Vivarium

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1986

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL
FOR THE
PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XXIV (1986)

*
&
< /11 j

E. J. BRILL - LEIDEN

12:58:48 PM

VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE
AGES AND RENAISSANCE

editors

advisory
committee
publishers
published

vivariumis devotedin particular

to the profane side of
mediaeval
lifeoftheMiddleAges
andtheintellectual
philosophy
and Renaissance.
- L. M. de Rijk,(Leyden)- H. A. G.
C. J. de Vogel,(Utrecht)
-J. IJsewijn,
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Braakhuis,
(Nijmegen)
.
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(Nijmegen).
(Louvain)
oftheEditorial
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CONTENTS

OF VOLUME

XXIV (1986)

Irene Rosier:
Paris

Relatifs et relativesdans les traits

des Xlle et Xllle sicles
terministes
deuxime
partie)
(

L. M. de Rijk:
Leiden

Walther Hurley's De
An Edition

Steven J. Livesey:
N orman, Oklahoma

The Oxford Calculatores, Quan, and Aristotle's

tificationof Qualities
50
Prohibition
o/Metabasis

J. M. M. H. Thijssen:
Nijmegen

Buridan, Albertof Saxonyand Oresme

,
and a FourteenthcenturyCollectionof
Quaestioneson thePhysicsand on De
Generatione et Corruptione

70

L. M. de Rijk:
Leiden

Peter Abelard's Semantics and His

DoctrineofBeing

85

Cary J. Nederman :
New Zealand
Christchurch,

TheAristotelian
oftheMean and
Concept
128
ofLiberty
JohnofSalisbury'sConcept

Jan A. Aertsen:
Amsterdam

Review Article (W. Khn, Das

des
in derPhilosophie
Prinzipienproblem
143
ThomasvonAquin)

Review:

Egbert P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen:

Treatiseson the Propertiesof Terms

exceptivis.

(E.J. Ashworth)

22

158
83

Books Received

163

Announcement civcma

12:58:48 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 1 (1986)
des
Relatifset relativesdans les traitsterministes
XHe et XlIIe sicles
IRENE ROSIER

et nonrestrictives
entre
relatives
Deuxime
). Distinction
(implicationes
Propositions
partie:
restrictives.
Dans notre premirepartie, nous avons abord diffrentesquestions
) et aux termesanaphoriques, nous atayant trait l'anaphore ( relatio
tachant particulirement dcrire le fonctionnementdes rgles
d'anaphore et de leurs contre-exemples,sans distinguerl'anaphore
nominale de l'anaphore pronominale. C'est ce qu'il va nous falloir
'4
faire prsent pour pouvoir traiterde ces phrases relatives" (i.e.
contenantun termerelatif)particuliresque sont les implicationes
, proseules
et
relatif
nom
un
(ex. qui) auxquelles
positionscommenant par
nous rservonsle nom de propositionsrelatives. Les problmes lis
celles-ci ne sont pas abords dans les chapitres ou traits que nous
. .) mais dans
avons analyss prcdemment(De relativis
, De relatione.
tractatus
des traitsspcifiques (De implicationibus
,
implicitarum...).
1 Anaphore
nominaleetpronominale
Les dfinitionsdu nom et du pronom fontl'objet de nombreuses
discussions chez les grammairiensdes XHe et XlIIe sicles. Il s'agit
en particulierd'claircir le sens des notions de substance et qualit,
utilisespar Priscien dans ces dfinitions.La distinctionentre nom et
pronom est surtout difficile tablir pour les nomsgnraux(interrogatifs,indfinis,relatifs).Ce problme remonte la difficultque
rencontre Priscien pour reclasser ce qu'Apollonius Dyscole range
sous l'article, catgorie qu'il n'accepte pas pour le latin: ce qui fait
fonctiond'article prpositifen latin, c'est le pronom hic, haec, hoc, dit
Priscien et aprs lui les grammairiensmdivaux. La diffrenceentre
le pronom et l'article est cependent que l'article est seulement
anaphorique, alors que hic signifie, en tant que pronom, une
substance. La classe nominale comprenait,chez Apollonius, outre les
noms propres et les noms communs (hritage stocien), des interrogatifs,indfiniset corrlatifs.C'est avec ces derniers que Priscien
rangera les relatifs,qui correspondentaux articles postpositifs.Con1

12:58:53 PM

trairement Donat et aux autres grammairienslatins, et contrairement la terminologiegrammaticaleactuelle, qui est donc, pour Priscien et les mdivaux, un nomrelatif.Pierre Hlie donne de nombreux
argumentspour montrerque quis-qui, non seulementest un mme mot
ayant les troisfonctions(indfinie,interrogativeet anaphorique) mais
est bien un nom, non un pronom1.Il restaitnanmoins des divergences
sur le type de substance et de qualit signifiepar les noms gnraux.
On acceptait souventl'ide qu'ils signifientune qualit indfinieet/ou
une substance indfinie2.
L' anaphore posait un problme difficile.Si anaphore a, avec la
deixis, pour rle de permettreau pronom de dsigner un individu
dtermin,est-ceque l'anaphore nominale ne le permettraitpas aussi,
rendant alors le nom relatifparfaitementdtermin,ce qui est contraire la propritgnrale de tous les noms, de signifier4'confusment". Nous n'avons pas trouv de rponse satisfaisante ce problme.
On peut citer un cas intressanto apparat bien la diffrencede
fonctionnemententre le nom et le pronom dans le phnomne
d'anaphore, c'est celui de la mutuarelatioou anaphore rciproque,
comme ille qui curritdisputt.Lambert d'Auxerre discute de cette
anaphore de manire cohrenteavec la dfinitiondu nom et du pronom: ille, en tant que pronom, signifieun rfrent,un suppt dtermin, et dfinitainsi le nom relatifqui quant au suppt; qui, en tant
que nom, signifie une qualit (gnrale) et dfinit ille quant la
qualit, i.e. dfinitl'individu auquel ille rfrepar une propritparticulire(celle, en fait, qui est exprime par la relative). Ille est donc
dfinissantquant au rfrent(c'est un pronom) et dfiniquant la
qualit alors que qui est dfinissantquant la qualit (c'est un nom) et
dfiniquant au rfrent3.
La diffrencede fonctionnementque nous avons recontreentre
anaphore nominale et pronominale dans notrepremirepartie, propos du problme de la restrictiontemporelle,est justifiele plus souvent en disant que le nomcontienten lui-mme un lmentconjonctif
(par ex. DIAL. MONAC. II, 2 p. 631 4).
1 Summa
Priscianum
constructionum
du Moyen
super
(ed. dansles Cahiersde l'Institut
AgeGrecet Latin27-28)p. 48 et67 etsv.
2 Cf. De Rijk,Logicamodernorum
(Assen),vol.II, 1 chapV.
3 Summa
Lamberti
, ed. F. Alessio(1971),p. 239.
4 Nousabrgeons
en majuscules
lestextes
la liste.
cits,cf. la finde l'article
2

12:58:53 PM

2 L 'implicatio
2. 1 Dfinition

Les traitssur les ' 'implicites'' sont, selon De Rijk {Logica modernorum
, II, 1 p. 400), une nouveaut en logique en cette seconde moiti
du Xlle sicle et n'existentpas du temps d'Ablard. Sur les diffrents
sens non techniques d" 'implicite", nous renvoyons l'introduction
de F. Giusberti5.p. 24 et sv. Nous retiendronsle sens de Boce o il
= duplexpropositio
donne opinioimplicata
, c'est--dire une proposition
en
contient
une
en
autre
elle-mme, tymologiequi est parfoisefqui
le
fectivementdonne, nous verrons. Dans un de ces premierstraits
sur les implicites,dit par Giusberti, les propositionsimplicitessont
dfinies comme des propositions dans lesquelles deux propositions
sont contenues6,la rgle tant que toute implicitecontientdeux ex'
plicites i.e. que 'toute implicitequivaut une copulative rsultant
d'explicites"7. On appelle ici implicitesles propositionscontenantnon
seulement des termes relatifs(id quod, ea que) mais d'autres termes
commes les exclusifs, exceptifs, etc. (solum, tantum
, praeter
, incipit
,
desinit
, nuncprimo, nuncultimo).Par la suite, seules des propositions
contenant une relative (implicatio)seront appeles implicites et le
traitementdes autres termesncessitantune reformulationde la proposition dans laquelle ils se trouventsera renvoyeaux traitssur les
syncatgormesou aux traitssur les exponibles.
La dfinitionsouvent donne pour implicare
estaliquid
est: " implicare
"
MONAC.
II, 2 p. 631, De
pro constantirelinquere (DIAL.
, p. 100). La DIAL. MONAC. dveloppe cette dfiniinplicationibus8
tion (ibid):
"Unde cumdicitur:
homo
, hecdictioquicircahuneterminm
quicurrit
disputt
homo
cursum
idestproconstanti
inplicat,
relinquit."
Ce passage s'explique si on retientpour implicare
Vtymologiesouvent
donne: intusplicare, placer l'intrieur.Il signifiealors que qui place
l'intrieurde 'homme' la course, et laisse cela comme constante. On
est prs des thses modernes du pr-assertou du pr-construit:la
5 F. Giusberti,
on Twelfth
Scholasticism
, Napoli;
(1982),Materials
fora Study
Century
Tractatus
implicitarum,
p. 43-58.
6 "Implicitae
a dialecticis
in quarumqualibetimplicantur
propositiones
appellantur
uel inuoluntur
duae" (p. 43,0.0).
7 "Iuxtaimplicitas
habetur
haecregula:Omnisimplicita
habetduasexplicitas.
primo
Item:Omnisimplicita
constanti
exexplicitis"
aequiualet
copulatiuae
(ibidd. 43,0.1).
8 Ed. parde Rijk,Vivarium
IV, 2, 1966.
3

12:58:53 PM

phrase commenantpar qui est une assertionrapporte la premire,

et c'est propos du sujet, ainsi "dispos", qu'est faitel'assertion principale. C'est exactement la dfinitionque donne Roger Bacon de
l'implication: elle lie le sujet avant que ne se fassela prdication(principale) (XIV p. 200 ou 202). Cette interprtationen termes de prconstruitou, comme dira Port-Royal, d'assertion incidente,apparat
bien dans le Trait De inplicationibus
(p. 100):
"
une chosecommeconstante
et de manireobscure,
, c'estsignifier
Implicare
'
commelorsquel'on dithomo
quiestalbuscurrit.
Je dis commeconstante'
parce
de 'homme',quelquechoseestdonn
que, outrequ'icila courseestaffirme
savoirquel'homme
estblanc;je dis'de manire
obscure"parceque,
entendre,
outrece qui esticiproprement
etprincipalement
savoirque l'homme
signifi,
l'intrieur
de cettesignification,
savoirque
court,quelquechoseestcompris
l'homme
estblanc.De cecidcouleque implicare
, c'estplacer l'intrieur
(intus
Ce que nousplaons l'intrieur,
nousle laissonscommeconstante9."
plicare).
Le restedu passage confirmebien que c'est le sujet dans cette "disposition", avec ce qui est contenu en lui, qui est concernpar l'assertion
proprementdite {proprie
) ou principale (principaliter
):
"De l suitqueimplicare
n'estriend'autreque laisser
le sujetsousquelquedispositioncommeuneconstante,
et de celui-ci
ainsidisposaffirmer
quelquechose.
Doncuneimplicatio
c'estun placement
l'intrieur
(intus
plicatio
)" (ibid.).
Une implicatio
est la conjonction de trois lments: ce qui est "impli=
et un signe d'implicaqu" ( plac dans), ce de quoi il y a implicatio
tion. Dans homoqui est albus currit
homo
est ce qui est concern par
,
l'implication, donc ce qui contient quelque chose en lui, albus est ce
qui est impliqu, qui le signe d'implication (ibid p. 102). Les signes
d'implication sont tous les "relatifs en q":
danslaquelleilsse trouvent,
lais"(...) Touslesmotsqui,dansuneexpression
sentquelquechosecommeconstante
ctde cequiestsignifi
principalement"
(ibid).
Cette dfinitionde Vimplicatio
est cohrenteavec celle des noms relatifs. Qui, en effet,contienten lui l'expression d'une substance indfinie et de l'article subjonctif, fonctionanaphorique:
9 "Implicare
estproconstanti
etinvolute
Ut cumdicitur:
'homo
aliquidsignificare.
'Precontentum'
hocquodasseritur
ibicursus
de
dico,quiapreter
quiestalbuscurrit'.
scilicet
hominem
essealbum;'involute'
dicoquiaprehomine,
aliquiddaturintelligi,
terhocquodibiproprie
et principaliter
hominem
currere,
significatur
aliquidintus
scilicet
hominem
essealbum.Perhocpatetquodimplicare
estintuspliintelligitur,
care.Id enimquodintusplicamus
siveponimus,
Nous
proconstanti
relinquimus".
sommesd'accordavec Giusberti
en precontentum
,
pourne pas corriger
proconstanti
commele suggre
de Rijk.
4

12:58:53 PM

"Dans homo
, l'article
qu'ilcomquiestenquiprendla substance
quicurrit
disputt
entantqu'elleestdtermine
) etla
parleverbequisuit(currit
porteenlui-mme,
C'est
ce terme
homo
, qui estsonantcdent
(...), ce qui le spcifie.
conjugue
homo
nesuppose
quepourceuxquicourent"
(DIAL. MONAC. II, 2p.
pourquoi
631).
Cette dfinitionde Yimplicatiopermet de rendre compte de la proprit de la relative d'tre restrictive,comme adjectifpar exemple.
Elle sera cependant contradictoire avec un fonctionnementnonde la relative,car dans ce cas l'assertion ralise par la relarestrictif
tive n'est plus considre comme antrieure l'assertion principale,
mais indpendante de celle-ci. (cf. infra).
2. 2 Les propositions
implicites
Les propositions dites 4'implicites", c'est--dire contenant une
ou propositionrelative sont gnralementanalyses comme
implicatio
un typede propositionhypothtique.Ainsi dans ARS MEL. elles se
rangent,parmi les hypothtiques,aprs 1) les conjonctives,2) les disjonctives et avant 4) les "continuatives" ou conditionnellesavec si. Il
nous est pourtant rapport dans l'ARS EMER. que ' 'certains les
appellent hypothtiques,d'autres catgoriques "(H> 2 p. 159)10. Il
serait intressantde connatre ces textes pour savoir si l'hsitation
entrehypothtiqueet catgorique, pour le classementdes propositions
relatives,ne vientpas d'une double interprtationde celles-ci. On sait
que les restrictivessont souventgloses par des hypothtiques(au sens
par des conjonctives11.Pour les deux
moderne) et les non-restrictives
de
la
n'avons trouv dans nos textesque
nous
relative,
interprtations
des gloses par une conjonctive(du typequi = et ille), glose parfoisrefuse pour l'interprtationnon-restrictive,sans qu'une autre glose soit
propose, nous y reviendrons.
10Dansce texte,
ilestpropos
d'autrestypesde propositions,
selonle typedu relatif:
..quantus),
les qualitatives
les quantitatives
(avectantus.
(avecqualis
), les substantives
estTullius
o onvoudrait
appeler
hypothti) au cas,ajoute-t-on,
(ex. idquodestMarcus
quescespropositions
(ibidp. 160-161).
11Dans sa Grammaire
le premier
gloserle
Gnrale
(1767),Beauzeest,semple-t-il,
relatif
des"incidentes
dansla terminologie
ici
non-restrictives,
explicatives"
(relatives
soitparet, mais
des
, donc,
or,soitparcar,puisque,
utilise)
parce
que,vuque, etc.Le relatif
"incidentes
dterminatives"
est glospar si, quand
, lorsque,
(relatives
restrictives)
Harrisanalyselespronoms
relatifs
commeprovenant
de
que.Plusrcemment,
pourvu
ets'ilsintroduisent
la conjonction
unenon-restrictive
etdela conjonction
si, condition
une explicative.
Telle estgalement
l'attitude
de Geach,par
ques'ils introduisent
Cf.M. Dominicy,
Beauze
dePortdurelatif,
dans:Etu, critique
al, la thorie
exemple.
Roy
dessurle XVIIIe sicle,VIII, d. de l'universit
de Bruxelles,
1981,pp. 104etsv.
5

12:58:53 PM

En effet,le faitde dire qu'une implicitesoit une propositionconteetimplinant en elle-mmeune autre propositionen puissance ( continet
ARS MEL. II, 1 p. 354) pose le problmedu
cai vimalterius
propositionis
de l'implicite celle des propositions
valeur
de
vrit
de
la
rapport
Ce
contient.
problme apparat trait,d'une part, dans les disqu'elle
infrences
sur
les
cussions
permisesentrela propositionimpliciteet les
diffrentespropositionsqu'elle contient(ex. est-ce que homocurritqui
disputtimplique homodisputtet/ouhomocurrit?),d'autre part sur les
quivalences possibles entre une propositionimpliciteet une conjonction de deux propositionsassertives(est-ce que, par exemple, homocurritqui disputtquivaut homocurritet ipse disputati).Dans le cas o
'
l'quivalence est reconnue possible, il y a hsitationentredeux 'expositions" possibles de l'explicite. Ainsi dans le Tractatus
, on
implicitarum
se demande si la bonne dcomposition de (1) est () ou (1"):
(1) Socrates non est id quod est homo
() Aliquid est homo et Socrates non est illud
(1") Aliquid est homo et Socrates non est homo (ed. par Giusberti,
P- 50)
Dans le cadre de ces traitssur les implicites,on admet gnralement
que certaines infrenceset certaines quivalences sont possibles. Ceci
tient au fait que, dans un tel contexte, c'est l'interprtationnonrestrictivede la relativequi est envisage. Les infrencessont rejetes,
en particulier,lorsque la relativeest clairementrestrictive.Mais pour
comprendreles analyses faitesdans ce typede traits,il nous fautaller
chercherdans d'autres traits,ceux portantsur la restriction,les critres proposes pour opposer les relativesrestrictiveset non-restrictives
(3). Nous reprendronsensuite en dtail la question des infrenceset
quivalences (4).
3 La restriction
par implication
3.1 Dfinition
Un termeest dit restreintlorsque, dans un contextedonn, il dnote
un nombre d'individus infrieur celui qu'il dnote par lui-mme. A
l'inverse il est dit amplifi lorsqu'il dnote un nombre d'individus
suprieur celui qu'il dnote par lui-mme. Ces notions bien sr ne
c'est-s'appliquent qu'au termecommun dans son usage significatif,
des individus.
dire quand il dnote effectivement
Deux typesde restrictionsont souvent distingus:la restrictionpar
l'usage et la restrictionpar la significationdes termes (cf. par ex.
6

12:58:53 PM

SUM. MET II, 1 p. 463 ou Pierre d'Espagne, Tractatusp. 207). Les

exemples de restrictionpar l'usage sont en particulierdu typerexvenit
(il s'agit ncessairementdu roi du pays o l'on est) ou monsestparvus
(cette montagne est petiteen comparaison des autres montagnes). Le
second typede restrictiondpend de l'action de la significationdes termes de l'nonc sur le nom appellatif.Un des premiersfacteurs tre
not est le temps du verbe. Un autre facteurest l'adjectif: en disant
homoalbus currit
, l'adjectif albus restreintle terme homo ne supposer
des
hommes
blancs. On remarque cependant que tous les
que pour
ne
adjectifs restreignentpas. Ainsi lorsque l'on dit corvusnigerou homo
rationalis,
l'adjectif, dans les deux cas, signifiantquelque chose qui est
un "accident insparable" de ce qui est signifipar le substantif,ne
restreintpas (SUM. MET II, 1 p. 464) 12. Un autre facteurde restriction est un cas oblique, par exemple le gnitif:dans asinusSortiscurrit
,
le gnitifSortisrestreintasinus ne supposer que pour l'ne de Socrate.
Enfin, on a restrictionpar la relative ( restricto
, ex.
per implicationem)
homoqui curritdisputt.
3.2 Facteursbloquantla restriction
par implication
Les facteursbloquant la restrictionpar implication fontapparatre
un fonctionnementnon-restrictif
de la relative. Anticipant sur ce qui
sera dit ensuite, nous parlerons d'interprtationrestrictiveet nonrestrictive,mme si ce n'est pas en ces termesque les auteurs raisonnent immdiatement.
12Cecianticipe
bienla distinction
dansla
explication/dtermination
qu'on trouvera
Pourle mmeexemple
Vhomme
estunanimal
douderaison
, o
logiquede Port-Royal.
l'on ditqu'il '"y a pas restriction
un "accident
parceque "doude raison"signifie
ondiradansle chap.VIII dela deuxime
insparable",
partiede la Logique:"Cette
se peutappelerseulement
addition
ou
explication,
quandellene faitque dvelopper,
ce qui toitenferm
dansla comprhension
de l'idedu premier
ou du moins
terme,
ce qui luiconvient
commeun de sesaccidents,
pourvuqu'il luiconvienne
gnralement& danstoutesontendue
la dtermina( .)' Le secondplede l'opposition,
dfini
commeunerestriction
tion,estd'autrepartle plussouvent
(ibid):"L'autre
sorted'addition,
estquandce qu'onajoute un
dtermination,
qu'onpeutappeller
enrestreint
motgnral
la signification,
&faitqu'ilneseprendpluspourcemotgnraldanstoutesontendue,
maisseulement
Il
pourunepartiede cettetendue
estimportant
de constater
entredeuxfonctionnements
du relatif
est
quela distinction
liechezPort/Royal
l'opposition
explication/dtermination
quinevautpasquepour
lui etque,commenousallonsle voir,l'opposition
restrictive/non
restrictive
pourla
se trouve,
relative
danscestextes
discute
exclusivement
danslestraits
mdivaux,
surla restriction,
donc proposdu phnomne
de la restriction
gnral
qui ne concernegalement
la relative.
pas seulement
7

12:58:53 PM

3.2.1 Ampliation
du terme
, restriction
, distribution
L'auteur anonyme de la SUM. MET. formule d'abord la rgle
gnrale: "un termecommun ne peut trerestreints'il est antrieurement amplifiou restreint(II, 1 p. 465). Ainsi par exemple homoalbus
o albus ne restreintpas homoparce qu'il est
potestesse Antichristus
retrouvepar ailleurs le problme des antcOn
amplifi par potest.
dents distribus que nous avons discut dans la premire partie.
L'exemple type est omnishomoalbus currit.Du faitque homoest distribu par omnisqui le fait supposer pour l'ensemble des hommes, il ne
peut tre restreintpar l'adjectif. Cependant l'auteur ajoute ensuite
une autre opinion, qui est en faitl'opinion la plus gnralementadopte, savoir que la phrase ci-dessus est "double". De mme que pour
d'un terme distribu, o on disait que l'anal'anaphore pronominale
suivre
ou
phore pouvait
prcder la distribution,ici, pour la dtermination restrictivepar un adjectifou une relative,on dit que la dtermination peut prcder ou suivre la distribution.
Un phrase comme omnishomoalbuscurrit
aura donc deux interprtations:
(a) La distributionopre avant la dterminationpar l'adjectif (sens
compos) et la glose est: omnishomo, qui omnishomoestalbus curritou
omnishomoestalbus et omnishomocurrit
(b) La dterminationopre avant la distribution(sens divis) et la
glose est: omnishomocui inestalbedo currit(la dterminationopre
d'abord et la distributionse fait ensuite sur la classe des hommes
blancs).
Il s'agit clairement des deux interprtationsrestrictiveet nonrestrictivede la relativeou de l'adjectif. En (a) l'adjectif ou la relative
ne restreignentpas et constituentune assertion part entire alors
qu'en (b) ils restreignent.
Chez de nombreux auteurs cettedouble interprtationde la relative
ne se trouve discute que lorsque l'antcdent est un terme distribu
(cf. Tractatusde Pierre d'Espagne p. 200, le traitDe Inplicationibus
p.
103, etc.). Le faitque cette double interprtationsoit admise, lorsque
l'antcdent est distribu,pour la relative,donc pour l'anaphore nominale et pas pour l'anaphore pronominale
est intressant.On se souvient
en effetque Pierre d'Espagne ou Lambert d'Auxerre admettaientuniquement la solution selon laquelle c'tait l'antcdent distribu
qui tait
= omnishomocurritet omnis
anaphoris ( omnishomocurritet ipse movetur
homo.. .) en vertude la rgle gnrale d'anaphore selon laquelle le rela8

12:58:53 PM

tifd'identit suppose pour les mmes individus que son antcdent.

Or cette rgle, pose pour toute anaphore, qu'elle soit nominale ou
pronominale, fonctionneen fait prioritairementpour anaphore proavec
nominale
(par ille,ipse),puisque dans le cas de anaphore nominale
la relative,il est admis que la dterminationrestrictiveopre avant la
distribution:c'est donc un antcdent nondistribu
qui est anaphoris,
le relatifet l'antcdent n'ayant pas dans ce cas la mme dnotation.
Le fait que l'on considre l le phnomne de la relatiofait que l'on
analyse ensemble anaphore nominale et pronominale en tentantd'en
donner une rgle gnrale, alors que le fait que l'on considre ici le
conduit traiterensemble les adjectifset les
phnomne de la restrictio
contiennentune anaphore nominale, sparelatives,
qui
propositions
rant par l le traitementde celle-ci de celui de anaphore pronominale.
3.2.2 Implications
fausses
Le problme pos par les implicationsfausses taitl'objet de discuset le trait
sions, dont tmoignenten particulierla DIAL.MONAC.
. Trois solutionstaient proposes: (i) une implication
De Inplicationibus
fausse est incorrecte;(ii) une implication fausse est correcte; (iii) une
implicationfausse est fausse. De plus, le problme se scinde en deux
selon que l'on a implication d'un faux
dans la DIAL.MONAC.,
est
asinus
currit
homo
, homoirrationalis
currit)ou d'un
impossible (ex.
qui
a
aucun
homme
faux possible (ex. homoqui estalbuscurrit
, lorsqu'il n'y
blanc).
On trouvetroisargumentsdonns en faveurde la thse que l'implication d'un faux impossible est cause d'incorrection.Dans un nonc
comme homoqui estasinusest, il y a conflit( repugnantia
) entre ce que le
termednote de par sa nature ( savoir des hommes) et ce que le terme
dnote de par l'implication ( savoir des nes). De ce faitle termeest
4'dchu de sa
supposition", ce qui rend la phrase incorrecte13.Le
en faveur de
second argument donn dans le trait De inplicationibus
la
en
en
donnant
en
fait
le
cette thse explicite
raison, qui est
premier
la rgle gnrale de l'anaphore que nous avons dj discute: puisque,
'homo estasinus
13"Quia cumdicitur:
es, isteterminus
''ex suinaturahabet
qui
ex vi inplicationis
habetsupponere
prohominibus,
proasinis,etitaibiest
supponere
cadita supEt propter
huiusmodi
dicuntquodterminus
repugnantia.
repugnantiam
etpropter
huiusmodi
dicuntquod
incongruitatem
position,etitaibiestincongruitas
falsisuntincongrue"
, p. 101).
inplicite
{De inplicationibus
9

12:58:53 PM

selon celle-ci, le relatifdoit dnoter ce que dnote son antcdent, et

que dans un tel cas, c'est impossible, la phrase est incorrecte14.Dans
la DIAL.MONAC.,
l'argument propos, qui amne l'auteur adopter cettethse, est qu'il y a incorrection4'parce qu'on voit des signifis
qui ne sont pas compatibles l'un avec l'autre tre rapports l'un
l'autre"15.
La seconde solution selon laquelle "les implicitesfausses sont correctes" est simplement nonce dans le Trait De inplicationibus
(p.
102). Il est simplementajout que les tenantsde cette opinion distinguent deux choses dans nonhomoqui estasinusest, une compositionde
et de neyet une compositionde homme
et du verbe tre.De ce fait
homme
la ngation ne portepas sur chacune des deux compositionsprise indpendamment (on ne peut donc conclure de l'nonc ci-dessusergohomo
estasinus), mais sur l'une en rapport avec l'autre16,ce qui donne une
interprtationde la ngation assez proche de l'hypothtique. Les
cet nonc:
tenants de la premire solution analysaient diffremment
en disant nonhomoqui estasinuseston ne pose pas la vritde "l'homme
est un ne", mais seulement la correctionde cette prdication. C'est
parce que celle-ci n'est pas ici respecte que l'implication fausse est
dite cause d'incorrection(p. 101).
Le problme des "locutions impliquant un faux possible" est plus
rejette l'opinion que
complexe. L'auteur de la DIAL.MONAC.
celles-ci seraient cause d'incorrection. Dans homoqui est albus currit
,
mme s'il n'existe aucun homme, il peut cependant en exister, et
humanitet blancheurne sont pas des "accidents opposs" comme
et asinit.De ce fait on n'a pas incorrection,mais
l'taient humanit
fausset(p. 633:5). Ceci s'appuie sur un argumentgrammatical: "Un
changement dans les choses ne peut rien modifierdans le discours
sinon le vrai et le faux" (ibid p. 635:15). Si l'nonc Socrates'assoitest
correctlorsque Socrate s'assoit, il l'est galement lorsque Socrate ne
' ' ex vi relationis
14"Vel alia regula,quodhocrelativum
habetsupponere
proeo
qui
habet
ex
vi
suum
et
ita
hominibus
antecedens;
supponere
pro
inplicationis
quo
pro
pro
et itaincongruitas"
asinis;etitaibiestrepugnantia
(ibid).
'homo estasinus
15"() estincongrua:
et'homo
irrationalis
curri
etconsi, curri
qui
essein
circaidemostenduntur
se
forme
non
miles,eoquodopposite
compatientes
talisomniscassusestet vanus"(DIAL.MONAC. II, 2 p.
eodem.Undeintellectus
632:16).
16"Et notandum
utramque
partem,non
quod secundum
quod negatiorespiciat
'
'
unaessentia
cum
homo
estasinus
sequitur:ergo
quia cumibisintduecompositiones,
sed
homine,alia asinitascumhomine,negationonnegatalteram
partemtantum,
unamrespectu
alterius"{De inplicationibus
p. 102).
10

12:58:53 PM

4
s'assoit pas. Il est donc faux de dire que le terme serait 'dchu de sa
signification",du fait que l'implication ne lui convient pas.
A ce problme des locutions impliquant un faux impossible deux
solutions sont en fait retenues: (1) l'implication d'un faux possible
rend la propositionfausse; (2) une implicationqui ne convientpas ne
restreintpas (p. 633:6). La logique de ces deux solutions se trouve
dans le passage qui suit immdiatementleur formulation,et o sont
clairementposes les deux interprtations
possibles de toute relative17.
et non-restrictive
3. 2. 3 Interprtation
restrictive
de la relative
Ce passage expliciteclairementles critrespermettantde distinguer
les deux types implicatio:
"Notandumquod omnispropositio
in Il fautnoterque touteproposition
dans
uneimplicatio
qua poniturinplicatio,
potestdistingui laquellese trouve
peuttre
ex eo quodverbum
de deuxmanires
selonque
dupliciter,
sumptum distingue
in inplicatione
indicare
remsuam (1) le verbemisdansl'implication
indipotest
velinrespectu
ad consequens que sa chose,simplement
ou (2) qu'il
simpliciter
17La rglegnrale
de l'anaphore,
selonlaquellele relatif
et l'antcdent
doivent
dnoter
lesmmesindividus,
a tsouvent
miseendfaut,
commenousl'avonsnot
dansnotre
propos
dela suppositio
supposi, desantcdents
premire
partie,
simplex
tionconfuse,
eticiavecle problme
desimplications
fausses.
Il fautnoterque c'est
decedernier
dansle trait
DeInplicapropos
problme
quelesauteurs
quientraitent,
tionibus
et dans la DIAL.MONAC. la remettent
en cause. Ainsi dans la
DIAL.MONAC. il estditclairement
ne supposepas ncessairement
que le relatif
"Dicendumenimestquodcumsicdicipourlesmmesindividus
que l'antcdent:
' refertur
'
' istum
'homo
tur:ihomo
videns
istum
ad huneterminm
est',hocrelativum
secundum
non
habito
ad ipsumsecundum
estinlocutione.
se,
respectu
quodpositus
Et secundum
hocrefert
hominem
communiter
nondeterminando
proaliquo.Unde
'
'
'
'
idemest homo
videns
istum
videns
hominem
refequod homo
(...). ' Cum' enimrelativum
rathominem
inhoctermino
sifiatdescensus
homoproSorte,nonoporcommuniter,
tetquod relativum
refert
proSorte,sed potestreferre
proalio a Sorte(II, 2 p.
du trait
De inplicationibus
estdiffrente.
L'auteurdistingue
635:24).La formulation
entrela suppositio
de l'antcdent
etsonmodus
Dans unnonccommeSor
supponendi.
la supposition
deSornepeuttretouche
, currit,
quiestalbus
puisqu'ils'agitd'unterme
maissonmodus
estaffect,
discret,
supponendi
puisqu'ilsupposepourSocrateen tant
commun
comme
homo
estrestreint
la foisquant sa supposition
queblanc.Unterme
(il supposepourdeshommes
blancs)etquant sonmodede supposition
(il suppose
en tantque blancs).Cettedistinction
entresuppositio
etmodus
pourleshommes
supponendi
de rendre
de la doublesituation
o se trouve
dterl'antcdent,
permet
compte
d'unepartentantque sujet,d'autrepartentantqu'anamin,quant sa rfrence,
l'auteurd'expliquer
des noncs
phoris.Cettedistinction
permet
l'ambigut
antcdent
commeomnis
homo
videt
idquodipsevidei,
soithomo
estrestreint
distribu,
maispasquant sa supposition,
quant sonmodede supposition,
parcequ'ilestdissoithomo
estrestreint
etquant sa suppositribu;
quant sonmodede supposition
direquela distribution
etYimplication,cequirevient
opre la foissurl'antcdent
tio(sens:omnis
homo
videt
idquodipsevidet).
quividet
(pp. 102-103).
11

12:58:53 PM

verbum.Si primomodo,quelibettalis l'indiquecommetantenrelation

avecle
locutiononeritsimpliciter
Dans le premier
una,sedplu- verbeconsquent.
cas,
res.Undesi talislocutioeritvera,non uneexpression
de cettesortene serapas
tarnen
erituna veritate
Par consquent
si
vera,sed pluri- une, mais multiple.
vel cetteexpression
estvraieellene serapas
bus, vel si falsa,falsitate
plurium,
etiameritveraet falsa.Verbigratia,si vraieselonuneuniquevrit,
maisselon
dicatur:'homoqui currit,
et si elle estfausse,ellesera
disputt',si plusieurs,
hoc verbum'currit'in hac ponatrem fausseselonplusieursfaussets
et elle
suam simpliciter,
tunc inplicationon pourrammetrevraieet fausse.Si on
caditsub conpositione
huiusverbi'dis- dit:"homoqui currit
le verbe
disputt',
eritveraora- 'currit'signifie
sa chosesimplement
et
putt',sedhoc'qui currit'
tioperse necpotest
huneter- l'implication
n'est alorspas concerne
restringere
minm'homo'cum
sitin aliquaoratione par la composition
(du sujet)avec le
Si verohocverbum
'currit'
non verbe'disputt':'qui currit'sera une
positum.
sedin respectu
ad phrasevraieparelle-mme
etne pourra
ponatremsimpliciter
tuncinplicatio
cadit restreindre
ce terme'homo'puisqu'ilest
verbum,
consequens
ettuncpotest
subconpositionem,
restrin-dans une autre phrase.Si le verbe
si sit conveniens,
sub 'currit',
ne posepas simplegeresubiectum,
parcontre,
hoc sensu: 'homo currensdisputt'" mentsa chose,maisla posecomme
tant
en relation
avecle verbesuivant,
alors
(DIAL.MONAC. p. 633:10)
estconcerne
l'implication
parla compoetpeutdoncrestreindre
le sujet,si
sition,
elle convient,
avec ce sens:'homocurrensdisputt'.
Nous rsumons ci-dessous les critresdonns dans ce texte:
<2>
- Il n'y a pas restriction
du sujetpar - Il ya restriction
du sujetparl'implication
l'implication
- Le verbede l'implication
de - Le verbede l'implication
en
signifie
signifie
manire
relation
avecle verbeconsquent
indpendante
- L'implicationse trouvedans une - L'implication
se trouve
dansla mme
de celleo se trouve phrase
phrasediffrente
l'antcdent
- L'implicite
contient
deuxpropositions- Il n'ya qu'uneseulephrase
de valeursde vritindpendantes:
elle
vraie,doublement
peuttredoublement
fausseou vraieetfausse
- L'implication
n'estpas concerne
par - Elle estconcerne
par la composition
la composition
principale
principale
- Une implication
fausserendl'implicite - Uneimplication
quineconvient
pasne
fausse
restreint
pas
- Ellen'quivaut
pas un participe
(ou - Ellequivaut un participe
un adjectif)
Une consquence importantequi se dgage des critresci-dessusest
qu'une phrase contenantune relativen'aura pas les mmes conditions
de vrit selon que la relative est restrictiveou non-restrictive.Si la
relative est non-restrictive
, il faut que celle-ci soit vraie pour que la
phrase soit vraie, puisqu'elle quivaut une conjonctionde deux pro12

12:58:53 PM

positions: si on a une "implication fausse" (ex. qui estasinus) la phrase

sera donc fausse, alors qu'elle ne le sera pas si la relativeest restrictive
,
puisqu' alors la restriction,impossible dans un tel cas, n'oprera pas
("une implicationqui ne convient pas ne restreintpas")18.
Ces critressont intressantsparce qu'on les retrouveen partiedans
d'autres textes propos d'autres problmes. Ainsi la SUM. MET.,
restrictioct de diversfacteursde blocage de la restriction( impedimenta
ce
"la
le
suivant:
restriction
est
nonce
empche
lorsque
qui est
ns)
restreintet ce qui restreintsont dans des lieux divers", c'est--dire
lorsque la relative est hors de la proposition contenant l'antcdent
(II, 1 p. 465). Pour que la relative restreigne,il fautqu'elle soitjointe
"immdiatement" son antcdent, ce qui est la rgle galement
pour l'adjectif: on sait qu'il est admis que l'adjectif ne restreintle
substantifque lorsqu'il lui est joint immdiatement( = en position
pithte) et non mdiatement ( = en position de prdicat)19.Pierre
d'Espagne mentionne galement dans sa rgle de restrictionque
18La position
estdiffrente.
On considre
adoptedansla Logiquede Port-Royal
que
relative
dansle cas o le quiestexplicatif
la fausset
de la proposition
("incidente"),
Ceci tientau
la vritde la principale.
n'empche
pas en gnral
( = non-restrictif),
"incifaitque l'onconsidre
est,prcisment,
opreparla relative
que l'assertion
.. il ya bienuneassertion:
Alexandre
dente".Endisant
Alexandre
quiestlefilsdePhilippe.
inciestlefilsdePhilippe
, assertion
qui peuttrevraieou fausse.Maiscetteassertion,
d'trevraie(chap.VII 2e partie"Par
dente,n'empche
principale
pas l'assertion
lesPerses
doitpasser
Alexandre
, a vaincu
, cetteproposition
filsdePhilippe
exemple,
quia t
dela
neseroit
pasfilsde Philippe,
parcequel'affirmation
pourvraiequandAlexandre
& ce qu'onya jointincidemment,
netombeque surAlexandre
proposition
principale
a vainculesPerses").
pointqu'il ne soitvraiqu'Alexandre
quoiquefaux,n'empche
la relative
ne peuttresusceptible
de
Dans le cas du quidterminatif
( = restrictif),
incidente
fausset
de la proposition
du sujet,
n'yestpasaffirm
"parceque l'attribut
mmesi,endisantlesesprits
, on
quisont
quarrs
Cependant,
auquelle quise rapporte".
une
actuelle"entreesprits
et quarrs
n'nonceaucune"convenance
, on a cependant
et de ce fait
taciteet virtuelle
idede convenance
possible,doncune affirmation
& de rond
tantincompatible
avecl'ide esprit
"l'ide de quarr
prispourle principe
incidentes
devraient
de la pense,
passerpourfausses".
j'estimeque cespropositions
sila proposition
totalecontenant
Nousn'avonspastrouv
de passageo il soitprcis
commefausseestelle-mme
une incidente
dterminative
considre
vraie,comme
uneincidente
fausse.On peut
c'estle cas pouruneproposition
contenant
explicative
dterminative
par
ajouter
quela conception,
qui,de Beauze Geach,glosela relative
.. , estamene
sont
lesesprits
.. = si lesesprits
unehypothtique,
quarrs.
quisont
quarrs.
vraiesi l'antcdent
totaleestncessairement
poserque la proposition
(doncla relace qui
de parlesconditions
admisespourla vrit
deshypothtiques,
tive)estfausse,
l'intuition
estpeuconforme
linguistique.
19Cf. par exempleDIAL.MONAC. II, 2 p.618:4. De mmeque l'adjectif
joint
doncenposition
nerestreint
de prdicat,
immdiatement,
pasdu faitqueprcisment

uneassertion
il estaffirm
non-restrictive
constitue
du sujet,de mmela relative
partentire.
13

12:58:53 PM

doit trejointe "immdiatement"20, sans prciserce qu'il

Vimplicatio
advient lorsque la jonction est mdiate. Cet auteur, par ailleurs, a
recours Tordre des mots pour marquer les deux interprtations:
omnishomoqui estalbuscurrit
vs omnishomocurrit
qui estalbus( Tractatus
p.
202).
4 Infrences
etquivalences
possibles partirdespropositions
implicites
Les critresdonns dans la DIAL. MON AC. permettentde comprendrepourquoi certainesinfrenceset quivalences sont autorises,
alors que d'autres sont rejetes. Comme nous le disions plus haut,
contrairement ce que l'on trouvedans les traitssur la restrictiono
- le titre mme du trait l'annonce - la relative est considre
d'abord comme restrictive,l'interprtationnon-restrictiveapparaissant comme une exception, il semble que l'on ait'l'inverse dans les
traitssur les implicitesou sur les quivalences entre propositions.
Ainsi par exemple, alors que dans le chapitre sur qui de son trait
sur la supposition, l'auteur anonyme du TRACT. ANAG. refuse
etipse
et omnishomocurrit
qui movetur
l'quivalence entreomnishomocurrit
il
sans
son
difficult
dans
movetur
notre
premirepartie), l'accepte
(cf.
et pour les quatre types
chapitresur les quivalences {De equipollentbus)
de propositionsconsidres (II, 2 p. 240):
Omnishomoestanimalquodestrisibile;
ergoomnishomoestanimaletipsum
estrisibile.
Aliquodanimalvivitquodnecvivetnecmovetur;
ergoaliquodanimalvivitet
ipsumnecvivitnecmovetur.
Aliquidnonestanimalquodesthomo;ergoaliquidnonestanimaletipsumest
homo.
SolusSocratesestanimalquodestSocrates;ergosolusSocratesestanimalet
ipsumestSocrates21.
Cependant les quivalences et infrencesdonnent lieu, le plus souvent, des discussions et des controverses.
Si on se reporteaux critresdfinisdans la DIAL.MONAC., le fait
20"Omnisimplicatio
termino
communi
immediate
adiuncta
ipsumsicutet
restringit
suumadiectivum"
( Tractatus
p. 202).
21II nousfautnoter
ontunerelative
ci-dessus
dontl'antcdent
estle
quelesexemples
etnonle sujet.Nousn'avonspas trouv
dejustification
qui permet{animal),
prdicat
casetnonpasdansle second.Parcontraitd'accepter
dansle premier
l'quivalence
o ce typed'quivalence
estdiscut
tre,on le verra(4-1),danslestraits
systmatioVimplicatio
le sujet,etd'autres
o
eto onsignaledesexemples
concerne
quement,
le prdicat,
le traitement
de ces exemples
estidentique
elleconcerne
(on a lesdeux
dansles deuxcas).
interprtations
possibles
14

12:58:53 PM

d'accepter inferencede implicite la propositionprincipale (<aliquid

quodcurritdisputtergoaliquiddisputt
) et/ou de l'implicite Yimplicatio
disputtergoaliquidcurrit
(<aliquidquodcurrit
) revient considrerque la
propositionprincipale et la relative sont de valeurs de vritindpenet accepdantes, analyser donc la relativecomme non-restrictive,
ter l'quivalence du nom relatif(ex. qui) en et-pronom relatif(ex.
ille).
Si l'ARS MEL. accepte le premiertype d'infrence,le second type
est rejet: de l'implicitesuitla simple obtenue par suppressiondu relatifet du verbe qui lui correspond (ex. si Socratesestaliquid quodcurrit
,
Socrates
estaliquid)mais de l'implicitene suit pas Y implicatio
(ex. si homo
n'est pas accepte)22. Dans le chapitreDe
, homocurrit
qui currit
disputt
ex
relationibus
du Tractatusde locis Argumentationum23
,
aequipollentia
l'auteur discute tous les typesd'infrenceset d'quivalences possibles
et leurs contre-exemples.Il est intressantde noter que ces contreexemples peuvent se ramener deux types,d'une part lorsque la relative est restrictive,d'autre part lorsque le temps de la principale n'est
pas le mme que celui de la relative.
4.1 Inferences
Les trois types d'infrencesqui nous intressentsont les suivants:
(a) une inferenced'une propositioncontenantune anaphore nominale
une propositioncontenantune anaphore pronominale:
ex. (TLA A76) Homo qui curritdisputt
ergo homo curritet ille disputt
cette infrenceest considre comme "probable".
(b) Une infrencede l'implicite "ce qu'elle implique", donc la
relative, considre comme "de plus grande probabilit":
22Saufs'ilya habitudo
terminorum
siinfrence
estpossible
de parlespro, c'est--dire
destermes.
AinsiSi aliquid
estgrammaticus
prits
smantiques
quodestsciens
ergo
aliquid
estsciens
estpossible,
c'estparceque l'on a le droitd'infrer,
de parla structure
de la
estgrammaticus
etque lesproprits
destermes
sciens
etgrammaticus
proposition
aliquid
sonttellesquetoutgrammairien
esthomme.
Parcontre
siquodestgrammaticus
estsciens
,
estgrammaticus
estimpossible
aliquid
(ARS MEL. , 1 p.354).Cf.la mmeargumentationdansTLA p. 53,ex. A 86a A 86d.
23Tractatus
deLocisArgumentationum
A Study
, ed. par IukioIwakuma,Instantiae.
oj
with
anEdition
Twelfth
Technique
ofArgumentation
ofMs. ParisBN lat.6674f.1-5,dans:
de MoyenAgeGrecet Latin,38 (1981)[abrgen TLA].
Cahiersde l'Institut
15

12:58:53 PM

ex. (TLA A78) Aliquid quod curritdisputt

ergo aliquid currit
Cette infrence,nous l'avons dit, est rejete par l'auteur de l'ARS
MEL.
() Une infrencede l'implicite ce que nous appelons proposition
'
proponit"),considre comme "ncesprincipale 'illud quodpropositio
saire", bien qu'il y ait ici aussi des contre-exemples,comme nous le
verrons:
ex. (TLA A81) Aliquis homo curritqui disputt
ergo aliquis homo currit
se rapporteau
Ce type infrencepeut se produirelorsque implicatio
sujet:
ex. (TLA A82) Aliquid quod curritdisputt
ergo aliquid disputt
ou au prdicat:
ex. (TLA A83) Aliquid curritquod disputt
ergo aliquid disputt.
Les contre-exemplescontiennentsoit des relatives qui ne peuvent
tre que restrictives:
ex. (TLA I 81.3) Socrates est fortiorquam homo qui est Plato
ergo est fortiorquam homo
soit des relatives dont l'interprtationest en gnral restrictive,par
exemple avec unussolushomoqui. . . ou unumsolumquod. . . (TLA I 76. 1, I
78. 1, 181.2, 182.2, 184.3), soitdes relativesdont l'antcdent est prcd d'un signe distributif:
ex. (TLA I 76.2) Omnem hominem quem video diligo
ergo omnem hominem video et ilium diligo
(cf. les contre-exemplessimilaires I 78.2, I 81.1, I 84.1).
Or nous avons vu ailleurs que ces exemples avec omnistaient frquemment discuts, soit dans les traitssur la restriction,o on reconnaissait leur propos une double interprtationpossible de la relative,
soit dans les discussions sur l'anaphore o diverses solutions taient
envisages, certainsauteurs refusantla possibilitqu'un termedistribu soit anaphoris et qu'un nonc comme le second membre de
16

12:58:53 PM

rinfrenceci-dessus soit correct.Les contre-exemplesdonns ici sans

justification,s'expliquent si on les rapporteaux cas gnraux que nous
avons discuts prcdemment.
4. 2 Restriction
temporelle
Nous avons donn dans notrepremirepartieles deux rgles,nonces en particulierdans le TRACT. DE PROPR. SERM. (II, 2 p.
de la restrictiontemporellepour les proposi724), du fonctionnement
tions contenantun relatif,et que nous reprenonspar les schmas suivants:
RI: pronom relatif

homo fuitet ille non est

R2: nom relatif

homo fuitqui non est

Selon les critresdonns dans la DIAL.MONAC.

supra, R2 n'est
acceptable que si la relativeest restrictive,les deux assertionsn'tant
pas indpendantes, l'assertion homoqui non est prcdant l'assertion
homofuit.
Certains auteurs donnentle faitque les tempsdes deux propositions
soient diffrentscomme un argument contrel'quivalence et ille= qui
comme dans le TRACT. DE PROPR. SERM. (qui refuse inference: homo
fuitqui nonest) ou dans le TLA, cf.
fuitetillenonestergohomo
le contre-exemplesuivant:
(TLA I 77.1) Aliquid fuitet illud non est
ergo aliquid fuitquod non est.
Dans le Tractatus
par contre,on accepte une des deux quiimplicitarum
mais
valences possibles (1")
pas l'autre (1') (p. 55):
(1) Aliquid quod non est homo erit Antichristus
(1') Aliquid non est homo et illud erit Antichristus
(1") Aliquid erit Antichristuset illud non est homo
Les argumentsdonns pour justifier(1") contre(1') reposentsur une
acceptationde la rgle RI mais sur un rejet implicitede R2. L'auteur
chercheen effet montrerque, pour que la restrictiontemporellesoit
conserve dans (1) et sa glose, il faut que les mmes sujets soient lis
aux mmes verbes: aliquiddoit donc restersujet de erit,verbe au futur
et le relatifdoit restersujet de nonesthomo, verbe au prsent,mme si
de nom relatif{quod), il devient pronom relatif{illud). De ce fait,dit
17

12:58:53 PM

l'auteur, les mmes sujets tant lis aux mmes verbes, Yappellatio
induite par le temps de ces verbes sur ceux-ci sera identique24.
tend donc fairedes deux propoL'auteur du Tractatusimplicitarum
sitions contenues dans implicite(1) des propositionsindpendantes
quant au fonctionnementde la restrictiontemporelle. D'autre part il
est clair dans cette analyse que la prdication principale (Aliquiderit
Antichristus
) est non seulementindpendantede la prdicationfaitepar
la propositionrelative, mais galement antrieure celle-ci: la prdication n'est pas faitedu sujet (<aliquid)en tantque modifipar Yimplicationmais indpendamment et antrieurement cette modification.
Tous ces argumentsnous montrentbien, si on les rapporteaux critres donns dans la DIAL.MONAC.
que, implicitementdans ce texte,
en retenant la glose (1"), l'auteur considre la propositionrelative
dans (1) comme non-restrictive.Le choix de (1") est en fait impos
par le sens de la phrase: si (1) signifiait(), l'explicite () tant
fausse, l'implicite (1) le serait aussi. Par contre (1") tant vraie, (1)
l'est aussi. C'est bien reconnatreque deux interprtationssont possibles.
Le faitqu'une proposition' "implicite", c'est--dire contenantune
"
propositionrelative, ne puisse tre glose par une explicite" que si
l'interprtationde la relative est non-restrictive,est bien justifiepar
un autre passage du mme trait, propos de l'exemple Omneanimal
quodesthomoestrisibile(p. 58). Puisque la seule interprtationacceptable de cette phrase est l'interprtationrestrictive,elle n'admet pas
d'tre glose:
"Itemdubitatur
de explicita
huiusimplicitae:
Omneanimalquodesthomoestrisibile
Ad hocdicimus
nullamhabetexplicitam..."
quodhaecpropositio
La seule glose qui seraitacceptable met bien en lumire cetteinterprtation restrictive:
"(...) velsi habet,sicessesumendam:
animalium
esthomoetnullum
esthomoquodnonsitrisiAliquorum
quodlibet
ble."25
24"Et estratioquaresic sumendasitexplicita,
quia isteterminus
supponit
aliquid
et sortitur
uerbofuturi
scilicet
ab eo appellationem
erit,
temporis,
(5a-i)". et "Item,
alia ratio:cumnomenrelatiuum
uerbopraesentis
etinexplicita
supponat
temporis,
loco illiusnominis
relatiui
illudpronomen
debetita
relatiuum,
pronomen
ponatur
inimplicita
uerbosupponere
cuisupponit
nomenrelatiuum
positum
(5a-iii)"( Tractatusimplicitarum
, p. 55).
25Cettegloseestbien
d'unehypothtique
dutype:omne
estrisibile
siillud
animal
proche
esthomo
restrictive
, ce qui confirme
l'interprtation
(cf.supra).
18

12:58:53 PM

Contrairement ce que Ton avait dans la glose (1") pour (1), l'assertion premireest ici celle qui faitporterl'assertion ralise par la relative sur le sujet de la principale, et l'assertion principaleest seconde et
dpendante de la premire.
Conclusion
Nous avons cherch montrerque Ton trouvaitdans les traitsterministesune opposition entredeux fonctionnementsde la proposition
relative. Nous avons vu que, si des critressont, dans un trait au
moins, noncs clairementcomme permettantde distinguerun foncde la relative,
tionnementrestrictif
et un fonctionnementnon-restrictif
ces critres restent souvent implicites ailleurs, mais influent sur
l'adoption de telle ou telle solution d'un problme logico-smantique
(comme celui des inferencespossibles partirdes implicites)et, dans
d'autres cas, semblent s'effacer,l'une ou l'autre interprtationde la
relative restantseule en jeu, ce que le type de question traite cet
endroitpermetd'expliquer. D'autre part il nous a paru importantde
montrerque, mme si cetteopposition apparaissait analyse dans nos
textes de diverses manires (restriction/non restriction, sens
compos/divis, liaison mdiate/immdiate,relative situe dans la
mme pas dans la mme phrase, etc.), elle restaitnanmoins lie au
contextede la thoriede la restrictionde la doctrineterministe.De ce
fait,le traitementde la relativese trouveli celui de l'adjectif et il est
intressantde noter que l'opposition entre les deux interprtations,
dans la Logique de Port-Royal, a pour origine la distinctionexplication/dtermination
qui, elle aussi, n'est pas pose uniquement pour la
mais
relative,
galement et d'abord pour l'adjectif26.Enfin,la spcificit du traitementde ce problme dans ces textes terministes- par
rapport,en particulier, celui de la Logiquede Port-Royal - vient de
l'analyse particuliredu phnomne de l'anaphore et des difficults
poses par la rgle gnrale adopte selon laquelle l'antcdent et le
26Cf.J. Cl. Pariente,
etponctuation,
Grammaire
Etudes
surleXVIIlesicle,
Univer, logique
sitdeClermont
enparticulier
L'auteurexplique
II, 1979,pp. 105-120.
quelefaitque
soitlie la distinction
en faituneopposition
l'opposition
explication/dtermination
de Portpurement
logique,ce qui expliquequ'onne la trouve
pasdansla Grammaire

C'estpeut-tre
mdivaux,
Royal(p. 108-109).
parcequ'elleestlie,danslestextes
la problmatique
essentiellement
logiquede la restriction,
qu'onnela trouve
pasdans
les grammaires
du moinscellesdontnousdisposons.
contemporaines,
19

12:58:53 PM

relatif(d'identit) ont la mme supposition27.Cette rgle, en effet,

pose pour toute anaphore, nominale et pronominale, s'applique en
faitdiffremment
dans les deux cas: c'est propos d'un des problmes
discutslis cettergle,celui des antcdentsdistribus,qu'est avance l'ide d'une double interprtationpossible qui vaut - ici aussi pour toute propositioncontenantun termedistribu28.Il nous a sembl qu'il fallait rendre compte, en mme temps que de la prsence
d'une telleoppositionentredeux typesde relatives,de la manire dont
le problme se posait dans les textesterministes.
Si nous avons insistsur le double fonctionnementde la proposition
relative, ce n'est pas simplement pour montrerque les mdivaux
4
sont, plusieurs sicles avant Port-Royal, les 'inventeurs" de celui-ci.
Ce n'est pas non plus pour dire qu'ils avaient cette distinctiondont
plusieurs tudes rcentes ont montr l'inadquation pour rendre
des relativesdans nos langues29.Il
compte du fonctionnementeffectif
nous semble plus intressantde voir que cette distinctionest bien
d'origine logique, s'appliquant sur un corpus d'exemples restreints,et
insr de ce fait dans un cadre o il s'agit d'assigner des valeurs de
vrit aux phrases contenantdes relatives,ce qui implique d'adopter
des positionstranches:on a telle ou telle inference partirde l'implicite, l'antcdent est restreintou il ne l'est pas. Ce qui est tonnant
c'est le bonheur avec lequel a perdur,jusqu' nos jours, ce type de
distinction,malgr les difficultsqu'elle suscitedans l'analyse linguistique de bon nombre d'exemples, ainsi que les critrespermettantde
l'tablir, dont certainsse trouventdj, par exemple, dans le passage
tudi plus haut de la DialcticaMonacensis.
Universit Paris 7
de Recherches
Dpartement
Linguistiques
C.N.R.S. (U.A. 381)

27Rgleambigu
danssa formulation,
direquel'antcdent
puisqu'elle
peutvouloir
etle relatif
ou qu'ilsontmmemodede supposisupposent
pourlesmmesindividus
tion.
28Cecivautgalement
commelesexceptives
avecsolum
,
pourd'autrespropositions,
tantum
, etc.
29Cf.enparticulier
P. leGoffic
relatives
etambigut
, identification
, ou:
(1979),Propositions
Pourenfinir
aveclesdeuxtypes
derelatives
de ParisVIII,
, dans:DRLAV 21,Universit
pp. 135-145.
20

12:58:53 PM

cits
Textes
ArsEmer.II, 2: ArsEmmerana,
ed. parL. M. deRijk,Logica
A contribution
Modernorum,
tothehistory
terminist
ofearly
, vol.II, part2, Assen1967.
logic
ArsMel. II, 1: ArsMeliduna,
ibid,vol.II part1.
ArsMel.: ArsMeliduna
on
, ed. complte
parF. Giusberti
(1982),Materials
fora Study
Scholasticism
on implicit
, Napoli: TheArsMeliduna
,
Twelfth
Century
propositions
p. 77-85.
De Inplicationibus
notes
ontheMedieval
tract
De inso, ed. par.L. M. de Rijk(1966),Some
with
theedition
the
endofthe12th
lubilibus,
, dans:Vivarium
ofa tract
dating
from
century
IV, pp. 83-115.
Dial. Monac.II, 2: Dialctica
Monacensis
, ed. parL. M. de Rijk(1967)vol.II, part2.
Fierville
latine
indite
duXlIIesicle
ed., Unegrammaire
, Paris1886.
Guillaumede Sherwood,Syncategoremata
, ed. O'Donnell,MediaevalStudies,3,
pp. 46-93.
Lambertd Auxerre,Logica(Summa
Lamberti
), ed. F. Alessio(1971).
Log. CumSit NostraII, 2: Logica
cumsitnostra
, ed. parL. M. de Rijk(1967),volII,
part2.
Pierred'Espagne,Tractatus,
ed. L. M. de Rijk(1972),Assen.
PierreHelie, Summa
Priscianum
constructionum
du
, ed. dans:Cahiersdel'Institut
super
MoyenAgeGrecet Latin,27-28.
RobertBlund,Summa
inarte
, ed. parKneepkens
grammatica,
cap.derelativis
(1977),
Therelatio
intheGrammatical
Tracts
,
simplex
oftheLate12thandEarly13thCentury
dans:Vivarium
XV, 1, pp. 1-30.
RogerBaconXIV: Summa
etdistinctionibus
desophismatibus
hacte, ed. parSteele,Opera
nusinedita
Baconi
, Oxford1937.
Rogeri
RogerBaconXV: Summule
dialectices
, ibid,volXV, 1940.
Summa
derelativis
ed. parKneepkens
(anonymi),
(1977).
Sum.Met. II, 1: Summe
ed. parL. M. de Rijk(1967),vol.II, part1.
metenses,
Tla: Tractatus
deLocisArgumentationum
A
, ed. parYukioIwakuma(1981),Instantiae.
withan Edition
ofTwelfth
Technique
Study
Century
ofArgumentation
ofMs ParisBN
lat.6674f.1-5.,dans:Cahiersde l'Institut
de MoyenAgeGrecetLatin38.
Iract.Anag:II,l lractatus
ed. parL. M. de Rijk(1967),vol.II, part2.
Anagnini,
Tract, de Univ.Monac. II, 2: Tractatus
deunivocatione
Monacensis
, ibid.
Tract.de Pr.Serm.II, 2: Tractatus
deproprietatibus
ibid.
sermonm,
Tractatus
, ed. parGiusberti
Implicitarum
(1982).

