Satow - Guide To Diplomatic Practice

FIFTH EDITION
Satow's Guide to
Diplomatic Practice
Edited by
Lord Gore-Booth
Assistant editor
DesDlond PakenhaDl
~~~
----
JII~~
~
LonglDan
London and New York
LongmaD Group UK Limited

Longman House,
Burnt Mill, Harlow,
Essex CM20 2JE, England
and Associated Companies throughout the world
Published in the United States of America
by Longman Publishing Group, New York
Longman Group Limited 1979

All rights reserved; no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without either the prior written permission
of the Publishers or a licence permitting restricted copying in the United Kingdom
issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WIP 9HE.
First published 1917
Second Edition 1922
Third Edition 1932
Fourth Edition 1957
Fifth Edition 1979
Seventh impression 1994
ISBN 0
5~2
50109 1
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Satow, Ernest Mason, Sir, 1843-1929.
Satow's Guide to diplomatic practice.
1. Diplomatic and consular service. 2. Diplomacy.
11. Title:
3. International relations. I. Title.
Guide to diplomatic practice.
7712580
JX 1653.S3
1978
327
ISBN 0-582-50109-1
Produced by Longman Singapore Publishers Pte Ltd

Printed in Singapore
Sir Ernest Satow (1843-1929)

reproduced by kind permission of the Mansell Collection
Contents
Preface
Biographical note on Satow
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
BOOK I
Chapter
3
4
5
6
7
8
BOOK 11
Chapter
9
10
I I
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
IX
Xli
XIV
..
XVll
DiploDlacy in general
Diplomacy
Privileges and immunities of the head of a foreign state
The minister for foreign affairs
Precedence among states and similar matters
Titles and precedence among sovereigns
Maritime honours
The language and forms of diplomatic intercourse
Credentials and full powers
3
9
12
20
27
36
38
55
DiploDlatic agents in general

Right of legation
The selection of diplomatic agents
Classification of diplomatic agents
Persona grata
Diplomatic agent proceeding to his post
Privileges and immunities of diplomatic missions
Immunities of diplomatic agents
Privileges of diplomatic agents
Families, junior staff and local nationals
Diplomatic agents in third states
Special missions
The diplomatic body (corps diplomatique)
Termination of a diplomatic mission
Breach of diplomatic relations
Attacks on embassies
Kidnapping of diplomats
Diplomacy and radio
67
76
82
89
94
106
120
135
143
15 1
156
161
174
18 7
19 2
199
204
BOOK III
Chapter 26
27
BOOK IV
Chapter 28
29
30
31
32
33
BOOK V
Chapter 34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Appendix i
..
11
111
IV
v
VI
Consular matters
The appointment of consuls
Functions, privileges and immunities of consuls
21 1
216
International transactions
Congresses and conferences
Treaties and other international instruments - I General
definition
Treaties and other international instruments - 11 Pact,
Constitution, Charter, Statute, Regulations, Concordat,
Additional Articles
Treaties and other international instruments - III Act,
General Act, Final Act, Modus Vivendi,
Compromis d' Arbitrage
Treaties and other international instruments IV Ratification, Accession, Acceptance and Approval
Treaties and other international instruments V Reservations, Notice of Termination and Registration
284
International organisations
The collective third party
The United Nations: A way of life and work
The United Nations - I The Charter and its operation
30 9
3 11
3 15
229
23 6
253
258
27 0
The United Nations - 11 Specialised Agencies, regional

commissions and special bodies
The United Nations - III Peaceful settlement of
international disputes
The United Nations - IV The International Court ofJustice
Privileges and immunities of international organisations
The Commonwealth of Nations
Some regional organisations
Post- 1945 diplomacy
Advice to diplomatists
347
356
368
380
39 1
43 8
44 2
Definitions and terms

Conferences
United Nations membership
Specialised agencies
Commonwealth membership
Specialised diplomacy
457
466
47 2
47 6
486
48 7
Notes
Bibliography
Index
48 9
5 22
53 2
343
Preface
To be invited to revise a masterpiece is a daunting challenge. For Sir Ernest
Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice is without doubt a masterpiece. The book he
wrote in the years after his retirement in 1905 went far beyond statements of
fact and law; he infused into the work a lively sense of living with people who
were not all good or famous diplomats, but human beings who behaved in
human ways according to their various characters and the spirit and letter of
their times.
When this editor was invited to supervise a fifth edition of Satow, the
publishers had already sought advice of some fifteen experts. Among the useful
and authoritative comments received, there were, it seemed, two imperatives.
Satow V must be ( I) as near to Satow I as possible and (2) as radically unlike it
as feasible. The paradox was inevitable. Satow set a particular genre and it
would be quite wrong to abandon it: on the other hand, since the fourth (1957)
edition, some passages have had to be rewritten, others have become archaic
rather than historically useful and have had to be omitted, while several new
chapters have had to be added.
It took this editor only a very short study of the book to realise that he would
not be able to manage without a partner. It might have had a contemporary
air if I had sought someone who knew nothing whatever about the subject to
be a kind of heckler-in-attendance on the editor. But after all, in respect of this
book, the diplomat or the student ofdiplomacy is both the supply and demand,
the participant and critic, so I asked the British Foreign and Commonwealth
Office whether they might know ofany recently retired colleague who might be
suitable, interested and available. The list included Desmond Pakenham, who,
apart from a taste for literary work, had served in countries which I did not
know and had an eye for detail which I thought I possessed myself and found I
did not. I would like to express my profound gratitude for his help and his
company throughout the exercise.
Arrangement of the book

We had to decide quickly whether to follow the previous arrangement of the
book or to start all over again. The latter seemed to transgress principle (I)
above. Satow's arrangement has a touch of whimsicality which there seemed
no reason to expunge. But some changes in the world demanded major
revIsion. The most momentous was a triple event in the 1960s, the three
Conferences in Vienna which in effect revised and brought up to date the
settlements made at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 at which so much of the
international law governing diplomatic practice had been drawn up. The work
of the Conferences held in the 1960s necessitated the rewriting of almost the
whole of the chapters which form Chapters 9-2 I and 26-33 of the present
edition. Acknowledgements are expressed below. In this process, we transposed
the previous Chapter IX, 'Advice to diplomatists', to the end of the book; it
seemed gratuitous to give the diplomat advice before he knew even a small
fraction of what he was being advised about. At the end of Book 11, we felt we
must insert some of those things which represent, in some cases regrettably,
features of later twentieth-century diplomacy. Sir Neville Bland, who so ably
edited the fourth edition, wrote in his preface (p. v) that, in his time,
'the accepted "practice of diplomacy" had received some rude blows from which, in
some respects, it has never recovered.'
He also said that:

'. . . in any case "guidance" as to the methods of dealing with this type of nondiplomacy, if I may coin a word, cannot be prescribed; the response can only be framed
in the light of the circumstances and the authority dealing with them.'
I have felt it no longer possible to decline to describe such tendencies;

Chapters 22-5 refer to some of them.
Chapters 34-42 are devoted to the practice of multilateral diplomacy, in
which we have, we think properly, given the United Nations pride of space.
These chapters seek not only to show the rules which govern the proceedings of
the United Nations and other intergovernmental bodies and to give examples
from recent history; they also give far more textual quotations from the UN
Charter and other documents than did the previous edition. We felt that direct
quotation gave the book greater authenticity and vividness than the best
organised indirect speech. We have also sought not only to describe
constitutions and rules, but also to suggest differences in atmosphere and
diplomatic technique between bilateral diplomacy in a foreign capital and
multilateral diplomacy at the seat of a worldwide political organisation.
We have been conscious that in the twentieth century for the first time in
known human history, diplomacy has become in many countries a profession
open to both sexes. The English language has not yet provided a grammatically
elegant way of dealing with this change. We have, therefore, used the
compromise of occasionally employing the 'he (or she)' formula to show our
absence of prejudice; but its constant repetition would be intolerably tedious,
and for this edition the male pronoun has had, once again, to serve both sexes.
A word is needed, finally, on the idea of 'guidance' as we have used it. We
cannot (as Satow himself could not) offer guidance in the style of the late Dr
Karl Baedeker, whose duty it was to record not only every masterpiece of
architecture and art, but also every steamer landing and tramway connection.
Within a volume of acceptable length, a guide to diplomatic practice can only
give selective guidance. By this we mean that some subjects can be treated in
some detail, but, in regard to others, we can do no more than indicate the
direction in which the student or pratiquant could pursue matters further. In
Xl
attempting to draw a balance between definition, description and comment,

we have sought to please and to help as many as possible. While we are well
aware that there will be times when the reader may fail to find in these pages
the precise answer which he happens to be seeking, we earnestly hope that the
many friends who have generously contributed their time and knowledge to
helping us will be satisfied that the effort was not in vain.
London, 1977.
GORE-BOOTH
Si r Ernest Satow
Ernest Mason Satow was born at Clapton, Essex, in 1843. He was the son of a
Swedish merchant who had settled in England, and an English lady, Margaret
Mason. In his studies at University College, London, he read at an early stage a
borrowed copy of Laurence Oliphant's Narrative ofthe Earl ofElgin's Mission to
China. This aroused in him a desire to know Asia. In 186 I he came first in an
examination for a student interpretership in the Far East. He was assigned to
the British Consular Service in Japan.
After a short stay in Peking for Chinese studies, Satow arrived in Japan in
1862, nine years after the 'opening up' of that country by Commodore Perry to
foreign presence and commerce. He found himself in the midst of the violent
struggle between the partisans of the Shogun, or chief of government, and the
Emperor, which involved constant physical danger to foreign residents in
Japan. The victory of the Emperor's party ushered in the great Meiji
Restoration period, in which Japan, after three centuries of isolation,
assimilated with incredible seriousness and rapidity skills developed during
those centuries in the Western world. For over twenty years Satow's linguistic
expertness, together with his adventurous travels (including shipwreck ofT the
port of Hakodate) and his personal qualities, gave him a most remarkable
position among Japanese of all backgrounds, and contributed greatly to the
standing of the British Embassy in Tokyo.
In 1884 Satow was posted to Siam (Thailand) and subsequently to Uruguay
in 1888 ('nothing to do') and Morocco in 1893. But a man with an uniquely
expert knowledge of both Chinese and Japanese language and civilisation was
bound to go back to the Far East, and Satow found himself in Tokyo
(1895-1900) and Peking (1900-6), in both places as Minister and Head of
Mission. In these last two posts he performed most distinguished service,
though, as the years went on, the claims and ambitions ofFar Eastern and other
Powers took the situation out of the control of diplomacy or peaceful foreign
policy.
On 25 July 1906, three months before his retirement from the Diplomatic
Service, Satow was received in audience by King Edward VII. 'On my going
away,' he recorded, 'His Majesty said that my services would receive
recognition. Later in the day came a notice that I was to be sworn a member of
the Privy Council.' 'I value it,' he wrote to an old friend, 'more than anything
else that could have been given me. It was The King's own idea.'
In 1907 Satow represented Britain at the Second Hague Conference on
Xlll
International Peace. For the rest of his life, he lived quietly at his home in
Devonshire, devoting his time to study and writing. He never married. He died
in 1929, having lived a full and fruitful life as a member of that rare calling, the
Scholar-Diplomat. As H. W. V. Temperley put it, 'He wrote various studies on
international law and history, and delivered his final message in a work full of
practical wisdom, legal acumen and antiquarian knowledge, entitled A GUIDE
TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE'
Acknowledgements
A book of this kind is essentially the work of a great many people, starting with
the original author and continuing through the many people who may have
helped him and subsequent editors to keep later editions as complete and up to
date as possible. This edition is no exception, and the present editors would first
like to express a most sincere thank you to all those people, and there are so
many of them, who have contributed anything from a chapter or more to a
chance remark containing just the information or inspiration needed at the
particular moment.
Far the greatest amount of the help needed came from myoid department,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London. Provided the department
were willing - and they were abundantly so - this was inevitable. For ifone is to
produce a modern edition of this book, such contemporary information as one
uses must be reliable, and it is not possible to acquire all the publicly usable
information that exists and is needed, unless an official source is available.
Having said this, I must make it clear that nothing in the way of opinion or
judgement expressed in the book is attributable to anyone but its editor, unless
it happens to be a direct quotation from an identified source.
In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, I am most grateful, first of all, to
Sir Thomas Brimelow (later Lord Brimelow), Permanent Under-Secretary of
State in the FCO 1973-5, who gave the project every encouragement when I
explained it to him. His successor Sir Michael Palliser, continued that
encouragement, and both of them made it clear that, subject always to the
requirements of the Office itself, I could enjoy freedom of access to any
members whom I felt I needed to consult, or from whom I could fairly ask a
contribution.
Of all departments of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, our greatest
debt is to that of the Legal Advisers. Since, as explained in the Preface, the
entire corpus of international law regarding the privileges and immunities of
diplomats and the forms and modalities of international intercourse had been
revised in the 196os, we had no option but to invite the Legal Advisers, some of
whom had participated in these proceedings, to rewrite chapters for us. This
they willingly and skilfully did.
We owe to them immeasurable gratitude, particularly to Sir lan Sinclair,
the chief Legal Adviser, who, with Mrs Eileen Denza, did most ofthe writing; to
Mr Henry Steel, who gave invaluable help on United Nations matters; and to
Mr David Anderson, who rewrote the very important chapter on the
xv
International Court ofJustice. I must not fail to add Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
British member of the International Court ofJustice and former Legal Adviser
to the British Foreign Office, whose wisdom and authority were a constant
support.
We were also greatly dependent on the Protocol Department for their expert
and up-to-date knowledge of the present state ofProtocol. It may sometimes be
supposed that Protocol is eternally static; in fact it changes, if slowly, all the
time, whether on the initiative of heads of state, governments or heads of
missions. We are most grateful to The Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, Lord
Michael Fitzalan Howard, and to Mr Roger du Boulay and Mr Geoffrey
Collins, Head and Deputy Head of Protocol in London, for their guidance.
On historical matters it has been especially valuable to be able to have
recourse at any time to the learning and advice ofMr Rohan Butler, Historical
Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, whose immense fund of
historical knowledge was particularly relevant to our subject.
On United Nations matters we have three special debts. First arising from a
meeting in N ew York, Mr Blair Sloan. the Head of the Legal Department of
the United Nations, was kind enough to furnish me with selected material
about certain points on the structure and functioning of the organisation.
Mr Sidney Bailey was good enough to read through a great deal of the
manuscript in draft, and his criticisms, remarkable for their courteous
frankness, were invaluable.
In the United States Department of State, I am most indebted to Mr
Hampton Davis, the Assistant Head of Protocol, for not only giving me
generously of his own time, but also for arranging meetings at which I was able
to talk with a number of his colleagues about problems of modern diplomatic
administration, especially in physically difficult circumstances. A further
special indebtedness to the United States Diplomatic Service is for the help
given to me personally by the Honorable Joseph N. Greene,Jr in ensuring the
accuracy of the account given in Chapter 23 of the most intricate diplomatic
situation in Cairo in the years 1967-73.
We benefited from talking to colleagues from other countries and would like
to express our thanks to the Ambassador of France in London, HE Monsieur
]acques Beaumarchais , to the Swiss Ambassador, HE Dr Ernesto Thalmann
and to the Charge d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in London, the
Honorable Ronald I. Spiers, for information furnished on specialised points;
and to HE Mr Seiro Kawasaki, Japanese Minister at Ankara, for his interesting observations on accreditation by and to the EEC.
The rewriting of the chapter on the Commonwealth of Nations needed
considerable expert support which was given by Mr John Chadwick, Director
of the Commonwealth Foundation, by Lord Garner, formerly Head of the
Diplomatic Service, and by Mrs Beryl Chitty of the Commonwealth
Coordination Department of the FCO. We owe them all particular thanks. We
are indebted to Sir Frank Roberts for his advice on the section dealing with
NATO, and to Mr Gerald Mansell, now Deputy Director-General of the
British Broadcasting Corporation, for his specialised help with the chapter on
radio and Diplomacy.
In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office itself we owe a special debt to Mr
xvi
Nicholas J arrold of the United Nations Department for his help over the long
chapter on the United Nations and to Mr Adrian Russell for expert advice on
consular matters. We are grateful to the Hon. David Gore-Booth, Mr John
Penney, Mr M. A. Patterson and Mr R. A. Longmire for giving us the benefit of
specialised knowledge. Many members of geographical and functional
departments also provided indispensable information without which a proper
standard of accuracy could not have been maintained. One wishes one could
thank individually each one of the many people who at one time or another
contributed knowledge, experience, comment or advice, and we can only
assure them that lack of personal mention signifies no lack of gratitude. But in
concluding these expressions of thanks to our colleagues, we would like to
mention our special gratitude to the Librarian of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Bernard Cheeseman, and his deputy and, later, successor,
Miss Eily Blayney, who were always courteously helpful, and to Mrs Fleur
Campbell of the Library for her exceptional prowess in locating sources of
reference which must have saved us innumerable hours of work.
Finally, I owe a quite special tribute to my wife Patricia who, mostly during a
series of air journeys, read through, with me, the entire first proof copy of this
book.
Abbreviations
ACABQ
ASA
ASEAN
BBC
BFSP
BTO
CEEC
CENTO
CINCHAN
CMEA
CMG
COMINFORM
CSCE
ECAFE
ECLA
ECOSOC
ECWA
EOC
EEC
EFTA
ELDO
ESCAP
ESRO
EURATOM
EUROCONTROL
FAO
FRG
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

Association of South-East Asia.
Association of South-East Asian Nations.
British Broadcasting Corporation.

British and Foreign State Papers.
Brussels Treaty Organisation.
Committee for European Economic Cooperation.

Central Treaty Organisation.
Commander in Chief, Channel.
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George.
Communist Information Bureau.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Economic Commission for Latin America.
Economic and Social Council.
Economic Commission for Western Asia.
European Defence Community.
European Economic Community.
European Free Trade Association.
European Launcher Development Organisation.
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
European Space Research Organisation.
European Atomic Energy Community.
Name given to the European Organisation for the Safety of Air
Navigation.
Food and Agriculture Organisation.

Federal Republic of Germany.
GATT
GPRA
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria.
HMSO
HC
His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

High Commissioner.
XVlll
Abbreviations
IAEA
IBRD
ICAO
ICj
IDA
IFC
ILC
ILO
IMCO
IMF
INMARSAT
INTELSAT
IRO
ITU
KB
KC
MAPHILINDO
Mise.
International Atomic Energy Agency.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
International Civil Aviation Organisation.
International Commission of jurists.
International Development Association.
International Finance Corporation.
International Law Commission.
International Labour Organisation.
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation.
International Monetary Fund.
International Maritime Satellite Organisation.
International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation.
International Refugee Organisation.
International Telecommunications Union.
King's Bench.
King's Counsel.
Malaya Philippines Indonesia.

Miscellaneous.
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
OAS
OAU
OECD
OEEC
Organisation
Organisation
Organisation
Organisation
PAU
PCIj
of American States.
of African Unity.
for Economic Cooperation and Development.
for European Economic Cooperation.
Pan-American Union.
Permanent Court of International justice.
QB
QC
Queen's Bench.
Queen's Counsel.
RN
Royal Navy.
SACEUR
SACLANT
SELA
SHAPE
sv.
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.
Sistema Economico Latino-Americano.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.
sub voce (i.e. see under the word in question.)
UAR
UNCTAD
UNEF
UNESCO
UNFICYP
UNHCR
UNICEF
United Arab Republic.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
United Nations Expeditionary Force.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.,
United Nations (Peacekeeping) Force in Cyprus.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
United Nations Children's Fund (1946-53 United Nations
International Children's Emergency Fund; in 1953 name changed,
original acronym retained).
Abbreviations
UPU
UNTS
VOA
WEU
WHO
WIPO
WMO
ZOPEAN
Universal Postal Union.

United Nations Treaty Series.
Voice of America.
Western European Union.

World Health Organisation.
World Intellectual Property Organisation.
World Meteorological Organisation.
Zone of Peace and Neutrality.
Note: for abbreviations of periodicals and other serial publications, see Bibliography.
XIX
BOOK I
Diplomacy in general
Chapter
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Diplomacy
Maritime honours
3
9
12
20
27
36
38
55
CHAPTER
Diplomacy
I. I.
Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official

relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes
also to their relations with vassal states; or, more briefly still, the conduct of
business between states by peaceful means.
1.2.
The Oxford English Dictionary is more precise. Harold Nicolson terms it 'precise
although wide.'} Diplomacy, the Dictionary says, is (i) the management of
international relations by negotiation; (ii) the method by which these relations
are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; (iii) the business or art
of the diplomatist; (iv) skill or address in the conduct of international
intercourse and negotiations. Two further interpretations are also current: a
subject of study in some colleges and universities, especially in European
and American countries; the diplomatic career.
1.3.
Although the word has been in the English language for no more than two
centuries, it has suffered from misuse and confusion. It has sometimes been
made to appear, for instance, as the equivalent of foreign policy.2 But foreign
policy is formulated by government, not by diplomatists. In order to carry out
its policy, a government will need to manage and adjust its international
relations by applying different forms of pressure. How successful these pressures
prove will greatly depend on the real power behind them. The power must be
real, but, rather than exercise it explicitly, the government may prefer to keep
it in reserve with the implication that in certain circumstances it could be used.
Nevertheless, in normal circumstances it will conduct its international
intercourse by negotiation. This is diplomacy. Persuasive argument, ifapplied
skilfully and sensitively at the right time, may achieve a better result than
persuasion too obviously backed by the threat offorce. The latter may provoke
resistance and finally lead to war.
1.4.
Diplomacy is in fact, as the Duc de Broglie remarked, the best means devised by
civilisation for preventing international relations from being governed by force
alone. The field in which it operates lies somewhere between power politics and
civilised usage, and its methods have varied with the political conventions of
each age. There is no lack of evidence that the sending of emissaries to open
negotiations was a common practice among quite primitive peoples and that in
many cases their reception and treatment were regulated, even if only in a
rudimentary way, by custom or taboo. The Greek city states frequently
despatched and received special embassies with due accreditation, who
Diplomacy
presented their case openly before the rulers or assemblies to whom they were
sent. The principles and methods of Greek diplomacy had in fact been
developed by the fifth century B.C. into a recognised system to which much
subsequent thinking on the subject oweS its origin, and which has provided one
of the earliest and clearest illustrations of the difficulty, so familiar to us today,
of reconciling efficient negotiation with the processes of democracy. The
Roman contribution to this heritage was characteristic of a people who
produced rulers and administrators rather than diplomatists, who preferred
organisation to negotiation, and who sought to impose a universal respect for
their own system of law. The Byzantine emperors, on the other hand, although
often at pains to elaborate the machinery of diplomatic intercourse, earned for
this machinery a reputation for complexity and deviousness which has added
little of lasting value to the traditions of the art. 3
1.5.
The Venetians undoubtedly learned much from Byzantine example, but the
diplomacy of the Italian city states was essentially a product of the political
conditions of the time. As the late Garrett Mattingly4 demonstrated, Italian
Renaissance diplomacy did not spring either from a Greek prototype or
ready-made from Italian soil. In his interpretation the Western and Central
European world based itself on the triple concept of the Roman Empire and its
tradition of civil law; its successor, the Holy Roman Empire, with its system of
Germanic feudal and customary law; and the canon law of the ecclesiastical
authority. The centre of faith was the Church of Rome, and of doctrine, the
Papacy. The whole formed what was termed the res publica Christiana. So long as
this trinity formed a credible unity, although of course emissaries (whether:
styled as agents, procurators, or consuls) were sent to transact business in
territories other than their own, there was no formal necessity for accredited
ambassadors (legati) in the sense in which we understand the term today; and
certainly not for resident ones. In fact the thirteenth-century canon law
authority Gulielmus Durandus gave the definition 'a legatus is anybody sent by
another.'
1.6.
Nevertheless as the Middle Ages proceeded, there was rarely concord between
Pope and Emperor, the sovereignty of individual states grew as walled cities
found they could defend themselves against quite large imperial or papal
forces, and credentials of some kind began to be required ifan ambassador was
to be received by someone regarding himself as holding sovereign power. Even
so, growth was by no means logical or tidy. Outstanding among early long-term
resident diplomatic agents was Nicodemo da Pontremoli, sent by Francesco
Sforza, ruler of Milan, not in the first place as his representative to
the Florentine State, but as his confidential agent to Cosimo de' Medici, its
most powerful citizen. When in 1450 Sforza became Duke of Milan, he
furnished his representative with a regular accreditation as 'orator' in the
Florentine republic, and Nicodemo held the post for seventeen years. One can
readily see how in the closely knit but tensely divided polity offifteenth-century
Italy the practice of residential diplomacy came to be commonly accepted and
to evolve its own conventions. At the outset of the sixteenth century this
practice was already spreading to other countries ofEurope. In the atmosphere
of developing nation states, shifting alliances and the dynastic struggles for power
Diplomacy
the resident diplomatic agent was invaluable in keeping his master supplied
with information and acting as a barometer to register every evidence or
portent of impending change. However, the wars of religion so embittered
relations between Catholic and Protestant states that for 100 years true
diplomacy was wellnigh paralysed by mutual distrust. Ambassadors reported
that it was impossible to find out anything, because nobody wanted to talk to
them. Christendom appeared to be breaking up and the civilised intercourse
essential to good diplomacy suffered a temporary lapse.
1.7.
It was in this period that the 'Machiavellian,' expedients of spying, conspiracy

and deceit brought the reputation of the resident diplomatic agent to its nadir.
Raison d'etat took unquestioned precedence over morality. Only when the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 had established a new order of relationships,
however precarious at first, could the age of classical European diplomacy (the
direct origin of all modern diplomacy) be said to have begun. This was
diplomacy conducted by members of an avowedly ruling class, who frequently
had more in common, across land and sea frontiers, with each other than with
the majority of their own people. It proceeded, like the limited wars ofthe time,
according to well-defined rules and civilised conventions. It was personal and
flexible, and its style, while not without subtlety, was clear enough for all who
took part in it to understand not only what was explicitly said, but what was to
be taken for granted.
1.8.
In post-revolutionary Europe the ascendancy ofnew objectives began to eclipse

earlier values. Acceptance of an established monarchical order gave way to the
growing will to overturn the status quo. The international struggle for power
brought into play collective national energies which could be more effectively
harnessed by constitutional methods and cabinet government than by the rule
of the 'Prince.' Although skill in the classical methods continued to command
respect and acceptance, it became evident that diplomacy should now be
exercised (or at least appear to be exercised) in the interest, not ofa dynasty, nor
even of an aristocracy, but of the nation as a whole. After the First World War,
indeed, a conviction asserted itself itself that the time was ripe for diplomacy to
be made more open and more accessible to public scrutiny and appraisal. The
clamour was heard for 'open covenants openly arrived at.' It was natural that
electorates claiming to control governments should require to know what
agreements were being made in their name and to exercise the constitutional
right of accepting or rejecting them (as when the United States Senate in 1919
rejected participation in the League of Nations). Nowadays the openness of
agreements is, in principle, guaranteed by the United Nations rule that all
agreements concluded by member states must be registered, and their texts
deposited, with the Secretary-General. But if negotiation is carried on under
the public eye - as President Wilson at first appeared to think it should be - it
quickly turns into a travesty ofefficient procedure and runs the risk ofbetraying
any constructive purpose for which it may have been conceived. By its nature,
true negotiation must be confidential. If exhibited, it degenerates into polemic;
and this is not diplomacy, it is the continuation of warfare in peacetime by
other means. A neat corroboration of this was furnished by the Soviet FieldMarshal Shaposhnikov's paradox: 'If war may be said to be the continuation of
Diplomacy
politics by other means,' [an allusion to the doctrine ofClausewitz] 'then peace,
in its turn, is no more than the continuation ofconflict by other means. '5 There
is of course nothing new in this. The same thought is implicit in Machiavelli's
prologue to his Art of War. In such a process ofconflict the practice ofdiplomacy
must be presumed to embrace not merely negotiation, but the use ofa complex
range of moral and psychological weapons.
I.g.
The definitions which follow, taken from various authorities, may be helpful as
a reminder of the many roots from which modern diplomacy has grown.
I. 10.
The diplomat, says Littre, is so called, because diplomas are official dosuments .(actes)
emanating from princes,and the word 'diploma'comes from the Greek 8l.".>..wp4 (S...".>..&w,
I double) from the way in which they were folded. A diploma is understood to be a
document by which a privilege is conferred: a state paper, official document, a charter.
The earliest English instance of the use of this word is of the year 1645.
I. I I.
Leibnitz, in 1693, published his Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus, Dumont in 1726 the
Corps universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens. Both were collections of treaties and other
official documents. In these titles diplomaticus, diplomatique, are applied to a body or
collection of original state papers, but as the subject-matter of these particular collections
was international relations, 'corps dipomatique' appears to have been treated as
equivalent to 'corps du droit des gens, , and 'diplomatique' as 'having to do with
international relations.' Hence the application also to the officials connected with such
matters. Diplomatic bol{y6 now came to signify the body of ambassadors, envoys and
officials attached to the foreign missions residing at any seat of government, and
diplomatic service that branch of the public service which supplies the personnel of the
permanent missions in foreign countries. The earliest example of this use in England
appears to be in the Annual Register for 1787. Burke, in 1796, speaks of the 'diplomatic
body,' and also uses 'diplomacy' to mean skill or address in the conduct of international
intercourse and negotiations. The terms diplomat, diplomate, diplomatist were adopted to
designate a member of this body. In the eighteenth century they were scarcely known.
Callieres, whose book was published in 1716, never uses the word diplomate. He always
speaks of 'un bon' or 'un habile negociateur.' Disraeli is quoted as using 'diplomatic' in
1826 as 'displaying address' in negotiations or intercourse of any kind (New English
Dictionary). La diplomatique is used in French for the art of deciphering ancient
documents, such as charters and so forth.
I. I 2.
It is interesting to examine the following attempts at defining diplomacy, all of

them by nineteenth-century authors, whose viewpoints derive in the main from
those of the ancien regime.
'La diplomatie est l'expression par laquelle on designe, depuis un certain nombre
d'annees, la science des rapports exterieurs laquelle a pour base les diplomes ou actes
ecrits emanes des souverains.' (Flassan, 181 I.) - The monarchical viewpoint.
'Die Kenntnis der zur ausseren Leitung der ofTentlichen Angelegenheiten und
Geschafte der Volker oder Souveraine, und der zu miindlichen oder schriftlichen
Verhandelungen mit fremden Staaten gehorigen Grundsatze, Maximen, Fertigkeiten
und Formen.' (Schmelzing, Systematischer GrUlldriss des Volkerrechts. 1818-20.) Competence which is the fruit of serious study and experience of the world.
'La science des relations exterieures ou afTaires etrangeres des Etats, et, dans un sens plus
determine, la science ou l' art des negociations.' (Ch. de Martens. 1866.) - A practice
requiring both knowledge and art.
'La science des rapports et des interets respectifs des Etats ou l'art de concilier les interets
des peuples entre eux; et dans un sens plus determine, la science ou l'art des
Diplomacy
negociations.... Elle embrasse le systeme entier des interets qui naissent des rapports
etablis entre les nations: elle a pour objet leur surete, leur tranquillite, leur dignite
respectives; et son but direct, immediat, est, ou doit etre au moins, le maintien de la paix
et de la bonne harmonie entre les puissances.' (Garden. 1883,) - Conciliation; and a
series of wholly beneficial objectives, in the last of which, however, the writer's
confidence seems to have faltered.
'L'art des negociations. Kliiber 7 developpe assez bien cette definition en disant que c'est
"I'ensemble des connaissances et principes necessaires pour bien conduire les afTaires
publiques entre les Etats." La diplomatie eveille en efTet I'idee de gestion des afTaires
internationales, de maniement des rapports exterieurs, d'administration des interets
nationaux des peuples et de leurs gouvernments, dans leur contact mutuel, soit paisible,
soit hostile. On pourrait presque dire que c' est "le droit des gens applique." , (PradierFodere. 1881.) - The role of diplomacy in times of peace and of conflict. (See 1.8.)
'La science des relations qui existent entre les divers Etats, telles qu'elles resultent de
leurs interets reciproques des principes du droit international et des stipulations des
traites.' (Calvo. 1885,) - A subject of study, with emphasis on law and treaties.
'La science et I'art de la representation des Etats et des negociations.
On emploie le meme mot ... pour exprimer une notion complexe, comprenant soit
I'ensemble de la representation d'un Etat, y compris le ministere des afTaires etrangeres,
soit I'ensemble des agents politiques. C'est dans ce sens que I'on parle du merite de la
diplomatie fran~aise cl certaines epoques, de la diplomatie russe, autrichienne.
Enfin on entend encore par diplomatie la carriere ou profession de diplomate. On se
voue cl la diplomatie, comme on se voue cl la magistrature, au barreau, cl I'enseignement,
aux armes.' (Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gms. 1896.) - The apparatus of representation,
now no longer of princes, but of whole states.
1.13.
Diplomatists existed long before the words were employed to denote the class.
Machiavelli (1469-1527) is perhaps the most celebrated of men who
discharged diplomatic functions in early days. D'Ossat (1536- 1604), the
Conde de Gondomar (1567-i626), Kaunitz (1710-94), Metternich (17731859), Pozzo di Borgo (1764-1842), the first Lord Malmesbury (1764-1820),
Talleyrand (1754-1838), Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (1786- 1880) were among
the most eminent of the profession in their time. If men who combined fame as
statesmen with diplomatic reputation are to be included, the Duc de Richelieu
(Cardinal Richelieu, 1585- I 642) was in a sense the father of French diplomacy;
and Count Cavour (18 I0-6 I) and Prince Bismarck (18 15-98) enjoyed a worldwide celebrity. Outside Europe there were notable 'pioneer' diplomats such as Sir
Thomas Roe, British 'lord ambassador' at the Court of the Mogul Emperor
Jehangir (1615-18) and Townsend Harris the first American Consul-General
in Japan (1855-60) with his remarka ble gift for comprehending the psychology
of a long-isolated people.
1.14.
'Diplomatist' ought, however, to be understood as including all the public

servants employed in diplomatic affairs, whether serving at home in the
department of foreign affairs, or abroad at embassies or other diplomatic
agencies. Strictly speaking, the head of the foreign department is also a
diplomatist, as regards his function of a responsible statesman conducting the
relations of his country with other states. This he does by discussion with their
official representatives or by issuing instructions to his agents in foreign
countries. Sometimes he is a diplomatist by training and profession; at others he
may be a political personage, often possessed of special knowledge fitting him
Diplomacy
for the post. In the Netherlands it is not unusual for a member of the Foreign
Service to be appointed minister for foreign affairs and, after serving his term,
to return to the Service.
I. I
5.
The 'diplomacy' of a country is sometimes popularly described as 'skilled', or

'blundering'; but such language tends to be ambiguous. It may indeed be that a
particular diplomatic official or agent, or group of diplomatic agents, has
handled a situation skilfully or unskilfully. But it may equally be that the
direction of a particular item of foreign policy has been incorrectly chosen by
the statesman in charge of the government department concerned. In such cases
blame for a mistake may be wrongly attributed by the public to the diplomatic
agent at home or abroad, who may in reality have been making the best of a
difficult predicament. On the other hand, if the government has fallen into
error as a result of misleading reports or advice from the agent, the blame must
rest largely on him. When expressions such as 'the State Department' , the 'Quai
d'Orsay', or 'the Foreign Office' are used publicly, it is often unclear whether
the writer or speaker is referring to the Secretary of State, or Minister, or to
decisions or actions at the official level. The distinction is nevertheless of
importance.
CHAPTER
Privileges and
immunities of the head
of a foreign state
2.1.
It has been established for several centuries in customary international law that
a sovereign, or head of state, who comes within the territory of another
sovereign is entitled to wide privileges and to ceremonial honours appropriate
to his position and dignity, and to full immunity from the criminal, civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the state which he is visiting. 1 From this
immunity of the head of state there flowed, at least in part, the privileges and
immunities accorded to diplomats and consuls who represented the state. And
from this same principle there was established the rule that the foreign state, as
a legal entity, could not be sued in courts oflaw. Actions could not be brought
on a contract with a foreign state, or to claim for damage inflicted by the agents
of the foreign state, or against a ship or aircraft owned by and operated in the
public service of the foreign state. But it is a curious consequence of the
developments of the last few decades, which have brought greater certainty to
the law concerning diplomats, consuls and other state officials and to the law
which regulates the immunities of the state itself, that the position ofthe head of
state has become less clear. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (which are
discussed in detail in Chapters 14-19 and 26-27) do not deal with the personal
privileges and immunities of the head of state. The New York Convention on
Special Missions of 1969 provides that heads of state leading a special mission
shall enjoy 'the facilities, privileges and immunities accorded by international
law to Heads of State on an official visit', but it does not define in any detail
these facilities, privileges and immunities. As regards the immunities of the
foreign state itself, many states have developed complex and detailed rules
under which these immunities are restricted in cases which may broadly be
described as 'commercial'. The States of the Council ofEurope have drawn up
among themselves a European Convention on State Immunity 2 which lays
down in detail the circumstances in which one Contracting State to the
Convention cannot claim sovereign immunity before the courts of another
Contracting State. But none of this large and complex body of international
law has been drawn up with the position of heads of state in mind. A clear
distinction is drawn in the law of many states, and implied in that of others,
between the foreign state as a legal entity and the head of such a state as an
individual to whom a very high degree of privilege and immunity remains due.
2.2.
The personal status of a head of a foreign state therefore continues to be

regulated by long-established rules of customary international law which can
10
be stated in simple terms. He is entitled to immunity - probably without

exception - from criminal and civil jurisdiction. His residence, person and
movable property are inviolable. tie is entitled to exemption from customs
duty and from search of goods he brings with him. His wife 3 and other close
members of his family travelling with him - and possibly all the members ofhis
suite - are also entitled to the same degree of privilege and immunity. He must
of course disclose his position in order to claim privilege or immunity, but it is
irrelevant that he may originally have entered the jurisdiction of another
sovereign incognito. 4 He has no legal power to exercise criminal or civil
jurisdiction over members of his suite.
2.3.
In the nature of things there are few opportunities for clarifying whether any
exceptions now exist to the immunity of a foreign sovereign. Cases which come
to court nearly always concern not the personal status or the personal property
of the head of state but the status or property of the state as a legal entity. A
head of state, whether a hereditary ruler or an elected president, does not enter
the territory of another state in his official capacity without the clearest
assurances being expressed or implied that full immunity and full ceremonial
honours will be accorded. Although heads of state visit other states not only on
formal visits but also on private visits, any disregard by them of their
obligations or of the laws and regulations of the state they are visiting is almost
unheard of. However, certain exceptions to full immunities may be said to be
inherently justifiable, even if it cannot be said that they are fully supported by
extensive practice. For instance if the foreign sovereign himself institutes civil
proceedings, he makes himself liable to a related counter-claim - as is the case
with a diplomatic agent. 5 If the foreign sovereign owns real property in a
personal capacity, his immunity cannot prevent the hearing of an action to
establish the title or the right to possession of that property, since otherwise no
forum would exist competent to hear such an action. 6 If the foreign sovereign
engages in a trading venture or in speculative investment, it may be justifiable
to subject him to civil suit or to deny him tax exemption on his profits. But state
practice in regard to the taxation of the personal investments offoreign heads of
state is in fact very varied.
2.4.
A head of state who has been deposed or replaced or has abdicated or resigned
is of course no longer entitled to privileges or immunities as a head of state. He
will be entitled to continuing immunity in regard to acts which he performed
while head of state, provided that the acts were performed in his official
capacity; in this his position is no different from that of any agent of the state. 1
He cannot claim to be entitled to privileges as of right, although he may
continue to enjoy certain privileges in other states on a basis of courtesy.
2.5.
In 1940 a state of affairs without precedent arose. Beginning with the Royal
Family and Government of the Netherlands, a series ofdispossessed sovereigns,
with their governments, established themselves in Great Britain. They were
accorded all the privileges normally due to visiting heads of states and to
diplomatic representatives, respectively. The British heads of mission
accredited to them continued to function but enjoyed no privileges, except to
some small extent, and then only by courtesy, in the matter of minor traffic
offences. The governments set up their own departments in offices which were
11
regarded as extraterritorial, and they were even authorised by the Allied

Powers (Maritime Courts) Act of 19418 'to establish and maintain in the
United Kingdom courts of justice to be called "Maritime Courts",' and
having jurisdiction 'to try persons not being British subjects' for certain
specified offences.
Note: Details of the following ceremonials, included at this point in the Fourth Edition,
have been omitted from the present volume:
Ceremonial of the State Visit of the President of the French Republic, accompanied by
Madame Vincent Auriol, in March 1950.
Ceremonial of the Vatican on the reception ofa Sovereign, as observed on the visit ofthe
King and Queen of the Belgians, the Duke and Duchess of Brabant, the Count of
Flanders, and Princess Marie Jose, January 7, 1930.
CHAPTER 3
The minister for foreign

affairs'
3.1.
The minister for foreign affairs is the regular intermediary between the state
and foreign countries. His functions are regulated by domestic legislation and
traditions, and his powers vary according to the political organisations of
different states.
3.2.
In England the origins of this high office take us back to the thirteenth century.
The King's Secretary is first heard of in 1253, in the reign of Henry Ill. The
office was at first a part of the royal household. Its holder might be a man of
character and capacity, fit to be a member of the King's Council, or to be sent
as an envoy to foreign powers. Such were the Secretaries of Henry III and
Edward I. Or he might be an inferior officer of the household, and such seems to
have been the position ofthe Secretary of Edward Ill. In 1433 (reign of Henry
VI) two Secretaries were appointed, one by the delivery of the King's Signet,
the other by patent. (Letters patent were open letters of authority, usually
issued by the Sovereign, written on parchment with the Great Seal pendent at
the bottom.) In 1476 (reign of Edward IV) a newly appointed Secretary is
described as Principal Secretary. In the reign of Henry VIII the position of
Principal Secretaries was advanced. They were still members ofthe household,
but ranked next to the greater household officers, and in Parliament and
Council they had their place assigned by statute. In 1539 a warrant issued to
Thomas Wriothesley and Ralph Sadler gave them 'the name and office of the
King's Majesty's Principal Secretaries during his Highness' pleasure.' After
Henry's reign the Secretary ceased to be a member of the household.
3-3.
During the greater part of Elizabeth I's reign there was but one Secretary, but
at the close ofit Sir Robert Cecil shared the duties with another, he being called
'Our Principal Secretary of Estate,' and the other 'one of our Secretaries of
Estate.' From this time, until the year 1794, it was the rule that there should be
two Secretaries of State. The exceptions occurred in 1616, when there were
three; from 1707 until 1746, when there was usually a third Secretary for
Scottish business; and from 1768 until 1782, when there was a third Secretary
for Colonial business.
3.4.
Down to 1782 the duties of the two Secretaries, as regards foreign affairs, were
divided geographically into Northern and Southern Departments, and until
that year they were described in official documents relating to the staffcommon
to both as 'His Majesty's Principal Secretaries ofState for Foreign Affairs.' The
Northern Secretary used to announce himself to resident heads of foreign
missions thus: 'Le Roi m'ayant fait l'honneur de me nommer aujourd'hui son
Secretaire d'Etat pour le departement du Nord,' but on 27 March 1782 Fox
announced to them that 'le Roi m'ayant fait l'honneur de me nommer son
Secretaire d'Etat pour le Departement des affaires etrangeres ... ' Since 1782,
therefore, the Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs has always been
entrusted to a single person. Sir William Anson says: 'I cannot ascertain that
any Order in Council or departmental minute authorises or records this
important administrative change. '2
3.5.
It was in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that most of the European
monarchies established a special branch of the administration for foreign
affairs. In the reign of Francis I ofFrance there was a secret committee to which
was entrusted the discussion of questions of foreign policy. In France, in the
year 1547, at the beginning of the reign of Henri 11, the Department of
Secretaries of State was founded. There were four such secretaries who shared
home and foreign affairs among them. In the reign of Charles IX the
department was divided into four sections: (I) Italy and Piedmont; (2)
Denmark, Sweden and Poland; (3) the Emperor, Spain, Portugal, the Low
Countries, England and Scotland; (4) Germany and Switzerland. In 1589 a
single ministry for foreign affairs was formed, and all foreign correspondence
was committed to a single Secretary of State. But previously to 1787 he shared
the direction of home affairs with the departments of War, Marine and the
Household. Thus, he had charge of Upper and Lower Guyenne, Normandy,
Champagne and part of La Brie, the principality of Dombes and Berry. But on
Montmorin succeeding to Vergennes as Secretary of State in that year, his
functions were confined to foreign affairs. 3
3.6.
The Emperor Charles V had a secret council of state to furnish advice to him
through the minister who was charged with the foreign branch of administration, while in Spain a somewhat complicated system was established.
3.7.
In contemporary Britain the mode of appointment of Her Majesty's Secretary

of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs is by the delivery to him by the
Sovereign of the seals ofoffice. There are three seals, viz. a greater and lesser signet
and a small seal called the cachet; all these are engraved with the Royal Arms.
The two former now differ only in point of size. In the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, diplomatic and consular commissions signed by the Sovereign pass under
the greater signet; the lesser is used in the case of royal exequaturs granted to
foreign consular officers, and for royal warrants (such as instruments
authorising the affixing of the Great Seal to full powers and to ratifications of
treaties); the cachet is used to seal the envelopes of letters containing
communications of a personal character made by The Queen to foreign
sovereIgns.
3.8.
Patents were issued from the fifteenth century onwards till 1852. From that
time the practice was intermittent till 1868, but since the latter date patents
have not been issued, nor in any case would they affect the powers of the
Secretary of State, for these follow the seals. 4
3.9.
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs holds a general
14
full power from The Queen, authorising him to negotiate and conclude, subject
if necessary to Her Majesty's ratification, any treaty in respect ofGreat Britain
and Northern Ireland. (See 8.18)
3.10.
Today governments of other countries address themselves to the minister for

foreign affairs either through their own accredited diplomatic agent, or
through the diplomatic agent who represents his sovereign or government at
their own capital. The former is the normal channel of communication and is
generally preferred, since by instructing their own representative a government can be confident that the wording and manner of delivery of their
message conforms as exactly as possible to their intentions. Moreover, he will
report immediately, if necessary, on the reception it obtained. However, there
are occasions when a minister for foreign affairs, wishing to communicate his
government's message with the greatest force, will summon a foreign
ambassador to receive it personally. In such cases the government's own
representative will of course be informed and may be required to take
complementary action in the capital where he is accredited. These procedures
are flexible, and the choice will depend upon circumstances and upon the
personalities involved.
3. I
As a general rule notes and other formal communications concerning relations

with other countries are signed by the minister of foreign affairs, or on his
behalf. Under his orders are drawn up documents connected with foreign
relations, drafts of treaties and conventions, statements of fact and law,
manifestos and declarations. The negotiation of treaties rests with him and he
watches over their execution. Ratifications of treaties are exchanged by him or
his agents. He proposes to the head of state the nomination of diplomatic
agents, he draws up their credentials and full powers for signature by the head
of state, and gives them their instructions. He advises the head ofstate as to the
acceptance of persons who have been proposed to be accredited to him, and
also as regards the issue of exequaturs to foreign consular officers. The consular
service receives its orders from him. Foreign representatives address themselves
to him in order to obtain an audience of the head of state.
I.
3. I 2.
Of the minister's task, Baron de Martens said:

'A l'egard des relations exterieures ... il faut demander, solliciter, negocier; le
moindre mot inconsidere peut blesser toute une nation; une fausse demarche, un faux
calcul, une combinaison fausse ou hasardee, une simple indiscretion, peuvent
compromettre et la dignite du gouvernement et l'interet national. La politique
exterieure d'un Etat presente des rapports si varies, si compliques, si sujets cl changer, et
cl la fois environnes de tant d' ecueils et de difficultes, qu' on concevra facilement combien
doivent etre difficiles et delicates les fonctions de celui qui est appele cl la direction d'une
telle administration.... On est tellement habitue cl juger d'apres le caractere, les
principes et les qualites personnelles du ministre des relations exterieures, le systeme de
sa politique, que sa nomination ou son renvoi sont toujours consideres comme des
evenements politiques....
'11 doit avoir une connaissance exacte des interets commerciaux qui rapprochent les
Etats, des ressources materielles de tout genre qui font leur force, des traites et
convention~ qui les lient, des principes et des vue~ qui gouvernent Jeur politique, des
hommes d'Etat qui la dirigent, des entourages de cour qui l'alterent, des alliances entre
les families souveraines qui l'influencent, des rivalites de puissances qui en compliquent
15
l'action; depositaire en quelque sorte de l'honneur et des interets generaux de son pays,
dans ses rapports exterieurs, il doit s'appliquer a bien connaitre les hommes, afin de ne
faire que des choix convenables dans le personnel de ses agents au dehors, et de ne
remettre qu'a des mains capables et dignes la sauvegarde de ces interets si graves et de
cet honneur si ombrageux. L'experience acquise, les services anterieurement rendus, la
notoriete du talent, la consideration personnelle, sont des elements essentiels de sa
confiance. '5
3.13.
At the present day the duties and responsibilities of the minister who is
entrusted with the conduct of the foreign relations of his country range over a
yet wider field than when the above was written. The birth of new states, the
advancement of others, constitutional changes which may occur in their
methods of government, the growth of organisations designed to foster a better
understanding between the nations of the world, the ever-increasing
complexity of international relationships, and the many questions to which all
these give rise, have largely extended the area within which diplomacy finds its
proper scope, and call for close and unremitting attention.
3.14.
Occasionally the holder of the office combines this with other functions. In the
United Kingdom within modern times the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs has on more than one occasion also been Prime Minister. In France he is
often President of the Council. In Germany, he might be also Chancellor.
3.15.
On taking office the minister for foreign affairs informs the diplomatic
representatives of foreign states, and customarily receives them as soon as
possible thereafter at his official residence to exchange greetings with them. He
also informs the diplomatic agents of his own country accredited abroad.
3. 16.
In the United Kingdom it is usualfor the retiring Secretary ofState for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs to address to the foreign diplomatic representatives an announcement in some such terms as
I have the honour to inform you that The Queen has been graciously pleased to
accept my resignation of the office of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and to confide the seals of this Department to
His successor, on assuming office, addresses a notification to the foreign

diplomatic representatives in such terms as
I have the honour to acquaint you that The Queen has been graciously pleased to
accept the Right Honourable --'s resignation of the office ofHer Majesty's Principal
Secretary ofState for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and to confide to me the seals
of this Department.
3.17.
For many years the normal procedure on receipt of this letter was for
arrangements to be made for the reception by the incoming Secretary ofState
of the heads of missions in the order of their precedence in the diplomatic list.
This procedure was maintained in the United Kingdom until 1974. But with
the number of heads of mission rising to over 100 (by 1976 it was 124), the
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr James Callaghan, decided to
substitute a reception for all heads of mission and their spouses, at which all
present would have the opportunity to meet him and Mrs Callaghan. Such a
16
change has tended to impose itself, particularly in large capitals in which the
Secr.etary of State (or Foreign Minister) combines parliamentary with
executive duties.
3. I 8.
In every country the foreign minister is assisted by a trained staffwho, under his
guidance, constitute the foreign office or ministry for foreign affairs. In the
United Kingdom the permanent staff of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office has at its head the Permanent Under-Secretary of State (in France it is
the Secretaire-General), who has the rank of ambassador. There may
nowadays be as many as nine officers with the rank ofdeputy under-secretary of
state (so diversified has the work of the Ministry become) and perhaps twice
that number of assistant under-secretaries. The exact number and attributions
will vary with the ebb and flow of priorities in external affairs. The United
Kingdom Secretary of State is also assisted by two ministers of state and two
parliamentary under-secretaries, who hold office as members of the government in power for the time being.
3. I g.
In all communications with the government of the state to which they are
accredited, diplomatic agents should address themselves to the minister for
foreign affairs, whether in seeking information as to the views or practice ofthat
government in regard to various matters that may arise, or in furnishing
information as to the views or practice of their own government.
The Pan-American Convention respecting diplomatic officers, signed at Havana on
February 20, 1928, lays down for the signatory States the following rules:
'Article 13. Diplomatic officers shall, in their official communications, address
themselves to the Minister of Foreign Relations or Secretary of State of the country to
which they are accredited. Communications to other authorities shall also be made
through the said Minister or Secretary.'
3.20.
It is often convenient, when dealing with specialised subjects, such as the detail
of financial, commercial or scientific activities, or questions concerning
development, technical cooperation, etc. for a diplomatic officer to establish
direct contact with the appropriate department or expert, especially if he has
made personal acquaintance with them already. But such approaches are only
semi-official and must be handled with tact, preferably by members of the staff,
rather than by the ambassador himself. On any matter of substance the
ministry of foreign affairs will expect at least to be informed, ifnot consulted in
the first place.
Relations with colleagues

3.2 I.
The practising diplomat at whatever level needs to have some feel for the actual
conduct of external policy in the country in which he is serving. Notably it is
important to know something of the standing ofthe foreign minister vis-a-vis his
colleagues, particularly the head of government.
3.22.
In early days this meant the direct relationship with an absolute sovereign. As
sovereignty ceased to be absolute, and authority became more diffused, the
Relations with colleagues
views of a number of governmental colleagues, notably the colleague in charge

of finance, became more important. But since the post of foreign minister
always ranks high in seniority, the relationship with the head of government,
whether president or prime minister, became the decisive one.
In times of crisis or of exceptionally heavy decision, the responsibility for
external policy has to go back to the head of government, whether 'in Cabinet'
or, when urgency or secrecy is paramount, ell petit comite of a few close
colleagues. But within this generalisation history shows many variations. In
nineteenth-century Europe, beginning with William Pitt the Younger in
Britain, there were many heads of government who firmly ran their own
foreign policy; other obvious examples were Chancellor Metternich of Austria
and Chancellor Bismarck of Prussia, and later of Germany, until his last
sovereign, William 11, turned against him. As Prime Minister of Britain, Lord
Palmerston came in a somewhat different category; his Foreign Secretary,
Lord John Russell (later Earl Russell), conducted foreign affairs with great
assiduity, but on major decisions there was little argument.
In the European relationships following the First World War some major
foreign ministers emerged, notably Artistide Briand in France, Otto
Stresemann in Germany and Sir Austen Chamberlain in Britain. They were
foreign ministers of talent and idealism to whom, for too short a time, their
heads of government were prepared to give considerable freedom of initiative
and action. In the period after the Second World War, many countries
achieved independence, and acknowledged leaders handled their own external
policies. J awaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of independent India, was
his own foreign minister until his death in 1964. Dr K wame Nkrumah ofGhana
and Dr Sukarno of Indonesia conducted their own foreign policies until they
fell from power. It was noticeable that on the fall of Dr Sukarno, the office of
foreign minister gained influence with the appointment to it of Mr Adam
Malik.
There are also interesting and important cases which defy tidy description. It is
often incorrectly supposed that during the Second World War Winston
Churchill ran the British war effort as a whole, with Anthony Eden as a
particularly expert 'adviser' on international affairs, whereas under the British
parliamentary system, the Foreign Secretary is not an 'adviser' but a full
Cabinet colleague of the Prime Minister. The United States has had a special
method of dealing with world crises, rendered possible by the Congressional
system in which the Secretary of State, like other members of the executive, is
not a member of the legislature. President Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert
Lansing, was by no means inactive; but for purposes of the Versailles Peace
Conference of 1919 his Secretary of State de facto was his private adviser,
Colonel House. Similarly in the Second World War, Secretary ofState Cordell
Hull busied himself with specialised matters such as economic policy and Latin
America, while Dean Acheson, his Deputy, was involved on a wide front
including post-war matters. But for a period, President Roosevelt's 'Secretary
of State' for war policy purposes was his private adviser, Harry Hopkins.
Lastly, one must note the performance, extraordinary for the present day, of
A. A. Gromyko, who, having been a Deputy Foreign Minister from 1946 to 1949
18
and from 1953 to 1957, became in the latter year Foreign Minister, and has
held this post until the time of the publication of this book. Given the Russian
penchant for secrecy, as notable in Communist as in Tsarist times, the full
background of this long tenure of office may never be known. But the
continuance of Mr Gromyko in the Supreme Soviet since 1959 must indicate
that his competence, endurance and loyalty to those in power were such that
there was no reason for change.
3.27.
In matters which affect him and his country, a diplomat thus needs to know
where the power lies. To put it more specifically, he needs to know whether an
initially favourable response by a foreign minister to an approach from a
diplomatic mission is a foretaste of government policy, or a characteristic piece
of personal courtesy, or something in between. In cases where the foreign
minister is known to be a weak member of the government, there may be a
temptation to seek a favourable decision, either by the use of indirect pressure
on him, or even by direct recourse to the head of government. But either of
these tactics can cause the apparently weak minister to show a surprising
negative strength.
Records
3.28.
In most countries special care has been devoted to the preservation ofpublic documents.
In England, from the fourteenth century, papers were deposited at the Tower of
London. Queen Elizabeth I, in 1578, created the State Paper Office for the documents
belonging to the Secretary ofState, which has developed into the existing Public Record
Office.
3.29.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the foreign, domestic, colonial and
military records, generally described as State Papers, were preserved in a common
repository, at first in Whitehall, and after 1833 in the new State Paper Office built in St
James's Park. During this period they were under the immediate charge of a Keeper of
the State Papers and a separate staff; but in 1854 the establishment of the State Paper
Office was amalgamated with that of the Public Record Office, and in 1862 the building
was pulled down and its contents transferred to the Record Office.
3.30.
The older Foreign Office records, that is those before 1760, were transferred to the
Public Record Office in 1862, with the rest of the contents of the State Paper Office.
Frequent transfers of the more modern papers have taken place since 1868, although,
until the 1958 Public Records Act came into force, they were made at irregular
intervals. The 1958 Act, as amended by the Public Records Act of 1967, placed a
statutory obligation on the Foreign Office (and later the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office) to transfer the records to the Public Record Office well in time for their opening
to public inspection when thirty years old. An exception to the thirty-year rule was
made when, in December 1969, the British Government decided, with the agreement of
the principal Opposition parties, to accelerate the opening of the records of the Second
World War. 6 As a result of this decision, British wartime Diplomatic Records were
opened on I January 1972. Since then, transfers are made annually to the Public Record
Office, thus opening the records for 19460n I January 1977, those for 19470n I January
1978 and so on. Indexes related to the correspondence contained in these records are
also transferred annually.
Records
3.31.
19
Records of certain other countries
France
The following archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are available for historical
research:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Up to December 1929: political and commercial documents relating to most

European countries, the Middle East and the United States.
Up to 3] May ]9]8: documents relating to the countries ofthe American continent
outside the United States, Asia and Africa (except for Morocco and Tunisia);
documents of the series The War, 1914-1918; ordinances, decrees, records of
appointments, regulations and decisions relating to diplomatic and consular
personnel; documents concerning the Department of Accounts in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (finances, budget, pensions).
Up to 3] December ]9]6: documents relating to Morocco and Tunisia.
Up to ]870: individual personnel files.
Germany (Federal Republic)

By special arrangement the diplomatic archives of the Auswartiges All}t for the years
] 86 7 to ]945 are made available to qualified researchers on application. Moreover, the
general policy remains that documents over thirty years old will be made available for
study. Most of the important documents now available have been micro-filmed and
copies are available for research and purchase in the National Archives at Washington,
and in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London.
Netherlands
Files more than fifty years old are in principle on deposit in the State Archives
(Algemeen Rijksarchief) and freely open to the public. Archives ofthe Foreign Ministry
which have not yet been transferred to the State Archives are open for scholarly research
after they are thirty years old.
United States
The policy records of the Department of State, with a small number of exceptions,
are required to be declassified and opened to research when they are thirty years old.
Documentary volumes, Foreign Relations of the United States, are in course of publication
for each year. In the restricted period (at present from ]948 onwards) copies of
identifiable documents may be requested by non-official researchers under the Freedom
of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) of ]966, amended by Public Law No. 93502 of 2]
November ]974, or Executive Order No. ] ]652, February ]975.
Soviet Union
There appear to be no published regulations concerning the availability of diplomatic
archives in the USSR. Requests for access are considered on an individual basis.
CHAPTER 4
Precedence among states

and similar matters
4. I.
The Pope in early times claimed the right of fixing the order of precedence
among the heads of states. The precedence of the Pope above all other
potentates was assumed as a matter of course. Next in order came the
Emperor; I then the King of the Romans, who was the heir-apparent of the
latter (by election).
4.2.
The list of sovereigns frequently attributed to PopeJulius n in 1504 was never

promulgated by him. But in that year Paris de Grassis ofBologna became one of
the two masters of ceremony of the papal chapel. At the beginning of a diary
kept by him occurs the list, which with some variations has been regarded as a
regulation intended to settle disputed questions of precedence. It formed part of
a passage relating the reception on 12 May 154, of the ambassade d'obedience
from the King of England, and is as follows:
Ordo Regum Christianorum.
Imperator Cresar,
Rex Romanorum,
Rex Francire,
Rex Hispanire,
Rex Aragonire,
Rex Portugallire,
Rex Anglire, cum tribus discors prredictis,
Rex Sicilire, discors cum rege Portugallire,
Rex Scotire et Rex Ungarire inter se discordes,
Rex Navarrre,
Rex Cipri,
Rex Bohemire,
Rex Polonire,
Rex Danire,
Ordo Ducum.
Dux Britannire,
Dux Burgundire,
Dux Bavarire, comes Palatinus,
Dux Saxonire,
Marchio Brandenburgensis,
Dux Austrire,
2I
Dux Sabaudire,
Dux Mediolani,
Dux Venetiarum,
Duces Bavarire.
Duces Francire et Lotharingire,
Dux Borbonire,
Dux Aurelianensis, Isti quatuor non prrestant obedientiam
Sedi Apostolicre quia subditi imperatoris sunt,
Dux Janure,
Dux Ferrarire. 2
4.3.
A bull of Leo X, dated March 15 16, uses the following language:

'Christianissimus in Christo filius noster, Maximilianus, in imperatorem
electus, J ulii 11 prredecessoris nostri, nostro vero tempore, clarissimre memorire,
Ludovicus Francorum et ceteri reges Christiani. ... Laterensi concilio
adhreserunt,'3 which shows that the King ofFrance enjoyed precedence over all
other kings.
4.4.
The first place being conceded to the Pope, and the second, with universal
assent, to the Emperor, up to the fall of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, the
question was as to the others. Gustavus Adolphtas of Sweden asserted the
equality of all crowned heads, Queen Christina maintained it at the Congress
of Westphalia, and in 1718 it was claimed for Great Britain on the occasion of
the Quadruple Alliance.
4.5.
A comparison of the antiquity of royal titles shows the following order:

France (accession of Clovis, A.D. 481, besides the rank derived from the
character of 'eldest son of the Church' attributed to the King of France).
Spain (kingdom of the Asturias in 718).
England (Egbert, 827).
Austria (Hungary a kingdom since 1000).
Denmark (Canute, 1015).
Two Sicilies (Norman kingdom, 1130).
Sweden (I 132, reunion of the kingdoms of the Swedes and Goths).
Portugal (Monso I, in I 139)'
Prussia (kingdom, I I January 170 I).
Italy (kingdom of Sardinia, 1720).
Russia (assumption of the title of Emperor, 22 October 172 I).
Bavaria (26 December 1805)'
Saxony (I I December 1806)
Wiirttemberg (26 December 1806).
Hanover (12 October 1814).
Holland (16 May 1816).
Belgium (2 July 183 I).
Greece (7 May 1832).
Turkey ('admitted to share in the advantages of European public law
and concert' by the Treaty of Paris, 30 March 1856).4
But until the matter was finally settled at the Congress of Vienna in 1815
constant disputes arose.
22
4. 6 .
In 1564 Pius IV declared that France was entitled to precedence over Spain
in a question respecting the relative rank of the ambassadors of the two Powers
at Rome. 5 In 1633,6 Christian IV ofDenmark having proposed to celebrate the
wedding of his son, the Crown Prince, a dispute arose between the French and
Spanish ambassadors, the Comte d' Avaux and the Marques de la Fuente. The
Danish ministers proposed to d' Avaux various solutions of the difficulty, and
a'mong these that he should sit next to the King, or next to the Imperial
Ambassador. To this he replied: 'I will give the Spanish Ambassador the choice
of the place which he regards as the most honourable, and when he shall have
taken it, I will turn him out and take it myself.' To avoid further dispute, de la
Fuente, on a plea of urgent business elsewhere, absented himself from the
ceremony. In 1657, a contest ofthe same kind occurred at The Hague, between
de Thou, Special Ambassador, and the Spanish Ambassador Gamarra. 7
4.7.
A more serious affair happened in London on 30 September 1661, on the

occasion of the state entry of the Swedish Ambassador. It was the custom at
such 'functions' for the resident ambassadors to send their coaches to swell the
cortege. The Spanish Ambassador, de Watteville, sent his coach down to the
Tower wharf, whence the procession was to set out, with his chaplain and
gentlemen, and a train of about forty armed servants. The coach ofthe French
Ambassador, Comte d'Estrades, with a royal coach for the accommodation of
the Swedish Ambassador, were also on the spot. In the French coach were the
son of d' Estrades with some of his gentlemen, escorted by 150 men, ofwhom 40
carried firearms. After the Swedish Ambassador had landed and taken his
place in the royal coach, the French coach tried to go next, and on the
Spaniards offering resistance, the Frenchmen fell upon them with drawn
swords and poured in shot upon them. The Spaniards defended themselves,
hamstrung two of the Frenchman's horses, mortally wounded a postilion and
dragged the coachman from his box, after which they triumphantly took the
place which no one was any longer able to dispute with them. 8 Louis XIV, on
learning ofthis incident, ordered the Spanish Ambassador to quit the kingdom,
and sent instructions to his own representative at Madrid to demand redress,
consisting of the punishment of de Watteville and an undertaking that Spanish
ambassadors should in future yield the pas to those of France at all foreign
courts. In case of a refusal a declaration of war was to be notified. The King of
Spain, anxious to avoid a rupture, recalled de Watteville from London, and
despatched the Marques de la Fuente to Paris, as ambassador extraordinary, to
disavow the conduct of de Watteville and to announce that he had prohibited
all his ambassadors from engaging in rivalry in the matter of precedence with
those of the Most Christian King. 9 The question was finally disposed of by the
'Pacte de Famille' of 15 August 1761, in which it was agreed that at Naples and
Parma, where the sovereigns belonged to the Bourbon family, the French
Ambassador was always to have precedence, but at other courts the relative
rank was to be determined by the date of arrival. If both arrived on the same
day, then the French Ambassador was to have precedence. lo
4.8.
Similar rivalry manifested itselfbetween the Russian and French ambassadors.

The latter had instructions to maintain their rank in the diplomatic circle by all
possible means, and to yield the pas to the papal and imperial ministers alone.
23
On the other hand, Russia had not ordered hers to claim precedence over the
French Ambassador, but simply not to concede it to him. At a court ball in
London, in the winter of I 768, the Russian Ambassador, arriving first, took his
place immediately next to the ambassador ofthe Emperor, who was on the first
of two benches arranged in the diplomatic box. The French Ambassador came
in late, and climbing on to the second bench managed to slip down between his
two colleagues. A lively interchange of words followed, and in the duel which
arose out of the incident the Russian was wounded. l l
4.9.
Pombal, Prime Minister ofPortugal, in 1760, on the occasion ofthe marriage of

the Princess of Brazil, caused a circular to be addressed to the foreign
representatives, announcing the ceremony, and acquainting them that
ambassadors at the court ofLisbon, with the exception ofthe Papal Nuncio and
the Imperial Ambassador, would thenceforth rank, when paying visits or
having audiences granted to them, according to the date of their credentials.
Choiseul, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, when the matter was
referred to him, maintained that 'the King would not give up the recognised
rank due to his crown, and his Majesty did not think that the date ofcredentials
could in any case or under any pretext weaken the rights attaching to the
dignity of France. , He added that though kings were doubtless masters in their
own dominions, their power did not extend to assigning relative rank to other
crowned heads without the sanction of the latter. 'In fact,' said he, 'no
sovereign in a matter of this kind recognises powers of legislation in the person
of other sovereigns. All Powers are bound to each other to do nothing contrary
to usages which they have no power to change.... Pre-eminence is derived
from the relative antiquity of monarchies, and it is not permitted to princes to
touch a right so precious.... The King will never, on any pretext, consent to an
innovation which violates the dignity of his throne.' Nor did Spain accord a
more favourable reception to this new rule of etiquette, while the court of
Vienna, though the imperial rights had been respected, replied to Paris that
such an absurdity only deserved contempt, and suggested consulting with the
court of Spain in order to destroy the ridiculous pretension of the Portuguese
minister. 12
4.10.
Pombal's proposal consequently did not succeed,13 and matters remained in

this state until the beginning of last century. At the Congress of Vienna the
plenipotentiaries appointed a committee which after two months' deliberation
presented a scheme dividing the Powers into three classes, according to which
the position of their diplomatic agents would be regulated. But as it did not find
unanimous approval, especially with the rank assigned to the greater republics,
they fell back upon the simple plan of disregarding precedence among
sovereigns altogether, and of making the relative position of diplomatic
representatives depend, in each class, on seniority, i.e. on the date ofthe official
notification oftheir arrival. And in order to do away with the last relic ofthe old
opinions that some crowned heads ranked higher than others, they also decided
that: 'Dans les actes ou traites entre plusieurs puissances qui admettent
l'alternat, le sort decidera, entre les ministres, de l'ordre qui devra etre suivi
dans les signatures.' 14 15
24
4. I
I.
The a/temat consisted in this, that in the copy of the document or treaty which
was destined to each separate Power, the names ofthe head ofthat state and his
plenipotentiaries were given precedence over the others, and his plenipotentiaries' signatures also were attached before those ofthe other signatories. Thus
each Power occupied the place of honour in turn.
4. I 2.
England and France established the a/temat between themselves in 1546,16

though it was not consistently followed thereafter. In the treaty of 13 January
1631, between Gustavus Adolphus and Louis XIII, the name of the latter
having been placed first in both originals, the Swedish King protested, and the
matter was arranged in accordance with his wishes. France did not claim it in
treaties with the Emperor, but refused it to the courts of Berlin, Lisbon and
Turin up to the end of the reign of Louis XVI. 17 In 1779, at the Treaty of
Teschen, it was observed beween the French and Russian courts. 18
4. I 3.
When the accession ofPhilip V to the Quadruple Alliance of I 7 I 8 was recorded

at The Hague, twelve copies of the Protocol were signed, six for the Emperor
and two each for France, Spain and England. The Emperor's plenipotentiary
signed first in all, according to the following table:
By Spain
"By France
"
"By England
"
"For Spain
"
"
"
For France
"
"
For England
"
"
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Emperor,
Spain, England, France.

Spain, France, England.
France, England, Spain.
France, Spain, England.
England, Spain, France.
England, France, Spain.
Spain, England, France.
Spain, France, England.
France, England, Spain.
France, Spain, England.
England, Spain, France.
England, France, Spain.
So that, the primacy of the Emperor being recognised, the other three Powers
admitted the a/temat among themselves.
4.14.
It was doubtless to avoid disputes about the a/temat that on some occasions the
practice was su bstituted of the plenipotentiaries signing only the copy intended
for the other party, as in the case of the Treaty of Westminster of 16 January
1756, between George 11 and Frederick the Great, and other instances. Kliiber
says that at the Congresses of Utrecht (17 I 3) and Aix-Ia-Chapelle (1748) each
of the High Contracting Parties delivered to each of the others an instrument
signed by himself alone. 19
4.15.
The Holy Roman Empire came to an end inJuly 1806, in consequence of the
establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the precedence over
other sovereigns formerly enjoyed by the German Emperor disappeared and
could not be claimed by the Emperor of Austria, whose title in 1815 was only
eleven years old. Nor was France at that time in a position to reassert her claims
to rank before the rest of the Powers. From this date the equality in point of
rank of all independent sovereign states, whether empires, kingdoms or
25
republics, has been universally admitted, and it is improbable that any

instances of the refusal of the alternat in connection with treaties are now likely
to occur, though in the case of multilateral treaties the more convenient
method of signing a single instrument in the alphabetical order of the
participating countries has in modern times supplanted former methods of
signing several originals according precedence to each in turn.
4.16.
While, however, the events recorded relate to an era when questions of precedence between states were jealously regarded as matters affecting the
personal dignity of their sovereigns, it hardly appears that changes to more
democratic forms ofgovernment lessen the importance attached by states to the
maintenance of their position vis-a-vis other states. As Vattel said:
'si la forme du gouvernement vient a changer chez une nation, elle n'en conservera pas
moins le rang et les honneurs dont elle est en possession. Lorsque l'Angleterre eut chasse
ses rois, Cromwell ne souffrit pas que l'on rebattit rien les honneurs que l'on rendait ala
couronne ou a la nation, et il sut maintenir partout les ambassadeurs anglais dans le
rang qu'ils avaient toujours occupe.'20
The same might be said of France on successive changes from monarchical

to republican forms of government.
4.17.
In the Soviet Union diplomatic representatives have the title of ' representants
plenipotentiaires' alone, but this title is qualified by ascribing to each in his
credential letter the rank of ambassador, minister, etc., so preserving his
relative precedence (see 10.4). The first Soviet representative accredited to
China thus became doyen of the diplomatic corps.
4.18.
In the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties resulting from the Peace
Conference of Paris, 1919, the five principal Allied and Associated Powers took
precedence of all other states ranged against the Central Powers.
4.19.
Dr J. B. Scott 21 narrates that at the First Peace Conference at The Hague in

1899 the ynited States' representatives took their place at the table under the
letter E (Etats-Unis), but at the Second Peace Conference of 1907 under the
letter A (Amerique), it having in the meantime been remembered that United
States of America was the official title; and he observes that this happy
philological discovery enabled the United States delegates at the latter
conference to claim the benefit of the first letter of the alphabet, and to take
precedence over other American states.
4.20.
Nowadays no formal precedence is recognised among nations. The relative

seniority of ambassadors, and consequently their precedence in the country
where they are appointed, is determined by the date on which they presented
their credentials. 22 In the case of special representatives sent to attend, for
instance, coronations or state funerals, precedence is generally the same as that
applying to the resident representatives of their countries. But where there is
doubt, the rules of protocol of the host government, or court, are decisive. 23 In
any strictly Commonwealth context the precedence of members follows the
order of the dates on which they respectively obtained independence.
26
Precedence at the United Nations

4. 2 I.
In the United Nations there are two orders of precedence, the precedence
between delegates and officials and the precedence between member countries.
As regards the first, the President of the General Assembly is held to be the most
senior, followed by the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Security
Council in that order. There follow the Chairman of the Economic and Social
Council, the Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly and the Chairmen and
Vice-Chairmen of the Assembly Committees. The Secretariat maintains a
protocol department to assist delegates, officials and others with seating
arrangements at formal occasions. This department is responsible for
determining the general order of precedence for occasions when delegates,
officials and other high dignitaries attend together.
4. 22 .
As regards precedence between delegations, this derives from the arrangements

agreed for the order of seating and roll-call voting in the General Assembly.
Each year, a country is chosen by lot to take the first seat to the left in the front
row of the Assembly and the remainder follow in English alphabetical order
from left to right in each row ofseats. This order of precedence is used in respect
of all delegates and advisers of equivalent rank who do not hold any office (e.g.
Chairman or Vice-Chairman). The only variation is at Security Council
lunches, where representatives are seated in the order of seating which they
have in the Security Council itself. The principle of precedence based on the
date of presentation of credentials does not apply at the United Nations.:l 4
CHAPTER 5
Titles and precedence
among sovereigns
Titles
5. I.
Originally the title of 'Majesty' belonged to the Emperor alone, who in

speaking of himself said: 'Ma Majeste.' Kings were styled 'Highness,' or
'Serenity.' In very early charters the titles Altitudo, llluster (for illustris) and
,Nobilissimus occur in mentioning the Emperor, and the last ofthese was given to
the King of France until the twelfth century. Sons of emperors were styled
Nobilissimus or Purpuratus. 1 Since the end of the fifteenth century other crowned
heads assumed it, the kings of France setting the example. Then it was adopted
by KingJohn of Denmark (1481 - 15 I 3); in Spain by Charles I (V, as Emperor);
in England under Henry VIII; by Portugal in 1578.2 England and Denmark
mutually applied it in 1520; Sweden and Denmark in 1685. France first
accorded it to the King ofDenmark at the beginning ofthe eighteenth century,
and in 17 I 3 to the King in Prussia, whose kingly title dated only from 170 I. The
Emperor gave it to the King of France at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and
soon afterwards to other kings. The Emperor Charles VII accorded it to all
kings without distinction.
5. 2 .
The Pope's title of courtesy is Most Holy Father, Tres-Saint Pere, also Venerable
or Tres- Venerable Pere, Holiness, Saintete, or Beatitude, and a Catholic sovereign,
in addressing him by letter, will sign devoue, or tres-devoue,jils. He in turn writes
to them as Carissime in Christo Fili, or Dileetissime in Christo Fili, in Italian
Dilettissimo, Carissimo Figlio. To emperors Sire and Majeste lmperiale are used.
Kings are addressed as Sire and Majeste. For other sovereign princes entitled to
royal honours, Monseigneur and Altesse Royale, for those who do not enjoy them,
Monseigneur and Altesse Serenissime. For the heir-presumptive of an imperial or
royal crown, Monseigneur and Altesse lmperiale, or Royale, as the case may be.
5.3.
The same titles of courtesy are given to empresses, queens and princesses,
according to the birth or rank of their husbands, with Madame instead of Sire.
When a princess entitled by birth to be called Altesse lmperiale or Royale marries
a prince who has not that title she continues to be addressed by it, but with this
exception: princesses bear the same titles as their husbands, unless a different
rule has been established by convention.
5.4.
The German Emperor was Majeste lmperiale et Royale. The title of the Emperor
of Austria was Empereur d'Autriehe, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie. The Emperor of
Russia was Empereur et Autoerate de toutes les Russies. The Russian title Tsar was not
28
to be used in speaking of him officially. The Emperor ofjapan is styled Tenno in

thejapanese language; the title Mikado is antiquated, and its use is not desired.
5.5.
In accordance with a proclamation made by King George V at Buckingham

Palace on 13 May 1927, His Majesty's title was: In Latin, 'Georgius V, Dei
Gratia Magnae Britanniae, Hiberniae et terrarum transmarinarum quae in
ditione sunt Britannica Rex, Fidei Defensor, Indiae Imperator'; and in
English, 'George V, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the
British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of
India.' The French rendering was 'Georges V, par la Grace de Dieu, Roi de
Grande Bretagne, d'lrlande et des Territoires britanniques au dela des Mers,
Defenseur de la Foi, Empereur des Indes.'
On the Accession of Queen Elizabeth 11 her title was 'Elizabeth the Second,
by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions
beyond the Seas Queen, Defender of the Faith.' Changes in this took place as a
result of discussions in London in 1952: these will be found in full in 41. 13.
5.6.
Emperors and kings who ceased to reign in consequence of their abdication, or

for other reasons, continue sometimes to receive the title of 'Majesty' from
friendly sovereigns. The Treaty of Paris of I I April 1814, provided that their
Majesties the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Marie-Louise should
preserve these titles and qualities.
5.7.
The title of Altesse (Highness), which at the outset was given principally to
Italian sovereign princes, and in Germany to the electors, as well as to reigning
dukes and princes, was borne later by princes on whom the German Emperor3
had conferred it. Although the German title Hoheit corresponds literally to
Altesse, it became a title intermediary between Altesse Royale and Altesse
Serenissime; but Hoheit, when applied to a prince of an imperial or royal family,
was always accompanied by Kaiserliche or kiinigliche. By itself Hoheit, which
implied a sort of superiority to Durchlaucht, was adopted in 1844 by reigning
princes of the ancient ducal families of Germany, such as those of Saxony,
Anhalt, Nassau and Brunswick, in distinction to Durchlaucht (likewise signifying
Altesse) , which was borne by sovereign princes (not of ancient descent) of
Germany, as well as by high civil or military functionaries on whom, being
already princes, it was conferred. The qualification of Erlaucht was granted to
the ancient families ofthe Germall counts mediatised after the dissolution ofthe
empire in 1806. 4 A list ofsuch families maybe found in Part 11 of the A Imanach de
Cotha.
5.8.
The title Sa Hautesse (His Highness) was formerly ascribed to the Sultan of
Turkey: in the treaties concluded with Turkey in 1854 and 1856 he was styled
Sa Majeste Imperiale, and the latter title became that habitually used. Formerly
the Khedive of Egypt was styled Son Altesse; the King of Egypt was Sa Majeste.
5.9.
The title Grand Duke was originally the prerogative of the reigning princes of
Tuscany; after Pope Pius V had conferred it on Cosimo I de'Medici. s Until
after the First World War it was borne by six reigning princes in Germany, viz.:
those of Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg and Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach. The Grand Duchess of Luxemburg bears
this title and is styled Royal Highness. In Russia the heir presumptive to the
Titles
29
throne was Tsasrevitch; all the other members of the Imperial Family bore the
titles of Grand Duke and Grand Duchess. 6
5. 10.
In Austria, with the exception of the eldest son of the Emperor, who was Prince
Imperial, the other members of the Imperial Family were styled Archduke or
Archduchess 7 (Latin, archidux, German, Erzherzog).
5.1 I.
The titles formerly accorded to certain republics have become obsolete. The
States-General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands were addressed as
'Their High Mightinesses' (Hautes Puissallces), and in the letters written to them
by sovereigns they were addressed as Tres-chers amis, or Chers et bons amis et allies.
The Presidents of the United States ofAmerica and of the French Republic are
addressed by other heads of states as 'Good Friend' or 'Great and Good
Friend.'
5. 12 .
In former times the King of France was designated 'le Roi Tres-chretien,' and
the King of Portugal 'le Roi Tres-fidele' since 1748. The KingofSpain became
'le Roi Catholique' in 1496, the sovereign of Austria-Hungary was 'His
Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty' from 1758. These titles were conferred
by various popes. Leo X bestowed that of 'Fidei Defensor' (Defender of the
Faith) on Henry VIII in 1521, and his successors have continued to bear this
title. The other titles mentioned were never employed by the sovereigns
themselves; it was only in addressing or speaking of them that they were used.
5. I 3.
In early times the Russian sovereigns bore the title of Autocrator, Magnus
Dominus, Grand-Prince or Czar (Tsar), the last being the Russian word for
'Emperor.'
The surname Monomachus, or Monomakh, was assumed in the twelfth century by
Vladimir 11, according to some writers because at the siege ofTheodosia (Kaffa) he had
vanquished in single combat the general of the Genoese, 8 but according to others, by
derivation from the title of his maternal grandfather the Greek Emperor Constantine
Monomachus. '9
In the seventeenth century the Russian sovereigns began to make use of the
word Imperator in the Latin translations ofofficial documents addressed to other
Powers, and it was Peter the Great who in 172 I, after his victories over Charles
XII, formally took the title of Emperor ofRussia. Notification was made ofthis
fact to all the ambassadors of foreign courts, which did not, however, at once
decide to recognise the new title. Queen Anne was the first to do this in I 7 10,
when she instructed Lord Whitworth to present an apology to Peter the Great
for the insult committed against his ambassador Mathveof (Matveev) in
170 8. 10
5. I 4.
The Elector of Brandenburg assumed the title ofKing ofPrussia in 170 I. It was
first recognised by the Holy Roman Emperor, then by most of the other
sovereigns of Europe at the conclusion of the Congress of Utrecht. The Pope
withheld recognition until I 786 .11
5.15.
After the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine by Napoleon I, the

Electors of Bavaria, Saxony and Wiirttemberg took the title of King, the
Margrave of Baden and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt that of Grand
30
Duke, and the Prince of Nassau that of Duke. These titles were not at first
recognised by all the Powers, but they were tacitly acquiesced in by those which
were parties to the Treaty of Paris of 30 May 18 I 4, and by the actefinal of the
Congress of Vienna to which all European sovereigns acceded.
5. I 6.
On the latter occasion the Emperor of Russia took the additional title of Tsar
and King of Poland; the King of England - Elector of Hanover, that ofKing of
Hanover; the King ofSardinia the additional title ofDuke ofGenoa; the Dutch
branch of Nassau those of King of the Netherlands and Grand Duke of
Luxemburg; the King of Prussia that of Grand Duke of Posnania and of the
Lower Rhine; the Dukes ofMecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz and
Saxe-Weimar that of Grand Duke; and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel that of
Elector.
5. I 7.
Since the popes and the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire ceased to grant
the title of King to other potentates, European Powers adopted the principle
that the title taken by the head ofa state could not ofitselfgive rise to any sort of
precedence over other crowned heads, and that the latter could either
recognise the new title, or refuse to do so, or recognise it on conditions. 12
5. I 8.
In 1818 the Elector of Hesse-Cassel notified to the diplomatic assembly at Aixla-Chapelle that he intended to take the title of King, having previously written
letters to the sovereigns of the Five Powers in which he asked for their consent.
At the sitting of I I October, the plenipotentiaries agreed that the title borne by
a sovereign is not a simple matter of etiquette, but a fact involving important
political questions, and that they could not collectively give a decision on the
request put forward. However, the Protocol stated that the cabinets, taken
separately, declared the Elector's request not justifiable on any satisfactory
ground, and that there was no inducement to them to accede to it. The cabinets
at the same time took an engagement not to recognise for the future any
change, either in the titles of sovereigns, or in those of the princes of their
families without coming to a previous agreement. They maintained all that
had hitherto been decided in this respect by formal documents (actes). The five
cabinets explicitly applied this reserve to the title of Royal Highness, which
they would henceforth only admit for the heads of grand-ducal houses,
including the Elector of Hesse, and their heirs-apparent. 13
5. I 9
A vote of Parliament at Turin on 17 March 186 I, conferred on Victor

Emmanuel, King of Sardinia, the title of King of Italy, recognised by the
United Kingdom on 30 March. It was not at first admitted by Prussia and
Austria.
Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria took the title of King on 5 October 1908, and
was recognised as such by the Great Powers of Europe between 20 and 29 April
190 9.
Prince Charles of Romania was unanimously elected King by the national
representatives on 14 March 188 I .
Prince Milan of Serbia took the title of King on 6 March 188 I.
King Haakon became King of Norway on 18 November 1905.
King Zog was proclaimed King of Albania on I September 1928.
More recent cases than that of King Zog are those of the Amir Abdullah of
Precedence among sovereigns
31
Jordan who assumed the title of King on 25 May 1946, and the Amir of
Cyrenaica, Mohammed Idris el Senussi, who became King of the United
Kingdom of Libya on 24 December 1951.
5.20.
Certain sovereigns use three sorts of title: the grand titre, the titre moyen and the
petit titre.
The first of these includes the names of the fictitious as well as of the real
dominions. For instance, the King of Spain's grand titre included the Two
Sicilies, Jerusalem, Corsica, Gibraltar, Austria, Burgundy, Brabant and
Milan, Habsburg, Flanders, Tyrol, all of which were fictitious, one of them,
Jerusalem, being also claimed in the grand titre of Austria. Those of the King of
Prussia and the Emperor of Russia also were very long. (See 5.13 and 8.6.)
The titre moyen is confined to real facts, and the petit titre, the most generally
used, is the highest of all - namely, that by which the sovereign is habitually
designated.
5.21.
Sovereigns in addressing each other officially begin Monsieur Mon Frere (Sir My
Brother), adding the name of any blood relationship that may exist between
them. To an empress or queen it is Madame Ma SO?ur (Madam My Sister); to a
reigning Grand Duchess, Madam My Sister and Cousin.
5.22.
Letters from the Pope to the British court may begin 'Serenissimo Augustoque
Principi' ... 'Serenissime Rex, Salutem et felicitatem'; or 'Augusto Principi ... '
'Auguste Rex et Imperator salutem et felicitatem.' The reply begins, 'Your
Holiness.'
5.23.
In British protocol other forms of writing Royal letters are: first, commencing
with 'Sir my Brother', or in some cases 'Sir my Brother and dear Cousin', and
ending 'Your Majesty's Good Sister'. Arab sultans are 'Your Majesty and
Good Friend'; amirs 'Your Highness and Good Friend'; second, commencing
with The Queen's titles. In these letters the plural 'We' and 'Our' are employed
instead of 'I' and 'My,' and the letters terminate thus: 'Your Good Friend.'
This form is used for Royal letters to presidents of republics.
5.24.
Titles of heirs-apparent, when not styled Prince Imperial or Prince Royal:

Belgium: Duc de Brabant.
Great Britain: Prince of Wales (by patent).
Sweden: Duke of Scania.
As long as the Holy Roman Empire continued to exist, the heir-apparent
was designated King of the Romans (by election). Napoleon I copied this when
he conferred on his infant son the title of King of Rome.
The heir-apparent of the German Emperor was Kronprinz, so also the heir
of the Emperor of Austria; of Italy, Prince of Piedmont; and of Romania,
Grand Voivode of Alba J ulia.
Precedence alnong sovereigns

5. 2 5.
As no rule has been devised for regulating precedence among sovereigns or

among the members of their respective families, the question of the relative
32
place to be taken by them on the occasion ofa gathering ofmore than two must
naturally present difficulties. The meeting of the emperors Napoleon I and
Alexander I at Erfurt, in September 1808, was attended by a number of kings,
grand dukes and princes belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine. Among
them were the Kings ofSaxony, Wiirttemberg, Westphalia, Bavaria, the Dukes
of Oldenburg, Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Mecklenburg-Schwerin
and Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and the Prince of Thurn and Taxis. At a great
dinner at Weimar on 6 October the order among these kings seems to have been
Westphalia, Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Saxony.14
5. 26 .
At the Congress of Vienna in 18 I 4- I 5 there was an assemblage of crowned

heads. Francis I of Austria was the host, and among the guests Alexander I of
Russia naturally ranked first. Next to him was the King of Prussia. Among the
lesser sovereigns Christian VI dou btless had the first place. Then in order came
MaximilianJoseph I of Bavaria and Frederick I ofWiirttemberg, the Elector of
Hesse and the Grand Duke of Baden. 15
5.27.
During the meeting ofthe three emperors (Austria, Germany, Russia) at Berlin
in 1872, these sovereigns took precedence over each other, alternately in each
succeeding ceremony, and the national hymns ofeach country were also played
accordingly.
5.28.
On the occasion of the Vienna Exhibition of 1873, the sovereigns representing

the Great Powers, including the King of Italy and the Sultan, enjoyed
precedence over one another in alphabetical order according to the French
language. A similar rule was observed as regarded the hereditary princes.
5.29.
It is not usual for heads ofstates to attend at each other's coronations, marriages
and on other similar occasions, but crowned heads are often represented by
members of their families. The order in which these are placed must be
determined by the court officials, or in the last resort by the sovereign who is
host. At the inauguration ofKing Leopold ofBelgium in December 1865, when
one crowned head, the King of Portugal, was present~ he naturally had the
place of honour. Next to him came the Comte de Flandre (Belgium), the Prince
of Wales (United Kingdom), Prince Arthur of England, the Crown Prince of
Prussia, the Duke of Cambridge, the Archduke Joseph of Austria, Prince
George of Saxony, Prince William of Baden, Prince Nicholas of Nassau, Prince
Louis of Hesse, Prince Augustus ofSaxe-Coburg-Gotha, and Prince Leopold of
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. 16
5.30.
At King George V's coronation at London in 191 I, which, in accordance with

custom, was not attended by crowned heads, the order of precedence followed
appears to have been: Crown Princes of Great Powers, followed by other
princely representatives of such Powers; the Prince of Wales; Crown princes of
lesser Powers; German Grand Dukes; representatives of the United States and
France; the Duke of Connaught and Princesses ofthe British Royal Family; the
special envoy of the Vatican; princely, grand ducal and ducal members of the
German, Netherlands and Greek Royal houses; Princes of Oriental states;
followed by special envoys accredited by foreign states to take part in the
ceremomes.
5.3 I.
33
For the coronation of King George VI in 1937 the order of precedence was laid
down as follows:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Princes representing countries represented in London by Ambassadors,

such Princes being brothers of their Sovereigns.
Brothers, sisters, sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law of the King.
Heirs to Kingdoms.
Great-uncles and great-aunts of the King.
Non-royal representatives of countries ordinarily represented in London
by Ambassadors, in the order of precedence of the latter.
The representative of the Holy See.
Princes (not being heirs) representing Kingdoms.
Cousins of the King who are Royal Highnesses.
Cousins of the King who are not Royal Highnesses.
Non-royal representatives of foreign countries not already included, in the
order of the precedence of their ministers in London.
Remaining members of the Royal Family.
5.32.
In 1937 the German Ambassador, Herr von Ribbentrop, and his Counsellor,
having informed the Secretary of State that the German Representative at
King George VI's Coronation would be Field-Marshal von Blomberg, then
enquired what precedence the German delegation would enjoy on the
occasion. They were told that it would accord, as between foreign delegations,
with the date when the Ambassador presented his credentials. The German
Embassy protested that this would place the German delegation in a
humiliating position for a great power and threatened that the Field-Marshal
would not be sent unless some improvement were made. After voluminous
explanations, both in London and Berlin, the British standpoint prevailed,
though the Germans still held to their view as to the impropriety of their
delegation coming so low on the list. It was stated, incidentally, in Berlin that
the German Ambassador had made his protest entirely on his own initiative.
5.33.
In this connection it is worth noting that, under the same rule of precedence, the
US special representative at King George VI's funeral had to take an even
lower place on the list; the reason for this was explained to him and he accepted
the situation without murmur.
5.34.
The order of precedence at the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth 11 in 1953 was

the following:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Representatives of Heads of States related to Her Majesty.

Sister of Her Majesty.
Representatives of three Great Powers (France, Soviet Union, United
States).
Uncle and Aunts, Great-uncle and Great-aunt of Her Majesty.
Representatives of other Monarchical States.
Representatives of Monarchical States not being themselves Royal
Personages.
Representative of Grand Duchy (Luxembourg).
Representative of the Holy See.
34
g. Representatives of non-monarchical States, in the order of precedence of

their resident diplomatic representatives in London (States represented by
Ambassadors) .
10. (a) Cousins of Her Majesty, being Royal Highnesses.
(b) Sisters of the Duke of Edinburgh.
(c) Cousins of Her Majesty, not being Royal Highnesses.
I I. Representative of the German Federal Republic.
12. Representatives of Principalities.
13. Representatives of non-monarchical States having resident Ministers in
London.
14. Remaining Members of the Royal Family.
15. Representatives of non-monarchical States having no resident diplomatic
representatives in London.
5.35.
Funerals of sovereigns are an exception to the rule mentioned in 5.29. The

funeral of King George VI, for example, was attended by the Kings of
Norway, the Hellenes, Denmark, Sweden and Iraq, the Queen of the
Netherlands and the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, and the Presidents of
France, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Among the crowned heads precedence was
determined by the date of their respective accessions.
5.36.
The frequent intermarriages between members of Christian reigning families

created bonds of actual relationship among the crowned heads which rendered
it natural and usual for them to communicate to each other news ofevents, such
as accession to the throne, births, marriages and deaths, etc. This practice,
which grew to include brother sovereigns not connected by family ties, has
largely fallen into desuetude through the reduction of the number of
monarchies in consequence of two world wars. On important occasions
communications may also be addressed by the sovereign to presidents of
republics, as for example letters of congratulation in reply to formal
announcements of their election and assumption of office. Such notifications
are in the form of letters from the sovereign and are transmitted through his
diplomatic agents, with instructions to present them through the appropriate
channel, and this is done by forwarding them to the minister for foreign affairs,
with the request that they may be communicated to their high destination.
Sometimes a special mission is sent, particularly on such occasions as accession
to the throne, or a coronation, or the celebration of a national event of
exceptional importance. If the distance is great, the local diplomatic agent may
be accredited as special ambassador or envoy for the occasion.
5.37.
Questions of precedence have sometimes arisen as between the diplomatic

agents permanently accredited and those accredited for the purpose of such
ceremonial missions. According to Article 3 of the Regulations adopted at the
Congress of Vienna (see 11.1.) those engaged on an extraordinary mission have
not on this ground any claim to precedence. But in practice some variation
exists. M. Genet recalls that on the accession of Pedro V ofPortugal the special
envoys of the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium and Saxony took precedence
over the ministers accredited to Lisbon, and ceded it only to the nuncio; while
at the coronation of the Emperor Alexander 11 of Russia the permanent
diplomatic agents maintained precedence over those specially accredited for
35
the occasion and having equivalent rank. At the accession of Leopold 11 of

Belgium the specially accredited agents took precedence over the permanent
envoys.
'D'une maniere generale la personne chargee de mission speciale n'a pas de rang
diplomatique proprement dit, a raison de la mission speciale, tout en ayant cependant le
caractere diplomatique.
'Tout agent accredite a done en principe le pas sur die; en pratique pourtant et
comme par une faveur insigne, le pas leur est generalement cede et on temoigne des
e~ards tout particuliers aux envoyes de cette cate~orie. "lis ne prennent pas la
preseance, ils la rec;oivent." Inter se, ils se classent suivant le grade reel; agrade egal, c'est
I'ordre de la remise des lettres de creances qui leur donne le rang. m
At the coronation of King George VI, 5.3 I appears to show that the special
representatives attending the ceremony enjoyed precedence.
5.38.
Friendly sovereigns sometimes exchange high orders of chivalry, which are

occasionally also conferred on members of reigning families. On the outbreak
of war, in August 1914, the Emperor of Austria, the German Emperor, the
King ofWiirttemberg, the Duke ofSaxe-Coburg, the Duke ofCumberland, the
Grand Duke of Hesse, Prince Henry of Prussia, the German Crown Prince and
the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz having become enemies, ceased to be
members of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, and their banners were
removed from St George's Chapel at Windsor. When one sovereign confers a
decoration on another, the intention to confer is expressed by letter.
Occasionally the Garter has been conferred on a foreign sovereign on the
occasion of his visiting England; sometimes it has been conveyed to him by a
complimentary special mission. 18
5.39.
An official notification made by the Vatican in December 193 I to diplomatic

representatives accredited to the Holy See says that cardinals are regarded as
equal in rank to princes of the blood, and, in accordance with canon law, claim
precedence over everyone except sovereigns and crown princes (principi
ereditari).
CHAPTER 6
Maritime honours
6. I.
At the Congress of Aix-Ia-Chapelle in 18 I 8 a protocol was signed on

November which contained the following paragraph:
2I
'Des doutes s'etant eleves sur les principes a observer relativement au salut de mer, il
est convenu que chacune des Cours signataires de ce protocole fera remettre a la
Conference Ministerielle a Londres les reglements qu'elle fait observer jusqu'ici a cet
egard, et que I 'on invitera ensuite les autres Puissances a communiquer les memes
notions de leur cote, afin que I 'on puisse s'occuper de quelque reglement general sur cet
objet.'
This protocol bears the signatures of Meuernich, Wellington, Nesselrode,

Richelieu, Hardenberg, Capo d'Istria, Castlereagh and Bernstorff.
6.2.
Nothing seems to have been done at the time to carry this agreement into effect,
but certain arrangements regarding ceremonial have since been entered into
between the maritime Powers; and although the practice of other countries
may differ in some particulars from that of the British Navy, the principles
governing courtesies to be shown are nevertheless generally recognised.
6.3.
The British rules for the flyingofflags, the firing ofsaluting guns, the formalities
for receiving distinguished visitors on board, the ritual exchange of calls,
precedence and the drinking of toasts are set forth in Chapter 12 of The
Queen's Regulations for the Navy. Chapter 8 of The Queen's Regulations for
the Army and Chapter 5 and Appendix 39 of The Queen's Regulations for the
Air Force contain directions on similar lines, in so far as these are applicable to
the respective services.
6.4.
Naval visits may be formal, informal, operational or routine. The rules of

procedure for each category differ. Notification offormal visits is made through
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; informal, operational and routine by
the Naval Attache.
6.5.
When a British diplomatic agent pays an official visit in a foreign port to the
officer commanding a British ship, his arrival is announced by the sounding of
the Alert (by bugle, or, at the discretion of the commanding officer, by pipe).
He will normally be accompanied by some ofhis staff. In going on board he will
ascend the ship's side at the head ofhis party and will acknowledge the salute of
the commanding officer by removing his hat and standing briefly at attention.
When appropriate, a salute is fired at the moment when he leaves the ship to
return on shore. The recipient acknowledges the compliment by removing his
Maritime honours
37
hat until the last gun is fired. Ifhe has been brought to the ship's side by boat, he
will be the last person of his visiting party to leave the ship's deck and enter the
boat.
6.6.
Not all of Her Majesty's ships are 'saluting ships'; the point is mainly governed
by the size of the ship and the number of guns that can be fired for saluting
purposes.
6.7.
When men-of-war happen to be lying in a foreign port on the occasion of a

national ceremony, it is customary for British warships to adopt the same
ceremonial as regards salutes, dressing ship and half-masting flags, as the ships
of the foreign nation concerned, provided, of course, the occasion is one which
can be properly recognised by Her Majesty's Government. A royal salute is one
of twenty-one guns.
6.8.
These are, however, matters with which the diplomatic agent is not, as a rule,
concerned, except in countries where the capital happens to be situated at a
port where ships can lie, and the conduct of the ceremonies to be observed in
such cases concerns the naval officers; the diplomatic official does not
intervene, but he will do well, ifresident at such a place, to inform himselfof the
rules that are observed in this respect by the navy of his own country.
6.g.
Queen's regulations for all the Services contain a paragraph to the effect that in
foreign and Commonwealth countries officers may fly their flags on their cars
on those occasions when the British Ambassador or High Commissioner
considers that it would be appropriate for them to do so. In certain countries,
the order continues, the flying of car flags may be completely precluded by
laws, customs or local conditions.
6. 10.
In many countries there exists a regulation prohibiting more than a certain

number of warships of any foreign country from lying at the same time in a port
of the country. When an official friendly visit is to be paid by a larger number,
the diplomatic agent will probably be the channel through which the
arrangements have to be made, and he may perhaps be afforded an
opportunity of presenting some of the principal officers of the squadron to the
sovereign or president at a private audience granted for the purpose.
CHAPTER 7
The language and forms of

diplomatic intercourse
7.1.
Latin, being the written language not only of the Roman Empire, but also ofits
successor the Holy Roman Empire and of the Roman Catholic Church, was
not unnaturally the written language of all early European diplomacy. From
the Renaissance onward, instructions to diplomatic representatives began to be
framed in the language of the envoy's own country, though the use ofLatin was
common until the eighteenth century. I Latin was also used in conversation
between diplomatists, where the parties were unable to speak each other's
language. French came next in frequency of use after Latin. At the end of the
fifteenth century it had become the court language of Savoy and the Low
Countries, and also of the Emperor's court. When the League ofCambrai was
formed, in 1508, the full powers of both Imperial and French negotiators were
drawn up in French, but the ratifications were in Latin. Henry VI of England
wrote to Charles VII of France in French, and that language was usually
employed both in writing and speaking between the two countries. At the end
of the sixteenth century the King ofFrance no longer writes Latin except to the
King of Poland, to such an extent had the use of French gained ground. 2
7.2.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century all agreements drawn up in English,

German or Italian have a domestic or quasi-domestic character. English served
for Anglo-Scottish relations, German for those of German princes and of
Germany with Bohemia, Hungary and Switzerland. Italian was sometimes
employed between the smaller Italian states. In the Low Countries, Lorraine,
and at Metz, French was naturally the native language. Only two languages,
however, were admitted for drawing up international compacts: Latin for the
apostolic notaries and the whole school attached to the Roman Chancery, and
French. England and Germany constantly used the latter, above all for treaties
with France and the Low Countries. At the end of the fifteenth century
England reverted to Latin for its treaties with France. 3
7.3.
The treaties ofWestphalia (1648) were in Latin. The Treaty of30January 1648
between Spain and the United Provinces, by which the independence of the
latter was recognised, was in French and Dutch, but Latin was used for all
communications between France and the Empire up to the time of the French
Revolution. 4 The Anglo-Danish Treaty of II July 1670 was in Latin; also the
Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1674; but the Treaty of Alliance of 1677-8 was in
French. The Treaty of the Grand Alliance of 7 September 1701 was in Latin,
and likewise that of 16 May 1703 between Great Britain, the Emperor and the
States-General, members of the Grand Alliance and Portugal. In 171 1 Queen
39
Anne wrote to her allies in Latin, and the full powers given to her
plenipotentiaries for the Congress of Utrecht were in the same language. But at
the first conference, in 17 I 2, the English demands were presented in French, as
were also those of Prussia, Savoy and the States-General. The Commercial
treaty between England and France of I I April 1713 was in Latin, certain
forms appended were in Latin and French, and the Queen's ratification was in
Latin. But the certificate of the exchange of ratifications was drawn up in
French. The treaties signed on the same day by France with Portugal, Prussia,
the Duke of Savoy and the States-General were in French. Sweden and
Holland exchanged correspondence about the same period in Latin, but Peter
the Great used French. On 13 July 17 I 3 Spain and Savoy signed a treaty of
peace in Spanish and French, while the treaty of peace of 7 September 17 14,
signed by the Emperor and the Empire with France, was in Latin. Russia used
German in her early treaties with Brandenburg; with Austria, German, Latin
and French on different occasions, but from about the middle of the eighteenth
century always French; with England always French from 17 I 5 onwards. 5
7.4.
At Aix-Ia-Chapelle, in 1748, a separate article was annexed to the treaty of

peace signed by Great Britain, Holland and France, to the effect that the use of
the French language in the treaty of peace was not to be taken as prejudicing
the right of the contracting parties to have copies signed in other languages.
7.5.
A similar article was attached to the Treaty of Paris of 1763, between Great
Britain, France and Spain, and to the Treaty of Versailles of 1783, between
Great Britain and France. 6 Article 120 of the Final Act of the Congress of
Vienna declared that:
'La langue franc;aise ayant ete exclusivement employee dans toutes les copies du
present traite, il est reconnu par les Puissances qui ont concouru a cet acte que l'emploi
de cette langue ne tirera point a consequence pour l'avenir; de sorte que chaque
Puissance se reserve d'adopter, dans les negociations et conventions futures, la langue
dont elle s'est servie jusqu'ici dans ses relations diplomatiques, sans que le traite actuel
puisse etre cite comme exemple contraire aux usages etablis.'7
7.6.
In March 1753, on the occasion of the settlement of prize claims under the
declaration of 8 July 1748, between Great Britain, France and the StatesGeneral, the French commissioners proposed to return to the British a
memorandum presented by them, on the ground of its being drawn up in the
English language, and claimed a prescriptive right to have all transactions
carried on in French. The British Government sent instructions to Paris, stating
that out of complaisance they had at first usually accompanied the English
memoranda (or memorials) with a French translation, but the French
commissioners having found fault with its wording, the commissioners had
been ordered to confine themselves in future to the English language; the
French commissioners having now, however, demanded the use of French as a
right, to comply would be to establish a precedent; and it was added:
'All nations whatsoever have a right to treat with each other in a neutral language.
As such, the French is made use of in transactions with the princes of the Empire and
other foreign Powers, and if the Court ofVersailles thinks fit to treat with His Majesty in
Latin, the King will readily agree to it. ... It is the King's express command that you
40
should not for the future accept any paper from the French commissaries in their own
language, unless they shall engage to receive the answer ... returned to it in English.'
7.7.
In 1800 Lord Grenville introduced the practice ofconducting his relations with
foreign diplomatists accredited to the Court ofStJames's in English instead of
French, the language previously employed. Lord Castlereagh, when at the
headquarters of the Allied Powers in 1814- 15, wrote in English to the foreign
sovereigns and ministers. Canning, in 1823, discovered that the British
representative at Lisbon was in the habit ofwriting in French to the minister for
foreign affairs, although the latter addressed him in Portuguese; he therefore
instructed him to use English in future. In 1826 a controversy arose with the
Prussian Government in consequence ofCount Bernstorffs refusal to receive an
English note from the British representative, 8 on the ground that it was the
offical rule to receive such communications only when written in French or
German. The question remained in abeyance until 1831, when the British
minister was instructed to use English in future. In 1851, the President of the
German Diet having set up the pretension to receive translations of notes
addressed to that body, Lord Palmerston instructed the British representative
that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government every government was
entitled to use its own language in official communications, on the ground that
it is more certain of expressing its meaning in its own language. He regarded as
objectionable the practice of furnishing a translation, because it led to the
translation being treated as an original in place of the English version.
7.8.
Since that time the right of a British diplomatic agent to use his own language
for communications to the government to which he is accredited does not seem
to have been further contested, the right claimed by Great Britain being
recognised by her as appertaining to every other state. While this right of the
representative of every nation to use the official language of that nation is now
generally accepted, there is no universal rule making obligatory the use of one
language rather than another, and practice varies. At many posts it is
customary to accompany a note which has been by deliberate preference
written in the language ofthe sender, with a translation into the language ofthe
receiving country, typed on plain paper and bearing, if necessary, an
indication (to overcome Lord Palmerston's objection) that it is strictly without
official status. This practice is not merely a courtesy; it may sometimes be
advisable in order to avoid on the one hand delay, or on the other the possibility
of misinterpretation. Occasionally, when the languages of the sending or
receiving state (or both) are not widely known, there may be mutual agreement
to use English or French as a convenient medium of communication. But it
would be rare for translators to be so scarce nowadays in countries which
entertained diplomatic relations that an arrangement of this kind would
become necessary. In the past this was not always so, as is shown in an anecdote
related to Dr Busch by Count Bismarck: 9
By the way, Keudell, he said suddenly, it just occurs to me that I must get a full power
from the King to-morrow - in German ofcourse. The German Emperor may only write
in German, the Minister may be guided by circumstances. Official correspondence
should be conducted in the language of the country and not in that of the foreign one.
Bernstorff tried to carry out that idea here, but he went too far. He used to write to all
Official communications
4I
diplomats in German, and they all replied - by arrangement ofcourse - in their mother
tongue, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, and what not, so that he had to keep a whole staffof
translators at the Ministry. That was how I found things when I took office. Budberg
sent me a note in Russian. That wouldn't do. If they wanted their revenge, Gortschakoff
would have to write Russian to our Minister at Petersburg. That would be the correct
course. It might be permissible to require foreign representatives to know and use the
language of the country to which they are accredited. But to reply in Russian to me in
Berlin to a note in German was unreasonable. So I laid it down that anything received
which was not in German, French, English or Italian should be left untouched and put
away in the archives. Budberg then wrote complaint after complaint - always in
Russian. No reply! The notes were put away in the presses. Finally he came himself and
asked why I didn't reply. 'Reply?' I said in astonishment - 'what to? I have seen nothing
from you.' Now, he had written weeks before, and had sent several reminders. I told
him, if I remember right, that a pile of documents in Russian were lying downstairs, and
that his notes were probably among them; but that downstairs no one understood
Russian, and anything in an undecipherable language was pigeon-holed. It was then
agreed, if my memory serves, that Budberg would write in French, and the Foreign
Ministry also occasionally. (Translation.)
7.9.
As regards treaties, conventions, etc., these, when concluded between two

countries, are now ordinarily signed in two texts, i.e. in the respective
languages of the two countries, though exceptions occur. In the case of treaties
of a general nature - multilateral treaties - concluded between many states, the
usual practice was formerly to use French, but after a discussion between the
French Foreign Minister, M. Pichon, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George
in January I gig, French and English were generally accepted as having parity;
and they were adopted as the official languages of the Versailles Conference
and later of the League ofNations. Treaties concluded under the auspices of the
United Nations normally have Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts, all equally authoritative. On the use of Arabic see Chapter 36 (36.68)
below. 10 In the European Community French is probably still the language
most used by officials, though the use of English is also current.
7.10.
The most generally used form of written communication between a head of

mission and the Minister of Foreign Affairs is called a Note. There are a number
of possible variations of detail in the drafting and presentation of Notes, to
which no universally accepted rules apply. The diplomatic services ofdifferent
countries have their own standing instructions on matters of drafting and
procedure; there is some latitude in the use of terms designating types of
document; and local custom will be found to vary. The indications given in this
chapter can therefore be only of the most general nature. In practice, every
head of mission, having taken account of local usuage, will ensure that his
correspondence is drafted in the manner which he judges most fitting in any
given circumstances. Certain formulae are current, but the exact choice of
words must always be a matter of discretion. Attention to detail must be
42
scrupulous. Even the size and type of paper to be used, for instance, in different
kinds of correspondence are important in as much as they lend an appropriate
degree of gravity to the matter they contain. Any impression of casualness in
this respect is to be avoided. It sometimes happens that sensitivity in such
matters is keenest in those countries where it is least expected.
7. I
I.
Essentially a Note is a formal personal letter. The traditional French terms used
to indicate its component parts are:
I.
2.
3
4.
5.
6.
L'appel (Sir, Your Excellency, Monsieur le Ministre etc.), which may be

placed en vedette, above the body of the letter; en ligne, at the beginning of the
first line; or dans la ligne, after a few words in the first sentence. The first is the
most usual.
Le traitement, or the title used when mentioning the person addressed in the
body of the letter. (Votre Altesse, Votre Excellence, Votre Eminence, etc.)
La courtoisie, or the complimentary phrase which concludes the letter
(assuring respect, consideration, gratitude, etc.)
La souscription, the signature. When preceded by 'votre obeissant serviteur',
it was said to be written en depeche; ifby 'veuillez agreer etc.', it was said to be
en billet, the former being the more ceremonious.
La date, which includes the place as well as the time of writing.
La reclame, which consists of the name and official designation of the person
addressed, and is reproduced in the address (la suscription) on the envelope.
7. I 2.
The above is the formal outline of a Note written in the first person. It is typed
on the ambassador's correspondence paper, in preference to foolscap. In British
and French usage the appel and the courtoisie are frequently handwritten.
7. I 3
A third person Note is on foolscap. It has no appel, and usually enters

immediately on the subject of correspondence, ending, however, with a
formula of courtesy, such as '... avails himself of this opportunity of assuring
. .. of (or, this opportunity of reiterating the expression of) his highest
consideration.' The Note having concluded thus, a signature is unnecessary.
Some officials, however, prefer to open with a formula ofcourtesy (presentation
of compliments, etc.) and omit the courtoisie at the close, but append their
signature. The date and the reclame should in any case appear at the foot.
7. I 4
The third person Note is often called a Note Verbale. The idea originally implicit
in this term was that it embodied the substance ofan oral communication, or of
a conversation, of the wording ofwhich it constituted a formal record, although
not designed for publication. The title Note Verbale is sometimes written at the
top of the paper.
7. I 5.
The customary vehicle for written communications between an embassy and a

ministry of foreign affairs is a third person Note typed on headed foolscap, in
the manner of a .Note Verbale, and beginning with the formula: 'The ...
Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs and has the
honour to inform them that ... ' (or, 'to invite their attention to the following
matter.') The usual ending is: 'The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity of
assuring the Ministry of its highest consideration.' Below this should appear the
43
date, the embassy's stamp, and the drafter's initials. Below this again, the
reclame.
7. I 6.
In formal correspondence, the use of abbreviations when writing the date, or

titles of any kind, should be avoided. Monsieur, Madame and Mademoiselle
are never abbreviated in the appel, traitement, courtoisie, or the reclame of a letter.
They may be abbreviated when referring in the text to third persons who will
not themselves read the letter. The use of initial letters to designate
organisations, which can be a convenient shorthand (if readily understood) for
informal use, is best avoided altogether in formal writing. In different
languages the initials of international organisations may not be the same and
are often arranged in a different order. 11 Even in informal writing it is a good
rule never to use initial letters as a designation unless the full name of the
organisation has already appeared at least once in the same document.
7. 1 7.
The following examples illustrate various methods used in drafting Notes.
7.18.
On the occasion of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by AustriaHungary in I g08, that Government informed the other governments who were
parties to the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, of the signature of a Protocol with the
Turkish Government, and requested their assent to the abrogation ofArticle 25
of that treaty. The Powers, one after another, notified their consent. The Note
of the German Ambassador was in the third person:
The Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government having informed the
Imperial German Government of the signature of the Protocol relating to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which has been concluded with the Sublime Porte, and having further
requested assent to the abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty ofBerlin, the undersigned
Imperial German ambassador, under instructions from his Government, has the honour
to make known to His Excellency Baron von Aehrenthal, the Imperial and Royal
Minister of the Imperial and Royal House and of Foreign Affairs, that the Imperial
Government formally and without reserve gives its assent to the abrogation of Article 25
of the Treaty of Berlin.
The Undersigned, etc.
VON TSCHIRSCHKY.
Vienna, 7 April 1909.

HIS EXCELLENCY BARON VON AEHRENTHAL,
etc., etc., etc.
The reply of the British Ambassador was in the first person:

Vienna,
April 17,1909'
MO:"SIEl'R LE MI:"ISTRE D'ETAT,
In reply to the communication which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London

made to Sir Edward Grey on the 3rd inst., I have the honour to inform Your Excellency
that His Britannic Majesty's Government give their consent to the suppression ofArticle
25 of the Treaty of Berlin.
I avail, etc.,
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.
It appears to have been the practice of the German and Austro-Hungarian

Foreign Offices to address Notes in the third person to foreign representatives.
44
7.19.
The mandates for Togoland accepted by the United Kingdom and France
provided for the delimitation by a mixed commission of the respective zones as
recorded in the agreement between the two governments of loJuly 1919. This
having been completed, the French Ambassador at London addressed a Note
Verbale to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:
Comme le sait son Excellence le Principal Secretaire d'Etat de Sa Majeste
Britannique aux Affaires etranghes, des conversations ont eu lieu entre I' Ambassade de
Sa Majeste Britannique it Paris, les Ministeres des Affaires etrangeres et des Colonies, en
vue de proceder it la delimitation des zones franc;aise et anglaise du mandat sur le Togo.
Une mission franco-anglaise ayant prepare un abornement definitif, dont le projet a
ete arrete it Lome par les Commissaires franco-anglais, un rapport commun fut etabli
ainsi que ses annexes (description de la frontihe et jeu de cartes) en trois originaux dans
chacune des langues franc;aise et anglaise et le tout signe it Lome le 21 octobre 1929.
Deux de ces originaux ont dii etre addresses it son Excellence le Principal Secretaire
d'Etat pour les Affaires etrangeres, l'un pour etre examine par le Gouvernement de Sa
Majeste Britannique et garde dans ses archives, I'autre, afin d'etre transmis au Conseil
de la Societe des Nations, lorsque les Gouvernements britannique et franc;ais se seront
notifie leur accord respectif it la frontihe proposee.
L'Ambassadeur de France a ete prie par son Gouvernement de faire savoir it son
Excellence le Principal Secretaire d'Etat de Sa Majeste Britannique aux Affaires
etrangeres que M. Briand a rec;u I'exemplaire qui lui etait destine, qu'ill'a soumis au
Gouvernement de la Republique et que le projet de frontihe ainsi tracee a obtenu son
agrement.
L'abornement definitif sur les lieux ne devant etre efTectue que lorsque les deux
Gouvernements se seront notifie leur mutuel accord, M. de Fleuriau serait tres
reconnaissant it Mr. Henderson de bien vouloir lui faire connaitre le plus tot possible
I'adhesion du Gouvernement britannique. 11 saisit, etc.
Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 30 janvier 1930.
The reply of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was in the first
person, and as the correspondence 12 furnishes an example of a joint Note
addressed by the French and British representatives to the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations, this also is given below:
Foreign Office,
August 19, 1930.
YOUR EXCELLENCY,
On the 30thJanuary last you were good enough, to address to me a note stating that
the French Government had given their approval to the boundary line defined in the
report of the British and French Commissioners appointed to define the frontier
between the British and French mandated territories in Togoland.
2. I am now in a position to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom have approved this report, and I have the honour to suggest
that, if the French Government concur, steps should be taken to communicate to the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations the third copy of the report, with the maps
attached thereto, which was forwarded to London by the Governor ofthe Gold Coast. I
beg leave accordingly to transmit herewith, for the consideration of the French
Government, the draft of the note which I would propose to address to the Secretary-
45
General and to request that I may be informed whether the French Government would
agree to address a similar note to Sir Eric Drummond.
I have, etc.
Geneve,
le 23 Septembre
M.
1930.
LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL,
Conformement aux instructions que nous avons rec;ues des Ministres des Affaires
etranghes de nos Gouvernements respectifs, nous avons l'honneur de porter a votre
connaissance que le Gouvernement franc;ais et le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste
Britannique dans le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande du Nord ont
approuve par echange de notes le Rapport final en trois exemplaires, date de Lome, le
21 octobre 1929, presente par la Commission mixte de Delimitation des Territoires du
Togo places sous le mandat des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes respectivement, en
vertue de l'article ler des mandats conferes par la Societe des Nations a la date du 20
juillet 1922.
Le depot aux archives de la Societe des Nations du troisieme exemplaire original
dudit Rapport final et des cartes y annexees s'effectue en meme temps que celui de la
presente note. Ces documents donnent la description exacte de la frontihe telle qu'elle a
ete determinee sur le terrain et portent les signatures des chefs de la mission.
Agreez, etc.
R.
MASSIGLI.
ALEXANDER CADOGAN.
,.20.
Memorandum (sometimes called memoire, or, especially when it embodies a

summary of a conversation, pro-memoria, or aide-memoire). This is often a detailed
statement of facts, and of arguments based thereon, not differing essentially
from a Note, except that it does not begin and end with a formula of courtesy
and need not be signed, since it is usually delivered either personally, following
an interview, or by means of a short covering Note.
'.2 I.
An important example is the memorandum communicated by the German

Government to the French Government on 9 February I 925~ initiating the
correspondence which led to the Locarno Conference of that year. 13
(Translation. )
(Strictly Confidential.)
In considering the various forms which a pact of security might at present take, one
could proceed from an idea cognate to that from which the proposal made in December
1922 by Dr. Cuno sprang. Germany could, for example, declare her acceptance of a
pact by virtue of which the Powers interested in the Rhine - above all, England, France,
Italy and Germany - entered into a solemn obligation for a lengthy period (to be
eventually defined more specifically) vis-a-vis the Government of the United States of
America as trustee not to wage war against a contracting State. A comprehensive
arbitration treaty, such as has been concluded in recent years between different
European countries, could be amalgamated with such a pact. Germany is also prepared
to conclude analogous arbitration treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of
juridical and political conflicts with all other States as well.
Furthermore, a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status ('gegenwartiger Besitzstand') on the Rhine would also be acceptable to Germany. The purport
of such a pact could be, for instance, that the interested States bound themselves
reciprocally to observe the inviolability of the present territorial status on the Rhine;
that they furthermore, both jointly and individually ('conjointement et separement'),
guaranteed the fulfilment of this obligation; and, finally, that they would regard any
46
action running counter to the said obligation as affecting themjointly and individually.
In the same sense, the treaty States could guarantee in this pact the fulfilment of the
obligation to demilitarise the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken in articles 42
and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. Again, arbitration agreements of the kind defined
above between Germany and all those States which were ready on their side to accept
such agreements could be combined with such a pact.
To the examples set out above still other possibilities of solution could be linked.
Furthermore, the ideas on which these examples are based could be combined in
different ways. Again, it would be worth considering whether it would not be advisable
so to draft the security pact that it would prepare the way for a world convention to
include all States along the lines of the 'Protocole pour le Reglement pacifique de
Differends internationaux' drawn up by the League of Nations, and that, in case sucha
world convention was achieved, it could be absorbed by it or worked into it.
The memorandum of the French Government in reply was as follows:

(Translation. )
The memorandum communicated to the French Government on the 9th February
by His Excellency the German Ambassador has been examined by them with interest
and with a determination not to neglect anything which may contribute to European
and world peace. The German Government will understand that the examination of
these suggestions cannot be continued until France has submitted them to her Allies and
has come to an agreement with them for the establishment ofa system ofsecurity within
the framework of the Treaty of Versailles.
Paris,
February 20, 1925.
7. 22 .
Collective .Note. This is one addressed by the representatives of several states to a

government in regard to some matter in which they have been instructed to
make a joint representation. It involves close relations between the Powers
whose representatives sign it.
The following notes addressed by the Italian, British and French
representatives at Budapest to the Hungarian Government in 1921, concerning
the deprivation of royal rights of all members of the House of Habsburg, are
instances: 14
( 1)
Budapest,
le 4 novembre, 1921.
M. LE MINISTRE,
D'ordre de la Conference des Ambassadeurs, nous avons l'honneur de transmettre

au Gouvernement hongrois la declaration suivante datee du 2 novembre:
'La Conference des Ambassadeurs a pris acte de la declaration faite aux
Commissaires allies par le Gouvernement hongrois suivant laquelle il se remet entre les
mains des Grandes Puissances alliees. Cette decision, en facilitant l'action que les
Puissances alliees ne cessent d'exercer pour ramener l'apaisement dans I'Europe
centrale, est de nature cl ecarter les dangers qui menacent la Hongrie.
'Convaincue que l'executio.1 de ses decisions constitue la seule sauvegarde de la
paix, la Conference a, de meme, pris acte de la declaration suivant laquelle le
Gouvernement hongrois proclame la decheance de tous les membres de la maison des
Habsbourg, declaration dont die attend que la confirmation soit remise par ecrit et sans
delai aux Commissaires allies. Elle compte fermement que I' Assemblee nationale
hongroise, comme le Gouvernement hongrois en a pris l'engagement, sanctionnera
47
cette proclamation de decheance avant le 8 novembre.

'La Conference charge les Commissaires allies de veiller cl la stricte execution de cet
engagement et decline toute responsabilite des evenements qui pourraient survenir s'il
n'etait pas tenu dans le delai maximum susdit.'
Veuillez agreer, etc.,
CASTAGNETO. HOHLER. FOUCHET.
Budapest,
le 5 novembre,
192 I.
M. LE MINISTRE,
D'ordre de la Conference des Ambassadeurs, nous avons l'honneur de signaler cl

votre Excellence que le texte du projet de loi gouvernementale, concernant la
decheance de la dynastie des Habsbourg, apparait aux Grandes Puissances comme
donnant prise cl une equivoque qui ne leur permettra certainement pas d'obtenir la
demobilisation de la Petite Entente. En effet, le projet de loi, tout en proclamant la
decheance de Charles IV, et l'abolition de la Pragmatique Sanction, reserve cl la
Hongrie le droit d'elire son roi, sans preciser que les Habsbourg, quels qu'ils soient,
seront exclus de cette election.
Il est indispensable que le vote de l'Assemblee nationale soit de plus grande nettete
et, cl cet egard, ne permette pas de supposer que la Hongrie se derobe cl la volonte tres
nettement marquee par les Puissances dans les declarations de la Conference des
Ambassadeurs des 4 fevrier, 1920, et 2 avril, 1921, en ce qui concerne l'exclusion du
trone de tous les Habsbourg.
En portant sans delai ce qui precede cl la connaissance de votre Excellence, nous
croyons devoir appeler tres vivement cl ce sujet toute l'attention du Gouvernement
hongrois.
Veuillez agreer, etc.,
le
12
Budapest,
novembre,
1921.
M. LE MINISTRE,
De la part de la Conference des Ambassadeurs, nous avons I'honneurde transmettre

cl votre Excellence la communication suivante qui vient d'etre adressee au Haut
Commissaire de France:
'La Conference se declare satisfaite du texte de la declaration complementaire de la
loi de decheance qui vous a ete remis par le Gouvernement hongrois, et que vous m' avez
communique par votre telegramme du 6 novembre 1921.
'Elle est en effet d'accord avec vos propositions et elle estime que les assurances ainsi
donnees par un acte international fournissent des garanties plus serieuses qu'une loi qui
pourrait etre sujette cl revision.
'Je vous prie en consequence de vous concerter avec vos collegues britannique et
italien, et, par une demarche conjointe, de faire savoir au Gouvernement hongrois que
les Principales Puissances alliees prennent acte avec satisfaction de la declaration visee
ci-dessus qu'elles considerent comme un engagement international.'
En portant ce qui precede cl la connaissance de votre Excellence, nous vous prions,
M. le Ministre, d'agreer, etc.,
7.23.
Identic Notes. These are not always exactly similar. It is, however, desirable that
they should be worded as closely as possible and be identical in substance. They
48
The language and forms of.diplomatic intercourse
should be presented, as far as possible, simultaneously.

On 4 February 1897, a Greek force landed in Crete and proclaimed the
occupation of the island in the name of the King of the Hellenes. The Powers
intervened, and in concert drew up the terms ofan identic note to be presented
to the Greek Government by the representatives of the United Kingdom,
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. This was in the
following terms: 15
Athenes,
le 2 mars, 1897.
M. LE MINISTRE,
J'ai re<;u de mon Gouvernement I'ordre de porter cl la connaissance de votre

Excellence que les Grandes Puissances se sont entendues pour arreter une ligne de
conduite commune destinee cl mettre fin cl une situation qu'il n'a pas dependu d'elles de
prevenir, mais dont la prolongation serait de nature cl compromettre gravement la paix
de l'Europe.
A cet effet les gouvernements d' Allemagne, d' Autriche-Hongrie, de France, de la
Grande-Bretagne, d'Italie et de Russie sont tombes d'accord sur les deux points
suivants:
I. La Crete ne pourra en aucun cas, dans les conjonctions actuelles, etre annexee cl la
Grece;
2. Vu les retards apportes par la Turquie dans I'application des reformes arretees de
concert avec elles et qui n'en permettent plus I'adaptation cl un etat de choses
transforme, les Puissances sont resolues, tout en maintenant l'integrite de l'Empire
Ottoman, cl doter la Crete d'un regime autonome absolument effect if et destine cl lui
assurer un gouvernement separe sous la haute suzerainete du Sultan.
La realisation de ces vues ne saurait, dans la conviction des Cabinets, s'obtenir que
par le retrait des navires et des troupes helleniques qui sont actuellement dans les eaux
ou sur le territoire de l'ile occupee par les Puissances. Aussi attendons-nous avec
confiance cette determination de la sagesse du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste, qui ne
voudra pas persister dans une voie contraire cl la resolution des Puissances, decidees cl
poursuivre un prompt apaisement aussi indispensable cl la Crete qu'au maintien de la
paix generale.
Je ne dissimulerai pas toutefois cl votre Excellence que mes instructions me
prescrivent de vous prevenir qu'en cas de refus du Gouvernement Royalles Grandes
Puissances sont irrevocablement determinees cl ne reculer devant aucun moyen de
contrainte si, cl l'expiration d'un delai de six jours, le rappel des navires et des troupes
helleniques de Crete n'etait pas effectue.
7.24.
Treaties are nowadays frequently concluded in the form ofan Exchange oj.Notes.
This subject is fully dealt with in 29 34-9.
7. 2 5.
In British usage, Despatch is the name given to a formal letter from the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to a head ofmission abroad, or
vice versa; or from one head of mission to another. In the latter case a copy is
normally sent to London.
7. 26 . Whereas foreign Ambassadors and Commonwealth High Commissioners

accredited in London are addressed as 'Your Excellency', the appel used in
despatches between the Secretary of State and British heads of mission abroad
(in either direction) is 'My Lord,' 'Sir,' or 'Madam,' as the case may be. In
writing to a head of mission, the traitement, used in the body of the despatch, is
'Your Excellency' ('Your Excellency will be aware .. .'). In writing to the
Semi-official correspondence
49
Secretary of State, however, the traitement is 'My Lord' or 'Your Lordship,'

'you, Sir, (or Madam)'. (' ... as you, Sir, stated explicitly on the occasion of
... ').
7.27.
It has long been the custom, though it seems not to be invariably so today, in
writing a despatch to the Secretary ofState, to begin with the phrase 'I have the
honour ... ' or to contrive to include it in the introductory sentences of the
despatch.
7.28.
The prescribed terminations of despatches and other formal correspondence,

drafted for or on behalf of the Secretary of State, have been revised and
simplified in recent years. The following are now generally used:
To a minister of foreign affairs, or to a foreign head of mission:
I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,
Your Excellency's obedient servant,
(Charges d'affaires are not Excellencies and receive 'high consideration'.)
To British heads of mission abroad:
I have the honour to be,
Sir (My Lord, Madam),
Your Excellency's obedient servant,
(Acting heads of mission, charges d'affaires and consuls general are not Excellencies.)
Most other cases are covered by the formula:
I am (or, on the highest levels, I have the
honour to be),
Sir (My Lord, Madam, Gentlemen),
Your obedient servant,
Semi-official correspondence
7.29.
None of the rules and conventions described in the foregoing section on official
communications will of course exclude the use, at their personal discretion in
certain circumstances, of a semi-official form of address between the Secretary
of State and an ambassador, or between one head of mission and another. This
will be a letter, not a Note, and may begin 'My dear Ambassador,' or 'My dear
Secretary of State,' and end 'Yours sincerely,' or in whatever way the writer
judges most suitable to the occasion. Such semi-official forms are tending to be
used with greater frequency internally in the British service; and they are by no
means unknown in foreign capitals, though, as they obey no generally accepted
rules, they do not provide a conventional vehicle for formal communications.
7.30.
In addition to special forms ofaddress and styles ofcorrespondence, diplomatic

intercourse has evolved its own characteristic idiom, in which certain set
phrases are used to convey, with the restraint ofa studied politeness, statements
or warnings which, if delivered more bluntly, would raise tempers. These
expressions, many of them devised by classical diplomatists speaking French,
have become the current coin of the profession and their meaning is generally
accepted. They are merely the counterpart of the 'parliamentary language'
50
enjoined upon legislators and other debaters, and they are preferable to the
'diplomacy by insult' practised by early Byzantine rulers and by like-minded
empire-builders of the twentieth century. In matters oflanguage the art of the
diplomatist, as observed by Andre Maurois, 16 is that ofexpressing hostility with
courtesy, indifference with interest, and friendship with prudence.
7.3 I.
When an ambassador, speaking on behalf of his government, says that they

'cannot remain indifferent' to a particular situation or course of action, he is
understood to mean that, should that situation arise, they will intervene. If they
are said to 'view with concern', or 'with grave concern,' a matter under
discussion, this means they are proposing to take a strong line about it. 'My
Government will reconsider its position' is a warning that a present state of
friendliness may not continue. 'Is obliged to tender grave reservations' means
in effect 'will not allow;' while 'will be obliged to consider its own interests'
indicates that, however its obligations have hitherto been interpreted, it will
claim a free hand, which could result in a severance of relations. 'My
Government will regard this as an unfriendly act' means 'will regard this as a
threat of war.' He may add 'and will decline to be responsible for the
consequences,' with the corresponding intention. I?
Bout de papier
7.32.
The preceding paragraphs have been concerned with the official forms of
written communication. An unofficial and personal adjunct to oral communication frequently used is known as a bout de papier. When an ambassador or a
member of his staff makes an appointment to discuss some matter semiofficially with a foreign representative, or in the ministry of foreign affairs, he
sometimes has typed on a piece of plain paper a few lines of notes to assist his
memory. He may decide to leave this piece of paper (which is much more
informal than an aide-memoire) with the person to whom he has been speaking,
in order to ensure that there will be no room for doubt regarding the main
points which he has sought to make. The recipient generally finds this helpful
and is grateful for it, especially if the conversation has been in a language in
which one or other participant is only moderately proficient. The piece of
paper is prepared in such a way that it bears no attribution. While it is thus
both a personal courtesy and a practical convenience, it cannot be claimed by
either side as possessing any official status.
7.33.
In different circumstances a bout de papier discreetly passed across the table has
saved the situation in many a conference about to founder on the apparent
inability of either side to move towards a mutually agreeable formula. One
side, let us suppose, has worked out a proposition ofwhich it cannot possibly go
on record as the proposer, but which, in the interests of cooperation, it could
agree to recommend for its government's consideration, if the other side were to
advance it. The anonymous piece ofpaper therefore contains some such form of
words as 'If you felt able to propose . . . I should be prepared to try it on my
Government.' Such a piece of classic give and take can often produce a
surprisingly happy result. But if it only elicits a shake of the head, at least no
'Rejection' of diplomatic communications
51
word has been spoken and no bones broken. In any case the procedure must be
nicely judged and depends, like most good diplomacy, on mutual confidence
and respect between negotiators. It would be worse than useless if the opposing
delegation were of the kind that aimed not at agreement but at scoring points
for the sake of publicity.
'Rejection' of diplolDatic cOlDlDunications

'.34.
Under the heading 'The language of diplomatic intercourse' it has become

desirable to utter a warning against the tendency to misuse the word 'rejection'
in connection with diplomatic correspondence. It is commonly employed
today to mean a refusal to agree with the contentions put forward in a
communication from a foreign power, with, or without, the production of
counter-arguments.
'.35.
Its proper interpretation is the literal one - the 'casting back,' in other words
the return to the sender of the actual document itself. 18 This occurs but rarely
and the reason for the 'rejection' is usually either the objectionable language of
the document in question, or that it is a gross interference with the internal
affairs of the addressee country, or both. A classic example of this was the
protest addressed to the British Government by the Soviet representative in
London in connection with the notorious 'Zinoviev letter.' This was 'rejected'
on the ground that, demanding the punishment of persons allegedly in the
employment or under the control of the British Government, it was an
interference in the internal affairs of the country. Shortly afterwards Mr (later
Sir Austen) Chamberlain, having succeeded Mr Ramsay Macdonald as
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, caused M. Rakowski to be informed that
no trace of the offending note could be found in the archives left behind by Mr
Macdonald, but that he, Mr Chamberlain, was acquainted with all the
circumstances and had no intention of departing from the decision that the
British Government could not consent to receive it.
'.36.
In 1943 Field-Marshal Stalin sent a telegram to Winston Churchill about the

Arctic Convoys, of which the form and substance were such that the Prime
Minister refused to receive it and, sending for the Soviet Ambassador in
London, handed it back to him in an envelope. Monsieur Gousev recognised
the document and said that he had been instructed to deliver it. The Prime
Minister replied 'I am not prepared to receive it' and indicated 'in a friendly
manner' that the interview was at an end. 19
'.37.
The foregoing examples show the importance of the rule in handling incoming
papers that no mark of any kind should be made on a paper containing a
communication which it might be necessary to reject. If it is returned clean,
there will be no documentary evidence that it was ever received. It will thus
have no status and must be consigned, so to speak, to limbo. There are times
when it may be not only desirable but effective to deliver orally, if possible
before witnesses, a message which, if delivered in writing only, might be
expected to be rejected or ignored. Mr Charles Thayer records having once
52
thus delivered with great firmness and presence of mind an unwelcome but
vital message which would otherwise, it seemed certain, have run into the
sand. 20
7.38.
A method of communication which used occasionally to be employed in some

matter of 'Yeighty import was for the Secretary ofState to address a despatch to
a head of mission, setting forth the views of his government, with an instruction
to read it to the Foreign Minister and to leave him a copy.
On the passage of the Panama Canal Act by the United States Congress in
1912 the following despatch was addressed by the British Government to His
Majesty's Ambassador at Washington. 21
Foreign Office,
London,
November 14, 1912.
SIR,
Your Excellency will remember that on the 8th July, 1912, Mr. Mitchell Innes
communicated to the Secretary of State the objections which His Majesty's
Government entertained to the legislation relating to the Panama Canal, which was
then under discussion in Congress, and that on the 27th August, after the passing of the
Panama Canal Act and the issue of the President's memorandum on signing it, he
informed Dr. Knox that when His Majesty's Government had had time to consider fully
the Act and the memorandum a further communication would be made to him.
Knowing as I do full well the interest which this great undertaking has aroused in the
New World, and the emotion with which its opening is looked forward to by United
States citizens, I wish to add before closing this despatch that it is only with great
reluctance that His Majesty's Government have felt bound to raise objection on the
ground of treaty rights to the provisions of the Act. Animated by an earnest desire to
avoid points which might in any way prove embarrassing to the United States, His
Majesty's Government have confined their objections within the narrowest possible
limits, and have recognised in the fullest manner the rights of the United States to
control the Canal. They feel convinced that they may look with confidence to the
Government of the United States to ensurethat, in promoting the interests of United
States shipping, nothing will be done to impair the safeguards guaranteed to British
shipping by treaty.
Your Excellency will read this despatch to the Secretary of State and will leave with
him a copy.
I am, etc.,
E.
7.39.
GREY.
Formerly when this method of communicating the views of one government to

another was resorted to, the copy of the despatch was sometimes withheld, a
course which might be held to justify a refusal to listen to the reading of the
despatch.
Canning, in January 1825, having recognised the independence of Buenos Aires,
Colombia and Mexico, the Russian and Austrian ambassadors called upon him on
successive days, and said they were instructed to read to him the despatches from their
respective courts on the subject, but were absolutely prohibited from giving or allowing
him to take copies. Canning asked them to give whatever they had to say to him the form
of a note verbale, explaining the difficulty in which he would be placed when, after
listening to the reading of a long despatch, it became his duty to lay before the King and
to convey to his colleagues a faithful impression of its contents, with no other voucher
Correspondence between sovereigns and heads of states
53
than his own individual recollection of it. He therefore felt bound not to listen to the
reading of the despatch without being allowed to take a copy of it, but was perfectly
willing to receive any communication in a written form. However, after they had left, he
noted down his understanding and impression of what they had said, and sent copies to
them for their approval or correction. These were returned to him - that from the
Russian ambassador considerably enlarged, and that from the Austrian ambassador
with an alteration.
Correspondence between sovereigns and heads of states

7.40. The titles used by sovereigns when addressing each other in correspondence
have been described in 5.21-3. The ceremonial observed is less strict than in the
case of communications addressed to others; between equals the style is more
familiar and less formal; for this reason the form designated in French Lettres de
Cabinet is that used by preference for communications between sovereigns.
Such letters (written usually on quarto paper) begin, Monsieur Mon Frere
(et cher Beau-Frere), Sir My Brother (and dear Brother-in-Law); Madame Ma
Sreur (et chere Niece), Madame My Sister (and dear Niece); Monsieur Mon
Cousin (Sir My Cousin); etc.
In the body of the letter the sovereign speaks of himself in the singular, and
gives to his equals the title of Majeste, Altesse Royale, etc. Princes of lesser rank
speak of crowned heads as Sire, both in the body of the letter and its signature.
Some friendly expressions, which vary according to the relations or degree of
relationship between the two sovereigns, close the letter, such as 'Je saisis cette
occasion pour Vous ofTrir les assurances de la haute consideration et de
l'invariable attachement avec lesquellesJe suis, Monsieur Mon Frere, de Votre
Majeste le bon Frere, N.'
The signature of the sovereign to such letters is in some countries
countersigned by a minister of state. Letters in this form are customarily
employed for credentials of ambassadors or ministers accredited between
sovereigns, or letters announcing their recall, and recredentials, or expressions
of congratulation or condolence conveyed to other sovereigns. They are
sometimes in similar formal style to lettres de Chancellerie, with the designation of
the sovereign to whom they are addressed following the name and title of the
sender.
7-41.
Letters addressed by sovereigns to presidents of republics are in the more

formal and ceremonious style ofLettresde Chancellerie (on large paper) beginning
with the name and title of the sovereign, followed by the title of the head ofthe
state to whom the letter is addressed: 'To the President of the Republic of
............ Our Good Friend' (or some equivalent). These are ordinarily
credentials of ambassadors or ministers, letters of recall, recredentials,
announcements of the death of the late sovereign or of accession to the throne,
congratulations on election, etc., and may end by an expression of the value
attached by the sovereign to the maintenance of the friendly relations happily
54
subsisting between the two countries. They are usually countersigned by a

minister of state.
'.42.
Letters addressed by presidents of republics to sovereigns usually begin: 'A.B.

To His Ma;jesty the King of
.
President of the Republic of
Great and Good Friend (or some equivalent).' These may be credentials of
ambassadors or ministers, letters of recall, recredentials, announcement of
election to the presidency, etc. In the case of many republics such
announcements of assumption of the office of president are customary.
'.43
In 1913 the Austro-Hungarian Chancery still used Latin for Imperial and
Royal letters:
Serenissime et potentissime Princeps, Consanguinee et Frater carissime....
Maiestatis Vestrae Bonus Frater
Franciscus Josephus.
Dabantur Viennae, die ... mensis....
CHAPTER 8

Letters of Credence or credentials
8. I. The form of credentials used in the United Kingdom in the case of foreign
sovereigns is that of a Lettre de Cabinet, in such terms as the following:
My BROTHER,
Being desirous to maintain without interruption the relations offriendship and good
understanding which happily subsist between the two Crowns, I have selected My
Trusty and Well-beloved X. Y. to proceed to the Court of Your Majesty in the character
of My Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
SIR
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary

Having already had ample experience of X.y.'s talents and zeal for My service, I
doubt not that he will fulfil the important duties of his Mission in such a manner as to
merit Your approbation and esteem, and to prove himself worthy of this new mark of
My confidence.
I request that You will give entire credence to all that X. Y. shall have occasion to
communicate to You in My name, more especially when he shall express to Your
Mcrjesty My cordial wishes for Your Happiness, and shall assure You of the invariable
attachment and highest esteem with which I am,
Manu Regia
Sir My Brother
Your Majesty's
Good Sister
ELIZABETH R.
Our Court of St. James's.
To My Good Brother the King of
8.2. Or, in the case of a republic, a Lettre de Chancellerie, in such terms as these:
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the
Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, &c., &c., &c.
To the President of the Republic of Z. Sendeth Greeting!
Our Good Friend! Being desirous to maintain, without interruption, the relations of
friendship and good understanding which happily subsist between Our Realm and the
Republic of Z., We have made choice of Our Trusty and Well-beloved X. Y. to reside
with You in the character of Our Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
The e'l:perience which We have had ofX. Y. 's talents and zeal for Our service assures
Us that the selection We have made will be perfectly agreeable to You; and that he will
discharge the important duties of his Mission in such a manner as to merit Your
approbation and esteem, and to prove himself worthy of this new mark of Our
56
confidence.
We therefore request that You will give entire credence to all that X.v. shall
communicate to You in Our name, more especially when he shall renew to You the
assurances of the lively interest which We take in everything that affects the welfare and
prosperity of the Republic of Z.
And so We commend You to the protection of the Almighty.
Given at Our Court ofSt. James's, the
day of.
One thousand
in the
Year of Our Reign.
Nine hundred and
Your Good Friend,
(Signed) ELIZABETH R.
8.3.
The language of such Documents is a matter of 'common form.' The heritage of

elaborate phraseology has been retained in the formal usage of the United
Kingdom and of some other European countries, where it is felt to express with
clarity and due emphasis ideas which have remained basic to diplomacy
throughout the centuries. But while each country will tend to evolve its own
characteristic style of address and some prefer simpler forms more in
consonance with contemporary moods and customs, the final phrase asking
that credit may be given to all that the agent may say in the name of his
sovereign or government is of universal application. This is what constitutes the
essential part of a Letter of Credence.
8.4.
Letters of recall
Letters of Recall may take the form of a Lettre de Cabinet as follows:
SIR My BROTHER
Having occasion elsewhere for the services of My Trusty and Well-beloved X.Y.,
who has lately resided at Your Majesty's Court in the
character of My Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
I cannot omit to inform You of his recall.
(Or,)
My Trusty and Well-beloved X.Y., who has lately resided at Your Majesty's Court
in the character of My Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary'
being now on the point of retiring from My Foreign Service, I cannot omit to inform
You of the termination of his Mission in that capacity.
Having Myself had ample reason to be satisfied with the zeal, ability, and fidelity
with which X. V. has executed My orders on all occasions during his Mission, I trust that
Your Majesty will also have found his conduct deserving of Your approbation and
esteem, and in this pleasing confidence I avail myself ofthe present opportunity to renew
to You the assurances of the invariable friendship and cordial esteem with which I am,
Sir My Brother,
Your Majesty's
Good Sister
ELIZABETH R.
Our Court of St. James's.
To My Good Brother The King of
Letters of recall
8.5
57
Or of a Lettre de Chancellerie, as follows:

Our Good Friend! [Having need elsewhere for the services of] Our Trusty and
Wellbeloved X.v. who has for some time resided with You in the character of Our
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
[being now on the point of retiring from Our Foreign Service.] [We have thought fit to
notify to You the termination of his Mission in that capacity.] [We have thought fit to
notify to You his Recall.)
We are Ourselves so satisfied with the zeal, ability, and fidelity with which X. V. has
executed Our orders on all occasions during his Mission that We trust his conduct will
also have merited Your approbation, and in this pleasing confidence We avail Ourselves
of the opportunity to renew to You the assurances of Our constant friendship, and of
Our earnest wishes for the welfare and prosperity of the Republic of Z.
Given at Our Court ofSt. James's, the
day oL
One thousand
Nine hundred and
in the
Year of Our Reign.
Your Good Friend,
8.6.
A number ofconcrete examples ofcredentials, etc. appearing in earlier editions

of this work have been omitted. Their value as guidance to present-day
practice has expired and they took up a lot of space. This is also true of the
following Lettre de chancellerie but it would be a pity for such a jewel to be lost
sight of.
Par la Gnice de Dieu,
Nous Alexandre Ill, Empereur et Autocrate de Toutes les Russies, de Moscou, Kiow,
Wladimir, Novgorod, Tsar de Casan, Tsar d' Astrakhan, Tsar de Pologne, Tsar de
Siberie, Tsar de la Chersonese Taurique, Tsar de la Georgie, Seigneur de Plescow et
Grand Duc de Smolensk, de Lithuanie, Volhynie, Podolie et de la Finlande; Duc
d'Estonie, de Livonie, de Courlande et Semigalle, de Samogitie, Bialostock, Carelie,
Twer, Jugotie, Perm, Viatka, Bolgarie et d'autres; Seigneur et Grand Duc de
Novgorod-inferieur, de Czarnigow, Riasan, Polotzk, Rostow, Jaroslaw, Beloosersk,
Oudor, Obdor-Condie, Witepsk, Mstislaw; Dominateur de toute la contree du Nord;
Seigneur d'lberie, de la Cartalinie, de la Cabardie et de la province d' Armenie; Prince
Hereditaire et Souverain des Princes de Circassie et d'autres Princes montagnards;
Seigneur de Turkestan; Successeur de Norvege, Duc de Schleswig-Holstein, de
Stormarn, de Dithmarsen et d'Oldenbourg, etc., etc., etc.
A la Tres-Haute et Tres-Puissante Princesse Victoire lere, par la Grace de Dieu,
Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande, Imperatrice des Indes, etc.
salut!
Tres-Haute et Tres-Puissante Reine, tres-chere Sreur et tres-aimee parente! Nous
avons juge a propos de rappeler Notre Conseiller Prive et Chevalier Baron Arthur
Mohrenheim du poste de Notre Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire qu'il a
occupe jusqu'ici pres Votre Majeste. En informant Votre Majeste de cette
determination, Nous La prions de vouloir bien congedier gracieusement Notre susdit
Ambassadeur, ~tant persuade, qu'en se conformant dans l'exercice de ses fonctions aux
instructions que Nous lui avons donnees, il aura deploye tout son zele pour entretenir les
liens d'amitie qui subsistent entre Nos deux Cours, et aura su meriter la bienveillance de
58
Votre Majeste. Sur ce, Nous prions Dieu qu'Il ait Votre Majeste en Sa sainte et digne
garde.
Donne a Petersbourg, le 8 fevrier, 1884, de Notre Regne la troisieme annee.
De Votre Majeste l'afTectionne Frere et Cousin,
ALEXANDRE.
(Countersigned) N. GIERS.
A Sa Majeste la Reine du
Royaume-Uni de la GrandeBretagne et d'Irlande, Imperatrice
des Indes.
8.7.
Subject, as occasion requires, to certain minor alterations, Recredentials 1

today are in the following form:
Our Good Friend! We have received from the hands of A.B. the Letter which You
, and in which You acquaint Us of the termination of
addressed to Us on
the Mission of X.Y. as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
at Our Court.
We think it due to X. Y. to assure You that his language and conduct during his
residence at Our Court have been such as to merit Our approbation and esteem, and
have been uniformly and zealously directed to the maintenance and improvement ofthe
relations of friendship which happily subsist between Our United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Z.
day of
, One thousand
Given at Our Court of Saint James's, the
Nine hundred and
, in the
year of our Reign.
Your Good Friend,
Recredentials addressed to sovereigns, in the form of Lettres de Cabinet, are in

much the same terms.
Full powers
8.8. A diplomatic agent to whom a particular negotiation is entrusted for the
conclusion of a treaty or convention, or an agent who is deputed to take part in
a congress or conference for a similar purpose, requires as a general rule a
special authorisation, called a full power,2 from the head of the state whom he
represents; or, it may be, from its government, if the proposed treaty
arrangement is to be between governments.
8.g.
The use of full powers has a long history going back through the Middle Ages to
the Roman plena potestas conferred on a proctor for legal transactions. It became
in due course an established rule that only the bestowal of full powers gave an
ambassador authority to commit his sovereign. The object of conferring them
Full powers
59
was to be able to dispense, as far as possible, with the long delays needed in
earlier times for referring problems back to higher authority. Their use at the
present day is a formal recognition of the necessity for absolute confidence in
the authority and standing of the negotiator. 3
8.10.
Before the signature of a treaty or convention, etc. it is the rule that the full
powers of the plenipotentiaries must be exhibited for verification. In the case ofa
bilateral treaty this usually takes place at the ministry for foreign affairs prior to
the signature of the treaty; in the case of a multilateral treaty, the duty
automatically devolves upon the headquarters government, viz, that of the
state wherein the treaty is signed, or the international organisation under whose
auspices the treaty is concluded; in the case of a conference a small
subcommittee is often appointed 4 at the outset to receive and examine the full
powers of the representatives of the various states taking part.
8. I
I.
It is not, however, necessary that an actual exchange or transference of the

original documents should take place. An inspection will suffice, and the most
that could be required would be the retention of certified copies. That this was
the custom in former times is shown from the practice that prevailed of
publishing the text of the full powers conferred by the high contracting parties
along with the treaty negotiated in pursuance of them. 5 But sometimes full
powers, where given ad hoc, having served the purpose for which they were
intended, are left with the government of the state, or with the international
organisation, wherein signature of the treaty takes place, and in this event they
are preserved with the signed treaty in the archives of the state or organisation
concerned.
8. I 2.
Formerly, when a congress was held under the superintendence ofone or more
mediators, the full powers of the plenipotentiaries were handed to them for
verification. At the conferences of Constantinople (1876-7) and Berlin (1884)
the plenipotentiaries appointed ad hoc alone produced full powers, which were
held to be unnecessary in the case of the resident diplomatic agents who
represented their governments on those occasions.
8. I 3.
In the eighteenth century the King of England and the Emperor conferred full
powers in the Latin language; France and Russia used French, Spain Spanish
and the United States English. For the definitive Treaty of Peace with the
United States of 3 September 1783, the King's full power was also in English.
Latin was used for this purpose as late at least as 1806, for the full powers given
first to Lord Yarmouth, and afterwards to Lord Lauderdale in conjunction
with him, for the abortive peace negotiations at Lille.
8. 14.
Full power, dated 23 April 1783 to the Duke of Manchester for negotiating a
treaty of peace with France:
(Signature) Georgius R.
Georgius Tertius, Dei Gratia, Magn<e Britanni<e, Franci<e, et Hiberni<e, Rex, Fidei
Defensor, Dux Brunsvicensis et Luneburgensis, Sacri Romani Imperii ArchiThesaurarius, et Princeps Elector, etc. Omnibus et singulis ad quos pr<esentes h<e liter<e
pervenerint, salutem! Cum ad pacem perficiendam inter nos et bonum fratrem nostrum
Regem Christianissimum, qU<e jam signatis apud Versalios, die vicesimo mensis
60
Januarii proxime prreteriti, articulis preliminariis feliciter inchoata est, eamque ad

finem exoptatum perducendam, virum aliquem idoneum, ex nostni parte, plena
auctoritate munire nobis e re visum sit; cumque perdilectus nobis et perquam fidelis
consanguineus et consiliarius noster, Georgius Dux et Comes de Manchester, Vicecomes
de Mandeville, Baron de Kimbolton, Comitatus de Huntingdon Locum-Tenens et
Custos Rotulorum, nobilitate generis, egregiis animi dotibus, summo rerum usu, et
spectata fide, se nobis commendaverit, quem idcirco titulo Legati Nostri Extraordinarii
et Plenipotentiarii apud prredictum bonum fratrem nostrum Regem Christianissimum
decoravimus, persuasumque nobis sit amplissime ornaturum fore provinciam quam ei
mandare decrevimus: Sciatis igitur quod nos prredictum Georgium Ducem de
Manchester fecimus, constituimus et ordinavimus, et, per prresentes, eum facimus,
constituimus et ordinamus, nostrum verum certum ac indubitatum plenipotentiarium,
commissarium, et procuratorem; dantes et concedentes eidem plenam et omnimodam
potestatem, atque auctoritatem, pariter ac mandatum generale ac speciale, cum
prredicto Rege Christianissimo, ipsiusque ministris, commissariis vel procuratoribus,
sufficienti auctoritate instructis, cumque legatis, commissariis, deputatis et pleniP9tentiariis aliorum principum et statuum, quorum interesse poterit, sufficienti itidem
auctoritate instructis tarn singulatim ac divisim, quam aggregatim ac conjunctim,
congrediendi et colloquendi, atque cum ipsis de pace firma ac stabili, sincercique
amicitia et concordia quantocius restituendis, conveniendi, tractandi, consulendi et
concludendi; eaque omnia, qure ita conventa et conclusa fuerint, pro nobis et nostro
nomine, subsignandi, superque conclusis tractatum, tractatusve, vel alia instrumenta
quotquot et qualia necessaria fuerint, conficiendi, mutuoque tradendi, recipiendique;
omniaque alia qure ad opus supradictum feliciter exequendum pertinent, transigendi,
tarn amplis modo et forma, ac vi effectuque pari, ac nos, si interessemus, face re et
prrestare possemus: Spondentes, et in verbo regio promittentes, nos omnia et singula
qurecunque a dicto nostro Plenipotentiario transigi et concludi contigerint, grata, rata
et accepta, omni meliori modo, habituros, neque passuros unquam ut in toto, vel in
parte, a quopiam violentur, aut ut iis in contrarium eatur. In quorum omnium majorem
fidem et robur prresentibus, manu nostra regia signatis, magnum nostrum Magnre
Britannire sigillum appendi fecimus. Qure dabantur in palatio nostro Divi Jacobis die
vicesimo tertio mensis Aprilis, anno domini millesimo, septingesimo octogesimo tertio,
regnique nostri vicesimo tertio. 6
8.I"S.
