Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CUSTODIO
TRICIA CRUZ
JDCTR DLSU LAW
1st Meeting
La Naval Drug Corp v. CA and Yao
FACTS:
Yao is present owner of a commercial bldg a portion of
which is leased to P under a contract of lease which
expired year 1989.
P exercised its option to lease same bldg for another 5
years but P & R disagreed on the rental rate.
P, to resolve controversy, submitted to arbitration pursuant
to RA 876.
R appointed Alamarez as arbitrator while P chose Sabile as
its arbitrator. The confirmation of the appointment of a
third arbitrator Tupang, was held in abeyance because P
instructed Sabile to defer the same until the BoD could
convene approve Tupangs appointment. This was accdg to
R, Ps dilatory tactic in violation of the Arbitration Law and
the governing stipulation.
R prayed that after summary hearing pursuant to Sec. 6 of
the A.Law, Sabile and Alamarez be directed to proceed with
the arbitration in acc with Sec. 7 of the Contract and the
applicable provisions of the law; and that the Board of
Three Arbitrators be ordered to convene and resolve
controversy.
P denied the averments of petition theorizing that such
petition is premature since there was failure of notice on
the part of R requiring both arbitrators to appoint third
member of the BoA. It gave the arbitrators a free hand in
choosing the third arbitrator, thus, R has no cause of action
against it.
R filed an amended petition for Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreement with Damages; praying that petitioner be
ordered to pay interest on the unpaid rents (prevailing
interest) and exemplary damages.
P answered, contending among others, that amended
petition should be dismissed OTG of non-payment of
requisite filing fees; and it being in the nature of an
ordinary civil action, a full blown and regular trial is
necessary. P presented a Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Hearing of its special and affirmative defenses
which are grounds for a motion to dismiss.
Resp Court announced that the two arbitrators chose
Narciso as third arbitrator. It also ordered the parties to
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the court a quo has jurisdiction over the case?
2. Did the doctrine of estoppel bar petitioners from
questioning the jurisdiction of the special commercial
court?
RULING:
1. NONE. Originally, section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) 902A13 conferred on the SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction
over intra-corporate controversies. However, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over such and other cases
enumerated under it were later on transferred to the courts
of general jurisdiction pursuant to the enactment of RA
8799.
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate
controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC, two
elements must concur: (1) the status or relationship of the
parties and; (2) the nature of the question that is subject of
their controversy. These elements were not present in the
case at bar. Moreover, the issue in this case does not
concern the regulation of CPAI or even CPA. The
determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed
property should be threshed out in a regular court. Cases
of this nature are cognizable by the RTC under BP 129.
Therefore, the conflict among the parties here was outside
the jurisdiction of the special commercial court.
2.
ISSUE: W/N the case may be considered as having been filed and
docketed when P60.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court even on the
assumption that said payment was not sufficient in amount?
RULING: The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only
upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filing in court. The Court holds that it was docketed upon the
payment of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient.
Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case
and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular.
The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee. Judge Canonoy ordered the payment of P3,104.00 as
additional docket fee based on the original complaint. However,
the petitioners assert as an alternative view, that the docket fee be
based on the amended complaint. The petitioners have a point.
"When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed
abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as
a pleading. The case stands for trial on the amended pleading only.
On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid
by the petitioners should be based on their amended complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted: the petitioners shall
be assessed a docket fee on the basis of the amended complaint;
and after all of the lawful fees shall have been paid, the
proceedings in Civil Case No. R-11882 shall be resumed.
Manchester Devt v. CA
FACTS:
This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and
specific performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order.
The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the
body of the complaint assessed a P 78.75 M. damages suffered by
the petitioner. The amount of docket fee paid was only P410.00.
The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the
damages to P10 M only.
ISSUE/S:
When does a court acquire jurisdiction?
Does an amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court?
HELD:
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction in the court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. All complaints, petitions, answers
and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for. Damages shall be considered in the assessment
of the filing fees in any case.
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion
FACTS:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) filed a complaint for the
annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire
insurance policy.
Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) filed a
complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL.
In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorneys fees,
litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the
amount of damages sought although from the body of the
complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million.
Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.
The complaint underwent a number of amendments to
make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of
damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees.
The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglamentary period. This ruling was made on the
premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. Thus, in
the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, the Court
explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to
defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its
willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees
when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in
several instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on nonpayment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits.
In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin, the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement
of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize
that its strict application is qualified by the following: first,
failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second,
such power should be used by the court in conjunction with
its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal
of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances.
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the
one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for
resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it is far
better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a
primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may
result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated
before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a
decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust
if Ps claim would be dismissed on a strict application of the
Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the
CA. Considering, however, that the case at bench has been
pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are
already before the Court, a remand of the case to the CA would
unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher interest of
substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the
Court will resolve the case on the merits.