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VIVARIUM
editors
advisory
committee
publishers
published
AN INTERNATIONAL
JOURNALFOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUALLIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
vivarium
is devotedin particular
to theprofane
sideof mediaevalphilosophy
and theintellectual
lifeof theMiddleAgesand
Renaissance.
- H.A.G. Braakhuis,
- C.H.
L.M. de Rijk,(Leiden)
(Nijmegen)
Kneepkens,
W.J.Courtenay,
(Groningen)
(Madison)E.P. Bos,
oftheEditorial
Board:C.H. Kneepkens.
(Leiden).
Secretary
All communications,
shouldbe
nature,
exceptthoseof a business
toProf.
addressed
Dr.C.H. Kneepkens,
Rijksuniversiteit
Groningen,
Faculteit
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Mediaevistiek,
Vakgroep
AS Groningen,
The Netherlands.
- Albert
- J.E.
TullioGregory,
Zimmermann,
(Rome)
(Cologne)
Murdoch,
MA).
(Cambridge,
The Netherlands.
Brill,
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ca. 280pagesyearly.
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INTHENETHERLANDS
18:38:48 PM
CONTENTS
Jennifer Ottman &
Rega Wood
Elizabeth Karger
Paul Vincent Spade
OF VOLUME
XXXVII
(1999)
Walter Burley'sRealism
Walter Burley on The Kinds of Simple
Supposition
Risto Saarinen
WalterBurleyon akrasia:Second Thoughts
Rega Wood
Willing Wickedly: Ockham and Burley
Compared
Gerhard Krieger
Studied on Walter Burley 1989-1997 ....
In memoriam
Prof.Dr. JosephIJsewijn
SimonTugwell, op
PetrusHispanus:Commentson Some Proposed Identifications
Anne Davenport
Peter Olivi in the Shadow of Montsgur
Richard Cross
Ockham on Part and Whole
Andrew E. Larsen
The Oxford "School of Heretics": the
Unexamined Case of FriarJohn
A
Spruyt
Joke
Fifteenth-Century
Spanish Treatise on
Consequences
A Forced March Towards Beatitude:
Kent Emery,Jr.
ChristianTrottmann's
Histoire
of theBeatific
Vision
Reviews
to Medieval
C.FJ. Martin,An Introduction
Philosophy{rev.byJokeSpruyt)
David Pingree,PreceptumCanonis Ptolomei (rev.byJohnNorth
)
Idit Dobbs-Weinstein,
Maimonidesand St.
Thomas on the Limits of Reason (rev.by
AllanBck)
Jan A. Aertsen,Medieval Philosophyand
the Transcendentais:
The Case of Thomas
Aquinas (rev.byAllanBck)
Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and
MechthildDreyer(eds.),JohnDuns Scotus;
Metaphysicsand Ethics (rev.byAllanBck)
Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz (eds.),
L'Enseignementdes disciplines la Facult
des arts(Pariset Oxford,XIIIe-XVe sicles)
(rev.byFransvanLier)
18:38:48 PM
1
24
41
60
72
94
101
103
114
143
168
178
258
282
285
286
288
290
293
iv
CONTENTS
Books Received
296
The De Rijk-Files
299
18:38:48 PM
Walterof Burky
: His Life and Works
JENNIFEROTTMAN & REGA WOOD
Walterof Burleywas bornin 1274-1275,probablyat thevillageof BurleyYorkshire.1His educationwas long and complete;he was
in-Wharfedale,
an Oxford Master of Arts by 130 1 and a Parisian Master of Theology
by 1324. His experienceof the world was wide: when studyingat Paris,
he held a quodlibetaldisputationat Toulouse. He enteredthe serviceof
Edward III in 1327 as an ambassador to the papal court at Avignon,
acquiring the title of king's clerk by the time of a second mission to
Avignonin 1330. In about 1333, he joined the circleof Richard de Bury,
named in that year to the see of Durham, whose patronagehe enjoyed
forabout tenyears.Burleyfoundhimselfimprisonedfora forestry
offense
in 1336. On his release, he traveledover-season the king'sbusinessin
1338-1339,held a quodlibetaldisputationin Bologna in 1341, and presentedone of his books to ClementVI at Avignonin 1343. He died at
the age of about 70 in 1344 or shordythereafter.
Like so many good
can
be
divided
three
his
life
into
nine
parts:
yearsat Oxford(1301things,
at
Paris
and
sixteen
seventeen
1310),
years
(1310-1326),
years as a clerical courtierin Britainand at Avignon(1327-1344).
Not the least of the problemsconfronting
studentsof WalterBurleyis
thathe wrotea greatdeal; thereare about fifty
authenticworks,a number of whichexistin more than one redaction.The workwhichwe know
of the works enumerated
best, the Physicscommentaiy
, the twenty-fourth
A.
the
situation.
illustrates
byJames Weisheipl,
WeisheipllistedfivedifferH.
ent worksby Burleyon the Physics
Charles
Lohr eliminatedone as
,
and
we
a
discarded second because it was writtenin a maninauthentic,
uscriptdated before 1250.2 Of the three remaining,the firstcould be
1 Forbiographical
A Biographical
seeA.B.Emden,
information,
oftheUniversity
Register
of
toA.D.1500, 3 vols.,Oxford
s.v."Burley,
Walter
1957-59,
de,"vol.1,312-4;and
Oxford
C. Martin,
Walter
Presented
toDanielCallus
Studies
, in: Oxford
, Oxford
1964,194-230
Burley
Historical
n.s.XVI).
Studies,
(Oxford
2 RegaWood,Walter
44 (1984),275's Physics
Commentaries
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Burley
A. Weisheipl,
in:Mediaeval
31 (1969),174-224,
327;James
Mertonense,
Studies,
Repertorium
at no. 24, 197-98;CharlesH. Lohr,Medieval
LatinAristotle
Commentaries:
Authors
G-I,in:
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke
Vivarium
37,1
18:38:54 PM
OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY
I HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
18:38:54 PM
OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER
1. Oxford
At Oxford Burleywas a fellowof Merton College. Merton fellowsordinarilycompletedtheirpreliminarystudiesat othercolleges.Since Burley
came from the North, and Balliol College was intended for northern
scholars,who were requiredto move on when theywere readyforinception, C. Martin suggeststhat Burley may have studied firstat Balliol
College.11Burley's regencyin Arts at Merton College was long, from
1300 to 1310 accordingto Weisheipl.12
Burley'searliestsurvivingworks are logical; they include both independenttreatisesand commentaries.If it were not forthe titlefoundin
13 and a
a single manuscriptof a commentaryIn Perihermenias
colophon
foundin one manuscriptof his Obligationes
,14MertonCollege recordswould
15
suggestthat Burleywas not yet a Master of Artsin 1305. Fortunately,
not only do we have a dated work from 1301 whose tide statesthat its
authorwas a Master of Arts,but it is both printedand edited. Stephen
F. BrowneditedBurley's1302 Oxford
in 1974.16
onthePerihermenias
Questions
It is a workin whichBurleyarguesagainstthe viewsof Avicenna,Albert
the Great, Henry of Ghent, St. Thomas, and Giles of Rome. Burley
prefersthe positionof Godfreyof Fontainesto these authors.17
With regard to the Perihermenias
, the situationis similar to that of
the Physics
, except that there are four survivingworks: an elementary
summaryas well as questions,followedby two others,the MiddleCommentaryprobablywrittenat Paris and the Final Commentary
completedwhen
a
was
member
of
the
of
in
circle Richardde Bury 1337.18Though
Burley
11Martin
., aboven. 1),202.
(iop.cit
12
basedon hisabsencefrom
theMerton
bursars'
rollofEasterto August
Although
himto haveleftOxford
considers
1305and
1307,Martin
bythatpoint,i.e.,between
Easter1307:ibid.,202.Weisheipl
1968(op.dt
., aboven. 7), 175,n. 56,quotesLondon,
Lambeth
tractatus
depuritate
artis
70,f.109vb:
"Explicit
logice
Burley
Anglici,
mag.Walteri
naturalis
et subtilis
optimi
logici,famosi
philosophi,
theologi,
utpote
qui in universitte
Oxon.quammultis
annirexit
in artibus
in theologica
facltate."
et tandem
Parisius
13"Questiones
de Burley
Peryarmenias
quinqudatea mag.Waltero
superlibrum
a.d. 1301":Weisheipl
1969(<
aboven.2),
., aboven. 2),no.4a, 188;Lohr1968(op.dt.,
op.dt
no. 7, 177.
14"Explicit
tractatus
de obligacionibus
de Burleye
anno
datusa mag.Waltero
optimus
domini
Millesimo
aboven. 2),no.20a,196.
trecentesimo
secundo":
1969(op.dt.,
Weisheipl
15He is listedas a fellow
butnotgiventhetitleofmagister:
1968(op.dt.,
Weisheipl
aboven. 7), 175.
16Stephen
F. Brown,
in:FrancisWalter
inlibrum
Perihermeneias,
Burley's
Quaestiones
canStudies,
at 202-95.
34 (1974),200-95,
17Brown1974(op.dt.,
aboven. 16),200.
18
1969(op.dt.,
aboven. 2), no. 4a,b,c,188;no. 7, 189;Lohr1968(op.dt.,
Weisheipl
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFEANDWORKS
18:38:54 PM
& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY:HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
of logic as it was taughtat that time,35a connectionwhich has encouraged most modern authorsto date all six together.If we suppose that
theymake up a singlelogic course offeredin 1302, thenperhapsit makes
sense that only the last of the treatises,the Obligationes
, is actuallydated
the
edited
scribe.
The
first
is
the
,
Suppositions
by Stephen Brown and
by
on account of its presencein two manuscriptscondated in 1302, firstly
tainingotherworksfromthat period and secondlybecause Burleycalls
Here a caveat is in order:not all of the works
it "a workof his youth."36
of Burley's youthbelong to the Oxford period. Burleyappears to have
called workswrittenin 1326 as well as workswrittenin 1302 "worksof
and De exclusivis
are the secEdited by De Rijk, De exceptivis
his youth."37
ond and thirdtreatisesin the group.38The fourthis De consequentiis
, and
De insolubilibus
is
also
dated
De
the fifth,
1302
,
by
Rijk.39
as an early treatmentof an imporBrown describedthe Suppositiones
its treatment
of relativesuppositionwas copied
tanttopicin theDe puritate'
.40Somethingsimilarcould
and accepted by Ockham in his Summalogicae
the
five
be
said
about
other
treatises.
For purposes of simplicprobably
will
this
of
six
we
call
treatises
Burley's Logicof 1302.
ity
group
Possiblyalso belongingto the Oxford period is the Posterior
analytics
, of which there may be as many as three redactions:expocommentary
is based on Albertus
sition, summaryand questions.41The Exposition
42 The
and
Grosse
teste.
, perhaps to be dated before
Quaestiones
Magnus
with
De
animae
1307 together
the
,43have been edited in a 1981
potentiis
35L.M.de Rijk,Walter
Bur
De exclusivis:
AnEdition
23 (1985),
, in:Vivarium,
ley'sTract
23-54,at 23.
36Weisheipl
1969(<
Walter
Treatise
De
., aboven. 2),no. 12,191;Brown,
op.cit
Burleigh's
andItsInfluence
on William
32 (1972),
, in: Franciscan
Studies,
ofOckham
suppositionibus
textat 31-64,dating
at 16.
15-64,
37Weisheipl
1968(op.cit.,
aboven. 7), 182.
38Weisheipl
1969(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),no. 16-17,195;De Rijk,Walter
De excepBurley's
tivis:
AnEdition
24 (1986),22-49,at 23-49;De Rijk1985(op.cit.,
above
, in: Vivarium,
n. 35),28-54.
39Weisheipl
1969(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),no.21, 196;textin M.L. Roure,La problmatique
despropositions
insolubles
au XIIIesicle
etau dbut
duXIVe,suivie
de Vdition
destraits
de
W.Burleigh
W.Shyreswood,
etTh.Bradwardine,
in:Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
et littraire
at 262-84;De Rijk,Some
du moyen
ontheMediaeval
Tract
Notes
ge,45 (1970),205-326,
Deinsolubilibus
Edition
the
the
EndoftheTwelfth
4
, with
, in:Vivarium,
ofa Tract
Dating
from
Century
at 87.
(1966),83-115,
40Brown1972(op.cit.,
aboven. 36),16,25-26,27.
41Weisheipl
1969(op.cit.,
aboven. 2), no. 9a,b,c,190;Lohr1968(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),
no.9-10,177-78.
42Weisheipl
1968(op.cit.,
aboven. 7), 178.
43ForthedateseeSynan
1997(op.cit.,
aboven.33),Introduction
, x-xi;andidem,
Introduction,
18:38:54 PM
OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
verysimilarto each other,withlots of verbatimborrowing.So the presumptionis that Kopp is right.But to say the least it complicatesthe
situation.For it mightequally be that what Kopp has foundis the base
textor textsBurleyused in lecturingon the Elenchi.
we tentativelyattributethe earliestof
As stated in the introduction,
commentaries
to
the Oxford period. Apart from such
Burley'sPhysics
in
modern
authors, the attentivewill note that
derring-do dating by
worksto the Oxfordperiod. There
thereis littleevidenceforattributing
on thePeriheris a titlein one of threemanuscriptsof the Oxford
Questions
meniasand a colophon in one of two manuscriptsof the 1302 Obligations
.
That is a circumstancewhich might prompt the prudent to wonder
whetherthese early Oxford productionseven have the same author as
the famousworkspublishedin 1330s. Here the workof Brown,who has
publishedsome of the earliestof these works,offersreassurance.Brown
, and the
, the ParisExposition
pointsto close parallelsin the firstQuestions
Final Commentary
.50For the firstbook of the
of Burley'sIn Perihermenias
.51So
1302 Logic
, Brownlistsparallelpassages in the De puntateartislogicae
one advantageof Burley'sreuse of earlierredactionsis greatercertainty
thatwe are dealing withworksby a single author.
2. Paris
Burley'sclericalcareer began in 1309, when he was admittedas rector
of Welbury,Yorkshire,a positionhe owed to SirJohn de Lisle, a friend
of the Archbishopof York, William of Greenfield.An acolyte,Burley
took this position in order to finance his study of theologyat Paris;
throughouthis pastoralcareer he employedsubstitutes.
Along with the income fromhis firstrectory,Burleyreceivedpermission to studyand to take holy ordersabroad. At Paris, Burleystrengthened his tieswithBishop Greenfieldby actingas a companionto Greenfield'snephew,Baldwin of St Albans, who received a Yorkshirerectory
at the same time as Burley.Papal reservationof a beneficein the giftof
the bishop of Lincoln was conferredon Burleyat the petitionof William
That
Testa, cardinal of S. Ciriaco, in 1317, notwithstanding
Welbury.52
received
the
a
new
of
before
the
is, Burley
last,
promise
rectory
leaving
but he did not occupy two rectoriessimultaneously.53
Burley'sLincoln
5)0Brown1973 cit.,aboven. 18),43; Brown1974 cit.,aboven.
(op.
(op.
16),201.
51Brown1972(<
., aboven. 36),26-7,n. 43.
op.cit
52See Emden(op.cit.,
aboven. 1),312.
53See Martin
aboven. 1),214,n. 3.
(op.cit.,
18:38:54 PM
10
OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
11
but receivedpermissionto remainabroad until 1322. Since Burleymentionshis master'spromotionto Chancellorin thework,the Tractatus
primus
has to be dated after1320. Since BurleyprobablyinceptedbeforeWilton
actuallyleftforLondon, around November 1, 1322, when Wilton'spermissionto be absentfromSt. Paul's expired,it seems reasonableto suppose that Burleyinceptedin 1322 or not long after.59
The Tractatus
primus
grewout of the discussionwhichfollowedBurley's
, just as Ockham's
inaugurallectureon the fourthbook of the Sentences
De sacramento
altarisaddressesquestionsraised in his fourthbook. Indeed,
it seems to us that Burley'sTractatus
primuswas writtenafterhis lectures
on the Sentences
and before he became a master,and should be dated
withthe dates suggestedforthe assobetween1320 and 1322, correlating
sit maximaopposition
ciated Quaestioutrumcontradicho
the firsthalf of the
and
Tractatus
secundus
between
and
One problem
1320
1323.60
1320s,
,
withthatsuggestionis thatit is generallyassumedthatthe Tractatus
primus
was writtenafterBurleybecame a masterof theology,because when it
was writtenhe had already held a quodlibet at Toulouse: De primoet
ultimo
instanti
.61However,the objectionholdsonlyifwe believethatMasters
of Artscould not hold quodlibetaldisputations;surelyat Toulouse, there
would be no obstacleto Burley'sholdingsuch a quodlibeton a question
in logic and physicsbeforebecominga Parisianmasterof theology(Sylla
also appears to hold thisview).62
59Assuming,
ofcourse,
thatbyreferring
to Wilton
as his"reverend
master"
Burley
meant
toindicate
thathe incepted
underhim,an assumption
whichdoesmakeitrather
difficult
to explain
hissimultaneous
useofthetide"socius."
60On thequaestio
seeDe Rijk,Burley's
So-Called
Tractatus
with
anEdition
primus,
ofthe
"
Additional
contradicho
sitmaxima
in:Vivarium,
34 (1996),161-91,
QuaestioUtrum
opposition
at 164,withtextat 176-91,
andMaier,Handschriftliches
Ockham
undWalter
zu Wilhelm
Burle)/.
Mittelalter:
Gesammelte
des14.
zurGeistesgeschichte
, in: Maier,Ausgehendes
Nachtrag
Aufstze
ofthetextbasedona different
/,Rome1964,469-79at 474;andtheversion
Jahrhunderts
msfrom
thefourusedbyDe Rijkin Ryszard
Burleii
Utrum
conPalacz,Gualterii
quaestio:
tradicho
sitmaxima
318f. 141va-l
in:Mediaevalia
(Ms.Vat.Ottob.
oppositio
45vb),
philosophicapolonorum,
11(1963),128-39.
On thetractatus
Traktat
De
, seeMaier,Zu Walter
Burleys
intensione
et remissione
in:Franciscan
25 (1965),293-321,
at 293-4.
formarum,
Studies,
61Weisheipl
1969(<op.t
andCharlotte
., aboven. 2),no.47,205;textinHerman
Shapiro
De primoet ultimoinstanti
desWalter
frGeschichte
der
, in: Archiv
Shapiro,
Burley
47 (1965),157-73,
at 159-73.
Philosophie,
62Sylla1984(< ., aboven. 54),261,
itis Maierwhomakes
thepointexplicop.cit
although
Maier1964(op.t.,
aboven. 60),475-76.Martin
assumes
thatonlya doctor
canhold
itly:
a quodlibet,
butmakestherather
morecomplicated
thatBurley
couldhave
argument
a first
written
version
ofthetreatise
before
Wilton's
in 1322,onlyto revise
it
departure
between
hisinception,
1324and 1327,after
whichin Martin's
viewmaybe as lateas
1324:Martin1964(op.cit.,
aboven. 1),208-9.
18:38:54 PM
12
& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER
beforeBurleybecame
was written
More evidencethatthe Tractatus
primus
a masterof theology,that is before 1324,63 comes fromits citationby
comWilliamof Ockham. Ockham borrowedfromit, as well as critically
on thePhysics.6*
mentingon it, in his circa-1324 Questions
there
are
no
insultingpersonal commentsin Ockham's
Interestingly,
includes
on
the
circa-1319Scriptum
on the Sentences
Ockham's
Questions Physics.
that
he
would
Ockham
and
the firstinsulttradedby
Burley.Ockham says
not have treateda certainfrivolousobjection (cavillatio
) had it not been
that "some people who considerthat theyknow logic give great weight
to such childishconsiderations(puerilid
) on account of which theyposit
from
this
But apart
comment,there are no more
many absurdities."65
nastyremarksabout Burleyin Ockham's writings.Some views Ockham
seeks to refute;others he adopts withoutattributionin the circa-1323
.66More importandy,beforeBurley's1324 Physics
Summalogicae
commentary,
thereis no sign thathe was aware of Ockham as an enemy.This peaceful intervalsuggeststhat when we findworksby Burleyin which there
is no sign of hostilityto Ockham, theymay be as late as 1324, though
it is more usual to suggest1320.67
One such work is the firstredactionof Burley'sfamouslogical treaThe second redaction,by contrast,is
tise, the De puntateartislogicae.
63See below.
64Svila1984(iop.cit
., aboven. 54),258.
65William
II-III,
ordinato:
Distinctiones
Sententiarum
ofOckham,
inlibrum
primum
Scriptum
withGedeonGal,St. Bonaventure
ed. Stephen
1970,146(OTh II): "IstacavilBrown,
talia
se scirelogicam,
nisiquiaaliqui,reputantes
lationonessethicponenda
pondrant
terminorum."
circasuppositionem
multaabsurda
propter
quaeponunt
puerilia,
66William
GedeonGal,andStephen
ofOckham,
Summa
Boehner,
, ed.Philotheus
logicae
De supposiSt. Bonaventure
1974,233-6(OPh I), wherehe useseither
Brown,
Burley's
tractaartis
tractatus
tionibus
orhisDepuntate
ibid.,233,n. 1. IftheDepuntate
longior;
logicae
itwould
to Ockham's
in response
tobe written
tuslongior
is supposed
Summa,
presumably
to himat thetimeofwriting.
be theformer
whichOckham
wouldhaveavailable
67Weisheipl
1968(<op.cit
., aboven. 7), 179,183-84.
68Weisheipl
arein Walter
aboven. 2), no. 13a,b,191-2.Bothversions
1969{op.cit.,
ed.
With
a Revised
Edition
Depuritate
artis
tractatus
breuior,
oftheTractatus
longior:
logicae
Burley,
Institute
Pub1955(Franciscan
St. Bonaventure-Louvain-Paderborn
Philotheus
Boehner,
at 1-197.Weisheipl's
at 199-260and thelonger
TextSeriesIX), theshorter
lications,
1980
Green-Pedersen
version:
fromtheshorter
no. 19b,De consequentiis
, is an excerpt
ofthe
translation
theGerman
version
aboven. 34),110.See alsoforthelonger
[op.cit.,
der
VonderReinheit
derKunst
terminorum
treatise
first
) in: WalterBurley,
{Deproprietatibus
anded. PeterKunze,Hamburg
derTermini
VondenEigenschaften
Traktat:
Erster
, trans,
Logik:
ofthefirst
translation
Bibliothek
1988(Philosophische
partofthe
CDI), andtheEnglish
OnConin: IvanBoh,Burleigh:
secondtreatise
conditionalibus)
{Depropositionibus
hypotheticis
bothwith
23 (1963),4-67,at 14-67,
ditional
Studies,
, in:Franciscan
Propositions
Hypothetical
Latinon facing
Boehner's
pages.
18:38:54 PM
13
18:38:54 PM
14
& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
15
18:38:54 PM
16
& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
17
18:38:54 PM
18
OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER
des14.Jahrhunderts
in:Maier,Ausgehendes
Mittelalter:
Gesammelte
zurGeistesgeschichte
/,
Aufstze
in:
onthePolitics
Walter
Rome1964,93-9;andThomson,
ofAristotle,
Commentary
Burley's
mdivale
littraire
etdoctrinale
dela scolastique
Etudes
d'histoire
Pelzer:
offertes
Auguste
Mlanges
anniversaire
l'occasion
desonsoixante-dixime
Pelzer
, Louvain1947,557-78
Monseigneur
Auguste
etde philologie,
3dser.XXVI);and
d'histoire
de Louvain,
Recueilde travaux
(Universit
on
areexcerpted
in L.J.Daly,TheConclusions
theconclusions
Burley's
Commentary
ofWalter
I toIV' in: Manuscripta,
Books
12 (1968),79-92,at 84-89;and idem,The
thePolitics,
13
V andVI, in:Manuscripta,
onthePolitics,
Books
Conclusions
Burley's
Commentary
ofWalter
at 145-8.
142-9,
(1969),
90
1969(<
., aboven. 2),no.23, 197.
op.cit
91Weisheipl
Shriver
aboven. 10),28-71.
1958(op.cit..
92WalterBurley,
Frankfurt
artem
veterem
, Venice1497(facsimile
1967),
reprint,
Super
f.d ii vb.
93Weisheipl
absenceofanydetailed
1968(op.cit
., aboven. 7), 180:"Thenoticeable
found
's arguments
thatitwaswritten
before
ofOckham
refutation
Burley
might
suggest
butsuchan absencecouldjustas
to study
ordinatio
an opportunity
Ockham's
carefully,
a detailed
refutation
written."
already
easily
presuppose
94For
Wodeham
andOckham
onsensory
seeWood,Adam
thepositions
ofAureol
illusions,
"
38
3, in: Traditio,
an Edition
onSensory
with
Illusions
, Quaestio
secunda,"
of Lectura
Prologus
at 220-6.
(1982),213-52,
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
19
18:38:54 PM
20
& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER
Burley'sotherexperienceof women may not have been entirelyfavorable either.At least one passage fromhis Ethicsis conspicuouslysexist.
The text on which Burleyis commentingis harmlessenough. Aristotle
remarksthat women are not called incontinentor overcomeby passion
because of the position they assume in (missionarystyle)intercourse."
Followinga ratherpoor translation,Aquinas takes thispassage to mean
thatsince women are led ratherthanleading,theydo not countas incontinent.Supplyingan explanation,Aquinas tells us that this is because
lacking reason, women are led by their affectionsratherthan governing their affectionswith reason. Consequently,we rarelyfind strong,
wise women.100
Burleygoes further.He agrees that such women are rare and adds a
prurientnote: For the most part, he says,women are led by theirconcupiscentdesires.If theyare not to be led by theirconcupiscentdesires,
then since they lack reason, they must be led by the reason of men.
Consequently,Burley concludes that, strictlyspeaking,women do not
- that iftheir
counteitheras continentor incontinent
is,
appetiteis unconof
universal
the
concomitant
women
lack
trolled,
practical right
grasp
reasonwhichcharacterizesthe merelyweak; iftheirappetiteis controlled,
it is by a man's reason, not by theirown.101
and his Politics
Burley'slastworkswere a 1341 disputationat Bologna102
1
to
in
November
of
343
which
he
dedicated
,
Pope ClementVI,
commentary
99Aristotle,
The
in:Aristotle,
W.D. Ross,rev.J.O. Urmson,
Ethics
Mcomachean
, trans.
Series
ed.Jonathan
TheRevised
Works
Barnes,
Translation,
Bollingen
Oxford
Complete
ofAristotle:
at lib.7, cap.5, no. 1148b,1815.
1984,2:1729-1867,
LXXI,Princeton
100
2 vols.,
C.I. Litzinger,
ontheMcomachean
Ethics
ThomasAquinas,
, trans.
Commentary
ofLiving
Catholic
1964,lib.7, lect.5, no. 1376,642 (Library
Thought).
Chicago
101
libros
Aristotelis
decern
Ethicorum
Walter
, Venice1500,f. 112 :
Burley,
Expositio
super
mulieres
maioris
dicens
"Deindeponit
supquod
quemadmodum
exemplarem
probationem
se per
in eis:undenonducunt
rationis
defectum
incontinentes
propter
ple nondicuntur
viri:vela concupiscentiis
rationem
sedmagisducuntur
suis,ita
perrationem
propriam:
non
debilem
nec illiqui habentrationem
concupiscentias
quae nonestnatarepellere
esthocprimoquod
autcontinentes
debentdiciincontinentes
Intelligendum
simpliciter.
nonpotunt
fortes
habent
tamcontinentes
quaerepelli
concupiscentias
quamincontinentes
conet quiatalisrationonestin hisqui delectabiliter
nisiperrationem
fortem,
operant
cumratioin eissitquasitotanonestnataessein talibus:
ideocontinentia
tranaturam,
etinquibusnon
velconsuetudine:
autexegritudine
exmalitia
literoppressa
complexionis
habeant
cumcontraria
ineisdem
nonestnataesseincontinentia:
estnataessecontinentia
mulieres
nondicuntur
circaidem.2 estintelligendum
fieri
quodin idiomate
graecorum
a concupiscentiis
et nona ratione
ducuntur
propria,
incontinentes,
quia ut in pluribus
naturae."
autfortes
mulieres
underaroinveniuntur
sapientes
propter
imperfectionem
102
derSptscholastik
Studien
im14.Jahrhundert:
DieVorlufer
Galileis
zurNaturphilosophie
,
Maier,
e letteratura,
Rome1949,257-8(Storia
XXII).
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY:HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
21
18:38:54 PM
22
OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER
18:38:54 PM
WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS
23
sedsolum
secundum
hocestmetaphorice
etsecundum
similiperatas
proprie,
metaphoram
tudinem
unumgenusad aliudgenusanimalium.
Differt
enimunumgenus
comparando
animalium
ab alioincontumelia
id estinhocquodunumestmagiscontumeliosum
quam
aliud:autin hocquodunumestmagisinmundam
vitamhabenssicutporcus
quamovis:
etsinamoria
scilicet
stultitia
utinhocquodunumanimal
eststultitius
alio,utasinus
equo:
etomnivorax
in hocquodunumestvoraxutlupuset aliudnon,undepercomscilicet
horum
animalium
intalibus,
animalium
dicunparationem
quaesuperfluunt
aliquagenera
turtemperata
etintemperata
utporcus
ovisdicitur
etovisrespectu
respectu
intemperatus
Cf.Aristotle,
lib.7, cap.6, no. 1149b,1816;ThomasAquinas,
porcidicitur
temperata."
lib.7, lect.6, no. 1399-1400,
649-50.
109
Walter
decern
libros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
Burley,
, Venice1500,f. 115vb:
Expositio
super
"Sedsi hocaccidat
eisexnatura
scilicet
exnatura
generis
progenitorum
quodnonpossint
sustinere
tristitias
neclabores
necresistere
delectationibus:
acciditeisex natura
progenitorum
sicutaccidit
et filiis
scilicet
delicate
suntnutriti:
non
regibus
regum
quia multum
debent
dicimolles
velincontinentes
seddebent
dicimolles
mollitiae
simpliciter:
regisvel
molles
Talisenimmollities
in regibus
invenitur
delicate
nutriri
genere.
Scytharum
propter
sustinere
tristitias
neclabores."
Cf.Aristotle,
lib.7, cap. 7, no. 1150b,
quodnonpossunt
lib.7, lect.7, no. 1416,657.
1817;ThomasAquinas,
110
Walter
decern
libros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
Burley,
, Venice1500,f. 115ra:
Expositio
super
"2 estnotandum
delectationes
quodmultisuperabundanter
quaerunt
qui tamennon
tristitias
Multienimmultas
tribulationes
labores
etpericula
sustifugiunt
superabundanter.
nentpropter
delectationes
utpatetde multis
incontinentibus,
consequendas:
qui propter
delectationes
etcalores
etmulta
ambucorporales
patiuntur
consequendas
frigora
pericula
lantes
solitarii
intempore
ad consequendum
delectationes
pernoctes
hyemales
frigidissimo
et voluptates,
et talesmagisnegociantur
circadelectationes
corporales
quamcircatristitias."Cf.Aristotle,
lib.7, cap. 7, no. 1150a,1817;ThomasAquinas,
lib.7, lect.7, no.
655.
1406-7,
18:38:54 PM
WalterBurley3
s Realism}
ELIZABETH KARGER
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
18:39:01 PM
BURLEY'S
REALISM
WALTER
25
in librosde anima
,5 the theorydeveloped in later worksis alreadypresent.
Could he have taken that turn early on in his career? That too seems
in librum
Periherruled out, forin one of his earliestworks,his Quaestiones
mendas
,6 the same theoryis already found. Moreover, in none of these
works,have I been able to discovera passage where Burleyso much as
mentionsthe theoryof universaiscontainedin M&F.
In view of these facts,I am inclinedto seriouslydoubt that Burleyis
the authorof thattract.7Nor can I agree withShapiro thata practically
incontrovertible
proofof Burley'sauthorshipis providedby the factthat
the sole printedversionof the tract,8as well as the codex whichcontains
the two knownmanuscriptversionsof it,9both ascribethe tractto him.10
This is not a point I wish to press, however.For whetherBurleyis
the authorof thistractor not, the factis that the theoryof extra-mental
universaiswhich it containsis one of the major medieval alternativesto
the theorycommonlyassociatedwithBurley'sname and foundin so many
of his works.As such, these two theoriesare well wortha comparative
5 A. Maierhasargued
"Averroist"
des14.Jahrhunderts:
Walter
(in:A. Maier,Einunbeachteter
e Rinascimento
B. Nardi),
Florence
, in:Medioevo
1955,477-99,
Burley
(Festschrift
reprinted
in:A. Maier,Ausgehendes
at 119-20)
Mittelalter
thatthisworkwas
I, Rome1964,101-121,
written
after
deanima
andtherefore
ThomasofWylton's
intellectiva
after1312and
Quaestio
Z. Kuksewicz
Theproblem
in:A. Maier&
Averroism,
(in:Z. Kuksewicz,
ofWalter
Burley's
A. Paravicini
diAnneliese
sulXIVsecolo
inmemoria
Maier
, Roma1981,
(eds.),Studi
Bagliani
in 1316.SinceConti(in:A. Conti,Ontology
341-77at 377)thatitwasprobably
written
inWalter
LastCommentary
onthe
Arsvetus,
in:Franciscan
50 (1990),121-76,
Studies,
Burley's
at 138)provides
no argument
in support
ofhisclaimthatbookI, thebookwhichcontainstheviewson universais
I discuss
between
1301and
here,was"probably
composed
it.
1307",I havedisregarded
6 Written
in 1301,seeS.F. Brown,
Walter
inlibrum
in:
Quaestiones
Pehermenasi
Burley's
34 (1974),200-95,
at 200.
Franciscan
Studies,
7 H.-U.Whler,
Das "realistische"
Walter
imgeschichtlichen
Kontexty
Burleys
Individualittskonzept
in:J.A. Aertsen
& A. Speer(eds.),
Individuum
undIndividualitt
imMitteralter
York
, Berlin-New
at 318 (Miscellanea
its
1996,313-326,
Mediaevalia,
24),citesM&F without
questioning
Nordoesheseemtohaverealized
toBurley.
howprofoundly
different
thetheascription
in thistractis from
contained
thetheory
contained
in otherworks
oryofuniversais
by
Burley.
8 In theprinted
edition
ofOxford
is entided:
"Tractatus
demate1518,thetract
perbrevis
riaetforma
Burlei
doctoris
Magisti
pianissimi
9 ThecodexisAssisi
2146.It is described
Vaticani
Latini,
byMaierin:A. Maier,Codices
codices
2118-2193
Vaticana1961,59-66.It contains
twoversions
ofourtract,
, Bibliotheca
which
is ascribed
to
in a notewritten
dated1397.
bytheowner,
10NorwouldthisBurley
be theonlyinstance
a worknotbyBurley
where
hasbeenascribed
tohim,evenat a relatively
methatall ofRichard
earlydate.RegaWoodhasinformed
Rufus'
works
havebeenascribed
to Burley
sinceabout1400,although
the
philosophical
themselves
datefrom
before
1250.
manuscripts
18:39:01 PM
26
ELIZABETH
KARGER
18:39:01 PM
WALTER
REALISM
BURLEY'S
27
where
account,individualsubstancesare composed of matterand form,17
form
is
not
an
The
a
substantial
accidental
one.
submeant,
by "form",
stantialformis said to providethe individualas a whole withan essence18
In otherwords,it providesthe individualas a whole with
or quiddity.19
a natureof a certainkind.A human being,forexample,is regarded,on
thisaccount,as essentiallycomposed of matterand of a substantialform
in virtueof which he or she is a human being.
Assumingthis to be a correctaccount of individualsubstances,the
authorproceedsto identify
extra-mental
universaiswithsubstantialforms.
is not, however,a straightforward
This identification
one. It requiresthat
a distinctionfirstbe drawn between actual and habitual being. It will
- identified
then turn out, as we shall see, that extra-mentaluniversais
withsubstantial
forms existas universaisonlyinsofaras theyhave habitual
being,whereas,insofaras theyhave actual being, theyexistas singulars.
Obviously,this is a doctrinewhich cannot be understoodunless the
distinctionbetweenactual and habitual being is clear. The actual being
of a thingis its presentexistence.But what is its habitual being?
Roger Bacon, surelyone of the fiercestopponentsof the notion,at
least tells us what its contentis. Habitual being, he reports,is characterizedas a being common to thingspast, presentand future.20
But the
which
is
common
to
and
future
onlybeing
precisely
past, present
things
is past, presentor futurebeing. Habitualbeing,therefore
or
, is past,present
future
being.
If this is what actual and habitual being are, relationshipsbetween
them will followfromtruthsof tense logic. Thus, it is a truthof tense
logic that whateverhas presentbeing has past, presentor futurebeing,
thoughnot conversely.Consequently,anythingwhich has actual being
has habitualbeing as well,thoughsome thingshave habitualbeing which
do not have actual being. Propertiesof actual and of habitualbeing will
also followfromtruthsof tense logic. Thus, it is anothertruthof tense
logic thatwhateverhas past, presentor futureexistencewill alwayshave
17"Notandum tantum
suntduoprincipia
substancie
secundum
materem,scilicet
quod
riaetforma."
(96).
18"Forma
autemesttotaessencia
. . ." (96).
compositi.
19"Secundum
autemquodforma
estin materia
... estperfeccio
tociuscompositi,
et
hocessedicitur
secundum
'quidditas'."
(97).
20Compendium
Studii
Leiden-New
York-Kobenhavn-Kln
, ed. T.S. Maloney,
TheologLae
unumesse... etdicunt
illudessehabitale.
Ethocdicunt
essecom1988,92:". . . fingunt
munepraesenti,
et futuro
..."
praeterito,
18:39:01 PM
28
ELIZABETH
KARGER
it. Accordingly,
we findthe authormakingthe claim that,insofaras ithas
habitualexistence,a thingis, as he puts it, "incorruptible".21
By contrast,
if a thinghas presentexistencenow, it does not followthatit will always
have it in the future.Accordingly,
we findthe authormakingthe further
claim that,insofaras it has actual existence,a thingis "corruptible".22
Such is the distinctionbetween actual and habitual being which the
authoruses to articulatea theoryof extra-mental
universais.On thattheory, an extra-mentaluniversal,identifiedwith a substantialform,has
Its actual being,however,supposingit does actuhabitualbeing of itself.23
it
to
fact that thereis an actual individualin which
owes
the
ally exist,
it existsas one of the individual'stwo essentialcomponentparts,matter
being the other.24But each of the componentparts of an actual individual is singular.25
It followsthat a given universal,insofaras it actually
exists
a
as
exists,
singular.Moreover,in all but exceptionalcases, a universal,if it existsin one individual,existsin many others.In each individual, it existsas a distinctsingular.It followsthat a universal,insofar
as it actuallyexists,normallyexistsnot just as one, but as many singulars. Insofaras it habituallyexists,however,whetheror not it also actually exists,a universalexists,not as a singularnor as many singulars,but
as a universal.
Let us take as an example the universalin which being human consists.That universalactuallyexistsinsofaras it existsin actuallyexisting
human beings. In each individual,it existsas a singular.Since it exists
in manyhuman beings,it followsthat,insofaras it actuallyexists,it exists
as manysingulars,and not as a universal.Insofaras it has habitualbeing,
however,a being which it has of itself,it existsas a universal.
we could say that a universal(or
Using the author'sown terminology,
substantialform),insofaras it actually exists,is "actually multiplied".
Insofaras it habituallyexists,by contrast,it is not actuallymultiplied,
thoughit is "multipliable".26
21Talking
essehabiofforms
or universais,
theauthor
tarnen
says(97):"Secundum
sunt.
..."
tale,incorruptibilia
22Talking
oruniversal,
theauthor
says(98):"subtaliesse[esseactale]
againofa form
estcorruptibile
..."
23". . . licetuniversale
..." (98).
insepreter
hocquodestinsingulari
essehabitale
habeat
24"... [universale]
in singularibus,
cumforma
sine
secundum
actumsolumreperitur
materia
subsistere
nonpotuit."
actualiter
(98).
25". . . principia
sinindividuarum
etnonuniversalia,
rerum
sunt,
quiaforma
singularia
. . ." (97).
et materia
singularis
gularis
26". . . priusenimsecundum
naturam
estforma
quamactu
permateriam
multiplicabilis
. . ." (97).
multiplicetur
18:39:01 PM
WALTER
BURLEY'S
REALISM
29
18:39:01 PM
30
ELIZABETH
KARGER
18:39:01 PM
WALTER
REALISM
BURLEY'S
31
On this theory,as on the precedingone, thereare extra-mentaluniversais,the most conspicuousof which are universaisin the categoryof
substance.As such,thoseuniversaisare commonto individualsubstances.
Accordingly,as on the precedingtheory,an account of those universais
requiresa metaphysicalaccount of individualsubstances.
Burley'streatiseDe formiscontainssuch an account. On that account,
an individualsubstanceis essentiallycomposed of two singularparts: its
matterand its substantialform.This substantialformis said to "perfect"
the entirematterof the individual.In everyindividualsubstance,there
necessarilyexistsexactlyone such form.For it is that substantialform
whichgivesthe individualitsidentity,
both specificand numerical,making
it an individualof a certainsort.36It is, for example, by her intellective
soul- which is the substantialformwhich perfectsher entirematter
that Susan is an individualhuman being.37By contrast,Susan's corpse,
because it has no substantialformperfecting
its entirematter,is not an
individualof any sort,it is a mere aggregate.38
Though an individualsubstancealways has just one substantialform
itsentirematter,it generallyhas otherformswhichalso perfect
perfecting
its matter.Some are substantialformseach of whichperfectsonly a part
of the individual'smatter,called "partial" forms.For example, different
parts of Susan's matterare perfectedby substantialformsin virtueof
whichone partis bony matter,anotheris flesh,anotheris nerves.39
Other
formsare accidentalforms.They perfectthe matterof the individualinsofaras thatmatteris alreadyperfectedby a substantialform,providing
TheTractatus
deuniversalibus
St.Bonaventure
, typescript,
dissertation,
ofWalter
Burky
University
as "Deuniversalibus";
etquaestiones
inPhysicam
Aristotelis
1958,abbreviated
/,Venice
Expositio
"
1501[reprint
Olms19721,
abbreviated
.
as Physic
36DFpp(op.
cit
substantialis
datessesimpliciter
., aboven. 35),10:". . . forma
composito
cuiusestforma
. . . Verbigratia:
forma
substantialis
hominis
dathomini
essesimpliciter
et
substantialis
quodsithomo.Undenihilesthomo,nisiex hocquodforma
sua,scilicet
animaintellectiva,
suammateriam
..."
perficit
37
estunaforma
substantialis
., aboven. 35),35: ". . . in homine
DFpp(op.dt
perficiens
totam
materiam
animaintellectiva
..."
hominis,
scilicet,
38DFpp(op.dt.,
aboven. 35),37: . . dicendum
mortuum
non
quodcorpusanimalis
estunumperaliquam
unamformam
substantialem
necinducitur
novaforma
substantialis
inmateria
. . . Dicoergoquodcorpus
animalis
mortuum
non
quandoanimalcorrumpitur
estunumnisiunitateaggregationis
..."
39DFpp (op.cit
animamintellectivam
suntpluresforme
., aboven. 35), 35: "Preter
substantiales
diversas
materie,
partiales
perficientes
partes
que forme
distinguuntur
specie,
cuiussuntforma
forma
nervi
etsicde aliis.Etitaestin quolibet
alio
carnis,
ossis,forma
..."
etheromogenio
18:39:01 PM
32
ELIZABETH
KARGER
18:39:01 PM
REALISM
WALTER
BURLEY'S
33
18:39:01 PM
34
ELIZABETH
KARGER
18:39:01 PM
WALTER
BURLEY'S
REALISM
35
Burleybelieved that this is not impossibleat all, at least not for all
"things".For individuals,it is indeed, he granted,impossiblethat they
should exist as one and the same in different
places at the same time.
But universaisare not individuals,and the propertyof not possiblyexisting as one and the same in different
places at the same time,whichholds
of individuals,does not hold of universais.
Why not? Because universaishave a type of identitywhich individuals do not have. There is, of course, a type of identitycommon to all
things,whethertheyare individualsor universais.Burleycalls this type
of identity"numericalidentityin the common or wide sense". But, more
basic than this general type of identity,are two other typesof identity,
one characteristic
of individuals,the otherof universais.Burleycalls the
former"numericalidentityin the strictsense" and the latter"specificor
The propertyof havingnumericalidentityin the wide
genericidentity."53
sense is thusderivative:it is common to whateverhas numericalidentity
in the strictsense and to whateverhas specificor genericidentity.54
Because theyhave different
typesof identity,individualsand universais supportoppositepropertiesof a veryfundamentalnature.In particular, individualshave the propertyof not possiblyexistingas one and
the same thingin different
whereasuniversais
places at the same time,55
53It is essential
torealizethattheexpression
orgeneric
is nottaken
"specific
identity"
hereinitsusualsense(thesenseinwhich,
in Topica
usesit),where
itdenotes
1,7,Aristotle
a certain
sortofsimilarity
therelation,
whichindividuals
ofthesame
relation,
namely,
or ofthesamegenusbearto eachother.
Instead
itis takenin a sensein which
species
a genuine
it denotes
therelation,
whicha universal
bearsto
relation,
identity
namely,
itself.
Theviewthatindividuals
havenumerical
whereas
univer(inthestrict
identity
sense),
saishavespecific
orgeneric
is expressed
overandoveragainbyBurley,
bothin
identity
Thus,in QPH, q. 1, 1.82,ed. Brown1974(<
earlyandin laterwritings.
., above
op.cit
n. 6),213:"... hocnomen'homo'significai
remextraanimam
sedillaresnonestuna
numero
sedunasecundum
necestomnisresextraanimam
unaresnumero.";
speciem,
inDe anima
. . . habeatessepraeter
itaquod
, I, q. 3: "Quodautemuniversale
animam,
estaliquanatura
extra
inIsagoge
animam,
numero,
.,
quaenonestunanatura
{op.cit
patet.";
aboven. 35),f.a5rb
andinDe universalibus,
ed.Shriver
1958{op.cit.,
aboven. 35),47: "Sed
unumnumero
stricte
secundum
contra
unumspecieetunum
accipiendo
quoddistinguitur
sicunumnumero
contra
commune
etsicidemetunum
genere,
distinguitur
quodcumque
idemestquodindividuum
numero
... et ideonullum
universale
estunumnumero
..."
andinPhysica
aboven. 35),f.9rb:"Sicdicoquoduniversale
nonestunumnumero
{op.cit.,
sedestunumspecievelunumgenere".
54Isagoge
aboven. 35),f.a5raandDe universalibus
1958{op.cit.,
above
, ed.Shriver
{op.cit.,
n. 35),46: "... idemnumero
scilicet
communiter
et stricte.
Idem
accipitur
dupliciter,
numero
communiter
est. . . superius
ad idemnumero
stricte
et ad
acceptum
assumptum
unumspecieet ad unumgenere
et etiamestcommune
cuilibet
enti..."
55Isagoge
aboven. 35),a5rbandDe universalibus
1958{op.cit.,
above
, ed. Shriver
{op.cit.,
18:39:01 PM
36
KARGER
ELIZABETH
18:39:01 PM
WALTER
BURLEY'S
REALISM
37
It followsthatthe corresponding
universal
by the generalterm
signified
existin those individuals.Nor does it, therefore,
habitcannot uniformly
ually exist in each. When writingthis work, then, Burley would have
surelyopposed the notion that a universalhabituallyexistsin past, present and futureindividuals.It is likelythat he would also have opposed
the notionthat universaishave habitual being.
Conclusion
universaisare verydifferent
fromeach
These two theoriesof extra-mental
other.They are, indeed, incompatibletheories.
On the theorystatedin M&F, a universalactuallyexistsin actual indi- i.e. as
viduals only as "multiplied"
many singulars,not as a universal.
It is only insofaras it habituallyexistsin past, presentand futureindividuals thatit existsas a universal.On Burley's characteristic
theory,by
universalactuallyexistsin actual individualsas
contrast,an extra-mental
a universal,or as one mightsay, it existsin them as "unmultiplied."58
Moreover,on thistheory,universaisare not recognizedas habituallyexisting in past, presentand futureindividuals.
these theorieshave some featuresin common: theyboth
Nevertheless,
avoid what may well have been regardedby medievaisas two major pitfalls for a theoryof extra-mentaluniversais.The firstpitfallcould be
called "inconsistent
whichacknowlrealism,"meaninga theoryof universais
edges extra-mentaluniversaiswhile denyingthem any mode of being
other than one wherebythey exist as singulars.59
Both theoriesclearly
avoid thatpitfall,the theorystatedin M&F by admittingthatextra-mental
et futuris,
sed analogice,
'homo'essetunivocus
ad
praeteritis
quoniamsi isteterminus
etCaesarem,
essentia
hominis
salvaretur
inJoanne
etetiaminCaesare.Sedhoc
Joannem
estfalsum,
nonhabetCaesaraliquamessentiam
..
quia. . . Caesarecorrupto
58Apparently
the"opinion"
subscribed
to byBurley
in so manyofhis
characterizing
in Ordinatio
Ockham
writes
andG. Gi,St.Bonaventure
works,
I, d. 2, q. 4, ed.St.Brown
istamopinionem
1970,101,6-11
(OTh II): "Etitasecundum
quotsuntuniversalia
praedicabilia
in quidet perse primomodode aliquosingulari
totsuntin
perse in genere
eo resrealiter
distinctae
realiter
ab aliaetab iliosingulari,
quaelibet
distinguitur
quarum
etomnes
illaeresin se nullomodomultiplicatae,
quantumcumque
singularia
multiplicenindividuo
eiusdem
tur,suntin quolibet
speciei."
