunt
    de dicto,quodestquaedamVeritas,
    quia illuddictumquod tunefuitnonestmodo,alia estenimvoxquae nunc
    et alia quae tuncdicebatur.
    dicitur
    Et licetdiversadicerent,
    nontamencondereintelligunt,
    realesde dicto.Etideosecundum
    tradicebant,
    quianominales
    hocvidetur
    debent
    dicirealeseteconverso
    quodpotiusnominales
    tquamsunti;
    videlicet
    huius<modi> nominaa primaopinionesumpserunt
    non ab ista.
    Praeterea
    dicuntnominalesquod nihilcrescit,
    undesi lapisacervolapidum
    noneritidem(Jillius
    adiciatur,
    trs.)acervus<at>que prius,sedalius- quare
    209

    09:12:08 AM

    (]quae trs.)autemhoc sit,bene(s.b.] benesittrs.)cogita- ; realesautem


    econtra.
    Ms Paris,Bibi.Nat.,lat. 15739,f.2rb.Transcription
    (trs.)byK. H. Tachau
    andconjectural
    Asthems.contains
    emendations.
    ( #), butwithourorthography
    in thebeginning
    ofthenote
    Summa
    Aureathereference
    WilliamofAuxerre's
    is to ourN 52f,supra.
    probably
    71 WILLIAM OF MARE, SCRIPTUMIN SENTENTIAS(ca. 1270)
    ' Utrum
    scivit':
    In question
    Deussciatquicquid
    Secundum
    quodolimscivitquia dicunt
    quosdamDeus seitomneenuntiabile
    cum dicitur"Sortescurrit"et "Sortescucurrit"et
    idemesse enuntiabile
    identitatem
    reidicuntesseidentitatem
    "Sortescurret"quia secundum
    proposiutvidetur.. ..
    et opinioMagisti
    tionset haecfuitopinionominalium
    a multis
    etmaximis
    etnominalium
    ... primatamenopinioquaedicitur
    Magisti
    illiqui fuerunt
    illiusopieos dicerentur
    estetveriussecundum
    veriorreputata
    nionisrealesquamnominalesquia quandodicuntquodestidemenuntiabile
    inA", hoc
    inA", "Sortescucurrit
    inA tempore",
    "Sortescurrit
    "Sortescurret
    ideodicuntquia nonestvariatioa partetemporis
    quia idemesttempusquod
    et si nonest
    et modoestpraeteritum,
    fuitfuturum
    et aliquandofuitpraesens
    variatioa partetemporis,
    quia eademresnon
    ergoneca partereienuntiatae
    Variaturergoenunhabererespectu
    eiusdemtemporis.
    potestse difformiter
    vocemtantum
    tiabilesecundum
    praesenti
    quandofitenuntiatio
    propraeterito,
    debetdicialiudet aliud,
    sedresnonvariatur
    etideonecenuntiabile
    et futuro,
    sed idem.
    inprimum
    librum
    Sententiarum
    dela Mare
    Ed. H. Krami(ed.), Guillelmus
    ,
    , Scriptum
    Mnchen1989,pp. 503-04(#).
    Akademie
    derWissenschaften,
    Bayerische
    AddendumANON., DE FIGURISSYLLOGISMORUM
    (ca. 1150)
    Nonusmodus< primaefigurae>siefalsificatur Vel sic:quidammodisunt
    Petrisunt
    sententiam
    sednulli(] nulleMs) clericitenentes
    nominales,
    maistri
    Petri.
    tenentes
    modi,ergoquidamnominalesnonsuntsententiam
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    LI
    Logicaingredientibus
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    = Abelard,Theologia
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    theTwelfth
    Mass.,
    , ed. R.L. Bensonand G. Constable.Cambridge,
    Century
    113-37.
    on Universals.
    Amsterdam.
    Tweedale,M.M., 1976,Abailard
    toprof.
    De Rijky
    in: Vivarium,
    , 1987,Reply
    25, 3-23.
    le
    et'sacra
    dePierre
    dudiscours
    Valente,L., 1990,Arts
    loquendi'
    pagina'dansle 'De tropis
    Chantre
    , in: Histoire,
    Epistmologie,
    Langage,12,II, 69-102.
    in:Dictionnaire
    dethologie
    11.1.Paris,cols.
    P., 1930,Nominalisme,
    Vignaux,
    catholique,
    717-84.
    in: Pierre
    Ablard
    , 1975,Notesurlenominalisme
    d'Ablard,
    , 523-29.
    du nominalisme
    mdival
    clairer
    desproblmes
    , 1977,La problmatique
    peut-elle
    actuel
    de Louvain,75, 293-331.
    ?, in: Revuephilosophique
    philosophiques

    215

    09:12:15 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 2 (1992)
    s Conceptionof theModalities
    Avicenna3
    ALLEN BCK

    I
    Modality occupies a central place in the philosophy of Ibn Sn
    (Avicenna). For him, realityis divided into necessarybeing and possible being. The realityof possible being is shown by our being directly
    acquainted with singular things whose existence looks contingent.
    Avicenna proves the realityof necessary being, if not throughmystic
    insightand prophecy, throughthe principle of sufficientreason and
    thefactof theexistenceof contingentbeings: theirexistencemusthave
    a sufficient
    cause, and that cause cannot be sufficientif it too be contingent. In this way, then, Avicenna bases his metaphysics of
    quiddity.
    In order to evaluate the intricaciesof Avicenna' s analysis, as well
    as his positionin the Aristoteliantradition,it is useful to have a clear
    grasp of how Avicenna understands modalities. Indeed, Avicenna is
    well known forhis original contributionsto modal theory.1But little
    detailed workhas been done, especially on the work survivingonly in
    Arabic. Here I devote myselfto that task. I shall begin with a study
    of Avicenna' s modal notions, and shall proceed by discussing some
    problems and obscuritiesin them. I shall conclude by sketchinghow
    these modal notions functionin his metaphysics.
    As we shall see, it mighteasily be thoughtthat Avicenna accepts a
    temporalview of modality,as he, like Aristotle,links 'necessary' with
    'always', 'impossible' with 'never', and 'possible' with'sometimes so,
    sometimesnot'. Indeed, ifAvicenna is offeringthese reductivedefinitions of the modalities in termsof time, this would resemble the view
    of modalitythat Hintikka attributesto Aristotle.2But that is not so:
    Avicenna does not equate the modal and the temporal operators. For,
    again like Aristotle,Avicenna allows forboth singular and universal
    1 Frederick
    A History
    , NewYork1972,115;Etienne
    Copleston,
    ofMedieval
    Philosophy
    intheMiddle
    Gilson,History
    ofChristian
    Philosophy
    Apes,NewYork1955,191-2.
    2 JaakkoHintikka,
    TimeandNecessity
    , Oxford1973,91-7.
    217

    09:02:05 AM

    possibilities that are never actualized in time. He does so, first,


    throughpostulatingtwo sorts of existence, real (in re) and mental (in
    intellectu
    ), and, second, by divorcingmodalityfromactual existencein
    time altogether.Still, he tries to accomodate the Aristotelianlinking
    of modality to time.
    In effectthenAvicenna is tryingto workout an Aristotelianposition
    on modality. His explanation, ifconsistent,will have the meritof presentinga unifiedaccount of featuresof Aristotelianmodal theorythat
    many have found obscure if not inconsistent.Further,his analysis of
    the necessary feature of contingent beings looks original and thus
    worthy of study- and may contribute to current discussions of
    modality. Finally, from this study we may gain insight into
    Avicenna' s systemof metaphysicsas well as those systemsof the many
    philosophers who have been influencedby his work.
    II
    As is usual, Avicenna has his most complex discussion of modality
    in the Shif3( TheHealing' his encyclopedia), in Al-Qfys(The Analytics)
    .
    But as it is also the most obscure, and has his own doctrineintertwined
    with otherviews and with sophisms, I propose to structuremy discussion around his more elementarytreatises,and then modifyand complicate the results as necessary fromAl-Qiys.
    In Al-Najt(The Deliverance)
    Avicenna makes the same distinctionof
    the modalityof the matterof the propositionand the modalityof the
    proposition as the Greek commentators.3The matter of proposition
    consistsin 44the state belonging to the predicate in relationto the subject' '4 That is, the predicate terms refersto a certain attribute,and
    the subject termto a subject. The relationof thatattributeto thatsubject determinesthe matterofthe proposition.If the matterofthe prop3 Ammonius,
    In Aristotelis
    De Interpretatione
    Commentarius
    , ed. A. Busse,Berlin1897,
    In Aristotelis
    Priora
    Commentarius
    , ed. M. Wallies,
    215,7;JohnPhiloponus,
    Analytica
    Berlin1905,43,23-7.
    4 Al'Najat
    Cairo
    , ed I. Madkhour,
    , ed. M. Kurdi,Cairo 1938,39,8-10;Al-Qfys
    1973,39,8-10.
    I offer
    a literal
    translation
    ofcertain
    As an appendix,
    keytextsthatarenotreadily
    ofAl-Ishrt
    available.Thereis a Frenchtranslation
    by Goichon(Paris1951);a
    Frenchtranslation
    ofAl-Ilhiyyt
    byG. Anawati(Paris1985),as wellas a medieval
    edition
    critical
    forwhichS. Van Riethasgivena current
    Latintranslation
    (Louvain
    trans.M.S. Khan,Delhi1969,99,
    ofAvicenna,
    1977).A.-M. Goichon,ThePhilosophy
    ofAl-Najt.
    Latintranslation
    also notesa medieval
    218

    09:02:05 AM

    osition is necessary, the attributebelongs to the subject always; if


    impossible, never; if possible, neithernecessary nor impossible, and
    hence neitheralways nor never.5 In contrast,the mode of a proposition concerns the predication relation between attributeand subject
    that is stated explicitlyin the proposition.6Still, the modalities are
    definedlikewisehere. The matterand the mode of a propositionmay
    differ:e.g., 'it is possible thata man is an animal' has a possible mode
    and necessary matter, since it is necessary that a man is an animal.
    It will already been seen that here Avicenna seems to maintain a
    strictequivalence between the modal and the temporaloperators. The
    necessaryis what is compelled to exist, what exists always.7 Hence the
    impossible ('necessary no) is what is compelled not to exist, what is
    never. Now Avicenna, followingAristotle,distinguishesthe possible
    into the one-sided, common possible ('not impossible') and the
    strictly,two-sidedcontingentpossible ('not necessary and not impossible').8 It mightthen seem to followthatthe contingentis what sometimes does exist, and sometimes does not exist. So here Avicenna
    appears to embrace a principle of plenitude, according to which
    everythingthat is possible must exist at some time. But we shall come
    to see that his position is a bit more complex, and denies this result.
    Ill
    Avicenna distinguishes six ways in which a predication can be
    necessary. Necessitymeans permanence, but there are differentsorts
    of permanence.9The distinctionis based on differencesin the stretch
    of time forwhich the predication is supposed to hold.10 It may hold
    1) always, withoutqualification,as in 'God is alive' 2) as long as the
    essence of the subject is existent,as in 'Socrates is an animal': Socrates
    does not always exist, and so thispropositionwill not always be true,
    since it asserts Socrates' presentexistence; yet, in the stretchof time
    5 Al-Najt
    Al-Isharat
    wa'l Tanbihat
    andRemarks),
    ed.
    14,21-15,4;
    (TheBookofDirectives
    S. Dunya,Cairo1947,306,1-12(trans.&comm.A.-M.Goichon,
    Le livre
    desdirectives
    etremarques
    , Paris1951).
    6 Al-Najt
    17,4-8.
    7 Al-Najt
    17,4;20,2-3.
    8 Al-Najt17,17-18,13;
    On Interpretation
    33,11-35,7;Aristotle,
    Al-Qiyas
    13; Prior
    1.13.
    Analytics
    9 Al-Najt
    17,4-5;Al-Qjys
    32,7.
    10Al-Najt
    Al-Ishrt
    20,5-21,6;
    21,13-23,15;
    32,8-33,8;
    Al-Qys
    310,1-316,7;
    Mantiq
    Al-Mushriqiyyn
    (Logicoj theOrientals
    ), Cairo 1973,71,11-72,6.
    219

    09:02:05 AM

    in which Socrates does exist, it is always true. Avicenna remarksthat


    these two senses of necessityhave a common structure,since 'as long
    as the essence of the subject is existent' is the common condition that
    must be satisfiedin each.11 This common condition constitutesstrict
    necessity, properlyspeaking.
    The last four cases all share the featurethat the stretchof time is
    determinedby when the termsof the propositionhold of the subject.
    3) A necessarypredicationmay hold as long as the essence of the subject is trulydescribed by the subject term, as in 'every white thing
    stands out in sight'. Here, the subject, say, a post, can exist without
    being white, but, as long as it is white, it necessarily stands out in
    sight. So here the subject always has the predicated attributeduring
    only a portion of its existence, namely, during the predication of the
    subject term.
    Now it followsthat whatever is necessary strictlywill be necessary
    in thisway too. For, if S is P as long as the thingthat is S exists, then
    S is P as long as that thing is described by 'S'. However, not conversely: a necessityof the thirdcase that is not necessary strictlywill
    describe an accidental necessityof the subject; once it happens to be
    S, it is necessarilyP thereby,but that necessityneed be only accidental, since the subject need not be S.
    4) A necessarypredicationmay hold as long as the predicate is existent, i.e., as long as the predication holds, as in 'Socrates necessarily
    walks when he walks': given that Socrates is walking, it is necessary
    that he is walking; in those stretchesof his career when he walks, he
    is always walking. Here the subject term, 'S', names the thingthat is
    the subject. To say here that S is P necessarilymeans that S has the
    attributeof being P as long as it has it. The fourthcase of necessity
    will then hold of accidental as well as of essential predications.
    Predications that are necessary in the first two ways will be
    necessaryin thisway too. Likewise, what is necessaryin the thirdway
    will be necessaryin the fourth.All threeofthesecases share the feature
    that once the subject is determinedit always has its attributesas long
    as it has them. However, what is necessary in the fourthway is not
    necessary in either of the firsttwo ways; just take an accidental
    predication,like 'Socrates walks'. Nor again in the thirdway: even if
    Socrates is always walking when he is walking, it does not followthat
    11Al-Najt
    20,10-1;Al-Qys
    31,15-32,6.
    220

    09:02:05 AM

    Socrates is always walking as long as the subject is named 'Socrates'.12


    The last two distinctionsboth concern predicates that must hold of
    the subject itself,not merelyof it under a description,unlike the third
    case. Unlike the fourthcase, here in both cases the predication cannot
    hold merelyby accident. Further,unlike the firsttwo cases, the stretches of time for which both predications hold are intermittentand
    discontinuous.
    Avicenna distinguishestwo cases. 5) These predications may hold
    in periods of time that are fixed and determinate,past, present, and
    future,as in 'the moon has eclipses by necessity': forthe moon is not
    always eclipsed, but it is so at definitetimes. Still, the moon is not
    eclipsed permanently,but only forshortperiods of time at great intervals. But, duringthose periods of eclipse, it is eclipsed necessarilyand
    not merelyby accident. Those periods are definite,and follow from
    the nature of the moon and the heavens.13
    6) Somtimes those periods of time forwhich the predication holds
    are required and fixed, but are less definite,as in 'Socrates breathes
    (inhales)' : Socrates must breathe during a stretchof time, because he
    is a human being, but when in particularduring that stretchof time
    is leftopen.
    So, unlike the fourth case, the fifthand sixth cases deal with
    predicatesthat have to be not accidental but essential or inseparable
    attributes{propria
    ) of the subject. Avicenna remarks that what is
    necessaryin the fifth(and also the sixth?) sense will also be necessary
    in the fourthsense: e.g., the moon is necessarilyeclipsed as long as
    12Aninteresting
    like'theoneseatedwalkswhen
    puzzlecanbe raisedaboutexamples
    hewalks'or'thewhiteisblackwhenitisblack'.Clearly
    thisis necessary
    inthefourth
    is restricted
    toholding
    way.Butwhataboutin thethirdway?Thenthepredication
    in onlythosetimeswhenthesubjectis described
    bythesubjectterm,e.g., whileit
    is seatedorwhite.Butduringthoseperiodsthereneverwillarisean occasionwhere
    thepredicate
    to thesubjectterm('walks'to 'seated';
    trulyarises,as it is contrary
    'black'to'white').So suchpropositions
    seemtoholdvacuously.
    But,as I shalldiscuss
    further
    hasan existential
    condition
    forthetruth
    of
    below,Avicenna
    generally
    import
    a proposition.
    Can a proposition
    be trueforwhichthereneverexistsa truthmaker?
    ForAvicenna,
    not.
    apparently
    Unliketheotherfivesensesdistinguished,
    thefourth
    senseseemsto concern
    the
    andnotthething,
    andnotdere.However
    Avicenna
    does
    proposition
    i.e., tobededicto
    notidentify
    thefourth
    senseas beingofa specialtype.I shalldiscussthedere- dedicto
    distinction
    issuebelowin VIII.
    13Perhaps
    notfrom
    thequiddities
    inthemselves,
    butfrom
    theminsofar
    as theyhave
    cometoexistin matter
    withtheirconcomitant
    attributes.
    See belowp.
    inseparable
    240.
    221

    09:02:05 AM

    it is eclipsed.14 But not viceversa: for Socrates need not be walking


    when he is walking; it is not determinedthathe walk at any time. The
    fourthcase allows accidental predication; the fifthand sixthcases do
    not. Further, necessity in the fifthor sixth way does not require
    necessityin the thirdway, since, in the former,the predicationholds
    discontinuously, as long as the subject exists; in the latter, continuouslyduring the stretchof time when the subject termholds of the
    subject. Again, because of this discontinuity,what is necessaryin the
    fifthor sixthway is not necessary in the firstor second, although the
    converse does hold, trivially.
    IV
    Avicenna has distinguishedthese six sortsof necessityin accordance
    with certain texts in Aristotle and doctrines in his Greek commentators. He seems to work fromthe work ofJohn Philoponus the most
    closely. This is not surprising, given that Avicenna also follows
    Philoponus when dealing with space and corporeity.15
    As forthe antecedentsof Avicenna' s division of modalityin Aristotle, the firsttwo modes concern Aristotle's simple necessity,with the
    distinction based on Aristotle's division of perishable and
    imperishablesubstance.16The thirdcase is peraccidensnecessity.17The
    fourthmode is tied to the discussion in On theHeavens1.12, where
    Aristotleclaims that in a hypotheticalsense, it is necessary that the
    seated Socrates sit, even though it is possible, in an absolute sense,
    that at that time he be walking about.18 The fifthand sixthcases are
    distinguished in accordance with the PosteriorAnalytics.19Still,
    Avicenna has not obedientlyheeded all ofAristotle'sremarks.Indeed,
    in his list he disregards Aristotle's tripartitedivision of necessity in
    PartsofAnimals1.1 and the division of teleological necessityin Physics
    II. 9. Further,as faras I can tell, neitherAristotlenor the Greek commentators gives this sixfolddivision in its entirety.
    14Al-Qjyas
    33,3-8.
    15The question
    s viewsis ofcourseenormous,
    sourcesofAvicenna'
    ofthehistorical
    I do notmoreherethanpointto a fewkeytexts;I
    and enormously
    complicated.
    a couplein theAppendix.
    translate
    16Aristotle,
    XII. 1; OntheHeavens
    1.12.
    Metaphysics
    17Physics
    II. 3; Metaphysics
    V.2.
    18281b8-15; cf.OnInterpretation
    19a23-8.
    19Posterior
    95a32.
    11.12,especially
    Analytics
    222

    09:02:05 AM

    v
    Avicenna consistentlyaffirmsthe point that necessitystrictlyspeaking is given in the firsttwo cases, which have a common structure.To
    say that it is necessarythat S is P claims that the thingreferredto by
    'S' is P as long as that thingexists. The only differencebetween these
    two cases lies in whetheror not the subject always exists.20
    The othercases of necessityare derivative.Avicenna holds thatsuch
    necessary propositions do not differ significantly from their
    categorical,non-modal counterparts.Thus, we may gain more insight
    into those cases of necessary propositionsby looking at what he says
    about categorical propositions in general.21
    Note that this issue, of the differencebetween universal categorical
    and necessary propositions,is a serious one for Aristotelianscience:
    forAristotelianscience requires necessarypremises,but inductionand
    experience yields only universal generalizations. So how are we to
    make transitionfrom the universal to the necessary, and from the
    syllogisticof the PriorAnalyticsto the demonstrationsof the Posterior
    ?22
    Analytics
    Avicenna distinguishestwo views on the truthconditions required
    for universal affirmativecategorical propositions held in late Greek
    philosophy,one championed by Theophrastus, and the otherby Alexander of Aphrodisias.23He claims thathis own view synthesizesthese,
    which he says indeed agree about the specificationof the subject: in
    'every S is P', the claim is about the thingthatis S, but the categorical
    proposition does not specifywhether the referenceis to the entire
    existenceof that thing,or to it only while it has the attributeof being
    S.24 He says thatthe two views differonly about how permanentlythe
    predicationis supposed to hold: whetherthe predicate has to hold of
    the subject, once determined, always, in any of the six modes of
    20Al-Najt
    25,8-10;Al-Qtys
    33,8-10.
    21Al-Qiys
    In An.Pr.43,15-7.
    33,8.On thisissuecf.Philoponus,
    22Aristotle
    thatwe graspfirst
    induc99b20-100a9,
    says,Posterior
    Analytics
    principles
    Butfirst
    aresupposedto be indubitable
    andnecessary,
    so howdo
    tively.
    principles
    we eliminate
    thedoubt?Thisproblem
    is commonly
    in theAristotelian
    recognized
    De Propositionibus
    Necessariis
    tradition;
    see,e.g.,Zabarella,
    , in Opera
    , Frankfurt
    Logica
    1623,368.
    23Al-Najt
    23,4-5;Al-Qys
    24,1-26,14;
    28,4-29,9;31,11-2.
    The Greektextsforthisclaimare scanty,
    butsee Alexander
    ofAphrodisias,
    In
    Aristotelis
    Priorm
    Librum
    I Commentarium,
    ed. M. Wallies,Berlin1883,
    Analyticorum
    36,28-9;156,29-157,2;
    158,8-10.
    24Al-Najt
    23,9-14;Al-Qtys
    20,15-21,5;
    26,10-27,9.
    223

    09:02:05 AM

    necessitydiscussed above, (so Alexander), or not always but only at


    some time (so Theophrastus).25 Avicenna himselftends to side with
    Theophrastus here, because Aristotleseems to assertthatpropositions
    like 'every horse is asleep' and 'no horse is asleep' are true iftheyhold
    merely at an instant of time (ut nunc or kata chronon)although not
    always.26
    Now let us fix on the differencebetween the necessary and the
    categorical. There will be some categorical propositionsthat are not
    necessary strictly:the ut nuncpropositions. Yet even these will be
    necessary in the thirdor fourthmodes. The only differencebetween
    a categorical proposition and its necessary counterpartin such cases
    seems to lie in the latter's stressingand stating explicitlyand more
    preciselyjust how the predication is intended to hold.27
    Why, then, bring in such cases of necessary propositions at all?
    Presumably to offera method whereby to select categorical propositions forAristoteliandemonstrativescience. Moreover, as I shall suggest, to emphasize the differencebetween essence (the quiddity in
    itself) and being (existence in re or in intellectu).
    VI
    Avicenna may appear to errwhen he says thatthe last fourdivisions
    concern propositions where "the mode" forms parts of the
    44
    predicate.28For the mode" (al-jihat) is the expression that he uses to
    signifythe modality.29By 'forms part of the predicate', Avicenna
    might appear to mean that the predicate term contains the modality,
    so that, e.g., the predicate of 'Socrates breathesnecessarily' would be
    'breathes necessarily'. But neitherhe nor Aristotleshows any inclination to recognize such terms in premises in the syllogistic.Perhaps
    then he means, rather,only thatthe specificationof the period of time
    during which the modalityhas to hold is on the side of the predicate.
    But the firstthree cases of necessitydistinguishedby Avicenna have
    the featurethat the subject and the period during which the predication has to hold is determinedindependentlyof the predicate. In contrast,in the last threecases, thatdeterminationcan be made only after
    25Al-Najt
    24,14-5.
    26Al-Najt
    34b7-ll.
    23,7-9;cf.Prior
    Analytics
    27Al-Najat
    21,6-7;Al-Qiyas
    33,8.
    28Al-Najt
    21,6-13.
    29Al-Najt
    16,6.
    224

    09:02:05 AM

    the predicate is given as well. So then, why group the last fourcases
    togetherand make this claim about them?
    We have seen that Avicenna wants to group those four cases
    togetherbecause they are not strictlynecessary and thus belong to
    what is properlycategorical. Perhaps he has been careless in using the
    term"mode". The point is thatthelast fourmodes all require, strictly
    speaking, a stipulationof the period of time forwhich the predication
    is to hold, in addition to the fixingof the subject by the subject term.
    I.e., the last fourcases share the featureof stipulatinga period of time
    that is a proper part of the time period during which the subject
    exists.30That stipulation,made explicit, becomes- more accurately,
    replaces- the modality. Avicenna then could be saying merely that
    these last fourcases have an additional stipulation,and that is part of
    the predicate. Indeed, Avicenna does say that in the sense that 4it is
    necessary that every S is P' means 'everythingthat is described as
    being S, as long as it is existent,is described as P, as long as it is P',
    the predicate is 'P, as long as it is P'.31 So Avicenna here locates the
    temporal specificationon the side of the predicate; likewise, Aristotle
    says thatthe significationof time is proper to the verb and so thistemporal specificationtoo will belong to the predicate.32
    The text is obscure. Yet Avicenna may be saying something
    interestinghere: the modal specificationmust be kept away fromthe
    subject so as not to complicate the ontology. For a determinationof
    the subject termtypicallychanges the referenceof the original subject
    term to some type of part of the subject.33By keeping restrictionson
    the stretchof time on the side of the predicate, he then has a way of
    giving a single account for all types of necessity: in all six cases, the
    necessityconcerns what holds during the whole or some part of the
    career of the subject. In effect,Avicenna may be insistingthat whole
    substances be subjects, not temporal parts or time-slicesof subjects,
    as he would be ifthe modal/temporalspecificationwere on the side of
    the subject. For, as we shall see in VIII & XI, the subject will turn
    out to be a quiddityin itselfthat has come to exist, in reor in intellectu
    ,
    30So incontrast,
    Avicenna
    seemstoimplythatinthefirst
    twocasesthemodality
    is
    noton thesideofthepredicate
    buton thesideofthesubject.Or, moresimply,
    he
    mayholdonlythatin thefirsttwocases thereis not any additional
    temporal
    specification.
    31Al-Qys
    42,3-6;Al-Najt
    21,10-3.
    32Aristotle,
    OnInterpretation
    16b6-9.
    33Suchis thetraditional
    view.See AllanBck,OnReduplication
    , [forthcoming].
    225