The full powers given in 1806 to Lord Yarmouth in the first instance, and
afterwards to Lord Lauderdale and Lord Yarmouth conjointly, were worded
in the same manner. Napoleon's full power to General Clarke on the same
occasion ran as follows:
Napoleon par la grace de Dieu, et les constitutions, Empereur des Franc;ais, Roi
d'ltalie, prenant entiere confiance dans la fidelite pour Notre personne, et le zeIe pour
Notre service de Monsieur le General de division Clarke, Notre conseiller intime du
cabinet, et grand officier de la Legion d'honneur, Nous lui avons donne, et lui don nons
par les presentes, plein et absolu pouvoir, commission, et mandement special, pour en
notre nom, et avec tel ministre de Sa Majeste Britannique dument autorise a cet effet,
convenir, arreter, conclure, et signer, tels traites, articles, conventions, declarations, et
autres actes qu'il avisera bien etre; promettons d'avoir pour agreable et tenir ferme et
stable, accomplir et executer ponctuellement tout ce que le dit plenipotentiaire aura
promis et signe en vertu des presents pleins-pourvoirs, comme aussi d'en faire expedier
les lettres de ratification en bonne forme, et de les faire delivrer pour etre echangees dans
le terns dont il sera convenu.
En foi de quoi Nous avons donne les presentes de notre main, contresignees et munies
de Notre sceau Imperial.
Full powers
6I
A St. Cloud, le vingt-un juillet an mil huit cent six, de Notre regne le second.
NAPOLEON.
Par l'Empereur, le Ministre Secretaire d'Etat,

HUGUES MARET.
Le Ministre des Relations Exterieures,

CH.
MAu. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Benevent. 7
8. 16.
At the present day the full powers issued to representatives for such purposes as
the negotiation and signature of a treaty, or the settlement in a similar manner
at a congress or conference of some question of international concern, vary
greatly in form, according to the particular constitution or the settled practice
of the country which issues them. The form used in the United Kingdom for the
signature of a treaty or convention between heads of states is that of Letters
Patent, as shown in 8. 1 7, and the wording, it will be seen, follows in general that
of the past (8.14) though the use of Latin for such purposes has long been
discontinued. Many countries adopt a similar formal style; in the case ofothers
it may be simpler, and the phraseology employed may vary considerably.
Differences may exist also according to the degree of importance ascribed to the
treaty, or whether it is to be concluded between heads of states or, on the other
hand, between governments. The essential feature ofall such documents is that
they should show by their terms that the representative to whom they are issued
is invested with all necessary authority on the part ofthe state concerned to take
part in the negotiations pending, and to conclude and sign, subject if necessary
to ratification, the treaty instrument which may result from these negotiations.
8.17
The form of special full power issued by the Court ofSt.James's for the purpose
of a treaty or convention between heads of states is as follows:
(Signature) Elizabeth R.
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain
Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, etc., etc., etc.
To all and singular to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting!
Whereas for the better treating of and arranging certain matters which are now in
discussion, or which may come into discussion, between Us, in respect of Our United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
.
We have judged it expedient to invest a fit person
concerning
with Full Power to conduct the said discussion on Our part in respect of Our United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Know Ye, therefore, that We,
reposing especial Trust and Confidence in the Wisdom, Loyalty, Diligence and
Circumspection of Our
have named, made, constituted and appointed, as We do by these presents name, make, constitute and appoint
him Our undoubted Commissioner, Procurator and Plenipotentiary, in respect of Our
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for the purpose aforesaid.
Giving to him all manner of Power and Authority to treat, adjust and conclude with
such minister or ministers, Plenipotentiary or Plenipotentiaries, as may be vested with
any Treaty,
similar Power and Authority on the part of..
Convention, Agreement, Protocol or other Instrument that may tend to the attainment
of the above-mentioned end, and to sign for Us, and in Our Name, in respect of Our
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, everything so agreed upon and
concluded, and to do and transact all such other matters as may appertain thereto, in as
ample manner and form, and with equal force and efficacy, as We Ourselves could do, if
62
personally present; Engaging and Promising, upon Our Royal Word, that whatever
things shall be so transacted and concluded by Oursaid Commissioner, Procurator and
Plenipotentiary, in respect of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, shall, subject if necessary to Our ratification, be agreed to, acknowledged and
accepted by Us in the fullest manner, and that We will never suffer, either in the whole
or in part, any person whatsoever to infringe the same, or act contrary thereto, as far as it
lies in Our power.
In witness whereof, We have caused Our Great Seal to be affixed to these Presents,
which We have signed with Our Royal Hand.
Given at Our Court of St. james's, the
day oL
, in the Year of Our
Lord one thousand nine hundred and
and in the
year of Our Reign
8. I 8.
The following is the form of a general full power such as is at present held 8 by
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ministers of
state, parliamentary under-secretaries, and the permanent representatives at
the United Nations and the European Communities in order to enable them to
negotiate and sign any treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom:
(Signature) Elizabeth R.
Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, &c., &c., &c. To all and singular to whom these
Presents shall come, Greeting!
Whereas, for the better treating of and arranging any matters which are now in
discussion, or which may come into discussion, between Us, in respect of Our United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and any other Powers or States, We
have judged it expedient to invest a fit person with Full Power to conduct negotiations
on Our part in respect of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Know ye, therefore, that We, reposing especial Trust and Confidence in the Wisdom,
have named,
Loyalty, Diligence, and Circumspection ofOur
made, constituted and appointed, as We do by these Presents name, make, constitute
and appoint him Our undoubted Commissioner, Procurator and Plenipotentiary in
respect of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Giving to him
all manner of Power and Authority to treat, adjust and conclude with such Ministers,
Commissioners or Plenipotentiaries as may be vested with similar Power and Authority,
on the part ofany other Powers or States, any Treaty, Convention, Agreement, Protocol
or other Instrument between Us and such Powers or States, and to sign for Us, and in
Our name, in respect of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
everything so agreed upon and concluded, and to do and transact all such other matters
as may appertain thereto, in as ample manner and form, and with equal force and
efficacy, as We Ourselves could do, if personally Present: Engaging and Promising,
upon Our Royal Word, that whatever things shall be so transacted and concluded by
Our said Commissioner, Procurator and Plenipotentiary, in respect of Our United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, shall, subject if necessary to Our
Ratification, be agreed to, acknowledged and accepted by Us in the fullest manner, and
that We will never suffer, either in the whole or in part, any person whatsoever to
infringe the same, or act contrary thereto, as far as it lies in Our power.
In witness whereof We have caused Our Great Seal to be affixed to these Presents,
which We have signed with Our Royal Hand.
Given at Our Court of St. james's the
day of
in the Year of
Our Lord, One Thousand Nine hundred and
and in the
Year
of Our Reign.
Full powers
8. I g.
63
In the case of an agreement between governments, the form offull power issued
by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is as follows:
Whereas for the better treating of and arranging certain matters which are now in
discussion, or which may come into discussion, between the Government of the United
Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of..
.
relative to
it is expedient that a fit person should be invested
with Full Power to conduct the said discussion on the part of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; 1..
.
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, do
hereby certify that
is by these presents named, constituted
and appointed as Plenipotentiary and Representative having Full Power and
Authority to agree and conclude, with such Plenipotentiary or Representative as may
be vested with similar Power and Authority on the part of the Government
of..
, any Convention or Agreement that may tend to the attainment of the
above-mentioned end, and to sign for the Government of the United Kingdom ofGreat
Britain and Northern Ireland everything so agreed upon and concluded. Further I do
hereby certify that whatever things shall be so transacted and concluded by the said
Plenipotentiary and Representative, shall, subject if necessary to ratification by the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, be agreed
to, acknowledged and accepted by the said Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the fullest manner.
In witness whereof I have signed these Presents, and affixed hereto my seal.
Signed and sealed at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, the......... day
of..
, in the Year of our Lord 19 ..
(Seal)
(Signature of Secretary of State.)
8.20.
A French example:
Vincent Auriol, President de la Republique Franc;aise,
A tous ceux qui ces presentes Lettres verront, Salut;
Un Accord complementaire a la Convention generale franco-britannique du 28
janvier 1950, relative aux regimes de securite sociale applicables en France et en Irlande
du Nord, devant etre prochainement signe a Paris, A Ces Causes, Nous confiant
entierement en la capacite, zeIe et devoument de Monsieur Pierre Garet, Ministre du
Travail et de la Securite Sociale, et de Monsieur Jean-Charles Serres, Ministre
Plenipotentiaire, Directeur des Affaires Administratives et Sociales au Ministere des
Affaires Etrangeres, Nous les avons nommes et constitues Nos Plenipotentiaires a l'effet
de negocier, conclure et signer avec le ou les Plenipotentiaires egalement munis de
Pleins Pouvoirs de la part de leur Gouvernement, tels Convention, Declaration ou Acte
quelconque qui seront juges necessaires dans l'interet de ces Pays.
Promettons d'accomplir et d'executer tout ce que Nos dits Plenipotentiaires auront
stipule et signe au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique Franc;aise sans permettre
qu'il y soit contrevenu directement ou indirectement ou de quelque maniere que ce soit.
En Foi de Quoi, Nous avons fait apposer aces presentes le Sceau de la Republique
Franc;aise.
Fait a Paris, le
12
mal
1952.
(Seal)
Le President du Conseil
des Ministres,
(Signed) ANT. PINA Y .
(Signed) V. AURIOL.
Par le President de la Republique
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
(Signed) ScHUMAN.
64
8.2 I.
A United States example:

Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America,
To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting:
Know Ye That, reposing special trust and confidence in the integrity, prudence, and
ability of Waiter S. Gifford, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the
United States of America to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, I have invested him with full and all manner of power and authority for and in
the name of the United States of America to meet and confer with any person or persons
duly authorized by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, being invested with like power and authority, and with such person
or persons to negotiate, conclude, and sign an agreement between the Government of
the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to facilitate the interchange of patent rights and technical information for
defense purposes, together with a related note.
In testimony whereof, I have caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
hereunto affixed.
Done at the city of Washington this fifth day ofDecember in the year ofour Lord one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-two and of the Independence of the United States of
America the one hundred seventy-seventh.
(Seal)
(Signed) HARRY S. TRUMAN.
By the President:
(Signed) DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State.
BOOK 11
Diplomatic agents in
general
Chapter
10
I I
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2I
22
23
24
25
Right of legation
Persona grata
Special missions
Diplomacy and radio
67
76
82
89
94
106
120
135
143
15 1
15 6
161
174
18 7
19 2
199
20
CHAPTER 9
Right of legation
9. I.
According to the principles which have been recognised since the time of
Grotius 1 and restated in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 196 I, both the establishment of diplomatic relations between
states and the establishment (which is legally distinct) of permanent diplomatic
missions take place by mutual consent. Every recognised independent state is
held to be entitled to send diplomatic agents to represent its interests in other
states, and reciprocally to receive such agents; and the right of legation has
been generally regarded as an attribute of sovereignty.
9.2.
The continuous residence of an embassy is a matter of comity, and not of right.

Nevertheless, so long a custom and so universal a consent have incorporated
this permission of residence into the practice of nations, that its refusal would
require unanswerable reasons for its justification. Such refusal was the ancient
practice of Far Eastern nations towards European states up to about the middle
of the nineteenth century, and in the case of Korea until 1883.
9.3.
In the past, treaties were often concluded expressly stipulating the right to
exchange diplomatic representatives. In 16 I 4, for example, it was provided by
a treaty between Sweden and Holland that the two states should mutually
accredit resident envoys. Holland had a similar agreement, also of 16 I 4, with
Brandenburg, Anhalt, Baden, Oettingen and Wiirttemberg. The Treaty of
Belgrade, 1739, between Russia and the Porte, provided that the former might
have a resident minister at Constantinople, of whatever category the Russian
sovereign might determine; and by Article V of the Treaty of KutchukKainardji, 1774 (10 January 1775), it was settled that the Russian
representative should always be of the second class, taking rank immediately
after the Imperial German minister; but if the latter were of a higher or lower
category, then the Russians to have precedence immediately after the Dutch,
or, in his absence, after the Venetian Ambassador. 2
9.4
After the setting up of the new Turkish State under Mustapha Kemal in 1923,
treaties were concluded establishing diplomatic relations with Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary) the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Spain, Sweden, the USSR and Yugoslavia. By the Treaty of Rapallo on 16
April 1922, Germany resumed diplomatic relations with Russia; and the Soviet
Union subsequently concluded treaties with various other countries to the
same effect.
68
Right of legation
9.5.
The conclusion of bilateral treaties providing for the establishment of

diplomatic relations is now considered necessary only in special circumstances.
Former British colonies, for example, have acquired the right of legation on
achieving independent sovereignty, so that no special treaties have been
needed to obtain it.
9.6.
Owing to varying interpretations of the relationship between the spiritual and

temporal powers of the Papacy, diplomatic agents of the Holy See have not
been received in all countries. Before the annexation ofthe Papal States to the
Kingdom of Italy, Prussia and Russia had legations at Rome, though nuncios
were not received at Berlin and St Petersburg; and a Secretary of the British
Legation at Florence usually resided at Rome as the unofficial medium of
communication. But after the annexation, some countries ceased to send
diplomatic representatives to the Vatican, and Britain maintained no regular
diplomatic intercourse with the Holy See until 19 14. The United States ceased
to be represented there in 1868. The right of the Holy See to diplomatic
representation abroad was nevertheless not affected by the annexation of the
States of the Church to the Kingdom of Italy. By the treaty of I I February 1929,
usually termed the 'Lateran Treaty,' between Italy and the Holy See, Italy
recognised the full ownership and the exclusive and absolute dominion and
sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City, all persons having
permanent residence there being subject to the sovereignty of the Holy See.
Under Article 12 of the treaty Italy also recognised the right of the Holy See to
active and passive legation, in accordance with the general rules of
international law, envoys of foreign governments continuing to enjoy in the
Kingdom all the privileges and immunities appertaining to diplomatic agents,
while their headquarters may remain in Italian territories and enjoy all
immunities due to them in accordance with international Law; an Italian
ambassador being accredited to the Holy See and a papal nuncio to Italy, the
latter being the doyen of the diplomatic corps in accordance with the customary
right recognised by the Congress of Vienna. (See 11.14 and 18.5.)
9.7.
During the Second World War, President Franklin Roosevelt created a mission
to the Holy See headed by Mr Myron Taylor with the personal, unofficial title
of Ambassador. Mr Taylor retired in 1951 but when a successor was nominated,
objections were raised both among the public and in the Senate. In 1969
President Nixon appointed former Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as his personal
representative to the Holy See with no official diplomatic title and thus no need
for senatorial confirmation. He was allotted a small resident staff Mr Lodge
was succeeded in 1977 by Mr Douglas Waiters, appointed by President Carter
as 'Special Representative to the Holy See', but without official title or personal
rank of Ambassador. Britain is now regularly represented at the Vatican by a
minister, and the Pope is represented in Britain by an apostolic delegate without diplomatic status but with unofficial access to the Government. At the
middle of this century there were as many as thirty nuncios representing the
Vatican abroad.
Right of making appointment
69
Diplomatic functions
9.8.
The function of a diplomatic mission is to represent the sending state, to protect

its interests and those of its nationals, to negotiate with the government to
which it is accredited, to report to the sending government on all matters of
importance to it, and to promote friendly relations in general between the two
countries. It must also endeavour to develop, in accordance with the
instructions it receives, cooperation useful to its government in matters of
commerce, finance, economics, labour, scientific research and defence. For
such purposes the head of mission will be assisted either by permanent members
of the diplomatic service specially trained under the auspices of the ministry of
foreign affairs, or by officers belonging to the army, navy, or air force, or to
other ministries of the government, specially selected for appointment as
attaches to the mission.
Right of making appointment

9.9.
In monarchical states the sovereign has the right, traditionally appertaining

to the head of state, of making appointments. Generally speaking, this right is
defined by the constitution. Thus, in the French Republic it is exercised by the
President; in the United States by the President in conjunction with the Senate,
whose consent is necessary to the nominations which the President sends it. 3
9.10.
In the case of a regency, the diplomatic agent is nevertheless accredited in the

name ofthe sovereign, whether he be a minor or be prevented by infirmity from
discharging his functions. During the minority of Louis XV, the Duke of
Orleans being regent, Cardinal Dubois negotiated the Triple Alliance of The
Hague in 1717, in virtue of credentials, full powers and instructions made out
in the name of the King. In England, during the periods when George III was
incapacitated for the transaction of affairs, the right of sending embassies was
vested in the Prince of Wales. The Republic of Poland, duringa vacancy of the
elective throne, exercised the right of embassy. 4
9.1 1.
On the occasion of the serious illness of King George V in 1928 His Majesty
signed Letters Patent authorising the issue of a Commission under the Great
Seal creating a Council of State, composed of the Queen, Prince ofWales, Duke
of York, Archbishop of Canterbury and the Prime Minister, who were
authorised to sign documents. 5 During the Royal Commonwealth Tour of
1953-4 the following were appointed Counsellors of State by Letters Patent in
accordance with the provisions of the Regency Acts of 1937, 1943 and 1953:
Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, the Princess Margaret, the Duke of
Gloucester, the Princess Royal and the Earl of Harewood. Formal documents
such as the credentials of ambassadors and ministers, full powers and
ratifications of treaties were signed on behalf of the Crown by the Regents.
9.12.
A monarch who is a prisoner-of-war cannot accredit diplomatic agents 6 ; nor a

monarch who has abdicated, or has been deposed.
70
Right of legation
Recognition of changed form of government

9.13.
When a civil war or a revolution breaks out, agents despatched to foreign

countries by the opponents ofthe hitherto constituted government ought not to
be officially received until the new state of things has assumed a permanent
character and given rise to the formation of a new de facto government which
has proved itself (whether elections have taken place or not) to be substantially
in control of the country. The fact that a party in a state, during a civil war, has
been recognised as a belligerent conveys no right to be diplomatically
represented abroad. But foreign states may negotiate with the agents of such a
belligerent informally, to provide for the safety of their subjects and of the
property of their subjects resident within the territory under the sway ofsuch a
party.7 During the continuance of a civil war or revolution the diplomatist on
the spot may often have to intervene on behalf of his own countrymen with the
insurgents in possession, but he will do this personally and unofficially until his
government recognises the new power which has been set up and, if necessary,
sends him new credentials. As long as the recognition ofa successor government
does not take place, the diplomatic agent previously received from the country
in question continues to represent the head of state which appointed him. In
1861, the United Kingdom, having recognised the Kingdom of Italy, which
had annexed the Neapolitan dominions, intimated to the charge d'affaires of
Naples that he could no longer be accredited as a representative of the King of
the Two Sicilies. 8 In 1871 Count Bismarck insisted that, in order that the
Government of National Defence should be recognised as having the right to
represent France diplomatically, it must be recognised by the French nation.
The right may sometimes be doubtful or disputed, e.g. when a sovereign has
assumed a title which is not as yet recognised by other Powers. On the occasion
of the coronation of King William I, Prussia not having recognised the
Kingdom of Italy, it was doubtful whether the King of Italy could send an
ambassador to attend the ceremony. The difficulty was overcome by
appointing General de la Rocca Ambassador of King Victor Emmanuel,
without specifying the country of which he was King. A converse predicament
arose when in 1936 Mussolini required that all credentials of newly appointed
ambassadors should be addressed to Vittorio Emmanuele Ill, KingofItaly and
Emperor of Ethiopia, the consequence of which appeared to be that all states
which were unwilling to recognise the latter title when providing credentials
for new heads of mission would have to be content to be represented at the level
of Charge d'affaires. The United States got over this by writing in the
credentials of their new Ambassador, 'Vittorio Emmanule Ill, King of Italy
et cetera, et cetera'. By 1938, however, Italian rule over Ethiopia was
recognised de facto by most European Powers.
9. 1 4.
There is no fixed method of according recognition to a new government

which has assumed office as a result of a revolutionary change. Any form of
notification suffices for the purpose, or any act on the part of a state which is
consistent only with such recognition.
9. 1 5.
In the case of many sudden and decisive revolutionary changes, the British
representative has been instructed (following the present-day trend towards
7I
according recognition in the most informal manner possible, that is by the mere
continuance of relations) to inform the new government that the British
Government consider that diplomatic relations between the two countries were
in no way affected by the change.
9. 16.
In Argentina General Ongania displaced President Illia by a swift and

bloodless coup d'etat early in the morning of28June 1966, dissolved the Congress
and the Provincial Assemblies, deposed the Provincial Governors, dismissed
five Judges of the Supreme Court and announced, in the Statute of the
Revolution, that all international obligations contracted by Argentina would
be honoured. The United States Government immediately expressed their
regret at the break in continuity which this action had caused, and announced
that, in accordance with the procedure regarding coups d'etat agreed at the
Inter-American Conference at Rio in 1965, all United States relations with
Argentina, including economic aid, were suspended pending discussion of th~
situation with the other Latin American countries. The Federal German
Government announced continuation of their relations with Argentina on 8
July and the United Kingdom recognised the new Government on 9July. The
United States followed suit on 15 July giving as their reason that at least forty
other governments had by that time done so, including twenty members of the
Organisation of American States.
9.17
In the case of the 1910 revolution in Portugal, official recognition was delayed
by the British Government until the new republic had been confirmed by a
general election, and until certain alterations, sufficient to protect British
church property in Portugal, had been made in the Constitution. Recognition
was accorded jointly with the Governments of Spain, Germany, Austria and
Italy, and was expressed in notes stating that, in view of the fact that the
Portuguese Constitution had been voted, the respective governments were glad
to join in the recognition of the republic.
9. I 8.
In 1924, following the plebiscite which resulted in favour of a republican form

of government in Greece, the British Government accepted the verdict as
representing the wishes of the Greek people and formally recognised the regime
thus established.
9.19.
The British note of I February 1924, to the Soviet Government stated that His
Majesty's Government recognised the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics as the
de jure rulers of those territories of the old Russian Empire which acknowledged
their authority. By the amendments to the Soviet constitution of I February
1944, the sixteen constituent republics of the Union were enabled to establish
separate foreign offices and diplomatic services; and at the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference in August of that year the Soviet Representative, Mr Gromyko,
proposed the admission to the future United Nations of all sixteen republics.
The United States delegation was somewhat taken aback by this suggestion,
but it was observed that several self-governing members of the British
Commonwealth would be candidates for admission. In the event, the Soviet
Government reduced their demands to include only the Ukraine and
Byelorussia, whose membership was in due course accepted. But subsequent
enquiries addressed to the Soviet Government by other governments about the
72
Right of legation
possibility of establishing diplomatic representation in these two republics, as

members of the United Nations, have never had a favourable response.
9.20.
On 16 February 1926 the Russian Consul-General in the Hedjaz sent Ibn Saud
a Note saying that the Russian Government recognised Ibn Saud's newly
proclaimed title of 'King', thus opening diplomatic relations. On 17 March
1927 there was an Exchange of Notes atJedda. From 1927 for several years the
Russians had a plenipotentiary representative at the court ofIbn Saud, but the
latter had no representative in Moscow.
9. 2 I.
Before the Second World War, Egypt and Iraq, being under treaties of
protection with the United Kingdom, and Syria and Lebanon, being under
treaties of protection with France, were unable to establish diplomatic relations
with third states. During the war, however, this status was altered, with the
result that Egypt was able to establish relations with the USSR on 23 August
1943, Syria on 26 July 1944, Lebanon on 5 August 1944 and Iraq on 13
September 1944.
9.22.
On 28 February 1966, four days after President Nktumah of Ghana had been
deposed by the Ghanaian Army in his absence from the country, the Ghanaian
High Commissioner-designate to London, whom Nkrumah himself had
proposed to send, flew from Peking to London and declared his loyalty to the
new Ghanaian Government as representing the State. The new Government
was recognised by Britain and by the United States on 4 March. Full
diplomatic relations between Britain and Ghana were re-established on 6
March, and a new British High Commissioner despatched on 9 March.
9.23.
In March 1975 the forces of the Khmer Rouge, having overrun large areas of
Cambodia and attacked Phnom Penh, warned all foreign diplomatic missions
in the capital that they should cease functioning. The French, whose mission,
after withdrawal of the Ambassador in 197 I and of the Charge d'Affaires in
1973, had remained in the charge of a Secretary, closed their diplomatic office
on 17 March, leaving a Consul in charge of French interests. The French
Embassy building however continued after the fall of Phnom Penh on 17 April
to provide a refuge for a number of diplomats and other foreigners until all
were obliged to leave the country at the end of the month. The British, who
since 1974 had been represented in Cambodia by their Ambassador in Saigon,
closed the Embassy office on 2 I March. The United States (the last functioning
foreign diplomatic mission) began evacuating their offices early in April.
Meanwhile the Soviet Government had on 28 March asked the Cambodian
Republic's Charge d'Affaires to leave Moscow, and forthwith recognised the
Royal Government of National Union headed by Prince Sihanouk. This new
Government, having established indisputable control of the greater part ofthe
national territory, was recognised by a number ofcountries in the second halfof
April and by the United Kingdom on 2 May. The French Government
accorded recognition on 12 April and handed over the keys of the Cambodian
Embassy in Paris to the representative of the Royal Government; but the
mission continued to use the flat which it had occupied during the civil war.
Prince Sihanouk stayed at the ambassadorial residence in October 1975, but as
the Royal Government made no attempt to establish diplomatic relations, the
73
French authorities closed the Cambodian Embassy at the end of the year.
9.24.
On the occasion, in April 1931, of the revolution in Spain and the departure of
the King of Spain from that country, the governments of most foreign states,
including those of the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth
countries, forthwith recognised the new regime. The former Spanish
Ambassador in London, the Marques de Merry del Val, having resigned, a
charge d'affaires ad interim was appointed by the Provisional Government, and
in May Senor Perez de Ayala took up his appointment in London as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from the Provisional Government, being received in that capacity, and his name placed on the diplomatic
list. However, the British Ambassador in Madrid was not furnished with new
credentials pending the confirmation by popular vote of the new regime which
had been set up in Spain and the election of a constitutional President of the
Republic.
9.25.
On 4 November 1938, during the Spanish Civil War, the British Prime
Minister (Mr Neville Chamberlain) announced in the House ofCommons that
his Government had entered, without prejudice to the Non-Intervention Pact
(proposed by Britain in August 1936), into negotiations with the Spanish
Nationalist authorities for an exchange of agents to discuss matters affecting
British nationals and commerce in Spain. The agents would not be given
diplomatic status. Occasional visits by the Commercial Secretary ofthe British
Embassy in Hendaye (where it was temporarily located) afforded inadequate
contact with the authorities at Burgos and Salamanca, while the appointment
of new consuls at these cities would imply a measure of recognition which was
not intended. On 27 February 1939, however, British recognition of General
Franco's Government as the legal Government of Spain was announced. On 4
March 1939 Sir Maurice Peterson was appointed Ambassador at Burgos.
9.26.
On General Franco's death on 20 November 1975, the British Government

immediately recognised the new constitutional arrangements which had been
foreseen for restoring the Spanish monarchy. HRH The Duke of Edinburgh
represented The Queen at the service held in Madrid on 27 November to
celebrate the accession of King Juan Carlos to the throne of Spain.
9.27.
Sometimes the installation of a new government is a consequence of the

establishment of a new state, the recognition of which must of course be
antecedent to that of the government. In international law the recognition ofa
state and the recognition of a government are entirely distinct and involve
different criteria. The following are instances of the successive stages in the
recognition of new states and their governments.
9.28.
On 6 December 1971, at the culmination of the hostilities between India and

Pakistan, the Pakistan Army surrendered to Indian forces and a gO\.(~rnment
initially calling itself the Pakistan Government in exile was established on 17
December in Dacca. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had been declared
President of the newly seceded state (Bangladesh) while he was still in prison in
West Pakistan, was released by President Bhutto on 8 January 1972. He
immediately flew to London, where he was told by the British Prime Minister
that the eventual recognition of Bangladesh by the British Government would
74
Right of legation
depend on the normal criteria: full control of its territory by the new
Government; the support of the majority ofthe population; and clear signs that
the newly set up State had reasonable prospects of permanence. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman arrived in Dacca on 10 January and announced in the
Provisional Constitution Order on I I January that the country was a
parliamentary democracy and that a Constituent Assembly would be called.
Meanwhile the new state had been recognised by India and Bhutan on 6
December 1971. The USSR recognised it on 24 January 1972; Australia and
New Zealand on 3 I January; the United Kingdom and the German Federal
Republic on 4 February; France on 12 February; and about thirty other
countries before the end of the month. As a protest against the decision by
Commonwealth Governments to recognise Bangladesh, Pakistan withdrew
from the Commonwealth on 30 January 1972.
9.29.
Relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh were severed until 1974, when
President Bhutto, in spite of outstanding subjects of disagreement between the
two Governments, decided on the eve of the Islamic Conference at Lahore to
accord recognition to Bangladesh in the interests of Islamic harmony.
9.30.
In September 1973, following the recognition by Britain of the new state of

North Vietnam, the British and North Vietnamese Governments agreed to
exchange diplomatic representatives at ambassadorial level. But when in
January 1974 the British sought to accredit an ambassador, the Government of
North Vietnam refused to accept his credentials and after a year he was
withdrawn. In July 1975, however, Britain having two months previously
recognised the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the
North Vietnamese Government accepted the appointment as British Ambassador of the officer who had since the beginning ofthe year been acting as Charge
d' Affaires in Hanoi. On 5July 1976 Britain recognised the new state created by
the reunification of North and South Vietnam.
Multiple accreditation
9.3 I.
A head of mission may be accredited to more than one state, so long as the
receiving states concerned have been duly notified and have raised no
objection. 9 Such multiple accreditation has often been found convenient for
geographical reasons, or because it has been desired to limit expenditure on
diplomatic missions. Subject to the same proviso, a member of the diplomatic
staff of a mission may be similarly assigned to more than one state.
9.32.
The Mongolian People's Republic was recognised as an independent state and

admitted to membership by the United Nations in October 1961. An
agreement was reached in January 1963 between Britain and Mongolia for the
mutual accreditation of ambassadors. The British Ambassador who visited
Ulan Bator to present his credentials in May 1963 was normally resident in
Peking where he held the appointment of Charge d' Affaires ad interim in the
British Embassy. The Mongolian Ambassador to Britain was accredited also in
Poland and normally resided there.
Multiple accreditation
75
9.33.
The principle being accepted that it is possible to appoint a diplomatic agent

whose presence will not be continuously required and who will accordingly not
be regularly resident in the country to which he is accredited, it may not be
unreasonable to ask agrement for a head of mission who will concurrently hold
another appointment, for example in the ministry of foreign affairs of the
sending country. In July 1970, for example, the head of the West African
Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was concurrently
accredited as Ambassador to the Chad Republic. At posts where such an
arrangement is found acceptable, routine transactions may be carried on by a
small office in the charge of a secretary, or under the supervision of a consul.
9.34.
Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 196 I provides

that two or more states may accredit the same person as head of mission to
another state, unless objection is offered by the receiving state. Arrangements of
this kind are sometimes found feasible by states which belong to a geographical
group and whose political and economic policies show affinities or corn plement
each other. However, it is not always easy to ensure that priorities can be
adapted to coincide in the long term; and the difficulties may be complicated
by additional problems of procedure and protocol.
CHAPTER
10
The selection of diplomatic

agents
10. I.
Most modern states entrust the conduct of their diplomatic business, at least
below the rank ofambassador, to a professional diplomatic service. This service
consists of men and, increasingly, women who have begun their careers at
junior level and risen gradually but regularly to higher rank. In the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth, the United Kingdom maintained special
regional services such as the China Consular Service and the Levant Service,
covering the Middle East. However, the modern tendency in all countries has
been to maintain a unified diplomatic and consular service with, at least in
theory, complete interchangeability both of diplomatic function and geographical area of work.
Heads of lDission
10.2.
As regards heads of mission, practice varies between countries. In United

States' practice, posts of prime importance are often held by people of
distinguished standing in public life, nearly always drawn from the political
party in power. A good instance from the mid-twentieth century period was the
appointment consecutively to London and MoscowofW. Averill Harriman. In
the British service, such appointments are exceptional and are made in
response to special circumstances. Examples are the appointment of the
Marquis of Lothian to Washington in 1939, to be followed on his death in 1940
by no less a figure than the former Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Halifax
(1940 - 6 ).
10.3.
In the United States, Article 11, Section 2,2 of the Constitution declares that
'the President shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.'
Diplomatic appointments to missions of all classes were formerly conferred
almost without exception on political supporters of the party whose nominee
had been elected President. But by the Rogers Act of 24 May 1924, a career
service was established amalgamating the diplomatic and consular branches
and providing for a uniform system of grading and salaries up to the level of
head of mission. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 codified and superseded all
previous legislation and made it no longer necessary for career officers to
hesitate to accept appointment as head of mission for fear that they would be
Heads of mission
77
displaced with a change of Administration. While, therefore, the presidential

prerogative of appointment remains in force, custom does not now require
career heads of mission (as opposed to political appointees) to submit their
resignations upon the inauguration of a new president.
10.4.
In the early days of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, appointments of

heads of diplomatic missions were undoubtedly and indeed necessarily made
on political grounds. By a decree of 22 MaY-4 June 1918, the titles of
ambassador, envoy, etc. were abolished, and a single class created, called
Representants Plenipotentiaires. But the need of indicating the rank ofthese agents
when accredited to foreign states compelled a modification, and their
credentials, while styling them Representants Plenipotentiaires, add to the
designation' cl titre d' ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipotentiaire,' or other
description, according to the rank to be assigned to them in the country in
which they are to serve. In diplomatic lists in foreign countries Soviet diplomats
carry the same designations as are employed by the diplomatic agents of other
countries.
10.5.
The regulations of the British service say: 'In regard to all appointments
whatever in the service, the Secretary of State will be free to make any such
selection as, on his own responsibility, he may deem right, without being bound
by claims founded on seniority or on membership of the service.' Literally
understood, this would give the foreign secretary total power over the most
important appointments; in practice, of course, an appointment of the highest
importance would not be made without consultation with the prime minister.
10.6.
If the diplomatist suggested for appointment as ambassador or envoy is

married, the social gifts, character, religion, past history or original nationality
of his wife may be important in the determination of his appointment. If
married women are appointed as heads of mission, comparable considerations
will no doubt apply.
10.7
Before 1914, entry into the British Diplomatic Service was by nomination. Sir
David Kelly relates l how, when he left Oxford in 1913, Sir Herbert Warren,
the President of Magdalen College, secured for him 'without any difficulty the
indispensable nomination.' Following the normal practice of that day, Kelly
presented himself in due course before the Foreign Office Selection Board. This
consisted of a panel of senior members of the service whose approach to their
task was strictly non-political. Having been accepted by the Board, Kelly spent
some time at a 'crammer's' (concentrated tuition course) to prepare for an
examination in history and languages. As the best general reading to fit himself
for diplomacy, Sir Herbert Warren had recommended biography, memoirs
and the Latin poet Horace.
10.8.
In 1914 a British Royal Commission on the Civil Service made a number of

recommendations, of which two of the most important were that the
diplomatic establishment of the Foreign Office and the diplomatic staff of
missions abroad should be amalgamated up to and including the rank of
assistant under-secretary of state and (diplomatic) minister of the most junior
grade; that the existing property qualification (the possession of an income of
400 a year) should be abolished, and that the members of the service employed
78
abroad should receive a suitable foreign allowance. These recommendations

were accepted in principle and were carried out after the First World War.
10.9.
In 1943 the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, the Consular Service and
the Commercial Diplomatic Service were brought together to form one
amalgamated service. In 1964 a committee under the chairmanship of Lord
Plowden, appointed by the Prime Minister to examine and report on
representational services overseas set out, in a report submitted to Parliament,
the reasons underlying the need to reform the structure and administration of
these services in the light of changing political, social and economic
circumstances. The report contains chapters of permanent value on the
conduct of Commonwealth relations and foreign policy and the working ofthe
British Diplomatic Service, as well as on recruitment and training, to which the
reader interested in these subjects can refer. 2
o.
In most countries it is an essential requirement for entry into the diplomatic

service that the candidate should be a subject or citizen of the country. A
further requirement is generally a university honours degree, or its equivalent,
and a satisfactory performance in an examination, which may in Britain and
France be that prescribed for the higher grades of the Civil Service. A special
selection board then has the responsibility of choosing from among the
successful candidates those who appear best qualified to fill the vacancies
occurring in the service. In Britain candidates are tested by the Civil Service
Selection Board for their aptitude in dealing with the administrative problems
posed by a given dossier; in the handling of discussion in small groups and in
committee; and in drafting. Their character and personality are assessed after
searching observation and the application of psychological tests. In many
countries today the problems of selection and recruitment for the diplomatic
service are the subject of continuing experimentation. Moreover, these
problems vary widely, since the kind of service a country requires is that best
suited to its particular stage ofevolution, social and economic background, and
national objectives and priorities. Recruitment will be conditioned to some
extent by educational resources. Newly independent countries have no choice
but to send abroad as ambassadors people who have held important positions
before independence, whether in the national independence movement,
academic life, the judiciary or the higher Civil Service.
10. I I.
In considering what sort of person the selectors should look for among younger
candidates for the service it is important to discern not only present attainments
but also future potentiality, a judgement requiring particular insight, and to
distinguish qualities of mind and character from acquired knowledge. A
representative should have a good all-round knowledge of his own country,
rooted in familiarity with its history and culture; and he should have a grasp of
the forces at work in its social, political and economic life. Unless he has this
kind of knowledge, and with it a powerful feeling of attachment (for which
personal ambition and vanity are no substitute), he will be unconvincing as an
interpreter of his country abroad. Moreover ifhe has not learned to understand
his own country to this degree, he will be less likely to develop an instinct for
asking the right questions or a flair for understanding the realities of the
countries in which he may have to work. It is obvious that a very young man or
10. I
Heads of mission
79
woman cannot be expected to have gained expert knowledge of all the various
aspects of national life. But diplomacy does not require polymaths; it is the
aptitude to learn and judge that matters. One of the diplomat's essential
abilities is that of knowing where to find needed information, how to acquire
and interpret it speedily and accurately, and when to make imaginative use of
it.
10.12.
Bismarck has left us a typically concise and pragmatic summary of what is

expected of a diplomat. 'His work consists of practical intercourse with men, of
judging accurately what people are likely to do in given circumstances, of
appreciating accurately the views of others, and of accurately presenting his
,
own.
10.13.
An active interest in human beings and sensitivity (which does not mean nafvele)
in converse with them are essentials to successful diplomacy. These qualities
tend to be underrated by outside observers, who may feel not unnaturally that
knowledge of foreign languages should take first place. It is true that for
diplomats whose language is scarcely known outside their own country. a
thorough knowledge of at least one of the internationally used languages
(particularly English or French) is essential. In most countries a diplomat
without special aptitude for languages can acquire by hard work at the outset of
his posting a sufficient practical grasp of the language to carry him through
day-to-day life, if not to do business. Facility acquired in a foreign language is
almost always admired as a capacity, and appreciated as a courtesy; and when
visiting parts of the country away from a cosmopolitan capital it is a most
valuable tool of the trade. For these reasons, both the American and Soviet
Governments have in recent years devoted much effort to producing diplomats
whose knowledge of foreign languages is not just adequate but truly expert.
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office facilitates the organised study of
languages and has instituted a scale of financial incentives for proficiency.
10.14.
Much has been written about the superlative qualities desirable in diplomacy.
Few persons can embody them all, but the greater part ofa diplomat's armoury
can be developed and improved by sincere application guided by the advice
and example of his seniors. This chapter is concerned primarily with the
foundations on which to build. For these the selectors must be satisfied that
there is a hard core to the applicant's personality. On it will rest the courage,
toughness in confrontation, patience and perseverance without which many
more brilliant gifts can come to grief. Contrary to popular belief, diplomacy is
not a career for the compliant. It often imposes on an officer the duty of
defending the interests of his country in places not of his own choice, where he
must be prepared to withstand the erosion of his health by uncongenial
climates. He must also withstand the moral attrition to which he may be
exposed in the front line of international politics, without flinching from the
Roman precept: aliis licet, tibi non licel.
10.15.
In sum, the acceptable candidate for diplomacy 'should be at the same time a
thinker and a doer, a man of action and a man of learning; a man who is
outgoing, but not insincere, studious and reflective but not withdrawn. He
should not be too pleased with himselfor easily offended; and he should be able
80
to distinguish between the consideration and treatment that he receives on

account of his position and that which is due to him personally. He should
combine a coldly analytical mind with a warm personality; and although he
cannot always be his natural self he must be inherently frank and honest, and
be able to inspire trust and confidence in others. '3 A century ago, Baron Charles
de Martens wrote,
'Pour que l'agent diplomatique inspire la confiance si necessaire au sucd~s des
affaires, il faut que, sans abandon affecte, son caractere fasse croire cl sa franchise. Le
soupc;on de finesse provoque la mefiance, et la marche des affaires en soufTre. '4
10. I
6.
A classic illustration offailure in this last and most vital quality was provided by
a distinguished man of letters and lifelong friend of John Donne and Izaak
Walton, Sir Henry Wotton, whose incursions into diplomacy over a number of
years were frustrated by a temperament which led many ofhis contemporaries
to regard him as less than trustworthy. It was an unkind poetic justice perhaps
that caused his ill-managed jest about ambassadors 'lying abroad' for the sake
of their country to recoil on him eight years afterwards, bringing him the
disfavour of his master and a bar to preferment, and leaving to posterity a
byword relished only by the ill disposed. An account ofthe episode by his friend
Izaak Walton s is appended here as a Cautionary Tale.
'At his first going ambassador into Italy, as he passed through Germany, he stayed
some days at Augusta [Augsburg], where having been in his former Travels, well-known
by many of the best note for Learning and Ingeniousness (those that are esteemed the
Vertuosi of that Nation) with whom he passing an Evening in Merriments, was requested
by Christopher Flecamore 6 to write some Sentence in his Albo (a Book ofwhite Paper, which
for that purpose many of the German Gentry usually carry about them) and Sir Henry
Wotton consenting to the motion, took an occasion from some accidental discourse ofthe
present Company, to write a pleasant definition of an Ambassadour, in these very
words:
Legatus est vir bonus peregre missus ad mentiendum Reipublica causa.
'Which Sir Henry Wotton could have been content should have been thus Englished:
An Ambassador is an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the good of his Country.
'But the word for lye (being the hinge upon which the Conceit was to turn) was not so
expressed in Latine, as would admit (in the hands of an Enemy especially) so fair a
construction as Sir Hen~y thought in English. Yet as it was, it slept quietly among other
Sentences in this Albo, almost eight years, till by accident it fell into the hands of Jasper
Scioppius, a Romanist, a man of a restless spirit, and a malicious Pen: who with Books
against King James, Prints this as a Principle of that Religion professed by the King, and
his Ambassadour Sir Henry Wotton then at Venice: and in Venice it was presently written
after in several Glass-windows, and spitefully declared to be Sir Henry Wotton's.
'This coming to the knowledge of King James, he apprehended it to be such an
oversight, such a weakness, or worse in Sir Henry Wotton as caused the King to express
much wrath against him: and this caused Sir Henry Wotton to write two Apologies, one to
Velserus (one of the Chiefs of Augusta) in the universal Language, which he caused to be
Printed, and given, and scattered in the most remarkable places both of Germany and
Italy, as an Antidote against the venemous Books ofScioppius; and another Apology to
King James: which were both so ingenius, so clear, and so choicely Eloquent, that his
Majesty (who was a pure judge of it) could not forbear, at the receit thereof, to declare
publickly, That Sir Henry Wotton had commuted sufficiently for a greater offence.'
In the letter to Mark Welser, Wotton calls his 'pleasant definition'
Heads of mission
81
'iocosam Legati definitionem, quam iam ante octennium istclc transiens apud amicum
virum Christophorum Fleckamerum forte posueram in Al bo Amicorum more
Teutonico, his ipsis verbis; "Legatus est vir bonus, peregre missus ad mentiendum
reipublica: causa." Definitio adeo fortasse catholica, ut complecti possit etiam Legatos a
latere.'7
10.17.
This sting in the tail was of course a riposte against Scioppius, whose diatribe
(entitled Ecclesiasticus), aimed at King James and his theology, contained the
assertion that he had sent a self-confessed liar abroad as his ambassador. The
fact that a further play is suggested on the term legatus 8 was doubtless calculated
to please the King.
10.18.
Walton, as a loyal friend, puts as good a face on it as he can, but all that could be
said in mitigation of Sir Henry's unwisdom (it was only light-hearted; it had
been an evening of merriments, a private occasion; there had probably been
chaff about the widely accepted 'Machiavellian' notions of diplomacy current
in those days) only serves to point the lesson of what may, when least expected,
overtake the diplomat who gives rein to an incautious display of wit. As the
Arab proverb says, 'The word you have not spoken is your slave; the word you
have spoken is your master.'
10.19.
Evidence that Sir Henry Wotton took his lesson to heart may be found in his
giving to a friend who, 'being designed for the employment of an Ambassador
. . . requested from him some experimental rules for his Prudent and Safe
Carriage in his negotiations ... this Infallible Aphorism, that, to be in safety
himself and serviceable to his country, he should always and upon all occasions,
speak the truth ... "for you shall never be believed; and by this means, your
truth will secure yourself, if you shall ever be called upon to any account; and
twill put your Adversaries (who will still hunt counter) to a loss in all their
disquisitions and undertakings." '9 And in a letter to Milton on 13 April 1638,
giving advice for an intended journey into Italy, he quoted an old Roman
courtier of his acquaintance: 'Signor Arrigo mio, i pensieri stretti, il viso sciolto,
will go safely over the whole world.,lo
CHAPTER
11
Classification of diplomatic
agents
11. I .
The following regulations determining the classification of diplomatic agents

were adopted at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
Reglentent sur le rang entre les agents diplontatiques l

Pour prevenir les embarras qui se sont souvent presentes et qui pourraient naitre encore des pretentions
de preseance entre les divers agents diplomatiques, les plhlipotentiaires des puissances signatazres du
traiti de Paris sont convenus des articles qui suivent; et ils croient devoir inviter les representants des
autres tites couronnees a adopter le mime reglement.
Art. I. - Les employes diplomatiques sont partages en trois classes:
Celle des ambassadeurs, legats ou nonces;
Celle des envoyes, ministres ou autres, accredites aupres des souverains:
Celle des charges d'affaires, accredites aupres des ministres charges du portefeuille
des affaires etrangeres.
Art. 2. - Les ambassadeurs, legats ou nonces, ont seul le caractere representatif.
Art. 3. - Les employes diplomatiques en mission extraordinaire n'ont, cl ce titre,
aucune superiorite de rang.
Art. 4. - Les employes diplomatiques prendront rang entre eux, dans chaque classe,
d'apres la date de la notification officielle de leur arrivee.
Le present reglement n'apportera aucune innovation relativement aux representants du pape.
Art 5. - 11 sera determine dans chaque Etat, une mode uniforme pour la reception
des employes diplomatiques de chaque classe.
Art. 6. - Les liens de parente ou d'alliance de famille entre les cours ne donnent
aucun rang a leurs employes diplomatiques.
11 en est de meme des alliances politiques.
Art. 7. - Dans les actes ou traites entre plusieurs puissances qui admettent l'alternat,
le sort decidera, entre les ministres, de l'ordre qui devra etre suivi dans les signatures.
Le present reglement sera insere au protocole des plenipotentiaires des huit
puissances signataires du traite de Paris, dans leur seance du 19 mars, 1815.
[1.2.
The document was signed, 2 not in accordance with Article 7, but in

alphabetical order of the states represented, viz.: Autriche, Espagne, France,
Grande-Bretagne, Portugal, Prusse, Russie, Suede. Nevertheless the determination 3 of rank among diplomatic agents effected by these regulations
(which have formed the basis of present practice) was designed toput an end to
the disputes which had constantly arisen in the past regarding matters of
precedence. How such preoccupations affected the classification and nomenclature of diplomatic agents in earlier days is illustrated in the historical notes
in the second part of this chapter.
Reglement sur le rang entre les agents diplomatiques
11.3.
83
Today heads of mission are divided, as stated in Article 14 of the Vienna

Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 196 I, into three classes:
Ambassadors or nuncios accredited to heads of state, and other heads of
mission (such as High Commissioners in the Commonwealth 4 ) ofequivalent
rank;
2. Envoys, ministers and internuncios accredited to heads of state;
3. Charges d' affaires accredited to ministers of foreign affairs.
I.
(Questions of precedence as between diplomatic representatives at the present

day are dealt with in 13.10 and 20.9.)
11.4.
What class of agents shall be accredited is a matter for arrangement between

the governments concerned, the usual practice being to exchange agents of the
same class. The Swiss Confederation, although receiving ambassadors from
various countries, for long maintained the practice ofappointing only ministers
as heads oftheir own missions abroad. In 1956 the Federal Assembly authorised
the Federal Council to transform Swiss legations into embassies and it was in
1957 that the title of 'ambassador' was first given to heads ofSwiss missions. Up
to 1893 the United States made it a rule to appoint agents of not higher rank
than envoy. At the beginning of Queen Victoria's reign the United Kingdom
had ambassadors at Vienna, Paris, St Petersburg and Constantinople. From
1844 to 1860 the post at St Petersburg was occupied by an envoy and minister.
The legation at Berlin was raised to an embassy in 1862, that at Rome in 1876,
at Madrid in 1887, at Washington in 1893, at Tokyo in 1905, at Brussels in
19 I 9, at Rio de Janeiro in 1919, at Lisbon in 1924, at Buenos Aires in 1927, at
Warsaw in 1929, and at Santiago in 1930. The embassy at Vienna was reduced
to a legation in 1920 and so remained until it was closed in 1938 at the time of
the Anschluss with Germany. It is now again an embassy.
11.5.
The British legations in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were raised to

embassies in 1963, a corresponding change being made in the status of those
countries' representations in London. This was officially announced as a
'normalising process' without special political significance. The Times,
however, noted the abandonment of what it termed the 'invidious practice' of
discriminating according to the supposed relative importance of relations with
different foreign countries. The raising to embassy status of the British
representation in Peking in 1972 was regarded as an important step in the
development of relations between the United Kingdom and the Chinese
People's Republic.
11.6. In all these cases the change of status took place by mutual consent and the
British diplomatic agent became ambassador. Similar upgrading has taken
place all over the world during the last 100 years in recognition of the growing
importance of the political and commercial relations of an increasing number
of independent states. The Second World War created new situations. In 1942
the United States raised their mission to The Netherlands from legation to
embassy and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom promptly
followed suit. The same procedure was shortly after adopted in the case of the
other exiled governmen ts. Since the end of the 1939 war, in accordance with the
principle of equality among nations as embodied in the United Nations
84
Charter, the tendency has become almost universal. Nearly all heads ofBritish
missions now have the title of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.
The habitual use of these terms is only to be understood by reference to their
historical background.
11.7.
The institution of permanent diplomatic missions originated in Italy in the

fifteenth century, Venice being one of its foremost exponents. 5 In the sixteenth
century the Republic had ambassadors ordinary at Vienna, Paris, Madrid and
Rome, while the Emperor and the Kings of France and Spain had
ambassadors, and the Holy See a nuncio, at Venice. Residents were accredited
to the courts of Naples, Turin, Milan and London, as well as to the Swiss
cantons. At Constantinople there was a bailo (bajulus). 6 It was partly the cost of
embassies, partly the trouble arising from disputes about precedence and
ceremonial, that led to the appointment of agents or residents, who were not
entitled to the same ceremonial honours as ambassadors. 7 In the sixteenth
century the less honourable title of agent began to fall into disuse, and the
process continued during the seventeenth century.8 Charge d'affaires was
another title for these diplomats of lower rank. Residents are found at
various periods till the close of the eighteenth century. In 1675 the Dutch
negotiator of the preliminary treaty with Sweden respecting contraband of
war, etc. is described as 'Minister Celsorum & Prrepotentium Dominorum
Ordinum Generalium Frederati Belgii ad Aulam altissime memoratre Regire
Sacrre Majestatis Suecire Residens,' and also as 'Dominus Residens,' both in
the preamble. Frederick William of Brandenburg (Der Grosse Kurfiirst), from
motives of economy, appointed no ambassadors. In 1651 he had residents at
The Hague, Vienna, Paris, Stockholm, Cologne and Brussels. 9 Bonet was the
King of Prussia's resident in London in 1710. In 1745, France had a resident at
Geneva. The Holy Roman Emperor in 1727 had residents at London, Lisbon
and Constantinople. Vattel, in 1758, speaks of ambassadors, envoys, residents
and ministers. 10
11.8.
The designation envoye, which is a translation of ablegatus, seems up to the

middle of the seventeenth century not to have been more highly esteemed than
that of resident. II At that period the general position was as follows: diplomatic
agents were still divided into two classes, the first consisting of ambassadors or
legati, the second comprising agents, residents, envoyes and ablegati; of these
agent is the earliest, envoye the latest in origin. Just as the title of resident had
superseded that of agent, so the envoye with the additional qualification of
extraordinaire pushed the resident ever further into the background.
II.g.
In the second half of the seventeenth century arose the practice of designating
resident ambassadors as 'extraordinary.' Originally this term had been applied
only to those who were sent on special missions. The disputes about precedence
between ordinary and extraordinary ambassadors furnished the motive to both
monarchs and their agents for this otherwise unreasonable custom. In imitation
of the ambassador extraordinary, the addition was conferred upon envoys, who
thereupon began to claim precedence over residents. Such questions of
precedence were naturally regulated by the etiquette of the court to which the
diplomatic agent happened to be appointed, and in Louis XIV's time the
French Court refused to make any difference. Still the envoys extraordinary
Ambassadors
85
went on asserting their pretensions, until in the beginning of the eighteenth

century the balance began to incline in their favour at Paris and Vienna, the
two courts which were most regarded as having a voice in such matters, while
lesser courts continued to recognise only the old division into two classes. The
title of resident was also degraded by the smaller German courts giving, or even
selling, it to private persons who had no diplomatic functions at all l2 (much in
the same way as in more recent times they had conferred decorations with a
lavish hand). In the eighteenth century, between the envoy extraordinary and
the resident there are found ministers, ministers resident and ministers
plenipotentiary. 13 Plenipotentiarii nomine tales magis in usu sunt, quam vere tales, says
a writer of 1740 quoted by Krauske. At the negotiations which preceded the
Peace of Nijmegen (1678), the conjunction of the two titles of envoy
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in one person made its appearance.
According to the regulations at the French Court the envoy extraordinary
presented his letters of credence to the King, while the mere minister
plenipotentiary, like the resident and others of the third class, such as the
charge d' affaires, delivered theirs to the minister for foreign affairs.
AlIlbassadors
11.10.
The derivation of ambassador seems to be as follows: Fr. ambaxadeur (fifteenth

century), asp. ambaxador, It. ambasciatore, respectively from ambaxade, asp.
ambaxada, It. ambasciata; all these are presumed to derive from ambactidre, a word
not found but inferred to have existed, and formed on ambactia, ambaxia in the
Salic and Burgundian laws, meaning charge, office, employment office.
Ambactia was the office of ambactus (found in Cresar, De Bello Gallico, vi. 15, in the
sense of 'servant, vassal, or retainer', and believed to be an adaption ofa Gallic
word.) 'Le mot ambaxador etait apparu au milieu du xur siecle' (Nys,
Origines du droit international, p. 3 17). 'Au XIV e siecle, la terminologie ambaxiator
continuus atteste deja la stabilite de l' institution.' Ambaxiator occurs in the treaty
between Henry V and Charles VI of France, of 14 October 1417 (Dumont, ii,
pt ii, 92; Rymer, IX, 517). 'Du VIUeau Xesiecle, dans les actes de la chanChancellerie verbe d'origine germanique ambasciare designe l'intervention de
quelque grand personnage dans le but de faire obtenir une concession du
souverain; l'intermediaire s' appelle l' ambasciator. Au XIV e siecle, ce dernier
mot devient usuel et passe dans plusieurs langues.' (R. de Maulde-la-Claviere,
cited by N ys, Le Droit international, ii. 34 I. )
11. I I.
Article 2 of the Vienna Reglement says ofambassadors, legates and nuncios, that
they alone have representative character, and by this was meant that agents of
the first class only were considered as representing the person of their sovereign,
though they did not receive all the honours due to the sovereign himself. Their
privileges were originally founded on the supposition that they alone were
competent to carry on negotiations with the sovereign himself. But this has no
real signification in modern times, for they deal as a rule with the minister for
foreign affairs, even in countries which preserve a monarchical form of
government. It is sometimes supposed that an ambassador can demand access
86
to the person of the head of the state at any time, but this is not the case, as the
occasions on which the ambassador can speak with the head of the state are
limited by the etiquette of the court or government to which he is accredited.
The so-called 'representative character' of the ambassador extends no farther,
as Leibnitz says, than 'quantumfert ratio aut consuetudo.' It gives him no right to go
behind the back of the minister for foreign affairs, and negotiate with the
sovereign direct. As Prince Bismarck rightly observed, no envoy or ambassador
has the right of demanding a personal interview with the head ofstate, nor can
the sovereign in any state which possesses a parliamentary constitution
negotiate apart from the advice of his responsible minister. Only in practice,
and especially in the case of absolute rulers, has the easier access to the sovereign
which an ambassador enjoys, any political importance, as was perceived in
1853 in the personal negotiations of Lord Stratford with the Sultan, and of the
Prussian ambassador Graf v. d. Goltz with Napoleon III in 1866. The same
ground is opposed to it from the side of the state to which he is accredited. If a
minister for foreign affairs has to endure that what he has settled with an envoy is
upset by conversations of the latter with the sovereign, no steady ifolgerichtige)
policy is possible. Frederick the Great refused to have any ambassadors,
because they were an inconvenience. 14
Legates and nuncios

11.12.
Canon law distinguished three kinds oflegates: the legatus missus (or apostolic
nuncio); the legatus a lalere (literally 'from the Pope's side'), who might be
ordinarius, that is responsible for a legation in one of the former Papal States, or
extraordinarius, that is a plenipotentiary envoy of the Pope, charged with a
special mission; and the legatus natus, a title often associated with a particular see
where the legate might hold an archbishopric, as formerly at Canterbury and
York, and still at Seville, Rheims and Cologne. 15
11.13
A nuncio is thus a legatus missus, but is distinguished from a legatus a latere, who
nowadays is always a cardinal, and of course from a legatus natus, who is not a
diplomatic agent at all. An apostolic delegate is a papal official responsible to
the Holy See for the supervision of ecclesiastical matters and has no diplomatic
status. 16
11.14.
In Roman Catholic countries, and in some others, the nuncio has traditionally
been regarded as the doyen of the resident diplomatic body. In 1856 the British
official interpretation of Article 4 of the Vienna Reglement was that 'if by the
invariable custom of any court the representative ofthe Pope had at the time of
the Congress been allowed to take precedence of all other diplomatic agents of
the same class, without reference to the date of his arrival, that custom should
not be affected by the new regulation.' This view has since been maintained.
Moreover, in other countries to which a nuncio has, since the time of the
Congress of Vienna, been accredited, the practice of conceding precedence to
him has, according to local circumstances and as an act of courtesy, been
accepted. Article 16 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of
Charges d'affaires
87
196 I takes account of this practice. It is by no means universal, however, and

local custom varies. 17 In India, for example, the representative of the Holy See
has full diplomatic status but stands apart from the order of diplomatic
seniority and consequently never becomes doyen. His designation is ProNuncio.
Envoys
11. I
5.
The ordinary custom is to give to an agent of the second class the double title of
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. These constitute, as has
been already remarked elsewhere, a rapidly dwindling class of diplomatic
agents.
Internuncios
11. I 6.
The Holy See employs for its ministers of the second class the title of internonce
apostolique. From the Middle Ages onwards internuntius was in use to denote the
diplomatic agent of a lay sovereign, but was not so common as ambasciator and
orator. It first occurs in the literature of the subject in 1595. Its signification was
gradually restricted until from the seventeenth century onwards it became the
technical term for the Austrian agent at Constantinople from 1678 to 1856.18 Its
use by Austria is thought to have been adopted in order to avoid conflicts of
precedence with the French ambassador, to whom Soliman the Magnificent
(1520-66) had undertaken by treaty to accord precedence over the
representatives of all other potentates, and it was continued down to the time of
the Crimean War.
Charges d'affaires
7.
These are accredited to the minister for foreign affairs, in accordance with
Article I of the Vienna Reglement and not to the head of the state (though
instances have occurred in which their credentials have been addressed to the
latter).
11.18.
A distinction is drawn between such as present Letters of Credence from their

government formally appointing them on a permanent footing as charges
d'affaires (charges d'affaires en titre) and such as are appointed only
temporarily, or are notified by the head of a mission as being left in charge of
the mission during his absence or pending the appointment of his successor.
The latter are styled charges d'affaires ad interim, and rank after those
accredited in a permanent capacity. In British practice, it was customary also
to rank charges d'affaires ad interim of embassies before charges d'affaires ad
11. I
88
interim of legations, where these existed.

II.lg.
Formerly it was the practice of some governments to accredit representatives

with the title of 'agent and consul-general' or 'commissioner and consulgeneral,' and these might be regarded as forming a fifth class. Thus, the United
Kingdom was represented by an agent and consul-general in Serbia till 1879,
Romania till 1880, Tunis till 188 I, Siam till 1885, Bulgaria till I g08 and
Zanzibar till I 9 I 3. In all these cases, except that of Siam, the country
concerned was a vassal-state. In Egypt, a vassal-state of Turkey till I 9 I 4, the
representatives of the Powers were 'agent and consul-general.' 19 Legally they
were consuls-general with a hilat from the Porte. But for a long time the title of
agent (or diplomatic agent) had been recognised. Most of the Great Powers
gave local diplomatic rank to their agents.
CHAPTER
12
Persona grata
12. I.
Every state has the right of refusing to accept a particular diplomatic agent,
whether on the ground ofhis personal character or ofhis previous record, as, for
instance, if he is known to have entertained sentiments of enmity toward the
state to which it is proposed to accredit him. A diplomatic agent may also be
declined because of the character with which it is proposed to invest him, 1 or, as
it is tersely expressed in Latin, ex eo ob quod mittitur. The Ottoman Porte for a
long time declined to exchange ambassadors with the United States, until the
latter finally despatched a squadron of ships of war to Constantinople, and at
the cannon's mouth, as it were, extracted a promise to fall in with the proposed
arrangement. 2
Agreation
12.2.
To avoid unpleasantness arising from a possible refusal, it is the usual practice

to submit beforehand to the government of the receiving state the name of the
person whom it is desired to accredit as head of mission. This is done
confidentially as a rule, the channel generally employed being the retiring
diplomatic agent of the country which appoints, or the charge d'affaires ad
interim. Sometimes it is done by the minister for foreign affairs addressing
himself to the diplomatic representative of the state to which the diplomatist is
to be accredited. When states have not yet established representation in each
other's capitals, the most convenient channel may be through their missions in
a third capital, or at the United Nations in New York.
12.3.
When the Pope was about to appoint a nuncio or legate to Spain (formerly also
to the courts of Austria-Hungary, France and Portugal) he submitted a list of
three names, called a tema, to the sovereign, who then was at liberty to make his
choice. If there existed no special reasons for exercising the power ofchoosing, it
was usual to take the name that stood first. In 18 I 9, Dessolles, the French
Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Nesselrode giving a list of four men, any
one of whom the King would be willing to appoint ambassador at St
Petersburg, recommending particularly the first on the list. Alexander I
however, chose La Ferronays, who was the second. By way ofexception, it has
even happened in recent years that an African head of state, visiting a country
with which diplomatic relations were envisaged, offered its ruler the names of
j
go
Persona grata
three persons whom he would be glad to accept as representatives of that

country. The ruler chose one of them and duly appointed him.
12.4.
There is no obligation to accompany a refu~al by a statement of the grounds on

which it is made. It is in fact customary to avoid, as far as possible, allowing
refusal to be a cause for offence; and it may be preferable to stop short ofmaking
any direct personal imputation which might bring discredit ifit became known
or might even provoke the sending government into insisting upon its choice.
For this reason it is the practice in many countries to reply to any request for
agrement orally rather than in writing; and some governments even delay
replying, or leave a request unanswered indefinitely, in the expectation that the
requesting government will draw its own conclusions, both courses having the
disadvantage, however, of being in themselves discourteous. But if the reasons
for refusal are asked for, and they are not given, or if it appears to the
government whose candidate has been refused that the grounds alleged are
inadequate, that Power may refuse to make an appointment, and prefer to
leave its diplomatic representation in the hands of a charge d'affaires.
12.5.
One of the best known instances of refusal was that ofthe Emperor Nicholas I of
Russia to receive Sir Stratford Canning in 1832, on the ostensible ground that
the appointment was made without previous notice having been given, since it
was only ten days after it had been officially gazetted that Palmerston
mentioned it to the Russian Ambassador in London. It has been suggested that
the Emperor's objection to Sir Stratford Canning was on personal grounds, and
though the British Government maintained that a government was perfectly
free in the choice of its representatives at foreign courts, the Emperor refused to
receive him, and the ordinary relations between the two courts were only
resumed in 1835, when Lord Durham was appointed ambassador.
12.6.
In the past, refusal to receive an envoy might occur on such grounds as the
following: Sweden, in 1757, refused to accept the British envoy, Goodrich,
because after his appointment he had visited a prince with whom Sweden was
at war; Great Britain consequently broke off diplomatic relations with
Sweden. 4 In 1820, the King of Sardinia refused to receive the Prussian envoy,
Baron von Martens, because he had married the daughter ofa regicide. In 1847
the King of Hanover refused to accept Grafvon Westphalen because he was a
Roman Catholic.
12.7.
According to Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of

I g6 I, 'the sending state may freely appoint the members of the staff of the
mission. In the case of military, naval or air attaches, the receiving state may
require their names to be submitted beforehand, for its approval.' The
receiving state, however, retains the right to declare a diplomat persona non grata
at any time, whether before or after his arrival in the country.5 The following
examples from the past illustrate some of the embarrassments which can occur
when a government's refusal to accept a diplomat as persona grata is contested.
12.8.
In 1885 Mr Keiley was appointed United States minister at Rome. The Italian
Government asked that another choice might be made, without, however, assigning any
. reason. But it was evident that the ground of the refusal to receive him was a speech
made by Mr Keiley at a public meeting of Roman Catholics, at which a protest was
Agreation
91
made against the annexation of the Papal States to the Kingdom ofItaly. Mr Bayard,
the United States Secretary of State, recognised 'the full and independent right' of the
King of Italy 'to decide the question of personal acceptability to him ofan envoy,' and Mr
Keiley, on being made acquainted with the refusal of the Italian Government, resigned
his commission.
12.9.
Mr Keiley was thereupon appointed to Vienna, and the Austro-Hungarian minister at

Washington was instructed to the effect that since, as at Rome, scruples prevailed
against this choice, he was to direct the attention of the United States Government, in
the most friendly way, to the generally existing diplomatic practice to ask, previously to
any nomination of a foreign minister, the consent (agrement) of the government to which
he is to be accredited. It was added that 'the position of a foreign envoy wedded to a
Jewess by civil marriage would be untenable and intolerable in Vienna.' This afforded
Mr Bayard the opportunity of asserting that the only reason given was the allegation as
to Mrs Keiley's religion, which he indignantly repudiated as sufficient ground for the
refusal, while recognising
'the undoubted right of every government to decide for itself whether the individual
presented as the envoy of another state is or is not an acceptable person, and, in the
exercise of its own high and friendly discretion, to receive or not the person so presented.'
12. I O.
Later, he discussed the question whether it was necessary previously to ask for the
consent of the government to whom the minister was to be accredited; there was no
instance of this having been done by the United States, and the reason was that frequent
elections at regular intervals might render it difficult to procure the consent ofa foreign
government to the appointment of agents whose views were in harmony with the latest
expression of public opinion, if the new government should happen to have superseded
one whose policy was more in accord with that of the foreign government concerned.
Subsequently the Austro-Hungarian Government based their refusal on the ground
that the Italian Government had objected to Mr Keiley, and that its views had found
earnest expression at Vienna since the President had nominated him to AustriaHungary; the fact that his wife was a Jewess did not influence the judgement of the
government, but the latter could not prescribe social usage, which might be unpleasant
in that regard. The main reason for objection was not the action ofItaly, but the public
utterances of Mr Keiley, which were of a character not agreeable to the AustroHungarian Government. Finally the latter definitely refused to receive Mr Keiley, who
thereupon sent in his resignation. The President declined to make a fresh nomination
and the legation was left in the hands of a secretary as charge d'affaires. 6
12. I I.
In 189 I the United States appointed Mr H. W. Blair minister to China. When he was on
his way thither, the Chinese Foreign Office telegraphed their objection to the
appointment on the ground that in 1882 and 1888 he had 'bitterly abused China in the
Senate' and 'was conspicuous in helping to pass the oppressive Exclusion Act.' In
response to a request that they would consent to reopen the case the Chinese Foreign
Office said 'Mr Blair is not popularly regarded in China,' but that if the President could
do anything to repeal the Exclusion Law of 1888 'the situation in China would be much
changed, and then it would not make much difference what Mr Blair has said, and he
would be well received if the President asked for it.' After the lapse of nearly three
months, the President wrote to Mr Blair accepting his resignation. At the same time, the
minister then in China was instructed to deny the sufficiency of the allegations made in
respect of the views concerning the Chinese people which were stated to have been
entertained and uttered in legislative debate by Mr Blair:
'If Mr Blair may not be received as minister while that law [of 1888] remains
unrepealed, and because of its existence as a law, it is not easy to reconcile that position
92
Persona grata
with the continued friendly reception of the present minister of the United States at
Peking. In this aspect, as in every other aspect, the position assumed by China is
incongruous and inadmissible.'
There was no interruption of the diplomatic representation at Peking. 7
Reception of own national as foreign diplolDatic agent 8

12.12.
Although exceptions have occurred in the past, it is nowadays taken for granted
that no national of a state will be employed as the envoy ofa foreign state in his
own country. Before he could appear in that capacity he would have to apply
for the approval of his own sovereign or government. In France it is a
constitutional maxim that French citizens are not admissible as foreign
ambassadors or ministers at Paris. And for more than a century past the British
Government has refused to receive British subjects as heads offoreign missions.
In the eighteenth century it was already beginning to be regarded as
unacceptable that any British national should enjoy privilege or protection in
his own country by reason of diplomatic employment in the service ofa foreign
power.
12.13.
In 1878 Mr M. Hopkins, who, in the absence of the Hawaiian envoy to the

United Kingdom, desired to be recognised as charge d'affaires, was informed
that, being a British subject, he could not be received in that capacity, and was
reminded of communications made to him to the same effect as far back as
1859. And in 1886 Mr A. Hoffnung, who was accredited as Hawaiian Charge
d' Affaires, was only accepted as such on his becoming naturalised in Hawaii
and so ceasing to be a British subject. His nephew, Mr S. Hoffnung, divested
himself of British nationality in like manner, and was thus enabled to act as
charge d'affaires ad interim in the absence of the head of mission.
12.14.
On 8 July 1786, the following notice was published in the London Gazette:
'Whereas divers applications have of late been made by people of different
descriptions to the foreign ministers resident in England to be appointed secretaries to
some or other of the said foreign ministers in order to avail themselves of the protection
due to persons in that situation against the ordinary course of legal proceedings in
various cases. And whereas such indulgence is liable to many abuses, it is His Majesty's
pleasure that henceforth no subject of His Majesty shall be permitted by the Secretary of
State to have his name inserted at the Sheriffs office in the list of those who are to be
deemed under the protection of any foreign minister, excepting only such persons as
may be employed by the said foreign minister in the capacity of menial servants.
G\RMARTHEN. '
12.15.
In the past, British subjects were occasionally permitted to serve as secretaries

to certain Asian missions in England. The Chinese, Japanese and Siamese
missions from time to time employed British su bjects in this capacity, and the
custom may have extended to some other missions. But the condition was made
that they should not be regarded as entitled to diplomatic privilege, and their
names were not inserted in the list of persons so entitled furnished to the Sheriffs
of London and Middlesex.
Reception of own national as foreign diplomatic agent
93
12.16.
Among other exceptional appointments on record from past ages the following
may be mentioned here.
12.17.
In 1714 Sir Patrick Lawless was Spanish envoy in London, and General
Wall from 1748 to 1762; both were Irishmen by birth. There is also the
case ofBenjamin Thompson, born in the United States, who entered the service
of the Elector of Bavaria, by whom he was appointed as minister to Great
Britain in 1798. He was refused by the British Government on the ground of his
being a British subject, aggravated by the circumstance of his having formerly
occupied the post of Under-Secretary of State in the American or Colonial
Department in 1780. Several of the smaller German states were represented at
Vienna by Austrians, and up to 1855 the charge d' afTaires of the Hanse Towns
in London was a British subject. Wicquefort had been resident of the Duke of
Luneburg at The Hague, though he was a Dutch subject born at Amsterdam.
(See also 17.13.)
'The laws of the United States forbid the employment of any other than a citizen of
the United States in its diplomatic service. It is also a rule of the Department of State
that no citizen of the United States shall be received by it as the diplomatic
representative of a foreign government, but this rule is of a flexible character in its
application. Anson Burlingame, who for some years had acted as the American minister
in China, resigned to accept from the Chinese Government the post of special
ambassador to the United States and certain European governments. He was received
as such in Washington, and Secretary Fish negotiated with him and his colleagues an
important treaty. '9
'Mr Camacho, a native of Venezuela but a naturalised citizen of the United States,
was accepted as minister from Venezuela in 1880, on renewal of relations with that
country which had been for some time suspended. On the other hand, General
0' Beirne, a prominent citizen ofNew York, was accredited as diplomatic representative
of the Transvaal Republic to the United States at the outbreak of hostilities with Great
Britain; and the Secretary of State, applying the rule, declined to receive him on the
ground of his American citizenship, thus avoiding the question of the reception of a
representative of a country which the British Government claimed was a state under
suzerainty.
'In late years a practice grew up of securing the insertion in the Diplomatic List,
published monthly by the State Department, of the names of resident attorneys of
Washington as counsellors of certain legations of the less important countries. The main
object ofsuch insertion was to secure thereby invitations for the persons named and their
wives to the receptions and teas at the White House. When the attention of Secretary
Root was called to the practice he directed it to be discontinued, basing his action on the
rule above cited, that an American citizen could not be clothed with a diplomatic
character in a foreign legation in Washington.'lo
CHAPTER 13
Diplomatic agent
proceeding to his post
13. I.
In ordinary circumstances a newly appointed diplomatic agent proceeding to

his post will find there an established mission, fully provided with archives
containing previous correspondence with his own Foreign Office, with the
minister for foreign affairs of the state to which he is accredited and with
miscellaneous persons; also ciphers, collections of treaties and all other helps
and appliances which he will require. He must carry with him his credentials to
the head of state, or if he is to be a charge d' affaires en titre, a letter accrediting
him in that capacity to the minister offoreign affairs at the capital where he is to
reside. If he is to be a charge d'affaires ad interim, he need have no credentials,
but his appointment must have been made before his arrival. It will be prudent
on his part to ascertain beforehand that the letter ofrecall ofhis predecessor has
been presented in the proper quarter, or if that formality has not yet been
complied with, to take the letter of recall with him. For in the contrary event it
may happen that on arriving at his post and applying for an audience to present
his credentials, he may receive for answer that his predecessor is not yetfunctus
officio, and so his own recognition may be delayed until the necessary document
can be procured from home.
13.2.
In addition to his credentials it is the custom of the Court of St lames's to

furnish a newly appointed ambassador or minister with a commission of
appointment in such terms as the following:
(Seal)
(Signed)
R.
Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, etc., etc., etc.
To all and singular to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting!
Whereas it appears to Us expedient to nominate some person of approved Wisdom,
Loyalty, Diligence and Circumspection to represent Us in the Character of Our
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Now Know Ye that We, reposing especial trust and confidence in the discretion and
faithfulness of Our Trusty and Well-beloved
have
nominated, constituted and appointed, as We do by these Presents nominate, constitute
and appoint him, the said
to be Our
ELIZABETH

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to
95
to
aforesaid. Giving and granting to him in that character all power
and authority to do and perform all proper acts, matters and things which may be
desirable or necessary for the promotion of relations offriendship, good understanding
and harmonious intercourse between Our Said Realm and
.
and for the protection and furtherance of the interests confided to his care; by the
diligent and discreet accomplishment of which acts, matters and things aforementioned he shall gain Our approval and show himselfworthy ofOur high confidence.
And We therefore request all those whom it may concern to receive and acknowledge
Our said
as such
as aforesaid, and freely to communicate with him upon all matters which may appertain
to the objects of the high mission whereto he is hereby appointed.
Given at Our Court ofStJames's, the
day of.
, and in the
.
year of Our Reign.
By Her Majesty's Command,
(Countersigned)
13.3.
The Byzantine Emperors, and the Venetians after them, used to furnish their
ambassadors with detailed instructions regarding their behaviour and conduct
of business while abroad; and the Italians in the sixteenth century gave their
ambassadors two sets of instructions, one open and the other secret. The
instructions of the French ambassadors in the eighteenth century contained full
accounts of the political conditions which they would find and of the policies to
be pursued, and were sometimes developed into volumes of considerable
length. Formerly printed instructions for the guidance of their conduct were
furnished to British ambassadors and ministers on taking up their appointments, but these were mainly ofa formal nature, relating to matters which have
become stereotyped by usage, and the custom no longer exists.
13.4.
The case of a negotiator at a congress or conference is naturally different. 1 On

such occasions special written instructions, or briefs, are indispensable. The
delegate to such gatherings will also be furnished with credentials according to
the requirements laid down by the organisers of the conference. They will
usually take the form of a letter, written at departmental level, and addressed to
the secretariat of the conference. The delegate will not be given full powers,
unless he is to be entrusted with the negotiation of a treaty instrument. The
same applies to an ordinary permanent diplomatic agent.
13.5.
Before starting for his post the agent should take care to let the probable date of
his intended arrival be known, in order that when he reaches the frontier he
may at once enter on the enjoyment of all the privileges and immunities
attaching to his position, especially with regard to the passage of his personal
effects through the Customs.
13.6.
A passport, 2 in which his official status is fully detailed, should be taken, duly
vise where necessary by the representative of the foreign state concerned, who
may also be asked for the favour of a laisser-passer, if exceptional circumstances
appear to render this desirable, in order to expedite the entry of the agent's
baggage and effects. If he has to pass through a third country before arriving at
his destination, similar steps may be advisable. 3
96
13.7.
Before proceeding to his post, Callieres recommends the agent to read the
despatches exchanged between his predecessor and the Foreign Office, and
after having perused them with care and reflection, to discuss pending
questions with the head of the office. He should gain as much information as
possible from those who have preceded him at the post to which he has been
appointed, and also make friends with the diplomatic representative of that
state, who will be able to write home a favourable account of his character and
disposition. This applies equally to all members of the Foreign Service
appointed to posts abroad: whether Ambassador or Third Secretary, and
whether appointed from the Foreign Office or from another post abroad, the
officer, as soon as his transfer ceases to be confidential, should lose no time in
calling on his equivalent in rank at the Mission of the country in which his new
post is situated.
13.8.
In the past it was the custom for an ambassador to make a formal state entry
into the capital of the sovereign to whom he was accredited, but this practice is
no longer observed. A special ambassador may sometimes be welcomed at the
railway station, or the airport, by the minister for foreign affairs, but the
pressure of a minister's work nowadays makes this very unusual. In the United
Kingdom it is normal for an Ambassador or High Commissioner on his arrival
at the capital to be greeted by the Assistant Marshal ofthe Diplomatic Corps on
behalf of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. But,
generally speaking, diplomatic agents travel to their posts with as little outward
show as private persons, though on long flights they may be met at transit stops
by colleagues from their own countries.
13.9.
On reaching the capital the new head of mission should at once formally notify
his arrival to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and ask when it will be
convenient to the latter to receive him. At some capitals he may also be
expected to notify the Master of the Ceremonies or the Introducer of
Ambassadors. This may be done by letter. He also requests the Minister for
Foreign Affairs to take the orders ofthe head ofthe state respecting an audience
for the purpose of presenting his credentials, of which he must furnish a copy
beforehand. This copy is known in London as the Working Copy. In French it
is called copie figuree. (The older term copie d'usage was used in London until
recently.) This document need not be signed, but should be in the same
language and wording as the original. It may be typed, photocopied, printed or
handwritten, as convenient. A translation is of course useful, especially where
the original is in a language not familiar in the receiving country, but it is not a
substitute for the Working Copy.
Presentation of credentials
13. I o.
According to traditional practice, a government does not admit a newly

arrived head of mission to the exercise of his full functions until he has presented
his credentials, with the due ceremonies which are the outward and visible
signs of his official character. In most countries, therefore, before presentation
Presentation of credentials
97
of credentials he makes no official calls. In London, however, he is admitted to

his full functions by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the strength of
the Working Copy of his credentials. It is accordingly convenient if the new
ambassador arranges to have this document and a copy of his predecessor's
Letter of Recall in his pocket on arrival, together with his own personally
signed covering letter addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, in order to hand these papers to the Assistant Marshal
when the latter meets him. In the letter he will state that he has arrived to take
up his functions as ambassador, and he will ask to be afforded an opportunity to
call on the Secretary of State and, in due course, granted an Audience of the
Sovereign in order to present his Letters of Credence. This procedure enables
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to examine the Working Copy and if,
as is normal, no queries arise, to send the ambassador without delay a formal
acknowledgement, upon receipt of which he is free to take up his functions. His
precedence in the Diplomatic List will date from the moment when this
acknowledgement is sent. But wherever he may be posted, as most governments
today select their representatives at foreign capitals from the members of their
regular diplomatic service, he is likely to find among his new colleagues
acquaintances or friends with whom he has previously been associated in the
course of his career, and he can freely make private visits to them, even before
he is recognised to be in exercise of his functions. It is also advisable to call
privately on the doyen of the diplomatic body, who will be able to afford him
useful information as to the ceremonies accompanying the presentation of his
credentials, the audiences of members of the reigning family in a monarchical
country, for which he may perhaps have to ask, the official calls he must make,
and other matters of local custom. Much useful and reliable advice can usually
be obtained from the agent's predecessor, if he is accessible. It must be
understood, however, that court and departmental officials, like the Master of
the Ceremonies, the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps in Great Britain, or the
Introducer of Ambassadors, are the authoritative exponents of the local
etiquette.
13.1 I.
On being informed by the minister for foreign affairs of the day and hour at
which his audience is to take place, if (which is not always the case) it is the
customary local usage for the agent to address a formal speech to the sovereign
or president, he sends to the minister for foreign affairs a copy of what he
proposes to say; but he has no right to expect a copy of the reply which will be
made to him. Such a speech should be of a general character. It might, for
instance, begin by expressing the agent's satisfaction at having been appointed
to represent his country; convey assurances of friendship on the part ofhis own
sovereign or president, and his own wishes for the prosperity and welfare of the
sovereign or president he is addressing; state that he will do all in his power to
strengthen the friendly relations existing between the two countries; and
bespeak the friendly cooperation of the sovereign's or president's ministers in
his endeavour to fulfil the purpose of his mission. He will mention also his
credentials, presenting them to the sovereign or president, who hands them
usually unread, to the minister for foreign affairs. If the agent has formerly had
diplomatic service in the country, e.g. as secretary, a graceful allusion to an
agreeable sojourn will be in place.
98
13. I 2.
His speech must on no account contain any reference to matters ofcontroversy

between the two states, nor to any current business, but, if an alliance of a
definite character exists, mention of it may be fitly introduced. There was once
a diplomatic agent, who, when presenting his credentials, committed the
mistake of urging certain pecuniary claims of his countrymen against the
government of the country to which he was being accredited, and thereby gave
serious offence at the very outset of his mission.
The object of communicating a copy of the speech beforehand is to give the
head of the state, to whom it is to be addressed, an opportunity of requesting
modifications, and it has happened on more than one occasion that this has
been done. 4
13. I 3.
In his reply the head ofstate will ofcourse normally observe the same discretion
and restraint. He is in the position of advantage, since his text is not
communicated to his guest in advance. If, as may occur very rarely, he surprises
the ambassador by including remarks critical of, or politically disobliging to
the sending government, this will almost certainly be done with a view to
publicity, in violation of the fundamental laws of good diplomacy. Such
unpleasantness will be remembered, all the more keenly for having been
deliberate, throughout the ambassador's term of appointment and is likely to
colour the relations which develop between the two countries.
13.14.
Besides committing his speech to memory as far as he is able, the agent would
do well to have a copy in his pocket.
The Comte de Segur, in 1785, on proceeding to the Palace for his audience of
Catherine the Great, and while waiting in the anteroom, engaged in a conversation with
his Austrian colleague, which proved of such an absorbing character that the speech
which he had prepared faded from his memory. When he entered the presence of the
Empress, he found that he could not recollect a single word of it, but, with great presence
of mind, he improvised an entirely new speech, to her great surprise, as she had received
a copy of the original discourse, and had framed a corresponding answer.
Subsequently when he came to be on intimate terms with the Empress, she asked him
one day why he had suddenly taken it into his head to change his speech at his first
audience. He replied that he had lost his nerve in the presence of so much glory and
majesty, and so expressed the sentiments of his sovereign in the first phrases that
suggested themselves. The Empress answered that he h~d done right. Everyone had his
failings, and one of hers was easily to conceive prejudices. 'I remember that one of your
predecessors was so perturbed on the occasion of his presentation to me that he could
only say, "Le Roi mon maitre, Le Roi mon maitre." The third time he repeated these
words 1 interrupted him by saying that 1 had long been aware of his master's friendship
for me. Every body assured me that he was an intelligent man, but his bashfulness always
made me prejudiced against him, for which 1 reproach myself, but, as you see, somewhat
late in the day.'s
13.15.
It is not usual for the diplomatic agent to speak again in reply to the answer
made to him by the sovereign or president.
The language of the speech may be that of his own nationality, or French. In
Oriental countries the former is most usual, the speech being translated into the
language of the country by an official interpreter; the head of the state replies in
his own tongue, and the reply is, if necessary, then translated.
Reception of diplomatic agents
13.16.
99
The following is an instance of a discourse on such occasions:

SIRE,
J'ai l'honneur de presenter cl Votre Majeste les lettres qui m'accreditent aupres de
son auguste personne en qualite de ...
Permettez-moi, Sire, d'etre en meme temps aupres de Votre Majeste l'interprete des
sentiments d'estime et de sympathie que mon souverain professe a un si haut degre pour
la person ne de Votre Majeste, et les vreux qu'il fait pour la felicite de votre famille et
pour la prosperite de vos peuples.
A l'expression de ces sentiments, daignez, Sire, me permettre d'ajouter l'hommage
de mon profond respect. Pendant le cours de la mission que je vais commencer, je ferai
tout ce qui dependra de moi pour meriter la confiance de Votre Majeste;je me trouverai
heureaux si j'y reussis et si mes constants efforts contribuent a resserrer encore les liens
d'amitie et d'interet qui unissent deja si etroitement les deux peuples. 6
13.17.
Speech of a Spanish ambassador to the President of the French Republic:

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,
J'ai l'honneur de remettre a Votre Excellence les lettres par lesquelles S. M. le roi
Don ... m'accredite en qualite d' Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire
aupres du President de la Republique Franc;aise.
C'est avec empressement que je saisis cette occasion solennelle pour exprimer, au
nom de mon auguste Souverain, les vreux tres sinceres qu'il forme pour la prosperite de
la France et pour le bonheur de l'homme d'Etat eleve par ses concitoyens a la premiere
magistrature du pays.
Quant cl moi, porte vers la France par toutes mes sympathies, j'accepte avec joie
l'honorable mission de maintenir, de developper et de rendre encore plus intimes les
bons rapports deja existants entre deux nations sreurs par la race et l'origine, par le
voisinage et la communaute des interets.
J'apporterai tout mon zeIe dans l'accomplissement d'un devoir si conforme a mes
sentiments, et j'espere pouvoir compter, pour y reussir, sur la haute bienveillance de M.
le President de la Republique comme sur le puissant et amical concours de son
gouvernement.
13.18.
Reply of the President of the French Republic:

L' AMBASSADEUR,
Je remercie S. M.le roi d'Espagne des vreux que vous m'apportez en son nom pour la
France et pour le President de la Republique. J'ai eu recemment l'honneur de dire a
votre illustre predecesseur, et je saisis avec empressement cette nouvelle occasion de
repeter, combienje desire ardemment le bonheur de la noble nation espagnole et de son
auguste Souverain.
Pour vous, Monsieur l' Ambassadeur, qui connaissez la France, et qui en parlez si
affectueusement, soyez persuade qu'elle vous accueillera avec une vive sympathie et que
vous trouverez aupres de son gouvernement, dans l'accomplissement de votre mission,
tout le concours et toute la cordialite que vous pouvez souhaiter. 7
MONSIEUR
Reception of diplolDatic agents

13.19.
An ambassador is taken to the palace by a court or state official with one or

more carriages for himself and his suite. Usually the ambassador enters the
presence unaccompanied by the members of his mission, and after the
100
conclusion of the ceremony of delivery of credentials he asks permission to

present them. At most capitals he is introduced to the presence of the head of
the state by the Master of the Ceremonies or by a court or state official of
equivalent importance. He does not always make a set speech; this is a point
regulated by local custom. The ceremonial in returning to his residence is the
same as on going to the audience. In most countries, after having presented his
credentials, the ambassador makes the first official call on the other
ambassadors, but he receives the first call from envoys, ministers resident and
charges d'affaires. He may also hold one or two official receptions, to which are
invited other members of the diplomatic body, and persons prominent in
official and social life, of whom a list is furnished to him by the proper court
or state official. If he is married, the ambassadress must call on, and receive,
respectively, the wives ofthe before-mentioned persons. In all cases return visits
must be paid as soon as can conveniently be arranged.
13. 20 .
In the past it was customary for a distinction to be made between the reception
of ambassadors, on the one hand, and of envoys extraordinary and ministers
plenipotentiary and diplomatic agents of lesser rank on the other. But since
nowadays almost every accredited head ofmission, however small his staff, is an
ambassador, the reduced ceremonial at one time prescribed for representatives
of lesser rank has become all but obsolete. The custom used to be that an envoy
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, or a minister resident, went to his
audience without the members of his legation and in his own carriage, and
made no set speech when delivering his credentials. At some capitals, however,
he took his personnel with him, and presented them at the end of his audience.
Altogether it was a much simpler affair than the audience accorded to an
ambassador.
13.2 I.
It is unusual, in modern practice, for an ambassador, on retiring from his post,

to present his Letters of Recall himself. They are more often delivered by his
successor together with his own credentials. But, in the United Kingdom, he
may apply to the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps to be granted an audience
for the purpose of taking leave of the Sovereign. 8
13.22.
13. 2 3.
Washington
In Washington both ambassadors and ministers are received by the President
in the same manner. Shortly after the arrival of the envoy at Washington an
appointment is made for him to see the Secretary ofState. For this appointment
he goes to the Department of State in his own car, usually accompanied by the
charge d' affaires ad interim, where he is met by the ChiefofProtocol, who escorts
him to the office ofthe Secretary. The envoy is presented to the Secretary by the
Chief of Protocol, who is the only officer of the Department present for this
meeting. The envoy presents to the Secretary copies of his Letter ofCredence, the
Letter of Recall of his predecessor, and his speech, and requests an audience with
the President. The meeting is brief and no matters of substance are discussed.
Within about ten days of the envoy's call on the Secretary a date is set for his
audience with the President. For this audience, he is escorted from his residence
in a White House automobile, by the Chiefof Protocol, to the executive office of
the President. The envoy is not accompanied by any members of his staff Upon
101
arrival at the office of the President the envoy is presented to the President by
the ChiefofProtocol. No one else is present at the meeting. The envoy hands his
Letter ofCredence, the Letter of Recall of his predecessor, and his speech to the
President. The speech is not read, and the President hands the envoy his reply
to the speech. After a brief informal conversation the audience ends. The Chief
of Protocol then escorts the envoy in the White House car back to his residence.
Ceremonial of the Court of St James's
13.24.
On the morning of the Audience, the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps calls at
the Embassy in a State Carriage, to take the Ambassador (or High
Commissioner, as the case may be) to Buckingham Palace. Similar carriag-es
follow for senior members of the Ambassador's staff, of whom up to eight may
attend, travelling four to a carriage. The carriage attendants are in royal
scarlet, and two footmen stand on the footboard at the back of each carriage.
13.25.
The Ambassador's spouse is invited to have Audience of the Sovereign

privately after the presentation of Letters of Credence, and generally follows
the procession, escorted by a protocol officer, in an Embassy car.
13.26.
On the Ambassador's arrival at the Palace, the Vice-Marshal of the

Diplomatic Corps and the Equerry-in-Waiting are in attendance at the foot of
the steps of the Grand Entrance. The Comptroller of the Lord Chamberlain's
Office and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (the senior official of that department, who nowadays
acts in this capacity for the Secretary of State) are waiting in the Grand Hall.
The Marshal presents them to the new Ambassador. The Ambassador then
waits with them in the Bow Room. The Vice-Marshal in the meantime
explains to the accompanying Embassy staff the procedure for their
presentation to the Sovereign.
13.27.
The Ambassador's spouse, on arrival, is conducted to the Bow Room, and waits
there with a Lady-in-Waiting, or other appropriate official, until fetched by
the Marshal.
13.28.
The Permanent Under-Secretary enters the Presence first in order to take the
Sovereign's pleasure, and, having done so, remains throughout the ceremony.
When the doors have been opened by the pages, the Ambassador,
accompanied by the Marshal and the Comptroller, takes one step forward with
the left foot and bows. After a second step and bow, the Marshal announces the
Ambassador as follows: 'The Ambassador of..
, Your Majesty.' The
Marshal and the Comptroller then withdraw.
13.29.
The Ambassador now goes forward to the Sovereign and states (usually in
English, but occasionally in French): 'Your Majesty, I have the honour to
present my Letters of Credence and the Letters of Recall of my predecessor.'
The doors are by then shut, and the Sovereign converses informally with the
Ambassador. No formal speeches are made at this ceremony.
13.30.
The Ambassador is then invited to present the members of his (or her) staff,
each of whom is presented individually. When these presentations have been
completed, and the members of the staff have withdrawn, the Ambassador's
spouse enters and is presented by the Ambassador. After a few minutes' further
102
conversation, Ambassador and spouse withdraw, and all return to the Embassy
Residence, or Chancery, or to the hotel, in the vehicles in which they arrived.
13.3 I.
The Ambassador and those members of the Embassy staff who are to be
presented to the Sovereign wear Uniform, National Dress, or European full
evening dress, with decorations. The Ambassador's spouse wears National
Dress, or European day dress (ladies' day dress with hat and gloves, or, for a
husband, morning coat), but without decorations.
Commonwealth High Commissioners
13.32.
High Commissioners from Commonwealth countries which have their own

Head of State (Monarch or President) are treated in the same way as
Ambassadors. Their credentials are in the form of a Letter of Commission
instead of a Letter of Credence, there being a slight difference in wording; and
the document is usually accompanied by the Letter of Recall of their
predecessor.
13.33
High Commissioners from countries of which the British Monarch is Head of

State (The Sovereign's Realms) do not present credentials in the same manner
as Ambassadors. They and their spouses are received by the Sovereign in
Private, informal audience. High Commissioners from these countries carry,
however, a letter of introduction to the British Prime Minister from their own
Prime Minister.
13.34.
Vin d'honneur
It is becoming increasingly common for new Ambassadors to offer a small vin
d'honneur at their Residence, Chancery, or hotel immediately on their return,
with the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, from their Credentials Audience.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
13.35.
Before the presentation of Letters of Credence, the Ambassador calls on the

Head of Protocol Department and on the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During
the visit to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Ambassador delivers to the
Minister a copy of his Letters of Credence, a copy of the Letter of Recall of his
predecessor and the text of the speech which he will make at the time of the
presentation of his Letters of Credence. At the same time, he makes a request
for good offices in arranging for his reception by the Chairman of the
Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet for the presentation of his Letters of
Credence.
13.36.
The Embassy forwards to the Protocol Department a list of the diplomatic

personnel from the Embassy who will be present at the ceremony.
13.37.
Dress at the ceremony is ceremonial uniform, national costume, morning suit,

or a dark suit, with decorations.
13.38.
On the appointed day the Head of the Protocol Department arrives at the
Embassy or the official Residence of the Ambassador in a special car provided
by the Chairman of the Praesidium. In this car he accompanies the
Ambassador to the Kremlin for the ceremony. The diplomatic staff of the
Embassy follow to the Kremlin in their own cars.
13
13.39.
At the entrance to the building ofthe Praesidium the Ambassador is greeted by

the Military Commandant. Officers in ceremonial uniform greet and salute the
Ambassador in the vestibule. The Military Commandant accompanies the
Ambassador to the outer hall. In the outer hall the Head of Protocol
Department introduces Soviet officials attending the ceremony to the
Ambassador.
13.40.
After the announcement of the arrival of the Ambassador to the Chairman of

the Praesidium, the Head of Protocol Department invites the Ambassador, the
officials accompanying him and the Soviet officials into the hall for the
presentation of Letters of Credence.
13.41.
The Ambassador, together with the diplomatic personnel from the Embassy
and the Soviet officials, enters the hall: the Head of the appropriate
geographical Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stands on the right
of the Ambassador, on the left is the Head of Protocol Department.
Simultaneously, the Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet enters
through the opposite door in the hall: on his right is the Secretary of the
Praesidium, on his left the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
Ambassador stops one or two paces short of the Centre of the hall, opposite the
Chairman of the Praesidium, and greets him with a slight bow. The Head of
Protocol Department presents the Ambassador to the Chairman of the
Praesidium.
13.42.
The Ambassador then delivers a speech. If the speech is delivered in a foreign

language, an interpreter translates into Russian.
13.43.
After the translation of the speech into Russian, the Ambassador hands his
Letters of Credence to the Chairman of the Praesidium, together with his
predecessor's Letters of Recall, and returns to his place.
13.44.
The Chairman of the Praesidium delivers a speech in reply, which is translated

into the language in which the Ambassador delivered his speech.
13.45.
At the end of the speeches and translations, the Chairman of the Praesidium
and the Ambassador approach one another and shake hands. The Chairman of
the Praesidium introduces the Secretary of the Praesidium and the Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador. In his turn the Ambassador
introduces the members of the Embassy diplomatic personnel accompanying
him.
13.46.
The Chairman of the Praesidium accords the Ambassador a private audience

in an adjoining room, at which the Secretary ofthe Praesidium and the Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs are also present. All the remaining officials return to
the outer hall, where coffee or tea awaits them.
13.47.
After the audience the Chairman of the Praesidium invites the Ambassador
and the Head of Protocol Department and all those present at the ceremony to
be photographed in the main hall. After the photograph the Ambassador bids
goodbye to the Chairman of the Praesidium and with the other officials and the
Head of Protocol Department departs for the Embassy or his Residence in the
order of arrival.
104
13.48.
13.49.
13.50.
Buenos Aires
The maintenance of traditional forms of pageantry and ceremonial to dignify
the introduction of foreign ambassadors is by no means confined to European
countries. In Buenos Aires, for example, it has been the custom for the new
Ambassador to be fetched from his residence by the Assistant Director ofState
Ceremonial and to be escorted by a squadron of the Mounted Grenadiers, with
the senior members of his staff, including Service Attaches, following in motor
cars.
The Ambassador is met at the entrance of the Casa Rosada by the Director of
State Ceremonial. National Anthems are played by a regimental band, and the
Ambassador is conducted to the Salon Blanco, where he is greeted by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and certain of the President's personal staff. From
there he enters the Presidential office and, having been duly presented, hands
his Letters of Credence to the President. After a short formal exchange of
courtesies and a few minutes' conversation, the Ambassador takes his leave of
the President, and is usually given the opportunity of speaking briefly to the
representatives of the national press before being escorted to his carriage. The
cavalcade then accompanies him to the Embassy, where it is customary for the
Ambassador to invite the Director of Ceremonial, along with the Commander
and the Second-in-Command of the escort, into the house to take a glass of
champagne.
Variations in procedure
In the few examples given, many divergences of practice are visible. For
instance, in the United States no arrangements are made for other than United
States officials to be present at any stage, and no official arrangements are made
for the spouse of the Ambassador to be received. If only for reasons of time, it is
bound to be difficult to arrange for any but the briefest ceremony when the
Head of State and the Head of Government are combined in the same person.
The opposite extreme is presented in India, where the two offices are separated;
all Embassy or High Commission staff are invited to participate and be
presented, while spouses watch the ceremony. This is a pleasant practice
although it provides a severe test of memory for the new Head of Mission, who
may only have known his staff for a few days.
13.5 I.
In Japan, the wife of the Ambassador is not at present introduced at the time of
the presentation of credentials to the Emperor. It is, however, understood that,
within a few weeks, the Ambassador and his wife will be invited to tea with the
Emperor and Empress.
13.52.
Thus these are matters in which no uniformity of custom or detail is to be

expected. But assuming that the new Ambassador is from a country which has
an already existing Embassy or High Commission, the procedure will have
been worked out in advance by the Chiefof Protocol and the Charge d'Affaires.
If the new envoy is the first head of a newly established post, the Chief of
Protocol will be wholly at his disposal and there will be no lack of colleagues,
from the Doyen downwards, ready to help if he so desires.
13.53.
105
In former days the reception of an ambassador was attended by an elaborate

ceremonial. An account of the public entry into London of the Venetian
Ambassador in I 7 I 5 is as follows:
Leaving his house at nine in the morning of 27 August, he drove with his suite incogniti
in hired carriages to the Tower, whence they were conveyed to Greenwich in boats
furnished by the Master of the Ceremonies. Greenwich was the point from which these
public entries commenced. There they waited, at a house previously hired for the
ambassador, for the arrival of the Master of the Ceremonies and the Earl of Bristol, who
had been deputed by the King to accompany the cortege to London. After refreshments
had been served, the party embarked in royal barges, and were rowed to the Tower,
where they disembarked. Here two of the royal carriages and one of the Prince of Wales
were standing ready, and three belonging to the ambassador. The moment the
procession started a salute was fired by the Tower artillery. It was headed by the
carriage of Lord Bristol, next came twenty of the ambassador's footmen, a squire on
horseback and six pages on foot, then the two royal coaches and the coach of the Prince
of Wales, the ambassador's three carriages, the first ofwhich was drawn by eight horses,
followed by the coaches and six belonging to a small number of peers. In this style the
ambassador was conveyed to his residence in St. J ames' by seven 0' clock in the evening.
The public audience of the ambassador took place on 2 September, with great pomp
and ceremony, and he was afterwards presented to the Prince and Princess of Wales.
The King's reply to the ambassador's speech was read in French by the Master of the
Ceremonies. 9
CHAPTER 14
Privileges and immunities

of diplomatic missions
14. I .
The more fundamental rules of diplomatic law - that the person of the
ambassador is inviolable and that a special protection must be given to the
messages which he sends and receives from his sovereign - have existed from
time immemorial among civilised states. During the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, when the exchange of permanent ambassadors between the states of
Europe gradually became general, it came to be accepted in state practice and
by the writers on international law that even where there was evidence that an
ambassador had engaged in conspiracy or treason against the receiving
sovereign, he was immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.
He could be expelled, but he could not be detained or tried. Immunity of the
ambassador from the civil jurisdiction of the receiving state was established
during the seventeenth century. Then, as much as now, it was thought
necessary for an ambassador to uphold the prestige of his sovereign by
magnificent display. But the sending state did not ordinarily provide
allowances for this, and so the ambassador who lacked great private means
would often find himself obliged either to go into business or to fall into debt.
Several governments found that embarrassing incidents, and the growing
independence of the courts, made it necessary to enact laws expressly providing
for diplomats to enjoy immunity from civil suits and from execution against
their property.
14.2.
The broad outlines ofcustomary international law regarding the privileges and
immunities of diplomats, their property, premises and communications were
established by the middle of the eighteenth century, and were excellently
described by Vattel in Le Droit des Gens. Vattel clearly explains why the nature
of the ambassador's function makes these immunities necessary.
'Le meme droit des gens qui oblige les nations a admettre les ministres etrangers les
oblige donc aussi manifestement arecevoir ces ministres avec tous les droits qui leur sont
necessaires, tous les privileges qui assurent I'exercise de leurs fonctions. 11 est aise de
comprendre que I'independance doit etre I'un de ces privileges ... 11 importe qu' il n' ait
point de pieges a redouter, qu'il ne puisse etre distrait de ses fonctions par aucune
chicane.')
Montesquieu also emphasizes the need for the ambassador to be

independent of the receiving sovereign.
'Le droit des gens a voulu que les princes s'envoyassent des ambassadeurs, et la
raison, tiree de la nature de la chose, n'a pas permis que ces ambassadeurs dependissent
107
du souverain chez qui ils sont envoyes, ni de ses tribunaux. Ils sont la parole du prince
qui les envoie, et cette parole doit etre libre. '2
14.3.
Modern practice and theory have adopted this explanation of'functional need'
as the correct explanation of and justification for diplomatic privileges and
immunities. The ambassador's status is thus distinct from that of the ordinary
alien who enjoys no immunity from jurisdiction because he does not represent
his state. Grotius remarked that ambassadors were, by legal fiction, deemed to
be outside the territory of the state where they were residing;3 but when this
fiction came to assume the character of a rule, it was seen to be misleading and
dangerous. The term 'exterritoriality,' or 'extraterritoriality,' is sometimes
used to denote the totality of privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic
agents, their families and subordinate staff, or to describe the status ofembassy
premises. But it is now everywhere accepted that it does not mean that the
diplomat is not legally present in the receiving state or that the embassy is
deemed to be foreign territory. Marriages, or crimes, occurring on diplomatic
mission premises, are regarded in law as taking place in the territory of the
receiving state.
14.4.
Diplomatic privileges and immunities therefore are founded on the customary

practice of many centuries. They enable ambassadors and their staffs to act
independently of any local pressures in negotiation, to represent a foreign state
under protection from attack or harassment, to speak freely to their own
governments, and they are thus essential to the conduct of relations between
independent sovereign states. They are given on a basis of reciprocity, which
has proved a most effective guarantee of observance of the rules. Any
government which fails to accord privileges or immunities to a diplomat within
its territory knows that it risks not only collective protest by the corps
diplomatique in its own capital but also reprisals against its own representative by the government whose diplomatic agent it has injured. 4
14.5. Although the broad rules regarding the privileges and immunities of
ambassadors and their staffs continued unchanged from the eighteenth
century, there grew up on matters of detail considerable variation in the
practice of individual states. Some states admitted exceptions to the rule of
immunity from civil jurisdiction in regard, for instance, to real property, or
where the action related to the diplomat's commercial activities, while others,
in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, admitted no
exceptions. Some states refused to accept their own nationals as diplomatic
representatives of another state, others accepted them provided that they
enjoyed no privileges or immunities, others again allowed them privileges and
immunities. Some states gave full privileges and immunities to all members of
the ambassador's suite, from counsellors and first secretaries to chauffeurs and
cleaners, while others accorded immunity to clerks and typists in regard to
oflicial acts only and nothing to domestic servants; and most drew the line at
intermediate points. The twentieth century led to new forms of diplomatic
communication, such as wireless transmitters in missions and carriage of
diplomatic bags by ad hoc couriers, or by hand of the pilot ofan aircraft, and no
clear agreement emerged as to whether these new methods were permissible or
entitled to equal protection with the traditional diplomatic bag. There was a
108
series of codifications of the rules of diplomatic law, of which the two most
important were the Havana Convention on Diplomatic Officers, signed in
1928,5 and the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges
and Immunities, published in 1932.6 But only fourteen Latin American States
became parties to the Havana Convention, and the Convention described itself
as an interim instrument 'until a more complete regulation of the rights and
duties of diplomatic officers can be formulated.... The Harvard document
had great persuasive authority, but it did not lead states to modify the
provisions of their domestic law where these diverged.
14.6.
The successful conclusion in 1961 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations, followed by ratification or accession by 113 states, has however
placed the law regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities on an entirely
different footing. The text of the Convention was carefully prepared for several
years by the International Law Commission of the United Nations,? who took
account of the comments of governments on successive drafts, and it was
submitted to a conference to which all members of the United Nations,
members of the Specialised Agencies and parties to the Statute of the
International Court of] ustice had been invited. The Convention therefore had
great authority as a codification of those areas of diplomatic law where the
customary rule was clear, or the weight ofstate practice could be ascertained by
research. Equally important, the text took careful account of the sometimes
conflicting interests of governments on those few but important issues where, in
the interests of progressive development of the law, it was necessary to negotiate
a compromise solution. The overwhelming acceptance of the Convention by
the international community as a whole, and by all the major states of the
world (with the accession of the People's Republic of China in 1975) as well as
the fact that only one provision in the Convention has attracted any significant
number of reservations is clear testimony to the soundness of its provisions.
Even where one state involved in a dispute over privileges or immunities is not a
party to the Convention, it is now common practice for the matter to be argued
entirely on the basis that the text of the Convention is the applicable law. And
although the increasing risks to diplomats abroad from violence, kidnapping
and attacks on embassy premises have made the protection given by the
Convention even more necessary than when it was drawn up, the instances of
breach of its provisions by governments are very rare. In short, the Vienna
Convention constitutes the modern law in regard to the privileges and
immunities of diplomats.
14.7.
The Convention clearly justifies privileges and immunities by reference to

functional need. The Preamble sets out '... that the purpose of such privileges
and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient
performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.'
The result of this approach is that a greater degree of protection than under
customary law is given to the mission itself - to its premises and to its
communications in particular - whereas to diplomatic agents and to the
subordinate staff of the mission privileges and immunities are sometimes
restricted below what was accorded under customary law. This restrictive
approach to individual privileges and immunities relates particularly to
The premises of the mission
109
matters outside the diplomatic function, such as commercial activities or the

private ownership of real property within the receiving state.
14.8.
Following the arrangement of the text of the Vienna Convention, the subject of
diplomatic privileges and immunities will be examined under the following
headings: the status of the mission itself as regards its premises, archives and
communications, the immunities of diplomatic agents, the privileges of
diplomatic agents, the position of families and subordinate staff and of
nationals and permanent residents of the receiving state, and the obligations of
third states.
The prelDises of the lDission

14.9.
The inviolability of the ambassador's residence was generally established in

customary international law by the eighteenth century. Before then the extent
of protection and immunity from law enforcement accorded to diplomatic
residences varied from capital to capital. In a few places, notably Venice,
Rome and Madrid, there was established by custom the franchise du quartier.
The embassies which enjoyed this very extended form of exterritoriality
claimed the right to prevent the arrest of persons dwelling in the vicinity of their
embassy, and the exemption from octroi tax ofsupplies brought in nominally for
their use. According to Sismondi:
'Les ambassadeurs ne voulaient permettre l'entree de ces quartiers a aucun officier
des tribunaux et des finances du Pape. En consequence, ils etaient devenus l'asile de tous
les gens de mauvaise vie, de tous les scelerats du pays; non seulement ils venaient s'y
derober aux recherches de lajustice, ils en sortaient encore pour commettre des crimes
dans le voisinage; en meme temps ils en faisaient un depot de contrebande pour toutes
les marchandises sujettes a quelques taxes. '8
14. I o.
The custom of franchise du quartier was obsolete in Europe by the eighteenth

century. However, somewhat similar rights of extended exterritoriality were
secured under nineteenth-century treaties between Britain and France on the
one hand and some of the states, particularly in the Far East, which came under
their protection or influence. For example in China, after the Boxer Rising in
1899, during which foreign missions in Peking were under siege, Article 7 of the
Final Protocol between China and the foreign Powers, under which friendly
relations were re-established, provided: 9
'Le Gouvernement Chinois a accepte que le guartier occupe par les legations {ut
considere comme un quartier specialement reserve a leur usage et place sous leur police
exclusive, oll les Chinois n' auraient pas le droit de resider, et qui pourrait etre mis en etat
de defense.'
Special rights of exterritoriality were everywhere terminated by the end of the

Second World War.
[4. I
I.
In Britain on the other hand, the inviolability of the ambassador's residence

was clearly established only during the nineteenth century. No reference to it
was made in the Diplomatic Privileges Act, 170810, whose provisions established
1 10
the framework of British practice in regard to diplomatic immunities.
14.12.
In 1827 the coachman of Mr Gallatin, United States Minister, the Head of Mission in
London, was arrested in the stable of the Legation, charged with assault. The
correspondence shows that the British Government upheld the action taken, and that
Mr Gallatin, who had in the meantime dismissed the servant, dissented from the views
expressed. As the outcome of this case, steps were taken by the British Government to
ensure that no similar arrest of the servant of a foreign minister should in future take
place without a previous communication being made to the minister, in order that his
convenience might be consulted as to the method of putting the warrant into
execution. II
14.13.
The celebrated incident concerning Sun Yat-Sen in 1896 shows that the
inviolability of the foreign embassy both from judicial process and from
executive action was then clearly established in Britain.
In 1896 Sun Yat-Sen, a Chinese national, and a political refugee, was detained as a
prisoner in the Chinese Legation in London, with the apparent intention of transporting
him to China. On the matter coming to light, his friends applied to the court for the issue
of a writ of habeas corpus, but the court declined,12 doubting the propriety of such
action where a foreign legation was concerned, and considering the matter rather one
for diplomatic proceedings. The Chinese minister was thereupon formally requested by
the British Government to release the man, whose detention was contrary to law, and an
abuse of diplomatic privilege. He was released on the following day.
14.14.
Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations lays down that

'The premises of the mission shall be inviolable.' The term 'inviolability' has
two distinct aspects. The first is immunity from any legal process or any action
by the law enforcement officers of the receiving state. This is spelt out in
paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 22. Without the consent of the head of mission,
the premises may not be entered by the police, by process servers, by building
safety or health inspectors - even by the fire brigade if the premises are on fire.
No right of entry is given to the receiving state, even where it believes that
inviolability is being abused and the premises used in a manner 'incompatible
with the functions of the mission' (which is prohibited under Art. 41). But on
one occasion the Pakistan Government told the Ambassador ofIraq that it had
evidence that arms imported under diplomatic cover into Pakistan were being
stored in tRe Embassy ofIraq, and asked permission to search the premises. The
Ambassador refused, but the police were authorised to carry out a search in his
presence and large quantities of arms were found to be stored in crates. The
Pakistan Government protested strongly to the Government of Iraq, declared
the Ambassador persona non grata and recalled their own ambassador. 13 Even for
a bona fide pu blic purpose, such as the widening of a road, the receiving state
has no power to expropriate any part of the premises of the mission. Thus, when
the British authorities wished to construct a new Underground Railway line
running underneath the premises of several embassies, the general compulsory
powers of acquisition were not used and the express consent ofeach embassy to
the tunnelling underneath its building was sought. The immunity from legal
process is extended to property on mission premises and to the means of
transport of the mission. Embassy cars are protected from 'search, requisition,
attachment or execution,' but it is accepted at least in London that a car which
is causing serious obstruction and whose driver cannot be traced may be towed
The premises of the mission
I I I
away provided that no charges or fines in respect of the incident are imposed on
the embassy involved.
14. I 5
The second aspect of the inviolability of embassy premises is the duty of

protection laid on the receiving state. Under Article 22 of the Vienna
Convention 'The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate
steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
dignity.' 'Appropriate' steps imply that the extent of protection provided must
be proportionate to the risk or threat to the premises. Clearly the receiving state
cannot be expected to station police permanently outside every embassy
building; and of course all residences of diplomatic and of administrative and
technical staff are equally entitled to the protection consequent on
inviolability. But if it knows of an impending hostile demonstration, or if the
ambassador informs it of an intrusion or an impending attack, then it is obliged
to provide protection proportionate to the threat or to remove the intruders on
request. It is not obligatory, nor is it universal practice, for the internal law to
provide especially severe penalties for attack or trespass on embassy premises,
or to make mere insult to the premises or the flag of the embassy a criminal
offence. But provisions of this kind have been very common. For example
legislation in the United States makes it an offence to display a flag or placard
intended to intimidate or ridicule foreign diplomatic representatives, to
interfere with performance of diplomatic duties within 500 feet of embassy
premises except under a police permit or even to congregate within that area
and refuse to disperse on police orders. 14 Nor does the duty of protection make it
a matter of legal obligation to pay compensation in respect ofany damage that
may occur to embassy premises in the absence of failure on the part of the
receiving state to accord the appropriate protection. But both before and after
the Vienna Convention (when attacks on mission premises have become more
frequent in many parts of the world) British practice has been to pay on an ex
gratia basis all claims for damage to inviolable premises in London, while
claiming reciprocally for all damage deliberately inflicted on British missions
and diplomatic residences abroad. Many other countries appear to follow this
practice and, generally speaking, there has been little difficulty in arriving at
satisfactory settlements of these claims. One instance when payment was made
in regard to damage which did not result from any deliberate attack on mission
premises related to the damage to the Nigerian High Commission in London
resulting from a car bomb explosion in March 1973. This attack was in no way
directed against the Nigerian High Commission and there was no suggestion of
any failure on the part of the police to take appropriate steps to protect the
mission. But the British Government met the full cost of the damage.
14. I 6.
The premises of the mission are defined in Article I of the Convention as 'the
buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of
ownership, used for the purposes of the mission including the residence of the
head of the mission.' Neither the sending nor the receiving state has a right
unilaterally to lay down that certain buildings are embassy premises. They
have to reach agreement in borderline cases such as cultural institutes under the
direction of a cultural attache, or embassy reading rooms or information offices
I 12
open to the public. But in practice the problems usually arise in determining
the time when the status of premises of the mission begins and ends. The Vienna
Convention has clear provisions regarding commencement and termination of
personal privileges and immunities, but not in regard to mission buildings. It is
settled that ownership of property by a sending state, perhaps with a remote
intention to use it for diplomatic purposes, is not enough to make these premises
inviolable. 15 But if the sending state has notified the receiving state of its
acquisition of premises for use as an ambassador's residence or embassy offices,
and has secured any consents which may be needed under local law (for the
character of a building as embassy premises does not exempt it from local
building or planning laws), then those premises are generally regarded as
premises of the mission while they are being prepared for occupation and use.
In the opposite case, where a diplomatic mission has vacated buildings, they
continue to enjoy inviolability for a 'reasonable period' of a few months,just as
the diplomat is entitled to privileges and immunities for a reasonable period
after his appointment ends. If diplomatic relations have been broken ofT or the
mission has been recalled, premises which are no longer in use may lose their
character of 'premises of the mission' and their consequent inviolability. But
the receiving state will still be obliged under Article 45 of the Vienna
Convention to 'respect and protect' them, along with the property and archives
in them.
DiplolDatic asylulD
14. 17.
A right to give asylum in diplomatic missions to refugees from the authorities of

the receiving state has often been claimed, but it has not always been accepted
and there is as yet no universal agreement among states on the circumstances in
which the right may be exercised. The right was claimed by the British
Government during the eighteenth century in two well-known instances.
14. 18.
In 1726 the Duke of Ripperda, a Dutch officer, and minister of the States-General at
Madrid, who afterwards became Spanish minister offinance and foreign affairs, fell into
discredit, and, alarmed at the readiness with which his resignation was accepted, fled to
the British Embassy. The Ambassador gave an assurance that he would not allow
Ripperda to leave until he had given up certain important papers of state said to be in
his possession. Nevertheless, soldiers were posted in the vicinity of the embassy, with
orders to examine all persons and carriages issuing from it, and the Spanish Council of
Castile, having been invoked, held that the Duke had been guilty of lese-majeste, and that he
could be taken by force from the embassy without infringing the privileges awarded to
ambassadors or violating the law of nations. Ripperda was thereupon arrested within
the Embassy by armed force and his papers seized. In the correspondence which
followed, the British Government protested that only an extreme necessity couldjustify
the violation of an ambassador's house, and expressed the hope that the Spanish King
would see that it was to his own interest to make the necessary reparation. But on
receiving the reply that the Spanish King saw no reason to concern himself further
about the affair, the correspondence assumed a bitter tone. Hostilities having broken
out in the following year, peace was not restored till the signature of the Treaty ofSeville
in 1729, in Article I of which it was stipulated that there should be 'an oblivion ofall that
is past. '16
Diplomatic asylum
14.19.
13
In 1747 one Springer, a Russian subject, domiciled at Stockholm, being accused of high
treason against the King of Sweden, took refuge in the hotel of the British Minister at
Stockholm. Under threats of compulsion, the minister consented to surrender the man,
but protested against the violation of the law of nations and the privileges of
diplomatists. On receiving his report, the British Government instructed him to address
to the King of Sweden a memorial, in which it was laid down as an incontrovertible
maxim that the residence of a foreign minister ought to enjoy the right of asyl urn, so long
as the right was not abolished by mutual consent. In reply, the Swedish Government
denied the assertions of the minister as to the treatment he had received, and sought to
lay the whole blame on him for what had occurred. As a result, the minister was
instructed to leave Stockholm as soon as possible, without taking leave ofthe King, and
the Swedish minister in London received similar orders in consequence. 17
But the United Kingdom would not now regard these cases as precedents or
claim any legal right to give asylum on embassy premises.
14. 20.
Among Latin American countries a right of diplomatic asylum has as a matter

oflocal usage been very generally accepted, and international agreements have
been concluded between those countries establishing rules for the exercise of
the right. For example in 1889 a convention regarding international criminal
law between Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay provided that
asylum in a legation should be respected in the case of persons prosecuted for
political offences. The head of the legation was obliged immediately to
acquaint the government of the state to which he was accredited with the fact,
and that government could demand that the refugee should be sent out of its
territory with as little delay as possible. The head of the mission could, in his
turn, demand the necessary guarantees that the fugitive would be allowed to
leave the territory without interference. A Convention on Asylum drawn up in
Havana in 1928 by the Sixth International American Conference,18 and
amended in 1933, established as between the parties a right to accord asylum to
political offenders, persons accused or condemned for common crimes and
deserters being expressly excluded. The most important of the conditions under
which the right was accorded were:
'( I) Asylum may not be granted except in urgent cases and for the period oftime strictly
indispensable for the person who has sought asylum to ensure in some other way his
safety;
'(2) Immediately upon granting asylum, the diplomatic agent, commander of a
warship or military camp or aircraft, shall report the fact to the minister offoreign
relations of the state of the person who has secured asylum, or to the local
administrative authority, if the act occurred outside the capital;
'(3) The government ofthe state may require that the refugee be sent out ofthe national
territory within the shortest time possible; and the diplomatic agent ofthe country
who has granted asylum may in turn require the guarantees necessary for the
departure of the refugee, with due regard to the inviolability of his person, from the
country.'
14.2 I .
The International Court ofJustice carefully considered the nature and scope of
the Havana Convention on Diplomatic Asylum in 1950 in the Asylum Case l9
and in 195 I in the Haya de la Torre Case. 20 In the first of these related cases they
observed
'that asylum as practised in Latin America is an institution which, to a very great extent,
14
owes its development to extra-legal factors. The good neighbour relations between the
republics, the different political interests of the Governments, have favoured the mutual
recognition of asylum apart from any clearly defined juridical system. Even if the
Havana Convention, in particular, represents an indisputable reaction against certain
abuses in practice, it in no way tends to limit the practice of asylum as it may arise from
agreements between interested Governments inspired by mutual feelings of toleration
and goodwill.'
14.22.
In general, however, diplomatic asylum is regarded as a matter of

humanitarian practice rather than a legal right, and it is accepted that it may
now be accorded only for the purpose of saving life or preventing injury in the
face of an immediate threat to the refugee. Even then diplomatic asylum
should, in the absence of an established local usage, be accorded only on a
temporary basis and the fugitive should be surrendered on demand by the local
authorities. It is therefore during war and violent revolution that diplomatic
asylum is most commonly extended. In this context the United States and the
states of Europe which do not now accept a right of diplomatic asylum except
for essentially humanitarian motives, have on a number of occasions granted
diplomatic asylum to political refugees - for example during the civil war in
Chile in 189 I, following the suppression ofthe uprising in Hungary in 1956 and
following the fall of the regime of President Allende in Chile in 1973. The
political character of the offence alleged is in theory not relevant when
temporary asylum is accorded for humanitarian motives, but in practice those
who benefit from asylum are almost always in danger because of their
involvement in political disturbances. Proposals regarding diplomatic asylum
were made in 1957 to the International Law Commission,21 but no provisions
on the matter were included in the Vienna Convention. The later discussion of
the question by the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
was also inconclusive.
14.23.
Somewhat similar to diplomatic asylum was the custom which existed in Persia
in relatively recent times of taking 'bast' or shelter in a foreign legation as a
means of asserting grievances. The principles of hospitality prevailing there
precluded the denial of hospitality under these circumstances, whatever
inconvenience might be caused. One incident of the kind is recounted in The
Biography of Sir Mortimer Durand, British Minister at Tehran: 22
'One day a royal eunuch came galloping into the legation in great haste to see me on
most important business. The message was that the Shah's wives had taken umbrage at
his decision to marry a girl who was sister of one of his wives. The new favourite was a
daughter ofa gardener whom the uxorious monarch had seen in one of his many gardens
and loved, to the great indignation of her sister, and against Persian custom.
'The other wives took up the matter hotly, and issued an ultimatum that ifthe Shah
would not forgo his purpose, they would all leave the Palace, and take bast at the
legation, which was, they declared, a place of refuge for slaves like themselves, and a
sanctuary for the oppressed.
'I expressed myself as being highly honoured at this proof of their confidence, and
declared that the legation was at the service of the ladies. Upon enquiring the size of the
party, 1 was somewhat staggered to learn that there would be about three hundred in
all. 1 said that the legation would hardly hold so many, but with a sweep of his hand
towards the lawn, the eunuch replied that a tent was all that was required, and, as for
food, a few sheep and some bread would suffice.
Inviolability of mission archives and communications
15
'The eunuch then galloped off, and returned two hours later, by which time tents
had been pitched on the lawn, sheep had also been purchased, together with the entire
contents of a baker's shop. He declared that the arrangements were excellent, that the
Shah was furious, and that the ladies were getting into their carriages. He again galloped
off, and we awaited the arrival of the refugees with keen interest, when the eunuch
reappeared like a whirlwind and shouted out, wild with excitement, "The Shah has
yielded, the ladies are getting out of their carriages, and send you their grateful
thanks!" ,
ExeDl.ption of Dl.ission preDl.ises froDl. taxation

14.24.
Article 23 of the Vienna Convention exempts the sending state and the head of
the mission from all taxes in respect of the premises of the mission, with the
exception of taxes which 'represent payment for specific services rendered.' It is
for each state party to give a precise interpretation of this exception in terms of
its own local taxation system, but the general effect is that the embassy, in
addition to being obliged to pay for commodities or utilities actually supplied,
where charges are levied for these, is expected to pay any tax, or element of a
tax, which relates to a supply or a service from which the embassy benefits. For
example the embassy would be expected to pay rates or taxes which related to
road maintenance or street lighting. It would not be obliged to pay rates or
taxes which related to national defence, or education, or administration.
Under British practice embassies are not expected to pay that part of the local
rates which relates to police protection, although they do benefit significantly
from police protection, because the obligation to provide such police protection
to foreign missions is part ofthe duty which falls on the receiving state to protect
inviolable premises and persons.
14.25.
For the exemption to apply, the tax must in law fall on the sending state or on
the ambassador. If a private landlord lets his property to a diplomatic mission
he cannot claim exemption from rates or taxes which under the local law fall on
him.
Inviolability of Dl.ission archives and cODl.Dl.unications

14.26.
Article 24 of the Vienna Convention provides that the archives and documents
of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be. This
means not only that the archives may not be seized or detained for examination
by the authorities of the receiving state but also that no one may be compelled
to produce them as evidence in any legal proceedings in that state. In the case of
Rose v. The King 23 a Canadian court held that documents which had been stolen
from the Embassy of the Soviet Union were admissible evidence in the trial ofa
Canadian citizen for espionage in the absence at least of any intervention or
protest from the Soviet Union. But a similar decision now would be inconsistent
with the inviolability accorded under all circumstances to archives by the
16
Vienna Convention. The Convention extended the protection accorded to

mission archives in that it was previously regarded as uncertain whether
archives were inviolable when they were neither on embassy premises or in a
diplomatic bag. The Vienna Convention protects archives 'wherever they may
be.' The term 'archives' is not defined in the Vienna Convention, but it is
normally understood to cover any form of storage of information or records in
words or pictures and to include modern forms of storage such as tapes, sound
recordings and films, or computer data. The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations provides that '''consular archives" includes all the papers,
documents, correspondence, books, films, tapes and registers of the consular
post, together with the ciphers and codes, the card-indexes and any article of
furniture intended for their protection or safe-keeping.'
14. 2 7.
The right of the diplomatic mission to free and secure communication for
official purposes is guaranteed by Article 27 of the Vienna Convention.
Specially protected communication is perhaps in practical terms the most
important of all diplomatic privileges and immunities. Without the right to
send messages in code and without being able to rely on the inviolability of the
diplomatic bag an embassy cannot usefully perform its function of observing
and reporting, and it will be seriously hampered in the conduct of negotiations
on any matter of importance if it cannot receive confidential instructions. But
because of the uncertainty ofthe previous international law on a few points and
fear of abuse of wireless transmitters and of the diplomatic bag, Article 27 was
one of the most controversial at the Vienna Conference.
14.28.
International practice had long recognised the right to secure diplomatic

communications, although the practice fell somewhat short of the ideal. On the
rare occasions where interception was detected and complained of, the state
challenged would claim that it had not been authorised. If the interception
revealed evidence of some conspiracy against the receiving state, that state
could claim to be acting exceptionally in defence of its vital interests. Adair
recounts the frequent interceptions of despatches authorised by Parliament
during the period of the Civil War, which members of Parliament believed to
be justified by the disturbed state of England. He continues:
'The Portuguese envoy was peculiarly suspect and finally, as he was found to be
implicated in negotiations with King Charles when the royal correspondence was
captured at Naseby, it was decided to expel him. The ambassador, knowing that any
way his fate was sealed, determined to have at least some revenge for the way in which
the parliamentary agents had been tampering with his correspondence. He did up in an
important looking packet an old news-sheet, a figure ofa man hanged and a few pairs of
spectacles and, so that the wits of the parliamentary commissioners, not attuned to
irony, might miss none of the gibe, he added a note saying that he hoped they would find
the spectacles useful in deciphering the valuable information he-was sending abroad. No
democracy can take a joke against itself, no democratic government dare recognise that
it might be a subject for humour: Parliament was furious and ordered his immediate
deportation. '24
14.29.
Improvement in methods of cipher, and the development of facilities for

transmitting wireless messages made really secure communication possible.
But states differed in their approach to diplomatic wireless. Only the richer
Inviolability of mission archives and communications
17
states could afford to install it, and they took the view that the inviolability of
the premises where it was installed, together with their right to free diplomatic
communication, implied that they were under no obligation to seek the consent
of the receiving- state before setting- it up. If the frequency selected caused
difficulty they would cooperate in changing it. The less developed states could
not afford to install wireless in t heir missions, and they were afraid that the
transmitters over which they had no control could be used for propaganda
against them. Eventually they succeeded in including in the Vienna
Convention the provision that 'the mission may install and use a wireless
transmitter only with the consent 0f the receiving State.' If a transmitter is
installed, it is the responsibility of the sending state to observe international
telecommunications regulations. The receiving state, under the International
Telecommunication Convention,2.'; is not responsible.
14.30.
The diplomatic bag is accorded under the Vienna Convention a more absolute
protection than was given under the previous customary law. Previously it was
on the whole accepted that the receiving state had a right to challenge a
bag which it believed to contain unauthorised articles. If this occurred the
sending state could elect either to return the bag unopened or to open it in the
presence of the authorities of the receiving state. This practice ofchallenge to a
suspect bag is still permitted in the case of a consular bag under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. 26 But it is no longer permitted in the case of
a diplomatic bag. The bag may contain only diplomatic documents or articles
intended for official use, but the authorities of the receiving state may not
demand that it be returned or opened even if they suspect that is is being used to
smuggle arms or other illegal exports or imports. States were fully conscious of
the dangers of abuse, but they were even more aware that any right of search
could be abused by officials claiming to have grounds to suspect any bag which
they wished to investigate. The receiving state or the airline authorities may
subject a bag to detector devices designed to show the presence of explosives,
metal or drugs, since this does not involve opening or detaining it, and if this
test disclosed grounds for suspicion the airlines could decline to carry it. In one
incident the customs authorities in Rome realised that a large diplomatic bag
destined for Cairo was emitting moans. They seized and opened it and found
that it contained a drugged Israeli who had been kidnapped. Some members of
the Egyptian Embassy were declared persona non grata as a result of this
discovery. 27
14.3 I.
Just as the diplomatic bag must be clearly identified as such, usually by an

official seal, so the diplomatic courier must carry identifying documents,
usually a courier's passport and a document identifying the packages which
constitute his bag. This is important because the courier's own baggage is not
exempt from search in the ordinary way. The only privileges or immunities
given to the courier are those which are essential to ensure the un impeded
transit of the bag, namely personal inviolability and immunity from arrest and
detention. Otherwise he enjoys none of the personal immunity from suit or the
tax and customs privileges of a diplomatic agent. In the case ofan ad hoc courier
it is even clearer that his limited inviolability derives from his function as
carrier of the bag, since his inviolability ceases as soon as he has delivered the
18
diplomatic bag. The Vienna Convention also authorises the modern practice of
sending a diplomatic bag 'by hand of the pilot'of a commercial aircraft. The
captain who carries a diplomatic bag in this way is not regarded as a courier ad
hoc, but a member of the mission is entitled to access to the aircraft and the
captain in order to take charge of the bag directly from him.
FreedolD of lDovelDent
14.32
The freedom of all members of a diplomatic mISSIOn to travel without

restriction within the territory of the receiving state was accepted without
question during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Within Europe at
least there were until the present century no frontier controls over immigration
or transit and no police supervision of the movement of aliens within the
territory of any state. It was therefore not necessary for governments to claim or
writers of books on diplomatic law to assert any special right for diplomats to
move freely within the receiving state. But during the twentieth century the
position changed. After the Second World War the Soviet Union issued
regulations prohibiting travel by members of diplomatic missions more than
thirty kilometres from Moscow without express permission. The other
Communist countries in Eastern Europe, and later China, imposed similar
restrictions. Many Western countries, including the United States, France and
the United Kingdom, responded by imposing precisely reciprocal limits on
travel within their territories by Soviet and Eastern European diplomats,
making clear that these would be withdrawn as soon as the original restrictions
were removed. 28
14.33.
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention obliges the receiving state to ensure

freedom of movement and travel in its territory for all members ofa diplomatic
mission. This obligation is 'Subject to its laws and regulations concerning zones
entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons ofnational security.' But
it is clear that the intention of the majority of those who drew up this provision
was that while the proviso would authorise the closing of limited areas of
military significance it would not authorise laws and regulations so sweeping in
their effect as to undermine the right offree movement. Regulations ofthe kind
described above severely limit the effectiveness with which a diplomat can
carry out his functions of protection of his fellow-countrymen and observing
and reporting on conditions and developments in the receiving state. However,
in spite of this the Communist countries have continued to impose very serious
restrictions on movement, and Western countries have not challenged their
legality but have retaliated on a basis of exact reciprocity.
14.34.
The position as between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union was set out
as follows in the British Parliament on 24 February 1976 by Mr David Ennals,
Minister of State, in answer to a Parliamentary Question by Sir Frederick
Bennett about travel restrictions for British diplomats in the Soviet Union and
Soviet diplomats in the United Kingdom. Mr Ennals said:
Freedom of movement
19
'British diplomats in the Soviet Union, together with their families, are required to
give the Soviet authorities at least two working days' notice of their intention to travel
beyond a 4o-kilometre radius ofthe centre of Moscow. A few towns and highways in the
Moscow oblast (province) are, however, open to notification-free travel by British
diplomats. One working day's notice is required for journeys by road along certain
prescribed motor tourist routes. The British Ambassador, his family and personal
driver/interpreter may travel without prior notification to the open towns and areas of
the Soviet Union. Large areas within the 4o-kilometre zone centred on Moscow; within
the Moscow province; and in the Soviet Union as a whole are formally out of bounds to
foreigners.
'Soviet diplomats in the United Kingdom, together with their families, are subject to
the requirements of the travel notification scheme. Soviet diplomats must give the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office at least two working days' notice of their intention
to travel beyond a 35-mile radius of the centre of London. Notification is not required
for journeys to the Soviet Embassy's country house at Seacox Heath, nor for road
journeys to Hastings, Bexhill, St Leonards, Rye, Winchelsea and Hawkhurst. The
Soviet Ambassador, together with his family, personal interpreter and personal driver,
is allowed to travel within the United Kingdom without prior notification to the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. There are no closed areas, as such, in the United
Kingdom to which foreigners may not travel.'29
CHAPTER 15
Immunities of diplomatic
agents
15. I.
The immunities accorded to a diplomatic agent personally, as distinct from

those dealt with in Chapter 14, which belong to the mission, include personal
inviolability and immunity from criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction. The distinction between an immunity and a privilege is not easy to
define precisely, and the terms are often used interchangeably, but in general a
privilege denotes some substantive exemption from laws and regulations such
as those relating to taxation or social security, whereas an immunity does not
imply any exemption from substantive law but confers a procedural protection
from the enforcement processes in the receiving state. The diplomatic agent is
legally bound to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state
(provided that these do not infringe his privileges and immunities). He is not
exempt from the obligation to obey the local criminal law, or the duty to pay his
debts, or to seek local planning permission before rebuilding his residence, or
from local regulations regarding the maintenance and insurance of his vehicle
when he drives. But if he breaks any of these laws he cannot be arrested or
detained by the executive authorities of the receiving state and he cannot be
tried, sued or made to testify before the judicial authorities of that state.
Personal inviolability
15.2.
Personal inviolability is of all the privileges and immunities of missions and

diplomats the oldest established and the most universally recognised. In
Europe the inviolability of diplomats can be traced back to the religious
protection accorded among the Greeks to the heralds who were the emissaries
of the states in war and later to the envoys who undertook peacetime missions. 1
Similar customs can be seen in the earliest history of ancient peoples in India
and in China. 2 Clearly the establishment ofsome rule, whether based on law or
on religion, protecting the person of an envoy venturing into strange or hostile
territory was an essential preliminary to the conduct of any form of relations
between independent peoples. The inviolability of ambassadors is clearly
established in the earliest European writings on diplomatic law 3 and from the
sixteenth century until the present one can find virtually no instances where a
breach of a diplomat's inviolability was authorised or condoned by the
Government which received him. The seriousness with which an infringement
of personal inviolability was viewed by both Governments is clearly illustrated
Personal inviolability
121
by the well-known incident of the arrest of the Russian Ambassador in London

in 1708, which led directly to the enactment, by way of expiation, of the
Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1708 (often known as the Act of Anne).
In 1708 M. de Mathveof (Matveev) the Russian ambassador, who was about to
present his letters of recall, was arrested, with some degree of violence, in the streets of
London, at the instigation of certain merchants, to enforce payment of debts. He was
shortly afterwards released, on bail being offered by his friends. On hearing of the
incident, the Queen commanded the Secretary of State to express regret to the
ambassador, who was informed that the offenders would be brought to trial, and
punished with the utmost rigour of the law. He was, however, in no way satisfied with
this apology, and hurriedly left the country, without presenting his letters ofrecall, or
availing himself of any of the courtesies placed at his disposal. To make amends, Lord
Whitworth, the British envoy at St Petersburg, was accredited as special ambassador,
for the purpose ofconveying to Peter the Great at a public audience the expression of the
Queen's regret for the insult offered to his ambassador, and it is recorded that the Czar's
carver and cupbearer proceeded to his residence in a court carriage to fetch him to the
audience, followed by twenty other coaches conveying court personages and gentlemen
of the embassy. 4
15.3.
Personal inviolability of a diplomatic agent is now guaranteed under Article 29

of the Vienna Convention. Like the inviolability of mission premises this has
two aspects. There is first the immunity from any action by law enforcement
officers of the receiving state: 'He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or
detention.' A diplomat who is suspected of an offence may be invited to
accompany a police officer to a police station so that his identity may be
verified, but he cannot be taken there under arrest or otherwise compelled in
any way to do so. The second aspect, which raises more problems of
interpretation, is the special duty of protection: 'The receiving state shall treat
him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack
on his person, freedom or dignity.'
15.4.
Many states, in fulfilment of their duty to prevent any attack on the person,
freedom or dignity of a diplomatic agent, have created special offences in
regard to attacks on diplomats, or punish offences against diplomats with
especially severe penalties. This can mean, for example, that press criticism ofa
foreign ambassador which would not have been criminal if the object of the
criticism had been a private individual, constitutes a criminal offence because
it attacks an ambassador. The Vienna Convention, however, does not make the
creation of special offences or penalties compulsory; nor does the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment ofCrimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 5 which however obliges States Parties to
'make these crimes punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature.' 'These crimes' include murder, kidnapping, other
violent attacks and threats and attempts to commit such attacks. 6 Some states,
including the United Kingdom, do not have special offences in regard to
diplomats, and so although violent attacks are of course punishable under the
ordinary criminal law, and the courts would take into account the fact that
they took place against a diplomat, offensive comments and criticisms in the
press are usually only punishable if they are obscene or constitute a criminal
libel, which is seldom the case.
122
15.5.
lmmunities of diplomatic agents
What are the 'appropriate steps' the receiving state must take to protect
diplomats and other inviolable persons must be determined in the light ofmany
relevant circumstances by agreement between the sending and the receiving
states. The negotiators of the Vienna Convention deliberately added the word
'appropriate' to make clear that there must be limits to the obligations of the
receiving state. Major capitals will have several thousand diplomats, together
with their families, and members of the administrative and technical staffs of
embassies and their families all entitled to inviolability, and clearly it would be
an impossible burden for each of these to have special police protection for
person and residence. But where there is evidence of a threat to the safety of a
diplomat, such as a likely mob attack or indications that a kidnapping is being
planned, then the sending state can demand that the receiving state should
provide special protection such as an armed guard. A sending state which is
well equipped with resources may prefer to provide special protection itselffor
vulnerable diplomats, and it may do this in agreement with the receiving state.
Bodyguards provided by the sending state are not of course exempt from the
laws of the receiving state regarding the carrying of firearms, or the use of
violence. It seems now to be clearly established that the 'appropriate steps'
which the receiving state is bound to take to protect personal inviolability do
not include surrendering to demands made by kidnappers when a diplomatic
kidnapping has taken place. When the German Ambassador to Guatemala,
Count von Spreti, was kidnapped in 1970, the Government of Guatemala
refused to accept the illegal demands made by his kidnappers, and the Count
was murdered. 7 The German Government accused the Guatemalans of failing
in their duty to protect the Ambassador, but the Guatemalan Government did
not accept that they had in any way fallen short of their legal obligations. The
fact that governments have not regarded a diplomat's inviolability as obliging
them to surrender to illegal demands made by kidnappers has probably done as
much as the tightening of security measures and the conclusion of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, to discourage
terrorists from regarding diplomats as particularly attractive targets. The
kidnapping of diplomatic agents is discussed in more detail in Chapter 24.
Inviolability of residence and property

15.6.
Until fairly recently no distinction was drawn in practice between the

'residence of the ambassador' and the 'premises of the embassy'. When the
mission consisted of an ambassador, perhaps one secretary (who in modern
terminology would be regarded as having diplomatic status), the ambassador's
family and his suite (whose function was to minister to his personal comforts
and enhance his status rather than to perform diplomatic duties), they lived and
worked in a single residence. But during this century the numbers of
diplomatic and other official staff have increased beyond the point where they
could be accommodated in the ambassador's residence, and the modern
practice is for official business to be done in an office building known as the
Inviolability of residence and property
123
chancery, while the ambassador's private residence may well be physically

separated. The prevailing practice was for inviolability to be accorded to
residences of staff other than the ambassador, but the point was seldom in issue
because these residences were not vulnerable to politically motivated attack in
the same way as the embassy and could not normally be said to need any special
measures of police protection. The Vienna Convention defines 'premises of the
mission' so as to include the residence of the ambassador only, but Article 30
provides that the private residence of a diplomatic agent is entitled to the same
inviolability and protection.
15.7.
Whether premises are in fact the 'residence' of a diplomatic agent may

sometimes be a difficult question of fact, for example ifthey are being prepared
for occupation but he has not moved in. In the English case of Agbor v.
Metropolitan Police CommissionerH the question in issue was whether the London
police, relying on Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, were entitled to evict
without a court order a family identified with the side in the Nigerian Civil War
opposed to the Government, who had taken possession of a flat which was
claimed to be the residence of a Nigerian diplomatic agent. The Court of
Appeal found as a fact that he had moved out without the intention of
returning and that the flat was therefore no longer his residence. The new
occupants were in possession, and the Court held that even had the premises
been the residence of a diplomatic agent, the executive were not entitled to
evict them without the authority of a court order. 'Squatters' in possession of
diplomatic missions or residences have not, however, proved a serious problem,
and in the much commoner case of a trespass during a political demonstration
the police have continued to remove the trespassers immediately on the request
of the ambassador.
15.8.
Article 30 also gives inviolability to the papers, correspondence and property of

a diplomatic agent. In the case of his property the inviolability does not apply
where there is an exception (such as those described in 15. I 3- I 5) to his
immunity from civil jurisdiction, provided that execution can be levied
without infringing the inviolability of his person or residence. The United
Kingdom authorities interpret this Article as permitting them to tow away an
obstructing vehicle belonging to a diplomat under the same conditions as an
official embassy car. 9
15.9.
The inviolability ofa diplomat's property does not mean that he is exempt from
the laws and regulations of the receiving state regarding exchange control. He
must, in accordance with Article 4 I of the Convention, respect these like other
laws. But in practice most states apply their regulations to foreign diplomats in
such a way that they do not experience practical difficulties. Ifany state did not
do so, it could be argued that it was failing in its duty under Article 25 of the
Convention to 'accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the
.. ,
mIssIon.
124
IlDlDunity frolD jurisdiction

15. I o.
If a diplomatic agent commits a crime in the country to which he is accredited,

he cannot be tried or punished by the local courts. No case can be cited where,
without his consent or that of his government, such a course has been followed.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the writers on diplomatic law
often asserted that where an ambassador was detected in a criminal conspiracy
or in treason against the receiving state, the receiving state could in self-defence
try and punish him. Thus when in 157 I the Bishop ofRoss, the representative of
Mary Queen of Scots whom Queen Elizabeth of England then held captive,
was found to have participated in plots for the deposition of the Queen of
England, five learned civilian lawyers were asked for their opinion and held
unanimously that an ambassador who incited insurrection against the ruler to
whom he was accredited forfeited his privileges and could be tried. But even in
this case, where the status ofthe sending monarch was so dou btful, Elizabeth did
no more than imprison Ross for a short time and then expel him. IQ Many other
cases of charges of treason against an ambassador can be cited, and in all of
them the result was that the ambassador was expelled or (as it would now be
pu t) declared persona non grata.
In 17 I 6 Count Gyllenborg, Swedish Minister in London, entered into communication with the leading Jacobites in furtherance of a plot which aimed, amongst other
things, at the deposition of George I from the throne. Gortz, a secret agent of Charles
XII of Sweden, at the same time pursued negotiations in Holland and elsewhere for
funds to prosecute these designs. The plot was discovered, Gyllenborg was arrested, and
his papers seized. The diplomatic body protested, but are said to have withdrawn their
protest. Gortz was also arrested in Holland at the request of the British Government. As
a reprisal Jackson, the British Minister at Stockholm, was arrested there, and the Dutch
Minister forbidden to appear at the Swedish Court. Eventually Gyllenborg was
exchanged for Jackson, and Gortz set at liberty in Holland. ll
In 1718 Prince de Cellamare, Spanish Ambassador in Paris, conspired to deprive the
Duc d'Orleans of the Regency and transfer it to his master the King of Spain. The
conspiracy was discovered, and Cellamare was placed under arrest. The resident
diplomatic body declined to take up the case. Meanwhile in Spain orders had been
given for the arrest of the French Ambassador, but he managed to reach the frontier in
safety. Cellamare was thereupon conducted to the Spanish frontier and expelled from
France. 12
15. I
I.
The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the criminal jurisdiction of the

receiving state is set out, without any exceptions whatever, in Article 3 I of the
Vienna Convention. The receiving state may, however, take certain actions ifit
learns of evidence of a criminal offence by a diplomat. A minor offence may be
drawn to the attention of the head of mission in the expectation that a
reprimand or disciplinary action will be taken by the head of mission. It is
customary in London, for example, to bring to the attention of heads ofmission
the numbers of parking offences which appear to have been committed by
members of the mission and for which proceedings could not be taken. In the
case of a more serious offence the receiving state is likely to ask for immunity to
be waived so that the diplomat may stand trial, and ifthis request is refused, it is
likely that the offending diplomat will be withdrawn. If he is not withdrawn,
the receiving state may declare him persona non grata and the sending state will
Immunity from jurisdiction
25
then be obliged to withdraw him. But states do not have set rules as to when
they will ask for a waiver ofimmunity or declare an offender persona non grata, or
when they will withdraw a diplomat against whom serious accusations have
been made. All the circumstances will be considered by both governments in
each case.
15. 12.
Immunity from civil jurisdiction was established somewhat later than

immunity from criminal jurisdiction, and came under some challenge during
the seventeenth century in several European states. The magnificence then
expected in the style oflife of an ambassador was not supported by allowances
from the sending sovereign, and ambassadors were often obliged to incur debts,
or to engage in trading to obtain money to pay for the necessary display.
Embarrassing incidents led to the enactment of legislation to put the position
beyond doubt. Thus in 1679 a decree of the States-General of the Netherlands
began: 'Be it known: that every day many troubles and difficulties are caused
because the Burghers of this State continue to have the Persons, Servants or
goods of Foreign Ambassadors or Ministers coming to this country residing
there or passing through it, arrested and detained.... '13 In 1708 the preamble
to the Diplomatic Privileges Act in England recited: 'Whereas several
turbulent and disorderly persons having in a most outrageous manner insulted
the person of his excellency Andrew Artemonovitz Matueof ambassador
extraordinary of his Czarish Majesty Emperor of Great Russia her Majesties
good friend and ally by arresting him and taking him by violence out of his
coach in the publick street and detaining him in custody for several hours.... '
and the Act went on to provide that
'all writs and processes that shall at any time hereafter be sued forth or prosecuted,
whereby the person of any ambassador, or other publick minister of any foreign Prince
or state, authorised and received as such by Her Majesty, Her Heirs or Successors, or the
domestick, or domestick servant ofany such am bassador, or other pu blick minister, may
be arrested or imprisoned, or his or their goods or chattels may be distrained, seized or
attached, shall be deemed and adjudged to be utterly null and void, to all intents,
constructions, and purposes whatsoever.'14
15. I 3.
The immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of a diplomatic agent

is restated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. This immunity is subject to
three important exceptions which were not previously admitted in common
law countries but which were established in many civil law countries. The first
exception relates to
'a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the
mission.'
One must look to the civil law to determine what 'real action' means, and that
makes clear that a real action is an action where ownership or possession of
immovable property is claimed. It is not very clear from the records of
the Vienna Conference whether the words 'unless he holds it on behalf of the
sending State for the purposes of the mission' exclude from the exception the
case of the diplomat in whose name the mission premises are placed or whether
their scope is wider and they exclude from the exception the private residence
126
of a diplomat, which he can be said to hold 'on behalf of the sending State for
the purposes of the mission.' Since the rationale of this exception to immunity is
to make possible the trial of actions affecting title to real property, which could
not possibly be tried in the diplomat's home state, it may be argued that the
exception should be narrowly construed and that it should be possible to bring
an action to determine the legal question of the ownership ofa house in which a
diplomat is living. Any judgement obtained would of course be unenforceable
so long as the diplomat continued to live in the house.
15. I 4.
The second exception relates to

'an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalfof the sending State;'
It is quite common for diplomats, particularly when exercising consular

functions, to be involved in succession matters in an official capacity, since if a
national of his own state dies in the receiving state leaving money to other
nationals in his home state, the diplomat may become involved in the
distribution of the estate, or in claiming on behalf of his government for taxes
owed, or for the estate itselfas 'bona vacantia' ifthere are no heirs either by will
or intestacy. In such cases the diplomat enjoys immunity in the ordinary way.
His involvement in a private capacity in a succession on the other hand is not
part of his functions, and here the interest of the receiving state in asserting
jurisdiction over all the parties involved in a succession question is regarded as
paramount.
15. I 5.
The third exception to immunity is

'an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.'
Article 42 of the Convention prohibits a diplomat from exercising in the

receiving state for personal profit any professional or commercial activity. But
an exception to immunity is still needed as well. A diplomat may disregard the
prohibition on professional or commercial activities. The sending and
receiving states may agree that the bar should be waived. The United
Kingdom will not ordinarily accept in a diplomatic appointment a person who
is engaged in business and intends to continue with his business, but very
exceptionally it has accepted such an appointment where the individual was
otherwise unusually well qualified for the post, and in such a case the diplomat
would not be immune in regard to his business activities. The exception is,
however, most important in regard to members of the diplomat's family, who
enjoy the same immunity from civil jurisdiction but are not obliged to abstain
from professional or commercial activities. The fact that immunity from civil
jurisdiction does not extend to professional or commercial activities makes it
easier for the wife or daughter ofa diplomat to practise her own profession or to
take a job in the receiving state. The receiving state cannot object to this on the
grounds that she would be unfairly protected if, for example, she could not be
sued as a doctor for professional negligence. However, some states do
discourage members of diplomatic families from taking employment sometimes in order to reserve scarce employment for their own nationals and
Immunity from jurisdiction
1 27
sometimes for social reasons. It is evident from the foregoing that when
commitments of this kind are contemplated by members of his staff or their
families, a head of mission should have the opportunity of considering
whether the appropriate authorities of the receiving state should be consulted.
15.16.
A diplomatic agent is immune from any measures of execution. Even if his

government waives his immunity from jurisdiction, the resulting judgement
cannot be enforced unless there is a separate waiver. But in the case of the three
exceptions to jurisdiction discussed above there is also an exception to
immunity from execution. So if an action were brought against a diplomat in
respect of a private business activity and judgement obtained against him, the
judgement could be enforced so long as the enforcement did not infringe his
personal inviolability or that of his residence. His business stocks might be
seized, but his house could not be entered.
15. 1 7.
The immunity of a diplomatic agent means that bankruptcy proceedings

cannot be instituted against him. In the event of a diplomatic agent dying,
whether on embassy premises or not, in circumstances which would normally
necessitate the holding of a coroner's inquest, it has become established
practice, where immunity is claimed by the diplomatic mission, to waive the
proceedings. On the suicide of the butler of the British Embassy at Madrid in
1921, the Ambassador received the examining magistrate of the district at the
Embassy, and the evidence given by him and some of the servants was
embodied in a proces-verbal, which stated that he had waived those rights for the
occaSIon.
15.18.
A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness in any legal

proceedings in the receiving state. This position was established very much
later than the diplomat's immunity from jurisdiction, and the position was still
uncertain during the nineteenth century.
In 1856 the Netherlands minister at Washington was requested by the Secretary of
State to appear in court to give evidence regarding a homicide committed in his
presence. By the unanimous advice of his colleagues he refused. Representations were
made to the Netherlands Government by that of the United States, which, while
admitting that in virtue of international usage and of the law of the United States, the
minister had the right of refusal, appealed to the general sense of justice of the
Netherlands Government. The latter, however, declined to give the desired
instructions, but authorised the minister to give his evidence in writing, and he
accordingly offered to do so, adding that he could not submit to cross-examination. The
offer was declined, as the district Attorney-General reported that such a written
statement would not be receivable as evidence. IS
The Vienna Convention endorses the position there taken by the Netherlands
Government. It is made clear that the diplomat is not merely immune from
compulsion in regard to the giving of evidence; he is exempt from any legal
obligation in the matter. The receiving state would thus not bejustified in using
his refusal as an excuse to declare him persona non grata (as happened to the
Dutch minister at Washington). In fact many states take a helpful attitude and
are prepared to authorise their diplomats to make statements on condition that
they are not cross-examined, or to submit written statements, or to make oral
statements on embassy premises. Such evidence was formerly of little use in
128
lmmunities of diplomatic agents
common law jurisdictions, but written evidence is admissible now to a greater

extent and so statements made under special conditions are increasingly
acceptable. But the matter must be decided by the sending state for each
request, and there are no exceptions to the diplomat's absolute freedom from
any legal duty in the matter.
15.1 g.