59In Ordinatio
I, d. 2, q. 5, ed. Brownand Gi (<
., aboven. 58), 153,Ockham
op.cit
refers
toa theory
towhich:
"... universale
etunivocum
according
[est]veraresextraanimamrealiter
in eo tarnen
distincta
ab individuo,
realiter
realiter
et
exsistens,
multiplicata
variata"
is inconsistent,
forit entails
(153,3-5).As he is quickto pointout,thistheory
thatevery
universal
is a singular
nota universal.
"... igitur
omnis
and,therefore,
thing
talisresestveresingularis
etperconsequens
nonestuniversalis."
(153,20-1).
18:39:01 PM
38
ELIZABETH
KARGER
60The author
ofM&F is gladto pointthisout.He writes
.,
(ed.Shapiro1962(iop.cit
secundum
rem
aboven. 2),97-8):"Etsi aliquisobiciat
quodhecopinioponituniversale
sicutposuit
etitaponitydeasseparatas
et extrasingularia,
essealiquidpreter
intellectum
habere
extrasingularia
universales
Plato;dicendum
separatas
quodPlatoposuitformas
Sed licetuniveraliorum.
et essehocaliquidet enciaactu,sicutentitas
actumexistendi,
actum
tamen
secundum
in se preter
salehabeatessehabitale
hocquodestin singulari,
subsistere
nonpotuit."
sinemateria
actualiter
in singularibus,
cumforma
solumreperitur
61In Isagoge
ed. Shriver
aboven. 35),f.a4 andf.a5va)andinDe universalibus,
{op.cit.,
contrasts
hisownopinion,
1958,36 and52,Burley
namely:
"opinioquaeponituniverse totum
secundum
in suissingularibus
et quoduniversale
salehabereessesubjectivum
"aliaestadhucopinioquae
whichhe rejects:
suosingulari"
withanother
estin quolibet
ethaec
essea singularibus;
suntextraanimam
secundum
separata
ponitquoduniversalia
sibiimponit."
secundum
fuitopinioPlatonis
quodAristoteles
62Hereis howDavidLewis(OnthePlurality
1986,ch.I, 64)charac, Oxford
ofWorlds
"To each
attractive:
whichhe considers
universais"
a "sparse
ofimmanent
terizes
theory
is
theproperty
. . . Wherever
a universal
natural
therecorresponds
property,
perfectly
. . . One andthesameuniversal
universal
thereis thecorresponding
recurs;
instantiated,
a shared
common
inbothparticles,
itiswholly
itis multiply
located;
partwhereby
present
incoma universal
is 'having
thetwoparticles
something
overlap.
Beingalikebysharing
to sucha theory,
literal
sense."Thoughlessfavorable
mon'in an absolutely
Armstrong
18:39:01 PM
REALISM
WALTER
BURLEY'S
39
18:39:01 PM
40
ELIZABETH
KARGER
as incorruptible
and as corruptible
2. On universais
etforma(97-8)
2a. De materia
. . . Unde Philosophus... et Commentator. . ., cum dicit quod [nullum]
universalehabet esse extra animam, intelliguntde esse quod est actus
existendi,et [non] de esse habitale.. . . secundum. . . esse habitale,
sunt; . . . secundumautem quod est actualiter
[universalia]incorruptibilia
...
multiplicatum,
[universale]... est corruptibile
2b. RichardRiifiis
Sententia
, ed. R. Wood, Erfurt,Quarto 290, fol.
superlibroPosteriorum
32va:
. . . dicendumquod universaledupliciterpotestconsiderali:aut secundum
esse quod habet in individuis;aut secundum esse quod debeturei non
inquantumest in individuis,sed quod debeturei in sua essentia... Et
proptereaper corruptionemindividuorumnon corrumpiturquoad esse
quod habet in sua essentia,sed tantumquoad esse quod actualiterhabet
in individuiscorrumpitur
ad eorum corruptionem.
Paris
CNRS
18:39:01 PM
1
WalterBurleyon The Kindsof SimpleSupposition
PAUL VINCENT SPADE
1. Background
By the early-fourteenth
centuryat the latest, the mediaeval theoryof
in most authorsinto two main branches,
divided
could
be
supposition
whichin recentliteraturehave come to be called the theoryof "suppositionproper"and the theoryof "modes of personalsupposition,"respecWhile the relationbetweenthese two branchesremainsobscure,
tively.2
we can say to a firstapproximation
thatthetheoryof supposition
properwas
a theoryof "reference,"
to
answer
the
what
designed
question
entityor entities a termrefersto or "supposits"forin a given occurrencein a given
whereasthe theoryof modes of personalsupposition,
whatever
proposition,
its ultimatepurpose,was the part of the theorythatincludedthe muchdiscussedaccountsof "descentto singulars"and "ascent fromsingulars."3
Walter Burley and his somewhatyoungercontemporary,
William of
Ockham,forthemostpartagreedabout themodesofpersonalsupposition,4
1 I am
to RegaWoodandElizabeth
comments
andsuggesgrateful
Kargerfortheir
tionson an earlier
ofthispaper.
draft
2 See PaulVincent
Kretzmann
et al. (ed.),
, in: Norman
Spade,TheSemantics
ofTerms
TheCambridge
Medieval
Thister, NewYork1982,Gh.9 (188-96).
History
ofLiter
Philosophy
wasfirst
usedbyT.K. Scottin the"Introduction"
to histranslation
ofJohn
minology
See T.K. Scott(trans.),
Buridan's
Buridan:
, andis notmediaeval.
John
Sophismata
Sophisms
onMeaning
andTruth
, NewYork1966,29-42.
3 Foran account
ofthissecondpartofthetheory,
anda discussion
ofsomeofthe
difficulties
TheMedieval
it,seePaulVincent
oftheCategorical'
surrounding
Spade,TheLogic
andAscent
Kretzmann
andInference
inMedieval
, in:Norman
ofDescent
Theory
(ed.),Meaning
inMemory
Studies
Dordrecht
Fora critique
ofmy
1988,187-224.
ofJanPinborg,
Philosophy:
ofthetheory
there
notofmyaccount
ofitsmechanics),
seeGareth
interpretation
(although
B. Matthews,
TwoTheories
, in: Topoi,16 (1997),35-40.See alsoTerence
ofSupposition
as Quantification
versus
as Global
Parsons,
, in:Topoi,
Supposition
Supposition
Quantificational
Effect
16(1997),41-63,especially
61,n. 2.
p.
4 Thatis, although
theirdefinitions
ofthemodesofpersonal
those
differ,
supposition
- at leastin
definitions
thevarious
modestoparticular
cases
appearto agreein assigning
thecontexts
thetheory
seemstohavebeenprimarily
tohandle.
Buridan's
designed
(John
definitions
behavethesameway.)On thisoddfactanditssignificance,
see Spade1988
cit.
, aboven. 3).
(op.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Vivarium
37,1
18:39:29 PM
42
PAULVINCENT
SPADE
18:39:29 PM
43
18:39:29 PM
44
PAULVINCENT
SPADE
18:39:29 PM
45
18:39:29 PM
46
PAULVINCENT
SPADE
18:39:29 PM
47
18:39:29 PM
48
PAULVINCENT
SPADE
18:39:29 PM
49
18:39:29 PM
50
PAULVINCENT
SPADE
18:39:29 PM
51
is stipulatedverbatim
tate
, but then Burleyadds the
, the same restriction
in
the
of
the
most general genera"words
case
"namely,
unexpected
thatis, the Aristoteliancategories.
Two thingsare surprising
about thisaddition.First,termshavingspecies
and individualsunder them are certainlynotconfinedto category-terms;
at all will count.And second,althoughall Burley'sexamany genus-term
"substance",the problem
ples in both textsdo involvethe category-term
is designedto address seems to be one that will arise for
thisdistinction
whatever,not just the most general ones.
any genus-term
in the commentaryon the Categories
foundin his Expositio
Furthermore,
the doctrineof De suppositionibus
, Burleyreaffirms
, that
superartemveterem
the distinction
betweengeneraland special simplesuppositionapplies to
all and only generaltermsthat have both species and individualsfalling
under them.28This suggeststhat the added words in De puntateare simply in error,and thatBurleydoes not intendany real change in or furtherrestriction
of the distinction
betweengeneraland special supposition.
the
is
Perhaps
simplestexplanation thatthe "mostgeneral"(= generalissimis
)
in the added phrase "namely,in the case of the most generalgenera" is
an erroneousglossor a corruptionof the textand shouldsimplybe omitted. In that case, the addition,now reduced to "namely,in the case of
of the point
genera",would be nothingmore than an acknowledgment
in
De
that
made
connection
with
the
restriction
of
,
already
suppositionibus
orwhether
itsignifies
a concept
in thesoul.Fora singular
is notproperly
stances,
thing
is a concept
defined.
Neither
in thesoul,sinceit is an accident.
Noris thething
com- thatis,themostgeneral
- sinceit doesnothavea genus
monto all substances
genus
anddifference,
andevery
definition
isgiven
anddifference.
if'Substance
Therefore,
bygenus
is defined'
is true,thensinceneither
an individual
norsubstance
in general
is defined,
'substance'
mustsupposit
forthespecies
contained
undersubstance.
Thosewhomaintain
thatspecies
andgenera
arethings
outside
thesoulhaveto saythis,as wellas thosetoo
whomaintain
thatspecies
andgeneraareconcepts
in thesoul.Forifthe
or intentions
mostgeneral
is a realthing,
thenclearly
it is notdefined,
genusin thegenussubstance
itis common
whether
or singular.
Andtherefore,
if'Substance
is defined'
is truein any
is a species
ofsubstance',
theterm'substance'
mustsupposit
sense,andalso'Substance
neither
forthemostgeneral
thatmaybe, norforindividuals
either.
genus,whatever
itmustsupposit
forthespecies
ofsubstance,
whether
thosespecies
areexterTherefore,
nalthings
in thesoul.")
or concepts
28Burlei
artem
veterem
"Etsciendum
de suppositione
sim, fol.d2va:
super
quodhaecdivisio
etspeciali
habetlocum[correction
hand
inthemargin
plicigenerali
bya mediaeval
oftheIndiana
subse species
et individua,
from
uocem]in terminis
University
copy
generalibus
qui habent
etnonin aliisterminis."
between
andspecial
("Youhaveknowthatthisdivision
general
concerns
terms
thathavespecies
andindividuals
underthem,
simple
supposition
general
andnotto other
terms.")
I amgrateful
to Elizabeth
forcalling
thispassageto myattention.
Karger
18:39:29 PM
52
PAULVINCENT
SPADE
the distinction
to "general"termsimpliesnotjust "commonor universal"
but
terms,
"genus terms"in particular.
Apart perhaps fromthat one dubious point,the divisionof compared
simplesuppositioninto generaland special is exactlythe same in the two
treatises.A genus-termterm has general compared simple supposition
when "it suppositsfor its significateabsolutely29
so as not for any supIt
has
positum."30
special comparedsimplesuppositionwhen "it supposits
forthe species so as not forindividuals."31
Note thatwhile at thispoint in the textsthe wordingis virtuallyidenticalin the two treatises,
theirgeneralnotionsof simplesuppositionappear
to be different.
When simple suppositionis firstintroducedin De suppositionibus
,32it seems to be intendedas always suppositionfor the term's
At the beginningof the passage, the preliminary
notionof "forsignificate.
mal" supposition
is introducedas supposition
eitherfortheterm'ssignificate
or for the term's suppositum.Formal suppositionis then immediately
divided into simple suppositionand personal supposition.The textdoes
not say explicitlythat the latterdivisionexactlymatchesthe former,so
thatsimplesuppositionwill alwaysbe suppositionforthe term'ssignificate
,
but that is the most naturalway to read it. This impressionis strengthened when the passage goes on at once to divide simplesuppositioninto
absolute and compared,both of which are said to be versionsof suppoThe case is perhaps not air-tight,
sition for the term'ssignificate.
to be
in
we
in
have seen
section2 above that De suppositionibus
the
sure, since
divisionof simplesuppositioninto absoluteand comparedis itselfnot an
exhaustiveone. But the exceptionalcases involveddiscretetermsforwhich
simple and personal suppositioncoincide, and there simple supposition
continuesto be suppositionfor the term'ssignificate
(in this instance,an
individual).
In De puntate
, however,Burleyhas a more complicatednotionof sim"Suppositionis simplewhen a common termsupposits
ple supposition33:
29"Absolutely"
hereis notbeingusedtechnically.
Thatis,general
compared
simple
isa typeofcompared
nota typeofabsolute
supposition.
supposition
simple
simple
supposition,
30De
1972(op.
cit.,
, ed.Boehner
, 2.32,ed.Brown
above,n. 12).InDepuntate
suppositionibus
1955(op.cit.,
aboven. 13),11.33-34,
trans.
cit.,aboven. 20) 46,"notforany
Spade(op.
seen. 27 above.
Forbothtexts,
is replaced
by"notforanyofitsinferiors".
suppositum"
31De suppositionibus
, ed.Boehner
cit.,aboven. 12);Depuntate
, 2.32,ed. Brown1972(op.
1955(iop.cit
trans.
., aboven. 20) 46. See n. 27
., aboven. 13),11.36-12.1,
Spade(op.cit
above.
32De suppositionibus
aboven. 12).See n. 15 above.
, 2.3,ed. Brown1972{op.cit.,
33Depuritate
above
1955(op.cit.,
, ed. Boehner
above,n. 13),7.1-5,trans.
Spade(op.cit.,
18:39:29 PM
53
orforeverything
contained
underitsfirstsignificate
forits firstsignificate
, or else
when a singularconcretetermor a singularcompound termsuppositfor
The wordsjust italicizedappear to be an attempt
its whole significate."34
to accommodatespecial compared simple supposition,as we shall see.
in the general notion of simple supposition
This apparent difference
to
a
: a termin special comleads
problemforDe suppositionibus
perhaps
not
but ratherfor
suppositforits significate
pared simplesuppositiondoes
a speciescontainedunder thatsignificate.
Thus it violateswhat seems to
be the view in De suppositionibus
that simple suppositionis always suppoThe problemis conjectural,since Burley
sitionforthe term'ssignificate.
of simplesuppositionin De suppositionibus.
givesno explicitgeneraldefinition
But ifit is real,thenonce again we see a way in whichDe puntate
attempts
to "clean up" the theoryof simple suppositionin De suppositionibus.
At any event,the point of the distinctionbetweengeneraland special
compared simple suppositionis the following.Consider the proposition
"Substance is properlydefined".35
(Since Latin has no indefinitearticle,
"A substanceis properlydefined"would look exactlythe same.) If the
term"substance"in thatpropositionsuppositsforindividualmen,the propositionis falsesinceindividualscannotbe properlydefined.On the other
hand, if "substance"suppositsforwhat it signifies
namely,for the cat- the
is
false
once
since
proposition
egory
again,
properdefinitions
proceed
in termsof genus and difference,
whereas a category,being a most general genus,belongsto no highergenusin termsof whichit can be defined.
But if "substance" suppositsfor specific
substancessuch as man, ox and
- in short,forintermediateentitieson the
dog
Porphyreantree,between
individualsat one end and the categoryat the other- thenthe proposition
is true.For mancan be properlydefinedas rational
animal.
Similarconsiderationsapply to "substance"in propositionslike "Substanceis second
substance"and "Substanceis a species of the genus substance".37
In such
n. 20) 28: "[S]uppositio
communis
est,quandoterminus
simplex
supponit
prosuosignivelproomnibus
ficato
subsuosignificato
contends
velquandoterminus
sinprimo
primo
velterminus
concretus
suosignificato
totali
..."
gularis
singularis
compositus
supponit
pro
34Forthepartaboutsingular
see Spade1997(<
terms,
., aboven. 5). The notion
op.cit
ofa "first
is derived
fromtheAristotelian
"first
ofan attribute
or
significate"
subject"
in Posterior
universal"
1.473b25-74a3.
Analytics
attribute,
"commensurately
35Depuritate,
ed.Boehner
1955{op.cit.,
aboven. 13),12.3-23,
trans.
above
Spade(op.cit.,
n. 20) 47. See n. 27 above.Thisexample
is notusedin De suppositionibus.
36Although
doesnotmakethepoint,
thespecific
substances
do nothaveto be
Burley
willdo. Thus,animal
Subalternate
canbe properly
defined
as sensible
infima
species.
genera
organism.
37Depuntate
1955(op.cit.,
aboven. 13),12.2-3,
trans.
above
, ed.Boehner
Spade(op.cit.,
18:39:29 PM
54
SPADE
PAULVINCENT
18:39:29 PM
55
for its significatein comparisonto its supposita,or (b) for some of its
inferiorsthat have supposita.Alternative(a) describesgeneral compared
while(b) describesspecialcomparedsimplesupposition.
simplesupposition,
Thus, in "Substance is a most general genus", "substance" has general
(the catcomparedsimplesuppositionsince it suppositsforits significate
a
"most
and
is
called
its
egory),
general genus" only in comsignificate
parison to what comes under it, and ultimatelyto its supposita.Again,
in "Substanceis properlydefined","substance"has special comparedsim(its
ple suppositionsince it suppositsfor species in the categorysubstance
and those species have supposita(individualsubstances).38
"inferiors")
4. TheMotivation
for TheseDistinctions
What is the purpose of all these divisions?Burleydoes not tell us what
is motivatinghim, but his purpose appears to be to block certaintypes
of fallaciousinferences.
Let us firstconsiderthe distinctionbetween absolute and compared
immedisimplesupposition.Consider the following.In De suppositionibus^
ately afterintroducingthe examples "Man is the most worthycreature
among creatures"and "Man is a species" in explainingthat distinction,
Burleyremarks,"Otherwise'The most worthycreatureamong creatures
is a species' would be true."39Althoughhe does not fillin the reasoning,presumablythe point is thatthe last propositionis nottrue,since an
individualhas all the perfectionof its species plus an additionalperfection besides (the individualdifference?),
so that an individualis more
than
its
"worthy"
species.40
In order to preventthe false conclusion,therefore,
we need to block
the inference"Man is the most worthycreatureamong creatures;man
is a species; therefore,the most worthycreatureamong creaturesis a
species." Burley'sanalysisdoes this by makingthe syllogismrest on an
ambiguityin the middle term. The firstpremise is true according to
38I do notunderstand
theoccurrence
of"some"in thephrase"someofitsinferiors
in clause(b). (See n. 21 above.)In noneof Burley's
thathavesupposita"
examples
is properly
"Substance
"Substance
is
substance"
and
"Substance
a
is
defined",
secondary
- is thereanyapparent
in thegenussubstance"
reasonwhy"substance"
should
species
foronlysome"ofitsinferiors
thathavesupposita"
supposit
(thatis,forsomesecondary
andnotforall ofthem.I suspect
no specialweight
shouldbe givento the
substances)
wordhere.
39De suppositionibus
2.3,ed. Brown1972(op.cit
., aboven. 12);seen. 15 above.
40But
therejected
in thepassagequotedin n. 41 below.
inference
compare
18:39:29 PM
56
PAULVINCENT
SPADE
18:39:29 PM
57
18:39:29 PM
58
PAULVINCENT
SPADE
18:39:29 PM
59
18:39:29 PM
1. BurleyandAquinas
: Gomes'Results
1 has been
WalterBurley'sExpositio
Aristotelis
superlibrosEthicorum
neglected
most
scholars
of
medieval
moral
In
to
the
extenaddition
by
philosophy.
can
find
some
sive unpublisheddissertation
one
analyses
by GJ. Gomes,2
of Burley'streatment
ofNicomachean
Ethics[EIN) in my own studyof weakness of will3and in a veryhelpfularticleby Rega Wood.4All thesestudies
findBurley'scontributionto medieval ethicshighlysignificant,
but they
evaluate his evidentdebt to Aquinas to some extentdifferently.
I will
thereforebegin (1.) by clarifyingonce more the relationshipbetween
Burleyand Aquinas withthe help of Gomes' study.In keepingwiththis
clarification,I will then (2.) reconsidermy earlier findingsconcerning
Walter Burley'sview of Aristotle'sabasia (;incontinentia
, weaknessof will)
and (3.) addressthe problemswhichWood and Jeffrey
Hause5 have seen
in my interpretation
of Burley.Afterthat (4.) I will have a closer look
at Burley'spreferred"fourthsolution"of abasia. In the last part of this
article(5.) I will summarizemy readingof Burleyas the "insufficient
reaabasia.
soning" explanationof
Throughouthis expositionof Aristotle'sethics,Burleyborrowsheavily
fromthe Sententia
libriEthicorum
of Aquinas. AlthoughAquinas is hardly
ever mentionedby name, thisdebt is so evidentthat nobody can fail to
see it: oftenBurleyis simplyparaphrasingthe textof Aquinas. In additionto the exposition,however,Burley'scommentary
containssome quesAs
tions and above all a great number of dubia
, notandaand intelligenda.
form:opposingviewGomes pointsout, the longerdubiahave a fullquestio
1 In the
I willusetheVenice1521edition.
following
2 G.J.Gomes,
onAristotle's
in Walter
Foundations
Nicomachean
ofEthics
Burleigh's
Commentary
Ethics
1973.
, Diss.Columbia
University
3 R. Saarinen,
From
toBuridan
Weakness
, Leiden
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought:
Augustine
1994,131-45.
4 In the
issueofVivarium.
present
5J. Hause,
ReviewofSaarinen
1994,in:Speculum
1996,759-60.
Vivarium
37,1
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
18:39:35 PM
61
SECONDTHOUGHTS
pointsand theirreasonsare set out, a resolutionis given,and the opposing views are answered.Thus Burley'scommentaryemploysa method
whichadds a lot of new materialand new perspectivesto Thomas' literal
exposition.Gomes calls this methodologicalfeaturethe "double orientation" of Burley'scommentary.6
AfterextensivelycomparingBurleywith
Gomes
comes
to
the
conclusion
that it is the dubia
and
, notanda
Aquinas,
that mark the widest departurefromAquinas' commentary.7
intelligenda
Gomes stressesthatthisdeparturepertainsnot only to the structureand
of Burley'scommentary
but also to itscontent.Burleydeparts
methodology
fromAquinas on some crucial pointsof doctrine.8
The two commentatorsare, however,in agreementon a number of
importantissues.Both affirmthat naturallaw is the norm forthe moral
of action and, consequently,they accept ethical naturalism,
justification
rationalismand cognitivism.Here Ockham according to Gomes clearly
parts companywith Burley,Aquinas and also with Buridan. Moreover,
thesethreeauthorsgenerallyagree on the conceptsof the supremegood
and the ultimateend and on theiridentification
with happiness.Gomes
further
notesan agreementbetweenBurleyand Aquinas on the doctrine
of justice and on the place of desire,will, the voluntaryand choice in
moral action.9
In addition to a number of differences
in detail, Gomes observesa
doctrinal
difference
between
major
Aquinas and Burleyin theirview of
the speculativeintellect.Whereas forAquinas the practicalreason in the
habit of synderesis
containsthe firstprinciplesof action,Burleyholds that
the speculativeintellectknows and establishesthe universalpreceptsof
the naturallaw. In a ScotisticmannerBurleydenies any real distinction
betweenthe speculativeand the practicalintellect:theyare formallydistinctbut denotatively
the same on the level of naturalreason. Burleythus
the
emphasizes
unityof the intellectand consequentlyrestoresthe function of the speculativeintellectin ethical theory.Accordingto Gomes,
Burley'sview anticipatesthe later conceptionthat the two intellectsare
not different
facultiesbut different
functionsof the same mind.10
6 Gomes1973(op.citaboven. 2),98-9.
7 Gomes1973
aboven. 2), 103.
8 Gomes1973(op.cit.,
., aboven. 2), 119-20.
(op.cit
9 Gomes1973(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),503-4,517,508.
10Gomes1973(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),512-4.
18:39:35 PM
62
RISTOSAARINEN
2. Burley's"Model2
, his results
AlthoughGomes does not deal withBurley'saccountof akrasia
are instructivefor the understandingof Burley'sexpositionof EN VII.
occurs
Here BurleynormallyfollowsAquinas, but whenevera notandum
Thomas
from
taken
are
the reader mustbe careful.Some of the notanda
or at least reflecthis views,but othersdepartfromAquinas and are critconof the text.Moreover,some of the notanda
ical of his understanding
medieval
all
earlier
from
to
tain viewswhich seem depart
interpretations
of Aristotle'sakrasia.
Burley'scontributionto medieval discussionon akrasiacan be briefly
Medieval interpreters
formulatedas follows11:
approach Aristotle'sakrasia
how
one can act againstone's
the
describedin EN VII i.e.,
problem
own betterjudgment withthe help of threedifferent
conceptualmodels.
Accordingto the firstmodel, the akraticpersonignoressomethingin his
the good action does not materialize.Most often
reasoningand therefore
thismodel is outlinedin termsof "particularignorance"explanationwhich
holds that the akraticperson does not grasp properlythe minorpremise
of the practical syllogism.The particularignoranceexplanationcan be
classifiedas model la., whereas a slightlydifferent
explanationlb. holds
minor
and
thatthe akraticpersonknowsboth major
premisebut failsto
combinethemproperly:akrasiawould thusratherresemblea logicalerror
than ignorance.
Accordingto what I call "model 2" the ignorancein question does
not pertainto the premisesof practical syllogismbut to its conclusion.
This explanationhas receivedsome supportin modernscholarshipwhich
somehow
has paid special attentionto Aristotle'swords that the akrates
when
before
choice
Moreover,
the
acting akratically.12
right
possesses
"
action
akratic
in
is
(EN
Aristotlesays that the "last protasis ignored
1147b9), a supporterof model 2 may claim that the last protasisis not
In
the minorpremisebut the propositionalconclusionof the syllogism.13
the
conclusion
is
choice
the
since
that
claims
model
2
reached,
right
sum,
11Cf.Saarinen
1994(op.t
., aboven. 3).
12EN 111Ibi3-15;1151a5-7;
Aristotle's
D. Charles,
See further
1152al5-17.
hilosophy
andWeakness
Aristotle
,
oftheWill
Reason,
London1984andN.O. Dahl,Practical
ofAction,
1984.
Minneapolis
13Charles1984(op.t.,
somehereclaimsthatAristotle
Charles
aboven. 12),117-21.
ofthepractical
whofailsto reachthegoodconclusion
onetypeofakrates
discusses
times
butfailsto
thegoodconclusion
another
typewhoreaches
(model1),sometimes
syllogism
withit(model2).
actin accordance
18:39:35 PM
SECONDTHOUGHTS
63
18:39:35 PM
64
RISTOSAARINEN
18:39:35 PM
65
SECONDTHOUGHTS
In thisconnectionBurleyalso quotesAristotle's
(71a21),
Analytica
posteriora
thus clearlyindicatingthat the akratic person commitsa logical error
which resemblesour model lb.
doesn't seem to fitwell into its context.For if thislogThis notandum
ical error explains the ignorance of the conclusion,why does Burley
develop the ratherelaborateidea of bound and releasedknowledge?And
why would he claim in the previousnote that the ignoranceof which
Aristotlespeakspertainsto the conclusion?For Aristotlein EN 1147a 10b 15 concentrateson cases in which the akraticperson claims to know
the "last protasis".If ignorancehere only means a logical error,no such
quasi-knowledgeof the conclusion would emerge in the akrateswhich
would need explanationin the firstplace.
In my book I resolve these discrepanciesby defendingmodel 2 as
as being
Burley'spreferredview and interpretthis problematicnotandum
compatiblewithit. One reviewerhas already remarkedthat thisdoesn't
work,since lb and 2 are simplyincompatible.21
Rega Wood suggeststhat
in
is
fact
alternative
three
models
of explainingakrasia.In
Burley
offering
additionto the above-mentioned
models2. and lb., Wood quotespassages
in whichBurleyadheresto the Thomistic"particularignorance"explanation la.22 These passages are in factparaphrasesof Aquinas' exposition.
How should we deal with all these findingswhich seem to raise serious doubts concerningthe inner coherenceof Burley'scommentary?As
to Burley'smethodology,I stillthinkthat Gomes' view of "double orientation"is useful:whereasBurley'sexpositionof the textfollowsAquinas,
the notanda
veryclearlymark out anotherkind of opinion which oftenis
not in keepingwith Thomas. I agree with Wood that all three models
of explainingakrasiacan be foundin Burley'scommentary.Perhaps one
should not reduce them to any one view but say simplythat akrasiais
explainedin threedifferent
ways. The view la is presentin Aquinas and
is clearlytakenfromthere;the view lb is suggestedby Averroeswho at
thispointspeaksof syllogistic
failuresin the reasoningof the akrates
P Perrefersto thatspecificAristotelian
haps view lb in Burley'ssecond notandum
case in whichthe lastprotasis
is not known,whereashis model 2 pertains
to cases in which it is knownimperfectly.24
21Hause1996(<op.cit
., aboven. 5), 760.
22Wood(inthisissue).
23Averroes,
In Eth.VII c.3 (f.98va"vb),
in:Aristotelis
omnia
cum
Averrois
commentants,
Opera
Venice1562,vol.Ill [reprint
Frankfurt
1962].
24Cf.EN 1147b9-12,
Latintext:"ultima
. . . velnonhabetin passione
ens
propositio
[= lb] velsichabetutnoneratin haberescire[= 2]".
18:39:35 PM
66
RISTOSAARINEN
18:39:35 PM
67
SECONDTHOUGHTS
In the fourthsolutionBurleyis explainingin what sense the conclusion of the practicalsyllogismfollowsfromits premises.There, as I will
show next, he applies a distinctionbetween the propositionaland the
fromthe premisesand thusfollowstheintercausal consequencesresulting
29 Gomes offersadditional
of
model
2.
supportto this
pretativepatterns
that
while
since
he
shows
interpretation,
Burley,
commentingon EN III,
considersthe conclusionof the practical syllogismto be not an action
but a normativeor prescriptivestatementindicatingwhat is to be done
in a particularsituation.The choice followsthis statementas a conclusion drawn fromit.30
In the fourthsolutionBurleyholds that,unlikein theoreticalsyllogism,
in practicalsyllogismthe action does notfollow
in thewaytheconclusion
from
butin thewaytheposterior
follows
from
premises,
theprior,
likethedownpour
from
theraincloud.
In thiswaydoestheactionfollow,
iftheagenthaving
is notprohibited
fromacting.
theseopinions
Forexample:
if
someone
hastheactualopinion
thateverything
sweetoughtto be tasted,
andhe
alsohastheactualopinion
thatthisis sweet,
thenit is necessary
thattheperson
himfrom
theseopinions
tastesthisifnothing
Thus,from
having
prevents
tasting.
thepremises:
sweetoughttobe tasted"
and"thisis sweet",
itnecessar"everything
that"thisoughtto be tasted".
Buttheactiondoesnotnecessarily
follow
ilyfollows
from
theactualopinion
theuniversal
sweet
tobetasted"
concerning
"everything
ought
andfrom
theactualopinion
thesingular
"thisis sweet".
Foritis possiconcerning
blethata person
whohastheseopinions
canbe prevented
from
Butifhe
acting.
is notprevented,
he necessarily
actsandtastes
thething
which
he actually
considers
sweet.31
29Cf.alsoSaarinen
1994(op.t
., aboven. 3), 133-4.
30Gomes1973(op.dt.,
aboven. 2),330.He quotesBurley,
In Eth.Ill c.3 p.3 (f.51ra):
"Electioestquasiconclusio
ad sententiam
factam
de operabili
que sequitur
que proUt si arguitur
sic:legibus
estobediendum.
Sed hoprieestconclusio
sillogismi
practici.
norrepatrem
in lege.Igiturpateresthonorandus.
et matrem
estpreceptum
Et ad
hancsententiam
electioeiusquodesthonorre
que estde honorando
patrem
sequitur
patrem."
31In Eth.VII c.3. (f.
in speculativis
ex propositione
universali
"[Sicutigitur
p.2 121ra):
et propositione
... ita in practicis
necessario
et factivis
ex
conclusio,
singulari
sequitur
in actuet opinione
universali
in actunecessario
opinione
singulari
sequitur
opus.]Non
sicutconclusio
ex premissis,
sedtarnen
sicutposterius
ad prius,
utplusequitur
sequitur
via sequitur
ad nubem.
Sic igitur
ab operando.
sequitur
opus,nisiopinans
prohibeatur
Verbigratia:
si aliquisactuopinetur
etetiamactuopiquodomnedulceestgustandum,
neturquodhoc estdulce,necesseestquodsic opinansgustet
hoc nisiimpediatur
a
Undeex istispremissis,
omnedulceestgustandum,
hocestdulce,de necesgustando.
sitate
in actude istauniversali,
Sed ex opinione
omne
ergohocestgustandum.
sequitur:
dulceestgustandum,
etex opinione
inactude illasingulari,
hocestdulce,nonde necessitatesequitur
in actupotest
ab operando,
opus.Habensenimistasopiniones
impediri
sedsi nonimpediatur
de necessitate
etgustabit
hocquodinactuopinatur
esse
operabitur
dulce."
18:39:35 PM
68
RISTOSAARINEN
18:39:35 PM
SECONDTHOUGHTS
69
18:39:35 PM
70
RISTOSAARINEN
together("fifthsolution").
Let us call this view the "insufficient
reasoning"explanationof akrasia. This explanationonce more bringsmodels lb and 2 (or the fifth
and
fourthsolution)into close connection,although one cannot simplybe
reduced to the other.What is distinctive
in Burley'sview of akrasiais his
tendencyto explain it as a problemof syllogistic
reasoning,thusemphathat
the
Aristotle's
view
cause
of
akrasia
can
be explained froma
sizing
"natural" syllogisticviewpoint(EN 1147a24-25). The "particularignorance" explanationis a commonplacein all medievalliteratureon akrasia.
In addition to this,Thomas Aquinas and especiallythe Franciscansare
in what sense akrasiais not onlyvoluntarybut also
interestedin clarifying
deliberate.Still another importantexplanatorystrategyis employedby
and
Albertthe Great and John Buridan who emphasize the uncertainty
facie
of
in
mind.36
character
the
ethical
the
akratic
prima
Though
premises
withany
dependenton many sources,Burley'sview cannot be identified
of these othermajor strategies.37
Why does Burleyemphasize so much the insufficient
reasoningas a
major cause of akrasiaiFurtherresearchis necessaryin order to give a
reallygood answer,but perhaps threefactorshere play a role.
1. Since Burleyin the firstplace clearlydistinguishes
betweenjudgment and choice (Gomes) and considersthe linkbetweenunderstanding
and executionto be a weak one (Wood), he has no need to postulate
:
additionalignoranceor deliberatebad choice in order to explain akrasia
insufficient
this
reasoningalready explains
phenomenon.
2. If Gomes is rightin claimingthat the speculativeintellectplays a
strongrole in Burley'sethics,its capacity for reasoningis decisive for
action theory.Whereas concupiscence cannot overcome true scientific
knowledge,it may temporarilysucceed in bindingthis capacity of reaactions.
soningso that it cannot bringabout self-controlled
rea3. In additionto historicaland conceptualissues,the insufficient
we
know
well
kind
has
a
of
soningexplanation
psychologicalplausibility:
enough many general truthsconcerningcertain harmfulactivities,e.g.
pollution.We can also
eatingsweets,cigarettesmokingor environmental
36Forthese,
see Saarinen
1994(op.dt.,
aboven. 3).
37In BookIII Burley
which
someremarks
doesmake,
however,
uncertainty
concerning
to
f. 47vavb.
I intend
Cf.In Eth.Ill c.2. p.2, especially
resemble
Buridan's
discussions.
return
to theseon another
occasion.
18:39:35 PM
SECONDTHOUGHTS
71
18:39:35 PM
WillingWickedly:
Ockhamand BurleyCompared
REGA WOOD
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke
18:39:42 PM
WILLING
WICKEDLY
73
18:39:42 PM
74
REGAWOOD
?
1. Must Wickedness
be basedon Ignorance
1. 1 Ockham
Ockham's positionon willingwickednessis well-known;it was, forexample, ably discussedby MarilynM. Adams at the 1994 EasternDivision
a briefsummarybased on Ockham's
APA Meetingin Boston.5Nonetheless,
De connexione
virtutum
will be useful.
In that work, Ockham defends,among other things,the thesisthat
prudencewithoutmoral virtueis possible.That is, we can knowperfecdy
well what it is we should do and yet fail to do it. We know the conclusion of the practicalsyllogism,and yet we do not choose to obey its
dictate. Unlike his predecessors,who claim that we choose wickedness
only because we somehow fail to understandour duty,Ockham claims
that sometimeswe cannot fail to understand.He holds that the intellect
is necessitatedor determined;by contrast,the will is free and undetermined. And since both Christiantheologians6and pagan philosophers7
agree thatwe are praised or blamed onlyforwhat is voluntary,Ockham
concludes that the will is the primarymoral faculty.8
he defends
Ockham's is a veryChristianthesis,and not surprisingly,
it in part by adducingthe authorityof all the theologianswho agree that
thereis malicioussin.9But malice does not differfromignorance,if the
maliciouslike theignorantdo not knowthe minorpremiseof thepractical
moral syllogism:'everything
worthyshould be done, thisis worthy,thereforethisshould be done'. The case based on malice is confirmedby an
argumentbased on incontinenceor weaknessof will,10a case in which
malefactorsdisplayawarenessof what it is theyshould or should not do.
In the processof arguingforhis conclusionOckham rejectsthe various
theorieswhich had explained that what is reallyinvolvedin wickedness
is a formof ignorance.The firstsuch thesisis the view that the minor
5 A revised
onWill,
as Ockham
is forthcoming
Nature
version
, andMorality
, in:P. Spade
toOham.
TheCambridge
Companion
(ed.),
6 Cf.August.,
De verareligione
, c.14,n. 27 (PL 34, 133):'Nuncverousqueadeopecsi nonsitvoluntarium.';
ut nullomodositpeccatum,
estmalum,
catumvoluntarium
De concepta
Anselmus,
, c.4,ed. Schmitt
(Rome1950),vol.II, p. 145:'Quidquid
virginali
estvoluntatis.
totum
faciunt,
imputandum
igitur
7 Cf.Aristot.,
BracarenMartmus
1; 3.5.1114a22-30;
Ethics
Mcomachean
, III.1. 1109b30-3
Louvain-Paris
Aristotelis
in:LesAuctoritates
demoribus)
citedas Seneca,
, ed.J.Hamesse,
sis,Liber
est.'
1974,p. 280(1): 'Omnispeccatiactiovoluntaria
8 Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed.J.C.Wey,364(OTh VIII).
9 Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,365(OThVili).
10Ockham,
virtutum
De connexione
, a. 3, ed. Wey,367(OThVili).
18:39:42 PM
WILLING
WICKEDLY
75
18:39:42 PM
76
REGAWOOD
avoid an object. But if the will is free,this cannot be its relationto the
dictatesof the intellect,accordingto Ockham.15
The classic replyto this argumentis that the will can avertthe intellect fromconsideringany object. It is free because it determineswhat
subjects the intellectconsiders,not because it can act contraryto the
intellect'sdictate.16
Ockham countersby askingabout the act of willwhich
determinedwhat subject the intellectconsiders:was it dictatedby our
understandingor not? If so, then the will is not free.If not, then since
the will is not followingan intellectualdictate,the will,not the intellect,
is the primarymoral faculty
contraryto the proponentsof the original
reply.Ockham concludes this series of argumentsby explainingthat in
any series of acts of will and intellect,there is an originalact of will
which depends not on a demonstratedconclusionbut on a bare act of
intellectwhich manifeststhe object to the will.17So, basically,Ockham
holds that the firstact is an intellectualact, but denies that it is an act
of reasoning;ratherit is a bare manifestation,
a merelyapprehensiveact.
In confirmation
of his views, Ockham adds that sensitiveappetiteis
and yet we do not
just as capable as the will of avertingthe intellect,18
his claim that
call the sensitiveact freeon that account. He strengthens
the intellect,unlike the will, is necessitatedand not free,by reminding
us that evidence compels the intellect.19
1.2 Burleyon WillingWickedness
a chapter
A discussionof Burley'sviewson Weakness
oftheWillconstitutes
in a recentbook by Risto Saarinen.20It is a valuable studyof an important
15Ockham,
De connexione
uirtutum
, a. 3, ed.Wey,367-70(OThVIII).
16Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,368(OThVili).
17Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,368-9(OThVili).
18Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,369-70(OThVili).
19Ockham,
a. 3, ed. Wey,370(OThVili).
De connexione
virtutum)
thatthewill
ofthewillsuggests
Another
toOckham's
account
ofthefreedom
objection
to
Ockham's
to understanding.
is freein respect
to external
notin respect
actions,
reply
actions
andexternal
thisobjection
is basedontheclaimthattherelation
between
volition
butinevitably,
from
executive
volitions
notfreely
is notfree.
External
actsfollow
provided
ofthisclaimis basedon authority.
FromSt.Gregory
Hisproof
there
is no impediment.
inEvang
seeXLHomiliarum
is volition
there
is action,
there
hetakestheclaimthatwhere
.,
itwilldo' is a textdrawn
II h. 30 (PL 76, 1220C). 'Whatan animaldesires
decisively,
to
Ockham
is heretacitly
from
Aristotle's
(9.4.1048a8).
Presumably,
appealing
Metaphysics
authorities.
intheworks
andphilosophical
oftheological
ourexperience
as agents,
as reflected
20R. Saarinen,
toBuridan
From
Weakness
, Leiden
Augustine
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought:
rolein thedevelopment
whosebookplayedan important
1994.Mythanks
to Saarinen
18:39:42 PM
WILLING
WICKEDLY
77
studied.Some
topicin medievalphilosophy,whichhas been insufficiently
hints of the difficulty
in studyingBurley on Aristotle'sEthicsare provided- one of whichis the extentto whichBurleyborrowsfromhis predecessors,mostof all St. Thomas Aquinas, fromwhom a greatdeal of the
literalexpositionof the text is taken,as Saarinen indicates.21
Moreover
thereis the problemwith unnamed sources. There are a couple places
which seem to indicatecontactwith Ockham as we shall see; similarly,
it is chronologically
quite possiblethatthereis a debt to GeraldusOdonis
whose pre-1329 Commentary
antedatesBurley's(1333-1334) by about five
it
is
indeed
views about
years;
quite likelythat some of the interesting
what goes wrongin incontinencedescribedbelow come fromGerald.22
So much is taken fromAquinas, that it is not always easy to discern
Burley'sown views. Sometimesthe quotation is so extensivethat it is
'almostimpossibleto see [Burley's]own contribution.'23
Facingthisdifficulty,
and seeing that Burleyadvocates alternativesto PIE, Saarinen assumed
thatBurleyhad rejectedPIE, Aquinas' principalsolutionto the problem
of abasia. But thisstrategyis too sweeping.We cannot simplydisassociate fromBurleythe views he owes to Aquinas.
SaarinencontrastsAquinas withBurleyin termsof two modelsof abasia. Thomas, he says, accounts for weakness in termsof ignorance of
moralscience;Burley,in termsof disregardforpracticalknowledge.According to Thomas, an incontinentperson does not know the minorpremise
in thepracticalsyllogism;
accordingto Saarinen,Burleyclaimsthatincontinentpeople are 'clear-eyed'.Saarinen completeshis expositionof Burley
by suggestingthat concupiscenceacts only on the body; thatwould certainlyexplain why incontinentpeople can retain theirknowledgewhile
actingbadly.24
I believe both that Burley'sdisagreementwith Thomas is less basic
and on a different
point, having to do not with the absence of knowlbut
the
absence
of deliberationamong the incontinent.I will show
edge,
firstthat Burleyand Aquinas do not disagree in the manner suggested
by Saarinen. Over and over again, Burleysays thatmoral science in the
ofmyownviews.
Saarinen
hascontinued
hisresearch,
as thereader
willseeinhisWalter
onabasia:Second
in thisissueofVivarium.
Burley
, whichappears
Thoughts
21R. Saarinen
1994(op.cit.,
above,n. 20),131-3.
22Gf.R.A.Gauthier
& J.Y.Jolif,
Nicomaque:
Introduction
etcommen, traduction
L'thique
2nded.,Louvain-Paris
taire,
1970,136.
23R. Saarinen
1994(op.cit
., above,n. 20),132.
24R. Saarinen
1994(<op.cit
., above,n. 20),135-41.
18:39:42 PM
78
REGAWOOD
exirein actuy
incontinent
is not actual (nonpotest
actu,etc.),25but what
ignort
is not actual is not 'clear-eyed' knowledge.As to the suggestionthat
knowledgeis intactbecause concupiscenceaffectsonly the body not the
of a textwhich Saarinen
intellect,it is the resultof a misinterpretation
himselfcorrectlytranslates:'concupiscencenot only moves the soul, but
even . . . the body'.26
Saarinen's expositionis also based on a correctreadingof a brieftext
frombook VII ch. 3 of theEthicswhichrendersthewholepuzzling.Burley
says in one sentencethatincontinencedoes not resultfromignoranceof
the particular,minor premisein the practicalsyllogism,thus seemingly
rejectingPIE,27the particularignoranceexplanationof incontinence.But
of incontinence
elsewhereBurley repeatedlyapproves the identification
with ignoranceof the particular.For the purposes of establishingthat
Burleydoes not reallywant to hold thatincontinencecannotinvolveignorance of the particular,let me quote a couple of laterpassages in which
he summarizeswhat has been establishedin the thirdchapter:There is
a sentenceat chapter8 which reads: We should note that the incontinent [person]trulyevaluatesthe universalbut not theparticular(.Notandum
... sed habet
... in universali
. . . habetveramexistimationem
estquodincontinens
A littlelaterin the same chapter,
de eis inparticular).m
falsamexistimationem
we read: 'An incontinent[person] acts against a dictate of reason on
account of passion, but passion passes rapidly,and when it ceases, she
contradictamen
evaluates the particularcorrectly(propter
passionem
operetur
inparexistimationem
habetrectam
cessante
tarnen
rationis,
passionequaecitotransit
is not
reason
that
'the
incontinenti
At
P
ticular)'
chapter 10, Burleysays
in
When
reason
the
universal.
she
has
passion [first]arises
right
corrupt;
she [also] has rightreason in the particular;she has it actually[again],
when passion ceases.'30
So Burley's apparent rejectionof PIE is puzzling.To get to the bottom of the puzzle, let me explain the structureof book VII, chapter3
of the Ethicsas Burleyexpounds it. Chapter three concernsa problem
set by Aristotle:what happens when someone does somethingwickedand
25Expositio
ArteSimonis
Aristotelis
libros
Ethicorum
Burlei
decern
Gualteri
, 7.1.3,Venetiis:
super
de Asula,1500[Hain,4144],f.l09vb
de Luere,impensis
AndreeTorresani
E-F, 110*
Nationale
UCLA'scopyoftheBibliothque
from
P. Xeroxcopy;reproduced
original.
26R. Saarinen
1994{op.cit.,
above,n. 20),134-5.
27R. Saarinen
1994(op.cit
., above,n. 20),138.
28Expositio
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.Burlei
7.8,f.116vaB.
29Expositio
D.
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.Burlei
7.8,f.116vb
30Expositio
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.Burlei
7.1.10,f.ll8vaF.
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18:39:42 PM
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36Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib. Eth.Arisi.
7.1.3,f.110*O.
37Expositio
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.Burlei
7.1.3,f.llO"J-K.
38Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
7.1.3,f.110rbO.
39Expositio
G.
s. X lib.Eth.Amt.7.1.3,f.llOra
G.Burlei
18:39:42 PM
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81
18:39:42 PM
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82
Ockham
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83
18:39:42 PM
84
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85
a vice- onlypartly,
Ultimately,
Burleyclaimsthatincontinenceis partly
because although appetite is corrupt,reason is not.60The incontinent
properlyunderstandthe universalpropositionwhich indicateswhat our
properends should be, at least most of the time. Their problemis that
theirreason is overwhelmedby theirpassion.