    09:02:05 AM

    to which the predicate, another such quiddity,is attached. The proposition then asserts that this attachmentexists, during some stretchof
    time. The temporal determination then gives the stretch of time
    during which the predication is supposed to hold.
    VII
    Avicenna complicates his view by distinguishingtwo senses of contingency. As we have seen, Avicenna does recognize one-sided
    possibilityas well. In this sense, a propositionmay be necessary and
    possible.34But his usual sense of the possible is the two-sided,the contingent.He says thatthe contingentis thatwhich is not necessarybut
    which, assumed to exist, leads to no absurdity.35He does not say that
    the contingenthas to exist sometime. Rather, he stipulatesonly that
    it not be necessary, and that, if it be posited to exist, no impossibility
    results.
    Avicenna at times distinguishestwo senses of the contingent.36In
    the firstsense, he says, the contingentconcernsa subject (S) thatexists
    now, where its attribute(P) is neithernecessarynor impossible. Here
    the predication of T' of 'S' is contingentwith respect to the present
    moment; no attentionis paid to whetheror not the subject will exist
    at some futuretime.37In this sense, the possible or contingentis more
    inclusive than the actual. Only the relation of subject and predicate
    matters; the proposition is contingent if that relation is accidental,
    regardlessof whetherit in factholds, eithernow or in the future.That
    is, 'it is contingentthat S is now P' is true regardlessof whetherS is
    P or S is not P, so long as S exists now and P is an accident of S.
    In the second sense, Avicenna says that 'it is contingentthat every
    S is P' ifand only ifthereis a time at which the claim thateverything
    that is described in act as being S is also P is neithernecessary nor
    34Al-Qtys
    35,6.
    35Al-Najt25,21-2;Al-Qjys
    In
    33,11-4.See PriorAnalytics
    32al8-20;Alexander,
    AnPr. 156,19-20.
    36See Alexander,In An Pr. 161,6-9;165,18,Aristotle,
    PriorAnalytics
    32b23;
    La logique
    in: Archives
    1048bl0-8.A.-M. Goichon,
    d'Avicenne,
    d'histoire,
    Metaphysics
    doesnotrecognize
    thatAvicenna
    16(1948),pp. 58-9,takestheposition
    contingency
    in thenatureof things.
    as an "ontological
    modality",but onlyas a condition
    appearsin hismodallogicanyway.
    Perhaps,butcontingency
    37
    41,7;
    319,5;319,17-9;322,7;Mantiq73,4-7;Al-Najt
    33,13-5;Al-Ishrt
    Al-Qys
    In AnPr. 59,15-7.
    42,6-7.Cf. Philoponus,
    226

    09:02:05 AM

    impossible.38This time in question typicallyif not always is a future


    time; it must be indefiniteand not specify,unlike the fifthand sixth
    cases of the necessary,particularsubjects at particulartimes. What is
    actual is not contingentin this sense.39Rather, the subject in such a
    contingentstatementitselfmay exist or may not exist. Contingency
    in thissense is independentof the presentstate of the subject (the S 's)
    but is tied to the future.40
    What Avicenna means here has its obscurities. It appears that this
    second sense of contingencyis a radical sense, where no attentionat
    all is paid to present(and past) contingentfacts. In contrast,in the
    firstsense, attentionis paid to those facts,and so existentialimportat
    a definitetime is required- and so one of the categorical statements
    (' S is P'; 'S is not P') that are the correlatesof the contingentstatement ('S is contingentlyP') will be true: categorical, accidental
    predicationis being made.41 However, in the second sense, the contingentstatementmay be truewithouteitherof its categoricalcounterparts being true: 'S is P' and 'S is not P' are both false forAvicenna
    when S does not exist; he takes the existentialimportcondition as an
    explicit truthcondition for the truthof a proposition.42
    Avicenna contraststhesetwo senses of the contingentin a discussion
    of the example, 'Zayd is sitting'.43While Zayd is sitting,I may say
    that it is contingentthat Zayd is sitting- i.e., that the present circumstance is neithernecessarynor impossible: presumably I may say
    thiseven when Zayd is standingand not sittingnow. That is the first
    sense. In the second, I may say now, while Zayd is sitting,that it is
    contingentthatZayd sits, in the sense that in the future,at some time
    leftindeterminate,that state of affairsmay be realized, or may not:
    Zayd may not even exist in the future.Avicenna denies that 'Zayd is
    sitting' is contingentin the second sense.44 Perhaps his point is that
    the second sense is ruled out when the existentialimportof the subject
    is established. So, given that Zayd is sittingnow, contingencyin the
    second sense does not obtain. Yet if we ignore Zayd' s present
    38Al-Qtys
    Al-lsharat
    33,15-34,2;
    320,3-8;Mantiq73,10-3;Al-Najat
    19,15-22.
    39Al-Qys
    34,7-10.
    40Al-Qtyas
    In AnPr.59,17;60,3-5.
    34,11-2.Cf. Philoponus,
    41Mantiq71,12-4.
    42Mantiq72,9-10.Foran
    ofAvicenna's
    ofpredication
    sec Allan
    exposition
    theory
    onExistence
    oftheHistory
    ofPhilosophy,
    XXV.5 (1987).
    Bck,Avicenna
    , in:Journal
    43Al-Qys
    34,7-35,7.
    34,8-10,butcf.34,12-5wherehe seemsto saythatitis: he says,in that
    Al-Qyas
    caseat least?,thatthetwosensesaredistinct
    butinseparably
    trueorfalsetogether.
    227

    09:02:05 AM

    existence, or note that he may not exist now, or if we consider his


    future status, contingency in the second sense does obtain.45 This
    second sense resembles Aristotle's attitudesabout sea battle and the
    example, 'the cloak may or not be cut up in the future'; indeed, the
    cloak may not even exist tomorrowto be cut up or not.46
    Avicenna also says that 'Zayd breathes' is not contingentin the
    second sense of contingencybut in the firstsense.47For here there is
    a definitesubject, that actually exists. This example differsfromthe
    previous example, 'Zayd is sitting'. As we have seen, Avicenna uses
    4a man breathes' as an
    example of the sixthcase of the necessary. So,
    that
    he
    must breathe at some time. Yet he need not
    exists,
    given
    Zayd
    be breathingnow. So his breathingnow is contingentin the firstsense.
    Further, although Avicenna does not say so explicitly,he seems to
    hold that it is also contingentin the second sense that Zayd breathes
    in the future,as it is contingentthat he will continue to exist.
    So the firstsense of the contingentrequires existentialimportof the
    subject term at some time; the second sense does not. In the first
    sense, if it is contingentthat S is P, then either S is P or S is not P.
    But not in the second sense: since S may not at all exist in the future,
    4S is P' and 'S is not P' will both be
    false, if S never exists. Indeed,
    in the latter sense, somethingcontingentneed not exist at all.48
    Avicenna may here have in mind the distinctionbetween internal
    and external possibilitymade by Aristotlein PriorAnalytics1. 13.49 'It
    is contingent that S is P' may mean 1) P contingentlybelongs to
    everything to which S belongs or 2) P contingentlybelongs to
    everything to which S contingentlybelongs. If so, his discussion
    followsthe lead of Philoponus who distinguishesthe contingentinto
    the definiteand the indefinite,and connectsthe formerwiththe internally possible, with what is for the most part ( epi topolu), with what
    is already in reality,and with the categorical, and connects the latter
    with the externallypossible, with what is not for the most part, and
    with what is not yet in realitybut mightbe in the future.50
    45Al-Ishrt
    221,1-6.
    46OnInterpretation
    19al3-3; 22b34,and,perhaps,
    Nicomachean
    Ethics1114al5-22.
    47Al-Qys
    35,3-5.
    48Al-Qjys
    distinction
    ofweak
    35,11;35,16-36,1;
    Mantiq71,14-5;73,5-7.A similar
    versusstrong
    in modern
    contingency
    appears
    logic.
    4y32b25-30;cf.Alexander,
    In AnPr. 166,5-25.
    50Philoponus,
    In AnPr. 59,15-20;61,12-20;154,29-155,2;
    155,11-2;In Aristotelis
    Commentario,
    InAnPr.
    , ed. H. Vitelli,Berlin1887-8,267,1.AlsoAlexander,
    Physicos
    228

    09:02:05 AM

    Avicenna' s discussion of contingencyis obscure. It has the unfortunate featureof using examples with singular terms,which do not fit
    this distinctionwell: forsingular termsparticular issues of existential
    importarise. He may be motivated to use singular termsto connect
    the distinctionwith the question of futurecontingents- the sea battle
    of On Interpretation
    9. For such futurecontingentstatementsas 'it is
    possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow' may be considered
    contingentin the second sense. In such cases the subject termmay fail
    to referever. On the otherhand, contingentstatementsmay deal with
    subjects actuallyexistingat some time, and claim that certain of their
    attributesdo not belong to them necessarily. In the firstsense, it is
    contingentthat Zayd is sittingor walking, as long as a furthercondition is not attached: i.e., a condition stipulatingthat Zayd is sitting
    or standingnow. For, ifthatconditionwere attached, then the proposition would become necessary in the fourthsense detailed above in
    HI.
    VIII
    There may arise the temptationto take strictnecessity,as being on
    the side of the subject, as de re, and the derivativenecessity,common
    to categorical propositions too, as de dicto.After all, the derivative,
    common necessityconcerns the predication, or the dictum.Further,
    Avicenna in the traditionof the Stoic lekton
    , stresses the conceptual
    level of the ma'nan or intentio.
    Then, predicational necessitywould be
    tied to the purely conceptual level, and so be de dicto, while necessity
    fixed solely by the reference of the intention would be de re. So
    Avicenna may be appearing to make a distinctionof de reand de dicto
    modalityhere.
    But this correlationhas flaws. Usually, a proposition is considered
    to be necessary de dictowhen it is true by definition, as in 'every
    bachelor is necessarilyunmarried'. Here analysis of the subject concept generatesthe necessity.In contrast,de renecessity(if thereis such
    a thing)depends on more than the analysis of the concept; e.g., 'every
    theseconnections,
    hadcollected
    andrun
    39,18-21;162,1-6.(Bymaking
    Philoponus
    - perhapslegitimately
    - severaldistinctions
    madeby Aristotle
    in different
    together
    places.)
    thisdistinction
    oftwotypesofcontingency
    obscure,
    Although
    maywellresemble
    themodern
    distinction
    ofweakand strong
    See MartinDavies,Meaning,
    modality.
    , London1981,pp. 213-4.
    Quantification,
    Necessity
    229

    09:02:05 AM

    body necessarilyhas weight' (probably false, but still de re according


    to Kant).
    Now for Avicenna the strictlynecessary propositions, based on
    definitionsholding throughoutthe career of the subject, will contain
    those predications here described as de dicto. Thus Avicenna' s
    necessarypredicationson the side of the predicatelook more de rethan
    those on the side of the subject. Likewise, the necessary propositions
    of the last four cases, based instead on the predication of inessential
    attributes,might be then taken to correspond to the de re.
    So we might turn about and make a case for a correspondence
    between the de dictoand Avicenna's distinctionof strictmodality(the
    firsttwo cases), and between the de reand derivativemodality,dependent on the predication. Still I have some qualms. First, as we shall
    see in XI, Avicenna views all modalitiesto deal withpredicationand
    to be grounded in the relation of one quiddity to another. Again, as
    we shall see in X, Avicenna recognizes two sorts of existence, in re
    Existentsof eithersortmay constitutethe referenceof
    and in intellectu.
    a universal term and may illustrate all six types of necessity. This
    approach does not look congenial to a sharp division of the linguistic
    level of the dictumand the thing-levelof the res.Third, in all six cases
    of necessity,Avicenna has the basic structureof a predicationapplying
    to a subject during some period of its existence. The six cases differ
    only in what that period is and how it is determined. This approach
    looks radically realist. Finally, the correlationdoes not work well in
    particularcases of sense distinguished.Like cases 1 and 2, case 3 looks
    de dicto: the thing is taken under a certain description, and then a
    necessary featureof that descriptionis predicated of it. Case 4 looks
    de dicto: surelyit is trivialthatevery many walks when he walks. Likewise cases 5 and 6 can be seen as followingfromthe meaning of the
    terms.
    So I do not take Avicenna to make a de re- de dictodistinctionof
    modality. He does make a distinction of the determinationof the
    modality by the subject or by the predicate. Perhaps, then, we might
    reformulatethe de re- de dictodistinctionto distinguishwhat holds in
    virtue of real definition,on the level of quiddities in themselves,and
    what holds in virtue of nominal definition,on the level of quiddities
    in the mind.51This distinctionmay anticipate or be isomorphicwith
    51Cf. Aristotle,
    Posterior
    92b5-8;93b29-32;94all-4.
    Analytics
    230

    09:02:05 AM

    thatdistinction,but the two do not clearlyappear identical: again consider the fifthand sixth cases.
    IX
    Anotherissue to be resolved concerns the principleof plenitude. As
    we have seen, at firstAvicenna has apparently taken the common
    Aristoteliantemporalattitudetowards the modalities: the necessaryis
    what holds always. Then the possible or contingentwould be what
    holds neitheralways nor never. But then, if not never, ifit is possible
    that S is P, then at some time S is P. Hence every possibilitymust
    occur. Here Avicenna seems to identifythe modal and the temporal
    operators.
    However, Avicenna does not seem to accept this consequence. We
    have seen Avicenna clearlyadmittingpossibilitiesthatdo not occur at
    any time especially those that are contingentin the second sense.
    Hence he rejects a strongprinciple of plenitude: at any rate, not all
    singular possibilitiesneed occur.
    Further, in his discussion of the universal, Avicenna recognizes
    purelyuniversalpossibilitiesthatneed not exist in re.Propositionsmay
    be satisfiedby thingsthat have existence in the intellectonly, and not
    in re (or, as he puts it, 44existence in individuals").52 This remark
    seems to agree withhis view of the universal,where he says thata term
    like 'the sun' is a universal even though therehas been and will be in
    factonly one sun, and, likewise, 'heptagonal house' is universal even
    thoughtheremay never be at any time such a house.33 But he claims
    thatsuch termsare universal because the mind is not preventedfrom
    supposing them to be predicated of many.
    Avicenna holds thatexpressionslike 'heptagonal house' are universal, as they can be predicated of many individuals. But there may
    never, at any time, exist in reany individual heptagonal houses. Still,
    even then, the intellectmay suppose such individuals to exist. Such
    suppositionsufficesto satisfythe requirementthat a universal be said
    of many. Hence such expressionsare universal. Thus, Avicenna con52Al-Qtys
    21,6;30,2-4.
    53Ilhiyyt
    (Metaphysics
    ), ed. Anawatiet al., Cairo 1960,195,11-196,3
    ( = Met. 86v
    col. 1); [I indicate
    ofOpera
    themedievalLatintranslation
    Avicennae
    parenthetically
    edition
    ofthis,
    (Venice1508;repr.Frankfurt
    1961)whenavailable;thereis a critical
    ed. S. Van Riet,Louvain1977,withthesamepagination.].
    Also cf. Aristotle,
    OntheHeavens
    1.9.
    1040a28-b2;
    Metaphysics
    231

    09:02:05 AM

    eludes that, in the logical sense, the universal is that which it is possible to predicate of many.54 An external cause may prevent this
    possibility,but it is a consistent,legitimatepossibility.
    Once again, Avicenna has denied a strongprinciple of plenitude:
    but this time not forsingulars but foruniversais. It is contingentthat
    some houses, or all houses, be heptagonal, since the combination of
    'house' and 'heptagonal' is neithernecessary nor impossible. Further
    this possibilityobtains, even when no heptagonal house exists in reat
    any time. Here Avicenna has divorced modality fromtime.
    So, on the one hand, Avicenna seems to identifythe modalitieswith
    time, and connects'necessary' and 'always', 'impossible' and 'never',
    'possible' and 'sometimes so, sometimesnot'. Yet, on the otherhand,
    he recognizes possibilities that are never actualized. How might we
    resolve this apparent contradiction?It is easy to say that Avicenna' s
    position is incoherent, because he had adopted Aristotle's position
    which itselfis incoherent, or because he has conjoined a temporal
    Aristotelian view with a timeless neo-Platonist view of modality.
    Beforetakingthisroute, let us make the more difficultmove oflooking
    at his views more closely.
    Indeed, note that Avicenna has not stated an equivalence of
    modalities and temporalities explicitly. As we have seen, he does
    endorse the followinginferences:
    If necessary, always.55
    If sometimes so, sometimes not, contingent.56
    If impossible, never, [indirect:substitute'-p' for'p' in 'if necessary
    p. ']
    But Avicenna denies the following inferences explicitly in some
    passages, althoughhis wording in yet othersmay seem to implythese
    consequences:
    If always, necessary.57
    If contingent,sometimes so, sometimes not.58
    If never, impossible, [substitute'-p' for 'p'].
    54llahiyyt
    , 196,4-5( = Met. 86vcol. 1); Al-Madkhal
    26,9;29,1( = Log.3v col. 1; 3v
    col. 2).
    55Al-Qtys,
    32,7.
    56Al-Qtys,
    73,11-3;Al-Ishrt
    , 280, 14.
    57Al-shrt,
    thatthequestion
    whether
    ornotthere
    323.1-3;at 329,9-12heremarks
    can be something
    is nota questionforthelogician
    alwayswithout
    beingnecessary
    to decide.
    58 Al-Qiyas
    35,1;Al-Isharat
    320,3-8;Al-Mantiq
    73,5-7.
    232

    09:02:05 AM

    This position does not sufficeto give temporal definitionsof the


    modalities. Indeed, there are possibilitiesthat never exist, as can be
    seen particularlyin the second sense of the contingent.
    It is easy to misread his position. A good example occurs when he
    44
    says that it is said" thatthe contingentis what does not exist no but
    will in the future.59He himselfdoes not necessarilyendorse thisview;
    notice how his own view, of the second sense of the contingentdiffers
    subtly fromit. To be sure, in this very passage, he asserts: if contingent, then neither necessary nor impossible; if necessary, then
    always; if impossible, never. But it does not thereforefollow: if contingentthen not always nor not never- that would be the fallacy of
    denying the antecedent.60
    So, despite appearances, Avicenna does not hold the strongprinciple of plenitude, sc., thatwhateveris possible must exist in reat some
    time, and that whatever is always is necessary.
    X
    However, mightnot Avicenna hold a weak principle of plenitude,
    that whateveris possible must exist in intellectu?
    I find his discussion
    obscure
    and
    difficult.
    Before
    to
    share
    quite
    proceeding
    my perplexities
    with you, let me merelylist the salient points. To be sure, Avicenna
    .61He also
    clearlyrecognizestwo sortsof existence: in reand in intellectu
    holds that some individuals at a given time may exist in intellectu
    without existing in re. Further, he says, there are individuals that have
    never existedin re- but whetherall these exist in intellectu
    is problematic. If Avicenna does hold thattheyall exist in intellectu
    , then he holds
    thisweak principleof plenitude; ifhe does not, then he does not hold
    it.
    Avicenna does claim that universal propositions may state
    predicates of individuals that have never existed in re. Thus he says
    that the categorical proposition, 'every B is A' deals with everything
    "that is described in view of the intellector existence as being B."62
    Apart fromany metaphysicalutility,thisdoctrinehas uses in accounting for the truth of mathematical propositions. So, e.g., 'every
    59Al-Najt
    15,2.
    60Likewiseat Al-Isharat
    Avicennagivesa commonconception
    of
    331,4-332,3,
    tiedtothetimeoftheexistence
    ofthesubject,
    andthenrejects
    itat 332,4-5.
    modality
    61Al-Madkhal
    15,2-3( = Lop.2rcol. 2).
    62Al-Najt
    24,12-3;Al-Ishrt
    326, 1-2.
    233

    09:02:05 AM

    chiliagon has more than 100 sides' refersto individual chiliagons but
    not to those that exist in re, but to those insofaras the intellectcredits
    them with actually existing,whetheror not theyexist or do not exist
    [in re].63In this way Avicenna explains how mathematicsdeals with
    individuals.
    So we may postulate individuals that never exist in re. For
    Avicenna, such a supposition of individuals sufficesforthe truthof a
    statementof possibility.He says that it is possible that every animal
    is man since it would have been possible to imagine a time in which
    there is no animal but man.64 We may establish the possibilityby a
    mental process. To verifya contingentproposition,thinkof the quiddities of subject and predicate, and note that theyare consistentwith,
    but not inseparable from,each other. We may then suppose that at
    some time a certainrelationholds betweenthem.65Then we may have
    some sortof mental experience of that state of affairs,in imagination
    or perhaps in pure thought. Thus, e.g., 'every chiliagon has more
    than 100 sides' mightcome to hold of the appropriate individuals. It
    is in thisfashionthatwe saw in IX Avicenna establishingthe univer
    salityof an expressionlike heptagonal house' even when it never has
    any instances existing in re. Likewise, the second sense of the contingentdiscussed in VII bases the truthof a contingentproposition
    in supposing a futurestate of affairs.
    So a contingentproposition about some state of affairsthat at no
    time exists in remay be verifiedthrougha mental process: individuals
    of the appropriate attributesare supposed or imagined to exist. It
    mightbe thoughtthat Avicenna holds that individuals recognized by
    For the intellectdoes imagine or
    mental supposition exist in intellectu.
    suppose instances of them. To be sure, Avicenna is famous forhaving
    a notion of the creative imagination whereby we may have mental
    experiences of phantasms, built up out of simplerreal elements given
    by sense experience. These phantasms themselvesmay never represent things that exist in re, but still they themselves, as mental
    If so, then Avicenna is admitting a
    experiences, exist in intellectu.
    weaker principle of plenitude: all that is possible must exist in
    - but not the strong principle that all that is possible must
    intellectu
    63Al-Qtys
    21,6-12.
    64Al-Qtys
    form
    intheir
    usestheseexamples
    30,10-1.NotethatAristotle
    categorical
    ofcertain
    oftheinvalidity
    at Prior
    1.42,as wellas whengivinginstances
    Analytics
    themas useless.
    butthendismisses
    modicalsyllogisms,
    65Al-Qys
    30,2-3;31, 1-2.
    234

    09:02:05 AM

    exist in re. This weaker principle has had many adherents, given the
    common identificationof the possible and the conceivable.
    Yet the hypothesisthat Avicenna holds that whatever the intellect
    has some problems. First, what
    supposes to exist exists in intellectu
    about suppositionscontraryto fact,especiallythose used in reductions
    and
    to absurdity?Then logical contradictionswould exist in intellectu
    so be possible and not impossible! Second, this approach seems to tie
    logical possibilitytoo closelyto psychologicalfactsand aptitudes. The
    intellectmay or may not suppose an individual withcertainattributes.
    So which possibilitiesobtain seems to depend on what in particular
    presentlyexistentintellectsare thinkingabout. Or is the possible what
    it is possible for an intellect to suppose? This begs the question.
    (Maybe the existenceof an infinitedivine intellectremoves thisobjection, but 'conceivable' in any case is not a good definitionfor 'possible', as it itselfcontainsa modal operator: '-able', and so obscures this
    question.)
    Third, Avicenna often seems to make existence in intellectu
    derivativeupon sense perception: somethingdoes not exist in intellectu
    thathas not existedin re. Sense perceptionis a passive process whereby
    the formis abstractedfroma substance composed of formand matter
    where
    that exists in re. The abstractedformcomes to exist in intellectu
    a
    furtheraccidents, proper to being in intellectu
    like
    ,
    being species, are
    attachedto it.66Still, once in the intellect,the abstractedconcept has,
    as it were, a lifeofits own. Thus, 'Homer is a poet' is true, even when
    Homer has died: being a poet is predicated of a phantasm of Homer
    That phantasm was historicallyderived
    presentlyexistingin intellectu.
    fromsense perceptionsof the reallyexistingHomer and of real discussions about Homer. Moreover, the phantasm will be in an intellect
    thatpresentlyexists in re. What exists in intellectu
    , in this way at least,
    on
    in
    re.
    But
    then
    existence
    what
    the
    intellectsupposes
    past
    depends
    to exist now may not exist in intellectu
    , in this realisticway, at least:
    e.g., the supposition of a heptagonal house or a chiliagon, Avicenna
    says, is not based on past perceptionsof such individuals existing in
    re.But ifexistencein intellectu
    requires such propositionsand hence the
    existence in reof such individuals at some time, then individuals supposed or imagined by the intellectdo not exist in intellectu.
    66Al-Madkhal
    23,10;34,5;34,20;69,7( = Log.3r col. 2; 4v col. 1; 12v
    ( TheIsagoge)
    - dealswithOnIntercol. 1. On 'Homeris a poet',seeAl-Burhn
    (TheDemonstration
    ed.
    AffifT
    et
    Cairo
    Also
    see
    Allan
    on
    al.,
    1956,109,11-10,1.
    Bck,Avicenna
    pretation),
    Existence
    , pp. 359-60.
    235

    09:02:05 AM

    I am uncertainjust how faritems may existin intellectu


    forAvicenna
    withouthaving had counterpartsor some basis for existing in re. He
    does recognize intellectual intuition as well as sensible intuition.
    : the
    Indeed, he seems to admit two sources for existence in intellectu
    representation of things existing in re, either by immediate sense
    perception or by memory and imagination, or the cognition of
    intelligibles that do not need to have any representationof things
    existing in re.61Thus, we might suppose a heptagonal house or a
    chiliagon to exist withouthaving an image or phantasm of its existing
    in intellectu
    ,68We mightwant to say thatwhat existsin intellectu
    depends
    forits simple component parts on perceptionsof what exists in re, but
    not for the very nature of its complex whole. However, Avicenna
    seems to claim that we have knowledge of some quiddities and
    simples, especially the mathematical, withoutsense perception.69So
    not all the simple components of a complex existing in intellectu
    need
    have a correlate existing in re.
    We may conclude that,at best, Avicenna admits only a weak princiThe problem
    ple of plenitude: what is possible must exist in intellectu.
    lies in two areas: mental supposition and intellectual intuition. Do
    eitherof these sufficeto generate somethingexistingin intellectu
    ? I am
    inclined to say so, but, as I shall discuss in XI, what inevitably
    comes to exist in intellectu
    is the mental act of supposing or imagining
    or intuiting;what is the object or contentof that mental act need not
    exist in intellectu.
    However, I am still uncertain about just how much
    creative synthesisAvicenna will allow- and about what may exist in
    intellectu
    without existing in re, or at least having some basis existing
    in re. But stillin general Avicenna holds thatwhat is conceived exists
    in intellectu.
    Since Avicenna clearlyholds thatall possibilitiesare in the
    divine intellectof the necessarybeing, thisresultwould not be too surprising anyway. (But then, as we shall see in XIV, therearises that
    problem of how necessary being does not change if it contains all
    possibilities but actualizes only some of them.)
    XI
    In any case, regardless of how much might exist in intellectu
    ,
    Avicenna clearly says that from the logical point of view existence,
    67Al-Madkhal
    23,13-5[ = Loe. 3r col. 21.
    68Descartesseemsto havesimilar
    viewsinMeditations
    6.
    69De Anima
    V. 1-2,22vcol. 2.
    236