21

12:58:53 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 1 (1986)
WaltherBurley's De exceptivis. An Edition

L. M. DE RIJK

Here is the edition of Walther Burley's early tracton the so-called

'exceptive propositions.' For some informationon it, see the Introductionprecedine my editionof Burley's De exclusivis.
in this Journal,vol.
23 (1985), pp. 23-54.
Contents
Chs
1-3 Introductio
4 Regula la: omnis propositio in parte vera et in parte
falsa potest verificanper exceptionem
5-15 Dubitatio
16 Regula2a: exceptiva est preiacenti instantia
17-23 Instantiae
24 Regula: si tot excipiunturquot supponuntur,exceptiva est impropria
25-34 Instantiae
35-69 De suppositione in exceptiva
36-40 De suppositione
subiecti
41-61 De suppositione
partisextracapte
42-45 De primaopinione
46-54 De secundaopinione
55-62 De tertiaopinione
63-69 De suppositione
predicati
70-84 De habitudine inter exceptivam et exclusivam
70-77 An omnisexclusivainferat
et econverso
exceptivam
An
78-82
ex negativaexponente
exclusive
exceptiva
inferatur
83-84 An exceptiva
ex affirmativa
exclusive
inferatur
exponente
85-91 Utrum exceptiva possit esse falsa, utraque exponente existente vera
92-99 An post exceptionem fiat distributio
100-109 Quid determinet prepositio cum suo casuali
22

12:58:59 PM

Sigla
L = codexLondinensis
(BritishMuseum, Royal Ms. 12 F XIX, 126va129vb)
L
Lc = manusquae correxit
=

codexBrugiensis(Bruges Stadsbibliotheek,cod. 500, 85va-89rb)

Bc = manusquae correxit

Walter Burley
DE EXCEPTIVIS
<Introductio)
a;

'
1 Circa exceptivas est sciendum quod hec dictio 'preter
aliquando
teneturexceptive, aliquando diminutive. Quando teneturexceptive,
tunc dnott instantiam esse in suo preiacente. Ut si dicatur: lnichil

preterSortemcurri, dnott ista duo instare: 'nichil curri et Sortes

curri. Sed quando teneturdiminutive, attribuiipredicatumparti
extracapte removetpredicatum a parte extracapta. Ut si dicatur:
' decern
preterquinqusuntquinqu', non sequitur ex hoc quod quinqu
non sunt quinqu. Nec etiam sequitur: ' decern
preter
quinqusuntquin'.
decern
sunt
qu; igitur
quinqu
'
2 Sciendum est quod differentiaest inter hanc dictionem 4preter
quando teneturexceptive et quando teneturdiminutive,quia quando
teneturdiminutive,propositio in qua ponitur 'preter'
, bene stat cum
suo preiacente. Sicut patet in exemplo: ista duo stant bene simul:
' decern
ammaliasuntalba9 et ' decern
animaliapreter
duosuntalba' , quia intellects huius ' decern
animaliapreter
animalia
duosuntalba9est iste: 1decern
remotis
duobussuntalba' ; que est vera si octo sintalba. Sed propositioin
1 Circa...dictio]
Hoc signum
L alterum
add.B. instanaliquando]LB tenetur
idestrepugnantiam
inL dicatur]
altamanus
L dicitur
tiam]L oppositum
superscr.
sicsaepius
dnott]
denotatur
L instare]
contradicere
L extracapte]
L ex ...extracapta]
trahere
L . ...decern
suntquinqu] . L quinqu
suntquinqu]& quinqu
hoc signumL exceptive]
2 hanc dictionem]
exclusiveL preter] .
L suo]L . sicut...
undeL bene] . L simul]LB quodadd.
exemplo]
decern]
L duo et]LB quodadd. est]LR . decernanimalia]L .
remotis]
L relictis
duobus]LB alia proanimalia)add. que] L et ista
hec dictiopreter]
L predicatum
(?) ut] L quando uno] L una opL contradictoria
nam] quiaL omnis]L .
positum]
23

12:58:59 PM


9
qua ponitur hec dictio preterut teneturexceptive, non stat cum suo
4
preiacente. Unde ista duo non sunt simul vera: omnishomocurriet
' omnis homo
preterSortemcurri, quia ex uno sequitur oppositum
alterius. Nam sequitur: omnishomopreter
Sortemcurrit
; igiturSortesnon
'
et
non
omnis
homo
curri
curri;
ultra: igitur
.
9
3 Alia differentiaest quod hec dictio 'preter
semper quando tenetur
a
toto
in
sive
exceptive excipit partem
quantitate
partem subiectivam
a terminocommuni. Sed quando teneturdiminutive,diminuii a toto
universali sive integrali; semper enim dividit [B 85vb] partem integralem a toto integrali.
{Regula prima)
9

4 De hac dictione preter

quando tenetur exceptive, dande sunt
regule. Una est quod
omnis propositio

in parte vera et in parte falsa potest

verificari per exceptionem;
est falsa. Ut si hec sit falsa: ' omnishomocurri

excipiendo illud pro quo

solum pro Sorte, excepto Sorte eritpropositiovera. Ideo hec est vera:
omnishomo
preterSortemcurri.
(Dubitatio)

5 Contra hanc regulam contingitdubitare an omnis propositio in

parte vera et in parte falsa possit verificari.Quod non, videtur. Nam
hec est falsa: nullus homoest homoalbus9' et non est falsa nisi pro
homine albo; et tamen excepto homine albo non erit vera. enim
non est intelligibilis:1nullushomopreterhominem
albumesthomoalbus',
non
instai
suo
quia pars extracapta
preiacenti. Nam ista duo non
' nullushomoest homoalbus9 et ' homoalbus est homoalbus'
repugnant:
3 quod] L quando semperquando]L . exceptive]
LB semperadd.
excipitpartem]excipit est exceptiopartisL partem...
partis
termino]
subiective
ut a termino
L communi]
L . sed] LB hec dictiopreteradd.
L diminuit]
L excipit
sive] vela totoL dividit]
excipit
L
4 quandotenetur]
tentaL exceptive]
una] LB
exceptiva
(!)L diminutive
L .
regulaadd. omnis]L . excipiendo...
falsa]L . propositio]
ideohec]L undeista . estvera]LR .
5 hanc]istamsic saepiusL in partevera...verificari]
L etc. erit] est
L hec...intelligibilis]
L hicenimestintellectus
hominem]
L . extracapta
L
LB prius
excepta suo]L nam] . L non] . L repugnarent]
repugnant
LB alterum
LB aliquis]L .
sequitur
sequeretur]
sequitur
sequeretur]
24

12:58:59 PM

Quia si repugnarent,ex uno sequeretur oppositum alterius; et tunc

sequeretur: ''homoalbus esthomoalbus; igituraliquis homoesthomoalbus*,
ubi antecedens est necessarium et consequens contingens.
6 Item. Supposito quod omnis homo alius a Sorte et Platone currat
et quod nec Sortes Plato currat, hec tunc est falsa: 'omnishomo
Sortemcurri, et non nisi pro Platone; et tarnenisto excepto non
preter
erit vera, quia non potest excipl.
7 Retento casu priori hec est falsa: 4omnishomocurri, et non nisi
pro Sorte et Platone. Et tarnenexcepto Sorte et Platone non eritvera.
enim est falsa: ' omnishomopreterSortemetPlatonemcurri, quia ex
hac sequitur quod omnis homo alius a Sorte et Platone currit [L
126vb]. Sed hec est falsa, quia Sortes est alius a Sorte et Platone;
tamen hec est falsa: ' Sortesnoncurri.
8 Item. Supposito quod omnis homo alius a Sorte excipiatur ab
'
aliquo actu et Sortes non, nec hec tunc est falsa: omnishomoexcipitur'
et nonnisi pro Sorte. Et tamen excepto Sorte non eritvera. enim
est falsa ' omnishomopreter
Sortemexcipitur'quia ex hac sequitur quod
Sortes non excipitur. Sed hec est falsa, quia in hac propositioneexcipitur.
9 Ad oppositum. Si propositio sit in parte vera et in parte falsa,
predicatum removeturvere ab eo pro quo est falsa, et attribuitur
cuilibetalii inesse. Et hoc dnott exceptiva. Igiturexceptiva est vera.
10 Ad istam dubitationemdico quod regula est bona. Quod patet
inductive, quia propositioin parte vera et in parte falsa aut est afflrmativa aut negativa. Si affirmativa,tunc predicatum vere inest
cuilibet alii ab eo pro quo est falsa et vere removeturab isto pro quo
est falsa; et hoc dnott affirmativaexceptiva. Si autem illa propositio
6 Platone]
a Platone
L sortes
plato] platosortes
L etnon]L ettamen
non istoexcepto]
L excepto
piatone priusnon]LR . erit] estL
7 casupriori]
eodemcasuL et non] sednonestfalsaL ettamen...
vera]
nonpotest
verifican
L currit]
LB igitur
omnishomoaliusa sorteet
perexceptionem
add. quia...currit]
LR . ex hac]L . R quod]L . R
piatonecurrit
et platonem
currit
pretersortem
igituromnishomoadd. piatone] a piatone
L tamen...
L igitur
sortes
noncurrit

currit]
8 aliusa sorte] . L excipiatur]
L excipitur
actu]L . aliusa sorteadd.
L tunc]L enim tamen] . L erit] estL sortes]
L .
9 vere]L . attribuitur]
. L inesse] inestL dnottexceptiva]

denotatur
L
perexceptivam
10 ad...dico]L dicendum
quod]L et quia]LB autillaadd. autest]L est
primm
denotatur
in L tervere]L . secundum
vere]L . dnott]
tiumvere]L . a quolibetalio] . L et vere...vera]L . et ab ilio
removetur
pro quo est falsa R igitur...
pro quo] LR . ista] L est
R propositio..
ab ilioproquo nonestfalsa
.alio]L estfalsaetremovetur
25

12:58:59 PM

sit negativa, tunc predicatum vere removetura quolibet alio ab ilio

pro quo est falsa, et vere attribuiturilli pro quo est vera. Igitur ista
propositio que significaipredicatum inesse illi pro quo propositioest
vera, removetura quolibet alio. Cuiusmodi est exceptiva negativa in
qua idem excipitur.
11 Ad primam rationem diciturquod hec est falsa: nullushomoest
homoalbus', et hoc non nisi pro homine albo verum est. Sed ex hoc non
sequitur quod posset verificariexcepto homine albo; sed exceptis istis
qui sunt libi erit propositio vera. Unde si aliqua propositio debeat
verificariper exceptionem, oportet quod singularia per se alicuius
communis excipiantur. Ideo cum homo albus sit per accidens, contentumsub homine ab eo non potest excipl.
12 Tu dicis: cum hec sit falsa: nullushomoesthomoalbus' pro aliquo
singulari et pro aliquo vera, potest verificariper exceptionem. Dico
quod debet verificari,excipiendo illa singularia pro quibus est falsa
sub disiunctione. Ideo debet sic verificari:4nullus{homo) preter
Sortem
velPlatonemesthomoalbus', supposito quod sit solum falsa pro Sorte et
pro Platone. Et si pro pluribus debet verificari, excipiendo illa
singularia sub disiunctione.
13 Tu dicis: si verificeturexcipiendo singularia sub disiunctione,
adhuc est ista exceptiva falsa, quia hec est falsa: nullushomopreter
Sortemest homoalbus', et hec similiter: ' nullushomopreterPlatonemest
homoalbus'.- Dico quod non erit disiunctiva sed de parte disiuncta,
ita quod excipias illud totum disiunctum: ' SortesvelPlato'.
14 Ad aliud dico quod supposito quod omnis homo alius a Sorte
vel a Platone curratet quod nec Sortes Plato currat,hec tunc est
falsa: 1omnishomopreter
Sortem
curri, et solum pro Platone. Sed ex hoc
11 rationem]
L responsionem
dicitur]
L dicendum
hocnonnisi]
hocnisi
L sed] quiaL possetverificari]
vera
nonnisi
. L albo]LB foret
propositio
add.L istis]L . erit] ex ( ?proerit)L est si...exceptionem]
L semper
L ex alicuius]
L illius excipiantur]
debetverificari
propositio
perexponentes
contentum...
subeo ab eo nonpotest
cipitur
accipi(!)B
excipi]L oppositum
L . excipiendo]
12 homoalbus]L albus vera]L non perexceptionem]
L perexceptionem
est]L hecest vel]L et solum]L . et]
excipiendo
L vel etsi] L velsi singularia]
L .
13 si] L quodsi verificetur]
L verificatam
perexceptivam
add. singulari
sub disiunctione]
LB sivenulluspreterplatonem
L solum sortem]
add. et
L disiunctiva
hec...albus]L . erit]L est sed]LB eritadd.L disiuncta]
excipias]
L excipitur
plato]LB velcichero
add.LB
14 dico]L . tunc] . L omnis]L nullus hoc] hacL verumtamen]
tarnenL propositio
propositio
L in
exponens(?/>ro
exceptiva]
exceptiva)
LR .
..sorte]
parte.
..parte]L . currit.
26

12:58:59 PM

non sequitur quod possit verificariper exceptionem, quia regula est

intelligenda de propositione non-exceptiva. Verumtamen ilia propositi exceptiva que est in parte vera et in parte falsa, potest
verificariper exceptionem. Ideo ista: ' omnishomoalius a Sortecurri
Platonem
verificatursic per exceptionem: ' omnishomoalius a Sortepreter
curri.
15 Ad aliud dico quod sicut Magister Abstractionum
dicit quod supalius
a
Sorte
et
omnis
homo
Platone
posto quod
excipiatur[L 127]
ab aliquo actu et Sortes non, hec est falsa: omnishomoexcipitur9
, et hec
1
'
est falsa: omnishomopreter
Sortemexcipitur9
, et hec similiter: Sortesnon
9 sed non
'
Sortesigiturexcipitur9
'
,
excipitur
sequitur: Sortesin hac excipitur;
sed hec est falsa secundum quid et simpliciter.
>
{Regula secunda
16 Alia regula est ista quod
exceptiva est preiacenti

instantia,

hocest quod quelibet exceptiva rpugnt suo preiacenti.

( Instantie
)
17 Sed contra hanc regulam sunt multe instantie. est vera:
'
, et hec similiter: aliquis homonon vidt
laliquis homonon vidtasinum9
asinumpreterBurnellum9,ut supposito quod Sortes videat aliquem
asinum et quod Plato non videat aliquem asinum alium a Burnello sed
solum Burnellum, hec est vera: aliquis homonon videtasinum9 (quia
Sortes non videt asinum), et hec similiter:' aliquishomononvidetasinum
9
Burnellum
preter
(quia Plato non videt asinum preterBurnellum).
18 Item. Ista duo stant simul: nichilpreter
hominem
[ 86rb] album
'
esthomoalbus9et homoalbusesthomoalbus9, quia supposito quod nullus
homo albus sit, utraque istarumest vera. tunc est vera: ' nichilest
homoalbus9, et hec similiter:' nichilpreter
hominem
albumesthomoalbus9,
est
vera.
quia utraque exponens
15 quodsicut]L sicutdicit dicit]L . ab...actu]L . quod] .
L ethec...excipitur]
. L sequitur]
L . sortes]
L .
L preiacentis
16 preiacenti]
suo]L . ut] . L
L burnello
quia...asinum]L .
17 alium...
solum] preterL burnellum]
LB quodadd. quia...asinum]
similiter]
. L
18 nichil...
albus] nullushomoestalbusL
27

12:58:59 PM

19 Ad oppositum est una regula in exceptivis.- Dicendum quod

regula est bona aliquando, aliquando non. Pro quo sciendumest quod
aliquando fitexceptio a subiecto, aliquando a predicato.
20 Si fiat exceptio a subiecto tune exceptiva non stat cum suo
preiacente, quia si fiat exceptio a subiecto, tunc suum preiacens est
una propositio vera in qua predicatum attribuiturcuilibet contento
sub subiecto vel removetura quolibet contento sub subiecto. Sed si
predicatumattribuiturcuilibetvel removetura quolibet, cum illa non
stat exceptiva, quia in exceptiva vel predicatum attribuituralicui
contento sub subiecto vel removeturab aliquo.
21 Si autem fiat exceptio a predicato, aut subiectum sumitur
universaliteraut particulariter.Si universaliter,talis exceptiva non
stat cum suo preiacente. Nam ista duo non stant simul: ' nullushomo
videi asinum9 et ' nullus homovidei asinumpreterBurnellurr
. Si autem
subiectum sumatur particulariteret fiat exceptio a predicato, tunc
cum tali exceptiva bene stat suum preiacens, quia cum tam in exceptiva quam in preiacente stat subiectum particulariter,potest subiectum in exceptiva stare pro uno et in preiacente pro alio. Sicut patet:
ista duo stant simul: ' aliquis homononvidetasinum' et 1aliquis homonon
videtasinumpreterBurnellum' Sicut et illa stant simul: ' Sortesnonvidet
asinum' et quod non videt asinum preterBurnellum.
22 Per hoc patet ad primam rationem quod ista duo stant simul:
'
'
4
aliquis homonon videtasinum et aliquis homonon videtasinumpreter
Burnellum*
, ex eo quod potest fieriexceptio a predicato et predicatum
sumatur particulariter.
23 Ad aliud dico quod ista duo non stant simul: ' nichilest homo
albus' et ' nichilpreter
hominem
albumesthomoalbus' . Ad probationemdico
'
quod supposito quod nullus homo sit albus, hec est falsa: nichilest
homoalbus', quia etsi homo albus non existt, adhuc homo albus est
aliquid in intellectuvel aliquid rationis.

19 pro...est]L propter

quodsciendum
20 una] . L vera] L una vel...subiecto] . L sed] .
L cum...stat] tuncilla non statsimulcumL secundum
vel] et L alicui]
cuilibet
L . tertium
alioL
vel] etL aliquo] quolibet
21 a] L ab aliquo sumitur]
L stat aut] velL universaliter]
LBCuniformiter
duo]L . sumatur]
L stat cum]L . potest]
L etpotest
et]
L . et...asinum]LR . sicut...burnellum]
L .
22 rationem]
regulam
L stant]LR nonstant non] . L ex eo... parL .
ticulariter]
23 duo]L . homo...
siveratione
L
existt]
28

12:58:59 PM

Regula tertia
24 Alia regula est ista:
si tot excipiuntur

quot supponuntur, [L 127vb] exceptiva est impropria.

curri. Et ratio huius

Ut si dicatur: ' omnishomopreter hominem
a
est
est
quia exceptio
extracaptio partis toto. Sed si tot exciregule
piantur quot supponuntur,tune non erit extracaptiopartis a toto sed
magis eiusdem a seipso.
(Instantie)
25 Contra istam regulam arguitursic: aliqua exceptiva est propria
ubi plura excipiunturquam supponuntur. Igitur a multo fortiorialiqua exceptiva erit propria ubi tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur.
'
aliuma Sortecurri
Assumptum patet, quia omnishomopreterhominem
<est una exceptiva propria) et tamen hic plura excipiuntur quam
supponuntur,quia omnes alii a Sorte excipiunturet nihil supponitur
nisi Sortes, et plures homines sunt alii a Sorte quam [ 86 va] Sortes.
Igitur etc.
26 Item. Supposito quod tantum sint tres homines albi et tantum
duo nigri et quod omnes homines albi currant et non niger, hec est
vera: ' nullus homopreterhominemalbum curri. Et plura excipiuntur
quam supponuntur, quia solum nigri supponuntur et albi excipiuntur, et plures sunt albi quam nigri.
27 Item. Supposito quod Sortes currat et Plato non, hec est vera:
'
uterqueistorum
preterPlatonemcurri, et tamen tot excipiuntur quot
supponuntur,quia Sortes excipituret Plato supponitur.

omnem]
LCB. L et] .
dicatur]
L dicitur
24 quot]L quodsicpersaepe
L quia...extracaptio]
L . toto]LB extracaptio
add.B tunc...
partis]L non
eritexcipitur
parsBf. sed...seipso]LBC.
Bccontra
. contra...
illud
25 contra...
sic]contraistamregulam
supponentur]
sicL aliqua]alia LB exceptiva]
L . priusubi]Bcin qua L a... aliarguitur
erit] estL propria]L vera alterum
qua] L multofortius
ubi] in qua
L
L assumptum...
quia] ut L et] . L hic] . L quia...excipiuntur]
.
namhic excipitur
aliusa sorte nichil] . L et] L sed homines]
L quamSortes]
. L
. L
26 Item...quamnigri]
L . non]LB currant
add. platonem]
L Sortem

27 currat]
29

12:58:59 PM

28 Ad oppositum est regula in exceptivis.- Ad hanc dubitationem

dico quod hec regula bona est. Cuius ratio est quia in omni exceptiva
in
propria excipiturpars a suo toto. Hoc enim patet per diffinitionem
est
a
suo
toto.
Sed
si
tot
exExceptivis
quoniam exceptio
extracaptio
partis
cipiantur quot supponuntur, non excipitur pars a suo toto. Ut si
dicatur: lomnishomopreter
hominem
curri, hic non excipiturpars
a suo toto. Nam omnishomonon est pars huius quod dico omnishomo.
29 Verumptamen sciendum quod regula habet intelligisic: si tot
excipiunturquot supponunturin preiacente, exceptiva est impropria.
Sed non sequitur: Hotexcipiuntur
in exceptiva;igiturexquotsupponuntur
. Unde sic habet intelligiut dictum est.
ceptivaestimpropria*
30 Per hoc patet responsio ad primam rationem,quoniam hec est
'
alium a Sortecurri. Nam hic non
propria: omnishomopreterhominem

excipiuntur tot quot supponuntur in hac: omnishomocurri, quia

Sortes non excipitur.Et exponitursic: Sortescurrit
etnullushomoalius a
Sortecurri.
31 Ad aliud dico quod in hac: luterque
istorum
Platonemcurri
preter
non excipiunturtot quot supponuntur in hac: ' uterqueistorum
curri.
Unde etsi in predictisinstantiisexcipiunturtot quot supponuntur in
exceptiva, tarnennon excipiunturtot quot supponunturin preiacente.
Ideo non sequitur has esse improprias.
32 Contra istud arguitur. Ostenditur quod aliqua exceptiva sit
propria in qua tot excipiunturquot supponunturin preiacente. Quia
hec est propria: 4nullussol preterhunesolemes , et tarnenhic tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur in preiacente. Nam iste sol excipitur et
nullus alius supponiturin preiacente.
33 Huic diciturquod hec est propria: nullussolpreter
hunesolemes ,
et hic excipitur iste sol et nichil aliud supponitur in preiacente.
Verumptamen plura in preiacente supponunturformaliterquam ex-

28 hec] . L bonaest] estveraL quia] . L inexceptivis]

exceptive
L suo...suo] . L dicatur]
L dicitur
quoddico]L .
L excipiantur
unde...ut] seddebetsicintelligi
29 excipiuntur]
sicutL
30 responsio]
. L primam
primm
L quia...sorte
rationem]
argumentum
L .
currit]
31 dico]L . preter
L preter
B. non...currit]
sortem
LB .
platonem]
istorum]
LBfpreter
add.L
platonem
argumentum
L aliqua] L alia quia...preiacente]
32 arguitur]
LBC.
quia]BfnamL
L dicendum
iste]LB terminus
33 dicitur]
add.L verumptamen...

exceptiva]
. L etsi] si L solus] . L inquantum]
L quantum

30

12:58:59 PM

cipiunturin exceptiva, quia etsi non sint plures soles in actu, tamen
sol, inquantum est ex sua forma, est communis pluribus.
34 Tunc dicendum est breviter quod ad proprietatemexceptive
sufficitquod plura formalitersupponantur quam excipiuntur. Et sic
est in hac: 'nullussol preter[B 86vb] hunesolemes .
in exceptiva)
(De suppositione
35 [L 127va] Circa suppositionem terminorumin exceptiva contingitdubitare. Cum igitur sint tria, scilicet subiectum a quo fitexceptio, et pars extracapta, et illud respectu cuius fitexceptio, de suppositionibuseorum dicatur secundum ordinem.
(De suppositione
subiect)
36 Sciendum quod subiectum in exceptiva habet duplicem suppositionem: unam respectu predicati, aliam respectuexceptionis. Sed
respectu predicati subiectum exceptive stat mobiliter,ita quod contingitdescendere ad quodlibet contentumsub subiecto aliud a parte
extracapta. Unde bene sequitur: 'omnishomopreterSortemcurrit;igitur
Sortem
et Cicerocurri, quia sequitur: lomnishomopreter
Platocurrit
currit;
4
Plato
currit
et
.
homo
alius
a
Sorte
curri
et
ultra:
Cicero1
omnis
;
igitur
igitur
37 Verumptamen respectuexceptionisstat subiectum immobiliter.
Unde non sequitur: *omnishomopreterSortemcurrit;igiturPlato preter
Sortemcurri. Sed non stat immobiliterabsolute, sed solum respectu
illorum qui non habent rationem totius respectu partis extracapte.
'
Sortem
currit
Unde bene sequitur: nullumanimalpreter
; igiturnullushomo
'
curri. Sed non sequitur: nullumanimalpreter
Sortemcurrit;
Sortem
preter
asinus
non
asinus
Sortem
habet
nullus
curri
rationem
,
preter
quia
igitur
totiusrespectu Sortis.
requiritur
estL breviter
sufficit]
L supponantur
34 estbreviter]
quamexL supponuntur
L supponuntur
quam excipiuntur
quam excipiantur
cipiuntur]
sol]LB .
35 terminorum]
termino
L exceptiva]
exceptivis
L contingit
.
dubitare]
L igitur] . L scilicet] cum sit L a...exceptioet] . L illud]L
eorum]L om.L
predicatum
L exclusive
extracapta]
LB
36 aliam] et aliamL sed]L si exceptive]
L .
add. bene]L . quia...cichero]
predicad
respectu
sed L subiectum]
. L stat]L . qui] L que
37 verumptamen]
. L totius]
non] . L respectu]
. L sortis]
totiusformalitatis
(%
31

12:58:59 PM

38 Verumptamen videtur quod non contingit descendere ad

'
partem extracaptam in exceptiva. Nam sequitur: omnishomopreter
estanimal;igiturSortesestanimaV; quod non esset nisi contingeret
Sortent
descendere ad partem extracaptam. Probatio huius consequentie:
Sortemestanimal; igiturSortesesthomo1
nam sequitur: ' omnishomopreter
,
quia ad hoc quod aliquid excipiturab aliquo oportetquod sub eo conSortem
estanimal;igiturSortes
tineatur. Igitur sequitur: ' omnishomopreter
esthomo' Igitur a primo.
39 Huic potest dici quod aliquando contingit descendere ad
partem extracaptam, et hoc quando talis exceptiva includitopposita.
SortemestanimaVincludit ista duo, quia hec
Ut hec: ' omnishomopreter
et quod Sortes non est homo.
homo
Sortes
est
ponit quod
Sortem
estanimal.IgiturSortesesthomo,
40 Quod patetsic.Omnishomopreter
Sortessithomo.
ab homine
, ex hocsequitur
quia ex hocquodSortesexcipitur
' quod
est
Sortem
homo
Similiter
preter
quodSortesnonsithomo,quiasequitur:omnis
sequitur
etc.
Sortes
nonesthomo'Igitur
nonestanimal
Sortes
; igitur
animal;
igitur
>
{De suppositione
partisextracapte
41 Circa suppositionem partis extracapte est sciendum quod
secundum diversos diversimode supponit pars extracapta. Nam
secundum aliquos supponit confuse et distributive;secundum aliquos
particulariter,et secundum aliquos aliquando universaliter,aliquando particulariter.
{De primaopinione
)
42 Circa [ 87ra] priorem opinionem est sciendum quod dicentes
partem extracaptam supponere confuse et distributivehoc dicunt
'

propterhanc rationemquia hec dictio preterimporttnegationem et

negatio quicquid confundit,confunditconfuseet distributive.Et ideo
L .
tarnen
L nam] quia L huius]L . sequitur]
38 verumptamen]
L sequitur
sortes
esthomo]L . ad] ex . L aliquid] . L oportet]
L continetur
igitur...
contineatur]
homo]igitursortesest animalL .
a primo]
quiasortes
esthomoL
igitur
39 potestdici] diciturL ut hec] ut hic L unde hec includitopposita
istaduoL quiahecponit
includit...
ponit]includit
40 quod...igitur
etc.] . L
. L secundum]

LB inexceptiva
add. secundum
41 sciendum]
diversos]
L
supponit
L aliquando...
universaliter
etsecundum
particulariter]
42 priorem] primamL est] . L rationem] causam L prius
L .
et...distributive]
. L et ideo] ideo L alterum
et...distributive]
L .
. L unde] etL omnishomocurrit]
ideo...distributive]
32

12:58:59 PM

quia in exceptiva exceptio pecedit partem extracaptam et negative

quicquid negat negat confuse et distributive,ideo pars extracapta
'
supponit confuse et distributive.Unde dicunt quod sequitur: nullum
animalpreter
hominem
currit
; igituromnishomocurri.
43 Verumptamen etsi pars extracapta supponat confuse et
distributive,hoc non est respectu exceptionis sed respectu predicati.
currit
Unde non sequitur: ' nullumanimalpreterhominem
; igiturnullum
4
animal preterSortemcurri, sed sequitur: igiturSortescurri. Unde
curri habet sic
secundum sic dicentes 1nullumanimalpreterhominem
1nullum
animai
aliud
ab
et
omnishomocurhomine
currit
exponi:
[L 127vb]
ri. Et ita 'omneanimalpreterhominem
currihabet sic exponi: omne
animalaliud ab hominecurritet nullushomocurri.
44 Contra istud arguitur. Ostenditur quod pars extracapta non
stet confuse et distributive,quia si sic, posito quod nichil currat nisi
'
hominem
curri; sed posito quod
Sortes, ista tunc est vera: nichilpreter
'
hec ponit hanc omnishomoes , hec est falsa.
sic.Ostenditur
<non>
[44a Contraistamopinioiiem
arguitur
quodparsextracapta
stetconfuse
etdistributive
nichilcurrat
nisiSortes,hecessetfalsa:
quia,
posito
quod
1nullum
animal
hominem
Si concurri
homocurrit.
, quia hecponitquodomnis
preter
' nichil Sortem
- contra:sequitur:
cedatur
quodhecsitfalsa,istocasuposito,
preter curnichil
hominem
curri
estverum;igitur
rit;igitur
; antecedens
preter
consequens].
45 Huic dicitursecundum hanc viam quod ab inferioriad superius
cum dictione exclusiva immediate addita non tenet consequentia,
'
Sortemcurrit;igiturnullushomo
quia tunc sequeretur: nullushomopreter
animai
curri
.
antecedens
est intelligibileet conVerumptamen
preter
non.
est
non
sequens
Consequens
intelligibileeoquod non excipitur
a
suo
sed
totum
a
sua
toto
pars
parte.
De secundaopinione
46 Alia opinio est quod pars extracapta in exceptiva stet particularits Et sic dicentes concedunt processum ab inferiori ad
43 verumptamen...
igitur]L . pretersortem]LCB . L sed] .
L habetsicexponi] exponitur
L secundum
sicdicentes]
L et]L
si dicetur
et
igitur
44 Contra...
estfalsa] . L
44a Contra.
L . <non>supplevi
coll.
..consequens]
45 dicitur] diciturquod L verumptamen]
L ultimum consequens...
in . L sua]L .
telligibile]
46 opinioest] estopinioL in...stet] supponit
L processum]
L quod adL
add. ad illud]ad id illudL quia...animals]
dita]LB nonvaletconsequentia
. secundum
L tertium
respectu
partisrespectu]
respectu
partis
partisrespectu]
L
partis
33

12:58:59 PM

superius cum dictione exceptiva immediate addita. Verumptamen

non contingitdescendere ad quodlibet superius ad partem extracaptam, sed solum ad illud quod habet rationempartis respectusubiecti.
Verbi gratia, bene sequitur: 4nullumanimalpreterSortemcurrit;igitur
nullumanimalpreter
hominem
curri, quia { homo) habet rationempartis
4
Sortemcurrit;
respectu animalis.Sed non sequitur: nullumanimalpreter
nullum
animal
substantiam
curri
non habet
substantia
,
igitur
quia
preter
rationem partis respectu animalis.
47 Contra istam opinionem arguitur. Isto dato, ex veris sequitur
falsum. Supposito quod omnis homo currit et quod nichil aliud ab
homine currat,tunc hec est vera: ' nichilpreter
hominem
curri. Si tamen
iste terminus 4homo9 stet particulariter,tunc sequitur: 4nichilpreter
currit
hominem
curritvelilium*
. Sed con; igiturnichilpreterhunchominem
sequens est falsum, quia est una disiunctiva cuius quelibet pars est
falsa.
48 Item. est vera: ' nullumanimalpreterhominem
'.
est rationale
Nisi tamen excipitur pro quolibet singulari, hec esset falsa, quia si
non [B 87rb] excipiatur pro quolibet sed pro aliquo et aliquo non,
ideo cum ad quodlibet contingatdescendere quod non excipitur,con4
tingitdescendere ad aliquem hominem. Et tunc sequeretur: nullum
hominem
estrationale
animalpreter
; igituraliquis homononestrationalis'Et
hoc est sic arguendum. Si Sortes non excipiatur, igitur contingit
descendere ad Sortem, quia ad quodlibet aliud a parte extracapta
4
hominem
est
contingitdescendere. Et tunc sequitur: nullumanimalpreter
rationale
Sortes
non
est
rationalis'
.
; igitur
49 Preterea. dictio 4preter aliquam importt negationem.
'
4
Igitur cum preterprcdt partem extracaptam, negatio importata

47 arguitur]
arguosicL quod]L . tunc]L . currit]
L . parL confuse
et distributive
particulariter
ticulariter]
(f)B velilium]L . sed]
. L secundum
estL quelibet]
utraque
L
est] . L tertium
est] consequens
48 esset]L est quia]L sed excipiatur]
L excipitur
aliquoetaliquonon]
L alio et alio ideocum] tamenL contingit]
seLB sequeretur]
contingit
contra
L nonexcipiatur
aristotilem
quiturL ethoc]L hec( f)B siearguendum]
aliud...extracapta]
L . descendere]
LB quod nonexigitur]L excipitur
et ad quodlibet
descendere
add.
cipitur
quod [?proaliud]a parteexceptacontingit
nullumanimal] nichil
L Item aliquam]aliam . L preter]
49 Preterea]
L dictio prcdt]
L
extracaptam]
L exceptam
importata
pecedit
per hoc] L in hac dictione
precedei] peceditL extracaptam]
L exceptam sed] sed si
L precedens]
prcdt
L ilium] . L stabit] statL distributive]
LB
in hacnullumanimalpreter
hominem
currit
add.
igitur
34

12:58:59 PM

per hoc precedei partem extracaptam. Sed negatio precedens terminm communem ilium confunditconfuse et distributive.Igitur in
hac: ' nullumanimal preterhominemcurri stabit iste terminus 4homo'
confuse et distributive.
50 Sustinendo istam [L 128ra] opinionem dicendum est ad

hominem
curriiste
primam rationemquod in hac: nullumanimalpreter
'
'
terminus homo duplicem habet acceptionem, unam respectu
predicati, aliam respectu exceptionis. Respectu predicati supponit
distributive.Illud patet sic. Sequitur: ' nichilpreter
hominem
currit;igitur
homocurri; et ultra: ' igituristehomocurritvelistecurri. Et sic respectu
predicati stat distributive.
51 Sed respectuexceptionisstatconfusetantum,quia nec contingit
descenderecopulative nec disiunctive.Non enim sequitur: ' nichilpreter
hominem
currit{et istum)', quia
currit;igiturnichilpreteristumhominem
omnis
currat
homo
et
nichil
aliud ab homine
supposito quod
quod
4nichil
hec
est
vera:
hominem
curri, hec tarnenest falsa:
currat,
preter
' nichil
preteristumhominemcurri. Et sic non contingit descendere
copulative. Nec disiunctive,quia eadem ratione, predictocasu posito,
hec est vera: 'nichilpreter
hominem
curri, hec tarnenfalsa: ' nichilpreter
istum hominemvel istum curri. Ex quo sequitur quod illud nec
copulative nec disiunctivestat, sed quod stat confuse tantum.
52 Per hoc potest dici ad aliud argumentum (sicut ad primum),
'
currit
quod non sequitur: nichilpreterhominem
; igiturnichilpreteristum
hominem
curri, quia pars extracapta non stat distributiverespectuexceptionis sed respectu predicati. Ideo non contingit descendere
respectu exceptionissed respectu predicati.

50 istam] primam
L quod]L quia acceptionem]
suppositionem
L exLB respectu
confusetantumvel distributive
ceptionis]
exceptionis
supponit
quod
idemestadd. supponit]
LB confuse
et add.L distributive]
LB respectu
exceptionisconfuse
tantum
add.L illud...sequitur]
sicutpatetL hominem]
sortem
L alterum
igitur
a primosicutpatetL et sic] . L stat] supponit
currit]
confuse
etL
51 sed] . L stat] . L etistum]
L . supposito]
positoL homo]
c . hominem
currit]LB . hic...falsa] currit]LB est falsaadd.
L et...copulative]
. L quia]L . eadam ratione
. L hec
predicto]
est...currit]
. L hectarnen
..currit]
LR
falsa]R hecessetfalsaL . nichil.
. velistum]
L . exquo...tantum]
R . LB
52 Per...sequitur]
R Et perhocad primum
L . nichil.
..currit]
argumentum
LB . currit]
LB1dicitur
add.L nonstat...predicati]
stat
quodnonsequitur
confuse
etdistributive
etnonrespectu
L
respectu
predicati
exceptionis
35

12:58:59 PM

53 Ad argumentumdiciturquod hec est vera: ' nullumanimalpreter

' . Et
hominem
estrationale
quando diciturquod si non quilibet homo excipitur, igitur contingit descendere ad quemlibet hominem,- dico
quod non sequitur. Et cum dicitur quod contingit descendere ad
quodlibet aliud a parte extracapta, dico quod regula sic habet intelligi:
contingitdescendere ad quodlibet de quo non diciturpars extracapta.
Sed pars extracapta in proposito [ 87va] diciturde quolibet homine.
Ideo ad nullum hominem contingitdescendere. Sed regula non est sic
intelligendaquod ad quodlibet contingatdescendere quod non est actualiter extracaptum, sed ad quodlibet de quo non dicitur extracaptum.
54 Ad aliud dico quod etsi hec dictio *preter1
importtnegationem
et prcdt partem extracaptam, verumptamen sua negatio non
pecedit partem extracaptam. Sicut patet: si dicam: t contingitad
utrumque hominem currerenegatio contingerepecedit subiectumet
tamen sua negatio non quia tunc sequeretur: ' contingit
ad utrumque
'.
hominem
ad
nullum
hominem
currere
currere;
igiturcontingit utrumque
De tertiaopinione
55 Alia opinio est quod in exceptiva affirmativapars extracapta
stat confuse et distributive sed in exceptiva negativa stat particulariter.Unde dicunt quod ista: 4nullumanimalpreter
hominem
curri
habet sic exponi: 4nullumanimalaliud ab hominecurrit
ethomocurri, sed
ista: lomneanimaipreterhominem
curridebet sic exponi: lomneanimai
aliud ab hominecurritet nullushomocurri.
53 argumentum
primmargumentum
L quod si] .
dicendum
dicitur]
L quilibet...
L quodlibet
quemlibet
quodlibet
igitur]
quodnonexhominem]
L etcum]L tamen a parte]LBC. dico] dicendum
L regula]L
cipitur
ista dicitur]
L predicatur
hominem]
istorum
L quod] . L contingat
. L actualiter]
accidentaliter
L prius
L acceptum
descendere]
extracaptum]
L exceptum

(!)B alterum
extracaptum]
54 aliuddico] argumentum
dicendum
L etsi] si L preter...
imprecedet]
portt negationemet hec dictio preter pecedit preter prcdt
L verumptamen...
. L patet] . L dicitur] dicam
extracaptam]
L utrumlibet]
L utrumque
igitur...
currere
t
verum]L . tcontingit...
ad utrumlibet
hominem
currere
ad utrumlibet
hominem
tcontingit
igiturcontingit
currere
nonestverumutrum
subiectum
cumsua negatione
non
contingere
prcdt
ad utrumlibet
hominem
currere
ad
quia tunesequeretur
contingit
igiturcontingit
utrumlibet
istumhominem
currere
valde
essevidetur
inutroque
codice
t L locus
corruptus
55 est] estistaL habetsicexponi]L exponitur
sic animal]L quodestadd.
L debetsicexponi]L exponitur
sic
36

12:58:59 PM

56 Ratio huius opinionis est quia in exceptiva affirmativanegatio

importata per exceptionem attingit partem extracaptam. Ut patet,
quia in exceptiva affirmativapredicatum negatur a parte extracapta.
Ideo virtute<exceptionis> negatio[nis] attingitpartem extracaptamet
stat pars extracapta universaliterrespectupredicati, etsi non respectu
exceptionis. In [L 128rb] exceptiva negativa negatio importata per
exceptionem non attingitpartem extracaptam, quia predicatum affirmaturde parte extracapta. Ideo virtutenegationisnon stat pars extracapta universaliternec virtutealicuius alterius posset stare sic.
57 Contra istam opinionem. Sicut in exclusione importatur
negatio, sic in exceptione. Si igiturpars extracapta staret confuse et
distributivein aliqua exceptiva ratione negationis incluse, inclusum
in exclusiva staretconfuseet distributiveratione negationisincluse in
exclusiva.
58 Dico quod in exceptiva affirmativapars extracapta stat universaliter, sed in exclusiva non stat universaliter.Cuius ratio est quia in
exceptiva affirmativanegatio referturad partem extracaptam sed in
exclusiva negatio non referturad inclusum. Ut patet: si dicitur: 4tan' refertumhomocurri, negatio importata per banc dictionem ' tantum
4
tur ad exclusa, quia exponitur sic: homocurritet nichilaliud ab homine
curri.
59 Contra. Etsi in exceptiva affirmativanegatio referturad excepta, verumptamen in exclusiva negativa negatio non referturad exclusa sed ad inclusum. Ut patet: hec ' tantum
homononcurriexponitur
56 quia] istaquodL utpatet]Bc. LB quia...extracaptam]
LBC. affirmativa...
L extracaptam]
exnegatur]Bc negativanegetur( /) predicatum
L . nec] L et alicuius]L nullius
tracaptaL respectu...
universaliter]
sic]L .
57 in exclusione]
L in exceptione]
in exceptione]
perexperexclusionem
L importatur
affirmatio
add. si] sicL staret]
statL aliquaexceptionem
exclusivaL fitadd. negationis
ceptiva]alia exceptiva
incluse]L inclusionis
& . eademratione
add.L inclusum.
LB . LB incluse]
negationis
..ratione]
L . inexclusiva]
. L
58 Dico] LB hec add. exceptiva]
L exceptione
sed...universaliter]
.
L cuius...quia]cuiusratioest quiaL exceptiva
L nota(/)exceptiva
affirmativa]
exclusiva]
LB negativa
add.L inclusum]
subiectum
L ut...dicitur]
utsi sic
dicamL exclusa]exclusivam
LB homo]L tantum
homo
59 exceptiva
L negativa
excepta]exceptiva
affirmativa]
exceptiva
(!)B exclusa
L verumptamen]
tarnen
L in exclusiva]
inclusa( f)L exclusa]L exclusivam
inclusum]
inclusaL patet]LB in hac add.L homononcurritet] L .
homine
L homine
secundum
inclusaL tertium

currit]
inclusum]
inclusum]
inclusaL et ideo] ideo L quartum
inclusivaL stabit] stat
inclusum]
L et...tantum]
. L non]L .
37

12:58:59 PM

sic: ' homononcurrit

etquodlibet
aliud ab hominecurri. Igiturin exclusiva
negativa staret subiectum universaliter, quia negatio pecedit inclusum in exclusiva et referturad inclusum. Et ideo inclusum stabit
universaliter. Et tunc ista: tantumhomo non curri exponitur sic:
'
quidlibetaliud ab hominecurritet nullushomocurri.
60 Item. Si in exceptiva affirmai
iva pars extracapta staretuniversaliter: supposito quod omne animal aliud ab homine moveatur et
aliquis homo moveatur et aliquis non, tunc hec esset falsa: 'omne
animalpreterhominem
movetur'
, quia ex isto videtur sequi quod nullus
homo moveretur.
61 Ad opinionem dicendum. Ad primam <rationem>, quod in
omni exclusiva negatio inclusa in exclusione referturad alia ab iniva quam in negativa. Unde in hac:
cluso, tam in exclusiva affirmai
' tantum
homocurrinegatio inclusa referturad exclusa. Unde debet sic

etnichilaliud ab homine
curri. Similiterin hac
exponi: {homononcurrit
' tantumhomononcurri
inclusa
refertur
ad
exclusa et) tune sic
negatio
4homononcurrit
et
nichil
aliud
ab
homine
non
curri, et hec valet
exponitur:
'
hanc: quodlibetaliud ab hominecurri. Unde nisi negatio in exclusione
referaturad exclusa, exclusiva non haberet aliquam affirmativam
exponentem.
62 Ad aliam rationem dico quod hec est falsa: ' omneanimalpreter
hominem
movetur'
, ilio casu posito.
{De suppositione
)
predicati
63 De suppositione predicati in exceptiva est sciendum quod
predicatum in exceptiva aliquando stat mobiliter et aliquando im60 si] L . moveatur]
L movetur
moveatur]
L movetur
aliquis]LB
homoadd.L tunc]L . isto]L opposito videatursequi] sequeretur
L homomoveretur]
L movetur

61 ad...dicendum]L . ad primam] . L exclusiva] exclusione

L inclusa]om. LB in exclusione]
exclusiveL quam in] quam L quod
negativa]LB negaturadd. inclusa] exclusive
L exclusa]L exclusivam
unde...exponi] . L homocurrit...
ad exclusaet] suppl.. LB tuncsic
L . L in exclusione]
exclusiveL exclusa]exclusivam
LB exexponitur]
clusiva]exclusaL . aliquam]L aliam
62 Ad...quod] Ad aliudargumentum
dicoquodistocasunonvaletargumentum
namL iliocasuposito] . L
63 sciendum]
dicendum
L aliquandostat] autsupponit
L aliquando]
aut
L tunc] . L stat] supponitestnon]LR non etita...quianon] .
L noncontingit]
contingit
Bf irrationale
esthomo]"hominem
estirrationaleL sequitur.
..est falsum]LBC . animalirrationale]
Bf hominem
L cum...estvera]L qui antecedens
estverumBf
38

12:58:59 PM

mobiliter, quia quedam est exceptiva affirmativa, et quedam

negativa. Si exceptiva sit affirmativa,tunc predicatum stat confuseet
distributiveimmobilier, quia nec contingitdescendere ascendere.
hominem
estnon-homo;
Non enim sequitur: omneanimalpreter
igituromne
animalpreterhominem
estasinus', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Et ita non contingitdescendere. Nec ascendere, quia
non sequitur: 4omneanimalpreterirrationale
esthomo
; igituromneanimal
est animal' cum antecedens sit verum (quia
preteranimal irrationale
utraque exponens antecedentisest vera) et consequens falsum(quia ex
consequente sequitur quod animal irrationalenon est animal).
64 Si autem fiat exceptio ab aliquo negato, adhuc supponit
predicatum [L 128va] aliquando mobiliteret aliquando immobiliter,
quia aut fietexceptio ab aliquo transcendenteaut ab aliquo speciali.
Si autem fiatexceptio a transcendente,tunc predicatum stat confuse
et distributive,quia sequitur: ' nichilpreterhominemest animai; igitur
nichilpreterhominem
est asinus', quia sequitur 4nichilpreterhominem
est
animai; igiturtantumhomoest animai'; et ultra: ' igiturtantumhomoest
est
asinus' (ut prius visum est); et ultra: ' igiturnichilpreterhominem
asinus'. Igitur a primo.
65 Ideo, si fiat exceptio a transcendente in exceptiva negativa,
contingitdescendere sub predicato. Si autem fiat exceptio ab aliquo
speciali, tune non contingitdescendere sub predicato. Quia non se'
estanimai;igiturnullushomopreter
Sortem
Sortem
quitur: nullushomopreter
estasinus', quia antecedens est verum, posito possibili, et consequens
falsum. Antecedens est possibile, quia potest esse verum, posito quod
nullus homo sit nisi Sortes. Impossibilitas consequentis patet, quia
'
Sortemestasinus; igiturSortesestasinus'.
sequitur: nullushomopreter
66 Contra ista arguitur. Si predicatum stetconfuseet distributive:
quando fit exceptio a transcendentein exceptiva negativa, tunc ex
64 supponit...
predicatum
autstatL etaliquando]
autL quia]L
aliquando]
. fiet] fitL si...tunc] si primomodoL quia] namL igitur
nichil..
.a
isteterminus
animalsupponit
confuse
etdistributive
si nichil
primo]
quiasequitur
hominem
nichilpreter
hominem
estasinusL
est,igitur
preter
65 Ideo]L . a ab aliquo]L si autem] sed si L contingit]
oportet
L quia non] non enimL verum...
possibili] possibileL falsum] imL antecedens
estpossibile]
. L quia] quia antecedens
L impossibile]
..patet] consequensest impossibile
L secundum
possibilitas.
asinus]L animal
tertium
asinus] anus(!)L
66 istaarguitur]
. L a] ab aliquoL in exceptiva
. L sit
negativa]
L hec] tuncL hac] hoc non L igitur] .
homo] videathominem
L que] quiaL subhac] ex eo L
39

12:58:59 PM

vero sequitur falsum. Nam supposito quod nichil sit homo nisi Sortes
et quod iste tantum videat se, hec est vera: ' nichilpreterSortembidet
. Sed ex hac sequitur: 'igiturnichilpreter
hominem'
SortemvidtPlatonem
est
sub
hac
Sortes
vidt Platonem.
falsa,
que
sequitur quod
quia
67 Item. Supposito quod quilibet homo sit niger, hec est vera:
' nichil
. Sed ex hac non sequitur quod
preterhominem
nigrumest homo"
nichil preterhominem nigrumest [ 88ra] homo albus. Consequens
est impossibile, quia ex consequente sequitur quod homo niger sit
homo albus.
68 Ad istud dicendum quod si fiatexceptio a transcendentein exceptiva negativa, contingitdescendere sub predicato ad quodlibet per
se suppositum predicati et non ad suppositum per accidens. Nunc in
' li videns
' est
ista: ' nichilpreter
Sortem
videthominem
hominem
predicatum
'
'
et vidensistumhominemper accidens continetursub isto. Et ideo ista
4
; igiturnichil
consequentia non valet: nichilpreterSortemvidethominem
videt
illum
.
Sortem
hominem
vel
ilium'
preter
69 Ad aliud dico quod homoalbus per accidens continetur sub
homine.Et ideo consequentia facta non valet.
INTEREXCEPTIVAM
ET EXCLUSIVAM
<DE HABITUDINE
An omnisexclusivainfrt
et econverso
)
exceptivam,
70 Nunc circa exceptivas queratur de habitudine interexceptivam
et exclusivam, an omnis exclusiva inferatexceptivam, et econverso.
Et quod non, videtur, quia non sequitur: 4tantumhomocurrit
; igitur
nichilpreterhominem
curri, quia aliquid sequitur ad consequens quod
non sequitur ad antecedens. Nam sequitur: ' nichilpreter
hominem
currit;
tantumhomocurrit
nichil
Sortem
curri
.
non
Sed
;
igitur
preter
sequitur:
igiturnichilpreterSortemcurri.
67 hec] hec tuncL hac non]L parte(!)B nichilpreter.
..nigrum
est] .
L consequens...
sequitur
quod] . L homo...albus] sithomonigerL
68 dicendum
quod]L . fiat]L fit a] ab aliquoL inexceptiva
negativa]
. quodlibet] . L suppositum]
L subiectum
predicati]
.
L suppositum
videt]L valet
per accidens]L per accidensad suppositum
hominem
li...sortem
li videnshominem]
L asinum
videt]LBf. hominem
vidensasinum hominem]
L . estadd.L continetur]
contentum
L isto]L
videntea subiecto
ideo] . L valet] tenetL hominem]
LB vel asinum
velillum] etistumL asinumadd.
69 ideo] istaL facti]
. L valet] tenetetc.L
dictionesexceptivas
70 exceptivas]
L queratur]L queritur
an] L nam
inferat]
L infer
eteconverso]
L consequentis
sequitur
L nichilsenichil]
L .
quitur sednon...sortem
currit]
40

12:58:59 PM

71 Item. est una exceptiva: 'nullushomopreter

Sortem
curri. Sed
ex hac sequiturnon aliqua exclusiva. Quia non alia quam hec: ' tantum
Sortescurri. Sed non sequitur: ' nullushomopreterSortemcurrit;igitur
<tantum
> Sortescurri.
72 Item. est una exclusiva: tantumSortesnoncurri. Et tarnen
ista non infer aliquam exceptivam, quia aut inferrethanc: 'nichil
'
preterSortemcurri aut hanc: nichilpreterSortemnon curri. Non
primam, quia aliquid sequitur ad hanc quod non sequitur ad ex'
clusivam; nam sequitur: nichilpreterSortemcurrit
; igiturSortescurri.
'
Sed non sequitur: tantum
Sortesnoncurrit;igiturSortescurri. Nec infert
'
secundam, quia valet hanc [L 128vb]: quidlibetpreterSortemcurri.