The procedure by which a claim to immunity is asserted varies from country to

country. In some states a diplomat may simply inform the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the proceedings, or a writ served through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs may be returned with the information that the defendant is entitled to
immunity. In most cases, of course, proceedings are simply never instituted
because the plaintiff is aware of the defendant's entitlement to immunity. In
some states the executive may direct the courts on the question ofimmunity. In
others, such as the United Kingdom, diplomatic immunity must be decided by
the courts as a matter oflaw. The function of the executive is confined to issuing
to the court or to the parties a certificate on relevant matters of fact within the
knowledge of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Thus the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office's certificate might state that the Secretary of State had
been notified on a certain date of the appointment of the defendant as Second
Secretary in the Embassy of Utopia, and that he continues to be received in
that capacity. The court would under the Diplomatic Privileges Act, 196416 be
obliged to accept these facts which indicate the status of the defendant. But if
the plaintiff argued that this action related to a commercial activity of the
defendant, or that the defendant was not entitled to immunity because he was a
permanent resident of the United Kingdom, the court would decide this issue
itself as a question of law.
15.20.
The rules under which the immunity from jurisdiction of diplomats,

subordinate staff and their families may be waived are set out in Article 32 of
the Vienna Convention. It is made clear that immunity in substance belongs to
the sending state and must therefore be waived by that state. Previous state
practice had been conflicting as to whether diplomatic immunity could be
waived by the individual concerned, particularly as regards the family and
servants of a diplomat. But for diplomats themselves the practice was to make
sure that the waiver was made on the authority of the sending state, as is
illustrated by the Waddington case in Belgium.
In 1906, M. C. Waddington, son of the Chilean charge d'affaires at Brussels, being
accused of murder, took refuge in the legation, which was surrounded by police. Later,
the charge d'affaires informed the Public Prosecutor that he renounced immunity from
the jurisdiction for his son. The Belgian authorities, however, decided that the consent of
the Chilean Government must be awaited, and this having been given, the accused was
brought before the Cour d' Assises of Brabant, where, after trial, he was acquitted. 17
15.21.
The fact that the immunity belongs to the sending state does not however
preclude that state from delegating authority to waive it. The instructions
given to diplomatic service officers of the United States and of the United
Kingdom are that immunity from jurisdiction must never be waived without
instructions from the home government. But not all states require reference
back before waiver is made, and there is nothing in Article 32 preventing a state
from giving its ambassador authority to waive the immunity of members ofhis
Commencement and termination of immunities
29
mission in cases where there is no significant danger to the interests of the

sending state and where justice might otherwise not be done. Equally the
receiving state is not obliged to enquire whether the sending government has in
fact been consulted. It is customary for a state to assume that acts or statements
made by an ambassador are made with the authority of the sending state. Thus
the United Kingdom has provided, in section 2(3)ofthe Diplomatic Privileges
Act 1964,18 that 'For the purpose of Article 32 a waiver by the head of the
mission of any State or any person for the time being performing his functions
shall be deemed to be a waiver by that State.'
15. 22 . The Vienna Convention requires that waiver must always be express.
Previously there were many cases in which it was held that where a diplomatic
agent simply entered an appearance and contested an action or charge in the
ordinary way he must be deemed to have waived his immunity. But a court
which is aware of the diplomatic status of the defendant cannot now safely
proceed without a waiver in express terms. The requirement that waiver must
be express does not, however, imply that it must relate to particular
proceedings. The tendency at least in common law countries has been to regard
a waiver as valid only ifit relates to particular proceedings, 19 and to treat as null
and void an undertaking made in advance to submit to the jurisdiction. This
means, for example, that where a diplomat finds that a landlord is unwilling to
let a house to him because of his diplomatic immunity he cannot get round the
problem by agreeing in the lease to waive his immunity in regard to disputes
which may arise under the lease. But under the Vienna Convention such
undertakings to submit to the jurisdiction would not necessarily be invalid,
provided that they were authorised by the sending state.
15.23.
If the diplomatic agent himself chooses to bring an action before the local
courts, he obliges himself, like a sovereign in similar circumstances, to comply
with the rules of the court. He cannot plead immunity in regard to any set-offor
counterclaim which may be pleaded, provided that it is directly connected
with the principal claim which he has brought. If he succeeds, and the
defendant appeals, he cannot plead immunity in regard to the appeal. The
proceedings which he has begun are regarded as a single entity until the matter
is finally resolved as to liability. But execution of ajudgement and the carrying
out of penalty or sentence following criminal proceedings are regarded as
separate from the issue of liability or guilt, and a separate waiver is required
before they may be carried out.
Commencement and termination of immunities

15.24.
Article 39 of the Vienna Convention lays down that personal privileges and
immunities begin when the person entitled enters the receiving state on his way
to take up his post. If he is in the territory of the receiving state when he is
appointed, his privileges and immunities begin when his appointment is
notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This provision ends the previous
uncertainty in state practice as to whether the critical date for the beginning of
130
immunities was the date of notification of appointment, the date of formal

presentation of credentials (in the case of a head of mission) or the date of
arrival in the territory. If legal proceedings have already been begun when the
entitlement to immunity arises, the immunity may be raised as a bar to their
continuing (in contrast to the position regarding waiver where proceedings
begun on the basis ofa waiver cannot be stopped by a withdrawal on the part of
the sending state). This may occasionally cause difficulty for the receiving state
if it is notified of the appointment as a diplomatic agent of a person against
whom criminal proceedings are pending, or if it suspects that the appointment
may have been engineered in order to obstruct pending civil proceedings. On
one occasion where the United Kingdom Government was informed of the
appointment in a diplomatic capacity of a person against whom serious
criminal charges had been laid, they asked the state in question to withdraw the
notification, and this was done. If a state declined to withdraw a notification in
such circumstances, the receiving state could of course declare the individual
persona non grata, but it would also have to argue that the procedure constituted
an abuse of diplomatic immunity such that it was not obliged to accord the
normal period of immunities which might enable the person to leave the
country.with impunity.
15. 2 5.
The position regarding termination of immunities on the other hand has long
been established - that immunities subsist until the diplomatic agent leaves the
country on termination of his mission, or for a reasonable period to enable him
to do so.
In 1859, in the case of the Magdalena Steam Navigation Company v. Martin, in the
English courts, Lord Chief Justice Campbell observed: 'There can be no execution
while the ambassador is accredited, nor even when he is recalled, if he only remains a
reasonable time in this country after his recall. '20
And in 1894, in the case of Musurus Bey v. Gadban, the English court found it necessary
to determine whether the Turkish Ambassador to London was entitled to diplomatic
immunity between the presentation of his letters of recall on 7 December 1885 and his
leaving the country in February 1886. It was held by the Court ofAppeal that the point
was decided in the case of Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin. 'It was there held that
there could be no execution against an ambassador while he is accredited, nor even
when he is recalled, ifhe only remains a reasonable time in this country after his recall,
and that is precisely what Musurus Pacha did in the present case. During these two
months Musurus Pacha was in the same position as he was in before his recall as to
immunity from being sued. '21
In 1929 a Netherlands court in the case of Banco de Portugal v. Marang, etc. held that
the immunity from civil jurisdiction enjoyed by a foreign diplomatic representative
ceases on the termination of his mission, except for the time required by him to liquidate
his affairs. 22
15.26.
Although the principle of the 'reasonable period' to leave the country is now
laid down in Article 39 ofthe Vienna Convention, no guidance is given on what
constitutes a 'reasonable period'. A few states defined in precise terms in their
internal law the duration ofthis 'reasonable period.' 23 Others have preferred to
retain a flexible approach which allows their courts or administrative
authorities (in the case of privileges) to have regard to the facts ofeach case. For
example an ambassador who was winding up the affairs of the mission as a
whole might claim to be entitled to a longer 'reasonable period' than one
Other remedies
13 I
merely leaving for his next posting. The United Kingdom in general prescribe
a period of one month for administrative purposes such as tax exemption, but
this could be varied in special circumstances and would not bind the courts if
immunity were in issue.
15. 2 7.
The immunity of a diplomatic agent for his official acts - acts performed in the
exercise of his functions as a member of the mission - is on the other hand
unlimited in time. Immunity in regard to such acts is not a personal immunity
of the diplomatic agent but is in reality the immunity of the sending sovereign
state. It therefore subsists even when the diplomat's immunity for his personal
acts has ended along with his mission. This rule was reaffirmed by the English
Court of Appeal in the case of Zoernsch v. Waldock, where Diplock, L. j.,
explained the position as follows:
'In respect of acts done by an envoy in his private capacity the purpose of his
immunity from suit or legal process is so that he may perform his duties to his
government without harassment while en poste. The immunity is from legal
process, not from liability, and its purpose is fulfilled when he has ceased to be en poste
and has had a reasonable time to wind up his affairs in the country to which he is
accredited. The English cases show that in English law an envoy's immunity from suit
and legal process in respect of acts done in his private capacity endures only so long as he
is en poste and for a sufficient time thereafter to enable him to wind up his affairs:
Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin (23); Musurus Bey v. Gadban (24)' Quite different
considerations, however, apply to acts done by him in his official capacity. Such acts are
done on behalf of his government. His government being a foreign sovereign government, under principles of English law which are so well known that I refrain from citing
authority, is immune from the jurisdiction of the English courts. The propriety of its acts
cannot be examined in a municipal court unless it consents to waive its immunity. A
foreign sovereign government, apart from personal sovereigns, can act only through
agents, and the immunity to which it is entitled in respect of its acts would be illusory
unless it extended also to its agents in respect ofacts done by them on its behal[ To sue an
envoy in respect of acts done in his official capacity would be, in effect, to sue his government irrespective of whether the envoy had ceased to be en poste at the date ofthe suit.' 24
Other remedies
15.28.
A person who has a civil dispute with a diplomat or other person entitled to
diplomatic immunity has, if it is clear that immunity will be raised as a bar to
proceedings before the courts of the receiving state, three possible channels
through which he may endeavour to obtain satisfaction:
I.
He may try to institute proceedings before the courts of the diplomat's home
state. Although Article 3 I of the Vienna Convention makes clear that the
immunity from jurisdiction of a diplomatic agent in the receiving state does
not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending state, there are many
practical obstacles to such a course. The prospective plaintiffmust seek legal
advice in the sending state. If he commences proceedings it may be
impossible to serve process on the diplomat while he is abroad, and the
diplomat may leave his post only to proceed directly to another. Even if the
proceedings may be validly instituted in some way, it will be difficult to
persuade witnesses to travel to another state to give evidence, and there will
132
be many matters, such as disputes over real property in the receiving state,
where the sending state has no jurisdiction.
2. He may lay the matter before the ambassador of the sending state hoping to
have his assistance in obtaining a settlement. Where there are no complex
legal or factual matters in dispute this procedure will often secure quick
redress. A member of mission who has been dilatory in settling a debt or a
claim for damages will be reluctant to have the matter reported to his
government with possible adverse comment on his behaviour by his
ambassador.
3. He may lay the matter before his own government, usually before the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and ask them to intervene with the head of
mission concerned. There are no legal rules as to what action may be taken
in such a case. Practice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in
London is to intervene only when three conditions are satisfied. The
complainant must produce satisfactory evidence of a prima facie legal case.
He must have exhausted other methods of obtaining settlement (that is, he
must have drawn the matter clearly to the attention of the member of
mission concerned and of the head of that mission). There must be some
indication that the person concerned is sheltering behind diplomatic
immunity (and so, for example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will
not intervene if there appears to be no immunity from action because the
diplomat's appointment has ended some time ago or the matter relates to a
claim against a member of the administrative and technical staff which is
clearly of a private nature).
15.29.
In many cases taken up by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs the mere

representation will be sufficient to obtain payment of a debt or a satisfactory
settlement of other claims. If there are important differences between the
parties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may use its good offices to a limited
extent to assist towards a settlement, but it will normally be reluctant to put
itself in the position of arbitrator, which could damage its relations with the
other governmen t concerned. It may press for a waiver to enable the issue to be
tried. It may suggest that the question be referred to arbitration, and even assist
in the arrangements to set up such an arbitration. If there are persistent
complaints in regard to a particular member of mission as regards his conduct
or his apparent evasion of his legal liabilities, the sending state may be asked to
withdraw him and if it refuses, he may in an appropriate case be declared
persona non grata.
Duties of a diplolDatic agent

15.30.
Certain duties laid on a diplomatic agent under customary international law

may be said to be the corollary of the immunities which he enjoys in the receiving
state. These duties are now set out in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention. The
most important is his duty to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving
state. His immunity from jurisdiction does not imply any exemption from
liability, although special provisions are often made in the local law to provide
Duties of a diplomatic agent
133
that diplomats should be exempt from certain obligations - for example rules
under local labour law - which are inappropriate to their special circumstances
or might be argued to be incompatible with their status. But in the absence of
such special exemptions he is bound by local laws even though they cannot be
enforced against him because of his immunity. For example it is of the greatest
importance that he should observe local motor traffic regulations, maintain his
car to the standard legally required and take out third-party insurance
wherever this is compulsory. In the United Kingdom it was established in the
case of Dickinson v. Del Solm:25 that an insurer cannot take advantage of the
special position of a client entitled to diplomatic immunity to avoid making
payment on a third-party claim, since his client is liable in the event of his
causing damage. But the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have sought to
prevent any further argument on this by asking all insurers in this field to give
them an assurance that they will not seek to take advantage of the privileged
position of a diplomatic client. A list of insurers who have given this
undertaking is circulated to missions in London, and the requirements of
English law regarding licensing, maintenance, testing and insurance of motor
vehicles are specially drawn to their attention.
15-3 I.
The obligation to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state applies
to the official as well as the private activities of diplomats. For example a
diplomat may only properly exercise consular functions on embassy premises if
this is permitted under the law of the receiving state. Some states prohibit this
and others require special permission, and Article 3 of the Vienna Convention
was intended to make it clear that a diplomatic mission had no inherent right to
perform consular functions regardless of the wishes of the receiving state. In
particular, diplomats should not perform consular marriages on embassy
premises unless this is permitted under local law. United Kingdom diplomatic
service officers are not now permitted to perform consular marriages unless not
only is this pennitted under local law but the local law (which is the law of the
place of marriage) will regard the marriage as valid. Many countries will not
regard as valid a marriage performed by a foreign diplomat or consul in their
territory, and this means that the marriage is unlikely to be regarded as valid in
any country other than the diplomat's sending state.
15-32.
A second duty traditionally laid upon diplomatic agents, and restated in the
Vienna Convention, is the duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of the
receiving state. There have been a number of notorious instances where
flagrant or unluckily discovered breach of that rule has led to the diplomat in
question being declared persona non grata.
In ]888 Lord Sackville, British minister at Washington, received a letter purporting
to come from a naturalised citizen of English birth, named Murchison, asking for advice
as to the way he, and many other individuals in his position, should vote in the pending
election of the President. Lord Sackville replied that 'any political party which openly
favoured the mother country at the present moment would lose popularity, and that the
party in power was fully aware of the fact.' With respect to the 'questions with Canada,
which have been unfortunately re-opened since the rejection of the [fisheries] treaty by
the Republican majority in the Senate, and by the President's message alluded to [by
the writer of the letter], allowance must be made for the political situation as regarded
the presidential election,' and he enclosed an extract from a newspaper in which electors
134
were distinctly advised to vote for Mr Cleveland. This letter of Lord Sackville found its
way into the newspapers, and caused a lively discussion in the Press. The United States
Secretary of State telegraphed to the United States Minister at London, complaining of
the letter and of the language used by Lord Sackville at interviews with newspaper
reporters, and suggested that Her Majesty's Government should take appropriate
action without delay. Lord Salisbury declined to act until he should be in receipt ofthe
precise language of Lord Sackville and his explanation. Lord Salisbury appears to have
said also that the Minister's recall would end his diplomatic career, which would not
necessarily be the case if he were dismissed by the United States, for which there were
precedents. Mr Bayard thereupon addressed a note to Lord Sackville, informing him,
by the instructions of the President, that he was convinced that 'it would be
incompatible with the best interests and detrimental to the good relations of both
governments that you should any longer hold your present official position in the United
States' and enclosing a passport. 26
In 1915 the United States Government requested the recall of Dr Constantin
Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, who admitted that he had
proposed to his government plans for instigating strikes in American munition factories.
Dr Dumba was therefore no longer acceptable to the United States Government, who
had no alternative but to ask for his recall on account of his improper conduct, which
they did with deep regret, while assuring the Austro-Hungarian Government that they
sincerely desired to continue the existing cordial and friendly relations. 27
On June 15, 1931, in the House of Commons, London, questions were asked of the
Prime Minister regarding certain addresses given by members of the Soviet Embassy
and the Finnish Legation within the precincts of the House, and it was suggested in reply
that Members might consider whether in using the committee rooms for addresses by
members of the diplomatic body upon controversial questions they were not adopting a
practice open to grave objection. In reply to a further question by Sir A. Chamberlain
whether such addresses by foreign diplomats were not contrary to diplomatic usage,
whether the interference of diplomats in the internal affairs of other countries had not
led to their being handed their passports, and whether it was not right that members of
embassies and legations should refrain in future from delivering addresses of that kind,
the Prime Minister said that that was the character and nature of the statement he had
made, and that he hoped its complete significance would not be lost. 28
15.33.
The third general obligation set out in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention is
procedural in nature: 'All official business with the receiving State entrusted to
the mission by the sending State shall be conducted with or through the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other ministry as may
be agreed.' It is, however, increasingly frequent that states agreee between
themselves to vary this rule in their daily business. 29
CHAPTER 16
Privileges of diplomatic
agents
16.1.
Five privileges accorded to diplomatic agents are specifically dealt with in the
Vienna Convention - exemption from taxation, exemption from customs
duties and baggage inspection, exemption from social security obligations,
exemption from personal and public services, and exemption from certain laws
of the receiving state regarding the acquisition of nationality. The right to
freedom of movement, which has already been discussed among the privileges
and immunities of diplomatic missions in Chapter 14, may also be
characterised as a personal privilege. In addition a diplomat may also be
granted special privileges under the law of the receiving state in the absence of
international obligation. For example, exemptions from local requirements
regarding immigration formalities or registration by aliens are quite common,
although there is no reference to them in the Vienna Convention.
Exemption from taxation

16.2.
Exemption from taxation in the receiving state is probably the most important
of a diplomat's personal privileges. The principle was clearly established under
customary international law, but states varied in the exceptions which they
admitted to the general principle, and it was difficult to deduce general
principles from the divergent and detailed provisions in the tax law ofdifferent
states. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention now provides in general terms that
a diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real,
national, regional or municipal, and sets out a list of exceptions to the general
rule. There a ppear to be three types oftaxation where a diplomat is not entitled
to exemption.
16.3.
The first category consists of taxes where it would be administratively

impractical to make arrangements for exemption or refund. Taxes in this
category include purchase tax, value added tax, sales tax, airport tax (where
this forms part of the ticket price). These are described in the Vienna
Convention as '(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in
the price of goods or services.' Some countries do in fact make arrangements
under which a diplomat may escape paying sales tax or its local equivalent. He
may be issued with a special card to show in shops in order to claim exemption
from the tax element in the price of what he buys, or refunds may be made by
136
the authorities on presentation of receipts for purchases. The United Kingdom

authorities make refunds in respect of value added tax or car tax on only three
categories of purchase - cars, and (to heads of mission only) spirits and fine
furnishings. In each case the articles must have been manufactured in the
United Kingdom. The tax is substantial in these three cases and the United
Kingdom wish to encourage diplomats to buy a British-made article rather
than take advantage of their exemption from customs duty to import foreign
equivalents more cheaply.
16.4.
The second category of tax which the diplomat must pay relates to activities
which are extraneous to his proper activities in the receiving state. He must pay
taxes on private immovable property in the receiving state 'unless he holds it on
behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission.' If he acquires a
holiday cottage, or a block of flats which he then lets to tenants, he must pay
rates and property tax imposed on these premises. But ifhe holds the embassy
premises in his own name, as he maybe required to do by the legal
requirements of the receiving state, he is not obliged to pay rates and taxes on
them. The words 'unless he holds it on behalf of the receiving State for the
purposes of the mission' clearly imply that no taxes are payable on the embassy
premises held in the name ofa member ofthe mission, but it is less clear whether
their effect is to take a diplomat's own residence out of the scope of the
exception. As with the corresponding words in Article 3 I (I Ha) the records of
the Vienna Conference leave room for argument on the point, and not all states
have adopted the same interpretation in regard to diplomatic residences. The
United Kingdom regard the diplomat's residence (whether privately owned or
leased or forming part of a government-owned block) as held by him 'on behalf
of the sending State for the purposes of the mission.' They therefore accord
relief from local rates on such residences in London, and they do receive
reciprocal treatment from the great majority of other states, although, since
systems of property tax differ, this does not always mean that the other state
concerned adopts the same interpretation of the Convention. Some states
believe that residences are not covered by the expression 'private immovable
property;' others do not impose tax on residences at all, while others may be
granting relief to United Kingdom diplomatic residences on a basis of
reciprocity. The general principles applied in the formulation of Article 34
would suggest that residences should be exempt from tax, since the occupation
of a residence in the receiving state is essential to perform diplomatic functions.
Holiday homes and premises which are leased are on the other hand extraneous
to diplomatic activities and therefore properly taxable.
16.5
Another exceptional case in this category where the diplomat is liable to tax is
'estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving State, subject to
the provisions of paragraph 4 ofArticle 39.' Article 39(4) in the special context
of the death of a member of the mission deals with the question of export of his
personal property (which must be permitted, with the exception of property
acquired in the country the export of which was prohibited at the time of the
death) and with estate duty. It provides that 'Estate, succession and inheritance
duties shall not be levied on movable property the presence of which in the
receiving State was due solely to the presence there ofthe deceased as a member
of the mission or as a mem ber of the family of a member of the mission.' These
Exemption from customs duties and baggage search
137
provisions taken together show the same functional approach to the question of
tax exemption; the diplomat should not pay tax, or his estate be liable, in
respect of matters which are a necessary par~ of his living and working in the
receiving state. But ifhe acquires a substantial fortune or holds property in the
receiving state which has no relation to his functions, estate or succession duty is
payable on it.
16.6.
The third exception to tax exemption which most clearly relates to matters
which are not a necessary part of diplomatic work in the receiving state is 'dues
and taxes on private income having its source in the receiving State and capital
taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving State.'
If the diplomat lets property privately or makes profits from investing on the
stock exchange in the receiving state, he is liable to pay tax on these profits.
16.7.
The final category of tax which the diplomat is liable to pay is the tax which is
in reality a charge for a service. Article 34 lists among the exceptions to the
general rule 'charges levied for specific services rendered.' The most frequent
application of this exception is to local rates. Just as under Article 23 the
embassy is made liable to that part of local rates or taxes which relates to
services rendered to the property, so under Article 34 the diplomat must pay
such charges in relation to his residence. He could also be required to pay road
or bridge tolls, where the proceeds were used for the upkeep of the particular
road or bridge. The final exception listed in Article 34: 'registration, court or
record fees, mortgage dues and stamp duty, with respect to immovable
property, subject to the provisions of Article 23,' may be regarded as an
example of the same principle. The dues described are, in general, not imposed
in order to raise revenue but to cover the administrative cost of providing the
service of registration of immovable property. Embassy premises are, however,
exempt from these dues.
16.8.
Article 34 is of necessity cast in very general terms, and to ascertain the precise
position it is necessary to examine the tax laws, or at least the information
circulated to embassies, in each state party to the Convention. There are
sometimes difficulties in applying the Convention to a particular new tax, and
differences between sending and receiving states as to whether a particular tax
has been correctly classed. In these cases it is usually necessary to examine the
purpose and nature of the particular tax, and it may also be helpful to ask
whether on the general grounds of principle described an exception may be
justified because relief would be administratively impractical, because the tax
relates to essentially and extraneous activities or because the tax is in
reality a charge for a service.
Exentption frOnt custOntS duties and baggage search

16.9.
Although it had for several centuries been the practice to grant diplomats
exemption from customs duty on import oftheir personal effects and articles for
their personal use or consumption, this was traditionally regarded as a matter
of usage and not of binding customary law. l
138
16.10.
Exemption from customs duty has always been a privilege particularly

susceptible to abuse. One notorious instance of abuse is described thus by
Bismarck, speaking of Morny:2
'When he was appointed ambassador at Petersburg, he arrived with a whole string of
fine, elegant carriages, and a host of trunks, boxes and chests, full oflaces, silk-stuffs and
ladies' dresses, for which as ambassador he had no duties to pay. Each servant had his
own coach, each attache or secretary two at least, and he himselfquite five or six; and, as
he was there for a few days, he auctioned the lot - carriages and laces and wearing
apparel. He must have made eight hundred thousand roubles. He was unscrupulous but
amiable, he could really be most amiable. '3
Governments may well have felt that their position in laying down regulations
to end abuse was stronger so long as the exemption from duty was regarded as a
conceSSIOn.
16.11.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, however, obliges the receiving state to

grant exemption from customs duties and taxes on articles for the official use of
the mission and on articles for the personal use ofa diplomat or a member ofhis
family, including articles intended for his establishment (such as furniture or a
motor car). But it is made clear that the exemption is to be granted in
accordance with such laws and regulations as the receiving state may adopt.
Missions must therefore consult the laws in the receiving state or the
information supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to ascertain
what procedure should be followed to clear baggage or official consignments of
goods through customs, whether any limits are imposed on the quantities of
goods such as alcohol and tobacco which may be imported duty free while the
diplomat is en poste, and what rules will apply if a diplomat wishes to dispose of
goods he has brought in duty free. Regulations on such matters - either to
prescribe procedures or to prevent abuse - are imposed by most countries and
are clearly permitted under Article 36. But regulations imposed in bad faith or
so restrictive as essentially to obstruct the exercise of the right to duty-free
imports, may be challenged by sending states. In one country for example
diplomats were severely limited in their imports of duty-free official cars in the
hope that this would lead to more purchases of locally produced cars. But the
restriction was challenged by the corps diplomatique who argued that its
purpose was essentially protectionist and that because it partly undermined the
right to import articles duty free it could not be justified under the provisions of
Article 36.
16.12.
On the other hand provided that the ambassador of the sending state certifies
that a particular consignment is of 'articles for official use,' the receiving state
will ordinarily accept the duty-free import even of highly unusual items; for
example the United Kingdom during the construction of new embassy
premises in the Soviet Union imported building materials free of duty into the
Soviet Union. Article 36 imposes an obligation to permit entry, as well as to
exempt from duty, and so the sending state, provided that the articles are
genuinely required for official use, would be justified in importing items such as
medicinal drugs or alcohol, even where in the absence of privilege such items
could not be imported under the law of the receiving state. But diplomats on
the other hand are not justified in importing for personal use articles whose
Exemption from customs duties and baggage search
139
import is forbidden under local law, unless they have specific authority from
the receiving state. The powers given in this Article to search a diplomat's
baggage for 'articles the import or export of which is prohibited by the law or
controlled by the quarantine regulations of the receiving State' imply that the
receiving state need not admit such articles.
16.13.
The regulations prescribed by the United Kingdom for the import of goods
under diplomatic privilege are set out in Annex C to a Memorandum on
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities which was circulated by the Foreign
Office to diplomatic missions in London in 1966, shortly after the United
Kingdom became a party to the Vienna Convention. After setting out the
entitlement of different categories of staff, the Annex continues with the
following general rules:
General
7. The relief from Customs duties outlined above applies to goods of foreign or
Commonwealth origin only (with the exception ofBritish manufactured motor cars
which may be imported free of Customs duties if previously owned and used
abroad).
8. Goods are allowed to be delivered under the above arrangements only on condition
that they are for the personal use of the entitled person or member of his family
forming part of his household or for the official use of a mission or international
organisation. Such goods must not, therefore, be sold, hired, lent, given away or
otherwise disposed of to non-privileged persons. Exceptionally, permission may be
given, on payment of the appropriate Customs charges, for the disposal of certain
articles such as motor cars to a person not entitled to Customs privileges.
Application for such permission should be made to the Protocol and Conference
Department, Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office before any goods imported
free of Customs duties are disposed of.
9. Restrictions will not normally be placed on the quantities of goods imported under
the above arrangements provided that the goods are genuinely required for the
personal use of a privileged individual or for the official use of a mission or
international organisation. If, in any particular case, quantities in excess of
reasonable genuine requirements are imported, the Commissioners ofCustoms and
Excise reserve the right to place a limit on the quantities which may be released free
of customs charges.
10. Goods delivered free of Customs charges under the above arrangements will
normally be released without examination. The Commissioners of Customs and
Excise reserve the right, however, to examine any such goods in exceptional
circumstances. The examination would normally be made after consultation with
the privileged importer and, if desired by him, in his presence or that of his
appointed representative.
11. Arrangements exist for facilitating the temporary exportation from the United
Kingdom of motor vehicles which have been acquired in, or imported into, the
United Kingdom under diplomatic privilege. These arrangements involve
completion by the privileged exporter of form C. & E. 945, copies of which may be
obtained from the Protocol and Conference Department, Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office or direct from the Commissioners of Customs and Excise, King's
Beam House, Mark Lane, London, E.C.3.
12. The arrangements mentioned in paragraph I I do not apply to motor vehicles being
140

permanently exported from the United Kingdom. The Commissioners of Customs
and Excise require notification of the permanent exportation of motor vehicles
which have been acquired in, or imported into, the United Kingdom under
diplomatic privilege and, where such notification is given in advance of shipment,
arrangements will be made to facilitate the movement of the vehicle through the
Customs control. The Protocol and Conference Department, Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office should be notified when it is intended permanently to
export such a vehicle and details of the date and port or airport of exportation, the
name of the export vessel or flight number, where known, and the name of the
shipping agent together with details of the vehicle and the privileged owner should
be supplied.
16. I 4.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention also provides that 'The personal baggage
of a diplomatic agent shall be exempt from inspection, unless there are serious
grounds for presuming that it contains articles not covered by the exemptions
mentioned in paragraph I of this Article, or articles the import or export of
which is probbited by the law or controlled by the quarantine regulations of
the receiving State. Such inspection shall be conducted only in the presence of
the diplomatic agent or of his authorised representative.' The right to inspect
the personal baggage of a diplomat in these exceptional circumstances is an
important exception to the general inviolability of a diplomat's property in the
receiving state. It should also be added that if a diplomat declines to allow his
baggage to be inspected or tested by agents ofan air carrier, under the practices
which since the advent of hijacking and terrorism on aircraft have become
general, the carrier is under no obligation to carry him.
16. I 5.
No specific provision is made in Article 36 in regard to search of incoming

consignments of articles for the official use of the mission or for the personal
use of a diplomat. This is therefore a matter which the receiving state can
regulate. It is of course open to the sending state to send any particularly
sensitive items, which it does not wish to be examined, in the character of a
diplomatic bag. Items in the bag must be for official use, but there is no other
limitation on their character.
Exemption from social security obligations

16. I 6.
Article 33 of the Vienna Convention provides that diplomatic agents are, with
respect to their work for the sending state, exempt from any social security
provisions in the receiving state. Previously this exemption was not established
in international custom, although some states expressly exempted diplomats in
their legislation. In states where there was no express or implied exemption in
regard to diplomats the position often was that the diplomat could choose
whether he wished to participate, or rely on his immunity fromjurisdiction ifhe
did not wish to do so. No pressure appears to have been put on embassies to
comply, except in regard to staff recruited in the receiving state. But this was
not entirely a satisfactory position, and it was recognised at the Vienna
Conference that exemption in substance was entirely justified for career
diplomats, so that they could, in general, expect to be covered throughout their
Nationality
141
peripatetic career by the system of their home state, to which they were likely to
return in the event of accident, illness, unemployment or retirement. The
Convention, however, permits voluntary participation in the social security
scheme of the receiving state if this is permissible under the local law (but under
the law of the United Kingdom for example such voluntary participation is not
permitted). Sending and receiving states may also make more liberal or more
restrictive arrangements in the context of bilateral social security agreements,
for the Vienna Convention expressly provides that its own provisions on the
matter do not affect bilateral or multilateral agreements, whether prior or
subsequent, on social security.
ExelDption frolD personal and public services

16.17
Exemption from such compulsory services as jury service, military service and
from military obligations such as requisition and billeting has traditionally
been accorded to diplomats. It is now required under Article 35 of the Vienna
Convention.
Nationality
16.18.
As a general rule, those states which confer nationality automatically on

children born in their territory make an exception in regard to the children of
diplomatic agents other than their own nationals, and also make provision to
ensure that children born to their own diplomats serving abroad acquire their
father's nationality. States which confer nationality by descent do not usually
require to make special provision. But although the general principle was well
understood and applied, the precise details varied from state to state,
particularly on the question of which members of a diplomatic mission were
covered by the exception. The Vienna Conference attempted to formulate a
provision on the question for inclusion in the Convention, but the original draft
of the International Law Commission, which was very wide in its application,
caused difficulties to a number of states, since it did not in some respects accord
with their policies in regard to nationality, and the less ambitious and more
precise draft produced by a special Working Group did not satisfy other states.
Neither proposal secured the necessary two-thirds majority, and it was agreed
to formulate the International Law Commission's text as an Optional Protocol
concerning Acquisition of Nationality. Those states which supported the
International Law Commission's text could then become parties to the
Protocol. In fact only about a quarter of the states which have become parties to
the Vienna Convention have also accepted the Optional Protocol on
Nationality.
16.19.
Article 11 of the Optional Protocol provides that 'Members of the mission not
being nationals of the receiving State, and members of their families forming
part of their household, shall not, solely by the operation of the law of the
142
receiving State, acquire the nationality of that State.' There were two main
objections to this provision. The first was that it did not take sufficient account
of the degree of connection between the child born and the receiving state. For
example a child born to parents both of whom were permanently resident in
the receiving state and whose father was a national of the receiving state (if the
mother was a member ofa mission and was not a national of the receiving state)
would not acquire automatically the receiving state's nationality. The second
was the possibility that in some cases the provision could give rise to
statelessness - for example in the case of an illegitimate child born to a woman
member of a diplomatic mission. The Protocol also has the effect of excluding the
possibility of the nationality of the receiving state automatically being acquired
on marriage to a member ofa diplomatic mission, and this also caused difficulty
for some states. The Protocol does not, of course, exclude the acquisition of
nationality by naturalisation, or by the exercise of rights to choose the
nationality of the receiving state on a voluntary basis.
16.20.
States which have not become parties to the Optional Protocol of course
continue, in general, to apply local laws which accord with the broad principle
established under customary international law. In the United States and the
United Kingdom, for example, the exception from the rule of acquisition of
nationality by birth in the territory depends on possession by the father of
immunity from jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom nationality is not
acquired 'if at the time of his birth - his father is a person on whom any
immunity from jurisdiction is conferred by or under the Diplomatic Privileges
Act, 1964, or on whom such immunity from jurisdiction as is conferred by that
Act on a diplomatic agent is conferred by or under any other Act, and is not a
citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.'4
CHAPTER 17
Families, junior staff and

local nationals
17. I.
The two previous chapters have set out the scale of immunities and privileges
which is accorded under the Vienna Convention to diplomatic agents who are
not nationals or permanent residents of the receiving state. A majority of the
individuals who are entitled under the Convention to some immunities or
privileges do not, however, come into this category, and they receive privileged
treatment on a lesser scale. Article 37 of the Vienna Convention sets out in
precise terms the immunities and privileges which must be accorded to families
ofdiplomatic agents, to members of the administrative and technical staffof the
mission and their families, to members of the service staff of the mission and to
private servants of members of the mission. Nationals of the receiving state are
entirely excluded from the provisions of Article 37. Permanent residents of the
receiving state are excluded also except in the case of members of the family
of a diplomatic agent. Article 38 sets out the immunities to be accorded to
diplomatic agents who are nationals or permanent residents of the receiving
state.
Fanlilies of diploDlatic agents

17.2.
The members of the family ofa diplomatic agent forming part of his household,
unless they are nationals of the receiving state, enjoy the entire range of
diplomatic privileges and immunities. If they are nationals of the receiving
state they receive no personal privileges or immunities at all, although the
diplomat may use his exemption from customs duty to import free of duty
articles for their personal use. Continuing immunity in regard to official acts is
of course irrelevant in the case of a family member, who does not carry out
official acts.
17.3.
The expression 'member of the family forming part of the household' is not
defined in the Convention. Considerable effort was devoted during the Vienna
Conference to the fonnulation of a definition, but none of those proposed
obtained the necessary majority. The question of who may qualify as a
'member of the family' is thus in principle for negotiation between sending and
receiving states. But states may establish reasonable guidelines for the
interpretation of the term, and these will normally be applied in practice in the
receiving state. Most states have not enunciated rigid rules on the matter and
144
have preferred to retain sufficient flexibility to deal with unusual cases (such as
polygamous diplomats arriving en poste with more than one wife) as and when
they arise. All states, however, accept the spouse of a diplomatic agent as a
member of the family. Spouse includes the husband of a woman diplomat. At
the Court ofStJames's in recent years a few married ladies have been received
as ambassadors and a greater number as diplomatic agents, and their husbands
have been accepted as entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities. All
states accept the minor child of a diplomat as a member of the family, although
there could be differences between sending and receiving state as to whether a
child is still a 'minor'. The United Kingdom regard the law of the receiving
state as determining this question. Beyond these categories practice varies. The
United Kingdom for the administration of privileges (a claim to immunity
would have to be determined by the courts) normally accept as members of the
family persons in the following three categories: (i) a person who fulfils the
social duties of consort or hostess to a diplomat who is not accompanied by a
wife; (ii) a child of full age who lives with the diplomat at least during vacations
(if he is a student) and is not engaged in paid employment on a permanent
basis; and (iii) a parent of the diplomat who lives with him and is not engaged in
paid employment on a permanent basis. But these categories are not exclusive,
and other claims to privileges as a member of the family of a diplomatic agent
will be considered in the light of the particular facts.
Administrative and technical staff

1'.4.
The question of the privileges and immunities to be extended to the 'suite', as

the family and junior staff of the mission were formerly called, was one on
which there was no consistent practice among states. Some states, notably the
United Kingdom and the United States, extended the entire range of
diplomatic immunities down the scale to domestic servants working in the
embassy and private servants of the ambassador. Most states limited the
privileges and immunities of junior staff in some way, but there were no
consistent rules in regard to the limitations which might be imposed. The
matter might be determined by reciprocity. The United Kingdom for
example, from the enactment in 1955 of the Diplomatic Immunities
(Restriction) Act} limited on a precisely reciprocal basis the immunity which it
extended to junior staff in diplomatic missions in London. The most restrictive
states accorded to junior staff only the immunities which flowed from their
status as agents of a foreign sovereign government, namely immunity in regard
to official acts and exemption from taxation on their official emoluments. In the
Vienna Convention, however, a clear distinction is drawn between those staff,
termed the administrative and technical staff, whose work is highly responsible,
who may be dealing at a lower level with diplomatic matters, who whether as
personal secretaries or as cipher clerks or wireless operators have access to
diplomatic secrets, and those staff whose functions are essentially domestic and
who are not in direct contact with official matters, namely the service staff 2
The first category require on functional grounds a greater protection than is
Administrative and technical staff
145
afforded by immunity for official acts alone, whereas the second are not likely to
be harassed or attacked and therefore do not need the special protection of
inviolability or immunity from jurisdiction in regard to their private acts. The
distinction itself was readily accepted and the terms have quickly become
standard diplomatic usage. But it proved difficult to agree on the exact
treatment to be accorded to administrative and technical staff The
formulation in Article 37 resulted from compromise. It constitutes progressive
development in this area, and it has not been universally accepted.
17.5.
There are no precise rules in the Convention or in practice as to which tasks are
properly to be performed by 'administrative and technical staff and which by
'service staff.' 'Members of the administrative and technical staff are defined
simply as the members of the staffof the mission employed in the administrative
and technical service of the mission. 'Members of the service staff are the
members of the staffofthe mission in the domestic service of the mission. It is for
the sending state to notify the receiving state of the appointment ofmission staff
in the various categories, and it must therefore decide borderline cases, such as
security guards and embassy teachers, for itself, acting in good faith. For
example it is clearly improper to appoint staff to a staff category which is not
justified by the work they do, simply to give them greater privileges and
immunities. But the receiving state is not under the Convention given power to
challenge a classification ofstaffor unilaterally to demand that they be assigned
to a lower staff category. It can of course ask the sending state to reclassify
particular staff. But if the sending state refuses, the receiving state, if unwilling
to acquiesce, can only declare the individuals persona non grata or not
acceptable, or use its powers under Article I I of the Convention to limit the
number of staff appointed to a particular category.
17.6.
Members of the administrative and technical staff, and members of their

families forming part of their households, unless they are nationals or
permanent residents of the receiving state, enjoy the same privileges and
immunities as diplomatic agents, with two important exceptions. They do not
enjoy immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction in regard to acts
performed 'outside the course of their duties.' They can never be tried on a
criminal charge in any circumstances (short of waiver of their immunity), but
they may be sued on personal matters, for example if they write a libellous
article in a local paper, or refuse to pay their children's school fees, or keep wild
animals which escape and cause damage. The immunity given to administrative and technical staff in regard to acts performed in the course of their
duties is wider than the immunity which is given to a diplomatic agent who is a
national of the receiving state and which covers only 'official acts performed in
the exercise of his functions.' The former expression would include acts
performed during the working day which were reasonably incidental to
employment with the embassy - for example driving to an official
appointment. 'Official acts performed in the exercise of his functions,' on the
other hand, includes only those acts which are performed on behalf of the
sending state.
17.7.
The second limitation on the privileges and immunities of administrative and

technical staff as compared with diplomatic staff is that the former enjoy
146
exemption from customs duty only in regard to those articles which they import
when they arrive to take up their post. They cannot later import items free of
duty, and in particular they cannot import wines, spirits and tobacco duty free
as diplomats can. Each receiving state has exact regulations concerning 'first
arrival privileges' (premiere installation), as the privilege given to administrative
and technical staff is often called. Some countries may allow only one car to be
imported on arrival in the receiving state. All countries have a period during
which articles must be imported if they are to qualify as being 'imported at the
time of first installation'. Some countries (including the United Kingdom)
require articles to be imported within three months after the arrival of the staff
member himself. Others are more generous and grant exemption from duty
even where the articles are imported up to six, nine or twelve months later.
Most will allow an extension if there are special circumstances such as an
unexpected delay in the shipment. The United Kingdom also expect items to
be in the ownership or possession of the staff member when he arrives - or at
least to have been ordered by then. A staff member travelling to a different
climate who wishes to import suitable clothing duty free after his arrival must
at least place his order before travelling to the receiving state.
17.8.
Four states - Egypt, Morocco, Cambodia and Portugal- have at various times
entered reservations 3 to the provision in the Vienna Convention which
regulates the privileges and immunities of members of the administrative and
technical staff They wished to accord to those staffonly the much lower scale of
privileges and immunities which under the Convention is given to service staff.
A number of other states, mainly European, objected to those reservations but
made clear that they regarded the reserving states as parties to the Convention.
Portugal has since withdrawn her reservation and the others have made clear
that in principle they are prepared to accord Vienna Convention treatment to
administrative and technical staff in missions where they are explicitly assured
of reciprocity for their own staffabroad. The People's Republic ofChina which
acceded to the Convention in November 1975 stated in its instrument that it
'holds reservations ... on the provisions of paragraphs 2,3 and 4 ofArticle 37.'4
This reservation therefore applies to all junior staff, not only to administrative
and technical staff, and many states have lodged objections to it.
Service staff
17.9.
Service staff, who are defined as members of the staff of the mission in the
domestic service of the mission, include embassy drivers, cooks, door-keepers
and cleaners. They differ from 'private servants' of members of the mission in
being employed by the sending state and not by any individual member of the
mission. They receive under the Vienna Convention only immunity for their
official acts, which may be regarded to some extent as acts of the sending state;
exemption from tax on the emoluments of their job, which may equally be
regarded as an exemption for the sending state which provides these
emoluments; and exemption from social security provisions. They are entitled
to no immunities or privileges of a purely personal character. Local nationals
Private servants
47
and permanent residents receive nothing.

17.10.
The limited privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Convention
may of course be supplemented by more generous provisions under local law or
practice, or by bilateral agreement between sending and receiving state.
Article 47 expressly sanctions the giving of more favourable treatment than is
required by the Convention where this is based on custom or agreement. For
example, when the United States ratified the Vienna Convention, it had not
yet been able to secure legislation to bring its own practice into conformity with
the provisions of the Convention; it was nevertheless made clear that the
greater immunities given tojunior staffin foreign missions under earlier United
States legislation would continue to apply, at least for the time being. 5 The
United Kingdom accords more generous treatment to junior staff in foreign
missions only on the basis ofagreements or arrangements already in force when
she became a party to the Vienna Convention. She has a number of such
agreements or arrangements providing for more generous exemption from
customs duty for junior staff, and three agreements - with the Soviet Union,
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia - which accord inviolability of person and
residence and personal immunity from jurisdiction on the diplomatic scale to
junior staff. 6 Even where there is no explicit provision for according greater
privileges and immunities to junior staff, it may also happen that
administrative discretion will be used in their favour. For example, if a
member of a foreign mission is detected shoplifting or driving while unfit
through drink, the executive, if it has discretion over the initiation of criminal
proceedings, may prefer, in order not to damage good bilateral relations with
the sending state, to send a private account of the matter to the ambassador
rather than institute criminal proceedings.
Private servants
17. I I.
In traditional diplomatic practice, the private servants of the ambassador were

regarded as members of his 'suite' and entitled to at least some privileges and
immunities on that basis. The Vienna Convention, however, distinguishes
between service staff, employed by the sending state, and the private servants of
members of the mission. No distinction is made between the private. servants of
the ambassador and the private servants of other members of the mission.
Private servants who are not nationals or permanent residents of the receiving
state enjoy two privileges only (which may in fact equally be regarded as
belonging to their employers). They are exempt from tax on the emoluments of
their employment and, on condition that they are covered by social security in
another state, they are exempt from the social security provisions of the
receiving state. This is primarily to the advantage of the diplomatic employer.
He does not have to pay such high wages as he would if they were subject to tax
and social security deductions by the receiving state, and he does not have to
master the intricacies of tax and social security law in each of the countries to
which he may be posted along with his servants.
148
17. 12.
The Vienna Convention also provides that jurisdiction over private servants
must be exercised 'in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the
performance of the functions of the mission.' This means in practical terms that
the local police should not arrest the ambassador's cook and detain him on
criminal charges on a day when the ambassador is giving an important dinner
party. The authorities should try to fix dates for the hearing of civil claims or
criminal charges against private servants in such a way that the diplomatic
employer is not seri0usly inconvenienced. It must also be remembered that if
the private servant is living, as he will usually be, with his diplomatic employer,
proceedings cannot be begun against him by service of process, or a judgement
against him executed in such a way as to infringe the inviolability of the
residence of the diplomat.
Nationals and perlDanent residents of the receiving state

17. I 3.
The exclusion of nationals of the receiving state from privileges and immunities
was common, although not universal, under customary international law. The
writers on international law were conscious of the special problems posed if a
national of the receiving state was accepted in the capacity of a diplomatic
agent, but they were not consistent in the conclusions they drew. Adair writes
in this way of Wicquefort, whose famous book on L'Ambassadeur et ses Fonetions
appeared in 168 I:
'Wicquefort, however, had in his own person experienced the dangers to which
ambassadors might be exposed, for, though by birth a Dutchman, he had resided in
Holland as agent for the Duke of Liineburg and while there had been condemned to
perpetual imprisonment for communicating Dutch secrets of state; he therefore gives
very vigorous support to the view that an ambassador possesses full immunity no matter
what his nationality may be, if he has been accepted in such capacity by the receiving
state, for he represents the actual person of the sovereign who has sent him and who
cannot be subject to a foreign jurisdiction; in addition, any such subjection on the part of
an ambassador would so limit his freedom of action as to make it impossible for him to
perform the duties of his embassy. The only qualification he would admit is that, if the
ambassador has himselfviolated the law of nations, he cannot call upon it for protection;
this is vague, and even here no greater punishment can be inflicted than a demand for
the ambassador's recall. If one turns, however, to the earlier and smaller version of this
work, published in 1676, one finds that there Wicquefort speaks with a very different
voice: an ambassador should certainly be secure, but ifhe attempts the life of the prince,
conspires against the state, or even gives information to its enemies, he becomes a traitor
and this is incompatible with his position as an ambassador; therefore there is no longer
any necessity to respect his privileges or to observe those rules ofinternational law which
he himself has broken, though, Wicquefort adds, a prince will have more honour ifhe
sends back to his master an ambassador who has become a criminal than ifhe punishes
him himsel[ Five years later Wiquefort is seen upholding the ambassador's complete
immunity; it is surely not unkind to suspect that his own long imprisonment was
responsible for this drastic change in his views.' 7
Some states avoided the problem by refusing altogether to accept their own
nationals as diplomats representing another state, and of those who were
Nationals and permanent residents of the receiving state
149
willing to accept them some gave them full privileges and immunities, some
gave them no privileges and immunities (or only immunity for official acts) and
some regulated the matter expressly at the time of receiving the diplomatic
agent, usually by reserving the right to withold immunities and privileges.
17.14.
The Vienna Conference, however, was firmly in favour of excluding nationals

of the receiving state from all personal privileges and immunities. Junior staff in
fact do not even receive immunity in regard to official acts, though this would
not prevent the sending state in appropriate cases from arguing before a court
that these acts were in reality acts of a foreign sovereign and therefore for
reasons of sovereign immunity not within the jurisdiction of the receiving state.
Diplomatic agents who are nationals or permanent residents of the receiving
state enjoy under Article 38 of the Vienna Convention immunity from
jurisdiction only, and inviolability in respect of official acts performed in the
exercise of their functions. The wording makes clear that both the inviolability
and the immunity are limited to official acts. The acts covered are only those
which are in some sense performed on behalf of the sending state. Incidental
acts performed during the working day, or necessary for the conduct oflife in
the receiving state, such as the renting of living accommodation, or driving to
an appointment, may be said to be 'in the course ofduties' (the expression used
in Article 37 of the Convention) but they are not 'official acts performed in the
exercise of his functions.'
17.15.
The main difficulty which arises in regard to the provisions of Article 38 results
from the exclusion of 'pennanent residents' as well as local nationals from virtually
all privileges and immunities. Whether a person is a national of the receiving
state is under general principles oflaw to be determined by the law ofthat state.
But the exclusion of 'permanent residents' was not common to many legal
systems before the Convention; it was added to the text of the Convention at a
very late stage and without much discussion, and neither the term nor a
procedure for resolving its application is defined in the Convention. The
United Kingdom Government found that the interpretation of the term was
difficult and gave rise to differences with individual missions. In the light of
several years' experience of administering the regime under the Convention,
and in an effort to avoid the arguments over particular cases which wasted time
and caused friction, the United Kingdom Government elaborated some
working criteria which they circulated on 27 January 1969 to all diplomatic
missions in London for their guidance. Subsequent practice has been based on
this circular. The guidance was as follows:
'When determining whether or not a particular member of your staff should be
regarded as a permanent resident of the United Kingdom the test should normally be
whether or not he would be in the United Kingdom but for the requirements of the
sending State. In applying this test I suggest that you should be guided by the following
considerations:
(i) the intention of the individual; a person should be regarded as permanently
resident in the United Kingdom unless he is going to return to his own country or
proceed to a third country as soon as his appointment in the United Kingdom ends.
It is suggested that points which may be relevant to this question include the links of
the individual with the State which he claims as his home, e.g. payment of taxes,
participation in social security schemes, ownership of immovable property,
150
payment of return passage by the sending state.

(ii) the prospect of the individual being posted elsewhere as a career member of the
service; he should be regarded as permanently resident in the United Kingdom if
his appointment in the United Kingdom is likely to continue or has continued for
more than five years, unless the Head of Mission states that the longer stay in the
United Kingdom is a requirement of the sending state and not a result of personal
considerations.
(iii) local recruitment of the individual; a person who is locally engaged is presumed to
be permanently resident in the United Kingdom unless the Head of Mission
concerned shows that he is going to return to his own country or to proceed to a
third country immediately on the termination of his appointment in the United
Kingdom; and
(iv) marital status of the individual; a woman memberofthe Mission who is married to
a permanent resident of the United Kingdom is presumed to be herself
permanently resident in the United Kingdom from the time of her marriage unless
the Head of Mission shows that in addition to her satisfying the other criteria, there
remains a real prospect in view of the special circumstances of her case that she will
be posted as a normal career member of the service.
If a review in the light of this guidance leads Your Excellency to conclude that any of
your staff should henceforward be regarded as permanent residents of the United
Kingdom for the purposes of the Diplomatic Privileges Act, I suggest that any change in
status should take effect from 1st April 1969 and would request that such cases be
notified to this Office by that date. Thereafter it would be helpful if Your Excellency
could arrange for prompt notification to this Office of any change in the residential
status of members of your staff. Should a difference of opinion arise between a Mission
and Her Majesty's Government as to whether an individual is permanently resident in
the United Kingdom, I suggest that consultation should take place between the two
sides and that each side should inform the other of any relevant evidence which may be
in their possession.
I should be grateful if Your Excellency would bear in mind the considerations set
forth above when making notifications of staff for the purposes of establishing and
maintaining the regime of immunities and privileges to be set up for foreign consular
personal under the Consular Relations Act 1968, and for Commonwealth quasiconsular personnel under the Diplomatic Immunities (Commonwealth Countries and
Republic of Ireland) Act 1952 as amended by the Consular Relations Act 1968.'
CHAPTER 18
Diplomatic agents in third

states
18. I.
Two questions arise for the diplomatic agent who wishes to cross a third state on
his way to or from the state where he has been appointed. Does international
law give him an automatic right of passage, at least in time of peace, and is he
entitled to any special privileges and immunities while he is passing through?
Practice on both matters varied considerably at different periods.
18.2.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was the custom for diplomats
who wished to cross foreign territory on the way to their post, and indeed for
private persons, to seek the assurance of a safe-conduct from the ruler of the
foreign territory concerned. Thus in 1572 when du Cros, French envoy to
Scotland, was arrested in England, at a time when passage of Frenchmen
through England to Scotland was forbidden, it was contended in defence ofthis
action that he should have asked for a passport. 1 States might provide in
general terms for the safe passage of their ambassadors in transit, as did Britain
and Russia in a Treaty of 1623, which protected: 'Ambassadors, Messengers or
Posts through the Countries and Dominions of the other unto and from
Germany, France, Spain, Denmarke, Sweathland and Netherland, or unto
and from Persia, Turkey and other Partes of the East, which are not in open
Hostilities with either of their renowned Majesties.... '2 Gradually the practice
of seeking safe-conducts fell into disuse but states until the nineteenth century
accepted that the ambassador had a right of innocent passage through third
states on his way to his post. It was clearly to the advantage ofall states that this
should be the position and legal restrictions on immigration or on the
movement ofaliens within a territory were still uncommon. Halleck sets out the
position thus:
'He has a right of innocent passage through the dominions of all states friendly to his
own country, and to the honours and protection which nations reciprocally owe to each
other's diplomatic agents, according to the dignity oftheir rank and official character. If
the state through which he proposes to pass has just reason to suspect his object to be
unfriendly, or to apprehend that he will abuse this right by inciting its people to
insurrection, furnishing intelligence to its enemies, or plotting against the safety of the
government, it may very properly, and without just offence, refuse such innocent
passage. But if an innocent passage is granted (and it is always presumed to be by a
friendly Power, unless specially denied) he is entitled to respect and protection, and any
insult or injury to him is regarded as an insult or injury both to the state which sends him
and that to which he is sent.' 3
18.3.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, controls on
152
travel became general and states became more restrictive, requiring foreign
diplomats to obtain a prior visa if such a visa was necessary for an ordinary
traveller ofthe same nationality. The reaction of the French Government to the
transit of M. Soule indicates this new attitude.
In 1854 the French Government refused to M. Soule, United States minister at
Madrid (of French origin, but naturalised in the United States, and said to have been 'of
a fiery temperament') permission to stay in France on his way to his post, on the ground
that his antecedents had attracted the attention of the authorities charged with public
order; they had no objection to his merely passing through, but as he had not been
authorised to represent his adopted country in his native land, he was for the French
Government merely a private person, and as such subject to the ordinary law. 4
18-4.
In the vast majority of cases a visa, or permission to transit on production ofa

diplomatic passport was granted as a matter of course, but where the diplomat
was not acceptable to the third state, or the third state had no diplomatic
relations with either the sending or the receiving state, he would find that the
'right of innocent passage' was of little practical significance. The Vienna
Convention is clearly based on the assumption that the diplomat has no right of
transit across a third state, and that he is not exempt from obtaining a visa for
such passage in the ordinary way. The old right of passage has in any event
become of much less practical significance now that air travel has become
general, since diplomats are frequently not faced with the necessity of entering
third states in order to proceed to or from their post. However, it sometimes
occurs that at a transit stop, whether made for the purpose ofchanging aircraft
or not, the authorities require a transit visa or a passport inspection.
18.5.
On the question of whether an ambassador in transit was entitled to privileges

and immunities the early writers were unanimous that he had no such
entitlement. His special position, if any, depended on the terms of a safeconduct, or on special bilateral agreement, or on courtesy. But later practice
was more varied. A few states, such as the Netherlands, in their ordinance of
1679,5 and France, under the decree of 13 ventose, an 11, made provision in
their legislation to treat diplomats in transit in the same way as diplomats
accredited to the state. Their immunity was of course subject to the same
exceptions. A series of United States cases, Holbrook v. Henderson, 6 Wilson v.
Blanco 7 and Bergman v. De Sieyes 8, established in that country that the diplomatic
agent in transit to or from his post was entitled to immunity from jurisdiction.
The view was taken in these cases that such immunity was necessary for the free
and unimpeded exercise of diplomatic duties, and that to oblige a diplomatic
agent to attend the trial ofan action in a third state was more inconvenient than
to oblige him to attend one in the receiving state. Where real difficulty might be
caused by the uncertain state of the law, matters could be regulated by
agreement as was done in the Lateran Treaty between Italy and the Holy See,
concluded on I I February 1929, which provided:
'Article 12. - Italy recognises the right of the Holy See to active and passive legation
in accordance with the general rules of international law. Envoys of foreign
governments to the Holy See shall continue to enjoy in the Kingdom all the privileges
and immunities appertaining to diplomatic agents in virtue of international law, and
their headquarters may remain in Italian territory and shall enjoy all the immunities
153
due to them in accordance with international law, even if the states to which they belong
maintain no diplomatic relations with Italy. It is understood that Italy undertakes
always and in every case to leave free the correspondence from all states, including
belligerents, to the Holy See, and vice versa. ... In virtue of the sovereignty recognised,
and without prej udice to the provisions ofArticle 19 below, diplomatists of the Supreme
Pontiff shall enjoy in Italian territory, even in time of war, the treatment due to
diplomatists and carriers of despatches of other foreign governments, in accordance
with the rules of international law.
Article 19. - Diplomatic officers and envoys of the Holy See, diplomatic officers and
envoys of foreign governments accredifed to the Holy See ... possessing passports issued
by their state of origin and vises by Papal representatives abroad, shall be admitted
without further formality to the City across Italian territory. The same shall apply to the
above-mentioned persons, who, being furnished with regular Papal passports, are
proceeding abroad from the Vatican City.'
18.6.
Article 40 of the Vienna Convention adopts a strictly functional approach to

the question of the privileges and immunities to be given to a diplomatic agent
passing through a third state to or from his post. The third state is obliged only to
accord him 'inviolability and such other immunities as may be required to
ensure his transit or return.' The same inviolability and immunities are
required in the case of members of his family enjoying privileges or immunities
who are accompanying him or travelling separately to join him or return to
their country. The diplomat and his family in transit are therefore entitled to
the special protection and freedom from arrest or detention implied in
inviolability, but any civil proceedings may be brought against them provided
that these do not involve their arrest, and they have no privileges such as
exemption from baggage search.
In 1972 the Netherlands, which although not a party to the Vienna Convention
applies most of its provisions, on search ofthe luggage ofan Algerian diplomat in transit
to Brazil found that it contained letter bombs, grenades, other explosives and pistols.
They confiscated the luggage but allowed the diplomat to continue his journey since
they took the view that they were unable to arrest or charge him. 9
18.7.
A diplomatic agent is entitled to these limited immunities irrespective of the

relations between the sending and receiving state on the one hand and the third
state on the other. The obligations in Article 40 apply even where the presence
of the diplomat (or other person, or diplomatic bag) is due toforce majeure, such
as the forced landing of an aeroplane, but it is not entirely clear whether it
would override the traditional rules and practice which apply during a state of
war. Armed conflict is specifically mentioned in relation to the right of a
diplomat to leave the receiving state and in relation to breach of diplomatic
relations, but not in regard to transit of a third state. To benefit from the
immunities in Article 40 a diplomat must be accredited to a specific receiving
state. In the case of R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison 10 in 197 I a United
Kingdom court refused to allow immunity from extradition proceedings to a
Costa Rican emissary named Or Teja, who carried a diplomatic passport, but
was neither accredited to nor received by the government of any particular
country. It is also essential that the diplomat should be appointed by a
government which is recognised as such by the third state. Emissaries of
'national liberation movements' which are not recognised by the third state, or
154
emissaries of the regime illegally set up in Rhodesia in I 965, for example,

would not be entitled to immunity under the Vienna Convention.
18.8.
It was established in customary international law, and remains the position

under the Vienna Convention that the diplomat who is in a third state for
recreational or other private purposes, or who pauses during his transit to or
from his post for a prolonged private holiday, is entitled to no immunity. As
Rivier pointed out: 'If he is there solely for his own pleasure, or in pursuit of
some merely private object, he is merely a distinguished personage, neither
more nor less. 11
18.g.
Third states are also obliged not to 'hinder the passage' through their territories
of members of the administrative and technical staff of a mission and members
of their families proceeding to or from their posts. This does not mean that these
persons have any immunity, but merely that the third state must not
inconvenience or delay them without good cause. Service staff and private
servants receive no special treatment in third states. Diplomatic agents who are
nationals or permanent residents either of the receiving state or of the third
state itself are not specifically excluded from the terms of Article 40; but it is of
course very unlikely that such persons would be passing through or in the
territory of the third state en route for their post or returning to their own
countries.
18. I o.
Official correspondence and other official communications in transit,

diplomatic couriers and diplomatic bags are entitled under Article 40 to the
same inviolability and protection as the receiving state is bound to accord.
Passage in titne of war

18. I
I.
Under customary international law a state was entitled to arrest the diplomatic
agent of a hostile state during war with that state and treat him as a prisoner of
war. 12 As Rivier said: 'If the two States are at war, the agent may in default ofa
safe-conduct be made prisoner. '13 If he travelled on board a neutral ship, the
vessel might be seized and brought in for adjudication. 14
In 1744 France declared war against the King of England, Elector of Hanover, and
Hanover was consequently enemy territory for France. Marshal Belleisle, then at
Frankfort as French ambassador to the Emperor Charles VII (Elector of Bavaria), was
ordered to proceed to Berlin as minister. In crossing Hanover, he and his brother were
made prisoners of war. Orders were sent from London to remove them to England,
where they were retained for several months, until released conditionally. IS
In 1917 Herr von Heinrichs, former secretary to the German Embassy at Madrid,
while on his way to Mexico to take up another appointment, was made prisoner on
landing in Cuba, then at war with Germany.16
In 1918 Captain von Krohn, naval attache to the German Embassy at Madrid, was,
at the request of the Spanish Government granted safe-conduct by the French
Government, to permit of his return to Germany through France, a prescribed route
being enjoined. 17
Duties of diplomatic agents in third states
18.12.
155
These rights were, however, given to belligerents and presupposed the

existence of a formal state of war. Since 1945 the formal declaration of war
between states has become a rare event, and such conflicts as have occurred
between independent states are normally described as 'armed conflicts.' It
must therefore be regarded as uncertain whether states which are involved in
an 'armed conflict' are entitled to exercise in regard to diplomats in transit
what are essentially belligerent rights. Article 40 of the Vienna Convention is
not expressly limited to passage by diplomats in time of peace, nor does it refer
to 'armed conflict' although other Articles of the Convention clearly deal with
the contingency of armed conflict between sending and receiving states. In the
Preamble to the Convention the Parties affirm 'that the rules of customary
international law should continue to govern questions not expressly regulated
by the provisions of the present Convention.' The matter may, however,
probably now be regarded as of small importance, since general air travel
means that it will hardly ever be necessary for a diplomat to traverse enemy
territory on the way to or from his post and it is clear that he would be
extremely ill-advised to do so.
Duties of diplomatic agents in third states

18.13.
A diplomatic agent, in the absence of a mandate or the permission of his

government, is in no way authorised to intervene in the external or internal
affairs of a third state. The prohibition is similar to that imposed on him in
regard to the internal affairs of the receiving state.
In 1746 Van Hoey, envoy of the United Provinces at Paris, wrote to the Duke of
Newcastle, then Secretary of State, after the battle of Culloden, asking that the
Pretender's life should be spared if he was captured. This interference was much
resented by the British Government, who complained to the States-General,
demanding public satisfaction proportioned to the scandal caused by this proceeding to
every friend of the honour, religion and liberty of the two Powers. The States-General
administered a severe rebuke to Van Hoey, whom they ordered to write a polite and
proper letter to the Duke of Newcastle, to acknowledge his own imprudence and the
fault of which he had been guilty, and to promise to conduct himself more prudently for
the future. 18
A diplomatic agent is of course obliged to respect the laws ofthe transit state, as
of any other third state, just as he is obliged to respect those of the receiving
state, and his immunity in transit implies no exemption from these laws.
CHAPTER 19
Special missions
19. I.
The earliest diplomatic missions in Asia and Africa as well as in Europe were
generally temporary diplomatic missions despatched for a particular purpose.
It was only in the sixteenth century that the major states in Europe began
to maintain permanent diplomatic representation abroad, and it is clear
from diplomatic writings of this period that permanent and temporary
ambassadors coexisted in a capital without its being thought that the
distinction in the duration of their missions implied any difference in their
status. But gradually permanent diplomatic missions became the norm.
Spec-ial missions were on the whole used only at a very high level and for
ceremonial occasions. A royal wedding or funeral, or the signing of a peace
treaty would be the occasion for a gathering of heads of state or their very
distinguished representatives. Routine business on the other hand was almost
always conducted through permanent ambassadors.
19.2.
However, during the twentieth century the sending and receiving of

representatives on short-term missions has again become more frequent. It is
not only that heads of state, prime ministers and ministers ofall kinds visit their
opposite numbers with a frequency that was unthinkable before the
development of fast and regular international air travel. Business exchanges at
the ordinary diplomatic and at the technical level between government
servants are steadily increasing. Speed of travel makes it easier to send the
expert in a particular subject for negotiations. The complexity of much
intergovernmental business makes it preferable to send that expert rather than
send the diplomatic mission complicated instructions which they do not have
the expertise to handle with confidence. The very large growth in the number
of sovereign states entitled to send diplomatic representatives, but unable to
bear the cost of many permanent missions abroad, and the need for economy in
their overseas representation even among the richer states, means that often a
special mission is essential for some particular business simply because the
sending and receiving states have no permanent missions in each other's
capitals.
19.3.
The status of these various representatives was, however, far from clear. Heads
of state enjoyed extensive privileges and immunities as foreign sovereigns.
Some states regarded other temporary representatives as entitled to the same
privileges and immunities as permanent diplomatic agents. It was generally
accepted that they enjoyed certain immunities, such as immunity for their
official acts and inviolability for their official papers and documents, by virtue
Special missions
157
of their status as agents of a foreign sovereign. Customs facilities would usually

be extended to them as a matter of courtesy on production of a diplomatic
passport. They did not, in general, stay long enough for serious questions to
arise in regard to their tax liabilities or to become involved in civil law disputes.
The extent of their privileges and immunities therefore remained obscure in
most countries, but this seldom gave rise to any practical difficulties. Where the
sending state had a permanent mission in the receiving state and it was
regarded as important that a special envoy should be protected by diplomatic
status, it was always possible to accredit him for a short period as a member of
the permanent mission.
The Vienna Conference of 1961 set on one side the question of special
diplomatic missions so that a more thorough study might be made of their
special requirements. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
therefore relates only to permanent diplomatic missions. Draft articles were
subsequently prepared by a Special Rapporteur and discussed by the
International Law Commission. In 1968 and again in 1969 the International
Law Commission's draft was discussed by the Sixth Committee (the Legal
Committee) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and a Convention
on Special Missions (usually known as the New York Convention on Special
Missions) was adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 1969.1 The
Convention, which followed closely the proposals of the International Law
Commission, very broadly gives to special missions and their members the same
privileges and immunities, with appropriate adjustments, as are accorded to
permanent diplomatic missions under the Vienna Convention of 1961.
Support for the Convention has, however, been very limited, and six years after
it was opened for signature only four states had ratified it.
A substantial number of countries, mainly Western European, had some
difficulty in accepting that all special missions should be given full diplomatic
privileges and immunities. These countries already had very substantial
numbers of diplomatic missions and privileged persons in their capitals, and
they were very conscious of the administrative difficulties of extending
inviolability to the hotel suites of transient missions, or of extending tax and
customs privileges to the multiplicity of foreign officials who came and went on
government business of some sort. They were prepared to guarantee
diplomatic status to high-level missions headed by a head of state, head of
government, minister or senior official, but more routine missions should, they
felt, be content with the immunities to which their character as emissaries of a
sovereign state entitled them, together with a lower level of privilege which
could be defended on grounds of functional need. But the majority ofcountries
did not accept this approach. They felt that great weight must be given to the
views of the International Law Commission. The smaller countries felt that
they were much more likely than the European countries to send a special
mission to a capital where they had no permanent diplomatic mission, with its
additional possibilities of protection, and that to a certain extent special
missions were the typical form of diplcmacy for the poorer countries. To give
their ad hoc representatives an inferior status to the permanent ambassadors of
the richer countries would thus amount to discrimination against them, and
the force of this argument was generally accepted.
158
19.6 .
Special missions
Article I of the New York Convention defines a 'special mission' as 'a

temporary mission, representing the State, which is sent by one State to
another State with the consent of the latter for the purpose ofdealing with it on
specific questions or of performing in relation to it a specific task.' 'Temporary'
distinguishes special missions from permanent diplomatic missions. 'Representing the State' distinguishes the special mission from a Parliamentary
delegation, a football team or a visiting orchestra carrying out a cultural
exchange, since, whatever their sponsorship, they are not emissaries authorised
to speak for the state, even when the state may assist in financing them. 'Specific
questions' or 'a specific task' define the purpose of a special mission. Most
important, however, in the definition is the requirement that a special mission
must be sent with the consent of the receiving state. This is again emphasised in
Article 2 which provides that'A State may send a special mission to another
State with the consent ofthe latter, previously obtained through the diplomatic
or another agreed or mutually acceptable channel.' It is this requirement of
prior consent which gives the receiving state the control over its reception of
special missions which is essential if it is to be able effectively to discharge the
heavy obligations in regard to privileges and immunities which are imposed by
the Convention. Among parties to the Convention it is probable that for most
routine visits of experts or official negotiators the status of special mission will
not be sought. Each receiving state may decide for itself how generous or
restrictive it will be in acceding to requests to receive delegations in the
capacity of special missions, and what criteria it will apply. It is clear, however,
that the intention of the Convention is that only missions whose functions are
essentially diplomatic in character are to be regarded as special missions.
During the negotiation of the Convention in the Sixth Committee the United
Kingdom explained its position in this way:
'A special mission is a temporary, ad hoc mission. The existence ofa particular special
mission derives from an ad hoc expression of mutual consent by the sending and receiving
States. A special mission represents the sending State in the same sense of the word
"represents" as a permanent diplomatic mission represents the sending State. It
represents the sending State in the external, international sense, in an aspect or aspects
of its international relations. The normal task which a special mission will perform is a
task which would ordinarily be performed by a permanent diplomatic mission of the
sending State if one exists in the receiving State or if it had not been decided on the
particular occasion that an ad hoc mission was called for. When you have said these
things, you have in our view said all that needs to be said to identifying the nature of a
special mission for the purposes of the Convention.'
19.7.
The rules regarding the formation, composition and functioning of special

missions in general follow those established for permanent diplomatic missions
by the Vienna Convention. But two provisions may be singled out which have
no parallel in the Vienna Convention and illustrate the uses to which the device
of a special mission can be put. Article 6 provides that two or more states may
each send a special mission at the same time to another state, with the consent of
that state, in order to deal together with a question of common interest to all of
them. Article 18 provides that special missions from two or more states may
meet in the territory of a third state if they first obtain the express consent ofthe
third state, which may withdraw that consent at any time, and may impose
Special missions
159
conditions and limit the extent to which it assumes the obligations ofa receiving
state.
19.8 .
The privileges and immunities accorded to special missions and their members,
as has been pointed out, also follow closely those accorded to permanent
diplomatic missions by the Vienna Convention. A few differences, however,
some deriving from the different nature of special missions and some from
reconsideration of the terms of the Vienna Convention, may be pointed out.
Article 2 I makes special provision for visiting heads of state, by requiring that
when a head of state leads a special mission he 'shall enjoy in the receiving
State or in a third State the facilities, privileges and immunities accorded by
international law toHeads of State on an official visit.' 2 The same Article also
provides that 'The Head of the Government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and other persons of high rank, when they take part in a special mission of the
sending State, shall enjoy in the receiving State, or in a third State, in addition
to what is granted by the present Convention, the facilities, privileges and
immunities accorded by international law. ' However, it cannot be regarded as
at all certain what, ifany, additional privileges and immunities are required by
international law to be given to visiting heads of government or ministers.
Some states may equate a head of government with a head of state, but
ministers have never been regarded under customary law as entitled to any
sovereign immunities.
19.9.
Article 24 limits tax exemption for special mission premises by the words 'To
the extent compatible with the nature and duration ofthe functions performed
by the special mission' - this allows the receiving state to claim that a mission
which overstays its welcome loses its tax exemption, and relieves it from an
obligation to grant exemption or repay minimal amounts of tax. Article 25
gives inviolability to the premises of special missions, but has regard to the fact
that such premises will often be in hotels by providing a power to assume
consent of the head of mission to entry where there is a fire or other disaster and
he cannot be contacted - a power which does not exist in the case of permanent
embassies. To the inviolability of archives set out in Article 26 it is added, to
assist the receiving state, that these archives should, when necessary, bear
visible external marks of identification. The right of freedom of movement,
under Article 27, is limited to what is 'necessary for the performance of the
functions of the special mission.' Rights of free communication similar to those
of permanent missions are given under Article 28, but it is added that 'Where
practicable, the special mission shall use the means of communication,
including the bag and the courier, of the permanent diplomatic mission of the
sending State.'
19.10.
The personal immunity given to members of a special mission is more limited

than that of a diplomat in that to the exceptions to immunity there is added 'an
action for damages arising out of an accident caused by a vehicle used outside
the official functions of the person concerned.' This reflects the resentment of
immunity in regard to motor accident claims which is expressed by public
opinion in all capitals where there are substantial numbers of persons entitled
to diplomatic immunity. Immunities and privileges are extended to
subordinate staff and to nationals and permanent residents of the receiving
160
Special missions
state to the same extent as under the Vienna Convention, but members of
families receive privileges and immunities on the Vienna scale only if they
accompany members of the special mission. The problem ofdetermining who is
a 'member ofthe family forming part of the household' thus does not arise in the
case of special missions.
19. I I.
The same obligations as under the Vienna Convention are laid on transit states
in regard to members of special missions. But in this case the obligations arise
only where the transit state has been informed in advance, either in the visa
application or by notification, of the transit of the persons concerned as
members of the special mission, members of their families or couriers, and has
raised no objection to it. This emphasises that, as in the case of members of
diplomatic missions, there is no right of passage through a third state and that
the third state must consent to the transit before being required to accord any
special privileges to members of special missions.
CHAPTER
20
The diplomatic body

(corps diplomatique)
20.1.
The diplomatic body (corps diplomatique) comprises the heads and the
diplomatic staff of all the missions accredited to a government. At most capitals
a list of the diplomatic body, compiled from lists furnished by each mission, is
published and distributed to missions from time to time. This list generally
includes the wives and adult daughters of the members of the missions.
20.2.
The doyen (dean) is the senior diplomatic representative of the highest

category. In most Roman Catholic countries this position has by long-standing
tradition been accorded to the Nuncio; and the practice is recognised in Article
16 (3) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of I 96 I. In countries
where the practice is not accepted (and where the papal representative of
ambassadorial rank is accordingly known as Pro-Nuncio), seniority follows
that indicated in the diplomatic list published by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. It is not proper, however, for the host government to exert any
influence in the appointment of the doyen. There have been instances of a
government refusing to recognise as doyen the representative of a country with
which relations were strained; such interference has even been followed by the
recall of the ambassador in question. Ex-colonial powers, generally speaking,
no longer assume in countries which they formerly governed the position of
seniority in the diplomatic body for their representative. Such precedence has,
however, been obtained by treaty for the representative of France in a number
of francophone countries of Africa.
20.3
The functions of the doyen and of his office (the decanat) range from questions of
ceremony and protocol to those concerning the day-to-day relations between
the diplomatic body and the host government. He is the mouthpiece of his
colleagues on public occasions. He is the defender of the privileges and
immunities of the diplomatic body from injuries or encroachments on the part
of the government to which they are accredited. The government may find it
convenient to use the doyen as a channel by which to convey to his colleagues
information or guidance of an informal character. To employ his good offices
for formal communications which could properly be circulated by the Protocol
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an imposition which a head of
mission will be inclined to resist, especially if his own staff and resources are
limited and the diplomatic corps is numerous. Whatever records belong to the
body as a whole are in his keeping. But he is in no case entitled to write or speak
on behalf of his colleagues without having previously consulted them and
obtained their approval of the step which it is proposed to take, and of the
162
wording of any written or spoken representations on their behalf.

20.4.
If the host government feel that members of the diplomatic corps are abusing
their immunities in day-to-day matters in such ways as frequent disregard of
traffic or parking regulations, the doyen's help is often sought. He will normally
circulate a note to all his colleagues asking them to assist the authorities in such
a matter and to request the members of their staffs to do likewise. The same
procedure is applied when in a country which restricts imports, diplomatic
agents are found to be circumventing import restrictions by duty-free import
for resale against local currency.
20.5.
On any matter with political implications a head of mission will not take part
with his colleagues in a joint representation to the government of the country
without special authorisation from home, or accept a summons from the doyen
to attend a meeting for the discussion of international matters unless he has
received instructions to take joint action. In practice a joint demarche by an
entire diplomatic corps on a matter with political content is most unlikely. The
possibility of joint demarches of such a kind by a number of heads of mission
representing a particular political grouping is not, however, to be excluded. If
the doyen happened to be a member of that grouping, he would be wise to take
into consideration his position as doyen when deciding whether to take part or
not.
20.6.
Where a state of antagonism or non-recognition exists between some of the

governments represented among his colleagues, the doyen may have to exercise
diplomatic skill, perhaps in consultation with the Chief of Protocol of the host
government, to avoid causes of embarrassment. Should the government which
he himself represents be on unfriendly terms with that of one or more of his
colleagues, both he and they should endeavour as far as possible to set aside
such considerations in so far as the formal discharge of the responsibilities ofhis
office is concerned.
20.7.
In recent years a vice-doyen (accepted only de facto by the government) has

been unofficially recognised by the diplomatic body in a few of the larger
capitals, notably where it has been found desirable for the nuncio to be
seconded by a layman. In such cases the choice falls normally on the
ambassador next in seniority, who will also be expected to act for the doyen in
the latter's absence.
20.8.
Wives of diplomatists enjoy the same privileges, honours, precedence and title
as their husbands. The wife of the senior diplomatic representative of the
highest category is called the doyenne. Her functions will vary widely from one
post to another. It may be the local custom for her to assume the responsibility
of presenting the wives of newly arrived heads of mission to the wife of the head
of state. But this is by no means invariably so. In general it may be said that her
functions complement those of her husband. A wise and accomplished doyenne
may be able to give a valuable lead in social matters, which will bring credit to
the diplomatic body as a whole; but this will be done by example rather than by
precept, since she has no explicit authority. In countries where the doyen is
unmarried (as is the case in Catholic countries where the papal nuncio is
accepted as the doyen ex officio) the functions of doyenne may fall to the wife ofthe
Precedence among heads of missions
163
next senior head of mission. At some posts wives of the senior staff of a mission
headed by a bachelor may, if need arises, look to the doyenne for help with
presentations which would otherwise have been effected by the wife of their
own ambassador. Where the doyenne is herself an ambassador, however, it
would probably be too much to expect her to fulfil the double task of
ambassador and ambassador's wife. On the other hand, if an ambassador is
accompanied by her husband, the fact that the roles cannot be neatly reversed
has created many a perplexing situation. For the purpose of initial calls on
colleagues, a female head of mission may go accompanied by her husband and
will then be received by her diplomatic opposite number and his wife.
Although at some capitals it has been ruled that the husband of a female
ambassador should be granted the courtesy of precedence immediately after
ministers, or after the deputy head of his wife's mission, it may on the whole
prove more convenient to place him at dinner parties and other formal
occasions where this is possible, among distinguished unofficial guests, such as
professors or artists. But there will always be predicaments covered by no
generally accepted rule; and these must be solved by forethought and
ingenuity.
Precedence alDong heads of IIlissions

20.9.
In each categoryl of diplomatic agents seniority depends on the date of official

notification of their arrival at the capital and the acceptance by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the true copy of their credentials, or of the presentation of
their credentials, whichever is the practice prevailing in the receiving state. 2
Alterations in the credentials of a head of mission not involving any change of
class do not affect his precedence.
20.10.
In March 1818 a controversy occurred at Copenhagen in the following

circumstances: The envoy of a certain Power was the doyen of the diplomatic
body at the Danish court. In consequence of changes at his own court, he
received new credentials. Some of his colleagues maintained that he had
thereby lost his seniority and must take rank after the others. The majority,
however, took the opposite view. 3 In 1830 it was agreed among the heads of
missions at Paris that, notwithstanding the date of delivery of their new
credentials, they should continue to rank among themselves as before. The
same arrangement was maintained in 1848, on the establishment ofthe Second
Republic, and in 1852, on the assumption of the title of Emperor by Prince
Louis Napoleon. At the accession of King Alfonso of Spain, in 1875, the British
minister had been doyen, but the ministers of Portugal and Russia, having
presented their new credentials before he did, claimed precedence. After much
discussion it was decided that the previous order ofprecedence should prevail. 4
20. I
As soon as a new ambassador has been admitted to the exercise of his full
functions he informs his colleagues by means of a letter addressed personally to
every other head of mission representing a country with which his own
entertains normal relations. According to the form traditionally used for these
I.
164
letters the ambassador, having announced his arrival and assumption of

functions, states that he looks forward to making the acquaintance of his
colleagues and to the maintenance and development of the excellent relations,
both personal and official, which have so happily existed as well between their
countries as between their respective missions.
20. I 2.
It used to be customary for newly arrived members of the diplomatic staff of

missions to send their visiting cards to all officials of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs with whom they would be likely to deal, and to all members of the
diplomatic body in the capital. Married officers added a card bearing their
own and their wife's names, or in the case of representatives of Britain, where
joint cards are not used, one of their wife's cards. These cards were
accompanied by one of their ambassador's cards, bearing in pencil the letters
p. p. (pour presenter). It was a matter of courtesy to reciprocate the sending of
cards within twenty-four hours. Only in a few capitals today are these (and
other rules governing the leaving of cards on various occasions) observed with
anything approaching their traditional stringency. In many places they have
fallen into almost total disuse. Nowadays a circular note verbale (not requiring
acknowledgement) is the usual form of notification.
20. I 3.
A number of other social formalities practised by Western European society of

past generations have been modified or attenuated, not only in general as a
consequence of new methods and habits of communication, but in
diplomatic circles because of the much greater number and the worldwide
diversity of countries represented. For this reason no attempt can be made in
this chapter to give a detailed description of the etiquette governing
presentations, exchanges of visits and the many other formal courtesies
connected with precedence. 5 Precise information applicable to the local
situation is always to be obtained from the Protocol, or Ceremonial,
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the newly appointed
diplomatic agent will do well, whenever he is in doubt, to seek guidance from
this source, as well as from the doyen. Moreover, he is likely to find that on such
subjects the more knowledgeable ofhis senior colleagues are pleased to be asked
for their advice. Provided that reasonable discretion is exercised, such
exchanges of ideas within the diplomatic body are beneficial.
20. I 4.
Ambassadors and other heads of missions, when invited to national or court

festivities, are entitled to a place of honour among the persons invited, which is
fixed by local regulation or usage. Neglect of this ceremonial obligation, in itself
of minor importance, in the past sometimes led to strained relations. In 1750
the Russian envoy at Berlin was omitted from the list of persons invited to a
certain court festivity, because he was supposed to be absent from the capital.
The incident led to a strong protest from his court, and diplomatic relations
between the two states were consequently suspended for a long period. 6
20. I 5.
Political significance has sometimes been attached to the absence of an envoy

from a state ceremony. In 1818 the omission ofthe Prussian envoy to attend the
diplomatic circle on the French King's birthday gave rise to public comment,
and the inference was drawn that the two governments had been unable to
come to an agreement about certain claims advanced by one of them. The
Precedence among heads of missions
165
allusions to these claims in both legislative chambers, combined with a new law
of recruiting, excited a hope in the minds of certain hotheads that the claims
would be referred to the arbitrament of arms. 'Payez les etrangers du fer' was a
common expression used in certain circles. 7 In 1823 Canning forbade the
British Ambassador in Paris to be present at any rejoicing given in celebrat.ion
of the French successes in the Peninsula. 8
20.16.
It is usually made clear by the Chief of Protocol whether the attendance of

heads of diplomatic missions is expected at formal occasions. A convention has
existed in some Asian countries by which heads of mission are notified in
advance of the arrival and departure at the airport of heads of state or
government on official visits, with the implication that attendance is expected.
Unavoidable absence would be understood, but in that case the head ofmission
should be suitably represented.
20.17
If the ceremony is one at which the diplomatic body has to take what may be
termed an active part, its members, ranged according to the order of
precedence, are placed on the right of the centre or post of honour occupied by
the most eminent person present, i.e. usually the head of the state. If, however,
the part taken by the diplomatic body is merely passive, i.e. that ofspectators, a
special place is set apart for it, such as a tribune in a church, boxes at a theatre for
a gala performance, etc. 9
As regards seats, the place of honour and consequently the precedence attributed to
the persons forming the company: At a four-cornered table of which all four sides are
occupied, or at a round or oval table, the first place is usually considered to be facing the
entrance, and the last place is that nearest to it. Counting from the first place, the order
of seats is from right to left, and so on. At a mixed party the hostess sits, tlormally,
opposite the host, and as she is, at least at a formal party, the last to leave the drawingroom with her partner, who is of course the principal male guest, it is more convenient
for her to sit at the side, or end, of the table nearest the entrance.
The order of precedence at mixed parties normally begins for the ladies on the right
of the host, and for the gentlemen on the right of the hostess, and proceeds thus from
opposite ends towards the middle of the table, male guests alternating with female. If
there are special circumstances which seem to require deviation from these accepted
principles, it may be well to take advice from the Protocol Department and also to
ensure discreetly that the guests understand (and are prepared to accept) the reason.
In standing, sitting or walking, the place of honour is at the right, i.e. when the
person entitled thereto stands or walks at the right. Precedence is when the person
entitled goes a step before the other, who is at his left side, as in ascending a flight ofstairs
or entering a room.
In a lateral arrangement, i.e. when the persons present stand side by side in a straight
line, the outside place on the right, or the central place, is the first according to
circumstances. When there are only two persons, the right hand is the first (00 ); if
the right hand the second, the
there are three, the middle place is the first
left hand the third. If the number is four, the furthest to the right is the first place, the
next is the second, the left ofthe latter is the third,and then thefourth
)10 Of
five persons, the first is in the middle, immediately to the right is the second, to the left is
the third, further to the right is the fourth, and the fifth is the furthest to the left
If six or more, the same principles are observed, according as the
number is odd or even.
(000),
(0000
(00000).
166
COlDlDunication in the absence of diplolDatic relations

20.18.
Between the representatives of states, one of which does not accord the other
diplomatic recognition, there can be no official communication; and calling is
excluded. If diplomatic relations are absent merely because a new state has not
yet been formally recognised or because relations have not yet been established,
a communication may be accepted, but it should not be acknowledged without
authorisation from home, since acknowledgement could be taken as evidence
of recognition. But when the absence of relations is due to a deliberate decision
not to establish them, a communication will be returned without acknowledgement. There will usually be a 'protecting power'll which has assumed the
responsibility of looking after the interests of one state in the other, and it is the
representative of this protecting power who will normally be used as
intermediary. When absence of relations is due to a deliberate breach, a
communication may be accepted without acknowledgement, or returned at
the discretion of the head ofmission to whom it was delivered. As the ret urn ofa
communication is a form of rebuff, a head of mission will be well advised to
make sure he has his government's approval before taking this action.
Protecting powers will generally be careful not to lend their good offices for a
transaction unless they have been given reason to believe that it will be
acceptable. The establishment of diplomatic relations where they have not
existed, or their resumption after interruption, may be brought about by the
intervention of a friendly power, either in a third state, or at the United
Nations, or by direct communication between the two governments concerned.
Conduct of diplolDatic representatives of belligerents to

towards each other during wartilDe
20.19.
Les Ministres des princes qui sont en guerre & qui se trouvent clans une meme Cour ne se
visitent point tant que la guerre dure, mais ils se font des civilitez reciproques en lieu tiers
lorsqu'ils se rencontrent, la guerre ne detruit point le regles de l'honnetete ny celles de la
generosite, die donne meme souvent occasion de les pratiquer avec plus de gloire pour le
Ministre qui les met en usage, & pour le Prince qui les approuve. 12
20.20.
It is the custom that diplomatic agents of belligerent states accredited to neutral

countries ignore each other, unless circumstances compel them to meet. During
the First World War the German Ambassador at Washington is said to have
ignored the British Ambassador, while conceding to the French Ambassador
such courtesy as the latter was entitled to as doyen ofthe diplomatic corps. In fact
no hard and fast rule can be laid down. If personal friendship has previously
existed between the representatives of belligerent countries, it would be
uncouth, and unprofitable, to ignore each other completely. In the Hague in
1939 at the request ofthe German Minister, the Swiss Minister arranged a secret
meeting between the former and his British colleague at the Swiss Legation.
Such meetings are exceptional, and nothing came of this one.
20.21.
Callieres relates the story ofthe Sieur de Gremonville, French representative at
Flags
167
Rome during hostilities between France and Spain, who, learning of a plot to
kill the Spanish Ambassador, warned the latter, and earned much praise for
this action. The story recalls the incident ofFox communicating to Talleyrand,
in 1806, information regarding a scheme for the assassination of Napoleon,
disclosed to him by a Frenchman. 13
National days
20.22.
On the date appointed for the celebration of its National Day, it is customary
for the head of a diplomatic mission to receive the congratulations of
representatives of the host government and of the heads of all the other
diplomatic missions accredited in the capital. The usual practice is for the
celebrating head of mission to give a reception at which these felicitations can
be offered. If space is insufficient in the premises of the mission, the reception is
sometimes given at a hotel. But many heads ofmission prefer to receive either at
home or in the building of the chancery. Occasionally this means giving as
many as three receptions in the day - one for members of the government and
distinguished citizens of the host country, one for the diplomatic body and a
third for the community of the celebrating country's nationals resident in the
capital. What arrangements are made will depend on local circumstances. It is
inevitable that considerations of expense and of prestige will also be taken into
account. For members of the diplomatic body who are invited, attendance is an
official obligation. If the absence of a head of mission is unavoidable (and no
social pretext will be accepted as an excuse), he will ensure that he is
represented by the most senior member of his staff. In any other case ofabsence,
an explanation, coupled with expressions of regret, should be sent without
delay. At most missions a visitors' book is open for signatures and is kept in the
entrance hall, or vestibule. It is normally signed by all those who call on the
head of mission, whether on business, or for the purpose ofexpressing thanks, or
congratulations, or condolences, or simply as a routine courtesy when arriving
in the country or leaving it. To call and 'sign the book' is an accepted form of
politeness (like the leaving of cards) on occasions when the caller has no
intention of taking up the time of the head of mission by asking to see him
personally. Heads of mission will generally make a point of signing their
colleague's book on his National Day, even if the book is not made available for
signature by all the guests at the reception. The gesture ofsignature provides, as
it were, a confirmation of goodwill and a sufficient expression of thanks for the
invitation on an occasion when individual letters on the following day are not
expected.
Flags
20.23.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1 96 1 recognises (in Article

20) that the mission and its head shall have the right to use the flag and emblem
168
of the sending state on the premises ofthe mission, including the residence ofthe
head of mission, and on his means of transport.'
20.24.
The flag flown by British diplomatic missions abroad is the Union Flag, with
the Royal Arms in the centre on a white shield, surrounded by a green garland,
and is flown either over the house of the head of mission, or the chancery, or
both, and at the appropriate place in the boat or other vessel, if the ambassador
is afloat. In countries where the custom is accepted, a flag is also flown on the
ambassador's car at any time when the ambassador is in it. An acting head of
mission, or a charge d'affaires will usually fly it only when he is making an
official visit. It is as well to observe the locally accepted practice in these
matters.
20.25.
Flags may be flown at any time at the discretion ofthe head ofmission. But over
the chancery the flag is expected to be flown (according to the rules which most
national services follow) at least on the National Day and principle patriotic
festivals of the sending state (for Britain on the birthdays ofthe Sovereign, actual
and official, and of members of the Royal Family, and on other days on which
flags are flown on public buildings in London); on the anniversary of the
accession, or the appointment, or the birthday, of the head ofstate to whom the
mission is accredited; and on the receiving state's National Day. It will be flown
at half-mast on the occasion of the death of the head of the sending state (for
Britain deaths of members of the Royal Family); or of the death of the sovereign
or head of state to whom the mission is accredited.
20.26.
The title of 'Excellency' is given to ambassadors orally as well as in written

communications in virtue of their diplomatic rank. The title came into general
use after the Peace of Westphalia. It is said to have been adopted by the French
plenipotentiaries d' Avaux and Servien, in order to mark the difference
between the ambassadors of crowned heads and those of lesser potentates. 14
After the Congress of Vienna it became general at all European courts.
A cardinal is addressed as 'Eminence.' The title is said to have been invented
by Cardinal Richelieu for himself. It was afterwards adopted by the other
cardinals, and became generally recognised.
20.27.
20.28.
The usage of English-speaking countries does not accord the title of

'Excellency' to ministers of the governments of these countries. Governors and
Governors-General are, however, formally addressed as 'Excellency.' In the
United Kingdom it was decided at the end of 1939 to address, from 1January
1940, all ministers of foreign governments as 'Excellency.' In French practice
the title is accorded to ambassadors, presidents offoreign republics, ministers of
state and other high dignitaries.
In the Hague the President of the International Court of Justice takes
precedence over all heads of diplomatic missions, including the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps. In the order of precedence the Dean is followed by the VicePresident of the Court, and thereafter precedence proceeds alternately
between the regular diplomatic corps and the members of the Court according
to the order of seniority in each category. Thus the last judge is in twenty-ninth
place, after which the remaining heads of diplomatic missions follow in their
normal order of precedence.
Precedence within missions
169
Precedence within missions.

20.29
The precedence within missions appearing in the diplomatic lists published

and circulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the receiving state follows
the order shown in the lists supplied for this purpose by each individual mission.
The head of each mission is responsible for ensuring that the order in which his
staff is listed conforms to the rules laid down by his government for precedence
in their diplomatic service.
According to the rules of the British Diplomatic Service,
Officers take precedence among themselves according to their grade in the
Service.
Officers of the same grade and branch of the Service take precedence
according to the dates of their respective appointments to the grade.
Officers granted acting or temporary promotion take precedence
according to their acting or temporary grade, but below officers of the same
substantive grade.
Officers granted local rank higher than that to which their substantive
grade would normally entitle them take precedence according to their local
rank, but below officers entitled to the same rank by virtue of their
substantive grade, or by virtue of their temporary or acting grade.
2. A Service Attache/Adviser designated Defence Attache/Adviser takes
precedence over other Service Attaches at the post. Subject to this rule,
precedence is according to Service rank and, where officers have equal rank,
according to the length of their residence at the post.
3. Diplomatic Service officers holding the rank of Minister in all cases take
precedence before Service Attaches/Advisers. Service/Defence Attaches/
Advisers take precedence with, but immediately after, the Diplomatic
Service officer who would normally be in charge in the absence of the
Permanent Head of Mission and other Diplomatic Service officers of the
same grade as that officer. At posts where the officer who would normally be
in charge in the absence of the Permanent Head of Mission has the rank of
First Secretary, Service Attaches/Advisers holding the rank of Captain
(Royal Navy), Colonel or Group Captain, will take precedence after that
officer, but before all other Diplomatic Service officers of the same rank as
that officer.
Assistant Service Attaches/Advisers will, as a class, take precedence with
but after First Secretaries.
4. The comparative precedence of officers holding consular rank and of
officers of HM Armed Forces is:
Consuls-General rank with, but after, Rear-Admirals, Major-Generals
and Air V ice-Marshals.
Consuls rank with, but after, Captains RN, Colonels and Group
Captains.
Vice-Consuls rank with, but after, Lieutenant-Commanders, Majors
and Squadron-Leaders.
Consular Agents rank with, but after, Lieutenants RN, Captains in the
Army and Flight-Lieutenants.
I.
170
5. Officers on loan ('seconded') to the Diplomatic Service from other

government departments take the precedence of their equivalent grade in
the Diplomatic Service and according to the date of their appointment to
their substantive grade in the public service. Where they are seconded in a
grade higher than their substantive grade, they take precedence according
to the higher grade and the date of their appointment to it.
6. If a Head of Mission is absent from his post or is unable to discharge his
functions (e.g. by reason of serious illness), the officer ordinarily designated
to take charge will be the senior Diplomatic Service officer at the post.
Where two or more officers of the same grade are eligible, the selection of the
officer to take charge is at the discretion of the Head of Mission, who will
have due regard to local conditions, the efficiency of the Mission and the
general interests of the Service.
The term 'Deputy Head of Mission' used in the United States Service to
designate the officer who takes charge in the absence of the Head of Mission is
not normally current in the British Service. In the absence of a British Head of
Mission, the officer designated to take charge is referred to as the Charge
d'Affaires, except at posts in the Commonwealth, where his title is Acting High
Commissioner.
Decorations and presents

20.30.
In former days when a diplomatist left the court at which he had represented his
sovereign, either on a permanent or temporary mission, he usually received a
decoration. A gold snuff-box set with brilliants was a gift often presented.
20.3 I.
Queen Elizabeth I objected to her subjects wearing foreign insignia of knighthood. Two
young Englishmen, Nicolas Clifford and Antony Shirley, had been admitted by Henri
IV to the Order of St Michael as a reward for their services. On their return to England
they appeared at court displaying the insignia of the order, which provoked the Queen's
anger, because the French king, without consulting her, had allowed these her subjects
to take the oath to him on their admittance, and she threw them into prison.
Nevertheless, she was too merciful to put the law in force against them, seeing that they
were ignorant youths, and also because she entertained a special goodwill towards the
King of France, who had conferred so great an honour upon them. She therefore
ordered that they should return the insignia and take care to have their names removed
from the register of the Order. Henri IV is said to have wittily replied: 'I wish the Queen
would do me a corresponding favour in return. I should like her to appoint to the Order
of King Arthur's Round Table any aspiring Frenchman whom she might see in
England.' That Order, so celebrated in fable, disappeared long ago, just as that of St
Michael, in consequence of the disturbed state of affairs, had sunk so low, that a French
nobleman said: 'The chain of St Michael, which was formerly a distinction for very
noble personages, is now a collar for every kind of animal. '
In 1596, when the title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire was conferred on
Thomas Arundel of Wardour, with remainder to all his male and female descendants, it
was argued in the House of Lords that an action for theft would lie against anyone who
branded with his mark the sheep ofanother, and an action of deceit agamst anyone who
by scattering food before the sheep of another enticed them into his own flocks. 15 Queen
20.32.
171
Elizabeth is reported by Camden to have said, in connection with this case: 'There is a
close bond ofaffection between princes and their subjects. As it is not proper for a modest
woman to cast her eyes on any other man than her husband, so neither ought subjects to
look at any other prince than the one whom God has given them. I would not have my
sheep branded with any other mark than my own, or follow the whistle of a strange
shepherd. ' 16
During the lifetime of Queen Victoria diplomatic servants of the crown were not
allowed to accept foreign decorations, except in the case of special complimentary
missions to foreign sovereigns. In all such cases the Queen's permission to accept and
wear had to be obtained; the intention to confer had to be notified to the Secretary of
State through the British Minister accredited at the court of the foreign sovereign or
through his minister accredited at the court of Her Majesty. By an order of 18g8
permission could only be obtained by the chief of a complimentary mission from Her
Majesty, or by a military or naval attache on the termination of his appointment. 17 In
Igl I the regulation was relaxed in so far that private permission might be given to
accept and wear on certain specified occasions, in a case where the decoration was more
or less of a complimentary character. The rules of 1914 stated that permission in such
cases would only be given on exceptional occasions, when in the public interest it was
deemed expedient that acceptance should not be declined.
20.33
The rules since 1930, however, have been more stringent, and members of the
British Foreign Service cannot ordinarily expect to be allowed to accept and
wear the decorations of foreign orders. The only exceptions which the rules
allow are for the grant of unrestricted permission in the case of decorations
conferred for distinguished services in the saving of life; and for the grant of
restricted permission, enabling the decorations to be worn only on certain
specified occasions, in the case of foreign honours conferred upon (I) British
ambassadors or ministers and their staffs, when the sovereign pays a state visit
to the country to which they are accredited; (2) members of special missions
when the sovereign is represented at a foreign coronation, wedding, funeral or
similar occasion; or (3) any diplomatic representative when specially
accredited to represent Her Majesty on such occasions (but not on the members
of his staff). Permission is not normally granted to British ambassadors or
ministers abroad to accept decorations when leaving their posts on final
retirement.
On various occasions when a foreign sovereign has made a general
distribution among members of the local diplomatic corps of medals
commemorating his coronation or jubilee or similar personal event, members
of Her Majesty's Embassy, in order to avoid any appearance of discourtesy,
have been given restricted permission to wear them.
It is not customary in England to offer a decoration to a foreign ambassador
or other diplomatic agent on quitting his post.
20.34.
The Constitution of the United States prohibits persons holding any office of
profit or trust under the United States Government from accepting without
the consent of Congress, any presents, emoluments, office or title of any kind
whatever from any king, prince or foreign state. This prohibition has been
modified to allow the acceptance of small gifts of minimal value. Under the
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act of 1966, as amended in 1967, Congress
consen ts to:
172
The accepting and retaining by an employee of a gift of minimal value

tendered or received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy; and
(2) the acceptance by an employee of a gift of more than minimal value when
it appears that to refuse the gift would be likely to cause offence or
embarrassment or otherwise affect the foreign relations of the United
States. However, a gift of more than minimal value is deemed to have been
accepted on behalfof the U ni ted States and shall be deposited by the donee
for use and disposal as the property of the United States.... 18
(I )
The Foreign Affairs Manual further defines a gift of 'minimal value' as one
which has a retail value not in excess of $50 in the United States.
2035
At the Congress of Vienna it was agreed that the plenipotentiaries should receive
neither presents nor decorations, but each of the Powers concerned gave presents to
Gentz, the principal secretary, and to others who had helped in drawing up the
protocols. On the proposal ofthe British it was decided to present Gentz with a snuff-box
and 800 gold ducats, to four of his assistants snuff-boxes and 500 ducats each, and to two
more each 100 ducats, or 3000 ducats in all. This sum would come to over 1200. When
the ratifications were exchanged of the treaty of peace of 20 July 1814, between France
and Spain, presents, consisting of a gold snuff-box with a portrait of Louis XVIII, worth
15,000 francs, were provided for Labrador, the Spanish plenipotentiary, and a similar
one, with the portrait of Ferdinand VII, for Talleyrand, besides 1000 (90,000 reals) for
the clerks of the French and Spanish ministries for foreign affairs. On 8, 9 and 10 June
1817, a treaty was signed between Spain and the five Great Powers with respect to the
succession of Parma on the death of the ex-Empress Marie-Louise, followed by the
accession of Spain to the treaties of Vienna and Paris (of 1815). On this occasion the
Spanish Minister of State received five gold snuff-boxes with portraits of the respective
sovereigns, and Fermin Ntifiez, the ambassador in London, received the same number.
To the clerks of the Spanish Ministry of State a sum of 450,000 reals (10,000 ducats) was
given for the treaty of 10 June (Parma succession). Besides these gifts, various
decorations of the order of Carlos III were distributed. As the English Foreign Office
neither gave nor received decorations, a sum of 1000 was given by the British embassy
to the secretaries of the Spanish embassy, a corresponding amount being assigned to the
secretaries of the British embassy. Presents to the amount of 90,000 reals (1000) were
also given to the chanceries of the five Great Powers. Care was taken that the
decorations given on both sides to the chancery clerks should be ofcorresponding class, a
matter always considered to be of the highest importance even in modern days, when
such trinkets are exchanged. 19 At the end of 1817 the amounts of the gifts in money
bestowed by the contracting parties on the occasion of the conclusion of treaties, of royal
marriages, of congresses and other conventions, and since then instead ofjewellers' gold
and silver work, mutually fixed in money, were divided among the officials ofthe state
chancery at Vienna. The sum accumulated up to that date was estimated at 28,000
ducats. 20
Schmelzing states that Metternich, in November 1818, received the Grand Cross of
the Netherlands Lion from the hands of the King of Holland. This was the twenty-fifth
order with which His Highness was decorated.
20.3 6 .
In earlier times presents in money to members of the Foreign Office were usually made
on the occasion of the exchange of ratifications of an important treaty. Thus, in 17 86,
in connection with the commercial treaty between Great Britain and France,
500 guineas were given by the French Government, of which six-tenths went to the
under-secretaries, one-tenth to the chief clerk, and three-tenths to the junior clerks.
173
In 1793 the Russian Government made a present of 1000 in connection with

conventions relating to commerce and to the war with France, of which the two
under-secretaries received each 300, and the remainder was shared among ten
other clerks. In the same year 500 were presented by the Sardinian chancery to the
under-secretaries and clerks for the ratification of a treaty between King George III and
the King of Sardinia, and similar sums were received from the German Emperor and
the Spanish, Prussian and Sicilian chanceries, which were divided in the same
proportions. Thus each under-secretary received in that year 900 from this source, in
addition to his salary. Similar presents were made by the British Government to foreign
chanceries in the King's name. The usual present to an ambassador on his retirement
was of the value of 1000, and to an envoy of 500.21
Not far removed from this usage was that of making gifts intended to influence the
course of politics. In 1727 the four Swedish commissioners who signed the Swedish
accession to the Treaty of Hanover received 40,000 thalers from the English and
French Courts. 22 This was probably in excess of the usual scale of such presents.
Between 1765 and 1766 England, France and Russia spent huge sums in endeavouring
to influence the Swedish Diet. France alone, in eight months, distributed among its
members nearly 1,830,000 livres, of which Denmark provided 100,000, but nevertheless
France did not succeed in obtaining a majority in her favour. 23
The practice of giving presents of this character upon the exchange of the
ratifications of treaties and conventions, or to ambassadors or ministers offoreign courts
sent to the King of England on missions of congratulations or condolence, or to the
permanent representatives of foreign Powers on their taking leave on the termination of
their appointments, was abolished in 1831 by a circular from Lord Palmerston. 24
20.37.
In 1834 a rule was made in the United Kingdom prohibiting all persons in HM
employment, in diplomatic, consular, naval or military capacities, from receiving from
a foreign Government any presents, whatever might be the occasion on which presents
might be offered. This rule has occasionally been relaxed by special permission of the
Secretary of State.
CHAPTER
21
Termination of a
diplomatic mission
21. I.
The mission of a diplomatic agent may be brought to an end in anyone of the

following ways:
the expiry of the period for which he was appointed, or the completion of the
task for which he was sent;
2. the return or arrival of the permanent head of mission, causing the
appointment of a charge d'affaires ad interim to come to an end;
3. the ending of the appointment of the head or a member of a special mission
with the conclusion, successful or not, of the business for which the mission
was appointed. Examples might include a royal wedding or a funeral of a
head of state for which special envoys had assembled.
I.
Special missions may come to an end in other ways, as is made clear by

Article 20 of the New York Convention on Special Missions. 1 In many of the
foregoing cases a formal recall by the sending state may not be necessary.
21.2.
A diplomatic agent may be recalled for the purpose of his appointment

elsewhere, or on his retirement from his own service, or on his resignation being
accepted by his own government. These are the normal ways in which the
function of a diplomatic agent in a permanent diplomatic mission is
terminated.
21.3.
When an ambassador is about to leave his post for any of these reasons, he
normally asks for a farewell audience with the head of state, at which he may
present his Letters of Recall if he has received them. The request for this
audience is made by means ofa Note to the ministry offoreign affairs enclosing a
copy of the Letters of Recall. The audience with the head of state is usually a
private one. If, as is not infrequently the case, the head of mission has to leave
before the Letters of Recall have arrived, he will none the less seek a farewell
audience, on the understanding that his Letters will be presented by his
successor. The new head of mission will then present the Letters when he
presents his own credentials.
21.4.
On receiving the Letters of Recall, the head of state customarily addresses to

the diplomat's own head of state a letter termed a 'Recredential' in which he
expresses his satisfaction with the agent's conduct and regret at his departure. 2
21.5.
When about to leave his post, whether temporarily or finally, the head of
mission should write to the appropriate official in the ministry offoreign affairs
(in London, the Vice-Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps) giving in advance the
175
exact date of his departure and nominating a charge d'affaires ad interim. This
letter has to be signed by the head of mission personally. The appointment ofa
charge d'affaires ad interim cannot be made after the departure of the head of
mission except by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the sending state.
21.6.
On the death of the head of a diplomatic mission, it will be necessary for the
sending state to notify the receiving state of the name of a charge d'affaires ad
interim, if one has not been previously appointed. If the death takes place in
circumstances where ordinarily an inquest would be necessary, the authorities
in the receiving state should be made aware that it has been general practice 3
not to hold an inquest where a diplomatic agent or other member of a mission
dies in office. In some cases this practice may be based on the continuing
immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability accorded by Article 39 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The sending state may ofcourse
waive immunity and allow an inquest to take place. In the case of the death ofa
member of a mission while resident at his post, the members of his family
continue to enjoy their privileges and immunities until the expiry of a
reasonable period allowed to them to leave the country.4 Article 39(4) of the
Vienna ConventionS obliges the receiving state to permit the withdrawal ofhis
movable property, with the exception of any property acquired in the country
the export ofwhich was prohibited at the time ofhis death. Estate, succession or
inheritance duty may not be levied on movable property whose presence in the
receiving state was due solely to the presence of the deceased as a member of a
diplomatic mission.
21.7.
If the mission terminates by the death of the ambassador at his post, the
receiving state may wish to mark the occasion by some ceremonial mark of
respect to him in view of his representative character. If it is wished that he
should be buried in the country where he was accredited, the receiving state
may offer a public funeral in his honour. The nature ofsuch a ceremony would
be for agreement between the sending and receiving state as well as the
ambassador's own family. Alternatively a memorial service or a similar
ceremony of honour and respect to the deceased ambassador might be
arranged. If it is desired that the body of the ambassador should be returned for
burial in his own country, the receiving state may offer to arrange the
conveyance of the body on a warship or state aircraft to his own country, or a
state procession from the embassy to mark the first stage of ajourney by sea or
air. On the death of the Netherlands Ambassador in London in 1952 a
ceremonial procession was arranged in his honour from the Embassy in
Portman Square to Knightsbridge Barracks, and the coffin was escorted by two
companies of the Scots Guards, a division of the Life Guards and the King's
Troop, Royal Horse Artillery, who fired a salute of nineteen guns. At
Knightsbridge Barracks there was a Guard of Honour from the Grenadier
Guards and the coffin was transferred from a gun carriage to a motor hearse for
conveyance to the airport. In 1958 full military honours were also accorded
when the body of the Iranian Ambassador was taken from London. The coffin
was borne from the Embassy to the Duke of York's Headquarters on a gun
carriage and was escorted by detachments of the Life Guards, the 1st Battalion,
Grenadier Guards, and the 2nd Battalion, Coldstream Guards, with the
regimental band of the Grenadier Guards and the pipes and drums of the 2nd
76
Battalion, Scots Guards. The coffin was taken by motor hearse to Northolt
Airport and was conveyed by Royal Air Force Transport Command to
Teheran. At the funeral in Teheran the Queen was represented by Her
Ambassador in Iran. 6 In 1976, on the murder of Senor Fernando Rodriguez
Olivia, the Peruvian Ambassador to Jamaica, his body was flown to Lima,
accompanied by the Jamaican Ambassador to Peru' and members of the
Jamaican Defence Force. A requiem Mass for the Ambassador was said at a
church in Kingston and was attended by the Prime Minister ofJamaica and
members of his Cabinet. 7
21.8.
In place of the farewell audience it is usual practice that the head ofstate of the
receiving state should convey his sympathy to the acting head of mission and
the family of the deceased ambassador and should be represented at any
funeral or memorial service. Practice in London on the death en poste of a head
of mission is that the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps calls on the acting head
of mission to convey The Queen's sympathy. The Queen is represented,
normally by the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, at the funeral or memorial
service in the United Kingdom and by Her Ambassador at the funeral or
memorial service in the home country of the deceased ambassador. The
Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps attends, in his personal capacity, the
departure of the body from London.
21.9.
The mission of a diplomatic agent will come to an end on a break in diplomatic

relations between the sending and receiving states. This situation is dealt with
in detail in Chapter 22. The functions of the diplomatic agents concerned
terminate on notification by the state which initiates the breach, since the
existence of diplomatic relations depends on agreement by the two states
concerned. Privileges and immunities of all members of the mission subsist in
the normal way until they leave the country, or have had an opportunity to do
so, or are reaccredited as diplomatic agents of the protecting Power should they
stay on in that capacity. In addition the receiving state is bound to permit
diplomatic agents (with the exception ofits own nationals) to leave the country,
and Article 45 of the Vienna Convention requires the receiving state to respect
and protect the premises of the mission, together wi th its property and archives.
As is emphasised by Articles 44 and 45 of the Vienna Convention, a rupture of
diplomatic relations, whether or not followed by hostilities, does not affect the
status of the diplomat or the obligations of the receiving state. When the
diplomatic agent's functions terminate on account of a breach in relations, the
formalities attending recall described in 21.3-5 are not observed.
21.10.
Following the disappearance of the head of state, either of the sending state or
of the receiving state, it is normally quickly apparent whether or not diplomatic
appointments will be renewed as a matter of course. Only very exceptionally
(for example when the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia
replaced the Government of the Khmer Republic in May 1975)8 is there an
interval before it becomes evident whether diplomatic appointments are being
renewed.
21. I I.
Where in either state a monarch or other hereditary ruler is replaced by his

successor, either constitutionally or otherwise, or where in either state changes
177
not provided for in the constitution lead to the emergence of a new head of
state, it is general practice that ambassadors who remain at their posts are
provided with fresh credentials. Ambassadors' order of precedence is
unaffected when this occurs. On the other hand, the replacement in either
state of a president or other elected or appointed head of state, whether on
death, resignation or expiry of his term of office, has never been regarded
as making fresh credentials necessary. It is sometimes difficult to determine
whether the constitutional change which has occurred is of a nature to make
fresh credentials necessary, and the modern tendency is, in cases of doubt,
neither to seek nor to issue fresh credentials. This is particularly the case when for
political reasons it is desired not to draw attention to the change which has
occurred. 9
21.12.
Where the change in the head ofstate ofa sending or receiving state takes place
as a result of violent revolution or armed conflict, it is more usual that
diplomatic appointments are not confirmed. A new government will wish to
replace former ambassadors by appointing new ones sympathetic to their own
views. If the sending state has merged with or been absorbed by another state it
will no longer have the right to send or receive ambassadors at all. Where the
government changes in the receiving state, other states may withdraw their
ambassadors as a mark of disapproval of the new regime, or they may not
recognise the new state or government which has assumed control of the
capital. The new government itself may not wish to remain in diplomatic
relations with all the states which formerly sent ambassadors to it, or may wish
fresh appointments to be made simply in order to indicate its distaste for
persons who did business with its predecessor. Io
21.13.
Where the government in the receiving state falls as a consequence of war or a

siege, it is likely that ambassadors and their staffs will have been withdrawn in
advance. The diplomatic missions of all Western states were withdrawn before
the fall of Saigon in 1975, and the French mission was alone in remaining
staffed until after the fall of Phnom Penh a few weeks earlier. Where, however,
some violent change has occurred and ambassadors remain at their post, they
may not enter into any form of official contact with the newly established
authorities in the state until they are instructed by their governments that
recognition is being accorded to the new government in the capital. When a
new government establishes itself by means of a coup d'etat, revolt or revolution,
it is customary for a circular Note to be sent to the heads of the diplomatic
missions remaining in the capital, informing them of the establishment of the
new government and expressing the wish that diplomatic relations should
continue between that state and the states which have accredited the
ambassadors receiving this Note. Since to acknowledge this Note could imply
recognition of the new government, it should not be acknowledged until
instructions authorising this are received from the home state. In such
situations action may be delayed through consultations between states closely
associated with each other (e.g. members of the European Economic
Community or the Organisation of African Unity), regarding the merits and
timing of recognition. The acknowledgement ofa Note of this kind is nowadays
the most common way in which recognition of a new government is effected
1 78
and the intention to continue diplomatic relations is confirmed. This occurred

at the time of the emergence in 1972 ofBangladesh as an independent country.
21.14.
Where the government in the sending country disappears or falls in some

violent conflict, ambassadors and their staffs abroad will have to assess their
position in the light of the circumstances. An ambassador retains his status as
ambassador up to the moment when the receiving state announces its
withdrawal of recognition of the government which accredited him. After the
fall of the Government of President Allende of Chile in 1973 the new
Government in Santiago, before it had been recognised by the United
Kingdom, dismissed the Chilean Ambassador in London and appointed a
member of the diplomatic staff as Charge d'Affaires. The mission staff were
divided in their loyalties, some being willing to serve the new Government and
some preferring to resign. Those willing to serve the new Government assumed
con trol of the Chancery building while the Ambassador remained in his official
residence, which was separate. In this situation the Foreign and Commonwealth Office made clear that, since they had not withdrawn recognition from
the Government of President Allende, they continued to regard the
Ambassador accredited by him as the Ambassador of Chile and they did not
regard his functions as terminated. Shortly afterwards, however, the United
Kingdom recognised the new Government in Chile and from that time
regarded the Charge d'Affaires appointed by that Government as head of the
mission of Chile. An ambassador may on the other hand prefer to resign on the
fall of the government which accredited him, without waiting for the receiving
state to withdraw recognition of that government. On the fall of the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975 the Ambassador in London
notified the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of his resignation and that of
his entire staff nine days before the recognition by the United Kingdom of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office accepted that this resignation terminated his functions
as Ambassador and at his request assumed temporary custody of the premises
and property of the Embassy. These were later returned to the Charge
d'Affaires of North Vietnam, which was the country appointed to protect the
interests of South Vietnam in the United Kingdom. The receiving state must
have regard only to the wishes, public statements or communications ofwhichever government it recognises at the relevant time as the government of the
sending state. It is, however, entitled to presume, when it recognises a new
government, that unless that new government has made clear by direct
communication or by public announcement that its country's previously
appointed ambassador has been recalled or dismissed, the ambassador continues
to exercise his functions on behalf of the new government. The receiving state
may, however, expect that in due course fresh credentials will be provided for
the ambassador by the new government.
Persona non grata

21.15.
The process by which an ambassador or other diplomatic agent who is

personally unacceptable to the receiving government is removed has been
known under varying descriptions at different periods - expulsion (the general
Persona non grata
179
term in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), request for recall
of the diplomat, dismissal (strictly an inappropriate term, since it is for the
sending state, not the receiving state, to 'dismiss' a diplomat from its service),
refusal to receive or to continue to receive the diplomat, and 'sending the
diplomat his passports.' This last expression derives from the former practice of
diplomats depositing their passports with the ministry of foreign affairs. The
expression, along with the practice, is now obsolete. There remains, however, a
tendency to use the somewhat more polite expression 'request the recall of a
diplomat' rather than the blunter 'declare persona non grata.' 'P.n.g.' and 'to
p.n.g.' are the standard colloquial terms. Whatever terminology is employed,
the characteristic feature of the persona non grata procedure is that it is the
diplomat personally who has offended the receiving government. Where the
displeasure is not with the diplomat personally but the policies or conduct of
the sending state, the correct course is to break diplomatic relations, or in a less
serious case recall the ambassador for consultations. Nor should a declaration
or declarations of persona non grata be used to reduce the number of diplomatic
staff in the mission of the sending state. The correct procedure for that purpose
is now set out in Article I I of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
21. I
6.
In 1584 one Francis Throkmorton was arrested in England, in consequence ofa letter he
had written to Mary Queen of Scots, which was intercepted, and the investigation
showed that Don Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish Ambassador, was party to a plot
which aimed at the deposition of Queen Elizabeth I. Camden ll relates that while
Throkmorton was under examination 'Don Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spaniard's
Embassadour in England, secretly crossed the seas into France, in a great rage and
fury, as if hee had been thrust out of England with breach of the privilege of an
Embassadour, whereas he himselfe being a man of a violent and turbulent spirit,
abusing the sacred privilege of an Embassage to the committing of treason, was
commanded to depart the land, whereas by the ancient severity, he was to be prosecuted
(as many thought) with fire and sword. For he had his hand in those lewd practises with
Throkmorton and others for bringing in of forreiners into England, and deposing the
Queen.... But yet lest the Spaniard should thinke, that not Mendoza's crimes were
punished, but the privileges of his Embassadour violated, William Waad Clerke of the
Councell, was sent into Spaine, to inform the Spaniard plainly how ill he had performed
the office of his Embassie; and withal to signifie (lest the Queene by sending him away
might seeme to renounce the ancient amity betwixt both kingdomes) that all offices of
kindnesses should be shewed, if he would send any other that were desirous to preserve
amity, so as the same kindnesses might in like sort be shewed to her Embassadour in
Spaine.'
Waad, however, was refused an audience of the Spanish King and 'returned
home unheard.'
This early example of 'expulsion' of an offending ambassador illustrates the
practice that became general: the offence was a personal, and indeed a serious
criminal one, and the receiving sovereign tried to make it clear that her quarrel
was with the ambassador personally and not with the sending sovereign.
21.17.
By the nineteenth century the practice applied by most states was that the
receiving state notified the sending state that its representative was no longer
acceptable and asked for his recall. The sending state immediately recalled the
offending diplomat, having indeed no effective alternative, since a diplomat
180
who is not acceptable cannot perform his proper functions. Reasons might be
given, but the sending State was not entitled to insist on them. In the most
celebrated cases the facts of course tended to become known.
In 1792 ME. C. Genest was appointed French Minister to the United States. On his
arrival, and before presenting his credentials, he began to fit out privateers to prey on
British commerce, in violation of United States neutrality. French consuls, sitting as
courts of admiralty, condemned prizes, some of them being captured in United
States waters. When remonstrated with, he expressed contempt for the opinions of
the President and questioned his authority. Mr Morris, the United States
representative in Paris, was instructed to ask for Genest's recall, which was
immediately granted. 12 The French Republican Government took advantage of the
occasion to ask for the withdrawal ofMr Morris, who had taken part in the effort to
effect the escape of Louis XVI from Paris. This was at once conceded.
2. In 1804 the Spanish Government asked for the recall ofMr C. Pinckney, the United
States minister at Madrid. The reason assigned was a threatening note which he had
addressed to the Spanish Minister of State. This Note contained an intimation that
he would inform American consuls of the critical state of the relations between the
two countries, and direct them to notify American citizens to be ready to withdraw
with their property. Mr Pinckney was instructed to come away on leave ofabsence. 13
3. In 180g Mr E. J. Jackson, British minister at Washington, in a correspondence with
the Department ofState, respecting the repudiation by the British Government ofan
arrangement entered into by his predecessor, Mr Erskine, for the settlement of the
Chesapeake case and the withdrawal of the Orders in Council, intimated that when
the agreement was concluded the United States Government were fully aware that
Mr Erskine had exceeded his instructions. The Secretary of State had already
protested against this insinuation, and, on its being renewed, wrote to Mr Jackson
that no further communication would be received from him. Shortly afterwards the
United States minister in London was instructed to ask for MrJ ackson's recall. This
was consented to by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who, however,
maintained that Mr Jackson did not appear to have committed any international
offence against the United States Government. 14
4. In 1846 Mr J ewett, the United States Charge d' Affaires at Lima, became involved in
a dispute with the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which he
characterised a decree which had been officially communicated to him as 'a
compound of legal and moral deformities presenting to the vision no commendable
lineament, but only gross and perverse obliquities.' He also omitted to address the
minister as 'Excellency' or 'Honourable' in written communications. He was
recalled in consequence of a reiterated request from the Peruvian Government. In
the despatch to Mr Jewett, the Secretary of State laid it down that 'if diplomatic
agents render themselves so unacceptable as to produce a request for their recall from
the government to which they are accredited, the instances must be rare indeed in
which such a request ought not to be granted. To refuse it would be to defeat the very
purpose for which they are sent abroad, that ofcultivating friendly relations between
independent nations. Perhaps no circumstances would justify such a refusal unless
the national honour were involved.' 15
5. In 1871 Mr Fish, the United States Secretary of State, informed the United States
minister at St Petersburg that the conduct of M. Catacazy, Russian minister at
Washington, both officially and personally, had for some time past been such as
'materially to impair his usefulness to his own government and to render intercourse
with him, for either business or social purpose, highly disagreeable'; that in these
circumstances the President was of opinion that the interests of both countries
would be promoted if the head of the Russian legation were changed; and it was
hoped that an intimation to this effect would be sufficient. The President eventuall'
I.
Persona non grata
181
consented to tolerate M. Catacazy until after the intended visit of the Grand
Duke Alexis to the United States. On this occasion the Secretary of State reaffirmed the United States view that an official statement that a diplomatic agent
had ceased to be persona grata 'is sufficient for the purpose ofobtaining his recall.' The
declaration of the authorised representative of the Power to which an offending
minister is accredited is all that can properly be asked, and all that a self-respecting
Power can give. Finally, M. Catacazy wrote to the Secretary of State that he had
received orders to sail for Russia immediately after the end of the Grand Duke's tour.
Mr Fish replied that this was understood to be a practical compliance with the
request for his recall. 16
6. In 1898 there was published in a New York paper a translation of a private letter
from Senor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister at Washington, to a Spanish
journalist friend in Cuba. The letter had been abstracted from the mail at Havana.
The letter described President McKi;lley as 'weak and a bidder for the admiration of
the crowd, besides being a would-be politician who tries to leave open a door behind
himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party,' and it suggested
that it would be a good thing for Spain 'to take up, even ifonly for effect, the question
of commercial relations.' The United States minister at Madrid was instructed to ask
for his immediate recall, on the ground that the letter contained 'expressions
concerning the President of the United States of such a character as to end the
minister's utility as a medium for frank and sincere intercourse between this country
and Spain.' The Spanish Government expressed their regrets for the incident,
making it clear 'that they did not share, and rather, on the contrary, disauthorised,
the criticisms tending to offend or censure the chief of a friendly state, although such
criticisms had been written within the field of personal friendship, and had reached
publicity by artful and criminal means.' They appointed a new minister to the
United States. I?
7. In 1927 the French Government addressed a protest to the Soviet Government
against the action of M. Rakovsky, their ambassador in Paris, in signing a public
declaration, which, in the event of any future war against the Soviet Union, incited
the workers of capitalist countries to work for the defeat of their governments, and
their soldiers to join the ranks of the Red Army. This action, the French Government
asserted, was a flagrant violation of engagements undertaken by the Soviet
Government at the time of their recognition in 1924. The Soviet Government
repudiated the action of M. Rakovsky, but the latter afterwards made a
communication to the Press with the evident intention of aligning particular
interests against the policy of the French Government in regard to the settlement of
Russian debts. The French Government thereupon deemed it impossible, in the
interests of the two governments and of the success of their negotiations, that M.
Rakovsky should continue as ambassador at Paris, and they demanded his
replacement. The Soviet Government then appointed a successor. 18
21.18.
Other cases could, however, be quoted where a request for withdrawal of a

diplomat who was no longer acceptable to the receiving state was not met and
the matter led to some dispute between the two governments. In most of the
cases where this occurred it is clear that the conduct of the diplomat was
authorised or at least sanctioned by his government, and the incident could not
be satisfactorily dealt with by means of the persona non grata procedure, since it
reflected a real difference on substantive matters between the governments
concerned. The following are examples in this category:
I.
In 1804 the MarquesdeCasa Yrujo, Spanish minister to the United States, proposed
to the editor of an American newspaper to oppose certain measures and views ofthe
182
government, and advocate those of Spain. The government censured his action, as
constituting a violation of an Act of Congress known as the 'Logan Statute. 119 He
defended his conduct in a Note, which he caused to be published in the newspapers.
On the ground of this attempt to tamper with the Press his recall was asked for,
through the United States minister at Madrid. The Spanish Government replied
that he had asked for leave of absence to return home at a season convenient for the
voyage, and the President acquiesced in this procedure; but when after some time he
had not departed, it was made clear to him that he was expected to leave. He replied
that he intended to remain in Washington as long as it might suit the interests of his
sovereign and his own convenience, and he had a further protest published in the
Press. The United States Government protested in Madrid, but the Spanish
Government defended the conduct of their minister. Yrujo's official relations with
the United States ceased and another Spanish diplomat was received as charge
d'affaires. 20
2. In 1852 the United States Government asked for the recall of Senor Marcoleta, the
Nicaraguan minister, which was refused. The Secretary of State then informed
Senor Marcoleta that the request for his recall had been renewed and that
meanwhile no communication could be received from him in his official capacity.
The charge against him was that he had communicated to the Press certain proposals
in regard to an inter-oceanic canal which had been shown to him unofficially and in
confidence. He not only tried to frustrate the negotiation, but also boasted of his
influence with certain senators and threatened to use it. The Secretary ofState wrote
to the United States minister at Nicaragua that a request for recall 'can never be
refused between governments that desire to preserve amicable relations with each
other; for a minister whose recall has been asked loses, by that fact alone, all capacity
for usefulness. If previously unacceptable, he must become doubly so by being
retained in office in opposition to a distinct wish expressed for his recall.' The
Nicaraguan minister was, however, not recalled but later presented fresh credentials
to a new President of the United States and remained in Washington as minister
until 1856.21
3. In 1905 M. Taigny, French minister to Venezuela, protested to the Venezuelan
Government at their action in summarily closing under decree the offices of the
French cable company at Caracas and elsewhere. In the view of the French
Government this constituted a violation of the rights of the company. The
Venezuelan Government denied the right of the French Government to take the
matter up through the diplomatic channel, claiming that diplomatic representations
could be made only if there had been a denial ofjustice, which was not the case. A
dispute followed, during which the Venezuelan Government expressed the hope that
the French Government would send a representative with whom more agreeable
relations could be entertained. M. Taigny remained in charge, but was not invited
on the occasion of the New Year official reception of the diplomatic corps by the
President, and it became apparent that only on his recall would the Venezuelan
Government resume official relations. The French Government announced his
recall, leaving their interests in charge of the United States minister. On M. Taigny
going on board s.s. Martinique to ascertain the instructions of his Government he was
refused permission to return on shore and thus virtually expelled from the country.
The diplomatic body protested against this act as contrary to diplomatic immunity,
but the Venezuelan Government maintained that immunity had lapsed with his
actual recall. In consequence the French Government on 18January 1906, notified
the Venezuelan charge d'affaires that his mission was terminated and he should
leave French territory the same day. He was escorted to the frontier that evening.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended for several years. 22
21.19.
A few governments, however, of which the British Government was the most
Persona non grata
183
conspicuous, expected reasons to be given when asked to recall one of their

diplomats abroad, and reserved the right to examine these reasons and not to
recall the diplomat unless satisfied that the reasons were adequate.
The Paris Revolution of I 848 led in Spain to the adoption of reactionary measures by
the government, and the reports received by Lord Palmerston from the British
Minister, Mr Bulwer, induced him to recommend 'earnestly to the Spanish
Government the adoption of a legal and constitutional course of government.' After
holding up as a warning to the Spanish Cabinet the recent fall of the French King he
added: 'It would then be wise for the Queen of Spain, in the present critical state of
affairs, to strengthen the Executive by enlarging the basis upon which the
administration is founded, and by calling to her councils some of those men who
possess the confidence of the Liberal Party.' When this advice was passed on by the
British Minister under cover of a Note to the Duque de Sotomayor, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, it was bitterly resented as interference in the domestic affairs of
Spain, and the Spanish Minister in London was instructed to ask for Bulwer's recall.
Palmerston refused to recall Bulwer, who was then 'dismissed' by the Spanish
Minister for Foreign Affairs. A protracted dispute followed and led to the
interruption for two years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Lord
Palmerston repeatedly called for a statement of the grounds on which the Spanish
Government had proceded in seeking Bulwer's recall, and he stated the British
position in this way: 'The Duke of Sotomayor, in treating of that matter, seems to
argue as if every government was entitled to obtain the recall ofany foreign minister
whenever, for reasons of its own, it might wish that he should be removed; but this is a
doctrine to which I can by no means assent . . . it must rest with the British
Government in such a case to determine whether there is or is not any just cause of
complaint against the British diplomatic agent, and whether the dignity and
interests of Great Britain would be best consulted by withdrawing him or by
maintaining him at his post. '23
2. In 1855, during the Crimean War the United States Government complained to the
British Government that British officials and agents had organised and were carrying
out in the United States an extensive plan for enlisting recruits for the British army,
in violation of the neutrality laws and in infringement of the sovereign rights of the
United States. The British Secretary of State Lord Clarendon disclaimed any
intention of sanctioning a violation of United States laws by British officials, but
there followed protracted argument between the two countries as to whether the
officials had committed the acts attributed to them and as to what conduct was
legally permissible. The British minister, Mr Crampton was meanwhile not recalled
but was dismissed by the United States Government. The British Government did
ultimately concede that it was for the United States to determine whether their own
laws had been violated, and while regretting the action of the President of the United
States as being 'of an unfriendly character' they did appoint another minister to
represent Great Britain in Washington. 24
3. In 1888 the legal views of Britain and the United States again clashed over the affair
of Lord Sackville. 25 The United States Government, insisting on their right to have
Lord Sackville recalled without giving reasons for their request, quoted Calvo as
authority for their position: 'When the government near which a diplomatic agent
resides thinks fit to dismiss him for conduct considered improper, it is customary to
notify the government which accredited him that its representative is no longer
acceptable, and to ask for his recall. If the offence committed by the agent is of a
grave character, he may be dismissed without waiting the recall of his own
government. The government which asks for the recall mayor may not, at its
pleasure, communicate the reasons on which it bases its request; but such an
explanation cannot be required. '26
I.
184
21.20.
The position taken by the United States and by the majority of other states is
now embodied in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, where
Article 9 states that:
, I.
'2.
The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision,
notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the
diplomatic staffofthe mission is persona non grata or that any other member of the staff
of the mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as
appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the
mission. A person may be declared non grata or not acceptable before arriving in the
territory of the receiving State.
If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to carry out its
obligations under paragraph I of this Article, the receiving State may refuse to
recognize the person concerned as a member of the mission.'
21.2 I.
The Vienna Convention rules are intended to ensure that where a diplomat
becomes personally unacceptable to the receiving state, the matter is handled
with as little personal embarrassment to him as possible and in the way least
likely to lead to protracted and unprofitable dispute between sending and
receiving state. In the majority ofcases the reasons for the recall are known both
to the sending and the receiving state, but they are not discussed in diplomatic
correspondence or in public. The diplomat may have against him evidence ofa
serious criminal offence, such as espionage or fraud, or he may have taken some
action which is resented by the receiving state as interference in its internal
affairs, or he may simply have given offence by his personal manner, attitudes
or conduct. Ifboth states agree, the matter may be handled so quietly that it does
not become public knowledge at all that the diplomat concerned has left before
the expiry of his normal tour of duty.
21.22.
The Vienna Convention makes clear that a diplomat may be declared persona
non grata before arrival and in that event he need not be granted a visa or
admitted on arrival. There is no agrement procedure for diplomats other than
the head of mission (and in some states for defence attaches) and so this
possibility may be of considerable importance if the receiving state finds that it
has been notified of the imminent arrival of someone newly appointed to a
diplomatic mission and it is aware that serious criminal charges have been
made against him or suspects that he is a spy.
21.23.
The rules, however, do not and cannot lead to the avoidance of dispute in all
cases between sending and receiving states. Probably the most dramatic case of
declaration of persona non grata occurred in 1971 when the British Government
requested the withdrawal of 105 Soviet Government officials, many of whom
were on the diplomatic staff of the Soviet Union's Embassy in London.
On the instructions of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Foreign Secretary, Mr
Ippolitov, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires, was asked to call on Sir Denis
Green hill, Permanent Under-Secretary. He was handed an aide-memoire
which contained the Government's request for the withdrawal of the officials.
The Foreign Office aide-memoire stated:
'When Mr Gromyko visited London in October, 1970, he spoke of the desirability of
improving Anglo-Soviet relations. It is the sincere wish ofHer Majesty's Government to
bring about such an improvement. There is however one matter of importance which
Persona non grata
185
has repeatedly caused friction in Anglo-Soviet relations. This is the scale of intelligencegathering activities by Soviet officials in this country.
'This subject was raised with Mr Gromyko by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, first in
conversation in London and subsequently in a letter dated December 3, 1970, written at
Mr Gromyko's suggestion, and in a further letter dated August 4, 1971.
These letters have not been answered, nor even acknowledged.
'Meanwhile inadmissible activities by Soviet officials in Britain have continued.
During the last twelve months a number of Soviet officials have been required to leave
the country after being detected in such activities. During the same period it has been
decided not to issue visas to a number of officials nominated to Soviet establishments in
the United Kingdom on account of their previous activities.
'The staffs of the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Trade Delegation, which form the
two largest elements in the Soviet official establishment in Britain, far outnumber the
British officials working in the Soviet Union.
'Her Majesty's Government have tolerated the growth of these establishments. They
have not sought to bargain increases in the Soviet establishments in this country against
increases in the British establishment in the USSR; nor have they sought to establish any
fixed relationship between the Soviet commercial establishment in this country and the
growth ofBritish exports to the Soviet Union. Evidence has however been accumulating
that this tolerance has been systematically abused.
'The abuse is a matter of serious concern to her Majesty's Government as a direct
threat to the security of this country. Moreover the recurring need to request the
withdrawal of Soviet officials from this country, or to refuse visas to certain officials
selected for service in this country, imposes strains on Anglo-Soviet relations. So do
unjustified acts of Soviet retaliation such as the recent expulsion of Mr Miller, Mr
Nicholson and Mr Jackson.
'The Soviet Government can hardly fail to be conscious of the contradiction between
their advocacy of a conference on European security and the scale of the operations
against the security of this country which Soviet officials and agents controlled by them
have conducted.
'Her Majesty's Government would like to see this contradiction resolved before the
preparation of a conference on European Security begins.
'The Soviet Embassy is therefore requested to arrange for the persons named on the
attached list, all of whom have been concerned in intelligence activities, to leave Britain
within two weeks from the date of this aide-memoire. Henceforth:
(a) The numbers ofofficials in (i) the Soviet Embassy (ii) the Soviet trade delegation and
(iii) all other Soviet organisations in Great Britain will not be permitted to rise above
the levels at which they will stand after the withdrawal of the persons named in the
attached list;
(b) If a Soviet official is required to leave the country as a result of his having been
detected in intelligence activities, the permitted level in that category will be
reduced by one.
The Soviet Embassy is also asked to take note that the Soviet citizens named on the
second list attached, who are believed to have left the country but still hold valid reentry
visas, will not be permitted to return to Britain, on account of their participation in
intelligence activities. '27
The officials concerned were recalled within the time limit set and the affair led
to a prolonged coolness in the relations between Britain and the Soviet Union.
This was to be expected, and the incident is a classic case of a situation in
which a Foreign Secretary is obliged to present to his Government a choice
between two disagreeable courses, either to continue to tolerate a practice
186
which has come to be an abuse of normal inter-governmental 'hospitality,' or to

end that abuse with the risk of at least temporary damage to mutual
relationshi ps.
21.24.
Two further recent cases of the application of the persona non grata procedure are
descri bed below:
I.
2.
In June 1976 the Libyan Ambassador to Egypt was declared persona non grata after
being detected by security authorities distributing pamphlets hostile to the regime of
President Sadat of Egypt. According to the Cairo newspapers an Egyptian reported
to the state security department that a Libyan (who proved on investigation to be the
Ambassador) asked him to take part in a clandestine organisation against the
Egyptian government. 28
The release in October 1976 of evidence of widespread smuggling and illegal sales of
drugs, alcohol and cigarettes by North Korean diplomats in Scandinavia led to a
number of declarations of persona non grata. The first country to act was Denmark,
which gave the North Korean Ambassador and his entire diplomatic stafTsix days to
leave on the grounds that they had turned their embassy into a front for the illegal
import and sale of drugs, liquor and cigarettes. This followed the seizure of 385
pounds of hashish, estimated to be worth about 200,000. The North Korean
Ambassador initially denied all the charges. A few days later the Government of
Finland disclosed that Finland had been used as a transit station for drugs destined
for other Scandinavian countries, and declared persona non grata the North Korean
charge d'affaires and three other diplomats. The charge d'affaires at first refused to go
and demanded that the Finnish Government should review 'the illegal decision.'
The following day the North Korean Ambassador to Norway and Sweden was
declared persona non grata, together with four of his diplomatic staff. On this occasion
however the diplomats concerned were recalled and returned home immediately.
Mrs Karin S6der, the Swedish Foreign Minister, said that her Government were
'deeply disturbed by the fact that officials at a foreign embassy had so seriously
misused their diplomatic immunity in committing such obvious criminal activity. '29
CHAPTER
22
Breach of diplomatic
relations
22. I.
Chapter 2 I dealt with the termination of diplomatic missions, whether or not

this termination involved an interruption or suspension ofdiplomatic relations
between states. Reference must still be made to what might be called 'nonrelationship' and, more importantly, to the diplomatic situation, characteristic
of the third quarter of the twentieth century, in which a much-advertised
breach of relations may turn out to be only partially real. This occurs when two
states, having broken off relations, usually on the initiative of one of them,
continue an active, ifquiet, direct relationship despite the appointment of third
states to protect the interests of each in the territory of the other.
Non-relationship
22.2.
Ever since the formalisation of modern residential diplomacy there have

always been independent states which, by reason of distance or lack of mutual
interest, did not maintain representation in each others' capitals. But the
absence in such cases of mutual representation did not mean that there was any
formal impediment to official contact.
Breach of diplolDatic relations

22.3
This act, usually decided and announced unilaterally, indicates a strong

objection by a government to language or actions on the part of another
government or other governments.
22.4.
In 1720 Bestoujew-Rioumine, the newly appointed Russian resident in London, was

instructed by Peter the Great to deliver memoires recounting the wrongs the Tsar had
suffered at the hands of the British Government. These were published simultaneously
with their delivery. The King of England and his ministers naturally were profoundly
irritated by this proceeding of the Tsar, and it was decided to suggest to Bestoujew that
he should quit the country within a week. This he accordingly did, and diplomatic
relations were not re-established until 1731, when Rondeau was appointed British
resident at Petersburg. I
22.5
In 1895 the Italian Government published a protocol signed at Caracas some time
188
previously by the diplomatic representatives of Belgium, France, Germany and Italy,

which in the opinion of the Venezuelan Government contained 'gratuitous and
defamatory statements reflecting on the honour of the State and the integrity of the
Executive.' Without taking the preliminary step of asking for the withdrawal by their
governments of the two out of the original four diplomatists who were still resident, the
Venezuelan Government sent them their passports. Simultaneously an explanation was
addressed to the two Powers concerned. France, which was one of these, broke off
diplomatic relations, while Belgium, the other, refrained from accrediting anyone in
place of the minister who had been dismissed. Eventually Venezuela invoked the good
offices of the United States to bring about the restoration of diplomatic relations, her
government declaring that Venezuela had intended no affront to France or Belgium,
whose flags she had conspicuously saluted on the same day that she dismissed their
personally objectionable agents. 2
22.6.
Since the Second World War there have been a number of instances of the
formal breaking off of diplomatic relations without the intention to proceed to
war. When Dr Mossedegh, the Prime Minister of Iran, broke offrelations with
the United Kingdom during the crisis of 1951, the breaking of contact was a
real one, and resumption could not be achieved until December 1952.
Similarly a literal interpretation of a breach in relations occurred in 1956 when
on 6 November, precisely one day before the cease-fire which brought the
Suez incident to an end, Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with
Britain and France. The Saudi Government found it impracticable immediately to reverse this decision once taken, and relations were not reopened unti19
September 1962 in the case of France and 16 June in that of Britain.
22.7
The conduct objected to is most usually felt to be directly injurious to the state
breaking relations. But relations may also be broken as a protest against the
policy of the other state on a matter of general international concern. In 1965
for example seven African states broke relations with the United Kingdom
because of resentment over the latter's handling of Rhodesia's unilateral and
illegal declaration of independence.
22.8.
It would not be the intention of the government breaking relations that this step
should lead on to war, though it would be intended as something more than a
'gesture' - perhaps a diplomatic 'weapon.' On the other hand it could hardly
be described as an effective weapon, even in the diplomatic sense, in that there
would normally be no assurance that it would achieve the effect intended, or
indeed have any important effect at all.
22.9.
It should be noted also that the breaking off of bilateral relations cannot be
as total as it could have been before the existence of international organisations.
Even if the states are not on mutual speaking terms, it is probable that there will
be on both sides what is called in United States State Department language
'passive acceptance of representation in multilateral bodies.' Such coexistence
modifies by implication the completeness of the breach ofdiplomatic relations.
It also offers opportunity for representatives ofthe two sides to discuss privately,
e.g. at New York during a session of the United Nations General Assembly,
presumably with the acquiescence of their respective governments, whether
any steps towards a renewal of relations could be taken. Such contacts can also
take place between representatives in a third state, though this method is on the
whole more likely to attract premature attention and thus endanger success.
189
22.10.
At the beginning of the so-called 'Six Day War' ofJune 1967 between certain
Arab states and Israel, an alarm was transmitted by the Government ofJordan to
President Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt that American and British aircraft
were on their way to cross Israel and attack Jordan. The rumour turned out to
be wholly false, but the Egyptian leadership had by then committed themselves
publicly to its acceptance. As a result, diplomatic relations between Egypt and
the United States (and Britain) were broken off by Egypt. This did not mean a
state of war between the United States and Egypt. But it did mean that, as in
the case of war, the conduct of business between the two Governments was
officially taken over by third parties. The handling of American interests in
Egypt was taken over by the Spanish Embassy in Cairo, while the Indian
Embassy assumed the same function on behalf of Egypt in Washington.
22. I I.
This arrangement had every appearance of orthodoxy. But, in fact, and

contrary to what would have happened on a declaration of war, there was
never a moment in which the American Embassy in Cairo (whose formal status
had become that of American Interests Section ofthe Spanish Embassy) lacked
the presence of an American official. At first there was only one, and he was
only responsible for administrative services, but, by 1968, when Mr Gunnar
Jarring, the Swedish mediator acting for the United Nations, began operating
in the area, it became clear that the presence of a United States diplomatic
officer in Cairo was indispensable for progress towards an Arab-Israel ceasefire. Accordingly, the American presence grew to six or seven people led by a
diplomat of Counsellor rank. At no time did the American officials move out of
the American compound into the Spanish Embassy. The Jarring Mission
having achieved no solution, the United States Secretary of State, Mr William
P. Rogers, undertook in 1970 a new peace initiative. Given the complexity and
delicacy of the discussions, and the high level of the negotiations, it became
necessary to send a more senior official to Cairo, and in February 1972 Mr
Joseph N. Greene, previously Minister at the United States Embassy in
London, arrived with the rank (not formally recognised but real) of Minister,
assisted by a team of experts in Arab matters. Mr Greene had access to the
Egyptian Head of State, as a regular ambassador would have had. This
arrangement continued until Dr Henry Kissinger took over from Mr Rogers
and conducted personal diplomacy which led to a cease-fire between Israel and
Egypt, and the restoration of full diplomatic relations between the United
States and Egypt.
22. I 2.
Since 1965 the United Kingdom have also made it their normal practice on a
breach of diplomatic relations to seek to establish a 'British Interests Section' in
the Embassy of a protecting power. For example, when the Government of
Iceland broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in February
1976, a British Interests Section of the French Embassy in Reykjavik was
established, consisting of all the members of the former United Kingdom
Mission other than the Ambassador, and was instructed so far as possible to
continue normal business.
22.13
At a seminar held in Singapore in 1970 senior Commonwealth officials

discussed the validity and utility of breaking diplomatic relations as a part of
the diplomatic process. The following comment is quoted from the Report of
190
that Seminar:
'The course of closing a mission should be resorted to very sparingly. Churchill's
dictum "jaw jaw is better than war war" has a basic truth in this respect. The very time
when a country should not break ofT diplomatic relations is when sharp differences of
view arise or there is a danger of actual conflict. That is the time when the diplomat is
most needed, since misunderstanding of the opposing viewpoint can be fatal in near
war, or actual war (including civil war) conditions. There is always a certain visceral
satisfaction to be gained from the gesture of breaking ofT relations, but the satisfaction is
often short-sighted and short-lived. An example ofa different type of approach is seen in
the Indian decision to maintain their Embassy in Peking throughout the confrontation
of the early I g6os'. 3
22. I 4.
It is fair to recall at this point that in recent years there have been several formal
breaches of relations within the Commonwealth and that the United Kingdom
broke off diplomatic relations in August 1976 with the Government of
President Idi Amin in Uganda. The British argued that its purpose in so doing
was not so much to rebuke or influence President Amin as to confirm that the
President had rendered impossible the proper functioning of the United
Kingdom High Commission in Kampala. 4
22.15.
It is perhaps a perception, conscious or instinctive, of the disadvantages

attaching to complete breaches of relations that caused states to adopt what
might be called half-way practices. Thus in 1975 the long-standing
disagreement between Argentina and the United Kingdom about sovereignty
over the Falkland Islands, or Malvinas, led to an explicit gesture ofdisapproval
by the Argentine Government, which, however, fell short of an interruption of
direct intercommunication between the two states. Objection was taken by the
Argentine authorities to action by a British ship to protect a Falkland Islands
vessel from harassment within the islands' territorial waters by an Argentine
patrol boat. The British Government were informed that, unless this action
were repudiated, the Argentine Government would require the withdrawal of
the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Mr Derick Ashe. No such repudiation
was forthcoming and Mr Ashe left on 19January 1976. It was made clear in
Buenos Aires that the request had no reference to Mr Ashe's conduct of his
mission and that there was no intention of interrupting Anglo-Argentine
relations. In fact on returning to London 'for consultation', Mr Ashe left his
wife and daughter behind in Buenos Aires. Thus the persona non grata procedure
was not involved. 5
22.16.
When requests for withdrawal of the head of a mission are made, the
government affected may seek to negotiate; but there is unlikely to be much
profit in this course once the matter has become public knowledge. In any case
the head of a mission who attempted to stay after being requested to go would
find himself immediately in a humiliating and, indeed, impossible position.
Nor, usually, is there any great advantage in retaliating in kind, unless by some
extraordinary chance the 'opposite number' of the head of mission expelled
happens to be on the verge of being declared persona non grata himself. The
British Government did not retaliate in the case described in the preceding
paragraph. In such a situation the only room for negotiation or gestures of
personal goodwill lies in such matters as the degree of courtesy to be shown to
191
the expelled envoy in terms, for instance, of the time allowed to prepare for
departure.
22.17.
In the century before 1914 diplomacy was very largely the diplomacy ofGreat
Powers acting either directly or on behalf of client states. This meant that a
breach of diplomatic relations was a very serious matter which might and
sometimes did portend war. The years after the Second World War brought a
great increase in the number of small independent states, some members of
alliances or blocs, some declaring themselves 'non-aligned' and others simply
remaining non-aligned in fact. It might have been thought that a world of this
kind would have been even more dangerous than the pre- 19 14 world. That it
was not so was at least partly because of the realisation, that as soon as atomic
capability began to spread, a local conflict might be the first step towards
drawing the greater Powers not, this time, into a conventional war, but into a
nuclear war. The fear ofsuch a development did not prevent local war, e.g. in the
Middle East, in South-East Asia and in the South Asian subcontinent. But the
fear that a war could turn nuclear had some inhibiting effect on any impulse to
slide or rush into war. In such circumstances a breach of diplomatic
relationship or a demand for the withdrawal of a particular head of mission
could prove a sufficient outlet for patriotic emotion. But even if a breach of
relations has, on such an occasion a 'safety-valve' effect, it is still permissible to
ask in the spirit of the Singapore report quoted above, to what extent gestures
intended to give satisfaction to domestic public opinion should be allowed to
take the place of normal diplomatic practice.
CHAPTER 23
23.1.
Early in the morning of 14 July 1958, Lieut.-General Abdul Qasim, having

received the order to transfer from Mansur, near Jalula on the Dujayla river,
where he was stationed, to a defensive position on the Jordan frontier,
instead marched the 20th Brigade into Baghdad. Once in the city, the troops,
instead of proceeding further, attacked the Royal Palace, overpowered the
Palace Guard and killed the young King Feisul, the Prince Regent Abdul Illah
and the entire Royal Family. Meantime other troops spread through the city, a
party of eight soldiers taking over from a police guard of twenty-four the
protection of the British Embassy compound.
23.2.
What precisely had happened was not at once known publicly, but the news
soon got round that the monarchy had been overthrown. Since there were in
the city large numbers of people who disliked the monarchy, partly for local
reasons and partly encouraged by broadcasts from Cairo radio, crowds soon
came out in the streets and large numbers of people gathered at the gates ofthe
British Embassy, the Royal Family having had strong British connections. At
about 8 a.m. a shot was fired, which turned out to have been due to clumsy
handling of a weapon by an Iraqi soldier who thereby injured himself in the
foot. But such was the tension in the city that the crowd found it only too easy to
believe that the shot had been fired from the Embassy Residence. The crowd
broke through the small party of soldiers, burst in to the Residence and burned
to the ground the fine building and its attractive and valuable contents.
23.3.
The Ambassador, Sir Michael Wright, and his household had retired to the
Chancery building by the riverside. In the confusion of these happenings,
the Comptroller, Lieut.-Colonel Ludovic Graham, was killed by a stray
bullet.
23.4
The next day the Ambassador, without waiting for instructions, called on
General Qasim, who had by then fully established his authority, and requested
a formal assurance of the safety of British subjects and their property, and a
convoy in case an evacuation of British subjects should be needed. He added a
formal protest over the failure to protect Embassy lives and property. General
Qasim expressed regret and added that a convoy would be provided but would
not be needed. On 16 July the Head of Protocol in the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs called on Sir Michael Wright to express regret at what had happened.
235
On 19July, having received instructions (the delay being partly accounted for
by several days of imperfect communications with London) Sir Michael called
Indonesia
193
on the Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs, repeated the requests already
described, and added that the British Government held the present
Administration responsible. In reply the Minister questioned whether there
was any established government which could be held responsible.
23.6 .
There was no immediate sequel to this conversation. But on 20 August the

Embassy received a verbal indication that the Iraq Cabinet had decided that
compensation should be paid. This message was never confirmed in writing,
but the Embassy and the British Government rightly assumed that the message
should be treated as an official communication. It is not necessary to give any
details of the compensation negotiations, which were not without confusions,
but agreement was reached through a top-level communication in September
1959
23.7
This case has been described in some detail because it contained many features
which are bound to characterise such a situation - internal tensions in the
country connected directly with external political relations, physical danger
and loss, an immediate protest and request for future protection, followed by a
protest on instructions and eventually, after due negotiation, the payment of
compensation. Such a protest by the head ofthe diplomatic mission concerned,
in anticipation of instructions, is politically and diplomatically important.
Failure to make such an immediate protest would suggest, in the home country
of the embassy attacked, timidity or negligence by the head of mission; to the
government of the country where the event occurred, it might imply doubt as
to the facts, and this could damage the success of a delayed demarche, however
official. The situation is obviously a difficult one, since the government of the
country where the incident occurred will have mixed feelings - a desire to make
the best of its own case and embarrassment that such an incident should have
occurred in its territory, whatever the cause.
23.8.
An event of this kind contains elements of personal tragedy and ofthreat to the
stability of political and diplomatic relations. But the element ofaccident in the
shot which precipitated the destruction ofa British Embassy Residence and the
manifest regret of the new Government that matters should have gone so far
provided a basis both for surmounting immediate political shock and for
agreeing on terms of compensation. But two other cases which involved the
British Government in the 1960s were more complex in their diplomatic
implications.
Indonesia
23.9.
On 16 September 1963 the British Government formally recognised the

establishment of the Republic of Malaysia. This recognition was not welcome
to President Sukarno's Government in Indonesia, since one element of it was
the formal acceptance by Britain that the Republic of Malaysia would include
the territory of Sabah (formerly British N orth Borneo), to which Indonesia had
laid claim. The Indonesian Government's reaction was extremely sharp and
was supported by popular demonstrations enjoying governmental approval.