    09:02:05 AM

    nor in re,is considered. Rather, only the relationof


    neitherin intellectu
    and
    subject
    predicateis considered.70That is, logic deals withthe relation of concepts whose definitionsare determined by quiddities in
    themselves.71Now modalityis such a logical relation. Indeed, we have
    seen in III thatAvicenna definesthe modalities in termsof the relation of the predicate to the subject, not in termsof the relationof one
    existingthing to another. To be sure, most of our concepts used as
    subjectsand predicatesreferto existents.But not all need to referthus.
    So, fromthe logical point of view, only the definitionsof the subject
    and predicate are considered: if they are compatible, they are not
    impossible, and hence either necessary or contingent.For Avicenna,
    a considerationof items solely withrespectto theirdefinitionsfallson
    the level of quiddities or essence in themselves.72Here whetheror not
    thesequiddities exist, or what accidents theymighthave, is a separate
    issue.73
    So modalityis determinedon the level of quiddities in themselves.
    This doctrine dovetails with Avicenna's basic definition of the
    modalities, in termsof what followsfromsupposing a certain state of
    affairsto be the case.74 Here Avicenna may be seen to be making a
    sharp distinction of existence and essence: modality concerns the
    essences of things; the modality is determinedby the relation of two
    concepts solely in regard to their definition.75
    This distinctionbetween essence and existence has some problems.
    First,even thoughAvicenna says thatmodalities are determinedwith
    respect to the quiddities in themselves, he also says that logic deals
    with quiddities existing in intellectu.
    Indeed, all propositions, strictly
    speaking, should be viewed on that level. So, Avicenna seems to say,
    even when we say that S does not exist, we have a concept of S, and
    70Al-Madkhal
    etde
    de l'essence
    22,7-12{-Log. 3r col. 1); Goichon,La distinction
    IbnSn, Paris1957,p. 157.
    l'existence
    d'aprs
    71Al-Madkhal
    23,10;34,5( = Log.3rcol. 2; 4v col. 1).
    12Al-Madkhal
    discussion
    22,4-5;22,15( = Log.3rcol. 1); Al-Qtys
    30,3. ora fuller
    see AllanBck,Avicenna
    in
    : TheIslamicBackground
    andAverroes
    , in: Individuation
    Scholasticism
    , ed.J. Gracia[forthcoming].
    73Al-Madkhal
    21,9-10("Log. 3r col. 1).
    74Al-Ishrt
    327,6-8.
    75Especially
    inthefirst
    inthesecondsenseofthecontingent;
    sense,thereis existentialimport,
    below(p. 240),thisis duetothepredication
    relation
    but,I shallsuggest
    andnottothemodality.
    In contrast,
    ifweputasidethenecessary
    beingfornow,what
    existsis determined
    externalcausal relations.See Al-llhiyyt
    261,17-8
    through
    ( = Met.91vcol. 1).
    On thedistinction
    ofessenceand existence,
    seeAl-Ishrt
    261,17-8;262,9.
    237

    09:02:05 AM

    .76 So, Avicenna seems to say, modalities are


    that exists in intellectu
    determinedon the level of quiddities in themselves,but modal propositions belong to the level of quiddities existingin intellectu.
    But how
    can he make both of these claims?
    Second, the issue of how much Avicenna holds to exist in intellectu
    reappears. As we have seen in X, it is not clear how much Avicenna
    will allow to exist in intellectu.
    Now, if a concept of S exists in intellectu
    even when it is true that S does not exist, he seems to allow that
    anything,includingimpossibleobjects and conditionscontraryto fact,
    exists in intellectu.
    Then how can he establish the possibilityof a state
    of affairsthroughan act of mental supposition?For ifeverythingexists
    in intellectu
    and that suffices to establish possibility, then nothing
    should be impossible- but Avicenna claims that there are
    impossibilities.
    Both of these problems can be solved by making a distinctionconThe sense ( ma'nan) of a proposicerningquiddities existingin intellectu.
    but
    the
    tion existsin intellectu
    ,
    quiddities being conceived need not. So,
    the
    'some
    animal
    has fourfeet' exists in intellectu
    , but
    e.g.,
    proposition
    '
    'animal' and four-footed'referto quiddities existingin re' the animal
    is not in the mind; the thoughtabout the animal is in the mind. Like,
    wise, the modal proposition,qua modal proposition,exists in intellectu
    but not all of its constituentsand aspects need be based upon quidTo put thepoint in anotherway, a conceptor a propdities in intellectu.
    osition can be considered in two ways: as being a mental act and in
    termsof its contentor its object: what the concept is about. In the first
    in the second it generallydoes not exist in
    way, it exists in intellectu'
    unless
    it
    is
    about
    intellectu
    ,
    something that exists in intellectui.e.,
    unless it is a second intention,and not a primaryone. (Note that in
    a way whateverexists in intellectu
    will be based on somethingexisting
    in re: it is an actual intellector mind existingin rethatmakes it possible
    forconceptsto exist in intellectu;
    theremustbe a real conceiverforthere
    to be concepts.)
    So then,modal propositionsmay exist in intellectu
    , even thoughtheir
    modal characteristicsmay be determinedon the level of quiddities in
    themselves. For us to thinkand talk about quiddities in themselves,
    we must be on the level of quiddities existing in intellectu.Still,
    although quiddities in themselvesmay be manifestedor represented
    76Ilhiyyt
    15,4-16
    32,12-6;33,12-3;34,1-2;34,7-8 Met.72v col. 1-2);Al-Madkhal
    ( = Log.2rcol. 2).
    238

    09:02:05 AM

    on thatlevel, it does not followthat theyexist in intellectu'


    ratheronly
    their concepts or propositionsabout them do.
    Likewise, this distinctionoffersa partial guide to what exists in
    We may talk about impossible objects, and our talk about
    intellectu.
    them exists in intellectu.
    But it does not follow that impossible objects
    have an existence in intellectu.
    Hence Avicenna says that the concept
    of S, in 'S does not exist', exists in intellectu.
    But it does not follow
    therebythat this S exists in intellectu.
    Nevertheless, this distinctionprovides only a partial guide, as it
    does not determinejust when somethingexists in intellectu
    : e.g., the
    individual chiliagons or heptagonal houses or simple properties(like
    being and unity)apprehended by intellectualintuition.The problems
    raised in X persist. Still, this distinctiongoes a long way towards
    Even though all logical items,
    clearing up what exists in intellectu.
    and
    and
    relationsof predication,exist
    includingconcepts
    propositions
    in intellectu
    , it does not followthat theirentire contentand all of their
    featuresdeal withwhat exists in intellectu.
    Indeed, in II, we saw that
    Avicenna distinguishesthe matterfromthe mode of the proposition.
    The latteris determinedby what the proposition states, on the level
    of what existsin intellectu
    ; the formerby the relationsof the quiddities
    in themselvesreferredto in the proposition. E.g., 'it is possible that
    a man is an animal' has a possible and necessary matter. The
    necessary matteris determined by the relation of two quiddities in
    themselves, humanity and animality. If we consider a simple,
    categorical predication, e.g., 'animal of man', and ask what its
    modalityis, we are asking forthe matterof its mode, and thatis determined on the level of the quiddities in themselves. On this level,
    existence in time is not considered. Thus, modality is not based on
    existence, but on essence, the definitionsof the concepts.77Thus,
    Avicenna's modalities do not deal with what exists in time, be the
    existence in re or in intellectu.
    XII
    This conclusion appears to conflict with Avicenna's claim that
    modalities have temporal consequences; e.g., if necessary, then
    always. For, if modality is determined on the level of quiddities in
    77Al-shrt
    ofthenecessary
    332,4-5.Again,withthepossible
    exception
    beingwhich
    I shalldiscussbelow.
    239

    09:02:05 AM

    themselves,and existence has nothingto do with quiddities in themselves, modalitiesare determinedwithoutregard to existence. Indeed,
    as we have seen in XI, Avicenna says this explicitly.But then, as
    time is linked to existence, how can Avicenna also allow modalities to
    have temporal consequences?
    Avicenna does not seem to address thisquestion explicitly,but does
    provide materials for an answer. I here offera reconstruction.
    Avicenna holds that a proposition asserts existential import.78In
    '
    general, a proposition having the form, S is P', is to be read: 'S is
    existentasaP'. (As we shall see in this section, propositionsdefiling
    with quiddities in themselvesare exceptions.) The existence may be
    in re or in intellectu
    , although in usual contextsit is both.
    in
    a
    modal
    Thus,
    propositionwe have a combination of a modality
    with a proposition asserting existence. Different positions of the
    modality yield differentresults. For Avicenna the external modality,
    as in his second typeof contingency,appears to be the usual one; here
    the formis 4it is possible thatS is P, i.e. 'S is existentas a Pr is neither
    necessary nor impossible. On the other hand, internal contingency
    would assert: 'S is possibly P'; i.e., 'S is existentand to suppose that
    S is P is neithernecessarynor impossible'. Hence his firsttypeof contingencyrequires existentialimport.
    My proposal then is that forAvicenna modalityby itselfmakes no
    assertion of existence; the primitive notion of necessity is one of
    inseparable concomitance.79Quiddities in themselves may be combined in various ways; e.g., rationalityand animality are combined
    in the quiddity, humanity,and that combination is necessary.80Likewise, the combination of whiteness and horseness is contingent,and
    the combination of humanity and stoneness is impossible. With the
    one exception of the necessary being, where the quiddities and being
    or existenceare inseparable concomitants,such combinationsof quiddities have their modal status completelyapart fromwhetheror not
    they ever exist.
    But when we formulatemodal propositions,assertionsof existence
    are connected to the modalities.81So, as above, 'it is possible that a
    78See AllanBck,Avicenna
    onExistence.
    79Al-lshrt
    327,6-8.
    80Al-llhiyyt
    28,13-29,6
    236,6-8;241,5-16
    ( = Met.90rcol.1; 90vcol.2)' Al-Madkhal
    ( = Log. 3v col. 2).
    81Al-Ishrat
    andmodality
    thatclaimsofpredication
    336,7ff.asserts
    mayeachbe true
    theother.AlsoAl-Najt
    without
    38,Iff.
    240

    09:02:05 AM

    horse is white' claims that the existence of a horse as white is neither


    necessary nor impossible; likewise the proposition that a man is
    rational is necessary. The existential import is not carried by the
    modality,however. It is carried by the propositionalcontext: in particular,the presence of the copula togetherwith the use of a concrete
    term. For quiddities in themselvesare signifiedby abstractterms,like
    'humanity' and whiteness', whereas quiddities in the mind (in
    intellectu
    ) and quiddities in individuals (in re) are signifiedby concrete
    terms, e.g., 'man' and a man' or 'men, respectively. I say that
    existentialimportrequires both the copula and a concretetermas subject in order to avoid having to have an existentialimport condition
    for propositions about quiddities in themselves, e.g., 4humanity is
    rationality'.For Avicenna holds that quiddities in themselvesdo not
    exist although theyhave ' 'being" (kuwn) and "subsist". The modal
    characterof a propositionis determinedon the level of quiddities in
    themselves,even though,when concretetermsare used in theproposi.
    tion, as usual, the termreferto quiddities existingin reor in intellectu
    The relationsbetween the definitionsof the quiddities in themselves
    decide whetherthe proposition is necessary or contingentor impossible in existence.Still, existenceis not a featureof quiddities in themselves, but of themas theycome into existence,generallyvia an external cause.
    Here then is a way for modalities not to be tied to existence,
    although still to have temporal consequences.
    XIII
    So the modalitiesare not concernedwithexistencein time. Still they
    have temporal consequences. Once the definitionsof quiddities and
    their interrelationsare considered, it is a furtherquestion what
    actually exists. Here Avicenna distinguishesnecessary and possibile
    being; literally,"what is necessary in existence", and "what is contingentin existence".82The veryphrases are suggestive: 'in existence'
    is somethingelse added onto the essential level of what the necessary
    and the contingent things are in themselves.83The necessary in
    existence is what assuredly exists.84It is the basic modality and is a
    82'In existence':
    an accusative
    ofrespect.
    83Ilhiyyat
    31,10-1;37.6-7;46.8-9(=Met. 72vcol. 1; 73rcol. 1; 74rcol. 1).
    84Al-llhiyyt
    36,5{ = Met.73rcol. 1).
    241

    09:02:05 AM

    primitivenotion.85What is primitiveis not the notion of necessary


    existence, but the notion of inseparable concomitance.86 What is
    impossible in experience is what has its non-existenceassured. What
    is contingentin existence is what does not assuredly exist nor notexist. Avicenna criticizesothers fordefiningmodalitycarelessly,and
    refersto the discussion in Al-Qiys.81
    Thus Avicenna has an asymmetrybetween necessary and possible
    being. Necessary being settlesthe question of existing{in re) by itself:
    given that there is a quiddity of a certain sort, it must exist. In contrast,possible being does not settlethe question of existence foritself:
    given such a quiddity,it is leftindeterminatewhetheror not it exists.88
    What is a possible being may exist and may not exist. Still, each
    thing that may possibly exist has the question of existence settledfor
    it: it either exists or does not exist {in re at a certain time). Now,
    Avicenna assumes, for every fact there must be a sufficientcause. A
    possible being itselfcannot be a sufficientcause forits own existence,
    nor forits non-existence,as it does not settlethe question of existence
    or non-existenceby itself.So somethingelse must settlethatquestion.
    That somethingis an externalcause forthe existenceor non-existence
    of a possible being.89 That external cause is either another possible
    (i.e., contingent) being or a necessary being. If it were a possible
    being, that stillcould not provide a sufficientcause, because its own
    existence is not determinedby itself.So to suppose that the sufficient
    cause of the existenceof a possible being is a possible being bringson
    an infiniteregress.90Hence the ultimate,sufficient,
    primary,external
    cause must be a necessarybeing. Avicenna goes on to show thatthere
    cannot be more than a single necessary being.91Hence the sufficient
    cause of all possible beings is the necessary being, the firstcause of
    everything.
    However, Avicenna denies that the necessarybeing is the cause of
    itself.92It might be thought that it should be, as somethingcannot
    come from nothing, and the necessary being is surely something!
    85Ilahiyyat
    36,4-6( = Met.73rcol. 1).
    86llahiyyt
    In AnPr.26,20-4.
    36,3(=Met. 73rcol. 1); cf.Alexander,
    87Ilhiyyt
    35,4-5( = Met.72vcol. 2).
    88Ilhiyyt
    39,8-9(= Met.73rcol. 2).
    38,17-39,4;
    89Ilhiyyt
    1; 262,12-4( = 73rcol.2; 91rcol.2;91vcol.2).
    ; 260,9-1
    38,11-6;257,10-1
    90Ilhiyyt
    39,11-6;262,1-5(= Met.73rcol. 2); 91vcol. 2).
    91Ilhiyyt
    37,11-2;43,4(=Met. 73rcol. 1; 73vcol. 1).
    92Al-Ilhiyyt
    37,5-9{ = Met.73rcol. 1).
    242

    09:02:05 AM

    Indeed, as the essence of the necessarybeing requires thatit exist, and


    Avicenna identifiesthe formalcause with the quiddity in itself,why
    should not the necessarybeing be at least the formalcause of itself?93
    His position is ratherclever. In his discussion of cause it becomes
    clear that forAvicenna 'being caused' applies only to what comes to
    be, and so only to thatwhichhas some sortof shiftfromnon-existence
    . Now the necessarybeing does not
    to existence,and perhaps viceversa
    fallinto that class and so does not have a cause. To be sure, ilex nihilo
    nihilfit", but the necessary being is not described by 'fil
    So Avicenna may be taken to prove the existence of a necessary
    , from his assumption that
    being in several ways.94 First, a posteriori
    contingentbeings exist. He justifiesthisassumption in two ways: first,
    he claims that we have in fact a primitive intellectual intuition of
    existence or being; second, we know via sense perception that contingentbeings do reallyexist. So it is a factthatbeing or beings exist,
    and so we must proceed to seek sufficientcauses for them. These
    proofsboth have as a common premise an assertionof a factabout our
    experience. Second, perhaps, a priori: consider the quiddity in itself:
    being, i.e., what is.95 Avicenna says that we have a primitivenonsensibleintuitionof being. Being seems to be a quiddity, as it is a constituentof other quiddities. At any rate, Avicenna says that being is
    a concept but is not a genus, and that it has accidents particularizing
    it.96If being is a quiddity, then being is what it is by definition,and
    so by necessity.Now consider 'being is (being)'. It is trueby necessity,
    and so being is necessarily. Hence being exists necessarily.
    I am a bit dubious about the second, a prioriapproach, although it
    is commonly attributedto Avicenna. It is clear that he holds the
    necessary being to have a quiddity in itself.97After all, it is the
    93Al-Ilhiyyt
    257,7-89 (= Met.91rcol. 1).
    94Whatfollows
    is a summary
    reconstruction
    ofhisvariousdiscussions,
    cf.Goichon,
    La Distinction
    , p. 355-6.
    95Goichon,
    La Distinction
    , p. 332.
    96Al-Ilhiyyt
    34,15-35,2;261,10-3( = Met.72vcol. 2; 91v col. 1). At Al-Maqlat
    ofsubstance.
    100,10he saysthatGod is notin thecategory
    97Goichon,
    La Distinction
    , pp. 343-53;Gilson,History
    , p. 216.
    ofChristian
    Philosophy
    Thatthequiddity
    ofthenecessary
    beinghasneither
    genusnotspeciesis noobjection;
    Avicenna
    23rcol. 2, thatmanyintelligible
    substances
    haveneither
    says,De Anima
    speciesnorgenera.
    Thewholeissueofthequiddity
    ofthenecessary
    muchmoreextenbeingrequires
    sivetreatment
    thanI givehere.Although
    I favortheviewthatAvicenna
    holdsthe
    sucha viewwouldrequire
    muchqualification
    and
    necessary
    beingtohavea quiddity,
    To be sure,at II. 347,17( = Met. 99rcol. 2), Avicennasaysthatthefirst
    exegesis.
    243

    09:02:05 AM

    unmoved mover, and in theAristoteliantraditionthe unmoved mover


    is the pre-eminentcase of substance.98What is dubious consists in
    whether it is appropriate to call the quiddity of the necessary being
    '
    being' in the sense of existence. The a prioriproof seems to demand
    that in order to be valid; otherwise, to say that being is would not
    require that it exist in re. But Avicenna generallyseparates existence
    fromessence. Further, his calling being a concept suggests that it is
    not a quiddity in itselfbut a quiddity in the mind. So, on the one
    hand, it would appear thatthe necessarybeing has a quiddityin itself,
    but that quiddity is not strictly"being" in the sense of existence in
    re." But thenhow is thea prioriproofsupposed to work?The textsthat
    purportedlypresentit are none too clear anyway. On the otherhand,
    the connection of being and existence is well fixed in the Aristotelian
    traditionin the discussion of being qua being. So perhaps Avicenna
    has this proof, and is caught in the vagaries of that tradition.Yet, I
    shall not insist upon it, nor stress the a prioriproof.
    It does not sufficefor the existence of the necessary being that it
    exist in intellectu
    alone, For, fromthe a posteriori
    perspective,we have
    to explain the existence,both in reand in intellectu
    of contingentbeings.
    he alsosays,349,12,thatthe
    However,
    beingdoesnothavea genusor a-quiddity.
    His position,
    necessary
    beingis itsessence,and so has one,presumably.
    strictly
    to
    connected
    stated,seemstobe that"thenecessary
    beingdoesnothavea quiddity
    it otherthannecessary
    holdsthatthenecessary
    existence",
    350,11-2.So Avicenna
    in a certain
    unusualrespect,
    without
    and
    beinghasa quiddity
    genusanddifferentia
    without
    hedeniesthatithasquiddity
    composition;
    onlyincertain
    respects.
    E.g., at
    344,11-2he saysthatthenecessary
    beinghasno quiddity
    properto itas necessary
    withthenecessary
    a quiddity
    undersomeother
    being.Thisisconsistent
    beinghaving
    to a quiddity
    viewedwithrespect
    to itslogical
    description:
    'necessary
    being'refers
    inintellectu
    and notinre.Again,344,10;345,6;346,1-2;346,7-12;347,7properties
    ofthenecessary
    10,Avicenna
    saysthatthequiddity
    beinghasnoquiddity
    apartfrom
    its"receptacles".
    I offer
    saidtohave
    onlytwofurther
    points:1) in theKalm,Godwascommonly
    essentialattributes:
    'living'and 'knowing'werestandard
    examples.Cf. Richard
    andTheir
    Attributes
    offers
    Frank,Beings
    , Albany1978,pp. 11; 151. NotethatAvicenna
    'God is living'as hisstandard
    exampleofthefirst
    typeofnecessity.
    2) Although
    scholars
    ofLatinmedieval
    haveoften
    concluded
    thatforAvicenna
    God
    philosophy
    hasno quiddity,
    thisconclusion
    hasbeenstrongly
    on textual
    challenged
    grounds
    by
    E.M. Macierowski,
    DoesGodHavea Quiddity
    toAvicenna
    ?, in: The Thomist,
    According
    52 (1988),pp. 79-80;84.
    98Al-Ilhiyyt
    31,15;34,16-7( = Met.72vcol. 2).
    99At Al-Ilhiyyt
    twosortsof
    , 346,5 ( = Met. 99r col. 1) Avicennadistinguishes
    existence:
    via thematter.
    the
    1) simple,via theessence2) composite,
    Apparently
    in thefirst
    senseonly;contingent
    necessary
    beinghasexistence
    beingsinthesecond
    sense(?).
    244

    09:02:05 AM

    for Avicenna either depends on what


    Since what exists in intellectu
    exists in reor at any rate does not sufficeto make somethingexist in
    re,the necessarybeing must exist in reas well in order to be a sufficient
    cause.100Again, on a priorigrounds, we need only consider the quiddity, the necessary real being, i.e., what exists necessarilyin re.
    One may well wonder whether such quiddities in themselves as
    being are legitimate or even well-formed. I have been offeringa
    reconstructionof his argumentsand discussions on the existenceof the
    being that exists necessarily. From a modern perspective, Avicenna
    appears insensitiveto certain issues. He plunges into a discussion of
    necessaryand possible being withoutanalyzing the phrases, showing
    and determiningtheirontological
    theirconsistencyand intelligibility,
    status and reference.Yet his doctrinesdo offermaterials with which
    to constructa more sophisticatedposition. He does not say that there
    is a thingor real essence, to wit, necessary being.101Rather, he says
    that there is a real essence or quiddity that turns out to exist
    necessarily. For he holds that modality is not a featureof quiddities
    in themselves,although it is determined on their level, but only of
    them insofaras they are conceived in the mind. So strictlyspeaking
    quiddities in themselvesare neithernecessary,contingent,nor impossible.102Rather they are judged modally when they come to be conceived in the mind, and such judgements depend only on what the
    quiddities are in themselves.Thus the necessarybeing need not have
    the essence, or quiddity in itself,of necessary being, although it may
    turnout to exist necessarily. Its true essence may be hidden. Still, as
    discussed above, Avicenna generallyuses 'being' or 'necessary being'
    to describe that quiddity in itself.
    So, to recapitulate,Avicenna comes to talk of necessary being and
    possible being thus: thereare various quiddities in themselves.Some
    of these are such thattheirdefinitionsdo not require nor rule out their
    existence(in re). Hence theyare possible beings. Now, there must be
    a sufficient
    reason determiningwhethertheyexist or do not exist. And
    the
    thereupon
    proof proceeds, and we arrive at a quiddity that has
    existencenecessarily.We may choose to bringin a posteriori
    factsabout
    the existenceof contingentthings.We mightalso startaprioriwiththe
    100llhiyyt
    bothinreand
    31,12-5( = Met. 72vcol. 1): simpleexistence
    comprehends
    inintellectu
    existence.
    101Goichon,
    La Distinction
    , p. 174.
    102Al-Madkhal
    196,6-15( = Met. 86vcol. 1).
    15,5-6( = Log.2r col. 2); Al-Ilahiyyat
    245

    09:02:05 AM

    quiddityin itself,being, ifwe wish to allow it, whichhas being by definition.


    The proof leads to the assertion that something that is a unique
    necessarybeing exists. This something,thisbeing is such that its very
    essence, its quiddity in itself,requires existence in re.103Strictly,its
    quiddity is not unique, necessary, or in existence. Rather these are
    featuresexternal to a quiddity in itselfbut inseparable fromthis one.
    Avicenna does not say much about that quiddity- it could have no
    definition:how could a simple be defined: perhaps here we may have
    an apprehension or an intellectual intuition of it only via mystic
    insight(recall Avicenna' s attractionto Sufism), or perhaps we may
    know it only throughits effects.104
    We mightjust give this necessary
    a
    'God'
    or
    'Allah'.
    God
    necessarilyexists in re: recall that
    being label,
    Avicenna' s firstcase of the necessaryconcernsthingswhichare always
    what they are and whose quiddity always exists. His set example is:
    God is living. So the divine essence is always in existence.
    XIV
    This picture of Avicenna' s modal views that I have extractedfrom
    his logical works may seem not to agree with a common view, that
    Avicenna is a determinist. So Copleston writes: "In other words,
    Avicenna' s universe is one of necessaryconnection. It is deterministic
    throughand through. There is no room forhuman freedom,except,
    of course, in the sense that a man's actions proceed fromhimself."105
    Again, Gilson writes: "What of contingencythere is in the world of
    Avicenna is due not to the First Cause, but to the matter", in particular the perishable matter of the sublunary world.106At any rate,
    I shall suggest that such claims must be qualified.
    We have seen thatthe modalities are based on the level of quiddities
    in themselves, although they are not located there. Because on that
    level many consistent combinations of quiddities, considered with
    respectto theirdefinitions,are not determinedto existnor not to exist,
    Avicenna has here a fundamental,radical contingencybased on the
    103Ilhiyyt
    46,6-9;261,10-1(-Met. 74rcol. 1; 91vcol. 1).
    104Goichon,
    s attitude
    towards
    La Distinction
    , p. 338.On Avicenna
    mystical
    insight,
    etlercit
    visionnaire
    seeHenriCorbin,Avicenne
    , Tehran1954,vol.2, 4, 15-6;5,6( = p.
    (5))105Copleston,
    A History
    , p. 114.
    Philosophy
    ofMedieval
    106Gilson,History
    intheMiddle
    , pp. 214-5.
    Ages
    Philosophy
    ofChristian
    246

    09:02:05 AM

    very essence of the quiddities. Just as God acquires the basis for
    necessary being and existence in re on that level, so white swans and
    blue swans gain the basis for contingentbeing on that level. This
    radical contingencyis not erased by always existing or by being
    necessitatedby some external cause.107
    Avicenna then is no logical deterministithe modal characterof the
    quiddities do not require that whateverexists exists by necessity.Yet
    he may stillbe a causal determinisi. Since, he argues, there must be
    a cause sufficient
    to determinewhetheror not contingentbeings exist,
    that cause, the FirstCause or necessarybeing, will dictate which contingenciescome to exist in re. But, as he often says, such a cause is
    external to those essences or quiddities that are contingent.So then,
    it may be said, Avicenna recognizesno contingenciesin the world, but
    not because thereare no contingenciesbut ratherbecause an external
    cause has determinedwhich contingenciescome to pass in the world;
    i.e., God determineswhat the world is.108
    A problen thenarises: just how much can Avicenna separate logical
    and causal factors?The problem lies in the nature of the necessary
    being. That being is what it is necessarily. However, we have seen
    some problems concerningwhetherit is strictly,a quiddity in itself.
    For on the level of quiddities in themselves, what something is is
    generallygiven by the constituentquiddities, that compose its definition. But the necessary being has no definitionand is utterlysimple.
    To be sure, it is what it is- but it is not definedas the necessarybeing,
    although it turnsout to be necessarily. Perhaps here looms a mystery
    that can be penetratedonly by mystical, intuitiveinsight: Avicenna
    did turn to Sufism. Yet, be that as it may, we seem to know, a
    , that the necessary being, throughbeing what it is, causes
    posteriori
    some contingenciesto come to be, and causes others to fail to come
    to be. Then there would appear to be a necessary reason why some
    contingencies obtain, given that every operation of the necessary
    being itselfis necessary. But a necessary reason cannot be otherwise,
    and so it does not appear to be a non-necessarycontingentfact that
    some contingencies come to pass and others do not. Therefore,
    because of the necessarycharacterof the First Cause, therecan be no
    logical contingencyeither.That is, if the divine essence is simple and
    107llahiyyat
    oneintheKalm.
    47,11-4( = Met.74vcol. 1). Thisviewwasa common
    See RichardFrank,Beings
    andTheir
    Attributes,
    76-7;125.
    pp.
    108Goichon,La Distinction
    , p. 160.
    247