Sed non sequitur: tantumSortesnon currit;igiturquidlibetpreterSortem

curri, quia tunc sequitur pari ratione: ' tantumhomononestnon-homo;
' ubi antecedens est verum et
hominem
estnon-homo
;
igiturquidlibet
preter
consequens falsum. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia sequitur:
'
est
quidlibetpreterhominemest non-homo;igiturquidlibetpreterhominem
asinus' .
73 Ad oppositum est una regula in exceptivis.- Ad hanc regulam
dicendum quod aliquando tenetet aliquando non, quia aut fitexceptio a transcendenteaut a speciali. Si primo modo, tunc exclusiva affirmaiiva infertexceptivam negativam, et exclusiva negativa exceptivam affirmativam.Ista enim convertuntur:' tantumSortescurriet
1nichil
Sortemcurri; et ista convertuntur:4tantumSortesnoncurri
preter
'
et quidlibetpreterSortemcurri. Et ratio est quia exponentes sunt
eedem.
74 Verumptamen si fiat exceptio ab aliquo speciali, sive sit affirmativa exceptiva sive negativa, non oportet quod convertanturcum
71 Item...igitur
Sortescurrit]
. L aliqua]alia
tarnen
72 et tarnen]
L ista]L . aliquam]L aliam inferret]
infert
L currit.
..preter
LR . primam]
hancnichilpretersortem
currit
sortem]
L nam]L quia tantum
tantum
homoL igitur
Sortescurrit]
LBC.
sortes]
secundam]
istamnichilpreter
sortem
noncurrit]
L valet] hecvaletL
sednon...sortem
L . pariratione]
pereademrationem
L quidlibet]
currit]
quilibethomo]L quilibetLc non homo...est] . L asinus] albusper
L
predicta
dicitur
73 dicendum]
L autfit]L fit ] ab aliquoL auta] autab aliquo
L primomodo] a transcendente
L exclusiva]
L excepta(!)B exceptivam]
L
negativa]
exclusivam
affirmativa
L affirmativam]
infert
negativam
L et
ista...sortem
. L eedem] eademL
currit]
74 sit]L 'm convertantur]
L convertuntur
cum aliqua exclusiva]L .
omnis...non
. L tantum
sortes
currit
omnishomopreter
sortem
currit]
igitur
curritL homo]B semper] tuncsimpliciter
L fiatexceptio]
. L tunc
41

12:58:59 PM

'
aliqua exclusiva. Unde non sequitur: nullushomopreterSortemcurrit;

igiturtantumSortescurri; sequitur: omnishomopreterSortemcurrit;

igitur tantumSortes non curri. Unde si fiat exceptio ab aliquo
transcendente,[ 88rb] semper exclusiva et exceptiva convertuntur;
sed si fiatexceptio ab aliquo speciali, tunc non oportet,nisi velimus
1
circumloqui exclusivam sie: tantumhocquod estSortescurri. Sed non
credo quod hoc posset convenientiussignificare.
75 Ad primum argumentum dico quod bene sequitur: 4tantum
curri. Sed non sequitur: 'nichil
Sortescurrit;igiturnichilpreterhominem
hominem
istumhominem
curri, eoquod pars
currit;igiturnichilpreter
preter
extracapta in exceptiva stat confuse tantum.
76 Ad aliud conceditur quod huic: ' nullushomopreterSortemcurri
non correspondet aliqua exceptiva, eoquod fit exceptio ab aliquo
speciali.
77 Ad aliud dico quod hec: ' tantumSortesnoncurricorrespondet
huic: 'nichilpreterSortemnon curri, que valet hanc: 4quidlibetpreter
Sortem
curri. Et dico quod bene sequitur: ' tantum
homononestnon-homo;
. Et nego hanc consequenest non-homo1
igiturquidlibetpreterhominem
hominem
tiam: 'quidlibetpreter
hominem
estnon-homo;
igiturquidlibet
preter
est asinusy,quia in exceptiva affirmativapredicatum stat confuse et
distributive immobiliter, ita quod non contingit descendere
ascendere.
ex negativaexponente
exclusive
>
{An exceptiva
inferatur
78 Circa exceptivas queratur adhuc an exceptiva inferaturex
negativa exponente (exclusive); et deinde queretur an inferaturex
affirmativaexponente (exclusive).
tantum
non]L non circumloqui]
loquiL exclusivam
sic] aliquamexclusionemundehecnullushomopreter
sortem
currit
valethuicL homoqui est] hoc
LB itaquodin exclusiva
et
denotatur
quodestU . L currit]
quodsortescurrit
add.L convenientius
denotari
quodnullusaliushomocurrit
perhanc
significare]
tantum
homoqui estsortes
currit
L
. L currit]
LB tantum
75 sequitur]
homocurrit
add.L igitur...
igitur
currit]
. inexceptiva]
. L
76 aliud] secundum
L huic...speciali]
. L huic]hue hec aliqua]alia

77 ad aliuddicoquod] . L sortes] homoL noncurrit]

LBCnoncurrit
tantum...
hominem
estnonhomo] nichilpreter
hominem
estnonhomoigitur
tantum
homononestnonhomoL nego...consequentiam]
dicoquodbene(!) sequiturL itaquod] cumL
L queritur
queratur
78 queratur]
queretur]
L
42

12:58:59 PM

79 Quod inferaturex negativa exponente probatur. Nam sequitur:

4nichilaliud ab hominecurrit
curri. Quod sic
; igiturnichilpreterhominem
4nichilaliudab homine
Nam
currit
est
; igiturnullumcurrens
patet.
sequitur:
est non-homo'
aliud ab homine9
. Et ultra: 4igiturnullumcurrens
; et ultra:
4
nonesthomo; <et ultra): 4igituromnecurrens
esthomo9;
igiturnullumcurrens
1
4
et ultra: igiturtantumhomocurrit
; et ultra: igiturnichilpreterhominem
a
curri. Igitur primo.
80 Ad oppositum. Si sic, ex possibili sequitur impossibile aut ex
necessario contingens. Nam tunc sequitur: 4nichilaliud ab homineest
homoalbus; igiturnichilpreterhominem
est homoalbus*. Antecedens est
necessarium, quia suum oppositum est impossibile. Sed hec est con4
hominem
tingens: nichilpreter
[L 129ra] esthomoalbus', quia ex hac sehomo
est
homo albus, et hec est contingens.
quitur quod aliquis
81 Item. Tunc sequereturex opposito: lnonnichilpreterhominem
est
9
animai; igituraliquidaliud ab homineestanimai . Et tune a propositione
habente plures causas veritatisad unam istam teneretconsequentia.
82 Dicendum quod non sequitur (exceptiva) ex negativa exponente, sed requirunturdue exponentes.- Ad primum dico quod
non sequitur: 4nullumcurrens
est non-homo;
igiturnullumcurrensnon est
homo9
y quia antecedens est propositio negativa et consequens affirmativa; tamen ex negativa non sequitur affirmativa;nec sequitur hec.
ex affirmativa
exclusive
(An exceptiva
)
inferatur
exponente
83 Circa secundum an ex affirmativaexponente sequitur excep4
tiva, probo. Nam sequitur: quidlibetaliud ab homineest animai; igitur
estanimal9. Probatio huius consequentie. Nam
quidlibetpreterhominem
4
sequitur: quidlibetaliud ab homineest animai; igituraliquis homononest
animal9. Sed quicquid sequitur ex antecedente et consequente, se79 igitur.
..hominem
. L sic patet] ostenditur
sic L homine]LB
currit]
nonadd. <etultra)suppl. currit
etultra]L currit

80 ex possibili]
. L autex]LR aut tunc] . L quia]L et
81 sequeretur]
sequetur
L aliquid] . L a] L ex teneret

consequentia]
estfallacia
L
consequentis
82 primumdico] argumentum
dicendumL propositionegativa] .
L tamen...
hec] . L
83 circa...an] L Contrasecundam
.
probationem
quia sequitur
exceptiva]
L probo]L . probatio.
..consequentie]
quodostendosicL namsequitur]
L . quodlibet]
L quod sedquicquid...
aliquishomononestanimal]L .
quia] L nam sequitur] infertur
L nam sequitur] nam L est non
a primo...
nonestanimal] . L igitur
animal]L nonestanimal igitur
ex]L
secutex opposito
L opposito
quidlibet.
..nonestanimal]L .
sequitur]
43

12:58:59 PM

1
quitur ex antecedente per se. Cum igitursequitur: quidlibetaliud ab
est
homine( estanimai>/ethomononestanimai;igiturquidlibet
hominem
preter
. Et similiter: ' quidlibetaliud ab homineestanimai; igiturquidlibet
hominem
estanimai'; ' igituraliquishomononestanimai', quia ex oppreter
posite)consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis. Nam [ 88va]

. Et
estnon-homo'
sequitur: omnishomoestanimai; igituromnenon-animal
*
est non-animal et ultra: 4igiturnon-homo
nonest
ultra: igiturnon-homo
'
animai;igituraliud ab hominenonestanimai'. Igitur a primo: omnishomo
est animai; igituraliud ab hominenonest animai'. Igitur ex opposito se
estanimai; igituraliquishomo
quitur oppositum: quidlibetaliud ab homine
nonestanimai'.
84 Ad oppositum. Exceptiva exponitur per duas exponentes.
Igitur una non sufficit. Dicendum quod exceptiva aliqua potest inferriex exponente affirmativa,si fiatexceptio a transcendente.Igitur
'
estanimai; igiturquidlibet
hominem
aliud ab homine
sequitur: quidlibet
preter
estanimai'. Verumptamen si fiat exceptio a speciali, tunc numquam
exceptiva inferturex affirmativaexponente.
<Utrum exceptiva possit esse falsa, utraque exponente existente
vera)
85 Alia dubitatio est utrum exceptiva possit esse falsa utraque exponente existente vera. Quod sic, videtur. Nam supposito quod
Sortes videat aliquem asinum et Burnellumet quod nullus alius homo
nec videat Burnellum nec alium asinum, tunc hec est vera: ' aliquis
homononvideialiquemasinumaliuma Burnello et hec similiter:aliquis
homonon videtBurnellum'
, etsi aliquis homo videat Burnellum.
tarnenest falsa: ' aliquishomononvidetasinumpreter
Burnellum'
, quia hec
est una particulariscuius quelibet singularisest falsa.
86 Item. Exceptiva potest esse falsa et utraque exponens vera.
Retento <enim> eodem casu, hec est falsa: ' nullushomovidetasinum
preterBurnellum'et tamen utraque exponens est vera. Ista enim est
84 una] unaexponens
L aliqua]L affirmativa
a] ab aliquoL verumpL unaqueque
tamen] sedL alterum
a] ab aliquoL numquam]
85 possit]L potent falsa]LBC. aliquemasinum..
.aliquemasinum]LR
. aliquem.
necaliquemaliumasinumetL homo]L .
..quod] burnellum
prius
L .
] . L tunc]L . aliquem] . L ethec...burnellum]
etsi...burnellum]
. L hecestuna...estfalsa]L estpartialiter
falsa
86 exponens] istarumL ista...vera] . L enim] tamen quia
aliter.
..burnellum]
. L quod...sequitur]
L . <vera>]suppl.nullushomo
videtasinumpreter
burnellum
add.L sed...falsa]L . videat]L videt
44

12:58:59 PM

vera: nullus homo videtasinum alium a Burnelloet aliquis homo videt

'
Burnellum',quia aliter hec esset falsa: nullushomovidetasinumpreter
. Quod hec est (falsa) probo: quia sequitur: 4giturPlato non
Burnellum1
videtasinumpreterBurnellum1
' sed hec est falsa, quia ex hac sequitur
Plato
Burnellum.
non
videat
quod
87 Verumptamen posito casu priorialiquis homo dicerethanc esse
. Et ideo ponitur iste
falsam: 1nullushomovidetasinumalium a Burnello1
casus quod Sortes solum videat Burnellum et quod nullus alius videat
asinum. Tunc exponentes sunt vere et exceptive expositum falsum.
88 Ad oppositum. Exponentes antecedunt [L 129rb] ad expositum. Sed antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente.
Ideo exponentes non possunt esse vere, exceptiva existentefalsa.
89 Ad hanc dubitationemdicendum quod exponentesnon possunt
esse vere, exceptiva existente falsa, et hoc propter rationem in oppositum.- Ad argumentumdicendum quod, isto casu posito, hec est
falsa: aliquishomononvidetasinumpreter
Burnellum
' Et dicendum quod
altera exponens est falsa. Unde non debet sic exponi: ' aliquishomonon
videtasinumaliuma Burnelloet aliquis homovidetBurnellum1
, sed oportet
in
subiectum
Et si exeodem.
quod
utraque exponente
supponat pro
ponentes exponantur pro eodem, una erit falsa, ut satis patet. Unde
debet sic exponi: aliquishomo [ 88vb] videtasinumaliuma Burnello
et iste videtBurnellum
', ita quod denotatur quod unus et idem non
videat asinum alium a Burnello et quod videat Burnellum.
90 Ad aliud dico quod, isto casu posito, hec est vera: nullushomo
. Sed ex hac non sequitur quod Plato non
Burnellum1
videtasinumpreter
videt asinum preter Burnellum, quia exceptio in predicato impedit
descensum in subiecto.
91 Vel potest aliter dici, secundum quod dicit1) quod, isto casu
9
'
posito, hec est falsa: nullushomovidetasinumpreterBurnellumet una
87 homodiceret]
videtL exceptive...
L oppositum

verum
falsum]
88 expositum]
L exponentem
sed]L et sine] sedL
89 dicendum]
dicoL non] . L propter]
patetperL argumentum]

L et dicendum]
L dicendum
undenon] et L sed]
primm
argumentum
sed non L utraqueexponente]
eadem exceptivaL supponat]L supponit
exponantur
proeodem]L excipitur
(!)B utsatispatet] . L unde...exponi]
LBC. quod]LR . unus]L unum quod] . L
90 isto] ultimoL sequitur]L . asinumpreterburnellum]
L etc.
impedit]
L .
91 aliter]L . secundum
quoddicit] . L nullus]LCBaliquisL videt]
LCBnonvidetL exponens
estL Ideoetc.]L .
sit] exceptio
Sc. opponens;
videos
, num.87.
supra
45

12:58:59 PM

exponens eritfalsa. Unde sic exponitur: lnullushomovidetasinumalium

a Burnelloet omnishomovidetBurnellum'Ideo etc.
<An post exceptionem fiat distributio)
92 Potest dubitare an, excepto aliquo, post exceptionem fiat
distributiopro eodem. Quod sic, videtur, quia in ista: ' omnishomo
preterSortemcurri fitdistributiopro Sorte, quia si non, Sortes non
posset excipl. Igitur oportetquod pro Sorte fiatdistributio.
93 Item. Si solum pro aliis a Sorte fieretdistributio,tunc esset
idem dicere: omnishomopreterSortemcurriet iomnishomoalius a Sorte
preterSortemcurri, que non est intelligibilis.
94 Ad oppositum. Si sic, quelibet exceptiva includerei oppositum,
quia ad quodlibet contingit descendere pro quo fit distributio. Si
1
igitur in hac: omnishomopreterSortemcurri, fieretdistributiopro
1
Sorte, tunc sequeretur: omnishomopreterSortemcurrit;igiturSortes
curri. Et similitersequitur quod Sortes non currit. Igitur ista duo
1
'
sequerentur: Sortescurriet Sortesnoncurri. Et eadem est ratio de
qualibet alia exceptiva.
95 Ad hanc dubitationem dicendum quod post exceptionem pro
parte extracapta non fitdistributio,quia exceptio est partisa totoexSed illud quod non est in aliquo, ab eo non excipitur.Ideo si
tracaptio.
in distributionealicuius aliquid supponatur, illud non excipitur.
96 Verumptamen est sciendum quod, excepto aliquo a subiecto
sumpto pro toto in quantitate, illud totumin quantitate ad duo potest
Alia est dubitatio
92 Potestdubitare]
L post] per L fiet] potestfieri
L quod sic videtur]
videturenimquod sic L quia si non] quod nisifiat
distributio
L . L
proSorteL posset]LB ab eodemadd. igitur...
distributio]
93 fieret]
fiet fiatL tunc...
dicere]L nichilessetdicere homo]LB aliusa
sorteadd.L etomnis...
sortem
. L que] quodL intelligibilis]
incurrit]
L
telligibile
94 includerei
includit
L fieret]
fitL pro] a L tune]
opposita
oppositum]
sic L sequeretur]
sequeturB6 sequitur
L similiter]
sic L quod]L .
igitur.
..noncurrit]
. L alia] . L
. L partis] extracaptio
95 Ad hancdubitationem]
partisL extracaptio]
in quantitate
extractio
L sed illudquod] L quod non est] est L sup supponat
L
supponitur
ponatur]
96 est] . L aliquo...pro]aliquo sumptopro aliquo subiectoab aliquo
L exceptionem]
exceptivam
L exceptionem]
exceptiva
dicto
(f)L dicendo]
L homo]LBC. respectu
. L respectu
exceptionis]
predicati
non] .
L si...exceptionem]
L cuiusratio(!)B semperfit]sic fitL semperenim pro
. L profrt]
L hoc
proferatur
sorte] . L Sortes] . L semper]
hoc proferatur
L pro eo] . L distributio]
LB pro Sorteadd.
profrt]
respectu...
L
predicati
non] etnonrespectu
46

12:58:59 PM

comparari: vel ad exceptionemvel ad predicatum. Si comparetur ad

exceptionem, semper fit distributio pro ^parte extracapta. Ut sic
dicendo: ' omnis homopreterSortemcurri, respectu exceptionis fit
distributiopro Sorte, respectupredicatinon. Si respectupredicati, sic
fit distributiopro Sorte quousque Sortes excipitur. Ideo si aliquis
4
profrtistam: omnishomopreterSortemcurri, semper fitdistributio
1
. Sed postquam hoc propro Sorte quousque profrtli preterSortem'
frt, tunc excipitur Sortes et, excepto Sorte, pro eo non fit
distributio.[ 89ra] Ideo respectuexceptionisfitdistributiopro parte
extracapta, respectu predicati non.
97 Ad probationemdico quod verum est, quia in exceptiva ubi illud quod distribuiturin preiacente, (excipitur), non fit exceptio a
subiecto exceptionis sed a predicato preiacentis. Unde ex hoc ipso
quod illud excipitur, pro eo non fit distributioin exceptiva sed in
preiacente.
98 Ad [L 129va] primam rationem dicendum quod non fit
distributiorespectu predicati pro parte extracapta.
99 Ad aliud dico quod etsi solum fiatdistributiopro aliis a Sorte,
curriet
tamen non est idem dicere: ' omnishomoalius a Sortepreter
Sortem
' omnishomo
Sortemcurri, quia requiriturquod in preiacente expreter
fiat
distributio
pro parte extracapta. Nunc in preiacentehuius:
ceptive
' omnishomoalius a Sorte
Sortem
currinon fitdistributiopro Sorte.
preter
(Quid determinet prepositio cum suo casuali)
100 Dubitatio est cuius determinatio sit prepositio cum suo
casuali: an subiecti an predicati. Quod non predicati,videtur,quia si
sic, pro totfieretdistributioin exceptiva pro quot in preiacente, quia
determinatiopredicatinon immutai distributionemin subiecto. Igitur
Sortem
curripro tot fieretdistributiopro
sic dicendo: ' omnishomopreter
4omnishomocurri.
in
hac:
quot
L . <excipitur>]
LB ubiillud...preiacente]
97 quia]quodL . exceptiva]
illud]idem
. L unde]L verumtamen
. LB nonfit...
preiacentis]
suppl.
. L non]LR .
in
ante 97 inL deest
98 Ad...extracapta]
positum
. L et...currit]
Bc. LB quia requiritur
99 aliisa] L . tamen]
quod]
BcquiaL . in preiacente
LB6. utadd.L fiat.
..currit]
LR .
exceptive]
non] nuncL
100 non] LB sit determinatio
add. L fieret] fietL immutai] mutt
dictoL fieret]
L dicendo]
fitL currit]
LB velociter
add.L
47

12:58:59 PM

101 Item. Si esset determinatiopredicati vel compositionis,tunc

Sortem
curri, quia
; igiturnullushomopreter
sequeretur: nullushomocurrit
a predicato negato absolute, vel a verbo negato absolute, ad verbum
negatum cum qualibet determinationetenet consequentia. Nam se'
curri. Igiturcum in
; igiturnullushomouelociter
quitur: nullushomocurrit

hac: nullushomocurrinegetur predicatum a subiecto absolute et in

1
Sortem
currinegeturpredicatuma subiecto cum
. hac: nullushomopreter
tali determinatione,erit consequentia bona.
102 Ad oppositum. Videtur quod sit determinatio verbi, quia
prepositio cum suo casuali equivalet adverbiali determinationi.Sed
adverbialis determinatioest determinatioverbi. Igiturprepositiocum
suo casuali est determinatioverbi. Exemplum: idem est dicere ' Sortes
esthic9 et ' Sortesestin hocloco' Sed sic dicendo: Sortesestin hocloco9 accipitur prepositio cum suo casuali. <Igitur> equipollet adverbiali
determinationi.
103 Ad dubitationem dicendum quod (prepositio cum suo
casuali) equipollet adverbiali determinationi,verumptamen non est
illi semper determinatumnomen impositum. Unde hoc quod dico
'
9
preterSortem equipollet adverbio, illi tamen non est nomen impositum.
104 Sed pro rationibus est intelligendumquod aliquid est determinatio predicati dupliciter: vel ita quod principaliter determinai
predicatum vel actum, vel quod determinetsubiectum, non absolute
sed in comparatione ad actum. Primo modo ilia que mere sunt
adverbia, determinantverbum; cuiusmodi sunt 'bene9
, 'male1, 'tarde9
,
. Secundo modo prepositionescum suis casualibus determi'velociter9
nant compositionem. Que equipollent adverbiis quibus non sunt
nomina imposita; cuiusmodi est hoc quod dico preter
.
Sortem9
101 sequeretur]
sequitursequiturL . a] L . prius absolute] .
L subiecto
cum] sortecumL bona] . L
102 quia prepositio...
casualiest determinatio
verbi]L . prepositio]
proverbum
add.L dicendo]
dictoL accipitur]

posinoL verbi]L etdeterminat

. L adverbiali
huicadverbio
hicL
determinationi]
103 dubitationem]
primamrationem
L equipollet]
equivaletL verumpillisimpliciter
L semper
determinatum]
.
tamen] tamenL illisemper]
L unde...impositum]
Bom.L illi]illius
104 rationibus]
responsionibus
L intelligendum]
L incedendum
(!)B est]
esseL predicatum
velactum]L velaccidentaliter
quoddeterminet]
.
potest
L mere]L vere adverbia]L adverbialia cuiusmodi...
.
velociter]
L compositionem]
propositionem
L que equipollent]
bisin L que equipollet
LB currit
add.LB
(!)B quibus]L cuius hocquoddico]L . sortem]
48

12:58:59 PM

105 Et breviter: quedam determinant actum principaliter et

quedam determinant subiectum in comparatione ad actum. Unde
vera adverbia determinantactum principaliter,sed reliqua que non
sunt adverbia sed equipollent adverbiis, determinant subiectum in
comparatione ad actum. Cuiusmodi sunt quedam prepositionescum
suis casualibus, ut 'preter[B 89rb] Sorterr[L 129vb], et sic de aliis.
106 Potest nunc queri quid prepositio cum suo casuali determinei
vel dictio exceptiva cum parte extracapta. Et dicendum quod determinant subiectum in comparatione ad actum.
107 Ad primm argumentum dico quod si esset determinatio
4
predicati absolute, tunc pro tot feretdistributioin hac: omnishomo
'
Sortem
curripro quot in hac: omnishomocurri. Tarnen non est
preter
determinatiopredicatiabsolute sed in comparatione ad subiectum. Et
illud quod determinat subiectum in comparatione ad actum, idest
predicatum, bene potest immutare subiectum.
108 Ad aliud dico quod non sequitur: nullushomocurrit
; igiturnullus
homopreter
Sortemcurri.
109 Ad probationemdico quod a verbo negato absolute ad verbum
negatum cum determinatione (que determinatio determinat prin'
'
cipaliter verbum) tenet consequentia. Nunc li preterSortem non
determinat subiectum absolute sed determinat subiectum in comparatione ad actum. Ideo non oportetconsequentiam valere.
105 et breviter]
L breviter
proistononestplusnisiquodadd.L quedam]L
hic
quod vera](Panpromere) omniaL reliqua] aliquaL preter
sortem]
sortem
L
currit
preter
106 potest...
quid] patetnunc qualiter patettunccum diciturquedamest
L determinet]
determinat
. L vel]utLB etdicendum]
LB
dicendum
fietL tamen]
107 fieret]
L nunc determinatio]
LB inhacadd.L subiectum
etillud...adest]L . predicatum]
L preciacentem
bene]L non
108 non]L bene nuncli] sed li L nunc subiectum
actumababsolute]
soluteL determinat]
. L Expliciunt...Burl']
L .
FilosofiseliInstituut
P.O. Box 9515
2300 RA Leiden
The Netherlands
. In summing
ofBurley'slogicalworks(Vivarium,
XXIII
Postscript
up theeditions
failedtomention
FatherRomualdGreen'sedition
(1985),23-4)I mostunfortunately
ofDeobligationibus:
TheLogical
Treatise
'Deobligationibus':
AnIntroduction
withCritical
Textsof Williamof Sherwood
and WalterBurley.The Franciscan
St.
Institute,
N.Y. (forthcoming).
Bonaventure,
49

12:58:59 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 1 (1986)
The Oxford Calculatores, Quantificationof Qualities,
and Aristotle'sProhibitionof Metabasis
STEVEN J. LIVESEY

When Walter de Merton founded Merton College in 1264, he

sought to provide a residence hall forArts studentsintendingto proceed to the Faculty of Theology at Oxford. Nevertheless,withthe exception of Thomas Bradwardine, Merton scholarsfromthe firsthalfof
the fourteenthcenturyhave achieved widespread fame not for their
achievements in sacred theology,but ratherfortheircontributionsin
the fieldsof natural philosophyand mathematics. The precise nature
of the Mertonian achievement is a topic which has been discussed at
great length during the past seventy-fiveyears,1 and a subject into
which this paper will not venture. Instead, its focuswill be Mertonian
methodology and in particular the relationshipbetween the Mertonians' work and a problem firstdiscussed by Aristotlein his Posterior
Analytics.
* Anearlier
Conofthispaperwaspresented
attheNineteenth
International
version
gresson MedievalStudies,May 10-13,1984at Kalamazoo,MI.
1 Regarding
theinstitutional
ofMerton
Rashdall,
development
College,seeHastings
TheUniversities
intheMiddle
, ed. F. M. PowickeandA. B. Emden,3
ofEurope
Ages
the
vols.,Oxford1936,vol. 3, 191-201.One can scarcelybeginto summarize
thefivevolumesofAnneliese
literature
on theMertonian
work.See in particular
Maier's Studien
zur Naturphilosophie
derSptscholastik
, Rome 1949-1958;Marshall
in theMiddleAges,Madison,Wise. 1959;Curtis
ofMechanics
Clagett,TheScience
Medieval
Wilson,William
, Madison,
Physics
Heytesbury.
LogicandtheRiseofMathematical
tothe1Merton
in:British
Wise.1956;A. G. Molland,TheGeometrical
School',
Background
fortheHistory
ofScience,4 (1968),108-125;
andtwoexcellent
dissertations,
Journal
withSpecial
School
JamesA. Weisheipl,
EarlyFourteenth-Century
Physics
oftheMerton
toDumbleton
andHeytesbury
, Oxford1956,and EdithD. Sylla,TheOxford
Reference
: Physics
Calculators
andtheMathematics
andMeasurement
1320-1350
,
ofMotion,
byLatitudes
:
Medieval
Harvard1970.See alsoSylla's subsequent
articles,
Qualities
of
Quantification
the*Merton
School'
, in: ArchiveforHistoryof ExactSciences,8 (1971),9-39and
doc: theOxford
d'histoire
Calculators
Medieval
, in:Archives
ofLatitudes
ofForms
Concepts
scholars
recent
trinale
etlittraire
du moyen
ge,40 (1973),223-283.Syllaandother
becausefourteenth-century
"Mertonian"
isincorrect
havearguedthattheappellation
was in factnotrestricted
to MertonCollege
workgenerally
as Mertonian
discussed
I haveusedthetraditional
thanstricte.
namelarge
rather
In whatfollows,
masters.
50

12:59:05 PM

While the Posterior

as a whole contains Aristotle'sthoughts
Analytics
on demonstrativescience, in Book I, chapter 7 he discusses a particular aspect of the method known as metabasis,that is, the transition
fromone scientificdiscipline to another in the process of demonstration. For a varietyof reasons, both ontological and methodologicalin
nature,2 Aristotleargues that science can be organized into distinct
categoriesor disciplines and that it is impermissibleto prove propositions by passing fromone such genus to another ( ovx . . . earive!jaXXou
yevou(xexaavTaSetat).As is oftenthe case in the Posterior
Analytics,
Aristotleproduces a mathematicalexample to reinforcehis point: it is
not possible, he says,
toprovea geometrical
... Wheredifferent
proposition
byarithmetic.
genera,
e.g.
arithmetic
andgeometry,
areinvolved,
thebasisoftheproof
although
maybethe
toapplythearithmetical
totheattributes
demonstration
of
same,itisnotpossible
extended
unlessmagnitudes
arenumbers.3
magnitudes,
Nevertheless,Aristotlewas compelled almost from the beginning to
modify his prohibition somewhat, for in chapter 7 and again in
chapters 9 and 13 he admits that the so-called subalternatingand
subalternate sciences- astronomy,music, optics, and the like- constituteda small group of exceptions to his general rule.4
When the Posterior
Analyticsentered the Latin West in the middle
of the twelfthcentury,5Aristotle's prohibitionof metabasisgenerated
2 Aristotle's
ofmetabasis
hiscriticism
ofthePythagoreans
arisesinpartfrom
rejection
In Metaphysics
andPlatonists.
VII. 11 1036b8-21,
herejects
forexample,
thereduction
ofall things
tonumbers,
notsimply
becausehe feelsnumbers
arenotthe
(avayaj^rj)
butbecausemorefundamentally
he opposesthereduction
ofall
propercandidates,
toonegenus.Moreexplicitly,
IV.2 1004a4and1.9992b19-933a7
inMetaphysics
things
he rejects
master-science
towhichall theothersciences
are
anynotionofa Platonic
becausethereis no genuswhichencompasses
reducible
all things.
Methodologically,
Aristotle
ofsucha master-science
wouldimplythatthefirst
saysthattheexistence
ofthesciences
beneath
itwouldall be provenbythemaster
science,and
principles
henceallsyllogisms
wouldbyreduction
havethesamefirst
Aristotle
principles.
rejects
inPosterior
thisemphatically
theability
1.3288a19.Finally,
totranscend
scienAnalytics
tific
wasa property
Aristotle
inPlatonic
andagainst
which
dialectic,
genera
recognized
he developed
hisowntheory
ofdemonstration.
Fora discussion
ofthisimportant
issue,see below,d. 62.
3 Posterior
1.7 75a38-b6.
Analytics
4 Posterior
1.7 75b15;1.1378b35-79a17.
ThatAristotle
sawthesubalternate
Analytics
sciences
as a relatively
constricted
issuggested
inPost.An.1.9
exception
byhisremarks
ei8jxrj,
W cbxpfxovijc
Si'ptGfjLrjTixfj.
76a10and76a23-25,
Aristotle's
Regarding
ofthesubalternate
see RichardD. McKirahan,
Suborsciences,
theory
Jr.,Aristotle's
dinate
in: British
fortheHistory
ofScience,11(1978),197-220.
Sciences,
Journal
5 Regarding
theLatintransmission
ofthePosterior
, seeCharlesH. Haskins,
Analytics
Mediaeval
Versions
Posterior
inthe
Science
, in:Studies
, 2nd
ofthe
ofMediaeval
Analytics
History
51

12:59:05 PM

significant interest among scholars studying the method of

demonstrativescience. The opening lines of chapter 7 became a frequent lemmaforliteral commentaries,and because theylikewise contained the most explicit account of Aristotle's prohibition,virtually
every commentaryon the Analyticsdiscussed the nature of Aristotle's
remarks. Similarly, when questionaries became the popular genre of
commentarylater in the thirteenthcentury,such queries as "Utrum
contingatex alio genere descendentem in aliud genus demonstrare?"
or "Utrum possibile est demonstratione descendere de genere in
genus?" became standard featuresof the commentarytradition.6
The new directionsin natural philosophy taken early in the fourteenth centuryrested on, among other things, the quantificationof
qualities, a procedure whose justificationmodern scholarshave found
problematic for a variety of reasons, including the disjunction of
quantity and quality in the categories7 and the tension between
mathematical exactness and the obvious inexactness of the physical
world.8But to those scholarsworkingwithinthe universitytraditionof
the Posterior
, Aristotle's prohibitionof metabasiswould conAnalytics
stitutestill another, disciplinaryobstacle to any attemptto quantify
qualities or inject mathematicsinto the domains of natural philosophy
or other sciences. It becomes, therefore,a significantquestion to ask
how Mertonians and theirlike-mindedOxonians undertakingsuch a
procedure could also reconcile theirwork withAristotle'sprohibition
of metabasis.
Attemptsto understand Mertonian positions on the prohibitionof
are made difficultby the factthat taken as a group, the Mermetabasis
tonians produced virtuallyno commentarieson the Posterior
Analytics.
Mass. 1927,223-241and morerecently,
Aristoteles
Latinus
IV.1-4:
edn.,Cambridge,
Posteriora
, ed. L. MinioPaluelloandB. Dod, Bruges-Paris
Analytica
1968,ix-lxxxiii.
Severalarticles
inMinio-Paluello's
Opuscula
(Amsterdam
1972)alsobearonthetopic,
L *ignota
versione
moerbekana
deiSecondi
Analitici
daS. Tomaso
usata
including
(pp. 155-163)
andIacobus
Veneticus
Grecus
: Canonist
andTranslator
Aristotle
of
(pp. 189-228).
0 Medievalscholarsconcerns
aboutmetabasis
in
maynothaveoriginated
exclusively
RobertKilwardby,
forexample,
logicalinvestigations.
spendssomefivefoliosofhis
on thePosterior
metabasis
and therelated
issueofthe
commentary
Analytics
discussing
subalternate
sciences
Peterhouse
butsomewhat
la205,fol.142v-147r),
(Cambridge,
scientiarum
ch.16,section
inmetabasis
isclearly
tiedto
ter,intheDe ortu
96,hisinterest
theproblem
oftheclassification
ofthesciences
andtherelationship
between
onescience andanother.
See De ortu
scientiarum
G. Judy,London1975,42.
, ed. Albert
7 See, forexample,
EdithSylla,Medieval
Quantification
ofQualities
(note1 above),p. 9.
A. G. Molland,AnExamination
s Geometry
forHistory
of
, in: Archive
ofBradwardine
ExactScience,19(1978),113-175
at 131-138.
52

12:59:05 PM

Early membersof the college, like Thomas Wilton and John Maudith
did not writeone, nor did Thomas Bradwardine.9 According to John
Bale, Robert Karew (or Cary), who was a fellowat Merton between
1326 and 1332, produced a questionary on the Analyticsin 1325, a
work that once was in the Oxford UniversityLibrary but seems no
Analytics
longer extant.10Various other commentarieson the Posterior
once attributedto early Mertonians must also be treated as questionable. Bale again remains the only referenceto a commentaryby
Thomas Sutton (d. 1311/15, and perhaps a Fellow between 1263 and
11
preservedin Gonville and
superlibrosposteriorum
1274). A Quaestiones
Caius MS 512 is attributedto Petrus de Insula, but whetherthiswork
was produced by the Petrus who was a fellowat Merton between 1284
and 1307 or three other candidates remains uncertain.12 More
importantly and certainly, the generation of the 1330s and
40s- Heytesbury, Dumbleton, Swineshead, and their lesser-known
colleagues William Sutton, Richard Billingham, Simon Bredon, and
Thomas Buckingham- leftno record of having writtencommentaries
on the work.13
If we cast our net somewhat wider and compare Oxford's production withthat of the Universityof Paris in the second half of the thirteenth centuryand all of the fourteenthcentury,we find a similar
situation. John Murdoch has noted recently that for the period
1200-1330, commentaries on the Physicsproduced at Oxford outnumbered those produced at Paris by a margin of betterthan two to
one and suggested that this may be partially related to the peculiar
9 JamesA. Weisheipl,
in: MediaevalStudies,31 (1969),174Mertonense,
Repertorium
224at 177-182,
222-224.
217-218,
10JohnBale,Index
Britanniae
Oxford
, ed. R. L. PooleandMaryBateson,
Scriptorum
A Biographical
1902,382.Concerning
Karew,seeA. B. Emden,
Register
oftheUniversity
toA.D. 1500, 3 vols.,Oxford,
vol.1, 366-367.
1957-1959,
Oxford
of
11Bale,455.See alsoEmden,vol.3, 1824-1825.
12Concerning
thefourcandidates,
seeCharlesH. Lohr,Medieval
LatinAristotle
Commentaries
NarcissusRichardus
28(1972),281-396at362.Concern, Authors
, in:Traditio,
A Descriptive
seeM. R. James,
in
ingthetextatfols.57-87v,
Catalogue
ofthe
Manuscripts
andCaiusCollege
theLibrary
vol.2, 581-584,
, 2 vols.,Cambridge,
1907-1908,
ofGonville
wherethetextis attributed
toWill(iam)
de Insulaatfol.
Dallingeatfol.57andPetrus
81.
13See Weisheipl
thatBredon'
s willrefers
(note9 above).One shouldnote,however,
to"quaternos
meosde grammatica
etdialctica;"F. M. Powicke,
TheMedieval
Books
84. Bale [(note10above)411]refers
toa commentary
, Oxford
1931,
ofMerton
College
on logicassigned
to Bredon4'seu Byridanus"
thathe sayshe sawin theMagdalen
Poole
linksthistoMS 88,which
an anonymous
contains
Collegelibrary;
logicalcomtoBuridan.
mentary
assigned
conjecturally
53

12:59:05 PM

character of Oxonian calculatory natural philosophy.14Precisely the

opposite seems to be the case for commentaries on the Posterior
, with Paris outproducing Oxford by a factorof two to one.
Analytics
This, combined with the dearth of commentariesat Merton in particular is in itselfan interestingstate of affairs,because the Posterior
Analyticscould not have been unknown to Oxford scholars in general
was reand Mertonians in particular. On the one hand, the Analytics
as
of
Arts
students
at
the
of
the
all
statutes
Oxford,
quired
University
clearly specify.15And closer to the College itself,the records of the
Merton Library indicate that the text of the Posterior
Analyticswas
available in four manuscripts present in the library before 1325,
another added between 1325 and 1360, and several which are only
or lending lists of 1372 and could have been
mentioned in the electiones
earlier
in
the
century.16In addition, the libraryalso acquired
present
commentarieson the Analytics
, including threecopies of the commen- one of which enteredthe
Robert
Grosseteste
taryby
libraryperhaps
between 1325 and 1346- , two by Thomas Aquinas, and one by
Simon of Faversham.17And while we do not know the extentto which
14JohnE. Murdoch,
TheAnalytic
Character
Natural
ofLateMedieval
Learning:
Philosophy
without
Nature
toNature
intheMiddle
D. Roberts,
, in: Approaches
, ed. Lawrence
Ages
NY 1982,171-213
at 197.Mystatistics
havebeenderived
a tabulafrom
Binghamton,
tionofcommentaries
listedin CharlesLohr's Medieval
LatinAristotle
Commentaries
, in:
27(1971)251-351;
Traditio,
23(1967)313-413;
24(1968)149-245;
26(1970)135-216;
36commentaries
28(1972)281-396;29(1973)93-197;and30(1974)119-144.
Against
on thePosterior
at Parisbetween
1250and 1400,onefinds
Analytics
produced
only16
at Oxford.
produced
15Statuta
ed. Strickland
Oxoniensis,
Gibson,Oxford1931,26:
antiquauniversitatis
librisBoecii,
"...quod omneslibrosveteris
logicaead minusbisaudierint,
exceptis
audiuisse
librumTopicorum
quossemelsufficiat
Boecii,quemaudiuispreter
quartum
se nonastringantur.
De novaautemlogicalibrum
Priorm,
Elenchorum,
Topicorum,
autemPosteriorum,
unaviceiurent
saltem
seaudiuisse.
... Si autemdesobis,librum
omneslibrospredictos
iurent
se audisse,hoc
phismatibus
publicenonresponderint,
librum
Posteriorum."
themedieval
curricuadiecto,quodbisaudierint
Concerning
lumat Oxford,
seeJamesA. Weisheipl,
Curriculum
atOxford
inthe
oftheFaculty
ofArts
Fourteenth
26 (1964),143-185.
howeOneshould,
, in:MediaevalStudies,
Early
Century
ingiving
toomuchweight
touniversity
statutes
as a reflection
ofactuver,be cautious
al curricular
as Mordicai
hasrecentiy
forlatesixteenthpractice,
Feingold
emphasized
andearlyseventeenth-century
seehisScience,
Universities
universities;
, andSoEnglish
inEngland
Oxford1981).
, 1580-1640
ciety
(Ph.D. dissertation,
16Forthoseinthelibrary
TheMedieval
before
Books
1325,seePowicke,
(note13above)
no.32,48,62,and63;between
1325and1360,no. 104;andforthoseincluded
among
of1372(nos.393-402),
no. 393,397,and401specifically
theelectio
includethelogica
nova.
17Grosseteste's
is included
in Powicke
no. 207( = MertonCollegeMS
commentary
theLibrary
between
1325and1345,no. 515( = Merton
perhaps
280),whichentered
MS 289),acquired
before
before
MS 292),alsoacquired
1385,andno.518( = Merton
54

12:59:05 PM

these were read in the firsthalf of the century,the firstlending list

available - dating from 137218- indicates that both the textsand the
commentarieson the Posterior
were popular in the second half
Analytics
of the fourteenthcentury.In view of the factthatthe Posterior
Analytics
generated increasingnumbers of commentarieselsewhere in the fourteenthcentury,it seems ratherodd thatthe Mertonians ofthe firsthalf
of the centuryshould have leftno commentaryrecord of the text.
The exception to this observation is Walter Burley, who was a
fellow at Merton by 1305, but who spent much of his career on the
Continent, firstat Paris and then at Avignon.19Burley seems to have
composed not one, but perhaps three commentaries on the Posterior
. 20 Nevertheless, Burley- like Aristotle- generally argues
Analytics
disciplinaryautonomy among the sciences. Paraphrasing Aristotle,he
notes that arithmeticand geometryhave some common principles
such as the axiom that equals subtractedfromequals yield equals, yet
diverse sciences such as arithmeticand geometrydo not have the same
subject genus or the same principles of the subject genus, and
thereforea transferencefromone genus to anotheris impossible.21But
Burley, again like Aristotle, also suggests that there is a legitimate
means of descending from one genus into another on certain occasions, and he divides these into two cases. On the one hand, one may
1385.Aquinas'commentary
is contained
in no. 126 ( = MertonMS 296) acquired
before1360and also in no. 357 ( = MertonMS 277) acquiredbefore1385.Faversham'scommentary
is contained
inno. 518.The availability
ofGrosseteste's
workis
hisdiscussion
ofpartialsubordination
ofthesciences
which
interesting,
considering
seemsto havestoodbehindOckham'sideadiscussed
below,pp. 57-58.
18See thetextin Powicke,
pp. 60-63.
19Concerning
seeC. Martin,Walter
in: Oxford
Studies
Presented
career,
Burley's
Burley,
toDanielCallus
, Oxford1964,194-230.
20Weisheipl,
threecommentaries
to him,inRepertorium
(note9 above)attributed
oneliteral
a secondabbreviated
version
intheVenice,
cluding
commentary,
printed
1514edition
ofGrosseteste's
anda questionary
onthePosterior
commentary,
Analytics
in Gonville
andCaius668*7645.
21Expositio
libros
duosPosteriorum
, London,LambethPalaceMS 70, fol.154va:
super
"...ita enimestunadignitas
communis
et arismetice
si ab aequalibusaegeometrie
nonhabentidemgenussubiectum
nec
qualiademaset cetera.Sed diversescientie
eandempassionem
subiecti
utarismetica
et geometria,
et ideononconvenit
generis
descendere
a geometria
inarismeticam
Non
quianonhabentidemgenussubiectum.
enimhabentidemgenussubiectum
nisimagnitudines
etnumeris
essentidem."The
lastphrase,
from
theattention
ofmedieval
commenAristotle,
paraphrased
occupied
tators
withGrosseteste;
rather
thantaking
thephraseinthesenseofa conbeginning
tofactstatement,
as Aristotle
hadintended
trary
it,mostcommentators
likely
sought
to explainhowmagnitudes
be numbers,
and proposed
a theory
ofmagnitudo
might
numerata
andnon-numerata.
doesnotelaborate
on thismaterial.
however,
Burley,
55

12:59:05 PM

transfera demonstrationwhen the subject genus of one simply constitutesa species of the other; thisis triviallytrue, says Burley,because
the same science that examines triangles also examines isosceles
triangles. On the other hand, demonstrations may be transferred
when the genera are the same "in a certain way" ( quodammodo
). This
occurs, according to Burley, among the subalternate sciences when,
for example, a proofinvolving a line is used to prove a propertyin, in otherwords, is
volving visual lines.22Burley's analysis of metabasis
is
of
littlehelp in deterhe
hence
and
of
that
with
Aristotle,
congruent
metabasisand the
of
mining a Mertonian response to the problem
techniques of the next generationof work.
Despite this setback, there are several aspects of Mertonian or at
Oxonian work which suggestresponses
least early fourteenth-century
to the problem of metabasis.The firstconcerns the subalternatingand
mediaeas theywere known in the Midsubalternatesciences or scientiae
dle Ages. As we have seen already, Aristotlehimselfrecognizedexcep: the sciences of astronomy,optics,
tions to his prohibitionof metabasis
their
music and the like prove
propositionsby recourse to principles
taken from the higher sciences of arithmeticand geometry. Based
, Aristotleseems to
upon his discussion in the firstbook of the Analytics
have considered this a rathernarrow exception to the general rule of
disciplinaryautonomy,23yet thereis evidence that would suggestthat
at least by the opening years of the fourteenthcentury, medieval
scholars were beginning to adopt a more liberal version of this rule.
And while he is neitheralone nor the firstin this movement,I should
like to illustratebrieflythe lengths to which this shiftwas taken by a
non-Mertonian whose logical and philosophical orientationwas frequently adopted by later Mertonians, William of Ockham.24
22Expositio
uno
in inferiora
dupliciter:
, fol. 154va:"...potestsuperiusdescendere
differentiam
modo
alio
constat
essentialem
modoperdifferentiam
per
speciem,
que
in
tuncfitdescensus
... Si fiatdescensus
essentialem,
existentiam.
perdifferentiam
etde suo
de superiori
habetconsiderare
nameademscientia
idemgenussimpliciter,
deysoceli.
considrt
detriangulo
Eademenimscientia
queconsidrt
perseinferiori.
in idem
tunenonfitdescensus
Si autemfiatdescensus
existentiam,
perdifferentiam
ut si per probatade linea
sed in idemgenusquodammodo
genussimpliciter,
inidemgenus
de aliade lineavisuali.Tuncfitdescensus
ad probandum
descendenda
idem
sunt
subalternata
scientia
et
ternans
subai
scientia
nam
quodamquodammodo,
in
a generein genusut descendendo
descendere
modo.Istoduplicimodoconvenit
inidemgenusquodammodo."
utdescendendo
idemgenussimpliciter
23See thereferences
innote4 above.
24The following
moreiullyin
is discussed
on metabasis
accountofOckhams position
forthAristotle's
and
Subaltrnate
the
metabasis,
William
Sciences,
Theory
of
ofOckham,
my
ofScience.
fortheHistory
inBritish
Journal
coming
56

12:59:05 PM

In the prologue to his Ordinatio,whichOckham completed beforehe

leftforAvignon in 1324, Ockham discusses the nature of science and
in particular,the ways by which one science interactswith another.25
Ockham argues that scientiamay be taken in two differentsenses. On
the one hand, it may referto a single propositionsegregated fromall
othersand hence autonomous. But, says Ockham, thisis generallynot
what we mean when we speak ofscientia
, nor is it what Aristotlehad intended when he discussed the sciences in the Posterior
Analyticsor the
librinaturales.Rather, scientiais usually taken to mean a collection of
propositionswhose unity derives not froma single subject, but from
the orderwhichbringstogetherthesepropositions.Under thisconception of science, Ockham suggeststhata propositionseparated fromits
ordermay well apply to several othersciences. And most importantly,
this idea of science leads him in turn to suggest that some sciences
overlap and that Aristotle's prohibitionof metabasisapplied only to
scientiawhen taken in the firstsense: that is, the autonomy of single
propositions.However, says Ockham, when the subject of one science
is contained under the subject of another, it is entirelypermissiblefor
one science to demonstratethe conclusions of another. How does this
happen? Clearly, Ockham recognizedthatAristotlehad excluded only
the traditionalsubalternatesciences fromhis prohibitionof metabasis
,
because at this point, he expands upon Aristotle's position:
IfitissaidthatthePhilosopher
excludes
andsubalternating
onlythesubalternate
butdidnotdo so
... ithastobe saidthatbythisheintended
toexclude,
sciences,
inotherways.26
certain
othersciences
whicharesubalternated
explicitly,
Now, in Part III of his SummaLogicae, Ockham elaborates on the
several ways by which sciences are subalternated,drawing upon and
making more explicita notion of partial subordinationthat had been
discussed as early as Robert Grossetestea centurybefore. One need
not suppose thatthe highermathematicalscience is completelyextended to the subalternatesciences; rather,only part of it may extendto all
or even part of the inferiorsciences. More importantstill, Ockham
argues that there is both a broad and strictsense of subalternation.
Strictlyspeaking, sciences such as optics, astronomy,music, and the
like are subalternated to arithmeticor geometry according to the
criteriathat Aristotlehad suggested. But Ockham also suggests that
25Scriptum
inlibrum
Ordinatio
Sententiarum
, Prologue,
primum
q.l.; ed. GedeonGi and
N.Y. 1967,7-15.
, vol. 1, St. Bonaventure,
StephenBrown,Opera
theologica
26Ordinatio
, Prologue,
q.l.; OTh1.14,16-20.
57

12:59:05 PM

thereis a broad sense accordingto which sciences not normallyseen as

subalternatingcan be considered in that capacity. In spite of the fact
thatAristotlehad statedexplicitlythatmedicine and geometryare not
subalternate sciences, Ockham suggests that broadly speaking they
are, and likewise, one may also consider logic or metaphysicsand the
special sciences in this same broad subalternatingrelationship.27
What is clear fromthis is that Ockham has altered Aristotle'sprohibition of metabasisfromtwo sides. On the one hand, by restricting
the prohibitionto only those sciences that are completelydistinctin
subject and properties- that is, Ockham's idea of science as a single
proposition- Ockham has removed much of the forcethatthe original
theorypossessed. And on the other hand, by greatlyexpanding the
number of sciences that may be considered subalternating and
subalternate, Ockham escapes the injunction of metabasisin most
cases. If a science cannot qualify as subalternate under Aristotle's
strictdefinition,it may well qualify under Ockham' s more liberal
rules.
Some ten years after Ockham's original discussion, Thomas
Bradwardine takes up the problem of metabasis
implicitlywhen he considers the genericincompatibilityof mathematicsand physicsin part 4
of his second chapter to the Tractatusde proportionibus
. Chapter 2 as a
whole deals with what Bradwardine calls "four erroneous positions"
regardingthe relationshipbetween velocityand the powers that cause
motion. Already he has argued against three: that velocityis proportional to the differencebetween motive and resistivepower, that it
followsthe proportionbetween thatdifferenceand the resistivepower,
and that it correspondsto the proportionbetween motiveand resistive
power.28All of these, Bradwardine notes, are similarinasmuch as they
assume that there is a mathematical relationship between velocity,
motive power, and resistivepower. But in the fourtherroneous position, Bradwardine considersthe objection thatnatural philosophyand
mathematics are genericallydifferentand that thereforethere is no
mathematicalrelationshipbetween motiveand resistivepowers. Brad27Summa
III, ii, ch. 20-21;ed. GedeonGi and StephenBrown,Opera
logicae
N.Y. 1974),537-542,
, vol.1,(St. Bonaventure,
philosophica
esp.539-541.Ockhamis
as I havesuggested
in
byno meansuniquein hisideasaboutpartialsubalternation;
ofmetabasis
seemtobe drinking
, Burleyand others
myarticleon Ockham'stheory
from
thesamestream.
28 Thomas
deproportionibus
, hisTractatus
; itssignificance
ofBradwardine
forthe
development
of
mathematical
, ed. and trans.H. LamarCrosby,
physics
Jr.,Madison,Wise. 1955,
86-105.
58

12:59:05 PM

wardine's replycenterson a distinctionof two senses of proportion:in

a strictsense, proportion refersonly to quantities and thereforeis
restrictedto scientificgenera that deal with quantity. In a more
general sense, however, proportionis found in all thingswhich admit
ofbeing equal, greateror less, similar,or largerand smaller. And this,
says Bradwardine, is the sense in which he uses proportion in the
present context.29With varying degrees of success, Bradwardine
challenges his fourthopponent, suggestingthat he has conflatedthese
two senses of proportion.But when the dust clears, we findthat Bradwardine's convictionabout the applicabilityof proportionto the topic
of motion rests on his observations about the subalternate and
subalternatingsciences:
"...if therewereno proportion
between
becausetheyarenotquantities
powers
therecouldbe
(ofthesamegenus),"saysBradwardine,
"bythesameposition,
noproportion
between
tones.Andthentheentire
science
ofharmonics
wouldbe
destroyed."30
Simple pragmatismon the one hand and I would suggestan expanded
view of subalternation- as we have seen in Ockham- on the other
seem to have exertedan influenceon Bradwardine's view of metabasis.
If Bradwardine's extensive discussion of the issue indicates that he
was concerned about the legitimacy of applying such proportions,
scholars of the succeeding generationseem to have merelyassumed it
at the outset. Many of them had learned of Bradwardine's work not
from the original Tractatus de proportionibus
, but rather from
abridgementsof the work. And it is interestingand perhaps indicative
of the concernsof the new generationthat one somewhatpopular ver- glosses over the argusion- the so-called Tractatus
brevis
proportionum
ment of chapter 2, part 4, and instead moves on to part 5- Bradwar- to deduce several conclusions that follow from
dine' s own function
it.31 In the same way, near the beginning of his Regule solvendi
29 Tractatus
lines481-516.
66, lines1-10;108-110,
30 Tractatus
106,lines445-447;mytranslation.
31I am currently
thedissemination
ofBradwardine's
material
investigating
through
theagencyoftheseabridged
editions.
Mostaresimilar
to theTractatus
brevis
proportionum
: abbreviatus
exlibro
deproportionibus
inScience
, Vienna1515,reproduced
byClagett
inthe
Middle
ofpartII, chapter
4
, Madison,Wise.1959;theargument
ofMechanics
Ages
hasbeenreduced
to"Quartaopinioponitquodvelocitas
motusnonsequatur
proporinter
etresistentiam.
Sedomniaargumenta
tionem,
quianullaestproportio
potentiam
solumprocedunt
de proportione
dicta.Ideocontra
earnnon
proiliaopinione
proprie
Naarguoad praesens."(p. 490). The versionfoundin Vienna,sterreichische
tionalbibliothek
is evenmorebrief
4784,fol.231r-236v,
(fol.236r"v):
"Quartaopinio
estquodvelocitas
motuum
nondebetattendi
Similiter
penesaliquamproportionem.
59

12:59:05 PM

sophismata,William Heytesbury remarks that he will assume in the

course of his work that "any finitelatitude is a certain quantity."32
Richard
And at the beginningoftreatiseXIV oftheLibercalculationum,
Swineshead points out that his treatmentof local motion will proceed
under the assumption that motion is measured according to
geometrical proportion.33If the application of proportion and the
legitimacyof quantificationrested originallyon an expanded version
of subalternation,it would seem thatthe issues and assumptionsofthe
and ingenerationof the 30s and 40s had shiftedaway frommetabasis
stead concentratedon what have come to be called calculatorytechniques.
In spite of this shiftin emphasis, there would seem to be at least
two aspects of Mertonian science which both facilitatedthe use of
mathematics in natural philosophy and relieved concerns about the
appropriate use of one science in the domain of another. Each treads
upon the development in ideas about the subalternation of the
in the sciences,
sciences. When Aristotleprohibitedthe use of metabasis
he made it clear that he was not concerned with the transferenceof
general principlesand axioms fromone science to another,but rather
with what he considered the misapplication of principles that are
specific to one science. From Grosseteste onward, virtually every
medieval commentator on the Posterior
Analyticshad noted that the
from
taken
equals yield equals" is common to
principle "Equals
several sciences, but the principle "Equal magnitudes taken from
equal magnitudesyield equal magnitudes" is specificto geometryand
cannot be transferredto anotherscience.34It is thelatter,more specific
principle that is constrainedby the prohibitionof metabasis.
One of the most strikingfeaturesof fourteenth-century
calculatory
science is the extentto which logic entersthe topics under discussion.
This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Heytesbury's Regule.
According to its prologue, the Regulewas intendedas a guide forfirsttalisnonstat."Stillanother
and Caius 182/215,
version
Gonville
pp.
(Cambridge,
119-131),
of
morecomplete
sections
ofthetreatise,
omits
thisportion
inother
although
thetextentirely.
32Hentisberi
desensu
etdiviso
solvendi
..., Venice1494,fol.
, Regule
composito
sophismata
40va:"Quelibetlatitudo
finita
estquedamquantitas."
33Libercalculationum,
Venice1520,fol.43va:"...quedamregulede motulocalisupattendi
proportionem
ponendomotum
geometricam."
34RobertGrosseteste,
Commentarius
inPosteriorum
libros
, ed. PietroRossi,
Analyticorum
Florence
1981,137.
60