Concerningintemperance,Burley like a number of other medieval
thatAristodewas not using
commentators
had no difficulty
understanding
the termas the medievaisdid, to referonly to vices of eatingand drinking. Aristotelianintemperance,according to Burley,is habitual lack of
rightreason concerningall bodily pleasures,making them the ends of
life.61
For Burley,as forOckham, temperanceis a superiordegreeof continence:rightreason concerningbodily pleasures undisturbedby strong
inclinations.
would not doBurleydoes do thingsa modernAristotlecommentator
such as, claimingthat continenceis a mean,62and holding that contifromothervirtuesmainlyin that it is not a firmhabit,but
nence differs
Like Ockham and othermedievais,64
rathera habitualdisposition.63
Burley
includesbestialityamong the vices [ratherthan excludingit as the result
of nature]. Burleymakes Aristotlea worse sexistthan he reallyis, suggestingthat in the Aristotelianscheme of thingswomen do not count
eitheras continentor incontinent.65
But his grasp of the basic Aristotelian
will
of
weakness
of
concept
appears unexceptionable:knowingwhat is
led
but
right,
by appetiteto act wickedly.The contrastingstate of
being
intemperancepromptednot by strongappetite but deliberatelychosen
falseprinciplescorrespondsto Aristotle'sstatementthat the intemperate
person thinkshe is right[NE 7.9. 1152a6-7).
Let us returnnow to Ockham's more Christianscheme for dividing
vice accordingto its causes: ignorance,passion,and malice. Incontinence
is the Aristoteliandescriptionwhich most closelyresemblesvices of passion,66while intemperanceresemblesmalice in some respects.Moreover,
Ockham arguesthatorthodoxAristotelians
cannotdistinguish
passion and
malice fromeach otherand fromvice. Aquinas distinguishes
malice from
passion,or ratherintemperancefromincontinence.Intemperanceresults
60Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.,
7.1.4,f.lllraB.
61Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.7.8,f.116ra
A-B.
62Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist
., 7.1.9,f.117ra*vb.
63Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist
E.
., 7.8,f.116vb
64Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,343(OThVIII).
65Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.,
A.
7.1.5,f.112rb
66Expositio
G.Burlas. X lib.Eth.Arist.,
7.8,f.116raB.
18:39:42 PM
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18:39:42 PM
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Ockham
18:39:42 PM
88
REGAWOOD
maintainpublic orderwithwhat is more vicious.Finally,we may be confusingvolitionwhich does not resultin action withweak volition.71
In fact,it is logicallypossible for equally intense,and hence equally
consereprehensible,acts of willingwickednessto have vastlydifferent
the
order
and
both
two
commanders,
Roger,
Henry
quences. Suppose
order
executionof an innocentsoldierin identicalcircumstances.
Henry's
is immediatelycarriedout, while Roger's is accidentallydelayed,and the
soldierescapes. Henry may be temptedby the success of thismethodof
eliminatingannoyance to issue similar commands,so his vice may be
certainly,if the sovereign,King Stephen,wants to encourstrengthened;
he will have to punish Henry more severelythan Roger.
age enlistment,
But fromthe point of view of an omniscentGod, at the time the order
is issued there is nothingin the situationwhich would justifyexcusing
Roger but not Henry, according to Ockham. Both commandershave
eliciteda formallyimperative,executiveact of will,72and hence both are
equally blameworthy.
When the widow of Henry'svictimobjects thatthe actionsof the two
commandersare not comparable,she's rightif she means that Stephen
should punish Henry more severely,but wrong if she thinksthat God
will not punishRogerjust as harshlyas Henrywas punished.The widow
is wrong,accordingto Ockham, providedboth Henry and Roger unconditionallywilled the execution that is, provided their acts of volition
were both formallyimperative.Neitherhad any more reason to believe
that the soldierwould survivethan I have that my hand will not grasp,
or my stomachdigest,the sweet I decide to eat. It is certainlypossible
that the volitionwill be impeded,but not because of anythingof which
I am aware or in control.And since moralitypertainsto what is volunlikea suddenparalytary,as Augustineand Aristodeagree,circumstances
sis of my hand are not relevantto evaluatingme as a moral agent.
Ockham distinguishesbetween conditional and formallyimperative
executiveacts of will to take account of the sortof considerationswhich
Scotus and his defender,Ockham's enemy Walter Chatton, offeredin
of the view thatdoing good is betterthan willingit. Ockham
justification
willmurderis worse than conditionally
admitsthat actuallycommitting
act
is
that
where
the
is,
only equivalentlyimperative.He
ing murder
denies that there is a differencein the moral significanceof formally
imperative,executiveacts of willingmurder,which depend on whether
71Ockham,
375-9(OThVI).
3 q.ll, edd.F.E. Kelley& G.I. Etzkorn,
Sent.,
72Ockham,
a. 3, ed. Wey,372(OThVIII).
De connexione
virtutum,
18:39:42 PM
89
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WILLING
18:39:42 PM
90
REGAWOOD
18:39:42 PM
91
WILLING
WICKEDLY
forthe
When expoundingbook VI c.9, Burleyuses Aquinas' terminology
threeacts of prudence: inquiry,judgement and command. But at book
vel
VII,82he describesthe thirdpart of prudence as 'executive'{executiva
So what has happened is that Burleyhas contrasted
executionis).
praeceptiva
impedablepracticalreasoningwithspeculativereasoningthatis inevitably
successfulonce the premisesare combined.He has pointedto the weakness of the link betweenintellectualjudgmentand practicalexecution.
If Ockham's pictureof the soul linkswill and execution,Burley'sexpositionof Aristodeunlinksintellectand execution.They are complementaryphilosophicalstrategies,both of which call our attentionto possible
problemsin the link betweenunderstandingand action. Burleyemphasizes that the intellectcannot be a total cause in the practical sphere;
Ockham stressesthe connectionof moral practice and will. Burley,like
Ockham, maintainsthat understandingdoes not determineaction. And
thoughhe does not maintainthatvolitiondeterminesexecution,Ockham
seeks to show that interruptions
of that linkage,unlikethe link between
and
are
volition,
understanding
morallyirrelevant.
It is odd to findBurleyliningup with an advocate of the primacyof
the will. Certainly,Ockham and the Franciscans,withtheircaricatureof
Thomism,would be surprised.And doubtlessthere are Thomists
perBut Thomas
haps Giles of Rome is an example who would be horrified.
himselfmightnot be. Gauthierhas argued persuasivelythatforThomas,
prudenceis a habit of will as well as intellect.83
Specifically,he suggests
a role forwillin the executionof the commandwhichis logicallythough
not temporallydistinctfromthe judgmentof the intellect.For Aquinas,
as forBurley,an adequate account of incontinencerequiresthatwe posit
or the lack of it, to linkjudgment
somethingotherthan understanding,
and action, somethingwhich functionsproperlyin some cases and not
in others.
4. Conclusion
Since Burley'sworkis considerablyless well-knownthan Ockham's, I will
conclude by consideringBurley'scontributionto medieval ethics.Burley
aimed at completeness
ratherthan originality
in his EthicsCommentary.
Most
of Grosseteste's
notesare included,as are substantial
excerptsfromEustratius'
82Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.,
7.1.10,f.118rbC.
83R.A.Gauthier,
ina review
ofPsychologie
etmorale
in:Bulletin
Thomiste,
byO. Lottin,
8 (1947-1953),
65-9.
18:39:42 PM
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REGAWOOD
18:39:42 PM
93
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18:39:42 PM
Studieson WalterBurley1989-1997
GERHARD KRIEGER
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke
18:40:32 PM
STUDIESON WALTER
BURLEYI989-I997
10) Expositio
superlibrosTopicorum
( 11L)
Summa
lib.
Elenchorum
:
Tract,
de
modoarguendi
11)
(13L)
12) Suppositiones
13) De puntateartislogica
14) Notabiliade logicis
15) De probationibus
16) De exclusivis
17) De exceptivis
18) De syncategorematibus
19) De consequentiis
20) De obligationibus
21) De insolubilibus
cumsua sophisteria
22) De sophismatibus
Tractatus
de
universalibus
realibus
23)
librorum
24) Expositio
Physicorum
(Lohr 17-19)
de duratione
25) Qustio
naturalibus
26) De principiis
de
Calo
et Mundo(2 IL)
27) Expositio
De
ationeet corruptione
28) Expositio
super Gener
(24L)
s. Metheorum
librosIV brevissime
29) Expositio
(26L)
deplanetiset eorumvirtute
30) Tractatus
Problemata
Aristotelis
31)
Tractatus
de
anima
33)
potentiis
de sensuet sensato(30L)
34) Expositio
de memoria
et reminiscentia
35) Expositio
(3 IL)
de
somno
et
36) Expositio
vigilia(34L)
de longitudine
et brevitate
vita(34L)
37) Expositio
de motuanimalium
38) Expositio
(33L)
De substantia
orbis
39) Expositio
superAverrois
Tractatus
de
42)
formis
44) Tractatus
primus: De comparatione
specierum
: utrum
contradicho
sit maximaoppositio
45) Qustio
disputata
secundus
: De intentione
et remissione
46) Tractatus
formarum
: De primoet ultimoinstanti
47) Quodlibet
librorum
Ethicorum
48) Expositio
(36L)
49) Expositio
superlibrosPoliticorum
(37L)
Lost works
16L) Expositio
superlibrosDe causis
orum
27L) Qustiones
superlibrosMeteor
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95
96
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KRIEGER
38L) In librosconomicorum
in lib. Sententiarum
43) Commentum
Doubtfuland Spurious Works
8) Commenta
superII Priorm
Analyticorum
(39L)
12L) Questiones
superlibrosTopicorum
2OL) NotulasuperlibrosPhysicorum
23L) NotulesuperDe calo et mundo
naturales
24) Questiones
et corruptione
25L) NotulasuperDe generatione
Meteorm
28L) Notulasuperlibrum
librorum
De anima(29L)
32) Expositio
et
Aristot.
40) Expositio quast.s. Metaphysicam
(15L)
et sententia
summrie
41) Divisiones
superMetaph.
40L) Shortertreatiseon the Ethics
4 IL) Dicta de libroPhysicorum
(Jacobus de Alexandria)
Auctoritates
or
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Philosophia, FloresParvi
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"Il
Id.,
catalogo delle opere di Ippocrate e Galeno nel De vitaet moribus
, in: Medioevo
, 16 (1990), 355-395
philosophorum'"
de los viejos
os": El
Kirk, Kathleen-Louise,"La Viday las costunbres
filosof
EscorialCodexh. III.l. an EditionoftheFifteenth-Century
SpanishManuscript
3s De vitaet moribus
and
' withan Introduction
of WalterBurley
philosophorum
Ph. D. Dissertation,Universityof Kentucky,1994
Glossary.
Prelog, J., "De Pictagoraphylosopho.Die Bibliographiedes Pythagoras
in dem WalterBurleyzugeschriebenenLiberde vitaetmoribus
philosophorurri'in: Medioevo
, 16 (1990), 191-251
ViDMANOV,
Amezka, "La formationde la seconde rdactiondes 'Vite
, 16
philosophorum'et sa relation l'uvre originale",in: Medioevo
253-272
(1990),
FakulttTrier
Theologische
18:40:32 PM
In memoriam
Prof.Dr. JosephIJsewijn
Prof.Dr. IJsewijn,
memberof the EditorialBoard of Vivariumsince 1974,
passed away on November 27, 1998, afteran illness of which the first
signsappeared already in 1997.
Born in Zwijndrecht(Belgium) on December 30, 1932, he studied
Classical Philologyand Ancient History at the Catholic Universityof
Louvain, where he was appointedfullprofessorin Latin Language and
Literaturein 1967.
Until 1973 the scope of Vivarium had been limitedto the Middle
Ages. Afteran evaluationheld on the occasion of the tenthanniversary
of ourjournal in 1973 the EditorialBoard judged it importantto broaden
the scope to the Renaissanceand to increasethe numberof Board members to include scholarsspecializingin thisfield.When asked to join the
Board, ProfessorIJsewijn,much to our pleasure,accepted withouthesitation,and thus became not only the firstRenaissance scholar in our
midst,but also the firstBoard memberfromabroad. His internationally
recognized expertisein the field of Renaissance Latin and Neo-Latin
enabledtheBoard to takeresponsibility
forthe new domain.As a member
of the Board ProfessorIJsewijncontributedsubstantially
to the scholarly
of
Vivarium
for
almost
five
quality
twenty
years, always impressinghis
his
with
and
sound
colleagues
penetratinginsight
judgement.
ProfessorIJsewijn'sscholarlymeritswill be discussed more comprehensivelyelsewhere,interalia in his journal Humanistica Lovaniensia,
whichwas supervisedby him fora long time in an admirableway. May
it sufficehere to mentionhis Companion
to Neo-LatinStudies
, which ever
since its appearance in 1977 has been an unfailingbest-seller(it saw a
second and revisededition);it is the referencebook par excellence
forNeoLatin studiesall over the world.
An honorarydoctoratebestowedon him by the University
of Valencia
and a numberof fellowshipsawarded him by severallearned academies
and societiesconstitutefurtherproofof his academic excellence.
The membersof theEditorialBoard ofVivariummournJosephIJsewijn's
passingand will miss his presence.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Vivarium
37,2
18:32:51 PM
1
on SomeProposedIdentifications
PetrusHispanas: Comments
SIMON TUGWELL,OP
In his article,Petrus
Summularum
(Vivarium,35 (1997),
HispanusO.P.,Auctor
D'Ors
the
the
author
of the Summulae
revives
claim
that
21-71), Angel
and
he
makes
several
Logicaleswas a Dominican,
suggestionsabout his
identity.However,withregardto two of his candidates,Pedro Ferrando
and PetrusHispanus conversus,we are on much firmergroundthan he
seems to realise,and it is doubtfulwhetherwhat we know about them
is compatiblewith the hintswhich Dr D'Ors has uncoveredabout the
authorof the Summulae.
With regardto two others,thereis no evidence
that theywere eitherSpanish or Dominican.
1. PedroFerrando
On Pedro Ferrando,we have a more or less contemporarystatement
fromsomeone who knew him well. The obituarycontainedin the Vitas
is one of severalcontributedby the formerDominican provincial
fratrum
of Spain, Giles of Portugal,and it is already there in the edition prepared by Gerald de Frachet in 1258, which survivesin Toulouse, Bibl.
mun., cod. 487. Giles was himselfpresentwhen Pedro died in Zamora,
as his narrativemakes clear:
Petrus
Cumfrater
nutritus
et doctus
Ferrandi,
qui a pueroin ordinesanctissime
beatiDominici
nostri
doctor
inmultis
fuerat,
locis,tanquietuitam
patris
descripsit,
demapudZamoram
frater
uiditipsumsupramontem
infirmaretur,
quidamdeuotus
altissimum
etfaciem
stantem
eiusresplendentem
utsol,eta dextris
eta sinistris
duos
iuuenes
stantes
nimis.
Cumautem
diefrater
michi
uisionem
hanc
splendidos
sequenti
dixisset
fratrem
Petrum
inproximo
intellexi
moriturum.
Etcumuenisquamuiderat,
semad eumet sederem
in lectoin quo ipseiacebat,
. . . narrauit
. . . michiquod
uiderat
sibiassistere
beatamuirginem
et sanctum
Iohannem
euangelistam
singulas
in caputilliusponentes.
coronas
Hancinquituisionem
uestre
dilectioni
committo.
michiquidsignificet.
Rogoautemut dicatis
Ego igitur,
qui uitamet conscientiam
eiuspienecognoueram,
tuedebetur,
alterapredicationi
dixi,Una illarum
uirginitati
et quia uirgoet doctores eas beateuirginis
et Christi
atquedoctrine,
discipuli
meutfratres
adiutorio
Tuncrogauit
omnesanteeumuocarem.
acquisisti.
Quibus
1 In thisarticle,
I use thefollowing
AFP = Archivm
abbreviations:
Fratrum
PraeMOPH = Monumenta
Ordinis
Praedicatorum
Histrica.
dicatorum;
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Vivarium
37,2
18:33:02 PM
104
SIMONTUGWELL
. . . Finitis
hiis
nonestordoquemdominus
tantum
astantibus
ait,Fratres
diligat
uerbis
in domino.
coramcunctis
fratribus
obdormiuit
18:33:02 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
105
18:33:02 PM
106
SIMONTUGWELL
Huiusordinis
institutor
etpaterinclitus
extitit
beatus
cuiusuitam
Dominicus,
primus
etordinis
uirtutibus
obitum
quoqueetexpartemiracula
pienam
deoquegratissimam,
exordium
rudiquidem
mundi
et occasutemporis
orientis
ipsiusin occiduis
partibus
lesuChristi.
estopitulante
sedueracistiloperstringere
gratia
opereprecium
10Jordan's
is basedexclusively
on whathe heardDominic
sayin Parisin 1219,
story
forthedating
arrival
there.
Thisis an important
before
partoftheevidence
Reginald's
oftheLibellus.
Cf.Tugwell
cit.,above,n. 6), 24-6.
(op.
11Ferrando
he died,Dominicformally
writer
to claimthat,before
is also thefirst
and
andvoluntary
thethree
ofcharity,
virtues
tohisfriars
humility
poverty,
'bequeathed'
intotheorder.It is
whointroduced
thathe pronounced
a curseon anyone
possessions
OP
and R. Creytens
or thecurseis historical,
thetestament
mostunlikely
thateither
device(R. Creytens
as a literary
thattheyshould
be regarded
O.P.,LeTestament
argued
etmoderne
dominicaine
ancienne
deS. Dominique
dansla littrature
, in:AFP,43 (1973),29-72,
wasinspired
ofthetestament
thatat leastthestory
bythe8th
esp.52-71).It is possible
filiis
uite
firmamentm
St
for
feast
of
Dominic:
matins
the
pau"Migrans
pater
antiphon
theoffice
himself
TheclaimthatFerrando
testamentm".
humilis
condit
composed
pertatis
andit is rendered
is notsupported
bythefactthat
improbable
byanyearlyevidence,
fratri
thethird
Laudsantiphon
reuelatur,
perquampatertran("Scalaceloprominens
found
ofGuala's vision
alludes
totheversion
sienssursum
onlyintheoriginal
ferebatur")
the
whentheLibellus
was revised
ofJordan's
version
Libellus'
chapter,
bysomegeneral
accountwhichis
and it is thetwo-ladder
by twoladders,
singleladderwas replaced
reproduced
byFerrando.
18:33:02 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
107
18:33:02 PM
108
WELL
SIMONTUG
18:33:02 PM
109
PETRUSHISPANUS
Humb.3
Ferr.5
a Diuinaigitur
Gumenimessetadhucpuerulus
nondum
gratiaiamin eo mirabiliter
cumessetadhucpuerulus
nondum
nutreis
segregatus,
diligentia
deprehensusoperante,
iam a nutreis
estsepelectum
dimitiere,
diligentia
deprehensus
segregatus,
quasicarnis
iam
eteligebat
delicias
dimittere,
abhorreret,
quasicarnis
super estsepelectulum
potius
et eligebat
terram
accumbere
abhorreret,
potiussuper
quamin lectocorporali delicias
accumbere
iacere.Et terram
quamin lectocorporali
quodammodoquieteresolutus
iacere.
resolutus
Extunc
ex tuncduxitin consuetudinem
declinata quodammodo
quiete
declinata
stratus
mollicie
frequentissime
superterram autemduxitin consuetudinem
mollicie
iamilludquodnondum stratus
dormire.
Videbatur
frequentissime
superterram
intellexisse
Adolescensdormire.
legerat
prouerbium,
iuxtauiamsuametiamcumsenuerit
non
recedet
ab ea.
The Spanish textclearlyfollowsHumb. (f. 2r)E porla gratiade diosque obrauaen el, enperoque eratanpequenno
que avn
en la tierra
delama,dexauamunchas
vezesel lechoet echauasse
nonle partiesien
de la carnee deseauamasyaseren tierra
assicomosi aborreiesse
ya losplaseres
se fallaua
ende.Et de si ouo en costunbre
de yaser
que en el lechoet masfolgado
en tierra
etdormir
y a menudo.
Shortlyafterthis,where Ferrando introducesthe section on Dominic's
studiesin Palenciawitha curt"posthe' the SpanishtextfollowsHumbert's
"
more ample "puerilibus
autemannisinnocenter
excursis
(Ferr. 7, Humb. 5):
"
la
hedat
de
sin
danno
"Despuesquepasso
pequennes
(f. 2r).
There are thus no groundsfor claimingthat the opening section of
the Spanish compilationderivesfromFerrando,withsupplementary
items
inserted
fromlaterlegendas.The wholesectionis translated
fromHumbert.20
In the case of the canonizationmiracles,however,Manning is wrong
to say that theyare translatedfromHumb. The decision of the editors
of MOPH, XVI not to repeatposthumousmiraclesfromone legenda to
ibid.92-103.Gf.alsoMOPH,XXVII,125-7.Sincenomanuscript
ofGui'sLatin
prayer,
texthassurvived,
thispartoftheMadridcodexis particularly
important.
20Dr D'Ors'ssuggestion
aboutghostwriting
to Humb.thanto
appliesmoreplausibly
- (itis ascribed
wasalways
butthelegenda
as Humbert's
ownwork
to
Jordan;
regarded
himbyDietrich
ofApolda(edited
inActaSanctorum
, Aug./,Antwerp
1733,
byG. Cuperus
Gui (MOPH,XXVII, 106-7,already
in thetext
563)and,independently,
byBernard
- and,granted
before
GuibecameawareofDietrich)
hislongstanding
inthe
involvement
revision
ofthelectionary
as a writer,
andhisfluency
thereis no realreasonto dispute
theascription.
Whatis more,as I hopetoshowin TheShaping
there
Fratrum,
oftheVitas
is goodevidence
thathepersonally
indeedrewrote,
muchoftheVitas
In
revised,
fratrum.
else,noneofitsinnovations
anycase,evenifHumb.wasactually
compiled
bysomeone
withSpain,so it wouldbe entirely
to suppose
that
anyconnection
suggests
gratuitous
PedroFerrando
hadanything
todo withit.In TheShaping
I shallalso
Fratrum
oftheVitas
showthattheascription
ofthecronica
ordinis
to Ferrando
is impossible,
as wellas being
attested.
verypoorly
18:33:02 PM
110
SIMONTUGWELL
18:33:02 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
111
Manning pointedout, thiscorrespondsto Lib. 102-5; but it did not necessarilycome directlyfromthe Libellus.None of it was included in the
originalversionof Ferrando'slegenda, but it was added by the revisers.
of the revisededitionof Ferr.,Lib. 102 is added, rather
In all manuscripts
the
of the whole legenda, afterFerrando's own formal
at
end
ineptly,
'
. That thisis the sourceof the Spanish
conclusion,completewithits Amer
textis suggestedby the factthatthe latterevidentlyfeltthe embarrassment
of the double conclusionto the legenda, and added a second 'Amen
Madrid
Ferr.
se demostraron
...
Multaquidem
etalia. . . innotuere
miracula,Muchasotrasmaravillas
a notification
Hec masestascosassonescripias
designata.
que nonsuntstiliofficio
... e a alabanae gloautembreuiter
adnotata
suntad sanctita- de la su sanctidad
ria
.
de
.
. biuee regna
tiseiusastructionem
... ad laudem
parasienaquel
que
quoque
et gloriam
eiusqui. . . uiuitet rgnt
per pre en todoslos sieglos.Amen.De los
delasenfermedades
muchas
cosas
infinita
sculaseculorum.
Amen.De cura- cuydados
manifiestas
inno- nosfueron
tionibus
etiam
infirmitatum
queacercadeloprepluranobis
mandata
non sentenonen escripto
tuerunt,
puestas
mageraque
queadpresens
scripto
sonsennales
de la su sanctidad
e nobleza.
eiusinsignia.
suntsanctitatis
Amen.
In almost all manuscriptsof the revisedFerr., the section de sanctiuiri
moribus
is insertedjust beforethe account of Dominic's death (it replaces
the first-edition
texteditedin MOPH, XVI as Ferr. 45), withoutJordan's
which are inappropriatein the new context.However,
words,
opening
thesewords are retainedin the Madrid codex:
Madrid
Lib.103
todaslasotras
cosasquepadresancto
estmagni- Entre
Ceterum,
quod ipsisfulgentius
fue
mas
e mas
tanta
honestate
morum
Domingo
resplandeiente
miraculis,
ficentiusque
de miraculos
fuequetantores...
magnifico
pollebat
estebienaventurado
varnen
plandeia
honestidad
...
Here too, though,the Spanish does not necessarilyderivedirectlyfrom
the Libellus
. . . miraculis
is also found at this point in the
, since ceterum
Lisbon manuscriptof the revisedFerr.,withwhichwe have alreadyfound
the Madrid translationagreeingin error.
On balance, it seems likelythat the whole of Getino's LXXXIII-CIX
derivesfromsome manuscriptof Ferr.; but it is the revisedtextof Ferr.
which underlies the Spanish version, not some pre-existingCastilian
legenda.We may safelyconclude thatPedro Ferrandohad nothingwhatsoeverto do withthe Spanish compilation,exceptthatthe revised,official
editionof his legenda was one of its sources.
18:33:02 PM
112
SIMONTUGWELL
18:33:02 PM
PETRUSHISPANUS
113
18:33:02 PM
1
PeterOlivi in theShadowofMontsgur
ANNE DAVENPORT
carnosno emdelmonnilmones de nos
Franciscanscienceas a mission
One of the difficulties
withinterpreting
to "defendCatholicEurope,"2 is thata numberof creativefriarsremained
far more focused on radically transforming
Catholic Europe than on
defendingit. No sooner had the FranciscanOrder obtaineda prestigious
Paris chair throughAlexanderof Hales than zealous friarspublishedan
introductionto Joachim da Fiore's Eternal Gospel, heraldingthe imminent demise of ecclesiasticalinstitutions
and the advent of a new spiritual age.3 Franciscan"spirituals"who felttheyhad special insightinto the
s teachingplaced it on a par withpapal authority
and foundthempoverello'
selvesin chronicconflictwithexistingChurch practicesand withRome.4
The line betweenobedience and defianceremainedparticularly
problematicin the South of what is now France. Franciscanfriarslike Hugh
of Digne at the conventof Hyres and Raimondo Barravi at the con-
1 I thankR. JamesLongforinviting
of thispaperat the
me to reada summary
in LeedsonJuly13, 1998;DavidBurrand Robert
International
MedievalCongress
andformaking
available
to me;Leon
Pasnauforfruitful
discussions
keyOlivimaterial
forhismeticulous
review.
Golubformultiform
help;andJohnMurdoch
I alsothank
ofHonolulu
Mr.andMrs.J. RussellCadesandtheCadesFoundation
Hawaiifortheir
generous
support.
2 RogerFrench
TheInvention
Friars'
Science:
Natural
andAndrew
Before
ofthe
Cunningham,
as "the
arecharacterized
Franciscans
, Aldershot
1996,2; seealsop. 204,where
Philosophy
consciences
oftheir
Church
oftheRoman
ageintheservice
spiritual
3 A summary
inMorton
ofthe"Eternal
Bloomfield,
Joachim
Gospel"scandalis found
XIII (1957),249-311.See alsoJohnMoorman,
: A Critical
in: Traditio,
Survey,
ofFiora
theFranciscan
Order
1968.
, Oxford
History
4 A of
vitae
Ubertino
da Casale.SeehisArbor
isPeterOlivi'sdisciple
crucifixae
goodexample
withan introduction
, Venice1485(reprinted
byC.T. Davis,Turin1961);seealso
Jesu
andthe
M.D. Lambert,
: TheDoctrine
Absolute
Franciscan
ofChrist
ofthe
Poverty
Apostles
Poverty
ofFranciscan
intheFranciscan
Order
1210-1323
, London1961;fora theological
analysis
vonAssisi
desHl. Franziskus
seeK. Esser,
DieArmutsauffassung
,
Mysterium
paupertatis:
poverty,
undWeisheit,
XIV (1951),177-89.
in:Wissenschaft
Vivarium
37,2
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke
18:33:10 PM
115
18:33:10 PM
116
ANNEDAVENPORT
18:33:10 PM
117
18:33:10 PM
118
ANNEDAVENPORT
18:33:10 PM
119
to theessences
of thosewhohad becomeeviland
God himself
addssomething
themto goodworks.26
disposes
Whetheror not this is what Olivi means in this prayer,his Franciscan
superiorsrejecteda kindredidea expressedin one of Olivi's formalscholastic texts.In 1283, an assemblyof Franciscantheologianscensored Olivi
forteachingthat grace "augmentsthe soul's essence." Specifically,Olivi
was chargedwithwronglyassertingthat
is an increase
ofgrace,andglory
increased
increase
thesoulis substantially
through
is increased.27
ofthesoulin thesensethatthesoul'sessence
In a responsepresentedin Avignonin 1283, Olivi denied that he ever
taughtthis.28He also denied the charge in a letteraddressedto friends:
dansle Bien,d'ajouter
unsurcroit
d'tre ceuxquele Mal a demi
tant
tout-puissant
la puissance
de l'trea, rptons-le,
autant
'anantis'.
d'accrotre
[. . .] Le dieusuprme
etincorruptibles
etde lesrendre
immuables
comme
lui";
qu'ilveutl'trede sescratures,
de l'action
divine
Roch1957{op.cit
., above,n. 9),II, 15:"La description
pourla crades mauvais
tiondesbons,pourla transformation
plus
qu'ilchangeen bonsenajoutant
mme
d'tre
nousmontre
restitue
toutes
leuressence
choses
(myemphasis),
que le Christ
en lui."
26Liber
deduobus
c. 23,ed.Thouzellier
above,n. 21),240:"Peripsum
{op.cit.,
principiis,
illorum
deumaliquidadditur
erant,
(verum)
ipsosinbonis
superessentias
quimalieffecti
on p. 248:"creare
The sameexpression
is repeated
et facere
ordinando."
est
operibus
andon p. 252.Noticethat"addere"
is constructed
with
aliquidadderesuperessentias";
is notthatsomething
therefore
rather
thanwith"ad":themeaning
is
"super"
foreign
butthattheessence
tosomething
different
thanitself,
is increased,
combined
with/added
i.e."Godaddssome"overandabovewhatamount
ofessence
is already
there.
Thusto
whathemeans,
Isaiah45,6-7:"NonestaliusdomiJeande Lugio(254)invokes
explain
withPaul,Ephes.
nusformans
enimaliquando
lucemnisiego"(254)together
5, 8: "Eratis
nuncautemlux."Onceagain,RenNelli(1972,80-1;op.cit.,above,n. 25)
tenebre,
dansle Bien,et- c'estici la conception
la pluspro"Dieuesttout-puissant
interprets:
comme
ilveutl'tre
de certaines
de sescratures
fonde
deJeande Lugio ilpeutaccrotre
de la libration."
si ellessontsurle chemin
27See Littera
1954{op.cit.,above,n. 13),53:
, art.22,ed. Fussenegger
septem
sigillorum
"Itemdicerequodin augmento
animasubstantialiter
et quodgloria
gratie
augmentetur
estaugmentum
animeessentialiter,
erroneum
est."
28"Semper
credidi
animasubstantialiter
nonaugmentetur,
quodin augmento
gratiae
animaeessentiale."
See "Responsio
etquodglorianonestaugmentum
Petrus
quamfecit
Ioannisad Litteram
sibiin Avinione",
editedbyDamasus
magistrorum,
praesentatam
Ioannis
Olm
SuiIpsius
, O.F.M.TriaScripta
, in: Archivm
Apologetica
Labergein Fr.Petri
in
Franciscanum
28 (1935),130.Olivilumpstogether
articles
16-22as listed
historicum,
theLetter
Seals
: "De aliisarticulis,
sextus
duodevidecimus,
decimus,
oftheSeven
septimus
etvigesimus
secundus
articuli
nonmetangunt,
primus
gesimus,
undevigesimus,
vigesimus
communes
Etsemper
credidi
contrarium
docui,sequens
opiniones.
quodgraquiasemper
et quodideaein Deo realiter
tiaponatin animaaliquidabsolutum,
nondifferunt,
et
animasubstantialiter
nonaugmentetur,
etquodglorianonest
quodinaugmento
gratiae
In thelonger
animae
essentiale."
toParismasters
in 1285,
augmentum
response
presented
thisparticular
Olivineglects
charge
altogether.
18:33:10 PM
120
ANNEDAVENPORT
I neither
saidthisnorwroteit; rather,
I believetheopposite,
sinceindeedgrace
indicates
an accidental
habitinthesoul,as I havetried
toprove
withallmystrength
in myquestions
on grace.29
But in 1311, on the eve of the Council of Vienne and at the requestof
Pope Clement V, Giles of Rome will once again examine this doctrine
as one of Olivi's errors,and give a fairlydetailed critiqueand answer.30
Did Olivi teach this doctrine?
In his own defenseto BrotherR.,31Olivi argues,as we just saw, that
the condemnedarticleis actuallyincompatiblewithhis true teachingon
grace. Since he has always maintainedthatgrace indicatesan accidental
habit in the soul, he cannot also maintainthat it indicatesa substantial
increase. Furthermore,
since the censored articleimpliesthat sinfulacts
would decrease the verysubstanceof the soul, it contradictsOlivi's teaching that no creature'sact is capable of corruptingthe substanceof the
rationalsoul. Olivi is therefore"not so insane as to say or thinkthis."32
With regardto glory,however,Olivi concedes that in a questionexamining whetherthe will is an active power33he "recitedthe positionof
some who say thatthe verysubstanceof our mind will be raised to subwhen the habit of gloryis given."34But this position,
limity(sublimatur)
29See Letter
toR. published
withtheQuodlibeta
1509)underthetide
(Venice:Soardum
aliorum
articulorum
immocontrarium
, f.52v:"Hecnondixi;necscripsi:
credo,
Impugnaciones
dicathabitm
animeaccidentalem,
sicutin questionibus
meisde gratia
cumenimgratia
I warmly
viribus
nixussumprobare."
thank
thisletter
availtotis
DavidBurrformaking
ableto mein microfilm.
30Aegidii
Romani
Doctrinae
P. I. Olivi
in: Archivm
, editedbyLeo Amoros,
Impugnatio
at p. 448.
Franciscanum
24 (1934),399-451,
historicum,
31DavidBurr(1976,37; op.cit.,above,n. 10) citestwocandidates
forBrother
R,
R. de Camliaco
in the1509Veniceedition,
andRaymondo
as stated
Gaufredi,
namely
fromspeculation.
refrains
as perhapssuggested
by a manuscript
copy.Burrhimself
sincehe
fitsnicely
withOlivi'sgreeting
of"truly
beloved
brother"
Gaufredi
Raymondo
- whichcausedhimeventually
to be
to theSpirituals
wasa fellow
Occitan
sympathetic
- oneofOlivi's
ofJohnofMurrho
as Minister
General
VIII,infavor
byBoniface
replaced
in 1283andeventual
Olivi'sdisciples.
censors
leaderofthepersecution
against
32See Letter
toR.}in: Quodlibeta
, ed. Venice1509(op.cit.,above,n. 29),f.52v:"Cum
cornoncredam
animerationalis
actum
creature
etiamperaliquem
aliquidde substantia
nonsumitainsanus
fieret
illiusarticuli
peractumpeccati,
rumpi
posse:quodsecundum
velsentirem."
uthocdicerem
33See Quaestio
librum
Sententiarum
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
seuvoluntas
libera
an liberum
arbitrium
"Quaeritur
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 394-517:
sitpotentia
activavelpassiva."
34Letter
toR., in: Quodlibeta
, ed.Venice1509(op.at., above,n. 29),f.51: In responan voluntas
sitpotentia
factiin questione:
sionemtamencuiusdam
activa;
argumenti
simul
cum
recitavi
dicentium,
glorie,
quodquandodaturhabitus
positionem
quorumdam
mentis
nostre."
substantialiter
substantia
hocsublimatur
18:33:10 PM
121
18:33:10 PM
122
ANNEDAVENPORT
40See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1924
Sententiarum,
super
sintperse
hocquodhuiusmodi
., above,n. 15),II, 423: "Nonpropter
aspectus
(op.cit
causaeffectiva
actuum
activaipsiusvoluntatis
nonestpotens
eius,sedquiavirtus
opeoftheimpairment
ralinisisubtalietcumtaliaspectu."
withOlivi'sdiscussion
Compare
offreewillin sleepand in infancy
LIX,ed.Jansen,
II, 518-68:"Aninfantes,
(Quaestio
etfuriosi
exercere
andwithQuaestio
III ofQuaestiones
dormientes
operaliberi
arbitrii")
possint
DeDeocognoscendo,
Sententiarum.
ed.B.Jansen,
in:Quaestiones
secundum
librum
, III,Appendix
,
super
at p. 545,whereOliviproves
God'sexistence
to
1926,453-554,
byappealing
Quaracchi
thedramatic
on Godandofthose
contrast
between
theactsofpersons
whoarefocused
whoarenot.
41See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
in actusgratiae
nisi
nonpotest
above,n. 15),II, 423:"Sic,utdicebant,
voluntas,
(op.cit.,
eiusvirtus
etpotestas
imbibita
etunitaetquasiincorporata
obiecto
activasitspiritualiter
divino
et obiectum
divinum
ei."
42See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
calesi daremus
incorporalibus
above,n. 15),II, 423:"Sicut,
quodignishaberet
(op.cit.,
facere
autliquefacere
centralem
substantiam
uniusmassaeaureaevelferreae,
nonposset
inipsometallo,
etnisi
hocfacere,
nisivirtus
caloris
imbiberetur
etprofundaretur
quidem
in medioipsiusignisseufornacis
Notethata verysimmetallum
igneaeprofundaretur."
is found
inOlivi'svernacular
ilarmetaphor
, ed.Zorzi1956(op.cit.,
above,n. 17),
preghiera
la duricia
e la tebesessa
delmieucore la ingratitut,
271:"Tantgrane tantabominabla
ni amolesir";
the
d'amorne focno se potescalsar
ni fondre
que pertantgranfornas
"Tantaettamabhominabilis
Latintext,
ed.Manselli
1959(op.cit
., above,n. 18),277,gives:
non
amoris
estduricia
et tepiditas
et ingratitudo
cordismeiquodprotalifornace
ignita
calefieri
alsowiththesingle
necmollilinecscindi."
poemof
potest
Compare
surviving
thecatharisant
troubadour
Guilhm
de Durfort,
oneofthelordsofFangeux:
"Quomaurs
en fueco cumaciersen farga."
43See Quaestio
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
LVIIIof Quaestiones
, ed.Jansen1924
super
vel
autemperhocquodipsaforma
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 423: "Nonintendebant
activavoluntatis
sedsolumperaccidens,
sicutneccalorignisper
virtus
perse moveretur,
suaemateriae
se movetur,
[. . .] Nonetiamintenquandoad congregationem
congregatur.
ceraesubsubstantial
debant
essetsubstantial,
sicutnecforma
quodistatransmutatio
diversas
tamipsaquamsua
stantialiter
transmutatur,
sigillorum
quandosecundum
imagines
materia
variefiguratur."
18:33:10 PM
123
44See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestixmes
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
fitperhabitus
virtuum
et specialiter
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 423:"Quae incorporatio
caritatis."
perhabitm
45See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
nonsuntperse causa
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 424:"Dicebant
ergoquodipsihabitus
effectiva
huiusmodi
sedpotius
activavoluntatis
utsubtalibus
habitibus
actuum,
ipsavirtus
etpertaleshabitus
ad agendum
et coaptata."
disposita
46Olivirejects
in particular
thesolution
thatpresents
thewillas a passive
"medium"
illuminated
LVIIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.
bygrace.See Quaestio
super
1924(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 422:"Si auteme contra
dicatur
Jansen
quodinproductioneistorum
voluntas
liberanonplusfacitnisiquantum
substantia
(i.e.actusgratiae)
lunaeautaerisfacit
inilluminatone
inea suscepto
a sole:tunchuiusquaeexita lumine
modiactusnullomodoerunt
libertatis
omnino
se habebit
liberi,
quiavirtus
peraccidens
ad productionem
sicutet forma
substantialis
se habet
ipsorum,
ipsiusaerisperaccidens
ad producendum
actumilluminationis."
18:33:10 PM
124
ANNEDAVENPORT
18:33:10 PM
125
18:33:10 PM
126
ANNEDAVENPORT
in no way
are impermanent,messyand vague. Our rationaldefinitions
ideal
natures
exist
that
such
"punctual"
extramentally.53
imply
rem
, Olivi tells
Turningnow to what is true about substancessecundum
us that
withwhomI findmorereason
toagree,
others,
however,
saythata moreanda less
mustbe granted
in substances
secundum
evenifthisis nottruesecundum
viam
rem,
.54
logicalem
VIII that "substances
Aristotlehimself,Olivi insists,assertsin Metaphysics
taken abstractlydo not vary according to more and less, whereas substances receivedin matterdo."55What Aristotlemeans, Olivi creatively
argues,56is that universaisconsideredas rationalnames do not vary by
degree,whereasreal extramentalsubstancesdo. Since Olivi endorseshylemorphismforall creatures,fromhis point of view, all createdsubstances
are composed of formand matter.57
God alone is absolutelyimmaterial.
rem.b%
The divineessence alone is therefore
absolutely"punctual"secundum
and
Aristodedifferendy, argue that
As forthose,Olivi says,who interpret
53Thisis also a keyfeature
in Olivi'srejection
illumination:
matheofAugustinin
he says,aremerely
notdivine
Ideas.See
matical
rulesandgenerad
abstractions,
concepts,
deDeocognoscendo
, ed.Jansen(op.dt.,above,n. 40),III, 455-99.On Olivi's
Quaestiones
seeE. Bettoni
1959(op.cit.,
above,n. 10),514-5:"MiparecheOccam
proto-nominalism,
Oliviana
delproblema
conaltreparolela soluzione
Quando
degliuniversali.
riproponga
le cose"aptaenataesuntsicintelligi"
sonooggettivi,
chei concetti
l'Oliviafferma
perch
attitudine
dellecose
di indicare
le ragioni
chefondano
raffermata
e nonsenteil bisogno
la posizione
di predicati
di qualchedecennio
a diventare
universali,
soggetto
anticipa
occamistica."
54Quaestio
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.cit
XXIIofQuaestiones
.,
Sententiarum,
super
iudicodicunt
above,n. 15),I, 391:"Aliiautemquibusin parteistamagisassentiendum
viamlogestdaremagiset minus
secundum
rem,etsinonsecundum
quodin substantiis
icalem."
55Quaestio
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.dt.,
XXIIofQuaestiones
Sententiarumi
super
autemest
remaliter
se habet,
above,n. 15),I, 392:"Quiaautemsecundum
metaphysici
nonhabet
considerare:
naturas
realiter
ideo,VIII Metaphysicae
, dicitquodsicutnumerus
sedsi quidem,
sicnecsubstantia
quaecum
quaeestsecundum
speciem,
magisetminus,
illahabet."
materia,
As we will
wouldagreewithOlivis interpretation.
Fewor no Aristotelian
exegetes
endorsed.
is notlikely
to be widely
thathisinterpretation
knows
seelater,Olivihimself
57LikeThomas,
thatAvicebron
Duhem1917(op.at.,above,n. 15),V, 361argues
(Ibn
alsothatScotus
isatthesource
ofFranciscan
formally
"Augustinizes"
hylemorphism,
Gabirol)
andthe
ForAvicebron's
ofspiritual
matter.
Avicebron's
gnosticism
placeinJewish
theory
ha-Kabalahu-Provans:
seeG.G.Scholem,
at Olivi'stime,
KabbalahactiveinMontpellier
hug
1963.
RabiTitshak
ha-Rabi
Avraham
benDavidu-veno
Jerusalem
SagiNahor,
58See Quaestio
librum
Sententiarum
secundum
XXII of Quaestiones
, ed.Jansen1922
super
remaliterse habet,
metaphysici
(op.dt., above,n. 15),I, 392-3:"Quiaautemsecundum
dicitquodsicutnumerus
considerare:
autemestnaturas
realiter
ideo,VIII Metaphysicae
sedsi quidem,
sicnecsubstantia
nonhabetmagiset minus,
speciem,
quaeestsecundum
18:33:10 PM
127
18:33:10 PM
128
ANNEDAVENPORT
18:33:10 PM
129
18:33:10 PM
130
ANNEDAVENPORT
18:33:10 PM
131
rem.Regardless
Rememberthatwe are consideringwhat is true secundum
in
human
substance
of what is truedefinitionwise,
realityadmitsa wide
spectrumof orderedvalues. Depending on whetherwe are considering
Adam in paradise, or fallen man corruptedby evil, or spiritualman
redeemedin glory,human substancevaries dramaticallyby "more and
less." Olivi's analysisimplies,in particular,that the human formthat is
receivedin perishablematteris a minimaldegree of humanity,quasi-nihil
comparedto the human formthatis foundin heaven clothedin celestial
Indeed as Olivi explainedearlier,materialcapacityand degree of
light.78
materiae
formalact go together:capacitati
actualitas
formae.Since
correspondet
the capacityof carnal matterto receivethe human formis disproportionatelyless than the capacityof spiritualmatter,it followsthat the degree
of humanitythat is receivedin carnal matter(and providesthe basis of
Aristotle'santhropology)
is a sort of infinitesimal
residue of what "man"
reallyis.79
There is of coursea veryimportantexception.Who, Olivi arguesnext,
would deny that the human body in its state of innocence has more
capacitythan our own perishablebodies, or
thatChrist's
soulhas a better
and higher
etaltiorem
nature(meliorem
than
naturam)
other
souls?80
" dressedhimself
Thus accordingto Olivi, when "IhesuCristveramienostre
in our nature,81
he did not take on our degree
of humanity,anymorethan
he took on our own corruptflesh.82
To articulateall of thisphilosophifor
cally,Olivi uses a numberof equivalentexpressionsinterchangeably:
animarum.
nonhabeatplus
nostrum,
Quisenimdicetquodcorpus
quandoestgloriosum,
de actualitate
suaespeciei
mortale?"
quam
corpus
78On thegnostic
rootofthisconcept,
seeHenry
Terre
dersurrection
cleste
etcorps
Corbin,
,
Paris1960.
79Forthe
ofthisas DunsScotus'pointofdeparture,
andinparticular
for
importance
in thePrologue
Scotus'critique
ofAristotle's
ofhisSentences
epistemology
commentary,
seePaulVignaux,
LireDunsScot
in:Laphilosophie
aumoyen-ge
, Albeuve
aujourd'hui,
reprinted
1987,243-65.
80Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.dt.,
super
nonhabeatmeliorem
etalteabove,n. 15),I, 406:"QuisetiamdicetquodanimaChristi
riorem
naturam
aliaeanimae?"
quam
81See Olivi'spreghiera
IhesuCrist
, ed.Zorzi1956(op.cit
., above,n. 17),271:"Senhor
e veramienostre,
nostra
natura
hasvestida."
pueys
que
82Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
nonplus
above,n. 15),I, 405: "Quisenimdicet... quodcorpusin statuinnocentiae
In boththeJewish
haberet
nostra
Zoharand in Catharism,
quamcorpora
corrupta?"
Christ
is "robbed
inhisethereal
beneath
theappearance
ofordinary
For
flesh.
garment"
thegnostic
character
ofthisproblmatique
, see Huntin1963(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 53-5,
18:33:10 PM
132
ANNEDAVENPORT
a being to "have more of the act of its species" is forit to "have more
form,"or, equivalently,"more parts of form,"which give thisindividual
a "better"nature,or a "higher"nature. If thereforeChrist'ssoul has a
meliorem
naturam
than othersouls,thismeans that Christ'ssoul
et alteriorem
has "more form"than ours. But if Christ'ssoul has "more" substance
than ours, this in turn implies that Christ's soul is formallyincreased
relative to our own- just as the glorious degree of humanitythat is
receivedin celestialmatteris formallyincreasedrelativeto the low degree
of humanitythat is received in our own muddy vesturesof decay. At
one level, Olivi's analysisis standardChristianfare.But at anotherlevel,
die veryattemptto expresstheseChristianmysteries
philosophically
brings
out the deep congruitybetween Olivi's doctrineand the more mythically-statedCathar doctrine,as capturedfor example by Dodat Roch
in the followingsummary:
human
totheCathars,
soulslefttheir
bodiesinthespiritual
According
pure,ethereal
intothese"tunics
realmwhentheyentered
ofskin,"
which
are,in St.Paul'swords,
in a pure,
thebodiesofsin.In contrast,
and incarnated
himself
Jesusdescended
humanbody:hencethedesignation
of"celestial"
or "spiritual"
ethereal
body.This
it
wasmadedensebythephysical
elements
thatfedit,andtowhich
bodyhowever
ofa terrestrial
human
thisbody
organism.