1 94
A ttacks on embassies
23.10.
Foreseeing the possibility of trou ble on 16 September, when Malaysia would

come into existence, the British Ambassador, Mr Andrew Gilchrist, requested,
on 13 September, a 'small guard'. He had in mind that the Chancery building,
being in contemporary style, was peculiarly vulnerable to attack. As he had
foreseen, a large demonstration of young people duly collected on 16
September and threw stones at the building, breaking 400 plate-glass windows.
In the evening, as a gesture of morale-raising defiance, Major Walker, the
Assistant Military Attache to the Embassy, walked round the damaged
building playing the bagpipes. This performance gave rise to the pleasant
legend that the Ambassador, a patriotic Scot, not only sanctioned it but played
the bagpipes himself. The local diplomatic effect of the gesture can hardly
have been advantageous, though subsequent events showed that there was
little that could have been done through diplomatic channels.
23.11.
On 17 September the British Embassy put in two Notes to the Indonesian

Foreign Office, and U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations,
publicly expressed disapproval of what had happened. However, soon after
midday on 18 September there was a more determined attack on the Chancery
building. This resulted in its forced evacuation some three hours later. In the
circumstances of the evacuation, much help, physical and diplomatic, was
received from the United States Embassy under the direction of the
Ambassador, Mr Howard Jones. The Australian and French Embassies were
also helpful. This informal but real aid was particularly valuable, since it was
largely thanks to it that on 26 September, six days after the second attack, the
British staff were allowed to reoccupy the building.
23.12.
For the next two years the compensation question did not move. The
Indonesian Government's policy continued to be the acquisition of all foreign
investment in the country. Then political fate intervened. In September 1965 a
political coup organised by the Indonesian Communist Party failed. A new
Government took over, headed by General Suharto, with Mr Adam Malik as
Foreign Minister. Military 'confrontation' with Malaysia and Britain ceased,
and in June 1966 Mr Malik reached a full agreement with Malaysia which was
signed in August. Attention could then be given to the liquidation of other
previous differences between the Indonesian and British Governments. A
compensation agreement satisfactory to both sides covering the damage to the
British Embassy in 1963 was signed on 1 December 1966.
China
23.13.
A third case of destructive attack on a British Mission took place in Peking in

1967 during the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution'. This mass movement led to
widespread turmoil throughout the year, involving both demonstrations
against domestic authorities and attacks, marked by a recrudescence of antiforeign sentiments, on a number of diplomatic missions. The Chinese Foreign
Ministry had been temporarily taken over by members of extreme left-wing
groups. Harassment was directed particularly at British diplomats because of
China
195
events in the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong. Severe restrictions were
imposed on the movements of British diplomats in Peking, which made it
impossible for them to carry out the purposes for which they were accredited.
The Chinese authorities also from time to time withheld exit permits for
diplomatic personnel. The mood in China seemed to vary from week to week
and the harassment of British officials led to restrictions on Chinese movements
in Britain and, in August, to demonstrations by British crowds outside the
Chinese Mission in London. The diplomacy ofthe period moreover was highly
unorthodox; the Chinese Charge d' Affaires 1 in London, for instance, refusing
to accept four written protests delivered to him. 2
23.14.
The Cultural Revolution had spread to Communist supporters in Hong Kong,

where there was a bomb campaign and a menacing succession of riots directed
against the Hong Kong Government. Legal action was taken to restore public
order, which involved acting against, among others, certain Chinese journalists
and representatives in Hong Kong of the official New China News Agency.
These measures resulted sometimes in imprisonment and entailed the
prohibition of the publication of at least three newspapers. They were
described in Peking as 'fascist atrocities'.
23. 1 5.
The first actual attack on British representation in China was not directed at
the British Mission in Peking, but consisted of the invasion by a crowd on 16
May of the large British Consulate-General compound in Shanghai. The
Consul-General and his family were subjected to indignities; furniture was
wrecked and a portrait of The Queen destroyed. This resulted in an immediate
representation to the Chinese Charge d' AfTaires in London, in which the
British Government reserved the right to claim compensation for the damage
done to British property. The Chinese Government on 22 May announced its
decision to annul the 1954 agreement which provided for the British Office in
Shanghai (which was not regarded by the Chinese as a Consulate). The British
Charge d' AfTaires protested at the unilateral abrogation of the agreement and
in a message to the Chinese Foreign Minister on the same day the Foreign
Secretary expressed the view that the agreement could not be unilaterally
annulled and expressed willingness to accept negotiations on the question; he
added that he had already decided to withdraw the British representative from
Shanghai because of the treatment to which the representative and his family
had been subjected, but that this action would not constitute acceptance of or
acquiescence in China's unilateral decision to abrogate the agreement.
Although the message was returned by the Office of the Charge d' AfTaires in
London and a copy delivered to the Foreign Ministry in Peking was
subsequently returned to the British Mission, it was clear that its contents had
been noted. The Counsellor of the Office of the British Charge d' AfTaires in
Peking was summoned to the Foreign Ministry on 9 September to receive
notification of an order by the Shanghai local authorities requisitioning the
premises of the British Office in Shanghai. The Counsellor duly protested and
reserved the right to seek compensation. Subsequently (19 September 1967) the
Chinese Charge d' AfTaires in London was summoned to the Foreign Office and
given a Note formally setting out the British Government's position in
protesting at the requisition and reserving all their rights over the premises as
well as the right to claim compensation.
1 96
A ttacks on embassies
23.16.
Meanwhile on 7 June there had been officially inspired anti-British

demonstrations in Peking, under pretext of alleged British support for the
Israelis in the 1967 Middle East war. An intrusion was made into the premises
of the British Mission, in the course of which the royal portrait was damaged.
The intruders were without exception non-Chinese, being mostly Arab
nationals resident in Peking.
23.17.
The most serious incident occurred on the night of 22 August 1967,

immediately following the expiry of a Chinese Government ultimatum to the
British Government, demanding that they release certain journalists imprisoned in Hong Kong or 'accept all the serious consequences'. At the moment when
this ultimatum expired, a very large crowd of Chinese demonstrators (10,000
according to the New China News Agency) who had surrounded the British
Mission throughout the day and prevented the staff from leaving, entered the
compound and set fire to and sacked the Chancery building, which was
completely destroyed. The British Charge d'Affaires, Mr (later Sir) Donald
Hopson, and his staff, including five women, on leaving the building were
physically attacked and beaten by the crowd before being eventually rounded
up by detachments of the Chinese Army who had been present throughout.
The contents of the outbuildings, including all the Mission's motor vehicles,
were also burned, as were the contents ofthe residence ofthe Charge d'Affaires,
adjacent to the Chancery.
23.18.
The response of the British Government was an immediate protest delivered by

the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Mr George Thomson, in which an
assurance of future protection was demanded and the right to full
compensation was asserted. A number of severe restrictions were placed on
Chinese officials in Britain, notably a ban on moving more than five miles
(eight kilometres) from the centre of London, or leaving the country without
specific permission. Tension continued, and there was a demonstration in
London by the staff of the Chinese Embassy against the restrictions placed on
them. However, at no time were diplomatic relations broken off
23. I 9.
On the 30 August a further hostile demonstration was directed against the

British Charge d'Affaires and his staff, who were obliged to appear publicly
before the demonstrators. It was only after Mr Hopson had been physically
manhandled by the Red Guards in an effort to get him to abase himself that
soldiers intervened to prevent further developments. An attempt to obtain
protection from the Chinese Foreign Ministry resulted only in advice to meet
the demonstrators' requests. At the beginning ofSeptember the Chinese Prime
Minister, Mr Chou-En-Lai, was reported to have issued a directive to the effect
that in relation to foreign diplomatic missions Red Guards should be content to
'demonstrate but not penetrate.' Despite the seizure on 9 September by the
Chinese authorities of the British Consulate-General compound in Shanghai
(mentioned in 23. I 5), there developed a clear inclination by both Governments
to diminish tension, and a number of restrictions were removed in succeeding
months.
23.20.
Little information has been made available about the negotiations for
compensation, but the Chinese Government in March 197 I made clear their
General
197
decision to bear the cost of rebuilding the Chancery premises. However,

various other claims by the British Government remain unsettled.
General
23.21.
Attacks on diplomatic and consular missions are attacks on institutions which

under international law enjoy extensive immunities and there can of necessity
be no a priori definition of procedure to be applied if such attacks take place.
The only way to work out any guidance on diplomatic practice is by taking
examples and deducing from them such general guidance as one can.
23.22.
Attacks of the kind described above imply an aroused public, possibly aroused
by the receiving government, as well as a degree of political instability. In a
stable situation, these incidents should not arise; if they are at all likely to do so,
police protection should, in accordance with international law and practice, be
available and sufficient. (The legal position governing the rights of the
diplomatic mission and the responsibilities of the receiving government, are
described in 140 1 5')
23.23.
In an unstable political situation, an alert and well-informed mission should be

able, even without specific fore-knowledge, to sense when disorder and perhaps
violence are to be expected. In such a case, a request in advance to the
government of the receiving state for special protection is a wise precaution in
itself, and will strengthen the position of the mission and the sending
government in any later argument about restitution. If there is prolonged
disturbance or civil conflict, it may also be sensible for the mission to ask its own
government for special assistance. 3
23. 2 4.
Whatever doubts there may be about facts and causes, it is reasonable for the
'victim' government to take the position that the de facto local government
(whether the established one or a new one) should accept on behalf of the
receiving state responsibility for any failure in the duty to protect diplomatic
premises, and also responsibility for paying compensation.
23. 2 5.
It is in any case wise diplomacy for an official request to be addressed

immediately after the attack to the host government on behalf of the victim
government to assure effective protection both for the official representation of
the victim country, and for its local community. The right to claim
compensation should also at once be reasserted. This kind ofdiplomatic action
can and indeed should be taken without delay (i.e. without waiting for
instructions) by the mission affected. 4 In the case of the burning of the British
Embassy in Peking this was done by the British Charge d' Affaires, who in the
absence of other facilities sent a letter typed by himself through the ordinary
post.
23.26.
Experience points to the great value in such cases ofgood working relationships
between the missions of countries friendly to each other in the wider context.
These would naturally include fellow-members of political organisations
pursuing similar policies, such as the member countries of NATO, the
198
European Community or the Warsaw Pact, or members of organisations such

as the Commonwealth or the big geographical groups such as the Organisation
of American States and the Organisation of African Unity. Each individual
country will naturally be cautious of involving itself politically in the causes
leading to violent attacks. But where the threat is not against one mission only,
collective representations may be more effective than representations by one
ambassador only. A certain diplomatic camaraderie can manifest itself in such
circumstances; and this can be very helpful in a situation which can, let it be
remembered, become extremely frightening and dangerous.
CHAPTER 24
24. I.
Attacks on Embassies such as those described in Chapter 23 presuppose a

degree of complicity or culpable negligence on the part ofthe authorities ofthe
country where the attack took place. The series of kidnappings of senior
diplomats which occurred in the late I 960s and early I 970S were clearly of a
different order. There was no need to storm and wreck an embassy in order to
kidnap the head of it. Whereas the purpose ofa mass demonstration might be to
give vent to a natural or stimulated national emotion, the purposes of the
kidnappings of individual diplomats were far more calculated and coldblooded. The object was nearly always to extract a particular concession from a
government, under the threat that, ifthe concession were not granted, a human
life would be lost and the government refusing the concession would be to
blame, both generally and in the eyes of the country which the victim
represented.
24.2.
Nor, when the technique was new, could the security authorities ofthe country
of the crime be specially blamed. Kidnappings of this kind were always
carefully planned and the security authorities could hardly be expected to
protect every single senior diplomat, whether at home or during his or her
comings and goings.
24.3.
The first case of attempted kidnapping which really startled world-opinion

occurred in Guatemala City on 28 August 1968. The American Ambassador,
Mr John C. Mein, was returning normally to his office from lunch at the
Embassy residence when his official car was blocked in a down-town street.
Seeing a number of young men in fatigue uniform bearing down on the car, Mr
Mein jumped out and ran, and was shot dead. The next day an organisation
called Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes announced that he had been killed 'while
resisting political kidnapping.' Seven months later, on 2 I March 1969, in very
similar circumstances, the Federal German Ambassador, Count Karl von
Spreti, was forced from his car by members of the same organisation, who held
him captive and demanded as the price for his release the release of seventeen
political prisoners. While the diplomatic corps were discussing the situation
with the Guatemalan Government and the German Government were
pressing for release on the conditions proposed, the price was raised to twentyfive prisoners and 700,000 US dollars, which the Germans offered to pay. The
Guatemalan Government insisted that some of the prisoners had already been
convicted of crimes and that the verdict of the courts could not be set aside by
executive order. While the discussion was still in progress the deadline set by
200
the kidnappers passed and on 5 April the body of Count von Spreti was found
with a bullet-hole in the temple.
24-4.
Not all such episodes ended in tragedy. On 4 September 1968, the United
States Ambassador in Brazil was forced from his official car and a note was left
in it describing him as the 'symbol of exploitation,' and demanding the
publication of a manifesto and the release of fifteen political prisoners. The
Brazilian Government agreed to the demands, and Mr Elbrick, on his release
three days after the kidnapping, said that his captors were 'young, very
determined, intelligent fanatics' who would have acted on their warning that
he would be 'executed' if their demands had not been met.
24-5.
Other such events include the kidnapping and murder in Canada in 1970 ofMr
Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labour of the Province of Quebec, the kidnapping
in the same year ofMrJames Cross, British Trade Commissioner in Montreal,
the kidnapping in 1971 ofMr (later Sir) GeofTreyJackson, British Ambassador
in Uruguay, the kidnapping and murder of the Israel Consul-General in
Istanbul by Turkish terrorists in May 1971 and the appalling sequel to
the occupation in March 1973 of the Saudi-Arabian Embassy in Khartoum
by the Arab 'Black September group', during which the American
Ambassador, Mr Noel, his Counsellor, Mr Moore and the Belgian Charge
d' AfTaires, Mr Eid, were murdered. Over twenty-five such kidnappings or
attempted kidnappings happened in the years 1968-73. I
24-6.
Reference has been made in the preface to this book to the political background
of the time which made such events thinkable. The basic purpose ofkidnapping
and holding as hostages people of diplomatic status could only be to cause the
sending state to exercise pressure on the receiving state, which is responsible for
his protection, to 'purchase' his release. The purchase price can be very precise,
for instance the release by the receiving state of certain people held in prison people probably of no direct interest to the 'victim' state at all. Or the purpose
could be political but less precise, as in the kidnapping of the British
Ambassador to Uruguay, where the motive appears to have been a determined
desire by the Tupamaros organisation, a young revolutionary group, to
establish themselves as the recognised second power within the State. The
remarkable self-control displayed by the Ambassador throughout his eight
months of captivity seems somewhat to have disconcerted his captors, despite
their success in keeping his whereabouts concealed. But it is well to recall that a
kidnapping operation could also be the expression of something more
fundamental still, a violation of law in pursuit of a doctrinal 'war of nerves,'
described by the Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighela in the following words:
'The object of the war of nerves is to misinform, spreading lies among the
authorities - thus creating an air of nervousness, discredit, insecurity,
uncertainty and concern on the part of the Government.'
24- 7.
It should be clear from the above that diplomatic kidnapping, although an

event concerning international diplomacy, is not amenable to diplomatic
method as between, for instance, the government employing the kidnapped
diplomat and the agents ofthe kidnapping. The victim government will indeed
use the diplomatic channel to urge a government in whose territory a
20 I
diplomatic kidnapping takes place to intensify its search for kidnappers and
kidnapped and to assure better protection in the future. But any 'negotiation'
has to be between the territorial government and the kidnappers. If the
diplomat's sending state embarked on its own direct negotiations with the
kidnappers, this could be resented by the territorial government as an
intervention in an affair which was its responsibility.
24.8.
The use of diplomatic kidnappings was frequently successful, notably in Brazil

where, for instance, the release of the Swiss Ambassador, M. Giovanni Enrico
Bucher, kidnapped in December 1970, was eventually purchased, after a
month and a half of negotiation, by the release of no less than seventy 'political
prisoners.' (The Brazilian Government had already accepted the release of
political prisoners in two previous diplomatic kidnapping cases.) Underlying
the governmental decisions in these cases was the fundamental political and
ethical question whether the paramount consideration was to preserve the life
of a human being, or to discourage recurrent kidnapping by refusing to accede
to the kidnappers' demands. A life would inevitably be risked by a refusal to
pay the price demanded. A very interesting comment on this, quoted by
Professor Baumann, 2 was made by Mr Burke Elbrick at a press conference after
his release, when he said that, although such restraint would have resulted in
his own 'disappearance from the scene,' it would in general be unwise for a
government to negotiate with terrorists and to give in to any of their demands.
Sir Geoffrey Jackson, who had suspected that the Tupamaros might seek to
kidnap him, had made it clear in advance to the British Government that he
did not wish to be ransomed. Knowledge ofthis by his captors may have helped
to save his life.
24.9
The Federal German Government for a number of years took the opposite
view. But having paid very heavily for the release in March 1975 ofthe eminent
Berlin political leader, Herr Peter Lorenz, they seemed to have changed their
minds by the time of the violent attack on the German Embassy in Stockholm
on 24 April 1975, when they decided that the moment had come to fight it out. 3
24. I o.
Although, therefore, diplomats are deeply concerned in this aspect of

terrorism, since anyone of them might suddenly become a victim, diplomatic
activity as such remains that of seeking to persuade government in countries
where kidnapping has taken place to act in accordance with the wishes of the
victim government. Beyond that, one can only point to certain actions which
involve diplomatic procedures.
24. I
First, it has to be accepted that security precautions during such a period have
to be reviewed and tightened up both in countries maintaining diplomatic and
consular missions and in countries receiving them. There can be no
mathematical rule of thumb about this. For instance, some receiving countries
are more vulnerable to terrorist attack than others if they hold in prison persons
who can be described credibly, whether correctly or misleadingly, as political
prisoners. Experience is at best an uncertain guide in any attempt to forecast
the occurrence of a kidnapping, or its timing; though reasonably good
intelligence about the strength, activeness and mutual relationships ofterrorist
groups will obviously be helpful. In this context, a state with an effectively
I.
202
repressive regime is more likely to be able (if willing) to control access to

embassies than a freer regime.
24.12.
Although it remains the duty of the receiving power to protect the lives of
members of diplomatic missions, security forces are often - owing to the
considerable rise in terrorist and criminal activity in recent years - too tightly
stretched to give the diplomatic community the protection that the threat
warrants. The receiving power, in these circumstances, can reasonably eXPect
all missions to take measures to protect themselves. Some missions sometimes
employ armed security guards, but a number of countries, including the
United Kingdom, strongly object to arms being carried officially within their
territory by anyone other than their own security forces. Where possible,
therefore, armed intervention against terrorists should be left to the receiving
power, which should of course have the means to intervene quickly and
effectively against armed terrorists attacking diplomatic missions.
24.13.
Some countries, especially those which felt themselves threatened, adopted

now well-known secondary defensive precautions. Apart from reinforcement of
security personnel, there are variations of times and routes of official cars (a
notably vulnerable target), temporary abandonment of official flags and
number plates and the use of cars of any colour provided it is not black. But
these useful secondary measures in turn have their limitations. For instance,
depending on relative locations there may be (as in Montevideo) very limited
possibilities of varying the route taken between residence and office, and a
determined group can sometimes rush the defences. And the problem for
diplomatic and security staff is also complicated when non-indigenous
terrorists break into and secure hostages in an embassy in a third country which
has nothing to do with the case at all, in order to bring pressure on their own
government or the government represented by the embassy attacked. This, it
will be recognised, is a generalised description of the attack in August 1975 by
Japanese terrorists on the American Embassy in Malaysia in order to bring a
certain pressure on the United States Government to persuade it to bring
certain pressures on the Government of Japan.
The legal position

24.14.
Diplomatic agents and premises of course enjoy inviolability under customary

international law, which is reflected in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961. The receiving state is under a special duty to take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom and dignity of
diplomats and to protect diplomatic premises. 4 International cooperation is
clearly essential both in the prevention of crimes against diplomats and in the
punishment of offenders. To this end, it was felt increasingly desirable to
conclude an international convention (similar to those on hijacking and
sabotage of aircraft 5 ) concerning legal measures aimed at the prevention and
punishment of crimes against diplomats. 6 The Organisation of American
States adopted a Convention on the subject in 1971, and later that year the
The legal position
20 3
United Nations General Assembly asked the International Law Commission to

prepare a set of draft articles. These were submitted to the Assembly and,
basing itself on the Commission's draft, the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the
Assembly elaborated the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents.
24.15.
This Convention,7 which was adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution

3166(XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, did not immediately receive the requisite
number of ratifications and accessions, but finally came into force on 2
February 1977. It provides that persons alleged to have committed certain
attacks against diplomatic agents and others should either be extradited or
have their case submitted to the authorities of the state where the alleged
offender is present, for the purpose of prosecution. It contains, in addition,
provisions concerning cooperation, the transmission of information and the
treatment to be accorded to alleged offenders.
24.16.
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed on 27

January 1977 by member states of the Council of Europe, imposes an obligation on contracting states not to regard specified offences (including
hi-jacking, kidnapping and certain crimes of violence) as political offences for
the purpose of extradition; and while a state may refuse extradition in cases
which it considers to be political, it must, if it does so, take into consideration
when evaluating the character of the offence any particularly serious aspects
of the offence and submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution. 8
CHAPTER 25
Diplomacy and radio

25. I.
In his book on radio broadcasting, J ulian Hale wrote:

'The BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) like the VOA (Voice of America) is
part ofa wide network of international communications designed to increase and spread
national influence. British communications diplomacy is on a smaller scale than the
American; nevertheless [it is] by no means negligible.' I
This use of the word 'diplomacy,' even in inverted commas, compels the
question whether wireless or radio is a branch ofdiplomacy as understood in the
present book, or whether it is simply one more international activity with which
diplomacy has to deal. Can a passing of international messages not to a
particular destination but to anyone who can tune in on the particular
wavelength be in any way termed 'diplomacy'? Even if not, has diplomacy any
special function in its relationships with broadcasting?
25.2.
As soon as broadcasting over international boundaries became possible, the

question at once arose, what would this new facility become? It could, in the
hopes of some, become a means of uniting peoples over the heads of
governments. But the advent in Europe of the twentieth-century ideological
totalitarian state gave a different answer. On 30 June 1933, AdolfHitler issued
a directive that a Reich Ministry of Enlightenment and Propaganda be set up
under Dr Josef Goebbels which would be
'responsible for all tasks having to do with influencing the mental and spiritual life of the
nation, for winning allegiance to the state, its culture and economy, for informing the
public at home and abroad about the nation, and administering all institutions and
installations contributing to these ends.'2
Thus a ruthless pattern had been set for state control of the content not only
of radio but of the whole of publication and broadcasting.
25.3.
There had indeed been fear in Europe already that the content of radio
broadcasts across international frontiers might disturb the political relations
between neighbouring countries, and a pact was concluded in 193 I, two years
before Hitler became Chancellor, between Germany and Poland, in which
part of the text reads:
'The two Contracting Parties undertake in the future to do everything in their power
to ensure that matter - whether political, religious, economic, intellectual or artisticbroadcast from their stations shall not compromise in any way the spirit of cooperation
Diplomacy and radio
205
and good understanding which is necessary if broadcasting is to fulfil its mission of

drawing nations together. '3
25.4.
The pact went on to note exceptions, best endeavours, etc. and the drafters
seem to have foreseen in some degree the difficulties of enforcement. But the
advent of totalitarian regimes in Germany and Italy, the permanently polemic
tone of Soviet broadcasting, the growth from 1939 ofwartime political warfare,
followed by cold warfare, suggested that any international control oreven selfcontrol of content was not likely to be agreed or established.
25.5
After the Second World War, the tendency of international broadcasting

seemed to move in different directions. One of these was summed up in an
American comment in 1946.4
'There is some reason to believe that a new phase in the history ofpropaganda is in its
early beginning - a phase in which emphasis on facts begins to displace frenzy and
invective.'
This judgement is expressed very cautiously, and rightly so, since the new
nationalism in countries nearing national independence was bound to be
reflected in radio broadcasting. But it is true to say that in the broadcasting of
some relatively mature middle-power countries, a conscious effort was made to
give both the home public and listeners abroad a balanced view of events,
internal and international: two outstanding examples are Canada and, as it
developed its democratic independence, the Federal Republic of Germany.
This development gave international prestige to particular broadcasting
systems. An indirect tribute to the maintenance of this standard was paid
nearly thirty years later in a speech delivered in the revolutionary days ofJuly
1975 by Dr Mario Soares, the future Socialist Prime Minister of Portugal who
said:
'We all know what people do in the evenings these days. They listen to the
Portuguese service of the BBC.'5
But on the whole, with the persistence of ideological argument and selfconscious nationalism, the voice of moderation and attempted objectivity was
bound to be the voice of the minority. The power of an international
broadcasting station did not necessarily reflect the importance of the country
using it, and a general exploration of the spectrum picked up easily the shrill,
denunciatory voice of Albania, the confident admonitions of the People's
Republic of China and the strong national 'colour' of the Voice of America
which was bound to qualify its conscientious efforts at objectivity.
25.6.
The continued use of radio broadcasting for mainly propaganda purposes

registered one most important political success. In 1954 Gamel Abdel Nasser
took over the Presidency of Egypt. Possessing the personal qualities needed for
influence through broadcasting, he addressed himself in this way to countless
Arabic-speaking listeners, from Kuwait and Bahrein across the breadth of
Africa to the Algerian nationalists, and from Zanzibar through Somaliland to
the Palestine refugee camps in Gaza andJericho and to the disaffected Moslem
groupings of the Lebanon. To this audience, whose politically minded
members were largely frustrated by a feeling that their nominal independence
206
Diplomacy and radio
was not real, he spoke frequently and dramatically ofArab unity and freedom.
The effect has been described thus:
'In 1955 ... what began to irritate other Arab leaders was appealing directly to their
own population, literally bypassing the governments in winning popular acclaim. It no
doubt annoyed President Chamoun of Lebanon and King Hussein of Jordan to see
Nasser's photograph more widely displayed than their own. But by early 1956, no Arab
leader dared to speak out against Nasser. Nasser was so popular that to oppose him
meant political suicide.'6
25.7
But, of course, any government on whose policies and proceedings a broadcast

attack is being made can understandably feel anxious about attacks ofthis kind
over the air, especially when they come from an avowedly governmentsponsored broadcasting system. After all, the voice carries much more emotive
appeal than the printed word, especially as between neighbouring countries. In
relation to its potential effect, moreover, the cost ofbroadcasting over a period of
time from a short or medium distance need not be burdensome. Again, to use
once more the words of Hale, 'radio can penetrate where it is not wanted.' 7
Resistance was therefore practised in the form of 'jamming' (drowning
broadcasts in conflicting noises). In the earlier days after the Second World
War, this technique, especially as practised by the Soviet Union, achieved
some success. But as sophistication grew on the part of transmitting countries,
jamming grew technically more difficult and economically less worthwhile.
25. 8 .
In 1973, noting a pronounced decrease in Soviet jamming ofAmerican, British

and Federal German radio broadcasts, Western countries were hopeful of
obtaining from the negotiations at Helsinki in 1975, in the name of greater
freedom of communications, some explicit discouragement ofjamming. If this
could be achieved, other benefits might follow, such as less interference by
national security authorities in the reception of short-wave broadcasts from
abroad.
25.9.
Predictably, nothing explicit was obtained. But an article was agreed which
stated in part:
'The participating states note the expansion of information broadcasts by radio and
express the hope for the continuation of the process, so as to meet the interest of mutual
understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this Conference.,8
25.10.
By the middle of the twentieth century radio broadcasting had established a

new dimension in the conduct of diplomacy and thereby added to the burdens
of the professional diplomatist. This dimension did not consist ofthe actual use
of radio broadcasting by diplomats for the normal professional purposes of
discussion and negotiation since such use would have been the equivalent of
discussion in the presence of a possibly large public audience. Admittedly this
audience could not interrupt the discussion directly (except by jamming), but
the diplomatic discussion would in fact be interrupted through public
discussion elsewhere, based on what had been heard of the broadcast
negotiation. This is not the way of diplomacy.
25.1 I.
However, given the control of broadcasting by government in many countriesor if not the control, the strong influence of government over broadcasting diplomacy has to follow what is said in the same way that it still has to follow and
Diplomacy and radio
207
assess what is published in the press. To the diplomat, moreover, the medium of
broadcasting may present the further complication that what is transmitted
locally on short waves may have to be monitored in his home country because
he is unable to receive it at his post. Precisely in such a case, his government will
need an estimate of the intention of such a broadcast, having regard to its
timing, and this can only be obtained with full knowledge of the local situation
if the text is sent back to him in the capital from which it originated.
25. I 2.
There is great variety from country to country in the kinds of control exercised
over broadcasting. It may be wholly state controlled or, having a degree of
independence, may be subject to the influence of pressure groups within the
state, or of financial interests. A particular station may be the voice of a party,
or of a leading personality. The audiences to which broadcasts are aimed will
be various, both within and outside the country oforigin. Listenership is always
difficult to estimate, but the diplomatic observer on the spot should be able to
give to his government a fair assessment of the popularity and credibility, in
local terms, of a station or of an individual broadcaster. Such reporting and
advice is part of a diplomat's work as interpreter of the local scene and adviser
of his government. In countries where access to broadcasting systems is
permitted, the normal work of embassy press and public relations officers will
be to offer information, briefing or illustrative material with the object of
keeping perspectives true and of maintaining personal relations on a
reasonable and friendly footing.
25. 13.
In the area of polemic, propaganda and 'hard' persuasion, the participation of

diplomacy in what is said is likely to be small. Diplomatic advice should, of
course, always be available, on request, from an embassy; but gratuitous advice
will tend to be resented and those in charge of broadcasting in such an
atmosphere will follow their own judgement of where their interests lie. The
diplomat serving abroad may nevertheless find himselfdiscussing with the host
government problems arising out of individual broadcasts or themes adopted
in a series of broadcasts. The host government will tend to argue, however
improbably, that radio, like the press, is free ofcontrol by government. But in a
country where this is palpably not true, it may well be the duty ofan embassy to
remonstrate with the host government when news about the country which the
embassy represents is manifestly untrue, or comment wilfully damaging. 9 At
least in the modern age, it is no longer possible to give the old routine reply, 'the
broadcast complained of is for internal consumption only.'
BOOK III
Consular matters
Chapter 26
27

21 1
216
CHAPTER 26

26.1.
So various are the functions of a consul that there can be no precise and at the
same time universally acceptable definition of the term. It would be exact and
perhaps deceptively simple to say that he is an official appointed by a
government to perform, with the permission of another government, certain
duties in the latter's territory. His functions are carried out in the interests of the
sending government's nationals and its commerce, or in connection with the
administration of its laws. But Talleyrand observed in 1837: 'Apres avoir ete un
ministre habile, que de choses il faut encore savoir pour etre un bon consul! Car
les attributions d'un consul sont variees cl l'infini: elles sont d'un genre tout
different de celles des autres employes des affaires etrangeres. Elles exigent une
foule
de.connaissances
pratiques, pour lesquelles une education particuliere est
,
,
necessalre.
26.2.
The ancient Greek city states recognised a system by which foreigners living in
Greece were permitted to choose representatives to act as intermediaries
between them and local authority. Greek settlers in Egypt in the sixth century
BC were permitted a similar privilege. In the third centuryBc the Roman praetor
peregrinus dealt with disputes between foreigners, or between foreigners and
Roman citizens. Comparable appointments, for which the term 'consul' came
to be used, were devised in Byzantium. Their holders were authorised in the
twelfth century to deal with Venetians in Constantinople, and later with
Genoese and French. It was in Constantinople that consular work as we
understand it today had its real beginnings. At first it was for the most part a
judicial responsibility for the foreign merchant community exercised by local
residents specially appointed for the purpose. In due course consules missi, the
first of whom were probably Venetians, were appointed and sent from abroad
to perform the same function. Following the Crusades, arrangements of this
kind proved their usefulness in other parts of the Mediterranean and the Near
East, as well as in France, Spain and Italy. The function of juges consuls and
consuls marchands was to arbitrate in commercial disputes. In due course it
became customary for them to exercise criminal as well as civil jurisdiction over
merchants of their own nationality. After the fall ofConstantinople in 1453 the
Western nations continued to be allowed by the Turks to appoint consuls.
Later on, France, Genoa and Venice were able to conclude agreements with
Turkey for 'capitulations,' or terms specifying the immunities and privileges to
be enjoyed by their subjects in Turkish territory.
2 12
26.3.
In the sixteenth century consuls began to be despatched by national

governments, but as representatives of their countries on the national plane
they were soon overshadowed by diplomatic missions. Two hundred years
later, with the expansion of industry and maritime trade, the usefulness of
consular functions was reasserted. In the middle of the nineteenth century, in
the face of diplomatic pressures exerted on them by self-confident Western
nationalism, several eastern countries, notably Siam, China and Japan, went
so far as to concede the principle of extraterritoriality, and capitulations were
introduced (as had already been done in the Middle East) under which consuls
appointed by Western Powers exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction over
their own nationals. The Japanese indeed themselves acquired capitulatory
rights in other countries. Some of these capitulations survived well into the
present century, those of Britain in Turkey being terminated by the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1926 and most of the remainder by the Montreux Convention of
1937. Capitulations in China survived until 1943.
26.4.
As international law was not developing fast enough to keep pace with the
expansion of mercantile activity, the leading Western nations found it
expedient to conclude bilateral treaties to regulate their relations in trading
centres and seaports. The first modern consular treaty was that signed by the
representatives of France and Spain at the palace of El Pardo in 1769. Several
hundred others have been concluded since then; and from the nineteenth
century onwards commercial treaties have often included clauses on consular
matters. By degrees a greater uniformity was thus established in the recognition
of consular functions and privileges. Nevertheless the need has become steadily
more apparent, especially since tne Second World War, for a set of clear and
universally accepted definitions.
26.5.
The Sixth International Conference of American States, held at Havana in

1928, produced a convention on 'Consular Agents' (to be understood as
'Consuls', not 'agents' in the now currently accepted sense) for the purpose of
clarifying for the American republics 'duties, rights, prerogatives and
immunities ... in accordance with the usages and agreements on the matter.'
The Harvard Research Draft concerning the legal position and functions of
consuls (1932), by carrying out a detailed examination of the subject, provided
a useful antecedent to the Draft Provisional Articles on Consular Intercourse
and Immunities submitted in 1957 byJaroslav Zourek, as Special Rapporteur,
to the UN International Law Commission. The Commission, working on the
Zourek Report as a basis, produced Provisional Draft Articles on Consular
Intercourse and Immunities which were adopted at their Twelfth Session in
1960. Proceeding from this groundwork, the UN Conference on Consular
Relations held in 1963 drew up the Vienna Convention, I to which in due course
over seventy nations have become parties. This convention, like its counterpart
on diplomatic relations, concluded at Vienna two years previously, is now an
accepted guide to international practice, though it is far from claiming to have
said the last word on the subject. On the contrary, it points the way to
progressive development. The effect of Article 73 is to keep existing bilateral
consular treaties in force and to leave it open to the parties to the Convention to
conclude new 'international. agreements confirming or supplementing or
extending or amplifying the provisions thereof.'
13
26.6.
Consular posts can be established only with the consent of the receiving state,
whose agreement must also be obtained for their location. The existence of
diplomatic relations may be taken as implying consent to consular relations,
but this does not cover the establishment of individual posts, for each of which
separate permission must be obtained. Consular work in the capital city is in
fact often carried out by a depart ment ofthe embassy, in which diplomatic staff
are allocated to consular fune tions. In order to combine flexibility with
economy many governments have now unified their diplomatic and consular
services administratively in a single overseas service, making it possible for an
officer to receive diplomatic or consular appointments alternatively, as
circumstances may require. By the same token an officer may hold at one time
the dual ranks of minister (or counsellor) and consul-general, or of first
secretary and consul.
26.7.
The severance of diplomatic relations need not automatically cause consular

relations to be broken off. In the Crimean War the belligerents maintained
consular relations. When diplomatic relations were broken offbetween Britain
and Mexico in 1937, consular representation was retained. In a different
category is the situation where diplomatic relations have been broken off but
the maintenance of some consular representation is tolerated, even if not
officially recognised, as part of the duties of an official working under the cover
of the diplomatic mission of the protecting, or of a friendly, power. When the
Federal German Republic recognised Israel in 1965, the United Arab
Republic allowed consular relations to subsist between Bonn and Cairo, thus
enabling a number of German diplomatic staff to remain in Egypt; the United
Arab Republic also, after breaking off relations with Britain (in connection
with the Rhodesian question), allowed a British diplomat to remain in Cairo,
integrated in the offices of the Swedish representation, from which he was able
to discharge certain consular functions; and when Britain and Australia had
severed relations with the United Arab Republic after the Suez operation in
1956, some of their officials were allowed to continue to discharge consular
functions under the roof of the Canadian Embassy. Indeed it is generally
accepted that neither the retaining nor the replacing of consular officials
necessarily constitute recognition. British Consuls were retained in both
Taiwan and North Vietnam in the absence of diplomatic relations. But the
sending of new consuls, since it involves obtaining an exequatur, will imply
recognition. It is obvious also that in the absence of recognition no consular
agreement can be negotiated or invoked. The United States did not in 1962
allow the West German Consul-General to act on behalf of Germans living in
East Germany, nor the Soviet Consul to act on behalf of nationals of the
absorbed states of Esthonia and Lithuania. Large foreign minorities have at
times existed without any consular protection at all. In former French
Indochina, for instance, the Chinese community numbering about 400,000,
were formed into congregations under 'head men.' In 1930, however, the SinoFrench Convention permitted Chinese Consuls in Hanoi, Haiphong and
Saigon.
26.8.
Whether, and if so how, a consul should continue in his functions when the
government of the receiving state is succeeded by a government which the
2 I4
The appointment of cOll.\uls
sending state does not recognise is a question which must depend on the nature
and importance of the interests which it is the consul's duty to protect, and also,
of course, on the practical possibility of his being able to carry on any effective
work. This kind of problem can only be resolved according to the
circumstances of a particular situation.
26.9
Consuls belong to two broad categories: career consuls and honorary consuls.
The first contains three classes: consuls-general, consuls and vice-consuls. Career
consuls are generally nationals of the sending state and are salaried, career
government servants. They are normally debarred from gainful private
employment or occupation in the country where they are appointed. Honorary
consuls may also be appointed in any of the three classes mentioned. To this
category also belongs the consular agent, a term not universally recognised, but
by many governments equated to honorary consul. An honorary consul is
customarily a local resident in the receiving state with business interests of his
own, or some other private occupation. He may have no previous consular
experience or training. It is generally thought desirable that he should be a
national of the sending state. (However, Scandinavian countries, certain South
American countries and indeed many small states with far-flung interests
freely appoint foreign nationals in this category of post.) But ifhe is a national of
the receiving state, or of a third state, the express consent of the receiving
government is necessary for his appointment. He will in any case be expected to
perform only limited duties and will receive fees, or an expense allowance
instead of a regular government salary.2 He may be nominated by a
superintending consular post, under whose jurisdiction he will then work; and
he will be appointed by the ministry of foreign affairs.
26. I o.
Consuls are often provided by the sending state with a Commission, which is
transmitted to the government of the receiving state. This is not, however, a
universal practice. Notification of the appointment is nevertheless indispensable; and the receiving government's response is to grant their authorisation;
for without this the officer cannot take up his duties. The authorisation, ifit is a
document, is called an exequatur. It may take whatever form the usages and
regulations of the receiving state prescribe. It need not even be explicit. But its
date, or the date on which the officer is provisionally admitted to the exercise of
his functions, if this is earlier, determines his seniority in the local consular
corps. Some communist states, including certain component republics of the
USSR, require that their consent to the appointment ofa head of post should
be sought in advance, on the analogy of agrement.
26. I
I.
Members of the consular staff, other than the head of post, may be freely
appointed by the sending state, subject only to notification in advance to the
receiving government. Some governments, however, find it convenient that
members of consular staffs should also receive exequaturs. The requesting or
granting of such exequaturs, being exceptional, is a matter for bilateral
agreement, or mutual understanding.
26. I 2.
The receiving state may, upon notice of the intention to appoint a consular
officer, refuse to grant an exequatur: and if so, the sending state may enquire the
reason through the diplomatic channel though the receiving state is under no
obligation to give it. Enquiries of this kind are, however, generally considered
215
to be inadvisable, since the statement of reasons may cause friction. Moreover

the receiving state may at any time declare a consular officer to be persona non
grata, whereupon it is normal for his government to recall him. Should it fail to
do so, the receiving government may have to announce that it has ceased to
regard him as a member of the consular corps; and, as a last resort, if he has an
exequatur, withdraw it.
26.13.
The size of consular staffs is at times made the subject of bilateral agreement.
The Vienna Convention of 1963 recognises the right of the receiving state to
require that the staff be kept within limits which it considers reasonable and
normal, having regard to circumstances and to the needs of the post. A small,
new, or developing state may find it administratively embarrassing to cope
with an inflated corps of foreign officials in its territory; and if the staffs of
foreign representations proliferate without apparent reason, it is legitimate to
wonder what they are all up to. The Abyssinian Government, for instance,
voiced its objection at the League of Nations Assembly to Italy stationing a
consul with a guard ninety strong in a place where there were no Italian
nationals. It can be accepted as fair that the host state should be able to veto
appointments in excess of the number which, having due regard to
circumstances, the recognised activities of a foreign consulate require. These
circumstances will include the number of foreign residents, visitors, tourists,
businessmen, ships and so on, with which the consulate may have to deal; but
the notion (sometimes alleged in the interest of equality, or of prestige) that
parity of representation is desirable is unrealistic and irrelevant to the true
significance of consular appointments. In 1961, owing to the sharply
deteriorating diplomatic situation, the Cuban Government called upon the
United States for the mutual reduction, within forty-eight hours, ofdiplomatic
and consular staff to eleven in the respective capitals. The United States
Embassy and Consulate in Havana employed 300 and had been issuing
thousands of visas every month for entry into the United States. The Cuban
request was, however, overtaken by a general rupture of relations.
26.14.
The Vienna Convention provides that, even in the case of armed conflict, the
receiving state shall grant members of a consular post, their families,
households and private staff, not being nationals ofthe receiving state, time and
facilities, including means of transport, to prepare their departure and leave at
the earliest possible moment after the termination of their functions; and shall
also protect the consular premises, the property of the post and the consular
archives. 3 The sending state may entrust the custody of the premises, property
and archives, as well as the protection of its interests and of its nationals, to a
third state acceptable to the receiving state. It was on account of the many
uncertainties which arose in the two world wars regarding the treatment of
consuls and consular property that provisions of this kind were included by the
United Kingdom and others in their consular conventions. Honorary consuls,
although unlikely to be made responsible for secret documents, receive the
same protection in time of war as career officers; and at all times such
protection as may be required by reason of their official position. 4 But the
treatment accorded to consular agents and agencies is in general governed by
agreement between the sending and receiving states.
CHAPTER 27
Functions, privileges and

immunities of consuls
27. I.
Although the historical origins, the titles and the status of consuls are different
from those of diplomats, the distinction between the functions of consuls and
those of diplomats is not clear cut. The essential difference between diplomatic
and consular work is that whereas the diplomat does business with or through
the central government of the receiving state, the consul for the most part
conducts official business only with local or municipal authorities. The nature
of the individual consul's work varies to a much greater degree, as between
different posts, than that ofthe individual diplomatist. For example, a consul in
a busy port may do little else but shipping work; whereas in another place he
may be concerned mostly with problems arising from migrant labour, pilgrims
or tourists. Overall, however, it is the function of protection, in its broadest
sense, which is the most important consular function, whereas in the case of
diplomats the protection function is normally ofless importance than the other
major functions of negotiation with the receiving state and reporting to the
sending state. Of course a consul is concerned with the furtherance of his
country's interests and with the maintenance of satisfactory relations between
his country and others, but in practical, day-to-day working intercourse rather
than in the political sphere. His functions are thus quite often parallel to those
of the diplomatist in the embassy, but they are carried out at a different level
and in a different way.
27.2.
The distinction is perhaps most easily understood by contrasting the different

aspects of the same matter which would fall to the consular and to the
diplomatic post. If, for example, a national of the sending state is arrested, it
falls to the local consul on being notified of the arrest, to visit him in prison,
advise him how best to protect his interests, notify his relatives if he requests it,
put him in touch with a local lawyer, attend any criminal proceedings and
perhaps assist with interpretation and repatriate him ifhe finds himselfreleased
without any funds. But ifhe complains that he has been held for several months
without any charge being brought, or that he has been brutally treated by the
police and that there is no form of redress open to him, then it is likely that
the embassy will be called upon to make representations on his behalf to the
ministry of foreign affairs. If a merchant ship is detained in a local port because
the crew are refusing to work until their arrears of wages are paid, or because
the local police wish to conduct an investigation into some minor offence which
is alleged to have happened on the vessel, it is for the consul to give assistance to
try to settle the dispute, or to persuade the local authorities that proceedings in
2I7
respect of the offence can better be taken when the ship has returned to its home
port. But if such matters are causing repeated difficulty, it may be desired to
negotiate a consular or a shipping agreement between the sending and
receiving states so as to reduce difficulty in the future, and this function will be
carried out through the embassy. The diplomat protects his nationals in the
general sense or where some major issue of principle or possible breach of
international law is involved, while the consul gives protection and assistance
in the particular case.
27.3.
One distinction which was formerly made between diplomatic and consular
work is virtually obsolete. This was that the promotion of trade and commerce
between the two countries was exclusively a function of the consul. It is true
that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations describes among the
functions of a diplomatic mission the developing of 'economic' relations,
whereas Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations lists among
consular functions 'furthering the development of commercial, economic,
cultural and scientific relations.' But now that the promotion ofexports and the
development of good trading relations is essential for the economic
development of all countries, and indeed for the survival of some, a clear
distinction can no longer be drawn between 'economic' and 'commercial'
work. In general, of course, negotiation on general trading matters falls to the
embassy, while it is the consul who, in his area, will give advice to the particular
businessman who wants to meet local contacts with a view to exporting his
goods or setting up a local branch ofhis firm. (In the capital this will be done by
the commercial department of the embassy.) But where the deal is of major
national importance - for example the sale of Concordes to Iranair or Spey
engines to China from the United Kingdom - the embassy will always become
closely involved.
27.4.
From an examination of a list of traditional consular functions, such as is

contained in Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations or in
the European Convention on Consular Functions!, it can be seen that, apart
from the assisting of persons in trouble and the promotion of commercial
interests, most are basically administrative. Among the more important of
these are the issue of passports and visas or entry documents for the sending
state, the notarising of documen ts required under the law of the sending or the
receiving state, assistance with succession matters on the death of a resident or
visitor who is a national of the sending state, the transmission ofvarious kinds of
legal document such as commissions under which evidence may be taken by
courts in the receiving state for use in the sending state and the registration of
births and marriages in the receiving state of nationals of the sending state.
Many of these functions require some knowledge of certain laws of the sending
state and also of those of the receiving state, although the difficult or unusual
case may have to be referred home for instructions in the light of legal advice,
and a local lawyer may have to be consulted on the law of the receiving state.
27.5.
No comprehensive list of consular functions can be drawn up. What functions

any particular consul may perform depends on two things - the instructions he
is given by his home state and the laws of the receiving state. Consuls in certain
cases (such as the representatives exchanged between countries in the
18
Commonwealth 2) may exercise a much more limited range offunctions than is

permitted under the local law or acceptable under international law. No consul
is entitled to exercise any function which is prohibited under local law,
although it may be said that a prohibition which was so wide as to undermine
the whole basis of the consular function, such as a prohibition on protecting the
consul's own nationals, would probably lead to the breaking of consular
relations. Many states find it useful to incl ude in a bilateral consular
convention a list of permissible consular functions, but such lists are seldom
exclusive.
Consular protection
27.6.
The most important of all the functions of a consul is that which heads the list
set out in Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
'protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its
nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted
by international law.' These last words were inserted at the instance of those
states which recalled with resentment the period when the ill-treatment of
nationals of an imperial power might occasion the despatch of a gunboat or
reprisals ofa drastic kind. But they remain a useful reminder of the limits ofthe
power of a consul, who must never in his zeal to protect transgress the local law
or intervene in the internal affairs of the receiving state. Protection may involve
assisting or repatriating the destitute, settling disputes and administrative
matters arising on visiting ships belonging to the sending state, visiting
nationals in hospital if they are injured or become ill on holiday, helping
them with their arrangements, and tracing the relatives of victims of an air
disaster in the receiving state. The growth in tourism and in casual travel by the
impecunious has led to considerable increase in this kind of consular work.
Before the consul becomes involved he will of course confirm that the person
seeking assistance is one of his own nationals. Should the individual also possess
the nationality of the receiving state, the consul may assist him or make
informal representations on his behalf to the local authorities, but he is liable to
find that his right to do so is challenged. The 'effective' nationality in such
circumstances is that of the receiving state.
27.7.
The most difficult situations arise when a national of the consul's state is
arrested or imprisoned. Although customary international law entitled a
consul to have access to and communicate with his nationals, in ordinary
circumstances, it was never obligatory for the receiving state to inform the
consul if a foreign national was detained in prison; and the consul had no clear
right of access. Many states might grant access as a privilege or under their
domestic law or practice, but these were not always the states where concern for
the prisoner might be greatest. When Gerald Brooke, a London lecturer, was
arrested in Moscow on a charge of disseminating subversive literature, the
British Consul in Moscow was given access to him during his period of
imprisonment only at very long intervals. It was therefore regarded by the
British Government as of the greatest importance that the Consular
Reporting and political work
2 I9
Convention which was shortly afterwards negotiated with the Soviet Union
should contain precise provisions obliging the receiving state to notify the
consul of the arrest of one of his nationals and granting him access on a
recurrent basis. Similar provisions have since been included in the Consular
Conventions which the United Kingdom have concluded with nearly all the
countries of Eastern Europe, and they are standard also in the Consular
Conventions negotiated by the United States. In addition to the precise rights
of consular access contained in numerous bilateral consular conventions, more
general provision is contained in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations as follows:
'(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post ofthe sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular
post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded
by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;'
'(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is
in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to
arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district
in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from
taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he
expressly opposes such action.'
It should be emphasised that the consul must be informed only ifhis national,
being informed of his rights, so requests. If he prefers not to have consular
assistance - either because he wishes the fact of his arrest or imprisonment not
to become known to his own authorities or because he is a refugee from his own
country and wishes to have nothing to do with his own authorities - the consul
will not be informed.
Reporting and political work

27.8.
If the consular post is entrusted with reporting or political functions by the

sending state, these functions (which do not form part ofthe traditional consular
functions) are in ordinary circumstances exercised in a subordinate capacity to
the embassy in the capital. Reports by provincial posts are normally sent to the
ambassador and will cover any subject of interest to the embassy, whether it is
the grass roots of politics, the pattern of agricultural development or
controversy over the siting of a new research station. A report addressed to the
ambassador may be transmitted, with the embassy's comments, to the home
government. If it is addressed elsewhere, for example to the home ministry
dealing with commercial or shipping affairs, it may be sent to the embassy
under flying seal, so that the embassy are aware of its contents.
27.9.
In ordinary circumstances a consul does not exercise political functions in the

broad sense, although a specific task may be delegated to him by the embassy.
220
But there have been many occasions where the circumstances have been highly
exceptional and the consul has had perforce to assume a political role. A consul
in a remote province or a district unresponsive to the central government may
be directed to make political representation to the local civil or military
administration. Perhaps the most celebrated case ofa consul who found himself
by force of circumstances in a political role of the greatest delicacy and
importance was that ofBruce Lockhart who, originally despatched to Russia in
a consular role, remained after the Revolution and the withdrawal of the
British Embassy stafffrom Leningrad in charge of the unofficial relations which
were maintained between Britain and the new Soviet Government before
recognition was accorded in 192 1. 3 The United States, particularly because of
their reluctance to recognise regimes of which they do not approve, have often
found themselves obliged to conduct business with unrecognised regimes
through their consuls. Thus the United States Consul-General in Peking was
instructed in 1950 to communicate with the authorities ofthe Chinese People's
Republic, and in 1955 the United States Consul-General in Geneva was
directed to negotiate with the Consul-General there of the Chinese People's
Republic. 4 The Belgian Consul-General in Elizabethville (now Lubumbashi)
was instructed to talk to President Tshombe at the time of the latter's secession
from the new Republic of the Congo. 5 The assumption of a political role of
course entails the acceptance of political risks, in particular that ofexpulsion on
account of the expression of views or attitudes unacceptable to the receiving
state. A consul who continues to function where diplomatic relations are
broken, or where the authorities in his consular area are not recognised by his
government, does not necessarily assume any political functions at all.
The United Kingdom retained its consul in Taiwan for a number of years after
recognising the Government in Peking as the sole Government of China, and
this consul dealt only with the local provincial authorities and had no contact
whatsoever with the authorities of the Nationalist Government.
ProlDotional activities
27. 10.
In trade and cultural promotion and in public relations exercises the consul will
be ready to take his cue from the appropriate departments of his embassy, draw
their attention to openings for new initiative, and, at discretion, take such
initiative himself. Mr Ernest Bevin circulated an instruction to the British
Foreign Service when he was Secretary of State after the Second World War to
the effect that every member of it should regard himself as an information
officer in addition to his other capac1ties. The consul will be prepared to play a
leading role in the community of his fellow nationals in the consular district,
where he will be regarded as spokesman for his country's interests. He will
probably be an honorary member of his local chamber of commerce and he
should be familiar with the local trade associations. His office may indeed, if
circumstances permit and warrant it, contain a busy commercial section
complementing that of the embassy. He will certainly be a useful colleague for
the embassy's information officer, or press attache. And he will be ready to help
and advise, when needed, the cultural attache, or, in the British service, the
221
representative of the British Council. The consulate may con tain an information
section in the charge of an information officer with consular status. As it is
not normally permissible to set up offices forming part of the diplomatic
mission in localities other than the seat of government without the
government's express consent, it is often convenient for an information officer
in the provinces to work under the consular roof, where his status will favour
the maintenance of direct contact with the public at large.
Privileges and bnIDunities

27.1 I.
Under customary international law only the most limited immunities, and no
privileges, were accorded to consular posts and to consuls. It could broadly be
said that only those immunities were required which resulted from the rules of
sovereign immunity. Thus the archives of a consulate were generally regarded
as inviolable, but this could equally be based on their character as archives ofa
foreign sovereign state. The consul was entitled to immunity in respect of his
official acts only. Again these acts were performed as agent for a foreign state
and so sovereign rather than consular immunity required that immunity
should be accorded in respect of them. The consular premises were not treated
as inviolable, consular bags did not enjoy the inviolable status of diplomatic
bags and consuls themselves enjoyed no personal immunity and were given
taxation or customs privileges only by courtesy, if at all.
27.12.
After the Second World World War an increasing number of states began to
merge their consular and diplomatic services and to make greater use ofcareer
consuls, as opposed to honorary consuls who would be locally engaged and not
subject to posting at the discretion of the sending state. The same individuals
might therefore serve successively in a diplomatic and in a consular capacity.
States which maintained extensive consular services abroad found that they
would benefit overall from the institution of tax and customs privileges for
consuls on a reciprocal basis. The need therefore came to be felt to assimilate
career consuls more closely to diplomats and since there was no basis for this in
customary law, it was done by means of a network of bilateral consular
conventions negotiated extensively by the major states with substantial
consular services. Most consular conventions moreover also contained
important provisions regarding consular functions. The United Kingdom
negotiated a Consular Convention with the United States in 1948 and
subsequently concluded broadly similar conventions with fourteen other states,
mostly in Western Europe, before the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations was drawn up in 1963. These conventions accorded a very limited
inviolability to consular premises and gave consuls no additional immunity or
inviolability. Career consuls, however, were given fairly extensive tax and
customs privileges. Conventions negotiated later with the countries in Eastern
Europe differed in that, in order to ensure a higher degree of protection, full
diplomatic immunities and personal inviolability were conferred not only on
consuls and their families but also on junior staffand private servants and their
families.
222
27. 1 3.
These bilateral consular conventions remain of the greatest practical

importance, not only because of the provisions they contain in regard to
consular functions, but because it was expressly provided in Article 73 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that the provisions of the
Convention should not affect other international agreements in force as
between states parties to them, and would not preclude states from concluding
further agreements confirming, supplementing, extending or amplifying its
provisions. It was clear that the major states attached great importance to
continuing their bilateral arrangements and that support could not be found
for the imposition of a uniform regime without regard to these arrangements.
The network of agreements has indeed continued to grow, and for this reason
an account of the provisions of the Vienna Convention does not in most cases
provide a full answer to any question ofentitlement to privileges or immunities.
Even where both states are parties to the Vienna Convention the post must still
consult the relevant bilateral consular convention to learn the position. Where
a bilateral convention accorded a lower standard of privilege or immunity, the
United Kingdom proposed to its treaty partners that the Vienna scale of
privilege or immunity should be accorded. This was accepted by all the
other states concerned. The effect is that where the relevant bilateral
convention and the Vienna Convention differ on any point, foreign consuls in
the United Kingdom and United Kingdom consuls abroad are entitled to
claim the higher ofthe two standards. They enjoy the higher immunities set out
in the Vienna Convention and the higher tax privileges specified in the
bilateral consular conventions.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

27.14.
It would not be justifiable in a book primarily concerned with diplomatic

practice to examine the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in minute
detail. A brief account of the provisions of the Convention regarding privileges
and immunities will be given, and it will emphasise those points on which the
privileges or immunities accorded by the Vienna Consular Convention differ
from those accorded under the Vienna Diplomatic Convention. The
negotiators of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 1963 were
heavily influenced by the text of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961. Many provisions in the Consular Convention were lifted
without change from the Diplomatic Convention and where this is so, it may be
found helpful to refer back to the explanation or discussion of the same
provision in the diplomatic context.
27.15.
A basic distinction is drawn in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

between consular posts headed by a career officer and consular posts headed by
an honorary officer. Posts in the former category, which are given a status
much nearer to that of a diplomatic mission, are dealt with in Chapter II ofthe
Convention. The posts themselves are, with only two significant exceptions,
given broadly the same inviolability of premises, inviolability of archives and
documents, freedom of movement and ofcommunications, exemption from tax
223
on their premises and on the fees and charges levied in the course ofthe work as
are given under the Vienna Diplomatic Convention to diplomatic missions.
The two exceptions limit the inviolability ofconsular premises. Where there is a
fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action on the part of the
authorities of the receiving state, these authorities may assume that they have
the consent of the head of the post to enter the premises. There is no such
implied authority in the case of diplomatic premises. If expropriation of
consular premises is necessary for purposes of national defence or public utility
(for example to allow a major road to be widened), it is permissible, provided
that all possible steps are taken to avoid consular work being impeded and
provided that prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the property
expropriated is paid to the sending state. Such expropriation could not take
place in regard to diplomatic premises except with the express consent of the
sending state.
27. I b.
Career consular officers are given broadly the same privileges as are given to a
diplomatic agent under the Vienna Diplomatic Convention: exemption from
taxation subject to similar exceptions, exemption from customs duties and
inspection of personal baggage, exemption from social security obligations and
from personal, public and military service obligations. But their immunities are
much more limited than those enjoyed by diplomatic agents. Consular officers
are immune from the jurisdiction ofcourts and authorities of the receiving state
only in respect of acts performed in the exercise ofconsular functions. They are
not accorded the general immunity extending to their private acts to which
diplomatic agents are entitled. It is emphasised that a consul does not have
immunity from a civil action arising out of a contract unless the consul
contracted expressly or impliedly as agent of his own state. Nor does he have
immunity from a third-party claim for damage arising from an accident in the
receiving state caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft. It is therefore not relevant
in the case of a suit against a consul whether he was driving on duty when the
accident leading to the claim occurred. In either case he has no entitlement to
immunity.
27. 17.
A career consul does enjoy some inviolability, although more limited than that
of a diplomatic agent. The receiving state is under a duty to respect and protect
his person, freedom and dignity. Ifa criminal charge is brought against him, he
may be arrested or detained only in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a
decision by a judge or court. If he is detained pending trial, the head of the
consular post, or the sending state in the case of detention of the head of the
post, must be notified of the detention. If criminal proceedings are taken
against him he must appear, although the proceedings must be condu .:ted with
due respect to his position and so as to hinder his functions as little as possible.
The fact that he must enter an appearance before the court does not of course
prevent his claiming that he is entitled to immunity because the act in respect of
which proceedings are brought was an official act. If doubt existed whether the
act was official, the court would probably seek information from the sending
state through the diplomatic channel. If he is found guilty, and provided that
the sentence is no longer subject to appeal, he may be imprisoned. Neither his
residence nor his property have any inviolability.
224
27. I 8.
Career consular officers are not exempt from the duty to attend ifsummoned as
witnesses, although if they decline to give evidence they may not be penalised.
They are under no obligation to give evidence on official matters or to produce
official correspondence or documents, or to give evidence on the law of the
sending state.
27. I g.
Career consular employees are accorded broadly similar privileges to those

given to administrative and technical staff in a diplomatic mission. Their
immunities are, however, rigidly limited to their official acts. They enjoy no
personal inviolability whatsoever, and their immunity from jurisdiction is
limited to acts performed in the exercise ofconsular functions. They are exempt
from the obligation to give evidence on official matters.
27. 20 .
Members of the service staff in a career post are accorded only tax exemption
on their wages, exemption from social security obligations and exemption from
the obligation to perform personal or public services.
27.2 I.
Members of families in the case of a career consular post enjoy, broadly

speaking, the same privileges as the entitled member of the post, but they have
no entitlement to immunity or inviolability.
27.22.
The rules regarding waiver of privileges and immunities, and regarding the
beginning and end of privileges and immunities are virtually the same as those
which apply to diplomatic staff. There is, however, one provision which
excludes from privileges and immunities persons carrying on private gainful
occupations and which is not parallel to any provision in the Vienna
Diplomatic Convention. Consular employees or members of the service staff
who engage in private gainful occupations, together with their families and
private staff, are excluded from all privileges and immunities. Members of
families who themselves engage in private gainful occupations suffer a similar
exclusion. Consular officers who are nationals or permanent residents of the
receiving state are excluded from all privileges and immunities except for
immunity fromjurisdiction and inviolability in regard to official matters. Their
families, other members of the post who are nationals or permanent residents of
the receiving state and their families, as well as members of families and
members of private staffs who are themselves nationals or permanent residents
of the receiving state, are excluded from all entitlement to privileges or
immunities.
27.23.
Chapter III of the Vienna Convention deals with honorary consular officers
and with posts headed by such officers. These posts are given very limited
privileges and immunities. Their premises are not inviolable, although some
obligation is imposed on the receiving state to protect them from intrusion,
damage or impairment of dignity. The premises are given tax exemption
provided that they are owned or leased by the sending state. Inviolability of
consular archives is conditional on their being kept separate from the consul's
private and business papers. Only specified articles for office use, and similar
articles, are entitled to exemption from customs duty: it is clear that alcohol and
other consumables for official entertainment by an honorary post are not to be
imported free of duty. Freedom of movement and freedom of communications
are accorded as to a post headed by a career officer.
27.24.
225
Honorary consuls are given the same limited immunity from jurisdiction as
career consuls. They are not entitled to any personal inviolability although
certain courtesies are to be extended to them by reason of their official position.
If proceedings are instituted against them, they must be conducted with respect
and so as to hinder consular functions as little as possible. Their privileges are
limited to tax exemption on their official emoluments and exemption from
personal and public services. Their families are accorded no privileges or
immunities. If the consuls or their families are nationals or permanent residents
of the receiving state - and this is nearly always the case - they are excluded
from almost all privileges and immunities on the same basis as career consuls
and their families. It may be said in general that the Vienna Convention has
not increased the status of honorary consuls and their posts above what was
accorded under customary international law. It is only career consuls and their
posts whose status has been elevated by the Convention.
BOOK IV
International
transactions
Chapter 28
29
33

Treaties and other international instruments - I General
definition
Treaties and other international instruments - 11 Pact,
Constitution, Charter, Statute, Regulations, Concordat,
Additional Articles
Treaties and other international instruments - III Act,
General Act, Final Act, Modus Vivendi,
Compromis d' Arbitrage
Treaties and other international instrument IV Ratification, Accession, Acceptance and Approval
Treaties and other international instruments V Reservations, Notice of Termination and Registration
CHAPTER 28
Congresses and
conferences
1
28.1.
From the point of view of international law there is no essential difference

between congresses and conferences. Both are meetings of plenipotentiaries for
the discussion and settlement of international affairs; both include meetings for
the determination of political questions, and for the treatment of matters of a
social or economic order. The term 'congress' has in the past been more
frequently applied to assemblies of plenipotentiaries for the conclusion of peace
and the redistribution of territory which in most cases is one of the conditions of
peace, as e.g., the Congress ofVienna (1814-15) after the Napoleonic Wars, the
Congress of Paris (1856) after the Crimean War, and the Congress of Berlin
(1878) for the settlement of affairs in the East, following the Russo-Turkish
War; but sometimes it has been 'conference,' as, for instance, the Conference on
the Affairs of Greece, held in London (1827-32) the Conference of London
(1830-3) after the revolt of Belgium, the Conferences of London (1912-13) to
arrange terms of peace between Turkey and the Allied Balkan States, and the
Paris Peace Conferences of 1919 and 1946-7. At the Congress of Paris (1856)
the assemblage began by styling itself a conference, and then, apparently
without discussion of its title, assumed the name of 'congress.' At the present
day the term 'conference' is habitually used to describe all international
assemblages in which matters come under discussion with a view to settlement. 2
28.2.
Conferences may be bilateral or multilateral; planned for the discussion ofone

subject or a number of subjects. They may be designed to provide an exchange
of information, o"to make non-binding recommendations to governments, or
to reach decisions which will be binding on governments. Their purpose may
be to negotiate and draft a treaty.
28.3.
In earlier times congresses were ordinarily held at a neutral spot, or at some

place expressly neutralized for the purpose of the meeting. There were often
mediators, who presided over the discussions, whether carried on orally or in
writing. Before the dissol ution ofthe Holy Roman Empire in 1806 the principal
representative of the Emperor discharged the functions of president. In the
nineteenth century congresses and conferences were mostly held at the capital
of one of the Powers concerned, and then the chancellor or minister for foreign
affairs of that Power usually presided. On these occasions, besides the specially
deputed plenipotentiaries, the local diplomatic representatives of the
respective Powers were also appointed.
28.4.
The place of meeting of an international conference may be determined in
230
Congresses and
co'~ferences
various ways. Sometimes it is the capital of the state which proposes this means
ofadjusting the questions at issue; or, it may be, that of the state most concerned
in their settlement. Sometimes it is chosen as a convenient centre for all parties
to meet; or to enable discussions to be carried on in a neutral atmosphere. In the
case of a multilateral treaty about to undergo revision, it may be determined by
the place of the former meeting, by a provision in the treaty itself or by an
understanding reached at the previous conference.
Invitations to a conference
28.5.
Invitations to a conference are usually preceded by an exchange of views

between the governments concerned, or at any rate those chiefly affected; and
in the case of a conference for the conclusion of peace, normally by the
conclusion of preliminaries of peace or an armistice between the belligerents. It
is always desirable, wherever possible, that the scope of the intended conference
should be determined beforehand, so as to provide a definite basis for the
discussions. Failure to reach an agreement has sometimes resulted from want of
due initial preparation, and a preliminary step should be the formulation of a
programme of the matters which are to be brought under discussion with a
view to arriving at a settlement.
28.6.
Ordinarily the invitations to a conference are issued by the government of the

state wherein it is to be held, but cases may, of course, occur in which another
government does so, after the consent of the former has been given to the
conference being held in its territory. Thus, though the idea of a conference
may be initiated by another government, or by an international organisation,
it is normal for the host government to assume for practical purposes the
responsibilities of sponsor and convener; and any government that does so will
consider carefully the reasons which justify its involvement. Quite apart from
any political considerations, the problems of finance, location and accommodation may prove unexpectedly formidable, and the task of detailed advance
planning may occupy many months. It is usual to issue the invitations
accompanied by a draft of the proposed rules of procedure, specifying among
other things the expected composition ofdelegations and the type ofcredentials
required; the arrangements for observers, the keeping of records, translation,
open and closed meetings; and the working languages and system of voting to
be used. At the same time the opportunity will be given for governments
intending participation to contribute suggestions for the composition of the
agenda, a final draft of which will need to be in the hands of prospective
delegations considerably in advance of the date of the conference. All this
presupposes the appointment of a secretariat on which the administrative work
of the conference is to fall.
Representatives
28.7.
Normally in the case of conferences of non-political or semi-political
Languages at conferences
23 I
character, diplomatic representatives are appointed as chief delegates (or

plenipotentiaries), assisted sometimes by others; or the delegates may be
officials or persons having special knowledge of the subject or subjects to be
discussed. The importance of the occasion will determine the numbers of their
delegations, which often include officials or persons having necessary legal or
technical qualifications, secretaries, translators, etc. If there is more than one
plenipotentiary for a state, the senior is usually designated as first
plenipotentiary or leader of the delegation, and he and the others will sit
together as a group. If the agenda ranges over a wide field, the staff may
amount to a considerable number of persons, more especially on the part of the
host, or receiving, state. At the Washington Conference of 1921 -2 on the
Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern questions, the four
plenipotentiaries of the United States were assisted by an advisory committee
of twenty-one persons: a secretariat ofsixteen persons; for ceremonial, protocol,
etc. five persons. There was a technical staff of twenty for the limitation of
armament; a staff on chemical warfare, consisting of a professor of chemistry
and officers of the army and navy; a staff of sixteen on Pacific and Far Eastern
questions; a staff of four for legal questions; a staffof two on economic questions
and merchant marine; a staff offour civilians and officers ofthe army and navy
on communications; two cartographers; two officers for press work; one for
archives; one disbursing officer; and two editors.
28.8.
Plenipotentiaries at an international conference are, as their name implies,

delegates who have been furnished with full powers 3 from the head of the state
or the government they represent, empowering them to take part in the
negotiations, and to conclude, subject if necessary to ratification, any treaty
instrument which may result from the deliberations. Where a state appoints
more than one plenipotentiary, full powers may be issued to each, or, on the
other hand, their names may be included in a single document, authorising
them to act jointly or severally. The names of plenipotentiaries should be
communicated in advance to the government of the state wherein the
conference is to be held. If they have to traverse a third state on their journey
thither, it may be desirable to advise the government of that state of their
intended mission.
28.9.
Credentials for delegates without full powers, and for other members of
delegations, usually take the form ofa letter from the head ofthe department of
the sending government, giving their names, style or title and functions. A
distinction is made between delegates who are the direct representatives of
their governments and participants who may represent other bodies.
Languages at conferences
28.10.
Before the First World War, the language employed at an international

conference was usually French, but, between the two world wars, there was a
growing tendency to use English also. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919
and the Washington Conference of 192 I -2, both English and French were
232
officially used. At League of Nations conferences both French and English had
equal validity. Where a limited number of states take part, the language ofone
or other of them is sometimes adopted as the official language, in which texts
and resolutions are published, but several languages may be used as 'working
languages' for discussions and for certain subsidiary documents. The current
tendency at conferences which are not limited to one region, is for English to be
the most widely used language, but normally at least one other language is also
employed. The development of modern equipment providing simultaneous
interpretation of speeches has made the use of two or more languages much
easier. 4 The choice of equipment and the lay-out (which will have security
implications) require up-to-date expert advice. Some organisations bring their
own interpreters. Otherwise the host is expected to provide them. The
standards of simultaneous interpretation, which has always had a few
exponents of legendary skill, is nowadays generally high. The International
Associations of Interpreters and of Translators, both with headquarters in
Paris, have helped to bring this about.
The president of a conference

28.1 I.
The president of an international conference is usually, but not always, the

principal representative of the country in which it is held, if that country is a
participant. Often he is the minister for foreign affairs. His election may be
moved by the representative of the country which comes first in alphabetical
order, or by the doyen d'age, or sometimes by some other specially chosen for the
occaSIon.
28.12.
The functions of the president of an international conference are to open the

proceedings by a speech setting forth the purposes and objects of the
conference; to name the members of the secretariat, previously agreed to
informally by the representatives in general; to direct the course of the
discussions throughout the continuance of the conference; and ultimately to
declare the conference closed. At the final meeting it is customary to propose a
vote of thanks to him for his services.
Precedence
28.13.
Precedence among the plenipotentiaries is customarily determined by the

alphabetical order in English of the states represented, unless some other order
is agreed upon. Traditionally, the order in which they sat was alternately to the
right and to the left of the president. The seating, however, may vary as a result
of a number of factors such as the accommodation available and the relations
between the participants in the conference. It is common practice now for the
seating to be arranged in alphabetical order, starting normally from the right of
the President. Which delegation occupies the first place on the right of the
President may be determined by arrangement or by lot. At a peace conference
the representatives of the belligerent states may fall into two opposite groups.
Procedure
233
Procedure
28.14.
Where, as often happens, committees are set up to discuss particular items on

the agenda, these in turn appoint a chairman, frame if necessary rules of
procedure, and in addition to a secretary or secretaries, often appoint a
'rapporteur,' to prepare the report to be furnished to the plenary body. Subcommittees may be formed from the members of a committee to deal with
special points arising, and these in turn report to the committee. Apart from the
main work of discussion, a small committee to examine the full powers 5 of the
representatives is desirable, and a drafting committee to prepare the text of the
treaty instrument resulting from the work of the conference is nearly always
necessary.
28.15.
When a 'rapporteur' is appointed by a committee which has been charged with

the discussion ofa particular subject, he mayor may not be also the chairman of
the committee; and his functions as 'rapporteur' are to summarise the
discussions in the form of a report, showing the concl usions arrived at by the
committee in the matter. This report, which is first submitted to the members of
the committee, is then communicated by him to the plenary body, and he is the
mouthpiece of the committee in placing their decision before that body. And
similarly in the case of a sub-committee which has been appointed to report to
the committee itself.
28.16.
Plenary meetings of the whole body of representatives take place from time to
time as the work proceeds. The first plenary meeting is of an introductory
character, for the election of president, naming of the secretariat, framing of the
lines on which the conference is to be organised, the appointment of
committees, etc. Thereafter plenary meetings are held, as may be required, to
receive and consider the reports of the committees. In a typical case, where the
results ofthe discussions are embodied in a treaty, and where the issues involved
are free from special difficulties, the successive stages might, for instance, be: a
first reading of the draft treaty prepared; followed by a further reading, should
modifications have been proposed and referred back to the committees; and
then a final reading of a formal character, at which the finished result would be
submitted for the signatures of the plenipotentiaries.
28.17.
At all important conferences care should be devoted to the preparation of a

record of the proceedings. It used to be the practice for minutes (proces-verbal) to
be prepared by the secretary or secretaries on the occasion of each sitting,
setting forth the date, hour and place of meeting, the names of the plenipotentiaries and their staffs, and the states represented. This would be
followed by a statement of the deliberations carried on and the conclusions
reached, and the hour at which the sitting closed. There would also be attached
any draft proposals which might have come under consideration, declarations
made, etc. The minutes would be signed by all the plenipotentiaries present,
and usually by the president and secretary-general or secretaries. Sometimes it
was read at the following sitting and adopted, but it was more usual first to
submit proofs to the plenipotentiaries for any necessary amendments, in which
case, the president would state the fact of agreement at the next sitting and
pronounce its adoption, whereupon it would be signed. The original would be
234
preserved by the government of the state in which the conference was held,
which would supply copies to the representatives ofthe others. 6 In recent years,
practice has become both less regular and less formal. There is generally a
verbatim record, either stenographic or taped, from which the secretariat are
responsible for producing, often under the supervision of a rapporteur, a
summary record for circulation to delegations. Participants may be given
an opportunity of altering wording in the summary, but not the sense.
Adoption of records by the conference and their signature by the president are
unusual, although they are normally submitted to plenipotentiaries before
being drawn up in final form by the secretary-general or secretaries, whose
signatures may then be added. Drafts, declarations, etc. are often circulated as
conference documents and are not always appended to the daily record of
proceedings.
28. I 8.
In modern practice, the signatures to a treaty, drawn up at the conclusion of a

conference as the outcome ofits deliberations, are appended in the alphabetical
order of the states represented. But in the case ofa treaty of peace the signatories
on each side may be classed separately, as in the Treaty of Versailles and other
treaties of peace resulting from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. At the
conclusion of the Second World War a different order was followed. For
example, the Peace Treaty with Italy was signed first by the five Great Powers,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United
States of America, China and France (in that order), then by the other Allied
and Associated Powers, in English alphabetical order, starting with Australia
and ending with Yugoslavia, and finally by Italy.
28. I 9.
In the past a great deal of the work of a congress or conference might relate to
the nice adjustment of matters of ceremonial and precedence. At the Congress
of Nijmegen (1676-9) it is recorded that on the signature of the treaty of peace
between France and Spain, two copies of the treaty having been prepared, one
in French and the other in Spanish, and laid on the table at which sat the
English mediators, the three French plenipotentiaries entered by one door at
the same moment as the three Spanish plenipotentiaries entered at the other;
they sat down simultaneously in exactly similar armchairs, and signed both
copies respectively at the same instant.
28.20.
The question may arise regarding the states to be admitted to take part in a
conference. Of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Professor Temperley
says:
'The first question was to decide what Powers were to be represented at the
conference, and what number of plenipotentiaries were to be allowed to each. It was
finally determined to admit all those who had declared war on, or had broken off
relations with, Germany, though the neutrals were to be allowed to take part in
discussions which affected their special interests. '7
Since the Second World War, the question ofthe composition ofa conference is
one that has frequently arisen. For example, in the Berlin Communique of 18
February 1954, detailed provisions were made for the composition of the
Geneva Conference. 8
The secretary
235
The secretary
28.2 I.
The principal secretary at a conference is usually an official of the country in

which it is held, if that country is a participant, and the other members of the
secretariat are also often furnished by it, supplemented, it may be, by others
drawn from among the suites of the various representatives. The secretariat
comes under the control and authority of the president of the conference, and
while its main duties are the preparation of the official records of the
conference, they comprise also the arrangement of all matters of routine, and
such other duties as may be assigned to it. Translations of speeches and
documents are often required, and communications may have to be issued to
the media. In the case of conferences held under the auspices of the United
Nations or one of its Specialised Agencies, the necessary services are normally
provided by the secretariat of the United Nations or the Specialised Agency.
The bureau in which these activities are carried on is placed under the
guidance of the president and vice-presidents, assisted by the secretary-general
of the conference.
28.22.
The proceedings of the conference, and the results arrived at, are on important
occasions sometimes recorded in a Final Act, more especially when these results
are embodied in a number of treaty instruments, the titles of which are set out,
with, it may be, certain voeux or recommendations, in the Final Act, which is
presented for signature by the plenipotentiaries at the last meeting of the
conference. 9
Note. - Lists of the more important congresses and conferences from the
middle of the seventeenth century onwards were given in the second edition
of this work; and in his further treatise, International Congresses, the late Sir
E. Satow dealt more fully with those held since the beginning of the last
century. None of this material is included in the present edition. But in view of
certain peculiarities with regard to the way in which the respective Peace
Treaties were negotiated and drawn up by the Paris Peace Conference of 1946,
the Japanese Peace Conference of 195 I and the Geneva Conference of 1954,
the notes on them which appeared in the Fourth Edition have been retained
and are reprinted (omitting the list of representatives at Geneva) in Appendix
11 of this book.
CHAPTER 29
Treaties and other

international instruments
-I General definition
29. I.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which was opened for
signature on 2 5 May 1969, defines the term 'treaty' for the purposes of the
Convention as meaning 'an international agreement concluded between States
in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation. q McNair uses the term 'treaty' to denote 'a written
agreement by which two or more States or international organisations create or
intend to create a relation between themselves operating within the sphere of
internationallaw.'2 At a higher level ofgenerality, Reuter proposes a definition
of the term 'treaty' in the following sense: 'une manifestation de volonh~s
concordantes imputables cl deux ou cl plusieurs sujets de droit international et
destinee cl produire des dIets de droit selon les regles de droit international.'3
Particular aspects of general definition

I.
29. 2 .
Agreements involving international organisations and oral agreements
It is thus apparent that there is no single, all embracing definition of the term
'treaty'. The Vienna Convention definition deliberately excludes international
agreements concluded between states and international organisations or
between international organisations themselves 4 and equally excludes international agreements not in written form. The International Law Commission
which prepared draft articles on the law of treaties as a basis for the work of
progressive development and codification represented by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, explained that its proposed definition of
the term 'treaty' (incorporated without change into the Vienna Convention)
was 'not ... in any way intended to deny that other subjects of international
law, such as international organisations and insurgent communities may
conclude treaties': similarly the Commission made it clear that the restriction
of the term 'treaty' to international agreements expressed in writing was 'not
intended to deny the legal force of oral agreements under international law. '5
The McNair definition goes wider than the Vienna Convention by covering
international agreements between states and international organisations or
between international organisations themselves, but again his definition
excludes agreements not in written form. This is not to say that McNair denies
Particular aspects of general definition
237
the legal force of oral agreements. Indeed, he specifically admits that, though it
is rare to find an oral agreement between states, 'it cannot be asserted that
international law regards writing as essential to the creation of an interstate
agreement. '6 In this context, he cites the judgement of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case in 1933, when
the Court had to consider the legal significance of an oral declaration made by
the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs (M. Ihlen) to the Danish Minister
accredited to the Norwegian Government. The Court concluded:
'... that a reply of this nature given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his
Government in response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign
Power, in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the country to
which the Minister belongs.'7
Much more recently, the International Court ofJustice has again had occasion
to consider the extent to which oral declarations made by a head of state, a
minister for foreign affairs or another government minister may give rise to a
commitment binding on the state concerned. In the. Vuclear Tests case (Australia
v. France) in 1974, the Court attributed special weight to a series of statements
made by the President of the French Republic, the French Minister ofDefence
and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequent to the oral proceedings
in the case; these statements, according to the Court, indicated the intention of
France to cease the conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests following the
conclusion of the 1974 series of tests. In analysing the legal significance of these
statements, the Court stated the following:
'With regard to the question ofform, it should be observed that this is not a domain in
which international law imposes any special or strict requiremen.ts. Whether a
statement is made orally or in writing makes no essential difference, for such statements
made in particular circumstances may create commitments in international law, which
does not require that they should be couched in written form.'8
293
For present purposes, one can ignore the special cases of international
agreements not in written form, and international agreements between states
and international organisations or between international organisations
themselves. But several other features common to the three definitions already
given warrant further analysis.
2.
29.4
Requirement that agreement should operate in sphere of international law
There is first the requirement that the agreement should be 'governed by

international law,' or should operate 'within the sphere of international law,'
or should be intended to produce legal effects 'selon les regles de droit
international.' This serves to distinguish a 'treaty' from other agreements
which, although concluded between states or other subjects of international
law, are regulated not by international law but by the national law ofone ofthe
parties (or by some other national law system chosen by the parties). An
example would be a state contract concluded between the Government of
Ruritania and the Government of Utopia, whereby the latter agreed to sell to
the former 1000 tons of meat upon the basis ofa standard form ofcontract used
238
Treaties - 1
in the meat trade. Such a contract would not be a treaty and would not be
governed by international law but by the terms of the contract itself
supplemented, where necessary, by general principles of law. 9 Other
transactions of a private law nature, such as leases of land and buildings and
loan agreements, may also be entered into between states; in such cases, it may
be difficult to determine whether the parties intended the transaction to be
governed by international law, or by general principlesoflaw, or by a particular
system of national law. IQ
3. Questions of form and terminology
29.5.
There is, secondly, the question of form, which is linked with the question of
terminology. The Vienna Convention definition makes it clear that a 'treaty'
covers not only international agreements which take the form ofa single formal
instrument, but also international agreements which take the form of related
instruments such as exchanges of Notes or exchanges of letters. The genus of
agreements connoted by the term 'treaty' is therefore a wide one. The term
'treaty' may be taken to cover all international engagements concluded
between states and governed by international law, whatever designation may
be given to the written instrument or series ofwritten instruments in which such
engagements are embodied. The term accordingly covers those written
instruments or series of instruments designated as a treaty, convention,
agreement, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act, declaration, concordat,
exchange of Notes, exchange of letters, modus vivendi and, depending upon the
intention of the parties, agreed minutes and memoranda of understanding. 11
As the Permanent Court ofInternationalJustice stated in its Advisory Opinion
concerning the Customs Regime between Germany and Austria:
'From the standpoint of the obligatory character of international engagements, it is
well known that such engagements may be taken in the form of treaties, conventions,
declarations, agreements, protocols or exchanges of notes" 2
The terminology employed to describe treaty instruments has rightly been

characterised as 'confusing, often inconsistent, unscientific and in a perpetual
state of flUX.'13 But it would appear that the most frequently utilised
designations for treaty instruments are agreements, exchanges of Notes,
conventions, treaties, protocols and declarations. 14
29. 6 .
In this chapter, it is proposed to deal with these six types of treaty instrument
(although not in the order given), and in Chapters 30 and 3 1 with various other
types of treaty instrument which fall within, or may fall within, the general
definition of the term 'treaty' (e.g. Pact, Constitution, Charter, Statute,
Regulation, Concordat, Additional Articles, Act, General Act, Final Act,
Modus Vivendi and Compromis d' Arbitrage).
4 Instruments not intended to embody legally binding obligations
29.7
But, first, it must be borne in mind that not all instruments of an international
character are intended to have an 'obligatory character.' For instance, no
legal obligations were incurred as the result of the Atlantic Charter of 14
August 1941, in which the then President ofthe United States (Mr Franklin D.
Treaties
239
Roosevelt) and the then Prime Minister (Mr Winston Churchill), representing
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, issued aJoint Declaration
stating that 'being met together' they deemed it right 'to make known certain
common principles in the national policies oftheir respective countries in which
they base their hopes for a better future for the world.' Similarly, it would
appear from the internal evidence that the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe 15 is not considered to amount to a treaty.
The Government of Finland is requested to transmit the text ofthe Final Act to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to its circulation to all
members of the organisation as an official document ofthe United Nations; but
it is specifically stated that the Final Act' is not eligible for registration under
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations,' and, as Article 102 of the
Charter requires the registration of every treaty and every international
agreement entered into by any member of the United Nations, it must be
presumed that the states participating in the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) and signing the Final Act did not consider
that they were subscribing to a treaty instrument. 16
29. 8 .
It would also seem that the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948, is not
legally binding since it was made clear that those countries voting in favour of
the Declaration would assume no legal obligations thereby. 17
Treaties
29.9.
Of those international instruments which are clearly intended to have an

'obligatory' or binding character, the most significant are those which bear the
designation 'treaty'. The word 'treaty' is of course derived from the French
word traiter, which means to negotiate. The comment to Article 1 of the
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties states that 'in the literature
of diplomacy and international law the term "treaty" is employed in both a
general and a restricted sense.' In the general sense, it 'embraces a great variety
of instruments to many ofwhich other names than "treaty" are given, although
there is seldom ifever any juridical distinction between them.' The definition of
the term 'treaty' in the Vienna Convention is of course based on this general
sense. But the designation 'treaty' in the restricted sense refers to the formal
instrument of agreement by which two or more states establish or seek to
establish a relation under international law between themselves; and it is this
restricted sense of the term 'treaty' which must now be considered.
Z9 1O
Generally speaking (although exceptions can no doubt be found) the

designation 'treaty' is reserved for international agreements of a particularly
significant character, for example, treaties of peace or alliance. The
designation 'treaty' may also be em,ployed to mark the political importance of
the particular international agreement - as, for example, the North Atlantic
Treaty of 4 April 1949,18 the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community of 18Apri11951, 19 the Treaty establishing the European Economic
240
Treaties - I
Community of 25 March 1957,:w the Treaty establishing the European Atomic

Energy Community of 25 March 1957,21 and the Treaty concerning the
Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community of 22
January 1972.22 Myers states that the treaty 'is the most formal instrument of
the genus, used to record comprehensive inter-state agreement upon
fundamental relations or status;' but he rightly goes on to say that 'the treaty eo
nomine is less used than formerly because the increased amount of negotiation
necessitated by the volume and complexity of relations, the amount of routine
business, and changes in governmental character have multiplied other more
convenient and speedy forms.'23
29. I
I.
Formerly, treaties in the restricted sense were always concluded between heads
of state; but modern practice demonstrates that treaties can be concluded in
heads of state form, in interstate form or in intergovernmental form. The choice
of form may depend in part on the political importance ofthe treaty and in part
on the constitutional requirements of the contracting parties; otherwise it is not
possible to discern any general principle governing the choice between these
forms, although the following illustrations of practice may be given.
29. I 2.
Treaties between heads of state are still concluded. The treaties establishing the
three European Communities are cast in this fonn, as (to take but a few examples
from United Kingdom practice) are the Treaty on Merchant Navigation between
the United Kingdom and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics of9 April 1968;24
the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and
France concluded at Dunkirk on 4 March 1947;25 the Extradition Treaty between
the United Kingdom and Austria of 9 January 1953, with amending Protocol of
15 January, 1969;26 and the Consular Convention between the United Kingdom
and the Polish People's Republic of 23 February 1967.27
29. I 3.
A treaty concluded in heads of state form can be broken down into the
following parts:
The preamble (narratio) beginning with (a) the names and titles of the High
Contracting Parties; (b) a summary of the object and purpose of the treaty; (c) the
names and official designations of the plenipotentiaries appointed by the High
Contracting Parties; (cl) a paragraph stating that the plenipotentiaries have
produced their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, and that
they have agreed upon the following articles.
2. The various substantive articles of the treaty (dispositio) which may begin with a
definitions article and will then normally be followed by general provisions, more
specific provisions and, finally, those provisions, ifany, which lay down the means of
executing the general and specific provisions. 28
3. A series of articles generally known as the 'final clauses' (corroboratio) which deal with
such matters as the extent of application of the treaty (whether ratione loci or ratione
temporis), signature, ratification accession, entry into force and duration. In the case of
a multilateral treaty, there may also be a reservations article. The provision for ratification usually mentions the place for the exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, whilst the clause dealing with duration may specify that the treaty shall remain
in force for a fixed number of years and shall thereafter continue in force until the expiry of six months' (or a year's) notice of tennination given by one party to the other.
I.
Conventions
24 I
4. A clause (testimonium) stating 'In witness whereof ... ('En foi de quoi ... ') the
respective plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures and seals.'
5. Locality and date ('Done at ... the ... day of. .. , 19 ...').
6. Seals and signature.
29. 14.
Treaties between states (that is to say, in interstate form) are now much more
frequent. The North Atlantic Treaty of4 April 1949, the Treaty of Peace with
Italy of 10 February 1947,29 the Treaty of Peace with Japan of8 September
195 I 30 and the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty of 8 September
1954 31 were all concluded between states rather than between heads of states.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of I July 1968, is
another example of a recent multilateral treaty concluded in interstate form.
Recent bilateral treaties concluded by the United Kingdom in interstate form
include the Treaty of Friendship with Bahrain of 15 August 197 1,32 the Treaty
of Friendship with Qatar of 3 September 197 I 33 and the Treaty of Friendship
with the United Arab Emirates of 2 December 197 I .34
29 I 5
Treaties between states are rather less formal than treaties between heads of
states. 35 In place of the term 'High Contracting Parties', the expression
'Contracting Parties' or 'Contracting States' (or sometimes simply 'the Parties'
or 'the States Parties') is used. The preamble may also be reduced in length by
the omission of one or other of the formal elements usual in the preamble of a
treaty concluded between heads ofstates. It is, however, customary, even in the
case of a treaty between states, to retain in the preamble a statement of the
object and purpose of the treaty.
29. I 6.
Treaties between governments are also less formal. The parties normally refer
to themselves as the 'Contracting Governments' or the 'Contracting Parties',
although occasionally one may come across the use of such terms as 'Signatory
Governments' or 'Participating Governments'. Again, however, the preamble
will usually contain a statement of the object and purpose of the treaty.
Conventions
29. I 7.
The designation 'convention' tends to be utilised for multilateral treaties of a

law-making type. Illustrative of this tendency are the various Hague
Conventions emanating from the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences
(of 1899 and 1907, respectively) and the various conventions concluded since
the Second World War as a result ofthe process of progressive development and
codification of international law being pursued within the framework ofArticle
13 of the United Nations Charter. Examples of modern (or fairly modern)
codification conventions of this nature are the Geneva Conventions on the Law
of the Sea of 1958,36 the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18
April, 196 1,37 the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April,
1963,38 the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of23 May, 1969/9 the
Convention on Special Missions of8 December, 196940 and the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 14 December 1973. 41 Many lawmaking treaties concluded under the auspices of the League ofNations are also
242
Treaties - I
designated as conventions-for example, the Barcelona Conventions of 1921

and the Slavery Convention of 1926. Law-making or regulatory treaties
concluded under the auspices of one or other of the Specialised Agencies of the
United Nations will also normally take the form of conventions: examples are
the Hague Convention for the Suppression ofUnlawful Seizure ofAircraft of 16
December 1970,42 and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
U nlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 23 September 1971,43
(both negotiated within the framework of ICAO) and the series of pollution
conventions recently concluded within the framework of the International
Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO). Treaties which are constitutive of
international unions of a technical character may also take the form of
conventions - for example, the Universal Postal Convention, the International
Telecommunications Convention and the various conventions for the
protection of intellectual property negotiated within the framework of the
Berne Union. As Myers says,44 'the great bulk of agreements reached under
the auspices of international organisations is in the form of conventions which
deal specifically with restricted phases of questions deemed ripe for handling.'
29.18.
However, it must not be thought that the designation 'convention' is used only
for multilateral treaties of a law-making (or normative) type. The designation
is also used for a wide range of bilateral treaties - for example, consular
conventions, double taxation conventions and conventions for the reciprocal
enforcement of judgements.
29.19.
As with treaties in the restricted sense, conventions may be concluded between

heads of state, between states and between governments.
AgreelDents
29.20.
The term 'agreement', like the term 'treaty' itself, is used in a number ofsenses.
In a generic sense, it covers any meeting of minds - in this case, the minds oftwo
or more international persons. But, as has already been stated, a distinction
must always be drawn between agreements intended to have an obligatory
character and agreements not intended to have such a character. In its
restricted sense, the term 'agreement' means an agreement intended to have an
obligatory character, but usually of a less formal or significant nature than a
treaty or convention. Like treaties and conventions, agreements in this
restricted sense may be concluded between heads of state, between states, or
between governments.
29.21.
The treaty instrument in the form of an 'agreement' is, as it were, the

workhorse of the treaty-maker. While it can be used for multilateral treaties for example, the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty of 19 June 195145 - it is more commonly used for
bilateral treaties of a fairly routine nature. Examples drawn from recent
United Kingdom practice are the Agreement with the German Democratic
Republic on the Development of Economic, Industrial, Scientific and
Technological Cooperation of 18 December 1973,46 the Agreement between
Protocols
243
the United Kingdom, Norway and the Soviet Union on the Regulation of the
Fishing of North-East Arctic (Arcto-Norwegian) Cod of 15 March 1974,47 the
Agreement with the Soviet Union on Cooperation in the field of Environmental Protection of 21 May 1974,48 the Agreement with Indonesia on certain
Commercial Debts of 4 October 1972,49 the Agreement with Denmark relating
to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the two Countries of 25
November 1971,50 the Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany
relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea
between the two Countries of 25 November 1971, SI the Agreement with
Denmark on the International Carriage of Goods by Road of 29 June 197 2 ,52
the Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards of 14 December 1972,53 the Trade Agreement with
Mongolia of 21 March 1973,54 the Cooperation Agreement with Czechoslovakia of 8 September 1972,55 and the Agreement with Indonesia for Air
Services between and beyond their respective Territories of 28 June 1973. 56 It
may be noted here that bilateral treaties concluded between the United
Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries usually take the form of
'agreements' and are expressed to be concluded as between governments rather
than as between heads of state or as between states.
29.22.
The designation 'agreement' is accordingly given to a treaty which is in the

form of a single instrument and which generally differs from a 'convention' in
that it deals with a narrower or less permanent subject-matter. 57 Sometimes
agreements are concluded between a government department in one country
and a government department in another. It depends on the circumstances
whether such 'interdepartmental agreements' are binding under international
law or whether they are merely private law contracts. 58
Protocols
29.23.
The term 'protocol' derives from the Low-Latin protocollum, itselfderiving from
a word in the original Greek meaning the 'first glued-in' to a book - that is to
say, a summary or digest of the contents. In diplomacy, it gradually came to
mean the register in which the minutes of a conference were held. It is, of
course, also employed in diplomacy to signify the forms to be observed in the
official correspondence of the minister for foreign affairs and in the drafting of
diplomatic documents such as treaties, full powers, letters of credence and
recall, etc. Finally, it has come also to embrace the concept ofsomething which
is added to a treaty in order to perfect or complete the treaty. The word
'protocol' may accordingly, depending upon the context in which it is used,
signify 'an addition to a treaty, a summary of official proceedings or a
technique of the proper method of doing things, including official etiquette. '59
In this last very broad sense, the word will, of course, cover such matters as
protecting sensitive national dignities on major occasions and the practical
arrangement of the most informal occasions where there might well be
difficulties if no rules existed. 60
244
Treaties - I
29.24.
When used in the sense of a treaty instrument, the designation 'protocol'

usually refers to a single instrument which amends or supplements an earlier
international agreement. Recent examples of amending or supplementary
protocols are those which amend or supplement the Double Taxation
Conventions with Italy (Protocol of 28 April 1969),61 with the Republic of
Ireland (Protocol of2 May 1973),62 with France (Supplementary Protocol of 14
May 1973)63 and with Denmark (Supplementary Protocol of 8 February
1973).64 The designation 'protocol' may also be given to a treaty instrument
which is ancillary to a treaty or convention, although concluded simultaneously. Thus, there are thirty separate protocols annexed to, but forming an
integral part of, the Treaty concerning the Accession of Denmark, Ireland,
Norway and the United Kingdom to the EEC and EURATOM of22January
1972. So, also, Optional Protocols on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
were adopted simultaneously with the adoption of the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatic Relations and Consular Relations and the Convention on Special
Missions. The term 'protocol' may also be given to a treaty instrument which
prolongs the duration of a treaty or convention which is about to expire.
Examples are the Protocol for the Continuation in Force of the International
Coffee Agreement, 1968, as extended, (this Protocol was concluded at London
on 1 November 1974)65 and the Protocols of 16January 1957,66 and 15January
196],67 for the extension of the period of validity of the Convention on the
Declaration of Death of Missing Persons.
29. 25.
In its secondary sense of a summary of official proceedings, the term 'protocol'

will often be used in the same sense as proces-verbal or the minutes of a
conference. It is no doubt for this reason that, on the conclusion of a
multilateral treaty or convention, observations, declarations and agreements
declaratory of the text may be recorded in a Final (or Additional) Protocol
which becomes part of the compact.
29.26.
Engagements between two or more governments in regard to some particular

matter are sometimes styled 'protocols,' though differing in no other
respect from other agreements. The form has been used to conclude an
armistice (Protocol between the United States and Spain of 12 August 1898;68
between Poland and Lithuania of 29 November 1920);69 to provide for the
delimitation of a boundary (Protocol concerning the delimitation and marking
of the Argentine- Uruguayan Boundary Line in the River Uruguay of 16
October 1968);70 to re-establish diplomatic relations (Protocol between the
Netherlands and Venezuela of 20 August 1894);71 to regulate the status of
international military headquarters (Protocol of 28 August 1952, between the
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty); 72 and to regulate the exercise ofcriminal
jurisdiction over foreign armed forces (Protocol of 26 October 1953, between
Japan, the United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom).73
Finally, mention may be made of the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, signed at
Geneva on 24 September 1923, concerning the recognition and enforcement of
certain arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. 74
29.27.
It is, however, correct to say that the protocol is now used principally as an
instrument subsidiary to a treaty or convention, usually (but not necessarily)
drawn up by the same negotiators, and dealing with ancillary or incidental
Declarations
245
matters such as the interpretation of particular articles of the main treaty or

any supplementary provision of a minor character. Ratification ofthe treaty or
convention 75 will normally ipso facto involve ratification of any supplementary
or additional protocol of this nature. Where the protocol is concluded
independently at a later date (as, for example, an amending protocol), it will of
course be subject to independent ratification.
Declarations
29.28.
According to Oppenheim,76 the tt'rm 'declaration' may be used in three

different meanings. The first is indistinguishable, save as to terminology, from
any other treaty intended to have an obligatory character. The Declaration of
Paris of 1856,77 which aimed at defining the rules of international law relating
to blockade and contraband, falls into this category. Oppenheim states that
this Declaration is 'as binding as any agreement which goes under the name of
"treaty" or "convention.'" 78 Other law-making (or law-declaring) Declarations are the Declaration of St Petersburg of 1868 (explosive bullets),79 the
(unratified) Declaration of London of 1909 (blockade and contraband)80 and
the Barcelona Declaration of 192 I recognising the Right to a Flag of States
having no Sea-Coast. 81 But Declarations are not confined to law-making
treaties. The Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos signed at Geneva on 23
July, 1962,82 contains a number of specific undertakings by the signatory
Governments and, in accordance with its terms, is to be 'regarded as
constituting an international agreement.'
29.29.
It may sometimes be difficult to determine whether an instrument which is

styled a Declaration amounts to a treaty rather than a pronouncement of policy
expressive of a shared or common purpose. The Declaration by the United
Nations of I January 1942,83 should almost certainly be regarded as a treaty,
since acceptance of the Declaration was a condition of original membership of
the United Nations. On the other hand the type of instrument which became
increasingly common during the Second World War (and has persisted to this
day), namely, a Declaration published after a conference ofthree or four heads
of state,84 presents rather special features. The contents of a Declaration of this
kind may be partly agreements to do or not to do something, and partly
statements of common policy; accordingly, it is unsafe to generalise on how far
Declarations of this somewhat unorthodox nature may constitute treaty
instruments. 85
29.30.
Secondly, according to Oppenheim, 'there are unilateral declarations which

create rights and duties for other States.' Among these should be included
'declarations of war, declarations on the part of belligerents concerning the
goods they will condemn as contraband, declarations at the outbreak ofwar on
the part ofthird States that they will remain neutral, and others. '86 Thirdly, the
term 'declaration' is used to describe the action taken 'when States
communicate to other States, or urbi et orbi, an explanation and justification ofa
line of conduct pursued by them in the past, or an explanation of views and
246
Treaties - J
intentions concerning certain matters.'87 Declarations of these second or third

types in no way constitute treaties.
29.3 I.
Declarations which have an obligatory character may sometimes be

important international agreements in themselves (e.g. the Declaration on the
Neutrality of Laos); but they are more often appended to a treaty or
convention forming a subsidiary compact. Thus, the Final Act of the
Conference between the European Communities and the States which have
applied for accession to these Communities88 records that certain Joint
Declarations 89 had been adopted, takes note that a unilateral Declaration by
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had been made,90 and
states that other Declarations had been made. 91
29.32.
The following Declaration was annexed to the Treaty of Commerce and

Navigation between Great Britain and Greece signed at London on 16 July
19 26 :92
'It is well understood that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great
Britain and Greece of to-day's date does not prejudice claims on behalf of private
persons based on the provisions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886, and
that any differences which may arise between our two Governments as to the validity of
such claims shall, at the request of either Government, be referred to arbitration in
accordance with the provisions of the Protocol of November 10, 1886, annexed to the
said Treaty.
Done at London, the 16th]uly, 1926.'
[signatures]
In the Ambatielos case 93 the International Court ofJustice held that the above
Declaration was a 'provision' of the Treaty to which it was annexed, within the
meaning of Article 29 of the Treaty, which stated that any disputes that might
arise between the parties 'as to the proper interpretation or application of any
of the provisions of the present Treaty' should be referred to the Court at the
request of either party. Consequently, the Court found that it had jurisdiction
to determine a dispute, relating to the interpretation of the Declaration, despite
an objection to the jurisdiction lodged by the United Kingdom. One of the
reasons why the Court came to this conclusion was that, when the instruments
of ratification of the Treaty were exchanged, the Declaration was included,
together with the Treaty, in the instrument prepared by the United Kingdom
Government, between the words 'which Treaty is, word for word, as follows'
and the words 'We, having seen and considered the Treaty as aforesaid, have
approved, accepted and confirmed the same in all and everyone of its articles
and clauses' (see instrument of ratification in 32.20.). Further reasons for the
Court's decision were that the plenipotentiaries had included the Treaty and
the Declaration in a single document; that the United Kingdom Government
had issued as Treaty Series, No. 2 (1927) a single document entitled 'Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Greece and
accompanying Declaration', and that the Foreign Offices of both countries had
communicated official texts to the League of Nations at Geneva for
registration, which led to their inclusion in the League of Nations Treaty Series
under a single number, as 'No. 1425. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between the United Kingdom and Greece and accompanying Declaration
signed at London, July 16 1926.'
Exchange of Notes
29.33.
247
The style 'declaration' is also occasionally given to agreements between

governments regarding some relatively minor matter. A modern example is the
Declaration on the Construction of Main International Traffic Arteries of 16
September 1950.94
Exchange of Notes
2934
The treaty concluded in the form of an exchange of Notes or letters is, in

modern times, the most frequently used device for formally recording the
agreement of two governments upon all kinds of transactions. It takes the form
not of a single instrument but of an ordinary exchange of correspondence
between the ambassador of one state and the minister for foreign affairs of the
state to which he is accredited. The content of the agreement to be recorded by
the exchange of Notes will of course have been agreed in advance between the
two governments. The initiating Note sets out the provisions of the proposed
agreement and goes on to suggest that if the proposals are acceptable to the
other government the initiating Note and the other government's reply to that
effect should constitute an Agreement in the matter.
29.35.
It is not customary to exhibit full powers for an exchange of Notes. Nor are
exchanges ofNotes normally subject to ratification, although in some cases they
may be. The International Law Commission in their commentary to what is
now Article 14 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, summarise
the position as follows:
'Meanwhile, however, the expansion of intercourse between States, especially in
economic and technical fields, led to an ever-increasing use of less formal types of
international agreements, amongst which were exchanges of Notes, and these
agreements are usually intended by the parties to become binding by signature alone.
On the other hand, an exchange of notes or other informal agreement, though employed
for its ease of convenience, has sometimes expressly been made subject to ratification
because of constitutional requirements in one or other of the contracting States.' 95
The fact that exchanges of Notes do not normally require ratification, and
accordingly enter into force as soon as the exchange has been effected, makes
them a very convenient and flexible instrument for treaty-makers. Although
the form is used for recording agreement between two governments on a wide
variety of routine matters, it has also been used to regulate transactions of
considerable political importance. Thus, exchanges of Notes have dealt with
such matters as the transfer and lease of military bases, the maintenance of
armed forces and military missions on foreign soil, settlement of war claims,
settlement of boundary disputes, delimitation of territorial waters and
jurisdiction over foreign armed forces for criminal offences. 96 More recently,
the device of an exchange of Notes was used to record the interim agreement
between the United Kingdom and Iceland in connection with the fisheries
dispute occasioned by the Icelandic claim to a fifty-mile exclusive fisheries
limit. 97
29.36.
Normally the Notes exchanged recording the agreement bear the same date, in
248
Treaties - 1
which case, unless they provide otherwise, the agreement has effect from that
date. If they bear different dates, that of the last Note, or at any rate the date of
its receipt, is the governing date (unless it is otherwise provided), since the
agreement cannot be regarded as completed until it is plain that it has been
accepted on both sides.
29.37.
The treaty concluded in the form of an exchange of Notes is the type of treaty
instrument which is now most regularly utilised. Comparative studies of the
types of treaty instruments registered with the League of Nations and with the
United Nations have confirmed the growing use of the 'exchange of Notes'
form. Blix, on the basis ofa comparative survey oftreaty instruments registered
with the League of Nations between the years 1932 and 1940 and with the
United Nations between the years 1946 and 195 I points out that inst.ruments in
the form of an 'exchange ofNotes' constituted 24 per cent ofthe League treaties
and 30 per cent of the United Nations treaties. 98 A rough analysis of recent
indices of the United Kingdom Treaty Series reveals that the use of the
'exchange of Notes' form is steadily increasing, at least in United Kingdom
practice. Of 350 treaty instruments published in the United Kingdom Treaty
Series during the years 197 I to 1974 in the form of treaties, conventions,
agreements, protocols and exchanges of Notes, 7 were in the form of 'treaties'
(in the restricted sense), 29 were in the form of 'conventions', 98 were in the
form of 'agreements', 29 were in the form of'protocols' and 188 (that is to say,
nearly 54 per cent) were in the form of 'exchange of Notes'.
29.38.
Agreements embodied in exchanges of Notes are, as a general rule, bilateral.

Exceptionally, there may be more than two states concerned in an exchange of
Notes or letters. Thus, the agreement between the Bank for International
Settlements, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, United States and
French Governments, on the other hand, for the return to those Governments
of gold looted by Germany was constituted by a letter addressed to
representatives of the three Governments by the Chairman of the Bank and by
a letter in reply signed by the representatives of the three Governments. 99 So
also an exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Italian
Governments for the allocation to Italy of a share in the proceeds of sale by the
International Refugee Organisation of certain valuables, currencies and
securities, presumed looted by the German forces and taken from them in Italy
by the forces of the Allies, was linked to a parallel exchange of Notes between
the United States and Italian Governments. 100 A somewhat unorthodox
example of a 'multilateral' exchange is afforded by the exchange of letters on
monetary questions annexed to the Treaty concerning the Accession of
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom to the EEC and
EURATOM of 22 January 1972. The initiating letter was addressed by Mr
Geoffrey Rippon (Chancellor ofthe Duchy ofLancaster and Minister in charge
of the United Kingdom delegation for the entry negotiations) to M. Thorn
(Minister for Foreign Affairs ofLuxembourg) in his capacity as President ofthe
EEC Council of Ministers, and sought confirmation from 'the Governments of
the Member States of the Community and ofthe Governments ofthe Kingdom
of Denmark, Ireland and the Kingdom of Norway' that they agreed to a
declaration made by Mr Rippon in the course ofthe negotiations. The letter in
Formalities in the drawing up of treaties
249
reply was signed by M. Thorn and countersigned by the eight other Foreign
Ministers. 101
29.39.
Examples of matters dealt with by recent exchanges ofNotes (and illustrative of

the wide variety of international transactions which are governed by this type
of treaty instrument) are:
(a) Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone
amending the Air Services Agreement signed at Freetovtn on 5 April
1962 ;102
(b) Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Jordan concerning
an Interest-Free Development Loan for Afforestation, Electricity and
Phosphates Projects; 103
(c) Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Canada concerning
the Training of United Kingdom Armed Forces in Canada;104
(cl) Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Thailand
temporarily prolonging the Treaty ofCommerce and Navigation signed at
Bangkok on 23 November, 1937;105
(e) Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and the Arab Republic
of Egypt concerning assistance by the United Kingdom in the clearance of
the Suez Canal. 106
ForlDalities in the drawing up of treaties

29.40.
The 'single-instrument' type of treaty (whether designated as treaty,

convention, agreement, protocol or declaration) is normally concluded, and
the authenticity of its text established, by means of the signatures of the
plenipotentiaries, who will, as a general rule, have to produce full powers for
the purpose. 107 It will depend on the circumstances whether signature alone is
sufficient to bring the treaty into force or whether some further step, such as
ratification, is necessary. 108
29.41.
Sometimes, however, and particularly when there may be a significant interval

between the conclusion of the negotiations and the signature of a treaty (for
example, in order to enable the governments concerned to satisfy themselves as
to the acceptability or otherwise of the agreement as a whole), the negotiators
append to it their initials ne varietur as a guarantee ofthe authenticity ofthe text.
Even when it may be intended to sign a treaty immediately upon the
conclusion of the negotiations, the separate pages of the text are sometimes
initialled prior to its reproduction in a form suitable for signature (this practice
applies to bilateral rather than multilateral treaties). The act of initialling a
treaty can of itself constitute a signature of the treaty when it is established that
the negotiating states have so agreed. 109 The International Law Commission
point out that in practice initialling, especially by a head of state, prime
minister or foreign minister, is not infrequently intended as the equivalent of
full signature. JIO But initialling by lesser dignitaries may equally have the effect
of full signature if this is the clear intention of the parties. Thus, the
Memorandum ofU nderstanding of5 October 1954, between the Governments
250
Treaties - I
of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Italy and Yugoslavia
about the Free Territory of Trieste 111 provides that certain things were to be
done 'as soon as this Memorandum of understanding has been initialled' or
within a specified period from the date of initialling.
29.42.
The preparation for signature of a bilateral 'single-instrument' treaty is

undertaken by the country in whose capital the treaty is to be signed. The style
and presentation of the instrument will accord with the practices of that
country. Bilateral treaties are prepared for signature in duplicate, in order that
each party may retain a signed original version of the treaty instrument. Each
of the two countries is entitled to precedence in the original retained by it - that
is to say, its language will (where the treaty text is printed on facing pages or in
parallel columns) appear in the first or left-hand page or column; its title (or the
title of its sovereign and plenipotentiary) will be named first in the preamble;
and the signature of its plenipotentiary or representative will appear above, or
to the left of, the signature of the plenipotentiary or representative of the other
party.
29.43.
If a treaty covers more than a single sheet of paper, the sheets will be united by
ribbon or fancy cord and the ends of the ribbon will be sealed. A cover will
normally be supplied by the host government.
29.44.
Personal seals (i.e. a hand-seal or signet-ring showing crest, emblem or other

device, or the initial letters of the owner's names) are used only when the treaty
is drawn up in heads of state form and when the testimonium requires that the
plenipotentiaries should affix their seals to the treaty. Where a plenipotentiary
has no personal seal, an official wax seal (which, in United Kingdom practice,
bears the Royal Arms and the name of HM Mission or the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office as the case may be) may be used.
29.45.
A bilateral treaty between two countries which share the same language will be
drawn up in that language only (e.g. a treaty between the United Kingdom
and the United States or between the United Kingdom and Australia).
29.46.
Sometimes, a treaty may be drawn up in a language or languages which are not

those of the contracting parties. The Treaty of Peace between Japan and
Russia of23 August/5 September 1905112 was drawn up in English and French.
Again a treaty may be drawn up not only in the languages of the contracting
parties, but also in a third language, which prevails in the event of any
divergence of interpretation. 113
29.47.
Where a treaty is drawn up in two or more languages, great care must be taken
to ensure the closest correspondence possible between the respective texts. But
this may sometimes be difficult, more especially when the languages differ
widely in character. The faith of negotiators that they have achieved
concordance between differing language texts of a treaty may sometimes be
sadly misplaced. The Treaty of Uccialli of 2 May 1889, concluded between
Italy and Ethiopia affords an example of such a misunderstanding. Article
XIX of this Treaty, in the English-language version published in British and
Foreign State Papers, 114 declared that 'the present Treaty being drawn up both in
the Italian and Amharic languages, and the two versions agreeing perfectly
Formalities in the drawing
up
of treaties
251
with one another, both texts shall be considered official, and shall have under
all circumstances the same authority.' The subsequent history ofthe Treaty, as
recorded by the Ethiopian representative to the Vienna Conference on the Law
of Treaties, is revealing:
'The treaty had been one of friendship and alliance, drawn up in Amharic and in
Italian, both texts being considered equally authentic. After its conclusion, differences
had arisen concerning the meaning to be given to Article XVII of the treaty. The
Emperor Menelik had argued, on the basis of the Amharic text, that the article did not
bind him to avail himself of the King of Italy's intermediary in his dealings with other
Governments, but the Italian Government, relying on the Italian text of the treaty, had
argued that the Emperor had agreed to avail himselfof the King ofItaly's intermediary
in all his dealings with foreign Governments. In December, 1889, the Emperor Menelik
had informed the Governments of European countries of his coronation directly, and
not through the intermediary of the King of Italy, an act at which the Government of
Italy had taken offence. Some time later, the Emperor had formally denounced the
treaty in a circular letter addressed to various European Governments, and the treaty
had subsequently been formally annulled under Article 11 of the Treaty of Peace
concluded between Ethopia and Italy in 189 6.' 115
Accordingly, it may well be desirable that it should be specified in the treaty

which of the language texts is to be regarded as authoritative, to provide for the
possibility of a difference of opinion subsequently arising as to the precise
meaning of a stipulation. It must be recognised, however, that national
sensitivities will normally be such as to require that both or all the language
texts of the treaty be treated as being equally authentic.
29-48.
The number of language texts in a multilateral treaty may vary from a single
text to as many as six (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish)
for treaties concluded under the auspices of the United Nations,116 or seven
(Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Irish and Italian) for treaties which
amend the original European Community Treaties following upon the
enlargement of the European Communities in 1973,117 all those texts being
equally authentic. But a multilateral treaty may be drawn up in two or three
widely spoken language texts only (for example, in English, French and
Spanish), provision being made for 'agreed translations (or official texts) ofthe
treaty to be established in other languages also).1118
29-49.
Article I I I of the Charter of the United Nations provides that 'the Chinese,
French, Russian, English and Spanish texts are equally authentic.' Nevertheless, since the working languages of the San Francisco Conference of 1945
were English and French, it is reasonable to assume that, in interpreting the
Charter, more weight should be given to the texts in these languages than to the
others. As between the English and French texts, the English is perhaps the
more authoritative for the reason that the text of the Charter finally approved
by the Coordination Committee - and the text from which the translations into
other languages were made - was in English. As Hardy points out by reference
to a number of cases which have come before the International Court ofJust ice
on the interpretation of particular articles of the Charter, the Court and its
individual members tend, despite the provisions of the Charter regarding the
authenticity of texts, 'to rely solely on the French and English versions of that
252
Treaties - I
instrument and to consider the Chinese, Spanish and Russian versions as mere
translations.' 119
29.50.
Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that 'the
terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic
text.' It then goes on to deal with the case where a comparison ofthe authentic
texts discloses a difference ofmeaning which the application ofaccepted rules of
treaty interpretation does not remove; and it states that, leaving aside the case
where the treaty has provided or the parties have agreed that, in case of
divergence, a particular text shall prevail, 'the meaning which best reconciles
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be
adopted.'
29.5 I.
It was formerly thought that, in the case of a divergence between two or more
equally authentic language texts of a treaty, a restrictive interpretation was
called for. In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent Court of
International Justice stated that:
'... where two versions possessing equal authority exist, one of which appears to have a
wider bearing than another, it [the Court] is bound to adopt the more limited
interpretation which can be made to harmonize with both versions and which, as far as
it goes, is doubtless in accordance with the common intention of the Parties.' 120
However, as Hardy has pointed out,121 the Permanent Court was concerned in
that case simply to establish whether a particular act (i.e. the grant of a
concession) fell within the powers conferred by the mandate instrument.
Moreover, the International Law Commission has since expressed the view
that 'the Court does not appear necessarily to have intended by [this sentence]
to lay down as a general rule that the more limited interpretation which can be
made to harmonize with both texts is the one which must always be adopted;'
and the Commission conclude that 'while the Mavrommatis cases gives strong
support to the principle of conciliating - i.e. harmonizing - the texts, it is not
thought to call for a general rule laying down a presumption in favour of
restrictive interpretation in the case of an ambiguity in plurilingual texts. '122
CHAPTER 30
Treaties and other

-11 Pact, Constitution,
Charter, Statute,
Regulations, Concordat,
Additional Articles
Pact
3.1.
The term 'Pact' denotes a specially solemn international agreement. It is

sometimes loosely (and journalistically) used as shorthand for a treaty which
bears another title. The Treaty for Renunciation of War signed at Paris on 27
August 1928, is accordingly referred to generally as the 'Briand-Kellogg Pact'
or the 'Pact of Paris' (and is indeed cited as the latter in various resolutions of
the League of Nations). As Myers states, the term 'pact' 'has a wide currency
because of its shortness, a single syllable, tempting for a headline writer or a
scholar to use for colour'. I
30.2.
None the less, several treaties which the Contracting Parties regard as being of
a particularly solemn nature are still given the formal designation 'Pact'. A
recent example of this usage is the Pact of the League of Arab States signed in
Cairo on 22 March 1945;2 another is the Pact of Bogota, the name deliberately
given to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement signed at Bogota on 30
April 1948. J
Constitution
30.3.
This form of designation for a treaty is self-explanatory. The constitutive

instruments of a number of Specialised Agencies established after the Second
World War within the framework of the United Nations system were
designated 'constitutions': thus, one has the Constitution of the Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO)4 the Constitution of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)5 and the
Constitution of the World Health Organisation (WHO).6
254
Treaties - 11
Charter
30.4.
The term 'Charter' given to the constituent treaty of the United Nations
appears to have originated in the United States Department of State with a
research staff group to which was assigned the task ofdrafting a text to embody
the principles of post-war international organisation developed by studies
made up to August 1943. 7 It would seem that the term was conceived of, by
analogy with Magna Charta, as symbolising a grant of authority to the
organisation from the peoples represented by the governments which would
institute it; and emphasis was given to this underlying idea by formulating the
preamble in the name of 'We the peoples of the United Nations.,a
30.5.
The designation 'Charter' for a treaty instrument is, however, no longer

dependent upon such a philosophical concept. The constituent instrument of
the Organisation of American States is a Charter9; and the European Social
Charter opened for signature at Turin on 18 October 1961 10 is also drawn up in
the form of an ordinary treaty or convention, being designated as a Charter no
doubt because it seeks to lay down the means for implementing what are
considered to be the basic economic and social rights of the individual.
30.6.
The term 'Charter' has also been given to certain instruments which do not
qualify as treaties, whatever influence such instruments may have as being
declaratory of the aspirations of those who subscribe to them. In this category
falls the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted on 12
December 1974, by virtue of General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX).II
Statute
3.7.
'Statute' as the designation for a treaty instrument has come into usage among
treaty-makers from parliamentary practice. It is a basic act which regulates an
institution or specific international regime; in so far as it may be the constituent
instrument of an international organisation, it is or may be interchangeable
with 'Constitution'. Examples of use of the term to denote the constituent
instrument of an international organisation are the Statute of the Council of
Europe, 12 the Statute ofthe Hague Conference on Private International Law, 13
and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 14 The Statute of
the International Court ofJustice which forms an integral part of the United
Nations Charter is another example of the use of the term 'Statute' to denote a
constituent instrument.
30.8.
In earlier times, and particularly during the period of the League of Nations,
the term 'Statute' was used more generally for treaty instruments setting up
regimes for particular territories or for particular waterways. The first use of
the term in this sense appears to have been in the Convention and Definitive
Statute of the Danube concluded on 23 July 192 L I5 Other instruments of this
type adopted within the framework of the League of Nations were the Statute
on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern l6 and the
Statute on the International Regime of Railways. 17 Finally, the special regime
Concordat
255
governing Memel during the inter-war period was embodied in the Statute of
Memel annexed to the Convention of Paris of 8 May 1924, relating to the
Territory of Memel. 18
Regulations
30.9.
The term 'Regulations' is used in cases where the constitution of a technical

Specialised Agency makes provision for the adoption of such Regulations, and
these may occasionally themselves constitute a treaty instrument. For
example, the World Health Assembly (set up within the framework of the
World Health Organisation) is competent to adopt health regulations which
come into force for those member states which do not reject them or make a
reservation to them within a specified period; current regulations of this type
are the World Health Organisation Nomenclature Regulations, 1967,19 and
the International Health Regulations, 1969.20 Regulations of this nature
undou btedly give rise to treaty obligations for those states which do not exercise
their option of rejecting them or making a reservation to them. They constitute
a flexible device whereby the Organisation and its member states can seek to
keep abreast with technical advances in sanitary and quarantine requirements
and public health practices.
3.10.
The International Telecommunications Convention, 1975 (Art. 82) states that

'the provisions of the Convention are completed by the following Administrative Regulations - Telegraph Regulations, Telephone Regulations, Radio
Regulations and Additional Radio Regulations;'21 these Regulations may be
revised, in whole or in part, by 'administrative conferences' of the Union, the
Convention as such being capable of revision only by a 'plenipotentiary
conference. '
Concordat
30.1 I.
A concordat is an agreement between the Pope and the head ofa state which
has for its purpose to safeguard the interests of the Roman Catholic Church in
the state concerned. It would seem that the concordat is gradually becoming
obsolete, being replaced by 'agreement' or modus vivendi of lesser scope. 22
30.12.
There was formerly considerable controversy as to the status of concordats in

international law, particularly during the period prior to the conclusion of the
Lateran Treaty between the Holy See and Italy in 1929. Hall, writing in 1924,
took a rather extreme view of the status of concordats:
'Contracts entered into between States and private individuals, or by the organs of
States in their individual capacity, are, of course, not subject to international law. Of
this kind are Concordats, because the Pope signs them not as a secular prince but as head
of the Catholic Church. '23
256
Treaties - 11
Lawrence also expressed doubts about classifying concordats as treaties:

'Concordats are not treaties from the point of view of international law. The
Papacy is incapable ofclassification. It cannot be recognised as a member ofthe
international society of nations, and it cannot be ignored altogether. '24
Fauchille took the view that concordats resembled treaties as to form, but
differed from them as to their object. He summarised the position in the
following terms:
'Deux puissances, l'une temporelle, l'Etat, l'autre, spirituelle, le Pape, independantes
l'une de l'autre, toutes deux personnes internationales, souveraines l'une et l'autre dans
l'ordre d'interets qu'elles ont a regir et a sauvegarder, se heurtant sur les limites de leurs
domaines respect ifs, s'accordant ensemble: viola en quoi un concordat ressemble a un
traite international.
Mais la difference est dans le fond. L'objet des concordats n'est pas matihe de droit
international. C'est matihe de droit public interne. Il s'agit de combiner le libre
exercice d'un culte avec le maintien de l'ordre public et des principes fondamentaux
d'une constitution et d'un etat social determines. '25
30. I 3.
The content of concordats would seem to confirm the view expressed by

Fauchille. Generally speaking, concordats deal with the following types of
subject-matter:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Nomination of bishops (the Pope having the sole right of episcopal

appointment subject to consultation with the government of the state
concerned before nomination);
Guarantee that the Papal nominees would be of the nationality of the state
concerned;
Adjustment of the state's legislation to canon law as regards the legal
position of dioceses, parishes, religious orders, etc;
Guarantees for Catholic schools, charitable works and ecclesiastical
property;
Arrangements concerning the validity of canon law inside the state
concerned in the sphere of matrimonial law; and
various rules concerning the personal status of the Catholic clergy (for
instance, exemption from military or jury service).26
30. I 4.
M yers takes the view that 'Concordats concluded between the Pope and States
are not treaties, but the Pope as head ofVatican State has the capacity to make
treaties and a concordat concluded by him in that capacity would be a
treaty. '27
30. I 5.
Accordingly, it seems fair to conclude that concordats are, in point of form,

analogous to treaties, and may operate to create reciprocal rights and
obligations as between the Contracting Parties; but that they seek to regulate
matters governed by the public law of the state concerned rather than by
international law proper. In this context, it may be relevant that no concordat
appears as yet to have been registered with the United Nations under Article
28
102 of the Charter.
Additional Articles
257
Additional Articles
3.16.
The type of treaty instrument designated as Additional Articles is now largely

obsolescent. Additional Articles were originally articles appended to an
international agreement in relation to some subsidiary matter, or in
qualification of a provision in the main instrument, and signed at the same time
as the latter. Thus, simultaneously with the signature at Paris on 30 May 1814,
of the Definitive Treaty of Peace and Amity between His Britannic Majesty
and His Most Christian Majesty (i.e. the King of France) - which paved the
way for the Congress of Vienna - there were signed, and by the same
plenipotentiaries, Additional Articles between France and Great Britain
relating to steps to be taken for the abolition of the slave trade, the liquidation
of accounts of expenses incurred through the maintenance of prisoners of war
and other matters. It was stated that 'The present Additional Articles shall
have the same force and validity as if they were inserted word for word in the
Treaty Patent of this day. They shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be
exchanged at the same time. '29
30.17.
The United States and Venezuela added the following Additional Article to
their Extradition Treaty of 19 January 1922:
The undersigned (names of plenipotentiaries) have agreed upon the following
additional Article to the Treaty of Extradition signed by the aforesaid on the 19th
instant:
It is agreed that all differences between the contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation or execution of this Treaty shall be decided by arbitration.
In witness whereof they have signed the above Article, and have hereunto affixed
their seals.
Done in duplicate, in Caracas, this 21st day of January, 1922.30
3.18.
In modern treaty-making practice, a treaty instrument relating to a subsidiary

matter and signed simultaneously with the main treaty, convention or
agreement would almost certainly be designated as a protocol, a protocol of
signature or an agreed minute; alternatively, the substance of the additional
provisions agreed upon would be embodied in an exchange of Notes or an
exchange of letters.
30.19.
Additional Articles were sometimes concluded at a later date 31 as agreements

between governments, and occasionally styled Additional Act, in amplification
or modification of the provisions of an existing treaty. Modern practice is,
however, to style treaty instruments of this nature as supplementary or
additional conventions, agreements or protocols (depending normally on the
styling of the principal treaty instrument).
CHAPTER 31
Treaties and other

-Ill Act, General Act,
Final Act, Modus Vivendi,
Compromis d'Arbitrage
Act
31.1.
The term 'Act' (as distinguished from 'General Act' or 'Final Act') is a form of
treaty nomenclature which has been used for many years. I t is sometimes used
to designate an international instrument which, in and of itself, may lack some
of the formal characteristics ofa treaty stricto sensu, but which nevertheless forms
part of a complex of treaty instruments establishing clear legal rights and
obligations as between the parties. In this sense, an 'Act' will constitute a piece
of international legislation and may indeed embody the decisive terms of the
treaty complex. An example of this type of usage is the 'Act concerning the
Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties' annexed to, and
forming an integral part of, the Treaty of 22 January 1972, concerning the
Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. 1 The
Act of Accession consists of 161 substantive articles which, when read with the
1 1 annexes, 30 protocols and single exchange of letters attached to the Act and
forming an integral part thereof, 2 constitute the substantive terms upon which
the accession of the three new member states to the European Communities
was negotiated. A single' Act' embodying the substantive terms ofaccession but
not constituting by itself a treaty stricto sensu proved to be a useful means of
overcoming certain technical difficulties posed by the differences between the
provisions of the three European Community treaties concerning the accession
of new members. Article 237 of the EEC Treaty clearly stipulates that 'the
conditions ofadmission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessitated thereby
shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the
applicant State.' Article 205 of the EURATOM Treaty is in identical terms.
By way ofcontrast, Article 98 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community provides that the Council, after obtaining the opinion of the
High Authority (now the Commission) shall, acting unanimously, determine
the terms of accession. Formally, therefore, provision is made for the accession
of the new Member States to the European Economic Community and to
General Act
259
EURATOM by the Treaty of Accession itself; and for their accession to the
European Coal and Steel Community by a Decision of the Council of the
European Communities of22January 1972 based upon Article 98 of the ECSC
Treaty. Both the Treaty of Accession and the Council Decision of 22 January
1972 incorporate the substantive negotiated terms set out in the single Act of
Accession. 3
31.2.
A particular usage of the term 'Act' appears to have developed in the practice
of the Latin American States. On at least two occasions, the Latin American
States have used the device ofan 'Act' to assert, in advance ofevents, what their
collective policy will be. Thus, the Act of Habana of 30 July 1940,4 was
intended to make clear the position of the American Republics if Germany
attempted to take French or other European territorial possessions in the
Americas before a Convention ofthe same date could be ratified. Similarly, the
Act of Chapultepec of 8 March 1945,5 was drawn up by an Inter-American
Conference on Problems of War and Peace in the form of an agreement
concerning reciprocal assistance and solidarity; the Act ofChapultepec tended
to unite the positions of the participating states in advance of the San Francisco
Conference and it clearly had some influence on the formulation of Articles
51 -54 of the United Nations Charter.
General Act
3 1.3.
A General Act became familiar in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century as the name of a treaty of general import negotiated at an
international conference. The Berlin Conference of 1885 drew up a series of
detailed provisions concerning:
(a) Freedom of trade in the Congo Basin, its tributaries and neighbouring
countries;
(b) The protection of the inhabitants, missionaries and travellers, as well as
religious freedom;
(c) The postal regime in the Congo Basin;
(cl) The slave trade in the Congo Basin;
(e) Neutrality of territories comprised in the Congo Basin;
(f) Navigation on the Congo; and
(g) Navigation on the Niger.
These detailed provisions were united in a single General Act, itself clearly
constituting a treaty. 6
31.4.
A later conference in Berlin concerned itself with the affairs of the Samoan
Islands and drew up a General Act on the Affairs ofSamoa dated 14June 1889
which united a series of provisions relating to the independence and neutrality
of the islands of Samoa, the modification of existing treaties, the establishment
of a Supreme Court of Justice for Samoa, titles to land in Samoa, the
administration of the municipal district of Apia, taxation and revenues in
Samoa, and restrictions on the sale and use of arms, ammunition and
intoxicating liquors in Samoa. 7
260
Treaties - 111
Further instances of the use of the term are the General Act of the Brussels
Conference of 1890 relative to the African Slave Trade;8 the General Act ofthe
Algeciras Conference of 1906 relative to the Affairs of Morocco; 9 the General
Act for the Pacific Settlement ofInternational Disputes of 26 September 1928,
prepared under the auspices of the League of Nations; 10 and the Revised
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 28 April
1949, prepared under the auspices of the United Nations. 11 It may be noted
that in the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France)
before the International Court ofJustice, Australia and New Zealand invoked
Article 17 of the 1928 General Act, read together with Articles 36( I) and 37 of
the Statute of the Court, as founding the jurisdiction of the Court in the
particular cases, Australia, New Zealand and the French Republic all being
parties to the General Act (with reservations). 12 In the proceedings instituted in
1976 before the International Court of Justice, Greece sought to found the
jurisdiction of the Court in relation to her dispute with Turkey over the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea on the 1928 General
Act, read in conjunction with Articles 36( I) and 37 of the Statute ofthe Court;
the Court, on I I September 1976, rejected the Greek application for interim
measures of protection on the grounds that no permanent damage was being
done to Greek interests by Turkish exploration, that any Greek claim to have
suffered financial loss because Turkish knowledge of the seabed resources had
affected its negotiating position when selling concession rights could be met by
financial compensation, and that both the Greek and Turkish Foreign
Ministers had reacted favourably to the Security Council resolution of 26
August 1976 urging both countries to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the
dispute. 13
Final Act
31.6.
The term 'Final Act' (Acte Final) is normally used to designate a document
which constitutes a formal statement or summary of the proceedings of an
international conference, enumerating the treaties or related treaty instruments drawn up as the result of its deliberations, together with any resolutions
or voeux adopted by the conference. The signature of an instrument of this
nature does not in itself entail any expression of consent to be bound by the
treaties or related treaty instruments so enumerated, which require separate
signature and, to the extent necessary, ratification.
31.7.
An example of this type of Final Act is provided by the Final Act ofthe Vienna
Conference on the Law of Treaties. This contains the following elements:
A description of the background to the convening of the Conference;
2. A list of the states represented at the first and second sessions of the
Conference (103 states represented at the first session and 110 states at the
second session);
3. A list of the Specialised Agencies and interested intergovernmental
organizations which had accepted invitations to attend the Conferences as
observers;
I.
Final Act
261
4. Statements as to the election of the President and Vice-Presidents of the

Conference;
5. A list of the Committees set up by the Conference, with their officers and
membership;
6. Statements as to the documentation before the Conference and as to the
drawing up of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;
7. The text of the Convention in extenso;
8. A statement relating to the adoption of the Convention by the Conference
and to its opening for signature and eventual deposit with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations;
9. A list of the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Conference and
annexed to the Final Act, that is to say:
(a) Declaration on the prohibition of military, political or economic
coercion in the conclusion of treaties;
(h) Declaration on universal participation in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties;
(c) Resolution relating to Article 1 ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties;
(d) Resolution relating to the Declaration on the prohibition of military,
political or economic coercion in the conclusion of treaties;
(e) Resolution relating to Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties and the Annex thereto;
(f) Tribute to the International Law Commission; and
(g) Tribute to the Government and people of the Republic of Austria.
It is self-evident that an instrument of this nature does not per se constitute a

treaty, since it is simply a summary of the proceedings of the conference which
drew up the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
31.8.
This is the normal type of Final Act, of which many examples can be found
in treaty practice. One of the first instances of the use of this device is the Final
Act of the Hague Conference of 1899. After much discussion as to how the
results of the Conference should be formally recorded, it was eventually
decided to draw up a Final Act which would be a resume of the work done by
the Conference and as such would be signed by all the Powers present 'who thus
affirmed the authenticity of the record without binding themselves to sign each
of the Conventions or adhere to each of the Declarations or Wishes contained in
the Act.' 14 Sir Julian Pauncefote (one of the principal United Kingdom
delegates) described the Final Act of the Conference as 'an exposition of the
work of the Conference presented to the various Governments for their
information and approval.'15
31.9.
The Final Act of the Second Peace Conference held at The Hague in 1907 was
drawn up in precisely the same form. It records:
The background to the convening of the Conference:
2. The names of the delegates representing each Power taking part:
3. Enumeration of the thirteen Conventions and the single Declaration drawn
up for signature;
4. The text of a separate declaration on compulsory arbitration;
I.
262
Treaties -Ill
5. The text of a resolution on limitation of military expenditure; and

6. The texts of four recommendations (voeux).
It is then signed by the Plenipotentiaries and provision is made for its deposit
with the depository Government.
31.10.
Most modern international conferences convened to draw up international

conventions, including those convened under the auspices of the United
Nations, conclude by adopting a Final Act of this nature. Recent examples are
the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law
Governing the International Sale of Goods, done at The Hague on 25 April
1964; 16 the Final Act of the Twelfth Session of The Hague Conference on
Private International Law of 21 October 1972; 17 and the Final Act of the
Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping ofWastes
at Sea done at London on 13 November 1972.18
31.1 I.
Exceptionally, a treaty instrument designated as a Final Act may constitute a

treaty stricto sensu. The Final Act of the Wheat Conference done at London on
25 August 1933 appears to be an example ofan international agreement drawn
up in the form of a Final Act. 19 It must be stressed, however, that most Final
Acts are of the proces-verbal type already described and are not treaties in the
sense of creating rights and obligations for the signatories. 20
Modus Vivendi
3 1 12 .
This is the title given to a temporary or provisional agreement, usually

intended to be replaced later on, if circumstances permit, by one of a more
permanent and detailed character. It may not, however, always be designated
as such: more often than not, what is in substance a modus vivendi may be
designated as a 'temporary agreement' or an 'interim agreement'.
An example of a treaty which is in fact formally designated as a modus vivendi is
the Modus Vivendi between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and
Turkey relating to the application ofMost Favoured Nation Treatment, signed
at Ankara on 12 March 1947. 21 This provides for most-favoured-nation
treatment to be granted by the parties on a basis of reciprocity in navigation
matters and in all matters relating to customs duties, formalities and charges
connected with customs clearance, subject to certain specific exceptions,
pending the entry into force of a treaty of commerce and navigation between
the parties.
Another example is the Temporary Commercial Agreement between the
United Kingdom Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Repu blics signed at London on 16 April 1930.22 This records (in the
preamble) the desire of the two Governments to conclude as soon as possible a
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and then states that the two
Governments 'have meanwhile agreed upon the following temporary
Agreement to serve as a modus vivendi pending the conclusion of such a Treaty'.
The substantive articles then cover the reciprocal grant of most-favoured-
263
nation treatment (with the necessary exceptions), the functions of the Soviet
trade delegation, shipping, extension to British Dominions, colonies, etc. The
Agreement is expressed to come into force on signature and to remain in force
pending the coming into force of a commercial treaty, subject to the right of
either Party to give six months' notice of termination. (Art. 7.)
3 1 1 5.
A more recent example of what is in substance a modus vivendi (although not so

designated) is the Exchange of Notes of 13 November 1973, constituting an
Interim Agreement in the Fisheries Dispute between the United Kingdom
Government and the Icelandic Government. 23 This records that, following
discussion between the two Governments:
'... the following arrangements have been worked out for an interim agreement
relating to fisheries in the disputed area, pending a settlement of the dispute and without
prejudice to the legal position or rights of either Government in relation thereto.... '
The agreemen t was to run for two years from the date of the Exchange ofNotes,
and it is specifically provided (in paragraph 3) that 'its termination will not
affect the legal position of either Government with respect to the substantive
dispute.' It will be recalled that, prior to the conclusion of the Exchange of
Notes of 13 November 1973, the United Kingdom Government had instituted
proceedings against the Icelandic Government before the International Court
ofJustice in relation to the substantive dispute; and this no doubt explains the
references in the Exchange of Notes to the legal position and rights of either
Government in relation to the substantive dispute. In its judgment on the
merits of the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the Court states the following:
'The interim agreement of 1973, unlike the 1961 Exchange of Notes, does not describe
itself as a "settlement" of the dispute and, apart from being of limited duration, clearly
possesses the character of a provisional arrangement adopted without prejudice to the
rights of the Parties, nor does it provide for the waiver ofclaims by either Party in respect
of the matters in dispute. '24
The Court accordingly concluded that there still existed at the time of the
adjudication an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal interests
between the Parties, and that the existence of the interim agreement ought not
to lead it to refrain from pronouncing judgement in the case.
Cornprornis d'Arbitrage
31. I 6.
This term denotes an agreement to refer to arbitration or to judicial settlement

some matter or matters in dispute, these being defined more clearly in the
compromis. The normal English equivalent of the term is 'special agreement'
(though 'Arbitration Agreement' may, depending on the context, be used);
and in French or Spanish it is customary to use only the single word' compromis,'
or 'compromiso,' respectively. Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice provides that:
'Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification ofthe
special agreement (compromis) or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In
264
Treaties - III
either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated.'
3 1 17
Several cases have been referred to the International Court ofJ ustice by special
agreement (compromis). A good example is the Special Agreement for
Submission to the International Court ofJustice of Differences between the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French
Republic concerning Sovereignty over the Minquiers and Ecrehos Islets,
signed in London on 29 December I 950. l~ The text of this Special Agreement
reads as follows:
'The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of the French Republic;
Considering that differences have arisen between them as a result ofclaims by each of
them to sovereignty over the islets and rocks in the Minquiers and Ecrehos groups;
Desiring that these differences should be settled by a decision of the International
Court of Justice determining their respective rights as regards sovereignty over those
islets and rocks;
Desiring to define the issues to be su bmitted to the International Court ofJustice;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Court is requested to determine whether the sovereignty over the islets and
rocks (in so far as they are capable of appropriation) of the Minquiers and Ecrehos
groups respectively belongs to the United Kingdom or the French Republic.
Article 11
Without prejudice to any question as to the burden of proof, the Contracting parties
agree, having regard to Article 37 of the Rules of Court, that the written proceedings
should consist of
a United Kingdom memorial to be submitted within three months ofthe notification
of the present Agreement to the Court in pursuance of Article III below;
2. a French counter-memorial to be submitted within three months of delivery of the
United Kingdom memorial;
3. a United Kingdom reply followed by a French rejoinder to be delivered within such
times as the Court may order.
I.
Article III
Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, it may be notified to the Court
under Article 40 of the Statute of the Court by either of the Contracting Parties.
Article IV
(a) The present Agreement shall be subject to ratification.
(b) The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible in Paris and
the present Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon the exchange of
ratifications.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their
respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto
their seals.
Done in duplicate in London, the 29th day of December, 1950, in English and
French, both texts being equally authoritative.
(L.S.) W. E. BEcKETT
(L.S.) MDRE GROS.
Compromis d'Arbit rage

31.18.
26 5
The content of a special agreement (compromis) referring a dispute to the

International Court of]ustice can be relatively simple since the composition of
the Court and the procedure to be followed are already determined by the
Statute of the Court and the Rules ofCourt. More complex arrangements are
necessary when the parties wish to refer a dispute to an ad hoc Court of
Arbitration. Article 52 of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes concluded at The Hague on 18 October 1907, reads as
follows:
'The Powers which have recourse to arbitration sign a compromis in which the subject of
the dispute is clearly defined, as well as the time allowed for appointing arbitrators, the
form, order and time in which the communication referred to in Article 63 26 must be
made, and the amount of the sum which each party must deposit in advance to defray
the expenses.
'The compromis likewise defines, if there is occasion for it, the manner of appointing
arbitrators, the special powers, if any, conferred on the tribunal, the place of meeting,
the language it shall use, and the languages the employment of which shall be
authorized before it, and, generally speaking, all the conditions on which the parties are
agreed.'27
31.19.
Basing itself on this and other material, the International Law Commission
drew up in 1958 a set of Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure which the General
Assembly brought to the attention of Member States 'for their consideration
and use, in such cases and to such extent as they consider appropriate, in
drawing up treaties of arbitration or compromis. '28 Article 2 of the Model Rules
reads as follows:
'I.
Unless there are earlier agreements which suffice for the purpose, for example in the
undertaking to arbitrate itself, the parties having recourse to arbitration shall
conclude a compromis which shall specify, as a minimum:
(a) The undertaking to arbitrate according to which the dispute is to be submitted
to the arbitrators;
(b) The subject-matter of the dispute and, ifpossible, the points on which the parties
are or are not agreed;
(c) The method of constituting the tribunal and the number of arbitrators.
'2.
In addition, the compromis shall include any other provisions deemed desirable by the
parties, in particular:
(i) The rules oflaw and the principles to be applied by the tribunal, and the right,
if any, conferred on it to decide ex aequo et bono as though it had legislative
functions in the matter;
(ii) The power, if any, of the tribunal to make recommendations to the parties;
(iii) Such power as may be conferred on the tribunal to make its own rules of
procedure;
(iv) The procedure to be followed by the tribunal; provided that, once constituted,
the tribunal shall be free to override any provisions ofthe compromis which may
prevent it from rendering its award;
(v) The number of members required for the constitution of a quorum for the
conduct of the hearings;
(vi) The majority required for the award;
(vii) The time limit within which the award shall be rendered;
(viii) The right of the members of the tribunal to attach dissenting or individual
opinions to the award, or any prohibition of such opinions;
266
Treaties - III
(ix) The languages to be employed in the course of the proceedings;

(x) The manner in which the costs and disbursements shall be appointed;
(xi) The services which the International Court ofJustice may be asked to render.
This enumeration is not intended to be exhaustive.'
31.20.
A recent example of an agreement making provision for reference of a dispute

to an ad hoc Court ofArbitration is provided by the Arbitration Agreement of 10
July 1975 between the United Kingdom and French Governments. 29 This
concerns the delimination ofthe portions ofthe continental shelfappertaining to
each of the two Governments in the English Channel and the South-Western
Approaches westward of 30 minutes west of the Greenwich Meridian as far as
the looo-metre isobath. The text of the Agreement reads as follows:
'The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the French Republic;
Considering that agreement in principle has been reached between the two
Governments on the delimitation of the portion of the continental shelf in the English
Channel eastward of 30 minutes west of the Greenwich Meridian appertaining to each
of them;
Considering that differences have arisen between the two Governments concerning
the delimitation of the portion of the continental shelf westward of 30 minutes west of
that Meridian appertaining to each of them which could not be settled by negotiation;
Considering the urgency ofsettling these differences by a process ofarbitration which
should result in a speedy decision on the remaining issues in dispute;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Court of Arbitration (hereinafter called the Court) shall be composed of:
Sir Humphrey Waldock (nominated by the United Kingdom Government),
Messrs. Paul Reuter (nominated by the French Government),
Herbert Briggs,
Erik Castren,
Endre Ustor.
The president of the Court shall be:
Mr Erik Castren.
2. Should the President or any other Member of the Court be or become unable to
act, the vacancy shall be filled by a new Member appointed by the Government which
nominated the Member to be replaced in the case ofthe two Members nominated by the
United Kingdom and French Governments, or by agreement between the two
Governments in the case of the President or the remaining two Members.
I.
Article
The Court is requested to decide, in accordance with the rules of international

law applicable in the matter as between the Parties, the following question:
What is the course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the portions of the
continental shelf appertaining to the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands and
to the French Republic, respectively, westward of 30 minutes west of Greenwich
Meridan as far as the 1,000 metre isobath?
2. The choice of the 1,000 metre isobath is without prejudice to the position ofeither
Government concerning the outer limit of the continental shelf.
I.
267
Article 3
I. The Court shall, subject to the provisions of this Agreement, determine its own
procedure and all questions affecting the conduct of the arbitration.
2. In the absence of unanimity, the decisions of the Court on all questions, whether
of substance or procedure, shall be given by a majority vote ofits Members, including all
questions relating to the competence of the Court, the interpretation of this Agreement,
and the decision on the question specified in Article 2 hereof.
Article 4
The Parties shall, within fourteen days of the signature ofthe present Agreement,
each appoint an Agent for the purposes of the arbitration, and shall communicate the
name and address of their respective Agents to each other and to the Court.
2. Each Agent so appointed shall be entitled to nominate an Assistant Agent to act
for him as occasion may require. The name and address of any Assistant Agent so
appointed shall be similarly communicated.
I.
Article 5
The Court shall, after consultation with the two Agents, appoint a Registrar and
establish its seat at a place fixed in agreement with the Parties. Until the seat has been
determined the Court may meet at a place provisionally chosen by the President.
Article 6
The proceedings shall be written and oral.
2. Without prejudice to any question as to burden of proof, the Parties agree that
the written proceedings should consist of:
I.
(a) a Memorial to be submitted by each Party not later than six months after signature
of the present Agreement;
(b) a Counter-Memorial to be submitted by each Party within a time-limit of six
months after the exchange of Memorials;
(c) any further pleading found by the Court to be necessary.
The Court shaH have power to extend the time-limits so fixed at the request ofeither
Party.
3. The registrar shall notify to the Parties an address for the filing of their written
pleadings and other documents.
4. The oral hearing shall follow the written proceedings, and shall be held in private
at such place and time as the Court, after consultation with the two Agents, may
determine.
5. The parties may be represented at the oral hearings by their Agents and by such
Counsel and advisers as they may appoint.
Article 7
The pleadings, written and oral, shall be either in the English or in the French
language; the decisions of the Court shall be in both languages.
2. The Court shall, as may be necessary, arrange for translations and interpretations and shall be entitled to engage secretarial and clerical staff, and to make
arrangements in respect of accommodation and the purchase or hire of equipment.
I.
Article 8
The remuneration of Members of the Court shall be borne equally by the two
Governments.
I.
268
Treaties - III
The general expenses of the arbitration shall be borne equally by the two
Governments, but each Government shall bear its own expenses incurred in or for the
preparation and presentation of its case.
2.
Article 9
When the proceedings before the Court have been completed, it shall transmit to
the two Governments its decision on the question specified in Article 2 of the present
Agreement. The decision shall include the drawing of the course of the boundary (or
boundaries) on a chart. To this end, the Court shall be entitled to appoint a technical
expert or experts to assist it in preparing the chart.
2. The decision shall be fully reasoned.
3. If the decision of the Court does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous
opinion of the Members of the Court, any Member shall be entitled to deliver a separate
OpInIOn.
4. Any question ofthe subsequent publication ofthe proceedings shall be decided by
agreement between the two Governments.
I.
Article
10
I. The two Governments agree to accept as final and binding upon them the
decision of the Court on the question specified in Article 2 of the present Agreement.
2. Either party may, within three months of the rendering of the decision, refer to
the Court any dispute between the parties as to the meaning and scope of the decision.
Article
11
I. A Party wishing to carry out, at any time before the Court has rendered its
decision on the question specified in Article 2, any activity in a portion of what it
considers to be its continental shelf within the area submitted to arbitration shall,
subject to the remaining provisions ofthis Article, obtain the prior consent of the other
Party.
2. If such a request for consent is made by one Party the other Party may not
withhold its consent for more than one month nor, if it consents within this period,
subject its consent to conditions, except on the ground that the proposed activity relates
to an area which it intends to claim or might claim as part ofits own continental shelfat
any stage in the course of the arbitration.
3. The Party withholding consent or subjecting its consent to conditions shall, when
notifying the party making the request, briefly state the grounds upon which it justifies
its position.
4. The Party making the request may, if dissatisfied with the justification provided,
refer the issue to the Court for a ruling.
5. Without prejudice to paragraph 4, either party may refer any Jispute as to the
interpretation or application of this Article to the Court for a ruling.
6. The Court shall give, as soon as possible, a ruling on any issue referred to it
pursuant to paragraph 4 or 5, and may order such provisional measures as it considers
desirable to protect the interests of either Party.
Article
12
The present agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective
Governments, have signed the present Agreement.
Compromis d'Abitrage
269
Done in duplicate at Paris this tenth day ofJuly, 1975, in the English and French
languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
EDwARD E. TOMKINS
For the Government of the French Republic

G. DE CoURCEL'
A close study of the text of this Arbitration Agreement reveals that it covers
most of the matters referred to in Article 2 of the Model Rules on Arbitral
Procedure drawn up by the International Law Commission.
31.21.
More complicated examples of arbitration agreements are provided by the

Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) of a Controversy between the
Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile determined by the United
Kingdom Government, done at London on 1 April 1965;30 and the later
Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) of a Controversy between the
Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile concerning the Region of the
Beagle Channel, done at London on 22 July 197 I. 31 Both these Agreements for
Arbitration derive from a General Treaty of Arbitration between the
Argentine Republic and Chile signed at Santiago on 28 May 1902,32 pursuant
to which the High Contracting Parties nominated His Britannic Majesty's
Government as Arbiter. Any points, questions or differences involved were to
be determined by the Contracting Governments who were entitled to define
the scope of the Arbiter's powers and any other circumstance relating to the
procedure; but, in dehmlt ofagreement, either ofthe Parties was empowered to
invite the intervention of the Arbiter, whose duty it would be to determine the
Agreement, the time, place and formalities of the proceedings, as also to settle
any difficulties of procedure as to which disputes might arise in the course ofthe
arbitration. Pursuant to these complex provisions, the United Kingdom
Government determined the Arbitration Agreement (Compromiso) in both
cases, after consultation with the Parties.:B
31.22.
Earlier examples of agreements submitting a particular dispute to arbitration

are provided by the Agreement between the United Kingdom and Greek
Governments regarding the Submission to Arbitration of the Ambatielos claim
signed at London on 24 February 1955;34 and the Arbitration Agreement
between the United Kingdom Government (acting on behalf of the Ruler of
Abu Dhabi and His Highness the Sultan Said bin Taimur) and the
Government of Saudi Arabia, signed at J edda on 30 July 1954. 35
CHAPTER 32
Treaties and other
-IV Ratification, Accession,
Acceptance and Approval
32.1.
The consent of a state to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature,

exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, or by any other means ifso agreed. 1 The treaty itselfmay
provide that it is to enter into force upon signature, in which case the act of
signature definitively expresses the consent ofthe signatory state to be bound by
the treaty.2 In exceptil)nal cases, the initialling of a text may also express the
consent of the states concerned to be bound thereby, when it is established that
the negotiating states have so agreed. 3 It sometimes happens that a
representative of a state is unable to receive positive instructions from his
government which would enable him definitively to express their consent to be
bound by the treaty; or it may be that the government concerned would wish to
have the opportunity to study the authenticated text in greater detail before
taking the final decision. In such circumstances, the representative may sign
the treaty ad referendum. Signature ofa treaty ad referendum by a representative, if
confirmed by the state concerned, constitutes a full signature of the treaty, 4
without, however, signifying immediate adherence to the treaty on the part of
the representative's government. The point of confirming signature ad
referendum is that when in due course full adherence to the treaty is signified, its
validity for the state concerned will be effective from the date ofthe signature ad
referendum (unless the negotiating states otherwise agree).5
32.2.
The majority of multilateral treaties, and a significant proportion of the more

important bilateral treaties are, however, concluded subject to ratification or
some other process of subsequent confirmation, and it is these various processes
which must now be considered.
Ratification
32.3.
From the point of view of form, ratification constitutes a solemn act on the part
of a sovereign or by the president of a republic whereby he declares that a
treaty, convention or other international instrument has been submitted to him
and that after examining it he has given his approval thereto, and undertaken
Ratification
27 I
its complete and faithful observance. International practice varies as to

whether the complete text of the treaty and related instruments should be
reproduced in the instrument ofratification, which is signed by the sovereign or
president, as the case may be, and sealed with the seal of state.
32.4.
In the case of a bilateral treaty, the instrument of ratification is exchanged for a

similar one given by the other party to the treaty. The fact of exchange is
recorded in a certificate of exchange, which is ordinarily drawn up in the
respective languages of the two parties, and signed in duplicate, each party
retaining an original in which it is given the customary precedence. As a rule the
exchange is effected by the head of the department concerned with treaty
formalities in the ministry of foreign affairs of the one country and the
diplomatic agent of the other, or a member of his staff. The issue offull powers
for such a purpose is unnecessary, unless, as has occasionally happened, one of
the parties should insist on this additional formality. The production of the
instruments of ratification by the officials undertaking the exchange is
normally regarded as sufficient evidence that they are authorised to proceed to
the exchange.
32.5.
The form of certificate of exchange used in the United Kingdom in respect of

treaties concluded in heads of state form is as follows:
The Undersigned having met together for the purpose ofexchanging the Instruments of
Ratification of a Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters between Her Majesty The Queen ofthe
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and
Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, in respect of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Federal President of the Republic of Austria, in
respect of the Repu blic of Austria, which was signed at Vienna on the Fourteenth day of
July, 1961; and the respective Ratifications ofthe said Convention having been found in
good and due form, the said exchange took place this day.