12:59:05 PM

year studentsin logic.35What preciselyis the relationshipof logic to

the mathematicalor physical topics under discussion? Over the past
thirtyyears, scholarshave recognized a two-fold,reciprocatingtie. On
the one hand, according to Curtis Wilson, while mathematical and
physical principlesare used in Heytesbury's text,theyare broughtto
bear on logical or semantic problems such as the problem of
denomination; that is, under what conditionscan a subject be said to
be such-and-such? If Brownie the donkey begins to move and increases her speed, at what degree of velocitymay we say she runs? Or
if Socrates is liftingweights and reaches the limits of his strength,is
there a maximum weight which he can lift,or a minimum weight
which he cannot lift?36While problems such as these admit of
mathematicalor physical solutions, and indeed Heytesburyuses both
in his discussions, he marshals these techniques in the solution of a
logical or semantic problem.
More recently, however, John Murdoch has noted that the
reciprocal relationshipis also true of Mertonian and more generally,
work. By using what Murdoch calls ' 'analytical
fourteenth-century
scholars transferredproblems in the
languages/' fourteenth-century
object language to ones thatwere analyzed in a metalanguage; thatis,
ratherthan an analysis of problems the objects of which are things,
those problemswere translatedin such a way that the objects became
propositions,and by suitable reductions,operationson termsor propositions gave solutions- or in the case of sophismata
, distinguishedbetween proper and improper procedures- firstin the metalanguage
and then by reversal in the object language.37
35Repule
fol.4V.
36Regule
SeealsoCurtisWilson(note1 above)21-25andhisWilliam
fol.93rff.
, 141r"v.
ofScientific
, in:Dictionary
, NewYork1972,vol.6, 376-380.
Heytesbury
Biography
37This aspectoffourteenth-century
sciencehas beenemphasized
by Murdochin
TheAnalytic
severalofhismorerecent
butsee in particular
Character
articles,
ofLate
Medieval
: NewApproaches
Learning
(note14above),TheDevelopment
ofa Critical
Temper
andModes
inFourteenth-Century
and
, Science
, andTheology
, in:Medieval
ofAnalysis
Philosophy
Renaissance
Studies
, ed. Siegfried
Wenzel,Chapel Hill, NC 1978, 51-79, and
Mathematics
andSophisms
inLateMedieval
Natural
littraires
dansles
, in:Lesgenres
Philosophy
etphilosophiques
mdivales
: Dfinition,
etexploitation.
Actesducolsources
critique
thologiques
de Louvain-la-Neuve
25-27mai 1981,Louvain-la-Neuve
1982,
loqueinternational
usedlogic,itwouldbe
85-100.Murdoch
notesthatwhilefourteenth-century
scholars
to suggest
or
thattheyare simply
misleading
doinglogic;"theyare doingphysics
butwithdecidedly
natural
tools"{Analytic
Character
,
philosophy
logical,metalinguistic,
ofthisissuein TheOxford
Calculators
, in: The
p. 196).See alsoEdithSylla'sdiscussion
Medieval
KenKretzmann,
, ed. Norman
Cambridge
History
ofLater
Anthony
Philosophy
1982,540-563at 546-547.
ny,andJanPinborg,
Cambridge,
61

12:59:05 PM

This relationshipbetween logic and the Mertonian work is not, I

would suggest, an insignificantone, forin his discussion of metabasis,
Aristotlehad singledout dialectic as a peculiar science in the sense that
unlike the special sciences- those of mathematics and natural
philosophy- dialectic has no specific domain or subject matter on
which it operates. This feature of dialectic lay at the foundationof
Aristotle's prohibitionof metabasis
, forunlike Plato, Aristotlewas far
less convinced about the certaintyof dialectical method in all areas of
science, and it was against Plato's universal dialectic that Aristotle
developed his theoryof demonstration.Dialectic could proceed from
knowledge based on belief or opinions; demonstrationby contrast
rested only on necessary principles. Dialectic must be prepared to
argue a conclusion from the indeterminateresponse to a question;
demonstrationmay respond to questions, but theymust be questions
that admit only one answer. Dialectic ranges over all fields;
, is restrictedto a
demonstration,bound by the prohibitionof metabasis
single subject genus.38
One means of avoiding this prohibition, as I have already suggested, is to change the nature of the subject genus or expand the
allowable exceptions, both of which can be seen in Ockham. But
another, perhaps less obvious solution is to draw upon Aristotle's
distinction between dialectic and demonstration. While Aristotle
clearlyfavoreddemonstrationas the methodofthe sciences, he did not
dispose completelyof the dialectical method. Instead he reservedit to
the Topics, where it served as a method fordiscoveringarguments.39
38Concerning
see Topics
1.1100al8-21, 100b22-23
theultimate
basesofdialectic,
and
In TopicsVIII. 1 155b8Posterior
1.1981b19-21.
17, Aristotle
the
Analytics
compares
method
ofthedialectician
withthatofthe(demonstrative)
Asforthesubphilosopher.
notesin Sophistical
XI 17244-17that
Aristotle
ject generaof dialectic,
Refutations
"...the artofexamination
is notknowledge
ofanydefinite
andittherefore
subject,
follows
thatitdealswitheverysubject;forall theartsemploy
common
alsocertain
Aristotle
1.11 77a26-35,
and in Onthe
principles."
repeatsthisin Posterior
Analytics
Generation
he saysthatdialectical
II.8 747b27-30,
ofAnimals
proofis moreuniversal
"the further
removedit is fromthespecialand properprinciples."
in
Likewise,
Rhetoric
statesthatrhetoric,
has no special
likedialectic,
1.1,1.2,and 1.4,Aristotle
rewithAristotle's
genusforits subjectmatter.Comparethischaracterization
1.7 75a38ff.),
fordemonstration
whichincludetheapquirements
Analytics
{Posterior
ofan essential
to somegenusand thespecification
ofthegenus
attribute
plication
itself.
39Concerning
Aristotle
andtheTopics
de Pater,LesTopiques
etla
d'Aristote
, seeWalter
on
dela dfinition
1965,andAristotle
, Fribourg
; La mthodologie
platonicienne
dialectique
ed. G. E. L. Owen,
TheTopics.
Dialectic.
Aristotelicum,
Symposium
oftheThird
Proceedings
Oxford1968,esp.thearticles
byDe PaterandDring;andJ. D. G. Evans,Aristotle's
1977.
, Cambridge
Concept
ofDialectic
62

12:59:05 PM

Now the fate of this topical method has been much-discussed by

scholarsover the past generation.40In the sixthcentury,Boethius held
much the same view of dialectic as a methodof discoveringarguments
and made the method more precise in his De topicisdijferentiis.
But
in
the
eleventh
and
the
thircentury
beginning
continuing through
teenth century,we find a deviation fromthe traditionalAristotelian
notion of topics. There is a growing sense that all syllogisms are
dependent upon topics and that topical arguments as well as
demonstrativeones are necessary. The result of this shiftis firstthat
topics become a method not as much for discovering as confirming
arguments, and second- and for our purposes more important- a
gradual blurringof the distinctionbetween dialectic and demonstration.41
The significanceof this development for the parallel problem of
metabasisis considerable. The revaluation of dialectic, particularlyin
the new formsof scholasticlogic like the consequentiae
, bringswithit the
and
some
that
to
extent
dialectic,
demonstration,
recognition
may be
freefromAristotle'sremarksabout metabasis.When coupled with the
broad sense of subalternationwe have seen in Ockham, this special
propertyof logic becomes a significantone forMertonian science. It is
perhaps even more suggestivewhen we observe that in the thirdpart
of the SummaLogicae, Ockham had suggested that one science may in
certain cases be both subalternatingand subalternatewith respect to
different
parts of another science.42In other words, logic as a science
in its own right can both come to the aid of and be aided by
mathematics and natural philosophy. If logic is subalternated and
subalternating to both mathematics and natural philosophy, both
sciences may be applied side-by-sidewithoutstrictlyspeaking resorting to metabasis.Logic thus becomes a bridge between mathematics
and physics.
Closely relatedto thisbridge is another aspect of Mertonian science
that bears upon quantification and metabasis.It has often been re40EleanorStump,Topics
: Their
andAbsorption
intoConsequences
, in: The
Development
Medieval
Liberal
, 273-299andDialectic
, in: TheSeven
Cambridge
History
ofLater
Philosophy
Arts
intheMiddle
ed. DavidL. Wagner,Bloomington,
Ind. 1983,125-146.
Ages,
41See,forexample,
Ockham'sdiscussion
atSumma
III, i, ch. 1; OPh1.360and
logicae
inDemonstrative
Science
III, ii,ch.9; OPh1.521andEileenSerene'sdiscussion
, in: The
Medieval
, 496-517at 514.
Cambridge
History
ofLater
Philosophy
42Summa
See alsothediscussion
inmyarticle
III, ii,ch.20-21;OPh1.537-542.
Logicae
citedinnote24 above.
63

12:59:05 PM

marked that Mertonian science is an analysis ofproblemssecundum

imThe
aginationem. problems Heytesburyconsiders,the solutionshe proposes, and the objections to his position thathe refutesare more likely
than not framed according to imagination; empirical considerations
and actual physical measurements are absent from his work.43
Likewise, when Swineshead discusses the case of a verythinrod passing down a shaftto the center of the earth and asks whetherit will
reach the center of the universe, his problem is framedsecundum
im44It matterslittleto Swineshead thatthis
aginationem.
problem may be
unverifiableor that the situation may be actually impossible. It is a
, whose purpose is to test the
problem framed secundumimaginationem
boundary conditions of a theoryunder consideration,not determine
how things actually behave in reality. Several years ago, A. G.
Molland drew attentionto the fact that by the early fourteenthcentury, imaginatiowas closely associated with mathematics. Thomas
Aquinas perceived mathematicsas a science which receivesits subject
matter through the imagination, while physics does so throughthe
senses. Henry of Ghent likewise suggested that those whose imaginative faculties were well-developed made the best mathematicians, the worstmetaphysicians,and inept natural philosophers.And
when Thomas Bradwardine discusses the mathematicalpropertiesof
relationshipsbetween infiniteclasses in the De causaDei , he does so per
,45Given this relationshipbetween the medieval concepimaginationem
tion of imaginatioand the mathematical disciplines, are we led once
43CurtisWilson(note1 above)24-25,148-149,
and 174n. 65.
44Liber
calculationum
ThetexthasalsobeeneditedbyM.
(note33 above)fol.35v-37r.
A. HoskinandA. G. Molland,Swineshead
onFalling
: AnExample
Bodies
ofFourteenthfortheHistory
ofScience,
3 (1966),150-182.
On the
, in:British
Physics
Century
Journal
sametopic,seealsoMolland,Richard
Swineshead
andContinuously
, in:
Quantities
Varying
duXIIecongrs
Actes
international
d'histoire
dessciences
, 4 (Paris1968),127-130.
45Molland(note1 above)113-114.ThomasAquinas,
librum
Boethii
de
Expositio
super
Trinitate
in XII libros
VII, lect. 10, nn.
q. 5, a. 3 resp.;Expositio
Metaphysicorum
1494-1496.
De
, Paris1518,II, q. 9; fol.36r.Bradwardine,
HenryofGhent,Quodlibeta
causaDeil, ch. 1,coroll.pars40; ed. HenrySavile,London1618,121-124.
Concernoftheimagination,
seeM. W. Bundy,TheTheory
theory
ingthemedieval
ofImagination
andMedieval
inClassical
oftheimagination
and
, Urbana,111.1927.Thefaculty
Thought
itsimportance
formedieval
ofAristotle's
ofmetabasis
hasnot
perceptions
prohibition
beenrecognized.
Asthefaculty
thatmediated
between
senseandreasonfirst
generally
thesensesandthencombining
them
byrecreating
imagesreceived
originally
through
toform
newcomplexes,
wasa kindofpsychological
itself
metabasis
ortransiimaginatio
tionbetweendissimilar
realms.This has beensuggested
forthecase of
recently
GalileansciencebyLorraine
: Imagination
atthe
Bounds
J. Daston,in:Galilean
analogies
of
Sense
, in: Isis,75(1984),302-310.
64

12:59:05 PM

again to the middle sciences as the vehicle foreluding Aristotle'spro? Unfortunately,the evidence on this score is
hibition of metabasis
somewhat mixed. As John Murdoch and Edith Sylla have noted,46
in early manuscripts were not grouped
works involving calculationes
with mathematicaltextslike the Elements
, but instead withtreatiseson
or
natural
of
course, would seem to be quite
logic
philosophy. This,
the
understandable,given
logical componentof the work and the fact,
as Murdoch and Sylla emphasize, that medievais oftentended to blur
the distinctionbetween mathematics and logic, moving freelyfrom
one to another. Furthermore,and perhaps more fundamentally,we
should remember that the Arts Faculty at Oxford or any other
medieval universityhad no provision for studyingcalculationes
apart
from the traditional curriculum of logic, mathematics, natural
philosophy, ethics, and metaphysics. When such curricula are
specified,mathematicalwork centeredaround such textsas the works
of Boethius, Euclid's Elements
, and Jordanus de Nemore's
and while Bradwardine's theoryof ratios has its roots in
Arithmetical1
the Elements
,48 it seems clear from the manuscript evidence that
medievais did not consider the mathematics of the calculatores
congruentwith that required in the arts faculties.Hence it should not be
should be grouped by default among the
surprisingthat calculationes
natural
or
logical
philosophical works.
It is perhaps more surprisingthat treatisesdealing withthe latitude
of formswere grouped in codices withtextsof more traditionalscientiae
mediaeonly beginning in the fifteenth
century.49There are, however,
some suggestionsalready in the fourteenthcenturythat this conception was beginning to change. Given the link between calculatory
traditionand imaginario,
one should note thatas early as the beginning
of the fourteenthcentury,Peter Auriol- whose work on the nature of
science seems to have influencedOckham's ideas on the same subject- characterizes the scientiaemediaeas those disciplines in which
46JohnE. Murdoch
andEdithD. Sylla,TheScience
in:Science
intheMiddle
ofMotion,
, ed. DavidC. Lindberg,
Ages
Chicago1978,206-264at 247-248.My owncursory
ofthemanuscripts
review
ofHeytesbury's
andSwineshead's
Liber
calculationum
Regule
thatquiteoften
wouldsuggest
thesetexts
weregrouped
withothers
ofthesamegenre.
47JamesA. Weisheipl,
TheCurriculum
(note15 above)esp. 170-176.See alsoEdith
in TheOxford
Calculators
Sylla'sremarks
(note37 above)esp.542-544.
48A. G. Molland,AnExamination
forHistory
of
, in:Archive
ofBradwardine's
Geometry
ExactSciences,19(1978),113-175andSylla(note37 above)553-554.
49Murdoch
andSylla(note46 above)263n. 137.
65

12:59:05 PM

sense and imaginadoare joined.50 Similarly, Henry of Langenstein

already in the 1380s includes treatises on the latitude of formsnot
sermocinales
or the disciplines of natural philosophy
among the scientiae
in his arborscientiarum
, but instead among the scientiaemediae.biWhat
this may suggest, in otherwords, is the genesis of a wider conception
of the middle sciences that becomes incorporated fully only in
texts and codices.
fifteenth-century
Historians of science have long pointed to the scientiaemediaeas the
mechanism for effectinga mathematical physics out of Aristotelian
natural philosophy. Olaf Pedersen, for example, sees the creation of
the concept of scientiaemediae by Aquinas as "un chemin du
" 52And more
recently,Jean Gagn has exquadrivium la physique.
50PeterAuriol,Scriptum
Sententiarum
St.
, ed. EligiusM. Buytaert.
super
primum
NY 1952,Prologue,
therelationBonaventure,
q. 5, a. 2, no.49(p. 300).Concerning
Aurioland Ockham,see Paul VincentSpade, TheUnity
shipbetween
ofa Science
According
toPeter
Auriol.
in: Franciscan
Studies,32 (1972),203-217.
51HenryofLangenstein,
Bibliae
Na; MS Vienna,sterreichische
Expositio
prologi
CVP 3900, fol.54ra*va.
The textis quotedfullyby NicholasH.
tionalbibliothek,
A LateMedieval
Arbor
in:Speculum
at 250-251.
Steneck,
Scientiarum,
, 50(1975),245-269
Steneck
hasalsonotedthatHenryarguesagainstdisciplinary
elsewhere
in
autonomy
hisworks;see Science
andCreation
intheMiddle
Ages'.
Henry
ofLangenstein
{d. 1397)on
Genesis
toSteneck,
, NotreDame1976,145and191n. 24. Henry'sposition,
according
bearsthe"unfortunate
... thatthestudyofnaturehasnorulesthatare
consequence
and exclusively
specifically
applicableto it alone" (p. 145), and he therefore
frommodern
distinguishes
Henry'sscienceand medievalsciencemoregenerally
science.In thegeneral
thebackground
of
sense,ofcourse,thisistrue;butseenagainst
Aristotle's
ofmetabasis
likethoseofother
fourteenth, Henry'sstatements,
prohibition
scholarssuggested
in thispaper,constitute
an important
hurdletoward
century
modern
methodology.
Earlierinthispaper,wesuggested
thatBradwardine's
inchapter
II, part
argument
4 oftheTractatus
restedin parton thenatureofmusic.Bradwardine's
is
argument
inFranciscus
likewise
mirrored
de Ferraria's
deproportionibus
ed. Marmotuum,
Questio
shallClagettinScience
seems
ofMechanics
(note31 above)at 501.The sameargument
tohaveappealedtoOresmeinhisdiscussion
ofintension
andremission;
seehisQuaestiones
Euclidis
andtheMedieval
, ed. MarshallCalgettin NicoleOresme
super
geometriam
andMotions
, Madison,Wise. 1968,q. 11 (pp. 546-547).The
ofQualities
Geometry
ofthislinkbetween
culmination
theintermediate
scienceofmusicand calculatory
musice
ofParis,BN lat. 7373
maybe foundin theanonymous
techniques
Questiones
studied
andNatural
Hitherto
Unnoticed
byJohnMurdoch
[Music
Philosophy:
by
Questiones
Blasius
in: Manuscripta,
20 (1976),119-136].
Murdoch
thatthe
ofParma(?)f
suggests
theinterests
textreflects
oftheUniversity
ofPavia(p. 126),andifthisis thecase,it
wouldalsoreflect
latefourteenth-century
viewsaboutthetiesbetween
a scientia
media
suchas musicandthenewcalculatory
sinceBlasiustaught
there
between
techniques,
1379and 1382,between
1389and 1399andagainbetween
1403and 1407.
52OlafPedersen,
Du quadrivium
laphysique
liberales
vonderantiken
zur
, in:Artes
Bildung
desMittelalters,
ed.JosefKoch,Leiden1959,107-123
at 123.
Wissenschaft
66

12:59:05 PM

amined the developmentof the more traditionalscientiaemediae

, showand
later
inthat
the
Arabic
Latin
these
commentators,
ing
among
termediatesciences moved away frombeing tied to eitherphysics or
mathematics- or as Aristotle had specified, from being "the more
'
physical parts of mathematics' - to become a tertium
quid, truly intermediatebetween the two disciplines.53What has not generallybeen
recognized is that later in the Middle Ages, not only was the position
of the scientiaemediaebeginning to change, but more fundamentally,
the criteriaby which a discipline could be considered subalternate or
subalternatingwere changing as well. Sciences could be seen as partiallysubalternatedin such a way that different
parts could depend on
distinct superior sciences for their principles. More important still,
many more sciences could qualify for this relationship,and the new
techniques of the fourteenthcenturywere eventually incorporatedin
the body ofthe sciences under thisrelationship.And withthischange,
medievais were able to modifyAristotle'sprohibitionof metabasisthat
had precluded cross-disciplinarywork in the sciences.
Somewhat more generally,this shiftin the nature of the subalternate sciences and the attendant revision of Aristotle's theory of
metabasisemphasizes an importantaspect of scientificchange in the
Middle Ages. By and large, historians have adopted the view that
while medievais modified ancient- and in particular Aristotelian- theories of natural philosophy, they did not usually challenge
the basic assumptions or the core elements54of Aristotelian science.
Bradwardine or Buridan, forexample, may have adjusted the description of motion or the causes of projectile motion, but they left undisturbed the idea that every mobile requires a mover. Similarly,
medieval scholars beginning with Grosseteste gave more precision to
the distinctionbetween propter
quid and quia science, but underlying
this work remained the convictionthat scientiais a causal enterprise.55
53JeanGagn,Du quadrivium
auxscientiae
mediae
libraux
etphilosophie
au moyen
, in:Arts
de philosophie
Montreal-Paris
mdivale,
ge.Actesdu IVe congrsinternational
1969,975-986.
54LarryLaudan,Progress
anditsProblems
, Berkeley
1977,95ff.
" Anneliese
derspatscholastischen
Maier, Ergebnisse
, in: Ausgehendes
Naturphilosophie
Mittelalter
vol.1.425-457;
ThePrinciple

, Rome1964-1977,
JamesA. Weisheipl,
, in: Isis, 56 (1965), 26-45;
quod moveturab alio moveturin Medieval
Physics
Grosseteste's
on scientia
position
propter
quidandquiais discussed
by. . Crombie,
Robert
Grosseteste
andtheOrigins
Science
, Oxford1953,esp. ch. 5; later
ofExperimental
medieval
discussions
ofthetheory
arereviewed
byJohnHermanRandall,TheSchool
of
PaduaandtheEmergence
Science
, Padua 1961.
ofModern
67

12:59:05 PM

In the modificationof the prohibitionof metabasis

, however, we have
what would seem to be a shift in one of the core elements of
Aristotelian science, for the prohibition of metabasisreflectedfundamental aspects of Aristotle's ontological and methodological positions. Yet even in this respect,when medievais shiftedthe boundaries
of the sciences, theydid so under the wings of Aristotle:Ockham, as
we have seen, suggests that if subalternationis possible in cases not
prescribed by Aristotle, it is not because he has deviated fromthe
Philosopher's position, but ratherbecause he has made explicitwhat
was implicitin Aristotle'sideas. And somewhatlater in the fourteenth
century,when Albertof Saxony asks why Aristotlewould botherprowhen so many sciences are related,his answer is that
hibitingmetabasis
Aristotlehad never intended to apply the prohibitionto the subalternate sciences (which Albert, like Ockham, now considers more
numerous), but ratheronly to those sciences thatare clearlydistinct.56
scholars reconciledto theirsatisfacIf, however, fourteenth-century
tion theirown modificationof metabasis
with Aristotle'sposition, their
solution was not unanimously held or at least permanent. Looking
back fromthe early sixteenthcentury,Pietro Pomponazzi complained
that Swineshead and the rest of the English calculators had put too
much mathematicsand geometryinto natural philosophy. According
to him, such sciences are illegal innovationsbetweenmathematicsand
physics.57 Likewise, later in the sixteenth century, Francesco
Buonamici, who was one of Galileo's teachers at Pisa, expresses his
exasperation at "many of these (Latins) who leap from physics to
mathematics."58And as Henry Guerlac has recentlynoted, as late as
56AlbertofSaxony,Quaestiones
libros
Posteriorum
, Venice1497,fol.D[b: ''Sed
super
diceretaliquisex quo suntpluresscilicet
de una
modiquibusconvenit
descendere
scientiain aliam, quare Aristoteles
pluriesdicitnon convenitdemonstrantem
descendere
de genere
ingenus?Respondetur
quodhocnondicitsicutpriusdicebatur
etetiamnondescendere
convenit
de aliquosubiecto
etc.,eo modoquo passioprobata
in scientiasubalternata
etiamprobaretur
de subiecto
... quandosunt
subalternante
duosubiecta
diversarum
etuniillorum
inestaliquapassioperseetalteri
scientiarum,
illorum
inestillapassioperaccidens,
tunenonconvenit
fieri
descensum
in
de genere
de subiectocui inestper se et
genus,ilio modo quod passio demonstrata
de subiecto
demonstraretur
cui inestperaccidens.Propter
hocquodplerumque
et
nonprobatquod
turpessuntpassionesque insuntperaccidensillilinee,geometra
linearectasitlinearum
.."
pulcherrima.
57De intensione
etremissione
ac deparvitate
etmagnitudine
, Venice1525,fol.6va,
formarum
gva-vb
see aso CurtisWilson,Pomponazzi'
s Criticism
, in: Isis,44 (1953)
ofCalculator
355-362at 357and360.
58Francesco
De motu
libriX, Florence1591,525. Atp. 528,Buonamici
Buonamici,
considers
theproblem
ofwhether
thatoperate
inmathematics
areapplied
proportions
68

12:59:05 PM

the end of the seventeenth century, the early French reviews of

Newton's Principia focused their attention on- among other
things- the fact that while this new work may have been a
mathematicalone, it was clearly not natural philosophy.59The problem ofmetabasis
and the idea of disciplinaryboundaries on which it was
foundeddid not evaporate in the Middle Ages. Rather, metabasisand
its avoidance was stillas much an issue in the seventeenthcenturyas it
had been in the fourteenth.
Norman, Oklahoma
University
ofOklahoma
Department
oftheHistoryofScience
- thesameconcern
inmatter
tothecaseofthings
dismisses
Bradwardine
legitimately
in his Traciatus
4.
see
ChapterII, part ConcerningBuonamici'streatment,
Tradition
andKinematics
in LateSixteenthandEarly
Lewis,TheMerton
Christopher
SeventeenthPadua 1980,127-169.
Century
Italy,
59HenryGuerlac,
ontheContinent
Newton
, Ithaca,NY 1981,50-51.It is perhaps
notable
thatthereviewer
intheJournal
dessavans(1688)regarded
as a
thePrincipia
workin the mixedmathematical
tradition
of mechanicsratherthan natural
philosophy.

69

12:59:05 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 1 (1986)
CollecBuridan, Albertof Saxonyand Oresme,and a Fourteenth-century
1
et Corruptione.
tionof Quaestioneson thePhysicsand on De Generatione

J. M. M. H. THIJSSEN

A substantial part of John Buridan' s works can be found in Italian

libraries. The studies of A. Maier forexample, show that the Vatican
libraryis particularlyimportant(not only withregardsto Buridanica,
but also with respectto many othertextsthatmust be of greatinterest
to students of 14th-centurynatural philosophy).2 Then there is G.
Federici-Vescovini, who, in two of her articles, has discussed a
number of mss. fromItalian libraries, all containing Buridan texts.3
This paper intends to be still another contributionto investigations
already made. Especially the ms. Cesena, . Malatestiana S. VIII. 5 is
of particular interestto us here.
on the Physicaand on De generaThis manuscriptcontains Questiones
claims
Buridan
and
tioneetcorruptione
,
John
(1300-after1358) explicitly
as its author. One might think that this attributionof authorshipis
thereforebeyond discussion. This is not quite true, however, as we
shall see.
The Questiones
on thePhysics
In the detailed description of the ms. Cesena, . Malatestiana
italiane
nellebiblioteche
S. VIII. 5 in the Catalogodi manoscritti
, D.
filosofici
Fiori takes the authorship as stated in the manuscript for granted.4
1 The researchforthispaperwas made possibleby financialsupportof the
Research(Z.W.O.).
forPureScientific
Netherlands
Organisation
from
forrendering
thetranslation
toH. H. Thijssen
I wouldliketoexpress
mythanks
andProf.H. Hubienfortheir
theDutch,andtoProf.H. A. G. Braakhuis
encourageofBasel
oftheUniversity
tothestaffs
ment.I wishtoexpress
Library
mygratitude
andcooperation.
ofErfurt
fortheir
kindreception
andtheGeneralScientific
Library
2 Maier(1949-1958).
3 FedericiVescovini
(1960);(1976).
4 Thisdescription
Priortothisthems.has
inLeonardi
canbe found
(1982),148-151.
Vescovini(1976),31-34and also in (1979),22 n.4 en
beendiscussed
by Federici- Buridan'
- without
of
s authorship
further
discussion
(1983),80n.14.Shetooaccepts
ofthe
we findthetabulaquestionum
on thePhysics.On ff.3ra-3vb
theQuestiones
Iohannem
secundum
tabulerubricarum
questionum
Physica.f. 3vb:" Expliciunt
70

12:59:23 PM

Ch. Lohr on the otherhand shows more caution, althoughhe too considers the Physics as a work of Buridan, but then in the category
"uncertain which redaction";5 and indeed the incipitas well as the explicitdifferfromthose of the well known redactions of Buridan' s Questioneson the Physics.6
A remark, made by the copyist himself,also gives the impression
that we are not dealing here with one of Buridan's "well known"
collections.On f.lr the text(in the same writingas the rest)
Questionesreads as follows: "Questiones iste sunt Parisius disputate per reverendm doctorem magistrmIohannem Bridam, et sunt sue questiones
moderne que omnibus aliis quas unquam fecerit prestant. Deo
"
" could be an indicationthat
7
moderne
gratias." The remark questiones
the attributionto Buridan was new to the copyist,eitherbecause they
reallyare anotherversion of Buridan' s , of which he did not know, or
because theyare not Buridan's at all. In the lattercase, of course, the
attributionmust be false. And indeed here we are dealing with a false
are in fact from Albert of Saxony
attribution,since these Questiones
which
is
evident
not
(d. 1390),
only fromthe incipitand the explicitand
the titelsof the questiones
but
also
fromthe textitself.From the follow,
ing transcriptionof a passage the reader can judge forhimself.The
last questioof the Book VIII, which is question 13, reads as follows:

Bridam
Amen."On f.5rathetextbegins:"He suntquestiones
superlibroPhisicorum.
Parisius
doctorem
Iohanperreverendm
superlibrophisicorum
disputate
magistrm
etsuntisteprimi
libri22." Thetextthenrunstof.74rb.Thecolophon
nemBridam,
as thetext)goes:"Expliciunt
superoctolibris
questiones
(in thesamehandwriting
Parisiusdisputateper reverendm
doctoremmagistrm
Iohannem
Phisicorum
fuerunt
scribipermeBartholomeum
de Madiis,diesabatisecundo
Bridamet finite
amen."(myowntranscription).
mensis
1373.Deo gratias
5 Lohraprilis
(1970),169.
6 Theincipit
circaprimum
Phisicorum
utrum
ensmobile
goesas follows:
"Queritur
inscientia
sitsubiectum
naturali
totali.Etperscientiam
naturalem
totalem
proprium
intelligohabitm congregatumex habitudinibusomnibus conclusionum
in librisnaturalibus..."
The explicit:"...et si accidensqualissit:
demonstratarum
velqualitas.Et si qualitas,utrumde primaspecieveltertia.Hoc
utrumquantitas
enimconsiderare
estalterius
scilicet
negotii,
metaphysici."
(myowntranscription)
7 Thisis a correction
ofFederici-Vescovini's
transcription
(1976),31. She proposed
thefollowing,
inmyopinion
lessmeaningful,
istesuntParisius
reading:"Questiones
Iohannem
Bridamet suntsuequesdoctorem
perreverendm
magistrm
disputate
tionesin ordinequestionibus
aliisquas unquamfecerit."
in Leonardi(1982),149be calledcorrect:
Neither
can Fiori's transcription
"Quesiohannem
tionesistesuntparisii
doctorem
brindisputate
perreverendm
magistrm
danumetsuntquestiones
aliisquasunquamfecerint
medecine
prestant.
queomnibus
Amen."
Deo gratias
71

12:59:23 PM

a quo moveatur
eiusa
queritur
Consequenter
proiectum
postseparationem
Aristoteles
circafinem
Istamdubitationem
tractat
huiusoctavi.
prohiciente.
a prohiCircaquamsuntdiverseopiniones,
quarumprimaestquod movetur
Namab iliomovetur
cui
ciente.Et hocistaopiniovultsicostendere.
proiectum
sedsicestquodiliaimponitur
prohicienti.
proiectio;
imponitur
etestquodproiciens
Aliaestopinioquampronuncreputo
veriorem,
imprimit
motivam
quamdamvirtutem
que estquedamqualitasque innataest
proiecto
aliundead eandemdifferentiam
ad
manerenisifiatimpedimentum
positionis
Et secundum
istamcpinionem
prohicit.
quam proiciens
possuntreddicause
Primoquialapisprohicitur
remotius
quampluma.
quarundam
experientiarum.
Breviter
huiuscausaestistaquiaexquolapishabetplusde materia
etestmagis
de istavirtute
motivaetdiutiusearnretinet
densuspluma,plusrecipit
quam
pluma.
nonspectat
sedad metaphysicam,
ad naturalem
scilicet
Que ressittalisvirtus
velaccidens,
talisressitsubstantia
etsiaccidens,
sit:utrum
utrum
qualiter
quande primaspecieveltertia.
Hoc enimcontitasvelqualitas.Etsi qualitas,utrum
scilicet
estaltioris
siderare
negotii,
metaphysici.
This passage fromCesena, S. VIII. 5, f.73r-74vis almost verbatim
the same as the transcriptionof Albertus' textby Maier, who used the
1504 Venice edition in her analysis of Albert's impetus-theory.8
Besides, a comparison between these (and other passages) and corresponding ones of other mss. can lead to no other conclusion than
that the Questionessuperocio librisPhysicorum
in the Cesena ms. .
VIII.
5
been
have
Malatestiana S.
incorrectlyattributedto Buridan.9
etcorruptione
The Questiones
on De generatione
In Ch. Lohr' s reportit says, thatthe Cesena ms. . Malatestiana also
contains a textof Buridan' s Questiones
etcorrupsuperlibrisDe generatione
tione
.10 G. Federici-Vescovini, on the other hand, mentions that the
of this work, but not the
Cesena ms. only contains a tabulaquestionum
textitself.11Besides, the ms. has a veryinterestingintroduction,to the
et corruptione
withinthe frameworkof
effectthat it places De generatione

8 Maier(1968),260-263.Thesetranscribed
withMaier's line
fragments
correspond
in thatorder.
1-7,84-92,and 110-end
9 Forthispurpose
I haveconsulted
thefollowing
mss.:Bologna,Collegiodi Spagne
ms.160;Brugge,
477;Venezia,Bibi.Naz. Marc.VI 218
OpenbareStadsbibliotheek
oftheBrugesms.,whichshowsthat
(= 3022).Pattin(1978),14 givesa description
inc.andexpl.areidentical
withthoseofourCesenams.We maytherefore
add the
ms.Cesena,. Malatestiana
S. VIII. 5 ff.5ra-74rb
toLohr'slist((1967),350)ofQuestiones
on thePhysics
byAlbertofSaxony.
10Lohr(1970),
171.
11Federici-Vescovini
(1976),31.
72

12:59:23 PM

Aristotle'slibrinaturales.Federici-Vescovini' s findingshave been confirmedby D. Fiori.12Here also both authors take the ms. attribution
forgranted.
This causes a problem, however, since a comparison between the
titlesof the questions of the Cesena ms. ' table of contentsand the titles
of another ms.
of Buridan' s
Basel,
Questiones (e.g.
UniversittsbibliothekF. V. 2, ff.64r-86r, or Munich, Clm. 19551,
ff. 106r-125v)13shows that there are many differences.Not only the
sequence of the titlesdiffersin the Italian ms., but also many questiones
have no equivalent in the other mss. (and vice versa). The introduction is also missing, at least in the mss. Basel, Universittsbibliothek
F.V.2; Berlin, SB lat. fol. 387 and Munich, Clm. 19551,14whereas
certainothermss. of Buridan's Questions on De gen. et corr. do have
the Introduction.15
Thus we findboth a similaritywith regardsto the Introductionand
discrepancies with regards to titlesand text. It seems to me therefore
that the attributionof this text to Buridan remains questionable. For
establishingthe authorshipit would be necessaryto identifyothermss.
containingthe textwhich once belonged to the Cesena ms. In orderto
faciliatethistask, I will presenthere the tabulaquestionum
, whichhas up
till now remained unpublished:
et corruptione
(f.4v: " est tabula questionumlibri De generatione
Parisiusperreverendm
doctorem
Iohannem
Bridam
disputatarum
magistrm
et suntnumero
39 ita,quodquestiones
primisunt25; secundivero14".
Tabulaquestionum
primilibriDe generatione.
1. Primaquestioestutrumvocessignificent
etnonexidemreexistente
istente.
(in carta89).16
2. Utrumrebusscibilibus
de eis.(incarscientiam
coruptis
possitmanere
ta 89).
3. Utrumde generabilibus
etcoruptibilibus
possitessescientia.
(in carta
90).
4. Utrumuniversale
sitperse generabile
etcoruptibile.
(in carta91).
5. Utrummobilead formam
sitsubiectum
huiuslibri,(in carta91).
12cf.Leonardi(1982),148-151.
13Thesearetwomss.ofBuridan's
degen.etcorr
. mentioned
Questiones
byLohr(1970),
171.Thefollowing
mss.canbeaddedtoLohr'ssurvey:
Liege,BU 346C,ff.53-94(cf.
Pattin(1978),103),Munich,Clm. 4376,ff.125-150(cf.Markowski
(1981),70).
14Maier(1952),
120hasbeenmyreference
withregards
totheBerlinms.
15AsMaier(1952),120indicates,
thisisthecaseforbothmss.ofErfurt,
B. Ampl.F.
325andF. 357.The sameholdstrueforWien,O.N.B. 5453.
16The foliating
(in carta...)has beendonebytheownerofthems.Cesena.I will
comebacktothislater.
73

12:59:23 PM

6. Utrumgeneratio
etcoruptio
sintpassiones
entium
naturalium.
(incarta
92).
7. Utrumistasitbonaconsequentia:
sipossibile
estgenerari,
impossibile
estea alterari.
(in carta93).
8. Utrumomnecorpussitdivisibile
superomnepunctum,
(incarta93).
9. Utrumsitdaregenerationem
datam,(in carta94).
simpliciter
10. Utrumsempergeneratio
uniussitcoruptio
alterius
et econverso,
(in
carta95).
11. Utrummateriasitcausapeipetuitatis
et coruptionis.
generationis
(in
carta95).
12. Utrumgeneratio
diffrt
ab alteratione.
(in carta96).
13. Utrumingeneratione
dictafiatresolutio
simpliciter
usquead materiam
primam,
(in carta96).
14. Utrumaliquaforma
accidentalis
maneat
eademingenerato
etcorupto.
(in carta97).
15. Utrumrarefactio
sitproprie
augmentatio.
(in carta98).
16. Utrumcorpuscumadvenitcibusaugeatur
velcibus,velmateria
vel
aliud,(in carta99).
17. Utrumin augmentatione
viventium
materiam
fluant
partessecundum
etrefluant,
(in carta100).
18. Utrumqualibetparsauctisitaucta.(incarta101).
19. Utrumaugmentatio
sitperse motus,(in carta102).
20. Utrumomnisactioetpassiofiant
ad passum.(in
percontactum
agentis
carta102).
21. Utrumsimilepatiatur
a simili,veldissimile
a dissimili,
(incarta103).
22. Utrumignissitcontrarius
aque. (in carta103).
23. Utrumforme
elementorum
suscipiant
magiset minus,(incarta104).
24. Utrumforme
elementorum
inmixto,
maneant
(in carta105).
25. Utrummixtio
sitpossibilis.
(in carta106).
Tabulaquestionum
secundilibriDe generatione
etcoruptione.
1. Utrumsinttantum
quattuor
primequalitates
tangibiles.
(incarta107).
2. Utrumaqua sitprimofrigida,
(in carta108).
3. Utrumcaliditas
naturalis
igniset aerissinteiusdemspeciei.(in carta
109).
4. Utrumprimarum
due sintactive,scilicet
qualitatum
tangibilium
calidum
etfrigidum;
duepassive,
scilicet
humidum
etsiccum.(incarta
109).
5. Utrumomniaelementa
sintad invicemimmediate
transmutabilia.
(in
carta110).
6. Utrum
elementa
habentia
simbolum
ad invicem
facilius
transmutentur.
(in carta111).
7. Utrumde necessitate
sisuntinfinita
elementa,
sequatur,
quodsuntinfinite
contrarietates.
(in carta112).
8. Utrumomniacomparabilia
in eademvel in consimili
communicent
materia,
(in carta112).
9. Utrumomniamixtaque suntcircalocummedium,
sintcomposita
ex
omnibus
simplicibus
corporibus.
(in carta113).
10. Utruminnaturasitpossibile
mixtum
reperiri
simpliciter
temperatum.
(in carta114).
11. Utrumcalidum,
etsiccumsintprincipia
humidum
activain
frigidum,
mixtorum.
generationibus
(in carta114).
74

12:59:23 PM

12. Utruminrebusperpetua
sitgenerado
etcoruptio.
(in carta115).
13. Utrum,si celumcessaret
a motu,aliquagenerado
essent.
et coruptio
(in carta116).
14. Utrum
ideminnumero
inistisinferioribus.
possitreverti
coruptum
(in
carta116).
Save fora fewexceptionsthe titlesof these questiones
are verbatim
the
same as those of a surveyof an anonymous
collectionof Questions on De
in
et
the
ms.
lat.
3097
corr.
Vat.
which was published by A.
gen.
Maier.17 A comparison between the Cesena ms. and the Vatican ms.
leads to the followingobservations: The questiones
1-10 inci. of Book I
run parallel in both mss. Questiones11 and 13 have no equivalent in
Vat. lat. 3097. Questio18 ("Utrum corpus vivens nutriaturquamdiu
vivitet non augeatur quamdiu vivit") of the Vat. lat. is missingin the
Cesena ms. The followingquestiones
are practicallyidentical again; so
the Cesena ms. has one question more than the Vatican ms.18 The
titlesin Book II are the same in both mss. They also have the same proemium.
A. Maier is of the opinion that the anonymous questiones
of the ms.
Vat. lat. 3097 are Nicole Oresme's (d. 1382) commentaryon De gen.
et corr. that was considered lost.19Her firstargumentis the matterof
style. She thinks she recognizes "der lebendige, temperamentvolle,
manchmal brillanteStil" of Oresme.20
The second argumentis the factthat Albert of Saxony and Marsilius
of Inghen base theirQuestiones
on De gen. et corr. upon Buridan's (in
the redaction known to Maier) and on the above mentioned
anonymous commentaryof Vat. lat. 3097. It is a well known fact,
however,that at otheroccasions Albertof Saxony as well as Marsilius
of Inghen repeatedlybase theirown commentarieson Aristotleupon
Buridan's and Oresme's commentaries. So for Maier it is obvious
thereforeto assume that theyhave done the same with regards to the
on De gen. et corr. From which she draws the conclusion
Questiones
17cf.Maier(1955),535-536.
18As a result
ofthesedifferences
theorderofquestiones
hasbeenchanged
somewhat.
Vat.lat.3097q. 11corresponds
withq. 12oftheCesenams.;q. 12-q.14;q. 13-17inci.withq. 15-q.19 ind.;q.18hasnoequivalent
as wehavealready
seen;q. 19-24incl.
withq. 10-25incl.
correspond
19Maier(1952),123;(1955),536.
20Maier(1952),
On pp. 118-134onecanfinda discussion
123-124.
ofa fewcommentaries
onDe gen.etcorr.andtheir
mss.NotethatMaierdidnotknowtheCesenams.
B. Malatestiana
S.VIII. 5 at thetime.Lohr(1972),123has takenoverMaier'sattribution
ofVat. lat.3097toOresme.
75

12:59:23 PM

that the anonymous collection must be fromOresme.21 The underlying implicit assumption here is, that the anonymous text of the
Vatican ms. is notthe same as the redactionof Buridan' s textthatwas
used by Maier. It is true, Maier has established the fact that the
anonymous Questionesof the Vatican ms. differ from Buridan's,
aithough in some cases the titlesare identificai.22She too found that
the anonymous commentaryshowed "eine gewisse Abhngigkeitvon
Buridan' ' on the one hand, but on the other hand also "eine starke
Selbstndigkeitdes Denkens und eine Art der Darstellung, die weit
ber den Durchschnitt steht und auf einem Verfasser von hohen
Niveau schliessen lsst".23
Maier' s discussion of the contentsof the Questions on De gen. et
corr. of the Vat. lat. ms. 3097 makes it sufficiently
clear, thatthistext
must definitelybe placed against the intellectualbackground of the
14th centuryParisian "school". One may question, however, her attributionof these anonymous Questionesto Oresme; even more so,
since afterMaier' s publication another ms. has been discovered, conon De gen. et corr. and which explicitly
taining a text of Questiones
names Oresme as its author: Firenze, . Naz., Conv. Sop.
H. IX. 1628, ff. l-76v.24 This is not the same text as the one in the
Vatican ms.25
In my opinion we should consider the possibilitythat in Vat. lat.
on De gen. et
redaction of Buridan's Questiones
3097 we have another
corr. This hypothesiscould be corroboratedwith the followingobservations:
1. In the first place we have the explicit attribution of the
anonymous Questions of the Cesena ms., a ms. not known to Miss
Maier: (f.4r) "Incipit ordo istius libri De generatione ad alios libros
naturales secundum magistrmIohannem Bridam". Then followsthe
preface: "Prima pars scientie naturalis tractat de entibus
21cf.Maier(1952),124.
22Maier(1952),121. 71,and122hasbasedhercomparison
F.
onthemss.Erfurt,
The mss.Basel,F.V.2 and
357 and Berlin,lat. fol.387 of Buridan'sQuestiones.
ofMaier's
confirm
thecorrectness
Munich,Clm. 19551,whichI haveconsulted,
observations.
23Maier(1952),123.
* Menut(19bo),Zo5. thisms.hasalready
beenreferred
toinKnsteller
(1),lo.
utrum
de entemobile
whichMenutgives(' 'Primoqueritur
theincipit
Unfortunately
desubiecto")
isnotfrom
. Naz.Conv.
sithaecscientia
ad formam
Firenze,
tamquam
thatthemss.listed
Vat.lat.2185!He didnotnotice
byhim
Sop.H.IX 1628,butfrom
on De gen.etcorr.
commentaries
andattributed
toOresme,containdifferent
25In theAppendix
a survey
ofthetitlesofOresmes questions.
I present
76

12:59:23 PM

naturalibus..." It concludes with the significant remark (f.4va):

"Hunc ordinem libri De generatione ad alios hie scripsipropterduo:
Primo, quia utilis est ad evidentiam omnium que dicentur; secundo,
quia ipsum Iohannes Bridam ponit in expositionelibriDe generatione
cuius libri questiones secundum eundem Iohannem infradicenturvel
ponentur. Quarum questionum est sequens tabula per rubricas protensa. Amen." Then the tabula of questions followswith the above
mentioned incipit, stating again that we are dealing here with
Buridan' s Questionesdisputate.The survey of titles concludes with
thefollowingexplicit(f.4vb) : ' ' Explicittabula questionumdisputatarum
super duobus libris De generatione et corruptione. Amen." The
Preface of this ms. is identical with the one of Vat. lat. 3097, and the
titlesof the questions are nearly identical. Besides, the same Preface
appears in some mss. ofDe gen. et corr. ofwhich Buridan's authorship
has never been doubted.26The assumption that Vat. lat. 3097 conon De gen. et corr. is
tains a second redaction of Buridan's Questiones
not basically being refutedby any of Maier' s argumentsin favourof
Oresme's authorship. On the contrary,her remarksto the effectthat
the commentary of Vat. lat. 3097 shows a certain dependency on
Buridan' s could be seen as a corroborationof this hypothesis.
2. The ms. Vat. lat. 2185, mentioned by A. Maier, contains on
ff.40ra-61rb anonymous
on De gen. et corr.27At the end of
Questiones
the firstbook of thiscollectiontwo questions fromBuridan' s commentary and his Introduction have been inserted: (f.50ra) "Expliciunt
questiones primi De generatione secundum ilium, sed ponuntur alie
due disputate per Iohannem Bridam cum quodam suo prohemio."
And indeed, then follows the Prologue and the questiones"utrum
voces significentidem re existenteet non existente", and "utrum de
generalibus et corruptibilibuspossit esse scientia". These are the
questions 1 and 3 of the ms. Cesena, . Malatestiana S. VIII. 5 and the
ms. Vat. lat. 3097. Thus in Vat. lat. 2185 we have anotherexplicitattributionto Buridan.
26Namelyin theabovementioned
B. Ampl.F. 325andF. 357.With
mss.Erfurt,
tothispointI havenotbeenabletoconsult
themss.Praha,Metr.Kap. 1286,
regards
ff.89v-lllrandWien,.N.B. 5453,ff.30r-48v,
whichaccording
toLohr(1970),171
alsocontainBuridan
's text.Besidesone mustbearin mindthatthereis alwaysthe
theoretical
thatan Introduction
hasbeentransmitted
fromthe
possibility
separately
somewhere
elseat a laterdate.
text,andhasbeeninserted
27Maier(1952),120-121.
An elaborate
analysisofVat. lat.2185hasbeengivenby
Maier(1961),191-201.
77

12:59:23 PM

A. Maier stated that both titles also occur in the only redaction of
3 and 1
Buridan' s De gen. et corr. she knew, namely in questiones
text
these
form
that
the
of
two
differs
theone
but
questiones
respectively,
ofVat. lat. 2 185.28This discrepancycould well be explained by theexistenceof a second redactionof Buridan's De gen. et corr. In such case
the questions 1 and 3 of Book I includingthe Prologue would then be
the ones found in Vat. lat. 2185.
3 . In connectionwiththese two argumentsI would like to draw the
attentionto a remarkable item with regards to Vat. lat. 2185. There
appears to be considerable differencebetween the rest of the text of
Book I in Vat. lat. 2185 and Book I in Vat. lat. 3097. Compare the
titlesforexample. Book II on the other hand runs almost exactly the
same as Book II of the Vat. lat. 3097. For Maier this was even the
reason for calling Vat. lat. 2185 a " Ziemlich eingreifende
Umarbeitung".29 On the other hand one could also say by way of
texts.One could
argument,thathere we are dealing withtwo different
- besides the
lat.
as
to
whether
Vat.
on
the
2185
speculate
question
questiones
explicitlyattributedto Buridan perhaps contains another
commentaryon De gen. et corr.
A real conclusion on the authorshipof the Questiones
of Cesena, .
Malatestiana S. VIII. 5 (in its entiretypresentedin Vat. lat. 3097) can
only be arrived at after a painstaking text-comparison between
Buridan's Questiones
and the so called otherredaction thereofin Vat.
lat. 3097. 30 Also the text of the ms. Firenze, . Naz., Con. Sop.
H.IX. 1628 must then be drawn into this investigation.
All I want to do here is simply indicate that the Questions on De
gen. et corr. of the ms. B. Malatestiana which are explicitlyattributed
to Buridan, are not identical to those known to us throughMaier' s
publications. The way things stand at the moment an attributionof
these Questiones
to Oresme is also questionable. The least we can say is,
28Maier(1952),121,namely
n. 71: "...brigensseibemerkt,
dassdiebeidenQuestionenin derDurchfhrung
ziemlich
abweichen
vondenentsprechenden
in denhs.
Erfurt
F. 357undBerlinlat.2 387." Bothmss.contain
Buridan's
onDe
Questions
et corr.in theonlyredaction
thatwasknownat thetime.
gen.
29cf.Maier(1952),122-123whereshepointed
outthediscrepancies
between
both
mss.withregards
to BookI.
30Prof.H. A. G. Braakhuis
and I are studying
thefirst
twoquestions
ofBookI in
Vat. lat. 3097 ("utrumvocessignificent
et nonexistente"
and
idemre existente
"utrumrebusscibilibuscorruptis
de eis") and their
possitmanerescientiam
in Vat. lat. 2185andin Buridan'sCommentary.
Perhapsthisstudywill
equivalent
solvethequestion
ofauthorship.
78

12:59:23 PM

redaction of Buridan' s Questions cannot

that the possibilityof another
ruled
be
out.31
simply
Another interestingaspect of the ms. Cesena, . Malatestiana
S. VIII. 5 are the annotationsin the margin by a one time owner of the
ms. (end 14th-beginning15th century). At the end of the tabulaquesof the Physicshe makes the remark(f.3vb): "Nota quod habeo
tionum
'
etiam questiones super libro Phisicorum secundum alios doctores.'
Among the authorshe then mentionsis also Blasius of Parma: "Item,
habeo questiones secundum Blasium librorum Phisicorum in libro
uno per se, in quo etiam sunt conclusiones super libris Phisicorum
secundum Blasium ipsum." G. Federici-Vescovini has been able to
as well as the Quesidentifythiscodex, which contains the Conclusiones
tioneson the Physics of Blasius of Parma: Vat. lat. 2 159. 32 It is interestingto see thatthiscodex Vat. lat. 2159 refersto the Cesena ms.
(f.227vb): "Item, habeo eas (seil, the Questions on thePhysics) secundum Bridam in libro in quo sunt etiam questiones de generatione
secundum Bridam.' '
Federici-Vescovini has not mentioned the fact that there are more
mss. withannotationsby thisowner in existence: forexample Vat. lat.
2185! With regards to the anonymous Questions on De gen. et corr.
this same owner remarks: (f.40v) "Habeo etiam istas questiones
secundum Marsilius de Hingen..., Item, habeo ipsas secundum
Bridam in uno libro, in quo sunt etiam questiones super libro
Phisicorum secundum ipsum Bridam.33" This seems to be a clear
referenceto our Cesena ms., which indeed also contains Questions on
the Physicsthatare being attributedto Buridan, as we have seen. The
owner who made these annotations was in all probabilitya certain
Bernardus a Campanea ofVerona, a medicus
,34From referencesmade
by the owner of these mss. we may conclude that the textof Buridan' s
(?) De gen. et corr. in the ms. Cesena, . Malatestiana S. VIII. 5 must
have been lost at a later date. As possible evidence of this may also be
seen the tabulaquestionum
of thisms. Aftereveryquestio we find-in the
owner's own handwriting-informationas to the foliumon which each
31Forthatmatter
itis notunusualforBuridantomakemorethanonecommentary
on oneandthesameworkofAristotle.
Forexamples
see Lohr(1972),163-182.
32Federici-Vescovini
(1976).32.
33Thorndike
Maier
(1952),83 givesthisreference
onlyin an Englishtranslation,
121transcribes
ofthepassagereferring
to Buridan.
(1955),
only
part
34cf.Federici-Vescovini 32 and Maier
(1976),
(1961),110.
79

12:59:23 PM

questiobegins (in carta...) These folia, however, are missing in the

codex (ff.89-116). 35
In his 'catalogue' the owner of these mss. has withoutdoubt taken
forgrantedthe attributionsmade in the mss.36HopefullyI have made
clear that in the case of the ms. Cesena, . Malatestiana S. VIII. 5 this
was not quite correct.
Summary
By way of conclusion we may add the followingthree items to A.
Maier's and G. Federici-Vescovini' s investigations:
in the ms. Cesena, .
1. The Questionessuper libris Physicorum
Malatestiana S. VIII. 5 have been incorrectly attributed to John
Buridan. Their real author is Albert of Saxony.
2. The ms. Cesena, . Malatestiana S. VIII. 5 ff.4ra-4vb contains
of the Questions on De gen. et
the Prologue and the tabulaquestionum
corr., whereas the ms. Vat. lat. 3097 ff. 103ra-146rbhas the complete
text. This Prologue and the questions 1 and 3 can also be found in
Vat. lat. 2185 ff.50ra-50vb. This textcertainlycannot be considered
as another copy of Buridan' s well known Questions on De gen. et
corr. Neither is it certain that Nicole Oresme is their author, as A.
Maier seems to believe. There are indicationspointingin the direction
of a redaction otherthan the one known, of Buridan' s Questions. In
any case this possibilitycannot be ruled out by the material that has
been presentedhere.
3. The ms. Cesena, . Malatestiana S. VIII. 5 has at one time had
the same owner as the codices Vat. lat. 2159, 2160, 2185 and 3066,
and the codices Cesena, . Malatestiana S. VII. 5 and S. VIII. 2. This
owner was in all probability Bernardus a Campanea of Verona, a
physician.
35Besidestherearetwomoremss.inCesena,. Malatestiana
anfundwithsimilar
toas in the
notations
bytheowner.Sincein thesemss.thesameworksarereferred
assumethatwe aredealingwiththe
Vat. mss.,onecouldsafely
alreadymentioned
tothesemss.
sameownerhere.Grabmann
(1928),105-106hasdrawntheattention
(S.VII.5 andS.VIII.2).
36Perhapsthisalso explainswhytheownerhas addedto thetitle1'Questiones
de
bridanum"thefollowing
et corruptione
aristotilis
partimsecundum
generacione
inVat. lat.2185;"scilicetsupersecundolibroetin fineprimilibrisuntdue
remark
secundum
questiones
ipsumbridanum".
(cf.Maier(1961),197).Theownerhimself
BookII inVat.lat.2185and
theanonymous
between
seenthesimilarity
hasprobably
S.VIII. 5, whichwasalsoa ms.in hispossession,
thesameBookin B. Malatestiana
toBuridanthere.
andwhichwasattributed
80