    09:02:05 AM

    has causal powers, and ifit is what is necessarily,God's causal nature


    seems to be identical to the divine essence. But then there is always
    a logical necessityfora causal act. So how can there then be logical
    contingencyat all?
    I forego furtherdiscussion of this issue here. To pursue it would
    require a full-scaletreatmentofAvicenna's account ofCreation, of the
    emanation of the intelligences and the sublunary world from the
    necessary being. Still let me remark that Muslims are not adverse to
    fatalismanyway. Further,note thatwe have here a common situation
    in theology: on the one hand, the divine intellectcontains ideas, sc.,
    the quiddities, and these appear to be what they are, in themselves,
    apart fromwhat the necessary being is.109Thus radical contingency
    arises, and the necessary being must make a choice as to which contingenciesshould and will obtain. On the otherhand, ifthe necessary
    being must be completelyself-generated,it must generate in itselfthe
    contentof the divine intellect.But thenit is the cause ofwhat the quiddities are in themselves, as well as the cause of which ones exists.
    Here, as a single, necessary cause is operating, it looks as if that it
    builds into the quiddities in themselves their existence or nonexistence in re. Or, even if it does not do that, the necessary being,
    assuming thatall of its attributesare necessary,cannot actualize those
    contingencies,if it selects by necessity. Hence what is not actualized
    looks impossible. (Leibniz has similar problems110!)But then radical
    contingencyis destroyed, and the necessary being has no choice to
    make.
    This same problem can be raised if we ask how God can thinkof
    the quiddities. Are the quiddities in themselvesin the divine mind, or
    ?m
    are they there not in themselvesbut only as concepts, in intellectu
    In what sense can possible beings 4'exist" in a fully actual divine
    intellect?In effect,thisis the quandary: ifthe former,thenthey"are"
    independent of God, although they do not "exist" independentlyof
    God; if the latter, then the same cause, God, makes the quiddities
    what theyare, and singles some of themout forexistence.112But then
    109Ilhivvt
    260,2-3( = Met.91v col. 1).
    110Leibniz,Discourse
    onMetaphysics.
    14; 28; 35; Monadology
    43; 46-7.
    1,1Cf.llhiyyt
    stillitsomehow
    IX.7. Evenifthenecessary
    beingthinks
    onlyofitself,
    in it. However
    as somehow
    boundup orcontained
    thinks
    ofall quiddities,
    virtually
    to
    it,thenecessary
    beinghasto havesomekindofrelation
    youmayliketo express
    overthem.
    contingent
    beings,in orderto havecausalinfluence
    112Cf. Ilhiyyt!
    IX.3-5.
    Metaphysica
    248

    09:02:05 AM

    why say thatessence is internalto quiddities, while existence is external? For the same causal process effectsboth. But then thereis no real
    contingency.
    So we have a problem of theodicy: can God have freewill and can
    there be contingency and freedom for creatures while God is a
    necessary,omnipotentbeing? I beg offfromthis question here. What
    I hope to have established is that Avicenna does admit contingency
    and deny the principle of plenitude froma logical perspective. If he
    holds thatopposite froma causal perspective,as he seems to, then we
    have to see how he can reconcilethesetwo results,in lightof the divine
    simplicity.
    XV
    Seen in light of his modal theory,Avicenna' s views on necessary
    being resemblelater medieval views markedly.This comes as no surprise forlater medievais like Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Scotus
    who were directlyinfluencedby his work. Yet it is remarkable how
    much his views resemblethose of later philosopherslike Descartes and
    Leibniz, although the historical connections have not been fully
    investigated.
    APPENDIX
    Below I give a literal translationof some key texts of Ibn Sln on
    modality that are not available in translation. I do not intend this
    translationto solve any of the difficulties
    or obscuritiesof the original
    text. (Goichon has translatedAl-Ishart,and there are translationsof
    in French by Anawati and in Latin in the Venice Opera
    Al-Ilhiyyt
    Omniaand in the criticaledition in Louvain ed. by Van Riet, and so
    I omit those passages.)
    AMMONIUS
    "... [Aristotle]
    is twofold:
    in oneway,saidsimply
    and
    saysthatthenecessary
    whatbelongs
    strictly,
    namely,
    alwaystothesubjectwhichis notabletosubsist
    it(indeed,either
    without
    since'always'is takeninindefinite
    time,as foreternal
    as whenwe saythatthesunmovesor thattheanglesofa triangle
    are
    things,
    or as longas thesubjectis present,
    as
    equalto tworight
    anglesbynecessity,
    whenwe saythatthefireis hotor thatSocratesis an animalby necessity);
    theotheris notlikethis,butwiththedetermination,
    whereas
    'as longas what
    249

    09:02:05 AM

    is predicated
    bytheonesayingthatitholdsthusis true',butno longer
    simply,
    be thesubjecteternal
    or perishable:
    forthatthesunis bynecessity
    covered
    by
    thecloudsor themoon,as longas it is covered,
    is true,butno longersimply,
    and thatyousitor walkbynecessity
    as longas oneofthesebelongsto youis
    Forneither
    do wewalkorsitalways,noras longas
    true,butnolongersimply.
    we partakeofbeing."In Aristotelis
    De Interpretation
    commentarius
    , ed. A. Busse
    (Berlin1895),153.13-26.
    PHILOPONUS
    in different
    "Theysay:someobjectsholdsimilarly
    always;others
    waysat different
    times.Andsomeofthoseholding
    similarly
    alwayshavesubsisted
    perse,
    liketheheavens;others
    in others,
    liketheblackin thecrow.Thus
    peraccidens
    indicatedwhatalwaysholds
    mode,theysay, [Aristotle]
    by the necessary
    whatalwaysholdsthusperaccidens,
    andbythe
    ; bythecategorical,
    similarly
    perse
    whatholdsindifferent
    times.Andtheytrytoshow
    contingent
    waysatdifferent
    thesamething
    morepersuasive
    butitis not,as itdoesnot
    division,
    byanother,
    havethenecessary:
    forobjects,
    theysay,areeither
    alwaysorat sometime.And
    ifat sometime,eithertheyhavehappened
    or are goingto happen.Thenthe
    modeindicates
    thosethatarealways;thecategorical
    thosethathave
    necessary
    whatis goingto happen,"John
    happenedat some time;the contingent
    In Aristotelis
    PrioraCommentarius
    , ed. M. Wallies(Berlin
    Philoponus,
    Analitica
    1905),43,8-18.
    For[Aristotle]
    thatthenecessary
    is saidintwoways,one
    saysinOnInterpretation
    and onebyhypothesis,
    and byhypothesis
    in twoways:in theformer,
    strictly
    itis saidto be necessary
    so longas thesubjectis present;
    in thelatter,
    so long
    as thepredicate
    is present.E.g., thatthesun movesis said to be necessary
    thatSocrates
    is an animalis necessary
    so longas thesubstrictly;
    byhypothesis
    is present,
    itis necessary
    thathe be an
    For,so longas Socrates
    jectis present.
    animal,whichis evencloserto thestrictly
    too;thethirdis as when
    necessary
    wesaythatitis necessary
    fortheoneseatedtosit.For,so longas thepredicate,
    I mean'sitting',
    itbelongs
    totheoneseatedinvirtue
    ofthe
    belongs,
    necessarily
    In An.Pr. , 126,8-17.
    hypothetically
    necessary."
    AVICENNA
    Al-Najt
    matter
    is thestatebelonging
    tothepredicate
    inrelation
    tothesubject
    Necessary
    without
    a doubtthatitbe permanently
    at everytime;
    bywhichitis necessary
    be withthenecessary
    at everytime,likethestateofanimal
    i.e., thatthetruth
    vis visman,anditdoesnotallowthedenial.Andimpossible
    matter
    isthestate
    in relation
    ofthepredicate
    tothesubjectinwhichthetruth
    is permanently
    with
    thedenial,likethestateofstonevis visman,anditdoesnotallowtheaffirmation.Andpossible
    isthestatebelonging
    matter
    tothepredicate
    inrelation
    tothe
    doesnotpersist,
    in affirmation
    or in denial,likethe
    subjectbywhichitstruth
    stateofwriting
    vis visman.Anditis saidthatthepossible
    is thatwhosejudgementis non-existent
    at sometime;i.e., inthepresent,
    andthenithasa judgefrom
    itsmaking
    a judgement
    mentinthefuture
    inthepresseparate
    necessarily
    ent.[14,20-15,4]
    250

    09:02:05 AM

    ofdifference
    thereis an intention
    and theimpossible
    Betweenthenecessary
    often
    uses
    inevitable.
    Ibn
    Sina
    in
    the
    of
    the
    coincidence
    sense
    their
    [N.B.:
    despite
    I shalltryto translate
    them
    'inevitable'and 'necessary'interchangeably;
    becomes unbearablybarbaric;
    distinctly,
    except when the translation
    as wellas
    'inevitable''darr',liketheGreek'dei', can statea necessity
    statesonly a
    'necessary''wjib', like 'anangk',generally
    impossibility;
    in existence,
    in
    and thelatteris inevitable
    The former
    is inevitable
    necessity.]
    it is permissible
    forus to
    non-existence.
    Andwhenwe discusstheinevitable,
    tobothofthem.So wesay:inevitable
    applytheverysameexplanation
    predicain permanence.
    And
    tionis according
    to sixmodes,eachofwhichparticipates
    doesnotnorwillnotceasetobe,[Thisexpresisthatthepredication
    [1]thefirst
    in thesepassagesas
    sion,'doesnotnorwillnotceasetobe', occursfrequently
    a setphrase;a freertranslation
    is: 'in thepresent
    and in thefuture'.]
    as in
    Allahisliving'.And[2]thesecondis that[thepredication]
    is as long
    'Almighty
    is notdestroyed,
    as in ourstatement:
    as theessenceofthesubjectas existent
    thatis a manis permanently
    animal';i.e., everything
    'everymanis inevitably
    butnotpermanently
    without
    animalas longas itsessenceis existent,
    qualification,so thathe be an animalanddoesnotceasenorwillnotcease[tobe one],
    andthissecondone
    Andthefirst
    before
    hisgeneration
    norafter
    hisdestruction.
    ordenialis saidtobe inevitable,
    wherean assertion
    arebothusesandintentions
    anda singlesenseis common
    to thembothfromsomemode,and [thatsense]
    isexistent,
    beitpermanently,
    isinevitability,
    as longas theessence
    ofthesubject
    iftheessenceexistspermanently,
    iftheessencemayperish.
    orinsomeinterval,
    The third[3] is that[thepredication]
    is as longas theessenceofthesubjectis
    characterized
    withwhich[theessence]is madea subject,
    bythecharacteristic
    butnotas longas itisexistent.
    whitething
    hasa colorstandE.g.,wesay:every
    doesnot
    i.e., it is notthecasethatitpermanently
    ingoutin sightinevitably;
    ceaseor shallceaseto be, noralso [doesthepredication
    hold]as longas the
    essenceofthatwhitething
    is an existent,
    so that,whenthatessencepersists
    and
    doesnotperish,
    andyetwhiteness
    mayleave,then[theessence]maybe characterized
    as beingtheessenceofa colorstanding
    outin sightinevitable.
    Butthis
    notas longas it is existent,
    butas longas itis characterized
    necessity
    persists
    thefourth
    is as longas the
    Further,
    bywhiteness.
    [4] is thatthat[predication]
    is existent,
    anditdoesnothaveinevitability
    without
    thiscondition,
    predication
    as whenwesay:'Zaydinevitably
    walksas longas hewalks',sinceitisnotpossible thathe notbe walkingand be walking.Further,
    thefifth
    [5] is thatthe
    is at a definite
    time,[and]thereis no doubtofit,as in 'themoon
    inevitability
    is eclipsedinevitably',
    butit is notso permanently,
    butit is so at thesame
    definite
    time.Andthesixthis thatitis [thus]inevitably
    at sometime,butnot
    at a definite
    one,as whenwesay:'everymaninevitably
    breathes';
    i.e., at some
    - and,as fortheselatter
    norat thesametime
    time,andit is notpermanently
    fourdivisions,
    whena condition
    is notstipulated,
    thepredication
    in themis
    calledcategorical,
    is stipulated
    in them,thefirst
    and,ifa modeofinevitability
    is thatthemodeis partof thepredicate
    and nota modesubjoinedto the
    and thatis sincethepredicate
    is notpredicated
    butrather
    predicate,
    byitself,
    withan addition,
    and thatadditiontogether
    withthepredicate
    is notthought
    ofas a singlething,
    noris therein ita modein thewaythatitis likea partof
    it.Further,
    intheinevitable
    ifthepredicate
    is independent
    initself,
    in
    premise,
    thatitspredication
    is considered
    andthem ode doesnotmakesomething
    in it
    butrather
    in thecopula,thenthepredicate
    is through
    itsessencelikea single
    to it. [20,1-21,13]
    sense,and themodeis subjoined

    251

    09:02:05 AM

    On Simple[Propositions]
    theview(ofTheophrastus)
    Aboutsimpleonestherearetwoopinions,
    andthen
    andothers;
    andtheviewofAlexander
    andmanyat present.
    ofThemistius
    The
    are thosein whichthe modeof the
    firstis thatthe [simplepropositions]
    ofthejudgement
    or thepossibility
    is notmenofthejudgement
    inevitability
    thejudgement
    butrather
    is unrestricted
    So itis possible
    thatthe
    tioned,
    simply.
    beexistent
    andpossible
    thatthejudgement
    beexistent
    not
    inevitably,
    judgement
    Anditis notunlikely
    thatthisis theviewof
    i.e., notpermanently.
    inevitably,
    thephilosopher
    aboutthe simple[propositions],
    inasmuchas he
    [Aristotle]
    allowstwouniversal
    affirmative
    andnegative,
    tobe true,
    simple[propositions],
    as whenyousay:everyhorseis asleep,and no horseis asleep,and thatthe
    universal
    affirmative
    is translated
    intotheuniversal
    simple
    judgement
    negative
    Thefollowers
    thattobe possible
    ofthisviewconsider
    butnot
    simple
    judgement.
    sincethephilosopher
    aboutsimple[promayalsobringin examples
    necessary,
    rather
    aboutwhichitis notpossible;
    theyareinevitable
    positions]
    permanently.
    ofthesecondview- Alexander
    As forthefollowers
    and manyat present
    who
    - theyconsider
    himwhois theirleader
    follow
    thatthistranslation
    is necessary
    thesimpleis notinevitable
    in itsjudgement
    in thesimple,eventhough
    except
    besidesthetwoadjacentmodes.
    tooneofthefourmodesmentioned,
    according
    So thebeingofthesimpleintheir
    isthatinwhichthejudgement
    isexisopinion
    as longas theessenceofwhatis judged
    tent,and is notrequired
    permanently
    is existent,
    at sometime,andthattimeiseither:
    as longas thesubject
    butrather
    as beingcharacterized
    is characterized
    bythat,as whenyousay,'everywhite
    outinsight',or:as longas thepredicate
    hasa colorstanding
    is predicated
    thing
    or: at a definite,
    inevitable
    time,as eclipsebelongsto themoon,andbeingin
    thewombbelongstoeveryman,or: at an inevitable
    butan indefinite
    time,as
    toanimal.We do notfavor
    either
    ofthesetwoviewsoverthe
    belongs
    breathing
    ofthesimplein thetwowaystogether,
    consider
    other,butrather
    judgements
    andthatwillappearto youwhenwe dividethesimplequantified
    judgements.
    Thesenseofoursaying
    thateveryB isA simply
    isthateverything
    thatis characinviewoftheintellect
    orexistence
    terized
    as beingB, whether
    itbe characterized
    orbe characterized
    as B atsometimeafter
    whichitis notBas B permanently
    as beingA, andwedo notknowwhenitis A, when
    thatthingis characterized
    as beingB, or at another
    it is characterized
    or notpertime,orpermanently,
    Thisis theopinionofTheophrastus.
    thesecondviewdoes
    Further,
    manently.
    thefirst
    viewin respect
    notdiffer
    from
    ofthesubject.So thereis nodoubtthat
    thesenseofyoursaying'everymoving
    thatischaracterized
    thing'is:everything
    andbyitsbeingimposed
    onitthatitbepermanently
    oratsome
    bybeingmoving
    time.So thesenseof'moved'on thetwoviewsis thesame,and thereis a difference
    thematter
    ofpersistence,
    and thematter
    is something
    thatis
    through
    ofit.Butthetwodiffer
    accidentad
    tothesenseandnotconstitutive
    abouttheside
    ofthepredicate,
    sincethefirst
    understands
    thejudgement
    thepredicate
    through
    thanwhatitiscertainly
    as morecommon
    toconceive
    without
    possible
    stipulation
    or impermanence,
    ofpermanence
    and theyspecify
    it through
    thecondition
    of
    So accordingto themthe senseof 'everyB is A' is that
    impermanence.
    thatis characterized
    as beingB, howeveris be characterized,
    .
    everything
    - thatthingis characterized
    or non-inevitably
    as beingA, not
    inevitably
    butat sometime,according
    towhathasbeensaid.Andsimilarly
    the
    inevitably
    'no A is B' without
    is thatno thing
    senseofourstatement,
    ischarqualification
    itbe characterized,
    acterized
    as beingB, however
    unlessA be deniedofit,be
    it thatwe do notknowhowandwhenor be itthatwedeny[it]at sometime.
    [23,4-25,5]
    252

    09:02:05 AM

    Al-Qys
    So itisnotatallunderstood
    that
    byoursaying'everywhite'thatitiseverything
    is established
    tobe white.Rathereverything
    inactuality
    as
    thatis characterized
    or definitely
    or permanently
    afterit
    beingwhiteis at sometime,indefinitely
    comestobe in actuality.
    Andthisactuality
    is nottheactuality
    ofexistence
    in individuals
    [i.e., inre]
    thesubjectmaynothavebeenconsidered
    insofar
    as itis exisonly.So perhaps
    whathastwotenths
    as whenyousay:everysphere
    contains
    tentinindividuals,
    ofthebaseofa triangle
    is notin accordance
    withits
    [?], andthecharacteristic
    tothething
    as itis existent,
    butrather
    invirtue
    ofitsbeingthought
    belonging
    in actuality
    as characterized
    in accordancewiththe
    by the characteristic
    inactuality
    intellect's
    itas having
    tobe such,whether
    itsexistence
    characterizing
    itexistornotexist.So thesenseofyoursaying'everywhite'is everything
    charin viewof theintellect
    acterized
    as makingitsexistence
    in actuality
    be white
    always,or at sometime,i.e., at anytimetherebe. So thisis thesideofthe
    subject.
    As forthesideofthepredicate,
    he [?wesay?]says:indeedtherearesimple
    affirmative
    statements
    and necessary
    onesand possibleones. Moreoverwe
    desireto speakaboutthesimpleuniversal
    affirmative
    and to findoutthedifference
    between
    thesimple
    andthenecessary.
    So wesay:hereallourstatements
    areaffirmative
    andthestatesinthemaredifferent.
    So wesay:[1]Allahisliving;
    i.e., permanently
    [and]He is notceasingnorshallnotceasetobe [so].Andwe
    is a colorand everymanis living.Andwe meannot
    say:[2] everywhiteness
    thateverything
    is a color,andis notceasingnorshallnotcease
    thatiswhiteness
    tobe one,orthateverymanis living,andis notceasingnorshallnotceaseto
    be living.Rather,we say: indeedeverything
    thatis characterized
    as being
    whiteness
    and to whichthatit is whiteness
    is said to belongis, as longas its
    essenceis existent,
    a color.Andsimilarly
    everyone to which'man' is saidto
    as
    belong:notthatitis notceasingnorshallnotceasetobe animal,butrather
    anditssubstance
    areexistent.
    Andwesay:[3] 'everymoving
    longas itsessence
    thatmovesis a bodyas
    thingis a body',andwedo notmeanthateverything
    longas itmovesonly,butalsoevenifitdoesnotmove.Stillwe meanthatit
    is a bodyas longas itsessenceis existent.
    Andthedifference
    between
    thisand
    the[statement]
    beforeit is thatthereitdoesnotdistinguish
    thestatebetween
    oursaying'as longas itsessenceis existent'
    and oursaying'as longas [itis]
    whereashere it distinguishes
    the state betweenour saying
    whiteness',
    characterized
    as moving
    as longas itsessenceis existent'
    andour
    'everything
    saying'as longas [itis] moving.Andwe say: 'everywhitethinghas a color
    outinsight',
    andwedo notmeanthateverything
    towhich
    wesaybeing
    standing
    white
    as longas itsessenceis existent,
    hasa colorstanding
    outinsight,
    belongs,
    butrather
    as longas itis characterized
    as beingwhite.Andindeedtheessence
    ofwhatischaracterized
    as beingwhiteisnotnullified
    whenitceasestobe white.
    Avicenna
    todiscussagaintheremaining
    threesenses.]
    [21,1-22,11;
    proceeds
    Ratherletus makea fresh
    start.So we saythatwe mayuse theexpression
    ofinevitability
    anditis permanence
    in situations.
    tothatwesay[1]
    According
    thatAllahisliving
    intherestofthis
    likewise
    bynecessity
    'inevitability';
    [strictly:
    andHe doesnotceasenorshallnotceasetobe [livpassage];i.e., permanently,
    notas intheabovecase
    ing],andwesaythateverymanis animalbynecessity,
    inthathedoesnotceasenorshallnotceasetobe [so],butas longas theessence
    ofthething
    towhichbeingmanis saidtobelongis existent;
    i.e., as longas he
    is characterized
    as making
    withita subject.Andwesay[3] thatevery
    together
    253

    09:02:05 AM

    notthatit [is so] permanently


    bynecessity,
    movingthingis corruptible
    [and]
    as
    doesnotceasenorshallceaseto be [so],andnotthatitis [so]permanently
    is existent,
    butrather
    as long
    longas theessenceofwhatis saidtobe moving
    ofitsessence
    as itis moving.Andifitis, itmayhappenthatthepermanence
    or [and?]itsbeingas saidofitis sucha one,justas wesaythatthe
    as existent
    as
    oftheessenceofeverymanand itsdescription
    oftheexistence
    persistence
    a body;
    thingis bynecessity
    beingmanis one.Andwe saythateverymoving
    itmaybe, thenit
    it is saidofitthatit is moving,
    however
    i.e., thatwhenever
    frommotion
    andifitis distinct
    thenit
    is [so]as longas itsessenceis existent,
    as longas he is a
    is a body.Andwesay[4] thatthewalkerwalksbynecessity
    thathe is a walker
    Andwesay
    butwedo notsaybyitself
    walker,
    bynecessity.
    tothemoonat suchandsucha timebynecessity.
    [5] thatan eclipseis present
    toitbynecessity
    ofitthataneclipseis present
    itis established
    And,eventhough
    of
    as longas thereis an eclipse,itssenseis notthatsense.Forthecondition
    whereas
    is 'as longas an eclipseis existent',
    in thesecondstatement
    necessity
    is thatthereis an occurrence
    in thefirst
    at
    ofnecessity
    statement
    thecondition
    these
    thesun.Andeventhough
    a timeinwhichthemoonis injunction
    opposite
    Andwe say:[6] everymanbreathes
    twoareinseparable
    by
    theyaredifferent.
    timebutat sometimethereis no
    necessity'
    [andthis]is nottrueat a definite
    as long
    doubtofit.Butthesenseofthisis notalsothathebreathes
    bynecessity
    it.Andallofthesearesimple
    from
    thatisinseparable
    as heisbreathing
    although
    in themis thatinwhichthe
    thenormalnecessity
    divisions.
    Moreover
    universal
    is saidordeniedas longas theessenceofwhatis saidtobe thesubject
    predicate
    inthis.
    Andwhatis neither
    is existent.
    ceasingnorshallceasetobe is included
    is as whenwe say
    affirmative
    theuniversal
    Further,
    possible[proposition]
    thatis characthateverything
    Anditssenseis [1] either
    'everyB is A possibly'.
    havethe
    doesnotnecessarily
    orimpermanently,
    terized
    as beingB, permanently
    is notconofA, whena condition
    existence
    ofan A, northenon-existence
    is notpaidtothefactthatit[A?]willnodoubtbe
    sidered.And[here]attention
    thatitnot
    for[or:present
    existent
    to]it[B?]at sometime,orthatitis possible
    Andthispossiitpermanently.
    thatitaccompany
    existatall,orthatitispossible
    that
    thanthesimplein thesecondmode.Or [2] everything
    ble is moregeneral
    ifatany
    orimpermanently,
    as beinginactuality
    is characterized
    B, permanently
    forit,then,ifanyofthefuture
    thattimeas existent
    timeit determines
    parthatatitthatjudgeas itispossible
    insofar
    ticularizes
    it,thattimeisdetermined
    tothebegininrelation
    mentexistsandthatitdoesnotexist,butitisnotfuture
    areparticular
    subjects,
    ningofa giventime[a "now"?],sothatthenthesubjects
    time.And
    as beingB at a definite
    arewhatarecharacterized
    and thesubjects
    Andoursaying
    ofthegiventimeinquestion.
    is thefuture
    inquestion
    thefuture
    as beingB at
    thewholethatis characterized
    'everyB' willnothaveincluded
    thatwe havedetermined.
    everytime.Butthatis a difference
    ofthepossible.
    todo withthissecondconception
    Andthesimplehasnothing
    ina given
    So itis nota partunderiteventhough
    theybothcanbe truetogether
    withnecessity
    but
    notinaccordance
    individuell.
    So, whenZaydsits,heis sitting
    in thesensegivenearlier,
    sincethis
    in thissense,butpossibly
    alsonotpossibly
    innon-existence
    as
    inexistence,
    noris itpermanently
    is notpermanently
    sitting
    inthis
    Indeeditis notinpossibility
    longas theessenceofthesubjectis existent.
    to
    butpaysnoattention
    thefuture
    inthissenserequires
    sense,sincepossibility
    attention
    to
    the
    in
    it
    this
    case
    whereas
    its
    current
    thepresent
    pays
    state],
    [or:
    and in
    is possible,
    in virtueoftheregardofthefuture
    So thissitting
    present.
    ofthe
    Andneither
    virtueof theregardoftimeis simplesinceit is definite.
    are
    is includedin theotheror is saidofit,butthey[thoserespects]
    respects
    be possiblethatitsbeingdoesnotmakeit required
    Andit might
    inseparable.
    254

    09:02:05 AM

    fortheotherrespect
    ofpossibility
    So sitting
    is
    toassigntoita timenecessarily.
    notlikebreathing
    orlikeelimination
    bydeathat sometimeorliketheeclipse.
    So forthethingitis possiblethatitnotsitat all,butitis notpossiblethatthe
    moonnotoccludeat all. So it is possiblethatthenon-existence
    of simple
    andthenon-existence
    thatitrequires
    ata timewithout
    ofthenecessity
    necessity
    is
    So our statement
    thatZayd is sitting
    a doubtis thesenseof possibility.
    in thissenseofpossibility
    Andour
    without
    included
    theregardofthefuture.
    thatZaydbreathes
    is notincluded
    in thispossibility
    butin thefirst
    statement
    division
    whichis a permanent,
    everything
    parnon-necessary
    thing.Further,
    in thepossible
    But
    eventhenecessary.
    in thesenseofnon-impossible,
    ticipates
    whatis usedin whatI sayis one ofthetwodivisions
    mentioned.
    So hewhowantstomakethenecessary
    tobe
    andthesimpleandthepossible
    naturesthatare absolutely
    notmixednorunitedin a singlemattermakes
    existence
    as longas theessenceofthesubjectis existent,
    andmakes
    necessary
    thesimplethatwhoseexistence
    is required
    atsometime,impermanently,
    perse
    ornotperse, andmakesthepossiblethatwhoseexistence
    noritsdenialis not
    at sometime.Further,
    ifhe makesthepossiblewhatis notnecessary
    required
    inreality,
    thedivision
    mentioned
    aboutthesimple
    init.And
    wouldbe included
    ifhe makesitwhatis considered
    in virtue
    ofthefuture
    at anytimethatdeterminedtobe thesame,thenthere
    toitandthesimple
    wouldbea matter
    common
    whichdo nothaveexactly
    thesametime,eventhough
    oneofthemis inferior
    totheother.Butitis notincluded
    itin matter.
    So
    in it;rather
    itaccompanies
    thesimplematter
    is in one respect
    andthepossible
    in another
    Andif
    respect.
    thepossible
    insofar
    as thereis no necessity
    initis takentohaveno permanent
    noranynecessity
    is isolated
    from
    atsometime,[andthen]thepossible
    necessity
    thesimple
    anddoesnotspecify
    itinsomerespect.
    theway
    So youmaydiscover
    in theconception
    ofmodes.Andyourexampleis theuniversal
    So
    affirmative.
    it'sup to youtochangeit intotheotherforms.
    [32,7-36,3]
    So theproposition
    in itscondition
    and becomes
    ['everyB is A'] is inverted
    suchas ifitweresaid:'everything
    thatis described
    as beingB is necessarily
    and
    as longas itsesssence
    isexistent,
    as beingA, as long
    characterized
    permanently,
    as itisAlif['A']. AndtheAlif['A'] isnotthepredicate
    butpartofthepredicate.
    Andthepredicate
    is 'is, as longas itis Alif,A'. Andthispredicate
    is certainly
    notseparate
    from
    itssubject,
    butnecessarily
    ontheother
    toit.Similarly,
    belongs
    is inverted
    intheaffirmation
    and
    hand,whenyouconsider
    this,theproposition
    Ratheritis necessary
    topayattention
    insimple[proposinegation
    necessarily.
    toexistence
    is notpermanent,
    tions]either
    onlyortothefactthattheexistence
    thatitbe withanycondition
    thatis required,
    andthenitis someand,further,
    to thesimplebynecessity,
    and thepredicate
    thingthatis connected
    changes
    fromitsbeingthepredicate
    to itsbeingpartofthepredicate.
    [42,2-42,10]