Consequently,
gavetheshapeandreality
initafter
becamemortal.
himself
However,
gradually
purified
byChrist
manifesting
itwasresurrected
theBaptism
oftheHolySpirit
as a glorious
(byJohntheBaptist),
thecrucifixion.83
bodyafter
If we now combinethismythicalaccountof Christ'sbodilymetamorphoses
with the Cathar teaching that God, to rescue his flock from nihilitas
,
increases theirspiritualsubstance,what we obtain is nothingless than
the esoteric blueprintof Olivi's philosophical doctrine: the purer the
materialvessel,the "more" human formit receives,the higherthe degree
of human substancein act. Olivi's axiom that capadtatimateriae
corresponneeded to express
deiactualitas
formae
providesthe philosophicalframework
in scholasticlanguage the Cathar doctrinethatthe verysubstanceof the
c. 1270:'Jesuswasnotmade
whoalsocitesa Cathar,
Bzerza,
Raymonde
interrogated
. . . NeverdidGodputon ourmortal
flesh."
ofourflesh
83Roch1957[op.rit.,
onthedepoabove,n.9),II, 82.Rochbasesthissummary
partly
inthebeginning
oftheXlVthcentury,
Fournier
sitions
received
bytheinquisitor
Jacques
ofBlibaste.
theteachings
NotethatOlivi,as reported
byDavidBurrin Eucharistie
stating
of the
inLateThirteenth-Century
Franciscan
Presence
andConversion
, in:Transactions
Thought
thedocetic
himself
from
74/3(1984),
distances
American
55,explicidy
Society,
Philosophical
admits
of"a moreanda
ofgnostic
traditions
wellknow,
Butas students
heresy.
gnostism
herebyDodatRochis,liketheviewimplied
less."The Catharviewsummarized
by
view.
as opposed
to a frankly
a verymitigated
andsubtle,
Olivi'sanalysis,
"docetic,"
18:33:10 PM
133
18:33:10 PM
134
ANNEDAVENPORT
Thus by examiningthe wider philosophicalcontextof Olivi's multifaceteddiscussion,we come to appreciatewhy his Franciscansuperiors
reacted so negativelyto the anonymouspositionhe innocently"recites"
in Question
LVII. Hypersensitive
to the thinline thatdividesCatholic docdel Be,
trinefroma more gnosticand even franklyheterodoxentendensa
increase
of
of
the
substantial
their
Occitan
confrere's
theyjudged
analysis
the human soul to be overall more hereticalthan Catholic- -justas they
sensedhot Cathar cindersbeneathOlivi's view of marriage,baptism,burial fees and the rationalsoul.86
The theologianswho censoredOlivi's articlewereperhapsfamiliarwith
in which the Cathar doctrineabout the soul's
Jean de Lugio's treatise,87
essentialincreaseis explicitly
expressed,or perhapswithDurand of Huesca's
writtenin Languedoc c. 1222.88This last treatise
LiberContraManicheos,
specificallyalerts Catholic theologiansto the metaphysicalproblmatique
raised by Olivi. In Chapter XIII, Durand respondsto the Cathar claim
- and were therefore
thatthe perishablephenomenaof thisworldare nihil
not createdby God. Althoughbasicallyunschooled,Durand trieshis best,
thatsubstance
by means of the Latin word semel,to argue philosophically
or affair.Thus he
does not admit of a more and a less, but is an either/
says that
orincorporeal,
is madewithout
No substance
smallorlarge,
God,norcan
corporeal
cannot
be
Whatindeedis once(semel)
it properly
be called"nothing."
something,
be attributed
tothattowhich
cannot
given,
Non-being
beingis once(semel)
nothing.
call
itsbeing.Do not,Cathar,
itmight
andrenew
eventhough
changeappearance
whatcanbe touched.89
nothing
Olivi's
illustrates:
whatthiscase-study
Butthisis,in a sense,precisely
philosophically.
remains
ofphilosophy
andamiede Dieu- hisassimilation
is to be a friar
deepidentity
extrahn.
somewhat
86It is interesting
thatNelli1972(op.at.,above,n. 25),113,
to note,in thisregard,
in Languedoc
in thelastquarCatharism
a
of
"diffuse"
sort
patriotic
spreading
reports
18:33:10 PM
135
Durand correctly
mutability,
change
appreciatesthatthe Catharsinterpret
and corruptionas hallmarksof the evil principle,as evidence of the relative nihilitas
of visiblephenomena.90Durand's argumentis thateven perishable and corruptibleentitiesare not "nothing,"since a thingeitheris
a substanceor is not. Whateverhas being- whatever,in particular,can
be touched- is not "more or less" something,but is something,and canbe properlydescribedas "nothing."In short,what Durand
not therefore
denies,is thatsubstanceadmitsdegrees.Durand moreoverseemsto understand that denyinga "more or less" to substancestrikesat the heart of
Cathar teaching,since the Cathar claim is preciselythatperishablephe- the resultof a cosmic
nomena are a mixtureof being and non-being
and
, fragmented
fall,afterGod's celestialcreationwas invaded by nihilitas
time
and
death.
corruptedby alteration,
Durand's Cathar opponentswould thuspresumablyhave answeredhim
that perishablephenomena inquantum
taleshave so littlesubstance,and
are so bereftof ontologicaltruth,so degradedcomparedto God's original
in
creation,thattheymay as well be nihil.And since God is all-powerful
is
but
no
evil
to
what
has
to
all
that
he
can
evil,
good
making
oppose
do to rescue his fallencreaturesis to increasetheirspiritualsubstanceso
that theyhave "enough" spiritualsubstanceto sufferevil withoutdoing
evilin return,and thusbe restoredto eternallife.The notionthatspiritual
melhorament
requiresGod to increase the soul's essence is fundamentalto
Catharism,since only throughan additionof spiritualsubstanceis man's
soul "made new" and awakened fromamnesia and liftedfromthe darkness of evil. The soul's degree of substantialdignityis inverselyrelated
to its admixtureof nihilitas
: the "greater"or "higher"the soul, the freer
it is fromnegationand despair,and the betterdisposed to effectacts of
grace.As Jean de Lugio explains,moral freedom,forthe Cathars,consists
in the power notto sin, ratherthan in the power to sin.91The person in
90See, for
theanonymous
entitled
Breuis
summula
contra
herrares
example,
compilation
notatos
to a Franciscan
friar
in Wakefield
herecorum
circa1250-60,
and Evans
assigned
1969[op.rit.,
mutable
arenotfrom
above,n. 11),354-5:"Theysay.. . thatthings
God;
thatnothe butthedevilcreated
thesebodies.TheysaythatthegoodGoddidnotand
doesnotmakeanything
ofa perishable
nature.
TheysaythatthegoodGod doesnot
givelifeto andkillbodies;he onlygiveslife,He doesnotkill.The evilone,however,
kills."
91Whichis no "power"
at all buta falseillusion
a mimicry,
a snare.See
ofpower,
Liber
deduobus
ed.Thouzellier
1973(op.rit
., above,n. 26),181-203;
JeandeLugio,
principiis,
alsotheprayer
recited
underBlibaste's
citedbyRoch1957
bysimple
croyants
guidance,
deJacques
., above,n. 9), II, 96-7from
Fourniers
(op.rit
JeanDuvernoy,
d'Inquisition
Registre
dePamiers
Toulouse1965,II, 461-2:"e pertalquarli diapble
eramot
uque
(1318-1325),
faisque lesprometa
male be."
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137
18:33:10 PM
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ANNEDAVENPORT
As we saw, Olivi argues that Aristotlein thispassage speaks about subratherthan secundum
rem.mBut suppose this
stancessecundum
viamlogicam
is not Aristotle'smeaning? Olivi's response revealsjust how carnal he
thinksdenyingGos power to increase the soul's substancereallyis:
in theCategories
thusspeakslogically
butsupposing
thatthisis
Aristotle
(vialogica);
tobelieve
hismeaning,
Aristotle
isnottheGodofourintellect
whom
weareobliged
- as do thosewhoareoftheseedofAntichrist.102
likesomeinfallible
rule
We note that Olivi's approach to the philosophicalanalysisof substances
exemplifieshis own guidelineswith regard to selectiveappropriationof
rulesforrationaldiscoursemustbe rigorously
pagan philosophy:Aristotle's
observed,but thephilosophicalcontentof his workmustnot be uncritically
adopted, since, as Olivi passionatelyputs it, "the principlesof truthare
supremelyspiritualand abstract,and the carnal man cannot grasp them,
ratherthansensual."103
becausediscernment
or experienceof themis spiritual
The duty of spiritualman is to formallyarticulatethese higherprinciples, thusgivingriseto a more abstractand veridicalscience.Presumably,
is a sample of this
Olivi's doctrinethat substantiae
magiset minussuscipiunt
more abstractand more veridicalscience, since it makes philosophical
- what Olivi calls "diversi
room for man's varyingmetaphysicalfortunes
."
et animaram
tas statusnostrorum
corporum
etiamad hocidemadducere
illudverbum
n. 30),448:"Possumus
Philosophi,
quodforme
in numero
nisivarietur
suntsicutnumeri.
fieri
Sicutergononpotest
species
augmentum
nisivarietur
forme
fieri
inessentia
sicnonpotest
numeri,
species
cuiuscumque
augmentum
sicaugmentum
velglorie,
forme.
Si ergoanimaessentialiter
peraugmentum
grafie
augeretur
dicere."
nonessetin eademspeciecumse ipsa,quodestridiculum
101
SententiaXXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
inQuaestio
Thusinhissolutio
obiectorum
super
which
thefirst
ed.Jansen
1922(op.cit.,
rum}
above,n. 15),I, 409,Olivianswers
objection,
dicendum
incontrarium
1044a14,as follows:
"Adprimum
citesMet.VIII, 1043b32igitur
in
aequaliter
participants,
quiatuncnonattenditur
logicaliter
acceptae
quoddefinitiones
Veritas
earum."
sedsolumabsoluta
eisintensio
velremissio
earundem
differentiarum,
102Quaestio
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
XXIIofQuaestiones
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
et posito
via logicali;
in Praedicamentis
enimAristoteles
above,n. 15),I, 410: "Loquitur
cuicredere
nonestipseDeusintellectus
nostri
regulae
tanquam
quodipsehocsensisset,
Burr1971
Seefurther
illiquisuntde semine
Antichristi."
sicutfaciunt
inerrabili
teneamur,
fromOlivi's
op.at.,above,n. 75), 15-29.In thisstudy,
p. 26, Burrcitesthefollowing
ofthe
theexperience
from
deperfectone
"Aristotle
tookhisprinciples
Quaestiones
evangelica:
elements
ofthisworldandthusconsidered
sensesor from
thesensible
impossible
simply
be
. . . cannot
. . . Buttheloverofpoverty
whatever
to senseexperience
seemed
contrary
to be nothing."
ofthisworld,
forhe counts
all temporal
deceived
things
bytheelements
havesaiditanydifferently.
wouldhardly
Jeande LugioandBlibaste
103See P. Ferdinandus
tractatus
'Deperlegendis
Fr.Petri
Olivi
Delorme,
Philosophorum
Joannis
enimveritatis
in:Antonianum,
16 (1941),32-44,especially
libris'
spirip. 38: "principia
homononpotuit
tualissima
suntet abstractssima,
quiaeorum
percipere,
quae animalis
sedpotius
examinatio
seuexperientia
nonestsensualis,
spiritualis."
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18:33:10 PM
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ANNEDAVENPORT
18:33:10 PM
RICHARD CROSS
Vivarium
37,2
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RICHARD
GROSS
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18:33:18 PM
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RICHARDGROSS
and form.6As we shall see, Ockham (at least in the textI focuson here)
does not share thisbelief.For him,the onlypossiblepartsof a composite
substanceare matterand form.We need to keep thisin mindto understand
what follows.)Scotus's view is that a materialsubstanceis numerically
distinctfromthe union of its parts.7His most importantarguments
- all
which I discussin a moment
springfroma crucial centralpremiss:
(1) If a substancex has a propertythat does not inhere in (one or
more of) its parts,then x is numericallydistinctfromthe sum of
its parts.
Both Scotus and Ockham accept (1). Scotus believesthat the antecedent
of (1) is demonstrably
true,and he offersthreesortsof propertythat he
believessatisfyit: generation,corruption,and the possessionof threesorts
of necessarybut non-defining
property:proper passions,proper actions,
and properaccidents.8As just pointedout, the partsavailable on Scotus's
6 On this,
seeMarkG. Henninger,
Relations:
Medieval
Theories
1250-1325
, Oxford
1989,
68-78;alsoCross1998(op.cit.,
above,n. 2), 107-12.
7 Eleonore
hasrecently
drawn
attention
toa rather
different
sortofanti-reducStump
tionistic
sortofaccount
in themiddle
thefactthatmaterial
account,
ages:'On Aquinas's
arecomposites
ofmatter
meansthatmaterial
andform
canhaveemergent
objects
objects
ofthesystem
ofthematerial
that'areproperties
butnotproperties
properties',
properties
ofthesystem':
Substance
Dualism
andMaterialism
without
Non-Cartesian
Reductionism,
parts
Stump,
in: FaithandPhilosophy,
sortofaccount
12 (1995),505-31(p. 510).Thisis a different
viewI am discussing
from
theScotist
here.The sortsofpartsthatScotushasin mind
are matter
on Stump's
therelevant
and form;
accountofAquinas,
partsare material
- thephysical,
andbiological
ofan object.I shallignore
this
chemical,
components
parts
inwhatfollows,
different
sortofanti-reductionism
there
is no doubtthatStump's
though
ofemergent
account
is farcloserto modern
accounts
thanthemoredistincproperties
I consider
is no doubtthat
medieval
ofanti-reductionism
here.Whilethere
tively
variety
offered
anda significant
theanalysis
ofthemind-body
byStumpis challenging,
problem
contribution
to modern
debatein theissue,I strongly
doubtthatitbearsmuchobvious
holdsthat'understandresemblance
to Aquinas's
account.
to Stump,
According
Aquinas
to thewholematerial
thatis a humanbeing'(p. 512).
composite
ingis to be attributed
Whilethisis true,
overa crucial
thecaseofintellectual
difference
between
Stump
glosses
is
on theonehandandnon-intellectual
activities
on theother.
activities
Understanding
attributed
toa
tobe attributed
to a humancomposite
on thegrounds
thatitis properly
- thesoul
- thatis itself
see
form
ofthebodyofthecomposite:
thesubstantial
substance
ScG
2.
69,n. 1464(II, 204b);ST 1.75.2(I/i,352a).(NoteherethatforAquinas
Aquinas,
in
A humanbeingincludes,
thebodyis notidentical
withthewholehumancomposite.
in matter':
ST 1.76.1ad 4 (I/i,359b).)
addition
to body,a partthatis 'notimmersed
attributed
nottothesoulbuttothebodyconsidered
activities
areproperly
Non-intellectual
see ST 1. 77. 5 (I/i,373b).
as a composite
ofmatter
andform:
8 I suspect
ofa subcausalpowers
thatby'proper
actions'
Scotusmeansthenecessary
holds
invirtue
ofthesepowers),
sincehe elsewhere
stance
thantheactions
elicited
(rather
canpossess
all ofitsactivecausalpowers
andyetlackanyopportunity
thata substance
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RICHARDGROSS
can be found in Ware, writingin the late 1290s, and thusjust a few
years beforethe ScotisttextI am lookingat here. Ware argues that the
sortof account proposed by Scotus entailsan infiniteregress.Suppose a
whole includessomethingover and above its matterand form.This additional thingis presumablyrequired to explain the unityof the matter
and form.But we will need to invoke a furtherobject to explain the
.,3
unityof matter,form,and the firstunityexplainer:and so on ad infinitum
Ware too seems to accept (1). So, given his beliefthat the consequent
of (1) is false,Ware argues (like Ockham afterhim) that the properties
of a materialsubstancemustprimarilybe propertiesof its parts- thatis
to say, they must be propertieseitherof its matter,of its form,of the
relationbetweenthese two, or of any aggregateof two or more of these
parts.Ware arguesthatwhen a substanceis generatedor corrupted,what
is reallygeneratedor corruptedis the relationbetween the substance's
matterand its form:the matterand frombegin,or cease, to be united.14
fromthe view Ware attacks.
Clearly,Scotus's view is ratherdifferent
a
to
in
whole
does
not
According Scotus,
any way include
anythingbeyond
its matter,form,and the relationbetween them. It does not have any
furtherpart otherthan these parts. A whole reallyis an object numerically distinctfromthe sum of all its parts. It is this view that Ockham
criticizes.15
Various beliefsthat both Scotus and Ockham share allow the considerationsdebated here to be applicable in exactlythe same way both to
the generalcase of matterand formand to the specificcase of body and
soul. The reason is that both Scotus and Ockham believe that certain
sortsof bodies- animatebodies, forexample- have a seriesof hierarchically orderedsubstantialforms.An animatebody includesprimematter,
bodily form(givingthe body the basic structureit has), and an animating form(givingthe body thus basicallystructuredthe sortsof function
itsmaterial
at.,above,n. 9), 144,
parts:seeIn Ph.1. 17 (IV, 7a),citedin Gross1995(op.
n. 20; Gross1998(<
claimis thesort
., above,n. 2), 80,n. 7. Butthisreductionistic
op.dt
that
ofviewopposed
notbyScotus,
butbytherather
different
sortofanti-reductionism
finds
in Aquinas.
(as notedabove)Eleonore
Stump
13See Ware,InSent.
inCross1995(iop.t
Cross
., above,n. 9), 149-50;
q. 164,discussed
1998(op.dt.,
above,n. 2),83-4.
14See Ware,In Sent.
m Cross1995(op.
at.,above,n. 9),
qq. 164,172,175,discussed
150-2;Cross1998(op.dt.
, above,n. 2),84-5.
15The Ockhamist
AdamWodeham,
around1330,claimsthatOckhammiswriting
a fewyearsearlier
understands
Scotusto acceptthetheory
byWare:see
takenly
rejected
I am aboutto give
Lect.
Wodeham,
prol.1 (I, 12,11.23-6).ButI hopethattheaccount
makesitclearthatWodeham
is mistaken
aboutthis.
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RICHARD
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A fourthargumentagainstScotus does not look as thoughit need presenthimwithtoo manyproblems.On Scotus'sview,a compositeincludes
thoughis not identicalto matter,form,and relation.Relations,however,
are accidents.So, accordingto Ockham, Scotus's view entailsthata substance necessarilyincludesan accident,and thusthata substanceis necessarilya merelyaccidentalunity.As Ockham notes,any seriousAristotelian
would regardthe conclusionas absurd.22Scotus, of course,could simply
deny that all relationsare accidental.In fact,he already has to hand a
- transcendental
set of relationsthatare necessaryfeaturesof theirsubjects
relations,as he calls them. All creatureshave a dependence relationto
God. This relation is necessary,since no creaturecould exist without
God's causal sustenance.Perhaps the relationbetweenmatterand form
could be like this.23
The gist of Ockham's argumentsis that therecannot exist any composite that is numericallydistinctfromits parts. Ockham proposes two
theoriesforhow a compositecould be numericallyidenticalwith
different
the sum of its parts.As we shall see, Ockham believesthereto be overwhelmingobjectionsto the firstof these, and consequentlyaccepts the
second one.
The point of both theoriesis to overcomean obvious (but not simpleminded)objectionto the sort of view proposed by Ockham. How can a
substancebe identicalwith the sum of its parts,if it is the case (as it
seems to be for at least some substances)that the parts can existwithout the whole's existing?(As we shall see in a moment,Ockham holds
thathuman beings,forexample,have partsthatcould be separatedfrom
each other, such that the parts exist but the person no longer does.)
Ockham discussesan analogous objection in the case of an artefact,a
house: how can a whole house be identicalwith its parts,given that (if
we are very careful)we can disassemblea house, and thus destroyit,
withoutdestroyingany of its parts- its bricks,timber,and so on?24
22Qu.Var
ofthe
. 6. 2 (OTTi,
VIII, 209,11.49-57;forOckham's
graspoftherelevance
to Scotus's
view,seep. 207,11.14-20).
argument
23For'transcendental
inScotus,
arecalled)
seeHenninger
1989(op.
relations
at.,
(asthey
matter
andformareessential
thattherelations
between
above,n. 6), 78-85.Claiming
for
and theform)
stillposea problem
features
of theirsubjects
(i.e.thematter
might
But
forbelieving
matter
andform
to be separable.
becausehe hasotherreasons
Scotus,
to matter
or form;
Scotuswouldarguethattherelation
neednotbe essential
perhaps
in Scotus,
to thesubstance.
andits
it needsto be essential
Foraccidental
rather,
unity
seeCross1998(op.citabove,n. 2), 100-7.
distinction
from
substantial
unity,
* Sum.Ph.1. 19 (OPh,VI, 206-7,11.43-8).
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RICHARDGROSS
Christ'sdead body in the tomb- forcesOckham to posit thata real relation is itselfan object, a partialcause5 of the compositeof which it is a
part.
The thrustof Ockham's firsttheoryis clear enough. On both versions
of thisfirsttheory,Ockham claims that a real relationof union between
matterand formis essentialto the composite.29
But accordingto Ockham
this makes the theoryvulnerable to an objection that Ockham raises
against Scotus. The objection is that a compositesubstancenecessarily
includessomethingaccidental- namely,a relation.And, as we have seen,
the AristotelianOckham sees this as unacceptable.(I have alreadyindicated some reservationsabout this,so I will not repeat them here.)
Ockham therefore
proposesa second, more subtle,theory,one thathe
as
'more
rational'.30
This second theorydenies that the union
regards
between matterand formshould count as a real relationat all. Rather,
the union between matterand formamountsto the denial of a certain
sort of distinctionbetweenthem. On this theory,thereare varioussorts
of beingdistinct
, one of which,as we shall see in a moment,is a real relation. For matterand formto be united is thus for them to fail to have
this real relationof distinctionbetween each other.
Ockham in fact discernstwo sorts of beingdistinct.
On the firstsort,
two objects are distinctif it is impossiblefor them to become parts of
one and the same composite.31
Ockham believesthat thissortof distinction is not a real relationat all, but merelya rationalone.32The second
sortof distinction
obtainsbetweentwo objectsthatnaturallyuniteto form
one composite.Disunited matterand formare distinctin this way: if
united,formwould naturallyinhere in matter:
Whenform
in matter
it causessomething
andonebya unity
inheres
non-distinct
. . . Thisseconddistinction
thatis opposed
tothissortofdistinction.
seemstoimply
oftheinformative
to theinformatile.33
andsignify
a realactualrelation
On the second theoryunion is not a relationbut ratherthe lack of a
where the relevant
relation:it is the lack of a real relationof distinction,
sort of distinctionis that which would obtain between disunitedmatter
and form:
29Qu.Var.6. 2 (07%,VIII, 207,11.14-16, 209,11.45-8).
30Qu.Var.6. 2 (OU, VIII, 209,1.58). p.
31Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTh,VIII, 209-10,
11.62-70).
32Forrational
see the
in Ockham,
from
realrelations,
relations
andtheirdistinction
accounts
inAdams1987(<
1989(op.t
andHenninger
., above,
., above,n. 2),I, 259-67,
op.t
n. 6), 136-40.
33Qu.Var.6. 2 (077i,VIII, 210,11.75-7).
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155
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ON PARTANDWHOLE
a realrelation,
but
doesnotsignify
The unionthatis opposedto thisdistinction
is distinguished
thenegation
oftherealrelation
bywhichtheinformable
merely
theinformative.34
from
The union of matterand form,then,is just for them to lack real reladistinction.On thissortof view,a substanceis identionsof matter-form
tical with the sum of its parts,where the sum of parts is just the parts'
A substanceis not identicalwith
lackingany real relationsof distinction.
its disunitedparts,since disunitedparts include furtherentitiesblocking
On this account, a real relationis not a componentpart of a
identity.35
compositesubstance,since compositionentails merelythe lack of real
relationsof distinction
as just outlined.It is forthisreason thatI claimed
above that Ockham would not count relationsamong the possible parts
of a substance.For Ockham, the only ultimatecomponentsof a substance are its matterand form.36
and richness
This account- or all itsmetaphysical
sophistication
might
not look veryexplanatory.But the crucial claim, I think,is that matter
and formhave a naturaltendencyto unite.Matterand formuniteunless
prevented.What preventsmatterand formfromunitingare theirrelations of distinction.But no such explanatoryreal featuresare required
fortheirunion. Union is just the lack of blocks on union; no more, no
less. Of course,on thisaccount,we need a theoryof relationssufficiendy
rich to distinguishreal relationsfrommerelyrationalrelations.But the
medievais,includingOckham all accept accounts thatwill allow forthis.
(Presumably,Ockham is going to need to invoke an additionalnegative
34Qu. Var.6. 2 (077i,VIII, 210,11.80-4;forthewholediscussion,
see p. 210,11.
71-84).
35Anobvious
Aristotelian
to thissortofaccount,
towhichmatter
objection
according
whendisunited
andform
haverealrelations
ofdistinction,
is thatanygivenform
seems
tohaverelations
toinfinitely
ofmatter,
ofmatofdistinction
andanychunk
manychunks
to infinitely
ButOckham
is natudoesnotbelieve
thata form
ter,likewise,
manyforms.
to morethanoneexistent
chunkofmatter,
or a chunkofmatter
to more
rallyunited
number
thana finite
offorms.
toOckham,
therelations
ofdistinction
are
And,according
thathavenatural
inclinations
to union:see Qu. Var.6. 2
onlybetween
objects
required
(07h,VIII, 218,11.265-70).
36Previous
in Ord.1. 30,have
becauseoftheir
focuson thediscussion
commentators,
tospotthiscentred
in Ockham's
failed
modification
account
The discussion,
ofsubstance.
I think,
forwanting
warrant
to datequestion
twoof the
six,article
givesus sufficient
Variae
laterthandistinction
oftheOrdinatio.
In Qu. Var.6. 2, Ockham
Quaestiones
thirty
recounts
andrejects
bothversions
he defends
in Ord.1. 30, and replaces
ofthetheory
themwitha further
he raisesagainst
notsusceptible
to thesortofobjection
his
theory
in theOrdinatio.
theories
Thisdoesnot,ofcourse,
tellus anything
aboutthedatesofthe
other
ofquestion
sixoftheQuaestiones
articles
Variae
is itself
an
, sincethisquestion
merely
editorial
ofmiscellaneous
Ockham's
Sentence
articles,
composite
supplementing
commentary,
in mostofwhichOckham
someofScotus's
views.
directly
targets
18:33:18 PM
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difference
betweensubstancesand
it is the mostmetaphysically
significant
I
In
the
course
this
shall
see whetherOckham's
of
discussion,
aggregates.)
(and Scotus's) relianceon (1), or a principlecloselyrelatedto it, can be
defended.If it can, I shall suggestthatScotus's account is to be preferred
to Ockham's. I shall conclude by tryingbrieflyto see which thinker
Ockham or Scotus- was rightto thinkthat his view is the one held by
Aristotle.
Ockham's defenceof (1*) formspart of a wider defenceof the logical
equivalenceof a whole seriesof claims. What the argumentlacks in elebetweentwo different
Ockham distinguishes
gance it gainsin thoroughness.
sortsof Scotus's C-accidents.Some which I shall label iG]-accidents'
are simplein the sense of havingparts the same in kind as theirwhole.
(I brieflydiscussedthis sort of Ockhamistaccident above.) Others C2- are not
accidents
simple in this way. Making use of this distinction,
Ockham understands(1*) as follows:
(1**) If it is not the case thata substancex is numericallydistinctfrom
the sum of its parts,then both (a) any Cj -accidentof x inheres
in exacdy one *'s parts,and (b) any C2-accidentof x inheresin
the sum of (more than one of) x's parts.
Ockham's argumentsrequireclose analysis,via fourrelevanttextswhich
I label '(I)'-'(IV)'. First,it is easy enough to show that,for Ockham, C-accidentsbelong to a whole onlysecondarily,and in virtueof theirinherin one of the partsof a whole. Ockham offersthe following
ing primarily
to
Scotus's
firstargumentagainst reductionism:
reply
(I) I replythat,if we accept 'passion' as it impliesa thingdistinctfrom
its subject and formallyinherentin it, then I say that a composite
does not have any proper operationor proper passion that does not
belong firstto its parts. And the reason for this is that,just as is
proved elsewherein Ockham, a subjectis always exactlyas simpleas
an accidentreceivedin it. For this reason no accident that has parts
of the same sortas itselfcan be receivedfirstly
by a [composite]whole.
Rather, all the operationsand real passions that belong to a composite belong to it throughthe parts to which [theseproperties]first
belong forexample,understanding,
willing,and sensingthroughthe
like throughthe body. For this
and
such
soul; laughing,descending,
reason I say thatwhat [Scotus] believesto be unreasonableis in fact
necessary.46
46Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTVIII, 216-17,11.227-38).
See alsoIn Sent.
4. 9 {OTh,VIII, 16,
18:33:18 PM
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GROSS
RICHARD
(2) is the same, it followsthat the premissand conclusionof (2) are logically equivalent.
(Ill) is in factno help in Ockham's attemptto attackthefirstof Scotus's
since (III) establishesthe crucialsimplicity
argumentsagainstreductionism,
claim by inferencefroma reductionistic
account of substance.Ockham's
here
turns
out
Scotus
to be circular:the proof of its
argumentagainst
relies
its
on
conclusion.
Nevertheless,theremightbe otherways
premiss
forOckham to establishthe crucialsimplicity
claim. Or perhapshe could
to
it
as
an
obvious
basic
truth.
just appeal
The final piece of Ockham's overall argumentis found in another
passage:
(IV) John [i.e. John Duns Scotus] positsa formof the whole. So he can
consequentlyposit that the immediatesubjectof an accidentis that
thirdformof the composite,and thus accordingto him the immediate subject of an accidentis not exactlyas simpleas the accident
itself.But those who do not posit such a thirdformwould have to
posit thatthe immediatesubjectof any accidentis exactlyas simple
as the accident.50
There are two claims here. First,thatif a substancex is numericallydistinctfromthe sum of its parts,then it is not the case that a propertyis
exacdyas simpleas the objectin whichit inheres.In otherwords,Scotus's
anti-reductionism
entails that the antecedentof (2) is false. Secondly,if
it is not the case that a substanceis numericallydistinctfromthe sum
of its parts,then a propertyis exactlyas simple as the object in which
it inheres. Ockham's reductionismentails the antecedentof (2). Thus
Ockham believesthat his reductionismis logicallyequivalentto his simplicitycriterionforpropertyinherence.
Taking all of Ockham's argumentstogether,he evidentlyregardsthe
followingthreeclaims as logicallyequivalent:
(i) It is not the case that a substanceis numericallydistinctfromthe
sum of its parts.
(ii) A propertyis exactlyas simple as the object in which it inheres.
(iii) Both (a) any Cj -accidentof a substance* inheresin exactlyone
*'s parts,and (b) any C2-accidentof x inheresin the sum of (more
than one of) *'s parts.
50In Sent.
4. 9 (OTh
, VII, 163,11.5-11).
18:33:18 PM
OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE
165
18:33:18 PM
166
RICHARDCROSS
18:33:18 PM
OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE
167
18:33:18 PM
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Koninklijke
18:33:25 PM
169
18:33:25 PM
170
ANDREW
E. LARSEN
18:33:25 PM
171
18:33:25 PM
172
ANDREW
E. LARSEN
18:33:25 PM
173
of Arches and he went therein Januaryof 1358, along with his proctors,Richard the Cistercian abbot of Lowth Park,John of Lancaster,
and otherclerics.Hotham broughtwith him a letterfromWilliam,the
Augustininprior provincial,and PriorJohn, which attestedthatJohn
Kedingtonhad made his appeal withoutthe permissionof his order and
which rejectedhis claims.
This letterwas witnessedby FriarWilliamof Alneto,Richard of Lowth
Park,masterJohn Bodi, Richard of Tennemuth,Galfridusof St. Botulph,
John Bourtone,John Bernewik,and other unspecifiedindividuals.Unwe knowlitdeabout any of thesemen. William,Richard,and
fortunately
describedas doctorsof theology,so the others
John Bodi are specifically
weren't.
Bodi
was a Benedictinewho had been insulted
John
apparently
an
unknown
Friar
in
1357 (presumablynot John Kedington).
by
John
The othersare completelyunknownexcept fromthis document.
How much furtherthe matterwent is unknown,but Kedingtonultimatelylost his case. The appeal cannot have dragged out much longer,
sinceJohn was being punishedbyJuly,and withJohn havingbeen forbidden to pursue the matter,the court of Arches probablyrenderedits
finalverdicta few monthslater. The court of Arches turnedthe matter
back to the chancellor.Kedington'spunishmentwas overseenby the proctorsof the University
for 1358-9,WilliamDenby and RichardToulworth.
of
Hotham
John
may also have been present,althoughthe record only
says in "the year of the Lord 1358, in the time of Chancellor John
Hotham, withthe presenceof the proctorsWilliam Denby and Richard
Toulworth".17
The judgmentwas made in the presence of and with the
of
permission John'sprincipal,otherdoctors,presumablyof theology,and
priorsof John's order. It would appear, then, that Denby, Toulworth,
and possiblyHotham determinedthe sentencein consultationwith the
othersmentioned.The referenceto John's principalis puzzling,since the
Augustiniansdo not appear to have employedan officialwith that tide,
but it is probablya referenceto John, the prior of the Oxford convent.
The elementsof John's punishmentneed to be considered,because
they are unusual withinEnglish universities.His punishmentinvolved
being forcedto publiclyread a statementof apology writtenforhim, to
17Munimenta
1868[op.cit.,above,n. 3), 208:"Memorandum,
, ed. Anstey
quodanno
Domini
millesimo
trecentesimo
Hothom
octavo,
Cancellarii,
Johannis
quinquagesimo
tempore
existentibus
Procuratoribus
Willheimo
Toulworth
. . Thefactthatthe
DenbyetRicardo
document
isrecorded
intheBookoftheProctors,
rather
thanintheBookoftheChancellor,
seemstosupport
this.
18:33:25 PM
174
ANDREW
E. LARSEN
pay a fineof 100 shillings,and to be barred fromever lecturingin theology again withoutthe permissionof the chancellor,the proctors,and
all the doctorsof theology.The fineof 100 shillingsis extremelyheavy,
and may have been imposed to help the Universitymake up for the
expenses involvedin the appeal. It is certainlya non-standardpunishment, with no parallel in any other case involvingacademic debate,
although imposing a fine was justifiedby the rules governingunjust
appeals.18John, being a friar,would not have been able to pay such a
fine,and it would have fallento his order to make good the payment.
No othercase at Oxfordor Cambridgeinvolvessuch a punishment.The
recantation,althoughunparalleledin heresycases in England,has a parallel in at least one non-heresycase at Oxford and was a standardpunishmentat continentaluniversities.19
The documentexplicitlynotes that
was
to
read
the
recantation
John
exactlyas it had been writtenforhim,
withoutany changes,additionsor deletions.20
Althoughwe cannotbe certain,it appears thatthispunishmentruinedJohn's career,since he is not
mentionedin any othersurvivingdocument.
It is importantto note thatJohnwas neverexplicitly
accused of heresy,
the
he
because
statements
made
were
the
source of considundoubtedly
erable controversy
at the time and had not been formallycondemnedby
the Church. The overall impression,however,is thatJohn was treated
as ifhe were a heretic,and his retraction
readslikea recantationof heresy.
In it, he is forced to retractthe opinions he expressed about tithes
and the deprivationof ecclesiasticsand to affirmthe contrary,and to
18Unjust
as farbackas c. 1300,when
fortheuniversity
appealshadbeena problem
formaking
theuniversity
hadbeenforced
toincrease
thepenalties
unjust
Unjust
appeals.
networth,
anda scaleoffines
intothree
basedontheir
weredivided
catagories
appellants
were
offenders
withtheappellant's
The wealthiest
wasestablished
thatincreased
wealth.
fines.
in excessofstandard
fined10 shillings.
Evengiveninflation,
finewasvastly
John's
In thelate15thcentury,
to 2s. or 3s.4d.See Munifines
forappealsnormally
amounted
TheUnivered.Anstey
1868(op.cit.,
Rashdall,
menta,
above,n. 3),73-6,as wellas Hastings
andA.B.Emden,
Oxford:
sities
intheMiddle
ed. F.M.Powicke
1936),vol.3,
ofEurope
Ages,
andMedieval
Archives
, ed. Salter1920(op.dt.,above,n. 9),vol.2, 281.It is worth
136-7),
court
thattheCrownpasseda statute
forbidding
noting
appealsfromtheChancellor's
to theArchbishop's
a fewyearsafter
thiscase.
just
19Munimenta
1868(op.cit.,above,n. 3), 211-2.An unidentified
, ed. Anstey
preaching
in a sermon
friar
attacked
a University
as theSophists
thesameyearthat
groupknown
to apoloBrother
andthefriar
wasforced
It touched
offa quarrel
Johnwaspunished.
His retraction
wasmuch
theartsstudents.
forhaving
insulted
gizein a secondsermon
ofarts.
thathe didn'tintend
todetract
from
thestudy
to a statement
milder,
amounting
20Munimenta,
ed.Anstey
1868(op.cit.,above,n. 3),209:"quodlegeret
palametpublice
ddo
necdiminuendo,
necaliquaverba{erasure}
revocationem
necaddendo,
infrascriptam,
inpublico
in ecclesia
Oxoniae".
BeataeMariaeVirginis
18:33:25 PM
175
18:33:25 PM
176
ANDREW
E. LARSEN
18:33:25 PM
177
21He limited
therights
offriars
to hearconfession
and discharge
functions,
pastoral
forthesecularclergy.
See D. Wilkins,
Concilia
Britanniae
et
owingto a concern
magnae
Hiberniae
, London1737,v. 3, p. 64,andtheDictionary
, vol.10,512:
ofNational
Biography
"Simon
Islip".He alsoestablished
students
at Oxford;
A.B.
Canterbury
Collegeforsecular
A Biographical
theUniversity
vol.2, 1008.
Emden,
, Oxford
1957-9,
Register
of
Oxford
of
28Ocker1993(op.cit.,
1868(op.cit
above,n. 7),34-5.SeeMunimenta
, ed.Anstey
., above,
n. 3),207-8.
18:33:25 PM
A Fifteenth-Century
SpanishTreatiseon Consequences
JOKE SPRUYT
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
179
Before going into details about the treatise,I shall first,by way of
introduction,
presenta surveyof the contentsof the Logica.
Let me startwith a shortdescriptionof the manuscripts.5
1 Aboutthemanuscripts
and theauthor
The two manuscriptswe have at our disposal are writtenin a similar
hand. They seem to be unrelated to each other. At times they have
different
readings,and both have omissionsoccurringin different
places.
This distinctionbetweenthe Sevilla and Zaragoza codexes suggeststhat
the two scribeseach must have had access to some other copy.
1.1 Ms Sevilla
Colombina
, Biblioteca
, 7-3-13
Capitular
Our firstcopy is found in codex 7-3-13 of the Biblioteca Capitular
Colombina in Sevilla. This in quartomanuscript,datingfromthe fifteenth
century,contains 145 folios.The textis writtenin one column of about
30 lines each. In many places the textis extremelydifficult
to read as a
resultof damp stains.On the firstfolio a later hand wrote "Guillelmus
Ferrer"(presumablythe name of the scribe),followedby the title"Logica
M." Our Logicabegins on the second folioand ends on the page that is
numbered132r,but is in fact 142r,because the numbers"102- (in fact
"1012"!) 111" are used twice. In the upper margin of f.2r,the same
hand of f.lr added the old siglum "C'Z. Tab. N 6 113". The scribe
frequendywriteshispanismssuch as "sich", "tunch","diferencia","discribere","neguare","sequella",and so on insteadof "sic","tunc","differentia",
"describere","negare" and "sequela".
The Logicafoundin thismanuscript(ff.2r-132
(DO 42)r)has the following incipit
LOGICAEST racionalis
veria falsodiscretiva.
sciencia
Primo
racionalis
logicadicitur
sciencia.
Et in hocconvenit
cumaliisscienciis
seuartibus
. . . etc.
liberalibus
The colophon runs as follows:
DEO GRACIAS.LaustibisitChriste,
iste,littera
nonestformosa
quialiberexplicit
setestbenestudiosa.
ferer
vocatur
benedicatur
laudeguiPermus
quis(!)scripsit.
virgo
turpostquam
finis
librihabetur
detur
Amen.
propena(!)scriptori
gloriaeterna.
seeJokeSpruyt,
Some
onSemantic
Remarks
inTwoSpanish
Tractatus
de conseviews,
Topics
onMedieval
and
quents,in:Actsofthe12thEuropean
Symposium
LogicandSemantics:
"Logic
Semantics
inSpain1220-1550",
heldinPamplona,
26-30May,1997.
5 I amvery
to Professor
De Rijkforsharing
hisinformation
withme.
grateful
Forthecontinuation
seeoursection
2, below.
18:33:38 PM
180
JOKESPRUYT
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
181
Nota.Secundum
Scotum
decorata,
logicaestclavisaureapupureijs
argumentis
per
cuiusauxilium
reservantur.
Velaliter
secundum
Abicennam,
...(?) libraphilosophie
de secundis
intentionibus
adiunctis
... etc.
logicaestque tractat
primis
On f.r the marginalgloss is found:
Notasecundum
Albertm
se extendit
unomodoad omneilludquod
quodsignum
facitaliquidevenire
in cognicionem
alicuius
... etc.
apprehensum
On the next page, afterthe Logica
, a freshstarthas been made with a
still
in
the
same
hand:
grammaticaltract,
<S>ECUNDUMQUOD DICIT philosophus
4 in ilia
primoetichorum(!)
capitulo
incidentaliter
inventores
scienciarum
et preactores(!)
partein qua docetur
quomodo
circaearummateri<a>s
diversimode
se habent,
arciumnonsolumsunt
principia
arcium
dimidium
... etc.
ymoplusquamdimidium
Like the firstone, this tractis incomplete.It breaks offon f.145.
The firstfly-leaf
of the Zaragoza copy calls our treatise"Logica Morelli".
The Sevillacopyonlyhas "Logica M". It is likelyto assumethat"Morellus"
is a nickname,but as yetwe do not know who it belongsto. The author
is obviouslya Spanish master who skillfully
compiled his introductory
workfromtextbooksthat were currentin SouthernEurope in the fourteenthand fifteenth
centuries.
2
The contents
of theLogica8
18:33:38 PM
JOKESPRUYT
182
On thelogicof terms
dicussionof
The firstpart of the Logicaopens (2^3") with an interesting
is defined
the notionsof 'sign', 'signifying'
and 'significative'.
Next terminiis
an
in
the
soul
or
as
(3*)
somethingexpressedin words
incomplexconcept
in a non-complexway,10and thus the
or in writingthat is significative
definitioncomprisesmental,vocal and writtenterms.
10Terminus
anime
hieacceptus
etproprie
describitur
sic:terminus
estsimplex
conceptus
autaliquidvocalevelscriptum
incomplexe
significativum.
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
183
On thelogicofpropositions
18:33:38 PM
184
JOKESPRUYT
veravelfalsa,autequivalens.
24r:PROPOSICIOestoracioindicativa
perfecta
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
185
es animal'),similitudinaria
(e.g. 'ego curro,sicut tu curris'),localis(e.g. 'ego
sum ubi [ibi S] tu es'), and temporalis
(e.g. 'tu curris,dum tu moveris')
(44v-48v).Four rules are added (48v-49r):
[1] "Secundum quosdam oppositum ypotetice non dicitur proposicio
ypotetica",
[2] "Oppositum copulative equivalei disiunctivefacte ex contradictoriis
parciumilliuscopulative",
[3] "Oppositum disiunctiveequivalet copulative facte ex contradictoriis
parciumilliusdisiunctive",
[4] "Oppositum racionalis significaiopposito modo ad proposicionem
racionalem,et proposiciocondicionalissignificai
oppositomodo ad proposicionem condicionalem,et oppositumcausalis significaioppositomodo ad
proposicionemcausalem, et ita de omnibus aliis speciebus".
The thirdchapter of the second Part (49v-75r)deals with the probacionesproposicionum
, in the wake of the fourteenth-century
Billinghamtradition.11Making use of the twelfthdivision presentedin the firstPart,
in which mediate termsas opposed to immediatetermswere definedas
those owing to which propositionscan be verifiedor falsifiedby reducthreetypes
ing themto simpleprotocolsentences,the authordistinguishes
of mediate propositions,viz resoluble,exponible and officiablepropositions.Next theirdifferent
verifications
are discussedalong much the same
linesas in the treatisesof the Billinghamtradition.This discussionincludes
an extensiveaccount of exclusive(54v-58r),exceptive(58r-60r)and reduplicative (60r-62v)propositions.Next the remainingtypes of exponible
, comparativeand
propositions(containingexponibletermsas idem,differ
superlativeterms,or incipitand desinitetc.)are dealt with (62v-71r).The
of modal propositions(71r-75r).
chapterwinds up with the verification
2.3
On argumentation
, the
Startingoffwith the well known Boethian definitionof argumentum
thirdPart of our Logicadeals with induction,exemplum,12
enthymema,
and syllogism(75r-81v).The syllogistic
modes and figuresare extensively
11See L.M. de
14thCentury
Tracts
ontheProbationes
Terminorum.
Martin
Rijk,Some
of
Alnwick
Richard
andOthers
1982(= Artistarium,
O.F.M.,
, Edward
, Nijmegen
Billingham
Upton
3).
As usual,thewayexemplum
is instanced
is indicative
ofthecouleur
locale
ofourtreatise:"Exemplum
estquo unumsimile
utcumdicitur
similitudinem,
probatur
peralterius
contra
Gallicos
malum
contra
Castellanos
est;ergoAragonenses
'Anglicos
pugnare
pugnare
malum
est".The sameexample
is found
in theZaragozamanuscript.
18:33:38 PM
186
JOKESPRUYT
On universais
and categories
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
187
118V119r:PREDICAMENTUM
alicuius
genere
largeaccipitur
progeneralissimo
decern
coordinacionis15
[119r]Et istomododicuntur
predicamenta
predicamentalis.
scilicet
decern
substancia,
relacio,
accio,pasquantitas,
qualitas,
genera
generalissima,
et habitus.
Sed predicamentum
sio,ubi,quando[quanta5],situs,
accipitur
proprie
scilicet
et specierum,
difomnium
terminorum,
generum
prototacoordinacione
seuindividua.
factaa generalissimo
ad specialissima
etindividuorum
ferencia<ru>m
decern
decern
cooridinaciones
Et istomodosimiliter
dicuntur
predipredicamenta
scilicet
ex decern
modispredicandi
velsignificandi
camentales
diversimode,
sumpte
substancie,
relacionis,
accionis,
ubi,
quantitatis,
passionis,
qualitatis,
predicamentum
estcoordinacio
termiUndepredicamentum
substancie
quando,situs,et habitus.
estcoordinacio
etpredicamentum
norum
substancie;
<quantitatis
significat<iv>orum
et predicamentum
estcoordinaterminorum
qualitatis>
significativorum
quantitatis;
etpredicamentum
relacionis
estcoordinacioterminorum
significativorum
qualitatis;
estcoordinacio
etpredicamentum
accionis
cioterminorum
relacionis;
significativorum
terminorum
et predicamentum
estcoordinacio
accionis;
significativorum
passionis
termiterminorum
et predicamentum
ubiestcoordinacio
significativorum
passionis;
terminonorumsignificativorum
loci;et predicamentum
quandoestcoordinacio
et predicamentum
rumsignificativorum
situsestcoordinacio
terminorum
temporis;
et predicamentum
estcoordinacio
habitus
terminorum
significativorum
posicionis;
habitus
circacorpus.
significativorum
Ex quibuspatetquodterminus
substancie
dicitur
de predicamento
significativus
utly'homo','animal',
sedterminus
de predicamento
estde
substancie,
quantitatis
et itade omnibus
aliis.Et sic<ut>suntdecern
maneries
predicamento
quantitatis;
sicdicuntur
decern
terminorum,
significacionum
predicamenta.
Secundo
nonpotest
patetquodidemterminus
pereandem
significacionem
[ponunt
sedperdiversas
S' essediversorum
predicamentorum,
significaciones
potest
poniin
diversis
Utly'albus',quiaformaliter
ideo[etS]
predicamentis.
significai
qualitatem,
<sed quiafundamentaliter
subperse in predicamento
ponitur
qualitatis,
significai
inpredicamento
stanciam
substancie.
Similiter
>, ideoponitur
peraccidens
ly'pater'
formaliter
ideoponitur
sed
relacionem,
relacionis,
significai
perse in predicamento
ideo [non5] ponitur
in
substanciam,
quia fundamentaliter
significai
peraccidens
substancie.
ideo[non
Sedquialy'homo'solumsignificai
substanciam,
predicamento
Et huiusmodi.
substancie.
5] ponitur
<perse> in predicamento
Next, the ten categoriesare discussedone by one (119r-131v).Folio 120v
has a pictureof the Arbor
porphyriana.
2.5
On thears obligandi
The fifthand last Part (13 1v-142r) of the LogicaMorelliis about the ars
obligandi.
Obligadois definedas follows:
131v:OBLIGACIOhiesumpta
estadmissio
describitur
sic:obligacio
ad
respondentis
ad aliquid
admissum
sifuerit
tenetur
opponentem
quarespondens
propositum,
responderesecundum
si oppoexigenciam
signi[Scsignificatum
5] obligacionis.