12:59:23 PM

APPENDIX
oftheCommentary
onDe gen.etcorr.attributed
Listofquestions
toNicoleOresme,
tothems.Firenze,. Naz. Conv. Sop. H.IX 1628.
according
BookI.
< concludi
> (?) aliquamgenerationem
esse.
1. Utrumpossitevidenter
sitalteratio.
2. Utrumgeneratio
eritinpossibilis,
3. Utrumsi generatio
alteratio
eritinpossibilis.
4. Utrumforme
et remitelementorum
suscipiunt
magiset minus,siveintendantur
tantur.
maneant
inmixto,
etlicetistaquestiositsupratextum
5. Utrumforme
elementorum
tamenvoloipsamdeterminare
sequentem.
propter
questionem
sequentem,
alterius
eteconverso.
6. Utrumomnisgeneratio
uniussitcorruptio
ad materiam
7. Utrumin generatione
sitresolutio
primam.
simplici
8. Utrumaliquaqualitasmaneateademin generato
quampriusfuitincorrupto.
9. Utrumdatoaliquogenerabili,
posseta quolibetplurium
agentium
generari.
10.Utrum
illudpossitinplurium
instantium
datoaliquogenerabili,
quolibet
generari.
11. Utruminomnialteratione
fiatreactio.
sitgeneratio.
12. Utrumaugmentatio
naturalis
13.Utrumaugmentum
maneatidemin principio
etinfine
augmentationis
de diminutione.
ipsius,et similiter
14.Utrumquelibet
parsauctisitaucta.
15.Utrumaugmentatio
etnonsecundum
materiales.
fiatsecundum
partesformales
sitmotuscontinuus.
16.Utrumaugmentatio
17. Utrumomnisactioet passiofiantpercontactum,
itaquodagenssemper
tangat
passum.
18. Utrumsimilepossitagereinsibisimileautetiampatia simili,autetiamsemper
fiata dissimili.
19. Utrummixtio
sitpossibilis.
20. Utrumindivisibile
possitalterari.
sitnaturalis.
21. Utrumomnismixtio
BookII (f.45r.)
1. Utrum
sintquattuor
scilicet
tantum
fri
et
caliditas,
qualitates
prime,
giditas,siccitas
humiditas.
2. Utrum
duesuntactive,
scilicet
calidum
etfrigidum,
quattuor
qualitatum
primarum
etduepassive,
scilicet
ethumidum,
siccum
etmoreAristotelis
contractum
pro
ponitur
abstracto.
etnonplura.propter
est
3. Utrum
sintquattuor
elementa
cavillationes
intelligendum
sic:utrumsintquattuor
ominspecieetnoninnumero,
scilicet
speciessignificantes
nia elementa,
nonestdeterminatum.
quia quantumad numerum
4. Utrumcaliditasigniset caliditasaerissinteiusdemrationis
et eodemmodode
humiditate
de frigiditate
terre
etcumhocde
aqueetaerisetsimiliter
aqueetfrigiditate
siccitate
ignisetterre,
quia eademestdifficultas.
5. Utrumquodlibet
elementorum
habeatunamde primisqualitatibus
magisprinscilicet
estmagissiccipaliter
quamaliameteo modoquoponitAristoteles,
quodterra
ca quamfrigida
etaqua primofrigida
et aerprimohumidus
etignisprimocalidus.
6. Utrumsitaliquodpurumsimplex
elementm.
7. Utrum
omniaelementa
sintad invicem
itaquodquodlibet
transmutabilia,
possitin
transmutari.
quodlibet
8. Utrumelementa
habentia
etcitiustransmutentur.
facilius
symbolm
9. Utrumex duobuselementis
possittertium
generari.
81

12:59:23 PM

etetiaminquolibet
infinite
essent
contrarietates
essent
10.Utrumsielementa
infinita,
essentinfinite
elemento
qualitates.
ex omnibus
11. Utrumquodlibetmixtumcircamediumlocumsit compositum
simplicibus.
mixtiex elementis.
activain generatione
12. Utrumqualitates
primesintprincipia
vel qualitatibus
ex elementis,
13. Utrumpossitesse aliquodmixtum
temperatum
eorum.
sitperpetua.
14. Utrumgeneratio
suedurationis.
habeatdeterminatam
15. Utrumquodlibet
periodum
corruptibile
deogratias
etcorruptione
libride generatione
explicit
(f.77vb)'...etsicestfinissecundi
amen.Sdamineomnifactopercivitatem.
etcorruptione
: Explicit
liberde generatione
nicolajorem.
colophon
Nijmegen
K. U.
Instituut
Philosophisch
List ofcitedworks.
di Buridano
manoscritti
G. (1960),Su alcuni
Federici
, in: RivistaCriticadi
Vescovini,
Storiadella Filosofia,
15,413-427.
au
enItalieduXI Vesicle
deJeanBuridan
desoeuvres
dela diffusion
.4propos
, (1976),
21-47.Copenhagen.
Buridan
XVIesicle
; ed.J. Pinborg,
, in: TheLogicofJohn
e scienzia.
Firenze.
, (1979),Astrologia
XIV. Firenze.
nelsecolo
, (1983),"Arti"efilosofia
undAristoteleslateinische
M. (1928).Mittelalterliche
Grabmann,
Aristotelesbersetzungen
Bibliotheken.
Mnchen.
inHandschriften
kommentare
spanischer
mean
Latinorum
aeviinAristotelem
commentanorum
quae
Korolec,G. B. (1977),Kepertonum
asservantur
.
nunc
Statni
Knihovna
CSR vocata
olimUniverstatis
inBibliotheca
Pragensis
Wroclaw.
italiane.
Voi. 4.
nelle
biblioteche
di manoscritti
. (ed) (1982),Catalogo
Leonardi,
filosofici
Firenze.
in:
Commentaries.
Authors
LatinAristotle
JacobusJoh.luff,
Lohr,. H. (1970),Medieval
Traditio,
26, 135-216.
de
Addenda
etCorrigenda
LatinAristotle
Commentaries.
, in:Bulletin
, (1972),Medieval
S.I.E.M.P., 14, 116-126.
vonScholastik
undNaturwissenschaft.
Roma.
Maier,A. (1952),AnderGrenze
in:Autour
d'Aristote.
Aristoteleskommentare
des14.Jahrhunderts,
, (1955),Verschollene
ancienne
etmdivale
A.
offert
monseigneur
Receuild'tudesde philosophie
Mansion,515-541.Louvain.
A. Maier.In BiblioVaticani
Latini.Codices
2118-2192
., recensuit
, (1961),Codices
thecaVaticana.
Monamanuscriptis
bibliothecarum
M. (1981),Buridanica
Markowski,
quaein codibus
Wroclaw.
censium
asservantur.
latinorum
MediiaeviinAristotelem
Commentariorum
Pattin,A. (1978),Repertorium
quaein
asservantur.
Leuven.
bibliothecis
belgicis
medieval
in: Scriptorum,
L. (1953),A highly
7, 81-88.
Thorndike,
library,
specialized

82

12:59:23 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 1 (1986)
BooksReceived

A curadiA. Lamacchia,
anSant'Agostino,
La vera
traduzione,
introduzione,
religione.
notazione
di PasqualePorro,AdriaticaEditrice,Bari1986,203 p.
andPaganism
EditedbyJ. N.
, 350-750.TheConversion
ofWestern
Europe.
Christianity
of Pennsylvania
Revisededition,University
Press,Philadelphia
Hillgarth,
1986,XVII & 213p. ISBN 0 81227993X & 0 8122 12134 (pbk)
WilliamChesterJordan,From
Servitude
toFreedom.
inthe
Manumission
intheSnonais
Thirteenth
of Pennsylvania
Press,Philadelphia
1986,VIII
, University
Century
& 149p. ISBN 0 812280067
in theDibner
and
oftheDibnerCollection
Library
ofScience
Manuscripts
oftheHistory
Institution
Libraries
, SmithsonianInstitution
of theSmithsonian
Technology
D.C. 1985,XIII & 145p. ISBN 0 88135025 7
Libraries,Washington,
First
FourTracts
Fallacie
, Obligationes,
John
ofHolland,
ofLogic{Suppositions,
Insolubilia).
theManuscripts
andIndices,byE.
Critical
Editionfrom
withan Introduction
P. Bos,Ingenium
Publishers,Nijmegen
1985,XLVII & 192p. ISBN 90 70419
11 4
In SixBooks
Proclus
fromthe
, ThePlatonic
, Vol. I: BooksI-III. Translated
Theology.
GreekbyThomasTaylor.Witha Preface
byR. BaineHarris,Selene Books,
KewGardens,
N.Y. 1985(Repr.tr.Taylor,London1816,ISBN 0 96098666
9 (pb;)
TheRuodlieb.
Editedwithtranslation
and notesby C. W. Grocock,BolchazyCarducciPublishers/Aris& Phillips,Chicago/Warminster
1985,235 p.
TexteditedbyI. J. Mueller,
Tractatus
deUniversalibus.
ClarendonPress,
Wyclif
John
Oxford1985(Repr.1986),XCIII & 403 p. ISBN 0 19 8246803
On Universais
de Universalibus).
Texttranslated
JohnWyclif
( Tractatus
byA. Kenny,
withan Introduction
byP. V. Spade,ClarendonPress,Oxford1985,LI & 184
p. ISBN 0 19 8246811
Versus.Quaderni
di studi
semiotici
medievale
, 38/39(maggio-dicembre
1984).Semiotica
a cura di U. Eco. - Contents:U. Eco, R. Lambertini,
. Marmo,A.
intheMedieval
OnAnimal
Tabarroni,
; R. Pellerey,
Language
Classification
ofSigns
Tommaso
: semiotica
naturale
e processo
; A. Tabarroni,Segno
d'Aquino
gnoseologico
e teoria
inOckham
mentale
dellarappresentazione
la meta.
; R. Lambertini,
L'origine
Percorsi
deimodisti
diOckham
; C. Marmo,Guglielmo
dell'interpretazione
contemporanea
e il significato
delle
Enunciazioni
circail modo.
Peruna
; M. Colmegna,
proposizioni
dellalogica
delle
modalit
e recensioni;
Summaries
; segnalazioni
grammatica
English
ofItalianArticles.
toL. M. de Rijk,Ph.D. on the
andMetaphysics.
Studiesdedicated
Mediaeval
Semantics
OccasionofHis60thBirthday.
EditedbyE. P. Bos,Ingenium
Publishers1985,
XXIX & 350p. ISBN 90 7041910 6 - Contents:
K. Jacobi,Diskussionen
ber
in Peter
Abaelards
Kommentar
zu Peri hermeneias;
D. P.
unpersnliche
Aussagen
s Mereological
. H. Kneepkens,"Omnis homo
Henry,Abelard'
Terminology,
'
and12thCentury
Grammar:
; H. A.
resurge: A NoteontheEarlyRestriction
Theory
83

12:59:29 PM

? TheContribution
onUniuocal
totheDiscussion
versus
Bacon
G. Braakhuis,
Kilwardby
Kilwardin
a
attributed
to
Robert
and
Sophism
Non-Beings
found
ofBeings
Signification
: la scission
de l'universel
; J. A. Aertsen,Der
by; J. Jolivet,Logiquecathare
inderSummaTheologiae
desThomas
von
OrtderGottesbeweise
wissenschaftstheoretische
DunsScotus.
Some
Semantical
andLogical
oftheYoung
Aquin'A. Vos,OnthePhilosophy
auXlVe
etthologie
trinitaire
dela doctrine
delasupposition
; A. Maier,Apropos
Aspects
in
De arteobligatoria
andEleonore
sicle
; N. Kretzmann
Stump,TheAnonymous
E. P. Bos,
Buridan
onIntentionality'
MS 306; Ria vanderLecq,John
Merton
College
siveDe taliter
et qualiter;G.
De veritate
et falsitate,
Peter
ofMantua'sTreatise
andFalsity.
Stanislaus
Nuchelmans,
ofZnaim(d. 1414)on Truth

84

12:59:29 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 2 (1986)
s Semanticsand His Doctrineof Being*)
PeterAbelard,'
L. M. DE RIJ

1 Preliminary
in Abelard
: Significatio
Abelard starts [GLPer. 335, 32ff.] from a rather broad sense of
'
significative according to which every word ( vox = 'articulate
sound') is significativeof the presence of a speaker ('prolator'). Of
course, like his contemporarieswhat he is really interestedin is those
words which are significativeof somethingwhich the speaker intends
to express concerningthe domain of whatever exists. In the wake of
Aristotle(De int. 3, 16b20) a word's significativefunctionis said to
consistin producingan idea in the hearer's mind which bears on some
entity. (Gl.Pred. 136,29ff.; Gl.Per. 339,20-340,6; D 112,30ff.) Significative words were commonly supposed to have acquired their
significationsthroughwhat was considered to be the historicalfactof

imposition' (impositio,institutio,inventici)as performed by some

or inventor
nominum
some time in the past (such as Adam in
impositor
Gen.
The
2:
Paradise;
concept of 'institution' hints at the
19-20).
(Ancients' and) Medievais' awareness of the fact that some social
agreement was required for there to be a 'universe of discourse'
[Gl.Por. 19,15; Gl.Pred 112,37ff.; 112,46].
'

andMediaeval
oftheseries' OnAncient
*) This paperis meantas a continuation
from1977-82.Forbibliographical
in
andMetaphysics'
this
Semantics
Journal
published
willbe continued
titlehasbeendroppedandthestudies
reasonstheoriginal
general
underseparatetitles.Someotherpaperson thesamesubjecthavebeenpublished
auf das mittelalterliche
Semantik
"Die Wirkung
der neuplatonischen
elsewhere:
- "Bocelogicien
mediaevalia
13(1981),19-35;
Denkenberdas Sein",inMiscellanea
de l'tre",inAttidiConetphilosophe:
etsa mtaphysique
sespositions
smantiques
di studiBoeziani(Paviaottobre
internazionale
1980), Roma 1981, 141-56:
gresso
in
of
Later
the
"Abailard'sSemantic
Viewsin
Logic
Developments", English
Light
to thetimeofWilliamofOckham
andSemantics
fromtheendofthetwelfth
century
on MediaevalLogic,Nijmegen
andBurleigh.
Actsofthe4thEuropeanSymposium
andJohannes
in RichardBillingham
Venator",inEnglish
1981,1-58:- "Semantics
on
Actsofthe5thEuropeanSymposium
LogicinItalyinthe14thand15thCenturies.
MediaevalLogicandSemantics,
Rejectthe
Napoli1982,67-83;- "Did Parmenides
SensibleWorld?",in Graceful
Reason.Essaysin Ancientand MedievalPhilosophy
toJosephOwensCSSR ... etc.Toronto1983,29-53.
presented
85

12:51:50 PM

For Abelard, 'significaiio' has two differentaspects. Of course,

tokens are used to referto 'things', i.e. all kind of entitieswhich are
(putatively) inhabitantsof the outside world. As a matterof fact,our
speech is mainly focussed upon 'real things', ratherthan 'figments'.
{Gl. Per. 315,29-30). However, the same tokens are used to convey
ideas (or entitiesqua conceived of; intellectus).
In Gl.Pred. 112,29-113,
3 Abelard is most explicit about this distinctionand sets out to make
it clear that the main aim of any imposition (or use) of significative
words is to produce some notion. For theirsemantic function,accordingly, the 'intellectus' conveyed by them is most vital.
Unlike some of his contemporaries, Abelard wishes to follow the
grammarians in also assigning some significationto conjunctionsand
prepositions [D. 119,30-120, 20; cf. Gl.Per. 338,2 Iff.] , to the extent
that theirs is mainly what was later labelled as a syncategorematic
function; that is, they do not have a meaning of their own, but,
togetherwith categorematicwords, contributeto the meaning of the
phrase involved. Sometimes Abelard even seems to be aware of their
operational character [Gl.Per. 336,27ff.; D. 118,14-25].
Nonetheless, the noun and the verb are the significativewords par
excellence.
On thisaccount, Abelard remindshis readers [D. 121, 28ff.]
of the fact that Aristotlediscussed only nouns and verbs. Nouns and
verbs are indeed perse significative,i.e. meaningfulby themselves,to
the extentthat even in complete isolation (as single lexical items, one
could say) theyconvey some definiteconception or idea. This is common doctrine with the Medievais. However, the contradistinction
between nouns and verbs vs prepositions, conjunctions and interjections is differently
viewed by them. Some people are of the opinion,
Abelard says, thatthe latterare also meaningfuleven quite apart from
any context, although when they are taken as lexical items, there is
somethinguncertain and vague about theirmeaning, but when connected with properly significativewords, they come to have a fullfledged meaning as parts of the meaningfulphrases involved, as e.g.
the preposition 'de' ('out of', or 'about') in the phrase 'de hornin'
(Gl. Per. 337,12ff.; ZU19,7ff.; cf. Mews [1985]: 4).
Abelard's objection to this view is especially interestingin that it
raises the question of the criteria for distinguishingnouns and verbs
from prepositions, conjunctions etc. He points out that as for nouns
and verbs, it may also be maintained thattheydo not have theirdeterminate meaning until some furtherdeterminationhas been given. He
instances [Gl.Per. 338, 3ff.] 'homo' ('man'), and 'diligo' ('I love') as
86

12:51:50 PM

opposed to phrases having a richer meaning such as 'homo albus'

('white man') and 'diligo Ricardum' ('I love Richard'). For that
reason, he prefersto assign them a proper significationof theirown,
whichtheyactuallyconvey only when theyare used in connectionwith
nouns and verbs. Thus their significationratheris 'co-signification'.
However, his ideas about co-significationof syncategorematicwords
stillwere rathervague, due to his seeminglytoo 'thing-like' conception of their semantic or syntacticfunctionas well as his failure in
recognizing mere operators or functors(cf. Gl.Per. 338,21-339, 4).
The phenomenon of co-signification plays an important role in
Abelard's thought,forthat matter. So it is at the basis of the notion
of temporalconnotationand of 'confusion of sememes' which may be
considered the key notions of his semantics (see below, pp. 88-9).
Since nouns and verbs are the principal conveyers of meaning we
have to startwith these 'parts of speech' ('partes orationis').
oratio
2 Nomen
, verbum,
The best way to elucidate Abelard's view on nouns and verbs is to
presenthis discussion of the criteriafordistinguishingbetween them.
. II 18, p. 55, 8-9; XVII 14, p. 116, 26Following Priscian ( Inst.gramm
7 etal.), grammariansused to distinguishthe differentparts of speech
according to theirdiverse meanings. Along these lines, the verb was
defined as a word which is mainly (principaliter
) significativeof an
action or a 'being-acted-upon' (' passio'), that is to say that verbs such
as 'sedere' ('to be seated') and 'vivere' ('to be alive') and even the socalled 'substantive verb' ('esse'; 'to be') are said to signifyan action
or a being-acted-upon [Gl.Per. 346, Iff.; D. 130,6ff.]. This mainly
grammatical view is rejected by Abelard in spite of its adherents'
attemptsto maintain it by assuming an equivocal use of verbs such as
'sedere', of whichtheyclaim thatit sometimesmeans the action of sitting,in its verbal function{in vi verbi
) that is, and at othertimes stands
for the state of being seated and thus acts, in fact, as a noun {in vi
nominis)ratherthan a verb. When applied to the substantiveverb this
way out induces the adherentsto make 'esse' equivocal as well in that,
as a verb, it may equivocally stand for all kinds of actions expressed
by otherverbs and, as a noun, forthe existence (or 'being given') of
any thingwhatsoeverincluding all kinds of accidental beings (such as
qualities and quantities). Of course, such a repeated refuge into the
domain of equivocity is bound to provoke Abelard's disapproval.
87

12:51:50 PM

In point of factAbelars solution sets about to more fullyemploy

the 'verbal vs nominal' distinctionintroduced by his opponents, in
that he applies it to the basic level of sememes as well. For each and
every sememe, e.g. the sememe common to 'white' ('albus,-um'),
'whiteness' (albedo) or 'be-white' ('albere7), you may form a noun
(whether substantival or adjectival) or a verb. Therefore, Abelard
argues, the criterionof lexical meaning fordistinguishingbetween the
noun and the verb is unsound. And it is at the same time against
authority,Abelard warns us (Gl. Per. 346,28-9), since it is Aristotle
himself who put forward (De int. 2, 16al9; 3, 16b6-9) the proper
criterionin saying that nouns and verbs differin that the latter'additionallysignifytime', and the formerdo not, and explainingthe verb's
distinctiveby the words: "a verb additionally signifiessomething's
''
obtainingnow.
To begin with the basic featureswhich the noun and verb have in
common, Abelard's explicit remark (Gl. Per. 346,25-8) should be
recalled to the effectthat "just as some nouns signifythingsin their
substantialness' (resin essentia
'; see below, pp. 110-1), while otherssigthem
after
some
adjacent property,so verbs do as well." All this
nify
amounts to assertingthat the noun as well as the verb have the dual
functionof naming and determining(cf. Kretzmann 494). 1 Indeed,
nouns such as 'lion' or 'brave' both name and determinea thing in
that using such nouns the 'thing' involved is introduced into the
universe of discourse as e.g. a 'lion-thing' or 'brave thing' or 'brave
lion-thing'. Of course, the functionof determiningcomes more to the
fore in the case of adjectival determinerssuch as 'brave', or 'red'.
Well, Abelard roughlyviews verbs along the same lines, and he does
this also in the wake of Aristotle(De int. 3, 169-20) who regarded
verbs merelyas a peculiar kind of common names. For Abelard also,
the naming-determiningfunctionas performedby a verb belongs to
its principal signification2(cf. Gl.Per. 357,1-3; D. 123,15-22; 131,
26ff.). Hereby it should be noticed, however, that the main function
of the verb is to determine ratherthan to name. Our author says in
this connection that by the second part of his definition[De int. 3,
16b7] Aristotle intends to make clear that verbs have mainly been
1 I prefer
tothatof'descriptive'
whichI haveused
Kretzmann's
label'determining'
elsewhere
(so De Rijk[19861,passim).
2 A noun'sor verb'sprincipal
as a conithasbyitself
is themeaning
signification
when
is partofitsmeaning
veyerofa sememe.Of course,temporal
co-signification
itis actually
used(as a finite
verb).Cf. Kretzmann
[1986],495,. 33.
88

12:51:50 PM

inventedfor'predication', whereas nouns ratherhave the functionof

statingsubjects (Gl. Per. 352, 4-6; see also below). To be sure, every
noun may be transformedinto a verb by simply adding a tense
indicator.
'
Abelard extensively discusses the ' consignificatio
temporis ('cosignificationof time', whetherpresent, preteriteor futuretime). His
remark( Gl.Per. 348, 28ff.; 359, 36; D 138, llff; see below) to theeffect
that in cases where no verb have been invented in order to convey
some sememe in a verbal manner, one may have recourse to forging
a stand-in by combining a noun (substantival or adjectival or a
nominal participle)with a finiteformof ' to be', fitsin with the same
line of thought. So there is no semantic difference,Abelard argues,
between 'sedere' and 'sedentem esse' or 'sedisse' and 'sedentem
fuisse'; indeed the circumscriptionshave the same meaning and the
same temporal co-significationas the one-word verbs have. Abelard
is glad enough to quote Aristotle's authorityagain, where the latter
remarks(De int. 12,21b9-10) thatthereis no differencebetween saying
that 'a man walks' and saying that 'a man is walking'. It should be
noted already that for Abelard' s semantics of the statement-making
utterance, this periphrasticdevice will prove to be of utmost importance (see below, 103).
Since the temporal connotation in the great commentary on
Perihermeneias
(Gl.Per. 36, 25ff.)is said to be the main semanticdistinctive between the noun and the verb, it is the more interestingto consider the two-sided position of participles. Abelard remarks (Gl.Per.
346, 32-4) that a part of speech such as 'amans' ('loving') is either a
noun or a participle designating one and the same action in either
function.It is only, he says, the temporal connotationwhich allows us
to set the two functionsapart and to determine this word as either a
noun or a verb.
However importantthe connotationof time may be in his Dialctica
,
not only as a distinctiveof the verb but in its own rightas well, our
author most significantlygoes so far as to bluntly reject Aristotle's
view thatverbs differfromnouns in having a co-significationof time,
since we may assign such a co-significationto nouns as well. Indeed
nouns, too could be considered as assigning theirmain significationto
the substratesinvolved in accordance with the time of the utterance:
circapersonam
cursum
D. 122,22-7:Sicutenim'curro'vel'currens'
tamquam
ita 'album' circa substantiam
inherentem
ei presentialiter
demonstrat,
nonenimalbumnisi
inherentem
albedinem
determinai;
presentialiter
tamquam
89

12:51:50 PM

albedinedicitur.
ex presenti
Undeettantum
'albi' nomendicerevidetur
quaninquodam
estinformatum',
sicutet'currens'
tum'quodpresentialiter
albedine
cursumparticipai.
presentialiter
inconnection
witha personas
Forjustas 'run'or 'running'
designate
running
in connection
whiteness
in him,just so 'white'determines
inhering
presently
>'3
witha substance
as presently
indeed,it is called'white< thing
inhering;
> ' seems
whiteness.
Hencethename'white< thing
onlybecauseofthepresent
tomeanjustas muchas 'thatwhichis presently
informed
justas
bywhiteness',
in somebody
in 'running'.
presently
partakes
'running'
Similarly substantive nouns have present time connotation:
D. 122, 29-31:Sicutenim'curritantumquantum'est currens'dicit,ita
mortale'.4
'homo'tantundem
quantum'<quod est> animalrationale
to'that
so 'man'istantamount
Forjustas 'runs'meansthesameas 'is running',
whichis, in thepresent
time,a mortalanimalendowedwithreason'.
Some lines furtheron our author again indicates the present time
co-significationof both substantival and substantivated adjectival
nouns:
albedinedatumest,ita etiam
D. 123, 11-5:"Sicutenim'album'ex presenti
et quemhominem
substantia
animalisrationalis
'homo'ex presenti
mortalis;
'hominis'
mortaleipsumostendis;et tantundem
dicis,iam animalrationale
est animal
vocabulumsonat quantum'quod' [quidemMS] presentialiter
mortale".
rationale
becauseofsomeprestosomething
Justas 'album'('thewhite
thing')isassigned
becauseofthe
so 'homo'('man') toois assignedto something
entwhiteness,
of a mortalanimalendowedwithreason.Andindeedthe
material
presence
inthepresent
tool'man'is equivalent
tothephrase'thatwhich,
time,
linguistic
is a mortalanimalendowedwithreason'.
For the presenttime connotation, see also D. 116, 25-6 and 137, 3-6.
So it may be said, in Abelard' s view, thatifit is a substantivalnoun
a name determinesa thingas subsistingor (if it is an adjectival noun)
as inhering in somethingelse at sometimeor other('aliquando').5
3 UnlikeLatin(and Greek)EnglishidiomrequireswhatGuthriecalls 'tiresome
'facV , 404,n. 1),suchas 'things',
'entities',
Philosophy
makeweights'
{History
ofGreek
tors'and so on whereGreekand Latin(and Dutchand German)haveonlythe
'album See also De
of'thewhite'{toleukon,
Rijk[1986],14.1,n. 13.
equivalents
*).
4 Tweedale[1976:288]isright
thatthetextas handeddownneedsemeninthinking
ofonlytheverb'est' is idiomatically
dation,buthissuppletion
wrong.Cf. alsoD.
123, 14-5quotedin thenextnote.
5 For the generalquestionof whether
Abelard'snotionof 'essentia'('material
seeDe Rijk[1981b],29-32.
actualexistence
intheoutside
includes
world,
presence')
seeDe Rijk[1981a]28-30and
vs'Facticity',
of'Actuality'
Fortheconnected
problem
[1981b],38-40.
90

12:51:50 PM

Jacobi is right in pointing out [1986: 153f.] that a noun such as

'album' does not mean 'white' in the sense of a dictionary entry
('albus'). Its neutrumalready hints at its being used in some context.
So it rather means 'something white' or 'a (the) white <thing>'.6
The same goes for a noun such as 'homo' which, when it is actually
used, is, by the same token,actually attributedto somebody existent
(or
supposed to be existent, speaking more precisely). Therefore, for
Abelard, a noun also has temporal connotation,so to speak, withinits
semanticvalue, which comes to be an actualdenotation of temporality
whenever the word is actually used in some context.
There is an interestingcontroversybetween modern scholars on
what exactly is meant by the noun's temporal co-signification.
Tweedale (1982: 146) is of the opinion thatthe noun used in predicate
position "has in isolation(my italics) a tense of its own (generally the
present) and thiscan conflictwith the tense of the copula". He refers
to the well-knownexample 'this old man was a boy' (' hic senexfuit
puer') which will be necessarily false if we treat 'boy' as retainingits
significationofpresenttime, forthen the sentenceis equivalent to 'this
old man was one of those who are presentlyboys' (fuitunusde habentibuspresentialiter
The remedy consists, Abelard says, in
pueritiam3).1
treatingthe copula plus predicate noun as one single construct('una
dictio') having the tense of the copula,8 to the extentthat the original
propositionis to be understood as: 'this old man is one of those who
were boys'.
Jacobi objects (1986: 164, n. 44) to the above view that our textual
evidence does not allow us to understand Abelard "as associating a
tense with the isolatednoun(my italics) generally the present" and
argues that to assume that in such cases as meant by Tweedale the
noun mustchange its meaning when it comes aftera copula in the past
or futuretense would be in conflictwith the wording of the passages
involved. Nor is it clear, Jacobi goes on, how a noun in isolation is
to convey a time co-significationon top of its main meaning. Finally
he refersto Gl.Per. 349, 31-3 where he thinksthat"Abelard speaks out
against the very theorywhich Tweedale attributesto him". He also
adduces Gl.Per. 349,33-350, 5. As a matter of fact, at 349,22-36 we
read:
6 Forthis'makeweight',
see above,p. 90, n. 3.
7 See Tweedale
D.
[1982], 146; cf. also PeterAbelard,Gl.Per.348,28-349,17;
138,5-140,22.
8 See Gl.Per.348,28ff.
D. 139,12-140,22
and 249,11-35.
(esp. 349,19-350,39);
91

12:51:50 PM

Quippe <sicut 'homo'> [Geyeronlysupplies<sicut>' tantumnomenest

vivorum
et 'cadaver'mortuorum,
et 4puer'eorumqui in praesenti
pueritiam
licettempus
nonnotet.Quodsiquisdicat'homo'nomenessehominum
habent,
tampraesentium
iamprofecto
aequaliter
quamfuturorum
quampraeteritorum,
et'homo'opposita
'mortuum'
nonsuntsicutaitAristoteles.
Etsicutveredicitur
'<hoc> cadaverfuithomo',et ita etiamverepotestdici 'hoc cadaverest
homo';qui cumipsumcadaversit,etiamunumesteorumquae ab 'hornin'
etverumestcadaveresseid quodestvelfuitvelerithomo.Si quis
nominantur;
autem dicat 'homo' per adiunctionem
'fuit' transirin significationem
non
preteritorum
quia verbumadiunctumtempuspraeteritum
significai,
videturratio,quia cumdico 'homoambulaviet 'ambulansambulavivel
'amansest(vel'erivel'fuit')amaturus'
(vel'amatus'),nonestnecessepropter
verborum
aliorumcommutari.
tempora
appositorum
significationem
It is quiteunderstandable
since<just as 'man'> is onlya namestanding
for
livingbeingsand 'corpse'fordead ones,in thesameway'boy' too < stands
time
for> thosewhointhepresent
haveboyhood,
it doesnotindicate
although
time.Forifsomebody
and
saysthat'man'isa nounstanding
equallyforpresent
oftheopposithedisappearance
men,wellthenhemustaccept9
pastandfuture
tionbetween
'dead' and 'man',whichAristotle
claimstheretobe, And,<on
> , as truly
thatsupposition
as itis said' < this> corpsewasa man',itcanalso
be truly
said'thiscorpseis a man';sinceheis thatverycorpse,itis alsooneof
thosethingswhichare nominated
by 'man', and it is true < stillon that
> thata corpseis thatwhichis,orwas,orwillbe,a man.However,
supposition
ifsomebody
theadditionof 'was', is transferred
to
saysthat'man', through
of thefactthattheverbadded
pasthumanbeingsin consequence
signifying
thepasttime,thereseemstobe no reason<forthat>, forwhenI say
signifies
'a manwalked'and 'a walking<man> walked'or 'a loveris (or 'willbe' or
thatthe
'was') goingtolove'(or'onewhohasbeenloved'),itis notcompulsory
oftheothertermsbe changedbecauseofthetensesadded.
signification
Matters seem to be rathercomplicated, indeed. In erroneouslytaking the MS reading r ( = ratio) for recto(Geyer gives the conjecture
rectum
, presumablynot knowingwhat to do with the reading r which
he does mentionin his apparatuscriticus)
Jacobi failedto grasp the point
of Abelard' s argument. In fact, in this passage our author does not
reject the view that an isolated noun has temporal co-signification,he
only rebukes the assumption that when a noun takes over a preterite
co-significationfromthe past tense 'fui it is just becausea verb of the
, we are bound to have
preteritetense is added, since, on thatassumption
as
'homo ambulavi, (a man walked')
difficultieswith expressions
where we findnothingof the sort. Well, that is why Abelard proposes
an alternativesolution, i.e. to take the copula plus thepredicated
noun
as one single dictio.
Besides, I have the impression that by 'the noun in isolation'
Tweedale does not mean the noun merely as a dictionaryentry,but
9 Forthisrendering
ofiamprojecto,
see De Rijk[1985b],9.2.
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rather,the noun actually used in a sentence but momentarilytaken

apart fromthat specificsententialcontext.10Finally there is a context
in which Abelard really makes the impression of assuming that
because of its proper invention a noun has present time cosignification. So in his discussion with his Master (William of
Champeaux?) he deals with phrases such as 'homo mortuus' ('dead
man') by arguing on the (clearly accepted) assumption that 'man'
may retain its proper invention because of its signifyingan actually
existenthuman being.11
The conclusion may be drawn now that Abelard is really of the
opinion that when actually used in some speech context a noun is
prone to retain the present time co-significationdue to its 'proper
invention'. However, one should bear in mind that by 'present time'
the time is meant in which the utterance is made. That is precisely
whytakinga noun 'in isolation' does not amount to viewing it merely
as a lexical entry.
Returning now to our author's search for a proper criterionfor
distinguishingbetween the noun and verb, we have to notice, first,
that Abelard looks for the distinctive feature of the verb in quite
anotherdirection.Again, he refersto Aristotle,who in definingit (De
int.3, 16b6-7) had not only paid attentionto the verb's temporalconnotation. Indeed, he says: "A verb is what additionallyis significative
of time [..] land it is a signofthingsas12said ofsomething
else' where the
latter is explained in terms of 'additionally signifyingsomething as
now It is true, in Gl.Per. this functionreceived quite a lot of
obtaining
attentionbut it is still labelled a verb's 'additional property' ('supposita proprietas'; Gl.Per. 357,17) which comes on top of its proper
distinctive,viz. its temporal connotation. In the Dialctica, however,
10Onemight
oftheuseofthephraseterminus
insupposition
be reminded
persesumptus
meansa propositional
termtakenbyitself
whereitsimilarly
fora moment
theories,
rather
thanjusta lexicalitem.See De Rijk[1971],73-80and[1985a],185-8.Forthat
themodern
notionof'nounas a lexicalentry'is notquitethesameas the
matter,
Ancient
andMedievalnotionof'nountakenin itsproperinvention'.
See alsowhat
willlaterbe remarked
about'presenttime'as 'thetimeof theutterance';
below
pp. 97-8.
11D. 116,25-6:Si vero'homo'propriam
servetex presentia
inventionem
animalis
eritquidemoppositio("However,if 'man' retainsitsproper
rationalis
mortalis,
ofa mortalanimalendowedwithreason,
invention
becauseoftheactualpresence
therewillsurelybe an opposition";
viz. thatbetween'man' and 'corpse').
12In myopinion,as so oftenin Greek(and Latin)theparticiple
construction
is to
be understood
indominant
thatinthiscaseitmeans,notjust'things
use,totheextent
as beingsaid'.
whichare said' butrather'things
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a verb's predicative or copulative function is the real focus of

Abelard' s attention. Our author is most explicit on this score. The
predicative-copulativefunctionis said to be an essential part of the
; D. 129,24-6).
comprehensionerr
concept of the verb (' ad verborum
3 On thepredicative-copulative
functionof theverb
What exactlyis to be understoodby the predicative-copulativefunction of the verb? It may be stated, at the outset, that 'copulative' or
'connecting a predicate to a subject' is, as such, a syntactictool,
whereas 'predication' or 'assigning some (essential or accidental)
propertyto a substrate' is, as such, of a semanticnature, since a noun
when predicated stillperformsits functionof determining.When considering a verb actually predicated it may be said that for one thing
it performsthe assignmentof its sememe to some subject and moreover, it literally'couples' a predicate noun with another noun put in
subject position. As may be expected, at this point, the syntacticlevel
is not clearly set apart from the semantic one by Abelard but,
nonetheless, he seems to have had some idea about their diversity.
E.g. at GLPred. 124,32-3, he says thatwhen we assert 'whitenessis an
accident' ('albedo est accidens') we are not assigning ('attribuere')
somethingto whiteness,but rathercoupling ('copulare') it witha subject. Of course, it is Abelard' s view of universais that preventshim,
in such cases, fromassuming thatwe are dealing with real attribution
('predication' in the semantic sense, we might say). In L.N. P. 534,
17-21 a division of 'predicari' is made fromthe same point of view:
"To be predicated is said in a twofoldmanner, viz meaning either
'being conjoined' .... or 'being trulyconjoined' ('coniungi veraciter').
And in the lattersense the term enters the definitionof 'universal' as
a result of which 'chimaera' and other nouns of that sort are
excluded". In Abelard' s discussion about the copulative verb 'is'
('est') it is preciselythe chimaera and its imaginary companions that
prove to be the main spoil-sportsin the numerous effortsto gain a
clear insightinto the nature of the propositional'is': see below, p. 120.
However this may be, the predicative functionassigned to every
verb in Aristotle's definitionis explained by Abelard as the job of
couplinga predicate with a subject ('officium copulandi predicatum
subiecto'; D. 129,23). In the Dialectica) the predicative-copulative
functionis no longer taken as merely a featureof the verb, as is the
case in Gl.Per., but ratheras thecriterionfor singlingout verbs from
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other significativewords, particularlynouns. So Abelard explicitly

states( D . 129, 25-6) that although "a verb can be pronouncedjust by
itself,withoutcoupling anything,stillit is always copulative as regards
its invention" (or 'original imposition'). At the same time, the temporal connotationhas been given a second rank in so far as that connotationas conveyed by a verb is just a concomitantof the special way
in which it designates the inherence of some propertyin a subject, a
way indeed thatshould be distinguishedfromthe way in which a noun
signifies,not a thing's inherence in another one, but rather some
4
in somethingelse [Z). 123,15-25].
thing' as inhering
The predicative-copulativefunctionhas still another aspect most
importantto Abelard. What distinguishesverbs from other words,
nouns in particular, is most significantlythat they effectthe completenessof sense ('sensus perfectio')which is thecharacteristicof fullfledged sentences ('orationes perfectae') as contradistinguishedfrom
incompletephrases (' orationes imperfectae'). In order to get thisfunction (whichmay be termedthe verb's functionas a 'statement-maker')
in the rightperspective we have to begin with considering 'perfect'
and 'imperfectsense'.
The theme of 'perfectsense' and its natural counterpart'imperfect
sense' as applied to thoughtsand theirexpressionsplays an important
role in the doctrine of the statement-makingutterance. It may be
traced back13to Plato's Sophist
, 262c where it is said that mere strings
of onomata(nouns) or rhmata
(attributiveexpressions including verbs)
do not yet make up a logos ('statement-makingutterance).14Some
relativelycompleteand self-containedspeech unit is required forthere
to be a statement,an expression, that is, which 'tells something' or
'makes a point' instead ofjust 'naming' or 'determining' thingsand
only bringingthem up for discussion. (See De Rijk, [1986], 309ff.).
At D. 148,19ff.Abelard divides the 'orationes' into perfectand
imperfectones. By the formerhe understandswhat Priscian calls 'constructiones' [Inst.gramm
. II, 108,16ff.and XVII, cap. 3], which are
defined as speech units orderlycomposed and conveying a 'perfect'
('complete') sense, e.g. 'a man runs' ('homo curri). Imperfect'orationes' are those, Abelard says, which in spite of a 'competens
13See Nuchelmans
ofTopicss.v. Completeness.
[19731,15-7and hisIndex
14Forthatmatter,
in Platoa logosis notofthewell-known
'S is P' form.See for
an all-overinterpretation
of thewholepassageaboutlogos(261C-264B),De Rijk
[1986],13.13and 15.2-15.4.
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dispositio' ('suitable disposition') of its parts yet still convey an

incomplete sense, e.g. 'running man' ('homo currens').
The suitable dispositionis interestingin as faras it is mentionedas
early as in Plato's Sophistas the basic requirementforthereto be a logos
(such as our 'running man' or 'white man'). However, such a suitable
disposition is a necessary condition but not a sufficientone in order
to have a real assertionor statement.When hearing an oratioimperfecta
the hearer's mind is not yet 'acquiesced' and waits for some more
information,in order to obtain a complete sense (or real assertion).15
Now withoutthe verb, Abelard says, no 'perfectiosensus' is possible.
Speaking about the phrase 'running man' ('homo currens') Abelard
remarks that it does not convey a real assertion. He explains:
enimestsubstantivi
etadiectivi
D. 148,24-30:Competens
cumad
constructio,
eundemcasum,ad idemgenuset eundemnumerum
sed nondum
copulantur,
in eis completaest sensusperfectio.
Adhucenimpremissa
orationeprolata
audientis
animusaliquidampliusaudiredesiderat
utad perfectionem
suspensus
sensusperveniat,
velutiesautaliquodaliudcompetens
verbum.
Preterverbumnamquenullaestsensusperfectio.
ofa substantival
andan adjectival
construction
Indeed,thereisa suitable
noun,
when<the twopartsmakingit up> are coupledin thesamecase,thesame
but <then> a completeness
ofsensehasnotyet
genreandthesamenumber,
beenbrought
aboutin them.Forwhentheaforesaid
phrasehasbeenuttered,
thehearer's
mindis suspended
andstilldesirestohearsomething
moreinorder
toarriveata completeness
ofsense,suchas <the verb> 4s' oranother
suitable
a verbthereis no completeness
verb.Forwithout
ofsense.
Making an expression an oratioperfectaamounts to pronouncing
something'sinherencein somethingelse, and that,Abelard says, is the
special functionof verbs. This 'pronouncing' is characterizedas producing a complete thought by way of the connection of A with
('perfectum ... secundum copulationem alterius ad alterum generai
intellectum;D. 149,2-3). However, the 'connection' meant here is of
a special nature, and not just a connection of two concepts in a harmonious way, which, as was objected against Abelard by his
opponents, certainlydoes produce some idea in the hearer's mind and
also supplies information,to a certain extent at least. For instance,
when one uses the expression 'the white man', ('homo albus') applying to, say, Mr. Johnson, obviously the hearer is supplied with some
15As a linguistic
unitPlato'slogosdoesnotyetconvey'perfect
sense'(sinceitmay
tobea real'statement'
onomazein
beusedontheso-called
('asserlevel).In orderthere
onthelegeinlevel.See Nuchelmans
[1973],14tion')thelogosneedstobeexpressed
5, and De Rijk[1986],194ff.
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information.Indeed some idea (man plus whiteness)is conveyed and,

besides, the inherenceof whitenessin the man is expressed. So much
forAbelard's (supposed) opponents (.D . 149,6-11). However, Abelard
stronglyrejects this view of 'copulation'. If there is to be a perfect
oratio
, he replies, it is not enough thatwhitenessis determinedas adjacent to man, we may have also to say it inheres in him. Well, this can
only be performedby a verb. Unlike a participle a verb not only
an action or a being-acted-upon, inheringin something,it also
signifies
tellsus thatit actually inheres in it. That is why this way of expressing
is called the 'indicative mood' Thus the verb as expressing an actual
is the main constituentof a 'complete sentence'. Abelard even
assertion
far as to include the other modiof the verb (imperative and
so
goes
optative) as expressing mental states other than the intentionof assertingsomethingof somethingelse. He says:
in verbis,
D. 149,20-7:Perfectio
itaquesensusmaximependeredinoscitur
animi
secundumvarioseffectus
quibussolisalicuiusad aliquid inherentia
orationis
non subdemonstratur;
preterquam quideminherentiam
perfectio
ad me',quodammodo
sistit.Cumenimdico:'veniad me' vel'utinamvenires
inherentiam
veniendi
ad meproponosecundum
iussummeumveldesiderium
veldesidero,
idestut
meum,in eo scilicet
quodiubeoilliutvenireei cohereat,
verbaoptativi
modivimenuntiativi
ipseveniat.Undeetsepein consequentiis
tenent.
So itis recognized
thatthecompleteness
ofsensemainly
dependson verbs,by
ofsomething
in something
in accordwhichaloneinherence
elseis designated
mental
ancewithdifferent
thisinherence,
then,nocompleteness
states;without
ofsensecomesintoexistence.
ForwhenI say: 'cometo me!' or 'ifyouwould
cometo me!', in a wayI pronounce
of 'comingto me' in the
theinherence
framework
ofmyorderormydesire,namelyin so faras I orderthat'coming'
I havea desire,viz. thathe come.
shouldinherein him,or that,respectively,
Thatis whyin inferences,
verbsoftheoptative
modeoftenactas verbsofthe
mode.
indicative
It should be noticed thatAbelard presumably speaks about the verb
on two differentlevels. When contrastingit with the noun, his main
concern seems to be the 'level of naming' (or onomazein
level),16rather
than the verb's functionof pronouncing something. So in D. 123, 1525 it was argued (see above, p. 95) that the noun as well as the verb
,
inhering
signifiessome (substantial or accidental) forms as presently
of
differs
from
that
of
the
latter
former's
mode
the
signifying
although
in that the verb signifiesthat inherence as such, not only some form
as inhering.
However, it is patentlyclear that in contrastingthe noun
and the verb in thisway, Abelard must have been thinkingof the noun
16Forthisdistinction,
see Nuchelmans
[1973],loc.cit.
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and verb in theirmerely semantic functionof naming and determinit is

ing. On the other hand, in his discussion of the oratioperfecta,
of
statementthe
verb's
special capability
accomplishing
precisely
making utterances that is in the focus of Abelard's attention. We
should be mindfulof him frequentlyreferringto the verb as a tool for
something. This assertive force of the verb is expressly
pronouncing
the inherenceof whitenessin
in opposing ' determining
forward
brought
man' to explicitlytellingthat it actually inheres in him (see D. 149,
12-3).
It may be gathered fromall our evidence that, in a final analysis,
Abelard findsthe proper distinctionbetween the noun and verb on the
to such an extent,indeed, thatthe
'level of pronouncing' (/gri-level),
latterconcerns,not the utterancecomposed of thenoun plus finiteverb
. 17
as such, but the statement-makingutterance as actuallypronounced
So the most appropriate distinctionbetween the noun and verb has
everythingto do with Abelard' s view of sentencehood.
4 The Noun and Verbin Abelard.A Survey
Before embarkingon a discussion of Abelard' s views on sentential
predication and the role of the copula, it seems useful to summarize
our author's basic views on the noun and verb.
(1) 'Nomen' (noun, name) is defined (in the Aristotelian-Boethian
tradition) as 'a spoken sound having a significationby convention,
without the notion of time, of which no parts are meaningful in
separation' (.D . 121,28-9; cf. 129,4-5 and GLPer. 334,18ff.). It should
be borne in mind thatlike the Ancients the Medievais too, were in the
constant habit of not sharply distinguishingbetween a noun's (or
verb's or any other significativeexpression's) significate and the
'thing' (whether substantial or accidental) signified in the outside
world.18
(2) Verbum ('verb') is defined (Z). 129,11-3) as: 'a spoken sound,
having a significationby convention, which, in its finite forms, is
17Cf.De Rijk[1986],293ff.,
between
whereitis arguedthatforPlato,thedifference
is mostvital.
and logos
eirmenos
logos
18For thisphenomenon,
see e.g. De Rijk [1986],Index
, s.v. Name. For Peter
D. 564,6-9andallthepassagesinwhichhe
seee.g. Gl.Pred.
126,35-127,13;
Abelard,
the
rerum
alwaysconcerns
). The distinction
(vs.intellectuum
explainsthesignificatio
as such.
thantheintellectus
rem
tointellectus
ofressignificata
, rather
significans
opposition
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designative of the present time, of which no parts have meaning in

separation'.
(3) As a logician Abelard is quite explicit throughouthis works
about the semantic differencebetween categorematic words (nouns
and verbs) and syncategorematicones (prepositions, conjunctions
etc.). As to the differencesbetween the noun and verb his opinions are
less stable, it seems. So much seems to be certain, on the semantic
between the noun and verb as,
level Abelard recognizesa close affinity
in his opinion, theyare just various tools to convey identical sememes
[so e.g. 'cursus' ('course') and 'currere' (to run')], whereas theyonly
differby the different
ways in which theyconvey the common sememe
('modus significandi').
(4) Both nouns and verbs have thejob of naming and determining,
wherebythe differencebetween 'naming' and 'determining' is only of
a syntacticnature, it seems. On the level of naming and determining
{onomazeinlevel), the noun and verb convey, each in their own ways
(nominally or verbally, respectively), some semantic content
('sememe'). By this, they constitutesome 'idea' ('conceptio', 'conceptus', 'intellectus') in somebody's mind (the speaker's or the
hearer's that is), but stillwithoutconveying any complete thoughtor
sense.
(5) Contrariwise, on the level of 'statement-making'( legeinlevel)
the (finite) verb whenactuallyused19 comes to be really 'statementmaking', to the extent indeed that it performsthisjob togetherwith
some noun(s) but nonethelessbeing itselfthe statement-maker,properly speaking.
5 Sentencehood
: Connection
and Predication
5.1 SomePreliminary
Remarkson Namingand Predication
A preliminary remark on the phenomenon of predication as
opposed to that of naming, first.The label, 'predication' is nowadays
commonly used to stand for the sentential assignment of some
(substantial or accidental) formby means of the well-known'S is P'
construct.As far as Ancient and Medieval texts are concerned the
verb 'dicere de' (or Greek legeinperi' to say of orabout') is usually considered a linguisticexpression entirelyequivalent to 'praedicare de'
19Forthiscondition,
see Kretzmann
[1986],495,n. 33; cf.De Rijk[1986],15.23;
15.32and 16.4.and below,p. 101.
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. gen.; to predicate of). As I have argued elsewere,20

(Greek katgorein
thisseems to be the resultof an optical error. It is oftensupposed that
where nouns have only the functionof naming or determiningtheyact
as real predicates in a (putative) 4S is P' scheme. To confine myself
to a famous example of this fallacious use: when Plato claims that the
Transcendent Form of Beauty ('Beautifulness') is primarilyentitledto
bear the name 'beautiful', most of his commentatorsare of the opinion
(and extremelyworried about this 'fact') that Plato should admit such
trickysentences as 'Beauty is beautiful' and 'Largeness is large'.21
A related commentatorialpecularityis to explain 'naming' in terms
of 'predication'. E.g. Jacobi [1986: 154] equals the assignment of
names to what he calls 'implicitpredication', in whichx is given some
name,/, but the F-ness "is not asserted expressly".22The temporal
connotationof nouns (discussed, above, p. 89) is viewed byJacobi in
a similar framework:"The temporal significancedoes not belong to
the significatio
of a word but to a specificfunction.When one refersto
somethingby means of a noun, one does predicate. The temporalcosignificationis the result of the implicit or explicit predication".
Jacobi is even of the opinion that "If Abelard' s line of thoughtwere
to be followed to its ultimate consequences, one can imagine him
givingup the differencebetween nouns and verbs altogetherand continuingto observe only the functionaldifferencebetween subject position and predicate position. But this [startingfrompredication as the
foundationof logic, De R. ] would have meant turningthe whole structure of logic upside down." {ibid.).
I am afraid that to explain 'naming' as an 'implicit predication'
(and therebyto understand it in terms of sentencehood) amounts to
confusing semantics proper and syntax. Even when one, quite
reasonably, it would seem, should assign priorityto sentence-making
over naming (and any otherpre-sententialsemantic activity)thereare
stillgood reasons to set naming theoreticallyquite apart frompredication and sentence-making. Otherwise, there is the risk of playing
20De Rijk[1980],26 ff.and [1986],Index
, s.v. Name.
21SeeDe Rijk[1986],316ff.
ForPlatosuchsentences
wereequivalent
to'Beautyparand shouldsimplybe rejectedas
in Beauty'or 'Beautyis beauty-like'
ticipates
or incongruent.
incorrect
basically
22Cf.Jacobi,ibid
. : "the nounservesto namex as something
to whicha definite
substantial
or accidentalform(forexample,the quality'whiteness')is to be
liesat thebaseofanynaming";"whenthisuseofnouns
ascribed";"a predication
tobe predication";
tosomeitis revealed
"whenonerefers
tonameismadeexplicit,
thingbymeansofa noun,onedoespredicate".
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down the name's denotativefunction,every time it is used incorrectly

in a trueproposition.When e.g. you are in the possession of a genuine
Rembrandt by inheritance and say: "I've got this rubbish in my
possession withoutpaying a nickel forit", not even the most brilliant
art expertcan claim that your assertion is false, in spite of his feeling
deeply shocked by your false qualification of the subject. However,
more importantlyof course, nothingof the sort is found in Abelard' s
expositions on nouns and verbs. There is no reason whatsoever to
assume any inclination on his part to start from predication as the
foundationof logic and, thus, 4'turning the whole structureof traditional (Aristotelian-Boethian)logic upside down".
5.2 Predication
as a SemanticProblem:Linguisticsvs Semantics
Abelard's favouriteexamples of predicationare 'Socrates est albus'
('Socrates is white') and 'Socrates legit' ('Socrates reads'). Predication
may be described as a 'relationship of some sort' (cf. Kretzmann
1982:493). As always this relationshipis determinedby the nature of
its relata
. For Ancient and Medieval thought, from the logicogrammatial point of view the relataare the subject (term) and the
predicate(term); ontologicallyspeaking theyare the substrate(or subject 'thing') and the attribute(or propertyor characteristic)which is
either a substantial (essential) or an accidental form of being. The
logico-grammaticalanalysis examines predication qua operation, the
conjunction or coupling, that is, of a subject term (5) and predicate
term( P) by means of a copula (i.e. a verb with copulative function).
So it is "concerned with how what is said in predication gets said"
(Kretzmann 1982: 493, n.23) and, thus, deals with the linguistic
apparatus of predication (the 'container' of the predicational expression so to speak). On the otherhand, the ontological analysis focusses
upon the relationshipbetween the formpredicated (which is signified
by P) and the thing signifiedby S , in which the formis supposed to
inhere. So thisanalysis is "concerned withwhatis said in predication"
(Kretzmann, ibid.) and, thus, deals with the 'content' of the expression involved.
Defining23semantics as the studyof the relationsbetween the signs
23WithC. W. Morris[See Lyons1977:115].Thisbroaddefinition
willsurelydo
forthepurposeof interpreting
PeterAbelard's
Ancientand Medievalthinkers.
on thescoreoflogicand grammar
ifone is aware
can onlybe understood
thought
ofthecloserelationship
between
dialectic
andgrammar
inhisworks.See esp.Jolivet
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and the objects to which the signs are applicable implies that its job
is to focus upon what I have labelled the logico-grammatical analysis
and the ontological analysis simultaneously. As for the phenomenon
of predication, this amounts to studyingthe interferenceof the 'container' and its 'content' when compared with the speaker's intention.
Abelard was fullyaware of a tension existingbetween the content
of a speech act and the speaker's intention, in that the logicogrammatical device has its proper features which are not per se
applicable to each and every ontological situation, let alone their
agreementwith a speaker's actual intention. See e.g. D. 127,20-128,
21; 136,22-36 (cf. Kretzmann, 507); 140,23-9 (cf. Kretzmann, 510).
Basically, the problem of predication as it worries Abelard equally
comes down to the antagonistic tension between its linguistic
'
apparatus (conjunction; copulatio
') and the speaker's intention,24i.e.
the predicationproper as intendedby the user of the linguisticdevice.
So it seems to be of the utmostimportanceto Abelard' s interpreterto
keep noticing that the entire discussion of predication is, in a final
analysis, one protractedattempt25to overcome the antagonism of the
'connection vs predication' issue in meticulously examining and,
throughdifferentmanoeuvres, delimitatingboth functions.
Hereby one should carefullyexamine what, in the Medieval view,
the precise bearing of the linguisticapparatus upon the semantic outcome is. What I am tryingto say is this. Often the linguisticsituation
is not simply mirrored in the semantic domain along the lines the
linguisticsurfacestructuremay make us think.For example, the plain
[1969],28-62.The latterhas pointedout [1981:175-95]thatPeterAbelardnever
himself
fromtheplatonist
detached
tradition
handeddown
completely
(ontological)
See also Mews[1985],n.66.
bytheLatingrammarians.
24As forthespeaker's
a sentence
intheMedievalsense
intention,
(or 'proposition',
notto a propositional
content
butto a propositional
of'propositio'
referring,
sign,
whether
orspokenormental)
written
either
orextenintensionally
maybe explained
In PeterAbelard(as inmanyotherMedievalauthors)
are
bothexplanations
sionally.
as: 'Socratesis a beinginformed
found.So 'Socratesis white'is interpreted
by
whereas
whiteness'
'Socratesis oneofthosewhoare' (See e.g.
(so e.g. D. 131,36-8),
as well
D. 135,8). However,
ofclassmembership
orclassinclusion
anyconsideration
as anydiscussion
ofan inherence
vs. identity
ofpredication
haslittlebearing
theory
talk
on theproperitemsofPeterAbelard'ssemantic
discussions.
modern
Especially
thepresent
Moodyandtakenupbymanyothers,
byErnest
including
author)
(started
can better
vsidentity
be stopped.Cf. De Rijk[1981a],
aboutinherence
predication
ofthetwoconsideraoccurrence
2.5 and Mews[1985b],n.37. Fora simultaneous
tions,seeD. 332,9-20andDe Rijk[1981a],25.
25On Kretzmann'
ofdifferent
s assumption
ofpredication
theories
in Abelard,see
below,p. 124.
102

12:51:50 PM

occurrence, on the linguisticlevel, of three-piece(as opposed to twopiece) predication with Abelard is not sufficientreason to ascribe to
him a similar tripartition( us bipartition) of the proposition when it
comes to its semanticanatomy. So, when Abelard, followingAristotle
(De int. 12, 21b9), substitutesan expression such as 'homo ambulai'
('A man walks') for'homo est ambulans' ('A man is walking'), without any change of meaning, his interpreteris not entitled to take
Abelard's choice of the linguisticapparatus, 'homo est ambulans' for
an argumentin favourof semantictripartitionto semanticbipartition.
To put it schematically,fromthe semanticpoint of view, Abelard may
take a linguisticthree-piecepredication to stand for a copulation of
just two sememes:
12
112 1
n
I
1
J
'homo est-ambulans': ('A) man is-walking'.
It should be noticed(against Kretzmann, passim) thatAbelard in fact
always maintained the semantic bipartition,fromwhatever linguistic
device (two-piece or three-piece)he started. This may seem the more
remarkableto us since the semantictripartitionwas equally traditional
as its linguisticcounterpart,the three-piecepredication.26
5.3.