    255

    09:02:05 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 2 (1992)
    Valla's Dialectic in theNorth 2: FurtherCommentaries

    P. MACK

    A few years ago I wrote an article for this Journal about the
    knowledge and understanding of Lorenzo Valla's Dialecticaedisputationeswhich Gerardus Listrius showed in his commentary(1520) on
    Peter of Spain. I found that although Listrius reported many of
    Valla's philosophical innovations he tended not to support them. On
    usage and on mattersof argumentativetechnique, on the otherhand,
    he quite oftenendorsed Valla's views.1 This article will consider the
    receptionof Valla's doctrinesin fiveothersixteenthcenturycommentaries on dialectical texts,withthe aim of correctingand extendingthe
    conclusions of the previous article. It goes withoutsaying thatmost of
    the humanist dialectic commentaries I have seen over the last few
    years make no referenceat all to Valla or to his opinions.
    Since the submission of my earlier article several new studies of
    Valla's dialectic have appeared. Pride of place must be given to the
    critical edition of the firstand third recensions of the text published
    by Gianni Zippel, under the now generallyadopted titleRepastinatio
    dialecticae
    etphilosophiae
    , in 1982. 2 This edition provides a fulldescription of the manuscripts and early printed editions,3 and, supplemented by John Monfasani's review,4 new informationon the
    (rather restricted)manuscript circulation of Valla's book. A lively
    controversy on the interpretationof the work has continued to
    develop, with much debate on the questions of its alleged scepticism
    and its possible anticipationof Wittgenstein'sordinarylanguage phi-

    1 Valla'sDialectic
    intheNorth:
    A Commentary
    onPeter
    Listrius
    , in:
    ofSpainbyGerardus
    21 (1983),58-72.
    Vivarium,
    2 L. Valla,Repastinatio
    dialecticae
    etphilosophiae
    , ed. G. Zippel,Padua 1982(hereafter
    RDP).
    3 In note6 ofmyprevious
    article(n. 1 above)I mentioned,
    in addition
    to foursixteenthcentury
    editions,two incunables.In facttherewas onlyone
    (northern)
    incunabular
    Milan1496-1500.
    RDP, xxxiii.
    edition,
    byGuillaumeLe Signerre,
    4 In: Rivistadi letteratura
    Italiana,2 (1984),177-94.
    256

    09:02:21 AM

    losophy.5Less attentionhas been given to the problem of the work's


    receptionand its influenceon the developmentof dialectic in the sixteenthcentury.6I hope thatthisarticle(and the list of logical doctrines
    on whichValla contradictsAristotleand his followers,provided in the
    appendix) will help direct attentionback to this issue.
    Of the fivecommentariesin which I have foundreferencesto Valla,
    two are commentarieson Rudolph Agricola's De inventione
    dialctica.So
    I shall begin by discussing the connectionbetween that much printed
    workand Valla's Repastinatio
    , going on to consider the othercommentaries in turn, before looking at the general pattern of the reception
    and transmissionof Valla's teaching.
    dialctica(completed 1479) was
    Rudolph Agricola's De inventione
    A further32 editionsof vari44
    times
    between
    1515
    and
    1579.
    printed
    ous epitomes of the work appeared between 1530 and 1600. 7 This
    work never mentions Valla but it includes a referenceto the Latin
    .8 Since
    word quiditaswhich Valla had rejected in his Repastinatio
    he
    to
    in a letattributes
    this
    Valla,
    Agrcola
    rejection(which contests)
    ter of 1480 to Alexander Hegius,9 we can assume that Agricola had
    read Valla's workbeforehe startedto write.Since Agricola was study5 L. Jardine,
    Lorenzo
    Valla
    : Academic
    andtheNewHumanist
    Dialectic
    , in: M.
    Scepticism
    Tradition
    Valla
    ed., TheSceptical
    , Berkeley
    1983,253-86,E. Garin,Lorenzo
    Burnyeat
    e l'umanesimo
    Vallae il volgare
    andS. I. Camporeale,
    Lorenzo
    Valla
    , M. Tavoni,Lorenzo
    < Repastinatio,
    liber
    > retorica
    e linguaggio
    , in:O. BesomiandM. Regoliosi
    edd.,
    primus
    Lorenzo
    Vallae l'umanesimo
    italiano
    , Padua 1986,1-17,199-216,217-39.N. Struever,
    Lorenzo
    Valla'sGrammar
    andObject
    , in: I TattiStudies,2 (1987),239-67.R.
    ofSubject
    andMeaning
    intheRenaissance
    Was
    Waswo,Language
    , Princeton
    1987,J. Monfasani,
    Lorenzo
    Vallaanordinary
    ofIdeas,50
    ?, in:JournaloftheHistory
    language
    philosopher
    (1989),309-23,and therepliesbyR. Waswoand S. SteverGravellein thesame
    Lorenzo
    VallaandRudolph
    ofthe
    number,
    324-36,
    J. Monfasani,
    , in:Journal
    Agricola
    ofPhilosophy,
    28 (1990),181-99.Theinterpretation
    andinfluence
    ofValla's
    History
    workis also discussed
    in myPhD Thesis,Rudolph
    andRenaissance
    Dialectic
    ,
    Agricola
    of London1983.I have revisedthismaterial
    and
    WarburgInstitute,
    University
    addedtoit in a book,Renaissance
    whichI hopewillbe published
    Argument,
    shortly.
    6 Butsee L.
    Dialectic
    ordialectical
    rhetoric?
    o's criticism
    Jardine,
    Agostino
    Nif
    ofLorenzo
    Valla
    36 (1981),253-70.
    , in: Rivistacriticadi storiadellafilosofia,
    7 I havedepended
    thelistinG. C. Huisman,Rudolph
    on,butalsoslightly
    emended,
    A Bibliography
    Works
    andTranslations
    1985.Forup to
    Agricola:
    , Nieuwkoop
    ofPrinted
    datestudiesandbibliography
    on Agricolasee F. Akkerman
    and A. J. Vanderjagt
    Phrisius
    1444-1485,
    Leiden1988.
    eds.,Rodolphus
    Agricola
    8 R. Agricola,
    De inventione
    dialctica
    , Cologne1539,reprinted
    Nieuwkoop1967,
    (hereafter
    DID), 228,RDP, 30-36,371-373.
    9 R. Agricola,
    Lucubrationes
    , Cologne1539,reprinted
    Nieuwkoop1967,190. This
    inmythesis,
    n. 5 above,
    pointwasmadebyMonfasani,
    JHP28, 189,butanticipated
    160-7,368-73.
    257

    09:02:21 AM

    ing in Ferrara between 1475 and 1479, and since Valla often sent
    copies of his works to Guarino, it is not too difficultto accept that he
    could have seen it there. Once this connection between Valla's work
    and Agricola's is accepted, a fewotherdetails ofAgricola's workbegin
    to look as though they could have been taken over fromValla.
    Three of Agricola's new topics (those which he calls 'around the
    substance'), adjacents, action and subject, parallel Valla's three
    categories: quality, action and substance.10 Some details of the
    presentation11encourage the parallel, but Agricola's basic position,
    that these are three topics among many others, differsfromValla's,
    that they are the three categories which comprehend everything.
    When he is discussing differenttypes of question, Agricola follows
    Valla in denying that 'animal' is a sufficientanswer to the question
    'what is a man?', thoughhe had earlier said that it was.12 Like Valla,
    Agricola considersthe problem of whetherto translatetheGreek word
    .13
    ouata as essentiaor substantia
    these
    details
    Although
    suggest that Agricola had read Valla's
    not support the view that Agricola was
    do
    carefully,they
    Repastinatio
    intellectually dependent on Valla, or that he could be called a
    populariser of Valla's views.14On the contraryone can point to many
    issues on which Agricola's views are explicitlyopposed to Valla's.
    1. In the topic of definition,he followsCicero's definitionwhere
    Valla had preferredQuintilian's. DID , p. 26, RDP , pp. 168, 400. 15
    10DID , 62-76,RDP, 363-6,46-156.
    11For exampleAgricola'stopicof adjacentsincludesall the thingswhichare
    Thelistofqualities
    oftouch
    bythesensesorcomprehended
    bytheintellect.
    perceived
    version:"tactus:calidum,frigidum,
    echoesthatin Valla's first
    humidum,
    siccum,
    DID , p. 62,
    durum,molle,asperum,lene,et reliquaquae tactupercipiuntur",
    "Tactusqualitates
    suntmolle,durum,
    lene,asperum,
    calidum,
    humidum,
    frigidum,
    tenue",RDP, p. 435.In mythesis
    densum,
    rarum,
    siccum,
    spissum,
    (160-161,164)
    I wasunsurewhichversionofValla's workAgricola
    had seen.NowI am inclined
    to believethatitwas thefirst
    version
    becauseAgricola
    (.DID , 228)wasunawareof
    ofPatavinitas
    andappietas
    Valla'shandling
    , lentulitas
    {RDP,34) andbecauseitwasthe
    n. 4 above,181which
    circulated
    mostwidely
    inmanuscript,
    first
    version
    Monfasani,
    4, 189.
    12 DID , 26, 229,RDP, 164-5,393-6.
    13DID , 76, RDP, 37, 41-6,363-5.
    14C. Vasoli,La dialettica
    e la retorica
    dell'Umanesimo
    , Milan 1968,157;L. Jardine,
    oftheHistory
    Dialectic
    VallaandtheIntellectual
    Lorenzo
    , in:Journal
    Origins
    ofHumanist
    15 (1977),143-64(146).
    ofPhilosophy,
    15Wheretwopagenumbers
    fromRDP, are giventherelevant
    passageappearsin
    recentothethird
    recension.
    boththefirst
    andthethird
    up to356refer
    Pagenumbers
    version.
    sion,thosein excessof357 tothefirst
    258

    09:02:21 AM

    2. In the definitionof property,he accepts Porphyry'sfourthdefinition, where Valla had also, in order to praise Quintilian, in effect
    accepted the second. DID , p. 50, RDP , pp. 170-172, 398-400.
    3. He accepts Aristotle'sview of the relationshipbetween formand
    matter.DID , pp. 53-4, RDP , pp. 110-2, 381-3.
    4. He agrees with the Aristoteliantraditionthat a substance must
    have quantity before it can have quality. DID , p. 76. 16
    5. He supports Aristotle's view of sense-perception as passive.
    DID , pp. 75-6, RDP, pp. 154-6, 445-6.
    6. In his discussion of action he uses the word 'entelechia', which
    Valla had rejected. DID , p. 72, RDP , p. 130.
    7. He admits place, time and connexaas topics, although Valla had
    reduced these categories to quality and action. His discussion shows
    no awareness of Valla's critique. DID , pp. 92-104, RDP , pp. 134-5,
    137-43, 438-42. [Together with point 4, this probably indicates that
    Agrcola accepts Aristotle's account of the categories.]
    8. He uses a definitionof time which Valla had rejected. DID , p.
    98, RDP , pp. 150-2, 438-40.
    9. He sets out the traditionalfourkinds of opposition, which Valla
    had reduced to one kind. DID , pp. 154-6, RDP , pp. 235-6, 497-9.
    10. He accepts Aristotle's account of subcontraries, which Valla
    had rejected. DID , p. 156, RDP , pp. 227-31, 481-5.
    11. He accepts Aristotle's four kinds of modal proposition, which
    Valla had reduced to two. DID , p. 234, RDP , pp. 237-43, 491-6.
    12. He accepts Aristotle's account of induction. DID , pp. 266-7,
    RDP , pp. 345-7, 587-92.
    13. He accepts the Aristotelianarrangementof fourformsof proof.
    DID , pp. 266-8, RDP , pp. 334-55, 578-96.
    14. He does not referto any formsof argumentationbeyond these
    four.17
    15. He distinguishedquality as status from quality as category.
    DID , p. 229, RDP , pp. 9-10.
    The most importantdifference,however, between the two works is
    16"Magnitudoautem,quam interadiacentianumeravimus
    si substantiae
    comsubiectihabet
    accedit:sin reliquisconferatur
    adiacentibus
    adiacentibus,
    paretur,
    sedquodnequeatnisiilliusinterventu
    vicem,nonquidemutin ipsasintadiacentia,
    in substantia
    ea praesertim
    adiacent,
    reponi."DID , 76,cf.RDP, 134,
    quae corpori
    141-7,415-40.
    17Valla teachesmanyotherkindsincluding
    variousdeviantformsof syllogism,
    sorites
    anddilemma.
    259

    09:02:21 AM

    a differenceof scope. Where De inventione


    dialcticais centred on the
    topics, showing how they can be used to generate argumentative
    discourse, Repastinatiois mainly concerned with the categories, the
    propositionand the formsof argumentation,in otherwords withthose
    elements of dialectic which Agricola would place in the treatise on
    judgment and which he thereforeexcludes fromhis book.18Valla does
    not produce a new account of the topics but he does insist on their
    importance and he places Quintiliano version of the topics beforethe
    formsof argumentationin order to emphasize this.19In his discussion
    of the proposition and of argumentationhe continuallysubordinates
    logical formalityto a considerationof the implicationsof the way particular words are actually used.20 A similar emphasis on arguing in
    real language and on the importance of the topics is characteristicof
    Agricola's entire work. So we might say that although Agricola uses
    relativelyfew details of Valla's teaching, and although he disagrees
    with him on many logical issues, they share one or two key preoccupations.21
    Phrissemius's commentaryon De inventione
    firstappeared in
    dialctica
    the fourth edition of that work, published in 1523. Thereafter it
    accompanied most editions of the text.22 Johannes Matthias
    Phrissemius studied at Leipzig and Cologne, taking the MA there in
    1516 and going on to teach in the facultyof arts. He was dean of the
    facultyof arts in 1522 and 1526 and became a doctor of canon law in
    1525. He was chancellor of the city of Cologne between 1525 and
    1528. He died in 1532. 23The prefaceto his commentaryindicatesthat
    he was teachingDe inventione
    dialcticain thepaedagogiaof the Cologne
    arts facultyin the early 1520s.
    Phrissemius's commentary contains eleven referencesto Valla.24
    Four of these referto threeof the detailed parallels between Valla and
    18DID , 197,267.
    19RDP, 244. 279-80.527.
    20E.g. RDP, 304-7,328-44,553-7,575-8.
    21Ofcoursetheideaofmaking
    dialectic
    lessformal
    andmoreresponsive
    totheneeds
    ofactuallanguageuse waspromoted
    otherhumanists
    as wellas byValla.
    many
    by
    22In Cologneeditions
    after1539,Phrissemius's
    is replaced
    commentary
    bya combinedcommentary
    In practice,
    the
    Alardus,Hadamarius).
    however,
    (Phrissemius,
    combined
    was a slightabridgement
    ofPhrissemius.
    commentary
    23Thebestsourceofinformation
    onPhrissemius
    formuch
    (andthemostconvenient
    is P. Bietenholz
    ed., Contemporaries
    century
    ,3
    earlysixteenth
    biography)
    ofErasmus
    vols.,Toronto1985-1987.
    24R. Agricola,
    De inventione
    dialctica
    cumscholiis
    Ioannis
    Matthaei
    Phrissemii
    , Cologne
    Hildesheim
    a2r-4v.
    1528,reprinted
    1976,hereafter
    Phrissemius,
    260

    09:02:21 AM

    Agricola noted above. Phrissemiusnotes thatValla would have disapproved of Agricola's firststatementthat 'animal' would be an adequate answer to the question 'what is a man?', commentingthat, in
    view of his later contradiction of this view, Agricola would have
    alteredthisstatementifhe had been able to revise the work. He refers
    back to thiscommentin his commentaryon the kinds of question. He
    noticesthe parallel between Valla's discussion of ouata and Agricola' s .
    He quotes the passage about Valla's views on words in -itas from
    Agricola's letter to Hegius. To this he adds a story about Filelfo
    baiting Valla by mentioningQuintilian's hispanitasP
    In four other cases Phrissemius records Valla's opinions. In his
    discussionof definition,Agricola explains thatbecause of the shortage
    of truedifferentiae
    it is not always possible to give definitionsin the form
    He sets out alternative ways of defining by
    genus plus differentia.
    graduallyexcluding related classes (e.g. an ass is a long-eared animal
    with solid feetwhich is capable of reproducing). Since some people
    would regard this as a descriptionratherthan a definition,Agricola
    justifieshis usage by explaining the differencebetween the two words.
    To this Phrissemius adds Valla's definition of description ('an
    explanation of the qualities present to a thing and its actions') and
    Cicero's. He regardsboth as supportingAgricola, thoughtheyare not
    identical with his formulation.26When Agricola comments that the
    goodness of a horse lies in its benefitto humans, Phrissemius notes
    thatValla would have preferredhim to use ei ratherthan sibi.21When
    Agricola says that some animals may have wills, Phrissemiusrefersto
    Valla's long discussion of this subject.28 When Agricola refers to
    grammar, rhetoricand dialectic as rational arts, Phrissemius recalls
    and rejectsValla's opinion that rational knowledge is about reasons,
    that is to say, about findingmiddle terms.29
    There are threereferencesto more strictlylogical doctrines. When
    Agricola mentions modal propositions, Phrissemius notes that Valla
    firstreduced the six modais to three (possible, impossible, true) and
    then added various other terms which he considered equally useful
    certain,uncertain,customary,unheard of, useful,
    (e.g. easy, difficult,
    25Phrissemius,
    27, 196,60, 195-6.
    26Phrissemius,
    23-5,28, RDP, 166.
    27Phrissemius,
    suietsuus
    Omnia
    66, L. Valla,De reciprocatione
    , in: Opera
    , Basel1540,
    Turin1962,239-41,248.
    reprinted
    28Phrissemius,
    63, RDP, 65-71,408-10.
    29Phrissemius,
    210RDP, 279.
    261

    09:02:21 AM

    useless).30 When Agricola discusses the conventional four forms of


    argumentation (syllogism, induction, enthymeme, example),
    Phrissemius draws attentionto Valla's attack on the Aristotelianversion of induction. For Valla it was unacceptable to move froma group
    of verifiedstatementsabout individuals to a general conclusion about
    a whole class. In his view inductionhad to involve questioning, in the
    Socratic manner. PhrissemiusreportsValla's opinion and then rejects
    it at some length. He includes examples from Plato and Cicero of
    general conclusions being drawn fromparticularobservations. When
    Agricola discusses the practiceof induction,Phrissemiusobserves that
    Valla would disapprove of Agricola's views and refersback to his own
    earlier comments.31
    Finally it should be noted that Phrissemiusdoes not mentionmany
    other topics which come up in De inventione
    dialcticaand on which
    Valla held controversialopinions which Agricola opposed, forexample, the categories, the contraries,the syllogism,non-standardforms
    of argumentation.32
    The commentary by Alardus (1491-1544) of Amsterdam was
    printedonce, in 1539, to accompany his revisionof the text. Alardus
    was one of the Louvain scholars who was involved in producing the
    firstedition of De inventione
    dialcticain 1515. In later life he became
    somethingof an Agricola specialist, continuingto collect lettersand
    minor works for publication, tryingto find new manuscripts from
    which to publish a better edition of the Dialectic.This culminated in
    his publication in 1539 of new editions of Agricola's Lucubrationes
    and
    De inventione
    dialcticawith commentary,in the prefaces and notes of
    which he tells the storyof his quest forAgricola' s manuscripts.33He
    was a correspondentof Erasmus and edited works of humanist and
    educational interest. He also wrote tracts against the Protestants.34
    Alardus' s commentaryis deliberatelylearned, fullof referencesto textual matters and parallels from classical and humanist authors. Its
    30Phrissemius,
    207,RDP, 237-41,491-3.
    31Phrissemius,
    260-2,266,RDP, 345-52,587-94.
    32References
    to thesewillbe foundin theAppendix
    below.
    33DID , a2r,217,459-60,Lucubrationes
    203-4.The storyis also
    , n. 9 above.*3V-4V,
    toldbyP. S. Allen,Theletters
    Historical
    , in:The English
    Review,
    ofRudolph
    Agricola
    L. Jardine
    willhavemoreto sayaboutAlardus'srole
    21 (1906),302-17.Professor
    in herforthcoming
    book,Distinctive
    Discipline.
    34B. de Graaf,Alardus
    Amstelredamus
    witha
    (1491-1544).His Lifeand Works
    1958.
    , Amsterdam
    Bibliography
    262

    09:02:21 AM

    concludingnote ratherself-consciouslyproclaims thatit is entirelydifferentfrom the commentaryof Phrissemius.35In any event subsequent editions which use Alardus' s improved text all carry a composite commentary,which claims to combine Phrissemius, Alardus
    and Hadamarius but which in practice is mainly an abridgement of
    Phrissemius.36
    Alardus's commentary makes 42 referencesto Valla, 15 to the
    , 27 to the dialectic. Alardus quite frequentlygives book and
    Elegantiae
    chapter numbers, though these are not always accurate (and occasionally I have not been able to trace the referenceintended).
    The largestclass of references(20 in all, 7 to the Dialectic)directthe
    reader to Valla's discussions of particular words which occur in
    Agricola's text.In these examples Alardus only rarelyexplains Valla's
    point. Usually he contentshimselfwith a referencewhich will enable
    the reader to findthe section of Elegantiaeor Repastinatio
    in which the
    formor usage of the word in question is considered. This, in other
    words, is the philological use of referencesto Valla.37
    In a similar way there are a few referenceswhich find parallels in
    Valla forsomethingthatAgricola says. So, when Agricola talksabout
    species divisionswhich don't work, Alardus refersto Valla's criticism
    of the tree of Porphyry.Or he findsan example in which Valla uses
    an argumentfrometymologyor a parallel in Valla forAgricola's three
    typesof magnitude.38In these cases Alardus is seeking to amplifyor
    confirmwhat Agricola is saying by citing parallels in Valla.39
    There are eight referencesto Valla's logical teachings. Alardus
    notes that Valla's definitionof propertydiffersfromAgricola's. He
    35DID, 459-61.
    36Huisman,n. 7 above,nos. 10,48, 58, 60, 62, 66, 71, 74, 77, 80.
    37In thisclassI include:
    1.21(virtuosus)'
    DID, 56,RDP, 111 uXrj;
    DID, 60,Elegantiae,
    DID, 60,RDP,83-4(cautio)'
    DID, 69,Eleg.,4.78(<affectiones);
    DID, 73,RDP, 127-34
    DID , 86, De reciprocatione
    DID, 73,RDP, 44, 128-30
    , n. 27 above
    (actio)',
    DID , 100,RDP, 153
    (sibi);DID , 96,Eleg.,1.21 (planus
    ); DID, 96,Eleg., 4.96(celeber)tohospes/
    whereAlarduswants
    (occasio
    ); DID, 123,Eleg., 4.83(butthisrefers
    peregrinus
    hostis/
    peregrinus
    ); DID , 123,noreference
    (poenitere
    ); DID, 168,RDP,326-327(violatio)'
    DID , 208,Eleg., 6.52(lignis);
    DID , 216,Eleg.,4.48(iuscivile);
    DID, 352,Eleg.,4.81
    DID, 377,Eleg.,2.25 (.siquidem
    (orator)-,
    ); DID, 415,RDP, 150-2(prius
    ); DID , 415,
    Eleg.,6.32 (I havenotfoundthecorrect
    reference)
    (prius);DID, 420,Eleg.,2.18
    Wherenecessary
    I haveadjusted
    tosuitOpera
    references
    n.
    (nedum).
    omnia,
    Elegantiae
    27 above,1-235.A goodandwellindexed
    modern
    ofElegantiae
    edition
    is muchtobe
    desired.
    38DID, 47, RDP, 46-50;DID, 60, RDP, 20-1;DID, 66, RDP, 141-3.
    39Otherexamples
    ofparallels:
    DID, 47,RDP,219-22(iniustum)',
    DID, 60, RDP, 175
    on competitors);
    DID , 123,Eleg.,6.36,37 (correcting
    (attacks
    etymologies).
    263

    09:02:21 AM

    points out that their discussions of Latin translationsof ouaiocand


    answers to the question 'what is a man?' are similar.40When Agricola
    sets out the truth conditions for a disjunctive proposition, Alardus
    refersto the discussion of dilemma in Aristotle's Rhetoric
    , in Aulus
    Gellius and in Valla. He refersto the same sections when Agricola
    discusses argumentswhich depend on dividingone issue between two
    opposite alternatives.41He records Valla's reduction of the modal
    propositions to three possibilitiesand his findingthat indefinitepropositions (propositions with no indication of quantity) are generally
    equivalent to universais.42In response to Agricola's treatmentof the
    formsof argumentation,Alardus discusses Valla's account of sorites,
    a formwhich Agricola does not mention.43
    Alardus also records several of Valla's philosophical innovations
    outside logic. There are fourreferencesto Valla's remarkson the soul:
    his rejection of the vegetable soul, his insistence that animals have
    tripartitesouls like those of humans, his account of habitusand affectus
    ,
    and a remark which I have not been able to trace, to the effectthat
    the souls of treesand cows lead them to fulfilltheirnatures.44He also
    refersto Valla's remarkson the perceptionof colour and on the active
    nature of sense perception.45He noticesthatAgricola uses a definition
    of time that Valla rejects and that Elegantiaehas some remarkson the
    tendencyof historiansto copy other historianswhich are like those in
    De inventione
    dialctica
    ,46This last is the only occasion on which a commentatorlinks a remarkfromthe literarycriticalside of Agricola with
    a source in Valla.
    Althoughboth theselast two groupingsshow Alardus passing on his
    knowledge of Valla's logical and philosophical opinions, many of
    Valla's most radical innovations (e.g. res, the categories, the contraries, alternative forms of the syllogism) go unmentioned and
    Alardus rarely suggests that either he or Agricola actually shares
    40DID, 49, RDP, 170-3;DID , 77, RDP, 37-8,41-6;DID , 230,RDP, 164-5.
    41DID , 231,374,Aristotle,
    Rhetoric
    AulusGellius,Noctes
    , II, 23, 1399al7-28,
    Atticae,
    5.11,RDP, 312-28,352-5.
    42DID, 236,RDP,237-239;DID, 283,RDP, 186-7.The indefinite
    must
    proposition
    bedistinguished
    nonisappliedtoa noun,e.g.nonhomo)
    from
    theindefinite
    use(where
    whichValla
    RDP, 215-217.
    43DID, 271,rejects,
    RDP, 306-12.
    44DID, 51, 69, 81, 85, RDP, 59-61,77, 67-71.
    45DID, 77 (2 references),
    RDP, 72-73,113-5,118-9,154-6.
    46DID, 100,300-1,RDP, 149-50,Eleg, 6.54.
    264