Exemplum:
nensdicatrespondenti
"Ponotibiistam
'tuesRome'",etrespondens
dixerit
"Admitto",
tuncfacta
siveadmissio
estistaobligacio
tenetur
"Concedo
respondere
quarespondens
illamproposicionem
'tues Rome',si fuerit
et hocsecundum
proposita",
exigenciam
15Thespelling
ofthiswordbothin theZaragozaandin theSevillacopies("cohordithetacitassociation
of'ordo'and'cohors'.
nacionis")
betrays
18:33:38 PM
188
JOKESPRUYT
huiussigniobligacionis
tenetur
scilicet
negando
'pono'.Et deponens
respondere,
utinferius
dicetur.
secundum
istius
exigenciam
signiobligacionis
'depono',
which in his
Subsequently,the author refersto an alternativedefinition,
is
opinion,however, inadequate:
estoracio[ordinacio
Vel alitersecundum
131v-132r:
5] comObligacio
quosdam:
et obligto.
"Ponotibiistam
utcumdicitur
positaex signis
Exemplum,
obligacionis
vocatur
'tues Rome'",tunctotaistaoraciovocatur
etly'ponotibiistam'
obligacio,
et 'tu es Rome'vocatur
et huiusmodi.
Sed talis
obligacionis,
obligtm;
signum
videtur
insufficiens,
quia ex talidescripcione
sequitur
quod,si opponens
descripcio
dixerit
"Ponotibiistam'tues Rome'"absqueadmissione
5]
[dimissione
respondenti
essetobligacio;
factaab ipsorespondente,
[132r]
quianondicitur
quodessetfalsum,
sibi
donecrespondens
admiserit
quamopponens
proprie
obligacio
proposicionem
S]; ethuiusmodi.
S] veldeposuit
5] velimposuit
[deponit
[imponit
posuit[opponit
and
, deposicio
Next, the threekindsof obligationare discussed,viz.posicio
a
of
rules
After
the
last
number
rule,
,
imposicio
(132r-142r).
including large
which concernsthe impositionof an impertinent
proposition(e.g. tues
lapis'), the explicitruns as follows:
142r:Et hecsintdictade terciaspecieet ultima
et,perconsequens,
obligacionum
huiuslogice.
de quintapartesiveultima
DEO GRACIAS
There is a colophon in the same hand.16
So much for the contentsof the Logica.Let us now say a few things
about the sectionon consequences.17
3
3.1
on consequences
The section
Shortsurvey
of thecontents
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
189
18:33:38 PM
190
JOKESPRUYT
The description
of consequences
18:33:38 PM
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
A I5-C. SPANISH
191
non
essesicut
bona
dicitur
cuius
adequate
significatur
perantecedens
consequentie
potest
consequentia
anddicitur
nonbonavelnon
suum
nisisitsicut
consequentia
perconsequens
adequate
significatur
antecedens
licet
non
sitsicut
esse
sicsicut
valere
stat
significatur
adequate
persuum
quando
significatur
adequate
persuum
consequens2"1
this was one of the
et adequatum
As to the expressionprimm
significatimi,
of a proposition,as opposed to the secondaryone, whichwere
significates
by logicians in the wake of Paul of Venice.23Our author
distinguished
about
this
notion in a precedingsectionof the Logica
, when dealspoke
of
The
or
total signifiwith
the
ing
signification propositions.
adequate
cate of a propositionis the resultof the combinationof all the partsthat
make up the proposition,whereas the partiglisignificateis the resultof
the combinationof onlypart of thepropositions^elements.As an example
the author uses homoest asinus
esse
, which adequately signifieshominem
esse.Again, the primary(adequate) signifianimal
, and partiallyhominem
cate of a propositionis set apart fromthe secondaryone; the primary
essehominem
and the
(adequate) significateof e.g. Sortesesthomois Sortem
follows
one
is
hominem
esse
animal.
The
latter
is
what
from
the
secondary
propositionwe startedoffwith.24This use of primaryand secondary
meaning is closelylinked up with Paul of Venice's terminologyin the
Logicamagna(II, II).25
Our authorsummariseshis descriptionsof the consequenda
bonawiththe
remarkthat the only thingrequiredfor a valid consequence is that the
consequentfollowsfromthe antecedent,irrespectiveof whethertheyare
both trueor false,whereasfora consequence to be invalidit is sufficient
thatthe consequentdoes not followfromthe antecedens.His last remark
about what it means to concede or to deny a consequence seems to be
a practicadremarkabout how one should handle consequencesin actual
arguments{MDC 1,9).
The finalparagraphsof this introductory
chapter raise the notion of
causal consequences.Our authoris inclinedto followthosewho reckonthem
should be
definition
among the consequences,but in thatcase a different
used: in a valid causal consequence the state of affairssignifiedby its
22De cons.,
1.1.02,ed. Seaton1973[op.t.yabove,n. 18),1.
23Forthegeneral
ofthisidea,seeNuchelmans
1980{op.cit.,above,n. 2),
background
45 ff.
24See De
Rijk(op.cit.,above,n. 8).
25SeeL.M.
deRijk,Semantics
inRichard
andJohannes
Venator
Maier
, in:Alfonso
Billingham
inItaly
inthe14th
and15th
Centuries
(ed.),English
Logic
(= Actsofthe5thEuropean
Symposium
on Medieval
Rome,10-14November
1980),167-83,
LogicandSemantics,
esp.172-5.
18:33:38 PM
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192
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193
18:33:38 PM
194
JOKESPRUYT
3.3 Rulesofvalidconsequence
In the second chapterthe anonymouslistsfourgeneralrulesof valid consequence. In factwhat is presentedis a more elaborateaccount of validity as it pertainsto consequence. The firstand second rules {MDC II,
1-2) actuallyfollowfromthe definitionof a valid consequencethe author
had given earlieron. In Strode's treatisetheyare not mentionedas separate rules,but merelyas parts of the descriptionof what a consequentia
bona is.32The third rule {MDC 11,3) correspondswith Strode's 24th,33
and the fourthrule {MDC 11,4)with Strode's 21st.34
Having presentedthese general rules of valid consequence,the author
then proceeds to look at a numberof consequenceswhich appear to be
truebut are disqualifiedby the rules.The consequenceshe discussesare
all aimed to show that one should always make a distinctionbetween
a propositionand its significate,
and that consequence concernsthe significateof propositions.In his explanationof what goes wrong,it seems
that what underliesthis type of distinctionis the principlethat validity
is applied to states of affairs,and not to the truthof the propositions
est
themselves.For instance,one cannot inferDeus est;ergohecproposicio
veraDeus est3,because it is possible that no such propositionexists,while
it stillis the case thatGod exists{MDC 11,5),nor is one entitledto infer
3est
'homoestasinus
hecproposicio
vera;ergohomoestasinus,forthe reason that
3 could
at some futuretime the proposition(homo
estasinus
signifythatGod
exists
while
it
that
man
is an ass {MDC
would
still
not
be
the
case
,
obviously
est vera;ergohomoestasinus
11,6).Again, the consequences nullaproposicio
are rejected
and nullaproposicio
estnegativa;
estaffirmativa
proposido
ergoomnis
on the suppositionthattherecould be a timewhen no propositionexists.
estnegaThe consequence omnisproposicio
estaffirmativa;
ergonullaproposido
tiva
, on the otherhand, is valid, because, owing to the existentialimport
of the antecedent,there is no case in which the opposite of the consequent does not contradictthe antecedent{MDC 11,6-7).
In the thirdchapterthe general rulespertainingto valid formalinferences are discussed.Most of the rules the authorpresentscan be found
is
oflaterdevelopments
zurGeistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters,
XXXVIII).A discussion
inJokeSpruyt,
Thirteenth
Positions
ontheRuleEx impossibili
found
quidlisequitur
Century
161-93.
bet,in thesamevolume,
32De cons.,
., above,n. 18),1.
1.1.02,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit
SiDe cons.,
contradictoed.Seaton1973(op.cit.,
above,n. 18),5: 24aregula:
oppositum
riumconseqeuntis
nonpotest
starecumantecendente.
* De cons.,
ex consi arguitur
ed. beatn1973(op.at.,above,n. 18),5: 21a regula:
estbona.
tradictorio
ad contradictorium
antecedents,
consequentia
consequentis
18:33:38 PM
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18:33:38 PM
196
JOKESPRUYT
The operativeword in this consequence is sic (or ita). This word can be
understoodin two ways. Firstit can be interpretedas a state of affairs
(our author speaks of a mode of being') which is asserted.In that case
the consequent,expressingin some mode of being that nothingis, contradictsthe antecedent,which states that nothingis. And if nothingis,
thismeans thatit is not true to say thatin some mode of being it is the
case that nothingis. If, on the otherhand, the word sic (or ita) is taken
as a mode of nothingnessor negation,thenthe consequencenichilest; ergo
sic est quodnichilestdoes hold good, but then it followsthat nothingis
[MDC 111,25-26),which means that the inferencenichilest;ergoaliquidest
is not acceptable.
Anotherrule foundin Morelli's tractthat does not featurein Strode's
treatiseis one that does not pertainto a singleconsequence,but to the
relationshipbetweena numberof consequencesused in an longerargument. This rule states the conditionsfor the validityof an argumenta
{MDC 11,36).
primoad ultimum
Of the general rules mentionedin Strode some are missingin our
author'stract.These are the 3rd and 4th,43and the 21st,22nd, 23rd and
24th44rules.As far as Strode's 23rd45rule is concerned,our authordoes
not approve of it as it stands,on the groundsthat one can know thata
consequence is valid, and know the antecedent,but this does not mean
a te our
that one knows the consequent. Thus to the phrase intellectum
author prefersthe expressionscituma te esse verum
, which is something
other than simplyscituma te. The reason for puttingit this way is his
contentionthat in order foryou to know a proposition,you mustknow
the terms.And thisis not the case if you are dealing withsome Hebrew
proposition,for instance,of which you know that it is true,but you do
not know what the termssignify[MDC 111,16).
So much for the rules of consequence headed under the categoryof
general ones. In the fourthchapter of our treatisethe author turnsto
specificrules.
43De cons.,
erititasicut
ed. Seaton1973(op.rit.,
above,n. 18),4: 3a regula:
aliquando
4a regula:
tuncerititasicutsignificatur
perconsequens.
significatur
perantecedens;
igitur
noneritsicutsignificatur
tuncnonerititasicut
significatur
igitur
aliquando
perconsequens;
perantecedens.
44Decons.,
siarguitur
excontradictorio
n. 18),5: 21aregula:
ed.Seaton1973(op.cit.,
above,
siarguitur
estbona.22aregula:
ad contradictorium
antecedentis,
consequentis
consequentia
...
conclusionis
cumaltera
alterius
exopposito
premissarum,
sequitur
oppositum
premisse.
starecumantecedente.
contradictorium
nonpotest
24a regula:
consequentis
oppositum
45De cons.,
si antecedens
estinteled.Seaton1973{op.cit.,
above,n. 18),5: 23a regula:
estintellectum
a te.
lectum
a te,consequens
18:33:38 PM
TREATISE
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197
on specific
rulesofconsequence
3.4 Someremarks
This firstchapterdevotedto specificrulesof consequencedeals withrules
betweenterms.This chapof consequenceconcerningspecial relationships
similar
as
de spealibusreglines
Strode's
ter is organisedalong
capitulum
ulis.46It startsoffwith rules relatingto the inferius-superius
relationship
betweenterms.The firstfourrulesof our treatise{MDC IV,2; IV,7; IV,8;
difference
betweenthe two authors
IV,9) resembleStrode's.One significant
here is that our anonymouspresentstwo rules that are not found in
adds fivenew rules,of which
Strode {MDC IV, 10-11), and furthermore
he says thattheyfollowfromthe firstsix he has given {MDC IV, 16-20).
The fivenew rules listedin this sectionof the fourthchapterdo not
relareallyappear to have any directconnectionwith the inferius-superius
tionship.The firstone seems to linkup witha remarkmade by Burley,47
and also by Buridan concerningthe invalidityof consequencesinvolving
adiacensand "est"tertium
adiacens.Accordingto Buridan, a
"est"secundum
to
adiacens "est"secundum
adiacensis formally
consequencefrom"est"tertium
not valid due to the fact that a propositionof the form eB estA3 could
be an instanceof ampliation,as in homoestmortuus.
Our anonymousstates
mode is permitted,provided
that such a consequence in the affirmative
no termsare involvedthatwould preventthis,in the formof a distracting
(<distrahens
),48ampliativeor equivocatingterm {MDC IV, 16).49To this he
adds anotherrule accountingforthe validityof consequencesin the negativemode from"est"secundum
adiacens
to "est"tertium
adiacens
{MDC IV, 17).
The thirdrule on the list,statingthata consequence froma dictum
secunis not valid is actuallya reformulation
dumquidto a dictum
of
simpliciter
the fallacysecundum
et
The
last
of
of
secrules
this
quid simpliciter.
couple
tion state the invalidityof consequences froma non-ampliatedterm to
an ampliatedone and vice versa {MDC IV, 19-20).
The next relationshipour anonymousdeals with is convertibility
and
The
first
rule
resembles
of
but
one
IV,
Strode's,
{MDC
22)
correlativity.
46De cons.,
2.1.01,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),42.
47De puniate
artislogicae
tractatus
St. Bonaventure,
N.Y.
, I, 3, ed. Ph. Boehner,
longior
1955,5717"20.
o thistermsee GabrielNuchelmans,
tertium
Foran explanation
Secundum/
adiacens.
Amsterdam
Vicissitudes
Nederlandse
1992pp. 29-30(= Koninklijke
distinction}
ofa logical
vandeAfdeling
Akademie
vanWetenschappen.
Nieuwe
Letterkunde,
Reeks,
Mededelingen
55 no. 10).
49Forotherlogicians
whomentioned
inferential
schemes
to est secundum
pertaining
adiacens
and "est"
tertium
adiacens
, seeNuchelmans
(op.cit.,above,n. 48),pp. 30ff.
18:33:38 PM
198
JOKESPRUYT
50Cf.Strode,
De cons.,
above,n. 18),81: Secundareg2.4.02,ed. Seaton1973{op.cit.,
et
et copuleet predicate;
duarum
ula est:quandosubiecta
convertuntur,
propositionum
et
et proeiusdem
et qualitatis
sunteiusdem
precise
supponunt;
quantitatis
propositiones
termini
consimiliter
se habent
situs;tuncab unaad aliam,conseqeuntia
quo ad ordinem
tenet.
51De cons.,
2.4.03,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),82: Tertiaregulaestquod
illudverbum
in qua predicatur
ad convertentia,
relativa
dicuntur
quia ex propositione
terminus
unussimplex
et subicitur
'est'secundum
relativus,
adiacens,
seqeuitur
propositio
relativus.
in qua subicitur
alterterminus
" De puntate
III 2, ed. Boehner
1955(op.at., above,n. 4-7),
artis
tractatus
longior,
Logicae
124M3113.
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
4
199
remarks
Concluding
From the themesdiscussedI hope to have shown how the presenttreatise on consequenceshas benefitedfrompreviousauthorsand uses material froma numberof traditions.
Particularly
Ralph Strode'sworkappears
to play a major role in our tract. Of course there are differences
too,
not onlyin the ways in whichthe rulesare formulated.The presenttract
seems to have a more strictorganisationthan Strode's. For example,the
modal termsand the different
rules that pertain to them are discussed
in a separatesection.The waysin whichthe authorsformulatetheirrules
is not entirelythe same either,nor are the typesof examples analysed.
Moreover,sometimesStrode has ruleswhich are missingin our tract,or
the other way round. Besides borrowingfromStrode, the treatisealso
containselementsthatgo back to otherimportantworkson logic. As we
have seen, connectionscan be made with Walter Burley,John Buridan,
Paul of Venice, and Richard Billingham.53
Maastricht
ofMaastricht
University
53Sincere
thanks
aredueto Professor
Braakhuis
forhishelpful
comments
on an earlierdraft
ofthispaper.
18:33:38 PM
JOKESPRUYT
200
sigla:
Z
5
=
=
=
Zc
=
Sc
add.
coni.
=
exp.
=
om.
=
=
]
=
?
=
/
< ... > =
=
[. . .]
DE CONSEQJJWCIIS
CAPITULUM PRIMUM
De descriponibus
consequenciarum
18:33:38 PM
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ON CONSEQUENCES
201
Ex quibus descripcionibusa
patetquod consequenciaest duplex,scilicet
racionalis
et
in hoc
proposicio
proposiciocondicionalis.Et tales differunt
quia in racionali proposicio precedens vocaliter notam consequencie
dicitur'antecedens' et proposicio sequens notam consequencie vocatur
'consequens', sed in condicionali proposicio sequens immediatenotam
consequenciedicitur'antecedens',et aliab proposicio,sive prcdt sive
subsequatur,[ 66r] vocatur'consequens'. Utc cum dicitur'tu es animal,
si tu es homo', hic talis proposicio 'tu es homo' diciturantecedens,et
talis proposicio 'tu es animal' vocatur consequens huius consequencie.
Quidam ponuntproposicionemcausalem esse consequenciamet alii non,
ut cum dicitur'quia homo currit,animal currit';de qua diceturinferius.
a
b
discrecionibus
Z ^ *'Z aliquaS c ut]Zet S
descripcionibusS
4 Antecedensestproposicioprecedensmentaliter
notamconsequencie,ex
dnott
Sed
est
qua
sequi sequens.
consequens
proposiciosequens mentaliternotam consequencie,que denotatursequi ex antecedente.[S 82^]
Ut cum dicitur'homo currit;ergo animalcurrit',hic talisproposicio'homo
currit'precedensnotamconsequenciediciturantecedens,sed talisproposicio 'animal currit'sequens notam consequencievocaturconsequensistius
consequencie.Ex quibus patetquod antecedenssemperpeceditsive antecedit suum consequens,et hoc dupliciter:aliquando enim peceditmentaliteret vocaliterina simul,ut in sillogismoet in consequenciaracionali,
aliquando peceditsolum mentaliter,ut in consequencia condicionali,ut
cum dicitur'animal currit,si homo currit',et huiusmodi.
a in. . .
ut]om.S
5
Consequenciarumaquedam diciturbona, quedam diciturmala. Consequencia bona est consequencia cuius primmet adequatum significatum
antecedentisnon potest esse absque primo et adequato significato13
sui
consequentis.Ut talis consequencia est bona 'homo currit;ergo animal
currit',quia hominemcurrere,quod estprimumet adequatumsignificatum
suic antecedentis,nond potest esse absque hoc, scilicetanimal currere,
sui consequentis.Similiter
quod est primumet adequatum significatum
talisconsequenciaest bona 'si homo est asinus,homo est rudibilis',quia
hominemesse asinum non potestesse nisi sit ita quod homo sit rudibilis,
et huiusmodi.
a
b
Z significato]om.Z sui]5 om.Z d non con"
consequenciarum]/^
consequencia
om
S
tis]
Z
sequen
18:33:38 PM
202
JOKESPRUYT
sequenciam.
a
valet]^ om.Z
9 Ex predictisinfertur
quod ad bonitatemconsequencienon plus requiritur nisi quod consequens sequatur ex antecedenteeiusdem consequencie, sive ambo sint vera sive falsa; et ad consequenciammalam sufficit
quod consequens eius non sequatur ex eius antecedente.Secundo infertur quod concedere consequenciamest concedere eius consequenssequi
ex eius antecedente,sed negare consequenciam est negare eius consequens sequi ex eius antecedente.
10 Sed quidam ponunt proposicionemcausalem esse consequenciam.
Et tunc talis diciturconsequencia bona quando res significataper eius
18:33:38 PM
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TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
203
18:33:38 PM
204
JOKESPRUYT
Quarta regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
ex contradictorio
consequentis
sequiturcontradictorium
a
tunc
bona.
antecedents
eiusdem
est
consequencie, consequencia
Exemplum:talis consequenciaest bona 'homo currit;ergo animai currit',
quia sequitur'nullum animal currit;ergo nullus homo curri. Similiter
talis consequencia est bona 'tu es homo; ergo tu nonb es asinus', quia
sequitur'tu es asinus; ergo tu non es homo', eodemc demonstrato.
a
om.S
om.S b non]
om.Z c eodemdemonstrato]^
tunc]
5 Ex predictisdescripcionibusconsequenciebone et consequenciemale
inferuntur
quedam consequencie que videnturesse bone etb non sunt
bone. Primo: talis consequencia non valet 'Deus est; ergo hec proposicio
est vera "Deus estc"',quia potestesse sicutprimoet adequate significato
18:33:38 PM
TREATISE
A I5-C. SPANISH
ON CONSEQUENCES
205
per eius antecedens absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate
significatur
per eius consequens,quia, posito tali casu quod eras nulla sit
perd hoc
proposicio,tunc erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur
antecedens'Deus est',tarnennon eritita6sicutprimoet adequatesignificatur
per hoc consequens'hec proposicioestvera "Deus est"', quia talisproposicio non erit.
a
et add.S b et. . . bone]om.S c est]
Z d Per significatur]
Zc$om
predictis]
regulis
c
om.S ita]f
istaS
6 Secundo:talisconsequncianon valethecproposicio"homo est asinus"
est vera; ergo homo est asinus', quia, posito quod eras talis 'proposicio
homo estasinus'significet
Deum esse,tuneerititaasicutbprimoet adequate
significatur
per eius antecedens,tarnennon eritita sicutprimoet adequate
significatur
per eius consequens.Tercio: talisconsequncianon valet 'nulla
proposicioest vera; ergo homo est asinus5,quia, posito casu quod pro
aliquo temporefuturonulla proposicio sit, tunc erit itac sicut primo et
adequate significatur
per eius antecedens,tarnennon eritita sicutprimo
et adequate significatur
per eius consequens.
a
b
. . . ita]Z'S om
$
Z ito]^' om
ita]istaS sicut
7 Quarto: talisconsequncianon valet 'nulla proposicioest negativa;ergo
eodem casu posito.Sed talisconsequncia
omnisproposicioest affirmativa',
est bona 'omnis [S 84^ proposicioest affirmativa;
ergo nulla proposicio
est negativa', quia oppositum consequentis rpugnt eius antecedenti.
Quinto: talis consequncia non valet 'solus asinus demonstratur;
ergo tu
non es homo', quia, posito casu quod post unam horam solus [Z 68r]
asinusdemonstratur
te dicente'iste asinus currit',tunc eritita sicutprimo
et adequate significatur
per eius antecedens; tamena non erit ita sicut
et
primo adequate significatur
per hoc consequens'tu non es homo', quia
asini non oportette desinereesse hominem.
propterdemonstracionem
a
om.Z
tamen]S
8 Consimiliter
concediturtalisproposicio'hoc est et hoc non est', eodem
demonstrato,quia hoc est, demonstratoaSorte, et hoc non est, demonstratoAntichristovel chimera. Ergob hoc est et hoc non est, eodem
demonstrato,idest dum idem demonstratur,
quia verum est quod idem
si
idem
Sortes
Sorti demonstratur,
et
demonstratur,
demonstratur,
quia
licet per utrumque'hoc' non idem
per consequens idem demonstratur,
et huiusmodi. Sed si arguatur 'Antichristusvel chimera
demonstratur,
demonstratur
vel chimeraest', non valet
per lyc"hoc"; ergo Antichristus
18:33:38 PM
206
JOKESPRUYT
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
207
11
b
a
materialis
Z
ad add.S quia]S quodZ materialiter]5
sequitur]
CAPITULUM TERTIUM
De regulis
generalibus
consequencie
formalis
1 Regule generales consequencie formalissunt decern et octo. Prima
regula:
dus est
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
antecedens
estverum
, consequens
verun.
18:33:38 PM
208
JOKESPRUYT
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
209
consequcntiam
regulam]om.S sicJ^'Som.Z consequens]
g
et. . . econverso]
omom.S fantecedens]
om.S e neque. . . sumptum]/
Z
S
consequens
S ethuiusmodi
add.Z
S hpars]om.S 1intuenti]
4
Secunda regula:
estfalsum
eiusboneetformalisconsequens
Si alicuiusconsequencie
, antecedens
estfalsum.
derrf
Exemplum:talisconsequnciaestbona 'tu es asinus;ergo tu non es homo';
cuius consequensest falsum,ergo antecedenseiusdemest falsum,et huiusmodi. Si quis negat istummodum arguendi,habet admittereoppositum
consequentiscum antecedente.Et tunc est danda consequencia bona et
formaliscuius consequens est falsumet antecedenseiusdem non est falsum,ergo antecedensest verum,cum omnisproposiciobsitvera vel falsa.
Et tunc erit consequencia bona et formaliscuius antecedensestcverum
et consequens0falsum,quod est oppositumprime reguleprecedentis.Ex
quo potestinferricontradiccio,sicut in predicta6regula.
a
b
veladd.S c est]eritS consequens]
eritadd.S c pre eiusS proposicio]
eiusdem]
dicta]S
primaZ
Sed talis modus arguendi non valet "antecedensillius consequencie
69^ nunc significainon potest
precise et primariesignificandosicut
esse verumsine consequente,vel nisi consequenssit verum;ergo illa consequencia est bona", quia talis consequencia non valet 'nulla proposicio
estvera;ergotu es asinus',cuiusantecedens3
preciseet primariesignificando
non
esse
sicut nunc significat
verum; ergo non potestesse verum
potest
sine consequentenec cum consequente,quia si tale antecedenssitverum,
sequiturquod aliqua proposicioest vera et nulla proposicioest vera, quod
est contradiccio.
a
S
Z antecedente
antecedens]
5
Secundo: talis modus arguendi non valet "antecedens illius consequenciea potestesse verumsine consequenteutroque preciseet primarie
ergo illa consequencia non valet", quia talis consequencia
significante15;
est bonac ctues homo, [S 86^ ergo tu es animal'; cuius antecedenspotest
esse verumsine consequente,posito casu quod in aliquo futuro0instanti
talisproposiciositvera 'tu es homo', nulla alia6 remanente,et huiusmodi.
Tercio: talis modo arguendi non valet "antecedens illius consequencie
potestesse verum,consequenteexistentefalso;ergo illa consequencianon
valet", quia talis consequencia est bona 'tu es asinus; ergo tu non es
6
18:33:38 PM
210
JOKESPRUYT
Tercia regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalisantecedens
est necessarium
, consequens
eiusdem
estnecessarium.
Exemplum: talis consequncia est bona 'Deus est; ergo Deus est', cuius
antecedensest necessarium,ergo consequenseiusdemest necessarium,et
huiusmodi.Unde diciturquod ex necessario non sequitur [Z 70r] nisi
necesarium.Si quis negatistummodumarguendi,habet admitiereoppositum consequentiscum antecedente.Et tunc est danda consequenciabona
et formaliscuius antecedensest necessariumet consequens eiusdemnon
est necessarium,ergo tale consequensest contingensvel impossibile,cum
omnis proposiciosit necessariavel contingensvel impossibilis.E gracia
exempli:sit Cb illa consequencia,cuius antecedens0necessariumsit A, et
consequensdcontingensvel impossibilesit B. [5 87r] Et tunc arguitursic:
A est necessarium;ergo sicut primo et adequate significatur
per A non
potestnon esse; et B, sive sit contingenssive sit impossibile,ergo6sicut
primo et adequate significatur
per B potest non esse. Ex quo sequitur
sicut
et
quod
primo adequate significatur
per antecedensA potestessef
18:33:38 PM
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JOKESPRUYT
om.S velimpossibilis]
om.S c bonaJ^Som.Z
12 Contra regulamarguitursic: Talis consequenciaest bona 'omne currens est asinusa;omnis homo est currens;ergo omnis homo est asinus5,
cuius antecedensest possibileet consequensimpossibile.Ergo regulafalsa.
Dico quod tam antecedensquam consequensilliusconsequencieestimpossibile. Licet enimbutraque pars antecedentissit possibilis,tamen totum
antecedensest impossibile,quia est una copulativacompositaex maiori
et minorique sunt proposicionesincompossibilesc.
a
in S delSc c incompossibiles]
et add.S b enim]
asinus]
ZCSimpossibiles
Z
13 Sexta regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
estimpossibile
eius, antecedens
consequens
1
dem estimpossibile.
Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona 'si homo est asinus, homo est
rudibilis';cuius consequens est impossibile,ergo antecedenseiusdem est
impossibile,et huiusmodi.Si quis negat istum modum arguendi,habet
admitiereoppositumconsequentiscum antecedente.Et tunc est danda
consequenciabona [S 881] et formaliscuius consequensest impossibileet
antecedenseiusdem non est impossibile,ergo tale antecedensest possibile, cum omnis proposiciosit possibilisvel impossibilis.Ex quo infertur
quod erit bona consequencia et formaliscuius antecedenserit possibile
18:33:38 PM
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et consequenseritimpossibile.
Quod estoppositumquintereguleprecedentis.
a
S eiusZ
eiusdem]
14
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214
JOKESPRUYT
17 Octava regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
scitea te esseboneconsequens
esttibidubium
, antecedens
.
eiusdema.
esttibidubiumvelcreditum
essefalsum
Exemplum:talis consequncia est bona et scita a te esse bona 'rex sedet;
ergo rex sede, cuius consequensest tibi dubium et antecedenseiusdemb
est tibi dubium. Similitertalis consequncia est scita a te esse bona 'rex
sedete nullusrex sedet;ergo rex sede, cuius consequensest tibidubium
et antecedenscreditumesse falsum,quia tale antecedensest copulativa
ex partibusade invicemcontradictoriisf,
et huiusmodi.Sed talis
composita41
modus arguendinon valet "consequensilliusconsequencieest tibidubium
et antecedenseiusdem est tibi dubium vel creditumesse falsum;ergo illa
consequncia estgbona", quiah talis consequncia non valet 'rex sedet;
ergopapa dormit',cuius tam consequensquam antecedensest tibidubium,
et huiusmodi.
a
b
factaZ * ad
Z'S om.
eiusdem]
Z'S om.Z etJ
Z ergS d compositia]^
fZ eiusdem]
h
g
om.
om.
contradicentibus
est
invicem]
Z'S Z contradictoriis]S
Z
^5" Z quia]opposibona]
tumconsequentis
statcumantecedente
add.Z
18 Nona regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalisantecedens
est concedendum,
consequens
eiusdem
estconcedendum.
Exemplum:talis consequncia est bona et formalis'tu es homo; ergo tu
esa animal', cuius antecedensest concedendum,ergo consequenseius est
et huiusmodi.Sed talismodusarguendinon valet"antecedens
concedendum,
illius consequencie [/71"] est concedendumetbconsequens eiusdem est
concedendum;ergo consequencia est bona", quia talis consequncianon
valet 'tu moveris;ergo tu curris',cuius tam antecedensquam consequens
est concedendum0,posito casu quod tu curras,et huiusmodi.
a es
19 Decima regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
estnegandum
eius, antecedens
consequens
demestnegandum.
Exemplum:talisconsequenciaest bona et formalis'si tu es asinus,tu non
es homo', cuius consequens est negandum,ergo antecedenseiusdem est
negandum.Similitertalis consequencia est bona [S 89r] 'nichilest; ergo
nullus deus est', cuius consequens est negandum,ergo antecedenseiusdem est negandum,et huiusmodi.
20 Ex istis regulispatet quod si alicuius consequencie antecedensest
concedendum et consequens eiusdem est negandum, illa consequencia
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18:33:38 PM
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JOKESPRUYT
est. Ergo aliquo modo est quod nichilest,et aliquo modo est quod nichil
estd.Ergo aliquis modus esteetfaliquis modus est. Ergo aliquid est. Ergo8
a primo antecedenteultimumconsequens sequiturformaliter
'nichilest;
ergo aliquid est5.
a S om. b
d
c
S c ergo. . . tertium
est]
Zf antecedents]
est]om.S est]om.S
consequents
8
S a primo
autemantecedente
est]bisinS et. . . est]
^6" om.Z erg antecedente]
Z
24 Dico quod talis consequncia est materialis'nichil est; ergo aliquid est', quia eius antecedensest impossibile,vel consequensnecessarium,
et eius consequensnonaincluditur
in antecedente.Sed ad probaformaliter
cionem potest respondendupliciter.Uno modo quod illabprima consequncia probacionisest materialiset non formalisc'si nichilest; ergo sic
est quod nichilest', quia eius antecedensestdimpossibile,et consequens
non est de intellectusui6 antecedentis.Et ideo non omnes ille consenon includitur'nichil
quenciefsunt bone et formales8.Quare formaliter
est'. Ergo aliquid esth.
a
b
add.S c formalist
formaliter
S d est]
S dicitur
non]bisinS illa]consequncia
Z c su^
S fconsequencie]
add.necnon
del.Z gformales]
S
formalis
antecedentis]
consequents
que
h S ont.
est]
Z
25 Alio modo faciendotalemdistinccionem
de ly 'sic' vel 'ita'. Quoda potest
enim
'sic'
vel
'ita' dicitmodmentitatisb
vel
accipi dupliciter:aliquando
ly
ut
cum
dicitur'homo est; ergo sic est vel ita est quod homo
affirmacionis,
velaffirmacionis
estquodhomoest.Et tune illa
est', idest aliquomodoentitatis
non
valet
de
forma
'nichil
est;
consequncia
ergo sic est quod nichilest',
eius
modo
entitatisest quod nichil
quia
consequenssignificaiquod aliquo
est. Quod esset falsum antecedente supposito, quiac si nichil est, nec
aliquis modus entitatisest, et per consequens neque aliquo modo entitatisest quod nichilest. Aliquando ly 'sic' vel 'ita' dicitmodumnichilitatis
vel negacionis.Etd isto modo concediturilla prima consequencia 'nichil
vel negacionisest
est; ergo sic est quod nichil est'. Via vero nichilitatis
quod nichil est.
a
b
sicsaepius
S c quia]S quodZ det. . . nega emtitatisf/j
quod. . . ita]Z'S om.Z entitatis]
om.S
cionis]
26 Sed negetursecunda consequencia,scilice 'sic est quod nichilest;
ergo aliquo modo est quodb nichil est; ergo aliquis modus es', quia
vel negacio, quia modus nichilitatis
arguitura secundum
quidad simpliter
nis proprievel simpliciter
non est aliquis modus,scilicetentitatis.Et ideo
<non> omnes iste consequencie sunt bone et formales,quia formaliter
non includitur'nichilest; ergo aliquid est'. Consimiliterpotestresponden
ad tale argumentum'nulla chimeraest; ergo sic est quod nulla chimera
18:33:38 PM
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217
est; ergo aliquo modo est quod nulla chimeraest et aliquo modo est quod
nulla chimeraest; ergodaliquis modus est et aliquis modus est; ergo aliquid est'; a primo antecedenteade ultimumconsequens sequitur 'nulla
chimera est; ergo [S 90r] aliquid est', cuius antecedens est pure negaEt ita de similibusf.
tivumet consequensaffirmativum.
c
e
a
h
S d ergo. . . alterum
est]^c5om.Z
CSom.Z est]om
si S quod. . . est]
scilicet]
add.Z
et huiusmodi
ad]Z quiaS rsimilibus]
[Z 72"] Tercia decima regula:
boneetformalis
Si alicuiusconsequencie
, illudpotest
aliquidstatcumantecedente
non
.
econverso
sed
starecumdus consequente
,
Exemplum:talisconsequnciaest bona et formalis'homo currit;ergo animal curri.Sed talisproposicio'homo est albus' statcum hoc antecedente
'homo curri,quia simulstant'homo curriet 'homo est albus'. Ergo illa
poteststarecum eius consequente,quia simulstant'animaicurri,et 'homo
est albus', et huiusmodi.Sed dixi in regula "sed non econverso",quia
talis proposicio 'nullus homo curri potest stare cum hoc consequente
'animal curri,sed illa non poteststarecum eius antecedente3,
quia 'nullus homo curri et 'homo curri repugnantad invicem.Sed talis modus
arguendinon valet "ista consequencia est bona; ergo quicquid stat cum
eius antecedentestat cum consequenteeiusdem",quia stat aliquam consequenciamesse bonam, ut inb ista 'homo currit;ergo animai curri,et
quod nichilstetcum eius antecedenteet consequente,et huiusmodi.
a
S b in ista]illeS
antecedente]
consequente
27
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JOKESPRUYT
30
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219
31
Decima septimaregula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
ex antecedente
et consealiquidsequitur
, illudpotestsequiex eiusantecedente
quente
perse.
bona
talis
est
et
formalis'homo currit;ergo aniconsequncia
Exemplum:
mal curri.Sed talisproposicioSubstanciacurrisequiturex antecedente
et consequente. Ergo illa potest sequi ex antecedenteper se, ut patet
intuenti.
32 [S 9 1r] Contra istas duasa regulas precedentesarguiturdupliciter.
Primocontradecimamquintamregulamsic. Talis consequnciaest bona
et formalis'pater est; ergo suus filiusest5.Sed ista proposicio'filiusestbi
anteceditad eius antecedens,quia bene sequitur'filiusest; ergo pater est'.
Tamen ipsa non anteceditad eius consequens,quia non sequitur'filius
est; ergo suus filiusest'. Ergo istiusconsequencie bone et formalisaliquid anteceditad eius antecedensquod non potestantecederead eius consequens. Ergo regula es falsa.
a
b
c S om.Z
duas]om.S est]om.S est]
Secunda arguiturcontra decimam sextm regulamsic. Talis consequncia est bona et formalis'bipedalis linea est; ergo pedlis linea est'.
Sed talisproposicio'linea semipedalisest eius maxima medietas'sequitur
ad eius consequens, quia bene sequitur 'pedalisa linea estb; ergo linea
semipedaliscest eius maxima medietas'.Tamen ipsa non sequiturex eius
antecedente,quia non sequitur'bipedalislinea est; ergo linea semipedalis
est eius maxima medietas',cum sitdantecedensverum ' 73*] et consequens falsum.Ergo illius consequenciebone et formalisaliquid sequitur
ex eius consequentequod non sequiturex eius antecedente.Et per consequens regula est falsa.
d
a
b 5 om. c
$
Z semipedalis]
Z'S semipedis
Z S^Z om
Z'S pedisZ est]
pedlis]
33
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220
JOKESPRUYT
35 Ad secundum3respondetur
consimilimodo, quando eius talisproposicio 'linea semipedalisest eius maxima [591^ medietas'infertur
ex consequente, tunc illud relativum'eius' referturad ly* 'pedlis linea'; sed
ex antecedente,tuncrefertur
ad ly 'bipedalislineab'.Et sic
quando infertur
non remaneteadem proposiciopropter0relacionisvariacionem,sed dicitur
alia proposicioque refertur
ad consequens etd alia proposicioque refertur ad antecedens.Et sic non est contra regulam.Et itae de similibus.
a
b
d
S secundam
S bipedalis
secundum]
Z ty]SiUudZ bipedalis
Z' pedlis
Z et. . .
linea]
refertur]
Z'S om.Z e ita]Z sicS
36
Secundo diciturin regula "et non variate",quia [ 74r] tunc consequencie non dicunturvariate quando solum illud quod est consequens
prioris consequencie es antecedens alterius consequencie immediateb
sequentis,et sic de singulisconsequenciarumintermediarumusque ad
ultimam.Ut patetin primoexemplohuiusregule.Sed consequenciedicuntur variatequando aliquidcfueritantecedens[S 92r] vel pars antecedentis alicuius consequencieintermediequod non fueritconsequens alterius
consequencieimmediate0precedentis.Ut cum dicitur:homo currit,ergo
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Secunda regula:
Ab inferiori
ad suumsuperins
a partesubiecti
cumnegacione
etfacta
postposita,
debitaconstancia
eiusdem
de eodeminferiori
et sinedistribucione
inferisuperioris
aliis terminis
oriset superioris
eiusdem
manentibus
omnino
, omnibus
consequencie
estbonaetformalis.
consimilibus
, consequencia
'homo
non currit;ergo animainon curri,et huiusut
Exemplum, sequitur
modi. Primodiciturin regula"cum negacionepostposita",quia cum neganon valet. Ut non sequitur'non
cione prepositaconsequencia formaliter
homo currit;et omnishomo est animai; ergo non animai curri.Secundo
dicitur"cum debitaconstanciasubiecti",quia sine constanciasuperiorisde
non valet. Ut non sequitur'asieodema inferiori
consequenciaformaliter
ut dictumfuitbin regula precenus non currit;ergo animai non currit5,
dente. [,Z 75r] Tercio dicitur"sine distribucioneinferioriset superioris",
quia cum tali distribucioneconsequencia formaliternon valet. Ut non
sequitur'omnis homo non currit;et omnis homo est animai; ergo omne
animal non curri. Quarto dicitur"omnibus aliis terminiseiusdem consequencie manentibusomnino consimilibus".Et ideo talis consequencia
non valet 'homo non est albus et omnis homo est animai; ergo animai
non est coloratum',et huiusmodi.
a
b
estS
eodem]
Ze om'Z$
8
Tercia regula:
ethcumdisAb inferiori
ad suumsuperius
, sed2-a partepredicati,
affirmative
et
existentis
in
antecedente
subiecti
eiusdem
tribucione
, conconsequente
afirmativa
estbona.
sequencia
Exemplum,ut <sequitur> 'omnis homo currit;ergo omnis homo moveseud cum distur', et huiusmodi.Primo in regula dicitur"affirmative0",
cum
distribucione
seu
tribucioneaffirmativa,
negativa,
quia negative,
non valet. Ut non sequitur'nullus homo currit;
consequenciaformaliter
ergo nullus homo [S 93^ movetur'. Sed dico "formaliter",quia talis6
consequencia est bona de materia 'nullus homo est homo; ergo nullus
homo est animai', et huiusmodi.
c
a
b
5 d seu. . . affirmativa]
del.Zc c
affirmativa
sed]S om.Z et]$om-Z affirmative]
S
om.
Z
talis]
9
Quarta regula:
seda partesubiecti
ad suumsuperius
Ab inferiori
, cumdiconeexcluaffirmative,
eiusdem
manentibus
et superiori
terminis
siva additainferiori
, ceteris
consequencie
estbonaetformalis.
omnino
consimilibus
, consequencia
Exemplum,utasequitur'tantumhomo currit;ergo tantumanimai curri,
et huiusmodi.Sed dixi"a partesubiecti",quia a partepredicaticonsequencia
18:33:38 PM
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JOKESPRUYT
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18:33:38 PM
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JOKESPRUYT
distrahente",
quia non sequitur'Adam estmortuus;ergoAdam est'.Secundo
dixi "sine terminoampliativo",quia nond sequitur'Antichristus
est genest9.Tercio dixi "sine terminoequivocanteseu
erabilis;ergo Antichristus
impedientealium terminma suo principalisignificato",
quia non sequitur
'Cesar est pictus6;ergo Cesar est5,vel 'Cesar est homo pictus;ergo Cesar
est5.Quarto dixi "sed non econverso55,
quia non sequitur'homo est; ergo
homo est albusf5,vel 'ergo homo curri,et huiusmodi.
a
b
S apliante
om.Z
S d non]cS
quodadd.Z ampliativo]
Z c significato]
significate
c regula]
f
.
.
.
alterum
est
om.
S albus]
pictus
]Z
asinusS
17 Secunda regula:
A secundo
adiacente
ad ipsumtertium
adiacensnegative
etsinetermino
distrahente
et ampliativo
e termino
seu
alium
terminm
a
suoprinequivocante impediente
est
bona
sed
non
econverso.
,
cipalisignificato,
consequemia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'nullus homo est; ergobnullus homo es albus5,
et sequitur'nullushomo est; ergo nullushomo curri,et huiusmodi.Primo
dixi in regula "sine terminodistrahente,quia nond sequitur'Adam non
est; ergo Adam non est mortuus5.Secundo dixi "sine terminoamplianon est; ergo Antichristus
non est
tivo55,
quia non sequitur'Antichristus
Tercio dixi "sine terminoequivocante
generabilisvel [Z 76"] generandus5.
seu impedientealium terminma suo principalisignificato55,
quia non
'Cesar
non
Cesar
non
est
vele
Cesar
non
est; ergo
sequitur
pictus5
'ergo
est homo pictus5.Quarto dixi "sed non econverso55,
quia non sequitur
'nullus homo est albusf;ergo nullus homo est5,et huiusmodi.
a
a Z b erg]c
om.Z c est]f
om.Z d nonsequitur]
nonS c vel]om.
et]cS
sequitur
f
S albus]
Z asinusS
18 [S 95r] Tercia regula:
A dictosecundum
nonvalet,
quidad dictum
simpliciter
consequncia
sed accipiendo "dictumsecundumquid55stricte.Quod potestfieriquatuor
modis.Primocum terminodiminuentestricteaccepto.Et ideo non sequitur
'Ethiopsest albus secundumdentes;ergo Ethiopsest albus5.Similiternon
sequitur'chimera est ens fictum;ergo chimera est ensa5.Secundo cum
terminodistrahente,
ut non sequitur'homo est homo mortuus;ergo homo
est homo5.Tertio cum terminoampliativo,ut non sequitur'Antichristus
est homo generabilis;ergoAntichristus
est homo5,et non sequitur'chimera
est ens opinabile; ergo chimera est ens5. Quarto cum terminoequivocante seu impedientealium terminma suo principalisignificato,
ut non
'iste
estb
homo
iste
est
homo5.
Unde
iste
terminus
sequitur
pictus; ergo
'homo5per se significat
hominemverum,sed cum adiunccionehuius termini 'pictus5equivocaturcad significandum
hominempictum,et per contunc
a
suo
sequens
impeditur
principali significato,quia principaliter
18:33:38 PM
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JOKESPRUYT
sineverbosignificante
actum
Ab uno convertibili
ad reliquum
suumconvertibile,
anime
tam
bona
.
est
, consequncia
,
quamnegative
affirmative
ut sequitur'homo currit;ergo risibile0curri,et
Exemplum affirmative,
sequiturctues homo; ergo tu es risibilis'.Exemplumcnegative,ut sequitur
nullushomo currit;ergo nullum risibilecurri. Et sequitur'tu non es
homo; ergo tu non es risibilis',et huiusmodi.Sed diciturin regula "sine
verbosignificante
actumanime",quia cum verbosignificante
actumanime
consequencia formaliternon valet. Ut non sequitur 'scio istum esse
hominem;ergodscio istumesse risibilem',quia stat quod sciam et intelligam aliquem esse hominem,seu racionem6formalemquare est homo,
ignorandofseu nesciendogeius propriampassionem.
a
c
om.S b risibile]
. . . risibilis]^
S rationale
om.S d ergo. . .
Z exemplum
terminorum],
e
racionalem
Sf
formalem
formaliter
om.S racionem
hominem]
formalem]^
Z racione
g
et
non
hoc
suam
add.
ignorando]
intelligendo propriam
passionem Zm nesciendo]
neciendo^S
Ex qua regula patet quoda
ah diffinicione
ad suumdiffinitum
tamaffirmative
consearguendo
quamnegative
quenciaestbona, et econverso.
ut sequitur'tu es homo; ergo tu es animalracinale
Exemplumaffirmative,
mortale',et econverso.Exemplumcnegative,ut sequitur'tu non es homo;
ergo tu non es animal racinale mortale',et huiusmodi.
22
b
S c exemplum
. . . mortale]
S om.Z
quod]quareS a diffinicione]
ad diffinicionem
23 [S 96r] Terminiconvertibili
suntmultplices.Primoterminisinonimi,
ut 'Marcusa', 'Tullius', 'Cicerob' Secundo species et sua propria passio,
ut suntly 'homo' et lyc'risibilis0'
et ly 'asinus' et 'rudibilis6',
et ly 'equus' et
et huiusmodi. Tercio diffinicioet suum diffinitum,
ut ly
ly hinnibilisf,
'homo' et ly8'animal racinale mortale'.Quarto discripcioet suum disdicunturproposicionesque mutuo
criptum,et similes.Similiterconvertibilia
sehsequuntur,' 77^ ut suntproposicionesequipollentesad invicem.Et
proposicioconvertenset sua conversa1,et proposicioexponibiliset copulativa compositaex omnibussuis exponentibus^,
et proposicioresolubilisk
et copulativa facta ex omnibus suis resolventibus,
cum quibus convertiedam
et1
sua
tur;
describens,et similes,de quibus
proposiciodescriptibilis
inferiusdicetur,ubi determinatur"1
de consequenciiscathegoricarum.
a
b
et
add.
S
scicero
om'
S c ly]Z om.S d risibilis]
sicsaepius
Z
marcus]
cicero]
resibilis)
f
S c rudibilis]
S
hinnibile
resibilis hinnibilis]
boset mugibilis
S g ly]^om.S hse]^ om.
Z
S 1conversa]
conversoi
S kresolubilis]
S1
m
(!) S exponentibus]^
compositis
exponibilis
cum
determinantur
S
et]^
Z determinatur]^
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
229
24 Contra regulam arguitur sic, quia non sequitur 'iste asinus est
risibilisa;ergo iste asinus est homo', quia antecedensest verum etb consequens falsum,posito casu quod iste asinus sit Sortisc.Secundo nond
sequitur'risibileest propriumhominis;ergo homo est propriumhominis5.