On Dating theLogical WorksofAbelard

Constant Mews has recentlypublished (1986) a thoroughinvestigation of the sequence of Abelard's various writings on logic and
theology.In my view most of its results,however tentativetheymight
be , should be accepted. Obviously he is rightin rejecting any idea
that Abelard had rewrittenthe Dialcticaseveral times (which, as the
editor of this work I took over fromd'Olwer) and also his claim that
the work dates back fromabout 1119 instead of the thirtiesseems to
restupon firmevidence. For thatmatterMews comes to the following
chronologyfor the extant works on logic:
-

1102-08: the so-called 'literal' glosses called editiones

in our MSS:
Editto superPorphyrium
Aristotelis
( Ed.Por.)' Editio superPraedicamenta
Ed.
Pr
ed.
Editio
Periermenias
Aristotelis
Editio
)'
super
(
(Ed. Per.);
superDe
26The rulesof conversion
and syllogistic
inference
namelymadethethree-piece
thelogician's
favourite
andso itis interesting
toseethaton thisscoreas well
analysis
Abelard
defends
thesemantic
as themorefruitfull
andevenindispensable
bipartition
cf.Tweedale[1982:146]and below,p. 122.
analysis.See D. 139,12-140,22;
103

12:51:50 PM

divisionibusBoethii(Ed. Div.); all edited by Mario dal Pra (Florence

2
1969)
- 1109-16: Sententie
secundummagistumPetrum(?
), edited by MinioPaluello (Rome 1958)
- c. 1117-21: Dialcticabeforethe so-called
LogicaIngredientibus
( Glosse
Gl.
Glosse
Predicamenta
Pr
Gl.
ed.
superPorphyrium
( Por.);
super
(
) ; Glosse
Periermenias
all
edited
and
Glose
super
(GL Per.),
by Geyr (1919-27)
super
Topica (Gl. Top.) edited by Dal Pra as part of the Logica Ingredientibus
(Florence 21969); see below, p. 113, n.46) and the GlossesuperPorsecundumvocales
, edited by Ottaviano, Florence 1933).
phyrium
Tractatus
de intellectibus(ed. Cousin 1859) and the
1120-24(?)
Glossule super Porphyrium
edited by Geyer under the title Logica
Nostrorum
petitioniMnster 1933).
For our purpose the relativedates of Dialctica, Gl.Per. and Gl. Top. are
of importance. Mews locates the Dialctica before the Gl.Per. The
followingarguments are adduced to support this view:
'
(1) 'Whereas in the DialcticaAbelard acknowledgesthatvocessignify
as well as things,in the gloss he assertsthat vocesin themselvesdo
not have any meaning, unless they were institutedfor this purpose'' (Mews, 82). I am afraid that Mews fails to see that in the
Dialctica, too Abelard considers the speaker's intention as the
main cause of signification.This is best seen where our author
deals with the question of the relation between imposition and
signification:
D. 114,6-11:Si tamen'significare'
secundum
rectam
et propriam
proprie
eius diffinitionem
nonalias ressignificare
dicemusnisique per
assignamus,
vocemconcipiuntur.
UndeBoetiumsupradixissememinimus:
"vocisin prodivisiofitetc. proprie
priassignificationes
namquesuntillererumsignificationesque determinate
in sententia
vocistenentur.
ifwe take'to signify'
and according
itsproperandcorrect
However,
properly
wewillsaythatthey[thenouns]do notsignify
other
thanthose
definition,
things
whichareconceived
ofbytheword.Hencewearereminded
abovethatBoethius
ofa wordis intoitspropermeanings
said,"thedivision
etc."; forthosemeanareproper
whicharedeterminately
contained
inwhatis meantby
ingsofthings
theword.
The term 'determinated' does not only referto the intentionof the
but also to thatof any user of the word in some context,
primusinventor
as may be clear fromwhat Abelard says about the use of equivocal
terms. Indeed, theyare said to have just one meaning. Well, this can
only be asserted of an equivocal noun whenusedin somecontext:
104

12:51:50 PM

D. 114,11-5:Etsienimvoxequivocapluribus
sit,pluratamenproprie
imposita
nondicitur;
significare
quiaequivocum
tamquam
quibusex
pluranonsignificat
eademcausaestimposita,
unamde omnibus
tantum
tenenssubstantiam.
Laxe
ad omnemimpositionem
tamennimium
nomen
sepeauctoritas
'significationis'
extendit.
Foralthough
an equivocal
toa plurality
of< different
>
wordhasbeenimposed
thatplurality
sinceitdoesnotsignify
things,
yetitisnotsaidtosignify
properly,
thosethings
towhichithasbeenimposedbythesamecause,quaplurality,
as
ithasonlyoneoutofallitsmeanings.
theauthors
extended
tooloosely
However,
theuse ofthenoun'signification'
to thewholerangeofimposition.
Furthermoreall passages where the hearer's mind is mentioned may
be referredto (e.g. D. 69,27-31). See also below, (2).
"
(2) Absent fromthe Dialcticais the discussion of the meaning of
'man' when used to mean thatword. Abelard insistedin the gloss that
such a vox signifiedonly through a process of translatio,
not through
any intrinsicpropertyof the word. This concept of transferenceof
meaning, not discussed in the Dialctica, has an importantplace in the
and Periermeneias
as well as in everyversion of
glosses on the Categories
the Theologia"(Mews, 82-3, and n.43).
Mews firststatementis not correct,I am afraid. There is a discussion in D . 166,16ff.of the autonymous use of 'homo' in sentencessuch
as 'homo est nomen'. There Abelard explains that the subject and the
predicate termsalways have to signifythe same thing ('in eadem re
conveniuntatque hoc modo consignifican). To be sure, in the Dialcticatheprocess as such is not discussed nor is thelabel 'translatio' used
for it. Mews is quite right in remarking (83) that in the GL Top.
Abelard quite explicitlyclaims (305,1-4) that a vox does not signify
unless a listenercan grasp the sense of its imposition. However, the
point Abelard sets out to make here is that an actualsignificationonly
comes about when thereis somebody to hear the vox.Well, this completely agrees with all earlier discussions on the subject, in which
significationis always related to a hearer's mind (e.g. as early as in
the Gl.Per. 76,12-9). One should be mindful that when speaking of
'the hearer's mind' Abelard (like his contemporaries) is thinkingof
any dialogical situation,ratherthan the occurrenceof a word as a lexicographical entry.
(3) Mews rightlystates (83) that in the DialcticaAbelard "asserts
that conjunctions and prepositions had to have a meaning in
themselvesif theywere to be distinguishedfromlettersand syllables,
althoughtheirsignificancewas uncertain". He refersto D. I, 118-120
and contraststhiswith Gl.Per., 337-340 where Abelard "formulatesas
105

12:51:50 PM

a criterionof meaning thata word must forman intellection( intellectus

)
in the mind". I am afraid, Mews fails to see that in the Dialcticathe
author (quite rightly)opposed conjunctionsetc.to (meaningless) letters
and syllables and assigns the formerthe functionof 'determiningto
some extent' ( quodammodo
the proper nouns theyare added
dterminent)
to. Well, that does not imply ascribing them any real signification
without
those nouns. Our author most explicitlytakes the part of those
(dialecticians) who deny any meaning to conjunctionsetc.It is true, in
the GLPer. it is explicitlyasserted that theydo not properly'forman
intellection'
(4) As to the differentmeanings of 'homo curri and 'homo currens' Mews remarks that "In the gloss he asserts that both phrases
have an identical meaning because one creates the same intellection
as the other. Although commenting in the Dialcticathat the same
statesof mind, he does not
phrase mightbe used according to different
mention the idea formulatedin the gloss that differenttype of phrase
could formthe same intellection". Mews contrastsD. II, 148,17-152,
26 with Gl.Per. 373,1-33. As one can easily see, it is overdoingit somewhat to speak here, with Mews, of "a (similar) contrastin his discussions of a phrase". From the doctrinal point of view both expositions
perfectlyagree.
(5) Next, Mews refers to the discussions in D. and Gl.Per. on
account of the analysis of the substantiveverb. At firstglance he seems
to be rightin arguing that the suggestion advanced in the Dialctica
only at the end of the discussion (see below, p. 121) to the effectthat
'is-a-poe should be taken as equivalent to a singleverb {prounoverbo),
is found in the Gl.Per. (349ff.) withoutsuch a tentativesetting.However, it should be noticed first,that the 'pro uno verbo' (or vi unius
verbivel dictionis
') device which admittedlyis the very nucleus of the
Dialctica suggestion, is not found in the special discussion of the
substantiveverb as such in Gl.Per. 359ff.but in an earlier discussion
of the temporalco-significationof verbs. Secondly, thatdevice is even
remarkably absent27 in the discussion of the substantive verb,
remarkablyto such an extentindeed, that sentencessuch as 'chimaera
est chimaera' are interpretedby transferringthe 'est' into a nun27Mews' reference
as
[1985a:85, n.59] to Gl.Per.360, 25-7mustbe a mistake,
whatsoever
canbefound
ofthe'prounoverbo'deviceinthatpassage.Morenothing
of"copulating
ofessentia"(84 and87) andhisviewofthe
over,Mews'discussion
entirediscussion
ofthesubstantive
I am afraid;seebelow
verbis notentirely
right,
pp. 113-4.
106

12:51:50 PM

cupative 'vocatur', which is an extremelyweak proposal (see Kretzmann [1982], 502-3). In the Gl. Top. the substantiveverb problem is
'
not solved by means of the 'pro uno verbo
device, either.
that
"the
one passage which Geyer
is
of
the
Mews
opinion (86)
(6)
cited as evidence that the argument of the Dialctica was 'more
developed5than thatof the gloss" is not conclusive. Geyer referredto
D. I 136,19-26 and II 169,4-24 where Abelard discusses a position that
he used to hold in defence of the opinions of his Master, William of
Champeaux, about figurativeconstructions(namely that in those constructionsthere was a sense of the phrase which was quite different
fromthe significationsof its separate parts) and took this as referring
to what Abelard wrote in Gl.Per. 480,22-37. However, in my opinion
Mews is wrong in rejecting(86-7) Geyer's argumentand in changing
the properissue of the passages involved; indeed, propositionssuch as
'Homer is a poet' are meant here, ratherthan phrases ('word strings')
such as 'dead man' ('homo mortuus'), as Mews seems to assume.
(7) Finally, Mews may find some support for his thesis by conin Gl. Top. 238,35-239,6
trastingAbelard' s view of maximapropositio
with the one held in the Dialctica(III 309,25-310,19). In the latter
passage Abelard followsthe view held by William of Champeaux that
(in Mews wording) "the meaning of a maxim lay in the multitudeof
hypotheticalconsequences which it implied." In the Gl. Top., however, Abelard explicitly rejects (239, Iff.) any interpretationof the
maxim as in inferencescheme.
The conclusion which we can draw fromall thisis obviously not the
one drawn by Mews (88) that the "the series of Glosseon Porphyry,
Aristotleand Boethius {Logica Ingredientibus)
present more developed
ideas than those of the Dialcticaand so are more likely to be a later
(Mews' earlieris a misprint) rather than an earlier (Mews lateris a
misprint)composition". I believe it makes more sense to assign both
works(followingMews) to roughlythe same period ratherthan tryto
separate them chronologically. Sometimes the Logica Ingredientibus
seems to be 'more developed' than the Dialctica, sometimesthingsare
the other way round. Besides, the author's differentintentionsmay
have been of some importance, since the Logica Ingredientibus
has
originatedfromschoolteachingwhereas the Dialcticawas writtenafter
a request had been made by Abelard' s brotherDagobert, presumably
for instructingthe latter's sons. Incidentally, Mews suggests (76-7)
that the Gl. Top. do not necessarily form part of the Logica Ingredienti

12:51:50 PM

tibus,so thatthislast argument(our number 7) may not bear upon the

date of the latter work either before or afterthe Dialctica.
s Tacklingof theProblemof Predication
in GLPer.
5.4 Abelard,'
In Abelard' s view to solve the problem of predicationalways meant
to recognize firstthe basical antagonism between the linguisticdevice
forconnectionand semanticpredicationas intendedby a speaker and,
accordingly, to conceive of a harmonious account of the two operations. This enterprisenaturallyrequired a meticulous examination of
the proper tool for coupling viz. the copulative verb (whether or not
occurring as the substantive verb 'in thirdposition' tertium
adiacens).
So the substantiveverb ('esse', 4to be') inevitablycomes up fordiscussion as well.
All personal verbs,Abelard says, {Gl. Per. 359, 23ff.)are able to couple themselves,no matterwhat theirsignification,since theyperform
the act of coupling and by the same token predicatingtheir semantic
content(the so-called 'res verbi'; see below, p. 119). This is clarified
by the well-knownAristoteliananalysis mentioned before:
verbaquae praedicari
Gl.Per.359,23-8:Et sciendum
possunt,
quodpersonalia
sint,omniase copularepossunt.Ut si dicatur
cuiuscumque
significationis
et
'Socratesest', 'Socrateslegit','esse' et 'legere'per seipsapraedicantur
ut simulet
habentet copulantis,
quia vimpraedicati
geminatim
funguntur,
'est
et seipsacopulent.Sic enimdicitur'curriquasi diceretur
praedicentur
currens'.
toknowthatall personal
whattheirsignification,
It isessential
verbs,nomatter
Forexample,ifonesays
can couplethemselves.
whichcan serveas predicates
there
without
'Socrates
reads','be' and'read'arepredicated
is', 'Socrates
being
fortheyhavethe
a dualfunction,
anymediumand < indeed> theyperform
are
forcebothof a predicate
and of a copulantso thattheysimultaneously
as well.Forto say'curri('runs')is tantaand couplethemselves
predicated
or 'is a running
< thing
mountto saying'estcurrens'('is running'
>').
It seems useful to remark that the linguistic 'copulare' and the
semantic 'praedicare' are mentioned in one breath, which should lead
us to take theirsubjects ('be' and 'read') in a dual manner, to mean
namely both the verbs as linguistictools and theirsemanticcontents.28
Abelard continues, then, by saying {ibid., 28-30) that there are only
two verbs that can couple utterances differentfrom themselves, the
28For the interwovenness
of the two items,see above, pp. 101-3. Cf. also
s casualness
thedistinction
or ambivalence
toward
s remark
on Abelard'
Kretzmann'
andextralinguistic
entities
between
linguistic
[1982:496,n.37].
108

12:51:50 PM

substantiveand the nuncupative, and he instances 'he is Socrates' and

'he is-named29Socrates'.
In the nextlines he goes on to discuss (360, 3ff.)the peculiar nature
of the substantiveand nuncupative verb.30The substantiveverb is not
so much interestingin that it is displayed bothas an ordinaryverb in
two-piece predication ('Socrates is') where it occurs as 'adjacent in
second position' ('secundum adiacens') and as the copula in threepiece predication(where it occurs as 'adjacent in thirdposition'; 'tertium adiacens') as well as being a spoil-sportin the lattercase. Indeed,
when acting as the copula it truly performsthe activityof coupling
intendedby the speaker, but, at the same time, it does a job which is
flatlycontraryto the intentionof the framerand uttererof the proposition. It is this dfautde qualitwhich bothers Abelard. What precisely
is that troublesome activity?No more and no less than retaining its
proper invention and thus conveying the notion of 'essentia' on top
of the specificnotion of the predicate noun. Let Abelard be his own
mouthpiece:
sed
Gl.Per.360, 13-22:Substantivum
ex appellatione
vero,quodnonconvenit
exipsareiessentia,
omnibus
tarnscilicet
nominibus
praedicatis
coniungi
potest,
vel participiis
siveetiamorationibus.
Et cumin essentia
quampronominibus
quaelibetsignificet,
numquamei copulatioessentiaedeest,quia ubiqueper
veluti
aliudesse,etiamquandoadiectivis
aliquid
adiungitur,
ipsumproponitur
ad intentionem
cumdicitur
'isteestalbus'.Namlicetquantum
facientis
proposiundeipsasolapraedicari
tionem
solaalbedocopulatur,
potest,- ex vi tarnen
verbiipsumsubiectum31
albumessentialiter
Socraticoniungitur;
substantivi
verbi,quia significationem
quare32ipse Socratesesse poniturvi substantivi
essentiae
tenet.
The substantive
whichis notsuitable<fora thing
> 33invirtue
verb,however,
withall sorts
ofitsnamesbuton thebasisofitsveryessentia
, canbe conjoined
ofpredicates,
notmerely
withnames,butalso withpronouns,
or
participles,
Andbecauseit signifies
evenwordstrings.
whatsoever
in essentia
, the
anything
29In English'is-named'is a twowordsexpression,
in Latin(as in Germanand
'heiss','heet').
Dutch)a one-word
expression
('nuncupatur';
30Abelard'
s discussions
verbs('nuncupari',
ofthenuncupative
'vocari',
'nominari',
I 414,19)are foundin Gl.Per.359,28-360,
and 'appellari';cf.Priscian,
Inst.gramm.
12andD. 134.3-27.ThevonlvDlava secondary
roleinhistreatment
ofpredication.
31The correction'ipsum subiectum
album' is
(instead of 'substantivum')
paleographically
easyand is supported
by theparallelpassagein theSuperTopica
Glossae
; seebelow,p. 115.
32I think,
theMS reading
intoquare
error
quiashouldbecorrected
(thiskindofscribal
is oftenfound:qcinsteadofq<.
33Viz. allkindsofthings
which
arereferred
tobyallsortsofnouns,adjectival
nouns,
andevenphrases
suchas 'homoalbus';seeGl.Per.360,6-9)as
pronouns,
participles
verbwhichbefits
opposedtothenuncupative
things
onlyon thebasisoftheirbeing
namedbya propername;see ibid.,9-12.
109

12:51:50 PM

is neverabsentfrom
ofessentia
it;forinallcases,itis bymeansofthat
coupling
thatonethingis something
<essentia>thatonepronounces
else,evenwhenit
as whenonesays'he is white'.Foralthough
as faras the
goeswithadjectives,
intention
of the framer
of the proposition
is concerned,
whiteness
alone is
as a consequence
ofthe
nevertheless,
coupledandso italonecanbe predicated,
withSocrates
ofthesubstantive
itself
is conjoined
force
verb,thewhitesubstrate
invirtue
oftheforceofthesubstantive
in themanner
ofan essentia.
Therefore,
as being,becauseitretains
verbSocrateshimself
is presented
thesignification
ofessentia.
Of course, it should be asked now what the precise meaning of
'essentia' is. Wherever, as in our context, 'essentia' is opposed to
'adiacentia', it cannot possibly stand for 'essence', and must be used
to mean 'what is of a non-adjacent nature' or 'what is a selfcontained
unity'. Therefore, the primary notion of 'essentia' must be that of
subsistence or rather 'substantialness'. Elsewhere the opposition
- secundum adiacentiam3
is found.34So Kretz'secundum substantiam
mann seems to be ratherclose to the truthin taking 'essentia' for"no
more than existence, or independent, substantial existence."35
Returning now to Abelard' s exposition of the behaviour of the
substantiveverb, we see him depictingwhat its performingone job too
many amounts to:
Socratiper'albus' [albumGeyer]
Gl.Per.360,23-34:Duo itaqueconiunguntur
albedo scilicetin adiacentiaet album,idestipsumaffectum
praedicatum,
intenalbedine,in essentia;solatamenalbedopraedicatur,
quia solaconiungi
34D. 595,36-8.Forsubstantia
seeD. 84, 1-2;87,
andessentia
usedindiscriminately,
of'substantia',
seeD. 331,
Forthedefinition
27; 91,8; 194,4; 408,33-4;425,12ff.
cf.594,9; and334,25: 'resper
remperse existentem');
15-6('substantiam
dicimus
docThisshouldbe parallelled
withgrammatical
idestnullo
subiecto'.
se existens,
egens
ed. Toison,whoexplicitly
minorem
, 59,28-61,73
trine,
e.g. PeterHelias,InPriscianum
and
all its substantial
describes'substantia'as a self-contained
entityunifying
thesubstantive
verbfrom
thispointofview(p. 61,75-62,
accidental
forms
andtreats
substantiam
hocuniversale,
29; esp.61,76-9:Sed equeestdicendum
quodsignificai
remutsubstantem
seddicitur
formis,
significare
nequehancvelillamsubstantiam,
etinterse. ("One shouldnotassert,
remutsibiunitformas
idestdsignt
however,
substance
theuniversal,
thatit[viz.thesubstantive
, northatitsignifies
verb]signifies
i.e. it
a thingas underlying
thisor thatsubstance;
it is rathersaid to signify
forms,
See
withitself
as it unitesforms
and alsomutually").
a thinginasmuch
designates
166.
also Kneepkens
(forthcoming),
35Kretzmann
doesnot
'substantialness'
[1982],497; cf.498,. 43.- Incidentally,
inAbelardtoo,to
in (this)outsideworld,as itmayrefer,
as suchimplyrealexistence
SeeDe Rijk[1981a],
as opposedto'Facticity'.
just'Particularizaron'
(or'Actuality')
is foundin manyotherauthors.
29-32and 38-40.A similaropposition
E.g. Duns
vel
univocerem,remanente
Scotus,InArisi.Periherm.
q.2, 586a: "nomensignificai
'Sortes'significai
velnonexistente.
Ad quod sciendum
existente
quodhocnomen,
"
existere
Sortemsecundum
, Cf. Id. InArisi.Anal.
quodestinactu,nontamenSortem
mensuratam".
remut tempore
Post.II, q.4, n.2: " 'ens' nomennonsignificai
110

12:51:50 PM

ditur.Nonenimquicquidconiungitur
sedid solumquodproposipraedicatur,
tioneconiungi
intenditur.
facit'Socratesestalbus',
Qui enimpropositionem
solum[solamGeyer]
albedinem
inesseSocratiostendit.
verbum
Et si haberet
per
'album'copulare
Socratiitaquodnilsubiecti
quodpossetsimpliciter
attingeret,
sicfaceret.
Sed quianonestverbum
profecto
perquodid fiat,venitad substantantum
tivum;quodquiaessentiae
habet,nonpotest
significationem
ipsumproferri
essentiae.
In essentia
verononpotest
sineconiunctione
vere'album'Socrati
ut scilicet
dicatur'Socratesestalbedo'.
copulari,
withSocratesby meansof thepredicate,
And so two'things'are conjoined
inadjacenceand'a white<thing>', i.e. thething
itself
'white',viz.whiteness
it
whichis affected
in terms
ofsubstantialness,
Nevertheless,
bythewhiteness,
tobe conjoined.
is whiteness
alonethatispredicated
, foritaloneis whatisintended
Fornoteverything
thatisconjoined
is predicated,
butonlythatwhichbymeans
frames
thepropoisintended
oftheproposition
tobe conjoined.
Indeed,whoever
is white'only36
declares
thatwhiteness
is inSocrates.
Andifhe
sition,'Socrates
hada verbbymeansofwhich
hecouldcouplewhiteness37
withSocrates
directly
so thathe wouldnottouchanything
ofthesubstrate38
> , he
< ofwhiteness
surelywoulddo so. However,becausethereis no verbavailablebymeansof
whichthatcouldbe done,heendsup withthesubstantive
as ithas
verb,which,
of'substantialness',
theconjunccannotbeuttered
without
onlythesignification
'white'39
cannotbe truly
Butas regards
tionofsubstantialness.
substantialness,
coupledwithSocrates,to theextentnamelythatone wereto say'Socratesis
whiteness'.
The resultis somewhat astonishing,indeed: whiteness,which is the
only thing the speaker intends to predicate is coupled only
'adjacently', whereas the supposititious child, the substrate of
whiteness,obtains the honour of being 'essentially' predicated.40One
36solamalbedinem
MS.
, solumalbedinem
Geyer
37Thereading
albedinem
ofalbum)
issupported
(instead
bytheparallel
passageinSuper
Glossae
; seeDe Rijk[1981b],55,n. 29 andbelowp. 116.Cf.Kretzmann's
Topica
proposal[1982],499.
'
38Abelardmeansto saythatofthewholesemantic
areaof'album'(i.e. that
which
is affected
theframer
of the proposition
wishesonlyto include
by whiteness')
notthe'thatwhich',in hisactofpredicating.
Thisinterpretation
'whiteness',
(esp.
thereadingsubiecti
insteadofsubstantivi,
a frequent
concerns
which,incidentally,
scribe'serror)
is strongly
Glossae
; see
supported
bytheparallelpassageinSuper
Topica
below,p. 115.
39At firstglanceKretzmann's
albedoforalbumcan be
[1982: 499] correction
reasonably
arguedfor,andmaybe supported
bytheparallelpassageinSuper
Topica
Glossae:
seebelow,p. 116andDe Rijk[1981b],55, n.29.Howeveritis unnecessary
evenseemsto missa subtlety
in Abelard'swords.One
and,aftercloserinspection,
has to notice,first,
thatthephraseinessentia
veroas putin first
has some
position
in
emphasis.Besides,Abelardseemsto say thatas regardsthe substantialness
'album', 'white'cannottrulybe conjoinedwith'Socrates',since,then,saying
'Socratesis white'wouldbe tantamount
to sayingtheclumsy'Socratesis hisown
I am afraidthatKretzmann's
whiteness'.
discussion
to the
(p. 501) is notentirely
his assertionthat"At thiscriticaljuncturethe theoryseems
point,especially
confused".
40Foran extensive
ofthewholepassage,see De Rijk[1981a],32-5and
discussion
38-40.
Ill

12:51:50 PM

should bear in mind that while discussing the substantive verb, our
author in fact has the vicissitudes of 'album' in the focus of his
interest, 'album', that is, inasmuch as, qua predicate noun, it is
affectedby that 'surrogate' copulative verb. So one need not be surprised that his remedy amounts to splittingup the semantic field of
'album' into its two differentstrata,viz. that concerningthe property
involved and its substrate(called 'fundamentumalbedinis'; 'the basis
of the whiteness' i.e. the property of being white inhering in
Socrates'). That is what we see him doing now:
in adiacentia
et secundum
Gl.Per.360,34-361,3:
Undeut et albumcopuletur
albumconiunctio
essentiaevereponatur,adiectivum
subiectum41
quod est
adiacentem
verbo,quod et formamquam significat
'album', coniungitur
et fundamentum
secundum
albedinem
essentialiter,
quod nominat
praedicet42
tantum
vi, ut dictum
est,poniintenditur.
praedicet,
quod in ea tantum
andtruly
theconin orderto both
Therefore,
couple'white'adjacently
present
viathewhitesubstrate,
theadjective,
'white'is conofsubstantialness
junction
theformit [i.e. theword
joinedwiththeverbwhichhas thejob to predicate
itnamesin the
thefoundation
as adjacent,and to predicate
'album']signifies
mannerofsubstantialness,
since,as wassaidbefore
solelyviaitswhiteness,43
to use it [i.e. theword'album']onlyin thatcapacity.
[360,25],one intends
Next Abelard triesto throwmore lightupon the vicissitudesa noun
such as 'album' undergoes when used as a predicate noun in connection with the substantiveverb. He does so by contrasting'album' as
predicatedwiththe same noun when placed in subject position. In that
case the forceof the substantive verb causes it to be understood only
in its substantialness,i.e. as primarilyreferringto a (white) subsistent
:
thing
hocmodo:'albumestSocrates',
or'album
Gl.Per.361,3-11:
Cumverosubicitur
tantum
Cumenimdicimus'albumcurri,
curri,invi substantivi44
accipitur.
taleest:'albumestaffectum
cursu'sicut'albumestSocrates'.Necestmirum
et de
si eandemsignificationem
'album',de albedinescilicet
semperretinens
modoin alterasubiciatur.
modoin alterapraedicatione
subiecto,
praedicetur,
sed non 'accidenssubici',quia
Unde recte<dicitur> 'accidenspredicari',
utdictum,
sedinvifundamenti
nomeninviaccidentis,
accidentale
praedicatur,
subicitur.
Butwhenit [theword'album']is usedas subjecttermin thisway:'thewhite
> runs',it is understood
in the
> is Socrates'or 'thewhite< thing
< thing
ofa substantive
> runs',is tantaforce
noun.Foroursaying'thewhite< thing
> is <a thing
> affected
mount
tosaying'thewhite< thing
which
byrunning';
41Again,readsubiectum
insteadofsubstantivum
, see above,n.38.
42Notethesubjunctive
moodpraedicet
(at 361, 1 and 2).
43Cf. whatI haveargued(above,n.39)on accountof360,28-36.
44Thecontrast
mentioned
somelinesbefore
iswithadiectivum
(360,36).
quodestalbum
112

12:51:50 PM

> isSocrates'.No wonder,

ifwhenalways
alsoholdsgoodfor'thewhite< thing
thewhiteness
anditssubstrate)
thesamesignification,
retaining
(viz.concerning
in one predication
<the word> 'white'is sometimes
and at other
predicated
said 'an accident
is predicated'
timesactsas thesubject.Henceit is correctly
> , a nounsignifyis thesubject'since,as wassaid < before
butnot'an accident
is predicated
in virtueofitssignifying
an accident
butactsas
ingan accident
thesubstrate.
subjectin virtueofitssignifying
Finally, the conjunction of non-existents(such as chimaera) comes up
for a short discussion. Abelard knows of no better way out than to
declare that in such cases 'est' equals 'vocatur' (4s called'), e.g. in
'chimaera est chimaera'.45
It seems to be useful to discuss, now, the parallel passage found in
Abelard' s SuperTopica Glossae.
5.5 The PresentInterpretation
Confirmed
by Super Topica Glossae
The logical commentaries on Porphyry, the Categoriesand
edited by Bernhard Geyer entitled Logica Ingredientibus
Perihermeneias,
were followedby Glosses on Boethius' De topicisdifferentiis
. Mario dal
Pra has convincinglyshown46that these glosses were part of the Logica
and were writtenafterthe texts edited by Geyer. These
Ingredientibus
an interestingdiscussion of predicationwhich provides
contain
glosses
a most clarifyingparallel to the one found in the Glossae super
Perihermeneias
. I shall give the vital passages in full.47
When discussing (271, 12ff.)Boethius, De top. diff.I, 1177 D 7ff.,
Abelard gives an extensive treatment of the so-called quaestio
praedicativa(e.g. 'utrum nix est alba' = 'whether snow is white'),
which entirelyfocussesupon the notion of predication. To this end he
makes a distinctionbetween 'inherence of essentia and inherence of
adjacence' (271, 19-21). The formeris instanced by 'whethersnow is
whiteness', the latter by 'whether snow is white'. He mentions his
master William (of Champeaux?) and the latter's adherentswho used
to say that as to sentences such as 'Socrates est albus' ('Socrates is
white'), there is a grammarian's interpretationunderstanding it as
45Geyer'
s eaque(at GLPer.361, 16) shouldreadea quae.Forthepresent
discussion,
see Kretzmann
[19821,502-3.
46[1969],Introduzione
XXXI-XXXIX,whereheadducessomeconclusive
arguments
thatthese
against
myassumption
[1967:173;183-6;203-5and1970:XII] totheeffect
also editedbydal Pra; see above,
glosseswerepartoftheIntroductiones
parvulorum,
p. 104.
47Fol. 176rb-vb( = ed. dal Pra
I quotetheMS, as theedition
con271,13-276,39).
tainssomemisreadings.
113

12:51:50 PM

'
'Socrates est ipsum album, idest ipsum quod albedine est affectum
('Socrates is the white < thing> itself,i.e. precisely that which is
affectedby whiteness'), which is the resultof the grammariansattendof the subject and predicate
ing only to the intransitiveconstruction48
noun:
fundamenti
albedinis
ad
essentie
Ethiitantum
Gl.Top.272,12-21:
copulationem
Socratem
attendunt.
solamnominationem49
Quippe 'album'quod secundum
intransitive
nominandosignificat,
copulaturSocrati,solumfundamentum
albedinem
verodeterminando
circafundamentum,
nonnominando.50
Undeilli
in constructione,
attendunt
maximead coniunctionem
qui vimintransitionis
nominatorum
secundumquam intransitio
fit,ut sit grammaticus
respiciunt
scilicet
sensusquodsubiectum
albedinis
essentialiter
cohereat
Socrati,
quodipse
Socratesestipsumquodalbedineestaffectum.
And theyattendonly to the couplingof the essenceof the foundation
ofthewhiteness
toSocrates.As is clear,indeed,'white',that,as
[ = substrate]
the
thenomination
regards
only,is intransitively
coupledto Socrates,
signifies
sole foundation
> thewhiteness
by naming< it> , whereas< it signifies
by
itas beinginthefoundation,
it. Hencethosewho
without
determining
naming
attend
totheforce
oftheintransitive
construction
theconjunction
mainly
regard
ofthethings
namedbywhichtheintransitive
is performed,
construction
so that
thegrammatical
ofthewhiteness,
in themanner
of
senseis thatthesubstrate
inheres
in Socrates,that,namely,
himself
isjustthat
Socrates
substantialness,
whichis affected
bythewhiteness.
The (false) sentence 'Socrates est albedo' ('Socrates is whiteness')
is explained by the grammarians in a similar way. That is, thereis a
similar essential coupling, in this case of whiteness to Socrates {ibid.
272, 21-31). The dialecticians, however, (still in the view of Master
William) take both cases as predication and, therefore, as an
'inherence of adjacence' and 'inherence of essence', respectively,taking 'inherentia' in a larger sense both ranging over the inherenceof
an essential nature and that of an accidental characteristic.Thus,
every proposition has a dual sense, one dialectical focussingon the
inherence of P in S , the other grammatical which concerns essential
coupling {ibid. 272,31-273,3).
48Anintransitive
orcoupling,
wasdefined
thegrammarians,
construction,
(after
e.g.
PriscianInst.gramm.
XI 8, 552,26-7and 11,555, 13) as a coupling
in whichthere
is no transition
from
onething
('subject')toanother
('object');e.g. D. 166,16-9:cf.
Gl.Per.361,15-7and 362,39-363,
3. For parallelviewsin grammatical
discussions
aboutthenatureandfunction
of'est' (theconjunction
of'essentiae'i.a.), seeMews
to papersby Hunt,Fredborg
and
[1986],5 ff.,esp. n.27-8,wherehe also refers
Kneepkens.
49'Nominado'or 'appellatio'
ofa particular.
Cf. above,p. 86.
is the'signification'
50I.e. itdoesnotsignify
theparticular
whiteness
in Socrates.
inhering
114

12:51:50 PM

So much forMaster William's view of predication. Abelard rejects

any distinctionbetween a dialectical and a grammatical sense and is
even of the opinion that in spite of theirdiverse formulasthe dialectician and the grammarian have quite the same thing in view. {ibid.
273,37-274,13). To his mind, every predicative proposition contains
and asserts ('continet et poni) a certain mode of inherence. He
explains:
Gl.Top.274,14-23:
Velutihec: 'Socratesesthomo'determinate
(determinare
hominemessentialiter
inesse Socrati,idest Socratemesse
MS) monstrat
et istaquoquepropositio:
'Socratesestalbus'determinatam
hominem;
(determinativa
scilicet
MS) inherentiam
proponit,
(siveMS) quantumad essentiam
albedinis
in adiacentia
et
(animalisMS): quippeet albedinem
copulattantum
subiectum
in essentia.Quippe ubi Socratesdicituresse ipsumsubiectum
albedinis
(animalisMS), simulostenditur
ipsealbedineadiacenter
(adiacentie
Et duo Socraticopulari(copulareMS) videnturs
albedoquidemin
MS) affici.
subiectum
albedinis
adiacentia,
(animal!MS) in essentia.
thatmanis
E.g. thisone: 'Socratesis a man'declaresbywayofdetermination
inSocrates
inthemanner
ofsubstantialness,
i.e. thatSocrates
andthis
is-a-man'
iswhite'pronounces
a determinate
viz.
inherence,
proposition
equally:'Socrates
inviewofthesubstantialness
ofwhiteness:
itcouplesthewhiteness
for,clearly,
in adjacenceonlyandthesubstrate
Of course,whereSocratesis
substantially.
saidto be theverysubstrate
ofthewhiteness,
he is simultaneously
declaredto
beadjacently
affected
Anditseemsthattwothings
arecoupled
bythewhiteness.
to Socrates,viz. thewhiteness
and thesubstrate
ofthewhiteness
adjacently,
substantially.
As in his Perihermeneias
commentary Abelard now introduces the
notion of 'speaker's intention': only whitenessis predicated, although
it is not the only thingcoupled, because 'white', too, is coupled. However one should not call 'the thing predicated' that thing which is
coupled to the subject, but solely the one which the (framer of the)
propositionintendsto couple. Our author repeats his complaint about
the absence of a properlycopulative verb:
Gl.Top.274,28-39:
Sicut'album',hocnomen,de Socrateenuntiatum
maxime
in significationem
albedinis
subiecto
coniungende
ponitur,
quia is qui propositionem
tantum
albuminesseSocratiutformam
ostendere
intendit.
profer,
Et,
si verbum
haberet
tantum
quodpossetcopularealbedinem
Socrati,numquam
ad subiectum
albedinis
veniret.
Sed quoniamsolumsubstantivum
[subiectum
MS] verbum(et nuncupativum,
quando in substantivum
[subiectum
MS]
resolvitur)
aliquas res coniungere
constat,substantivum
per predicationem
sineconiunctione
essentie
[subiectum
MS]quiaomniainessentia
significai,
proferri
nonpotest.Oportet
ubiquealiquaessentialiter
persubstantivum
[subiectumMS] verbum
copulari.
ofSocrates
is mainly
usedtosignify
the
E.g. thenoun'white'whenenunciated
ofthewhiteness
withthesubject,
becausewhoever
a propoconjunction
proffers
sitiononlyintends
todeclarethatwhiteis inSocrates
as hisform.
Andifhehad
115

12:51:50 PM

a verbthatcouldcouplejustthewhiteness
to Socrates,
he wouldneverlaya
on thesubstrate
of thewhiteness.
But,sinceit is plainthatonlythe
finger
substantive
verb(andthenuncupative
whenitis resolved
intothesubstantive)
thesubstantive
verbcannotbe proconjoincertain
'things'through
predication,
ferred
without
theconjunction
ofsubstantialness
becauseitsignifies
everything
insubstantialness.
<So> itis inevitable,
thesubstanthat,inallcases,through
tiveverbsomethings
arecoupledin themanner
ofsubstantialness.
Finally Abelard sketcheswhat goes on semanticallyas a resultof the
inadequacy of the copulative verb, which really does itsjob, but not
withoutdoing somethingelse which is not called for,viz. to substantially couple the whiteness(or some other form) as well:
Gl.Top.274,39-275,7:
Atveroalbedoinessentia
verecopulari
nonpotest.
Unde
ad fundamentum
cum[supplied
bythescribe]
ipsiusvenimus
quodnoninessentia substantivi
albedinissimul[similiter
[subiecti
MS'
MS] verbicopulamus,
dum videlicet
adiacentiam
indicamus,
quam intendimus
proponimus
ipsum
esseipsumsubiectum
albedinis
Socratem
[animal!MS'. Etlicetduocopulentur,
sola albedotamen
fundamentum
scilicetin essentiaet albedoin adiacentia,
intenditur
dicitur,
copulaquiasolacopulari
predicari
[intendunt
MS' etpropter
insignificationem
eiustantum
vocabulum
maxime
fit;etpredicatum
propositio
tionemeius subiectocopulatur,quia tantumad subiectionem
albedinis
subiectoconiungitur.
ostendendam
whiteness
cannottrulybe coupledin themanner
ofsubstantialness.
However,
whenwearriveat thefoundation
ofthat
whichwedo notcouplein
Therefore,
themannerofsubstantialness
verb,bythesame
expressed
bythesubstantive
tokenwedesignate
theadjacenceweintend<to designate
> , viz.whenwepronouncethatSocrates
istheverysubstrate
Andalthough
himself
ofthewhiteness.
two < 'things'
> are coupled,viz thefoundation
in substantialness
and the
inadjacence,nevertheless
whiteness
is saidtobe predicated,
onlythewhiteness
sincethataloneis intended
to be coupledand itis onlyin viewofitscoupling
thattheproposition
andthepredicated
term51
is mainly
is framed;
coupledwith
thesubjectin orderto signify
it [i.e. whiteness],
sinceitis conjoined
withthe
thesubstrate
ofthewhiteness.
subjectonlyfordesignating
So, again we see Abelard proposing to split up the semantic field of
'album' into its two strata,viz. the 'characteristic'and its 'foundation'
or 'substrate'.
5.5 The DiscussionofPredication
in theDialctica
In the Dialctica, Abelard is still primarilyconcerned with the worrisome contrastbetween conjunction and predicationwhich, fromthe
operational point of view, amounts to the conflict between the
linguistic apparatus of the proposition and the speaker's intention.
The outcome of the longish treatmentof the problem as reportedin
51Viz. theword'white'('album').Abelardalludestothedualsemantic
of
function
suchwords,to refer,
and itssubstrate.
bothto a characteristic
namely,
116

12:51:50 PM

the Logica Ingredientibus

(both in Gl.Per. and in Gl. Top.) was, roughly
speaking, that the framerof a proposition intends only to predicate a
formand actually does so, but not without,besides adjacently coupling thatform,also conjoining its substratein termsof substantialness.
When taking up that discussion in the Dialctica (at 129,2 Iff.)
Abelard begins by rejectingthe view of those who reduce predication
to the adjacentcoupling only, thus ignoring the natural (and quite
inevitable) conjunction in terms of substantialness. So they claimed
that in 'Peter is white' whitenessalone is attributedto Peter as somethingadjacent, since that is the only thingthe framerof that proposition intends to do ( D . 131,26-33). Abelard replies that, quite to the
of the whiteness
contrary,the predicationwhich concerns the substrate
which is named by the predicate noun 'albus', pertains to the true
sense of the propositionas well as the proper functionof the substantive verb rather than to the predication concerning the adjacenceof
whiteness
, which is only connoted by the predicate noun. In fact, he
argues:
D. 131,36-132,6:
Cum enimaliquemdicimusessealbum,hocestproponimus
secundum
ipsumessealiquemex hisque albedineinformantur,
copulationem
essentie
illudquodessedicitur
hocestres
proprie
per'est' verbum
predicatur,
albedine
informata.
Sedquoniamper'albi' nomenipsumattribuitur
designatur
est, ex ipsa quoque propositione
quod ei ex adiacentealbedineimpositum
inherentia
adiacentis
albedinis
innuitur.
Iliaitaquepredicatio
essentie
que ineo
exverbispropositionis
iliavero
estquodhocilludessedicitur,
proprie
exprimitur;
innuitur.
attributio,
quodammodo
que estadiacentie
Forwhenwesaythatsomebody
is white(i.e. whenwepronounce
thatheis one
ofthose'things'thatareinformed
thecoupling
then,regarding
bywhiteness),
52is saidtobe thatis properly
ofsubstantialness,
which
itis that
predicated
bythe
verb'is', namelythethinginformed
However,sincethe
by thewhiteness.
"thename'white'ofall names53
is attributed"
is usedtoshowthat
expression
on thatthingin viewoftheadjacentwhiteness,
it is imposed
theinherence
of
theadjacentwhiteness
is also impliedbytheproposition
itself.
the
Therefore,
whichconsists
ofsubstantialness
insayinglthis
isthabA
is thatwhich
predication
is properly
whereasthepredication
by thewordsof a proposition,
expressed
whichis theattribution
ofadjacenceis somehow
implied.
There is something remarkable about Abelard's rejection of the
opponents' view inasmuch as it nicely suits his own intentionto rule
52In myviewilludquodis thepredicate
nounin illudquodessedicitur
thanits
rather
takesit [1982]:503). Cf. thephrase'hoc illudesse'.
subject(as Kretzmann
53Albinomen
= 'precisely
thename'white'.Abelard
meanstosaythatalthough
ipsum
thesubstrate
involved
is themainsemantic
ofthesememe,thename
by
ingredient
meansofwhichitis namedis alsoofsomeimportance.
Abelardintendsto pointout thatthe proposition
concernsthings
primarily
themselves
rather
thantheirproperties.
117

12:51:50 PM

out the unwanted role of the copulative verb. However, as we can see
from the last quotation, Abelard sticks to the Log.Ingred
. view, and
4
even gives 'essential conjunction' a clear priorityto adjacent predication'. Quite naturallyour author goes on to attemptto take away the
bad consequences of the dominant position of the 'essential conjunction'. His move is quite ingenious. Taking up an idea prompted
.55 he sets out to empty the very
earlier in the Glossaesup. Periherm
notion of 'substantialness' ('essentia') in strippingit of any 'thing-like'
content. In fact, 'est' developes into an open spot which stands itself
'
an-x or y' Abelard explains this aspect of the
only for there-beingof
use
the substantiveverb as its secondary sense, which is
copulative
opposed to the primary sense it has when it is used as a full-fledged
verb ofexistence. He embeds the novel view in a general consideration
of the verb used in a statement-makingutterance:56
D. 134,28-135,1:
Nonestautemilludpretermittendum
quodverbain enuntiamodoperaccidenspredicandicuntur.
tionibus
Proprie
positamodoproprie,
autempredicantur
hocmodo:'Petrusest','Petruscurri;hicenimgeminavi
cumnonsolumcopulandi
officium
sedetiamreipredicate
tenent,
funguntur,
habent.Per accidensautemet nonpropriepredicari
dicitur,
significationem
ita: 'Petrusest
ad eiustantum
cumipsumpredicato
copulationem
apponitur,
continet
homo'.Nequeenimhicinterpositum
quoquerempredicatam
(quippe
sedtantum
iam'homo'superflue
quodsubiungitur
supponeretur),
predicatum
in ipsoessetattributum,
in eodem
hominem
copulat.Necsi iamaliquidpreter
loco 'hominem'
subiunctum.
copularet
thatverbsusedin statements
are saidto be
Nowthatmustnotbe overlooked
on someoccasionsand secondarily57
on others.Theyare
properly
predicated
in thisway: 'Peteris', 'Peterruns'.For heretheyare
predicated
properly
ofcouplthefunction
inthattheydo notonlyperform
engagedina doubleforce
ofthe'thing'predicated.
However,it [the
ing,butalsobearthesignification
whenitis added
andnotproperly
verb'is'] is saidtobe predicated
secondarily
termforthesolepurpose
ofcoupling
to thepredicate
it,as in 'Peteris a man'.
verb does not also containthe 'thing'
For in this case the interposed
55Whencommenting
assertion
16b23-4;
(at De interpr.
(358, 1-19)uponAristotle's
seeArist.Latinus
yad loc.):"by itself'is' is nothing".Cf. Gl.Per.349,16-350,39.
56I am afraidthatKretzmann
is wrongin thinking
[1982:504]thatat thispoint
Abelardleavestheproject
ofa unified
adiacens
boththe'is' secundum
theory
covering
onthisscorethatallverbsmaybe usedeither
adiacens.
He seemstoignore
andtertium
or improperly
properly
e.g. 'ridet'('laughs')in 'Petrus
(primarily)
(secondarily);
ride('Peterlaughs')and 'pratumridet'('themeadowis in bloom').
57Whentheopposition
'proprie'vs 'per accidens'is used,'per accidens'equals
and
or 'transsumptive'
or 'diminutive'
'improprie'
[see 134,32-3],or 'secundario'
thelike,andstandsfora wordbeingusedina diminished
sense,i.e. whenonlysome
are involved.
See esp. Gl.Per.362,
oftheconstitutive
notions
ofitspropermeaning
of'pro4-9where'peraccidens'is glossed:'idestsecundoloco' andtheequivalents
and 'primoloco'.
prie'are 'principaliter'
118

12:51:50 PM

- then,indeed,'man' wouldbe suppliedsuperfluously

- insteadit
predicated
Andifsomething
otherthan'man'would
onlycouplesthepredicate
subjoined.
beattributed
as contained
intheverb< 'is' > , itwouldnotsimultaneously
cou'man'.
plethesubjoined
Of course, the crux lies in the meaning of 'res predicata'. Well, by the
'thing predicated' one has to understand, it seems, what is traditionallycalled thepragmaor 'res verbi'.58 In the grammaticaltradition
the 'res verbi' is also called 'substantia verbi'. In L.N. P. 532, 34,
Abelard apparently also uses that term so common with the
,
grammarians.59See e.g. Peter Helias, Summain Priscianumminorem
61,75-62,29 (ad XVII, 35) and 65,40-67,95 (erfXVII, 37-8). Helias
is all the more interesting,since he describesthesubstantia
verbiof 'esse'
as "to signify'a thing' as underlyingformsand as 'unitive of all kind
of forms" (61, 75ff.).60
In the next lines Abelard refers to Aristotle's use of the label,
'accidental predication' in De interpr.11, 21a25-6, where 'Homer is
somethingsay, a poet' is instanced and the predicationof 'is' is called
accidental, since here it does not have its fullsense; "for it is because
he is a poet, not in his own right,thatthe 'is' is predicatedof Homer".
I cannot see why Kretzmann calls this development astonishing
[1982: 505]: the substantive verb still signifies 'essentia' but after
closer inspection and adapting the empty (or variable) 'is' from
Aristotle,Abelard comes to the insightthathe has to refinethe notion
of 'substantialness'. Indeed, the substantive verb when it is used as
copula:
D. 135,4-8:... predicato
ad ipsumtantumcopulandum
nec pro
apponitur
seduttantum
subiecta
repredicanda
id quodpredicatur.
Cum
ponitur,
copulet
autempropriedicitur,remetiampredicatam
continet
atque aliquamrerum
existentium
indeterminate
velutcum dicitur'Petrusest', hocest:
attribuit,
rebus.
Petrusestaliquade existentibus

58See e.g. Nuchelmans

[19731,47-50.
59Cf. Gl.
Per.354, 1-3wheretheressuaof'currere'
is saidto be 'currens'('the(a)
see alsoD. 120,18-20and 133,5-7.
running
<thing>);
60See PetrusHelias,Summa
inPriscianum
minorem
(ad XVII, 35,p. 61-62ed. Toison);
Etquiahocvocabulum
'esse'significat
utsibiunitformas,
substantiam
indeestquod
potestformas
copularereisubiecte.Et ita substantivum
Toison]potest
[subiectum
extrase rei subiecte,cum nullumaliud verbumnisi
copularealiudpredicatum
vocativum
hocpossitfacere.Nullumenimaliudvocabulum
significat
[proverbum?]
remutunitivaestformarum
interse. [ ]. Cum ergo'esse' substantiam
significet
utunitivaformarum
sibiest,ideopotestnomenquodex formadatumestcopulare
subiecto.
119

12:51:50 PM

... is notaddedtothepredicate
forthesolepurpose
ofcoupling
it;itis notused
forpredicating61
an underlying
'thing',butonlyinordertoconjointhatwhich
is predicated.
itcontains
alsothe
When,on theotherhanditis usedproperly,
and determinately
attributes
one of thethingsthatexist,as
thingpredicated
whenone says'Peteris', thatis, Peteris one ofthethings
thatexist.
It should be noticed (and objected to Kretzmann' s too strictdistinctions between several Abelardian ' theories') that quite the same view
of the copula is already found at 362,32-4 in the Glossae super
Perihermeneias
:
Gl.Per.362,32-4:Undeinterpositum
nilsignificationis
tertium
inse tenetquod
rempredicati
intellectus
copuletsedtantum
suppositi.
as a third
Hencewhen'is' is interposed
element
ithasnothing
ofa signification
initwhichtheintellect
couldcouplebutonlythe'thing'ofthepredicate
added.
So when speaking of an 'indeterminate attribution' Abelard
establishes his view of 'is' as an empty container. Whenever 4s'
couples non-existententities(as in 'a chimera is conceivable') it does
not even have any significationof substantialnessat all and just serves
as a copula, Abelard argues:
At veroqueritur,
D. 135,18-23:
cum'est' verbumsuperius
dictumsitinde62
essentias
quaslibet
copulare
quodomnes<res> inessentia
significat,
quomodo
iliapotestcopularequorumsignificationem
noncontinet,
veluti'<non> ens'
aut 'opinabile',quod proprieacceptum
sola non-existentia,
ut nobisplacuit,
autquomodoconstructionis
servari
nisiintransitive
nominat;
proprietas
poterit,
ipsumquoquehisque copulaiconiungatur?
thereis a question.Sincetheverb'is' wassaidabovetocoupleany
However,
forthatveryreasonthatitsignifies
whatoever
kindsofessentiae
all things
in the
of
mannerofsubstantialness,
thesignification
how,then,can it couplethings
whichit doesnotcontainsuchas a 'nonbeing'or 'whatis justconceivable',
non-existents
which,properly
used,in ourview,designates
alone;or howcan
thespecialcharacter
oftheconstruction
be preserved
unlessit[ = theverb'is']
withthethings
is also intransitively
it couples?
conjoined
Indeed, when being mindful of what he has continously claimed
about the substantive verb as naturally signifying'substantialness'
Abelard cannot escape admitting chimaeras or dead persons like
Homer to the scene. He startswith recalling earlier attemptsto solve
the problem, among which the one given by his Master and his own
61In rendering
an underlying
seemstoignore
"predicating/or
reality"Kretzmann
thegerundivum
tobe equaltothe(unusual)gerundium
construction
prorepredicanda
rem.
construction predicando
62IndeMS, pro
in myedition;'inde ...
English'hence wrongly
changedintointer
quod' = 'fortheveryreason... that',(cf.English'hence... because').The same
construction
is foundat D. 138,9.
120

12:51:50 PM

earlierargumentin defenceof it. First,he renewsthe rejectionof some

people's63 claim that in 'Homerus est poeta' ('Homer is a poet') 'est'
is used to referto non-existents.But in that case, Abelard asks, what
kind of being is involved?64Therefore, he now returnsto the former
view of his Master "that the predication was improper, not because
of the verb but because of the figurativeand improperway of expressing performedby the grammaticalconstructiontaken as a whole" ( D .
135,29-31), which makes the composite expression have a sense differentfromthose of the separate words. So 'Homer is a poet' is a true
sentenceonce 'to-be-a-poe is taken forone constructionin which the
word 'poet', to some extent, also refersto the poem still extant ( D .
should be read sin135,32-136,13, where at 135,33 signijicatorum
gularum).
Next, Abelard recalls an objection and the answer he used to give
in defence of his Master's view. The objection runs: if 'Homer is a
poet' is an improperlocution one may ask whom the sentenceis speaking about. If about Homer, the assertionis false, since Homer is dead;
if about his poem, there is no reason to deny its existence or to consider the constructionan improper one. (D. 136, 14-8). The support
Abelard used to give his Master earlier consisted in profilingthe
'entire-construction'view in greater detail:
D. 136,22-6:At verocumtotiusconstructionis
ac simul65
sententia
pensatur
verbain sensualteriusenuntiationis
noniam singularum
dicconfunduntur,
tionumsignificadoattendendaest, sed tota magis orationissententia
diciturorationisconstructio
intelligenda;
atque in eo impropria
quod eius
sententia
ex significatione
nonvenit.
partium
whenthemeaning
oftheentire
construction
is pondered
However,
grammatical
andthewordsaremixedtogether
in thesenseofthealternate66
then
assertion,
itis nolongerthesignification
oftheseparate
wordsthatshouldbe attended
to;
thewholemeaningoftheexpression
shouldbe understood.
And the
rather,
construction
oftheexpression
iscalledimproper
inthatitsmeaning
grammatical
doesnotcomefromthesignification
ofitsparts.See alsoD. 169,4-24.
63The quidem
oftheedition(135,34) is a misprint
forquidam.
64Kretzmann
is definitely
inreading
eisforea(in 135,27: 'Sed quidergoesse
wrong
ea negat?'),as theLatinreadsliterally:
he denies',where'them'
'themtobe what,
accusativus
totheinfinitive
esse.(cf.English:'I takehimtobe such-and(ea)issubject
See alsoD. 136,16-7:"cur esseet
such').
(not,ipsi)denegetur".
65Simul= 'together' be takenwith ipsum
rather
than'at thesametime'
(to
confunduntur)
(Kretzmann).
66The equivalent
assertion
is meantwhichmoreaccurately
whatthe
expresses
speakermeansto say,suchas 'famaHomriperpoesimipsiusmanealternates
'Homerusestpoeta';seeD. 136,2.
121

12:51:50 PM

Some lines furtheron, the sentence 'a chimaera is conceivable' is

interpretedalong the same lines.
Abelard himselffeelsinspired, now, by the way he (and his Master,
to some extent) tackled the problem of predication and he undertakes
a freshmove in defending,this time along the very same lines of the
'entire-construction'view, an improper use of 'is' for all its occurrences as a copula. Along the same lines, indeed, since he goes on to
exploit a concomitantfeatureof the 'improper use' explanation of the
chimaera case; viz. to take 'is' togetherwith the predicated noun as
a singlepredicate such as in 'to-be-a-man', to-be-a-chimera'. Now, the
existentialimport is associated with the noun predicated:
Atveromichiomnisiliaverbipredicado
D. 136,37-137,6:
peraccidensatque
adiacensinterponitur,
cumnon
videtur
quandoipsum[...] tertium
impropria
sedsoliuscopuleofficium
contineat
em[.. .] predicatam
habeat,utinea quoque
ad eiusinterpreta'Petrusesthomovelalbus'.Necquidemquantum
qua dicitur
ex eo quoddicitur
'Petrusesthomo'inferri
tionem
potest:'Petrusest',
pertinet
sed fortasse
reitantum
'hominis',quod existentis
quantumad predicationem
nomenest.
and
suchpredication
of theverbseemsto me to be secondary
"But every
thething
itis third
whenever
improper,
adjacent[...]. For[...] itdoesnotcontain
ofthecopula,also e.g. here:'Peteris a
and onlyhas thefunction
predicated
from'Peteris a man'to 'Peteris'
man',or 'Peteris white'.Andtheinference
ofthe
doesnotpertain
totheinterpretation
existential
import]
[viz.anyputative
verbbut,perhaps,
tothepredication
of'man'whichis thenameofan existent
entity
only.(Cf. D. 122,22ff.,
quotedabove2.3).
A final objection is made about the label 'improper use'. Our
author argues thatit is not so pejorative as it may sound, once one has
accepted his suggestion to take the 'is' plus predicate as one single
sememe:
D. 138,5-17:At veroquomodolocutiopropriadiceturubi predicatio
verbi
fuerit
necearnin qua inventum
estsignificationem
tenuerit?
impropria
Neque
eniminventum
fuitin officio
soliuscopulationis
verumsimul[...] in significationeexistentium;
copularepotest
quod etiam[...] indequelibetquibuslibet
suam
MS, nominibus
quod omnibus(hominibus
ed)67secundumessentiam
est.Sed curad eorumquoqueinherentiam
impositum
que nonsunt
ponitur
Unde michi,si profiteri
audeam,illud
atque in ipso non continentur?
utscilicet
'est
rationabilius
videtur
utrationi
sufficere
valeamus
[...] cumdicitur
67Kretzmann
in rejecting
oftheDialcseemstobe right
myreading
(in myedition
since'nominibus
est' is ratherawkward.It shouldbe
impositum
tica)nominibus
criticus
ad loc.) thattheMS readshominibus
whichoftenis
recalled(see apparatus
. Kretzmistaken
in MSS fornominibus
(e.g. Gl.Per.347, 12) as wellas foromnibus
rebus
is paleographically
One shouldrather
mann'sconjecture
unattractive.
change
or otherwise
I think.
intointerpositum
readomnibus
insteadofhominibus,
impositum
122

12:51:50 PM

homo'vel 'estopinabile'vel 'estalbum',prounoverbo'essehominem'68

vel
'essealbum'vel 'esseopinabile'intelligamus.
Buthowis one tocalla locution
in whichthepredication
oftheverbis
proper
and < theverb> doesnotretain
thesignification
inviewofwhich
itwas
improper
invented?
Forit[ = 'to be]wasinvented
notinviewofthefunction
ofcoupling
alonebutsimultaneously
it can coupleanything
to
existents;
[...] signifying
whatsoever
anything
justbecauseithasbeenimposedto all ofthemin viewof
their
substantialness.
Butwhyis itusedfor< expressing
> theinherence
ofalso
thosethingsthatarenotand thatare notcontained
in it< s signification
>?
ifI mayventure
todeclareit openly:in orderto be able to satisfy
Therefore,
reasonitseemsto memorereasonable,
that[...] whenonesays'is a man'or
'is conceivable'
or 'is white'weunderstand
itas oneverb:'to-be-a-man'
or 'tobe-white'
or 'to-be-thinkable'.