    09:02:21 AM

    Valla's views. When Alardus fills in the background to Agricola's


    referencesto scepticismhe does not mention Valla.47
    George of Trebizond' s Isagogedialctica(1433) was printed more
    than fiftytimes in the sixteenthcentury. It is sometimes found in
    dialctica(supplyuniversityand facultystatutesalongside De inventione
    of
    dialectic
    which
    that
    works
    the
    ing
    judgment part
    lacks) and the two
    works are fairlyoften issued by the same printers.48In 1567 when
    Orazio Toscanella chose two humanist dialectics to translate into
    dialcticaand Isagogedialctica
    Italian, theywere De inventione
    , in the edition with commentary by Bartholomaeus Latomus and Jan
    Bronkhorst(Johannes Neomagus). Bronkhorsts commentary first
    49
    appeared in 1533 and Latomus's was added to it in 1540. Latomus
    had been instrumentalin bringingthe teachingofDe inventione
    dialctica
    fromCologne to Paris. In 1531 he became professorof rhetoricat the
    college of Ste. Barbe, moving in 1534 to the chair of Latin rhetoricat
    the Collge Royal. In 1530 he published an epitome of De inventione
    dialcticawhich was printed 26 times up to 1600. 50
    The commentaryof Latomus and Bronkhorston Georg of Trebizond's Isagogedialcticamakes seven explicit referencesto Valla, but
    also touches on a number of other matters to which Valla refers,
    almost always disagreeingwithhim.51Three of the referencesconcern
    matters of terminology.Bronkhorstremarks on the way in which
    Valla uses propositio
    (the firstsentence of the syllogism)and enunciatio
    .52
    (the general word forproposition) in the thirdbook of Repastinatio
    He notesthatValla prefersthe terminfimato specialissima
    in the phrase
    4
    speciesspecialissima.He records Valla's objection to the phrase in eo
    quodquid es in the definitionof genus, but replies that if it is enough
    to say that genus is what is predicated of several thingswhich differ
    47DID , 5-6,195,Phrissemius.
    4. 184-5.DID . 221 refers
    to Valla'sDe vero
    bono.
    48J. Monfasani,
    VallaandAgricola
    to hisGeorge
    , n. 5 above,referring
    ,
    ofTrebizond
    Leiden1976,333-6and Collectanea
    NY 1987,473-7.
    Trapezuntiana
    , Binhamton,
    49Huisman,n. 7 above,no. 76, Monfasani,
    , n. 48 above,328-337.MonGeorge
    Collectanea
    15editions
    from1533onwards
    ofBronkhorst's
    comfasani,
    , 473-7records
    ofhisandLatomus's
    from1540/41
    onwards.
    alone,and11editions
    mentary
    together
    50Bibliographical
    detailsin2 articles
    byG. Cambierin: Latomus22 (1963),839-44
    and 23 (1964),819-27.
    51So manyoftheideaswhich
    Vallaattacks
    comeupinthecommentary
    thatI almost
    wishto entertain
    the(chronologically
    thatIsagoge
    dialctica
    verydifficult)
    hypothesis
    in Repastinatio.
    (1433)wasoneofValla'stargets
    52
    De redialctica
    ofB. Latomusand
    , withthecommentaries
    GeorgeofTrebizond,
    J. Neomagus,
    Lyons1559,b4v.
    265

    09:02:21 AM

    in species, he does not see how Valla will distinguish between


    and the definitionof genus.53 Three references
    accidents, differentiae
    concern mattersof dialectic. Bronkhorstagrees withValla (against the
    Boethian view that they are like particulars) that indefinitepropositions generally behave like universais but wants to retain the term
    indefinite because indefinites sometimes have the force of particulars.54He refersto Valla's objection to Aristotle's use of letter
    substitutionsin PriorAnalytics
    ,55 At the end of his remarks on the
    of
    contraries
    he
    work on the markersof quality
    recalls
    Valla's
    square
    and quantity, referringto the chaptersin Repastinatio
    book two which
    deal with this material but urging the reader to omit the sections in
    which Valla attacks other dialecticians.56
    One detailed discussion touches on Valla's metaphysics. After
    notingthatessentiawould be a bettertranslationof ouata than substantia
    is, and explaining thatessentiaand esseare the same (thus twice agreeing with Valla withoutnaming him), Bronkhorstgoes on to say that
    ouata can also mean the material fromwhich somethingis made and
    that in this sense, in spite of Valla's views, substance is the better
    translation. He recalls that Aristotle calls the form of a thing its
    substance, where Valla prefersto treatformas part of quality.57This
    does not support Valla's opinion, nor does it explain it in any adequate way but it alerts the reader to the strikingdifferencesbetween
    Valla and Aristotlein metaphysics.
    On the souls of animals, Bronkhorstcites Quintilian's view that
    animals lack language ratherthan lacking reason, again agreeing with
    Valla withoutmentioning him.58On the other hand he upholds the
    opposite opinion to Valla's on subcontrariesand on substance having
    the propertyof not undergoing increase or reductionof degree, again
    without referringto him.59
    Bronkhorst,in short, shows some knowledge of Valla and records
    his views about terminologyand his definitions. He is unusual in
    referringto Valla's ideas about metaphysicsbut he does not support
    s3 Ibid.,c2v(2 references).
    54Ibid.,b5v,RDP, 186-187,Boethius,
    De syllogismo
    Latina64,
    I, Patrologia
    categorico,
    802.
    55George,n. 52above,a8r,RDP, 548,299-300.Prior
    , I, 2-11,25al4-31b36
    Analytics
    and passim.
    56George,, b7r.
    57Ibid.,
    c6r,RDP, 36-46,110-2.
    58George,c3v,RDP, 70-1.
    59George,b6v,c6r.
    266

    09:02:21 AM

    him in any of his innovations. Latomus's commentaryis brieferand


    tends to restrictitselfto explaining what George is saying.
    In 1535 a commentaryon Porphyry'sIsagogeand Aristotle'sOrganon
    was published over the name of the arts facultyat Louvain. It was
    reprinted in 1547, 1553 and 1568. This commentary is usually
    attributedto Johannes StannifexfromGosslies but the introductory
    letterindicates that several authors contributedto it and the titlepage
    suggeststhat it may have had a semi-officialstatus at Louvain.60 Its
    dialcmany referencesto Rudolph Agricola suggest that De inventione
    ticamay have been taught there,but thereare also four referencesto
    Valla.61
    One is grammatical: when discussing a problem of translation,the
    commentaryrefersto Valla's discussion of the differencein the usage
    of antiquusand senex.62The commentary quotes Valla's abusive
    remarks about the pointlessnessof the third figureof the syllogism,
    and replies that this sort of invective does not really answer the
    argumentsof the peripateticsor detractfromtheir authority.It concludes withsome examples which show thatthe thirdfigureshould not
    be omitted.63On induction, the Louvain commentary firstrejects
    Valla's observation that afterlisting a series of individual cases one
    should then add 'and so all x is y', arguing that this is implied by the
    non-intervention
    of the exponent. Later it sums up Valla's objections
    to inductionfromRepastinatio
    book three,chapter sixteen and replies
    to them. Valla's point about the juxtaposition of similars is not an
    objection because it is an admitted quality of all inductions. His
    examples of particularpropositionsare said to be misleading and his
    commentthatall inductionsmust involve questioning of the opponent
    is answeredwithexamples fromPhaedoand ProlegeManilia. Finally the
    commentaryresponds to Valla's wish that inductions should include
    the phrase 'and similarlyforthe others' by showing that Valla's own
    chosen example from Grgiasdoes not include it.64
    It is strikingthatValla should be referredto at all in what is forthe
    mostpart a rathertraditionalAristoteliancommentary.The commen60I amgrateful
    toProfessor
    Gilbert
    oftheCatholicUniversity
    ofLouvain
    Tournoy
    forinformation
    aboutthiscommentary.
    61I shalldiscussthereferences
    toAgricolain Renaissance
    Argument.
    62LouvainArtsFaculty,
    inIsagogen
    Commentario
    etinomnes
    de
    libros
    Aristotelis
    Porphyrii
    dialctica
    , Louvain1568,16v.Elee. . 4.5.
    63Louvain,n. 62 above,Q2r,quotineRDP, 297-8.
    64Louvain,V6r,
    Gg6v,RDP, 345-52.
    267

    09:02:21 AM

    tators seem to think that his challenges to the third figure of the
    attractiveand dangerous to
    syllogismand to inductionare sufficiently
    warrant rebuttal,but that his other innovations, such as his complete
    overhaul of Aristotelian metaphysics, are so extreme that they can
    safely remain unanswered.
    Johann Caesarius was born in Jlich in 1468. He matriculatedat
    Cologne in 1491 and also studied in Paris under Jacques Lefvre
    d'Etaples. He held teachingposts in Cologne, Munster, Mainz, Leipzig and Moers. He was the author of textbooks on logic, rhetoric,
    grammar and medicine. His Dialcticawas completed in 1520 and was
    printedmore than seventytimes in the sixteenthcentury.65In a preface of 1525 he lists various humanists (including Agricola, Valla,
    Erasmus and Vives) among his authorities,but his treatmentof the
    subject is on the whole traditional,followingthe order of the Organon
    and making much use of Boethius's De syllogismo
    and De difcategorico
    The
    edition
    with
    Welsdalius
    and
    ferentiistopicis.66
    commentary by
    Glareanus was firstpublished in 1559. 67
    Caesarius himselfmakes three incidentalreferencesto Valla, justifyinghis own use of Boethius by noting thatValla called him 'the last
    of the erudite', pointingout Valla's oppositionto Boethius's use ofpersona in his work on the double nature of Christ, and notingthat Valla
    approves of the word praedicamentum
    (for category).68 There is a
    referencein the commentarywhich may also be termed incidental,
    when Glareanus points out that Valla discusses equivocation in
    , book two, chapter two.69
    Repastinatio
    On the issue of the form of the proposition Glareanus refersthe
    reader to Valla's attackon thosewho treatnouns and verbs as the only
    parts of speech.70 He reproduces and praises Valla's teaching on
    biparticulars in a lengthy note, adding that Valla has not had the
    credithe deserves and statingthat althoughhe is not a classical author
    he deserves to be compared with them. In a later note he quotes
    65Algemeine
    Deutsche
    , 3, 689. DetailsofCaesariuseditions
    Biographie
    (basedon W.
    , I (1472-1800),Hildesheim
    1965,IndexAureliensis
    Risse,Bibliographia
    , and
    Logica
    National
    UnionCatalog
    ) in mythesis,n. 5 above,312-4,493.
    66J. Caesarius,Dialctica
    , Cologne?1525, (British
    Library
    copy520d6(2)),Aalv.
    67Risse,n. 65 above,records
    editions
    withcommentary
    byGlareanus
    (1556)andby
    I used.
    himandWelsdalius
    of1567which
    together
    (1559).He doesnotlisttheedition
    68J. Caesarius,Dialctica
    andGlareanus,
    ColofWelsdalius
    , withthecommentaries
    1567, + 8V,B4r,C4r.RDP, 4, 8-9,Eleg.,6.34.
    ogne
    69Caesarius,C6r,RDP, 182-3.
    70Caesarius,G8r,RDP, 178-81.
    268

    09:02:21 AM

    Valla's second rule forbiparticulars,also with approval.71 This is a


    rare instance of original opinions of Valla being endorsed warmlyby
    a sixteenthcenturycommentator.On induction he adds:
    ofthethird
    all of
    LorenzoVallainthelastchapter
    bookofhisDialectic
    mocked
    thisas itis taught
    andBoethius.
    Forhiman induction
    musthave
    byAristotle
    threeproperties:
    thejuxtaposition
    ofsimilars
    and proof.He was
    questioning,
    ofQuintilian
    moremovedbytheauthority
    thanbythatofAristotle,
    Ciceroor
    Boethius.
    Whoever
    wishesmayfollow
    him.72
    This commentsums up a common attitudeto Valla. The commentatorsummariseshis views accurately,but he also, withoutcriticising
    Valla, distances himselffromValla's views.
    Among these five commentariesa good range of Valla's doctrines
    are commented on or referredto. In metaphysics and philosophy,
    attentionis directedby at least one writerto his views on persona
    , on
    the translationof ouaia, on matterand form,on answers to questions
    in quid, on the definitionof genus, on the soul, on perception, on
    habitusand affectus
    , on the souls of animals, and on time. In the area
    of the proposition, to equivocation, to parts of speech other than
    nouns and verbs, to modal propositions,to biparticulars,to indefinite
    propositions and to disjunctive propositions. Within the forms of
    argumentationcomments referto the terminologyof the syllogism,
    the thirdfigureof the syllogism,induction, sorites and dilemma.
    Taken together then, these commentaries confirm that Valla's
    dialectic was available, that it was read attentivelyand that several of
    its doctrines were thoughtworthyof comment. On the other hand
    there are several importantdoctrines which are not reported in the
    commentaries,forexample the reductionof the transcendentaisto res,
    the reductionofthe categories,the reorganisationof ethics,the reform
    of the square of contraries,the promotionof the topics, the attack on
    the fourformsof argumentation,the new kinds of syllogism,and the
    importanceof measuring the strengthof particular words. The commentaries give no sense of how Valla's doctrines fit together as a
    whole, or of which of his innovations are most important.
    71Caesarius,I8V-K1'RDP, 199-201.
    72"Laurentius
    Vallalibro3. de Dialctica,
    ridethoctotum
    ab Aristotele
    cap.ultimo,
    et a Boethiotraditum.
    adessedebereasserii:interrogaIpse enimtriainductioni
    similium
    etprobationem;
    motusQuintiliani
    authoritate
    tionem,
    appositionem,
    magis
    velCiceronis
    velBoethii.Qui velitsequatur."Caesarius,08v,
    quamvelAristotelis
    RDP, 345-52.
    269

    09:02:21 AM

    Valla's views are most oftenreferredto on issues of terminology,on


    the souls of animals, or translationsforouaia and on induction. Indeed
    most of the referencesto Valla are more in the nature of scholarly
    indications of contrast than positive endorsementsor interpretative
    suggestions. This must have something to do with Valla's rather
    ambiguous position. Thanks to Erasmus and to the circulationof the
    , Valla was an extremelyprominentauthorityfor northern
    Elegantiae
    humanists. The display of knowledge of his works was an indication
    of the eruditionof the commentator.But his actual views on dialectic
    were much too extreme for the basically Aristoteliancontextsof the
    works being commented on. The Louvain commentary gives the
    impression that although some of his views needed to be rebutted,
    otherswere best passed over in silence. But in the othercommentaries
    there is not even that much acknowledgementof the revolutionary
    effectof Valla's views on logic and metaphysics.
    In his Oratio in laudemAristotelis(1510) the well known Dutch
    humanist Martin Dorp, who was then teaching at Louvain, attacked
    Valla for criticisingAristotle.73He regards Valla as a learned and
    acute man and a supreme grammarian who has an unfortunate
    tendency to attack all established authorities. He regretsthe recent
    publication of Valla's dialectic.74For the most part he answers Valla
    by citing greater authorities(including Valla's hero Quintilian) who
    admired Aristotle,but he also refersto threedetails fromthe preface
    : Valla's criticismof Aristotle's failure to perto Valla's Repastinatio
    formany of the really importanttasks of a public man or a writer,his
    attack on his contemporaries' veneration forAristotlealone, and his
    objection to the Aristotelians' way of using the phrase 'philosophus
    dixit'.75 Dorp makes no referenceto Valla's dialectical teachings.
    At thispoint it may be worthrecallingtheviews ofJuan Luis Vives,
    a more distinguishedhumanist than any of the commentatorsI have
    discussed. Vives had witnessed at firsthand both the apogee of late
    scholastic logic at the college of Montaigu, where he studied in Paris
    between 1509 and 1512 and the early years of the Agricola revival at
    73Biographical
    n. 23 above,I, 398in Contemporaries
    article
    byJ. IJsewijn
    ofErasmus,
    to Dorp's
    ofthisjournalfordrawing
    to theeditors
    404. I am grateful
    myattention
    oration.
    74M. Dorp,Orationes
    IV, ed. J. IJsewijn,
    Leipzig1986,18-24(18).
    75 Ibid.,22-23,RDP,5-7,361(butitishardtoimagine
    howDorpcouldhaveknown
    thislast).
    270

    09:02:21 AM

    Louvain from 1512 onwards.76In his Adversus


    pseudodialecticos
    (1520),
    Vives endorses some of Valla's general positions (that dialectic
    depends on the ordinaryusage of language, that it ought not to formalise itselfby employing letters of the alphabet as substitutesfor
    terms, that dialectic is brief, and that philosophers need freedom)77
    withoutmentioninghis name. At the end of book threeofDe causiscorartium(1531) Vives comments on Valla's contribution to
    ruptarum
    dialectic.
    Vallaundertook
    ofdialectic,
    withAristothereconstruction
    Lorenzo
    disagreeing
    bothancientand modern.He makessomerecommendatleandhisfollowers
    tionswhicharenotbad,though
    thesearefew.In mostcaseshemakesmistakes,
    forhe wasan impetuous
    He errednot
    man,and hastyin making
    judgments.
    butalsoinphilosophy
    whichhe alsodealtwith,and,whichis
    onlyindialectic,
    in thelawsof theLatinlanguage.But he erredno lessin
    moresurprising,
    others
    inthissubjectthanhedidinElegantiae
    andinhisInvectives.
    As
    reproving
    forhisnumerous
    indialectic,
    errors
    weshallpassoverthemhere,orsavethem
    foranother
    occasionifit seemsappropriate,
    forit wouldtaketoolongto get
    inan argument
    involved
    them.In anycaseitis unnecessary
    becausehis
    against
    areneither
    basedonsoundreasons,
    noraretheyaccepted
    arguments
    byanyone
    as rulesofthisart.78
    Most sixteenth-centuryhumanists in the north appear to have
    thoughtbetter of Elegantiaethan Vives did, but his judgement that
    Valla's reasoning was unsound and his positions insufficiently
    well
    a
    to
    fits
    in
    well
    with
    the
    of
    evidence the comsupported require reply
    mentariesconsidered in this paper.
    In my previous article I suggested that the philosophical importof
    Valla's views hardly came across in Listrius's comments, that Valla
    was used much more on matters of argumentative technique and
    points of stylethan in his logical teaching and that Listrius tended to
    76R. Guerlac
    thePseudodialecticians
    ,JuanLuisVives
    Against
    (Dordrecht
    1979),pp.23-7.
    77Ibid.,pp.56,
    arenotamongthosewhich
    Vivestakesover
    60,78,104.Thesepoints
    from
    ThomasMore's1515letter
    to MartinDora.
    78Opera
    omnia
    Valla
    (Valencia1782),vi,p. 151,Guerlac,n. 73,p. 152:"Laurentius
    estreconcinnationem
    faceredialecticae,
    in qua dissentit
    ab Aristotele
    et
    aggressus
    veteribus
    ac novis.Monetin quibusdam
    Peripateticis
    neutiquam
    prave,etsiea sunt
    ut fuitvirillevehemens
    et ad faciendum
    labitur,
    perpauca.In plerisque
    judicium
    Necsolumin redialctica
    falsus
    namhincquoest,sedinphilosophia,
    praecipitatus.
    etquodmagismirere
    inpraeceptis
    Latinaelinguae.Sed nonminusillic
    que attingit,
    aberravit
    et invectivis.
    Ceterumdialecticae
    illius
    improbando
    quam in elegantiis
    errores,
    qui suntsane multi,nos vel omittemus
    prorsusvel in aliud tempussi
    videbitur
    reservabimus.
    Namsuscipcre
    resessetnimium
    cumeo disputationem
    prolixaminimeque
    inpraesens
    necmagnisrationibus
    necessaria,
    quodilliusargumenta
    necproinde
    suntab ulloreceptatamquam
    nituntur,
    dogmataartishuius."I made
    useofGuerlac
    's translation
    in preparing
    mine.
    271

    09:02:21 AM

    referto Valla's dissentingviews ratherthan explore or support their


    subversive potential. All the commentariesstudied in this articletreat
    Valla in a more fragmentaryway, and regardhim withmore distance,
    than Listrius did. They tend to confirmmy suggestionthatValla was
    read throughAgricola, that rather than being an inspiration to the
    northernhumanist reformersof logic, Valla's dialectic was more an
    incidental, scholarlyinterest,and a guide to usage.
    Coventry
    University
    of Warwick
    Appendix
    A listoflogicalissueson whichVallaattacks
    andhisLatinfollowers,
    Aristotle
    oron
    whichhisviewscontradict
    theirs.79
    1. Thereare threecategories
    andnotten.363,8-10,46-50,112.Arist.,Categories
    ,
    4, Ib25-2a4.
    2. Relatives
    shouldnotbepartofthecategories.
    425.Arist.,Categories
    , 7,6a36-8b25.
    3. Quantity
    is partofquality.425. Arist.,Categories
    , 6, 4b20-6a36.
    4. All theothercategories
    can be reducedto qualityand action.438, 112-115.
    5. The termenshas no force.369, 13-15.Arist.,Metaphysics
    , IV, 1, 1003a28-32.
    6. Valla attacksthe distinction
    betweenconcrete
    and abstract.373-377,21-30.
    etal., Opera
    Ockham,Summa
    , ed. P. Boehner
    , I, St. Bonaventure
    Logicae
    philosophica
    80
    NY 1974,I, 5-10,16-38.
    7. Vallasuggests
    thattheuseofthelatinwordsubstantia
    as a translation
    forouatais
    butgoesalongwithit becausetheusageis so firmly
    established.
    37-46.
    incorrect,
    In Categorias
    Aristotelis
    , I, PL 64, 181D-184D.
    Boethius,
    8. Thedistinction
    between
    form
    andmatter
    is either
    frivolous
    ordeceitful.
    382,110112.Arist.,Metaphysics
    , XII, 3, 1070a19-30.
    9. Theproperty
    ofnottaking
    moreandlessbelongs
    tonounsgrammatically
    andnot
    to substances
    384, 157.Arist.,Categories
    , 5, 3b33-4al0.
    logically.
    10. Vallarejects
    theAristotelian
    ideaofthemedium
    between
    387.Arist.,
    contraries.
    , 10, 12al-25,Ethics
    , II, 6-9, 1106al4-l109b28.
    Categories
    11. Goodandbadaremorecontrary
    thangoodandnotgood.389,(162-3).De inter, 14,23b33-24b9.
    pretation
    12. Resis thegenusto whichthecategories
    In Categorias
    belong.392. Boethius,
    Aristotelis
    , I, PL 64, 180B.PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
    II, 7, 18-19.81
    79My intention
    incompiling
    thislistis toincludeall thosedoctrines
    ofVallawhich
    ina dialectic
    onemight
    thatis,all thestrictly
    expecttofindmentioned
    commentary,
    andsomefrom
    andpsychology
    whichareclosely
    related
    metaphysics
    logicaldoctrines
    orwhichmight
    occurinexamples.
    Renaissance
    willcontain
    a listofdoctrines
    Argument
    on whichVallainRDP, contradicts
    drawnfroma muchbroaderrangeof
    Aristotle,
    The first
    after
    eachstatement
    refer
    totherelevant
    groupofnumbers
    subjects.
    pages
    ofRDP.
    80'Abstract'
    arediscussed
    and'concrete'
    della
    Maier,Terminologia
    byAlfonso
    logica
    tardascolastica
    , Rome1972,66-9.
    81I am citingthisworkfromtheeditionofL. M. de Rijk,Assen1972,hereafter
    Trac
    tatus.
    272

    09:02:21 AM

    viewthatthegenusis a sufficient
    13. Vallaattacks
    answertoa question
    Porphyry's
    in 'quid'.393-396,164-166.L. Minio-Paluello
    translatio
    Boethii
    ed., Porphyrii
    ,
    Isagoge
    Aristoteles
    I, 6-7,Categoriarum
    Latinus,
    Supplementa,
    Bruges1966,hereafter
    Isagoge,
    7-8.
    14. Valla attacks
    definition
    ofdifferentia.
    391, 163-164.Porph.,Isagoge
    ,
    Porphyry's
    18.
    definition
    of property.
    15. Valla attacksPorphyry's
    398-400,170-171.Porph.,
    , 19-20.
    Isagoge
    ofdefinition
    is vagueandempty.400, 168.Arist.,Topica
    16. Aristotle's
    definition
    ,
    I, 5, 101b37.
    useofthephrase4species
    17. Vallaattacks
    medieval
    Aristotelians'
    ' 423,
    specialissima
    18.
    10. PeterofSpain,Tractatus
    , II, 7,
    is unintelligible.
    160.Arist.,Categories
    18. Secondary
    substance
    , 5, 2bl3-3a20.
    is inconsistent
    andincompatible
    withChristianity.
    19. The 'TreeofPorphyry'
    389In Porphyrium
    Commentariorum
    , III, PL 64, 103,G. Schepss,S.
    391,46-50.Boethius,
    inIsagoge
    Brandt
    Commentarti,
    edd.,Boethius
    , II,
    Porphyrii
    Leipzig1906,209. Tractatus
    11,20.
    53-58.Arist.,
    ideaofGodismistaken.
    20. Aristotle's
    , XII, 7-8,1072b24Metaphysics
    1073al3,1074a35-bl0.
    21. Animalspossessreason.409-410,67-73.Arist.,De anima,
    III, 3, 429a5-9.
    in ethics.77-78.Arist.,Categories
    22. The notionofhabitis ofno significance
    , 8,
    8b26-9al0,Ethics
    , II, 1, 1103al3-25.
    andhabitus.418,79.
    23. Therearevariousintermediate
    stagesbetween
    disposition
    , 8, 8b26-9al0.
    Arist.,Categories
    ofpotential
    are absurd.128-129,Arist.,
    and evxeAexetoc
    s conceptions
    24. Aristotle
    , IX 7, 1048b35-1049b2.
    Metaphysics
    25. Thereare notsix kindsof motionbutonlyone.82436-438,132-133.Arist.,
    , 14, 15al3-bl7.
    Categories
    26. Lines do not have longitudewithoutlatitude.428-429,143-144.Arist.,
    In Categorias
    Aristotelis
    , II, PL
    , V, 6, 1016b26,13, 1020al4[Or Boethius
    Metaphysics
    64, 204C-205B].
    27. Pointsarepartsoflines.429-430,144-147.
    Arist.,
    , XIV, 3, 1090b5-20
    Metaphysics
    loc.cit.in previous
    [Or Boethius
    item].
    is activenotpassive.445-446,154-156.Arist.,De anima,
    28. Senseperception
    II, 5,
    416b32-418a6.
    ofa wordthatitssignificance
    is fixedby
    29. Valla addsto Boethius's
    disposition
    Inlibrum
    De interpretatione
    humanconvention.
    433,122-124.
    , editiosecunda,I, PL 64,
    I, 1-5,1-2.
    395-396;ed. C. Meiser,Leipzig1880,6-10.PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
    - copula- participle.
    shouldnotbe reducedtotheform:subject
    45030. Sentences
    213. PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
    I, De introd.,
    1, 3-4.
    451, 178-181,
    45131. Denominative,
    andunivocal
    areissuesingrammar,
    notdialectic.
    equivocal
    lai
    181-183.
    -15.
    Categories
    1,
    452,
    Arist.,
    ,
    behavelikeparticulars.
    Boethius's
    viewthatindefinite
    32. Vallacorrects
    propositions
    II, PL 64, 802C.
    454, 186-189.Boeth.,De syllogismo
    categorico,
    ofpropositions.
    189-190.
    Arist.
    33. Vallaattacks
    theconversion
    , Prior
    , I, 2-3,
    Analytics
    25al-b25.PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
    I, 15,8.
    34. Vallarevises
    ontheeffects
    oftheLatinwordsusedas markers
    previous
    teaching
    ofpropositions.
    ofthequalityandquantity
    457-472,190-215.PeterofSpain,Tractatus
    , I, De introd.,
    8, 4.
    82Vallaalsoallowsthatthere
    canbe changes
    ofquality,
    buthedoesnotregard
    them
    as partofmotion
    strictly
    speaking.
    273