Tercio, isti terminisunt convertibiles:ly 'homo5 et 'tantumhomo5,sed
non sequitur'homo est; ergo tantumhomo est5.Ergo regula est falsa.
a
S
$ c sortis]
5 sortes
idesthomoadd.Zmb ci]Z om
Z d non]om
risibilis]
consimiliumcasuum
25 Ad primumdico quod ly 'homo5et ly 'risibilis5
Sed ly 'homo5 nominativicasus et ly 'risibilis5
sunt terminiconvertibiles.
ut patet in proposito.Ad secundum
non
sunt
casus
convertibilia,
genitivi
sunt
dico quod quando ly 'risibile5et lya'homo5accipiunturpersonaliterb,
in
ut
sed quando accipiunturmaterialiter,
terminiconvertibiles,
proposito,
Ad terciumdico quod ly 'homo5et 'tantumhomo5
non suntconvertibilia.
Sed talis proposicio 'tantumhomo est5potest accipi
nonc convertuntur.
modo
de subiectoexcluso,et tunc sequituret convertitur
unod
dupliciter:
cum illa [.S 96"] 'homo es5, alio modo exclusiveseu tamquam proposicio
proprie exclusiva, et tune non sequitur ex illa 'homo est5. Et ita de
similibusf.
a
S primo
5 om.Z d unomodo]
. . . accipiuntur]
om"
$ b personaliter
com.Z non]
WZ
e
est
add.
S de
et
aliud
homo
est
homo
nichil
et
quam
Z est] significai
quodaliquidquod
add.Zmfsimilibus]
et huiusadditasubiecto
in quintaregulade exclusivis
hochabetur
modiadd.Z
26 Secunda regula:
cumisto
a partesubiteti
suumcorrelatiuum
ad reliquum
Ab unocorrelativorum
adiacente
tam
verbo' es <singulari>de secundo
, con,
affirmative
quamnegative
estbona.
sequncia
ut sequitur'pater est; ergo filiusest5,et sequitur
Exemplumaffirmative,
'dominus est; ergo servus est5,et sequitur 'agens est; ergo patiens est5.
Exemplum negative,ut sequitur'pater non est; ergo filiusnon est5,et
huiusmodi.Primo dixi in regula "a parte subiecti55,
quia a parte predicati consequencianon valet,ut non sequitur'tu es pater; ergo tu es filius5.
Secundo dixi "cum isto verbo 'es5 singulari55,
quia cum verbo plurali
'filii
non
ut
non
sunt; ergo patres sunt5.
valet,
sequitur
consequencia
non
Similitercum verbo de preteritoconsequencia
valet,ut non sequitur
'pater fuit;ergo filiusfuit5.Similitercum verbo de futuroconsequencia
non valet,ut non sequitur'pater erit;ergo filiuserit5.Similitercum verbo
adiectivoconsequencianon valet,ut non sequitur'pater15
currit;ergo filius
cum
tercio adiacente
dixi
"de
secundo
currit5.Tercio
adiacente55,quia
non valet,ut non sequitur'pater est bonus; ergo
consequenciaformaliter
filiusest bonus5,et huiusmodi.
18:33:38 PM
230
JOKESPRUYT
a est
estZ om.S b pater. . . sequitur]
om.S
singulari]
cor27 Quidam dicuntquod ly 'parens' et 'filians'suntproprie3[
bene
et
non
et
relative,
sequitur'parens est; ergo
lyb'pater5 'filius',quia
filiansest', et econverso,sed non sequitur'paterest; ergo filiusest', neque
econverso,quiac statesse patremet habebitfiliam,et non filium.Similiter
potestesse filiusquia habeatdmatrem,et none patrem,et istudstatfsatis
simplicitateopinionis.Alii dicuntquod ly 'pater' et 'filiusg'possuntaccipi
dupliciter.Uno modo logicaliterseu in communigenere,et tunc dicuntur11
proprie correlativasicut ly 'parens' [S 97r] et 'filians'.Alio modo
seu in masculinogenere,et tunc simpliciternon dicuntur
gramaticaliter
correlativanisi cum disiunccioneutriusquesexus- ut sunt1ly 'pater veP
mater',et ly 'filiusvel filia' , et tuncsequitur'paterest; ergofiliusvel filia
est', et econverso 'filiusest; ergo pater vel mater est', et huiusmodi.Et
istudest satisdefendibilis
opininionis.Consimiliterpotestdici de istiscorrelativis'dominus' et 'servus',et 'magister'et 'discipulus',et huiusmodi.
a
b
6
S
habebat
S om.
Z quia]^5" om.Z habeat]S
Z ty]^omZ c non]
proprie]
fstat. . . propria
g
est
satisfacere
bene
add.necnon
Zh
opinionis] 1
opinionis
filius]
quia
sequitur
exp.
S dicuntur]^
S sunt]
dicunt
om.S j vel]et Z
28 Sed talis regula non est generalisomnibuscorrelativis,
nisi arguitur
cum tali adiunccionea'est' vel 'fuit'vel 'eri vel 'poteritesse'. Et rcio
est: AJiquandoenim consequncia valet cum isto verbo 'est' de secundo
adiacente,ut 'pater est; ergo filiusest'. Aliquando consequenciavalet cum
ly 'est' vel 'fuit',utb sequitur'quantum est; ergo quantum est vel fuit'.
Aliquando consequencia valet cum lyc 'est' vel 'eri, ut sequitur'prius
est; ergo poteriusest vel eri. Dum enim priorpars motusvel temporis
est, pars posterior0non est, sed erit vel poteritesse. Ideo non sequitur
'hoc prius est; ergo suum posteriusest', et huiusmodi.Aliquando consequencia valet cum lye 'est' vel 'poteritesse', ut sequitur'scibile est; ergo
sciencia est vel poteritesse'. Similitersequitur'productumest; ergo productibileest vel poteritesse', et huiusmodi.Unde talis materia correlativorumtangitmateriamrelacionumf.Que est altiorisspeculacionis8.Et
ideo de hac materia supersedeo,causa brevitatisretinendeet puerorum
faciliorisintelleccionisservandeh.
a
c
d
S b utsequitur]
adiunccio
S motus
adiunccione]
om.S ly]5hocverboZ posterior]
f
c
8
taverboZ relacionum]
S relativi
S
Z
posterioris
ly]^
Z
speculacionis]/
speculaciones
h
conservande
S
servande]/^
29 Tercia regula,et ultima:
Ab active?ad suamh
consimili
modo
, terminis
, consequenpassivem
supponentibus
cia estbona, et econverso.
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
231
18:33:38 PM
232
JOKESPRUYT
Secunda regula:
De quocumque
termino
in rectocumverbosubstantivo
de presenti
et sineimpedimento
unumoppositorum
contrariorum
, tammediatorum
affirmatur
quamimmediab eodemestnegabile
suumcontrarium.
atorum,
reliquum
mediatorumtamain concreto0quam in
[ 98r] Exemplumcontrariorum
ut
'Sortes
est
abstracto, sequitur
albus; ergo Sortes non est niger', et
sequitur'istud accidens est albedo; ergo istud accidens non est nigredo',
et huiusmodi0.Exemplumcontrariorum
immediatorumtam concretorum
ut
Sortesd
est sanus; ergo Sortes non est
quam abstractorum, sequitur
et
'hoc
accidens
est
sanitas;ergo hoc accidensnon est egrieger', sequitur
tudo'. Similitersequitur'hec virtusest iusticia;ergo hec virtusnon est
et huiusmodi.Sed econversoformaliter
iniusticia6',
consequncianon valet,
ex
formaliter
non
affirmativa.
Ut non sequitur
quia
pura negativa
sequitur
'Sortes
non
est albus; ergo Sortes est niger',quia antecedensest
[Z 79r]
verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quod nullusSortessit,velfposito casu quod Sortesnon sit albusgneque niger,sed sit medio colore coloratus.Sed cum constanciain contrariisimmediatish
valet consequncia,
uti sequitur'Sortes non est sanus et Sortes est; ergo Sortes est eger', et
huiusmodi.Et predictecondicionesregulepossuntdeclararisicutin regula precedenti.
a
om.Z b concreto]
rectoZ huiusmodi]^
S d sortes
econverso
. . . sequitur]
tam]cS
om.S e iniusticia]
iusticia
S fvel]S sedZ 8 albus]
in mediatis
S himmediatis]
S1
Z om
ut]Z et 5
32
33
Tercia regula:
De quocumque
termino
in rectocumverbosubstantivo
et sineterminis
depresenti
divinissivecorrelavis
unumcontradictorium
et ab eodem
affirmatur
incomplexo,
estnegabile
suum
contradictorum
reliquum
incomplexorum.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes est homo; ergo Sortesnon est non-homo',
et sequitur'Sortes est non-asinus;ergo Sortes nona est asinus', et huiusmodi. Sed econversoformaliter
consequncianon valet,quia ex pura negativa formaliter
non sequituraffirmativa.
Ut non sequitur'Sortesnon est
Sortes
estb
homo; ergo
non-homo',quia antecedensest verumet consequens falsum,posito casu quod nullus Sortes sit. Similiternon sequitur
'chimeranon est animai; ergo chimeraest nonc-animal',quia antecedens
[S 98^] est verum et consequens falsum.Sed econversocum constancia
subiectivalet consequncia, ut sequitur'Sortes non est homo et Sortes
est; ergo Sortesest non-homo',et sequitur'Sortesnon est asinuset idemd
Sortes est; ergo Sortes6est non-asinus',et huiusmodi.
a non
nonestZ d idem]
om.
est]estnon& estS b estnon]nonestS c estnon]/c
c
S sortes]
Z'S om.Z
18:33:38 PM
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
A I5-C. SPANISH
233
b
a
add.S add.necnon
Z om.S
Z fProeadem]
Z'S suppono
exp.Zc supponente]
dpatet]quodS subiecto
affirmatur
sicsaepius
Zc om.Z$ 8
dicitur]
Z affirmantur]^
substantivo]
et]ZCom.ZS
36 Contra regulam arguitursic. Teiles proposicionessunt vere 'Sortes
albo et alio exisest albus' et 'Sortes est non-albusa',uno Sorte existente0
tentenigro.Ergo de eodem terminoinc recto cum verbo substantivode
duo contradictoria
incomplexa.
presentiet sine terminisdivinisdaffirmatur
istud argumentumvel simevitandum
ad
falsa.
es
Quidam
Ergo regula
ile ponerentin regula "de quocumque terminosingulariseu discreto".
Sedfnon oportet,quia licetille proposicionessintverein quibus affirmantur
duo contradictoriaincomplexa,tarnencum hocg stat quod exh utraque
illarumpotest sequi proposicio negativa in qua negabituralterumcon-
18:33:38 PM
234
JOKESPRUYT
tradictorum
incomplexorum.Unde si Sortesest albus,bene sequiturquod
non est albus, et1si Sortes non est albus, bene sequitur
Sortes
aliquis
Sortes
est albus, quia omnes iste proposicionesstan simul
quod aliquis
sine contradiccione,posito casu predicto.Consimilekargumentumpotest
fiericontra secundam regulamprecedentemde oppositiscontrariis,quia
tales proposicionesstant1simul 'Sortes est albus5et 'Sortes est niger',uno
Sorte existentealbo et alio existentenigro,et huiusmodi.
a
undeadd.Zb sorte
sorteSc in]S om.Zd divinis]
albus]
existente]
modoexistente
c S om. fsed
idemZ g hoc]S verboZ hex]5 inZ 1et. . . alterum
Z est]
Z
albus]^
non]f
1
om.S j stant]
S suntZ
S consimiliter
S suntZ kconsimile]
Z stant]
37
Quarta regula:
De quocumque
termino
in rectocumverbosubstantivo
depresenti
unum
qffirmatur
ab
eodem
est
suum
.
oppositorum
privative,
negabile
privative
reliquum
oppositum
Exemplum, ut sequitur*'Sortes est videns; ergo Sortes non est cecus'.
Similitersequitur'Sortes est cecus; ergo Sortes non est videns',et huiusmodi. Sed econversoconsequenciaformaliter
non valet,quia ex pura negativa formaliter
non sequituraffirmativa.
Ut non sequitur'Sortes non [
80r] est cecus; ergo Sortes est videns',quia antecedensest verumet consequens falsum,posito casu quod nichilbsit Sortes. Sed cum constancia
et temporedeterminatovalet consequencia, ut sequitur'Sortes non est
cecus; et Sortes est; ergo Sortes est videns',et huiusmodic.Et dixi "cum
temporedeterminato",quia canis non diciturproprie'cecus' ante novem
dies. Et ideo sine tali temporedeterminato,non sequiturd'iste canis non
est videns,et iste canis est; ergo iste canis est cecus', et huiusmodi.Et
predictecondicionesregulepossuntdeclaran sicut in regula precedente.
a
S om.Z b nichil
sitsortes]
S nullus
sortes
sitZ c huiusmodi]
seddixicumtemsequitur]
valet
determinato
ut
nonestcecuset sortes
sortes
estergo
pore
consequencia sequitur
sortes
estvidens
add.necnon
exp.Z d sequitur]
om.S
39 [S 99"] Quinta regula,et ultima:
A nomine
habitusaffirmative
cumistoverbocesad normtsue opposite
privacio3
nis cumistoverbo'potes
estbona.
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes est videns;ergo Sortespotest0esse cecus'.
Sed econverso,a nomine privacionisaffirmative
cum isto verbo est ad
nomen sui habituscum isto verbo 'potest',consequencia formaliter
non
saltem
naturaliter
ut
non
est
'Sortes
valet,
cecus; ergo
loquendo,
sequitur
Sortespotes esse videns',et huiusmodi.Unde secundumAristotilem,
in
, abd habitu possibile est devenirein privacionem,sed a
Postpredicamentis
privacionead habitmimpossibilisest regressio6.
a
S b potest]
Se
potest]
possunt
Z$ potest]
Z$ d at>habitu]
habitm
poterit
poterit
S regressus
scilicet
habitu
add.ZT et huiusmodi
add.Z
Z sequente
regressio]
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
235
CAPITULUM QUINTUM
De consequenciis
proposicionum
cathegoricarum
1 De consequenciisproposicionumcathegoricarumest quintuplexordo.
concernentbus
habitudinem
terminorum
infinitoruma
Primode consequenciis
et privativorumb
et suorumoppositorum.Secundo de consequenciisconcernentbusquantitatemcproposicionum.Tercio de consequenciisconcernentbus
probacionesproposicionumQuarto de consequenciisproposiet reduplicativarum.
cionumexclusivarum,
Quinto,et ultimo,
exceptivarumd
sensumcompositumet sensumdivisum.
de consequenciisconcernentbus
De quibus per ordinemest agendum.
a
. . . conS c quantitatem
infini
tivorumf/jZ h privativorum]
privatorum
infinitorum]S
d
S
.
.
.
et
om.
exceptivarum
proposicionum
cernentbus]^^Z exceptivarumreduplicativarum]
etreduplicativorum
Z
habitudinem
terminorum
concementibus
De consequenciis
infinitorum,
et suorum
oppositorum
privativorum
infinitoruma
2 De consequenciisconcementibushabitudinemterminorum
et suorumoppositorum
et privativorumb
ponunturquatuorregulesequentes.
Prima regula:
depredicato
ad negativam
depredicato
Ab afirmativa
finitoilliusconsiminfinito
depresenti
etsineteretin rectis
casibuscumverbo
substantivo
iliumc
subiectorum
estbona.
minisdivinis,
consequencia
estdnon-iustus;ergo Sortes non6 est ius'Sortest
ut
Exemplum, sequitur
et
huiusmodi.
tus',
b
a
S c consimilium]Z
similio privatorum
infinitivorumf/J
Z privativorum]
infinitorum]iS
e
d
rumS estnon]nonestS nonest]estnonS
3 Primo dixi in regula "consimiliumsubiectorum",quia si sint dissimiliumsubiectorum,
consequencia[ 80*] non valet,ut non sequitur'Sortes
esta non-iustus;ergo Plato non est iustus'. Secundo dixi "in rectiscasibus", quia in obliquis casibus consequencia non valet, ut non sequitur
'Sortesest non-asinus;ergo Sortisnon est asinus'. Tercio dixi "cum verbo
substantivo",quia cum verbo adiectivonon valetbconsequencia,ut non
sequitur'Sortesvidetnon-asinum;ergo Sortesnon videtasinum' Quarto
dixi "de presenti",quia cum verbo de preteritovel de futuro[S 100r]
consequencia0non valet, ut non sequitur 'Sortes fuit non-iustus;ergo
Sortesnon fuitiustus',et huiusmodi.Quinto dixi "sine terminisdivinis",
quia cumdterminisdivinisnon sequitur'Deus6 est non-pater;ergo Deusf
18:33:38 PM
236
JOKESPRUYT
Secunda regula:
a
A negativa
depredicato
depredicato
illiusconsimfinitoad qffirmativam
infinito
iliumsubiectorum
in rectiscasibuset cumverbosubstantivo
de presenti
, consenon
,
quencia
formaliter valet
non sequituraffirmativa.
quia ex pura negativaformaliter
Exemplum,ut
non sequitur'Sortes non est iustus;ergo Sortesest non-iustus',quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum,nullo Sorte existente.Sed cum
constanciaetb debito modo valet consequencia,ut sequitur'Sortes non
estiustusc;et idem Sortesest; ergo Sortesest non-iustus'.Similiter0
sequitur
'tu non es asinus;et tu es; ergotu escnon-asinus',
et huiusmodi.Condiciones
huius reguleintelliguntur
sicut in regula precedentef.
a ad . . .
b
d
om.S et]Z seuS c iustus]
nonadd.Z c es non
infinito]^
ergoadd.S similiter]
]Z
nones S rprecedente]
add.
S
patet
5
Tercia regula:
Ab affirmativa
de predicato
ad qffirmativam
de predicato
illius
privativo
infinito
consimilium
subiectorum
in rectis
casibusetcumverbo
substantivo
depresenti^
conestbona.
sequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes est iniustus;ergo Sortes est non-iustus',et
et huiusmodi.Sed
sequitur'Deus est infinitusa;
ergo Deus est non-finitus',
econversoconsequencia formaliternon valet. Ut non sequitur'lapis est
non-iustus;ergo lapis est iniustusb',quia antecedensest verum et consequens falsum,quia exc consequentesequiturquodd lapis est aptus natus
esse iustus,quod est falsum.Aliquando valet consequenciade materia,ut
sequitur'Sortes est non-iustus;ergo Sortes est iniustus'.Similiterbene6
et sequitur
sequitur'punctusest non-divisibilis;
ergopunctusestindivisibilis',
'celum est non-corruptibile;
celum
est
etf
ergo
incorruptibile', sequitur
'Deus est non-mortalis;ergo Deus est immortalis',quia in terminisconnotantibusactum et potenciam talis negacio 'non' etg illa privado 'inh'
negan seu privant*actum etkpotenciam,ut patet in prima parte huius1
logice, octava"1et nona divisione"terminorum.
a
finitus
S b iniustus]
noniustusS c ex consequente]
S eiusantecedente
infinitus]
Zd
c
f
h
1
8
om.
S
S
non
5
ut
S
est
om
S
quod]
bene]
Z et]
Z m]Z
Z et]
negant]
negatS j
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
237
S ket poteciam]
om.S 1huius]
om.
om.S moctava. . . terminorum]S
privant]
n privt
de omnibus
S
Z divisione]
6
Z$ positivo]positoS substantivo]
privativo]
privato
g
est
non
^
om.
S
om.S c quando]quodZ$ fnonest
similibus]/
]Z
De consequenciis
concementibus
proposionum
quantitatem
7 De consequenciisconcementibusquantitatem3
proposicionumponuntur octo regulesequentes.Prima regula:
siveaffirmative
sivenegavelindenitam)
Ab universali
ad sua<m> particularem
est
bona.
tive,consequencia
ut sequitur 'quilibet homo currit;ergo quidam
Exemplum affirmative,
homo curri vel 'homo currit',et sequitur'necesse est Deum esse; ergo
possibileest Deum esse', et huiusmodi.Exemplum negative,ut sequitur
'nullushomo currit;ergo quidam homo non curri vel 'homo non currit,et sequitur'impossibileest hominemesse asinum; ergo possibile est
hominem0non esse asinum', et huiusmodi.Ex ista regula patet quod a
ad eundem stantemdeterminate6
terminostanteconfuse0et distribuibile0
valet consequencia.
a
b
S commune
S cconfuse]
S quantitatum(7j
non]nonhominem
Ze hominem
quantitatem]
d
S determinante
(!) Z
Z distribuibile]^
determinate]
distributive^
8 Sed contraregulamarguitursic: Talis consequencia non valet 'nullus
homo est animal; ergo homo nona est animal', et arguiturab universali
negativam.Ergo regulaestbfalsa.Antecedens
negativaad suam indefinitam
probatur:posito casu quod nullus homo masculus sit, tunccantecedens
18:33:38 PM
238
JOKESPRUYT
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
239
asinus]
ergo
13 Quarta regula:
cumdebenumeratis
ad omneseiussingulares
Ab universali
sufficienter
afirmativa
econverso.
et
valetconsequencia
ita constancia
,
Exempluma,ut sequitur 'quilibet homo est animai; et isti sunt omnes
hominesmasculi;ergo iste homo est animai, etbiste homo est animai, et
istechomo est animai, et sic de singulis'.Exemplumdeconverso,ut bene
sequitur'iste homo est animai,et iste homo est animai, et sic de singulis;
et isti sunt omnes homines masculi; ergo quilibet homo est animai', et
huiusmodi.Sede si arguatursine constancia,non valet consequencia. Ut
non sequitur'quilibethomo est animai; ergo iste homo est animai,et iste
18:33:38 PM
240
JOKESPRUYT
consequens]
Z
Z
om.S 1impossibili]
S possibiliZ mquidlibet]
et huiusmodi
add.Z
14 Quinta regula:
Ab universali
ad einssingulrem
eiussingulares
a, velad omnes
negativa
sufficiente
numerata valetconsequncia,
sive
cum
constancia
sivearguituf
sinecon,
arguitur
sed
non
econverso.
stancia,
Exemplum ab universaliadd eius singulrem,ut sequitur 'nullus homo
currit;ergo iste homo non curri.Exemplum6ab universaliad <omnes>
eius singulares,ut 'nullus homo currit;ergo iste homo <non> curritet
iste homo non currit',et sic de singulisf.
Sed econverso,scilicetgsi arguitur11
cum constancia,valet consequncia,ut sequitur[5 102r] 'iste homo
non curritet iste homo non currit,et sic de singulis,et isti sunt omnes
hominesmasculi; ergo nullus homo curri,et1huiusmodi.Sed si arguitur sine constancia,formaliternon valet consequncia. Ut non sequitur
'iste homo non curritet iste homo non curritet sic de singulis;ergo nullus homo curri, quia post [ 82r] mille annos antecedenspoteritesse
verum et consequens falsum,quia illi homines qui per illud antecedens
notanturjvel significa<n>turnon erunt,ut patet intuenti.
a
S c arguitur]
S bnumeratas]
arguatur
singulrem]
numeratis
singulares
Zd ad] omnes
c
f
add.necnon
.
.
.
alterum
S
om.
ab universali
exp.Z exemplum
currit] Z singulis]
exemplum
ad omneseiussingulares
utsequitur
nullus
homocurrit
homononcurrit
etiste
ergoiste
1
homononcurrit
et sicde singulis
add.Z g scilicet]
sedS om.Z harguitur]
S arguatur
Z
ethuiusmodi]
S om.Z* notantur]
demonstrantur
S
Z numeratur
15 Sexta regula:
A particulari
ad suamindenitam}
siveaffirmative
sivenegative,
est
consequncia
bonaetformalis
, et econverso.
ut sequitur'aliquid homo currit;ergo homo curri,
Exemplumaffirmative,
et econverso.Exemplum negative,ut sequitur'aliquid homo non currit;
ergohomo non curri,et econverso.Ex istaregulapatetquod proposicionis
18:33:38 PM
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18:33:38 PM
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JOKESPRUYT
animal]
mal]
Z
animai]
dicitur]
erg
et. . . animal]^om.S 1antecedens
. . . per]om.S
De consequenciis
concementibus
probaciones
proposicionum
18 De consequenciisconcementibusprobacionesproposicionumponuntur sex regule sequentes.Prima regula:
Ab exponibili
ad omneseiusexponentes
simulsumptas
valetconsequencopulative
cia, et econverso.
Exemplum,u sequitur'omnis homo est animai; ergo homo est animai
et nichilest homo quin illud sit animal', et econverso.Similitersequitur
'tantum homo currit;ergo homo curritet nichil non-homo curri, et
econverso.Sed ab exponibilicopulativead unam eius exponentemvalet
consequncia,sed non econverso.Ut sequitur'tantumhomo currit;ergo
homo currit',et sequitur'tantumhomo currit;ergo nichilnon-homocurrit'. Sed econversonon valet consequncia,ut non sequitur'homo currit; ergo tantumhomo currit',et non sequitur'nichil non-homocurrit;
ergo tantumhomo currit',et huiusmodi.Aliquando valet consequncia
de materia,ut bene sequitur 'homo est homo; ergo tantumhomo est
homo'. Similitersequitur'homo est asinus;ergo tantumhomo est asinus',
quia ex impossibilisequiturquidlibetb.
a ut
S om.S b quidlibet].S
add.S
sequitur]
quodlibet
Z et huiusmodi
19 Secunda regula <est> quod
a disiunctive
Ab exponibili
secundumb
ad
modumexponendi
disiunctive
duplicem
sui modum
cumdisiunccione
valetconsequncia
.
, et econverso
utrumque
exponendi
Ex qua regula patet quod ab exponibilichuius verbi 'incipit'vel huius
verbi'desinit'ad utrumquesui modum exponendicum disiunccionevalet
consequncia,et econverso.Et si arguaturad unum [S 103r]eius modum
exponendivel econverso,non sempervalet consequncia.Ut non sequitur
'Sortes incipitesse; ergo in presentiinstantiSortes non est, etdimmediate post instanspresensSortes eri. Similiternon sequitur'Sortesincipit
currere;ergo in presentiinstantiSortes [ 83r] currit,et non immediate
ante6instanspresens Sortes curreba, et huiusmodi.Sed si arguaturad
unum modum exponendi secumfconvertibilium,
valet consequncia,et
econverso.Exemplumhuiusverbi'incipit',utgbene sequitur'Sortesincipit
18:33:38 PM
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JOKESPRUYT
22 Quinta regula:
estbona
A descriptxbili
ad einsdescribentem
,
consequencia
acceptadescriptibiliter
et econverso.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'necesse est Deum esse; ergo talis proposicioest
Deum esse', et econnecessaria"Deus est",primoet adequate significans
et
dixi
in
huiusmodi.
Sed
verso,
regula "accepta descriptibiliter",
quia
talis proposicio 'necesse est Deum esse5,vel aliqua similis,potest accipi
Uno modo descriptibiliter,
et tunc bene sequitur'necesse est
tripliciter.
Deum esse; ergo talisproposicioest necessaria"Deus est", primoet adequate significansDeum esse', et econverso.Alio modo exponibilitervel
et tuncnon sequitur'necesseest Deum esse; ergotalisproposiresolubiliter,
cio est necessaria "Deus est"', quiaa antecedensest necessariumet consequens contingens.Vel aliter,quia potest esse sicut primo et adequate
significatur
per antecedensabsque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significateper consequens. Ut patet intuenti.
a
quia]S etZ
23 Sexta regula,et ultima:
A proposicione
habente
ad omnessuas causassimul
plurescausassue veritatis
cum
disiuncone
valet
et
econverso
.
,
acceptas
consequencia
Exemplum,u sequitur'non tantumhomo est animal; ergo nullushomo
est animal vel aliquid non-homoest animal', etbeconverso.Et si arguatur
ad unam illarumcausarum,non valet consequencia.Ut non sequitur'non
tantumhomo est animal; ergo nullushomo es animal', quia antecedens
est verumet consequensfalsum.Sed si arguatureconversoab una causa
veritatisad proposicionemhabentemplures causas veritatis,consequencia est bona. Utd bene sequitur'aliquid non-homoest animal; ergo non
tantumhomo est animal'. Et ita de omnibusoppositisexclusivarum,
exceptivarum,et aliarumproposicionumexponibilium,que habentprobariper
suas causas veritatis,ut dictumfuitsuperius,ubi determinatur
de probacionibusproposicionum6.
a ut
ut Z b et]om.S c est]homoestadd.Z d ut]^et Z* proposisequitur]^
sequitur
S
etc.
add.
cionum]
De consequenciis
et reduplicativas
concemenbus
exclusivas,
proposiciones
exceptivas
24 [S 104r]De consequenciisproposicionumexclusivarum,
exceptivarum
et reduplicativarum
ponunturquatuor regulae sequentes.Prima regula:
Ab exclusiva
ad suamuniversalem
de terminis
affirmativa
qffirmativam
transposi
tisrectis
nonampliativo
estbona
depresenti
,
mplibuetcumverbo
consequencia
et econverso.
18:33:38 PM
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18:33:38 PM
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JOKESPRUYT
asinus et capra currun5,posito talifcasu quod non plura quam ista tria
currant,tuncgsibi debet correspondereuniversalisaccepta collective,que
est vera. Et istomodo valet consequncia'tantumhomo et asinuset capra
currunt;ergo omnia currenda sunt homo et asinus et capra', quia tam
antecedensquam consequenssunt verah,ut patet intuenti.
a
om.S b hec. . . correspondei]
om.Z c pluralitatis]
S d et]ZCest
alietatis
exclusio]
ZCS
e
f
h
8
omnia
add.
S
S
currencia
om.
nunc
S
ZS currunt]
^
vera]
Z om.S
ergo
tali]
tunei
27 Secunda regula:
Ab exceptiva
ad exclusivam
sibicorrespondentes?
, cuiussubiecnegativa
affirmativam
tumestpars extracaptaetpredicatum
cum
estaggregatum
ex termino
distributo
residuo
eiusdem
et
est
bona
econverso.
,
proposicionis
exceptive,
consequncia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'nullus homo preterSortem currit;ergo tantum
Sortes est aliquis homo currens5,
et econverso.Similitersequitur'nullum
animal preterhominemest racinale; ergo tantumhomo est [Z 84r] animal0racinale5,et huiusmodi.Ex ista regulapatetquod talisconsequncia
non valet cnullushomo preterSortem currit;ergo tantumSortes currit5,
quia antecedensest verum et consequens falsum,posito casu quod nullus homo curratnisiSorteset cum hoc asinuscurrat.Similiternon sequitur
'nullum animal preter hominem est racinale; ergo tantum homo est
racionalis5,quia ista non est sua exclusiva,sed illa tantumhomo est animal racinale0.Et huiusmodi.
a
S b animalracinale]
S racionalis
Z correspondente
correspondentem]
Z c racinale]
Z'S
om.Z
28 Tercia regula:
Ab exceptiva
ad exclusivam
sibi correspondentem
, cuius
affirmativa
affirmativam
subiectum
estpars extracaptaetpredicatum
estaggregatum
ex termino
distributo
cumresiduoeiusdem
ultimotermino
,
proposicionis
exceptiva,
preposita
negacione
estbona, et econverso.
consequena
Exemplum,ut sequitur'omne ens preteraccidens [S 105r] est substanet econverso.Similiter
cia; ergo tantumaccidens est ens non-substancia5,
'omne animal preterhominem estb irracionale;ergo tantumhomo est
animal non-irracionale5.
Similitersequitur 'omnis homo preter Sortem
tantum
Sortes
est homo non-currens5,
et huiusmodi.
currit;ergo
a
b
sedS est]Sc om.S
exceptive]
29 Quarta regula,et ultima:
A reduplicativa
ad suampreiacentem
estconsequena
bona, sed noneconverso.
u
'homo
Exemplumaffirmative, sequitur
inquantumanimai est corpus;
ergo homo est corpus5.Exemplumnegative,ut sequiturb'homo inquan-
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A I5-C. SPANISH
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247
a
S om.Z
S om.Z d ve^sensus]
sicsaepius
om.Z$ b a sensu]assensu
Z$ valet]
e arguendo]
om.
hic] Z
31
Prima regula:
in proposicione
velformaliter
modalis
Terminus
fadt sensum
subsequens
precedens
dictum
eius
sensum
divisum.
intermediat
sed
, facit
,
quando
compositum
Ex quo patet quod talis consequencia non valet inquantumarguitura
sensu compositoad sensum divisum'impossibileest te currerevelocius
est te currerevelocius quam tuc curquam tua curris;ergo impossibile15
est
verum
et consequensfalsum.Secundo patet
antecedens
eius
ris',quia
quod talisconsequencianon valet,in qua arguitura sensu divisoad sensum compositum'album possibileest esse nigrum;ergo posssibileest [S
105"] album esse nigrum',quia eius antecedensest verumet consequens
falsum,et huiusmodi.Aliquando valet consequencia de materia,ut bene
sequitur'necesse est Deum esse; ergo Deum necesse est esse', quia eiusd
consequencieconsequens6est necessarium;quod potestsequi adf quodlibet. Similitersequitur'hominempossibileest esse asinum; ergo possibile
est hominemesse asinum', quia huius consequencie antecedensest impossibile; ex quo potest sequi quidlibet. Similitersequiturpossibile est
18:33:38 PM
248
JOKESPRUYT
Secunda regula:
Terminus
communis
stansdeterminate
divisum
, sed quandostatconfat sensum
fise tantuma.
fat sensum
compositum.
Ideo talisconsequncianon valet 'scio alterumcontradictorium
esse verum;
- in
alterum
contradictorium
scio
esse
verum'
ergo
qua arguitura sensu
compositoad sensum divisum quia antecedenshuius consequencie est
verumet consequensfalsum,positisvel demonstrates
istisduobus contradictoriis'rex sede et 'nullusrex sede, quorum neutrumscio esse verum.
Ex qua regula patet quod a terminostantedeterminatead eundem stantem confusetantumet econverso,formaliter15
consequncianon valet,ut
patet intuenti.
a
S om.Z b formaliter]
S om.Z
tantum]
33
Tercia regula:
3
taliumterminorum
in
Quilibet
-ta,-tumvel (totus
-ta,-tum9,
'infinitos,
precedens
tenetwr
et
tune
sensum
divisum
sed
;
proposicione
sincathegorematice, fat
quando
seuponitur
a partepredicati
tenetwr
et tunc
subsequitur
cathegorematice,
facitsensumcompositum.
Exemplum de ly 'infinitus,-taa, -tum', ut talis consequncia non valet
in qua arguitura sensu diviso ad [ 85"] sensum compositum'infinite
partes sunt in contnuo;ergo partes in continuosunt infinite'.Similiter0
non sequitur'infinitasuntfinita0;
vel non sequitur
ergo finitasuntinfinita',
'infinitihomines sunt finitid;ergo finiti6hominessunt infiniti',et huiusmodi, quia cuiuslibetistarumconsequenciarumantecedensest verum et
consequens falsum.Exemplum de ly 'totus,-ta, -tumf',ut non sequitur
'totusSortesest minorSorte; ergo minorSorte [S 106r] est totusSortes'.
Similiternon sequitur'in oculo meo est totumquod est in mundo; ergo
totum quod est in mundo est in oculo meo', et huiusmodi.Sed quid
significanttales proposicionesaccepte in sensu diviso et quid in sensu
composito,dictum fuitsuperiushin prima parte huius logice1,in sexta*
regula supposicionum.
a ta
d
om.S b similiter
. . . alterum
tum]
Z'S om~Z c finita]
infinita]
ZS infinita^
Z'S
finiti]
e
ta
S infiniti
om.S g significant]
S hsuperiusJS
om.
infinitif
Zc
finiti]
Z
tum]
significans
1
S ] sexta]
S octavaZ
Z logice]^logices
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A I5-C. SPANISH
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249
34
Quarta regula:
et precedens
Tale relativum
suumantecedens
verbum
sui
qui sequensimmediate
sensum
antecedentis
,
facit
compositum
ut cum dicitur'omne animal quoda est racinale est homo'. Sed
verbum
sui antecedentis
divisum
, tune
,
fadt sensum
quandosubsequitur
ut cum dicitur'omne animal est racinale6quod est homoc' Etd ideo
talis consequncianon valet 'omne animal quod est racinale est homo;
ergoomne animalest racinalequod est homo'. Antecedensenimsignificat
quod omne animal racinale est homo, quod est verum,sed consequens
significatquod omne animal est racinale, et omne6 animal est homo,
quod est falsum.Similiternon sequitur'omnis homo qui est albus currit;ergo omnis homo curritqui est albus', quia antecedensest verumet
consequensfalsum,posito casu quod solus Sortessit albus et solus Sortes
currat,et huiusmodi.
c
a
racinale
S d et. . . alterum
om.S b racinale]
Z'S om.
homoS homo]
homo]
quod]
c
S
homme
(!)
Z omne]^
35
Quinta regula:
solurr
terminos
etnonproposiciones
Coniunccio
fat sensum
coniungens
copulativa
divisum.
sed coniungens
fadt sensum
proposiciones
compositum,
Ex qua regulapatetquod a proposicionecathegoricade copulatoextremo
vel ad alterameius partemconsead copulativamsibibcorrespondentem
formaliter
non
tunc
valet;
arguitura sensu compositoad sensum
quncia
divisum.Exemplum a parte subiecti,ut non sequitur 'Sortes et Plato
dixerunttotumpsalterium0;ergo Sortes dixit totum salteriumet Plato
dixit totumpsalterium',quia huius consequenciedantecedensest verum
et consequensfalsum,positotali casu quod Sortesdixi unam medietatem
et Plato dixitfalterammedietatem,et huiusmodi.Exempluma partepredicati, ut non sequitur'tu es corpus et anima; ergo tu es corpus et tu es
anima'. [ 86r] Similiternon sequitur'tu non es homo et asinus; ergo
tu non es homoget tu non es asinus'. Similiternon sequitur'tuhdiffers
[S 106^] ab1 homine et aW asino; ergo tu differsab homine et tu differs
ab asinok',quia cuiuslibetistarumconsequenciarumantecedensest verum
et consequensfalsum,et1copulativa falsa. Aliquando valet consequencia
de materia,ut bene sequitur'Deus et homo sunt;ergo Deus est et homo
est'. Similitersequitur'tu es homo et animai; ergo tu es homo et tu es
animal'. Similitersequitur'Sortes et Plato curruntm;
ergo Sortes curritet
Plato currit'.Similitersequitur'Sorteset Plato biberuntvinum;ergo Sorte
bibitvinum et Plato bibit vinum', et huiusmodi".
d
a
salterium
sicsaepius
S bsibi]bisinS c psalterium]
Z$ huiusconsequencie]^
Z om
solum]
1
f
h
g
S
om.
S dixerit
dixerit
eiusS e dixit]
Z dixit]
Z homo]c.S Z tu]es odi-necnon
exp.Z
18:33:38 PM
250
JOKESPRUYT
k
suntet tunones
ab] omniadd.S Jab] omniadd.S ad asino]tues et homoet asinus
homoet asinusergotudiffers
ab omnihomine
et ab asinusadd.Z1et]^estZ mcur"
runt
. . . alteram
om.Z
Z om-$ net huiusmodi]S
Plato]
36 Secundo patet quod aa copulativa ad proposicionemde copulato
extremosibi correrspondentem
non valet.Et tunc
consequenciaformaliter
arguitura sensudivisoad sensumcompositum.Exemplum,u non sequitur
'Sortes est homo et Plato est homo; ergo Sorteset Plato sunthomo', sed
sequitur'Sortes et Plato sunt homines'. Similiternon sequitur'Sortes est
in domo et Plato est in domo; ergo Sortes et Plato sunt in domo', sed
bene sequitur'Sortes et Plato sunt inc domo vel in domibus'.Aliquando
valet consequencia de materia,ut sequitur'Deus est et homo est; ergo
Deus et homo sunt5.Similitersequitur'Sortes <currit> et Plato currit;
ergo Sortes et Plato currun,et ita de multissimilibus.
aa
S b ut]Zom.S c in domovel]S om.Z
ad copulativam
copulativa]
37
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A I5-C. SPANISH
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251
Secunda regula:
A parteprincipali
ad eiuscopulativam
utsuepartesprinsignificativarrf
copulative
nonvalet.
cipalesconsequencia
formaliter
Exemplum,ut non sequitur 'homo currit;ergo homob curritet asinus
currit',quia huius consequencieantecedensest verum et consequensfalsum, posito casu quod homo curratet nullus asinus currat.Aliquando
valet consequenciade [S 107"] materia,quando copulativafitex duabus
18:33:38 PM
252
JOKESPRUYT
partibusquarum una pars sequiturex alia, et arguiturex parte que antecedit ad aliam. Et potestfieriquatuor vel quinqu modis. Primo quando
adc invicem,ut bene'sequitur
partesprincipalescopulativesuntconvertibiles
'homo currit;ergo homo curritet racinale0curri.Secundo quando una
pars copulativeest inferiorad aliam, ut sequitur'homo currit;ergo homo
curritet animai curri.Tercio quando una pars copulativeex qua arguitur es impossibilis,ut sequitur'homo est asinus; ergo homo est asinus
et tu curris'.Quarto quando una pars copulativeest necessariaet alia
pars ex qua arguiturest contingens,[ 87r] ut sequitur1'tu curris;ergo
tu curriset Deus est'. Quinto quando una pars copulativeest contingens,
ut sequiturad aliam quarum nullaguna est convertibilis,
nec inferiornec
impossibilisneque necessaria,ut bene sequitur'tu curris;ergo tu curris
et tu non sedes', et huiusmodi.
a
S b homo. . . et]Z'S om-Z c ad]Som.Z d racinale]
S
significativam]
Z significativa
c
risibile
om.S fsequitur
. . . contingens]^
om.S g nulla]
unaS
Z est. . . arguitur]
4
Tercia regula:
A totacopulativa
ut suepartesad disiunctivam
de partibusormino
significativa
consimilibus
est
bona.
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'homo curritet asinus currit;ergo homo currit
vela asinus curri.Sed econversonon valet consequencia,ut non sequitur
'tu es homo vel tu es asinus; ergo tu es homo et tu es asinus', quia
antecedensest verum et consequens falsumb.
a
b
et huiusmodi
add.S
vel] etZ falsum]
De consequenciis
disiunctwarum
5
De consequenciisdisiunctivarum
ponunturtresregulesequentes.Prima
regula:
A parteprincipali
disiunctive
ad dus disiunctivtam
ut suepartes
significativam*
est
bona.
principales
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'tu es homo; ergo tu es homo vel tu es asinus'.
Sed dixi in regula "significativa
ut sue partesprincipales",quia predictab
consequencianon valet,posito casu quod aliquac disiunctivaque est conte esse capram vel aliudd falsum,
sequens sit impositaad significandum
non
ex
eius
antecedente.
quod
sequatur
a
S bpredicta
S c alisignificativam]
consequencia]
predictam
consequenciam
d significativa
illa
S
qua] Z aliud] aliquidZ
6
Secunda regula:
A totadisiunctiva
ut sue partespncipales
ad alterameiuspartem
significativa
non
valet.
principlem
consequena
formaliter
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ON CONSEQUENCES
253
Exemplum,ut non sequitur'tu es homo vel tu es asinus; ergo tu es asinus', quia huiusconsequencieantecedensest verumet consequensfalsum.
Aliquandovaletconsequnciade materia,quando disiunctivafitex duabus
partibusquarum una pars sequiturad alteramet arguituraa disiunctiva
ad suambpartemquec sequitur.Et potestfieriquatuor vel quinqu modis.
Primo [S 108r] quando partes principalesdisiunctivesunt convertibiles
ad invicem,ut sequiturhomocurritvel racinale currit;ergo homo curri. Secundo quando una pars disiunctive est inferiorad aliam, ut
sequiturhomocurritvel animal currit;ergo animai currit'.Tercio quando
disiunctivaest impossibilis,ut sequitur'homo est asinus vel nullus deus
est; ergo homo est asinus', quia ex impossibilisequiturquidlibet.Quarto
quando una pars disiunctiveest necessaria et alia pars disiunctive0est
contingenset concluditurpars necessaria, ut sequitur 'Deus est vel tu
curris;ergo Deus est', quia6 necessariumfsequiturad quidlibet. Quinto
quando una pars disiunctiveest impossibiliset alia possibiliset conciuditurpars possibilis,ut sequitur'tu currisvel tu es [Z 87v] asinus; ergo tu
et huiusmodi.
curris5,
aa
S om.Z c
S b suam]om.S c que]om.S d disiunctive]
ad disiunctivam
disiunctiva]
f
ad
S
add.
necessario^
Z
necessarium]
quia]
7
Tercia regula:
f ut suepartesprinpalescumcontradictorio
unius
A totadisiunctiva
significativo
estbona.
dus partem
consequena
principlem
partisprinpalisad alteram
es asinusc;
vel
es
sed
tu
nonb
'tu
es
homo
tu
ut
asinus;
sequitur
Exemplum,
tu
et
huiusmodi.
es
homo',
ergo
b
a
Z$chomoS
^6" om.Z asinus]
Z'S omZ non]
significativa]
8 Contra regulamaarguitursic. Talis consequncia non valet 'rex sedet
vel nullusrex sedet; sed nullusrex sedet; ergo rex sedet',quia huius consequencie antecedensest verum et consequens falsum,posito casu quod
nullus rex sedeat. Ergo regula falsa. Secundo arguitursic. Talis consequncia non valet 'tu es asinusvel manus mea est clausa; sed manus mea
nonb est clausa; ergo tu es asinus', quia huius consequencie antecedens
illa
est verumet consequensfalsum,posito tali casu quod dum profertur
contradisiunctivasit ita quod manus mea sit clausa, sed dum profertur
dictoriumilliuspartsnulla manus mea sit clausa. A similinon sequitur
'tu es asinus vel tu sedes; sed tu non sedesc; ergo tu esd asinus', quia
antecedensest verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quode dum proconferturillafdisiunctivasit ita quod tu sedeas, sed dum quod profertur
illiuspartisgsit ita quod tu non sedeash,et huiusmodi.
tradictorium
a
S nullaZ c sedes]
Z es asinusS d es asinus]
sedesS e quod]
Z bfnon]
Z'S regulas
regula]
h
g
S
om.
om.
S
sedesadd.necnon
18:33:38 PM
254
JOKESPRUYT
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
255
b
171
facit
bonamcon
om.
S
ethuiusmodi]
om.
Z
i^a]
exemplum] Z erg est]
1
dolesS
S om.Z kdoleo]
add.Z" 1sed]5 etZ* exemplum]
Z dolesS doleo]>
sequenciam
De consequenciis
expletivarum
12 De consequenciisexpletivarum
ponunturdue regulesequentes.Prima
regula:
dus partem
indicativi^
ad alteram
Ab expletiva
expartibus
prndpalem
composita
estbona.
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'tu es homo quamvis tua sedes; ergo tu es homo5
vel 'ergobtu sedes'. Sed econversonon valetconsequencia,ut non sequitur
'tu es homo; ergo tu es homo quamvis tu sedes', quia antecedens est
verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quod non sedeas. Similiternon
sequitur'tu curris;ergo tu currisquamvis tu sedes5,et huiusmodi.
Secunda regula:
departibusomnino
ad copulativam
expartibus
indicativis
Ab expletiva
composita
estbona.
consimilibus
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'tu es homo quamvis tu sedes; ergo tu es homo
et tu sedes5,et econverso,etc huiusmodi.
b
a
c
Sc huiusmodisS om.Z
tu]bisinS ergo]om.S et huiusmodi]
De consequenciis
similitudinarie
13 De consequenciissimilitudinarie
ponunturdue regulesequentes.Prima
regula:
eiuspartem
utsuepartesad alteram
A similitudinaria
prin[ 88^ significativa
bona.
est
ciplemconsequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes curritsicut Plato currit;ergo Sortes curri vel 'ergoa Plato currit5.Sed econverso non valet, ut non sequitur
'aquila volat; ergo tu volas sicut aquila volat5,quia antecedensest verum
et consequensfalsum,et huiusmodi.
18:33:38 PM
256
JOKESPRUYT
Secunda regula:
A similitudinaria
est
ad copulativam
departibus
ormino
consimilibus
consequencia
bona.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes curritsicut Plato currit;ergo Sortes currit et Plato currit'.Similitersequitur'tu volas sicut aquila volat; ergo tu
volas et aquila volat'. Sed econverso non valet consequencia, ut non
sequitur'Sortes curritet Plato sedet; ergo SortescurritsicutPlato sede.