6 Conclusion
Upon surveying Abelard' s investigations about sentencehood it
may be stated that it certainlydeveloped gradually and, as a result,
so to speak, of our author's continuouslyscrutinizingthe recalcitrant
problems concerningthe ways in which, in our linguisticbehaviour,
we deal with the vital problem of being.
First, Abelard makes us recognize the peculiar nature of the
substantiveverb 4to be' ('esse'), peculiar indeed, since it is the only
verb thatis capable of conjoining but, at the same time, when serving,
thus, as a device forpredication, conveys, due to its proper invention,
the notion of 'substantialness' ('essentia'). As was said before(above,
p. 109), Abelard' s entire discussion of the problem is ostensiblyconcerned withmasteringthe antagonism between coupling and predication. First, he considers the vicissitudes the predicate noun cannot
escape undergoing as the very result of this antagonism and finds a
remedy in splittingup the differentstrata present in nouns such as
'album' ('the ora white <thing>'). In this endeavour, the chimaera
and the like (the 'non-existents') turn out to be a real spoil-sports.
In the Dialctica, then, Abelard maintains, a a whole, his previous
position (which is found in two parts of the Logica Ingredientibus
, viz.
the Perihermeneias
commentaryand the one on Boethius De topicisdifferentiis
), but sets on to refineit in thathe gives the couplingof 'substantialness' a predominant position over and against the predication
of a
or
form.
he
However,
(substantial
accidental)
aptly combines this
68Ofcourse,
Kretzmann's
theMS reading
'essehominem'
into'essehomo'
changing
is a serious
mistake
an accusative
againstLatinidiomwhichstrictly
requires
(thesocalled'subject-accusative')
in suchphrases.
123

12:51:50 PM

move (quite unavoidably, it may seem) with a subtle emptyingof the

notion of 'essentia' ('substantialness'), with the resultthat, fromnow
on, 'est' (4s') has developed into a mere container(meaning 'undetermined substantialness') for 're-al' ('thing-like') content(or sememe)
conveyed by a predicate noun (which also may be a participle of an
ordinaryverb). An additional resultis that,on thisinterpretation,the
existentialimportseems to come fromthe predicate noun, so thatour
chimaera is no longer a spoil-sport.Finally, the empty-containerview
of the copula is completed by Abelard' s suggestionto take the 'is' plus
the predicate noun as merely one linguisticconstruct.
Kretzmann [1986: 493 and passim] takes the stages in which
Abelard developed his view of predicationforthreedifferenttheories,
the firstof which occurs in an original version and a revision, while
the third is no more than a suggestion. He even views them in a
'
'
Theory', the DialcticaRevichronological order (the Ingredientibus
'
sion' thereof,the DialcticaTheory' and the DialcticaSuggestion').
Jacobi seems to be quite right in rejecting [1986: 171] any
chronologicalarrangementof thatkind. He is of the opinion that "the
array of differenttheoriesin Abelard' s work is not to be explained in
chronologicalterms" {ibid.). To my mind, one should not even speak
of "differenttheories" on this score. Our texts rather show a continuous discussion in which Abelard himselfis making proposals and
attemptingcertain solutions to the questions raised, and, quite in line
with his undertaking,he himselfis always the main objector.
One should notice, in this connection, that what Kretzmann calls
the ' Ingredientibus
Theory' is foundon about one page of theLog.Ingred.
'
'
(360,13-361,20) and the Dialctica Revision' plus the Dialctica
'
Theory' plus the Dialctica Suggestion' occur in less than 10 (successive) pages of the Dialctica, so thatone mightthinkof temporaldifferences,ifany, between thelatterthreeofjust a fewdays, so to speak.
Besides, Kretzmann failedto see thateach new move mainlyconsisted
in an alternateevaluation of some element taken fromformerviews.
More importantly,Kretzmann did not regard it as a special difficulty
to his view that both the notion of coupling as expanded in the Dialc'
tica(' "is" merely
conjoins') and the DialcticaSuggestion (take 'to-bea-man' as just one dictio) are explicitly found in the Log. Ingredientibus
.69
69See above,p. 92. Kretzmann
suggests
(509, n. 62) thatthelocationof some
' 4could
aboutthechronology
raisefurther
similar
questions
passageintheLog.Ingred.
ofhisthought".
ofAbelard'swritings
oraboutthehistorical
However,
development
124

12:51:50 PM

I think,one had betterregard the whole discussion of predication

in Abelard as exclusively focussingupon the problems generated by
the relations between 'predication' and 'copulation'.70 Its outcome
can indeed ratherbe viewed as the resultof Abelard' s own procedure
of 'triedand error'.71
However this may be, Abelard' s achievements in semantics are
astonishinglygreat and even remained unparallelled for centuries.
Instituut,
Filosofisch
P.O. Box 9515,
Leiden

BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Abbreviations:
textsofMedievalauthors
AbelardD. = PetrusAbaelardus
Dialctica.
Firstcomplete
Editionof theParisian
withan Introduction
Manuscript,
byL. M. de Rijk,Ph. D. Assen21970
- Ed.Cat.,Ed. Per.,Ed.Por.,Ed.Div., Gl.Top. = Scritti
di logica:INTRODUC- Glossae
- Editio
TIONESDIALECTICAE:EditiosuperPorphyrium
in Categorias
- De divisionibus.
- LOGICA INGREDIENDe interpretatione
superAristotelem
TIBUS:SuperTopicaGlossae
editida Mariodel Pra, Firenze21969
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Abaelards
Geyer.Peter
philosophische
Schriften,
I Die LogicaIngredientibus
in B.G.Ph.T.M.A. BandXXI, 1 Heft1-3Mnster
1919-27
- L.N.P. = Id. Ibid.II Die Logica'Nostrorum
sociorum.
Die Glossenzu Porpetitioni
in B.G.Ph.T.M.A.BandXXI, Heft4
phyrius,
= TheSumma
PetrusHelias,In Prise,minorem
HeliasonPriscianus
minor
ed.
ofPetrus
JamesE. Toison,withan introduction
by MargaretGibson.Part I, in
1978
CIMAGL, 27 Copenhagen
= rrisciani
rnscianus:Inst.gramm.
Laesariensis
Institutionum
grammatici
grammaticarum
libri
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MartiniHertzii( Grammatici
latini
ex. rec.H. KeiliiII,
III), Lipsiae1855-59.

heseemstocomeclosertothetruth
inthinking
that"it is mostnaturally
interpreted
as an earlierexpression
ofa desideratum
whoseimportance
becameclearerto him
afterhe hadseentheproblems
ofthesubstantive
verbas
generated
byhistheories
the copula" (ibid.),in spiteof his speakingof 'theories'wherelabelssuch as
views'woulddo farbetter,it mightseem.For
'theoretical
moves'or 'tentative
onaccount
ofAbelard'
s theory
remarkable
ofpredication
inhis
developments
parallel
and otherworks,see Mews[1985]and [19861,passim.
theological
70Cf.Kretzmann,
503.To mymind,anychoicebetween
andthree-piece
two-piece
predication
went,
Abelard'sfocusofinterest.
See
also
above,
' as such,
' bevond
>d. 103.
'
(
71As forthat,Kretzmann
didwellsee(506),thatAbelarddidnotoffer
positive
sup'
raisedsomedecisivecounterarguments
Theory'and,instead,
portforthe Dialctica
himself.
125

12:51:50 PM

. Abbreviations:
literature
secondary
ber
indenlogischen
Prdikationstheorie
desPetrus
JacobiK. [1980]= Diskussionen
Schriften
Werk
und
Abcelardus.
Versuch
einer
in:Petrus
Ablardus
Ubersicht,
(1079-1
142).Person,
ed. R. Thomasin TriererTheologische
Studien,Bd 38, Trier1980,
Wirkung,
165-179
- [1981]= Die Semantik
undAussagen
in
Ausdrcke,
sprachlicher
Ausdrucksfolgen
1 (1981),41-89
Kommentar
zu Perihermeneias,
in: Medioevo
Abaelards
- [1983]Abelard
andProposition,
andFrege:
TheSemantics
in:Atti
delConofWords
di storia
dellalogica.San Gimigniano
4-8 decembre1982.
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vegno
Bologna1983
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s Investigations
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andFunctions
Abelard'
oftheSpeech
Historical
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and
sign'Est',in: TheLogicofBeing.
vol. 28 Dordrecht
etc.1986
Historical
JaakoHintikka.
Synthese
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etthologie
chezAblard,
in: Etudesde philosophie
Jolivet,
J. [1969]= Artsdulangage
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57, Paris1969
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in: Ablard
etsontemps.
Actes
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chezAblard,
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organis
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G. H. [forthcoming]
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theWorks
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trinaleet littraire

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Paris1986(forthetsescontemporains.
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1973
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Firenze21969,
in: Pietro
di logica,
Scritti
Dal Pra,M. [1969]= Introduzione,
Abelardo,
XI-XXXIX
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De Rijk,L. M. [1967]= Logica
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oftheTheoryofSupposition,
Assen1967.
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to PetrusAbaelardus,
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Assen1970,IX-CII
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inderLogik
des13.Jahrhunderts
undihrGegenstck
indermetaphysischen
in: Miscellanea
Mediaevalia,7 (1970),1-22
Spekulation,
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Impact
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Denken
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143-57

127

12:51:50 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 2 (1986)
The AristotelianDoctrineof theMean
and John of Salisbury's Conceptof Liberty
CARY J. NEDERMAN

One tenet of conventional wisdom among historians of medieval

moral and political philosophy holds that the dawn of the thirteenth
centurymarked the beginning of a new directionin the trajectoryof
social ideas. An intellectual reorientation is said to have been
necessitatedby the reintroductioninto the West of the body of Aristotle's writings on ethics and politics. It is thus commonplace for
scholars to declare that Western social theoryunderwenta " conceptual revolution'' during the period from1200 (when fragmentsof the
Nicomachean
Ethicscame into circulation)until 1250 (by which date the
whole Politicsseems to have been translated). These five decades are
taken to be a watershedin the developmentof European philosophy.1
In turn,two conclusions are ordinarilydrawn fromthe postulate of an
Aristotelian revolution in the early thirteenthcentury: first,after
about 1200, and certainly by 1250, the foundations of ethical and
political thinkingin Latin Christendomwere whollyand irredeemably
Aristotelian; and second, it is senseless to look for the influenceof
Aristotle'sideas on moral and social treatisescomposed priorto 1200.
Althoughthese canons of interpretationhave become paradigmatic,
theyare by no means engraved in stone. On the one hand, it may be
demonstratedthat even the most Aristotelianof thirteenthand fourteenth centuryauthors were often less indebted to Aristotlethan to
other classical and medieval sources. Aristotle,once recovered, in no
way supplanted, but instead supplemented,the otherauthoritiesupon
which the Middle Ages depended.2 On the other hand, Aristotle's
social ideas were not entirelyunknown to, and uninfluentialwith,
1 It would,ofcourse,be a massiveundertaking
all oftheauthors
who
todocument
see:WalterUllman,Medieval
haveadoptedthisview.Fora representative
sampling,
Middlesex1975,p. 159; QuentinSkinner,
Political
The
, Harmondsworth,
Thought
Foundations
Political
1978,I, pp.50-1;andBrian
, 2 vols.,Cambridge
Thought
ofModern
R. Nelson,Western
Political
Cliffs,
, Englewood
Thought
NJ1982,p. 89.
2 I intend
toestablish
thisina forthcoming
seriesofinvestigations
intotheinfluence
of
after1250.
Aristotle
on medieval
theory
political
128

12:58:19 PM

Latin philosophers prior to the thirteenthcentury. Indeed, earlier

research has already shown that one of the most prominent twelfth
centurytreatiseson moral and political matters,John of Salisbury's
Policraticus
, is unmistakably imbued with Aristotelian doctrines.3
access
to these doctrines indicates the existence of an
John's
'
"underground" traditionof Aristotelianthoughtabout man in society
running throughout the Middle Ages prior to the recovery and
.4 Admittedly,knowledge
transmissionof Aristotle'sEthicsand Politics
of the structureof the Aristotelianargumentwas fragmentaryuntilthe
thirteenthcentury.But Aristotledid exerta philosophicallyinteresting
influence over earlier moral and political concepts in the medieval
West.
The mere presence of Aristotelian terminologyand ideas in texts
completed before 1200 does not, it is true, prove their importance to
medieval philosophizing. Rather, what is required is an analysis of
how Aristotelian principles were assimilated and integrated into
significantaspects of medieval philosophical discourse. With this
broader issue in mind, the presentpaper will argue thata key element
ofAristotle'smoral thought,his definitionofvirtueas a mean, was not
, but
only known to and used by John of Salisbury in the Policraticus
also was the indispensible basis for the doctrine of individual and
political libertyespoused by John.5 Defense of this claim necessitates
the investigationof three matters: first,the range of sources from
which John may have drawn the idea of virtue as a mean; second,
;
John's application of the concept of the mean within the Policraticus
as a
and third,the conclusions about libertyreached in the Policraticus
result of John's notion of the mean. By focussing our attentionon
John of Salisbury, we shall discover how, in at least one instance, the
3 Cary J. Nedermanand J. Brckmann,
Aristotelianism
in Johnof Salisbury's
in:Journal
oftheHistory
ofPhilosphy,
21 (1983),pp. 203-29.
Policraticus,
4 Fora similar
abouttheworkofHenryBracton,
seeCaryJ. Nederman,
argument
Bracton
onKingship
Revisited
ofPolitical
, in: History
Thoueht,5 (1984),pp. 61-77.
5 Forthesakeofa broader,
tothePolicraticus
will
audience,references
non-specialist
be drawnfromthe existingtranslations
The
(withoccasionalmodifications).
ofthePolicraticus
havebeentranslated
under
"political"sections
byJohnDickinson
thetitleTheStatesman's
Book(New York1927);the"courtly"chapters
havebeen
rendered
intoEnglish
andFootprints
byJ. B. Pikeas Frivolities
ofCourtiers
ofPhilosophers
arebasedon theexcellent
1909critical
edition
(Minneapolis
1938).Bothtranslations
ofthePolicraticus
a.M.,
(latelyreprinted)
producedby C. C. J. Webb(Frankfurt
Unvernderter
willalsobe giventothemarginal
Nachdruck,
1965),2 vols.;citations
in Webb'sedition.In future
numbers
thecriticaleditionwillbe abreferences,
as P, TheStatesman
breviated
's Bookas S, andtheFrivolities
as F.
ofCourtiers
129

12:58:19 PM

4
'underground Aristotle" provided the foundationsforan innovative
contributionto the moral and politicalphilosophyof the Middle Ages.
I
It would be a difficultand perhaps futiletask to identifyall of the
documents from which John of Salisbury could have extracted the
equation of virtue with a mean between excess and deficiency.
Elements of this doctrine pervaded the Roman and Christian traditions, and were often expressed by poets and theologians as well as
philosophers.6But while moderation or the mean as a general principle was commonly advocated by pre-medieval authors, John would
have known comparativelyfew works which provided a thorougharticulationof the concept. In particular,thereappear to be two possible
sources fora more detailed Aristotelianaccount of virtue: first,Aristotle himself,some of whose treatiseson logic and language survivedin
Latin to the mid-twelfth
century;and second, the writingsof Cicero,
who occasionally reportedand even accepted Aristotle'smoral ideas.
It may be thatotherpotentialauthorities(such as Boethius) have been
overlooked. But it is sufficient for the present argument to
demonstratethatsometextsfamiliartoJohn contained the substanceof
Aristotle's doctrineof the mean.
In preparationforan examination of the sources to whichJohn had
direct access, however, we ought firstto surveythe salient featuresof
Aristotle'sclassic and complete definitionof virtue in the Nicomachean
Ethics.Aristotleclaims that the virtuous soul is possessed only by the
person who has learnt all the virtuesin their
propermeasure.Goodness in
human action is thus defined as hittingthe mark (or mean) between
excess and deficiency;evil occurs when the agent's behaviour is either
"too much" to "too little". For instance, it is equally bad to be
foolhardyas to be timid when the virtue sought is courage. Aristotle
teaches that "whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is
7
rightin feelingsand actions, virtueascertains and adopts the mean."
This suggeststhat we ought not simplyto contrastgood and evil, virtue and vice. Instead, the good and the virtuousmust be juxtaposed to
6 Forexample,
atP 398a-b(F,
citesTerenceandHoraceonmoderation
Johnhimself
inDe libero
ara moderate
lifestyle
p. 25); andwefindevenSt. Augustine
advocating
bitro
, Book3, sec. 48.
7 Aristotle,
2nd ed.,
EthicsII.vi.16, 1107a;H. Rackhamtranslation,
Nicomachean
Mass 1934.
Cambridge,
130

12:58:19 PM

two formsof vice, excess and deficiency,both of whichare in turncontraryto one another.8It is noteworthythat, on this account, to hit the
in one's moral conduct, but thatmoderation(as
mean is to be moderate
to
opposed
temperenceor self-control)has no standing separate from
the specificvirtues. Good or virtuous action consists in followinga
middle path between opposite wrongs. Therefore, moderation or the
mean is characteristicof all the virtueswithoutever being construedas
a virtuein itself.
Various logical and linguisticcomplexitiesarise fromthe structure
of ethical propositions. Consequently, Aristotle's works on language
and syllogisticlogic oftenaddress moral ascriptionsand, by extention,
concepts. Some of these writings,known collectivelyunder the label of
the Organon
, were available during the Middle Ages even prior to the
massive influxof Aristoteliantextsthat commenced at the end of the
twelfthcentury. For example, the Categories
had been translated into
Latin by Boethius and was read widely by early medieval men, including John of Salisbury; similarly, the Topics, the transmissional
historyof which is a bit more confused,9was known already to John
when he composed the Metalogicon
in the late 1150s.10In each of these
works, Aristotlehad expressly referredto the doctrine of the mean
both as one way of understandingthe term "good" and as an important exceptionto general rules about the use of contraries.As a result,
the Topicsand Categories
contain several passages whichpresentthe notion of the mean in a manner parallel to the Nicomachean
Ethics.The
for
that
is
the
word
instance,
Topicsdeclares,
applicable to
"good"
"that which is moderate; for that which is moderate is also called
good."11 Aristotlelater expands on this remarkwith the explanation
that "defect and excess are in the same genus- for both are in the
genus of evil- whereas what is moderate, which is intermediatebetweenthem,is not in the genus ofevil, but thatof good." 12Essentially
the same argumentis also foundin the Categories
: "What is contraryto
a bad thingis sometimesgood but sometimesbad. For excess, which is
itselfbad, is contraryto deficiency,which is bad; yetthe mean is con8 See ibid.,II .viii.1, 1108b.
9 Thisisdealtwith,atleastinpart,byEleonore
's De topicis
Boethius
Stump,
dijferentis, Ithaca,NY 1978,pp. 159-236.
10AsJohnhimself
tellsus at Metalogicon
Book3, Chapter5 (trans.D. D. McGarry
(Berkeley
1955),p. 172).
11Aristotle,
Mass.
Topics1.15,107al1-13;E. S. Forstertranslation
(Cambridge,
1960).
12Ibid.,IV.3, 123b27-30.
131

12:58:19 PM

trary to both and it is good."13 According to both the Topics and

, then, moral goodness may be found in moderation
Categories
understoodas a mean between excess and deficiency.Attainingto virtue consists in measured action, and by extension vice may equally
well arise out of either an absence or a surplus of virtue.
There is no doubt thatclassical authors in the centuriesafterAristotle both knew and recounted the doctrineof the mean. The most prominent of these thinkerswritingin the Latin language was Cicero,
many of whose works were retained and disseminated by the intelligensia of both late Roman and medieval Christendom. Cicero's
application ofAristotle'snotion of the mean was not, it must be admitted, thorough-goingor consistent. In his mature moral thought,
, Cicero generally adopts the tenets of the
represented by De officiis
Stoic ethical system. Nevertheless, he does on occasion referto "the
doctrine of the mean... approved by the Peripatetics, namely, that
14
"happy mean which lies between excess and defect." Moreover, De
teaches that in dress and in generousity"the rule of the golden
officiis
mean is best." 15This view accords withCicero's claim that "moderation in all things" is embraced by the concept of decorum
, that is, the
quality which pertains to every act of moral rectitude.16But the very
essence of decorum
, De officiisdeclares, is the Cardinal Virtue of
In
other words, moderation really forms a part of
Temperence.17
ratherthan a structuralcharacteristicof
substantivevirtuein De officiis
all the virtues. Cicero is truerto Aristotle'sdoctrineof the mean in a
,
, which was, like De officiis
youthfulessay on rhetoric,De inventione
the
read
the
In
De
inventione
as
in
Middle
,
widely
throughout
Ages.
, the concern is not with ethics perse, but with the linguistic
Organon
nature of moral ascriptions.Specifically,Cicero objects to the conventional paring of one virtue with its opposite vice, e.g., courage with
cowardice. Instead, Cicero maintains that the standard virtues
(justice, courage and the rest) are contraryboth to theircustomaryopposites (injustice, cowardice, etc.) and to anotherset ofqualities which
insiststhat "each
are composed of virtuetaken to excess. De inventione
virtue will be found to have a vice bordering upon it, either one to
which a definitename has become attached, as temeritywhichborders
13Aristotle,
translation
11, 14a2-6;J. L. Ackrill
Categories
(Oxford1963).
14Cicero,De officiis,
Mass. 1913).
1.89;W. Millertranslation
(Cambridge,
15Ibid.,11.59;cf.1.130and 11.66.
16Ibid.,1.93-4.
17Ibid.,1.100.
132

12:58:19 PM

on courage ... or one withoutany definitename. All of these as well as

the opposites of good qualities will be classed among things to be
avoided."18 Cicero's analysis thus captures what was crucial to
Aristotle'soriginalaccount of the mean: thatit is no betterto display a
surplus of virtue than a surfeit.Missing the mark in either the direction of defector of excess is bound to lead the individual into vice.
II
We can now see thatJohn of Salisbury possessed an ample number
of authoritieson which to base an Aristotelianconception of the virtues as a mean between excess and deficiency.We should not be surprised, then,to discover reverberationsof thisdoctrinethroughoutthe
text of the Policraticus.
John certainlyhad a good historicalreason for
Aristotle's
doctrine
of the mean. The Policraticus
was comincluding
a
after
as
of
of
the
with
associated
all,
posed,
critique many
practices
the courtly conduct of the twelfth century feudal aristocracy in
England and on the Continent. John's primary concern is to illuminate the vices of noblemen and rulersin order to instructthem in
the formsof behaviour becoming men of status and power.19To impose upon such magnates a monastic or ascetic regimen would be,
however, unrealistic and ultimately self-defeating. The feudal
aristocracy,as John knew well, was properly composed of war-like
men of action who would never heed seriouslythe bookish virtuesnoris
mally advocated by contempletivechurchmen. Since the Policraticus
intended to be a practical guidebook, John is willing to allow that "if
moderation is displayed, I do not judge it unbecoming... to dwell at
timesupon the pleasures of the senses; as has oftenbeen said, nothing
is unseemlyexcept thatwhich is beyond measure... Modestly pursued
for purposes of recreation, they are excused under the license of
leisure." 20In thisway, John orientsthe values he upholds towardsthe
actual conditions under which knights and princes lived. The
seeks to temper the behaviour of warriors,not to suppress
Policraticus
all the amusements of court.
18Cicero,De inventione
Mass. 1949).
, 11.65;H. M. Hubbelltranslation
(Cambridge,
19The rangeofJohn's
concerns
is addressed
and N.
courtly
byCaryJ. Nederman
ElaineLawson,TheFrivolities
Follow
theFootprints
: Misogyny
andthe
ofCourtiers
ofWomen
Crisis
inJohn
in: C. Levinetal., eds.,Medieval
and
Policraticus,
ofVirility
ofSalisbury's
Renaissance
Detroit(Forthcoming).
Women,
20F, p. 373;P 761b-c,761d.
133

12:58:19 PM

The audience to which John addresses himself thereby helps to

determine his conception of virtue. For throughoutthe Policraticus
,
4
John maintains that if any action 'exceeds the mean, it is a fault.
Every virtue is marked by its own boundaries, and consists in the
mean. If one exceed this, one is offthe road, not on it."21 It is a
characteristicof genuine moral goodness, John teaches, to be neither
excessive nor deficient,but ratherto followa middle course between
'
opposite evils. Bad men, accordingly, 'withdraw fromthe mean be,
'
tween vices, which is the fieldofvirtue. 22Employingthe metaphorof
observes that "to incline to the
the leftand righthands, the Policraticus
rightsignifiesto insisttoo enthusiasticallyupon the virtuesthemselves.
To incline to the rightis to exceed the bounds of moderation in the
works of virtue, the essence to which is moderation. For trulyall enthusiasm is the foe of salvation and all excess is a fault: nothing is
worse than the immoderatepracticeof good works."23 While thisview
churchman, it
may seem strange for an orthodox twelfth-century
reveals the extentto whichJohn's concerns about the conditionof the
feudal nobility result in his presentation of a fundamentally
Aristotelianaccount of virtue. It is in the nature of all virtues,John
says, that they may be attained only when pursued within definite
limits. Moderation or the mean indicates the manner in which the
boundaries definingvirtuous action are to be constructed.John seeks
particularlyto establish the harm which may result fromthe zealous
exercise of virtue. For instance, the individual who, in the name of
justice, shows mercy to someone whose actions warrant punishment
has committedas grave an injustice as ifpunishmenthad been meted
out unfairly.Perhaps referringdirectlyto Aristotle,24
John comments
that "the philosopher warns us to avoid excess; for if a man depart
from this caution and moderation, he will in his lack of caution
foresakethe path of virtue itself... What can then be of any profitif
justice herself, the queen of the virtues, is hurtful in excess?"25
Overstepping the bounds of goodness in the name of goodness itself
will be as repugnantas the utterabsence of moral propriety.Moderation pertains to the essential structureof virtue, in the sense that any
21F, p. 157;P 480d.
22F, p. 374;P 762c.
23S, p. 43; P 731c-d.
24Nederman
$ Policraticus,
inJohnofSalisbury
Aristotelianism
and Brckmann,
pp.
215-6.
25S, p. 43; P 731d.
134

12:58:19 PM

action is virtuousif and only if it participatesin and is guided by the

measure or mean.
But how can one know what the virtuous mean is in any specific
Ethics, Aristotle
case requiring a moral decision? In the Nicomachean
had held thatthe mean is always relative
to the agent.26So faras can be
discovered, however, this position is not reproduced anywhere in the
Organonor in the Aristotelian-influencedthinkersavailable to John.
does not differ
Nevertheless,the solution proposed in the Policraticus
'
own.
'Discretion with regard to time, place,
greatlyfromAristotle's
'
'
amount, person and cause,' John states, 'readily draws the proper
distinction"between virtuousand vicious action; indeed, circumstantial discretion"is the origin and source of moderation in its widest
sense withoutwhich no duty is properlyperformed."27 In deciding
how to conduct himself,each individual must determineall relevant
circumstantialconsiderationsand choose the course of action which is
appropriatelymoderate within its context. According to John, most
actions cannot be judged apart fromtheircircumstances.To cite but
one case, it is clearly vicious to take a human life; yet as a formof
punishment,or as the outcome of a justly foughtbattle, it may be
vicious notto take a life. In John's view, therewould seem to be a few
moral absolutes in the realm of human conduct. His circumstantialist
doctrineleads to a formof individualism,28although not, of course, to
complete relativism, insofar as one is still subject to the ultimate
assessmentof divine judgement.
Anotherconsequence of the claim that all virtueis characteristically
governed by moderation is that various actions which John firstappears to condemn as morally reprehensiblehe eventuallyallows to be
morally acceptable in the proper measure. After a lengthy and
scathing critique of hunting- a favourite pastime of the AngloNorman aristocracy- John ostensivelyreverseshimself: "The activity, however, is laudable when moderation is shown and hunting is
pursued with judgement and, when possible, with profit."29 The
seeming contradictionbetween John's obvious distaste for hunting
and his later acceptance of it may be explained preciselyby his view
26See Aristotle,
Nicomachean
Ethics
, II.viii,1109a.
27F, p. 373;/>761d-762a.
28A viewwhich
intheBody
hasbeenproposed
byKateLangdonForhan,TheIndividual
ThePolitical
tothe1984annualmeeting
of
Politic:
, presented
Thought
ofJohn
ofSalisbury
theAmerican
D.C.
ScienceAssociation,
Political
Washington,
29F, p. 25; P 398a.
135

12:58:19 PM

that the virtuousmean arises out of circumstantialdeterminations.In

this instance, the relaxation afforded by hunting to the warrior
aristocracymay render it a proper formof behaviour at times. The
Policraticus
analyzes courtlymusic in an analogous fashion. Although
John recognized that the morals of courtiersand knightsare threatened by contemporarymusical lyricsand styles,he stops shortof the
condemnation of music altogether.While objectingto those lavacious
and wanton tones which "exceed the mean," the Policraticusalso
declares that if singing "be kept within moderate limits, it freesthe
mind fromcare, banishes worryabout thingstemporal,and by impartingjoy and peace and by inspiringa deep love forGod draws souls to
association with the angels.,,3 As the examples of huntingand music
illustrate,John's central goal is to promotethat "moderation without
which a good lifeis impossible."31 Such moderationrequires thatvirtue and vice be judged on the basis ofthe individual agent's chosen action in a particular set of circumstances.What may at one place and
time be correctforone person may at another place and time be improper foranother person (or even forthe same person). The overaris thatvirtuestemsfromperformching moral lesson of the Policraticus
ing the right act in the right situation, which constitutesthe very
essence of moderation.
If the Policraticus
is addressed generallytowards the medieval court
then
its
more definite target is the prince and his imaristocracy,
mediate circleof advisors. We should not be surprised,then,thatJohn
applies this conclusions about virtue as a mean to the specificconditions and problems confrontingfeudal rulers (primarily kings, but
also, by extension, other independent magnates). Fundamental to
John's approach is the claim that the political qualities of the communityare inextricablylinked to the moral qualities of its royal head.
Hence, the prince of virtuousmoral characterassures the stabilityand
cohesion of the polity; a vicious prince will destroythe body politic.
But insofaras virtuehas already been defined as a mean between excess and deficiency,John must maintain that the actions of the good
advocates
prince will themselvesbe moderate. Indeed, the Policraticus
the
view
the
ruler
that
moderate
and
security
exactly
engenderspeace
among his people: "With how much care should the prince moderate
his acts, now with the strictnessofjustice, and now with the leniency
30F, p. 32 (translation
P 402d-403a.
altered);
31F, p. 161;P 482c.
136

12:58:19 PM

of mercy,to the end that he may make his subjects all be of one mind
in one house, and thus as it were out ofdiscordantdispositionsbringto
pass one great perfectharmony in the service and in the works of
charity."32We ought not to infer,however, that the ruler is to be the
absolute arbiterof the morals ofhis subjects. Rather, the prince should
instructmainlyby his own example, adopting that 4'tranquil moderation of mind" so valued in the magistratesof antiquity.33While never
overlookingor encouraging moral erroron the part of subjects,John's
monarch would not activelypunish those evils withinthe politywhich
do not endanger public order or religious orthodoxy. On the one
hand, John insiststhat "the measure of the affectionwith which [t]he
[prince]should embrace his subjects like brethrenin the arms ofcharity must be kept in the bounds of moderation,"34 lest he commit the
vice implied by excessive kindness. Still, on the other hand, the
Policraticus
protestsagainst the ruler "who is too ready to faulthis subjects, and take revenge on them fortheirfaults."35 Both routes are of
greatharm to the body politic,John says, although he would preferto
err on the side of royal tolerance.36While the king should rapidlysuppress those "flagrant outrages" which "it is not permissable to
tolerateor which cannot be toleratedin good conscience," he should
also show patience towards whatever faults of subjects "which can
honorably be tolerated."37 Special princely virtue, the art of
statesmanship, consists in the moderate use of divinely granted
authority.The virtuousprince will aim fora mean between two contraryuses of political power: excessive charity and intolerance. By
conceivingof the moral character of the monarch withinthe termsof
virtue defined as a mean, John has built his political theory upon
essentiallyAristotelianfoundations.In the case of the prince, as forall
othermen, whosoever followsthe moderate course, by carefullydetermining the circumstances in which action is to be performed,may
properlybe admired forhis virtue.
Ill
Our analysis of John of Salisbury's application of the Aristotelian
doctrineofthe mean has so fardemonstratedthatvirtuousmoderation
32S, p. 39; P 530b.
33 pp. 40, 41; P 530d.
34 p. 37; P 529a.
35S, p. 43; P 531d.
36S, p. 44; P 532a.
37S, p. 265;P 629b.
137

12:58:19 PM

But John,
must be counted among the key themes of the Policraticus.
in
the
that
moral
consists
established
mean, addigoodness
having
tionallyinfersfromthisprecepta set of corollaryprinciples.Specifically, John's acceptance of the doctrineof the mean leads him to adopt
two claims about liberty- one of a moral character,the otherpolitical:
1) Each individual agent must be at liberty to make his own circumstantialdeterminationsregardingthe mean in a particularcontexto and
The
prince has a responsibilityto ensure each subject's libertyby
2)
steeringa politicalcourse between license and slavery,so thata virtuous communityentails the continued libertyof the virtuous individuals withinthat community.
Both of these principles of libertyare dependent upon John's account of virtue as moderation. For John acknowledges an intrinsic
connection between virtue and liberty: ' 'Virtue cannot be fullyattained withoutliberty,and the absence of libertyproves thatvirtuein
its fullperfectionis wanting. Thereforea man is freein proportionto
the measure of his virtues."38 Liberty and virtue are in principle inseparable. He who is most virtuousis most freeand the freestman enjoys the greatestvirtue.
But whydoes John posit thisintimateand inexorable connectionbetween liberty and virtue? The answer, it seems, is that John
understandslibertyto be the abilityto make circumstantialdeterminations regardingthe proper course of conduct (the mean) in any situation. Hence, liberty is required for the individual to discover the
moderate, and thereforevirtuous, route and to act in accordance with
it. " Libertyto do as one pleases is justifiedifmoderationcontrolsthe
act," the Policraticussays, "The circumstances that regulate all
freedomfromrestraintare dependent upon a preceedingconsideration
of place, time, individual and cause."39 Libertyconsistsin the formation of sound, rationaljudgements by the individual agent about the
most appropriate route to virtue: "Liberty means judging everything
freelyin accordance with one's individual judgement."40 Virtue is a
set of general postulates which through liberty are translated into
specificpreceptsof action applicable as circumstanceswarrant. Liberty is not, however, quite co-extensive with right reason, insofar as
John questions the value "of libertyif it is not permittedthose who
38S, p. 323;P 705d.
39F, p. 28; P 400a.
40 p.
323;P 705c.
138

12:58:19 PM

desire to ruin themselvesby luxury."41 If libertyis necessary forvirtue, thentheremust remain the possibilitythatit will be used wrongly,
forvice. Indeed, the occasional use of libertyforvicious acts does not
constitute for John sufficientgrounds for the denial of liberty
altogether.Without a measure of liberty,we have no hope of achieving virtue; forthisreason, vice must sometimesbe tolerated. Full and
true libertydemands that the individual serve virtue and performits
duties.42But the suppressionof libertyin the name of eradicatingvice
will only result in the simultaneous eradication of virtue.
Consequently, the conception of liberty in the Policraticusitself
resembles nothing so much as a mean between the excess of license
and the defectof slavery.By license is meant unlimitedfreedomwhich
does not concern itselfwithcircumstantialdeterminations;by slavery,
the inabilityto make any circumstantialdeterminationswhatsoever.
Both license and slavery lead to vice, in John's view, because both
constitutedenials of thatlibertywhich is a requisite of virtuousaction.
The man who acts on the basis of license stands opposed to true liber"
ty, since he aspires to a kind of fictitiousliberty,vainly imagining
thathe can live withoutfearand do withimpunitywhatsoeverpleases
him; and somehow be straightawaylike unto God, not, however, that
he desires to imitate the divine goodness, but rather seeks to incline
God to favourhis wickednessby grantinghim immunityfrompunishmentforhis evil deeds."43 License is a sortof self-deification
by which
man confusesthe pursuitof arbitrarydesires withhis divinelygranted
freedom.The man of license seeks to make God's will conformwith
his own, therebyrenderingvirtuouswhatever has been chosen. John
is adament in his condemnation of such license: 4'When under the
pretextof libertyrashnessunleashes the violence of its spirit,it properly incurs reproach, although, as a thingmore pleasing in the ears of
the vulgar than convincingto the mind of the wise man, it oftenfinds
in the indulgence of othersthe safetywhich it does not owe to its own
prudence."44 But iflicense by its excessive charactercan lead only to
vice, then no betterend can be achieved by the utterabolition of liberty through the introduction of slavery. John alternately describes
slaveryas "the image of death"45 and as "the yoke of vice."46 Virtue
41F, p. 342;P 741c.
42F, p. 365; P 756c.
43 p. 282;P 675c.
44 p. 324;P 706c.
45 p. 282;P 675c.
46F, p. 365;P 765c.
139

12:58:19 PM

can only be voluntary,the result of choice in accordance with right;

any action which is involuntary,slavish, can thereforeby definition
never be virtuous. Indeed, the Policraticus
suggestsmore than once that
because virtue can never be achieved without liberty,men of good
charactershould be willing to give all theyhave, even theirown lives,
in orderto 'strikeoffthe heavy and hatefulyokeof slavery.' ' 47Even if
the slave behaves in all external ways correctly,he can never attain
virtue,forhe has not exercised the power of his will, thatis, the liberty
of making one's own circumstantialjudgements. On John's account,
'
then, those 'things which are done or spoken freely" constitutea
mean between "the faultof timidityon the one hand and of rashness
on the other,"48between the moral attitudesarisingout of slaveryand
out of license. The slavish and the licentious men are equally lacking
in liberty,although for quite opposite reasons: fromlicense, no rational, moderate and thus valid choice can be made; under slavery
there exists no choice at all.
It is preciselybecause of the precarious balance required forliberty
thatJohn is so fearfulof the prince who seeks to enforcemorals coercivelyover his subjects. John acknowledges that "in order to preserve
libertyand out of regardforit, it has always been permissiblefora free
man to speak to persons concerningtheirvices."49 Patient correction
is the duty of the good man. But correspondingly,the libertyof others
must be respected in word and in deed, at least so long as another's
freedomdoes "not involve the casting away of virtue. For since each
virtueshines by its own proper light,the meritof toleranceis resplendam witha veryspecial glory."50 It pertainsespeciallyto the princeto
ensure the liberty of those over whom he reigns. Indeed, John's
famous distinctionbetween the prince and the tyrantturnson his doctrineof liberty.By definition,"the prince fightsforthe laws and the
libertyof the people: the tyrantthinksnothingdone unless he brings
the laws to nought and reduces the people to slavery."51 Since John
elsewhere tells us that "good laws were introduced for the sake of
liberty,"52we may surmise thatthe true king's effortsare directedentirelytowards the preservationof each subject's individual freedom.
47Syp. 323;P 705c.A similar
at S, p. 282;P 765c.
opinionis expressed
48S, p. 324;P 706b.
49 p. 331;P 710b.
505, p. 324;P 706b.
51S, 335;P 777d.
32S, p.
p. 323;P 705d.
140

12:58:19 PM

Nor does John leave any doubt about what the protectionoflibertyinvolves: "So long as theyhave peace and practicejustice and abstain
from falsehood and perjury,'' members of the body politic "enjoy
libertyand peace in such fullnessthat there is nought that can in the
least degree disturb theirrepose."53 The intimacywhich obtains between a body politicand its royalhead depends upon the maintenance
of a proper moral and political order. This order is the special responsibilityof the prince and his government.The rightorderingof society
secures libertyand libertyprocuresthe virtueof individuals and of the
whole community. Disorder, by contrast, stems from immoderate
governmentand results in the loss of libertyin one of two manners:
throughrule based on license and throughtyranny.Any monarch corruptedby license will invariablysuccomb to evil, since his government
"does not know its own just measure, nor will it repress its intemperence before it has fallen into the last extremityof baseness
through overindulgence in license."54 Simultaneously, those subjected to such licentious rule either will become corrupt themselves
fromlack of moral guidance and example or will rebel against public
immorality.55In both cases, the consequence is an absence of peace
and justice withinthe community,hence the denial of liberty.Yet the
tyrantfaresno better,forhe too disturbspolitical orderby demanding
slavish obedience fromhis subjects. Those over whom a tyrantrules
should never make a virtueout of theirsituation; to do so is to confuse
"the semblance of liberty'' with "real and pure liberty." 56 In
response to theirenslavement, rather,men should seek to correctthe
tyrant,they should pray to God for his removal, and they may even
act as God's representativein such removal.57Tyranny destroyslibertyand thusvirtuejust as surelyas does licentiousgovernment.Only in
moderationis the authorityof the prince used rightlyand legitimately.
In effect,the prince is not free(if he is to retain the name of prince) to
forcehis subjects to surrendertheirliberty- even in the name of virtue. The distinguishingmark of any vicious governmentwill be a
populace deprived of its own appropriate libertyand led instead into
eitherlicence or slavery.
53S, p. 54; P 536b-c.
54 p. 222;P 610b.
55S, pp. 222-3;P6 lOb-d.
56F, p. 184;P 496d.
57John'sviewsabouttyranny
treated
havebeenthoroughly
byRichardRouseand
in: Speculum,
42 (1967),
andtheDoctrine
MaryRouse,John
ofSalisbury
ofTyrannicide,
pp. 693-709.
141

12:58:19 PM

In a sense, the indispensiblepolitical lesson of the Policraticus

is that
individual libertyprovides the limitingcondition defininggood and
valid government.The virtuous prince knows when to suppress the
flagrantvices of his subjects without denying to them the libertyto
make theirown moral determinations.That John comes to this conclusion of the basis of a concept of libertyinformedby the doctrineof
virtueas a mean indicates the philosophical importanceofAristotelian
ideas in the Policraticus.It is true thatJohn, in constructinga political
analysis directlyrelevant to the problems of twelfthcentury feudal
society, has added a new dimension to the Western conception of
liberty. Unlike the ancient Greeks, John teaches that libertycan be
maintained withoutnecessarilydevolving into license.58In contrastto
the Church Fathers,John claims thatlibertyis not merelythe submission of one's own will to God, but implies a process of genuine individual judgement and choice.59John thereby creates a notion of
libertywhich points the way towards modern principlesof freedom.60
has at
Yet, all the same, the idea of libertyproposed in the Policraticus
its root the Aristoteliandoctrine of the mean: the qualititesJohn attributesto libertydepend upon his logicallypriordefinitionofvirtuein
terms of moderation. Although John laboured without direct
knowledge of either the Ethicsor the Politics, the moral and political
owe a profounddebt to Aristotle.This and
concepts of the Policraticus
similar debts must be not only acknowledged but analyzed ifwe are to
assess the full extent of the "underground" traditionof Aristotelian
philosophypresent during the Middle Ages.61
Christchurch,New Zealand
University
of Canterbury
58Thismaybe contrasted,
forexample,
inRepublic
toliberty
withPlato'sobjections
,
andLaws, III, 699a-701e.
VIII, 561b-563e
59Cf. St. Augustine,
De libero
arbitrio
, BookII, sec.37.
60Thisis nottorejecttheobservation
inthe
Medieval
Humanism
ofHansLiebeschtz,
is a
LifeandWritings
ofJohn
ofSalisbury
(London1950)thatJohn'snotion"ofliberty
forhimmeansthateachdistinct
medieval
one,andthatliberty
sphereshouldbe allowedtoenjoyitsspecialrights
undisturbed"
(p. 54). Itis bynomeansabsurdtosay
ofliberty,
medieval
from
theprivatized
thatthepeculiarly
arising
jurisdicconception
fortheemergence
condition
ofthe
was a necessary
tiontypicalof feudalsociety,
In manyways,John'sAristotelian
ofliberty
is
modern
notionofliberty.
conception
ideaoffeudalliberty.
withthehistorical
compatible
61Thisessaywascomposed
oftheMactaggart
withthesupport
Research
Fellowship
attheUniversity
version
ofthepresent
Anabbreviated
ofAlberta.
paper
programme
GuildofthesameUniversity.
waspresented
to theMedievalandRenaissance
142

12:58:19 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 2 (1986)
REVIEW

ARTICLE

TranszendentalversusKategorial: Die Zwiespltigkeitvon

}
Thomas Philosophie?Eine kritischeStudie
JANA. AERTSEN
I
1982 erschien eine umfangreicheArbeit - 555 eng bedruckteSeiten - von WilfriedKhn mit dem Titel Das Prinzipienproblem
in der
des ThomasvonAquin.1 Um welches Problem geht es hier?
Philosophie
Die Problemstellungkann knapp mit einer Formulierungzusammen4
gefasst werden, die der Autor selbst im Vorwort gebraucht: 'Die
Konkurrenz der Transzendentalien und Kategorien um die Stellung
von Prinzipien" (XXIX). Wesentlich deutlicherist mit dieser Kurzformel die Problematik allerdings noch nicht geworden. Es bleibt
nmlich unklar, wie hier von einem Spannungsverhltnisdie Rede
sein kann. "Transcendentia" werden ja von Thomas als Bestimmungen charakterisiert,die in allen Kategorien "herumgehen"
( circumeunt
) und darum "in jedem Prdikament anzutreffensind".2
Deshalb mssen wir erst dem nachgehen, wie der Verfasser das Thema problematisiert.
(1) Im ersten Teil seiner Studie ("Selbstndigkeit als Begriffvom
Prinzip: Die Substanz", 35-179) will Khn zeigen, dass Aristoteles
auf die Prinzipienfragemit dem Begriff"Substanz" antwortetund
diese Antwortzugleich eine deutlich gegen Piaton gerichtetepolemische Spitze enthlt.
Die Kategorienlehre, worin die Substanz ihre Prinzipienfunktion
gewinnt,entwickeltAristotelesaus seiner Analyse des Urteils, in welchem etwas von etwas ausgesagt wird. Dass die Substanz die grundlegende Kategorie ist, ist jedoch nicht sosehr das Resultat dieser
Analyse; vielmehrist frdiese das "Prinzip der Substantialitt" bereits vorausgesetzt. Im aristotelischen Verstndnis von Sprache
1 VerlagB. R. Grner,Amsterdam,
1982(Bochumer
Studienzur Philosophie,
Bd. 1).
2 De potentia
omnegenus;De virtutibus
incommuni
9,7: ... circuit
q.un., 2 ad 8: ...
intranscendentibus,
omneens;In I Ethic.,
lec.6,81:Bonmautem
quaecircumeunt
sicutet ens,cumconvertatur
cumeo, invenitur
in quolibetpraedicamento.
143

12:58:26 PM

werden nmlich die Satzzusammenhnge aufgelstund dem Subjektnomen eine klare Priorittvor dem Verb eingerumtund zwar, weil
das Subjekt etwas Selbstndigesbezeichnetund das Selbstndige Priorittvor dem auf anderes Bezogenes hat. Substantialittim Sinne von
selbstndigem,von anderem unabhngigem Bestehen ist von vornherein als der erste Sinn von Sein gedacht (51).
Fr die Auffassung,Selbstndigkeitsei das Kriterium fr Prinzipien, beruftAristotelessich auf Piaton. Nach Khns Urteiljedoch zu
Unrecht. Piaton habe die Ideen gerade nicht als unabhngige Prinzipien gedacht. Vor allem im Sophisteshabe der spte Piaton mit seiner
Konzeption der fnf"grssten Genera" (Sein, Bewegung, Ruhe, das
Selbe und das Andere) seine Ideenlehre korrigiert.Er macht diese
apriorische Grundbestimmungen nicht zu Prinzipien im Sinn selbstndiger Frherer, sondern begreiftsie in ihrer synthetischenFunktion fr besondere Sachbestimmungen. Sie sind Transzendentalien,
d.h. Reflexionsbestimmungen,unter denen Gegenstnde berhaupt
gedacht werden.
Die Prinzipienfragekann deshalb von Khn auf die Alternativezu'
gespitztwerden: 'Reflexionsbestimmungen(Transzendentalien) oder
Substanzen?" (siehe 164 ff.). Aristoteles'Intention ist, die konkreten
als Prinzipien auszuEinzelseienden anstelle von Reflexionsbegriffen
weisen (vgl. 345) und die Transzendentalien, die Piaton als Prinzipien
etabliert hatte, 4'aufzuheben". In Metaphysica fhrter den Nach4
weis, dass die ersten Genera, auf die Bestimmungen 'Sein" und
"Einheit" reduziert,keine Prinzipien sein knnen. Sie sind die allgemeinstenPrdikate, aber bezeichnen nichtsSelbstndiges. "Die Prioritt unmittelbarerSachbestimmungen vor der Reflexion auf ihre
transzendentallogischenBedingungen konstituiertdie aristotelische
Fragestellung" (176).
In diesem ersten Teil wird deutlich, dass das Prinzipienproblem,
welches der Verf. anvisiert,sich "aus Aristoteles'Aufhebungsptplatonischer Prinzipien zum Kategorienschema" ergibt. Dies ist der
Hintergrund,vor welchem er Thomas' Haltung den Transzendentalien gegenber, wie wir sehen werden, als ambivalent betrachtet.
(2) Aber bevor er sich Thomas zuwendet, setztKhn seine Analyse
der aristotelischenAntwortauf die Prinzipienfragefort.Im erstenTeil
kommter zu dem Ergebnis, dass das Theorem der Prinzipienfunktion
der Substanz weder aus Aristoteles'Analyse des Urteils noch aus seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Piaton resultiert.Im zweiten Teil ("Begrndung des Prinzips 'Substanz' aus der Begrenzung des
144

12:58:26 PM

wissenschaftlichen
Diskurses", 183-325) will Khn zeigen, dass diese
These aus der aristotelischenWissenstheoriebegrndetwerden kann.
Aristotelesbegreiftden wissenschaftlichenDiskurs als eine endliche
Reihe der Begrndungen. Die Unmglichkeiteines unendlichen Regressesimpliziert,dass die demonstrativeWissenschaftvon Prmissen
ausgehen muss, die keiner weiteren Begrndung oder logischen Vermittlungmehr fhig sind. Aristotelesunterscheidetzwei Typen sol'
cher Wissensbedingungen,d.h. 'Prinzipien", deren Differenzin den
jedoch nicht entsprechendgewrdigtwird.
AnalyticaPosteriora
Zunchst gibt es Prinzipien, die wie das WiderspruchsprinzipBe"
dingungen jeglicher Erkenntnis sind. Sie knnen als apriorische"
Prinzipien charakterisiertwerden, denn diese allgemeinen Erkenntnisprinzipienerkenntman gerade so wie die platonischen Transzendentalien durch Reflexion auf die logische Form des vernnftigen
Denkens. Es handelt sich um eine Erkenntnis,die man im kantischen
Verstnde (KRV All ff.) transzendentalnennen kann (233).
Daneben kennt Aristoteles spezielle Prinzipien der verschiedenen
Wissenschaften,nmlich die Wesensbestimmungen von Substanzen
durch Definitionen. Mit bezug auf diese besonderen Prmissen realisiertAristotelesdie Unmittelbarkeitauch an der Erkenntnisweise,insoferndie Einsicht in solche Prmissen auf Wahrnehmung als einem
unmittelbarenBewusstsein beruhen soll. Sie bringt die Priorittder
Substanz als Inbegriffeiner an vorfindbarenDingen orientiertenErfahrungzur Geltung. Die Notwendigkeiteiner Begrenzung im Beweisverfahrenwird in der sinnlichen Erfahrungvon der unmittelbar
gegebenen Substanz realisiert,die dadurch den Rang eines Prinzips
erhlt. Die Einsetzung der Substanz zum Prinzip schlechthinkann, so
konkludiertKhn, als ein Ergebnis wissenstheoretischerArgumente
betrachtetwerden. Sie ist mit einer Minimalisierung des reflexiven
Moment im Wissensprozess verbunden.
(3) Im drittenTeil, sicherlichder interessanteste,behandelt Khn
verschiedeneAnstze, die den Prinzipiencharakterder Substanz, des
selbstndigen Frheren, relativieren (' 'Alternative Anstze in der
Prinzipientheorie", 329-524). Erst in diesem letzten Teil kommt
hauptschlichThomas zu Wort, denn in dessen Philosophie befinden
sich Elemente, die nach dem Urteil des Verf. eine Revision der aristotelischenPrinzipienkonzeptionermglichen. Dazu gehren vor allem
die Transzendentalien, "die Vernunftbestimmungenjeglichen Gegenstands". Ihre Ausarbeitung ist bei Thomas viel deutlicherals bei
Aristoteles, obgleich Khn dem sofort die Bemerkung hinzusetzt,
145