In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed the present Certificate.
Done in duplicate at London the Third day of December, 1975.
[Signatures]
32.6.
The form of certificate of exchange used in the United Kingdom in respect of

treaties between governments is as follows:
The Undersigned having met together for the purpose ofexchanging the Instruments of
Ratification of an Agreement for the Avoidance ofDouble Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital which was signed at
Jakarta on the Thirteenth day of March, 1974, by representatives ofthe Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and ofthe Government of
the Republic of Indonesia; and the respective Ratifications of the said Agreement
having been found in good and due form, the said exchange took place this day.
In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed the present Certificate.
Done in duplicate at London the Third day of December, 1975.
[Signature]
If the treaty is concluded in interstate form, the certificate

accordingly.
3 2 .7.
IS
modified
When there are more than two contracting parties to a treaty, it is customary to
have but one original text of the treaty (in all language versions), which is
272
Treaties - IV
signed by the plenipotentiaries and deposited in the archives of the state

wherein it was signed, or of the international organisation under whose
auspices it was concluded, each of the other parties being furnished by that
state or internatioral organisation with a copy of the treaty as signed, certified
by it as correct. 6 The instruments of ratification are then as a rule deposited
with the government of that state, or with the secretary-general of that
international organisation, which, on the occasion of each deposit, delivers a
formal acknowledgement, acte d'acceptation or proces verbal de depot to the state
concerned, and at the same time notifies the fact of such deposit to all the other
states parties or states entitled to become parties. The procedure to be followed
in these cases is ordinarily laid down in the treaty itsel[ 7 In the United
Kingdom, the treaty-making power is vested in the Sovereign and the
ratification of a treaty concluded in heads of state form is effected by means of
an instrument of ratification signed by the Sovereign and sealed with the Great
Seal. 8 In practice the Sovereign acts on the advice of his or her responsible
ministers and, in certain circumstances, notably where the execution of a
treaty involves financial commitments or a cession of territory, the approval of
Parliament will first be sought. Furthermore, if legislation is required to carry
out the provisions of the treaty, Parliament will be asked to enact the necessary
implementing legislation before the United Kingdom instrument of ratification is exchanged or deposited. Whether or not specific implementing
legislation is required, the practice (followed generally by all governments for
the past fifty years) is nevertheless to lay before Parliament the texts ofall treaty
instruments requiring ratification and not to proceed to ratification until, in
the case of a particular treaty instrument for which no further Parliamentary
action is required, a period of twenty-one sitting days has elapsed. 9
32.8.
A number of legal points arise in connection with ratification. There is first a

certain confusion as to what the term 'ratification' precisely connotes. It can be
variously used to describe:
(a) The act of the appropriate organ of the state (sovereign, president or
federal council) which signifies the consent of the state to be bound by the
treaty;
(b) The internationally agreed procedure whereby a treaty formally enters
into force, that is to say, the formal exchange or deposit of instruments of
ra tification;
(c) The actual document or instrument whereby a state expresses its consent
to be bound by the treaty; and
(d) More loosely, the approval of the legislature or other state organ whose
approval may be constitutionally necessary as a condition precedent to
ratification in the sense of (a) above. lo
As ratification is a technical term of international law, this last usage of the
term, which is sometimes popularly translated into 'Parliamentary ratification'
is incorrect. In the United Kingdom, it is the Crown which ratifies, not
Parliament, though Parliament may, as a condition precedent to ratification,
be invited to approve and, if necessary, to legislate. Thus, (a) is the correct
technical sense of the term. Where (b) is intended, reference should be made to
the exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification; and, strictly speaking,
Ratification
273
where (c) is intended, reference should be made to the instrument ofratification

rather than to ratification tout court.
32.9.
The second legal point relates to the purpose which ratification (and indeed
other forms of subsequent confirmation) is designed to serve. McNair explains
the position succinctly:
'Ratification is not (or, at any rate, since the days ofabsolute monarchs it has not been) a
mere formality, like the use of a seal, or parchment, or tape. Ratification has a value
which should not be minimized. The interval between the signature and the ratification
of a treaty gives the appropriate departments of the Governments that have negotiated
the treaty an opportunity of studying the advantages and disadvantages involved in the
proposed treaty as a whole, and of doing so in a manner more detached, more leisurely,
and more comprehensive than is usually open to their representatives while negotiating
the treaty. However careful may have been the preparation of their instructions, it
rarely happens that the representatives of both parties can succeed in producing a draft
which embodies the whole of their respective instructions; some concession on one side
and some element of compromise are present in practically every negotiation. It is
therefore useful that in the case of important treaties Governments should have the
opportunity of reflection afforded by the requirement of ratification. Moreover, the
more careful the preparation of the treaty and the more deliberate the decision to accept
it, the more likely is the treaty to be founded upon the interests of the parties and to be
observed by them.'ll
32. I o.
The third legal point of interest is that ratification must, in principle, be

unconditional. Its operative effect cannot, unless the treaty itself specifically so
provides,12 be made dependent on the receipt or deposit of ratifications by
other states.
32. I I.
The fourth legal point of significance is that ratification, being in part a

confirmation of a signature already given, must relate to what the signature
relates to, and must therefore relate to the treaty in its entirety, and as such, and
not merely to a part of it, unless the treaty itselfprovides that states may elect to
become bound by a certain part or parts only; this is ofcourse without prejudice
to the possibility of attaching reservations to the instrument of ratification,
which is considered more fully in Chapter 33.
32. 12.
Finally, there are the related questions of which treaties require ratification
and which do not; and whether, assuming the treaty to be one which requires
ratification, there is any duty to ratify.
32. I 3.
The older view was that, in principle, all treaties required ratification in order
to become valid and binding. The International Law Commission have
explained the reasons for this view:
'The modern institution of ratification in international law developed in the course of
the nineteenth century. Earlier, ratification had been an essentially formal and limited
act by which, after a treaty had been drawn up, a sovereign confirmed, or finally
verified, the full powers previously issued to his representative to negotiate the treaty. It
was then not an approval of the treaty itself, but a confirmation that the representative
had been invested with authority to negotiate it and, that being so, there was an
obligation upon the sovereign to ratify his representative's full powers, ifthese had been
in order. Ratification came, however, to be used in the majority of cases as the means of
submitting the treaty-making power of the executive to parliamentary control, and
274
Treaties - IV
ultimately the doctrine of ratification underwent a fundamental change.

It was established that the treaty itself was subject to subsequent ratification by the
State before it became binding. Furthermore, this development took place at a time
when the great majority of international agreements were formal treaties. Not
unnaturally, therefore, it came to be the opinion that the general rule is that ratification
is necessary to render a treaty binding. '13
32.14.
As late as 1929, the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice gave expression

to this traditional view in the Territorial]urisdiction ofthe International Commission
of the River Oder case by referring to the rule that 'conventions, save in certain
exceptional cases, are binding only by virtue of their ratification.' 14
32.15.
It is extremely doubtful, however, whether the traditional view still holds good.
Several leading modern authorities have taken the view that the necessity for
ratification is not inherent but depends essentially on the intention of the
parties to the particular treaty; and that present-day state practice shows that
treaties in which there is no clear evidence, express or implied, of the parties'
intentions as to the mode ofentry into force almost without exception enter into
force on signature. IS
32.16.
Fortunately, the dispute as to the nature of the underlying rule is more

theoretical than real; for it is now almost the invariable rule for the treaty itself
to contain either an express stipulation or other clear indication as to the
intention of the parties on the question whether ratification is required. Where
the parties do not regard ratification as necessary, the treaty usually states that
it will come into force upon signature, or on a certain date, or upon the
happening of a certain event.
32.17.
At the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, there was extended

discussion on whether there should be incorporated in the Law of Treaties
Convention a residual rule in favour of signature or of ratification when a
treaty was silent as to how consent to be bound should be expressed. In the
event, the debate was inconclusive. The Convention as adopted makes no
attempt to resolve the doctrinal argument as to whether there should be a
presumption in favour of signature or ratification as a means of expressing a
state's consent to be bound when the particular treaty is silent on the matter.
The Convention simply enumerates the circumstances in which consent to be
bound is expressed by signature, and the circumstances in which consent to be
bound is expressed by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 16
3 2 18.
It used to be thought that heads of state were under a binding legal duty to
ratify treaties entered into by plenipotentiaries appointed by them, save in
those exceptional cases where the plenipotentiaries had exceeded the
instructions contained in their full powers. This view is, however, no longer
held. As Judge Moore said in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case:
'The doctrine that Governments are bound to ratify whatever their plenipotentiaries,
acting within the limits of their instructions, may sign, and that treaties may therefore be
regarded as legally operative and enforceable before they have been ratified, is obsolete,
and lingers only as an echo from the past.'17
On the other hand, although ratification is a matter of discretion, it is not

generally the practice of an enlightened government to sign a treaty unless it
275
Ratification
means to make an effort in good faith to ratify it in due course. As McNair

rightly says, 'to withhold ratification lightly and without adequate reason ... is
a breach of courtesy.' 18 But, as is well known, governments may meet with
insuperable political difficulties which preclude ratification. 19
32 19.
It is not customary to fix a time limit for ratification and, unless the treaty
provides otherwise, there is no rule oflaw as to the date within which, ifat all, it
must take place. Frequently several years may elapse between signature and
ratification. 20
Examples of instruments of ratification

I.
Theform ofratification ofa treaty between heads ofstate given by Her Majesty in respect ofthe
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories
Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, etc., etc., etc. To all and
singular to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting!
Whereas a Convention establishing the European Centre for Medium-range
Weather Forecasts, open for signature at Brussels, from the 11th day ofOctober 1973
to the 1uh day of April 1974 by the Heads ofcertain European States, was signed by
the Plenipotentiary of Us, in respect of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, on the 1uh day of October 1973;
We, having seen and considered the Convention aforesaid, have approved,
accepted and confirmed the same in all and everyone of its Articles and Clauses, as
We do by these Presents approve, accept, confirm and ratify it, in respect of Our
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland only, for Ourselves, Our
Heirs and Successors; Engaging and Promising upon Our Royal Word that We will
sincerely and faithfully perform and observe all and singular the things which are
contained and expressed in the Convention aforesaid, and that We will never suffer
the same to be violated by anyone, or transgressed in any manner, as far as it lies in
Our power. For the greater testimony and validity ofall which, We have caused Our
Great Seal to be affixed to these Presents, which We have signed with Our Royal
Hand.
Given at Our Court of Saint James's the Eighth day ofJuly in the Year of Our Lord
One thousand Nine hundred and Seventy-five and in the Twenty-fourth Year of
Our Reign.
(Signed)
(Seal)
2.
ELIZABETH
R.
The form of United Kingdom ratification of a bilateral treaty concluded between states
WHEREAS a Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the

Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income was signed at London on
the Thirtieth day of April, One thousand Nine hundred and Sixty-nine, by
representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of
the Republic of Austria, which Convention is, word for word, as follows:
(Texts)
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
having considered the Convention aforesaid, hereby confirm and ratify the same and
276
Treaties - / V
undertake faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations therein contained.
In witness whereof this Instrument of Ratification is signed and sealed by Her
Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
Done at London the Fifth day ofSeptember, One thousand Nine hundred and Sixtynme.
(Signed) MICHAEL STEWART
(Seal)
3. Governmental ratification
WHEREAS a Cultural Convention was signed at London on the second day ofMay,
One thousand Nine hundred and Seventy-four, by representatives ofthe Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the Government of
the Kingdom of Denmark, which Convention is, word for word, as follows:
(Texts)
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
having considered the Convention aforesaid, hereby confirm and ratify the same and
undertake faithfully to perform and carry out all the stipulations therein contained.
In witness whereof this Instrument of Ratification is signed and sealed by Her
Done at London the First day of August, One thousand Nine hundred and Seventyfour.
(Signed) JAMES CALLAGHAN
(Seal)
Accession
32.21.
Accession is the traditional process whereby a state may, in certain

circumstances, become a party to a treaty of which it is not a signatory. The
process is sometimes designated as 'adherence' or 'adhesion,' the French
equivalent of 'accession' being' adhesion.' The correct English term is, however,
'accession. '
32.22.
Accession is normally a secondary process - that is to say, the act whereby a

state accepts the offer or the opportunity of becoming a party to a treaty
already negotiated and signed by some other states. 21 But it can exceptionally
constitute the primary (indeed the exclusive) process whereby a state may
express its consent to be bound by a treaty. This is particularly the case with
certain treaties negotiated under the auspices of the League of Nations or the
United Nations. Thus, the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes was drafted by a Commission set up by the Assembly of
the League of Nations, was subsequently discussed and modified, and was
eventually adopted by the Assembly itself and was then left open for accession.
It was not signed by representatives of members of the League, and the
customary articles providing for signature and ratification are lacking.
Accession was the only means of becoming a party to it. The relevant provisions
(Arts. 43 and 44) simply provide that 'the present General Act shall be open to
accession by all the Heads of State or other competent authorities of the
Members of the League of Nations and the non-Member States to which the
Council of the League of Nations has communicated a copy for this purpose'
Accession
277
(Art. 43); and that 'the present General Act shall come into force on the
ninetieth day following the receipt by the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations of the accession of not less than two Contracting Parties', (Art. 44).:!:!
The Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 28 April 1949 23 not
unnaturally follows the same pattern.
32.23.
Another example of the use of accession as the sole means whereby a state can
become party to a treaty is provided by the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations approved by the United Nations General
Assembly on 13 February, 1946.24 Sections 31, 32 and 34 are the relevant
provisions and bear setting out in full:
'Section 3 I - This Convention is submitted to every Member of the United Nations for
acceSSIOn.
'Section 32 - Accession shall be effected by deposit of an instrument with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations and the Convention shall come into force as regards each
Member on the date of deposit of each instrument of accession.
'Section 34 - It is understood that, when an instrument ofaccession is deposited on behalf
of any Member, the Member will be in a position under its own law to give effect to the
terms of this Convention.'
Similar, but slightly more complex, provisions are contained in the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies of the United
Nations adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 21 November
1947. Again, accession is the only means whereby a state can become a party to
this Convention, but each state party is required to indicate in its instrument of
accession the specialised agency or agencies in respect of which it undertakes
to apply the provisions of the Convention (with an option to make su bsequent
notifications covering further specialised agencies). 25
32 2 4.
It should be stressed, however, that accession as a primary process whereby

states express their consent to be bound by a treaty is exceptional. Multilateral
treaties concluded under the auspices of the United Nations will normally
make provision for the treaty to be open for signature by states 26 until a
stipulated date and thereafter to be open for accession. Thus, Article 8 I of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that:
'The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States Members of the
United Nations or of any of the specialised agencies or of the International Atomic
Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International Court ofJustice, and by any
other State invited by the General Assembly ofthe United Nations to become a party to
the Convention, as follows: until 30 November, 1969, at the Federal Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria, and subsequently, until 30 April, 1970, at
United Nations Headquarters, New York.'27
Article 82 then provides that the Convention is subject to ratification and that
the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. Finally, and in order to enable these states which have not
signed the Convention by the terminal date specified in Article 8 I to become
parties thereto, Article 83 stipulates that:
'The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State belonging to any
278
Treaties - I V
of the categories mentioned in Article 81. The instruments of accession shall be

deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.'28
32.25.
It used to be thought that it was legally impossible to accede to a treaty which

was not yet formally in force. The rationale of the view was that accession
amounted in essence to acceptance of a contract already entered into, thereby
i!TIplying an operative instrument to accede to. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice puts
it:
'Strictly, accession implies, and should only be made to, a treaty already in force. It is
essentially a method ofjoining a "going concern" so to speak, and this results from the
fact (which constitutes the fundamental difference between accession and signature)
that accession is essentially the acceptance of something already done - not a
participation in the doing ofit. Exceptionally, however, - and particularly in the type of
case where there is no signature at all - accessions prior to coming into force may be
admitted and may have to be admitted.'29
32.26.
It must be admitted, however, that, whatever may be the doctrinaljustification

for the view that accession can only be made to a treaty already in force,
modern practice contradicts it. As the International Law Commission have
pointed out:
'... an examination of the most recent treaty practice shows that in practically all
modern treaties which contain accession clauses the right to accede is made independent
of the entry into force of the treaty, either expressly, by allowing accession to take place
before the date fixed for the entry into force of the treaty, or impliedly, by making the
entry into force of the treaty conditional on the deposit, inter alia, of instruments of
accession. '30
It may therefore be concluded that it is open to the states negotiating a treaty to

provide that it should be open to accession at once (or after the expiry of a
stipulated period), even before the treaty has formally entered into force; and
likewise to provide that accessions shall rank equally with ratifications in
making up the number of firm expressions of consent to be bound required to
bring the treaty into force. 31
32.27.
Accession as a secondary process comprehends accession as of right (where the

treaty expressly provides that certain states or categories ofstates may accede to
it) and accession by invitation (where the treaty expressly provides that nonsignatory states may accede only upon the invitation of the contracting parties
or of a body representative of the contracting parties which has been set up by
the treaty). Many examples exist of treaty provisions where accession is by
invitation only. Thus, Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949,32
provides tha t:
'The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to
the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government ofthe United
States of America. The Government of the United States ofAmerica will inform each of
the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.'
By virtue of a Protocol of 17 October 195 1,33 the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty gave their unanimous consent to the despatch ofan invitation to Greece
Accession
279
and Turkey to accede to the Treaty, Article I of the Protocol providing that:
'Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of
America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the
Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to
accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article 11 of the present
Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each
become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the
Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article ID of the
Treaty.'
A similar Protocol of 23 October 195434 conveyed an invitation to the

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
32.28.
The nature of a treaty may be such that the contracting parties may wish to
subject an invitation to a state to accede to conditions to be agreed between
them and the state so invited. Thus, Article IX of the Treaty of Economic,
Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at
Brussels on 17 March 194835 (popularly known as the 'Brussels Treaty')
provided that:
'The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to
the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.
'Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument
of accession with the Belgian Government.
'The Belgian Government will inform each of the High Contracting Parties of the
deposit of each instrument of accession.'
On 23 October 1954, the parties to the Brussels Treaty extended an invitation

to the Federal Republic of Germany and to Italy to accede to the Treaty, but
only as modified and completed by a series of protocols which inter alia
constituted the Parties members of Western European Union. 36
32 2 9.
Where a treaty is the constitutive instrument of an international organisation,

the admission of a new member state (on such terms and conditions as the
constitutive instrument may lay down) may be regarded as equivalent to
accession. Thus, the Charter of the United Nations stipulates (Art. 4) that:
'I.
'2.
3 2 .3 0 .
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in thejudgement ofthe
Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Counci1'37
Where the treaty is a constitutive instrument of an international organisation

establishing a customs union or economic community, the conditions of
admission will of necessity require detailed negotiation between the existing
members and the applicant state. Article 237 of the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community provides that:
'Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall
address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the
280
Treaties - IV
opinion of the Commission.

'The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessitated thereby
shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant
States. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States
in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.'
In the case of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, which applied in
1970 to become members of the three European Communities (that is to say,
the European Economic Community, EURATOM and the European Coal
and Steel Community), the conditions of admission and the adjustments to
the Treaties were established after laborious negotiations culminating in the
signature, on 22 January 1972, of the Treaty concerning the accession of the
new Member States to the European Economic Community and EURATOM
and the parallel Decision of the Council concerning their accession to the
European Coal and Steel Community. Article I of the Treaty of Accession
provides that:
'I.
'2.
The Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland ... and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland hereby become members of the European Economic
Community and Parties to the Treaties establishing these Communities as amended
and supplemented.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties establishing the
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community
necessitated thereby are set out in the Act annexed to this Treaty. The provisions of
that Act concerning the European Economic Community and the European
Atomic Energy Community shall form an integral part of this Treaty.'
32.3 I.
In a case such as this, where the new member state isjoining a 'going concern'
(to use Fitzmaurice's phrase) and where the constitutive treaties have theirown
inbuilt dynamic, accession (or admission) may be rendered possible on terms
which put the new member state in a different position from the other
contracting parties, at least for a transitional period. Normally speaking,
however, any state exercising the right of accession given to it in a treaty enjoys
the same rights and becomes subject to the same obligations as the other
contracting parties, whether original signatories or states who have
subsequently acceded. Accordingly, in principle, and unless the particular
treaty otherwise provides, the legal effect of accession is the same in all respects
as that of ratification, and there is no difference of any kind as regards the
status, rights and obligations of states participating by way of accession as
compared with those of states participating by way of signature followed by
ratification.
32.32.
Sometimes, a purported instrument of accession is expressed to be 'subject to

ratification.' The Assembly ofthe League ofNations considered this question in
1927 and adopted a resolution to the following effect:
'The procedure of accession to international agreements given subject to ratification is
an admissible one which the League should neither discourage nor encourage.
Nevertheless, if a State gives its accession it should know that, if it does not expressly
mention that this accession is subject to ratification, it shall be deemed to have
undertaken a final obligation. If it desires to prevent this consequence, it must expressly
declare at the time of accession that the accession is given subject to ratification. '38
Accession
28 I
Present-day practice, however, discourages this procedure. In his capacity as

depositary ofmultilateral treaties, the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations
considers an instrument of accession declared to be subject to ratification
'simply as a notification of the government's intention to become a party;' and
he draws the attention of the government concerned to the fact that the
instrument does not entitle it to become a party and underlines that 'it is only
when an instrument containing no reference to subsequent ratification is
deposited that the State will be included among the parties to the agreement
and the other governments concerned notified to that effect.' The International
Law Commission have expressed the view that the attitude adopted by the
Secretary-General towards an instrument of accession expressed to be subject to
ratification is 'entirely correct. '39
32.33.
Finally it is necessary to say a few words about which states may accede to a
treaty. It would seem beyond dispute that no state, uninvited, has a right by
means of accession to make itself a party to a treaty between two or more other
states; and that, accordingly, accession can only take place when the original
parties to the treaty consent, either generally by means of a provision in the
treaty or ad hoc, and only upon the conditions laid down by them for accession. 40
But this does not entirely dispose of the problem. It has been suggested that the
principle of universality imperatively requires that all states should be entitled
to participate in general multilateral treaties, defined for this purpose as
treaties which concern general norms of international law or which deal with
matters of general interest to states as a whole. A proposal to this effect was
advanced at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties by a group of
Eastern European and non-aligned states. 41 The proposal was, however,
rejected by the Conference mainly on the ground that it ran contrary to the
principle that states are, and should be, free to choose their treaty partners. 42
32.34.
International law prescribes no particular form for an instrument ofaccession,

though the treaty itself may do so. An instrument of accession is a formal
instrument, and it seems inconceivable that an oral communication would
suffice. Accession is carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
the particular treaty, either by the deposit of a formal instrument of accession
with the depositary government or authority indicated in the treaty, or by a
notification in the form of a letter addressed to that government or authority.
The instrument or notification emanates from the executive authority of the
state. It will enter into force on the date of deposit or notification, unless the
treaty otherwise provides. Where the deposit or notification takes place, in
accordance with the treaty, before the date of entry into force ofthe treaty, the
accession will not take effect unless and until the treaty itself enters into force.
32.35.
Example of instrument of accession

The form of United Kingdom accession to a multilateral treaty concluded between states
WHEREAS a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral

Awards was open for signature at New York from the Tenth day ofJune to the Thirtyfirst day of December, One thousand Nine hundred and Fifty-eight, by representatives
282
Treaties - IV
of certain Powers and States;

AND WHEREAS paragraph I of Article IX of the said Convention provides that
States Members of the United Nations may accede thereto;
NOW THEREFORE the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
hereby accede to the said Convention and undertake faithfully to perform and carry out
all the stipulations therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF this Instrument ofAccession is signed and sealed by Her
DONE at London, the Fourth day 01 August, Une thousand Nme hundred and
Seventy-five.
(Seal)
(Signed) JAMES CALLAGHAN

32.36.
Acceptance and approval, as alternative methods of particIpation in a

multilateral treaty, may conveniently be considered together. Acceptance has,
during the past thirty years, become established in treaty practice as a new
procedure for becoming a party to treaties. It is, as the International Law
Commission rightly point out, 'an innovation which is more one ofterminology
than of method. '43
32.37.
Where a treaty is made open to 'acceptance' without prior signature, the

process is akin to accession. Thus, Article 14 of the Statute of The Hague
Conference on Private International Law drawn up at The Hague between 9
and 31 October 195144 provides that:
'The present Statute shall be submitted for the acceptance of the Governments of the
States which participated in one or more sessions of the Conference. It shall enter into
force from the date that it is accepted by the majority of the States represented at the
Seventh Session.
'The declaration of acceptance shall be deposited with the Netherlands Government,
which shall inform the Governments referred to in the first paragraph of this Article.
'The same shall apply, in the case ofthe admission ofa new State, to the declaration of
acceptance of that State.'
32.38.
In other cases, 'acceptance' is akin to ratification. Thus, Article XIX of the

Agreement on the Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in
Iceland signed in Geneva on 25 September 1956,45 provides that:
'I.
'2.
This Agreement shall remain open until I December, 1956, for signature by the
Governments named in the Preamble.
This Agreement shall be subject to acceptance by the signatory Governments.
Instruments of acceptance shall be deposited as soon as possible with the SecretaryGeneral, who shall inform all signatory and acceding Governments of the date of
deposit of each such instrument.'
That 'acceptance' in this particular Agreement is regarded as equivalent to

ratification is confirmed by the fact that a later provision (Article XX) provides
that the Agreement is open for accession by the government of any state
member of the United Nations or of a Specialised Agency in relationship
therewith.

32.39.
283
Reference to 'acceptance' as a method of participation in a treaty may also be

found in the so-called 'triple option' clause to be found in many international
conventions. An example is the Convention on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organisation signed at Geneva on 6 March 1948,46
Article 57 of which provides that:
'... the present Convention shall remain open for signature or acceptance and States
may become parties to the Convention by:
(a) Signature without reservation as to acceptance;

(b) Signature subject to acceptance followed by acceptance; or
(c) Acceptance.
Acceptance shall be effected by the deposit ofan instrument with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.'47
32.40.
The advantage ofa provision for acceptance in a treaty is that it may enable the
treaty to enter into force earlier than if the treaty had provided for 'ratification'
eo nomine. The constitutional procedures ofsome states require the assent ofthe
legislature before a treaty can be formally ratified, and it may be possible to
accomplish the process of 'acceptance' by executive action alone. 48
32-41.
The form of an instrument of acceptance is, in United Kingdom practice,

identical with that of an instrument ofratification except that it reads 'confirm
and accept' instead of 'confirm and ratify.'
32.42.
What has been said above about 'acceptance' applies mutatis mutandis to
'approval,' whose introduction into the terminology of treaty-making is even
more recent than that of 'acceptance.' 'Approval' appears more often in the
form of 'signature subject to approval,' where, according to Liang, approval is
apparently used 'to indicate the approbation, by the process of municipal law,
of the terms ofa treaty, as contradistinguished from "acceptance" which is used
to indicate the formal act evidencing the actual acceptance of the treaty by the
State. '49 The opening of a treaty to 'approval' without signature appears to be
rare. 50
CHAPTER 33
Treaties and other

- VReservations, Notice of
Termination and
Registration
33. I.
This chapter is devoted to certain miscellaneous, but controversial, aspects of

the law of treaties.
Reservations
33. 2 .
A reservation is defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as:

' ... a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude
or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State. '1
It may sometimes be difficult to distinguish a 'reservation' from an

interpretative statement or declaration made by a state when expressing its
consent to be bound by a treaty; but, in principle, interpretative statements or
declarations are not subject to the legal regime applicable to reservations as
such. As Sir Humphrey Waldock has put it, with reference to the definition
contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
'When the International Law Commission had drafted sub-paragraph (d), it had
taken cognizance of the existence of declarations as to interpretation and had
accordingly drafted sub-paragraph (d) in its present form. Some such declarations were
of a general nature and represented an objective interpretation ofwhat was understood
to be the meaning of a treaty. The purpose of others was to clarify the meaning of
doubtful clauses or of clauses which were controversial for certain States. Others again
dealt with the application of a treaty in certain circumstances peculiar to a State. The
Commission had considered that reservations should be understood to mean
declarations which purported to exclude or vary the legal effect of certain provisions in
their application to a particular State. That question called for thorough examination,
but the Conference should be very cautious about the application of the term
"reservations" to declarations as to interpretation in general.'2
Reservations
33.3.
285
McNair3 indicates the object and purpose of a reservations regime m the

following terms:
'A State which, while wishing to become a party to a treaty, considers that it can only do
so if it can exclude or modify the application to itself of one or more of its particular
provisions, can achieve this object in one of the following ways:
By inducing the other party or parties to insert an express term to this effect ... ;
2. By a reservation attached to the signature of a treaty by its representatives and duly
recorded in a proces-verbal or protocol of signature;
3. By a reservation attached to the ratification and duly recorded;
4. In the case ofa treaty left open for accession, by a reservation attached to its accession
and duly recorded.'
I.
33.4.
Where the particular treaty specifies whether, and if so what, reservations can
be made, the terms of the treaty will prevail; and, in the case of treaties
concluded under the auspices of certain international organisations, 'reservations' clauses, varying in their formulation and effect, are a standard feature.
The practice of the Council of Europe affords a good illustration of the variety
of 'reservations' clauses which may be found in multilateral conventions: all
these 'reservations' clauses were, of course, agreed upon by the negotiating
states within the framework of the negotiations and then incorporated in the
final text of the particular convention.
33.5
An example of a specific 'reservations' clause is to be found in the European

Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, done at Strasbourg on 29
April 1957, 4 Article 35 of which stipulates that:
'I.
'2.
33. 6 .
The High Contracting Parties may only make reservations which exclude from the
application of this Convention disputes concerning particular cases or clearly
specified subject matters, such as territorial status, or disputes falling within clearly
defined categories. If one of the High Contracting Parties has made a reservation,
the other Parties may enforce the same reservation in regard to that Party.
Any reservation made shall, unless otherwise expressly stated, be deemed not to
apply to the procedure of conciliation.'
This is an example of a reservation clause expressed in fairly general terms, but

related closely to the contents of the particular convention. Other reservations
clauses may, however, be expressed in more precise terms and may indeed
particularise the precise reservations which are permissible. Thus, Article 3 of
the European Convention on Compulsory Insurance against Civil Liability in
respect of Motor Vehicles, done at Strasbourg on 20April 1959,5 provides that:
'Any Contracting Party may, when signing this Convention or on depositing its
instrument of ratification or accession, declare that it avails itself of one or more of the
reservations provided for in Annex 11 to the Convention.'
Annex 11 then lists sixteen precisely formulated reservations (for example, 'to
exempt from compulsory insurance damages for pain and suffering') which a
contracting party may make. Similar provisions will be found in the European
Convention providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration, done at Strasbourg on
20 January 1966.6 where Annex 11 to the Convention lists fifteen precisely
formulated reservations, and in the European Convention on Consular
Functions, done at Strasbourg on I I December 1967,7 where Annex I to the
286
Treaties - V
Convention lists four specific reservations which a contracting party may

make.
33.7.
In certain cases, the faculty of making a specified reservation may be limited to

particular states identified by name. Article 7 of the European Convention on
the Place of Payment of Money Liabilities, done at Basle on 16 May 1972,ij
provides that:
'The provisions of this Convention or of Annex I hereto shall not be subject to any
reservation with the exception of that referred to in Annex 11 to this Convention.'
Annex 11 then provides that:

'Any of the States mentioned hereafter may, at the time ofsignature or when depositing
its instrument ofratification or acceptance ofthe Convention, declare that it reserves the
right not to apply the provisions of Article 3 of Annex I:
Italy
The Netherlands.'
33. 8.
In other cases, the particular convention may prohibit reservations altogether.

Thus, Article 39 ofthe European Convention on State Immunity, done at Basle
on 16 May 1972,9 specifically provides that 'no reservation is permitted to the
present Convention.' A similar provision will be found in the European
Convention on the Establishment of a Scheme of Registration ofWills, done at
Basle on 16 May 1972,10 and in the European Convention relating to Stops on
Bearer Securities in International Circulation, done at The Hague on 28 May
197 0 . 11
33.9.
Where the particular treaty contains a 'reservations' clause, questions

concerning the legal effect of reservations made to that treaty will primafacie be
governed by the terms of the treaty; and it is only when the terms of the treaty
are ambiguous or unclear that reference may have to be made to the rules of
general international law concerning the formulation, making, and legal effect
of reservations. It is now necessary to survey briefly the principal features ofthe
controversy which has built up over the past fifty years on the question of
reservations to multilateral conventions.
33. 10 .
It maybe said at the outset that the area of controversy, at least in modern
times, has largely been confined to the cases of those multilateral conventions
which contain no 'reservations' clauses and are therefore silent on the question
of reservations. 12 In the case of negotiations for a bilateral treaty, the question of
reservations rarely arises since it is generally accepted that an attempt by one of
the two negotiating states unilaterally to vary the terms of the agreed text after
the conclusion of the negotiations will simply mean that negotiations will have
to be resumed so that consensus ad idem can be reached on the text. As Reuter
puts it: 13
'En effet, bien que techniquement possible pour un traite bilateral, la "reserve" ne
constitue pas dans le cadre de ce dernier une figure juridique pratique, ni originale, car
die se ramene cl rouvrir apres leur cUhure les negociations.'
Reservations
287
The traditional view

33.11.
Traditionally, the generally accepted view was that a state which sought
subsequently to attach a reservation to a multilateral convention the text of
which had been established ne varietur could only do so with the assent of the
other parties or potential parties to the convention. This view was based inter
alia on the practice of the League of Nations. In 1927, a problem had arisen in
connection with the Convention of 19 February 1925 for the Suppression ofthe
Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (popularly referred to as the Second Opium
Convention). Austria, who had not participated in the negotiations leading up
to the establishment of the text of the Convention, had been invited to sign it;
and duly tendered a signature accompanied by a reservation in respect of
certain clauses. The Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of
International Law was thereupon instructed to review the question of the
admissibility of such reservations and, on 17 June 1927 tendered a report, the
gist of which is contained in the following passage:
'In order that any reservation whatever may be validly made in regard to a clause ofthe
treaty, it is essential that this reservation should be accepted by all the contracting
parties, as would have been the case if it had been put forward in the course of the
negotiations. If not, the reservation, like the signature to which it is attached, is null and
void. '14
33.12.
It will be noted that there was a close link between the unanimity rule for the
establishment of the text ofa multilateral convention and the unanimity rule for
the admissibility of reservations to that text. So long as it was accepted that the
text of a multilateral convention could be established only by the unanimous
agreement of the participating states, so long was it understood that subsequent
reservations to that text required, in order to be accepted as valid, the
unanimous consent of the parties to the convention. 15
The Genocide Convention case

33.13.
The traditional 'unanimity rule' governing the admissibility of reservations to

multilateral conventions was applied in the practice of the League of Nations
Secretariat as depositary of certain multilateral conventions; and this practice
was taken over by the United Nations Secretariat on the demise of the League
of Nations in 1946.16 The traditional rule was not, however, universally
acknowledged to be correct. A small number of states, notably from Eastern
Europe, adhered to the principle that every state has a sovereign right to make
reservations at will and unilaterally, and to become a party to treaties subject to
such reservations, even if they are objected to by other contracting states. A
larger group of Latin-American states applied the more flexible PanAmerican system (based upon a resolution of the Governing Board of the PanAmerican Union of 4 May 1932) whereby:
(a) as between states which ratify a treaty without reservations, the treaty
applies in the terms in which it was originally drafted and signed;
(b) as between states which ratify a treaty with reservations and states which
288
Treaties - V
accept those reservations, the treaty applies in the form in which it may be
modified by the reservations; and
(c) as between states which ratify a treaty with reservations and states which,
having already ratified, do not accept those reservations, the treaty will not
be in force. 17
33. I 4.
Matters came to a head in 1950 when a number of reservations were made to

the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(the 'Genocide Convention') adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 9 December 1948. The Genocide Convention contains no provision
governing reservations. The Secretary-General had become involved in
correspondence with a number of states who had objected to certain of these
reservations, and a number of difficult legal questions had arisen. Accordingly,
the General Assembly decided to seek an advisory opinion from the
International Court ofJustice on certain questions relating to the reservations
to the Genocide Convention. The most significant of these questions were:
I.
2.
Can the reserving state be regarded as being a party to the Convention

while still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one
or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others?
If the answer to question I is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the
reservation as between the reserving state and
(a) The parties which object to the reservation?
(b) Those which accept it?
The Court 18 held, by a majority of seven votes

question I:
to
five, in response to
that a state which has made and maintained a reservation which has been
objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others,
can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is
compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that
state cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention.
The Court further held, again by a majority ofseven votes to five, in response to
question 2:
(a) that if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers
to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in
fact consider that the reserving state is not a party to the Convention; and
(b) that if, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being
compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact
consider that the reserving state is a party to the Convention.
This sibylline pronouncement was initially greeted with less than enthusiasm.
The advisory opinion was exposed to penetrating criticism by Fitzmaurice l9
and others, particularly on the ground that the 'compatibility' test as
formulated by the Court would prove to be unworkable in practice, and was in
any event fundamentally subjective and uncertain in its application.
33. I 5
Developments subsequent to the Genocide Convention case

Simultaneously with seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court
Reservations
28 9
of Justice on the question of reservations to the Genocide Convention, the

General Assembly had invited the International Law Commission 'to study the
question of reservations to multilateral conventions both from the point ofview
of codification and from that of the progressive development of international
law'; and to report urgently thereon. 2o
33.16.
The Commission undertook this study as a matter of priority and reported in

1951. It expressed the view that the 'compatibility' criterion, as formulated by
the Court in the Genocide Convention case, was too subjective and was not suitable
for application to multilateral conventions in general. 21 The Commission
thought it reasonable to assume that 'ordinarily at least, the parties regard the
provisions of the convention as an integral whole, and that a reservation to any
of them may be deemed to impair its object and purpose.'22 Additional
considerations were that so long as the application of the criterion of
compatibility remained a matter of subjective discretion, some of the parties
being willing to accept a reservation and others not, the status of a reserving
state in relation to the convention must remain uncertain; and that this could
throw doubt on the status of the convention itself since there might be a
question as to whether an instrument of ratification or accession accompanied
by a reservation to which objection had been taken by some states would count
towards the number of ratifications or accessions required to bring the
convention into force. 23
33. 1 7.
The Commission accordingly recommended reversion to the traditional rule

requiring unanimous consent for the admission of a state as a party to a treaty
subject to a reservation, while at the same time proposing certain minor
modifications in the application of the rule.
33 18.
The Commission's 1951 report on reservations to multilateral conventions met

with a mixed reception in the General Assembly. The only outcome was a
'neutral' resolution 24 which, as regards reservations to the Genocide
Convention, requested the Secretary-General to conform his practice to the
advisory opinion given by the International Court; and, as regards all future
conventions concluded under the auspices ofthe United Nations, ofwhich he is
the depositary:
I.
2.
33.19.
to continue to act as depositary in connection with the deposit of documents

containing reservations or objections, without passing upon the legal effect
of such documents; and
to communicate the text of such documents relating to reservations or
objections to all states concerned, leaving it to each state to draw legal
consequences from such communications.
In the context of its work on the law of treaties in general, the Commission had
to keep the question of reservations to multilateral conventions under review;
and, in the course of its subsequent consideration ofthe topic, it is clear that the
Commission underwent a change of heart. This change of heart is no doubt
primarily attributable to the very rapid expansion of the international
community since 1951 with the consequence that 'the very number of potential
participants in multilateral treaties now seems to make the unanimity principle
less appropriate and less practicable. 'l!5 With this consideration in mind, the
29 0
Treaties - V
Commission proposed, in 1962, a preliminary series of draft articles on the law

of treaties which, as regards reservations, proposed a 'flexible' system based in
some respects on the Pan-American practice. In commenting on the proposed
draft articles, the Commission stated:
'... the Commission was agreed that, when the treaty itself deals with reservations, the
matter is concluded by the terms of the treaty. Reservations expressly or impliedly
prohibited by the terms of the treaty are excluded, while those expressly or impliedly
authorised are ipso facto effective. The problem concerns only the cases where the treaty
is silent in regard to reservations, and here the Commission was agreed that the Court's
principle of "compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty" is one suitable for
adoption as a general criterion of the legitimacy of reservations to multilateral treaties
and of objections to them. 26 The difficulty lies in the process by which that principle is to
be applied, and especially where there is no tribunal or other organ vested with standing
competence to interpret the treaty. Where the treaty is the constituent instrument ofan
international organisation, the Commission was agreed that the question is one for
determination by its competent organ. It was also agreed that where the treaty is one
concluded between a small group ofStates, unanimous agreement to the acceptance ofa
reservation must be presumed to be necessary in the absence ofany contrary indication.
Accordingly, the problem essentially concerns multilateral treaties which are not
constituent instruments of international organisations and which contain no provisions
in regard to reservations. '27
After canvassing the various standpoints, and considering possible solutions,

including a 'collegiate' system under which the reserving state would only
become a party to the treaty if the reservation were accepted by a given
proportion of the other states concerned, the Commission favoured 'a flexible
system, under which it is for each State individually to decide whether to accept
a reservation and to regard the reserving State as a party to the treaty for the
purpose of the relations between the two States. '28 This is the system which,
with minor modifications is now embodied in the \ -ienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.
Reservations in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
33.20.
The Convention regime on reservations is set out in Articles 19-23. Of this

series of provisions, Articles 19-21 are the most significant and warrant being
set out in full:
Article 19
Formulation of reservations
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceeding to a treaty,
formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;

(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made, or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) the reservation is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Reservations
Article
29 I
20
Acceptance of and objection to reservations

I. A reservation expressly authorised by a treaty does not require any subsequent
acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object
and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the
parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a
reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organisation and
unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent
organ of that organisation.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise
provides:
(a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving
State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in
force for those States;
(b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry
into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a
contrary intention is defmitely expressed by the objecting State;
(c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a
reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the
reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a
reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no
objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified
of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the
treaty, whichever is later.
Article 21
Legal effects of reservations and of objections to reservations

I. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with Articles
19, 20 and 23:
(a) modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the provisions of
the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and
(b) modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with
the reserving State.
The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to
the treaty inter se.
3. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the
treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation
relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.'
2.
33.2 I.
It will be seen that, broadly speaking, the 'flexible' system proposed by the
Commission in 1962 forms the basis of the Convention regime on reservations.
The most significant departure from the Commission's proposals is the reversal
of the rule concerning the legal effect of an objection to a reservation (Art.
20(4)(b) ). The Commission had proposed that an objection to a reservation
should preclude the entry into force of a treaty as between the objecting and
reserving states unless a contrary intention was expressed by the objecting state.
The conference, on the basis of a proposal by the Soviet Union at the second
session, put the onus on the objecting state to declare positively that its
292
Treaties - V
objection had the effect of precluding the entry into force ofthe treaty between
the two States concerned. 29
Comment
33.22.
It will be seen that the topic of reservations to multilateral conventions has

been, and remains, highly controversial, and that the state ofinternational law
on the subject is still obscure and surrounded by uncertainties. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties is not yet in force (1977) and in any event
would apply as such only to treaties concluded by states after its entry into force
with regard to such states (Art. 4). In view ofthe wide divergence ofopinion on
the subject of reservations in general, and on the legal effect of objections to
reservations in particular, it is highly desirable that, whenever reservations
may be expected, the parties to a treaty should write into the treaty itself an
article prescribing exactly what reservations shall be admitted and upon what
conditions. When the treaty itself contains specific provisions clearly demonstrating which reservations are admissible (as in some of the Council ofEurope
conventions to which reference is made above), there is no need for subsequent
acceptance. But where the treaty is silent on reservations, or where the
particular reservation is not expressly authorised, objection may be taken by
other interested states; and it then becomes a question of assessing whether the
intention of the objecting state was to preclude treaty relations between it and
the reserving state. Having regard to the regime established in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the continuing uncertainty as to the
state of existing international law on the topic, it would seem to be desirable for
an objecting state, if it wishes to preclude treaty relations between it and the
reserving state, to declare positively that such is the effect of its objection.
Notice of TerlDination
33.23.
A treaty continues to have operative effect for any party to it so long as it

remains in force generally or for the party concerned. A treaty remains in force
generally so long as it has not come to an end, either automatically by virtue of
a provision in the treaty concerning expiry or lapse, or at any time by consent of
all the parties. Many treaties provide that they are to remain in force for a
specified period of years or until a particular date or event. An example of a
treaty concluded for a specified period of years is the Fourth International Tin
Agreement, opened for signature in London between 1 July 1970 and 29
January 1971,30 Article 53( a) of which provides that:
'The duration of this Agreement shall, except as otherwise provided in this article or in
paragraph (b) of Article 47, be five years from the date of entry into force. '31
An example of a treaty concluded until a particular date is the United

Kingdom/Mongolia Trade Agreement of 21 March 1973,32 Article 10 ofwhich
stipulates that:
Notice of Termination
293
'This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by both Contracting parties and
shall remain in force until 31 December, 1974.'
An example of a treaty concluded until a particular event is the Exchange of

Notes of 14 May 1974, between the United Kingdom Government and the
Government of the Arab Republic ofEgypt concerning assistance by the United
Kingdom in the clearance of the Suez Canal. 33 The concluding paragraph of
the United Kingdom Note reads as follows:
'If the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of Egypt, I have the honour to propose
that this Note, together with Your Excellency's reply in that sense, shall constitute an
arrangement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of
Your Excellency's reply and shall remain in force until the day of the departure of the
British Force from Egyptian territory or territorial waters.'
All the examples so far given are of treaties which come to an end by operation
of their own terms; they are perhaps more accurately characterised as examples
of expiry clauses than of termination clauses.
33.24.
As to termination stricto sensu (by which is meant action by one or more of the
contracting parties to bring a particular treaty to an end during the period
when it remains in force), it is necessary to distinguish between termination ofa
treaty through the application of its own provisions and termination ofa treaty
otherwise than through the application of its own provisions.
I.
33. 2 5.
Termination of a treaty through the application of its own provisions
The majority of modern treaties contain clauses which provide for a right to
denounce or withdraw from the treaty upon the giving of a specified period of
notice. In these cases the termination of the treaty or the termination of the
participation of a contracting party in the treaty is brought about by the
provisions of the treaty itself, and when this may happen is essentially a
question of interpreting and applying the treaty. As the International Law
Commission have pointed out:
'The treaty clauses are very varied. Many treaties provide that they are to remain in
force for a specified period of years or until a particular date or event; others provide for
the termination of the treaty through the operation of a resolutory condition.... More
common in modern practice are treaties which fix a comparatively short initial period
for their duration, such as five or ten years, but at the same time provide for their
continuance in force after the expiry ofthe period subject to a right of denunciation or
withdrawal. These provisions normally take the form either ofan indefinite continuance
in force of the treaty subject to a right of denunciation or withdrawal on six or twelve
months' notice, or of a renewal of the treaty for successive periods of years subject to a
right of denunciation or withdrawal on giving notice to that effect six months before the
expiry of each period. Some treaties fix no period for their duration and simply provide
for a right to denounce or withdraw from the treaty, either with or without a period of
notice. Occasionally, a treaty which fixes a single specific period, such as five or ten
years, for its duration allows a right of denunciation or withdrawal even during the
currency of the period.'H
33.26.
It will accordingly be seen that withdrawal or denunciation clauses may vary
294
Treaties - V
widely in their form and effect. The following examples illustrate the types of
clauses which may be found in modern treaties. The examples are not intended
to be exhaustive, but simply to demonstrate the more usual forms ofwithdrawal
or denunciation clause currently in use.
33.27.
A. Withdrawal or denunciation after initial period

The Convention between the United Kingdom and Italy for the Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial
Matters, signed at Rome on 7 February 1964, remains in force for a short initial
period, with a right of termination upon notice accruing to either party at the
end of that period or at any time thereafter. Article XI of the Convention
accordingly provides:
'The Convention shall come into force three months after the date on which the
instruments of ratification are exchanged, and shall remain in force for three years. If
neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice through the diplomatic
channel to the other, not less than six months before the expiration of the said period of
three years, of intention to terminate the present convention, it shall remain in force
until the expiration of six months from the date on which eitherofthe High Contracting
Parties shall have given notice to terminate it.'35
Occasionally, the treaty may stipulate a much longer initial period ofduration,
with a right of withdrawal or denunciation only accruing to a party after the
expiry of this period. Thus, Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington on 4 April 1949, provides that:
'After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any party may cease to be a party
one year after its notice ofdenunciation has been given to the Government ofthe United
States of America, which will inform the Governments ofthe other Parties ofthe deposit
of each notice of denunciation. '36
33.28.
B. Withdrawal or denunciation at any time, effective immediately

It is customary for a withdrawal or denunciation clause to provide that a
specified period of notice (normally six months or one year) be given.
Exceptionally, however, a particular treaty may provide that notice of
withdrawal or denunciation can be given to take effect immediately on its
receipt by the depositary authority. Thus, Article XV (I) of the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, signed at Washington on 27
December 1945, provides that:
'Any member may withdraw from the Fund at any time by transmitting a notice in
writing to the Fund at its principal office. Withdrawal shall become effective on the date
such notice is received. '37
33.29.
C. Withdrawal or denunciation at any time, upon notice

Many examples can be given of this type of clause. Ifa treaty is expressed to be
of indefinite duration, and if the intention of the parties is to admit of the
possibility of withdrawal or denunciation upon notice, express provision to this
effect will be written into the treaty. Thus, Article 51 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Animals during International Transport,
opened for signature in Paris on 13 December 1968, provides as follows:
'I.
'2.
The Convention shall remain in force indefinitely.

Any Contracting Party may, in so far as it is concerned, denounce this Convention
'3.
295
by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of

Europe.
Such denunciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by the
Secretary-General of such notification. '38
Even if the treaty is not expressed to be of indefinite duration, a simple clause

providing for withdrawal or denunciation at any time, upon notice, may
nevertheless be written into it. Thus, the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23
September 1971, provides as follows (Art. 16):
'I.
'2.
Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notification to

the Depositary Governments.
Denunciation shall take effect six months following the date on which notification is
received by the Depositary Governments.'39
In particular cases (and this depends essentially upon the nature ofthe treaty in
question), a party wishing to exercise a right of withdrawal or denunciation
may have to show special cause. Thus, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed at
Moscow on 5 August 196340 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington
on 1 July 1968, contain similar clauses covering the right of withdrawal for
special cause. It is sufficient for the purposes of illustration to cite Article X( I) of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which reads as follows:
'Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice ofsuch
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security
Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. '41
Termination of a treaty otherwise than through the application of its own

provIsIons
2.
33.30.
Even if a treaty contains no express provisions governing its expiry or

conferring upon a party the right to withdraw from it or denounce it with or
without the giving of notice, it can still be terminated at any time by consent of
all the parties. 42
33.31.
More controversial is the question whether, and if so in what circumstances

and subject to what conditions, a state can, consistently with international law,
unilaterally terminate its participation in a treaty which contains no clause
providing for withdrawal or denunciation with or without the giving ofnotice.
It must be stressed that there is a presumption against unilateral termination.
As McNair puts it:
... the normal basis of approach adopted in the United Kingdom and, it is believed, in
most States, towards a treaty is that it is intended to be of perpetual duration and
incapable of unilateral termination, unless, expressly or by implication, it contains a
right of unilateral termination or some other provision for its coming to an end. There is
nothing juridically impossible in the existence of a treaty creating obligations which are
incapable of termination except by the agreement of all parties.'43
296
33.32.
Treaties - V
The presumption is not, however, an absolute one, since there may be evidence
that the parties to the treaty intended to admit a right of unilateral termination
upon notice: equally, the nature of the treaty itself may be such as to imply the
existence of a right of unilateral termination upon notice. Article 56( I) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties accordingly provides that:
'A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not
provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal
unless:
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or
withdrawal; or
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.'
It is generally recognised that a right of unilateral denunciation is more easily

implied in the case of commercial treaties or treaties ofalliance than in the case
of other treaties. As regards commercial treaties, McNair. states:
'It is believed that the view now held is that, in the case of a treaty embodying a purely
commercial bargain between the parties, the existence of an implied right of
denunciation upon giving reasonable notice can readily be inferred from the very
nature of the treaty on the ground that it requires revision from time to time in order to
bring it into harmony with changing conditions. '44
Brierly takes the view that there are certain types of treaty which, from the
nature of the subject-matter or the circumstances in which they are concluded,
may be presumed to be susceptible of denunciation even though they contain
no express term to that effect: and he cites a modus vivendi as an obvious
illustration, adding that 'treaties of alliance and commerce are probably in the
same case, though in practice such treaties ordinarily have a fixed period of
duration. '45
3333
It is, however, only too easy for controversy to arise when a state purports
unilaterally to terminate a treaty which contains no provision on withdrawal or
denunciation with or without the giving of notice. An interesting recent
example of controversy of this nature stems from the action ofthe Government
of Senegal 46 in transmitting to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on
9 June 197 1, a Note denouncing the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the 1958 Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. Senegal had
acceded to these two Conventions on 25 April 1961. None of the four Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1958 contains a denunciation
clause. Indeed, proposals at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference to include a
'denunciation' clause in the 'codifying' conventions and also in the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas were
heavily defeated on two separate votes. Despite this history, Senegal sought to
exercise a right of unilateral denunciation in relation to the two 1958 Law ofthe
Sea Conventions to which she had become a party. This gave rise to an
exchange of correspondence between the Government of Senegal and the
United Nations Secretary-General (in his capacity as depositary), correspondence which was subsequently circulated by the Secretary-General to all states
entitled to become parties to the conventions concerned. 47 It may be noted
297
that, on 2 June 1973, the United Kingdom Government sent a Note to the
Secretary-General (in his capacity as depositary) which stated inter alia:
'As regards the notification by the Government of Senegal purporting to denounce the
two Conventions of 1958, the Government of the United Kingdom wish to place on
record that in their view those Conventions are not susceptible to unilateral
denunciation by a State which is a party to them and they therefore cannot accept the
validity or effectiveness of the purported denunciation by the Government of Senegal.
Accordingly, the Government of the United Kingdom regard the Government of
Senegal as still bound by the obligations which they assumed when they became a party
to those Conventions and the Government ofthe United Kingdom fully reserve all their
rights under them as well as their rights and the rights oftheir nationals in respect ofany
action which the Government ofSenegal have taken or may take as a consequence ofthe
said purported denunciation. '48
33.34.
Another recent example ofcontroversy is provided by the action ofIndonesia in

1965 in purporting unilaterally to withdraw from the United Nations. The
Charter of the United Nations does npt contain any express provision
prohibiting, permitting or regulating the question of withdrawal from the
Organisation. It is nevertheless clear from the records of the San Francisco
Conference that the founding members intended to concede the right to
withdraw in exceptional circumstances;49 indeed, the competent Committee of
the San Francisco Conference went so far as to adopt a commentary on
withdrawal in the following terms:
The Committee adopts the view that the Charter should not make express provision
either to permit or to prohibit withdrawal from the Organisation. The Committee
deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to continue
their co-operation within the Organisation for the preservation of international peace
and security. If, however, a Member because of exceptional circumstances feels
constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and
security on the other Members, it is not the pl1rpose of the Organisation to compel that
Member to continue its cooperation in the Organisation.
It is obvious, particularly, that withdrawals or some other forms of dissolution of
the Organisation would become inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the
Organisation was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the
expense of law and justice.
Nor would a Member be bound to remain in the Organisation if its rights and
obligations as such were changed by Charter amendment in which it has not concurred
and which it finds itself unable to accept, or if an amendment duly accepted by the
necessary majority in the Assembly or in a general conference fails to secure the
ratification necessary to bring such amendment into effect. '50
33.35.
It is against this background that one must assess the significance of the
Indonesian action in 1965 in seeking unilaterally to withdraw from the United
Nations. By letter dated 20 January 1965, the Indonesian Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister ofForeign Affairs informed the Secretary-General ofthe
United Nations that, in consequence of the election of Malaysia to one of the
non-permanent seats on the Security Council, his Government 'felt that no
alternative had been left for Indonesia but withdrawal from the United
Nations.'51
33.36.
The Secretary-General immediately issued the Indonesian letter as a
298
Treaties - V
document of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. On 26

February 1965, the Secretary-General sent a carefully considered reply to the
Indonesian letter which stated inter alia that:
'... the position of your Government recorded therein has given rise to a situation in
regard to which no express provision is made in the Charter. It is to be recalled,
however, that the San Francisco Conference adopted a declaration relating to the
matter.'
The Secretary-General's reply concluded by expressing:

'... both the profound regret which is widely felt in the United Nations that Indonesia
has found it necessary to adopt the course of action outlined in your letter and the
earnest hope that in due time it will resume full co-operation with the United Nations. '52
33.37
It has been rightly pointed out that the Secretary-General's reply was noncommittal on the question of the validity of the Indonesian action: and that,
indeed, the concluding sentence 'was clearly drafted in such a way that it might
be interpreted to mean that Indonesia had not ceased to be a member because a
non-member could not "resume full co-operation" unless it had been admitted
or, in this case, re-admitted to the Organisation. '53
33.38.
Only two member states expressed an official position on the Indonesian

action. In a note of 8 March 1965,54 the United Kingdom Government
formally placed on record its conviction that the reason for withdrawal
advanced in the Indonesian letter:
'... namely, the election ofa non-permanent member ofthe Security Council which the
Government of Indonesia unilaterally considers as not fulfilling the requirements of
Article 23 of the Charter - is not a circumstance so exceptional in nature as to justify the
Government of Indonesia in withdrawing from the Organization.'
This statement of the position of the United Kingdom Government was

carefully prefaced by the warning that it was 'without prejudice to their views
as to the circumstances which might legally justify a member state in
withdrawing from the United Nations.'
33.39.
A note from the Italian Government of 13 May 1965,55 was expressed in more
general terms. The Italian Government felt it necessary 'to voice its
apprehension over the disquieting consequences for the United Nations
resulting from the absence of any mention in the Charter of such an important
point as withdrawal or recession of a Member State from the Organisation.'
With reference to the San Francisco commentary on withdrawal, the Italian
Government took the view that it was 'not entirely adequate' since it did not
'contain any definition of the circumstances which might justify the
withdrawal or recession of a Member State,' nor did it specify any procedure
for determining those circumstances in the future. Furthermore, the
commentary did not indicate any procedure whereby the withdrawal of a
member state might be considered effective. The Italian Note expressed the
hope 'that in the near future it will be possible to undertake an appropriate
study of the problem in general terms.'
33.40 .
Perhaps fortunately, it proved unnecessary in the event to embark on such a
299
study. On 19 September 1966, the Indonesian Ambassador to the United

States addressed a telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in
which, with reference to the Indonesian letter of 20 January 1965, and the
Secretary-General's reply of 26 February 1965, he informed the SecretaryGeneral, upon instructions, that the Indonesian Government 'has decided to
resume full co-operation with the United Nations and to resume participation
in its activities starting with the Twenty-first session of the General
Assembly. '56
3341.
On 28 September 1966, the President of the General Assembly reported to the

Assembly the outcome of discussions held on 22 September 1966 between the
Foreign Minister of Indonesia, on the one hand, and the Secretary-General
and the President, on the other hand. After reviewing the developments since
January 1965, the President went on to say:
'It would therefore appear that the Government of Indonesia considers that its recent
absence from the Organisation was based not upon a withdrawal from the Organisation
but upon a cessation of cooperation. The action so far taken by the United Nations on
this matter would not appear to preclude this view. If this is also the general view ofthe
membership, the Secretary-General would give instructions for the necessary
administrative actions to be taken for Indonesia to participate again in the proceedings
of the Organisation. It may be assumed that, from the time that Indonesia resumes
participation, it will meet in full its budgetary obligations. Ifit is the general view that
the bond of membership has continued throughout the period of non-participation, it
would be the intention of the Secretary-General to negotiate an appropriate payment
with the representatives of Indonesia for that period and to report the outcome of his
negotiations to the Fifth Committee for its consideration. '57
No objection having been raised to the President's statement, the representatives of Indonesia were invited to take their seats in the General Assembly, and
the Secretary-General took action on the lines suggested.
33.42.
There can be little doubt that the manner in which this episode was concluded
revealed a desire on all sides to skate over the difficulties presented by the
Indonesian action of January 1965.58 Notwithstanding the clear and
unambiguous terms of the Indonesian letter of 20 January 1965, it was possible
for the Secretary-General, and indeed for the generality of the membership, to
take the view that the bond of membership between Indonesia and the United
Nations had not been interrupted; and this was the l;>asis upon which it was
eventually accepted that Indonesia should 'resume full participation in the
activities of the United Nations.'59
33.43
But if controversy surrounds the asserted right ofunilateral withdrawal from or

denunciation of a treaty which contains no provision on withdrawal or
denunciation, controversy equally surrounds the questions of what other
grounds a party may invoke for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties lists three possible grounds of this
nature, namely, breach, impossibility of performance and fundamental change
of circumstances, and it is necessary to comment briefly on each of these
grounds. 60
300
33.44.
Treaties - V
Breach
A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its
operation in whole or in part. 61 A material breach of a multilateral treaty by
one of the parties entitles:
the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty
in whole or in part or to terminate it either:
(a) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting state, or
(b) as between all the parties;
2. a party especially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the
operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the
defaulting state; and
3. any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty with respect to itself if the treaty is ofsuch a
character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the
the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations
under the treaty. 62
I.
33.45.
In recent years, the International Court ofJustice has had occasion to consider
the consequences of material breach of a multilateral treaty in two separate
cases. In its Advisory Opinion in the Namibia (South West Africa) case,63 the
Court stated:
'94. The rules laid down by the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties concerning
termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach (adopted without a
dissenting vote) may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing
customary law on the subject. In the light ofthese rules, only a material breach ofa
treaty justifies termination, such breach being defined as:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of the treaty.' (Art. 60, para. 3.)
'95. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) determines that both forms of material
breach had occurred in this case. By stressing that South Africa "has in effect
disavowed the Mandate," the General Assembly declared that it had in fact
repudiated it. The resolution in question is therefore to be viewed as the exercise of
the right to determine a relationship in case of a deliberate and persistent violation
of obligations which destroys the very object and purpose of that relationship.'M
33.46 .
In the Appeal relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICA 0 Council (India v. Pakistan)
case,65 the issue of the right of a state unilaterally to terminate or suspend
multilateral treaties for breach arose in two ways: in regard to the jurisdiction
of the ICAO Council and in regard to the jurisdiction of the International
Court itself. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note the Court's statement
that:
'... India's allegation ofa material breach ofthe treaties by Pakistan, asjustifying India
in treating them as terminated or suspended, is inherently and by its very nature, one
that must involve an examination ofthe treaties in order to see whether, according to the
definition of a material breach of treaty contained in Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, there has been (paragraph 3(b)) a violation by
Pakistan of "a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the
treaty." 'bb
.Notice of Termination
33.47
301
Impossibility of performance
Article 61 (I) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that:
'A party may invoke the impossibility ofperforming a treaty as a ground for terminating
or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution ofthe treaty. Ifthe impossibility
is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the
treaty. '
Naturally, impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party if the

impossibility is the result of a breach by that party of an obligation under the
treaty or any other international obligation owed to any other party to
the treaty. 67
33.48.
33.49
The usual examples given of the rare cases of supervening impossibility of

performance are 'the submergence of an island, the drying up of a river or the
destruction of a dam or hydroelectric installation indispensable for the
execution of a treaty.'68
Fundamental change of circumstances

Linked with the concept of supervening impossibility of performance, but
much more controversial in its formulation and application, is the doctrine that
political (as opposed to physical) changes ofcircumstances may be invoked as a
ground for terminating a treaty. This is the so-called doctrine rebus sic stantibus.
It is spelt out, in suitably restrictive terms, in Article 62 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the text of which reads as follows:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion ofa treaty, and which was not,foreseen by the
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a
treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis ofthe consent
of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to
be performed under the treaty.
'2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result ofa breach by the party invoking it either
of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed
to any other party to the treaty.
'3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also
invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.'
'I.
There have been relatively few cases in which the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
has been invoked before an international tribunal and in no case has the right
to terminate a treaty on the ground of fundamental change of circumstances
been upheld. Thus, in the case of the Free Zones of (lpper Savo..y and the District of
Gex 69 (France v. Switzerland), the Permanent Court of International Justice had
to consider a French argument that certain treaty stipulations dating from
1815 had lapsed. The Court held that it would have been necessary for France
to prove that it was in consideration of the absence ofcustoms duties at Geneva
302
Treaties - V
that the Powers decided, in 1815, in favour of the creation of the zones. This
France was unable to do. Consequently, the Court affirmed, the French
argument on this point:
'... fails from lack of proofthat the zones were in fact established in view ofthe existence
of circumstances which ceased to exist when the Federal Customs were instituted in
1849.'70
The Court concluded:

'As the French argument fails on the facts, it became unnecessary for the Court to
consider any of the questions of principle which arose in connection with the theory of
the lapse of treaties by reason ofchange ofcircumstances, such as the extent to which the
theory can be regarded as constituting a rule of international law, the occasions on
which and the method by which effect can be given to the theory if recognised, and the
question whether it would apply to treaties establishing rights such as that which
Switzerland derived from the treaties of 1815 and 1816.'71
33.50 .
More recently, the International Court of Justice was confronted with an

allegation that a particular treaty had terminated by reason of a fundamental
change of circumstances in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom v.
Iceland). 72 In the jurisdictional phase of this case, the Court had to consider an
Icelandic contention that owing to changed circumstances resulting from the
ever-increasing exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas surrounding
Iceland, the 1961 Exchange of Notes (on which the United Kingdom relied as
establishing the jurisdiction of the Court) was no longer applicable. The Court
stated:
'In these statements the Government of Iceland is basing itself on the principle of
termination of a treaty by reason of change of circumstances. International law admits
that a fundamental change in the circumstances which determined the parties to accept a
treaty, if it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations
imposed by it, may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground for
invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty. This principle, and the conditions
and exceptions to which it is subject, have been embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be considered as a
codification of existing customary law on the subject of the termination of a treaty
relationship on account of change of circumstances.' 73
33.5 I.
The Court then went on to analyse the Icelandic claim in detail. It noted that
Iceland had relied on developments in fishing techniques leading to overexploitation of the waters around Iceland as affecting the 'vital interests' of
Iceland, and commented that this 'would correspond to the traditional view
that the changes of circumstances which must be regarded as fundamental or
vital are those which impair the existence or vital development of one of the
parties. '74 However, the Court likewise noted that the United Kingdom
contested the 'fundamental' or 'vital' nature ofthe changes invoked by Iceland.
Relying on the fact that, at the jurisdictional stage, it was not necessary to enter
into the merits of the dispute, the Court concluded:
'But the alleged changes could not affect in the least the obligation to submit to the
Court's jurisdiction, which is the only issue at the present stage of the proceedings. It
follows that the apprehended dangers for the vital interests of Iceland, resulting from
changes in fishing techniques, cannot constitute a fundamental change with respect to
.Notice of Termination
303
the lapse or subsistence of the compromIssory clauses establishing the Court's

jurisdiction. '75
33.52.
The Court also denied that the change of circumstances invoked by Iceland
had resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of obligations still to be
performed, pointing out that:
'The present dispute is exactly ofthe character anticipated in the compromissory clauses
of the Exchange of Notes. Not only has the jurisdictional obligation not been radically
transformed in its extent; it has remained precisely what it was in 1961.'76
33.53.
Finally, the Court referred favourably to a United Kingdom argument that the
doctrine of change of circumstances never operates so as to extinguish a treaty
automatically or to allow an unchallengeable unilateral denunciation by one
party; it only operates (if the asserted right of termination is challenged) 'to
submit the dispute to some organ or body competent to determine whether the
conditions for the operation of the doctrine are present.' In commenting on this
argument, the Court noted that, in the instant case, 'the procedural
complement to the doctrine of changed circumstances is already provided for
in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.'??
Procedure for termination

33.54.
A notice of termination, withdrawal or denunciation consists of a formal

notification emanating from the competent executive authority of the state
concerned and communicated through the diplomatic channel to the other
party or parties to the treaty or to such depositary government or authority as
the treaty may specify. In the case of a bilateral treaty, it may on occasion
happen that, after notice of termination has been given, the treaty is
maintained in operation (by means of an exchange of Notes) for a brief period
pending its replacement by a new treaty.
3355
Any notice of termination given under a treaty must comply with the
conditions specified in the treaty and must be given in the circumstances and
manner therein indicated. It is not sufficient to announce termination or
withdrawal or to publish a notice of it in the press.
33.56.
Notices of termination, withdrawal or denunciation take effect on the date of

their deposit with the other party or parties or with the depositary government
or authority, and any period to which the notice is subject runs from then.
Unless the treaty provides otherwise, notices of termination, withdrawal or
denunciation must be unconditional and will apply automatically to all
annexes, protocols, Notes, letters and declarations attached to the treaty and
forming an integral part thereof.
33.57.
Unless the treaty provides otherwise, a notice of termination, withdrawal or

denunciation may be withdrawn or revoked at any time before it takes effect
provided that such withdrawal or revocation of the notice is consented to by
any other party which, in consequence ofthe original notice oftermination, has
itself given notice of termination or has otherwise changed its position.
304
33.58 .
Treaties - V
Where notice of termination, withdrawal or denunciation ofa treaty is given in

accordance with the terms of the treaty itself, the notice mayor may not be
accompanied by a statement of the reasons which render this step desirable or
necessary.
Registration
33.59.
Article
'I.
'2.
33.60.
102
of the Charter of the United Nations provides as follows:
Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member ofthe
United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be
registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been
registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may
invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.'
At its sixty-fifth meeting the Gener 1 Assembly adopted Regulations to give

effect to Article 102. The most important provisions of those Regulations are
the following:
Article
Every treaty or international agreement, whatever its form and descriptive name,
entered into by one or more Members of the United Nations after October 24, 1945,
the date of the coming into force ofthe Charter, shall as soon as possible be registered
with the Secretariat in accordance with these regulations.
2. Registration shall not take place until the treaty or international agreement has
come into force between two or more of the parties thereto.
3. Such registration may be affected by any party or in accordance with article 4 of
these regulations.
4. The Secretariat shall record the treaties and international agreements so registered
in a Register established for that purpose.'
I.
Article 3
I. Registration by a party, in accordance with article 1 of these regulations, relieves all
other parties of the obligation to register.
2. Registration effected in accordance with article 4 of these regulations relieves all
parties of the obligation to register.'
Article 4
I. Every treaty or international agreement subject to article 1 ofthese regulations shall
be registered ex officio by the United Nations in the following cases:
(a) Where the United Nations is a party to the treaty or agreement:
(b) Where the United Nations has been authorised by the treaty or agreement to
effect registration.
2. A treaty of international agreement subject to article 1 of these regulations may be
registered with the Secretariat by a specialised agency in the following cases:
(a) Where the constituent instrument of the specialised agency provides for such
registration;
Registration
305
(b) Where the treaty or agreement has been registered with the specialised agency
pursuant to the terms of its constituent instrument;
(c) Where the specialised agency has been authorised by the treaty or agreement to
effect registration.'
33.61.
The Regulations also provide that, in addition to keeping a Register oftreaties

and international agreements, entered into by one or more members of the
United Nations after 24 October 1945, the Secretariat shall 'file and record'
certain treaties and international agreements. Thus Article 10 of the
Regulations provides:
'The Secretariat shall file and record treaties and international agreements, other
than those subject to registration under article I of these regulations, if they fall in the
following categories:
(a) Treaties or international agreements entered into by the United Nations or by one
or more of the specialized agencies;
(b) Treaties or international agreements transmitted by a member of the United
Nations which were entered into before the coming into force of the Charter, but
which were not included in the treaty series of the League of Nations;
(c) Treaties or international agreements transmitted by a party not a Member ofthe
United Nations which were entered into before or after the coming into force ofthe
Charter which were not included in the treaty series of the League of Nations,
provided however, that this paragraph shall be applied with full regard to the
provisions of the resolution of the General Assembly of 10 February 1946 set forth in
the Annex to these regulations.'
33.62.
Under Article 12 of the Regulations the Secretariat is obliged to 'publish as

soon as possible in a single series every treaty or international agreement which
is registered, or filed and recorded, in the original language or languages,
followed by a translation in English and French.' The Secretariat has given
effect to this Article by publishing the United Nations Treaty Series in two Parts
(Part I consisting of 'treaties and international agreements registered' and Part
11 of' treaties and international agreements filed and recorded.')
33.63.
No binding definition exists ofthe words 'treaty' and 'international agreement'

which appear both in Article 102 of the Charter and in Article 1 of the
Regulations. However at the San Francisco Conference Committee IV/2
expressed the view that 'the word "agreement" must be understood as
including unilateral engagements of an international character which have
been accepted by the State in whose favour such an engagement has been
entered into.' Accordingly, the United Nations Secretariat has treated as
registrable under Article 1 of the Regulations 'both declarations ofacceptance
of the optional Clause of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court ofJustice, made by States under Article 36, paragraph 2, ofthe Statute of
the Court, and also instruments of adherence to the United Nations submitted
by new Members, which involve their acceptance of the obligations of the
Charter. '78 The Secretariat has, moreover, registered ex officio under Article 4
of the Regulations agreements such as the trusteeship agreements, the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies.
BOOK V
International
organisations
Chapter 34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

The United Nations: A way of life and work
The United Nations - I The Charter and its operation
The United Nations - 11 Specialised Agencies, regional
commissions and special bodies
The United Nations - III Peaceful settlement of
The United Nations - IV The International Court ofJustice
Post- 1 945 diplomacy
343
347
35 6
368
380
39 1
43 8
44 2
CHAPTER 34

34. I .
In the Preface to this edition, brief reference was made to the startling changes
which in modern times have affected the pace and methods ofdiplomacy. One
of the chief consequences is the enormous increase in the amount ofdiplomacy
by conference. This is not restricted to Viennas and Berlins. The age has given
birth to an entirely new phenomenon, diplomacy by conference based on
permanent organisations meeting regularly and serviced not by officials of
member governments or of the government of the country in which the
conference is held, but by independent international staffs of their own.
34.2.
The first example of such a permanent institution was probably the Universal
Postal Union, set up as a consequence of the Berne Conference on postal
matters in 1874. This was a highly suitable field in which to start this new kind
of work. There was plenty to argue about at the technical level, but political
differences were not involved in the subject-matter, nor in a relatively tranquil
age were they brought in for purposes other than those of the organisation as
such.
343
For the discussion of political matters, there was in the nineteenth century no
movement towards setting up a permanent organisation. It was tacitly assumed
that the affairs of Europe, on which world peace and war almost entirely
depended, could and would be successfully regulated by the Concert of
Europe, and that inter-imperial problems could be settled amicably by the
imperial Powers. This assumption, however, suffered a few shocks such as the
Anglo-French confrontation in 18g8 at Fashoda. The nearest practical
approach to the concept ofan international organisation to maintain peace was
probably the First Hague Conference of I 8gg which established the Permanent
Court of Arbitration.
34.4.
In 1914, however, the Concert of Europe, having modified itself into the
Balance of Power, broke down in the ultimate cacophony of war. 1 The
destruction of the old system in Germany, Austria and Russia was so complete
as to be a little hard to grasp even now. But we are less concerned with that
convulsion than with the attempt made to provide a policy and an
administrative remedy. It was only the relative isolation of the United States,
followed in I 9 17 by a sudden access of recognised world power, combined with
the character and convictions of President Woodrow Wilson, that made it
possible for him to believe and the world experimentally to accept that a totally
new method of conducting international relations was feasible. 2
3 10
34-5.
The collective third par~y
The essence of the radical change initiated by President Wilson is expressible in

many ways. An American scholar defined it thus: '... the international
organisation represents a collective third party which is invited to undertake a
process of implicit mediation in the non-technical and broadest sense of the
word.'3 In practice, when the Covenant of the League had been accepted by
nations and the first Secretary-General 4 had taken up his post, a new dimension
had been added to politics and diplomacy. Half a century later, the ideal and
the dimension lived on - the ideal less certain, but the dimension maintained. If
either collapsed, the prospects for modern civilisation would have reached a
menacing twilight.
CHAPTER 35
The United Nations:

Away of life and work
Way ofHfe
35.1.
We shall come back briefly to the League of Nations when we examine the
institutions and procedures of its successor. But it may help to give life to
analysis if an attempt is first made to describe some ofthe differences in the way
of life and of doing business between service at the seat of an international
organisation and service at a national capital in a diplomatic mission accredited
to the government in that capital. We shall take membership of a national
delegation to the United Nations in New York as a prototype. But the
principles apply in some degree to all resident missions to the headquarters of
permanent intergovernmental organisations with international secretariats.
They apply broadly to an organisation such as the International Atomic
Energy Authority at Vienna, to a branch of the United Nations itself, such as
the European Office at Geneva, to a defence organisation such as NATO in
Brussels, or such as that of the Warsaw Pact, or, in a slightly different way, to
the Organisation of African Unity, which has a permanent headquarters in
Addis Ababa but holds its Conference in different countries by invitation.
35. 2 .
The differences of diplomatic method and style apply with particular force
during meetings at the broad political level, such as sessions ofthe UN General
Assembly. But much of what follows illustrates a way oflife which in any case
has to accommodate itself to the routine, or sometimes lack of routine, of
plenary meetings.
35.3.
Service at a national capital includes office work, development of local

knowledge, personal relations and judgement, hospitality and, not to be
omitted, recreation. All this activity is centred on learning how to deal with and
legitimately influence, in general or in detail, the government and people ofthe
host country. The purpose is, by sensing the possible in one's own country and
in the country of temporary residence, to seek to interpret and reconcile. In the
present century this doctrine has had to be qualified by the ideological element
referred to in the Preface, I but even between ideologically hostile countries
there are always practical problems capable of adjustment.
35.4.
The tactical purpose of a diplomat in a permanent delegation to the United

Nations is quite different. True, he lives in or near New York, USA, and is likely
to be interested in a whole range of things from the Metropolitan Opera (ifhe
can afford it) to the collection of refuse. But, professionally, his interest is in the
312
The United .Nations: A way of life and work
United Nations Building on First Avenue, its inhabitants and its regular
visitors. Thus, while geographically in the United States, he is in the
professional sense not 'of it. He may have the good fortune to make American
friends outside the United Nations world, but he will not have much time to
spend with them, because the curious amalgam of friendship and duty which
constitutes diplomacy will decree that his business (and pleasure or suffering)
will be with a large number of specialised people from anything up to 150
countries.
35.5.
This sounds at first to be 'liberating'. The United Nations is a microcosm ofthe

world, and since no one has a long enough life to serve everywhere, there is no
better road to learn about the ways of unknown continents than service at the
UN. But in another sense it is constricting. Conversations can so easily turn into
the same old channels - did the Secretary-General really mean what he said
when ... , what is the matter with the air-conditioning in Committee Room 10,
and so on. Of course the diplomatic officer in such a post can interest himselfin
life and conditions in a country whose representative he works with and likes.
But he cannot do this in depth; there will always be too much else to attend to.
Style of work
35. 6 .
Another important difference is in the style of work. Since the Assembly has
many subsidiary bodies, permanent or temporary, a diplomat serving in a
delegation will attend a great many meetings - again unlike normal diplomatic
proceedings in most national capitals. A proportion of these meetings, such as
Committees of the General Assembly, will be in public. Normally the press will
not be there, but if there is a flare-up, it will certainly appear. In that case the
diplomat needs the capacity to think and talk not only in the diplomatic but
also in the political and public relations dimension. He may well need not only
to master his brief as a diplomatic representative but also to handle it in public
like a politician.
35.7
At the Third Committee (Social) of the 1946 General Assembly, an

inexperienced British delegate (not, as it happened, an official) admitted in a
manner tinged with apology that there was drug traffic in the British colony of
Hong Kong. The Soviet representative, Mr Valerian Zorin, very quick in
controversy and a zealous promoter of anti-colonial emotions and views, at
once caught the chairman's eye and accused the British Government of
promoting the drug traffic in Hong Kong. This intervention was followed up
by a Soviet Delegation press statement. Such a situation may not often occur,
but it is an illustration of a trap and an opportunity.
35.8.
In this respect, the United Nations is naturally more sensitive than

organisations such as NATO, which works to a common purpose of great
importance but specialized scope and practically always meets in private. This
does not prevent leakage, but the individual diplomat does not run the risk of
being quoted personally.
Style ofwork
35.9.
35. 10.
35. I
I.
35. I 2.
313
The organisation of diplomatic work in the United Nations is also quite

different from work in a national capital. The relationship between a
diplomatic mission and a national government is mostly bilateral, thoughjoint
approaches to the host government by several missions are by no means
unknown. There can well be urgency, but there is not often a deadline. In the
United Nations the work is by definition multilateral, and not infrequently it is
work towards drafting a resolution which may start by being slow but
suddenly develop a deadline. Both contexts demand an ability to reach available sources of information quickly. But whereas in a normal capital one knows
where a particular person is likely to be at a particular time, this is by no means
so during a United Nations Assembly. There is much scurrying between hotels,
official residences, delegation offices and the United Nations Building.
Important people at any level often have to be caught on the wing. This is all
something of a specialised art. For the diplomat resident in N ew York there is,
of course, relief during the months when the Assembly is not meeting (though
not so much so if his country is at the time a member of the Security Council,
which is theoretically in permanent session). But from September to December
there is not much rest for anybody.
A further important difference of technique imposes itselfon diplomats serving
at the United Nations. In a national capital, oral discussion with the ministry
for external affairs is normally conducted by the head of the mission or one of
his staff, depending on the nature and importance of the subject. A call on the
ministry is the usual procedure. In the French and British services, and to some
extent the United States service, (though this depends on the character of the
head of mission) the tradition is to employ for this purpose officers of varying
rank and the choice may range over a considerable proportion ofthe officials in
the diplomatic list. It is good experience, it widens personal contact and, in a
large and busy embassy, relieves the senior officials of work that can be
acceptably done by others.
In the United Nations and at other conferences, the discussion and negotiation
formula is quite different. The spokesman for a government in plenary sessions
or in important committees may well be a politician or someone specially
chosen for his or her expertise from outside official ranks. In that case,
diplomatic officers form what is conveniently described as a 'second row.' In
other words their function will be to advise continuously on what is beingsaid,
done and contemplated by other delegations and by the United Nations
Secretariat. The spokesman himself will know the subject, but he cannot be
expected to know all the intricacies of the politics and tactics current in the
Organisation and under discussion in the corridors or the Delegates' Lounge.
Nor can the national spokesman be expected to risk missing what may prove to
be an important phase of a discussion in order to telephone for advice. On the
other hand officials, diplomatic or specialist, will often find themselves involved
in difficult discussion, either when business is heavy and the national team
spread thin, or when important business with political content is done in
committee meetings during periods when the Assembly is not sitting. A case in
point in the I 960s was the Committee of Twenty-four where work was heavy
and speech highly political and emotional. 2
All independent nations seek to arrange representation at the United Nations,
314
The United .Nations: A way of life and work
if not permanently, at least at the General Assembly. (Some seek to combine

representation at New York with ambassadorship in Washington, but this is
almost impossible.) Reasons include prestige, a desire to express views in a
world forum, - and to be reported at honk as having expressed them, - the
importance attached to casting a vote and the opportunity for contact with any
nation in the world.
35. 1 3.
But given the expense ofdiplomacy and, in many cases, a shortage of personnel,
a small newly emerging state cannot possibly think in terms of a delegation,
whether permanent or appointed for the duration of an Assembly Meeting,
strong enough in quality and quantity to master the whole political, economic
and judicial front, or the mass of documentation. There are for such countries
two principal recourses, block voting, and concentration on a few matters of
special interest to a particular country.
35.14.
Block voting as a system was practised both at the San Francisco Conference
and at the Preparatory Commission Sessions in London before the First
General Assembly Meeting. The Soviet orientated Communist countries
practised it from the beginning. The Latin American countries formed a
natural block in the early stages, though differing internal policies later
modified their solidarity. The Arabs and Asians formed an early alliance but,
again, differing political stances limited its completeness, though the Palestine
question always produced Arab solidarity. Unity between Africans, Caribbean
countries and Asians is naturally produced by any discussion involving the
colour problem. Block voting (and in some cases the absence ofit) does produce
'lobbying,' a word with a slightly ugly connotation. However, so long as it
avoids intimidation or corruption, lobbying can be accepted as a natural
process of persuasion in the lobbies and on the telephone.
35.15.
A natural growth is that of the large grouping formalised through the

machinery of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development), of the countries in process of development. (The appropriateness of the title 'non-aligned' to a mostly similar group is much disputed and it
is therefore not used here.) The developing countries are numerous and strong
in debate and set the industrial countries a difficult problem in finding a line
which combines sympathy and equitability with political frankness and
economic wisdom.
35.16.
The other recourse of medium and small powers is to concentrate energy and
money on problems of special interest to them. A classic case was the decision of
the Spanish Government in 1967 to use all the diplomatic resources available to
press the Spanish claim for the re-establishment of Spanish authority over
Gibraltar, lost to Britain in 1704. The result of this pressure was an Assembly
Resolution which recommended. in the name of anti-colonialism, the handing
over of the people of Gibraltar, who did not want it, to a regime of which the
vast majority of the Assembly disapproved. A result containing so much inner
contradiction helps to explain why, despite widespread feelings ofreluctance at
the time, the drafters of the United Nations Charter insisted on confining the
Assembly's power to that of recommendation. None the less, from the Spanish
point of view, the passing of the resolution, even if it was not implemented, was
a considerable public relations and diplomatic achievement.
CHAPTER 36
The United Nations-I

The Charter and its
operation
36.1.
In the 1932 edition of this work, considerable space was given to an account of
the League of Nations, its constitution, its activities and kindred matters. But
for all the idealism of its founders, the camaraderie of those who worked in it and
the merits of much of its work, the League's span of life, in terms of world
history, was short. Handicapped from its birth in 1919 by the absence of the
United States, discredited later by its failure to deal adequately with open
breaches of the peace by Italy in Albania and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and by
Japan in Manchuria and China, fettered by what amounted to a liberum veto l
which inhibited quick, decisive action, weakened in numbers by the inevitable
withdrawal ofNazi Germany and the equally inevitable expulsion of the Soviet
Union on the latter's invasion ofFinland in 1939, the League and its supporters
had to accept during the Second World War that revision and renovation
would be too difficult for them, and that effective world opinion would insist
upon a new international organisation. Accordingly on 18 April 1946, after the
formation of the United Nations, the League gracefully brought its life to a
close, bequeathing certain of its less political responsibilities to the new body.
36 2 .
The term 'U nited Nations' derives from the 'Declaration by United Nations' of
1 January 1942, in which the twenty-six nations then fighting against the
German-Italian-Japanese Axis affirmed their resolve to cooperate in winning
the war and their adherence to the Atlantic Charter. That Charter, proclaimed
on 14 August 1941 by the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Spencer Churchill,
looked forward to a peace affording to all peoples freedom and security from
aggresSiOn.
36 .3.
Before any formal steps were taken internationally to set up a new world
political and security organisation, a conference in the name of the United
Nations was held in May andJune 1943 at Hot Springs, Virginia, USA, at the
instance of President Roosevelt. It was called under the title 'United Nations
Conference on Food and Agriculture' and it was attended by repr~sentatives
from forty-four countries. Its mandate was purely advisory, but the Conference
led directly to the establishment in October 1945 of the Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO).
316
The United Nations - I
The Charter
36.4.
The first formal international discussions with the objects described in 36.2
were held at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, DC, in the summer of 1944,
between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union. They were followed by similar talks between the United States,
the United Kingdom and the Republic of China. (The Soviet Government
refused to participate with the Nationalist Chinese in these preliminary
meetings.) Further discussions took place at the Yalta Conference in February
1945, attended by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister
Winston Churchill. Those talks resulted in a text of a draft Charter2 for
presentation to the forthcoming United Nations Conference on International
Organisation which opened in San Francisco on 25 April 1945. Various
modifications presented by the Great Powers were agreed; the only issue which
brought the Conference to real crisis with fear of failure was the difference of
opinion between, on one side, the United States, the United Kingdom and
China, with the sympathy of the middle and smaller powers, and, on the other
side, the Soviet Union about the extent of the right of veto by a Great Power in
the Security Council. 3 Extensive argument also took place between the greater
and smaller powers over the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as modified at Yalta;
some concessions were thereby achieved by the smaller powers, but in the main
the Great Power proposals stood. The Charter was signed on 26 June by
representatives of all the fifty-one nations taking part in the Conference, except
Poland, which signed on 15 October. The requisite number of ratifications
having been received, the Charter went into force on 24 October 1945.
Membership
36.5.
The names of the original membership and of members admitted up to and

including 1976 will be found in Appendix Ill.
36.6.
Members are admitted under Article 4( I) of the Charter, which reads as

follows:
'Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states [i.e. other
than original members] which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter
and, in the judgement of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations. '
Admission is effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the

recommendation of the Security Council. This means at least unanimous
acquiescence by the permanent members." But it may be thought that in
practice the criteria set in Article 4( I) have not always been applied in recent
years with the strictness originally intended.
The General Assembly
3I 7
Principal organs
36.7.
The principal organs of the United Nations are:

The
The
The
The
The
The
General Assem bly;

Security Council;
Economic and Social Council;
Secretariat;
Trusteeship Council;
International Court ofJustice.
The International Court ofJustice is considered in Chapter 39. Comments on

the operations of the other organs are given in the following paragraphs.
The General Asselllbly

36.8.
The General Assembly is the only organ in which all members of the United
Nations are directly represented. The Assembly receives and notes reports from
the Security Council and other bodies, and it is the Assem bly which approves
the Budget of the Organisation. The Assembly's sphere of activity is as wide as
the Charter itself. But in essence, apart from household questions (budgets,
elections, appointments, etc.) and affirmations of corporate views (e. g. on
racism), it is a recommending and not a deciding body. Under Article I I (I) the
General Assembly
'may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international
peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation
of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the
Members or to the Security Council or to both.'
But even this broad function is intended to be circumscribed by Article I2( I),
which lays down that:
'While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so
requests. '
However, this limitation, 5 intended in the main to avoid confusion, has not
been difficult to circumvent by procedural devices.
36.9.
The preceding paragraph has placed necessary emphasis on the limitations

imposed by the Charter on the General Assembly in the matter of taking
decisions. The corollary is that if the Assembly discusses and adopts a
Resolution which it is known in advance will be unacceptable to the Security
Council, the text may well be less responsible than one which had some
prospect of success. None the less it would be unwise to discount the publicrelations effect in individual countries, and sometimes more widely, of the
passage by a large majority in the Assembly of a Resolution on a major or
highly topical matter, even if such a Resolution in unacceptable to those
3I 8
The United .Nations - I
members who will have to enforce it and there is therefore no prospect ofact ion
on it by the Organisation as a whole.
36.10.
The Assembly, like all other organs, is bound by the 'non-intervention' section
of the Charter. Article 2(7) reads:
'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction ofany state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII.'6
Meetings
36.1
I.
The Charter provides (Art. 20) for the Assembly to have to meet in regular
annual sessions and in 'such special sessions as occasion may require.' Such
sessions can be convoked at the request of the Security Council or by a majority
of members.
The custom has established itself for the regular sessions of the General
Assembly to meet at United Nations Headquarters in New York on the third
Tuesday of each September. The 'Uniting' for Peace' Resolution (1950) made
specific provision for meetings at short notice. 7
Structure of the General Assembly

Main committees
36 . I 2.
The final authority within the General Assembly is the Plenary Meetingwhich
can be called at any time during a session. At the next level the Assembly has set
up seven main committees on which each member country may be represented
by one person. (No limit beyond that of space is placed on the number of
advisers present). The committees are:
First Committee: Political and Security.
Special Political Committee: Political questions not taken by First Committee. s
Second Committee: Economic and Financial.
Third Committee: Social, Humanitarian and Cultural.
Fourth Committee: Trusteeship (including non-self-governing territories).
Fifth Committee: Administration and Budgetary.
Sixth Committee: Legal.
Procedural committees
36. 13.
These are two in number.

The General Committee. This Committee consists of 25 members, namely the
President of the Assembly, who presides, and the 17 Vice-Presidents, together
with the Chairmen of the seven main committees. 9 It occupies a position in the
structure which gives it some influence, since it assists the President of the
Assembly over the arrangement of the agenda, including additional items
319
presented for admission over and above those originally accepted. 10 It can also
in theory tender general advice to the President on the handling of the sessions:
in practice, its advice has not gone beyond making recommendations a bou t the
inclusion of agenda items and occasionally the amalgamation of related items.
36 1 4.
The Credentials Committee. This is a committee of nine members, set up at the

beginning of each session by the General Assembly on the proposal of
the President. It examines the credentials presented by the leaders of the
delegations to the particular session and reports on them to the Assembly.
It might be supposed that the functions of these procedural committees would

be largely routine. In the highly political atmosphere of the United Nations this
is not necessarily so. For instance, a question of accreditation can arise when,
during a civil war, whether in a member country or otherwise, both sides seek
to send delegations to United Nations Headquarters. This happened in the
Congo, and the question overhung for many years the membership of China,
when the Nationalist Chinese authorities, despite expulsion from the
mainland, could offer as diplomatic arguments their original permanent
membership of the Security Council and their continued retention of Taiwan
(Formosa).ll Questions of official acceptability have arisen also when
international opinion has moved very strongly against a member country, as it
did when pressure developed for exclusion of South Africa from the United
Nations. 12
Standing committees
36 16.
This title is applied to two committees only, the Advisory Committee on

Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Committee on
Contributions. The former has its origin in the Advisory Group of Experts
whose quiet, expert work at the San Francisco Conference and subsequently
laid the foundation for a rational structure for the United Nations, given the
problem inherent in the nature of a large international governmental
organisation operating on the principle of equitable distribution of staff It
examines and reports on the budget and the accounts of the United Nations
and the administrative budget of the Specialised Agencies and advises the
General Assembly on other administrative and financial matters referred to it.
In the selection of the thirteen members of this committee, provision is made
not only for broad geographical representation, but also for personal
qualifications and experience.
The second standing committee, the Committee on Contributions, concerns
itselfwith the assessment ofcontributions, but seeks to avoid entanglement with
the politics of arrears. This particular matter is dealt with by Article 19 of the
Charter which reads in part:
'A member ... in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the
Organisation shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears
equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full
years....'
This logical provision precipitated in due course a major crisis in the

organisation.
320
The United. 'Vations - /
36.18.
At the time of the Congo crisis of 1960, there was disagreement within the
United Nations about paying for the United Nations Emergency Force in the
Middle East and for peace-keeping operations in the Congo. The Soviet
Union and its Communist associates had taken the line from 1956 onwards that
only the Security Council had the authority to establish United Nations forces
and decide how their operations should be financed. However, the events
which will be described in 36.46 had shown that practice was not so clearly
definable, and in any case many countries of the Latin-American and AfroAsian groups did not challenge the legality of the procedures adopted in the
case of the Congo, though it was suggested that contributions corresponding to
the assessment of each country for UN budget purposes would place too great a
burden on the poorer countries. 13 The position was further complicated by
Soviet opposition in 1960 to peace-keeping activities in the Congo.
36 1 9.
The Assem bly failed to solve the problem and the Soviet Union and, in respect
of the Congo, France began to withhold payments. The Assembly in 196 I
decided by a majority to refer to the International Court of] ustice the question
whether peace-keeping activities in the Middle East and the Congo constituted
'expenses of the Organisation' under Article 17 of the Charter. 14 The Court
took, by majority vote, the view that no limitation of the scope of United
Nations action, as implied by the opposing side, existed in Article 17, thereby
rejecting the Soviet and French contention and action. In 1964, when Soviet
payments had dropped seriously behind, the United States raised the
possibility of action under Article 19 to suspend the Soviet vote in the
Assembly. There was naturally relief when crisis was averted by a so-called
'non-objection procedure' which enabled the United States to withdraw its
pressure. But this procedural device thinly concealed a major concession of
principle proving the non-effectiveness of rules and committees when a leading
power decides not to comply. IS
36.20.
Subsidiary and ad hoc bodies

The remaining committees are grouped by the United Nations under the title
Subsidiary and Ad Hoc Bodies. In 1975 there were thirty-nine of them. This
total divides itself into four almost equal groups: political and disarmament,
individual problems and crises, administration, and the remainder, notably
legal, social and economic. They vary greatly in activity and performance;
their scope extends from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(officially, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament) and the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, through the International
Law Commission, and Committees on Namibia and Apartheid, to the]oint
Inspection Unit which continually inspects the functioning of the United
Nations machinery.16 There is one characteristic of almost all of these
committees. They are the classic field of modern collective diplomacy
conducted by mixed national teams of specialists and diplomats. The specialist
provides the knowledge without which no expert discussion is possible; the
diplomat provides the knowledge of the relationships between countries
without which purely technical judgements can go awry. The effect of this
work-sharing is often to convert the specialist into a half-diplomat and the
diplomat into a half-specialist, each able for a period to 'stand in' for the other;
but the two are much stronger as a combination than is either on his own.
32 I
Plenary sessions
36.2 I .
General policy speeches, very often made by foreign ministers and occasionally
by heads of government are delivered in plenary session during the first two or
three weeks of the regular Assembly session. Since most speakers work out their
speeches carefully in advance and devise them at least in part to satisfy
audiences at home, there is not much debate at this stage. From then on,
practically every item on the agenda is considered in the appropriate
committee. This will, if necessary, refer them, generally between sessions, to an
existing or ad hoc sub-committee which will be able to do detailed and
specialised work in a group smaller than the main committee ofanything up to
some 150 people. Each item will come back from its committee to the Plenary
Assembly where it will be voted on, sometimes without discussion and
generally with much briefer discussion than that in committee.
36.22.
Decisions are taken in committees by a simple majority of those present and

voting. The same rule applies in plenary meetings of the Assembly, except in
respect of 'important' questions on which decisions are taken by a two-thirds
majority of those present and voting. 'Important' questions include automatically recommendations concerning the maintenance of peace and security,
elections to the Councils, admission, suspension and expulsion of members,
questions relating to the Trusteeship Council system and budgetary questions:
other questions may be ruled to be 'important' by a simple majority vote and
the overwhelming majority of substantive decisions are taken in this way. It
follows that for those taking a negative view on a draft resolution, the
requirement of a two-thirds vote is advantageous, since this is more difficult to
achieve than a simple majority. 17 Thus the preliminary quasi-procedural vote
(or decision by consent) can in fact anticipate the final, formal vote itself.
Order of roll-call voting
36.23.
Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly reads in part as follows:
(a) The General Assembly shall normally vote by show of hands or by standing,
but any representative may request a roll-call. The roll-call shall be taken in
the English alphabetical order of the names of the Members, beginning
with the Member whose name is drawn by lot by the President. ... 18
In the early meetings of the General Assembly, the roll-call was conducted
in alphabetical order starting at the beginning of the alphabet. It was not
perhaps fully realised that if roll-call votes were declared publicly, the first vote
on a difficult question on which voting lines had not yet become clearly defined
might have an unintended influence on subsequent voting. This possibility can
never be wholly eliminated. The nearest way ofachieving fairness was felt to be
to retain the alphabetical principle as the only practicable one, but to subject
each year to chance the choice of the country announcing its vote first. This at
least avoided all other avoidable disadvantages, and, in particular, the exercise
of special pressure over the years on one single country.
322
The United ,Nations - I
The Security Council

36.24.
The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Membership
36.25.
Originally the Security Council had eleven members, five permanent and six
non-permanent. The permanent members were the Republic of China,
France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom ofGreat
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The six nonpermanent members were to be elected by the General Assembly for two years,
a provision in Article 23(2) ensuring that three would be elected each year.
Since that time there have been two important changes, one in the number of
members and the other in the identity of one of the permanent members.
36.26.
In the election of non-permanent members, due regard is to be paid to the

contribution of members to the maintenance of international peace and
security and to the other purposes of the Organisation, and also to equitable
geographical distribution. In practice the real decisions on these candidatures
are taken after internal negotiation, sometimes protracted, within the regional
groups.
Procedure
36.27.
The Security Council is organised so as to be able to function continuously. Every member of the Council has to be represented at all times at
the seat of the Organisation. The position of President is held for a month at a
time by each of its mem bers, in the alphabetical order of their English names.
Functions
3 6 2 8.
The main functions of the Security Council are dealt with in Chapters VI
and VII of the Charter. Under Chapter VI of the Charter, entitled the
'Pacific Settlement of Disputes', the Council may call on the parties to a
dispute to settle it by peaceful means; may investigate any dispute or any
situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in
order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; or, at any
stage of such a dispute or situation, may recommend procedures or methods of
adjustment. Any member of the United Nations may bring such a dispute or
situation to the attention of the Council, or of the General Assembly. Any state
not a member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the same
bodies any dispute to which it is a party, if it accepts for the purposes of the
dispute the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter.
323
36.29.
Chapter VII of the Charter is entitled'Action with respect to Threats to the

Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.' Under it the Council is
given extensive powers, including the power to use armed force. In general,
Member States are obliged to comply with decisions of the Security Council
(whereas resolutions of the General Assembly can, as a rule, only have the force
of recommendat ions). In pract ice, however, owing to the power of veto of the
permanent members of the Security Council, the Council has rarely been able
to exercise the powers granted to it by the provisions of Chapter VII. In
particular, Article 43, which provides the key to enforcement action by the
Council, has remained inoperative, owing to the failure to conclude the special
agreement or agreements referred to in it. Similarly the Military Staff
Committee, for which Article 47 provides and which is intended to assist the
Security Council in making plans for the application of armed force, has had
from the beginning a purely formal existence.
36.30.
While thus vesting primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the
Security Council, the Charter also provides that nothing contained in it shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, if an armed
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. It is under this provision of the Charter that the establishment of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and of the South-East Asia Treaty
Organisation is justified.
36.3 I.
The Charter also allows (in Chapter VIII) for the establishment of regional
arrangements for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. But no
enforcement action can be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council. (A temporary
exception was made with regard to measures against an 'enemy state' defined
as any state which was during the Second World War an enemy of any
signatory of the Charter.)
Enlargement of membership
36.32.
With the achievement by a large number of former colonies, particularly in

Africa, of national independence, the membership of the United Nations
grew from 82 in 1959 to 117 in 1965. It was becoming clear that a Security
Council of 1 1 members would not satisfactorily accommodate the views of the
various regions of the world on a basis of equitable geographic distribution. It
was accordingly decided in 1963 (ratified in 1965) that the membership of the
Security Council should be raised to fifteen, the number of permanent
members remaining at five. 19 The geographical distribution ofnon-permanent
seats was laid down as follows:
Africa and Asia
Eastern Europe
Latin America
Western Europe and
other states
5
1
2
2
324
36 .33.
This change had a consequence which was more than mathematical. When the
Security Council numbered I I members, a procedural motion required seven
affirmative votes, so that one such vote had to come from one of the five
permanent members. When the membership was raised to fifteen, it was
decided to fix the number of affirmative votes required to carry procedural
motions at nine, with the consequence that such motions can be passed without
a vote from any of the permanent members, and that even with the support of
the five permanent members a resolution requires the positive votes of nonpermanent members representing at least two regional groups. Furthermore,
on a matter on which the permanent members are not enthusiastic but on
which no permanent member wishes to vote negatively, whether alone or in
company with others, a proposition can be carried by the votes of nonpermanent members only. This procedure was used in a vote in 1973 in regard
to the holding of a Peace Conference in Geneva. 20
Replacement of the Republic of China by the People's Republic

3 6 .34.
At the San Francisco Conference the people of China were represented by the
Republic of China, whose Government had for practical purposes been since
1928 in the hands ofChiang Kai-shek. The Republic had struggled since 1931
against Japanese invasion and had fought alongside the Allied forces from the
day when in 1941 Japan entered the Second World War. On the initiative of
the United States, China was accepted as one ofthe original sponsors ofthe San
Francisco Conference and one of the permanent members of the Security
Council. In the immediately succeeding years, while efforts were being made to
find an acceptable modus vivendi between the Nationalists and the Communists,
China was represented at the United Nations by a composite NationalistCommunist delegation. But in 1949, as had by no means been expected in the
outside world in 1945, the Nationalist forces were routed in continental China
by their Communist opponents and Chiang Kai-shek retired to Taiwan
(Formosa) to set up his administration there, retaining the name 'Republic of
China'. At this point a number of countries transferred recognition from the
Republic ofChina to the (Communist) People's Republic, headed by Mao TseTung, as effectively representing the Chinese people as a whole. Among these
countries was the United Kingdom, in conformity with the British doctrine that
recognition is not a moral choice but a recognition that a particular
government has genuine control of a country.
36.35.
However, United States doctrine and policy in a situation of this kind permits
the exercise of choice. In the Chinese case, given the breadth and intimacy of
America's relationship with China, and particularly Kuomintang China, in
peace and war, the Americans did not feel able to accord early recognition to
the Communist Government. There was strong and continuous pressure from
political and economic organisations in the United States against any change.
The subsequent war in Korea made this position more difficult still to abandon.
Other countries, while disagreeing, were not disposed to provoke an American
veto on the question who should represent China, which a motion in the
Security Council under Article 4(2) would have induced. It was only in 1971
32 5
that the general pressure of fact and opinion, and the refusal of the People's
Republic to consider a so-called 'Two Chinas Policy', led the United States
Government reluctantly to agree that the replacement in the United Nations of
the Chiang Kai-shek administration in Taiwan by the People's Republic had
become inevitable. This took place on 25 October 197 1. 21
Voting in the security council
36.36.
Article 27 of the Charter which deals with voting in the Security Council
originally read as follows:
Each member of the Security C<'uncil shall have one vote.
Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of seven members.
3 Decisions ofthe Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that in decisions under Article VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a
party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
I.
2.
(The Articles specifically referred to in sub paragraph 3 above concern the

Pacific Settlement of Disputes, whether in a general or regional context.)
36.37.
Under the amendment to the Charter already mentioned in 36.32, which

entered into force on 31 August 1965, the number of votes required for
affirmative decisions was raised from seven to nine.
36.38.
The effect of Article 27.3 is to create the so-called 'veto', exercisable by any of
the permanent members. Not unnaturally this was strongly attacked at the San
Francisco Conference by both 'middle' and smaller powers, but it was a
proposition from which the sponsoring powers and France were not prepared
to move, maintaining that it was only by a measure of this kind that the
constitution of the United Nations could be made to conform with the realities
of world power. The only modification agreed later (1946/7) by the permanent
members was that abstention by a permanent member was not to be regarded
as the exercise of a veto. Thus, if a permanent member abstained, such an
abstention would not imply failure of a draft resolution provided that there
were sufficient affirmative votes to make up seven or, after August 1965, nine.
36.39.
On 25June 1950, troops from North Korea crossed the boundary into South
Korea and met resistance from South Korean forces. The matter was at once
brought to the attention of the Security Council. In the debate the SecretaryGeneral, Mr Trygve Lie, exceptionally intervened to give his opinion that the
attack was a violation of the United Nations Charter. It was to be presumed,
however, that any proposal for United Nations preventive action would be
vetoed by the Soviet representative.
36.40.
But the Soviet Union was at that time boycotting the Security Council and
other organs of the United Nations on the ground that, given the victory ofthe
Communist forces on the Chinese mainland the year before, China was no
longer properly represented at the United Nations by a Nationalist delegation.
Accordingly, when a draft resolution was put to the vote calling for a cease-fire
326
The [lnited ,Nations - I
and a withdrawal of forces, there was no veto. Under subsequent resolutions

(27 June and 7 July 1950), in addition to the forces of the Korean Republican
Army already engaged in hostilities, contingents were provided by sixteen
states and medical units by five. These forces were organised under what was
called a United Command.
36.41.
After spectacular vicissitudes, hostilities were formally brought to an end by an

armistice signed in Korea on 27July 1953 by the Commander-in-Chief, United
Nations Command, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The Armistice
agreement provided for the setting up of a Military Armistice Commission,
consisting of five members from each side, whose instructions were 'to supervise
the implementation of this armistice Agreement and to settle through
negotiation any violations of the Armistice Agreement.' Nearly a quarter of a
century then passed without change in this military and political arrangement. Because of the absence of the Soviet delegate from the relevant Security
Council meeting, the Assembly had been able to accept a resolution not only
condemning aggression in Korea, but also calling for action to repel it. But it
was recognised that if another case should occur in which the Soviet Union
might wish to veto action supported by the majority of the members of the
United Nations, the Soviet Union might well instruct its representative to be
present and vote, despite Soviet disapproval of the form of Chinese
representation. The Council would then be prevented from taking action, and
action by the Assembly on a Security Council matter would thereby also be
ruled out. Even in the absence of a veto it was manifestly not possible for the
General Assembly to alter by resolution its powers as laid down (and limited)
by Chapter IV of the Charter; but it was possible to alter usefully certain items
of procedure. In particular the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution, accepted by the
General Assembly on 3 November 195022 provided principally that, if the
Security Council were prevented by lack of unanimity among its permanent
members from taking action in a case involving a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace or an act of aggression, the Assembly might be called within twentyfour hours at the request of seven members of the Security Council, or of a
majority of member states, to meet in emergency special session for the purpose
of making recommendations for collective measures to maintain or restore
peace.
36.42.
In addition to establishing a peace-keeping force (UNEF or United Nations

Emergency Force), the resolution also provided for a Peace Observation
Commission of fourteen members which could observe and report on the
situation in any area where international tension existed; a Panel of Military
Advisers to be available to advise member states on the formation of military
units which they would be asked to keep ready for service upon the
recommendation of the General Assembly or the Security Council; and a
Collective Resources Committee of fourteen members to study and report to
the Security Council and the Assembly on methods of maintaining and
strengtpening international peace. In fact none of these provisions were ever
put into effect. But what had been done was the best that could be done in the
absence of a Security Council decision and an effective United Nations
Military Staff Committee as intended under Article 47 of the Charter. In the
32 7
circumstances, there being no Military Staff Committee 23 to give 'strategic

direction' (Art. 47.3), the Assembly, having established a United Nations
emergency force, put the day-to-day management of that force under the
Secretary-General, assisted by a Committee of states providing military
contingents.
36.43.
No situations involving the procedural complications produced by the Korean

crisis arose in the following years. But the proceedings described above enabled
a Special Session of the General Assembly to be convoked in November 1956 at
the time of the Suez crisis, which authorised the formation ofa United Nations
Emergency Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.
Use by the United Nations of armed forces

36.44.
It is of value to trace the sequels of this episode along two lines, the use of
military forces by the United Nations and the use of the veto. It was not
unreasonable to expect that, as a result of what happened over Korea, no
permanent member of the Security Council would again be absent on a
comparable occasion and no further use of armed forces would be made by the
United Nations. The first judgement has been correct for over a quarter of a
century. The second judgement would be wrong. It is true that with the tacit
approval of at least two permanent members of the Security Council,
machinery for organising action under Article 47 of the Charter through the
Office ofthe Military Adviser had been allowed to run down. However, this did
not happen to the use of the armed forces of the United Nations in the cause of
peace-keeping.
36.45.
Two years before the Korean War the Security Council had on 29 May 1948
authorised the United Nations Mediator in Palestine to use military observers
for truce supervision; but at that stage these observers did not constitute an
'interposition' force between possible combatants. Later, after the Suez crisis, a
United Nations Emergency Force was placed on the border between Israel and
Egypt (United Arab Republic) between the forces of the two countries. In
1967, however, in a tense political situation, the withdrawal of the force was
demanded by Gamel Abdel Nasser, President of the UAR, and the demand
was promptly (and controversially) acceded to by the then United Nations
Secretary-General, U Thant. After the defeat of the Arab forces, the passage
five months later of Security Council Resolution 242 resulted in the truce
supervision organisation assuming responsibility for maintaining the cease-fire
in the Suez Canal Zone. When in 1973 the war broke out again, the Security
Council in Resolution 338 and 339 of 2 I and 23 October set up a new UNEF
with the instruction to 'supervise the immediate and complete implementation
and observance of the cease-fire ... and to use its best efforts to prevent a
recurrence of the fighting.'
36.46.
The use of United Nations forces in a peace-keeping capacity was not confined to the Middle East. There was the intervention in 1960 in the former
Belgian Congo (Zaire). This example of the employment offorces in the name
of the United Nations was wholly different from the other two referred to
328
above. A few days after independence day (20June 1960) the Congolese army
revolted against the Belgian forces still stationed there and, in the atmosphere
of tense fear which followed, the Belgian Government ordered the sending of
reinforcements from home. The Congolese Government appealed to the
United Nations for help, and the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskj6ld,
put the matter urgently to the Security Council under Article 99 of the
Charter. 24 Putting his initiative in language which was based on the setting up
of the UNEF in Sinai and avoiding the concept of'enforcement,' the SecretaryGeneral persuaded the Security Council to accept his plan and at one time
there were contingents from no less than eleven members ofthe United Nations
in the Congo for the purpose of promoting the peace and uLity of the country.
The tragic death ofHammarskjold in 1961 and disunity among the powers led
Hammarskj6ld's successor, U Thant, towards a policy ofdisengagement and the
handing to the Specialised Agencies ofthe task ofassisting a country now weary
of civil war. In the wake of the Soviet and French complaints about the Congo
operation a Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations was set up by
the General Assembly Resolution 2006 (XIX) to draw up guidelines on peacekeeping operations. But it has so far failed to agree on the terms to be
recommended.
36.47.
Yet another variation in the use of United Nations Forces for peace-keeping
was the Security Council's Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, designed to keep
the Greek and Turkish protagonists in a near-civil war in Cyprus from actual
hostilities. Under this Resolution there was established, in consultation with
the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom (the
former ruling power), a United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Drawn
from seven Commonwealth and European countries (including, for the first
time, a permanent member of the Security Council, the United Kingdom), the
force became operational on 27 March 1964, initially for three months. It was
not strong enough to prevent civil strife and the Turkish invasion of 1974, and
its existence was constantly placed in jeopardy by the habit of United Nations
members of failing to provide until the last moment, ifat all, the funds required
for the next period. Nevertheless, the presence of these forces (4100 members in
all in 1974) gave to life in the island a certain reassurance which would not
otherwise have existed.
36 .48 .
The utility of peace-keeping forces is unquestioned. But the bilateral solution of

the crisis in 1962 between the United States and the Soviet Union over the
stationing of missiles in Cuba, and the absence of any United Nations
intervention in V ietnam, showed that there are limitations to this technique
when leading world powers are involved.
The veto after Korea

36.49.
The unique experience of the Korean debate and its sequel did not
immediately change the spirit or practice of the Security Council in the use of
the veto. In general, the custom was to bring disputes and situations involving
possible dangers to peace rapidly before the Security Council (as indeed
appeared to be the intention of the Charter) with the resultant risk of veto
329
occurring soon after. 25
36.50.
The hundredth veto was applied in 1963. At the end ofthat year the number of
vetoes cast was as follows:
China (Nationalist)
France
USSR
United Kingdom
United States
100
3
nil
(2 jointly with the

United Kingdom)26
(2 jointly with France)
108
In a degree, the figures speak for themselves. But it needs to be noted at once
thal the figures are 'gross' rather than 'net.' For example, nearly 50 per cent of
the vetoes cast concerned the admission to membership of the United Nations
of new members. Some countries were vetoed more than once before eventual
admission. The frequent use ofvetoes caused increasing concern whether it was
right or expedient for the world organisation responsible for the maintenance of
peace and security to place itself in a position where decision was impossible.
Moreover, with the rapid growth from the late I 950S onward of the concept of
non-alignment, there were many newly elected members to whom it was
distasteful either to take sides or to be criticised, whether for being present and
abstaining from voting or for being absent during a vote.
36.5 I.
On the other side, it could be argued that it was seriously damaging to this
world organisation to face an international crisis and take no decision at all, or
worse still, not even to face it, despite the words of the Charter in Article I. I:
'The Purposes of the United Nations are:
I. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace... .'27
Sydney Bailey's comment reads:

'For as far ahead as one can foresee, we will have to continue to live with the veto, which
will remain as an expression of superior power and privilege. Indeed, it is possible that
the Western powers will in the future be tempted to use the veto more frequently than
they have in the past. Some vetoes are inescapable, but the lesson of the past six years
(1963-9) during which the veto has been used on only five occasions, is that vetoes can be
kept to a minimum if there is adequate diplomatic consultation before a proposal is
pressed to a vote.' 28
36.52.
A classic example of successful diplomacy along the lines of this thinking was
the handling of the diplomatic situation after the Six-Day Arab-Israel War of
1967. A cease-fire was followed by the calling of a Special Assembly of the
United Nations at which the Soviet Union prompted a draft Resolution wholly
favourable to the Arab view. This was not adopted, and deadlock appeared
complete. However, early in August there emerged the first signs that there
could be the possibility of compromise. This possibility was pursued
pertinaciously over the next three months, particularly by two leaders of
330
delegations in New York, Lord Caradon (United Kingdom) and Arthur

Goldberg (United States) and by V. V. Kuznetsov (Soviet Union), who arrived
for the 1967 General Assembly. The end of this intensive 'conference
diplomacy' was Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which
some ten years later still stood as the basis, accepted by the member states
(though not by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation), for the final
settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. 29
Developments in international thinking about the veto, and the decreased
candidature for membership by countries whose candidacy might provoke
controversy, led to a notable decrease in the number of vetoes used. The
numbers in early 1977 read:
Country
Vetoes cast in 1964-76
China (Nationalist)
China (People's Republic)
2
France
USSR
UK
Total of Vetoes cast

2
4
(2 jointly with UK)
10
12
(2 jointly with France)

USA
17
37
17
145
The proportionate increase in Western as opposed to Communist vetoes

reflected among other things the careful choice by the Soviet Union of
initiatives which, in the view of that Government, might secure the support or
non-resistance of the non-aligned countries while arousing at least anxiety in
the Western world.
Against some measures of success must be set the major problems involving the
convictions and ambitions of major powers. The history and practice of the
United Nations in the field of peace and security are not to be underrated. But
in recent years the limitations on what can be done have obtruded themselves
uncomfortably and raise fundamental questions. How willing are Great
Powers to accept some degree of international discipline and how much
initiative and authority ought the Secretary-General to assume in forwarding
the peace-making and peace-keeping process?
EconolDic and Social Council

3 6 .5 6 .
Under the heading 'International Economic and Social Cooperation,' Article

55 of the Charter sets out the objectives ofthis side ofthe Organisation's work as
follows:
'With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
Economic and Social Council
331
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social
progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and
international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.'
36.57.
Authority for carrying out the above functions is vested in the General
Assembly and, under its authority, in the Economic and Social Council (Art.
60). The Council may make or initiate studies on the matters referred to, and
may make recommendation upon them to the General Assembly, to member
states and to the Specialised Agencies concerned. It may also make
arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations. The
Council enters formal relationships with the Specialised Agencies by
negotiating special agreements with each of them, subject to approval by the
General Assembly.
Membership and procedures

36.58.
Originally the Economic and Social Council consisted of 18 members, ofwhich

one-third retired each year but remained eligible for immediate re-election.
The number was increased to 27 in 1963 and to 54 in 197 I. Decisions of the
Council are made by a majority of members present and voting, each member
having one vote.
36.59.
It is often asked why, given the importance of the economic and social aims of
the United Nations and the progress made since 1945 in respect of many of
them, the Economic and Social Council does not enjoy a prestige comparable
to that of the Security Council. It is fair to say that in the United Nations'
formative years of 1945-6, while economic and social objectives were realised
to be very important, the main interest of governments and peoples lay in
organising the preservation of peace and the prevention of future war. But
there was also a basic difference between the two Councils. The Security
Council had no competitors; the Economic and Social Council had
competition existing already in the International Labour Organisation (1919),
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
International Monetary Fund (articles approved in 1946), and later in the
World Health Organisation (1948) and, on the economic analysis side,
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1961) and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1964)' Of these
'competitors', all but the OECD have since become Specialised Agencies.
Thus, while the Economic and Social Council has initiated such enterprises as
the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and encouraged
progress on economic and social developments, including in later years work
designed to assist the developing countries, it has never succeeded in
establishing for itself the place of world authority which many in 1945 hoped it
might achieve.
332
The Secretariat
36.60.
In the opening words ofArticle 97, 'The Secretariat shall comprise a SecretaryGeneral and such staff as the Organisation may require.'
The Secretary-General
3661
The same Article continues, 'The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the

General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall
be the chief administrative officer of the Organisation.' Article 98 states that
the Secretary-General 'Shall act in that capacity in all meetings ofthe General
Assembly' [and of all the Councils of the Organisation] 'and shall perform
such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs'.
The functions of the Secretary-General are up to this point somewhat modestly
described. But Article 99 is of a different quality. It reads:
'The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.'
It was realised by those who devised the Charter that one of the difficulties
which obstruct international peace-making and peace-keeping is a situation in
which national or group sensitivities are so touchy, or moods so tense, that none
of the states concerned wish to invoke or provoke third-party intervention,
national or international. Article 99 contains the strong implication that in
such circumstances the Secretary-General has some moral obligation to have
the position discussed in the Security Council. Such a decision would need both
judgement and courage. If the Secretary-General acted too hastily, he might
make matters worse; if he hesitated too long or did not act at all, he might be
failing to exercise on behalf of the organisation established as the guardian of
the world's security a most important faculty provided explicitly by the
Charter. Different Secretaries-General have taken different views. The second
Secretary-General, Mr Dag Hammarskjold ofSweden, certainly took an active
view of his office in this context, his successors less so.
The staff
36.63'
The staff of the Secretariat is appointed by the Secretary-General under

regulations established by the General Assembly. The paramount consideration in their employment and in the determination of their conditions of
service is, according to Article 101 (3), the
'... necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.
Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting staffon as wide a geographical
basis as possible.'
Thirty years later no one could be considered cynical for doubting whether ail
these conditions have been and continue to be fulfilled. Indeed they are hardly
self-consistent, since the choice of the most competent candidate cannot be
The Secretariat
333
expected regularly to coincide with the widest possible selection on a

geographical basis.
36.64.
In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and staffmay not seek
or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority
external to the Organisation. They are to refrain from any action which might
reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the
Organisation. According to Art. 100, each member of the United Nations
undertakes to respect the exclusive international character and responsibilities
of the Secretary-General and his staff and not to seek to influence them in the
discharge of their responsibilities. 30
Languages
36.65'
On I February 1946, during the first part of its first session, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted a Resolution entitled 'Rules of Procedure
concerning Languages' of which the Annex, paragraph I, reads as follows:
'In all the organs of the United Nations, other than the International Court of] ustice,
Chinese, French, English, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages, and
English and French the working languages.'
This meant in effect that speeches made in one working language were
interpreted into the other, and speeches made in the official languages were
interpreted into both working languages. Any representative might make a
speech in any other language, but in that case he would be responsible for
providing interpretation into one of the working languages; the Secretariat
would then provide interpretation from that working language into the other.
Apart from this, a fuller documentation would be furnished in the working
languages than in any other.
36.66.
At that time simultaneous interpretation was in a very early technical stage, and
the General Assembly included in the same Resolution a recommendation that
the Secretary-General 'make a thorough enquiry into the question of the
installation of telephone systems of interpretation.... '31 As a result of this
examination and the installation ofa telephone system providing simultaneous
listening facilities in more than one lang-uage, the Assembly resolved 32 on 7
December 1946 to continue using both systems (consecutive and simultaneous)
until the next session and meanwhile to provide more equipment with
apparatus for simultaneous interpretation and to consider whether a wireless
system of simultaneous interpretation would be preferable to the equipment
then in use. On 15 November 1947 it decided 33 that simultaneous
interpretation should be adopted as a permanent service, either as an
alternative to, or in connection with, consecutive interpretation. In fact, this
was the end of consecutive interpretation in the Assembly.
36.67.
Consecutive interpretation has its merit ifthere are only two languages in use at
a Conference, since it gives delegates whose own language is other than either of
these two a little more time and opportunity to make sure they understand
what has been said. But whatever might be thought in 1946, the eventual
334
increase in the number ofworking languages would have made the consecutive
procedure impossibly lengthy, and some alternative system had to be invented
and applied. 34
Meantime the number of working languages increased. In 1948 Spanish was
added. Twenty years later the Assembly decided to add Russian. Five years
after that in 1973, Chinese was included for all purposes, together with Arabic
for the Assembly and its Committees. The terms 'official' and 'working'
languages were retained in the title of Rule 51, the text of which reads:
'Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be both the official and the
working languages of the General Assembly, its Committees and the subcommittees.
Arabic shall be both an official and a working language of the General Assembly and
the main Committees.'35
36 69.
Thus the simultaneous interpretation system, with its six glass boxes containing
interpreters, enabled the assimilation of working and official languages to
progress, and various national and group claims on behalf of particular
languages to be met. A limited addition to the language services was made
when, to respond to the needs ofAustria, the Federal Republic ofGermany and
the German Democratic Repu blic, it was decided that written German
translation services (as opposed to oral interpretation) should be furnished in
respect of basic documents, provided that the three countries collectively
covered the cost.
In the Budget proposals for UN Headquarters for 1976/7, the estimated
aggregated expenditure of the Translation Division, Interpretation and
Meeting Division and the Editorial and Records Division amounted to over
US $4 1 million. 36
The Trusteeship Council

36.71.
The United N at ions Charter devotes three chapters to the su bject ofdependent
territories. Chapters XII and XIII, entitled respectively 'International
Trusteeship System' and 'The Trusteeship Council,' deal with a special task
inherited from the Permanent Mandates Commission ofthe League ofNat ions
as modified by the changes in the world military and political situation brought
about by the Second World War. Chapter XI, under the title 'Declaration
regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories,' presents a declaration under
which 'Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities
for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government. .. '37 accept certain obligations. The scope and
limits of these obligations are discussed in the following section of this chapter.
But before the two methods of approach are described separately, it is
important to note a degree of common origin.
36.72.
Throughout known history, stronger and better organised states or other

groups have, for defensible or indefensible reasons, dynastic, power-political,
economic, commercial, demographic and so on, occupied through force or
The Trusteeship Council
36.73.
36.74.
335
threat of the use of force, territories 'belonging to' or administered by others or

barely administered at all. From the late sixteenth century onwards, advanced
European countries sought first trading posts and later sovereign territory in
other parts of the world, notably Asia, Africa and Central and South America.
Sometimes rival claims could, despite initial tensions, be settled peacefully
between the claimants, such as Spanish and Portuguese claims in South
America and French and British claims in Northern Africa. But often rival
claims led to war, as did those between Britain and France in India. In these
cases, the successful party would take over the territory formerly claimed by the
other.
This process might well have been repeated at the end of the First World War.
However, strong pressure by the United States, under the leadership of
President Woodrow Wilson, led to a change in the world order by which the
colonies of the defeated colonial powers (Germany and Turkey) were placed
not under the sovereignty of individual victorious powers, but under mandate
exercised by individual powers or groups of powers on behalf of the world
community embodied in the League of Nations, and in accordance with
obligations laid down in the Covenant ofthe League. (The failure ofthe United
States itself to become a member of the League did not affect the adoption of
the new system.)
The supervision of the mandated territories on behalf of the League was no
doubt lacking in full effectiveness and the supervisors were, in the
circumstances not unnaturally, the victorious powers. But a new dimension
had been brought into being in terms of international law and diplomatic
practice. In one part of a judgement on the workings of the mandate system
between the world wars, Professor Leland M. Goodrich wrote:
'While failing to live up to the expectations of its more idealistic proponents, it did
achieve substantial benefits both in the quality of administration of dependent
territories and in changing prevailing attitudes and expectations regarding the
treatment of dependent peoples.'38
36.75.
In the circumstances, it is natural that the drafters of the United Nations

Charter should have made provision for the continuation of the Mandate or,
under its new name, Trusteeship system. Eleven territories were placed under
the Trusteeship Council through agreements approved by the General
Assembly. Of these, ten had become independent by 1975. An eleventh, the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, became in 1947 a strategic trust territory
administered by the United States under an agreement approved by the
Security Council under Articles 82 and 83 ofthe Charter. This meant that these
islands were subject to less vigorous United Nations supervision than were
ordinary Trust territories. One territory, South-West Africa (later Namibia),
formerly a League mandate administered by South Africa, was not transferred
by the administering state to the United Nations Trusteeship system.
36.76.
Since the Trusteeship Council had thus largely fulfilled its purpose, it would be
unprofitable in this edition of this book to describe in detail its nature, purpose
and rules. 39 The texts ofChapters XII and XIII ofthe Charter are, however, of
great interest as illustrating the development of the idea ofTrusteeship, should
336
events again make its adoption expedient and acceptable. Two points may,
however, be briefly noted. Article 76(b) of the Charter describes as a 'basic
objective' of the trusteeship system:
'To promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards selfgovernment or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned,
and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.'
Thus in careful language, bearing every sign of negotiation and compromise,

the Trusteeship system looked forward to an ultimate destiny for those
territories which, for agreed reasons, had been committed to Trusteeship.
36.77.
Another feature of note was the effort made in Article 86 of the Charter to
balance the interests of administering powers, non-administering powers and
world security - the latter by the inclusion as members of the Trusteeship
Council of all the permanent members of the Security Council. This balance
was to be worked out in such a way as
'... to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally
divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust
territories and those which do not.'40
36.78.
This equilibrium between administering and non-administering powers

survived without disturbance until 1960, when both France and Italy ceased to
be administering powers. By 1967 the Trusteeship Council consisted only of the
two remaining administrative powers, the United States and Australia, and the
non-administering permanent members of the Security Council. From 1975
on, the Trusteeship Council consisted simply ofthe United States, representing
the Pacific Islands Trusteeship, and the other four permanent members of the
Security Council, China, France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.
The truth was that from the time of the proceedings in the United Nations
Assembly in 1961, described in the next section in this chapter, and the
adoption of the Resolution on Colonialism, the constitution and proceedings of
the Trusteeship Council became irrelevant to the main stream of United
Nations policy and action in respect of dependent territories.
N on-self governing territories

36.79.
Since the First World War had been conducted principally in Europe and
three out of the four main Allied participants in the Versailles Peace
Conference were European Colonial Powers, it was hardly to be expected that
the international agreements arrived at would contain any statements about
the future of dependent or non-self-governing territories as a whole. In most
colonies movements in favour of independence had scarcely begun; only in the
(British) Indian Empire was the war immediately succeeded by active pressure
for swara} (self-rule). Progress moved fastest where it was least difficult, in what
Professor Max Beloff christened 'Britain's Liberal Empire, '41 in which the
Non-selfgoverning territories
337
'White Dominions' acquired by 193 I complete independence from the

Government at Westminster. 42
36.80.
During the Second World War various Allied declarations spoke in terms of
freedom, and in the case of India a highly serious, if unsuccessful, effort was
made in 1942 to advance this progress beyond the provincial self-government
already achieved. India had in any case been a member of the League of
Nations while not yet independent of Britain, and it was accepted
internationally that India would be independently represented not only at
politico-technical Conferences such as the Chicago Civil Aviation Conference
in 1944 but also at the San Francisco Conference itsel( American opinion,
official and unofficial, was strongly opposed to the return of French and Dutch
rule in Indo-China and Indonesia (Dutch East Indies) respectively, where
strong nationalist movements had developed during Japanese occupation. It
was thus inevitable that the question whether there should be an Article in the
United Nations Charter about Non-Self-Governing Territories should be
raised and hotly debated in San Francisco. The majority of the Conference,
containing as it did Asian, Arab and Latin-American States, many of which
had had colonial pasts, was bound to be in favour of such an article being
included. Against this the proponents of the emerging Article 2.7, the noninterventi< n clause, could and did argue that the two concepts were
inconsisteJ t. 43 When both Article 2 and Chapter XI - the latter dealing with
non-self-governing territories - became part of the Charter as ratified,
their coexistence raised obvious difficulties. Administering states in due course
sought to use Article 2.7 to prevent discussion of items concerning non-selfgoverning territories, but the Assembly could, if the majority so wished, vote by
majority to undertake such discussion.
36.8 I.
The wording of Chapter XI is cautious. It is described as a 'Declaration', and

its introductory paragraph, in Article 73, reads as follows:
'Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of selfgovernment recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the
utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present
Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories.... '
36 82 .
Article 73(b) opens with a commitment 'to develop self-government' but does
not contain a commitment to political independence. On the other hand the
phrase 'have not yet attained a full measure of self-government' has an
implication of progress towards independence, and a much stronger
implication is to be found in Article 1.2 of the Charter which, under the
introductory phrase 'The purposes of the United Nations are -' reads in part:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and determination of peoples... .'44
'2.
Yet here again interpretation has to be careful, since the people of West Irian
exercise the right not to become a separate, independent state, but to become
part of an already existing state, Indonesia.
338
The United ,Nations - I
36 8 3'
And, as if in the early stages of the United Nations this matter were not
ambiguous enough, reference may be made back to Article 73(e), in which
administering powers accept the obligation to 'transmit regularly to the
Secretary General for information purposes ... statistical and other
information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational
conditions in territories for which they are respectively responsible.' But
Chapter XI does not provide for the furnishing by the administering power of
'political information.'45
36.84.
The limitations in Chapter XI of the Charter are important. But the essential
change from previous practice is that for the first time the administering
powers accepted the proposition that they had a degree of obligation,
sustained by international Charter, to report to the international community
on matters which had previously been considered their own exclusive
responsibility. This does not mean that foreign public or even governmental
opinion had felt debarred from commenting critically on the colonial
proceedings of others; but hitherto such criticism had enjoyed no status in
international law.
36.85.
A third consideration, to become later of great importance, was that, no doubt

because Chapter XI is a 'declaration', no specific organ of the United Nations
was created with power to supervise its operation. The information under
Article 73(e) was to be furnished to the Secretary-General. But the SecretaryGeneral was not told what to do with the information. In the event, he
transmitted it to the General Assembly, which created a committee to examine
it. This committee, like the Trusteeship Council, was constituted on the basis of
parity between administering and non-administering states. The Colonial
Powers resisted attempts by the committee or the General Assembly to issue
guidance or directives on colonial policy, and also took refuge in the fact that
there was no obligation on them to transmit political information on certain
territories, on the grounds that these had already attained the 'full measure of
self-government' referred to in the Charter. The committee to examine
information submitted under Article 73 was dissolved in 1963, as part of the
major changes of attitude and pace in the handling of these matters in the early
1960s.
36.86.
In the early years after the ratification of the Charter a number of things
happened which had been expected, but they happened rather earlier than
foreseen. India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) became independent from
Britain in 1947 and Burma in 1948: the first three within the Commonwealth
and Burma outside. The Dutch, under pressure from the United Nations,
accepted similar developments in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) in 1950. In
1956, Morocco and Tunisia declared independence from France, and the
Sudan emerged from a nominal Anglo-Egyptian condominium which had become, in practice, British authority. In 1957, the Gold Coast (Ghana), under
the leadership of Dr Kwame Nkrumah, a thorough student of the theory and
practice of colonisation and decolonisation, became the first British black
African colony to gain independence, and in South East Asia the same step was
taken by Malaya (Malaysia).
,I\fon-selfgoverning territories
339
36 8 7.
History had now taken charge. Achievement of independence by a number of

non-self-governing territories encouraged others to follow suit. The conspicuous failure of the United Kingdom and France, the two leading European
Colonial Powers, in their Suez enterprise in 1956; the remarkable political
performance of General de Gaulle who, having given in 1958 the impression of
intending to keep Algeria French, worked steadily towards the opposite
objective of Algerian independence (1962); the speech by Harold Macmillan,
the British Prime Minister, on 3 February 1960 while on a visit to South Africa,
which launched the famous phrase 'the wind of change is blowing through the
continent,' thereby reflecting much intelligent expatriate opinion in Africa and
starting a slow-moving comprehension in Britain - all pointed this way. There
was now no stopping the advance to independence, though (apart from the war
in Algeria) active trouble did not break out until the explosion in the (Belgian)
Congo described in 36.46.
36 .8 8.
This was briefly the historical and constitutional picture in 1960 when over and
above the many new admissions in the 1950S, seventeen more colonial countries
were due to attain independence and, therefore, to become eligible for
membership of the United Nations. The next episode is a classic example ofa
political tactic applied with appropriate timing to foreign policy and
diplomatic situation. On 23 November 1960 the Soviet Delegation requested
that an additional item be added to the Assembly agenda, namely, a
'declaration on granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. '46
36 8 9.
The text was considered so important that it was moved by the chairman of the
Soviet Council of Ministers (Nikita Khrushchev) himself. Apart from the main
theme of the Resolution, perhaps the most penetrating phrase was that
'inadequacy of ... preparedness should never be served as a pretext for
delaying independence.'
36.90.
There were objections from some delegations to the tone of the language,
notably from those Latin-Americans who, contrary to the Communist and
African thesis, maintained that there had been some accomplishments in the
colonial periods for which credit must be given to the colonisers. The Soviet
draft, with minor modifications, was carried by eighty-nine votes to nil with
nine abstentions (the administering powers). 47 By abstaining from voting the
administering powers can be said to have conceded the proposition.
36.91.
As explained in 36.8, a policy Resolution by the General Assembly is not

binding, but a decision to accept a declaration which would include the
establishment of a subordinate body can be approved by a two-thirds majority
vote. On 27 November 1961 the Assembly passed a Resolution 48 setting up
a special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation ofthe
Declaration on Decolonisation, to make suggestions and recommendations on
the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration and to report
to the Assembly at the next session. The original committee consisted of
seventeen members of the United Nations but was increased in 1962 to twentyfour, a figure which caused it to be known as the Committee oftwenty-four. No
provision was made for parity between administering and non-administering
countries; among the first seventeen members, seven were from formerly non-
340
The l Tnited .Nations - I
self-governing countries in Africa and Asia, and three from Communist

countries, if Yugoslavia is included. The procedure included a provision that
the Committee would resort to voting procedures 'whenever any member felt
that procedure was necessary.'
It is not necessary to follow the proceedings of the Committee of Twenty-four

over subsequent years. It suffices to say that dealings with it were so difficult 49
that in 1969 Australia felt compelled to withdraw cooperation, as did in 197 I
the United States and the United Kingdom. 50
These events left behind important questions which would need future
solution. 51 One, affecting delegations, especially those on the defensive, was by
whom public argument should be conducted. Many professional diplomats
possess or develop an effective aptitude for argument in public, none more so
than the first two British Representatives to the United Nations, Sir Alexander
Cadogan and Sir GladwynJebb. But many ofthe meetings ofthe Committee of
Twenty-four were conducted in an atmosphere of emotion, sometimes
attended with abusive nagging to which officials trained in reasoned argument
and moderate language had to reply. The question was asked whether in such
an atmosphere it would be wiser for public argument to be entrusted to
representatives from public life experienced in the rigours of public
controversy, with diplomats or administrative officials active as advisers. Since,
however, the marshalling of public argument is inseparable from diplomatic
dealings with opposing delegations, it is probably best to accept that a mastery
of tactics has become, in the era ofmultilateral diplomacy, an accomplishment
as essential to the modern negotiator as it was to the 'orators' of former times.
Another problem which arises concerns the handling of non-self-governing or
dependent territory matters in the framework of world policy. The Soviet
initiative, whatever its motives, simply made quicker and more disagreeable to
the administering powers the inevitable achievement of independence by nonself-governing territories. More importantly to the international community as
a whole, these proceedings left behind for foreign policy and diplomacy a real
and more difficult problem. If the decolonisation of the formal colonial system
is as good as complete, this leaves unsolved the recalcitrant problem of
countries which although now nominally independent, are known to be not
truly so in as much as they are not permitted by other and more powerful states
to conduct their own independent external and, in some cases, even internal
policies.
Postscript
:J6.95.
These sections have sought to show how over some thirty years a number of
events and developments have affected the character and practices of the
United Nations. Processes which may appear complicated and even frustrating
are more readily understood when their origins and history are examined.
Undoubtedly, the most important single development has been the increase,
Postscript
341
which amounts to nearly 200 per cent (50 to 147) in the number ofmembers. Of
this latest number, some 90 are former dependent territories. Thus, the earlier
period in which a strongly held American position usually prevailed, passed
into one in which any alliance between the Communist countries and nonaligned countries (as over decolonisation) could dominate the Assembly
without, however, imposing policies or actions on which the Security Council
had, under the Charter, the final say.
36.96.
Immediately after the drafting and ratification of the Charter in 1945, the
hopes of public opinion, despite some chilling warnings, were perhaps placed
too high. Nations did not cease to behave like nations, parties like parties and
politicians like politicians. Successes and failures were mixed; the considerable
successes in the Middle East in 1967 was balanced by the long run offailure over
Rhodesia. But at least a remarkable degree of universality was achieved for the
United Nations. No country wishing to become independent thought in terms
of independence outside the United Nations and the only nation so far to
suspend its participation (Indonesia) came back. Nor does there seem likely to
be a dramatic change in the Organisation unless some sudden physical or
political convulsion were to alter the world scene beyond recognition.
36.97.
It is natural that there should be from time to time interest in the question ofthe
revision of the United Nations Charter. The whole matter, including the
politically sensitive question of the rules governing permanent membership of
the Security Council, has been under discussion in a special United Nations
Committee. The rules governing amendments of the Charter are set out in
Article 108. They are precise and read as follows:
'Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United
Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the
General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the
permanent members of the Security Council.'
Not unnaturally permanent members of the Security Council do not regard

with any enthusiasm a change in their number or identity. National interest
and the reality of power play a part in this attitude. But there is also the
argument that the Charter as it is at present has not worked too badly
considering the state of the world and that it would be unwise to embark on an
amendment of any importance since such an initiative would be likely to
provoke further ideas for amendment in a degree which could very well weaken
the stability of the Organisation as a whole. The consequence is that unless
there is some very drastic alteration in the balance of power between the
nations concerned, the matter is not likely to become actual.
36.98.
The Organisation, the members and the Secretariat will need to be neither too
hasty nor too faint-hearted in their efforts to organise peace-keeping, the
peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful change. Members and blocs will
need to conform to accepted obligations (not at present the United Nations'
strongest virtue), and to confront the difficult rather than shirk responsibility or
yield to the momentarily attractive. Nor will it help to imagine that differences
of ideology do not matter. Without full authority over national and therefore
342
international force for direct use and for the maintenance of international
peace and security (Article 43) the United Nations will have to work for
reconciliation despite the temptation to which members are exposed to abuse
and victimise. Without control over economic and social policy, which has
gone to the Specialised Agencies and to UNCTAD (The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development), the Assembly will nevertheless have
to show active interest and support in these matters and provide a world forum
for their discussion.
Chapter 37
The United Nations -11
Specialised Agencies,
regional commissions and
special bodies
'Specialised agencies'
37. I.
Article 57 of the United Nations Charter reads as follows:
'I. The various specialised agencies, established by inter-governmental agreement and

having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in
economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into
relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.'
37.2.
Article 63, paragraph
states that:
'The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the
agencies referred to in Article 57 ... '
and adds that:

'Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.'
37.3.
In paragraph 2 of the same article it is laid down that the Economic and Social
Council
'may coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies through consultation with
and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General
Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.'
37.4.
At the time of the signing of the Charter in June 1945, there was in existence
only one Specialised Agency of the broad politico-social kind covered by these
Articles - the International Labour Organisation. Two other important
organisations, the International Postal Union, as it then was, and the
International Telecommunications Union, were still regarded as principally
technical in function and scope, though later they also joined the group of
Specialised Agencies. However, activity in the direction of creating international agencies to cover Food and Agriculture, Finance, Civil Aviation and
Education, Science and Culture had already reached an advanced stage, and it
was clear that, in the forthcoming period of international relationships, there
would be an unprecedented growth of intergovernmental intercourse through
agencies organised not as periodic conferences, but as bodies with permanent
staffs and continuous international work between conference meetings.
344
The United Nations - II
37.5.
The nature, volume and authority of such work could not be clearly foreseen;
hence the prudent wording of the first sentence of Article 63, paragraph 2,
quoted in 37.3. Both the concepts and the constitutions of a number of
Specialised Agencies had reached an advanced stage before the U nited Nations
Charter had been approved. These constitutions envisaged fully operative
international agreements, so that there was no question of United Nations
'supervision.' None the less it was generally thought that agreements between
the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies would at least assure a
measure of compatibility, coherence and mutual help, and by the end of 1976
fourteen such agreements had come into force. A schedule of these Agencies,
with brief descriptions of their origins and purposes appears in Appendix IV.
37.6.
The basic structures of such Agencies are generally similar. They consist of an
Assembly or Conference of all members, a smaller Executive Board to meet
regularly between Assembly meetings to steer and sometimes determine policy
and to prepare Assembly meetings, and a Secretary-General or Director to
handle continuing work, organise operations and projects, attend to
administration and keep the organisation generally 'on course.'
37.7.
At the end Of1975, out ofa world community nearing 150 independent nations,
12 of the 14 Specialised Agencies had memberships varying from 100 to 145,
the highest being that of the Universal Postal Union, the most needed and least
controversial of all. The Communist group tended not to join the financial
organisations, and some others did not join those in which they had no special
interest. In the earlier stages, Specialised Agencies were largely run by those
governments who possessed the greatest interest and proficiency in the subject.
With the growth in memberships, greater interest began to attach to equitable
geographical and regional distribution of places on executive boards. The
degree of political as opposed to technical influence varies from, say, the World
Meteorological Organisation, where it is negligible, to UNESCO where,
owing to the incidence of politics in 1974, Israel was prevented from joining a
regional grouping and, as a result, the United States withheld payment of
contributions.
United Nations regional bodies

37.8.
At the time of the establishment of the United Nations, the Specialised

Agencies in existence or in early prospect seemed certain to cover a large range
of international functions. None the less there was a widespread conviction
both among United Nations members and within the organisation itself that it
would be natural and useful also to set up United Nations Regional
Organisations to handle economic problems under the auspices of the
Economic and Social Council. Their regional nature differentiated them from
the Specialised Agencies organised on a world scale; their basis in the United
Nations differentiated them from independent regional intergovernmental
organisations such as the future Organisation of American States or the
Organisation of African Unity.
UNCTAD
37.9.
345
The first UN regional economic commission to be set up was the Economic

Commission for Europe, established in 1947. The present list is as follows:
Economic Commission for
Europe
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (ESCAP) (formerly the
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)
Latin America (ECLA)
Africa
Western Asia (ECWA)
Established
Headquarters
28 March 1947 1
Geneva
29 March 1947 2
Bangkok
8 March 19483
Santiago de Chile
29 April 19684
Addis Ababa
9 August 1973 5
Beirut
While all these bodies have done meritorious work in matters such as research
and statistics and in modest projects, the political situations in the different
regions have not been helpful in creating opportunities for politico-economic
cooperation.
UNCTAD
37.10.
It was for some time hoped that the International Bank and Fund and their
offshoots, together with the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade),
might have sufficient resources and skill to provide for the needs of the newly
developing countries. A number of such countries might, it was thought in the
early 1960s, bring themselves to what was called the 'take-off stage, from
which point they would be able to finance and manage their national
economies. It did not take long to become clear that the problems of the
countries with the lowest standards of living were far deeper than this, and at
the call of the United Nations, the first United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development met in Geneva from 23 March to 16 June 1964.6 By
Resolution 1995 (XIX) of 1964, the General Assembly established UNCTAD
as an organ of the Assem bly.
37.1 I.
UNCTAD subsequently had conferences in Delhi (1968), Santiago de Chile

(1972) and Nairobi (1976). The first item in the official statement of
UNCTAD's purposes reads:
'(a) To promote international trade, particularly between countries of different stages of
development, with a view to accelerating the economic growth of developing countries.'
37. 12 . As an organ of the Assembly, UNCTAD did not appoint a Secretariat after the
form of a Specialised Agency, but entrusted to a Trade and Development
Board the task of carrying out the functions of the Conference when it was not
346
The United Nations - 1I
in session. From the account given here of the Specialised Agencies and
UNCTAD, it will be seen that (a) in the economic situation of the world, an
organisation additional to the economic and financial agencies had become
politically necessary, (b) much difficult argument will be necessary if countries
are successfully to reconcile needs under UNCTAD policies with existing
formal obligations under agreements entered into under the auspices of other
intergovernmental bodies.
United Nations High COlnlnissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR)
37.13.
After the First World War, machinery was set up in Geneva, under the auspices
of the League of Nations, to deal with the problem of refugees. This
organisation continued in operation after the Second World War under the
direction of Sir Herbert Emerson. Since, however, the decision had been taken
internationally not to prolong the life of the League ofNations but to replace it
by the United Nations, the General Assembly decided on 3 December 1949 to
appoint a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for a three-year
term, which has been renewed at five-yearly intervals. From being a nonoperational organisation, it soon became operational and with an Executive of
thirty-one, all from (politically) Western countries; it now operates on an
annual budget of US $12.5 million.
UNICEF
37. 1 4.
An allied and, in United Nations terms, older body, the United Nations
Children's Emergency Fund was set up as an emergency body in 19467 and
became a permanent organisation in 1953. 8 The UNICEF has the special
feature of accepting subscriptions from both governments and private
organisations as well as from individuals.
From the foregoing paragraphs it becomes clear that an unprecedented
amount of 'diplomatic time' is now devoted to work in and with international
organisations. A high proportion of this work is naturally done by professional
experts,9 many without previous diplomatic experience. Some of the practical
implications of this are dealt with in Chapter 43. But in the broadest sense, this
world wide tendency means that many technicians, senior and junior, learn to
become diplomats, and many diplomats acquire an ability to handle, or at least
'hold the fort' in what might be called general technical discussion. Such
versatility is particularly valuable to countries who need or wish to keep up
with technical developments but do not possess the manpower or financial
resources to send technical experts to every conference or international
committee. It also permits a certain elasticity of movement in that in some
specialised fields professional diplomats find themselves developing a reputable
degree of aptitude. This is particularly true in disarmament and allied subjects.
Thus, sometimes the later career of a diplomatic officer may be channelled not
in accordance with his familiarity with region or language so much as in
directions indicated by economic, social or technical su bjects to which he has
made a contribution.
Chapter 38
The United Nations-Ill

Peacefu I settlement of
38.1.
Over the last two centuries international society has evolved a number of
procedures whereby disputes between states can be settled by peaceful means. 1
While it would be beyond the scope of this work to attempt a history of these
developments, the following salient points may be noted. 2 The first cases arose
under the General Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (,the]ay
Treaty,') so named after the American Secretary ofState,]ohn]ay) of 1794.
The Treaty dealt with all outstanding issues between the two countries
accumulated since 1776, except three which were remitted to arbitration by
mixed commissions. Simpson and Fox described this step as:
'a new starting point for the development of international arbitration, after the process,
in the preceding period of a century or more, had come to be regarded as virtually in
desuetude. '3
In the nineteenth century pursuant to a series oftreaties concluded between the

United Kingdom and the United States, various issues were submitted to
mixed commissions or arbitral tribunals. The most famous of these cases was
that concerning the 'Alabama' which was submitted to an international arbitral
tribunal pursuant to the Treaty ofWashington of 1 87 I. Resort to international
procedures was had by several other states in Europe and the Americas, each
time on an ad hoc basis. A number of boundary disputes were thus submitted to
impartial international procedures, as well as disputes concerning the
interpretation of treaties and the treatment of aliens.
Towards the end of the century, ratification of certain multilateral
Conventions conveyed in advance the consent of the parties to submit any
disputes which might arise in the future to international arbitration.
The first serious attempt to set up an international system ofarbitration was the
establishment under the Hague Convention of 1899 of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. It was provided that the Court 'shall be competent for all
arbitration cases unless the parties agree to institute a special tribunal' (Art.
21); that 'an international Bureau, established at the Hague, serves as record
office for the Court' (Art. 22); 'each signatory Power shall select four persons at
the most, ofknown competence and disposed to accept the duties ofarbitrators'
and that the International Bureau is under the direction and control of a
'Permanent Administration Council, composed of the diplomatic representatives of the signatory Powers accredited to the Hague and of the Netherlands
Minister for Foreign Affairs who will act as President.' (Art. 28.) But while the
348
The United .rVations - III
machinery for setting up a system ofarbitration had been established, it should

be noted that no permanent arbitral or judicial tribunal had in fact been
created.
38-4.
The Convention of 1907 amplified a number of the ideas expressed in the

1899 text. However, at the 1907 Conference, a proposal to develop the 1899
initiative and to create a standing Judicial Arbitration Court was not
accepted, largely because smaller powers were dissatisfied with the system
proposed for selecting the judges. None the less, the idea of creating a permanent tribunal with a wholly judicial function gradually gathered support, and
when the League of Nations was set up after the First World War, agreement
was reached in December 1920 on the creation of the Permanent Court of
International Justice with its seat, like that of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, at the Hague. The fears over the selection ofjudges were overcome
by giving the decisive role in this matter to the organs of the League, coupled
with giving a state involved in a case the right to nominate a judge ad hoc. The
Permanent Court of Arbitration continued to exist alongside the Permanent
Court of International Justice; but it was the latter to which greater recourse
was made, and it quickly created its own jurisprudence, thereby greatly
influencing the development of international law.
3 8 .5.
In 1928, an attempt was made to formalise procedures for the settlement of

disputes generally. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement ofInternational
Disputes of 1928 sought to codify procedures for conciliation, judicial
settlement and arbitration, the latter relating to disputes other than those
concerning legal rights. The General Act was revised in 1949 but few states
have become parties.
3 8 6 .
In 1945, when the United Nations came into being, the (new) International
Court of Justice became the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
(Art. 92 of the UN Charter.)4 Since that time, a number of cases have been
submitted to the Court but not at the same rate as in the case ofits predecessor,
the Permanent Court.
38 .7.
With regard to other means of settling disputes, it may be recalled that when
the Charter was drafted, the general political presumption was that, despite
difficulties between the major allies, some known and others unknown at the
time to the general pu blic, a general unity of purpose and policy among
the leading Powers could be achieved and maintained. On this hypothesis the
central problem would be that of ~olving peacefully secondary problems left
over from the Second World War or arising from the resurgence of previously
independent nations or the appearance of new ones. Fears that there might
later be differences between leading Powers were not overlooked (though
mostly unexpressed), but the hope persisted that the habit of cooperation
engendered in wartime would endure in the form of an ability and willingness
to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. Such future cooperation, the draft
Charter made clear, would have to be based on Article 24( I) of the Charter
which laid down that the Members of the United Nations:
'confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.... '
The Charter
349
The Charter
38.8.
Against this background the San Francisco Conference of 1945 agreed on

Chapter VI (Art. 33-8) of the Charter. The governing paragraph, Article
33( I), reads as follows:
'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.'5
38.9.
It will have been noted from Article 33( I), that the obligation to seek a solution
by negotiation or any of the approved procedures only arises in the case of
disputes the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security. Article 37(2) makes it clear that the judge of
'likelihood' will be the Security Council itself, a determination consistent with
the analysis given above.
38.10.
In recent years, as the following pages will show, examples can be found of
recourse to a number of different procedures for the peaceful settlement of
disputes. Some procedures involve the use of permanent bodies, paramount
amongst which is the International Court of.J ustice; others are customarily
devised ad hoc. A new and increasingly important field of international
litigation concerns human rights, while closer regional integration, represented
most clearly by the European Community, also leads to a need for permanent
courts, which quickly acquire a heavy workload.
38.1 I.
The rest of this chapter seeks to bring out certain important features of the
various methods available to governments for the peaceful settlement of
disputes as defined in Article 33( I).
Negotiation
38.12.
By 'negotiation' is meant the conduct of direct talks between the parties to a

dispute, aimed at settling the dispute. 6 H. G. Darwin adds:
'Negotiations are the simplest method of peaceful settlement of disputes, in the sense
that in negotiations the parties to the dispute alone are involved in the procedure.'
By contrast, all the other methods named in Article 33( I) bring into the
procedure other states or individuals who are not themselves parties to the
dispute. However, this relative simplicity of procedure, presupposes that each
government involved feels that it may be able to make, within the range of
tolerance of its own public opinion, sufficient concessions to render agreement
possible. Of course, the degree of tolerance is not unconnected with the nature
of a state's political system. Also, it is easier to present such concessions to the
pu blic if they can be represented as a necessary response to the pressure of a
stronger power, or indeed of the United Nations itself.
38 1 3.
A government's estimate of its own public opinion may be wrong, in which

case negotiation will fail. A classic case in twentieth-century British history was
350
The United Nations - III
the rejection by British public opinion of the Hoare-Laval agreement of 1935

for the future of Abyssinia. 7
38 . 1 4.
A negotiation of any importance is not simply a matter of sitting assiduously

round a table and discussing. There will be reference home over difficult or new
points by the visiting team in a third country; there are matters such as
adjournment for internal discussion ofa possible message from one government
to the other at a high political level, designed to break a deadlock.
38.15.
The balance of advantage between conference diplomacy and more private

procedures was weightily stated in an address in 1955 at the University of
California at Berkeley, California, in the University United Nations
Convocation by the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag
Hammarskjold. He said in part:
'This instrument has many advantages. It can serve to form public opinion. It can
subject national policies and proposals to the sharp tests of world-wide appraisal, thus
revealing the strength or weakness of a cause that might otherwise have remained
hidden. It can activate the sound instincts of the common man in favour of righteous
causes. It can educate and guide. But it has, also, weaknesses. There is the temptation to
play to the gallery at the expense of solid construction. And there is the risk that positions
once taken publicly become frozen, making compromise more difficult. Thus, we find
introduced in conference diplomacy an aspect of propaganda and an element of
rigidity.... '
38.16.