    09:02:21 AM

    useofquidam
    35. Vallaattacks
    Boethius's
    as themainmarker
    ofparticularity,
    arguforthepurpose.
    460-461
    De inter
    , 195-196.
    Boeth.,Inlibrum
    ingthatitis toodefinite
    ed. C. Meiser,Leipzig1880,147.
    pretatione
    , editiosecunda,II, PL 64, 540A-548B;
    viewson biparticulars.
    36. Valla attacks
    Boethius's
    De interpreta199-201.In librum
    ed. C. Meiser,Leipzig1880,294-310.
    tion,editiosecunda,IV, PL 64,540A-548B83
    37. The negative
    shouldnotbe appliedto thenoun.472-475,215-219.Arist.,De
    2, 16a30,10, 19b38.
    interpretation,
    477-491
    iswrong.
    De interpretation,
    38. Thesquareofcontraries
    , 224-235.
    Arist.,
    7-8,
    17a37-18a28.
    39. Thereare not fourkindsof opposite,but two. 497-499,235-236.Arist.,
    10, 11b15-13b35.
    Categories,
    40. The system
    of six kindsofmodalproposition
    is mistaken.
    491-493,237-238.
    Arist.,De interpretatione,
    12, 21a34-36.
    41. VallasaysthatPeterofSpamiswrong
    toderive
    dialectic
    from
    between
    reasoning
    two{duo)people.526,279. PeterofSpain,Tractatus
    , De introd.,
    I, 1, 1.
    isnotspecific
    ofsyllogism
    42. Aristotle's
    definition
    280-281.Arist.,
    528-529,
    enough.
    Prior
    I, 1, 24bl8-20.
    Analytics,
    forthepartsof thesyllogism.
    43. Valla altersBoethius'sterminology
    529-530.
    II, PL 64, 811B-C.PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
    Boeth.,De syllogismo
    IV, De
    categorico,
    Sill.,2, 43-44.
    o proposition
    44. Valla attacksthe definition
    used by Boethiusand the Latin
    tradition.
    Aristotelian
    529, 280-281.Boeth.,De differentiis
    I, PL 64, 1174B.
    topicis,
    PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
    I, De introd.,
    7, 3, IV, 1, 43.
    45. Valla wantstoaltertheorderofthepartsofthesyllogism.
    531,282. Boethius,
    In TopicaCiceronis,
    I, PL 64, 1051A-B.
    46. Manyofthemoodsofthesyllogism
    arepointless.
    297-300.Arist.,Prior
    546-548,
    I, 11, 31al9-32a5.
    Analytics,
    47. Vallaattacks
    Aristotle's
    useofletters
    torepresent
    terms
    inhisdiscussion
    ofthe
    and passim.
    548,299-300.Arist.,Prior
    I, 2-11,25al4-31b36
    syllogism.
    Analytics,
    48. Valla adds manynew typesof syllogism
    in wholeand parts,all
    (syllogism
    all particular
    and all singular
    basedon
    syllogisms,
    negative
    syllogisms,
    syllogisms
    304-306.Cf.PeterofSpain,Tracwords)535-537,543-546,553-555,282,289-291,
    tatus,
    IV, De sill.,4, 45.
    49. Valla attacksBoethius'saccountof hypothetical
    549-553,300-304.
    syllogism.
    Brescia1969,
    Boeth.,De syllogismo
    I, PL 64, 831-832;ed. L. Obertello,
    hypothetico,
    204-208.
    50. Vallaaddsotherforms
    ofargumentation
    sorites,
    (chainsofsyllogisms,
    interrogation,dilemma).556-563,306-312.
    51. Valla rejectsconversion
    as a replyto thedilemma.562-575,312-328.Aulus
    5.10.1.
    Gellius,NodesAtticae,
    52. It is futile
    toattempt
    a systematic
    treatment
    oferrors.
    575-576,
    328,334.Arist.,
    .84
    Sophistical
    Refutations
    53. Aristotle
    s accountofinduction
    is mistaken.
    587-592,345-349.Arist.,Topica,
    I,
    12, 105al3-18.
    83Thisreference
    comesfromZippel.It is highly
    likelythatValla is hereattacking
    medievallogician,whoperhapsalso uses theexampleofthefish
    someparticular
    whichtheJewsare permitted
    to eat.
    84AtRDP, 304-6,314-6,328-34,553-5,564,575-8,Valla attempts
    to accountfor
    severalsophism-like
    and late
    (some of themtakenfromAristotle
    ambiguities
    recourse
    todoctrines
    associated
    withthesophisms.
    without
    scholastic
    philosophers)
    Further
    detailsin mythesisand book,n. 5 above.
    274

    09:02:21 AM

    forms
    ofargumentation.
    54. VallaupsetsBoethius's
    offourrelated
    scheme
    594,352PeterofSpain,Tractatus
    353.Boeth.,De differentiis
    PL, 64, 1183A-1184D.
    , V,
    topicis,
    85
    De loc.,3, 56-58.
    85The schemeprobably
    derivesfromArist.,Posterior
    , I, 1, 71al0. I am
    Analytics
    indebted
    to Zippel'snotesin RDP, forsomeoftheparallels
    citedabove.

    275

    09:02:21 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 2 (1992)
    Reviews
    : a Portrait
    SaintAnselm
    R.W. Southern,
    ina Landscape
    Press
    , Cambridge
    University
    1990,xxix+ 493p. ISBN 0 521 362628
    It is nowalmostthirty
    hisfirst
    book
    yearssinceSirRichardSouthern
    published
    on Anselm,Archbishop
    ofCanterbury
    It seemedthenthatSaintAnselm
    1093-1109.
    andhisBiographer
    Press1963)mustsurelybythedefinitive
    (Cambridge
    University
    written
    as thisfirst
    workwas,matchless
    in itsinsights
    and
    Beautifully
    biography.
    wonderfull
    skilledin itsinterpretation
    ofthewritten
    it appearedincapable,
    record,
    ofnewevidence,
    thediscovery
    either
    ofserious
    alteration
    orofsignificant
    exbarring
    tension.
    retaina smallmeasureoftruth.
    Theseappearances
    The first
    workstillstandsin
    bookdoesnotreplacetheformer;
    itsownright.The present
    indeed,wenowneed
    thetwobefore
    us. Butit doeschangeandextendit.And,in so doing,italtersthe
    at thedeepestand,to many,themostrewarding
    oflevels.
    messageoftheoriginal
    The first
    wehavemovedfrom
    the
    changeis oneofpace.As thenewtitlesuggests,
    and toa farlargercanvas.The Europeanbackground
    tothe
    pentothepaint-brush,
    laterEnglish
    sceneis discussed
    morethoroughly,
    andsomeofthebrush-strokes
    used
    in itsdescription
    are bolderand morefullofpigment
    thantheearlierinstrument
    allowed.The messages
    Themost
    then,reacha widerreadership.
    theyconvey
    might,
    is thechangeofperspective.
    ofthechanges,
    In theearlierbook
    however,
    important
    itwas Eadmer,Anselm'sfirst,
    andnearlycontemporary,
    wholedus to
    biographer
    theArchbishop.
    NowEadmeris, so tospeak,relegated
    tothewings,andAnselmis
    tocentre
    forhimself.
    Anselm
    When,furthermore,
    stagetospeakoutclearly
    brought
    doesspeakouttohisexpectant
    hisprayers,
    audience,he doesso primarily
    through
    andletters.
    Ata timewhenprayers
    andmeditations
    arenotnormally
    meditations
    the
    first
    sourcestowhichthehistorian
    The Anselm
    turns,thisis peculiarly
    refreshing.
    so firmly
    is notAnselmtheArchbishop,
    moreover,
    but,overwhelmingly,
    projected,
    monk.
    AnselmtheBenedictine
    The physical
    centre
    ofthebookis devotedtoa discussion
    ofthisAnselm.We are
    to realise that his meditative
    both of
    broughtimmediately
    understanding,
    ingeneral
    monasticism
    andofhisownvocation,
    wascrucialtoallofhispublicactions
    It wasalsobyno meansa common
    andexpressions.
    one.Thismayin partexplain
    theexasperation
    thesaintarousedin someofhiscontemporaries.
    andinRejection
    droveAnselmto Bee. Self-abnegation
    hisgrateful
    to the
    security
    governed
    response
    lifehefoundthere
    andat Canterbury.
    Continued
    andtheabasement
    self-abnegation
    ofthemerely
    humanwillwere,tohim,thesoleguarantees
    ofhistrueliberty
    andthat
    of others.It was a view bothbleak and immutable.
    Anselm'sconception
    of
    monasticism
    is noteasytocomprehend
    totranslate
    now;norwasiteasythenreadily
    it intopractice.
    Thesecentral
    pagesuponthepartmonasticism
    playedin Anselm's
    ofpeaceandfreedom,
    bothinprivate
    andinpublic,and,aboveall,uponhis
    pursuit
    areamongthemostvaluableinthebook.Theycontain
    ideasofmonastic
    friendship
    gleaming
    passagesofprose.
    meantforAnselmtheliberty
    todo no wrong,
    Liberty,
    including
    political
    liberty,
    isnotthepowerofchoicebetween
    ''freedom
    goodandevil,butthepowerofsteadfasttothewillofGod,which
    comesfrom
    theloving
    lywilling
    nothing
    contrary
    acceptance
    ofthelimitations
    ofcreatedbeing",and "...neitherfriendship,
    as Anselmusedthe
    can be fully
    without
    an intense
    oflife."Such
    word,norfaith
    experienced
    discipline
    observations
    a badlyneededbalanceandcorrection
    totoosimplean associaprovide
    tionofmonastic
    emotion
    withhomosexual
    orientation.
    Also,at a timewhenfewpersonshavedirectexperience
    oftheBenedictine
    ofthebook
    wayoflife,thesesections
    276

    09:02:27 AM

    thislife,itsseverities
    withan aptness
    anditsrewards,
    evokeandpresent
    andintensity
    whichis as rareas it is essential
    to all understanding
    ofthisperiod.
    Anselmthusemerges
    as a manforwhom,oncehe enterstherealmofstatecraft,
    all essential
    choiceshavebeenmade.He has no roomfor,or interest
    in, political
    manoeuvre.
    He mustremainfaithful
    in thefullest
    senseto hiscommitments,
    and
    so to hisfirst
    vocation
    as a monk.HereDr. Southern
    tackleshead-ona
    especially
    offered
    viewofAnselmtheArchbishop.
    to thisviewArchbishop
    recently
    According
    Anselmwas a figure
    one
    vitallyengagedin theexerciseofpowerand influence;
    mindful
    of theimpacthis collected
    letters
    especially
    mightmakeuponthelarger
    scene.It is no longerpossibletosustainsucha position.
    The careful
    discussion
    of,
    andappendix
    tradition
    ofAnselm's
    collected
    letters
    mustalone
    upon,themanuscript
    setat restforeverthenotionthatAnselmwas,orwishedtobe, in fullcommand
    of
    suchmatters.
    It alsobrings
    toourattention
    howcrucialan expert
    sharply
    knowledge
    ofall themanuscripts
    is to sucha discussion.
    Somestepshavehad, inevitably,
    to be retraced.
    On certainsubjects,
    however,
    takeson theforceoffresh
    assertion.
    Sucha oneis thenotorious
    repetition
    problem
    ofthe"Canterbury
    In herworkon Lanfranc,
    Gibsonargued
    Forgeries".
    Margaret
    - butis unrepenforan earlydateforthese.SirRichardreviews
    thiswork
    cogently
    tant.The caseforan 1120/21
    datehe madein hisfirst
    is re-stated
    with,
    biography
    it mustbe said,compelling
    power.I cannotsay quitethesameforthecase for
    HonoriusAugustodunensis
    thewandering
    Irishmagpie;butherewe enterregions
    beyondthescopeofa review.
    The central
    feature
    ofthisstudyis theportrait.
    The re-painting
    ofthelandscape
    hasbrought
    outthefigure
    as neverbefore.It is a marvellous
    achievement.
    Auckland

    Valerie I.J. Flint

    PeterofSpain,Language
    inDispute.
    TheSummulae
    translation
    of
    , (An English
    Logicales
    PeterofSpain'sTractatus
    calledafterwards
    Summulae
    on thebasisofthe
    Logicales
    critical
    edition
    established
    byL. M. de Rijk).Translated
    byFrancisP. Dinneen.
    ( = Studiesin the Historyof the LanguageSciences,39). JohnBenjamin,
    1990.ISBN 90 272 4524X
    Amsterdam/Philadelphia
    PeterofSpain(ca. 1205-1277)
    is oneofthebestknownfigures
    in thehistory
    of
    so. His Tractatus
    inthe1230s,provides
    written
    a full
    logic,anddeservedly
    , probably
    introduction
    toAristotle's
    oftheAnalytica
    Posteriora
    logic(withtheexception
    ), together
    witha lengthy
    treatment
    of thespecifically
    medievaldevelopment
    of supposition
    Theworkwaswidely
    usedandcommented
    onwellintothesixteenth
    theory.
    century,
    to shapeuniversity
    education
    thelatermiddleages.At
    thereby
    helping
    throughout
    thesametime,theTractatus
    contains
    muchofinterest
    to thehistorian
    oflanguage.
    Peterwaswriting
    at a timewhenthespeculative
    ofthemodistae
    wasjust
    grammar
    to takeshape,beforeits culmination
    in the greattreatises
    on modi
    beginning
    ofthelastthreedecadesofthethirteenth
    andwe findinhimthe
    significandi
    century,
    simultaneous
    useoftworather
    different
    to language.On theonehand,
    approaches
    his tractson supposition,
    relative
    and
    terms,ampliation,
    restriction,
    appellation,
    distribution
    totheeffect
    ofcontext
    onword-meaning
    anduse.On
    paycloseattention
    theother
    themodistic
    notionthata spoken
    hand,histractonfallacies
    emphasizes
    (or
    wordis endowed
    at oneandthesametimewithitssignification
    anditsconwritten)
    or secondary
    so thatsentential
    context
    will
    signification,
    grammatical
    signification,
    ofsuchproblematic
    notions
    as equivocation.
    normally
    playnoroleintheexplanation
    277

    09:02:27 AM

    thislife,itsseverities
    withan aptness
    anditsrewards,
    evokeandpresent
    andintensity
    whichis as rareas it is essential
    to all understanding
    ofthisperiod.
    Anselmthusemerges
    as a manforwhom,oncehe enterstherealmofstatecraft,
    all essential
    choiceshavebeenmade.He has no roomfor,or interest
    in, political
    manoeuvre.
    He mustremainfaithful
    in thefullest
    senseto hiscommitments,
    and
    so to hisfirst
    vocation
    as a monk.HereDr. Southern
    tackleshead-ona
    especially
    offered
    viewofAnselmtheArchbishop.
    to thisviewArchbishop
    recently
    According
    Anselmwas a figure
    one
    vitallyengagedin theexerciseofpowerand influence;
    mindful
    of theimpacthis collected
    letters
    especially
    mightmakeuponthelarger
    scene.It is no longerpossibletosustainsucha position.
    The careful
    discussion
    of,
    andappendix
    tradition
    ofAnselm's
    collected
    letters
    mustalone
    upon,themanuscript
    setat restforeverthenotionthatAnselmwas,orwishedtobe, in fullcommand
    of
    suchmatters.
    It alsobrings
    toourattention
    howcrucialan expert
    sharply
    knowledge
    ofall themanuscripts
    is to sucha discussion.
    Somestepshavehad, inevitably,
    to be retraced.
    On certainsubjects,
    however,
    takeson theforceoffresh
    assertion.
    Sucha oneis thenotorious
    repetition
    problem
    ofthe"Canterbury
    In herworkon Lanfranc,
    Gibsonargued
    Forgeries".
    Margaret
    - butis unrepenforan earlydateforthese.SirRichardreviews
    thiswork
    cogently
    tant.The caseforan 1120/21
    datehe madein hisfirst
    is re-stated
    with,
    biography
    it mustbe said,compelling
    power.I cannotsay quitethesameforthecase for
    HonoriusAugustodunensis
    thewandering
    Irishmagpie;butherewe enterregions
    beyondthescopeofa review.
    The central
    feature
    ofthisstudyis theportrait.
    The re-painting
    ofthelandscape
    hasbrought
    outthefigure
    as neverbefore.It is a marvellous
    achievement.
    Auckland

    Valerie I.J. Flint

    PeterofSpain,Language
    inDispute.
    TheSummulae
    translation
    of
    , (An English
    Logicales
    PeterofSpain'sTractatus
    calledafterwards
    Summulae
    on thebasisofthe
    Logicales
    critical
    edition
    established
    byL. M. de Rijk).Translated
    byFrancisP. Dinneen.
    ( = Studiesin the Historyof the LanguageSciences,39). JohnBenjamin,
    1990.ISBN 90 272 4524X
    Amsterdam/Philadelphia
    PeterofSpain(ca. 1205-1277)
    is oneofthebestknownfigures
    in thehistory
    of
    so. His Tractatus
    inthe1230s,provides
    written
    a full
    logic,anddeservedly
    , probably
    introduction
    toAristotle's
    oftheAnalytica
    Posteriora
    logic(withtheexception
    ), together
    witha lengthy
    treatment
    of thespecifically
    medievaldevelopment
    of supposition
    Theworkwaswidely
    usedandcommented
    onwellintothesixteenth
    theory.
    century,
    to shapeuniversity
    education
    thelatermiddleages.At
    thereby
    helping
    throughout
    thesametime,theTractatus
    contains
    muchofinterest
    to thehistorian
    oflanguage.
    Peterwaswriting
    at a timewhenthespeculative
    ofthemodistae
    wasjust
    grammar
    to takeshape,beforeits culmination
    in the greattreatises
    on modi
    beginning
    ofthelastthreedecadesofthethirteenth
    andwe findinhimthe
    significandi
    century,
    simultaneous
    useoftworather
    different
    to language.On theonehand,
    approaches
    his tractson supposition,
    relative
    and
    terms,ampliation,
    restriction,
    appellation,
    distribution
    totheeffect
    ofcontext
    onword-meaning
    anduse.On
    paycloseattention
    theother
    themodistic
    notionthata spoken
    hand,histractonfallacies
    emphasizes
    (or
    wordis endowed
    at oneandthesametimewithitssignification
    anditsconwritten)
    or secondary
    so thatsentential
    context
    will
    signification,
    grammatical
    signification,
    ofsuchproblematic
    notions
    as equivocation.
    normally
    playnoroleintheexplanation
    277

    09:02:42 AM

    is equivocalbecauseas a participle
    itconsignifies
    Thuslaborans
    bothpresent
    andpast
    verb.
    time,and notbecauseit isjoinedto anyparticular
    ofPeterofSpain'sTractatus
    It is notsurprising,
    should
    then,thata translation
    tothehistory
    ofthelanguage
    Whatis surprising,
    sciences.
    appearina seriesdevoted
    doneandso poorly
    shouldhavebeenso poorly
    is thatthetranslation
    presented.
    Any
    readers
    toa historical
    tointroduce
    textshoulddo
    bookwhichpurports
    contemporary
    whichtellsthereaderwhothe
    fourthings.First,it shouldhavean introduction
    historical
    authorwas,andwhichsetshimin hiscontext.
    Second,it shouldprovide
    a fair
    a selected
    as a guidetofurther
    Third,itshouldprovide
    reading.
    bibliography
    numberof explanatory
    notes,since even quite recentworksare rarelyselfwhichis bothaccurateand
    Finally,it shouldprovidea translation
    explanatory.
    ofmeeting
    thepresent
    workfallsfarshort
    readable.Unhappily,
    anyofthesecriteria.
    indexesand
    oftheintroduction,
    I shallbeginwithan examination
    bibliography,
    of
    notes.The introduction
    'Hispanuswasa contemporary
    openswiththeremark:
    entitheorists
    called'Modistae'after
    their12th[sic]to14thcentury
    writings
    linguistic
    tledDe ModisSignificando
    (p. xvii).Dinneengoeson tellus thatPeterwasbornca.
    fora datebefore
    De Rijk'sarguments
    1205,andthathis'workappeared
    1215,despite
    toprovide
    historical
    around1300[sic]'(p. xxvi),buthe makeslittlefurther
    attempt
    is devotedto a disorganized
    seriesof
    details.Most of the22-pageintroduction
    Thelanguage
    isjargon-ridden
    remarks
    aboutmedieval
    (e.g.theuseofthe
    linguistics.
    arebaffling.
    and'etically'),
    invented
    words'emically'
    andsomeoftheremarks
    What,
    whatthey
    from
    forinstance,
    is onetomakeoftheclaim:'The Medievais
    progressed
    between
    twoofAristorelations
    calledLogicaAntiquatoLogicaModernabyrefining
    andQuantity:
    Substance
    otherCategories
    tle'sCategories,
    (e.g. QualityandRelaadded'(p. xxxvii)?
    wereexplicitly
    tionitself)
    The Bibliography
    just fourworks:the1955Loeb editionof
    (p. xxxix)contains
    edition
    1947edition
    ofPeterofSpain,Bursill-Hall's
    Bochenski's
    Aristotle's
    Organon,
    ofThomasofErfurt,
    and De Rijk's 1972editionofPeterofSpain1on whichthis
    sourceon
    is madeat anypointtoanysecondary
    translation
    is based.No reference
    medieval
    grammar.
    logicandspeculative
    andtheindex
    Theindexofwordsandthings
    Therearethree
    indexes.
    (pp.208-260)
    on De Rijk's
    of sophisms
    and examples(pp. 261-271),bothheavilydependent
    aresatisfactory,
    buttheindexofreferences
    indexes,
    (pp. 206-207)is useless.Without
    thereader,itrefers
    onlytothepagesofDe Rijk'sedition;nordoesitgive
    warning
    as 'Anonymous.
    Comm.in de Celo'.
    detailsforsuchentries
    anybibliographical
    aboutthe
    similarproblems.
    The notesexhibit
    Apartfroma fewminorremarks
    himself
    withcopying
    de Rijk'snotes.A number
    Latintext,Dinneenhascontented
    Latinus
    references
    totheAristoteles
    ofthesegiveunexplained
    (e.g. p. 143,n. 78: 'Post.
    Minio-Paluello's
    An. I 16, 79b 23-25,Jacobi's[sic] translation,
    edition,p. 34')
    whicharerelevant
    onlytotheLatintext.One note(p. 184,n. 6) tellsthereaderthat
    hasa pointonlywhenonerealizes
    that
    which
    'box'means'trunk,
    coffer',
    strong-box,
    ' ina context
    totheword'archa
    wherea previous
    De Rijk'snote(R, p. 207)referred
    '
    Noe' (Noah'sark).In oneplace(p. 12)Dinneendoesadd a note
    examplewas archa
    buton p. 66 line8 he follows
    abouta variantreading
    foundinDe Rijk'sapparatus,
    corrects
    De
    thefact,andonp. 66 line10hesilently
    a variant
    without
    noting
    reading
    '
    '
    '
    noto'
    . On p. 164he silently
    toto
    adoptsthe
    Rijk's minus
    (R, p. 75 1. 16) to minus
    to De Rijk's
    variantreading'PriscianMajor',buton theverynextpagehe reverts
    thereaderanyhelpinunder'PriscianMinor'.Notoneofthenotesoffers
    reading,
    difficult
    logicalpoints.
    standing
    andnotes,thisbookwouldhave
    a proper
    Evenwithout
    introduction,
    bibliography
    oftheLatintext.Unfortunately
    a reliabletranslation
    beenusefulhad itcontained
    He is literalwherehe should
    Dinneenfallsintoeverytrapthatawaitsa translator.
    wherehe shouldbe literal,ifseveralEnglish
    be free,he paraphrases
    inaccurately
    278

    09:02:42 AM

    or understand
    he failsto recognize
    wordsarepossible
    he choosestheleastsuitable,
    andhisEnglishis frequently
    hemakesstraightforward
    technical
    errors,
    vocabulary,
    I go ontodocument
    theseclaims,I wouldlike
    Before
    orevenunintelligible.
    clumsy
    TractI andpartofTract
    all ofPeterofSpain'stext,apartfrom
    tosaythathappily
    VII, is alreadyavailablein English.TractsVI, VIII, IX, X, XI and XII were
    of
    translated
    ofPeter
    byJ. P. Mullally{TheSummulae
    Logicales
    ofSpain,University
    NotreDamePress,NotreDame,Indiana1945,tobecitedas M). Whilethistranslationis veryold,andwasnotbasedona critical
    text,itdoesat leastmakesense,and
    himwithDinneen,Mullallyis clearlysuperior.
    in all theplaceswhereI compared
    TractsII, III, IV, V andpartofTractVII haverecently
    beentranslated
    byNorman
    Kretzmann
    and EleonoreStump( TheCambridge
    Translations
    ofMedieval
    Philosophy
    Texts.Vol.I. LogicandthePhilosophy
    , Cambridge
    Press,CamofLanguage
    University
    withDe
    bridge1988,tobe citedas KS). I compared
    everylineoftheirtranslation
    and I foundit to be immeasurably
    Rijk'seditionand withDinneen'stranslation,
    to Dinneen's.It is lucid,elegantand accurate.2
    superior
    Let me first
    speakofDinneen'sEnglish.Evenat itsbest,itdoesnotflow.For
    he writes:'To becomefamiliar
    withthePredicaments,
    a few
    instance,
    prefacing
    letus first
    a triplemodeofpredicating'
    withAristotle
    necessary
    things,
    distinguish
    Kretzmann
    andStumpwriteTnordertounderstand
    thecategories
    cer(p. 25)where
    tainintroductory
    remarks
    arenecessary.
    wewilldistinguish
    withAristotle
    three
    First,
    suchas
    waysofmakinga predication'
    (KS, p. 88). He usesheavyformulations,
    ... inseparably'
    'blackco-occurs
    acci(p. 23, cf.KS p. 86: 'blackis an inseparable
    Some
    dent')or 'unusableconnexities'
    (p. 48,cf.KS p. 225'uselesscombinations').
    a mistranslation
    sentences
    bothcontain
    andmakeno sense:e.g. 'Shiftis ambiguous
    '
    in proof(p. 191)fortheLatin' Quiaduplex
    estprocessus
    inprobatione
    (R, p. 2171.2),
    thatis, 'thereis a two-fold
    of
    in
    , M p.
    process reasoning thedisproof
    'improbatione'
    75. He almostalwaysuses'like'wherehe means'suchas', 'forexample'or 'e.g.'.
    Thuswe readthatsomewordsare predicated
    'like"dog" bya single
    equivocally,
    nameis predicated
    ofthebarker,
    marineanimaland heavenly
    body'(p. 24).'
    he is overly
    Sometimes
    literal.Thus'essebipedem
    inest
    omni
    homini
    sednonsoli (R,
    as 'beingtwofooted
    is in everyman,notjustone' (p. 22)
    p. 22 11.5-6)is rendered
    rather
    than'beingtwofooted
    isineverymanbutnotinmenalone'(KS, p. 85) which
    is thesensedemanded
    Atothertimeshe supplements
    thetext
    bytheentire
    '
    ' passage.
    inan unfortunate
    of'figure'(evenifPeter
    way.The wordquartamakeshimthink
    ofSpainadmitted
    so we twicefindreferences
    to the
    onlythreesyllogistic
    figures)
    'fourth
    ofthefirst
    mood'(p. 153,p. 154,cf.p. 42: 'This is reducedto the
    figure
    'secundum et
    ' as
    fourth
    He sometimes
    translates
    figure').
    prius posterius
    'proportionally
    or analogically'
    in his Tractatus
    PeterofSpain
    78, cf.
    (p.
    pp. 85, 89), eventhough
    '
    '
    neveronceuses analogiaorwordsformed
    fromit,andeventhough
    whenlogicians
    didstartdiscussing
    itin anysimplewaywith
    analogyas such,theydidnotidentify
    secundum
    predication
    priusetposterius.
    HisgraspofLatinvocabulary
    is unsure.Sometimes
    thisis morea matter
    ofchoice
    thanofactualerror.
    Thuswefind'costume'
    for'habitus'
    inplaceswhere'possession'
    ' is translated
    is thebetterreading(e.g. p. 18, p. 36); 'pena
    as 'suffering'
    where
    is better
    as 'he
    'punishment'
    (p. 60); lpenitet'
    deliqui
    ergo
    (R, p. 701.20) is translated
    hasregrets;
    therefore
    hehasfailed'(p. 62) rather
    thanas 'He is repentant;
    therefore,
    he hasdonesomething
    wrong'
    (KS, p. 239). In otherplaces,hischoiceofwordis
    ' volubile
    '
    mistaken:
    totheheavensis translated
    as 'changeable'
    rather
    simply
    applied
    ' is translated
    '
    than'revolvable'
    as 'genus'whenit hasto be 'gender'
    (p.
    66);
    genus
    '
    '
    as 'field'(p. 59, p. 60); 'sanativus'
    is
    (p. 125); vitrum
    ('glass') is twicetranslated
    translated
    as 'healthy'
    rather
    than'health-giving'
    withtheresult
    thatthewhole
    32)
    (p.
    'Castrum' the
    sentence
    is garbled;
    is rendered
    as 'camp'rather
    than'for(in singular)
    tress'(p. 64).
    279