12:58:26 PM

Thomas bringe die fundamentaleFunktionder Transzendentalien im

ganzen seiner Philosophie nicht entsprechendzur Geltung.
Der Sache nach knpftThomas' Reflexion an Piatons Konzeption
der "grssten Genera' ' an, die den historischen Hintergrund des
Transzendentalienthemasdarstellt(416). Die Analyse der Transzendentalien geht nicht mehr von einem unmittelbarenBewusstseinund
einem unmittelbarGegebenen aus, sondern von den Urteilsformen,
Affirmationund Negation, und betrachtetdie apriorische Struktur
der diskursivenVernunftals Prinzip allen Wissens.
Einen ersten alternativenAnsatz sieht Khn in der transzendentalen Bestimmung "Wahrsein" (343 ff.). Diese wird in De veritate
1,1,
wo Thomas die verschiedenen'transcendentia' ableitet, als die Bezogenheitauf Erkenntnis,auf das erkennendeBewusstsein,verstanden.
Dieser "Vernunftcharakter"kann dem Verfasserzufolgeauch an den
anderen transzendentalenBestimmungen nachgewiesen werden, obgleich Thomas diesen Zusammenhang nicht gesehen hat. Die Konsequenz, die sich aus dem Begriffder Transzendentalien als "a priori
gewisserBestimmungenbeliebiger Objekte" ergibt,knnte nur sein,
dass die Annahme eines einfachen Gegebenseins der Realitt berwunden wird. Das Wahrheitsbewusstseinmacht die Wirklichkeitzu
einem - abhngigen - Extremder Erkenntnisbeziehung.Aber gerade diese Konsequenz zieht Thomas nicht; "so leer bleibt bei ihm der
Vernunftbezugalles Seienden unter dem Titel des transzendentalen
Wahrseins" (350). Es ist ihm an einem Prinzip gelegen, das die Unabhngigkeit der Realitt von der Erkenntnisbeziehungzu verbrgen
verspricht.Als solches fungiert"die Materie". Sie wird gleichsam
zum Garanten der im Sein der natrlichen Einstellung pointierten
Objektivittder Kategorien, whrend die Transzendentalien auf eine
blosse begrifflicheStrukturrestringiertbleiben.
Einen weiterenalternativenAnsatz zum aristotelischenPrinzipienDurchdenken
begriffsieht Khn in Thomas' vernunfttheoretischem
des Begriffs"Seiendes". Thomas nennt "Seiendes" das Ersterkannte. Damit gibter zwar - gemss dem Ansetzen bei einem unmittelbar
Gegebenen - fr die intellektuelleAnschauung einen intelligibelen
Gegenstand an, aber man kann diese Rede auch als "einen nichtaller ErkenntintendiertenVerweis auf die sprachlicheVernunftform
kann
seine Reflexion in dem
nisgegenstnde" verstehen(437). Man
Sinne lesen, dass sie nichtsosehrvon einem Gegenstand handelt, sondern von dem Inbegriffaller Urteilsmglichkeiten.Wenn Thomas in
De veritate
1,1 weiter sagt, dass jede beliebige 'Natur' "wesentlich ein
146

12:58:26 PM

Seiendes" ist, heisstdas, dass die Bestimmung 'Seiendes' nicht separat, sondern in ihrerbedingenden Funktion fralle anderen Bestimmungen gedachtwerden muss. Thomas macht die Verselbstndigung
des Prinzips gegenber dem durch es Bedingten gerade anhand einer
reinen Vernunftbedingungapriori faktischrckgngig(426).
Eine Legitimation zu dieser vernunfttheoretischen
Deutung des
Khn
in
sieht
der
auffallenden
Seinsbegriffs
Neueinschtzung des Nebei
Thomas. In seinem Kommentar zu Boethius' De Trinitate
gativen
(Q.4, Art.l) entwickeltThomas die These, die Negation sei in ihrer
Entgegensetzungzuje einer AffirmationPrinzip aller Distinktionund
Verschiedenheit.3Die Einbeziehung der Negation in diesen Entwurf
bedeutet nach Thomas' Begriffvon der Negation, dass eine Unterscheidung von Seienden und deshalb auch die Distinktheitdieses
einzelnen Seienden nur unterder Bedingung eines reinen Verstandesseienden ( ensrationis)mglich ist. Thomas fasstdie Unterschiedenheit
beliebiger Seiender von einander nicht mehr als einen gegebenen
Sachverhaltauf, sondern als eine Konstruktionder Vernunft,als Resultat einer Reihe von Gedankenschritten,deren Form durch die
Transzendentalien a priori ('Sein-Nichtsein', 'GeschiedenheitEinheit') bestimmtist. Mindestens de facto wird so das traditionell
aristotelischeAufnehmendes natrlichenRealittsbewusstseinskritisiert.Zugleich wird diese Interpretation,worin die Transzendentalien
als 4'Resultate logischer Ttigkeit" erscheinen, wiederum von Thomas selbstrelativiert,indem er die Bestimmung"Seiendes' allem Negativen unterdem Terminus 'Nichtseiendes' - entgegensetztund
so zu einer Bezeichnung fr reine Positivittmacht.
(4) Das Fazit von Khns Studie ist deshalb "die Zwiespltigkeit"
von Thomas' Philosophie (375), die "Zwiespltigkeit" seiner Prinzipienkonzeption(522): EinerseitstreibtThomas die Reflexion auf die
Transzendentalien weiter,weist gegen die antiplatonischeAbsichtder
aristotelischenKategorienlehre deren bedingende Funktion fr die
Denkbarkeit von Gegenstnden nach und restituiertso ihren Prinzipiencharakter.Aber gerade, weil Thomas die logische Struktur,die
Seiendes berhaupt bestimmensoll, weiterausarbeitet,ergibtsich fr
ihn die Notwendigkeit,dagegen den Prinzipiencharakterder Katego3 In Boethu
De trinitate
veldivisionis
ratiosiveprincipium
est
4,1: Primapluralitatis
exnegatione
etaffirmatione,
uttalisordooriginis
intelligatur,
pluralitatis
quodprimo
sintintelligenda
ensetnonens,ex quibusipsaprimadivisaconstituuntur,
perhoc
estindivisum,
statim
invenitur
plura.Undesicutpostens,inquantum
unum,itapost
divisionem
entiset nonentisstatiminvenitur
pluralitas
priorm
simplicium.
147

12:58:26 PM

rien deutlichzu markieren.Er schwchtgleichzeitigdie Transzendentalien "zu blossen Gedankenbestimmungen,,ab (379), er ordnet sie
als nur gedankliche Differenzierungendes Seienden dessen realen inhaltlichenBestimmungenunter, "die unter die aristotelischenKategorien zu subsumieren sind und deshalb die Substanz zum Prinzip
haben (siehe v.a. XXIX).
II
(1) Aus der vorangegangenen Darlegung des Gedankengangs, wie
knapp auch immer, trittdeutlich hervor,dass Khns Studie kritische
Philosophiegeschichtsschreibungsein will. Der Anfangssatz seines
Buches ist in dieser Hinsicht vielsagend: "Thomas von Aquin galt
lange als systematischerDenker und sein Werk als in sich kohrente
philosophisch-theologischeTheorie". Genau dieses Bild bedarf dem
Verf. zufolge einer grndlichen Revision. Er will nachweisen, dass
Thomas' Philosophie sich in den Grundlagen als uneinheitlichund
nichtharmonisierbarerweist. Immer wieder signalisierter fundamentale Widersprchlichkeiten.So wird auf S. 457 darauf hingewiesen,
dass Thomas mit seiner Analyse von Unterschiedenheit"sich dem
Einwand aussetzt, der sonst von ihm vorgetragenen Philosophie
grundstzlichzu widersprechen".
Khns kritischerAnsatz sttztsich stark auf die Arbeiten von K.
desEinenbeiNikolausvonKues.
Flasch, namentlichdessen Die Metaphysik
und
Bedeutung(Leiden 1973).
Problemgeschichtliche
Stellung
systematische
Der erste Teil davon enthlt eine weitgespannteExposition der ProAufhellung
blemlage, deren zentraler Punkt die kritisch-historische
der Beziehung des Aristoteleszu Piaton ist. Diese Beziehung wird als
Zurckdrngungder transzendentallogischenMotive Piatons gekennzeichnet (109 ff.). Khns Studie kann als Ausarbeitung dieser Perspektive in bezug auf Thomas betrachtetwerden.
Die Philosophie des Doctor Angelicus ist im Laufe der Jahr'
hundertewohl mehr als andere Denksysteme "sanktioniert' worden.
Eine kritische Durchleuchtung seines Denkens ist darum nur zu
begrssen;4 letztlichwird sie Thomas als Denker mehr gerecht.Aber
im Hinblick auf die vorliegende Kritik an Thomas erheben sich doch
4 Solcheinekritische
istindenletzten
ungebruchweniger
Bewertung
Jahrzehnten
undGeschichtwill.Vgl.L. B. Puntel- Analogie
machen
lichalsderAutorunsglauben
derMetaphysik
Versuch
berdas Grundproblem
lichkeit
I: Philosophiegeschichtlich-kritischer
,
1969.
Freiburg/Basel/Wien,
148

12:58:26 PM

ernsthafteBedenken, die vor allem die Beziehung von Systematikund

Geschichte in der Problemstellungund -analyse betreffen.Beide Momente sind untrennbar: Philosophiegeschichtsschreibungist, um
einen Ausdruck von Gilson zu gebrauchen, immer mehr als nur
4'mentale
Archologie". Die Analyse eines Denkers der Vergangenheit kann nie lediglich rein historischsein, schon aus dem Grunde,
weil sie stets eine philosophischeReflexion erfordert.Die Beziehung
zwischen dem historischenund dem systematischemMoment variiert
je nach Art der Forschung. Manchmal ist der systematischeAnsatz
vorherrschend- man kann aus einer modernen Problemstellungheraus die Geschichte befragen,z.B. untersuchen,ob die mittelalterliche
Philosophie die konstitutive Funktion des menschlichen Denkens
Inkonsistenzin Thomas'
kennt.5Gerade in einer Arbeit, die die innere
Denken aufzeigen will, ist es jedoch ein hermeneutischesErfordernis
die systematischeStellungnahme in den Dienst des historischenVerstehens zu stellen. Es muss darum gehen, die Intentionen von Thomas* Denken freizulegen.
In dieser Hinsicht versagt diese Studie. Ihr Aufbau ist im Wesen
a-historisch.Der Autor versucht"eine rationale Rekonstruktionvon
Grundkonzeptionen" (XXVI), wobei es allerdings fraglich ist, ob
darin die Hauptperson der Studie wirklichnoch zu Wort kommt,ja
zu Wort kommen kann. Auffallenderweisewird in diesem Buch nirgends die Frage gestellt,wie Thomas selbstdie Begriffe"Substantialitt" und "Prinzip" versteht, obwohl sich hierzu in seinem Werk
interessanteDarlegungen befinden.6Dadurch auch wirktKhns kritische Problemstellung"konstruiert", und man fragtsich, ob es hier
wirklichnoch um ein Problem bei Thomas geht. Die Geknsteltheit
trittvor allem zutage bei der Errterungeines anderen zentralen Begriffsdieser Studie, nmlich dem der 'transcendentia'. Hier werden
wohl Texte von Thomas diskutiert,aber sie werden so gelesen, dass
der vom Verf. selbst gebrauchte Ausdruck "spekulative Deutung"
(XXXVIII) eine nicht unzutreffendeBezeichnung ist. Im Verlauf
5 Vgl.denAufsatz
vonK. Flasch- Kenntdiemittelalterliche
diekonPhilosophie
in: Kantstudien
stitutive
Funktion
des menschlichen
63 (1972),182-206.
Denkens?,
6 Kennzeichnend
mehrWerkeberPiatonund
ist,dass im Literaturverzeichnis
werdenals berThomas.So gutwiealle Abhandlungen,
Aristoteles
die
angefhrt
imThomas-Studium
nachdem2. Weltkrieg
haben,
wichtige
Neuerungen
eingeleitet
werdenz.B. die verschiedenen
bleibenungenannt.
Arbeiten
berdie BeIgnoriert
Tradition
inThomas'Denken,wiedievonC. Fabround
derplatonischen
deutung
L.-B. GeigerberdiePartizipation,
einThema,dasvonKhnwohlimZusammenwird.
hangmitPlato,abernichtbei ThomaszurSprachegebracht
149

12:58:26 PM

dieses Aufsatzes werden wir auf einige Aspekte der Darstellung eingehen, die unsere methodologischenund inhaltlichenBedenken verdeutlichen werden.
(2) Das Prinzipienproblembei Thomas, das Khn ins Auge fasst,
bestehtin dem Gegensatz von dessen Konzeption der Transzendentalien und der Kategorienlehre. Nun steht"transzendental" im scholastischen Sinne in der Tat gegenber kategorial. Aber es ist wichtigzu
sehen, wie diese Opposition begriffenwird. Dies wird von Thomas in
dem klassischen Text von De veritate
1,1 herausgearbeitet.
Seiendes ist das Ersterkannte.Dies beinhaltet,dass alle anderen Begriffedurch Hinzufgung zu Seiendes entstehen. Aber wie ist dies
mglich? In jedem Fall nicht in der Weise, wie ein Differenzeinem
Genus hinzugefgtwird. 'Seiendes" ist kein Genus (vgl. Aristoteles,
B, c.8); ausserhalb des Seienden gibtes nichts.Andere BeMetaphysica
griffeknnen dem Seienden allein in dem Sinne etwas hinzufgen,
dass sie von ihm eine Seinsweise {modus)ausdrcken, die durch den
Namen "Seiendes" noch nicht ausgedrckt wird. Die Explizierung
dessen, was im Seienden enthaltenist, kann auf zweierlei Weise geschehen. Was zum Ausdruck gebrachtwird, kann zunchst eine spezielle Seinsweise sein. "Seiendes" wird dann kontrahiert und
eingeengt.Dies geschiehtin den Kategorien; sie stellendie erstenVerbesonderungen des Seienden dar. Aber das, was ausgedrcktwird,
kann auch einen allgemeinen Modus betreffen,der jedem Seienden
omneens). Dann wird etwas expliziert,
folgt( modusgeneralisconsequens
das Seiendem als solchem zukommt, das damit "konvertibel" ist.
Diese Termini nennt Thomas anderswo (u.a. in De veritate
21,4) auch
transcendentia.
Aus diesem Text geht deutlich hervor, dass der Gegensatz von
transzendentalund kategorial bei Thomas auf dem Unterschied von
allgemeiner und besonderer Seinsweise beruht. Wie wird dieser Gegensatz nun in Khns Studie verarbeitet?Charakteristischdafr sind
drei Schritte.
: "Transzendental" wird hier ausschliesslichim logischen
Erstens
Sinne aufgefasst.Transzendentalien werden konsequent als "Vernunftbestimmungen jeglichen Gegenstandes" bezeichnet, als "a priori
gewisse Bestimmungen beliebiger Objekte". Damit wird eine bestimmteerkenntnistheoretische
Position eingenommen, die offenbar
frso selbstverstndlicherachtetwird, dass dieser Schrittweder erlutert noch begrndet wird. Verallgemeinernd wird behauptet, dass
"die transzendentale Einsicht in Vernunftbestimmungen"das Ziel
150

12:58:26 PM

der philosophischen Reflexion als Prinzipienforschung ausmache

(234). Aufgrunddieses Standortesgebrauchtder Verf. den Ausdruck
' 'transzendental" nur in der kantischen
Bedeutung; dieser bezieht
sich also auf die Analyse der Konstitutionder Objektwelt durch den
menschlichenGeist.7
Damit istindessen eine Entscheidunggefallen,die in einer Analyse,
welche sich mit Thomas' Denken befasst, von vornhereineinen Gegensatz hineintrgt.Kant stelltnmlich in der KritikderreinenVernunft
(par. 12, 114) seine eigene Konzeption der "Transzendentalphilosophie der Alten" gegenber. Darin wurden die Transzendentalien
falsch gedolmetscht als "Prdikate der Dinge"; sie sind jedoch
"nichts anderes als logische Erfordernisseund Kriterien aller Erkenntnisder Dinge berhaupt". Indem der Verf. "transzendental"
in dieser Bedeutung fixiert,weiss er mit den 'transcendentia' im mitSinn eigentlich nichts anzufangen. Mit
telalterlichen ontologischen
seinerTextlesung bezweckter, jene als "logische Momente der Realitt" zu rekonstruieren(vgl. 463); Seiendes ist "eine reine Vernunftbedingung a priori". Es wre jedoch historischangemessener und
auch philosophisch fruchtbarergewesen, Thomas' Denken ber die
'transcendentia'als eigenstndigeForm innerhalbder transzendentalphilosophischenTradition anzuerkennen. Einen ersten Ansatz dazu
hat N. Hinske geliefert("Verschiedenheit und Einheit der transzendentalen Philosophien", in: Archivfr Begriffs
geschickte14 (1970),
41-68).
: Weil "transzendental" im kantischen Sinne gegenber
Zweitens
"empirisch" steht und dieser Gegensatz mit der (nicht-kantischen)
Distinktion transzendental/kategorialidentifiziertwird, wird diese
Unterscheidungin der vorliegenden Studie mit einer Reihe weiterer
Gegenstze befrachtet.Es geht um die Reflexion auf die logischen
Voraussetzungen der Erkenntnisversus unmittelbareGegenstandserkenntnis,um Wissensbedingungen versus objektive Seinsprinzipien,
um apriorischeBedingungen versus natrlichesRealittsbewusstsein,
um das Prinzip der Relationalitt versus Substantialittdes Prinzips.
Drittens
: Alle obengenannten Oppositionen verankertKhn historischin dem Gegensatz zwischen Piaton und Aristoteles.Dem "Platonismus der Transzendentalien" (176) steht die aristotelische
Prferenz fr unmittelbareSachbestimmungen gegenber.
7 Angeregt
beiNikolaus
vonKues
vonK. Flasch- DieMetaphysik
desEinen
, 103,Anm.
1.
151

12:58:26 PM

Aufgrunddieser drei Schritteist die ursprngliche,mittelalterliche

in diesem Buch
Bedeutung des Gegensatzes transzendental/kategorial
so transformiert,
dass Thomas' Transzendentalienanalyse einen ' 'alternativenCharakter" erhlt und der Thomismus als "ein sich selbst
relativierenderAristotelismus" (521 ff.) prsentiertwerden kann.
(3) Khns transzendentallogischeInterpretationvon Piaton sttzt
sich vor allem auf die Lehre von den grsstenGenera im Sophistes.
Uber diesen Dialog ist in den letztenJahren viel geschriebenworden.
Hier ist nicht der Ort, und frunseren Zweck ist es auch nicht notwendig, auf die mit diesem Werk verbundenenProbleme einzugehen.
Wir begngen uns mit zwei Anmerkungen. Zunchst konstatieren
wir, dass eine transzendentallogischeDeutung keineswegscommunis
opinio ist. So schreibtz.B. W. Beierwaltes: "Die 'megista gene' ...
scheinen mir aber auch nicht auf reine Begriffereduzierbar zu sein.
Es sind vielmehrdie jedem Seienden und jeder Idee zukommenden,
ontologischenund deshalb auch logisch ausdrckbarenStrukturen".8
Besonders instruktivist in dieser Hinsicht auch ein auf dem sechsten
Aristotelicum
Symposium
gehaltenes Referat von E. de Strijkerber das
zwischen
Piatons
Verhltnis
Sophistesund Aristoteles' MetaphysicaB,
nebst der sich daran anschliessenden Diskussion. Daraus ist zu ersehen, wie unterschiedlichdiese Beziehung eingeschtztwird.9
Wichtigeristjedoch noch ein zweiter Punkt. Dass Thomas sich eines transzendentallogischenAnspruchs von Piatons Position bewusst
gewesen sei, wie der Verf. suggeriert,ist vllig unakzeptabel ("Thomas musste sich des impliziten Anspruchs des Transzendentalienbegriffs,eine Theorie der Wissensprinzipien zu enthalten, durchaus
bewusst sein, weil er die aristotelischeKritik ... kommentierendverfolgthat", 415). Hier rcht sich erneut der a-historischeAnsatz von
Khns Arbeit. Weder Thomas' Kommentare noch seine selbstndigen Schriftenenthalteneinen Hinweis darauf, dass er die philosophische Beziehung zwischen Piaton und Aristotelesals den von Khn
rekonstruiertenGegensatz von transzendentallogischemversus kategorialem Denken durchschaut hat.
In der Konsequenz dieses Schemas erscheintAristotelesbei Khn
in erster Linie als Reprsentant der Substanzontologie, der Philoso8 W. Beierwaltes
- ''Nicht-Sein
undDifferenz
alsElemente
is' Identitt
platonischerDialektik,
in: Identitt
undDifferenz
a. Main,1980,9-23(hier:19).
, Frankfurt
9 Notessurles relations
entrela problmatique
du Sophiste
de Platonet cellede la
in: P. Aubenque(ed.) - Etudes
surla Mtaphysique
d'Aristote
d'Aristote,
,
Mtaphysique
Paris,1979,49-64(Diskussion:
65-67).
152

12:58:26 PM

phie von dem empirischDinghaften. Aber wie aristotelischist dieser

Aristotelismus?10Die Darlegungen des Verfassers sind ziemlich einseitigauf das Verhltnis von konkreterSubstanz zu Akzidenz gerichtet. Gerade bei Thomas (z.B. De potentia9,1) htte er nachlesen
knnen, dass das Prinzip der Substantialittbei Aristotelesvieldeutiger ist - der Aquinat fhrtauch die philosophischenGrnde dafr
an. "Philosophus ponit substantiamdupliciterdici. Dicitur enim uno
ultimum . . . Alio modo diciturforma
modo substantia ipsum subiectum
vel naturasubiecti". Das Kennzeichen von Substanz im ersten Sinne
ist die Subsistenz ("quasi per se et non in alio existens"). Substanz
in der letzterenBedeutung, von Thomas auch 'essentia' genannt, ist
etwas Nicht-Subsistierendes,aber nichtsdestowenigerdas ontologisch
'4
Frhere, weil aus ihr die determinado essendi" hervorgeht.An dem
Form-Prinzip,mit dem damit verbundenen Begriffvon "Akt", kann
man nichtvorbergehen,wenn man Aristoteles'Position im Verhltnis zu Piaton, aber auch in Beziehung mit Thomas, bestimmenwill.
Die primre, formale Bedeutung von Substantialitt11 relativiert
noch in anderer Hinsicht das Aristotelesbilddes Verf., in dessen Mittelpunktnmlich die These steht,Aristoteleshabe den von ihm in Metaph. V, 1 (1013 a 17 ff.) bestimmten Relationscharakter von
Prinzipien ("das Erste zu sein, von dem her etwas ist, entstehtoder
erkanntwird") gerade in sein Gegenteil verkehrt(82/3), weil Aristoteles die Selbstndigkeitzum Kriterium fr Prinzipien erhoben habe
ist,
("Substantialitt des Prinzips"). Dass dieses Bild undifferenziert
wird noch durch einen Text besttigt,der Khn (297) zufolgedie Rolle des empirischenMoments bei Aristotelesillustriert,nmlich Physica
B, l.12 Nun definiertAristotelesdort 'Natur' als eine arche(von Bewegung und Ruhe), aber er betont, dass sie kein selbstndigerGegenstand ist. Wie Thomas in seinem Kommentar bemerkt, hat das
(selbstndige) konkreteNaturding "rationem principiati", die Natur
jedoch "rationem principii" {In llPhys., lect. 2,152). Fr Thomas gilt
10 Vgl.F. Inciarte
- Wiearistotelisch
istderAristotelismus,
in: Theologie
undPhilo54 (1979),94-107(Zu K. Flasch- Die Metaphysik
desEinenbeiNikolaus
von
sophie
Kues).
11 F. Inciarte
- o.e.,103:"WederindenSubstanzbchern
nochin De animahat
die aristotelische
Substanzprimr
Charakter".
dinghaften
12 Khnzieltaufdie
desAristoteles,
mitdererdieFragefrberflssig
Bemerkung
ob es so etwaswieNaturdinge
wirklich
erklrt,
gebe.Der Textsagtetwasanderes
aus. NichtdieFragehltAristoteles
frberflssig,
sondern
denBeweisdafr,
dass
es dieNaturgibt.Der Verf.hatmanchmal
selbstdas Bedrfnis,
seinAristotelesbild
zu modifizieren
(vgl.XXXV).
153

12:58:26 PM

noch, dass er die eigentlicheBedeutung von "principium" im Begriff

'
'
"
'Ursprung" ( origo
) siehtund nichtim Begriff Prioritt' (vgl. Summa
I, 33,1 und ad 3).
theologiae
Die
mittelalterlicheLehre der Transzendentien hat sich im 13.
(4)
Jahrhunderts entwickelt im Zusammenhang mit der AristotelesIV, .
Rezeption. Denn sachlich knpftdie Scholastik an Metaphysica
2 an, wo Aristotelesausfhrt,"das Eine" sei eine mit Seiendem koextensiveEigenschaft.Khn konstatiertzurecht,dass Thomas weiterals
Aristotelesgegangen ist. Die Frage ist: Warum? Welche Motive haben im weiteren Ausbau der Transzendentalienlehre eine Rolle gespielt?
Ein erstes Motiv ist von onto-logischer Art; Transzendentien
drcken, wie wir sahen, Weisen von Sein aus. Dieses Motiv wird bereits in Thomas' Kommentar zu Metaphysica
IV, 2 sichtbar,wo er die
Konvertibilittdes Seienden und des Einen entfaltet,aber zugleich
ein weiteres transzendentales Attribut introduziert, nmlich 'res'
("Ding"). Diese Bestimmung unterscheidetsich insofernvon "seiend", als resdie Washeit oder das Wesen des Seienden ausdrckt,
whrend der Name ensdem Seinsakt entnommenist ( In IVMetaphys.,
lect. 2,553). Die neue transzendentaleBestimmtheitdrcktdie Tatsache aus, dass die Strukturdes Seienden selbstbei Thomas komplizierter als bei Aristoteles geworden ist, nmlich dreifach:
'subiectum-essentia-esse'.Diese TriplizittfasstThomas in der These
zusammen: "Hic homo non est sua humanitas nee suum esse".
Kennzeichen von 'subiectum' ist die Subsistenz, von 'essentia' das
Wassein, von 'esse' die Aktualitt.13
Diese komplizierteSeinsstrukturmacht bereits deutlich,wie unbegrndetKhns Auffassungist, "Bestehen" mache auch bei Thomas
den eigentlichenSinn von Sein aus (111/2). Bei der Behandlung der
transzendentalen Bestimmung 'bonum' ist das entscheidende Argument des Aquinaten frdie Konvertibilitt"des Seienden" und "des
Guten", dass das Sein die actualitasvon einem jeden Ding ist (5. th.
13 Einsprechendes
istSumma
contra
Gentiles
frdieDreifachheit
desSeienden
Beispiel
estetiamaliudquod
aliudestessentiaetesse,et in quibusdam
IV, 11: In creatura
insuaessentia
etejusessentia
sivenatura;namhichomononestsuahumasubsistit
etsuumesse.Et,quamvishaecinDeo
nitassuumesse,sedDeusestsuaessentia
velsubsistenad rationem
tamenin Deo estquidquidpertinet
unumsintverissime,
velipsiusesse;convenit
enimei nonessein aliis,in quantumest
tiaevelessentiae
essequid,in quantumestessentia
, et essein actu,rationeipsiusesse.
subsistens,
- Natura
van
De denkweg
enCreatura.
auchJ. A. Aertsen
Vgl. zu dieserDreifachheit
vanAquino
Thomas
I, Amsterdam
1982,130; 175; 376/7.
154

12:58:26 PM

I, 5,1). Es ist merkwrdig,dass der Verf. nichtbemerkt,dass sich dieses neue Seinsverstndnisauch auf Thomas' Substanzdefinitionauswirkt. Ens per se, so Thomas in De potentia7,3 ad 4, ist nicht die
Definitionvon Substanz. Insoferndie Substanz als genus generalissimm in einer definitorischenBestimmungfassbar ist, muss diese lauten: "Substantia est cuius quidditati debetur esse non in aliquo".
Darum ist die Substanzdefinitionnicht auf Gott anwendbar ("Et sie
non conveniet definido substantiae Deo").14
Damit gelangen wir zu einem anderen, theologischgearteten,Motiv im Ausbau der Transzendentalienlehre, nmlich die Reflexion
ber die gttlichenNamen. Es ist kein Zufall, dass die transzendentalen Seinseigenschaftenbei Thomas hauptschlich an den Stellen der
Summatheologiae
diskutiertwerden, wo er die gttlichenAttributebehandelt. In dieser Reflexion taucht nmlich die Frage auf, wie der
Transzendente, der alle Kategorien bersteigt,sich zu dem Transzendentalen, das sich durch alle Kategorien erstreckt,verhlt. In diesem
Zusammenhang gebraucht Thomas ein anderes Prdikationsmodell
als das aristotelische,nmlich das platonischevon peressentiamund per
partieipationem
(siehe z.B. S.th. I, 6,4 und Quodl.II, 2,1) und entwickelt
er einen Begriffvon Ursprnglichkeit,der das Seiende als Seiendes
d.h. eine transzendentaleKausalitt (vgl. S.th. I, 44,2). Die
betrifft,
aristotelischenKategorien erhalten den Status einer divisioentiscreati
{In I Sent.8,4,2 ad 1).
In noch anderer Hinsicht istdas theologischeMoment in der Transzendentalienlehreinstruktiv,weil es nmlich deutlichmacht, dass diese Lehre bei Thomas eine andere Tendenz hat als bei Kant. Das
Anliegen dieses Denkens ist nicht eine Begrenzung der Vernunft
durch die Vernunft.Die besondere Beziehung des Menschen zum ersten Seinsprinzip wird von Thomas gerade auf die transzendentale
Offenheitdes menschlichenGeistes gegrndet(S.th. II-II, 2,3: "Natura autem rationalis, inquantum cognoscit universalem boni et entis
rationem, habet immediatum ordinem ad universale essendi principium"). Das menschliche Denken ist nicht auf das Kategoriale
beschrnkt,sondern besitzt eine Offenheitfr alles, was ist.
Damit ist die Verbindung hergestelltmit einem letzten Motiv in
Thomas' Transzendentalienlehre, welches in De veritate1,1 im Vordergrundsteht. In diesem Text wird eine 'resolutio' zum Anfang des
14 Vgl.E. Gilson- Quasidefinitio
in:St.Thomas
Commemoratisubstantiae,
Aquinas
veStudies
I, Toronto,1974,111-129.
155

12:58:26 PM

menschlichen Denkens, zu den ersten Denkinhalten durchgefhrt.

Diesem Moment widmet Khn aufgrund seiner Transzendentalienauffassungexklusiv seine Aufmerksamkeit.Aber seine Deutung des
"Vernunftcharakters" der 'transcendentia' bei Thomas ruftinhaltliche Bedenken hervor. Zum Schluss hierzu.
(5) 'Transcendentia' fgen "Seiendem" etwas hinzu. Diese Hinzufgung, so betont Thomas in De veniate21,1,1 betrifftnicht eine
' 'bestimmte Weise von Sein" determinatus
modusessendi
(<
), denn dann
wrden sie ja ' 'Seiende" beschrnken und ihren transzendentalen
raCharakter verlieren. 'Transcendentia' fgenetwas hinzu secundum
tionemtantum.So fgtbeispielsweise "das Eine" an "Seiendes" die
Negation hinzu.
Daraus konkludiertder Verfasser,dass Transzendentalien "nur rationale" Bestimmungen seien. Die Konsequenz ist dann, dass die
Transzendentalien, seiner Ansicht nach, bei Thomas eine eigentmliche Stellungbekommen: sie sind "notwendige Elementejedes Seienden als solchen und zugleich blosse Gedankenbestimmungen" (175).
Dies fhrtgleichzeitigzu einem Spannungsverhltniszwischen transzendentalen und kategorialenPrinzipien. Thomas bestimmtnmlich
das Verhltnisdes transzendentalenEinen zum kategorialenEinen als
das des Frheren zum Spteren {In V Metaph. lect. 8,875: Et ideo
unum non omnino aequivoce diciturde eo quod convertiturcum ente,
et de eo quod est principium numeri, sed secundum prius et posterius). "Das Verhltnis Frher-Sptermacht in dem vorliegendenFall
die transzendentaleBestimmung ... zu einer notwendigenBedingung
frdie kategoriale,also eine 'nur rationale' Bestimmungzum Prinzip
freine unmittelbareSachbestimmung. Diese Formulierungsoll das
Dilemma anzeigen, in dem sich Thomas' Denken ber Prinzipien bewegt" (379). Mir scheintjedoch, hier werde ein falsches Dilemma
gezeichnet, weil die Semantik der transzendentalenTermini missverstanden ist.
Ausdruck der Transzendentalitt ist die Konvertibilitt.Das Eine,
das Wahre und das Gute sind mit Seiendem und untereinanderumkehrbar. Aber diese Konvertibilittresultiertnicht in tautologische
Stzen, ist kein "leeres Gerede" ( nugatio
).15 Transzendentien bezeichnen realiterdasselbe, sind qua 'suppositum' identisch,aber Synonyme sind sie nicht. Sie differierenqua Begriff,gemss dem 'modus
15 De veritate
1,1 ad 1 (sed contra);21,1.
156

12:58:26 PM

signifcandi'.16In Khns Betrachtungwird dieser letzteAspekt verabsolutiert.Die logische Bedeutung wird vom ontologischen Sinn isoliert. So konkludierter, dass die Transzendentalien "auf eine blosse
begrifflicheStrukturrestringiertbleiben". Dies liegt in der Konsequenz seinesAusgangspunktes. Aber von einer solchen Restriktion,
'
von einer Reduktion auf "bloss gedachte Momente' findetsich bei
Thomas keine Spur, wie sich aus seinen Darlegungen ber "das Eine" zeigt. Das Eine, das mit dem Seienden konvertibelist, ist "quoddam metaphysicum" ( Summatheologiae
I, 11,3 ad 2), denn "das Eine
bedeutetnichtlediglichdie Ungeteiltheit,sondern das Wesen des Seienden mit dieser (Ungeteiltheit)".17
Transzendentien explizieren Perfektionen,die in Seiendem als sol''
chem enthalten sind: U ngeteiltheit ( ' eines ) , Intelligibilitt
("wahr") und Begehrenswrdigkeit("gut"). Diese Explikationerfordert Gedankenschritte, die in De potentia9,7 beschrieben werden
vero est
(" Primumenim quod in intellectumcadit, est ens; secundum
intellectus
divisiotertio
his
ex
autem
duobus
sequitur
negatio entis;
scilicet
inin
ratio
autem
intellectu
unius, prout
nis...; quarto
sequitur
telligiturhoc ens non esse in se divisum"). Fr Thomas sind jedoch
Transzendentien weder mit diesen Gedankenschrittenidentischnoch
eine "Konstruktion der Vernunft". Transzendentien bezeichnen die
durch diese Schritteexpliziertenallgemeinen Seinsweisen; darum sind
wohl 'ens' und 'unum' transzendentaleBegriffe,aber nicht 'negatio'
und 'divisio'. Es gibt dann auch keine "Konkurrenz" zwischen (nur
begrifflichen)transzendentalenund kategorialen Prinzipien. Unsere
Schlussbeurteilung muss lauten: Khns Thomas-Kritik ist nicht
gelungen, weil sie ihr Ziel verfehlt.
16 Depotentia
secundum
sedtarnen
9,7ad 13:Unumetensconvertuntur
supposita;
et propter
hocnonsuntsyunumadditsecundum
rationem,
divisionis;
privationem
suntquae significant
idemsecundum
rationem
eamdem.
nonyma,
quia synonyma
17 De potentia
sedsubstantantum,
9,7: ... nonquodsignified
ipsamindivisionem
tiameiuscumipsa.

157

12:58:26 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 2 (1986)
Review

ontheProperties
: Treatises
A FirstCritical
EgbertP. Bos. Marsilius
ofInghen
ofTerms.
Edition
and'Aliena'Restrictions'
'Ampliations',
ofthe'Suppositions',
'Appellations',
tions'withIntroduction,
Historical
Translation,
Notes,andAppendices.
Synthese
Boston,Lancaster:D. ReidelPublishing
Library,22. Dordrecht,
Company,
1983.ix + 274 pp.
ofa groupofMarsilius
's logical
thiseditionandtranslation
ofInghen
Byproducing
E. P. Bos has rendered
a signalserviceto thehistory
oflogicin thelater
treatises,
middleages.The periodfrom1350to 1500,duringwhichMarsilius's
workswere
andread,hasbeenmuchneglected.
Feworiginal
other
textsareavailable,
produced
thaninfacsimile
editions
ofearlyprinted
andtherecent
material,
Cambridge
History
of
on logic,tellsus virtually
LaterMedieval
,! despiteitsheavyconcentration
Philosophy
to
oftheyearsafter1350.In orderto overcome
itis essential
thisneglect,
nothing
havegoodaccessto thetextbook
foritis onlybyanalyzing
thisthatone
literature;
can cometo understand
how
thetypesof logicaltheorywhichwerepresented,
andchanged,andwhatparttheirstudyplayedin theuniversity
theories
developed
curriculum.
The groupoftextswhichBoshaschosentoeditislargely
withproblems
concerned
of reference.
The issuesdiscussedrangefromthereference
of concrete
nounsin
to thevariations
standardcategorical
introduced
of
propositions
by thepresence
relational
andintentional
is
verbs.Marsilius's
discussion
terms,
modifiers,
temporal
For instance,he disagreedwith
innovative.
clear,organized,and occasionally
ofwhether
to
Buridanoverthecloselylinkedquestions
couldbe extended
reference
topast,present
coverimaginary
andfuture
objects,inaddition
objects;andwhether
to pickoutimpossible
wordssuchas 'chimera',whichpurport
objects,can havea
referent.
do notplaya
differences
However,it mustbe notedthatthesedoctrinal
noris theremuchemphasis
on sophisms
and
largerolein Marsilius's
presentation;
ofthesortfoundinPaulofVenice'sLogica
texts
counter-examples
Magna.Marsilius's
arepreeminently
itwouldseem,toward
theyounger
student
directed,
texts,
teaching
(cf.p. 63).
In his studyof Marsilius,Bos does notpurportto present"a complete
and
norto locatethemproperly
in thehistory
ofhisteachings,
of
discussion
thorough
to theproperties
ofterms,
thesubjectimphilosophy"
(p. 17). Evenwithrespect
is
matters
and theirdevelopment
at issue,Bos's analysisof doctrinal
mediately
in thebodyofthenotestothetext.Bos's
andpresented
onlyincidentally
piecemeal,
thereader,butitis easytounderstand
andtojustify
maydisappoint
given
approach
us withthe
thenatureofwhathehasdone.On theonehand,Bos'saimis topresent
fora fullstudyofdoctrinal
essential
rawmaterial
On theotherhand,
developments.
sucha study,forin itwe
thebookis alreadylongandtightly
packedevenwithout
1 TheCambridge
, editedbyNormanKretzmann,
History
ofLaterMedieval
Philosophy
NewYorketc. 1982.
Anthony
Cambridge,
KennyandJanPinborg,
158

12:58:31 PM

ofMarsilius's
findan introduction
whichtreats
lifeandworks;an exhaustive
listing
of all themanuscripts;
a thorough
discussion
of theeditorialprinciples
adopted;
one whichgivesan overview
ofthedifnotes;fourappendices,
including
lengthy
between
and severalindices.
ferences
Buridanand Marsilius;
outlines
ofBos'spresentation
areperfectly
thereare
Whilethegeneral
satisfactory,
I shallbeginwitha fewscattered
someminorpointswhichneedcomment.
remarks.
ofMarsiliusat Paris,Bos doesnotmention
WilliamBuser,
First,in hisdiscussion
in 1362,2 andfromwhomMarsilius
drewmuchof
underwhomMarsilius
incepted
onobligations.
inhistreatise
commenthematerial
Second,theso-called
Hagennaw
inthe
inBasel,in 1487.3Third,thereis noindication
tarywasinfactfirst
published
inthefootnotes,
suchan indication
textofwhichsections
havebeendiscussed
though
wouldhavebeenofgreathelptothereader.Fourth,
Ashworth
1977(citedonp. 192)
to p.
thenoteon p. 245 (referring
doesnotappearin thebibliography.
Finally,
4Disiunctive*
in thiscontext
nottothedoctrine
of
refers
surely
240.12)is misleading.
timepickedoutis
butto thefactthatin 4'Sorteswillrun" thefuture
ampliation,
orthenextdayorthedayafter
either
tomorrow
in ''Sortes
that,andso on,whereas
of
willruntomorrow"
whichrulesout anysuchdisjunction
thereis a restriction
times.
future
A
oftheterms
whichstrikes
meas lessminorhastodo withBos'shandling
' point
' and'Parva
. He claimsthatthelogica
moderna
embraced
both
Logicamoderna
logicalia'
ontheproperties
treatises
ofterms
andthethreetreatises
onconsequences,
insolubles
and obligations;
and he supports
thisclaimby a reference
to an early(- 1962- )
remark
he ignores
Gilbert's
discussion
oftheissue,in
byDe Rijk(p. 44). However,
which
Gilbert
showsthatinfacttherelevant
usageofthephrasewas
fifteenth-century
topickoutjustthethreetreatises
on consequences,
insolubles
andobligations.4
Bos
alsoidentifies
theso-called
as embracing
bothgroups
oftreatises,
andin
parvalogicalia
he citesa very-poorly
footnoted
support
passageby Boehner(p. 3, p. 46). Again,
Gilbert
tractatuum
pointsoutthatthesourcequoted,theCologneCopulata
parvorum
of 1493,makesan explicitdistinction
in its subtitle
betweentheparva
logicalium
andthethree
othertreatises;5
andthesameis trueofthe1494,1496and1498
logicalia
ofthisworkthatI haveconsulted.
editions
It is also relevant
to notethatthe1463
statutes
ofFreiburg
imBreisgau
seemtomakea distinction
between
theparvalogicalia
and theconsequences
whentheywritethatthebooksto be readinclude:"Parva
LogicaliamagistiMarsilii,scilicetsupposiciones,
ampliaciones,
appellaciones,
etalienaciones,
similiter
etambaspartesConsequenciarum
eiusdem."6
restricciones,
Thisreference
totheFreiburg
statutes
another
issuetowhich
suggests
interesting
Bos mighthavepaidmoreattention,
ofMarsilius's
namelytheactualimportance
workas measured
byitsuse in thefifteenth
century.
Apartfromtheevidence
providedby thelargenumberof manuscripts
whichsurvive,thereis somereadily
availableevidenceofMarsilius's
whichcan be
curriculum,
placein theuniversity
2 See C. H. Kneepkens,
TheMysterious
Buser
Buser
andthe
Again:William
ofHeusden
Tract
in: English
Ob rogatum,
Obligationes
LogicinItalyinthe14thand15thCenturies
,
editedbyA. Maier,Napoli1982,p. 152.
3 The fulltitleis Commentum
In primum
novum
etquartum
tractatus
Petrihispani
cum
commento
A copyis tobe foundin theBodleianLibrary,
Marsilii.
parvorum
logicalium
Oxford.
4 N. W. Gilbert,
Ockham
andthe' ViaModerna*
Mediaevalia
9.
, WycliJ
, in: Miscellanea
undModerni
, editedby A. Zimmermann,
Berlin,New York 1974,pp.
Antiqui
111-115.
5 Gilbert,
op. cit.,pp. 112-113.
6 H. OttandJ. M. Fletcher,
TheMediaeval
Statutes
oftheFaculty
ofArts
oftheUniversity
imBreisgau
, NotreDame,Indiana1964,p. 40.
ofFreiburg
159

12:58:31 PM

He wasreadat Cracowin thefirst

summarized
as follows.
briefly
sixtyyearsofthe
fifteenth
a cultofMarsilius
wasrevived
at Heidelberg
attheendofthefifcentury;7
teenth
he wasusedat Erfurt,
inthestatutes
of1412
century;8
judgingbyreferences
andtheadditions
of1449;9andtherearevariousreferences
tohimin theactsofthe
ofartsatVienna.10
To be specific,
tohisinsolubles,
thereis onereference
and
faculty
therearetworeferences
tohissuppositions,
fourtohisconsequences,
andninetohis
He wasforbidden
at Cologne;11
hewasforbidden
at Louvainin 1427;12
obligations.
andhe wascondemned
at Parisin 1474.13On theotherhand,afterhisobligations
had beenpublished
at Parisin 1489,14he was usedextensively
as
bysuchauthors
ThomasBricot,
thatlater
JohnMajorandDomingode Soto.It is alsoworth
noting
in thesixteenth
theItalianAristotelian
Nifofrequently
citedhis
Agostino
century
onthePriorAnalytics.15
Suchdetailscouldusefully
havebeenaddedto
commentary
him in the detailedanalysisof doctrinal
Bos's introduction,
withoutinvolving
thathe,probably
wishedto avoid.
developments
rightly,
I shallconcludebypointing
outthatBos hasbeenextremely
poorlyservedinhis
workbyhiseditors
andpublishers.
First,thereseemstobe an extraordinarily
large
number
oftypographical
withtheexception
of'body'for'boy'on p.
errors,
though
117,4from
tomislead
noneofthemislikely
thereader.16
Therealsoseemsto
bottom,
' dansla
7 S. Wlodek,' ViaModerna
et' ViaAntiqua
l'universit
deCracovie
mtaphysique
leproblme
delaforme
substantielle
auXV sicle
travers
Mediaevalia
, in:Miscellanea
9,
, vues
p. 494.
' and' ViaModerna
' andthe
8 A. L. Gabriel,' ViaAntiqua
and
Migration
ofParisStudents
Masters
totheGerman
in theFifteenth
Universities
Mediaevalia
, in: Miscellanea
9,
Century
p. 463.
9 Gabriel,op. cit.,pp. 467-468.
10 P. Uiblein,ActaFacultatis
Artium
Universitatis
Vindobonensis
1385-1416,Graz,
Vienna,Cologne1968,passim.
11 Gilbert,
op. cit.,p. 91; Gabriel,op. cit.,pp. 465-466.
12 Gilbert,
cit.,p. 91.
op.
13 Gabriel,op. cit.,p. 446.
14 The workwas attributed
to Peterof Ailly:Tractatus
dearteobligandi.
Editusa
Petro
deAlliaco
Sacre
doctori
I havecompared
magistro
theologie
(Parisius1489).However,
itwithKrakowBibl.Jag. 2602fols.70r-101v
(see Bos p. 23, XII) and itis thesame
work.
15 Niforeferred
to Marsiliusas Inguenus.See Agostino
Priorm
Nifo,Superlibros
Aristotelis
passim.
(Venetiis
1554)
16 Hereis thelistoftypographical
errorsthatI noticed:14,4f.b.'published'
for
20,8f.b.'on' for'an'; 33,3f.b.'claissical'for'classical';40,8'II' for'I';
'publisher';
54,21'sit2'for'si'; 77,8 'if' for'it'; 81,20'if' for'it'; 89,5f.b.'is' for'it'; 93,22
'causes'for'cases' (and thelowerpartofthelastlineon thispage is improperly
in mycopy);97,1 'is' for'it'; 101,11'significated'
for'significates';
103,19
printed
'wih'for'with';106,6'spponifor'supponi;121,5'may'for'my'; 121,14'has'
for'was'; 127,6'man'shouldnotbe italicized;
for'participles';
127,2f.b.'particples'
139,lastline 'bus' for'but'; 152,10thereshouldbe no modaloperator;154,32
for'significantia';
155,10f.b.'known'for'know';158,22'rem'should
'significada'
be 'rationem';165,10f.b.'dissilaba'for'dissillaba';168,13'exponic'for'exponi';
for'totalem';178(title)'Appeliationes'
for'Appellationes';
169,3'toltalem'
184,20
'inforo'
for'infero';
200,7'is' for'it'; 201,2and8 f.b.'Burdian'for'Buridan';204,9
for'distinguish';
for'prinf.b.,'distinuish'
205,22'as' for'and'; 205,30'principle'
for'corrollaries';
210,9 f.b. 'virute'for'virtute';
cipal'; 208,3 f.b. 'corrolaries'
for'signification
for
218,22'then'for'than';225,17'signficatio'
227,23'thought'
'though';250,2and3 f.b.'Chirst'forChrist';252,22'Chirsfor'Christ';256,2f.b.
160

12:58:31 PM

fromtheLatinon p. 234,14,forthephrase"thetermmanis
be a phrasemissing
thatitwasaddalienated"appearsintheEnglish
anyindication
(p. 235,13)without
read
thetexthasnotbeencarefully
edbythetranslator.
Second,andmoreseriously,
heis nota nativeEnglish
andinisexcellent,
forsense.WhileBos'sEnglish
speaker,
ordifficult
tofollow,
orwhere
isstilted,
there
areplaceswherehistranslation
evitably
oftheLatin.I shallconsider
themeaning
itsimply
doesnotseemtocapture
justthose
is obscured.17
casesinwhichthemeaning
as 'No manruns',when,giventhat
On p. 64.35 'homononcurriis translated
itshouldbe 'Some
andindefinite
aboutparticular
Marsilius
is talking
propositions,
ofuniversal
On p. 76,7-9,theLatintextspeaksfirst
manis notrunning.'
propostextthetwoarefudged
butintheEnglish
itionsandthenofaffirmative
propositions,
On p.
in thephrase'predicateof a universalaffirmative
proposition'.
together
et alterum
82,11-12the Latin 'Unum istorumterminorum
poniturantecedens
oneofthesetermsis usedas an antecedent
is translated
as "Sometimes
relativum'
twoterms
arebeingreferred
whenclearly
andatothertimesas a relative",
to,onean
hec supponere'is
and theothera relative.On p. 82,17 'non oportet
antecedent
whenthereadingshouldbe
do nothavesupposition'
translated
as 'theserelatives
On p. 84,11 'per positionem
do nothave to have supposition'.
'theserelatives
whenthesenseofthephrase
as 'whenthesubjectisplacedfirst'
subiecti'
istranslated
is
ofthesubjectis posited.On p. 92,27'hecessetconcedenda'
is thattheexistence
thanas 'thisshouldbe conceded'.On p.
translated
as 'ithadbeenconceded'rather
On p. 122,3-4
determinate'.
is translated
as 'confused
etdistributive'
92,9'confuse
as 'a creating
'creanspotestnonessedeus'is translated
thingcannotbe God' rather
theLatin
fora creating
thanas 'itis possible
thingnottobe God'. On p. 128,10-12,
seu ra'rationem
secundum
quam fuitad significandum,
givestwoalternatives:
'La' for'Le'; 257,1'Ebbessen'for'Ebbesen';257,3'Kar for'Karl'; 257,9f.b.
for'Berkeley';
259,13f.b.,'of'for
'aujourdjui'for'aujourd'hui';259,17'Bekerley'
for'significatio'.
'by'; 263 'singificatio'
17 The otherverbali
I noticedwereas follows:19,19
infelicities
and difficulties
indifline10,'propluribus
Text
so hardly'is notEnglish;
'transcribed
36, TheSecond
whenitshouldbe 'as standas 'inmanyinstances
ferenter'
istranslated
indifferently'
of'descensus
Text
, lines4-5:thetranslation
p. 37, TheThird
ingformanyinstances';
thatithassupposition
to theeffect
as 'a descent
estoquodsupponeret
propluribus'
is obscure;57,13-14'in thetermthereis descent'is puzzling;
formoreinstances'
as 'and so on,
is translated
60,8 'et sicde singulis
copulativam'
perpropositionem
whenitshouldbe 'andso onforallthesingulars
thecopulative
proposition'
through
61, thelastlineexhibits
veryawkward
syntax;
proposition';
bymeansofa copulative
of
actus'is puzzling;72,19-20thetranslation
of'inquostransit
70,17thetranslation
acttransiting
another
in sortem'as 'and signifies
transir
'etaliumactumsignificai
toSortes'is puzzling,
whenitseemsthatwhatis beingspokenofis an actqualifying
as 'graduad'
is translated
ofthetermin someway;80,10'singulatim'
thereferent
andwhenthe
correct
whenthisdoesnotproducea grammatically
Englishsentence,
leftoutthanto', the
senseis 'one-by-one';
89,8f.b.in thephrase'thereis nothing
word'out'mustbe omitted;
95,35theuseof'wouldhave'in 'ifitwouldhave'is inthatdidnotaccordto' is clumsy
'in a proposition
English;147,13
correct;
141,12-13
to
'Thereis no questionregarding
'Thisis wellpossible'is notEnglish;157,19-20,
which'is notcorrect
English;191,5'thatinwhich'shouldbe 'thatintowhich';192,2
is notEnglish;208,
reference'
is notEnglish;195,10'itis a selftranslating'
'prefers
alienameant...'is notEnglish;209,9'in threenotes'is
notefor88,16'Is bycorrelarla
'here?'
ofMarsilius
ofthisstatement
notEnglish;
209,15f.b.'On whatisthebearing
is veryclumsy.
161

12:58:31 PM

is
alternative
tionemsecundum
quamsua significata
significaiHowever,thefirst
ofimposition.
in thetranslation,
whichmakesno mention
suppressed
I warmly
recommend
Bos'svolumetoallhistorians
remarks,
Despitethesecritical
to hispromised
oflogic;and I lookforward
volumein whichMarfurther
eagerly
on consequences,
andinsolubles
aretobe edited.
silius'streatises
obligations
ofWaterloo,
Canada
Waterloo,
University

E.J. Ashworth

162

12:58:31 PM

Vivarium
XXIV, 2 (1986)
CIVCMA
etdela Communication
International
du Vocabulaire
desInstitutions
Comit
Intellectuelles
au Moyen
Age

du Vocabulaire
Le ComitInternational
des Institutions
etde la Communication
au MoyenAge (CIVCMA) a tcrlorsd'un 'workshop'
surle
Intellectuelles
de la "Terminologie
thme
de la vieintellectuelle
au moyen
ge", qui s'esttenuaux
les20 et 21 septembre
1985.
Pays-Bas,
Le CIVCMA nevisequ'unepartie
dela vieintellectuelle,
savoir
duvocabulaire
des diversesdisciplines,
les pointsde convergence
nonpas leurcontenu,maisle
du travail
intellectuel.
systme
se sontmisd'accordsurle proLesmembres
duCIVCMA prsents
auxPays-Bas
detravail
neseveutni
ici,toutenprcisant
quenosprsentons
quele schma
gramme
ni exhaustif:
il s'agitd'un programme
dfinitif
ouvertmentionnant
les
simplement
terrains
de recherche
d'aborder.
premiers
que nousnousproposons
surles diffrents
estla publication
d'tudesinterdisciplinaires
principal
L'objectif
bienentendutrediffrencis
lments
du programme,
qui devront
gographiqueCes tudespourront
mentetchronologiquement.
trepublies
ou non,selonlesvues
etsousla forme
la plusindique:livres,
desauteurs,
microarticles,
quileurparatra
etc.
fiches,
de constituer
unfichier
De plus,nousavonsadoptla suggestion
centralis
destermesayanttraitauxterrains
tablir
selondesnormes
etsouuniformes
dtermins,
mis la limite
de 1520.Le traitement
desfiches
informatises
se fera
chronologique
de AstoninBirmingham,
le fichier
traditionnel
aurapeu-tre
sa placeau
l'Universit
bureaudu ComitDu Cange Paris.
Le CIVCMA tantuneinitiative
la prsidence
en a tconfie
au
nerlandaise,
L. M. de Rijk,de l'Universit
Olga Weijers,
de Leyde,etle secrtariat
professeur
desPays-Bas.Les diffrents
du Lexiquedu latinmdival
paysde l'Europeoccidenetle Canada,sontreprsents
Pour
tale,ainsique lesEtats-Unis
pardesmembres.
et pourstimuler
coordonner
le Comita l'intention
lesrecherches
de se
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runir
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tousles chercheurs
Nousdemandons
de nousmettre
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recherches
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Secrtariat
du CIVCMA: Olga Weijers
Bibliothque
Royale
PrinsWillemAlexanderhof
5
2595BE Den Haag, Pays-Bas
detravail
Programme
descoles(institutions,
1. Vocabulaire
lves,mthodes).
enseignants,
- IX-XIesicles.L'colede typecarolingien.
- Xlle sicle.
- XlII-XIVesicles(colesurbaines
et studiadesmendiants).
2. Vocabulaire
desuniversits
mthodes
(institutions,
personnes,
d'enseignement).
- XlIIe sicle.L'espaceeuropen
unecertaine
unitqui permet
paratconserver
unetuded'ensemble.
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12:58:39 PM

- XlV-XVesicles,o les diversits

treprises
ou nationales
devront
rgionales
de compte(France,Angleterre,
Italie,Empire,Pninsule
ibrique).
del'enseignement,
ilfaudra
destermes
conAd1 et2: Dansledomaine
traiter
cernant
lesmthodes
en laissant
techde ctle vocabulaire
d'enseignement,
aux diverses
niquepropre
disciplines.
il faudraincorporer
les aspectssocioculturels,
Sur le terrain
institutionnel,
commeparexemple
le vocabulaire
relatif
la viedes tudiants
(notamment
danslescollges).
3. Vocabulaire
du livreetde l'criture.
- le livre(fabrication,
dition,
composition,
circulation).
- autresformes
crits(chartes,
de documents
tablettes,
fiches).
- criture
d'criture,
styles
(matriaux,
copistes).
- le texteet sa tradition
(copie,faute,correction).
- lesbibliothques
et lesarchives
classement,
(cadrematriel,
catalogues).
du travailintellectuel.
4. Vocabulaire
instruments
etproduits
desmthodes,
- alphabtisation,
communication.
annotation,
traduction,
information,
- concordances,
tables,glossaires,
encyclopdies.
- traits,
etc.
commentaires,
sommes,
compendia,
5. Les appellations
desdisciplines
et de leurstudiants.
- disciplines
et sciences.
- personnes
decretista,
physicus,
etc.).
s'y consacrant
(artista,
Ralisations.
desuniversits
auXlIIesicle
ad 2: Unetuded'OlgaWeijerssurla Terminologie
paratra
du Lessico
Intellettuale
en 1986dansla collection
Europeo.

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