All in all, good negotiation is founded on general good sense and good instinct
and, ofcourse, a will to succeed. Beyond this, there are great varieties of method
and procedure. And there are few more rewarding things in diplomacy than a
successful negotiation of whatever kind from which both or all parties derive
some satisfaction. For mutual satisfaction is the best guarantee of permanence.
Enquiry
38.17.
In a general context, enquiry can mean any form of search for information. In
this specialised context, it denotes a particular process of settling international
disputes which had its origin in the Hague Convention of 1899. Article IX of
this Convention stated the general principle as follows:
'In differences of an international nature involving neither honour nor vital national
interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points offact, the signatory Powers
recommend that the parties who have not been able to come to an agreement by means
of diplomacy should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an International
Commission ofInquiry to facilitate a solution of these differences by elucidating the facts
by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation.'
Article XIV of the same Convention further provides:

'The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry is limited to a statement of
facts, and has in no way the character of an Arbitral Award. It leaves the conflicting
Powers entire freedom as to the effect to be give to this statement.'
38.18.
Impressed by the ideas in both the 1899 and 1907 Conventions, the General
Assembly in 1949 adopted a Resolution establishing the United Nations Panel
The Charter
351
for Inquiry and also Conciliation, to be directed by the Secretary-General, and

adopted rules for its composition and procedures. 8 For a number of reasons,
notably the early concentration of the United Nations on immediate peacekeeping rather than on the peaceful settlement of future disputes, no use was
made of the machinery set up by the Assembly. The failure of members of the
United Nations to use the Panel impelled the United Kingdom Government to
put before the General Assembly in 1965 a draft resolution calling for progress. 9
But the unilateral and illegal declaration of independence by Rhodesia in that
year created so much suspicion and tension as to render progress impossible.
38.19.
The Report on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, published in 1966, speaks with
unusual emphasis on this subject. After a thorough analysis of the situation at
the time, after references to the Commission of Inquiry, Conciliation and
Mediation of the Organisation of African States and to the Inter-American
Peace Committee sponsored by the Organisation of American States, the
Report proceeds:
'The Study Group ... suggests that the United Nations should make every endeavour,
by appropriate publications, to focus attention on the need for a more positive approach
by States to peaceful settlement and on the available procedures.'lo
38.20.
In 1967, the General Assembly concluded its consideration of an item

concerning methods of fact-finding by adopting Resolution 2329 (XXII). The
General Assembly recognised the usefulness of impartial fact-finding as a
means towards the settlement of disputes as well as their prevention. Pursuant
to the Resolution, the Secretary-General prepared a register of experts in legal
and other fields whose services states parties to a dispute may use by agreement.
38.21.
A modern example ofenquiry as a means ofsettling a dispute is provided by the

affair of the Red Crusader, a British fishing vessel which became involved in 1961
in a rather unpleasant incident with a Danish fishery protection vessel. The
facts were disputed and complaints made by both skippers. A Commission of
Inquiry was created by agreement 11 between the British and Danish
Governments, composed of Professor de Visscher (Belgium), Professor Gros
(France) and Captain Moolenburgh (Netherlands). The Commission held
hearings into the facts of the incident and its report, dated March 1962, formed
the basis of an agreement between the Governments l2 settling the dispute by
means of a mutual waiver of all claims under charges.
Mediation and good offices
38.22.
If the first two methods of solution commended in Article 33( I) are easy to
distinguish, the next one, mediation, is less easy to define precisely. It is closely
akin to, and yet slightly different from, an activity not listed in this Article and
yet often applied in United Nations proceedings, good offices. From the point of
view of a diplomat handling such matters, the obvious but fine distinction
would be that, whereas a Mediator would seem to be under some obligation to
suggest possible solutions, a person or organisation invited to afford 'good
offices' might well argue that his obligation was to provide every possible
facility including advice on prodecure, but that any proposals must come from
the parties themselves.
352
The United ,Nations - III
In regard to mediation, it might be best to start with H. G. Darwin's suggested

definition:
'Mediation, as a method of peaceful settlement of international disputes, means the
participation of a third State or a disinterested individual in negotiation between States
in dispute. 113
To make this definition complete, the words 'or organisation' should perhaps
have been added after 'or individual;' but the Darwin definition is better than
that quoted from Oppenheim in Satow (4th edn) which suggests, too narrowly,
that proposals are 'made by the mediator.' 14 Darwin quotes with approval
Article 4 of the Hague Convention of 1899 as describing the role of a mediator
as:
'reconciling two opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may
have arisen between the States at variance.'
38 24.
In seeking to define 'good offices' Darwin, referring to the earlier, more

restricted view, writes:
'Good offices are sometimes held to mean the action taken to bring about or initiate, but
without active participation, the discussion of the substance of the dispute.' 15
Pointing out that this would make good offices a 'mediation of more limited
scope,' he continues:
'But the terminology is not exactly applied and good offices and mediation are
sometimes used indifferently [i.e. interchangeably].'
38 . 25.
The example whichjustified this comment lies in General Assembly Resolution

186/S/I1 of 14 May 1948, which invited a Committee of the Assembly to
appoint a United Nations Mediator for Palestine who would 'use his good offices
with the local and community authorities in Palestine ... to promote a
peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine. , When it is added that
later that year the General Assembly created a Conciliation Commission for
Palestine, 16 one can fairly suggest that the Assembly may have been wise not to
trouble itself too much about niceties of nomenclature in this highly political
field.
38 26 .
In the early years of the United Nations, a number of major attempts were
made by the Security Council and the General Assembly to temper hostilities
or to go further and settle highly contentious questions by the use ofmediation.
In the case of Palestine cited above, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden was
appointed Mediator; after his assassination, Dr Ralph Bunche, later to become
the senior Under Secretary-General, took over as Acting Mediator. But the
attempt had to be given up in 1949. In Indonesia, a Committee ofGood Offices
was set up which brought about a truce between the Dutch and the Indonesian
nationalist movement; but the matter was finally settled by the Dutch and
Indonesians bilaterally. A very protracted effort was made to assist India and
Pakistan over Kashmir. But the matter proved too intractable, and the
problem was ultimately settled outside the United Nations through the good
offices of the Soviet Union which resulted in the Tashkent Declaration of 10
January 1966.
The Charter
38.27.
353
The degree of success achieved by the United Nations in this period was
disappointing, given the mandate enjoyed by the Organisation under Article
33( I) of the Charter. Judgements on the reasons are necessarily subjective, but
a few are suggested.
There has to be on the part of the contending parties an acceptance of the
thesis that a solution is both necessary and, no doubt with great patience,
attainable - that neither side can 'win' and that a compromise would be
better than living with the status quo. In the period following the Second
World War the circumstances in some of the cases did not fulfil these
conditions.
2. Since the 'unity of the Great Powers,' held to be the precondition of the
successful working of the security and peace-keeping work of the United
Nations, was not maintained, united world pressure behind United Nations
mediation could not be maintained either. The success of the Soviet
Government in acting as a mediator to bring an end to hostilities between
India and Pakistan over Kashmir was achieved expressly outside the United
Nations, and was the effective expression of Soviet presence and power in
the area.
3. With hindsight, it is fair to ask oneself whether United Nations mediators,
who were in the main not professional diplomatists, were right in using
normal diplomatic techniques of patient negotiation in their difficult work.
Could a more political approach, including the conscious use of publicity
and political pressure, have been more effective? Or would that kind of
approach also have been frustrated by considerations (I) and (2) above?17
4. The idea of the promotion of the peaceful settlement of international
disputes by mediation and good offices under United Nations sponsorship is
logical and contains much of good sense and promise, provided that behind
the rules and procedures there is real power. If the world, as a world of
independent states, moves into a period of history which, in terms of
economics and ideology, is less strained than the present, the experience
gained in recent years of a mixed diplomacy, in which politicians,
diplomats, international lawyers, administrators and others take a share,
could be of renewed value.
I.
Conciliation
38.28.
This word can be employed very generally as an aspect of good offices. But it
also has a precise significance in the context of certain international
instruments. In arguing in favour of the conciliation procedure, M. Henri
Rolin, the eminent Belgian jurist, stated:
'... l'essentiel de la conciliation est l'examen au fond, ce qui la differencie des bons
offices [good offices], suivi d'une recommendation non obligatoire (ce qui differencie
conciliation et arbitrage)')8
Against these advantages there have been two major arguments. First, there
are in fact treaties which bind the participants in advance to accept the
Conciliation Commission's views, thereby creating the concept of a 'binding
conciliation.' Secondly, and more important, a decision arising out of what is
354
The United Nations - III
basically a diplomatic procedure could well diverge in general or in an

important particular from a judgment on a comparable matter given on a
strictly legal basis. Despite this, the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of
Treaties 19 provides for 'compulsory conciliation' as a means of settling certain
classes of disputes about the interpretation of the bulk of Part V of the
Convention. Conciliation can be compulsory in the sense that one party to a
dispute can initiate the process, the other party having given its consent to that
possibility at the time of consenting to the Convention as a whole. But the
report of the Conciliation Commission is of itself not binding, having merely
the effect of a recommendation to the parties with a view to their reaching an
amicable settlement of the dispute.
38 2 9.
The attraction of the main doctrine of conciliation as expounded by M. Rolin,

and of 'compulsory conciliation' in individual cases, persists in Europe. The
matter is dealt with in the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes concluded in 1957 20 under the auspices of the Council of Europe.
Article 15 defines the tasks of a conciliation commission as 'to elucidate the
questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by
means of enquiry or otherwise, and to endeavour to bring the parties to an
agreement. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the parties of the
terms of settlement which seem suitable to it and lay down the period within
which they are to make their decision.'
Arbitration
3 8 .3 0 .
Paragraphs I -7 of this chapter have shown how for over a century from 1794
onwards the idea of involving third parties in the peaceful settlement of
international disputes was thought ofin terms ofarbitration, whether by mixed
commissions or by heads of third states (actually or, more usually, nominally)
or by any variant acceptable to the contending sides. In the twentieth century
other devices came into greater prominence which, while calling for thirdparty participation, did not necessarily call for a commitment by the
contending parties in advance to accept the eventualjudgment. A limitation in
this way of the initial commitment obviously makes it easier to accept, but,
equally obviously, makes the prospect of ultimate decisions much less certain.
In this situation the International Law Commission sought to unify the rules
governing the submission of international differences to arbitration. To this
end the Commission introduced into the General Assembly in 1958 a
Convention on Arbitral Procedure:!l based on what it called the 'principle of
non-frustration.' This principle attempted to ensure that once a country had
agreed to an arbitration, it could not later recede from that commitment.
Debate over this proposition over the next five years reached no practical
conclusion; on the contrary it revealed a deep difference of doctrine between
those countries which were prepared to accept some such limitation on
national freedom of choice at some stage in the arbitration proceedings and
those, particularly the Communist countries, who argued that at any moment
in the discussion, the autonomy of the national will of sovereign states could
become paramount.
Conclusion
355
The above illustrated the diversity of origins and views on arbitration. But at
least it seems that there is no significant limit on the possibilities of taking an
international dispute to arbitration. In United Nations terms the most
straightforward method is recourse to the International Court and this is often
provided for in bilateral or multilateral agreements which contain a clause to
the effect that the dispute regarding the meaning of the agreement will be
referred to the Court for decision.
A simpler possibility is for a direct appeal to be made by two countries in
disagreement to a third state in whose integrity and impartiality they both have
confidence. Thus, Chile and Argentina, pursuant to an Agreement dated 17
April 1896, appealed to the United Kingdom for arbitration over certain
frontier disputes. An Award was accordingly made on 20 November 1902; but
controversy having arisen between the parties regarding points in the region of
Palena, a further appeal for arbitration was made in 1964.22 Arbitration was
also requested later to determine the marine frontier in the Beagle Channel. 23
In the case Anglo-French disagreement over the continental shelf in the
English Channel, many of the arrangements for the arbitration were inspired
by those of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Specialised Agencies have also interested themselves in arbitration as a method
of peaceful settlement of disputes: for example the International Bank (IBRD)
has established a Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. And
previous sections of this chapter have shown that questions can go to
arbitration through the Enquiry and Conciliation procedures.
In short, despite the variety of doctrines and the complex background of
procedures, arbitration is not an obscure or difficult resource for states which
require an answer to a specific question and are prepared to abide by an
undertaking to accept the arbitrator's decision. Failure to settle does not
suggest so much weakness in procedure as an absence of readiness to accept an
unfavourable judgment.
Conclusion
38 .35.
This summary will have shown that there is in fact no lack ofroutes to peaceful
settlement of international disputes. Any disappointment over achievement
lies more in the lack of urgent and persistent interest on the part ofmem bers of
the United Nations than on the part of the institution itself in the subject of
peaceful settlement of international disputes, which should be one of the main
items of continuous study and practical pursuit. There are honourable
exceptions such as the judicious intervention by the Secretary-General, Dr
Kurt Waldheim, in 1975 in the Greco-Turkish problem in Cyprus on the basis
of a mandate from the Security Council. But for anyone who doubts thejustice
of the previous comment, a search in the United Nations Yearbook for details of
activities in this field is recommended.
Chapter 39
The United Nations - IV

The International Court
of Justice'
The provisions of the United Nations Charter
39.1.
Article 7( I) of the Charter lists among 'the principal organs of the United
Nations' an International Court of Justice. Chapter XIV of the Charter
(Articles 92-6) contains provisions relating to the Court and to its place in the
schemes of international institutions envisaged by the Charter. 2 Although
located at The Hague, the International Court of Justice is just as much an
organ of the United Nations as is the General Assembly or the Security
Council.
Article 92 of the Charter provides that:
'The International Court ofJustice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute which is based upon
the Statute ofthe Permanent Court oflnternationaIJustice and forms an integral part of
the present Charter.'
It is important to note that, although most ofthe detailed provisions relating to

the functions and powers of the Court are to be found in the Statute rather than
in the Charter, the Statute following the words ofthis Article, 'forms an integral
part of the present Charter.' Moreover, although its Statute is 'based upon the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice' there is no doubt that
the International Court ofJustice was created as a new Court. The reference to
the Statute of the new Court being based upon the Statute ofthe old Court was
inserted largely for jurisdictional reasons. 3
39.2.
Article 93( I) of the Charter provides that 'All Members of the United Nations
are, ipso facto, parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.'
Therefore it is impossible for a State to be a member of the United Nations
without also being a party to the Statute of the International Court ofJ ustice.
On 1 December 1976, Angola was admitted as the 146th member ofthe United
Nations.
Article 93(2) of the Charter provides that:
'A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the
Statute of the International Court ofJustice on conditions to be determined in each case
by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.'
On II December 1946, the General Assembly adopted, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, a resolution 4 providing that Switzerland should
The provisions of the United Nations Charter
357
become a party to the Statute on the following conditions:

(a) acceptance of the provisions of the Statute of the Court;
(b) acceptance of all the obligations of a Member of the United Nations under Article
94 of the Charter;
(c) an undertaking to contribute to the expenses of the Court such equitable amount as
the General Assembly shall assess from time to time after consultation with the Swiss
Government.
Switzerland accepted these conditions in an instrument deposited with the

Secretariat of the United Nations on 28 July 1948. Liechtenstein and San
Marino became parties to the Statute on similar conditions by depositing the
necessary declarations with the Secretariat on 29 March 1950 and 18 February
1954 respectively. 5 Article 35(2) of the Statute of the Court contains a further
provision enabling states which are not even parties to the Statute to appear
before the Court upon certain conditions laid down by the Security Council. 6
Article 94( I) of the Charter provides that:
'Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the
International Court ofJustice in any case to which it is a party.'
This obligation was also covered in the conditions upon which Switzerland,
Liechtensteirr and San Marino were permitted to become parties to the
Statute, and in those under which the Court is open to states not parties to the
Statute. In any case, irrespective of those provisions it is an established
principle of general international law that the decision of an international
tribunal is binding upon the parties. In practice, this has normally, but not
always, been accepted by losing parties.
39.3.
Article 94(2) of the Charter states that:

If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
The first question to which this most important provision gives rise is whether
the right which it confers - i.e. the right to have recourse to the Security
Council - applies only to members of the United Nations or to all states entitled
to appear before the Court, whether as members of the United Nations (i.e.
under Article 93( I) of the Charter), or as non-members under the provisions of
Article 93(2) of the Charter or of Article 35(2) of the Statute. According to the
normal rule of international law treaties cannot confer any rights upon states
not parties to them (pacta tertiis nee noeent nee prosunt), 7 and if this rule were
applied literally, it is difficult to see how a state not a Member of the United
Nations could acquire any right of recourse to the Security Council. The
position would be different if either the conditions determined by the General
Assembly for the purposes of Article 93(2) of the Charter or those determined
by the Security Council for the purposes of Article 35(2) of the Statute had
made express provisions concerning the application of Article 94(2) of the
Charter to non-members of the United Nations. But in neither case was this
done. On the contrary, whereas both the General Assembly and the Security
358
Council insisted upon 'acceptance of all the obligations of a Member of the

United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter,' nothing was said as to the
grant to non-members of any of the rights of Members under that Article.
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the rule paeta tertiis nee noeent nee prosunt 8
and, having regard to the general intention of the Charter and the Statute to
open the Court to non-members of the United Nations on substantially the
same terms as Members,9 it seems that this case should be one of them and,
therefore, that non-members should have, if necessary, a right of recourse to the
Security Council under Article 94(2) of the Charter.
39.4.
The second question to which Article 94(2) of the Charter gives rise is the
nature of the right conferred by the Article. Clearly, the right of recourse to
the Security Council in the event of a failure to comply with ajudgment of the
Court implies no right to demand that the Security Council shall take steps to
execute, or otherwise secure the enforcement of, the Court'sjudgement. Article
94(2) imposes no obligation upon the Security Council or upon the Members of
the United Nations. According to what is probably the better view, the
Security Council, when dealing with a case under Article 94(2), simply deals
with apolitical situation arising out of the failure of a state to comply with the
judgement of the Court. It also appears that Article 94(2) gives the Security
Council power to substitute its own recommendations for thejudgement ofthe
Court, but it is not clear whether, before it decides upon 'measures to be taken
to give effect to the judgement' - if it should so decide - it must first determine
the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach ofthe peace under Article 39 of
the Charter, or whether it is free to act independently of Article 39. 10
39.5.
Article 95 of the Charter states that

'Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from
entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements
already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.'
This Article makes it quite clear that the existence ofthe International Court of
Justice under the Charter in no way limits the right of Members of the United
Nations to settle their disputes by other means. The express reference in Article
95 to 'other tribunals' shows that the Charter permits the existence, alongside
the International Court ofJustice, of other courts (including, no doubt, even
courts organised on a 'permanent' as opposed to an ad hoe basis) with power to
apply international law, while Article 33( I) of the Charter lays down the
general principle that
'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.'
It would appear that by 'judicial settlement' is meant essentially, though not

exclusively, reference to the International Court ofJustice. The other means of
settling disputes are discussed in 3 1 I 6-22. II
The working of the Court under its Statute and Rules
359
The working of the Court under its Statute and Rules

39. 6.
The operation of the Court is governed primarily by its Statute and by Rules of
Court adopted under Article 30 of the Statute. The effect of the Statute and
Rules is summarised, though briefly, below.
397
The original Statute, as annexed to the Charter, has not been amended. The
Court proposed 12 in 1969 certain amendments to Articles 22,23 and 28 (which
refer to the seat ofthe Court in The Hague), but the General Assembly deferred
consideration of the question. 13 The present Rules ofCourt were adopted on 10
May 1972 (replacing those which had operated since 1946) and were first
applied in 1973 in the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France, New Zealand v.
France). The main changes in the Rules of Court were:
'to permit expressly the parties to influence the composition of ad hoc Chambers; to
suppress the right to a Reply or Rejoinder, thus reducing the normal number of
pleadings to the Memorial and Counter-Memorial; to exercise greater control over oral
proceedings by indicating precise questions to be dealt with orothers on which there has
been sufficient argument; to provide for accelerated and exclusively oral proceedings in
urgent requests for an advisory opinion and finally, to determine the Court'sjurisdiction
at the preliminary stage of the case and eliminate the express authorization in the Rules
for the joinder to the merits of a preliminary objection.' 14
The Court has a committee which is revising its Rules with a view to
modernising and speeding up the procedures. 15
39.8.
Articles 2-23 of the Statute relate to the organisation of the Court. The Court
consists of fifteen judges, 'no two of whom may be nationals of the same State.'
(Article 3.) The judges are to be 'elected regardless of their nationality from
among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required
in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices or
are jurisconsults of recognised competence in international law.' (Art. 2.)
Nominations of candidates are made by the national groups in the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (Art. 4) 16 and 'those candidates who obtain an absolute
majority of votes in the General Assembly and in the Security Council shall be
considered as elected.' (Art. 10.) It is the intention' not only that the persons to
be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that
in the body as a whole the representation ofthe main forms ofcivilisation and of
the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.' (Art. 9.) Judges are
elected for nine years and may be re-elected. (Art. 13.) They may not 'exercise
any political or administrative function or engage in any other occupation ofa
professional nature.' Nor may they 'act as agent counsel or advocate in any
case,' or participate in cases in which, before election, they have taken part in
any capacity. Doubts on these points 'shall be settled by the decision
of the Court.' (Arts. 16-17.)17 The judges 'when engaged on the business
of the Court shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.' (Art. 19.) 18 The
Court elects its President and Vice-President for three years: they may,
however, be re-elected. (Art. 2 I.) The Court appoints its own Registrar and
other staff (Art. 2 I .) Although the seat of the Court is at The Hague, this 'shall
not prevent the Court from sitting and exercising its functions elsewhere
whenever the Court considers it desirable.' (Art. 22.) The Court may sit either
360
The United .Nations - IV
as a full Court - it is provided that 'a quorum of nine judges shall suffice to
constitute the Court' (Art. 25) - or in Chambers of three or more judges.
Chambers for labour cases and for cases relating to transit and communications
are specifically mentioned in the Statute, but these are not exclusive (Art. 26),
and 'with a view to the speedy despatch of business, the Court shall form
annually a Chamber composed of five judges which, at the request of the
parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure.' (Art. 29.)19 As
already stated, the Court makes its own rules of procedure. (Art. 30.) Article 3 I
contains important provisions concerning the rights of the parties to be
represented on the Court by a judge of their own nationality. If the Court
already includes judges of the nationality of both the parties, thesejudges 'shall
retain their right to sit in the case before the Court.' If the Court includes a
judge of the nationality of one of the parties only, the other party has the right
to appoint ajudge for that particular case. Ifthe Court does not include ajudge
of the nationality ofeither ofthe parties, both parties have the right to appoint a
judge for that particular case. The additional judges appointed in this way
'shall take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their
colleagues. '20
Competence of the Court

39.9.
Articles 34-8 of the Statute relate to the competence ofthe Court. In so far as the
jurisdiction of all international tribunals ultimately rests upon the consent of
States, these Articles are of the greatest importance. Article 34 lays down the
general principle that 'Only States may be parties in cases, before the Court.'
Thus the United Nations, though it is' an international person' and though it
has 'capacity to bring international claims,' 21 has no capacity to prosecute such
claims before its own 'principal judicial organ.' This remains true, even if the
State against which the claim is brought is willing to have the matter
adjudicated by the Court. The capacity of the United Nations and its organs
and specialised agencies to initiate proceedings before the Court is therefore
limited to the right to request advisory opinions. 22 However, Article 34 also
provides that the Court 'may request of public international organizations
information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information
presented by such organizations on their own initiative.'
39.10.
By contrast with Article 35 of the Statute, which deals with the general right of
access to the Court, Article 36 is concerned with thejurisdiction ofthe Court to
determine the particular dispute submitted to it. Article 36( I) provides that
The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and
conventions in force.
This paragraph mentions two of the three ways in which a case may be brought
before the Court, the third way being mentioned in Article 36(2). These three
ways will now be considered in turn.
39. I
I.
The first way in which a case may be brought before the Court is by the consent
Competence of the Court
361
of the parties (i.e. 'all cases which the parties 23 refer to it'). Usually this consent
is given in the form of a written agreement or treaty, known as a 'special
agreement' (compromis).24 However, so long as the necessary consent is really
present, the Court is not punctilious about the form. As the Permanent Court of
International Justice said in the case of the Minority Schools in Upper Silesia:
The acceptance by a State of the Court's jurisdiction in a particular case is not, under
the Statute, subordinated to the observance of certain forms, such as, for instance, the
previous conclusion of a special agreement. 25
Citing this decision, the International Court ofJustice in the Corfu Channel case
(Preliminary Objection) said:
Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent the acceptance ofjurisdiction, as in the present
case, from being affected by two separate and successive acts, instead of jointly and
beforehand by a special agreement. 26
39.12.
The second way in which a case may be brought before the Court is under a
treaty providing for the submission of a certain class of disputes to the Court by
the unilateral application of one of the parties. The treaty concerned may be a
treaty relating purely to the settlement of disputes - in which case the article
providing for the reference by unilateral application of one class of dispute to
the Court may be accompanied by other articles providing for the reference of
other classes of disputes to other bodies - or it may be a treaty dealing with
other matters (e.g. commerce and navigation) and containing an article
providing that any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of that
particular treaty may be referred to the Court by one party only. In either case
the competence of the Court depends upon whether the dispute actually
referred to the Court is or is not within the class of disputes covered by the
treaty. The reference in Article 36( I) to 'all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations' is a drafting error, as no matters are in fact
specially provided for in this way.
39.13.
The third way in which a case may be brought before the Court is under the
provisions of Article 36(2) of the Statute which reads as follows:
The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes
concermng:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;

(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach ofan international
obligation.
As between two states, both of which have made the declaration referred to in
this paragraph (usually known as the 'Optional Clause') and have deposited it
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, one is entitled to institute
proceedings before the Court against the other by means of a unilateral
application, and the Court will havejurisdiction so long as the subject matter of
the dispute is covered by the declarations and is not excluded by any
362
reservation. For this purpose the respondent state is entitled to rely upon any
reservation made by the applicant state.
39.14.
In the event of a case being brought before the Court by unilateral application,
it is always open to the other party to raise a preliminary objection, provided he
does so before the expiry of the time-limit fixed for the delivery of his first
pleading. The effect of raising an objection is to cause the proceedings on the
merits to be suspended while the Court hears the objection. Three possibilities
are open to the Court: either to uphold the objection, or to overrule it, or tojoin
it to the merits. 27
39.15.
Although the International Court of] ustice was established as a new Court, it is
provided in Article 36(5) of the Statute that 'Declarations made under Article
36 of the Statute ofthe Permanent Court ofInternationaljustice and which are
still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Stature, to be
acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of]ustice
for the period which they have still to run and in accordance with their terms;'
and in Article 37 that 'Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for
reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of
Nations, or to the Permanent Court ofInternational]ustice, the matter shall,
as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International
Court of]ustice.'
Article 36(6) contains the important provision that 'In the event ofa dispute as
to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision
of the Court.'
39.16.
As well as the question of its jurisdiction, the Court will also consider that ofthe
admissibility of a case. Admissibility is a concept separate from that of
jurisdiction and goes to the nature of a case. If the Applicant's claim is found to
concern a dispute which has disappeared, or if a case is found to be moot,
academic or devoid of object and purpose, then the Court will declare the case
inadmissible and decline to adjudicate upon its merits. 28 The reason is to
safeguard the judicial function of the Court. A case can become moot after the
filing of the application, for example as a result of a change of practice or the
making of undertakings on the part of the respondent. 29
Applicable law
39. 1 7.
Article 38, which is one of the most important articles in the whole Statute,
states:
I.
The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules

expressly recognised by the contesting States:
(h) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
Procedure before the Court
363
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings ofthe
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
2.
This shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono. ifthe
parties agree thereto.
The importance of this Article lies in the fact that the sources mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 above are now generally regarded as
the sources of international law which airy international tribunal, to which a
dispute is referred for judicial settlement, should apply in the absence of an
express direction to the contrary. In the particular case of the International
Court of Justice the only possible direction to the contrary is an agreement
between the parties that the Court should decide the case ex aequo et bono. The
effect of such a direction - which is likely to be rare - would be that the Court
need not confine itself to applying the existing law but could, if it deemed the
existing law to operate harshly or unjustly, give a decision more in keeping with
the essential requirements of justice and equity. It may also be noted that,
whereas sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 38(1) indicate the sources
where international law may be found (i.e. international conventions,
international custom and the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations), sub-paragraph (cl) of the same paragraph indicates the 'means for the
determination of the rules of law.' Judicial decisions (by which is meant the
decisions of the national tribunals and also - and above all - of international
tribunals, including the Court itself) and the teachings of publicists are
mentioned as 'subsidiary means' for this purpose, the principal means being of
course the states themselves who are parties to the conventions or who are
responsible for the customary law or the general principles oflaw referred to in
sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). Sub-paragraph (cl), while classifying 'judicial
decisions' among the 'subsidiary means for the determination of rules oflaw,'
expressly states that these are 'subject to the provisions of Article 59,' which in
turn states that 'The decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case.' The International Court of
Justice is therefore, in strict law, not bound even by its own precedents, let
alone by the decisions of inferior international tribunals. In practice, however,
the Court attaches great weight to previous decisions, not only its own and
those of the Permanent Court of International Justice, but also on occasions
those of arbitral tribunals of high standing. 30
Procedure before the Court

39- 18.
Articles 39-64 of the Statute and Articles 35-65 of the Rules of Court relate to
procedure before the Court, and it is necessary to single out only a few matters
for attention. Contentious cases are begun by the filing with the Court of either
an application or the compromis, or special agreement, where one exists. The
application is signed by the agent or some other duly authorised person. As
agent, it is usual to appoint a legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry or a
diplomatic representative in The Hague. The agent, who acts as the link
364
The United .Nations - IV
between the Court and the applicant state, is responsible generally and at all
stages for the handling of the case. In drawing up pleadings and presenting
argument orally the agent is often assisted by Counsel, including in some cases
law officers, ministers of foreign affairs or professors. An application must
identify the parties, the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, the nature of the
dispute, and the precise nature of the claim. It must summarise the main facts
and grounds on which the claim is based. These are developed in detail in the
Memorial, to which documentary evidence is attached. 31
39- I 9
The official languages of the Court are French and English, although there is
nothing to prevent a party using another language provided it arranges for a
translation to be made into one or other ofthe official languages. (Art. 39 ofthe
Statute; Art. 42 and 64 of the Rules of Court.) The procedure consists of two
parts: written and oral, and the oral proceedings may include the hearing of the
evidence of witnesses. (Art. 43 of the Statute.) Article 46 provides that 'The
hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide otherwise, or
unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted.' The Court has
power to make orders governing any aspect of the conduct of the case (Art. 48),
to call upon the parties to produce documents and supply explanations (Art.
49), to appoint an individual or a number of persons to carry out an enquiry
or give an expert opinion (Art. 50) or to put its own questions to the parties.
(Art. 57 of the Rules.)
39-20.
Article 53 of the Statute provides that

'Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case,
the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour ofits claim.' Before doing so,
however, the Court must 'satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance
with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.'
This situation has arisen in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the.Nuclear Tests cases,
the Pakistani Prisoners of War case and the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case. In its
judgement in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), the Court
stated:
'It is to be regretted that the Government of Iceland has failed to appear in order to
plead its objections.... '32
These objections had been indicated in letters and telegrams from the Foreign
Minister to the Registrar, but no Icelandic Agent was appointed and no
Counter-Memorials were presented to the Court despite its Orders fixing the
timetable for pleadings. The Court, however, considered all the material
concerning the Icelandic Government's attitude and 'stressed that in applying
Article 53 of the Statute in this case, the Court has acted with particular
circumspection and has taken special care, being faced with the absence of the
respondent State.'33 A similar approach was adopted by the Court in the other
cases in which that situation arose. 34
39-2 I.
The deliberations of the Court take place in private and remain secret (Art. 54.)
All questions are to be decided by a majori ty ofthejudges present, and in the event
of an equality of votes, the President or thejudge who acts in his place has a casting
vote. (Art. 55. )35 The judgement, which must contain the names of the judges tak-
Interim measures of protection
365
ing part, is also required to state the reasons on which it is based. (Art. 56.) Any
judge is entitled to deliver a separate opinion (Art. 57), which may be either a 'dissenting opinion,' or an 'individual opinion' agreeing with the conclusions of the
judgement, though not necessarily with the reasons on which it is based. The
judgement is final and without appeal. The Court may, however, be asked to
construe it ifa dispute arises as to its meaning or scope (Art. 60)jb or even to revise
it in the event of a new fact being discovered 'ofsuch a nature as to be a decisive
factor, which fact was, when the judgement was given, unknown to the Court
and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance
was not due to negligence.' The application for revision must be made within
six months of the discovery of the new fact, and no application for revision may
be made after the lapse often years from the date of the judgement. (Art. 61.)
39.22.
Article 62 provides that 'Should a State consider that it has an interest ofa legal
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be pennitted to intervene.' It is for the Court to decide
whether or not to accept such a request. (Art. 62.) Such requests are rare. Fiji
applied to intervene in the two ,Nuclear Tests cases brought by Australia and
~ew Zealand against France. When the Court found that the cases were
without object, it also found that the Fijian applications thereby lapsed. 37
However, third parties have an automatic right to intervene, 'whenever the
construction of a convention to which States other than those concerned in the
case are parties is in question.' But, if they exercise this right, they are bound by
the judgement. (Art. 63,) Article 64 provides that 'U nless otherwise decided by
the Court, each party shall bear its own costs.' But the costs of the Court are met
not by the parties (as is the case with arbitrations) but from the UN budget.
Interim measures of protection

39. 2 3.
Article 41 of the Statute, though contained in the chapter on procedure, really

relates to a matter of more than procedural importance. It reads as follows:
I.
2.
The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so
require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party.
Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given
to the parties and to the Security Council.
In some cases, the Court has ordered both parties to refrain from taking any
action 'which might aggravate or extend the dispute ... or prejudice ... rights
... in respect of the carrying out of whatever decision the Court may render in
the case. '38 If the rights are such that any breach of them eventually found
could be repaired (for example, by the payment of compensation), or if the
parties have already accepted obligations to refrain from actions which would
aggravate the dispute (for example, through the Security Council), the Court
will not order interim measures. 39 It may be a matter of considerable political
importance whether or not, in a given case, the Court decides to indicate
provisional or interim measures.
366
39.24.
The United .Nations - I V
Under Article 66 of the Rules of Court, requests for the indication of such
measures shall be treated as a matter of urgency and' if the Court is not sitting,
the Members shall be convened by the President forthwith.' Even before that
'the President shall, if need be, take such measures as may appear to him
necessary in order to enable the Court to give an effective decision.' The Court
has power in certain circumstances to indicate interim measures before it has
decided that it has jurisdiction. Such measures had been indicated where the
Court has considered it probably did have jurisdiction but not where it clearly
lacked such competence. 40 The Court is entitled to indicate measures other
than those proposed in the request and even to indicate measures proprio motu
(i.e. without any request having been made), and it may 'at any time by reason
of a change in the situation revoke or modify its decision indicating interim
measures of protection.'41 It is a controversial question whether the measures
indicated by the Court are legally binding or not. The words 'indicate' and
'suggested' in Article 41 give the impression that the measures are not intended
to be binding, but it has been argued that 'it is in a necessary consequence ofthe
bindingness of the final decision that the interim measures intended to preserve
its efficacy should equally be binding. '42 The measures lapse upon the giving of
judgement upon the merits (whatever the circumstances at that time 43 ) orupon
a finding that the Court lacks jurisdiction. 44
Advisory opinions 45
39. 25.
Article 96 of the Charter reads as follows:

The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal
question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at
any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request
advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of
their activities.
I.
The General Assembly requested eleven advisory opinions and the Security
Council one during the period 1945-76.46 The other bodies authorised to
request advisory opinions include the Economic and Social Council, the
Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements, thirteen Specialised Agencies (all except the Universal Postal Union)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency; and of those bodies and
agencies, the Committee on Applications, UNESCO and the International
Maritime Consultative Organisation each made one request. Of the total of
fifteen advisory opinions, four have concerned the interpretation of the
Charter,47 three the interpretation of other treaties,48 four the situation in
South West Africa (Namibia)4!1 and three the administration of the international civil service. In addition, there is the most recent case, that
concerning the Western Sahara in 1975.
39.26.
What is a 'legal question' within the meaning of Article 96? The term is 'not to
be interpreted restrictively.' ~o The Court has stated that' ... the contingency
Advisory opinions
367
that there may be factual issues underlying the question posed does not alter its
character as a 'legal question' ... 51 Thus, 'a mixed question of law and fact is
none the less a legal question within the meaning of Article 96 ... ' and so is a
question about rights or obligations at an earlier point of time than that of the
Opinion. 52 The fact that an Advisory Opinion has been requested on a political
issue does not make the question a 'political' rather than a 'legal' one. As is
stated in a case about the interpretation of the UN Charter, 'the Court cannot
attribute a political character to a request which, framed in abstract terms,
invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty
provision.' 53 The Court is not prevented from giving an Advisory Opinion on a
legal question by reason only of its being cast in abstract terms. 54 In another
case it was stated that 'the mere fact that it is not the rights ofStates which are in
issue in the proceeding cannot suffice to deprive the Court of ... competence.
. . .'55 Similarly, the Court is not debarred from giving an Opinion for the sole
reason that the question touches upon a contentious issue involving a state
which contests before the Court the. latter's power to exercise its advisory
function, 56 or which abstained from voting on the Resolution requesting the
Advisory Opinion or which previously declined an invitation to submit the
dispute to the Court by special agreement. 57 But if a question is not a legal one,
the Court 'must decline to give the opinion requested.'58
39.27.
Is the Court obliged to give an Advisory Opinion on a question (assuming it to

be a legal one)? Article 65 of its Statute provides simply that it 'may' give an
opinion and so the Court can decide not to do so. 59 The Court will exercise its
discretion and decline to meet a request only for 'compelling reasons' 60 and in
order 'to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character.' 61 There
has to be incompatibility between answering the question and the Court's
judicial character, as for example in the case where 'to give a reply would have
the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its
disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent.'62 Other
possible reasons include the lack of evidence on the facts of a case and the
academic nature of a particular question. But if answering the question would
not affect the rights or compromise the position of the state objecting but would
rather 'guide the United Nations in respect of its own action,'63 the Court will
comply with the request.
39.28
Advisory Opinions have no binding force and states have indicated reservations over their terms in some instances. 64 Nevertheless such opinions are
'authoritative in the sense that their legal correctness cannot be officially or
formally questioned by the organ to which they are rendered, acting
in its corporate capacity.'65 Also, since they emanate from 'the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations' and the highest international tribunal in
the world, 'whatever be their formal authority, their persuasive character and
substantive authority must be great. '66 Moreover, Advisory Opinions may in
certain circumstances be negatively binding, in the sense that, if the Court were
to indicate that a certain course of action would be definitely illegal or that, of
various courses of action proposed only one would be legal, it would be difficult
in practice for the organ requesting the opinion not to follow the course
advocated by the Court. Finally, there is nothing to prevent Advisory
Opinions being given binding force by agreement. 67
CHAPTER 40

of international
organisations
4.1.
International law regarding the privileges and immunities of international

organisations is an entirely modern development. Although the Covenant of
the League ofNations did make provision for representatives ofMembers ofthe
League and officials to enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities when
engaged on business of the League, and accorded inviolability to the buildings
of the League and of representatives attending meetings, I there were no
multilateral agreements defining in detail the privileges and immunities to be
accorded to international organisations or persons connected with them.
Outside Switzerland, which housed most of the earliest established international organisations, and the Netherlands, where the Permanent Court of
International Justice had its seat at The Hague, there was very little systematic
state practice or legislation.
40.2.
After 1945 the position changed swiftly and dramatically. International

organisations, both worldwide and regional, multiplied rapidly. By January
1975 the United Kingdom was a member of ninety-five separate intergovernmental organisations. ~ But little attempt was made in the early years after the
war to formulate privileges and immunities for the various organisations on a
general basis. It was left to the negotiators of the international agreements by
which the individual organisations were established to make provision, either
in general or specific terms, for appropriate privileges and immunities to be
accorded by states members of the organisation to the organisation itself, its
premises, property, archives and communications, and to the different classes
of persons connected with the organisation - representatives of member states,
staff members and experts.
40.3
The most important of the arrangements made at this time was that drawn up
for the United Nations itself. The Charter of the United Nations made only
very general provision for privileges and immunities. Article 104 provided that
'The Organization shall enjoy in the territory ofeach of its Members such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment
of its purposes.' Article 105 required that the Organization should enjoy 'such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes' and
that Representatives of Members and officials ofthe Organisation should enjoy
'such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of
their functions in connection with the Organization.' As was envisaged in
Article 105, there was then negotiated a detailed international agreement for
the application of these general provisions. This was the General Convention
369
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,3 which was adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946 and
opened for accession by UN Members. It has received overwhelming support
from Members although the United States, the host state to the Organisation,
has never accepted it and instead regulates its relations with the United
Nations on the basis of a Host State Agreement with the Organisation. 4
40.4.
The General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United

Nations confers on the United Nations legal personality, in particular the
capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable
property and to institute legal proceedings. It accords full immunity from
jurisdiction and every form of legal process to the Organisation, its property
and assets, and inviolability to its premises and property, its archives and
documents wherever located. The Organisation is given wide-ranging
exemptions from national exchange control and other financial regulations
and exemption from direct taxes, customs duties and prohibitions and
restrictions on import and export of its publications. An exception is made, as
regards tax exemption, of taxes 'which are, in fact, no more than charges for
pu blic utility services.' Where the United Nations makes important purchases,
for official use, of property on which taxes have been paid or are payable,
member states in which the purchases are made are, whenever possible, to
make administrative arrangements for remission or refund of the tax. The
United Nations is accorded diplomatic treatment for its communications
(including such matters as rates and priorities for mails, telephone calls,
telegrams and so on) and it may use codes, couriers and diplomatic bags in the
same way as a diplomatic mission. No censorship may be applied to the official
correspondence and other official communications of the United Nations.
40.5.
Representatives of Members at the United Nations (a term which includes

delegates, deputy delegates, advisers, technical experts and secretaries of
delegations) are accorded a scale of privileges and immunities which falls
somewhat short of what is accorded to a diplomatic agent under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. While exercising their functions or
journeying to or from the place of meeting, they are given immunity from arrest
and detention and from seizure of their personal baggage. They have an
unlimited immunity from jurisdiction in respect ofwords spoken or written and
all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, but they do not have
the immunity from jurisdiction in regard to their personal acts which is enjoyed
by diplomatic agents. They are specifically accorded inviolability for all papers
and documents, the right to use codes, couriers and sealed bags, exemption for
themselves and their spouses from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration
and national service obligations, facilities in respect of currency or exchange
restrictions, diplomatic treatment for their personal baggage (so that it is
exempt from inspection except where there are serious grounds for suspecting
abuse of the privilege). They are not given a general exemption from taxes or
customs duties, but it is provided that where taxes are levied on a basis of
residence, periods during which representatives are present in a state for the
discharge of their duties are not to be considered as periods of residence. In
addition they are accorded 'such other privileges, immunities and facilities not
inconsistent with the foregoing as diplomatic envoys enjoy.' This means that
370
where a privilege or immunity has been accorded in a limited form by the

Convention, no more need be accorded to the representative, but privileges
and immunities not mentioned at all, but which are given to diplomatic agents,
should also be given to the representative. States are not obliged to accord any
privileges or immunities to their own representatives.
4 0 6 .
Officials of the United Nations, in general, are accorded a narrow range of

privileges and immunities which can easily be justified as essential to enable
them to perform their job independently of any control or interference by any
member state. They are immune from civil and criminaljurisdiction in respect
of words spoken or written and of all acts performed by them in their official
capacity. The salaries and emoluments paid to them by the United Nations are
exempt from tax. They are immune from national service obligations,
immigration restrictions and aliens' registration (together with their families)
and from exchange control regulations. In time of international crisis they can
claim the same right to be repatriated as a diplomatic agent. When they first
take up their post with the United Nations, they have the right to bring their
furniture and effects duty free into the country where they are posted, but
subsequently they have no further exemption from customs duty. All member
states allow a period ofgrace for the import of household effects after the arrival
of the official in person, but the length of the period varies between different
states within a range of three months to two years. Officials have no personal
inviolability, or inviolability of residence or property, immunity in regard to
their personal acts or any personal privileges other than those mentioned
above, which are needed to ensure that they are personally at the disposal ofthe
United Nations.
40.7.
The only officials of the United Nations who under the General Convention are
accorded privileges and immunities on the diplomatic scale are the SecretaryGeneral himself and all Assistant Secretaries-General. These 'High Officers'
are given all the privileges and immunities accorded under international law to
an ambassador. The reference to international law may now be taken as a
reference to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The state of
which a High Officer of the United Nations is a national or permanent resident
need therefore only accord him the more limited immunities which it is obliged
under Article 38 of the Vienna Convention to accord to diplomatic agents
under the same circumstances. The Convention imposes serious obligations on
the United Nations itself to balance the immunities which it accords. It stresses
that privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the
United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.
The Secretary-General has the duty to waive the immunity of an official where
in his opinion immunity would impede the course ofjustice and can be waived
without prejudice to the interests ofthe United Nations. No comparable duty is
imposed on states by international law or by treaty as regards the waiving of
any immunity enjoyed by their diplomats or consuls, but a duty is laid on them
by the General Convention to waive the immunity of their representative
where this can be done without prejudice to the purpose for which the
immunity is accorded. The United Nations is obliged to cooperate with
Members to facilitate the administration ofjustice and the observance ofpolice
regulations, and to prevent any abuse of privileges or immunities.
371
40 8 .
Experts on missions for the United Nations are treated separately from officials.
The distinction between an official and an expert is that while an ofIicial has a
contract of employment with an international organisation and is invariably
subject to the staff rules or regulations of the organisation which employs him,
the expert is engaged for a specific task, his contract relates only to the
performance of and remuneration for that task and he is not subject to the staff
rules of the organisation. He is not the servant of the organisation but is in the
position of an independent contractor. The period of service is not the
determining factor, for an organisation may recruit officials who are employees
on a short-term basis (for example additional secretaries or interpreters for a
conference) or on a part-time basis, and an expert may be engaged full-time
on some task for an international organisation for a prolonged period. Nor is
the type of work a guide to the status as expert or official. The tasks for which
experts may be engaged are infinitely varied. More typical assignments include
serving independently on a committee of experts, fact-finding and reporting to
the organisation on some area within its concern, advising on some major new
purchase or enterprise which the organisation is contemplating. Experts under
the United Nations General Convention are accorded, during the period of
their missions and on journeys in connection with their missions, immunity
from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage,
inviolability for their papers and documents, the right to communicate with
the United Nations in code, by courier or by bag, the facilities in respect of
exchange control and currency restrictions which the state concerned accords
to representatives of foreign governments on temporary official missions, and
diplomatic treatment for their personal baggage. In respect ofwords spoken or
written and acts done by them in the course of their mission, experts are
accorded immunity from every form of legal process for an indefinite period.
The Convention imposes on the Secretary-General the same duty as regards
the waiver of the immunity of an expert as is imposed in regard to the immunity
of an official.
40.9.
The scale of privileges and immunities set out in the General Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations was used as a model for other
international organisations having worldwide membership and responsibilities. For the most part the United Nations scale was treated as a ceiling, and
minor reductions in privileges and immunities were negotiated in the case of
other organisations. It was accepted that few other international organisations
had to carry out tasks of such political sensitivity or physical danger as the
United Nations itself and that on a basis of functional need they could not
therefore lay claim to the same level of immunity. The most important of the
international agreements which followed the United Nations pattern was the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities ofthe Specialised Agencies of the
United Nations,S which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 21 November 1947. The Specialised Agencies Convention set out a
detailed scale of privileges and immunities for the organisation and for various
categories of persons connected with it - representatives of member states and
United Nations officials - which was closely based on the United Nations scale
and was described as 'the standard clauses.' The standard clauses made no
provision for experts, and they provided that only the executive head of each
372
Specialised Agency, including any official acting on his behalf during his
absence from duty, should be accorded 'high officer treatment' - that is the
additional privileges and immunities which are given to diplomatic agents
under international law. Each Specialised Agency can, in accordance with its
own constitutional procedure, make modifications as regards itself in the
standard clauses at the time when the Convention becomes applicable to it or
subsequently, and a number have done so. Several Specialised Agencies have
made provision, on the lines of the United Nations Convention, in regard to
experts. The International Labour Organisation have made special provision
to treat as 'representatives' the Employers' and Workers' members and deputy
mem bers of the Governing Body of the Organisation - who do not represent
member governments - and have also provided that any Deputy DirectorGeneral of the International Labour Office and any Assistant DirectorGeneral of the International Labour Office shall be accorded 'high officer
treatment.' By 1959 the Specialised Agencies Convention applied to thirteen
Specialised Agencies of the United Nations, b with particular modifications for
each one which are set out in the various Annexes.
4.10.
The United Nations scale of privileges and immunities has also been generally
followed in the case of a number of important regional international
organisations. Examples which may be quoted (although in each case the
relevant international agreement must be consulted to ascertain the differences
from the United Nations precedent) include the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization,7 the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), 8 Western
European Union, Y the Council of Europe lO and the Customs Cooperation
Council. 11
4.1 I.
The international financial organisations have followed a somewhat different

pattern. In the Agreements which established the International Monetary
Fund 12 and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 13 (the
Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944) it was recognised that if the Bank (usually
known as the World Bank) was to be able to raise loans and perform certain of
the other functions envisaged for it on international markets, it could not be
accorded a general immunity from suit. Its immunity from suit was therefore
limited to actions brought by member states or by persons acting for or deriving
claims from member states. Ordinary commercial lenders could bring actions
in the ordinary way to recover their loans, and this made the Bank a credible
borrower in the market. The scale of privileges and immunities both for the
Fund and for the Bank was in other ways notably more restrictive than the
United Nations scale. For example no privileges or immunities were accorded
to representatives of member states, or to experts, nor was 'high officer'
treatment accorded even to the executive head of the Bank. On the other hand
the Bank was given certain tax privileges - such as immunity for the collection
or payment of any tax or duty and certain tax exemptions on any obligation or
security issued by the Bank - which are peculiar to international agreements
esta . : lishing financial organisations. The precedents ofthe World Bank and the
Inten ational Monetary Fund were followed in the case of the International
Finance Corporation,14 the International Development Association,15 the
Asian Development Bank l6 and the Caribbean Development Bank 17 among
PriviLeges and immunities of internationaL organisations
373
others. The first four of these organisations are also covered by the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies of the United
Nations (although not all members have undertaken to apply the Specialised
Agencies Convention to them).
40.12.
Some international organisations were established with a minimal scale of

privileges and immunities. They might be accorded only the legal personality
which was essential if they were to hold property and contract in the host state.
The agreements under which the commodity organisations (the International
Wheat Council, the International Sugar Organisation, the International
Coffee Organisation and the International Tin Council) were established
contained provisions which accorded only the most limited privileges, namely
tax exemption for each organisatio!"l and tax exemption on emoluments for staff
members. One organisation, E UROCONTROL, was accorded very limited
fiscal privileges in the expectation that financial equilibrium between member
states would be achieved by spreading the projected air traffic control
installations evenly among their territories; but when this plan did not work
out, there were complaints from some member states that their contributions to
EUROCONTROL's budget were finding their way into the coffers of other
member states where the organisation was operating and was being heavily
taxed. 18
4. 1 3.
This example illustrates one of the most important justifications for the
granting of privileges to international organisations and their staffs: the need
for financial equality as between the host state to the organisation and the other
members. The host state should not be entitled to make, through the presence
of the organisation on its territory, a direct profit at the expense of other
contributors to the budget of the organisation. Of course the host state makes
some indirect profit because representatives of other governments come there
for meetings, bringing and spending foreign exchange; and there are other
intangible benefits accruing to capitals which can attract a number ot
international organisations to set up house there. But it is generally accepted as
wrong in principle that the host state should tax the salaries paid to officials out
of the budget of the organisation and keep the proceeds for itself, or that it
should subject the organisation to direct taxation or even to indirect tax in
respect of its major purchases. This need for equality between member states
does not apply in the case of the diplomat's tax exemption. The diplomat is not
exempt from such indirect taxes as value added tax or purchase tax on the
goods he buys, because this is administratively very difficult to arrange and the
reciprocal nature of diplomatic relations means that no one government
benefits overall at the expense of others. But in the context of international
organisations there is no real reciprocity. If the host state could levy indirect
taxes on an organisation in its territory, or customs on such an organisation's
imports, it could make an undue profit at the expense of the other members
without suffering any reciprocal loss. Of all the privileges accorded to
international organisations, therefore, tax exemption is the most readily
conceded.
4. 14.
Immunities for an international organisation and its staffare somewhat harder

to justify. In the case of a highly political organisation such as the United
374
Nations it is easy to see that its officials must be free from pressure and from
harassment in the performance of their delicate and important tasks in the
territory of members, just as it is essential for diplomats to be free and
independent of pressures from the authorities of the receiving state. But
international organisations have tended to multiply at an unforeseen rate and
to assume functions such as the financing of international telecommunications
systems,19 or the development of rocket launchers,20 or the development of
better weather forecasting,21 which are far removed from the functions of
traditional diplomacy. While perhaps earning a little extra foreign exchange,
the host state does not derive any reciprocal advantage in granting immunities
to international organisations and persons connected with them, such as it
obtains for its own representatives abroad when it accords diplomatic and
consular immunities to foreign diplomatic agents. If persons enjoying
immunity by virtue of their connection with an international organisation
behave unacceptably or cause a security problem in the host state, there is no
swift and reliable method analogous to declaring a diplomat persona non grata,
whereby that state can ensure that the offenders are immediately removed from
its territory. It therefore became necessary, particularly in those states where
public and parliamentary opinion is sensitive to any apparently excessive grant
of immunity, to make quite clear that immunities were not being granted
beyond those which were necessary to enable the organisations concerned to
function effectively, and that privileges and immunities would not be granted
so as to enable any international organisation to carry on a commercial activity
from a position of advantage over its competitors.
415
The European states which negotiated the Protocol on Privileges and

Immunities of the European Space Research Organisation in 196322 and the
Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Launcher
Development Organisation in 196423 were conscious that these were regional
organisations of a technical and scientific character for which privileges and
immunities on the United Nations scale would not have been appropriate. In
the case of the latter organisation it was then envisaged that if a successful
rocket launcher was developed, it should be constructed and sold on a
commercial basis, and it was important that in that event member states should
not be according tax reliefs in respect of activities of this character. These two
international agreements therefore contained certain novel and restrictive
features. In each case the Organisation is obliged to include in all its written
contracts (other than staffcontracts) an arbitration clause which either party to
the contract may invoke. Unless the Organisation waives its immunity,
member states may submit to an international arbitration tribunal any dispute
arising out of damage caused by the Organisation, or involving the
responsibility of the Organisation, or arising from a claim against a person
connected with the Organisation who is entitled to immunity in regard to the
claim. If an action is brought in the courts to enforce an arbitration award
made under any of these provisions, the Organisation is not entitled to
immunity from jurisdiction and execution in that action. Another important
exception to the immunity from jurisdiction and execution ofthe Organisation
exists where a civil action is brought against the Organisation by a third party
for damage arising from an accident caused by a motor vehicle belonging to the
375
Organisation or operated on its behalf. This exception from immunity extends

to criminal proceedings for a motor traffic offence involving a vehicle which
belongs to the Organisation or is being operated on its behalf. The effect of the
first of these exceptions is that although the Organisation cannot be obliged to
litigate its disputes in the courts in the ordinary way, most people who have a
claim of some sort against the Organisation can be sure of obtaining justice,
since the Organisation can be required to submit to arbitration and the
resulting award is enforceable. The exception regarding motor traffic offences
and claims takes account of the fact that such charges and claims form an
overwhelming proportion of the proceedings in respect of which immunity is
raised, and that there is considerable public reluctance to widen the classes of
person who are thought of as being in some sense 'above the motoring laws.'
The Organisation is accorded the standard exemptions from taxation and
customs duties, but great stress is laid on such exemptions relating only to
matters which are 'strictly necessary' for the exercise of the official activities of
the Organisation. These official activities are defined precisely, and it is made
clear in the case of the European Launcher Development Organisation that
they include only 'administrative activities and the design, development and
construction of prototype space vehicle launchers.'
40. 16.
The immunity from jurisdiction ofboth officers ofthe Organisation and experts
is subject to an exception in regard to motor traffic offences and claims resulting
from motoring accidents, parallel to the exception regarding the Organisation
itself. The tax exemption given to the executive head and the staff members of
the Organisation in regard to their salaries and emoluments is made
conditional on their paying tax to the Organisation itself, the tax collected to be
used for the benefit of the Organisation. The practical advantages of this
'internal tax' arrangement are that:
Equality is created between the different members of an international secretariat
(which would not occur if the staff members were paying tax at varying rates to their
home government);
2. The host state is not making a tax profit as it would do ifit could tax staffmembers on
the basis of their residence in its territory;
3. The staff members do not enjoy a tax-free status which might be resented by public
opinion, particularly in the host state.
I.
The general approach of these two international agreements may best be

summed up by quoting Article 2 I of the European Space Research
Organisation Protocol, which provides:
The privileges and immunities provided for in the present Protocol are not designed
to give the Director-General, staff members and experts of the Organisation personal
advantage. They are provided solely to ensure, in all circumstances, the unimpeded
functioning of the Organisation and the complete independence ofthe persons to whom
they are accorded.'
'I.
In 1965 the United Kingdom Government expressed to other governments in

the Council of Europe the considered view that in the negotiation of
agreements concerning privileges and immunities for international organisations too much regard was being paid to precedent and to equality of status
with other organisations, and that states which wished to attract international
376
organisations to establish themselves in their territory had on occasion used

privileges and immunities as a bargaining counter. Insufficient regard on the
other hand was being paid to the basic principle that 'no privileges and
immunities which are not really necessary should be asked for.'24 As a result of
this initiative a careful study of the whole question of the principles which
should govern the grant of privileges and immunities to various categories of
international organisation and to persons connected with them was made by a
sub-committee of the Council of Europe. The report which resulted from this
comparative study and discussion of future policy was endorsed by the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, who recommended 'that the
governments of member states should be guided by the considerations set out in
the report in any future negotiations concerning privileges and immunities of
international organisations. 25 The Governments of the Council ofEurope have
since then followed a reasonably coordinated policy in the negotiation of
agreements regarding new international organisations, but it is easier to agree
in general terms to relate privileges and immunities to functional need than to
translate this into the precise details of a scale of appropriate privileges and
immunities. Nor has it proved feasible to re-negotiate any international
agreements on privileges and immunities in a downward direction.
Headquarters agreetnents
40. I 8.
The status of an international organisation and of persons connected with it

may be regulated by a bilateral international agreement between the
organisation and the host state. This headquarters agreement, as it is called,
may be
in addition to the multilateral agreement which specifies the privileges and
immunities to be accorded by all member states;
2. In substitution for the multilateral agreement if the host state is not a party
to that agreement;
3. or required because the multilateral agreement may contain no detailed
provisions in regard to privileges and immunities.
I.
An example of (I) (a headquarters agreement which supplements and makes

only minor adjustments to the relevant multilateral agreement) is the
Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Centre for MediumRange Weather Forecasts. 26 The purpose of the Headquarters Agreement in
this case was to make the necessary provision regarding the premises which the
United Kingdom Government placed at the disposal of the Centre and also to
spell out in terms of United Kingdom law and practice the privileges and
immunities to be accorded to the Centre. On the other hand, in the case of the
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organisation regarding the Headquarters ofthe Organisation (1968),27 certain
additional financial privileges were accorded to the senior officers of the
The Vienna Convention on the Representation of States
377
Organisation which were not required by the terms of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations.
This Agreement also set out in detail the way in which the broad terms of the
Specialised Agencies Convention were interpreted in United Kingdom law,
practice and procedure.
Examples of (2) (headquarters agreements which are required because the
host state is not party to a multilateral agreement regarding the status of the
organisation) include the Agreement between the United States of America
and the United Nations regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations 28
and the Headquarters Agreement between Switzerland and the United
Nations. 29 Switzerland is not a member of the United Nations.
Headquarters agreements in the third category (3) (where the multilateral
agreement contains no detailed provisions regarding privileges and immunities) usually relate to international organisations which do not need privileges
and immunities except in the host state. In such a case the multilateral
agreement which establishes the organisation may make no provision in regard
to privileges and immunities; it may make provision only in general terms (for
example 'shall be accorded in the territory of member States such privileges
and immunities as it may require'); or it may expressly provide that the
organisation and the host state shall conclude a headquarters agreement
regarding privileges and immunities to be approved by the council or other
executive body of the organisation. The last of these formulations, which has
become the most common, is the most satisfactory, since it emphasises the
interest of the generality ofmembers in the level of privileges and immunities to
be accorded and prevents the possibility of the secretariat of the organisation
negotiating an unacceptably high level of privileges and immunities with one
member state and using this as a precedent in similar negotiations with other
members. The United Kingdom has concluded headquarters agreements with
the five commodity organisations which have their headquarters in London. 30
In each case the relevant multilateral agreement called for the negotiation ofa
headquarters agreement between the host state and the organisation (there
being little general need for privileges and immunities in other member states,
except as regards taxation of the organisation) and the agreement, which
followed generally the precedent of the European Space Research Organisation described above, was approved by the Council of each organisation
before signature. Where the organisation does not have a widespread need for
privileges and immunities, this scheme, while ensuring that the interests of all
member states are consulted, is an economical way of providing the necessary
privileges and immunities. The negotiation of multilateral agreements to
regulate privileges and immunities consumes a great deal of expert time and
effort, and does not always lead to a more satisfactory result than a simple
headquarters agreement between the host state and the organisation.

40. I g.
The sequence of international conferences designed to codify the various areas
37 8
of diplomatic law which began with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations of 1961 and continued with the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963 and the New York Convention on Special Missions of 1969,
led to the convening ofa conference at V ienha in 1975 to consider draft Articles
prepared by the International Law Commission on the subject of representatives of states to international organisations. This Conference adopted the
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with
International Organisations of a Universal Character. 31 Part 11 of the
Convention accords to permanent missions to international organisations of a
universal character broadly the privileges and immunities of a diplomatic
mission. It even goes further in requiring the host state, in case of an attack on
the premises of the mission, to 'take all appropriate steps to prosecute and
punish persons who have committed the attack'. The head of the permanent
mission, the diplomatic staff of the mission, subordinate staff, private staff, and
the families of diplomatic and of administrative and technical staff are given
the privileges and immunities which they would enjoy if they occupied a
corresponding position in regard to a diplomatic mission. Although a number
of headquarters agreements give more extensive privileges and immunities to
permanent missions to the organisation than are required by the relevant
multilateral agreement, the majority fall well short of the full range of
diplomatic privileges and immunities. In addition the Vienna Convention
(unlike host state agreements which confer a high level ofimmunities) gives the
host state no right to declare a member of a permanent mission to an
international organisation persona non grata. The Convention requires the
sending state, in case of grave and manifest violation of the criminal law of the
host state, or interference in its internal affairs, to recall or terminate the
functions of a member of its mission, but if the sending state does not agree that
such an offence or intervention has taken place and declines to recall the person
concerned, the host state has no remedy.
40.20.
Part III of the Vienna Convention deals with delegations to organs and to
conferences and again, with some important exceptions, such delegations are
given privileges and immunities on the full diplomatic scale. No inviolability is
given to the premises of the delegation, although residences are inviolable (this
anomaly resulted from argument at the Conference over the level appropriate);
the immunity ofthe head and of the diplomatic staffofthe delegation is limited
to immunity from criminal jurisdiction and immunity from civil jurisdiction in
respect of acts performed in the exercise of their functions (traffic accidents
are specifically not covered by immunity from civil jurisdiction); and personal
customs privileges of the head and of the diplomatic staff are limited to the
articles which they import in their personal baggage on first entering the
territory to attend the meeting or conference of the organisation. The privileges
and immunities given to families and subordinate staff are also somewhat
below the full diplomatic scale. But the general level of privilege and immunity
goes far beyond what is accorded under the General Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, or under any bilateral
headquarters agreement, to delegations to organs of an international
organisation or to conferences convened by it. The host state has no power to
declare any person entitled under Part III to immunity persona non grata, or to
379
obtain his removal, if the sending state proves unhelpful.

40.2 I.
Part IV of the Vienna Convention provides that observer delegations (that is,
delegations representing states which are not members of the international
organisation) are entitled to the same level of privileges and immunities as the
delegations of members which are covered in Part Ill.
40.22.
In the formulation ofthe Vienna Convention on the Representation ofStates in

their Relations with International Organisations ofa Universal Character, little
regard was paid to the interests of the traditional host states - the United States,
Canada and the states ofWestern Europe. Although all states are potential host
states to international organisations and even more so to conferences convened
by international organisations, the majority of states adopted the position that
they were primarily sending states, and a polarisation ofviewpoints occurred in
which the majority supported a considerable extension of the privileges and
immunities given to representatives to international organisations, while the
traditional host states argued that their legitimate interests, and the traditional
principle that no privileges and immunities should be accorded unless they
were necessary, were both being ignored. The consequence is that the
Convention is likely to have little practical impact on the existing network of
multilateral and bilateral international agreements. Article 4 of the
Convention provides that
'The provisions of the present Convention
(a) are without prejudice to other international agreements in force between States or
between States and international organizations of a universal character, and
(b) shall not preclude the conclusion of other international agreements regarding the
representation of States in their relations with international organizations of a
universal character or their representation at conferences convened by or under the
auspices of such organizations.'
Article 2 of the Convention provides that it shall apply to an international

organisation of a universal character when it has been accepted by the host
state and the organisation has taken a decision to implement the relevant
provisions. It is clear that the major host states are unlikely to become parties to
the Convention. 32
CHAPTER 41
The Commonwealth
of Nations
Balfour Definition
4 1 .1.
The first modern definition of the Commonwealth of Nations was enshrined in

the formula associated with Lord Balfour which issued from the Imperial
Conference of 1926. The status of the group of self-governing communities
composed of Great Britain and the Dominions was therein described as
follows:
'They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no
way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs,
though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members
of the British Commonwealth of Nations'. 1
Statute of Westtninster
41.2.
Under the Statute of Westminster, 1931, passed by the United Kingdom

Parliament, certain remaining restrictions on the powers of Dominion
Parliaments were removed. The Statute provided, inter alia, that:
Dominion Parliaments had full power to make laws having extra-territorial
operation.
2. The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, should not apply to any law made by
a Dominion Parliament.
3. Future laws made by a Dominion Parliament should not be void or
inoperative on the ground of repugnancy to the law ofEngland orofany Act
of Parliament or any order, rule or regulation thereunder, and that
Dominion Parliaments henceforth had power to repeal or amend any such
Act, order or regulation in so far as it was part of the law of a Dominion.
4. No future Act of the United Kingdom Parliament should apply to a
Dominion as part of its law. 2
I.
The turning point

41.3.
The turning point in the history of the Commonwealth came with the
Commonwealth membership: A latter-day definition
381
Declaration of 28 April 1949, in which member countries accepted India's

intention to adopt a republican constitution, at the same time continuing 'her
full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of The
King as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations
and as such the Head of the Commonwealth. '3
41-4.
It was also in 1949 that the title 'Commonwealth of Nations' was first used as an
alternative to the former title 'British Commonwealth of Nations,' which in
time it replaced completely. Nowadays it is simply referred to as the
Commonwealth. Thus, the concept of the Commonwealth has changed from a
group of countries owing allegiance to a single crown, to an association of
sovereign independent nations which includes alongside those members both
republics and countries with their own monarchs.
41.5.
Since 1950, some twenty-eight former dependent territories have become

independent and full members of the Commonwealth. Member countries,
including the United Kingdom, now (1977) number thirty-six. 4
FreedolD of decision
41.6.
In 1947, on the occasion of the Burma Independence Bill, the then British
Prime Minister, Mr C. R. Attlee, emphasised that 'The British Commonwealth of Nations is a free association of peoples, not a collection of subject
nations.' Burma was thus free to become an independent state outside the
Commonwealth and so decided, as did Eire (the Irish Republic) under the
Ireland Act of 1949. The Sudan took the same course in 1956 and between that
date and 1967 British Somaliland and Protectorate, 5 Kuwait, Southern
Cameroons, the Maldive Islands and the South Arabian Federation (including
Aden)6 ended their earlier, sometimes tenuous, imperial connections.
41.7.
None of the above countries had enjoyed the status of member country of the
Commonwealth at the time of decision. Only the Union of South Africa on its
declaration of a republic in 1961 and Pakistan in 1972, following the
recognition by Commonwealth governments of Bangladesh, the former East
Wing of Pakistan, as an independent state, voluntarily ceased existing
membership. There has been no case of any country being expelled, and there
is no machinery for expulsion. The withdrawal of South Africa in 1961 was,
however, due to what was felt to be the pressure of the majority of
Commonwealth governments on the South African Government for an
essential change in the system of racial apartheid to which the South Africans
were not willing to agree.
COlDlDonwealth lDelDbership: A latter-day definition

41.8.
From 1949 on, as numerous dependent territories assumed independent status,

a preponderance of countries opted for republican status either at the time of
382
transition or shortly afterwards. On the other hand, some traditionally

monarchical communities retained their own monarchies.
4 1 .9.
Member countries of the Commonwealth can now be said to fall within the
following broad categories:
Monarchical: Countries of which The Sovereign remains the constitutional
Head of State under the 'divisible monarchy' concept, namely: Australia,
The Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Fiji, Grenada,Jamaica, Mauritius, New
Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the United Kingdom.
2. Republics in which the offices of Head of State and Head of Government are
combined, namely: Bangladesh, Botswana, Cyprus, The Gambia, Ghana,
Kenya, Malawi, Nauru, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia.
3. Republics in which the functions of Head of State are separate from those of
Head of Government, namely: Guyana, India, Malta, Singapore, Sri
Lanka and Trinidad and Tobago.
4. Other monarchies: Malaysia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tonga and Western
Samoa. Of these Malaysia is an elective monarchy, the Head of State or
Yang di Pertuan Agong being chosen from among the Malay rulers of the
nine states of Malaysia. Each Head of State holds office for five years. In
Lesotho and Swaziland the King is designated by the Chiefs in accordance
with customary law. Tonga is a long-established hereditary monarchy. The
functions of the Head of State in Western Samoa are analagous to those ofa
constitutional monarch.
5. Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia): In 1923, Southern Rhodesia was formally
annexed to His Majesty's dominions as a colony, and granted responsible
government subject to certain limitations. These last, however, largely fell
away over the years. In 1953 Southern Rhodesia became a part of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and in 1961 the colony was granted
a new constitution which replaced that of 1923. Following the dissolution
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 31 December 1963, the
Government of Southern Rhodesia resumed those powers in the colony
which had been transferred to the Federal Government in 1953.
I.
41.10.
In 1965 the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr Ian Smith, and his ministerial
colleagues purported to declare Rhodesia independent, whereupon Her
Majesty, acting through the Governor, dismissed them from office. In June
1969, following a referendum in the colony which resulted in a large majority in
favour of a republican form of government, the Governor sought and obtained
The Queen's permission to resign. In consequence the Residual Mission ofthe
British High Commission in Salisbury and the Rhodesian Mission in London,
respectively, were closed. But, as was announced in the year following by the
then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the illegal introduction of a
republican constitution in Rhodesia in no way affected the constitutional
position. This meant that because of its illegal declaration of independence,
made in 1965, Rhodesia had become a colony administered by a regime in
rebellion against Parliament and the Crown.
RoyaL StyLe and TitLes
383
Head of the COlDlDonwealth

41.11.
Despite such wide constitutional divergencies, one common factor remains:

that of The Queen as the symbolic Head of the Commonwealth. No functions
attach to this title. Nor has it any constitutional significance. It is, however,
seen as the outward and visible mark of the special Commonwealth
relationship. In the remaining dependencies The Monarch also remains Queen
of 'Her other Realms and Territories.'
Royal Style and Titles

41.12.
At the time of her Accession to the Throne The Queen's title was uniform
throughout the then monarchical Commonwealth, viz 'Elizabeth the Second,
by the Grace of God of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions
beyond the Seas Queen, Defender of the Faith.' In December 1952, however,
Commonwealth Prime Ministers gathered in London concluded that the Title
was no longer in accord with modern constitutional relationships and that it
would henceforth be more appropriate that each monarchical member
country should use for its own purposes a form of title better suited to its own
particular circumstances.
41.13.
During the quarter century up to 1976, as countries which had had the status of
monarchies either left the Commonwealth Association (South Africa and
Pakistan) or became republics (e.g. Sri Lanka), and former dependencies
became independent, the list of the Royal Style and Titles was modified.
By the end of 1972 it read as follows:
United Kingdom
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen,
Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.
Canada
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Canada
and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth,
Defender of the Faith.
AustraLia
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other
Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.
,New ZeaLand
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of New Zealand and Her
Other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the
Faith
Jamaica
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace ofGod of]amaica and of Her other Realms
and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth.
384
The Commonwealth of .Nations
Barbados
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, Queen of Barbados and of Her
other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.
Mauritius
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Mauritius and of H~r other Realms and
Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.
Fiji
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, Queen of Fiji and of Her other
Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.
The Bahamas
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, Queen of the Commonwealth of
the Bahamas and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the
Commonwealth.
Grenada
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, Queen of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and ofGrenada and Her other Realms and
Papua New Guinea
Elizabeth the Second, Queen ofPapua New Guinea and Herother Realms and
Governors-General
41.14.
In those member countries still owing allegiance to the Crown, the Queen is
represented by a Governor-General. He is charged with many, though not all,
of the functions performed in Britain by The Sovereign personally, such as the
summoning, proroguing and dissolution of Parliament, the giving of the Royal
Assent to Bills and the appointment of Cabinet Ministers and Judges. The
Imperial Conference of 1926 placed it on record 'that the Governor-General in
a Dominion is the representative of the Crown holding in all essential respects
the same position in relation to the administration of public affairs in a
Dominion as is held by His Majesty the King in Great Britain and that he is not
the representative or agent of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain or of
any Department of that Government.'
41.15.
At the Imperial Conference of 1930 it was agreed that a Governor-General

should be appointed on the advice ofMinisters ofthe Dominion concerned and
not, as formerly, of United Kingdom Ministers.
41.16.
In Australia The Sovereign is still also represented in each State by a Governor.

His functions are generally similar to those ofa Governor-General, save that he
is appointed formally on the advice of United Kingdom Ministers and not on
that of Ministers in the State concerned.
The Commonwealth Secretariat
385
Meetings of COlDlDonwealth Heads of GovernlDent

41.17.
While ministerial and functional conferences now take place throughout the
Commonwealth on an increasing scale, ranging from gatherings, sometimes in
a United Nations context, of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Justice,
Health or Trade to those of Cabinet Secretaries, officials or technicians, the
meetings of Heads of Government have become the most obvious symbol of
continuing Commonwealth cooperation. When such meetings were resumed
in 1944, they took on a more informal character than the pre-war Imperial
Conferences. During the two following decades they were held almost without
question in London under the chairmanship of the British Prime Minister of
the day. Servicing of the meetings remained in the joint hands of the British
Cabinet Office and of the Dominions (later Commonwealth Relations) Office.
Even following the independence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon in 1947-8, the
gatherings remained small and retained something of a family atmosphere.
41.18.
It was not until 1966, shortly after the unilateral declaration of independence
by Rhodesia, that a new precedent was set. In that year not only were two
Heads of Government meetings held; but for the first time one of them took
place outside London - in Nigeria - and was devoted to the single subject of
Rhodesia. While a further conference was convened in London in 1969, the
concept of 'rotation' had by now been tacitly accepted. Thus, Heads of
Government met in Singapore in 1971, at Ottawa in 1973, in Jamaica in 1975
and London in 1977, the year of the Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth 11.
41.1 g.
Each meeting since 1947 has seen a gradual widening in membership, to a

point where Heads of Government have recently had to devise new procedures
in order to preserve the confidentiality and informality of their discussions. One
marked departure from earlier conferences was the growing habit of Heads of
Government of foregathering in restricted session with no more than one and
sometimes no adviser present.
The COlDlDonwealth Secretariat

41.20.
Consultation had been the distinctive mode of operation by Commonwealth

countries. This had been carried out by periodic gatherings of Heads of
Government, by regular meetings ofMinisters and officials, by correspondence
and by diplomatic contacts. From time to time, committees had been set up to
deal with particular subjects. But though the possibility of a Commonwealth
Secretariat had been suggested for several decades, objection had always been
raised by some governments to the creation of centralised machinery for the
consideration of political questions - especially those relating to foreign affairs
and defence - on the ground that it might involve a commitment and imply a
derogation from the independence of individual members. It was also feared
that the existence of a secretariat might undermine the direct personal
relationship between the Ministers and officials of different Commonwealth
countries which was a valuable feature of the Commonwealth association. But
386
with the constantly growing numbers of Commonwealth members, with the

increasing complexity of the issues that presented themselves and the
differences that arose between the various Commonwealth governments, there
was general recognition that the time had come to set up a secretariat on a
Commonwealth-wide basis. At a Conference in London in June, 1966, the
Heads of Government decided to establish forthwith a Commonwealth
Secretariat. They regarded this body as being 'at the service of all
Commonwealth governments' and as 'a visible symbol of the spirit of
cooperation which animates the Commonwealth.' The Secretariat was set up
at Marlborough House, a Royal Palace (the former home ofQueen Mary, wife
of King George V), which Queen Elizabeth 11 had placed at the disposal ofthe
British Government in 1959 as a Commonwealth Centre.
41.2 I.
The first Secretary-General to be appointed was Mr Arnold Smith, a senior

member of the Canadian diplomatic service. The appointment was significant
in that, in the early days of discussion about a Commonwealth Secretariat
before the Second World War, the Government of Canada had been, for the
reasons mentioned above, hesitant about the idea. In the first eleven years of its
life, under Mr Arnold Smith and his successor Mr Shridath S. Ramphal Kt.,
C.M.G., QC., a distinguished legal and political personality from Guyana, the
Secretariat developed from being, as originally comprehended, a servicing
organisation into an initiator of programmes in the fields of development,
technical cooperation, health, youth affairs and education and, within the
limits imposed by differences of alignment (political, defence and regional)
between individual members, a coordinator of Commonwealth policies and
activities. The Secretariat also effectively took over the prerogative of
organising Commonwealth meetings at the high political level which had
hitherto lain traditionally and appropriately with the British Government.
Organisation within the British Government

4 1 22 .
Over a period of some fifty years, organisation within the British Government
had been adapted to meet the changing needs of the Commonwealth. A
separate Department of State had first been established in 1925. Called the
Dominions Office, it was formed from the Dominions Department of the
Colonial Office to handle relations with the Dominions which had effectively
gained independence after the First World War, as well as with Newfoundland
and Southern Rhodesia. On 15 August 1947, the day ofIndependence for India
and Pakistan, the name ofthe Office was changed to Commonwealth Relations
Office, and it assumed responsibilities for United Kingdom relations with
these countries. 7 With the process of independence continuing apace in the
next two decades, most of the territories which had been administered by the
Colonial Office became the responsibility of the Commonwealth Relations
Office. It was decided in 1966 that the remaining responsibilities in this field no
longer justified the maintenance of a separate Colonial Office, which was
accordingly absorbed by the Commonwealth Relations Office, then renamed
Commonwealth Office. 8
Membership of the United Nations
41.23.
387
In the meantime in 1966 as a result of the Government's acceptance of the

recommendations of the Plowden Report,9 the staffs of the Foreign Office and
the Commonwealth Relations Office had combined to form a single
Diplomatic Service (though the two Departments remained separate). On 16
October 1968 the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office were merged to
form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This history of splits, mergers
and re-mergers is symbolic of how, in less than fifty years, an Empire evolved
into a lively association of independent states, and it emphasises the important
role which the Commonwealth Secretariat had assumed as an active focal
point of the Commonwealth system.
The conduct of British relations with other lDelDber

countries of the COlDlDonwealth
41.24.
Since 1968 the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs has
been responsible for the conduct of relations with other member countries of
the Commonwealth and for the administration of the remaining United
Kingdom dependencies. Within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office there
are departments to advise Ministers on Commonwealth matters and on the
Dependent Territories. Although the conduct of diplomatic business between
Commonwealth governments is carried out in much the same way as that with
foreign countries, Commonwealth High Commissioners and their staffs
traditionally deal direct with a wider range ofgovernment departments, and in
general in a more informal manner, than do their foreign counterparts. 10 Such
dealings across departmental boundaries have grown greatly since the Second
World War, notably in such organisations as the European Communities;
none the less, history, language and habit have given this Commonwealth
practice a special flavour.
MelDbership of the United Nations

4 1 2 5.
Under the Covenant of the League of Nations all the then Dominions except
Newfoundland became original members of the League. In that capacity
they were enti tIed to send separate delegations to the Assembly and were
eligible for election to the non-permanent seats on the Council. Thus Canada
was elected in 1927, the Irish Free State in 1930, Australia in 1933 and
New Zealand in 1936. All members of the Commonwealth (save, at the end of
1977, Nauru and Tonga) have Permanent Representatives at the seat of the
United Nations in New York. Though not a separate member, Southern
Rhodesia was admitted, prior to its unilateral declaration of independence in
1965, to membership of certain international organisations dealing with nonpolitical matters, such as the International Telecommunications Union.
Individual participation by Commonwealth member countries in such
conferences is in itself a token of the true independence of each of them.
388
The Commonwealth of .Nations
DiplolDatic representation
4 1 26 .
In accord with its estimate of its needs and the requirements of its national
budget each member government accredits ambassadors or consular representatives to foreign countries. Within the Commonwealth, however, a Head of
Mission is styled 'High Commissioner' rather than 'Ambassador,' and his
office 'High Commission.'
High COlDlDissioners
41.27.
All High Commissioners, to whatever Commonwealth country they may be

accredited, have a status equivalent to that of Ambassador. So far as Britain is
concerned, its High Commissioner will be either the representative of the
British Government or, in those Commonwealth countries whose Head ofState
is other than The Queen, her representative. The duties of a High
Commissioner from any Commonwealth country will be similar to those of a
foreign ambassador, namely to advise his government on the politics of the
country to which he is accredited, to interpret and project the policies of his
own country and to look after its interests.
41.28.
Until quite recently, it had not been accepted that a High Commissioner in
London could be the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps. When, in 1948, High
Commissioners were assimilated fully to the status of ambassador, it was still
considered inappropriate that a subject of The King (which all High
Commissioners then were) should be the Doyen of the diplomatic representatives in his capital, since he was technically not accredited to The Sovereign.
That last inhibition, which never existed at all in other Commonwealth
capitals, lapsed in 1972 when the then High Commissioner for Jamaica in
London, Sir Laurence Lindo, became Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps.
41.29.
Article 14 of the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations makes a

special provision enabling High Commissioners to be included in the first class
of heads of mission. This class comprises' ambassadors or nuncios accredited to
Heads of State, and other heads of mission of equivalent rank.' High
Commissioners (and High Representatives within the French Communaute)
are technically not 'accredited' when the countries between which they are
exchanged share the same head of state. 11 Since High Commissions have the
status of diplomatic missions, all privileges and immunities under the Vienna
Convention are accorded on that basis. The United Kingdom in one respect
extend more favourable treatment to members of Commonwealth High
Commissions than is extended to members of other diplomatic missions. A
member of a Commonwealth High Commission who is a dual citizen (of the
sending country and also of the United Kingdom) is treated as though he were
Consular functions
389
not a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies in that he does not lose his
privileges and immunities because he is a 'national of the receiving state.'
Agents-General
4 1 .3 0 .
While the Commonwealth ofAustralia and Canada are represented in London

as sovereign States by High Commissioners, the constituent States ofAustralia
and the Provinces of Canada are separately represented by Agents-General.
The Agents-General are not diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention,
but under the Commonwealth Countries and Republic ofIreland (Immunities
and Privileges) Order 197 I they, their families, their staffs and their offices are
accorded privileges and immunities on the scale set out in the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations 1963. They are not, however, entitled to
any special precedence.
Consular functions
41.31.
By long-standing convention, which to a substantial degree continues, the

practice between Commonwealth member governments has been that those of
their citizens living in another country of the Commonwealth will look to the
government of that country for protection rather than to their own diplomatic
or other representative. Consular functions, and likewise consular titles, were
deemed unsuitable to the Commonwealth relationship. Thus, in those
Commonwealth countries (as previously in Pakistan), where the interests of
Britain dictated the need for a presence outside the capital, for example in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India or later in the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, British representatives were, with the agreement of the receiving
member country styled variously as 'Deputy High Commissioner' or 'Senior
Trade Commissioner.' Such officers were treated as members detached for
local service from the diplomatic staff of the British High Commissioner in the
capital concerned.
41.32.
In 1970, however, given the continuing expansion in the independent

membership of the Commonwealth, the question of consular relations was
raised on the initiative of the Government of New Zealand. Two years later
senior Commonwealth officials met in London to examine the problem. While
no formal agreement resulted, the consensus of the Conference was that it
should be considered an acceptable practice to make consular appointments
within the Commonwealth and to discuss the adoption of consular titles. The
British Government for its part announced its readiness to consider, on a
strictly bilateral basis, proposals from any other Commonwealth government
for the opening of consular relations between them. However, they remained
strongly of the view that the adoption of consular titles should not presuppose
any extension of consular functions in the countries concerned. In the upshot,
understandings were reached between Britain and the Federal Governments of
Canada and Australia, as well as with New Zealand, whereby diplomatic posts
390
outside the capitals of the two latter countries have recently become
Consulates-General, as opposed to Deputy High Commissions or Senior Trade
Commission Offices. They do not, however, carry out any statutory consular
functions, as they are not empowered to do so. In certain other countries ofthe
Commonwealth it remains the practice for British diplomatic offices outside
the capitals to be styled 'Deputy High Commissions.'
41.33.
Some functions which are consular in nature, such as trade, welfare and
immigration, are carried out by representatives whose titles are varied - Trade
Commissioners, Immigration Officers and Assistant Commissioners are among
those used. In the United Kingdom these officers are also given privileges and
immunities on the consular scale under the Commonwealth Countries and
Republic of Ireland (Immunities and Privileges) Order 197 I. The privileges
and immunities accorded in the United Kingdom to the Commonwealth
Secretariat are set out in the Commonwealth Secretariat Act, 1966.
Registration of intra-ColDlDonwealth agreelDents with

the United Nations
41.34.
The view formerly held by the United Kingdom Government, and accepted
with isolated exceptions by the then Dominion Governments, was that
agreements between mem bers of the Commonwealth were not properly
registrable with the League of Nations under Article 18 of the League
Covenant. Since the establishment ofthe United Nations further consideration
was given to this question and it was later agreed by all members of the
Commonwealth that agreements concluded since 24 October 1945 should be
registered with the United Nations, saving those which merely amended or
modified agreements concluded before that date, and certain other classes of
agreement not regarded as registrable when concluded between foreign
countries.
Links with the Judicial COlDlDittee of the Privy Council

4 1 .35.
For so long as the Crown remained one and indivisible it had been looked to
throughout the Empire, and indeed as recently as 1947, as the 'Fountain of
Justice.' Appeals thus lay by right or by special leave from higher courts
overseas to the Judicial Committee. But once it proved possible, from 1949
onwards, to accommodate republics within the Commonwealth, links with the
Judicial Committee suffered much attrition. In the majority of countries
appeals have terminated. Efforts to establish an alternative worldwide Court,
or a series of regional Commonwealth Courts, have failed. However, a number
of member countries, namely The Bahamas, Barbados, Fiji, The Gambia,
Grenada, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Singapore and
Trinidad and Tobago (three of them now republics), together with the
Australian states, still maintain the right of appeal to theJ udicial Committee.
CHAPTER 42
Some regional
organisations
4 2 .1.
The last chapter of the fourth edition of this book was entitled 'Associations of
Western States.' If 'Western' is taken to mean Western Europe and its
American and Canadian allies, or Western Europe on its own, this special
chapter was timely. For a look back from the present day to the first fifteen
years or so immediately after the Second World War shows that period to have
been remarkable for multilateral diplomatic activity leading to the formation
of intergovernmental organisations.
42.2.
Impatience with the narrow economic confines imposed on small countries by

separation from their neighbours, opportunities for discussion afforded to the
European governments in exile in London, the desire to eliminate finally some
of the apparently endless feuds in Europe, notably those between France and
Germany, and the necessity which became clear only too soon after the
armistice in Europe for the maintenance of strong defence - all these and other
influences pushed Western Europe in the direction of using the prospect of
quicker travel between cities in Europe and across the Atlantic to make
permanent the machinery by which governments had learned to act together.
42.3.
But in the present chapter it would have been mistaken to confine the study of
regional associations to Europe and the Atlantic. Economic and political
considerations have enhanced the importance of some existing organisations,
while newly independent countries have found regional organisations a help in
preserving and developing their independence. Sections have therefore been
added on the Organisation of American States (OAS), which has existed in
intention if not in fact since the International Union of American Republics
was founded in 1890, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established in
1963, and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), established
in 1967.
42.4.
Two very important regional associations have not been subjected to the same
analysis for the reason that they are not wholly parallel in nature to the others.
The first is the organisation generally known as the 'Warsaw Pact,' but more
correctly styled 'Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,'
signed at Warsaw on 14 May 1955. The text of the Treaty is largely in general
terms, with special reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; the
impact lies in the 'Statement on the Formation of a Joint Command of The
Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty States, 14 May 1955.'1 The membership
of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation consists of Bulgaria, Czechoslavakia, the
392
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Roumania and the USSR, Albania, an original signatory, having withdrawn.
42.5.
The Organisation has a Committee consisting of top-level party, ministerial

and defence members which meets twice a yearorsometimes less, each member
country holding the chair for one year. The Organisation, except for some of
the members of the Joint Secretariat, is of a military character and there are
special organs to manage joint exercises. The forces, nuclear and conventional,
at the disposal of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation are very large, technically
and operationally efficient and expertly led. Rapid advances in strength in all
three arms have been noted in the 1960s and 1970s.
4 2 .6 .
The Warsaw Treaty Organisation differs from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation in two important respects: the preponderant power of the Soviet
Union is in the closest proximity to the other members; and, in the case of
Czechoslovakia, the power of the Organisation as a whole has been used
against a member state.
4 2 .7.
A second organisation which is very important, can be termed regional, but is

not wholly parallel with regional associations analysed in this chapter, is the
Arab League. Founded in 1945, it is an association oftwenty Arab states. It has a
Council, fourteen Specialised Committees, the same number of Specialised
Agencies and a Secretariat administered by a Secretary-General resident in
Cairo.
4 2 .8.
While the Arab League is an intergovernmental'organisation, the emphasis of

its work is different from that ofother regional associations in that it consists less
in the day-to-day handling of intergovernmental business than in the
organising of conferences, largely on economic and social questions, and
particularly in the handling of the Arab case in the Middle East through
speeches, publications and personal contacts. The League has a resident
observer at the United Nations. Representatives with ambassadorial status
are posted at a number of capitals. The League also concerns itself with the
maintenance of the Islamic faith.
European and other Western organisations

42.9.
At the end of the Second World War, Western Europe was faced with two
necessities. The first was that of repairing physical destruction and human
deprivation. The second, already apparent at the time when the United
Nations was being formed, was to take necessary precautions against any
danger developing from divergences of ideas and policies between the Western
Powers and the Soviet Union and its associates. The first was obvious for all to
see. The second showed itself in numerous ways, of which one of the most
conspicuous was the commitment sustained by the Western Powers to the
policy of a united Germany democratically governed, as opposed to the Soviet
policy of keeping Germany divided with one zone under a Communist regime.
The divisions went so deep that, somewhat in advance of much of public
opinion, Western governments had to accept that there would need to be
European and other Western organisations
393
arrangements between them not only for mutual economic help (which could
perhaps be shared with the East), but also for physical defence; and moreover
that this might have to be organised, not simply against a possible revival of
German power, but also against potential dangers from the East both to
military security and to human rights and individual and national freedoms
as understood in the West.
Treaty of Dunkirk
42.10.
The first post-war Western European agreement for mutal defence was the
fifty-year Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance entered into by the United
Kingdom and the French Repu blic at Dunkirk on 4 March 1947. 2 Each
country bound itself to give the other all the military and other support in its
power, should either again become involved in hostilities with Germany. The
Treaty of Dunkirk also provided for consultation on matters affecting the
economic relations ofthe two countries. It did not provide for the establishment
of any formal machinery. It is still valid, although largely superseded by the
more comprehensive agreements signed later.
The Brussels Treaty

42.1 I.
Signature and provisions. The Brussels Treaty was signed on 17 March 1948
between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. 3 It is described as a 'Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural
Collaboration and Collective Self-defence.' The preamble declares that the
Parties resolve 'to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights ... to
fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and
political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law . .. to
strengthen the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are ... united;
... to afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in
resisting any policy of aggression.... '
42.12.
In addition to undertaking immediately to consult together with regard to any

situation which might constitute a threat to peace in whatever area this threat
should arise, and also in the event of a renewal of an aggressive policy by
Germany, the Five Powers entered into a specific engagement for automatic
mutual support in the case of aggression against anyone of them in Europe.
This obligation is defined as follows (Article IV):
'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of any armed attack in
Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 5 I of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the
military and other aid and assistance in their power.'
42.13.
This Treaty also provided for the coordination of economic activities and the
signature of social and cultural conventions between the Parties (Articles
I-Ill). Finally, it contained an accession clause enabling the Parties, by
394
agreement among themselves, to 'invite any other State to accede to the present
Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.' (Art.
IX.)
4 2 14.
Machinery. Article VII provided for the creation of a Consultative Council as a

permanent means of consultation on all questions dealt with in the Treaty. In
1948 this Counc il, which consisted of the Foreign M inisters ofthe Parties to the
Treaty, set up a Permanent Defence Organisation which was the responsibility
of the Five Defence Ministers. A Finance and Economic Committee was also
set up under the direction of the Five Finance Ministers. This defence and
economic machinery was absorbed in due course by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation. (See 42.25.)
42.15.
Other organs were set up to deal with the non-military aspects of the Brussels
Treaty. They were the Social Committee, the War Pensions Committee, the
Cultural Committee, the Public Health Committee, the Joint Committee on
the Rehabilitation and Resettlement of the Disabled and the Civil Defence
Conference, with their sub-committees. All these committees met at frequent
intervals and submitted the results oftheir work to the Permanent Commission.
A number of conventions, e.g. multilateral conventions on Social Security,4
Social and Medical Assistance,5 Student Employees, 6 Frontier Workers, 7 were
signed as a result of Brussels Treaty action. The existing network of bilateral
cultural conventions between the five countries (e.g. that of 1948 between the
United Kingdom and France)8 were progressively enlarged in the spirit of
Article III of the Brussels Treaty.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

4 2 16.
The Brussels Treaty provided a framework for cooperation between the five
Western European Allied Powers. But even at the time of its signature there
was a growing realisation on both sides of the Atlantic that a wider alliance,
combining the strengths of Europe and North America, would be essential. No
one saw this more clearly than the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. To
be of real value to Europe, such an alliance would involve for the United States
a permanent commitment far beyond any traditional interpretation of the
historic American phrase 'no entangling alliances. '9 Fortunately for the
prospects of such an ideal becoming real, the United States had at the time not
only a strong Executive in President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State
(General) George C. Marshall, but, indispensable to success, a united
leadership in the Senate. Early in 1948, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg from
the Republican side drew up, with the full support of the Executive branch of
Government and of Senator Tom Connally for the Democratic Party, a
resolution embodying what would be for the United States an unprecedented
overseas commitment. 10
4 2 17.
Talks between Secretary Marshall and the Senators began on

On 28 April
II
April 1948.
.North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NA TO)
395
' ... the idea of a single mutual defence system, including and superseding the Brussels
Treaty, was publicly put forward by Mr St Laurent [Prime Minister of Canada] in the
Canadian House of Commons.' 11
The Vandenberg Resolution was adopted by the United States Senate on I I

June, and talks were immediately begun between all the Governments of the
Brussels Treaty countries. They were able at the end of October to express
'complete identity of views on the principle of a defensive pact for the North
Atlantic area.' On 18 March 1949, the text was published. Three days before,
the Brussels Treaty Powers (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom), Canada and the United States had officially invited
Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal to accede to the proposed North
Atlantic Treaty. On 4 April 1949, the Treaty was signed in Washington on
behalf of these twelve countries. 12 All their parliame'1ts ratified it within five
months, so that it came into force on 24 August 1949. Greece and Turkey were
invited to join the Alliance in 195 I and acceded to the Treaty by Protocols of
Accession on 18 February 1952. The Federal Republic ofGermany was invited
to accede to the Treaty following the signature of the Paris Agreements in
October 1954, and formally became a member of NATO on 9 May 1955.
42.18.
Before any study of the content of the Treaty, it is instructive to look at the
events of almost exactly a year from I I April 1948 (opening of preliminary talks
with Senators Vandenberg and Connally) to 4 April 1949 (signature of the
North Atlantic Treaty) as a whole. The negotiations, carried out on a wide
international front, were remarkable both for their efficient organisation and
their well-chosen timing. However urgent the purpose and however high the
level of discussion, there is always the possibility of small slips with grave
consequences. None occurred, and this is a tribute to the calibre of those
engaged in the negotiations. Timing was also felicitous, not simply because of
the shared purposes and anxieties of those involved, but particularly in the
American political context; 1948 was an election year, and the customary
practice in election years is to cut down on policy risks as the election
approaches. Had the momentum been slowed down (e.g. as it would have been
by an attempt to draft a Constitution) and had things then gone wrong for the
Democratic Party in the November election (as they very nearly did) the
impetus could have been significantly lost and the consequences serious.
Timing is, of course, never wholly under the control of governments or
individuals; but politicians and diplomats should never leave timing out of
sight, whether the problem to be negotiated be great or small.
The provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty
42. I 9.
The Preamble affirms the determination of the Parties

'to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples ... to
promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area ... to unite their efforts for
collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.'
42.20.
Article I significantly relates the Atlantic Treaty and the future actions of the
Alliance to the purposes and actions of the U nited Nations. Thus, in Article I,
396
'The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.'
42.2 I.
The signatories undertook to contribute towards the further development

of peaceful and friendly international relations 'by strengthening their free
institutions . . . and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being'
and to seek 'to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies.... ' 13
(Art. 2.) They undertake to 'maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack' (Art. 3) and to 'consult together
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.' (Art. 4.).
42.22.
In Article 5, the Parties

'agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, ifsuch
an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'
Article 6 describes the circumstances in which Article 5 becomes operative.

Since the accession of Turkey, Article 6 has read:
'For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to
include an armed attack:
(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian
Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the
jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of
Cancer;
(ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories
or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were
stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea
or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.' 14
Machinery
4 2 2 4.
It has been noted that, in the different conditions which prevailed in

comparison with those attending the formation of the United Nations, the
Atlantic Treaty did not attempt to set up a constitution. The Treaty delegated
this power to the new organisation in these words (Art. 9):
'The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to
consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so
organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a
defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation ofArticles
3 and 5.'
.North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (.NA TO)
397
This meant that, to a considerable degree, the history of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation is a history of frequent adaptation of structure to meet
changing events and requirements, always in pursuance of and in conformity
with the Treaty.
4 225.
The first meeting of the Council was held in Washington on 17 and 19

September 1949. Since the Treaty was an instrument negotiated by Foreign
Ministers, the Council consisted of the Foreign Ministers of the member
countries. 15 They immediately created a Defence Committee, consisting of
Ministers of Defence, and a Military Committee, consisting of national Chiefs
of Staff, with an executive body, the Standing Group, comprised ofFrance, the
United Kingdom and the United States and responsible for strategic guidance
in areas in which NATO forces would operate. Regional planning groups were
set up and preliminary consideration was given to production, supply and
finance. In a further meeting on 18 November a Defence Financial and
Economic Committee was set up consisting of Finance Ministers. In 1951,
however, the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic
Committee were abolished, and the whole supreme responsibility was assumed
by the (ministerial) Council itself, supported by its own political, defence,
economic, scientific and other committees, while the Military Committee
retained, under the authority of the Council, its authority over the various
Commands. However, the previous Committee structure had provided a
pattern and precedent for the attendance of the three ministers (Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Finance) at Ministerial Council meetings if it seemed
necessary.
4 2 . 26 .
But in 1950 the Alliance lacked two essentials. First, while there was a great
multiplicity of national armed forces, the edifice had no unified apex, a
situation which would mean weakness and delay in an emergency. (There was
no provision in the Treaty covering this point.) At its Brussels meeting in
December 1950, the Council accepted a recommendation from the Defence
Committee that an integrated European Defence Force be created and that a
Supreme Headquarters be established under the command of an American
officer, and that President Truman be invited to designate General Dwight D.
Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR). The President agreed
and General Eisenhower accepted. 16
42.27.
On the civilian side the response to need came in 1950 when

'The control and supervision of the civilian and military agencies of the Alliance could
no longer effectively be undertaken by the Council in the course of its infrequent
meetings. The Council therefore decided at its meeting in London of I 5- I 8 May 1950 to
set up a civilian body to execute its directives, coordinate the work of the Alliance's
civilian and military bodies and act as a forum for regular political exchanges between
member governments.'l?
The new body was known as the Council Deputies. It was composed of twelve
Deputies, one representing each of the (at that time) twelve Foreign Ministers,
with advisers and staff as necessary. The Deputies were instructed to meet in
continuous session in London.
4 2 28 .
The Foreign Ministers' Deputies were mainly very senior diplomatic officers.
398
But it will be noted that, particularly after the Council in May 195 I dispensed
with the original Defence, Financial and Economic Committees and
concentrated supreme policy authority in its own hands, each Deputy
represented his Foreign Minister not simply as a departmental Minister but in
the name of the national interest as a whole, including the special interests and
capacities of the Ministers of Defence and Finance. Thus, the Deputies grew
into being not only 'representative' in a conventional, limited sense, but also
the machinery of the government of an important international Alliance. This
is not the same as 'political integration', since each member government
retained its political sovereignty and NATO decisions continued to be taken by
unanimity.

4 2 2 9.
As part of the process of internal and external 'house-keeping,' the Council

Deputies worked out in 195 I two important Agreements, both on lines adopted
by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations. The
'Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding
the Status of their Forces,' signed on I June 1950, determined the legal status of
the military personnel of any member country called upon to serve under
NATO command in another. 18 A Protocol to this Agreement defined the status
of military headquarters set up under the Atlantic Treaty. 19 An 'Agreement on
the Status ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Representatives
and International Staff was signed on 2 I September 195 I and covered the
status of the civilian side of the Organisation. 20
Finance and collective defence
42.30.
Meanwhile, basic work on defence policy done within the Organisation made
it clear that the requirements deemed essential by the Military Committee
called for contributions from member states far greater than the members
considered themselves able to make. A Ministerial Council meeting held in
Ottawa from 20 to 25 September 195 I, was attended by Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Finance, with the thought in mind that 'Korea (1950)
might happen here,' and with a conviction that, in the immediate future prices
were likely to rise. The Council appointed a Temporary Council Committee of
Three 21 to review the whole question of requirements versus resources. The
Committee produced many new ideas, notably an application of the principles
of mutual aid and equitable burden sharing. On the basis of the Temporary
Council Committee's report, the Council at its meeting in Lisbon from 20 to 25
February 1952, set future force levels and a future pattern for regular reviews
and economic negotiation.
4 2 .3 I .
Simultaneously the Council decided on some very important administrative

changes. Instead of being a periodic ministerial meeting, the Council should
become a permanent body, titled the North Atlantic Council and located in
Paris. To enable the new Council to act in the absence ofsome, or indeed all, of
.North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (.NA TO)
399
the Ministers, each Minister should appoint a Permanent (Resident)

Representative. The Chairman should be an international civil servant who,
in addition to being V ice-Chairman of the Ministerial Council, would also
serve as Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The
proposals were approved, and Lord Ismay (United Kingdom) was appointed
the first Secretary-General.
42.32.
This appointment was both institutionally and personally imaginative and

significant. First, just as the military apparatus had needed an apex, so the
civilian organisation had needed a coping-stone. Secondly, Lord Ismay was by
profession a soldier, had been Secretary of the British War Cabinet, and
subsequently became Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs in Sir
Winston Churchill's 1951 Cabinet. This background, combined with his
personal qualities, made him the ideal man to bring together definitively the
civilian and military sides of the Organisation. 22
42.33.
It is not possible in this book to follow, even in brief detail, the events and
developments affecting so large and many-sided an organisation as NATO. But
a few landmarks stand out. In May 1956 the Council appointed a Committee to
advise on closer cooperation in non-military matters. It consisted of Dr
Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr Halvard Lange (Norway) and Mr Lester Pearson
(Canada), each at one time or other Prime Ministerofhis country, who became
known as 'The Three Wise Men.' Working amid the anxieties of 1956, the year
of the failure of the Hungarian uprising and of the Anglo-French enterprise
in Suez, the group laid the greatest emphasis on the necessity ofcooperation at
all times between the members ofan alliance, lest the habit ofcooperation falter
when the need was greatest. In a notable document of 103 paragraphs, they
wrote,
'... events have reinforced the Committee's conviction that the Atlantic Community
can develop greater unity only by working to achieve common policies on matters of
common concern. '23
The report suggested a number of ways in which day-to-day non-military

cooperation might be extended. It was approved by the Council on 13
December 1956, and its effect proved lasting.
42 .34.
On 10 March 1966 communications were received from the Government of

France and a public announcement was made by President Charles de Gaulle
that France intended to withdraw French personnel from the NATO
integrated Military Headquarters, to terminate the assignment of French
forces to the international commands and to request the transfer from French
territory of the NATO International Headquarters and of Allied units and
installations or bases not falling under the control of the French authorities.
The Standing Group (42.25) would also have to be discontinued. It had been
known for a considerable time that President de Gaulle's preference was for a
NATO essentially run by a triumvirate of the United States, the United
Kingdom and France. Since the President was alone in this concept, it had
400
been hoped that he would not insist and there was therefore a brief sense of
shock when action was in the end taken. However, NATO, after a short period
of uncertainty, showed its by now built-in strength by the Council taking note
at its meeting at Brussels on 7 June that a number of the practical problems
consequent on the French decision had been worked out, accepting a warm
invitation from the Belgian Government to make Brussels the Council's
Headquarters and asking for space in Belgium for Military Headquarters. It
then proceeded to consideration of other important technical business.
42.35.
The new Council Headquarters in Brussels opened on 16 October 1967, and

the ministerial meeting considered and approved the Harmel Report, a short
statement by Monsieur Pierre Harmel, Foreign Minister of Belgium,
presenting a case for a policy of both retaining the Alliance's defensive strength
and seeking actively for means by which greater stability could be secured in
relations within Europe. The essence of the 'Exercise', as it was called, lay in
one sentence of the Council's report attached to the Communique of the
December 1967 meeting: 'Military security and a policy of detente are not
contradictory but complementary. '24
Committees and commands
42.36.
As has been evident from the above, NATO was engaged throughout nearly
three decades in a process of structural experiment and adaptation. The main
structure prevailing in 1977 was not far different from that adopted in 1951.
(See 42.28-31.) The principal change had been the formation of a Defence
Planning Committee which was in practice the Council, meeting under the
Defence Planning title and with that function. When in 1966 France remained
in the Alliance but ceased taking part in NATO military discussions, a possibly
serious difficulty was circumvented by the discussion of these items by the
Council, meeting as its own Defence Planning Committee. As such, it became
the organ of coordination and decision for all questions concerning the
integrated defence in which the remaining fourteen members took part, while
from 1966 France did not exercise a right to sit. 25
4 2 .37.
The main committees of the Council/Defence Planning Committee were in

1976 those handling the following subjects:
Political affairs
Nuclear defence affairs
Economic affairs
Defence review
Armaments
Science
Infrastructure
Senior civil emergency planning
Information and cultural relations

Challenge to modern society
Civilian budget
Military budget
European airspace coordination
NATO pipelines, etc.
The Military Committee (of national representatives) continued as before

(but without France), assisted by its International Staff and exercising its
authority over three main Commands - Europe (SACEUR), Atlantic
The Paris Agreements
401
(SACLANT) and Channel (CINCHAN) - each with five subordinate

Commands, the majority with European Commanders. The chair of the
Council and Defence Planning Committee was taken by the SecretaryGeneral, and Military Headquarters (SHAPE) settled at Casteau Mons.
4 2 .3 8 .
In addition to its most important political function NATO operates as a very

large organisational machine in terms of such activities as running airports,
working towards what is known as the 'interoperability of systems and
machinery,' and of supervising and harmonising the Defence Budget as a
whole. The scope of the defence effort is sometimes described as 'the three D's':
deterrence, defence, detente.
4 2 .39.
There is no doubt that, after the 'Harmel Exercise,' NATO retained an

increased 'outward look' in the sense of interest in world economic, scientific
and social developments indirectly affecting the stated purposes of the
Organisation as laid down in the 1949 Treaty. On the defence side, a notable
initiative was the statement at the Ministerial Meeting at Reykjavik in June
1968 on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which finally led towards the
exploratory talks in Vienna in 1973. On the other hand NATO observed its
limitations as the organ of a treaty of self-defence in that it disapproved
corporately of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 without any attempt to
intervene directly in either situation. If the impatient sometimes complain of
NATO's inactivity, the corporate reply can be that, subject to any complicating
internal effects of the French action in 1966, the Organisation fulfilled its
purpose of peaceful self-defence.
The Paris AgreelDents

42.40.
In 1950 the question of obtaining a German contribution to the security of the

West became urgent. On the one hand there was general recognition that
Germany should participate in her own defence and in that ofWestern Europe;
on the other hand there was a natural reluctance in Europe, and particularly in
France, to allow uncontrolled German rearmament. The French Government
thereupon proposed a compromise arrangement which came to be known as
the 'Pleven Plan'; Germany should be rearmed within a European army in
which national units would be wielded together under a supranational
command. Effect was given to this idea in the European Defence Community
Treaty signed in Paris on 27 May 1952, by France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 26
4 2 -4 1.
In August 1954, however, the French National Assembly after many anxious
delays, finally decided not to accept the EDC Treaty. In consequence it
became necessary to establish new arrangements for the integration of the
Federal Republic of Germany into the Western system of security. At a
Conference held in London from 28 September to 3 October, and attended by
the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada as well as by the six
402
Powers of the abortive European Defence Community, certain fundamental

decisions were taken. 27 These included:
(i) the decision ofthe United Kingdom, the United States and France to terminate the
Occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany;
(ii) the decision of the Brussels Treaty Powers to invite the Federal Republic of
Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty, to modify that Treaty so as to
emphasise the objective of European unity, and to strengthen the Brussels Treaty
Organisation (BTO) by giving it work to do in connexion with fixing the levels of
the maximum defence contributions to NATO ofall members ofBTO and with the
control of armaments on the Continent of Europe of the continental members of
BTO;
(iii) certain assurances given by the United States and the United Kingdom with
regard to the maintenance of armed forces on the Continent ofEurope, as well as a
declaration by Canada reaffirming its resolve to discharge the continuing
obligations arising out of its membership in NATO and its support ofthe objective
of European unity; and
(iv) the decision of those Powers represented at the Conference which were members of
NATO to recommend at the next ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic
Council that the Federal Republic of Germany should forthwith be invited to
become a member.
Effect was given to the London decisions at a Conference held in Paris from 20
to 23 October 1954. 28
The Organisation for European EconoDlic Cooperation

Origin and purpose
4 2 .4 2 .
Action to create European organisations for mutual self-defence grew naturally

from the events immediately following the Second World War. The necessity
for organising self-help and mutual and external aid on the European
economic front was brought home far more dramatically. The long, bitterly
cold winter of 1946-7 exposed with terrible clarity the weaknesses of Europe's
economy after six years of war, and the pressing necessity for general
cooperation in remedying them.
42.43.
The formation for this purpose of the OEEC owes its origin to the historic
speech made at Harvard University on 5 June 1947 by the United States
Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, in which he referred to the need for
positive action to help Europe towards economic recovery, but stressed the
need for the countries of Europe to reach agreement on the requirements of the
situation before the United States could consider how it could aid a joint
European programme.
42.44.
The speech produced a prompt response from Western Europe. The

Governments of France and the United Kingdom immediately invited the
Soviet Government to join with them in considering the American offer of
economic aid and preparing a European Recovery Programme. However, at
a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, it soon became
The Organisation
(l Hurupean
A'conomic (;oo!Jeratioll
403
evident that the Soviet Government would not cooperate in the active role
which the other two governments considered would have to be played by
Europe. Accordingly, the French and United Kingdom Governments invited
all European states (with the temporary exception of Spain) to participate in a
Conference for the drawing up of a European programme. The invitation was
accepted by the majority of European governments but declined by the
Governments of Finland and of those countries under Soviet influence,
including one which had originally accepted.
42.45.
The Conference met in Paris on I 2]uly 1947 and adjourned on I 5]uly, having
entrusted the work to a Committee of European Economic Cooperation
(CEEC) under the chairmanship of Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary. Sir
Oliver Franks 29 was appointed his alternate to chair on his behalf the working
sessions of the Committee. At the end ofSeptember the Committee submitted a
report covering estimates of production, requirements and future plans. On the
basis ofthat report, the President ofthe United States presented to Congress the
outline of a European Recovery Programme which was made law by the
passage of the European Cooperation Act of 1948. The Act provided for
economic aid to Europe during a four-year period ending in 1952, and set up a
United States Economic Cooperation administration to administer this aid.
42.46.
On the initiative of the Governments of France and the United Kingdom a

working party of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation was set
up in March 1948 to prepare proposals defining the purposes, functions and
organisation of a new intergovernmental body and to draw up a draft
multilateral agreement. These proposals were submitted in the form ofa Draft
Convention for European Economic Cooperation. On Friday 16 April 1948 a
further meeting was held in Paris to sign the Convention and hold the
inaugural meeting of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC).30
4 2.47.
As part of the preamble to the Convention it is stated that 'the Signatories ofthe
present Final Act who become signatories of the Convention will be deemed to
be the original Members of the Organisation as from the date of the deposit of
their instruments of ratification.' These were Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, The Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the
Commanders-in-Chief of the French, United Kingdom and United States
Zones of Germany. 31
42.48.
On 2 I September 1949, the German Federal Government succeeded to the

representation in OEEC of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Western Zones of
Germany and on 14 October 1949, the British/U nited States Zone of the Free
Territory ofTrieste was admitted to membership. On 23]une 1950, the United
States and Canada became associate members of the Organisation. In practice,
although ratifications were not complete until October 1949, all the
participants took part in the work of the Organisation from its inception.
404
Aims
42.49.
The central aIm of the Organisation was expressed

Convention:
In
Article
11
of the
'The aim of the Organisation shall be the achievement of a sound European economy
through the economic cooperation of its members.'
The Article continues:

.An immediate task of the Organisation will be to ensure the success of the European
recovery programme.'
42.50.
The wording of the general passages ofthe new Convention reflects much more
than do most official documents of this kind the atmosphere in which it was
drafted. Thus from the Preamble:
'The (signatory) Governments ... considering that a strong and prosperous European
economy is essential for the attainment of the purpose of the United Nations, the
preservation of individual liberty and the increase of general well-being. . . .
'... Believing that only by close and lasting cooperation between the Contracting
Parties can the prosperity ofEurope be restored and maintained, and the ravages ofwar
made good....
'Taking note of the generous resolve of the American people expressed in the action
taken to furnish assistance without which the aims set forth above cannot be fully
achieved....
'Have agreed, etc. etc.'
There is much history in these few paragraphs.
42.51.
In the more specific paragraphs there are passages which are important as
describing the degree of shared effort represented by the future Organisation
for European Economic Cooperation. Article 14 reads in part:
'Unless the Organisation otherwise agrees for special cases, decisions shall be taken by
mutual agreement of all the members.'
These words had two purposes. The word 'decision' emphasised that the
Organisation would not be limited to making 'recommendations.' It was there
to get things done, whether to reach agreement on a system of freer payments
across international exchanges or to ensure delivery at the right places with the
utmost speed, of scarce and vital industrial necessities from railway wagons to
furnace linings. On the other hand, by prescribing that decisions must be
unanimous, the Convention made it clear that these decisions leading to
economic recovery would be arrived at by 'cooperation,' a word much used in
the Convention, not by submergence of national sovereignty nor by majority
voting. In the early, urgent years, this was no serious impediment to action.
General obligations
42.52.
Under the Convention member countries assumed certain general obligations.

They agreed, for instance, to promote both individually and collectively the
development of production through efficient use of their resources (Art. 2) and
The Organisation of European Economic Cooperation
405
to draw up general programmes for the production and exchange of

commodities and services. (Art. 3.) They undertook to achieve as soon as
possible a multilateral system of payments, to cooperate in removing
restrictions on payments and trade and to correct and avoid excessive
disequilibrium in their financial and economic relations. (Art. 4.) They agreed
to strengthen their economic links, to study customs unions or analogous
arrangements, to cooperate in reducing tariff and other barriers for the
expansion of trade, to avoid or counter the dangers of inflation, to maintain
stability of their currencies and sound exchange rates, and to make the most
efficient use of their manpower. (Arts. 5 and 8.) They also undertook to furnish
the Organisation with all the information it required of them. (Art. 9.)
42.53.
Rapid and dynamic progress was made, and a report was presented annually to
the governments, including those of the United States and Canada, who had
become associate members of the Organisation in 1950. Perhaps the most
notable feat was the conclusion in 1950 of the European Payments Union.
Under this agreement resources made available under the Marshall Plan were
used to support European currencies in liberating trade and payments from the
tightly controlled bilateral channels in which they had had to operate and
developing an increasingly free-flowing multilateral system.
4 2.54.
The European Recovery Programme ended in June 1952, but the United
States Economic Cooperation Act was succeeded by the Mutual Security Act
of 1952 providing for continued United States economic aid to Europe and
setting up, as the successor body to the Economic Cooperation Administration,
the Mutual Security Agency (restyled, as from August 1953, the Foreign
Operations Administration and from 1955 onward, known as the International
Cooperation Administration).
42.55.
A very full account of the structure and workings of the OEEC is given in the
fourth edition of this work 32 to which the attention of the economic historian is
invited. It is not reproduced here since the OEEC terminated its existence in
1960 to be replaced by a new body.
42.56.
By that year, the main purposes of OEEC had been accomplished. The
financial problems of Europe were no longer localised. In terms of industrial
supplies, scarcity had been succeeded by plenty and the ordinary channels of
trade were operating freely under the rules of GATT.
42.57.
Accordingly, the situation was discussed at a Western summit meeting in Paris

(Federal Republic of Germany, France, United Kingdom and United States)
and a communique issued on 21 December 1959 read in part as follows:
'The Heads of State and Government have discussed the important changes that have
taken place in the international economic situation. Recognising the great economic
progress of Western Europe, they have agreed that virtually all ofthe industrialised part
of the free world is now in a position to devote its energies in increased measure to new
and important tasks of cooperative endeavour with the object of:
(a) furthering the development of the less developed countries, and
(b) pursuing trade policies directed to the sound use of economic resources and the
maintenance of harmonious international relations....
In their view these cooperative principles should also govern the discussions on
406
commercial problems arising from the existence of European economic regional

organisations, which are or will be constituted within the framework of the GATT, such
as, the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area... .'
42.58.
The Heads of State and Government closed their communique by stating that
they had agreed to call an informal meeting in Paris in the near future to pursue
i~tensive study of these principles. A meeting of Ministers of thirteen countries
and the European Economic Commission followed on 12 and I 3]anuary 1960
and proposed that in April a meeting of senior officials of the twenty member
governments or associate members of the OEEC should meet in Paris:
'to consider the question of appropriate arrangements to achieve the objects stated
above,
and that
'in order to facilitate the work of such a meeting, a group of four persons would be
appointed to prepare a report. .. .'
The proposal received ministerial approval on I 4]anuary, and a few days later
the Governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and
Greece were invited to nominate the four persons who styled themselves 'The
Group of Four on European Organisation.'33 The Group reported on 7 April
1960, proposing the setting up of a new body to be called the 'Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development'. This new name and the future
foreseen for the Organisation took its work outside the confines of Europe and
North America and its main task was to become an authoritative centre of
research and initiative in economic thought and development on the economic
performance and prospects of the world as a whole.
The European Economic Community H

42.59.
In the previous two sections consideration has been given to organised efforts by
Western European countries and their North American allies both to establish
a higher level of mu tual defence than ever before in peacetime, including some
degree of integration of armed forces and commands, and to rebuild in fuller
cooperation than before attempted the economic damage inflicted by the
Second World War.
42.60.
But there was in Europe, particularly in continental countries which had

suffered not only hostilities but also occupation, a growth of the feeling that
something even more ambitious politically should be attempted. A leading
French citizen, M. Jean Monnet,35 is regarded as the intellectual father and
leader of this movement. But many others had distinguished parts to play,
notably in Belgium M. Paul-Henri Spaak,36 in France, M. Robert Schuman 37
and the first Secretary-General of OEEC, M. Robert Marjolin. 38
The European Economic Community
407
Benelux
42.61.
After a number of discussions before the Second World War among smaller
European Powers about a possible advance towards customs union, the first
definite step was taken during the war when the Governments in Exile in
London of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed a Convention
affirming their intention to establish a customs union with a common external
tariff. Disruption immediately after the war delayed entry into force which,
however, came on 1 January 1948. Thenceforth the three countries worked
very closely together in all international economic matters. A number of
agreements were confirmed in a more formal and detailed treaty signed on 3
February 1948 entitled 'Traite instituant I'D nion Economique Benelux'. Since
this agreement was signed later than the signature of the Treaty of Rome
(42.74) it is pertinent to quote an authoritative comment:
'La difference principale entre les deux Traites reside dans le rythme et le stade de la
realisation de leurs object ifs. En effet, la Communaute Economique Europeenne
n'atteindra le degre actuel d'integration du Benelux qu'apres une periode de transition
assez longue, tandis que le marche commun du Benelux est deja, dans une large mesure,
une realite. 39
42.62.
There was no immediate sequel in Western Europe along the line of the
Benelux initiative. Defence coordination and economic (including industrial
and financial) recovery were being pursued on a wide front and along lines
leading to NATO and OEEC. But even at the meetings in Paris in 1948 at
which OEEC was founded, there were voices from Benelux and France
indicating a desire for integration as a more speedy and effective road to
recovery, and criticising those who could not agree.
42.63.
Since the advance of the American Recovery Plan through the medium of
OEEC was clearly not to be postponed or obstructed, the way towards greater
(supranational) integration clearly lay elsewhere. It lay through two particular
interrelated industries, coal and steel.
42.64.
In May 1950, M. Robert Schuman, then Minister of Foreign Affairs in the

French Government, announced proposals for the integration of the coal and
steel industries of Western Europe, under some form of supranational
authority. The initiative was generally well received by the continental coal
and steel industries. In May 1950 M. Schuman visited London to see whether
the attitude of British Government and industry might be positive. There were
natural doubts about this. The corresponding British industries had not
suffered destruction or exploitation for enemy purposes as had those in
continental Europe, and their respective pasts had had many features of
difference. It was not at all clear whether they needed this kind of unification
with the continental group. Moreover, there were still many more general
questions for discussion in Britain about the country's future politico-economic
relationship with Europe in the light, for instance, of relations with the
Commonwealth. At any rate there was no enthusiasm either in Government or
in industry, and no action by Britain. 40 Nor was it foreseen what an important
effect this attitude would have on the shape over the next quarter ofa century of
the growth of Western European unity.
408
4 2 6 5.
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created under the
Treaty signed on 18 April 1951 and ratified on 25 July 1952. The signatories
(and, therefore, the members of~his Community) in order of signature, were:
the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. 41 The Constitution of the Community is described fully in the
fourth edition of this book, and, in view of the greater importance to these
studies of the Treaty of Rome, does not need so long a description here. None
the less, the ECSC Treaty was the first of its kind, and its influence on the
drafting of the Treaty of Rome is apparent and important.
42.66.
The objects of the Coal and Steel Community started with the desire to abolish
Franco-German rivalry in these industries in the interest of economic unity in
Europe. Import and export duties, quantitative restrictions and discriminatory
practices between members of these industries were to be eliminated and a
constant watch was to be kept on the whole process and appropriate decisions
taken.
ECSC institutions
42.67.
From its inception in 1951 to its merger in 1967 with the European Economic
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, the institutions of
the ECSC were as follows:
A High Authority of 9 members (France and Germany 2 each, the remainder
1 each, the ninth appointed by the 8 so nominated). The members of the
High Authority were the Executive of the Organisation, forbidden either to
consult or to accept instructions from any government or organisation. On
certain subjects, the High Authority was obliged to consult (but without
commitment) a committee of producers, employees, consumers and dealers.
2. The Council ofMinisters, drawn from member governments. Its object was to
reconcile decisions of the High Authority with the general economic policies
of the member countries. The High Authority had to consult the Council
over many issues, and in some cases to obtain its concurrence before acting.
3. The Common Assembly, the parliament of the community, consisting of 78
delegates, chosen annually by national parliaments from their members.
(France, Germany and Italy 18 each, Belgium and the Netherlands 10 each,
and Luxembourg 4.) The Assembly held one ordinary session a year to
debate the Report submitted to it by the High Authority.
4. The Court, the final authority on the interpretation of the Treaty.
I.
4 2. 68 .
However, following the Merger Treaty,42 signed on 8 April 1965, which came
into force on 1 January 1967, the three Communities (Coal and Steel,
Economic and Atomic) share common institutions. These are:
The Commission (in place of the High Authority), which consists of 13
members (2 each from the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy,
and 1 each from the rest).
2. The Council (as before).
3. The Assembly, which has 198 members, rising to 410 after direct elections.
I.
409
(See tables in 42.81.)

4 The Court, which has a membership of 13 (9 judges and 4 advocatesgeneral).
42 6 9.
It was natural that those hoping for greater unity in Western Europe should
regard the ECSC as a promising step. A further advance was to be expected,
but some of the governments, notably France, were most immediately
concerned with the permanent regulation of the formal relationship between
the other Western European countries and the Federal Republic of Germany.
This was not resolved until October 1954. (See 42.41.) Apart from immediate
political considerations, it might have been unwise to hurry too fast.
42.70.
However, in June 1955, the five governments, joined by Italy, held a

Ministerial Conference at Messina in Sicily to explore the possibility of a
European Customs Union. As at the time of the negotiations for a Coal and
Steel Community, the attitude of the British had been important but doubtful,
and an invitation was addressed to the British Government to send a
representative at ministerial level to Messina. The British Government found
that no Minister was available and offered to send a senior official. However, in
the circumstance of the proclaimed ministerial status of the Conference, the
inviting governments did not accept the counter-proposal and no British
representative was present. 43
42.71.
So the six countries conferred and decided that they would go ahead with the
attempt. Negotiations lasting well over a year ended on 25 March 1957 in the
signature of the Treaty of Rome, setting up the European Community and
the European Common Market. 44
42.72.
It will be necessary to return to the structure and functioning of the Treaty. But
a short reference is first needed to the economic diplomacy of the period
immediately preceding and following the signature of the Treaty. It was clear
from the progress in 1956 of the negotiations between the Six that a Customs
Union would emerge. The United Kingdom were quite prepared to compete
in an industrial free trade area, but could not see themselves as part of an
economic unit of which the strict control of agricultural prices would mean for
the British consumer far higher prices than currently paid through free access
to world supplies in a competitive market. In this situation the United
Kingdom launched a plan for a European Industrial Free Trade Area
with which the Common Market could be closely linked or of which it
could be a member. Despite immense activity both at official level, conducted
by technical experts and diplomatic representatives, and at ministerial
meetings, no answer could be found, and at an unhappy meeting in Paris in
November 1958 the project collapsed. The British together with six other
countries then formed in 1959 the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)45
which generated a useful volume of trade over the succeeding years.
42.73.
By 1960, with the work of OEEC accomplished, and despite the valuable
accomplishments of EFTA, it had become clear that the centre of economic
power in Western Europe would thenceforth be the European Economic
Community. Thinking in the United Kingdom about the relationship with the
Communities began to change. In 1962 and again in 1967 the United Kingdom
410
formally applied to negotiate entry; on both occasions the application was

prevented from going forward by President de Gaulle on the ground that
Britain was not yet ready to undertake the obligations of membership.
Meantime the EEC was advancing in its work in accord with the timetable it
had set itself in the Rome Treaty.
The Treaty of Rome
42.74.
The Treaty of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957, and entering into force on 1
January 1958, contains 248 Articles and, if the Amendments to Annexes up to
1960 are counted, includes approximately twice as much again in additional
content. In this, it is totally unlike the two main agreements involving Western
Europe considered so far, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Convention for
European Economic Cooperation. Both these agreements were relatively short
(the former seventeen Articles and the latter twenty). These instruments were
concluded rapidly; they stated great principles, set out some important general
purposes and instructed the organisation set up under the agreements to work
out ways and means of carrying them out. By contrast, the Treaty of Rome,
though it sprang from emergency, set out its principles, radical as they were, for
the indefinite future, and, not content with that, it elaborated very precise
methods by which those principles were to become reality.
4 2 .75.
The Preamble, a notable document throughout, starts with the heads ofthe six
states declaring themselves
'Determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European
peop Ies.... '46
This is, as it were, the political charter of the Community. The use of the word
'union' in this manner is something more than a hope, while not imposing a
degree of precision which might arouse mistrust at the start. Nor is it valid to
object to the use of the word 'peoples' in a Treaty. The United Nations had
already used it in the Charter in a conscious effort to express the idea that
international engagements concern not only governments who make them but
also peoples on whose authority they do so.
42.76.
The Preamble looks both inward and outward, e.g.

'ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious
development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the
backwardness of the less favoured regions.
'DESIRING to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, to the
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade.... '
And then states without qualification,

'HAVE DECIDED to create a European Economic Community.... '
42 .77.
Article 3 of the Treaty enumerates a number of primary objectives, notably
'(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of

quantitative restrictions in regard to the import and export ofgoods as well
4I
as of all other measures having equivalent effect,' (b) the establishment ofa
common customs tariff and of a common commercial policy towards third
countries, (c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to
freedom of movement for persons, services and capital, (cl) the
establishment of a common policy in the sphere of agriculture....'
Having made these and other statements of objective, the Treaty by no means
stops there. It proceeds to set out (Art. 8) a timetable under which the processes
will be completed and an arbitration procedure for use in case of deadlocks; in
paragraph 6 of that Article, it says sharply 'nothing in paragraphs I -5 shall
cause the transitional period to last more than 15 years after this Treaty comes
into force.' Nothing did.
42 .7 8 .
In Part Two of the Treaty, entitled 'Foundations of the Community,'47 (Arts.

12-37), an intricately worked-out calculation prescribes the procedure to be
followed in the 'Elimination of Customs Duties as Between Member States and
the Setting Up of the Common Customs Tariff.' These processes require most
detailed calculation in order to provide a fair process of adaptation between
members and the outside world and among the members themselves. The next
Articles, 38-46~ indicate the intention to operate the Common Agricultural
Policy in terms which will, as far as possible, offer a stable future to the
Common Market Agricultural producer.
Structure of the EEC
42.79.
Paragraphs 42.66-8, describing the structure of the European Coal and Steel
Community show that it was not something worked out with the sole purpose of
enabling an international governmental organisation to manage a large
international coal and steel industry. Much of the thinking behind it reflected a
general European approach to a more integrated management of European
industry and economic affairs generally. (The same feature is reflected in the
European Atomic Energy Community Treaty, concluded at the same time as
the Rome Treaty.) Inherent in both are a consciousness of the possibilities of
strain between the ideals of the 'philosopher kings,' the thinkers and
administrators, and the physical pressures represented by the Ministerial
Council.
The Assembly (Arts. 137-44)
42.80.
This is defined as 'Representatives of the peoples' of the member states,

exercising 'the advisory and supervisory powers' conferred on them by the
Treaty. Members are to be nominated by the respective parliaments, but are
instructed to 'draw up proposals for direct universal suffrage in accordance
with a uniform procedure in all Member States.' (Art. 138, paras. I and 3.)
412
42.8 I.
Seats were allocated as follows:
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
(Norway
United Kingdom
1976
14
As revised in
preparation for
direct elections
24
10
16
36
36
81
81
10
15
36
81
6
14
25
10)48
36
81
The principal activity of the Assembly falls under Article 143: 'The Assembly
shall discuss in open session the annual general report submitted to it by the
Commission.' Article 144 lays down that' if a motion of censure is carried by a
two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly, the Commission shall
collectively resign their office.'
The Council (Arts. 145-54)
42.82.
On the Council's purpose, Article 145 reads:

'To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Council, in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, shall:
- ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the member states;
- have power to take decisions.'
Article 146 explains that each member government shall delegate to the
Council one of its members as its representative, and that the office ofPresident
shall be held for six months by each member in alphabetical order.
4 2 8 3.
Council voting is by simple majority unless the Treaty otherwise requires.

Weighted voting is adjusted as follows:
1958
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
(Norway
United Kingdom
4
4
1977
5
3
10
10
10
3)48
10
f2.84.
413
Article 149 reads:

'Where in pursuance of this Treaty, a formal measure is taken by the Council on a
proposal from the Commission, the Council may only take a measure amounting to an
amendment of the proposal of its decision is unanimous. So long as the Council has not
taken a decision, the Commission may amend its original proposal, in particular where
the Assembly has been consulted on that proposal.'
The Council can also request the Commission for studies, and determines,
by qualified majority, the salaries, allowances and pensions of the President
and Members of the Commission and the President and most senior
officials of the Court.
The Commission (Arts. 155-63)
42.85.
Article 157 (Section I) of the Rome Treaty reads:

'The Commission shall consist of nine members who shall be chosen on the grounds of
their general competence and whose independence can be fully relied upon.'
The following paragraph provides for amendment of this number 'by

unanimous consent'; in 1977 it was thirteen.
42.86.
Further paragraphs of Article 157 and Article 158 prescribe various rules and
obligations. Article 158 lays down that:
'The members of the Commission shall be appointed by common accord between the
Governments of Member States.'
The Commissioners must be nationals of member states and must be (Sect. 2)

'completely independent in the performance of their functions, in the general
interest of the Community.' They shall 'neither seek nor take instructions from
any Government or from any other body,' and member states undertake to
respect these rules. Any infringement by Commissioners of these obligations is
to be referred, on the application of the Council, to the (Community) Court of
Justice.
42.87.
Under Article 155, the Commission has the general obligation 'to see that the
provisions of this Treaty and the measures pursuant to it taken by the
institutions are carried out,' and the Commission is to 'exercise the powers
conferred on it by the Council to ensure enforcement of the rules laid down by
the latter.' Two more obligations are more precise:
- 'formulate recommendations or give opinions on matters which are dealt with in this
Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary;'
- 'have its own power of decision and take part in the shaping ofmeasures taken by the
Council and by the Assembly in the manner provided for in the Treaty.'
Presidency
42.88.
The Council and the Commission both have Presidents. The Council is the
4I 4
body to which 'each Government shall delegate ... one of its members.' (Art.
146.) The Article continues:
'The Office of President shall be held for a term of six months by each member of the
Council in rotation according to the (French) alphabetical order ofthe Member States. '
Thus, any member of the Council is by definition a member ofthe Government

which has 'delegated' him. He may well be the Foreign Minister.
42.89.
With regard to the Commission, under Article 161:

'The President and two Vice-Presidents of the Commission shall be appointed from
among its members for a term of two years in accordance with the same procedure as
that laid down for the appointment of the Commission.'
The appointments of the President and Vice-Presidents are renewable.

4 2 .90 .
In such matters as a permanent expert staffand the presence at headquarters of

resident national representatives, there are similarities between the Community and other intergovernmental organisations. But the nature ofauthority
at the top is different. The President of the Commission exercises an authority
over the running of the organisation and is served by a staff ('cabinet') of his
own which makes him in many ways more akin in United Nations terms to
the Secretary-General than to the President of the General Assembly. But the
essential preoccupation of the President of the Commission must be the
conduct of the Commission's business and, given the powers and duties
conferred on the Commission by the Treaty ofRome, he is bound to act more in
the manner of a politician than of an official.
42.9 I.
However, it is the President of the Council who presides over the body
possessing the greater weight of authority in the Community, and in this way is
rightly considered, although he is not so called, the President of the
Community. He has to combine this position with his many time-consuming
national duties as a Minister and cannot be expected to absorb community
business in anything like the detail required and acquired by the President of
the Commission. For this reason, over and above any support he may receive
from his national officials and advisers, special arrangements have to be made
by the Community to provide him with a staff to assist him in preparation for
and execution of any business during his tenure of office. Such special support
has developed into a new institution entitled the 'Presidency.' This group not
only organises programmes and movements, a duty which entails much
commuting from Brussels to the President's own capital, but inevitably finds
itself involved in much political business such as priorities and the handling of
major matters between Council meetings.
Sequels and reflections
42.92.
Accession Treaty. Article 237 of the Rome Treaty reads as follows:

'Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall
address its application to the Council whose decision, after the opinion of the
Commission has been obtained, shall be unanimous thereon.
4 15
'The conditions of admission and the adjustments of this Treaty necessitated thereby
shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant
State. That agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in
accordance with their respective constitutional rules,'
The two approaches made by the United Kingdom in the 1960s had failed
under the unanimity rule. The attitudes of a number of non-member states
continued to grow closer to those ofthe Community and new approaches in the
early 1970S led, after prolonged negotiations, to the signature on 25 January
1972 of a Treaty providing for the accession to the European Economic
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community of Denmark,
Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom. 49
4 2 .93.
The negotiations were not without difficulty, since it is by no means easy to

revise or amend an instrument as detailed and complex as the Treaty ofRome.
Recourse was had on more than one matter to the device of agreed statements
or exchanges of letters, rather than attempted textual or substantial
amendments. 50 The Accession Treaty had to contain also guidance relative to
the alterations to be made in the tariffs of each signatory to make them
correspond to those in the Rome Treaty itself, and the adaptations necessitated
by the accession to membership of Community bodies. Formal accession of
the new members took place on 1 January 1973.
42.94.
A somewhat unusual sequel to the Accession Treaty was the result of a change
of government in the United Kingdom in 1974. The incoming Labour
Government requested a renegotiation of the terms agreed by its Conservative
predecessor. The other members ofthe Community were not best pleased at the
necessity for renegotiating a Treaty so recently concluded. But a difficult
negotiation was completed successfully, though even then the matter was not
finally settled until approval of the new terms had been confirmed by a
referendum of the British people.
42 .95.
Meantime, after the initial period of completing internal arrangements and

harmonising tariffs and other economic policies, and of concluding in 1967 the
so-called 'Merger' Agreement uniting the three Communities, the Community
turned to wider international activity. In 1970, the original Six members of the
Community set up machinery for consultation on broad matters of foreign
policy, and an initially informal arrangement became a system of periodical
meetings by the nine Foreign Ministers. This system was of particular interest,
since it was not provided for in the Treaties. It was, however, accepted as a
natural development. The habit of consultation can also translate itself into
diplomatic method. For instance, ifa member country interested in an incident
in a third country involving one of its citizens cannot obtain access to that
country, a European Community partner enjoying such access could easily and
naturally take diplomatic charge.
42.96.
Another step in the Community's broadening external relations was the

conclusion in 1975 (following on the Yaounde Convention of 1963 concluded
by the original Six and renewed with modifications in 1969) of the Lome
Convention to govern economic relations between the Community and fortysix developing countries. 51
416
42 .97.
In February 1975 the President of the EEC accepted an invitation from the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (comprising the USSR, the countries
of the Eastern European bloc, Mongolia and Cuba) to visit Moscow for
preliminary talks with a view to drawing up an agreement between the two
organisations. InJanuary 1976 the commissioner responsible for the external
relations of the EEC visited Romania to continue these talks, and urged
individual members of the CMEA to negotiate bilateral agreements with the
EEC. In September 1975 diplomatic relations were established between the
EEC and the People's Republic of China.
42.98.
The EEC exercises the right oflegation both passively, by receiving diplomatic
missions from non-members, and actively, by maintaining diplomatic
missions in certain non-member countries and international organisations
outside Community territory. In 1952 the United Kingdom was the first of
the non-member states to accredit a permanent diplomatic mission to the
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, and in 1956
received the diplomatic mission accredited by the High Authority to the
British Government. Such accreditation requires the procedure of Agrement.
(In contrast to the foregoing, permanent missions to the United Nations from
non-member states have only observer status.) Member states of the EEC
all maintain resident missions in Brussels. Given the nature of much Community work, most missions maintain on their regular staff more specialists
than diplomats, although the head of the mission is normally a senior diplomatic officer.
4 2 .99.
There can be no doubt that the European Community is, from the points of
view of both political and diplomatic practice, undertaking a challenging
experiment. It is engaged in a day-to-day exploration of the ground between
cooperation and union. As such, it can hardly stand still. It cannot escape its
various risks, - the risk, for instance, that a further (no doubt gratifying)
increase in membership may make decisions by consensus more difficult to
achieve. It can also wear a confusing aspect because, at least outside the
organisation, there is sometimes, on a particular point, uncertainty where the
last word lies, - the Council or the Commission, or, sometimes, neither. But
behind the daily work lie forces oflogic and history. These have imposed on the
Community a task of coordination far transcending that of the independent
member governments, concerned as they must be in the first place with their
own national policies and performance.
The Council of Europe

42.100.
The Statute of the Council of Europe was signed in London on 5 May 1949.
The signatories are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, The Irish Republic, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. * (*Original signatories.)
42.101.
It is of interest that the date of signature wasjust over a month later than that
of the North Atlantic Treaty and just under three weeks later than that of the
Convention for European Economic Cooperation. In pure logic, and given the
advocacy by an influential body of opinion in Europe of the setting up of a
417
Council of Europe with real power, the order of dates might well have been
reversed. But the urgencies of defence and of economic recovery and doubts
and differences about the degree of 'European Union,' even among supporters
of the European idea, made such an order of events impossible. The result was
that, when the Council of Europe Statute came to be signed, it was already
clear that although the Council was a body ofparliamentarians, the realities of
power would reside elsewhere. Hence the comment by M. Guy Mollet 52
'The Council of Europe represents one of the principal forces working for unity in
contemporary Europe. Though its achievements are less than we had hoped in the first
flush of enthusiasm in 1949, they are nevertheless considerable, particularly when
viewed in the light of history; they represent a new conception of international cooperation whose influence is only beginning to be felt.'
Principles and aim

42.102.
The third paragraph of the Preamble to the Statute sets out the following
principle:
'Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common
heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and
the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy... .'
This precise wording turned out to be very important.

4 2 10 3.
(Ch. I, Art. I.) The aim of the Council of Europe, as set out in Article 1 of the
Statute, is 'to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purposes of
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common
heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.' This aim 'shall be
pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of
common concern and by agreements and common action in economic and
social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.' Matters relating to national defence are specifically excluded from
the Council's scope. Participation in the Council 'shall not affect the
collaboration of its Members in the work of the United Nations and of other
international organisations or unions to which they are parties.'
42.104.
Membership. (Ch. 11, Arts. 2-9.) Every member of the Council 'must accept the
principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its
jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate
sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council. ... '
Membership is open under Article 4 to any European state 'which is deemed to
be able and willing to fulfil' the preceding provisions and which is invited to
accede by the Committee of Ministers.
42.105.
Structure. (Ch. Ill, Arts. 10-12.) The Council consists of the Committee of
Ministers and the Consultative Assembly, served by the Secretariat. There is
also the Joint Committee, the organ of liaison between the Assembly and the
Ministers. The permanent seat of the Council is at Strasbourg.
4I 8
42 106.
The Committee ofMinisters (ch. IV, Arts. 13-2 I ) is the intergovernmental organ of
the Council. Its members are the Foreign Ministers ofmember states, who can,
if necessary, be represented by an alternate, preferably ofministerial rank. The
Committee deals with recommendations made by the Consultative Assembly,
any other matters of general concern which it decides to place on the agenda,
and with administrative and financial questions affecting the Council. It is the
only organ of the Council empowered to take decisions. These may take the
form of recommendations to member governments. The practice has been
usual for decisions to be taken unanimously, although the Statute provides
that certain decisions, including membership invitations, require a two-thirds
majority and, in some cases, lesser majorities. Meetings of the Committee are
held two to three times a year. The preliminary work is undertaken by a group
of officials known as the Ministers' Deputies who also meet between sessions to
discuss current matters. The Deputies are authorised to take decisions on behalf
of the Committee of Ministers on all questions other than those involving
important issues of policy.
42.107.
The Committee of Ministers has, from time to time, set up Committees of

Experts, composed of government officials, to examine the more technical
recommendations of the Assembly and to discover what measure of
intergovernmental agreement exists on the action to be taken on these
recommendations.
42 I 08.
Consultative Assembly53 (Ch. VI, Arts. 22-35), which is the' deliberative organ' of
the Council, is composed of I 57 representatives elected by national parliaments
or appointed in such manner as the parliaments may decide. The number of
seats allotted to each member state in the Assembly is governed by the need to
keep the size of the Assembly to reasonable proportions and at the same time to
ensure that the smaller states are adequately represented.
42 . 109.
The Assembly holds one ordinary session each year, and there is a provision for
the calling of extraordinary sessions. In furtherance of close relations between
the two bodies, the Assembly holds an annual meeting with the European
Parliament of the Communities on a subject of topical interest. The President
and the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly form the Bureau which directs the
Assembly's work. The Assembly's views may be incorporated in resolutions or
recommendations. The latter, which may propose specific action by member
governments, come before the Committee of Ministers for consideration.
Major decisions require a two-thirds majority.
42 110 .
The work of the Assembly between sessions is carried on by a group of

committees of which the most important is the Standing Committee, consisting
of the Bureau and the chairmen of the other committees.
The Joint Committee was set up in 195 I by a decision of the Committee of
Ministers. Its function is to discuss problems ofinterest to the Assembly and the
Committee of Ministers, to coordinate the work of the Council as a whole and
to resolve differences arising between the Ministers and the Assembly. Its
Chairman is the President of the Assembly, and it is composed in principle of
twelve members - seven from the Assembly and five from the Committee of
Ministers.

42.1 I
419
I.
Activities. For the reasons explained in 42.101, it was from the beginning not
easy to be sure what business the Council of Europe should undertake which
would ensure a substantial function in Europe rather than high-level
discussion. Indeed the first two years of its existence were largely occupied in
deliberations about federation and the possibility oftransforming the Assembly
into a European Parliament and the Council as a whole into a European
Political Authority. It became clear that whereas certain member governments
wished to create forms of association on federal or confederal lines, other
member governments were, for a variety of reasons, not willing to do this.
42. I 12.
Over the years, the most valuable functions of the Council divided themselves
into three distinct sections:
I. The proposal and submission to Government of conventions;
2. the work done in collaboration with Specialised Agencies, particularly the
International Labour Organisation, culminating in the Social Charter; and
3. the 'tidying up' (harl'1onisation) of items oflegislation or administration in
individual European countries which, while identical in general purpose,
may differ in detail and can be more usefully discussed in conference than
bilaterally.
42.113.
The first Convention to be drawn up was the European Convention on Human

Rights. On 10 December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations
proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was noted by
international lawyers and others that this declaration contained no enforcement provision and was most unlikely to prove 'self-enforcing.' Referring back
to the Congress of Europe held at The Hague in May 1948, which had
proclaimed that
'An independent European Court should be created to which any member of the
Council could refer cases in which it appeared that the Declaration of Rights had been
violated ... '
the Council of Europe approved, after some extremely complex technical

negotiation, the European Convention on Human Rights. This entered into
force on 3 September 1953. 54 It provided for the creation of a European Court
and this provision, combined with the wording of the Preamble to the Statute
quoted in 42. 102, represented a far stronger instrument than had existed
hitherto. A quarter of a century later, this Convention became both
procedurally practical and politically significant.
42. I 14.
Since the conclusion of this first Convention, over ninety further Conventions
on widely varied subjects, social, professional, economic and cultural have
passed successfully through the Council of Europe.
42. I 15.
The main activities and agreements on social policy are the European Social
Charter (signed 1964), the European Code ofSocial Security (signed 1968) and
the European Convention on Social Security. The Charter seeks to improve
social and economic rights of individuals generally, the Code to establish
acceptable standards of social benefits and the European Convention on Social
Security to solve social security problems raised by the movement ofemployees,
tourists, etc. across national frontiers. By 1976, the Charter had been accepted
420
by eleven countries and the Code by nine; but the Convention, which came
into force in March 1977, has not as yet been signed by the United Kingdom.
42.116.
In the matter generally described as 'harmonisation' ((3) above), the Assembly

raises, largely through its nearly twenty committees ofmembers ofparliaments,
subjects of the greatest variety such as, to mention only very few, migrant
workers, the European cultural heritage, the prevention of terrorism and soil
conservation. This kind of work will be found at all stages of development and
can lead to anything from harmonisation in purely practical terms to a
formal Convention. The Committee of Ministers has, in its turn, six or more
groups of officials and supporting staffto advise on propositions initiated by the
Assembly.
4 2 .117.
It is clear from this brief analysis that the Council of Europe has found itself a
purpose and method by which it can handle matters not covered by any other
European organisation. Much of it, while not attracting immediate public
attention, has long-term value. It is bound at times to involve the European
Communities, with whose activities it may from time to time overlap, and with
whom its future technical and political relationships will be both delicate and
very important.
The Organisation of AlDerican States

42 .1 18.
The Organisation of American States was formed in 1948, but efforts to

establish some system of inter-American organisation are as old as the
independence of the Latin American republics. The reasons for this slow and
seemingly balling gestation, incomplete as it is even today, may be more
readily understood after a brief glance over the background out ofwhich it has
emerged. 55
42.1 19.
A Congress of American states, the first attempt of its kind, was convened by
Simon Bolivar 56 at Panama in 1826. Common to all the peoples of the new
states was the determination to enjoy independence in their own way, to resist
intervention from abroad and to respect each other's freedom ofdecision. None
of this in itselfmade unified organisation easy; and further formidable obstacles
were the immense size ofthe American continent, its vastly differing climates, a
population of varied racial origins, languages and social customs, a land of
sparse communications broken up by jungle, mountain, river and desert,
where stretches of uncertainly defined frontiers still lead to disputes, and
finally, the extreme inequality of economic resources. The imbalance between
the abundantly realised capacity and wealth of the United States and the
relative weakness, however great their potential resources, of her twenty Latin
American neighbours has led inevitably to a divergence in the motivation of
national policies. Add to this the differences of culture and temperament
between the north with its Anglo-Saxon base in language and institutions, and
the heirs of the Spanish and Portuguese civilisations in Latin America, and it
becomes obvious that a true Pan-American harmony must be hard of
achievement. Whereas the United States has aimed steadily to preserve the
The Organisation of American States
421
security of the continent and to promote the free enterprise of her people, the
Latin American countries have been concerned less with their security (which
they have not felt, at least since the latter part of the last century, to be
threatened by the rest of the world) than with non-intervention in their
domestic affairs, not merely by European Powers but also by their northern
neighbour. What they have seen as a tendency on the part of the United States
to speak for all Americans has made them all the more jealous to preserve their
own freedom of action. Thus non-intervention has come to be described as the
cornerstone of the inter-American system. But being a negative principle, its
operation has been generally unfavourable to international organisation.
42 120.
Fundamental to the Western hemisphere idea is the so-called Monroe

Doctrine,57 which laid down that the United States should 'consider any
attempt [on the part of the European Powers] to extend their system to any
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.' Latin
Americans have, however, been less inclined to regard this declaration as a
guarantee of their independence than as the implied assertion of United States
hegemony in the Western hemisphere; which goes a long way towards
accounting for the slowness of some Latin American governments to oppose
(under United States persuasion) the challenge of the Axis Powers before and
during the Second World War and that of the Communist Powers after it.
Argentina has always been foremost of the Latin American countries in
resisting any limitation of her traditional relations with Europe; and Mexico,
after playing an important part in the formulation of the GAS Charter, has
consistently shown herself to be a firm opponent of collective as well as
unilateral intervention, notably with regard to Cuba, with whom she refused to
sever relations in 1962, unlike the remaining GAS members. Welcoming the
opportunity to speak with their own voice on the world stage, Latin American
governments were from the beginning enthusiastic supporters of the League of
Nations, just as, a quarter of a century later, they alljoined the United Nations
at its inception. Meanwhile the Good Neighbour Policy inaugurated by
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934, and designed to achieve greater mutual
understanding by recognising as fundamental the two principles of nonintervention and consultation, did much to diminish ill will. But the Second
World War brought new and serious problems for the inter-American system.
42 122 .
It was natural that in the world struggle the United States should put the
defence and security of themselves and their allies, as well as their own
economic strength as belligerents, ahead of any other considerations, and
should indeed look to their American neighbours for all the assistance they
could give. This was less than welcome to Latin Americans who had come to
attach greater importance to their own social and economic advancement than
to the necessities of defence. Relations were not unnaturally strained by the
maintenance of military bases in Latin American territories, by demands for
the eradication of Axis agents, by insistence on the coordinated use of natural
resources for wartime purposes and, furthermore, for the severance ofrelations
with the Axis Powers. And when the war was over and price controls were lifted
in the United States, the Latin Americans found that they were having to pay
more for United States goods, while the value oftheir own exports had fallen in
422
the United States markets. A further cause of disappointment was the

preoccupation of the United States with the rehabilitation of her future
European trading partners rather than with the economic assistance which her
Latin American neighbours had expected as the price of support for United
States policies. Thus, after the formation of the Cominform in 1947 and the
extension of the Cold War to the New World, proposals for collective defence
against the su bversion of democracy were slow to gain support in Latin
America, even from those who intrinsically approved of them, owing to the
suspicion that they were US inspired and would favour intervention by the
United States in the affairs ofcertain Latin American countries. The absence of
a permanent seat for Latin America in the Security Council accentuated the
feeling of imbalance in the inter-American system and resentment ofthe Great
Power veto. The tendency in Latin America has in fact been to regard the
system of international law emanating in the main from Europe as designed to
operate primarily to suit the Western Powers and their allies. Latin Americans
have accordingly been inclined to adopt an extreme judicialism in their
treatment of international questions, though attempts to establish an interAmerican Court ofJustice have so far failed to make any progress.
42 . 123.
Against such a background of unfavourable circumstances and conflicting

objectives, it would be surprising if the progress of an inter-American
organisation embracing the whole continent had not been delayed, throughout
successive conferences, by numerous abortive resolutions, crippling reservations and unratified conclusions. The First International Conference of
American States, held in Washington from October 188g to April 18go,
established the International Union of American Republics (forerunner of the
OAS) and the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, which the
Fourth Conference, in Buenos Aires in 1920, recognised as a Permanent Organ
and renamed the Pan-American Union. It was not until 1948 that the Charter of
the Organisation of American States was produced by the Ninth Conference at
Bogota, which also concluded the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement,
known as the Pact of Bogota. A tenth meeting (styled simply Inter-American
Conference) was held at Caracas in 1954, after which this series of conferences
was abandoned in favour of the Meetings of Consultation of American
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which had been put on a regular annual basis from
1945 and were to prove less unwieldy and more efficient than the full-scale
conferences.
42 . I 24.
In addition, a number of special Inter-American conferences were held to

discuss particular aspects of inter-American affairs. Such were the InterAmerican Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Mexico, 1938); the InterAmerican Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Mexico, 1945), which
produced, as its VIIIth Resolution, the 'Act ofChapultepec', dealing with mutual
aid within the American region in the event of armed attack; and the InterAmerican Conference on the Maintenance of Peace and Security (Petropolis,
1947), which resulted in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
generally referred to as the Rio Treaty.
42 3
The Rio Treaty
42.125.
This instrument had the character of a regional treaty within the framework of
Article 51 of the U nited Nations Charter. It provided for collective defence in
the face of armed attack either by an American state or by a state outside the
Western hemisphere, and also, though not explicitly, for regional action in the
event of any other act of aggression, as envisaged in Chapter VIII (Arts. 52-4) of
the Charter. The measures of self-defence to be used would be decided by the
'Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American system,' which consisted of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, though provisional
action could be taken by the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union
(later transformed into the Permanent Council of the OAS) whose
responsibility it would in any case be to convene the 'Organ of Consultation.'
The signatories agreed immediately to furnish the UN Security Council with
'complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of
maintaining inter-American peace and security.' Senator Vandenberg, a
member of the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference,
described the Rio Treaty as 'a supplement to the United Nations and part of its
machinery.' The United States Government invoked it in the overthrow in
1954 of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, and also in their intervention
(supported by a token inter-American peace force) in the Dominican Republic
in 1964. The Rio Treaty was revised by a Protocol ofAmendment signed at San
Jose de Costa Rica in July 1975 and generally known as the SanJose Protocol.