    09:02:42 AM

    is
    withwordsbecomereallyseriouswheretechnical
    Thesedifficulties
    vocabulary
    ofthewordsalready
    isthatDinneenisunaware
    Theleastserious
    concerned.
    difficulty
    'extenfor'hypothetical
    usedintheliterature.
    Thus,hehas'hypothetic'
    proposition',
    Somenotions
    for'confused
    'diffuse
    sions'for'ampliation',
    supposition'.
    supposition'
    ' and'
    areroutinely
    as 'nonfinite',
    translated
    Thusboth' indefinita
    heconfuses.
    infinita
    anda nounwitha
    an unquantified
    between
    thedistinction
    whichfudges
    proposition
    ' are bothtranslated
    '
    as
    and ' ostensivus
    negativeprefix.More seriously,inferens*
    as demonstrative
    various
    of
    whichleadstothelabelling
    'demonstrative',
    syllogisms
    sense(seep. 148,153,155).He
    notso in thetechnical
    whentheyarcconspicuously
    ' mediumwhichcanmean
    as 'middleterm',even
    translates
    ',
    'premiss(es)',
    resolutely
    as 'a middletermis calledthatbecauseithastwo
    in suchsentences
    whenitresults
    ' means
    so that
    that' instantia
    extremes'
    'counterexample',
    (p. 49). He is unaware
    '
    '
    a further
    as 'Noristhere
    deoratione
    estinstantia
    objec(R, p. 321.6) is rendered
    Neque
    a
    does not constitute
    tion froma sentence'(p. 29) insteadof 'An expression
    '
    . Thus, secunwith'consequential
    counterexample'
    (KS, p. 93). He hasgreatdifficulties
    '
    essentie
    dumsubsistendi
    consequential
    (R, p.
    consequential
    (R. p. 40 1. 10)and secundum
    and'because
    insubsisting'
    of
    the
    basis
    as
    'on
    rendered
    11.
    40 21-22)get
    subsequence
    and 'a
    thanas 'an existential
    ofessential
    consequence'
    dependency'
    (p. 35) rather
    havingto do withessence'(KS, p. 99. p. 100).
    consequence
    withLatin
    thatisatstake,forDinneenalsohasdifficulties
    It is notonlyvocabulary
    for
    when
    his
    as
    his
    own
    these
    are
    of
    Sometimes
    preference adjectives
    making, '
    syntax.
    nature'(p. 25),
    as 'substantial
    leadshimto render1ratiosubstantie
    overgenitives
    ' as 'material
    '
    ' nominis
    materie
    and
    as
    'nominal
    forma
    interpretation'
    (p.
    54),
    interpretation
    I
    shall
    stem
    from
    form'(p. 188).Others
    simplemisunderstandings. givea listofthe
    a
    utnichil
    habet
    naturalem
    dicitur
    mostseriousexamples.'Ut sanativus
    potentiam
    eoquod
    as 'One iscalledhealthy
    accidentibus
    (R, p. 3611.23-24)istranslated
    patiatur
    quibuslibet
    at allthathappen'
    from
    ofnotsuffering
    becausehehasa natural
    anythings
    capacity
    insofar
    is saidtobe health-giving
    thanas 'So, forexample,
    something
    (p. 32) rather
    accidents'
    certain
    from
    ofpreventing
    as ithasa natural
    (KS, p.
    suffering
    any
    power
    '
    dicimur
    (R, p. 38 1. 18) is
    agere
    quamin id quodsubicitur,
    96). Actioestsecundum
    as 'Actionis thatbywhichwearesaidtoactonwhatis subjected'
    translated
    (p. 33)
    withwhichwe aresaidto
    thanas 'Actionis thatin thesubjectinaccordance
    rather
    '
    e'.
    existenti!
    rulesbymisreading
    someofPeter'ssyllogistic
    act'(KS, p. 98). He garbles
    existenti
    Thus' majori
    (R, p. 48 11.5-6)is readas 'Ifthemajoris a particular
    particulari
    is
    means'If themajorpremiss
    existential"
    (p. 40, cf.p. 42, p. 44), whenitsimply
    '
    estSortes
    , animalest
    (KS, p. 221). Peter's'exampleof a fallacyanimal
    particular'
    as
    homo(R, p. 82, pp. 143-144)is twicerendered
    Plato
    ,... ergoanimalestomnis
    'Socratesis an animal,Platois an animal,... therefore
    everymanis an animal'(p.
    ofwhythearguofPeter'sexplanations
    nonsense
    71, 124),whichmakes
    complete
    'Accidentalis
    communis
    termini
    estacceptio
    autem
    mentis fallacious.
    proeispro
    suppositio
    '
    is
    as 'accidental
    supposition
    adjunctum
    (R, p. 81 11.5-6) is translated
    quibusexigit
    added'
    it
    demands
    for
    which
    those
    for
    term
    of
    a
    common
    something
    things
    acceptance
    termforall
    ofa general
    is theacceptance
    than'Accidental
    supposition
    (p. 70) rather
    '
    .... Sednonnisi
    estuniversalis
    altera
    itsadjunctdetermines'
    thosethings
    p.
    Ergo
    5).
    (M,
    '
    is
    thefirst
    as 'Therefore
    estiustus"
    hec:" non-homo
    (R, p. 225 11.1-2)is translated
    universal....Butonlyif "non-manis just" is universal'
    (p. 198) ratherthanas'
    butitcanonlybe thisone: "Not manisjust"
    'Hence,one ofthemis universal...
    (M, p. 89).
    or omitted
    Thereis a fairnumberoftypographical
    words,and
    errors,
    repeated
    'not'onp. 69,
    is an extraneous
    there
    I shallmention
    othererrors.
    onlythefollowing:
    as cause'on
    before'non-cause
    section2, para. 1, lastline;'not'shouldbe inserted
    shouldbe
    p. 155,section168,lastlinebutone.One p. 148,section146,'healthy'
    of'scienceofthesick'.PartsoftheLatin
    for'sick'in bothoccurrences
    substituted
    280

    09:02:42 AM

    onp. 21,section12,p. 51,section


    texthavenotbeentranslated
    3, p. 73,section11,
    andp. 76, section1.
    I do notrecommend
    little
    thisbook.It reflects
    credit
    onitsauthororitspublisher.
    Ont.
    Waterloo,

    E. J. Ashworth

    Notes
    1 PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
    called
    Summule
    Editedby L.M. de
    afterwards
    Logicales.
    Assen1972,to be citedas R.
    Rijk,Van Gorcum,
    2 However,
    ofcomposition'
    on p. 250,lines22-23'fallacy
    shouldread'fallacy
    of
    '
    division'.I wasa littleunhappy
    thattheytranslated
    as 'meaning'on p.
    appellatio'
    89 para.3.
    MarianneHeimbach,
    Derungelehrte
    MundalsAutoritt.
    als Quelle
    Mystische
    Erfahrung
    RedeimWerk
    Mechthilds
    vonMagdeburg
    inGeschichte
    kirchlich-prophetischer
    (Mystik
    - TexteundUntersuchungen:
    undGegenwart
    I: Christliche
    Abteilung
    Mystik.
    von MargotSchmidtund HelmutRiedlinger,Band 6).
    Herausgegeben
    Canstatt1989.
    Stuttgart-Bad
    Fromman-Holzboog,
    DiesesBuchenthlt
    eineStudie,die 1988vonderKatholisch-theologischen
    FakulttderUniversitt
    alsDissertation
    wurde.DerZweckdieser
    Wrzburg
    angenommen
    Arbeit
    Licht
    derGottheit
    den'Zusammenhang
    zwiist,anhanddesWerksDasflieende
    schenMechthilds
    undihremaufdie Kirchegerichteten
    mystischer
    Gottesbeziehung
    undSchreiben'
    Sprechen
    (S. 11) darzustellen.
    In einemersten
    H. mittels
    dreiGrundlinien
    die Grundzge
    von
    Kapitelskizziert
    Mechthilds
    1. dieSelbsterkenntnis
    desMenschen
    imLichtseireligiser
    Erfahrung:
    nerGottesbeziehung;
    2. die gegenstzliche
    vonTrostundTrostlosigkeit;
    Erfahrung
    3. diemystische
    als Nachvollzug
    derHeilsgeschichte.
    Das zweiteKapitel
    Erfahrung
    einerTugendethik:
    zur /m>z;zzwischen
    gibtAnstzezurGrundlegung
    Beziehung
    GottundMenschgehrt
    das WirkenundHandeln.Das dritteKapitelbeschreibt
    Mechthilds
    DenkenundReden.ErstwirdihrKirchenbild
    charakkirchenbezogenes
    dannwirduntersucht,
    wiesie das Wortinnerhalb
    dieserKircheergreift,
    terisiert,
    sowohlimGebetwiein kritischer
    Im letzten
    WeisungundStellungnahme.
    Kapitel
    machtH. deutlich,
    wieMechthilds
    Auftreten
    sichin einerprophetischen
    Sendung
    Sie zeugtvonderErfahrung
    dergttlichen
    minne
    grndet:
    , wiesehrsiesichauchals
    kritische
    einesKonflikts
    mitGesellschaft
    undKircheaussetzt.
    BeginederGefahr
    EinAnhang
    einegutgegliederte
    Bibliogibtdiebibliographischen
    Abkrzungen,
    vonG.J.Lewis,F. Willaert
    undM.J.Govers
    graphie
    (berdie 1989erschienene,
    verfate
    zurdeutschen
    desMittelalters
    konnte
    H. nichtverfgen,
    Bibliographie
    Frauenmystik
    aberaus einemVergleich
    derbeidenBibliographien
    ergibtsichdie Grndlichkeit
    ihrerbibliographischen
    undeinPersonenundSachregister.
    Arbeit),
    Die ganzeArbeit
    istsehrkohrent
    undsystematisch
    BeiderLektre
    falaufgebaut.
    leneinemMittelniederlandisten
    verschiedene
    Parallelen
    vonMechthild
    mitHadeundanderenmittelniederlndischen
    Autoren
    auf.
    wijchundRuusbroec
    mystischen
    AusdieserSichtmchte
    icheinigeBemerkungen
    zumvorliegenden
    Buchmachen.
    Im Laufedesersten
    die ganzeSchpfung
    H., wieMechthild
    Kapitelsbeschreibt
    sichindemLob Gotteszu vereinen,
    wiewohl
    siewei,da auchdannGott
    einldt,
    nichtnachseinerWrdegelobtwerden
    kann.DiesesWissenistaberkeinAnlazur
    sondern
    zur Freude:'Herre,magmandichvolleloben?Nein,des
    Entmutigung,
    vroeweichmich'(S. 47). H. siehtdenGrunddieserFreudein derEnthebung
    des
    281

    09:02:42 AM

    Es wrdemichwundern,
    dadieseaufdas eigneIchgerichtete
    Leistungsdruckes.
    derUrsprung
    dieserFreudewre:Das selbstlose
    IchderMystikerin
    wei
    Erfahrung
    nurnochumeineFreude:denGeliebten.
    DiesesVermuten
    wirdverstrkt
    durcheine
    Brulocht
    , diederzitierten
    PassageinRuusbroecs
    PassagebeiMechthild
    analogist:An
    dieStelledes'Lbens'tritt
    beiRuusbroec
    das 'Minnen'.berdies
    Ruusexplizitiert
    broecaberauchdenGrundderFreude:'Nochtanblivetgodonghement
    na weerde
    vanallencreaturen.
    Endedates derverlichter
    redenen
    cen grotewalostendeghedatharegoden de hareliefsoehogheendesoe rijckees, dathi allen
    noechlijcheit,
    crachten
    endevan niemenne
    en es na sineweerde
    ghescapenen
    onthoghet
    ghemint
    danvanhemselven'.( Opera
    Omnia
    , 3, bl 165-1
    169).GrundderFreudeistalsonicht
    dieEnthebung
    desLeistungsdruckes,
    sondern
    'datharegodendehareliefsoehoghe
    endesoe rijckees', nichtdas Ich,sondern
    derGeliebte.
    Im selbenKapitelwirdbehauptet,
    Mechthild
    nehmemitihrerBeschreibung
    der
    mittels
    dergegenstzlichen
    desAuf-undAbsteimystischen
    Erfahrung
    Bewegungen
    innerhalb
    derTradition
    ein,indemsiedasAufstiegsschema
    gens'eineSonderstellung
    mit
    durchbricht,
    [...]' (S. 65,Note249).AufjedenFallteiltsiedieseSonderstellung
    Ruusbroec
    Werken
    , Ruusbroec,
    , II, S. 57: *[...]wantnedergaen
    (z.B. aus Tabernakel
    in oetmoedicheiden,
    dates eenopgaenbovenallehoecheit
    derhemele'),Claesinne
    vanNieuwlant
    Z. 241: 'doordenneder, hrsg.v. Mommaers,
    (z.B. ausSamenspraak
    eenenpuurenopganck
    inGo) undMarguerite
    denmensch
    Porete(z.B.
    gancheeft
    ames
    ausMirouer
    dessimples
    encel, hrsg.v. Verdeyen,
    Kap. 98, 5-7:'Ilz s'esbayssent
    etsi s'esbayssent
    de ce mesmes
    luyqui estdu montde sa montaigne,
    qui estou fons
    de leurvallee').
    imselbenKapitelzitiert
    H. Richsttters
    Abermals
    Meinung,da es sichbei der
    von Mechthild
    in KapitelIV.24 berichteten
    Schauum die ltestebisherbekannte
    handelt
    keinen
    Kommen(S. 75,Note308).Da siedieserMeinung
    Herz-Jesu-Vision
    tarhinzufgt,
    scheint
    siedieseAnsicht
    zu teilen.Die Herz-Jesu-Vision
    vonLutgard
    vanTongeren
    istaberlter.
    (1182-1246)
    zwischen
    undHadewijch
    BeiallerVerwandtschaft
    Mechthild
    ltauchdieLektre
    zwischen
    diesesBuchesdieUnterschiede
    beidenschreibenden
    umso strker
    Beginen
    zu erwhnen:
    ThemadiesesStudiums
    in
    spren.Um nurdas zentrale
    nirgendwo
    ihrem
    sichselbstals'ungelehrte'
    oderals 'snoeganzenOeuvreerniedrigt
    Hadewijch
    VisionzeigtsiesichimGegenteil
    deswib'(p. 175).In dersiebten
    demmnnlichen,
    manbei ihrnichts
    vonderganz
    gelehrten
    'kimpe'berlegen.
    Zugleichaberfindet
    inderGeschichte
    konkret
    wurzelnden
    derMechthild.
    Kirchenkritik
    Wohlbtsieoft
    scharfe
    aberdiesegiltfastimmerdenMitgliedern
    ihresmystischen
    Kreises
    Kritik,
    oderdenjenigen,
    diediesenKreisbedrohen
    Auchbezglich
    desvon
    (den'vremden').
    H. untersuchten
    ThemaswirdderBefund
    vonFrances
    Gooday(Diss.Harvard1974)
    bei allerhnlichkeit
    istdas WerkbeiderFrauengrundverschieden.
    besttigt:
    Antwerpen

    Guidode Baere

    DieAristotelisch-Scholastische
    Theorie
    derBewegung
    : Studien
    zumKomSarnowsky,
    Jrgen
    mentar
    Alberts
    desAristoteles
    vonSachsen
    zurPhysik
    zurGeschichte
    der
    ( = Beitrge
    undTheologie
    desMittelalters,
    NeueFolge,Band32).Aschcndorff,
    Philosophie
    Mnster1989.xii + 501 pp. ISBN 3 402 039273
    inmedieval
    Albert
    ofSaxonyis innowaya stanger
    butrarely
    doesheprescircles,
    enta clearcut
    andmorerecently
    image.His worksfaredwellamongearlyprinters,
    hisfairshareofattention
    as a notably
    thinker
    in the
    he hascaptured
    "progressive"
    and naturalscience.Allthishas meantthat
    fieldsoffourteenth-century
    philosophy
    282

    09:03:02 AM

    a conveniently
    availablesourceforsampleopinions
    hiswritings
    haveprovided
    on
    Aristotelian
    issuesofhistime.Buthe alwaysseemstobe in theshadowofanother,
    moreoriginal,
    andputatively
    or,moreproBuridan,Bradwardine,
    greater,
    figure,
    Oresme.Sarnowsky
    facestheproblem,
    and seeksa middleposition
    blematically,
    between
    thoseofPierreDuheminhisearlierwritings,
    forwhomAlbertwasoneof
    "themostpowerful
    andmostoriginal"offourteenth-century
    andAlexscholastics,
    anderBirkenmajer,
    whoregarded
    himas little
    better
    thana plagiarist.
    A middle
    positionis difficult
    to developsharply,
    whenone is dealingwithsuchan
    especially
    andSarnowsky'
    s strategy
    doesnotgreatly
    facilitate
    thisend.
    greyfigure,
    apparently
    After
    someveryuseful
    onAlbert's
    sourcesandinfluopening
    chapters
    biography,
    toa chapter-by-chapter
    ofhiscommentary
    onthe
    ence,Sarnowsky
    proceeds
    analysis
    Thisis veryhandyforgeneral
    butgiveslittlesenseofthecutand
    reference,
    Physics.
    thrustof debate,nor of Albert'sparticular
    nuancesof interpretation
    and his
    immediate
    reasonsforchoosingthem.One longsformorediachronic
    appraisal
    overtheshortterm),butmostquestions
    of thiskindare leftto the
    (particularly
    44
    short
    finalchapter,
    DerPhysik-Kommentar
    Alberts
    vonSachsenunddie
    relatively
    derNaturerkenntnis"
    Entwicklung
    (pp. 405-434).In thisSarnowsky
    develops12 +
    10 + 4 theses.
    and,onemaysaycommendably,
    Unsurprisingly
    theyaresoundrather
    thanexciting.
    In thefirst
    sethe characterises
    Albert's
    relation
    tocontemporary
    and
    earlierscholastic
    theories
    ofmotion:whether
    todescribe
    hisdeviations
    as majoror
    minor
    willdependonone'shistoriographical
    The secondconcerns
    Albert
    viewpoint.
    vis--vis
    theClassicalPhysics
    oftheseventeenth
    thinks
    in terms
    century:
    Sarnowsky
    ofpreparation
    rather
    thananticipation,
    andinhissearchfora characterisation
    makes
    useofhintsprovided
    The thirdsetofthesesrelate
    particular
    byAmosFunkenstein.
    tothelimitations
    ofhisownprocedures:
    hereoneseemstosensean impatience
    atthe
    constraints
    thathehasfeltattheendofcomposing
    thisrelatively
    earlywork,andthe
    desirefora morestimulating
    to follow.
    Letus hopethatsuchan able
    methodology
    scholar
    infinding
    succeeds
    one!On a moreprosaic
    level,wemustaccordhimespecial
    thanks
    for56 pagesofveryvaluablecodicological
    and bibliographical
    information
    locatedtowards
    theendofthevolume.
    Aberdeen

    GeorgeMolland

    283

    09:03:02 AM

    Vivarium
    XXX, 2 (1992)
    BooksReceived
    LuisE. Bacigalupo,
    Intencin
    enla EticadeAbelardo,
    Pontificia
    Universidad
    y Conciencia
    Catlicadel Peru,Fondoeditorial
    1992339 p.
    WalterBerschin,
    undEpochenstil
    imlateinischen
    III Karolingische
    Mittelalter.
    Biographie
    750-920
    n.Chr.
    AntonHiersemann
    1991xii&484p.
    Biographie
    Verlag,Stuttgart
    ISBN 3 777291021 (QuellenundUntersuchungen
    zurlateinischen
    Philologie
    des Mittelalters,
    Bd. 10)
    AnneBondelle-Souchier,
    dansla France
    cisterciennes
    mdivale.
    des
    Bibliothques
    Rpertoire
    d'hommes.
    du Centrenational
    de
    Abbayes
    Avant-propos
    parA. Vernet.ditions
    la recherche
    Paris1991lvii& 381 p. & 28 planchesISBN 2 222
    scientifique,
    045967
    duMoyen-Ages
    Cahiers
    del'Institut
    etlatin(Universit
    deCopenhague
    grec
    ), Vol. 61 (1991),
    440 p. - Contents
    : Chr.Troelsgaard,
    Themusical
    structure
    stichera
    offiveByzantine
    andtheir
    Western
    A. Jung,TheKathismata
    intheSophia
    parallels
    among
    antiphons;
    Kliment
    Ochridski
    cod.gr.814;G. Klima,Latinas a Formal
    ; C.
    Manuscript
    Language
    librum
    A Partial
    Posteriorum.
    Marmo,Anonymus
    Cordubensis,
    Questiones
    super
    primm
    andqq.1-5;C. Marmo,Anonymi
    Edition:
    "Sicut
    dicitur
    abAristoPrologue
    Philosophia
    tle".A Parisian
    toPorphyry;
    C. Brousseau,
    Lesophisme
    "Amatus
    sum
    prologue
    anonyme
    velfui",ducodex
    BN lat.16135;K. Friis-Jensen,
    Addenda
    etCorrigenda
    to
    parisinus
    CIMAGL 60: 319-88;A. Tabbaroni,Henricus
    An
    Ruyn,
    Disputata
    Metaphysicae.
    S. Ebbcsen,TwoNominalist
    Texts.
    Edition;
    TheVariae
    Aurelius
    Cassiodorus
    Senator.
    Translated
    withnotesandintroducofMagnus
    tionbyS.J.B.Barnish,
    1992xlix&204p.
    Press,Liverpool
    Liverpool
    University
    ISBN 0 85323436 1
    sullatradizione
    Documenti
    e studi
    medievale.
    RivistadellaSocietInternazionale
    filosofica
    : S. Donati,
    Latino,I, 1 (1990)vii& 325p. - Contents
    perlo Studiodelmedioevo
    delle
    I : Le opere
    Studi
    diEgidio
    Romano.
    del1285.I comperunacronologia
    opere
    prima
    menti
    : C. Luna,La Reportatio
    aristotelici
    dellalettura
    diEgidioRomano
    III
    sullibro
    dellesentenze
    dell'rdinatio;
    dell'autenticit
    R. Martorelli
    (Clm.8005)e ilproblema
    dellagiustizia
    e delpeccato
    neltrattato
    Depeccato
    Vico,La dottrina
    originale
    originale
    diEgitio
    C. Trifogli,
    La dottrina
    inEgidioRomano;
    deltempo
    R.
    Romano;
    originali
    videtur
    tres
    rationes.
    lettore
    edinterprete
    Lambertini,
    Philosophus
    tangere
    EgidioRomano
    dellaPolitica
    nelterzo
    libro
    delDe regimine
    principm.
    Documenti
    e studi
    sullatradizione
    medievale.
    RivistadellaSocietInternazionale
    filosofica
    : C.
    per lo Studiodel medioevoLatino,I, 2 (1990) vii & 320 p. - Contents
    nonestyliathim.
    Liber
    deCausis,
    e la
    D'Ancona,Cause
    prime
    prop.8[9]: lefonti
    M. McCord Adams,SaintAnselm's
    L. Sturlese,Il
    dottrina;
    theory
    of truth;
    razionalismo
    e scientifico
    diAlberto
    il Grande;
    K. White,St. Thomas
    filosofico
    Aquinas
    andthePrologue
    toPeter
    's Qiiaestiones
    De sensu
    etsensato;
    M. G.
    ofAuvergne
    super
    Thomas
    Il problema
    dellostatuto
    ; C. Trifogli,
    Henniger,
    Wylton's
    theory
    ofrelations
    nelle
    deltempo
    di Thomas
    e di Giovanni
    ontologico
    Quaestiones
    super
    Physicam
    Wylton
    diJandun;
    M. Pereira,Unlapidario
    alchemico:
    il Liber
    deinvestigatione
    secreti
    occulti
    attributo
    a Raimondo
    Lullo.Studio
    introduttivo
    ededizione
    divia
    ; E. Randi,Onnipotenza
    efuturi
    XIVsecolo;
    Z. Kaluza,Eugenio
    Randi(1957-1990);
    indicedei
    contingentinel
    indicidei nomini.
    manoscritti;
    AzucenaAdelinaFraboschi,
    Cronica
    dela universidad
    deParis
    y deunahuelga
    y susmotivos
    Instituto
    deestudios
    "Prof.F. Nvoa".[BuenosAires
    (1220-1231),
    grecolatinos
    1991],143p. ISBN 950 998200 8
    TheGesta
    Normannorum
    Ducum
    Orderic
    andRobert
    Vitalis,
    ofWilliam
    ofJumiges,
    ofTorigni.
    Vol. I: Introduction
    and BooksI-IV. Editedand translated
    byE. M. C. van
    Houts,Clarendon
    Press,Oxford1992exxxiii& 156p. ISBN 0 19 8222718
    284

    09:03:27 AM

    LatinPoems.Rome1633 and1639. EditionwithIntroduction,


    Lelio Guidiccioni,
    Translation
    and Commentary
    byJohnKevinNewmanand FrancesStickney
    1992278 p. ISBN 3 615 000749
    Newman.Weidmann,
    Hildesheim
    de
    Pressesuniversitaires
    et l'averrosme.
    M.-R. Hayoun& A. de Libera,Averros
    France,Paris1991128p. ISBN 2 13 044203X (Que sais-je2631)
    B. R. Grner,Amsterdam-Philadelphia
    DesmondPaul Henry,Medieval
    Mereology.
    StudienzurPhilosophie,
    1991XXV
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