Similiternon sequitur'tu es albus et corvus est niger;ergo tu es albus
sicut corvus est niger',et huiusmodi.
a
S om.Z
ergo]
De consequenciis
localium
14
De consequenciistemporaliumponunturdue regulesequentes.Prima
regula:
A temporali
ut suepartesprinpalefad alteram
eiuspartem
significativa
princiestbona.
plemconsequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes curritdum Plato currit;ergo Sortes currit'vel 'ergo Plato currit'.Sed econversonon valet consequencia,ut non
sequitur'sedebo; ergo sedebo quando curram',et huiusmodi.
Secunda regula:
A temporali
ad copulativam
departibus
omnino
consimilibus
estbona.
consequencia
Utb sequitur'Sortes curritdum Plato currit;ergo Sortes curritet Plato
currit'.Similitersequitur'sedebo quando curram;ergo sedebo et curram'.
18:33:38 PM
A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
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257
18:33:38 PM
A ForcedMarch TowardsBeatitude:
s Histoire of theBeatificVision
ChristianTrottmann'
KENT EMERY,JR.
Christian
XII
La vision
sa dfinition
desdisputes
Trottmann,
beatifique
scolastiques
parBenot
coleFranaise
de Rome,Rome1995899 pp. with3 plates(Bibliothque
des coles
Athnes
et de Rome289).
Franaises
The medieval discussion of the beatificvision involvesfundamental
of intelligent
questionsabout the metaphysicaland psychologicalstructure
creaturesin relationto God; it testsnoetic theoriesat theirouterlimits;
it disputesthe ultimateethicalends of human life;it entailslogical paradoxes that require sophisticatedtreatment;it likewiseinvolves crucial
hermeneuticalquestionsabout the interpretation
of "divine" and human
In
his
doctoral
the
from
thesis,
writings.
abridged(!)
topicalvantagepoint
of the beatificvision (than which only one can be higher),Christian
Trottmannsurveysthe universalprogressof medievaltheoriesof knowledge, focusingon the thirteenthand early fourteenthcenturiesuntil
Benedict XII's dogmaticConstitution,Benedictus
Deus (1336), but casting
his sightbackwardsto the early Church fathersand glancingforwardto
the theologicaldiscussionsof our own day.
Trottmann'sbook is an encyclopediaand willbe the standardreferencework concerningthe beatificvision foryears to come. For thisreason it
meritsa long review.His study,moreover,suggestscountlesstopics for
furtherresearch;he himselfpromisesseveralcriticaleditions(pp. 1-2),a
completestudyof the process againstDurand of Saint-Pourain(p. 592
n. 12), and monographson the noetic statusof theologyand on synderesis, whichwill offer"une critiquede la raison pure et une critiquede la
raison pratique au Moyen Age" (p. 818 n. 1).
Trottmannmeans further
to exemplify
a proper,correctivemethodfor
medieval
intellectual
interpreting
history.Alludingto a recentbook on
medievaltheoriesof vision,whichexcludesfromitspurviewthe theological
topic of the beatificvision (p. 9), he states:
L'histoire
de la pensemdivale
a tropsouffert
d'unelecture
quiprenait
positiviste
au piedde la lettre
ancilla
etconsidrait
l'adage:"Philosophia
theologiae"
quela philoso Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Vivarium
37,2
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259
Lesrapports
entre
science,
philosoAgetaittouffe
parla thologie.
phieduMoyen
etdialectiques,
comme
en
en ce sicle,
n'taient-ils
pasrciproques
phieetthologie
hisconclusions
intheform
bene
: Trottmann
d'autres?
frequently
expresses
(p. 10;nota
ofrhetorical
questions).
will persuade readers that movementsin
Trottmann'sdemonstrations
medievaltheologyand philosophywere reciprocaland inextricably
related,
and thatquestionsconcerningthe beatificvisionwere centralto the major
intellectualdisputesof the thirteenth
century.Nevertheless,he formally
excludesfromhis own treatment"specifically
theological"questionsconof
human
Christ's
vision
the
beatific
soul,the beatifiedand natural
cerning
knowledgeof angels (see the referenceto S.D. Dumont, p. 10), and the
glorifiedconditionof the resurrectedbody (p. 8 n. 1). Likewise,only in
passingdoes he mentionthe specialproblemsconcerningthe soul's knowledge of the Trinity(e.g., pp. 364-65), the highestobject of Christiancontemplationin this world and presumablyin the next. No one, I think,
would wish Trottmann'sbook to be any longer.To address all of these
related topics in the thoughtof any author would probably require an
independentmonograph;moreover,to introducethemwould obscurethe
conceptualclarityof Trottmann'sundeviatingnarrativeline.
The book is divided into threeparts. As a prelude, the firstchapter
fromthe
surveys"the heritageof ten centuriesof theologicalreflection,"
Peter
Lombard.
and
Bernard
of
Clairvaux
fathers
to
Naturally
early
enough,Trottmannpays most attentionto those authors(e.g., Augustine,
pseudo-Dionysius,Eriugena,Bernard)whose textswere contestedin the
laterScholasticdisputes.Otherwise,he strivesto establisha dialecticrelaof God and Augustine's
tionbetweenGreekdoctrinesof the unknowability
doctrineof the immediatevisionof the divineessence,and betweenintellectualistand affectiveconceptionsof beatitude.
Trottmanndivideshis book into two major parts,according
Thereafter,
on the one hand, and Quando?
to an orderof questions,Quid?et Quomodo?
conon the other.For Trottmann,thisdivisionis more than rhetorically
venient,forthe orderof questions,he argues,followsan innerlogic that
correspondsto the emphases in the chronologicalsequence of debates.
The firstdivision"What?"and "How?" embracesthe Scholasticphilosophical and theologicaldiscussionsof the thirteenth
century.It is subdivided
and
historical
to
phases established
categories
according doxographical
more or less securelyby modernhistorians(see below). The last division
of thebook "When?" comprisesthe dramatic"reaction"ofJohnXXII and
the subsequentdisputes,concludingwith the dogmatic Constitutionof
BenedictXII. In thissection,Trottmannoffersa paraphrase-commentary
18:33:50 PM
260
KENTEMERY,
JR.
of nearlyeveryitemin the debate, editedor newlyuncoveredfrommanuscripts,and a detailed examinationof all the historicalevents.
In effect,Trottmannhas yoked togetherwhat could be two separate
books.He unifieshis huge narrativeby meansof a philosophicalconception
of Histoire.His conception,not surprisingly,
is dialectical. Thus, each
dialecticalphase of the thirteenth-century
discussionwas propelledby a
new penetrationof Aristotle'stheoryof knowledge,and was delimitedby
successivetheologicalCondemnations(1210, 1241, 1277). Each "wave"
of Aristoteliantheoryengendereda reactionand an alternativeinterpretation,motivatedespecially,Trottmannargues,by a concernto preserve
or meet the theologicalrequirementsof the beatificvision,and to distinguishits elevated cognitionfromordinaryknowledge.The dialectical
Scholasticthoughtculminatedin the "perprocess of thirteenth-century
fectsynthesis"of Thomas Aquinas, who understoodAristotlebetterthan
resolvedthe noeticissuesinvolved
anyone else, and who mostsuccessfully
in the beatificvisionby way of his doctrineof the lumen
Afterwards,
gforiae.
of alreadyestabprogressivemovementseemed to stallamidstrefinements
lished positionsand responsesto criticisms,untilPope John XXII reinvigoratedthe dialectic and extended its historicalrange by asking the
question "When?" The new dialecticalmovementinitiatedby thisquestion,and the "archaic" way in whichit was proposed,in turn,demanded
a more comprehensivehistoricalsynthesis,
thistimebetweenpatristicand
monastic theology,on the one hand, and Scholastic theology,on the
other.This synthesiswas achieved privatelyby the "ProvidentialMan,"
Jacques Fournier,who later became Pope Benedict XII. Having taken
"two stepsforward"as a theologian,however,as Pope he "took one step
backwards,"leaving out of his dogmatic Constitutionthe most innovative and satisfying
ideas of his personal synthesis.However disappointing
his decisionmightbe, he thusleftopen the possibilityfora later,higher
.
synthesisin the on-goingdialecticalprocess of Histoire
The thirteenth-century
dialecticis kickedoffby the writingsof David
of Dinant and Amauryof Bne, whichwere condemnedat Paris in 1210.
and "pantheistic"readingof Aristotle,
Accordingto David's "materialistic"
matter
and God are essentiallyone thing;accordingly,the
spirit{mens),
unitybetween the knowerand the thingknown,like the unitybetween
matterand form,constitutesonly one being. The consequencesof this
"materialisticpantheism"in regard to the human mind's knowledgeof
God are patent:one mustneeds conclude thatthe individualsoul cannot
know God, and that its substance,the universalmens
, plays the passive
role of "matter"in union with the "form"of God, therebyconstituting
18:33:50 PM
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261
one realitywithhim (pp. 118-19). The ideas of the "spirituals"who followed Amauryand who conceived that the unitybetween the knower
and thingknown was realized in God or in his eternal creativeIdeas,
while not materialistic
were no less "pantheistic."In the largerscheme
of things,whetherTrottmann'sinterpretation
of David of Dinans "naive"
or
is
correct
"nuanced"
seems relativelyunimsufficiently
comprehension
he
that
such
it
portant,except
places
weightupon as the startingpoint
of the dialecticalprocess.It seems,however,that many of the fragments
attributedto David were in fact not writtenby him and date fromthe
1260s, that David's notion of matterderivesmore fromtwelfth-century
Platonic sources than from Aristotle,and that the characterizationof
David as a "materialistic"philosopherhas its originsin polemics of the
laterthirteenth
In
century,notablyin Thomas Aquinas' Summatheologiae.1
otherwords, at its beginningthe historicaldialectic purportedlyset in
motionby David of Dinant is vexed with chronologicaland interpretive
questions.
AdoptingEtienne Gilson's term,Trottmannlabels the next "wave" of
the receptionof AristotleL'augustinisme
avicennisant.
Because it "conforms
Trottmannargues,Avicenna's
moreto thedominantAugustinin
Platonism,"
ofAristotle'snoetictheoryprovided"an advantageousalterinterpretation
native to the materialisticreading of Aristotle"proposed by David of
Dinant (p. 130). Accordingto Avicenna,an intelligiblespecies,servingas
a mean betweenthe possibleintellectand its object, is the firstobject in
everycognitiveact, even in the highestreaches of spiritualknowledge.
Because Avicenna's teachingrendersimpossiblea pantheisticinterpretation of the knowledgeof God, theologianswere "seduced" into applying
it to the questionof the beatificvision:
n'est-il
L'intrt
desthologiens
du dbutdu XIIIesiclepourAvicenne
pasd'abord
dansle cadrehistorique
despremires
condemnations
de 1210-1225?
pistmologique
la connaissance
humaine
en tantqu'illumination,
ilsonten vue
Lorsqu'ils
pensent
ordinaire
aussibienla connaissance
que celledonnepar grce,voirela vision
batifique
(pp. 151-2).
In interpreting
the Condemnationsof 1241, which affirmedthat in
the beatificvisionsouls see the essence of God immediatelywithoutany
1 See thestudy
Anzulewicz
andMartin
Davidvon
Pickav,
byAndreas
Speer,Henryk
Dinant
unddieFragmente
der"Quaternuli
und
York,in: Studien
(Leiden-New
forthcoming
The textmostat question
is thelongfragTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters).
deDinando
in: Studia
mentG in: Davidis
Quarternulorum
, ed. M. Kurdzilaek,
fragmenta
, 3 (1963).
Mediewistyczne
18:33:50 PM
262
KENTEMERY,
JR.
intervening
speciesor "theophanies,"Trottmannattemptsto reconcilethe
interpretationsof P.-M. de Contenson and Gilson, which emphasize
"l'enjeu pistmologiquede la pntrationavicennienne,"with those of
M.-D. Chenu and H.-F. Dondaine,whichemphasizetheencounterbetween
Greek and Latin theologicaltraditions(p. 185). Those theologianswho
were touched by the Condemnations(Stephen of Venisy,John Pagus,
Hugh of Saint-Cher,Guerric of Saint-Quentin)tried to reconcile the
Aristotelianrequirementof a union betweenthe knowerand the object
known and the Greek theologicalidea of the unknowability
of God by
to
the
of
notion
(and Eriugenian)
resorting
pseudo-Dionysian
"theophanies"
as the object of the soul's knowledgein the beatificvision. William of
Auvergne,who authoredthe Condemnationsof 1241, like Avicennarecognized the need foran impressedspeciesin everyact of ordinaryknowlof the immediacyof the beatific
edge, but saved the Latin understanding
visionby purgingAvicenna'steachingof its cosmologicalinconveniences
and reconcilingit withAugustine'steachingsabout the soul. Thus, in the
beatificvision the image of the soul itself,elevated by grace and glory,
becomes the medium
quothe divineessence is seen. (Withmanyvariations,
other theologiansadopted this basic approach for decades.) But while
such solutionsas William'spreventeda pantheisticidentitybetweenthe
soul and God, and avoided the "heretical"idea thatsome createdsimilitude other than the soul itselfintervenedin its beatificvision of God,
theyyet, in Trottmann'seyes, sacrificedthe theologicalrequirementof
of Avicenna's noetic teaching
immediacy.Concerningthe attractiveness
for"Augustinin"
direct
the
nexus
betweenthe Condemnations
theologians,
of 1210 and 1241, and the as yet unsatisfactory
outcome,Trottmannis
he says,
emphatic.Avicenna'sinterpretation,
ainside penser
commeintentionelle
et nonsubstantielle,
l'unionde l'intelpermet
lectavecsonobjet.Ainsi,voulant
se sauverde Pcueilpanthiste
d'unenotique
navement
aristotlicienne
en laquellele sujetconnaissant
ne ferait
comprise
qu'un
avecl'objetconnu(Dieudansla vision
avicennisant
va tre
batifique)
l'augustinisme
Il devaiten effet
amen nierl'immdiatet
de cettevision.
interncessairement
Voulant
le voilede quelquesimilitude.
poserentrela divineessenceet l'intellect
la transcendance
sauver
de Dieu dansla visionbatifique
il en perdl'immdiatet
(p. 150).
of theCondemAlthoughTrottmannattemptsto balance interpretations
nations of 1241, he in fact confersmore weight on the. influenceof
of Aristotle,
Avicenna,as his dialecticalpattern,propelledby interpretations
seems to require. In general, Trottmannseldom lingerson "Platonic"
contributions
to the discussion,save Augustine's,and he rarelyevaluates
18:33:50 PM
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263
au Stagirite
parla rduction
pursaristotliciens
leurpoque(p. 297 n. 49).
Afterthe Condemnationsof 1241, whichsupposedlyresolvedthe question"What?"concerningthe beatificvision,theologiansturnedtheirattentionto the question"How?" In doingso, theyrespondedto, and benefitted
LatinAverroism"
the "first
from,thenextwave ofAristotelian
interpretation,
in the facultyof Arts (1225-1265). Relyingheavilyon studiesby R.-A.
of
Gauthier,Trottmannemphasizesthe interplaybetweeninterpretations
Aristotle'snoetic theoryand ethics.The "principalcharacteristic"
of the
in contrastwith"thesecondLatinAverroism,"
Artists'
noeticinterpretations,
consistsin makingthe agent and possible intellectsfacultiesof the individualsoul (pp. 212, 218), as Albertand Thomas did later(see n. 10 below).
In the treatiseshe recounts,Trottmanndiscoversa new synthesis
between
Averrosand Augustine,for which he coins a new term:L'augustinisme
averroismi.
The consequences of this synthesisfor the conceptionof the
soul's beatitude(and by implicationforthe theologyof the beatificvision)
are to be foundin contemporary
commentarieson theNichomachean
Ethics.
Influencedby Christianideas, thesecommentators
that
stressed
truebeatitude lies beyondthe naturalcapacitiesof the soul and mustbe received
passivelyfromGod. In theirconceptionof beatitude,theycelebratedthe
"la conlifein the termsof traditionalChristianmysticism:
contemplative
naissanceamoureusede Dieu, par la partiesuprieurede l'me (intellect
spculatif,
pratique,voire partiedsidrative)sans la mdiationdes phantasmes" (p. 241). AlthoughTrottmannis sympathetictowardsthe "first
Latin Averroists"insofaras their doctrinesconcerningthe passive and
agent intellectspoint in the rightdirection,he is severelycriticalof their
their "concordismenaf, mais aussi
"naivelyChristian"interpretations,
18:33:50 PM
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JR.
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18:33:50 PM
266
KENTEMERY,
JR.
knowledgeof God and any it can have in via (p. 298). Such a discontiis contradictedby two questions(recently
edited)
nuityin Albert'sthinking
De raptuand De visione
Dei inpatria
, in which Albertargues thatthe mystical raptureexperiencedby some saintswhile stillin thislifeapproaches
the formof the beatificvision ("est similegloriaeper aliquem modum"),
that "elevatio haec est quodammodo praeternaturam,in quodammodo
supra, et quodammodo contra," and that its intellectualvision occurs
withoutimagesor phantasms("in raptuomnes convertuntur
ad intelligentiam,et in ilia percipiuntde luminedivino,quantumpossunt,unaquaeque
secundum proportionempropriam sibi").2 Moreover, Alain de Libera
showsthatAlbertallowed the possibility
of a naturalcontemplative
felicity
in this life, by way of the conjunctionor continuationof the possible
intellectwith the agent intellect;3a fortiori
, thispossibilitywould seem to
admita supernaturalmysticalcognitionof God in thislife.Rathersophistically,Trottmannadduces de Libera's evidenceto reduce Wber's interis forced
pretationad absurdum
(p. 299). Trottmann'soverallinterpretation
his
historical
to
which
Albert
once
more
thesis,according
by
larger
appears
as an imperfectprecursorof his student,movingthe rightinterpretation
of Aristotleforwardbut still infectedby "neo-Platonic" elements.So
Trottmannconfirmsa longstandinghistoriographical
tradition,in the face
of the major reassessmentof Albert'steachingin the last few decades.4
of a philosophBeyond doubt,however,Albertadmittedthe possibility
ical cognitionthatThomas denies:the knowledgeof separatedsubstances.
2 The two
are editedbyA. Fries,W. Kbeland H. Anzulewicz
in: Sancti
questions
Doctoris
Ecclesiae
Alberti
. . Opera
omnia
i.W. 1993,
25.2,Mnster
(Cologne
Magni.
Edition)
85-101.Forthequotations,
see 86b,92b,93b.
Trottmann's
thatthephilosopher's
beatitude
"consiste
recevoir
la
rapidinference
forme
mmede la divine
essence
de l'intellect"
parcontinuation
(p. 299)seemsunjustified
Albert
he quotes,
whichspeaksofunderstanding
substances.
bythetextfrom
separated
Trottmann
doesnotrefer
toa seeming
contradiction
Albert's
varSurprisingly,
among
iousstatements
aboutthebeatific
which
wasremarked
medieval
thinkers.
vision,
byother
notesthatin hiscommentary
on De divinis
Albert
nominibus,
DenystheCarthusian
says
thateventheblessed
soulscannot
knowthequidestofthedivine
butonlyitsquia
essence,
est
. Denyscomments:
"Verum
istudnonvidetur
ritesonare,
, habetur
quiacognitio
quiaest
etiamin praesenti;
et perspeculum
in aenigmate,
obscura,
estquetaliscognitio
quae
mentem
creatam
contentare
etquietare
nonvalet.
. . . Insuper
de hacipsamateria
Albertus,
virvaldecatholicus,
in aliislocismelius
on De mystica
(seeDenys'commentary
scripsit"
absolutiones
a.1, inDoctoris
ecstatici
D. Dionysii
Cartusiani
theobgia:
Difficultatum
praecipuarum
Opera
omnia
16:482-83).
Twoobservations
should
be made:(1) likesomeofhisDominican
confrres
before1241,Albert,
movedby thedrift
of Dionysius'
text,hereis still
perhaps
influenced
ofGod'sunknowability
notion
eveninthebeatific
vision;
bytheGreek
(2)howeverdefined,
in Albert's
mindthere
is a gradedcontinuity
between
thesoul'sknowledge
ofGodinviaandinpatria
a knowledge
, in thisinstance,
quiaest.
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"
"
, and theorderofknowing
followsnature
followstheorderof being,
Operation
Curiously,according to Trottmann'sthoroughrecitationsof the early
disputes,it is the "Augustinin"proponentsof the argufourteenth-century
ment that the soul's beatitudeincreases"intensively"
when reunitedwith
its body who most oftenappeal to thisgeneralprinciple.The Franciscan
Arnaud of Clermont,forexample,arguesthatas the human subjectneeds
a body in order to performits most noble act, i.e., intellection,so the
separatedsoul, because it as yet lacks the perfectionof its being,will not
be able to realize its most perfectoperationuntilreunitedwithits body
(pp. 620-21; Trottmannjudges the argument"specious"). On behalfof
an "intensive"increase,an anonymous"CarmeliteBachelor" attemptsto
establisha similarparallel betweenthe ordersof being and of knowing,
and betweenknowledgein via and knowledgeinpatria
. Whereas Arnaud
to
an
from
the
Carmelite
Thomas,
Bachelor, ironiresponds
objection
cally,adduces Thomas' support(p. 633; Trottmannjudges the argument
"feeble"). Contrariwise,one wonders why the Dominicans, Armand of
Belvzer and John of Naples, arguingthat the separated soul does not
requirea body forits perfectoperationand essentialbeatitude,foundit
of
necessaryor at least convenientto adopt Albertthe Great's definition
the soul as "an intellectualsubstance that subsistsby itself"(pp. 568,
576). Thomas Aquinas himselfchanged his mind on thisquestion,at first
maintainingthat the soul's beatitude will increase "intensively"when
reunitedto its body but later concludingthat reunionwould bringonly
an "extensive"increase. TrottmannmentionsThomas' reversalseveral
reatimes,but he does not search deeply the intrinsicor circumstantial
sons that mightserve to explain it.
If, as Thomas teaches,the human soul, which is last in the hierarchy
of Intelligenceshavingonly a potencyforknowledge,by naturehas need
of body in orderto know,would it not seem that,accordingto the principle that"grace and gloryperfectbut do not destroynature,"the soul must
await reunionwithits body beforeit partakesits fullcognitivebeatitude?
in thehumancomposite
camecloseto beingcondemned
at Parisin 1277.The many
a plurality
in thehuman
ora forma
ofhisdoctrine
offorms
opponents
posited
composite
theexistential
oftheseparated
soul.Thomas'doc, in partto preserve
reality
corporeitatis
trineraisedproblems
Christ's
intoHell,
threedaysin thetomband descent
regarding
Hisdoctrine
an heated
wasvindicated,
at theCouncil
of
however,
producing
controversy.
Vienne(1311-12),
which
declared
that"therational,
intellectual
soulis byitsownnature
theform
ofthebody."Trottmann
orpriorquesmentions
anyofthesematters
scarcely
tionsin theorderofbeing;thisis so,I think,
tolimit
hisdiscussion
becausehe wishes
to
theacceptably
modern
terrain
of "epistemology,"
thatis, to "unecritique
de la raison
de la raisonpratique"
pureet unecritique
(p. 818 n. 1).
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that locate beatitude primarilyin the will or which treat logical and
semanticquestionsarisingfromthe mysteryto be historicallyretrogressive.) In this heterogenoussection,Trottmannpresentsthe teachingsof
in some instances(Henryof Ghent,
variousmastersin a seriesof vignettes;
the
at
"secondFranciscanschool,"includthe
court
of
Viterbo,
theologians
he has publishedseparately.
he
rsums
of
articles
Duns
Scotus) gives
ing
for
the
This tacticcreated some problems
editingof the book, forlater
in the textthereare referencesto pointsthatmusthave been established
in the thesisbut are absent in the summaries.The reader, then, may
wish to acquire the articlesto accompany the bulkyvolume.
The dialecticalmovementof the narrativeagain gathersfullsteam in
the last part,which treatsthe debates provokedbyJohn XXII and their
culminationin the papal Constitutionof BenedictXII. This part,which
bringsto lightseveralunstudiedtexts,representsTrottmann'smost "original contribution
to scholarship."
John XXII's centralidea about human beatitude,firstpresentedin a
seriesof sermonshe preached in Avignonin 1331, is this:elect separated
souls mustwait for the fullnessof beatitudeand the vision of God face
to face untiltheyare reunitedwiththeirbodies, and untilthe finaljudgment at the end of time,when the totalityof the mysticalbody will be
assembledin gloryunder its head and Christwill hand over his rule to
the Father.Untilthattime,electseparatedsouls contemplateGod through
to "an archaictheological
a visionof the humanityof Christ.By returning
tradition,the old jurist Pope" thus "invitedhis contemporariesto reflect
on thecollectiveand eschatologicaldimensionof salvation,"and challenged
theprevailingScholastictheology,which,conceivingthe worldas eternal,9
tendedto focuson the destinyof individualsouls afterdeath and seemed
to "push back the eschatologicalreckoningto infinity"
(p. 455).
9 "La rflexion
porter
surle destin
individuel
desmes
avaiteu tendance
scolastique
le mondecomme
. . . N'ytait-elle
pensant
aprsla mort.
pasinvite
parunephilosophie
ternel
ainsirepousser
l'infini
l'cheance
etsemblant
eschatologique?"
(p.455).Trottmann
thephilosophers
whosewritings
in hisexpression,
foralthough
shouldbe morecareful
didnotteach
thattheworld
is eternal,
whatScholastic
readargued
theologian
theologians
in timeandwillbejudgedat a definite
endoftime?
thatin facttheworldwascreated
and
andinfidel
sometheologians
totheheathen
philosophers,
(e.g.,Bonaventure
Contrary
oftheworldin timecouldbe proved
ofGhent)
byreaHenry
judgedthatthecreation
contrast
andeffect.
Thenagain,
is sacrificed
forrhetorical
son.Too often,
exactexpression
itwasnot
in theentire
a presupposition
embedded
thestatement
mayreflect
argument:
the
altered
or transformed
Scholastic
, thatradically
bysacrascriptum
theology,
governed
in "waves"of
of ancientphilosophy,
butancientphilosophy
(assimilated
conceptions
theoutcome
oftheological
thatpredetermined
Aristotelian
speculation.
interpretation)
18:33:50 PM
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KENTEMERY,
JR.
creature
clearlyand openly;thisvisionis unmediatedby any intervening
or created similitude(pp. 802-7). In this definition,
Trottmanndiscerns
the influenceof Duns Scotus (p. 804). Since Scotus keeps appearing,in
Jacques Fournier'smastersynthesisand in his finalword on the matter
as Pope, one wonderswhy he does not hold a more prominentplace in
Trottmann'sbook (see pp. 359-60). Significantly,
Benedict'sConstitution
makes no referenceto the lumen
gloriaenor to the relationbetweencreated and uncreatedgrace in the beatificvision.It venturesnothingabout
the relationbetweenparticularand generaljudgmentsor about any augmentationof beatitudeat the resurrection
or generaljudgment.Thus, in
his ConstitutionBenedictXII abandoned the surpassingideas of his private treatiseand retreatedfromhis own synthesisof patristic,monastic,
Deus
mysticaland Scholastictheologies.So, as Trottmannsays,Benedictas
leftunresolvedthe dialecticaloppositionbetween "a collectiveand historicalconceptionof eschatology,"expressedmythically
and imaginatively,
and an individual,a-temporalconception of eschatology,expressedin
abstract,metaphysicalterms,whichsets aside the "cosmic" dimensionsof
salvation (pp. 814-5). Doubtless, as Trottmannconjectures,Benedict's
restraint
was governedby his desireto avoid the likelyoppositionof both
Dominicansand Franciscans,and to put to resta disputethathad caused
turmoilthroughoutthe Church. It is possible, however,that Benedict
exercisedintellectual
judgmentas well as politicalprudence,decidingthat
most questions concerningthe "How?" and "When?" of beatitudefall
withinthe realm of probable opinion and are thereforeunsuitablefor
dogmaticdeclaration.
* * *
One may summarizeTrottmann'sargumentthus:The "materialistic"
and
of David of Dinant provokedthe Condem"pantheistic"Aristotelianism
nationsof 1210, whichbegat Uavgustinisme
avicennisant
(Gilson);thismovementprovokedthe Condemnationsof 1241, whichbegat "the firstLatin
Averroism"(Gauthier)or L3augus
tinisme
averroismi'
the wanton piety of
10CarlosBazn,WasThere
Euer
a "First
inMiscellanea
Mediaevalia
Averroism"?
(forthcoming
on
andA. Speer)establishes
thatnoneoftheLatincommentators
27, ed.J.A. Aertsen
Aristotle's
De anima
between
doctrine
that
Averros'
distinctive
1230and 1260adopted
boththeAgent
andMaterial
areseparate
doctrine
that
Intellects
substances
oranyother
is distinctively
thatall oftheGreekandSemitic
commentators
Averroistic;
unanimously
heldthattheAgent
Intellect
is a separate
thatall oftheearlyLatincommensubstance;
in contrast,
intellects
arepartsofthehuman
tators,
arguedthattheagentandpossible
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Reviews
AnIntroduction
toMedieval
Press,
C.F.JMartin,
Philosophy.
University
Edinburgh
Edinburgh
1996,vii+ 148p. ISBN0 748607900
It hasbeensomeyearsnowsincethepublication
ofJulius
short
of
Weinberg's
history
medieval
As Martin
whichcan serveas
literature
says,thereis notenough
philosophy.
"anintroduction
of"medieval
to,andoverview
(Indeedthisis trueforintrophilosophy.
in theEnglish
volumes
Therehardly
existany.In theGerman
lanductory
language.
is theexcellent
there
bookon thesubject
andweshould
guage,however,
byKurtPlasch,1
alsomention
De Rijk'sclassic2
in 1977andtranslated
in 1985.)It
intoFrench
published
is worthy
thatan attempt
ofapplause,
has beenmadeto comeup withan
therefore,
forstudents
oftheMiddleAgesas wellas students
ofphilosophy.
English
guidebook
Whenpresenting
a reliable
introduction
to thephilosophy
oftheMiddleAges,it is
to keepa number
ofthings
in mind.Firstofall,oneshouldrealisethatthe
important
term'medieval
in thatitmight
canbe misleading,
there
exists
a type
philosophy'
suggest
ofphilosophy
thatcanbe characterised
as 'medieval1,
or ancient
as opposedto modern
to speakofmodern
as ifthere
were
However
philosophy.
justas itis useless
philosophy
onekindofthought
ofthatname,likewise
onecanhardly
is such
worthy
saythatthere
as a medievali
'kind'ofthought
or philosophy.
As hasbeenadequately
thing
arguedby
scholars
in thephilosophy
oftheMiddleAges,theterm'medieval'
canbe no morethan
a convenient
shorthand
fora quitearbitrarily
chosenperiodin thehistory
ofwestern
towhich
onewishes
to confine
one'sresearch.
Thisis notto saythatoneis not
thought
entided
to distinguish
certain
or related
withphilosophical
developments
waysofdealing
ina given
butweshould
be careful
nottomistake
ourfindings
as inherproblems
period,
entto an historical
period.3
toomuchintotheterm'medieval',
Besides
oneshould
notcombeingofwaryreading
thatcannotbe
does,theMiddleAgeswithsomesortofalienculture
pare,as Martin
without
first
withitssecret
it is fairto say
familiar
codes.Although
approached
getting
ofphilosophy
thatmanyproblems
ofthepastarenowno longer
an issue,itis
perhaps
notas ifwhatwe callphilosophy
hasnothing
to do withwhatwasdonein
nowadays
certain
weareas much
traditions
havefadedintothebackground,
previous
ages.Although
theheirs
oftraditions
inthepastwere.In other
inorder
as philosophers
tobecome
words,
withwhatwasdonein theMiddleAges,philosophy-wise
familiar
thatis,itis notadvisableto setoneself
theMiddleAges.
apartfrom
Martin
hisAnIntroduction
toMedieval
withan "introduction
totheintroPhilosophy
begins
as hecallsit(p. 2),where
hepaysconsiderable
tothequestions
'what
attention
duction",
is philosophy?'
and 'whatare theMiddleAges?'.To consider
thesequestions
couldbe
butparticularly
theseconditem,one shouldnotdealwithit on the
useful,
regarding
thatthere
is a fixed,
standard
of'medievality',
letaloneas faras its
assumption
objective
is concerned.
philosophy
eviThattheauthor
oftheIntroduction
indeedhassucha standard
in mindis already
dentin hisapproach
After
withus hisoddlypessimistic
view
tohisfirst
problem.
sharing
that"contemporary
is a ruin"(p. 4), he continues
on theassumption
thatin
philosophy
wasa philosophical
which
thepastthere
Descartes
started
outtobuild,andof
structure,
whichat present
likein a museum.
he states
Likewise
that
onlyscattered
partsareleft,
in building
kind"(p. 4).
medieval
thinkers
werealso "involved
a structure
ofa certain
Andwiththe"decay"
ofmedieval
after
thegreat
St.Thomas
(notably
philosophy
Aquinas),
Martin
thisstructure
fellintoruin.
claims,
in
In viewofthispreconceived
ideaofmedieval
which
wasquitecommon
philosophy,
as De Wulf,
itis hardly
thedaysofhistorians
thatMartin
setsitwidely
surprising
apart
from
whatis donein themodern
era.The maindifference,
in hisidea,is thatin the
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Vwarium
37,2
18:34:01 PM
REVIEWS
283
of
there
wasno suchthing
as epistemologa,
orworries
aboutthestatus
medieval
period,
thathasentered
toMartin,
human
a problem
according
onlysince
knowledge,
philosophy,
notjudgemedieval
he
Descartes.
Thusweshould
standards,
byourmodern
philosophers
from
Butwhat
ourundertakings.
becausewhattheyweredoingwasso different
insists,
medieval
becausewe
we shouldnevertryto do,we aretold,is to defend
philosophers
to usingthemto our
canidentify
withwhattheyweredoing.Thiswouldonlyamount
is leftforus to figure
Whatkindofdefenders
Martin
hasin mindhere,however,
profit.
ifwe wishto understand
we must
medieval
out.In anycase,he claims,
philosophers,
howtruly
different
us (pp. 7-8).
realise
theyarefrom
It is regrettable
thatMartin's
to suchan interesting
introduction
periodin thehistory
a notion
ofthephilosophy
intheMiddle
intothetrapofcreating
ofphilosophy
hasfallen
with
is concerned)
wereonedistinct
(atleastwhere
period
Agesas ifthelatter
philosophy
withthephilosophy
a definite
ofSt.Augustine,
anda definite
end,in
starting
beginning,
ofDescartes
is overthrown
when
thephilosophy
("[.. .] Medieval
philosophical
thought
on returning
Descartes
insists
to self-evident
[. . .]" (p. 40)).Whilehe is quite
principles
on thesubject
lenient
ofwhereto puttheboundaries
between
MiddleAges
Antiquity,
andModern
ofMedieval
of
Times(p. 10),thedifferentia
is the"synthesis
specifica
thought
ancient
Greeklearning
andChristian
tradition"
{ibid).
[. . .] andtheJewish
ofmedieval
As faras the'quality'
is concerned,
theauthor
us on
lectures
philosophy
howdespite
theapparent
similarities
we might
discover
between
themand us,we are
witha completely
alienculture
Thestrangeness
ofthisculture
essentially
dealing
(p. 14f.).
is explained
tous in thesecondchapter,
where
wearetoldhowthemedievais
dealtwith
Thewayin which
Martin
thisnotion
is confusing.
he has
authority.
explains
Apparently
theideathatunlike
themedievais
werepsychologically
ourselves,
dependent
uponauthoritative
ofwhomGodwasbyfarthegreatest
ThatMartin
shoulddisfigures,
authority.
cusstheideaofauthority
initself
isnotso strange,
themajority
sinceofcourse
ofmedieval
works
arecharacterised
todifferent
authorities
theCommentators
bytheir
appeals
(Aristotle,
andso on).However,
it is altogether
to ascribe
to thema slavish
kindof
presumptuous
as opposed
totherebellious
attitude
nature
ofpeoplein ourownage.It is as iftheonly
reasonwhywe ofthetwentieth
do notappealto authority
is thatwe
century
anymore
havesucha different
andsocialmakeup. Alternative
viewsofauctoritas
in
psychological
theMiddleAgesarecompletely
ignored
byMartin.4
to authority
in theMiddleAges,as hasbeenpointed
out,areto be underAppeals
stoodinterms
ofcontemporary
Foronething,
intellectual
thewayinwhich
the
practices.
medievais
theirworks,
authorities,
compiled
taking
greatcareto quotefrom
recognised
canbe seenas answering
tonorms
ofstyle.
Instead
ofjustgetting
onwithit,itwasconsidered
from
authorities.
Buttheappeal
politeto couchone'sownviewswithquotations
to authorities
wasmorethanjusta matter
was
ofstyle.
As in lateAntiquity,
an 'auctor'
thuslabelled
he represented
becauseonebelieved
theTruth.
In other
an authorwords,
is (partof)a revealed
rational
truth.
As it appears,
notall
text,
ity,i.e.an authoritative
texts
written
wereauthoritative.
Thismeansthatit is notpeoplethat
bye.g.Aristotle,
weretheauthorities
buttexts.
on thetypeofenquiry,
different
texts
werethe
Depending
authoritative
ones.Farfrom
ofthetruth
whichhadtobe recbeingdifferent
expressions
as Martin
wouldhaveit,theauthoratitive
texts
werebotha meansto support
onciled,
one'sownviews,
as wellas a foundation
uponwhichonecouldbuildnewideas.
A reading
ofthemoregeneral
ofthebookconfirms
ourfirst
that
chapters
impression
Martin
hasa biasedoutlook
on philosophy
in theMiddleAges.Medieval
is
philosophy
considered
to reconcile
in orderto reachthe
authorities
byhimas a continuous
attempt
Truth.
Smallwonder
thenthatapartfrom
St.Augustine,
whois saidto havestarted
the
medieval
theonlymedieval
ofconsiderable
whois worthy
attention
synthesis,
philosopher
is ThomasAquinas.
Theories
andideasofotherphilosophers
areeither
misrepresented,
oraremerely
in passing,
mentioned
without
thereaderanyexplanation.
giving
As to Martin's
ofSt. Augustine,
he seemsto ignore
thefactthatthe
representation
18:34:01 PM
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REVIEWS
latter
In fact,
topresent
owesa greatdealtoAntiquity.
therejection
ofa positive
evil(as
to a privation
ofgoodness)
as a notion
thatentered
western
opposed
philosophy
through
is a serious
Thisnegative
mistake.
ofevilis foundas earlyas in
Augustine
description
andcontinues
to feature
in thephilosophy
ofPlatoandAristode.
Empedocles,
As faras thephilosopical
ofothers
thanThomasAquinas
areconcerned,
the
systems
Martin
itis not
discusses
themis often
wayinwhich
quitesuperficial.
Generally
speaking
correct
toassume
thatin theMiddleAgesnothing
wasdoneinthefieldofepistemology,
as Martinwouldhaveit. As regards
individual
Martin's
of
explanation
philosophers,
Aristotle's
ofcauses,
forinstance,
isnotonlyconfusing,
butdrastically
theory
oversimplified
thatthemedievais
thewayin whichhe assumes
Moreover,
justtookover
(p. 104f.).
Aristotle's
notion
of'form'
forbothindividuals
andkinds(pp.
andusedit ambiguously
is notveryfair.Therearedifferent
this
couldinterpret
101-102)
waysin whichauthors
notion
of
orBacon).Butitis notonlyAristotle
andthemedieval
(e.g.Aquinas
reception
hisworks
thatis handled
shouldone makeofMartin's
What,forexample,
carelessly.
remark
aboutAbelard's
"moderate
realism"
onthequestion
ofuniversais
(p.87)?Furthermore,
it is wrong
to sayabouttheproblem
ofuniversais
thatthroughout
theMiddleAgesan
"'intermediate
between
Platonism
andextreme
became
answer',
nominalism,
widely
accepted"
forinstance
to thisproblem
thedifferent
(p. 96).Consider
bypeoplesuchas
approaches
whatcouldtheexpresandothers.
Abelard,
Moreover,
Bacon,Ockham,
Buridan,
Aquinas,
sion"intermediate
answer"
meanin thisconnection?
possibly
ofoversimplification,
habitofmentioning
Besides
Martin
hastheirritating
beingguilty
ofimportance
ideasthatheseemstoconsider
forthereader
without
togivean
bothering
on p. 77 we aretoldhowBoethius
tendenForinstance,
had"Aristotelian
explanation.
cies"which"alsogivehiman interest
in producing
definitions
(. . .) someofwhichare
stillin philosophical
arethey?
In hisdiscussion
usetoday(. . .)". Whatdefinitions
ofthe
Boethian
Martin
talksaboutAugustine
as opposed
to
and 'fideism',
approach
(p. 84ff.),
I cannotunderstand
Boethius'
at all whatMartin
is on abouthere.Where
'rationalism'.
isthecontrast?
withrationalism?
isunorthoAndwhatexactly
Whynotassociate
Augustine
doxaboutAbelard's
intheology
is Martin
conclusions
referring
(p. 87)?Whatconclusions
to here?
It seemsas ifMartin
fails
is fondofattaching
labelsto philosophers,
buthe certainly
to account
forthewayin whichhe usesthem.
tellsus howimporAgain,he sometimes
tantsomeworkwas,e.g.the"brilliant"
De ventate
byThomasAquinas
(p. 122),butthen
with
doesnotexplain
is identified
whatwasso interesting
aboutit (thefactthattruth
is notmentioned;
we onlyfindhisconfusing
ideaof
account
ofAristotle's
intelligibility
truth
as a "match
between
mindandreality").
DunsScotusis handled
miserably
Finally,
in Martin's
Whilehe recognises
ofmodality
account.
theimportance
ofScotus'notion
is missing.
(p. 127),onceagainan explanation
In hisoverestimation
Martin
haspresented
ofThomas
oftheaccomplishments
Aquinas,
diverse
a one-sided
thewidely
oftheMiddleAges,andthuscompletely
disregards
picture
is measured
ofmanyindividual
ofthatperiod.
Medieval
activities
philosophy
philosophers
ofan Aquinas,
elseeither
leadsup to thisachievement,
andeverything
bythestandards
orisevidence
Astodetails
theachievements
ofindividual
ofa decline.
philosoconcerning
Martin
onecancomeacrossin encydoesno morethanto repeata fewclichs
phers,
withthesources.
written
whoareinnowayfamiliar
ofphilosophy
byscholars
clopaedias
in
ofintellectual
hisintroduction
doesnojusticeto therichforms
Furthermore,
pursuit
inthefield
inMartin's
theMiddle
willbe disappointed
book,andbecause
Ages.Specialists
I cannotrecommend
itto non-specialists
either.
areleftunexplained,
manythings
JokeSpruyt
ofMaastricht
University
18:34:01 PM
REVIEWS
285
1 KurtFlasch,
imMittelalter.
Von
Dasphilosophische
Denken
zuMachiavelli
, Stuttgart
Augustin
1986.
2 L.M.de
Traditie
enVernieuwing
, Assen1977.(translation:
Wijsbegeerte.
Rijk,Middeleeuwse
York1985).
La philosophie
au moyen
, Leiden/Kln/New
ge
3 See De
., above,n. 2), ch. 1-2,and Flasch1986(op.cit.,above,
Rijk1977(op.cit
n. 1),16-7.
4 See De
useofauthoritative
Rijk1977(op.cit.,above,n. 2), ch.4. Forthefrequent
in theMiddleAgesbyThomasAquinas,
forinstance,
seeM.-D.Chenu,Introduction
texts
l'tude
deSaintThomas
, Paris1954.
d'Aquin
DavidPingree,
Ptolomei
Louvain-la-Neuve
Canonis
, AcademiaBruylant,
1997,
Preceptum
desAstronomes
172pp.ISBN2-87209-479-2
viii.).
(Corpus
Byzantins,
is a Latinastronomical
textwithsucha complex
thatit could
ThisPreceptum
history
Mostofitis
havebeenfound
a homein manyotherseriesthanoneofByzantine
texts.
from
Theon'sLittle
translated
theGreek,
from
(c.377)ontheHandy
notably
Commentary
a revision
ofTheonin Greek,
an earlier
Tables.OtherTheonic
might
represent
passages
usedbyTheon.Someofthenontranslation
intoLatin,or an olderGreekcommentary
Theonic
is paralleled
Valens'Anthologiae.
Itfirst
material
comesto
byVettius
apparently
thesurface
in western
formoftheAlexandrian
calendar
EuropewhentheRomanized
contained
in theworkis attested
at St Gallin theearlyninth
The oldestextant
century.
inMS Harley
wascopiedaround
theyear1000,either
in
2506(British
version,
Library),
Winchester
or Fleury.
Itseditor
DavidPingree
an ancestor
thatwasat Fleury
postulates
in 994,andhe conjectures
thatit or theHarleycopywassentto England
byAbboof
areconnected
withChartres
Other
andCanterbury,
andtesFleury.
pertinent
manuscripts
andfro-ing
tomuchto-ing
ofliterary
resources
between
andFranceoverthe
tify
England
In themiddle
nexttwocenturies.
ofthetwelfth
ofChartres
century
Thierry
attempted,
notvery
totransliterate
thetext's
Latintransliterations
ofGreek
backintothe
successfully,
Greekalphabet.
Thattheworkgoesbackto thesixthcentury,
is notin doubt.
however,
tothe'present
time'as a yearthatbeganon 29 August
Thereis onereference
534,and
another
to a datein 528,andPingree
thatit might
havebeenintended
for
conjectures
usein theabortive
thatCassiodorus
Christian
andpopeAgapetus
werehoping
Academy
at Romeinimitation
oftheacademy
at Nisibis.
Thisconjecture
(in535)toestablish
gives
somedifficulty,
sinceCassiodorus
whileoneofthemainobjecPingree
opposed
astrology
tivesoftheauthor
ofthePreceptum
wastoprovide
western
withthemeansto
astrologers
casthoroscopes;
butRomeat leastseemscertain
as theplaceofitscomposition.
wascomposed
The Preceptum
witha verypoorgraspofhisastronomical
bya scholar
material.
Itis essentially
a series
ofcomputational
ruleswithout
theanyoftheunderlying
oretical
Fewerthanhalfofthetablesalludedto in thetextareincluded
rationale.
with
whether
everusedtheworktocompute
a fullrangeofplanit,anditis doubtful
anyone
is moderately
well
well,although
etarylongitudes
simplesolarand lunarcomputation
catered
for.Ourchief
interest
in itscontents
ifnotfrom
muststem,
thesesadfacts,
then
from
theoccasionili
itgivesintotinyfragments
ofancient
known
insights
astronomy
only
from
thissource.
itgivesevidence
fortheRomanuseofa symbol
forzero
(Forexample,
thatusedbytheGreeks.)
paralleling
no overallstudyof theworkin a historical
includes
context,
Pingree
beyondthe
withthemanuscript
tradition.
The textitself
is whatmatters
Introduction,
most,
dealing
andtheedition
itself
is presented
in an exemplary
andstraightforward
way.The Latin
withits(footnoted)
variant
fewer
thanfifty
occupies
pagesin all. In thefacing
readings
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Vivarium
37,2
18:34:12 PM
286
REVIEWS
translation
withthetext's
hasfought
andhiscommentary
Pingree
valiantly
shortcomings,
at theendoffers
intoparallel
Greekmaterial.
manyuseful
insights
J.D.North
Groningen
IditDobbs-Weinstein,
Maimonides
of
andSt.Thomas
ontheLimits
, StateUniversity
ofReason
NewYorkPress,
N.Y. 1995x Q 278p. ISBN0-7914-2416-2.
Albany,
Thisbookfocuses
on theviewsofMaimonides
andAquinasabouthowtheplaceof
humanbeings
in theworldlimits
andconditions
their
to know.Dobbs-Weinstein
ability
concludes
thatMaimonides
andAquinasagreethathumanbeings,
after
their
especially
oftheultimate
oftheworld
ontheir
structure
Fall,havenochanceofreaching
knowledge
ownefforts.
Thisis common
doctrine:
revealed
Judaeo-Christian
philoreligion
surpasses
human
after
theFallaredeficient.
a bitnovelis
Whatis perhaps
science;
sophical
beings
insistence
of
Dobbs-Weinstein's
thatMaimonides
andAquinas
stress
so muchthedanger
intellectual
we shouldaccept,and notseekto understand.
So they
pride:somethings
limit
thescopeofphilosophy.
: Jobhadthe
Hencesheemphasizes
theBook
sharply
ofJob
faultofintellectual
theplaceofhuman
pride[175].Thisineffectual
pridecomesfrom
in theworld:
to learnscience
from
senseperception,
buttootiedto
beings
highenough
senseperception
and material
theintelligible
realities.
objectsto apprehend
Havingthe
ofhalf-God,
status
human
haveno chanceofsucceeding
on their
half-beast,
own,
beings
as Godoras beast.Theymustdepend
willcome
anddivine
which
uponrevelation
grace,
tothosewhochosetolivetheir
livesproperly
[168].As mostdo not,mostsinas wellas
failin philosophy.
Thebulkofthebookconsists
insummaries,
withcritical
ofvaricomments,
interspersed
ouspassages
from
Maimonides
andAquinas.