Under this amendment the detailed definitions of aggression were enlarged by
a clause enabling the Organ of Consultation to 'determine that other specific
cases ... equivalent in nature and seriousness ... constitute aggression.' The
sanctions proposed in Article 8 of the original Treaty for use against an
aggressor and requiring for their adoption a two-thirds majority in the Organ
of Consultation could be rescinded by a simple majority. This meant in effect
that members of the OAS were thenceforth free to normalise their relations
with Cuba. The resolution indeed regularised, ex post facto, the unilateral
actions of several parties to the Rio Treaty, such as Peru, Argentina, Panama,
Venezuela and Colombia, in resuming direct relations with Cuba. Furthermore, contracting states were not (as in 1947) obliged under the new
amendment to come to the assistance of a state which was not a party to the
Treaty (i.e. Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Grenada, Guyana andJamaica). On
the other hand, if any of these states were victims of aggression, or of a conflict
that might endanger the peace of the hemisphere, the Organ of Consultation
was to meet immediately to agree on measures for the common defence of the
hemisphere.
The Pan American Union (PAU)

Although no longer in existence under this name, the P AU must be mentioned
for its part in the history of the inter-American system. When established, its
seat was at Washington. At the Sixth Conference (Havana, 1928), on Mexico's
424
proposal, the Latin American states obtained greater participation in the

governing and staffing of the PAU, which were systematised by the InterAmerican Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Mexico in 1945. At
that meeting the PAU was empowered to 'take action ... on every matter that
affects the effective functioning of the inter-American system ...;' 'to call the
regular meetings of the Ministers ofForeign Affairs, and special meetings when
requested;' 'to supervise the inter-American agencies which are or may become
related to the PAU;' and to 'prepare a draft charter for the improvement and
strengthening of the Pan American system.' It produced in due course a
'Project of Organic Pact' which was laid before the drafters of the Charter of
the OAS at the Ninth Conference. Under this Charter it became the central
and permanent organ of the OAS and was transformed in 1970 into the
General Secretariat of the Organisation, of which its Director-General
accordingly became Secretary-General.
The Charter
The charter of the OAS needs only a brief summary here since, apart from its
revision in 1970, when a General Assembly was introduced as the 'Supreme
Organ' to supersede the Inter-American Conferences and a General
Secretariat took the place of the PAU, it is subject to plans, at present (1977) in
preparation, for a thorough reform in order to simplify it and to make it more
relevant to the concerns of member countries.
42 128.
Chapter 1 of the Charter described the Organisation as 'within the United

Nations a regional agency' and referred to its 'regional obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations.' Article 20 stated that 'all international disputes
that may arise between American States shall be submitted to the peaceful
procedures set forth in this Charter before being referred to the Security
Council of the United Nations.' And in Chapter I of Part III it was laid down
that 'none of the provisions of this Charter shall be construed as impairing the
rights and obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the United
Nations.'
The essential purposes of the OAS were given as the maintenance of peace
and security in the continent; the pacific settlement ofdisputes; common action
in the event of aggression; the solution of political, juridical and economic
problems; and economic, social and cultural cooperation.
Chapter 2 contained a reaffirmation of principles, including the effective
exercise of representative democracy; respect for the rights of the individual
'without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex;' and condemnation of
aggression, adding that 'victory does not give rights' - a phrase on which the
Argentine representative laid particular stress. Nevertheless, human rights are
one of the issues on which the OAS is still deeply divided. Sharp censure by
some members of infringements committed by others has made the adoption of
a collective stance on this subject difficult.
42 1 30 .
Chapter 3 dealt with the fundamental rights and duties of states. Article 12,
involving the question of diplomatic intervention in the interest of a country's
42 5
nationals abroad, aroused some controversy and was finally modified to read:
'The jurisdiction of States within the limits of their national territory is exercised
equally over all the inhabitants, whether nationals or aliens.'
42. I 3 I.
The principle of non-intervention was reaffirmed in Article 15:

'No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing
principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements.'
And Article I 7 read:

'The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of
military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or
indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages
obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognised.'
42. 132.
The Institutions of the OAS are:

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
g.
10.
The General Assembly (which meets annually).

The Meetings of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (which
take place as necessary, or when requested).
The Permanent Council (which comprises one representative of each
member state with the rank of ambassador).
The Inter-American Economic and Social Council.
The Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture.
The Inter-American Juridical Committee (which has its seat at Rio de
Janeiro).
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
The General Secretariat.
The Specialised Inter-American Conferences.
The Specialised Organisations, namely the
Inter-American Children's Institute;
Inter-American Commission of Women;
Inter-American Indian Institute;
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences;
Pan-American Health Organisation;
Pan-American Institute of Geography and History.
These bodies have full technical autonomy, but take account of the
recommendations of the General Assembly. They establish cooperative
relations with world agencies of the same character in order to coordinate
their activities.
42 . I 33.
The Ninth Conference also produced the American Treaty on Pacific

Settlement, or Pact of Bogota, intended to replace the eight instruments
hitherto constituting the inter-American peace system, ofwhich not one had so
far been ratified by all the American states. It dealt with Good Offices and
Mediation, Investigation and Conciliation, Judicial Procedure and Arbi-
426
Some reJ!,ional organisations
tration, but attracted numerous reservations, the sum of which was to hamper
the application of the compulsory arbitration and jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice and to rob the Treaty of its effectiveness in
ensuring the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
42.134.
It will be seen from the foregoing that the OAS is well designed to provide a
vehicle for Inter-American communication at the political and economic
levels; and if the more optimistic forecasts of its founders have not been fulfilled,
this is because more was being asked of it than in the circumstances it could
reasonably be expected to perform.
4 2 1 35.
For United States-Latin American relations the OAS has served as a

framework for endeavours by each party to obtain its objectives. The United
States met suspicion and resistance at the Tenth Conference whenJohn Foster
Dulles was pushing his anti-Communist resolution aimed at Guatemala, yet he
gained enough grudging acquiescence to secure its passage, and ultimately
neither the peace-keeping machinery of the OAS nor the United Nations
prevented the overthrow of the Arbenz regime. In 1961 six of the most
important Latin American states refused to vote for a Meeting ofConsultation
to consider what should be done about the violations of human rights and the
subversive activities against his neighbours ofwhich President Fidel Castro was
accused. Nevertheless a meeting was eventually held in February 1962 at
Punta del Este, where the Alliance for Progress 58 had been launched the
previous year, at which sixteen delegations supported a ban on military
supplies to Castro, and fourteen the exclusion (i.e. in practice the suspension) of
the Cuban Government from the OAS. There was, however, sharp
disagreement regarding the juridical soundness of this exclusion according to
the terms of the Charter. Again, when the Cuban missile crisis arose in October
1962, President Kennedy appealed simultaneously to the Security Council and
to the OAS. The latter adopted a resolution calling for the dismantling and
withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and sanctioning the use of armed force
under the Rio Treaty to ensure that the Government of Cuba could not
'continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military supplies and related
material which may threaten the peace and security of the continent.'
However, Mexico, Bolivia and Brazil made it clear that they would not support
armed invasion of Cuba to remove the missiles. Nor did the United States
succeed in securing the removal of all Soviet forces from Cuba, still less the
downfall of Fidel Castro.
42.136.
From the point of view of the Latin American states, on the other hand, these
same episodes could be viewed as examples ofhow in the framework ofthe OAS
it was possible to exert a restraining influence on the United States. In fact the
Latin Americans have always shown reluctance to allow the OAS to be
involved in military commitments of any kind. They see its virtue as a peacekeeping instrument; and as such it has proved its usefulness in (to name a few
instances only) the investigation of the Costa Rica-Nicaragua dispute in 1955;
the mutual recriminations between Honduras and Nicaragua in 1957 and
1959; successive crises in the Caribbean arising from accusations laid against
Cuba by the Dominican Republic and Haiti of invasion attempts mounted
against them from Cuban territory; complaints by Venezuela ofthe violation of
427
human rights by the Government oft he Dominican Republic; and an easing of

tension with Chile following the General Assembly's meeting in June 1976 at
Santiago. Especially satisfactory was the result of the investigation by the OAS
of the incidents in the Canal Zone of Panama in January 1964 concerning
which Panama had laid charges ofaggression against the United States in both
the Security Council and the OAS. The situation from which the incidents
arose was difficult of solution and had been a long-standing cause of bitterness.
The OAS Council constituted itself Provisional Organ of Consultation, sent a
committee to Panama, and was able to announce in April that the disputants
had agreed to resume diplomatic relations and to 'seek the prompt elimination
of the cause of conflict ... without limitations or preconditions of any kind.'
42.137.
An important aspect of the usefulness of the OAS to the Latin American states
is the opening it has given them for pursuing their own objectives in their own
way. 59 The Inter-American Economic and Social Council has encountered
extreme difficulty in the attempt to reconcile United States and Latin
American policies with regard, for instance, to industrial products and raw
materials, and a solution has been sought in cooperation with the Economic
Commission for Latin America in a move towards establishing a multilateral
Latin American regional market. The Charter of OAS is flexible enough to
admit to membership new entities composed ofregional groupings ofcountries
within the area, provided they ratify the necessary agreements. However, the
newest of such experimental groupings, the Latin American Economic System
(SELA in Spanish) with headquarters at Caracas, is outside the OAS. It
comprises the twenty Latin American states, including Cuba, and five
Caribbean, including Guyana. The United States is, in accordance with the
title, excluded from membership. It remains to be seen how successful SELA
will be in stimulating regional economic cooperation on lines independent of
the hitherto existing framework. But the OAS is conspicuously a useful forum
for the discussion of technical issues, as a result ofwhich bilateral arrangements
can be made either within the Latin American region, or with the United
States, or again with countries or organisations outside the hemisphere. The
inter-American Specialised Organisations may perform the functions of other
international agencies without losing their status as integral parts of the OAS.
In this way a more realistic appreciation can be achieved of Latin America's
relation, as a developing area, to the world as a whole.
42.138.
Membership of the OAS in 1977 was as follows:
Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica;

Cuba; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador;
Guatemala;
Haiti; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru;
Uruguay; Venezuela
United States
Trinidad and Tobago (1976);
Grenada( 1 975)
42.139.
Barbados (1968);
Jamaica (1969);
The OAS has permanent resident representatives in twenty-four American

states. In addition to the United Nations, the following countries have
Permanent Observer status at the OAS: Belgium, Canada, France, Guyana,
428
Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain. Guyana, although a member
of the Latin American Group at the United Nations, is excluded from
membership of the OAS under the terms ofthe 1964 Act ofWashington, which
disqualifies any country against which an OAS member may have a territorial
claim. Residual colonial disputes concerning the Falkland Islands and Belize
have been an obstacle to any close relationship between the OAS and Britain.
British application for Permanent Observer status at the OAS was rejected in
1973 and 1974
42.140.
The OAS Secretary-General is entitled to attend the United Nations General

Assembly as an Observer, and the United Nations has Observer status at all
OAS inter-American conferences and meetings of consultation. Although
there is no formal political cooperation between the OAS and the UN, organs
of the OAS have adopted texts in support of UN actions (e.g. the Suez and
Hungarian questions in 1956) and have from time to time reported to the UN
Secretary-General (in accordance with Art. 54 of the UN Charter) on OAS
decisions and on developments within the region.
Organisation of African Unity

42.141.
In 1977, there were forty-nine members ofthe Organisation ofAfrican Unity. 60

Of these, only two, Egypt and Liberia, were original members of the United
Nations when it was formed in 1945. 61 This expresses the fundamental
difference between the OAU and the other international regional organisations considered in this chapter. In 1977 the vast majority ofthose who by then
occupied places of power in these countries had a living memory of being
governed, at least down to middle level, by people of a different race and
nationality. This was bound to give a special perspective to those seeking both
national independence and the strengthening of that independence through
continental unity.
42.142.
Except for the overrunning of the North in the eighth century by the Moslems,
conquest came to Africa late. It came from many sources, principally the
Netherlands, Britain, France and Port ugal, but also from others, and there was
no development parallel to that in the Americas, where the original British and
other settlers in the United States converted themselves through the Monroe
Doctrine into the guardians of a continent against outside interference.
European power in Africa was such that it even survived two world wars in
which some European countries which had colonies in Africa fought on
opposite sides without causing the colonial structure in Africa to collapse. A
prerequisite for agreed African unity would have to be African independence.
42.143.
Some pressures for independence existed before the Second World War historic American disapproval of colonies, contact of African students in
Europe and the United States with libertarian doctrines, teaching and
practice, followed after the Second World War by the many invitations
extended by the Soviet Government to African students to study in Moscow.
But perhaps the most telling influence on African hopes was the success of the
429
Indian sub-continent and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1947 in gaining independence

from Britain.
Even so, there were still ten years to come before the first African state, Ghana
(previously the Gold Coast) became independent. 62 This was the achievement
of Dr Kwame Nkrumah who combined political charisma among his own
people with a relation of confidence between him and the liberal British
Governor, Sir Charles Arden Clarke. Dr Nkrumah's dynamic radicalism had
two positive effects: it provided African radicals with a persuasive theoretician
and it enabled him through his friendship with other African radicals like M.
Sekou Toure of (French) Guinea to create a bridge between English-speaking
and French-speaking Africa which would be essential to any future
organisation claiming to represent Africa as a whole. On the other hand, his
very radical line aroused suspicions in Moslem North Africa and other
countries whose participation was essential to success.
An era of conferences and drafting of charters now began. 63 In 1958, Ghana
and Guinea, joined later by Mali, adopted a Charter which was intended to
form the basis of a Union of African States. Arising from this initiative, a
conference was held at Casablanca in January 1961 attended by the heads of
state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and representatives of Libya and the
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA); it adopted an
African Charter and decided to set up an African Command and an African
Common Market. However, a number ofstates from the same general area had
declined the invitation to Casablanca, and in June 1961 a conference of
nineteen states was held at Monrovia, capital ofLiberia. The majority ofthose
attending came from former French colonies, but the conference included two
previously independent states, Ethiopia and Liberia, and two important
former British West African colonies, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. At a further
meeting in Lagos in January 1962, substantially the same group set up a
Permanent Secretariat and a Standing Committee of Finance Ministers, and
adopted a draft Charter for an Organisation of Inter-African and Malagasy
States.
Meantime a third 'stream' of conferences had been held by French-speaking
countries between October 1960 and March 1961 at Abidjan, Brazzaville and
Yaounde, which led to the signing in September 1961 at Tananarive, the
capital of Madagascar, of a Charter establishing the Union Africaine et
Malgache (succeeded four years later by the Organisation Africaine et
Malgache). Thus, in 1961 the moment had arrived when African countries had
to decide whether division should continue or be overcome.
A preparatory conference was held at Addis Ababa at the beginning of May
1963 at which the Foreign Ministers ofthirty African states met to discuss items
of principle which would have to be covered by a Charter. Each of the three
groupings was fully represented, each region of Africa, (except the Portuguese
and Spanish colonies, which had not yet gained independence, and South
Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia) and each political trend. The Heads of State
met on 16 May and drew up a draft ora Charter for an Organisation ofAfrican
Unity which was signed on 26 May 1963 by the representatives of thirty-one
states.
430
The OAU Charter
42. I 48.
The Charter represented a compromise between those who, like Ghana,

favoured something as close as possible to federation, and those who insisted on
as loose an association as was compatible with the word 'unity.' The document
clearly owes much to the ideas expressed in the United Nations Charter, but
naturally contains much that arises specifically out of the African context.
Aims and purposes
4 2 . 149.
These are expressed succinctly yet comprehensively in Article 11 as follows:

'I.
The Organisation shall have the following purposes:
(a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;

(b) to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life
for the peoples of Africa;
(c) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
(d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
(e) to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'
Section 2 of the Article sets out the particular subjects in which the member
states are 'especially' to coordinate and harmonise their policies. (For text see
4 2 . I 55.)
42. I 50.
While the Preamble has less legal force than the Articles, there are points in it
worth special mention. It speaks ofthe 'inalienable right ofall people to control
their own destiny,' an evident reference to the past. Another such reference is
the phrase:
'Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives
for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples.'
It is also of note that, while 'to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa' is
in the Charter (Art. 11 (d)), the phrase 'to fight against neo-colonialism in all its
forms' is in the Preamble. This is wisdom, since while the word 'colonialism,' if
open to discussion in detail, is generally accepted, the expression 'neocolonialism' would be greatly open to question ifit were to become subjected to
juridical scrutiny and definition.
Membership
42. I 5 I.
Qualification for membership comes under Articles I and IV of the Charter

which read as follows:
Art. 1:2. 'The Organisation shall include the Continental African States,
Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa.'
Art. IV. 'Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to
become a Member of the Organisation.'
43 I
There is no behavioural qualification in the style of Article 4 of the United

Nations Charter. In theory South Africa might make a case for membership
under the wording ofthese Articles. In practice at the time ofwriting, objection
would be unanimous and would no doubt be expressed as a unanimous
vote of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments.
Structure: The Assembly of Heads of State and Governments
42 I 52.
The participation of heads of governments and states is a striking feature ofthe

formation and continuing activity ofthe Organisation ofAfrican Unity. At this
stage of growth and danger, the presence of the effective political head of state
at important conferences was necessary if the voice ofthat state was to be heard
and its interests protected. The time for 'devolution' might come later.
42. I 53.
It was not therefore surprising, even if it was unusual, that Article VIII, the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, should have read:
'The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme organ of the
Organisation. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss matters of
common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonising the general
policy of the Organisation. It may in addition review the structure, functions and acts of
all the organs and any specialised agencies which may be created in accordance with the
present Charter.'
This is far from the kind of Assembly which is mainly an advising or reviewing
body.
42. I 54.
Under Article IX:

'The Assembly ... shall meet at least once a year. At the request ofany Member and on
approval by two-thirds of the Member States [Le. not two-thirds of those present and
voting] the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session.'
Each member has one vote and, except on procedural matters, 'All Resolutions
shall be determined by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the
Organisation.' (Art. X.) The Assembly has, under Article XXVII, the task of
deciding by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly 'any question that may arise
concerning the interpretation of this Charter.'
The Council
42. I 55.
The Council of Ministers consists of Foreign Ministers or such other Ministers

as are designated by member governments. (Art. XII.) They are to meet 'at
least twice a year,' and, like the Assembly, meet in extraordinary session when
requested by a member and approved by two-thirds of the membership. (Art.
XII.) The Council of Ministers prepares conferences of the Assembly,
implements decisions of the Assembly, and 'shall coordinate inter-African
cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly and in
conformity with Article 11 (2) of the present Charter.' The section reads as
follows:
432
'To these ends [referring to Article 11 section I] the Member States shall coordinate and
harmonise their general policies especially in the following fields;
(a) political and diplomatic cooperation;
(b) economic cooperation, including transport and communications;
(e) educational and cultural cooperation;
(d) health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation;
(e) scientific and technical cooperation: and
if) cooperation for defence and security.'
42.156.
In contrast to the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments, Council

decisions are by majority vote, but, as in the Assembly, two-thirds of the total
membership is required for a quorum. (Art. XIV.)
Administration
42.157.
Articles XVI-XVIII entitled 'General Secretariat' provide for an 'Administrative Secretary-General' and staff, enjoying the normal privileges and
restrictions. The term 'administrative' does not appear to be in popular use,
but simply indicates the normal difference of status between principals or
delegates and staff
Mediation, etc.
42.158.
Unlike many international organisations, the OAU makes no provision for a

Court ofJustice. It might indeed have been difficult to do this, since the various
countries have developed legal systems based on British, French, Arab, etc.
traditions and practices, qualified by what may have persisted of indigenous
law. The Charter did provide (art. XII) for a Mediation, Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission, but this body proved ineffective and was replaced in
1977 by a ten-man Standing Committee on Disputes.
42.159.
Among the remaining clauses there is an 'adhesion and accession clause' (Art.
XXVIII) which reads in part:
'Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the Administrative
Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter.'
It goes on to say that:

'Admission shall be by a simple majority of Member States.'
This would appear to qualify the apparent au tomatic working ofArticles I and
IV. It must be assumed that South Africa would be rejected under this head.
Unlike the United Nations, the OAU has also a clause providing for 'Cessation
of Membership.'
4 2 160.
The languages of the Organisation are to be 'if possible, African languages,

English and French.' (Art. XXIX.)
433
Later Events
4 2 16 1.
The Organisation of African Unity had set itself a most ambitious task of both
policy and administration. The administrative problems are obvious, the sheer
difficulty of adequate communication, interpretation and consultation
between nearly fifty nations inhabiting an enormous continent and its adjacent
islands. The policy task was governed by two sets of tensions, those indigenous
to Africa itself and those resulting from past and present encounters between
Africa and the outside world. Some contained elements of both.
42.162.
Confronted by these tensions, the OAU applied both conciliation and pressure.
An important first step in conciliation was the acceptance by the Organisation
in 1964 of a Protocol under which member states would accept the boundaries
set up in the colonial period. The acceptance was not in fact complete. War
broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977 over the Ogaden area; Libya
has frontier claims against Chad. None the less, the continued validity of the
Protocol and the conciliation activities of the new Standing Committee on
Disputes (42.158) remove much possible danger.
42 16 3.
A very important individual as opposed to general act ofconciliation occurred

in 1968 when the OAU sought to be helpful over the civil war in Nigeria,
passing a Resolution in the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in
support of what were termed 'the Federal Government's efforts to unify the
country.' More recently, the Organisation has been seeking ways to be helpful
over the continuing territorial dispute in the Western Sahara.
42.164.
An example ofpressure exerted by the OAU and affecting both Africa itselfand
the outside world was the formation in 1963 at Dar es Salaam in Tanzania of
the Coordinating Committee for Liberation Movements in Africa to provide
financial and military aid to nationalist movements in dependent countries.
Apart from its practical activities, the Committee issued at its twenty-first
session, held in Accra, Ghana, in 1973, a declaration affirming that the
liberation of territories under 'foreign domination' could only be achieved by
armed struggle.
42 165.
To pressures such as these, operating within the continent, there can be added
one operating with some effect outside. There are (1977) no less than forty-nine
member states of the OAU, all members of the United Nations. Such a group
constitutes almost exactly one-third of the total United Nations membership.
Apart from the mathematical effect on voting in the Assembly, a voting bloc of
this magnitude cannot fail to affect the general atmosphere there and the votes,
in Committee meetings in which African members may take a particular
interest. These are changes which cannot be ignored despite the limitations on
the Assembly's power.
4 2 . 166 .
As a result of the lessons of the last thirty years, the concept of uni ty among the
peoples of Africa has grown at great speed, measured against the scale ofworld
history. How rapidly this unity can be translated into yet further practice by so
large a number of newly independent states will depend partly on active
understanding of Africa's problems by the developed world, and partly on the
skill shown in resolving outstanding differences, in particular those which, if
they persist or recur, could inhibit urgently needed economic growth.
434
OAU Member States

Algeria; Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burundi; Cameroon; Cape
Verde Islands; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoro Islands;
Congo; Djibouti; Egypt; Equatorial Guinea; Ethiopia; Gabon;
The Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Ivory Coast; Kenya;
Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania;
Mauritius; Morocco; Mozambique; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda;
Sao Tome and Principe; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Somalia;
Sudan; Swaziland; Tanzania; Togo; Tunisia; Uganda;
Upper Volta; Zaire; Zam bia.
The Association of South-East Asian Nations

42.167.
The reasons for the formation ofASEAN are a complete contrast to those which
lay behind the founding of the Organisation of African States. Whereas in
Africa there was a clear political objective to bring independence to all African
countries that had not yet achieved it, and to remove racial discrimination
from the African continent, the position in Asia in the mid- 1960s was much
more complex. First there were a number of states either at war or at least in
sharp conflict with each other, notably the two Vietnams and the two Koreas.
There was also the confrontation between Malaysia, supported by the United
Kingdom, and Indonesia. In addition, the activities of Communist dissidents
were a continuing problem for countries such as Thailand and the Philippines,
and even to some extent Malaysia (although the Emergency had officially
ended in 1960). These countries therefore sought the reassurance of continued
links with the West. Thailand and the Philippines were members of SEATO:
Malaysia and Singapore had defence ties with Britain. At the same time they
were also a prey to the fear that too much reliance on the West would only serve
to attract increased hostility from the Communist world. They therefore felt
the need to group together in what was seen as the middle ground between the
Communist and non-Communist worlds.
42.168.
When the United States, from acting as adviser to the South Vietnamese
Government and armed forces decided early in 1965 to become more directly
involved by sending regular units in support ofSouth Vietnam the desire ofthe
South-East Asian non-Communist states to stay out of trouble was further
emphasised, despite the degree of active support which both Thailand and the
Philippines gave to the American war effort in Vietnam.
42.169.
Although there was a gradual trend toward the formation of an organised

'middle' group in South-East Asia, its achievement might have been delayed
for a considerable time, had it not been for two important developments.
During 1965, fears grew in Indonesia, particularly among military leaders, that
President Sukarno might press his policies of friendliness to the Communist
Party at home and to Communist states abroad to the point that Indonesia
would become wholly committed to the 'Communist Camp.' On 30 September
The Association of South-Aast Asian .,Vations
435
of that year an attempted coup by left-wing groups, including the leaders of the
Communist Party, was thwarted by the Army. President Sukarno, whose
attitude to the coup had been equivocal, subsequently fell from power and was
succeeded by a military regime under the leadership of General Suharto. The
new government was anti-Communist in sentiment and sought improvement
of relations with non-Communist countries, and the cessation of confrontation
with Malaysia and Britain. Indonesia thus became one of the 'middle'
countries of the area whose location, size, population and resources made its
membership essential if any effective South-East Asian Organisation independent of outside alliances were to be formed.
42.170.
The second important development was that, between the end of I 965 and the
beginning of 1967, a number of efforts to find a solution for hostilities in
Vietnam failed, and thus any hope that the area might settle down in the
atmosphere of a truce and render an independent South-East Asian political
grouping unnecessary collapsed. This tended to accelerate the feeling among
the non-Communist countries that closer cooperation would benefit their
interests.
42.171.
The first attempt at a regional grouping dates from 1961 when the Association
of South-East Asia (ASA) was formed by Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines.
Two years later MAPHILINDO was formed by Malaya, the Philippines and
Indonesia. Neither of these organisations was effective, largely owing to
disputes between the members over the formation of Malaysia in 1963.
Eventually, with Confrontation over, the way was clear for regional
cooperation between all these states and on 8 August 1967 a meeting ofpolitical
representatives of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 64 and
Thailand issued in Bangkok an announcement under the title 'ASEAN
Declaration.' This document, after a statement of motives and attitudes,
proceeded to state that the above-mentioned political leaders:
'DO HEREBY DECLARE:
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the
countries ofSouth-East Asia to be known as the Association ofSouth-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN).
SECOND, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:
I. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the
region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East
Asian nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the
rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the
principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common
interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative
fields;
4. To provide assistance to. each other in the form of training and research facilities in
the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and
industries, the expansion of their trade including the study of the problems of
international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and
communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
436
,\'ome regional organisations
6. To promote South-East Asian studies;

7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and
regional organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for
even closer cooperation among themselves.'
42.172.
As part of the Declaration, the Ministers agreed upon the following:

(a) 'An Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers which shall be by rotation and shall be
referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special meetings of Foreign Ministers
may be convened as required....
(b) A Standing Committee under the Chairmanship ofthe Foreign Minister ofthe host
country or his representative and having as its members the accredited
Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work ofthe Association
in between meetings of Foreign Ministers.
(c) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the
Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings
of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other committees as may
hereafter be established.'
42.173.
Sub-paragraph (c) above should be particularly noted because the setting up of

a 'National Secretariat' in each member country meant the rejection, at least
for the time being, of the idea of a central secretariat and therefore of central
management. One of the results of this cautious decision and of the separation
of the different subjects to be handled by the different members of the
organisation, was that in the immediately succeeding years a great proportion
of the work done was confined to the completion of a detailed structure for the
organisation. A local comment stated that: 'By 1975, ASEAN produced a
profusion of organisational arrangements that bewildered even the foreign
office experts, and an ever increasing number of recommendations, most of
which lacked substance or were impossible for implementation.'65
42.174.
But matters had been moving steadily towards a greater unity and in 1973 the
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting decided that there should be a permanent
centralised secretariat located in Djakarta. With the establishment of the
EEC/ASEAN Joint Study Group in 1975, ASEAN, in a collective diplomatic
move towards the outside world, undertook discussion with the European
Economic Community. The next year, the Ministers took diplomatic steps to
formalise the corporate status and purposes ofthe Associat ion. On 24 February
at a summit meeting in Indonesia, held at Den Pasar in Bali, the representatives
of the five member states signed three important agreements.
(a) a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia;

(b) a Declaration of ASEAN Concord;
(c) an agreement on the establishment of an ASEAN secretariat.
42.175.
Much of the wording of the Declaration and the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation reiterates and amplifies the purposes and aims adopted in the
1967 Bangkok Declaration. But there were also significant additions. For
instance, in the fourth sentence of the Preamble of the Declaration, the
signatories:
'V ndertake to consolidate the achievement of ASEAN and expand ASEAN
cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields.'
The Association o.fSouth-East Asian .Nations
437
The last item mentioned is new and significant. In paragraph 1 of the

Declaration itself, the members define the first item of their principles as the
pursuit of political stability:
'The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential
contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to
eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and
ASEAN resilience.'
Another important political point was the call for the establishment of a Zone
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPEAN) in South-East Asia, thus
transferring to the ASEAN level an initiative made originally by Malaysia in
1971. The economic development aspects are stated with more vigour and
precision than in the previous Declaration, while the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation affirms the objective of regional peace and, no doubt with the
United Nations Charter in mind, contains a chapter (IV) entitled 'Pacific
Settlement of Disputes.'
4 2 1 76 .
At this conference the Ministers also appointed the first ASEAN SecretaryGeneral, Lieutenant-General Hartono Rekso Dharsono, Special Adviser on
Indo-Chinese Affairs to the Foreign Minister ofIndonesia. Provision was made
for other posts to be allotted to nationals from other ASEAN countries. Thus,
the year 1976 represented an affirmation and a strengthening of the unity of
organisation and purpose in the Association. It brought a clearer statement of
the desire of the members for the formation ofan area ofstability and economic
progress as a bulwark against attempts from outside to weaken them.
4 2 177.
Since the 1976 Summit Meeting, ASEAN has continued to make plans for
further progress. The Economic Ministers, at a meeting following the Summit,
simplified ASEAN's administrative arrangements by substituting for the
original eleven economic sub-committees five Permanent Committees: on (a)
Trade and Tourism; (b) Industry (including Energy); (c) Food, Agriculture and
Forestry; (d) Communications and Transport; (e) Finance and Banking.
They also agreed to allocate an industrial project for development under
ASEAN auspices to each member state. Early in 1977 a preferential trading
agreement was signed under which the five countries are to help each other in
the supply and purchase of basic commodities and provide market support for
the products of ASEAN industrial projects. Subsequently they agreed on tariff
reductions for some seventy items. Further consideration has also been given
to the development of the Association's economic and political relations with
the EEC, Japan, USA, Australia and New Zealand. In 1977 the Prime
Minister ofJapan, Mr Takeo Fukuda, at the end of a formal visit to the area,
announced the intention of his country to give political and economic support
to ASEAN and its member countries.
CHAPTER 43
Post-1945 diplomacy
43. I.
When the Second World War ended, residential diplomacy resumed its normal
rhythm, which had indeed never wholly ceased. The work of observing,
reporting, persuading and negotiating continued wherever countries were
accessible to each other, whether as allies or neutrals. National purposes in
wartime are different from those in peace, but, subject to the demands of
wartime security, diplomats en poste remained protected by the privileges and
immunities accorded by the Vienna Conventions of 1815. But much was
happening, regardless of changes in the balance of power, to alter the style of
international relations in the future.
43. 2 .
The first such change was physical - the fantastic growth in the speed and
availability of fast international travel. When a Naval Conference was
arranged to take place in London in 1935, any preliminary contact with the
Japanese delegates had to cease while the Japanese made their five-week
journey by sea to London. The corresponding journey by air today would take
thirteen and a half hours. The effect of this change on the mobility ofpoliticians,
diplomats and delegations, and the resultant effect on the work required of
resident diplomacy is not hard to imagine. 1
43.3.
The other decisive influence was the great increase in all countries ofthe direct
involvement of government in economic, social and technical affairs, of which
a large proportion had previously been handled, (ifat all,) outside government,
with a modicum ofrestraint imposed by national finance ministries and central
banks. The consequence was a corresponding growth at government level in
direct contact with other governments, the volume and content ofwhich could
not possibly be carried by the 'professional generalist' diplomatic service which
all nations maintain. The legal position of the travelling delegations which this
development produced is covered in 19.6- I o.
43.4.
The following paragraphs consider briefly some of the developments in

international practice which follow from:
I. high-speed travel;
2. permanent or periodical multilateral diplomacy, other than in the United
Nations;
3. diplomacy other than purely political diplomacy which deals with highly
specialised subjects but cannot escape the intrusion of political argument.
This includes the whole area in which the 'professional generalist'2 diplomat
cannot be expected to handle highly technical argument but where his
Political relationships
439
intervention, or at least advice, may be essential at moments of

international sensitivity.
Political relationships
43.5.
It might be supposed that in the most literal way fast air transport brought
nations formerly considered remote into closer touch with and understanding
of each other. This argument can be pressed too far. In the late nineteenth
century, for instance, accidents of history sometimes proved stronger than
accidents of geography. As a result of close naval relationships, Britain arrived
at some degree of sympathy and understanding with two of the 'remotest'
countries in the pre-aviation world - Japan and Chile. (Nor do over seventy
years of Franco-German relations starting in 1870 prove that propinquity
necessarily produces understanding and friendship.) But a combination of fast
travel with political developments such as the disappearance of European
empires has meant that a great acceleration in the growth of large regional
blocs has become possible. Previous to 1945, an Organisation of African Unity
was neither politically nor physically thinkable. Neither, for that matter, was a
United Europe. The result has been to add a new dimension to policy and
diplomacy, the weighing of not only the national but also the regional element
in judging an international situation.
43.6.
Another diplomatic change lies in the difference between the League of

Nations and the United Nations. In theory the United Nations Security
Council is in permanent session. This does not mean a world government. But it
does mean the permanent presence in New York offifteen highly distinguished
people on whose governments the members of the United Nations 'confer ...
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security.... '3 The effectiveness of this provision has been weakened in practice
by failures, for regional and other reasons, to refer some threatening situations
to the Security Council. None the less, the existence of this continuous
responsibility must exert an important influence on the policy and action of
governments. And into the sphere ofdiplomatic practice comes the convention
by which many foreign ministers and sometimes heads of government make a
point of attending the early days of the United Nations General Assembly
session each year in order not only to make speeches but also to make or renew
acquaintances.
43.7.
The post-1945 period has also seen another way in which the dimensions of
day-to-day diplomacy have been widened through rapid international travel.
The classic example is the technique used by Dr Henry Kissinger, United
States Secretary of State from 1968 to 1977. There have of course been
many occasions in history where heads of government and foreign ministers
have acted as, in a sense, their own diplomatic agents and conducted
detailed negotiation. One has in mind Castlereagh, Metternich and Talleyrand at Vienna in 1815. Disraeli and Bismarck at Berlin in 1876, and the
Big Three, Woodrow Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George in Versailles in
1919. There have also been many occasions on which mediatory roles between
440
Post-1945 diplomacy
several states have been played at international conferences, such as that of

Anthony Eden at the Geneva Conference on South-East Asia in 1954, and of
the Soviet Prime Minister A. N. Kosygin in 1965 at Tashkent on behalf of
India and Pakistan. A degree of 'shuttling' was employed by Dag
Hammarskjold and Gunnar Jarring on behalf of the United Nations, and a
notable effort was undertaken in 1967, under imminent threat of war between
Greece and Turkey, by the American diplomat and future Secretary of State,
Cyrus R. Vance.
43.8.
But under Dr Kissinger, an emergency technique became a method. Thanks

again to transport, the Secretary of State (Foreign Minister) of a 'summit'
Power was instructed by his President to use the combined weight ofAmerican
national strength and his own exceptional personal ability, knowledge and
energy, to travel from country to country in the active search for international
solutions to urgent and critical problems, first in the Middle East and then in
Africa. This is a new style of negotiation and diplomacy, and is likely to remain
exceptional. It required, over and above unusual individual qualities, to be
sustained by the highest political authority and provided with totallogistical
and other communications support. It also presupposed an ability on the part
of the remaining government machine to deal with all other aspects ofexternal
policy.
Economic and social relations

43.9.
The change in the style of diplomacy which has emerged in economic and
social affairs is less dramatic but more fundamental. It has meant the
acceptable and efficient incorporation into diplomacy of people whose
profeSsion is not diplomacy at all. They may be civil servants from home
departments of government or experts from industry, finance, trade unions,
professions or the academic world. 4
43.10.
In 1957 the Federal German Government and the British Government held
negotiations in Bonn about the German contribution towards the expense of
maintaining British military forces in Germany (Stationierungskosten). Both
delegations were led by senior diplomats specialising in economic matters. The
two leaders were supported by experienced officials from their respective
economic and defence ministries, while the British team also included the
senior member of the British Embassy in Bonn handling Anglo-German
economic relations. This formation was highly advantageous: negotiation of
this kind involves expert technical knowledge of defence and finance on the
part of members of the delegation who conduct subsidiary bilateral talks.
Diplomatic experience is needed, and an easy access to political authority
which may have to be invoked if, as is often the case, political side-issues may be
the final obstacles to agreement. All these things occurred, and a successful
compromise was reached.
43.1
It is a matter of judgement whether and when a political member of the

government should intervene personally in a negotiation of this kind. 5 On the
I.
Economic and social relations
441
one hand, authority at the political level is greater than at the official; on the
other hand, a premature commitment by a political leader reduces flexibility
and can make compromise more difficult. But there is one absolute prerequisite
at all stages if a result satisfactory to all is to be achieved - mutual
communication and trust between all members of a negotiating team. (A bad
team can by good fortune achieve a good agreement, but the attempt is not
advised.)
43.12.
But the above is orthodox intergovernmental mixed or multidepartmental

negotiation. The considerations governing the setting up or operating of a
Specialised Agency are totally different. In organisations such as the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International
Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organisation or the World Health
Organisation, to mention only a few, there would be no sense in having any but
a specialist leadership, staff and delegation, whether at the political or what is
called 'official' level. (The word 'official' covers both civil servants and experts
drawn from outside government for service in the government machine in a
particular negotiation.) 6
43.13.
There are two diplomatic riders to the above. When a new international
Convention or Constitution is being negotiated and drafted, it is indispensable
for any interested state to include in the delegation an expert international
lawyer, preferably from its own Foreign Office. Secondly, in a politically
charged age, an official delegation at a Conference where there is forewarning
of political trouble (like that experienced by Israel in UNESCO in 1974) does
well to attach to itself a political adviser. The easiest way to do this may be to
put on the Conference list an official from the permanent diplomatic mission to
the host country. He or she may never be needed. But absence ofthe name from
the Conference list could mean at least temporary exclusion by a conscientious
Conference security guard from a confidential meeting which the official
concerned had been invited by his delegation to attend. 7
CHAPTER 44
44. 1
Of the qualities necessary for the profession of a diplomatist, Callieres treats in

his famous work De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains, 1 and his observations,
though made over two centuries ago, have still much to commend them to
notice. In modern days methods of diplomacy are doubtless less subtle and
tortuous than were those of the past; while the rapidity of telegraphic communication now enables a negotiator to remain in constant touch with his
government throughout. But national character and human nature have not
changed to any appreciable extent. Callieres' counsels are not here reproduced
for the use of experienced diplomatists, but rather as hints that may prove
serviceable to younger members of the profession. The following passages, 2
taken from his work, on the qualities of the good negotiator, may therefore
fitly form an introduction to the present chapter.
Ces qualites sont un esprit attentif et applique, qui ne se laisse point distraire par les
plaisirs, & par les amusemens frivoles, un sens droit qui con~oive nettement les choses
comme elles sont, & qui aille au but par les voyes les plus courtes &Ies plus naturelles,
sans s'egarer aforce de rafinement & de vaines subtilitez qui rebuttent d'ordinaire ceux
avec qui on traite, de la penetration pour decouvrir ce qui se passe dans le coeur des
hommes & pour s~avoir profiter des moindres mouvemens de leurs visages & des autres
effets de leurs passions, qui echapent aux plus dissimulez; un esprit fecond en expediens,
pour aplanir les difficultez qui se rencontrent a ajuster les interets dont on est charge; de
la presence d' esprit pour repondre bien a propos sur les choses imprevues, & pour se tirer
par des reponsesjudicieuses d'un pas glissant; une humeur egale, & un naturel tranquile
& patient, toujours dispose a ecouter sans distraction ceux avec qui il traite; un abord
toujours ouvert, doux, civil, agreable, des manihes aisees & insinuantes qui contribuent
beaucoup aacquerir les inclinations de ceux avec qui on traite, au lieu qu'un air grave &
froid, & une mine sombre & rude, rebute & cause d'ordinaire de l'aversion.
443
11 faut surtout qu'un bon Negociateur 3 ait assez de pouvoir sur lui-meme pour resister a
la demangeaison de parler avant que de s'etre bien consulte sur ce qu'il a adire, qu'il ne
se pique pas de repondre sur le champ & sans premeditation sur les propositions qu'on
lui fait, & qu'il prenne garde de tomber dans le deffaut d'un fameux Ambassadeur
etranger de natre terns, qui etoit si vif dans la dispute, que lorsqu'on l'echauffoit en le
contredisant, il reveloit souvent des secrets d'importance pour soutenir son opinion.
11 ne faut pas aussi qu'il donne dans le deffaut oppose de certains esprits mysterieux, qui
font des secrets de rien, & qui erigent en affaires d'importance de pures bagatelles; c'est
une marque de petitesse d'esprit de ne s~avoir pas discerner les choses de consequence
d'avec celles qui ne le sont pas, & c'est s'ater les moyens de decouvrir ce qui se passe, &
d'acquerir aucune part a la confiance de ceux avec qui on est en commerce, lorsqu'on a
avec eux une continuelle reserve.
445
443
Un habile Negociateur ne laisse pas penetrer son secret avant le temps propre; mais il
faut qu'il sc;ache cacher cette reteniie a ceux avec qui il traite; qu'illeur temoigne de
I'ouverture & de la confiance, & qu'illeur en donne des marques effectives dans les
choses qui ne sont point contraires a ses desseins; ce qui les engage insensiblement a y
repondre par d'autres marques de confiance en des choses souvent plus importantes; il y
a entre les Negociateurs un commerce d'avis reciproques, il faut en donner, si on veut en
recevoir, & le plus habile est celui qui tire le plus d'utilite de ce commerce, parce qu'il a
des vues plus etendiies, pour profiter des conjonctures qui se presentent.
11 ne suffit pas pour former un bon Negociateur, qu'il ait toutes les lumieres, toute la
dexterite & les autres belles qualitez de I'esprit; il faut qu'il ait celles qui dependent des
sentimens du coeur; il n'y a point d'employ qui demande plus d'elevation & plus de
noblesse dans les manieres d'agir.
447
Tout homme qui entre dans ces sortes d'employs avec un esprit d'avarice, & un desir d'y
chercher d'autres interets que ceux qui sont attachez a la gloire de reiissir & de s'attirer
par la I'estime & les recompenses de son Maitre, n'y sera jamais qu'un homme tresmediocre.
Pour soutenir la dignite attachee a ces employs, il faut que celui qui en est revetu, soit
liberal & magnifique, mais avec choix & avec dessein, que sa magnificence paroisse
dans son train, dans sa livree & dans le reste de son equipage; que la proprete,
I'abondance, & meme la delicatesse, regne sur sa table: qu'il donne souvent des fetes et
des divertissemens aux principales personnes de la Cour OU il se trouve, & au Prince
meme, s'il est d'humeur a y prendre part, qu'il tache d'entrer dans ses parties de
divertissemens, mais d'une maniere agreable & sans le contraindre, & qu'il yapporte
toujours un air ouvert, complaisant, honnete et un desir continuel de lui plaire.
449
S'il est dans un Etat populaire, il faut qu'il assiste a toutes ses Diettes ou Assemblees,
qu'il y tienne grande table pour y attirer les Deputez, et qu'il s'y acquiere par ses
honnestetez & par ses presens, les plus accreditez & les plus capables de detourner les
resolutions prejudiciables aux interets de son Maitre, & de favoriser ses desseins.
44. 10.
Une bonne table facilite les moyens de sc;avoir ce qui se passe, lorsque les gens du pays
ont la liberte d'aller manger chez I'Ambassadeur, & la depense qu'il y fait est non
seulement honorable, mais encore tres-utile a son Maitre lorsque le N egociateur la sc;ait
bien mettre en oeuvre. C'est le propre de la bonne chere de concilier les esprits, de faire
naitre de la familiarite et de l' ouverture de coeur entre les convives.
On appelle un Ambassadeur un honorable Espion; parce que I'une des ses principales
occupations est de decouvrir les secrets des Cours ou il se trouve, & il s'acquitte mal de
son employ s'il ne sc;ait pas faire les depenses necessaires pour gagner ceux qui sont
propres a l' en instruire.
44. 12 .
La fermete est encore qualite tres-necessaire a un Negociateur ... un homme ne timide

n'est pas capable de bien conduire de grands desseins; il se laisse ebranler facilement
dans les accidens imprevus, la peur peut faire decouvrir son secret par les impressions
qu'elle fait sur son visage, & par le trouble qu'elle cause dans ses discours; elle peut
meme lui faire prendre des mesures prejudiciables aux affaires dont il est charge, &
lorsque l'honneur de son Maitre est attaque, elle I'empeche de le soutenir avec la
vigueur & la fermete si necessaires en ces occasions, & de repousser I'injure qu'on luy
fait, avec cette noble fierte & cette audace qui accompagnent un homme de courage....
Mais l'irresolution est tres-pr~judiciable dans la conduite des grandes affaires; il y faut
un esprit decisif: qui apres avoir balance les divers inconveniens, sc;ache prendre son
parti & le suivre avec fermete.
Un bon Negociateur ne doit jamais fander le succes des ses negociations sur de fausses
promesses & sur des manquemens de fay; c'est une erreur de croire, suivant I'opinion
444
vulgaire, qu'il faut qu'un habile Ministre soit un grand mai'tre en l'art de fourber; la
fourberie est un effet de la petitesse de l'esprit de celui qui le met en usage & c'est une
marque qu'il n'a pas assez d'etendue pour trouver les moyens de parvenir ases fins, par
les voyes justes & raisonnables.
44. 14.
Un homme qui se possede & qui est toujours de sang fro id a un grand avantage a traiter
avec un homme vif & plein de feu; & on peut dire qu'ils ne combattent pas avec armes
egales. Pour reiissir en ces sortes d'employs, il y faut beaucoup moins parlerqu'ecouter;
il faut du flegme, de la retenue, beaucoup de discretion & une patience atoute epreuve.
Un homme engage dans les employs publics, doit considerer qu' il est destine pour agir &
non pas pour demeurer trop longtemps enferme dans son cabinet, que sa principale
etude doit etre de s'instruire de ce qui se passe parmi les vivans, preferablement atout ce
qui s' est passe chez les morts.
44. 16.
Un sage & habile Negociateur doit non seulement etre bon Chretien; mais paroitre
toujours tel dans ses discours & dans sa maniere de vivre.
11 doit etre juste & modeste dans toutes ses actions, respectueux avec les Princes,
complaisant avec ses egaux, carressant avec ses inferieurs, doux, civil & honneste avec
tout le monde.
44. 1 8.
11 faut qu'il s'accommode aux moeurs & aux Coutumes du Pays Oll il se trouve, sans y
temoigner de la repugnance & sans les mepriser, comme font plusieurs Negociateurs qui
loiient sans cesse les manieres de vivre de leurs pays pour trouver a redire a celles des
autres.
44 19
Un Negociateur doit se persuader une fois pour toutes qu'il n'est pas assez autorise pour
reduire tout un pays a sa fac;on de vivre, & qu'il est bien plus raisonnable qu'il
s'accommode a celle du Pays Oll il est pour le peu de temps qu'il y doit rester.
11 ne doit jamais blamer la forme du gouvernement & moins encore la conduite du
Prince avec qui il negocie, il faut au contraire qu'illoiie tout ce qu'il y trouve de loiiable
sans affectation et sans basse flaterie. 11 n'y a point de Nations & d'Etats qui n'ayent
plusieurs bonnes loix parmy quelques mauvaises, il doit loiier les bonnes & ne point
parler de celles qui ne le sont pas.
44.2 I.
11 est bon qu'il sache ou qu'il etudie l'histoire du Pays Oll il se trouve, afin qu'il ait
occasion d' entretenir le Prince ou les principaux de sa Cour des grandes actions de leurs
Ancetres & de celles qu'ils ont faites eux-memes ce qui lui est fort capable de lui acquerir
leur inclination, qu'illes mette souvent sur ces matieres, & qu'il se les fasse raconterpar
eux, parce qu'il est sur qu'illeur fera plaisir de les ecouter, et qu'il doit rechercher aleur
en faire.
Un Negociateur doit toujours faire des relations avantageuses, des affaires de son Maitre
dans le pays Oll il se trouve, mais avec discretion & en se conservant de la creance pour
les avis qu'il don ne; il faut pour cela qu'il evite de debiter des mensonges, comme font
souvent certains Ministres de nos voisins qui ne font aucun scrupule de publier des
avantages imaginaires en faveur de ceux de leur party. Outre que le mensonge est
indigne d'un Ministre public, il fait plus de tort que de profit aux affaires de son Ma'itre,
parce qu'on n'ajoute plus de foy aux avis qui viennent de sa part; il est vray qu'il est
difficile de ne pas recevoir quelquefois de faux avis, mais il faut les donner tels qu'on les a
rec;us, sans s' en rendre garand; & un habile Negociateur doit etablir si bien la reputation
de sa bonne-foy dans l'esprit du Prince & des Ministres avec qui il negocie, qu'ils ne
doutent point de la verite de ses avis lorsqu'illes leur a donnez pour surs non plus que de
la verite de ses promesses.
Un Ambassadeur doit eviter de recevoir au nombre de ses principaux domestiques des
445
gens du Pays OU il se trouve, ce sont d'ordinaire des espions qu'il introduit dans sa
malson.
Quelques elevez que soient les Princes, ils sont hommes comme nous, c'est-cl-dire sujets
aux memes passions, mais outre celles qui leur sont communes avec les autres hommes,
l'opinion qu'ils ont de leur grandeur, & le pouvoir effectifqui est attache cl leur rang leur
donnent des idees differentes de celles du commun des hommes, & il faut qu'un bon
Negociateur agisse avec eux par rapport cl leurs idees, s'il veut ne pas se tromper.
11 est plus avantageux cl un habile Negociateur de negocier de vive voix, parce qu'il a
plus d'occasions de decouvrir par ce moyen les sentimens & les desseins de ceux avec qui
il traite, & d' employer sa dexterite cl leur en inspirer de conformes cl ses vues par ses
insinuations & par la force des ses raisons.
La plupart des hommes qui parlent d'affaires ont plus d'attention cl ce qu'ils veulent dire
qu'cl ce qu'on leur dit, ils sont si pleins de leurs idees qu'ils ne songent qu'cl se faire
ecouter, & ne peuvent presque obtenir sur eux-memes d'ecouter cl leur tour.... L'une
des qualitez le plus necessaire cl un bon Negociateur est de sc;avoir ecouter avec attention
& avec reflexion tout ce qu'on luy veut dire, & de repondrejuste & bien cl propos aux
choses qu'on luy represente, bien-Ioin de s'empresser cl declarer tout ce qu'il sc;ait & tout
ce qu'il desire. 11 n'expose d'abord le sujet de sa negociation quejusqu'au point qu'il faut
pour sonder le terrain, il regie ses discours & sa conduite sur ce qu'il decouvre tant par
les reponses qu'on lui fait, que par les mouvemens du visage, par le ton & l'air dont
on lui parle; & par toutes les autres circonstances qui peuvent contribuer cl luy faire
penetrer les pensees & les desseins de ceux avec qui il traite, & apres avoir connu
la situation & la portee de leurs esprits, I'etat de leurs affaires, leurs passions & leurs
interests, il se sert de toutes ses connoissances pour les conduire par degrez au but qu'il
s' est propose.
C'est un des plus grands secrets de l'art de negocier que de sc;avoir, pour ainsi dire,
distiler goute cl goute dans l'esprit de ceux avec qui on negocie les choses qu'on a interest
de leur persuader....
Comme les affaires sont ordinairement epineuses par les difficultez qu'il y a d'ajuster des
interests souvent opposez entre des Princes & des Etats qui ne reconnoissent point de
Juges de leurs pretentions, il faut que celuy qui en est charge employe son adresse cl
diminuer & cl aplanir ces difficultez, non seulement par les expediens que ses lumieres
luy doivent suggerer, mais encore par un esprit liant & souple qui sc;ache se plier &
s'accommoder aux passions & meme aux caprices & aux preventions de ceux avec qui il
traite. Un homme difficultueux & d'un esprit dur & contrariant augmente les difficultez
attachees aux affaires par la rudesse de son humeur, qui aigrit & aliene les esprits, & if
erige souvent en affaires d'importance des bagatelles & des pretentions mal fondees,
dont il se fait des especes d'entraves qui l'arretent cl tous momens dans le cours de sa
negociation.
n ne se trouve presque point d'hommes qui veiiillent avoiier qu'ils ont tort, ou qu'ils se
trompent, & qui se depoiiillent entierement de leurs sentimens en faveur de ceux
d'autruy, quand on ne fait que les contredire par des raisons opposees quelques bonnes
qu'elles puissent etre, mais if y en a plusieurs qui sont capables de se relacher de
quelques-unes de leurs opinions, quand on leur en accorde d'autres, ce qui se fait
moyennant certains menagemens propres cl les faire revenir de leurs preventions; il faut
pour cela avoir l'art de leur alleguer des raisons capables de justifier ce qu'ils ont fait ou
ce qu'ils ont cru par le passe, afin de flater leur amour propre, & leur faire connoitre
ensuite des raisons plus fortes appuyees sur leurs interets, pour les faire changer de
sentiment et de conduite ... if faut eviter les contestations aigres & obstinees avec les
Princes & avec leurs Ministres & leur representer la raison sans trop de chaleur, & sans
vouloir avoir toujours le dernier mot.
446
44.30.
44.3 I.
A century later the first Earl of Malmesbury 4 wrote to Lord Camden, at the
latter's request, on his nephew, MrJames, being destined for the foreign service:
Park Place, April 1I, 1813.
My DEAR LoRD,
It is not an easy matter in times like these, to write anything on the subject of a Foreign
Minister's conduct that might not be rendered inapplicable to the purpose by daily
events. Mr. James' best school will be the advantage he will derive from the abilities of
his Principal, and from his own observations.
44.32.
The first and best advice I can give a young man on entering this career, is to listen, not to
talk - at least, not more than is necessary to induce others to talk. I have in the course of
my life, by endeavouring to follow this method, drawn from my opponents much
information, and concealed from them my own views, much more than by the
employment of spies or money.
44.33.
To be very cautious in a'!-y country, or at a'!-y court, of such as, on your first arrival,
appear the most eager to make your acquaintance and communicate their ideas to you.
I have ever found their professions insincere, and their intelligence false. They have been
the first I have wished to shake off, whenever I have been so imprudent as to give them
credit for sincerity. They are either persons who are not considered or respected in their
own country, or are put about you to entrap and circumvent you as newly arrived.
44.34.
Englishmen should be most particularly on their guard against such men, for we have
none such on our side the water, and are ourselves so little coming towards foreigners, that
we are astonished and gratified when we find a different treatment from that which
strangers experience here; but our reserve and ill manners are infinitely less dangerous to
the stranger than these premature and hollow civilities.
44.35.
To avoid what is termed abroad an al/achement. If the other party concerned should
happen to be sincere, it absorbs too much time, occupies too much your thoughts; if
insincere, it leaves you at the mercy of a profligate and probably interested character.
44.36.
Never to attempt to export English habits and manners, but to conform as far as possible
to those of the country where you reside - to do this even in the most trivial things - to
learn to speak their language, and never to sneer at what may strike you as singular and
absurd. Nothing goes to conciliate so much, or to amalgamate you more cordially with
its inhabitants, as this very easy sacrifice o(your national prejudices to thein.
44.37.
To keep your cypher and all your official papers under a very secure lock and key; but
not to boast of your precautions, as Mr Drake did to Mehee de la Touche.
44.38.
Not to allow any opponent to carry away any official document, under the pretext that
he wishes 'to study it more carefully;' let him read it as often as he wishes, and, if it is
necessary, allow him to take minutes of it, but both in .your presence.
44.39.
Not to be carried away by any real or supposed distinctions from the sovereign at whose
Court you reside, or to imagine, because he may say a few more commonplace sentences
to you than to your colleagues, that he entertains a special personal predilection for you,
or is more disposed to favour the views and interests of your Court than if he did not
notice you at all. This is a species of royal stage-trick, often practised, and for which it is
right to be prepared.
44-40.
Whenever you receive discretionary instructions (this is, when authority is given you) in
order to obtain any very desirable end, to decrease your demands Or increase your
concessions according as you find the temper and disposition ofthe Court where you are
employed, and to be extremely careful not to let it be supposed that you have any such
447
authority; to make a firm, resolute stand on the first offer you are instructed to make,
and, if you find 'this nail will not drive,' to bring forward your others most gradually, and
not, either from an apprehension of not succeeding at all, or from an over-eagerness to
succeed too rapidly, injure essentially the interests of your Court.
44.4 I.
It is scarcely necessary to say that no occasion, no provocation, no anxiety to rebut an

unjust accusation, no idea, however tempting, ofpromoting the object you have in view,
can need, much less justify, a falsehood. Success obtained by one is a precarious and
baseless success. Detection would ruin, not only your own reputation for ever, but
deeply wound the honour of your Court. If, as frequently happens, an indiscreet
question, which seems to require a distinct answer, is put to you abruptly by an artful
minister, parry it either by treating it as an indiscreet question, or get rid ofit by a grave
and serious look: but on no account contradict the assertion flatly ifit be true, or admit it
as true, if false and of a dangerous tendency.
44.42.
In ministerial conferences, to exert every effort of memory to carry away faithfully and
correctly what you hear (what you say in them yourself you will not forget); and, in
drawing your report, to be most careful it should be faithful and correct. I dwell the
more on this (seemingly a useless hint) because it is a most seducing temptation, and one
to which we often give way almost unconsciously, in order to give a better turn to a
phrase, or to enhance our skill in negotiation; but we must remember we mislead and
deceive our Government by it.
I am, etc. 5
44.43.
A good diplomatist will always endeavour to put himself in the position ofthe
person with whom he is treating, and try to imagine what he would wish, do
and say, under those circumstances. As Callieres observed:
'11 faut qu'il se depoiiille en quelque sorte de ses propres sentimens pour se mettre en la
place du Prince [say, the government] avec qui il traite, qu'il se transforme, pour ainsi
dire en luy, qu'il entre dans ses opinions & dans ses inclinations, & qu'il se dise cl luimeme apres I' avoir connu tel qu' il est, sij'itois en la place de ce Prince avec le meme pouvoir, les
memes passions & les memes prijugez, quels effets produiroient en moy les choses que j'ay a luy
representer?'
44.44.
The man who speaks in a foreign tongue, not his own, is to a certain extent
wearing a disguise. If one wants to discover his ideas de derriere la tete encourage
him to use his own language. Prince Bismarck is reported to have said: 'Der alte
[ich verstand Meyendorfl] hat mir einmal gesagt: Trauen Sie keinen
Englander der das Franzosische mit richtigem Accent spricht, und ich habe das
meist bestatigt gefunden. Nur ado Russell mochte ich ausnehmen.' This
remark cuts both ways. On the other hand, a minister who can spare time to
study the language of the country to which he is sent, will find its acquisition of
great advantage. The surest way to gain admission to the heart ofa nation is to
give this proofofa desire to cultivate intimate relations with, and to understand
the feelings of, the people.
44.45
A diplomatist must be on his guard to protect the dignity of the state which he
represents. Thus, the Duc de Mortemart, French Ambassador at Petersburg,
having been invited to attend a performance of the Te Deum in celebration of
Russian victories over the Turks, learnt that it was to be given in a church
decorated with flags taken from the French, and on this ground declined to be
present. This course was approved by both his own government and by the
448
Emperor of Russia. 6 In October 1831, after the capture of Warsaw from the
Polish insurgents by the Russian troops, M. Bourgoing, the French Minister,
refused to be present at a Te Deum ordered to celebrate the triumph of the
Russian Government, and he informed Count Nesselrode of his intention to
absent himself, his reason being the strong sympathy for the Poles which was
felt in France. On the same day he dined at an official banquet given at the
Austrian Embassy, went publicly the next day to the theatre, and passed the
evening at a private house. I t does not appear that his conduct was made a
ground of complaint to the French Government by the Emperor? But it is
scarcely admissible for an envoy to refuse to be present on such occasions,
merely on the ground of friendship between his own country and the
belligerent over whose defeat the rejoicing is held.
44.46.
It is not always easy to avoid making mistakes in precedence and protocol

generally in a foreign country. A diplomat who considers himself the victim of
such an one and attempts to make a scene renders himself, more often than
not, ridiculous, even if he tries to justify himself on the ground that it is his
country's position that he is defending and not his own. Such mistakes are
seldom made of malice aforethought.
44.47.
The head of a mission should be careful that the affairs, the manners and
customs of the country in which he is residing are not criticised at his table.
What he or his guests may say on such subjects is sure to be repeated to his
disadvantage. A native occasionally makes disparaging remarks about his own
country. A diplomatist should think at least twice before he expresses
agreement with them.
44.48.
A diplomatist should not hold government bonds or shares in a limited liability

company in the territory of the state where he is accredited, and in general,
neither real nor personal property which is under the local jurisdiction. A
fortiori he should not engage in trade or hold directorships, or speculate on the
Stock Exchange. He must not incur the risk of his judgement as to the financial
stability of the state or of local commercial undertakings being deflected by his
personal interest.
44.49.
A diplomatist must be on his guard against the notion that his own post is the
centre of international politics, and against an exaggerated estimate ofthe part
assigned to him in the general scheme. Those in whose hands is placed the
supreme direction of foreign relations are alone able to decide what should be
the main object of state policy, and to estimate the relative value of political
friendships and alliances.
44.50.
In former times a wide discretion in the interpretation of his instructions was

permitted to an envoy, in case it became necessary to take a sudden decision,
but in these days, when telegraphic communication is universal, if he is of
opinion that his instructions are not perfectly adapted to secure the object in
view, he can easily ask for the modification he judges to be desirable. In doing
this he will be well advised to explain his reasons at full length. I t is better to
spend money on telegrams than to risk the failure of a negotiation.
449
44.51.
A diplomatic agent should beware of communicating the text of the

instructions he receives, whether by telegram or written despatch, unless he is
specifically told to do so. It sometimes happens that he is told to read a despatch
to the minister for foreign affairs, and to leave with him a copy. With this
exception, the ambassador should generally confine himself to making the
sense of his instructions known by note, or by word of mouth.
44.52.
The case of Bulwer8 at Madrid, in 1848, who enclosed, in an official note to the
Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy ofa despatch of 16 March, marked
'confidential', in which Palmerston instructed him to ofler to the Spanish
Government advice on the internal affairs of the kingdom, is an example ofthe
unwisdom of putting in writing language which, if used orally, would have
been much less likely to give offence.
44.53.
Before sending home the report of any important conversation with the
minister for foreign affairs, in which the latter has made statements or given
promises that may afterwards be relied on as evidence of intentions or
undertakings of the government in whose name he is assumed to have spoken, it
may be advisable to submit to him the draft report for any observations he may
desire to make. It is said that Lord Normanby, when Ambassador at Paris,
reproduced a conversation of M. Guizot's, which the latter asserted was
incorrect, and he pointed out that the report of a conversation made by a
foreign agent can only be regarded as authentic and irrefragable when it has
previously been su bmitted to the person whose language is being reported. He
added that if Lord Normanby had conformed to this practice, he would have
spoken otherwise and perhaps better. 9
44.54
In concluding any written agreement with the state to which he is accredited,

the agent should take ample time to study the document carefully so as to avoid
any ambiguity or imperfection in the terms employed. The use of clear and
definite language should in all cases be secured, the meaning ofwhich shall not
be open to doubt or dispute.
44.55.
Despatches, their style. '11 faut que le stile des depeches soit net & concis, sans y employer de
paroles inutiles & sans y rien obmettre de ce qui sert a la clarte du discours, qu'il regne
une noble simplicite, aussi eloignee d'une vaine affectation de sc;ience & de bel esprit, de
negligence & de grossierete, & qu'elles soient egalement epurees de certaines fac;ons de
parler nouvelles & affectees, & de celles qui sont basses & hors du bel usage. 11 y a peu de
choses qui puissent demeurer secrettes parmi les hommes qui ont un long commerce
ensemble, des lettres interceptees & plusieurs autres accidens imprevus les decouvrent
souvent, & on en pourrait citer ici divers exemples; ainsi il est de la sagesse d'un bon
Negociateur de songer lorsqu'il ecrit que ses depeches peuvent etre vues du Prince ou des
Ministres dont il parle, & qu'il doit les faire de telle sorte qu'ils n'ayent pas de sujet
legitime de s' en plaindre.' 10
44.56.
When not too hard pressed, heads of missions and of Foreign Office
departments can contribute greatly to the training of junior members of the
Service in their duties and conduct in general, more particularly perhaps in the
proper methods of drafting letters, despatches, etc. If, as is all too apt to happen
nowadays, they have too little time to act personally as instructors, they should
make a point of delegating the task to some experienced member of their
mission or department. This applies also to dress and behaviour: casualness in
450
either on the part of a member of the Foreign Service reflects discredit not only
on himself but also on the mission or department to which he belongs.
44.57.
The duties ofthe head ofa mission include also the furtherance ofthe legitimate
private interests of his own countrymen residing in or passing through the
country to which he is accredited, the giving of advice to them when in
difficulties and especially intervention on their behalf, if they invoke his
assistance when they are arrested and detained in custody. This should be done
through the ministry for foreign affairs, to which he alone is entitled to address
himsel He should not, however, interfere in civil actions that may be brought
against them, or in criminal matters except where manifest injustice or a
departure from the strict course of legal procedure has taken place. He must on
no account occupy himself with the interests of any but the subjects or
ressortissants (a much wider term) of his own sovereign or state, and especially
not with those of the subjects of the local sovereign.
44.58.
A diplomatist ought not to publish without the authority of his immediate

superiors any writing embodying his personal views on international politics,
either anonymously or with his name. The rule of the British Service is very
strict in regard to the publication of experiences in any country where a
diplomatist has served, without the previous sanction of the Secretary ofState,
and it applies to retired members as well as to those still on active service.
44.59.
The reader who has reached this point in the chapter will reflect that the art of
negotiation is not new and that wisdom from the past is every bit as valid today
as it was in the times of Callieres and Malmesbury. The twentieth-century
psychologist may analyse what the skilled practitioner has always known
instinctively. Negotiation is a dialogue made up of give and take, and the
diplomat will be a poor performer who, as Callieres says, is so full of his own
ideas that he can only think about getting himself listened to, and can scarcely
bring himself to listen in his turn. 11 It is noteworthy that this insistence on the
virtue of listening is common to both Callieres and Malmesbury. Perhaps the
advice of the latter to a young man 'to listen, not to talk - at least not more than
is necessary to induce others to talk - is a shade cynical, or at least too sweeping.
Sometimes you have a long or complex message to deliver which may need
clarifying. Sometimes, maybe, the other interlocutor has a legitimate wish to
listen himself. Everyone knows the colleague who asks everything and gives
nothing; and Callieres warned against this too. Malmesbury has a good point for
beginners; but Callieres, mindful of the potency of suggestion, recommends
learning the secret of distilling 'drop by drop' into the mind of the listener the
matter of which one wishes to persuade him. 12 And it may happen that the
advice to listen becomes more rather than less urgent with experience; for the
more one has to say, the greater the temptation to say it, whether it be timely or
not.
Problems of protocol and precedence
451
The Nicolson dermition

44.60.
Before advice is offered on situations arising from latter-day changes in the

method and content of diplomacy - situations which Satow would certainly
have dealt with - one more classic statement must be added on what a diplomat
ought to be, say and do. It may suitably be called 'the Nicolson test'.
'These, then, are the qualities of my ideal diplomatist. Truth, accuracy,
calm, patience, good temper, modesty, loyalty. They are also the qualities ofan
ideal diplomacy.'
'''But,'' the reader may object, "you have forgotten intelligence,
knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage and
even tact." I have not forgotten them. I have taken them for granted.'13
44. 6 1.
One should pause a moment over 'truth.' When a Soviet Foreign Minister told
the President of the United States in 1962 that there were no Soviet missile
launchers in Cuba, President Kennedy happened to have in his desk drawer a
photograph ofjust such weapons. What could be his judgement? Perhaps that
of Aristotle who, it is said, when asked what a person could gain by uttering a
falsehood, replied, 'Not to be credited when he shall speak the truth.' The
incident did not change the power position in the world. I t merely cast a
qualification over future judgements made not at the diplomatic but at the
highest political level.
44.62.
The same comment could be applied to relations with Bismarck when it

became known that, by sending in 1870 the famous Ems telegram, a message
not wholly consonant with truth, he had made sure that war between Prussia
and France could not be prevented.
ProblelDs of protocol and precedence

44.63.
A sure way of making oneselflook foolish is to 'make a scene' about matters of

precedence and protocol. In 1508 Dr de Puebla, the Spanish Ambassador in
London (and incidentally the first resident ambassador there) informed his
successor that 'it was his custom to attend court ceremonies when he was
invited and to sit or stand wherever he was placed, since his business was to
maintain friendship between his master and the King of England and he
thought it would be ill served by making a fuss over trifles.' 14
44.64.
It should always be remembered that protocol is a means to an end and not an

end in itself. As Sir William Temple, British Ambassador to the Viceregal
Court at Brussels, put it, 'ceremonies were made to facilitate business, not to
hinder it. 'l~ If protocol and procedure go beyond this, then the proper sense of
proportion has been lost, and that frequent phrase, 'it is not for me, it is for my
country' has lost its integrity.
44.65.
In the more informal diplomatic society of the latter twentieth century,

younger diplomats may feel an impatience with protocol and ask whether it is
452
really necessary. For the answer one can best refer back to the battle of the
retinues at the Tower Wharf in London in 166 I, before general rules ofprotocol
and precedence had evolved into an accepted system. 16 An alternative
reference might be to the diplomatic chaos produced by President Thomas
J efferson of the United States, who decided, on lively democratic grounds, to
dispense with any attempt at formal seating arrangements and to place
members of his Administration and foreign envoys and their wives in an order
which corresponded to his feelings towards individuals and the governments
they represented. 17
44. 66 .
Put generally and less dramatically, ifno rules governed diplomatic and other
official occasions, the problem of seating would be solved by a free-for-all with
unfair results. In this respect diplomats would behave neither better nor worse
than other human beings. Obviously in public life some people are more
powerful or more interesting than others, and a seat next to one (or two) ofthem is
something of both a privilege and an advantage. If there were no rules there
would be pushing and shoving, and unscrupulous characters would, with
whatever pretence of politeness, place themselves more effectively than others
with a more developed sense of courtesy. Much bad blood would be created
and the host government would rightly be criticised for letting it happen. A
fixed order may repeatedly put a diplomat next to Mrs X with whom he has no
common language, or Mr Y to whom, two dinners ago, he or she had already
said all that there was to say, after listening to all the other had to contribute.
But diplomats and politicians move on: discomforts caused by official placement
(arrangement of guests at a table) can easily be exaggerated and there are often
pleasant surprises. At least, if the rules are followed, there is no discord. The
wisdom of the Congress of Vienna is not to be despised.
An important contribution a diplomat can make to this procedural harmony is
not to take any risk of causing a scene when he himself is the host at some
diplomatic occasion. He should never be content to trust to instinct or to an
ostensibly knowing colleague's advice. If he has the slightest doubt about
placement at a table, or at separate tables - and both types of party will
continue to take place - he should consult the host government's Head
of Protocol. It is that official's duty to know and to advise; if he does not
know, the person who has put a difficult problem to him has rendered
him a service. The problem may recur.
Protocol and placement need not be totally rigid. Let us suppose that, as can
quite possibly happen, the balance of acceptances and refusals for a sit-down
luncheon leaves the host in a situation where all the diplomatic guests outrank
all the guests from the host country. To seat them accordingly might well defeat
the whole purpose of the party. It is possible to adjust the placement to suit
common sense, by mixing diplomatic and host country guests, but only if the
precaution is taken in advance of making sure that all the guests who will be
'demoted' according to protocol have no objection. IS
If a private citizen makes a protocol mistake, it is best disregarded. If a

diplomatic colleague, particularly a friendly one, makes a mistake, it is
probably best to say nothing at the time, but to mention it gently and
Public occasions
453
quietly when the next opportunity for a private word arises. If the diplomat
who notices the mistake does not do as much as this, he may be the passive
and unwitting accomplice of less charitable persons who know what has
happened and rather enjoy the thought that it might happen again.
Public occasions
44.7 0 .
The real difficulty occurs when on a public occasion, or an occasion which will
be known about publicly, a mistake is made by the host government or by, say,
a diplomatic colleague, which could legitimately be thought to disturb
international relations or give rise to misunderstanding. The situation is
particularly difficult to handle when, as can well be the case, the diplomat
whose position is adversely affected has only a few seconds in which to make up
his mind whether to protest at once or to let the matter pass. In the latter case he
can protest later to the host government, but this is obviously much less telling
than to make his objection known at once.
44.71.
In 1954 a certain ambassador in Moscow felt he could contribute usefully

to friendly relations between Eastern and Western Europe by inviting to a male
dinner party a number of colleagues from either side of the prevailing
ideological contest. This led, among other things, to the British Ambassador,
Sir William Hayter, being seated next to the Ambassador of the German
Democratic Republic. There was no personal problem - there seldom is. But
the policy ofthe British Government at the time was allied to that ofthe Federal
German Government in not accepting the idea of a divided Germany. This
being so, Britain and East Germany had no diplomatic relations with each
other. The host had thus put two senior diplomatic officers (and indirectly the
Federal German Government) in an impossible position. A diplomat on an
occasion like this cannot suddenly divest himself of his diplomatic status and
regard the event as an amiable gesture between personal friends. A negative
response is not one of personal stuffiness or public pomposity. If the British
Ambassador had let the matter pass then, however strenuously he or his
Government strove to deny it later, there would be those in politics, diplomacy
or the media who would interpret such friendly tolerance as a change, however
slight, in the attitude of the British Government. (This would have suited the
East German Government, whose representative naturally did not protest.) Sir
William Hayter took the only action open to him, which was to walk out. The
American Ambassador, Mr Charles E. Bohlen, like Sir William a professional
diplomat of great experience, finding himself in a similar position, walked out
with him.
44.7 2 .
Strange events such as these are the oddities affecting contemporary

diplomacy, especially in countries and regions where secrecy combined with
strict political orthodoxy is regarded as a prerequisite of good government. In
such situations it is advisable to form the habit ofscanning the seating order at a
pu blic function as a clue for a correct judgement of the balance ofpower within
the government. Furthermore, remembering that on public occasions in such
454
countries every detail of speech and conduct may be planned and observed
with an eye to its potential utilisation in propaganda, a diplomat will be wise to
refrain from applauding an official speech unless he understands it, even
though his applause might be intended merely as a courtesy to the host
government. But all these counsels to circumspection lead back to a reminder of
the elementary principle that the diplomatic officer arriving at a new post must
try to develop a feel for the way in which the host country manages its external
policy.
44.73.
If you are in the United States, you will be conscious of the important and
active role played by the Congress, and particularly by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, in the supervision of policy and the appointment of
ambassadors. This perspective is reflected in those Latin American countries
which maintain democratic government on the United States model. In
Britain and other Commonwealth countries, where the power of the executive
is more direct, there is sometimes a temptation to impatience with what seem
(wrongly) to be deliberate American procrastinations.
44.74.
In countries with political organisations ofthe French type, a diplomat will find
that he has to learn to understand and work with the so-called cabinet system. 19
The Minister, as in all governments, derives information and support from his
department. But he has also a personal supporting team of his own choice,
consisting partly of officials and partly of people from political, academic and
professional life who, while conversant with external policy, are his personal
eyes and ears in relation to what the rest of the government is thinking and
doing. This arrangement, among other things, helps to protect his external
policy against erosion from outside his own department.
44.75.
Since the institutions of the European Community are based very largely on a
Latin rather than an Anglo-Saxon tradition, it is natural that a cabinet system
should prevail there; and the diplomat in Brussels, whether representing a
member country or a non-member, will need to develop relations with the
cabinet as well as the department of any Commissioners with whom contact is
needed.
44.76.
Another variant in relationships is to be found in Communist countries. Since

in each of these a particular brand of Communist doctrine governs all political
and economic thinking, including, of course, international relations, machinery is necessary by which doctrine can be blended with the purposes and
practices of day-to-day external policy. A method of achieving this is the socalled collegiate system. This means that when consideration of important
external policy matters reaches a high level in government, it must be discussed
at a meeting of senior Communist Party officials and diplomatic officers. This
process minimises the conflict between day-to-day policy and current ideology;
it also explains some of the delays which occur in negotiation with the Soviet
Union and with those countries which feel it essential to assure Soviet
concurrence in any policy initiative. 20
Internal discords
455
Internal discords
44.77.
Diplomacy, like any other worldwide aCtivIty, enjoys and suffers its own
peculiar rewards and deprivations: against absorbing interest must be set the
disadvantages of family separation; against exciting variety, periods of
unexpected monotony. Diplomacy also has privileges, as described in previous
chapters, linked with special obligation and responsibility. Within this general
framework are the phases ofpersonal relationship which can, at least over short
periods, make or mar the good functioning of the machine as a whole. One of
these, while common enough in other walks of life, has particular dangers in
diplomacy. It has been called the Us and Them complex; and it can still arise
even in an age when the international telephone system is generally at hand to
link the post abroad with the ministry at home.
44.78.
Honest differences of view between different diplomatic missions serving the

same government, or between a mission and the home department, are
unavoidable and indeed essential to proper analysis offuture policy. But there
is a dangerous by-product ifsuch disagreement corrodes into destructive habit.
It is only too easy to build up in a mission abroad a picture of Us as
hardworking, conscientious and prompt, battling with a disobliging foreign
government and a disagreeable climate, while They are living comfortably at
home, taking their bureaucratic time over correspondence and callous about
Our physical affiictions. Or, in reverse, We are commuting uncomfortably,
cramped bureaucratically, and (to Our way of thinking) financially
disadvantaged; why is this not apparent to Them?
44.79.
None of this is wholly unreasonable; its only fault is that, ifit is allowed to grow,
it is fatal, first to personal relationships between post and ministry, and later to
the conduct of the diplomatic machine. The main responsibility for averting
this development of the Us and Them disease lies with the head of the post or
the head of the department. But no one should be unconscious of the possible
danger, or too torpid, or too timid, to do something about it when its symptoms
appear. There are ways and ways of complaining or protesting; most of them
are wrong and can produce a pained reaction. The search for the right way is
one of the challenges to diplomats and to a diplomatic service. Neither total
complacency nor total officiousness is helpful, and tattle is apt to be worse still.
Mutual confidence within diplomatic services varies from nation to nation, but
there are certain observable general principles and this is one of them. 21
44.80.
Most advice to diplomats falls, as natural science used to fall, under the heading
'organised common sense.' But among the traps that can be difficult to detect
without advice is the following. It can happen that a young diplomat suddenly
finds himself or herself thrown into a position of abnormally heavy
responsibility when an unexpected crisis occurs in the absence of the head of
mission or leader of delegation. The young diplomat performs brilliantly,
possibly in a way that attracts public attention. It is subconsciously tempting at
such a moment to promote oneself to a rank beyond that which one's limited
service will carry. The essence ofdiscretion at this point is to remind oneselfthat
experience is the best ally of true talent.
456
44.81.
But enough of precept. Shakespeare must have, as so often, the last word. No
one is quite sure whether Polonius's advice to Laertes is to be taken as parody,
irony or high seriousness. But to say to a diplomat:
'... to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man'22
is to get as near to the kernel of truth as this Guide can travel.
And if the diplomat, aspiring or experienced, who has read thus far should
feel that he has had his fill of instruction and exhortation, let him, or her, take
consolation in Warwick's exclamation:
'Alas! How should you govern any kingdom
That know not how to use ambassadors?'23
Appendix I
Definitions and terms
A. SOlDe dermitions
I.
The following elucidations of certain terms and expressions, some of which are
no longer in current use, have been retained from earlier editions on account of
their intrinsic interest. Briefer notes have been added on a few terms commonly
used today, but not figuring in the index.
2.
Ultimatum. This term signifies a note or memorandum in which a government

or its diplomatic representative sets forth the conditions on which the state in
whose name the declaration is made will insist. It should contain an express
demand for a prompt, clear and categorical reply, and it may also require the
answer to be given within a fixed limit of time. This is as much as to say that an
ultimatum embodies the final condition or concession, 'the last word,' so to
speak, of the person negotiating. I It ordinarily, but not always, implies a threat
to use force, if the demand is not complied with.
3.
A good example of this is contained in the last paragraph ofa note addressed by
the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople to the Reis-Effendi in 1826,
which was thus worded:
Le soussigne terminera la tache que lui imposent les instructions de son souverain, en
declarant cl la Porte Ottomane que, si, contre la legitime attente de l'Empereur, les
mesures indiquees dans les trois demandes qui forment le present office n'auraient pas
ete mises completement cl execution dans le delai de six semaines, il quitterait aussit6t
Constinatinople. Il est facile aux ministres de Sa Hautesse de prevoir les consequences
immediates de cet evenement.
Le soussigne, etc.
MI;\/CIAKI. 2
Constantinople,
le 5 avril, 1826.
4.
Another case of ultimatum in the ordinary sense occurred in 1850, when, by the
orders ofPalmerston, the British Minister at Athens presented a demand for the
settlement of the Don Pacifico claim within twenty-four hours, failing which a
blockade of the coasts of Greece would be established and Greek merchant
ships seized. 3
The note from the British Minister to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs
of 5 January 1850, after making a formal demand for reparation for the
wrongs and injuries inflicted in Greece upon British and Ionian subjects, and
458
Appendix I
the satisfaction of their claims within twenty-four hours, announced that if the
demand were not literally complied with within that period after the note had
been placed in the hands of the Hellenic Minister for Foreign Affairs, the
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's naval forces in the Mediterranean
would have no other alternative (however painful the necessity might be to
him) than to act at once on the orders he had received from Her Majesty's
Government. 4
5.
Article I of The Hague Convention No. 3 of 1907 declares that:

'Les Puissances contractantes reconnaissent que les hostilites entre elIes ne doivent pas
commencer sans un avertissement prealable et non equivoque, qui aura, soit la forme
d'une declaration de guerre motivee, soit celle d'un ultimatum avec declaration de
guerre conditionnelle.'
6.
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. This took the form ofa note, dated 23july 1914,
to the Serbian Government, containing various demands, and requiring an
answer by six o'clock in the evening of the 25th. The reply of the Serbian
Government not being regarded as satisfactory, the Austro-Hungarian
Minister left Belgrade, and war was declared against Serbia on the 28th.
7.
On 3 1 july, 1914, the German Ambassador in Paris asked the President of the
Council (who was also Minister for Foreign Affairs) what would be the attitude
of France in the case of war between Germany and Russia, and said he would
return for a reply at one o'clock on the following day. On 3 August, at 6,45 p.m.
alleging acts of aggression committed by French aviators, he communicated a
declaration of war. This does not appear to have been preceded by an
ultimatum.
8.
At midnight on 31 july, 1914, the German Ambassador at St Petersburg, by

order ofhis government, informed the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that
if within twelve hours Russia had not begun to demobilise, Germany would be
compelled to give the order for mobilisation, and at 7.10 p.m. on I August the
German Government, on the alleged ground that Russia had refused this
demand, presented a declaration of war. The demand for demobilisation was
in the nature of an ultimatum.
9.
The German ultimatum to Belgium of 2 August 1914, demanded permission to

march through Belgian territory and threatened to regard Belgium as an
enemy
'soUte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegentreten, insbesondere ihrem
Vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas-Befestigungen oder durch Zerstorungen von
Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten Schwierigkeiten bereiten.'
The note of the German Minister presenting this demand did not mention any
length of time for an answer, but it appears from the telegram of 3 August sent
out by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers at St
Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna and The Hague, that the German
Minister had verbally required an answer within twelve hours.
10.
On the same occasion the British Government, on 31 july, asked the German
A. Some definitions
459
and French Governments to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium,

adding that it was important to have an early reply. France at once acceded to
the request, but, no reply having been received from the German Government,
the United Kingdom on 4 August protested against a violation ofthe treaty by
which Belgium was constituted a neutralised state, and requested an assurance
that her neutrality would be respected by Germany. Later in the day a
telegram was sent to Berlin, instructing the Ambassador to ask for the same
assurance to respect the neutrality of Belgium as had been given by France, and
for a satisfactory reply to the requests of 3 I July and of the morning of 4
August to be received in London by midnight. These requests, especially the
last, amounted in substance to an ultimatum.
In the Second World War the Hitler Government more than once waited to
present its ultimata until German troops had actually crossed the frontiers of the
victim countries. Such action is contrary to diplomatic practice and greatly to
be deprecated.
11.
But the meaning of ultimatum is not restricted to the sense which it bears in the
foregoing examples. During the course of a negotiation it may imply the
maximum amount of concession which will be made in order to arrive at an
agreement, where no resort to compulsion is contemplated in case of refusal.
Cases have occurred in which it has been used as denoting an irreducible
minimum which would be accepted, a plan or scheme ofarrangement which it
was sought to impose, a maximum of what would be conceded, and the like.
12.
l Tti possidetis and status quo. These two phrases often amount to the same thing,
and are used to denote actual possession by right of conquest, occupation or
otherwise, at some particular moment, which has to be defined with as much
exactness as possible in the proposals for a treaty of peace, or in the treaty itself. 5
But while uti possidetis relates to the possession of territory, the status quo may be
the previously existing situation in regard to other matters, e.g. to privileges
enjoyed by one of the parties at the expense of the other, such as the French
privilege of taking and drying fish on a portion of the coast of Newfoundland.
In the memorial of the King of France of 16 March, 176 I, it was proposed
that the two Crowns shall remain in possession of what they have conquered from each
other, and that the situation in which they shall stand on the I st September, 176 I, in the
East Indies, on the I st]uly in the West Indies and Africa, and on the I st May following
in Europe, shall be the position which shall serve as a basis to the treaty which may be
negotiated between the two Powers. 6
The British reply accepted the status quo, but it is alleged to have said nothing
'with regard to the epochs.' It did, in fact, sai that
expeditions at sea requiring preparations of long standing, and depending on
navigations which are uncertain, as well as on the concurrence of seasons, in places
which are often too distant for orders relative to their execution to be adapted to the
common vicissitudes of negotiations, which for the most part are subject to
disappointments and delays, and are always fluctuating and precarious: from whence it
necessarily results, that the nature ofsuch operations is by no means susceptible, without
prejudice to the party who employs them, of any other epochs than those which have
reference to the day of signing the treaty of peace.
460
Appendix I
The French Government took this to mean that the date of the treaty of peace
should be the epoch to fix the possessions of the two Powers, and delivered a
memorial of 19 April, insisting on the dates previously proposed by them. On
this, the British Government replied that they were ready to negotiate as to the
dates. The French envoy to London was furnished with 'extremely simple
instructions. '
The basis of them regarded the proposition Uti Possidetis and he was enjoined to demand
of the British Minister, whether the King of England accepted of the periods annexed to
the proposition of Status quo, and if His Britannic Majesty did not accept of them, what
new periods he proposed to France?8
The British proposal in reply was that]uly, September and November should
respectively be the periods for fixing the uti possidetis. So much difficulty arose
from this original proposal of uti possidetis, that it was ultimately replaced by a
series of mutual concessions of territory to take place in consequence of the
treaty which might be eventually concluded. In the preliminaries of peace
finally signed at Fontainebleau, 3 November, 1762, it was provided, for
instance, by Article 7 that Great Britain should restore the fortresses in
Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, Desirade, Martinique and Belle-Isle 9 in the same
condition as when they were conquered by the British arms, i.e. in statu quo, and
the French trading posts in India 'in the condition in which they now are,' i.e.
also in statu quo. 10 These stipulations were renewed in the definitive treaty of
peace of 10 February 1763.11
In stipulating for uti possidetis or for status quo, it is consequently ofthe utmost
importance to fix the date to which either expression is to relate.
When on the conclusion of a treaty of peace the belligerents agree mutually
to restore all their conquests, they are said to revert to the status quo ante belium. 12
In 181 3 Napoleon drafted instructions for his plenipotentiaries to the Congress
of Prague: 'Quant aux bases, n'en indiquer qu'un~ seule: l' Uti possidetis ante
bellum,' meaning by that the relative possessions of France and the continental
alliance before the invasion of Russia in 1812. 13
In May 1850 the French President, Prince Napoleon, demanded ofthe Porte
that the privileges accorded to the Latin Church by the treaty between Francis
I and Soliman should be upheld, without regard to those granted to the Greek
Church by various firmans. The Emperor Nicholas resented this action, and
addressed a letter to the Sultan Abdul Medjid in which he insisted on the
maintenance of the status quo with respect to the Holy Places, i.e. the
arrangements that had existed up to that time in virtue ofthe firmans. 14 This is
a case in which status quo has nothing to do with the state of territorial
possessIOn.
English writers ordinarily use the form status quo. Statu quo is the foreign
expression for the same thing.
13.
Ad referendum and Sub spe ratio When the sovereign whom a diplomatic agent
represents, or to whom he is accredited, dies, the mission ofthe agent is, strictly
speaking, at an end. During the interval which must elapse before he can
receive fresh credentials, he may carry on a negotiation which has already been
commenced, sub spe rati, i.e. in the expectation that what he promises will be
ratified by his sovereign. 15
A. Some definitions
46 I
It has also been said that when a proposal is made to an agent, and the case is
urgent and the distance from his own country is considerable, he may accept or
decline it sub spe ratio 16 But in these days, when telegraphic communication is
possible between capitals even the most distant from each other, a prudent
diplomatist will take care not to commit his government by a provisional
acceptance of what is not warranted by his previous instructions. The utmost
he will do will be to receive the proposal ad referendum. Sub spe rati maybe
explained to indicate that the agent is himself inclined to favour the proposal,
but there is no reason why he should compromise either himself or his
government.
14.
.Ne varietur. Louis Philippe wrote to Guizot, 24 July 1846:

'Une lettre de vous a Bresson, qu'illui serait enjoint de lire a sa Majeste, et dont il devrait
lui demander de laisser entre ses mains une copie ne varietur, .. .'
i.e. from which no departure can be permitted. Again, an acte authentique is an

instrument certified by a third authority who is competent for the purpose. It
has a public and permanent character. It is perfect in itself, without ratification.
It is inserted in the minutes of the notaries, ne varietur. 17
The Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, 1925, in reciting the various
treaties and conventions prepared and initialled at that conference, continued:
Ces actes, des a present paraphes ne varietur, porteront la date de ce jour, les
representants des parties interessees convenant de se rencontrer a Londres le I er
decembre prochain, pour proceder, au cours d'une meme reunion, a la formalite de la
signature des actes qui les concernent.
Nevertheless some slight amendments in grammar and spelling were found

necessary, and these were agreed to by the plenipotentiaries at the time of the
signature of the instruments on I December, 1925.
15.
A condition sine quo. non denotes a condition that must be accepted, if an

agreement is desired by the party to whom it is proposed.
16.
Casus belli and Casus foederis. These terms appear to be sometimes confused.
The former signifies an act or proceeding ofa provocative nature on the part
of one Power which, in the opinion of the offended Power,justifies it in making
or declaring war. Palmerston defined it in 1853 as 'a case which would justify
war.'I8
The latter is an offensive act or proceeding ofone state towards another, or
any occurrence bringing into existence the condition of things which entitles
the latter to call upon its ally to fulfil the undertakings of the alliance existing
between them, i.e. a case contemplated by the treaty of alliance.
At the Congress of Paris, 15 April 1856, the English, French and Austrian
plenipotentiaries signed a convention by which a reciprocal engagement was
entered into to regard as a casus belli any violation of the main treaty, and any
attempt, no matter from what quarter it might be made, on the independence
and integrity of the Ottoman Empire; it also fixed the naval and military
contingents to be mobilised in case this casus foederis should arise. 19
I,.
Demarche is defined by Littre as: 'Ce qu'on fait pour la reussite de quelque
chose,' and one of the examples he gives is: 'la demarche que l' Angleterre avait
462
Appendix I
faite du cote de Rome.' This 'something' may have been what in English might
be described as an offer, a suggestion, an advance, a demand, an attempt, a
proposal, a protestation, a remonstrance, a request, an overture, a warning, a
threat, a step, a measure - according to circumstances, and unless the
translator happens to know what the circumstances were under which the
demarche was made, he will be at a loss for a precise English equivalent.
18.
Fin de non-recevoir is originally a legal term. Littre explains fin or fins as

'Toute espece de demande, pretention ou exception presentee au tribunal par les
parties. Fin de non-recevoir, refus d'admettre une actionjudiciaire, en pretendant, par un
motif pris en dehors de la demande elle-meme et de son mal-fonde, que celui qui veut
l'intenter n'est pas recevable dans sa demande. 20 Dans le langage general, fin de nonrecevoir, refus pour des raisons extrinseques. Repondre par des fins de non-recevoir.
Opposer des fins de non-recevoir.'
Cussy says:
'Cette locution, en usage dans les tribunaux, signifie les exceptions diverses qui forment
autant d'obstacles a ce que le juge saisi d'une instance puisse s'occuper, au moins
immediatement, de la connaissance et de l'appreciation de la demande; c'est un moyen
de droit prijudiciel, par lequel on repousse une action, sans qu'il soit necessaire
d'examiner le fond de la contestation. '21
This latter explanation corresponds better to the notion conveyed when the
expression is used to describe the diplomatic practice which consists in rejecting
an official complaint or demand without examining into the merits.
'Evasive reply' may be sometimes the best rendering.
19.
Prendre Acte. Donner Acte. The legal definition of acte is 'a declaration made
before a court, whether spontaneously or in consequence ofan order ofa court,
and which has been certified to have been made.' In diplomacy it is applied to
any document recording an international agreement by which an obligation is
undertaken; such as, for instance, the convention for the suspension of
hostilities of 23 April 1814, signed between France and the four allied Great
Powers. 2~ 'Instrument' is the proper English equivalent, though we sometimes
find it rendered by 'Act,'
Prendre acte is to declare that one will avail oneself, should the necessity arise,
of a declaration or admission made by the other party, without conceding that
one is in any way bound by that declaration. 'To take note or is perhaps the
English equivalent. Yet it may sometimes conveniently be rendered by
'recognise' or 'acknowledge.'
'Mais les sagesses tardives ne suffisent point; et meme quand elles veulent etre prudentes,
I'esprit politique manque aux nations qui ne sont pas exercees a faire elles-memes leurs
affaires et leur destinee. Dans le deplorable etat OU l'entreprise d'un egolsme heroique et
chimerique avait jete la France, il n'y avait evidemment qu'une conduite a tenir;
reconnaitre Louis XVIII, prendre acte de ses dispositions liberales et se concerter avec
lui pour traiter avec les etrangers. '23
J)onner acte is to give recognition

certain necessary act.
20.
to
another party that he has performed a
Donner la main (in English, give the hand, German Oberhand) means to give the
B. Some terms in common use
463
seat of honour, i.e. on the right hand ofthe host or diplomatic agent receiving a
visit from a person of lower rank. The Elector Max Joseph of Bavaria was
reported in 1765 to have bestowed this mark of deference on the Imperial
Ambassador 'which certainly no crowned head in Europe would do. '24 In the
instructions to Lord Gower, on his appointment as Ambassador to Paris in
1790, he is directed to act in accordance with the Order in Council of 26
August 1668, and 'to take the hand of envoys' in his own house, i.e. to place
them on his left hand. 25 See also on this point 450 in the fourth edition of this
work.
21.
National. This French term, of which the convenience must be admitted,

corresponds in English to 'subject or citizen.' A similar convenience attaches to
the term ressortissant, one who is subject to a particular jurisdiction, which used
to comprise both citizens of the French Republic and persons under its
protection, whether as subjects of a protected state, or in accordance with
former treaty stipulations.
B. SOIDe terIDs in COIDIDon use

Belligerent rights. In international law, certain rights and duties of a
government engaged in war, e.g. the right to declare a blockade of the coasts
and ports of the enemy. (Insurgents and revolutionaries are not recognised as
belligerents, though such recognition may be accorded if rebellion develops
into civil war.)
Chancery. In diplomatic usage, the office, or offices, of a mission; more
particularly the political section, with its registry. In a British diplomatic
mission the Head of Chancery is the officer in charge of this, and holds the key
post in the administration of the work of the mission.
In Latin, cancelli meant a barrier, grill, or lattice. Hence, in the twelfth
century, cancellus, a place so closed ofT, whether the chancel of a church, or the
enclosure where the seals and documents of a ruler were kept. The original
sense of 'chancellor' was derived from cancellarius, an officer stationed at the
cancelli, with various responsibilities, at first secretarial, laterjudicial. Early in
English history the Chancellor was the chief legal officer of the King's Council.
As designating the keeper of the documents and seals of state, the term came to
be applied to certain other senior officers, responsible under the Crown for
departments of state. It is retained for several such offices at the present day, as
well as in connection with cathedral chapters, orders of chivalry and
universities.
In modern French, the chancelier of an embassy, or a consulate, has
administrative duties comparable to those of the head archivist of a British
mission. The Chancelier de l'Ordre de la Legion d'Honneur is the chief of the Order,
holding the seals. The term chancellerie (not equivalent to 'chancery' as above) is
applied to the administrative offices of the French Ministry of Justice. La
Chancellerie du Vatican is the office concerned with the Acts and documents of
the Holy See. The essentially pre- 1914 English expression 'the chancelleries of
464
Appendix I
Europe' means the Ministries, in particular the Ministries for Foreign Afhlirs,
of the European countries.
In German, Kander is a Minister at the head ofa government department. It
may be used as an abbreviation of Reichskander, the Chief Minister. The
Minister's office is the Kandei. (Kanzel is, however, a pulpit.)
The Spanish canciller can be used for the official called chancelier in a French
embassy, and cancilleria for the office called chancery in English. But in some
Spanish-speaking countries the Minister for Foreign Affairs is still known by
the traditional title of Canciller, and his office, or that of his Ministry, is the
Cancilleria.
Consular invoices. As all goods exported by a country have not necessarily been
manufactured there, customs officials in the importing country may require
them to be accompanied by a certification of origin signed by the importing
country's consul in the exporting country. Such a certification is known as a
consular invoice.
Counsellor.
Secretary.
The diplomatic rank intermediate between Minister and First
Customs union. An agreement made by two or more countries to impose a

common tariff on goods exported to them by other countries.
Detente. A relaxation of tension in the relations between countries, not
necessarily implying rapprochement on matters of political or ideological
conviction, or a reduction in the means of defence.
Domino theory. The contention that in specific circumstances the collapse of a
government or state will cause the collapse of a neighbouring government or
state, which in turn will produce a series of similar collapses, on the analogy of
falling dominoes.
Double taxation agreement. An agreement between two countries designed to
prevent the same income from being taxed twice, i.e. by each of the parties.
En clair.
Uncoded: in plain language.
Executive agreement. An agreement made by executive officers of the state

without reference to the legislature (e.g. in the United States an agreement not
requiring the assent of the Senate).
Flag of convenience. The flag of a state whose laws are less onerous on
shipowners than those ofother states. Vessels registered in such a state fly its flag
and their crews are subject to its laws.
Force majeure.
control.
Compulsion or coercion by circumstances which one cannot
Free trade area. Two or more countries agreeing to the abolition of tariffs on
goods imported from each other, but not necessarily to the imposition of a
common tariff on imports from outside the area.
Hot line. Direct and constant communication by electronic teletype (not
telephone). Usually refers to heads of government.
B. Some terms in common use

Lettres de recreance. See Recredentials. (Ch. 8 &
used to refer to notice of reposting.
Paraphe.
page.
465
I.) But sometimes loosely
Initialling either at the foot of a document, or in the margin of each
Parliamentary diplomacy. The word 'parliamentary' is here used with reference

only to procedure and not to any particular parliament. The expression is
current chiefly in the United States and indicates the conduct ofdiplomacy in a
multilateral forum where issues are decided by voting. (This procedure
naturally renders expedient the practice of lobbying outside the chamber,
which is where strictly diplomatic, rather than forensic, talents are brought
into play.)
Placement. The placing round a table of guests at a formal meal, or of officials
at a meeting, according to certain rules and conventions. (See 20. I 7 and 44. 66
and 67.)
Presidential agent. In United States' usage someone appointed or assigned by
the President to a particular function or task without confirmation by the
Senate.
Raison d'fiat. The interest of the state taking precedence over normally
accepted morality.
Sponsion. In United States' usage a commitment entered into by a diplomatic
agent personally, without official authorisation. (If he has exceeded his
authority, his sponsion is voidable.)
Tacite reconduction. Renewal ofa contract by tacit agreement. Continuation in
force of an agreement after the initially stipulated term, no objections having
been raised by either party.
Appendix 11
Conferences
(See 28.22.)
Paris Peace Conference, 1946

I.
Peace, Treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

In the conditions that obtained after the cessation of hostilities in Europe, it
became evident that the conclusion of any Peace Treaty by the ordinary
process of calling a full-scale Peace Conference, to be attended by all the Allied
countries, with such representation of the enemy countries as might be decided
on, was likely to prove unduly difficult and long drawn out, and that it would
be necessary to adopt some procedure directed to 'predigesting' the material to
go into the proposed Peace Treaty before this actually got to a Peace
Conference. It was accordingly decided to make use of the machinery of the
Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Potsdam Conference in 1945
(the Council consisting for this purpose of the Foreign Ministers of France, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States). The Council of
Foreign Ministers, so composed, accordingly met in Paris at the Palais du
Luxembourg in April 1946. Each Foreign Minister was attended by a Deputy,
and the process was for the Deputies to meet in the mornings and the Foreign
Ministers in the afternoons. There were, of course, also established various
Committees of Experts, military, economic and legal, etc. There was a double
protess by which questions were considered in these Committees and then
passed up through the Deputies to the Foreign Ministers; or, alternatively, by
which questions were first considered by the Foreign Ministers or the Deputies
and then passed down, to come up again later. The Deputies may be said to
have acted as the central clearing house of the process. Anything which they
were able to agree upon normally stood agreed: what they could not agree
upon would either be reserved for consideration by the Foreign Ministers or
else sent back to the appropriate Committee.
2.
The first meeting of the Council lasted for about a month, and was followed by
a second meeting - in June and part ofJuly. Opportunity was afforded to the
enemy countries to express their views, and in some cases their representatives
were heard at the Council table. In this way, the complete drafts of Peace
Treaties with each of the five countries were drawn up. The remaining Allied
Powers were then invited to a full-scale conference, also at the Luxembourg,
which started early in August and went on until late in October. However, this
.Japanese Peace (,"Ol~rerence, /95/
46 7
conference was not empowered to take any final decisions: according to the
Rules of Procedure which it adopted as its opening act, it could only proceed on
the basis of the texts already drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers,
though of course it was open to any delegation to propose amendments, which
would then be carried or rejected by a majority vote. But even where carried,
these amendments did not of themselves cause the text as drawn up by the
Council of Foreign Ministers to be altered. Their status was simply that of
proposals for amendment made by the conference to the Council. The upshot
was that at the end of the Peace Conference in October, a considerable part of
the original texts as drawn up by the Council stood approved by the
Conference, while in respect of the rest, the Conference had adopted a series of
proposed amendments which the Council would now have to consider.
3.
The Peace Conference then came to an end and never reconvened, and the
remainder of the work was done by the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting
for this purpose in New York from early November until January, the Foreign
Ministers themselves leaving about half-way through December. The meetings
took place in one of the Tower Rooms of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. At these
meetings, the Foreign Ministers examined one by one the proposals for
amendment to the original text adopted by the Peace Conference and either
approved the amendment or rejected it, or possibly adopted some amendment
of their own, using the same apparatus ofDeputies and Committees, etc. By the
time the Foreign Ministers themselves left, complete and final texts had been
drawn up, subject to a comparison of the texts in the different languages
(French, English and Russian), in the course of which some further purely
drafting alterations were made.
4.
These final texts were then thrown open for signature in Paris. A short
signature ceremony took place then on 10 February 1947, and the texts were
signed by all the Allied Powers that had actually been at war with the five
countries concerned.
Japanese Peace Conference, 1951

The Japanese Peace Treaty
5.
The procedure adopted for the conclusion of this Treaty was of an even more
unorthodox kind than in the case just considered. Some of the preparatory
work was done by a body sitting in Washington, consisting of representatives of
the principal countries that had been at war with Japan, and called the Far
Eastern Commission. However, the actual raison d' et re of this body was not the
conclusion ofa Peace Treaty, but the political supervision ofthe administration
ofJapan during the occupation period. The first actual drafts ofa Peace Treaty
were got out by diplomatic correspondence between the United States and
United Kingdom governments during the latter part of 1950 and the early part
of 195 I. There then followed a series of meetings between officials and
468
Appendix 11
Ministers of these two countries, some of which took place in Washington and
some in London, between April and August 1951, at which progressive
agreement was reached on the text of the Peace Treaty. Contact with other
prospective signatories was maintained, partly by diplomatic correspondence
conducted mainly through the State Department in Washington; partly by
meetings between the State Department and the Embassies ofsuch countries in
Washington; and partly by means ofsimilar meetings between these Embassies
and the British Embassy in Washington. In this way, the views of the different
countries on the proposed text were ascertained, and progressive alterations
were made in the texts to take account of these views. However, at no stage of
the proceedings was there any general negotiating conference at which views
could be exchanged across the table between all concerned.
6.
Eventually, in August, final texts ofa Treaty and various ancillary instruments
were circulated to all the prospective signatories, and they were invited to
attend a meeting at San Francisco which, it was emphasised, would be for the
purpose of signing the Peace Treaty and other instruments and of hearing any
accompanying declarations or speeches, but which was not intended to be a
forum for any negotiations or for proposing alterations in the existing texts.
,.
The San Francisco meeting was duly held in the first part ofSeptember 1951, in
the same buildings that had been utilised for the drafting ofthe United Nations
Charter. Objections to the procedure adopted were voiced by certain countries
which did not sign the Treaty. Apart from that, the Treaty and ancillary
instruments, as presented, were found to be acceptable, and were signed on
8 September by twenty-six Allied Powers that had been at warwithJapan, and
by Japan.
8.
This affords a unique example of a Peace Treaty concluded entirely by

correspondence, by informal contacts and by meetings between representatives
of one or more interested countries without any general conference other than a
meeting for the purpose of signature.
Geneva Conference, 1954

9.
This Conference originated in a communique l of 18 February 1954, issued at

the conclusion of a meeting in Berlin of the Foreign Ministers of the United
States (Mr John Foster Dulles), France (M. Georges Bidault), the United
Kingdom (Mr Anthony Eden), and the Soviet Union (M. Vyacheslav
Molotov). The relevant part of the communique read as follows:
Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent
Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring
peace in other parts of Asia,
Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United
Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the
Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic ofKorea and the other countries
the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to
attend, shall meet in Geneva on April 26th for the purpose of reaching a peaceful
settlemt:nt of the Korean question,
Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China will also be discussed at the
469
conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic and other
interested States will be invited.
It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned
Conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not
already been accorded.
10.
The Conference was held in the Palais des Nations from 26 April to 21 July
1954. 2 It virtually became two conferences - one for the Korean question and
one for the problem ofrestoring peace in Indo-China. This division was natural
because, apart from the concern of the Four Powers and the People's Republic
of China in both problems, they were entirely separate and distinct.
11.
On the conclusion of hostilities in 1945, Korea had been temporarily divided

along the 38th parallel. In the following years, vain attempts were made by the
United Nations to bring about the unification of Korea by democratic means,
but on 25June 1950, North Korean troops attacked South Korea. They were
opposed by United Nations forces, and in spite of the support of very large
numbers of Chinese Communist troops were in the end able to bring about no
significant change in the division of Korea at the 38th parallel. Hostilities were
ended by the Korean Armistice Agreement signed at Panmunjom on 27 July
1953. The result was a deadlock which neither the United Nations General
Assembly nor, in the event, the Geneva Conference was able to break. At the
conclusion of the Korean Section of the Conference on 15 June 1954, the
representatives of the sixteen nations who contributed military forces to the
United Nations Command in Korea made a declaration including a statement
of the following two fundamental principles:
I. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take
collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good
offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.
2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free
elections should be held under United Nations supervision, for representatives in the
National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the
indigenous population in Korea.
12.
The Indo-China phase of the Conference opened on 8 May 1954, a short time
after the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu fell to the onslaught of the Viet
Minh forces. The battle was the culmination of a nationalist and Communist
struggle to wrest the Associate States ofVietnam, Laos and Cambodia from the
status of protection which France had tried to re-establish after the Second
World War. At the time of the Conference, France had, in principle,
recognised the independence ofthe Associate States and the primary task ofthe
Conference was to put an end to hostilities so as to make possible a stable
political settlement. The result was the signature of three Agreements on the
cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, respectively signed in
each case by the appropriate military authorities. The conference contented
itself with a declaration which, inter alia, took note of the three Agreements.
Separate declarations were also made by the representatives of the United
States, Cambodia, Laos and France. 3
13.
The relations betweeen the various governments and the non-recognition of

some by others made the seating at the Conference both diffricult and
Appendix l/
470
interesting. Ostensibly, the seating for the Korean phase followed the English
alphabetical order and for the Indo-China phase the French alphabetical
order, but the practical convenience of the arrangement in both cases is
apparent from the seating plans set out below:
Ch.urm.m
d.od \tarf
Luxem-
Austra
bourg
lia
Interpreter,
Nether-
lands
4
U Rued Kingdom
or Great Brilaln
&. Nonhem Ireland
Royaumc
un.
The Korean phase4
The Indo-China phastf
In addition to the number of seats shown on Plan A, the delegations of

Australia, Canada, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, New
Zealand, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States had places for their
advisers on benches at the back along the walls of the League of Nations
Council Chamber where the meetings were held. For the Indo-China phase of
the Conference each delegation had a separate table with three places, but
there were also chairs behind for a limited number of advisers.
14.
There was no Secretariat for the Conference as a whole, but the sixteen nations
who had contributed military forces to the United Nations Command in Korea
formed their own Secretariat for the Korean phase of the Conference. A
47 1
Secretariat on a reduced scale was also maintained, on behalf of the Western

Powers and their Indo-Chinese associates, by France and the United Kingdom
during the Indo-Chinese phase of the Conference. In both cases, almost all the
staff were provided by the United Nations Organisation and their services were
used to some extent by other delegations as well.
The procedure for both phases of the Conference was very informal. There was
no voting. The most significant features of the procedure were the provisions
relating to languages and the rotation of the Chairmanship. For the Korean
phase Prince Wan, M. Molotov and Sir Anthony Eden were the Chairmen.
For the Indo-China Phase Sir Anthony Eden and M. Molotov were the
Chairmen, although at some meetings their places were taken by their
deputies.
16.
At the first Plenary Meeting on Korea, Prince Wan made the usual polite
introductory remarks, read a telegram of greetings from the President of the
Swiss Confederation, and made the following announcements from the chair,
which in fact governed the procedure of the Conference:
The Conference will meet daily at 3 p.m. except on Sundays.
2. Delegates wishing to speak should inscribe their name with the Chairman, who
will call them in the order in which their names are received. The speakers' list will be
carried on from day to day.
3. The official languages of the Conference will be French, Russian, English, Chinese
and Korean. Each language will be used for a day at a time in the above order. Speeches
will be interpreted into the language of the day on the floor of the Conference and
concurrently into the other four official languages.
4. No observers or spectators will be permitted, and the Press will be excluded except
as the Conference itself decides. (On the first day Press photographers were admitted for
the first ten minutes.)
5. Each Delegation is free to conduct its own relations with the Press and official
communiques will only be issued if the Conference so decides.
I.
At the first Plenary Meeting on Indo-China on 8 May 1954, Mr Anthony Eden

made the following brief statement from the chair which again in practice
governed the procedure of this phase of the Conference:
There are one or two points of procedure which I should like to make sure are generally
agreed. First, I think it is agreed that we should use French, Russian, English and
Chinese languages in that order. Second, I take it that these discussions will be private
with no observers as in the case of Korea. And, third, I assume, also that the press
arrangements will be the same as for Korea; that is to say, the communiques will be
issued only if the conference so decides, and each delegation will conduct its own
relations with the press.
18.
The pattern of the Geneva Conference was reminiscent ofmany conferences of

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It had a character and dignity of its
own, which, except during the final week, were unruilled by the pressure of
drafting treaty texts and voting on numerous clauses and amendments which is
typical of conferences in recent times. It aimed at a political settlement not by
the production of a single treaty to which all participants might adhere, but by
the formal statement of policies and views, the pronouncement of declarations
and the encouragement of agreement between the parties most directly
concerned.
Append ix III
United Nations
membership
Melllber states of the United Nations at
1 Novelllber 1977 1
The 147 member states of the United Nations, with the dates on which they
became members, are listed below:
Member
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Benin 2
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Byelorussia
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Date of admission
19 Nov. 1946
14 Dec. 1955
8 Octo 1962
I Dec. 1976
24 Oct. 1945
1 Nov. 1945
14 Dec. 1955
18 Sept. 1973
2 I Sept. 197 I
17 Sept. 1974
9 Dec. 1966
27 Dec. 1945
20 Sept. I 960
21 Sept. 1971
14 Nov. 1945
17 Octo 1966
24 0c t. 1945
14 Dec. 1955
19 Apr. 1948
18 Sept. 1962
24 0c t. 1945
9 Nov. 1945
16 Sept. 1975
20 Sept. 1960
20 Sept. 1960
24 0c t. 1945
24 0c t. 1945
5 Nov. 1945
12 Nov. 1975
20 Sept. 1960
Member states of the United Nations at / .November /977
Member
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Democratic Kampuchea 3
Democratic Yemen
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt 4
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
German Democratic Republic
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia 5
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Lao People's Democratic Republic ot6
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
473
Date of admission
2 Nov. 1945
24 Get. 1945
20 Sept. 1960
24 Get. 1945
14 Dec. 1955
14 Dec. 1967
24 Gct. 1945
24 Get. 1945
21 Dec. 1945
24 Gct. 1945
24 Get. 1945
12 Nov. 1968
13 Nov. 1945
13 Gct. 1970
14 Dec. 1955
24 Get. 1945
20 Sept. 1960
2 I Sept. 1965
18 Sept. 1973
18 Sept. 1973
8 Mar. 1957
25 Gct. 1945
17 Sept. 1974
21 Nov. 1945
12 Dec. 1958
17 Sept. 1974
20 Sept. 1966
24 Get. 1945
17 Dec. 1945
14 Dec. 1955
19 Dec. 1946
30 Gct. 1945
28 Sept. 1950
24 Get. 1945
2 I Dec. 1945
14 Dec. 1955
I I May 1949
14 Dec. 1955
20 Sept. 1960
18 Sept. 1962
18 Dec. 1956
14 Dec. 1955
16 Dec. 1963
14 May 196 3
14 Dec. 1955
24 Get. 1945
17 Get. 1966
2 Nov. 1945
474
Appendix III
MelDber
Libya
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia 7
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Surinam
Swaziland
Sweden
Date of admission
14 Dec. 1955
24 0c t. 1945
20 Sept. 1960
I Dec. 1964
I 7 Sept. 1957
2 I Sept. 1965
28 Sept. 1960
I Dec. 1964
27 Oct. 1961
24 Apr. 1968
7 Nov. 1945
270ct. 1961
12 Nov. 1956
16 Sept. 1975
14 Dec. 1955
10 Dec. 1945
24 0c t. 1945
24 0c t. 1945
20 Sept. 1960
7 Oct. 1960
27 Nov. 1945
7 0c t. 197 1
0
3 Sept. 1947
13 Nov. 1945
10 Oct. 1975
24 0c t. 1945
3 I Octo 1945
24 0c t. 1945
24 0c t. 1945
14 Dec. 1955
21 Sept. 1971
14 Dec. 1955
18 Sept. 1962
15 Dec. 1976
16 Sept. 1975
24 0c t. 1945
28 Sept. 1960
21 Sept. 1976
27 Sept. 196 I
2 I Sept. 1965
20 Sept. 1960
7 Nov. 1945
14 Dec. 1955
14 Dec. 1955
12 Nov. 1956
4 Dec. 1975
24 Sept. 1968
19 Nov. 1946
Member states of the United .Nations at
Melllber
Syria8
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Republic of Cameroon
United Republic of Tanzania 9
United States
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
.November 1977
475
Date of acbnissioD
24 Dct. 1945
(resumed 13 Dct. 1961)
16 Dec. 1946
20 Sept. 1960
18 Sept. I 962
12 Nov. 1956
24 Dct. 1945
25 Dct. 1962
24 Dct. 1945
24 Dct. 1945
9 Dec. 197 1
24 Dct. 1945
20 Sept. 1960
14 Dec. 1961
24 Dct. 1945
20 Sept. 1960
18 Dec. 1945
15 Nov. 1945
30 Sept. 1947
24 Dct. 1945
20 Sept. I 960
I Dec. 1964
Appendix IV
Special ised agencies
Agency
Origin and basis
Food and Agriculture

Organisation (FAO)
Food and Agriculture Conference,

Hot Springs, Virginia, 1943.
Constitution came into force when accepted
by twenty members, 16 October 1945
International Bank
for Reconstruction
and Development
(IBRD or World Bank)
Established 1945 with articles drawn up at

Bretton Woods Conference, New Hampshire,
1944
Membership restricted to members of IMF
(q.v.) who ratify the articles of the IBRD
International
Civil Aviation
Organisation
(ICAO)
Convention prepared at a Conference in

Chicago, 1944: came into force 4 April 1947
Head
quarters
Purpose
Structure
To promote common welfare

by furthering action to
raise nutrition and living
standards, promote
efficiency in production
and distribution of food/
agricultural products
A biennial General
Conference; a Council (4 2
members with 4
Committees); Executive;
Director and Secretariat
Rome
To promote an international
flow ofcapital for productive
purposes and to finance
rebuilding after the Second
World War. Main objective
later became financing
projects which would aid
developing countries
President; Board of
Governors; 20 Executive
Directors
Washington
To develop 'the principles

and techniques of international air navigation and
foster the planning and
development of international air transport so as
to ensure the safe and
orderly growth of international civil aviation
throughout the world'
A triennial Assembly;
Council of 33; SecretaryGeneral and Secretariat
Montreal
477
NUtnberof
tnetnbers
12 9
478
Appendix IV
Agency
Origin and basis
International
Development
Association
(IDA)
At the 1959 annual meeting of the IBRD and

IMF proposals were approved for setting up this
new lending organisation. Established in
September, IDA began operations in November
1960
International Finance
Corporation (IFC)
Affiliate of the IBRD but a separate legal

entity with separate capital. Established July
1956: became a Specialised Agency 20
February 1957
International Labour
Organisation (ILO)
Established on I I April 1919, its constitution

forming part of the Versailles settlement. The first
agency to conclude a relationship agreement with
the UN: this came into force 26 September 1945
Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative
Organisation (IMCO)
Convention concluded at Geneva in 1948,

came into force 17 March 1958. First meeting
London, 1959
479
Headquarters
NUlnberof
Inelnbers
Purpose
Structure
To promote economic
development by providing
tinance to developing
countries on much more
favourable terms than
conventional loans,
especially for projects
which do not attract
private investment and
cannot service IBRD loans
President. IDA shares

Governors and Executives
with IBRD
Washington
116
To invest in enterprises,
private or partly
government, when private
capital is insufficient, and
to bring together
investment opportunities,
private capital and
experienced management
President and Chairman of

Executive Board; Board of
Governors (I per country);
20 Executive Directors
Washington
105
To improve working and

living conditions through
conventions and
recommendations setting
standards of wages, hours,
employment and social
security
An annual Conference in
which each member has 4
delegates (2 government
representatives, I of
employers, I of workers);
A Governing Body: tripartite
(government, employers,
workers);
Director-General;
International
Labour Office: Regional
Conferences
Geneva
133
To facilitate cooperation in
technical matters and in
promoting safety of life at
sea. Consults with other
organisations on marine
aspects of matters with
which they deal
A biennial Assembly;
Council (24 members from
3 defined categories of
interest in shipping);
Secretary-General and
Secretariat
London
103
480
Appendix IV
Agency
Origin and basis
International Monetary
Fund (IMF)
Established 1945 with articles drawn up at the

Conference at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, 1944
International
Telecommunications
Union (ITU)
Founded in 1865. New convention signed at its

tenth Plenipotentiary Conference at
Torremolinos, Malaga, 1973; in force 1
January 1975
United Nations
Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO)
Established at a Conference in London in

November 1945 to promote the aims set out in
Art. I, para. 3 of the UN Charter
Universal Postal Union

(UPU)
Successor of the General Postal Union

(IPU or Berne Union) established in 1875.
Provisions agreed at the Tokyo Congress of
1969 and came into force in 1971
481
Headquarters
NUlDberof
lDelDbers
Purpose
Structure
International monetary
cooperation to facilitate
trade, maintain high levels
of employment and real
income, promote exchange
stability and assist members
with temporary balance of
payments difficulties
without their being
compelled to resort to
measures inimical to
national or international
prosperity
Board of Governors; 20
Directors; Managing
Director and Chairman of
the Board of Directors
Washington
13 0
To maintain and extend

international cooperation
for the improvement and
use of telecommunications,
to improve efficiency and
availability and harmonise
national actions
A five yearly
Plenipotentiary Conference;
Administrative Council of
36; Secretary-General and
Secretariat
Geneva
153
Art. I, para. 3 of the UN

Charter reads: 'To achieve
international cooperation in
solving international
problems of an economic,
social, cultural or
humanitarian character
and in promoting and
encouraging respect for
human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or
religion'
A biennial General
Conference; Executive
Board, increased between
1946 and 1972 from 24 to
40 (elected from five
geographical groupings).
Director-General and
Secretariat
Paris
142
To secure the organisation

and improvement of the
postal services and to
promote in this sphere the
development of international cooperation
A five yearly Universal

Postal Congress. Executive
Council of 40 members;
Consultative Committee for
Postal Studies;
Management Council;
International Bureau
(Secretariat)
Berne
15 6
482
Appendix / V
Agency
Origin and basis
World Health Organisation

(WHO)
Constitution drawn up by the International

Health Conference, New York, June 1946:
came into force 7 April 1948
World Intellectual
Property Organisation
(WIPO)
Established by a Convention signed at

Stockholm 14July 1967. Entered into force
January 1974. On 17 December became the
13th Specialised Agency
World Meteorological
Organisation.
(WMO)
Successor to the International Meteorological

Organisation formed in 1878. Came into
existence on 23 March 1950
483
Headquarters
NUlIlber of
lIlelllbers
149
Purpose
Structure
The attainment by all

peoples of the highest level
of health (Art. 1 of the
Constitution)
An annual Assembly;
Executive Board of 30;
Secretariat
Geneva
To promote the protection of

intellectual property in
collaboration with other
existing unions - the
International Union for
the Protection of Industrial
Property (Paris Union,
founded 1883) and the
International Union for the
Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne
Union, founded 1886)
A triennial General
Assembly, in which states
members ofWIPO and of
either the Paris or the
Berne Union are entitled
to participate;
Annual WIPO Conference;
Conference Committee of 3$
Director-General
Geneva
To promote international
cooperation in providing
and rapidly exchanging
meteorological information,
in standardising
observation and its
application to aviation,
shipping, etc
A four yearly Congress;

Geneva Executive
Committee of 24 (I
President, 3 vice-presidents,
6 presidents of the regional
associations and 14
directors of other member
states' meteorological
services); Secretary-General
and Secretariat
Geneva
73
(WIPO)
81
(Paris
Union)
65
(Berne
Union)
484
Appendix / V
IlIlportant intergovernmnentalorganisations, not Specialised

Agencies of the UN
Origin and basis
General Agreement on
Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)
By resolution 13 (I) of 18 February 1946 the

Economic and Social Council decided to call
an International Conference on Trade and
Employment for the purpose of promoting the
expansion of production, exchange and
consumption of goods. The conference was
preceded by meetings of a Preparatory
Committee and by certain tariff negotiations,
the results of which were incorporated in a
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) of 30 October 1947. When the
International Conference met at Havana it was
presented with a draft International Trade
Charter. In addition to the commercial policy
matters now covered by GATT, the Charter
contained sections dealing with economic
development, full employment, international
investment, international commodity
arrangements, restrictive business practices. and
the apparatus of an International Trade
Organisation (ITO)
Governments proved unwilling to ratify the
Havana Charter, and ITO was not therefore
established. GATT has been administered by a
secretariat on behalf of the Interim
Commission of the International Trade
Organisation (ICITO)
International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)
The IAEA is an autonomous intergovernmental organisation whose Statute

entered into force on 29 July 1957. It was
created under the aegis of the UN, to speed
the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and
to ensure that nuclear materials and
equipment supplied for peaceful purposes are
not diverted for military use. It has
responsibility for the application of safeguards
to the full nuclear cycle
485
Headquarters
NUlDber of
lDelDbers
83
Purpose
Structure
Trade should be cond ucted

on a non-discrimination
basis with most favoured
nation clauses. Protection
of domestic industries
should be used only for
limited, defined purposes,
e.g. balance of payments,
and in such cases there is
full provision for
consultation. GATT
maintains a small but
highly efficient framework
within which negotiations
on tariffs and trade can be
held
Contracting Parties;
Council of Representatives
meeting between Contracting Parties' meetings;
CommiUee on Trade and
Development; International
Trade Centre (working
with UNCTAD). (See
37. I 0- I 2.) DirectorGeneral; Secretariat
Geneva
Defined in the Statute as

'to seek to accelerate and
enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace,
health and prosperity
throughout the world'
An annual General Conference; Board of Governors

of 34 (initially 25) consisting of 9 from the
members most advanced in
atomic technology, the
remainder representing
selected geographical areas;
Director-General
Vienna
plus
3
provisional
members
10
Appendix V
Commonwealth
membership
(A) Member countries of the Commonwealth (April 1977)
Australia; Bahamas; Bangladesh; Barbados; Botswana; Canada;

Cyprus; Fiji; The Gambia; Ghana; Grenada; Guyana; India;
Jamaica; Kenya; Lesotho; Malawi; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius;
Nauru; New Zealand; Nigeria; Papua New Guinea; Seychelles;
Sierra Leone; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Tanzania; Tonga;
Trinidad and Tobago; Uganda; United Kingdom; Western Samoa;
Zambia
(B) Associated states
West lndies Associated States
(in association with Britain)

Antigua; Dominica; St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla;
St Lucia;
St Vincent
Self-governing countries in association with .New Zealand
Cook Islands;
Niue
(C) Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia)

(D) Dependent Territories
British
Belize; Bermuda; British Antarctic Territory; British Indian Ocean

Territory; British Virgin Islands; Hong Kong; Montserrat; New
Hebrides (Anglo-French Condominium); Pitcairn Islands Group;
St Helena and Dependencies; Cayman Islands; Falkland Islands and
Dependencies; Gibraltar; Gilbert Islands; Solomon Islands
(Protectorate); Turks and Caicos Islands; Tuvalu.
Australian
Norfolk Island; Coral Sea Islands Territory; The Australian Antarctic

Territory; Heard Island and McDonald Islands; Cocos (Keeling)
Islands; Christmas Island.
New Zealand
Tokelau;
Ross Dependency.
Appendix VI
Special ised diplomacy
A proportion of diplomatic work is performed in many embassies and
high commissions by officials who are not career diplomats, but whose names
figure on the diplomatic list recognised by the government of the host country.
2. Even a statistical table based on data collected from all round the world
would be of uncertain value because of the constantly changing size and nature
of diplomatic staffs and the varying practice of different countries in
announcing, for publication in official lists, the precise qualifications and
assignations of individual members of their staffs. However, an approximate
estimate of the proportion of specially qualified professionals other than career
diplomats employed on the staff of diplomatic missions has been based on the
study of lists in London in the mid- I 970s.
3. Of the 2,000 or so officials on the diplomatic lists of 130 missions, it has
been estimated that about 380 were non-career diplomats, working in specialist
capacities. This last figure does not include attaches from the armed services, or
officials performing consular, passport or administrative functions, since all
these have long been regarded as essential members of a diplomatic staff.
However, commercial and information officers have been included among
specialists, since in the services of most countries (though not in the British
Service) such officers tend to be employed on loan or transfer from the
appropriate home department of the government. It must also be taken into
account that there may be a few diplomatic officers who have through practical
experience acquired the ability to occupy a position in one or other of the
specialist fields.
4. The rough breakdown of the total figure for specialists in the survey
was as follows:
Commercial
10 7
Economic and financial
59
Press and information
62
Culture
60
Agriculture
22
Education
18
Scientific and technical
14
Specialised commodities
10
Tourism
I I
Shipping
9
Medical, legal and other
professional representation - say
I.
488
Appendix VI
(Approximatedly 19 per cent of the officially listed members of diplomatic

staffs.)
5. It is difficult to go beyond this statement except to say that in most
countries resident specialist members of diplomatic staffs can expect to enjoy
the same direct access to the departments and authorities who deal with
matters ofmutual interest as that ofcommercial counsellors or attaches to trade
ministries, economic departments, etc. But, depending on the structures and
customs of different governments, this freedom of access may be broad or may
be confined to special sections or individuals designated by the receiving
government to handle all business with foreign missions. Whatever the degree
of these variations, the specialist diplomats are a sign of the degree to which,
within the general framework of a state's external policy and the overall
authority of a head of mission over his team, specialised diplomacy is
accepted as a legitimate part of diplomacy as a whole.
.Notes
489
Notes
Chapter
Diplomacy (London, 1939).

In popular American usage, the United States Secretary of State is sometimes called
a 'diplomat'. An active Secretary of State like Dr Henry Kissinger could and did negotiate. But
the Secretary, though not a member of the Legislature, is essentially a member of the
Administration and not of the Diplomatic Service, so that the description 'diplomat' can be
misleading. (See Ch. 3, footnote to title.)
3. Professor T. L. Hodgkin, in a lecture entitled 'Diplomacy and Diplomats in the Western
Sudan,' made the following comments about non-resident diplomacy in Arab North Africa
from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries:
I.
2.
(i) 'Most of these embassies would fall, so far as their ostensible object was concerned, into
the category which Mattingly [see footnote 4], following and adapting Bernard du Rosier,
calls "embassies of ceremony", to bring presents and letters of congratulation to a Prince
on accession or after conquests, to renew friendship, etc.'
(ii) 'At the same time, from a more practical standpoint, in most cases these embassies also
presumably fall into Mattingly's other category as "embassies of negotiation."
(Quoted from Foreign Relations of African States, ed. K. Ingham (London, 1974), 9,)
4- Mattingly Renaissance Diplomacy (London, 1955), Ch. I - 11.
5. Quoted by Garthoff in La doctrine militaire sovietique (Paris, 1956 ), 4.
6. This use of the expression first arose in Vienna about the middle of the eighteenth
century. (Ranke, cited by Holtzendorff, iii. 617.)
7 Chronicler of the Proceedings of the Congress of Vienna, 1814-15. (See bibliography.)
l
Chapter
A regent, or other acting head of state, is entitled to the status of head of state.
2. Cmnd 5081.
3. This applies equally to the husband of a female head of state.
4- In the case of Mighell v. Sultan of Johore the Sultan who, describing himself by the assumed
name of' Albert Baker' had promised to marry the plaintiff, succeeded in his plea that he was
as a sovereign ruler immune from the jurisdiction of the court in regard to an action for
breach of promise (1894) 1 QB. 149.
5 See 15.23.
6. See European Convention on State Immunity, Art. 9 (Cmnd 5081) and see below under
15. 1 3.
7 See 15.2 7.
8. 4 and 5 Geo. vi, c. 21.
I.
Chapter 3
I. In most countries the title of the minister who directs foreign relations is Minister for
Foreign Affairs, or of Foreign Relations. In the United Kingdom it is Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics foreign
490
Notes
relations are controlled by the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs.

The United States Constitution (Art. 2 Sect. 2) confers on the President the responsibility
for foreign policy and for negotiations with other states; but he may often look to the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of Congress for advice
and support in these matters. He has the power to appoint ambassadors and consuls and to
make treaties, subject to the Senate's advice and consent. The Secretary of State is the
spokesman of the President and his closest adviser. Although United States foreign policy
is thus strictly presidential policy, much depends, in its formation and conduct, upon the
personal relationship between the President and the Secretary of State.
In many Commonwealth countries (See 41.24.) a distinction was made for a number of
years between the handling of Commonwealth and foreign business. The United Kingdom
maintained a separate Commonwealth Office until 1968, when the Foreign and
Commonwealth Offices were merged. In India, at the senior level in the Secretariat, directly
below the Secretary-General, there were two officials designated 'Foreign Secretary' and
'Commonwealth Secretary' respectively, until at the end of the 1960s the separation became
politically and administratively anomalous. From this background grew the use in the
Commonwealth of the expression 'Ministry (or Minister) of External Affairs.' The Italian
'Affari Esteri' and the Spanish 'Relaciones Exteriores' could fairly be translated using either
term, foreign or external, indifferently. For simplicity, therefore, the short title originally used
for this chapter has been retained, except where specific application would make it incorrect.
2. Anson, Law and Custom of the. Constitution (3rd edn), ii, pt. I, 166.
3. Masson, Le Departement des Affaires Etrangeres pendant la Revolution, 56.
4. Anson, op. cit., 168.
5. Guide Diplomatique (Leipzig, 1866).
6. Hansard, HIC, Vol. 793, No. 38, cols. 4 12 and 413.
Chapter 4
I.
'Emperor of Germany,' though often found in historical works applied to the head of the
Holy Roman Empire, and even 'German Emperor,' were probably only convenient
corruptions of the proper title (Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, lib. edit., 1889, p. 305). From the
eleventh to the sixteenth century, that was, until his coronation, Romanorum rex semper Augustus,
and after the ceremony, Romanorum lmperator semper Augustus. In 1508 Maximilian obtained a
Bull from J ulius 11 permitting him to call himself lmperator eleetus. This became till 1806 the
strict legal designation, though the word 'elect' was often omitted (ibid., p. 432).
2. Paris de Grassis, Brit. Mus., Diarium, MSS, 8440, 8444> quoted by Nys, 25 R.D.I.L.C., 5 15.
3. de Maulde-la-Claviere, 2nd part, i. 65
4. Garda de la Vega, 525.
5. Flassan, ii. 66; Prescott, Philip // (edn 1855), 233, says it was Pius V.
6. Flassan, iii. 13.
7. Lefevre-Pontalis, Jean de Wilt, i. 245; Chappuzeau, L'Europe Vivante, cited by D. J. Hill,
History of European Diplomacy, iii. 26.
8. Diary ofJohn Evelyn (Wheatley's edn), ii. 486; Pepys' Diary (under date of30 September, 1661).
9. Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, vi. pt. ii. 403.
10. Flassan, vi. 314.
11. Ibid., vii. 376.
12. Ibid., vi. 193.
13. It took a convulsion of the magnitude of the Napoleonic Wars to sweep away the
conflicting pretensions of the numerous kingdoms and principalities which persisted in Europe
until the final disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire.
14. But though the reglement states that the order of signature shall be decided by lot, the
signatures appended to that document followed the alphabetical order of the French
language, and the same procedure was adopted for the signature of the aete final of the
Congress of Vienna.
15. d'Angeberg, Le Congres de Vienne, prem. part. 50 I, 503, 504, 612, 660, 735; deux. part. 932,
939
16. de Martens-Geffcken, ii. 134.
17. Garda de la Vega, 253.
18. de Martens-Geffcken, ii. 133 n.
.Notes
491
19. Kliiber, Acten des Wiener Congresses, vi. 207.

20. Droit des Gens, ii, c. 3, Sect. 39.
21. Le Fra~ais, langue diplomatique, 19; cited by Genet, Traite de Diplomatie, etc., i. 325 n.
22. See 13.10.
23. See also Chs. 5t 20 and 28.
24 See also ]6.23.
Chapter 5
de Maulde-Ia-Claviere, 289.
2. de Martens-Geffcken, ii. 25; Pradier-Fodere, i. 67.
3. 4 I ., footnote I.
4. de Martens-Geffcken, ii. 27 n.
5. Genet, Traite de Diplomatie etc., i. 352.
6. de" Martens-Geffcken, ii. 24.
7 Ibid., ii. 23.
8. Raabe and Duncan, History of Russia, 62 n.
9. Kluchevsky, History of Russia, ii. 22.
10. Ch. de Martens, Causes celebres, etc., i. 47. (See 15.2.)
I I. Pradier-Fodere, i. 5 I .
12. Ch. de Martens, op. cit., ii. 89.
13. Pradier-Fodere. i. 53 n.
14 Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre ler, i. 4 14, 444.
15 Cambridge Modern History, ix. 580 et infra.
16. Garcia de la Vega, 561.
17. Genet, op. cit., i. 86.
18. See Redesdale, Garter Mission to Japan (1906).
I.
Chapter 7
I. See 8.13.
2. de Maulde-Ia-Claviere, i. 80, 389.
3. Ibid., 209.
4. Garden, Histoire des Traites de Paix, v. 155 n.
5. F. de Martens, Recueil des Traitis etc., v. and ix. (x.).
6. J enkinson, iii. 342.
7. d'Angeberg, Le Congres de Vienne (1864)'
8. Stapleton, Political Life of the Rt. Hon. George Canning, iii. 265.
9. Moritz Busch, Graf Bismarck, 4th edn (1878), ii. 289.
10. For a more detailed account of the use of languages in the United Nations, see 36.65-70.
I I. E.g. 'C.E.E.' (French), 'E.E.C.' (English) for the European Community.
12. Trea~v Series, No. 45 (1930).
13. Parliamentary Paper, Mise., No. 7 (1925).
14.B.f:S.P., cxvi. 513-17.
15 B.F.S. P., xci, 175.
16. L'eloge du diplomate.
17. Lord Trevelyan has amusingly caricatured the abuse of diplomatic language in the
communiques issued after conferences to which the press have had no access. He makes the
following suggestions: ' "A frank exchange of views" = "nearly came to blows." "In the spirit
of brotherly solidarity" indicates that one side made clear to the other that it was becoming
too independent for its future comfort. "An atmosphere of cordiality" may mean that,
although one party was on the wrong side of the ideological fence, it was hoped that a little
flattery might induce it to do something in the other's interests.' Humphrey Trevelyan,
Diplomatic Channels (London, 1973), 9 I.
18. See also 23. I 3 and I 5.
19. Churchill, The Second World War, v.
20. Charles Thayer, Diplomat (London, 1960) pp. 105- 106.
21. B.F.S.P., cv. 366.
492
Notes
Chapter 8
I. See 21042. See 28.8.
3. A classic illustration of the importance of a clear definition of full powers and their
relation to the instructions given to the negotiator is afforded by the events which led to
Cardinal Richelieu's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Regensburg in 1630. His grounds for
refusal were that the two French representatives, whose full powers had been intended
apparently to apply only within the limits of their instructions, had gone far beyond what
they were authorised to do, and had thus placed their sovereign in an unacceptable position.
But it appeared that the Cardinal's thinking had changed with changed circumstances in the
three months between the initial despatch of the negotiators and the opening of the
discussions; and that the successive instructions he sent them proved more confusing than
helpful. For a detailed reconstruction of the whole story and its background, see' A cause celebre
in the history of treaty-making: The refusal to ratify the Peace Treaty of Regensburg in
1630', by D. P. O'Connell, in the BrIL, 1968, p. 71. Professor
O'Connell shows how this and other failures to ratify treaties in the first half of the
seventeenth century led to greatly intensified scrutiny of the credentials and full powers of
delegates to negotiations. 'Out of this caution,' he concludes, 'was born the modern
international law of ratification.' See also 28.8, 32.9, 32.13-15 and 32.18.
4. See 28.14
5 See Jenkinson, iii. 347.
6. Jenkinson, iii, 347.
7. Papers Relative to the. Vegotiations with France, 75.
8. But see 29.40 and footnote 107.

Chapter 9
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
De lure Belli ac Pacis, 11. XVIII. Ill. 2.

Koch and Schoell, Histoire abregee des Traites de Paix, etc., xiv.
See Chapter 3 footnote to title, para 2; and 10.3.

Phillimore, ii. 163-4.
Keith, British Constitutional Law, 35.
G. F. de Martens, Precis du Droit des Gem, ii. 40.
Oppenheim, i. Sect. 362.
de Martens-Geffcken, i. 39.
See Art. 5 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 196 1.
Chapter 10
I.
The Ruling Few (London, 1952).
2. Cmnd 2276 of 1964.

3. R. G. Feltham (Director of the Oxford University Foreign Service Course), Diplomatic
Handbook (London, 1970), 34
4. de Martens-Geffcken, 15 2
5. Life of Sir H. Wotton, prefixed to Reliquiae Wottonianae, 4th edn (1685).
6. John Christopher Flechammer or Fleckammer. See Logan Pearsall Smith, Life and Letters
of Sir H. Wotton, i. 49 n., 127 n.; ii. 10. Also an article by E. Nys in Revue de Droit International,
xxi. 388.
7. L. P. Smith, op. cit., ii. 9, and Reliquiae Wottonianae (4th 00).
8. See 11.12.
9. Izaak Walton, op. cit.
10. 'My dear Sir Harry, Your thoughts close and your countenance open is a motto that will
go safely over the whole world.'
Chapter 11
I. de Martens-Geffcken, i. 53.
2. See 4.10, footnote 14
,Notes
493
3. Deak, 'Classification etc. des agents diplomatiques', R.D. 1. L. C., (1928), 183, 185.
4 4 1.26-9.
5. Some of the ground of this and the following paragraphs is covered in greater detail by Garrett
Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy Chapter 5 onwards. See also Eileen Young, 'The development of
the law of diplomatic relations', B. r. I. L., (1964), 166-8.
6. Nys, Les Origines du Droit international, 312. There was a Venetian hailo there already in
1249, but not till after the conquest by the Turks did he come to have a diplomatic character
(Holtzendorff, iii. 613).
7 Schmelzing, ii. 115; de Martens-Geffcken, i. 59.
8. Krauske, 160.
9. Krauske, I 29
10. Nys, Droit International, ii. 345.
I I. Krauske, 163.
12. Krauske, 165, 174.
13. L'Intermediaire des Chercheurs of 13-30, August 1931, notes that the term 'ministre
plenipotentiaire' appears in the first edition of the Dictionnaire de l'Aeademie in 1694, and that
Richelet's Dictionary, which omits it from the first edition (1680), includes it in that of 1719,
with the note 'mot ecorche du latin,' which is taken to signify that grammarians did not
approve of it. Quotation is made from the Treaty of Munster (1648) 'congressus
plenipotentiariorum' and 'legati plenipotentiarii'; and of somewhat later seventeenth-century
instances of the French word - thus Cardinal Mazarin is 'Plenipotentiaire de S.M. TresChretienne' in the Treaty of the Pyrenees. Hatzfeld-Darmesteter gives as the first occurrence
that in Balzac's address to the Regent in 1615. (Notes and Queries, 12 September 1931.)
14. Holtzendorff, iii, 641.
15. Ferraris. Prompta Bihliotheca, Canonica, Juridica etc., iv. 1401 (quoted textually on page 168
of the Fourth Edition of the present work). See also Schmelzing, ii. 120.
16. See 9.7.
17. See 20.2.
18. Heffter, Das Europiiische Volkerrecht der Gegenwart, 7te Ausg., 428.
19. Almanach de Gotha.
Chapter 12
I. See 9.6.
2. Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, 31.
3. F. de Martens, Recueil des traites, etc., xiv, 415.
4. Schmalz, Europiiisches VOlkerrecht, 87, etc.
5. See 21.22.
6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, (Washington, 1886).
7. Hall, 355 n.
8. See 17.13 and 14, which also deal with the relevant privileges and immunities.
9. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, (Washington 1868-9), i. 493, 60 I;
Foster op. cit., 49.
10. Foster, op. cit., 49, 50.
Chapter 13
I. See 28.7 and 8.
2. The diplomatic representatives of most countries are furnished with special passports,
known as 'diplomatic passports,' the purpose of which is to ensure that the status of their
holders is recognised and that they are shown the consideration to which they are entitled.
The British Government do not issue diplomatic passports.
3. See 18.
4. Garcia de la Vega, Guide Pratique des Agents Politiques, Paris, and Brussels, 18 73, p. 635.
5. Memoires et Souvenirs de M. le Comte de Segur (3rd edn), Vol. 2, p. 215.
6. Garcia de la Vega op. cit., p. 636.
7. de Castro y Casaleiz Guia Practica del Diplomatico t.spanol Madrid, 1886, Vol. 2, pp. 291-2.
8. See 21.3.
9. Giacomo Bologna, Noz<.e Busnelli-Ballarin, Schio ( 1884).
494
Notes
Chapter 14
Le Droit des Cens, IV. VII, Sect. 92.
De l'Esprit des Lois, xxvi, Ch. 2 I.
3. De Jure Be'lli ac Pacis, 11. XVIII. iv. 5.
4. Hurst, 'Les immunites diplomatiques,2 H.R. (1926), p. 123.
5. UN Legislative Series, Vol. 7, p. 4 19.
6. 26 A.].I.L. (1932) (Suppl.), 19.
7. For a summary of the debates and successive drafts of the International Law Commission
see rearbook of the /LC, 1957 and 1958.
8. Histoire des Franfais, xxv, p. 552.
9 Treaty Series, No. 17 (1902).
10. 7 Anne, c. 12.
11. McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 193.
12. Mew's Digest of English Law Cases, Vol. 2, p. 306; McNair, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 85.
13. The Observer, I I February 1973.
14. UN Legislative Series, Vol. 7, p. 375; 32 A.J.I.L. (193 8 ), 344 and Supp., 100. Frend et. al. v.
US, Annual Digest (1938-40), No. 161.
15. Tietz et al. v. People's Republic of Bulgaria, Weinmann v. Republic of Latvia, Bennett and Ball v.
People's Republic of Hungary, Cassirer and Ceheeb v. Japan, 28 I.L.R. 369, 385, 392, 396.
16. De Martens, Causes Celebres du Droit des Cens, Vol. I, p. 174.
17. Ibid., p. 326.
18. Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. 4, p. 2412.
19. ICJ Reports (1950), p. 266.
20. ICJ Reports, (1951), p. 7 I.
21. ILC rearbook (1957), Vol. I, p. 54.
22. By Brigadier-General Sir P. Sykes, p. 233.
23.3 Dominion Law Reports (1947), 618, Annual Digest (1946), No. 76.
'24. The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, p. 175.
'25. UK Treaty Series, No. 41 (1967), para. 261.
16. Art. 35.
27. The Times, 18-20, 23-25, 27 November 1964.
28. Perrenoud, 'Les restrictions cl la liberte de deplacement des diplomates,' 57 RGDIP, p. 444.
29. Hansard, HC Debates, Vol. 906, col. 133 (written answers).
I.
2.
Chapter 15
I. Tenekides, 'Droit international et communautes federales dans la Grece des cites,' 2 H.R.
(1956), p. 552; Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Creece and Rome,
Vol. I, Ch. xiii.
2. Chatterjee, International Law and Inter-State Relations in Ancient India, London, 1958, p. 66.
3. e.g. Gentilis, De Legationibus Libri Tres (1585).
4. De Martens, Causes Celebres du Droit des Cens, Vol. I, p. 68.
5. Art. 2. Cmnd 6176.
6. Art. 2.
7. The Times, 7 April 1970 .
8. (1969), I W.L.R. 703, 2 All E.R. 707.
9 See .4. 14.
10. McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 186.
I I. De Martens, Causes Celebres du Droit des Cens, Vol. I, p. 83.
12. Ibid., p. 139.
13. UN" Legislative Series, Vol. 7, p. 201; Bynkershoek, De Foro Legatorum, Ch. IV.
14.7 Anne, c. 12.
15. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. 4, p. 662.
16. 1964, c. 81, S. 4.
17 14 RGDIP, p. 159
18. Eliz. 2, 1964, C. 81.
19. See Empson v. Smith (1966) I QB. 426, (1965); 2 All E.R. 881; 41 I.L.R. 407.
20. 121 E.R. 36; 2 E.&E. 94.
.Notes
495
2 I. (1894), 2 QB. 352.

22. A.J.I.L. (193 1), 259.
23. e.g. Switzerland (six months maximum), Venezuela (one month minimum): CUI[ Legislative
Series, Vol. 7, pp. 305,403.
24 (1g64) 2 All E.R. 265-6.
25 (193 0 ) I K.B. 376.
26. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the Us., 1888, pt. ii; B.F.S.P., Vol. 81
p. 479; Moore, Vol. 4, p. 536.
27. Diplomatic Correspondence Between the United States and Belligerent Governments - Neutral Rights
and Commerce, Vol. 10, p. 361.
28. Hansard, 15 June 193 I
29 See 3.20.
Chapter 16
I. Vattel, Le Droit des Gms, IV, VII, Sect. 105; Pradier-Fodere, Cours de Droit Diplomatique Vol. 2,
pp. 50-62; McNair, International Law Opinions Vol. I, p. 204; Harvard Research, 26 A.J.I.L. (1932)
(Suppl.), 107.
2. Charles, Duc de Morny, 1811-65. President du Corps Legislatif 1854-65. Sent to St
Petersburg 8 May 1856 as Ambassador Extraordinary to attend the coronation of Tsar
Alexander 11.
3. Busch, Bismarck, Some Secret Pages etc., Vol. I, p. 503.
4. British Nationality Act 1948 (c. 56) s. 4, as amended by the Diplomatic Privileges Act
1964 (c. 81) s. 5(2).
Chapter 17
4 & 5 Eliz. 2 c. 2 I.
2. Service staff in the Vienna Convention does not refer to the Defence Attaches (generally
known in English as 'Service Attaches'), or to other Naval, Military, or Air Force members of
the mission.
3 UN Docs. CN 99, 1964, Treaties - 10; CN 93, 1968, Treaties - 10; CN 139, 1965,
Treaties - 11; CN 153, 1968 - Treaties - 14.
4 CN 354, 1975, Treaties - 8.
5. Advice from Assistant Attorney-General to Acting Legal Adviser of State Department, 67
A.J.I.L. (1973), 760 - 2.
6. Details of arrangements and agreements were published in the London Gazette of I October
1964, and amended on I September 1966 (by the removal of Hungary on termination of the
relevant arrangement).
7 The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, pp. 31 -2.
f.
Chapter 18
I. Ward, Law ofNations, p. 560.
2. 'De intercursu mercandisarum cum imperatore Russiae', Rymer, Foedera, Vol. 17, p. 506 .
3. International Law, Vol. I, p. 389.
4 Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. 4, p. 557; Foster, Practice of Diplomacy p. 53.
5. UN Laws and Regulations regarding Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities
(UN Legislative Series Vol.. 7, p. 201).
6. (N.Y. 1839), 4 Sandf. 619.
7 (N.Y. 1889),4 N.Y. Suppl. 714.
8. 71 F. Suppl. 334; 170 F 2d 360; Annual Digest (1947), No. 73.
9 UN Doc.SII0816; RGDIP, (1974) p. 247.
10. (1971) 2 QB. 274; (1971) 2 All E.R. I I.
I I. Principes du Droit des Gens, Vol. I, p. 508.
12. Hall, p. 365.
13. Principes du Droit des Gens, p. 509.
14. Hurst, 'Immunites diplomatiques', 2 H.R. (1926), p. 235.
15. De Martens, Causes Celebres, Vol. I, p. 285.
496
.Notes
16. Oppenheim, Vol. I, p. 398.

17. Genet, TraiU de Diplomatie, Vol. I, p. 596.
18. De Martens, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 312 -2 5: Rivier, op. cit., Vol.
I,
p. 512.
Chapter 19
I. Cmnd 4300.
2. Chapter 2 sets out the privileges and immunities accorded under customary international
law to heads of state in foreign territory.
Chapter 20
I. See 11.3.
2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, Arts. 13 and 16. See also 13-10.
3. Schmelzing, Vol. 2, p. 128.
4. Foreign Relations of the United States, cited by Foster, op. cit., p. 71.
5. One of the most up-to-date handbooks, in which almost every aspect of the subject
receives thorough and lucid treatment, is Diplomatic Ceremonial and Protocol, by John R. Wood
and Jean Serres, London (1970).
8. Stapleton, Political Life of the Rt. Hon. George Canning, Vol. I, p. 482.
9 De Martens-Geffcken, Vo!. I, p. 127.
10. De Martens-Geffcken, Vo!. I, p. 131, puts the order thus 4 3 I 2
I I. See 22.1, 10 and 12 and Arts 45 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (1961). See also 26.7 and 14.
12. Callieres, 194.
13. Cambridge Modem History, Vol. 9, p. 269; Holland Rose, Lift of Napoleon I, Vo!. 2, p. 70.
14 Flassan, Vol. 3, p. 93
15. Camden, Annales Rer. Angl. Leyden, (1639), p. 734.
16. The story is reproduced by Wicquefort in L'Ambassadeur, nouv. edit., augm., (1730), Vo!.
2, p. 33, and Bk. 11, p. 99.
17. There is a well-known story that when Castlereagh, at Vienna in 1814, appeared in his
ordinary dress-coat with only the riband of the Garter among a crowd of foreign ambassadors
in full uniform and covered with orders, Talleyrand exclaimed, 'Ma foil C'est distingue!'
Croker, Correspondence and Diaries, Vo!. 3, p. 191, puts the scene at Chatillon.
185 V.S.C. 7342.
19 Villa-Vrrutia, Vol. 3, pp. 381 , 382, n.; pp. 448, 483.
21.]. Q Adams, Memoirs, Vol. 3, p. 827, cited by Foster, op. cit., p. 147.
22. Mirruss, Europiiisches Gesandschaftsrecht, p. 200.
23. Flassan, Vo!. 6, p. 560.
24. Hertslet, Old Foreign Office, pp. 174-6.
Chapter 21
Cmnd 4300.
See 8.7.
See 15. 17.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 , Art. 39(3).
See 165
6. The Times, 8 May 1958.
7 The Times, 17 June 1976 .
8. See 9.23.
9. See 9.13-18; 20.9-10; and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 16(2).
10. See 9.23 and 30.
11. Annales Rerum Anglicarum et Hibernicarum, regnante Elizabetha, trans. by R. N. Gent, London,
3 rd edn, ( 16 35), pp. 263-4.
12.J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Washington (1906), Vo!. 4, pp. 485, 489.
I.
2.
3
4
5
.Notes
497
13. Ibid., V01. 4, p. 490.

14 Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 5 14.
15 Ibid., Vol. 4, p. 492.
16. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, p. 433.
I 7. Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, Vol. 2, p. 249; Moore, op. cit., Vot. 4, p. 507; Foreign
Relations of the United States (1898), p. 1007.
18. Le Temps, 15 October 1927.
19. The violation of the Act was alleged to have been committed by American lawyers who
had given Yrujo a legal opinion adverse to the view of the US Government: Adams,History of
the United States, Vol. 2, p. 259.
20. Moore, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 508.
21. Ibid., p. 497.
22. de Boeck, 'L'Expulsion et les difficultes internationales qu'en souleve la pratique,' 3 H.R.
(1927), p. 5 02.
23 Moore, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 538-9; Correspondence Presented to Parliament (1848).
24 Moore, op. cit., Vot. 4, p. 534; 47 and 48 BFSP.
25 See 15.32.
26. Calvo, International Law (4th edn), Vot. 3, p. 213; Moore, op. cit., Vot. 4, p. 536 .
27. The text of the aide-memoire was printed in The Times, 25 September 197 I .
28. The Times, I July 1976.
29. The Times, 16, 21, 22 and 23 October 1976.
Chapter 22
I. De Martens, Recueil des Traites etc., Vol. 9( 10), p. 52.
2. Moore, Vot. 4, p. 548.
3. Diplomatic Service: Formation and Operation, London (1971), p. 80. The report is described by
the then Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr Arnold Smith, as 'a distillation from the
papers prepared for the Seminar, and the discussions which took place in Singapore.' The
report contains a great deal of highly useful information and practical advice on diplomacy,
especially valuable for countries whose financial means only permit diplomatic representation
on a modest scale.
4 Hansard, 28 July 1976 .
5 See 21.15
Chapter 23
I. Mr Shen P'ing, who was appointed in 1975 Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Asian
Affairs Department.
2. See 7.35.
3. It is a not uncommon and very mortifying experience for a mission to learn from a written
or broadcast comment from home that 'Our Embassy was taken entirely by surprise': so,
presumably, was the previous national government.
4. The question whether this immediate request should be made 'on instructions' or on the
responsibility of the head of mission may well depend on the possibility of immediate
telephone communication between the head of mission and his own foreign ministry; if there
is any doubt about this at all, immediate action by the head of mission is desirable.
Chapter 24
I. Sources include Political Kidnappings, Committee on Internal Security, US House of
Representatives, 93rd Congress, I August 1973, and Professor Carl Edler Baumann, The
Diplomatic Kidnappings The Hague, (1973).
2. Op. cit.
3. The nature of the dilemma in which German public opinion and the German authorities
themselves had been placed by the activities of violent revolutionaries is described by Melvin
J. Lasky in 'Ulrike Meinhof and the Baader-Meinhof gang,' Encounter (June 1975).
4 See 14. 15.
5. The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts committed on board
498
.Notes
Aircraft, 14 September 1963, which came into force on 4 December 1969. (Cmnd 4230.)