EachofChapters
TwotoSixtakesa topic,
ordivine
from
Mailaw,andthenhastwoparts,
say,Creation
keypassages
summarizing
monides
andAquinasrespectively.
I findthecomments
often
andintriguing,
thoughtful
bothin explaining
thetextandin evaluating
howsuccessful
theyare.Dobbs-Weinstein
doesnothesitate
tocriticize
as a failure
an account
ofMaimonides
orAquinas
[75; 100;
ofhuman
thatAquinas
arrives
at theright
account
121-3;152].On thewholeshethinks
makestheseremarks
inpassing,
and
Dobbs-Weinstein
However,
knowledge
[133;192T.].
so doesnotworkthemoutvery
far.Stillsheis covering
ina short
book
so muchmaterial
thatperhaps
shecouldhardly
do more,
herproject.
Butthen,
givenhowshehasdefined
herstyledoesn't
OftenI foundherproseturgid,
help:e.g.,p. 74,lastsentence.
rough
going.
Dobbs-Weinstein
makesfargreater
claimsforthisbookthanwhatI havesaidso far.
andAquinas
Shefrequently
announces
thatthebulkofmodern
onMaimonides
scholarship
hasfatalflaws.
is thatmodern
Hermaincomplaint,
withwhichI havesomesympathy,
writor thereligious
scholars
a focus:theystudy
either
thephilosophy
havetoonarrow
likeMaimonides
Butin doingso theymissthesystematic,
andAquinas.
ingsofthinkers
as well
holistic
character
oftheir
boththeir
oftheScripture
thought,
study
encompassing
in philosophy
as ofthephilosophy
think
that
[17-20;30; 42; 89]. So, shesays,scholars
findhimNeo-Platonist
is Aristotelian,
whilethosein theology
becausetheyconAquinas
as
endsup claiming
centrate
on onlya portion
ofthecorpus[19].Dobbs-Weinstein
that,
view
theNeo-Platonist
overphilosophy
forMaimonides
andAquinas,
hasprimacy
religion
is better,
withtheAristotelian
onceharmonized
[89; 111-2].
teachings
shecharges,
modern
eventhosedoinghermeneutics,
Moreover,
scholars,
paytoolittle
ofthetexts
attention
to thehistorical
context
studied
theyneglect
[4; 39]. In particular,
their
varithedifferent
andpurposes
thatMaimonides
audiences
andAquinasintended
ouswritings
for.Oncewe regaintheseinsights,
andrespect
theadviceon howto read
Vivarium
37,2
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
18:34:12 PM
REVIEWS
287
thesetexts
notonlybecome
their
works
thatthesetwohavegivenus,shepromises,
more
to us,butalsotheymight
rescueus frommodernity
intelligible
[1; 5-7].She regularly
modern
forfailing
on thesecounts[17-20;61-2;67-8;73-4;89; 91;
scholarship
castigates
186].
all thesecomplaints,
I do notseethatDobbs-Weinstein
hasgivenus anything
Despite
I findextremely
theabsenceofreferences
better.
to and discussion
ofearlier
troubling
sources.
hasasserted
thatAquinas,
likeMaimonides,
is basically
a
E.g.,Dobbs-Weinstein
She noteshisindebtedness
to Avicenna
Neo-Platonist.
[n. 8; 131],butthendoesnot
I findthisomission
Avicenna's
discuss
theory.
glaring,
givenherclaimsaboutthemetaofAquinas
andMaimonides,
thanAristotelians,
sc.,thattheyaremorePlatonists
physics
forAvicenna
offers
a scheme
thathassomePlatonist
features
whilerejecting
Forms.
So
Maimonides
andAquinasare merely
Avicenna
here;thenno radical
perhaps
following
viewneedbe required.
reassessment
oftheir
At theleast,givenherownfrequent
criticismsofscholars
forignoring
sheshouldhaveprovided
muchmorebackground
context,
forunderstanding
thetheories
thatshediscusses
thanshedoes.
I findothercounts
ofDobbs-Weinstein
herownmethods.
If sheis so conignoring
cerned
abouttheproper
audience
ofthevarious
shediscusses,
writings
whythendoesshe
notgointothehistorical
evidence
abouttheseaudiences
andtheir
intellectual
background
thehistorical
more?She doesnotdiscuss
evidence
forMaimonides'
audienceand the
ofhisstudents.
She doesnotdiscuss
wrotetheGuide
in
demography
whyMaimonides
ArabicandhisTalmudic
andreligious
in Hebrew.
works
Maimonides
himself
is
Surely
a message
thathe intends
hisworks,
andreligious,
to be readsepsending
philosophical
in someway.So tooAquinassharply
from
at ST
arately
separates
philosophy
theology
: whydoesnotDobbs-Weinstein
discuss
thispassage?
shedoesnotdiscuss
the
I.Q,1
Again,
inwhich
northelecture
format
at theuniversity
ofParis.
wrote,
university
setting
Aquinas
Hernote[636]whyAquinas
wrote
theSumma
needssupplementing
with
Theofogiae
surely
ifshedoestakeso seriously
thishistorical
theremarks
abouttheproper
perspective.
Finally,
audiences
forthesetexts,
ofMaimonides
andAquinas
werewritwell,noneoftheworks
tenforus anyway!
Thisbookprobably
triesto covertoomuchtooquickly.
Ifwe eliminate
themethodin effect
Dobbs-Weinstein
hasgivenus an explication
ofa fewimporremarks,
ological
tanttexts
onvarious
issuesconcerning
theorigin,
andknowledge
ofhuman
status,
beings
andAquinas.
Forhertheirreligious
doctrines
thephilobyMaimonides
alwaystrump
in thosecases,likeCreation
ones:thisis obvious
whereMaimonides
orAquinas
sophical
in other
morefrom
thehistorical
factoftheir
cases,itis obvious
saysso explicitly;
being
thanfrom
thegrounds
thatshegives.I do notgeta sensefrom
herbook
JeworCatholic
ofhowtheviewsofAquinasandMaimonides
cohereas a whole:in their
philosophical
moments
bothMaimonides
andAquinas
seemmoreoptimistic
abouthumanability
than
a lapsarian
to theinevitable
ofhumanthought
andpractice.
holding
failings
I amwrong
to seekcoherence
in their
views:Dobbs-Weinstein
Perhaps,
though,
says,
a Modern
is a single,
discourse
thenecessary
condition
"Onlyfrom
perspective
unifying
forphilosophical
from
Parmenides
on,non-contraknowledge"
[3].Well,forphilosophy,
- orher
hasbeentheprevailing
Ifthediscourse
diction
norm.
ofMaimonides
orAquinas
- avoidsthisnecessary
owndiscourse
whatphilosophical
worth
canithave?
condition,
Kutztown
Allan Bck
18:34:29 PM
288
REVIEWS
Medieval
andtheTranscendentais
: TheCaseofThomas
, Brill
JanA. Aertsen,
Philosophy
Aquinas
Academic
Leiden.1996x + 468p. ISBN90 04 105859
Publishers,
Thisbookpresents
thedoctrine
ofSt.Thomas
onthetranscendentais.
(Generally
Aquinas
in themedieval
termis one thatdescribes
realthings
sense,a transcendental
speaking,
thatoccurinmorethanoneofthecategories
ofbeings
enumerated
Aertsen
byAristotle.)
that'transcendental'
hasvarious,
inmedieval
times.
senses
andinmodern
argues
differing
haveciteda useful
article
The Kantiansenseof
(Herehe might
byIgnacioAngelelli.)
'transcendental'
"is concerned
withthemodeofourcognition
insofar
as this
ofobjects,
modeofcognition
is possible
a priori
." [22]The modern
sensethenconcerns
theepisteIn contrast,
themedieval
thetranscendentais
sensesconcern
theontological:
mological.
describe
thatexistinre.Aertsen
a Platonist
usedbyAugustine,
sense,
things
distinguishes
from
an Aristotelian
orgo
Platonist
transcendentais
sense,usedbyAquinas.
"transcend",
thethings
in thecategories
thatprovide
theobjects
forhumanunderstanding.
beyond,
Aristotelian
transcendentais
toallbeings
inthe
describe
whatis common
[92]In contrast,
thesebeingsto belongto a
categories
quabeings.[93] Hencetheydo notgo beyond
ThisAristotelian
whowishtomainraises
forChristians
reality.
higher
problems
approach
taina sharpdivision
whilestillmaintaining
thatGodis the
beingGodandother
beings,
humanexistence
and
ultimate
hasto surpass
beingWhois WhoHe Is. God somehow
human
in somerespects
whileremaining
ableto actin thisworldandto
comprehension
be comprehensible,
terms
as 'being',
bysuchtranscendental
bybeingdescribed
'good',
and 'one'.[Ill] Becausethisproblem
in effect
amounts
to asking,
'Is it possible
to be
Christian
whilebeinga philosopher?',
is "the
Aertsen
contends
thatmedieval
philosophy
coreofmedieval
itsrelative
inmodern
ofmedieval
treatments
despite
metaphysics,"
neglect
[21]
philosophy.
Aertsen
a newtheory
claimsthatAquinasdevelops
oftranscendentais
to address
this
involves
a theory
ofanalogy,
basedonAristotle's
[123]Hissolution
problem.
developing
ofhomonymy,
butgoingbeyond
it. [90;53] (I wouldthink
it better
notto use
theory
to describe
doesnot;too,thetheory
of
Aristotle's
Aristotle
himself
'homonymy'
theory:
focalmeaning
orperhaps
'tarco
isnotthesameas thatofhomonymy.)
('ttcpev'
xivo')
Godhasthetranscendental
attributes
while
created
havethem
primarily,
derivatively,
things
inthecausalorderofbeing.[382-3]In contrast,
in thepredicational
orderofknowledge,
we learnofthedivine
attributes
from
ourexperience
ofcreatures.
In thisway,transcenlike'being'and'good'canapplytoterrestrial
as wellas toGod,
dentalterms
substances
without
thesharpdistinction
between
andcreature.
Creator
[374;403]
destroying
andphiloAquinasusestwomaindevicesto showthetranscendentais
theologically
as justmentioned,
canbe comFirst,
saysthatprinciples
sophically
respectable.
Aquinas
andbycausality.
is a principle
forall forms
monin twoways:bypredication
E.g.,form
as 'form'
forall growing
ispredicated
ofthemall; theSunis a common
things,
principle
causalprinsinceit causes
canstudy
Godas a common
themto grow.[119]Philosophy
canstudy
forhere
Godas a common
onlytheology
ciple,whereas
predicational
principle,
intheworld,
arerevolted.
theeffects
manifested
thenature
ofGodinHimself,
transcending
in theworldwithHis beingremote
from
God'sacting
[120-1]Hencewe can reconcile
it.Second,in orderto provethedivineunity,
he claimsthat,sayin thecaseofGod,
tothesamething,
different
'one'and'being'refer
thedivine
butunder
substance,
aspects.
andnot
makea virtual
orformal
onesecundum
Thatis,transcendentais
distinction,
rationes)
a realdistinction.
[130-4;145]
hastwomodes:
usesthesedistinctions
to resolve
manydifficulties.
E.g.,truth
Aquinas
a formal
onein theintellect
oneinre.[271-2]Again,
(inratione
) anda material
beingis
whilegoodis priorto beingin theorderof
equalto goodin theorderofpredication
causality.
[162;313-6]Liketheotherdivinetranscendentais,
beingandgoodareidentisecundum
rem
inratione.
AtonepointAertsen
correlates
resolution
cal onlyinrebutdiffer
Vivarium
37,2
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke
18:34:36 PM
REVIEWS
289
withcommonness
andresolution
secundum
rationem
withcommonness
bycausality,
bypredication.
[135]
somehistorical
ofAquinas'
Aertsen
antecedents
bypresenting
begins
theory:
Philipthe
Alexander
ofHales,andAlbert
theGreat.He alsonotestheimportance
of
Chancellor,
to whomAquinaswas thefirst
the"Arabic
to make
Avicenna,
notably
philosophers",
intaking
reference
transcendental.
while
[81;136]However,
explicit
'being'as theprimary
Avicenna
hasthreeprimary
and 'necessary',
notions,
'being',
'thing'
Aquinaskeepsonly
thefirst
others:
Avicenna
seesthenotion
truth,
two,whileadding
unity,
goodness.
Again,
theWorldSoulwhileAquinasseesitgrasped
ofbeingto be impressed
uponsoulfrom
human
oftheindividual
intellect.
Avicenna's
[82-3;160;171]Aquinas
bytheactivity
rejects
viewthatweknowbeingandtheother
transcendentais
Instead,
bya primary
impression.
known
butat thesametime
"theyare immediately
bythelightoftheagentintellect,
mediated
abstracted
from
sensible
takes'one'as
[173]AgainAvicenna
perspecies
things."
theprinciple
ofnumber,
whileAquinas
deniesthis.[144;203;214-5]
As withmanyotherofthehistorical
claimsmadein thebook,Aertsen
doesnotconwithhisviewsnecessarily.
vinceme.It is notthatI disagree
I do notseethathe
Rather,
hisclaimsadequately.
hassupported
Forexample,
to theprevious
to return
always
paratheaccount
ofourknowledge
ofbeingthatAertsen
attributes
toAquinas
looksto
graph,
mea lotliketheonethatAvicenna
has.[181;191-2]Again,Avicenna
doesdiscuss
the
relation
ofGod (or:thenecessary
andgoodness
in his
elsewhere
truth,
being)to unity,
is a divineattribute.
Metaphysica
(VII.6).It alsois notclearthatforAvicenna
'necessary'
To be sure,Aertsen
thetranscendentais
from
thedivine
namesanddiscusses
distinguishes
their
ornotAquinas
hasjustappropri[373;360-3]Butitisnotclearwhether
relationship.
atedandrenamed
a doctrine
ofAvicenna
whohaslongdiscussions
ofhowthequiddities
inthemindinclude
andplurality
buthavetheir
in themselves.
basisin quiddities
I
unity
do notfindAertsen
muchhelpinsettling
suchissues.
Moregenerally,
without
an
offering
extensive
ofsuchas Albert
theGreat,
Alexander
ofAphrodisias,
andAverroes,
investigation
to namea few,it is hardto assessthenovelty
in Aquinas'discussions
ofthetranscendentais.
Thebulkofthebookconsists
in methodically
texts
on eachofthe
presenting
Aquinas'
transcendentais
in turn.Aertsen
textsbearing
on eachtranscendental
andtheir
presents
interrelations
from
heparaphrases
thearguments
anddoctrines.
Opera.
Generally
Aquinas'
discusses
Aertsen
ofthetheory
ofthetranscendentais,
Occasionally
applications
e.g.,to
theTrinity.
ofthisstyle
andorganization,
thebookreturns
[224;376;413]On account
to thesametopicseveral
times.
hisinterpretations
Aertsen
defends
inthesecondary
others
literature.
Forinstance,
against
he arguesagainst
Kremer's
and De Vries'readings
ofAquinas'essecommune
[388-90],
viewofThomist
ofAquinas'
conMclnerny's
analogy
[399],Honnefelder's
interpretation
of'transcendental'
ofAquinason abstraction
ception
[472],and Geiger's
interpretation
claimis thathe denies,
Gilsonand
[129].His mostsignificant
against
many,
including
to be a transcendental.
convincEco,thatAquinastakesbeauty
shows,
[335-6]Aertsen
thatbeauty
is nota transcendental,
butis implicit
in thetranscendentais
trueand
ingly,
confines
himself
to theneo-scholastic
literagood.[344-6;359]Aertsen
mostly
secondary
- notto
ture:He doesnotdealwiththoselikePeterGeachor Hermann
Weidemann
mention
moreradicalcritiques
ofAquinas'wholeenterprise.
Aertsen
defends
Overall,
viewas correct
andas philosophically
all comers,
witha few
Aquinas'
significant
against
minor
hesitations.
[E.g.,230]
Certain
features
ofAquinas'
oftranscendentais,
Aertsen
haveoriginal
and
claims,
theory
Forexample,
oftruth
different
from
philosophical
significance.
Aquinashasan account
hiscontemporaries.
one,inre, anda
[243]Truthhastwomodesofbeing:an ontological
truth
concerns
tothelogicalrelation
ofa subject
topredione,inintellects
logical
Strictly,
iscausedbytheontological
ofthings
relations
intheworld.
cate,whilethisrelation
[248-9]
Thislogicaltruth
thenfallsoutside
ofmetaphysics.
truth
in thehuman
[252]Locating
18:34:36 PM
290
REVIEWS
mindrather
thanin thecosmos
makes
instead
ofthe
Aquinas'
thought
"anthropocentric"
classical
from
"cosmocentric".
theworld
as itappears
tous andthentry
[257-8]Westart
to getat reality.
however
differs
from
modern
likeKantin that
Aquinas
phenomenalists
he thinks
identical
to therealform
oftherealobject
that,becausethemindbecomes
we canhaveknowledge
ofreality.
as pureact,is priorto thought.
[200;
thought,
Being,
Aertsen
unlike
truth
inthe
locates
268]Moreover,
saysthatAquinas,
Heidegger,
primarily
hedoesrecognize
intellect
truth
outside
ofthemind[250].Aquinas'
views
[265],although
on transcendentais
thusbecomehistorically
in thedevelopment
of modern
important
thought.
Aertsen
wantsto do morethanto showthehistorical
of
However,
clearly
importance
In an excellent
doctrines
ontranscendentais.
Aertsen
reviews
Introduction,
Aquinas'
briefly
themodern
on medieval
He locatesthreemainviews;1) the
historiography
philosophy.
Christian
ofGilson[8] 2) thelinguistic
turnto theworkin medieval
philosophy
logicof
thoselikeKretzmann
on intellectual
andmystical
lifebythoselike
[12]3) theemphasis
De Libera[14-5].However,
he charges
thatall three
limit
thestudy
either
of
approaches
medieval
to whatis familiar
to modern
areasof
ears,or ignoreimportant
philosophy
medieval
In contrast,
seeksto restore
Aertsen
boththedistinctive
philosophical
activity.
to themedieval
character
andthephilosophical
on the
integrity
periodbyconcentrating
"theconditions
forallthought
andthebasisofallphilosophical
reflection."
transcendentais,
texts
tomodern
wishes
torestore
medieval
He stresses
[20]Aertsen
philosophizing.
Aquinas'
connection
ofbeingtoHeidegger's
Dasein.[105;264]I canseeAertsen's
point:
Aquinas
hasan anthropocentric
whilestilldefending
an objective
realism.
epistemology
However
Aertsen
doesnotdo muchto defend
thisview.To be sure,thebookis a
solidtreatment
ofAquinas'
doctrines
on thetranscendentais.
ButI do notfindittotranscendthatparticular
as Aertsen
texts,
topicnortheparticular
hopes.
Kutztown
University
Allan Bck
DunsScotus;
Honnefelder,
Dreyer
(eds.),
Ludger
RegaWood,andMechthild
John
Metaphysics
andEthics.
Leiden-New
York-Kln
1996ixQ 608p. ISBN90-04-10357-0
Brill,
(Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
53)
I amgrateful
on thephilosophy
forthislargecollection
ofessays
ofJohnDunsScotus.
inmedieval
ingeneral,
modern
hisimportance
as wellas inphilosophy
Despite
philosophy,
we
hiswork.[2-9]In comparison
to Aquinas
scholars
haverelatively
neglected
studying
in medieval
havenotdonemuch.I findthisironic,
givenScotus'dominance
theology
nottomenfrom
hisdeathtotheRenaissance,
hisgreatinfluence
onmodern
philosophy,
ofhaecceities
AsHonnefelder
tionon PeirceandHeidegger,
andtherevival
notes,
today.
incurrent
theThomist
dominance
neo-scholasticism
comesfrom
mostly
non-philosophical,
influence
historical
considerations.
[4] ButScotus,it seems,had thegreatest
uponthe
modern
period.[31-2]
he is 'ofreality
As theeditors
therarest-veined
Scotushasa motley
write,
reputation.
On theotherhand,thoseoftheRenaissance
so hatedtheSubtleScotand
unraveler'.
I see
hisendless
distinctions
thattheybequeathed
to us theword'dunce'.Accordingly,
thetextand
Scotusnotonlyhavetheusualtaskof explicating
thatthosediscussing
butalso haveto explain
clearitshistorical
and philosophical
why
significance
making
Ingeneral
theessays
dosucceed
attheusualtask.However,
thetheory
ofScotus
isnotsilly.
in accurately
theterminology
ofScotus,
sometimes
theymakemeat leastlose
reporting
ofthephilosophical
ofthequestions
debated.
track
significance
oftopics,
from
andethics,
butalso
The essays
dealwitha variety
mostly
metaphysics
'Caesaris Caesar'.The main
withlogic,as with
JakobSchneider's
essayon thesophism
Vivarium
37,2
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke
18:34:36 PM
REVIEWS
29 1
theinfinite
reason.
include
andpractical
These
modality,
univocity,
topics
haecceity,
being,
norevenall hismainoneslikeangels,
the
topicsdo notcoverall ofScotus'interests,
andtheformal
distinction.
modern
interests
andtheparInstead,
Trinity,
theyrepresent
ofthewriters.
ticular
inclinations
witha fewexceptions.
Thebookis wellproduced
[28.24;128;182;183n. 39] Given
I wouldhavefound
thestateofScotusscholarship,
ituseful
to havea common
bibliogat theend,as thenoteshavequiteextensive
citations.
raphy
dealswithhistorical
issues.
AllanWolter
discusses
thecomplexities
of
Thefirst
section
andarguesthatthenewVaticanedition
oftheOrdinatio
Scotus'works,
probably
dating
Dumont
doesnotrepresent
Scotus'finalviews.[40;57] Stephen
dealswiththerelation
ofWareand
ofHenryofGhentas William
ofScotusto suchcontemporary
supporters
claimsthatScotus,
viatheTheorematai
hada direct
Richard
[71]M. Draeger
Conington.
in nineteenth-century
axiomatic
structure
science.
influence
on theriseofthedeductive
ofHenry
ofrelaWilson
theinfluence
ofGhenton Scotus'theory
[88]Gordon
analyzes
tions.[123-4]
holdsthatScotushasa newview
SimoKnuuttila
Thenextsection
concerns
modality.
attributes
to Aristotle,
as opposedto theone Hintikka
ofmodalities
as possible
worlds,
whilewhatis necessary
is whatis
is whatis thecasesometimes,
where
whatis possible
neednotoccurever.In this
thecasealways.
[130]On thisnewview,whatis possible
claims
freetochoosewhattocreate,
ornottocreateat all.Knuuttila
way,Godremains
are independent
and
thattheselogically
worlds
of God'swill.[140]Normore
possible
thatforScotusthepossible
on theactual,
Bolerdisagree
andtaketheposition
supervenes
in particular,
will.[160-1;167]Still,Normore
admits
on theactualpowerofthedivine
is independent
ofGod'swillina sense.[162]
thatnon-repugnance,
sc.,logical
consistency,
whilealsohavMarrone
sideswithKnuutilla
[178],butclaimsthatScotus'viewschange,
ofmodality
thatGrosseteste
hada theory
ingdifferent
stages.[186]NeilLewisobserves
todivine
the
is reduced
Scotusgrants
likeScotus',
where
modality
power.[223]However
a bitmoreindependence.
modalities
[224]
ofthetheory
Scotists
likePoncius
and
thelaterhistory
ofmodality.
S. Sousedik
follows
- likeLeibniz!
- tiedpossibility
todivine
followers
Mastrius
andtheir
[198]
power,
perhaps
tookpostheseventeenth-century
Thomists
toavoidWycliff's
doctrines.
[201]In contrast,
Knuutilla
ofdivinewill.[194]However,
claimsthatScotus
siblebeingas independent
whatis logically
doesnotaccepttheviewthatGoddecides
as,hesays,Descartes
possible,
and
on thedivine
aredependent
intellect,
as,he says,Aquinas
does,northatpossibilities
Leibniz
do. [134]In opposition,
Normore
saysthatSuarezsideswithScotusandDescartes
thatScotus
it is settled
him,withOckham.[172]So, at thispoint,although
against
it is notsetded
rationalists
influenced
theseventeenth
century
gready,
justin whatthat
influence
consisted.
andScotus'doctrine
ofessays
dealswiththeproblem
ofindividuation
Another
section
therelation
of Scotusto earlier
ofhaecceity.
figures,
principally
RegaWoodconsiders
andAvicenna.
Rufus
ofGhent,
butalsoKilwardby,
[256;271] Usinghispastwork
Henry
Scotus'disGraciaanalyzes
andfinds
onthetheory
Scotus'theory
ofindividuation,
Jorge
as wellas beinga
andtheindividuating
tinction
between
entity
individuality
significant
Parkcriticizes
andemends
Gracia's
answer
toSuarez'criticisms.
[234;248]Woosuk
possible
ofindividuation.
viewsso as topointthewayto a newtheory
[279;288]
ofbeingin Scotus.Boulnois
contains
sevenpaperson theunivocity
Another
section
on theunivocity
ofbeing,
butthathisposithatScotushasa consistent
position
argues
ofanalogy.
seesa similar
tionevolved
[293;314]M. Burger
proalongwithhistheory
contrasts
ScotuswithAureol
and
inScotus'conception
ofperson.
[323]S. Brown
gression
toallitems.
ofGhent
on there
, applicable
[331]
Henry
beinginquid
beinga fundamental
on how'being'is univocal:
in Scotusan ambivalence
takentranscendenKobusch
finds
in all
inre, 'being'nameswhatis common
to all items
on thelevelofthequiddity
tally,
in itself,
on thelevelofthequiddity
thecategories;
takensupertranscendentally,
'being'
18:35:16 PM
292
REVIEWS
In theformer
forcoming
intoexistence.
whatis available
sense,'being'applies
signifies
to
all
In a similar
in
to
actual
the
vein,Beckmann
latter,
possible
beings.
only
beings;
'relation'
nolonger
different
from
Aristotle's:
outthatScotushasa useof'relation'
points
and
a category,
term
toallpossible
butbecomes
a transcendental
being,
signifies
applying
tothedeterminations
andformal
distinctions
ofbeing.
soisfundamental
[371;376]Kobusch
claimsthatlaterScotists
on howto takebeingin Scotus[357;362],andsees
differed
thesamesplitamong
commentators
onScotus.[362-5]Thosewhotakethe
contemporary
takehim
former
thosewhotakethelatter
takeScotustobe following
Avicenna;
approach
to reject
Avicenna
andbe a precursor
to Heidegger,
[cf.305-6]
elaborate
on Henryof Ghentand Latinmedieval
Surprisingly,
despite
presentations
theauthors
ofthisvolume
do notdiscuss
Avicenna
much.So I findit hardto
writers,
is right
assesswhich
notesthatScotus
criticized
here.Honnefelder
groupofcommentators
hiscontemporaries
forembracing
a version
ofthe'augustinisme
avicennan.
[11]buthe
toorecognizes
theimportance
ofAvicenna
forScotus'thought.
bythecita[30]Judging
tions
oflatermedievais,
Evenifsome
likeOckham
andBurleigh,
so didScotus'successors.
ofAvicenna
do notfitScotus'theory,
stillitdoesnotfollow
thatthehypothinterpretations
esisofthe'augustinisme
dismadefamous
becomes
avicennant,'
by. Gilson,
completely
credited.
ofhisdoctrines
inAvicenna.
Avicenna
Scotus
Forinstance,
mayhavefound
many
has thedoctrine
ofhaecceity,
which
somefindoriginal
toScotus.[30]Again,
Sondagdisthequiddity
in itself
from
inintellectu
thequiddity
without
outthereftinguishes
working
erenceto Avicenna.
of
claimsthatScotushasa newtheory
[395n. 2] Also,Ghisalberti
ofnon-repugnance,
as opposed
contotheAristotelian
statistical
modality,
( la Hintikka)
hasthesamenotion.
Likewise
O'Connor
discusses
Scotus'
ception.
[420;425]ButAvicenna
thatthere
cannot
be morethanonenecessary
Avicenna's
proof
beingwithout
mentioning
elaborate
moreon howto formulate
Scotus'arguargument.
[437]Butthenhe focuses
ments
so as to makethempalatable
to modemanalytic
ofreligion.
philosophers
Again,
Scotus'rejection
of theadequacyof negative
claims
Schnberger,
discussing
theology,
thatScotusmakes
thenovelmoveofno longer
namesbutconcepts.
discussing
[490]He
worries
aboutwhether
Scotustakes'infinite'
as a negative
name.[486]But,oncemore,
theseissues
ariseinAvicenna's
De Bonihasa morecomprehensive
viewwhen
Metaphysial.
he claims
thatScotusdeparts
hismedieval
in holding
from
thattheunity
contemporaries
ofGodcanbeproved
onphilosophical
as Avicenna
somewhat
did.[467]However,
grounds,
he says,Scotusdeparts
from
in requiring
Avicenna
theexistence
causesfor
ofsecondary
thisclaimto be established
Onceagain,Avicenna's
metaphysics
apartfromrevelation.
needslooking
at.
The lastsection
concerns
ethical
issuesin Scotus.Marilyn
McCordAdamscompares
ScotusandOckham
in whatsenseandto whatdegree
can
on theunity
ofthevirtues:
haveone moralvirtue
someone
without
theothers?
She finds
it surprising
that
having
Scotus
allows
them
moreindependence
thanOckham
does:Scotus
takes
a moreAristotelian
modelofsimplicity
and Ockhama morePlatonist
I findherdiscussheclaims.
model,
sionexcellent,
butwonder
at hersurprise:
formal
distinctions
like
foronewhochampions
Scotuswouldtendto allowmoreindependence,
coextensive
evenfornecessarily
propertiesormoraldispositions,
thana nominalist
likeOckham.
forinstance,
Likewise,
Inciarte,
- nosurprise,
finds
herScotusmoreakintoPlato'stheory
ofethics
givenhisAugustinin
that
alsoseesScotusdeparting
from
theAristotelian
viewinholding
itage.[524]Inciarte
is nota moralvirtue
for
butat bestsomething
prudence
[i.e.,practical
required
wisdom]
theexpert
levelofmoralexcellence.
thatScotushasa viewofpru[532-3]Ingham
agrees
dencedifferent
from
hispredecessors.
Sheseeshimmoving
theStoic-Patristic
awayfrom
towards
a viewofpractical
wisdom
morelike(inmyview)Aristotle's
view,andmoving
ofphronesis.
dealswitha
holdsthatforScotusprudence
original
conception
[553]Ingham
self-reflexive
moralchoice[557],sometimes
aboutmeans,
butothertimes,
aboutendsas
well.[565;569]However,
Scotusinsists
choice
thatprudence
doesnotgenerate
byitself
andso cannot
andsin,becauseoftheabsolute
freeavoidance
ofmoralerror
guarantee
domofthewillto chooseanyalternative,
or to refrain
from
[562-4;570]
choosing.
18:35:16 PM
REVIEWS
293
thanAristotle,
ofOriginal
I gather
thathereScotusis lessoptimistic
giventhedoctrines
In contrast,
these.
Mhleoffers
a more
doesnotdiscuss
SinandGrace,although
Ingham
In thelaterworks,
inScotus.
Mhleclaims,
Scotusallows
wisdom
active
roleforpractical
established
as a practical
scitobe a causeofthewillandtobecome
knowledge
practical
ofright
wherethestandard
reason
ofabsolute
ence.[577]Fromitsstandpoint
freedom,
thewillchooses,
ofnatural
lawsandpersonal
enforces
independendy
logicalconsistency,
a virtue
Scotusis moving
ethicconcerned
awayfrom
[579;588]Gonsequendy
happiness.
withachieving
to an ethicmuchmorelikeKant's.[581;587]Still,
happiness,
personal
to divinerevelation
in thatScotustiesthisviewpoint
and obScotusand Kantdiffer
whereas
Kantdoesnot.[587;594] Mhleand the
moralobjects,
transcendent
jective,
makethecasethatKantmight
havehadScotusas a worthy
others
predecescertainly
connection.
theissueoftheactualhistorical
sor,although
theyfailto address
howinfluential
themodA recurrent
intheseessays
concerns
Scotuswasduring
theme
from
Leibnizand
ernperiod.
Suarezthrough
We seehisinfluence
Descartes,
stretching
LikeKant,Scotusdivorces
from
Kant,up to thoselikePeirceandHeidegger.
prudence
andmorality
andnatural
fulfillment
Descartes
moralexcellence,
from
personal
necessity.
tradition
of 'right
whenspeaking
reason'and 'the
echoesScotusand theAugustinin
is right
tosaythatScotus'influence
ofreason'.
hasnotbeen
[528;542]Honnefelder
light
andmuchneedstobe doneto appreciate
hisworth.
Thisvolume
sufficiently,
recognized
ofinquiry
avenues
intotheimportance
manyinteresting
helpsinthisendeavor
byraising
onewhoseinfluence
ofScotusas a great
on themodern
philosopher,
periodhasbeenrelItspapersaregenerally
ofhighquality.
thisis a
atively
Byandlarge,though,
neglected.
andwillnotbyitself
makeScotus'influence
bookforspecialists,
clearto a moregeneral
audience.
Kutztown
Allan Bck
desarts(ParisetOxford
desdisciplines
la Facult
sicles
, XIHe-XVe
), eds.Olga
L'enseignement
Turnhout
andParis1997,StudiaArtistarum
LouisHoltz.Brepols,
4, 562
Weijers,
pp.ISBN2-503-50571-6
Thehistory
hasrecendy
ofuniversities
andschools
beenthesubject
ofgrowing
scholThepresent
oftheproceedings
ofa congress
heldin Paris
volume
consists
arlyattention.
attheInstitut
inMay1995,organized
andLouisHoltz,under
de France
byOlgaWeijers
dela Recherche
Theseveterans
ofthehistoritheauspices
oftheCentre
National
Scientifique.
ofmedieval
universities
chosethetopicoftheFaculty
ofArtsfrom
thethirteenth
ography
andinfluence
ofthisfaculty,
to thefifteenth
becausetheposition
itsrelation
to
century
and itsmethods
of instruction
theotherfaculties,
haveso farbeenrelatively
underin French,
researched.
Thevolume's
articles
sixin English,
one
(twenty-one
twenty-eight
in Italian)
intosevensections
aredivided
withsixroman
(labelled
inexplicably
numerals):
theinstitutional
thequadrivium
thetrivium;
methods
ofinstrucframework;
; thenewAristotle;
oftheartstotheology
andphilosophy;
andtheinfluence
oftheParisian
tion;therelations
is introduced
on thestatus
model.Eachsection
lecture
after
which
bya general
questionisi
research
in shorter
various
scholars
their
current
contributions.
Eachsection
conpresent
cludeswitha roundtable
The titlepromises
to giveequalattention
discussion.
to Paris
in English
willbe disapand Oxford,
butsomeone
witha specific
interest
universities
morethanthreequarters
oftheresearch
focuses
on Paris,suggesting
pointed;
presented
thatOxford
wasaddedas an afterthought.
at theParisian
Still,bylooking
model,
mainly
withexcursions
to Oxford,
conclusions
canbe drawn
fortheplaceoftheArts
important
within
ofmedieval
education.
theframework
Faculty
oftheArtsFaculty
in bothParis
introduction
on theinstitutional
framework
Verger's
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Vivarium
37,2
18:35:16 PM
294
REVIEWS
andOxford
raises
headmits
thatthere
aremorequestions
than
issues,
although
important
thesources
Whatwerethedifferences
Howdid
cananswer.
between
ParisandOxford?
theArtsfaculty
fitintothefederative
Whoexactly
were
bodyoftheentire
university?
theseartsstudents
whomadeup circaeighty
ofthestudent
percent
Verger
population?
concludes
thatmostofthemwerelessyoungthangenerally
hasbeensupposed
(17-20
andmosteither
finished
witha B.A.ordropped
outbefore
that.(Thiswouldsugyears),
in thestudent
associated
withtheRenaissance
bodyoften
gestthatsomeofthechanges
wereactually
thanpreviously
to
lesspronounced
Students
whoseriously
wanted
thought.)
advanceto,say,theology,
often
foundtheirpreparation
butin
notin theArtsFaculty,
localmendicant
studia.
Theroundtable
discussion
thatconcludes
the
thissection
underlines
needformoreprosopographical
andthecontributions
ofLusignan
research,
(onParisian
andCourtenay
thedataoftheUniversity
of1329/30)
show
colleges)
(presenting
computus
thatthistypeofresearch
canindeedoffer
interesting
perspectives.
to theinstitutional
framework
is thequestion
of
of themethods
Closelyconnected
instruction:
whatactually
wenton in theclassroom?
Weijers
givesa largely
biographical
inthisfield,
introduction
tothestatus
andconcludes
a growing
interthatdespite
questionis
est(modestly,
shedoesnotmention
thatmuchofthisgrowing
interest
is duetoherown
moreresearch
remains
tobe done.Notonlyis there
a largediscrepscholarly
activities),
inmethods
ourinterest
ofinstruction
andtheavailability
ofsource
materials,
ancybetween
as is pointed
butanother
is thegreatdiversity
discussion,
putin theroundtable
problem
from
oneplacetothenext.Can research
forParissimply
be extrapolated
toother
results
in thelastsection
ofthis
institutions?
is addressed
(Thisintriguing
question
byBuzzetti
ofthe"Parisian
on theinfluence
Thebasicmethods
were
ofinstruction
volume,
model".)
thelecture
in an interesting
contribution
ofthe
(treated
byMaieron theterminology
lectiones
extra-ordinaria
andthedisputation
notonlyprovided
ordinaria,
, andcursorie)
(which
thebasicargumentation
newresearch
butalsoeventually
matemethod,
gavethemasters
showsinhercontribution).
Forthosewhowonder
howactualinstruction
rials,as Weijers
waseventually
in texts,
recorded
Hamesse's
contribution
discusses
thetechnique
ofreportado.In thesamesection,
Lafleur
of
makesa convincing
casefora closerexamination
ofthestudent
"textes
as a distinctive
curriculum,
didascaliques",
descriptions
genre.
intheartsfaculty
is traditionally
Thecurriculum
andthequadridescribed
as thetrivium
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riculum,
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18:37:21 PM
REVIEWS
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BooksReceived
Court.
Latina
Alcuin
Scholar
at theCarolingian
oftheThirdGermania
ofYork.
Proceedings
Conference
heldat theUniversity
of Groningen,
May 1995,editedbyL.A.J.R.
HouwenandA.A.MacDonald,
1998xi & 215pp. ISBN 90 6980108
Groningen
6 (= Mediaevalia
D.A.Bullough,
s Cultural
Alcuin'
XXII) Contents:
Influence:
Groningana,
TheEvidence
TheRoleof
A. Diem,TheEmergence
Schools:
ofMonastic
oftheManuscripts',
Alcuin
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toScioli'
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; M. deJong,
;
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ofAlcuin:
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G.H. Kneepkens,
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onAlcuin'
s De perihermeniis
with
Notes
oftheText,
Priscian
inAtom's
De orthographia;
Alcuin'
s Ambrose:
Ch.D.Wright,
Polemics,
LJ.Engels,
andTextual
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P. Lendinara,
Mixed
Attitudes
toOdd:TheCarolingian
Criticism',
Patrology,
andtheGlossographers
Charles
rsauMoyen
Amour
etdelectatio
morosa.
Lesditions
du Cerf,
Baladier,
, dsir
ge.
Paris1999221pp. ISBN 2 204 061069
etla thologie.
d'Ockham
Les ditions
du Cerf,Paris1999(Initiations
JolBiard,Guillaume
au Moyenge)131pp. ISBN 2 204 05982X
Didascalia.
A Journal
andPhilology
LateAntiquity
totheRenaissance,
2 (1996)
forPhilosophy
from
Contents
: Shimizu,
Alcuin's
and
32 pp. ISSN 1341-6227
Tetsuro,
Theory
ofSignification
Ch. Burnett,
andAristotle
ofPhilosophy,
System
ofSalisbury
John
Documenti
e studi
sullatradizione
7 (1996)465 pp. ISBN 2 503 505503
medievale,
filosofica
Contents'.
U.R.Jeck,
derKunst
undTheorie
desSchnen
beiPs.-Dionysios
Philosophie
Areopagitesr,
C. Trifogli,
Lequestioni
sullibro
IV dellaFisica
inalcuni
commenti
allamet
intorno
inglesi
delsec.XIII ParteI; AngelD'Ors,Raimundo
Lulio
dePazy la Logica
, Nicolas
Parva',
in
R.L. Friedmann,
Relations
andHerny
UseoftheVerbum
mentis
, Emanations,
ofGhent's
Trinitarian
theBackground
inThomas
andBonaventure
Giles
; J.Decorte,
Theology:
Aquinas
of
andHenry
Rome
ontheReality
L.O. Nielsen,
Dictates
ofGhent
ofa RealRelation',
ofFaith
versus
Peter
Dictates
Aureole
onDivine
Power
, Creation
, andHuman
ofReason:
Rationality;
G. Alliney,
e Ockham:
FraScoto
Giovanni
diReading
e ildibattito
sullalibert
a Oxford
(1310Chr.Schabel,
De RivoandtheQuarrel
Peter
over
Future
atLouvain:
New
1320)',
Contingents
Evidence
andNewPerspectives
DieAndersheit
Gottes
alsKoinzidenz,
(PartII); B. Mojsisch,
und
beiNikolaus
vonKues:
Nicht-Andersheit
undKritik,
IndicedeimanoNegation
Explikation
Indicedeinomi
scritti;
Denduytschen
Cathoen.
druk
vanHenrick
NaardeAntwerpse
Eckert
vanHomberch.
Metalsbijlage
de andereredacties
vande vroegst
bekende
derDicta
Middelnederlandse
vertaling
Catonis.
doorA.M.J.vanBuuren
in samenwerking
metO.S.H. Lie en
Uitgegeven
A.P.Orbn.Verloren,
Hilversum
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Parisian
Scholars
intheEarly
A Social
Fourteenth
Portait.
W.J.Courtenay,
Century.
Cambridge
Press1999xix& 284 pp. ISBN 0 521642124 (Cambridge
in
Studies
University
Medieval
LifeandThought.
Fourth
Series)
Gosvin
de Marbais,
Tractatus
deconstruction.
indexparIrneRosierEdition,
introduction,
Catach.Ingenium
1998liii& 112pp. ISBN 90 7041939 4
Publishers,
Nijmegen
11)
(Artistarium,
FrankHentschel,
MusikunddieGeschichte
der
undNaturwissenschaften
imMittelalter.
' undPhilosophie
'
' imMittelalter.
von'Musica
von
zurWechselwirkung
Fragen
Philosophia
Herausgegeben
F. Hentschel.
1998xi & 418 pp. ISBN 90 04 110933
Brill,Leiden-Boston-Kln
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters,
(Studien
LXII)
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ofSicily
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and annotated
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by G.A.Loudand Th. Wiedemann.
University
York1998xvii& 286pp.ISBN0 71904894X (hardback)
Manchester-New
5435
4 (paperback)
De suppositionibus,
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bytheDutchSociety
Philosophy
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72)
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Gottesbeweis
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Kapriev,
1998viii& 404pp.ISBN 90 04 110976
Leiden-Boston-Kln
vonCanterbury.
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39)
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Johannes
zugeschriebene
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principio.
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seiner
ausdemordo
essentialis.
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metaphysischen
Verlag
Halle1997215pp.ISBN 3 929 887 14 2 (Dissertationes
humanarum
litSchwarz,
etdoctrinarum
de rerum
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etdansl'artdel'Antiquit
dansla pense
etduMoyen
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Age.
Du mythe
ausymbole
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de Belgique.
ClassedesBeaux
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Acadmique
royale
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Maracaibo
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1998477pp.ISBN980 232686 0
Canonis
Ptolomei
Academia
Louvain-la-Neuve
1997
, byDavidPingree.
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Bruylant,
desastronomes
172pp.ISBN2 87209479 2 (Corpus
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VIII)
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Versado gregoe estudocomplementar
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Teologia
Areopagita,
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Almeida,
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Eng.Antonio
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10)
A CaseofWitchcraft.
Robert
TheTrialofUrbain
Grandier.
Manchester
Rapley,
University
Manchester
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S. Ihm,
, tomeXXVI(1996)295pp.ISBN2 271054478. Contents-.
Lesmssps alpha
Rossianum
ad Luci; J. Fohlen,
, betaet V desEpistulae
ZumFbrilegium
LeProtvangile
deJacques
enlatin.
Etatdela question
etperspectives
noulium'
J.-D.Kaestli,
velles',
nei
diMarziale
Sostituzioni
; P. Mastandrea,
;
(ealtre
eufemistiche
varianti)
florilegi
carolingi
M. Greem,
TheDevelopment
F. Bogdanow,
Unmanuscrit
mconnu
dela mise
oftheTrotula'
duJoseph-Merlin
enprose
deRobert
deBoron
B. Maruc
.,B.VI.24);J.-L.Leclanche,
(Florence,
L'interversion
dedeux
dans
la tradition
manuscrite
d'Herbert
duDolopathos
; F.T.Coulson,
feuillets
Giovanni
Francesco
Picenardi
andtheOvidian
onthe
inModena
(Bibi
Commentary
Metamorphoses
lat.306);P. Derron,
Estense
surMacintosh
desmanuscrits
Classement
desVers
d'OrpythagoA problem
riciens
inthehistory
anditsimplications
; B. Victor,
ofmethod
oftexts
forthemantradition
Index
desmanuscrits
cits
uscript
ofTerence;
Revue
d'histoire
destextes
, tomeXXVII (1997)321 pp. ISBN 2 271 05530X. Contents:
B. Rochette,
traductions
ethistoire
destextes
dansl'Orient
-IVesicle
Bilinguisme,
(Ier
grec
aprs
desmanuscrits
latins
III;
J.-C.)'B. MnkOlsen,Chronique
(IXe-XIIesicle),
classiques
C. Auvraydudeuxime
livre
duDe natura
deorum
deCicron.
Politien
as,L'ordre
Assay
Ange
etlaphilologie
moderne
Testo
e dintorni
inunnuovo
testimone
dellaRhetorica
; M. Spallone,
ad Herennium;
Les
; G. Labory,
J.Glenn,Thecomposition
ofRicher's
autograph
manuscript
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BOOKSRECEIVED
L. Brottier,
de Normandie
duXIVeetduXVesicle;
manuscrits
dela Grande
Chronique
surtrois
tmoins
Surla GensedeJeanChrysostome
dessermons
(Monacensis
gr.
Remarques
Bata'
s manuscripts
; G. Lano,
352,Sinaiticus
Elfric
gr.775);S. Gwara,
gr.376,Parisinus
Index
cits
Lesmanuscrits
deGanagobie;
desmanuscrits
M.
Revue
d'histoire
destextes
, tomeXXVIII(1998)274pp. ISBN 2 271 056195. Contents:
Lesmanuscrits
desEpistulae
ad
tradition
Joyal,Thetextual
ofPlato,
Theages;
J. Fohlen,
Lesmanuscrits
dela
F. Fery-Hue,
Sidracetlespierres
; G. Labory,
Lucilium;
prcieuses
surles
GrandeChronique
duXIVeetduXVesicle
de Normandie
Note
; H. Anderson,
a la
En torno
surla Thbade;
M.A.Gutirriez,
manuscrits
ducommentaire
deFulgence
: nuevas
latinae
deNebrija
edicin
delasIntroductiones
; D. Bguin,
Quel
segunda
aportaciones
del'informatique
etdesrseaux
Index
desmanuscrits
usage
pourlesantiquisants?;
Elisabeth
inspeculo.
des12.Und13.Jahrhunderts
Clericus
Studien
Verssatire
zurlateinischen
Stein,
undErstedition
1999ix & 405 pp.
des"Speculum
Brill,Leidn-Boston-Kln
prelatorum".
undTexte,25)
ISBN9004 113290 (Mittellateinische
Studien
of
at theUniversity
Censure
andHeresy
University
J.M.M.H.Thijssen,
ofParis,1200-1400.
1998xiii& 187pp.ISBN0 812233182
Press,
Pennsylvania
Philadelphia
Tomsde Aquino,
mundi.
a eternidade
domundo.
Textolatinoda edio
De eternitate
Sobre
leonina.
e estudo
doutrinal
Traduo
Eng.Antnio
porJ.M.CostaMacedo.Fundao
Porto1996149pp.ISSN 0872-0991
Almeida,
(Mediaevalia,
9)
Zweite
Walter
deuniversaltbus.
Traktat
dieUniversalien.
Lateinisch-Deutsch.
Tractatus
ber
Burley,
versehen
undmiteinemNachwort
verbesserte
neuereEdition,
bersetzt
herausgg.,
zu Leipzig,
vonH.-U.Whler.
derWissenschaften
Akademie
VerlagderSshsischen
199984 pp. ISBN 3 777609587
Stuttgart-Leipzig
York/Kln
Pauline
LawTheory.
Leiden/New
C. Westerman,
TheDisintegration
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ofNatural
1997xiii& 325pp.
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