The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December 1970,
(Cmnd 4577), came into force on 14 October 1971 and was republished as Cmnd 4956.
The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of
Civil Aviation, 23 September 1971, came into force on 26January 1973. (Cmnd 5524.)
6. This desire was intensified by the kidnappings of Mr Laporte and Mr Cross in Canada.
(See 24.5.) A fascinating account of this episode, with all the complexities of a situation in
which a Federal Government and a State Government were dealing simultaneously with
more than one terrorist group, will be found in Baumann, op. cit., Ch. VII, I I 1-38.
7. Cmnd 61 76.
8. Published in the UK Mise. series (Cmnd 7031) pending receipt of the necessary ratifications
to bring it into force.
Chapter 25
Julian Hale, Radio Power (London, 1975), 62.
The Goebbels Diaries (New York, 1946), 13.
3 See Thomas Grandin, The Political Use of the Radio, Geneva Studies, x. No. 3 (1939).
4. Quoted by Hale from John B. Whitton and Arthur Larson, Propaganda: towards
Disarmament in the War of Words (New York, 1959).
5. Quoted in a lecture, 'Why external broadcasting?' by Gerald Mansell, Managing
Director, BBC. External Service, 1976.
6. Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt; the Search for Dignity (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).
7. Op. cit.
8. Final Act, Helsinki Conference, 1975.
9. It is to be hoped that they will not often have to go so far as a certain ambassador of recent years
who, on hearing intolerable disparagement of his country in a broadcast by the local dictator,
is said to have driven immediately to the studios and to have interrupted the discourse by making
his protest there and then.
I.
2.
Chapter 26
I. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963. Cmnd 5219.
2. United States' practice is an exception.
3 Arts. 27 and 53
4 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, Art. 64.
Chapter 27
I. Paris, 11 December 1967. European Treaty Series 61.
2. See 41.31-33.
3. Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent. London, 1932.
4 New York Times, 26 July 1955.
5. New York Times, 11 January 1963.
Chapter 28
I. Permanent organisations having their own standing arrangements and rules ofprocedure, such
as the United Nations and the Special Agencies, are treated as a separate subject in Book V. Crossreferences to that Book have therefore been kept to a minimum.
2. The Universal Postal Convention, however, continues to be revised periodically at
congresses of the states forming the Universal Postal Union.
3. See 8.8.
4 See ]6.65-9'
5. See 8.10.
6. Basdevant, 'La conclusion et la redaction des traites,' 5 H. R. (1926), p. 629.
7. History of the Peace Coriference of Paris, Vol. I, p. 247.
8. See Appendix 11.
9. See 316.
Notes
499
Chapter 29
I. Cmnd 4818, Art. 2(1) (a). The Convention has not yet formally entered into force. As of31
December 1977, thirty-one states had deposited instruments of ratification or accession with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations: Article 84 of the Convention stipulates that it will enter
into force on the thirtieth day following the receipt ofthe thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or
accession. The fact that the Convention has not yet formally entered into force does not materially
affect its significance, since it may in many (though not in all) respects be taken as an exercise in the
codification of existing customary international law: see Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1973), Ch. I for a brief analysis of how far particular Convention provisions represent
progressive development of international law rather than codification. The International Court of
Justice has already held (in its Advisory Opinion in the Namibia case) that the rules laid down in the
Convention concerning termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach 'may in many
respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law;' and (in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
case) has made an identical pronouncement with respect to Art. 62 of the Convention which deals
with the question of termination ofa treaty relationship on account ofchange ofcircumstances. See
3349-3353
2. Law of Treaties (1961), p. 2.
3 Introduction au droit des Traites (1972), p. 40.
4. A resolution adopted by the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties recommended to
the United Nations General Assembly that it refer to the International Law Commission the
study, in consultation with the principal international organisations, of the question of treaties
concluded between states and international organisations or between two or more
international organisations. This study has now been put in hand: see Reports of the
International Law Commission covering its 1974, 1975 and 1977 sessions (A/961O/Rev. I,
A/wow/Rev. I, and A/32/1O respectively)
5. Reports of the International Law Commission on its 17th and 18th sessions (1966): A/6309/Rev. I
(hereinafter cited as 1966 /LC Report), p. 22.
6. Op. cit., p. 7.
7 PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, p. 7 1.
8. ICJ Reports (1974), p. 267. Earlier, the Court had affirmed that 'declarations made by way
of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal
obligations;' and that 'an undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be
bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding.'
(Loc. cit.) It would appear that an oral statement of this nature must be construed in
accordance with the precise meaning of the original language version in which it has been
expressed. The Court indicated that the precise nature and limits of the obligation
undertaken by the French Government 'must be understood in accordance with the actual
terms in which [they have] been publicly expressed'. (Loc. cit.)
9. McNair, op. cit., pp. 4-5
10. See Mann, Studies in International Law (1973) pp. 140-255. Of particular interest in this
context is the ruling of Arbitrator Cassin in the Diverted Cargoes arbitration between the
United Kingdom and Greece. The question at issue was which rate of exchange (the rate on
the day on which the debt arose, or the rate on the day of payment) should be used to
calculate the sterling amount to be credited to Greece under the terms of an agreement of
1942 between the United Kin~dom and Greek Governments for the settlement of claims
arising from the diversion of Greek cargoes by UK forces during the Second World War. The
arbitrator. although holding that the 1942 agreement was 'unquestionably governed by
International law' and not by the internal law of one or other of the states concerned, was
nevertheless constrained to found his award on reasoning derived from analogies with rules of
comparative municipal law. For the text of the award, see Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, VoI. 12, pp. 53-81; see also Mann, op. cit., pp. 166-75.
11. At the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, the United Kingdom representative
maintained that 'many agreed minutes arid memoranda of understanding were not
international agreements subject to the law of treaties, because the parties had not intended
to create legal rights or obligations, or a legal relationship, between themselves.' He also
pointed out that 'international practice had consistently upheld the distinction between
international agreements properly so-called, where the parties intended to create rights and
obligations, and declarations and other similar instruments simply setting out policy objectives
or aRreed views.' Official Records, Second Session (1969), p. 228.
500
Notes
PCI], Series A/B, No. 4 1, p. 4713 'Harvard Research,' 29 A.J. I.L. (1935), p. 712.
14 Myers, 'The names and scope of treaties,' 51 A.].I.L. (1957), pp. 575-605.
15. Cmnd 6198.
16. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Mr Harold Wilson) in his speech at
the CSCE in Helsinki on 30 July 1975, specifically stated that 'the Final Act of this
Conference is not a treaty; nor is it a peace settlement'. (Cmnd 6197.)
17. Other examples of instruments which are not intended to embody legally
binding obligations are: (a) the conclusions of the 1943 Cairo Conference; (b) the Potsdam
Protocol of 2 August 194$ (e) the so-called 'gentlemen's agreement' of 1946 on the
distribution of non-permanent member states on the Security Council; and (d) the so-called
'Luxembourg agreement' of 1966 on voting procedure in the EEC Council of Ministers. On
the whole question of non-binding agreements, see Munch in 29 Z.a.o.R. V., (1969), pp. 1-11.
18. Treaty Series, No. 56 (1949), Cmd 7789.
19. Treaty Series, No. 2 (1973), Cmnd 5189.
20. Treaty Series, No. I (1973) - Part 11, Cmnd 5179-1 I.
21. Ibid.
22. Treaty Series, No. I (1973) - Part I, Cmnd 5179-1.
23.51 A.].I.L. (1957), p. 579. While this may be true on a quantitative analysis of the
12.
various international agreements registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
the fact remains that the 'treaty' form is still used for international agreements of a
particularly significant nature. Recent examples are the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963 (Treaty Series,
No. 3 (1964), Cmnd 2245), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of I July
1968 (Treaty Series No. 88 (1970), Cmnd 4474), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America of 14 February 1967 (Treaty Series, No. 54 (1970), Cmnd 4409)
and the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 27 January 1967 (Treaty
Series, No. 10 (1968), Cmnd 3519).
25 Treaty Series, No. 73 (1947), Cmd 72 I 7
27 Treaty Series, No. 75 (197 1), Cmnd 4790.
28. This order is, however, by no means sacrosanct. The definitions article (if any) is
sometimes relegated to the end; and, where the treaty sets up an organisation or mechanism
to ensure effective execution of its provisions, the organisational or mechanical provisions may
precede the more specific substantive provisions.
29. Treaty Series, No. 50 (1948), Cmd 748 1.
30. Treaty Series, No. 33 (1952), Cmd 860 I.
33. Treaty Series, No. 4 (1972), Cmnd 4 850.
34 Treaty Series, No. 35 (197 2), Cmnd 4937
35. Occasionally, one may come across a treaty which is in 'mixed' form. Thus, the Treaty of
Versailles of 28 June 1919 is expressed to be concluded between the 'Principal Allies and
Associated Powers' and Germany, but the High Contracting Parties (on the Allied side) are
the various Heads of State 'represented' by certain Ministers and Ambassadors. This formula
was probably chosen for the purpose of enabling the British self-governing Dominions and
India to participate separately in the Peace Treaty without raising what would have been
regarded at that time as difficult questions of their treaty-making capacity; see McNair, op.
cit., p. 16.
36. That is to say, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the
Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, and the Convention on the High Seas, all of 29 April 1958; the texts of
these four conventions can be found in Mise., No. 15 (1958), Cmnd 584.
37 Treaty Series, No. 19 (1965) Cmnd 256 5.
39 Mise., No. 19 (1971), Cmnd 4818.
40. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution
.Notes
501
2530 (XXIV) of 8 December 1969. For the text of the Resolution, to which the Convention is
annexed, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 30
(A/7630); or Mise. No. 3 (1970), Cmnd 4300.
41. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution
3166 (XXVIII) of 14 December 197$ for text, see Official Records of the General Assembly,
Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/9030); or Mise., No. 19 (1975), Cmnd 6176.
4 2 . Treaty Series, No. 39 (1972), Cmnd 4956.
44. Loc. cit., p. 583.
45. Treaty Series, No. 3 (1955), Cmd 93 6 3.
49 Treaty Series, No. 4 (1973), Cmnd 5204.
53 Treaty Series, No. 23 (1973), Cmnd 522 I.
54. Treaty Series, No. 53 (1973), Cmnd 5306 .
55. Treaty Series, No. 70 (1973), Cmnd 5335
56. Treaty Series, No. 99 (1973), Cmnd 5433
57. Myers, loco cit., p. 589.
58. See 29-4
59. Myers, loco cit., p. 586 .
60. See especially Chapters 4, 13, 20, 44
62. Treaty Series, No. I 18 (1973), Cmnd 5454.
66. United Nations Treaty Series (UNT..~J, Vol. 258, p. 39 2.
67. l ~ /\fTS, Vol. 588, p. 290.
68. British and Foreign State Papers (BFSPj, Vol. 90, p. 1049.
69 Ibid., Vol. 114, p. 875.
70 . CI\fTS, Vol. 67 1, p. 57.
71. BJ<:~'P, Vol. 86, p. 543.
73 Treaty Series, No. 14 (1954), Cmd 9071.
75 See 32.3 and 32.11.
76. International Law (8th edn, (1955), Vol. I, p. 899.
77 BJ<:.,P, Vol. 46, p. 63.
78. Loc. cit.
79. BFSP, Vol. 58, p. 16.
80. Ibid., Vol. 104, p. 242.
82. Treaty Series, No. 27 (1g63), Cmnd 2025.
83. rearbook of the United Nations (1946-7), p. I.
84. Such as the conferences which took place at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945.
85 McNair. op. cit., p. 23, n. 2.
86. Op. cit., p. 872.
87. Ibid.
88. Treaty Series, No. 1(1973), Cmnd 5179- 1, p. 275.
89. On the Court ofJustice, on the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, on the fisheries sector, on
the development of trade relations with Ceylon, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Singapore,
and on the free movement of workers.
90. On the application of the Treaty of Accession to Berlin.
9 1. Including a unilateral Declaration by the United Kingdom Government on the definition
of the term 'nationals.'
502
Notes
92. BFSP, Vol. 123, p. 500.

93. lC] Reports (1952), p. 28: the case arose out of a claim by a Greek shipowner (Mr
Ambatielos) who alleged that he had suffered considerable loss in consequence of a contract
which he concluded in 1919 with the British Government (represented by the Ministry of
Shipping) for the purchase of nine steamships then under construction, and in consequence of
certain adverse judicial decisions in the English courts in connection therewith.
94 Treaty Series, No. 12 (1952), Cmd 8490.
95.1966 /Le Report, p. 30.
96. These and other examples are given by Weinstein in an article entitled 'Exchanges of
Notes' published in 29 B.Y.I.L. (1952) pp. 205-26.
98.30 B.Y.I.L. (1953), p. 362: Weinstein, loco cit. (pp. 213-14) gives roughly comparable
figures based on a different statistical method.
99. Treaty Series, No. 38 (1948 ), Cmd 7456.
100. Treaty Series, No. 52 (195 I), Cmd 8294. The actual formula used in the Note from HM
Ambassador at Rome to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs was as follows: 'A Note in
similar terms is being addressed to Your Excellency by His Excellency the Ambassador of the
United States of America and I suggest that his communication and the present
communication, together with your replies thereto, ... shall be regarded as constituting an
agreement on this matter between His Majesty's Government and the United States
Government on the one hand and the Italian Government on the other.'
IO!. Treaty Series, No. I (1973) - Part I, Cmnd 5179-1, pp. 272-4.
103. Treaty Series, No. I I (1974), Cmnd 5526.
10 5. Treaty Series, No. 28 (1974), Cmnd 5585.
107. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art. 7). It should be noted that heads of
state, heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs are, in virtue of their functions
and without having to produce full powers, considered as representing their state for the
purposes of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty. (See 8.18.) Credentials
notifying the composition of a delegation to an international conference at which a treaty
may be negotiated and signed do not constitute full powers for the purposes of signature.
108. See Ch. 32.
109. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art. 12, para. 2).
110. 1966 ILC Report, p. 29.
I I I. UNTS Vol. 235, p. 99.
112. BFSP, Vol. 98, p. 75.
I 13. Examples are the Treaty of Peace between Indonesia and Japan of 20 January
1958 (UNTS, Vo1324, p. 241) which is drawn up in the Japanese, Indonesian and
English languages, the English text to prevail in case of any divergence of interpretation;
and the Treaty of Friendship between Japan and Ethiopia of 19 December 1957
(UNTS Vol. 325, p. 99) drawn up in the Japanese, Amharic and French languages, the French
text to be authentic in case of any divergence of interpretation.
114. BFSP, Vol. 81, p. 733.
I 15. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, First Session (1968),
P 26 4
116. See, for example, the Convention on the Registration of Objects launched into Outer
Space, opened for signature pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 3235(XXIX) of 12
November 1974.
I 17. See, for example, the Treaty of 22 July 1975 amending certain Financial Provisions of
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a Single
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Cmnd 6252. Note also that
the Agreement establishing a Financial Support Fund of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development concluded at Paris on 9 April 1975, is drawn up in seven
language texts (English, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Netherlands and Spanish), all
texts being equally authentic: Mise., No. 20 (1975), Cmnd 6242.
118. An example is the Universal Copyright Convention of 6 September 1952; Treaty Series,
No. 66 (1957), Cmnd 289.
,Notes
503
119. Hardy, 'The interpretation of plurilingual treaties by international courts and

tribunals,' 37 B.Y.I.L. (1961 ), pp. 72-155 (at p. 143).
120. PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, p. 19.
12 I. Loc. cit., pp. 77-80.
122. 1966 ILC Report, p. 56.
Chapter 30
'The names and scope of Treaties,' 51 A.J.I.L. (1957), pp. 580-1.
UITS, Vol. 70, p. 248: the full text of the Pact is also given in The Treaty-Makers
Handbook (1973) (ed. Blix and Emerson), a useful compilation of various treaty materials.
3. [J.llfTS, Vol. 30, p. 55: Art. LX of the Treaty provides that the 'the present Treaty shall
be called the Pact of Bogota.' See 42.123.
4 Treaty Series, No. 47 (1946 ), Cmd 6955
7. Myers, loc. cit., p. 581.
8. It may be noted here that the constitutive instrument of the League of Nations was
designated 'Covenant' to emphasise its solemnity. It is said that President Woodrow Wilson,
in choosing this title, derived inspiration from the Solemn League and Covenant of 1642
subscribed to by the Scottish people. The designation 'Covenant' is still occasionally used: for
example, the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. (Misc., No. 4 (1967),
Cmnd 3220.)
9 U.NTS, VoI. 11 9, p. 3
I I. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 120 in favour, 6 against, and 10 abstentions.
The States voting against were Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany,
United Kingdom and United States.
Il Treaty Series, No. 65 (1955), Cmd 9582.
15 UlfTS, Vol. 26, p. I 73.
16. LNTS, Vol. 7, p. 35
17 LNTS, Vol. 47, p. 55
18. LITS, Vol. 29, p. 85.
2 I. Treaty Series, No. 104 (1975), Cmnd 6219.
22. Lucien-Brun, 'La fin des concordats?,' A.F.D.I. (1972),
pp. 225-33
23. Hall, International Law, 8th edn, p. 379.
24. Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 7th edn, pp. 76-7.
25. Fauchille, Traite de Droit International Public, (8th edn, 1926), Vol. I, Part 3, p. 442
26. Ehler 'The recent concordats,' 104 H.R. (T961), p. 53; and de la Briere, 'Le droit cOllcolda/aire
dans la Nouvelle Europe,' 63 H.R. (1938) pp. 371-468.
27. Loc. cit., p. 603.
28. Ehler, loc. cit., pp. 41-2.
29. Bf:~'P, Vol. I, p. 172.
30. Ibid., VoI. 118, p. 1141.
31. For example, the Additional Articles to the Agreement with the Post Office of
Czechoslovakia for the exchange of money orders of 17 JuIY/9 August 1925, which were
signed at London/Prague on 28 March/30 April 1927: UVTS, VoI. 59, p. 372. See also the
Additional Articles to the corresponding Agreement with Iraq: LIVTS, Vol. 63, p. 389.
I.
2.
Chapter 31
I.
Tlfa~)' Se/if.l, No. I (1973)-Part I, Cmnd 5179-1.
2. See Art. 158 of the Act of Accession.
504
Notes
3. For a fuller explanation of the legal background, see Puissochet, L 'Elargissement des
Communautes Europeennes (1974), pp. 3 1-5.
4. Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. 8, p. 563.
5. 39 A.J.I.L. (1945); Supplement, p. 108: it may be noted that the Act of Chapultepec
consists in substance of a Declaration and Recommendation, together to be known by the
name of 'Act of Chapultepec'. See 42. 124.
6. BFSP, Vol. 76, p. 4.
7. Ibid., Vol. 81, p. 1058.
8. Ibid., Vol. 82, p. 55.
9. Ibid., Vol. 99, p. 141: this is sometimes popularly referred to as the 'Act of Algeciras'.
10. Ibid., Vol. 130, p. 878.
I I. UNTS, Vol. 71, p. 101.
12. The Court did not feel itself called upon to pronounce on the issue of jurisdiction, holding
that, having regard to certain circumstances set out in the judgment, the claims of Australia
and New Zealand no longer had any object. But the joint dissenting opinion of Judges
Onyeama, Dillard, Jimenez de Arechaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock contains a full
description and analysis of the jurisdictional provisions of the 1928 General Act and its
relationship to the Revised General Act: IC] Reports (1974), pp. 253-74 (Australia v. France),
and 457-78 (New Zealand v. France), the joint dissenting opinion being found at pp. 312-71
and 494-523, respectively.
13. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Request for the indication of interim measures
of protection: IC] Reports (1976), pp. 1-40.
14. Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences (1909), p. 41.
15. Sir J. Pauncefote to the Marquess of Salisbury, 31 July 1899: Pari. papers,' Mise., No. I
(1899), p. 27 8.
16. Mise., No. 19 (1g64), Cmnd 2415. This covered the Convention relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods and the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on
the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
17. Mise., No. 6 (1973), Cmnd 5225. This covered draft conventions concerning (a) the
International Administration of the Estates of Deceased Persons, (b) the Law applicable to
Products Liability and (c) the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions relating to Maintainance Obligations.
18. Mise., No. 54 (1972), Cmnd 5169.
20. See the interesting discussion by Briggs, 'The Final Act of the London Conference on Germany,'
49 AJ.I.L. (1955) pp. 148 - 65, especially at pp. 149-52.
21. UNTS, Vol. 37, p. 223
22. Treaty Series, No. 19 (1930) Cmd 3552. See also the Temporary Fisheries Agreement
between the Government of the United Kingdom and of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics signed at London on 22 May 1930 - Treaty Series, No. 22 (1930), Cmd 3583.
24.IC] Reports (1974), p. 18.
25. Treaty Series, No. 103 (195 I), Cmd &4:l2. Note also that the North Sea Continental Shelf cases
(Netherlands v. Federal Republic of Germarry, Denmark v Federal Republic of Germarry) were referred
to the ICJ by Special Agreements: see ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Pleadings (1g68), Vol. I,
pp. 6-9
26. This refers to the written pleadings of the parties.
27. Text as published in Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conference (1909), p. 137.
28. General Assembly Resolution 1262 (XIII) of 14 November 1958.
30. Mise., No. 17 (1965), Cmnd 2682.
31. Mise., No. 23 (1971), Cmnd 4781.
32. BFSP, Vol. 95, p. 759
33. Pursuant to the Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) of I April 1965, the Court of
Arbitration constituted by that Agreement (whose President was Lord McNair) delivered its
report to the United Kingdom Government on 24 November 1966. The formal Award was
promulgated by Her Majesty on 9 December 1966 For the text of the Award and report, see
Report of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 16, p. 109. The Award of Her Majesty
in the Beagle Channel case was promulgated on 18 April 1977: for the text ofthe Award and the
Notes
505
report and decision of the Court of Arbitration (whose President was Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice), see
Award of Her Britannic Majesty's Government pursuant to the Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso)
of a Controversy between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile concerning the region of the
Beagle Channel, published by HMSO in 1977. See 38.32.
34. Treaty Series, No. 20 (1955), Cmd. 9425.
35. Treaty Series, No. 65 (1954), Cmd. 9272. This was the famous Buraimi arbitration where
the Tribunal became disrupted as a result of serious allegations of improper conduct on the
part of the Saudi Arabian member of the Tribunal: see Simpson and Fox, International
Arbitration (1959), pp. 162-3, 253 and 288, n. 85.
Chapter 32
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art. I I).
See Chapter 29. 9, also 32. I 7, 18.
3. Ibid.
4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art. 12(2) (b) ).
5. 1966 /LC Reports, p. 29
6. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. For example, the Agreement regarding the
Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty Series, No. 3 (1955) ) was
signed in London on 19 June 1951, but was deposited in the archives of the United States
Government (presumably because the United States Government was the depository of the
North Atlantic Treaty itself). Multilateral agreements which adopt the 'triple depository'
technique may also constitute an exception to the general rule. Thus, the Hague Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was originally opened for signature at The
Hague by states which had participated in the conference at which the convention had been
negotiated. The Governments of the USSR, United Kingdom and the United States were,
however, designated as the Depository Governments, and the Convention remained open for
signature by all states in Moscow, London and Washington, respectively, after the expiry of
the short period stipulated for signature at The Hague. (Treaty Series, No. 39 (1972) (Art. 13).)
A parallel provision will be found in the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. (Treaty Series, No. 10 (1974) (Art. 15,)
7. Art. 77 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets out in general terms the
functions of a depository of a treaty 'unless otherwise provided in the treaty or agreed by the
contracting States.'
8. Practice, of course, varies widely as regards the precise form of an instrument of
ratification. For examples from other countries, notably Australia, Cyprus and the
Philippines, see The Treaty Makers Handbook, pp. 57-8.
9. This is popularly known as the 'Ponsonby rule'; it derives from a statement made by the
then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in 1924. See 5 B.Y.I.L. (1924), p. 190, and
McNair, Law of Treaties (1961 ), pp. 99, 190.
10. McNair, op. cit., pp. 129-30.
11. Ibid., pp. 133-4.
12. An example of express provision to the contrary is provided by Protocol 3 to the Universal
Copyright Convention signed at Geneva on 6 September 1952 which stipulates that 'any
State party hereto may, on depositing its instrument of ratification or acceptance of or
accession to the Convention, notify the Director-General of UNESCO that that instrument
shall not take effect for the purposes of Article IX of the Convention until any other State
named in such ratification shall have deposited its instrument.' (Treaty Series, No. 66 (1957),
Cmnd 289.)
13. 1966 /LC Reports, p. 30; see also the judgment of Sir William Scott (later Lord Stowell) in
the Eliza Ann (1813) I Dods. 244 at p. 248, and Mervyn Jones, Full Powers and Ratification
(1946), pp. 12-20 and 74-90.
14. PCI], Series A, No. 23, p. 20.
15 Fitzmaurice, 15 B.Y.I.L. (1934), p. 129; Blix, 30 B.Y.I.L. (1953), p. 380 .
16. Art. 12, 14 and 15; see also Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1973),
pp. 36- 8.
17. PC/], Series A, No. 2, p. 57.
18. Op. cit., p. 135.
19. For example, the then French Government failed to obtain in 1954 the necessary
I.
2.
506
,'Votes
Parliamentary approval required to enable France to ratify the European Defence

Community Treaty.
20. It is rare that the gap between signature and ratification is as long as sixty-three years,
which was the case with respect to the United Kingdom ratification (on 13 August 1970) of
the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, see Trea~v
Series, No. 6 (1971), Cmnd 4575. The lengthy delay is attributable to the fact that it was not
until the enactment of the Oaths and Evidence (Overseas Authorities and Countries) Act,
1963, that the United Kingdom was in a position to give effect to certain provisions of the
1907 Convention relating to the taking of evidence.
21. McNair., op. cit., p. 149.
23. l:\"TS, Vot. 71, p. 101.
24 Trea~v Series, No. 10 (1950), Cmd 7891.
25. Trea~v Series, No. 69 (1959), Cmnd 85 The relevant provisions are Sects. 41-7.
26. There may be a defined category of states to whom the treaty is open for signature.
27. The Declaration on universal participation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties adopted by the Conference invited the General Assembly to give consideration to the
matter of issuing invitations in order to ensure the widest possible participation in the
Convention. By virtue of General Assembly Resolution 3233 (XXIX) of 12 November 1974,
all states were invited to become parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
and the Convention on Special Missions.
28. Similar provisions (though with minor modifications) will be found in the major codifying
conventions negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations - that is to say, the four
Law of the Sea Conventions adopted by the First United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea held at Geneva in 1958, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 (Art.
4 8 - 50), the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 (Arts. 74 - 6) and the
Convention on Special Missions, 1969 (Arts. 50-2).
29. 1 earbook of the International Lau' Commission (1956), Vol. 2, p. 125.
30. 1966 ILC Reports, p. 32.
31. For example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates (Article 84) that
the Convention 'shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the
thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession.'
3 2 . Trea~v Series, No. 56 (1949), Cmd. 7789.
33 Trea~}' Series, No. 11 (1952), Cmd 8489.
34 Trea~v ,lojeries, No. 44 (1955), Cmd 950 I.
35 Trea~v Series, No. I (1949), Cmd 7599
36 . Trea~v ,lojeries, No. 39 (1955), Cmd 9498.
37. The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly (Rules 113-16) under which
the first six new members were admitted to membership of the United Nations (Afghanistan,
Iceland, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand and Yemen) provided that membership in case of a
favourable decision by the General Assembly should become effective on the date on which
the applicant state presented to the Secretary-General an instrument of adherence. This was
later altered. Under the current rules (Rules 135-9) the applicant state is required to embody
in its application a declaration, made in a formal instrument, that it accepts the obligations
contained in the Charter; and, if the application is approved, membership becomes effective
on the date on which the General Assembly takes its decision on the application.
38 . Assembly Records (1927), Plenary Meetings, item 77 (23 September), cited in McNalr,
op. cit., p. 152.
39. 1966 /LC Reports, p. 328. It may be noted that, according to United Kingdom practice, an
instrument of accession does not require ratification and is regarded constitutionally as
equivalent to ratification.
40. McNair, op. cit., p. 151.
41. This was a proposal for a new Art. 5 bis in the following terms: 'Every State has the right
to participate in a multilateral treaty which codifies or progressively develops norms of
general international law, or the object and purpose of which are of interest to the
international community of States as a whole.' (Doc. A/CONF. 39/C. I/L. 388 and Add. I.)
42. Sinclair, op. cit. p. 138; but see Nahlik, La Conference de Vienne Jur le droit des traith: [1ne vue
d'ensemble in Annuaire Ji'ran(ais de Droit International (1969), pp. 48-9.
43 1966 /LC Reports, p. 31.
.Notes
507
44. Tr~aty Series, No. 65 (1955), Cmd 9582.

45 Trea~y Series, No. 20 (1959), Cmnd 677
4 6 . Treaty SerieJ, No. 54 (195 8 ), Cmnd 589.
47. A similar provision will be found in Art. 10 of the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea signed in London on 17 June 1960: Treaty Series, No. 65 (1965), Cmnd 28 I 2.
48. See Liang in 44 A.J.I.L. (1950), pp. 342-9.
49. Liang, loco cit., p. 346.
50. 1966 /Le Reports, p. 31.
Chapter 33
I. Art. 2(1) (d).
2. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, First Session, p. 34.
3. Law of Treaties (1961), pp. 160-1.
5. Conventions and Agreements concluded within the Council of Europe and which concern the European
Committee on Legal Cooperation, (1974), p. 23: the United Kingdom Government have neither
signed nor ratified this Convention.

6. Loc. cit., p. 61.
7. Loc. cit., p. 84
8. Loc. cit., p. 170.
9. Loe. cit., p. 141: the United Kingdom Government have signed, but not yet ratified, this
Convention.
10. Loc. cit., p. 183 (Art. 15): the United Kingdom Government have signed, but not yet
ratified, this Convention.
I I. Loe. cit., p. 127 (Art. 25)'
12. This is not to say that there may not be argument as to the legal effect of an objection to
a reservation which the particular treaty arguably permits to be made.
13. Introduction au droit des traites (1973), p. 89
14. League Document G.212: 1927 V: the full text of the report is published in McNair, op.
cit., pp. 173-7.
15. Reuter, op. cit., p. 89.
16. See the Secretary-General's Report to the General Assembly of 20 September 1950
(AII372) on 'Reservations to Multilateral Conventions.'
1]. See 'Historical summary of the question of reservations to multilateral conventions,'
appended to Sir Humphrey Waldock's first report on the law of treaties (Doe. A/CN. 41144):
rearbook of the International Law Commission (1962), Vol. 2, pp. 73 -80.
18. IC) Reports (195 I), p. 15.
19 I.C.L.Q (1953), pp. 1-26 and 33 B.Y.I.L. (1957), pp. 272-93.
20. General Assembly Resolution 478 (V) of 16 November 1950.
21. ILC Report (1951), p. 5 (Doe. AII858).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. General Assembly Resolution 598 (VI) of 12 January 1952.
25. /LC Reports (1966), p. 37.
26. This is of course a complete reversal of the Commission's 195 I pOSItIOn.
27. rearbook of the International Law Commission (I g62), Vol. 2, pp. 178-9.
28. Ibid., p. 180.
29. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1973), pp. 42-3.
3 I. The remaining provisions of Art. 53 permit the International Tin Council, by a specified
majority, to extend the duration of the Agreement by a period or periods not exceeding
twelve months, require the Council to consider whether it is necessary and appropriate that
the Agreement should be renewed and if so, in what form, give any contracting government
the right at any time to propose termination of the Agreement, and lay down rules as to what
is to happen in the event of termination. As the Agreement contains separate provision about
provisional entry into force, Art. 47(b) stipulates that if entry into force remains provisional,
the Agreement shall be terminated not later than one year after the provisional entry into
force. Most commodity agreements follow this pattern.
508
,Notes
32. Trea(y Series, No. 53 (1973), Cmnd 53 06 .

33. Treary Series, No. 55 (1974), Cmnd 5745
34. 1966 /LC Reports, p. 78 .
35. Treary Series, No. 5 (1974), Cmnd 55 12 .
36. Treary Series, No. 56 (1949), Cmd 77 8 9.
37. Treary Serzes, No. 21 (1946), Cmd 6885. The Articles of Agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development contain a similar provision. (Art. VI, Sect. I.)
No. 31 (1974) Cmnd 5613.
No. 10 (1974), Cmnd 5524.
No. 3 (1964), Cmnd 2245.
No. 88 (1970), Cmnd 4474. For other examples of withdrawal and
denunciation clauses of various types, see The Treary-Maker's Handbook, (1973), pp. 104-14.
42. Art. 54(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
43 0 P cit., pp. 493-4
44 O p. cit., p. 504.
45. Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th edn, 1963), p. 331; see also Detter, Essays on the Law of
Treaties (1967), p. 87.
46. For a history of the matter, see 1966 /LC Reports, p. 79.
47. Multilateral Treaties in Respect of which the Secretary-General Performs depositary Functions, list of
signatures, etc. as at 31 December 1974, p. 43 6 , n. 3.
48. Ibid. For a fuller analysis of the controversy see Bardonnet, 'La Denonciation par le
38 . Treary Series,
39. Treary Series,
40. Treary Series,
41. Treary Series,
gouvernement senegalais de la Convention sur la Mer Territoriale et la Zone Contigiie et de la Convention

sur la Piche et la Conservation des Ressources biologiques de la Haute Mer' in Annuaire fran(ais de droit
international (1972), pp. 123-80.
49. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (3rd edn, 1975), p. 349; Schermers, International
Institutional Law (1972), Vo!' I, p. 46; Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter ofthe United Nations
(3rd edn, 1969), pp. 74-6.

50. 7 U.N.C.1.0., p. 267. For differing views as to the status and legal effect of this
commentary on withdrawal, see Kelsen (Law of the United Nations, p. 127), who regards the
commentary as being 'of no legal importance;' Rolin (Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Droit
International, (1961), Vo!' I p. 237) who argues that the Conference had clearly expressed its
refusal to provide for a possibility of denunciation or to interpret the absence of any clause
relating to it as the equivalent of an implied right freely to withdraw; and Goodrich, Hambro
and Simons (op. cit., p. 75) who maintain that, despite the commentary, each member retains
the right to withdraw at will, but must justify its withdrawal in the eyes of the Organisation
and its members. For a comprehensive recent sUlvey of the issue, see Dehousse, 'Le Droit de
Retrait aux Nations Unies, R.B.D.1. (1955), pp. 30-48 ~nd (1966) pp. 8-27.
51. UN Doe. A/5857; S/6157 of 21 January 1965.
52. UN Doe. A/5899; S/6202 of 26 February 1965.
53. Schwelb, 'Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian intennezzo,' 61 A.J.I.L.
(1967), p. 666.
54. UN Doe. A/5911; S/6229 of 12 March 1965.
55 UN Doe. A/5914; S/6356 of 17 May 1965. The Note is reproduced in International Legal
Materials (1965), Vol. 4, p. 774
56. UN Doe. A/6419; S/6498 of 19 September 1966.
57. UN Doe. A/PV. 1420 of 28 September 1966.
58. Schwelb, loco cit., pp. 670-1.
59. The purported Indonesian withdrawal from the United Nations IS also discussed in
Dehousse, loco cit. (1966), pp. 21-7; Livingstone, 'Withdrawal from the United NationsIndonesia.' 14 I. C. L. Q p. 637: and Schwarzenberger, letter to The Times of 11 January
1965, reprinted in International Law and Order (1971), pp. 279-80.
60. A treaty may also be considered as terminated by operation of law if all the parties to it
conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter which is so far incompatible with
the earlier one that they must be considered to have intended to abrogate it. (Art. 59 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.)
61. Art. 60( I) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
62. Art. 60(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
63 IC] Reports (197 I), p. 16.
64. Ibid., p. 47. But note that Judge Fitzmaurice, in his lengthy dissenting opinion, finds the
Notes
509
Court's invocation of Art. 60(3) (a) of the Vienna Convention quite misplaced since, in his
view, the South African attitude was in no sense equivalent to a disavowal of the Mandate,
loco cit., p. 300. See also Briggs, 'Unilateral denunciation of treaties: The Vienna Convention
and the International Court of Justice', 68 AJ.I.L. (1974), pp. 5 1- 68 .
65 IC]. Reports (1972), p. 46.
66. Ibid., p. 67.
67. Art. 61(2).
68.1966 ILC Reports, p. 84.
69. PCI], Series A/B, No. 146, pp. 155-8.
70. Ibid., p. 157.
71. Ibid., p. 158.
72 IC] Reports (1973), p. 3.
73. Ibid., p. 18.
74 Ibid., p. 19
75. Ibid., p. 20.
76. Ibid., p. 21.
77. Ibid., p. 21.
78. Note by the Secretariat and Regulations to give effect to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December, 1946 (UNTS., Vol. I,
p. xvi).
Chapter 34
Lord Strang, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1949 to
1953, has this interesting comment: 'The policy of the balance of power may at some stage in
the 1815-1914 period have become a misguided policy through becoming difficult to realise....
Less work was done in those days by foreign ministries and diplomatists than ought to have
been done, and the work that was done tended to become rather superficial.' The Foreign
Office (London, 1955), p. 33
2. The autocrats of pre-1914 Europe would probably not have welcomed it; Sir Eyre
Crowe's famous memorandum in the British Foreign Office in 1907 was perhaps the period's
shining exception.
3. Professor Stephen C. Xydis, Department of Political Science, Hunter College, New York,
in The United Nations, Past, Present and Future, ed. James Barros (New York, 1972).
+ Sir Eric Drummond (who later succeeded to the title 'Earl of Perth').
I.
Chapter 35
I. Fourth paragraph
2. An interesting and sensitive account of the work of a Colonial in these surroundings is
given in William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain, (London, 1975) Ch. 9.
Chapter 36
I. A procedure under which one adverse vote prevents a decision.
.
2. It is generally accepted that the word 'charter' originated in the group in the United
States State Department engaged, under the supervision of Dr Leo Pasvolsky, in the
preparation of documents and drafts for the Dumbarton Oaks talks. The alternative word
'covenant' was rejected as reminiscent of the failure of the League of Nations.
3 See 36 38 .
4 See 36 38 .
5. The effect of the limitations on the powers of the Assembly to act in a situation in which
the Security Council may not be able to do so are referred to in 36 41.
6. See 36. 29.
7 See 36 41.
8. From an early stage it became apparent that the First Committee could not complete
within one session of the Assembly the amount of work assigned to it. Therefore, in 1948 the
Assembly set up an ad hoc Political Committee to assist it in its work. At the eleventh session
(1956) the Assembly, on the recommendations of the General Committee (see 36. 13), placed
510
Notes
this Committee on a permanent basis and named it the Special Political Committee. The
First Committee has of late increasingly concentrated on disarmament issues.
9. Selection of Vice-Chairmen of the Assembly and Chairmen of Committees is carried out
by negotiation, first within and then between 'blocs'. The electoral process starting with the
President may be protracted. To establish a generally acceptable balance of distribution
between blocs, the Assembly by Resolution 1990 (XVIII) of 17 December 1963 laid down
that the number of Vice-Presidents should in future be 17, distributed in agreed proportions
between African and Asian, Eastern European, Latin American, Western European and other
States, and permanent members of the Security Council. A comparable system has also been
worked out for the choice of the 7 Chairmen of the Main Committees.
10. The Soviet Draft Resolution on non-self-governing territories of 1960 was a case in point.
I I. For the sequel see 36.34'
12. The United Nations Assembly records are full of examples of the mutual influence of politics,
law, institutional theory and practice, etc. A classic instance is the debate on the position of
South Africa recorded in A/PV 2281 of 12 November 1974.
13. The position was further complicated by the decision of the Soviet Government to give its
support in the Congo civil war to Mr Lumumba instead of his rival Mr Adoula whose claims were
supported by the majority of the United Nations.
14. Article 17.2 reads, 'The expense of the Organisation shall be borne by the Members as
apportioned by the General Assembly'.
15. The discussions, voluntary initiatives and expedients accompanying this main question
were of immense length and complexity and can only be studied completely by reference to
United Nations documents. A good background can be obtained from Sydney H. Bailey, The
General Assembly of the United Nations (rev. ed, New York, 1964) and Stephen C. Xydis, The
United Nations, Past, Present and Future, ed. James Barros (New York and London, 1972).
16. The best way to approach a more detailed knowledge of this subject is undoubtedly to use
the latest edition of the United Nations rearbook as a starting-point. Research into the more
detailed or more controversial activities can then follow.
17. The Russians applied to this 'thesis', the term 'hidden veto'.
lB. Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, United Nations (New York, 1970), p. 18: Rule 128
prescribes the same procedure for the Main Committees of the Assembly.
19. General Assembly Resolution No. 1991(XVIII), 17 December 1963. The Resolution came
into force on 31 August 1965 on receipt of the necessary ratifications.
20. In 1976 Angola was admitted despite abstention by the United States.
2 I. General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI): 'Restoration of the lawful rights of the
People's Republic of China in the United Nations.'
22. Resolution 377, 3 November 1950.
23 See 36.29.
24. See 36.18.
25. Any serious study of the question owes the highest debt to Sydney D. Bailey, both for his
general work on the United Nations, and, in this present context, for his careful, informative
and sensitive work Voting in the Security Council (1969), and his later work The Procedure of the
Security Council (1975)'
26. The Anglo-French vetoes concerned the Suez episode of 1956.
27. There was, for instance, criticism of the failure of the Security Council in 1976 to take
active cognisance of the intervention of Cuban troops in the civil war in Angola; and of the
civil war in the Lebanon in the same year.
2B. Bailey, Voting in the Security Council, p. 10 I.
29. It is right to add that the Resolution left behind one ambiguity for which, in the view of
the Israelis and some others, a solution is required. The English text of the first 'affirmation'
in the Resolution contains the following principle: (i) withdrawal of Israel armed forces from
territories occupied by the recent conflict. ... The French text ('des territoires') does not
admit the narrow distinction between 'territories' and 'the territories' implied in the English,
and this distinction may require final compromise, - and statesmanship. The interpretation of
the formula by the majority of delegations was that the text meant a wholesale restoration of
occupied territories qualified only by small agreed modifications where experience and good
sense indicated that these would help.
30. Full text in Arts. 100 and 10 I.
31. Resolution 2 (I), I February 1946.
.Notes
511
32. Resolution 75 (I), 7 December 1946.

33 Resolution 152 (11), 15 November 1947
34. It is, however, pleasant to record that the end of the era of consecutive system in the
United nations had its glorious moment. The noted Latin-American statesman and orator,
Senor Fernando Belaunde of Peru made at the General Assembly a long political speech in
Spanish which was translated into French by one of the famous brothers Kaminker. M.
Kaminker reproduced every significant phrase, every telling pause, every emotional tone and
even every dramatic gesture, and, having used no notes at all, sat down amid a thunder of
applause.
35 Resolution 3189 (XXVIII) and 390 (XXVIII). See also 7.9.
36. Budget, Annex VI proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 1976/7, Vot. 7.
37. See Art. 73, quoted further in 36. 81-5
38. The United Nations (New York, 1959), p. 296.
39. See Art. 79-91 of the Charter.
40. A comprehensive account is given in Sydney D. Bailey The General Assembly of the United
Nations (London and New York, 2nd edn, 1964), pp. 176-84; and in the same author's The
procedure of the Securi~v Council (1975), pp. 238-40.
41. Max Beloff, Britain's Liberal Empire, (London, 1969).
42. See Chapter 41, 'The Commonwealth of Nations.'
43. Art. 2.7 reads in part: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter.... ' (The remaining language removes this limitation in cases arising under
Chapter VII which deals with threats to the peace, etc.)
44. This Article of course excluded Trusteeship territories for which provision is made in
Chapter XII of the Charter.
45. Professor David A. Kay, University of Wisconsin, in his essay 'Colonisation and
decolonisation,' in The United Nations, Past. Present and Future, ed. James Barros (New York and
London 1972), writes (p. 168, footnote 20) 'significantly for later developments, this provision
was sponsored at the San Francisco Conference by the Soviet Union.'
46. The introduction was violent in tone, containing old-fashioned phrases such as: (in the
colonial territories) 'the swish of the overseer's lash is heard; there heads fall under the
executioner's axe.' (Kay, op. cit., p. 149). The declaration was of course less intemperate, but
it is well for the apprentice diplomat to know the language to which he may be exposed.
47. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.
48. General Assembly Resolution 1654 (XVI), 27 November, 1961.
49. As a minor example, a sub-committee of the main committee visited Aden (South Yemen)
in 1967. They correctly called in London on their way and saw the Foreign Secretary,
George Brown, who explained the local situation to them. When they reached Aden, the
situation was disturbed; the sub-committee stayed in their hotel and refused even to meet
members of the local Administration. After a few days they went back to New York and
(with the tacit acquiescence of the Secretary-General, U Thant) did not return to Aden.
50. The W~itlam Government reversed its predecessor's policy towards the Committee, on
which, despite the return of a Liberal Administration, Australia now serves. The Labour
Government returned to power in Britain in 1974 similarly decided that the United Kingdom
should cooperate with the Committee.
51. In this connection William Wallace's observations are valuable. See The Foreign Policy
Process in Britain (London, 1975), especially pp. 261 and following.
Chapter 37
I. ECOSOC Resolution 36 (IV) of 28 March 1947
2. ECOSOC Resolution 37 (14) of28 March 1947
3. ECOSOC Resolution 106 (VI) of 28 February and 5 March 1948.
4. ECOSOC Resolution 671 (XXV) of 29 April 1968 .
5. ECOSOC Resolution 1818 (LV) of9 August 1973
6. Economic and Social Council Resolutions 917 (XXXIV) of 3 August, 1962 and 96 3
(XXXVI) of 18 July 1963, endorsed by General Assembly Resolution 1785 (XVII) of 8
December 1962.
512
,Notes
7. General Assembly Resolution 57 (I), 11 December 1946. (The terms of reference were
amended in Resolution 417 (V), I December 1950.)
8. UNICEF/UK Agreement of 7 October 1953 (Cmd 8981).
9. See 43. 8- 12 and also Appendix 6.
Chapter 38
I. For a general view of this topic by a group of eminent international lawyers and
diplomats, attention is invited to the Report ofa Study Group on the Peaceful Settlement ofDisputes,
under the auspices of the David Davies Memorial Institute, (London, 1966).
2. For a survey of the history of international arbitration, see J. L. Simpson and Hazel Fox,
International Arbitration (London, 1959), and Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice
(1934)
3. Op. cit., Ch. I, p. I. The rest of the chapter follows the practical development of this
innovation through the nineteenth century.
4. Art. 92 also defines the exact terms of the International Court's succession to the
Permanent Court of International Justice. Chapter 39 of this book discusses the International
Court in greater detail.
5. 'Judicial settlement' refers to the processes described in Chapter 39 (International Court of
Justice) while 'resort to regional agencies or arrangements' may be taken to refer generally to
such agencies as are referred to in Chapters 37 and 42 and are in good standing with the
United Nations.
6. Satow, 4th edn, p. 487, para. 2, and Report on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, (see
footnote I), p. 67.
7. See e.g. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (London and Boston, 1948).
8. General Assembly Resolution 268D (Ill) of 28 April 1949.
9. The Netherlands Government were also active in this period.
10. Op. cit., p. 45, para. 65. The whole subject of the peaceful settlement of disputes is dealt
with in detail in Sect. I, paras. 4-46.
I I. Trea{v Series, No. 118 (1961).
12. Hansard, HC Debates, Vol. 670 (Written Answers), cols. 77-8.
13. Report on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, p. 72, para I.
14. Satow, op. cit., p. 438, para. 809, quoting Oppenheim, International Lau', (7th edn, 1952),
Vol. 2, p. 10.
15. Op. cit., para. 2.
16. Resolution 194 (Ill) of 1948.
17. See comments on Dr Henry Kissinger's methods in 43.7.
18.49 A.I.D.I. (1961), Vol. 2, p. 227: quoted in Report on the Peaceful settlement o.IDiJ/JuteJ,
Annexe IIC para. 4.
19. Cmnd 4818; Art. 66(b) and the Annex.
20. T rea~v Series, No. 10 (196 I ).
2 I. Yearbook of the International Lau' Commission (1958), Vol. 2.
22. See Cmnd 2682 (1965)'
23. In the Palena case, a tribunal presided over by Lord MeNair (formerly President of the
International Court of Justice) gave in 1966 a decision which was accepted by both parties.
(The Award was published by HMSO. in 1966.) In 1977 a decision on the Beagle Channel
case was given by a tribunal presided over by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (formerly a judge of the
International Court of Justice). See 31.2 I.
Chapter 39
I. A leading work on the Court is Rosenne, The Law and practice of the International Court, in two
volumes (Leyden, 1965). For the general reader, see idem, The World Court: What it is and How
it IVo rks, (3rd edn, 1973) and The International Court of]ustice, (1976) a booklet prepared by
the Registry of the Court. For recent surveys of the Court's role and standing see Professor
M. Lachs, 'La Cour Internationale de Justice dans le monde d'aujourd'hui.' 9 RBDI (1975), p. 548,
and Gross (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice (1976), 2 vols.
2. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United. 'Ifations (3rd edn, 1969).
3. See 39.7. The Court submits reports to the General Assembly: that for 1974 to 1976 is in
,Notes
513
Document A/31/5' The Court also publishes Yearbooks, the most recent of which (No. 30)
covers the period from I August 1975 to 31 July 1976.
4 Resolution 9 1(I) (1946).
5. 1(7 Yearbook '975-'976, pp. 35-7 Before becoming a Member of the United Nations,
Japan was a party to the Statute of the Court from 2 April 1954.
6. See Resolution 9 (1946). For full details, see the fourth edition of this work and 1(7
Yearbook '975-76, pp. 37-8. In the past, several declarations were filed under this provision.
7. See Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (Cmnd 4818).
8. Ibid., Article 36.
9. Indeed Article 35(2) of the Statute, referring to the conditions under which the Court
shall be open to states not parties to the Statute, expressly says that 'in no case shall such
conditions place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.'
10. Goodrich et aI., op. cit., pp. 555-8.
I I. Article 96 of the Charter (Advisory Opinions) is considered at 39.24.
12. In exercise of the power given to it by Article 70 of the Statute.
13. In 1975, work began on a new building at the expense of the Dutch Government in the
grounds of the Peace Palace where the Court sits in The Hague. In its Report for 1974-6, the
Court stated that the new building would 'help to remedy what has long been an
unsatisfactory situation.'
14. Gilberto Amado Memorial Lecture by Judge (now President) Jimenez de Arechaga, 15
June 1972, pp. 27-8, reproduced in 67 AJ.I.L. p. I, at p. 21.
15 I(] ,yearbook '975-'976, p. 118.
16. Concerning the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see 38.3.
describing the method of selecting arbitrators according to the Hague Convention of 1899.
17. See for example Orders Nos. I, 2, and 3 of 26 January 1971 in the Advisory Opinion on
the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) I(] Reports
(197 1), pp. 3,6 and 9, also pp. 18- 19.
18. In an exchange of letters between the President of the Court and the Dutch Minister of
Foreign Affairs on 26 June 1946, it was arranged that Members of the Court would, in a
general way, enjoy the same privileges immunities, facilities and prerogatives as Heads of
Diplomatic Missions in the Hague (I(] Acts and Documents, No. I, 2nd edn, pp. 86-90). For
the special arrangements about the question of precedence of Members of the Court in
relation to Ambassadors, see 20.28 and 1(7 rearbook '970-'97', pp. 110-1 I. In the Hague
the president of the Court takes precedence over the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.
19. Changes made to the Rules of Procedure in 1972 were designed to facilitate and
encourage the use of Chambers, but no case has ever been referred to one.
20. The additional judges (usually known as ad hoc judges) need not possess the nationality of
the party who appoints them, although of course they usually do. They can be appointed in
certain circumstances for Advisory Opinions: an example of the appointment of a nonnational is that by Morocco of Mr A Boni (Ivory Coast) in the Western Sahara Advisory
Opinion (I(] Reports (1975), p. 12).
2 I. See the Advisory Opinion concerning Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the
United Nations (I(] Reports (1949), p. 174)
22. See 39.25-8.
23. By 'parties' is meant states having a right of access to the Court under Articles 34 and
35 of the Statute.
24. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, jurisdiction was based on two agreements between
Denmark and the FRG and between the Netherlands and the FRG (/C] Reports (1969),
pp. 5-7)
25 P(;I],~eries A, No. 15.
26. f(.] Reports (1948), p. 15.
27. The rules governing preliminary objections - which are usually, though not necessarily,
objections to the jurisdiction - are contained in Article 67 of the Rules of Court.
28. Northern Cameroons case (le] Reports (1963), p. 15)
29.. Vuclear Tests cases (/(7 Reports (1974), pp. 253 and 45 1).
30. For a full survey of the provisions of Article 38 of the Statute see Parry, The Sources and
Evidences of International Law (1965)'
31. Rule 35 of the Rules of Court.
514
.Notes
3 2 . IC] Reports (1974), p. 3 at p. 9.
33 Ibid., pp. 9- 10.

34. See in particular IC] Reports (1974), pp. 181,251 and 461.
35. For an example of a President's casting vote, see the South West Africa cases (Second
Phase) 1(,] Reports (1966), p. 6. at p. 51.
36. As in the judgment of 27 November 1950, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of
20 November 1950 in the Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru), IC] Reports (1950), p. 395.
37. IC] Reports (1974), pp. 530 and 535. Questions concerning the Court's jurisdiction in cases
of intervention and the right of the intervening state to be heard were raised in a declaration
by two judges. The Rules of Court on interv'ention are under review (IC] rearbook
1975-1976, p. 118).
38. Nuclear Tests cases (IC] Reports (1973) pp. 93 and 135, at pp. 106 and 142 respectively).
Similar orders about refraining from actions exacerbating disputes were made in the Fisheries
]urisdiction cases (1(,] Reports (1972), pp. 12 and 30).
39. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turke:y) IC] Reports (1976), p. 3. Nor will interim
measures be ordered in cases where the need for such measures is not urgent. Interhandel case
(Switzerland v. US), IC] Reports (1957), p. 105 and 112 and Pakistani Prisoners of War case
(Pakistan v. India), IC] Reports (1973), p. 330.
40. For an illuminating study, see M. H. Mendelson 'Interim measures of protection in cases
of contested jurisdiction,' B. Y.B.I.L. (1972-3), p. 259.
41. Rules of Court, Art. 66. For an example of modification of the duration of interim
measures, see the Court's order of 12 July 1973 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (UK v. Iceland),
(IC] Reports (1973), p. 302).
42. By Sir Gladwyn Jebb (UK) in the Security Council, in relation to the Court's order in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (S.C.O.R., S/PV 559, p. 20). In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case
(FRG v. Iceland), the German Agent, Professor Jaenicke, claimed compensation in respect of
damage suffered as a result of certain Icelandic actions in intentional 'disregard' of the
Interim Measures Orders of 1972 and 1973 (IC] Pleadings, Vo!. 11, p. 347). However, the Court
declined to accede to the claim without considering the status of the Order.
43. Fisheries Jurisdiction case (FRG v. Iceland) IC] Reports (1974), p. 202.
44 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (]urisdiction), IC] Reports (1952), p. 93.
45. For a full review of this topic, see K. J. Keith, The Extent of the Adviso~'V ]urisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (Leyden, 1971).
46. For complete list, see rearbook of the ICJ.
47 Conditions of Admission cases (1948 and 1950), Reparations for Irljuries case (1949), Expenses
case (1962).
48. Interpretation of Peace Treaties cases (1950 and 1951), Reservations to Genocide Convention
(1951) and IMCO case (1960).
49. Status of South West Africa case (1950), Voting Procedure case (1955), Petitioners case (1956)
and Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (1971).
50. Western Sahara case (lC] Reports (1975), p. 20).
5 I. Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (lC] Reports (1971), p. 27).
52. Western Sahara case, (IC] Reports (1975), p. 19)
53. Admissions case (le] Reports (1948), p. 61).
54. Ibid.
55 Application for Review of Judgment No. 58 of the UN Administrative Tribunal (IC] Reports (1973),
p. 17 2 ).
56. Interpretation of Peace Treaties case (lC] Reports (1950), p. 71).
57. Western Sahara case, ibid. at pp. 22-5. However, the Court will consider the factor of lack of
consent in determining the propriety of giving an Opinion.
58. Expenses case (lC] Reports (1962), p. 155).
59. Although it has never yet declined to comply with a request for an Advisory Opinion on a legal
question, in the Eastern Cardia case, the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice did so on the
grounds that it lacked 'materials sufficient to enable it to arrive at any judicial conclusion on
the question offact' (PCI], Series B, No. 5, p. 28). In that case, one state, which was not a party to
the Court's Statute, refused to take part in the proceedings.
60. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO (IC] Reports (1956), p. 86).
61. Western Sahara case (IC] Reports (1975), p. 21).
62. Ibid., p. 25.
.Notes
515
63 Reservations case (le] Reports (195 1), p. 19).

64. Dr Rosalyn Higgins in 21 I.C.L.Q" (1972), p. 270
65. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in 2,9 R. rJ L., (195 2), p. 54..
66. Ibid., p. 55.
67. Thus, Sect. 30 of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations provides as follows: 'If a difference arises between the United Nations on the one
hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on
any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the
Statute of the Court. The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the
parties.'
Chapter 40
Art. 7.
Hamard, H.C. Debates, Written Answer by Mr Ennals on 20 January 1975. For a
comprehensive account of developments in the law regarding privileges and immunities of
international organisations see Jenks, Internalionallmmunities (1961), London and New York.
3. ['h" Trea~y Series, No. 10 (1950).
4. See 40.18 (2).
5 ['h' Trea~)'Series, No. 69 (1959).
6. The organisations are:
International Labour Organisation (ILO)
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
World Health Organisation (WHO)
Universal Postal Union (UPU)
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
International Refugee Organisation (IRO)
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
7. UK Treaty .\eries, No. 11 (1955)'
8. Agreement on the Status of the Central Treaty Organisation, National Representatives
and International Staff, 1960, Cmnd 1721.
9. UK Treaty Series, No. 4 2 (1957)
10. VK Treaty Series, No. 34 (1953) (extended by four later Protocols).
11. UK Treaty Series, No. 50 (1954).
12.2 UN Treaty Series, p. 39 (Art. IX at p. 72).
13.2 UN Treaty Series, p. 134 (Art. VII at p. 180).
14. 264 UN Treaty Series, (Art. VI at p. 142).
15. lTK Treaty Series, No. I (1961) (Art. VIII).
16. [IK Treaty Series, No. 53 (1968) (Ch. VIII).
17. lTK Trea~y Series, No. 36 (1970) (Ch. VIII).
18. See Convention relating to Cooperation for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL), 1960 (UK Treaty Series, No. 39 (1963) ), Art. 21-7, and Additional
Protocol to the Convention, 1970 (Cmnd 4499).
19. See Agreement relating to International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation
(INTELSAT) (UK Trea~y Series, No. 80 (1973)); and International Maritime Satellite
Organi!>ation (INMARSAT).
20. European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO).
21. European Centre for Medium Range \Veather Forecasts.
22. l"lt" Tlfa~)' Sf/ie,l, No. 39 (1968).
23. l'l( Treaty Series, No. 28 (1967). These two organisations subsequently merged to form the
European Space Agency.
24. General Assembly Resolution of 13 February 1946.
25. Resolution (69)29 adopted hy the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 26
I.
2.
516
Notes
September 1969, and Explanatory Report (1970).

26. UK Treaty Series, No. 2 (1976).
27. UK Treaty Series, No. 18 (1969)'
28. I I UN Treaty Series, p. I I.
29. I UN Treaty Series, p. 163.
30. Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Wheat Council, UK Treaty Series, No. 14
(1969); Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Sugar Organisations, UK Treaty Series,
No. 88 (1969); Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Coffee Organisation; UK Treaty
Series, No. 86 (1969); Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Tin Council, UK
Treaty Series, No. 38 (1972); Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Cocoa Organisation;
UK Treaty Series, No. 94 (1975)'
31. Text in UN Doe. A/CONF.67!I6, and in 69 A.J.I.L. (1975) at p. 730.
32. See the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with
International Organisations of a Universal Character, 70 A.J.I.L. (1976) p. 62, at pp. 71-2.
Chapter 41
I. The Imperial Conference 1926, Summary of Proceedings, Cmd 2768. At that time the
self-governing Dominions were Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa
and the Irish Free State. Newfoundland is also mentioned in the Statute of Westminster, but
is omitted from the previous sentence as its constitutional development led away from
independent international status.
2. One problem of some difficulty concerning Canada is still unsolved. Under the Statute of
Westminster certain sections of the British North America Acts which contain the constitution
of Canada can be amended only by the Parliament of Westminster, and this has given rise to
various suggestions as to how the Canadian Government might acquire the power to amend
these sections (i.e. how the Canadian constitution might be 'repatriated.')
3. The Declaration regarding the future of the Commonwealth was incorporated in the
communique issued at the end of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting on 30 April
1949. The full text is as follows:
'The Government of India have informed the other Governments of the Commonwealth of
the intention of the Indian people that under the new Constitution which is about to be
adopted India shall become a sovereign independent Republic. The Government of India
have, however, declared and affirmed India's desire to continue her full membership of the
Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of The King as the symbol of the free
association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth.
'The Governments of the other countries of the Commonwealth, the basis of whose
membership of the Commonwealth is not hereby changed, accept and recognise India's
continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this Declaration.'
4. A list of member countries is given in Appendix V.
5. Now Somalia. 6. Now Southern Yemen.
7. The newly named Department thus took over the work of the former India Office in so
far as that remained appropriate to the changed conditions.
8. The Merger of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office 1968 (1968). This publication
gives a clear, brief account not only of this later merger but of its historical background.
9 Cmnd 227 6 (1964)' See 10.9
10. For direct contacts between diplomatic missions and government departments other than
those regularly responsible for external affairs, see 3-19.
I I. See 13.32-3.
Chapter 42
The 'Joint Command' decision is often believed to have been a counter-measure to
NATO. It was, in fact, a reply to the Paris Agreements of 1954, (42.40-41). See Barraclough
I.
Notes
517
and Wall, SUTl'f;.V of International Affairs (Oxford 1960), p. 48.

2. Cmd 7217. 3. Cmd 7599.
4 Cmd 79 1 I. 5 Cmd 7973 6. Cmd 797 2. 7 Cmd 7971. 8. Cmd 7386.
9. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural, 4 March 1801.
10. It is of historical interest that both Senators were members of the United States delegation
at both the San Francisco Conference and the first meeting of the General Assembly of the
United Nations.
11. These words are quoted directly from ..\':1 TO, Facts and Figures (Brussels, 1976) because
they represent a brief, authoritative definition of what was to happen.
12. Cmd 7789.
13. It is characteristic of those who work in NATO to emphasise that the Preamble and
Article 2 are not routine sentiments but genuinely animate the work of the Organisation.
14. Protocol Regarding the Accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty of
4 April, 1949; signed in London on 17 October, 1951 (Cmd 8407).
15. It should be understood that the Council can in fact meet at any level from Head of
Government, or Head of State, to Permanent (Official) Representative, suqject, naturally, to
the agreement of member governments on the appropriateness of the subject to the level of
the meeting.
16. General Eisenhower applied for release in 1952 to enter political life. His successors have
been:
1952-3
General Matthew B. Ridgway
1953-6
General Alfred B. Gruenther
1956-63 General Lauris Norstad
1963-9
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
1969-74 General Andrew J. Goodpaster
1974General Alexander M. Haig, Jr
17.. Vato Facts and Figures, p. 28.
18. Cmd 8279.
19. Cmd 8675: This Agreement superseded a similar Agreement on the Status of Members of
the Armed Forces of the Brussels Powers, Cmd 7868, which had not been ratified.
20. Cmd 8400.
21. The members were: Mr Averill Harriman (USA, Chairman), M. Jean Monnet (France)
and Sir Edwin Plowden (United Kingdom).
22. The successors to Lord Ismay, who retired in 1957, were:
1957-61
M. Paul Henri Spaak, (Belgium)
1961-64
Mr Dirk U. Stikker, (Netherlands)
1964-71
Signor Manlio Brosio (Italy)
1971Dr Joseph Luns (Netherlands)
The high public and personal standing during this period of all the Secretaries-General and
Supreme Commanders has been a notable feature of NATO.
23. Report of the Committee of Three on .Von-military Cooperation, Ch. I, para. 4. In the next
paragraph the authors add the reminder to members of NATO that an attack on one is an
attack on all. This Report is regarded in NATO as a turning point in the Organisation's
development at which the members accepted that consultation on defence policies necessarily
involves discussion of the whole content of world policy.
24. The Harmel Report (entitled The Future Tasks of the Alliance), para. 5.
25. The French Government did, however, set up a Military Liaison Mission with the NATO
Military Committee and the major NATO Commands.
26. Cmd 9127. 27. Cmd 9289. 28. Cmd 9304.
29. Then Provost of Queen's College Oxford and from 1948 to 1952 British Ambassador in
Washington.
30 . Cmd 7796.
31. When the United States and United Kingdom Zones in Germany were combined they
were represented in OEEC by the 'Bizonal' delegation.
32 pp. 476 - 82 .
33. They included two diplomats with economic experience, one senior civil servant expert in
trade and finance and the Governor of a central bank. For a more detailed account of these
proceedings and the thinking behind them see A Remodelled Economic Organisation, a Report by
the Group of Four (Paris, IgGO).
518
Notes
34. There are problems about the correct title to use in different contexts. There is no doubt
that the founders decided 'to create a European Community' (Treaty of Rome Preamble,
final para.), and this is a straightforward, popularly usable title. It should, however, be
recalled that the European Coal and Steel Community existed before the establishment of the
EEC, and the European Atomic Energy Community was created at the same time as the
EEC; in many circumstances and applications, the title 'European Communities' is correct
(see for instance the title 'Convention relating to certain institutions common to the European
Communities,' Treaty of Rome, Annex 11).
It is important to bear in mind that, as the United Kingdom was not a signatory of the
Treaty of Rome, no English text can be regarded as authoritative for legal purposes; this
point is made clear by HMSO in the English translation published by them in [967. The
official and authentic texts are the French, German, Italian and Dutch, published by the
office of the EEC in Brussels.
35. Commissioner for Armament Supplies and Reconstruction in the French Committee of
National Liberation, [943-4. General Commissioner for the Modernisation Plan (which bears
his name), [947. President of the ECSC High Authority, [952-5.
36. Foreign Minister of Belgium, [936. Prime Minister, [938-9. Active in forming the Benelux
Customs Union, [944, and in the drafting of the UN Charter and the NATO Treaty.
Secretary-General of NATO [957-6I. Frequently held office of Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister in Belgium.
37. Prime Minister of France, [947-8. Minister of Foreign Affairs, [948-52. President of the
European Parliament, Strasbourg [958-60.
38. Head of the French Supply Mission to the USA, [944. Director of External Economic
Relations in the French Ministry of National Economy, [945. Deputy High Commissioner for
the Modernisation and Equipment Plan, [946. Secretary-General of OEEC, [948-55.
39. Le Binilux Commenti, Karelle et Kemmeter, (Brussels, [96[).
40. This was one of those occasions when an accumulation of doubts, both personal and
institutional, provided a difficult atmosphere in which to achieve a positive result. A vivid
description of this will be found in Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (London, [970),
pp. 38 4-7.
4I. An agreement providing for a 'Standing Council of Association' between the United
Kingdom and the ECSC was signed on 2[ December [954. (Cmd 9346.)
42. Published in Brussels (See fn. 34.)
43. This episode is included partly as showing that, in the diplomatic context, the status of a
parliamentary representative may be held to differ from that of an official.
44. Ambassador Attilio Cattani one of the leading economic negotiators for Italy at this
period and later head of the Italian Foreign Office, once observed to the editor, 'We looked
out together over the Straits of Messina and did not quite believe what we had done.'
45. The agreement was initialled in [959 and signed in [960. (Cmnd [026.) EFTA consisted
originally of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. The UK and Sweden were the principal architects; Finland and Iceland joined
later. By [977, Britain and Denmark had joined the EEC, Norway had negotiated entry but
had not ratified. Under a series of agreements, industrial goods were moving freely between
the sixteen EEC and EFTA countries.
46. Determines a etablir les fondements d'une union sans cesse plus etroite entre les peuples
europeens.... '
47. 'Les Fondements de la Communaute.'
48. See fn. 45.
49 Cmnd 4862- [ of [972. The United Kingdom gave notice at the time that it had not
acceded to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. But the UK did
sign in time to accede to all three communities on [ January [973.
50. See Cmnd I026, pp. I07, [22 on the future of sterling balances and future handling of
certain sensitive agricultural products.
5 I. By [977 the figure had risen to fifty-two.
52. President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe ([954-6) and Prime
Minister of France ([ 956-7). In his foreword to The Council of Europe (London, [96 [), Mr A.
H. Robertson gives a brilliantly lucid account of the events leading up to the formation of the
Council of Europe (pp. [-6), and follows it with a few equally clear and persuasive pages on
why the tendency, since the Second World War, to produce multilateral organisations has
persisted.
.Notes
519
53. There is some danger here of a confusion in names. In the Statute, the Consultative
Assembly is called by that name; a full description would be 'the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe.' The parliamentary body of the European Community is called in the
Treaty of Rome, Art. 137, 'The Assembly.' It became known in popular usage as 'The
European Parliament' and adopted the name in 1962. The confusion was at its worst when,
with the Council of Europe sometimes referring in its literature to the Consultative Assembly
as the 'parliamentary Assembly', the European Parliament held some meetings in the Council
of Europe Building in Strasbourg pending the completion of its own accommodation in
Brussels.
54. For the negotiations see Robertson, op. cit., pp. 160-84. The precise status of a draft
Convention at any given moment can be a somewhat intricate matter. Expressed as simply as
possible, when the Committee of Ministers approves, under its Rules of Procedure, a draft
text, it is 'open for signature.' The text is then submitted to individual member governments,
with a favourable recommendation, by their representatives on the Committee, for signature
and ratification. When a number of ratifications, usually specified in the text, is received, the
Convention has 'entered into force.'
55. For a fuller treatment, the reader is referred to Gordon Connell-Smith's masterly study,
The Inter-American .\)stem (London, 1966).
56. Sim6n Bolivar, called El Libertador, born at Caracas in Venezuela in 1783. After
travelling in Europe and the USA he joined the independence movement in Venezuela in
1809 and commanded insurgent forces with varying success until he defeated the Spaniards in
1821 and became the first President of Colombia, later helping to bring both Ecuador and
Peru to independence. He died in 1830.
57. President J ames Monroe embodied this doctrine, now universally known by his name, in a
message (largely written by John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State and future President) to
Congress on 2 December 1823. The so-called Roosevelt Corollary, enunciated by President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, seemed to be an extension of the doctrine presaging claims by
the USA to the right of intelVention in the affairs of Latin American states. In 1923 Secretary
of State Hughes formally stated that the US had no such intention, and in 1930 was
published a memorandum previously prepared by Under-Secretry J. Reuben Clark, stating
that the Corollary was not justified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine.
58. Established by the Charter of Punta del Este, under which $20 billion, largely from US
governmental sources, would be made available over a period of ten years for national
development projects in Latin America.
59. Diplomatic asylum is a subject having peculiar relevance to Latin America. An InterAmerican Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, recognising a general right of asylum, and also
a similar Convention on Territorial Asylum, were signed at Caracas in March 1954. The
United States refused to sign either; and five signatory states recorded reselVations. See 14.20
and 2 I.
60. A list is appended to this section.
61. It is fair to recall that Ethiopia had retained its independence until its conquest by Italy
under Mussolini in 1935. This, together with the sUlVival in exile of the Emperor Haile
Selassie, gave Ethiopia a good claim to be the headquarters of the eventual OAU.
62. Apart, of course, from South Africa. (See 42.159.)
63. For the historian of the development of the idea of African unity, the lists of attendances
at these conferences are of very special interest. They suggest a study, as it were, in two
depths, (I) the general growth of the idea and (2) variations of thinking and of regime in each
of the individual countries.
64. The amalgamation of Malaya and Singapore as Malaysia had not worked satisfactorily,
and the two states were separate again by August 1965. The name 'Malaysia' was, however,
retained by the former Malaya as a better designation for a state which included as well as
Malaya the states of Sarawak and Sabah (former North Borneo).
65. ASEAN Problems and Prospects, Singapore, (December 1975).
Chapter 43
I. Castlereagh took twenty-eight days to reach Vienna for the Congress in 1815,
with a short detour to call on Talleyrand in Paris.
2. This felicitous phrase was first employed in Sir Vat Duncan's Report on British Overseas
520
Notes
Representation, Cmnd 4107 (I969), Ch. 11 para. 30.

3. Art. 24( I) of the United Nations Charter.
4. See App VI.
5. The degree and timing of ministerial or other political intervention in a negotiation must
vary with the nature of the subject under discussion, its political sensitivity and the structure
of the government concerned. In the Organisation for African Unity there is much ministerial
participation because (a) many of the subjects under discussion are highly political, and (b) in
many developing countries the civil service cadre is small and not yet accustomed to political
negotiation.
6. Some reflections on the psychology of relations between foreign offices and other
government departments will be found in Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect (London,
1974), pp. 163 and 227
7. It is true that countries which are short of staff or have to be careful about budgets for
overseas travel and temporary residence may appoint locally posted diplomats as observers;
but the general proposition stands.
Chapter 44
I. Paris, I 716
2. The orthography and accenuation of the original are preserved.
3. Observe that the word diplomate did not exist when Callieres wrote.
4. James Harris, first Earl of Malmesbury, British Ambassador at St Petersburg, I 777-82.
5 Diaries and Correspondence, Vol. 4, p. 420.
6. Garden, Traiti complet de Diplomatie, Vol. 2, p. 84.
7- F. de Martens, Recueil des Traitis etc., Vol. 15, p. 140'
8. See Ch. 2 I.
9. Ollivier, L'Empire Liberal, Vol. I, p. 322.
10. Callieres, op. cit., pp. 298, 304.
I I. See 44.26. 12. See 44.27.
13. Harold Nicolson, DiplomaC)! (Oxford, 1939), p. 126.
14. Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (London, 1955), Ch. 25.
15. Sir William Temple (I 628-99), distinguished British diplomat and writer much involved
in the succession of William III and Mary to the British throne in 1689. In 1669 he applied
the principle quoted above in the brilliantly swift negotiation of an alliance to protect the
Netherlands and Flanders against French pressure.
16. See 4.7.
17 Beckles Willson, Friend~y Relations (London, 1934), pp. 43-7.
18. This suggestion is made on no other authority than experience, which may not be
applicable everywhere.
19. In this context, the word 'cabinet' is always used with the French pronunciation.
20. For this analysis, the Editor is indebted to the late Mr Radivoy Uvalic, Yugoslav
Ambassador in India in the early 1960s, and from 1968 to I97 I Head of the Yugoslav
Foreign Office.
2 I. For some comment on certain concrete cases, see Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect,
pp.80-I.
22. Hamlet, Act I, Scene 3, l. 78.
~3 King Henry VI, Part Ill, Act IV, Scene 3, l. 35.
Appendix I
I. Cussy, Dictionnaire du Diplomate et du Consul, s.v.; Oppenheim, Vol. 2, s. 95.
2. Garden, Traiti Complet de Diplomatie, Vol. 3, p. 344.
3 BFSP, Vol. 39, p. 49 I.
4. See also Ollivier, L'Empire Liberal, Vol. 2, p. 320; and F. de Martens, Recueil des Traitis
etc., Vol. 7, p. 262.
5. Foster, A Century of American Diploma9', p. 246, defines uti possidetis by the belligerents as
the territory occupied by their armies at the end of the war, but this seems too absolute. Cr.
Oppenheim, Vol. 2, 263.
6. Jenkinson, Vol. 3, p. 91.
.Notes
521
7 Ibid., pp. 95, 96.

8. Ibid., p. I08. 9. Jenkinson, Vo!. 3, p. 170. IO. Ibid., p. 171. 11. Ibid., p. 177.
12. Foster, A Century of American Diploma~y, p. 246.
Il Sorel, L'Europe et la Revolution franfaise, Vo!. 8, p. 159.
14.011ivier, L'Empire Liberal, Vo!. 2, p. 323.
15. de Martens-GefTcken, Vo!. I, p. 187.
16. Pradier-Fodere, Vo!. I, p. 370.
17 de Maulde-Ia-Claviere, Vo!. 2, pp. 3, 199.
18. Ashley, Life of Lord Palmerston, Vo!. I, p. 35.
19 Ollivier, L'Empire Liberal, Vo!. 2, p. 363.
20. The nearest English legal equivalent is perhaps 'demurrer,' or 'objection in point of law.'
21. Dictionnaire du diplomate, etc., s. v., p. 323.
22. Memoires du Pr. de Talleyrand, Vo!. 2, p. 175, in the preamble.
23. Guizot, Memoires, etc., Vo!. I, p. 95.
24 Temperley, Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph, p. 67.
25. Browning, The Despatches of Earl Gower, p. 2.
26. See also Annual Digest, etc. (1927-8), Case No. 24.
Appendix 11
I. Documents relating to the meeting of Foreign Ministers, Berlin, January 25-February 18, 1954,
Cmd 9080, p. 180.
2. See generally Documents relating to the discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva
Coriference, Cmd. 9186.
3 For the text of the Agreements and declarations see Further Documents relating to the discussion
of Indo-China at the Geneva Coriference, June 16-July 21, 1954, Cmd. 9239.
4. The numbers on the plan indicate the number of seats assigned to each delegation.
5 During the later meetings on Indo-China, tables were arranged to form a continuous
hollow square, but the retention of the same order of seating enabled any embarrassing
proximities to be avoided.
Appendix III
I. United Nations OP1/599, November 1977.
2. Formerly Dahomey.
3. Formerly Cambodia.
4. Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945.
Following a plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a
union of Egypt and Syria and continued as a single member. On 13 October 1961, Syria,
having resumed its status as an independent state, resumed its separate membership in the
United Nations.
5. By letter of 20 January 1965, Indonesia announced its decision to withdraw from the
United Nations 'at this stage and under the present circumstances.' By telegram of 19
September 1966, it announced its decision 'to resume full cooperation with the United
Nations and to resume participation in its activities.' On 28 September 1966, the General
Assembly took note of this decision and the President invited representatives of Indonesia to
take seats in the Assembly.
6. Formerly Laos.
7- The Federation of Malaya joined the United Nations on 17 September 1957. On 16
September 1963, its name was changed to Malaysia, following the admission to the new
Federation of Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak. Singapore became an
independent state on 9 August 1965 and a member of the United Nations on 21 September
196 5.
8. See note 4.
9. Tanganyika was a Member of the United Nations from 14 December 1961 and Zanzibar
was a Member from 16 December 1963. Following the ratification on 26 April 1964 of
Articles of Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Republic of Tanganyika
and Zanzibar continued as a single member, changing its name to United RepUblic of
Tanzania on I November 1964.
Bibliography
This bibliography contains all the sources quoted in the Fourth Edition and the names of all the
original works to which reference has been made in the present text. It will be noted that many of
Satow's references are to classical nineteenth-century works on diplomacy which by now might be
considered out of date. But they remain valuable because the nineteenth century was the first
period in which the establishment of rules of diplomacy by the Congress of Vienna made such a
general treatment possible. Twentieth-century writing has carried further the exploration of
primary sources and the study of individual cases; but the value ofthe generalised approach which
was fundamental to the shaping of Satow's book is not thereby diminished. The present editors
have accordingly mentioned, in addition to references of quoted material, only a few books and
articles which they found particularly illustrative or otherwise helpful.
Yearbooks, Annual Reviews and Journals

For convenience some titles are referred to by initials, e.g. AJIL, and volume numbers are
indicated by a figure preceding such abbreviations, e.g. 44 AJIL.
American Journal of International Law (AJIL).1907 - . Washington.
AnnlUlire de l'Institut de Droit International (AIDI). Basle.
Annuaire Franfais de Droit International (AFDI). 1955 - . Paris, Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique.
Annual Practice of the Supreme Court. 1923 - . London.
Annual Register. 1758 - . London.
British rearbook of International Law (BrIL). 1920 - .
Cambridge Historical Journal. (CHJ).
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ). 1947 - . London.
Journal de Droit International Prive (]DIP). Paris. (Founded by E. Clunet, and sometimes referred to
by his name.)
Journal of Comparative Legislation (]CL). 1901-46. London.
London Gazette. 1665 - .
Revue Beige de Droit International (RBDI). 1965 - . Brussels.
Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparie (RDILC).
Revue des Questions Historiques (RQH). 1866 - . Paris.
Revue Generale de Droit International Public (RGDIP). 1894 - . Paris.
rearbook of the International Court of Justice (ICJ rearbook).
rearbook of the International Law Commission (ILC rearbook).
Zeitschrift fur ausliindisches offintliches Recht und VOlkerrecht (ZRV). 1929-44 and 1950 - . Stuttgart.
Law Reports etc.

Academie de Droit International de la Haye, Recueil des Cours (HR). 1923 - .
All England Law Reports (All ER) 1936 - Selected cases, 1558-1935. Published by Butterworth.
London.
Bibliography
English Reports (ER). An edited collection of law reports from 1220 to 1865.
Law Reports (LR) (monthly); Weekry Law Reports (WLR) - . Published as official senes
In
London by the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, founded in 1865.

International Law Reports (ILR) 1950 - . (Formerly entitled Annual Digest and Reports of International
Law Cases (ADIL). Sixteen volumes covering the years 1919-49,) Later volumes edited by E.
Lauterpacht.
Times Law Reports (TLR).
Dominion Law Reports. 1912 - . Published by the Canada Law Book Company, Toronto.
International Court of Justice (commonly abbreviated ICJ) publish Reports, a Yearbook (see
above) and a Registry.
International Commission of Jurists (not to be confused with the ICJ above) publish occasional
reports, a Yearbook and a biannual Review in Geneva.
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) publications:
Series A - Judgments, 1922-30;
Series B - Advisory Opinions, 1922 - 30;
Series A/B - Cumulative Collection ofJudgments and Opinions given since 1931. 193 I -40. Leyden.
Reports oflnternational Arbitral Awards, 1949 - , published by the United Nations.
Publications of international organisations are in general listed under the name of the organisation
in question, e.g. League of Nations Treaty Series, and United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS).
British and Foreign State Papers (BFSP) are an official series which began to be issued in 1841. Since
1887 they have been published by His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO). The series
includes documents dating from the year 1373 onwards.
Command Papers (Cmd., printed Cmnd. from Nov. 1956 onwards) are papers presented to the
British Parliament by command of His/Her Majesty. They are published by HMSO.
Texts ofConventions, Agreements etc. which the United Kingdom has signed, but which are not
yet ratified, or in force, are published in the Miscellaneous, Country, or European Communities
Series. Once an Agreement has been ratified and is in force for the United Kingdom, it is laid before
Parliament again and published in the Treaty Series (TS) of Command Papers. The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, for example, was originally pu blished as Cm nd. 2 I 13, M isc
911963, and re-issued after ratification in 1972 as Cmnd. 5219, TS 1411973. Many Agreements
which do not require ratification or any other process to bring them into force are published
directly in the Treaty Series.
The terminology of legal references follows the accepted methods of indexing used by law
libraries in Britain. As the reader wishing to look them up must inevitably have recourse to such
libraries, no elucidation of them is necessary here.
Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. London, 1970.

- - . Power and Diplomacy. Cambridge, Mass., 1958.
Adair, E. R. The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the 16th and 17th Centuries. London, 1929.
- -. In CHJ, vol. 11, No. 3.
Adams, Henry. History of the United States. 9 vols. New York, 1889-9 I.
Adams, John Quincy. Memoirs (edited by Charles F. Adams). 4 vols. Philadelphia, 1874-5.
Almanach de Gotha.
Angeberg, Comte de. Le Congres de Vienne et les Traitis de 1815. Paris, 1864.
Anson, Sir William. The Law and Custom of the Constitution, 3rd edn. 2 vols. Oxford, 1908.
Argyll, Duke of The EaJtern QuestionfTOm 1856. London, 1879.
Ashley, A. E. M. The Life and Correspondence of Hen~y John Temple, Viscount Palmerston. 2 vols.
London, 1879.
Aspaturian, V. V. The l !nion Republics in Soviet Diplomacy. Geneva, 1960.
Bailey, Sydney D. The General Assembry of the United Nations, rev. edn. New York, 1964.
- . Voting in the Securi~y Council. Indiana University Press, 1969 (rev. edn. 1970).
Barraclough, Geoffrey and Wall, Rachel F. Survey of International Affairs 1955-6. Oxford,
1960.
524
Bibliography
Ban-os, James (00.). The United Nations, Past, Present and Future. New York, 1972.
Bardonnet, Daniel. La denonciation par le gouvernement senegalais de la Convention sur la
Mer Territoriale et la Zone Contigue et de la Convention sur la Peche et la
Conservation des Ressources Biologiques de la Haute Mer en date a Geneve du 29 Avril
195 8 . AFDI, 1972, p. 123.
Basdevant, J. La Conclusion et la Redaction des Traites. HR, 1926(V).
Baumann, Carl Edler. The Diplomatic Kidnappings. The Hague, 1973.
Beloff, Max. Britain's Liberal Empire (vol. I of The Imperial Sunset) London, 1969.
Bittner, L. et al. Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Liinder seit dem westfiilischen Frieden
( 1648 ). Vol. I: 1648-1715. Oldenburg, 1936; Vol. 2: 1716-1763. Zurich, 1950; Vol. 3:
1764- 1815. Graz- Koln, 1965.
Bluntschli, J. C. Das moderne Vjjlkerrecht der civilisierten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt, 3rd edn.
Nordlingen, 1878.
Boeck, Charles de. L'Expulsion, etc. HR, 1927 (iii).
Bologna, Giacomo. Noae Busnelli-Ballarin. Schio, 1884.
Bowett, D. W. The Law of International Institutions, 3rd edn. London, 1965.
Brierly, J. L. The Law of. Vat ions, 6th edn. Oxford, 1963.
Briggs, Herbert W. The Final Act of the London Conference on Germany. 49 AJIL, 1955.
- -. Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties, etc. 68 AJIL, 1974.
Browning, O. The Despatches of Earl Cower. Cambridge, 1885.
Bryce, James. The Holy Roman Empire. London, 1889.
Busch, J. H. M. CrafBismarck und seine Leute wiihrend des Kriegs mit Frankreich, 2nd edn. 2 vols.
Leipzig, 1878.
- -. Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of his History. 3 vols. London, 1898.
Busk, Sir Douglas. The Craft of Diplomacy. London, 1971.
Bynkershoek, Cornelius van (1673-1743). De Foro Legatorum.
Callieres, Franc;ois de. De la manihe de nigocier avec les souverains, etc. Paris and Amsterdam,
1716. Translation by A. F. Whyte, London, 1919.
Calvo, Charles. Dictionnaire de Droit Internat ional Public et Prive. 2 vols. Berlin (and Paris), 1885.
- -. Le Droit international, Thiorie et Pratique, 5th edn. 6 vols. Paris, 1896.
Cambon, Jules. Le Diplomate. Paris, 1926.
Cambridge Modern History (edited by Sir Adolphus Ward and others). 13 vols. Cambridge,
1904- 11.
Camden, William. Annales rerum Anglicarum et Hibernicarum regnante Elizabetha. 2 vols. Leyden,
1616, 3rd edn. translated into English by R. N[orton]. London, 1635.
Castro y Casaleiz, de Cuia prtictica del Diplomtitico Espanol, 2nd edn. 2 vols. Madrid, 1886.
Chappuzeau, Samuel. L'Europe Vivante, etc. Geneva, 1667.
Chatterjee, International Law and Inter-State Relations in Ancient India. London, 1958.
Churchill, Sir Winston. The Second World War. 6 vols. London, 1948-54.
Clark, Eric. Corps Diplomatique. London, 1973.
Cobbett, W. Parliamentary History. 12 vols. London, 1806-12.
Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, Report to the
League of Nations, 1928 (League Document A.15.1928.v.).
Committee of Three. Report on Non-Military Cooperation. Paris, 1956.
Commonwealth Secretariat. Diplomatic Service: Formation and Operation. London, 1973.
Connell-Smith, Gordon. The Inter-American System. London, 1966.
Croker, John Wilson. Correspondence and Diaries, 2nd edn., by Jennings. 3 vols. London, 1885.
Cussy, Baron Ferdinand de. Dictionnaire du Diplomate et du Consul. Leipzig, 1846.
D' Abernon, Lord. An Ambassador for Peace. London, 1929.

David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. Report ofa Study Croup on Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes. London, 1966.
Deak, F. Classification des Agents Diplomatiques. RDILC, 1928.
Dehousse, Fernand. Le Droit de Retrait auxNations Unies (I & 11). REDI, 1965, p. 30; 1966,
p.8.
Denza, Eileen. Diplomatic Law; A Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
New York and London, 1976.
Bibliography
Detter, Ingrid. Essays on the Law of Treaties. London, 1967.
Dicey, A. V. Conflict of Laws, 4th edn. by Berriedale Keith. London, 1927.
Dictionnaire de I' Acadimie fran~ise. Paris, 1694.
Diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Belligerent Governments
relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce. Special Supplement to the American
Journal of International Law, Vot. 10 (1916).
Documents relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference
(Cmd. 9 I 86).
- -. Further Documents relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva
Conference, June 16-July 21, 1954 (Cmd. 9239)'
Documents relating to the Meeting of Foreign Ministen, Berlin, January 25-February 18,
1954 (Cmd. 9080 ).
Dumont, Baron Jean C. de. Corps Universel Diplomatique duo Droit des Gens. Paris, 1725-31.
Duncan, Sir Val. Report ofthe Review Committee on Overseas Representation, 1968-9. Cmnd. 4107.
London, 1969.
EFTA Secretariat. Building EFTA. Geneva, 1966.
Ehler, Sidney Z. The recent Concordats. 104 HR (1961) p. I.
Evelyn, John. Diary. Edited by W. Bray. 4 vols. London, 1906 - .
Fauchille, P. Traiti de Droit International Public. 8th edn. ofBonfils' Manuel de Droit International
Public. 2 vols. Paris, 1926.
Feltham, R. G. Diplomatic Handbook. London, 1970.
Ferraris, Lucius. Prompta Bibliotheca canonica, juridica, etc. I I vols. Venice, 1782-94 (Paris,
1852 -7).
Finett, Sir John. Finetti Philoxonis: Som Choice Observations etc. London, 1656.
Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald. A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice. The Hague,
1965.
Fitzmaurice, G. G. The Law and Procedure of the International Court ofJustice. 29 Brn
(1952).
- -. Reservations to Multilateral Conventions. 2. ICL~ January 1953.
Flassan, G. de R. de Histoire Ginirale et Raisonnie de la Diplomatie Fran~aise, 2nd edn. 7 vols.
Paris, 181 I.
Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Offu:e, The Merger of the. London (HMSO) 1968.
Foster, J. W. A Century of American Diplomacy. Boston, 1900.
- -. The Practice of Diplomacy as Illustrated in the Foreign Relations ofthe United States. Boston,
1906
Fraga Iribarne, Manuel. Diplomacia en el Siglo Xx. Madrid 1960.
Garda de la Vega, D. Guide Pratique des Agents Politiques, etc. Brussels and Paris, 1873.
Garden, Comte Guillaume de. Histoire des Traites de Paix. 13 vols. Paris, 1848-59.
- -. Trait! complet de Diplomatie. 3 vols. Paris, 1883.
Gardiner, S. R. History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. 3 vols. London, 1894-190 I.
Gardner, R. N. Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy. London, 1956.
Genet, R. Trait! de Diplomatie et de Droit Diplomatique. 3 vols. Paris, 1931.
Gentili, Alberico. De Legationibus Libri Tres. 1585.
Gerin. -. 16 RQH.
Goebbels Diaries, The. Edited by Louis P. Lochner. New York, 1948.
Goodrich, Leland M. The United Nations. New York 1959; London, 1960.
Goodrich, L. M., Hambro, E. and Simons. ThtCharterofthe UnitedNations, 3rdedn. London,
1969'
Gore-Booth, Lord. With Great Truth and Respect. London, 1974.
Grandin, Thomas. The Political Use of the Radio. Geneva Studies, X, 3, 1939.
Grassis, Paris de. Diarium. British Museum, MSS. 8440-4 (cited in 25 RDILC ( 1893) p. 515.)
Gross, Leo (ed.) The Future of the International Court of Justice. 2 vols. New York, 1976.
526
Bibliography
Grotius, Hugo. De Jure Belli ac Pacis (d)25)' Translated by Whewell. 3 vols. Cambridge and
London, 1853.
Group of Four. A Remodelled Economic Organisation. Paris, 1960.
Guizot, F. P. G. Mbnoires pour semir al'Histoire de mon Temps. 8 vols. Paris, 1857-67.
- -. Histoire de la Ripublique d'Angletem et de Cromwell. 2 vols. Paris, 1856.
Hale, Julian. Radio Power. London, 1975.

Hall, W. E. A Treatise on International Law. 8th edn., by Pearce Higgins. Oxford, 1924.
Halleck, H. W. International Law. 2 vols. 186 I. 4th English edn. by Sir Sherston Baker.
London, 1908.
Halsbury, Lord. The Laws of England. 3 I vols. London, 1907- I 7.
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Commons (5th series), vol. 281. London, 1803 -.
Hardy, J. The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals. 37 BrIL (1961 ) p. 72.
Harmel, Pierre. The Future Tasks of the Alliance. Brussels, 1967.
Harvard Research in International Law. Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities, and Introductory Comment. Cambridge, Mass., 1922.
Hatzfeld-Darmsteter. Notes and Queries, September 12, 193 I, 9th edn. Paris, 1932.
Hayter, Sir William. The Diplomacy of the Great Powers. London, 1960.
Heffter, A. W. Das europdische Vijlkemcht der Gegenwart. 7th edn. Berlin, 1882.
Hendrick, B. J. The Life and Letters of Waiter H. Page, 3 vols. London, 1922-5'
Henige, D. P. Colonial Governors from the 15th Century to the Present. University of Wisconsin,
1970.
Hershey, Amos S. Diplomatic Agents and Immunities. Washington, 1919.
Hertslet, Sir Edward. Recollections of the Old Foreign Office. London, 190 I.
Heyking, Baron A. L'Extraterritorialite. HR, 1925, ii 266.
Higgins, Pearce. The Hague Peace Conferences etc., London 1909.
Higgins, Rosalyn. The Administration of United Kingdom Foreign Policy through the UnitedNations.
Syracuse, New York, 1966.
Hill, Chesney. Immunities of Diplomatic Agents. 25 AJIL (1931).
Hill, D. J. A History ofDiplomacy in the International Development ofEurope. 3 vols. New York and
London, 1911-14.
Hodgkin, T. L. Diplomacy and Diplomats in the Western Sudan. In Foreign Relations ofthe
African States, edited by K. Ingham. London, 1974.
Holmes, T. Rice (ed), Caesar, de Bello Gallico. 7 books. Oxford, 1914.
HoltzendorfT, F. von. Handbuch des Volkerrechts. 4 vols. Hamburg, 1885-9.
Horn, D. B. The British Diplomatic Service, 1689-1789. Oxford, 1961.
Hudson, Manley O. Cases on International Law. St Paul, 1929.
- -. International Legislation. 8 vols. Washington, 193 I -49.
- -. The Permanent Court of International Justice. London, 1934.
Hurst, Sir Cecil. Les Immunites Diplomatiques. HR, 1925, ii, 228.
- -. Diplomatic Immunities - modern developments. In 10 BrIL, 1929.
Instructions to Diplomatic Officers of the United States, 1897.

Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Final Act of Conference and
Convention, 1948 (Cmd. 7412).
International Civil Aviation Conference. Final Act (Cmd. 6614-1945).
International Labour Organization. Declaration of Aims and Purposes, Philadelphia, 1946
- -. Report on the 29th Session of the Conference, Montreal, 1946 (Cmd. 7185).
- -. Report on the 30th Session, 1947 (Cmd. 7437).
- -. Reports to the United Nations, 1947 -. Geneva.
International Law Commission: Report Covering the Work of its Third Session, May
16-July 27, 1951 (United Nations Document A!I858).
- -. Report Covering the Work of its Fifth Session, June I-August 14, 1953 (U.N.
Document A/2456).
International Radio Regulations, Atlantic City, 1947. London, 1948.
International Telecommunication Convention, Buenos Aires, 1952. Geneva, 1953.
International Telecommunication Convention and Related Documents (Cmd. 7466).
Bibliography
Jackson, Sir GeotTrey. People's Prison. London, 1973.
Jenkinson, Charles (1st Earl ofLiverpool). A Collection ()fall the Treaties . .. between Great Britain
and Other Powers . .. from 1648 to . . . 1783. London, 1785.
Jenks, C. Wilfred. Internationallmmunities. London and New York, 1961.
Jimenez de Arechaga, Eduardo. The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the
International Court of Justice. 67 AJIL (1973) p. I.
Johnson, W. F. America's Foreign Relations. 2 vols. London, 1916.
Joy, c. T. How Communists Negotiate. New York, 1955.
Kay, David A. In The United Nations, Past, Present and Future, edited by James Barros. New
York, 1972.
Karelle, Jacques and Kemmeter, Fritz de. Le Benelux Comment!. Brussels, 196 I.
Keith, A. Berriedale, and Adair, E. R. 12 JCL (1930) and 13 JCL (1931).
Keith, K. J. The Extent ofthe Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice. Leyden,
197 I.
Kelly, Sir David. The Ruling Few. London, 1952.
Kelsen, Hans. The Law of the United Nations. London, 195 I .
Kennedy, A. L. Old Diplomacy and New. London, 1922.
Kissinger, Henry. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy. New York, 1957.
Klliber, J. L. Acten des Wiener Congresses, 2nd edn. Erlangen, 1817-35.
Kluchevsky, V. O. A History of Russia. 5 vols. London, 191 I.
Koch, C. G. de. Histoire abregee des Traites de Paix, etc. (continued to 1815 by F. Schoell).
181 7- 18. 4 vols. Brussels, 1937-8.
Krauske, Otto. Entwickelung der stiindigen Diplomatie, etc. Leipzig, 1885.
La Briere, Yves de. Le Droit concordataire dans la nouvelle Europe. 63 HR (1938) p. 367.
Lacil~, M. La Cour Internationale de Justice dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. 9 RBDl (1975)'
Lawrence, Thomas Joseph. Principles of International Law. 1898. 7th edn., revised. London,
1937
Lay, T. H. The Foreign Service of the United States. New York, 1925.
League of Nations Treaty Series. 205 vols. Geneva, 1920-46.
Lee, Luke T. Consular Law and Practice. London, 196 I.
Lefevre-Pontalis, Antonin. Jean de Wilt. Paris, 1884.
Leibnitz, G. W. von. Codex luris Gentium diplomaticus. Hanover, 1693.
- -. In Holtzendorffs Handbuch des Viilkerrechts, vol. Ill.
Liang, Yuen-li. Notes on legal questions concerning the United Nations observance of
human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. 44 AJIL (1950) p. 100.
- -. United Nations practice with respect to reservations to multipartite instruments. 44
AJIL (1950) p. 117
Livingstone, F. Withdrawal from the United Nations: Indonesia. 14 lCLQ (1965) p. 637.
Lockhart, Robert Hamilton Bruce. Memoirs of a British Agent. London, 1932.
Lucien-Brun, J. La fin des concordats? AFDl, 1972, p. 225.
Machiavelli, Nicolo. L'A rte della Guerra. 152 I.
McNair, Sir Arnold. The Law of Treaties. Oxford, 1961.
Malmesbury, 1st Earl of. Diaries and Correspondence. 4 vols. London, 1844.
Mann, F. A. Studies in International Law. Oxford, 1973.
Mansell, Gerald. Why External Broadcasting? London, 1976.
Martens, Baron Charles de. Causes celebres du Droit des Gms. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1827.
- -. Le Guide diplomatique, 5th edn. by F. H. GetTcken. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1866.
Martens, Georg Friedrich von. Precis du Droit des Gens modeme de I' Europe. 2 vols. Paris, 183 I.
- -. Recueil de Traitis d'Alliance ... depuis 1761 (1761-1808). 8 vols. Gottingen, 1817-35.
- -. Nouveau Recueil ... depuis 1808 (1808-39). 16 vols. and 3 supplements. GOttingen,
181 7-42.
- -. Nouveau Recueil General de Traitis . .. depuis 1840: Series I (1840-73),20 vols. GOttingen,
1843-75; Series Il (1873- 1906),35 vols. Leipzig, 18g6-I908; Series Ill, 1906 -. Leipzig,
IgoB -.
528
Bibliography
Masson, F. 1. Departement des Affaires Etrangeres pendant la Revolution. Paris, 1877.

Mattingly, Garrett. Renaissance Diplomacy. London, 1955.
Maulde-Ia-Claviere, A. R. de. Histoire de Louis XII. Paris, 1893.
Mendelson, M. H. Interim Measures ofProtection in cases ofContestedJurisdiction. BrBIL,
197 2-3.
Mew's Digest of English Law Cases. 24 vols. London, 1924-8.
Michaud, J. F. and Poujoulat, J. J. F. Nouvelle Collection des Mimoires, etc. Paris, 1836-9.
Miruss, A. Das europiiische Gesandschaftsrecht, etc., 2 vols. Leipzig, 1847.
Montesquieu, Baron Charles Louis de. Esprit des Lois. Paris, 1748.
Moore, John Bassett. A Digest of International Law. 8 vols. Washington, 1906.
Moussa, Farag. us Services Diplomatiques des Etats Arabes. Geneva, 1960.
- -. Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: I. L'Ambassade. Brussels, 1972.
Munch, Fritz. Non-binding agreements. 29 ZRV (1969) p. I.
Myers, Denys P. The names and scope of Treaties. 51 AJIL (1957) p. 575.
Nahlik, Stanislaw E. La Conference de Vienne sur le Droit des Traites: une vue d'ensemble.
AFDI (1969), p. IZ4.
Nato Information Service. Nato Facts and Figures (379 pp). Brussels, 1976.
New English Dictionary on Historical Principles. Oxford, 1884- 1928.
Newhouse, John. Cold Dawn: The Story of S.A.L. T. New York, 1973.
Nicholson, Sir Harold. Diplomacy. London, 1939.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Agreement on the Status of N.A. T.O. National
Representatives and International Staff (Cmd. 8400).
- -. Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
(Cmd. 8279).
- -. Protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the
North Atlantic Treaty (Cmd. 8687).
Northedge, F. S. The International Political System. London, 1976.
Nys, E. Le Droit international, 2nd edn. 3 vols. Brussels and Paris, 1904-6.
- -. In RDILC, vols. XXI and Xxv.
O'Connell, Professor D. P. Cause Ce1i~bre in the History of Treaty Making. 42 Brn (1967)
p. 7 1
Ollivier, E. L'Empire Liberal, 1895-1915. 16 vols. Paris, 1895-1912.
Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States, 1789-. 23 vols. Washington.
Oppenheim, L. International Law (edited by H. Lauterpacht). Vol. I (Peace), 8th edn., 1955;
vol. 11 (War), 7th edn., 1952. London.
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. Supplementary Protocol No. I to the
Convention of 1948 (Cmd. 7796).
Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford, 1933Page, Waiter H. Life and Letters. See under Hendrik.
Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi. The Woman in Diplomacy. In Siminaire International pour Diplomates
de Klessheim: La Diplomatie Contemporaine. Vienna, 1959.
Panikkar, K. M. The Principles and Practice of Diplomacy. Delhi, 1952.
Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1789 -. Washington.
Papers Relative to the Negociation with France, 1806. London, (British) Parliamentary
Papers, Session 1806-7, vol. IX.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons. See under Hansard.
Parliamentary Paper, Mexico, No. 1 (1924) (Cmd. 2225).
- -. Mise., No. 7 (1925) (Cmd. 2435)
Parry, Clive. Index of British Treaties, 1101-1968. London, 1970.
- -. The Sources and Evidences of International Law. Manchester, 1965.
Pearsall Smith, L. Life and utters of Sir Henry Wotton. 2 vols. London, 1907.
Pearson, Lester. Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. Cambridge, Mass., 1959.
Pepys, Samuel. Diary, 1659-69. London.
Bibliography
Perrenoud, G. Les Restrictions a la Liberte de Deplacement des Diplomates. 57 RGDIP
([953) p. 444
Phillimore, Sir Robert. Commentaries up. 'n International Law, 3rd edn. 4 vols. London, [879-89.
Phillipson, Coleman. The International '.-aw and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome. 2 vols.
London, [9[I.
Plowden, Lord. Report of the Committee on Representational Services Overseas, 1962-3. London,
[964.
Pradier-Fodere, P. Cours de Droit Diplomatique 2 vols. Paris, [88I.
Prescott, W. H. History of the Reign of Philip II. London, [855.
Public Record Office Documents:
King's Letters, Prussia, [737-60.
S.P. Foreign, Germany, vol. LX.
S.P. France, 242.
Puissochet, Jean Pierre. L'Elargissement des Communautes Europeennes. Paris, [974.
Quaroni, Pietro. Diplomatic &gs. London, [966.

Queller, D. E. The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages. Princeton, [967.
Raabe, A. and Duncan, J. History of Russia. London, [854
Redesdale, Lord. The Garter Mission to Japan. London, [906.
Regulations for the Army, Navy and Air Force. London (current).
Regulations to give effect to Article [02 of the United Nations Charter (U.N. Document
AI266). Flushing Meadow, N.V., [946.
Reliquia Wottoniana, 4th edn. London, [685.
Reuter, Paul. Introduction au Droit des Traitis. Paris, [972.
Richelet, Pierre. Dictionnaire Franfois. 2 parts. Geneva, [680.
Rivier, Alphonse. Principes du Droit des Gens. 2 vols. Paris, [896.
Robertson, A. H. The Council of Europe. London, [96 [.
- -. European Institutions. London, [959.
Rolin, Henri. La Conciliation Internationale. Annuaire de I'lnstitut de Droit International.
[96 [, p. [93
Rose, J. Holland. Life of Napoleon I. 2 vols. London, [902.
Rosenne, Shabtai. The Law and Practice of the International Court. 2 vols. Leyden, [965.
- -. The World Court: What it is and how it works. 3rd edn. Leyden, [973.
Rymer, T. Foedera. 20 vols. London, [704-32.
Sainty, J. C. Officials of the Secretaries of State 1660-1782. (Vol. 2 of Office-holders in Modern
Britain) London, [973.
Satow, Sir Ernest. International Congresses. London, [920.
Schermers, H. G. International Institutional Law. Leyden, [972.
Schmalz, T. Europdisches VOlkerrecht. Berlin, [8 I].
Schmelzing, J. Systematischer Grundriss des praktischen europdischen Vijlkerrechtes. 3 vols.
Rudolstadt, [8 [8-20.
Schwarzenberger, Georg. International Law and Order. London, [97 I.
Schwelb, Egon. Some aspects of international jus cogens as formulated by the International
Law Commission. 6[ AJIL ([967) p. 946.
Scott, James Brown. Le Franfais, langue diplomatique moderne. Paris, [924.
- -. Cases on International Law. Boston, [902; St. Paul, [922.
- -. The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 197. New York, [9[5.
Secretan, J. Les Immunites diplomatiques des Representants des Etats membres et des Agents de la Societe
des Nations. Geneva, [929.
Segur, Comte Louis Philippe de. Memoires, ou Souvenirs et Anecdotes, 3rd edition. Paris, [827.
Sen, Biswanath. A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice. The Hague, [965.
Shortt, F. H. and Mellor, F. H. Practice of the Crown Office, 2nd edn. London, [908.
Simpson, J. L. and Fox, Hazel. International Arbitration. London, [959.
Sinclair, Sir lan. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. London, [973.
530
Bibliography
Singapore Institute of Studies. ASEAN: Problems and Prospects. Singapore, 1975.

Sismondi, J. C. L. Simonde de. Histoire des Franfais. 31 vols. Paris, 1821-44.
Sorel, Albert. L'Europe et la Revolution Franfaise. 6 vols. Paris, 1885-1904.
Stapleton, A. G. George Canning and his Times. London, 1859.
- -. Political Life of the Right Honourable George Canning. 3 vols. London, 1831.
Strang, Lord. The Foreign Office. London, 1955.
- -. At Home and Abroad. London, 1956.
Stuart, G. L. American Diplomatic and Consular Practice, 2nd edn. New York, 1952.
Sykes, Sir Percy. Biography of Sir Mortimer Durand. London, 1926.
Talleyrand, Prince Charles M. de. Memoires du Prince de Talleyrand (edited by the Duc de
Broglie). 5 vols. Paris, 1891-2.
Taylor, Hannis. A Treatise on International Public Law. Chicago, 190 I.
Temperley, Harold. Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph. London, 1915.
- -. History f the Peace Conference of Paris. 5 vols. London, 1920-4.
Tenekides, Georgios K. Droit International et Communautis Federales dans la Grece des Cites. HR
(1956 ).
Thayer, Charles. Diplomat. London, 1960.
Thurloe, J. A Collection of State Papers. 7 vols. London, 1742.
Times History of the War. 22 vols. London, 1915-20.
Treaty Maker's Handbook, The. edited by Blix, Hans and Emerson,Jurina H. Uppsala, 1973.
Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance (United Kingdom-France), 1947. Cmd. 7217.
Treaty Series: see United Kingdom Treaty Series.
Trevelyan, Humphrey (Lord Trevelyan). Diplomatic Channels. London, 1973.
Ullmann, E. von. Volkerrecht, 2nd edition. Tiibingen, 1goB.
United Kingdom Official Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations (Cmd. 6666,
Mise. No. 9, 1945)
United Nations
Handbook. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975.
Legislative Series.
Monetary and Financial Conference, Final Act. (Cmd. 6546).
Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. New York, 1970.
Treaty Series.
Yearbook.
United Nations Educationl Scientific and Cultural Organisation:
Final Act and Constitution (Cmd. 6963).
First General Conference (Cmd. 7128).
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation:
Documents relating to the First Session of the Conference (Cmd. 6731).
Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, Hot Springs,
1943 (Cmd. 645 1).
Report of Preparatory Commission on World Food Proposals (Cmd. 7031).
United States Congress. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S.
Senate. Document No. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, 1919.
United States House of Representatives. Committee on Internal Security (93rd Congress).
Political Kidnappings. 1973.
Universal Postal Convention and Regulations. (Cmd. 7435).
Valfrey, Jules. Hughes de Lionne, Sts Ambassades en Espagne et en Allemagne (also entitled La
Diplomatie Franfaise au XVIIeme Sitcle). Paris, 1881.
Vandal, A. Napolion et Alexandre [". 3 vols. Paris, 1891-4.
Vattel, E. de. Le Droit des Gem. 3 vols. Paris, 1835.
Villa- Urrutia, W. R. de. Relaciones entre Espana iInglaterra durante la Guerra de la Independencia. 3
vols. Madrid, 191 1- 14.
Bibliography
Wallace, William. The Foreign Policy Process in Britain. London, 1975.
Walton, Izaak. Reliquia Wottoniana, 4th edn. London, 1685.
Ward (afterwards Plumer Ward), Robert. An Enquiry into the Foundation and History ofthe Law
of Nations in Europe. 2 vols. London, 1795.
Watt, D. C. Personalities and Politics. London, 1965.
Webster, Sir Charles Kingsley. The Art and Practice of Diplomacy. London, 1961.
Weinstein, J. L. Exchange of Notes. 29 BrIL (1952) p. 205.
Wheaten, Henry. Elements ofInternational Law. 8th (American) edn., by Dana. Boston, 1866;
5th (English) edn., by Coleman Phillipson. London, 1916.
Whitton,John B. and Larson, Arthur. Propaganda: Towards Disarmament in the War of Words.
New York, 1964Wicquefort, A. Van. L'Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions. 2 vols. The Hague, 1682; Amsterdam,
1730 .
Willson, Beckles. Friend~y Relations. London, 1934.
Wilson, C. E. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities. Tucson, Ariz., 1967.
Wolff, C. Jus gentium methodo scientifico pertractatum. Halle:an-der-Saale, 1749.
Wood, John R. and Serres, Jean. Diplomatic Ceremonial and Protocol. London, 1970.
World Health Organisation. Final Act of Conference, and Constitution. (Cmd. 7458).
World Meteorological Organisation. Final Act of Conference, and Convention. (Cmd.
742 7).
Wynn, Wilton. Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity. Cambridge, Mass., 1959.
Xydis, Stephen C. In The UnitedNations, Past, Present and Future. Ed.James Barros. New York,
197 2.
Yoshitomi, M. Chine: l'affaire de la perquisition de l'Ambassade Sovietique cl Pekin par les
autorites chinoises. RGDIP (1928).
Young, Eileen (Eileen Denza). The Development of the Law ofDiplomatic Relations. BrIL
(1964).
53 1
Index
(The references are to chapters and paragraphs)
A
Ablegatus, 11.8
Absence from state ceremony, 20.15,22; 44.45
Acceptance and Approval (treaties),
32 .3 6-4 2
Accession (treaties), 32.21-5
Accreditation, 9.9,31-4
see also credentials
Acheson, Dean, 3.25
Act, 31.1
Additional Articles, 30.16- 19
Address, forms of, $ 7; 20.26,27
Admissions case, 39 n.53
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, 39020
Agbor v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner,
15-7
Agreation, (Agrement) 12.1 - I I
Agreement. 29020
Aide-m/moire, 7.20
Aircraft, seizure of (Hague Convention),
24. 14- 16; 32 n.6
Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of (1818), 6.1
Alabama case, 38.1
Alexander I, Tsar, 12.3.
AIIende, President, 14.22; 21.14
Alternat, 4- I I - 14, 15; 2g.42
Altesse, 5.7
Ambassade d'obidience, 4-2
Ambassadors, 1.5,6; 4-17; 10.2-6; 20.9- 1 I
special, 4-20; 5-32
title, 11.9; 20.26
Ambatielos claim, 29.32
Amin, President, 22.14
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, 39 n.42, n.44
Anne, Queen, 5- I 3
Anne, Statute of, 14 n.lO; 15-2 and n. 14
Appel, 7.11-13
Arab League, 42.7-8

Arbenz, President, 42.125,135
Arbitration, 38.30-4
Agreement between UK and French
Governments (1975) 31.20
Argentine-Chilean frontier, 31.21; 38.32
n.23
Beagle Channel, 31.21; 38.32 n.23
compromis d'arbitrage, 31.16-22
General Act, 38.5
Hague Conventions (1899), 38.3
International Court of Justice, 38.6
Permanent Court of Arbitration, 38.4
Permanent Court of International Justice,
38 04
UN Charter, 38.8- I I
Archduke, 5-10
Archives, 3.28; 14.26; 21.9; 26.14; 27. 11 ,15,23
Arctic Convoy, 7.36
Arden-Clarke, Sir Charles, 42.144
Aristotle, 44.61
Armistice, 28.5
Arundel of Wardour, Thomas, 20.31
ASEAN,42167
economic and trade policies, 42.177
relations with EEC, 42.174
structure, 42.172,173
Ashe, Derick, 22.15
Asylum, 1+ 17-23; 42 n.59
Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru), 14.21; 39 n36
Atlantic Charter, 29.7; 362
Attaches, 908; 20029
Attlee, C. R., 41.6
Audience, 13-9-15, 21 et seq.; 21.3
Avaux, Comte d', 4-6
Index
B
Baader-Meinhof, 24 n3
Bags, official, 14.$ 14.26-8,30,31; 27. I I
Bailo, 11.7
Balfour, Lord, 41.1
Banco de Portugal v. Marang, IS.25
Bangladesh, 9028
Bast, 14.23
Beagle Channel arbitration, 31.21; 38.32,
n.23
Belatinde, Fernando, 36 n.34
Belligerent rights, 18.12; App. loB
Belleisle, Marshal, 18.11
Benelux, 42.61
BenneU and Ball v. People's Republic of Hungary,
14 n5
Berat, 11.19
Bergman v. de Siiyes, 18.5
Bernadoue, Count Folke, 38.26
Bernstorff, Count, 7.7
Bestoujew-Rioumine, 22.4
Bevin, Ernest, 27.10; 42.16,45
Bhuuo, President, 9028
Bidault, Georges, App. 11. 9
Billet, en, 7.1 I
Birthdays, royal, 20.25
Bismarck, Prince Ouo von, 3.2$ 7.8; 901$

10.12; 437; ff44
Blair, H. W., 12.1 I
Blomberg, Field Marshal von, S.32
Boats, 6.5; 20.24
Bogota, Pact of, 30.2; 42.123
Bohlen, Charles, ff. 7 I
Bolivar, Sim6n, 42.119
Boundaries, 31.21; 38.32
Bourgoing, .....45
Bout de papier, 7.32,33
Boxer Rising, 14. 10
Briand, Aristide, 3.24
Breach
diplomatic relations, 22
treaties, 33.44-6
Bribery, 20.36; ..... 11
Broglie, Duc de, 1.4
Brooke, Gerald, 277
Bucher, Giovanni Enrico, 24-8
Bulwer, William Henry Lyuon Earle, (later
Baron Dalling) 21.17; ff.52
Bunche, Ralph, 38.26
Burke, Edmund, 1.1 I
Burlingame, Anson, 12. I 7
c
Cabinet system, ff.74-5
Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 36.93
Callaghan, James, 3-17
Callieres, Franc;ois de, I. I I; ff. I -29
Calls on appointment to new post, 13.10,19;
20.8,13
Camacho, 12.1 7
Canning, George, 7.7,39
Canning, Sir Stratford, 12.5
see also under Stratford de RedclifTe
Canon Law, 1.5; 11.12
Capitulations, 26.2,3
Caradon, Lord, 36.52
Cardinals, S.39; 11.1$ 20.26
Casa Yrujo, Marques de, 21.18
Castlereagh, Viscount, 7.7; 20 n. 17; 43.7
Castro, President Fidel, 42.135
Cassirer and Geheeb v. Japan, 14 n. 15.
Casus belli, App. I. 16
Casus fOederis, App. I. 16
Catacazy, 21.17
Catholic King (title), S.12
Cecil, Sir Robert, 3.3
Celebrations, national, 20.15,16,22; .....45
flying flags, 20.25
man of war in foreign port, 6.7
see also Mission, ceremonial
Cellamare, Prince, IS. 10

Ceremonial
death of envoy, 21.7,8
minister for foreign affairs, 3. I 7
reception of ambassadors, 13.10-53
Ceremonial missions, S.32-5; 19.1,2
Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 324j 7.35
Chamberlain, Neville, 9025
Chamoun, President, 2S.6
Channels of communication, 3.20; 41.24
Chapultepec, Act of, 42.124
Charge d'affaires, 9.13; 11.17-18; 20.29;
21.5-6
Charter (treaties), 30.4-6
Chiang Kai-shek, 36.34
Children, 16.19-20; 17.1-3
China consular service, 10.1
China (membership of UN), 36.15
Chou En-Iai, 23.19
Churchill, Sir Winston, 3.25; 7.36; 29-7; 36.2
Civil aviation, safety of, (Montreal
Convention) 32 n.6
Civil Service, Royal Commission on (1914),
10.8
Civil War, 9.13
Clarendon, Lord, 21.19
Clark memorandum, 42 n. 57
534
Index
Contracts (private law), 29.4
Convention, 29 I 7- 19
Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomats, 24.14
Corfu Channel case, 39-1 I
Coronations, 5.29-34
Correspondence, 7
British forms of address, 7.27-8
despatch read and copy left, 7.38-9
heads of states, 7.40
let/res de cabinet, de chancellerie, 7.40; 8.1-7
rejection, 7.34-7
semi-official, 7.29
Counsellor, App. I B
Coup d'etat, 9.16; 21.13
Couriers, 14.3 I
Court (law), 2.$ 15.7,18,19,23,28,
27.4-. 16- 19
Courtoisie, 7. I I
Crampton, 21.1 7
Credentials, 8
change of regime, 9-13,24,30; 21.12
conferences, 28.9
death of sovereign, 21.1 I
presentation, 13-10-18,22-51
UN, ;)6.14
Crime by diplomatic agent, 15.10, I I
Criminals
Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomats, 24.14
refuge in legation, 14.17-23
see also Hijacking and terrorism
Cromwell, Oliver, 4- 16
Cros, du, 18.2
Cross, James, 24.5
Crowe, Sir Eyre, (memorandum), 34 n.2
Cuba (missile crisis, 1962),36.48
Customary international law, 14-2,4,9; 26.11;
29 n.1
Customs Regime between Germany and Austria case,
29-5
Customs facilities, 13.5,6; 16.1,9- 15; 17.2,7;
18.6; 19.3,5; 27. 11 , 12, 16,23;
40.4- 6,8,13,15,20
Customs Union, European, 42.70-2
Clausewitz, Karl von, 1.8

Clemenceau, Georges, 43 7
Clifford, Nicolas, 20.31
Collective Note, 7.22
Collegiate system, 44.76
Commercial work, 10.9; 26.4; 27.3,10
Commission of appointment, 3.7; 26.10
Commission, Royal, on the Civil Service
(1914), 10.8
Committees, conference, 28.14-16
Commonwealth of Nations
composition, 41.9
definition, 41. I -8
diplomatic representation, 41.27-9
Governors-General, 41.14-16
High Commissioners, 41.27-9
India, acceptance of as republican
member, 41.3
intercommunication, 41.24,26
intra-Commonwealth agreements
registered with UN, 41.34
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
4 1 .35
legislative powers, 41.2
meetings of heads of government, 41.17- 19
membership of UN, 41.25
relations with foreign countries, 41.26
Rhodesia, 41.10
Royal style and titles, 41.12-13
Statute of Westminster, 41.2
trade and consular representation, 41.30-2
Communications, inviolability of, 14-27-31
Compensation, 23.6,8,12,15,24,25
Compromis d'arbitrage, 31.16-22
Conciliation, see Disputes
Concordat, 30. I I - I 5
Conditions of Admission case (UN Charter),
39 n47
Congresses and Conferences, 28
Commonwealth, 41.1,17-20
delegations, 28.7,19
Geneva Conference (1954), App.II
Japanese Peace Conference (195 I), App. 11
languages, 28. 10
Paris Peace Conference (1946), App. 11
proces-verbal, 28. I 7
Connally, Senator Tom, 42.16, 18
Constitution (UN Specialised Agencies), 30.3
Consuls, 14.30; 23.15,19; 26; 27; (in
commonwealth) 41.31-33
D
Date, 7.11
Death
head of mission, 21.6,7
head of state, 20.2S; 21.10, I
Declaration, 29-28-33
Decolonisation, 36.91
Decorations, see Orders of Chivalry
Defender of the Faith, 5.5,12; 41.12,13
De Gaulle, President Charles, 3687; 42.34,73
Delegations, 28.7,8,9; 40.5,8,20
Index
Dimarche App. I. 7;
by diplomatic corps, 20.5
Den Pasar Conference, 42.174,175
Depeche, en, 7. I I
Despatches, 7.25-7,38,39
Dessolles, 12.5
De Visscher, Professor, 38.2 I
Dharsono, General Hartono Rekso, 42.176
Dickinson v. Del Solar, 15.30
Diplomacy
general, I
by conference, 3+1
public argument, conduct of 36.93
role of international lawyer, 43.13
specialised and technical content,
43-4>9, 10-12
speed of travel, 43-2,7,8
Diplomatic agent, 9-1$ IS; 18 etc.
conduct in absence of diplomatic relations,
2G. 18; 26.8; 27.9
conduct in war time, 9-1$ 20.19-21;
26.7,14
offences against and protection of, 15.4,S;
2$ 24
offences by, 15.10-16,28-9; 20.4; 21.15-24
respect for laws and non-interference in
affairs of state, 15.30-2; 18.13
at UN, 35
see also 3-20; 20.13,22; 4$ 44
Diplomatic lists, 13.10; 20.1,29; App. VI. I
Diplomatic missions, 1.4-8; 9.1 -8; 19
New York Convention on Special Missions
(1969),14- 19
termination, 21
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
abuse of, 24-4
acquisition of nationality, 16.18-20
archives and communications, 14-26-31
bag, 14-30
bankruptcy, 150 I 7
cars, 15.8
civil jurisdiction, 15.12-15
commencement and termination, 15.24
conferences, of international organisations,
40.5,8,20
consular, 26.1 1-24
counterclaims, 15023
courier, 14-3 I
criminal jurisdiction, 150 I 0-1 I
customs, see under Customs facilities
evidence, 150 18, 19
extraterritoriality, 14.3
family, 17.2,3
freedom of communication, 14.27-31
freedom of movement, 14.32-4
history, 14.1-2
Holy See, 9-6; 18.5
independence, 14.4
inquests, 15.17; 21.6
535
international organisations, 40
jury service, 16.14
local nationals employed, 17.13-14
military obligations, 16. I 7
official and private capacity, 15.27
premises of mission, 14-9-16
real property, 2.$ 14.24,25; 16.4; 40.4,18
reciprocity, 14.~ 17.8
residence, 15.6-9
servants, 17.1 1-12
service staff, 17.9-10
social security, 16.16
termination of mission, 21.6,9
UK guidance, 17.15
UN, 40
waiver, 15020-2
wireless, 14-29
see also Inviolability, Taxation
Diplomatic Privileges Act (1708), see Anne,
Statute of
Diplomatic relations
absence, 20.18; 22.2,9; 26.8; 27.9
breach, 21.9; 22
resumption, 9.22,23,30; 20.18
Diplomatic service
admission of women, 10.1,6
amalgamation with consular and
commercial services (British), 10.9;
26.6
British regulations, 10.5-10
qualifications, 10.1 1,15
United States, 10.3; 26 n.2
Soviet Union, 10.4
Diplomatic Wireless, 14.29
Disputes
peaceful settlement of, 38
arbitration. 38.30-4
conciliation, 38.28-9
enquiry, 38.17-21
General Act (1928) for Pacific Settlement,
38.5
good offices, 38.24>25
Hague Conventions, 38.3-4
judicial settlement, 39-5
mediation, 38.22-7
Permanent Court of Arbitration, 38.3
38.4
Disraeli, Benjamin, 1.11; 43-7
Diverted Cargoes (arbitration UK-Greece),
29 n.IO
Dominions, see Commonwealth of Nations
Don Pacifico claim, App. 1.4
Donner acte, App. I. 19
Donner la main, App. 1.20
Doyen, II.I~ 20.2-3
Doyen d'age, 28. I I
Doyenne, 20.8
536
Index
Dulles, John Foster, 42.13$ App. 11,9

Dumba, Dr Constantine, 15.32
Dumbarton Oaks, 90 I 9; ]6.4
Dunkirk, Treaty of, 42. 10
Dupuy de LoI1lt, 21. I 7

Durandus, Guglielmus, 1.5
Durchlaucht, 5.7
Durham, Lord, 1205
E
European Economic Community, 42.59-91
Assembly, 42.80-1
Commission, 42.85-7
Council 42.82-4
European Economic Cooperation,
Organisation for
aims, 42.49-51
Convention (1948), 31.1; 42.46
obligations, 42.52
origins, 42.48
progress, 42.52-6
European Free Trade Association, 42.72-3
European Launcher Development
Organisation, 40.15
European Payments Union, 42.53
European Recovery Programme, 42.45,54
European Space Research Organisation,
4. 15- 16
Evidence, 15.18-19
Excellency, 20.26,27
Exchange of Notes, 7.24; 2905,34-9
Exequatur, 26.7,10,11,12
Expenses case, 39 n.47, n58
Extraterritoriality, 25; 14.3
'Extraordinary' (diplomatic representation),
5-32-S; 119
see also 19
Eastern (;arelia case, 39 n59

Ecrehos, see Minquiers
Eden, Anthony (Lord Avon), 3.25; 43.7;
App. 11,9,15,17
Eid, 24.5
Elbrick, Burke, 2404>8
Eliza A nn case, 32 n. 13
Elizabeth 11, Queen, 5.5; 41.12,13
Embassies, increase in number of, 11.5-6
Embassy house, see Residence
Eminence, 20.26
Enemy, diplomatic representative of, 18.11
Equality of sovereign states, 4.15; 11.6
Erlaucht, 5-7
Estrades, Comte d', 4.7
EUROCONTROL,4o. 12
Europe, Council of, 42.100
activities, 421 I 1-17
Consultative Assembly, 42.108
machinery, 42.105-10
membership, 42.104
principles, 42.102 -03
European Coal and Steel Community,
42 65- 6
institutions, 42.67-8
European Defence Community, 42.40-1
F
Falkland Islands, 22.15
Feisul, King, 23.2
Fernan Ntiiiez, 20.35
Fidei Defensor, 5.5, I 2
Final Act, 31.6
Fin de non recevoir, App. 1.18
Fish (US Secretary of State 1871), 21.17
Fisheries jurisdiction case
UKv. Iceland 31.1S; 33.15-5$ 39020;
39 n'3 8, n4 1
Federal Republic ofGermany v. Iceland 39 n'42,
n43
Fishing and Conservation, Convention on,
3333
Flags, 20.23-5
see also Maritime Honours
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
amalgamation of different elements, 10.8,9
evolution, 41.22,23
nationality qualifications, 10.10
Franchise du quartier, 14.10
Franco, Generalisimo Francisco, 9.25,26
Franks, Sir Oliver (later Lord Franks) 42.45
Frederick William of Brandenburg, 11.7
Free Zones of l pper Sal'~V and District ~l
Gex (France v. Switzerland), 33.49
Fuente, Marques de la, 4.6
Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Guatemala) 24.3
Full Powers, 8.8-2 I; 28.9
conferences, 28.9
reserve of ratification, 32.1,4,13
Secretary of State, 3.9
treaties, 29040
Functions, consular, 27.1 -10
Functions of diplomatic mission, 9.8
Functus officio, 13.1
Funeral of a diplomatic agent, 21.7
Index
537
G
Goodrich, 12.6
Gousev, 7.36
Governors-General, 41.14-16
Graham, Lt Col Patrick, 23.3
Grand Duke, 509
Grand-titre, 5.20
Grassis, Paris de, 4.2
Great Seal, 3.2,7; 32.3
Greene, Joseph N.Jr., 22.1 I
Gremonville, Sieur de, 20.2 I
Grenville, Lord, 7.7
Gromyko, Andre, 3.26; 9- 19
Gros, Professor, 38.21
Guizot, Fran<;ois Pierre Guillaume, 44.53
Gustavus Adolphus, 4.4. I 2
Gyllenborg, Count, 15.10
Gallatin's coachman, 14.12

Garter mission, 5.38
General Act (treaties), 31.3
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
420 56
Genest, 21.17
Genocide Convention case, 33. I 3- 18
Genocide Convention (reservations) 39 n.48
Gentz, Friedrich von, 20.36
Gibraltar (Spanish claim) 35.16
Gifts, 20.30-7
Gilchrist, Sir Andrew, 23.10
Goebbels, Josef, 25.2
Gortz, 15.10
Goldberg, Arthur, 36.52
Good Neighbour Policy, 42.12 I
Good Offices, 38.24-5
H
Habana, Act of, 31.2
Habsburg, deposition of House of,
(Hungary), 7.22
Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907
(arbitration) 38.3-4
Haile Selassie, Emperor, 42 n.61
Halifax, Earl of, 10.2
Hammarskjold, Dag, 36.46,62; 3815; 43.7
Harriman, W. Averill, 10.2
Harvard Research Draft Convention on
Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities (1932), 1+5
Hautesse, 5.8
Havana Convention on Diplomatic Asylum
(1950), 1+21
Havana Convention on Diplomatic Officers
(19 28), 1+5
Haya de la Torre, 14.21
Hayter, Sir William, 44.71
Headquarters Agreements, 4.18
Heinrichs, von, 18.1 I
Heirs Apparent, 5.24

High Commissioner, 13.24, 32, 33; 4127-9
High Contracting Parties, 29-15
Hijacking and Terrorism, 16.1'f.; 24.14-16
Hitler, Adolf, 25.2,3; App. 1.10
Hoare-Laval Agreement (/935), 38.13
Hoey, van, 18.13
Hoffnung, A. and S., 12.13
Hoheit, 5.7
Holbrook v. Henderson, 18.5
Holy Roman Empire, 1.5
Emperor, 5.1,17
King of the Romans, 4.2; 5024
Holy See, 9-6
see also Pope and Vatican
Hopkins, Harry, 3.25
Hopkins, M., 12.13
Hopson, Sir Donald, 23.17,19
House, Colonel, 3-25
Hull, Cordell, 3.25
Hussein, King, 25.6
I
Iceland, 22.12
Ibn Saud, 9-20
Identic Notes, 7.23
Illah, Abdul, 23.2
Immunities, 2,14,15.4
see also Diplomatic Privileges
International Civil Aviation O~ganisation Council,
Jurisdiction of, (India v. Pakistan) 33.46
International Maritime Consultative Organisation
case, 39.n.48
Income Tax, see Taxation
Independence, diplomatic agent, 14.4
Innes, MitchelI, 7.38
Inquests, 150 17; 21.6
Instructions, 13-3; "'40,50 - 2
briefing for a conference, 13.4
Interference, 15.32; 18.13
see also Termination of a mission
538
Index
/nlerhandel case, (Switzerland v. [.S.), 39 n.39

advisory opinions, 39.25-8
applicable law, 39.17
competence, 39-9- I 7
composition, 39.8
expenses, 39.2
heritage from Permanent Court of
International Justice, 39.1
membership conditions and obligations,
39- 2,3
methods of presenting cases, 39.18
procedure, 39.18-22
International Law Commission, 29-2,3$

33. 1 5- 19
International Telecommunications
Convention, 14.24
Internuncios, 11.16
Interpretation ofPeace Treaties case, 39 n'48, n56
Interpreters, 28.10; 36-65-70
Inviolability, diplomatic,
archives and communications, 14-26-31
personal, 15.2-5
premises, 14.9-16
residence, 15.6-9
Ismay, Lord, 42.32
J
Jackson, G.]., 21.17
Jackson, Sir Geoffrey, 24.5-8
Jamming of Broadcasts, 25.7,8,10
Jarring, Gunnar, 22.1 I; 43.7
J ay Treaty (General Treaty of Friendship,
commerce and Navigation, 1794) 38.1
Jebb, Sir Gladwyn (Lord Gladwyn), 36.93
Jefferson, Thomas, 44.65

Jewett, 21.17
Jones, Howard, 23.1 I
Juan Carlos, King, 9-26
Judicial settlement, 39-5
Julius 11, Pope, 4.2
K
Kaminker brothers, ]6 n.34
Keiley, 12.8- I 0
Kelly, Sir David, 10.7
Kemal, Mustapha, 9-4
Kennedy, President John F., 42.13$ 44.61
Khmer Rouge, 9-23
Kidnapping, 154,5; 24
Kissinger, Henry, I n.2; 22.11; 43.7,8
Korea
Korean war, ]6.39-41
peace conference, App. 11
Kosygin, Alexei, 43.7
Krohn, von, 18.11
Khrushchev, Nikita, 36.89
Kuomintang, ]6.35
Kuznetsov, V. V., ]6.52
L
Labrador (Spanish plenipotentiary 1814),
2035
La Ferronays, 12.3
Laisser-passer, 13-6
Lange, Halvard, 42.33
Languages
conferences, 28.10
diplomatic intercourse, 7.1-8
required for diplomatic service, 10.13
treaties, 29-45-51
UN, ]6.65-70
Lansing, Robert, 3.25
Laporte, Pierre, 24-5
Lateran Treaty, 9.6; 18.5
Lawless, Sir Patrick, 12.17
League of Nations, 1.8; 36- I
Legal Consequences of continued presence of South

Africa in Namibia, 39 n.49
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 29-2
Legate, 11.12, 1$ 12.3
Legation, 9.6; 11.4-6
Legatus, 1.5
a latere, natus, 11.12,13
Leo X, Pope, 4-3
Letters:
credence, see Credentials
patent, 3.2
recall, 8.4-6; 21.3
LeUres de cabinet, de chancellerie, 7.40,41
Levant Service, 10.1
Liberum veto, 36. I
Libyan Ambassador to Egypt, 21.24
Index
Ligne, en, dam la, 7. I I
Lindo, Sir Laurence, 41.28
Lloyd George, 79; 43 7
Locamo Conference, 7.2 I; App. I. I4
Lockhart, Robert Bruce, 27.9
539
Lome Convention, 42.92

Lorenz, Peter, 24.9
Lothian, Marquess of, 10.2
Louis XIV, +7
M
Messengers, see Couriers
Messina Conference, I955, 42.70
Metternich, Prince von, 3.23; 2035i 43.7
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, 2 n.4
Minister for Foreign Affairs, I. I4; 3
Minister Plenipotentiary, 11.3,4,7,9; 13.3,20
Minister Resident, 11.7,9
Minority Schools in Upper Silesia case, 39. I I
Minquiers and Ecrehos islets, 3 1 I 7
Mission
ceremonial, 5-32-5
special, 19
termination, 21
Modus vivendi, 31. I 2- I 5
Mollet, Guy, 42.IOI
Molotov, Vyacheslav, App. 11,9, I5
Monitoring, 25. I I
Monnet, Jean, 42.60
Monomachus, 5.I3
Monroe Doctrine, 42. I 20
Montmorin, Armand Marc, Comte de, 3.5
Moolenburgh, Captain, 38.2 I
Moore, (US Counsellor, Khartoum, I973)
24-5
Morny, Duc de, 16.IO
Mortemart, Duc de, 42.45
Mossadegh, 22.6
Motor cars and driving, 15.8; 17.6;
40.I5, I6,20
Mussolini, Benito, 9. I 3
Musurus Bey v. Gadban, 15.25,27
Macdonald, Ramsay, 7.35

Machiavelli, Nicolo, 1.7,8
Macmillan, Sir Harold, 36.87
M agdalena Steam Navigation Company v. Martin,
15- 25,27
Majesty, 5-I,2,4>8
Malik, Adam, 3.24i 23- I2
Malmesbury, Lord, ..... 30-42,59
Mandate system, 36.73-5
Mao Tse-tung, 36.34
Marjolin, Robert, 42.60
Marighela, Carlos, 24.6
Maritime Honours, 6
Marriages
consular registration of, 15.3 I; 27.4
royal, 5-29,36
Marshall, General George C., 42.I6,43
Martino, Gaetano, 42.33
Martens, Baron von, 12.6
Mavrommatis Palestine Concession case, 29-5 I;
32- I8
Matveof (Matveev), Andrew Artemonovitz,
5-I$ 15 2,I2
Medals, see Orders of Chivalry
Mediation, 38.22-7
Medici, Cosimo de', 1.6
Mein, John c., 24.3
Mhnoire, 7.20
Memorandum, 7.20- I
Mendoza, Bernardino de, 21.I6
Merry del Val, Marques de, 9.24
N
Namibia case, 33-45
Napoleon I, 20.2 I
Nasser, President Gamel Abdel, 22. IO; 25.6;
36-45
National Days, 20.22
Nationality, acquisition of, 16.I8-20
Nationals
employment of local nationals, 17. I3- I4
local nationals as representatives offoreign
countries, 12. I 2- I 7
national groups in ICJ, 39-8
protection of, 9.8; 27. 6 -7; .....57
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3.24
Nesselrode, Count Karl, 12.$ .....5

Ne varietur, 29-4I; App. I. I4
New China News Agency, 23-I4
New York Convention on Special Missions,
I969, 19-4
Nkrumah, Kwame, 3.24i 9.22; 36.86; 42.I44
Nicolson, Sir Harold, I. I; .....60
Noel (US Ambassador, Khartoum, I973)
245
Non-self governing territories, 36.79-94
Normanby, Lord, .....53
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
accession, 4 2 I 7
540
Index
alms, 42.19
machinery, 42.24-8,36-8
origins, 42. I6- 18
privileges, 42.29
North Sea Continental Shelf Pleadings, 31 n.2S;
39 n.24
Notarial Acts, 27.4
Note, 7.10-19
Note verba/e, 7. I 4- I S
Notice of Termination (treaties) 33.23
Nuclear Tests cases, 29-2; 39.20 and n.38
Nuclear war, risk of, 22. I7
Nuncio, 11.3, 12-14i 20.2
o
O'Beime, 12. I7
Oder arbitration, 32. 14
Offences, see Diplomatic agent
Ongania, General, 9- I6
Oral agreements, 29.2
Orator, 1.6; 36-93
Orders of Chivalry etc., 20.30-7
Organisation of African Unity, 42.141
activities, 42. I6 I- S
alms, 42. 149-So

charter, 420 147-8
Organisation of American States, 9-16;
42 11 9
external relations, 42. I39
usefulness, 42. I3S-7
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development and the Group of Four,
42 S7
p
Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Revised
General Act for, 38.S
Pact, 30.1
Pakistani Prisoners of War case, 39-20; 39 n.39
Palena arbitration, 38 n.23
Palestine Liberation Organisation, 36.S2
Palmerston, Lord, 3.2$ 7.7; "".S2; App. 1.4
Pan-American Conventions
asylum, 1+20,2 I
diplomatic officers, 3. I9
Pan-American Union, 42. I23, 126
Paris Agreements, 19S2-4, 42.40- I
Passports, 13.6; 14.3 1; 18.4,S,7; 21.IS; 27.4
Peace, 1.8; 22. I I, I 7; 42. I24
Peace conferences, 28.1; Appl. 11
Peace treaties, 28. I8
Peace keeping, 36.44-8,S I
Peaceful settlement of Disputes, 38
Pearson, Lester, 42.33
Perez de Ayala, Ram6n, 9.24
Permanent Court of Arbitration (Hague),
3 8.3,4
3 8.4
Permanent Delegations at UN, 35-4>S
Perjona grata, 12
Persona non grata, 15.1 I; 21.IS-24
recall refused, 21.18
Peter the Great, 5. I3; 7.3
Peterson, Sir Maurice, 9-2S
Petitioner case, 39 n49
Petit-titre, 5.20
Pichon, 7.9
Pinckney, 21. I7
Pitt the Younger, William, 3.23

Placement, 20. I7; .....66-8
Plenipotentiary, 8.8-2 I; 11.9; 28.8
see also Full Powers
Pleven plan, 42.40- I
Police, 1+14-IS; 15.6-7; 23.22
Political adv isers, 43. I3
Political refugees, see Asylum
Political techniques at UN, 35.6
Pombal, Marques de, 4.9
Pontremoli, Nicodemo da, 1.6
Pope
bestowal of titles, 5. I2
bull of ISI6, 4.3
former precedence, +4
role of papacy, 7.S,6
titles and mode of address, 5.2,22
See also Vatican
Praetor peregrinus, 26.2
Precedence, 4; 5. I I; 20. I7; "".46,63
cardinals, 5.39
charges d'affaires, 11.3. 17.18
Commonwealth, 4.20
heads of mission, 20.9- 10
mission staff, 20.29
nuncio, 11. 14; 20.2
Pombal's proposals, +9
President of the ICJ, 20.28
wives, 20.8
Premiere installation, 17.7
Premises of mission, 14. IS
Prendre acte, App. I. 19
Presents, 20.30-7
Presidents (of republics) 5.2$ 7.41,42
Index
Press, 7. 17; 13049; 15.~ 25. 11 ,12; 27. 10;
287,21; 350 6; 44.71
Proces-verbalr, 28.17
Pro-memoria, 7.20
Promotion, *80
Pro-Nuncio, 20.2
Property, 202,$ 1506-9; 16.4-5; 21.6
Protecting power, 200 18
Protection
consular, 27.6-7
of diplomats, 15.5
541
Protests
dtmarche by doyen, 20.3,5
against negligence by host government,
2307,11,15,18,25
Protocol, 3020; 4; .$ 6; 13.9-52; 20.1-29;
21.3-8,11; 28.13,18,19; 29023-7;
4 1 12 ,13,2""28; 44. 63-7 1
Publications by diplomats, 44.58
Puebla, Dr de, *63
Punta del Este charter, 42 n.58
Qasim, Abdul, 230 I
R
Rv. Governor of Pentonville Prison, 18.7
Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, 9.28
Rakovsky, 7.3$ 21.17
Ramphal, Shridath S., 41.2 I
Rapporteurs, 28. I..., 15
Ratification, 8n.$ 32.2-19
examples, 32020
Rebus sic stantibus, 33.49
Recall, letters of, 8.4-6; 21.3
Riclame, 7.1 I
Recognition:
de facto government, 9.13
examples, 9-16-30
methods of according, 9- 14, 15
Records, diplomatic, 3.28-3 I
Recredential, 8.7; 21.4
Red Crusader case, 38.21
Red Guards, 230 I 9
Redress against diplomtic agent, 15028-9
Refugees, UN High Commissioner for, 37.13
see also Asylum
Regent
entitled to sovereign privileges, 2 n. I
in minority, illness, absence of monarch,
9- 10- 11
Regional blocks, 3513-I~ 4305
Registration (treaties), 1.8; 33.59-60; 41.34
Reglement de Vienne, 11.1-2
Regulation, 30.9, 10
Rejection, 7.34-7
by Chinese Charge d'affaires, 23.13-15
Reparations for Injuries case, 39-47

Representants plenipotentiaires (Russian),
+17; 104
Representative character, 1+7; 26.$ 27.10
ambassadors, 11. I, I I; 14-2
Reservations (treaties), 33.2-22
Reservations case, 39 n.63
Residence of diplomatic agent, 15.6-9
Resident, 11.7
Ressortissants, 44.57; App. I. 2 I
Revolutions, 9-13-19; 21.12-14
Chinese cultural, 230 13-14
Ribbentrop, 5.32
Rio Treaty, 42.124-5
Ripperda, Duke of, 1+ 18
Rippon, Geoffrey, 29.38
Rogers, William P., 22.11
Rome, Treaty of, 42.61,65,71,73,74
accession, 42.88-90
external relations, 42.92-4
objectives, 42.75-8
presidency, 42-95-8
structure, 42.80-7
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 3.25; 9.7;
297; 36. 2; 4 2121
Ross, Bishop of, 15.10
Royal titles, +5; .$ 41.12,13
Russell, Lord John, 3.23
Russell, Odo (later 2nd Baron Ampthill),
*44
542
Index
s
Smith, Arnold, 41.2 I
Soares, Mario, 25.5
Sotomayor, Duke of, 21.19
Souscription, 7. I I
South East Asia Treaty Organisation, 36'30;
42 16 7
Sovereigns, 1.6,8; 2,4,5; 9-1,9-12,26;
13. 10,25-3$ 21.10-11; 41'4, 11, 12-1416; 4+1
see also Titles
Spaak, Paul Henri, 42.60
Special missions, 5.32-5; 19
New York Convention on, 19-4-11
Specialised Agencies (UN), 37. App. IV
Spreti, Count Karl, 15.5; 2+3
Springer, 1+ 19
Stalin, Field-Marshal, 7.36; 36'4
Status quo, App. I. 12
Status of S. J11. Africa case, 39 n.49
Statute, 30.7,8
Statute of Westminster 1931, 41.2
Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord, 1.1 $ 11.1 I
see also Sir Stratford Canning
Stresemann, Ouo, 3.24
Sub spe rati, App. I. 13
Suez crisis, 36'43-5
Suharto, General, 23.12
Sukarno, President Ahmad, 3.2~ 23-9;
4 2 169
Sun Yat-sen, 1+ 13
Sackville, Lord, 15.32

Sadler, Ralph, 3.2
Safe conduct, enemy diplomatic
representative, 18.1 I
St Laurent, Louis, 42.17
Salutes, see Maritime honours
San Francisco Conference 1945, 36'4
San Jose Protocol, 42. I 25
Schuman, Robert, 42.60,64
Sea, Geneva Convention on the Territorial,
3333
Sea, Conference on the Law of the, 33.33
Seals, 3.2,7; 29.43,44
see also Great Seal
Secretary of State, 3
Secretaries to Asian missions, 12.15
Segur, Comte de, 13.14
Sekou Toure, President, 42.144
Selection Board, Civil Service, 10.10
Sirinissime, 5.2,7
Servants, 17.1 I, I 2
Sforza, Francesco, 1.6
Shaposhnikov, General, 1.8
Shirley, Antony, 20.31
Siege, 9-2$ 21.13
Signatures, order in treaties, 29.40-2; 32.1
see also Altemat
Sihanouk, Prince, 9-23
Sine qua non, App. I. I 5
Six Day War (Arab-Israel), 22.10; 36'52
T
Taigny, 21.17
Talleyrand, C. M. de, 20 n. 17; 20.21,35;
26.1; 43.7
Taxation, 2.$ 14.24.25; 16.1-8;
4,4- 6,11-14,16,18
motor cars, 15-8; 17.6; 40.15,16,20
Temple, Sir WiIliam, 44.64
Teja, Dr, 18'7
Termination of a mission
death of head of mission, 21.6-8
modalities, 21.1-3
nomination of Charge d'affaires, 21.5
persona non grata, 21.15-24
recredential, 21'4
replacement of head of state, 21.10- I I
war, revolution, 21.12-14
Termination of Treaties, 33.23-43,54
Third state, diplomat transiting,
armed conflict and belligerent rights, 18.12
immunities and privileges, 18'5-10
non-interference, 18. I 3
passage in war time, 18. I 1-12
right of innocent passage, 18.1-4

Thompson, Benjamin, 12.17
Thomson, Lord, 23.18
Thorn, M., 29'38
Throkmorton,21.16
Tietz et al. v. People's Republic ofBulgaria, 14 n. 5
Titles, 4'S; S; 20.26-7; 41 12 - 13
Titre-moyen, 5-20
Tower Wharf, 1661, affair of, 4.7; 44.65
Trade, 10.9; 26.3,4; 27. 1,3,13; 41.30-3
Traffic regulations, see motor cars
Traitement, 7. I I
Translation, 7'7,8; 13. 15,42; 28.10; 36.65-70
Treaties, 29-33
Acceptance and Approval, 32'36-42
Accession, 32.21-5
Act, 31.1
Additional Articles, 30.16- 19
Agreement, 29-20
Charter, 3.4-6
Compromis d'arbitrage, 31.16-22
Concordat, 30. I I
Index
Constitution, 30.3
Consular treaties and conventions, 26.4
Convention, 29. 17- 19
Dates of operation and duration, 29.13
Declaration, 29-28-33
Exchange of Notes, 29-5,34-9
Full powers, 29040
Final Act, 31.6
General Act, 31.3
Head of state or interstate form, 290 I 1- I 6
High contracting parties, 290 15
Languages, 29045-51
Modus vivendi, 31. I 2- 1 5
Notice of termination,33.23
Oral agreements, 29.2
543
Pact, 30.1
Protocol, 29023
Ratification, 32.2-19
Registration, 33.59
Regulations, 30.9
Reservations, 33.2-22
Statute, 30.7
Treaty-making power; 29.1 I (.lee also
Ratification)
Truman, President Harry S., 42.16
Trust territories, 36.71-8
Tsar, 5.~ 13
Tsarevitch, 5.9
Tshombe, President, 27.9
Tupamaros, 24.6
u
negotiation, 38. 12- 16
non-intervention, 36.10
non-self governing territories, 36.79-94
Organisation of American States, relations
with, 42.125,140
organs, 36.7
origins, 36.2-4
Palestine, mediation, 36.45; 38.25-6
Palestine Liberation Organisation, 36.52
permanent delegations, 35.4-5
political techniques, 35.6
privileges and immunities, 40.3-9
public argument, conduct of, 36.93
refugees, UN High Commissioner for,
37. 1 3
Secretariat, 36.60-4
Security Council, 3624-55; 3903,4
Six-Day War (Arab-Israel), 36.52
South Africa (exclusion), 36.15
Specialised Agencies etc, 37; App. IV
specialists, role of, 35.1 I
Suez crisis, 36.43-5
Trusteeship Council, 36.22,71-8
Twenty-four, Committee of, 35. 1 I; 36.91-2
Trade and Development, UN Conference
on, 35.15; ]6.98; 37.10- 12
uniting for peace, 36.1 1,41
veto, 36.29,38,49-54
voting, 36.22,23
Us and them, 44.n
Uti possidetis, App. I. I 2
Ultimatum, App. 11. I I

United Nations, 34-9
arbitration, 38.30-4
block voting, 35.13- 14
charter, ]6.4
amendment, 36.97
children's emergency fund (UNICEF),
37. 14- 1 5
China's membership, 36.15
committees, ]6.12-17
conciliation, 38.28,29
Congo, Belgian (Zaire), 36.46
Cuba (missiles), 36.48
Cyprus, 36.47
decolonisation, 36.79-94
depositary of international agreements, 1.8
disputes, peaceful settlement of, 38
Economic and Social Council, 36.56-9
enforcement action, 36.29
enquiry, 38.17-2 I
expeditionary force (UNEF), 36.42-5
General Assembly, 36.8-23
International Court ofJustice, 386; 39
Indonesian withdrawal, 33.34-42
Korean war, ]6.39-41
languages, ]6.65-70
lobbying, 35.14
mandate system, 36.73-5
mediation and good offices, 38.22-7
membership, 36.5-6; App. III
military forces, 36.40-8
military staff committee, 36.42
v
Vance, Cyrus R., 43.7
Vandenberg, Senator Arthur H.,
42.16,18,125
Vatican
544
Index
concordat, 30. I I - I 5
diplomatic representation, 9.6;
11.12-14. 16
treaty with Italy, see Lateran
see also Pope
Vedette, en, 7-1 I
Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de, 3.5
Versailles, Treaty of, 4.18
Veto, see United Nations
Vice-doyen, 20.7
Vienna, Congress of, Reglement, 4.6, 10;
11.1-2,14
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
1963, 2.1; 26; 27

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
1961 , 2.1; 14-19 etc
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
29. 1; 31.7; 32.17 and n. 16; 33.2,20,22
Vienna Convention on the Representation of
States in their Relations with
International Organisations of a
Universal Character, 40.19-22
Vietnam, 9-30; App. 11
Visits, see Calls and Maritime honours
Voeux, 31.6,9
Voting Procedure case, 39 n.49
w
Westphalen, Graf von, 12.6
Whitworth, Lord, 5 I 3
Wicquefort, Abraham, 12.1 7; 17.13
Wilson v. Blanco, 18.5
Wilson, President Woodrow, 1.8; 3.25; 7.9; 30.
n.8; ]673; 43-7
Wives, 10.6; 17.$ 20.8
doyenne, 20.8
reception at Court of St J ames's,
13. 25,27,3 0,3 1
varying customs elsewhere, 13.50,51
Wotton, Sir Henry, 10.16-19
Wright, Sir Michael, 23-3-5
Wriothesley, Thomas, 3.2
Waad, William, 21.16

Waddington, C., 15.20
Waiver of immunity, 15.20-2
Walker, Major, 23.10
Wall, General, 12. I 7
Wan, Prince, App. 11.15
War
declaration, 29.28-3 I
diplomatic agent in, 9-1 $ 18.7, I I, 12;
20.19- 21 ; 267,14
Warsaw Pact, 42.4-6,39
Watteville, 47
Western Sahara case, 39 n.50,n.57,n.61
Westminster, Statute of, (193 I), 41.2
y
Yaounde Convention, 42.92
Yalta, ]6.4
z
Zinoviev letter, 7.35
Zoernsch v. Waldock, 15.27
Zorin, Valerian, 357

Zourek, Jaroslav, 26.5

Satow - Guide To Diplomatic Practice

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Satow - Guide To Diplomatic Practice

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FIFTH EDITION

London and New York

LongmaD Group UK Limited

Longman Group Limited 1979

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Produced by Longman Singapore Publishers Pte Ltd

Sir Ernest Satow (1843-1929)

DiploDlatic agents in general

The United Nations - 11 Specialised Agencies, regional

Definitions and terms

Arrangement of the book

He also said that:

I have felt it no longer possible to decline to describe such tendencies;

attempting to draw a balance between definition, description and comment,

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

British Broadcasting Corporation.

Committee for European Economic Cooperation.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Food and Agriculture Organisation.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

International Atomic Energy Agency.

Malaya Philippines Indonesia.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

United Arab Republic.

Universal Postal Union.

Western European Union.

Zone of Peace and Neutrality.

Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official

It was in this period that the 'Machiavellian,' expedients of spying, conspiracy

In post-revolutionary Europe the ascendancy ofnew objectives began to eclipse

It is interesting to examine the following attempts at defining diplomacy, all of

'Diplomatist' ought, however, to be understood as including all the public

The 'diplomacy' of a country is sometimes popularly described as 'skilled', or

The personal status of a head of a foreign state therefore continues to be

Privileges and immunities of the head of a foreign state

be stated in simple terms. He is entitled to immunity - probably without

Privileges and immunities of the head of a foreign state

regarded as extraterritorial, and they were even authorised by the Allied

The minister for foreign

The minister for foreign affairs

In contemporary Britain the mode of appointment of Her Majesty's Secretary

The minister for foreign affairs

Today governments of other countries address themselves to the minister for

As a general rule notes and other formal communications concerning relations

Of the minister's task, Baron de Martens said:

The minister for foreign affairs

His successor, on assuming office, addresses a notification to the foreign

The minister for foreign affairs

Relations with colleagues

Relations with colleagues

views of a number of governmental colleagues, notably the colleague in charge

The minister for foreign affairs

Records of certain other countries

Up to December 1929: political and commercial documents relating to most

Germany (Federal Republic)

Precedence among states

The list of sovereigns frequently attributed to PopeJulius n in 1504 was never

Precedence among states and similar matters

A bull of Leo X, dated March 15 16, uses the following language:

A comparison of the antiquity of royal titles shows the following order:

Precedence among states and similar matters